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KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
THE CONSUMMATE POLITICIAN

DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

by
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The Ohio State University
1973

Approved by

Adviser
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Darlene J. Alberts
Preface

The nature of this study involves firstly, the formation of a nationalism in Jordan. More directly, the design of this paper is to demonstrate the influence and direction of Jordan's leader, King Hussein ibn Talal. Germane to the problem lies the background of the King and the impact of this background on his policy. Over the last two decades, Jordan and King Hussein have faced both internal and external crises, which would seemingly wreck any chance for the formation of a viable nation or the success of the leader of that nation. The question of survival has always continued to haunt King Hussein, both personally and politically.

Since any nationalism is fragile, this factor becomes even more noticeable in the case of the State of Jordan. Whatever sense of historicism existed under King Abdallah ibn Hussein, the first ruler of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, could easily have died with him. Yet, the new Arab awareness in the small Kingdom continued to grow under Hussein's careful planning and direction. King Hussein skillfully brought the Jordanian people into the knowledge of their heritage and purpose in their role in the Arab world. In addition, he has tried to implant this Arabness into the scheme of the Arab world as a whole. His design emerges as a tripartite unification for the Arab nations in which Jordan plays a leading role. Whether King Hussein will accomplish his goal is for the future to judge; how and why he has succeeded in the last twenty years is the function of this study.
Introduction


Quo Vadis Jordannie?

A nation signifies an independent, cohesive, politically organized and autonomous group of individuals all of whom are internally legitimate. This nation, to be a state, should be independent of external control. Along these lines, its community would be politically linked. All of these factors would be cemented by the concept of nationalism and an international awareness. So in order to build a nation, there should be an opportunity to promote a national feeling to create autonomy for a society.

Furthermore, an historical background is necessary to provide the mortar to pull the nation together. For Jordan, all of these elements are present, although not as convincingly to all individuals in all areas. Husseîn of Jordan must emphasize, forge, cement, coalesce, and even create this nationalism. How he has done it is elemental.

Even more important is his agility in juggling the international crises of 1956 and 1967 with the internal economic, political, and social crises between Palestinians and Jordanians. Adding to this situation is the opposition he faces from the Arab world. His ability to survive remains a paradox within itself. The task may be elemental but the
accomplishment is phenomenal.

Before one can begin an analysis of Hussein and modern day Jordan, it is requisite to understand some basic elements of this area prior to its becoming Jordan. Out of the ashes of World War I, the Western world created a series of British and French mandates in the Middle East. Transjordan, part of one of these British mandates, was formed on the east side of the Jordan River. Its name meant "across the Jordan" - Transjordan. To the north lay Syria; to the East lay Iraq and part of Saudi Arabia; to the west lay Palestine; and to the south lay the Hedjaz and another part of Saudi Arabia.

Governmentally, Transjordan had become a British "colony." The finances, administration, military, and a definite cultural influence came from the British. Of course, this precluded the existence of any real autonomy or independence. The British even chose the leader. They controlled Amir Abdullah by financial support and even later when he became the King. Looking into British finances reveals that England annually gave Transjordan 500,000 until 1930. This amount then increased by the late 1930's to over 2,000,000 a year.

Another move of domination by the British came by means of military support, both internal and external. The British set up and financed the Arab Legion (formed in 1921 by Captain Frank G. Peake) and the Transjordan Frontier Force (formed in 1928). Under the supervision of the British High Commissioner in Jerusalem, these two forces were responsible for border protection.

Economic and military control by and/or influence from the British posed a positive threat to the newly forming nation of Transjordan. Of course, this control was most strategic to the British. It
was control the British wished not to lose. Nevertheless, British interference and presence threatened any chance to produce a viable, sovereign state. Still, as will later emerge, the necessary items for a unified nation were present. Despite this external "coercion," certain cohesive elements could not be ignored and would not be silenced.

First of all, one indispensable substance of a nation, an historical awareness, revealed itself. The population of this handle-shaped area had a common heritage. One might say they had a common identity. Religiously, linguistically, and culturally a bond existed. Of course, this consciousness could not fully surface because of external coercion. In fact, this common sense of historicism is not only applicable to Jordan, but to the entire Arab world. How the emergence of those temporarily subdued factors occurred, partially embodies the intent of this study.

In addition, an awareness of continuity in the past existed. Transjordanians knew of their common will to free themselves from Ottoman domination. It was certainly not their common desire to substitute another dominating foreign power. However, to accomplish ultimately the unity of a nation, this stage of British domination appeared unavoidable, at least temporarily.

Also, there is the factor of national evolution which established a further continuity of nationness. The events of the preceding centuries had laid the basis. As Transjordan emerged from World War I, so Jordan emerged as the Product of World War II. In April, 1950, the formal unification of east and west Jordan transpired. The resultant creation was the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. When Palestine was divided in 1948, a sector of it remained independently Arab. This
sector amalgamated with the emirate of Transjordan under King Abdallah, forming the new nation of Jordan.

The new Jordan contained four administrative districts, including the part of Palestine called the West Bank. With the addition of the West Bank, Jordan totalled over 37,000 square miles. Four hundred miles of Jordan originally bordered Israel. Of course, the boundaries became different in 1972. The new Jordan of 1950 consisted of approximately one and one-half million people, including almost 500,000 refugees.

An agreement had created the legal existence of the new nation. It struggled to become a new nation in actuality and King Abdallah found this unification ill-fated for him. On July 20, 1951, a fervent religious leftist assassinated the King as he left a mosque in Jerusalem. If any political unity had existed in the new kingdom, it was seemingly lost. Thus, the political unity created in 1921 (even though it was externally dominated) found its fragile existence almost obliterated. However, the awareness of national unity remained intact even with this act. In a way, this extremist act served to create both a positive and negative unity.

Aroused elements of the population who resented the monarchy and Abdallah's seeming acceptance of Israel's existence by acquiescing in the partition of Palestine, produced sufficient excitement to cause the criminal act. These people felt this situation as one against unity of the Arab world. They did not view Jordanians as a positive force of unity for the Arab world.

Contrarily, there were also those who began to feel and think of Jordan as a national entity. This was their nation, as wobbly as it might be, and still, many of these people related to a subtle alienation
from the Palestinians. In this way they questioned the advisability and even the merits of sacrificing national unity for the sake of a "foreign element" - Palestinians.²

In this latter view, one can see the rising welt of Jordanian nationalism. Along with this, there is a definite break in Pan-Arabism. The elections in 1952 of a new Jordanian Parliament contained a certain reaction to the incorporation of the Palestinian refugees into Jordan. Also, this election reflected a response to nationalism.

After Transjordan became a larger, more legally unified entity, as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, a new and more real act of independence came into existence. One of the basic drawbacks for Transjordan's existence was the external control. Having been promised self-determination, the population of this area became deluded and discontented. Many even felt the whole concept was only a myth or a delusion. So when Jordan became a separate nation - state - after 1950, the whole idea of independence had to be reestablished.

A whole generation was born and grew up during the British mandate period. Because of this new generation, frustration resulted, especially when one saw self-governing nations in other parts of the Middle East and in the rest of the world. A feeling of discrimination, self-recrimination, and some inferiority resulted. Still the spark of language and religious unity remained. So when the new autonomy resulted, new awareness of ability to be self-determining followed. Yet, it must be noted that certain discrepancies overshadowed this new sovereignty. By this unification in 1950, a certain acquiescence to Israel was felt. Many Jordanians believed that King Abdallah had compromised Jordan, independence, the Arabs, and Palestine. By accepting
the refugees, he admitted the loss of Palestine.

In another sense, this loss also meant the inclusion of non-Jordanian peoples or nations. True, in 1950 many were not really aware of their Jordanianism. However, many were. Those who were keenly aware of this gaining nationalism allowed it to subdue or even to disperse the ultimate Arab nationalism.

So one can surmise that a true sense of autonomy did not reveal itself in the early 1950's in Jordan. However, even before 1960, evidence of awareness filtered through. The more or less independent action became realized as essential, not only by the government, but by the people also.

The evidences of this awareness are many. First came the unsuccessful union with Iraq in 1958, which was a reaction to the United Arab Republic, formed in February, 1958. Also, the situation which touched off the Arab-Israeli conflict in June, 1967, illustrates an embryonic independence. Beyond this the Civil War in Jordan has demonstrated this sense of independence both by government and population.

In one way the new government of Jordan fits the concept of a government politically organized. King Hussein's constituency partially provided an effective rule. The majority of the population accepted government decisions. A weak but substantial example is the Civil War of the fall of 1967. When the Palestinian forces physically took over, especially in Amman, little opposition arose from the people. Ostensibly, it appeared as if the Palace had surrendered at the most or had temporarily become subdued for unity's sake. Whatever the reason, from taxi drivers to civil employees, the Government's action was accepted. Then, when the Government acted to contain the chaos and dispel the
commandos, the people rallied. So the results demonstrate that the government could and did control. However, there was also present the opposite factor of dissension.

From the time of its inception, the new kingdom had dissatisfied, dissident elements which engendered great dislike for Jordan's political situation, mainly the King.

Hussein, himself, realized these threats, both against his person and the existence of Jordan. From the time of the Baghdad Pact in 1955, a great communication gap occurred. The Palestinian contingency of the population felt somewhat alienated. Instead of physically or even diplomatically trying to regain lost Palestine, King Hussein had joined forces with King Faisal, Prince Abd al-Ilah, and Nuri al-Said - perpetrators of the Baghdad Pact. Even though King Hussein removed the physical presence of Great Britain, even Jordanians believed their political situation was being compromised. So many turned to Gamal abd al-Nasser of Egypt. In this way, an ineffective measure of popular control was revealed. Certainly, without the disciplined, well-trained intervention of the Jordanian military in 1957, the outcome would have been disaster for Jordan. The King himself recognized this. He also believed his people really welcomed military control in Jordan during the stages of Jordan's development.

Another problem troubles many Jordanians and Palestinians; the problem may stem from a desire to find any excuse to harass the political establishment in Jordan. A few individuals scornfully denounce a lack of public or democratic means of choosing the leader of Jordan. These elements feel the people have not elected the monarchy. Therefore, this system is illegitimate and an usurper of popular sovereignty. The
fact that Jordan has no political parties lends credulity to this charge. In the same way, these critics charge Hussein with running a dictatorship to perpetuate a dynasty. Contrarily, intellectual individuals in Jordan believe King Hussein, at the very least, is a monarch, but in large, he is a democratic ruler always responding to popular need. These people reply to the charges by saying Hussein could win a popular election if the situation arises.7

A nation must have a sense of oneness within itself. The people must feel a loyalty and a patriotic bond. In short, a feeling of national unity becomes necessary. One must have a pride and love of country. Granted that for Jordanians these feelings are not always for Jordan. Some Jordanians feel a stronger desire for a greater unity, such as Pan-Arabism. Contrarily, some Jordanians continue to remember the free Bedouin life of the past and desire its resurrection. Nevertheless, most Jordanians have not yet progressed beyond personal awareness. It must be created. A feeling or awareness of national identity comes from many sources. Of course, the language forms the basic tie. Along with this lingual tie is custom and religion. The historicism of this land provides another strong bond. Nevertheless, one should not forget that all of these bonds of language, custom, and historicism could also apply to an even larger idea than Jordanian nationalism. Many Arabs believe these elements apply to the Arab world as a whole.8

However, the dominating element involved remains His Majesty, King Hussein. Besides the fundamental make-up of the nationalism of Jordan, the most crucial point of this study is how this anomaly of
inherent divisiveness becomes linked to national consciousness and is coalescing by means of the most powerful ingredient, King Hussein ibn Talal, himself.
Footnotes - Introduction

1 Ajlun, Al-Balga, Al-Karak, Ma'an.

2 King Abdallah, My Memoirs Completed, pp. 16-17.

3 Abdul Aziz al-Duri, Juthur al-Tarikhiyya, pp. 11-12.


5 Pierre Lauer & Vick Vance, Hussein de Jordannie, pp. 41-50.


"The story of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is the story of the late King Abdullah. ... the Amirate and the Kingdom owed their relative stability and limited progress to Abdullah's personal authority. So intertwined were the fortunes of Jordan with the person of the slain King that it is unlikely that his place will be filled by a successor of the same caliber."


Throughout history certain periods have marked themselves as watershed years. The year 1953 has the distinction of being just such a time for the contemporary Middle East. For several thousand years Egypt towered under the hand of foreign rulers. In 1953, Gamal Abd al-Nasser became the first native Egyptian leader. Saudi Arabia lost its first real contribution to the history of the Middle East - King Abd al Aziz ibn Saud. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan found a leader destined to change the course of growth and unity among the Arab people. In a way this latter change emerged at first as perhaps the most unsuspicious event in the Middle East. A young Harrow student at the helm of the traditional Hashemite family of Sharif Hussein was an unexpected and novel development. Who would have believed he would physically and politically outlive his contemporaries in the Arab world? With the ascension of Hussein ibn Talal to the position of King on May 2, 1953, Jordan embarked on the most treacherous and harrowing experience of its existence. For the next few months, it faced international, national and local crises of proportions designed to wreck any chance of existence for this third world nation, let alone unity of the entire Arab world.

When King Abdallah ibn Hussein unwillingly accepted the United Nations truce in 1949, the outcome for his thirty year reign sealed itself.
King Abdallah died Friday, July 20, 1951, at the hands of members of the opposition to his Israeli policy. Even prayer and the holy day did not abate the assassins. Dr. Musa Abdallah Husseini (cousin to the Grand Mufti) along with several others, faced execution shortly thereafter. However, many of those involved escaped immediate political punishment. Among these were certain leftists and military persons in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. Later developments substantiated their complicity.

For a period of thirteen months, the country swayed beneath the unofficial hands of Talal ibn Abdallah. Actually, the country moved under the leadership of Tawfiq Pasha Abu Huda. His ministership, which replaced Samir al-Rifa, lasted from July 25, 1951, to May 5, 1953. Under his tutelage Jordan virtually continued as a protege of England. At the least, Jordan remained almost a colony under British control.

Hussein became king in 1952, but was not crowned until 1953, upon his becoming of age. While at Harrow, Hussein received word, in August, 1952, that the Government of Jordan believed his father was unable to rule the nation. Talal, Hussein's father, had presented an unwieldy and embarrassing situation to the ministers of Jordan. Many claimed Talal's ideas of regaining "lost Palestine" resisted the trend of the Jordanian officials.* So, from August 11, 1952, the ministry of Abu Huda continued

* Very few Westerners are aware of Talal ibn Abdallah and his position in 1951. Talal was, unfortunately, in the eyes of his father, a weak-bodied and weak-minded offspring. King Abdallah did not dislike nor pity his son. He just did not comprehend him. The King interpreted his son's lack of activeness and refusal to participate in the more manly activity of war as a sign of weakness. In this way, so did the intellectual elite of Jordan. They saw Talal's quietness as a threat to the more or less bellicose attitude necessary to sustain this new nation. So Talal "voluntarily" removed himself to a twenty-year exile. For the greatest part of this time, he lived in seclusion northeast of Ankara, Turkey. There he died quietly on July 12, 1972, but his unvoiced ideas live in his son Hussein.
to maneuver Jordan's policies until the official crowning of Hussein on May 2, 1953. As a result of Hussein's ascension, Prime Minister Tawfiq Pasha Abu Huda, as a matter of policy, resigned. On May 5th the new cabinet under Fawzi al-Mulqi, former Minister of Defense, added a portfolio for the Wazir al-dawli (Minister of State). Thus began a new chapter but with a definite continuation of previous ideas. For the next four years, Hussein seemed somewhat unconnected from the actual running of the government. The ministries conducted affairs of Jordan.

However, not just politically, but economically, the country saw little distinction from the preceding period. One year after the annexation of the West Bank, in April, 1951, the United States signed its first technical cooperation treaty with Jordan. Continuing this assistance which began under Abdallah during the early part of the 1950's, the Point Four Mission maintained operation in Jordan until June, 1954. Then a new economic assistance program began. The concentration of this project centered on road construction and development of waterway sources. This aid continued until about February, 1957, when these two agreements were supplanted by sizeable increases in American foreign aid to Jordan. Alongside these economic developments came some startling political events changing the whole relationship of Hussein with his nation and the Arab world. Even before Hussein received the official title of king, tremendous political pressures existed within Jordan. This is obvious from the assassination of his grandfather. Much of this strain came from outside sources. Striking within the military ranks proved to be a highly vulnerable spot. For many years much anti-western feeling found it necessary to remain unvoiced, except in subtle policy usually expressed by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem (the Old City). The first real reaches of this anti-monarchy feeling vented itself on the Palace directly. Again
and again the monarchy felt the thrust of this underground movement. The earliest sign of Hussein taking a true hold of his position as leader of Jordan occurred on March 2, 1956, with the firing of General John Bagot Glubb (known as Glubb Pasha). The onslaught of Arab nationalism was certainly a leading motive involved here. From its inception, the government of Jordan did not permit lawful opposition in the form of political parties. So foment and conspiracy are rampant. From approximately 1950, impatience with British influence and intervention reached revolutionary proportions. By 1955, necessity of removing British interference loomed as a pre-requisite to redress the loss of Palestine to Arab sovereignty. Men like General Ali Abu Nuwar, personal friend of Hussein, influenced the King to remove General Glubb, as well as to entertain the desire for the removal of key British personnel in Jordan. Many anti-British ministers wanted the shackles of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty of 1948 abrogated. For several months, important Jordanian individuals agitated from both inside and outside Jordan (Arab nationalists, Palestinians, leftist Arab groups, Ba'athists, Egyptians, and Iraqi revolutionists) to extricate the government from the British presence. However, getting rid of the British proved to be only the initial step in a long-run plan to weaken Hussein in the Arab world and strengthen other influences within Jordan. Finally, on February 19, 1951, the Treaty ended and, superficially, so did British domination.

