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INTRODUCTION

During the last century and three-quarters the speculative works of Immanuel Kant have occasioned more than their share of controversy. In part this is due to the difficult and abstract character of Kant's doctrines; in part also it is due to the ambiguities and inconsistencies which, depending oftentimes on one's point of view toward Kant, exist either in the doctrines themselves or in their tangled mode of expression. Whatever the cause, though, it is true that even yet there is little unanimity about many of the fundamental positions Kant adopts in his speculative works. Indeed, doubts about his meaning are so widespread that it is still a matter of some debate whether the First Critique is simply a patchwork of fragments, fragments which were written in the course of approximately a decade and then sewn together in the space of four months, with little attention being paid to details like consistency, or whether the Critique of Pure Reason is a single unified whole whose unity and power is sometimes masked by surface inconsistencies.

No one, it seems to me, could hope to solve all the problems which Kant's speculative works occasion in one or three hundred pages. Nor could he hope to offer any completely novel view, one which no one else has ever advanced. For that reason I shall attempt to do neither. In the first place, I shall limit myself to one major question—that of whether Kant is or is not, in an appropriate sense of the term, a "realist." In the second place, I shall only attempt to offer novel arguments, or perhaps merely novel nuances of argument, for the well worn conclusion
that he is. My aim is thus primarily interpretive. I am not particu-
larly concerned with the truth or falsity of Kant's claim, though
as a matter of fact I think that in some important respects he is on
the right track. What critical comments I do offer are directed exclu-
sively against those who offer conflicting accounts of Kant's position;
and even these I try to keep to a minimum.

The issues with which I shall attempt to deal in the body of
this dissertation are vexing ones. Throughout his critical writings,
Kant makes us of what he clearly feels to be a crucially important dis-
tinction between empirical objects of phenomena and things-in-themselves. Despite its importance, though, the details of the distinction remain
obscure. Is it, that is, a distinction between collections of subjective
representations, distinguishable in name only from Lockean ideas of Humean
impressions, and their mysterious independently existing causes, causes
with which we can have no epistemic contact whatsoever; or do empirical
objects and things-in-themselves differ, not as objects, but as "modes
of representing" the same object? Though the former is the more popular
alternative, especially among present-day interpreters, I shall argue
that the latter is correct. My reasons for rejecting the former are,
in outline: (a) because it is inconsistent with the way Kant himself
makes the distinction in the very sections of the First Critique and
other writings where he is attempting to elucidate it; (b) because it
commits Kant to a view of the causal relation between appearances and
things-in-themselves which he explicitly rejects the Fourth Paralogism;
and (c) because a plausible interpretation of the distinction can be
given which does not involve Kant in the difficulties mentioned in (a) and (b). Conversely, my reasons for accepting the latter are: (a) because it is the way in which Kant makes the distinction when he is expressly concerned with explaining it; (b) because it does not commit him to a view he openly rejects; and (c) because it makes at least understandable his apparently unargued belief in the existence of things-in-themselves.

Kant's exact manner of distinguishing between appearances and things-in-themselves provides the topic for Chapters I and II. It also generates further complex issues. For, if Kant does distinguish appearances and things-in-themselves as "two ways of looking at the same thing," then he cannot think of representations or appearances as of a sort with Locke's ideas of Hume's impressions, nor of phenomena as collections of such entities. What then are representations, and what relationship do they bear to things-in-themselves on the one hand and phenomena on the other? The answers to these two questions fill the pages of Chapters III and IV. In them I argue several points. In the first place, the Kantian term "representation" is meant to cover a number of mental items, most importantly three which can be called impressions, intuitions, and judgments. None of these is like a Lockean idea or Humean impression, for they are all complexes of "given" matter and mind donated form, each of which is relative to the type of representation under consideration. It is complex impressions, intuitions, and judgments which Kant has in mind when he asserts that appearances are representations.
In the second place, the representations of experience are not themselves the objects of awareness in experience. Rather, such representations are intentional, and intend things-in-themselves. Thus, in experience they function as mental items by means of which we are non-inferentially aware of things-in-themselves; and are in a second way unlike ideas of impressions. Nevertheless, because the matters and forms of such representations are all subjective, the representations of experience allow us no knowledge of their objects as they are in themselves. We are restricted to knowing those objects only as modified by the very representations which make us aware of them. We are restricted, that is, to knowing objects by means of characteristics which are, in truth, merely subjective matters and forms of intentional representations, characteristics which do not exist unless the object they characterize is being experienced.

In the third place, the notion that in experience we are aware of things-in-themselves by means of subjective representations provides the means for explaining the relationship between representations and phenomena. If we can know nothing about things as they are in themselves, then our knowledge must be limited to their subjective modifications. Empirical objects or phenomena are simply collections of such modifications, connected and unified by the various pure and empirical conceptual rules which the understanding has at its disposal. Various representations bear the relationship which Kant calls "standing for" to a phenomenon when they are included in the conceptually necessitated collection of
representations which constitute that phenomenon.

The points which I have mentioned in the last couple of pages are those which I hope to argue in the next four chapters. It is true that Kant accepts them, then he is a realist in the sense that he holds: (a) that there are externally existing objects; (b) that in experience we are aware of those objects; and (c) that our experience of those objects is direct, i.e. non-inferential. The truth of these, though obscured, is not vitiating by his also holding that our acts of awareness modify the external objects they are "of" to such an extent that we have no inkling of those objects' intrinsic natures.

In what follows I have tried to stick to the Kantian text as closely as possible, and to provide as much textual verification for my claims as I can. This is, unfortunately, not always possible. If it were, then there would probably be little controversy surrounding the issues with which I am dealing. Where no textual verification is possible, I have tried to attribute to Kant only the most plausible view consistent with what he does say. In doing so I am working from two presuppositions, both of which take the form here of personal prejudices. First, I believe that, despite occasional lapses, Kant is a consistent thinker, and that there is to be found in his speculative writings coherent positions regarding the distinction between phenomena and things-in-themselves and the nature of representations. Second, I cannot believe he would accept account of these issues which are openly at odds with other view he expresses. To believe this would be to suppose not merely that Kant contradicts himself, but that he is guilty of contradictions so obvious that any thinker, especially
one of Kant's magnitude, should have picked them out immediately.

Such a supposition I find absurd.

I admit that these presuppositions are in many ways unarguable; and I have made no attempt to argue them. Their surface plausibility is obvious, and they should be rejected only out of necessity. That there is no such necessity I hope will become clear as the pattern of my argument emerges.
CHAPTER I

Among the characteristics of objects there are some which are in the following sense "mind-dependent": a necessary condition of their existence is that the object characterized by them be related in certain specifiable ways to perceivers. Call this entire statement P, the mind-dependent characteristics so defined M-characteristics, and any other objective characteristics, that is, any which are not M-characteristics, I-characteristics. The specifiable ways I have in mind are those ordinarily expressed by such verbs as "see," "hear," and the like, i.e. by the ordinary list of perception verbs. The objects referred to in P are to be considered as different from and independent of perceivers, but otherwise they will at this point remain unspecified. P (which for lack of a better term I will call a principle), when properly interpreted, furnishes an accurate means of elucidating Kant's distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves. In itself P is neither trivial nor profound, though in a certain sense it is commonplace. It becomes one or the other, or something in between, depending upon the class or classes of characteristics which are thought to be M-characteristics. For example, P is completely trivial if one claims that the only M-characteristics are those expressed by perceptions verbs, i.e. being seen, heard, etc. It is far more interesting if one claims that M-characteristics are those traditionally known as secondary qualities. It is perhaps most
interesting if one believes, as Kant does, that all empirical properties about which we can sensibly speak are M-characteristics. But of this more later. Given P, a rather obvious distinction between things as they "appear" and things as they "are in themselves" can be drawn. The former phrase designates objects insofar as they possess M-characteristics, while the latter denotes those same objects insofar as they do not possess M-characteristics, but have only l-characteristics. Several points about P, the notions of M- and l-characteristics, and the distinction between things as they appear and as they are in themselves introduced above, merit discussion.

1) The sense in which M-characteristics are said to be mind-dependent should be very cautiously understood. Though P does state that the existence of M-characteristics depends upon things' being perceived, it neither states nor implies that M-characteristics are related to minds in the same way in which Lockean ideas or Humean impressions have been thought to be related to minds. Indeed, as stated, P is incompatible with any view that does claim this. For example, it is incompatible with any representationalist theory of perception according to which we are immediately aware of our own ideas, and know objects only inferentially via such ideas, if at

1Strictly speaking, P even as I have given it here is not trivial, thanks to my assertion that the objects designated are to be thought of as distinct from and independent of perceivers. Though perhaps this claim should be trivial, unfortunately it is not. Nevertheless I have chosen, for better or worse, simply to ignore the possibility of idealism, and interpret P in such a way that it is excluded from the start. Even given that exclusion, however, P holds varying degrees of interest, and my claim to that effect does not seem completely vitiated by interpreting P realistically.
all. M-characteristics are qualities of objects, and are mind-dependent only in the sense that they would not qualify objects were those things not being perceived. Not that they would then characterize something else; rather they simply would not exist at all.

2) To talk of things as they appear, or as appearances, is always to talk of them as possessing M-characteristics; and since it is a necessary condition of the existence of such characteristics that the object be perceived, calling something an appearance does imply that it is perceptually related to a mind. Thus the notion of a thing as it appears is always relational; for there are no appearances which are not appearances to someone. On the other hand, the notion of a thing as it is in itself, or thing-in-itself, is not implicitly relational. To talk of things as they are in themselves is simply to ignore whatever M-characteristics an object might possess or be able to possess and speak solely in terms of its l-characteristics. One does not thereby deny that the thing possesses M-characteristics. Rather, in speaking of the thing as it is in itself, one so to speak abstracts from the object's M-characteristics; but such abstraction in no way implies that it does not, or might not, have such qualities.

3) As a result of (2) some further discussion and clarification of (1) seems required. There I explained that M-characteristics are properties of objects and do not qualify minds in the sense in which ideas or impressions have been alleged to qualify minds. But it is also true that such properties would not exist were the object which they characterize not being perceived; and it is on the basis of this fact that the notion of an appearance was claimed to be relational. It
seems that M-characteristics must be construed as properties of objects in relation to minds; and thus as relational properties, equally as well properties of minds as of objects. In other words, calling a property an M-characteristic implies both that it is an M-characteristic of an object, and, if you will, that it is an M-characteristic to a perceiver. Consequently, it is not true that M-characteristics are in no sense properties of minds. They are relational properties of minds; but they are equally as well relational properties of things.

4) P, as stated, entails neither that things as they are in themselves cannot be perceived nor that they cannot be known in some other way. In the first place, P does not entail that all perceptible properties are M-characteristics. Strictly speaking, indeed, it does not entail that any perceptible properties are M-characteristics, for

The statement that all perceptible properties of objects are M-characteristics I take to be equivalent to the statement that things as they are in themselves cannot be perceived. In doing so, I am presupposing two things: (1) that it is primarily objects we perceive and not properties, and (2) that nevertheless it is only by means of their properties that we do perceive them. This is, it seems to me, the thesis propounded by Kant a good part of the time, and it is in a sense because he propounds the view that he gets into trouble regarding the thing-in-itself. For, as I hope to show, what Kant does is accept P and then claim that all empirical properties of objects are M-characteristics. This, of course, leads to the problem that we cannot know things as they are in themselves. But it also leads to another and perhaps more serious problem. For, if we perceive objects only by means of their properties, and yet the only properties by which we know them are M-characteristics, then it is no longer clear how we can be said to perceive the object. Indeed, it is no longer clear that we can be aware of it in any sense at all. Part of the difficulty with any realistic interpretation such as the one which I am going to attribute to Kant concerns the possibility of specifying a sense in which we can be aware in perception of an independent object, when, so far as we know, all its characteristics are due to our mental constitution. This problem cannot be avoided, though perhaps it also cannot be solved. I shall deal with it later on.
it might be the case that M-characteristics, though having as a necessary condition of their existence the perception of the object, are not in themselves perceptible. Thus, it is compatible with P that there are perceptible properties for whose existence the object's being perceived is not a necessary condition. It is, in other words, entirely possible that there are some perceptible properties which are yet properties of things as they are in themselves; or, to put the point still another way, it is not a contradiction both to assert P and to claim that some of the characteristics by means of which we perceive things are l-characteristics. This possibility would, of course, be precluded if the class of M-characteristics were somehow expanded to include all perceptible properties; but such a move must be made independently of accepting P. In the second place, even if this last step were taken, things as they are in themselves would not as a consequence become unknowable. For P does not rule out the existence of some epistemic relationship, other than perceptual, between minds and things as they are in themselves.

5) The distinction between things as they appear and as they are in themselves, as P allows it to be made, is not a distinction between objects, in the sense in which the difference between muskrats and motor oil is a difference between objects. The thing as it appears is the same thing as the thing as it is in itself. However, in some way dependent upon the mechanics of perception, an object which already possesses its own properties and is thus constituted a thing as it is in itself, takes on a number of additional properties, and thereby becomes a thing as it appears. Appearances are distinguished from
things-in-themselves by these further properties, and by the perceptual relations wherein they are acquired. Nevertheless, it is the very same object, which, while retaining whatever I-characteristics it may possess, becomes, when perceived, an appearance. Consequently, despite the fact that I have up to now used the terms "appearance" and "thing-in-itself" interchangeably with "thing as it appears" and "thing as it is in itself," the former pair is somewhat misleading. To be correctly understood, each should be taken as shorthand for its longer counterpart.¹ This is both because the latter terms express the distinction more adequately, and because they are less likely to arouse suspicions of a bifurcated universe.²

6) Accepting P does not as such commit one to any particular account of what I called above the mechanics of perception. That is, it does not commit one to any specific account of the manner in which M-characteristics are acquired. Though one may feel required to give

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¹ Despite my own advice, I shall continue to use "appearance" or "thing-in-itself" wherever "thing as it appears" or "thing as it is in itself" is linguistically cumbersome. My reasons are simply stylistic.

² Many of the misinterpretations of Kant's distinction seem to derive from making the former set of terms instead of the latter more basic. This, of course, is understandable, given Kant's own tendency to speak of appearances and things-in-themselves. Even so, it is, as I hope to show, mistaken, and leads to the phenomenalistic and idealistic interpretations which are so popular among present-day Kant commentators. Such interpretations are exemplified by Jonathan Bennett, Kant's Analytic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), Peter F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1966), and Robert Paul Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963). Wolff's interpretation is more subtle than either of the other two, and I am sure that he would balk at my calling it idealistic. Nevertheless, in claiming that Kant abandons objects for objectivity, it does seem to me that Wolff is interpreting Kant idealistically. But, once again, of this more later.
such an account, which one he gives is not decided merely by arguing that some characteristics of objects are M-characteristics. The only views which P rules out, and this by fiat are those which lead to subjective idealism or representative realism. Any other position is compatible with it. It might perhaps be thought P also rules out many forms of "naive" realism, for example, any account which makes use of Moore's act/object distinction. This, though, is not the case as long as characteristics like "seen" are admitted as possible M-characteristics.

So far I have been attempting to make and draw attention to several points about a distinction between things as they appear and things as they are in themselves which is expressed in terms of P. The distinction as I have drawn it so far rather obviously does not yet capture Kant's full blown division of things into appearances and thing-in-themselves. Nevertheless P does lie at the foundation of Kant's distinction, at least in the sense that his distinction can best be understood if he is seen as (1) accepting P, and (2) extending the class of M-characteristics to include all empirical qualities about which we can intelligibly speak. What this means, and what I shall shortly begin to argue, is that, in spite of what seem, especially in the A edition, to be assertions to the contrary, Kant does not think of appearances and things-in-themselves as distinct objects. Rather, . . . things as they are in themselves are the very same things that appear to us, although they appear to us . . . as different from what they are in themselves. Strictly speaking . . . (there
is) only one thing considered in two different ways; the thing as it is in itself and as it appears to us. \(^1\)

Furthermore, as I shall also soon begin to argue, attempts to make Kant out as either the kind of phenomenalist who believes that empirical objects are collections of sense data, or as a subjective idealist are mistaken. Such conceptions are, of course, incompatible with the claim that the thing as it appears is the same thing as the thing as it is in itself, and, if it can be established that Kant holds this latter view, then phenomenalist and idealist interpretations of the sort with which I am concerned will \textit{ipso facto} have been shown to be false.

Once again, the basic position which I want to argue is that Kant's distinction between things as they appear and things as they are in themselves can best be understood if he is seen as accepting \(P\) and then extending the class of \(M\)-characteristics to include all those about which we can intelligibly speak. However, I shall not argue that, nor do I think it is true that, Kant ever explicitly does either. I am simply claiming to provide a means of interpreting Kant, a means which reflects his meaning more accurately than interpretations according to which things-in-themselves and phenomena are different objects. Consequently, I cannot point out any place where Kant explicitly makes his distinction in the way outlined above. What I can provide evidence, and I hope conclusive evidence for, is the thesis

that Kant does distinguish appearances and things-in-themselves in a manner which shows that he would have accepted my account of the steps involved had he been made aware of it. Since the interpretation which I am advancing has two distinct parts, demonstrating that Kant would have accepted it requires that I show both that he would have accepted P, and that he would have placed all empirical properties in the class of M-characteristics. Of the two, it is the latter part which is the easier to prove; for it is clear and uncontroversial that Kant thought that all the properties of things which we can know about are somehow mind-dependent. Thus, if it can be shown that Kant would have accepted the claim that there are any M-characteristics at all, it can be rather easily shown that he would have included all knowable properties among them. The problem lies in providing support for the claim that there are any M-characteristics at all, i.e. in proving that Kant would accept P.

P, or at least that interpretation which I have so far given to P, is divisible into three closely related but distinct theses: 1) that there are objects which are different from and independent of perceivers, 2) that there are properties of things which do not exist except when those things are being perceived, and 3) that it is exactly the same object which both exists independently of perceivers, and which possesses the mind-dependent properties mentioned in (2). Three

1The only passage in which Kant looks as though he might explicitly be accepting my account occurs in the Prolegomena (13, Remark II). This, indeed, he might be doing; but the passage is overtly representationalist, and consequently I hesitate to use it as support for my position.
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is the crucial point, because (1) and (2) by themselves are compatible with almost any interpretation of Kant's distinction. Unfortunately, it is also the most difficult to ascribe to Kant; for, though his acceptance of (1) and (2) is clear, it is by no means clear that he would accept (3). Nevertheless, if conclusive evidence can be given that Kant agrees with, or would agree with, (3), it will for all intents and purposes have been shown that he would accept P.¹

I pointed out earlier that, when appearances and things-in-themselves are distinguished on the basis of P, the thing as it appears is the same thing as the thing as it is in itself. The two are distinguished in terms of properties which the former has and the latter does not, and by the epistemic relations in which the object stands on the one hand and does not stand on the other. Thus, proving that Kant would have accepted P amounts to demonstrating a belief on his part that the thing as it appears and the thing as it is in itself are the same thing, and/or that the distinction concerns properties and ways of being aware of objects, not objects themselves. And this is exactly what he does claim throughout both editions of the Critique of Pure Reason, as well as in numerous other locations throughout other Critical writings.

There are several scattered sections of the Critique in which Kant attempts to make clear his Critical distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves. The most important is the chapter entitled

¹Kant's acceptance of (1) and (2) seems to me so clear that I do not think argument for them is necessary. Consequently I shall provide none which is not at the same time argument for (3).
"The Ground of the Distinction of All Objects in General into Phenomena and Noumena," especially pages 305 to 309 of the B edition. This is a complete rewrite of a corresponding passage in A which occupies pages 249 to 253 of that edition. In it Kant discriminates among three items: the phenomenon, the noumenon in the negative sense, and the noumenon in the positive sense. He then goes on to explain the usefulness or lack of usefulness of the latter two for speculative knowledge, concluding that the noumenon in the negative sense has a place in the speculative edifice, but that the noumenon in the positive sense has none. This passage gives strong support to that conception of the distinction between things as they appear and things as they are in themselves which I believe expresses Kant's intended position.

The core of Kant's discussion of how the distinction is to be made is given on B306 and B307. The section is long, but I shall quote it in full.

At the same time, if we entitle certain objects, as appearances, sensible entities (phaenomena), then, since we thus distinguish the mode in which we intuit them from the nature that belongs to them in themselves, it is implied in this distinction that we place the latter, considered in their own nature, although we do not so intuit them, or that we place other possible things, which are not objects of the senses, but are thought as objects merely through the understanding, in opposition to the former, and that in so doing we entitle them intelligible entities (noumena). The question then arises, whether our pure concepts of understanding have any meaning in respect of these latter, and so can be a way of knowing them.

I shall, for the time being, only concern myself with the B revision. The passage from A will be considered in Chapter II, where I shall argue that what in A Kant calls "transcendental object" does the work of what he terms in B the "noumenon in the negative sense."
At the very outset, however, we come upon an ambiguity which may occasion serious misapprehension. The understanding, when it entitles an object in a certain relation mere phenomenon, at the same time forms, apart from that relation, a representation of an object in itself, and so comes to represent itself as being able to form concepts of such objects. And since the understanding yields no concepts additional to the categories, it also supposes that the object in itself must at least be thought through these pure concepts, and so is misled into treating the entirely indeterminate concept of an intelligible entity, namely, of a something in general outside our sensibility, as being a determinate concept of an entity that allows of being known in a certain (purely intelligible) manner by means of the understanding.

If by "noumenon" we mean a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensible intuition, and so abstract from our mode of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the negative sense of the term. But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensible intuition, we thereby presuppose a special mode of intuition, namely the intellectual, and of which we cannot comprehend even the possibility. This would be "noumenon" in the positive sense of the term."

In this selection Kant draws a distinction between what he calls our mode of intuition of objects and the nature which those objects have in themselves. When we call an object "appearance" or "phenomenon" what we are talking about is the manner in which we are aware of it. In doing so, we discriminate between this mode of intuition and whatever nature the object may possess in itself. What we do not do, however, is to distinguish two separate objects, which are in no way identical. There is only one object, which is viewed as appearance insofar as we consider the way in which we intuit it, and as thing-in-itself insofar as we consider the nature which it has in

\[\text{All the quotations from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason are taken from the translation done by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Macmillan: St. Martin's Press, 1968). However, page references will follow the pagination of the original A Edition (1781) and B Edition (1787) of the Critique. Wherever possible, page references will occur in the text following the quoted passages.}\]
itself. Thus, what we have so far is one object, with what might be called two different points of view towards it.

Such a distinction would be comparatively unproblematic were it not for the fact that all known properties of objects have their source in our sensuous mode of awareness and are thus phenomenal. However, due to this fact, the latter manner of conceiving objects, i.e., as to the nature which they have in themselves and out of all relation to our sense, is without content. It is an entirely indeterminate notion, which can only be expressed negatively as the conception of an object "insofar as it is not an object of our sensible intuition." The understanding, however, is not satisfied with such an indeterminate notion, and attempts to give to it some sort of content in terms of the only essentially non-empirical concepts which it has at its disposal, the categories. In so doing, it generates another representation, which is a determinate representation of the nature of objects as they are in themselves, a nature which can only be known by means of a special, non-sensible kind of intuition.

There results a threefold distinction among the "concepts" of phenomenon, noumenon in the negative sense, and noumenon in the positive sense. The first is the idea of an object insofar as it is related to our senses; the second is the indeterminate notion of that same object insofar as it is not available to our intuition, where no attempt is made to specify its nature; and the third is the determinate idea of an object of a special nonsensible type of intuition. This contrast is generated by the understanding subsequent to its realization that the objects of experience are mere appearances. Only the first
two conceptions are speculatively warranted. The third is an illegitimate attempt on the part of the understanding to give some content to the negative notion, that is, to specify for itself the nature of things as they are in themselves.

There are two points about the three-pronged distinction between phenomena and noumena as Kant draws it in the passage quoted above and the pages immediately following that should be stressed. In the first place, the distinction is not between objects. The phenomenon and the noumenon in the negative sense are not different objects. What the distinction distinguishes is our mode of awareness of objects, on the one hand, and the nature which those same objects have in themselves, on the other. Or, as Kant puts it in the second paragraph, it differentiates between objects "in a certain relation" and those same objects "apart from that relation." Such a distinction is the result of an entirely legitimate procedure of the understanding necessitated by its realization that empirical objects are appearances. Without it we should find ourselves in the position of having to claim that there are appearances, but nothing which appears. And as Kant states elsewhere, this is absurd.

But our further contention must also duly be borne in mind, namely, that though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be an appearance without anything which appears. (Bxxvi-xxvii)

What is illegitimate, and this is the second point which requires emphasis, is the understanding's effort to form some positive conception of the nature of the objects of sensible intuition as they are in
themselves. Due to the fact that all the known properties of objects are phenomenal, any such positive conception is and must remain one for which no corresponding object can be provided, and consequently is and must remain the mere form of a concept. In other words, what is illegitimate is the understanding's move from the notion of a noumenon in the negative sense to that of a noumenon in the positive sense. The only conception of noumenon which the understanding is speculatively justified in employing is that of noumenon in the negative sense, that is, of a thing "so far as it is not an object of our sensible intuition."

The force of this last point can be brought out differently. As is obvious from all his Critical writings, Kant believes that we can have no knowledge of things-in-themselves. However, expressed in the terms which I have used here, this claim is ambiguous in a very important way. It could mean either that we cannot know that there are things-in-themselves, or that we cannot know anything at all about such entities. The first of these possible interpretations Kant consistently and forcefully denies. He never doubts that there are things-in-themselves, and that we can know that there are. For example, in Prolegomena #13, Remark III, he says:

My idealism concerns not the existence of things ... since it never came into my head to doubt it, but it concerns the sensuous representation of things to which space and time essentially belong.¹

Or again, in the quote from Bxxvi-xxvii which I gave earlier, and which echoes a similar though deleted passage at A252, Kant clearly states that at least part of what he means by calling an empirical object "appearance" is that there is something, not itself appearance, which appears. Similar texts can be discovered elsewhere, but there is no need to multiply examples. Kant clearly believes both that there are things-in-themselves and that we can know this. Consequently, what he must mean when he says that we have no knowledge of things-in-themselves, is that we cannot know anything about them, cannot, that is, form any speculatively productive notion of the properties which belong to them as they are in themselves. In other words when Kant says that we do not know things-in-themselves he means only that we can have no positive conception of the nature of things as they are in themselves and thus no positive conception of noumenon. What the things-in-themselves which we can know to exist may be like in themselves we cannot discern. We can conceive them only negatively as objects "so far as they are not available to sensible intuition." This negative conception is completely undetermined and unspecified; but it is the only way in which the understanding can frame to itself the idea of a thing as it exists unperceived.

The distinction, then, between things as they appear and things as they are in themselves, at least as Kant makes it on B306 and B307, deals with our mode of intuition of objects and the nature which those objects have in themselves. It is not a distinction between two different objects. The only thing which we can know is our mode of intuition of objects, while the nature of those objects as they exist
unperceived remains inscrutable. Given this method of differentiating the two, what on any other interpretation must remain a puzzling comment on Kant's part becomes less so. In several parts of the chapter on phenomena and noumena, both in A and B, Kant claims that the "Transcendental Aesthetic" justifies his distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves.

Now we must bear in mind that the concept of appearances, as limited by the Transcendental Aesthetic, already of itself establishes the objective reality of noumena and justifies the division of objects into phenomena and noumena. (A249)

The sensibility . . . is itself limited by the understanding in such fashion that it does not have to do with things in themselves but only with the mode in which, owing to our subjective constitution, they appear. The Transcendental Aesthetic, in all its teaching, has led to this conclusion. . . . (A251)

The doctrine of sensibility is likewise the doctrine of the noumenon in the negative sense, that is, of things which the understanding must think without this reference to our mode of intuition, therefore not merely as appearances but as things in themselves. (B307)

These statements must remain problematic if Kant is interpreted as claiming that appearances and things-in-themselves are different objects. For, if such a view is true, then Kant must be stating that the Aesthetic contains some sort of explicit or implicit proof that there are these two different kinds of things. Yet, if one returns to the "Aesthetic" in search of a proof, he will be sadly disappointed; for it is just not true that there Kant ever explicitly or implicitly argues to the conclusion that there are two totally distinct kinds of things; nor does it follow from the points he does make. Moreover, it is difficult to see how what he says in the Aesthetic could be used to prove it; for nothing about a distinction between discrete objects
seems to follow from the fact that space and time are subjective forms of intuition. That is, merely from the fact that the spatial and temporal characteristics of things are due to our subjective constitution, it does not follow either that the objects having them have no existence outside our sensibility, or that these things must be distinguished from another totally unknown type of object. Consequently, if the Aesthetic is supposed to justify the distinction between phenomena and noumena in the sense of showing that appearances and things-in-themselves are totally discrete, it fails miserably. However, lack of such an argument is not to be viewed as a fault of either Kant or the Transcendental Aesthetic, but rather of an interpretation which mistakenly sets out to find a position which Kant does not hold.

Kant's point then in saying that the "Aesthetic" justifies the distinction between phenomena and noumena is not that it proves that there are appearances and things-in-themselves and that they are different objects. Rather, his point seems to be that the conclusions about space and time provide the basis, and go some way towards explaining the need for a distinction between the subjective mode in which we know things and the properties which those things have independently of our awareness of them. The distinction, in other words, between things as they appear and things as they are in themselves, is explicable in terms of the doctrine of the subjectivity of space and time. If this is true, then it should be possible to discover exactly what Kant meant that distinction to be by seeing what does result from viewing space and time as pure forms of intuition.
The epistemic consequences of the investigation into the status of space and time conducted in the Aesthetic are pointed out by Kant in the section entitled "General Observation on Transcendental Aesthetic."

For example, at A42=B59-60, he says:

What we have meant to say is that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance; that the things we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them as being. . . . What objects may be in themselves, and apart from all this receptivity of our sensibility, remains completely unknown to us. We know nothing but our mode of perceiving them. Space and time are its pure forms, and sensation in general its matter.

Or again, at B69:

When I say that the intuition of outer objects and the self-intuition of the mind alike represent the objects and the mind, in space and in time, as they affect our senses, that is, as they appear, I do not mean to say that these objects are mere illusion. For in an appearance the objects, nay even the properties we ascribe to them, are always regarded as something actually given. Since, however, in the relation of the given object to the subject, such properties depend upon the mode of intuition of the subject, this object as appearance is to be distinguished from itself as object in itself.

The Aesthetic has shown that spatial and temporal properties of objects are contributed by the sensibility.1 Whenever, that is, we are "affected" by objects, they take on spatial and temporal characteristics which are different from and additional to whatever properties they possess when we are not aware of them. As a result, we are justified in considering the objects of intuition from two different points of view. On the one hand we can consider them as possessing

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1Strictly speaking, this is all the Aesthetic has shown. Kant, however also takes it as certain that sense properties, i.e. secondary qualities, are also subjective. He provides no argument for this assumption, perhaps because he took their subjectivity to be a matter of common philosophical knowledge. For example, see Prolegomena, p. 37.
spatial and temporal qualities. Since they possess those characteristics only when they are perceptually related to us, when we view objects in this way, we are viewing them only as they appear to us, and thus as appearances. On the other hand, we can consider the same objects as they might be without the spatial and temporal properties which are due to our sensibility. From this point of view we ignore all subjective contributions and think about objects as they exist unperceived, or as they are in themselves, or as things-in-themselves.

Such a distinction, however, does not entail that the existence of the objects experienced is somehow due to the subjective constitution of the mind. Were one to think this, he would commit Berkeley's mistake and reduce objects to mere illusion. The distinction between things as appearances and as things-in-themselves which is a consequence of the arguments about space and time in no way calls into question the existence of independently existing things. To paraphrase Kant, in making the distinction, the object is regarded as given. Rather, what it is concerned with is the subjective nature of the spatial and temporal characteristics of the given objects, which subjective nature is a result of the fact that space and time are forms of sensuous intuition. In other words, since spatial and temporal properties depend upon the subject's mode of intuition, the object "as appearance is to be distinguished from itself as object in itself."

The passage from the Aesthetic now under consideration also helps clarify the term "mode of intuition." As Kant sometimes uses it in elucidating the distinction between appearances and
things-in-themselves it is ambiguous, having what might be described as a subjective and an objective reference. Subjectively, it designates the sensuous fashion in which we are perceptually aware of things, while objectively it refers to the characteristics of things which result from our being aware of them in that fashion. This ambiguity sometimes hides the fact that the distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves can itself be expressed either subjectively or objectively. Subjectively, it is between objects as we intuit them and as they exist unintuited; while objectively it is between objects as possessing characteristics which are due to our mode of intuiting them and the unknown nature which those same objects have in themselves. Either way is a viable means of expressing the distinction, but that there are two of them is sometimes hidden by the ambiguity of "mode of intuition." The second of the above passages from the "Aesthetic" clarifies things somewhat, for in it the ambiguity is not present. Here Kant differentiates between the sensuous manner in which we intuit objects and the resultant characteristics which things take on; and he uses "mode of intuition" to designate only the former. Thus, primarily the reference of "mode of intuition" is subjective. But this does not mean that the distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves cannot be expressed in terms of properties, since the passage makes the distinction in just those terms. It only suggests that Kant does have a precise use for "mode of intuition," and that the ambiguity of the term is not purposeful.
The conclusions to be drawn from the last few pages by now ought to be clear. In both the chapter on phenomena and noumena, where Kant is explicitly concerned with making his distinction intelligible, and the "Transcendental Aesthetic," where he previews and "justifies" that differentiation, he is not concerned with dividing the world into different kinds of things. Rather, he is concerned with differentiating (a) between objects insofar as they are intuitively (i.e. perceptually) related to us, and those same objects insofar as they are not intuitively related to us; or (b) between things insofar as they do, and those same things insofar as they do not, possess properties which have their source in our sensuous mode of intuition. The fact that our knowledge of things is exhausted by specifying their phenomenal characteristics and that we as a consequence cannot know the nature of things as they are in themselves does not vitiate the force of the basic distinction. All that follows from this fact is that we can have only a negative conception of objects as things-in-themselves.

Since the sections which have been discussed are those which Kant wrote for the expressed purpose of explaining the distinction he had in mind, it can, I think, safely be concluded that the distinction as he lays it out in those passages and as I have explained it here is the distinction as he intended it to be drawn. Now, though it certainly may be the case either that Kant makes some claims which contradict his intended position, or that he holds another full blown position which is incompatible with the one I have explained here, there are a couple of criticisms which cannot be raised against my
interpretation. In the first place, it cannot be argued that the view I have attributed to Kant is a pre-Critical remnant which somehow found its way into the pages of the Critique. For at least part, and in both cases a crucial part, of the two sections in which it occurs were added by Kant in the B edition. In the second place, it cannot be objected that the position I have explained occurs only occasionally in the Critique and consequently, despite Kant's intentions, it can be written off as a merely temporary aberration. For the same kinds of claims which Kant makes in the chapter on phenomena and noumena and in the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' also occur in many other places throughout both editions of the Critique, as well as in other Critical writings.

To cite a few:

Now let us suppose that the distinction which our Critique has shown to be necessary, between things as objects of experience and those same things as things in themselves, had not been made.
(Bxxvii)

... the transcendental object lying at the basis of appearances... is and remains for us unscruttable. The thing itself is indeed given, but we can have no insight into its nature.
(A614=B642)

If by the complaints—that we have no insight whatsoever into the inner nature of things—it be meant that we cannot conceive what the things which appear to us may be in themselves, they are entirely illegitimate and unreasonable. (A277=B333)

Since, however, all concepts of things must be referred to intuitions which, for us human beings can never be other than

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As I shall point out in Chapter II, there is some controversy as to whether Kant means to identify the transcendental object with the thing in itself. In general, however, this controversy surrounds the use of the term "transcendental object" in the A edition Transcendental Deduction. In the passage quoted above there seems to be no question that the transcendental object and the thing-in-itself are the same.
sensuous, and which thus let the objects be known not as things in themselves, but only as appearances.¹

... that space, generally, belongs, not to the qualities or relations of the things in themselves, for this would necessarily have to admit of reduction to objective conceptions, but merely to the subjective form of our sensible intuition of things or relations which, as to what they may be in themselves, must remain wholly unknown.²

... the subjective form of our sensibility, under which objects of our external sense, unknown to us as to their construction in themselves, appear to us, this appearance being termed 'matter.'³

An indefinitely long list of other examples could be given, but their enumeration is not really needed. For what the passages quoted above and the many other sections which could be given as examples show conclusively I believe is that Kant continues throughout his later writings to discriminate between things as they appear and things as they are in themselves in the manner that I have indicated.

Apparently, then, at least in intention, that distinction is supposed to play an important role in the Critical philosophy. It is not merely a pre-Critical remnant, nor can it be dismissed as a mere temporary aberration.

