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ELECTORAL OPPOSITIONS IN MEXICO: EMERGENCE,
SUPPRESSION, AND IMPACT ON POLITICAL PROCESSES

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

Robert Raymond Bezdek, B.A., M.A.

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1973

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Many individuals and institutions helped me to complete this research project. But due to the sensitive nature of the subject matter, many preferred to remain anonymous. Unfortunately, that presents problems for the reader who might want to substantiate information. Thus, wherever possible, I have attempted to give the reader a general idea of the political position of my sources without revealing names. I regret that I cannot cite the source for some election results, but much of these are publicly available for those who want to search newspapers, magazines, and congressional sources.

Among those who can be cited, I would like to mention the following. Grateful acknowledgement goes to the Latin America Teaching Fellows program of the Fletchers School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University for a fellowship to a Mexico City institute. There, my superiors, Jorge Arreola Loperena, Jorge Gonzalez Chávez, and José Ramón Benito Alzaga, understood my research needs and generously spared me from the normal teaching load. Constructive criticisms on initial drafts of this study came from Kenneth F. Johnson, Diego and Patricia Valadez, Giacomo Sani, Bradley M. Richardson, Terry McCoy, and Miguel Angel Corso. In addition, I am grateful for discussions with other scholars, who have written on Mexico: Robert Aubey, Manfred Mols, and Donald Nabry. Several individuals, who either have extensive knowledge
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Introduction

The overwhelmingly dominant governing party in Mexico generally faces only token opposition. Since its inception in 1929, the government party—now called the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)\(^1\)—has not only held a monopoly over elective and appointive offices at all levels but also has won virtually every election with percentages as high as 85 to 90 percent. In recent elections the bulk of the remaining percentage of the vote generally goes to the major opposition party, the Party of National Action (PAN), when it fields a candidate. In very few cases PAN and an independent opposition movement have defeated PRI at the mayoral level but never beyond this level. The purpose of this study, then, is to determine why a party system with a strong opposition has not developed in Mexico.

My main argument is that the Mexican incumbents\(^2\) have prevented the development of a strong opposition. To support my argument for at

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\(^1\)From 1929 to 1938 the official party was called the National Revolutionary Party (PNR), while from 1938 to 1946 it was called the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM). Since 1947 the name of PRI has not changed.

\(^2\)By the "Mexican incumbents," I mean those who determine policy, particularly electoral policy, during each sexennial presidential administration. These are generally the president, some Gobernación (the Government Ministry, which is much more powerful than the others) officials who supervise elections, and some officials within the national and state PRI organizations. I do mean to imply that these "incumbents"
least the 1960s, I will detail three important cases of electoral oppositions. In at least the past two decades, the most significant opposition victories occurred in three state capitals: an independent movement won in San Luis Potosí in 1958, while PAN candidates won in Hermosillo and in Mérida in 1967. The opposition mayors in San Luis Potosí and Mérida ran in subsequent gubernatorial elections (in 1961 and 1969 respectively), while opposition candidates for mayor and governor ran in simultaneous elections (in 1967) in Sonora. In these gubernatorial campaigns, the government prevented opposition victories primarily through extensive electoral fraud.

A systematic treatment of these three cases of electoral oppositions will suggest the significance of this study not only within the Mexican context but also cross-nationally. Since no author on Mexico has dealt with these cases systematically, this study can clarify misconceptions and confusion in the literature. In these works the authors disagree on their interpretations of Mexican electoral behavior primarily because of the extent of confidence they place in official election results. As to be shown with the best available evidence, these official results are falsely recorded and/or intentionally distorted, although they still are valuable for observing some general tendencies in noncompetitive elections. But these results are of little form a monolithic bloc, although their treatment of electoral oppositions has been highly consistent since the evolution of the official party.

Electoral oppositions refer to either legal parties or independent movements which attempt to gain mass support and to win elections within the constitutional framework.
value in studies of competitive elections, that is, cases in which PRI is seriously challenged and must use electoral fraud and other suppressive techniques to assure its victory. In other words, many authors have overlooked the importance of the government's suppression of oppositions in competitive elections and have focused solely on noncompetitive elections. Hopefully, this study, utilizing data from both types of elections, can help clarify some of the contradictory interpretations of the authors on Mexican electoral behavior.

The cross-national significance of this study is seen in the absence of literature on electoral oppositions in nondemocratic societies. Accordingly, I will explore at least three questions relevant to this broader concern. First, what conditions account for the emergence of electoral opposition movements? Second, under what conditions will political incumbents allow legal oppositions to develop or prevent their development? Third, what is the impact of electoral oppositions on political processes? Wherever possible, I will suggest hypotheses which could be examined within the confines of a generally qualitative study in a cross-national context.

In more democratic settings, such as in northern European countries and the United States, the literature on electoral oppositions is abundant. The works of contemporary political scientists typically treat the origins, structures, and bases of support for oppositions. In

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4 In this study political processes refer to either outcomes, such as goods, services, and prestige, or to procedures, such as freedom of participation to change the pattern of outcomes.
In addition, these studies generally reflect the pluralist bias of nineteenth and twentieth century democratic theory by showing that party systems with legal oppositions have political processes, which are by and large accountable to the majority of citizens. But these types of polities are limited in number, for, as Robert A. Dahl argues, "of the 113 members of the United Nations in 1964, only about 30 had political systems in which full legal opposition among organized political parties had existed throughout the preceding decade."5

It is not surprising, therefore, that political scientists have not studied oppositions in the less democratic societies. Again, Dahl states: "Admittedly, it would be important to know more about the ways in which opposition operates in nondemocratic systems."6 Although some authors treat oppositions in a general fashion in country studies, apparently no studies exist on many specific aspects of oppositions in nondemocratic settings. Consequently, a study of legal opposition in Mexico would be an important contribution to the political science literature because Mexico, like the majority of polities, is neither among the most democratic nor the least democratic systems.

The extent or the absence of democracy in Mexico is difficult to determine because no one has developed an adequate instrument to measure this complex concept. Of course, many cite the well-known study by

6 Ibid., p. xix.
Russell H. Fitzgibbon and Kenneth F. Johnson in which experts ranked Mexico fifth out of 20 Latin American countries in 1960. As that ranking suggests—in spite of the problems of any such endeavor—Mexicans have done quite well in comparison to their Latin neighbors.

Still, despite Mexico's impressive socioeconomic development in many areas, the number of her critics appears to be increasing in recent years. Many of these political observers see the student protests of 1968 and 1971 and particularly the regime's brutal suppression of the protesters as symptomatic of more serious problems. Moreover, many critics argue that the official suppression of these protesters is clear evidence that freedom of participation by the opposition will not be tolerated. In fact, many of these critics would agree that the Mexican incumbents fit the following description when dealing with many of their

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opponents:

Somewhere in the world, at this moment, a political group is probably engaged in the antique art of imprisoning, maiming, torturing, and killing its opponents. Somewhere, as you read these words, a government and its opponents are no doubt trying to coerce one another by violent means. For without much question the most commonplace way for a government to deal with its opponents is to employ violence.9

While this characterization of the Mexican government's treatment of student protests is accurate, it is also accurate to say that many governments, even more democratic ones, deal in a repressive manner—although perhaps less so than the Mexican incumbents—with student protest movements. In other words, many governments are not as tolerant with student or mass protests as they are with clearly legal oppositions. Since mass protesters tend to destroy private property and/or injure other citizens, suppression of these demonstrators generally goes under the label of "preserving public order."

Perhaps a more critical measure of the extent of democratic practices in a given polity revolves around the incumbents' treatment of legal or electoral opposition movements. In fact, Dahl argues that the recent emergence and acceptance of opposition parties is one of the three major dimensions of democratic development.10 For this reason I have chosen to focus almost exclusively on electoral oppositions.

My intention, however, is not to argue for or against the implementation of a democratic system in Mexico or in other developing

9Dahl, Political Oppositions, p. xiii.

10Ibid.
societies but rather to relate the successes and failures of electoral oppositions to the more general political processes. The important point is that the perception of these political processes (in terms of the distribution of resources and freedom of participation) as "fair" or "unfair" can discourage or encourage opponents of a government to mobilize support against the government. Herein lies the importance of Mexican oppositions, for many Mexicans themselves have become increasingly aware that these political processes are biased in favor of the upper socioeconomic sectors of their society. As a result, many Mexicans are demanding changes which would favor a larger percentage of their fellow citizens.

But in order to understand electoral oppositions in Mexico, one needs a brief historical overview of the evolution of the present political system. Some of the more salient features of this evolution are the emergence of a strong executive, a one-party system, and the political processes favoring the upper socioeconomic sectors of society. I will describe these features since the Mexican Revolution of 1910 because this latter event is a convenient dividing point in Mexican political history. To be sure, the reader might want to consult sources which show many parallels between 19th century politics and present Mexican practices.

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Much of 19th and early 20th century Mexican politics was dominated by either one strongman or several strongmen competing with each other. The dominance of one strongman is illustrated by the dictatorial rule of General Porfirio Díaz from 1876 to 1910 (Latin America's longest dictatorship). After the exile of Díaz in 1911, several strongmen competed with each other for power by violent force. For example, in the 1910s and 1920s, many of the revolutionary leaders were assassinated, apparently by other leaders who wanted to eliminate their rivals.

The transition from the dominance of strongmen to more democratic political stability did not occur until the 1930s. Three strongmen—General Alvaro Obregón, General Plutarco E. Calles, and General Lázaro Cárdenas—were instrumental in this transition to stability. Obregón was the first president after the downfall of Díaz to complete his term (1920-1924). Calles succeeded him from 1924-1928, but, more important, controlled the presidents until Cárdenas exiled him in 1935.

Toward the end of his term, Calles supported Obregón, who wanted another presidential term. Two constitutional amendments were passed, permitting Obregón to be re-elected and lengthening the presidential term to six years. Two weeks after he was elected, however, Obregón was assassinated, allegedly by Calles. To prevent bloodshed among the

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12"Democratic Political Stability" refers to a condition whereby institutions provide for regular changes in the major political positions. I prefer to preface the term with democratic because some authors on Mexico consider the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz as a period of political stability. Thus, in my study I refer to democratic stability to avoid confusion with a strictly dictatorial type of stability.
factions fighting for the presidency, Calles organized the National Revolutionary Party (PNR, the forerunner of PRI). From 1928 to 1934, Calles selected some puppet presidents and likewise maintained control over the party and the relatively powerless legislature. Meanwhile, some younger politicians rekindled the zeal for implementing the revolutionary principles, which favored the lower socioeconomic sectors of society.

As the left wing of the party became more powerful, Calles pragmatically chose its chief representative, General Lázaro Cárdenas, in 1934 for the presidency. Shortly, the latter, an astute politician in his own right, eliminated Calles as a power contender by forcing him into exile. Thus, Cárdenas was free to finish his six-year term, implement reforms, and turn the government over to the next president in 1940, thus initiating the present period of democratic political stability.

Cárdenas merits special attention because he is responsible for much of the present evolution of the Mexican polity. The consensus among authors is that Cárdenas's programs were not successful in economic terms but rather in his ideological support of the lower socioeconomic sectors of society. As a result, even today Cárdenas, more than any subsequent president, is considered the hero of the masses. In March, 1938, he divided the official party into four sectors: military, worker, agrarian, and popular (the latter is constituted by small

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13The military sector was eliminated from the official party in 1947.
businessmen and professional groups). The last three sectors never were influential in determining policy, but their symbolic identification with the Mexican Revolution has created a reservoir of support for the polity.

Since many of Cárdenas's reforms were considered quite radical, the present major opposition party, PAN, emerged in 1939 to combat the leftward direction of politics. Initially, PAN was highly Catholic, pro-business, anti-Communist, etc., but since then has become more moderate. To be sure, the official party has continually proclaimed itself as the legitimate heir of the revolutionary goals favoring the lower socio-economic sectors of society, but at least one Mexican leftist thinks that PAN has evolved to such an extent over the years that now it is "not in the left, but to the left of PRI--actually the more conservative party."14 PAN has never seriously challenged PRI at the presidential level. Nevertheless, it is the only opposition party15 to run its own candidate in the four most recent presidential elections. At subnational levels PAN has seriously challenged the official party more than any other.


party, although the number of those challenges is still quite limited.

Since 1940 Mexican politics have displayed some relatively stable tendencies, especially in comparison to the previous Mexican experience as well as to the problems of other developing countries. In Mexico, for instance, succession to the presidency has been institutionalized. At other levels succession to offices likewise follows stable procedures. In fact, while these procedures are not democratic, many authors argue that the one-party system has created a stable environment for investor confidence and impressive economic growth—more than six percent annually for the past 35 years. Thus, at least in terms of stability and sustained economic growth, Mexico has been the envy of her Latin neighbors and has been considered by the leaders of many polities throughout the world as a model for development.

Another stable tendency is executive dominance over politics. On the one hand, the formal structure of power in Mexico is similar to that in the United States inasmuch as the 1917 Constitution calls for a representative, democratic federal republic. In reality, on the other hand, executive dominance is indicated by the president's control over the legislature, the courts and other institutions. The Federal Deputies, for example, have approved all bills from 1934-1964; most bills were approved unanimously. While the Supreme Court has some autonomous power, the Judges "generally follow presidential policy." Executive


dominance is further indicated by presidential control over more than 70 percent of the funds for all governmental levels, the president's power to approve and to remove governors and officials for most positions, and his control over the party and patronage. As Frank Brandenburg argues: "Mexicans avoid personal dictatorship by retiring their dictators every six years," although he overstates the point.

Likewise, the political processes favoring the upper socioeconomic sectors have formed a stable pattern. In terms of outcomes, these wealthy sectors have received increasingly larger shares or maintained their position—as to be detailed in Chapter III. Moreover, freedom of political participation to change this pattern of outcomes is biased against the lower socioeconomic sectors—easily the majority of Mexicans. More specifically, the peasants, workers, and some middle-class groups—those symbolically represented in PRI—have actually experienced considerable control from above. In some cases these sectors of society are not able to clearly articulate their interests because of the limited opportunities for educating themselves. But in other cases, such as when opposition leaders mobilize them, they face suppressive tactics from the regime.

Consequently, perhaps it is not difficult to understand why opposition to governmental policies and practices has increased recently. To be sure, opposition leaders are favorably impressed with the institutionalized succession to offices and the economic growth, but they attack

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the executive's unchecked power, the inequitable distribution of resources, and, of course, the lack of freedom for opposition participation. In general, electoral opposition movements in some of the 32 federal entities have emerged as a result of one or more of the above mentioned conditions. But an apparently increasing awareness of these conditions seems to have also encouraged a dramatic increase of nonelectoral oppositions in the past five years. The latter's inception is primarily indicated by the 1968 and 1971 student movements. The government's suppression of these movements, in turn, has encouraged the formation of clandestine groups who are involved in bank robberies and kidnappings with political implications and in minor guerrilla activities. Apparently, in response to this opposition the government has introduced proposals in 1972 to allow opposition parties greater freedom for participation.

In this brief historical overview of Mexico, I have emphasized the role of the opposition. Moreover, my treatment of oppositions may leave the impression throughout this study that I am focusing solely on the negative aspects of Mexican politics. Such an impression may be unavoidable because opposition leaders themselves focus on the negative aspects of incumbents in order to win over supporters. In any case, it is recommended that the reader refer to other accounts emphasizing the noteworthy aspects of Mexican politics.

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19 The federal entities are the equivalent of states. In Mexico there are 32 federal entities divided into 29 states, two territories, and one federal district.

Before outlining the content of the chapters, I would like to alert the reader to my own biases. While I do not believe that a democratic system (as practiced in the United States and northern European countries) should be implemented in Mexico, I nevertheless believe that reforms should be encouraged in two general areas of the political process. The first area deals with greater freedom of opposition participation, and the second revolves around a more equitable distribution of resources. My biases for these concerns are founded on the generally favorable records of the opposition administrations in the cases to be presented herein. Finally, I believe that without some reforms, Mexicans might face increasingly serious problems, such as what Samuel P. Huntington and others label "political decay" and "system breakdown," although, as we all realize, no one can clearly document such an argument.

This study is divided into six chapters. First, given the contradictions and confusion in the literature on Mexican electoral oppositions, I will discuss the major instances of these oppositions within the past three decades. Afterwards, we will be better prepared to deal with other problems in estimating the scope of opposition support. In the second chapter I will show how the incumbents have used a variety of suppressive techniques to prevent the development of a party system with a competitive opposition.

The third chapter deals with various reasons for the present level of support for electoral oppositions. To be sure the opposition

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cannot easily win support from those who are content with PRI. In short, PRI might have a certain level of popularity for such reasons as the sustained economic growth for the past 35 years and special favors or benefits to various groups. Generally, where PRI is popular, elections are noncompetitive, although in these elections we will note that opposition support tends to increase with the more developed federal entities. But while opposition movements have appeared in the federal entities with higher versus lower levels of development, this factor alone— the level of development— does not account for the emergence of opposition movements. Thus, in the fourth chapter, I will discuss some special conditions which explain the emergence of these oppositions to challenge PRI in competitive elections. These special conditions revolve around the regime's mistakes, which then lead to mass discontent with PRI and to support of the opposition candidate.

In the fifth chapter I will deal with the impact of these movements and nonelectoral oppositions on national and subnational political processes. At the local level, two of these cases show that the opposition administrations had generally corrected abuses of power and had governed more effectively than the previous PRI administrations. In the third case, I had to suspend judgement because of the lack of evidence. Further, I will suggest parallels between electoral and nonelectoral oppositions and show how both have increased their criticism of the incumbents within the past five years. The impact of non-electoral oppositions on the incumbents appears greater, however, for these groups, perhaps because of their use of violence, seem to have
forced the incumbents to reform the electoral process.

In the concluding chapter I will summarize the findings, suggest hypotheses for testing, and speculate on future alternatives for Mexican politics. One of the basic concerns for Mexico's future deals with some reforms of the electoral laws and practices. Such reforms could improve the overall functioning of the political system and perhaps prevent more serious problems by making the political processes more accountable to the majority of Mexicans.
Chapter I

OVERVIEW OF ELECTORAL OPPOSITIONS IN MEXICO

In this chapter I will review the literature on Mexican electoral oppositions, discuss the major instances of electoral challenges to the official party, and deal with problems of estimating the scope of opposition support. Although very few authors have dealt with electoral oppositions in Mexico, many show the overwhelming dominance of PRI by citing the official election results. The confidence in the accuracy of these results, however, is critical for explaining the different interpretations of these authors, for many argue that the vote is honestly counted, while others disagree. In other words, with different estimates on the extent of electoral fraud, the authors naturally have different interpretations for PRI's dominance. Moreover, since electoral fraud is a sensitive topic, native Mexicans writing on their own political system generally evade the question of electoral behavior and focus on "safer" topics, such as the historical evolution of the various political parties.

Later in the chapter I will briefly review the major instances of electoral challenges to the official party and then show the problems in estimating the scope of opposition support. A review of the major competitive elections will show that the Mexican incumbents have occasionally allowed an opposition victory at the mayoral level but never beyond this level. In addition to this problem in estimating the scope of opposition
support, accurate estimates are further complicated by the meanings of voting in the Mexican cultural context. In short, the meanings of voting are quite different from those in more democratic settings, as a discussion of Ronald McDonald's categories of voting will show. Further, a documentation of electoral fraud in noncompetitive and competitive elections will suggest that the scope of opposition support is underestimated, although with the data limitations, the probable level of opposition support cannot be accurately estimated.

Before reviewing the literature on Mexican electoral oppositions, we must understand the overwhelming dominance of the official party. Since its inception in 1929, the government party has not only held a monopoly over elective and appointive offices at all levels but also has won every presidential election with at least 80 to 95 percent of the vote (Table I-1). Moreover, PRI (or its forerunners) has never lost a gubernatorial or senatorial election, at least according to the official results, although I will later show three probable gubernatorial defeats. For many years and until electoral reform in the early 1960s, PRI won over 95 percent of the 162 Federal Deputy seats. Recent reforms to provide the opposition with limited proportional representation have lowered PRI's percentage of seats to around 84 percent (out of 211 seats); very few opposition Deputies have actually defeated the PRI candidates. In fact, opposition victories occurred in only 17 out of more than 2,300 municipalities during the

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* Ital. indicates amount less than 80.0 per cent.  * Includes votes cast through non-official parties for the official-party candidate; includes legal votes only; excludes election of 1928 when Álvaro Obregón ran unopposed.  * No data given in source.


But by far the most important of these opposition victories occurred in three state capitals, as to be elaborated later in this chapter.

In attempting to account for this overwhelming dominance of the official party few authors state their arguments clearly. The reasons these authors suggest for PRI's dominance range from frequently implicit references to the popularity of the official party to its pervasive control of many sectors of society, including opposition parties, to fraudulent elections or, of course, to some combination of these reasons. I argue that the government has not allowed an opposition to develop, although PRI has sufficient popularity to win the majority of elections within the near future. More specifically, the Mexican regime perpetuates its overwhelming dominance through many methods of control including its own distorted counting and/or reporting of the electoral results, particularly when strongly challenged by an opposition movement. If these opposition movements had been allowed to win, then opposition parties would have greater strength in Mexico. Presently, we can turn our attention to the literature on electoral oppositions.

A. Review of the Literature on Electoral Oppositions

The authors from the United States who deal with the Mexican electoral process up to the early 1960s generally argue or imply that PRI's overwhelming dominance comes from its popularity and/or control

\[\text{Visión, March 14, 1969, p. 24}\]
over voters. The observations of Howard F. Cline are perhaps
typical: "In general, the votes for the non-official parties and
candidates represent a protest vote against the PRI or its candidates."³
Later Cline adds: "The PRI is now so secure that it can afford to
relax and does not need many of the repressive measures it earlier
took in dealing with the opposition."⁴ Some of the other standard
works on Mexico during this period, such as William P. Tucker's,
Robert E. Scott's, and Frank Brandenburg's,⁵ have little to add to
our knowledge of the electoral process.

One exception is Philip B. Taylor, Jr., who writes about the
1958 elections. In a more general remark, he argues: "In all fairness
it must be concluded that the possibility of a truly honest election
in Mexico is still very scant indeed."⁶ Taylor does not, however, go
into any detail about the extent of electoral fraud or how it occurs.

In the works appearing in the 1960s, many authors provide more
detail on electoral phenomena. In attempting to deal with the official
party's electoral domination, L. Vincent Padgett relies on the Mexicans'
explanations, which are twofold. First, electoral fraud exists. Second, the major political opposition parties are instruments of the government, and thus their leaders are controlled through one means or another. In short, the opposition parties exist in order to present a facade for democracy, which Mexican elites consider important for their international image. But then Padgett discredits these explanations by arguing:

In either case it would be very difficult to put together an adequate empirical case substantiating the judgement . . . . Charges of fraud are seldom carefully documented. However, the belief continues widespread among Mexicans that somehow elections are a farce.  

Hansen likewise makes the same two basic arguments and adds that "they remain generally unsubstantiated." 8  

Some authors reason that electoral fraud could not explain PRI's overwhelmingly dominant position. Ergun Ozbudun, for example, argues:

despite the existence of a measure of intimidation and fraud in the early Mexican elections, the overwhelming victories of the PRI certainly cannot be attributed to such electoral manipulations. Martin Needler, for example, observes that "today . . . unfair electoral practices are met with probably no more frequently in Mexico than in the United States, and the PRI gains its victories fairly and squarely." 9  

7 Padgett, The Mexican Political System, pp. 81-82.  
More recently, Martin Needler writes:

Today the typical picture is rather one of spontaneous violations of electoral honesty by some overenthusiastic local PRI partisans, but no deliberate national policy of rigging the elections. This does not mean that the national leadership would necessarily shrink from annulling an important election which was won by the opposition.¹⁰

Unlike most of the other authors, Needler presents evidence to support his latest arguments, which thus merit closer analysis. Basically, he uses the Almond and Verba data,¹¹ collected in 1959 in Mexico, and compares it with the official results of the 1958 presidential elections. Since this survey dealt with individuals living in population centers of only 10,000 or more, roughly half the population of the country was excluded. Nevertheless, Needler cites a secondary analysis of this survey to show that 14 percent of those interviewed identified with PAN, the only opposition party to run a presidential candidate in 1958. If no PAN identifiers existed in the countryside, Needler reasons, then the PAN identifiers would be 7 percent of the Mexican population. The average of these two extreme figures is 10.5 percent, or what Needler considers a "generous estimate" for PAN because this secondary analysis shows that PAN supporters are less likely to vote. Since PAN's officially announced vote in 1958 was 9.4 percent, he considers the vote count accurate at least for this election, although he generalizes beyond just "this election."¹²

¹⁰Martín Needler, Politics and Society in Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1971), p. 15


¹²Needler, op.cit., pp. 16-17.
To be sure, Needler's reasoning is useful for assessing the relative accuracy and honesty of official election results. If in fact no electoral fraud exists, then the government party could easily prove this during election times to international observers—something it has not done. In addition, the secrecy surrounding official results as well as the difficulty of obtaining them suggests that some fraud exists. Of course, no one can determine the extent of fraud. In any case one needs to evaluate the assumptions of Needler's evidence, that is, the accuracy of survey research in a relatively closed society. How honestly, for example, would many Mexicans respond to survey questions? This question takes on additional significance when one realizes the high degree of distrust and suspicion of Mexicans toward each other, a point well documented in the Almond and Verba study. One suspects this would increase when an unknown interviewer—who, incidentally, could be suspect as a government agent—asks questions, particularly sensitive questions about party identification or for which party one votes. I found that many Mexicans would not discuss such sensitive, political information until they knew me quite well. Finally, Needler says that 1½ percent of those interviewed identified with PAN. If the question dealt with party identification and not with how one voted, what is the probability that a certain percentage of Mexicans did not identify with PAN but voted anti-PRI and thus for the PAN candidate? My interviews suggest that this happened, but again there is no systematic way to determine the extent of anti-PRI voting.

Other authors give more credence to the charges of electoral
fraud, thus limiting the ability of the opposition to develop. In one study James W. Wilkie suggests using formulas to estimate the approximate vote since the government inflates its own victory margins. In another of his works, Wilkie argues: "There has never been any question that the official party manipulates the vote."\footnote{James W. Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 180.} It still would win overwhelming in fair elections at the presidential level, he adds, but manipulates the vote for "propaganda purposes.\footnote{Ibid., p. 181.} Wilkie briefly states that "honest" elections would lead to PRI's defeat at the lower governmental levels and perhaps eventually at the presidential level, but the official party is strong because of patronage and an almost total control on all types of organizations. Further, in his oral histories, Wilkie interviewed Vicente Lombardo Toledano, who discussed, among other topics, electoral fraud. Lombardo Toledano, the founder of the PPS, argues that since 1910 up to the present the votes at the presidential and federal deputy levels have never been counted.\footnote{James W. Wilkie y Edna Monzón de Wilkie, México Visto en el Siglo XX: Entrevistas de Historia Oral (México, D.F.: Instituto Mexicano de Investigaciones Económicas, 1969), pp. 399-400.} He cites his own elections as Federal Deputy, a position he held on at least two different occasions. After elected he wanted to check a document enclosed in an envelope with the electoral results from his district. To his surprise he
found that the envelope had never been opened by the Congress, which
then was functioning as the electoral commission. He further adds,
nevertheless, that PRI wins the majority of votes. Perhaps one cannot
accept Lombardo Toledano's statement that votes have never been counted,
but his observation is one of the most authoritative, suggestive of
widespread manipulation.

Only two authors document the refusal of the regime to allow
opposition victories by resorting to electoral fraud. Ronald McDonald
briefly discusses the Sonora elections of 1967, while Kenneth F.
Johnson presents various cases of strong opposition movements at the
gubernatorial and local levels. Although neither attempted to
document fraud in noncompetitive elections, McDonald's statement on
its existence is clearer than Johnson's.

Perhaps because of the limitations of official election results,
only two quantitative studies suggest reasons for PRI's overwhelming
dominance and conditions leading to opposition support. Both the
Barry Ames as well as the John Walton and Joyce A. Sween studies

16 James W. Wilkie y Edna Monzón de Wilkie, México Visto en el
Siglo XX, p. 400.

17 Ronald H. McDonald, Party Systems and Elections in Latin

18 Johnson, Mexican Democracy, pp. 130-146.

19 Barry Ames, "Bases of Support for Mexico's Dominant Party,"

20 John Walton and Joyce A. Sween, "Urbanization, Industrialization
and Voting in Mexico: A Longitudinal Analysis of Official and Opposi­
reach the same, basic conclusion, that is, the greater the urbanization (used as a simple measure of socioeconomic development), the greater the tendency to vote for an opposition candidate. The latter have a better grasp of the Mexican political situation, however, and are thus more successful in analyzing this relationship than Ames. Walton and Sween, for example, refer to "deliberate distortion" of electoral data, argue that the "informed critic of Mexican elections may want to double the figures on opposition support" so that they more closely reflect reality, and discuss PRI's strong political control in the rural areas, thus clearly suggesting why the major findings of both studies exist. Ames, on the other hand, deals only briefly in a footnote with the problems of official election data and never elaborates on the impact that PRI's political control has on electoral behavior.

Thus far, I have not reviewed the works of recent Mexican political observers. Many influential Mexicans admit that the works of their fellow countrymen on the present functioning of their political system, and in particular, elections are generally inferior to those written by foreign scholars. Even an influential Mexican economic historian, Daniel Cosio Villegas, has recently noted that "the four or five known researched works on the Mexican political system are due to foreigners, or more concretely North Americans." In contrast, Mexican historians, economists, and other professionals

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22 Daniel Cosio Villegas, "Política: Acción Estudiada y
have written outstanding works. The basic reason for inferior political studies seems to lie in the nature of the subject matter, for it can be personally dangerous for a Mexican political observer to spell out present characteristics of his own political system in writing as he impressively can in private, although some recent publications suggest that this is changing. One anecdote is illustrative. After receiving some valuable information from a knowledgeable and open PRI official, I asked him why he didn't write the "definitive work" on PRI. He grinned and simply stated: "Because I have political ambitions."

Consequently, one can understand why virtually all Mexicans' studies of their political system ignore elections, deal only briefly with them or just print official results, and thus contrast enormously with the abundant literature analyzing elections in the United States and other, "more advanced" democracies. Examples of works on Mexican politics which, by and large, ignore elections are those of Antonio Delhumeau A.\(^{23}\) and Vicente Fuentes Díaz.\(^{24}\) They focus on the historical evolution of the various political parties, their ideology, etc.; of course, these latter topics are much safer to treat.

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Three of the more accurate, recent works on Mexican politics deal only tangentially with elections. Pablo González Casanova's work is excellent in terms of describing PRI's control of various sectors of society and in spelling out many aggregate characteristics of the Mexicans. To my knowledge, González Casanova is the only Mexican author who published official results for various elections. He does not specifically say that electoral data are fraudulent, however, although he implies it when he argues that official data for the federal entities can show which ones tend to give more support to the opposition, "even in those cases in which the opposition votes which they register are inferior to the real [votes]." Salvador Hernández primarily analyzes how the regime dealt with the student movement of 1968 but, in showing the evolution of the present political system through a rather creative integration of other studies, discusses PRI's electoral manipulation in general terms. Finally, one of Mexico's most brilliant historians, José C. Valades, deals with a series of questions from nomination of the president to elections to public policy in a general, but insightful, manner. He argues that the whole process is corrupt and nonaccountable to the basic needs of the majority of Mexicans.

As mentioned earlier few Mexican politicians write revealing

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26 Salvador Hernández, El PRI y el Movimiento Estudiantil, esp. pages 55-71.

works about the "inner workings" of the political system. One former Senator, Manuel Moreno Sánchez, has not written a brilliant work but has made some accurate assessments of Mexican politics in a recent book, much of which is a collection of his newspaper articles. Interestingly, he was a staunch supporter of the regime at least according to his 1961 statement quoted at the beginning of Brandenburg's book. Later, however, he turned against the regime and writes bitterly and cynically, and thus is not considered a "scientific" source by some, although many of these same critics would still agree with one of his statements on elections: "Elections, which the laws establish, are of little importance, for it is known beforehand that the PRI will win or the elections will be annulled."  

I have found only four books on electoral opposition movements and apparent victories, although I suspect more of these case studies exist. Alfonso Trueba deals with the 1945 municipal elections of

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28. Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico, p. 3. In 1961, Senator Manuel Moreno Sánchez stated on the Senate floor: "I wish to affirm vigorously and courageously that an oligarchy supported by the people governs in Mexico, an oligarchy that has made possible the leading of the nation into development."  

29. Many well-informed Mexicans consider many critics of the regime to be bought off. In some cases, they think the regime pays them to be critics, while in others they think dissident elements pay them to embarrass certain individuals or the government. This could be true in some instances, but I am at a loss to explain such widespread sentiments except to say that it could be another manifestation of the extensive distrust and cynicism in the Mexican society.  