During the months following 1956, the most demanding examination of the Palace's ability to hold command occurred. In addition, the successful coups in Syria and Iraq and the unsuccessful ones in Jordan appear too coincidental. Possibly all the revolutionary movements were just Ba'athist or leftist inspired as a necessity to wipe out pro-Israeli elements in the Middle East. Actually, all the coups seem quite in line
with Egypt's desires and Nasserism. True, the situations within these countries varied drastically militarily. Perhaps this is why the outcome differed so much in the case of Jordan as the following revealed.  

Within the Jordanian military existed no elitist class. Instead, up until 1962, the majority of the military were uneducated Bedouin tribesmen. However, an exception to this was Lieutenant Colonel (Fariq) Abdallah al-Tal from northern Jordan (Irbid) who had an aristocratic background as a member of a very influential political family. Colonel al-Tal had received this rank by special appointment from King Abdallah in 1950. This in itself reflects the status and intelligence of the young officer. No real disaffection by the officer became apparent until 1949. At that time he had come into contact with Ba'athists and leftist Palestinians. He abandoned his friendship for Hussein and ultimately exhibited anti-monarchist feelings. By 1949, his activities forced him to leave Irbid and go to Cairo where he "voluntarily" remained until 1964. 

This post-1950 incident ties itself with Egypt and Nasser, and Syria and Michel Aflaq, as well as with the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem (Hajj Amin al-Husseini). So it is true with the case of Ali Abu Nuwar and Sulieeman Nabulsi. Like Colonel al-Tal, General Ali Abu Nuwar from Salt received his military honors through the monarchy. By ingratiating himself with Hussein in Paris, Abu Nuwar convinced his friend Hussein to rid the Arab Legion of British officers and finally British domination in Jordan. Probably the General's Anglophobe opinion received great coloration from the friendship with Captain Tharwat Ukasha (brother-in-law to Ahmad Abu al-Fath, editor of Al-Misri), Egyptian Free Officer Corps member and military attache in Paris. So, obviously, the definite revolutionary and nationalistic views of this Egyptian officer strongly swayed General Abu Nuwar. Because of this direct line to the King, an easy understanding
reveals itself in the motivation of the dismissal of the founder of Al-Jaish al Arabi (The Arab Army). Of course, the strongest motive represents the powerful nationalistic and independent spirit. However, along with this spirit exists a subsidiary desire to elevate junior Jordanian officers to responsible positions, thereby creating a true Jordanian Arab Legion.

A substantiation of the desire to elevate Jordanians in the Legion becomes apparent very quickly. Many times Hussein requested a raise of rank for promising Jordanian legionnaires. However, the highest rank for Jordanian officers remained regimental commander unless the King wished to appoint an Arab commander to the Royal Engineers. Only a drastic direct action could produce prompt return of Jordan to Jordanians. Almost on the heels of Glubb Pasha's departure in February, 1956, Major General Ali Abu Nuwar obtained the rank of Commander of the Arab Legion in March, 1956. However, the chief incident which plunged the fast ascending Commander came about with unpredictable suddenness. By the end of 1956, Hussein recognized the slow disaffection of his "friend" and protege, Abu Nuwar. Slowly the General began to reveal his pro-Nasser feelings and his alliance with the "Free Officer's Association."

In the meantime, Iraqi troops entered Jordan as the Suez crisis heightened. General Ali Abu Nuwar headed the troops for Jordan, Syria, and Egypt to coordinate defenses against the Israeli aggressions. On October 25th Iraqi troops moved into Jordan and so did General Nuwar, who had been in Syria. Following these military advances, Prime Minister Nabulsi stated, on December 16th, that his country must be connected "militarily, economically and politically to the other Arab states."4

Actually, this was an unveiled demand for complete removal of Western ties. Nabulsi unabashedly asked for replacement of British
influence with Arab assistance and money. Forces acted. In reply, President Eisenhower submitted the now famous Eisenhower Doctrine to Congress on January 3, 1957. As expected, or at least hoped, in an announcement two days later, King Hussein believed Nabulsi's entreaty called for the acceptance of any assistance which would help the economy and strengthen the sovereignty of Jordan.\textsuperscript{5}

So to counter these moves, which Arab leaders considered attacks on Arab nationalism, the Arab Solidarity Pact or Cairo Agreement emerged. Representatives from Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan met in Cairo. The purpose of this meeting was aimed mainly at negotiating the end of the 1948 Anglo-Jordan treaty.\textsuperscript{6} However, this did not mean King Hussein would accept the substitution of other influence which he considered even more a threat to Arab existence and independence. He recognized that power could easily slip to another dominant force - to Nasser and the East.

On February 7, 1957, Hussein had instructed his Prime Minister, Sulieman Nabulsi, against "replacing imperialism with a new type of colonialism from which we might be unable to free ourselves." The issuance of this letter produced definite bitterness, especially when the Prime Minister's government received the announcement the same day the public received it. What a blow!

Following the final version of the Eisenhower Doctrine, signed March 9, 1957, the termination of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty occurred after several communiques on March 13, 1957. But the King warned that the removal of this kind of influence was not an invitation to usher in a new more harmful one, aiming his remarks mainly at attempts of intervention by sympathizers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Somehow this was to be ignored.
Then the explosions began. The first event was Prime Minister Sulieman Nabulsi's establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the intimation of perhaps even recognizing the Chinese People's National Republic. On the heels of this action, Nabulsi broadcast from Amman radio that his government did not want nor need the aid coming from the Western block (United States) and that Jordan's government would accept all and any aid coming from the Soviet Union.

The startling governmental announcements had no mention of the King, and certainly no sanction from him - only heard was the voice of Prime Minister Nabulsi. In addition, the Parliament (Majalis) gave the Prime Minister a 39 to 1 vote of confidence. Interestingly, the Cabinet consisted of a coalition of three national socialists, two members of the Ba'ath or Arab Renaissance Party and two members from the National Block. It was at this point that King Hussein also met the government crisis directly. He intercepted a telegram from President Nasser to Nabulsi. The telegram simply read: "Do not waiver. Keep your stance firm on this." Two days later, General Ali Abu Nuwar's forces surrounded the city, supposedly as a precautionary measure. Again the King reacted quickly, as he had with Nabulsi. He dismissed the guard of the General. However, this was only the beginning of the crisis. For the next two weeks His Majesty searched for a nucleus to form the new cabinet.

Then, as in any other political upheaval, a hole in the right side developed. However, it did not really have a rightist impetus. The incentive was leftist and it emerged. Some members of the so-called "independent officers" fomented a move to overthrow the position of Hussein. This new threat came to its height at Zarqa, which is a military base approximately twenty-three kilometers from Amman. The threats came from the right by the military, but the move was leftist inspired. The government
of Sulieman Nabulsi had penetrated into the ranks of the military. For the most part, this penetration confined itself to a small nucleus of the officer corps, but an important part. In the meantime, the populus reacted. Demonstrations in Amman demanded the elimination of American interference. In addition, definite anti-Hussein undertones became apparent.

To cope with all of this, Hussein requested General Abu Nuwar to go with him to Zarqa to check the military uprisings. However, the Bedouin military element were aware of the General's subtle treachery and demanded immediate reprisal against Abu Nuwar. Instead, Hussein sent the General back to Amman for his own safety. Then Hussein's car proceeded through Zarqa where a warm reception awaited him, after he strongly rebuked the rebel members. As a security precaution, approximately two dozen officers received prison sentences. The General, who was relieved of his command, sought refuge in Egypt. In addition, many of the imprisoned members of the rebel movement had accepted undisclosed amounts of money directly from Egypt. The course Hussein followed proved more than adequate. The monarchy had very successfully met a potentially explosive internal challenge and, had the strength of the King waivered, Jordan might have become an Egyptian province.

Contradictory speculation arose about the nature of this internal-external plot. Temporarily chief of the Arab Legion (three days, April 14 - 17), General Ali Huyari left for Damascus where he resigned, then denounced the so-called plot as "an American imperialistic" conspiracy to force Jordan to abandon her Arab neighbors. A further examination of the officer's movements revealed that he went to Egypt where he joined Lieutenant Colonel Abdallah al-Tal, General Abu Nuwar, and other exiles.

Moves to dissolve the monarchy continued along with serious communist agitation. In October, 1957, Economic Minister Khulusi Khairi went to the
United States for economic aid. The aid arrived in the form of thirty-five million dollars from April, 1958 to January, 1959, to be used for the economic and military advancement of Jordan. By January, 1958, a great strengthening of United States-Jordanian relations had materialized. However, a counter move was afoot from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic in two ways. This infusion of Russian interest first occurred with military and economic aid to Syria. There is no doubt that this, plus the strengthening of Russian relations with Cairo, produced a definite move to topple the Hashemites.

The second threat to Jordan came from the union of Egypt and Syria on February 1, 1958. Initially, Hussein rejoiced. He wanted Arab unity. However, he, along with many Middle East observers and other Arab leaders, feared for the ultimate final unification of the Arab world. Ostensibly, reaction in Washington remained subdued over the situation in Cairo and Damascus. But certainly Hussein had great reason to believe disaster approached.

In reply to this union, the governments of Kings Hussein and Faisal of Iraq (first cousins) united on February 14, 1958. Hussein hoped this union would mark the initial step in an ultimate strike for Arab unity. This time reaction in Washington expressed a certain happiness. Unfortunately, this union served only to strengthen the anti-monarchists' aims and hastened their plans. The first manifestations appeared in Lebanon in May with anti-monarchy demonstrations. From there, events snowballed.

The reality of this became apparent in the ensuing month of 1958. The most obvious move came first in Jordan's sister state of Iraq. Assassination toppled the Arab Union. On July 14, 1958 King Faisal and his uncle Abd al-Illah were killed by a revolutionary mob. The government of Iraq moved into the hands of the leftist leader, General abd al-Karim
Qassem. With this move it seemed the next objective would be Jordan. The United States and London proceeded quickly.\textsuperscript{13}

King Hussein acted without delay, requesting that United States troops and British aid be sent immediately to Jordan. To request and accept assistance made a bitter cup for the young monarch to swallow. On the heels of American aid to Lebanon, the United States Government sanctioned the sending of United States Air Force detachments to Jordan. In addition, on July 16th, the British landed their paratroopers post haste. Additional financial aid flowed in the form of seven million dollars from the United States.\textsuperscript{14}

The King still holding his head well above the situation, immediately announced his continued sovereignty in lieu of his late cousin, King Faisal. He had agitated many by this Union between Jordan and Iraq. Nevertheless, he proclaimed he would continue with himself as the head of that Union. But the words produced only short-lived results. Also, the action led to deeper and further friction between himself, his government, and Gamal Abd al-Nasser of Egypt. By this act, Hussein had finalized the rift between the two states. The next step was the removal of the diplomatic representatives from Cairo in Amman and those from Amman in Cairo. On the surface this emerged as purely a struggle for power which had bared its teeth. However, this is too obvious. Far deeper than this ran the ideology of a nationalism, an Arab nationalism. On the one side stood the bastion of leftist socialism dedicated to the eradication of Arab national sovereignty and the implanting of an individual national sovereignty.

In direct opposition, a counter offensive unfolded which held itself responsible for the preservation of Arabism from the foundation to the completion of unity of the Arab world. The next ten years were only an enlargement of this first really direct confrontation of the internal Arab
struggle.

Following the events of 1958, relations between Jordan and her neighbors became continually abrasive. Of course, months of untruffled feelings between Jordan and Egypt produced some cordiality. Diplomatic relations resumed. Nevertheless, to supplant the loss of friendship of the Arab leaders, King Hussein found some consolation in American and British friendship. Here there was some common meeting ground. America and Great Britain both knew the threat of Russian or Chinese Communism could become a reality in the Middle East at any time. They, if not more than Hussein, sought a rapprochement in this area to free this strategic area from threat. During May, 1959, Hussein made his initial sojourn to the United States. President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Christian Herter extended the most cordial of welcomes. The King garnered the assurance of a firm and friendly hand for Jordan by the United States. During his second visit, the King made his first appearance before the United Nations General Assembly. Once again he reaffirmed his strong belief in a strong, realistic Arab union. Again he cast doubt on the authenticity of the Syrian-Egyptian Union both as a union and as the forerunner of a united Arab state. Hussein's words were to prove prophetic.

In the meantime, Jordan was "progressing" toward some useful development plan internally. In considering the overall economic progress of Jordan in the earlier part of the 1960's, definite contributions came from the successful implementation of the East Ghor project. The employer of the largest amount of Jordan's labor force was and is agriculture (forty percent). The East Ghor Irrigation Project proposed to divert the Yarmouk River water to the land of the East Bank of the Jordan River. The Project realized a projected total of 100.7 percent increase of agriculture production between 1959 and 1965. The income for 1970-71 projected a doubling
of the increase from the previous years. The Project began in July, 1958, with British, American, and Jordanian construction. Completed finally eight years later, the East Ghor Irrigation Project realized the following accomplishments. The Project raised the living standards for Jordan. Secondly, it consolidated land ownership and redistributed farm units. The Project assisted modernization, while increasing agriculture output. Finally, the Gross National Product increased overall.16

The year 1961 saw the adoption of the Five Year Plan for 1962-67. Some severe critics of the Plan felt it promised increased income per capita and more short-run employment. This contradicted sound economic advice from some economists on the United Nations Development Board. The goal of the adopted Five Year Plan had definite political targets in mind. To a certain extent, the solutions exemplified a very short-lived approach. Even the government of Jordan recognized this. In the early part of 1963, the Five Year Plan was revealed as incapable of completing many of the projects enumerated in the proposed program. Mainly this was due to the "reductions in the level of budget support, particularly that received from the United States." Most of the fault also lay with the inability of the exports to create a balance of trade. For many years, beginning about 1950, the chronic problem for Jordan's economy was the great deficit in trading. Imports always exceeded exports. In 1967, over fifty-five million Jordanian dinars went into imports, as against eleven million from exports. So one can readily grasp the basic problem which arose by virtue of dependency on foreign assistance. Most of the smaller projects planned required extensive study and research which necessitated much funding. The government of Jordan felt that, basically, a change from the Five Year Plan to a Seven Year Plan was only a rearrangement of the projects. The Seven Year Plan included agricultural and industrial changes to produce higher productivity.
 Basically, it embodied the same impractical, unrealistic goals of the original program. Additionally, the Seven Year Plan could not cope with the loss of the West Bank contributions to Jordan's economy.  

Actually, the original plan seemed only to satisfy political aims and paid little heed to the economic exigencies. Since the fundamental requirement of good economic planning for underdeveloped countries seems to lie with stability, both financial and political, the future short-range plans would only superficially accomplish the task of making Jordan's economy self-sufficient. By voiding the original Five Year Plan, the government of Jordan substantiated the prediction that the Plan could not succeed.

Another economic consideration is the external aid to Jordan. Unfortunately, the funding from United States and British programs has been, at best, ad hoc. Therefore, no planned increase appeared forthcoming. The general policy toward Jordan may be called "a holding operation" in which the present political positions should be held as they are at a maximum cost. The minimum cost need not go far beyond the financial support of the armed forces to the extent to which they can maintain internal security and satisfy the minimum demands for external security.

Whether the government of Jordan can finance the forthcoming Three Year Plan for 1972 out of government resources without endangering its security and stability domestically and financially, is yet to be determined. The problem still remains, however, that the major objective of the Seven Year Plan is to relieve Jordan of having to depend on external financial aid.

According to the Seven Year Plan, the Gross National Production is projected to have a sixty-four percent increase from 1963 to 1970, with only a thirty-seven percent increase in private consumption and an increase
of one hundred twenty-six percent in private and public investment. In 1963, the Gross National Product stood at one hundred thirty-eight million Jordanian dinars. To satisfy the aims of the Plan, an increase to two hundred sixty-six million Jordanian dinars would have to be made in 1970. Actually, by 1967, the Gross National Product rose to a staggering two hundred five million Jordanian dinars, almost one hundred percent above the figures in 1961, which are measured at market prices. Non-market or factor prices for 1961 escalated from ninety-two million to one hundred seventy-seven million Jordanian dinars in 1967.  

In the light of all the statistics, both projected and real, and despite the internal and external political upheaval, the economy remained stable on the whole. An example substantiating this occurred in 1967. Although imports dropped, probably due to the loss of the West Bank, exports continued to rise. So production was not really disrupted. In fact, as with other nations during wartime, the economy was somewhat stimulated.  

However, this does not alter the seriousness of political events nor does it create a more convincing picture that all remained untouched by the frustrated events of the 1960's. An ugly internal feudal problem exploded in mid-1960. Up until then the country functioned constructively. In August, 1960, Prime Minister Hazza al-Majali was completing his fifteenth month as Prime Minister of Jordan. Previous to this, he had held other portfolios in the somewhat mixed cabinets. While Prime Minister, he helped co-ordinate the aftermath of the withdrawal of the British forces. During his administration, the foreign and domestic scene remained relatively peaceful. Whatever residue of pro-Nasserite forces existed in Jordan temporarily restrained their activities. Nevertheless, the political unrest expressed itself within the government in an initially acceptable fashion.
In May, 1958, former Prime Minister Samir al-Rifa'i had again become Jordan's Prime Minister. Agitation between him and Hazza al-Majali concerning the internal conditions, especially the elections, broke loose. Also, al-Majali had desired to stop Egyptian dominance in the Arab League. Here was another point on which the two men clashed. Then, in May, 1959, al-Majali replaced Samir al-Rifa'i. The first assassination attempt on al-Majali, in March, 1960, was prompted by a controversy over Nasser's control of Syria and the League. But when the Arab League met in Chartura, Lebanon, al-Majali rejoiced, even though Nasser still remained the dominating figure. At the Lebanese conferences he saw renewed hope for Arab unity.22

On Monday, August 29, 1960, at 11:30, he died at the hands of pro-Nasserites. The explosion planned got one victim, but failed to get its second victim, Hussein himself. After the rubble of the second explosion was cleared, it was found that ten Jordanians, plus the Prime Minister, had died. The King turned to Iraq and Abd al-Karem Qassem to strengthen his position and counterbalance the necessary anti-Nasser status.23

Nevertheless, the months following the unfortunate assassination of Prime Minister al-Majali, produced the institution of heavy security and a closer observance of Nasser movement. Bahjat al-Talhuni headed the ministry until January, 1962. His first major problem emerged solidly on August 30. A threatened bloodbath by the Majali tribe of Karak had to be checked. There was a vengeance threat when King Hussein appointed Faisal al-Majali to the Senate. During the term of al-Talhuni, some interesting persons were added to the cabinet circle. A controversial choice for the Minister of Economy caused some consternation in the government. Rafiq al-Husseini became the first member of the al-Husseini family appointed to the Jordanian government. His cousin's name was Hajj Amin al-Husseini. This avowed enemy of the monarchy who lived in Cairo had had a definite part in the
assassination of Abdallah. The year ended on this note of assassination.