The fully developed distinction between things as they appear and things as they are in themselves which Kant elaborates in the


³Ibid., p. 180.
chapter on phenomena and nomena and the "Transcendental Aesthetic" includes essentially three different points. 1) When we distinguish appearances from things in themselves, we are discriminating between our mode of intuition of things on the one hand and the nature which those objects have in themselves on the other. Since objects acquire sensible characteristics (i.e. spatial, temporal, and sense properties) as a result of their "affecting" our sensibility the distinction can also be expressed in terms of the difference between things insofar as they possess sensible characteristics, and those same objects insofar as they possess whatever properties constitute their nature as they exist unrelated to our sensibility. 2) The things as it appears is the same thing as the thing as it is in itself. Thus, it is a mistake to think of the appearance as a second object, and to claim that there is no sense in which they are identical. 3) We can have no knowledge of the properties constituting the nature of things as they are in themselves, and consequently any alleged conception of that nature is and must remain for us empty. The only speculatively warranted notion which we can form of things as they are in themselves is the completely negative idea of objects insofar as they are unavailable to sensible intuition. In forming such a conception, we abstract from our mode of intuition of objects, and thus from all their sensible characteristics, but make no attempt whatsoever to specify the nature of the objects of experience as they are in themselves. 1

1The passage where Kant introduces the concept of a noumenon in the negative sense has been used by at least one commentator to support one version of the claim that the thing as it appears is not the same thing as the thing-in-itself. This interpretation appears in Graham Bird's Kant's Theory of Knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
Though the full blown Kantian distinction requires all three of the points just mentioned, they do not contribute equally to it. What I mean is this. One and two tell us exactly how Kant wishes to divide up appearances and things-in-themselves. Three, however, is different, for it makes a point, not about the correct manner of dividing the two, but about our knowledge or lack of knowledge of the second. Had he been so inclined, Kant could have distinguished appearances and things-in-themselves in the manner expressed by (1) and (2), and yet not have made the further point expressed by (3). His doing so, of course, would have required massive revision and perhaps abandonment of the entire Critical edifice, but the basic distinction between phenomena and things-in-themselves would have been unaffected. Consequently, if one wants to work out the implications of the way in which Kant distinguishes appearances and things-in-themselves, he can do so simply by explicating and drawing the consequences from (1) and (2). Three explains how we must discuss things-in-themselves so as not to overstep speculative bounds, but it does not provide any insight into the grounds and manner of determining what is appearance and what is thing-in-itself. That is discovered, as I remarked above, by concentrating on (1) and (2).

1962), pp. 75-76. Bird here claims that the negative notion of noumenon is introduced by Kant as our only way of talking about objects which are completely divorced from and which never come into any sort of epistemic relation to us, objects which, according to Bird, Kant never really believed to exist. Such an interpretation is simply and obviously mistaken. Indeed it directly contradicts what Kant says in the very same sentence. The whole point of the introduction of this negative conception is to give us a way of abstracting from our mode of intuition of objects, and still have some way of talking intelligibly about things-in-themselves.
A number of pages ago I stated as my basic thesis that Kant's distinction between things as they appear and things as they are in themselves could best be understood if he were viewed as accepting P and then extending the class of M-characteristics to include all those about which we can intelligibly speak. I also argued that it could easily be established that Kant would accept the claim that all sensible properties are M-characteristics, if it could previously be established that he accepts or would accept P. Furthermore, I stated that proving this latter point amounted to showing he believes, both that the thing as it appears is the same thing as the thing as it is in itself, and that in drawing the distinction what we discriminate between are objects insofar as they possess M-characteristics and those same objects insofar as they possess only l-characteristics. It seems to me that it has at this point been sufficiently established that Kant does distinguish between appearances and things-in-themselves in the manner required, and thus that he would accept P. For the two points which I have just recalled correspond exactly to the first two points involved in the distinction as Kant lays it out in his chapter on phenomena and noumena and in the "Transcendental Aesthetic." He does, that is, claim that the thing as it appears is the same thing as the thing as it is in itself, and that the distinction is correctly described as being between objects considered as possessing properties whose existence depends upon our mode of intuition, i.e. as possessing M-characteristics, and those same objects considered as possessing whatever qualities constitute the nature of such objects in themselves, i.e. as having l-characteristics. The fact that Kant also denies us
any knowledge of the "inner nature" of the objects we perceive, and argues that our notion of things-in-themselves must be negative, makes no difference whatsoever to the point that in making the distinction one of the items discriminated is that nature. We apparently must be able to know that the objects we perceive do have some properties which do not depend upon our mental apparatus, even though we cannot discern what those properties might be; and this is sufficient to require us to make a distinction which, if kept within proper bounds, is speculatively viable.

It is probably worth recalling here exactly what has been established. Although hints to the effect that sensible qualities exist in virtue of the structure of our faculties of knowledge have been dropped from time to time, I have as yet made no attempt at a detailed explanation of why sensible characteristics must be M-characteristics. The only thing I have shown is that there are M-characteristics, i.e. characteristics a necessary condition of whose existence is that the object they qualify be perceived. The "how and why," so to speak, of M-characteristics must wait until later, in particular until Chapter III.

Kant does, then, differentiate between appearances and things-in-themselves in the way required, and thus would accept P. The most difficult part of my main thesis has, in other words, been successfully demonstrated. The other half, i.e. that Kant extends the class of M-characteristics to include all those about which we can intelligibly speak, still remains, but only a few words need be said in its defense; since it is obvious and undeniable that Kant believes
all the properties of objects about which we can know to be due to
the constitution of our minds. Nevertheless, the reasons for this
view can be conveniently and briefly reviewed, and will serve to
cement my contention that all empirical properties of things are
M-characteristics.

Kant's ties with classical empiricism surface in many locations
throughout the Critique. Nowhere, perhaps, are they more evident than
in his acceptance of what Peter Strawson calls an empiricist "principle
of significance." "This is the principle that there can be no
legitimate, or even meaningful, employment of ideas or concepts which
does not relate them to empirical or experiential conditions of their
application". What exactly this principle is, and how Kant employs
it, is not for my purposes important. What is important is Kant's
contention that the tracing of any idea to essentially involves relating
it to intuition. Relating an idea to intuition means either (a) finding
its source in intuition, or (b) discovering its necessary applicability
to the objects of experience. These can be taken in turn.

a) Representations whose source is intuition are in general
complexes of sensible characteristics which in turn derive from either
sensation or the form of intuition. The characteristics which are
"given" in sensation include all those which come from the five
senses, that is, all those which are usually grouped under the title

1Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, p. 16.
2A92=B124-125.
"secondary qualities." To the best of my knowledge Kant never explicitly argues that secondary qualities are mind-dependent and thus contributions of the subject to experience. However, despite this lack of argument, there can be no doubt that Kant thinks of secondary qualities as mind-dependent and as not qualifying things as they are in themselves. He may not have thought it necessary to provide an argument for the subjectivity of sense qualities, since the philosophical community for which he wrote generally assumed their mind-dependence.

Long before Locke's time, but assuredly since him, it has been generally assumed and granted without detriment to the actual existence of external things that many of their predicates may be said to belong, not to things in themselves, but to their appearances, and to have no proper existence outside our representation. Heat, color, and taste, for instance, are of this kind.

Thus, if Kant would accept P, he would also admit that secondary qualities are M-characteristics.

It is equally clear that Kant would also agree that the geometrically and arithmetically describable qualities of things derived from the form of intuition are M-characteristics. The "Transcendental Aesthetic" is designed to establish just this conclusion.

All geometrical spatial characteristics, and all arithmetically measurable temporal characteristics are contributions of the mind to experience and its objects. They do not qualify things as they are in

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1 A20-21=B35

2 Kant, Prolegomena, p. 37.
themselves, but things in relation to our sensibility. They are, in short, M-characteristics.

Intuitions, as I remarked above, are complexes of sensible characteristics which have their source either in sensation or in the form of intuition. Since Kant thinks of both sorts of characteristics as humanly subjective contributions to experience, and as qualifying objects only in relation to our senses, he would agree that both sorts are M-characteristics.

b) If a representation does not have its source in intuition, then to be meaningfully employed it must have necessary application to the objects of experience. It must, in other words, be a representation such that, unless it applies in experience, no object of experience is possible. The pure concepts of the understanding are representations of this sort. They have a necessary application in experience in the sense that they provide connections among intuitively given characteristics without which connections those characteristics would not constitute objects of experience. The categories, though, have their source in the understanding; and thus the connections which they provide are mind-contributed. These connections are not exhibited by things as they are in themselves, but they are exhibited by things as they appear to us. Thus, categorial connections are also M-characteristics.

The fact that the connections among sensible characteristics are mind-dependent, when coupled with the further fact that sensible characteristics themselves are subjectively contributed, leads to the conclusion that all the characteristics which we can know to qualify
objects are M-characteristics.Included among these are sense qualities, spatial and temporal properties, and objective categorial connections. In other words, by choosing an empiricist "principle of significance," accepting the view that sense characteristics are mind-dependent, arguing for the status of space and time as pervasive forms of intuition, and arguing that the categories are necessarily applicable though humanly subjective forms of thought, Kant has committed himself to claiming that our knowledge is only of things as they appear to us, and that all the qualities of things as they appear to us are M-characteristic.

Both parts of the thesis I set out to establish have now been demonstrated. It is acceptable to view Kant as in the first place accepting P and in the second place as extending the class of M-characteristics to include all those about which we can intelligibly speak. If true, then this means that the correct way to interpret Kant is as some sort of a "direct realist." The primary purpose of the remainder of this dissertation is to provide a detailed explication of what I take Kant's realism to be. The specifics of my interpretation will be given for the most part in Chapters III and IV, though some of the issues discussed in Chapter II will also be relevant. Before that discussion gets under way, and before this chapter is brought to a close, I want to take up in rather general terms a couple of objections to my whole program, objections which are framed in terms of an alternative interpretation of Kant's distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves. I bring them up for several reasons. First, the alternative interpretation which I shall discuss entails a complete
denial of the type of realism which I believe Kant espouses. Consequently, showing that it is false is one of the primary negative purposes I have in writing this thesis; and I would like at least to introduce it as early as possible. Secondly, though adequately demonstrating that it is unsatisfactory hinges upon successful explanation of what I believe to be Kant's realism, there are several reasons why even \textit{prima facie} it ought to be viewed with suspicion; and these I would like to have on the table. Third, introducing the alternative will allow me to set a number of the problems which will have to be dealt with in subsequent chapters.

The passages in which Kant elaborates his distinction in the way I have indicated have very seldom, if ever, been completely ignored by commentators. Almost everyone at least acknowledges that Kant does contrast things \textit{as} they appear (or \textit{as} appearances) with those same things \textit{as} they are in themselves (or \textit{as} things-in-themselves), and that he does appear in places to speak as if there were some sense in which we are aware of things-in-themselves (though not as they are in themselves) in intuition. But it is sometimes also argued that such claims do not express Kant's true Critical view, or that he makes other assertions which indicate that he holds, in addition to this version, and perhaps on an equal footing with it, another version of the distinction which is incompatible with it. According to those who believe that Kant holds a second view, he "sometimes refers to the thing-in-itself as the cause of appearances. On this view appearances are regarded as subjective sense data and things-in-themselves as independent objects, stripped of all primary and
secondary qualities." Furthermore, the objects of experience, phenomena, are merely collections of subjective sense-data. The crucial ingredients, then, in this second position are: a) that appearances are subjective sense-data and the empirical objects which we are aware of simply collections of such sense-data; b) that things-in-themselves are completely independent of appearances; and c) that things-in-themselves are the "causes" of appearances. I shall refer to any interpretation of this type as a "two-world" view. Usually where it introduced at all, as for example by Strawson, it is also claimed to be Kant's really Critical doctrine. The sections of the Critique which I have emphasized are placed in a subordinate position and considered as, to quote Strawson, "blandly ironical reminders that questions . . . about the nature of things in space and time as they are in themselves . . . are senseless questions."

There are several notable logical relations among (a), (b), and (c) which serve both to elucidate the two-world view and to show how it must be supported. The first point to be noticed is that, though (a) does entail (b), (b) does not entail (a). It does not


2Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, p. 245.
follow from the claim that things as they are in themselves are different things from phenomena, that appearances are subjective representations or that phenomena are collections of those representations. Thus although the two claims have often been conjoined, they need not be. Someone could perfectly well hold that a thing-in-itself is a different object from a thing as it appears, and yet deny that appearances are sense-data. Consequently, it is illegitimate to argue that, because the thing as it is in itself is independent of appearances, Kant must be advocating subjective idealism, phenomenalism or representationalism.

In the second place, just as (b) does not entail (a), neither does (c). Even if it is granted, as it surely must be, that Kant does believe the thing-in-itself to be in some sense the "cause" of appearances, it is not thereby demonstrated that those appearances are sense data. Indeed, the so-called double affection theory, which Kant apparently toyed with in his later writings and possibly also in the Critique itself, provides some evidence that Kant at least at times wanted to hold both that phenomena are the outcome of some quasi-causal relation among things-in-themselves and that nevertheless they are not merely collections of sensa. Thus, it is also illegitimate to argue that because Kant believes things-in-themselves to be the causes of appearances he holds one of the three views mentioned a moment ago. Though Kant's speaking in this way does provide some evidence that he holds one of these views, the relation involved is not entailment.
In the third place, and this is a point which sometimes seems to be missed, (c) does not entail (b). That is, it does not follow simply from the fact that the thing-in-itself is somehow the cause of appearances and of phenomena, that the former is a different object from the latter. What I have in mind is the following. According to the interpretation which I hope to show is correct, the difference between the thing as it appears and the thing as it is in itself is in terms of properties, i.e. M-characteristics, and relations which the first has and the second does not. Now it is certainly possible that the thing as it is in itself (in conjunction with the noumenal self and its sensibility) could in some sense or other be the cause of the M-characteristics in virtue of which we can know it only as it appears, and still be the same thing as the phenomenal thing.\(^1\) Consequently, the mere fact that Kant postulates a "causal" relationship between things-in-themselves and appearances is not in itself sufficient to show that the thing as it appears is a second object. The helpful relationship, as a matter of fact, would go the other way, in the sense that, if it could previously be shown (as I hope to prove it cannot) that things-in-themselves are independent of appearances, then this

\(^1\) We do, as a matter of fact, speak commonsensically in somewhat the same way. It makes perfectly good sense to say that the objects cause us to perceive them, and in doing so we do not imply that the things we perceive are different from the things which cause our perceptions. And this remains true regardless of whether or not in perceiving them, the objects are somehow altered. To say that objects cause our perceptions thus in no way implies either that there are different objects involved or that the objects which cause us to perceive them must remain unaltered by our perceptions of them.
would probably shed some light upon how the alleged "causal" relation between things-in-themselves and appearances should be understood.

The notion that appearances and things-in-themselves are distinct objects cannot then be supported by arguing that Kant believes the former to be caused by the latter; for this presupposes an interpretation of the "causal" relation which cannot itself be justified until appearances and things-in-themselves have been shown to be different things. In other words, (c) cannot be used as a reason for (b). Nevertheless, there are reasons which can be offered for (b), the most popular of which, at least among recent commentators, is to argue that Kant is a phenomenalist, i.e. that he believes empirical objects to be simply collections of sense-data. This, of course, is the position expressed in (a), and if it can be established, then (b) will necessarily follow. It is not the only way of establishing (b), but it is, as I remarked above, the most popular and the most plausible. As a result, I shall concentrate on the claim that Kant thinks of appearances as sense-data on the grounds that if it can be shown to be false, or at least unwarranted, the most plausible reason for believing (b) is true will have been found wanting.

Refutation of the claim that Kant is a phenomenalist is not something which can be brought off in a matter of several paragraphs, or even several pages. Among other things it involves giving non-phenomenalistic explanations both of some of Kant's key assertions, for example that appearances are "nothing but representations," and of the key terms, for example "representation," involved in them. Since providing such explanations is one of the tasks which I hope to
accomplish in the following chapters, much of what occurs in them can be looked on as an implicit attack on phenomenalist interpretations. Moreover, since much of the attack will be implicit, there will be explicit discussion of (a) in only a very few places. One of them is the remainder of this chapter. The comments I shall make in the next few pages will be rather general. In making them I do not intend to show that the claim that Kant is a phenomenalist is false. My only purpose at this point is to cast some suspicion, both on the general phenomenalistic tack and upon the reasons which are usually given for it.

The usual phenomenalistic interpretation does not include merely the claim expressed in (a). In addition it also encompasses the theses expressed by (b) and (c). The inclusion of (b) is to be expected, since it follows from (a); but why (c) is added is sometimes not so clear. More often than not, it seems to be given in support of (a). Be that as it may, however, the ordinary phenomenalistic, or two-world, interpretation of Kant encompasses all the claims expressed by (a), (b), and (c). Such a position as this requires, of course, direct investigation. Nevertheless, even before direct investigation of either the position itself or of the support which might be offered for it is begun, there are a couple of more or less compelling reasons for viewing it with suspicion.

In the first place, any account according to which things as they appear are collections of sense-data, and in fact any account according to which the thing as it appears and the thing as it is in itself are in no sense identical, is incompatible with Kant's ethics, and more particularly, directly contradicts his solution of the problem
of freedom. For, as Kant himself emphasized in discussing freedom, the distinction between phenomena and noumena allows him at least to think that one and the same will can be both caused and free. Insofar, that is, as the will is viewed as a faculty of the phenomenal self, its sensible effects, its appearances, are subject to the law of causality. On the other hand, insofar as the same will is viewed as a faculty of the noumenal self, it is not subject to natural causal laws and can thus be thought of as free. In other words, the problem of freedom has a possible solution only if the same will can be considered as both thing-in-itself and as appearance.

Now let us suppose that the distinction . . . between things as objects of experience and those same things as things in themselves, had not been made. In that case all things in general, as far as they are efficient causes, would be determined by the principle of causality, and consequently by the mechanism of nature. I could not, therefore, say of one and the same being, for instance the human soul, that its will is free and yet is subject to natural necessity, that is, is not free. . . . But if our Critique is not in error in teaching that the object is to be taken in a twofold sense namely as appearance and as thing in itself . . . if the principle of causality . . . applies only to things taken in the former sense . . . then there is no contradiction in supposing that one and the same will is, in the appearance, that is, in its visible acts, necessarily subject to the law of nature, and so far not free, while yet, as belonging to a thing-in-itself, is not subject to that law, and is therefore free. (Bxvi-xxvii)

Thus, Kant's solution to the problem of freedom is premised upon the claim that it is possible to suppose the same will is both caused and free, depending upon whether it is considered as appearance or as thing-in-itself. But, since the will (or practical reason) is one of the most important of the self's mental faculties, viewing it under such a dual aspect is equivalent to viewing the self under that same dual aspect. And from this it follows that a solution to the problem
of freedom is possible only if the same self can be considered as phenomenon and as thing-in-itself; or, to put it another way, it is a necessary condition of the possibility of freedom that the self as it appears and the self as it is in itself be the same self. So, in the case of Kant's resolution of the Third Antinomy, and more generally in his treatment of the self as a whole a two-world view simply will not do. One who opts for that sort of position is forced to claim not simply that Kant has two distinctions between appearances and things-in-themselves but also that one of them applies only to selves, and the other to everything else. According to the former the thing as it appears is the same thing as the thing as it is in itself, while according to the latter it is not. This view seems to me implausible, at least at first glance. It is difficult to believe that there exist, side by side and apparently on equal footing, two different and incompatible distinctions, and that Kant had no inkling that this was the case. Moreover, it becomes even more difficult to accept when one remembers that in many places Kant distinguishes objects as they appear from objects as they are in themselves in exactly the same terms as he distinguishes selves as they appear from selves as they are in themselves.

There is another general problem with a phenomenalist position. For it is not merely that such a position implies Kant's acceptance of two incompatible distinctions, one for selves and another for objects. In addition, it also implies that without realizing it, Kant applies these two incompatible distinctions to the same thing, i.e. that he claims that in one particular case, a certain thing as it appears both is
and is not the same thing as a certain thing-in-itself. The issue once again concerns the self. It is undeniable that Kant thinks the noumenal self is the same self as the phenomenal self. Indeed, he goes so far as to specify, perhaps unjustifiably, their points of identity—understanding and reason. But the phenomenal self—the self as it appears—is also an empirical object among other such objects. Kant's theory of self-affection and inner sense is designed at least in part to establish that the empirical self does not occupy a privileged position in experience. Just as we can only know things external to us only as objects of experience and thus as they appear, so we can only know ourselves only as objects of experience, and thus as we appear. Both external empirical objects and empirical selves enjoy exactly the same status—they are objects of experience. So it cannot simply be the case that the two distinctions necessarily claimed by the proponent of the two world view are such that one applies to selves and the other to objects. The distinction between selves and objects is by no means hard and fast, and to the extent that the empirical self is an object of experience on a par with other empirical objects, the distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves which was supposed to apply to objects as distinct from selves also applies to it. And this of course means that both

Man, however, who knows all the rest of nature solely through the senses, knows himself also through pure apperception. . . . He is thus to himself, on the one hand phenomenon, and on the other hand, in respect of certain faculties the action of which cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility, a purely intelligible object. We entitle these faculties understanding and reason". (A546-547=B574-575)
distinctions between things as they appear and as they are in themselves must hold for selves, and that, since the distinctions are incompatible, Kant has directly contradictory views regarding the relations between the noumenal and the phenomenal self. He believes both that the noumenal self is, and that it is not, the same self as the phenomenal self.

The consequences which I have drawn from this brief consideration of what I have called a two world view in no way constitute a reductio of that position. For someone who opts for it would simply agree with me that such consequences do follow and then go on to claim that here, as he does in many places throughout his writings, Kant is, as a matter of fact, holding contradictory positions. This may be true. It does, however, seem to me illegitimate to attribute contradictions to any philosopher, even Kant, unless all other interpretive avenues have been explored and found to be dead ends. Until such exploration has been carried out, any interpretation which forces a philosopher into contradictions should be viewed with at least a modicum of suspicion and granted at best only conditional acceptance. About the case under consideration, I hope to show that suspicion is indeed warranted, and that not even conditional acceptance ought to be granted.

As I mentioned just a bit ago, the prima facie difficulties with the two-world view are in no way conclusive against it. Furthermore, there are reasons which can and have been given to show that despite what Kant says in some places, in truth he is a phenomenalist, and does hold a two-world view. There are three reasons which are
most often given for this interpretation, at least one of which seems very strong. Before closing this I want at least to mention all three. I do so, not in the hopes that by mentioning them they will miraculously dissolve, but only to set for myself particular issues to be settled in succeeding chapters.

The first bit of evidence which is usually given in support of the claim that Kant is a phenomenalist has been mentioned before. There is no doubt that Kant sometimes speaks of appearances as the result of the "affection" of our sensibilities by things-in-themselves, and this fact is often taken to confirm the claim that he is a phenomenalist. However, to repeat what has already been said, even though Kant does say that things-in-themselves "affect" our sensibilities and that appearances are the outcome of that relation, this is not in itself sufficient to establish in general that appearances are different things from things-in-themselves, or in particular that appearances are sense-data. Such a conclusion would only follow if one presupposed a Lockean interpretation of perception and of the nature of the entities which are its outcome. Such an interpretation, however, is precisely what is at issue, and one cannot presuppose it in giving a meaning to Kant's statements about "affection" without obviously begging the question. At most Kant's claim that appearances result from "affection" can be used to support an already practically justified interpretation of the nature of appearances; but it cannot be used to establish any particular view.

The second reason which is often given to support a two world view is Kant's assertion that appearances are "representations"
("Vorstellungen"), mere modifications of our sensibility. Kant makes this point in a great number of places, especially in the A edition, and it is thought to be by no means clear what he could be saying except that appearances are sense-data, Lockean ideas, or Humean impressions. If Kant does, of course, mean by "representation" sense datum or impression, then he will indeed be a phenomenalist. However, as I hope to show in detail later, this is not what he has in mind by calling appearances "representations." To anticipate in a vague sort of way, the claim that appearances are representations is complex and can be broken down into three different points: (1) that appearances are certain types of those "mental" entities which Kant calls "representations;" (2) that they "represent" things-in-themselves; and (3) that, in a different sense, they "represent" or "stand for" phenomena. Only the first of these might be termed phenomenalism (in a funny kind of sense given the types of representations involved), but whatever phenomenalist force it might have by itself is vitiated when it is coupled with (2). For although the representations which are appearances are mental entities, they are not primarily objects of awareness. Rather, they are those mental entities by means of which we become aware of things-in-themselves; and in this sense they "represent" things-in-themselves. As a result the sensible characteristics which make up the "content" of such representations are all M-characteristics of the objects they enable us to experience. Appearances are "nothing but representations" in that they arise out of the experiential interaction between perceivers and things-in-themselves, and are the only means through which we can apprehend the
outside world. They are humanly subjective representations of that world, humanly subjective in the sense that a being with a differently constructed faculty of knowledge would know things via different representations. But appearances are not subjective in that they are, or are like, sense-data, Lockean Ideas, or Humean impressions.

The third contention which might be made in support of the view that Kant is a phenomenalist, but which as far as I know has never explicitly been used with that purpose in mind, is that only phenomenality is compatible with Kant's account of the nature of synthesis. It can be explained in the following way: Kant develops the theory of synthesis as a reply to Hume's objections to the notion of synthetic necessity. His ploy is to argue that the objects of experience are nothing but syntheses of representations, syntheses which are carried out, at least as regards the form of objects, by means of necessary conceptual rules known as categories. The concept of cause, for example, has the kind of objectivity which Hume denied it because it expresses one type of necessary synthesis in accordance with which the objects of knowledge are constituted. Such an interpretation of Kant's extremely problematical notion of synthesis, if it were accurate, would present very serious problems for the interpretation which I am attributing to him. For, despite the fact that Kant leaves out of the second edition many of the passages which are crucial to explaining synthesis, there can be no doubt that a good

1Such a view of the nature of synthesis seems to be that expressed by Wolff in Kant's Theory of Mental Activity. More will be said about it later.
deal of what he says in the Analytic requires the doctrine for whatever intelligibility it has. Fortunately, though, the proposed interpretation of Kant on synthesis is incomplete, and because incomplete, also inaccurate. It hangs on an ambiguity in the term "object of experience," which could designate either the thing-in-itself or the empirical object. The account of synthesis given above applies only to the latter. Phenomena are, in a sense which will be elucidated in Chapter IV, conceptually ordered syntheses of representations. However, the account does not apply to things-in-themselves, which are "objects of experience" in a different sense than are empirical things. Consequently, the brief outline of Kant's doctrine is ambiguous, and it is this ambiguity which makes synthesis appear to require phenomenalism. Once the different senses in which appearances "represent" have been explained, as they will be in Chapters III and IV, the temptation to view Kant's beliefs about synthesis as essentially phenomenalistic will disappear.

It is finally time to bring this first chapter to a long overdue conclusion. I shall do so now, finishing with a summary both of what has and of what has not been accomplished. It has been my primary purpose to show, and I believe I have successfully shown, that Kant's distinction between things as they appear and things as they are in themselves can be profitably understood if he is seen as accepting P and extending the class of M-characteristics to include all those properties about which we can intelligibly speak. This is the conception which is expressed in the "Transcendental Aesthetic," and which is reiterated in the chapter on phenomena and noumena. It is
required if any sense is to be made of a great number of passages in
the Critique of Pure Reason and in other Critical writings, especially
those in which Kant discusses the relation between noumenal and
phenomenal self, and in which he gives his solution to the problem of
freedom.

This, it seems to me, is the only positive result achieved in
the last 46 pages. There are a number of problems which have arisen
out of it, and none of them has been resolved. Though it has been
successfully established that P and the parasitic notion of an
M-characteristic can somehow be used as an interpretive tool, exactly
how these notions can be so utilized has not been explained. That is,
no Kantian interpretation of either P of the idea of an M-characteris­
tic has as yet been provided. Giving and defending such an explication
thus remains as the principal positive task to be accomplished in the
following chapters. It involves several problems, primarily those of
providing some non-subjectivist elucidation of the claim that
appearances are representations and of specifying what, given a non­
subjectivist account of representations, Kant believes an empirical
object to be. In addition, the attack on phenomenalist interpretations
is by no means complete; and, although there will be very few places
where explicit discussion of phenomenalism occurs, that attack must
be continued.

I will begin to deal with the problems mentioned in the last
paragraph in Chapter III. However, before I turn to them I want to
bring up another issue which has to do with the relation between
things-in-themselves and appearances. The issue is this. One of the
most problematic notions which appears in the pages of the First Critique is that of the "transcendental object." There is a great deal of controversy and disagreement among Kant scholars regarding Kant's claims about the transcendental object; and apparently Kant himself found it somewhat discomforting since he abandoned at least the term in those sections of the Critique which he re-wrote for the B edition. I want, in the following chapter, to add another flame to the fire of that controversy. For I believe that most interpretations of Kant's views about the transcendental object are mistaken. It seems to me that the notion of the transcendental object furnishes Kant with a means of giving some minimal elucidation of the relation between appearances and things-in-themselves. The explanation of and argument for this vaguely expressed claim will occupy the pages of Chapter II.

Strictly speaking, Chapter II is not essential to my main purpose. For that reason, and because I do not have as much confidence in it as I have in Chapters I, III, and IV, I think I should state at the outset that the acceptability of the other chapters does not hang on the adequacy of the interpretation given in the next 40 pages. The argument of those chapters can still succeed even if that of Chapter II fails. I include Chapter II because it seems to me both interesting and perhaps important as Kant interpretation. Nevertheless, the main thread of argument will be suspended in the following pages. It will be picked up again in Chapter III, where the meanings of the term "representation" will be explored.
CHAPTER II

The claims Kant makes in the Critique of Pure Reason about the transcendental object, whatever their correct interpretation might be, are among the most enigmatic of the entire Critical Philosophy. Indeed, doubts about Kant's meaning are so widespread that even the reference of the term "transcendental object" is a topic of considerable debate. It is still, that is, thought to be an open question whether Kant means by "transcendental object" the thing-in-itself, or something else, usually the unity of the manifold, a unity which, depending upon one's stand regarding the Patchwork Theory, may or may not be explained in terms of necessary categorial production and reproduction.\footnote{The relevance of the Patchwork Theory is this. If one accepts the theory, then the unity of the manifold referred to by Kant by the term "TO" is not explicable in categorial terms, but only by appeal to what Kant calls "the concept of an object." According to proponents of this theory, at the time when Kant wrote the A Deduction he had not yet realized the importance of the categories for the explanation of empirical knowledge, and thus could not explain the crucial notion of objectivity by appealing to them. cf. Kemp Smith, Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason," pp. 204-219. If, on the other hand one rejects the Patchwork thesis, then the unity to which Kant refers by "TO" is a categorial unity, though, due to the preliminary nature of the passage (A104-110) wherein it is discussed, Kant did not think it necessary to mention them. cf. Paton, "Is the Transcendental Deduction a Patchwork?" in Moltke Gram, Kant: Disputed Questions (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), esp. pp. 77-86.} I want in the present chapter to attempt to sort out some, though by no means all, of the beliefs which Kant holds about the transcendental object (hereafter TO). In particular, I intend to argue that certain crucial
passages of the Critique are designed to provide a realistic explanation of how we are to understand the notion of "an object corresponding to, and consequently also distinct from, our knowledge" (A104), a notion which certain Critical principles have apparently rendered paradoxical. The conclusion he comes to is simply that the TO, which for the time being I shall assume without argument to be identical with the thing-in-itself, accounts in some unknown and mysterious way for a minimally conceived unity which the manifold of sensible intuition possesses in and of itself. In advancing this interpretation, I am denying outright what many Kant scholars take to be a Kantian fundamental, viz. that objective unity can be accounted for completely and without remainder by appeal to conceptual rules. I believe this to be false, and it seems to me that Kant also thought it false.

Fairly early in the last chapter I pointed out that the main problem in showing that Kant would have accepted P arises in connection with the idea of an object which both exists independently of perceivers and yet, in relation to them, possesses M-characteristics. That he does believe there is such an object, and that it is the thing-in-itself, I then tried to establish textually. I want now to approach some of the problems he has to face from a different direction.

Kant's principle that all the properties of empirical objects ultimately derive from the various ways in which our faculties of inner and outer sense are affected has already been mentioned. Unfortunately, though, it has a most unfortunate consequence. For, if all speculatively meaningful ways of talking about objects are
rightfully traced back to sensible affections, then there remain no meaningful terms in which, so to speak, to characterize the mode of existence of the object itself. To put it more simply, if Kant does believe that there is, in some sense of the term "object," an object which exists independently of perceivers and yet in relation to them possesses M-characteristics, he can have absolutely no inkling of the properties it has in itself, i.e. of its I-characteristics. He can, therefore, say very little if anything about it. Worse yet, it is not even clear that the notion of such an object is itself intelligible.

Kant seems to recognize the difficulties involved; and he grapples with them several times in the pages of the First Critique. The most important and controversial passage occurs in the A Edition Transcendental Deduction and runs from A104 to A110. The conclusions reached here are reiterated in a section of the A Edition Chapter on Phenomena and Noumena which stretches from A250 to A253. I want to subject both these sections, especially the first, to rather close scrutiny; for I think that in them Kant advances and explains to the fullest possible extent—an extent which of necessity remains minimal, however—his view that the TO, or thing-in-itself accounts in some unknown way for a kind of pre-experiential unity which the manifold possesses in and of itself.

The problem of how to make sense of the notion of an independently existing object, given that all our modes of knowledge are subjective, is introduced unexpectedly by Kant in the middle of
the A Subjective Deduction. At A104, in what seems to be a complete change of thought, he says:

(1) At this point we must make clear to ourselves what we mean by the expression "an object of representations." We have stated above that appearances are themselves nothing but sensible representations, which, as such, and in themselves, must not be taken as objects capable of existing outside our power of representation. What, then, is to be understood when we speak of an object corresponding to, and also distinct from, our knowledge?

Here Kant sets for himself a problem to be either solved or dissolved. It is just the problem which I mentioned a moment ago. Kant realizes that he has already shown that appearances, whether they be single empirical characteristics or phenomena, have no existence outside our sensibilities and thus cannot exist when unperceived. But, since all ideas which have any meaningful use must be traced back to sensibility, apparently the only ideas of this sort are empirical and are thus ideas or phenomenal objects of their properties. What possible content could be given then to the notion of an object which is independent of all our modes of knowledge?

It is important to notice two points about the question which Kant raises here. The first is that he is asking, not simply what kind of a thing it is which exists independently of all its appearances, but what, given the representational and thus phenomenal character of all appearances, the phrase "object of representations" could even mean. In giving his reply, Kant is attempting to provide such a meaning. He is attempting, that is, to explain how the phrase "object of representations" is to be understood, when it is supposed to designate an object distinct from all our modes of knowledge. Since Kant believes that things-in-themselves are the only objects which can
exist independently of perceivers, it is at least prima facie plausible to read him as setting for himself the task of specifying as openly as possible the content of our idea of a thing-in-itself. Whether he later in the passage abandons this query on the grounds that there is no such content makes no difference (at this point) to the claim that he seems to set out to answer it. Whatever he winds up discussing, in introducing his problem, he seems to be asking about how we can meaningfully talk of things-in-themselves.

The second noteworthy point about the problem Kant sets for himself here, and about the solution which he gives to it in the next several sentences, is that he is not inquiring about how we all as a matter of fact analyze our conception of an independently existing thing. He is not, that is, explaining what we all customarily mean by the phrase "object of representations."

There are reasons why this latter point should be emphasized. Commentators have sometimes argued that, when Kant asks about "what we mean by the expression 'an object of representations,'" where that expression is used to designate "an object corresponding to and consequently also distinct from, or knowledge," what he is asking about is the customary meaning of the phrase.¹ How, that is, do we all generally think about independent objects, if we ever do? Since we customarily characterize the object as a "something=x," it is clear that, if we rely on the customary meaning the objectivity of knowledge, which consists in its necessary unity, cannot be accounted for. So,

¹For example, see Wolff, Kant's Theory, pp. 113-114 and 137-139.
if knowledge is to be possible, the phrase "object of representations" cannot mean, as it normally does, "independently real thing." Any independently existing object must be entirely eliminated from our account of knowledge, the objectivity of which must then be accounted for solely in terms of necessary connections among the representations themselves. The necessity of these connections Kant subsequently identifies with the formal unity of consciousness and thus with the pure concepts of the understanding.

