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THE MAKING OF AN EGYPTIAN NATIONALIST: THE POLITICAL CAREER OF SAAD ZAGHLUL PASHA PRIOR TO 1919

DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By
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1972

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The idea for this study of Saad Zaghlul came out of a series of conversations with my Adviser, Professor Sydney N. Fisher, during the spring of 1970. His unflagging support and enthusiasm for this project during the next two years constantly served me as a source of inspiration and I am grateful for his help and encouragement.

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I am also grateful to the staff of the National Library in Cairo who saw to it that I never waited to receive research materials. I can never forget their friendliness and kindness to me.
DEDICATION

To my wife, Rosalie, who shares with me deep respect and admi-
ration for the people of Egypt.
VITA

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INTRODUCTION

The memory of Saad Zaghlul is very much alive in Egypt today, nearly fifty years after his death. Large statues of him stand in the center of major squares in both of Egypt's largest cities, Cairo and Alexandria, and his great Pharonic-style tomb is passed daily by thousands of Egyptians as they ride the shuttle trains between Cairo and the suburbs of Maadi and Helwan. In his own lifetime, his home received the appellation Beit al-Umma (Home of the Nation) and his wife, Safiyya, was called Umm al-Masriyyin (Mother of the Egyptians). With her death in 1946, Beit al-Umma was transformed into a national museum in which almost everything is still preserved as it was when the house was occupied. In addition to these visible remainders of Zaghlul, numerous short books and magazine articles of a popular nature help to preserve his memory among the people, a great number of whom even repeat his legendary last words as a joking comment on the perversities of life and the future of Egypt: "Ma feesh faida!" (There's no hope!).

The honor in which Saad Zaghlul is held in Egypt stems from the reputation he gained after World War I as the leader of Egyptian Nationalism struggling to realize the goals of an Egypt for the Egyptians and an end to the British domination of Egypt begun in 1882. As the result of continuing agitation led by Zaghlul beginning in 1918, and bursting into open revolt in 1919, the British finally ended their
Protectorate and declared Egypt independent in 1922. However, the English restrictions on this grant of independence were so numerous as to render it meaningless and the remainder of Zaghlul's life was spent in attempting to wrest more freedom from England for Egypt—a struggle which, for him, ended with his death in 1927. It fell to Gamal Abdul Nasser to realize Egyptian Nationalist goals with the Revolution of July 23, 1952, and the consequent resumption of the rule of Egypt by Egyptians for the first time in over two thousand years.

Although Zaghlul's reputation as a Nationalist leader came after World War I, Dr. Mahmud Zayid, a professor at The American University in Beirut, has pointed out that most of what has been written about this leader has failed to do justice to the development of his career as a Nationalist prior to the War, and to see that his career after the war was rooted in the earlier period. The goal of this study is to remedy some of the deficiency noted above.

The few works which deal at all with the earlier portion of Zaghlul's career are concerned with subjects other than his work and they rely on Zaghlul's Egyptian biographer, Abbas Mahmud al-Aqqad, for their information about Saad's earlier career. Al-Aqqad described Zaghlul as a man who had no place in the Nationalist movement led by Mustapha Kamel who was oriented to the Ottoman Sultan and supported by the French. The biographer claimed that because Zaghlul had seen the Arabist movement fail, served a term in prison in its wake, and had realized the impotence of Turkey in the face of European power as well as the irresolution of France, Zaghlul had, therefore, concluded that
no good could come from militancy or dependence on outside support. Instead, said al-Aqqad, Zaghlul worked to prepare his country for independence in other ways.\(^3\)

As a result of al-Aqqad's analysis, Zaghlul has been treated simply as a moderate Nationalist who believed in Egypt's connection with Britain and in British attempts to reform Egypt. However, closer study of Zaghlul's career prior to 1919 reveals that he was more than this. Al-Aqqad's analysis may serve to explain why Zaghlul led no movements for a violent break with Britain, either then or later, but it does not take into account the increasing militancy displayed by Zaghlul in his career, especially after 1908. Neither does it account for Zaghlul's emergence as the most popular figure in Egypt as he became more closely identified, by the British and by the Egyptians, with extreme Nationalism. Zaghlul never called for a violent break and attempted always to work within the political system to reach his goals, but as this study will show, a number of Englishmen were wary of him throughout his career, and some of them voiced their fears that he would emerge as the popular leader of Egyptian Nationalism a number of years before it actually happened. Some of them also expressed their feelings that the uncomfortable position of the British Occupation between the years 1906-1910 were set in motion by Cromer's actions, especially the appointment of Saad Zaghlul to the Egyptian Cabinet. Thus, it would seem that Zaghlul was more than just a moderate Nationalist who believed in the British presence in Egypt, and that a new view of him is in order.
Footnotes - Introduction

1 Mahmud Y. Zayid, Egypt's Struggle for Independence (Beirut: Khayatz, 1965), p. 79.

2 Abbas Mahmud al-Aqqad, Saad Zaghlul: sirah wa tahliyyah (Cairo: Matbaa Hajazi, 1936).

CHAPTER I
FROM VILLAGE TO CABINET

Saad Zaghlul was born on June 1, 1859, in the village of Abyana located near the Rosetta Branch of the Nile in Gharbiyya Province. He was the elder surviving son of Shaykh Ibrahim Zaghlul and his second wife, Miriam, an older brother having died in infancy. In addition to Saad, there was an older sister, Sittuhum, and a younger brother, Fathi, who would also leave his mark on Egyptian history but for reasons different from his brother's.

Although the future leader of the Egyptian Wafd Party was of fellahaen or peasant extraction, his family was by no means a poor or an unimportant one in its locality. The Zaghlul family probably emigrated to the rich Delta of Egypt sometime around the middle of the eighteenth century. From where it came or for what reason it came to Abyana is not known, but by the middle of the nineteenth century the Zaghlul family was one of the notable families of the area in terms of prestige and land ownership. One of Saad's relatives, Shaykh Ahmad Zaghlul who became mayor of the village, is known to have bought 230 feddans (1 feddan = 1.038 acres) of land for 500 bintos in one payment. Saad's father, Shaykh Ibrahim, was noted among the local people for his wealth because he owned over 200 feddans of land as well as a
large house. Aside from this wealth, Ibrahim also had the prestige of being the leader of the village shaykhs.

Shaykh Ibrahim died when Saad was still quite young and it fell to his mother to educate him and Fathi. She was aided in this task by Shanawi Zaghlul, the boys' half-brother. Shanawi was the son of another of Shaykh Ibrahim's wives and an uncle as well by marriage to a sister of Miriam. Following what was the custom among many families at that time, Shanawi and Miriam set the elder son, Saad, on the path to an al-Azhar education where he was supposed to imbibe all the traditional Islamic studies and become a shaykh like his father and grandfather before him. In preparation for al-Azhar, Saad at the age of five began to study reading, writing, and memorization of the Koran at the village maktab or mosque school. In 1870, Shanawi was appointed to a government position at the nearby town of Dusuq, and he took Saad with him so that the boy could study recitation of the Koran from a famous reciter at Dusuq's main mosque. Saad spent three years there; then he came to Cairo and enrolled at al-Azhar in 1873. Here he displayed a sense of independence, which the British would note in the future, by taking lodgings outside the area usually inhabited by al-Azhar students.

The six years which Saad spent at the Azhar were very formative ones; for, in addition to the traditional Islamic training he received from the university, he came into contact with the growing national movement for political and social reform. During these same years, he met two of the leaders of that movement—Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Mohammad Abduh. Saad was greatly influenced by both of them.
Al-Afghani came to Cairo in 1871 after having been expelled from Istanbul, Turkey. He took a house near al-Azhar where he soon attracted a group of young men, mainly from the university. In an era of European intervention into the affairs of Muslim countries, al-Afghani preached that Muslims should have a better understanding of their religion and live by its principles, thus creating a strength based on unity among the Islamic peoples. To this end he lectured his followers on his views of theology, jurisprudence, philosophy, and mysticism. He also taught that dynastic interests should not be permitted to stand in the way of the unity which he espoused and that a ruler's powers should be limited by a constitution. For the propagation of his ideas, al-Afghani encouraged his students to write and to establish newspapers, but in a revitalized Arabic freed from the vagueness caused by excessive use of rhetorical flourishes which had been a weakness of Arabic for centuries. Abduh and Zaghlul met for the first time at al-Afghani's house and became among the foremost of his students.

The appeal of Afghani's message to young Egyptians such as these two can be seen as stemming from the activities of Khedive Ismail who ruled Egypt from 1863 to 1879. Egypt was still nominally a part of the Ottoman Empire and Ismail hoped to break that tie. To glorify himself and to win support at home, he tried to create an expanded, modern, and Europeanized Egypt. In the attempt to realize his goal, Ismail borrowed money from European banking houses at ruinous rates of interest—often 20 percent. While much of this money was spent in projects which did benefit Egypt such as railroads, schools, and a national
library, much was also spent on an expensive and unsuccessful war in
the Sudan as well as numerous agricultural and industrial schemes which
failed to yield income enough to pay the interest on the debts incurred
in undertaking them. To make up the difference, Ismail placed heavy
burdens of taxation upon the peasants which left them suffering and him
unpopular.

So acute were Egypt's financial problems that in the autumn of
1875 the Khedive sold the Egyptian holdings of Suez Canal stock to
England for four million pounds to pay the next installment on the in-
terest of his debts. The next year, 1876, he invited the European
Powers to help him untangle his financial snare. As a result, the
Caisse de la Dette Publique was established composed of four commis-
sioners appointed by the chief bondholding countries—Britain, France,
Austria, and Italy—to represent the bondholders. In addition Ismail
appointed two controllers, one British and one French, to oversee state
revenues and expenditures. In 1879, he quarreled with the controllers
and was deposed by his Turkish sovereign, Sultan Abdul Hamid II, who
was acting under pressure from the Powers.

Ismail's successor, Tawfiq, exacerbated the feelings of the re-
formers by proving hostile to their hopes for a constitution and ame-
nable to foreign interference. Between 1879 and 1882, the reformers
coalesced into a single nationalist movement under the leadership of
Colonel Ahmad Arabi who in 1882 became Minister of War and "virtual
head of the government." France, as the representative of the major
bondholders, and Britain, as the chief user of the Suez Canal, re-
garded this state of affairs as a serious threat to their interests.
and an Anglo-French fleet was dispatched to Alexandria. However, the French withdrew when the British decided to bombard the city. The Khedive sought the protection of the admiral commanding the British fleet and was declared a traitor by Arabi. Tawfiq responded by dismissing Arabi from office and declaring him "a mutineer and an outlaw." The British were empowered in the name of the Khedive to quell what was termed the Arabi Revolt. Troops were landed and the rebellion was broken with Arabi's defeat at the Battle of Tal al-Kabir in September, 1882. The occupation of Egypt by Britain had begun. One of those who played a prominent role in the events which culminated in the Arabi Revolt and the British Occupation was Mohammad Abduh who, along with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, was important in Zaghlul's formation as a nationalist. In time, Saad was identified by the British as a disciple of Abduh and, on this basis, was tapped by Cromer to be a minister in the Egyptian government.

As was noted above, Mohammad Abduh and Saad Zaghlul first met at al-Afghani's house and were among the foremost of his students. But Abduh, ten years older than Saad, graduated from al-Azhar in 1877 and began a dual career as a teacher at the university and as a writer of articles reflecting al-Afghani's political views for the newspaper, al-Ahram. In 1879 the new Khedive, Tawfiq, expelled al-Afghani from Egypt and banished Abduh to his village—the latter perhaps for his articles. The next year, however, although it is not clear as to why, the Government invited Abduh to enter its service as chief editor of the official gazette of the Egyptian Government, al-Waqai al-Misriyyah. He enlisted the aid of several former students of
al-Afghani, among them Saad Zaghlul who entered Government service on October 5, 1880, after leaving al-Azhar without obtaining his degree. With the help of these young men, Abduh made the official gazette more than just a sheet for reporting Government decrees and changes in personnel. For the next two years, "he played an important part in forming public opinion, by a series of articles on the social and political order, and in particular on national education." When Arabi emerged to the forefront as the nationalist leader, Abduh, after an initial period of distrust, threw his support behind the colonel and helped to organize the resistance to the invasion. Zaghlul, in the meantime, was shifted in May, 1882, to the Ministry of the Interior as an aide, and then to the Governate of Giza as an overseer in the Legal Department. Nevertheless, when the Arabi Revolt broke out, he took part in it, but evidently in a speaking and not a fighting role.

With the crushing of the Arabi Revolt, the leaders, Abduh among them, were tried and exiled. Saad himself was dismissed from his job in the Governate of Giza on October 2, 1882, but, although many of his friends were arrested, he was neither arrested nor asked to testify against his friends. Instead, he was deprived of his civil rights and precluded from working for the Government. He remained in touch with Abduh, who was in Beirut, and, in April, 1883, wrote his former chief that he had begun to represent some of the people who were being prosecuted for their activities in the Revolt. Although he would later become one of the leading lawyers in Egypt, this first sortie into the practice of law was interrupted in June, 1883, when he was implicated and arrested as a member of the Society of Revenge.
The goal of this Society was to get the British out of Egypt and to overthrow the existing system of government. Its membership was open to anyone, "Egyptian or foreign, Muslim or Christian," who paid five pounds and swore an oath of obedience. Another stipulation of membership was that the member must possess "a rifle, a pistol, and a dagger." In spite of the ominous threat of violence posed by its goals and membership stipulations, the Society in action was hardly a danger to either the British Occupation or the Egyptian Government. Its membership was probably never large, and it seems to have limited its activities to sending anonymous letters to various officials in the Government. The content of these letters is unknown, but the British authorities attributed little harm to them except that they had an upsetting quality about them. Edward Malet, the British Consul-General, wrote to Granville, the Foreign Secretary in England, saying:

A few anonymous letters have sufficed to make many people uneasy during the last month, and have given rise to the most fantastic exaggerations and alarms. Although no positive evidence with regard to the source of these letters has been obtained, various circumstances point to their being of no importance, and the reports of the responsible authorities show that the country is extremely quiet.

The same day Malet wrote to Granville, June 12, arrests began. The first newspaper reports alluded to those arrested as "natives of the lower classes," but as the arrests continued throughout the month, it became apparent that among the members were the son of a former Minister of the Government and a former director of the Naval College at Alexandria. Investigations further revealed that the "Anonymous Letter Writing Society," as it came to be called by the leading English
paper in Egypt, *The Egyptian Gazette*, had branches in Port Said and Alexandria, and had as its president a man "holding a high social position." The enquiry into the affairs of the Society failed, however, to learn much else when it began to meet with reticence to disclose any information on the part of many of those held. Reporting this difficulty, the *Gazette* noted: "...as many of the accused flatly deny having been connected with the Society, some difficulty is experienced as to the best course to be pursued for bringing their guilt home to them." 

Saad's participation in the Society remains unknown. He may have been among those who denied any connection with the organization. He was arrested with a number of others on June 20, but his release was ordered on the 26th for lack of evidence. Despite the order, he remained in Cairo's Zaptieh Prison until he was finally freed on bond on October 3, 1883. Years later, Wilfred Scawen Blunt, while commenting in his diaries on Zaghlul's recent appointment as Minister of Education, recalled: "I am glad to remember that it was due to my intervention with Cromer, and beyond Cromer with Gladstone, that I obtained his release from prison in 1883." Soon after writing these words, Blunt wrote an article on education in Egypt and mentioned that he had seen Saad in the Zaptieh Prison in September, 1883. However, a series of letters between Blunt, Cromer (then Sir Evelyn Baring), and other British and Egyptian officials cast doubt on both of Blunt's claims.

Wilfred Scawen Blunt was an English aristocrat and a minor poet married to the granddaughter of Lord Byron. No friend of imperialism,
he felt his mission in life was "that of pleading the cause of the backward nations of the world, and especially those of Asia and Africa, from their slavery to Europe." He was well acquainted with the Egyptian scene and was a friend of both Colonel Arabi and Mohammad Abduh. He may even have known Zaghlul in the early 1880's, but this is by no means clear; nor is there much information on later relations between these two.

In the late summer of 1883, Blunt passed through Cairo on his way to Ceylon to visit Arabi and other leaders of the Revolt residing in exile on the island. On October 1, 1883, Blunt wrote to Evelyn Baring, who had recently replaced Edward Malet as British Consul-General and chief official of the Occupation, that he had recently received a letter from a prisoner in the Zaptieh Prison who had been held there since his arrest three months before "on a charge originally of connection with a political plot." This prisoner, whom Blunt called Abdul Rajah Bey, was none other than the former director of the Naval College at Alexandria who was among those arrested for complicity in the Society of Revenge. Blunt went on to say that the prisoner had requested to see him and asked Baring to obtain him a pass to see the prisoner that day as he was leaving Cairo the next day. Baring refused Blunt permission saying that the matter rested with the Egyptian Government. But in a letter of the same date to Granville, Baring wrote: "Mr. Blunt is about to visit Colombo, and it would not have been desirable than an opportunity should have been afforded him of being the medium of communication between the exiles in Ceylon and any prisoners
confined for political offenses in Egypt." So far as is known, Blunt left Cairo the next day.

On October 8, Sherif Pasha, the Egyptian Prime Minister, sent Baring a letter which made it very clear that Blunt had been carefully kept under surveillance by agents of the Government. Sherif reported that Blunt, since his arrival in Cairo, had been communicating with the families of the rebels and some of the other people "compromised in the recent events." Learning that Abdul Rajah Bey was in prison, Sherif went on, Blunt went to the Zaptieh and asked to see the prisoner. This was the only reported visit of the Englishman to the prison, and the prison officials refused to allow him to visit the prisoner. Blunt "departed, abusing the guards and boasting that he would shortly return with an order from Her Majesty's Representative which would open all doors to him." The emptiness of that boast has already been seen. Sherif Pasha informed Baring that the Egyptian Government, afraid that Blunt's "words may raise hopes among the relations of the exiles and disturb the minds of those who have compromised themselves with the rebels," had decided to refuse to allow him to land in Egypt on his way back to England from Ceylon. Baring communicated this decision to Blunt and he did not land in Egypt.