On the last day of 1960, the execution of four of the conspirators took place. On this note of retribution, the King freed four political prisoners, including Major General Sadiq al-Sahr and Rif al-Awdah who conspired with the United Arab Republic against the monarchy.

This latter act ushered in a year of attempted rapprochement with Cairo. In spite of this, and partially because of the recognition of Syria, during the last months of 1960 and the early months of 1961, relations between Egypt and Jordan had begun to reach a tone of accord. Letters flowed between the two Arab leaders following the Baghdad Conference in January, 1961.

In these letters and the pronouncements coming from both men, one finds a deep chasm separating their respective beliefs. Nevertheless, the Jordanian government adopted a pro-Nasser position. Political prisoners, convicted of subversive activities who were pro-Nasser, found themselves freed. Thus, a resurgence of pro-Nasserism came to the surface; however, no anti-Hussein feelings arose. (It is also interesting to note that this pro-Nasserism had no organization or leaders; perhaps this is why the success and length of pro-Nasserism proved so furtive and lost most of its proponents.)

Then came the announcement of the impending marriage of the King to Miss Antoinette Gardner. So, while he pleased many of his critics by his political moves, many expressed extreme displeasure at his marriage to a non-Moslem foreigner, especially since she was British. The King called for support from his people saying that his personal, private life did not effect his or Jordan's relations with the other Arab states. Unfortunately, Hussein was unrealistic.

Along these lines, the King ordered the release of Suliman Nabulsi,
perpetrator of a pro-Nasserite plot in 1957. In a way, this overt act
demonstrated Jordan's "cordiality" toward the United Arab Republic. In
fact, many members of the cabinet and senate were leftist or had leftist
leanings. Despite this air of friendship, the government continued to
espouse an anti-Nasser and anti-Communist policy. The events of 1961
brought satisfaction for his policy.

All during the short-lived United Arab Republic, the dominance of
Syria by Egypt left little doubt to observers that economically, politi-
cally, and governmentally Cairo controlled the union. The final breath
arrived when Egypt attempted to nationalize the economy of the Syrian
region around Tripoli. On September 28, 1961, the first modern attempt
at Arab "unity" failed. One day after the coup against Egypt by Syria,
Jordan recognized the break and the establishment of the new Republic of
Syria.24

Then, one failure after another besieged Egypt. The Yemeni govern-
ment and conservative elements, such as the Imam Ahmed of Yemen, severely
criticized Nasser. Now the existence of the United Arab States faced ex-
tinction as well. Firstly, the Yemeni revolt erupted involving the Re-
publicans and the Monarchists. The Republicans won. And, in the latter
part of 1962, the Arab powers immediately aligned themselves. The newly
founded Republic of Yemen faced its first real crisis. Nasser, of course,
loan his military and financial aid to the Republican government of
Abdallah al-Sallal, while Saudi Arabia and Jordan backed the Royalist
faction of Iman Ahmed ibn Yahya. To counteract Nasser's support, Hussein
sent military and financial aid. Unfortunately for Hussein, the move
proved unpopular in Jordan. Many, especially West Bankers, opposed this
and took their services to Egypt. In addition to this, the Western
nations, especially the United States, extended recognition to the Yemeni
Republic. At first blush, Nasser and the West were on the same side. However, Nasser saw Yemen as a door to Saudi Arabia and was to face an uphill battle, which he ultimately lost. 

Leftist movement proceeded in 1963. The first target was Iraq. The leftist regime of Abd al-Karem Qassem had instituted many reforms and had displeased many middle class elements. As a result, on November 18, 1963, the Ba'athist' lost power. A split had developed between Nasser and the Ba'athist'. So, with the help of Cairo, the pro-Nasser faction led by Abd al-Salam Arif, former Lieutenant Colonel under Qassem, defeated and executed Qassem and his regime. Demonstrations broke out throughout Jordan and the new regime in Iraq. All of these events between Egypt and Iraq tended to release external pressure from Jordan.

The lessening tensions produced two Arab Summit Conferences at Cairo one in January and the other in September, 1964. More cordial relations and greater hope for Arab unity ran very high. Between the two conferences King Hussein further solidified the position of Arab unity and his intention toward this goal with his words and visits to the United States during April, 1964. So by 1965, the stormy Arab relations were approaching some agreement and strength. During the years from 1962 through 1965, two new Prime Ministers took the reigns of government, Sharif Hussein ibn Nasir, and Wasfi al-Tal. The latter, elected for the first time in January, 1962, correctly sensed the impending disaster both for himself and for his country. If any of the heads of Jordan's government mirrored the ideals and feelings of the king, certainly Wasfi al-Tal was first.

The year 1966 marked the first waves of conflict. Jordan's economy flourished, as noted. No apparent signs of political unrest existed. The real thrust of what was to come showed through, however, all during 1966.
First, the Palestine Liberation Organization stirred demonstrations and protests throughout the Arab capitals. Some of this activity resulted from legitimate governmental and private support. Whether or not they intended to launch a major offensive has no relevancy. The world viewed unrest and agitation marking some impending event. The obvious answer called for counter-offensive measures.

As the year ripened, a virtually defensive event produced mild world reaction. On November 13th, the Jordanian village of al-Samu bore the brunt of an actual offensive move by Israel. Located about twenty-five kilometers from the Holy City, the village of 4000 people was devastated by Israeli forces. Just as the violent events in Palestine in 1947 foreshadowed the events of 1948, so the al-Samu action served as a warning for 1967.

Certainly the Palace and the government knew the signs. The initial action came when the Palace issued a National Service Decree (November 26th). This instituted compulsory participation for all between the ages of 18 and 40. The cabinet was dissolved and Hussein brought the return of Wasfi al-Tal. By now his anti-Nasser, anti-guerrilla feelings gave notice of what to expect in the coming months. His speeches against President Nasser and the type of nationalism and unity the Egyptian press represented burned into the minds of pro-Nasser elements. This type of agitation against Nasser gave the appearance of acquiescence to the Israeli government.

To insure Jordan's security, King Hussein and the Prime Minister embarked on vital control measures. The initial step led the King to visit the West Bank and Jerusalem frequently to guarantee his position there politically. In addition, a press law provided for the safety of news releases.
This latter measure appeared in the face of many demonstrations and acts of sabotage throughout the early months of 1967. Some observers believed bombings in Jerusalem, Nablus, and Amman, and demonstrations led the government to promulgate control of the news media. Actually, this was a step in the King's plan to integrate Palestinians into Jordan since mostly Palestinians owned the newspapers. Al-Filastine and Al-Difa', located in Jerusalem, had refugees for owners. So on February 1, 1967, the cabinet of Wasfi issued a new press law which cancelled all existing newspaper licensing. To receive a new license, the law required each daily paper to have four editors and publishers and publish at least eight pages. Conformity to the law also necessitated a certain amount of establishment of the newspaper. Along with this, fifty percent ownership belonged to the government. If this legislation seems a regimetary act, it is because of the nature of the people. King Hussein knew his people well. He realized that with very little stimulation or rumor, desperate situations could result.

In addition, the King was determined to keep the illegal forces from overcoming his state. The Palestine Liberation Organization remained the main danger to the regime. The struggle against it came on two levels, security and politics. With the Palestine Liberation Organization many factions, such as the fedayeen, required control. Wasfi al-Tal, Prime Minister, believed Ahmed Shuqayri, the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization had become one of the tentacles of the Egyptian intelligence. Furthermore, the Prime Minister felt the Palestine Liberation Organization wanted to liquidate the question of Palestine and blame it on someone else in the process. The administration and the King himself had cognizance of the elements which saw the government as traitors (Kha'ymiin) and meant to deal with it. Of course, Shuqayri hoped otherwise.
Between the massacre at al-Samu in November, 1966, and the Ramatha incident on May 31, 1967, the Palace encountered a more dangerous issue. On March 1st, the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, returned to Jerusalem from exile in Beirut. Now the regime found itself confronted by Israel, the Palestine Liberation Organization and its "sacrificial" membership, and the treacherous and bitter opponent of the Hashemite Dynasty. King Hussein realized he needed support from Jerusalem. Somehow the idea Hajj Amin could consolidate that element evolved. Along with this, observers believed the ex-Mufti and the King together were attempting to form a new Palestinian movement to prevent a direct confrontation between the government and the Palestine Liberation Organization. Of course, this seems somewhat doubtful since the King recognized his opponent no longer had "teeth" and would not be able to persuade even the religious elements. Interestingly, the cabinet of Wasfi al-Tal was dissolved and a new two-month coalition was constructed under Sharif Hussein ibn Nasir.

Then on April 23rd, the King designated Sa'ad Juna'a to form a new cabinet. The Chamber of Deputies, newly elected, continued to lean to the left, including Hajj Amin's relative, Muhyi al-din al-Husseini, representing the Arab High Command. On May 11, 1967, the Chamber gave a vote of confidence to the Juma'a government.

During this crucial period, the military, the mainstay of the regime, occupied the Palace. Up until 1961, the loyalty remained constant, except for 1957-58. However, by 1967, the makeup of the majority of military had fifty percent Palestinians in its ranks, but by then many had really become Jordanians. Still some unsupported reports of purges occurred. To satisfy any errant elements, the Palace announced a pay raise. From the latter months of 1966, the strength of the military increased. However, the enlargement remained highly inadequate in the face of any concerted effort by
the enemies of the regime.31

Because of the impending threats from Israel, the King declared a state of emergency during the third week of May, calling for strong economic and civil defense measures. To shore up the internal resistance, the Palace was reconciled with the Palestine Liberation Organization and its leader, Shuqayri, as well as with the United Arab Republic. However, former Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal warned Cairo and Shuqayri of any overt action which could produce confrontation between Jordan, the Arab states, and Israel. Very shortly thereafter his foresight proved itself correct, culminating in the June War of 1967.
Footnotes - Chapter I

1 The Arab World 35:2 (October 25, 1956).

2 Unclassified Record Center, United States Operation Mission (Point Four), Amman, Jordan, Text of Agreements, 1951.


6 Peter Young, Bedouin Commander, pp. 173-4.


8 Middle East Journal, 2:182 (September, 1957).

9 Middle East Affairs, 8:108-109 (March, 1957), Text of the Agreement.

10 Jordan Information Center, April 10, 1957, Telegram: Gamal Abd al-Nasser to Sulieman Nabulsi.


Footnotes - Chapter I (cont.)


19 Professor Elizabeth Penrose, "Developing Economy in Developing Nations" (Lecture at Royal Scientific Society of Jordan), July 20, 1972.


21 Ibid., pp. 25-29.


33 An-Nahar, Beirut, July 24, 1962.
CHAPTER II

Al-Arub al-Wataaniyy: Tariq al Jadid

Arab Nationalism: A New Way

"The whole of the Arab nations, without one exception, have decided in these last years, to live and to accomplish their freedom..."
Sharif Hussein, July, 1915
Letter to Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner at Cairo

One of the most delicate problems which faces any new aspiring nation state concerns the implanting and/or fostering of nationalism. This is doubly true for Middle East Arab nations. Primarily, there is the strong feeling of individuality on a basis both as people and as governments. This, then, could very easily defeat an overall desire to promote pan-Arab nationalism or a united Arab state. Still, on the part of most Arab leaders there is the desire for the emergence of Arab nations. Ultimately, the necessary ingredients for nationalism rest on tradition and custom acquired over a period of time by means of historical similarity. Herein lies a chasm. On the surface it would appear Arab peoples have strong reason for unity of nations. Closeness of language, religion, proximity of territory, similarity of culture and history - all of these constitute the usual foundation for nationalism. However, on closer examination, these all reveal more than crevices when relating to the Arab nations.

Each nationality, and for that matter even each district, has its own dialect or peculiarity of the Arabic language. True, there is one literary language, but even that breaks down with common usage. As a result, therefore, the apparent cohesiveness of their language contains elements which seem more divisive than unifying. If one nation accepts for
itself complete autonomy, then these people would consider their language as superior and not want to merge their individual or customary tongue with others.

In a similar fashion, and directly tied to the Arabic language, is religion; for Arabic has been inextricably intertwined with Islamic tradition. The basis of the classical or the written literary Arabic is the Koran. But Pan-Arabism cannot be and is not necessarily synonymous with pan-Islam. This element of religion requires more scrutiny than just Judaic-Christian rejection of religion as a basis for Arab nationalism. There are many Arab leaders who would resent the intrusion of religion in the function of what in their minds constitutes a secular phenomena. Since for several hundred years Islam remained as the basis of "law and order" in the Middle Eastern world, directly or indirectly, many modern-minded Arab leaders believe that this institution has served its term. In fact, many go so far as to say it held back change and development. For them religion really has no place in modernity of government. Even if Islam were acceptable as a building block in a national state, the elements of Judaism and Christianity, also present, would act against it. Because of the variance of language and religion, tradition and custom take on special distinctions. Many in the Arab world today believe that the devisiveness originated from the intrusion of the Byzantine Empire into the Umayyad dynasty. Also widely accepted is the thesis that this interruption of Middle Eastern culture came unalterably from outside in the wake of centuries of Arab solidarity. However, this idea lacks essential substantiation. An exacerbation of Arab unity resulted from western interference; nevertheless, western influence neither created nor destroyed unity. For a certain time western influence even acted to preserve Arabism.

Islam, whether admitted or not, certainly remains an anchor of
nationalism. For centuries, the Islamic religion contained the most cohesive elements for unity. In more recent times, this tenacious religion suffered in the wake of another formidable component of unity. Oddly, both religion and nationalism, in comprised spiritual movements, preached Arab unity. However, in the undertaking of one, the other vanishes. So both have related, if not identical messages and aims, but for one there is defeat. The time for Islam to write the Arabs has lapsed; so Islam becomes a present day anachronism for unity and must be subservient to nationalism. Nationalism must itself draw from Islam strength and purity to produce any kind of successful union. This interruption of Middle East culture came unalterably from outside in the wake of centuries of Arab solidarity. In actuality, the break within Islam itself ended deficiencies within the scope of purpose of those very early. The non-Arab peoples in Syria, Iraq, and Egypt fused with the conquering Arab caliphate. Whatever unity existed dissolved when the Empire split in the eighth century as the Abbasids attempted to maintain Islam. This fragmentation never really solidified since it gave way to the Persians, Fatimids, Kurds, Mamluks, Mongols, and Ottomans. None of the countries of the Levant except Iraq and Syria remained effectively ruled by any one group. Thus, even though Islam, broadly speaking, remained unified, Islamic history tends to relate disunity because of the different political and cultural experiences. Adding to this is the natural lack of unity produced by the natural boundaries of deserts and mountains. Perhaps more than anything this created ethnic, cultural and social distinctions. Even more, important psychological differentiations occurred. Of course, much of this takes on real or physical variations. Language, physical features (especially facial), speech, and customs bear the mark of these various distinctions.

Despite all of the dissimilarities among Arab peoples and groups,
Arab nationalism is the strongest and deepest force in the Middle East today. If all of the nationalistic forces are lacking, how can this be? In the absence of these factors, how, then, is King Hussein able to proclaim a realistic desire for Arab unity? Even further, how is he able to continue a successful regime since it is based on the idea of Arab nationalism? To accomplish the first blossom of nationalism, King Hussein had to disrupt and then dismiss British influence from his nation. Comparable to the dismissal of the USSR from Egypt in 1972, the Arab world hailed the small struggling nation. However, Arab action on Jordan's cry for sovereignty arrived only after Jordan severed the last vestige, the Anglo-alliance of 1948. Although strongly influenced by his Arab neighbors, the decision to end British control remained foremost in Hussein's national aspirations implanted by generations of pan-Arabism. When King Hussein embarked on the career fated for him, he envisioned his role as something more than a position. He always knew the paths he had to pursue. He knew its sacrifice. In fact, the King possessed from his background an inherent knowledge, an inbred feeling for his destiny. He readily recognized this. Sharif Hussein ibn Abdallah, his great-grandfather, held, in Hussein's eyes, the leadership of the Arab world with an awareness of and responsibility to it.

From the outset, Sharif Hussein had been cognizant of his relations with England and the West. In his hands rested the ultimate establishment of an independent Arab state. However, the realization of this state was not to be. Still, his original design continued even in the presence of adversity. Creation of the mandate throughout Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Palestine only served to strengthen a desire for unity instead of conquering it. So when his son, Abdallah, received the nod from the British to lead the created territory of Transjordan, the opportunity to advance the ultimate goal was disclosed. The seed grew again and nurtured within the mind of King
Hussein's grandfather. Adding to this was certain visible evidence of Abdallah's desire for unity. The joining of Transjordan and Iraq in September, 1946, involved both Abdallah and Prince Abd al-Illah in creating a political, defensive, and economic union. Of all of his offspring, King Abdallah loved and admired his grandson Hussein. Abdallah talked of his ideas and revealed his inner feelings concerning the fate of Arab unity. And Hussein listened. He watched as his grandfather struggled with the creation of a foreign state on Arab soil. Just as after World War I, the remnants of Arab unity left the concept of unification almost without physical existence. Nevertheless, unofficially, in 1948 Abdallah accepted the partial loss of Palestine. The remaining pieces combined to form the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Now the piecemeal unification included Jordanians, Palestinians, and refugees from the occupied state of Palestine.

