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AN HISTORICAL DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE BROADCAST SKILLS BANK--A COOPERATIVE INDUSTRY EFFORT TO INVOLVE MINORITIES IN BROADCASTING

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Kent William Creswell, B.S., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1972

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is a study of the Broadcast Skills Bank, an industry-wide effort begun in 1964 to increase the number of minority group members in broadcasting. The bank began in pilot form as a training program for minority group members at the Westinghouse Broadcasting Company. A year later its scope was enlarged to include the leadership of major network executives in cooperation with the Urban League's National Skills Bank program in cities across the country.

The following pages in this introduction provide information concerning the research and writing of the dissertation. The first section describes the historical setting in which the Broadcast Skills Bank developed. The second section explains the scope of the study in terms of geography, time and other factors. The next section, on the significance of the study, lists some of the elements involved in skills bank operations and shows the importance of this topic for dissertation research. The fourth section on method describes the way in which personal interviews and primary sources were used in the gathering and analysis of
data. A section on **problems** of research examines the major barriers which were encountered in this study. A final section on **organization** explains the overall layout of the chapters which follow this introduction.

**Background on the Study**

The United States has many minority groups, including Jews, blacks, Orientals, European immigrants, Spanish-speaking Americans and American Indians. Various federal agencies have been created to protect the rights of minority group members and assure them an equal opportunity for economic, political and social advancement. The National Labor Relations Board, Office of Federal Contract Compliance, U.S. Civil Service Commission and other agencies of the federal government have authority to assure equal employment opportunity.¹

Black Americans made considerable gains in their fight for equality beginning during the Reconstruction period. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments abolished slavery and insured voting rights for black citizens. In 1957 Congress established the Commission on Civil Rights to investigate specific charges of discrimination. Black people in particular were being employed in positions far beneath their qualifications. There was a need for substantial upgrading in these jobs.² The Civil Rights Act of 1964 established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to enforce fair employment practices.³ This act was the strongest
civil rights act in United States history, especially as a means of enforcing fair employment practices through the powers of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.4

One month after the Civil Rights Act became law, Congress passed other legislation creating an Office of Economic Opportunity. With a budget of 800 million dollars, this federal agency developed training and employment programs in the middle 1960s to assist minority group members and other poverty-stricken groups in America. These included programs such as the Neighborhood Youth Corps, the Upward Bound project and the Job Corps.5

These programs developed by the federal government in 1964 and 1965 were designed to provide training for underprivileged young people who lacked the education and skills necessary to obtain jobs. As projects of the Office of Economic Opportunity, they were part of President Lyndon Johnson's war on poverty launched early in 1964.

The Broadcast Skills Bank was created in this context of civil rights organizations designed to implement congressional acts. However, the bank was not a federally imposed program. In fact, the chairman of the Broadcast Skills Bank described it as a "voluntary effort on the part of the broadcast industry designed to demonstrate our good faith and practice as we develop equal employment opportunities for all people in radio and television."6 As the bank developed in 1964 and 1965, it took on many features which were common
in the government programs—assistance to young people from low-income families, training programs in radio and television and scholarships for minority group members who needed to develop skills before entering the industry.

Because of its nationwide growth and its similarity to federal programs, the Broadcast Skills Bank was recognized by government officials as a positive step to overcome discrimination in broadcast employment and programming. For example, Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, who had been placed in charge of coordinating the work of all civil rights agencies, referred to the Broadcast Skills Bank as an example of the proper use of resources to solve national problems. In a letter to the bank chairman, he complimented the major broadcast groups which had united in launching the organization.

I commend the Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, the American Broadcasting Company, the Columbia Broadcasting Company and the National Broadcasting Company for your cooperative initiative and creative ingenuity in providing more jobs opportunities for Negroes and other minorities through the Broadcast Skills Bank.