Back in England by May, Blunt wrote Granville a letter blaming Baring for the Egyptian Government's decision not to allow him to land. He asked the Foreign Minister if the British government approved of Baring's attitude toward him or if it was going to support his demand to be admitted to Egypt. The government's answer was unequivocal. Blunt was informed "that the decision not to permit you to visit Egypt"
is one with which Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to inter­fere."23

While this correspondence is not a conclusive refutation of Blunt's claims, it makes them doubtful. Since both the authorities at the prison and Baring refused him permission to see the prisoner, Abdul Rajah Bey, there is little reason to believe he got into the prison to see Saad Zaghlul. Further correspondence shows that the British govern­ment supported their Consul-General's decision to refuse Blunt admis­sion to the prison and to communicate to Blunt the Egyptian Govern­ment's decision not to allow him to land in Egypt. Finally, Gran­ville's answer to the poet's letter asking support from Whitehall for his demand to be admitted to Egypt shows that he was not as influential as he later tried to establish. However, with or without Blunt's help, Zaghlul was released from the Zaptieh.

Soon after his release from prison, Saad began to work as a law­yer in the new national court system established by the British in January, 1884, as part of a program of reforms designed to make Egypt capable of self-government. Because there was a lack of trained per­sonnel, no formal legal training was required. Thus the ante-room of the Ministry of Justice was soon filled with large numbers of young men seeking employment in the new courts who were, like him, former em­ployees of the Government who had been dismissed from its service. In the course of the next few years, however, Zaghlul emerged from the crowd and became one of Egypt's outstanding lawyers. The key to his success was his eloquence in the courtroom which brought him both a wide-spread reputation and wealth.
In June, 1892, he was appointed a deputy judge in the court of appeal. He was the first advocate to be given such a position and the event was commemorated by a dinner given in his house by colleagues from both the Bench and the Bar. Heretofore the practice of advocacy had been held in low esteem in Egypt, but with his appointment to the Bench, advocacy came of age. The vice-president of the court, Ismail Sabri, noted at the dinner that Saad's nomination was "an indication that advocacy and the judiciary are two equal entities."  

Saad's success in his legal practice, and the reputation and the wealth it brought him, opened the way to social success as well. Sometimes in the 1880's, as far as can be determined, he was introduced into the social circles of the Turco-Circassian aristocracy of Egypt, and on February 6, 1896, he married a member of this class—Safiyya, a daughter of the pro-British Prime Minister of Egypt, Mustapha Fahmi. While Zaghlul was not the first Egyptian of fellaheen origin to rise so high socially, it was still not a common event in an era when the Turco-Circassian ruling element still called fellah Egyptians pis-fellah (dirty peasant).

His mentor in the world of Egyptian high society was Princess Nazli Fadl, a niece of the former Khedive, Ismail, and a cousin to the then-reigning Tawfiq. She disliked her cousin intensely and had supported the Arabi Revolt partly for this reason. When it failed, she gave her approval to the Occupation by becoming a whole-hearted admirer of the British. She loved politics and presided over one of the several political salons which arose in Egypt in the first few years after the Occupation. Saad was a frequent visitor to this salon after being
introduced into it around 1886 by Kassem Amin, one of his associates from his legal practice.25

The details of the relationship between Princess Nazli and Zaghlul are unknown, but it is well known that he was her lawyer and her protege, and there were rumors that he was also her lover. When they met he was still a lawyer and, as such, was considered "socially impossible." At her advice, he studied French and, according to Ronald Storrs, "generally rendered himself first ministrable and in the end papabile." She is also credited with having arranged his marriage to Mustapha Fahmi's daughter. However, Saad's relationship with the Princess and her salon provided more than just an opportunity for social betterment. It may also have provided him with the opportunity to meet Sir Evelyn Baring, the British Consul-General and head of the Occupation in Egypt, who sometimes attended Nazli's salon.26

The only account of such a meeting comes to us from an article published in the Egyptian magazine, Ruz al-Yusuf, soon after Saad's death in 1926.27 The article, of anonymous authorship, reported that Baring had told his good friend, Doctor Phillips, a well known English physician residing in Egypt, that Saad Zaghlul was the first Egyptian he had met who did not automatically agree with everything he said. Furthermore, Zaghlul, unlike many other Egyptians attending the salon, did not ask favors of the Consul-General and Baring had great respect for Zaghlul because of this. Although this story appeared in a popular magazine at a time when the nationalist leader was at the height of his glory, there is no reason to reject its credibility. It is certainly reasonable to assume that Zaghlul could have met Baring at the
salon since both men were welcome callers there, and, as other evidence seems to indicate, the portrait of the proud young man seeking no favors from the British official tallies with what Baring himself later had to say about Saad. The main problem with the story concerns the means of communication between the two men. Baring was known to have spoken little or no Arabic, while Zaghlul knew only Arabic until he began to study French in 1892. However, an interpreter could have been found in Harry Boyle, Baring's Oriental Secretary from 1885 until 1908, who knew Arabic well and who attended Nazli's salon along with his chief.28

The next meeting between Zaghlul and Baring took place in 1889 and concerned the return of Mohammed Abdüh from exile.

The sources concerning the pardon and return of Mohammed Abdüh from exile are few. Only the Shaykh's biographer and disciple, Rashid Rida gives any information as to Saad's role in this event, and it is unfortunately meager.

Rida related that a number of people had gone to Tawfiq seeking his pardon for Abdüh so that the former rebel could return to Egypt. Among the most prominent of these were Ghazi Ahmad Mukhtar Pasha, the Ottoman High Commissioner for Egypt, Princess Nazli Fadl, and Sir Evelyn Baring; none of whom knew Abdüh personally, but each had a high opinion of him. Of Zaghlul's part in the affair, Rida said only that his efforts were praiseworthy.29 This must be an understatement since Zaghlul, as the only one of these who had known Abdüh, probably acquainted the others with the merits of the exiled Shaykh and the desirability of his return to Egypt. Indeed, there is no doubt that Baring
desired his return, and the Khedive finally gave in. In informing the Foreign Office that Tawfiq had pardoned Abdüeh, the Consul-General added a confidential note saying:

I may mention...that Mohammed Abdou sic is one of the ablest representatives of the party to which he belonged, and possesses considerable influence in certain native quarters. It is very desirable for the Khedive to do all in his power to encourage men of this stamp to give him their support. I spoke to His Highness some time ago in this sense, and the present order is doubtless due to the adoption of suggestions I made on that occasion.30

In later years, he admitted that Tawfiq's adoption of his suggestions was more in the nature of Tawfiq's "acting under British pressure...

Baring's interest in Abdüeh's return was due to the uncomfortable situation in which the British Occupation found itself in 1888-1889. The Occupation, when undertaken, had not been meant to be permanent, but the dangers posed by international affairs as well as internal Egyptian affairs made a permanent British presence in Egypt seem more desirable. The British had occupied Egypt "with no thought beyond rescuing the Egyptian monarch from the nationalists, restoring his authority, effecting rapid reforms in the administration, and then retiring from Egyptian political life."32 By 1889, the British had accomplished a good deal toward restoring Egypt's solvency, security, and stability, and Baring was afraid that a British evacuation would be followed by a relapse into the chaotic conditions of 1882. He complained to Salisbury that the ruling classes in Egypt were composed of foreigners—mainly Turks, Armenians, etc.—who little understood the local political problems and who were, moreover, despised by the local
populace to a greater extent than ever before. As for the Khedive, Baring claimed that he was unpopular, and that Riaz, the Prime Minister, was so lacking in judgment that, without the British presence, there would be a revolution in Egypt in six months. The dangers of revolution were also apparent to the Khedive, and Abdühh was brought back from exile to reinvigorate a movement for political reforms and intellectual activity.\(^{33}\)

When Abdühh returned to Egypt, he wanted to go back to teaching, but Tawfiq was still distrustful of the former rebel and refused to permit this. Instead he appointed the Shaykh as a judge in the courts at Benha, a town near Cairo. Abdühh brought his spirit of reform with him to the courts and became known for his unorthodox opinions in which his first concern was always the welfare of society. He ignored the letter of the law in favor of equity and justice and never passed up the opportunity to effect a reconciliation rather than render a verdict believing that "disturbed hearts and wounded souls drift apart once a verdict is passed. Reconciliation, on the other hand, opens the door for amicable settling of differences within the family."\(^{34}\)

Another reform to which Abdühh addressed himself, with the connivance of Wilfred Blunt who had been allowed to return to Egypt in 1888, was the substitution of a fellah Ministry for the usual Turco-Circassian one. Blunt wrote that the suggestion for this change emanated from Abdühh in the early spring of 1891. Baring had admitted to Blunt that Riaz was an obstruction, and the Consul-General said that he was willing to meet any of the men of the fellah class whom Blunt suggested. Sometime in March, 1891, Blunt and Abdühh drew up a list of
men of the fellah party who might make up a Reform Ministry. Among those on the list were Abdus and Saad Zaghlul, but Blunt thought that another of those listed, Hassan Pasha Sherii, "politically, was of far greater weight than any of them..." The plan came to naught, however, for Baring's comment on it was: "I do not think there is a ghost of a chance of the Khedive forming a fellah Ministry."35

Whether or not the Khedive would consent to such a Ministry, Baring himself seems to have been unimpressed with the men on the list. Blunt went to see Baring again on April 4. In the course of their conversation, Baring commented that it was difficult to get honest and capable men to govern Egypt. Referring to the men whom Blunt and Abdus had listed, the Consul-General said that he knew most of them, except Hassan Sherii, but that Egyptians were "all alike." Over a year later, in September, 1892, Blunt was told by Frank Villiers—the private secretary to the current Foreign Secretary, Lord Rosebery—that Baring had informed the Foreign Office of the idea of a fellah Ministry, but was still complaining that he could not get capable men. There is no known reason why Baring reacted the way he did toward the men listed by Blunt and Abdus in 1891, and, in spite of this reaction, as Blunt noted in his Diaries, Baring appointed Zaghlul Minister of Education fifteen years later, and declared Mohammed Abdus as the "chief hope of Liberal Islam in Egypt."36

The catalyst for Baring's change of attitude toward Abdus and Zaghlul was Abbas Hilmi who succeeded to the Khedival throne as Abbas II after Tawfiq's death in January, 1892. The new Khedive was only eighteen at the time of his accession, and was called back to Egypt
from Vienna where he was completing his education at the Theresianium. Valentine Chirol of the London Times said that Tawfiq's choice of a site for his son's education was not a happy one, "for the reactionary and militarist atmosphere of the Austrian capital tended to encourage a naturally self-willed disposition." Within a year of the new Khedive's accession, Cromer (Baring had been elevated to the Peerage in March, 1892, as Baron Cromer) informed Lord Rosebery that the young ruler was evidently going to give a great deal of trouble. This trouble assumed the form of a power struggle between the British Agency and the Khedive, a rivalry which continued over a number of years.

Abbas' endeavor to become the de facto ruler of Egypt attracted other factions who also wished to be rid of the British. One of these groups was led by Shaykh Ali Yusuf, whose newspaper, al-Muqaddus, was founded in 1889 and espoused a pan-Islamic line. Another, and eventually more important group, was led by the Franco-ophile Mustapha Kamel who founded the newspaper, al-Lawi, in 1899 which called for a constitutional form of government. Both groups supported the Khedive and he them, but with the disparity of political aims held by all of them, it was inevitable that quarrels should arise. The Khedive, having been schooled in despotic Austria, had no real enthusiasm for pan-Islamism and the acknowledgement it entailed of the Ottoman Sultan's political and religious authority, nor had he any ardor for the constitutionalism of Mustapha Kamel. Cromer, feeling that the agricultural population, the Egyptian and foreign merchant, and commercial interests were content with the political stability and healthy economic climate
accomplished under British rule, treated both pan-Islamism and constitutionalism with contempt. He believed on the one hand that Egyptian nationalism, as expressed in the Arabi Revolt, was basically anti-Turkish, and pan-Islamism, therefore, had no real appeal to the Egyptians. On the other hand, he was convinced that the Egyptians were incapable of ruling themselves under a constitutional or any other system and that the majority of Egyptians preferred the continuation of Britain's presence.39

Sometimes during the period of this struggle for power between Cromer and the Khedive, Mohammed Abduh returned to Cairo from Benha. He became a frequent visitor to the salon of Princess Nazli and gathered around him a group composed of some of his former students such as Saad Zaghlul and men whom he had perhaps met for the first time at the salon such as Saad's brother, Fathi, and Kassem Amin. This group, led by the Shaykh, came to be known for their political moderation and their desire "to reform the various Muslim institutions without shaking the main pillars on which the faith of Islam rests." Cromer questioned whether the Shaykh and his group would ever be successful, but because they were repelled both by pan-Islamism and by Abbas' predeliction for absolutism, and because they distrusted Mustapha Kamel since he flirted with both, the Consul-General and his secretary, Harry Boyle, discerned in them a moderate nationalism which could be used to offset what they perceived to be the fanatical and extreme nationalism of Mustapha Kamel and his allies. In 1906, the British were forced to turn to the Abduh group as the necessary "counterpoise to the Pan-Islamists...."40
With the support which the Occupation seemed to enjoy from the agricultural masses of Egypt and the commercial groups, the activities of Mustapha Kamel and the extreme nationalists had presented no serious problem before 1906. However, in that year, three events occurred which in their entirety shook the British Occupation and rendered Cromer's position insecure. The first of these was the election of a Liberal Administration in the British General Elections of January, 1906. The Liberals seemed to be less likely to be sympathetic to Cromer's contempt for nationalist aspirations in Egypt, but they supported Cromer's demand for Ottoman troops to be recalled by the Sultan after they had crossed the settled Ottoman-Egyptian boundary in the direction of the Suez Canal in March, 1906. The Turks withdrew, but this second of the three incidents served to show the British that the Occupation was unpopular with the Egyptians many of whom supported their Sultan - Caliph against the Christian British occupiers. The third incident caused an explosion of feeling in England against Cromer's policies and provided Egyptian nationalism a sympathetic ear among Englishmen in and out of Parliament.\footnote{41}

This third event was the famous Denshwwai incident which occurred in June, 1906. A detachment of British troops, enroute to Alexandria from Cairo, encamped outside the village of Denshwwai in the Delta. A party of British officers went pigeon hunting and became embroiled with the villagers who probably felt the pigeons were village property. Pigeon is popular eating in Egypt and every village has a tower or two especially for pigeons to roost in. In the ensuing fracas, the officers were knocked around, and one of the officers died. Although
this officer had received a blow on the head, the major cause of his death was determined to be sunstroke. Under a law promulgated in 1895 providing for the establishment of Special Tribunals to deal with crimes committed against members of the Army of Occupation, four villagers were hanged, and a number received fifty lashes. The sentences were carried out in public in front of the villagers of Denshwai the day after they were pronounced even though public executions had been stopped two years before. 42

When the news of the sentences reached England, a storm of protest and criticism of Cromer's regime broke out in the Press and in Parliament. Even Sir Edward Grey, the new Foreign Secretary who outwardly supported the sentences, privately pronounced them as severe and, a few years later, freed those of the villagers who had received prison sentences. In the meantime, the furor which Denshwai aroused in England encouraged the nationalists in Egypt. In September, Cromer informed Grey that the situation was generally disquieting thanks to Pan-Islamism which "has quickened into activity all those elements of discord, which to close observers are well known to exist, but which have heretofore remained comparatively dormant." He painted a bleak picture saying that Pan-Islamism meant a combination of all Muslims to resist and defy the Christian Powers. In Egypt, it would also mean a recrudescence of racial and religious animosity. He held out hope, however, saying that there also existed in Egypt a bona fide national movement—a "national movement in its healthy form"—which the British should endeavor to rally to their side as a counter to the other.
He was referring to the Abduh group (Abduh himself died in 1905) who "constitute the only class from whom the European reformers can expect the least assistance." Cromer said that this group, always a small body which stood in the background, was showing greater activity now because it was disgusted and alarmed at the violence and folly of the Pan-Islamists, and that many of the late Shaykh's followers were convinced that "their aims can best be attained by co-operation with the English, whose interference in Egyptian affairs has, they fully admit, exercised a most beneficial effect." He was, therefore, inclined to bring a member of this group into the Egyptian Cabinet at an early opportunity, but he made it clear that such a move was an experiment. On October 29, 1906, the appointment of Saad Zaghlul as Minister of Education was published in the local Egyptian newspapers.

Cromer wrote to Grey on November 2, that, because of the growing interest of the Egyptian public in educational matters, it was thought advisable to raise education to the level of a separate Ministry (it had been handled under the Ministry of Public Works in the past), and entrust it to the hands of a "Minister carefully selected and appointed ad hoc." He informed the Foreign Secretary that the appointment was well received in the local papers, including those which were hostile to the occupation, and that, in his opinion, the move had "obliterated in the minds of the Egyptian the recollection of the Denshawai incident," and that they now recognized the sincerity of the British "to advance the native element whenever possible." He sympathized with the desire of educated Egyptians to see higher offices filled with men of true Egyptian origin rather than with Turco-Circassians, but he pointed
out that such native leadership as existed did not extend far beyond the members of the Mohammad Abdulh group of which, he observed, Zaghlul was a "leading representative."44

It is puzzling that Cromer named Saad Zaghlul as a leading representative of the Abduh group which the Consul-General had described in September, 1906, as "the only class from whom the European reformers can expect the least assistance." A quick glance at Zaghlul activities between 1889 and 1906 would seem to suggest that he was hardly a likely candidate to assist the British in any way.

There is no doubt that he participated with his old teacher and the group of reformers gathered round him in helping to execute some of the reforms in which the group was interested—particularly in education and justice. Saad was active in the establishment, and a lifelong member, of the still-existent Muslim Benevolent Society which Mohammed Abduh founded in 1892 to provide for the education of the poor in schools set up by the Society. Zaghlul was also an original financial contributor to the scheme for establishing the National (now Cairo) University in 1906 and was vice-president of the Organizing Committee—a position he had to resign when he became Minister of Education. As Minister, he was responsible for the establishment of the School of Cadis (judges in Islamic law courts) which was founded to provide a wider knowledge of Islamic law and Arabic, and to instill greater integrity into the judges. This School was a project which had been of great interest to Mohammed Abduh and which he had failed to accomplish in his lifetime due to opposition from the religious conservatives and the Khedive who supported them. As a judge, Zaghlul
used the bench as an instrument for reforming the administrative machinery. He criticized police and government officials who misused their power by saying that public security suffered from unbridled behavior on the part of those charged with securing the public welfare. In such judgments, he showed himself to be a true disciple of Mohammed Abduh.45

There was, however, another side to Zaghlul's career in this period which was decidedly anti-British and not in keeping with the British portrayal of the Abduh group as standing in the background. He is known to have encouraged and helped Shaykh Ali Yusuf to found his anti-British newspaper, al-Ikhayyad, in 1889, and in 1891 when Ali Yusuf disagreed with his partner, Saad loaned him the money to take over full ownership of the paper.46 As a judge, he was warned by Sir John Scott, the Judicial Adviser, for occupying himself with politics and throughout his judicial career he wrote anonymous articles for the Arabic newspapers—a Press, which with few exceptions, was anti-Occupation.47 When Denshawai occurred, he showed his anger toward the British in a letter to his friend, Abdullah Abaza, in which he said that the event "disclosed the injustice of the unjust, the vileness of the vile, and the deceit of the cunning."48 Cromer was not unaware of his new Minister's anti-British tendencies and admitted as much to Grey when he informed him that Zaghlul had come into office "somewhat of an Anglophobe...."49 Why then did Cromer select this man for a Ministry?