In August, 1952, with a solid intellectual awareness of the necessity of Arab unification, the youthful vigorous Hussein found himself as the head of a new wobbly nation, a political homunculus. Carrying with him the strong precedents from his forebearers, the uninitiated set out to continue his rigorous training. Unlike most monarchs, Hussein's preparations for this new status had very liberal, yet military leanings. Discipline and yet freedom from responsibility dominated his education. He guarded a freedom-loving attitude toward his education as with his whole life. Coupled with the ideas from his family, his education demonstrated that theoretically he would be able to implement those ideas in the future. However, he recognized that the future could perhaps be a long time coming.

The first opportunity for him to exhibit pragmatically his ideas came March, 1956. For from May, 1952, until 1956, the government ostensibly proceeded under the direction of ministers of state. However, this did not indicate a lack of the King's influence and ideas. Actually a relinquishment
of authority never occurred. Power remained fixed in the central figure of the King. And there was and is no sign of accepting any other source of power or legitimacy. In fact, no official political parties exist, then or now. Again, as in 1956, the following year's political situation proved unruly to the point of directly threatening the Palace and authority. To show his position and, perhaps, to test his power, the King refused to bend even in the face of Egyptian threats. He handled the military rebellion with the touch of an experienced ruler. His counter move forcing Sulieman Nabulsi's resignation revealed a master stroke by a master politician. The period of a free reign for cabinets ended. No one remained in doubt as to where the real power rested.

A pervasive desire to perpetuate this status continued, but not to the exclusion of promoting Arab unity. However, unnecessary consideration emerged from outside forces which again influenced the decision. This time the United States prodded the course of leftist pro-Egyptian Nabulsi who lost his position. By the same token, United States pressure influenced the signing of agreements between Hussein and King ibn Saud. Certainly the stationing of the Sixth Fleet near the Levantine coast acted to preserve Jordan's integrity. Nevertheless, this did not alter the firm grasp the King had, even in the light of subsequent events.

Often cited as the most striking example of a willingness to subjugate or, at least, subdue his political ambitions, was Hussein's action in February, 1958, in his agreeing to form a Union with Iraq. Although this appeared as a countermove to the United Arab Republic, in actuality the Union would accommodate the theory of unification which King Hussein possessed. On the surface, the union with his cousin, King Faisal of Iraq, revealed a desire to shift the burden of responsibility for Jordan.

In reality, although political expedients fostered the union,
King Hussein felt it to be the foundation to realize the ultimate plan. The acceptance of the idea or possibility of a unification for all Arab nations immediately would indicate naivete. Knowing the nature of the Arab people and the Arab states, the King was aware that instant unification would result in a relatively rapid dissolution. He rather regarded that the first step of unification would be some kind of a tripartite arrangement. Necessarily, a unity among the Arab countries of North Africa, together with the primary union on the Arabian peninsula coalescing with a Levantine union, would all be required for an ultimate union. When the Arab states could accept the existence of sovereignty and place it in a central or federated head, then an opportunity for further unity could arise. The events of 1958 threatened even the embryonic stages of any unification. For a while it appeared as if only external interference could preserve Jordan notwithstanding any multi-labyrinthised union. The union between Iraq and Jordan haunted Hussein's thoughts. He would continue to seek an ultimate federation.

President Nasser lodged himself as the "thorn in the side" of Hussein through the late 1950's and into most of the following decade. Even the Arab League functioned as Nasser's tool. "The League is only a political office under the control of Egyptian propaganda. And this is the main reason for its failure." With brief periods of lukewarm relations, enmity persisted between Egypt and Jordan. The Palace viewed Nasser's brand of Arab nationalism as a menace to valid unification. Hussein stood in the way of Nasserism by opposing his United Arab Republic, which Nasser held forth as the answer to unity. Added to this, Hussein represented for Nasser a tool of the west. Naturally, he vented his failure to unite the Arab world on Hussein. Nasser made vitriolic attacks against Hussein on Radio Cairo in Al-Ahram, and even in correspondence. At times, the attacks
involved loosely veiled cries for the King's assassination. Even the actual attempts on Hussein's life had the backing of the United Arab Republic, reaching even into the kitchen of the Palace. 11

Still, this did not signify a refusal by Hussein to attempt to work cooperatively for Pan-Arabism. In 1961, the idealist bent to the political pragmatist. Hussein pleaded with Nasser to work together for the common cause of Arab unity, stressing equality among the brothers of the Middle East. Nasser, in his reply, showed only his unyielding position on Western imperialism, Israel's removal, and the desire for dominance of the situation. He disclaimed any loss of Jordan's friendship as detrimental to Egypt, inferring Egypt did not need Jordan as Hussein needed Egypt. 12

Along with this and other entreaties to Egypt, Hussein continually advanced overtures to the Palestinians to fulfill the destiny of the Arab world. In 1968, with the hope of regaining and keeping Arab solidarity, Hussein opened the gates to criticism both from within and without. After the crushing defeat of 1967, the Palestinian frustration continued until it reached fever pitch. Hussein realized the necessity of venting the defeat. The Palestine Liberation Organization remained the outward manifestation, along with the Palestine Liberation Front, Al-Fatah, and others. Here existed a way to fight back. To the ordinary Arab, this group had not sold itself to the west or Israel. It only found its efforts thwarted. And Hussein feared that "putting a cover" on the situation would create more hostility.

So from January, 1968, until September, 1970, the Palestinian movement maintained its base of operations in Jordan with no restraints. This constituted another act in which the King willingly cooperated with those who had denounced him and had threatened his personal experience. Certainly, it was expeditious. However, more pointedly, his commitment to Arab unity
exceeded everything. Iraq and Syria, being extremely volatile politically, represented special problems to Hussein and Pan-Arabism. Significantly, the dominant forces of nationalism and revolution contradicted Hussein's every intention for Pan-Arabism. The basis of this movement, in part rightist and in part leftist, originated from the Al-Hiyb al-Ba'ath al-Arabi al-Ishtiraki (the Party of the Arab Renaissance Socialists) or the Ba'ath Party.

The source of the Ba'ath developed under the tutelage of Michel Aflaq and Salah Bitar, both Syrians. Its program is nationalist, reflecting the will of Arab people to unite, and missionary in concept, propelling the party. It is revolutionary in pragmatic terms and socialist in theory. From 1948 to 1956, the right arm of the party extended from the military into the political by a series of party inspired coup d'etats. But to Iraq, this nationalism had no meaning without the socio-economic crusade for the Arab world. Both Bitar and Aflaq expanded their ideas into reality as political leaders of Syria, while their influence radiated into the neighboring countries of Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan. The constitution of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party contained the necessary elements of the needed union whose realization and failure came in the United Arab Republic. At that time and later, the program of the United Arab Republic corresponded substantially with Ba'ath policies.

These policies had an elucidating question as to how democratic and how socialistic contemporary Arab parties of radical reform were and still are. The Ba'ath insists on the institutions of western parliamentary democracy. In addition to subordinating this democracy to an unidentified national interest and an undescribed national ideal, the whole structure rests upon a historicism of Arab Renaissance. Practically, the Ba'ath Party calls for startling reforms. Further, the movement itself emanates
from the newly rising petit bourgeois with lower class support.16

If there be any deviation between the UAR and the Ba'ath program, the alteration must lie in land reform. The Ba'athists promulgate a much more extensive program for land and wealth distribution. Economically, the base is socialist with the hope of gaining the masses. Additionally, the constitution asks for a broader based policy toward the Bedouin and settlement of the refugees, coupled with almost complete equality for all Arabs remaining a necessary goal.

On the surface, all of these policies seem germane to the Hussein idea of unity. Why then rejection of the Ba'ath? Fear completes more power loss than rejection and has always sufficed as an explanation. Yet examining the political implications reveals a more intricate situation. Hussein read the constitution and understood, therefore, that acceptance of Ba'ath principles underwrote revolution. The Arab Resurrection Socialist Party is revolutionary, believing that its principal goals of awakening Arab nationalism and building socialism cannot be achieved except by revolution and strife. The party believes that dependence upon gradual change and contentment with superficial and partial amelioration will defeat these ends through faintheartedness and loss of opportunity. Therefore, the party has decided to: a) struggle against foreign colonialism in order to achieve absolute freedom for the Arab homeland; b) struggle to achieve a union of Arabs in a single independent state; and c) rebel against existing evils affecting all intellectual, economic, social, and political aspects of life. To Hussein and the tradition of his family this spelled anathema. Historically, revolution usually resulted in more revolution. Of this he was keenly aware.17

The path of the Ba'ath in the Middle East is disclosed in the political legitimacy of governments. Up until 1958, when General Abd
al-Karim Qassem relieved King Faisal, Nuri al-Said, and Abd al-Ilkah of power, the Ba'ath had felt secure in Iraq. During Nuri al-Said's regime the Ba'ath secretly carried its activities into Iraq's politics. Even after Qassem's coup, the Ba'ath continued its political agitation. When he and Nasser fell out of step, the suppression of the Ba'ath naturally occurred. Revolution established the Qassem regime and Ba'ath manipulation aided its initial existence. After Qassem turned them out, they rallied to support Nasser and the disgruntled elements under Qassem.

Hussein, stunned by the loss of his cousin and the hope for unity, understandably remained aloof from Iraq's new regime. In fact, Hussein continued to speak of Jordan and Iraq as unified under himself. Although Qassem appeared to have little affection for Hussein, actually the Iraqi general continuously taunted Nasser with his unsuccessful attempts to take Jordan. The more Nasser failed in terrorist and assassination attempts against Hussein, the more Qassem ridiculed the United Arab Republic. Even Nasser's speeches of unity between the UAR and Iraq did not frighten Qassem because he would never affix his signature to such a union. Animosity increased even more but only verbally against Hussein who called for liberation of Iraq from usurpers and extremists. In turn, Qassem attacked Hussein as a western puppet of imperialism. Qassem even enjoined those revolutionary Ba'athists especially to establish and free themselves from the yoke of "imperialist agents." Still Qassem did not reveal the whole of his feelings. In the light of all Qassem's diatribes against Nasser and Hussein, an obvious element emerged. The Iraqi president, culturally and ideologically, found himself closer to a union with Jordan than to any union with Nasser. 18

Moreover, President Qassem feared Nasser and Nasserism. Qassem also instinctively held, as did Hussein, the same concept of Arab nationalism.
But as a leader, he recognized the danger of a premature unity. This substantiates the lack of real action against Jordan, for Qassem and Hussein sustained similar emotions of Arab nationalism beneath the whole facade. Both Qassem and Hussein endorsed some of the basic tenets of nationalism.

The most fundamental element represents an overlapping of religion and nationalism. Hussein supported the Islamic tradition as the very root of Arab nationalism. Qassem and Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz, his Minister of Oil and later Vice-President, viewed Arabism and Islam as the overlapping of concentric circles. In reality, Qassem and Hussein sensed and pragmatically recognized the necessity of Islamic tradition as an integral part of any future Arab nation. 19 To both leaders communism spelled anathema. It was Qassem who demanded the removal of all traces of the Hisb-al-shu'iyya (Communist Party) and the Hib-al-Ba'ath. These parties represented the extremists who he believed would endanger and corrode any future for a unified Arab world. Of course, Hussein constantly and publicly proclaimed his anti-communist program. 20

The rift between Qassem and Nasser widened, causing both leaders to seek friendship with Hussein. The situation continued "hot and cold" throughout 1959 and 1960. Qassem accused both Egypt and Jordan of losing sight of the major issue - Israel. He accused Nasser of maintaining unjustly the Gaza Strip. In addition, Hussein was a usurper. The annexation of Palestinian territory in 1950 again whittled down the size of Palestine. These results brought Nasser to veil the issue in the Council of the Arab League in September, 1959, at Casablanca. Nasser ignored Gaza and charged Jordan with occupying Palestinian territory. Thereby he hoped to promulgate a territorial state of Palestine which would owe "allegiance" to the United Arab Republic. 21 President Qassem realized Iraq's existing
cultural affinity with Jordan. He viewed the historical background of the Bedouin ancestors of the two countries as a way toward unity. However, to effect unification required other cultural factors. Before any union, a definite national unity, an awareness of state nationalism, should exist.\textsuperscript{22}

King Hussein strongly believed the strongest unifying element of the Arabs to be cultural and historical. Based on this, with strong national awareness, a preliminary tripartite unification, ultimately leading to a federation of three unified geographical areas, needed to be formed. The first step toward this consisted in unity with Iraq. An attempt toward this goal seemed imminent in early 1961.\textsuperscript{23} Whatever elements held Jordan and Iraq together, most certainly the strong anti-British feelings in Iraq tended to destroy any tendency toward unity. Also associated with this feeling loomed the historical and hated mandate in Palestine which related King Abdullah and Hussein. To Qassem, a state nationalism for the Arab world could not result from a foreign background. Still, the closest ally Jordan had throughout the period of 1960-1971 was Iraq.

Hussein and his government recognized Nasser's feints and his intentions. Hoping to stem the tide, Hussein and King Ibn Saud regained cordial relations. Then Prime Minister Majali countered Nasser's vitriolic statements by a press release in which he cautioned Nasser not to speak for Palestinians who were now Jordanians. Even Hussein entered the discourse in March, 1960. On radio Amman, he quietly and calmly criticized the United Arab Republic's policy to establish a state for Palestinians. He continued the indictment of Nasser, pointing out the lack of responsibility and future in the proposal. Believing the only
workable solution to Palestine must embody a futuristic program, Hussein implied Nasser's policy contained selfish and even criminal precepts. The strikes at Nasser found their mark. Nasser retorted by slandering Hussein as a Khayin (traitor) and western puppet. This caused Hussein to recall Nasser's ability of bringing imperialist communism to the Middle East. With the convening of the Arab League in April, 1960, the diatribes slowly subsided.

The quietness lasted only temporarily. Jordan's Prime Minister Majali carried on the challenge to the UAR. Majali declared the necessity to prevent a Nasserian takeover of the Arab world. Continuing, Majali accused Nasser of wanting only to subvert the other Arab nations to Egypt. In August, 1960, the assassination of Hazza Pasha Majali, Prime Minister, and the attempted assassination of Sharif Nasir ibn Jamail (Hussein's uncle) gave rise to the resumption of verbal attacks. Hussein instinctively condemned the conspirators. Lashing out at extremists, Hussein at the United Nations on October 3, 1960, remarked he detested a significant parallel "between tactics that have been used against Jordan and those employed by communism all over the world." And the United Arab Republic continuously disrupted friendly relations to resume an anti-Jordan campaign.

The attacks came from both Cairo and Damascus, but not Baghdad. During this period Qassem dropped his dispute with Jordan since stopping Nasser seemed more important. Two of his closest associates, Abd al-Salam Arif and Rashid al-Gailani, had converted to Nasserism. So through the Arab League Council and the United Nations meetings, Iraq's foreign minister Hashim Jawaad, Jordan's foreign minister, Musa Nassir, and Hussein negotiated resumption of diplomatic relations. The government of Jordan extended recognition to the new regime, thereby breaking Egypt's
attempted isolation of Jordan. This renewal of Jordanian and Iraqi relations substantiates Qassem's fear of Nasser and the eventual assumption by the latter of the Arab world leadership.  

From all indications, any basis for a friendly and/or personal relationship between King Hussein and President Nasser of Egypt entailed very weak premises. Although the desire for Arab unity seemed a sound factor for cooperation, actually any similarities here were furtive. The need for a common struggle to produce unity served as the nucleus of Nasser's concept of Arabism. Accomplishing Arab unity necessitated also an awareness of Arab strength. To Nasser, the most important factor was utilizing the natural resource, oil, as "a big stick" against the world powers to pull them in line.

With the loss of King Abdullah, a shiver of death and expectation swept across the Middle East. Not unaffected, President Nasser, newly installed, had annexation of Jordan in his thoughts from the outset. Hussein realized the complex barrage of threats presented especially by the Egyptian forces. Nasser made no secret of his wish to overthrow the King and his government and place an evolutionary government in power. This new political structure would then join itself to the United Arab Republic of Nasser. To him, this highly unviable state of Jordan and its inexperienced king represented an easy prey. However, as events occurred, Nasser discovered his inability to create little more than tension. Certainly from everything announced by Nasser, Syria, and Qassem, King Hussein and the Hashemite Dynasty had a very short future. Nasser's extremist position indicated his philosophy on Arabism and his attitude toward Hussein. From 1955, with the signing of the Baghdad Pact, Hussein necessarily had to admit to the existence of anti-Jordan forces. The
Treaty freed many previously shielded emotions. As a by-product to his anger, President Nasser took the opportunity to attempt unsuccessfully the destruction of Hussein by verbal assault. Nasser's maneuvering did, however, destroy Jordan's sister state. Unfortunately, the new Iraqi regime proved disappointing to the Egyptian president. So, unsatisfied, Nasser continued his corrosive assaults, mainly bent on overthrowing Hussein. The many assassination attempts found willing tools in the hands of exiles from Jordan, Palestine, Syria, and Iraq within the confines of the Egyptian capital.

All the riots and demonstrations culminating against Hussein's regime in 1955, again in 1956 and 1958, in 1963, in 1966, and in 1969, proved fruitless to President Nasser. Throughout the entire period from 1953 to 1970, Hussein experienced volte-face dealings from his Arab neighbor. He soon came not to expect any substantial help when Jordan faced a crisis. This included the tumult of war in 1956, threats of war in 1961, and civil strife in 1970. In the impending disaster, Hussein never lost sight of the main objective.