31. Incidentally, I found two of these books in the dusty stacks of major bookstores. The PAN president gave me Trueba's book, while PAN openly sells Gutiérrez Aguilar's book.
León, Guanajuato; 32 Manuel Gutiérrez Aguilar primarily treats the 1968 elections of Mexicali, the capital of Baja California (north); 33 Carlos Ortega G. describes the 1959 gubernatorial election of Baja California (north); 34 and Antonio Estrada M. captures the highlights of the reform movement in 1958 for the state capital of San Luis Potosí and then the gubernatorial campaign in 1961 in that same state. 35 Almost without exception, these studies are emotional, disorganized accounts of the mentioned movements, although they are apparently more accurate than inaccurate. All include one or more of the following: cartoons and/or pictures of individuals stealing ballot boxes, pictures of large crowds supporting the opposition candidate, pictures showing victims of repressive tactics as well as those killed by soldiers or paramilitary elements, poetry, campaign songs, and similar items.

One of the more interesting studies deals with a speculative discussion of political mobilization in the 1980s. 36 The Mexican

32 Alfonso Trueba, La Batalla de León por el Municipio Libre (2a ed.; Mexico, D.F.: Editorial Jus, 1957). This is the only one out of the four books, where the editorial house was willing to print its name on the book.

33 Manuel Gutiérrez Aguilar, La Derrota del Regimen (Hermosillo, México: by the author, 1971).

34 Carlos Ortega G., Democracia Dirigida... Con Ametralladoras (El Paso, Texas: by the author, 1961).

35 Antonio Estrada M., La Grieta en el Yugo (2a ed.; San Luis Potosí, México: by the author, 1963). According to the inside flap of this book, the first 5,500 copies were confiscated by the government of San Luis Potosí, but subsequent copies were clandestinely printed on various presses throughout the Mexican Republic.

36 José Luis Reyna, "Movilización y Participación Políticas:
author, José Luis Reyna, bases his discussion on some quantitative findings in the same elections Ames used, but Reyna does not present many details on his findings. He does argue, however, that electoral results are a more accurate reflection of the regime's control rather than the extent of PRI or opposition support.

The review of the literature on Mexican electoral oppositions has pointed out the contradictions and hence confusion. Therefore, I will first deal with two simple descriptive questions: 1) what have been the major instances of electoral opposition in recent years in Mexico? and 2) what are the problems in estimating the scope of opposition support?

B. Major Instances of Electoral Opposition

Since the formation of the governing party in 1929, electoral opposition movements have seriously challenged the official party in only a limited number of elections at the three basic levels—presidential, gubernatorial, and mayoral.\textsuperscript{37} At the presidential level

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\textsuperscript{37}I have eliminated the analysis of competitive elections for Federal Senators and Deputies. In the case of the former, no competitive elections have occurred (to the best of my knowledge), while only very few have occurred for Deputies. Further, both of these positions are symbolic due to the overwhelming dependence of the legislative branch on the Mexican Executive, as mentioned in the introduction. In addition, these legislators are not as closely linked to a constituency as a governor or a mayor. Finally, the electoral arrangement for Federal Deputies differs from that for all other positions because of limited proportional representation, whereby opposition parties receive
serious challenges to the governing party have occurred in 1940, 1946, and 1952. At the gubernatorial level at least five highly competitive elections have occurred from 1956 to 1969. At the mayoral level electoral oppositions have officially won and ruled three state capitals from 1958 to 1969; other mayoral victories are not as important. While the number of serious challenges to PRI have been quite limited, enough cases exist to help us understand the pattern of electoral opposition in Mexico.

The three serious presidential challenges generally involved popular candidates with three short-lived parties. As Scott observes, the candidate was "usually the most influential of the disappointed aspirants for the official nomination, whose unsatisfied ambition caused him to leave the revolutionary party" and attempted to set up a rival political organization. By far the most serious encounter at this level occurred with General Juan Andreu Almazán and his Revolutionary Party of National Unification in 1940. Apparently, President Lazaro Cárdenas wanted a fair election and to turn the government over to Almazán, providing that he could win, but finally decided to go

five seats if they win 2.5 percent of the national vote. For each additional 0.5 percent of the national vote, the party receives another seat up to a maximum of 20. The Deputies who receive a seat in this fashion are called "Party Deputies" to distinguish them from Deputies who win a majority in single member districts.

I heard rumors of others but found confirming evidence for these five only.

Scott, Mexican Government, pp. 176-177.
along with fraudulent electoral results to maintain continuity during this period of national and international turmoil. In fact, government officials announced fraudulent results for the Federal District because they feared that the real results, showing Almazán's victory in this highly urban area, would have further encouraged the demonstrations and riots. At the same time, most of these observers argue that the official candidate actually won the election because the vote outside the Federal District heavily favored him. In any case the official announced vote was 93.9 percent nationally for the government party (see Table I-1).

The challenges to the official party were less serious in 1946 and 1952. In the former year Ezquiel Padilla formed the Mexican Democratic Party to challenge the incumbents, while in the latter year, General Henríquez Guzmán formed the Federation of Popular Parties of Mexico. Perhaps because the government felt less threatened, it announced the lowest percentages that it has ever received at this level—77.9 percent and 74.3 percent in 1946 and 1952 respectively (see Table I-1). PAN ran its first presidential candidate in 1952, and, while it garnered a smaller percentage of the vote than Henríquez Guzmán, it has continued to run candidates in 1958, 1964, and 1970, and has slightly increased its national support with each election.

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41Needler, Politics and Society in Mexico, p. 16.

At the gubernatorial level at least five significant challenges to PRI have occurred within the past two decades. These are: 1) Chihuahua (1956); 2) Baja California North (1959); 3) San Luis Potosí (1961); 4) Sonora (1967); and Yucatán (1969). Although at times I will discuss all five cases, I will deal in depth with only the last three since detailed information on the others was quite difficult to obtain in Mexico City. Further, the three cases I will detail were more important than the other two because these three involved mayoral opposition victories of the state capitals.

In contrast to the other two levels, electoral oppositions have officially won some elections at the mayoral level. As cited earlier one source reported that out of the more than 2,300 mayoralties in Mexico, 17 were ruled by the oppositions in the late 1960s. Perhaps many more serious challenges have occurred at this level, but it would be difficult to gather evidence for all these. Further, one suspects that the patterns of political behavior would be similar to those which I will describe shortly. More importantly, I will discuss how electoral oppositions have officially won and ruled three state capitals: San Luis Potosí, San Luis Potosí (1959-1961), Hermosillo, Sonora (1967-1970), and Mérida, Yucatán (1967-1970).

In summarizing these major instances of electoral challenges, one can safely say that no author has systematically recorded these or stated the pattern that emerges. The basic pattern is official
recognition of some, mayoral opposition victories but no recognition beyond this level. Shortly, I will show through a discussion of the three electoral challenges at the gubernatorial level that the Mexican incumbents have not allowed oppositions to win, thereby relegating them exclusively to occasional victories at the mayoral level.

C. Problems of Estimating the Scope of Opposition Support

When dealing with estimates of the scope of opposition support, one must discuss two measurement problems. First, given certain socioeconomic conditions in Mexico, what does opposition and/or regime (PRI) support actually mean? The most common measure of support is the percentage of vote, but if 24 percent of the Mexicans ten years and older in 1970 were illiterate, what does their vote mean? McDonald discusses this problem and warns against "superficial" cross-national comparisons of aggregate voting results when the concept of voting can mean something quite different from country to country. **I might add that the concept of voting can mean something quite different to different sectors of the same country and of even the same subnational unit.**

McDonald's five different (although somewhat overlapping) categories of voting can help elucidate the problem for the Mexican political cultural setting. First, "affirmative voting" is voting

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45McDonald, Party Systems, p. 27.

46 For a more elaborate discussion of these categories of voting, see ibid., pp. 23-271
for the incumbents because they have power or because they intimidate or control the voters. While this occurs in some highly rational sectors of many societies, this tends to be more characteristic in the Mexican case of those who are uneducated and illiterate and thus probably do not understand the implications of their vote. This particularly applies to Mexico's rural population or roughly 58 percent of the total population. These "marginal" individuals—estimated by González Casanova as approximately 60 percent of the Mexican population—are frequently the targets of PRI's persuasion, control, and intimidation around election time.

Second, "protest voting" revolves around one or more sources of frustration and often may not be clearly articulated but, nevertheless, is virtually always present. This type of voting, of course, is quite high in the few competitive elections in Mexico. Third, "Identification voting" occurs in countries, like Colombia, where the individual identifies more intensely with his party than with his nation. This does not appear to have relevance for Mexico. Fourth, "Alienation (or nonvoting)" is common to all polities. I disagree with McDonald's equating nonvoting and alienation and for not treating another possibility. In some instances, for example, nonvoting can be

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47 I define "rural" here as those living in areas of under 10,000 inhabitants. The percentage comes from the 1970 census, op. cit.

48 González Casanova, The Democracia, p. 112 and passim.
"healthy" inasmuch as it may suggest that the citizen is relatively content with performance of his political system. To be sure, non-voting can also indicate alienation, but in many situations survey research might be the only reliable way of determining this difference. Fifth, "ritualistic voting" refers to the feeling of a national holiday or one big fiesta, where individuals can drink (although illegal on election day), be with their friends, and fulfill that vague sense of obligation to one's patria (homeland).

While McDonald mentions ideological and programmatic reasons for voting, he did not elaborate on this concept of (for lack of a better name) more "rational voting." Of course, "affirmative," "protest," and "alienation" voting may frequently be rational forms of voting behavior, although a discussion of what is "rational" could result in a merely academic exercise. By "rational voting," I mean the citizen who considers the alternatives and then votes for the candidate and/or party which most clearly reflects his ideology, self-interests, etc. In Mexico this would be more characteristic of the more educated who primarily live in highly urban areas. This category of voters might be the largest single one in Mexico, while we can probably safely assume that this includes the majority of voters in "more advanced" societies, such as the United States, Japan, and Western European countries.

To be sure, some problems exist with McDonald's different concepts of voting. One case in point is the overlap among the various categories, a problem at least implicitly dealt with in the preceding
paragraph. Another example revolves around his not mentioning "candidate orientation," or personalistic candidates, who might be expected to win even more support on their personal qualities in the Latin American setting than a similar candidate in the United States. But, given the consistently high PRI percentages, this problem does not have much relevance for Mexico. Further, I have no solution to the difficulty of clearly identifying which concept of voting is consistently typical of a specific election, region, or socioeconomic sector of society, although some broad tendencies have already been treated. At the same time, I do not intend to belabor these problems, for McDonald has sensitized us to the enormous difficulties involved with the meaning of voting in other cultural settings, such as Mexico. Hence, one can easily see the difficulties for measuring support through the concept of voting in my study.

The second measurement problem in estimating the scope of opposition support deals with the unqualified reliance on official election results and officially-recognized opposition victories. Most of the authors on Mexico err in this manner because electoral data is intentionally distorted—at least according to the best available evidence—thus rendering official results (even in noncompetitive elections) less useful than in a more open polity. In fact, as a result of both the different meanings of voting as well as electoral fraud, official data might more accurately reflect the regime's ability to control rather than its or the opposition's actual support. In the following section, therefore, I will present evidence of electoral fraud in noncompetitive elections. Afterwards, I will
discuss how fraud occurred in three competitive gubernatorial elections.

1. Electoral Fraud in Noncompetitive Elections

As we have seen in the review of the literature, confirmation of intentional distortion in competitive elections, particularly when the regime perceives itself as probably losing an important election, poses few difficulties in comparison to confirmation of intentional distortion in noncompetitive elections. In the latter case, some evidence, generally based on statements from reliable informants, exists. First, Wilkie, who has collected a considerable amount of inside information through his interviews, argues:

In Mexico, low percentages won by the official party include all figures below 80 per cent, a figure that would be considered a landslide victory in the United States. Merte R. Gomez, Minister of Agriculture under President Manuel Avila Camacho, has noted that in 1940 Avila Camacho won the national vote but lost the Distrito Federal. Table 1 reveals, however, that official election results gave Avila Camacho 72 per cent of the votes of the Distrito Federal. If a generalization might be drawn from this case, amounts less than 70 per cent could be considered a loss to the government.49

In addition, Wilkie's study shows how many more people than live in some relatively unpopulated areas "officially" voted. In many of these areas, he adds, geographical barriers would prevent these large numbers of individuals from voting. Further, implicit in these arguments is that the consistently high percentages of PRI vote would suggest intentional distortion, most probably at the national level.

level.

Second, the PRI President (actually the President of PRI's Central Executive Committee) recently informed me that electoral fraud occurred in the polling places and that his attempts to reform such practices were met with the resistance of years of custom. Much of the fraud at this level, it appears, occurs in a haphazard fashion, indicating that the regime manipulates the vote in a more systematic fashion at a higher level so that the pattern of high, relatively stable percentages occurs. Third, a high government source inside the Presidency revealed that the data needed doctoring to avoid embarrassing situations, as occurred in Oaxaca when a zealous, prospective candidate for office wanted to impress the government officials and mobilized 140 percent of those registered to actually vote. While this information deals with the participation percentage, one suspects that this occurs similarly with election returns. In other words, some national manipulation would have to occur to avoid many, embarrassing and contradictory figures, like the ones reported earlier.

Fourth, in my first interview with an open, high-ranking government official, I asked about the accuracy of election results. He thought they were accurate, but when I returned for a second interview, he apologized and stated that he had one of his aides ask for the data apparently from Gobernación. While the official data for one

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Incidentally, his aide was viewed suspiciously and needed a good reason for the data for only one section of Mexico City for his
section of Mexico City showed that President Echeverría received about 65 percent of the vote, the supposedly real data showed that the PAN presidential candidate, Lic. Efraín González Morfín, received 65 percent of the vote or, in short, just the opposite. Of course, one cannot generalize from this example to the rest of Mexico City.

Finally, a highly reliable informant in the opposition has a copy of a magazine with the official results already published the morning of the past elections, July 5, 1970, and notarized at 9:00 A.M.—before the overwhelming majority of people had a chance to vote. Thus the publisher probably had the official results some time prior to the election.

While this evidence suggests some degree of intentional distortion, many informants doubted that the regime actually counts the vote. The last incident with the official results published before the voting results could have possibly been available indicates that the regime does not count the votes, but the previously cited incident of the opposition's receiving 65 percent of the vote in one section of the Federal District apparently contradicts this argument. Of course, possibilities, such as the regime's counting the vote in trouble spots (particularly after announcing the official results) and occasionally in other areas, exist, although perhaps no "outsider" could obtain

boss! This incident suggests that the "real election results" exist (at least for some areas) and certainly shows the difficulty even high-ranking Mexicans have in acquiring this data.

51 Vicente Lombardo Toledano also made this argument. See footnote 15 of this chapter.
confirming evidence to spell out clearly if, when, and to what extent the regime counts the vote.

Even without this intentional distortion, PRI would still win the majority of election, at least in the near future. This is not the important point, however. If intentional distortion were eliminated, then the higher opposition results would encourage opposition leaders to mobilize greater numbers of followers. Within a number of years, consequently, electoral oppositions would probably be able to seriously compete in many elections with the governing party. In other words, more accurate counting and reporting of the votes would be an important psychological boost for the oppositions. This point is most clearly exemplified in the three case studies.

2. Three, Competitive, Gubernatorial Elections

The reliability of evidence presented varies from quite good in the Yucatán to good in San Luis Potosí to fair in Sonora. In the Yucatán I have gathered the best evidence available (to the best of my knowledge) since I witnessed the campaign for five weeks, interviewed all principal participants, and witnessed crowd reactions, etc. In the San Luis Potosí case, I interviewed the opposition candidate on several occasions and talked with others in the opposition as well as those who supported the PRI candidate. The Sonora case, in contrast, posed difficulties because I was unable to visit the area and talk to the opposition candidate and others. Consequently, I had to rely exclusively on secondary sources. Correspondingly, I will deal more extensively with the Yucatán situation, then with San Luis Potosí, and
less extensively with the Sonora case.

As to be expected, evidence confirming probable opposition victories at the gubernatorial level consists of little "hard" data and frequently of "unobtrusive measures." First, the most common measure of opposition support in San Luis Potosí, Sonora, and Yucatán deals with estimates from reliable sources. Second, some estimates can be made from election results. In the Yucatán case, for example, one can use the results witnessed by representatives from both PRI and PAN and discard those recorded by PRI alone. In all three cases some estimates can come from past or simultaneous elections, where the opposition has overwhelmingly won in the capital city but then loses that overwhelming margin in the same place at the gubernatorial level. In addition, the state electoral commission occasionally publishes a total vote for a particular area which excels the known or anticipated vote from the various polling places. Third, the organization of the crowds as well as the number of people who freely attend each party's rallies indicates support. Finally, in the Yucatán case the striking contrasts between the PRI and the PAN conventions suggests higher opposition support. To be sure perhaps some of these measures alone would not indicate high opposition support, but, taken together, they tend to confirm opposition victories in these three cases.

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a. Yucatán 1969 Gubernatorial Election

Virtually all impartial observers admit that PRI lost the 1969 gubernatorial election in the Yucatán. Hansen states: "The degree of skepticism which greeted the announcement of a PRI victory at the polls was high even in the Mexican setting."\(^5^3\) Kenneth P. Johnson argues that the election "was almost universally denounced in Mexico as a gigantic fraud against a popular reform oriented regional leader."\(^5^4\) Juan de Onis wrote that PAN had "a chance of winning in a fair election."\(^5^5\) At the same time, however, his informants thought that PRI would manipulate the results.

Public Mexican sources, in contrast, generally toned down evaluations of an opposition victory. Excélsior, one of the most reliable—although not always impartial—newspapers in Mexico, editorialized immediately after the election that who actually won was less important than reform of electoral practices. Gente, a magazine considered a right-wing critic of the regime, implied that PRI lost in its post-election issue.

*Por qué?*, a leftist magazine, deserves special mention. While informants claim that it has one of the highest paid circulations per issue of any political literature in Mexico, this is probably a result of its highly emotional criticism of the government as well as


\(^5^5\)*The New York Times* (Nov. 24, 1969),
its staunch support of the university students. At the same time, one has to admit that Por qué? reports many issues more accurately than other news sources in Mexico and thus not infrequently is subject to repressive tactics from the regime. After the Yucatán election, for example, it printed a special edition to denounce the election as a fraud and was the only source I found outside the Yucatán to print two pages of election results, witnessed by both PAN and PRI representatives (see Table I-3). Since these results coincide almost exactly with those published in the Diario de Yucatán (see discussion in Chapter II), I use them in my study.

An unpublished bachelor's thesis by Beatriz R. Torres-Ramírez disagrees with my conclusion about an opposition victory. She argues that electoral fraud occurred but that "it is almost impossible to know what would have been the results if this electoral fraud had not happened." In discussions about our findings, we were in basic agreement except for the above conclusion. Our difference lies in the fact that I place more confidence in the Diario de Yucatán and in PAN information. Further, Beatriz Torres-Ramírez did her research after

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56 One informant who knows the director well said that the strategy of Por qué? was to "exaggerate the truth."


58 Ibid., p. 94.
the 1969 election and thus was not present for any of these campaign activities.

As anticipated, official election results show an overwhelming victory for the PRI candidate, Carlos Loret de Mola. If one excludes the PPS candidate, who managed to attract only 816 official votes out of 259,900 total votes, then the PRI candidate won 78 percent of the vote, while the PAN candidate won 22 percent (see Table I-2). But election results witnessed by both PRI and PAN clearly indicate that PAN won 60 percent of the vote, at least according to those polling places in which PRI supporters allowed PAN representatives or, specifically, from only 33 percent of the polling places (250 out of 754). In the remaining 66 percent of the polling places, the incumbents had a relatively free hand to manipulate the vote in order to "officially" win, although the apparent fraud in these places was probably much less important than the official total result published by the State Electoral Commission, which, incidentally, did not include opposition representatives. In any case, one suspects that the incumbents thought that they could more easily justify the electoral results if they excluded opposition representatives in the majority of the polling places.

\[59\text{Diario del Sureste, November 29, 1969, p. 7.}\]

\[60\text{Interestingly, the national PRI president told me that his party won by a slim margin of approximately 100 votes. As one can easily see, the evidence does not support his statement.}\]

\[61\text{Diario de Yucatán, November 25, 1969.}\]
Table I-2
OFFICIAL RESULTS AND THE RESULTS VERIFIED BY BOTH PRI AND PAN IN MERIDA AND THE YUCATAN IN THE 1969 GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION\textsuperscript{a}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official Results</th>
<th>Results Verified by PRI and PAN\textsuperscript{b}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ENTIRE STATE OF YUCATÁN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>157,094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MERIDA AND SURROUNDING AREA (DISTRICTS 1, 2 &amp; 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>126,794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a}I have eliminated the results of the candidate of the Popular Socialist Party, who won approximately 0.3 percent of the total vote, because his votes were not always included in the available sources. In any case the main encounter was between PRI and PAN.

\textsuperscript{b}Source: Diario de Yucatán, November 25, 1969.
In addition, comparisons with the 1967 election point to an opposition victory in 1969. Interestingly, despite some voting irregularities by PRI in the 1967 mayoral election in Mérida, the official results showed that PAN received around 72 percent of the vote. Would PAN, with its popular reform Mayor as gubernatorial candidate, receive less of the Mérida vote in 1969? One suspects that he again garnered at least two-thirds of the vote. Further, the 1969 Mérida vote verified by PRI and PAN (the latter's representatives were allowed in only around 85 of the 150 polling places) comes closer to the 1967 official vote and not with the 1969 official vote, which shows that PAN's popular candidate lost the capital city. Torres-Ramírez also argues than PAN won the election in Mérida.

A further breakdown of the vote is reproduced from Por qué? in Table I-3. This magazine suggests that these results are the only legal ones since representatives from both parties witnessed the voting and counted the results, as stipulated in the electoral law. In any case, the reader can examine these as suggestive of how the entire state probably voted.

The organization of the crowds and the number of people who attended either of the party's activities suggests that public sentiment overwhelming favored the PAN candidate. In contrast to PAN's spontaneous, enthusiastic crowds, PRI's gatherings had more organization,

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63 Torres-Ramírez, "The Mexican PAN," p. 94.
Table 1-3
THE LEGAL ELECTION RESULTS IN THE 1969 GOVERNORIAL ELECTION IN THE YUCATAN ACCORDING TO POR QUÍP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>District 1st</th>
<th>District 2nd</th>
<th>District 3rd</th>
<th>District 4th</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-2-3-4</td>
<td>1-2-3-4</td>
<td>1-2-3-4</td>
<td>1-2-3-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-2-3-4</td>
<td>1-2-3-4</td>
<td>1-2-3-4</td>
<td>1-2-3-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

as the following observations exemplify. First, the powerful bus drivers' union always sent from five to fifteen bus drivers to nearly all PRI meetings. These individuals, with their musical instruments, created excitement and a bandwagon effect wherever they went. Since they always applauded the candidate first and thus gave direction to the crowd, they frequently gave the rallies an appearance of enthusiastic support for Carlos Loret de Mola when, in some cases, the majority of those attending appeared apathetic. Second, on many occasions local leaders had arranged the presence of controlled sectors of society, such as 100 to 200 school children waiting in orderly columns to greet the candidate. This organized presence, of course, demonstrated party discipline and control that PAN certainly could not match and apparently did not need. Third, one could see lines of trucks and buses bringing in PRI "supporters," further indicating that many attending PRI activities did not necessarily support Loret de Mola.

More detail is presented in Chapter II under PRI control.

In spite of such PRI control, PAN rallies had a larger attendance. On November 12, Correa Rachó estimated that some 215,000 individuals had freely attended his activities up to that day and that only 55,000 had attended his opponent's activities. The PAN candidate clearly showed how he had arrived at his figures by spelling out the attendance at each of his major rallies. The following day Loret de Mola retorted by stating that some 300,000 individuals had attended...

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\[64\] Diario de Yucatán, November 13, 1969.
his activities, although he did not spell out the attendance figures for each one. My own observations would place the attendance figures for both candidates close to Correa Rachó's estimates. A very conservative estimate (excluding some estimate of the number of individuals either forced or offered rewards for attending PRI's rallies) would suggest that the PAN candidate outdrew the PRI candidate by at least two to one.

In addition, during the last two weeks of the campaign, many more Yucatecans turned out for PAN's activities than for PRI's. On November 16, for example, Correa Rachó closed his campaign in Mérida and drew at least 30,000 individuals. That same evening, in contrast, Loret de Mola was greeted at the airport on his return from Mexico City by some 4,000 individuals, many of whom were brought in 61 buses. Two days later PRI drew some 10,000 people to a major rally in the Mérida bullring. Interestingly, one of the speakers complained that more people would have attended if the buses had brought villagers from nearby areas, as PRI had originally planned. Apparently, PRI had enticed these Yucatecans to attend through promising free entertainment (some national movie star performed) and other gratuities.

All political observers found the high PAN attendance figures

65Diario de Yucatán, November 13, 1969.
66Ibid., November 14, 1969.
67Ibid.
68Ibid., November 18.
quite surprising. In fact, reporters from the three major Yucatecan newspapers related their surprise to me concerning Correa Rachó's high appeal in the rural areas. Before the PAN candidate's first tours outside of Mérida, informants thought that he had little support in the rural areas, although everyone acknowledged his high support in the capital city. Towards the end of September, when Correa Rachó had toured some rural areas, informants began to think that Correa Rachó would win in a fair election.

In September, 1969, I attended both PRI's and PAN's conventions and, immediately afterwards, felt that many political observers had underestimated PAN's support. The contrasts between the two conventions suggested to many that PAN had the support to threaten PRI's dominance at the polls. In attendance PAN had approximately double the number of supporters. PRI held its convention in the Cine Mérida theatre, which holds approximately 3,000 individuals. Perhaps another 1,000 could not enter because of the limited seating and thus stood outside. In contrast, some 7,000 to 8,000 attended the PAN convention held in an open park. One should note that many peasants supporting PAN reported that many buses were not running regularly that day and thus had to walk and hitchhike to and from the convention. If the buses

69 PRI and PAN held their conventions on Saturday evening, September 7, and Sunday evening, September 15, respectively.

70 PAN attempted to rent the Cine Mérida theatre in order to protect themselves from rain. Since the theatre owner refused their request, PAN held its convention outdoors in Santa Lucía park. If they had been able to hold their convention in the theater, their attendance might have been likewise limited.
had been running their normal routes, more might have attended.

In addition, the following observations suggest the scope of opposition support as well as anti-PRI sentiment. First, many at the PRI convention appeared disinterested, particularly peasant groups (who might have been bused in); these appeared to enjoy each other's company more than events on the stage. At the PAN convention, in contrast, virtually all followed events on the stage with enthusiasm. In fact, when the PAN convention had terminated, many supporters started shouting and demanding a march to the main plaza as a show of strength.71 Second, in the PRI convention, many PRI supporters began whistling (an insult) when some speakers mentioned the name of the then incumbent and highly-detested Governor, Luis Torres Mesias. Such an insult within the official party exhibited a serious image problem. Third, PRI did not have as much youth representation as PAN; at the latter's convention two addressed the crowd. Fourth, few women participate in Mexican politics, but PAN had at least twice the percentage of women present as PRI, perhaps 20 to 10 percent respectively.72 Finally, while many at the PRI convention came from the lower class, a large number also

71 The Yucatan PAN Chairman, Tomas Vargas Sabido, successfully discouraged this request. Evidently, the PAN leaders felt that such a demonstration could have jeopardized a highly successful convention, particularly if even minor violence occurred.

72 Taylor, Jr., "The Mexican Elections of 1958," p. 741 and Johnson, Mexican Democracy, p. 143 as well as Johnson, "Ideological Correlates of Rightwing Political Alienation," The American Political Science Review (September, 1965), p. 659 also note that women tend to support PAN more visibly than they support PRI.
appeared quite wealthy, particularly a majority of those sitting on the well-packed stage. In contrast, those at the PAN convention came overwhelmingly from the lower class, including the peasant sector.

The available evidence points clearly to an opposition victory in this election. The pattern of the incumbent's behavior toward the opposition in the cases of San Luis Potosí and Sonora are similar, but, as reported previously, the available evidence is not always as extensive. Thus, I will treat these last two cases more briefly.

b. San Luis Potosí 1961 Gubernatorial Election

Despite problems of evidence (such as the total lack of voting results witnessed by some Nava supporters), many high-ranking government officials in Mexico City discuss this case more freely than the other two. Perhaps with the passage of time—this election occurred over ten years ago—high government officials do not feel as threatened to discuss past controversial events. In this instance even the national PRI President readily admitted that PRI had lost this election. In addition, almost all informants from San Luis Potosí (both the state and the state capital are called "San Luis Potosí"), including PRI supporters, agreed that Dr. Nava had won.

The election results appear in Table I-4 but are of little help in discussing an opposition victory, for the majority of voters were not even permitted to vote. These voting irregularities were

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73 Many informants argue that the "official truth," as defined by every presidential administration, changes with the next administration. In other words, few critical items appear during the same administration compared to the many that appear when that sexennial period has ended.
Table I-4

OFFICIAL RESULTS OF THE 1961 GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION IN SAN LUIS POTOSI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District Description</th>
<th>López Davila</th>
<th>Doctor Nava M.</th>
<th>J.E. de la Cruz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Local Electoral District (San Luis Potosi, Eastern Part)</td>
<td>14,414</td>
<td>8,548</td>
<td>598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two special polling places</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>5,508</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14,718</td>
<td>14,056</td>
<td>617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Local Electoral District (San Luis Potosi, Western Part)</td>
<td>8,862</td>
<td>9,182</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two special polling places</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>4,955</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9,733</td>
<td>14,137</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Local Electoral District (Santa Maria del Rio)</td>
<td>18,301</td>
<td>3,281</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Local Electoral District (Salinas)</td>
<td>10,673</td>
<td>2,226</td>
<td>606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth Local Electoral District (Matehuala)</td>
<td>16,167</td>
<td>3,559</td>
<td>739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth Local Electoral District (Cerritos)</td>
<td>15,853</td>
<td>2,813</td>
<td>1,898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Local Electoral District (Rivarde)</td>
<td>20,677</td>
<td>4,010</td>
<td>1,808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth Local Electoral District (Cardenas)</td>
<td>12,900</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninth Local Electoral District (Ciudad Valles)</td>
<td>17,514</td>
<td>1,198</td>
<td>1,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth Local Electoral District (Ciudad Santos)</td>
<td>21,703</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleventh Local Electoral District (Tamazunchale)</td>
<td>17,407</td>
<td>906</td>
<td>683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>175,646</strong></td>
<td><strong>45,617</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,301</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First, no Nava supporters were allowed in the polling places, which were heavily guarded by soldiers. Second, many ballot boxes were carried away while long lines of individuals were waiting hopelessly to vote. Third, the Electoral Commission of San Luis Potosí announced the official results approximately a month after the election, although it is customary to publish them a few days afterwards. Many of these and other points are detailed in the petition Dr. Nava presented to the Supreme Court in his futile attempt to get them to intervene and annul the election.  

One "unobtrusive measure" of an opposition victory deals with the Potosinans' treatment of the PRI candidate, Manuel López Dávila, during the campaign and after he officially became Governor. Frequently, López Dávila cancelled campaign rallies for fear of violence against himself and his supporters or for fear of a poor turnout. It was also reported that when he became Governor, López Dávila was quite reluctant to appear in public because Potosinans continued for at least a year to boo, whistle, or otherwise embarrass him by shouting in favor of Nava.

c. Sonora 1967 Gubernatorial Election

Of the three cases, this one is the clearest example of "protest" voting. The movement started when the national PRI imposed an unpopular Federal Deputy, Félix Faustino Serna, as the gubernatorial

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74 See part of the Nava petition in Chapter II under the regime's control of elections.
candidate after initially allowing a more open nominating process, during which more popular candidates had emerged. Consequently, this imposition led to mass demonstrations, initiated by students and shortly joined by large numbers of women. As one event led to another, official repression of students and others later became motivating forces to mobilize virtually every sector of society—including some policemen and PRL officials—against the regime. At one point, reportedly around 90 percent of all schools throughout the state were on strike. Approximately two months before the election, the incumbents outlasted the protestors, broke up the strike, and forced the Sonorans back to some degree of normalcy.

With this background information one can easily understand why PAN reversed its decision not to run a gubernatorial candidate, although they announced early in the Mermosillo (the state capital) campaign that Jorge Valdez Muñoz was their candidate. Thus, about a month and a half before election, Lic. Gilberto Suárez Arvizu became the PAN gubernatorial candidate in order to take advantage of this high anti-regime sentiment. In indicating the scope of this protest, McDonald argues that this "struggle . . . stimulated a voter turnout of almost 50 percent of the registered voters (350,000) instead of the normal 10 percent." 75 To be sure, emotions were quite high, and, as Kenneth F. Johnson argues, Valdez Muñoz "was allowed to win." 76

75 McDonald, op. cit., p. 258, neither cites a source for this information nor says which elections have this ten percent turnout.