This conception of the argument given by Kant on A104 and in the pages which follow seems to me mistaken. Perhaps the most important error involved is thinking that Kant, in asking about the meaning of the phrase "object of representations" is inquiring about the customary meaning of that expression. The main objection to this claim is that the sense of the passage in which Kant raises the question indicates that he is asking it of himself as Critical philosopher and not of one of the vulgar. This is made clear in the second and third sentences of the section which I quoted above, and in the sentence which immediately follows. In the first sentence Kant ambiguously asks what we mean by the expression "object of representations." In the second and third he specifies exactly what the question to be answered is, and also why replying to it is problematic. He states that it is not at all obvious how we should understand "object of representations" precisely because, as we have stated before--and

\[1\]"It is easily seen that this object must be thought only as something in general=x, since outside our knowledge we have nothing which we could set over against this knowledge as corresponding to it". (A104)
here the reference of "we" is unambiguously and obviously Kant himself--appearances are nothing but representations. Finally, in the fourth sentence, Kant announces his tentative solution to the problem, stating that the object can be thought only as a something=x. Now, it should be clear that if Kant is attempting to offer an account of what the customary use of his problematic phrase is, he has failed. For, in the first place, it is just false that most of us think of either empirical characteristics or the things we experience as representations. As a result, when we ordinarily think of objects distinct from our knowledge, the conception we have of them poses no problems whatsoever. The objects which exist independently of our perceptions we think to be the exact same objects we perceive, and to possess when unperceived at least some, and more often than not a great many, of the qualities they have when they are perceived. In the second place, and this is just the same point in a slightly different guise, the conception we have of such independent objects bears very little resemblance, if any, to that of a completely bare something=x. For whatever object anyone cares to name, we can and sometimes do specify a great number of more or less important characteristics which are included in our concept of that thing; and we can, if requested, distinguish between those which we believe do and those which we believe do not, belong to that object when no one is aware of it. The notions, in other words, of phenomenal characteristics as representations, and of independent objects as something=x, are not common, ordinary garden-variety notions. They are purely philosophical
conceptions, and it is only if one adopts the former on philosophical grounds, that he may either be led to the latter, or at least feel some sort of need to explore carefully his own now necessarily non-commonsensical idea of an independently existing object of representations. It is surely this need which Kant is expressing at A104; and in what follows he is undoubtedly giving his own views about how he understands the phrase "object of representations."

The problem, then, which Kant raises and for which he tries to offer some satisfactory solution is this. Given the fact that all our knowledge is of appearances and the fact that all appearances are representations, what can possibly be the meaning of the phrase "object of representations," where that phrase is used to refer to an object which corresponds to and is consequently distinct from all our knowledge? His perhaps tentatively offered solution appears in the next several sentences.

(2) It is easily seen that this object must be thought only as something in general=x, since outside our knowledge, we have nothing which we could set over against this knowledge as corresponding to it.

Now we find that our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it an element of necessity; the object is viewed as that which prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines them a priori in some definite fashion. For insofar as they are to relate to an object, they must necessarily agree with one another, that is, must possess that unity which constitutes the concept of an object.

But it is clear that, since we have to deal only with the manifold of our representations, and since that (the object) which corresponds to them is nothing to us—being, as it is, something that has to be distinct from all our representations—the unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations. (A104-105)
The points which Kant makes here are then restated in the chapter on phenomena and noumena.

(3) All our representations are, it is true, referred by the understanding to some object; and since appearances are nothing but representations, the understanding refers them to a something, as the object of sensible intuition. But this something, thus conceived, is only the transcendental object; and by that is meant a something=x, of which we know and with the present constitution of our understanding can know, nothing whatsoever, but which, as a correlate of the unity of apperception, can serve only for the unity of the manifold in sensible intuition. (A250)

In outline Kant seems to be arguing here in somewhat the following manner: since the only way in which an object can be known is by means of the properties of a sensible manifold, whenever one speaks of an object corresponding to and distinct from those properties, it is clear that this object cannot be determined in any way whatsoever. It can only be thought, that is, as a "something in general=x," or as a transcendental object. However, though no account can be given of what such an object is, something about what it does, if you will, can be discovered. It is a necessary condition of modes of knowledge being of an object that they possess a certain kind of unity. The properties by whose means we determine objects are never a random set; and it is the object which is thought to account for this fact. The object, in other words, is "viewed as that which prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary." In some unknown way it is thought to ground the unity of the manifold of sensible intuition, a unity the possession of which distinguishes objective knowledge from subjective association, and which is itself identical with our concept of an object. Thus the object can legitimately be
described, in practically empty terms, as simply an unknown something=x which mysteriously keeps the representations in its sensible manifold from occurring randomly. The object thus minimally characterized, Kant calls the transcendental object, and he thinks that it provides at least a preliminary solution to the question of the meaning of the expression "object of representations." When used to refer to an independently existing thing, "object of representations" means nothing than "something=x" which "prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines them a priori in some definite fashion."

At first glance, then Kant, seems to be saying that the thing as it is in itself, considered as TO, is a something which is independent of perceivers and all their representations, and which "serves for the unity of the manifold in sensible intuition." Whether he is as a matter of fact making this claim, however, depends upon whether he is here using the term "TO" to designate the thing-in-itself. Unfortunately, it is by no means universally acknowledged that he is. A good number of commentators have held, and continue to hold, that at least in certain crucial passages, among them the ones which I have already discussed, the TO and the thing-in-itself are not identical. Although their position certainly cannot be ignored, I shall delay discussion of it until a bit later. I can at present only confess my belief that in all passages in which the term occurs Kant does mean by "TO" the thing-in-itself, and until I can conveniently supply reasons, I shall assume that he does so. The
argument of the next several pages is as a consequence merely hypothetical, requiring for its completion some justification for my assumption that TO and thing-in-itself are the same.

The preceeding brief sketch of the position Kant seems to be taking in quotations 2 and 3 would be quickly disputed by Kant experts, most of whom believe that he accounts for the unity of objects completely in terms of the functioning of the transcendental unity of apperception and the categories. The unknowable thing-in-itself in no way grounds the unity of objects. This unity, and thus the objectivity of knowledge, is totally mind-contributed. If this is true, then clearly Kant is not arguing in the way I have interpreted him. Rather, he must be expressing in what is perhaps a most unfortunate way his basic belief that the unity of objects is completely a function of the mind's activity. The sections of the A Deduction and chapter on phenomena and noumena which immediately follow those given in quotations 2 and 3 seem to reinforce such a reading, for in them Kant replaces the transcendental object with its concept (or, if you prefer, with the concept of an object in general) and argues that it is by means of this concept that the unity of the manifold is to be explained. Since the concept of the transcendental object is only a shorthand way of talking about the categories, the conclusion would seem to follow that Kant, in asserting that the TO accounts for the unity of the manifold is really stating in a misleading form his fundamental conviction that the unity of objects is a formal categorial unity whose source is the understanding.
The sections of the Critique which run from A104-110 and from A250-253 are usually interpreted in some such manner as has just been outlined. I think that interpretations of that sort are mistaken, and that it is correct to read Kant as stating that the transcendental object or thing-in-itself does to a certain extent constitute an externally existing ground of the unity of the sensible manifold. In order to show this, I want to consider three or four passages from the crucial sections in detail. Two of them have already been given, the others will be introduced later on.

On A104 Kant raises the question of what can possibly be meant by the expression "object of representations," granted that all appearances are representations. His answer, as expressed in the first sentence of quotation 2, is that we can only mean by this phrase a something-in-general=x. Any attempt to specify the object further would involve an illegitimate appeal to empirical determinations and thus to appearances. What this first point amounts to is that, whenever we use the term "object of representations" to designate a thing which corresponds to our knowledge, it tells us nothing about the "nature" of the object referred to. Insofar as we know it, the object is simply a something-in-general=x. We cannot in any way discover what it is like, but must be content simply to speak of it as that x which corresponds to our knowledge.

To this barely minimal notion of the object Kant adds more in the next two sentences. Not only is the conception of the object simply a notion of a bare something=x, but it also involves some
thought about what function the object serves. The claim that we have knowledge of an object implies that that knowledge is unified. The properties by means of which things make themselves known never occur haphazardly or arbitrarily. It is the object which is thought to account for this fact, for the fact, that is, that objective modes of knowledge "possess that unity which constitutes the concept of an object."

This restatement of the second and third sentences of quotation 2 is only slightly, if at all, less opaque than the two sentences themselves. In particular, it leaves completely intact and totally unaltered Kant's dark contention that the concept of an object is constituted by, or identical with, the unity of the manifold. Fortunately, exactly what this might mean is not yet crucial for my purposes. Whatever else Kant is expressing by making the identification, he is at least saying that all experience involves concepts of objects, and that such concepts provide at least in part the rules in accordance with which the manifold of our perceptions is organized. Even this much is superfluous for what I am presently about, however. I am concerned, for reasons which will be given presently, not with what Kant means by the identification, but simply with the fact that he makes it, and apparently does so seriously. For it brings to light an important point about the passage in which it occurs, a point which is more often than not overlooked.

In that part of the section from A104 and A105 which I have so far commented on, Kant seems to have talked about, or at least to have
mentioned two distinct items. He begins by asking about the meaning of the expression "object of representations," when it is used to designate an object distinct from our knowledge. He goes on to explain that we can only think such an object as a something=x which "prevents our modes of knowledge from becoming haphazard and arbitrary, and which determines them a priori in some definite fashion." The object, that is, so far as we know, is an unknown thing which somehow "provides" unity for our modes of knowledge. Then, in the third sentence of quotation 2 he introduces, very briefly, a new element. He switches from discussing the object as "provider" of unity, and begins to talk about the unity "provided" by the object. This unity he then identifies with the concept of an object. This is Kant's initial mention of the concept of an object, and he introduces it in such a way that it appears to be contrasted with, or at least differentiated from, the object itself.

In other words, the points Kant makes in the several sentences under consideration suggest that he is beginning to draw a distinction between what he later (A109) calls the T0 on the one hand and the concept of an object on the other. The former we can merely describe as an inscrutable something=x, which prevents our knowledge from being random; while the latter is identical with the unity provided by this object. To anticipate a bit, what occurs later is that Kant collapses this distinction, and speaks of the transcendental object as if it were identical with the concept of an object (or concept of the T0), and thus with the unity of the manifold, a unity which is
actually reducible to category-directed productions and reproductions of representations. This same pattern recurs in the section running from A250-253, where Kant also begins by making and ends by collapsing a distinction between the transcendental object and its concept. Be that as it may, he seems, at this point to be implying that the two are different; and, as I hope to show, he is doing so purposefully.

This same point, as well as one of its more interesting implications, can be illustrated in the following way. The paragraph which begins "Now we find . . ." is sometimes cited as being the place where Kant makes explicit his switch from a correspondence to a coherence theory of truth.¹ Now, if true, this means two things. In

¹Cf. Wolff, Kant's Theory, pp. 137-139, A. C. Ewing, A Short Commentary on Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 80ff. The claim that Kant holds a coherence theory of truth is a puzzling one. It is puzzling because it is not at all clear why one should believe it, given some of the things which Kant explicitly says. Two of his statements are important. (1) He explicitly and openly denies, in a section which occurs early in the Analytic, that any "material" criterion of truth is possible, on the grounds that any general definition of truth would require that particular contents of knowledge be included in it, and this is impossible. Thus, coherence would seem to be denied as a "material" criterion of truth. (2) The "formal" criterion of truth is the principle of contradiction, which Kant views as the fundamental principle of the understanding. Agreement with the principle of contradiction is thus a formal necessary condition of truth, and if coherence can be interpreted simply in logical terms, as the requirement that representations not contradict one another, then it might be possible to view Kant as holding coherence as a formal criterion of truth. Unfortunately, this is too weak a claim to satisfy those who believe Kant a coherence theorist, for, if they mean anything by that claim they mean that coherence is for Kant a sufficient condition of truth, and thus that it provides a "material" criterion. However, in virtue of Kant's denial that such a criterion is possible, the contention that coherence is one for him remains unsettling. Cf. A57=B82-A63=B86.
the first place, there is no distinction to be drawn between object and concept. Kant is even here meaning to identify the two, and is claiming that the concept and not the object provides the unity required for the objectivity of knowledge. In the second place, the final sentence of the paragraph expresses a sufficient condition of truth, stating that the "agreement" or coherence of our modes of knowledge is sufficient for the objectivity of that knowledge. His subsequent argument that the coherence of the manifold is both synthetic and necessary is what differentiate him from Berkeley and especially from Hume.

It seems to me that neither of these contentions is supported by the text. The first, that here as elsewhere, the object and the concept are being identified, implies that Kant has not even attempted to deal with the problem he set himself just previously. He has not, that is, even tried to discover what we mean by the expression "object of representations" when it is used to designate something distinct from our knowledge. He has introduced the problem and then ignored it, turning instead to a discussion of something completely different, without giving any indication whatsoever that he either thinks his original difficulty insoluble or merely a pseudo-problem. This seems to be absurd in its own right, and to be unsupported by what Kant as a matter of fact says. For he does give what appears to be an answer to the question he asks, and to incorporate in that answer a distinction between the object and the concept of an object, between, in other words, that which prevents the manifold from being randomly collected on the one hand, and the unity of that manifold on the other.
The second claim, that the final sentence of the paragraph expresses a sufficient condition for truth, is simply false. If Kant is making any assertion at all about truth in this sentence, and it is by no means clear that he is, he is merely stating a necessary condition. The sentence, that is, simply does not say that the necessary "agreement" or coherence of the manifold is sufficient for the objectivity of knowledge. What it says is merely that if the representations in the manifold do not cohere, no objective knowledge can occur.\footnote{Indeed, no knowledge at all can occur. For Kant, of course, all knowledge, strictly so-called, is objective or of objects. However, in this passage and especially in the sentence now under consideration, he speaks in a way which blurs this fact. It is difficult to restate his thought without doing the same thing.} And this, of course, is true, irrespective of whether one holds a correspondence or a coherence theory of truth. We could not have anything describable as knowledge of objects if the representations through which we know them could occur in the same random way that imaginings can, or that hallucinations sometimes do. But this does not mean that the objectivity of knowledge can be completely accounted for in terms of the coherence of perceptions, nor does Kant here say that it can. It is simply a mistake to read the last sentence of the paragraph being discussed as Kant's explicit avowal of a coherence theory of truth.

Notice that I am not denying that Kant holds a coherence theory of truth, or something which may be likened to a coherence theory. All I am at this stage denying is that in this sentence he...
expresses it. However one interprets Kant's views about truth, there can be no doubt that the "agreement" of the manifold plays an important part in them. But that does not change the fact that Kant is not here explaining truth simply in terms of coherence.

It does then seem as if Kant is at least at this point distinguishing between the object of representations, i.e. that unknown something=x which prevents our modes of knowledge from occurring haphazardly, and the concept of an object, i.e., the unity of the objective manifold. Now, if Kant means this distinction to be taken seriously, and if he has not forgotten his own claim that things-in-themselves are unknowable, then it should turn out that only the second item distinguished, the concept of an object, can bear any speculative weight. The object should simply drop by the board and be ignored for the remainder of the discussion. What I mean is this. Kant has already claimed that, since all appearances are representations, we cannot characterize independent objects in any way save as an unknown x which provides in some way the unity of an objective manifold. The thing-in-itself is thus speculatively useless; and any attempt to expose the necessary conditions of the possibility of empirical knowledge must be made without further appeal to either the thing-in-itself or the notion of the object of representations. In short, if objectivity is to be further explained, the explanation must be in terms, not of the object, but of the concept of an object, that is, not of the thing which provides unity, but of the unity which it provides. Consequently, it should turn out that in the passages
following those already cited reference to the unknown something=x drops out, with the discussion dealing exclusively with the concept of an object, or, if you prefer, with the unity of the manifold. And, indeed, this is just what does occur, beginning with the last sentence of quotation 2.

This sentence just mentioned is the key sentence in the entire Subjective Deduction. It is also one of the most difficult in all of the Critique to piece together. I doubt seriously that any attempt to render it intelligible can be given which is not open to objections, but that has not deterred others, nor shall it hinder me, from making a stab at doing so. The entire sentence bears requoting:

But it is clear that, since we have to deal only with the manifold of our representations, and since that x (the object) which corresponds to them is nothing to us—being as it is something that has to be distinct from all our representations—the unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing but the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations.

The underlined clause is, of course, the source of the problem. Before that, however, what Kant seems to be doing is relatively clear. He restates his claim that the x which corresponds to our knowledge is nothing to us,¹ and then, because it is of no further use for explaining the notion of objectivity, drops it from consideration. No mention of it occurs again until A109. He then switches in

¹The locution is worthy of mention. Kant does not say that the object is nothing—he says it is nothing to us. He is thus not denying that there are any objects which correspond to our knowledge, but only that we can know nothing about what they are like. The mere fact that he says what he does is evidence that he is here talking about things-in-themselves, and that he does not mean to identify the T0 and the unity of the manifold.
mid-sentence to talk about "the unity which the object makes necessary"—what he equated in the preceding paragraph with the concept of an object—and enigmatically identifies it with "the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations." I make no claim whatsoever to understand fully what Kant means here. However, a general approximation of what he says bears exploring, and can be given without too much difficulty.

The something=x which prevents our modes of knowledge from occurring arbitrarily, and to that extent grounds the unity of an objective manifold is completely unknown to us. Consequently, we cannot become aware of the characteristics in virtue of which the object renders the manifold united, for if we could we would be able to know something about it. All we can bring to consciousness are the various modes of unity of the manifold, modes which, as it turns out, are identical with the formal unity of consciousness. Since, as Kant later goes on to argue, the formal unity of consciousness is equivalent to the pure concepts of the understanding, equating the unity of the manifold with the formal unity of consciousness amounts to equating it with the categories. Kant's statement, then, that the unity which the object makes necessary is identical with the formal unity of consciousness seems to be some very complicated way of suggesting that the unknown something=x is ultimately responsible for occasioning particular applications of pure concepts. He is not, of course, claiming that the categorial modes of unity in terms of which the understanding connects representations bear any resemblance to
independent reality, for this would clearly entail that the categories apply to things-in-themselves. Rather, his seems to be the more restricted, yet perhaps equally as problematic claim that, whatever the nature of the objects corresponding to our knowledge might be, they do in some fashion which must remain forever mysterious, provide the stimulus for the mental activities which are the applications of pure concepts.

The remainder of the section from A105 to A108 Kant fills with a discussion of the formal unity of consciousness and the transcendental unity of apperception. In so doing he explains the synthesis of recognition in a concept. In these pages there is, as should be expected, no mention of the unknown object=x, but only of its concept. Kant seems to have left the independent object, so to speak, on the speculative sidelines where it belongs. He has said all he intends to about it, and indeed all he can.

Thus, between pages A104 and A108 Kant has treated, at least in a preliminary fashion, a number of topics. He has introduced, more suggestively than explicitly, a distinction between the unknown object of representations (something=x) which grounds the unity of an objective manifold in the sense that it prevents our representations from occurring randomly, and the concept of the object or the unity which the unknown object grounds. Then, after abandoning the speculatively barren object of representations, he has explained the synthesis of recognition solely in terms of the concept-of-an-object/formal-unity-of-consciousness. By the time he reaches A108 he is
ready to bring the argument to a conclusion. This he attempts on A108-A109, but in doing so he goes badly awry; for he collapses the crucial distinction with which he began and on which the success of his argument hangs.

The key passage containing Kant's confused representation of his own conclusions stretches from the last paragraph on A108 through the first paragraph on A110. Kant begins with a reiteration of the puzzle that opened his discussion. Appearances are nothing but representations, and representations have to have an object. What, then, can this object be? The answer he gives is exactly the same as he gave on A104. "But these appearances . . . are only representations which in turn have their objects—an object which cannot itself be intuited by us, and which may, therefore, be named the non-empirical, that is, transcendental object=x". The only novel element in this reply is the term "transcendental object." Previously, Kant simply had referred to the object as a something=x, but now he identifies it clearly as the thing-in-itself.

In the next sentence Kant reintroduces the concept of an object (now designated as the concept of the transcendental object) and asserts that it is this concept and this concept alone which accounts for the objectivity of empirical knowledge. "The pure concept of this transcendental object . . . is what can alone confer upon all our empirical concepts in general relation to an object, that is objective reality." (A109) The concept of an object is then immediately equated with the unity of the manifold and the necessary
unity of consciousness. Although, as will become evident later, there is reason for questioning Kant's designation of this concept at the concept of the *transcendental* object, that problem can be ignored for the present. If it is, then there is nothing in the sentences under consideration which should occasion either confusion or surprise. Kant is so far simply reiterating the position he has outlined in the immediately preceding pages. However, the next sentence introduces both confusion and surprise; for there Kant unaccountably speaks as if the objectivity of empirical knowledge is a function, not of the relation of modes of knowledge to the concept of the TO, but to the TO itself. "Since this unity must be regarded as necessary *a priori* . . . the relation to a transcendental object, that is, the objective reality of our empirical knowledge, rests on the transcendental law that all appearances, in so far as through them objects are to be given to us, must stand under those *a priori* rules of synthetical unity whereby the interrelating of these appearances in empirical intuition is alone possible". (A109-110) What is surprising about the underlined passage should be obvious—it is completely different from and apparently incompatible with, not only what Kant has argued from A104 on, but also with what he has explicitly restated in the preceding sentences of this very paragraph.

There are only two ways of accounting for the apparent discrepancy between the claims that objectivity consists in the relation of modes of knowledge to the concept of the (transcendental) object, and that objectivity is constituted by relation of modes of
knowledge to the TO itself. Both of them involve some sort of confusion on Kant's part. Either Kant has all along been conflating the TO and its concept, but has been up to now expressing himself badly; or he is here simply making a mistake and confusing the TO with what he takes to be its concept. The former of these alternatives appears unlikely for two reasons. In the first place, if, as I am now assuming, that the TO is identical with the thing-in-itself, then it is false that Kant means to identify the TO with the concept of anything. The thing-in-itself is surely an independent object if anything is, and its identity with the TO means that the TO too is an independent thing, not a concept. Secondly, the view that Kant is purposely conflating the TO and its concept simply does not square with the text. Up until the sentence on A109-110, there is no indication of such a conflation, and the preceding pages make sense without presupposing it. Indeed, as I have tried to point out in various ways, Kant even seems intentionally to distinguish between the TO and what he identifies as its concept, not to identify them. There is no mention of the unknown object of representations in Kant's discussion of the formal unity of consciousness, not because the unknown x is identical with that unity, but because it is speculatively barren and offers nothing which would further the explication.

The latter alternative thus remains. In this case, as he does in several other places, Kant is simply confusing object and concept. He is not intentionally identifying the unity of the manifold with the transcendental object, but for some reason or another has
become confused. The concept of the TO remains identical with the unity of the manifold, or the formal unity of consciousness; while the TO Kant continues to think of as that something=x which in virtue of preventing our representations from occurring randomly accounts for the unity of the manifold.

The same doctrine, as well as the same confusion of object and concept, occurs in that portion of the A chapter on phenomena and noumena which I referred to earlier. Unfortunately, though, the confusion is more pronounced, and as a result comes out looking more like Kant's accepted doctrine. The most important passage occurs on pages A250-251; and its first few sentences have been cited above as quotation 3. In them Kant reiterates his contentions that the transcendental object is the unknown thing which "as a correlate of the unity of apperception, can serve only for the unity of the manifold in sensible intuition." (The context once again makes clear that he means by "TO" the thing-in-itself.) The unity which the TO "serves for" is what constitutes objectivity. Immediately afterwards, however, he conflates the TO and its concept, claiming that the TO is merely "the representation of appearances under the concept of an object in general..." (A251) Once again, he cannot mean this, given that he has just previously asserted that the TO is simply an unknown independent something=x, or, if you will, that it is simply a thing-in-itself which, due to the way our understanding is constructed, is and must remain unknown to us.
The confusion is repeated on A253 in a pair of sentences which, as they are written, are simply unintelligible.

(5) The object to which I relate appearance in general is the transcendental object, that is, the completely indeterminate thought of something in general. This cannot be entitled \textit{noumenon}, for I know nothing of what it is in itself, and have no concept of it save as merely the object of a sensible intuition in general, and so as being one and the same for all appearances. (A253)

These sentences are incomprehensible as they stand because in them Kant seems both to affirm and deny that the TO is identical with the concept (thought) of an object. If, as he states in the second and third line of 5, the TO is identical with a certain concept, then it makes no sense to say that we know nothing of what it is in itself. That claim could only apply to the TO as thing-in-itself. If, on the other hand, we can know nothing of what the TO is in itself and thus the TO is the thing-in-Itself, then the assertion that it is merely "the completely indeterminate thought of something in general" cannot possibly be true. These two claims are incomprehensible when taken together, and their unintelligibility is a result of Kant's mis-identification of the transcendental object and its concept. If he had kept the two separated, as his argument seems to imply and as seems to have been his intention, then there would have been little, if any, confusion about either his meaning in the A Subjective Deduction or in the chapter on phenomena and noumena.

The upshot of my entire discussion of Kant's views about the transcendental object as he expresses them in the only two sections where they come in for even minimal elucidation is this. Kant is
Intentionally drawing a distinction between the T0 on the one hand and the concept of the T0 or concept of an object on the other. By the former he means the thing-in-itself, insofar as we can conceive of it. Our notion of it is simply as "a something in general=x," which "prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard and arbitrary, and which determines them a priori in some definite fashion." Or, in the words of A250, it is "something=x . . . which, as a correlate of the unity of apperception, can serve only for the unity of the manifold in sensible intuition." These claims provide the meaning for the expression "object of representations" when it is used to refer to an independent object, and in virtue of them Kant designates the T0 "the object of sensible intuition." However, the object, thus conceived, is speculatively barren. It cannot be used to explain the objectivity of empirical knowledge. What must replace it is the concept of the T0 or the concept of an object. This latter concept is nothing more than the unity of the manifold or the formal unity of consciousness, a formal unity whose modes Kant eventually interprets as categorial orderings of representations. In terms of the concept of an object/formal unity of consciousness, the objectivity of our empirical knowledge can and, given the impossibility of appeal to the T0 itself, must be elucidated.

The fact that the objectivity of empirical knowledge must be explained without appeal to independently existing objects and strictly in terms of various sorts of conceptual unity, along with some anticipatory remarks about the details of that explanation, sheds what
little light can be shed upon Kant's claim that the TO "prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard and arbitrary, and which determines them a priori in some definite fashion." As I will argue in detail in Chapter IV, empirical objects are unified collections of categorially ordered representations (judgments). The unity within each judgment is provided by the pure concepts of the understanding, while the unity of the collection is provided in part by pure concepts and in part by empirical concepts. The categories contribute the formal modes of unity which representations must have if they are to be objective; while empirical concepts contribute the sensible characteristics which are categorially combined into objective representations of particular empirical things. The complete explanation of objectivity is in terms of the various ways in which representations are necessarily connected by pure and empirical conceptual rules, and thus locates objectivity in necessary connections among representations. Since the source of specific modes of necessary connection is subjective, then the fact that we connect representations in such specific ways cannot be attributed to independent objects. They cannot account for the unity of the sensible manifold in the sense of furnishing the specific modes of necessary connection which the objects of experience exemplify. In other words, the claim that the TO prevents our representations from occurring haphazardly can be given no positive elucidation. It must be an entirely negative claim to the effect that the TO somehow constrains the order of our thought.
Yet a bit more about the "constraining" function which independent things perform can perhaps be said. Given that the particular ways in which objective representations are connected are categorial, and that the TO somehow keeps our representations from occurring randomly, then the function of the TO can be described in the following way. The TO constrains the order of our thought in the sense that it "gives" us representations in an order such that, granted our possession of the categories, we have no choice but to connect the given representations in particular categorial ways in particular instances. Thus, though we cannot appeal directly to the thing-in-itself in order to account for specific objective connections, we can say that those connections would not be exhibited in a certain case had the representations not been "given" by independent things in an order consistent with the application of that, and only that, conceptual rule. For example, though we cannot directly appeal to the TO to explain why the particular form of necessary connection exemplified in the experiential judgment "This house is white" is that of subsistence and inherence, we can say that the subject/predicate connection would never have been exhibited had the representations expressed by "This house" and "white" not been caused by independent reality to occur in an order which necessitated the representing of the former as subject and the latter as predicate.\footnote{In addition, of course, to constraining the order of our thought, the TO must bear the ultimate responsibility for the individual representations of the manifold. This is what is expressed by the claim that things-in-themselves "cause" appearances. Kant apparently sees the phenomenal outcome of this "causal" relation as being those}
Thus, if the interpretation of Kant's views about the TO which I have given is correct, then he does believe that there is a minimally characterizeable independently existing ground of the unity of the sensible manifold. Unfortunately, however, the adequacy of my interpretation can and undoubtedly would be questioned; for it differs radically from the usual views. There are, it seems to me, two different objections which could be raised, not to the details of my account, but to the general adequacy of such a position as I have adopted. Both can be fairly easily outlined; and I will consider each in turn.

The first objection is simply this. Throughout the preceding pages I have been assuming that the transcendental object is the thing-in-itself, or noumenon in the negative sense. Now, though it is undeniably true that in the great majority of cases where Kant refers to the TO he means the thing-in-itself, there are certain crucial parts of the Critique, notably the A Deduction and chapter on phenomena and noumena, in which he is not identifying them. Rather, when he uses the term "transcendental object" in these passages he is referring, not to the thing-in-itself, but to the unity of the manifold. In these places, the term is synonymous with both "concept of an object" and "concept of the transcendental object." Kant is representations which he groups under the general rubric "sensation." There will be some discussion of sensation in the early part of Chapter III.
consequently not claiming that in any sense the thing-in-itself accounts for the unity of the manifold. That unity is provided solely by the concept of an object and the categories.¹

There are three reasons which might be given for denying that the TO and the thing-in-itself are the same in all cases; and the third of them actually constitutes the second above mentioned objection. (1) In three different locations Kant asserts, or at least strongly suggests, that the TO is to be thought of as that concept which is equivalent to the unity of the manifold, and in terms of which the objectivity of empirical knowledge is to be explained. He does this on A109, and again on A251 and A253. If these three passages are taken seriously, then cannot mean by "transcendental object" the thing-in-itself.

The adequacy of this claim hinges upon whether the passages at A109, A251, and A253 express Kant's true meaning. It implies that he has two different uses for the term "transcendental object," and that he vacillates between them in the same section and even in the same sentence. For there can be no doubt that in some of the occurrences of the expression in the A Deduction and the Chapter on Phenomena and Noumena, for example in the second sentence on A109 and in the term's initial occurrences on A251 and A253, the transcendental object is the thing-in-itself. I have already argued, successfully I hope, that the passages where Kant equates the TO with its concept should not be taken seriously, but should be viewed as confusions. What

¹See, for example, Wolff, Kant's Theory, pp. 313-314.
makes it seem to me unlikely that he is purposefully using the phrase in two different ways, and that he switches back and forth between them, so to speak, in mid-stream, is (a) that a coherent and intelligible interpretation of what is going on from A104-A110, and from A250-A253 can be provided which does not require that "transcendental object" be used ambiguously; and (b) that nowhere else in the entire Critique does such an ambiguity surface.

(b), it seems to me, is fairly important. The term "TO" occurs a significant number of times in sections of the Critique other than those in which I have been interested. In each and every one of them the reference is unquestionably the same—the thing-in-itself. It seems to me probable that, if the term had another meaning, it would have surfaced in at least a few of those other places. That it does not suggests that there are not two different uses, but only one; and that seeming variances should not be taken as expressing Kant's seriously considered doctrine, but should be taken as aberrations and in one fashion or another be explained away. Furthermore, the fact that all other occurrences of "TO" refer to the thing-in-itself points up the _ad hoc_ character of the claim that in the passages being discussed the term is ambiguous. There is no evidence that in other places it has two uses, and, consequently, the claim that in this section it does seems questionable. Ultimately, however, the success or failure of this first reason hangs upon the adequacy of the

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1In addition to its occurrences in the sections under consideration, it is also found at A46, A191, A277, A288, A358, A366, A372, A379, A390, and A393-94, A478, A494, A495, A538, A539-41, A545, A557, A565, A613, A679, and A698.
interpretation which I have given of the crucial sections wherein the supposed ambiguity occurs. Since it seems to me that that interpretation is correct, it also seems that the first reason for viewing the TO as not identical with the thing-in-itself is inadequate.

(2) The second reason for denying the identity of TO and thing-in-itself is this. There is at least one place where Kant explicitly denies that the transcendental object is the thing-in-itself. This occurs on A253, and was given earlier as quotation 5. Since Kant uses "noumenon" as simply a fancy manner of designating things-in-themselves, if he denies that the TO is the noumenon he is surely denying that it is identical with the thing-in-itself.

Two replies are possible. (a) If it is true that Kant in some places denies that the TO is the thing-in-itself, it is also true that in others he asserts that it is. The most obvious is at A288=B345, where he says:

(6) If we are pleased to call this object noumenon for the reason that its representation is not sensible, we are free to do so. But since we can apply to it none of the concepts of our understanding, the representation remains for us empty.

Since there are quotes which explicitly support both the view that the TO is, and the position that it is not, identical with the thing-in-itself, it would appear that the issue cannot be decided simply on the basis of what Kant says. Moreover, since in the overwhelming majority of cases, the transcendental object clearly is the thing-in-itself, even though Kant does not explicitly say so, it would seem that, if possible, some other explanation of why Kant denies on A253 that the TO is the noumenon should be offered.
(b) Such an explanation can, it seems to me, be given. To begin with, it is just not true, especially in the A edition, that for Kant "noumenon" is merely a fancy way of designating things-in-themselves. In this Edition, the term has, except in unguarded moments, a very specific meaning. It is designed to refer, as it did in the Dissertation, to intelligible entities, objects of a very special intellectual kind of intuition. Thus the term is in a sense a loaded one, for it carries with it notions which, to put it mildly, Kant finds speculatively problematical. "Thing-in-itself," however, is a much less loaded expression. It does not carry along with it the suggestion of purely intelligible properties or of a purely intellectual mode of knowledge. It is, if you will, a more neutral term used simply to refer to objects which bear no essential relation to perceivers.

Kant denies, of course, that we can know whether noumena exist, but he does not deny that we can and do know that things-in-themselves exist. What this at first glance paradoxical claim amounts to is simply that, though we can and do recognize that there are objects which correspond to and are distinct from our knowledge (things-in-themselves), we cannot discover what properties these things might have in themselves. In particular, we cannot discover

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1 For example: "But if I postulate things which are mere objects of understanding, and which, nevertheless, can be given as such to an intuition, although not to one that is sensible--given therefore coram intuiti intellectuali--such things would be entitled noumena (intelligibilia)". (A249).
that they have those characteristics which have traditionally (for Kant) been associated with the name "noumenon." Whether (i) the objects which correspond to our knowledge or (ii) any other objects, are noumena we can never discern; and consequently we cannot know whether or not noumena exist. This, however, does not vitiate the claim that things-in-themselves, construed simply as objects corresponding to and distinct from our knowledge, exist.

Granted the explanation of "noumenon" just given, Kant's apparent ambivalence about whether the transcendental object is to be called noumenon can be fairly easily explained. Since he clearly believes that there are things-in-themselves (and thus TOs), if he allows that the TO can be called "noumenon," he is apparently admitting the existence of both intelligible objects and an intellectual intuition by means of which awareness of them is possible. In other words, he is at the very least admitting that we do know something about the nature of things-in-themselves. This, of course is unacceptable. The other side of the coin, though, is less clear cut; although Kant continually asserts that we cannot know whether noumena exist, he at the same time seems to have believed1 that they do, and moreover that the natures of things as they are in themselves are noumenal. Consequently, he is reluctant to deny outright that the TO is a noumenon, because if

1 Though not without reason. The whole of his moral philosophy depends upon the noumenal nature of the self, as well as on the conviction that the ultimate ground of the natural world is purposive. It would have been odd indeed had these convictions not made their presence felt, despite Kant's best intentions, in his speculative works. They most obviously control the solutions to the third and fourth Antinomies.
he does he seems both to be making a dogmatic statement about things-in-themselves, and to be drawing a distinction between things-in-themselves and noumena. Such a distinction is untenable on practical grounds, and Kant seems also to have found it speculatively uncomfortable.\footnote{1}

The means for dissolving the tension is provided by Kant in the B edition, in the form of the distinction between noumena in the positive and noumena in the negative sense. In the positive sense a noumenon is described, as it was in A, as the object of a non-sensible, or intellectual, intuition; and Kant continues to assert that we cannot even be sure of their possibility. A noumenon in the negative sense, however, is simply "a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensible intuition" (B307), where we abstract from our mode of intuiting things and think them as things in their own right. In this latter sense noumena exist, and we can know that they do. This distinction enables Kant to overcome his ambivalence about whether to

\footnote{1The explanation of much of Kant's wavering about whether the pure concepts apply to things-in-themselves lies in the difference between what, as speculative philosopher, he feels he can legitimately assert and what, as practical philosopher, he must postulate. That Kant constantly has his eye on the latter causes him to leave open possibilities which, had he been occupied solely with speculative concerns, he would probably have closed. The most important of these is the issue of whether categories have noumenal application. As speculative philosopher he can certainly not assert that they do, but moral considerations prohibit him either from positively asserting that they do not, or from giving an analysis of them which bars their application to the objects in the external world. The tension between his speculative and practical leanings may have been what compelled him to differentiate between schematized and unschematized categories, a distinction which more than one writer has declared to be unnecessary.}
designate the TO "noumenon." In the positive sense, the TO obviously cannot be called "noumenon," since the existence of intelligible entities remains an open question while the existence of the TO does not. In the negative sense, however, the TO can be considered a noumenon, since both "TO" and "noumenon in the negative sense" are nothing more than different ways of designating things as they are in themselves, whose existence Kant does not question.