The answer may well lie in those activities of Zaghlul which dealt with educational matters. Education was a sore point with the British in Egypt for their record in this field was one of neglect.
Many Egyptians accused Cromer of having shunned education so that he could continue claiming that Egypt was incapable of self-government. Indeed, the British showed suspicion of the scheme for a national university because Mustapha Kamel was reported to have suggested its founding a few days before the Organizing Committee was established, and The Egyptian Gazette, in announcing its support for the scheme, said that there had been fear of Pan-Islamism being involved. The British seemed to suspect all moves toward the establishment of educational institutions which were outside governmental control. The Muslim Benevolent Society had been attacked by Cromer in March, 1895, as a secret society whose goal was to promulgate Pan-Islamic views and to drive the British out of Egypt. Although this particular change proved to be totally unfounded, it and the fears expressed about the National University scheme reflected British nervousness about such matters. The Egyptian Standard, the English-language edition of Mustapha Kamel's al-Lewa, later wrote that Cromer had appointed Saad Zaghlul to the Ministry of Education to remove his leadership from the National University scheme because, under his direction, the movement was going well and promised to be successful. Without Zaghlul's direction, the Standard admitted, subscriptions trickled in slowly. Cromer himself seems to have given credence to this later interpretation when he wrote a letter to Grey soon after Zaghlul's appointment in which he intimated the new Minister's qualities of leadership. Cromer wrote:

By the force of circumstances rather than from any definite design or intention, the present Ministers have unquestionably drifted rather into the
position of cyphers. The new man's, by all accounts, not likely to be a cypher. It remains to be seen whether he will be wise enough—as I hope and believe will be the case—to co-operate, or whether he will adapt the foolish advice given him by the opposition press, to resist English opinions merely in order to show that he is not a dummy. To put the matter in a form which you will readily understand. I have brought an Egyptian John Burns into the Cabinet. It will be curious to watch the results.
Footnotes - Chapter I


2 LaSheen, pp. 21-25.


4 Hourani, p. 133.


6 Hourani, p. 133.

7 Ibid.


9 Rashid Rida, Tarikh al-Ustadh al-Imam Shaykh Mohammad Abduh, I, 1082, quoted in LaSheen, pp. 32-33.

10 Ahmad Shafeeq, Mudhakarat fi nefs qarn I (Cairo: Matbaa Misr, 1934), p. 212.

11 Blue Books (Egypt No. 22, 1883), Malet to Granville, June 12, 1883, p. 47.

12 The Egyptian Gazette, June 15, 1883, p. 2.

13 The Egyptian Gazette, June 30, 1883, p. 2.

14 Shafeeq, p. 212; LaSheen, p. 33.

16 The Egyptian Standard, March 11, 1907, p. 1.


18 Blunt's grandson, the Earl of Lytton, seemed to suggest that there was a close relationship between the two when he wrote that the first wreath to reach his grandfather's graveside after Blunt's death in 1922 came from Saad Zaghlul. The Earl of Lytton, Wilfred Scawen Blunt (London: Macdonald, 1961), p. 96.

19 Official Reports on Egypt and the Soudan (Egypt, No. 27, 1884), "Correspondence Respecting Mr. Wilfred Blunt," Blunt to Baring, October 1, 1883, p. 1.

20 Ibid., Baring to Granville, October 1, 1883, p. 2.

21 Ibid., Sherif Pasha to Baring, October 8, 1883, pp. 3-4.

22 Ibid., Blunt to Granville, May 1, 1884, pp. 8-10.


29 Rida, I, p. 418.


32. al-Sayyid, p. 28.

33. Marlowe, p. 141; Rida, I, p. 418.


35. Blunt, pp. 48-49.

36. Ibid., pp. 49, 74.


39. Ibid., pp. 258-261.

40. Memorandum by Lord Cromer on the Present Situation in Egypt, FO 371/68/600-606; Marlowe, p. 262.

41. Marlowe, pp. 262-265.

42. Ibid., p. 265; al-Sayyid, pp. 171-172.

43. Memorandum by Lord Cromer on the Present Situation in Egypt, FO 371/68/600-606.

44. Cromer to Grey, November 2, 1906, FO 371/68/287-289.

45. Ahmed, p. 39; The Egyptian Gazette, October 6, 1906, p. 3; LaSheen, p. 41; Ahmed, pp. 53-54.


50 al-Sayyid, p. 176.

51 The Egyptian Gazette, October 2, 1906, p. 3.

52 al-Sayyid, pp. 116-117.


54 John Elliot Burns was a labor leader and agitator who was taken into the 1906 Liberal Cabinet. L. G. Wickham Legg and E. T. Williams (ed.), Dictionary of National Biography, Supplement 1941-1950 (London: Oxford University Press, 1959).

55 Cromer to Grey, October 27, 1906, Cromer Papers, FO 633/13, pt. 2/3-5.
CHAPTER II
RUPTURE WITH THE NATIONALISTS

Zaghlul took up his duties as Minister of Education on October 30, 1904, and, in accordance with his new status, was awarded the title of Pasha by the Khedive. Humphrey Bowman, one of the British school inspectors, described the new Minister's attitude as an active one—touring provinces, visiting schools, receiving all inspectors' reports (he insisted they be submitted in Arabic) and reading them himself. His first few weeks in office seemed to please almost everybody. Cromer reported to Grey that Zaghlul's appointment had been well-received by the Egyptians and that "even the most hostile of native papers join in approbation of the measure...."

The Nationalists were indeed happy with Saad's first activities because he seemed to be following their admonition to be more than a do-nothing Minister. Upon the announcement of his appointment, al-Moqyyad had best expressed the meaning which Egypt put on this action when it wrote:

Up to the present all power has fallen upon the English advisers. But now we have been wakened with a start. A loud bang has aroused us from our torpor; it concerns a new combination in our Ministry. This combination instills in us new hope, for we can only attribute it to the desire of the Sovereign and his Advisers to render to the Ministers a certain measure of their old powers.

35
al-Lewa more aggressively advised the new Minister to "at once seize the opportunity to prove his energy and talent."\(^5\) Within two months of Zaghlul's assumption of office there were rumors of strained relations between him and Douglas Dunlop, the stern Scotsman who had ruled the Ministry as the Adviser.\(^6\)

One need not seek far to find the reasons for problems between the two men. Even enemies of Egyptian nationalism such as Lord Lloyd have described Dunlop as "a dour Scot, who, if he possessed the qualities of his race was certainly not free from its defects."\(^7\) Moreover, he was known for his unsympathetic attitude toward Egyptians and Arabic. Concerning the latter, he is reported to have said that he would have no Englishman serving under him who knew Arabic as it "would only give them romantic ideas about the natives and they would waste their time explaining what they taught to the natives in Arabic instead of making them learn English."\(^8\) His strong bureaucratic tendencies were portrayed by Humphrey Bowman who wrote that in Dunlop's administration of the Ministry "originality and initiative on the part of the British staff were not encouraged; if an Egyptian dared to show them he was regarded with positive disfavour."\(^9\) It must also be added that Dunlop had been connected with the Ministry of Education since 1889 and had been Departmental Adviser before education was raised to the level of a Ministry.\(^10\) Little wonder then that there were rumors of strained relations between the Minister and the Adviser when Mustapha Kamel told Wilfred Blunt that Zaghlul had begun well at the Ministry "insisting that all papers should be brought to him, not to Dunlop..."
examiners in Arabic should know Arabic, and that Dunlop should come to him on business, not he to Dunlop.\textsuperscript{11}

If the Nationalists were pleased with Saad's strong-minded approach to Dunlop, the British were equally pleased when, upon completing one of his inspection tours, the new Minister granted an interview to al-Ahram and pronounced his satisfaction with the progress of education in Egypt. The Gazette was so pleased that it fully quoted his views. After enumerating all the schools he had visited, Saad noted that he found "the organization to be perfect and the methods of instruction easily followed by the pupils." He mentioned that the headmasters and professors did their best for their students, and that he was sorry the public did not appreciate their work more. In summation he said:

The general condition of affairs is flourishing and the schools are making great strides on the path of progress.... I shall be delighted if those who are interested in education in this country, members of the Press, and all who criticize instruction here and its methods, those whose criticism is based upon the necessary experience and knowledge, would be good enough to visit the government schools so that their critiques, if they have any, may rest upon a solid basis.

The Gazette commented on these remarks by stating that "some of our contemporaries were inclined to hint that Saad Pasha had intended to curse the Ministry. He has obviously remained to bless."\textsuperscript{12} If the Nationalists disagreed with the Minister's remarks on the state of education in Egypt, they were not printed.

The hopes which the Nationalists had taken at the appointment of the new Minister for an administration more responsive to their demands
were dashed on March 3, 1907. The General Assembly had met for its bi­
nannual session and Shaykh Ali Yusuf had proposed that all instruction in
Government schools be given in Arabic. At the time, instruction in the
lower primary schools and technical schools was in Arabic while the
higher primary schools, secondary schools and professional colleges of­
ered instruction through the medium of English or French except for
courses in the Arabic language and Islamic Law.13

Zaghlul explained to the members of the Assembly that he was in
sympathy with the proposal, but that it was impossible to accomplish
at the moment. The present system of instruction had grown out of what
the people themselves wanted. The Government had not initiated the use
of European languages as the linguistic basis of instruction, but the
parents of school children had wanted their children to learn foreign
languages so that they could benefit from European civilization and be
of use to their country. The people had simply sent their children to
foreign schools where instruction was in a foreign language rather than
to Government schools where the instruction was in Arabic. The Govern­
ment, its schools deserted, had adopted the use of foreign languages
in its schools, not only to compete with the foreign schools, but also
because it was a necessity if Egyptians were to compete for jobs with
the foreigners who had flocked into Egypt after the Occupation as well
as with those Egyptians educated in foreign schools.

He pointed out that too many students in Government schools were
still considered weak in their knowledge of foreign languages and told
of an official who complained to him that there had been twenty-four
vacancies in a governmental department which had to be filled with
foreigners because the Egyptian candidates did not have enough fluency in English or French to qualify for these jobs. He also noted that the Muslim Benevolent Society, of which he was a founder, had undertaken in its schools to offer no foreign languages, but that the Society too had changed its mind and introduced the teaching of foreign languages into the school curriculums.

If, he went on, the proposed changes were actually made, it would be impossible for pupils educated under this new system to find employment in the numerous jobs in Egypt which required linguistic proficiency such as the customs, the Post Office, the courts, banks and joint-stock companies. Moreover, the material difficulties involved in the proposed changes would prevent their accomplishment. There were not enough trained teachers capable of teaching the courses in Arabic at the present time. He did note, however, that steps were being taken to correct this deficiency in preparation for the day when the proposal of the Assembly could be carried out. He asked the Assembly not to place obstacles in his way for then the purpose for which he and the Assembly were striving could not be attained. The Assembly's answer to his argument against accepting the proposal at this time and his plea for cooperation was to pass it with only five dissenting votes.  

Cromer reported the incident to Grey saying that Zaghlul had made an excellent speech pointing out the objections to the proposal but that the pressure exerted by the Khedive and the fear inspired by the newspapers were "too strong to overcome." Cromer said, however, that he thought something could be done to meet the views of the Assembly vis-à-vis the use of Arabic in teaching in the primary schools, but he
agreed with Zaghlul that another proposal of the Assembly calling for
all regulations respecting public education to be submitted to the
other, smaller legislative body, the Legislative Council, should be
opposed on the grounds that it would deal a serious check to the edu-
cational progress of the country. 15

Cromer's reports to the Foreign Office in England over the meet­
ing of the Assembly revealed that Saad's speech marked a change in his
own attitudes toward the education question in Egypt, and also that he
had begun experiencing some difficulties with criticisms from differ­
ent quarters. Cromer wrote:

I may mention that the newly appointed Minister of
Education, Saad Pasha Zaghlul, who is certainly,
not only by far the most able, but also by far the
strongest Egyptian with whom I have yet had to deal,
and who came into office as a strong patriotic re­
former and somewhat of an Anglophobe, has entirely
changed his views. One of his strong points was this
very question of teaching the Arabic language, as to
which, now that he has thoroughly grasped the argu­
ments, he has entirely come round, and sees the very
great difficulties of the question and the objections
of making any radical reform. He is maddened by the
opposition of the Khedive, the Legislative Council,
etc., against his reform proposals, and half of my
time is taken up in mitigating his impatience. I
should not be at all surprised if, before long, he
resigned. He has already talked of doing so....
This particular incident is, I think, sufficient to
give you some idea of the state of things here, and
of the very great difficulties of associating Egyp­
tian reformers with the work of reform in a manner
which will at all conciliate the ultra-opposition.
The fact of the matter is that all the best men in
the country are with us, but very few of them have,
like Saad, the courage to say so. 16
Zaghlul's speech to the Assembly aroused the anger of Nationalists such as Mustapha Kamel whose newspaper al-Lewa accused Saad of supporting British proposals to weaken the Arabic language. The point really at issue was that Dunlop had said that Arabic was unsuited as a medium for instruction in sciences because of its poverty in technical phraseology and the complexity and rigidity of its grammar. Therefore students were forced not only to study sciences in English or French, but to write their examinations in these subjects in foreign languages as well. Kamel pointed out that Japan, England, France, Italy, and Russia taught sciences in their native languages while an official in the Ministry of Education wrote an anonymous letter to al-Lewa noting that the present Minister of Education had learned French late in life after studying about law and sciences in Arabic and had not been precluded from attaining his high station. This official further argued that if foreign languages were offered as a course of study rather than as the medium of instruction, Egyptians, like the Minister, would still learn a foreign language and be able to enter into various jobs which the Minister had enumerated in his speech as requiring linguistic abilities.

The bitterness which the Nationalists felt toward Zaghlul's speech was expressed by Mustapha Kamel who wrote: "When Lord Cromer demanded the nomination of Saad Pasha Zaghlul as Minister of Public Instruction, a movement of surprise and hope was produced in Egypt.... Many believed in the good intentions of Saad Pasha and even in the transformation of Lord Cromer." He went on to say that he had told
Saad in the pages of al-Lewa that he must either be a real minister able to carry out a national program or that he must resign before the English encroachments on his ministerial prerogatives. In either case, Kamel said, the Minister would have the admiration of the people. Saad's third choice of action was to serve English policy and to lose thereby all sympathy and prestige in the country. Kamel went on: "I regret to state today that the Minister in his speech to the Assembly said: I am placed between your resolutions and the commands of Lord Cromer, I obey the latter!" Italics his. Alluding to the point of view Zaghlul expressed in his speech, Kamel said that he found it easier to understand why Cromer had chosen for the Ministry the son-in-law of Mustapha Fahmi who was the "confidant" of Cromer's policy. Likewise, it was easier to understand why the English and Anglophile journals had thrown "dust in everyone's eyes" calling Zaghlul a Nationalist "while everything about him showed his sympathy for might." He noted that Saad Pasha had undergone a reverse in the Assembly which would have prompted him to resign if he had been a European minister speaking before a Parliament, but that, in Egypt, the confidence of Lord Cromer sufficed to protect him. Kamel said that Zaghlul was deceiving himself to rely on this confidence for the more he did so, the more he would lose the support of the country. The Nationalist leader added that all of those who had valued Saad Pasha as a magistrate regretted "his present, fear for his future and prefer his past. He is now on a dangerous slope." Kamel ended his article by saying: "I know that the prospect of succeeding his father-in-law as president of the Council (of Ministers) is being held out to him, but is the post really
worth all the moral loss he cannot fail to suffer if he continues on the path on which he has entered?"  

This attitude of bitterness soon changed to one of cautious optimism when it appeared that the Ministry of Education was attempting to carry out some of the desired reforms. As early as March 22, only nineteen days after Saad's speech to the Assembly, _The Egyptian Standard_ published the news that the Government intended to introduce teaching in Arabic in the near future, and that a committee of translation would be appointed to translate into Arabic all the necessary scientific books. Another contemplated reform of primary importance was that of allowing students to write their science examinations in Arabic if they felt they could not do it in English or French. There were also reports of proposed reforms such as the revival of the Egyptian Educational Mission to Europe and the hiring of Egyptian teachers to fill vacancies in the schools rather than filling them with young Englishman as so often had been the case in the past. _Al-Lewa_ cautiously welcomed the changes but reminded the authorities that this was not everything the nation wanted.  

Another boost to Nationalist hopes for reform, not only in education, but in the whole of British policy toward Egypt, was provided on April 12, 1907 by the announcement of Cromer's resignation. The official reasons were those of health, but the _Standard_ published that Cromer's leaving Egypt had been expected ever since the Denshawai incident of the summer before. Denshawai, said the _Standard_, was the manifestation and conclusion of Cromer's policy and had wounded the Egyptians deeply as well as placing British policy in an equivocal
position. Cromer's resignation was the logical consequence of his policies which had led to that incident, and, Kamel wrote, "we trust that the English Government will recognize the necessity of changing the system with the man...."22

On May 4 a farewell gathering was held for Cromer at the Opera House, and the Consul-General delivered an address recapitulating the British achievements in Egypt and paying homage to some of the Egyptians with whom he had worked. He did not slight his Minister of Education who was one of the five Egyptians he singled out for praise that evening:

Lastly, gentlemen, I should like to mention the name of one with whom I have only recently cooperated, but for whom, in that short time, I have learned to entertain a high regard. Unless I am much mistaken, a career of great public usefulness lies before the present Minister of Education, Saad Zaghlul Pasha. He possesses all the qualities necessary to serve his country. He is honest; he is capable; he has the courage of his convictions; he has been abused by many of the less worthy of his own countrymen. These are high qualifications. He should go far.23

Cromer's successor was Sir Eldon Gorst who, as Kamel had hoped, represented a change in policy from that of Cromer. The new Consul-General wished to render British rule more acceptable to the Egyptians by what came to be known as the "Liberal Experiment." Gorst wanted to cut back on the number of Englishmen flooding into Egypt to work in government offices, to encourage the Egyptian officials to take a more active part in their Government, and to give a more national character to education.24

The priority Gorst assigned to the problem of education in Egypt was underlined when he wrote Grey on May 18, only a few days after
Cromer's departure, that he had spent much of the last week occupied with educational matters. He said that he was taking advantage of the long summer lull "to put right any weak places in our armour, and to make such concessions as are feasible, with a view of satisfying the more reasonable section of the Egyptians." He explained that Cromer had recently arranged for all subjects (except foreign languages) in primary schools to be taught in Arabic, and added that if a few more reforms could be started next autumn "we shall be in a much stronger position when, later on, premature and extra-vagrant proposals are hurled at our head."25

The reforms he had in mind dealt mainly with increasing the number of Egyptian teachers in the system. He wrote that up to that time all teaching in secondary schools had been conducted in English by Englishmen; as of the new school year arithmetic would be taught in Arabic by Egyptians and that "a few qualified native professors" would be appointed in other branches of the secondary schools. To increase the number of qualified Egyptian teachers, the Training College would be enlarged and a section added for training secondary school teachers. Also some Egyptians would receive teacher-training in England through a two year course and one or two would be sent to technical schools in England for preparation as teachers in Egyptian technical schools. Finally, candidates for the secondary school certificate would be allowed to take the examination, hitherto conducted only in a European language, in Arabic.