76 Johnson, Mexican Democracy, p. 134.
Some evidence suggests that the incumbents may have decided to give PAN its first victory of a state capital and thus tried to hide a probable gubernatorial victory. As one can see from Table I-5, the official elections are not helpful in analyzing the results, while the following observations are suggestive of a gubernatorial victory, Valdez Muñoz officially won with 12,505 to 8,867 votes for his PRI opponent. According to La Nación, in contrast, the gubernatorial vote in Hermosillo was 15,824 for PAN versus 6,523 for PRI to 66 out of the 74 polling places. But in the remaining eight polling places the PRI candidate supposedly gained more votes than in the other 66! In addition, the officially announced vote lowered PAN's vote to 10,222 versus PRI's vote of 14,500. Given the high anti-PRI sentiment as the primary motivation for voters, how plausible is it that the PAN candidate for mayor of this state capital received close to 71 percent of the vote, while the PAN gubernatorial candidate received only 41 percent of the vote in the same city? Further, PAN local deputies in Hermosillo received 13,859 votes to PRI's 7,143. Voting irregularities were widespread, particularly in the rural areas. Many PAN representatives were not allowed to supervise the voting procedures in many polling places. As in the San Luis Potosí case, election results here at the gubernatorial level were not


Table I-5
OFFICIAL RESULTS OF THE 1967 Gubernatorial Election in Sonora

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral District</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Faustino Félix Serna</th>
<th>Gilberto Suárez Arvizu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>Altar</td>
<td>19,763</td>
<td>8,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>Magdalena</td>
<td>7,492</td>
<td>4,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>Arizpe</td>
<td>5,487</td>
<td>2,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>Hermosillo</td>
<td>10,222</td>
<td>14,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth</td>
<td>Guaymas</td>
<td>32,241</td>
<td>5,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth</td>
<td>Moctezuma</td>
<td>4,224</td>
<td>1,914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh</td>
<td>Ures</td>
<td>3,317</td>
<td>2,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth</td>
<td>Sahuarina</td>
<td>2,967</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninth</td>
<td>Navojoa</td>
<td>60,877</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>146,581</strong></td>
<td><strong>41,451</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

announced within a few days, as is customary. In fact, immediately after the election, one PRI official stated that the election was "close," although the official results do not show that. Other voting irregularities occurred, but these are similar to those already dealt with in the previous two cases.

In this section we have seen that the incumbents prevented opposition victories at the gubernatorial level through the use of electoral fraud. Certainly, official recognition of a gubernatorial victory in at least one or more of these states could have worked as a catalyst for more opposition support throughout Mexico. Apparently, the incumbents recognized this and decided to deny electoral oppositions, particularly PAN, this incentive. Thus, when attempting to estimate the scope of opposition support, one must give these competitive elections more weight than the noncompetitive elections.

In summing up the findings of this chapter, we can readily understand that the scope of opposition support is underestimated. But realistic estimates of the PRI or the opposition vote cannot be made because of different degrees of fraud in noncompetitive and competitive elections. In any case one can safely assume that many more competitive elections would have occurred at the local and state levels if the Mexican government had recognized opposition victories. Further, the percentage of PAN's vote in noncompetitive national elections would be higher than it presently is (roughly now around 15 percent), although no one can accurately estimate this vote. Electoral fraud alone, however, is not sufficient to explain the regime's success in preventing
an opposition party from developing. Hence, we can now turn our
attention to other official tactics used against electoral oppositions.
Chapter II

THE MAJOR BARRIER FOR OPPOSITION DEVELOPMENT: Suppression and Other Regime Tactics

In addition to electoral fraud, the Mexican regime prevents the development of a strong opposition through a variety of other tactics. Some of these tactics are clearly suppressive (such as the brutal treatment of Dr. Nava after the election), while others are more subtle (such as legal stipulations favoring the official party). As a discussion of these case studies will illustrate, the regime will use the necessary tactics to suppress the opposition but begins with more subtle tactics.

Based on my three cases, I have listed in Table II-1 five general clusters of tactics used by the regime to prevent the development of a strong opposition. To a certain extent these clusters represent a hierarchy inasmuch as each cluster could be considered a stage of regime tolerance. For instance, the regime can prevent an opposition party from forming, but, after the regime recognizes such a party, then it has to control communication, competition for supporters, or voting procedures in order to prevent an opposition party from gaining momentum.

While these clusters of tactics tend to form a hierarchy, they overlap in some instances. The access of the official party to public funds is a case in point. Initially, the use of funds helped establish
Table II-1

THE REGIME'S TACTICS TO PREVENT THE DEVELOPMENT OF A STRONG OPPOSITION

A. Control over Opposition Party Formation:

1. Electoral laws and practices.
2. Treatment of opposition elites.
3. Access to public funds.

B. Biased Communication:

1. Coverage of opposition activities in printed and electronic mass media.
2. Circulation of opposition party propaganda.

C. Limited Competition for Supporters:

1. Treatment of opposition party followers.
2. Treatment of official party followers.

D. Control over Voting Procedures:

1. Equal opportunity for voter registration.
2. Information on polling places.
3. Vote according to "one man, one vote" criterion.
4. Vote counting with opposition representatives.
5. Official recognition of an opposition victory.

E. Regime Harassment of Opposition Rule.
and maintain the organization--headquarters, salaries, etc.--for the official party and thus has given it an enormous advantage over opposition parties, such as PAN, which has to obtain funds from generally small contributors. Funds, however, particularly large amounts, are critical for PRI's dominance because the costs of communication (such as extensive advertising), competition for supporters, etc. are quite high. Thus, as this example suggests, these tactics can be applied in small or large doses. To illustrate how and to what extent these tactics are applied, I will now discuss the three cases of electoral opposition movements presented in the previous chapter.

A. Control over Opposition Party Formation

Three aspects of the regime's control over opposition party formation appear critical here. These are the electoral laws and their application (or failure to apply them), freedom from repressive tactics for legal opposition elites, and use of public funds for official party expenses. Without some change in the incumbent's behavior in these aspects, oppositions will not be able to gain many more supporters than they presently have.

One of the most basic requirements for an opposition is to receive recognition as a legal political party. To acquire this an opposition group has to meet the following stipulations of the electoral law:

I. To have at least 2,500 members in each of no less than two-thirds of the country's states and territories and, in any case, a minimum of 75,000 members;
II. To pledge obedience to legal and constitutional provisions, to prohibit subordination of the party to foreign political parties or international organizations, and to engage to participate only in peaceful political activities;

III. To hold in at least two-thirds of the federal entities a meeting to select delegates to a national constituting convention of the party. At both the state-level and the national meetings, a notary must attend, in order to attest to the legal number of members and to the fact that decisions were reached by vote of a majority of delegates;

IV. To adopt a statement of party principles and, as required by the national constitution, a distinctive name that does not allude to race or religion.¹

But, as Scott shows, Gobernación (the major government ministry) officials determine whether these conditions are met. Before the 1958 presidential elections, for example, two groups requested recognition. According to Scott, the Communist group was denied recognition, although it apparently met these requisites, while the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution was granted recognition, in spite of the fact that it did not meet these requirements.² Further, informants argue that this last party still should be legally cancelled (because it has not acquired the legally stipulated support), but government officials refuse to do this. Other examples of arbitrary recognition exist.³

Another aspect of the electoral laws and practices benefitting the regime and limiting the opposition's chances of victory stem from the revolutionary slogan of "effective suffrage, no re-election."

¹Scott, Mexican Government, p. 149.
²Ibid., pp. 147-154.
³Ibid.
While the purpose of this practice was to prevent individuals from perpetuating themselves in power and has certainly succeeded, its negative aspects have frequently been overlooked. In all cases, Mexicans face an entirely new slate of candidates, since no one can run for re-election. To be sure, the new candidates are still from PRI, but the important point is that none of these has to run on the record of his predecessor, particularly if he was unpopular. In other words, the argument to the voters can be that this new candidate will follow new policies. Consequently, the opposition candidates can attack more successfully past policies of the incumbent but are less successful in attacking the policies of the candidate they are challenging because the latter has no record to defend for that particular position. Of course, if an incumbent could run for re-election, perhaps he would frequently be re-elected, as occurs in more democratic societies. But, at the same time, a candidate running for re-election would probably act much differently in office from many of the present incumbents.

More importantly, the entire electoral process is built on this type of non-accountability. At the presidential level, for example, the "official truth" supposedly changes with each, new sexennial administration, and thus many voters frequently believe that new policies favoring them will emerge, although the only drastic

\[1^{\text{In the case of Federal Deputies, ex-Deputies can wait for three years and then run again. Apparently, this is the only exception for later holding the same position.}}\]
change from one presidential administration to another occurred in 1940 as Avila Camacho and his favoritism towards the business sectors replaced Lázaro Cárdenas, who favored the lower socioeconomic sectors. In short, the basic policies persist from administration to administration, but the initial "honeymoon" with each new president tends to give many Mexicans a renewed hope in the political system. Herein lies one of the principal values of presidential elections, although in the literal sense the citizens' votes are purely symbolic because the PRI candidate—chosen by very few individuals and then symbolically nominated by the official party—always becomes President.

Similarly at other levels of politics, voters do not have an opportunity to vote on the incumbents. The case of Yucatán in 1969 exemplifies this. Governor Luis Torres Mesías was highly unpopular, even among his fellow priistas (PRI members), as mentioned earlier. If he had been able to run for re-election and had accepted the challenge, one suspects that the Mexican government would not have been able to cover up an opposition victory.

Perhaps more important still, the no re-election principle has influenced the types of incentives for office-seekers. Although all PRI candidates must stay within a revolutionary ideology favoring lower socioeconomic sectors of society, many practices do not follow this.

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6For a discussion on how the president is chosen, see Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico, pp. 145-150.
ideology. In fact, the incentives for office do not revolve around policy (as they might have to with more popular control) as much as they entail the prestige and spoils of office. Brandenburg and others argue that some elective offices are sought because a relatively poor men can become rich and be ready to retire after only one term in office. 7

As we will see in the case studies, the incumbents rigidly adhere to some aspects of the electoral law, while they readily violate other aspects when this is needed to maintain their overwhelming dominance. A case in point is the one year's residency requirement for the gubernatorial candidate, an explicitly stated requisite in the state constitution. Manuel López Dávila, the PRI candidate and later the Governor of San Luis Potosí, obviously did not fulfill this requirement since he had spent most of his life in Chihuahua although he was born in San Luis Potosí. In fact, four months before the


8Johnson, op. cit., pp. 138-140, provides another example of this double standard when he discusses the Baja California elections of 1968. The PAN candidate, Norberto Corella, apparently won the mayoral election in Mexicali, the capital of Baja California, but the incumbents disqualified him because he was born in the United States. He had, however, gone through the legal procedures for Mexican citizenship at the age of 18; since many Mexicans living close to the United States have been born in American hospitals, this claim by PRI was seen as a pretext. In addition, Corella had served in the Mexican armed forces. In contrast, the PRI mayor of Tijuana, Francisco López Guiterrez, reportedly had been born in the United States and had not bothered to go through the legal process of acquiring Mexican Citizenship, as had Corella.
election, that is, at the time of his nomination as official gubernatorial candidate of San Luis Potosí, López Dávila was still the Chief Administrator (Oficial Mayor) of the Secretary of Public Education in Chihuahua. Opposition complaints were ignored, but then how could the incumbents reply to this explicit violation without lending validity to it?

Dr. Nava argues that another tactic of incumbents to ignore the constitutional rights of opposition involves a series of false promises and delays. In his San Luis Potosí campaign in 1961, for instance, Nava argued that he and many others received promises from the government officials about party registration and voting procedures. Frequently, officials would respond: "The man in charge of this is in Mexico City and will not be back for a few days. Come back next week." Other administrators gave out false information, etc., until opposition leaders became quite discouraged.

One should also mention what electoral laws do not stipulate or how the regime violates the spirit of the law, thereby giving itself an enormous advantage. First, electoral laws do not prohibit the official party from using the colors of the flag—red, white, and green—as their own. Consequently, nationalism and voting for PRI can easily be equated, particularly among uneducated and, not infrequently, illiterate peasants. When one of the peasant leaders, for example, tells them to vote for the colors of the flag, peasants might consider this the "proper thing to do." These types of voting, of course,

9Needler, Politics and Society in Mexico, p. 20.
would tend to be "affirmative" and "ritualistic." Second, the legal composition of the national and state electoral commissions always includes a large majority of PRI representatives. Thus, even in those cases where the opposition has a few representatives on these commissions, it is easy to understand the lack of checks and balances with vote tabulations.

A second aspect of party formation deals with the opposition leaders' freedom from repressive tactics. While the behavior of Mexican incumbents has become considerably less repressive over the years, they still resort to many overt and covert techniques, which discourage and, in some cases, virtually eliminate the opposition. The gubernatorial race in San Luis Potosí illustrates some initial, subtle pressures followed by heavy-handed repression to eliminate the opposition leader's activities.¹⁰

Just as at the beginning of the 1958 mayoral campaign, Nava attempted to receive the official nomination within PRI in the governor's race. After discussions with the then Secretary of Gobernación, Lic. Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (later Mexican President from 1964-1970), and the President of PRI's Central Executive Committee, General and Lic. Alfonso Corona de Rosal, Nava felt confident that he

¹⁰To see how a variety of techniques, beginning with those using a minimum of violence, can be applied to individuals or groups, see Evelyn P. Stevens, "Legality and Extra-legality in Mexico," Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 12, (Jan., 1970), p. 73.

¹¹Scott, Mexican Government, pp. 154-176, has a good discussion of PRI's formal structure.
could become the PRI candidate if, as they assured him, he showed that he had a statewide, popular following. At least these two important government officials indicated that PRI was open to Nava's candidacy. In fact, Corona de Rosal told Nava to keep him informed of his activities.

Approximately two months later, after Nava had demonstrated extensive, statewide support, the PRI President called him to Mexico City for a conference. According to my interviews with Nava, the gist of the conversation was as follows:

Corona de Rosal (CR): Dr. Nava, you cannot be the PRI candidate.  
Nava (N): You are mistaken because the convention has not been held. If the people do not choose me, then I will bow out of the campaign.  
CR: You will not be a candidate.  
N: You are not the party; the people are. Besides I've already invested time and money in the campaign and have made a commitment to the people.  
CR: You will not be a gubernatorial candidate. If you wish, I will make you a federal deputy. Also tell me how much you have already spent in your campaign, and I will reimburse you.  
N: If the president doesn't want me for some reason, then let me talk to him. Otherwise, I will let the people decide whether I should be their candidate.  
CR: If you continue, you will be sorry.  

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One can only speculate on why PRI refused Nava the official candidacy, particularly since the official party could have channeled and taken advantage of a popular, reform movement. Of course, Nava, as a serious reformer, presented a threat to the existing power structure because he had already demonstrated that by hard work and honesty reforms could be made; this was quite embarrassing to the government. Thus perhaps PRI wanted to stop the reformer before he gained any more momentum and provided a threatening example to the rest of Mexico. As Johnson, Mexican Democracy, pp. 34-35, notes, Mexican political reformers tend to have noticeably short political careers. Nava thinks, however, that presidential politics was involved inasmuch as Lic. Miranda Fonseca, a secretary to the Presidency and a presidential contender, wanted to place his own supporters, such as López Dávila, in key positions and thus chose a member of his camarilla (political clique; see Johnson, op. cit., pp. 67-84) for San Luis Potosí. In this case Nava obviously would not have been valuable to a presidential contender.
Nava, as to be expected, did not give in to these threats. He called for a mass rally in San Luis Potosí and discussed the results of his confrontation with the chief PRI spokesman. When Nava asked the large gathering whether they wanted him as the gubernatorial candidate, they responded enthusiastically. But from this time on, it appeared that the regime's representatives would resort to less subtle tactics.

Despite minor violence directed toward various sectors of the Potosinan society, the regime did not use major repressive tactics on Nava and his key leaders until after the election. A description of these events merits detail, for apparently they were the most violent incidents against the leaders of an electoral opposition movement in Mexico in recent years.

After the election, when the regime had assured itself of an "official" victory, the government began suppressing Dr. Nava and his followers by enormously increasing the costs of continued, political participation. But the process of official suppression was accomplished by isolating the opposition leaders from their mass following and thus by not provoking the ire of Potosinans through highly-visible, indiscriminate acts as occurred in 1958. (In 1958 soldiers physically beat opposition supporters in large gatherings and occasionally killed individuals in these crowds.)

After the election mass protests erupted in the state capital because many Potosinans were convinced that the incumbents had stolen the elections. But what could the opposition do? The alternatives were to: 1) protest to their "friend," President Alfonso López Mateos,
who apparently had approved giving official recognition to Dr. Nava after the 1958 mayoral election; 2) protest to officials in Gobernación; 3) stage mass protests in San Luis Potosí, perhaps including general strikes; 4) engage in violence; 5) organize an opposition party for future elections; and 6) recognize their powerlessness before the government and resign their efforts.

The first alternative proved futile, for the President refused to talk personally to the approximately 1,000 protestors, who made the 250 mile trip from San Luis Potosí to the National Palace; the President had one of his secretaries meet with them. The second alternative similarly failed. While the navistas were planning a massive protest after the election, the government jailed Nava and four main organizers on "orders from the presidency," but shortly released them. On July 25, some three weeks after the election, Potosinans began a mass protest and reportedly stopped all commercial activity. When Dr. Nava spoke to a crowd of 60,000 protestors, violence erupted; the soldiers wounded several individuals and jailed some protesters. After these attempts navistas were certain that their protests would not alter the results of the past election.

According to one, highly pro-Nava informant, Nava and a very small group of supporters briefly considered the fourth alternative—violence. If this is the case, then one could more easily understand

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13 For a description of all these events, see Tribuna during the month of July, 1961. Nava confirmed the accuracy of these reports.
the government's mass arrests of navista leaders. In any case the government attempted to pin various acts of violence on the opposition and to "discover conspiracies" in order to justify their own violence on the opposition as they began whipping the recalcitrant Potosinans into shape. Reportedly, in September, 1961, a small group of navistas had planned to blow up a train bridge and fuel deposit of PEMEX (the government's gasoline monopoly)--both of which were on the outskirts of the state capital--but changed their minds when they saw soldiers guarding these installations. Publicly, Nava definitely preached nonviolence and certainly was doubtful about the results of violence, particularly when directed against the Mexican regime. Many informants inside the government, however, argued that an appeal from Nava to the Potosinans for mass violence against the regime would have easily triggered off a massive uprising and probably brutal, official retaliation, resulting in a blood-bath. Privately, Nava denied any knowledge of any attempts at violence within his organization.

During the middle of September, the government began a massive crackdown on the opposition. Many arrests followed house to house searches for firearms. On September 15, at least 200 key leaders of the opposition were jailed. That same evening government henchmen destroyed the offices of the opposition newspaper, Tribuna, and threatened its personnel to leave the state within 24 hours or else probably face a series of repressive acts. The government also

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14 Estrada, La Orieta en el Yugo, p. 203.
jailed Dr. Nava but released him on October 4. When Nava returned to San Luis Potosí, large crowds welcomed him, thus signifying their willingness to continue their opposition.

By this time, however, Dr. Nava and his key organizers, many of whom had suffered repression, decided to stop fighting the regime openly and thus curtailed their opposition activities. Many supporters told Nava that they feared further repressive acts against themselves and their families and, in addition, could not afford the high costs of participation. They wanted to return to normalcy so that they could earn a living and feed their families. Consequently, they all decided to organize an opposition party for future elections.

The Partido Demócrata Potosino (Democratic Potosinan Party), the Nava party, ran Dr. Rangel\textsuperscript{15} for mayor of San Luis Potosí in December, 1961. The overwhelming majority of Potosinans, however, were dispirited and thus thinking that PRI would also steal this election, did not bother to vote. According to a much smaller edition of \textit{Tribuna},\textsuperscript{16} PRI falsely recorded a high turnout—some 25,000 votes. The official vote showed that at least 22,000 had voted, with the PRI candidate, Silva, receiving 17,000 votes to Rangel's 5,000.\textsuperscript{17} Apparently, the still active opposition members had to fight not only PRI's manipulation but also the understandable apathy of their former supporters.

\textsuperscript{15}Rangel was a strong supporter of and campaign manager for Nava.

\textsuperscript{16}December 11, 1961.

\textsuperscript{17}\textit{Ibid.}
supporters.

For a period of time Dr. Nava traveled throughout some northern Mexican states in an attempt to start regional parties against PRI. While on many occasions he was enthusiastically received and honored by large gatherings of people, his initiatives for opposition parties were by and large met with apathy and fear to tangle with PRI. Even though his own attempts to form another opposition party failed, Dr. Nava never considered joining PAN or any of the other opposition parties.

The final, repressive act occurred approximately a year and a half after the gubernatorial election. On February 5, 1963, Dr. Nava was arrested, probably on orders from the Governor. As mentioned earlier, Lopez Davila was quite embarrassed whenever he appeared for public gatherings because crowds booted him, insulted him with whistles, and apparently succeeded in irritating him by shouting pro-Nava slogans. Perhaps, as a result, the Governor decided to fabricate some reasons for retaliation against Nava and attempt to put an end to his support. In any case all informants report this as an arbitrary act.

In the San Luis Potosi jail, the jailers tied Nava's hands, blindfolded him, and beat him mercilessly. Nava related that he almost immediately fell unconscious some time before midnight but that when he regained consciousness around seven o'clock the next morning, he realized that he had vomited considerably. When some friends, who were medical doctors, visited him, they were shocked by his appearance and realized that Dr. Nava needed medical attention. After the State Attorney General refused their request for Nava's release, they talked to a Federal Judge, who demanded that Nava be freed, but the jailers
initially ignored the Judge's legal order. Finally, the Judge threatened to send in Federal troops if the jailers did not release him. On February 8, Dr. Nava was taken to the hospital. From the severe beatings, Nava had a broken rib, a hemorrhage in the heart, countless bruises, and could not move his right arm.

Finally, the net result of the regime's repressive tactics is that the regime has eliminated the organizational base of the navista movement. Since the early 1960s there has been no electoral opposition movement of any significance in San Luis Potosí. Quite clearly, the Potosinans were defeated and have become apathetic and/or alienated (either or both of which could be defensive, psychological moves). Informants report that many former navistas have not bothered to vote, but official election data, which probably is still manipulated, show only a slight decrease in electoral participation. In addition, these data show no significant increase in opposition voting. Some argue that greater political awareness which might be easily mobilized into opposition behavior is high; the translation of these latent attitudes and predispositions into political behavior remains to be seen. Up until now, the obvious conclusion for San Luis Potosí is that the Mexican incumbents have accomplished their goal of domination through suppression of the opposition leaders, especially of Dr. Nava.

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18 For percentages of participation by federal entities, see Table V-1.

19 One can check the decreases (or lack of them) in the presidential percentages in each federal entity in Table I-1.
In the Sonoran and the Yucatecan cases, in contrast, the opposition leaders did not face such repressive tactics. The reasons for less repression in these two cases could be: 1) the opposition did not protest as vigorously as in the San Luis Potosí case and/or 2) these two competitive elections occurred later than the previous gubernatorial election and thus after some regime attempts at electoral reform.

National PAN elites now face more subtle controls—generally in terms of surveillance and economic pressures—rather than overt repression. For example, PAN leaders report that their telephones both in their headquarters and their homes are tapped. Consequently, this perception seriously limits their effectiveness, since any strategy discussions, etc., cannot be held over the phone. In another example, Efrain González Morfín lost his job in the economic research department of the Banco de Londres y Mexico ostensibly because he accepted the PAN presidential nomination in 1961.20

The third characteristic aiding PRI and limiting the formation of a strong party deals with PRI's access to public funds. Virtually all sources and informants readily admit that PRI uses funds from the public treasury.21 At the same time, some argue that PAN receives some funds from the treasury.22 No one, however, has been able to document

20Mabry, op. cit., p. 282.

21The only written source to discuss the problems of funding, particularly extravagant costs of campaigns, is Carmona, El Milagro Mexicano pp. 220-225.

22McDonald, Party Systems, p. 249. Most Mexicans argued that PAN was also paid off by the regime.
"payoffs" to the major opposition party so that they continue as a "democratic facade." If PAN does receive these funds, it certainly is not apparent, as the following observations illustrate. At the national level, for example, the several-story PRI headquarters on a main avenue stands conspicuously in contrast to the much smaller PAN headquarters on a side street just off a smaller avenue. In addition, the number of PRI staff members is quite large in comparison to the number of PAN staff members. Further, the PRI staff has private planes available to fly them to all sections of Mexico, while the PAN staff must use commercial airlines.

Even at the state level, the contrast between these two parties is enormous. In Mérida, Yucatán, to illustrate with one case, the PRI headquarters is quite large. As to be expected, the PAN headquarters is much smaller. The differences were even more striking when I accompanied the PRI and PAN candidates on their tours in the 1969 gubernatorial election. The PRI candidate and entourage had at their disposal an air-conditioned bus from the powerful union of bus drivers, while the PAN candidate and his staff had to tour the state in their own cars. (To accompany PAN I likewise had to use my own car.) In addition, the PRI candidate had various gifts, such as irons, etc., to give to people at his rallies; these were apparently donated by the local businessmen. During the final days of the campaign, the PRI candidate used a helicopter to visit remote areas, another item that certainly was not available to PAN.
B. Biased Communication

The second most important characteristics for the development of an opposition party deal with communication. In fact, without communication an opposition party would be unable to gain supporters and to effectively challenge PRI. Under this heading two types of activities are elemental. First, some unbiased coverage of opposition activities is essential if individuals are to be aware of an opposition's existence, policy positions, candidates, etc. Second, another opposition necessity revolves around the unrestricted printing and circulation of opposition party propaganda.

Although some slow changes are visible, the electronic mass media (television and radio) have not covered opposition activities, except to a minimal extent at the national level. The government control over these outlets prohibits coverage of opposition activities, at least in practice, even though theoretically this may be possible. On the other hand, printed mass media (newspapers and magazines) have covered opposition activities, even at the state and local levels. In fact, given the official percentage of opposition vote, the opposition parties receive a much higher share of the printed news than one would anticipate, although the nature of coverage is more important.

23 The government's control over electronic mass media is exemplified by its "national hour" on radio every Sunday night from 10:00 to 11:00. During that time period, all radio stations (including the English station) broadcast the same program, which covers the past week's political events, some cultural activities, etc. Of course, on special occasions, such as the State of the Union message, all radio and television stations must carry these programs live.

24 McDonald, Party Systems, p. 254, also makes this observation.
The nature of newspaper coverage of campaigns needs elaboration. In the 1969 gubernatorial campaign in the state of Yucatán, to illustrate the point, PRI received support and/or controlled three of the four newspapers: Diario del Sureste, Avance de Mérida, Novedades de Yucatán. The first strongly supported PRI and slandered the opposition, while the other two supported PRI and covered opposition activities in a somewhat less biased manner. It should be noted that the above newspapers received their paper for printing from PIPSA (Productora e Importadora de Papel, S.A.), the federal newspaper monopoly, and thus could face serious problems if they deviated from the party line. The Diario de Yucatán, on the other hand, strongly supported PAN and, if generally accurate in its coverage of PRI activities, certainly stressed the official party's negative features. To be sure, it is one of the most independent newspapers in Mexico—if not the most independent. The directors of this newspaper astutely

25For other methods of newspaper control, see William Tuchy and David Ronfeldt, "Political Control and Recruitment of Middle Level Elites in Mexico," Western Political Quarterly (June, 1969), pp. 366-368.

26Many informants argued that the Diario de Yucatán began as a reactionary newspaper around 1924 and still follows that ideological orientation. While the reactionary label depends on one's definition of the term, the revolutionary label is also a source of confusion, for apparently many Mexicans apply this latter term to different political themes of the 1910 Revolution and postrevolutionary period without much regard to more generally accepted left-right distinctions. In any case the Diario de Yucatán is much less biased in its news coverage than the other newspapers. Torres-Ramírez, "The Mexican PAN," pp. 38-40, cites a public opinion survey which shows that this paper has much greater credibility than the others, particularly among the lower socioeconomic classes. She suggests that their circulation is based on their credibility, for the Diario de Yucatán has a daily circulation of around 50,000, Novedades de Yucatán has an estimated 15,000 subscribers, and the Diario del Sureste has about 5,000 subscribers.
receive their printing paper directly from Canada and thus are not subject to this type of official pressure from PIPS A.

The Diario de Yucatán merits closer analysis because of its critical role in supporting the opposition. Further, if similar papers existed in other states, perhaps the opposition would have more seriously challenged PRI in more elections. This opposition paper has built up such an impressive reputation recently that even some PRI officials would volunteer in private that it was the most potent mass media channel in the state of Yucatán. These same officials would also admit that the Diario del Sureste did more harm than good to the PRI cause mainly because of its general tendency toward distortion of the news. According to informants the majority of the Yucatecans consider the Diario de Yucatán their "bible" because it helped define and support their discontent, gave direction to their criticisms, exposed corruption, and published extensive information on PAN's activities and plans. Because of its general opposition to the regime, the offices of this newspaper have been burned down twice, only to be rebuilt and to acquire greater prestige. Consequently, the regime has apparently decided within the past decade or so to let it alone because many of their repressive tactics against it have proved counterproductive.

Since Avance de Mérida is a much more recent newspaper, no estimates were given.

27Mario Menéndez Rodríguez, Yucatán o el Genocidio (México, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Popular, 1964), is an example of this paper's efforts to expose corruption in the sisal industry.
Establishing the credibility of the Diario de Yucatán is quite essential because much of the information on this case comes directly from this source. For six weeks I observed campaign activities of both parties and then checked the descriptions in the four newspapers. I soon became convinced that the most consistently reliable paper was the Diario de Yucatán. Supporting evidence came from discussions with three reporters from the Mérida papers except the Diario del Sureste. These reporters emphatically argued that the Diario de Yucatán was the most accurate one. They agreed that the reporters and editors from the other newspapers were controlled. Two of these reporters-informants, for example, stated that they would occasionally inflate the number of individuals attending a PAN activity because their editors would invariably reduce the number; thus, the reduced number would more accurately reflect reality. Consequently, all three reporters thought that the reputation for accuracy the Diario de Yucatán had acquired among the Yucatecans was well deserved.

One incident clearly exemplifies the differences in the newspapers' coverage of campaign activities. This incident was one of the most emotional of the campaign since it deals with violence against the PRI candidate and his entourage. This occurred in Dzidzantún—a village of 4,615 residents and about two hours by car from Mérida—on Monday night, October 6, 1969. As the PRI candidate, Carlos Loret

de Mola, and his supporters entered the village, some PRI sympathizers told the candidate that some residents would attack him if he entered the main plaza (village square). Loret de Mola, nevertheless, decided to enter the village. In order to protect the buses, the candidate and his supporters decided to walk to the meeting place. Somewhat earlier, however, the advance group for PRI was greeted by some young hecklers. Irritated by the catcalls, one of the PRI members began a fist fight with one of the youngsters. As a result, many residents of Dzidzantún demanded that the PRI Mayor call off the candidate's visit. The Mayor refused, and thus tensions within the village were high.

As Loret de Mola and his supporters approached the plaza, approximately 100 youngsters and some older people began throwing rocks. Immediately, the PRI group ran for cover in the meeting place. Meanwhile, some PRI officials—perhaps security agents or bodyguards—fired their pistols and wounded five residents of the village. In turn, the villagers set out for revenge. To protest himself from the threatening crowd, the candidate and a handful of supporters barricaded themselves in a room, while others called Mérida for military help.

When the situation had calmed down, I talked to four groups of individuals. Talking more openly than I had anticipated and without one dissenting voice, these 13 residents of Dzidzantún volunteered that: 1) their mayor was not freely elected but imposed by Enrique Pacheco Larondo, a State Deputy and President of the bus drivers' union, who was barricaded in the room with Loret de Mola; 2) they were disgruntled with PRI because the mayor wanted to bring running water into the
village but the price was too high considering the low income of the residents; 3) PRI should have never entered the village and provoked the trouble when they found out that people were waiting to attack; 4) PRI agents should not have used pistols against youngsters armed only with rocks.

When the Federal Troops arrived, they dispersed the crowd and took approximately 20 prisoners. Apparently, no one in the PRI group had been injured, except for some minor bruises.

The following morning the PRI newspapers, Diario del Sureste, Avance de Merida, and Novedades de Yucatán, blamed the attack on PAN. Further, it was reported that the youngsters were drunk and that no one knew which side had fired the shots. Moreover, in an open letter to these newspapers, the PRI candidate stated that the attack coincided suspiciously with the departure of the PAN candidate to Mexico City.