The B edition terminology of noumenon in the positive sense and noumenon in the negative sense replaces that of noumenon and transcendental object. Among other things it serves to mark the end of the ambivalence which Kant felt in A concerning the relation between the notion of the transcendental object and that of noumenon. Nevertheless the difference in terms should not be taken as expressing any positive difference in doctrine, both because the distinction explicitly formulated in B is already implicit in A,¹ and because the claims which Kant makes in B about noumena in the negative sense parallel those which he makes in A about the TO.² The terminology is new and perhaps clearer in B; the doctrine, however, remains the same.

(3) The third and final reason which might be given for the claim that the TO and the thing-in-itself are not the same is in itself important enough to constitute a completely different objection to my interpretation of Kant's views concerning the TO. In its

¹Witness Kant's wavering about the idea of noumenon on A252.
²Except, of course, for those where the TO and its concept are confused.
essential features, and expressed in a manner which (hopefully) clearly shows why it is both a reason for viewing the TO as different from the thing-in-itself and a separate objection to my proposed interpretation, the objection goes something like this. It cannot be the case that Kant holds as a part of his mature teaching that the TO accounts for the unity of the manifold, even in the restricted sense which has been indicated. For the view that the TO/thing-in-itself is a something=x which prevents our modes of knowledge from occurring randomly implies that we can know the categories apply to the TO or thing-in-itself; and this implication is thoroughly un-Critical. It can only be avoided if one of two alternatives about the proposed interpretation is true. Either the TO is not identical with the thing-in-itself, and the interpretation is incorrect in attributing this to Kant. Or, the two are identical, but Kant is not claiming that the TO accounts in any way, shape, or form for the unity of the manifold; and the proposed interpretation is mistaken in attributing this thesis to him.

Both these alternatives are, it seems to me, wrong. That is, it seems to me that Kant does believe both that the TO is the thing-in-itself and that it does account for the unity of the manifold in the manner I have suggested. In order, however, for him to be able to hold them both, it must be the case that the thesis which I am attributing to him does not imply that we can know that categories apply to things-in-themselves. For this consequence Kant would surely
Fortunately, when correctly understood, the interpretation that I have given does not imply that knowledge of the characteristics of things-in-themselves is available to us; though Kant's own unfortunate manner of expressing himself does leave open this possibility.

There are two different ways in which one might argue that reading Kant's claims about the TO in the way I have claimed that they should be implies the possibility of our knowledge of things-in-themselves. The first of these I shall mention because it will probably occur to anyone familiar with Kemp Smith's Commentary. However, since Kemp Smith's version really concerns issues which will come up for discussion later, I shall not attempt to do justice to it here. After mentioning it, therefore, I shall simply let it drop. The second, to the best of my knowledge, has never been explicitly elaborated. Nevertheless, it should occur to anyone who reads the A Subjective Deduction as I believe it should be read, so I shall take some pains to explain and avoid it. What I hope to show is not that Kant's views do not imply knowledge of things-in-themselves, but that this

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1 Notice that what I am saying is not that Kant rejects the claim that the categories do apply, but that he denies the possibility of our knowing this. Kant is at pains to at least leave open the possibility that things-in-themselves have characteristics which are somehow describable in terms of the unschematized categories, and thus have properties "analogous" to those of phenomena. To close the door on this possibility would, of course, have been practically disastrous and speculatively dogmatic. Cf. Wilfrid Sellars, Science and Metaphysics (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), esp. Ch. 1.
implication is caused neither by the thesis that the TO and the thing-in-itself are identical nor by the view that the TO prevents our modes of knowledge from occurring randomly.

Kemp Smith's description of what he calls "the doctrine of the transcendental object" involves two points, neither of which has entered into my account, and a third which has played a very important role.¹ (1) Appearances are nothing but sensible representations, where "representation" means nothing more than sense impression. (2) The transcendental object is "simply the thing-in-itself viewed as the cause of our sensations."² (3) Finally, the TO is "viewed as that which prevents our representations from occurring at haphazard, necessitating their order in such a manner that . . . they can yet be self consistent . . . and so possess that unity which is essential to the concept of an object."³ About (3) Kemp Smith has little to say, except that since Kant obviously believes the unity of objects to be completely provided by the transcendental unity of apperception and the categories, (3) must be a claim, not about the TO, but about its concept. (1) and (2) thus for Kemp Smith constitute the heart of the "doctrine." He finds them, naturally enough, unacceptable and pre-Critical; and he does so for two reasons. "The doctrine of the transcendental

¹Kemp Smith, Commentary, esp. pp. 204-219.
²Ibid., p. 216.
³Ibid., p. 205.
object has thus a twofold defect: it advocates an extreme subjectivism, and yet at the same time applies the categories to the thing-in-itself".¹

The former of these criticisms concerns the issue of Kant's phenomenalism. For that reason I do not intend to discuss it here. The latter holds a bit more present interest, but, for reasons which will become clear in a moment, I shall also postpone consideration of it until later. Nevertheless, some slight clarification of what Kemp Smith means by saying that "the doctrine of the transcendental object" applies the categories to things in themselves can be given before the topic is shelved temporarily. What he seems to have in mind is not that all the categories are true of independent objects, but that if the thing-in-itself is viewed in line with (1) and (2), then at least the categories of causality and substance hold for the transcendental object of our representations.² He does not appear to want to make the more comprehensive claim nor does he have to. Even if causality and substance are the only categories which apply, on Kemp

¹Ibid., p. 206.

²"What renders this doctrine impossible of permanent retention was that it allowed of no objective existence mediate between the merely subjective and the thing in itself. On such teaching there is no room for the empirical object; and immediately upon the recognition of that latter phenomenal form of existence in space, Kant was constrained to recognize that it is in the empirical object, not in the thing itself, that the contents of our representations are grounded and unified. Any other view must involve the application of the categories, especially those of substance and causality, to the thing in itself". Ibid., p. 206.
Smith's view Kant's realization of this fact, plus his reconsideration of the "subjectivism" expressed in (1), sufficiently explains why the "doctrine" disappears from the Critique in B.

The issue, then, of whether Kant's claims about the TO involve an illegitimate application of the categories to independent reality, as Kemp Smith introduces it, hinges in large part on whether and in what sense the thing-in-itself is the "cause" of appearances. Now, although this topic will probably remain mysterious forever, there are, I believe, a couple of plausible indications of what Kant has in mind which can be given. They will be introduced late in Chapter III, after the nature of representations has been explained. For the present I want to make only one point which is taken from Paton, and about which he seems to me perfectly correct.\(^1\) The position that the thing-in-itself is somehow the "cause" of appearances is not restricted to those passages of the Critique where Kant is talking about the TO. It is a position which Kant adheres to seriously throughout, and which was not deleted from B. He apparently is trying to convey something important by speaking of things-in-themselves in such terms; and it is unwise to argue, as Kemp Smith and others seem to, that his mere use of the term "cause" in connection with independent objects is conclusive evidence for a misapplication of the category. Moreover, even if no other explanation is possible, the claim that one of the reasons why Kant abandons the "doctrine of the transcendental object" in B is because it applies the category of cause to things-in-themselves is at

\(^1\)Paton, Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, I, p. 422-423
best doubtful, since there is no indication that he ever gave up the view that things-in-themselves are somehow the "causes" of appearances.

The issues involved in Kemp Smith's claim that Kant's views about the TO imply the possibility of our knowing that the categories apply to things-in-themselves will be discussed in the course of the next two chapters. I have indicated already, though, that there is another sense in which someone might think that my rendering of Kant's position entails such a possibility. This sense I want to discuss in some detail, and in doing so I shall bring this chapter to a close.

The general pattern of argument which I believe is found in those sections of the Critique of Pure Reason wherein Kant divulges his beliefs about the TO does seem to entail the possibility of our knowing that pure concepts apply to independent objects. For in them Kant seems to argue in the following way. The TO somehow prevents our modes of knowledge from occurring randomly and in that minimal way accounts for the unity of the sensible manifold. However, since we can know nothing about the nature of this object, we cannot use it to explain the objectivity of empirical knowledge. Objectivity must be explained in terms of the concept of the TO (unity of the manifold), and in particular in terms of the various categorial modes of unity into which that concept can be analyzed. Now, if this is indeed a sketchy but in outline accurate description of the way Kant proceeds in the A Deduction, then his argument does imply both that the categories apply to things-in-themselves and that we can know this. For if it is possible to discover that the concept whose analysis gives
the categories is the concept of the TO, or is the concept of the thing-in-itself, then it surely seems to follow that whatever we can know to be included in the content of that concept we can also know to apply to the objects whose concept it is.¹ Thus, if we can know that the categories are in some way part of the content of a certain concept which we possess, and that this concept is the concept of the TO or thing-in-itself, then we can as a matter of fact know that the categories apply to things-in-themselves.

The fundamental problem, in other words, seems to be that in the A Deduction Kant puts forth an argument containing as premises (a) the TO is identical with the thing-in-itself, (b) the pure concepts of the understanding can be derived analytically from a certain concept, and (c) this concept is the concept of the transcendental object; and together these do imply that we can have knowledge of things-in-themselves. (b) is undeniable, so, for the implication to

¹What I have in mind here is this. Suppose I ask someone, as only a philosopher would, to enumerate the essential features of the concept he has of rabbits. He then tells me that, on the basis of a conceptual investigation, he has discovered that the essential characteristics of rabbits are that they have 8 legs, 4 short stubby ears, and are carnivorous. Now, it seems to me that if he did such a thing and listed none of the characteristics which most of us take to be essential to rabbits, I would be inclined to say that, though he did apparently have some concept which he associates with the word "rabbit," he does not really know what a rabbit is and thus does not really have a concept of rabbits. In other words, it seems that (a) in order for someone to have a concept of Xs, it must be the case that the essential characteristics involved in his concept X are, as a matter of fact, characteristics of Xs; and (b) in order for him to know that he has a concept of Xs he must also know that the essential characteristics involved in his concept X are characteristics of Xs.
be avoided, either (a) or (c) must be rejected. It need not be (a), however; for it is the latter which seems problematical. There seems, that is, to be no justification for identifying the concept from which the categories flow with the concept of the T0.

Suppose, to exaggerate ad absurdum, that Kant had argued in the following way. Numbered among our "mental possessions" are what appear to be two widely disparate concepts--the concept rabbit and the concept transcendental object. About rabbits we have discovered a rather large number of facts and these have been incorporated into our concept rabbit and now form what is usually an implicit part of that concept's content. If we so desire, we can make our knowledge of these facts explicit simply by making explicit the content of our concept rabbit. However, the single fact which we can discern about a transcendental object is that it is a "something=x which serves for the unity of the manifold of sensible intuition." We know, in other words, absolutely nothing about the nature of such things, and as a result the concept transcendental object is virtually devoid of content. Even so and despite all appearances to the contrary, the two concepts are actually identical in the sense that they are both concepts of the same sort of thing. Such a claim, had Kant been unwise enough to make it, would surely have been immediately rejected; for there is no possible way of knowing that both these concepts are concepts of the same sort of thing. Now, though it is obviously absurd to suppose that Kant would ever have considered making this particular patently unjustifiable assertion, it is true that he does make the same general kind of mistake in the A Deduction.
His exact error is this. In A he argues (1) that the TO somehow accounts for the unity of the manifold, and (2) that the categories can be analytically derived from the concept we have of this transcendental object. However, at the same time he consistently denies to us any knowledge whatsoever about things-in-themselves, that the categories, for example, apply to them. Notice that he denies, not merely that we do know the categories have application, but that we can know they apply. Consequently, the legitimacy of his original equation of the concept whose content is the categories with the concept of the transcendental object is called into question. For on what grounds could we possibly decide that the concept which serves as the basis of the deduction of the categories, is the concept of the TO, an object about whose nature we can discover nothing? There seems to be no way, and that identification seems unjustifiable. In order for it to be justifiable, we would have to be able to know a great deal about something, the nature of which is to us completely inscrutable.

Pointing out that the identification is unfounded is not of course the same as calling it false. The point to be made is not that the concept from which the categories are derived and the concept of the TO do not "get at" the same things, but that there can be no speculative reason for believing that they do. It would be perfectly consistent for Kant both to deny that we can know whether our concept of an object is identical with the concept of the TO, and yet to maintain on other grounds—practical grounds, for example—that they are indeed the same. The problem is entirely one of justification.
The real difficulty with the argument which Kant presents in the A Deduction thus does not lie in his identification of the To with the thing-in-itself, but in his assertion that the concept of an object, whose analysis gives the categories is (the same concept as) the concept of the To. Though categories can successfully be deduced from our concept of an object (or concept of the unity of the manifold, or the unity of the manifold) it ought not be called the concept of the To. That concept is in actuality a representation of a mere something=x, which, because it is of things-in-themselves, can have no more content than is expressed in those terms. Consequently, there is some truth in the claim that Kant's view as I have given it implies the possibility of our knowledge of things as they are in themselves. However, avoiding such an unacceptable result does not require that the identification of To and thing-in-itself be denied; for this contention does not cause the implication. What does have to be rejected as unjustifiable is the identification of the concept of the To and the concept of an object. And this, of course, can be done without affecting either the thesis that To and thing-in-itself are the same, or the point that the To provides in some minimal sense the unity of the sensible manifold.

\[1\] Indeed, there is at least one place in which Kant makes exactly this point. It was given earlier as quotation 6, but it bears re quoting. "If we are pleased to call this object noumenon for the reason that its representation is not sensible, we are free to do so. But since we can apply to it none of the concepts of our understanding, the representations remains for us empty. . . ." (A288=B345)
The possibility that we can know the categories apply to things-in-themselves thus does not result from the identity of the TO and the thing-in-itself. Nor does it result from the claim that the TO accounts for the unity of the sensible manifold. Rather, it is a consequence of Kant's misidentification of two concepts which he should have kept distinct. Since this is so, then the fact that the argument of the A Deduction has such an unfortunate implication does not constitute an objection to either of the theses which I have been contending that Kant holds. Both of these remain unaffected.

The main thesis which I have tried to support throughout the preceding pages is this. Kant's views about the TO, especially as they are expressed in the A Transcendental Deduction and the A chapter on phenomena and noumena, comprise his attempt to specify the notion of an independently existing object of representations. According to him, the TO, or thing-in-itself, is such an object, though it can only be thought as a something=x which "prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines them a priori in some definite fashion." The TO thus accounts for the unity of a sensible manifold in the sense that it constrains our mind to connect representations in particular categorial ways in particular circumstances. Despite this unifying function, however, the TO does not explain the objectivity of empirical knowledge. Objectivity is a function of connections among representations, and must be explicated without appeal to things-in-themselves.
This second chapter was intended to establish nothing else. I admit, however, that I am not overly confident that even its intended purpose has been achieved. The main reason is that, although I have been able to handle objections to the view I have proposed, I have not been able to do so without accusing Kant of confusions which should have been obvious even to him. Perhaps this is alright—Kant is at times notoriously careless. Nevertheless I would have preferred to have given an explanation which would have accounted for all, and not just the majority, of what he says. This, indeed, may also be impossible, since were all his statements above reproach, there would likely be fewer disagreements about how to read them. My doubts may thus be unfounded. But, should they turn out to be well grounded and the interpretation I offer incorrect, I would only remind the reader that the remainder of this dissertation is unaffected. It still stands, even if what I have argued here does not.
Kant makes no more insistent claim about the "nature" of appearances than they are "representations (Vorstellungen)." However, despite the emphasis he places on it, his exact meaning is in many ways not at all clear. Sometimes he makes assertions which suggest that he believes appearances are "representations" of the exact same sort as Lockean ideas or Humean impressions. Other times he says things which seem to imply that appearances are "representations" in that they are particular "ways of representing" items which are not themselves representations, items which seem in some cases to be in one way or another "constructs" out of representations and in other cases to be things which are in no sense representations and whose relationship to representations is problematic. It is the aim of this chapter to untangle a number of the important threads in Kant's view that appearances are "representations." The entire chapter, as well as

\[1\]
A104, A109, A190-191=B236, A250, A378, and many others.

\[2\]
A370, A383.

\[3\]
A385.

\[4\]
A191=B236.

\[5\]
A366.
the one following, might thus be looked at as an attempt to answer the question: What does Kant mean by calling appearances "representations?"

As the previous paragraph suggests, and as will become even more evident before very long, the question is not simple. For Kant seems to have a number of things in mind when he says that appearances are "representations," and each of them has its rightful place in the Critical Philosophy. Actually there are three questions hidden in the one mentioned above, and Kant's answer to the third provides the key to the understanding of his realism. This it does by allowing further explanation of the notion of an M-characteristic, in particular, by making it possible to explain in detail (a) why all sensible properties must be mind-dependent, and (b) how they can nevertheless be characteristics of things-in-themselves.

Though there are three different questions involved in the one I stated a bit ago, this chapter will only be concerned with two of them, those which will turn out to be the first and the third. In depth exploration of Kant's answer to the second will be reserved until Chapter IV. However, before distinguishing the three questions, I want to call attention to a couple of noteworthy preliminary points. Neither is particularly profound or original, but they will help to clarify what follows.

First, the German word for "representation" is Vorstellun. As a number of writers have noted it is ambiguous as between the "act" of representing ("my representing") and "content" of representing
("what I represent"). Though the distinction between act and content is never explicitly formulated by Kant, it is clear that he intends both sides to be taken into account when he speaks of Vorstellungen. Furthermore, both have a very specific role to play in the representations which constitute experience; and those roles also merit description. Very generally, each Vorstellung (considered now as "what I represent" or "content") can be considered as a complex of form and matter. For example, intuitions have a form which is space and time, and a matter which Kant designates "that which corresponds to sensation," and which seems to encompass those sensible characteristics of things which are derived directly from the five senses. Or, those experiences which I will shortly term "judgments" have forms which are the pure concepts of the understanding, and matters which, for the moment at least, can be considered as intuitions. Granted this distinction between form and matter, which is obviously relative to the type of Vorstellung under consideration, the part played by the "act" and "content" can be indicated. The form of any Vorstellung is that non-empirical or pure component of its content which is directly contributed by the mind in the very act of representing. It consists in the order and connection of the material elements, whatever they

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1 For example: Paton, Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, 1, 95, note 5; and Wilfrid Sellars, Science and Metaphysics, Ch. 2, p. 36, note 1.

2 A21=B35, A175=B218.

3 A20=B34.
might be, of the Vorstellung, material elements which are, with respect to the specific kind of Vorstellung under consideration, "given." Thus, for example, intuitions have as their form spatial and temporal orderings of those sensible characteristics which make up their matters. The formal ordering is done by the mind in its representing act, while the material sensible characteristics are the result (ultimately) of external "affection."

That the form of Vorstellungen, though mind-contributed, nevertheless is a part of their content is worthy of further consideration. It explains, for example, why Kant speaks of space as both the "form of intuition" and as "pure intuition." All objects of the primarily passive mental "activity" which is intuiting come to us as spatially (and temporally) ordered complexes of sensible

\[ A20=B34. \]

The notion of something's being "given" thus shares the relativity of those of matter and form. This explains to some extent Kant's otherwise incompatible assertions about what it is that is given, whether, that is, sensations, intuitions, or something else is to be regarded as given. It clearly depends upon what kind of Vorstellung is under consideration. Thus, for example, with regard to intuition, sensation (or, better, what corresponds to sensation) is given, while with regard to judgment, intuitions are given.

This general use, however, must be distinguished from another one. For, in the above use no question is asked about, so to speak, what "gives" the "given." Kant, however, clearly thinks that, at least in one instance, this is a crucial question. In the case of sensation, not only is sensation "given," but it is "given" by something, and that something is claimed by Kant to be the thing-in-itself. It is this fact which Kant sometimes expresses by saying that the thing-in-itself is given to us, though he also often couples it with the further point that it is not given to us save as it appears. Just how important this claim is will become clear later on.
characteristics. By definition, or so it seems, the characteristics connected are the matter of intuitions, while the spatial patterns of connection are their form.¹ Though it is true that there can be no connections without something connected, it is also true that we can attend to and isolate the various modes of connection. To the extent that we do this we are attending to a completely non-empirical part of the content of our intuitions. Considered in this light, the orderings among intuited sensible characteristics constitute pure intuition.

An analogous point holds with regard to the form of judgments, or the pure concepts. Judgments are complexes of necessarily connected intuitions and empirical concepts, whose formal modes of connection are the categories. Just as we can pay attention to and isolate spatial connections, so we can do the same with formal categorial connections. In doing so we are attending to a completely non-empirical or pure part of the content of our judgments. This pure content of our judgments is what Kant means by pure thought of objects, and it forms the subject matter of transcendental logic.²

In outline, then, the form of any Vorstellung is that pure component of its content which is the result of the act of representing; while the matter of the Vorstellung is that component of its content

¹ "That in the appearance which corresponds to sensation I term its matter; but that which determines the manifold of appearance that it allows of being ordered in certain relations I term the form of appearance." (A20-21=B34).
² A55=B80-81.
which is "given" to the mind (or to a particular faculty of the mind) from elsewhere. Even if this were, as it is not, the only reason why it is worthwhile distinguishing act and content of Vorstellungen, that distinction would be of great interest; for it would show that Kant does not view an act of awareness, a la G. E. Moore, as "transparent" or "diaphonous" in the sense that it "is and must be in all cases of such a nature that its object, when we are aware of it, is precisely what it would be, if we were not aware..."1 The mind itself contributes something--various patterns of connection--to knowledge in the very process whereby it represents. In addition, it also focuses attention on one facet of the claim that appearances do not exist independently of the mind and are thus not things-in-themselves. That, as complexes of mind-contributed form and "other" contributed matter, they do not exist outside the mind, is a necessary truth, whose denial entails the contradiction that what the mind contributes to knowledge can exist without the mind's contributing it. This is assuredly an important fact about both appearances and representations, and renders it impossible to view Kant as thinking of representations as on a par with Lockean ideas or Humean impressions.

Although Kantian mental acts are not diaphonous in the sense indicated in the last paragraph, there is another sense, also discussed by Moore, in which it is correct to think of them as diaphonous.2 This


2Ibid., pp. 27 and 31.
is the sense in which an act of awareness is diaphonous when, to paraphrase Moore, we "look through" it and see nothing but its object, when, that is, the act seems to be completely absorbed by the object. This is a difficult sense to characterize accurately, but fundamentally it seems to be negative. When we know any object we are not at the same time and in the same way aware of the act which enables us to know it. Our awareness is of the object and of that alone; and this is true irrespective of the fact that there must be an act.

It is also true even if some of the characteristics of the object are contributed by the act which makes it known. Even characteristics such as these we know not as mind-contributed, but rather as objective. This follows from our inability to be aware of the act; for as a result we cannot be aware of the "process" whereby the object takes on such characteristics, but only of the characteristics which are its outcome. For example, on the Kantian account, the spatial, temporal, and categorial connections exemplified in experience are one and all mind-contributed. However, because our mental acts are diaphonous in the appropriate sense, we are not aware of any of these connections as mind-contributed. Rather, we know them as objective connections characterizing the objects of experience.¹ To put it another way, when in experience we are aware of spatial, temporal, and categorial connections, it is true that we are aware of

¹Notice that this seems to be implied with regard to space even in the description which Kant gives of outer sense. "By means of outer sense, a property of our mind, we represent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all without exception in space". (A22=B37)
our own representations. However we do not experience them as representations, but as objective connections. This last way of putting it will gain in importance as time goes on.

There is then a sense in which Kantian mental acts are, and as sense in which they are not, transparent or diaphonous. They are "looked through" and absorbed in the object, but they are not unstruc­
tured. In virtue of the structure they possess, mental acts or representings provide a pure content to our representations, but in virtue of acts being "looked through" we experience this content not as mind-contributed but as objective.

The ambiguity present in the term "Vorstellung" is thus extremely important. Nevertheless, until much later in this chapter I intend to ignore it. It plays very little role in two of the three senses in which appearances are representations, and consequently need not be explicitly considered in any detailed fashion. For the next several pages, wherever the term "representation" appears, it will be employed primarily in the "content" sense. The comments about mental acts which have been made in the preceding two paragraphs will be presupposed to some extent, but the act will not be explicitly mentioned. When later on it becomes important, it will be reintroduced and further clarified.

Second, the term "Vorstellung" is usually translated by "representation." However, there are those who believe that it is more
adequately rendered by "idea." Though it seems to me that "idea" is to a great extent misleading, since it fails to take account of the ambiguity of "Vorstellung" as between "act" and "content" of representing, and consequently blurs the importance of the fact that the "act" of representing is itself "structured," so long as the "act" can conveniently be ignored, it makes no difference whether "Vorstellung" is translated by "representation" or by "idea." My reason for allowing "idea" to serve as translation for "Vorstellung" is this: the first question which I will consider concerns the type of types of Vorstellungen which Kant takes appearances to be. Whether, in approaching this problem alone, "Vorstellung" is rendered as "representation" or as "idea" is irrelevant; for both express the idea that Vorstellungen and thus appearances are in some manner "mental" entities. The more interesting questions, however, do not concern appearances simply insofar as they are intuitions, or perceptions, or judgments. Rather, they deal with how appearances, whatever their status as Vorstellungen, "represent" (vorstellen) items other than themselves. Kant clearly and unequivocally states that appearances do represent such items, in particular, that they "represent" both phenomena and things-in-themselves. This is not a


2A191=B236, A198=B243.

3A366, A386.
point which depends upon the exigencies of translation. It has to be taken into account whether "Vorstellung" is rendered by "representation" or by "idea" or by some entirely different term. In order to bypass the possible objection that the question of how representations represent items other than themselves is not one about which Kant worries, but is merely a quasi-problem suggested by a particular translation of "Vorstellung," I am willing to allow the use of "idea" in translating "Vorstellung." Whether appearances are "ideas" or "representations" does not change the fact that somehow they "represent" both phenomena and things as they are in themselves.

The three problems which must be investigated if one is to discover what Kant means by calling appearances "representations" have already been suggested. The first is the problem of specifying those types of mental entities which appearances, as representations, are supposed to be; the second is the problem of how these representations (or at least some of them) "represent" phenomena; and the third is the problem of how these representations (or at least some of them) "represent" things-in-themselves. As I mentioned earlier, this chapter will deal with only the first and third. The second, which has to do with the "construction" of phenomena out of representations, will be introduced a bit later, but will not be considered in detail until Chapter IV.

1) The term "representation," when Kant uses it merely to designate ideas in a manner which suggests nothing about the relationship of such representations either to other representations or to entities completely distinct from representations, is avowedly the
most general and ambiguous term he uses. It covers such things as perceptions, intuitions, pure and empirical concepts, judgments, and the illusory ideas of reason. Thus, it might be thought that Kant, when he designates appearances "representations," is making only the very general claim that appearances are some sort of idea whose exact species can remain unspecified. That this is not the case, however, becomes evident once one recalls that appearances provide us with all the knowledge we can attain, and that the representations which give us knowledge must be, at least in part, sensible. Effectively eliminated by this requirement are concepts, considered simply as concepts, and the ideas of reason. So there are only certain types of representations which can qualify as appearances, those which either result directly from the affection of our sensibilities by external objects, or involve both such affections and the activity of the understanding. There seem to be only three types of representation which meet these requirements, and I shall call them "impressions," "intuitions," and "judgments."

a) Impressions. "Impressions" are the most basic of the representations which are appearances. Nevertheless, they are not in any usual sense "simple"; for, like all representations which play a

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1 A320=8376.

2 The distinction between impressions and what I shall shortly call intuitions is inspired by an analogous distinction which Sellars discovers in the Critique. His distinction seems to be based upon whether the representation is, in an appropriate sense, "conceptual" or not. I make no claim either that the distinction I have in mind is exactly the same as that which Sellars enunciates or that the use to which I shall put it is one which he would accept. Sellars, Science & Metaphysics, pp. 15ff.
part in empirical knowledge, impressions possess both matter and form. The most important point about impressions is that, unlike either intuitions or judgments, they are totally non-conceptual. That is, they exhibit none of the connections with other representations which it is the business of conceptual rules to provide. Impressions are thus essentially unconnected and discrete. In addition they are completely unconscious. That this is so follows from their being unconnected; for consciousness, or self-consciousness, is possible only insofar as our representations are conceptually united.

The fact that impressions are completely non-conceptual severely limits the description which can be given of either their matter or their form. The matter of impressions Kant calls "sensation," and he says that it is simply "the effect of an object upon the faculty of knowledge." (A19=B34) The form of individual impressions is in a certain sense space (and if one is talking about a series of impressions, time). However, since the space which Kant discusses in the Aesthetic and elsewhere is at least a partially conceptual representation, it cannot be the form of non-conceptual impressions. That space (and that time) must likewise be non-conceptual. I shall designate it by space_t (and time_t) in order to distinguish it from the space (and time) which constitute the form of intuitions.

It is difficult to describe the matter and form of impressions more concretely. Nevertheless, a couple of things should be clear. (i) Though impressions are discrete and embody no conceptual connections, they are not totally without connection. They are "spread out"
at least in space \(_1\) (and time \(_1\)); and space \(_1\) must be at least analogous to the space which is the form of intuitions. Like the latter space, in other words, space \(_1\) must be "that which so determined the manifold of appearance that it allows of being ordered in certain relations..." (A20=B34) Thus, the sole types of connections which are lacking in impressions are those whose existence is due to the application of conceptual rules.

(ii) That conceptual connections are missing in impressions is crucial. Concepts Kant conceives of as rules for the connection of representations, rules by means of which we are able to recognize items as being of certain definite kinds. In general, there are two sorts--pure and empirical. By means of pure concepts--considered as concepts of objects in general--we recognize items as being objects, while by means of empirical concepts we recognize items as being either particular instances of certain types of objects or particular instances of certain types of sensible characteristics. If conceptual connections are missing from a representation, then it lacks those connections in virtue of which we are able to recognize it as being of a certain kind. Ultimately, since the categories furnish conditions which all empirical concepts of objects must meet, this means that a representation which lacks conceptual connections is nothing more than a particular representation of a particular sensible characteristic.

The upshot of all this is that impressions are essentially particular representations of particular sensible characteristics "spread out" in a particular space. The sense characteristic --as
particular—is the impression's matter, while the particular space in
which the characteristic is "spread out" is its form. If true, then
impressions would seem to resemble sense data. Within limits, such a
comparison is allowable; but it must not be pushed too far.

In the first place, impressions are not "simple." They are,
like all Kantian representations, complexes of matter and form, both
of which are needed. It is essential, in other words, that the
particular sensible characteristic which is the matter of an impres­
sion be "spread out" in space; and equally essential that the
particular portion of space exhibit some sensible characteristic.

In the second place, impressions are not made known to us via
"direct knowledge" or "acquaintance." Indeed, we cannot be
consciously aware of them at all, for consciousness is recognition via
concepts. But even if we could be conscious of impressions, it would
not be correct to describe such awareness as "direct knowledge" or
"acquaintance." For, as is true of all representations which are
complexes of matter and form, the form of impressions is contributed
by the mind, in this case by the sensibility in its passive "act" of
representing. On the other hand, the matter of impressions, sensation,
is directly given to the mind by the objects in the transcendentally
external world. It is the ultimate "given" element in knowledge; and,

1Throughout what follows I shall speak of the world of things-in-themselves as the external world. I shall not mean by this the
world of objects in space and time. Following a distinction intro­
duced by Kant in the Fourth Paralogism, I shall refer to things-in-themselves by speaking of the "transcendentally" external world.
However, except where the context would invite confusion without it,
the term "transcendentally" will remain implicit.
however the causal relation between minds and things-in-themselves is to be understood, here at the level of impressions that relation occurs. Sensation is the immediate effect of things-in-themselves on the sensibility and through the affection of things-in-themselves objects are "given."\(^1\)

The fact that there are such representations as impressions in the sense in which I have described them is not open to direct textual verification. This is primarily because, although Kant does unquestionably at times recognize a distinction between non-conceptual sensations and the conceptual material representations (sensible characteristics) which "correspond" to them,\(^2\) he does not correlative distinguish the non-conceptual representations of space\(^1\) and time\(^1\), which provide the order of sensations from the conceptual representations which are the form of intuitions.\(^3\) Moreover, failure to make the latter distinction causes him to vacillate about sensations, and sometimes to speak as if they were identical with the generalized sensible characteristics from which the course of his argument demands

\(^1\)Exactly how important the claim that things-in-themselves "give" the matter of impressions will be indicated at the close of this chapter. Unless Kant can give some reason why we should believe it is true, he seems to have no means available for avoiding skepticism about the world of things-in-themselves.

\(^2\)This distinction he makes use of sometimes in the section entitled "Anticipations of Perception," for example at A166=B207, A169=B211, and A170=B212, where he distinguishes between sensation and the "reality" which corresponds to it.

\(^3\)As Sellars indicates, the argument for what I am calling space, and time, must thus be dialectical. It is not that Kant explicitly realizes the need for them, but that, given the direction his explicit argument does take, they must be granted a place in that argument. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics, p. 29.
that he divorce them.\(^1\) However, since Kant's account of the synthesis of apprehension requires that intuitions be partially conceptual, and since as a consequence they cannot simply be representations of a passive sensibility, this latter species of non-conceptual representations must be distinguished both materially and formally from intuitions.

b) **Intuitions.** The representations which I am going to call "intuitions" are not merely the products of sensibility. They are partially conceptual synthetic representations, the task of whose combination is accomplished by the productive imagination through the synthesis of apprehension.\(^2\) Intuitions are singular representations which, as Sellars describes them:

a) . . . are representations of *this-suches*, i.e. representings in the expression of which predicates do not occur in the *properly predicative position*; (and)
b) the *suches* are sensible characteristics.\(^3\)

Thus, intuitions are representations which are expressible in such terms as "this-cube," or "this-horse," where such representations are not identical with other representations expressed in sentences like "This is a cube" or "This is a horse." Kant seems to have thought of men as something like mergers.\(^4\) The form of intuitions is that

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\(^1\) \(B44, \ A42=859-60.\)

\(^2\) \(B164-165.\)


\(^4\) For example, A120 and A120n. More about this in the early stages of Chapter IV.
full-blooded space (and, if one is talking about a series of
intuitions, time) which provides the topic for discussion in the
Aesthetic, and which Kant also speaks of as pure intuition. I shall
refer to the form of intuition as space and time. Its source, like
that of the form of impressions, is the mind, and thus, if the
distinction between "act" and "content" of representations is
explicitly taken into consideration, is the result of the "act" of
intuiting. The matter of intuitions is "what corresponds to
sensation" or "the real in the field of appearance," where those
phrases seem to refer to certain types of sensible characteristics.

Exactly which empirical characteristics Kant means to include
among those which make up what corresponds to sensation or the real
in appearance is not clear. There are places where he seems willing
to number among them such attributes as colors, heat, and other purely
sense qualities. More often, though, he denies that these can be
included. When he does so, he apparently has it in mind that what
constitutes the real in appearances is physical matter and its
determinations, and that as a consequence the only sensible character-
istics which merit inclusion are those which are essential to

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1 A168=B210, A581=B609.
2 A21=B35, A169=B211.
3 B370n, A169=B211.
4 B44, A28-29.
5 A173-175=B214-216.
physical matter. These Kant at one point identifies with impenetrability and extension.¹

Though intuitions are partially conceptual representations, Kant does not believe that we can be conscious of them, except to the extent that they are part and parcel of experience. In the early stages of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant seems unsure about this, claiming in some places that it is at least possible for us to be aware of them.² Later on, however, he concludes explicitly that no consciousness of intuitions simpliciter can occur;³ and there are excellent reasons for believing that this is his final position. They derive from the argument of the Deduction, which is designed to show that self-consciousness is possible only if representations are categorically combined. For me to be able to self-consciously designate any representation as mine, it must be accompanied by the pure thought "I think". But, in order for it to be so accompanied, it must fulfill those conditions under which it can be so accompanied; and these conditions are that it be synthetically connected with other representations by the understanding in accordance with its pure concepts. Experience is such a synthesis according to categories, and it is essentially expressible in terms of the various forms of judgment. In short, for any representation to be accompanied

¹A618=B646. What the other "determinations" of matter might be is unclear. Presumably it would be up to the physicist to decide, although motion and force would certainly be included among them.

²A90=B122-123.

³A112.
by the "I think" it must be combined with others in a propositionally expressible experience. Intuitions, because they are "this-such" representations, i.e. representations in whose expression the predicates do not appear in the predicate position, and are not "this is a such" representations, fail to meet this requirement. Therefore we cannot be conscious of them by themselves, but only insofar as they are synthesized with others in experience. Even this, however, would be impossible if the intuitions had not already been synthesized by the imagination and if they were not already to a degree conceptual. For Kant, there is no consciousness at all of totally non-conceptual impressions.