The bank was recognized as a voluntary effort, without federal funding, designed to carry out the responsibilities described in civil rights legislation. It was reasonable for the Vice-President and others to commend this program because it was extending the government's efforts without pressure or funding. Humphrey later noted that other industries should follow the Broadcast Skills Bank's example
"in our national efforts to make equality of opportunity for all people a reality in practice and not just in theory."^8

It is the purpose of this dissertation to describe and analyze the specific program of the Broadcast Skills Bank which developed during the civil rights period of activity in 1964. Within the context just described, the Broadcast Skills Bank was distinctive as a broadcast industry effort, but it had characteristics which were similar to other programs prominent in that period of history.

Scope of the Study

The major purpose of this dissertation is to describe and analyze the history and operation of the Broadcast Skills Bank. The activities of the national office and several local offices of the Broadcast Skills Bank between 1964 and 1972 will be evaluated. To accomplish this purpose, the study deals with five major questions.

1. What factors contributed to the origin and development of the Broadcast Skills Bank as a national organization?

2. How has the national office of the Broadcast Skills Bank facilitated the origin and development of local branches of the organization?

3. In what ways have local Broadcast Skills Banks related to the national office in their function as minority training and placement services?

4. Why do local banks differ widely in their
organizational patterns and procedures in cities where they have been established by the national office? How do they differ?

5. To what extent has the Broadcast Skills Bank been successful in accomplishing its stated goals, as evaluated by broadcast executives?

In addition to these major questions, the study gives some attention to several additional questions and problems related to the Broadcast Skills Bank.

1. Why did Westinghouse Broadcasting, the National Urban League and the major competitive broadcast networks cooperate in the establishment of a national minority involvement program? How successful was this cooperation?

2. What factors have contributed to the success and/or failure of city-wide minority involvement programs for broadcast employees?

3. What characteristics and abilities of Broadcast Skills Bank leaders have made a significant difference in the operation of the organization, particularly at the local level?

4. After researching a national-local organization directed toward minority involvement in broadcasting, what may one conclude about the future success or failure of this effort and of similar endeavors?

To uncover data related to these questions, this dissertation examines the scope of the Broadcast Skills Bank at
its two levels—national and local—as explained in the sections which follow.

**National Office—Development and Function**

One major area of study in this dissertation is the history and development of the Broadcast Skills Bank at the national level. After interviewing leaders at Westinghouse Broadcasting and the National Urban League and after studying file documents in New York at the skills bank offices, the researcher described the history of the organization. Westinghouse Broadcasting and the Urban League played key roles in its beginning. In addition, the author interviewed vice-presidents at the National Broadcasting Company, Columbia Broadcasting Company and American Broadcasting Company who had helped design the national program of the Broadcast Skills Bank.

During the initial interviews, national leaders of the Broadcast Skills Bank explained that the organization was designed to assist minority group members. Although the phrase "minority group members" usually refers to racial and cultural groups representing small population percentages in America (Jews, blacks, Orientals, European immigrants, Spanish-speaking Americans and American Indians), most of the applicants who came to the Broadcast Skills Bank for assistance were blacks. For this reason, in this study the phrase "minority group members" will refer mainly to blacks.

In 1964 the bank began nationwide operation as a part
of the Urban League's National Skills Bank, a clearinghouse with offices in seventy-two cities where the League is located. The original purpose of the National Skills Bank was to bring together skilled or technically trained minority group job seekers and prospective employers. As the Broadcast Skills Bank began, the Urban League worked closely with Donald McGannon, President of Westinghouse Broadcasting, who had initiated a pilot program to involve minorities in his own organization.

As chairman of the Broadcast Skills Bank's decision-making board which was called the Industry Advisory Committee, McGannon kept in touch with local bank chairmen to keep them abreast of what was happening in the bank's operation nationally. While the bank was being developed, McGannon directed George Norford, a minority group member and a Westinghouse Broadcasting vice-president, to spend 80 per cent of his time on the problem of minority hiring, training and placement activities at the Westinghouse Broadcasting Company. In addition, he appointed Norford national coordinator of the Broadcast Skills Bank; this made Norford responsible for the establishment and development of local Broadcast Skills Banks in cities throughout the country. After launching a local bank in some city, Norford kept in touch with local leaders and guided the development of the bank. Through correspondence, phone calls and visits, he also kept a close watch on each city bank to insure its continued growth.
The national office of the Broadcast Skills Bank was officially established in August, 1964, at a National Conference of the Urban League in Louisville, Kentucky. Of the twenty-two local banks established by the national office, the last was launched in November, 1970, in Tampa, Florida. Beginning in 1970, however, George Norford felt less need to be involved with local banks—the locals began operating more autonomously. In chapter two, this emphasis on local bank autonomy will be discussed further.