Time and again King Hussein entreated, cajoled, and pleaded with President Nasser to abandon his short-sighted course. He espoused that the recognition of the "equanimity among the sons of our nation" be the basis of cooperation between Jordan and Egypt. Hoping an appeal to Nasser's strong religious background would bring a responsive note, King Hussein wrote to Nasser on February 23, 1961:

"In your capacity as a responsible Arab person, we extend to your excellency the call for fraternization, harmony, and solidarity - a call which is reiterated by our believing hearts in Jordan, which stands on the Arab worlds' first line of defense against Zionism and the enemies of Arabhood. Our purpose is to serve our glorious nation and our great Arab homeland. We
hope that this fraternal call will mark the beginning of a new era of fruitful work in joint constructive cooperation for the sake of our nation and nationalism."

Hussein asked for strengthening and solidifying the Arab world. Nasser read but was not convinced. 34

On March 8, 1971, President Nasser responded to the request in an unconciliatory manner. His answer to Hussein's federation proposal consisted of a counter-proposal, exactly what President Nasser himself held as a solution.

"Our stand on imperialism: we believe, your majesty, that imperialism in all its form is evil and an affliction... we believe that surrendering to imperialism represents destruction for the people who accept surrender and we believe that bargaining and aligning with imperialism will strengthen it.

In the international field, we believe in the positive neutrality as the goal toward a peace based on justice... we also feel that we are shouldering special responsibilities toward the liberation movement especially African movements. This might explain Israel attempts to infiltrate these regions. Our stand on Israel 'we believe that the evil which was placed in the heart of the Arab world should be uprooted and the rights which were usurped from the Arab entity should be restored. This, before anything else, requires a comprehensive, sovereign, Arab power.'

I placed the Israeli problem among the final factors of our policy with the non-Arab parties, because this problem is closely connected with our internal conditions.

Society in our republic: we believe your majesty that there will be no dignity for the homeland without the dignity of the individual. True democracy in our opinion is not the mere participation in general elections; it is actual participation in the national economic income. For this we have directed our actions in what we call the cooperative, socialist, democratic society, toward increasing production and equal distribution.
To achieve increased production we have prepared a ten-year plan for increasing national income. With regard to the Arabs: we believe Arab nationalism is a true and original current leading toward a comprehensive unity."

To Nasser, the largest and most grotesque aspect of the immediate past remained the Baghdad Pact. He viewed this agreement as the political event most damaging to Arab solidarity and the defeat of Israel. "The Baghdad Pact aimed at turning Arab interest away and mobilizing Arab efforts to face a danger from the Soviet Union which did not materialize, thus keeping the Arabs from concentrating on the real danger in the heart of the Arab world - the danger of Israel."35

This brief exchange of letters points out the willingness of Hussein to attempt some rapprochement with his "enemies" to accomplish peace and solidarity. Some observers have proposed the theory which explains Hussein's action as yielding to Nasser's pressure or to prodding from the United States. Much more than this, Hussein studied the situation and saw an opportunity to advance his confederation of Arab unity. In actuality, a certain amount of agreement with President Qassem of Iraq marked an excellent opportunity for further entrance into the elusive consolidation of the Arab peoples. "And in view of our appreciation of the greatness of the responsibility shouldered by us and every responsible Arab person, we responded to the call of the sacred duty to serve our nation. [our nation - one Arab state]" Continuing this and substantiating the above, Hussein remembered sincerely and candidly "we believe under the influence of this sacred memory we write to your excellency."36

Throughout the subsequent years which preceded 1967, King Hussein found his position solidified internally. However, the resonant tone of
international short-run defeat for Arab unity and peace sounded over and over. His relations with the United Arab Republic and Iraq continued unfinished. Syria continued to be a mystery. Lebanon showed no signs of involvement. No real agreement presented promise of effecting Hussein's main ambition.

On February 8, 1963 Premier Abd al-Karim Qassem gave his last to the republic of Iraq. His former deputy, Colonel Abd al-Salam Muhammed Arif took the reigns of government. As early as September, 1958, a definite split began to grow between Premier Qassem and Arif. At no time did Qassem demonstrate an intention to associate Iraq with the United Arab Republic. On the other hand, Arif had made many statements over radio Baghdad and in Al-Ihtihad (Ba'athist) praising both Nasser and the United Arab Republic. Again the hostility between anti-Arab nationalists emerged over Pan-Arabist Colonel Abd al-Wahab Shawwaf. At Mosul he died leading a pro-Nasser uprising in March, 1959. This produced a wave of anti-Nasser protests in Baghdad weakly supported by the Communist Party. 37

Along with all this subversive activity, Qassem and Arif stood at odds with the Kurdish problem. Qassem knew the Kurds had a great antipathy toward Arab nationalism and especially the United Arab Republic. Even the Iraqi constitution of July 27, 1958, provided for a bi-national regime of Kurds and Arabs in Iraq. Qassem realized he could not afford to lose this element, and thus it became necessary to silence Arif by sending him to Germany. 38

Basically, Colonel Arif and Qassem disagreed on fundamental issues. Qassem pointed out that Iraq's independence and sovereignty remained the first priority. To a great degree this frustrated Arab nationalists, especially Colonel Arif. Just at the beginning of
September, 1958, he secretly left Bonn and led a leftist-backed military coup against Qassem. The President's effective military and popular control supressed the coup. With Colonel Arif, former minister Rashid Ali Gailani received a death sentence on February 7, 1959. Unfortunately, Qassem later commuted that judgment because of friendship leaving himself open to subsequent events. But his "friend" Arif soon forgot the favor of 1959.\(^{39}\)

On January 8th, Qassem announced elections in which he never participated, for February 9, 1963 marked the end of his life. The actual revolution led by Brigadier Abd al-Karem Mustafa culminated in the election of Colonel Abd al-Salam Muhammed Arif as President of Iraq. If King Hussein's goal was Arab unity, the Iraqi leftist movement put it out. Hussein also held the strong suspicion that other elements besides Nasser, Ba'ath, and the military shared responsibility for the coup in Iraq. "I believe certainly that the coup d'etat in Iraq on February 8th was supported by an American Intelligence."\(^{40}\)

While Qassem governed, Hussein believed some basis of agreement existed. He even hoped the United Arab Republic might become reconciled. He continued to urge this Arab solidarity even in the face of obvious Egyptian rebuffs. Unfortunately, President Arif had little perception, sensitivity, and comprehension for the cause of Arab unity. Had he understood the foundation of Qassem's program, Arif would have supported it. To Qassem as to Hussein, there could be no Arab unity without national awareness first. The establishment of this nationalism must necessarily precede. Arif and his vice-president, Brigadier Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, as well as Arif's brother, saw only the need to maintain power, not to advance the concept of any unity or even national awareness.
Because of the dichotomy of philosophies, Hussein's relations with the Arifs, both Abd al-Salam and Abd al-Rahman, never really reached more than nodding acquaintance. Definitely, the regimes of Iraq from 1963 to 1968 had little positive nature to offer in the way of Arab unity. The only solid factor emerging became the ousting of the extreme Ba'ath party. According to Arif, "there will be not a single Ba'athist in Iraq." Whatever loyalty Arif might have had, was certainly denied existence by his actions. First, he betrayed his friend Qassem, then he destroyed the element which had put him in power, the Ba'ath. Even his fidelity to Nasser waned.

On April 17, 1963, a proposed tripartite agreement between Syria, Iraq, and Egypt conjealed in Cairo after one month of negotiation. The meetings established a federal union to be implemented in stages. However, none of its hopes materialized. During the summer, the pact disintegrated when the mutual suspicion of the Syrian Ba'athists, Nasser, and Arif, proved stronger than their willingness to make concessions for Arab unity. The pact ended on July 22, 1963. In addition, for the first time, the Ba'ath installed Amin al-Hafiz as president in Syria.

From September, 1961, until 1963, Syria's volitile position caused much concern for Hussein. But not as much as ensuing years would hold. While Syria remained in the Nasser camp for three years, Hussein experienced minor worry from the border to the Northeast. As the obvious disaffection became visible, Hussein predicted the shattering of the premature unification as did Wasfi al-Tal, later Prime Minister. Hussein had faced the Ba'ath and other subversive activities from Syria until late 1958. At that time, internal Jordanian security under the hand of Al-Sharif Nasser ibn Janail prevented, for a short period,
further Ba'athist intrusion. Also, the exiled extremists in Jordan found refuge in Damascus, adding to Hussein's concern. Meanwhile, in Jordan itself, many Syrian undercover agents infiltrated and agitated to overthrow the monarchy. Of course, the legitimate government in Syria encouraged the anti-Hussein campaign.43

In September, 1961, when the Syrian secession from the United Arab Republic took place, Dr. Mamun al-Kuzbari and his all-civilian cabinet declared Syria independent. At this point Hussein's relations with Iraq and Qassem had appeared close to a decision on Arab solidarity. With this unbelievable turn of events in Syria, Hussein saw an opportunity for a realistic beginning for Pan-Arabism. He immediately ordered Premier Bahjat al-Talhuri to recognize Syria. The move temporarily shored up the defenses of Arab nationalism.44 The loss of Syria to the Ba'athist forces in November, 1963, reinstated Hussein's frustration. The regimes of Amin al-Hafiz and General Hafiz al-Asad with supporters like Salah Bitar, Michel Aflaq, Ahmad Sawaydani made Damascus again the stronghold of the Ba'ath. By the end of 1966 the instability of governments in Syria produced no continuity, no consistency of policy. Thus, the most apparent danger for Arab nationalism lay in the loss of identity for the center of the Levantine region.

Thus, by 1965, Arab unity seemed to be at the lowest ebb in ten years. The Arab world had suffered a series of blows. The construction of the United Arab Republic fell in Syria. Resulting actions produced a series of Ba'athist governments from 1963 to 1966. Even a high flown hope of unity in the spring of 1963, among Syria-Egypt-Iraq with a loose federation, collapsed in July, 1963. The following year Nasser's attempts to reach the wealth of Arabia by way of the side door through
unity with Yemen, failed miserably. So, whatever hopes and fears Hussein and Arab nationalists had for Arab nationalism again proved evanescent.
Footnotes - Chapter II


6 Hussein, p. 40.

7 Huntington, *Political Order*, p. 185.


11 Middle East News Agency (MENA), Hussein, pp. 186-197.


23 "The Political Situation in Iraq" Vito Priestly, Middle East Affairs 13:141, May, 1962.


27 Al-Wazarut al Nruuniyya fi Khanrisin 'aamrah, pp. 44-5. Middle East Affairs, 12:345.


31 Hussein, Uneasy Lies the Head, pp. 55-83. Be'eri, pp. 229-234.

32 Ibid.


Be'eri, pp. 155-60.
CHAPTER III

Pan-Arabism, Palestine, Jordan

Quo Vadis Hussein?

"The Palestinian faced the following dilemma: either to become a powerless refugee living in tents, or to become an ex-Palestinian."

Ahmed Bab ad-Din
(Editor of Mussawar, Cairo)

The initial consideration in assessing the role of a leader transcends the physical factor. To transport an ephemeral concept as unity into permanence requires confidence along with a delicate measure of persuasion. Implanting this idea of union necessitates the finesse of a seasoned statesman, well schooled in realpolitik. Herein lies the task which confronted King Hussein.

Beyond this burden, King Hussein has faced the monumental task of relating Jordanians to Palestinians and seeking to demonstrate realistically that a basis for one nationalism exists. While maneuvering these factors, he has been constantly aware of the hostility and enmity coming from Israel and his Arab neighbor states. Because of his association with the west, Hussein has placed himself as suspect in the eyes of many pan-Arabists and Arab leaders. Countering these taunts of his brother Arabs sometimes caused embarrassment and disillusion for him, as well as for Jordanians. Often times the natural reactions of rejection and perplexion become frequent visitors to Palestinians.

Hitherto, no distinction between Palestinians and Jordanians has seemed necessary. At this point, these variances and subtleties become requisite to understanding Hussein's position. Statistically, until
1950, Transjordan consisted of approximately 375,000 native population with 350,000 refugees from the 1948 war. With the amalgamation of Transjordan and the East and West Banks of Palestine, the increase tripled the population to over one million with four percent population increase annually. This creation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan contained a total of 37,000 square miles with about ten percent (two million acres) cultivable land and a density of approximately 800 persons per square mile. More than fifty-five percent of these people inhabited the small part of West Jordan, which produces a lopsided demographic situation. National and occupation differences also accentuated the problem. Before 1948, a national homogeneity existed among the native inhabitants of Transjordan. These people originated mainly from Bedouin ancestry with very little sedentary population involved. Pastoral, rural, and even nomadic pursuits made up their occupations. Coming mostly from the southern Arabia and the Hedjaz areas meant that they were Sunni Moslems who injected their own desert culture into the area. Because of this desert culture and conservative religious background, the perspective and world view of the native segment achieves a distinction counter to the inhabitants of Palestine.¹

The entire concept of the desert molds its people as individualistic freedom lovers, with a fathomless sensitivity to space, no ties, no thoughts of materialism, except existing freely. This "nobility" of the desert enables its sojourners to develop a sensitization for disregard of sedentary responses. So the incaucasion of unrivaled nationalism would present special issues to a ruler.

To King Hussein, personally, these special problems take on double meanings. His family and tribal ancestry are definitely Bedouin. The
traditions and customs of the desert are deeply embedded in the soul of his allegiances. Even the claim of descendancy from the Hashim Family of the prophet, leaves little doubt as to Hussein's goals. A shadowy fact of the Prophet's expansion drives for Islam hinged strongly on Arab unity. In fact, one of the major reasons for the sporadic nature of Islam's expansion at the beginning involves the desire of Mohammed to preserve Arab characteristics and solidarity. The constant awareness of some Arab allegiance to Arabness marks even the split within Islam. Hussein carries this component as part of his very nature and heritage.

The ancestry and descendants of Sharif Hussein furnish a desire of achieving their design for Arab unity. Sharif Hussein created the very essence of the independent Arab state with unity as the plan. Placing Abdallah in Transjordan, Faisal in Syria, and Sayd in Iraq, partially complied with the Sharif's blueprint. History, unfortunately, has viewed the move as a compromise to the West. Yet, on closer observation, this superficial analysis dissolves into a more refined definition of early Arab nationalism. Certainly Sharif Hussein's knowledge of instilling immediate Pan-Arabism did envision difficulty. Even though a seeming illustration of compromise, the acceptance of a World War I settlement permitted time to filter and purify the process of Arab unity.

Undoubtedly, sacrificing principles for the sake of expediency is unreliable as a rejoinder. For to King Hussein, the only hope for any kind of future peace centered on a refusal to accept an expedient measure which devours convictions and ideals. A further affirmation of these feelings illustrates the strong, vigorous, and profound policy which follows:
"Man's love of his homeland and his people has never been simply a word uttered by the tongue or commodity bought and sold every now and then. To me, it is a man's entire existence, essence, and meaning. For this reason it is represented in his acts of life in every step and every moment. It can never be realized except when man lives honorably and truly through the values, views, and beliefs he champions."

Again on the feast of Ramadan, he remarked:

"No part of the world is as much a test of men's principles as the Middle East today. Everywhere one sees men of ambition, opportunists sowing dissension, using the unfortunate Palestinian refugees as political pawns. We in Jordan will never sacrifice principles for expedience."

This remained the heart of Hussein's vision and ideals.  

Over and over Hussein pleaded with his fellow Arabs in Jordan to "remain a great beacon lighting the road before me during my trip with you through the difficulties and problems." When he entreated his fellow Jordanians he was always cognizant of the diverse elements within his nation. For part of these "difficulties and problems" represented the Palestinians, the very inhabitants of Jordan.

When the 1948 war ended, approximately one million Palestinian Arabs swelled the population of Jordan. Another 100,000 integrated themselves into the Jordanian sedentary communities, especially Amman, Salt, and Irbid. Less than half a million of the Palestinians remained on the West Bank, mainly in the divided city of Jerusalem. Many of the Palestinians originally came from Bedouin stock. However, over a period of decades they became traders, merchants, doctors, professors, lawyers, and builders. Their outlook took on distinctive characteristics which had few affinities with the desert. Their goals became more urban and materially oriented because of closer contact with the west through.
direct British suzerainty for a quarter of a century. Simultaneously, many of the religious views had adapted to less stringent observance of Islamic traditions. In fact, the simplicity of the Moslem customs somehow seemed inadequate and even unwieldy in the new society. So Palestinians fitted their previous culture to their life in Palestine. Forced to leave in 1948, again they had to restyle their living pattern to a different culture. However, the Palestinian patterns were not so easy to abandon. So this heterogeneous element had to assimilate itself into a background and culture completely distinct from its pre-1948 occupation. The diversity in background and culture does not cease with these two elements. In 1967 the population of Jordan received another jolt. Many of the productive inhabitants of the West Bank now ballooned the ranks of the refugee population. These 300,000 displaced persons created a new economic outlay on the country. Previous to 1967, this portion of Jordan's population provided forty-five percent of the gross national product. Now with the loss of this cultivated area, and forty-eight percent of the industrial establishment, the economy of Jordan received a transfusion in reverse. The substantial number of unemployed imposed a dependency on the country's national economy. Consequently, with this increase of unemployed and decrease in the government's domestic revenues, the first blow to Jordan struck the economy. Unfortunately, the ripples spread even deeper into the fiber of Jordan than its economy, since the economy itself snapped back rapidly.

While the Jordan of 1950 remained intact until 1967, Hussein's chances of coalescing the dissimilar elements appeared more and more imminent. Many of the dissatisfied segments in Jordan had become reconciled and some had even accepted the circumstances forced on them
by 1948's events. He had shown his nation it belonged to the cause of Arab unity, gained by adherence to principles, even though a certain minority of dissidents continued to agitate and rumble. The probability of adequately handling the Pan-Arabism case in Jordan gathered positive momentum.