This, of course, is not to say that impressions play no part in knowledge. The imagination can only carry out its task of synthesis if there are impressions to be synthesized. The impressions of sensibility "guide" to a great degree, the activity of synthesis. Which spatial, (and perhaps temporal,) characteristics make up the form of a certain intuition, and which sensible properties make up its matter are to a large extent determined by the spatial, (and perhaps temporal,) characteristics and the sensations which constitute the form and the matter of its corresponding impressions. Intuitions cannot be synthesized at random. It is this fact which Sellars expresses by saying that impressions have the "counterpart" attributes to intuitions, attributes which, though not literally spatial for example, are analogous to full-blown spatial properties. Because impressions have

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1Sellars, Science and Metaphysics, pp. 26 and 29.
the "counterpart" attributes they do their corresponding intuitions have the spatial and sensible qualities they do; and because impressions with certain counterpart attributes are present in the sensibility on a given occasion intuitions with certain spatial and sensible characteristics occur on that same occasion.

The fact that impressions bear the relationship to intuitions described above accounts for a kind of parallelism which exists between those two, but which, as will shortly become evident, does not exist between them and the third type of representation to be considered, namely judgments. Both the form and the matter of impressions are "counterparts" of the form and the matter of intuitions. The difference between them lies in the fact that whereas the attributes of intuitions are conceptual, and thus the intuitions themselves are conceptual representations, the "counterpart" attributes of impressions are non-conceptual, and thus the impressions themselves are non-conceptual. The important difference, in other words, between impressions and intuitions as types of representations lies in the fact that intuitions are, whereas impressions are not, conceptual representations. Other than that, they rather closely resemble each other, especially in that, despite the fact that intuitions are somehow the outcome of the synthesis of productive imagination, both are tied very closely to sensibility and the faculty of intuition. Both, that is, are singular representations in "immediate relation" to objects. It is just here where they differ from judgments, whose source is the understanding.
c) **Judgments.** The term "judgment" as applied to a specific kind of representation may be somewhat puzzling. However, it will be less so if the following are kept in mind. In the first place, that empirical knowledge which is experience arises through the cooperation of both passive sensibility and active understanding. Understanding, which Kant defines in various allegedly equivalent ways,\(^1\) is in essence a faculty of judgments;\(^2\) and experience arises when sensible intuitions are thought as objects by the understanding. Such thought can only be accomplished through the discursive application of concepts in judgment. Thus, the process of thinking objects for intuitions is actually a process of discursively applying concepts, i.e., judging\(^3\) in accordance with the various forms of judgment isolated by logicians. In short, experience is nothing more than a "series" of judgments of the understanding, the clue to whose form is found in the logicians table of forms of judgment. This is, of course, not to say that experience is a "series" of overtly or even covertly linguistic episodes, but only that it is an essential feature of the conceptual episodes which together constitute the course of experience that they can be expressed linguistically by means of the forms of judgment.\(^4\) Because experience

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\(^1\)A126.

\(^2\)A69=B94.

\(^3\)A69=B93.

\(^4\)This seems to be part of the point Kant is making on A79=B104-105 when he says: "The same function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition. . . ."
has the feature of "linguistic expressibility" it is acceptable to designate the various fully conceptual representations making it up by the term "judgment;" and it is in this sense that I am using the term.

In the second place, it is strictly speaking an abstraction to speak of "a judgment of the understanding," where that expression is meant to refer to an individual conceptual episode within experience. For it is false that experience comes to us as a conjoined set of isolated and individual recognitions. The experience we all live through comprises one continuous course, and it is only post hoc and in abstracto that we can isolate the various separable events included within it. In using the term "judgment" I do not mean to suggest anything which might appear to cast doubt upon the undeniable fact that the flow of experience is unbroken. The only sense in which the term "judgment" will be taken to designate a single conceptual episode is the sense in which it refers to a "part" of experience which can be expressed in a single overtly linguistic proposition. In employing the term in this way, however, I do not mean to suggest that in living through what we might later describe as a single experience we distinguish it as one conceptual episode from another.

Some of the characteristics of judgments, which are epistemologically the most important of all representations, have already been indicated. Their source is the synthesizing activity of the understanding, through which the intuitions given by sensibility

1A110.
are brought to full conceptual consciousness. The process of synthesizing representations into judgments generates both experience and its objects. Since experience is itself nothing but an ordered and connected "series" of such conceptual representations, another term for a "judgment" would be an "experience."

The matter of a judgment or an experience depends to a large extent upon the type of judgment under consideration. If the judgment is expressible in terms of a simple subject/predicate proposition, then its matter is two-fold. On the one hand, it is the intuitions of sensibility which are "given" to the understanding after being partially conceptualized by the productive imagination in the synthesis of apprehension. On the other hand, it is the various sensible characteristics whose "representation" is necessitated by the empirical concept under which the intuitions are brought and by which an object is determined for them. Thus, for example, in the judgment expressed by the proposition "This house is white", the matter is both the singular, partly conceptual intuition expressed by "this house" and whatever sensible characteristics are included in the content of the empirical concept designated by "white." However, if the judgment is itself complex, i.e. expressed by either a hypothetical or a disjunctive proposition, then its matter is in actuality the two (or more) judgments which are hypothetically or disjunctively joined. Thus, for example, the matter of the causal experience expressed by "If this egg

1A106.

2A266=B322.
"hits the floor, then necessarily it breaks" consists of the two subsistence/inherence experiences expressed by the two subject/predicate propositions "This egg hits the floor" and "This egg breaks".

The form of a judgment or an experience consists of the order and connection of the various representations making up its matter, irrespective of whether those representations are intuitions, concepts, or themselves judgments. This order and connection is imposed upon the different representations by the understanding in synthesis. Thus, the form of experience, like the form of impressions and intuitions, is the result of the "act" of representing, in this case the "act" of judging. The modes of formal connection are the categories, and the particular types of categorial connection making up the form of a given judgment is reflected in its corresponding linguistic expression by the form of judgment employed. For example, cause and effect experiences are expressed by means of hypothetical propositions, with the causal character of the judgment being mirrored by the hypothetical form of judgment used to express it.

In addition to being the only full conceptual, i.e. connected, representations, judgments also provide the only representations in the occurrence of which we are fully conscious. Once again this seems to follow from Kant's argument in the Deduction that I can be conscious of a representation only if I can know it as mine, and that I can know it as mine only if it is connected categorically with other representations. Since to connect representations categorically is to judge, it would seem as if I can only be even minimally conscious insofar as my
representations are included in an experience, and that the only representations in the occurrence of which I can be fully conscious are judgments.¹ This theme, which is one of the most important conclusions of the Deduction, has, as will be elaborated in some detail in Chapter IV, a bearing on both how phenomenal objects can be constructions out of representations, and why those representations could not possibly be sense-data.

Impressions, intuitions, and judgments, then, are the three types of representations in terms of which appearances might most plausibly be defined. They are, to repeat, not the only species of representations; but due to the fact that all three are in one manner or another tied closely to sensibility, they are the only sorts of representations which Kant could legitimately have in mind when he tells us that appearances are representations. And, as a matter of

¹Such a restriction, as has previously been mentioned, rules out any kind of immediate consciousness of intuitions. It also excludes any direct consciousness of concepts. Just as we cannot, so to speak, turn our mind's eye directly towards intuitions, so we cannot turn it towards our concepts. What this means is that there are no abstract ideas, and that, for Kant as for Aristotle, there is no thinking, no matter how abstract, without some sort of imagery. Closely associated are two other themes: a) that concepts are merely "predicates of possible judgments" (A69=B94), and (b) that the Imagination is a surrogate of sensibility in that it can reproduce representations and give images to the understanding even without concurrent sensory stimulation. For as predicates of possible judgments, concepts can only occur in representations which also contain some sort of intuitive representations. In the absence of sensuous intuitions, such intuitive representations can be constructed by the imagination and "given" to the understanding as the subject term of representations which are in such a way sufficiently similar to judgments of experience that abstract thought can be carried on.
fact, he seems to have thought of appearances as representations in all three senses.\footnote{This fact is somewhat blurred because Kant never seems to pay more than lip service to the difference between impressions and intuitions. What open recognition he does give to that distinction is in terms of the difference between the matter of impressions and the matter of intuitions.} Thus, for example, at A120 he speaks of appearances as if they were impressions,\footnote{"What is first given to us is appearance. When combined with consciousness it is called perception."} at A248 as if they were intuitions,\footnote{"Appearances, so far as they are thought as objects according to the unity of the categories, are called phaenomena." Also A20=B34, A90=B123, A387.} and at A127 as if they were judgments.\footnote{"All appearances, as possible experiences, thus lie apriori in the understanding, and receive from it their formal possibility." Also B233.} Furthermore, there seems to be no basis for a decision about which sense is the true sense in which Kant believes appearances to be representations, so long as the lone topic under discussion is the type of representation which is supposed to be designated. A decision about the relative importance of each type of representation becomes possible only when, as is just about to occur, another topic is introduced. For appearances are not representations merely in the sense that they are certain sorts of mental entities. In addition, as Kant continually asserts throughout the \textit{Critique}, appearances are representations "of" other items. The "represent," in other words, items which are in some suitable sense "other" than themselves.\footnote{B147, B148, A191=B236, A379, A385, A492=B520.}
In addition, then, to claiming that appearances are impressions, intuitions, and judgments, Kant further contends that they "represent" other entities. It is now time to turn to this second thesis. Unfortunately, however, it is not unambiguous. Its ambiguity is the result of Kant's claim that appearances "represent" or "stand for" phenomena and that they "represent" things-in-themselves. Thus, there are really two different topics to be considered: how it is that appearances "represent" or "stand for" phenomena; and how it is that at the same time they "represent" things-in-themselves. I have pointed out both these problems before, but have given neither its due. That I now intend to do, though in this chapter I shall deal with only the second in detail.

Before I turn to the two senses in which appearances "represent," I want to issue a brief reminder. Whatever the "representing" relations which exist between appearances and phenomena and between appearances and things-in-themselves turn out to be, Kant's view that appearances are representations—impressions, intuitions, or judgments—must not be forgotten. Thus, a more adequate phrasing of the two "representing" problems is the following: how is it that appearances, which are representations, can correctly be said to "represent" or "stand for" phenomena; and how is it that appearances, which are representations, can equally correctly be said to "represent" things-in-themselves?

(2) The problem of how individual appearances, as representa-
tions, "represent" or "stand for" empirical objects or phenomena is raised in its most explicit form in the Second Analogy. There Kant states it as follows:
Everything, every representation even, is so far as we are conscious of it, may be entitled object. But it is a question for deeper enquiry what the word "object" ought to signify in respect of appearances when these are viewed not in so far as they are (as representations) objects, but only in so far as they stand for an object. (A189-190=B234-235)

From the way he phrases the problem, as well as from the terms in which he expresses its solution, it is fairly clear that Kant takes the "standing for" relation to be explicable in terms of the connection of representations with one another. An appearance, or representation, "stands for" an object if it is combined with others by the understanding according to some one particular necessary rule of synthesis. In other words, for a representation to "represent" a phenomenon is for it to be connected with others by means of concepts. Not all appearances, however, can "represent" an empirical object in this sense. In particular, since only representations which are at least partially conceptual can be synthesized by the understanding, totally non-conceptual impressions are excluded. Thus, the only types of representations which can "represent" phenomena would seem to be intuitions and judgments. Furthermore, since we cannot be conscious of intuitions unless they are matters of categorically ordered judgments, only intuitions which are matters of such judgments can "represent"

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1Also A197=B242. It should be noted that this is not the same question as was raised by Kant in the A Edition Subjective Deduction. There Kant was trying to discover what the expression "an object of representations" could mean when it was used to designate a thing-in-itself. Here he is asking, not about things-in-themselves, but about phenomena, how individual representations "stand for" or "represent" them, and thus, if you will, what it means for a phenomenon to be an object of representations.
phenomena. Thus, although judgments, which are already complexes of categorically combined representations, can "stand for" phenomena in themselves, intuitions cannot. They can only "represent" empirical objects when they are included in judgments. It is this, in part, that Kant is trying to express when he says that concepts in general enable us to think or determine objects for our intuition, and that the categories in particular are concepts without which no object of experience would be possible. Intuitions in themselves "represent" no empirical thing; to do so they must be connected necessarily with other representations by means of concepts in judgments.

The empirical object, Kant says, is nothing but the "sum" of the representations which "represent" it. These representations are most importantly judgments, though also intuitions insofar as they are material constituents of judgments. Thus, at least in the Second Analogy, Kant seems to be claiming that phenomena are in some sense constructions out of appearances which are themselves no more than certain kinds of judgments or experiences. This view will be subjected to considerable scrutiny in the next chapter, but some points about it are worthy of present consideration.

The position that an empirical object is nothing but the sum of a certain kind of representations is on the surface at best phenomenalistic and at worst idealistic. Part of the burden of both the remainder of this chapter and the next is to show that, despite the

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1 A51=B75.
2 A93=B125-126.
the appearances, it is neither. To stay on the surface for the moment, though, it is worthwhile pointing out that, whatever Kant's position might be, it cannot be a traditional sort of phenomenalism. There are three different but connected reasons why. In the first place, Kant does not claim that phenomena are collections of items to which we bear a simple unstructured sort of epistemic relationship called "direct knowledge," or "acquaintance." For Kant no mental act is either simple or unstructured. All of them contribute something to the representations which they help fashion. Even that passive "act" whereby impressions are generated spatially orders the sensations resulting from external affection and in so doing contributes the form to impressions. Analogous patterns recur for Intuitions and judgments. The forms of both are contributed by the mind, in the very act through which those representations come into being. In the second place, and this is simply the other side of the same coin, all representations which the mind plays a role in creating, are, as a consequence of their formal characteristics, complex. Though their form and matter are logically distinct, and thus can be separately discussed and characterized, such discussion and characterization abstracts from the necessarily complex manner in which they must enter consciousness, if they are to do so at all. Thus, just as there are no simple unstructured mental "acts," so there are no simple impressions, Intuitions, and judgments. Since these (and actually only the latter two) are the only plausible candidates for phenomena to be "collections" or "sums" of, clearly Kant cannot be claiming that the objects of
experience are composed of simple sorts of representations to which the mind bears a simple unstructured epistemic relationship. Because of both reasons it would seem impossible for Kant to be construed as either a traditional sense-datum phenomenalist or a subjective idealist.

The fact that there are neither simple, unstructured mental acts, nor simple impressions, intuitions or judgments, points up the "artificiality in experience" of the act/content distinction as well as the importance of the "what I represent/my representing it" ambiguity of the term "Vorstellung." For what requires emphasis is not that there are no "simple" mental items. At least sensations, and perhaps also those sensible characteristics which correspond to sensations are in a suitable sense simple. Rather, the important thing is that in order for these items to play any determinate role in experience, the mind must, so to speak, take cognizance of them, and by cognizing them, give them a definite form. The representations of experience are complexes of act-donated form (space time, and the categories), and content-donated matter (what corresponds to sensation, intuitions, and concepts), neither of which can enter consciousness without the other. Thus, it is not merely that Kant cannot be a sense-datum phenomenalist or subjective idealist. The whole notion of a direct acquaintance with basically simple mental entities is totally foreign to and incompatible with the thrust of the Critical Philosophy.

The third and final reason why Kant cannot be a traditional sort of phenomenalist or idealist is because of the type of appearances which he sees phenomena to be "sums" of. If empirical objects are constructions out of representations, then it must be possible for us
to be conscious of the representations composing them. The only representations which meet this requirement are judgments; and so phenomena would appear to be, in the strictest sense, "suns" of judgments or experiences. Intuitions, indeed, do play a role, but only insofar as they appear in judgments; while impressions are totally excluded. The type of constructionism which on the surface Kant appears to hold is as a consequence far more complicated, and it seems to me much more plausible, than the view that empirical objects are collections of sense-data. It demands careful examination, examination which I shall carry out later on.

That empirical objects are collections of judgments or experiences is the thesis forwarded by Robert Paul Wolff in Kant's Theory of Mental Activity. He bases it upon his understanding of what he calls "the double nature of representations," their status, that is, both as contents of consciousness (or objects of awareness), and as entities which refer beyond themselves to objects which we would ordinarily say that they are "of." Wolff argues that if representations are to be able to refer to objects, as indeed they must be, and if we can nevertheless only be aware of representations, then their referring function must be explicable in terms of the relations which representations bear to other representations, and not in terms of the relation

\[1\] "A house, in Kant's view, is not a little object constructed in imagination from a collection of sights and feels. Strictly speaking, it, like every other empirical object, is a set of judgments." Wolff, Kant's Theory, p. 279.

\[2\] Ibid., pp. 109-111.
which they bear to an independently existing thing. But, if so, then the objects to which representations refer can themselves be nothing more than concatenations of our representational contents of consciousness. Moreover, since we are conscious of representations only in experience, and since any representation, to enter into experience, must have categorial, i.e. judgmental, form imposed upon it by the understanding, the representations which constitute empirical objects must be judgments. Phenomena, in short, are nothing more than sets of categorially ordered judgments.

The position which Wolff adopts seems to me the most plausible non-realistic interpretation of Kant which has been offered. Unfortunately, however, it too is mistaken. Without going into the details of where and why Wolff goes wrong, I would like to mention his most important error. Basically Wolff misinterprets the sense in which representations are objects of consciousness, i.e. are what we are conscious of. As a result, he is led to overestimate and over-emphasize the importance of Kant's claim that representations "stand for" phenomena, and conversely to overlook, or at least to underestimate, the importance of Kant's further thesis that appearances "represent" things-in-themselves.

The claim that appearances, as representations, "represent" things-in-themselves is one which I shall spend the remainder of this chapter investigating. It seems to me to carry a rather large amount, indeed a disproportionate amount, of the "realistic" load of Kant's epistemology. What I mean is this. Were it not that Kant asserts
numerous times that appearances "represent" things-in-themselves, Wolff's view would, as an interpretation of Kant, be correct. Now, as Wolff himself hesitantly and reluctantly admits,¹ such a view is at bottom idealistic. Thus, if Kant is not to be viewed as an idealist, there is something about the "representing" relation born by appearances, as representations, to things-in-themselves, which makes that kind of interpretation unacceptable. What that feature is will, I hope, become evident in the pages which follow.

It will probably be helpful for me to issue another reminder of the exact terms in which the problem should be stated. It is not merely the question of how appearances "represent" things-in-themselves which I shall be considering. Since Kant does rather obviously hold that in some sense appearances are impressions, intuitions, and judgments, the question which demands an answer is the more complex one of how appearances, as representations, "represent" the transcendentally external world. The intricacies of this question, phrased in exactly these terms, I intend to explore in the remaining pages of Chapter III.

(3) Let me begin in a somewhat unusual way. In a number of places throughout the Critique Kant contrasts our sensuous mode of awareness of objects with another, that which he calls "intellectual" or

¹"Kant's own statements to the contrary notwithstanding, it is not the teaching of the Critique that phenomena are merely in the head, or that in any ordinary sense material objects are not real. But to the more sophisticated objection—that the "ordinary sense" includes and must include the idea of an ontologically independent object—there can be no answer beyond a careful reiteration of all the reasons why such a demand is self-contradictory." Ibid., p. 322.
"non-sensible" intuition. Now, despite the fact that by rights we can neither make the latter type of intuition intelligible to ourselves, nor comprehend its possibility, Kant often suggests that were our intuition intellectual instead of sensible we could know the world, not as it appears, but as it is in itself. It may prove helpful to delve a bit into the implications of Kant's cautiously expressed though still speculatively unwarranted assertions about intellectual intuition.

Kant seems to think that an intellectual intuition would have four different characteristics. The first three are closely inter-connected, and it is difficult if not impossible to discover which of them, if any, Kant feels to be most crucial. These are, first, that intellectual intuitions (or, more properly, intuitings) are like the representations of our understanding in being "active;" second, that they are nevertheless also like our intuitings in being "immediately related" to their objects, and thus, though they are active, they are non-discursively so; and third that they are constituted in such a way that they do not require an object to be "given" from elsewhere but can somehow "give" themselves, or create, their objects. I shall discuss these three characteristics shortly. Right now, however, I want to concentrate on the as yet unmentioned fourth feature.

A being which like God possesses a faculty of intellectual intuition would be able to know the things-in-themselves as they are in

1B69, B307, A286=B342-343.
2B72, B159, B309.
themselves. Nevertheless, its knowledge of that world, though, as intuitive, it would be "immediate," would also be in a different but equally important sense "mediate." For such a being would only know the world as "seen through" a certain special kind of representation, an "intellectual intuition." Regardless of the fact that it would be an "immediate," i.e. non-inferential, knowledge of things as they are in themselves, the awareness of a being with a faculty of intellectual intuition would be mediated by representations, that is, by intellectual intuitions.

Kant makes comments which suggest that this is so in several places. For example:

An understanding which through its self-consciousness could supply to itself the manifold of intuition—an understanding, that is to say, through whose representation the objects of the representation should at the same time exist—would not require, for the unity of consciousness, a special act of synthesis of the manifold. (B138-139)

For were I to think an understanding which is itself intuitive (as, for example a divine understanding which should not represent to itself given objects, but through whose representation the objects should be given or produced), the categories would have no meaning whatsoever in regard to such a mode of knowledge. (B145)

I exist as an intelligence which is conscious solely of its power of combination; but in respect of the manifold it has to combine I am subjected to a limiting condition (entitled inner sense). . . . Such an intelligence, therefore, can know itself only as it appears to itself in respect of an intuition which is not intellectual and cannot be given by the understanding itself, not as it would know itself if its intuition were intellectual. (B158-159)

From these quotations, as well as others which might be given, three points emerge. (1) A being whose intuition is intellectual would know things as they are in themselves; (2) the knowledge gained by such a being would be "mediate" in that it would require a certain special
sort of representation, an "intellectual intuition;" and (3) the knowledge gained by such a being would also be "immediate" in that it would be non-inferential.

(1) seems fairly straightforward, although in the passages I have quoted Kant applies it only to the self. Were our intuition intellectual, we could know ourselves as we are in ourselves. But, because the manifold of intuition must be "given" from elsewhere, and because in being "given" that manifold is subject to the form of inner sense, our intuition is not intellectual, and consequently we are restricted to knowing ourselves as we appear. However, the two reasons why we cannot know ourselves as things-in-themselves are also reasons why we cannot know anything as thing-in-itself. No matter what object we take, so long as the manifold of its intuition must be sensibly "given" and consequently subject to the form of inner sense, our intuition of that object is not intellectual and we are restricted to knowing it merely as appearance. This indicates that, were our intuition intellectual, we could know any object as thing-in-itself.

(2) and (3) pose problems. It is not clear, that is, that representations would be required for a being having a faculty of intellectual intuition to know things as they are in themselves; nor does it seem evident that the knowledge possessed by such a being would be non-inferential.

The claim that no representations would be needed for a being having intellectual intuition to know things-in-themselves is not open

1B68-69.
to absolutely conclusive refutation. However, it seems to me highly unlikely. For it directly contradicts what Kant says on B138-139 and on B145. In both these places Kant says that a being having an intellectual intuition would be one "through whose representation the objects of that representation should at the same time exist." (Emphasis mine) The only way in which Kant might not be meaning what he says here is if he is using the term "representation" as shorthand for "faculty of representation," in the same manner as he sometimes uses "intuition" for "faculty of intuition." But this is also unlikely, for it makes inexplicable (a) why Kant should call such a faculty a faculty of representation\(^1\) when that is exactly what it would not be, and (b) what the manifold of intuition which the being supplies to itself could possibly be. It seems most probable, then, that Kant does mean what he says on B138-139 and B145, and that the knowledge gained through a faculty of intellectual intuition would require representations.

Furthermore, it is also unlikely that Kant would have allowed such knowledge to be inferential. Doing this would have raised, on a different level, the question of the ground for such an inference, and the objectivity of knowledge. Kant's motivation for writing the Critique, however, was in part his conviction that no account of epistemic objectivity can be given if one thinks of knowledge as inferential, since the inference from representational effects to objective causes can never be justified. Consequently, it seems

\(^{1}\) Also B135.
improbable that he would have accepted an inference view at any level, especially not at the level of beings having intellectual intuition, the only one of which, Kant believes, is God.

Apparently, then, a being possessing intellectual intuition would know things as they are in themselves directly, non-inferentially, and yet his knowledge would be mediated by representations.

There is, to put the matter a bit differently, at least in the case of intellectual intuition, no incompatibility between being non-inferentially aware of objects, and yet having that awareness mediated by representations. If this is true, then its implications are important. In the first place, the representations of a being whose intuitings are intellectual would not be primarily objects of awareness, that is, what knowledge is, in the first instance, knowledge of. On the contrary, the objects of awareness would be things-in-themselves; so . . . the representations themselves would be mental entities by means of which awareness of things as they are in themselves occurs, and without which no such awareness would be possible. Moreover, in the second place, for a being with a faculty of intellectual intuition to know the world would be for him to represent it in a very special sense, and to represent it would be for him to be aware of it by means of certain (to us) mysterious representations, intellectual intuitions.

The mode of awareness possessed by a being whose intuition was intellectual would allow it non-inferential knowledge of things as they are in themselves but would nevertheless be mediated by representations. Although up to now this claim has only been forwarded for a particular unconventional sort of being, there is every reason to think that Kant
also believes it to be true of the mode of awareness of every rational being, including human beings. Much of the argument has already been provided. For, to begin with, as Chapter 1 established, Kant holds that we are aware of things-in-themselves in experience, although we are limited to knowing them only as they appear. Furthermore, appearances, whose correct understanding furnishes the explanation of the empirical and thus phenomenal character of our experience, do not constitute a second set of objects totally divorced from the first (things-in-themselves), but are rather 'modes of intuition' or 'our mode of intuition' of things-in-themselves. From these two complementary doctrines, taken together and coupled with the additional thesis that appearances are impressions, intuitions, and/or judgments, i.e. that they are representations, it follows that human beings, just as beings with intellectual intuition, have a mode of awareness which allows non-inferential knowledge of external objects (though in the case of humans, of course, not as they are in themselves), but which is nonetheless mediated by representations. And from this it further follows (once again just as in the case of a being with a faculty of intellectual intuition) that: a) human representations— Impressions, intuitions, and judgments—are not primarily objects of awareness, but are rather mental items by means of which we (consciously or

1A42-43=B59-60, B69, B306.

unconsciously) "apprehend" the world,¹ and without which no such "apprehension" of it would be possible; and b) for humans, to (consciously or unconsciously) apprehend the world is to represent it, and to represent : it is to (consciously or unconsciously) apprehend it by means of a representation (i.e. as impression, intuition, or judgment).

The conception of representations as mental entities by means of which we non-inferentially apprehend things-in-themselves and of a certain class of them (judgments) as items by means of which we consciously apprehend the world makes it possible to begin explaining what Kant means by saying that appearances, as representations, "represent" things-in-themselves. With respect to human beings, for appearances to "represent" things-in-themselves is nothing more than for them to be representations (impressions, intuitions, or judgments) by means of which human beings (consciously or unconsciously) apprehend those things-in-themselves. Thus, to dust off a manner of speaking, the representations through which we know objects are not themselves objects of first-intentional awareness. The "series" of first-intentional

¹The reason why I have introduced the term "apprehend" into the discussion and have prefixed it by enclosing "consciously or unconsciously" in parentheses is of course because of the status of impressions and intuitions as unconscious representations. Especially in the case of impressions, they are essential to our being able to represent the world despite the fact that we are not and cannot be conscious of them. Thus, I have introduced "apprehend" as a term designed to cover both our conscious and unconscious representings. I realize that in so doing I have twisted its traditional meaning somewhat. Nevertheless, I hope that this warning will ward off possible confusion. From now on I shall not parenthetically prefix "consciously or unconsciously" to "apprehend" but will let this be conveyed by the latter term itself.
representations which constitute experience have as their objects things-in-themselves, not our own mental states, or at least not as mental states. The point behind this reservation should be clear. Our first intentional acts of awareness are not diaphonous. They modify their objects, thereby enabling us to know things only as they appear. In being aware of those things, we are also aware of the modifications introduced by our representings, and to that extent we are aware of our own representations. Yet we are not aware of the modifications as representations, but as objective characteristics. Nor is this point incompatible with our acts of awareness intending things-in-themselves; for it does not follow from the notion that the objects of first intentional awareness are things-in-themselves that such representings cannot themselves influence the manner in which those objects are represented.

Such a view is neither phenomenalism, subjective idealism, nor representative realism. Unfortunately, as many people have pointed out, Kant himself sometimes speaks in idealistic or phenomenalistic ways, especially in the A Edition Transcendental Deduction, Second Analogy, and Paralogisms. Indeed, the argument of the Fourth Paralogism seems to be based upon the claim that appearances are nothing more than ideas, since in it Kant proceeds by admitting, a la his reading of Descartes, that all I can be certain of are my own ideas, but then asserting, a la Berkeley and contra his conception of Descartes, that these ideas are real and
constitute the objects of experience.¹ Much of the idealism or phenomenalism which surfaces in the Critique must, it seems to me, be written off as confusion on Kant's part. However, it is interesting to note that the most idealistic or phenomenalistic sections of the first Edition, with the exception of the Second Analogy, were rewritten for B, and that the replacements are neither phenomenalistic nor idealistic. Since, as is evidenced by comments dispersed throughout both the Prolegomena and the B Critique, Kant was especially sensitive to what he considered to be the unwarranted criticism that he was an idealist, it is not unreasonable to think that his purpose in rewriting the sections he did was to eliminate the apparently subjectivist manner of speaking in which his doctrines are couched. Be that as it may, however, Kant seems to have thought that the "representing" relation which appearances, as representations, bear to things-in-themselves is to be explained in a way which is incompatible with the way in which he read either Descartes or Berkeley.

The notion that representations intend things-in-themselves does not exhaust what Kant has in mind by saying that appearances "represent" things-in-themselves. For the issue is complicated by his

¹"There can be no question that I am conscious of my representations; these representations and I myself, who have the representations, therefore exist. External objects (bodies), however, are mere appearances, and are nothing but a species of my representations, the objects of which are something only through these representations . . . these external things . . . are in all their configurations and alterations nothing but mere appearances, that is, representations in us, of the reality of which we are immediately conscious". (A370-372)
view that the characteristics and connections which make up the matters and forms of the representations through which we apprehend things-in-themselves do not qualify those things as they are in themselves, and indeed are not in any ordinary sense similar to those properties, whatever they may be, which do constitute the intrinsic nature of external objects. The view, that is, is clouded by Kant's doctrine that the representations by means of which we apprehend the world are merely appearances. This implication, though, leaves him two additional difficulties. In the first place, he should offer some account of why we are warranted in believing that representations are "of" things-in-themselves at all. In the second place, granted that the former problem can be solved, he should furnish some explanation of how subjective representations, whose matters and forms do not bear any similarity to the nature of things as they are in themselves, can provide us with knowledge which is appropriately described as knowledge of those things as they appear.

About the first of these problems I shall have something to say later on. (It ultimately concerns whether Kant could, if asked, in some sense "justify" his apparently unargued assertion that the matter of impressions, sensation, is "caused" by things-in-themselves.) The second is essentially the problem of how sensible characteristics can be both subjective representations and M-characteristics of things-in-themselves. I intend to deal with it now, but in order to do so adequately, I need first to review some of the reasons why the world is only available to us as it appears.
(In what follows it should be kept in mind that, whether or not Kant is justified in doing so, he does believe that representations are items by means of which we know the world, and are not, as representations, themselves objects of first intentional awarenesses. The key to explaining how sensible qualities are M-characteristics will be lost if this is forgotten; for only as coupled with it does the explication which I am about to begin explain what it is intended to.)

As I have already argued, both beings (if there are or can be any) which have a faculty of intellectual intuition and those, like humans, whose intuition is sensible, know the world representationally. Whereas, however, a being whose intuition is intellectual would know the world as it is in itself, humans do not. The responsibility for this variance between the two lies, of course, in the distinct types of mental faculties possessed by each being, and consequently also in the varied types of representations generated by those faculties.¹ These

¹This dual difference reflects Kant's belief that the representations which a certain mental faculty generates are our sole means for discovering that that faculty exists. Thus a difference in faculty must exhibit itself in a difference in types of representation, and a difference in types of representation marks out a difference in mental faculty. (For example, A66=B91.) Part of the reason why Kant holds this view has already been suggested. The mental acts of a faculty contribute the form to its specific type of representation. Since it is impossible that different formal characteristics could be contributed by the same sort of mental act, and thus by the same faculty, any difference in representational form must reflect a difference both in type of act and in faculty. The doctrine seems most vital in the Deduction, where Kant argues that our awareness in experience of unified objects entails the existence of a transcendental faculty of mind, the transcendental unity of apperception, which unifies them.
differences between faculties and the representations which they occasion occur on at least two distinct levels, each of which sheds light on why beings with an intellectual intuition could, while beings with sensible intuition cannot, represent the world as it is in itself.

By means of a certain very special type of representing/representation an intellectual faculty of intuition would enable a being possessing it to be aware of things as they are in themselves. Although Kant insists that we cannot understand how such representings might even be possible, he does give some verbal indications of what they might be like, indications which are useful by way of contrast. To begin with, as intuitions, the representings would have to be in "immediate relation" to their objects. There would not be, so to speak, standing between the representation and its object, a second representation, serving as the means through which the first is related to what it is "of." Secondly, as intellectual, the representings would have to be active "thinkings" of their objects. To the extent that the representings of an intellectual intuition are separately immediate and active, they are similar to the intuitions and thoughts of the human mind. However, in the latter case, there are two different faculties of the mind, which can be characterized independently of one another. But in the former case this is not so. There is only one type of representation, springing from only one faculty, and consequently the features of the representations-as-intuitions are internally related to the features of those same representations-as-thoughts. As thoughts, in other words, they would have one of the defining characteristics of
intuitions, that of being "immediately related" to their objects; while, as intuitions, they must have one of the defining characteristics of thoughts, that of being active "thinkings" of their objects.¹

In the requirement that the representations through which knowledge is acquired be both intuitions and thoughts lies the reason why they are incomprehensible to human understanding. For the intuitions and thoughts of the human mind, in addition to being respectively "immediate" and active, are also on the one hand passively received and on the other "mediate," discursive combinations of "given" representations. These characteristics, however, are excluded from the notion of intellectual intuition and its representations, since were it passive it could not be intellectual, and were it discursive, it could not be intuitive. Thus, such representings must be at the same time non-discursively active and non-passively immediate.

We cannot make sense of a thought which is not discursive or an intuition which is not dependent upon objects for its manifold; and Kant wastes no effort attempting to clarify either, except to say that a being whose representations were of this sort would "create" the objects it knows through its representations.² His attribution of even this capacity to a being with an intuitive understanding, though, reflects an interesting ambiguity in how he conceives of the "activity"

¹It is because such representations must be essentially both thoughts and intuitions that Kant speaks of their source equally as a faculty of intellectual intuition (B72, B307) or as an intuitive understanding (B135, B139, B145).

²B72, B145.
of such an understanding, an ambiguity which reflects both his convictions about how representations are related to their objects and his aversion to the Leibnizian doctrine of pre-established harmony. The ability to create the objects of its representations Kant sees as following from the fact that its intuitions would not be passively received. Such a being, that is, would not require that representations be "given" by objects before those objects could be known. Consequently it would have to "give" itself representations and thereby create the objects of those representations. That the mind would have to create objects through its representations, however, does not follow simply from the fact that it must "give" itself the representations which it non-discursively thinks. It is compatible with the mind's "giving" itself representations, that the objects "represented" not be created by the mind's activity. Kant, however, ignores this possibility, taking it as certain that a being with an intellectual intuition, in addition to giving itself representations, must also create "through" those representations the objects it knows. His doing so reflects his sensitivity towards the problem of the relationship between representations and their objects. For admission of the possibility that someone or something could "give" itself objective representations of independently existing objects would have left him with no account save pre-established harmony of how those representations and their objects established their alleged connections.¹ Since

¹In this connection, see Kant's account of why Leibniz held the doctrine as he explains it in the "Note to the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection," esp. pp. A275-276=B330-331.
pre-established harmony is to be avoided at all costs, if any being is to "give" itself objective representations, it must at the same time guarantee their objectivity by "creating" the objects they represent. Thus, the faculty of knowledge of a being whose intuition was intellectual would have to be "active" in two different senses, one of which is entailed by none of its other characteristics. In the first sense, it non-discursively thinks objects for its representations, or, to place the emphasis on the other side, it "gives" itself representations which are objective. In the second sense, "through" the representations it "gives" itself it at the same time guarantees their objectivity by creating the objects they represent. Because Kant feels that the two senses must be combined, even though they are as a matter of fact logically independent, he also believes that an intellectual intuition or intuitive understanding could only be possessed by God.