He reported that it had not been easy to bring the Minister of Education and the Adviser together over the matter of these reforms and
that only "after a good deal of talking" had he been able to get them to accept the proposed changes. The problem was that "the former has somewhat wild notions of what his compatriots are capable of, while the latter only thinks of the efficiency of his Department, and considers that if it is shown that an English teacher is better than an Egyptian one, that settles the question." He also mentioned that he had hoped to keep the reforms as a pleasant surprise for the Egyptians in the autumn, but that Zaghlul had been indiscreet in talking to his friends and the newspapers were already talking about them.

There can be little doubt that Saad had leaked the news of these reforms to the Press in an attempt to regain some of the stature he had lost among the Nationalists as a result of his March 3 speech. On May 11, Kamel had attacked him in a vitriolic article claiming that his program was that of the British Agency and that he followed British command. However, with the news of the new reforms to be effected, the papers changed their tone. Al-Ahram praised him and expressed hope in his policy. Al-Moqaddam expressed disapproval of surrounding the Minister's actions with doubt and fears for the future and said that it did not attribute these reforms to Gorst even though a circular concerning the proposed appointment of Egyptian diploma-bearers in vacancies in the Ministry of Education had been issued the first day after the new Consul-General's arrival. Even Mustapha Kamel adopted a friendlier attitude, welcoming the changes even though he considered them "but drops."

This "rapprochement" was short-lived however, and Saad was once again the object of Nationalist criticism. Kamel and the Nationalists
always seemed to see the influence of Cromer and his policies behind what was done in the Ministry of Education when the Ministry's activities did not meet with their demands. When the mission of Egyptian students to study in Europe was announced, the Nationalists called for an Egyptian head for that mission saying that the appointment of an Englishman would be "a slight on the capabilities of the Egyptian nation." To Kamel's chagrin, it was reported on May 24 that an Englishman had been appointed. The Nationalist cited this as another occurrence of Cromer's policy of "English heads and Egyptian hands," and called upon the Minister to explain if this act met with his approval or had been forced upon him by the Adviser. Saad's opinion on this appointment is unknown, but the raising of the matter of Zaghlul's position vis-a-vis his adviser was timely. In the course of the summer and early autumn of 1907, there unfolded in the newspaper reporting of what was called the Lambert Affair the story of how the Minister's attempts to conduct reforms were blocked by the British Adviser, Douglas Dunlop.

The Lambert Affair broke into the newspapers while Zaghlul was away on his annual summer vacation in Europe. Kamel's newspaper, The Egyptian Standard, reported a disagreement between Monsieur Edouard Lambert, the French Director of the Kheïval Law School, and Dunlop. The next day June 21, it was reported that Lambert had resigned from his position. At first the cause of the resignation was assigned to Dunlop's refusal to reopen the night school at the School of Law as the Nationalists had demanded, but that reason was refuted when it became apparent that Lambert had also been against reopening the night
Lambert was replaced by an Englishman named Hill who had been brought to Cairo originally to teach history, but who had finally earned a degree in law after having once flunked his law examination. The Standard now reported that Dunlop had embarked upon a program of Anglicising all education in Egypt, including the Law School, which had been dominated by Frenchmen since Egyptian law was based on French law. It was also reported that the Parisian newspaper _Le Temps_ had discussed the Lambert Affair and had vowed that France would not renounce her economic and intellectual interests in Egypt.

Gorst was reported to be angry with Dunlop for not consulting him before accepting Lambert’s resignation, for allowing the matter to assume political overtones and for giving the opponents of the Entente Cordiale an occasion to make political hay. He was supposedly also irritated with the Adviser’s "chaotic orders" and "frequent changes" in the policy of the Ministry. The Egyptian newspapers called for Dunlop’s resignation but were ignored, and by the middle of August it was clear that Dunlop was to be given "the chance of continuing irritating both Egyptians and Frenchmen."

The matter seemed to lie in abeyance until an Egyptian named Abu Hafs submitted a long letter to _al-İewa_ which was published in seven parts. It was intended to be an open letter directed to Zaghlul and, in it, Abu Hafs stated that the Egyptian nation trusted that the Minister was earnest in wishing to help the nation attain its hopes and educational goals, and that criticism of the Ministry offered Zaghlul a good pretext for showing the necessity of introducing reforms. He then proceeded in the course of his seven letters to show how a number
of reform projects ordered by Saad had been blocked by Dunlop during the summer while the Minister was on vacation and asked him to restore them.

First of all Abu Hafs pointed out that Dunlop had refused to restore the night law school and had appointed Hill as Lambert's successor in Saad's absence. As for the Khedivial Training College for Teachers, Dunlop had deflected money set aside for it, again in the Minister's absence. The project of allowing students to take their examinations for the secondary school certificate in Arabic had also been deflected by the Adviser in Saad's absence. The most damning indictment of Dunlop was that he had undone Zaghlul's attempt to bring more Egyptian teachers into the system. In Saad's absence, Dunlop had, at least in the case of Lambert, put pressure on the law school Director to report that the applicants for teaching jobs in the school were inadequate. Lambert had disputed with the Adviser about this practice but, in the end, gave in. Abu Hafs' last letter said that he was well-acquainted with what went on in the Ministry of Education and that he knew from personal knowledge that Dunlop ran the Ministry. He reported that Saad had begun his administration "by holding the rudder of the Ministry personally, yet Mr. Dunlop is endeavoring to loosen his hold...."

Abu Hafs' revelations were confirmed in part when a letter from Lambert, now a Professor of Law in Lyon, France, was published in both the Standard and the Gazette on October 10 and 11, respectively.37 Lambert said that he had resigned because of Dunlop's policy which was to combat the development of French culture in the law school. He
accused Dunlop of getting rid of the older staff in the English section of the law school and replacing them with young men just out from England whose knowledge of French was inadequate for translating the French law manuals from which they derived their lecture notes. The inferior teaching engendered by this practice had caused discontent among the students and Dunlop had responded by treating grown men with the same disciplinary measures usually reserved for children. This in turn caused hatred among the students for the British administration and the law school had been transformed "into a veritable seminary of Egyptian nationalism, so that among an actual attendance of 400 pupils, one would with difficulty find a dozen not entirely devoted to the doctrines of Moustapha Kamel Pasha."

Lambert also told of how he had played a role in Dunlop's machinations against the Minister of Education, Saad Zaghlul, who had not been content to play a secondary role in his own Ministry. Lambert said that in order "to reduce this spoil-sport, Saad, to impotence, the English Adviser compelled the principal functionaries of the Ministry of Public Instruction" to join in forming a sort of league intended to paralyse the action of their official chief. Dunlop dictated to Lambert the outlines of his official reports and then compelled him to submit them to the Adviser's corrections before passing them on to the Minister. "These acts of compliance," said Lambert, "already very annoying, were considered insufficient." For him to have longer remained Dunlop's collaborator would have caused him "a sacrifice of conscience more humiliating still," and would have exposed him to the risk of being caught in his betrayal by Zaghlul. Lambert
further exposed that in order to secure the appointment of two Egyptian teachers, he was compelled to give "an unfavorable report concerning all the candidates" who might apply for admission as teachers in response to the appeal made by Zaghlul for Egyptians to present themselves for jobs in the schools.

The Nationalist response to these revelations concerning the Adviser and his treatment of the Minister was not sympathetic to Zaghlul. Instead he was told by Mustapha Kamel in the Standard that if he had attempted to apprise the Nationalists of the true state of affairs, "he would have possessed the support of the nation and the press would have raised its voice with him." In lieu of this, according to Kamel, the Minister had preferred to think that leaving the University committee, making the speech he did before the Assembly, and issuing invitations to Cromer's farewell celebration would not affect the nation's conviction in him.38

Zaghlul's situation with the Nationalists fared even worse when, according to al-Lewa, he claimed that he was independent and effective as Minister. The paper's answer was that Lambert's letter proved that Zaghlul was "a captive in his Ministry and not a Minister at all...." Al-Lewa stated that Saad's claim was induced by two motives: "The desire to satisfy the British Agency," and his anxiety to show his superiority over the other Ministers who were known to be deprived of their authority. The paper said that Zaghlul had shown himself to be Cromer's man and that only by drafting and carrying out a plan of reform could his past be forgiven him. "But," it said, "as long as you
are without a definite programme receiving the orders of the British Agency do not expect us to respect you more than your colleagues!"\(^{39}\)

Saad remained an object of Nationalist criticism throughout most of 1903. However, Dunlop continued to be considered the chief villain, and the death of Mustapha Kamel in February, 1903, provided the occasion for further agitation against the Adviser's continued presence in the Ministry of Education.

Kamel's funeral was attended by large numbers of students who cut classes to do it. This incensed the Adviser, and, the newspapers reported, he was determined to punish the students for this act.\(^{40}\) Exactly what steps he took as retribution on the students is not clear, but it was reported that one of the punishments he chose was to change a school sport's competition day from its usual date of March 19 to Friday, March 20. It was pointed out in \textit{al-Leva\'a} that Friday was always an official holiday in Egypt and that this particular Friday was dedicated to a commemoration ceremony for the late Nationalist leader. The paper said that in changing the date of the sport's competition, the Adviser meant to resist the desire of the students to participate in the commemoration ceremony and to have his revenge on them and the Egyptian people as a whole. It would also seem from the newspaper reports that Dunlop undertook disciplinary measures such as dismissal of students from school and ordered at least one class "to be punished by imprisonment every Thursday for a year."\(^{41}\) This latter punishment no doubt meant denial of recesses or having to stay after school, but the Nationalist papers were not usually careful with their choice of words.
The students were so upset by Dunlop's reaction that a number of them addressed an open letter in the papers to the headmasters of schools not controlled by the Ministry of Education saying to prepare for their en mass transfers the next academic session. The Standard strangely enough counseled the students to submit their grievances to the Ministry and asked the Ministry not to wound wantonly the patriotic sentiments which the students had expressed by their attendance at Kamel's funeral. The next day, February 27, it was reported that Zaghlul had ordered the reinstatement of two students dismissed from school for disciplinary reasons and that the date for the sport's competition was changed back to March 19. Two days later it was reported that the Minister, after visiting the class under discipline, ordered it relieved of its penalty. By the middle of March, the Standard, while still doubting that Zaghlul was the paramount authority in the Ministry, was admitting that the students were convinced that their grievances were due to the activities of the Adviser and that their Minister was sympathetic to them. In 1918, the British were to fault him for the sympathy he displayed toward student grievances and even blame him for the student disturbances.

It is not difficult to believe that he actually did pursue a policy designed to counter-act the worst offences of the Adviser since Zaghlul's hostility to Dunlop was, as will be seen, well known at that time among the British authorities. Cut off, as he seems to have been, from exercising much authority in the realm of reforms, he had little other power to exercise except to block what his countrymen, and no doubt he, considered to be excesses on the part of the Adviser.
However, as a member of the Government, his struggle with Dunlop could not be allowed to be confirmed before the public. Thus when Saad denied in the British organ, The Egyptian Gazette, that there was any agitation in the schools against Dunlop and that neither the Adviser nor he had any intention to punish the students, even the Nationalists caught on. During a speech in April, 1907, about how most government Ministers were doing nothing, Mohammad Farid, Kamel's successor, remarked: "There are some of them, it is true who really desire to work, but their fear of displaying any disagreement between themselves and their advisers compels them to stop at a certain limit."

The question of education in Egypt was soon over-shadowed when in July, 1908, Turkey was reinvested with a constitution. The newspapers began clamoring for one in Egypt, too, and, when it was not forthcoming, some of them blamed the governmental Ministers for not taking a strong enough stance. By mid-September the movement for a constitution had become a national one, and the Khedive complained that while his position to resist this movement was stronger than that of the Ottoman Sultan's, the members of his Government, on whom he felt he should be able to rely, carried no weight in the country. Some of them, he went on, were indeed a source of real embarrassment—he referred specifically to Saad Zaghlul—and he said that there was great need of a stiffening of men possessing real political and business ability. The inference was, of course, that the Khedive wanted a new Cabinet—preferably one without Zaghlul. In November, 1908, the Khedive Abbas got his new government, but Zaghlul was still in it although Abbas thought only temporarily.
The movement for a constitution in Egypt caused the final rupture between the Nationalists and the Khedive and a rapprochement between him and the British. The Khedive, who by nature and training did not want a constitution, was backed by Gorst who stated in an interview that Britain would gradually enlarge Egypt's powers of self-government, but that a constitution and unrestricted Parliamentary government as found in England and elsewhere was unthinkable under present conditions in Egypt. Perhaps as a symbol of this rapprochement, the Khedive was given a new Cabinet in which Mustapha Fahmi, Cromer's Prime Minister for thirteen years, was replaced by Butros Ghali, a Coptic Christian chosen by the Khedive. The new Ministry also included Mohammed Said, the Khedive's favorite who would be Ghali's successor in 1910. Zaghlul, however, remained in the Cabinet despite the Khedive's wishes because Gorst, who was also irritated with Saad for reasons which are not clear, but partially over his disputes with Dunlop, was afraid to get rid of him. Gorst told the Khedive that he was afraid what Zaghlul might say and do if he were ejected from the Government at this juncture and asked Abbas to agree to keep him two or three months more when a way could be devised to get him to leave.

Butros Ghali also told the Khedive to leave Zaghlul to him and that he knew a way to force the Minister to leave. The British and Ghali may have hoped to drive Zaghlul out of the Government by ordering him to bring any future disputes with Dunlop to the Prime Minister. This would be a further curbing of Zaghlul's powers to run his own Ministry and may have been designed as an insult which would force him to
resign. However, as shall be seen, Zaghlul was still in the Government when it was changed again in early 1910 and seemed in the meantime to have gained power and stature among his fellow Egyptians.
Footnotes - Chapter II

1. The Egyptian Gazette, October 31, 1906, p. 3; November 12, 1906, p. 3. Hereinafter cited as Gazette.


5. Ibid.


13. Cromer to Grey, March 8, 1907, Official Reports on Egypt and Soudan, 1902-1908 (Egypt No. 3, 1907); Gazette, March 5, 1907, p. 3; FO 371/247/6662, Parliamentary Question by Robertson, M.P. on use of Arabic in schools in Egypt.

14. Gazette, March 5, 1907, p. 3; Cromer to Grey, March 3, 1907, FO 371/247/6662.


22. Gazette, April 13, 1907, p. 3.

23. Gazette, May 7, 1907, p. 3.


26. Ibid.


30. Standard, May 24, 1907, p. 3.

31. Standard, June 20, 1907, p. 2; June 21, 1907, p. 2; July 2, 1907, p. 2.


33. Standard, July 1, 1907, p. 2; July 21, 1907, p. 1.
No further identification of Abu Hafs was possible. His letters were printed almost daily on page 3 of The Egyptian Standard beginning September 18, 1907 and running to September 29, 1907.

Standard, October 10, 1907, p. 1; Gazette, October 11, 1907, p. 5.

Note to be submitted to Colonel House along with Zaghlul's telegram to President Wilson, FO 371/3204/186096.
CHAPTER III
RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE NATIONALISTS

The new relationship between the British Agency and the Khedive, symbolized by a new Cabinet, was accompanied by Gorst's determination to implement new, more liberal policies. The Consul-General had earlier announced to a gathering of senior British administrators a new policy which meant that "British officials who had acquired positions of unquestioned authority now found themselves demoted and forced to defer to the Egyptians who were their nominal superiors." In forming the Ghali Government, the slate was wiped clean by appointing men who were new to office. The exceptions to this were the Prime Minister who had been Minister of Foreign Affairs under Mustapha Fahmi, but was retained in the Government at the Khedive's request, and Saad Zaghlul who was retained for reasons which have been explained already.

The Nationalists sensed that there was change in the air and welcomed the formation of the new Cabinet. Mohammad Farid denounced Butros Ghali for signing the Sudan Agreement, which put the Sudan under exclusive British control, and for his presiding at the Denshwar Trials, but he found it encouraging that the rest of the Ministers "do not accept to be mere instruments in the hands of their English Advisers. We are led to believe that they have laid down conditions on their
appointment that they should be real Ministers...." Moreover, he found nearly all the new Ministers to be men educated along modern lines who had studied European "Government and Constitutionalism," and who were convinced that Egypt must have a more representative system of government for the nation's political advancement. 2

While the Egyptians were to be disappointed in their hopes for a constitution from this and succeeding governments until after World War I, Farid's analysis of the Ministers was in many ways correct. Between 1909 and the end of the "Liberal Experiment" in 1911, Gorst not only upgraded the authority of Egyptian Ministers, but he also revitalized the heretofore powerless legislative bodies— the Legislative Council and the General Assembly. The door to increased Egyptian participation in Egyptian affairs having been opened, a number of Ministers resolved to keep it open and, moreover, to broaden the scope of Egyptian control of the nation's destiny beyond what the British envisioned. In the course of the Liberal Experiment it became increasingly apparent that Saad Zaghlul was among the foremost of these Ministers.

Zaghlul's activities in the Ministry of Education under the new Government were marked by a pronounced aggressiveness which was missing before. Although prior to this time his struggles with Dunlop were conspicuous, he had been blocked by the Adviser's machinations against his bids for reform. On the other hand, Zaghlul had shown some success at undoing the Adviser's attempts to punish the students for their demonstrations and gained a reputation among the students, and sometimes among the Nationalists, as being sympathetic and working for Egyptian interests. In 1909, Zaghlul's reputation among the
Nationalists was enhanced as he used the authority derived from Gorst's policies to make his influence more keenly felt in this direction. He lost little time in beginning.