Local Banks—Development and Function

The national office of the Broadcast Skills Bank established local banks in twenty-two cities across the country. Each local bank developed its own officers and organization. Some were quite successful in training and placing minorities; a few became inactive or merged into other organizations.

To obtain background material on the local banks and plan research of the Broadcast Skills Bank at the local level, the author conferred with George Norford in New York. Norford discussed some of the twenty-two banks and described locations, organizational patterns and other factors which distinguished one bank from another. Table 1 on page 10 lists the local banks, indicating the dates when they were established and, in five cities, dates when they became inactive or merged into other organizations. Although many of the banks were located in the eastern part of the country,
# TABLE 1

LOCAL BRANCHES OF THE BROADCAST SKILLS BANK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishment</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Termination</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966 June</td>
<td>New York, New York</td>
<td>Sept., 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>Detroit, Michigan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Los Angeles, California</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967 Feb.</td>
<td>New Orleans, Louisiana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Philadelphia, Pennsylvania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chicago, Illinois</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Providence, Rhode Island</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Baltimore, Maryland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>Cleveland, Ohio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>St. Louis, Missouri</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969 Jan.</td>
<td>Cincinnati, Ohio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Columbus, Ohio</td>
<td>June, 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dayton, Ohio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>Fort Wayne, Indiana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indianapolis, Indiana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miami, Florida</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 May</td>
<td>Orlando, Florida</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>Tampa, Florida</td>
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there were several in the west, midwest and the south. They ranged in age from eighteen months to six years and had begun in small industrial cities as well as the largest metropolitan areas. Some organizational patterns were informal with voluntary leadership while others were highly structured with full- and part-time salaried personnel.

In selecting representative local banks for further investigation, the author used the following criteria:

1. The banks selected must include both active and inactive examples in order to discover some of the reasons why local banks survived and flourished or became weak and ceased to exist.

2. Varied organizational patterns or leadership arrangements must be represented in the local banks selected. This will allow some analysis of the strengths and weaknesses involved in local bank decision-making structures.

3. Each bank selected should have been involved in scholarship or training programs for minority group members. This will provide a comparative evaluation of local programs designed to assist "qualifiable" minority group members through specialized training.

4. The banks investigated should be widely separated geographically. This will facilitate some comparison of the way banks operated in various parts of the country.

Before these criteria could be used to select several representative local banks for further study, the author
sought out more information on the twenty-two locals. George Norford and Donald McGannon were questioned in detail about the current status of each bank. For some of their answers, they referred to recent written reports from local bank chairmen or telephoned these men to be sure they had the latest facts. The author was allowed to examine some of the written materials which included "year end reports," letters and promotional materials which local chairmen had sent to the national office.

Through this preliminary investigation of the local banks, the author learned which banks were relatively strong and which were weak in their efforts to train and place minority group members. The investigation also revealed that some banks rotated chairmanships each year while others had permanent chairmen. There were five banks which had attempted scholarship or training programs for minority group members.

As these twenty-two local banks were evaluated during the preliminary investigation, the four selection criteria listed above were applied. The first criterion required that both active and inactive locals be included in the group of banks selected for further investigation. To make clear comparisons among banks, it seemed best to select those which were very active and those which had definitely terminated. Only three banks reported high levels of activity: San Francisco, Tampa and Miami. Two banks had completely
terminated their work without merging into other organizations. These were located in Washington, D.C., and Columbus, Ohio.

The second criterion required that varied organizational patterns or leadership arrangements be represented in the local banks selected. To satisfy this criterion, it seemed reasonable to compare chairmanship patterns at local banks. Five banks reported rotating chairmanship arrangements: Dayton, Cincinnati, Providence, San Francisco and Chicago. Four banks reported permanent chairmanships: Fort Wayne, Miami, Tampa and Columbus. If one or more could be selected from each of these two groups, the criterion would be satisfied.