Because the thought of a being with an intellectual intuition would be non-discursively active, and its intuition non-passively immediate, it could attain knowledge of things as they are in themselves. This indicates that, on one level, humans are limited to knowing the world merely as it appears both because their intuition is passive and because their thought is discursive. In order, that is, for men to represent external objects their sensibility must first be "affected" by the objects and thus "given" representations, and their understanding must conceptualize the previously "given" representations in judgment. Judgment, though is merely "the mediate knowledge of an object, that is, the representation of a representation of it." (A68=B93) Thus, both the construction of the human faculty of intuition
and the construction of the human understanding contribute to our inability to know things as they really are. But it is not the particular forms of our passive intuition, space and time, nor the specific forms of our discursive judgment, which on this level cause the limitation of our knowledge to appearances. Any intuition which is sensible in that it depends for its representations upon objects external to it, irrespective of its particular forms, and any understanding which is discursive in that it must conceptualize intuitions in judgments, irrespective of the particular forms of judgment involved, would be restricted to knowing things only as they appear.

This suggests that Kant should allow the possibility of other rational beings with different forms of sensibility and different forms of thought. This he seems to do at times when discussing intuitions, though he does not do so consistently. In some places he clearly seems to recognize that there might be rational beings with other forms of sensibility than space and time. Thus, for example on B72, he admits that other rational beings might possess forms of intuition different from ours, but that even so, their faculty of intuition would represent things only as they appear, because it would still require that representations be given from elsewhere.¹ On the other hand, in certain

¹"If we do not treat them (space and time) as objective forms of all things, the only alternative is to view them as subjective forms of our inner and outer intuition, which is termed sensible for the very reason that it is not original, that is, is not such as can give us the existence of its object. . . . The mode of intuiting in space and time need not be limited to human sensibility. It may be that all finite, thinking beings necessarily agree with man in this respect. . . . But however universal this mode of sensibility may be, it does not
passages from the Aesthetic, for example at A42=B59, he makes comments which at least suggest that space and time are the only possible forms of intuition.¹

Kant is much more reluctant to admit that other discursive forms of understanding are possible.² His reluctance seems to spring from what can only be described as a kind of dual uncertainty on his part about the status of the categories. For, on the one hand, he seems unsure about the relation of the categories to discursive thought in general, while, on the other hand, he seems to be uncertain about the relation of the pure concepts to the particular discursive forms of thought expressed by the twelve forms of judgment.

The uncertainty which Kant feels about the relation between the categories and discursive thought in general and the resultant ambiguity about that relation which surfaces in the Critique has to do in part with how the account of the categories given in the Transcendental

cease to be sensibility. It is derivative . . . not original . . . and therefore not an intellectual intuition." The same point is also suggested on B139 and B148.

¹Also on A249, A251, and B307.

²There is only one passage which suggests that there might be. At A230=B283, Kant says: "Other forms of Intuition than space and time, other forms of understanding than the discursive forms of thought, or of knowledge through concepts, even if they should be possible, we cannot render in any way conceivable and comprehensible to ourselves; . . . ." The problem with this passage is that it need not be seen as allowing the possibility of other discursive understandings. Kant may be meaning to contrast our understanding with one that is intuitive and not with another discursive form. If so, then there is no place where Kant explicitly says that our discursive forms of thought need not be present in every discursive understanding.
Deduction is to be understood, and puts into some perspective the problem of whether the categories apply to things-in-themselves. Kant begins the Analytic by reasserting the distinction between sensibility and understanding, the latter of which he describes as, in humans, a faculty of knowledge by means of concepts, and thus as, for rational beings whose intuition is sensible, necessarily discursive. He then goes on, in the remainder of the Analytic but especially in the Transcendental Deduction, to show that the categories are ways of organizing a manifold, ways which must be possessed by any understanding which thinks objects by discursively conceptualizing previously "given" intuitions. To put it another way, any understanding which thinks objects discursively must "employ" the categories. The point at issue, though, about which Kant never seems to have gotten clear, is whether the interpretation of the categories as modes of organization of a previously "given" manifold is an account of, so to speak, what they are for a discursive understanding, or what they are simpliciter. What he seems unsure about, in other words, is whether any understanding which employs the categories must think objects discursively.

At times Kant speaks as if pure concepts are nothing more than forms of thought for a discursive understanding. For example, twice in the B Deduction, at B149 and B150, he states that the categories are valid for "all objects of intuition in general, whether that intuition be our own or any other, provided only it be sensible." (B150) What

\(^1\) A65=B93.
this suggests is that, since for the categories to be applicable the understanding must be "given" representations in intuition, pure concepts are nothing more than combinatorial rules necessarily possessed by a discursive understanding. It suggests, that is, that the account given in the Deduction explains what the categories are simpliciter. Such an interpretation has, however, one unfortunate and unacceptable consequence. It prohibits the categories from applying to things as they are in themselves. For, if they are restricted to a discursive understanding, they could not belong to a being with a non-discursive, or intuitive, understanding. Since only this sort of being can know things as they really are, and yet would not know them by means of categories, the pure concepts as a consequence would not apply to things as they are in themselves. This result Kant would have undoubtedly found unacceptable, not as speculative philosopher because it is false, but because it is a dogmatic statement about unknowable objects, and because, as practical philosopher, he needs to leave the possibility of their application open. Nor, strictly speaking, is he committed to it. For, if one recalls that in the Analytic, Kant is investigating the human understanding, which is by nature discursive, in the hopes of discovering some concepts by means of which it must think objects, and that he is not at all concerned with an intuitive, or non-discursive, understanding, then it is at least possible to see him as giving an account, not of what the categories are simpliciter, but of what they are for human discursive understanding. In this case the possibility would remain open that pure concepts in some to us
unexplicable sense could be possessed by an intuitive understanding and could apply to things as they are in themselves.

That Kant occasionally realizes that what he says about the categories in the Analytic need only be true of them as they are possessed by a discursive understanding is indicated by the fact that he sometimes raises the issue of whether the categories apply to noumena by asking whether they apply to objects of a non-sensible intuition. For, since an intellectual intuition is non-discursive, the account of the categories given in the Analytic does not apply to it; and consequently the issue of whether or not such an understanding could possess "concepts" analogous to our categories which apply to things-in-themselves remains unresolved. Moreover, it is precisely because the "analysis" of pure concepts only deals with them as modes of discursive thought that, if they are considered as somehow non-discursive, the possibility of their non-discursive applicability to external objects remains open. Unfortunately, however, Kant never seems to have come to any satisfactory conclusion about what he is doing in the Analytic, and as a result he wavers between thinking of them as nothing more than concepts for a discursive understanding, and thinking of them as "concepts" for any understanding, but which take discursive form in man.

If Kant is willing to admit that the categories are more than simply modes of thought for our understanding, then there is no reason why he could not also allow the possibility of other discursive understandings which possess the categories as pure concepts and which yet
combine "given" representations in ways not expressible by the twelve forms listed in the Table of Judgments. There is, however, little evidence that he ever considered the question of the possibility of other discursive forms of understanding. As a matter of fact, what evidence there is suggests that he would reject it, claiming instead that the categories as elucidated in the Analytic are forms of thought not just for human understanding but for any faculty of thought which is coupled with a sensible faculty of intuition. Nevertheless, he need not be committed to such a view if all he is attempting in the Analytic is to sort and "analyze" the pure concepts belonging to a human understanding; for it is obviously compatible with the account given there that there be other understandings, both discursive and intuitive, to which it does not apply. The issues involved, though perhaps important for discovering Kant's fundamental intent in the Analytic, are not vital to the question I am investigating here. Consequently, I shall not pursue them any further. The only point I want to emphasize is that at bottom if there can be, as Kant seems to admit, faculties of sensible intuition with forms other than space and time,

1 That this is so is evidenced by the same quote given above. For, if the categories, as "analyzed" in the Deduction, are valid for objects of any sensible intuition, then it appears that any understanding which needs to be "given" representations from elsewhere before it can know objects would combine the "given" Intuitions in the same categorial ways. Since the only type of understanding not subject to such a requirement would be an intuitive understanding, it would seem to follow that any discursive understanding would categorize according to the same forms of thought. Thus for all rational beings, the forms of thought would be the same.
and if there can be, as he is at least not committed to denying, discursive faculties of thought with (categorial) forms other than those expressed by our forms of judgment, these faculties too, because they are respectively sensible and discursive, would represent the world only as it appears. They would not allow the beings possessing them knowledge of things as they are in themselves.

Thus, at the most basic level, it is because men represent the world passively in intuition and discursively in judgment that they are restricted to knowing it merely as appearance. This, of course, is not all; for in addition men represent it by means of intuitions whose particular forms are space and time, and by judgments whose particular forms are the categories as deduced and "analyzed" in the Transcendental Analytic. In short, men know the external world as appearances on two different levels: they know as passively intuited and discursively thought on the one hand, and as passively intuited in space and time and discursively thought according to categorial rules on the other. I have already suggested that these levels are to a certain extent independent of one another in the sense that there could be passive intuitions and discursive understandings with different forms than those possessed by men. However, they are not independent to the extent that there could be faculties of intuition or thought having no forms at all. Every intuition and thought must have some forms or other, and what forms they are determine in large part the precise manner in which things-in-themselves appear. Thus, the difference, as well as the connection between the two levels might be expressed in the following way: that we can only know the world as it appears is due to the passivity of our intuition and the discursiveness of our thought, but its particular character as
appearance is (in large part) due to our particular forms of intuition and our particular forms of thought.

I have restated several times that a being with an intellectual intuition would both know things in themselves as they are in themselves and yet would represent them. If both these conjuncts are to be true, then it must be the case that the representations by means of which such a being knows things-in-themselves in one way or another accurately "reflect" the characteristics and connections of external objects. The "matters" and "forms" of their representations must exactly resemble, or be literally true of the objects represented by them. From the other side, the objects represented must exist in themselves just as they are represented. It is this resemblance between representation and object which the representations of humans lack. The impressions, intuitions, and judgments of men do not accurately reflect (at least not in any literal sense) the characteristics and connections of the external objects which they represent. This difference between the representations of the two types of beings is of course due to the difference in their faculties of knowledge, but the point now is that the variance in faculties shows itself through variations in representations. Whereas the representations of a being whose intuition is intellectual do, those of men do not, have a structure which mirrors that of the things they represent. It is for this reason that the representations of the latter differ from those of the former in being nothing but appearances.

\[1\text{Sellars, Science and Metaphysics, pp. 49-50.}\]
The three types of representations which are appearances were discussed at some length a while back. That discussion, however, did not take into account the thesis that representations represent things-in-themselves in the sense that they are items by means of which men apprehend the external world. I want now to recall some of what was said about impressions, intuitions, and judgments, with an eye toward appreciating the importance of the fact that appearances, as representations, do represent things-in-themselves.

According to Kant, appearances, as representations, are either impressions, intuitions, or judgments. Impressions are totally non-conceptual and unconscious representations, whose matter is sensation and whose form is non-conceptual space \( \text{space}_1 \) (and, if one is talking about a series of impressions, non-conceptual time \( \text{time}_1 \)). Intuitions are singular conceptual representations which are fashioned by the productive imagination. In themselves, they are probably unconscious, and we can only be conscious of them in experience. Their matter is "what corresponds to sensation" or "reality in the field of appearance," and their form is the space discussed in the Aesthetic \( \text{space}_2 \) (and, if one is talking about a series of intuitions, the time discussed in the Aesthetic \( \text{time}_2 \)). Finally, judgments are the fully conceptual, i.e. connected, representations which are generated by the synthesizing activity of the understanding. Intuitions, empirical concepts, and other judgments make up their matter; while categorical connections constitute their form. The "series" of judgments is experience.
Each sort of representation thus has an internal organization or structure. All, that is, are complexes of matter and form. In a fashion which is relative to each different type of representation the form consists of a certain order, imposed upon the matter by the faculty of the mind whose type of representation it is. Formal connections become part of the "content" of representations in virtue of being contributed by the "act" of representing, an act which is, so to speak, a "process" of informing, i.e. connecting, the representation's matter. The matter of each type of representation, on the other hand, consists of the items connected. As such it is logically prior to the form, and must be "given" to a particular mental faculty before it can be connected.

Although all three types of representations have this sort of internal arrangement and structure I want to concentrate only on intuitions and judgments for the time being. For Kant holds that sensible characteristics and connections, those which we commonsensically believe to be non-mental characteristics of objects which also exist independently of our minds, are in reality quite literally nothing more than forms or matters of intuitions or judgments. It is this which he expresses by saying that phenomenal properties are appearances and that such appearances are "mere" representations. Thus, in the first place space (and time) are quite literally ways of ordering the matter of intuitions, or what corresponds to sensation, while the categories are likewise quite literally ways of connecting intuitions, concepts, and judgments. Causality, for example, is
nothing more than a necessary ordering of judgments, a necessary ordering which is imposed upon the combined judgments by the understanding and whose verbal expression is the hypothetical form of judgment. In the second place, those sensible characteristics which Kant designates by the phrase "what corresponds to sensation" are, also quite literally, matters (material elements) of intuitions. Thus, such qualities as impenetrability, hardness, and the various colors are, when intuited, nothing more than matters of partially conceptualized "this-such" representations, matters which, as unconceptualized, were "given" to the sensibility through the senses, and which were then partially conceptualized by the productive imagination. When such characteristics are not themselves intuitively given, but are included in the empirical concept of an object which is intuitively given, they, along with the given characteristics synthesized into "this-such" representations by the productive imagination, are nothing more than matters of the judgments whereby the intuited object is determined. Space \(_2\) (and time \(_2\)), the categories, and sensible qualities exhaust the list of types of characteristics and connections which we ordinarily think to be independently existing characteristics of independently existing objects. All of them turn out to exist only as forms or matters of certain types of representations. Neither they, nor anything which in any straightforward sense resembles them, exist independently of representations; and to the extent that this is true, all such characteristics are essentially "mind-dependent."

Were there nothing more to the conception of appearances as representations (and conversely to that of representations as
appearances) than what has just been reviewed, Kant would be an idealist. Fortunately, though, there is more. What is needed to complete the account, of course, is the claim that representations represent things-in-themselves in the sense which was elaborated earlier. The representations from which experience is built—impressions, intuitions, and judgments—are not in themselves objects of first intentional acts of awareness. They are not what awareness is in the first instance "of." Rather, representations are those mental entities by means of which we apprehend, either consciously or unconsciously, the external world of things-in-themselves. Thus, things-in-themselves are the objects which conscious or unconscious apprehensions are "of," although these apprehensions are only possible by means of impressions, intuitions, and judgments. This fact, the fact, that is, that representations "represent" things-in-themselves in the sense indicated, Kant does not think vitiated by its also being the case that both the forms and matters of the representing representations are dependent upon human minds, thereby making it impossible for us to apprehend external things save as they appear.

The twin theses, that phenomenal properties are really nothing more than forms or matters of certain important types of representations, and that these sorts of representations are the mental items by means of which we apprehend the external world implicitly contain the explanation of how such properties can be thought of as M-characteristics. An M-characteristic, it will be recalled, is a characteristic of an object which is mind-dependent in the sense that a necessary condition of its existence is that the object characterized by it be
perceived. That phenomenal characteristics are M-characteristics was the outcome of the first chapter, where it was shown that the principle which I called P could be used to elucidate Kant's distinction between things as they appear and things as they are in themselves. But Chapter I did not explain how it is that sensible characteristics can be M-characteristics, how, if you will, it is possible for them to be. It is that explanation which the two theses expounded in the course of this chapter makes possible.

In outline the explanation goes something like this: Phenomenal properties, among the set of which are included all attributes which we commonsensically think of as independently existing properties of independently existing objects, are one and all both "mind-dependent" and characteristics of things-in-themselves. They are mind-dependent in virtue of the fact that they are nothing more than either matters or forms of representations, while they are characteristics of external objects in virtue of the fact that the representations whose forms or matters they are are items by means of which humans apprehend things-in-themselves and are not themselves the objects of first intentional awareness. There are several points implicit in this outline whose discussion will both elucidate and expand it.

1) The key point in the above outline is the notion that phenomenal characteristics are nothing more than forms or matters of the representations by means of which we apprehend the world. What the phrase "nothing more" is intended to express is that the characteristics and connections which are the matters and forms of impressions,
intuitions, and judgments do not bear any resemblance whatsoever to the characteristics and connections of objects represented by them. Thus, they do not exist save as material and formal elements of representations. By contrast, the characteristics composing the "matters" and "forms" of the representations by whose means a being with an intellectual intuition would know the world would mirror exactly the attributes of things as they are in themselves (else such a being would not know objects as they are in themselves). This is only possible if those characteristics and connections, in addition to existing as structural elements in representations, are also independently existing properties of the represented objects. In other words, they must be I-characteristics of things-in-themselves. The forms and matters of our representations, though, are not at the same time also independent properties of external objects. Outside the representations of which they are a part, such attributes are nothing. They cannot therefore be I-characteristics. Nevertheless, because our representations, just as those of a being with intellectual intuition, do represent things-in-themselves, because they are, that is, those items which make the external world non-inferentially available to us, the sensible characteristics and connections which are their matters and forms are M-characteristics of things-in-themselves. The key to why phenomenal properties are merely M-characteristics is thus the notion that they are nothing more than structural elements in first intentional representations. It is not simply that they are such elements; for that alone would not differentiate them from the "matters" and "forms" of the representations possessed by a being whose intuition
was intellectual. And it is precisely from these that phenomenal properties must be distinguished.

2) Despite the fact that individual phenomenal characteristics can be discussed in abstraction from one another, this should not be taken as showing that such characteristics ever occur in isolation. In particular, it does not justify the claim that material characteristics, for example hardness or impenetrability, ever occur in isolation from formal connections. For Kant this would be impossible, because it implies that there could be unstructured mental "acts" and thus purely material "contents." Material characteristics always occur as formally connected in representations. It is consequently somewhat inappropriate to think of individual characteristics and connections, either material or formal, as themselves representations. Rather, individual characteristics and connections are either material or formal elements in representations; and neither of them could exist unless the other did also. The representations themselves are complexes of both matter and form, sensible characteristics making up their matter, and spatial, temporal, and categorial connections making up their form.

3) The two claims, that phenomenal characteristics are mind-dependent characteristics of things-in-themselves and that they are material and formal elements in representations, are not incompatible with one another. They would only be incompatible if phenomenal properties were also characteristics or qualities of the representations in which they occur. However, this is not the point of the view that phenomenal properties are matters and forms of representations. The "relation" which either the matter or the form of a representation
bears to that representation is not of the same sort as that which properties bear to the objects they are "of." Unfortunately, exactly how the "relation" should be described is not at all clear. The terminology of "matter," "form" and "element" is not particularly helpful, but some suggestions of other modes of description have been given elsewhere. If the "what is represented/my representing it" ambiguity of the term "Vorstellung" and the Kantian belief that "forms" of representations are orderings of "given" items imposed by the subject through its representing while "matters" are the "given" items so ordered—if these are taken into account, then the "relation" which forms and matters bear to representations can be seen to be tied to the "relation" between acts and contents of Vorstellungen, and identical with the "relation" between items which are connected and the connections such items exhibit. However this unclarity is to be resolved, though, the negative point is still the crucial one. Sensible characteristics and connections are not properties of representations, and that they are is not what the "matter/form" terminology is supposed to express.

4) This next point is closely related to that made in (3). Both the facts that sensible characteristics and connections are M-characteristics of things-in-themselves and that they are forms or matters of representations can be expressed by saying that they are "mind-dependent." But it should be kept in mind that there are two different senses of mind-dependence involved, and that it is only because such characteristics and connections are mind-dependent in one that they are mind-dependent in the other. Thus, it is because they are mind-dependent
as merely material and formal elements in the representations by means of which we apprehend external things that they are mind-dependent in the further sense that they would not characterize objects were those objects not being perceived. The latter sense, of course, is definitive of an M-characteristic.

The characteristics and connections which make up the forms and matters of the representations by means of which we apprehend the external world are M-characteristics of the objects in that world. Despite the fact that they exist only as material and formal elements of representations, they nevertheless are characteristics of objects. They fit this latter description for the same reason that the qualities which would make up the structure of the representations of a being with an intellectual intuition would be characteristics of the objects which they represent; that is, because in both cases representations are items by means of which awareness of things is alone possible and are not themselves objects of first intentional awareness. The difference between the two beings, which accounts for the ability of the one and the inability of the other to represent things as they are in themselves, is that the characteristics making up the internal structure of the representations possessed by a being whose intuition is Intellectual do exactly mirror the inner nature of things as they are in themselves, while the phenomenal qualities which are the forms and matters of human representations not only do not exactly mirror the inner nature of things as they are in themselves but indeed bear no resemblance at all to that nature. Sensible characteristics and connections are nothing.
more than forms and matters of representations. Consequently they can be only M-characteristics, qualifying things only as they appear. Since the list of those properties includes every attribute about which we can intelligibly speak, it follows that all we can know are objects as possessing M-characteristics. About their I-characteristics, and thus about what they may be like as they are in themselves, we can have no idea whatsoever.

The view that all the qualities of the objects we perceive are M-characteristics in virtue of being forms and matters of first-intentional representations is not meant to be idealistic. It is saved from idealism by the claim that representations intend things-in-themselves. Unfortunately, however, it is about just this claim that doubts can apparently be raised, given the mind-dependent status claimed for all known properties and connections. For, if all the qualities which we ordinarily and commonsensically attribute to objects are no more than humanly subjective "parts" of representations, then it is difficult to see what reason there could be for believing that the representations of which they are constituents do "represent" independently existing objects. To put it another way, if it is truly the case that our knowledge of objects is exhausted by specifying their appearances, then what justification can be given for thinking that these appearances are appearances "of" things-in-themselves? I want now to raise this problem for Kant and offer, rather hesitantly, what I think he might have had to say about it. In doing so, I am at last going to be discussing problems about the "causal" relation which Kant alleges to obtain between phenomena and things-in-themselves. In
particular, I shall be offering some suggestions about why he affirms that sensations must be "given" by things-in-themselves. Even so, however, my aim is limited. I do not intend to offer any but the most sketchy account of what he might mean by saying either, i.e. of how he conceives of the "causal" relation between things-in-themselves and minds or of how he thinks that things-in-themselves do "give" sensations. My only hope is to offer some plausible suggestions, in the first place as to why he says what he does, and in the second place as to why he gives no arguments for his claims. I doubt that anything more can be done.

That impressions, intuitions, and judgments to represent external objects seems to be one of the things Kant wishes to express by asserting that representations are "caused"\(^1\) or "given"\(^2\) by things-in-themselves. The likelihood that this is what he is doing is increased if it is kept in mind that a part of Kant's purpose in saying that things-in-themselves "cause" appearances is undoubtedly expression of the fact that appearances are appearances of things-in-themselves. Since, however, the two "causal" assertions are at bottom identical, given the fact that appearances are representations, it does seem probable that, in making the former he is likewise affirming that representations represent things-in-themselves. As a result the problem of justifying the claim that representations represent things-in-themselves would seem to come

\(^1\) For example: A190=B235, A372, A494=B522.

\(^2\) For example: B145.
down to the problem of discovering some reason for believing that representations are "caused" by things-in-themselves.

Although there is a sense in which all representations which play a role in experience are "caused" by things-in-themselves, it is clear that the immediate outcome of "causal" affection is the matter of impressions, sensation. Sensation is "the effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by it." Forms of impressions, as well as matters and forms of other representations, are "caused" only in a derivative sense, i.e., insofar as they are related to things-in-themselves through sensation. In short, if Kant offers any reason for thinking that representations represent external things, it should appear as some explicit or implicit support for the claim that sensations are indeed "caused" by things-in-themselves.

First of all, it should be noted that this claim is itself complex. For Kant is asserting not only that sensations have a certain kind of "cause," things-in-themselves, but, more simply and more basically, that the question "what is the cause of sensations?" can be and perhaps must be given an answer. It is just this question that Hume, for example, declares to be unintelligible, holding instead that the very notion of an external cause of impressions and ideas is inconceivable to human reason, and that as a consequence the attempt to discover their cause is futile.¹ Thus, it would seem that, if Kant is

¹"Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are derived from something antecedently present to the mind; it follows that 'tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of anything specifiable distinct from ideas and impressions . . . we can never really advance a step beyond ourselves,
to show that representations represent external objects, he should provide some justification, both for the general view that sensations are "caused" and also for the particular thesis that their "causes" are things-in-themselves. It seems to me that, although an argument of sorts for the second of these claims can be constructed on the basis of other positions Kant holds, in no place does he offer a proof of the first. However, as I shall indicate a bit later on, this is probably because he feels that no proof of it is necessary.

A somewhat rough-edged argument designed to show that sensations are "caused" by things-in-themselves can be pieced together. It must be constructed, because Kant nowhere explicitly makes anything but a flat assertion that sensations are the result of external affection.\(^1\) It takes the form of a reductio of the only possible alternative, that sensations are somehow "caused" by our minds.\(^2\) If, that is, this

\[^{1}\text{The quotation from A19=B34 which was given earlier, plus another passage on A372 which was also referred to earlier are two of the most direct avowals of the view that things-in-themselves "cause" sensations. Neither is accompanied by any justification.}\]

\[^{2}\text{That this is the other alternative indicates how I shall be using the term "thing-in-itself" in what follows. I shall be distinguishing things-in-themselves from minds, and not from appearances. Perhaps this would be better indicated by using "external object" instead, but as long as the contrast is apparent without the switch, I shall not make it. The other view, that sensations are "caused" by appearances, is patently false, ultimately because something cannot be the cause of itself.}\]
alternative can be shown to be false, then it will follow, granted the necessity of a "cause" at all, that transcendentally external objects "cause" sensations.

According to Kant the human mind consists ultimately of four different faculties: sensibility, imagination, understanding, and reason. If somehow the human mind is able to "cause" sensations, it must be through the activity of one or the other of these faculties. Either sensibility, or imagination, or understanding, or reason must "affect" our sensibility and by doing so "give" sensations. Each can be taken separately.

Rather clearly, sensibility cannot be the "cause" of sensations; for our sensibility is essentially passive. It must itself be "affected" in order for the matter of impressions to occur. However, were it to be the "cause" of sensations, it would also have to be active, since for something to "cause" sensations it would surely have to be somehow active. Thus, were sensibility the "cause" of sensations, the same faculty would be both active and passive; and this is impossible. So sensibility cannot "cause" sensations. Moreover, if any faculty of the mind is to be such a "cause," it is at least a necessary condition that that faculty be active is a sense which would enable it to "give" the matter of impressions.

Understanding and reason are the two active faculties of the mind. Both of them introduce unity into manifold representations, the former by means of concepts or rules, and the latter via
principles. Yet, despite the fact that both are essentially active, neither can possibly "cause" sensations. The reason, which is the same in both cases, has already been suggested. Understanding and reason alike are mental faculties whose activity is by nature combinatorial. It is their task to unify certain types of representations by combining them in some objectively or, in the case of the ideas of reason, subjectively necessary fashion. But, for them to be able to carry out their functions in any way which aids in the attainment of knowledge, the representations which are combined must be "given" from elsewhere. The understanding, that is, fashions objective representations only insofar as it is "given" intuitions; while reason can introduce unity into the concepts of understanding only if those concepts have likewise been previously "given." In neither case is the faculty active in the further sense that it can provide itself with the representations it combines. This is exactly what would have to happen were either the understanding or reason to "cause" sensations. Whichever faculty was thought to "affect" sensibility would be giving itself the representations it combines.

Holding that either understanding or reason could "give" itself representations by affecting sensibility is roughly analogous to thinking that a machine made for the purpose of sorting mail could in addition provide itself with the mail it sorts. Just as this is

1"Understanding may be regarded as a faculty which secures the unity of appearances by means of rules, and reason as being the faculty which secures the unity of the rules of understanding under principles". (A302=B359)
impossible, so it is also impossible for our two active faculties, whose essential functions are combinatorial, to give themselves representations by "affecting" sensibility. Thus, neither understanding nor reason could "cause" sensations.

Two remarks seem appropriate at this juncture. First, despite its speculative illegitimacy, Kant believes that understanding and especially reason are faculties which we possess insofar as we are things-in-themselves. Moreover, on practical grounds he also apparently holds that there are no other noumenal mental faculties. Thus, if we are to be, as noumena, "causes" of our own representations, we would have to do so through either the activity of understanding or that of reason. But since the action of these faculties is restricted to combining previously "given" representations and is not creative, the possibility of our being as noumena "causes" of sensation is likewise ruled out. Secondly, the point just made is not vitiated by another, which is advanced in the middle of the Second Paralogism and is apparently at cross purposes to it. At A358 Kant states that, for all we know, "the something which underlies the outer appearances, and which

\[ A546-547 = B574-575. \]

I have, in what has just preceded, ignored that noumenal faculty which is practical reason. Although he does believe practical reason to be "creative," its ability to "create" is limited to the sphere of actions. Practical reason, that is, can "cause" novel effects through freedom, but there is no reason at all to believe, and as a matter of fact it is psychologically false, that all the representations we receive are the results of the action of practical reason.
so affects our sense that it obtains the representations of space, matter, shape, etc., may yet, when viewed as noumenon (or better as transcendental object) be at the same time the subject of our thoughts."

Although this passage seems to allow that we could, as things-in-themselves, "cause" sensations, there are two reasons for thinking that Kant does not take this alleged possibility seriously. In the first place, as he indicates on the next page, the hypothesis he really has in mind is that the things which "cause" our sensations might themselves be other subjects, possessing their own inner sense and thoughts. He is, in other words, not actually entertaining the notion that we ourselves might be the transcendental "cause" of our own representations.

Furthermore, in the second place, such "self-causation" would be untenable; for it entails at least a kind of pre-established harmony among perceivers, and at most total solipsism. The former, however, is even speculatively unacceptable, while the latter is incompatible with the practical demands of morality.

We cannot, therefore, either as possessing understanding or reason, be the "cause" of sensation. Imagination remains. As a matter of fact, imagination is actually the most plausible candidate, since it can fashion images, which, like intuitions, are singular representations, and give them to the understanding. Imagination, that is, can

It may further assume that the substance which in relation to our outer sense possesses extension is in itself the possessor of thoughts, and that these thoughts can by means of its own inner sense be consciously represented. In this way, what in one relation is entitled corporeal would in another relation be at the same time a thinking being, whose thoughts we cannot intuit, though we can indeed intuit their signs in the (field of) appearance. (A359)
put together without external stimulation images both of previously encountered objects and of objects which have not been and perhaps cannot be met with in experience. Perhaps, then, in some manner analogous to that in which it makes sensible images, it can also by "affecting" sensibility "cause" sensations. Unfortunately, though, fashioning images and "causing" sensations are not appropriately parallel. As Kant several times points out, what we commonly call "imagining" is an exercise in reproduction.¹ The imagination can only construct images, whether of already experienced or completely novel objects, if it has previously been "given" the characteristics out of which it constructs them. These "simple" building blocks it cannot create. To use a stale and not quite accurate example, one can only conjure up the imaginative representation of a little green man from Mars if he already has experienced the color green and knows through experience the general characteristics of men. In short, the imagination is limited in its imaginings by the range of characteristics it has previously acquired through non-imaginative experience: it cannot create these characteristics, but at most can reproduce them. Even that mysterious faculty, the productive imagination, whose synthesizing activity generates intuitions, is not creative, since, like the understanding with which it is closely tied, it only unites a manifold "given" to it from elsewhere. Thus the imagination, because it cannot in the necessary sense create representations, cannot be the "cause" of sensation.

¹A142=B181.
(Despite its unacceptability, the claim that the imagination "causes" sensations and through them the various representations involved in experience is the most plausible alternative to the truth, i.e. that they result from external affection. For unlike sensibility, understanding, and reason, there is at least a restricted sense in which imagination can create representations. There may be a tie between this creative ability of imagination and Kant's puzzling attribution to Berkeley of the view that objects in space and time are merely imaginary entities or illusions. If he believes that, contrary to fact, Berkeley denies an external cause for our representations, then he might also be convinced that Berkeley is committed to their being the result of some sort of internal mental creation. The only viable candidate is imagination, since only it is in any sense creative. In such a way, Kant might be inclined to misrepresent Berkeley and see him as committed to the view that representations and objects which are congeries of representations are somehow creations of the faculty of imagination. Whether this is actually Kant's meaning is, of course, problematic. Nevertheless, the fact that only imagination could even prima facie provide an internal "cause" of representations, does at least suggest it as a possibility; and beyond that I do not intend to go.)

None of the mental faculties which our mind possesses can, so to speak, create representations ex nihilo, and consequently our mind

1 B71, B274.
cannot serve as the "cause" of sensations. Since the only other alternative is that things-in-themselves act as such "causes," it must be the case that sensations are the result of "affection" of our sensibilities by transcendentally external objects. Now, if an argument like the one which I have just sketched is in line with Kantian beliefs, then he could reply to anyone who denies that the cause of our representations is external, while admitting that representations must in some sense be "caused." On the other hand, the argument would carry no weight at all against someone who, like Hume, thinks that the whole enterprise of searching after "causes" of our representations is futile. Indeed, if it were offered in response to the Humean claim, it would clearly beg the question. Thus, before an argument like the one outlined above, or for that matter before any argument designed to show that the "cause" of representations must be external can be effective, some reply must be made to the Humean claim.

Unfortunately, perhaps, Kant does not seem to have at hand an attack on the Humean objection. He obviously gives no explicit reason for claiming that some "cause" of representations is necessary; nor does he say anything which provides material out of which an argument to that effect can be constructed. As a result, anyone who agrees with Hume in believing that a justification is required will find Kant severely lacking at this point. However, I would like to suggest that Kant would find the whole skeptical tack out of order here. In other words, it seems to me that Kant does not and would not seek to "prove" that our sensations must have a "cause" because he does not feel that a "proof" of it is in any way needed. That representations refer
beyond themselves to something which may be called their "cause" is a fact, not a questionable assumption which stands in need of justifica-
tion.

If the portrayal of the nature and function of representations in experience which I have given in the course of this chapter is any-
where near accurate, then it should be clear that Hume and Kant are, in a manner of speaking, playing in completely different ballparks. 
Whereas for Hume, representations--Impressions and ideas--are the only items of which we can be conscious, for Kant Impressions, intuitions, and judgments are not primarily objects of consciousness at all. Rather, they are entities by means of which we apprehend a distinctly external world. The important points in this Kantian conception are that it is the external world of which we are conscious, and that an essential experiential function of representations is to enable us to attain consciousness of things which are not themselves representations. Consequently, it is in a sense a part of what it is to be a representa-
tion that such items refer beyond themselves to distinct "causes." This is not something for which argument is necessary; but it is a fact from which argument begins. Moreover, the only reason for calling the external reference of representations into question would be because one has badly mistaken their nature and function. Refutation of Hume thus would amount, not to showing that his mistake is claiming that the search for a "cause" of representations is futile, but to pointing out that the presupposition that one must demonstrate the existence of a "cause" for representations is based upon a mistaken conception of
representations as objects of consciousness. Had Hume, in other words, seen that representations are Intentional he would have found no problem either with admitting that they have a "cause," or with allowing that that "cause" can be discovered without "proof." Thus, it may well be that Kant does not offer any argument for his claim that representations are the result of "affection" because he does not feel the need for any such argument. As I said above, that representations are "caused" is not itself arguable; It is the place where argument begins.

The view that it is not necessary to "prove" that our representations are "caused" has a bearing on two other important issues. In the first place, it furnishes some slight indication of what Kant might have in mind by calling things-In-themselves "causes" of representations. One of the crucial points included in the conception of our representations' being essentially intentional is that in some sense they depend upon the objects which they represent. In experience, were there no objects being represented, then there would be no representations. This is also part of what Kant means when he says that our sensibility is passive. But the notion of being passive in intuition (and thus, to a certain extent also in experience) implies a great deal more. For if it is the case that with respect to the material of impressions given to sensibility, we are passive, then it must be the case that the objects upon which those sensations depend for their existence are, with respect to the sensibility, in some sense or other "active."
The point can be put in another way, which serves to bring out its importance. That we are passive in perception (insofar as perception is tied to sensibility) follows from the idea that the representations of which experience is composed are intentional. But, if some of the constituents of our representations, i.e. sensations, are passively "given" in sensibility, then the objects which our representations are "of" must "give" sensations and thus be "active." And this is true, despite the fact that we may not be able to understand how this action takes place. In short, that things-in-themselves are "active" follows from the passivity of sensibility, which in turn follows from the intentional nature of representations.

That things-in-themselves are "active" may be what Kant has in mind when he calls them "causes." Such a use would not be unprecedented, even in Kant. In the Second Analogy, for example, he argues, inexplicably given the proof of the principle of causality which has preceded, that there is a close tie between the concept of a cause and that of action.\footnote{A204=B249.} He then goes on to speak as if causality were equivalent to the activity of a substance, arguing that activity is the "empirical criterion" of substance.\footnote{A205=B250-251.} Now, I do not want to claim that Kant thinks of things-in-themselves as active causes in the same sense that empirical substances are supposed to be. Obviously he does not. My only purpose is to indicate that the notion of causes as somehow...
"active" is not foreign to him. Indeed, it was probably a conception with which he had at one time found himself most comfortable, since it is thoroughly rationalistic. So it would not be surprising if the main thrust behind the claim that things-in-themselves are "causes" of representations is the rationalistic conception of causes as somehow "active."