On Wednesday, October 8, Novedades de Yucatán printed a confession

29 This type of federal protection was not available to the opposition, at least on one occasion when I was present. As the PAN candidate and his entourage were approaching Temax after a rally in Buctzozt, a group of PAN supporters stopped them on the highway to warn them that some 100 to 200 individuals, led by the mayor of Temax, were waiting in ambush with machetes, rocks, guns, etc. Although the PAN caravan was armed to protect itself, Correa Rachó typically decided on the more prudent course. He asked all to return to Buctzozt, thus avoiding violence, and then called for help from the federal troops stationed in Mérida. Such help never came, and in fact a spokesman in the commander's office reported that they never received the call. Thus, Correa Rachó and his party spent the night in Buctzozt. First, however, the candidate had to persuade the villagers, who had returned from their homes with shotguns, that he did not want an "armed escort" through Temax. Again he averted an armed confrontation.
from the PAN leader of Dzidzantún to the effect that the incident was an attempt to assassinate Loret de Mola. Such an accusation is difficult to support because: 1) apparently, the youngsters were armed only with rocks; 2) I saw no shots fired from the residents of Dzidzantún and definitely saw one PRI agent shoot a youngster (afterwards, the PRI group surrounded this agent in order to protect him from the crowd, which had identified this agent and wanted him either arrested or killed immediately); 3) all shots came from pistols, while it is more probable that the residents had only shotguns for hunting (in any case no shotguns were fired).

That same Wednesday the Diario de Yucatán began printing stories counter to the ones in the other three papers. No reporter from this newspaper covered PRI activities outside of Mérida; thus none was present in Dzidzantún. These reporters investigated the attack and then wrote accounts which coincide with mine. Of course, the majority of Yucatecans believed the coverage in the Diario de Yucatán. The assassination plot reportedly came from two of those arrested in Dzidzantún. They said that they signed a confession concerning a plot to assassinate the PRI candidate because they were tortured with electric shocks on their wet and nude bodies. Later the Judge

30 The reader can check the two versions by reading the various newspapers for several days after the incident.

31 The primary political reporter from the Diario de Yucatán as well as PAN leaders asked for my account of the attack. I declined for obvious reasons. After this incident the directors of this newspaper began to send reporters to cover all PRI rallies.

32 Diario de Yucatán, October 15, 1969.
dismissed these individuals since he considered the evidence of the federal security agents (officially called the Departamento de Averiguaciones Previas or shortened to D.A.P.) "improbable." 33

The PRI-oriented newspapers continued to print Loret de Mola's verbal attacks on PAN leaders as the instigators of the incident at Dzidzantún. It appeared that his attacks on PAN were counterproductive, except with the hard-core PRI supporters. Among those most directly involved, that is, the residents of Dzidzantún, their sentiment against PRI was expressed on election day, for it was one of the lowest percentages PRI received—20 percent (PAN vote was 96%; PRI vote was 24%). 34

Besides local coverage of this incident, the national press began to talk about the climate of violence in this campaign. Excélsior, interestingly, headlined the incident as an attempt to assassinate the PRI candidate. This main headline in what is considered by many the major, national newspaper is suggestive of the nature of newspaper coverage at the national level.

The PAN leaders were quite cautious in dealing with this incident since they feared that PRI was trying to blow it out of proportion. Thus, they reasoned, the Federal Government could "legally" restrict PAN's activities or later justify the annulment of the elections.

Similarly in the San Luis Potosí case, the regime controlled

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33 Diario de Yucatán, October 15, 1969.
34 Ibid., November 24, 1969
communications. The major difference between the press in these two cases is that the opposition in San Luis Potosí initiated a newspaper for the specific purpose of helping their candidate in the gubernatorial race. In the 1958 mayoral campaign, Nava received some support from El Sol de San Luis and virtually none from El Heraldo, which has a smaller circulation that the former. But, during the Nava administration, they both vehemently attacked his reforms, probably because of orders from the Mexican regime. Thus, in 1960, when around 26-28 key navistas told Dr. Nava that "he had an obligation to be the gubernatorial candidate," these same core supporters decided that victory or even a strong showing was impossible without an opposition newspaper. At a high cost to these individuals and to all Nava's supporters, Tribuna started publication in October, 1960.

No one could expect Tribuna to be unbiased. Nava himself admits that the paper frequently overstepped the boundary of accurate reporting, for its purpose was to reinforce the anti-regime attitudes of its supporters as well as to orient their specific opposition behavior. In addition, Tribuna attempted to counteract statements from the regime-controlled papers and thus engaged in a psychological battle. In spite of these factors, the reporting in the opposition paper appears to have been much less biased than in the other two papers. In any case, Potosinans throughout the state strongly supported the opposition paper and boycotted the other two. Informants report, for example, that Tribuna's paid circulation throughout the state was at least three times that of the previously dominant newspaper, El Sol de San Luis; thus the former sold around 15,000 copies daily
Starting an opposition paper in Mexico is no easy task. The initial costs of machinery and the operating costs of rent, salaries, paper, and many other items are quite high. Informants argue that in spite of some major contributors, there were a high number of medium and small contributors. Apparently, no outside money (that is, outside of the state of San Luis Potosí) was received.

The regime obviously saw Tribuna as an enormous threat. Almost no information or strategy of PRI was sacred because this newspaper could and would print it. Of course, the overwhelming number of navistas in all sectors of society were more than willing to cooperate. A case in point is the famous conversation between the national PRI President, Corona de Rosal, and the PRI Gubernatorial Candidate, López Davila. Essentially, López Dávila stated that he wanted to resign as the official candidate because of the enormous opposition he had encountered. Corona de Rosal responded that he had to fight and could not make PRI look ridiculous. According to Nava, Tribuna, which printed this conversation almost verbatim, received this information from some of the 80 telephone operators in the state capital. As strong supporters of the opposition, these women were willing to listen in to calls made by government officials and to pass on the embarrassing information.

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35 Estimates vary primarily because the number of sold copies varied from day to day.

In Sonora, in contrast, the opposition had no newspaper. At the same time, the anti-PRI sentiment was so high that opposition activities were covered more accurately in the generally PRI-oriented press than was the situation in the other two cases. Of the two major newspapers, El Imparcial and El Regional, the former is considered more accurate. Campaign news, of course, was secondary to the mass demonstrations, strikes, and other forms of protest. But when these papers reported on the campaigns, it appears—at least according to the observations below—that they covered opposition activities more extensively in some cases.

When PAN announced its gubernatorial candidate, for instance, El Imparcial printed this news as well as a large picture of the candidate on its first page. In another example, the day after the election, El Regional printed a picture of the PAN gubernatorial candidate and his wife as they were voting but did not do the same for the PRI gubernatorial candidate.

The unrestricted printing and circulation of opposition party propaganda is likewise critical to the development of effective legal oppositions. As reported earlier in the San Luis Potosí case, when opposition activities did not die down after the campaign, the government sent pistoleros (gunmen) and others to wreck the Tribuna offices and machinery as well as to beat the staff and threaten their lives. The paper reappeared but in a much shorter form. Just as the government officials had hoped, their tactics had succeeded in

37 El Imparcial, May 19 and 20, 1967.
38 El Regional, July 3, 1967.
hamstringing the opposition's activities. In the Yucatán, on at least
one occasion, an estimated 15,000 out of 80,000 copies of the Diario
de Yucatán were immediately bought up by certain individuals on
November 22, 1969, just one day before the election. Perhaps this was
an attempt to prevent some voters from receiving final information on
the location of polling places, etc. In general, however, it appears
that outside of the San Luis Potosí case, which occurred in the early
1960s, the regime has now become more tolerant in this area and,
according to informants, only confiscates copies from opposition party
publications, such as PAN's La Nación, when particularly sensitive
information is published.

C. Limited Competition for Supporters

The limited competition for supporters further illustrates how
Mexican incumbents hamper the development of an opposition. This limited
competition includes threats to mass followers, who are generally
defectors from PRI or previously apathetic individuals, as well as
gratuities and bribes to followers of the official party. These threats
include many tactics, such as shutting off electricity at an opposition
rally, loss of job, physical beating, and others. To gain supporters and
particularly to boost attendance at their rallies, PRI organizers offer
free meals, beer, transportation, a few pesos, exchange favors, etc.
The 1969 Yucatecan gubernatorial election provides many examples of
these tactics.

Frequently in rural areas, a PAN rally was held without the
benefit of lights. Many of the local PRI mayors and supporters would
shut off the electricity on the evening of or during a PAN rally.\(^{39}\)

While PAN had its own power plant for amplifiers, it certainly had no manner of lighting the main plaza. As a result many PAN supporters, particularly women, were discouraged from attending such an activity in the dark.

Some PAN supporters received notice from their employers that their services were no longer needed. Baltasar Medina worked at the Federal Commission of Electricity in Progreso. He had not only engaged in PAN activities but also had encouraged his fellow employees to support the opposition. His notice of dismissal was attributed to these activities.\(^{40}\) These incidents did not seem to be too widespread, but it appears that Yucatecans considered them typical of PRI behavior.

A more brutal and unusual tactic occurred when some residents of Mérida covered PRI propaganda which had been painted on their house without their permission. One evening police entered their home, fired shots, and beat five individuals, all ostensibly to show what could happen when Yucatecans tampered with PRI propaganda. Public outrage was high, as indicated by the letter of protest (with more than 80 signatures) published in the \textit{Diario de Yucatán}.\(^{41}\)

On October 30, Correa Rachó attacked a practice he attributed to PRI supporters. He stated that circulars with promises he supposedly had made were being distributed in the interior of the state. These

\(^{39}\)Novedades de Yucatán, September 17, 1969.  
\(^{40}\)Diario de Yucatán, October 19, 1969.  
\(^{41}\)Ibid., October 26, 1969.
promises included that he would: 1) get rid of businessmen; 2) lower the price of corn; 3) abolish all religions except Catholicism. Yucatecans generally accepted such tactics as originating with PRI.

Another tactic was using, without permission, the names of businessmen and prestigious members of the community in ads supporting the PRI candidate. I learned from discussions with these individuals that they resented the use of their name but did not complain openly because they recognized the incumbents' power to affect their businesses and other activities.

To attract large crowds, PRI organizers used a combination of gratuities and coercive pressures. Examples are quite easy to find. In Motul, I counted some 23 buses and 11 trucks used to bring "supporters" to a PRI rally. Interestingly, PRI's attendance of around 2,500 was smaller during the evening, when the temperature is cooler, than was PAN's attendance of 6,000 during the day, when the sun is quite hot. In Progreso 18 buses were parked at the site of the meeting, while local bus drivers—probably under duress—were offering free rides to the rally. Some 3,000 attended.

On November 9, PRI held a meeting in CORDEMEX (the Federal Government's sisal cooperative). Elaborate publicity, such

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42Diario de Yucatán, October 31, 1969.

43The report of the PRI rally in the Diario de Yucatán, October 9, 1969, coincided with my observations. The PAN rally occurred on November 3, or later in the campaign, when attendance might be expected to increase. See the Diario de Yucatán, November 4, 1969.

44Diario de Yucatán, November 12, 1969.
as full-page ads in the newspapers, preceded the event. Trains and 
buses carried passengers to the rally. Soft drinks, cookies, and 
entertainment were advertised and freely provided. Loret de Mola 
claimed that some 23,000 had attended, but other estimates were around 
12,000. Finally, when the PRI candidate was returning from Mexico 
City, more than 4,000 individuals were transported in 61 buses and other 
means of transportation to greet the candidate at the airport. Some 
500 cars, most apparently from the taxidrivers' union and under pressure 
from union leaders, were lined up along the road to greet Loret de Mola 
and his caravan.

Whether PRI organizers still pay individuals to attend some of 
their activities, as claimed by PAN and other sources, is difficult 
to ascertain. To be sure this could still be the case with the illiterate 
and uneducated population, particularly peasants, but the more educated 
are probably subjected to more subtle types of control. The case of 
one of my friends, a primary school teacher, is illustrative. She 
wanted a transfer from a rural school to one closer to her home in Mérida 
in order to avoid long, daily trips and thus time spent away from her 
family. Leaders of the teachers' union said that she had to be present

45Diario de Yucatán, November 10, 1969.

46Ibid., November 17, 1969.

47PRI has a well-deserved reputation for paying and/or forcing 
individuals, especially peasants, to attend their rallies. See Bo 
Anderson and James D. Cockcroft, "Control and Cooptation in Mexican 
Politics," in Irving Louis Horovitz, Josue de Castro, and John Gerassi 
at many of the PRI candidate's meetings in Merida before she could receive the transfer.

In contrast, PAN supporters at rallies were motivated to attend for other reasons. Frequently, they remarked: "No hay pagados aqui," translated as "no one is paid (or forced) to be here." In fact, on some occasions PAN supporters had to make considerable sacrifices in terms of transportation costs, etc. to attend PAN activities.

Many of these practices occurred in other cases. In San Luis Potosi, the entire state and federal apparatus worked to the disadvantage of the opposition, as the following examples show. First, the busing and trucking of supporters to PRI rallies is standard procedure. Second, one of Nava's campaign coordinators, Jesus Acosta, was attacked and shot by PRI workers in Tamazunchale. One suspects that the killing and perhaps even the attack on the Nava committee could have been due to high emotions, but the refusal of the regime thereafter to arrest the assassin, who was clearly identified by witnesses, suggested to many pro-Nava supporters that those who perpetrated violence against them would also be above the law. Third, violence against navistas was common as some 200 opposition supporters were reportedly injured up to June 22. Finally, some subtle pressures were exerted against businessmen and teachers.

\[48^{\text{Tribuna, June 26, 1961.}}\]
\[49^{\text{Ibid., May 22 and afterwards in 1961.}}\]
\[50^{\text{Ibid., throughout the campaign but especially on June 23, 1961.}}\]
\[51^{\text{Ibid.}}\]
In the San Luis Potosí case, one event merits special attention, if not because the source was absolutely accurate, then because many Mexicans believe that public funds are used in this manner for major, PRI rallies. Such a rally to close the campaign occurred on June 25, 1961. A reporter from Tribuna estimated and spelled out the typical costs of such efforts (Table II-2). (Since all costs are expressed in Mexican pesos and the rate of exchange was $12.50 pesos at the time to one United States dollar, then the total estimated cost of this rally in dollars is $74,520.00.) Dr. Nava admitted that these costs were overestimated but thought that a realistic estimate would be half this amount or roughly $37,000 dollars. According to this article, many peasants roamed about town afterwards since they said PRI organizers had not paid them as promised and had not provided return transportation. Again, many Mexicans believe that PRI organizers promise money to entice peasants to attend rallies but, afterwards, pocket the money for themselves.

D. Control Over Voting Procedures

The control over voting procedures especially prevents electoral oppositions from gaining any momentum. In addition to other tactics already discussed, the incumbents have manipulated the electoral process in order to officially win any election they desperately want. Since the election itself is the most visible part of the entire electoral process, I will detail how PRI has officially won in highly competitive elections. Five important aspects of these competitive elections are: voter registration, adequate information on the location of the polling
### Table II-2

**ESTIMATES OF TYPICAL COSTS (in Mexican Pesos) OF A MAJOR PRI RALLY IN 1961 IN SAN LUIS POTOSI**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gratuities to 15,000 people at $25.00 each</td>
<td>$375,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent on 100 buses</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent on 50 freight cars</td>
<td>$124,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs to local press</td>
<td>$30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs for national press including editorialists and columnists</td>
<td>$175,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio, television, and movie advertising</td>
<td>$40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing, food, etc. for invited PRI guests</td>
<td>$25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs for entertainers from Mexico City</td>
<td>$35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party expenses</td>
<td>$12,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, miscellaneous costs</td>
<td>$15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$931,500</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

places, free vote according to the "one man, one vote" principle, the presence of opposition representatives to aid in the final counting of the votes, and official recognition of a victory when the opposition has won.

Little information is available on voter registration, except that known opposition supporters can be denied a voting credential. In the city of San Luis Potosí in 1961, for example, many residents were not allowed to register but then had been given permission to vote. When election day came, however, they were still prevented from voting. Consequently, I will deal more with the critical voting procedure, the counting afterwards, and official recognition.

Undoubtedly, adequate information to the voters on the location of the polling places is essential to fair elections. In the 1969 Yucatecan election, approximately 70 to 75 percent of the polling places throughout the state were changed. These changes were officially announced in the Diario del Sureste on November 2, some three weeks before the election. Because of this paper's low credibility and circulation, these changes went unnoticed until the Diario de Yucatán reprinted them on November 7 and started investigating the changes. Their articles showed several illegal procedures in Mérida: 1) many (perhaps as high as 40 percent) of the new polling places were in individual homes; 2) several were changed to union meeting places (controlled by PRI); 3) one was changed to the main PRI headquarters; 4) many were placed in areas distant from the voters; and 5) some could...
not be found. Complaints to the State Electoral Commission fell on deaf ears. No estimates have been found on the number of people who were unable to vote because of the confusion created by these changes.

The numerous irregularities on election day, November 23, 1969, suggest that the incumbents had extensive plans to cover up an opposition victory. I have presented some of these previously but will list the major irregularities here so that the reader can appreciate the scope of electoral fraud:

1. In some areas, such as Tizimin, only a minority was allowed to vote.

2. Many reports showed that ballot boxes were stuffed before the voting began.

3. PAN representatives were not allowed to carry out their legal duties, such as supervising the voting and afterwards helping count the votes at each polling place, in 317 out of the 754 voting places.

4. Those PAN members who were insistent about carrying out their legal functions were frequently jailed.

5. Many regime officials supervised the vote of their subordinates. In Mérida, for instance, the police personnel chief watched each policeman as he marked his ballot.

6. After the voting many ballot boxes were taken to other areas, such as Mérida, to be counted.

7. Many PRI supporters voted several times.

A few days after the election, the State Electoral Commission announced the final results, which I have already dealt with in Chapter I.

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52 See the Diario de Yucatán for several days beginning with November 7, 1969. Also see Torres-Ramirez, "The Mexican Pan," p. 89.

53 For these and other irregularities, see the Diario de Yucatán on November 24, 25, and 26.
Of course, the officials on this commission "counted" the results without the aid of any opposition representatives.

The control of the electoral procedure in San Luis Potosí parallels the Yucatán case in many ways. To understand how the regime controlled these election results, I will present parts of the petition presented by Nava to Mexico's Supreme Court.54

1. No offices were established for voter registration throughout the state. Consequently, on election day, the voter lists were arbitrarily prepared, thus eliminating the majority of voters. In the state capital, to be sure, four special voting booths were set up for voters, who had been unable to register, but the enormous vote recorded here in favor of Nava was declared null and void by the State Congress.

2. The election officials in the voting booths almost always favored PRI. Opposition representatives, of course, were not allowed in the polling places. In addition, people had to vote amid threats carried out by the army, who obeyed the orders of the electoral officials.

3. With army protection, ballot boxes were carried away without an open count on the scene. This even occurred in places were numerous citizens were still waiting to cast their ballot.

4. Violation of the right of petition, that is, numerous questions directed by the Nava committee to the State Electoral Commission were ignored.

Many of these violations were rather obvious, but the Supreme Court refused to investigate these claims. This refusal, perhaps more than any other official act, exhibits the extensive control of the regime as well as national collusion to deny victory to the Nava movement.

Now that we have seen how the incumbents can manipulate the electoral process, we can easily understand how the Mexican regime

54 Estrada M., La Grieta en el Yugo, pp. 239-243.
prevents an opposition from officially winning a competitive election. In some cases, however, voting irregularities are so widespread that even the incumbents realize that the PRI candidate cannot take office. In such cases, as some Baja California cities, the regime annuls the elections and thus justifies their not turning the office over to the opposition because of "irregularities."55

E. Regime Harassment of Opposition Rule

At the mayoral level, where the opposition has taken office, the incumbents at the state and perhaps even the national level have placed a series of obstacles in front of the opposition administration. To be sure the incumbents of different parties at the various administrative levels in more democratic societies may limit their cooperation with each other and may, in some cases, attempt to embarrass the opposition and prove them ineffective. In Mexico, however, the regime resorts to tactics which create high tensions on all sides. In Mérida, for example, businessmen would close their shops, students would demonstrate, and crowds of 30,000 people would attend a protest rally; virtually all of these protests in this case were against the state government. The importance to the oppositions of being popular to voters is seen in two of the cases—San Luis Potosí and Mérida—where the mayors later ran for governor. If they had not proved themselves more effective than the previous PRI administrations, then the voters would probably not

55Johnson, Mexican Democracy, pp. 139-140.
have given them much support in their gubernatorial campaigns.

I will present a few examples of these obstacles in the Mérida case. First, some establishments did not pay taxes as previously, thus denying the opposition vital sources of revenue. Second, some individuals threw garbage into the streets to embarrass the new administration's apparently successful attempts to keep the city cleaner than the PRI administration had done. Third, at 2:00 A.M. on June 9, 1969, the Governor transferred local control of the Mérida police to his office. His justification was that the local police had become a "threat" to the community and that the PAN administration have proved itself incapable of maintaining public security. Finally, Alfonso Trueba, a PAN city councilman, turned on the PAN government and attempted to vilify it, all ostensibly because the PRI had bribed him. 57

I have almost no examples for San Luis Potosí and Hermosillo. In the former Nava mentioned that the state government had cut off some funds and that the two newspapers attempted to discredit his activities. In the latter case I have no evidence.

In this chapter I have presented evidence to show that the Mexican regime has prevented the development of a strong opposition. This evidence included examples of the regime's control over the formation of an opposition party, biased communication, limited competition for supporters, control over voting procedures, and the regime's harassment of opposition rule. But, while the evidence indicates that the regime

57Torres-Ramírez, "The Mexican PAN," p. 70.
has prevented the development of a strong opposition, I have not yet dealt with the present (although limited) level of opposition support. For instance, why has the regime allowed the formation of opposition parties but then denied them other requisites to effectively compete with the official party? Why has the regime allowed the opposition some victories at the mayoral level? What conditions account for the present level of opposition support in noncompetitive elections? In the next chapter we can attempt to answer these questions about the present level of opposition support.
Chapter III
HYPOTHESES ON THE LIMITED DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTORAL OPPOSITIONS

In the previous chapters I have dealt with the three most important challenges to PRI at the gubernatorial level and concluded that the Mexican regime has prevented the development of a strong opposition party. But even with the regime's control over electoral behavior, opposition parties have challenged PRI, have officially won some of these competitive elections at the mayoral level, and in noncompetitive elections receive a certain percentage of the vote.¹

The emergence of competitive electoral movements is best accounted for by special conditions, which I will detail in Chapter IV, although in this chapter I will make some observations on their emergence. The main purpose of this chapter, therefore, is 1) to account for the official opposition victories at the mayoral level in San Luis Potosi (1958), Hermosillo (1967), and Mérida (1967) as well as 2) to account for the present official level of opposition support in noncompetitive elections.

In attempting to account for the present level of opposition support, we are limited by the available data in Mexico. In contrast to excellent data (such as surveys, detailed and accurate election

¹PAN received 14 percent of the national vote in the 1970 presidential elections.
results) on party support for more developed political systems, the best Mexican data are the percentages of the vote for each party by federal entity and qualitative assessments of electoral behavior. Because of the problem of electoral fraud, the reader must keep in mind throughout this chapter that we are discussing the official level of opposition support.

In spite of data limitations, I will discuss some hypotheses on opposition development. In the first section of this chapter, I will attempt to account for the regime's recognition of opposition victories through a presentation of some hypotheses from studies by Robert Dahl and Charles Anderson. Briefly, these studies suggest that oppositions may be accepted by the incumbents when coercion of oppositions could fail or when the opponents of the government show that they will not attempt to change certain practices, as to be elaborated later. In addition, I will suggest other hypotheses derived from my case studies.

The second section deals with some hypotheses to account for the present level of opposition support in noncompetitive elections. The major hypothesis tested in the literature on Mexico suggests that federal entities or urban areas with higher (rather than lower) levels of socioeconomic development tend to support opposition candidates to a greater extent. At the same time, PRI receives anywhere from 65 to 99 percent of the vote in different federal entities (Table I-1). Thus, in addition to the regime's control over electoral behavior and over the final results, we might suspect that the official party has a certain level of popular support. This popular support, of course, would limit the ability of the opposition to mobilize support. In fact, I have
argued that PRI would continue to win the majority of elections if the regime implemented significant electoral reforms. Although the available data cannot show us the extent of PRI's popularity, perhaps we can make inferences from the favorable economic growth in each federal entity and nationally for the past three decades. But, while this aggregate growth is impressive, I will show that the distribution of the benefits of this growth has not been equitable and thus will suggest reasons for PRI's continued high level of support. Unfortunately, in many cases I will have to substitute national data for state data when the latter is not available.

A. Regime's Recognition of Opposition Victories

Out of the large number of Mexican elections, only a few can be classified as competitive. In these competitive elections the regime has recognized some opposition victories at the mayoral level but never beyond this level. The most significant official opposition victories occurred in the state capitals of San Luis Potosí, Hermosillo, and Mérida (Table III-1). At the same time, probable opposition victories at the gubernatorial level occurred in these same states, although the regime did not recognize these victories. As we have already seen, the regime's suppression of these movements has prevented them from continuing. As a result, PRI was able to re-establish its dominance in subsequent elections at the mayoral level. In other words, all these opposition movements appeared during one period of time in different federal entities, and after the regime's suppression, have not appeared again.
Table III-1
- SUMMARY OF THREE OPPOSITION CAMPAIGNS AT THE MAYORAL AND GUBERNATORIAL LEVELS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Previous Party Activity</th>
<th>Regime’s Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>San Luis</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>UCP</td>
<td>Dr. Salvador Nava M.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Recognized victory but put up obstacles to administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potosi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonora</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>Jorge Valdez Munoz</td>
<td>Not as high as in Yucatán</td>
<td>Recognized victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yucatán</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>Lic. Víctor M. Correa Rachó</td>
<td>Considerable</td>
<td>Recognized victory but put up obstacles to administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Luis</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>PDF</td>
<td>Dr. Salvador Nava M.</td>
<td>As Mayor, Nava had implemented popular reforms</td>
<td>Denied victory and extensive repression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potosi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yucatán</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>Lic. Víctor M. Correa Rachó</td>
<td>As Mayor, Correa Rachó had implemented popular reforms</td>
<td>Denied victory. No repression needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aThe independent movement built around Dr. Nava had a couple of labels. The first was Unión Civica Potosina (Civic Potosinan Union). The second was Partido Demócrata Potosino (Potosinan Democratic Party).
For these reasons we would not expect the emergence of these movements to be related to specific socioeconomic conditions but rather to special conditions. The special conditions revolved around a catalyzing incident and thus these opposition movements were initially formed to protest some aspect of the regime's behavior, as to be detailed in Chapter IV. But perhaps some socioeconomic conditions could create latent discontent with the regime. Unfortunately, we have no data in these three cases to show that this occurred.

Having reviewed the three most significant opposition victories as well as the competitive movements at the gubernatorial level, we can now speculate on reasons for the regime's recognition of opposition victories in some cases and not in others. Robert Dahl as well as Charles Anderson suggest reasons why a regime might allow new power contenders to enter the political arena. Dahl deals more explicitly with opposition parties than does Anderson and argues:

Opposition is likely to be permitted in a political system if
1) the government believes that an attempt to coerce the opposition is likely to fail, or
2) even if the attempt were to succeed, the costs of coercion would exceed the gains.2

Anderson, who does not refer exclusively to opposition parties, does spell out perhaps more clearly some conditions for the acceptance of new "power contenders" within the Latin American context:

New contenders are admitted to the political system when they fulfill two conditions in the eyes of existing power contenders. First, they must demonstrate possession of a power capability sufficient to pose a threat to existing contenders. Second, they must be perceived by other contenders

2Dahl, Political Oppositions, p. xiv.
as willing to abide by the rules of the game, to permit existing contenders to continue to exist and operate in the political system. If the first condition is not fulfilled, the power contender will be ignored, no matter what the merits of his case may be . . . . If the second condition is not fulfilled, efforts will be made to suppress the new power contender. 3

While most of these arguments are not helpful in suggesting why the regime has occasionally recognized an opposition victory at the mayoral level, most of them undoubtedly help to account for the Mexican incumbents' suppression of electoral oppositions. With regard to Dahl's first argument, we have seen that the Mexican government has an almost absolute control over physical force. Dahl's expansion of his second argument is even more helpful, for he "surmises" that successful coercion can turn into costly failure when the elites and masses have certain values or an ideology, such as a "sense of nationhood that includes the opposition; a distaste for violence; a commitment to a liberal ideology; or economic and social goals that require internal stability." 4 The conclusion in my three case studies, therefore, would have to be that these values are not shared by at least the elites. And to apply Anderson's arguments, the Mexican oppositions neither have a power capability similar to those of the incumbents nor would they be willing to permit existing contenders to operate in the traditional manner. The latter reason, in fact, might help explain why PRI reconquered the municipalities of San Luis Potosi, Hermosillo, and Mérida after allowing the opposition administration to rule for one term only.


4 Dahl, Political Oppositions, p. xvi.
Perhaps the following hypotheses would better account for the regime's occasional recognition of opposition victories at the mayoral level. First, the regime might be taken by surprise, that is, not expect such opposition strength. In other words, the regime might be able to suppress these movements when it has a long period of time to prepare but not on a short notice. This, then, could tie in with Dahl's second argument in the sense that the costs of coercion would exceed the gains if done hastily. (Italics mine). Second, the lack of internal consensus within the local power structure could result in official recognition. This is particularly true if the PRI candidate is much less popular than the opposition's nominee, and/or some influential members of the local power structure aid the opposition. Third, recognition of a limited number of opposition victories could present a facade for democracy and/or work as a safety valve. This could also provide just enough incentive to prevent an opposition party, such as PAN, from disbanding when discouraged over the limited role it is allowed. Fourth, the opposition might have such an overwhelming majority of supporters that the costs of coercion might exceed the gains. In short, perhaps winning by 55 to 60 percent of the vote does not entitle one to official recognition, while 65 to 70 percent could.

These hypotheses are supported to some extent in the cases of San Luis Potosi, Hermosillo, and Mérida. The first hypothesis on the opposition surprising the regime applies to all cases except Hermosillo, where anti-regime sentiment was so high (because of PRI's imposition of Faustino Félix Serna) that the regime could not have been taken by surprise. The second hypothesis on the lack of internal consensus in the
local power structure is valid in all three cases, while the third hypothesis on the facade for democracy is equally valid in all instances. Moreover, here the safety valve principle applies to Sonora where recognition of a lower level victory could give the regime more latitude in successfully denying PAN a gubernatorial victory at the same time. The fourth hypothesis on overwhelming opposition support is warranted in all these cases because the official opposition vote was at least two or three to one. Some evidence even suggests that it could have been higher, since the initially announced vote in San Luis Potosi in 1958 was 26,319 for Nava and 1,683 for his opponent or 94 percent of the vote for the opposition. The official margin for Nava was later announced as 66.5 percent. Initial results in the other two cases were higher than the final ones, although not as high as in San Luis Potosi.

In this section we have seen that the regime appears to follow a reasonably clear strategy in recognizing opposition victories, and we have speculated on hypotheses for that strategy. In elaboration on the regime's strategy, we could say that it involves: 1) recognition of some opposition victories at the mayoral level, particularly after 1965, when Carlos Madrazo attempted to reform the internal structure of the official party so that PRI candidates at the local level could be more

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5Among other reforms Madrazo wanted open primaries within PRI. For a case study on the results of these reforms, see W. V. D'Antonio and Richard Suter, "Elecciones Preliminares en un Municipio Mexicano: Nuevas Tendencias en la Lucha de Mexico hacia la Democracia," Revista Mexicana de Sociologia (Enero-Marzo, 1967), pp. 93-108.

The Madrazo attempts at reform are discussed quite well in Joseph C. Goulden, "Mexico: PRI's False Front Democracy," Paper, 1966, available through the Foreign Affairs Research Documentation Center, U.S. Department of State, pp. 19-25. Also see Kenneth F. Johnson, Mexican Democracy,
democratically selected, 2) no official recognition of an opposition victory beyond the mayoral level, and 3) to reconquering city administrations lost to the opposition. In short, while the regime allows opposition parties to participate in elections, the regime, at the same time, prevents them from gaining a foothold and further threatening PRI's overwhelming dominance. In the final analysis it again appears certain that the opposition can do little to enhance its own position but rather is generally dependent on the regime for official recognition of its victories. Likewise, in noncompetitive elections the opposition is also heavily dependent on the regime, as we will now see in the following section.

B. Present Level of Opposition Support in Noncompetitive Elections

While the regime's control over electoral behavior is the most significant factor in limiting the development of a strong opposition party, other factors could also help account for the present level of opposition support in noncompetitive elections. We would first suspect that the official party has a certain level of popular support. Unfortunately, the available data cannot help us determine the extent of popular support. Hence, because of these data limitations, we might attempt


6 When the opposition won 17 city administrations in the late 1960s, the regime decided to reconquer all these. See the article reprinted verbatim from Mexico City's Excélsior in the Diario de Yucatán, November 24, 1970. The article implies that extralegal tactics were generally used to win back all these municipalities while Alfonso Martínez Domínguez was President of PRI's National Executive Committee.
to make inferences about PRI's support from the favorable economic growth in Mexico for the past 35 years. At the same time, we should examine other hypotheses which might be related to PRI’s support, such as the distribution of benefits, government spending, and the location of federal entities. To start with we can examine the hypothesis on socio-economic development and opposition support; this hypothesis is central to the studies on Mexico by Ames, Reyna, and Walton and Sween.