 Perhaps the divergent elements had established themselves in different geographical segments of Jordan and this factor accounts for certain areas of integration. Even the additional 100,000 Palestinians in Amman witnessed an unbelievable absorption into the country. In fact, many of the ordinary individuals found the new community more than acceptable. After all, twenty years had not produced for them wholly disastrous conditions. Before many of them had fled Palestine, their occupations restricted them to the land. Even so, many of them did not lose any land, only their livelihood. So, therefore, it was not incomprehensible for them to find another method of existence. Of the few who did own their land, the loss had not easily found substitution, of course. From among this small group of landholders arose the greatest furor over deeply felt loss. So Hussein's goal of firmly established nationalism in Jordan emerged, gathering more momentum as a real force, at least until 1967. However, the newly created Jordanian population had a restless counterpart.

 In 1948, several hundred thousand persons grew into a "do-nothing" society. Added to these people arose a new group in 1967. Over three hundred thousand joined the refugees in Jordan. These families found that the only place for them was a kind of living oblivion. Many were now twice refugees. They had first fled Jerusalem and other areas in 1948 and settled on the West Bank. After June, 1967, they once again
abandoned their homes. This time many settled on the already crowded East Bank and in Jordanian villages. The refugee camps at Jerash, Man'an, Ajlun, Karameh, in Jordan housed sad, wearied, defeated, desolate, undernourished sections of Palestine's dislocated populace. Up until 1967, they were growing slowly into an apathetic crowd. They had no present and no immediate hope of a future. And their past had only furtive existence.

For the newly created segment of the society, the only aim seemed mere subsistence. To encourage nationalism seemed foolish. And the plight of the refugees was so miserable that they barely found existence. A man whose aim is merely to live through the day certainly would not listen to idealistic prattlings of unity. Nor did the governments of the Middle East seem concerned. The only thing affecting the refugee became the knowledge that he must live. How he lived and under what system seemed of very minute importance. The need was only to live. Somewhere in the dim past arose the longing for the denied homeland. The impoverished present only served to illuminate the past with a feeling of irreconcilable right to return. In the meantime, the refugee had to hold onto the fast fleeing yesterday. The frustration mounted. But grudgingly the refugees settled for the wait. Twenty years had passed, and for some, the hope of regaining Palestine turned sour. For others the frustration only mounted into further frustration. At every turn the way ended in a blind alley. With little else to occupy their minds, many of the refugees began to believe no one would restore their rights. The governments of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq promised restoration. The United Nations annually had affirmed the right of Palestinians to return. But that right emerged as highly
improbable and unrealistic, as were promises of the Arab leaders.

Some of the frustrated population felt a man's dependence of his livelihood fell on his own hard work. Out of this philosophy, the camp towns like Karameh and al-Samu began to show signs of activity. These towns, through refugee efforts and United Nations participation through UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Work Agency), proved fertile. Mud homes, mosques, youth clubs, civic centers, roads, some telephones, and water supply helped to make the time less difficult. These refugee towns became a natural meeting place for individuals to stir the already existing subjugation and defeat especially after 1966.8

In November, 1966, an omen forecast the path of disaster. The Israeli military launched a full scale attack on the Jordanian village of al-Samu on November 13th. Ostensibly, a punitive attack against al-Fatah, the al-Samu raid became a symbol of 1967 as Der Yasin had of 1948. The village had received the brunt of Israel's vengeance against Syria and the commandos. The daylight attack obliterated the village of 4,000, killing 24 Jordanians - Palestinians. Jordan sustained the loss which Israel supposedly meant as retribution for Syria's attacks of sabotage. The whole attack lasted four hours receiving world condemnation. Certainly this "tank operation" revealed itself as direct Israeli aggression.

This act of almost wanton punishment does not stand isolated. The Israelis shelled and bombarded the refugee town of Karameh on November 20, 1967 for the first time. Two days later the United Nations passed a resolution urging peace, mentioning nothing about the raid at Karameh. The village of 30,000 people, which originally was established in 1952, discovered after this attack and five succeeding ones in 1968
(January 8, January 25, February 8, February 11, and February 15) that Israeli policy had more in mind than just rooting out the Palestinian commandos. Israeli Defense Minister General Moshe Dayan, in May, 1968, voiced the intent. "There is no room in the Jordan valley for civilian life, families, children, cattle or cultivation." Karameh had become the most productive refugee village in Jordan. This village had supported its population in the most dignified manner its inhabitants could provide. It had blacksmiths, small shopkeepers, shoemakers, carpenters, police, farmers, and teachers. The town undoubtedly thrived. Most of its citizens had lived in the oldest human settlement in the world, Jericho, which lay just across the Jordan River. Now, after the attacks, they lived nowhere. The town named "dignity" still suffers an undignified end. So long as liberationists and other factions continued, the Israeli guns found the targets.\(^9\)

Events such as those at al-Samu and Karameh have served to forge the strongest bonds for Arab nationalism. Whatever distinctions between and among the Jordanians and Palestinians existed, these disappeared in the face of the common enemy. For a native Jordanian began to realize his precarious position in the light of an Israeli attack. He viewed the plight of his newly added counterpart from Palestine as his own. He felt the deepest empathy in these circumstances. These kind of emotions became a major factor in the necessary support for Arabism. Condoning underground activity becomes less and less difficult. In addition, the Palestinian discovered a tie which placed him and the Jordanian in a similar situation. Again, nationalism cut into religious, social, economic, and political allegiances. However, Hussein does not depend upon disaster to accomplish unity, but, rather, the absence of violence.
"Woe unto him, wherever he may be, who is tempted to obstruct by violence or by any other means, the march, or hinder the caravan, to gamble with fate." Certainly an appeal to the Bedouin in the Jordanian and the Palestinian countries becomes obvious. And again, the warning followed riots in Amman: "they (brothers) too must not allow weak spirited people to infiltrate into their ranks... under the pretext of unity."

Before June, 1967, the divided city of Jerusalem best illustrated the disunity and the frustration of the Arab world. On one side of the Mandelbaum gate the Zionist government administered one hundred and fifty thousand Israelis and continued to lay plans for the unification of the city. In the Arab sector of approximately sixty thousand, Moslems, Christians, and Middle East Jews lived together, as the world focused on the fate of the holiest city in Western civilization. The Arab population of Eastern Jerusalem usually lived in congested and impoverished sections within the walls. The semi-feudalistic system formed the basis of the economy. As seen in other areas of the Middle East, a rigid class structure existed. On June 28, 1967, the unbelievable happened. The Holy City was no longer divided. The events of June 6th resulted in a unified Jerusalem. Then came the only unrealizable, unacceptable factor of the whole sequence of events. To the Arab, loss of Jerusalem embodied the loss of the symbol of unity, both nationally and religiously.

After the electrifying events of June, 1967, Jerusalem served even more poignantly as illustrative of Arab disunity and frustration. Certainly, the loss sustained economic impact. It also sustained demographic losses. Certainly, it did arouse Arab public resentment. However, none of these factors could approach the personal sorrow
unleashed by this sequence of events. The loss of Jerusalem became a point of honor, a point of personal dignity for every Arab. More than any other event from 1948 on, the complete separation of Jerusalem from Arab borders meant the sacred heart of the Arab world had bled and was left untended. The necessity to regain the soul (al-nafs) of Arab unity cannot receive enough emphasis. The return of Jerusalem is rudimentary to the establishment of any solution.

With the action of "annexing" the Old City to the Zionist side, the lines of communication with the Arab countries went down. In addition, some world public opinion hailed the re-unification of the city of Islam, Christendom, and Judaism. To insure Jerusalem's undivided status, the Israeli government took very definite pragmatic political, social, religious, and economic steps. Inside the walls an Arab world changed. Outside the walls an Arab world waited. "le Palestine est dans le coeur de tout le peuple Arab" (Wa Al-Quds Al-Qalb Al-Filistini).

In the midst of all the chaos, tumult, and unsettlement aroused by the political situation between the Arab world and Israel, one component emerged as a by-product of the events. The plight of the refugee, which was seemingly inconsequential, refused to remain so. Countering the Palestinians who accepted 1948, at least temporarily, those Palestinians who assimilated into Jordan, those Palestinians who envisioned no pact to Palestine, Shebab, the educated, and now homeless segment of Palestinians "lost generation," found a path. For them the Shar of unity could only billow by means of armed force. Had not the successful Ba'ath advocated revolution? And by 1965, a Ba'athist government existed. So no doubt these disillusioned Palestinians believed terror to be the only remaining solution. Eventually, the
refugee camps spawned the leftist groups. Palestinian refugees had nothing to lose. At least they would have a raison d'etre. So several types of direct action organizations formed.

As early as 1949, in Beirut, an underground Palestinian student club turned into the Arab Nationalist Movement. By 1956, this group spread into most of the Arab countries and had become very strongly pro-Nasser. However, in the latter months of the 1950's their faith in Nasser waned as he failed to take decisive action against Israel. By 1960, under the leadership of Dr. George Habash, the Arab Nationalists adopted a radical independence line. 12

Rivaling the extreme elite leftists, the Arab Summit Conference Meeting at Cairo in January, 1964, established the need for the Palestinian Liberation Organization. In May and June, 1964, Ahmed Shuqaryi, a protege of Nasser and the United Arab Republic, as well as Palestine's representative to the Arab League, announced the creation at Jerusalem of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Simultaneously, Shuqaryi and the newly elected congress set up the national charter and constitution. The League, and more realistically, Nasser, had asked Shuqaryi to set up a "Palestine entity" which would give the Palestinians a more decisive effective role in reestablishing Palestine. 13

In the Old City, the Palestinian Liberation Organization formed around a nucleus dedicated to the regaining of Palestine. The Palestinian National Charter of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which superceded the original earlier one, proclaimed itself the liberator of Palestine. In addition, a political constitution set up the administrative machinery. Realizing the grave responsibility which the organization had as the liberator of Palestine and the future task
of organizing a center of resistance, the charter enunciated the basic
tenets of Arabism. Most certainly, as the Charter stated, the national
ties binding the Arab people befitted any action necessary to regain
the most integral part of the Arab world. For the world government,
the most controversial part of the charter, passed in May, 1964, turned
out to be Article 6: "The Palestinians are Arab citizens who lived
normally in Palestine before 1948 despite the fact that they might have
been expelled. All children born of a Palestinian parent even after
1947 is a Palestinian, even if the child was born outside the state of
Palestine."14

The charter, undauntedly, reminded the Arab people that the
primary task remained the liberation of Palestine. Reaffirmation of
Zionism as a "colonialist movement" (harika al-istam'ariyya) would
continue as a source of permanent tension and chaos in the Middle East.
Also, the charter denied any sovereignty to itself over the West Bank
or any other Jordanian area. Undoubtedly, this part of the charter,
Article 24, had some direct connection with later negotiations in 1969
between the Palestine Liberation Organization and the government forces
in Amman.15

For forty-two months, Ahmed Shuqayri led the Palestine Liberation
From late 1966, internal dissension grew over Shuqayri's leadership and
objectives. Then strong voices from unwieldy Arab leftist elements op­
posed his reconciliation with King Hussein in May, 1967. After the June
situation, even more Arab leaders strongly criticized the Palestine
Liberation Organization. They said the inability of the organization
to continue as an effective force for a liberation had become obvious
since the failure against Israel in June, 1967. So in December, 1967, al-Fatah demanded Shuqayri's resignation indirectly by requiring that Arab information be personally withheld from him, thereby rendering him powerless in the Organization. Almost immediately the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization met in Cairo urging Shuqayri's resignation. On December 25th the Committee named Yahya Hammoude from Lifta, Palestine, to head the Palestine Liberation Organization. In this manner, the pact exhibited the inadequacy of the organization to fulfill the desires of the estranged Palestinians. 16

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine replaced the Arab National Movement of 1949. The Popular Front emerged more strongly than ever. Its leader, Dr. George Habash, along with Abu Khaled, continued to agitate as a Marxist-Arabist. More radical than the Popular Front was the splinter wing group under Nayef Hawatneh from Irbid. This group called itself the Popular Democrat Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Within this latter faction, great dissatisfaction arose against Abu Ammar (Yasir Arafat) and al-Fatah. Because of the lack of trust existing among the three, they reached no accord and, therefore, no concrete results. 17 In reality, the most activist commando group in the late 1960's continued until 1971 and exemplified a difference from the Ba'ath Revolutionists and Nasserites, as well as from any other liberation group. Al-Fatah began to fulfill a real need for direct action when the Palestine Liberation Organization failed to provide results. A young engineer, Yasir Arafat, set up the machinery and aims of the movement originally. He along with other young men like Abd al-Fatah Humoud set up the standards for military and physical training. In 1959, Arafat enunciated the seven points of the organization.
These resolutions served as a reaffirmation of the immediacy of regaining Palestine. In point seven the Palestine National Liberation Movement took note that the struggle for Palestine is not completely unique. "The struggle of Palestine is like that of the people of the historical process of a liberation of oppressed peoples from colonialism and imperialism." Undoubtedly, this substantiates, partially, King Hussein's view that the most extremist element in the liberation movements have world-wide revolutionary reverberations. By their own words, George Habash, Yasir Arafat, and members of the Black September (Alul al-Aswad) form part of a world terrorist web. To Hussein the solution would arise through peace and not revolution.\(^{18}\)

Despite Hussein's personal prospective toward a solution for Palestine, his policy seemed contradictory. After 1967, the mounting pressure in and out of his nation threatened constantly to explode. As a way of relieving strain, Jordan unofficially sheltered the activist elements of a liberation movement. From January, 1968, through the next year, Hussein, the government of Jordan, civilians, and military personnel knew of the presence of the commando units.

Perhaps the feeling of responsibility as well as one of personal loss and aggravation permitted Hussein to open his policy to criticism and risk the wrath from abroad. Nevertheless, the salient point is his devotion to Arab solidarity. When Hussein faced his avowed enemies, he reconciled himself that anything he could do to prevent war and further peace for Arab unity required his sincere and completely undivided efforts. This judgment adequately accounted for his inaction toward the various groups in 1968.\(^{19}\) Up until the fateful days of 1970, the extremist liberation groups worked unhindered in Jordan. Previous to
1967, Damascus, Cairo, Baghdad, and Beirut sheltered and cared for these homeless commandos. The legitimate governments of these countries directly or indirectly provided training grounds and war material for the restless contingency. Often the young men and boys of these countries swelled the ranks of al-Fatah and similar revolutionary circles. However, because of the loss of the West Bank in 1967, many of the Arab countries had partially lost their fervor for fighting. The defeat illustrated a strong military reverse both morally and economically. The Ba'ath in Syria and Iraq turned inward. Also, Nasser's policy desired to appease the domestic scene. President Charles Helou and Lebanon clamped a tight security against the known commandos in Beirut. With nowhere to turn, the leftist elements filtered into Jordan. For months the forces of Dr. George Habash, Yahya Hannoude, and Yasir Arafat lingered, travelled, worked, and resided in the populous areas of the country. Amman, which substantially had a Palestinian populous, turned into the barracks of the liberation movement.

"Amman est Palestinienne. Des Fedayins en armes dans le centre de la ville, aux barrages a la sortie de la ville, tenus par des gendarmes jordains assiste d'hommes d' El Fath, Amman paraît conquise, qanqee soumisse par les commandos."

By 1970, Amman fell into the hands of the Palestine Liberation Movement. Each day Amman demonstrated a greater number of refugees as well.

The situation continuously deteriorated. Hussein desired to contain the unruly elements within the confines of Amman. So he passively permitted the extremist to move about unobstructed. The ordinary citizens, particularly in Amman, found less and less political, military, and police action. As the year 1969 closed, the circumstances evolved
into a state of approaching anarchy. Rather than fear of the militant Palestinian element, a sense of heroism and admiration surrounded the Palestinian combatants. The ordinary Palestinian who had been absorbed into Jordanian society felt great esteem and respect for the commandos. Because of this newly found confidence and strength, the commandos seemingly had been able to humble the government of Jordan. The commandos tightened control further throughout the early months of 1970. As the anarchist state asserted itself into one of complete chaos of the Bakunin type, Hussein and the government realized the severity of the consequences. After all the attempts to appease the commandos by placing and replacing ministers of state, Hussein "invited" the leaders to confrontation. At the meeting in early September, 1970, Dr. George Habash, Yasir Arafat, and Yahya Hammoude threatened to crush the military forces of Jordan unless the government handed full control into their hands.

Between the time of the meeting and the end of 1970, the whole complexion of the movement for the liberation of Palestine ulcered and the inevitable response to the previous months occurred. For months after June, 1967, Hussein recognized the symptoms of bitterness, frustration, and immediacy. Certainly these were not strangers even in his own mind. Above all else, he sensed the utter despair and despondency of his fellow Arabs. Undoubtedly, had not he held the position of King, reason might have given way under the strain of frustration. How could he even answer others when he felt the solution getting lost under the weight of negotiation? Losing Jerusalem represented the greatest tragedy to him, but to subdue his own brothers had no comparison. "This referring to the civil conflict in September, 1970 was the saddest
personal happening of my life, and the saddest event in the history of Jordan." He was both saddened and disillusioned, but the whole Arab world lost faith in the Palestinian movement to free Palestine and, more than this, Arab confidence in Jordan suddenly disappeared as if it never existed.23

Hijackings in early September and the unbearable anarchy had culminated in the final ultimatum. The force generated from Palestine's leaders had placed Hussein squarely between them and his goal of peace. His government verbally retaliated by informing the leaders directly that, unless they checked and balanced their activities within the confines of order, the government would act. Jubilantly, the leaders awaited the opportunity to crush the "traitor" and his troops. That jubilation soon turned to defeat. The government physically and psychologically extinguished the threats. The leaders had to acknowledge their loss.24

The reports of the military events themselves proved fantastically outlandish and undocumented. Accounts in the western press raged with the fire of thousands of deaths. The news media announced the casualty lists as high as thirty thousand. The validity of these published reports depended on accounts from persons who neither witnessed nor participated in the events. From the ground floor of the Hotel Intercontinental, the world received information which the newspapers had released two days before the events occurred! Obviously, this series of fabrications had the design of threats to Hussein and the government, to prevent any movement against the Palestinian forces. Accountably, Hussein called the bluff. As in 1956, domestically and internationally, he moved decisively. So, undoubtedly, the resulting opinions need
re-evaluation in light of these disclosures. Even Hussein gives credence
to the ploy used by the leaders to prevent government and/or military
action.