Furthermore, if Kant does have this in mind, then he need not be guilty of misapplying the category of causality to things-in-themselves. As I remarked in passing earlier, Kant's conviction, which he voices in the Second Analogy, that causes are active, apparently is inconsistent with his previously given analysis of the category of causality in terms of necessary connections between representations. If he remains committed to that analysis, then any other conception of causality, including and especially the one now under consideration, is irrelevant to the category of cause and effect. Interpreted in this light Kant actually has two different notions of cause, the one in important respects Humean, and the other an unquestioned and perhaps unconscious holdover from his days as a follower of Leibniz and Wolff. Things-in-themselves could then be causes in the latter sense and Kant would not strictly speaking be misapplying the category. This is not, of course, to say that he is not guilty of some sort of confusion. For the rationalist conception of cause as active has very definite metaphysical presuppositions, including among others the notions that the effect is virtually contained in the cause, and that the cause is "at least as perfect" as the effect; and if Kant were to attribute it to
things-in-themselves he would be betraying some convictions about the intrinsic nature of things-in-themselves. But this mistake, if it is a mistake, would be a great deal different from misapplying a category.

In the second place, whatever Kant means by saying that things-in-themselves "cause" representations, and whatever purpose such an assertion is supposed to serve, there is one job for which it is almost assuredly not designed. It is not meant to provide a proof, or for that matter even evidence, for the existence of things-in-themselves. The point is important, for some writers have indicted Kant on the grounds that he is using the assertion for one or the other of these purposes. There are two reasons why this kind of indictment is mistaken. First, it implies that Kant is employing on his own behalf the same kind of argument from effects to causes which he uncompromisingly rejects in the Fourth Paralogism. That he would reject the empirical Idealists argument for objects in space and time while consciously accepting it for things-in-themselves, is simply inconceivable. Secondly, were the assertion that external objects "cause" representations an attempt on Kant's part to "prove" that there are things-in-themselves, he would be admitting just the view which I earlier suggested he denies, namely that some "proof" of the representing function of representations is necessary. I have already indicated my reasons for thinking that he does not believe such an argument is required.

As a matter of fact, it seems to me false that Kant anywhere in the Critique offers a straightforward "proof" that there are things-in-themselves. As I have already noted in Chapter I, no attempt to prove their existence occurs in the Aesthetic, despite comments from
the chapter on phenomena and noumena which might lead one to expect it. Nor does the argument of the Antinomies seems designed to establish the conclusion that things-in-themselves exist. Like the Aesthetic, the Antinomies seem to presuppose their existence, while demonstrating, on the one hand that space and time cannot apply to them, and on the other that freedom and unconditioned necessity cannot be shown to be incompatible with their nature. The Aesthetic and Antinomies are the two sections in which it can most plausibly be claimed that Kant "proves" that there are things-in-themselves, and if they do not argue to that conclusion, then it seems unlikely that any other sections do. And, indeed, there is no other place in the Critique where Kant seems set on demonstrating the existence of transcendentally external things. Lack of a strict demonstration, though, is to be expected if Kant does believe that representations represent objects in the way I have attributed to him, since on this view, the existence of objects is guaranteed by the very occurrence of representations. To put it bluntly, that there are things-in-themselves is a matter of "perception."

The intent of this chapter has been to begin investigation of Kant's claim that appearances are representations. In it I have argued that, insofar as appearances can be considered as "mental contents" they are impressions, intuitions, and judgments. All are composed of formal and material elements, with the form being contributed by a certain faculty of the mind and the matter being "given" to the appropriate faculty from elsewhere. Impressions are totally non-conceptual and unconscious, while intuitions and judgments are in
different degrees conceptualized and synthesized. Only judgments are
totally conscious; while intuitions enter consciousness only to the
extent that they are components of judgments. In addition to being
simply mental contents, appearances, qua mental contents, also represent
items other than themselves. In particular, they represent both
phenomena and things-in-themselves. In the latter case, they are not
themselves objects of first-intentional awareness, but are mental
entities by means of which we consciously or unconsciously apprehend
the external world. That impressions, intuitions, and judgments only
allow us to know the world as it appears has a dual cause. In the first
place, our faculties of knowledge, notably sensibility and understanding,
are respectively passive and discursive and in the second place the
sensible characteristics and connections which make up the matters and
forms of our representations do not themselves exist except as such
matters and forms. Nevertheless, given the intentional nature of
representations, the characteristics included among their matters and
forms can be thought of as M-characteristics of the things-in-themselves
which representations represent.

In essence, these are the conclusions which have been argued to
in the last 83 pages. What has not as yet been given anything but the
most cursory treatment is the first of the representing functions which
appearances--qua representations--perform. It has not, that is, been
explained how and in what sense representations "represent" phenomena.
That function provides the topic for Chapter IV.
CHAPTER IV

The problem of how appearances, as representations, "represent," or as Kant more often says, "stand for" phenomena was introduced in the preceding chapter. In addition, the bones—almost totally bare, it must be granted—of its solution were offered. It is my intention in this fourth and final chapter to put some flesh on those bones. In particular, I intend in the following pages to explore in detail two more specific problems hidden in the general question of the relationship between representations and empirical objects.¹ The first concerns the type or types of representations which do "stand for" phenomena. The brief hints given in the last chapter suggest that Kant's main thesis is that judgments are the most important of the representations "standing for" empirical things; but that intuitions and concepts, to the extent that they are matters in judgments, also play a role. After sorting out the different types of representations which "represent" phenomena, I shall then discuss the second problem, that of specifying the exact nature of the relationship which Kant

¹The passage on A189-190 in which Kant introduces this problem has already been quoted. However, due to its importance for what follows, it deserves to be recalled: "Everything, every representation even, in so far as we are conscious of it may be entitled object. But it is a question for deeper enquiry what the word "object" ought to signify in respect of appearances when these are viewed not in so far as they are (as representations) objects, but only in so far as they stand for an object."
expresses by the term "stands for." Hints were also given in Chapter III about its correct solution. For since Kant claims that phenomena are "sums" of the representations which "stand for" them, he apparently means the "standing for" relation to be explicable in terms of the relations which judgments, intuitions, and concepts bear to one another, and not in terms of whatever relations which they bear to items other than representations. In other words, he apparently intends that "standing for" be explained in terms of coherence rather than correspondence.

Providing detailed solutions to these two problems is, as I mentioned before, the primary aim of this chapter. However, there is one other topic which will emerge in the ensuing pages and which will occupy my attention briefly. It may appear that there is a contradiction between this chapter and those which precede it. In particular, it may seem that my account of phenomena, according to which they are "collections" of judgments, is inconsistent with the claim that in experience the objects of awareness are things-in-themselves. That the two are not incompatible, given the intentional nature of representations and the consequent status of sensible characteristics as M-characteristics, can, I believe, be demonstrated rather easily. Nevertheless, to avoid if possible any suspicion of incompatibility, I intend to mention the reasons why no such incompatibility exists. Making them explicit will bring the chapter to an end.

\[A191=B236.\]
I am not now at the end of the chapter, however, but at the beginning. Reaching the end involves providing what I take to be the correct solutions to the problems mentioned above. It is that task which beckons, and to which I shall now turn.

The nature of those representations which I have been calling "judgments" has already been discussed. Nevertheless, since they are so important for the remainder of this chapter, some further explanation of and elaboration upon several of the points made in Chapter III seems called for.

The representations which I have been calling "judgments" are the deliverances of the faculty of judgment, the understanding. Though they are not in themselves linguistic occurrences, it is an essential feature of them that they be expressible in the forms of judgment isolated by general logic. Each judgment has both matter and form. The matter depends upon the type of judgment under consideration, but in the simplest subject/predicate judgment it is the intuition expressible by the subject term and the empirical concept expressible by the predicate. For example, the matter of a judgment expressed by "This house is white" is the intuition corresponding to the phrase "this house" and the empirical concept corresponding to the adjective "white." In more complex judgments, i.e. those which are hypothetical or disjunctive, the matter is the two or more judgments united in the complex. The form of any judgment, simple or complex, consists of the order and connection of the representations which are the matter of the judgment. It is a product of the synthetic activity of the
understanding whose modes are the categories. The particular mode of synthetic activity whereby a given judgment is generated, and thus the particular category employed in its occurrence, is reflected by the linguistic judgment form which must be used to express that judgment. Thus, the fact that the judgment form "... is (a) ..." must be used to express our experience that a certain house is white shows that the particular category employed in the judgment is subsistence and inherence.¹

Given the discursive nature of the human understanding, the only way in which empirical knowledge of objects, experience, can be gained is via judgment. To judge is simply to conceptualize discursively, or in other words, to bring an object judgmentally under a concept. Thus, knowledge is essentially conceptual. Moreover, in the judgments which constitute experience, the concepts under which objects are brought must occur as concepts, that is, as predicates. No representation can be fully conceptual unless the concepts in it occur as concepts. Consequently judgments are the only fully conceptualized representations. They are not, to be sure, the only representations in which concepts occur; for concepts are also found in intuitions. Nevertheless, because in the intuitions concepts do

¹This is, of course, not the only category involved. For judgments expressibly by "... is (a) ..." are also at least affirmative and assertoric, and thus the categories of existence and reality are also used. Moreover, the judgment must be either universal, particular, or singular, so that one of the categories of Quantity must also be employed. Which of these latter is used, however, remains undetermined.
not occur as concepts—as predicates—such intuitions cannot be fully conceptualized and cannot in themselves be knowledge.

Judgments, then, are the only fully conceptualized representations. Up to this point I have offered no explanation of what a "fully conceptualized" representation is. However, I can ignore the issue no longer; for, even when interpreted as a representation in which concepts appear as concepts, the notion of a "fully conceptualized" representation remains unclear. Fortunately, some clarification of this point can be given, the key to which is found in Kant's account, meager though it is, of concepts. Two passages from the *Critique* will help.

The word "concept" might of itself suggest this remark. For this unitary consciousness is what combines the manifold, successively intuited and thereupon also reproduced, into one representation. A103

But a concept is always, as regards its form, something universal which serves as a rule. The concept of body, for example, as the unity of the manifold which is thought through it, serves as a rule in our knowledge of outer appearances. . . . The concept of body, in the perception of something outside us, necessitates the reproduction of extension, and therewith the representations of impenetrability, shape, etc. A106

A concept is thus a rule for the connection of representations. Its function, as the first of the above two quotations indicates, is to combine representations which are in themselves discrete—at least logically—into a single complex but unified representation. This general task Kant sees as performed by all concepts, be they empirical or pure. Whereas, however, empirical concepts are rules by whose means definite sensible characteristics or combinations of sensible characteristics are connected, pure concepts are rules specifying the
manner in which the sensible characteristics making up the content of any empirical concept must be connected. Thus the categories might be described as "second-order" rules, whose specific function is to provide the formal framework into which all "first-order" rules, or all empirical concepts of objects, must fit. As Kant puts it, the categories are concepts of an object in general, under which any object must be brought, or by means of which any object must be thought, if it is to be an object of experience.

Kant has very little to say about the manner in which either empirical or pure concepts function as rules in experience. What little he does say, though, indicates his belief that, when we recognize something as being of a certain kind, or as having a certain property, the mind is somehow forced to "represent" (think, perhaps) that thing as possessing, in addition to the intuitively given characteristics in virtue of which the concept is applied, all non-intuited characteristics included in the content of that concept. Thus, for example, if I recognize something as a body in virtue of apprehending intuitively that it is hexagonal, then my application of the concept 'body' to the thing intuited also forces me to "represent" it as extended, impenetrable, hard, etc. The psychology of this mental compulsion Kant does not explore, perhaps because he thinks that its investigation belongs to empirical psychology. Nevertheless, it is clear that, whatever the

1 B158 and elsewhere.

2 B165. For more on the notion of concepts as rules, see Robert Paul Wolff, Kant's Theory, pp. 121-125 and 133-134.
psychological description might be, the fact that the mind unites representations in experience is due to the understanding's being guided in its activities by conceptual rules.

The notion of concepts as rules connecting representations helps provide some insight into what the claim that judgments are fully conceptual representations amounts to. To say that a representation is conceptual is simply to say that it is an ordered complex of representations, whose order is due in part to the application of a conceptual rule. Thus, neither sensations nor impressions can be conceptual, the former because they are simple and discrete, and the latter because the connections among sensations embodied in them are not the result of concepts. Intuitions are partially conceptual, in that the connections among the representations making up their matter are in part the result of the productive imagination's synthesizing in accordance with concepts. However, since concepts do not function as concepts, i.e. as predicates, in intuitions, and since no use is made of the categories, these representations cannot be fully conceptual.

I admit to being pretty much in the dark about how intuitions, or any representations for that matter, can be partly conceptual. However, a couple of suggestions can, I think, be made. First, a complex representation is only fully conceptual when the representations making

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1 The connection of representations in a conceptual representation is however, due solely to the application of conceptual rules. For space and time also contribute to the manifold, though, as Kant is at pains to point out, they are not concepts.
it up are connected by both pure and empirical concepts. If either sort of connection is not present, the representation is only partly conceptual. Now, intuitions lack categorial connections. The representations of which intuitions are composed are not connected in one of the categorial modes of necessity reflected in the various linguistic forms of judgment. Thus, intuitions are partly conceptual in this sense. Second, empirical concepts seem to play a dual regulatory role in knowledge. In addition to supplying the non-intuitively given characteristics which the mind is somehow forced to "represent" in experience, they also provide the "principle" in terms of which intuitively given characteristics are combined. Examples come hard at this point, but perhaps it's worth a try. Suppose that I recognize something as a body in virtue of its being square and hard. My application of the concept 'body' to this thing warrants the attribution to it of the additional property impenetrability, even though this property is not given in intuition. But is also in virtue of some sort of quasi-application of the concept 'body' that the intuited characteristics hard and square are themselves put together. Now Kant apparently thinks that the combining of intuitively given characteristics into intuitions is accomplished by the productive imagination. He seems to have something like this in mind on A120 when he claims that the productive imagination "has to bring the manifold of intuition into the form of an "image," and again the footnote which appears on the same page.

Psychologists have hitherto failed to realize that imagination is a necessary ingredient in perception itself. This is due partly to... the belief that the senses not only supply impressions
but also combine them so as to generate images of objects. For that purpose something more than the mere receptivity of impressions is undoubtedly required, namely, a function for the synthesis of them.

However, and this is the important point, the synthesizing activity of the productive imagination is limited to characteristics given in intuition. The application of the concept is thus only partial, for the mind is not compelled to "represent" any characteristics which are not intuitively present. Complete application of the concept, which includes "representation" of non-intuitively given properties, comes about only in recognition. Thus, in a second sense also intuitions can be thought of as partly conceptual.

Judgments are the sole representations which are wholly conceptual. They are the only representations, that is, in which the various sorts of conceptual connections among component representations are complete. In the first place, their material intuitions and concepts are necessarily connected in categorial modes, while in the second place, the application of empirical concepts to an object which occurs in judgment is such that it necessitates the "representing" of those sensible characteristics which, though they are included in the concept of the object and we are consequently justified in asserting them as its properties, are not present in its intuition.

Thus, claiming that judgments are fully conceptual representations amounts to saying that the representations composing them are connected by means of pure and empirical conceptual rules. Now, in addition to being completely conceptual representations, judgments are also the only representations in the occurrence of which
we are fully conscious. The argument for this point, as was indicated in Chapter III, is given in the Deduction, where Kant argues that being conscious of representations requires that I recognize them as mine, while recognizing them as mine is possible only if they are connected with other representations by the understanding in judgment. There are a couple of explanatory points, though, which are worthy of at least a passing reference.

For Kant experience is conscious awareness of objects. Attaining it involves, to speak roughly for the moment, "attaching" the "I think" to representations which without it would remain unconscious. Thus, it is not merely the case that experience is conscious awareness of objects— it is better described as self-conscious.

1The claim that we are only conscious insofar as we are judging entails that we cannot be conscious of either impressions or intuitions. As Wolff points out, Kant's overt acceptance of this doctrine comes only gradually, after he had in several places admitted the possibility of such consciousness. Cf. A89-91=B121-124, A93-94=B125-126. His final acceptance comes on A121-122.

Wolff takes Kant's claim that only synthesized representations can enter into consciousness as amounting to the claim that there cannot be an unsynthesized manifold. "In Kant's view, sense-datum languages and the uninterpreted given, those foundation-stones of contemporary phenomenalism, are sheer impossibilities." Wolff, Kant's Theory, p. 156. In my terminology, he takes Kant as denying the possibility of impressions. This seems to be a mistake on Wolff's part. Kant is not denying that such representations exist. Rather, what he is pointing out is that even if they exist, unless it is possible for the understanding to combine them judgmentally, then they are for us as good as nothing and might as well not exist. Nowhere to my knowledge does Kant ever deny that there are unconscious representations, and as a matter of fact his classification of representations on A320=B376-377 admit their existence.
awareness of objects. The point worthy of mention here is this. Kant's claim that experience is self-conscious awareness of objects, with one fairly important reservation, aligns him with those philosophers who have thought that to know is to know that one knows. The fairly important reservation, of course, is that knowing that one knows, which is attaching the "I think" to representations, is not in actuality an instance of knowing. The "I think" is merely the thought that the representations involved in knowledge are mine,¹ and, as such, constitutes the form of all knowledge. It is not, however, a further instance of knowledge, either of objects or, as Kant is at pains to point out, of the self.² Thus, the thesis that all consciousness is self consciousness might be more appropriately phrased in the following way: for Kant, to know is to be aware of oneself as knowing.

This fact also has a bearing on the previously mentioned status of pure concepts as "second order" rules. For categories are not merely second order in the sense that, as Wolff describes it, "they lay down the general conditions to which first-order empirical concepts must conform."³ They are also second-order in a sense which relates to their subjective source. The categorial connections which are exhibited in experience have their source in the mental activity whereby we become self-conscious, and not in the representations which those

¹A341-B399.
²B157 and B158n; the Paralogisms also make this point most emphatically.
³Wolff, Kant's Theory, p. 213.
activities bring to consciousness. To put it another way, the source of categorial connections lies in the activity of attaching the "I think" to already existing representations. This, of course, is not a particularly profound observation, and it is certainly not original, but it does point up the fact that the unconscious representations which are brought to consciousness in experience are not judgments. Becoming self-conscious, that is, should not be thought of as becoming conscious of judgments. Rather, becoming self-conscious is judging. In no sense are there such things as unconscious judgments, which exist prior to experience.

In the last 8 pages I have been concerned with adding some details to the discussion of judgments which occurred in the preceding chapter. The reason why more detailed consideration of judgments seemed necessary is because they are, epistemologically speaking, the most important of all Kantian representations. Experience itself is nothing but a "series" of judgmental episodes; and, more crucially for my purposes, when Kant speaks of representations as "standing for" phenomena, it is judgments which he primarily has in mind. That this latter claim is true I shall now begin to argue, though I do not think that it requires a great deal of argument. Consequently, much of what I shall have to say in the next several pages can be construed both as an argument for and as an explanation of the thesis that the representations which "stand for" phenomena are judgments.

According to Kant an empirical object is a "sum" of representations, each of which somehow "stands for" that object. Now,
whatever representations Kant sees as "standing for" phenomena, it is clear that unconscious representations must be excluded. For experience is conscious knowledge of objects, and it would be impossible for the objects of conscious experience to be sums of unconscious representations. Thus impressions, which are totally unconscious, are precluded ipso facto from "standing for" phenomena. Nor is it possible for us to become conscious of them; for doing so would involve some degree of conceptualization, and their nature as discrete impressions would thereby be destroyed. The situation might at first glance appear to be exactly the same for intuitions; for considered simply as singular "this-such" representations they too are unconscious, and to that extent represent no empirical thing.

Intuitions are nothing to us, and do not in the least concern us if they cannot be taken up into consciousness, in which they may participate either directly or indirectly. . . . For in me they can represent something only insofar as they belong with all others to one consciousness, and therefore must be at least capable of being so connected. A116

The case, however, is not quite as simple as it was for impressions; since intuitions, in addition to being singular "this-such" representations, are also matters of judgments. It is intuitions, that is, which are categorically connected with empirical concepts in the judgments of experience. Judgments, however, are conscious representations. Thus, it would seem that it is possible for us to become conscious of intuitions as combined with empirical concepts in judgment. The sense in which such consciousness is possible, though, is restricted. We are never, even in judgments, conscious of intuitions in the manner that they exist as unconscious representations,
i.e., as singular "this-such" representations. We are never, that is, conscious of them save as categorically connected with other representations. The mental act whereby intuitions become conscious, and we become self-conscious, is no more unstructured than is any other mental act. It has a categorial structure which modifies the very intuitions it makes conscious. Thus, it remains true that, considered simply in themselves, intuitions are unconscious, and as such cannot be said to "stand for" phenomena.

The same thing is also true of the sensible characteristics which comprise the contents of empirical concepts. Though it is on the one hand true that we can never gain consciousness of empirical concepts alone, it is on the other hand also true that in judgments they do enter consciousness to the extent that judgmental recognition forces us to "represent" as properties of the object recognized, all the sensible characteristics included in the content of the concept whereby the object is determined. Thus, under the same proviso that applies to intuitions, i.e. that they appear as matters of judgments, empirical concepts would seem to be able to "represent" phenomena.

There remain judgments, which alone are fully conscious. The requirement then that the representations which "represent" phenomena must be conscious leads to the conclusion that judgments are those representations. Whatever interpretation of the "standing for" relation is given, it must be explained primarily in terms of the relationships which exist among judgments. But the other side of the coin about intuitions and concepts should also be taken into
account. For insofar as they are included as matters of conscious judgments they too can "represent" phenomena. So long, that is, as intuitions and concepts are combined categorically into judgments, they can also "stand for" empirical things. It should not be forgotten, though, that there is an important difference between the conditions under which judgments "represent" phenomena and those under which intuitions and concepts can do so. Judgments "stand for" phenomena in and of themselves; while intuitions can only do so insofar as they are included in judgments. Thus, although it is false that judgments exclusively "represent" empirical things, it is nonetheless true that they are the primary "representors."

The claim that it is primarily judgments which Kant has in mind when he speaks of representations as "standing for" phenomena can be established in another, perhaps less oblique, fashion. In the Transcendental Analytic Kant attempts to show that the necessary conditions of experience are at the same time the necessary conditions

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1 It is worth restating that impressions can in no sense "represent" phenomena. One of the reasons for this which was not mentioned earlier is because impressions are not material elements in intuitions. Were they such, an argument to the effect that impressions do "stand for" phenomena could be fashioned. For, since impressions could then be thought of as matters of intuitions, and since intuitions can in a restricted sense be said to "represent" empirical things, it would be at least plausible to think that impressions, to the extent that they are material elements in intuitions, could also play such a role. But such an argument would be unsound, on the grounds that it is a mistake to think of impressions as matters for intuitions. What the relation between impressions and intuitions is was discussed to some extent in Chapter III. It probably deserves more investigation.
of all objects of experience. The linking of these two apparently divergent notions he accomplishes by viewing empirical things as mere appearances, and appearances in turn as representations. As Kant argues in the Deduction, for experience to be possible it must be a necessary synthesis of representations, the modes of which necessity are found in the categories. Given the tie between categories and forms of judgment, what this means is that experience must have judgmental form. Furthermore, the objects of experience, which are themselves no more than representations, must share the categorial form of experience. In other words, they too must have the form of judgments.

Although no exact specification of how "standing for" is to be understood has as yet been given, it should be clear from what has been pointed out, (a) that empirical objects are somehow "sums" of the representations which "stand for" them, and (b) that consequently for a representation to "stand for" an object is somehow for it to be one among those which constitute that object. In short, a representation which "stands for" an empirical object is somehow a part of that object. The objects of experience, however, in addition to whatever material characteristics they might possess, also have categorial form. Thus, those representations to which the categorial

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1Quotes abound, but the following, taken from A111 is as clear as can be found. "The a priori conditions of a possible experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience." Also A93=B125-126, B161, A158=B197.

form of objects is due, judgments, must be among the representations which taken together constitute empirical objects. But, in addition, the categorial form which representations possess is, in a most important sense, what makes them objective. Since the categories are concepts of an object in general, any representation which is to be part of an object must have categorial form. So the object must be a collection of categorially ordered representations, that is, of judgments. However, since the judgments which "stand for" phenomena also have sensible material components, in virtue of which they "represent" particular empirical things and not simply an "object in general," these components also "stand for" phenomena, though in a derivative sense.

The thesis that judgments "stand for" phenomena is not as abstract as might first appear. It says simply that phenomena are "represented" by sensible characteristics which are necessarily connected. The characteristics which are combined we get originally from sensibility; while the connections among them result from the synthetic activity of the understanding. Though the thesis says no more than this, however, it also says no less; and for that reason more should be said about it.

Intuitions (along with empirical concepts) are matter for judgments. Moreover, they are themselves complex representations, whose matter is "what corresponds to sensation" or "the real in appearance," and whose form is space and time. "What corresponds to sensation" or "the real in appearance" Kant identifies with sense
qualities, though, as was pointed out earlier, he is ambiguous about exactly which of them he means this phrase to designate. Space and time consist of certain non-conceptual orderings of the material sensible characteristics, in virtue of which these appear as spatially outside us and as temporally before or after one another. In other words, if the broadest possible interpretation is given to the term "what corresponds to sensation," intuitions can be thought of as complexes of spatially and temporally ordered primary and secondary qualities.

It is not in the claim that the primary and secondary qualities united in intuitions "stand for" objects that Kant's originality lies. To the extent that he thinks this he does not differ from a large number of others, among them Berkeley and Hume, who have held that empirical objects must be analyzed in terms of such properties. Rather, Kant's originality is found in his belief that the connections

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This is not quite true, for a couple of reasons. In the first place neither Berkeley nor Hume thought of sense qualities as M-characteristics of independently existing objects, as Kant does. So if this additional point is taken into consideration, it is false that Kant, Berkeley, and Hume do not disagree. However, since what I am concerned with is the relation of representations to phenomena and not to things-in-themselves, their status as M-characteristics can be ignored for the moment. And if it is, then it is true that to whatever extent Kant claims that sensible characteristics "stand for" phenomena he is in essential agreement with Berkeley and Hume. In the second place, there is a discrepancy here between Kant and Berkeley about the self. Kant holds, as Berkeley does not, that the empirical self is a phenomenon like other phenomena. Thus, the same sort of representations which "stand for" empirical physical objects also represent the empirical self. Berkeley of course denies this, claiming that the self is essentially different from other things. Here to, then, there would be a difference between Kant and Berkeley, though not between
among characteristics are more important than the qualities themselves in grounding the objectivity of knowledge, and that as a consequence the sense in which sensible properties "represent" objects is derivative. His originality, that is, is found in his revivification and reinterpretation of the idea, left for dead after Berkeley and Hume, that explaining the relation between sensible qualities and objects cannot be done without appealing to necessary connections. Not that Berkeley and Hume denied the existence of some sort of "necessary" connections among the representations of which objects are composed. They did not. However, the accounts which each gave of such connections makes them, so to speak, subjective, and thus extraneous both to the representations themselves and to the objects composed of them. For example, according to Berkeley it is just a brute fact, ultimately explicable in terms of the "laws of nature" in accordance with which the Infinite Mind presents ideas to us, that certain ideas—in themselves discrete and separable—"attend" or "accompany" one another in uniform patterns. On the basis of such regularly occurring patterns, the mind unites ideas into objects. But such unifications among ideas have no objective foundations in the ideas themselves. They are due merely to a subjective mental tendency to combine sense ideas which have been observed to occur together regularly. To be sure, that we perceive ideas in specifiable regular patterns is no accident, but

Kant and Hume. My point, then, should be taken to be making a claim about the relation between Kant and Berkeley about physical objects alone. As such, it is essentially correct.
is the result of God's benevolent decision to present them to us in uniform ways. God, though, is under no compulsion to abide by his original decision and to continue to present ideas to us in the same lawlike ways. The laws which the sequence of ideas now obeys reflect no previously existing ideal connections, and could be changed simply by a Divine act of will.

To Berkeley's account Hume makes one subtraction and one addition. First, he abandons God, thus making the regular occurrence of impressions ultimate and inexplicable. Secondly, he gives an associationistic account of the mental operations whereby perceptions are combined into objects. Simple perceptions which resemble one another, which occur contiguously in space and time, and which are related causally are united together into complex ideas of distinct and enduring things. The simple perceptions so united, however, remain in themselves distinct and separable, bearing no essential connections whatsoever with each other.

The upshot of Berkeley's and Hume's analysis is that the connections among the representations which constitute objects are denied their objectivity. From Kant's point of view this is to deny their necessity; and he finds in it the main inadequacy of their positions. For the denial of objectivity to the connections exhibited within objects violates the conditions of a possible experience by making it impossible to distinguish between subjective and objective connections among representations.
What I mean is this. Neither Berkeley nor Hume would admit any absurdity in supposing that our present experiential pattern might be altered in such a way that the complex objects which we now experience were replaced by simple perceptions. There is no absurdity, that is, in hypothesizing a world in which the mind did not combine the simple ideas or impressions which occur together in regular and uniform ways, so that, instead of items such as houses and rabbits we would experience things like reds, hards, and sweets. In such a world there would be no concepts of objects as we know them. Indeed, there would probably be no general concepts at all. Their place would be taken by representations of particular qualities, which would somehow play the same role that general concepts do now. Certainly a shift of this sort would necessitate some sweeping revisions in our patterns of behavior, if we were to survive. Perhaps survival would even be impossible under such conditions. But these consequences would be practical, and would not affect our ability to experience. All would be the same here except that the items which our experience is of would have changed. In other words, it would still be true to say that we see or taste. However, instead of seeing a house or tasting a lemon, we would, for example, see Red135 or taste Sour4.

From the point of view of Berkeley or Hume the world just described is possible. That it is not our world is merely a matter of fact. To Kant, on the other hand, it conflicts not only with experience as it now is, but also with any coherent conception of experience which we can form. His reasons are well known. For any
conception of a possible "experience" to be intelligible it must allow the possibility of our being self-conscious. This possibility in turn presupposes our ability to distinguish between the objects of our awareness and our awareness of them, a distinction which we can make only if we can further differentiate between the time order of our acts of awareness and the time order of their objects. Since our awareness is limited to representations, we have nothing outside of representations with which we can compare them in order to establish an objective time order. Consequently, differentiating between subjective and objective time order is possible only if the time order of our representations is itself somehow necessarily determined. In short, for any alleged conception of "experience" to be intelligible, it must make room for necessary connections among representations sufficient to ground an objective time order. The "experience" described above, by eliminating all necessary connections among representations, violates this condition; and thus it is not an intelligible conception of "experience."

Strawson, in discussing the same sort of hypothetical experience, puts this point as follows: "When we entertain the thought of a possible experience in which sensible representations succeed one another but possess none of that connectedness necessary for employment of concepts of the objective, we are at least thinking of such a succession of representations as belonging to a single consciousness. The tautology on which Kant bases his declaration that no such experience is possible is the tautology that experience or representations belonging to a single consciousness must satisfy the conditions of belonging to a single consciousness. . . . What is required for a series of experiences to belong to a single consciousness is that they should possess precisely that rule-governed connectedness which is required for them objectively to constitute a temporally extended experience of a single objective world." Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, pp. 92-93
The two sides of this coin have already been indicated. In the first place, it makes necessary the inclusion of necessary connections as objective characteristics of the items we experience. In other words, judgments must be numbered among the representations which "stand for" objects. In the second place, it implies that the sense in which sensible characteristics "represent" objects is in an important way derivative from and dependent upon that in which necessary connecters do. Sensible characteristics can represent objects only if they are connected necessarily with one another. To put it another way, no representation which is not itself a judgment can "stand for" an empirical object unless it is somehow "part" of a judgment.

That necessary connections are essential characteristics of phenomena and that sensible qualities "represent" objects only if they are connected necessarily, are both entailed the claim that judgments are the primary "representors" of phenomena. Although discussion of this point is by no means complete my purpose would be better served right now by a switch to a different topic, one which has been hovering in the background for the last several pages. Consequently, what I intend to do is in a sense to switch horses in the middle of the stream. I am going to drop further explicit consideration of the view that Kant has mainly judgments in mind when he says that representations "stand for" phenomena, and turn instead to a discussion of how judgments and other representations pertain to their function. In other words, I shall begin to consider the second
of the problems which I introduced at the beginning of the chapter, the problem of specifying exactly the relationship between representations and empirical objects which Kant designates by the term "stands for." Prior to detailed consideration, though, the problem needs to be made more specific.

In the first place, the basic issue here is what for lack of better phrasing can be termed Kant's analysis of an empirical object. Hints to this effect have already been given. Kant thinks of a phenomenon as the "sum" of the representations which "stand for" it; and a representation "stands for" a phenomenon when it is one among those, the sum of which constitutes the object. Thus, explicating the "standing for" relation amounts to explaining the relationship which the representations constituting an object must bear to one another. Before this can be done, however, the sense in which objects are "sums" of representations must be made clear. In short, explaining how representations "stand for" objects requires prior elucidation how objects are "sums" of representations.

In the second place, two problems actually need to be solved. The last several pages have furnished arguments to the effect that different sorts of representations "stand for" phenomena. In the main judgments represent empirical things; but the material "parts" of judgments, i.e. intuitions and concepts, to the extent that they are matters in judgments, do also. Thus the relationship between both these sorts of representations and objects needs to be explained;
first, that between judgments and phenomena, and second, that
derivative "standing for" relation between the matters of judgments
and empirical objects.

(It will be helpful for what follows to have a clear way of
indicating which "representing" or "standing for" relation is at
issue. For that reason, from now on I shall designate the relation­
ship between judgments and phenomena by "represent₁" or "stand-for₁,"
and the dependent relationship between the sensible characteristics
included in judgments and phenomena by "represent₂" or "stand-for₂." Where it makes no difference, I shall write the word without sub­
scripts.)

In the third place, it should be kept in mind that the relation
between judgments and empirical objects concerns judgments. That is,
to ask how judgments "stand for₁" phenomena is not to ask how repre­
sentations are combined into judgments. Rather, it is to ask how
already constituted judgments are combined into objects. Thus, though
there must be unifiers in terms of which judgments are collected
together into objects, these unifiers are not in the last analysis
the categories, whose main function it is to unite representations in
a judgment. As will be shown later on they are empirical concepts.
The different jobs performed by empirical and pure concepts will be
missed if one mistakenly thinks that the question of how judgments
"stand-for₁" phenomena is a question about the parts of judgments. It
is not. It is about judgments themselves.
The essentials of Kant's analysis of an empirical object are contained in the following passages from the Critique. Some of them have already been quoted elsewhere, but they can profitably be given again.

(i) Thus we think a triangle as an object in that we are conscious of the combination of three straight lines according to a rule by which such an intuition can always be represented. This unity of rule determines all the manifold, and limits it to conditions which make unity of apprehension possible. The concept of this unity is the representation of the object=x, which I think through the predicates, above mentioned, of a triangle. (A105)

(ii) . . . this object is no more than that something, the concept of which expresses such a unity of synthesis. (A106)

(iii) The pure concept of this transcendental object, which in reality throughout all our knowledge is one and the same is what can alone confer upon all our empirical concepts in general relation to an object, that is, objective reality. This concept cannot contain any determinate intuition, and therefore refers only to that unity which must be met with in any manifold of knowledge which stands in relation to an object. (A109)

(iv) Understanding is . . . the faculty of knowledge. This knowledge consists in the determinate relation of given representations to an object; and an object is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united. (B137)

(iv) That which lies in the successive apprehension is here viewed as representation, while the appearance which is given to me, notwithstanding that it is nothing but the sum of these representations, is viewed as their object; and my concept . . . has to agree with it. Since truth consists in the agreement of knowledge with the object, it will at once be seen that we can here enquire only regarding the formal conditions of empirical

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1In Chapter II it was argued that Kant's designation of the concept he is describing as the concept of the transcendental object is a mistake. He is really referring to what he earlier called the concept of an object in general. That criticism still stands, and I shall assume throughout the following discussion that Kant is here discussing the concept of an object in general, not, as he mistakenly claims, the concept of the transcendental object.
truth, and that appearance, in contradistinction to the representations of apprehension, can be represented as an object distinct from them only if it stands under a rule which distinguishes it from every other apprehension and necessitates some one particular mode of connection of the manifold. The object is that in the appearance which contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension. (A191=B236)

(vi) If we enquire what new character relation to an object confers upon our representations, what dignity they thereby acquire, we find that it results only in subjecting the representations to a rule, and so in necessitating us to connect them in some one specific manner; and conversely, that only insofar as our representations are necessitated in a certain order as regards their time relations do they acquire objective meaning. (A197=B242-243)

Kant's term "object" is notoriously ambiguous. He uses it to designate a wide variety of items, and seldom indicates which sense he is employing in a particular instance. The six passages just quoted illustrate this ambiguity, for in them "object" is used in at least three and possibly four different ways. It is used first of all to designate empirical objects, trees or houses, for example. This sense is exemplified by the first occurrence of "object" in (i), the last two occurrences in (iii), the first occurrence in (iv), the second and third occurrences in (v), and the lone occurrence of "object" in (vi). Secondly, it refers to a certain "something" in terms of which empirical objects are unified, and not to empirical objects themselves. This is illustrated by the second occurrence in (i), the lone occurrence in (ii), the second occurrence in (iv), and the last occurrence in (v). Thirdly, in the first occurrence of (iii) it is allegedly used to designate the transcendental object or thing-in-itself. Finally, in its first appearance in (v) the term "object" is used in an apparently neutral sense to mean that, whatever it might be, which
representations are of. But, since what Kant is concerned with in the passage are empirical objects, it is probable that the object he has in mind is the empirical thing.