Ames attempted to account for the bases of PRI's support. His model (Table III-2) accounts for 77 percent of the variance and thus merits closer scrutiny. To be sure, many scholars have criticized Ames's study because he only briefly qualified official election results and did not deal adequately with the general problem of PRI's control over electoral behavior. Recently, for instance, Kenneth F. Johnson attacked this study by arguing that its author is "most concerned with the niceties of quantitative data analysis and much less concerned with the substantive anchoring which his analysis postulates." Other scholars, particularly Mexicans, severely criticize this study in private.

To evaluate Ames's study we can analyze the high relationship between the level of urbanization in each federal entity and the percentage of PRI vote (see Figure III-1). Urbanization is defined as the percentage of population in each federal entity living in communities of more than 2,500 individuals. In choosing urbanization as a measure of "level of development," Ames reviews the arguments of George Blanksten, Ronald Ridker, Edward Shils, S.N. Eisenstadt, Gerhard Lenski,

7Johnson, Mexican Democracy, p. 84, footnote.
Table III-2
AMES'S FINDINGS: STANDARDIZED MULTIPLE REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS
ASSOCIATED WITH PRI'S VOTE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRI Vote</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>-.579**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Nonintegration</td>
<td>-.238**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence on U.S. Border</td>
<td>.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure of the Opposition</td>
<td>-.418**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliated Members</td>
<td>-.174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits</td>
<td>-.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout</td>
<td>.276**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiple Correlation Coefficient: .880
Coefficient of Determination: .774

*Significant at the .10 level.
** Significant at the .05 level.

Figure III-1
AMES' SCATTERGRAM SHOWING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN URBANIZATION AND PERCENTAGE OF PRI VOTES BY FEDERAL ENTITIES

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William D'Antonio and William Form, and L. Vincent Padgett, who "generally agree that conditions in urban areas are more favorable to the development of oppositions." Thus, there is theoretical justification for choosing this variable. Ames's election data come from the following: the presidential elections of 1952, 1958, and 1964, and the congressional elections of 1955, 1961, and 1967.

But because of electoral fraud and the regime's control over electoral behavior, one suspects that, while Ames accurately measured some relationships, he did not give sound reasons for these high relationships. The problem appears to lie with the type of study, which is insensitive to the nonquantitative conditions which might better account for the high relationship between such variables as urbanization and PRI support. In other words, urbanization might explain a higher percentage of the variance because traditional PRI practice is to load peasants on buses and trucks by offering them a few pesos, a free meal, some variety of cheap liquor, and some excitement in return for their vote. Further, as we have seen in the three competitive cases, rural ballot boxes are easier to stuff than urban ones. In contrast, the urban vote is not as easily manipulated.

This does not mean that a relationship does not exist between urbanization and the vote direction but rather that the relationship is probably lower. In fact, the tendency of a high urban vote against the party in power is confirmed in eight other Latin American countries by

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McDonald, who used the concept of a core (capital city and surrounding area versus the rest of the country) rather than the percentage living in urban areas. The urban loss in Venezuela was 25.2 percent, in Mexico 22.0 percent, in El Salvador 20.0 percent, while this loss in Colombia, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Panama, and Argentina was 7.0 percent or less.\(^9\) As McDonald argues:

> The core area opposition tendency affects liberal, reform regimes as often as conservative traditional ones. The pattern suggests rather high levels of discontent in core area electorates, perhaps induced by economic factors, expressed as opposition party activity.\(^{10}\)

Because of the problems involved in cross-national comparisons of this type (extent of regime control and electoral fraud), one cannot make explicit inferences about the extent of the urban bias in Mexico. Still, one cannot fault Ames for showing that higher urbanization and lower PRI vote are associated. Thus, while the extent of that relationship remains in doubt, we can nevertheless conclude that PRI support is higher in federal entities with lower levels of socioeconomic development. Conversely, opposition support is higher in federal entities with higher levels of socioeconomic development.

While this major finding of Ames's study is confirmed by Jose Luis Reyna, the latter gives better reasons for higher opposition support in more developed federal entities. Reyna argues that the electoral results are a "measure of political control . . . given the type of party

\(^{9}\)McDonald, Party Systems, p. 302.

\(^{10}\)Ibid.
system extant in Mexico.¹¹ This Mexican author used the same elections for analysis as Ames and used not only urbanization but also industrialization and literacy as indicators of socioeconomic development in the federal entities. Reyna used the same measure of urbanization as Ames (percentage of inhabitants in communities of more than 2,500), while he measured the two remaining variables as the percentage involved in manufacturing occupations and the percentage of the population six years of age and older who can read and write. His findings (Table III-3)—which are measured by Pearson's "r" and thus differ from Ames's—further confirm the relationship between higher levels of development and higher opposition vote in the federal entities.

In order to account for this relationship, Reyna hypothesized that those involved in rural occupations would be easier for the regime to control than those in more urban occupations. Hence he used the percentage of the population in each federal entity in the following four groups: 1) executives (except in agriculture), professionals, and technicians; 2) office workers, businessmen and street vendors; 3) mine and petroleum workers and those directly and indirectly involved with production; and 4) all agriculture workers. The first three groups represented more urban occupations, while the last was definitely rural. In Table III-3 we can see that Reyna's hypothesis of more regime control over rural groups is confirmed since the correlation between all agriculture workers—the only rural category—and the PRI vote is positive whereas the other three are negative.

Table III-3

REYNA'S FINDINGS: CORRELATIONS (Pearson's "r") ASSOCIATED WITH THE PRI VOTE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Vote for PRI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>-.728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrialization</td>
<td>-.653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy</td>
<td>-.460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Occupation:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Executives,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals,</td>
<td>-.498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Office Workers,</td>
<td>-.570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street Venders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mine and Petroleum</td>
<td>-.388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. All Agriculture</td>
<td>+.495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relationship between higher levels of socioeconomic development and higher opposition support is also confirmed in different elections and with different units of analysis in a study by Walton and Sween. These authors selected the 1961, 1964, and 1967 Federal Deputy elections in addition to the Presidential and Senatorial elections of 1964. Moreover, they selected municipios (urban areas) of 5,000 or more inhabitants as the units of analysis rather than the 32 federal entities. Walton and Sween's data, therefore, have a strong urban bias because the rural population (50 percent of the total population) is excluded. As a result of this operationalization, Walton and Sween had 318 units for analysis but frequently could get complete electoral data for only 230 to 300 municipios. In any case they found a low but consistent correlation and concluded that "the greater the degree of urbanization, the higher the level of opposition voting." 13

In discussing this and other findings, Walton and Sween caution against underestimating the role of the regime in affecting electoral behavior. In fact, they state: "Perhaps the best explanation of the voting patterns demonstrated is that they vary directly with PRI organizational strength and the absence of rivalry." 14 As a result, these authors suggest why urbanization has the above impact on political behavior

12 According to the 1970 Mexican Census, 50 percent of all Mexicans lived in communities of 4,999 or less. For the election years Walton and Sween chose, the percentage of the population excluded would have been slightly higher than 50 percent.


14 Ibid., p. 742.
in Mexico. Rather than the size or number of individuals living in an urban area accounting for this relationship, they reason, it is the "relative concentration" of urban characteristics (such as percent urban, educated, economically active, non-agricultural employment, and others) which leads to less PRI control and thus greater opposition support. In other words in urban areas individuals tend to move into middle class professions, which are not as easily controlled as at least two of the official party sectors—peasants and workers.

From a review of the studies by Ames, Reyna, and Walton and Sween, we can tentatively conclude that in aggregate terms individuals living in more rather than less developed states tend to support the opposition candidates to a greater extent. In order to more clearly see this relationship we can construct a scattergram with the opposition vote and the level of socioeconomic development in each federal entity. We would expect our scattergram to be similar to Ames's in Figure III-1, although the latter dealt with only PRI's percentage of the vote and used only a single measure for socioeconomic development. I will use a more complete measure, as to be detailed below. First, I will present the best available data on opposition support.

The PAN percentage of the official vote in presidential elections is the best available measure of the opposition's support in noncompetitive elections. This makes theoretical sense because PAN is the only opposition party to run its own presidential candidate from 1952 to 1970 and because not even PAN has always presented a candidate for every position at other levels. In addition, data at other levels are not available for this time span. As we can see in Table III-4, the major opposition party's vote
Table III-4
OFFICIAL PERCENT OF TOTAL VALID VOTE OBTAINED BY THE PAN
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES FROM 1952 TO 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State/Region</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1958</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Aguascalientes</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Baja California N.</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Baja California S.</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Campeche</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Coahuila</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Colima</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Chiapas</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Chihuahua</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Distrito Federal</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Durango</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Guanajuato</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Guerrero</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Hidalgo</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Jalisco</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Mexico</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Michoacán</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Morelos</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Nayarit</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Nuevo Leon</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Oaxaca</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Puebla</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Querétaro</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Quintana Roo</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. San Luis Potosí</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Sinaloa</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Sonora</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Tabasco</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Tamaulipas</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Tlaxcala</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Veracruz</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Yucatán</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Zacatecas</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Confidential.

*It should be noted that in 1952, General Henríquez Guzmán, a popular candidate of the Federación de Partidos Populares de México (a PRI splinter group), officially won 17.8 percent of the national vote. Further, this was the first year in which PAN fielded its own presidential candidate.*
has increased during these four elections from 7.8 to 14 percent at the national level, although these results more than likely underestimate the opposition's support. Further, we can observe a consistent increase in the opposition vote in most of the federal entities.

More important, according to our hypothesis, we can expect the range of the opposition vote to roughly suggest the level of socioeconomic development of the states. In 1970, for instance, the PAN candidate received 29.9 percent of the total vote in the Federal District, while he received only 1.1 percent of the vote in Chiapas and Tabasco. Thus, to determine whether the Federal District is among the most developed states and whether the last two are among the least developed, we must turn our attention to measures of socioeconomic development for the federal entities.

One of the most thorough and recent longitudinal studies of socioeconomic development of the 32 federal entities is that of Ignacio Aguilar Alvarez, Arturo Lamadrid Ibarra, and Martin Luis Guzman Ferrer.\footnote{Ignacio Aguilar Alvarez, Arturo Lamadrid Ibarra, and Martin Luis Guzman Ferrer, "Desarrollo Socioeconomico Comparativo de las Entidades del Pais, 1940-1970," Comercio Exterior (Marzo de 1972), pp. 255-265.} Table III-5 shows their ranking and index scores of these entities from 1940 to 1970. This ranking, by and large, coincides with others, such as that used by Ifigenia M. de Navarrete for 1965.\footnote{Ifigenia M. de Navarrete, "La Distribucion del Ingreso en Mexico:} The latter ranked the states according to the "product per capita," while the former authors ranked the states and divided them into three categories of development after averaging the following twelve indicators:

- gross product per capita, participation of the industrial sector in the state gross product, participation of the economically
### Table III-5

**INDEX OF SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BY FEDERAL ENTITIES AND CHANGES IN THEIR RELATIVE POSITION, 1940-1970**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Range</strong></td>
<td><strong>Entidades</strong></td>
<td><strong>Indice</strong></td>
<td><strong>Range</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1940</strong></td>
<td><strong>1950</strong></td>
<td><strong>1960</strong></td>
<td><strong>1970</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Distrito Federal</td>
<td>4.712</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Baja California</td>
<td>2.323</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Coahuila</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nuevo León</td>
<td>0.292</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Chihuahua</td>
<td>-0.932</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sonora</td>
<td>-0.795</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Tamaulipas</td>
<td>-0.946</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Aguascalientes</td>
<td>-0.878</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Colima</td>
<td>-1.475</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Baja California</td>
<td>-1.656</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Durango</td>
<td>-1.668</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Campeche</td>
<td>-1.700</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Yucatán</td>
<td>-1.621</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Jalisco</td>
<td>-2.002</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Quintana Roo</td>
<td>-2.070</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Sinaloa</td>
<td>-2.263</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Morelos</td>
<td>-2.358</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Guanajuato</td>
<td>-2.519</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Veracruz</td>
<td>-2.685</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Querétaro</td>
<td>-2.589</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Nayarit</td>
<td>-2.624</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Michoacán</td>
<td>-2.664</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>San Luis Potosí</td>
<td>-2.943</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Hidalgo</td>
<td>-2.053</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>México</td>
<td>-3.119</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Zacatecas</td>
<td>-3.124</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Tlaxcala</td>
<td>-3.271</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Puebla</td>
<td>-3.364</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Tabasco</td>
<td>-3.654</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Chiapas</td>
<td>-3.792</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Guzmán Velázquez</td>
<td>-4.074</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Zacatecas</td>
<td>-4.150</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

active population (PEA) in the industrial sector according to the total PEA, indicator of agriculture capitalization, participation of the irrigated area with regard to the labor surface, consumption of electric energy per capita, consumption of gasoline per capita, infant mortality per 1,000 live births, consumption of sugar per capita, percentage of housing with running water, percentage of population using shoes, and percentage of population which can read and write.  

After these authors make certain qualifications on the historical limitation of their indicators, Aguilar Alvarez, Lamadrid Ibarra, and Guzman Ferrer present some general observations on regional socioeconomic development in Mexico. Here, of course, we can see if some socioeconomic conditions might be related to the emergence of electoral opposition movements in the states of Chihuahua (1956), Baja California North (1959), San Luis Potosí (1958-1962), Sonora (1967), and Yucatan (1967-1969). The first observation on regional socioeconomic development is that, with the exception of Quintana Roo between 1950 and 1960, all federal entities have achieved sustained growth from 1940 to 1970, a rare phenomenon indeed for developing countries. Even the Yucatán, whose relative rank position dropped from 13th to 15th to 19th to 21st during these four decades, experienced, at the same time, absolute growth. Of course, this drastic relative drop could account for Yucatecans' negative perceptions on economic growth and thus could account for their high negative feelings toward


18 They ask, for example, what happens when 100 percent of the people wear shoes, or when electric energy is replaced with other forms of energy.
the government, as to be detailed later.

Second, 24 entities have maintained their same relative position with some slight variations. Third, five entities—Baja California (south), Mexico, Tabasco, Sinaloa, and Morelos—have increased their relative positions, while, as partially seen above, the Yucatan, Quintana Roo, and Durango have decreased their relative positions. Quintana Roo has skidded from 15th to 18th to 29th to 29th, with the major relative drop coinciding with its negative absolute growth from 1950 to 1960. We should note that the Yucatan is second among the 32 entities in decreasing its relative socioeconomic position. Finally, the other states with opposition movements do not show dramatic changes. Chihuahua has decreased only slightly from 5th to 6th to 7th to 9th. Baja California (north) and San Luis Potosi are quite stable, while Sonora has increased slightly. At this point we can conclude that this index (Table III-5) does not suggest a strong relationship between socioeconomic conditions and the emergence of electoral opposition movements.

To perhaps an impressive extent, Aguilar Alvarez, Lamadrid Ibarra, and Guzman Ferrer have helped us understand socioeconomic development in the federal entities, at least in aggregate terms. One suspects that this aggregate development in all entities has played a vital role in maintaining a certain level of PRI support and thus has prevented the oppositions

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19 Interestingly, from Table I-1, we can see that the lowest official PRI vote for this entity occurred in 1958 or, in other words, when Quintana Roo was experiencing negative, absolute growth. Thus, while this entity generally has given PRI at least 95 percent of the vote, its 1958 vote was 79.9 percent.
from making significant inroads. At the same time, the level of socio-economic development is related to the level of opposition support, as we will now see.

To demonstrate the relationship between higher levels of socio-economic development and higher percentages of the opposition vote, I will construct a scattergram. Instead of averaging the opposition vote over several elections, I will use only the 1970 vote—that is, the highest official opposition vote—on the assumption that the results in this most recent presidential election more accurately reflect opposition support. This assumption is made because the official vote probably underestimates the opposition vote. For 1970 the exact socioeconomic scores for each federal entity as well as each entity's percentage of the PAN vote (as a percent of the total vote) appear in Table III-6. The rank of each federal entity refers to its 1970 socioeconomic position in relation to the other entities; this rank score, rather than the name of each federal entity, also appears in Figure III-2. In other words, in Figure III-2 number 1 refers to the Federal District, number 2 to Nuevo León, and number 32 to Oaxaca. Now we can easily see that in noncompetitive elections the more developed states tend to support PAN more than the less developed states, although it is easy to note that the relationship is far from perfect.

A major problem with the relationship shown in Figure III-2—level of socioeconomic development and of opposition support—is the inadequacy of the data for development. Briefly, the aggregate growth in each federal entity could mean that the upper socioeconomic sectors are increasing their relative portion of the benefits of growth, while lower
Table III-6


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Converted Index(^a)</th>
<th>PAN Percent of Total Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Distrito Federal</td>
<td>10.816</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nuevo León</td>
<td>8.456</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Baja California Norte</td>
<td>7.463</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Sonora</td>
<td>7.135</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Coahuila</td>
<td>6.907</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Baja California Sur</td>
<td>6.349</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Aguascalientes</td>
<td>5.929</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Tamaulipas</td>
<td>5.898</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Chihuahua</td>
<td>5.739</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>5.645</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Sinaloa</td>
<td>4.779</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Jalisco</td>
<td>4.632</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Colima</td>
<td>4.141</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Veracruz</td>
<td>3.911</td>
<td>7.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Campeche</td>
<td>3.742</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Querétaro</td>
<td>3.609</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Guanajuato</td>
<td>3.494</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Durango</td>
<td>3.490</td>
<td>13.3</td>
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<td>3.311</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Yucatán</td>
<td>3.204</td>
<td>15.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>San Luis Potosí</td>
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<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Puebla</td>
<td>2.620</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Michoacán</td>
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<td>Hidalgo</td>
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\(^a\)To eliminate minus scores 2.0 was added to each number.

Source: Table III-5 for the socioeconomic index and Table III-4 for the 1970 PAN vote.
Figure III-2

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEVEL OF SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF EACH FEDERAL ENTITY IN 1970 AND THE OFFICIAL PERCENTAGE OF 1970 PAN PRESIDENTIAL VOTE (as a percentage of total vote)

Source: Table III-6. Note that the socioeconomic rank of each federal entity appears in place of its name.
and perhaps even middle sectors are experiencing little, if any, improvement. In other words, socioeconomic development at the aggregate level might not account for PRI's support if relatively few sectors are receiving a proportionately large share of this wealth. The best measure to resolve this problem would probably be the figures for the distribution of income over at least two time periods in each of the 32 federal entities. Unfortunately, I have been unable to find such data, although I suspect that it exists. Thus, I will use data on the national distribution of income, which is suggestive of what happens to Mexicans at the state level.

In Figure III-3 we can see that from 1950 to 1963 family income has become relatively more concentrated in the hands of the upper sectors of society and, concomitantly, reduced for the lower sectors. In 1950, for example, the upper ten percent of the families had 49 percent of the total income, while the lower 50 percent had 19.1 percent. In 1963, this upper sector increased its share by 0.9 percent, whereas the lower half of the population had a decrease to 15.7 percent. The highest income concentration, of course, was within the upper five percent of the families, who had over 38 percent of the income in 1963. In absolute terms, however, the income of the 20 percent of the poorest families was at best static from 1958 to 1963. Although a highly inequitable income distribution is apparently a characteristic of many developing countries,

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21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p. 36.
Figure III-3

DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILY INCOME IN MEXICO

Hansen argues that the degree of income inequality in Mexico in the early 1960s was greater than in most other Latin American countries. Apparentely, this situation has not increased opposition support, but perhaps there is little awareness of this inequitable income distribution or of limited government spending.

Thus while the distribution of income is inequitable, we might examine governmental spending to see if it benefits some of these lower socioeconomic sectors of society. Hence if, on the one hand, the government improves social services through its spending policy, then one might suspect that many individuals would have a higher standard of living than their salary would indicate and thus would tend to support the official party. If, on the other hand, government spending is quite low, then one would expect little support for the official party.

A review of the Mexican government's spending policy will show that governmental expenditures must be quite low because of low governmental income. For example, in 1965, Mexico ranked close to last among all the Latin American countries in revenues for all levels of government as a percent of the gross national product. According to Hansen Mexican revenues were roughly 14 percent of its GNP, while Brazil and Chile raised over 25 percent, and Uruguay, Ecuador, and Venezuela raised over 20 percent. Moreover, in a study measuring "tax efforts" of 72 developing countries, on one measure (the ratio of revenue to GNP) Mexico ranked seventh from

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23 Hansen, The Politics of Mexican Development, p. 74. A more recent report tends to confirm this. See Excelsior, September 5, 1972, p. 1A.

24 Hansen, ibid., p. 84.
the bottom or 66th, while Brazil ranked 21st, Argentina ranked 27th, and Chile ranked 23rd.  

Thus, we can easily understand low governmental expenditures. During the late 1950s, for instance, Mexico's total expenditure on education as a percentage of GNP was 1.4 percent, while Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela spent around 2.5 percent or more. In 1967, social security benefits reached 6.1 percent of the Mexican population. Corresponding figures for other Latin American countries were: Argentina, 24.9 percent; Brazil, 6.6 percent; Chile, 21.8 percent; Peru, 8.4 percent; and Venezuela, 6.9 percent. As a result of these and similar indicators, Hansen concludes "that in terms of using tax and expenditure policies to arrive at a more equal distribution of income, over the past several decades Mexico has done less with less than have all the other major Latin American nations."  

Still, PRI appears to have a high enough level of support to win the majority of elections, even if greater freedom of opposition participation were allowed. Thus, we must attempt to suggest other hypotheses for PRI's support. First, Mexico's continual economic growth of approximately six percent annually for the past three decades is frequently referred to as the "Mexican miracle," thus suggesting the importance of

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26 Ibid., pp. 85-86.
27 Ibid., p. 86.
28 Ibid., p. 87.
a "myth" of growth. In short, many are still waiting for their time to come when they can reap the miracle's benefits. More importantly, this aggregate growth has been sufficient to provide positions and relatively high salaries for the most ambitious socioeconomic climbers, who otherwise might be forming part of serious opposition movements. As Hansen argues: "To put the matter in an only slightly overstated way, below the elite levels the present political regime has only needed to gain the support of ambitious individuals in order to persist."  

Second, we might not be able to measure PRI's benefits to some socioeconomic sectors of society. For example, when one travels throughout Mexico, he can witness in almost every small village a government cooperative, such as CONASUPO (which buys peasants' crops and sells certain commodities at bargain prices). In addition, there is frequently a basketball court (built by the government) and a PRI headquarters. To be sure, such evidence has pitfalls, but one cannot fail to be impressed with the government's and PRI's penetration to even the smallest of villages.  

Third, enough evidence exists to show that the majority of Mexicans, especially poorer ones, are generally passive and thus are easily persuaded or controlled. In other words, those who have received less in terms of income and of governmental spending are the very ones who are unable to organize opposition. Thus, the regime can successfully ignore them. Fourth and perhaps most important, any individuals and/or

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30 These themes of passivity and subordination are found in the works of many authors, especially the following: Octavio Paz, The
groups who protest either legally in elections, as we have seen, or protest in the streets are suppressed by the regime. From this observation and from my interviews with many members of the opposition as well as students, I would argue that fear of repression is an important ingredient in keeping support for PRI and preventing further oppositions.

Thus far in this chapter we have examined the level of socioeconomic development and the level of opposition support as well as other hypotheses, such as the distribution of benefits and the government's spending. One final observation on opposition movements should be presented.

The location of federal entities might have an independent effect on their tendency to support opposition candidates. In his study of noncompetitive elections, Ames found almost no relationship between the location of a federal entity, that is, its presence on the U.S. border and the vote direction (see Table III-2). But if we briefly examine the competitive gubernatorial campaigns in the states of Chihuahua, Baja California (north), San Luis Potosí, Sonora, and Yucatán, we can easily see that three of these states border the United States (see Figure III-4). Although the number of cases is too small for a sound conclusion, we might hypothesize that more frequent contact with the citizens of the United States could result in more democratic cultural characteristics, and thus

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Figure III-4
POLITICAL MAP OF MEXICO

the tendency toward opposition voting and supporting opposition move­
ments is higher. To determine whether such a relationship exists, we
will have to wait for better data.

To summarize this chapter we can see that the limited development
of opposition support within the regime's constraints depends on the
level of socioeconomic development. Unfortunately, no data is available
to help us understand what specific aspect of socioeconomic development
accounts for increased opposition support. In the absence of such data
as surveys, detailed election results, etc. we have attempted to examine
conditions--such as the distribution of income, government spending,
special benefits--which could be related to PRI and/or opposition support.
Presently, it appears that we will have to wait for better data before
we can more clearly come to grips with many aspects of electoral behavior
in Mexico. In addition, our analysis did not suggest conditions for the
emergence of electoral opposition movements. Because few movements have
emerged to compete with PRI, we suspect that special conditions must ex­
plain their emergence. Now we can attempt to deal with these special
conditions.
CHAPTER IV

THE EMERGENCE AND WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FOR

ELECTORAL OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS

In the first chapter we have seen that opposition candidates have won the mayoralities of the state capitals in three different cases. Further, the reader will recall that the opposition mayors in San Luis Potosí and Merida later became gubernatorial candidates and apparently defeated PRI. Only these two cases parallel each other, for in Sonora the mayoral and gubernatorial candidates emerged during the same campaign, and later the mayor did not run for governor. In Chapter II the discussion showed that the regime had "life and death" control over these movements and, as a result, was the primary factor in explaining much of their behavior. Chapter III dealt with some hypotheses suggesting reasons for the present level of opposition development within the constraints imposed by the regime.

Within this context my first task in this chapter is to account for the emergence of all three electoral opposition movements in their first electoral battle (or battles in Sonora). In resolving this problem I have found that the conditions crucial for mobilizing mass support are catalyzing incidents, the emergence of opposition leaders, and newspaper support. While we can analytically separate these conditions during this period of emergence, reality dictates a more complex interlock. More specifically, as these conditions unravel, their joint impact tends to "create" momentum (for lack of a better label).
inasmuch as a chain of events—some planned and others unplanned—tend
to emotionally charge up the opposition leaders, the newspaper directors,
and the mass public so that they mutually reinforce one another. Hence
I will discuss events in the sequence they occurred during the
emergence of these movements until the opposition candidates have won
the mayoralty of the state capital.

My second task is to account for the conditions leading to the
second and subsequent electoral battle in the cases of San Luis Potosí
and Yucatán. Here the opposition leaders do not have the benefit of
the catalyzing incidents and of a relatively short campaign, whereby
they can take the regime by surprise. In fact, now the regime is much
better prepared to suppress these movements, as we have seen. Thus,
in contrast to the previous election, the organizational efforts of the
opposition are much more extensive in an attempt—however futile—to
counteract this suppression. In addition, these efforts (ongoing party
activity, communication, and special appeals) are more critical here
because the opposition has to move out from the highly-urbanized state
capital to mobilize the rural dwellers; obviously, this is a much more
difficult task.

Very few electoral opposition movements have occurred in Mexico
in comparison to the overwhelming number of elections. Hence, when
these movements occur, one suspects that some special conditions are
present. The main condition deals with catalyzing incidents (or
frequently the regime's mistakes). In other words, the overwhelming
dominance of PRI cannot be overcome unless some major incident rouses
Mexicans from their understandably passive attitudes toward electoral
politics. Further, in these three cases, such catalyzing incidents have served to drive a wedge into the consistently high unity of local PRI elites, thus giving the opposition additional encouragement.

Afterwards, some opposition leaders must emerge to lead the challenge against PRI. This is not as simple as one might imagine, for very few leaders have attempted to challenge the awesome and extensive powers of the regime. We will recall from the discussion in the second chapter that opposition leaders face enormous risks in terms of their own personal safety and that of their followers. In addition, active participation generally involves economic sacrifices and, in some cases, reprisals—a problem almost never encountered by PRI leaders. Thus, as or after these catalyzing incidents occur, these opposition leaders evaluate their possibilities for mobilizing support, which are much more favorable if they have an ongoing organization, and then choose a prestigious leader as the opposition candidate, who, if not always charismatic, is honest and skillful. Finally, the mass media and specifically newspapers are critical for publicizing the regime's mistakes—thus encouraging outrage among the mass public—and for publicizing information on opposition leaders and their activities.

During the emergence of these movements, the organizational efforts of leaders also play a role in mobilizing mass support. First, ongoing party activity is helpful inasmuch as the opposition is better able to capitalize on catalyzing incidents if it already has a hard core of followers. This is especially seen in Sonora and Yucatán, where PAN became the conduit for discontent against the regime. In the San Luis Potosí mayoral contest in 1958, PAN had no strong
organization to take advantage of the discontent, but the independent group, which emerged to challenge PRI, began to organize around five months before the election.

Second, communication is crucial to gain and reinforce followers. Outside of newspaper coverage of events, the newspaper advertisements placed by opposition leaders are important to mobilize mass attendance at rallies. In addition, mass rallies themselves are crucial to expand and reinforce the hard core of followers. Further, the following methods of communication may be used: candidate's visits, loudspeakers, party symbols painted on walls and fences, posters, party literature, and personal contact of more active participants.

Finally, the candidate and/or the leaders must make special appeals in terms of issues directed at certain sectors of society. During the first electoral battle, the appeal generally revolves around exploiting the catalyzing incident or subsequent incidents. To be sure, the opposition leaders may have no specific program, except to say that they will be more honest and accountable than the "corrupt and immoral" incumbents. Frequently, these appeals are directed to the less controlled sectors of society, such as women, who have not voted to the same extent as men, students, who may be voting for the first time, and to those in middle-class occupations. The more controlled sectors of society, such as those belonging to the worker sector of PRI, may be given instructions to nullify their already marked ballots, as we will see in the Yucatán election.

In order to demonstrate this complex interlock of all these conditions, I will first discuss the emergence of these movements in
each of the three cases from the beginning until they have officially won the state capital. In the second section of this chapter, I will focus on the organizational efforts of the opposition leaders to mobilize mass support throughout the state in the subsequent gubernatorial campaigns in San Luis Potosí and Yucatán.

A. The First Electoral Battle

1. San Luis Potosí

The catalyzing incident in San Luis Potosí was more gradual than in the other two cases. Here the movement began slowly as Potosinos became increasingly aware of the economic and political stranglehold of a regional cacique (boss), Gonzalo N. Santos. He was not only the largest landholder but also owned the most fertile lands in the Huasteca (at a lower altitude than the rest of the state and toward the Gulf of Mexico) region of the state.\(^1\) Along with powerful economic control for more than 20 years, Santos directly controlled many politicians as well as the newspapers. According to Dr. Nava, Santos even received a monthly cut ($8,000 dollars) of the meager budget of the state's capital city. Further, Potosinos reported that his tactics were ruthless as he frequently sent his pistoleros (gunmen) to prevent or put an end to attempts to thwart his activities. The specific nature of Santos's controls are not as important as the Potosinos' perceptions of the cacique's almost unchecked power.

\(^1\) Estrada, La Grieta en el Yugo, pp. 23-26 and passim, briefly discusses the economic and political control of Santos.
Dr. Nava thought that the anti-Santos movement actually began within the Autonomous University of San Luis Potosí. In 1956, Dr. Manuel Nava, Jr., the well-respected Rector of the state university and brother of Dr. Salvador Nava, faced re-election to his position. Since he had conducted a series of reforms, Dr. Manuel Nava was highly popular with students, professors, and the state capital residents. Thus when Santos tried to impose his own candidate, the university community rallied to the support of the rector and achieved a victory over the cacique. In the process, however, Santos had provoked the ire of university professors and students and hence had stimulated the incipient stages of opposition. Again in 1958, this pattern repeated itself, as the popular Rector was re-elected. These first battles against Santos were important inasmuch as these successes began to encourage others to mobilize support against the cacique.

The students soon attracted national attention to their cause. During the early months of 1958, Lic. Adolfo Lopez Mateos, the presidential candidate, visited San Luis Potosí on his nationwide tour. As Lopez Mateos approached the university, he was met by students with banners, such as "Death to Santos," "Expel the Cacique," "Santos, the Assassin," and others. Similar banners greeted the presidential candidate at other stops on his tour throughout the state. Later during the campaign, in Poza Rica, Veracruz, Lopez Mateos stated: "Los cacicazgos subsisten hasta que el pueblo los tolera."2

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2Estrada, La Grieta en el Yugo, p. 41. Dr. Nava, Lic. Rafael Montejano y Aguiñaga, and others stressed the importance of this presidential statement.
("Caciques subsist as long as the people tolerate them.") Such a statement did not go unnoticed in San Luis Potosi. In fact, it was interpreted as national support for local movements against bosses and became the theme of this movement in its incipient stages.

The second condition is the emergence of opposition leaders. In July, 1958, a group of professionals and intellectuals initiated a reform movement in order to: 1) join and work within the structure of the local PRI; 2) win the municipal presidency of the state capital in the 1958 elections; and 3) finally break Santos's stranglehold. They did not accomplish their first goal, although they received encouragement and support from the national PRI. To their surprise, the reformers, perhaps with the help of some emotional incidents to be described later, accomplished the third goal before the second.