The Ghali Cabinet had been in office barely two months when the story broke into the newspapers that the Minister of Education had ordered a British school official to be disciplined for disobeying his orders. The official involved was Miss Johnson, Headmistress at a large girls' school, who had dismissed one of the girls from the school. According to the British view of the facts, the girl had not been doing well in her school work and "was exercising a very unsalutary influence upon the minds of her fellows...." For these reasons the Headmistress wished to deny the girl the privilege of returning the next year and received verbal assurances from an inspector of schools that the Ministry would support her decision. Consequently when the girl reappeared the following autumn, Miss Johnson dismissed her. Six weeks later she received an order signed by Zaghlul to reinstate the girl, but the Headmistress said she could not do this without injuring her authority and destroying the discipline in the school. Then, went the British explanation, it was tacitly given her to understand that she could keep the girl apart from the other students so long as she was under the "same roof," and evidently the girl was readmitted to the school but secluded in a separate room so that she could not mix with the other girls. The Minister was informed of this situation, said the Arabic newspaper al-Garida by the girl's guardian (she was an orphan), and the Minister then ascertained these facts and ordered the Headmistress to appear before a Council of Discipline.
The British point of view, however, was that the Nationalist papers had gotten hold of the story, and that perhaps in consequence of this or of other influences, Zaghlul sent another order to Miss Johnson in the middle of January, 1909, "to the effect that the offending pupil was to be immediately reinstated with all full privileges." What happened after this is blurred, but it appears that the girl in the meantime had left the school—the British said she was "absent without leave"—and the order either was not or could not be carried out. In either case, the Minister ordered that Miss Johnson should face a Council of Discipline.\(^5\)

Zaghlul's action caused a stir among the Egyptians. Even the moderate Coptic newspaper, *al-Watan*, said that Miss Johnson's approaching trial was "unprecedented in the history of the occupation," and that her act of insubordination was "an offense which was considered customary or even necessary in former years." Being a moderate paper, *al-Watan* hoped that Miss Johnson would be lightly treated, and noted: "We understand that the British colony here is now watching the case with unanimous sympathy and concern."\(^6\)

The British sympathy and concern for Miss Johnson was such that the composition of the Council of Discipline named to handle the matter was weighted in her favor by appointing two Egyptians and two Englishmen of whom one of the latter was to preside at the trial. The Council met in early February, and its decision was to issue her an official warning while at the same time recording its recognition of her long and able service and acknowledging that she had acted in the best interests of the school.\(^7\) This of course was hardly any punishment at
all, although the British thought otherwise, but the Council's decision had still to be reviewed and confirmed by the Minister before becoming official, and his next action caused the British even greater anguish.

Zaghlul confirmed the Council's judgment, and further ordered that the Headmistress was to leave her school to take up the post of Headmistress at the Kuttab Training School—an action which both the Egyptians and the British regarded as humiliating to Miss Johnson. The leading British newspaper in the Middle East and Egypt, The Egyptian Gazette, viewed the Minister's action as justifying the "triumphant paean" of the extreme Nationalist press over the matter. The Gazette said that the major portion of the work at the Kuttab School consisted of teaching cooking, sewing, and laundry work, matters which were ridiculously out of keeping with Miss Johnson's great abilities as an educator. In addition, very little English was spoken at the school, and the rooms allotted to the Headmistress were "most inadequate." "Under these circumstances," said the Gazette, "the transfer may be regarded as an additional punishment for Miss Johnson, and cannot be defended, merely on the grounds that it was necessary for the authorities to remove the mistress from the Sanieh School where their own action had made her position impossible." Al-Lewa, on the other hand, said that by this decision, the Headmistress had received from the Ministry "some of what she deserves as punishment for her despotism and disobedience." It thanked the Ministry for the firm stand it took in the matter, and hoped that the British officials had learned a lesson from this event which al-Lewa regarded "as an example of the new and
firm attitude which this Ministry is taking up against the forces of
anarchy."9

The activities of the Ministry of Education under its "new and
firm attitude" continued to be an object of criticism by the Gazette
throughout the remainder of Saad's tenure as Minister. With the Lib­
eral Experiment in force, a number of jobs formerly always reserved for
Englishmen were being given to Egyptians, and the Ministry of Education
was the most conspicuous case of reform in this direction. The Gazette
commented that the authorities in that Ministry "have striven with
something akin to desperation to thrust the teaching of more and more
subjects into the hands of natives," a policy which the paper viewed
as ensuring that these subjects were not taught at all. It pointed out
that only 251 out of 750 candidates for the Secondary School Certificate
had passed the recent examinations, and blamed such poor results on en­
forcing changes before the country was prepared for them.10

Although the Gazette blamed British policy for the rash haste of
such reforms as much as it did the Egyptian officials, the gratitude
of the Egyptians for the accomplishments of the Ministry redounded only
to Saad. In September, 1909, the Egyptian newspaper, al-Moayyad, re­
ported that 113 students were to receive free educations in Government
schools during the 1909-1910 school year. The establishment of free
education in Government institutes for poor but deserving students had
long been a desire of the Egyptians, and al-Moayyad expressed its
pleasure at this news by reporting:

Between 1903 and 1908, not a single student was ac­
cepted gratis, but when Saad Pasha Zaghloul sic took
up the affairs of Public Instruction he made efforts
to restore free teaching, within certain limits, in the Government institutions and after a long debate, it was decided to accept 40 students free of fees. And now the poor pupils who have been accepted up to next year without payment are 113 in number.

Zaghlul exchanged his portfolio in Education for that of Justice in February, 1910, but the high regard in which a number of his countrymen held him for his work as Minister of Education was made patent to him when he attended the February 5 session of the Legislative Council to discuss a Bill. The Gazette correspondent who attended the meeting reported that as the Minister "took his seat on the right of the President most of the members rose and greeted him with evident pleasure." The Bill, which Zaghlul explained to the body was framed "in accordance with the desire of this Council," enabled students who were not members of the Khedival Law School to enter the school for the purpose of taking the examination for the license without incurring the expense of having to travel to Europe for the same purpose as in the past. To an objection that there were already too many lawyers, Saad answered that since the Khedival School had to limit admissions for lack of room, it was unjust that those who were thus forced to attend other law schools had to go to Europe to take their examinations for the license when the Khedival School could so easily provide this service. As to job opportunities, he said that one need not be a judge or an advocate to serve his country, and he hoped to see the day when the nation's Assemblies were filled with men who had studied law and the whole country in general filled with men who had graduated from high schools. At these remarks, one of the members of the Council
prayed that God would help the Minister "in the grand work of promoting the country by education, the others replying 'Amen, Amen' as he pronounced that prayer."\(^{12}\)

Several days later when Zaghlul was appointed Minister of Justice, al-Moayyad wrote that his transfer was "owing to the difficulties raised by the British officials in the Ministry in the way of everyone who attempts a reform of Education in this country."\(^{13}\) The British, on the other hand, chose not to remember his attempts at reform, but only his apparent sympathy with the students whose discontent with the state of Egyptian education and politics had so often taken the form of demonstrations and strikes throughout 1907, 1908, and the first half of 1909. The Gazette expressed its confidence that Zaghlul would find in the Ministry of Justice a greater scope for his abilities than "in conducting minute investigations into the punishments inflicted at the Government Secondary Schools, or in venturing upon personal encounters with recalcitrant pupils...instead of leaving them to be dealt with in the proper manner by their headmasters." The paper admitted, however, that he was an able man and that there was every reason to hope he would enjoy success in his new Ministry.\(^{14}\)

Zaghlul's struggle in the Ministry of Education to wrest authority from the British Adviser and to place it in Egyptian hands carried over into his work in the Cabinet. Here the struggle was not simply against British Advisers, but also against the Khedive and his Prime Minister—especially the latter—as Saad and two of his colleagues, Hussein Rushdy and Mohammad Said, sought to make the Cabinet a viable and effective influence in the governing of Egypt.
Actually this was nothing new for Zaghlul who had clashed violently with the Khedive in February, 1907, during a discussion in the Cabinet over the proposed School of Cadis. When the Khedive, who was against the project, attempted to delay further consideration of the matter until a later date, despite the fact that most of the Ministers were for the proposed School, Zaghlul became angry, banged the table with his hand, and said words to the effect that the Khedive was making it impossible for anyone to speak his mind. The Khedive in turn became angry and threatened never again to attend Cabinet meetings where he might be forced to agree to projects which did not meet with his approval. 15

While no further disagreements in the Cabinet of such a nature as that recorded above are reported prior to 1909, they seem to have become almost commonplace in the Ghali Government and its history is scarred with numerous reports of sharp disagreements among the members of the Cabinet, rumored resignations, and finally a definite antagonism toward the Prime Minister by his own Ministers.

The first signs that all was not well with the new Cabinet began to appear in February, 1909, with the report of the Ministers' dissatisfaction at losing one of their new privileges. The British had initiated a scheme whereby the Advisers were to present departmental projects to their respective Ministers for approval, but it was dropped after a short time because the British found it impossible to ascertain whether or not the Ministers were convinced of the practicality of projects which they approved or were simply afraid to say no. Perhaps assuming that the Egyptians had been given more responsibility than
they were yet ready to take on, the British decided that Ministers would submit their departmental projects to the Advisers for approval. The Arabic newspaper, al-Ahram, attacked this change in policy saying that the Advisers had become the actual Ministers while the Egyptian officials had been converted into mere "Chefs de Bureaux." It said that it understood the discontent of the Egyptian Ministers at being so degraded and expressed its assurance that the nation would join with them in protesting against the intolerable regime which Gorst had established by this action.¹⁶

If the Ministers were degraded in their handling of departmental matters, they quickly served notice to the Advisers that the same was not to be true of Cabinet affairs. On March 13, 1909, the Adviser to the Ministry of Finance laid before the Cabinet for its approval a project for the Government to purchase the Oasis Railway for 125,000 Egyptian pounds with the condition that the profits from this venture be shared with the railway company for a specified time. Zaghlul, Said, and Rushdy considered that the matter had been presented at a late date, refused to discuss the matter hurriedly, and asked that the discussion of this important project be delayed until another session. The Adviser became angry and demanded that it be discussed right away. The Ministers finally gave in at the request of the Khedive and considered the project, but when the Adviser pushed them to give their approval of other matters without first discussing them, the Ministers heatedly insisted upon delaying their consideration until another meeting. After the meeting was over the Khedive told some of the members of his Court that he had never before witnessed such sharp discussions
in the Cabinet. One of the members of his Court, Ahmad Shafeeq, re-
plied that it was a good sign because the Adviser now knew that from 
this moment on, the Ministers, unlike their predecessors, would not ac-
cept projects without discussion and without being convinced of their 
utility. 17

The Ministers, sitting as a Cabinet, proved to be no less argu-
mentative and forceful with their own head—the Prime Minister, Butros 
Ghali. Within four months of the new Government's formation, there 
began to appear rumors that either Ghali or the entire Government would 
resign because of serious differences of opinion within the Cabinet. 
These rumors of sharp differences of opinion in the Cabinet and its 
impending resignation revolved around the above-mentioned Oasis Rail-
way matter, the treatment of striking students at al-Azhar, and came 
to a climax over the revival of the Press Law of 1881. This was an 
attempt to stifle the serious student strikes and demonstrations which 
were the result of what the British felt to be irresponsible agitation 
in the native newspapers for the immediate conferring of a constitution 
on Egypt.

The student demonstrations for a constitution had intensified 
throughout the first three months of 1909, and had culminated in a 
student mob which literally tore a British-sponsored agricultural ex-
hibition to pieces in early March. The Gazette blamed the native press 
for this outburst saying that the press must be brought to reason, and 
"must not be allowed to pander to the vilest passions of an illiterate 
and inflammable populace." 18 On March 25, the Gazette announced that 
the Press Law of 1881, by which a newspaper could be suspended by the
Government after it received two warnings, was to be reactivated. It noted that there were rumors that the Ministers would oppose the Law but said that its revival was supported by the Khedive and Gorst, and that the latter need only to remind recalcitrant Ministers that they were bound to follow the advice of "His Britannic Majesty's Representative" in all matters of importance. In answer to stories circulating that there was another Cabinet crisis over the matter, the Gazette published a categorical denial by Zaghlul that such a crisis existed although, as the paper pointed out, "this does not exclude the contingency of the existence of a divergence of opinion between the Prime Minister and some of his colleagues."^{19}

The rumor-mills were correct in their conjectures. Zaghlul, Rushdy, and Said did oppose the British-sponsored reactivation of the Press Law, at least in its pristine form, and threatened to resign when it appeared that the Prime Minister was determined to reactivate it without first discussing the matter with his Cabinet. The Khedive called the entire Cabinet to his palace for a meeting with him, and the Ministers finally agreed to accept the resurrection of the Law. Zaghlul proved to be the last holdout, sitting quietly through the session and not declaring himself until his colleagues had given in. Even then he said that he was not comfortable with his decision. The Khedive was disgusted with his Ministers and told Ahmad Shafeeq that if the Ministers presented their resignations, then he would never again entrust them with important matters and would be forced to form a new Cabinet.
In the meantime, the Ministers, having told Ghali that Gorst was amenable to their making some alterations in the Law, proceeded to present the Prime Minister with a modified version of the Press Law. Ghali expressed his opinion that this version was not clear, but showed it to Gorst and came back to the Cabinet with the news that Gorst would not accept their modified Law. The Ministers became suspicious of this sudden change in Gorst’s opinion, and believed that their Prime Minister was being less than frank in his dealings with them. Therefore, they sent the proposed Law back to Gorst, this time in the hands of Chitty Bey—a British Adviser who was known to be sympathetic to Egyptian Nationalism. Gorst now accepted the changes in the Law and the matter ended. The Khedive, however, reproved his Ministers, especially Mohammad Said, for having first accepted the project and then going back on their word, an activity, he said, which he had not seen among Ministers in the last seventeen years. 20

The Press Law as amended and re-issued provided another example of how the Ministers were striving to keep control of Egyptian affairs in Egyptian hands for it provided that the Government could not under any circumstances suppress a newspaper without first obtaining the consent of the Cabinet. 21 The importance of this provision was not appreciated by a number of the Egyptian newspapers which protested against the revival of the Law and organized demonstrations against it. Nevertheless, the reactivation of the Law seemed to have lulled the British into a sense of security, and less than a month afterwards, the Gazette reported that the crisis appeared to be at an end, and that it
was "disposed to believe that peace has been assured for the time being."22

The Cabinet's provision that no newspaper could be suppressed without its consent worked to the benefit of the Egyptian papers, and by July, the Gazette was complaining that the tone of the Nationalist press had not improved. It blamed the Law's failure to have the desired effect on the Government's unwillingness to implement the Law, and reported that there was dissension in the Cabinet over this matter while al-Jawa was urging Egypt to follow the American example and to stage a revolution.23

Under such circumstances, the agitation in Egyptian newspapers for a constitution continued unabated, but in September the Nationalists suddenly changed their tactics. Instead of heaping abuse on the Khedive, whose reconciliation with the British was always unpopular, and on Zaghlul, who was under fire probably for defending, as a Minister, the Government's reactivation of the Press Law, the Nationalists shifted their attacks to Butros Ghali and constantly called for his resignation unless he asked for a constitution. The anonymous Gazette correspondent who reported this new twist in Nationalist tactics unfortunately offered no explanation for it, but reported that he was informed by "one who knows" that such a policy was supported in the Cabinet where one of the Ministers had asked al-Jawa to cease attacking "one of his colleagues," and to write articles calculated to bring the Khedive into the campaign against the Prime Minister.24 While al-Jawa was quick to deny that such a thing had happened, Misk al-Patat, another Nationalist paper announced that the Ghali Government would fall
in November, and, in accordance with the new policy towards Zaghlul, stated that "the English would like to exclude Saad Pasha Zaghloul sic —Minister of Education—from the Ministry for no other fault than his being a diligent and zealous patriot." 25

The apparent collusion between the Nationalists and the Cabinet with Ghali, always disliked by the Nationalists, as the odd man out was to continue for some time. Although it was not always visible, its manifestations were to recur several times in the next few months, one of them being in the course of the negotiations for the extension of the Suez Canal concession from 1968 to 2008, a matter which was to cost Ghali his life, while other Ministers—notably Zaghlul—used the matter to advance Egypt on the road to self-government.

The Suez Canal Company approached the Egyptian Government in the early autumn of 1909 with a scheme to extend the foreign-owned Company's concession from December 31, 1968 to December 31, 2008. In return for this extension, the Government, whose coffers were low, would receive a payment of four million Egyptian pounds to be spread over a period of four years. The Nationalists, recalling that the Canal had been built at the cost of thousands of Egyptian lives, were of course calling for its restoration to Egypt at the earliest possible moment. The British on the other hand were in favor of the extension. According to the Gazette the extension was inspired solely by political reasons, the feeling being that Egypt would be too weak throughout the remainder of this century to protect the Canal from hostile powers. Furthermore, in the paper's opinion, there was little hope that Egypt would find itself in sole possession of the Canal after 2008. 26
In the Egyptian Cabinet, Butros Ghali favored the extension of the Concession while Rushdy, Said, and Zaghlul were arrayed in opposition to the scheme. The Government had been inundated with telegrams from Egyptian notables, and the different political parties calling for the defeat of the scheme, and the Khedive, fearful of again coming under attack in the newspapers, decided that the matter should be taken before the General Assembly. The Ministers also felt that it was too much responsibility to take on their own shoulders, and agreed. On November 1, Gorst was consulted about sharing the responsibility for the decision with the Assembly, and he agreed to it provided that Zaghlul, the best debater and speaker in the Cabinet, defend the Government's official position of being in favor of the extension. It was further decided that the Assembly's decision on the matter would be final. This latter decision, however, was not immediately announced.