"Just as the first reports of ten or twenty thousand
casualties were not only gross exaggeration but
pure fabrication invented for propaganda purposes,
so too, was the incredible stories of the city of
Amman going up in flames."

Hussein's expulsion of the Palestine guerrilla forces remains a
point of agitation and disruption of Arab affairs.25

In the aftermath of September, Hussein very succinctly summarized
the plight of the Middle East. Notably, the basic problems had erupted
and he took the occasion to remind his critics and supporters of the
urgency for solution. To him, whatever answers had arisen, they had
fallen victim to further conflict, first in 1956 and then in 1967, pro-
ducing the events of late 1970. To utilize these solutions for a repeat
performance would only produce a repeat performance of disaster. Ad-
ditionally, to continue this policy of procrastination and delay would
only end eventually in another direct confrontation. And no solution
which did not embody the basic rights of the Palestinians and encompass
an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli troops from presently occupied
Arab land could receive acceptance or even acknowledgement. However,
looming over the shoulder of Hussein and Palestine, still moved the ul-
timate shadow of history. The solution of federation would hold very
little satisfaction for either the Arab or Israel - too weak for one and
too strong for the other.26

In the final analysis the immediate boundary disputes hopefully,
would dim and fade. The creation of nation-states would eventualize by
means other than peace and legality. Today the Arab world is extremely
sensitized to the recent events of over half a century. Removal of this microscopic view through time will produce almost unbelievable results. The disputation of lines will disappear and acceptance of even the act of injustices will materialize. However, in 1970, the Middle East Arab was hardly prepared for such a long term perspective. History does not serve justice or morality. Admittedly or not, Hussein's knowledge of history and his people bring both views into his scope of vision. Certainly this awareness accounts in part for his longevity. Imperialism, colonialism, violence, invasion, and armed struggle forge nations. The myths, legends, culture, and historical similarities preserve them.
Footnotes - Chapter III


Footnotes - Chapter III (cont.)

19 Interview, Moraiwid al-Tal, July 20, 1972.

20 Interview, Dr. Kamel Abu Fabir, July 21, 1972.

21 Gilbert Denoyen, pp. 143-150.


25 Ibid., Hussein, Address to National Press Club, p. 4-5.

CHAPTER XV

Jordan and Israel: A Case in Point

"If indeed, Britain and France capture the Suez Canal and restore its international status by force of arms, the political implications for us will be of the highest importance."

Moshe Dayan
Diary of Sinai Campaign, p. 20

"Je ne veux pas seulement vous parlez de paix. La condition preamble a la paix est la justice."

Hussein Ben Talal
Ma Guerre avec Israel, p. 198

In 1948, Count Folke Bernadotte, independent mediator, became part of a tragedy that engulfed the passions, reason, and emotions of the Middle East for over twenty years. Seemingly irreconcilable circumstances created an entrapping web which has thus far involved directly or indirectly the whole world. The guilty and the innocent are indistinguishable. Involvement of concerned and unconcerned protract the image of frustration and apathy. Yet a response remains unheard. The gaping wounds of three major assaults and hundreds of minor ones have only festered. The end appears inevitable. However, the acceptance is not so easy.

Following Der Yasin in April, 1948, (called a justifiable massacre, since it produced the 1948 military victory over Palestine) the first fiery chapter of the contemporary Middle East proceeded. The attack on Der Yasin forewarned the Arab world of the events of 1948. Again, on October 10, 1956, another punitive action against Jordan occurred. This time it was at Kalkiliah, which is west of Nablus. An
attack on the police fortress nearby preceded the Sinai disaster. The third warning came prior to June, 1967. Al-Samu, on November 13, 1966, foretold another phase. Each of these major strikes seemed remarkable and frightening omens forecasting future events.¹

From 1952 until 1956, similar problems engulfed Jordan and Israel. Militarily, they each suffered miniature wars and retaliatory effects. However, the attempt to stabilize occupied the higher priority for both. King Hussein, young and inexperienced, faced a hostile minority in Jordan and an even more menacing world outside. Israel found little solace in her 1948 accomplishments. The borders of her land had no acceptability, validity, or even existence for her neighbors. However, notwithstanding this, other forces in the cauldron bubbled.

Part of Gamal abd al-Nasser's struggle to achieve his personal and professional goals faltered in mid-1956. In an attempt to complete negotiations for an anticipated loan from the United States to build the High Dam at Aswan, Ambassador Ahmed Hussein from Egypt, through his slightly veiled threats, alienated Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Feeling intimidated by the Ambassador's threats of accepting Russian aid, Dulles treated the situation with indifference. He retracted the preceding months of planning and withdrew the offer. So the Ambassador did what the Israelis had tried to do earlier. He unwittingly sabotaged his own country's plan. As a result, Egypt's tone caused a closing of American aid and an opening for the long-awaited Russian intervention, assuring a certain affability between the Soviet Union and Nasser.²

Still, Nasser felt alienated and determined to strike back. The Suez Canal had long been a point of friction between the British and the Egyptian President. Remaining steadfast to his commitment to uproot and
purge all imperialist elements, Nasser obtained the opening in the refusal by Secretary of State Dulles. "While Eden handles diplomacy richly and softly, Dulles moved heavy handedly." Nasser had waited for any provocation to end British influence. Dulles' action gave that excuse. So, on July 26, 1956, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company. The British opened a verbal attack. Exactly three months and three days later retaliation by the British and the French spilled over in the form of an Israeli attack. As for Israel, the scheme emerged as the first of two attempts to take Sinai. War number one failed and war number two succeeded.\(^3\)

The plan by the Western nations to allow Israel to become engaged in the war seems not to have been a trick, at least not from the Israeli standpoint. This proposed action fitted very beautifully into previously conceived ideas for the "final solution" for the State of Israel. Earlier schemes, such as the Lavon affair (see note below) temporarily succeeded in involving Egypt in anti-American demonstrations and deaths. When Egyptian security traced the conspiracy to the Israeli Minister of Defense, the damage already materialized and was not erasable. Later the substantially real disclosure of the subplot to get rid

**NOTE:**

The Lavon Affair occurred when by signing falsely the name of Defense Minister Lavon to some documents, Moshe Dayan, David Ben Gurion, and Shimeon Peres (the power triumverate in Israel) succeeded in sabotaging the USIA Library and other American places, actually killing several individuals in Cairo. The whole situation was designed to implicate, first Egypt, and later Lavon.
of Lavon and cool relations between the United States and Egypt substantiated an overall plan, culminating in Sinai in late 1956.4

General Dayan's personal diary attested to an intended military plot against Egypt and her Arab neighbors, even if an Anglo-French decision had not materialized. Justification for this lay in the increased Arab raids which Dayan claimed as "an organized operation" undertaken against Israel's security. An even further fear arose when Egypt closed the arms deal with Czechoslovakia on September 27, 1955. Israel realized the need of immediacy of action. However, General Dayan made no mention of when he believed these actions would take on the form of an all out attack. Also, any remark about any serious action on the part of the other Arab countries is singularly absent. For some unknown reason, he noted only isolated raiding incidents, which ceased in April, 1956. Nevertheless, Israel's intention did emerge when Dayan affirmed, "one of the basic issues in the conflict from the outset between Israel and Egypt was the freedom of Israeli shipping through the Red Sea."

Anyway, the whole of the retaliatory policy originated from the beginning with Israel.5

For weeks prior to the actual confrontation, Israeli leaders met with French and British officials to lay the preparations and groundwork to carry through the projected attack. On September 1 and 21, as well as October 21, 1956, both General Dayan and Shimeon Peres had rendezvous with France and England respectively. Even preceding these meetings, Christian Pineau, French Foreign Minister, and Anthony Eden, British Prime Minister, were already agreeing in London to act jointly against Egypt in a military venture. It took very little to incorporate Israel in their plans. The hard line, tough policy of David Ben-Gurion
and Mrs. Golda Mier, the Prime Minister and Minister of Labor respectively, of using military reprisals and retaliatory measures began from 1951. Of course, General Dayan denied any retaliation _sans_ provocation.

In relation to Suez and Sinai, undoubtedly, Israeli leaders could claim an imminent fear from "suspected" Egyptian attack. However, no proof existed. Even so, what provocation lay within Jordan's actions? Certainly, the Baghdad Pact could account for Egypt's recent verbal assaults on Hussein. However, what aggravation or indignity had Israel suffered from Jordan?

General Dayan believed necessary precautions had to be taken on the borders of Syria and Jordan. Also, as in 1967, the Israeli commandos recognized the solitary importance of striking in "blitzkrieg" fashion to prevent further complications or involvement by other countries. The "Schlieffen Plan" of 1956 required knocking out Arab forces in the Jordanian and Syrian borders quickly and devoting the full brunt of attack at Suez. So naturally, an outpost on the West Bank became the target.

From 1948 onward, tension between Israel and Jordan became an everyday experience. The very nature of the armistice which existed served to emphasize the extemporaneity and lack of permanence in the solution. Even the physical appearance of the boundaries themselves point to an ad hoc solution. Oftentimes, the belligerents (particularly Jordan and Israel) found themselves separated only by barbed wire. In the contested city of Jerusalem, the border had only a makeshift guard of Israelis and Jordanian-Palestinians. The Mendelbaum Gate divided the City. Even the guards themselves exemplified the levity and made a
mockery of the division. What existed only seemed to challenge each side to violate the line of demarcation. This factor held true for the other boundaries of Israel.9

Syria sat across the Dead Sea and on the Golan Heights, taunting the Israeli government both verbally and militarily. At best the agitation from Syria originated from the left wing element in Damascus, spurred on by Nasser and the Ba'ath in Iraq. The fuel lighting the contested border of the Syrian government and Israel involved Syrian territory. Economically desirable land around Lake Tiberias in the southeastern area and near Lake Huleh caused frequent assaults. Israel violated the armistice lines in October, 1953 by attempting to build a canal in the demilitarized area of Lake Tiberias.10

Lebanon, which also borders Israel on the northwest, contented herself with supplying the leftist elements sometimes with shelter and aid. President Charles Helou officially gave no sanction to these activities. However, thousands of Lebanese pounds equipped the Palestinian refugee leaders and encampments south of Sidon (Saida) and sheltered them. Nevertheless, the Lebanese Government itself discouraged border incidents. One of the main water supplies for Lebanon came from the southern mountains. Partially for this reason, and partially because of her weak military, Lebanon desired not to arouse any large scale attack by Israel.11

Whatever the status with her Arab neighbors in Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt, the new state of Israel seemed always to push the brunt of retaliation on Jordan. King Hussein early realized a delicate balance between the two nations. The "peace" appeared similar to the armistice as temporary and inviable. Hussein also perceived that this balance
pertained to the situation within Jordan. How to avoid, or at least lessen, the burden of military attack without sacrificing the dignity and pride of his people impressed him greatly. More than any other retaliation, Hussein feared the loss of the pocket or semi-circle which jutted into the carved area known as Israel. The West Bank of the Jordan River confined a psychological and physical world for the Arabs. To lose this to Israel, signified an irreparable wound. Nevertheless, the tension tightened as Israel responded with retaliatory assaults.  

A large percentage of Jordan's population consisted of Palestinians. Many of these who were not refugees per se still hated strongly. Through the fedayiin (sacrificers) Jordanian refugees and other Palestinians experienced a vicarious release of frustration. However, Israeli ammunition took more lives than she lost. Israeli revenge often exceeded the cause. The resulting hatred and tension reached fever-pitch. Somehow this retaliation mounted against Jordan in late 1956. Israel refused to accept the words of Hussein that he could not constantly contain all of the infiltrators all of the time. This situation the United Nations and the Western nations found to be a far more explosive problem. Nasser had closed Suez and threatened to strangle Israel economically. So, on October 10, 1956, when Israeli guns shelled and ravaged the town of Kalkiliah, Jordan, a minimal stir arose.  

All through 1956, Hussein primarily directed his efforts toward internal considerations. Removal of British influence partially spurred by Nasser's Soviet policy (freeing Egypt from western imperialists) preoccupied Hussein and his ministers. The only real consideration Hussein gave to foreign affairs, particularly to Israel,
posed neither defensive nor offensive measures. All of Hussein's energies were channeled toward overturning Israeli assaults. Still, he could not control every segment of his society. So the raids continued and murdering on both sides escalated. The 1948 wartime hatreds deepened and mutual suspicions compounded the problem. Outraged by the death of three Israeli Druzes in September, Israeli government officials launched a major assault.14

On the border of Israel and Jordan, twelve miles east of the Tel-Aviv highway, Israeli troops, under the orders of General Dayan, proceeded into Jordan at Kalikiliyah. As daylight came, on October 11, Israeli tanks and armored vehicles headed toward Israel. The artillery left in its wake the devastation of a town of 20,000 Arabs. Fighting uselessly against superior weaponry and training, Hussein requested Iraqi and British aid. Actually, the British feared Dayan's move might have disrupted the proposal against Egypt. In a way, the British action in these tight days exhibited a lack of awareness or perception as to the Israeli disposition.15

In regard to Hussein's position concerning Suez, the situation had anomalies. Nasser's motion of ousting further imperialist influence from the Arab world impressed Hussein. In fact, this action could have prompted the King to take the firm hold he took in late 1956 and 1957. Another consideration might represent a counterbalance which Hussein tried to effect against Nasser. However, probably a fuller explanation of this point was related to his essential desire to fill the vacuum with unity. With the British gone, both Jordan and Egypt had vast and uneasy complications. When Israel launched its attacks with lightning speed against the Sinai, England and France stepped in. Hussein
probably felt that the British were saying indirectly "we told you not to leave the fold." The British promised the Israeli government that a second front in Syria and Jordan would not pose a concern to Israel in this undertaking. 16

The rebuke issued by the world powers (especially the United States and the Soviet Union) when the Israeli-British-French action succeeded, postponed any accomplishment of "great Eretz" for ten years. Held in abeyance, Israel contented itself with retaliatory and offensive actions against Egypt, Syria, and Iraq through Jordan. However, certain unknown negotiations to reach a soluble position stalemated or ended on the drawing board for many and various reasons.

Probably far more than any other actions, Sinai in June, 1967, confirmed the basic premise of many critics of Israeli behavior. The most dammingly abusive rhetoric hurled at the Zionist state and its leaders originated with the Zionist themselves and far exceeded any attacks by Nasser or any other Arab leader. 17 And again, the noted Zionist I. F. Stone remarked:

"...moral myopia makes it possible for Zionists to dwell on the 1900 years of exile in which the Jews have longed for Palestine, but dismisses as purgatory the nineteen years in which Arab refugees have also longed for it. 'Homelessness' is the major theme of Zionism, but this pathetic passion is denied to Arab refugees." 18

Whatever the Israeli rationale of the 1956 and 1967 events was, Arab criticism and warnings to the world of impending disasters outweigh any logic or even reality. The Arab nations generally accept only one official premise toward Israel - Palestine is in the hands of a foreign invader and that invader must be expelled from Arab territory. King Hussein has expressed this idea over and over. Radio Amman almost
weekly, since 1956, announces the official attitude of the Palace as "irreconcilable" with the occupied portions of Palestine. But his solution is not violence. Hussein reiterated that evolution and not revolution must be the method to defeat the enemy. Realistically or not, he believes that with no provocation from the Arab world, Israel fails. Officially, this view emerges as a soft policy criticized by most Arab governments and seen as eeminiscent of his grandfather. Unofficially, Hussein and those close to him know the reality of the Arab situation as negotiable. 19

This unofficial view subletly emerges in speeches, official communiques, military communication, closed cabinet talks, and veiled meetings with Israeli diplomats sans portfolios. In late January, 1967, the Government of Jordan rescinded recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Officially this action had the sound of surrender since the order came on the heels of the al-Samu raid. The Government itself explained the move as necessary since the Organization had failed to achieve its aims to organize Palestinians for Palestine and for their rights. Underlying the official statement lay the desire to disassociate Jordan from the center of guerrilla attack into Israel. Hussein could not forget what could happen to his West Bank or the East Bank and the Jordan River. When he discovered the course for which the Arab governments headed, in May, 1967, he reconciled with Ahmed Shuqayri. However, the move was what he believed to be the lesser of two evils, Nasser and Al-Fath on one side, and the Palestine Liberation Organization, as a lesser extreme, 20 on the other.