As president of this group, Dr. Salvador Nava began searching for a mayoral candidate for the upcoming elections. This group wanted his brother, Dr. Manuel Nava, as candidate because he was easily the most prestigious Potosinian and had administrative experience, but he declined for health reasons. His sudden death in August, 1958, led to conflicts for the rectorship of the university. This time, however, Santos was successful in imposing one of his own candidates by manipulating the elections. Students and professors protested through a

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3The national leaders of the CNOP, the National Confederation of Popular Organizations, gave Nava and his organization encouragement. After the election Alfonso Corona de Rosal, the titular PRI Director, wanted to attend Nava's inauguration. Nava dissuaded him from attending because his movement had fought PRI.
series of strikes. Consequently, anti-Santos feelings were high in the university and began pervading the community.

Since at least 18 prestigious leaders declined the mayoral candidacy, Dr. Salvador Nava became the consensus candidate, although he lacked political ambitions and experience. At this time Nava was not as prestigious as his brother, even though he was well-known for his social labor among workers and was highly respected for his honesty. On October 19, some 5,000 Potosinans attended the open convention nominating Nava as an independent candidate, while, simultaneously, PRI held its convention to nominate the official candidate. At its first meetings, however, this movement did not attract as many supporters as it did when violence broke out during the last three weeks of the campaign.

The third condition for the emergence of an opposition movement is newspaper support. As the anti-Santista movement gained momentum, Santos lost control over the press. The major newspaper, El Sol de San Luis, began printing cartoons lampooning Santos and his political control, such as his many impositions. Further, the newspaper printed pictures of students and others tearing down plaques on buildings and streets where the name "Santos" was mentioned. For example, El Sol de San Luis gave considerable publicity to the students who changed

\[\text{El Sol de San Luis, October 20, 1958. The 1960 population of San Luis Potosi was 159,980; see Maria Teresa Gutierrez de MacGregor, Desarrollo y Distribucion de la Poblacion Urbana en Mexico (Mexico, D.F.: Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 1965), p. 12. The population of the entire state in 1960 was 1,054,206; see Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico, p. 238.}\]
the name of a major avenue from "Pedro A. Santos" to "Dr. Manuel Nava, Jr." On other occasions it printed headlines such as "San Luis Prefers Death to the Hated Cacique System." The net impact of this type of publicity was to enormously increase mass discontent, anger, and rage with the existing system.

During the last three weeks of the campaign, violence broke out and helped assure the election of Dr. Nava. The newspaper, of course, aided by treating these incidents emotionally. While sporadic outbursts of violence began around November 15, the incident which assured massive opposition support occurred on November 20, the anniversary of the Mexican Revolution. Parades are in order on this national holiday, but the angry Potosinans had more in mind. As a group of students and others paraded in front of the governor's palace, they began tossing a large number of eggs at Governor Manuel Alvarez, who was standing on his balcony. Although Alvarez was imposed by and closely identified with Santos, it is more probable that the eggs were meant for Santos since it was rumored—apparently intentionally—that he was in the palace. Rather than reacting more calmly, the understandably-angered Governor and his supporters immediately ordered the soldiers to counterattack. Thus the soldiers viciously and brutally attacked and beat the students and bystanders. In turn, the crowds

5El Sol de San Luis, November 25, 1958.
6Ibid., November 23, 1958.
7Ibid., November 21, 1958.
were outraged and bent on revenge. Alvarez was so terrified that he left the palace under heavy guard through the back door and apparently moved to Mexico City.

The soldiers' attack was a costly mistake for the regime, for the resulting mass outrage was so widespread and intense that perhaps even the regime (or what was left of it) was afraid to tamper with the upcoming election and results. While previous navista meetings had a limited—although still large—number of supporters, now the number of active supporters appeared to include virtually the entire population of the state capital. Thus, the only remaining task for the opposition leaders was to channel this wave of outrage to victory in the December 7, 1958 elections.

On November 24, a citizens' committee presented an ultimatum to the Minister of Government (Gobernación) to the effect that if Governor Manuel Alvarez were not forced to resign, then the Potosinans would go on strike indefinitely. In order to apply pressure to their demand, the residents of San Luis Potosí closed all factories and stores at 5:00 p.m. on November 27. Meanwhile, massive demonstrations were being held. Three days before the election, when violence erupted, leaving two dead and 19 injured, the government ordered a state of siege.

Against the backdrop of this tense situation, the angered Potosinans voted on Sunday, December 7. The first official results

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8El Sol de San Luis, November 21, 1958.
9Ibid., December 6, 1958.
showed Nava with 26,319 to Gutierrez's 1,683. Perhaps because of these favorable results and because of presidential guarantees to "respect the vote," the opposition leaders decided to lift the strike for five days beginning on December 9. A week after the election, the final official results gave Nava the victory by a two to one margin. Shortly, the elated Potosinans dropped their demand for the governor's resignation; he resigned about a month later. In fact, they had achieved a historic victory, for (to the best of my knowledge) this was the first opposition movement to defeat PRI for the mayoralty of a state capital since the formation of the official party.

2. Sonora

In Sonora, the catalyzing incident was the imposition of the unpopular Federal Deputy, Faustino Félix Serna, as the official gubernatorial candidate in the 1967 elections. But the importance of this incident is understood only when it is seen in proper perspective, that is, an open nominating process within PRI, which then was suddenly and arbitrarily closed by this imposition. For example, as early as October, 1966, a journalist from El Imparcial began campaigning in his column with the slogan, "Estamos Contigo!" ("We are with you.")--the first initials of each word, E.C., stand for Enrique Cubillas. As of Oct.


11. President Adolfo López Mateos had promised this a few days before the election in a meeting with Nava.

jockeying for the official nomination began in January, 1967, it appeared that Enrique Cubillas was the most popular candidate, as evidenced by the pictures, articles, and paid advertising—all part of the rules of the game—that appeared quite frequently in the newspaper. Another popular candidate was Fausto Acosta Romo, although his support did not appear to be as solid and extensive as Cubillas's.

But suddenly, on February 19, 1967, numerous paid ads with support from many official organizations filled the newspapers and gave the appearance of overwhelming support for Félix Serna. Two days later, however, official groups vehemently denied that they had signed or authorized these ads for Félix Serna. These denials made front-page headlines since many Sonorans were irritated with this unauthorized use of their names and organizations.13

In contrast to the other two cases where electoral oppositions took advantage of the catalyzing incident, this case shows that university students can emerge as the opposition leaders. In fact, in Sonora the university students played the pivotal role in initiating and continuing the protest against the PRI imposition from February through May, at which time PAN announced its gubernatorial candidate. Four major periods of activities highlight the nonelectoral phase of the opposition movement: 1) during the last week in February, demonstrations and riots occurred in anticipation of the impending imposition of Faustino Félix Serna; 2) during the last ten days of March, the use of tear gas against

crowds and the shipment of tear gas from Arizona gave the opposition movement additional momentum; 3) on March 29, members of FEUS (Student Federation of the University of Sonora) decided to go on a strike indefinitely; and 4) in the middle of May, rioting erupted again and resulted in federal intervention with troops in order to end the street protests and violence.

After Félix Serna's claims of overwhelming official support and the immediate denials, a demonstration of 10,000 Hermosillans on February 24 signaled their protest against the imposition. Their cry became "Faustino no." The following day "thousands" of students and others met to protest the lack of "liberty." Félix Serna and his supporters did not heed these warnings and continued with plans to officially open the campaign in Hermosillo on Sunday, February 26. In order to prevent an embarrassingly low turnout, the prospective PRI candidate had brought in many people, reportedly from the nearby states of Sinaloa and Nayarit, on 96 buses, 53 trucks, and five traincars. But the anti-imposition forces, mainly students, wanted to disrupt the campaign opening and thus burned five automobiles and one bus, overturned many other cars and broke the windshields of the "greater part" of the cars in Hermosillo, as well as assaulted people waiting for Félix Serna's rally to begin. Official reaction was swift, as

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15Gente, April 1, 1967, pp. 14ff.

16The News, February 27, 1967, p. 36.

17Gente, April 1, 1967, pp. 14ff.
police invaded the University of Sonora campus (a serious violation of autonomy in Mexico) and took some 34 prisoners; not all were students. Reports indicated that by 4:00 that afternoon over 30 individuals had been injured.

After this first phase of violence, the local police restored order to a still tense situation. Charges and countercharges flourished, as police accused backers of another aspiring gubernatorial candidate, Fausto Acosta Roma, of instigating the riot. Such charges are difficult to substantiate, although it is clear that opposing candidates and their factions within PRI did not close ranks, thus fueling the disputes. In any case students applied pressure to the two Hermosillo police chiefs and forced them to resign on March 1.

The important role of the newspapers is easily seen here. For example, for a couple of weeks the newspapers left the impression that various PRI groups were closing ranks behind Félix Serna, although the following sequence of events suggests otherwise. Whatever the case may be, verbal feuds and street violence (or communication of these incidents) came to a halt. On March 14, when El Imparcial published a student ad, which asked for mass support at an anti-imposition rally, the stage was set for the second phase of violence.

The mass public and many PRI officials now became involved in the protests as again one event led to another. On March 14, some 2,000 individuals attended the peaceful student rally, but peace would


not last long. When a youngster was shot and killed on March 19, El Imparcial printed a front-page editorial criticizing PRI's handling of the situation. That some evening many Hermosillans demonstrated peacefully, although some students destroyed Félix Serna's campaign offices. To control the demonstrators police used tear gas, which, in turn, angered the mass public and some government officials. Later that evening the mayor of Hermosillo, Alberto Gutiérrez, and other city officials resigned. While they gave no explanation for their sudden resignation, many interpreted their behavior as a protest against the use of tear gas.

In spite of increasing discontent in all sectors of society, PRI still held its convention on March 26 to officially nominate Faustino Félix Serna. Even within the ranks of the local officialdom, this discontent and disunity was evident in the reported resignation of the PRI state president, Manuel Morua Johnson, on the eve of the convention and the conspicuous absence at the convention of the other PRI candidates for governor. In addition, it is interesting to note that 2,000 guards surrounded the auditorium when the 1967 population of Hermosillo was around 210,000, while roughly half of these could not be a threat since they were either too young or too old.

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21 The News, March 26, pp. 1 and 25.


23 Ibid., March 27, 1967, pp. 1 and 30.

24 This is my estimate based on its 1960 population of less than
Since most of these problems could have been avoided if PRI would have either allowed the Sonorans to choose their own candidate or reversed official approval of Félix Serna, one must speculate on the reasons for continuing to support him at the high costs of social disruptions. The first reason is Governor Luis Encinas Johnson's strong support for this candidate, although his motives for this continued support are unknown. Perhaps the more important reason is the strong national PRI support, which one source attributed to the candidate's payoff of these officials. In short, while the other candidates were campaigning in Sonora, Félix Serna had supposedly paid some 30 million pesos ($240,000 U.S. dollars) to various PRI officials in the Mexican capital.

While PRI's imposition of Félix Serna was always a basic issue for the opposition, the salience of this catalyzing incident lost ground to others, such as the use of tear gas on crowds, the police's shipment of arms and tear gas across the international border from Arizona, the violation of the university's autonomy, and others. All of these led to the third phase of silent, massive protest against Governor Luis Encinas Johnson. On March 29, 600 members of FEUS met and decided to demand the resignation of the governor and to go on

100,000 (see Gutierrez de MacGregor Desarrollo y Distribucion de la Poblacion Urbana en México, p. 13) and its estimated population for 1969 was 238,000; Comision Nacional de los Salarios Minimos, Salarios Mínimos Que Regirán en los Años de 1970 y 1971 (Mexico: by the same commission, 1970), p. 74. Apparently, Hermosillo's population increase from 1960 to 1970 was around 150 percent.

strike indefinitely until the government met their demands. They also asked the teachers to join their strike. For the first few days, the student strike appeared to be an isolated event, which could fold overnight. But once again the mass public rallied to their side. On March 30, an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 women, called the "mothers" of the students, demonstrated with them.

The student strike, during which many students actually lived 24 hours daily on the university campus, soon mobilized support from other sectors of society. For instance, ranchers pledged to keep students supplied with meat, while residents in Hermosillo furnished them daily with fresh eggs and milk. Shortly, the secondary and preparatory schools as well as the state normal school joined the strike. By April 15, most teachers, along with their students, and store employees in Hermosillo supported the protest. Later, virtually 100 percent of the schools in the state were shut down. Further, businesses stopped their commercial activities, primarily in Hermosillo, for one or more hours daily either because workers failed to report in or because students threatened the owners. By April 21, an estimated 75,000 Sonorans were demanding the governor's resignation. \(^{28}\)

Because the local officials had not responded favorably to the now widespread demands, around 2,500 people, many students, traveled over 500 miles to discuss the situation with President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz on his April 25th visit to Tijuana in the neighboring state of

\(^{28}\)The News, April 22, 1967. According to the 1970 Census, the population of Sonora was 1,098,720. This is roughly seven percent of the total population demanding his resignation.
Baja California (north). The president received them and said he would attend to their problems only if no pressure were applied. In other words, peace had to be restored first.

The strike continued in an orderly fashion until Sunday night, May 14, when eight individuals (two were policemen) were wounded by gunfire. The following day 28 out of 200 local policemen resigned, ostensibly because they did not want to attack their fellow citizens. On May 16, around 1,000 people stormed the PRI headquarters and burned its contents. Rioting with "mobs of up to 8,000 people roaming the streets" continued for several days.

To prevent the violence from escalating further, President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz ordered an army takeover of Hermosillo. The army promptly cleared the university campus. To be sure, the government jailed many student leaders. Other students, fearing imprisonment, fled in temporary exile to Arizona. Some 2,000 federal soldiers patrolling the streets, while federal security agents, attempting to break the backbone of the opposition, kidnapped 13 anti-imposition leaders and flew them to Mexico City for questioning. Finally, order was

34 Ibid.
permanently restored in Hermosillo and in the rest of the state, although latent discontent remained high. Thus, many normal activities were resumed slowly except for university classes, which had to be suspended because students still had not returned to the university by the first week in June.35

During the middle of May, as we have already seen, PAN announced its gubernatorial candidate in order to capitalize on this discontent, but the elections themselves were anticlimactic to many. The regime recognized the PAN victory for the municipal presidency of Hermosillo, thus placating some of those charging electoral fraud in other elections. But perhaps the greatest significance of this movement was that it represented one of the most serious splits within a state PRI organization in recent Mexican history.

35 The News, June 6, 1967, pp. 36-35. It is interesting to speculate on the relatively easy task the soldiers had in breaking up the students' strike. One fascinating account of the students' strategy argues that they preferred to retreat rather than provoke a bloodbath, which they thought imminent. Apparently, one student had intercepted radio and telephone communications between government officials and policemen, who were mapping out a strategy to provoke and then to eliminate sufficient numbers of students to subdue them. In short, the university students thought that the regime had a master plan to massacre a certain number of them. In Gente, August 1, 1967, pp. 17-22, Jose Antonio Arce C., the reporter who had covered much of the Sonoran protest movement, stated that he had listened to these recordings, made by the students, of the official dialogues and confirmed the students' report. In any case it appears that the university students believed that such a plot against them existed and thus backed off rather than risk a bloodbath.
3. Yucatán

In contrast to the typically placid election for federal deputies on July 2, 1967,36 the Yucatecan mayoral campaign in Mérida five months later dramatically demonstrates the importance of catalyzing incidents. This incident, which emerged after the deputy elections, revolved around the installation of a running water system, which, while sorely needed, was costly because of soil conditions. As a result, the federal government obtained a 20 year loan of 150 million pesos (or 12 million U.S. dollars) from the International Bank for Development.37 Of this amount the state would pay 27.2 million pesos, while increased property taxes, which affected all residents of Mérida, would account for the rest.

As is true elsewhere virtually no one wants to pay higher taxes, but many residents considered the new taxes exorbitant and attributed this to corruption on the part of public officials. The latter countered by arguing that soil conditions, which they had not taken into account sufficiently at the outset, accounted for the higher than anticipated costs. In any case the state governor initially decided


37Torres-Ramírez, "The Mexican PAN," p. 41, says that these were dollars, but the Diario de Yucatán, November 10, 1967, says pesos. The latter is probably correct.
against forcing the residents to pay the new taxes rather than face massive protests. In turn, the local government did not have the funds to pay its share on the loan to the federal government, which, in July, 1967, stopped several projects in the Yucatán in order to use the money saved here to make its payments on the loan.\(^3\) It should be noted that the federal government had started to invest heavily in this state during the 1960s because many economic activities were facing serious problems.

Opponents of the new, high taxes formed a committee to study the problem. In order to present the committee's report, the committee chairman, Lic. Victor Arjona Barbosa, led a group to confront President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz on his visit in August, 1967, to the neighboring state of Campeche. The President asked for the committee's report, which the chairman sent, but Díaz Ordaz never answered.\(^3\) Other sources reported some of the President's unfavorable comments about the Yucatecans' unwillingness to pay for their public services, thus injecting some regionalist sentiments into the issue.\(^4\) To be sure the Yucatecans identify more with their state than with the nation, but the overall impact of this regional identification is difficult to determine, a point to be elaborated in the following section.

\(^3\)Torres-Ramírez, "The Mexican PAN," pp. 41-43, describes these events.

\(^3\)Personal interview with Lic. Victor Arjona Barbosa in December, 1968.

\(^4\)Torres-Ramírez, op. cit., p. 43.
Surprisingly, PAN, which has always had one of its strongest organizations in this state, still did not have a mayoral candidate five weeks before the election. Through the press the opposition leaders requested Dr. Francisco Solís Aznar, who was a known panista (PAN member) but, more importantly, was instrumental in the movement to get running water in Mérida and certainly was not identified with the alleged misuse of funds. In a statement declining the candidacy (he ran as a PAN city councilman in this election and easily won), Solís Aznar recommended Lic. Víctor Manuel Correa Rachó, who had been the PAN mayoral candidate in 1964 and garnered 32 percent of the vote. Apparently, Correa Rachó was not the most prestigious leader at this time (and certainly not as prestigious as he was to become later) but was considered honest.

This short campaign was characterized by increasing controversy over the high taxes, which the state governor had now put into effect, and unpopular PRI candidates for mayor and city councilmen. Opponents of the increased taxes attempted to stop them through the traditional Mexican legal procedure, amparo (a court injunction against activities, while a judge reviews the complaints). About two weeks before the

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41 Torres-Ramírez, "The Mexican PAN," pp. 57-58. The total vote in 1964 was 33,413.

Many informants charged that Correa Rachó belonged to the conservative power structure in the Yucatán. Some even claimed that he was their tool. I have found no evidence to support this. It is quite apparent that the majority of the Yucatecans saw Correa Rachó as an honest reformer.
election, the Judge ruled against the opponents, which was poor timing. The Diario de Yucatán, as to be anticipated, gave considerable publicity to this ruling and further exacerbated feelings on the activities surrounding the running water issue. Also, for the first time, this newspaper began to form an alliance with PAN. At the same time, PRI did not have its better candidates, for the mayoral aspirant was "weak," while his councilmen (who had recently voted in favor of the increased taxes when they were still local deputies) were considered corrupt and unresponsive to popular demands.

The special appeals of the PAN leaders are interesting. No specific solution was given for the new, high taxes, but then perhaps little could be done. In any case honesty and accountability were major issues. Another issue was municipal freedom, that is, the general principle of local control over many activities without federal interference. To symbolize this cars paraded in "caravans for freedom" around Merida. Other special appeals dealt with attempts to prevent PRI control over voters. Thus, according to my interviews with Tomas Vargas Sabido and Carmen Robleda de Solís Aznar, PAN activists encouraged those individuals who received an already marked ballot


[^44]: I interviewed them in March, 1969, when Vargas Sabido was PAN Director in the Yucatan and Robleda de Solís Aznar was in charge of the women's sector but was much more influential in the PAN organization than that position indicates.
from PRI to cross out the boxes for all the candidates, thus nullifying their vote. In the process, however, they would receive an unmarked ballot from the polling place representative and could return this to their union bosses and leaders to prove that they voted. Meanwhile, PAN had encouraged women to vote to a much greater extent than they are accustomed so that PAN could win. Apparently, this system was successful.

The election on November 26, 1967, was characterized by a high turnout and few violent incidents. As the initial results came in—44,354 votes for the opposition and 15,466 for PRI—"it was clear that this was by and large a "protest" vote and that PAN was the conduit."

B. The Second Electoral Battle

Up to now we have seen that the emergence of these opposition movements is primarily dependent on catalyzing incidents. Only slightly less important are the emergence of opposition leaders and newspaper support, which capitalize on these incidents in order to mobilize mass support. Taken together, these conditions appear to give these movements momentum for winning the mayoralty election of the state capital. But later this momentum was apparently lost in Sonora (perhaps because of the nature of the protest), while the momentum continued in San Luis Potosí and Mérida with the opposition administrations. Thus we can turn our attention to a discussion of these two subsequent gubernatorial campaigns, when organizational efforts were much more extensive than in the previous electoral battle.

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For this reason as well as the fact that repetition of these events (already discussed in the first and second chapters) would serve no useful purpose, this section lends itself to a focus on organizational efforts. Since I have more evidence for the Yucatecan campaign as a result of my experience there, I will focus on this case more than on the San Luis Potosí campaign.

First, some general observations on factors affecting organizational efforts and mass mobilization in these cases are helpful. To be sure, organizational efforts can be effective or noneffective. To elaborate further, the effectiveness of the efforts of opposition leaders can be enhanced by their skills, amount of effort, victories in previous elections (which, as we have seen, is greatly dependent on the regime), and, since they have ruled the state capitals, their positive record. Mobilization of mass support is affected by urbanization level (or concentration of voters), educational level (literacy, understanding of social processes, etc.), and the percentage of individuals who speak Spanish (at least in the Yucatecan case where many speak Maya only).

Organizational effectiveness is illustrated in the contrast between the PRI and PAN conventions in the 1969 Yucatecan campaign (see the earlier description in Chapter I). Apparently, PAN leaders had worked longer and more skillfully on their convention than PRI. The former had sent out credentials for delegates, which might have increased the number in attendance. During the convention, when the delegates arrived ushers escorted them to their designated site, where signs with their village name had been painted. Some of the Mayans
delivered speeches in their native tongue, while some of the young Mayan girls marched in a typical costume parade to open the convention. In other words the PAN leaders wisely made special appeals to different groups. Afterwards, the PAN committee helped feed the numerous peasants and find transportation for them back to their villages. In contrast, I did not see the same attention to detail in the PRI convention.

Likewise, the mayoral victories and the positive records of both Nava and Correa Racho enhanced the efforts of the opposition leaders to mobilize statewide support in the subsequent electoral battle. Informants report that both of these were more impressive than the previous PRI administrations. While the general improvement of public services was quite notable, many people in both states appreciated the accountability of these men, as they were the first to publish information on the income and expenditures of their government. As a result, when the gubernatorial elections were less than a year away, people began to mention these reform mayors as the logical choices for candidates.

In addition, Nava's positive record was even acknowledged by President Adolfo López Mateos on the latter's visit to San Luis Potosí in August, 1960. Many Potosinans welcomed the President because they considered him a friend since he was responsible for allowing official recognition of Nava's 1958 victory. Before addressing a large, public gathering, the President had one of his aides divide a list of governmental accomplishments in this state capital according to "city" and "state" sponsorship. Thus, when President López Mateos gave more
credit to the Nava administration by reading its longer list of accomplishments, many interpreted this presidential gesture as tacit approval for Nava in the upcoming gubernatorial elections.

In the Yucatecan case we must remember that Correa Racho's record would have been more positive if the state governor had not attempted to continuously embarrass him and put obstacles in front of his administration. At the same time, however, perhaps the governor's counterproductive efforts made the mayor's record appear even more impressive. In fact, some national PAN leaders thought that Correa Racho would have been only a successful mayor if he had not had this interference. To illustrate this I will briefly detail the incident, which encouraged Correa Racho to become the PAN gubernatorial candidate.

As mentioned earlier Governor Luis Torres Mesias transferred local control of the Merida police to his office around 2:00 A.M. on June 9, 1969, some six months before the election. The mass public reacted immediately against the governor. That same day several thousand residents of Merida gathered in the morning and the evening to show their disapproval, the society of lawyers filed a formal protest, and students marched in support of the mayor. On June 11, at 8:00 in the evening, 15,000 Yucatecans attended a rally in the main plaza. During this protest meeting Correa Racho had a "surprise" announcement: that he would be a gubernatorial candidate if the citizens wanted him and would openly support his efforts. On June 13, 90 percent of the Merida businesses were closed in support of the mayor, while on June 12, 13, and 14, many pedestrians and motorists blocked traffic in the center.

of town for anywhere from two to fifteen minutes in peaceful protest of the governor's actions. Although these and other types of protest did not lead to the governor's returning the local police, this incident helped mobilize further support for the mayor. 47

Some specific socioeconomic characteristics had an impact on mass mobilization in these movements. The most important characteristics were the concentration of residents, their education level, and, in the Yucatan case only, the percentage of individuals who did not speak Spanish. These points, which do not need much elaboration, can be seen quite easily. For example, these opposition movements began in state capitals, that is, in the state's largest urban area. Apparently, the reason for this is that when catalyzing incidents occur, large concentrations of people can communicate with each other rapidly and can attend mass rallies on a frequent basis, whereas rapid communication and frequent attendance at rallies are impossible in the rural areas. To be sure, the findings of Ames, Walton and Sween, and Reyna—studies which we have already seen—show a relationship between higher levels of urbanization and a lower percentage of the PRI vote. Using Ames's and Reyna's operationalization of urbanization, we can see that in 1960, 66.4 percent of the Potosinans lived in communities of less than 2,500, while the corresponding percentages for Sonora and Yucatan are 42.4 and 40.2. 48 These percentages alone would indicate greater difficulties for mass mobilization in San Luis Potosi.

47See the Diario de Yucatan during this period.

48 Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution, p. 219
In addition to urban concentration, mass mobilization for the opposition candidate appears enhanced by the educational level of mass followers. Of course, higher educational levels tend to overlap considerably with higher levels of urbanization. Walton and Sween argued that the relative concentration of urban characteristics accounted for higher opposition support (see earlier discussion in Chapter III), while Reyna showed that higher percentages of literacy in the 32 federal entities correlated negatively with higher percentages of PRI vote. While there is no systematic way to show that this occurred in these three opposition movements, larger crowds and a higher percentage of the vote (both in relation to the number of residents in urban and rural communities) for the opposition came from the highly urban areas. In any case, illiteracy in these states in 1960 was 46.7 percent in San Luis Potosí, 23.8 percent in Sonora, and 34.3 percent in Yucatán. Here we should note that the opposition leaders themselves have emerged from the most educated sectors of society: in San Luis Potosí, university students and a group of intellectuals and professionals; in Sonora, basically the university students; and in Mérida, an independent group of professionals in the running water committee. This would suggest that those with better education understand social processes to a greater extent and are more willing to challenge PRI.

Finally, mass mobilization may be affected by the percentage of

a population speaking only an Indian language. In 1960, this was the case for 4.7 of the Potosinans, .3 percent of the Sonorans, and 12.6 percent of the Yucatecans\(^5\) (who spoke Mayan). As we can easily see, this factor would be expected to play a role in only the Yucatecan gubernatorial campaign, where at most rallies of both parties, some speakers spoke in Mayan.

Having seen some general characteristics which affect mass mobilization, we can now turn our attention to some examples of the opposition leaders' efforts. I will deal briefly with the ongoing party activity of the opposition as well as its statewide communication efforts, both of which are interrelated. Within this context it is more important to focus on the special appeals of the opposition leaders, particularly how they exploited the discontent. The special appeals in the Yucatecan gubernatorial campaign dealt with issues of honesty or administrative accountability, local autonomy, economic progress, regionalism, and voting instructions.

One of the strongest state organizations of PAN is in the Yucatán. Since its early inception in 1940 in this state, PAN has run candidates in many elections, particularly in the 1960s. In 1964, PAN began to maintain a regular headquarters in Mérida and later had committees in approximately 90 percent of the urban centers throughout the state.\(^5\) Many of these committees functioned only around elections.

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but their existence gave PAN a skeletal structure for the entire state.

During the gubernatorial campaign opposition leaders had to expand communication efforts to the entire state. For the literate population communication is generally accomplished through the newspapers, party literature, etc. For those who are illiterate as well as for those who are literate, the candidate's visits are quite important. This is especially true in the rural areas, as illustrated in the Yucatán campaign. Many rural dwellers had heard of Correa Rachó, but they had not heard him speak, seen him, or witnessed his extensive mass support. Thus, the PAN candidate's visit to their town or village was not only a chance to acquaint themselves with his positions but also a source of estimating the support given to him by their fellow area residents. If many attended his rallies, which was generally the case, then they felt reinforced for the upcoming confrontation with PRI.

The most important source of communication for many Yucatecans outside of the state capital was the local committee, which coordinated efforts with the state organization. To estimate the impact of these committees, I accepted an invitation to visit Buctzozt before the candidate's arrival. There, in this village of around 4,500 inhabitants, the baker was in charge of PAN activities and used his house and large backyard for party meetings. In addition, as a baker, he was in a strategic commercial position because many people came daily to his store to buy fresh bread and pastry; thus he communicated with his fellow residents (in many cases, through their children) on a frequent
basis.

The baker traveled to Merida at least once a week and visited the party headquarters to request that the candidate come to Buctzozt for a rally. Finally, with the date designated, the baker informed and prepared people for the impending visit. For example, one day before the candidate arrived, he organized about 20 villagers for a deer hunt in order to get meat for Correa Rachó's visit. Women prepared other dishes and helped decorate the house. Extra supplies, such as refreshments, etc., were trucked in. In turn, the increased pace of life helped to communicate the candidate's visit and showed which villagers supported Correa Rachó.

In addition to the ongoing party activity and the communication efforts of opposition leaders, the special appeals of opposition speakers, particularly the candidate, were quite important for mass mobilization. In the Yucatecan campaign some general comments about the two candidates' contrasting styles of appeals are helpful. While Loret de Mola made many specific promises, Correa Rachó made few more general promises. One reason for the latter's generalities was his realization that, if allowed to win, he would not receive federal support and funds and thus might appear quite ineffective. Correa Rachó's strategy appeared to pay off, for later in the campaign Loret de Mola began to speak more in generalities when he discovered that Yucatecans were disgusted with PRI promises, many of which they considered unfulfilled.

To illustrate this PRI style, I will list Loret de Mola's promises in Xumpich, a village which was apparently too small to be
listed in the 1960 census. In response to a list of petitions, which was common only in PRI meetings, the candidate promised: 1) a modern school building, 2) a donation of cement for the peasant commissariat annex, 3) reconstruction and paving of a section of access from the highway to the sisal plant, 4) a basketball court, 5) needed medical aid, and 6) other, miscellaneous items. I suspect that not even a highly efficient governor could deliver on all these promises, given other priorities for investment.

When PRI does not deliver on its promises, then it may run into trouble, as illustrated in the case of Dzilam González. Evidently, Loret de Mola had promised school furniture to this village when he was a candidate for the National Senate. But the furniture had never been delivered. Consequently, when the PRI candidate returned to Dzilam González as a gubernatorial candidate, the residents remembered that promise and thus greeted him with catcalls, fire-crackers thrown in his direction, and stones. Further, the residents interrupted his rally with catcalls and a fist fight.

In contrast, perhaps Correa Rachó's most specific promise was that he would bring tourism to the beaches of Progreso (the major port

52The smallest village included in that census is Tolchac Puerto with 472 inhabitants. Consequently, it is interesting to note the number of specific promises for such a small village.

53Diario de Yucatán, September 18, 1969.

54I accompanied the candidate to this village. Interestingly, the final vote witnessed by representatives from both parties was 444 for PAN and 144 for PRI according to the Diario de Yucatán, November 25, 1969.
in Yucatán and about half an hour by car from Mérida). Outside of that specific promise, which would not be too difficult to fulfill, the PAN candidate's statement in Panabá was typical: "I am going to make you a promise. I promise you justice, progress, and liberty."\textsuperscript{55} Further, he was not given a long list of petitions in every village.

As to be expected Loret de Mola frequently appealed to the traditional symbol of the Mexican Revolution. In virtually every PRI rally, speakers would constantly remind those in attendance that the Mexican Revolution not only had improved their life situation but also was an ongoing Revolution still bearing fruits. Apparently, this strategy proved counterproductive for PRI since Correa Rachó and other PAN leaders would frequently argue that the Mexican Revolution had failed miserably. This is indeed an interesting finding and a recent PAN strategy, for Kenneth F. Johnson stated in the early 1960s that "PAN carefully avoids direct attacks upon those institutions which are traditionally mexicano and are important symbols of nationhood."\textsuperscript{56}

In any case, many of the recent PAN leaders might support many of the Revolution's goals but certainly capitalize on the lack of fulfillment of Revolutionary promises. In fact, as these examples show, Correa Rachó had more credibility than Loret de Mola, especially since the former's position as mayor of Mérida gave him more visibility and opportunities for political reform than did the latter's position as a

\textsuperscript{55}Diario de Yucatán, September 21, 1969.