When it was proclaimed that the Canal question would be laid before the General Assembly, the Gazette stated that British official circles thought such a move was ill-advised, but that in light of the outcry against the extension in the press, the decision was understandable, as the Ministers hoped to escape from the unpopularity of the Government's position by appealing to the representative body. However, the Gazette warned, if the Assembly should reject the extension, the Occupation would be prolonged because Britain would find it "absurd to entrust to Egypt such momentous duties as the guardianship of the Canal involves."
Despite this warning, the Nationalist papers continued their campaign against the project. This drew another warning from the Gazette after the Khedive made a statement that in referring the matter to the Assembly, "myself and my Government have endeavored to lay down the principle of consulting the country on all important matters." The Gazette now counseled that a rejection by the Assembly would be viewed as being due to dislike of the Occupation, and, the Assembly having discredited themselves, "their advice...will not again be sought for a very long time to come, with the ulterior consequence that progress towards self-government will be infinitely retarded." 30

The Assembly was convened in early February, 1910, and the Khedive's opening speech reminded the members of this body that they need not have been consulted at all but that the Government had decided that the matter was important to this generation and the generation to come. He also said that the Government was unanimous in considering the extension acceptable. A committee was formed to study the matter, but the Gazette reckoned that it was a foregone conclusion that the committee would advise the Assembly to reject the proposal and that the Government would "give way." 31

Suddenly, on February 20, Butros Ghali was assassinated by a young Egyptian pharmacist, Ibrahim al-Wardani, who justified killing Ghali on the grounds of his roles in the Denshawai trial, the revival of the Press Law, and his advocacy of accepting the extension of the Suez Canal Company's concession. 32 The Gazette blamed his death directly on Nationalist agitation against the Canal project, saying that the Government's decision to include the Assembly in the consideration
of the matter was taken as a sign of weakness and had inflamed the
people's emotions. It said that the assassination should be an induce-
ment to the British Foreign Office to take stock of the situation in
Egypt brought about by its changes in policy since Cromer's retirement.
The paper placed the responsibility for the policy of allowing the As-
sembly a voice in the Canal business on the Foreign Office saying that
Corst would not have advised it, and that now, perhaps, the Liberal
Government in Britain would go back to the old policy and trust the man
on the spot as it had in Cromer's time. 

There was no reversion to any old policy, however, for the new
Government was headed by Mohammad Said, the Minister of the Interior
in the Ghali Cabinet, and the Khedive's favorite. As has been already
recorded, Zaghlul was switched from Education to Justice. Said was
known by the British to have had strong Nationalist leanings, and a
correspondent for the Gazette wrote that the general opinion among the
Europeans in Cairo was that Said's appointment as Prime Minister was a
mistake because of his earlier predelictions for the doctrines of
Mustapha Kamel. Therefore, the correspondent judged, the extremists
would consider the assassination of Ghali to be justified because it
had led to the formation of a Cabinet under a Nationalist Prime Min-
ister. Whereas the British in Egypt might blame the Foreign Office for
the policies being pursued in that country, the correspondent could not
fault the Foreign Office in the selection of the new Egyptian Cabinet.
For this, wrote the article's author, Sir Edward Grey could not be
blamed as he did not know one Minister from another.
One of the new Government's first pronouncements heightened the apprehensions which the British had felt at its formation. The General Assembly met on April 4, 1910, in a session charged with excitement. Rumors had been current throughout the day that a great national secret would be divulged, and the visitors' galleries were crowded to overflowing. After the reading of the minutes from the previous meeting, Mohammad Said stood up and addressed the Assembly. He gave the history of the Suez Canal project and told why the matter had been brought before the Assembly even though the law did not provide for such a move. He expressed the hope that the members of the body would study carefully the Government's remarks on the project, and then announced that "as the present question was of exceptional importance, the Government had decided, without in any way altering the laws of the country, to take an exceptional step and to make the decision of the Assembly, as an exceptional case, final and binding." Said resumed his seat "as the hall rang with long and enthusiastic applause from all sides, and people at last understood the fact to which the early rumor had persistently referred."

Zaghlul took the floor as the Government's spokesman for the project and explained why the extension should be granted. In what the Gazette described as a "long and eloquent speech," the Minister stated that the scheme was purely a financial matter, not a political one, and that it did not imply the loss of the Canal to Egypt, but was only the extension of an already existing lease which could in no way affect the future status of the nation. He spoke for an hour, perspiration dropping from his forehead and his voice showing signs of fatigue. At
this point, another Minister took over reading the Government's remarks while Zaghlul rested. After a short recess, he resumed his speech explaining that Egypt "would in all probability be forced to make the passage in the Canal free when it reverted to her, and that the Company would alone be able to induce the Powers to accept the continuance of dues." He said that the Government needed the money which the Company was offering for the extension, and had the Minister of Public Works read a statement on irrigation and drainage schemes which could be undertaken with the money. Zaghlul ended his remarks by urging the Assembly to accept the extension which the Government found to be of advantage to the country, and deprecated rejecting it saying that "it was a great error to deny the country the benefit of such great schemes...." He too was cheered "very loudly" when he took his seat at the end of his speech. The meeting was then adjourned.35

Ignoring Zaghlul's speech, the Gazette commented on the Prime Minister's announcement, saying that the Government had been overawed by the Nationalist press into granting final responsibility to the Assembly on the Suez Canal question, and that it was a sign of the Government's paralysis as well as ample proof of a "policy of drift and do little which prevails here."36 The British newspaper, dismayed by Said's pronouncement, continued to discuss its impact, and three days afterwards there appeared a long editorial saying that rumors were now abundant that the Government intended to increase the powers of the Legislative Council, the other chamber of the Legislature, and that, in effect, Egypt would be endowed with a parliament and, to some extent, self-government. The editorial noted that, until a few months ago,
Gorst had been strongly against such a policy, and quoted excerpts from the Consul-General's Annual Reports to the British Government illustrating how Gorst had felt that Egypt was hardly prepared to control its own affairs. The Gazette could not imagine that Gorst had reversed his opinion, especially after Ghali's assassination, and speculated that the only possible theory to explain the changes was that both the British and Egyptian Governments "consider the situation so serious that they have decided to make any concession that is demanded for the sake of tranquilizing the Nationalists."^{37} There was, however, an even greater shock in store for the British.

The General Assembly met again on April 7 to give its reply to the Government's memorandum and Zaghlul's speech. What was supposed to happen was that after hearing the Assembly's reply, the Government would draw up another memo, produce more arguments for accepting the project, and keep the matter alive in the Assembly until a point was reached where debate would be ended and a vote taken, the matter having received full consideration. The meeting, however, did not run according to expectations. After the meeting opened, Fathalla Barakat, a member of the Assembly and Zaghlul's nephew, took the floor saying that the Assembly's committee for the Canal project had framed a reply to the memo and to the arguments of the Government's spokesman. He moved that this reply be read and that a vote be taken immediately afterwards. In the opinion of the Gazette correspondent who covered the meeting, this maneuver was "evidently prearranged," and the motion passed "as no one seemed to understand at that moment what the said motion implied." The Assembly's reply had been kept secret and the
idea was to call for the vote without allowing the Government time to
reply or the members to change their opinion.

The reply, advising rejection of the scheme, was read, and "the
visitors' galleries which were crowded with boys of all ages between
5 and 20 years rang with long applause and shouts of approval." On the
floor of the hall, members of the Assembly stood and shouted that they
would reject the Canal extension "finally and immediately," and for
some time "chaos reigned in the hall and jubilant remarks were ex­
changed here and there without the least thought of order or self-
restraint."

Zaghlul rose to speak in reply, but was informed by another mem­
ber of the Assembly that the passing of Barakat's motion "meant that
there should be no discussion after the statement of the Committee,
nothing but voting and rejecting the scheme which the Government urged
to be of great advantage to the country." Zaghlul still attempted to
speak, now over an excited din, and finally, with some order restored,
he told the members it was wrong not to allow him to reply: "You are
here to act upon the principle of liberty, not to stifle liberty of
speech and stand against it." His words were unavailing and the As­
sembly rejected the Canal concession extension by a large majority.

The Assembly's decision was greeted with ecstasy by the people.
The applause and cheering were deafening, and members, visitors, jour­
nalists, and others "were seen embracing one another and exchanging
congratulations upon the grand victory." Outside the hall, about
15,000 children and pupils raised a cheer when the Assembly's decision
was announced, and marched with banners and music shouting their praise
of the Assembly members and the Nationalist leaders. The Gazette correspondent noted the presence of a new cry among the crowd, however: "Down with the Army of Occupation," and "Down with England."³⁸

Despite an official disclaimer from the Government, the suspicion by the Gazette correspondent of collusion between the Ministers and the Assembly in the rejection of the Canal scheme was made patent when the Nationalist newspaper, al-Shaab, published a story to that effect. The Gazette called the story "extraordinary" and "audacious," but said that the view of al-Shaab was commonly believed. High officials and former Ministers were declaring that the present Government had not desired the extension of the Canal concession and that its agreement with the Assembly was a "matter of course." Unwilling to relinquish their posts, the Ministers had appeared to accept the scheme because their superiors wished it to pass, but as Egyptians, the Ministers "were bound to think as their friends in the Assembly thought and pray for the fall of the scheme."

The Gazette said that it would be difficult to find ten Egyptians in Cairo who held a view different from this but pointed out that Zaghlul had assured friends that he was perfectly sincere in his defense of the project. Having studied the matter carefully, he was convinced that the nation would never gain anything from the Canal because, "unless the Company continued its administration after 1969, the Canal would be considered the common property of all nations, and Egypt would lose all revenue therefrom."³⁹ Although Zaghlul's assurances were accepted by the Gazette, it had to admit that the public continued
to believe that there had been collusion and that Zaghlul had "wrung" the official disclaimer from the Prime Minister only "after consider­able difficulty." The Assembly's rejection of the Canal concession extension was reported in Gorst's Annual Report for 1909 as proving that Egypt was unfit for self-government. There can be little doubt of a connection between this and the news that the Egyptian Government had suddenly de­cided to follow a sterner policy with the Nationalists. The Press Law was modified to make it tougher and more impartial by putting trials arising from it into the hands of the European judges of the Assize Courts. In addition, the Government submitted two other Bills to the Legislative Council, one of which dealt with discipline in the Government schools, and the other with political conspiracies. The Gazette welcomed all three Bills describing them as "the important legislative trilogy which may be taken to represent the new policy of firmness introduced by the Government since the murder of Butros Pasha and foreshadowed in Sir Eldon Gorst's Report."

It was evident by the sudden change in policy that the Government was in a bind, and there appeared persistent rumors that the Said Min­istry was going to resign. The Gazette reported the rumors as justi­fied saying that "the present Ministry was ushered into official ex­istence as the most liberal and most patriotic of Egyptian Ministries ....But the current of circumstances has compelled them to drift in the opposite direction...." The paper went on to tell how, ever since the Ministers had assumed office, they had been dismissing "mutinous Na­tionalists" from offices, suppressing Nationalist newspapers and
prosecuting their owners, framing laws to combat the Nationalist movement, supporting schemes which the majority of the people opposed, and generally "disappointing their friends in nearly every way." In addition, it was an "open secret that the relations of Ministers with British authorities are not exactly what they should be in some departments of State." Thus, the paper analyzed, "it would require superhuman powers to retain a position in which such difficulties exist for any length of time." 43

However, if the Government had decided to be tough with the Nationalists, Zaghlul's activities belied his agreement with that policy. On April 16, only a few days after the Assembly's rejection of the Canal concession extension, it was reported that the Ministry of Justice was already drawing up a new scheme to increase the powers of both the Legislative Council and the General Assembly by granting them the right to give decisions binding on the Government in a number of affairs excluding the budget. 44 Moreover, as Minister of Justice, Zaghlul was responsible for defending the Government's position before the Legislative Council on two of the three Bills designed to curb Nationalist activities. In each case it was obvious that his heart was not in it.

On May 30, 1910, Zaghlul met with the Legislative Council to discuss the modified Press Law Bill which two of the members, Ismail Abaza and Fathalla Barakat, opposed on the grounds that there was no appeal from the judgment of the Assize Courts nor was there any jury. The Minister defended the Bill saying that the Government wanted the Assize judges to handle the trials because they were not under the control of
the Ministry of Justice and any suspicion of influence being exercised on the outcome of the cases would thus be removed. Although in its reporting of the matter, the Gazette made no allusion to the insult which Zaghlul must have felt at having to admit that his own Ministry was deemed untrustworthy by the authorities, it did say that his defense was "perhaps not as forcible and eloquent as some of his former utterances...."  

The Legislative Council met again on June 1 to discuss the Political Conspiracies Bill in which the Government was seeking to make the law applicable to any criminal agreement between two or more persons, and included "all sorts of conspiracy or concerted action, or the determination to act in a criminal way." The Council's committee in charge of the Bill amended it to read that the law was not applicable to any group of less than five persons, and that it was to be used only in cases of conspiracy involving members of the Government or its officials. The Bill was passed as amended without discussion, in the Gazette's opinion, by prearrangement among the members of the Council. The newspaper reported that, "strange to say," Zaghlul, who had come to defend the Bill, saw it "distorted and disfigured...without uttering a single word in defense of the official view." With obvious sarcasm, the correspondent said that the Minister rose to speak only "when the work of distortion was achieved" and delivered a speech in which he thanked the members of the Council for their aid to the Government in legislation and for "the patriotic zeal they had invariably shown." He "reiterated and even emphasized the remarkable statement of the Committee that the country enjoyed perfect peace and tranquility, and that
all rumors to the contrary were untrue," Zaghlul assured the Council members that this Bill and the others recently submitted to them were only measures of precaution, and "were not put forward because there was any unrest or agitation; but because they were necessary for completing the law of the land and supplying a need which might become pressing in the future." The correspondent, his pen by now dripping with acrimony, reported that-Zaghlul "repeatedly prayed God to keep Egypt in her present peaceful condition and never to allow the necessity of applying the new laws. A chorus of 'Amens' was raised by the members while their favorite Minister made this pious declaration."46

Zaghlul's conduct before the Legislative Council received more bitter comment in a Gazette editorial on June 3 which noted that the Political Conspiracies Law, having been made applicable only to the Government and its servants, now shielded the very agitators against whom it had been designed. The School Discipline Bill, framed to check student demonstrations, now provided that guilty students would not be dismissed, but simply transferred to other schools thus making it possible "to spread sedition throughout all the Government Schools," and the Press Bill, which was to check the Nationalist agitation said to be responsible for Ghalil's assassination, was rejected. The Gazette, with both irony and dismay, commented that "all this" was done amidst declarations that "neither the conduct of the students nor that of the political agitators who egg them on is such as to call for any special measures," and that Zaghlul had not only echoed these sentiments, but had watched these Bills "mutilated out of all recognition without uttering a single protest!" The paper served notice that the matter was
not ended by remarking that it remained "to be seen what the Government and its British Advisers will do." If there was any indecisiveness on the part of the Egyptian Government and its Advisers as to how to deal with the situation, it was soon resolved for them by the Liberal Government in England. On June 1, former President of the United States Theodore Roosevelt delivered a speech in London criticizing British policy in Egypt and reminding the British that they had entered Egypt twenty-eight years before to establish order. He then told his hosts that "if you do not wish to establish and keep order there, why, then, by all means get out of Egypt." Undoubtedly stung by this advice, Foreign Secretary Edward Grey announced in Parliament a few days later that the British Occupation of Egypt would continue. Speaking about the agitation in Egypt against the Occupation, he warned that it could only lead to the increased assertion of British authority, and added: "I cannot talk any more of the development of self-governing institutions in Egypt as long as that agitation against the British Occupation continues...."

These words doomed any hopes the Council and Zaghlul were entertaining of rendering the three repressive Bills ineffective, and on June 15, the Gazette announced that, while the Discipline Bill had not yet been passed, the Egyptian Government had overridden the Council's decisions and had passed the Press Bill unaltered and the Conspiracies Bill with slight modifications. Zaghlul, trying to soften the blow, and perhaps partly as a last gesture of defiance, was reported to have promised that the new laws would be used only in exceptional circumstances and would not be employed to undermine personal liberty.
Although such Bills were passed into law by the Egyptian Government, and it seemed hopeful to the British that the Nationalists had at last been brought under control, there remained doubt that this was really the case. The reason for such doubt is that there still seemed to be suspicions that the Said Government was in collusion with the Nationalists. In early September, the Gazette reported that the Cabinet was under heavy attack in the Nationalist press for being tools of the British. Such attacks, said the Gazette, "now-a-days necessarily mean that the Ministry is stable and permanent in its position and that the ruling Power will uphold and maintain the Said Ministry as a matter of course."51

These attacks were closely followed by rumors that Said and Zaghlul would resign from the Cabinet and be replaced by two other men, one of whom was Fathi Zaghlul, Saad's brother, who was hated by the Nationalists for sitting as a judge in the Dinshwai trials. It was also rumored that the new Prime Minister would be Mustapha Fahmi, the former Prime Minister under Cromer and a known British partisan. When al-Mokattam, a pro-British Arabic newspaper with the reputation of being very close to the British Agency, asserted in its columns that the Ministry was indeed about to resign, the Nationalists suddenly abandoned their policy of hostility to the Government and began to defend it as the best one for Egypt. The Gazette correspondent submitting the story to the paper analyzed the Nationalist's strange behavior as part of a hoax which they were perpetrating on the British. Taking advantage of British tendencies to support the Egyptian Cabinet when it was under attack in the anti-Occupation press, as exemplified
above by the Gazette's own reaction to Nationalist criticism of the Government, the Nationalists, in the reporter's opinion, were attacking the Cabinet, assuring that the British authorities would keep it in power. Moreover, the correspondent thought the hoax to be "quite obvious" because the Nationalists "consider some of the present Ministers as the best friends of their cause...."

In spite of the knowledge that the Cabinet contained men who might be expected to obstruct their cause, the British authorities continued to keep the Said Government in power, and the Gazette, justifying this, wrote that they had done everything according to the advice of the British and had the open satisfaction of the Khedive. Furthermore, the Cabinet had even "done in certain cases what the British Advisers desired but did not advise out of deference to the supposed Nationalist tendencies of certain Ministers."  

Although the Gazette continued to adhere to its editorial policy of describing the Said Cabinet as satisfactory and loyal to the British, it had already begun, for the first time, to question publicly the loyalty of Saad Zaghlul by publishing articles, written by non-staff people, which connected this Minister with the Nationalists. Such an article had first appeared in June, 1910, when the Gazette published an article written by Valentine Chirol, Foreign Editor of the London Times. Chirol laid the blame for the state of affairs in Egypt at that time on Cromer who appointed "Saad Pasha Zaghloul sic, an avowed Nationalist" to the Egyptian Ministry. While the Gazette made no comments on Chirol's description of Zaghlul, it published a Letter
to the Editor in September which could leave little doubt in the minds of the British as to where Zaghlul stood.

The letter, signed simply "An Ex-Official," was a commentary on the article revealing that Nationalist criticism of the Cabinet was a hoax. The "Ex-Official" agreed with the article, but said that the correspondent "deliberately avoided touching on certain facts which ought to be made officially public one day and of the truth of which I have no doubt." He remarked that his facts were "really startling," and might draw denials from certain quarters, but that "the world will be convinced of their truth in the course of the following season."