Only the first two senses of "object" are needed to explain how representations "stand for" objects. For that reason I will ignore the latter two. Because the former pair are important, however, I want to provide some unambiguous means of making clear in all instances exactly what sense of "object" is being used. From this point on I shall refer to a phenomenon as an "Object;" and that unspecified something which the second sense of Kant's term refers to I shall designate by "OBJECT." Whenever the term is being used neutrally, it will be written completely in lower case, i.e. "object." The importance of these distinctions will hopefully become apparent later. Until they do, I must beg the reader's indulgence.

An empirical Object is for Kant a "sum" of representations, in the main judgments, each of which "stands for" or "represents" that Object. The intricacies of this view can best be brought out by contrasting it with another to which it bears a skeletal resemblance. The contrasting view which I have in mind is a simple kind of phenomenalism. As given, it can be found in Berkeley and a number of others, though it is too sketchy to do justice to any of their full-blown positions. As a result, though I shall spell out the view with the help of references to Berkeley, I shall not attribute it to him or to anyone else.
According to this position, an empirical Object is a "collection" of simple sense ideas. Let \( O_1^* \) stand for a certain empirical thing and the lower case letters "a," "b," "c," etc., stand for the simple ideas which are its components. These simple ideas a through n are in themselves unconnected, and they remain so even when considered as properties of \( O_1^* \). Consequently, analyzing \( O_1^* \) amounts simply to listing its component ideas in somewhat the following way: \( O_1^* = a, b, c, d, e, f, \ldots n \). Such listing of properties, however, might appear to omit something else which the analysis of \( O_1^* \) should reflect—some basis for explaining why just these ideas and no others are grouped together into \( O_1^* \). What, then, does account for this fact? If the ultimate appeal to God is ignored for the moment, then Berkeley’s reply is clear and straightforward. Ideas a through n are combined into \( O_1^* \) because they happen to "attend each other," and when simple ideas occur together the mind unites them into one object.¹ Such a grouping, though, reflects no objective connection among the ideas themselves, but only a subjective tendency on the part of the mind to associate and call by one name ideas which have been observed to attend each other. Since there are no objective connections among ideas, there is no objective basis for the occurrence

¹"Since it is not a being distinct from sensations, a cherry, I say, is nothing but a congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas, perceived by various senses, which ideas are united into one thing (or have one name given them) by the mind because they are observed to attend each other. Berkeley, Dialogues, p. 97. Also, Principles, p. 23."
of a particular set of ideas in particular objects; and thus no such basis can be reflected in the object's analysis. A mere listing of ideas must suffice.

To Kant this sort of account is inadequate, because it leaves totally unexplained the very thing which stands in need of explication, the notion that the ideas which constitute 0[^*]"attend each other." For in the course of experience ideas or representations attend each other in many different ways; but they are not all united into one object. For example, in perceiving a landscape, the brown color which is attributed to a tree, and the round shape which is attributed to a certain rock attend each other. Yet the mind does not associate them with the same object. Thus, the mind does not unite all ideas which occur together. Rather, it only groups into Objects ideas which attend each other in certain ways. In other words, though it can perfectly well be granted that through association of ideas the mind unites ideas which attend each other, it could not do this unless the representations thus associated were in themselves associable.

(vii) If, however, representations reproduced one another in any order, just as they happened to come together, this would not lead to any determinate connection of them, but only to accidental collocations; and so would not give rise to any knowledge. Their reproduction must therefore conform to a rule, in accordance with which a representation connects in the imagination with some one representation in preference to another. This subjective and empirical ground of reproduction according to rules is what is called the association of representations.

Now if this unity of association had not also an objective ground which makes it impossible that appearances should be apprehended by the imagination otherwise than under the condition of a possible synthetic unity of this apprehension, it would be entirely accidental that appearances should fit into a connected whole of human knowledge. . . . This, however, is
impossible. . . . There must, therefore, be an objective ground . . . upon which rests the possibility, nay, the necessity, of a law that extends to all appearances—a ground, namely, which constrains us to regard all appearances as data of the senses that must be associable in themselves and subject to universal rules of a thoroughgoing connection in their reproduction. (A121-122)

The representations which constitute Objects must in themselves be associable, that is, connected in specific ways; and one of the inadequacies of the simple kind of phenomenalism outlined above is that no such specification is provided and indeed cannot be provided. Yet even if the ways in which ideas are in and of themselves connected were to be specified, the phenomenalist account would still be unacceptable. For it would still lack an explanation of why representations which are connected in just these ways form Objects.

The Kantian view that empirical Objects are "sums" of judgments attempts to avoid the inadequacies of the phenomenalist position. According to it (A) the judgments of which an Object is composed in and of themselves exemplify categorial necessary connections; and (B) a particular set of judgments is synthesized into an Object, in general because the categories are concepts of objects in general without which that thing would not be possible as Object of experience, and in particular because their inclusion is necessitated by the empirical concept of that Object.

(A) The claim that Objects are composed of categorially connected representations, judgments, has already been in large measure explained and justified. In terms of the symbolism introduced a couple of pages back it means that the representations constituting
an Object $O_1^*$ would never include isolated sense characteristics like a, b, and c. Rather $O_1^*$ would be composed entirely of representations exhibiting necessary connections of various sorts among sense qualities. Thus the analysis of $O_1^*$ would consist of items like:

$O_1^*$ is a, if $O_1^*$ is b, the it is c, Either $O_1^*$ is d or it is e, $O_1^*$ is not f, and so on. Reference to simple sensible characteristics could only occur within the judgments.

(B) actually answers two separate but closely connected questions. First of all, it explains why representations exhibiting categorial connections and categorial connections alone are united into Objects. Secondly and more specifically it explains why particular categorially ordered representations are combined into particular empirical Objects.

That the categories are concepts of objects in general, without which no Object of experience is possible Kant establishes in the Deduction. It entails, on the one hand, the weaker thesis that judgments represent phenomena, and on the other hand the stronger thesis that only judgments represent phenomena. In other words, though we cannot know a priori the specific representations which represent any particular Object, we can know a priori that all of them will have categorial form. Objects, that is, will have standing for them

\[1\] Actually, this is not quite true. The sensible characteristics united in judgments must be thought of as already spatialized and temporalized by intuition. Thus they would be in a sense complex before they are combined in judgments. Though this makes the Kantian account more complex, it is a complexity which for my purposes can be ignored.
representations expressible in categorical judgments, hypothetical judgments, affirmative judgments, negative judgments, and so on. It is in this way that the categories, considered as concepts of Objects in general, account for why representations having the form of judgments are united in Objects.

Somewhat the same point can be made in a different way. Several places in the *A Deduction* Kant makes reference to what he calls our "concept of an object in general." One of these is in quotation (iii), where he mistakenly refers to it as the concept of the transcendental object. He identifies it with "that unity which must be met with in any manifold of knowledge which stands in relation to an object" (A109), and later goes on to explicate it in terms of the categories. Let "0" designate the abstract "object in general." If one were then to give an analysis of 0 it would provide a formal framework for the analysis of all analytical things, in the sense that only the forms of judgments would be included, while their material components would remain unspecified. Thus, \( 0 = \ldots \text{is (a) } \ldots \), \( \text{if } \ldots \text{is } \ldots \text{, then } \ldots \text{is } \ldots \), \( \text{Either } \ldots \text{is } \ldots \text{ or } \ldots \) \( \text{is } \ldots \), \( \text{All } \ldots \text{are } \ldots \), \( \text{No } \ldots \text{are } \ldots \), etc. The analysis of any particular Object must be in terms of this formal framework in that the representations expressed in it must be of these forms and no others. What material components fill in the blanks will, of course, depend upon the particular Object or type of Object whose analysis is being given.

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\(^1\text{Eg. A109.}\)
Thus the abstract "object in general" is made up of the set of formal characteristics which any and all objects of knowledge must possess. In addition, the concept of this object provides a formal framework for all empirical concepts of Objects. It is in this sense, as has been pointed out before, that the categories are "second-order" rules. Their "second-order" status is the result of the fact that all empirical concepts must fit the formal framework which they furnish.

Although the categories, considered as concepts of an Object in general, account generally for why representations of categorial form are united together into Objects, they do not explain why particular judgments are combined into particular Objects. The reason is obvious. Suppose, instead of the phenomenalist analysis of $0_1^*$, the following Kantian analysis: $0_1^* = 0_1$ is a, if $0_1^*$ is b, then it is c, Either $0_1^*$ is d or it is e, $0_1^*$ is not f, etc. The fact that the categories are concepts of an Object in general accounts for the presence of the various forms of judgment listed above; but it does not explain the reference to the material components of those judgments. To that extent it does not, so to speak, differentiate one Object from another, and does not provide a "principle" in terms of which the specific judgments reflected by the list are unified.

Appeal must consequently be made to something other than the pure concepts of the understanding in order to account for the presence of the specific judgments referred to in the analysis of Objects like $0_1^*$. This something else, Kant seems to think, is the empirical concept. A certain specific set of judgments constitutes $0_1^*$ because
they are united together in the concept of $O_j$. Several of the passages quoted earlier provide evidence for this view. For example, in (v) Kant asserts that an appearance can be thought as an Object only if its manifold is subjected to a conceptual rule which "distinguishes it from every other apprehension and necessitates some one particular mode of connection of the manifold." Note that there is a pair of criteria proposed here, and that the categories can fulfill just one. To be thought as Object the manifold of an appearance must be subjected to a conceptual rule which (a) distinguishes it from every other apprehension, and (b) makes necessary some one particular mode of connection of the manifold. Though the latter criterion can be interpreted in such a way that the categories meet it, the former cannot. For the categories do not provide a means of distinguishing

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1In addition to the variety of meanings of the term "object," there is another problem with several of the quoted passages. Most of them are taken from sections of the Critique where Kant is discussing the categories. Thus it is easy to think that wherever he uses the term "concept" he means, not empirical concepts, but pure concepts of the understanding. This is obviously not the case in all places, for example in (ii) and (iv). On other occasions, unfortunately, it is not as obvious which sort of concepts Kant has in mind. For example, in (v) and (vi) where he speaks of subjecting representations to a rule, it is not clear whether he means empirical or categorial rules, or perhaps both. It seems to me likely that in (v) he is discussing empirical concepts. What inclines me to think this is his claim that an appearance can be represented as an Object "only if it stands under a rule which distinguishes it from every other apprehension and necessitates some one particular mode of connection of the manifold." Subjecting representations to the categories, as has been pointed out already, simply would not do this. However, uniting the representations according to empirical conceptual rules would. In (vi) it is even less clear, due to the words "as regards their time relations." This makes it look like Kant is referring solely to the categories. If so, then he does not have any particular object in mind, but only what I called earlier the "object in general."
the manifold of an appearance from every other apprehension. Thus, although they do allow one to differentiate formally between the subjective order of apprehension and the objective order "in" the appearance, they do not also make it possible for one to distinguish among objective orderings of representations. They do not, that is, provide a means of differentiating among particular phenomena. Nevertheless, since such differentiation must be accomplished in accordance with some conceptual rule, the concept involved must be empirical.

That the empirical concept is what accounts for particular objective groupings of judgments is expressed more clearly by Kant in (ii) and (iv). These passages are taken from different editions of the Critique, (ii) from the A Edition and (iv) from B; but they make precisely the same point. The concept of an empirical Object—and in these two passages there can be no doubt that Kant has in mind empirical and not pure concepts—is that in terms of which a given phenomenal manifold is united. Thus, to belabor the point a bit, it is the empirical concept of $O_{j*}$ which accounts for the fact that a certain specific set of judgments both matter and forms is grouped together into $O_{j*}$. These judgments are the "various representations" which are "brought under the common representation" which is the concept of $O_{j*}$. In short, they are the representations which make up the content of the concept of $O_{j*}$.

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\[1\] "Whereas all intuitions rest on affections, concepts rest on functions. By 'function' I mean the act of bringing various representations under one common representation." A68=B93. Kant is here talking about general concepts. Whether all empirical concepts are general is a topic which will be discussed shortly.
It is now possible to begin a fairly accurate statement of Kant's conception of the nature of an Object. A phenomenon is a unified collection of judgments. A judgment is itself a unified complex of sensible characteristics, the modes of whose unity are the categories. The unity possessed by the collection as a whole is accounted for by both the pure concepts of the understanding and the Object's empirical concept. The former, considered as concepts of an Object in general, ground the "objectivity in general" of the collection. That is, they account for the fact that each member of the collection is a representation of an Object. This they accomplish by functioning as formal rules in accordance with which all objective characteristics must be combined. The latter concept also grounds the unity of the collection, but now considered as a specific collection of specific judgments. In other words, it explains why each of the members of the collection is a representation of this particular Object. It also accomplishes its task by functioning as a rule, but a rule in accordance with which specific judgments must be collected if they are to be representations of this particular Object.

Consider again $O_1^*$. $O_1^*$ is an indefinitely large collection of categorially ordered judgments. That is, $O_1 = O_1^*$ is a, if $O_1^*$ is b, then it is c, Either $O_1^*$ is d or it is e, $O_1^*$ is not f, etc. Each of the judgments reflected by the list is a single unified complex, whose formal unity is provided by the category or categories exhibited in that judgment. In addition the collection itself is
unified. That the complex constituents in the collection all have categorial form is due to the fact that the categories are concepts which must unify all objective representations. The specific representations reflected by the list all occur because their inclusion is necessitated by the empirical concept of \( O_j^* \).

This, in outline is how Kant conceives of an empirical Object. A number of further points about it need to be made before it is complete. I will turn to them now.

(1) Up to this point it has not been necessary to distinguish between individual Objects like \( O_j^* \) and the various "species" of phenomena, i.e. between individual houses and the kind of Object 'house.' These, however, need to be distinguished; for the same analysis which holds for a particular Object will clearly not hold for its kind. Very generally, some judgments appearing in the analysis of an individual Object would not appear in the analysis of that Object's kind. Those which would be absent in the latter case are the linguistic expressions of the singular and particular judgments which are constituents of some, but not all, of the Object's of a certain kind. To put it another way, the analysis of a kind of Object would lack expressions of those representations whose inclusion, while necessitated by the concept of an individual Object, is not rendered necessary by the concept of that Object's kind.\(^1\)

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\(^1\)This whole paragraph, as well as the three which follow, is probably somewhat misleading. In speaking of a kind of Object, and of the analysis which should be given of it, I do not mean to imply that Kant believes in kinds of Objects as distinct from individual
The importance of distinguishing between individual Objects and their kinds can be brought out in the following way. Let "$O^*"$ stand for the kind of phenomenon which $O_1^*$ instances, and "$O^*$" for its general concept. $O_1^*$ is a collection of judgments of all categorial modes. However, it does not, so to speak, contain all types of judgments in exactly the same way. What I mean is this. If $O_1^*$ is composed of judgments exemplifying all the categories, then it must in some sense contain universal judgments, i.e. judgments which exhibit characteristics and connections shared by all Objects of the kind $O^*$. But it apparently cannot do so explicitly, since the characteristics and connections of individual Objects like $O_1^*$, whether or not they are instances of properties shared by every Object of that type, are one and all particular. Thus, all the judgments explicitly contained in an individual Object will be singular, though some of them will exhibit characteristics and connections which any Object of that type would exhibit. In other words, every individual Object will be composed of singular judgments, but there is a sense in which not all the judgments will be equally singular. Some of them will have matters

Objects. He does not. As a matter of fact, there is no reason to believe that he thought there were universals or abstract ideas of any sort. Indeed, whether Kant intended it or not, the view that concepts are rules precludes the possibility of there being such entities. Consequently, talk of analyses of kinds of Objects, as if they existed in their own right, is misleading. Unfortunately, I know of no other way to make the point I want to make. I can only hope that by disavowing any intention to attribute to Kant a belief in universals I can counteract the misleading way in which I express myself in the next few paragraphs.
and forms peculiar to the individual Object under consideration, while others will have internal characteristics also present in all other individual Objects of that kind.

It is by reference to singular judgments of the second type that the sense in which universal judgments are contained in individual Objects can be explained. This sort of judgment is a constituent of an individual Object in virtue of the fact that the Object falls under the general concept of that kind of thing. A general concept, though, as a representation of a kind of thing, has as its content only universal judgments. Thus, for example, the content of the general concept '0*' might consist of the judgments: 'All 0*'s are h', 'If any 0* is k, then it is l', 'No 0*'s are m.' Any individual Object which falls under this concept will necessarily have among its constituents singular instances of these universal judgments. For example, 0_1*' will contain: 0_1* is h, if 0_1* is k, then it is l, 0_1* is not m. The universal judgments which such singular judgments are instances of can then be thought of as constituents of the individual Object in the sense that by appealing to them one can explain the presence of those singular judgments as objective components. Thus, the universal judgments: All 0*'s are h, if any 0* is k, then it is l, and No 0*'s are m, are constituents of 0_1* in that they explain the presence of the singular judgments: 0_1* is h, if 0_1* is k, then it is l, and 0_1* is not m, as objective components of 0_1*.

The inclusion of universal judgments in individual Objects is what might be described as "virtual of implicit." Thus, even though
It may seem strange to include universal judgments among the constituents of individual Objects, they do seem to have a rightful place. The category of unity is every bit as much a concept of an Object in general as is any other. What their inclusion reflects is Kant's Aristotelian leanings. There is a distinction between "accidental" and "essential" characteristics; or, to put it another way, there are some characteristics which Objects possess simply in virtue of the fact that they are the kind of thing they are. For example, \( O_i^* \) has property \( h \), not, as it were, because it is \( O_i^* \), but because it is an \( O^* \) and all \( O^* \)'s are \( h \). Thus, being \( h \) is somehow an essential characteristic of \( O_i^* \), whereas, for example, being \( a \) might not be. Such essential characteristics are of different sorts. For example, the hypothetical judgment, If \( O_i^* \) is \( k \), then it is \( l \), expresses an essential causal property of \( O_i^* \), while a judgment like, Either \( O_i^* \) is \( i \) or it is \( j \), might express an essential relation of reciprocity.

(2) Earlier I argued that empirical concepts account for the fact that expressions of a specific set of judgments occur in the analysis of an Object. But that was before the distinction between types of Objects and individual things had been explicitly drawn; and that distinction raises a problem. For coupled with the claim that empirical concepts account for the grouping of specific sets of judgments into Objects, it seems to commit Kant to a doctrine of individual concepts—a doctrine which it is by no means clear that he holds.
It seems to me likely that Kant does hold such a view. Very little textual verification can be provided, but other evidence is available which makes it probable that Kant does indeed believe in individual concepts. What textual evidence there is comes from A71=B96, where Kant is discussing singular judgments. He says:

Logicians are justified in saying that, in the employment of judgments in syllogisms, singular judgments can be treated like those that are universal. For, since they have no extension at all, the predicate cannot relate to part only of that which is contained in the concept of the subject and be excluded from the rest. The predicate is valid of that concept, without any such exception, just as if it were a general concept and had an extension to the whole of which the predicate applied.

Kant's use of the term "general concept," as well as his designation of the representation we have of the subject of a singular proposition as a concept, suggests his recognition and acceptance of a distinction between general and individual concepts. One quote, however, is not conclusive; especially when a belief in individual concepts would seem to contradict several other beliefs which Kant has about concepts. In particular, it would seem to conflict with the claims that concepts are "predicates of possible judgments" (A69=B94), and that they are always "something universal which serves as a rule" (A106).

There is only an apparent conflict here however. In reality the notion of individual concepts is compatible with the two other claims about concepts. To see this, as well as why it is likely that Kant did believe in individual concepts, it is only necessary to recall a few points about his conception of experience. Experience is essentially recognition, and recognition requires the use of concepts. In experience we recognize a great number of things. We might
recognize, for example, that a certain dog is a Boxer, or that a certain box of cereal is Wheaties, or that all mammals have lungs. But it is also true that we make other sorts of recognitions. For example, we sometimes recognize that a certain individual, whom we already know to be a man, is our friend Jones, or that a certain animal, which we already know to be a Boxer, is our neighbor's dog Ralph. That is, we sometimes make judgments like "This man is Jones" and "This Boxer is Ralph". If these are indeed examples of recognition—and there seems to be no plausible reason for ruling them out, then they require concepts under which the subject representations expressed by "this man" and "this Boxer" are brought. These would have to be the representations expressed by "Jones" and "Ralph."

It follows from this that we possess representations which enable us to recognize individuals. In judgments like "This man is Jones" and "This Boxer is Ralph" such a representation appears as a predicate. Thus it fulfills that requirement according to which concepts are predicates of possible judgments. Furthermore, it is also something which is "as regards its form universal" in the sense that it is logically possible for the representation to refer to more than one object. That our representation of Jones, for example, now designates only one individual, or for that matter any individuals at all, is purely a matter of fact. Nothing about the representation we have of Jones makes uniqueness of reference necessary. To a certain extent, of course, this reflects the fact that representations, insofar as they function as predicates in judgment do not relate directly to
objects. For them to give us knowledge of objects requires another representation which stands "in direct relation" to an Object. These representations, so to speak, particularize concepts; and they must be "given" by objects. No predicate representation can ever provide them for itself. No concept, in other words, considered simply as predicate, can particularize itself; and it is in this sense that all of them, even those which as a matter of fact have only one instance, are formally universal.

The most important evidence that Kant holds a doctrine of individual concepts is thus his conception of experience as recognition via concepts. If recognition does indeed require application of concepts, and if such judgments as "This man is Jones" and "This Boxer is Ralph" are examples of recognition--both premises which it seems impossible to deny--then individual concepts are necessary. So the fact that they are also needed to explain Kant's conception of an empirical Object in reality poses no problems.

(3) Earlier I pointed out and took steps to avoid the ambiguity which occurs in Kant's use of "object." At that time I introduced the term "Object" to designate empirical objects, and "OBJECT" to refer to a certain "something" which Objects possess. I want now to explore the interrelations between these two senses of Kant's "object" in hopes of further clarifying his conception of empirical Objects.

Crudely, the distinction between an Object and an OBJECT goes something like this. An Object is a unified collection of representations, each of which is itself a categorially ordered complex of
sensible characteristics. If each of the representations in the collection is thought of as a complex property, then the object which they are properties of is "that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united" (B137). In other words, strictly speaking, the thing which the properties of an Object qualify is a certain something, whose concept accounts for why the representations of the manifold, i.e. the properties, are united as they are. This something is the OBJECT, and all the representations united in the concept are its properties. Thus, while in one sense an Object is a collection of judgments, in another sense it is a set of properties plus an OBJECT.

Consider once again $O_1^*$ and suppose it consists of only four judgments: $O_1^*$ is a, if $O_1^*$ is b, then it is c, Either $O_1^*$ is d or it is c. $O_1^*$ is not f. Each of these judgments is a complex of necessarily connected sensible characteristics, and can be thought of as a complex property. In addition, the various sensible characteristics combined in the judgment, to the extent that they are included in the judgment, are also properties. That they are properties means that in judgments they appear as predicates, not subjects. However, as predicates of judgments, they require a subject which not itself a predicate or combination of predicates. This subject must be itself undetermined, since any determination would attach predicates to it and thus would vitiate its status as subject. This "ultimate subject" is "that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is
united," or "the undetermined object of an empirical intuition (A20=B34). It is also what I am designating by the term "OBJECT."

The notion of the OBJECT can be approached from a slightly different direction. According to Kant, in each judgment of experience we discursively determine an object by "bringing it under a concept. To bring an object under a concept, though, is to attach to it a predicate which the object shares or at least can share with other objects. Thus the Object, to the extent that it is a collection of predicates, is a collection of general characteristics. As such, it contains nothing which grounds it as a particular thing; nothing, that is, which provides a particular common reference for the varied general representations collected in its concept. Such a common referent is needed if the potentially general collection is to be particularized, and it is furnished by the OBJECT.

The OBJECT thus serves as the undetermined "ultimate subject" of the necessarily connected representations whose collection is a certain Object. As such, it makes possible a final explanation of how Kant conceives of an Object. Up to this point the expression of each judgmental constituent of the Object has made reference to the very Object of which that judgment is a part. This reference can now be eliminated and replaced by something which reflects the fact that the OBJECT is, strictly speaking, the subject of all the component representations.

For reasons which will become evident shortly, I will designate the OBJECT by "T," which is short for "This." If the OBJECT is then
given its appropriate place, the analysis of $O_1^*$ can be expressed without explicit reference to $O_1^*$ and in such a way that the ultimate subject of all the representations included in the analysis can be indicated. That is: $O_1^* = a \ T$ such that: \( T \) is \( a \); if \( T \) is \( b \), then it is \( c \); Either \( T \) is \( d \) or it is \( e \); \( T \) is not \( f \).

To say that the \text{OBJECT} is the ultimate subject of the necessarily connected representations which constitute an Object is not to say that our ordinary subject/predicate experiences ever have this OBJECT as what might be called their "grammatical" subject. They do not. The "grammatical" subject of an experience is itself a determined representation—an intuition—in which the This has taken on the character of a This-such by being partially conceptualized. The experiential judgment itself, in which this partly conceptual intuition is brought under an empirical concept, is a recognition that the This which is "given" in intuition as a This-such is also represented by the characteristics included in the content of a certain empirical concept. For example, the judgment expressible by "This house is white" is a recognition that the \text{OBJECT} which is intuitively "given" as This-house is also represented discursively by the concept 'white.' So the claim that the \text{OBJECT} is the "ultimate subject" should not be interpreted as a point about the "grammatical" subjects of judgments of experience. The \text{OBJECT} is only intended to provide something to which all the predicates of an empirical Object, and thus all the representations reflected in its analysis, can be attached.
It is now possible to give a final account of Kant's conception of empirical Objects, and to answer the question which prompted this long discussion of Objects, namely the question of how representations "stand for" or "represent" phenomena. An empirical Object is a unified collection of judgments, which are themselves complexes of necessarily connected representations or appearances. The representations united in judgments are sensible characteristics, with the categories accounting for the formal unity within each judgment. In addition, the pure concepts of the understanding account for the formal unity of the collection as a whole, in the sense that, considered as concepts of Objects in general, they specify exactly the formal modes of unity in terms of which representations can and must be combined if they are to constitute Objects. Thus they explain why representations of judgmental forms, and of these forms alone, are collected into phenomena. The unity of the specific collection of judgments constituting a particular empirical Object is provided by the empirical concept of that Object, which makes it necessary that these and only these judgments be included in the specific collection.

The various necessarily connected sensible characteristics united in an empirical Object are all conceptual determinations or predicates of an OBJECT. This OBJECT, which is in itself undetermined, serves as the "ultimate subject" of all the judgments making up an Object. It is never given in an experience save as an intuited This-such, but it must be given if there is to be a particular subject for the sensible characteristics in the intuitively given "grammatical"
subject of the experience and those sensible characteristics thought in its predicate. Thus, as long as it is kept in mind that in experience the OBJECT is always given as This-such and the judgmental tie is consequently between an OBJECT-as-intuitively-determined and an empirical concept, an empirical Object can be thought of, in a way which might be described as "experientially" abstract, as a collection of judgments whose subject is an undetermined OBJECT and whose predicates are the empirical determinations included in the concept of that Object. This can be done without violating the requirement that judgments are in experience complexes of necessarily connected representations.

The explanation of how representations "stand for" or "represent" phenomena is implicit in the account of the nature of empirical Objects which has just been completed. A judgment "stands for_1" an Object when it is one among those judgments united together in accordance with the empirical concept of that Object; while it "stands for_2" an Object when it is a judgmental part of a more complex judgment which "stands for_1" the Object. In this latter sense, an intuition or concept also "stands for_2" an Object. An intuition or concept, that is, "stands for_2" an Object when it is matter for a judgment which "stands for_1" that Object. Thus, to refer for the last time to O_1*, the judgments O_1* is a, if O_1* is b, then it is c, Either O_1* is d or it is e, O_1* is not f, all "stand for_1" O_1* because their inclusion in O_1* is necessitated by its empirical concept. The simple sensible characteristics a through f, as well as the
simple judgments $0_1^* \text{ is } b$, $0_1^* \text{ is } c$, $0_1^* \text{ is } d$, $0_1^* \text{ is } e$, all "stand for" $0_1^*$ because they are matters of the judgments which "stand for" that Object.

The senses in which representations "stand for" Objects are also the senses in which "modes of knowledge" are true of empirical things. Kant, while denying that any "sufficient and at the same time general criterion of truth" (A59=B83) can be given, gives as a "nominal" definition "the agreement of knowledge with its object."\(^1\) On the surface this definition expresses what appears to be a correspondence theory. However, since there are no independently existing objects to which "modes of knowledge" can correspond, truth cannot consist in a correspondence between knowledge and such objects. Consequently the agreement of knowledge with its object must be explained in some other fashion. The explanation is found in the notion of how representations "stand for" Objects. A representation "stands for" an Object ultimately because its inclusion among the constituents of the Object is necessitated by a certain empirical concept. Furthermore, any representation which "stands for" an Object is also true of that Object. Thus, if a representation is necessitated by the empirical concept of an Object, then that representation is true; if it is not so necessitated then it is not true.

Such an interpretation of truth might be regarded as a kind of correspondence theory. The correspondence, though, is not between a

\(^{1}\text{A58=B82. Also A191=B236.}\)
mode of knowledge and an independently existing object, but between a
representation and the empirical concept of an Object. Thus a
representation is true when it "corresponds" with the empirical
concept of a certain Object, and untrue when it does not. This view
does not make truth any more dependent upon individual minds than
does the general thesis that empirical Objects are phenomena. For in
the only sense in which empirical Objects exist, i.e. the sense in
which there are certain unified groupings of representations, their
existence is literally dependent upon the pure and empirical concepts
which we possess. Since it is a matter of fact that we all have some-
what the same empirical concepts, it is also a matter of fact that for
all of us somewhat the same Objects exist, and that somewhat the same
modes of knowledge are true.¹

There is one final question which must be dealt with very
briefly before this chapter can be brought to an end. In the course
of the preceding pages, the suspicion might have arisen that the
interpretation offered in them, according to which phenomena are

¹This is not of course to say that there are no difficulties
with the view. There are. In particular, it seems to make the
acquisition of empirical concepts inexplicable, unless they are one
and all innate. It is doubtful, to say the least, that Kant himself
thought all concepts are innate, so one wonders how he can consistently
account for their acquisition. Perhaps, but only perhaps, the problem
becomes less acute if the distinction between pure and empirical
concepts is taken into account. If so, then it may be that, though we
must be born with pure concepts and thus must experience things which
have the formal characteristics of Objects, we can acquire
experientially the material characteristics whose addition transforms
pure into empirical concepts.
conceptually ordered collections of necessarily connected sensible characteristics is inconsistent with the position, advanced in earlier chapters, that in experience we are non-inferentially aware of things-in-themselves. For if the Objects we gain knowledge of in experience are collections of representations, how can we at the same time be aware of things-in-themselves?

The suspicion of inconsistency can, I think, be rather easily eliminated. It only arises if the intentional character of all our experiential representations is forgotten. The representations comprising both experience and its Objects are all items by means of which we are aware of independently existing things-in-themselves. Through such representations we have in experience non-inferential awareness of external objects, but only as modified by the very representations which make us aware of them. The matters and forms of intentional representations, which comprise all the characteristics about which we can sensibly speak, are all mind-contributed. As a result the only characteristics of things-in-themselves which we can discover are those which characterize them as they appear. In other words, we are restricted to knowing their M-characteristics. The essential objectivity of experience is due to the existence of certain connections among sensible M-characteristics. In short, empirical Objects, or phenomena, or things as they appear are simply ordered collections of M-characteristics of things-in-themselves. Thus, as long as the intentional nature of representations and the consequent character of sensible qualities as M-characteristics are kept in mind,
there is no inconsistency involved in claiming both that experience
gives us non-inferential awareness of independently existing objects
and that empirical objects are collections of representations.

The purpose of this chapter has been to explain how appearances,
as representations, "stand for" or "represent" phenomena. In it I
have discussed several facets of the problem. In the first place, I
argued that Kant has in mind primarily judgments when he speaks of
representations as "standing for" empirical things, though he also
admits that intuitions and concepts, to the extent that they are
necessarily connected in judgments, also "represent" phenomena. In
the second place, I argued that the empirical objects which representa­
tions "stand for" are themselves ordered collections of necessarily
connected representations or sensible characteristics, whose order and
connection is provided by both the categories and empirical concepts of
Objects. All of the representations which are included in the collec­
tion which is a particular empirical thing can be said to "stand for"
that thing, though in different senses. A judgment "stands for₁" an
Object when its inclusion within the collection is necessitated by
the Object's empirical concept, and it "stands for₂" an object when
it is a part of a more complex judgment which is so necessitated. An
intuition or concept "stands for₂" an Object when it is matter for
a judgment which "stands for₂" that Object. Finally, I pointed out
briefly that, given the notion that sensible characteristics are
M-characteristics of things-in-themselves, there is no incompatibility
involved in claiming both that empirical Objects are collections of representations and that in experience we are non-inferentially aware of things-in-themselves.
CONCLUSION

The task which I set for myself has now been completed. I would like to conclude with a very few evaluative comments. The distinction between phenomena and things-in-themselves, plus Kant's belief that appearances are "mere" representations, are generally alleged to be among the weakest links in the entire Critical chain. The distinction, so it is felt, is at best unjustifiable and at worst unintelligible, given the restrictions Kant puts on our speculative abilities; while the claim that appearances are representations is thought to commit Kant to the very sort of "idealist" account of phenomena which seems at pains to avoid. If the position which I have elaborated is correct, then such criticisms may well be at least in part misguided. In the first place, it is just not true that the distinction between phenomena and things-in-themselves divides up objects. Rather, it is the same object, which, from one point of view, is appearance, and from another is thing-in-itself. This object, Kant feels, is given to us directly in experience, so there is really no question about its existence. It stands in no need of "proof," especially not a proof which proceeds from effects to causes. Such an account as this seems to me perfectly intelligible, though one might still want to raise a question about its justifiability within the Critical framework. As I have tried to indicate already, though, I think that Kant would have been unable to appreciate such a question. The existence of independently existing things-in-themselves is, so to speak, a matter of "perception." As such, it is one of the bases for
argument, one which is not itself arguable. Nor does Kant believe that their existence is brought into doubt by the phenomenal character of all our modes of knowing them. To think so is to miss the intentional structure of experience and of the representations which constitute it.

In the second place, the Kantian account of representations does not commit Kant to the kind of idealism or representationalism which he explicitly disavows. Kantian representations are not of a sort with Lockean ideas or Humean impressions, both because they are not "simple" and because they are not objects of awareness. Representations are intentional complexes of matter and form, whose objects, strictly speaking, are things-in-themselves. The characteristics and connections embodied in such representations are mind dependent, but are nevertheless characteristics of external things and are in that sense externally grounded. Phenomena, though they are constructions, are constructions out of ideas or impressions whose only relation to things-in-themselves is that they are effects in a problematic causal interaction.

It is difficult to tell whether Kant's claim that appearances are representations is ordinarily misinterpreted because the distinction between phenomena and things-in-themselves is misread, or whether the error is in the other direction. My suspicion is that, because of a preconceived notion of what appearances must be if they are representations, the difference between phenomena and things-in-themselves is misjudged. Whatever is cause and whatever effect, however, I hope I have demonstrated that both Kantian doctrines are usually mishandled.
I do not claim that the interpretation I have offered is without problems. Obviously it is not. However, as I mentioned at the beginning, it does have the advantage of saving Kant from what should have been the obvious inconsistency involved in committing himself to a view which he clearly found philosophically abhorrent. This point—which I have belabored almost ad nauseam—others have failed to appreciate adequately. To think that Kant would have been perfectly content with an idealistic, phenomenalistic, or representationalistic account of the nature of representations and the relation between appearances and things-in-themselves, views which he uncompromisingly rejects when he finds them in others, is little more than absurd. Whenever the inconsistencies lie in Kant's thought—and there can be no doubt that inconsistencies exist—I cannot believe that they lie here.
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