The third criterion required that each bank selected for final investigation should have been involved in scholarship or training programs. Five banks met this criterion. In Baltimore, training had been provided by the Community College of Baltimore for minority group members. In Miami, funds had been pooled by broadcasters to train engineering applicants. In Columbus, a cooperative training program had been developed between broadcasters and the Ohio State University. In Dayton, an unsuccessful scholarship program had been attempted and was to be revitalized. In San Francisco, the Office of Economic Opportunity had funded a scholarship program for the training of minority group members through the Broadcast Skills Bank.
The final criterion required that the banks investigated should be widely separated geographically. Of the two banks on the west coast, the San Francisco local satisfied the first three criteria and was selected for further investigation. In the south, only the Miami bank satisfied the first three criteria because it had been involved in a scholarship training program. In the east, the Baltimore bank was considered because it had been involved in training minority group members, but it was decided that further investigation would not be appropriate while broadcasters were making a decision on the Urban League's proposal for a new bank structure. This left two banks in the midwest which had been involved in scholarship or training programs: Dayton and Columbus. Because both the San Francisco and Miami banks had reported strong activity in the preliminary investigation, it seemed reasonable to select Columbus rather than Dayton because the Columbus bank had come to a definite termination of activity.

In 1972, the author conducted field research at San Francisco, Miami and Columbus to gather data on the history, development and current operation of these three local banks which had been selected as reasonably representative of the entire Broadcast Skills Bank program. Bank officials, broadcast executives and minority group members were interviewed to determine how each program operated and how successful it had been for the radio and television stations in the area.
Interviewees and file materials provided some historical data on each local bank. However, the investigation emphasized the operation of the banks in 1972 because the primary sources of data, the interviewees, were most familiar with current operations.

To provide an overview of all the local banks in this introductory chapter, the author examined documents and interview transcripts related to the banks, and telephoned several local chairmen later in 1972. In addition, he contacted the office of the National Association of Broadcasters which had recently conducted a survey of minority involvement programs in selected cities. The survey provided information on two local Broadcast Skills Banks. In the paragraphs which follow, each of the twenty-two local banks is described individually with emphasis on the bank's activity in 1972 when this research was conducted.

In **New York City** a local bank was established in June, 1966. According to the national coordinator of the Broadcast Skills Bank, the New York bank was a kind of "city pilot," designed to determine how well the Broadcast Skills Bank would operate on a city-wide basis. After three years of successful activity, the New York local bank was merged into another organization, a Communications Skills Bank, which had similar goals. The Communications Skills Bank was directed by the New York Urban Coalition and continued to function until September, 1969. At that point, the national
coordinator of the Broadcast Skills Bank began to provide assistance on his own for New York minority group members looking for broadcast employment, but he felt that "the need for such a service in New York had diminished because local stations had begun their own programs to involve minority group members in their operations."\textsuperscript{15} This bank will be discussed further in the next chapter.

At \textit{Pittsburgh}, Pennsylvania, a local bank was established in July, 1966. In an interview with the author, the bank chairman, James King, Manager of KDKA television, said that the level of the bank activity had been "below average" for several months because it was difficult to recruit minority group members in the Pittsburgh area. Although the bank had attempted to work with the local Urban League, King said that the League was not "geared as an employment program, and when our stations have openings, no applicants are available." Another broadcaster had preceded King as chairman of the Pittsburgh bank, but there had never been a coordinator. The chairman handled most of the bank responsibilities although he did have some clerical assistance. No scholarship program was reported.\textsuperscript{16}

In \textit{Detroit}, Michigan, a local bank was established in August, 1966. In an interview with the author, the bank chairman, Lawrence Carino, Manager of WJBK television, said that the bank had been "relatively active" since its establishment but that it was going through a period of transition
in 1972. Carino had been chairman of the bank since its establishment. He had appointed another member of his staff at WJBK to handle the responsibility of bank coordinator as an additional assignment. The bank had been involved with the local Urban League office at the time it was established in 1966. A new structure was being established for the bank in 1972 which would center the bank at Carino's station but would be administered by a black executive other than Carino himself. No training or scholarship programs were reported.17