He began his expose by commenting that there was a mistaken common belief among the British in Egypt that Mohammad Said, a known Nationalist, was contemplating taking over the leadership of the Nationalists as soon as he was compelled to resign from his post as Prime Minister. "This is incorrect," said the writer, "for although Mohammad Said is a Nationalist at heart...he prefers to remain the faithful servant of his august master, the Khedive,..." The letter-writer further revealed that it had always been clear to high British functionaries "who know what the man is" that Said was "unjustly suspected and unfairly treated by certain supporters of the present regime." The former official reiterated that Said was a Nationalist at heart, "as nearly every Egyptian Moslem is, but he is not the dangerous schemer and the future Nationalist leader that some people seem to suppose."

Then came an astounding disclosure that it was Zaghlul who threatened to lead the Nationalists the moment he left the Ministry. Calling Zaghlul an able and secretive man, the writer revealed that the
Mini at nr had worked for an independent Egypt and for a Nationalist movement since the days of the Arabi Revolt, and that no one who had followed Zaghlul's career for three decades or who had any inkling of the purposes of the Moslem societies which he had founded or joined could doubt for one moment that Zaghlul was a "nationalist of the Nationalists" and that one day he would prefer the leadership of that party to official life. Zaghlul was taken into the Government by Cromer and Mustapha Fahmi over the objections of the Khedive, and Fahmi was even now trying to secure the position of Prime Minister for his son-in-law, Zaghlul, a move which the Khedive would not now or ever countenance.

The letter further disclosed that Butros Ghali had repeatedly complained of Zaghlul's conduct and that the late Prime Minister had once openly accused his Minister of disclosing a state secret to the Nationalist leaders. The "Ex-Official" explained that "the removal of this Minister who worked Nationalist wonders at the Ministry of Public Instruction was contemplated on various occasions" but that he was retained because of the influence of Cromer, and because whenever Zaghlul's removal was hinted at, the Minister threatened to lead the Nationalist party to victory. Thus, Zaghlul was retained in the Cabinet although the Khedive and Ghali were never on his side.

Coming to the present, the letter said that the impression that Said and Zaghlul were an inner circle in the Cabinet working together for Nationalist aims was incorrect. On the contrary, the two men were not presently on friendly terms, and had "lived in evident unfriendliness" ever since Said's promotion to the premiership which Zaghlul had
coveted for himself. The letter ended: "The late Butros Pasha said on more than one occasion that he regretted the admission of Saad Pasha Zaghloul sic into his Ministry."55

Despite disclosures by men such as Chirol and the amazing revelations contained in the former official's letter, the Gazette made no comments against the Said Government nor Zaghlul. Instead it reported by late November that there were no problems between Gorst and the Ministers and that all was quiet as the new political season began.56 It was not quiet long.

Only a few days after the political season was initiated with the opening session of the Legislative Council, there were rumors of a crisis in the Cabinet. According to the Gazette, it was "apparent that there were deep differences of opinion" between Said and Zaghlul which might lead to the latter's resignation. However, the Gazette stated that Zaghlul's resignation was unlikely.57 Nevertheless, the rumors persisted throughout the spring and early summer of 1911 that changes were coming in the composition of the Government.

In the meantime, Zaghlul left Egypt for a summer vacation in Europe, and the newspapers were devoted to the news that Gorst who had died of cancer in England in July, was to be replaced by Lord Kitchener, the former chief of the Egyptian army in the days of Cromer. With Zaghlul's return to Egypt, however, the rumors started up again. Both Said and Zaghlul, in separate interviews, deprecated the notion that there were bad relations between them,58 but the idea that changes were going to occur in the Cabinet was too strong to be quieted. It was
even rumored after Kitchener paid an hour-long unannounced visit to Zaghlul's house that he would be asked to form a new Government and become Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{59}

All the same, no changes occurred, and the same Cabinet continued in power. But soon after the beginning of 1912, rumors began again; this time that Zaghlul was going to resign. Throughout February and March, the stories persisted and gained credence. The Gazette, commenting on these rumors, said that there was no doubt that the harmony between Said and Zaghlul which had appeared in September was missing, but the paper was mystified as to the reasons for this situation. Furthermore, the Gazette wondered why Zaghlul felt he must resign, remarking that he had the confidence of the British Agency and that there was no reason to suppose that this confidence had been withdrawn.\textsuperscript{60}

The announcement of Saad Zaghlul's resignation from the Cabinet on April 1, 1912, caused the speculation in Cairo to change from the question of what he would do to why he had done it. The Gazette's opinion was that the resignation was the "outcome of a long series of differences of opinion between him and his colleagues."\textsuperscript{61} Other newspapers believed that it was due to poor relations between him and the Khedive to whom Zaghlul had failed "to show any condescension...,"\textsuperscript{62} a view which Kitchener appears to have put forth when he informed the Foreign Office of the Minister's action.\textsuperscript{63} The Gazette also reported that there was even a third interpretation. This was that Zaghlul had resigned because he was not consulted by the Prime Minister before the latter instituted legal proceedings against Mohammad Farid, the
Nationalist leader, in connection with a speech against the Government made by him in February. Wilfred Blunt seems to have viewed Zaghlul's leaving of the Government in a similar vein, and wrote in his Diary on April 13, 1912: "It appears that Saad Zaghlul has resigned at Cairo, having refused to prosecute Farid." Probably all three reasons are connected with Zaghlul's resignation.

In evaluating Zaghlul, the Gazette said that the term "naive" could be applied to the former Minister because of his obstinate stands on issues. It found that his force of character "might be useful in many spheres, but was disturbing in an Egyptian Cabinet." Nevertheless, it stated that Zaghlul was much respected and full of energy, and expressed the hope that this energy would find "an outlet useful for this country." A few days later, the British paper reported that Kitchener and his Oriental Secretary, Ronald Storrs, had called on Zaghlul and that the men had discussed Kitchener's projects for Egypt in a meeting lasting over an hour. The Gazette deduced from this that there remained little ground for suspicion that relations between Zaghlul and the British Agency were unfriendly, and asserted: "The former Minister of Justice still enjoys the confidence and esteem of the Occupation." As events were to prove, the Gazette was speaking only for itself.
Footnotes - Chapter III

1 Mansfield, p. 184.

2 Standard (Weekly Edition), November 24, 1908, p. 367; Gazette, November 14, 1908, p. 3.

3 Gazette, March 4, 1909, p. 4.

4 Gazette, January 19, 1909, p. 5.

5 Gazette, March 4, 1909, p. 4.

6 Gazette, February 8, 1909, p. 3; February 12, 1909, p. 3.

7 Gazette, February 19, 1909, p. 3.

8 Gazette, March 2, 1909, p. 3.

9 Gazette, February 27, 1909, p. 3.


11 Gazette, September 27, 1909, p. 3.

12 Gazette, February 7, 1910, p. 3.

13 Gazette, February 25, 1910, p. 3.

14 Gazette, February 25, 1910, p. 2.


16 Gazette, February 16, 1909, p. 4.


18 Gazette, March 8, 1909, p. 3.

19 Gazette, March 25, 1909, p. 3.


25. Gazette, September 8, 1909, p. 3.


29. Gazette, November 4, 1909, p. 3.


31. Gazette, February 10, 1910, p. 3; February 12, 1910, p. 3.


33. Gazette, February 21, 1910, p. 3.

34. Gazette, February 26, 1910, p. 3.

35. Gazette, April 5, 1910, p. 3.

36. Gazette, April 6, 1910, p. 3.

37. Gazette, April 7, 1910, p. 2.

38. Gazette, April 8, 1910, p. 3.

39. Gazette, April 15, 1910, p. 3.

40. Gazette, April 15, 1910, p. 3.
41 Gazette, April 28, 1910, p. 2; May 10, 1910, p. 2.
42 Gazette, May 6, 1910, p. 2; June 2, 1910, p. 3.
43 Gazette, May 24, 1910, p. 3.
44 Gazette, April 16, 1910, p. 3.
45 Gazette, May 31, 1910, p. 3.
46 Gazette, June 2, 1910, p. 3.
47 Gazette, June 3, 1910, p. 2.
48 Gazette, June 6, 1910, p. 5.
49 Gazette, June 15, 1910, p. 3; June 21, 1910, p. 5.
50 Gazette, June 15, 1910, p. 3.
51 Gazette, September 5, 1910, p. 3.
52 Gazette, September 10, 1910, p. 3.
53 Gazette, September 29, 1910, p. 3.
54 Gazette, June 28, 29, 1910, p. 3.
55 Gazette, September 13, 1910, p. 3.
56 Gazette, November 29, 1910, p. 2.
57 Gazette, February 13, 1911, p. 3.
58 Gazette, September 18, 1911, p. 3; September 19, 1911, p. 3.
59 Gazette, October 3, 1911, p. 3; October 27, 1911, p. 3.
60 Gazette, March 23, 1912, p. 3.
A minute, or comment, signed R.G.V. (probably Robert Gilbert Vansittart who had been a member of the British Agency in Cairo from 1909-1911), and written on the cover of the file containing Kitchener's telegram informing the Foreign Office of Zaghlul's resignation said: "We were prepared for this. Saad Zagloul and H.H. have never got on. Their faults clashed." FO 371/1562/13894.
CHAPTER XV

EMERGENCE AS LEADER OF THE NATIONALISTS

Saad Zaghlul's resignation from the Government on March 31, 1912, by no means removed him from the public eye, and the newspapers continued to follow his activities and to speculate about them. In the first few days after his resignation, it appeared that he would eschew politics, returning to private life and the practice of law. When it was reported that he had refused to join the Party of the People—an anti-British, anti-Khedive, and an anti-Said Government Party—he denied in an interview with the Gazette that he had even been approached by the Party. He also denied that representatives of the newly-established Syndicate of Lawyers (Bar Association) had come to him with a request to become their President and told the reporter that he intended to set up office as a consulting lawyer but would not engage in advocacy before the Courts.¹

If Zaghlul was seeking a life free from controversy, he was not able to attain it, for he quickly became embroiled in a libel suit arising out of facts concerning his resignation which it was evident certain high personages, including some in the Government, did not wish to be made public. On April 6, only six days after he had left the Cabinet, al-Ahram published a letter signed "Aref" (one who knows) alleging that only a short time before his resignation, Zaghlul was
saying that he had never thought of resigning and never would as long as he was doing his duty toward his country. But, Aref continued, if Zaghlul was an inflexible man as some people said, he was also flexible enough "to yield and to give way" when necessary as his resignation proved. 2

The letter then disclosed that some of the former Minister's friends had related that Zaghlul, as a Minister, had questioned the honesty and dignity of a highly-placed Government employee during an important meeting, thinking that by so doing, he was serving his country. Aref went on, saying that Zaghlul, by this action, wanted to sow dissension between the "two groups of the leading men of the nation" when it was to Egypt's interest to promote friendship and understanding between them. When Zaghlul was asked to verify what he had said about this man, he was unable to do so. Soon thereafter, some of the men in the Executive Branch of the Government began to lose confidence in the Minister's reports, and members of the Legislative Branch began to think that the time had come for him to resign. However, Zaghlul did not submit his resignation right away because he was waiting for an opportunity to leave under favorable conditions. In the meantime, Aref alleged, Zaghlul sought to save himself by requesting a member of the Khedive's family to intercede with Abbas II on his behalf. When this failed, he submitted his resignation.

Aref's letter also related that Zaghlul had submitted his resignation to Kitchener through the Judicial Adviser with an accompanying letter to the Consul-General from the Minister stating: "You have sacrificed me to please the Khedive." Aref reported that Kitchener
personally informed the Minister that he accepted his resignation with satisfaction, and Aref commented further that if Kitchener did sacrifice Zaghlul, it was because the former wished to cater to public opinion and not, as Saad had claimed, to that of the Khedive.

The letter then went into Zaghlul's appointment to the Cabinet in the days of Cromer saying that the latter was seeking to strengthen his position after Denshway and that by appointing Saad, a man well-known for his opposition to the British Government and policy, Cromer meant to please the Nationalists. Also, since Saad was known to "praise" the British, the former Consul-General hoped as well to strengthen his own position in England. "Days passed," continued Aref, "and the two powers reconciled. Thus there was no need for the services of Saad Pasha who had entered the Cabinet for dissension and controversy, and who left it for conformity and peace."

After the publication of Aref's letter, Zaghlul sent a telegram to the Egyptian newspapers denying what Aref had written, and especially that he had resorted to a member of the Khedive's family for intercession on his behalf. He also said that he was prepared and authorized to disclose the true facts of the matter if Aref would reveal his real name, and filed a charge of libel against al-Ahram. On April 11, the same paper declared that it was authorized by Aref to reveal his name upon the request of any Court or its representative, and that Zaghlul had been informed of this. In the meantime, al-Ahram published another of Aref's letters confirming the contents of the first one, and further alleging that Saad's telegram to the newspapers had been a creation of the organ serving the Party of the People—al-Garida.
On April 14, an investigation into the matter was begun by the Prosecuting Attorney at which Zaghlul's two lawyers, Ibrahim al-Hilbawi and Mohammad Yusuf, were present as well as Aref himself. The masquerade was at last ended, and Aref was publically revealed to be Ismail Abaza, one of the leading members of the Legislative Council. He is reported to have requested that Zaghlul personally attend such conferences because "he knows himself best," and because there were matters which Saad might agree were better not discussed. After a fifteen day delay, Abaza met again with the plaintiff's representatives who gave him permission to proceed with proving his allegations saying that their client would not hold the defendant to the law which forbade defamers from proving their accusations. Abaza repeated his request that Zaghlul attend these meetings, but the lawyers informed him that they had advised their client not to attend and presented Abaza with their Powers of Attorney from Saad. Abaza declined to accept these documents on the grounds that they did not specify the exact task for which the attorneys had been empowered, and refused to answer any more questions until he saw new, detailed Powers of Attorney. On this note, the investigation was terminated.

The next day, April 30, the Gazette reported that Abaza and Zaghlul would appear in Court, but several days later, it was announced that the case had been postponed due to a full Court Calendar.³ In the midst of all the excitement caused by the revelations contained in Abaza's letters and Zaghlul's lodgement of a suit against him, the Gazette declared that an article appearing in al-Garida showed that the former Minister still intended to take an active interest in politics.
The Gazette article said that Abaza had repeatedly written in another Nationalist journal, al-Moayyad, that al-Garida's support of Zaghlul was motivated by a personal interest in the former Minister and that the political views of both the Party of the People and Zaghlul were the same. Al-Garida did not deny this, saying that it did not alienate itself from Zaghlul now that he had left the Government, "but rather have come nearer to him than before. We do not deny the bonds which unite us, nor that we are his personal friends, nor that we are in perfect harmony as to our political tenets. We believe, too, that this relationship...is not unwelcome to Saad Pasha, nor denied by him."

The Gazette's reaction to this news was that it showed "clearly" that Zaghlul had "thrown in his lot" with the Party of the People, and that this explained his attitude towards the Khedive and the Prime Minister. Perhaps bitterly remembering that this Party had begun with the encouragement of Lord Cromer in 1907 for the purpose of being a moderately Nationalist ally of the British in the struggle against Mustapha Kamel and then had joined the opposition, the Gazette said that it had expected Zaghlul to be more "prudent" than to declare so quickly his loyalties to the Garida Group. It further said that his connection with them would probably do him more harm than good because the policy of that newspaper appeared "to consist solely in criticising the Government in season and out of season, and its great grievance is the permanence of the excellent relations between the Khedive and the British Agency." The paper commented that it was a pity that Zaghlul had allied himself with al-Garida and the Party of the People, and said
that "no doubt the time will come when Saad Pasha Zaghlul will repent of the step he has taken."4 But, in light of later reports appearing in the Gazette, as shall be noted, it would appear that the Gazette was perhaps incorrect in connecting Zaghlul with the Party of the People, and, despite the fact that a British official later described Zaghlul as a member of this Party, it still remains a matter of conjecture.

The story which obviously was the focus of the public's attention, however, was the impending litigation between Zaghlul and Abaza, and people eagerly awaited the further revelations which the trial would disclose. The authorities, on the other hand, intended to minimize those disclosures. On May 24, the Gazette reported that "every effort is being put forward to prevent any revelations which the Zaghloul-Abaza case may involve from reaching the press and the public." The paper further noted that "influential personages" were trying to induce Zaghlul to withdraw his case, and that another journal, "the suppressed 'Akhbar'," had "received clear intimations from high quarters" that its articles concerning some of the reasons for Zaghlul's resignation "were not favourably received."5 The latest rumor, said the Gazette, was that the public was to be excluded from the courtroom during the upcoming trial, a rumor, which despite the public's dislike of the idea, became fact.

Zaghlul refused to withdraw his case, and the litigants gathered for the trial in the Cairo Assize Court on May 30, 1912. Evidently the public was admitted to the courtroom, but by prearrangement, the counsel for the defendant opened the proceedings by moving that the room be closed to the public, and the remainder of the trial was held in
camera. Four days later, on June 2, it ended in a judgement against Abaza. Nevertheless, Zaghlul's victory appears not to have been convincing, and the Gazette revealed its suspicions about the judgement by reporting a few days later that official means were used to cover up the circumstances leading to the former Minister's resignation. There are several good reasons for believing that the paper was correct in its statement.

Having supposedly been found guilty of libeling a person of Zaghlul's stature, Abaza's punishment was incredibly light. He was made to pay Court costs, a fine of ten Egyptian pounds, and only one pound in damages to the plaintiff, a mild sentence unless Zaghlul was wanting to prove only that he had been libeled and sought only a small sum in satisfaction of his claim. On the other hand, if Zaghlul asked for a large sum in damages, the Court's judgement would appear to show that Abaza was able to prove the truth of much of what he had written.

Another facet of the trial which must have caused suspicion that higher authorities had mixed into the proceedings was a report which al-Mokattam, the semi-official Arabic newspaper, published saying that all of the witnesses whom Abaza had called in for his defense had testified against him. An example of this is provided by Ahmad Shafeeq, a member of the Khedive's Court, who appears to have been a personal friend of Abaza and who certainly worked closely together with the defendant over a number of years. Shafeeq wrote in his Memoirs, published in 1937, that he had appeared as a witness at the trial and that he had testified against Abaza saying that he was motivated to write the Aref letters out of personal animosity to Zaghlul and out of
a personal desire to please the Khedive. It should also be noted, as a gauge of how sensitive a matter the trial was, that Shafeeq's Memoirs were published twenty-five years after this event, and that he saw fit to say nothing more of importance about it than to explain his own testimony.