\textsuperscript{56}Kenneth F. Johnson, "Ideological Correlates of Right Wing Political Alienation in Mexico," pp. 658-659.
Senator (which is typically symbolic) in far-away Mexico City. Further, Correa Rachó had a favorable record of accomplishments.

In addition, the contrasts between FRI's paternalistic attitude and the opposition's community involvement and participation was notable. In San Luis Potosí, for example, Nava told me that some residents of the state capital petitioned him for running water in their district. Faced with limited resources, Nava felt that he could not further strain his budget but promised to give the residents sufficient pipes if they dug the ditches to lay them. These residents gladly accepted the offer, and the city administration came in to lay the pipes. Similarly in the Yucatán, Correa Rachó told his audiences that he would not be able to correct in six years the serious problems accumulated over the past decades, but "if all cooperated," they together could make progress. Perhaps this strategy increases the opposition's credibility.

In the Yucatán case, economic difficulties were a campaign issue. As we have seen, some absolute growth was coupled with a relatively declining position when compared with the other federal entities. The hardest hit sector was the peasant, who was highly dependent on sisal (henequén), a strong white fiber used for rope, rugs, and many other items. Some background information puts the problem into proper perspective. The "boom to bust" history of this product began around 1880 due to its demand in the United States. To meet this need, large plantations emerged in the Yucatán and soon produced 90 percent of all Mexican sisal. Unfortunately, the Yucatecan economy became almost totally dependent on this crop, and hence
fluctuations in price and demand created serious problems in this state. In addition, agrarian reform after the Revolution broke up the large plantations and led to unproductive plots of land with peasants who needed technical advice for proper exploitation.  

Some information is available on the impact of the international market. For example, the demand for sisal peaked during World War II, although I have not been able to find the amount produced. In 1948, some 120,000 tons were produced, while ten years later, only 80,000 tons were produced since the demand had dropped sharply. The price for sisal also fluctuated; it was nine cents (U.S. currency) a pound in 1945, 12.5 cents in 1950, and 24.5 cents in 1951. From then on, the rapid decline is easily seen: in 1952 the price was 18.2 cents; in 1953, 10.2 to 8.8 cents; and after 1964, the trend continued downwards with the 1968 price around 4.5 to 4.7 cents.

To combat these problems and to utilize sisal in other ways, in 1961 the federal government helped sponsor a sisal-growing and -marketing collective, called CORDEMEX. These efforts failed for a variety of reasons, some of which do not appear to be the government's fault. But the reasons for failure are not as important for the campaign as what many Yucatecans believed. Many thought that the problems centered around

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corruption of officials running CORDEMEX, particularly since some official records were initially published, while secrecy prevailed later on. In fact, one source estimated that 10 million pesos ($800,000 U.S. dollars) are stolen annually through a variety of abuses. Thus, CORDEMEX became the subject of much campaign rhetoric, although the impact that a state governor, especially one from the opposition, could have on a federally-sponsored cooperative is unclear. In any case, this was an issue which encouraged many peasants to support PAN in order to "protest" against practices of those identified with PRI and Mexico City.

Yucatecan regionalism also contributed to opposition mobilization, although the extent of its impact is difficult to demonstrate. To be sure, in noncompetitive elections Ames found the relationship for four states (Yucatán, Oaxaca, Baja California North and South) with a history of nonintegration and the PRI vote to be -.238 (Table III-1). Some of this regionalist sentiment has resulted from the physical environment. For instance, Scott argues:

the state of Yucatán is the clearest example of isolation, separatism, and economic woe in the Mexican union. Not until 1950, with the completion of the Southeastern Railroad, which took fifteen years to build, was there a land tie between the peninsula and the north, and as late as 1958 Yucatán had no roads across the isthmus to the economic heart of the country, the mesa central, and Mexico City.63

61 Torres-Ramírez, "The Mexican PAN," p. 36.
62 Ibid., p. 35.
63 Scott, Mexican Government, p. 41.
Today one can frequently hear many educated Yucatecans make disparaging remarks about the residents of Mexico City. In addition, as others have observed, many Yucatecans tend to identify with the Yucatán first and then with Mexico. Hence, given these facts as well as the economic difficulties blamed on the federal government, it is little surprise that the opposition's appeals to state pride worked to their advantage.

One of the most consistent appeals of opposition speakers was encouraging Yucatecans to register and vote. Outside of arguing that Correa Rachó's honesty and accountability would improve living conditions, opposition leaders frequently repeated the promise of free elections by President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz in his State of the Union Address on September 1. In addition, PAN leaders would hold up their voter-registration credentials to show individuals what they had to demand. Later, they discussed voting procedures, especially the legal rights of opposition representatives.

Special appeals were made to two sectors of society—women and students—over which PRI has virtually no control. For the former PAN women were quite active in recruiting other women. In fact, Correa Rachó's wife almost always accompanied her husband to political rallies and frequently addressed the women in the audience for a few minutes. She and others stressed the significance of the women's vote. Students were attracted to the PAN campaign, gave speeches at rallies,

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and helped in other ways. Outside of their being attracted to a reformer, their support might have resulted from many of Correa Racho's promises for university students: a halt to government interference, academic freedom, an employment agency to help them find work when they graduate, etc. 65

Due to the lack of specific promises to other sectors of the Yucatecan society, it appears that widespread support for Correa Racho came from the general discontent with PRI. Thus, while no specific programs were proposed, many opposition speakers attacked PRI's "false promises" and rebutted PRI's attempt to label PAN as a party of rich people. For example, Genny Canto, a peasant, was one of the opposition's most effective speakers. In front of a group of peasants and workers in Buctzotz, she argued:

... candidates come and go and make promises during elections. But they never fulfill them.

One has to refute the argument that the National Action candidate is surrounded by bankers. That is a big lie! I am not the owner of a factory; I am the daughter of peasants, and therefore I am a peasant. Where then are the bankers who accompany him? Or could it be that all of us gathered here are millionaires? (laughter) 66

In contrast, the PRI candidate was warmly received in only a few places, and he privately acknowledged that he was the victim of high discontent resulting from years of traditional PRI practices.

In this chapter we have seen that special conditions account for the emergence and widespread support for these three electoral

65 Torres-Ramírez, "The Mexican PAN," pp. 82-83.

66 My translation after taping the speeches. September 27, 1969.
opposition movements. The primary condition for the emergence of these movements is a catalyzing incident. After the incident has occurred, opposition leaders and newspaper directors join to exploit this incident and thus to mobilize mass support. These conditions appear necessary and sufficient during the first electoral battle. In the two subsequent gubernatorial campaigns in San Luis Potosí and Yucatán, organizational efforts of the opposition leaders appeared more critical than in the previous election. Mass mobilization was more difficult in this second electoral battle because the regime was better prepared to prevent an opposition victory, the opposition leaders had to mobilize rural dwellers and others throughout the state instead of just the residents of the state capital, and the emotions of opposition supporters did not seem as high as previously because of the absence of catalyzing incidents.

Thus far in this study, we have discussed the emergence and the suppression of these opposition movements. Presently, we must attempt to determine the opposition's impact on political processes.
Chapter V

THE POLITICAL IMPACT AND STRATEGY OF ELECTORAL AND NONELECTORAL OPPOSITIONS

Thus far we have seen the pattern of limited development of electoral oppositions in recent Mexican history. The pattern involves emergence of an opposition movement in a state capital in response to catalyzing incidents. The opposition candidate then wins the state capital and performs effectively in office for one term but faces suppression in the gubernatorial campaign. Afterwards, the opposition leaders and followers are understandably dispirited and do not strongly challenge PRI in the subsequent mayoral election in the state capital. Hence PRI reasserts its traditional dominance.

Some would argue that this pattern—and particularly the suppression of legal opposition—is related to the recent emergence of more violent types of opposition. Such an argument is difficult to clearly demonstrate with the available evidence. In any case I will attempt to show some parallels between electoral and nonelectoral oppositions. More importantly, I will argue that nonelectoral oppositions have a greater impact on political processes because these more violent types of opposition have apparently forced the present administration to propose reforms of the electoral procedures. Perhaps the incumbents are

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1 The reader will remember that the electoral opposition movement in Sonora emerged at the mayoral and gubernatorial level during the same campaign.
now willing to reform the electoral process because they would prefer to see the more violent opposition groups form political parties and thus participate within the legal framework.

In turn, electoral reforms—if meaningfully implemented—could lead to greater increases in the opposition vote in upcoming elections. But if meaningful reforms are not implemented, perhaps we could expect clandestine violence and/or official suppression to increase.

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss three concerns. First, I will deal with the political impact and strategy of electoral oppositions. Second, I will attempt to show parallels between electoral and other types of oppositions and suggest that the increasing opposition in Mexico has forced the incumbents to reform the electoral process. Finally, because of the increasing opposition, especially those involved in violence, one would suspect that the opposition's percentage of the vote will increase in upcoming elections. Hence I will make some qualified projections on the future of opposition support.

A. The Political Impact and Strategy of Electoral Oppositions

The political impact of electoral oppositions appears minimal, and thus this limited impact affects their strategy. To be sure opposition administrations (that is, where oppositions have won office) have some impact on local politics but still have only minimal impact on national political processes. It is not difficult to understand, therefore, why opposition movements have disbanded at the local level and why PAN leaders debated the possibility of disbanding in 1969 at the national level.
The opposition movement in San Luis Potosí accomplished more of its goals than the movements in Sonora and Yucatán. In the first case in 1958, the opposition succeeded in diminishing, if not totally eliminating, the political and economic stranglehold of the cacique (boss), Gonzelo N. Santos. Moreover, although the 1958 election challenge occurred at the mayoral level in the state capital, the Potosinans still were able to force Governor Manuel Alvarez (who was identified with Santos) to resign. They failed, however, in their attempt to work within the PRI or to reform it. After the Yucatecan 1967 election, in contrast, it appears that little could be done to lower taxes—the incident which catalyzed support against PRI—for the running water system, while in Sonora the opposition did not succeed in reversing official support for the imposed Governor, Faustino Félix Serna, or in forcing Governor Luis Encinas Johnson to resign.

Of course, these opposition administrations had a strong impact on local policy, for even high-ranking government officials report that the oppositions performed more effectively than the PRI administrations. This is clearly seen in the San Luis Potosí case. Although sorely lacking in administrative experience, Nava and his staff corrected abuses with the budget, thus increasing almost immediately the amount of money available to improve city services. According to Nava, the annual municipal budget increased from $376,000 (U.S. dollars) to slightly more

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²It is interesting to note that the government placed Santos in charge of the Ministry of Fishing in the Secretariat of Industry and Commerce in April, 1959, in order to accommodate him. Even today, one must wonder about his power, for Excélsior, Sept. 2, 1972, p. 11A, reports that Santos sat among the State Governors during the President's State of the Union address. In fact, once when Santos left his seat, a Governor occupied
than $560,000 within the first year—a 50 percent increase without raising taxes. Due to this elimination of corruption and its own serious intent to reform, the new administration soon installed drainage systems, expanded electrical services and running water, paved streets, etc. Daily, the city government published its income and expenditures in front of city hall. Periodically, they also published this information in the newspaper. In addition, Nava fired one of his department leads for corruption, thus increasing his own credibility. In fact, according to some informants, myths began to emerge around the personality and accomplishments of Dr. Nava. One was that he used to take stimulants in order to work efficiently until 2:00 or 3:00 A.M. many nights. Even today, Potosinans show an enormous amount of respect for Dr. Nava.

The impact on policy after these administrations were defeated in their attempts for re-election was the greatest in the Yucatán case. In the 1970 mayoral election in Mérida, PRI ran a strong, popular candidate, Victor Cervera. The latter even promised to continue the positive accomplishments of the PAN administration. After elected, Cervera continued to publish the income and expenditures of the local government—a practice initiated by PAN. In general, his administration appears more honest and productive than previous PRI administrations.

At the national level these local and state opposition movements have probably served as a warning to PRI leaders inasmuch as widespread continued support for the official party cannot be taken for granted. Beyond this point, I doubt that these oppositions have had much of an it but was chased away when the cacique returned.
impact on national policy.

One final observation on the Mexican political system suggests PAN's minimal impact on national policy. In recent years Scott, Brandenburg, Padgett, and Hansen have debated the nature of the official party's impact on policy. Basically, and at the risk of oversimplification, we can place Scott at one extreme because he sees the three sectors—worker, peasant, and popular—of PRI as influential in policy-making (at least in his first publication because he has since modified his position), while we can place Brandenburg and Hansen at the other extreme because they see the president as the powerful "liberal Machiavellian" who controls PRI as well as other sectors of society and determines policy. Padgett's argument appears to lie inbetween. The evidence presented here in Chapter III supports Brandenburg's and Hansen's argument since the very sectors which have profited least in the past few decades are the very ones represented within the official party structure. In fact, the large commercial interests are not within PRI; these economic interests, according to many Mexicans, have been able to force the president to protect their investments and profits, to the detriment of the lower socioeconomic sectors of society. In any case, PRI has very little impact on policy and is, among other

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5 Carmona, et al., El Milagro Mexicano. This view is also frequently expressed in Por qué?
things, the electoral arm of those more powerful individuals within the
government. Thus, since PRI has little impact on policy, we might ex­
pect an opposition party to likewise have little impact on policy.

With the opposition's minimal impact on politics as well as the
regime's suppression, we could expect the strategy of opposition leaders
and followers to change from challenges to PRI to either voting for op­
position candidates in other elections and/or to nonparticipation at
least for a period of time. As the reader will recall, the inaccuracies
in official data hamper our attempts to measure mass behavior changes
in terms of greater opposition voting in noncompetitive elections as
well as electoral participation. Therefore, I will have to rely on
informants' estimates, which are virtually unanimous in arguing that
electoral participation has decreased considerably in these cases. More­
over, these informants also argue that the opposition vote has increased
only slightly—if at all. Within the limitations of some of the data,
I will discuss the strategies of the opposition movements in my case
studies and PAN's national strategy.

After the San Luis Potosí gubernatorial election in 1961, protest
over the official PRI victory was by far the most intensive and of the
longest duration. Massive protests occurred until official suppression
of nava leaders discouraged the opposition. In the following election
for mayor, reportedly very few citizens (as few as ten percent) voted,
although the official number of voters was apparently exaggerated. Mass

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6 On the other roles of PRI, see McDonald, Party Systems, p. 245,
as well as the authors cited in footnotes 3 and 4.
attitudes and behavior—inasmuch as one can rely on fairly consistent estimates from informants—showed apathy as well as fear of the political incumbents. In contrast, Nava's immediate reaction was to start regional opposition parties, but, after witnessing the widespread apathy to his efforts and after suffering physical violence, he likewise became understandably apathetic.

As to be expected official data show little differences in the Potosiñas' participation in elections and their support for PRI. The official participation percentage in the following presidential election (1964) did not decrease, although it did in 1970 (Table V-1). Further, the official PRI percentage of the vote has not decreased significantly (Table I-1).

The Yucatán reaction parallels the San Luis Potosí situation in terms of mass attitudes but not for opposition elites. Here the opposition leaders protested legally and did not attempt to organize mass demonstrations, which could have led to suppression similar to that which occurred in San Luis Potosí. Again in this case informants argued that few voted in the following election for mayor, although the official number of votes was high. One reporter, voting early in the day, said that he had trouble putting his ballot in the box because it was already "filled" with votes. Interestingly, the official participation figures show that the percentage of voters declined from 79.8 percent in 1964 to 71.3 percent in 1970 (Table V-1), although that official decline is still small. And in comparison with the 1964 PRI presidential vote,

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7Diario de Yucatán, November 23, 1970.
Table V-1
VALID VOTES CAST IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AS PERCENT OF ALL
REGISTERED VOTERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1958</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Aguascalientes</td>
<td>73.4%</td>
<td>61.4%</td>
<td>73.4%</td>
<td>62.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Baja California</td>
<td>72.9%</td>
<td>73.0%</td>
<td>70.5%</td>
<td>82.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Baja California T.</td>
<td>90.4%</td>
<td>79.6%</td>
<td>76.6%</td>
<td>68.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Campeche</td>
<td>89.8%</td>
<td>76.1%</td>
<td>84.8%</td>
<td>65.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Coahuila</td>
<td>94.2%</td>
<td>79.8%</td>
<td>77.9%</td>
<td>59.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Colima</td>
<td>64.5%</td>
<td>73.8%</td>
<td>57.5%</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Chihuahua</td>
<td>59.4%</td>
<td>56.1%</td>
<td>56.6%</td>
<td>59.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Chiapas</td>
<td>79.1%</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
<td>77.4%</td>
<td>67.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Distrito Federal</td>
<td>69.9%</td>
<td>68.9%</td>
<td>68.5%</td>
<td>65.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Durango</td>
<td>67.5%</td>
<td>62.0%</td>
<td>73.4%</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Guanajuato</td>
<td>66.3%</td>
<td>68.2%</td>
<td>66.9%</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Guerrero</td>
<td>78.9%</td>
<td>72.5%</td>
<td>76.5%</td>
<td>67.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Hidalgo</td>
<td>84.9%</td>
<td>89.9%</td>
<td>86.4%</td>
<td>82.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Jalisco</td>
<td>59.6%</td>
<td>53.7%</td>
<td>59.5%</td>
<td>64.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. México</td>
<td>83.1%</td>
<td>85.2%</td>
<td>71.8%</td>
<td>63.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Michoacán</td>
<td>61.0%</td>
<td>62.0%</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Morelos</td>
<td>58.9%</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
<td>68.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Nayarit</td>
<td>73.2%</td>
<td>78.1%</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
<td>68.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Nuevo León</td>
<td>67.2%</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
<td>57.8%</td>
<td>55.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Oaxaca</td>
<td>78.4%</td>
<td>85.0%</td>
<td>77.9%</td>
<td>76.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Puebla</td>
<td>78.1%</td>
<td>79.9%</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
<td>64.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Querétaro</td>
<td>72.6%</td>
<td>70.7%</td>
<td>78.2%</td>
<td>67.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Quintana Roo</td>
<td>96.2%</td>
<td>74.6%</td>
<td>98.1%</td>
<td>94.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. San Luis Potosí</td>
<td>84.6%</td>
<td>69.7%</td>
<td>70.1%</td>
<td>66.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Sinaloa</td>
<td>66.3%</td>
<td>74.1%</td>
<td>71.9%</td>
<td>53.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Sonora</td>
<td>69.5%</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
<td>57.7%</td>
<td>46.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Tabasco</td>
<td>74.6%</td>
<td>84.2%</td>
<td>84.1%</td>
<td>80.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Tamaulipas</td>
<td>78.0%</td>
<td>75.2%</td>
<td>73.0%</td>
<td>60.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Tlaxcala</td>
<td>82.2%</td>
<td>87.3%</td>
<td>80.7%</td>
<td>70.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Veracruz</td>
<td>78.1%</td>
<td>78.5%</td>
<td>69.1%</td>
<td>74.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Yucatán</td>
<td>88.5%</td>
<td>62.8%</td>
<td>79.8%</td>
<td>71.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Zacatecas</td>
<td>77.3%</td>
<td>75.8%</td>
<td>73.9%</td>
<td>68.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

National Average         | 74.2%  | 71.7%  | 69.4%  | 65.0%  |

Source: The Office of the Mexican President
the 1970 vote declined less than one percent (Table I-1).

In the Yucatecan case one recent favorable remark about Correa Rachó by President Luis Echeverría Alvarez suggests a greater acceptance of legal oppositions. In early 1972, when the President toured the Yucatán, he stated that Correa Rachó was a "good citizen." The latter immediately responded in interviews that PRI stole the 1969 gubernatorial election from him but, more recently, has also made favorable remarks about the President's attempts to reform PRI, increase federal expenditures in the Yucatán, and increased national concern for Yucatecan problems. Incidentally, no special significance can be attached to the president's visit to the Yucatán because he has visited almost every part of the country since assuming the presidency. At the same time, the president would have used his visit to make a highly favorable impression on the Yucatecans.

The Sonoran case differs from the other two because of its type of protest—students mobilizing mass support against the regime because of PRI's imposition of the gubernatorial candidate. Consequently, one suspects that many of those who voted for PAN will return to support PRI. It is surprising to see, therefore, that the official PRI vote for president declined five percent. Specifically, it dropped from 98.4 percent in 1964 to 93.5 percent in 1970 (Table I-1). At this point, however, we should note that PRI support has been quite high in Sonora, given its fourth-place ranking for socioeconomic development in 1960 and 1970 (Table III-5). The official participation rate dropped even further.

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Iniciativa, August 26, 1972, pp. 8-10, 43.
from 57.7 to 46.8 percent in these two elections (Table V-1). In other words, with official data we would think that the greatest degree of mass behavioral change occurred here vis-a-vis the other two cases, but this apparent change probably tells us more about the nature of official data than it does concerning mass behavior in Sonora.

At the national level the minimal impact of PAN on policy as well as the regime's suppression of PAN's gubernatorial victories have seriously affected the enthusiasm of key supporters of this major opposition party. Hence one of their major debates centers on continued participation in elections (where PRI will not allow them to win) or disbanding. The 1969 convention occurred before the Yucatecan gubernatorial election, and thus many leaders argued that PAN participation in the 1970 presidential elections should be dependent on the outcome of the Yucatec election. In other words, if the incumbents recognized Correa Rachó's victory, a victory which appeared highly probable, then PAN would run a presidential candidate. After a heated debate the PAN delegates barely approved the proposal for continued participation regardless of the outcome of the Yucatecan gubernatorial election. But, while PAN fielded a presidential candidate in 1970, his campaign was characterized in many areas by low enthusiasm from many PAN leaders. Many of these leaders, of course, had voted against continued participation.

Since this participation debate is the subject of much controversy within and outside of PAN, its advantages and disadvantages merit closer scrutiny. The basic arguments in favor of participation are: 1) campaigns

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are important to spread PAN's message; 2) they need ongoing organization at the local and state levels so that they can capitalize on PRI's mistakes; 3) PAN leaders do not want to lose their official registration; 4) if PAN disbands, another party might step in and become the major opposition party; and 5) PAN has a small, but steady, increase in the vote. The arguments against participation are: 1) PAN candidates are not allowed to win major elections; 2) their continued participation serves primarily as a facade for democracy; and 3) PAN's disbanding might force the incumbents to reform the electoral process. There are many merits to both sets of arguments, which will continue to be the source of much heated debate, particularly by many who identify neither with PAN nor PRI and think that PAN shows its "corruption" (or the fact that it is coopted by PRI) through its continued participation.

In this section we have seen that the electoral oppositions have only a minimal impact on politics. Yet, recently, President Echeverria has proposed some electoral reforms. Thus, in the following section I will argue that nonelectoral oppositions have apparently forced the regime to reform the electoral procedures.

B. Nonelectoral Oppositions and Their Political Impact

To clearly show a relationship between a closed political system and the emergence of nonelectoral oppositions is an impossible task with the available data. Nevertheless, one can show many parallels between electoral and other types of opposition (ranging from anti-government violence to criticisms of government practices), particularly since all
these are attacking the same basic problem—relatively closed access channels for influencing policy within or outside of PRI for the vast majority of Mexicans. These closed channels have encouraged the recent student protests, while the government's suppression of students has led to clandestine opposition. In turn, the present administration has proposed electoral reforms because it would prefer to see more violent types of opposition contained within the party structure. In this section, therefore, I will suggest the relationship between the futility of attempting to influence policy through legal access channels and the emergence of other forms of opposition and then show how all these recent developments have pressured the Echeverría's administration to reform the electoral process.

For the benefit of the reader who might not be aware of the recent trends of nonelectoral oppositions, I will briefly review some salient features of recent protests, beginning with the 1968 student movement. While many authors differ in some of their interpretations of this movement, Hernández, Poniatowska, Medina Valdés, Goodsell, and Johnson agree on the following general description of the student protest. In July, 1968, an insignificant incident (ostensibly a fight over a girlfriend) led to a gang fight between two preparatory schools in Mexico City. The city government sent out some 200 granaderos (riot policemen) to quell the disturbance, but their apparently brutal tactics triggered widespread support from other students. This catalyzing incident (similar to those in the three cases of electoral opposition discussed) led to a series of mass protests. On event led to another, and on August 27, an estimated 300,000 students, teachers, an
workers marched peacefully to the Zócalo (the main plaza, in front of the presidential palace).\textsuperscript{10} From time to time some violent confrontations between the granderos and students occurred, but the government allowed the peaceful protest to continue and hoped that the student organizers would lose their active supporters before the upcoming Olympics around the middle of October. At the same time federal security agents had jailed many participants.

With the opening of the Olympics drawing near and the student movement quite strong, the government ordered 10,000 soldiers to take over the National University on September 17, thus violating 40 years of autonomy.\textsuperscript{11} Since this did not stop the protests in other areas of Mexico City, the government escalated its tactics at a rally of 15,000 individuals on October 2 in Tlatelolco, a residential area of high-rise apartments. Shortly after 6:00 P.M., apparently with the cue of flares, many of the 5,000 soldiers assembled in the area began firing at the peaceful demonstrators. Shots were heard for at least two hours. Later, estimates of those killed ranged from 200 to over 1,000, but all sources

\textsuperscript{10}Hernández, El PRI y el Movimiento Estudiantil de 1968, p. 78. Johnson, Mexican Democracy, p. 154, estimates that half a million joined the protest.

\textsuperscript{11}Hernández, El PRI y el Movimiento Estudiantil de 1968, p. 83. Perhaps the "government" (meaning the president) was not the initiator of this decision to enter the university as well as the decision to forcefully eliminate the movement at Tlatelolco. Medina Valdés, Operación 10 de Junio, pp. 254-255, argues that army leaders wanted to stop the movement. Further, Medina Valdés stated in his press conference (which I attended) on June 9, 1972, that the military came close to taking over the government. His arguments in his book on the military's intention of winning power through elections are unclear, however.
report that some foreign correspondents and other innocent bystanders were killed and wounded.\textsuperscript{12} Afterwards, President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz offered no explanation of what many referred to as the "Massacre of Tlatelolco."

Basically, the students and those who joined them\textsuperscript{13} had complaints paralleling those of the three opposition movements. Goodsell argues that these were "government corruption, one-party rule, heavy-handed police tactics, and a corrupt judicial system."\textsuperscript{14} Hernández states that the students wanted a "public dialogue."\textsuperscript{15} (Luis Echeverría Alvarez, the then Minister of Gobernación, had agreed to a private dialogue, but the students rejected this.) While different authors, informants, and participants may express the students' complaints somewhat differently,\textsuperscript{16} they can be subsumed under the general inaccountability of government officials.

Most informed Mexicans agree on the importance of the 1968 student movement and the subsequent suppression for increasing public awareness

\textsuperscript{12}All sources likewise report that the crowd had not provoked the soldiers. Johnson, \textit{Mexican Democracy}, p. 161, argues that some students were, nevertheless, armed and had brought in some trained guerrillas.

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., p. 154, states that many government employees who had a free day for a counter demonstration joined the students.

\textsuperscript{14}Goodsell, "Mexico: Why the Students RIoted," p. 32.

\textsuperscript{15}Hernández, \textit{El PRI y el Movimiento Estudiantil de 1968}, Chapter III.

\textsuperscript{16}For a disjointed, but useful, oral history of different motivations and observations of the protestors, see Poniatowska, \textit{La Noche de Tlatelolco}.
of Mexican problems and criticism of the government. This is well expressed by the frequently-quoted statement of one of the student leaders, Luis González de Alba:

Beginnng with July 26, everything changed . . . . I am not the same; all of us are different. There is a Mexico before the student movement and another one after 1968. Tlatelolco is the dividing point between the two Mexicos.17

All authors agree on this point because the student complaints—although not new—attracted widespread sympathy from the more politically aware sectors of society. In addition, student protests in Mexico City before 1968 focused on nonpolitical issues; since then they have focused on national politics.18 Interestingly, the government changed the electoral law before the 1970 elections so that 18 year olds could vote and younger people could become Senators and Federal Deputies.

Since 1968, criticism of Mexican politicians has increased considerably. As the Director of one Research Institute told me:

"Before 1968, we thought that Mexico was making progress. After 1968, we have begun to question everything." One can present examples of this increasing criticism from the recent Mexican works, newspaper articles, conversations with friends-informants, and even presidential statements. For example, Manuel Moreno Sánchez argues that awareness and criticism of the many problems in Mexico began in 1968 and cites in a general fashion many of the statistics presented here in Chapter III;

17Quoted in Hernández, El PRI y el Movimiento Estudiantil de 1968, p. 7.

18Ibid., pp. 73-74.
he argues that the Mexican political system is in a "crisis." José C. Valadés states that the students "forced the State on the road of reforms."20

One can read newspaper articles and editorials and find frequent references to 1968 as a pivotal year. One major development—initiated by the students—is the present criticism of the incumbent Mexican president.21 Since 1968 many writers have begun to criticize the president while he is still in office, although they generally do not do so as openly as did the students. Perhaps because of this trend, President Echeverría has asked during the beginning of his administration (1970-1972) for public criticism in an attempt at "democratic openness" (apertura democrática); the latter is now a very common phrase in Mexican politics.

At the same time, I do not mean to imply that this increased criticism is shared by all Mexicans. Without the necessary survey data, one can only hazard an informed estimate that many Mexicans in the lower socioeconomic sectors and/or those outside of Mexico City (or large urban areas) are not highly aware of the resultant public criticism, but then these are probably sectors and areas which will not lead opposition to the government.

Perhaps the 1968 student movement would have been only a historical reference for some increasing opposition if it had not been

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19 Moreno Sánchez, Crisis Política de México


21 Kenneth F. Johnson, Mexican Democracy, p. 162.
for events in 1971. Opposition to the government increased further after the suppression of students on June 10, 1971—the first massive student demonstration in Mexico City after 1968. Briefly, approximately 8,000 students met at the Normal School and wanted to march peacefully for a couple of miles to the center of the downtown area. But before they could start, the riot police opened their ranks to let several hundred Halcones (Falcons—a paramilitary force) attack the students. In the process an estimated 30 students were killed, and many more were wounded. This time, however, the official government response was not one of silence. President Echeverría fired the Mayor and Police Chief of Mexico City, told a group of "indignant" reporters, many of whom had been injured, that he, the president, was even more "indignant," and ordered the Attorney General to investigate the incident to determine the identity of the Halcones. A few days later, the president appeared on the Zabludovsky television news program (24 hours) and promised "categorically" that the "guilty ones would be punished." The government still has not published that report.

Later in 1971, clandestine violence attracted national attention. In September, Julio Hirschfield Alameda, the Director of Airports and Auxiliar Services, was the victim of the first major political kidnapping in Mexico. Shortly thereafter, other kidnappings and

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23Mexico, of course, had been spared virtually all of the problems of clandestine oppositions in such Latin American countries as Uruguay, Colombia, Brazil, and others.
"political" bank robberies occurred. To be sure, the government was concerned and had kept gunshops closed since the June 10th affair and had increased the number of guards surrounding all banks. The most dramatic kidnapping occurred in November, 1971, and was generally attributed to Genaro Vázquez Rojas (government spokesmen called him a common bandit, while other sources referred to him as a guerrilla leader). The ideal target was Dr. Jaime Castrejon Díaz, the Rector of the University of Guerrero, a wealthy man with stocks in the Coca Cola company (thus supposedly linked to U.S. imperialistic interests). In return for his safety, and hence an implicit commitment to other wealthy businessmen, the government had to release about ten prisoners (many charged that all of these were being held for political reasons; some were connected with the 1968 student movement) and fly them to Cuba. As to be expected the Exheverria administration appeared visibly shaken.

In addition, the newspapers now reported minor skirmishes between the army and "guerrillas." Inadequate coverage and conflicting accounts prevent accurate documentation of the estimated numbers involved, frequency of clashes with soldiers, the areas where they operate, etc., although it is certain that a group exists in the poverty-stricken and mountainous state of Guerrero. A weekly newsletter of the respected Instituto Mexicano de Estudios Politicos, Análisis Político, documents their existence from articles in the major newspapers. To be sure,

24 Included among these prisoners was Mario Menéndez Rodríguez, one of the directors of Por qué?. Government charges against him are unclear.

25 Análisis Político, 7 de Febrero de 1972.
extensive information is provided by Por qué?, although some of its information could be misleading.

According to Mexico City newspapers, such as El Día, El Universal, Excélsior, and others, the reasons for the emergence of these guerrillas and the clandestine opposition was quite clear. These reasons range from "serious inequalities among Mexicans," "the official violence against students in 1968 and 1971," to "lack of internal democracy within PRI."