At San Francisco, California, a local bank was established in September, 1966. According to a report on file at the national office of the Broadcast Skills Bank, the bank had maintained a high level of activity through 1971 and had included a scholarship program funded by the federal Office of Economic Opportunity. A full-time coordinator was paid by a "pool" of funds contributed by local radio and television managers. Various broadcasters had served as chairmen of the bank through its six-year history. There was close contact and cooperation between the bank and the local Urban League.18

At Los Angeles, California, a local bank was established in September, 1966. According to a report on file at the national office in New York, the bank operated for three years and then "inspired the creation of BEAM, Broadcasting Employment Advancement for Minorities," in January of 1970. The new organization was sponsored by the Southern California
Broadcasters Association and concentrated on guiding potential employees to "smaller AM and FM stations and small-market television stations." No scholarship or training program was reported in connection with the Los Angeles bank. When the author questioned Louis Simon, Westinghouse Broadcasting Area Vice-President in San Francisco, about the continuation of BEAM in the summer of 1971, he said that he had no comment concerning BEAM or the Los Angeles Broadcast Skills Bank.

At Washington, D.C., a local bank was established in November, 1966. According to the national coordinator of the Broadcast Skills Bank, the luncheon which officially opened the bank office was attended by a number of Federal Communications Commission commissioners and other government leaders whose offices were located in the nation's capital. Those who attended from the FCC were the then chairman, Rosel Hyde, and Commissioners Kenneth Cox, Lee Loevinger and Robert Lee. The bank maintained a "satisfactory" level of activity until September, 1971, when the local committee decided to terminate the organization. The reason given by the national coordinator was that local stations had begun to establish minority involvement programs of their own and it was not necessary to continue the bank effort. No scholarship program was reported.

At New Orleans, Louisiana, a local bank was established in February, 1967. In a report to the Public Affairs
Coordinator of the National Association of Broadcasters, the bank chairman, A. Louis Read, Manager of WDSU television, said there was little bank activity in 1972 because broadcasters did not have much employee turnover. The bank did not have a coordinator or scholarship program. The chairman served as a liaison between broadcasters and the local Urban League office.  

At Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, a local bank was established in February, 1967. In an interview with the author, the chairman, William Ryan, Manager of WKBS television, said that the level of bank activity left "something to be desired" in 1972. Ryan said he was disappointed because the bank was getting increasingly less assistance from the local Urban League. "They are trying to phase out as a placement service," he said. There had been no coordinator at the Philadelphia bank. No scholarship program was reported.  

At Chicago, Illinois, a local bank was established in February, 1967. In a report to the national coordinator of the Broadcast Skills Bank, the bank chairman, Daniel T. Pecaro, Manager of WGN radio and television, said there was strong bank activity in 1972. One or more broadcasters had preceded Pecaro as chairman. The coordinator held another position at WGN and assisted with the bank as an additional assignment. Bank officials worked closely with the local Urban League. No scholarship programs were reported.  

At Boston, Massachusetts, a local bank was established
in March, 1967. According to the national coordinator of the Broadcast Skills Bank, George Norford, the Boston bank became less active after two years and was merged into another organization, the Boston Community Media Committee, in September of 1970. Norford provided no information concerning the bank's organization or whether there had been a scholarship program. Regarding the bank's relationship with the Urban League, he said that "most local banks worked with local Urban League offices." No further information was available on the operation of the Boston Community Media Committee in 1972.