The interest aroused by the circumstances of Zaghlul's resignation survived his death, and soon thereafter, another version of his resignation was published which shows that Abaza was correct in some of his facts and it also gives some insight as to why the Government wished to prevent their exposure.

According to the version of Zaghlul's resignation which was published after his death in 1927, the circumstances which led to his leaving the Government arose out of the appointment of Hussein Moharram as guardian for the estate belonging to one of the princesses of the royal family, Princess Salha. Zaghlul objected to this appointment, and, citing unmentioned but specific charges, demanded that Moharram be dismissed from his office. Zaghlul's mistake, according to this story, was that Moharram was a close personal friend to Kitchener, in fact, his "favorite" among the Egyptians. It was also well-known that Moharram kept the Consul-General informed as to what was occurring at the Khedive's palace. When Kitchener was informed of these charges, he reportedly called Zaghlul to his office and told him to produce evidence to prove his charges or to resign, giving him two weeks. In reality, goes the story, Zaghlul's two week period of grace was not for his benefit, but was to allow Kitchener time to confer with London
and obtain its support because he was determined to get rid of Zaghlul whether he could prove his charges or not.

Throughout the affair, the Khedive, who had hated Kitchener ever since an incident that had occurred between them in 1894, retained a position of neutrality with the idea of stepping in on Zaghlul's side, saving his position, and gaining the loyalty and friendship which Saad had heretofore denied him. Others, who knew the truth of the Minister's charges against Moharram, however, refused to help Zaghlul out of fear of Kitchener. Mohammad Said, on the other hand, was aware of what Kitchener intended, and secretly informed Zaghlul of the former's contacts with his Government. Zaghlul became angry with the Consul-General's double-dealing, visited him, and spoke sharply to him about his actions, then left the office, wrote out the resignation, and gave it personally to the Khedive. In the resignation, Zaghlul reportedly mentioned his reasons for leaving, and added: "Because I am not able to reconcile myself between the two authorities: the legal authority, and that of the Occupation, I have had to present my resignation."10

Even though the above story depicts Zaghlul in rather heroic proportions, the facts revealed by it explain how it came to be that the Khedive and Zaghlul, who had never gotten along together in the past, were to be allies in the future as further events will show. It also helps to clarify how early in Kitchener's own career in Egypt he had decided Zaghlul did not belong in the Egyptian Government or in any position which it was in the Consul-General's power to deny him. As shall be revealed, Zaghlul's career was subject to Kitchener's influence even after his own career in Egypt was finished.
The trial over, and the victory ostensibly his, Zaghlul left Egypt in June to rest and to take advantage of the curative waters at Karlsbad. During his absence, newspaper reports circulated that the Nationalist Party would ask for the resignation of their leader, Mohammad Farid, who had fled his country for Europe rather than face trial for his inflammatory speech back in January. This news led to the outbreak of rumors upon Saad's return from Germany that he might be intending to take over the leadership of the Nationalist Party, and interest himself actively in Egypt's politics once again. Nothing came of the rumors, however, and Zaghlul appears to have lived a quiet life as a private citizen for the next year.

Although little is known about the period of Zaghlul's life between his resignation from the Government and his re-emergence into Egyptian politics at the beginning of 1914, there is a story which seems to fall into this time slot, and shows that he had fallen onto hard times financially. It also shows how Kitchener felt about Zaghlul, and how, in the opinion of one man, Lord Lloyd, Kitchener's personal feelings wreaked the chances of bringing over to the British side "a politician who was beginning to display dangerous proclivities towards agitation...."

According to this story, the post of Intendant of the Egyptian Educational Mission in Paris had been vacated by the death of the incumbent, and Kitchener had been requested by Mustapha Fahmi, as a favor for his past loyal services to the British, to offer the position to his son-in-law, Zaghlul, who "was now out of employment, restless, and dissatisfied." Kitchener asked Ronald Storrs, his Oriental Secretary,
for an opinion. Storrs admitted that Zaghlul had a number of defects, but that he was "zealous and honest," and Storrs told the Consul-General that Zaghlul's defects "should not disqualify the Pasha from the care of his young compatriots abroad." Kitchener's answer to Storr's opinion was that Zaghlul was "more trouble than he's worth, and we must find something better." Kitchener, as shall be seen, seems never to have changed his opinion of Saad.

Kitchener had arrived in Egypt with orders from the British Government to restore order but not to reverse Gorst's trends toward liberalization. He accomplished the first part of his orders admirably. Making use of the Press Law, School Discipline Law, and the Conspiracy Law, he suppressed the two leading and most vehement of the Nationalist newspapers, al-Lewa and al-Alam, by the autumn of 1912. The Nationalist Party was rendered moribund by the absence of its leader, Farid, and the suppression of its organs, and a noticeable quiet set into the Government with the resignation of Zaghlul.

By the summer of 1913, Kitchener was ready to continue the policy of liberalization in satisfaction of the second part of his orders, and at the beginning of July, the Gazette published a new Organic Law which replaced that of Lord Dufferin issued in the first months of the Occupation. By the new law, the Legislative Council and the General Assembly were replaced by a single body, the Legislative Assembly, consisting of seventeen Government-nominated members and sixty-six elected members. The Gazette heralded the new Assembly as having much greater power than its predecessors, but the new powers actually boiled down to only two—if they could be called powers: No new laws could be passed
without first being submitted to the Assembly, and the Assembly could delay any legislation it objected to for a month. In the final analysis, the Government, as before, retained paramount power and could either promulgate laws after the month's blocking time was up, or dissolve the Assembly.\textsuperscript{15}

Preliminary elections were held throughout the country on October 26, 1913, to select electors-delegate who would choose the sixty-six elected members of the Assembly at a second election to be held in December. The principal feature of these first elections was complete apathy. Only a little over 50 percent of the electorate voted, and, in the rural areas, much of this turnout was accomplished by coercive measures such as surrounding entire villages with police and refusing to allow any villager to drive his cattle into the fields until he recorded his vote.\textsuperscript{16} The indifference with which the peasants viewed the elections was apparent among the Egyptian upper classes as well, and, reported the Coptic newspaper, \textit{al-Watan}, not one of the Princes, Ministers, or other leading men of the country bothered to vote. The paper's one exception from this statement was Saad Zaghlul whom "everybody admired...for going to vote," and whose action was "a proof of his respect for the nation and the Government, which is the basis of true patriotism."\textsuperscript{17}

Zaghlul's appearance at the polls in Saida Zeinab, a section of Cairo, was received with cheers and shouts from the people that they wanted him as their member in the new Assembly. To the people's disappointment, said the \textit{Gazette}, Zaghlul answered them saying he had come only to vote and not to seek election.\textsuperscript{18} Perhaps because of the
people's cheers, however, he changed his mind and declared his candidacy. In the three weeks between the preliminary elections and the second or general elections, he mounted an election campaign using methods which the Gazette described as "up to date." He was one of only two candidates who wrote up a platform identifying the policies he would pursue if elected. Among these was the cheapening and expediting of attaining justice in the Courts, the spread of public education, and greater freedom of the press. He also warned people against two kinds of candidates: those who used illegal means to promote themselves such as bribery; and those who made use of the European press to advertise their candidacy.

The general elections were held on December 13, 1912, and, unlike the October elections, were attended by great excitement and interest. Although vote-buying was rampant, no such charge was attached to Zaghlul, and he secured the singular triumph of being the only candidate elected to represent two constituencies, one of which, under the Electoral Law, he had to give up. According to a description and analysis of the election written for Kitchener by Ronald Graham, the Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, Zaghlul was easily the most popular figure to run for the Assembly, and with the backing of the Bar Association, the Nationalists, the Party of the People, and the Palace, he secured his election by substantial majorities. Saad's victory, continued Graham, "was celebrated by a paean in the anti-governmental press and he is popularly designated as the natural leader of the opposition...."
In analysing these facts for Kitchener, Graham expressed surprise at the Khedive's support of Zaghlul in view of their bad relations in the past, and the Adviser gave it as his opinion that the Khedive, who was becoming politically isolated, was seeking support "in any quarter, however unpromising." Having intimated that there need be no fear of cooperation between the Khedive and Zaghlul, Graham went on to inform the Consul-General that, despite the Nationalists' designation of Zaghlul as the leader of the opposition, "it is probably far from his inclinations or intentions to assume the attitude of consistent and factious hostility to the Government which is expected of him by the extremists." His analysis proved incorrect.

The Assembly was convened by the Khedive on January 22, 1914. Its first business was to choose an elected Vice-President to serve alongside the President and Vice-President who were appointed by the Government. There were six nominees, and of these, Zaghlul received 65 of the 79 votes recorded, including those of the Government's eight Ministers who may have been hoping to win his support for their policies. If such was the case, the Ministers were to meet with failure.

The Assembly met again on February 2 to discuss its Rules of Procedure. Zaghlul took an opportunity, afforded by a debate on the Rules, to deny rumors that the Assembly was nothing but a Chamber of Opposition to the Government. He called upon the members to prove to the Government that such rumors were groundless and, further, urged them: "Let us understand the Government and it will understand us. Let us leave trifles aside and see to vital questions." Despite
Zaghlul's words, it soon became clear to the British that a large section of the Assembly viewed the Government in a spirit of hostility, mistrust, and suspicion, and that Zaghlul was the embodiment of that spirit. Furthermore, the British believed that Zaghlul was working hand-in-glove with the Khedive to bring about the downfall of the Prime Minister, Mohammad Said, against whom the Khedive bore a bitter grudge for having worked closely with Kitchener to remove the Wakfs from the monarch's control.

Mohammad Said's downfall was brought about over one of the "trifles" which Zaghlul himself had admonished the Assembly to "set aside,"—the matter of who should conduct the Assembly's meetings in the absence of President, the elected or the nominated Vice-President. A motion was made that the Government-nominated Vice-President should have the precedence, and a violent, bitter, and long controversy ensued. Zaghlul declared that this motion was an attempt to humiliate the nation and its representatives, and must be resisted to the death. Said stated that the procedure in force in the old Legislative Council would continue to be followed and that the nominated Vice-President would replace the President when he was absent. The press picked up the matter, and Said was soon unpopular among many of his fellow countrymen. The Khedive expressed his exasperation with him and demanded that Kitchener permit a change in Prime Ministers. The British Government grudgingly allowed Kitchener to permit the switch because the Consul-General feared an open rupture between the British and the Khedive if he were opposed on this matter, and because his choice for Said's replacement was Mustapha Fahmi. Kitchener advised that the
appointment of Fahmi, who was no friend to the Khedive and who had always been loyal to the British, would be a move for the better.  

Kitchener changed his mind after a meeting with Fahmi on April 4, 1914, during which it became apparent that Fahmi had fallen under the influence of his son-in-law, Saad Zaghlul. Kitchener informed the Foreign Office that Fahmi proposed to change all of the Ministers sooner or later, "and especially to make a clean sweep of those who had been most loyal to His Majesty's Government." The men whom Fahmi intended to put into the Cabinet, Kitchener noted, "were chiefly distinguished for their devotion to Saad." The Consul-General called on the Khedive that afternoon and "discovered" that his repugnance to Fahmi's proposals was shared by the Khedive. The two men decided to offer the Premiershipt to Hussein Rushdi, the Minister of Justice, whom Kitchener felt was a good speaker and was best able to cope with the present situation. On April 5, Rushdi formed his Cabinet and became the new Prime Minister.

When the new Government met with the Assembly for the first time on April 7, Zaghlul expressed his desire to work with it in a co-operative spirit, but he was soon attacking its measures, and, it was apparent, he had the support of the Khedive in these attacks. Thus the acrimonious debates between Government and Opposition continued throughout the remainder of the Assembly's session, except for the last day, June 7. The British noted that Saad was absent from that last meeting.

Six months before, Ronald Graham had found it unlikely that the first session of the Assembly would be marked by factious opposition or
that Zaghlul would be its leader. He now wrote that the results of
that first session were unsatisfactory, and that Zaghlul, who was the
dominating personality throughout the session, had "all the makings of
a successful demagogue." Concerning the activities of the Assembly, he
wrote that its "bitter and unreasoning hostility" to the Government had
seriously affected the conduct of State affairs and that it was a
question "whether this experiment in representative Government could
justify its inception." In considering the answer to this question,
part of his analysis should have gladdened the heart of every Egyptian
Nationalist.

Graham pointed out that the Assembly was only a consultative
body, but that the manner in which it was discussed in the Egyptian
press and the interest which the press had excited among "small but
noisy" circles of Egyptians had given the Assembly an importance out of
proportion to its powers. The Assembly quite naturally had sought to
extend its powers and to arrogate the right to force the Government to
subordinate legislation to its approval. This tendency was encouraged
by the weakness of Ministers who "must inevitably incline to sympa-
thise with the Chamber's aspirations" or be considered as an "un-pa-
triotic" reactionary. When, added to this, the Khedive worked against
his own Cabinet, "few, if any," Ministers could be found strong enough
to maintain their position. Thus, wrote Graham, "it must be recognized
that, in the future, the new Chamber will be an important factor in the
success and even the existence of Egyptian Cabinets." The Assembly was scheduled to meet again on November 1, 1914, but
the outbreak of war in August caused both the British authorities and
the Egyptian Government first to delay the re-opening of the Assembly, and then finally adjourn it until the end of the Great War. Their reasons for this were of course motivated by fear of the Assembly which the British felt would afford opportunities for intrigue against a Ministry which was committed to cooperation with them. The British were determined to keep a tight lid on Egyptian Nationalism during the War, and although Zaghlul assumed a quiet, and even a penitent attitude, the Occupation authorities refused three times between 1914-1918 to allow Rushdi, who feared Zaghlul's popularity, to take him into the Cabinet.

Zaghlul, for his part, continued in his quiet attitude, even though denied Cabinet posts. He made no moves until the cessation of hostilities, when, drawing on his status as the elected Vice-President of the Assembly—the highest elective office in Egypt—he asked, as the representative of the Egyptian people, to be allowed to proceed to London to present the Egyptian case for independence.
Footnotes - Chapter IV

1. Gazette, April 6, 1912, p. 3; April 12, 1912, p. 3.

2. Shafeeq, vol. II, pt. 2, pp. 271-273. The actual letters of "Aref," printed in al-Ahram, were unobtainable at the time that research was being conducted for this dissertation. They will, however, be available in the near future. In the meantime, use has been made of a precis of these letters contained on the pages from Shafeeq's Memoirs cited above, and all quotes used in narrating the contents of the letters come from the precis of the letters.

3. Gazette, April 30, 1912, p. 3; May 4, 1912, p. 3.


5. Gazette, May 24, 1912, p. 3; May 27, 1912, p. 3.

6. Gazette, May 28, 1912, p. 3; June 3, 1912, p. 3; June 29, 1912, p. 3.

7. Gazette, June 3, 1912, p. 3.

8. Gazette, June 4, 1912, p. 3.


11. Gazette, May 28, 1912, p. 3; August 29, 1912, p. 3; September 17, 1912, p. 3.


14. Gazette, September 2, 1912, p. 3; October 7, 1912, p. 2; November 7, 1912, p. 3.

15. Gazette, January 22, 1914, p. 3; Mansfield, p. 199.

17. Gazette, October 28, 1913, p. 3.

18. Gazette, October 29, 1913, p. 3.

19. Gazette, December 16, 1913, p. 3.

20. Gazette, October 30, 1913, p. 3.


22. Gazette, January 23, 1914, p. 3.


28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.
CONCLUSION

As was mentioned in the Introduction to this study, modern scholars have not studied Zaghlul's career prior to 1919, and have allowed themselves, when discussing his early career, to be guided by the views of Saad's late biographer, al-Aqqad. The facts which have emerged in this study would seem to call for a revision of al-Aqqad's view that Saad was a moderate Nationalist who believed in the British presence in Egypt.

It is to be suggested that Zaghlul did believe in British attempts to reform Egypt and to prepare her for self-government, but it has been seen that the British also did much to see that Egypt would not be prepared for this stage for a great number of years. Their parsimonious release of powers to the Egyptian Legislature and to the Egyptian Cabinet were intended to guarantee that Egypt would be under their thumb probably for the remainder of this century. This situation may have been realized by Egyptians at the time that the project for the extension of the Suez Canal concession was presented to the General Assembly in 1910.

Zaghlul's career from 1906-1914 seems to have been based on the assumption that the British were dragging their feet in the matter of preparing Egypt for self-government. This is shown in his career in
the Ministry of Education and his continuous opposition to the policies of Dunlop, the Adviser, whose objections to the use of Arabic in schools assured that Egypt would be years in learning the modern knowledge of technology, etc., which was being produced in English. Politically, the British hesitation to give any real powers to the Egyptian Legislature or to the Government guaranteed that Egypt would be in a state of tutelage for years to come, and Zaghlul's work in resisting the extension of the Canal concession may be seen as his attempting to gain for his country not only power over its affairs, but also as an attempt to deny the British to keep his country in tutelage into the Twenty-First Century.

At the same time, the Canal concession project marks a complete change in his attitude. Before this, he seems not to have been working to expel the British from Egypt, but during the early months of 1910, his energies appear to have been geared in that direction. Hence, his lukewarm support of the Press Bill and his non-support of the Conspiracies Act was an effort to defeat British attempts to quell the spirit of rebelliousness which was becoming stronger in Egypt. He was defeated when these laws were passed by the Government acting under British pressure.

Having left the Cabinet in 1912, he returned to Egyptian political life in 1913. He ran for the new Legislative Assembly with the support of the Nationalists and the Khedive and won by substantial majorities in two constituencies, the only Egyptian to be so honored. In the first, and only, session of this Assembly, he dominated the Chamber and led the forces opposing the British supported Government to
an important victory—the power to influence the success and even the existence of Egyptian Cabinets. By the end of this session, it was apparent that Zaghlul was the leader of Egyptian Nationalism.

When World War I began, the British clamped the lid on Egyptian Nationalism, but the triangle—British, Nationalists, and King—which was to dominate Egyptian politics in the post-war era had already appeared by the outbreak of the War. It may be argued that it first clearly materialized when the Khedive Abbas II threw his support to Zaghlul, who had already begun to appear as the heir to Farid's leadership of the Nationalists, in the election for the Legislative Assembly. The triangle was kept up in the course of the War when Abbas' two wartime successors, Hussein and Fuad, tried to assure themselves and their Government of Zaghlul's support by requesting that he be taken into the Cabinet. However, the British were by this time so assured of Zaghlul's hostility that they could not afford to take the chance of having him in a position to wreck their hold on the Egyptians during the War. With the triangle already in existence, however, and with Zaghlul well aware of the power which he held as the highest elected representative of the people, it would seem that his post war career was inevitable.
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