Further, one young bank robber in Chihuahua said that he joined the revolutionary movement after student suppression in 1968 and 1971, after "I learned that one must respond to reactionary violence with revolutionary violence."27

Even before June 10, 1971, some statements of high government officials were encouraging the formation of other political parties. On June 1, 1971, in response to a student strike in Monterrey, President Echeverría stated that "those in pressure groups . . . should join one of the existing political parties or form their own."28 But in his 1971 State of the Union Address (September 1), the president did not suggest any reforms for the electoral process. Later in November, the Minister of Government stated that it is "desirable that the currents of opposition organize themselves in political parties and fight, within the legal framework, for the ideas and principles which they hold."29

26Análisis Político, pp. 2-3. All are cited in this source.
27Ibid., p. 2.
28Ibid., p. 3.
29Ibid.
Still, no reforms had been proposed.

The death of Genaro Vázquez Rojas on February 2, 1972, gave even greater visibility to the clandestine opposition. The official version stated that he had died in an automobile accident, although other sources argued that he had been assassinated by federal agents.\(^\text{30}\) Since then, Genaro Vázquez Rojas has become the hero of many leftist university students because he was the best known guerrilla leader fighting against the government. Presidently, Vázquez Rojas appears destined to become the Che Guevara for Mexican revolutionaries.

Some bizarre events since the Spring of 1972 have led to a paralysis of educational activities at the National University in Mexico City (and apparently at other universities throughout Mexico). Mexican informants frequently remind the foreigner that he cannot understand the intrigue, alliances, and the general complexity of Mexican politics; this appears especially true for what I call the "neutralization" technique, where different factions support and fight each other, create disorders, and finally force the resignation of high officials. Such appears to be the case at the National University (over 100,000 students and professors), where the following facts are certain.

Since the Spring of 1972, some "individuals" have occupied Rector Pablo González Casanova's office. Frequent denunciations of these

\(^{30}\)La Batalla, No. 22 (Abril de 1972), pp. 2-3, is a PAN publication which accused the government of assassinating him. \(\text{Por qué?}\) (Febrero 17 de 1972), esp. pp. 26-31.
"outside forces" (without identifying them) by the Rector, journalists, and even the government serve to complicate the issue. During a student meeting in June, a couple of students were shot, although those identified as the guilty ones have not been apprehended. Further, no authorities have apprehended those occupying the Rector's office for at least six months; from all reports these "outside forces" come and go as they wish. Finally, around the middle of November, González Casanova submitted his resignation since he had not been able to enter his office for several months. Many informants argue that individuals in Echeverría's administration wanted to embarrass the president, while others argue that the government (including the president) wanted to paralyze higher education because it is the source of increasing criticism and opposition to the government. Whatever the reasons for these events may be, many were highly critical of the government's inability or unwillingness to resolve this problem.

Some examples of publications, particularly from the opposition, will show increasing general criticism of the government and perhaps will suggest why the present administration has recently proposed electoral reform. One of the leftist publications--if not the main one--is Por qué?. Since its first publication in early 1968, this weekly magazine has strongly criticized the government, but, more recently, Por qué? named Genaro Vázquez Rojas its "man of the year" (before his death) and has encouraged a guerrilla-type revolution.  

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31Among other issues of Por qué?, see its January 13th and June 22nd issues in 1972. In the latter its headline was, "Only One Road: The Catacombs," meaning underground movements against the government.
Although its impact is difficult to determine, it does have much support from many leftist students, which might be one of the reasons the government has not suppressed all its publications. One clandestine publication, *Vanguardia Proletaria*, has likewise encouraged revolution and has called individuals and parties "corrupt," if they accept the government's electoral reforms as genuine rather than an attempt to further ensure their own control over legal opposition. 32

PAN publications, such as *La Nación* and *La Batalla*, have likewise become increasingly critical. They have published information on the concentration of income and on other measures of poverty, some of which we have reported in Chapter III. They, in fact, strongly denounce the government for sponsoring the "massacre of Tlatelolco" and the June 10th killings. 33 These PAN publications would have a much larger circulation than the clandestine publications, such as *Vanguardia Proletaria*, but could not equal the circulation of *Por qué?*.

Newspaper articles and perhaps two "comic books" would have much larger circulations and a greater impact than the mentioned publications. One example of the recent trend of criticism in the newspapers is an editorial article by Daniel Cosío Villegas on July 3, 1971 (just after the June 10th affair). In attacking PRI he labels it a "vote-sucking machine." 34 Two comic books, *Los Supermachos* and *Los Agachados de Riego*,

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32 *Vanguardia Proletaria*, a seven page mimeographed publication with no date, is one example of the underground publications. I received a copy from a student in the summer of 1972.

33 See *La Batalla*, especially on December 17, 1971.

are filled with very pointed political humor and criticism. For example, the latter had an anniversary issue of the June 10th affair and criticized the president's "lack of direction," and stated that Echeverría's clarification of that incident could resolve many Mexicans' doubts about him. Other issues are filled with caricatures of political leaders, problems of corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, etc. Los Supermachos was initiated in 1964 and, according to the information printed inside, had a weekly circulation of 270,000 copies in April, 1972. Los Agachados de Rius was first published in 1968 but does not list its circulation.

One recent criticism of the Echeverría administration is unprecedented for various reasons. In August, 1972, PAN leaders through their president, José Angel Conchello, blamed the government for many of the events just described. I will list the major charges:

1. The Year of Juárez (1972) has been characterized by constant violence and even terror, and the government is responsible.
2. The functionaries do not respect the laws, and neither do the Mexican people; these factors are the reasons for the present chaos in Mexico.
3. The government has initiated official violence and denied constitutional rights for small landowners and for students, who wish to demonstrate.
4. The government has not informed the people about the so-called "hidden interests," which have created disorders in the universities.
5. The universities (National University as well as the major universities in Puebla, Monterrey, Veracruz, and Sinaloa) are deteriorating because local governments and influential politicians are sponsoring violence.
6. In the labor unions there is an increase of bloody violence daily because the government supports corrupt leaders who are not interested in the workers.

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35Los Agachados de Rius, No. 98, July 30, 1972.
7. Local governments maintain and protect paramilitary groups to use against the people.
8. Those directly responsible for all this are some of the president's collaborators, who neither respect nor make people respect the laws, and in charge of these is the president himself. This event is unprecedented because: 1) PAN's attack on the president was perhaps its strongest; 2) the press covered this attack extensively (much more than one would expect with the limited number of PAN followers); 3) an Excélsior editorialist, Ricardo Garibay, juxtaposed these PAN charges with President Echeverría's general claims about Mexican progress in his recent speeches and argued that neither one was totally right, although Garibay defended the President more than Conchello. This editorial alone suggests dramatic changes in recent Mexican criticism of public officials and especially the president.

Perhaps as a result of these recent trends, the present administration has proposed some electoral reforms. In his second State of the Union Address, President Echeverría stated:

I shall submit a bill to reform the Federal Electoral Law during the present congressional period. It will guarantee all parties full representation and voting rights in electoral bodies and make substantial changes in the organization and operation of the National Register of voters. These measures will make application of the principle of shared responsibility in the organization and direction of the process whereby the government structure is shaped, far more efficacious.

It is also proposed to ensure more effective communication between political parties and the people and broader information, through diverse media, on their ideologies, platforms and action programs.

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37Ibid.
The reforms we have undertaken will be put to the test in the elections for federal deputies to be held July, 1973. While many critics argue that this is mere rhetoric, one should note that this is the strongest presidential statement on this topic in recent years.

Shortly thereafter, other officials began to detail the proposals. Most notable among these was the Minister of Government, Mario Moya Valencia, who said that other parties will have free radio and television time during the campaigns to express their points of view, equality of representation on all electoral commissions, franking privileges, and others. Still, there are many skeptics among the opposition, for they are not convinced that the government will approve an effective reform bill and apply it fairly.

Whether the government will approve an effective reform bill and apply it fairly might depend again on nonelectoral oppositions. More specifically, if clandestine violence continues and/or increases within the near future, then one could expect genuine electoral reforms. If, on the other hand, the federal agents are able to contain much of the violence, then the more traditional practices will prevail. But up to 1972 it appears that nonelectoral oppositions have accomplished what electoral oppositions alone could not accomplish.

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38Mexican Newsletter, Office of the President, September 1, 1972, p. 4.

39Excelsior, September 12, 1972, p. 1A.
C. Future Support for Electoral Oppositions

Based on the preceding discussion, one would expect the vote for opposition candidates, particularly those of PAN, to increase more rapidly within the next few elections. The rate of increase, as to be expected, would be contingent on the extent of the administration's electoral reforms. If, on the one hand, the administration allows fairer competition and a more accurate count of the vote, then PAN's percentage of the vote could increase much more than it has up to the present. But, despite its support of the 1968 and 1971 student movements as well as its strong condemnation of the government for suppression of students, PAN does not appear sufficiently attractive for many leftist intellectuals and students. Consequently, another opposition party might emerge to capture the support of these sectors. If, on the other hand, no or minimal reforms occur, then perhaps we could expect more violence and/or suppressive tactics. In any case, given the first alternative, I will make some future projections of the opposition vote and attempt to carefully qualify them within the boundaries of the previous discussions.

In order to project the future support for opposition parties, we will have to review two of our findings in Chapter III. First, with the best available data (official election results at the presidential level), we have seen that PAN's national vote has increased from 7.8 percent in the 1952 election to 14 percent in 1970. Although these official results more than likely underestimate the opposition's support, we still can observe a slow, but consistent, increase in PAN's vote during these four presidential elections (see Table III-4).
Second, the percentage of opposition support in the federal entities tended to correlate with the state's level of socioeconomic development. Therefore, we would hypothesize that, other things being equal, the opposition vote could continue to increase because of increasing socioeconomic development.

To enhance the accuracy of our projections on future opposition support, however, we need to analyze the percentage of the PAN vote (as a percentage of the total PAN vote) which comes from the various federal entities (Table V-2). For example, in the 1970 presidential election, roughly 36 percent of the total PAN vote came from the Federal District alone, while around 57 percent of the total PAN vote came from only five federal entities—the Federal District, Guanajuato, Jalisco, México, and Puebla. These five were among the eight most populous entities in 1970 and had 39 percent of the total Mexican population.\textsuperscript{40} Further, in four of these five states, PAN had a 4 to 8 percent increase from 1964 to 1970 (Table III-4). Consequently, if this trend continues, one could project a more rapid increase in PAN's vote in the 1976 and subsequent presidential elections. More importantly, this increase would be even higher if discontent with PRI has increased (as seems to be the case) and if the regime implements meaningful reforms (including a more accurate count of the vote).

Other factors could also increase a realistic projection of PAN's

\textsuperscript{40}Calculated from the 1970 Mexican Census. I have used the total population in each entity because it appears more suggestive of future support than just the voting-age population at this time.
Table V-2
1970 Population and PAN Presidential Vote by Federal Entities and Each Entity’s Percentage of the Total PAN Vote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>1970 Population</th>
<th>PAN’s Absolute Vote</th>
<th>Entity’s Contribution to PAN’s Total Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aguascalientes</td>
<td>338,142</td>
<td>11,959</td>
<td>.61 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baja California</td>
<td>870,421</td>
<td>72,175</td>
<td>8.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baja California T.</td>
<td>128,019</td>
<td>2,023</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campeche</td>
<td>251,556</td>
<td>1,768</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coahuila</td>
<td>1,114,956</td>
<td>30,349</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colima</td>
<td>241,153</td>
<td>5,005</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiapas</td>
<td>1,639,053</td>
<td>4,833</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chihuahua</td>
<td>1,612,525</td>
<td>83,120</td>
<td>5.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distrito Federal</td>
<td>6,874,165</td>
<td>697,138</td>
<td>35.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durango</td>
<td>939,208</td>
<td>28,900</td>
<td>1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guanajuato</td>
<td>2,270,370</td>
<td>108,928</td>
<td>5.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrero</td>
<td>1,597,360</td>
<td>20,341</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hidalgo</td>
<td>1,193,845</td>
<td>12,798</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalisco</td>
<td>3,296,587</td>
<td>167,629</td>
<td>8.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>3,833,187</td>
<td>134,949</td>
<td>6.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michoacán</td>
<td>2,320,042</td>
<td>82,509</td>
<td>4.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morelos</td>
<td>616,119</td>
<td>17,583</td>
<td>.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nayarit</td>
<td>544,031</td>
<td>4,686</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuevo León</td>
<td>1,694,689</td>
<td>68,260</td>
<td>3.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oaxaca</td>
<td>2,171,733</td>
<td>23,425</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puebla</td>
<td>2,508,226</td>
<td>96,214</td>
<td>4.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Querétaro</td>
<td>485,523</td>
<td>13,620</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quintana Roo</td>
<td>88,150</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Luis Potosi</td>
<td>1,281,996</td>
<td>35,947</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinaloa</td>
<td>1,266,528</td>
<td>15,450</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonora</td>
<td>1,098,720</td>
<td>14,704</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabasco</td>
<td>768,327</td>
<td>2,735</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamaulipas</td>
<td>1,456,858</td>
<td>24,209</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tlaxcala</td>
<td>420,638</td>
<td>7,098</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veracruz</td>
<td>3,815,419</td>
<td>84,471</td>
<td>4.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yucatán</td>
<td>758,355</td>
<td>35,896</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zacatecas</td>
<td>1,451,462</td>
<td>26,049</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>48,377,363</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,945,391</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 %</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**a**Source: 1970 Census figures.

**b**Source: Confidential.

**c**Rounded off to two decimal places.
percentage of the vote. First, catalyzing incidents, as indicated by the case studies, could benefit the opposition. Any of a number of conditions discussed in Chapter III or more violence might be sufficient to create discontent with the government party and encourage a "protest" vote. Second while in noncompetitive elections urban dwellers do not vote to the same extent as rural dwellers, we could expect a higher level of participation by voting among urban dwellers if their votes were made more meaningful (through electoral reforms) or if they were voting in "protest." This situation would likewise favor the opposition, as indicated by the case studies.

Given these series of conditions, one could project a more favorable future for PAN, although one must also examine some of PAN's serious problems, especially its lingering image of conservatism. To be sure some authors show that this opposition party has shifted toward the center and has accepted some more socialistic positions of other Christian Democratic parties in Latin America. But even some of these positions might be too conservative for many intellectuals and students, although in many cases one suspects that an inbred distaste for this party because of its history of conservatism and its "providing a facade for democracy" might be more important than its changing ideology. At the same time, however, a conservative image

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41 This finding is supported in the studies by Reyna, "Movilización y Participación Políticas," and by Walton and Sween, "Urbanization, Industrialization and Voting in Mexico."

42 Donald Mabry, "Acción Nacional," deals extensively with PAN's evolving ideology.
may not be a serious obstacle for winning mass support since the masses are not as concerned with left-right distinctions as they are for more accountable politicians. Certainly this was the case with Dr. Nava and Correa Rachó, both of whom won even intellectual and student support in their own states.

Finally, if electoral reforms are meaningful, another party could emerge to capture the support of less alienated intellectuals and students, who still have confidence in legal types of opposition. This development, however, remains to be seen.

In this chapter we have seen the political impact and strategy of electoral and nonelectoral oppositions. I have argued that the political impact of nonelectoral oppositions has been greater than the impact of electoral oppositions. In short, nonelectoral oppositions, such as student demonstrations and clandestine violence, appear to have forced the regime to reform the electoral process. If the regime implements these reforms, then we would expect the opposition vote to increase more in the upcoming elections than it has in the past.
Chapter VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In this final chapter I will summarize the major descriptive findings as well as suggest some hypotheses for testing cross-nationally and then discuss future alternatives for Mexican politics. First, because of the data limitations in a study of this nature, one has to keep in mind that some of the findings are tentative. Moreover, not all of the findings are new, but an organized presentation of these with some suggested hypotheses can hopefully orient other scholars who wish to study oppositions.¹ Second, while many authors have speculated on the future of Mexican politics, few have dealt with the possible impact of oppositions. Although the difficulties of such a task are only too obvious, I am assuming nevertheless that the advantages of this type of speculation outweigh the disadvantages.

Refinement of many of the findings on the problems of electoral oppositions in Mexico as well as elsewhere is dependent to a great extent on the availability of better data. This specifically means more accurate and comprehensive election results and questions related to our concerns in reliable survey research. Then, we could better answer

¹A study of oppositions in all polities can be found in Robert A. Dahl, Polarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971). Unfortunately, I was not aware of this book until I had returned to the United States and had finished my study. In any case some of Dahl's and my concerns overlap.
such concerns as the extent of positive support for the government party and the various opposition groups and parties, the types of socioeconomic groups which support the government, the ideological perceptions of voters toward parties, and the impact of student protests, clandestine violence, etc. on the mass public. Further, we could determine how much of the opposition support is merely anti-government sentiment and/or alienation. But, if the past is any guide, scholars will not have access to much better electoral data and survey research in such countries as Mexico within the near future.

A. Summary of Findings on Mexican Electoral Oppositions and Suggested Hypotheses

Chapter I

1. The regime's control over electoral behavior is enormous, particularly when challenged in a competitive election (most of the literature on Mexican politics has underestimated the regime's control, and thus some of the interpretations of PRI's or the opposition's support are inaccurate).

2. Controversial elections (not indicated by official election results) have occurred at the presidential level in 1940 (the most significant), 1946, and 1952. These seem to have involved splinter groups within PRI.

3. Since the 1952 presidential election, strong opposition movements or candidates have emerged only at the local and state levels. The most significant opposition victories were in state capitals; an independent movement won in San Luis Potosí in 1958, while PAN candidates
won in Hermosillo in 1967 and in Mérida in the same year.

4. The regime prevented these opposition movements from winning gubernatorial elections in San Luis Potosí (1961), Sonora (1967), and Yucatán (1969). The successful opposition mayors in San Luis Potosí and Mérida ran in these subsequent gubernatorial elections in their states, while opposition candidates for mayor and governor ran in these simultaneous elections in Sonora. The regime prevented gubernatorial victories primarily through extensive electoral fraud.

5. Electoral fraud does not appear as extensive in noncompetitive elections, that is, where opposition candidates provide no serious threat to the government party.

Chapter II

6. To a great extent the Mexican regime has prevented the development of a strong opposition party. It has accomplished this by controlling factors affecting the formation of a party, communication, competition for supporters, and voting procedures. In addition, in the few cases of opposition rule at the mayoral level, the regime by and large has attempted to prevent oppositions from performing effectively. Many of the findings in this chapter could be formulated into hypotheses. We could hypothesize, for example, that institutional nonaccountability helps to maintain one-party dominance.

Chapter III

7. Occasionally, the Mexican regime has allowed an electoral
opposition to win at the mayoral level but never at the gubernatorial level. Overlapping hypotheses for allowing these local victories could be:

- a. divisions with the local PRI;
- b. local and national PRI leaders are taken by surprise;
- c. the opposition has overwhelming support;
- d. the national PRI has encouraged opposition parties to challenge PRI (briefly from around 1965 to 1968);
- e. the national government wants a facade for democracy.

8. From a review of three studies on noncompetitive elections with official (and thus probably biased) election results, I found the following hypotheses, which we can tentatively accept:

- a. rural voters favor PRI candidates more than urban voters; federal entities with:
- b. higher percentages of middle class rather than agricultural professions correlate negatively with higher percentages of PRI vote;
- c. higher levels of industrialization tend to correlate negatively with higher percentages of PRI vote;
- d. higher levels of literacy tend to correlate negatively with higher levels of PRI vote.

9. Mexico's aggregate socioeconomic growth has provided enough opportunities for the most ambitious social climbers and thus has probably helped prevent more opposition.

10. Most socioeconomic indicators show that the Mexican government has not improved the living conditions for at least the lower half of
the population. These sectors are a potential source of opposition but probably need the help of opposition leaders for mobilization, as the case studies suggest.

11. Electoral opposition movements do not emerge in the least developed federal entities, although the number of cases is too small to make a definitive generalization. Generally, socioeconomic problems did not account for the emergence of these movements, even though economic discontent contributed to opposition mobilization in at least the Yucatecan gubernatorial election.

12. A federal entity's common border with the United States might be associated with higher electoral opposition support.

Chapter IV

13. The major condition for the emergence of electoral movements was a catalyzing incident (or incidents). Afterwards, the local PRI leaders could not maintain their traditional unity in order to control electoral behavior.

14. Other conditions for the emergence of these movements were the mobilization of opposition leaders and newspaper support. These conditions interacted with the catalyzing incident in order to mobilize mass support against the regime.

15. The mobilization of mass support was quite different in the first and then in the subsequent electoral battles. In the former, the catalyzing incident (s) appeared sufficient. In the latter, the organizational efforts (ongoing party activity, communication and special appeals) of the opposition leaders were much more critical for mass
mobilization. According to informants all of these competitive elections were characterized by a high voter turnout.

Chapter V

16. Opposition administrations in San Luis Potosí and Mérida were more effective and accountable than previous PRI administrations. I had less evidence for Hermosillo.

17. The impact of these opposition administrations on local politics was significant, although they appeared to have only a minimal impact—if any—on national politics.

18. Suppression of these movements has depoliticized the opposition leaders and supporters in these states and has discouraged national opposition parties, especially PAN, from participation in other elections. PAN strongly debated the possibility of disbanding in 1969.

19. Nonelectoral opposition movements (student protests and clandestine violence) have many similarities with electoral movements but apparently have a much greater impact on national politics.

20. Since the student movement of 1968, criticism and opposition to many practices of the incumbents have increased considerably. President Echeverría (1970-1976) has also encouraged open criticism. In turn, these developments have led to governmental proposals in 1972 to reform the electoral process because the incumbents would prefer to see students and those involved in clandestine violence within the legal party structure.

In similar situations cross-nationally, we could hypothesize that more violent types of opposition could encourage a trend toward a two
or more party system. Apparently, the pressure for electoral reform has come from the government's opponents, although a more adequate answer involves further research.

21. If the government honors its reform proposals for the electoral process, then PAN will probably increase its vote within the immediate future. However, due to its lingering conservative image, PAN will probably not be able to capture much national student and intellectual support. Another party could emerge to capture these leftist elements.

22. If the government does not reform the electoral process, then one can expect more clandestine violence and/or more government suppression to eliminate this violence.

To be sure more hypotheses can be formulated from the findings. But perhaps such a formulation could be enhanced through a comparative study, for what is meaningful within the Mexican context may not be meaningful in another context. Presently, however, we can speculate on the future of Mexican politics, particularly in relationship to recent developments with opposition behavior.

B. The Future of Mexican Politics

Perhaps we could best characterize the Mexican political system as authoritarian. Its treatment of electoral oppositions as well as

\[\text{In spite of the difficulties of any conceptual label, one can safely argue that Mexico is more "authoritarian" than "democratic."} \]
its violent suppression of student protests support that evaluation. At the same time, one can point to a less authoritarian or a more democratic trend with electoral oppositions within the past decade, although this short time period indicates the tentative nature of this observation. In contrast to the government's jailings and physical violence of Dr. Nava and some of his organizers from 1961 to 1963, one can witness less governmental suppression of the PAN movements in Sonora in 1967 and in Yucatán in 1969. In addition, the recent open criticism of politicians and the president--permitted and encouraged by President Echeverría--as well as electoral reform proposals would also suggest a more democratic trend. One of the upcoming tests of this trend is the Federal Deputy elections in July, 1973, since President Echeverría clearly stated in his Second State of the Union message that his reforms will be implemented by then.

The future of Mexican politics can be discussed within the boundaries of five broad alternatives or some combination of these. The alternatives are: 1) the political oppositions will remain static; 2) reforms within PRI will lead to a greater positive (rather than forced) acceptance of the official party; 3) electoral reforms and their impartial base this evaluation on the evidence presented in this study and on the arguments presented by Susan Kaufman Purcell, who is the only author to apply a systematic conceptual framework to this polity. See "Decision-Making in an Authoritarian Regime: Mexico," Paper Presented at the 1971 Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 7-11, 1971. Apparently, this study will be printed in 1973 in World Politics. Also see Susan Kaufman Purcell, "Authoritarianism," A Review Article in Comparative Politics, 5 (January, 1973), pp. 301-302.
application will result in a strong two or more party system; 4) more
government coercion will maintain a forced acceptance of the official
party; and 5) rapid change and increasing opposition may lead to a
system breakdown with a military or other type of dictatorship. At
the outset, we can reject the first alternative (no increase in oppo­sition support) since it is the least probable because of increasing demo­
graphic trends as well as increasing awareness, criticism, clandestine
violence, etc. With regard to the second alternative, one can point to
some present reforms within the official party, but many aware Mexi­
cans are so disgusted with the government party that its widespread positive
acceptance in fairer elections is doubtful, although it will continue
to win the majority of elections at all levels within the near future.

To make the third alternative (the development of a strong two or
more party system) more probable, the government would have to implement
comprehensive electoral reforms. To be sure, this could allow other
power contenders into the political arena and might be more than one
could realistically expect from Mexican officialdom. Further, the tenden­
cy for those in power to maintain their privileged position is not unique
to the Mexican political system. In fact, as Stokely Carmichael and
Charles V. Hamilton argue:

Whenever a number of persons within a society have enjoyed
for a considerable period of time certain opportunities for
getting wealth, for exercising power and authority, and for
successfully claiming prestige and social deference there is
a strong tendency for these people to feel that these bene­
fits are theirs "by right."³

³Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: The
This is certainly true of the Mexican political elites because they have not even allowed a fair vote count, which is the first requisite of electoral reform and for encouraging the development of a party system with a strong opposition.

Dahl suggests the urgency of research directed to the problems of the evolution of party systems with a strong opposition. He states:

until now, stable systems with legal oppositions have evolved rather slowly. It is by no means clear whether or how the process can be deliberately contrived or greatly speeded up. Yet it would be hard to find other questions on which knowledge is more urgent.4

Dahl assumes that the establishment of meaningful, legal opposition parties can prevent problems of violence and instability. This argument is the subject of much debate, for others have suggested that strong one-party systems—not weak and multiparty systems5—in modernizing societies are associated with political stability. To be sure, Mexico's political stability from the 1930s to the present might be the result of its one-party system along with suppression of oppositions. But the price of this stability seems to be the inaccountability of political leaders and processes.

My study, however, has shown that many Mexicans are demanding a more democratic system—not because of some idealistic commitment to

4Dahl, Political Oppositions, p. xvi.

democracy—but rather because they want a political system which is more accountable to a larger number of Mexicans. They convincingly argue that their one-party system has not been responsive except to a very small minority of selfish interests. Electoral reforms permitting opposition administrations, at least at the subnational levels, could improve the accountability of politicians, as even my few case studies indicate.

In order to answer Dahl's concern about "contriving or speeding up" the development of legal oppositions, one would first have to take into account unique features within each political system. In Mexico, for example, I would suggest reforms of the election itself, the no re-election principle, and the length of incumbency. Any Mexican president can easily guarantee a free election, especially in competitive cases, as already occurred in three state capitals. The mechanics of this can simply be left to the PRI leaders or to some prestigious independent leaders, who could move into areas of competitive elections around election day and then supervise the counting of the vote. To argue that this process is more complicated would suggest that there are few impartial Mexicans, including the president. Perhaps one cannot expect objective results overnight, but serious attention from high government officials could set the impartial trend in motion.

The no re-election principle and the length of incumbency could be jointly reformed. The former seems to have outlasted its original intention, while six years in office for the president and governors (the most critical election positions) could be reduced. In other words, incumbents would probably be more accountable to the voters if
they had to run for re-election to shorter terms. For example, if the Yucatecan governor from 1963 to 1969, Luis Torres Mesias, would have had a four-year term from 1963 to 1967 and then would have run for another term, his behavior would have been more responsive to popular needs or it is almost certain that he would have been defeated. If the regime would have attempted electoral fraud to assure his re-election (fraud similar to that in 1969), mass violence would have occurred. Likewise at the presidential level, similar reforms could produce more accountability. And, of course, the no re-election principle could still apply after two terms.

At the mayoral level the incumbent could run for another three-year term but then would have to retire. As for Federal Deputy and Senatorial elections as well as legislators at the local and state levels, reforms here are not as critical because many of these positions are symbolic because of their overwhelming dependence on the Mexican Executive or the governors. The desirability of more powerful legislators—as in "more advanced" societies—need not be useful for Mexico. Of considerable importance is the reform of the selection process for the mayor (regente) of Mexico City. Competitive elections to this position would enable this largest number of Mexicans in any federal entity to express their preferences. This might even encourage some disenchanted students in this area to support a candidate.

Given the recent problems of violence, this alternative, at least in terms of initial minor reforms, could be the most probable. Some reforms certainly might create many new problems, but we cannot know these until some experiment is attempted. Perhaps the regime could make
reforms in stages, such as fairer mayoral elections for a period of time and later fairer gubernatorial elections. This would allow for some period of adjustment and evaluation.

This third alternative might be even more probable, if government officials see electoral reforms as a method of continuing their own dominance. For example, some recent statements by incumbents suggest that they will encourage enough opposition parties to split the non-PRI vote. Jorge Arellano Amezcua, a Federal Deputy from Colima, recently stated: "Up to the present we have four parties, but if there were 20 or 30, that would be too many. Another two, three or four, which would make eight parties, would be sufficient for anyone to participate in the group which best suits him." The Deputy does not mention that two (FPS and PARM) of the four present parties are virtually captive organizations of PRI. In any case, we can be certain that one strong opposition party could provide a serious challenge to the government, while two or more strong opposition parties could assure the official party's dominance for a long period of time. Certainly, this type of reform would be "more democratic" but more acceptable to the government. And, of course, without these or similar reforms, Mexico's political stability could be threatened, as the fourth and fifth alternatives suggest.

The fourth alternative of more government coercion to maintain a forced acceptance of PRI could encourage further protests and violence, particularly after some recent expectations of electoral reforms. In addition, the increasing urbanization, literacy, education, etc., would

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6Iniciativa, Éo. 294 (7 al 13 de Octubre de 1972), p. 35.
lead one to project at least some moderate increases in the opposition vote. Consequently, this alternative is unlikely.

Many consider the last alternative of a system breakdown the most probable, with or without the "most democratic" reforms possible. As one presidential contender privately lamented: "Time is running out for Mexico to solve her problems peacefully. The serious gaps between the poor and the rich, the injustices, corruption, student protests, clandestine violence, demographic explosion, etc., are problems which cannot be easily solved." Some might argue that the violent incidents and increasing criticism described in Chapter V could suggest imminent political instability in Mexico, but such an argument is very difficult for anybody to document.

In a recent attempt to deal with this complex problem of stability in Latin America, Ernest A. Duff and John F. McCamant made the following prediction on Mexico: "Instability, under-manifested in the past, would break out if the delicate political equilibrium were disturbed through an increase in opposition power or a breakdown in the unity of the government party." Although their study shares the problems of other, quantitative, cross-national attempts to come to grips with social realities, their prediction merits a closer analysis. Duff and McCamant refer to some serious socioeconomic imbalances in the Mexican society. The impact of these imbalances, however, appears diminished in the Mexican case at least up to the present because the incumbents

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have prevented the development of oppositions, even if frequently they have resorted to brutal tactics. These imbalances will increase, at least according to some Mexican authors, unless President Echeverría's reforms in some areas, such as redistributing the wealth, can reverse the trend. Further, we will have to wait to see the impact of some of the president's political reforms.

Perhaps the greatest threat to Mexican political stability within the near future is not student protests, clandestine violence, peasant revolts, etc., but rather—as Duff and McCamant partially suggest—the disunity of the most powerful individuals in Mexico. (Of course, they could become disunited over how to deal with students, guerrillas, etc.) Unfortunately, evidence on the identity of these most powerful leaders as well as on their unity or disunity is difficult to gather. Medina Valdés argues that the most powerful group is the military because of its control over physical force as well as its strategic location of personnel in every important government office throughout the country. According to him the military was responsible for crushing the students at Tlatelolco and on June 10, 1971. In other words, those who control the resources for physical violence (especially with modern weapons which the clandestine oppositions cannot obtain) are undoubtedly the most powerful individuals when the peaceful or less violent techniques of

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control break down. Moreover, many informants report the emergence of a select group of military men, Los Penicilinos (The Penicilins, because of their broad training, which ostensibly makes them capable in a variety of areas, including the administration of a country). Thus, if violence increases, then perhaps one could expect these military leaders to take control of the government.

In conclusion, we can sum up the future alternatives for Mexican politics by saying that Mexican incumbents must attempt to solve some of the problems resulting from the student protests in 1968. It certainly appears that a more politicized environment exists in Mexico. Hence one could speculate that a national catalyzing incident, particularly if it occurred in the national capital with its large concentration of Mexicans, would produce a much more serious strain on the system and might even lead to a system breakdown. Evidence for this observation comes from my case studies which showed that catalyzing incidents at the local level led to mass discontent with the regime and PRI's defeat in the following elections. To be sure, no one can clearly predict what will happen, but some of the findings in this study suggest that the Mexican leaders face their strongest challenge within at least the past three decades.

10Medina Valdes, Operación 10 de Junio, pp. 254-255. Almost nothing is written about the "Penicilins," although many discuss it.
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