Under the rhetoric of temporary acceptance of the Israeli occupation, resided Hussein's position and his hope for the ultimate
victory of Arab nationalism. His great-grandfather, Sharif Hussein ibn Abdallah, participated grudgingly in the division of the promised Arab state; so, now Hussein participates in the parceling of Arab territory to Israel. Surely he recognized the change of the loss of Arab land as a step toward loss of Arab solidarity.21

The events of June, 1967, go deep into the very essence of several factors. Of course, the awakening of Arab self-awareness of nationalism presents the first consideration. Within this Arab awakening is the arousal of Palestinian existence. Beneath the cover of Arab nationalism, the power struggle for political hegemony among Arab leaders and Arab nations exists, and the Palestinian people, represented by the "guerrilla" forces, are caught in this maneuvering for leadership. Each Arab nation desired to claim the victory of liberating Palestine. By becoming the champions of Arab attempts to free Palestine, an Arab leader and his nation could demonstrate the purity of its Arabness or nationalism. In this way the Arab leader would attain a respected position in the family of Arab nations. All of the Arab countries, Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan initially, and later the North African nations of Algeria and Libya, used this strategy. The adoption of al-Fatah ideology by Syrian leaders is an excellent method of wanting to show this leadership. Certainly Nasser never turned a deaf ear to the commando group nor to the leader, Yasir Arafat. Even King Hussein, whose personal and political philosophy is against the violent nature of extremists, bent to the pressure of Palestinian frustrations by giving the Arab commandos a more or less free hand in Jordan. Hussein's appeasement action, however, only whetted their appetites for the establishment of an Arab Palestine in Jordan. Thus, the most
significant way to attract Arab recognition for Arab leadership seemed synonymous with regaining Palestine.22

In this regard of regaining Palestine, President Nasser faced challenges and frustrations. Ten years before, as a result of the Czechoslovak arms deal, Nasser had become the unquestioned leader of the Arab world. If Nasser had run for president in the Arab countries in 1956, his election would have been unanimous. Through the Suez Crisis of 1956 and into the 1960's, Nasser's star continued to rise. King Hussein realized this and turned inward toward internal problems. His main concern was the preservation of whatever Arab solidarity existed in Jordan among Jordanians and Palestinians. His policies continued to ignore the Ba'athist governments in Damascus and Baghdad. And continuously he warned against military acts against Israel. At the base of his fears stood the West Bank and Jerusalem. The threat of the loss of this territory was real, especially after the Sinai War. Even Nasser had adopted a more realistic view of what the Arab world needed before embarking on another military venture against Israel.23

Still, Nasser used the new position as a tool. His widespread popularity became a strong bargaining point before 1967, especially in dealings with the big powers. His experience with the West had convinced him that to be respected he had to be strong. And since he knew his weaknesses were military and economic, he became strong politically through his influence over that mass of people who occupied the strategically vital, oil-rich part of the Arab world.

Nevertheless, by 1965, no Arab leader held a tight rein. With the Syrian defection in 1961 and the growing stalemate in Yemen, a steady erosion of Arab unity increased as King Faisal of Saudi Arabia
checkmated Nasser on a number of occasions by adroit diplomacy. Nasser's Unified Military Command began to break up. Divisions within the Arab League were so sharp it was impossible to hold a proposed conference of Arab heads-of-state to consider common Arab problems. By the summer of 1966, the Arab world was divided among itself. The dream of a unified Arab people, under Egyptian hegemony, Syrian revolution or Jordanian nationalism, appeared more a mirage than ever. As if these setbacks were not enough, Arab countries faced disastrous economic situations. Nasser's attempts at massive industrialization programs failed miserably. Syria's products could not compete against Western-made goods. The only answer was to create an Arab Common Market. But, peace and unity under one Arab leader was the only way to accomplish this economic unity. And in 1966, just the opposite situation occurred.

During 1966, several fateful political and military incidents occurred to set the stage for 1967. Much disunity existed among the Arab states, especially with Nasser and King Faisal fighting over Yemen. Also, a running disagreement between Nasser and Syria continued over the way to deal with Israel, since Syria kept opting for wearing down Israel by terrorist attacks, while Nasser urged preparation of Arab forces.

In July, 1966, President Nasser announced that he would not attend the next Arab Summit Conference. The Palestine Liberation Organization faltered. The Syrians took control of al-Fatah, for without a Summit Conference no unified Arab action could be taken against Israel. In turn, the Syrians now had a free hand to mount terrorist attacks. With the Syrians running al-Fatah, the terrorist attacks intensified to a vast degree prompting Israeli retaliation. On November 4, 1966, Egypt and Syria signed a Defense Pact.
The most fateful event occurred on November 13, 1966. The al-Fatah had been operating against Israel from Jordanian bases. In a reprisal raid, the Israelis attacked the Jordanian town of al-Samu. Why didn't the Israelis attack Syria? To the Syrians and Egyptians the answer seemed to be the deterrent force of their Defense Pact. Actually, Hussein had expressed personal opposition to reprisal, but the Arabs believed Nasser protected Syria from Israeli attack. So Hussein again emerged pro-Israel and the Syrians believed they could attack Israel with impunity. In the long run, the Arabs, Nasser, and Syria, were mistaken. This fact was brought home on April 7, 1967, when six Syrian MiG's were shot down by the Israeli Air Force. Nasser was forced to honor the Defense Pact. By mid-May, Israel's threats and raids against Jordan had alarmed not only the Middle East, but also the world at large. Premier Levi Eshkol, Foreign Minister Eban, and Major General Itzhak Rabin, the Israeli Chief of Staff, made formidable public threats. Rabin threatened to send a force to Amman and to Damascus to overthrow the Jordanian and Syrian governments. Premier Eshkol stated Israel would use force and warned Jordan and Syria that retribution was at hand. 24

Whether or not mobilization threats in May, 1967, were sufficient causes for the ensuing events, is not the issue at hand. The main thrust concerned Hussein's relations with his Arab compatriots in the light of his actions regarding Israel. Hussein has recognized the futility of war with Israel and has proposed a solution to satisfy Israeli demands with the least compromise for Arab nationalism. Somehow Hussein must regain the West Bank. Basically, his plan has the mark of a long run attempt at a loose Arab confederation. The new proposal has
Hussein as the central authority in this United Arab Kingdom consisting of Jordan and the West Bank, as well as any other Palestine territory where the population has opted to join. In this manner, Hussein has fulfilled Palestinian desires again to become part of the Arab world. But from 1967, the agitation against Hussein increased because of his lack of militancy. Former Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal became the first successful target. Al-Tal represented the image of Hussein's ideas incarnate.

An integral part of Hussein's relations with Israel has involved the Palestinians living in Israel and the eventual return of the West Bankers. The liberation of the West Bank ideally would reunite the area with the East Bank. However, the proposed amalgamation seemed unacceptable to the Arab world under the United Kingdom of Jordan, which, coincidentally, sounds British. To the West Bank Palestinian, a whole different idea has evolved.25

One of the primary goals of the Israeli state has been to assimilate the foreign factors which have remained. The intent has not been to make the Palestinians become Israeli, but rather to subvert the Arab by means of a temporary "security blanket." Israeli efforts have been to employ Arabs as unskilled labor to complete the government's plans for Jerusalem. Certainly the new Arab-Israeli individual has no Israeli citizenship. Nevertheless, the world of western technocracy has come to satisfy more of the material demands than were supplied under the Jordanian government. As most people in underdeveloped countries have fallen under the spell of materialism and the accruing physical comforts, so the Arab Palestinian has succumbed. The Arab has had very little in the past materially. With the advent of Israel, the
Palestinian has a small monetary gain. The longer the Palestinian in Jerusalem has exposure to this new found "wealth," the more difficult becomes the problem of unity. Thus, the most salient feature of Hussein's battle for reunification with the West Bank is not Israel but the necessity to recapture the West Bank Palestinian allegiance for Arab nationalism.  

Having returned the Palestinian to the fold of Arab nationalism, Hussein will have accomplished a major step in a solution to the Arab dilemma. Since May, 1948, the Zionist state of Israel seemingly has confronted the Arab world with the greatest single blow to Arab unity. Yet, the physical loss of Arab land is not the only important aspect. More importantly, the subversion of Arab awareness outweighs the loss of Palestine. True, the land of Palestine is an integral part of the Arab world. But Palestine's inhabitants must recognize themselves as Arab and part of the unique world of Pan-Arabism. If the people in Palestine, now Israel, become lost in the maze of technocracy of the Israeli world, Hussein and Arab nationalism will have failed. Realizing the shift in national feelings, Hussein has been trying to effect a settlement with Israel which will allow the West Bank Palestinians to become part of the Arab world.

Outwardly, Hussein has been developing a substantial army of 125,000 men to prevent another disaster, as in June, 1967. His public statements sound as if military measures are within reasonable bounds. 

"In the face of what happened and of what is likely to happen again, we have the peace of mind and the satisfaction of knowing that we are on our ground; we know what our means are; but we are also aware this is where we lie and this is where we die. And if we are destined to die, then we are going to make quite sure the price will be extremely high for those who commit aggression."/ Emphasis and translation mine.
These remarks substantiate two important points. First, Hussein has been making preparations for further physical conflict. Secondly, the Arab leader has no intentions of being the aggressor. He readily has recognized Israeli actions as aggressive and as imperialistic as those of the West (England) or the East (Russia).27

The position of retaliation and reprisal has been the position of Israel toward most of the Arab world. However, in the light of the "civil war" of September, 1970, in Jordan, Israel has softened her policy toward Hussein. Both nations have equally contributed to greater communication between the East and West Bank. Between the occupied territory of the West Bank and Jordan, the exchanging of visits by all Arabs has become a rule, rather than exception. Unofficial extended communication between Jordan and the West Bank has been permitted. In addition, the East Bankers have been allowed a view of Jerusalem by way of television. By means of this new communication, Hussein seems to be setting a foundation for the reintegration of the East and West Banks under the formation of a federation. The response of Israel toward this reunification has appeared unwilling. However, in the face of continued hostilities over the boundaries, the choices of action have become limited either to continued war and insecurity, or an armistice leading toward peaceful coexistence. Hussein has desired the latter, but has accepted the possibility of the former.28
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER IV


3 Mohammed Husseininyy Haykal, 'Abdul Gamal Nasser, pp. 168-69 (Cairo).

4 Moshe Menhuin, Quo Vadis Zionist Israel?, pp. 27-8.


9 Al-Quds (Jerusalem), Jan. 18, 1965.


13 Ibid. Dayan, p. 44. Khourie, pp. 184-90.


17 Moshe Menuhin, Quo Vadis Zionist Israel, p. 1

Footnotes - Chapter IV (Cont.)


CHAPTER V

Assessment

"After the war, the peace is delivered."
Arab Proverb

The life of King Hussein ibn Talal has marked a triumph in personal ability and endurance. Even more, the success of Hussein's longevity and the achievement of Hussein's ideas of nationalism in Jordan pose many queries. How did a young man of nineteen years of age formulate his concepts? How was he able to survive twenty years despite the personal and political threats and violences? How has he been able to walk among the various internal Arab factions while still maintaining his pro-Western stance? How has King Hussein managed to create and nurture Jordanian nationalism? How does Jordanian nationalism fit within the scope of Arab solidarity? And what does he hold for Arab solidarity?

The nature and background of King Hussein is both western and eastern. Certainly, the professional training and world awareness came from his education at Harrow and Sandhurst. However, his strong sense of duty to his Arab heritage is ancestral. The personal contact with his grandfather, King Abdallah, and his father, King Talal, imbedded the natural recognition of Arabness. These ideas of nationalism along with his strong sense of personal responsibility to his people, appear both in Jordan and the Arab world as a whole. Certainly, a feeling of dynasty is implicit in Hussein's character. Although the family comes from Bedouin origins, Hussein early recognized an aristocratic aspect of his family. True, he finds himself comfortable with the Bedouin tent-liver, but awareness of his aristocratic position remains evident. A keen
responsibility for his people, nevertheless, appears closer to his motivation.

He understands the patriarchal image of the Arab family structure, which is seemingly inherent as well in the Arab nation as a society. This characteristic explains why an anachronism such as a monarchy in a third world nation has been accepted. For Hussein continues to lend the basic Islamic structure credence by the authoritarian figure of King.

The idea of a monarchy also involves the word "power." Through sheer power and control of Jordan, King Hussein has been able to stave off several attacks of assassination. His personal dealings with the perpetrators often produced the threats. Perhaps trust or lack of judgment contributed to "allowing" the attempts to occur. However, through naked security and sometimes coercion, Hussein continued to lead Jordan.

The attacks against the nation-state have come again from both enemy and friend. Israel has succeeded in capturing and occupying the most integral part of the Hashemite Kingdom. The loss of Jerusalem and the whole West Bank threatens the very existence of Jordan as a political and national entity. Violence in this connection is often perpetrated by Arab attacks or threats. Hussein's attempts have partially failed to curb the violent activity of his compatriot Arabs. Instead of unity of purpose by fellow Arab leaders, Hussein encountered internal complicity to sabotage his desires for Arab solidarity. The keen sense of competition for leadership of the Arab world seemed to engulf any overall drive for Arab unity. Nasser threatened and blustered for concerted war against the enemy. Yet, he devoted more efforts toward
removing other threats to Arab unity. Foremost, Nasser tried sometimes successfully to discredit Hussein.

The most monumental and successful attacks on Hussein stemmed from his pro-Western policies. From the outset, Nasser led the Arab world in diatribes against foreign intervention and imperialism in the Arab nations. Even Hussein's removal of outward British influence and control in 1956 and 1957 only staved off criticism momentarily. The Syrian and Iraqi regimes both followed Nasser's position in criticizing Hussein's program as following western patterns for the Arab world. Nevertheless, through extensive diplomacy and security measures, Hussein managed to survive and still maintain a modicum of cordiality with the West. Fortunately, Hussein could counter this attack when Egypt, Syria, and Iraq accepted aid from the communist block. Foreign influence and intervention could come from either side and Hussein did not hesitate to show the anomaly.

Still, the Arab leaders did not abandon their vitriolic attack on the lack of Hussein's sincerity and ability to lead the Arab people. Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya has slurred Hussein at every opportunity. On one occasion, Qaddafi attacked Hussein's sanity by alluding not too subtly to Hussein's father, Talal ibn Abdallah. Qaddafi has even sponsored assassination attempts on Hussein. Syria's President, Hafiz al-Assad has used Radio Damascus to sound his anti-Hussein policy and he has continued to oppose Hussein personally as well. With little respect for Hussein and Jordan as a nation, President Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr of Iraq has warned the Arab people to beware of Hussein's deceitful motives toward Arab nationalism. Al-Bakr cites Hussein's attack on the Palestinian commandos. President Anwar Sadat has remained silent,
except to condemn the actions of September, 1970. However, none of the Arab leaders has been willing to make the "civil war" an all out war against Hussein.

Still, the most vital part of Hussein's program has been to create and instill a sense of Jordanian nationalism within the framework of Arab unity. This task has not been concluded and will require an even greater effort now that certain forces intend to disrupt the viability of Jordan as a nation and Hussein, as a leader. With the death of President Nasser, Egypt's leadership in the Arab world ended and left an unfilled vacuum. The governments of Syria and Iraq both presented very volatile and unstable programs for Arab unity. Their policies lack definition except to pursue Arab unity in some vague manner through revolution. The unofficial and illegitimate Palestinian commando groups follow only a negative attitude. The constitution or charter of al-Fatah called for destruction of Israel, whose existence has prevented total Arab unity. The Arab governments of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, coupled with the Palestine resistance movement, have thus far checked and contained Hussein's long range plans for Arab unity.

However, the program King Hussein has proposed might be too lenient toward Israel and too compromising for Arab unification; yet, the structure and idea have remained the most lasting aspect of Hussein's program. Hussein has envisioned a federation on the West Bank with the Jordanian and Israeli governments participating under the aegis of King Hussein. The plan has left the Arab leaders convinced that Hussein must fail politically and personally.

Yet the sensitive, gentleman with an unusual amalgamation of tradition, conservatism, liberalism toward progress, and change, has
survived. How he has continued still has puzzled many and has caused much unsettlement in the Arab world. Nevertheless, his political diplomacy and statecraft have created a mystique around this young leader. His fantastic grasp of his fellow Arab's desires, coupled with his politicism, have indeed produced the consummate politician.
Appendix A

Resolution concerning: Unification of the East and West Banks

April 24, 1950 (Translation mine)

Acknowledging the meritorious struggle of His Majesty the King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Abdallah ibn al-Hussein, for the actuation of his national goals; pursuing the right of self-determination, with a view of the East and West Banks of the Jordan River, their national and geographic unification and the requisites of their common interests. Because of these considerations, the Congress of Jordan, which represents the Banks, resolved on the seventh day of Rajah, 1369 (A.H.) or April 24, 1950, the following:

The substantiating for the permanent and whole unity of the East and West Banks into one state, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan under the leadership of His Exalted Majesty, King Abdallah ibn Hussein. This state is based on a congressional or parliamentary, constitutional administration with equal rights and responsibilities among all citizens.

Additionally, the preservation and protection of all Arab rights in Palestine by lawful means which allows the complete ability to do this without prejudice toward the final Palestine settlement within the structure of Arab national goals and cooperation (as well as) international justice.

This section is from the Arabic text, pages 4 and 5, of Majmu 'at al-quawmin, published in 1957 in Jordan.
Appendix B


Jordan has never ceased to call for a united front that needs full mobilization and coordination of efforts... We are pleased to announce that the basic principles of the proposed new plan are:

1. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan shall become a United Arab Kingdom, and shall be thus named.

2. The United Arab Kingdom shall consist of two regions:
   A. The Region of Palestine, and shall consist of the West Bank and any further Palestinian territories to be liberated and whose inhabitants opt to join.
   B. The Region of Jordan, and shall consist of the East Bank.

3. Amman shall be the central capital of the Kingdom and at the same time shall be the capital of the Region of Jordan.

4. Jerusalem shall become the capital of the Region of Palestine.

5. The King shall be the Head of the State and shall assume the Central Executive Power, assisted by a Central Council of Ministers. The Central Legislative Power shall be vested in the King and in the National Assembly whose members shall be elected by a direct and secret ballot, having an equal number of members from each of the two regions.

6. The Central Judicial Authority shall be vested in a "Supreme Central Court."

7. The Kingdom shall have a single "Armed Forces" and its "Supreme Commander" shall be the King.
Appendix B - cont.

8. The responsibilities of the Central Executive power shall be confined matters relating to the Kingdom as a sovereign international entity ensuring the safety of the union, its stability and development.

9. The Executive Power in each region shall be vested in a Governor General from the Region, and in a Regional Council of Ministers also formed from citizens of the Region.

10. The Legislative Power in each Region shall be vested in a "People's Council" which shall be elected by a direct secret ballot. This Council shall elect the Governor General.

11. The Judicial Power in each Region shall be responsible for all matters pertinent to it with the exception of such matters as the constitution defines to be the responsibility of the Central Executive Power.

This new phase, to which we look forward, will guarantee the rearrangement of the "Jordanian-Palestinian home" in a manner that will ensure for it additional innate strength and thus additional ability to enable us to reach our hopes and our aspirations.

Courtesy of Jordan News Agency
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