At Providence, Rhode Island, a local bank was established in March, 1967. In an interview with the author, the chairman, Alan Andrews, Manager of WJAR radio, said there was little bank activity in 1972 because most of the stations had developed their own minority involvement programs. One or more broadcasters had preceded Andrews as chairman. The bank had no coordinator or scholarship programs. The chairman called various stations to inform them of available applicants who were minority group members. Bank officials maintained contact with local Urban League leaders, but the relationship was "not the best because of personality differences." In Baltimore, Maryland, a local bank was established in June, 1967. It was administered by the Baltimore Urban League with training provided by the Community College of
Baltimore. After a period of activity and growth, interest diminished in the bank efforts, and it became necessary to revise the operation late in 1972. In a proposal to the broadcasters in Baltimore, local Urban League officials suggested that the bank train minority group members at the Community College through scholarship funds contributed by local radio and television stations. A screening committee would interview and select a certain number of applicants for training each year. The program would be administered by a coordinator whose salary would be paid by the Urban League. When this dissertation was being written in 1972, broadcasters were evaluating the proposal to determine the future direction of the Baltimore Broadcast Skills Bank. 28

At Cleveland, Ohio, a local bank was established in October, 1967. In an interview with the author, the manager of WJW television, Charles Bergeson, said that the bank was "almost totally inactive because stations in the area have made progress on their own in hiring minority group members." The bank had no coordinator or scholarship program. The chairman of the bank was Kenneth Bagwell who had been manager of WJW television until September, 1972, when he moved to a new position in Florida. When Bagwell left Cleveland, no one replaced him as chairman of the Broadcast Skills Bank although Bergeson did have the file available. Bergeson referred to a letter written by Bagwell to George Norford in September of 1972 which stated that Bagwell had talked with
other Cleveland broadcasters and decided that there was no purpose for the bank in that city in 1972. Bergeson explained that Cleveland broadcasters were working with the local Urban League office to find qualifiable minority group members. At St. Louis, Missouri, a local bank was established in October, 1967. In a report to the Public Affairs Coordinator of the National Association of Broadcasters, the bank chairman, Robert Hyland, Manager of KMOX radio, said there was little bank activity in 1972 because of "organizational difficulties" in the bank structure. The coordinator held another position at KMOX and assisted with the bank as an additional assignment. Bank officials maintained contact with the local Urban League office. No scholarship program was reported.

At Cincinnati, Ohio, a local bank was established in January, 1969. In an interview with the author, the chairman, Richard Reed, Manager of WLW-T television said that the bank became inactive in 1970 because local stations began developing their own minority involvement programs. Another broadcaster had preceded Reed as chairman of the Cincinnati bank. Reed said he had appointed one of his staff members as coordinator for several months but then had abandoned the idea because it "was not effective." The bank chairman had maintained contact with leaders of the local Urban League. No scholarship program had been attempted by the bank.

At Columbus, Ohio, a local bank was established in
June, 1969. In an interview with the author, the coordinator, Chuck White, Public Affairs Director of WBNS television, said that the bank had terminated activities in December, 1971, when the chairman retired and moved out of the area. White said that competition among the local broadcasters had also contributed to the bank's termination. He explained a scholarship training program had been conducted by the bank in cooperation with the Ohio State University. Although there had been no formal connection between the bank and the local Urban League, White had kept in touch with the League office concerning the bank's activities.

At Dayton, Ohio, a local bank was established in June, 1969. In an interview with the author, the bank chairman, Ray Colie, Manager of WLW-D television, said that the bank was "below average" in its activity in 1972 because it had been difficult to find qualifiable minority group members. Another broadcaster had preceded Colie as chairman of the Dayton bank. The coordinator held another position at WLW-D television and assisted with the bank as an additional assignment. To find qualifiable minority group members, the coordinator talked with officials at the local Urban League office and other social service agencies. However, the search for applicants had not produced sufficient numbers. An unsuccessful scholarship program had been attempted by the bank in 1969, and Colie said he wanted to ask broadcasters to pool funds in order to revitalize the scholarship program.
At Fort Wayne, Indiana, a local bank was established in August, 1969. In an interview with the author, the chairman, Carl Vandagrift, Manager of WOWO radio, said that the bank "never got off the ground." Vandagrift was the only person who had served as chairman of the bank. In 1969 he appointed one of his staff members as coordinator but was unable to develop support from other broadcasters "who were jealous of WOWO." Vandagrift felt that local banks would be more appropriate in larger cities where "cooperation would be more satisfactory because of the number of stations involved." Fort Wayne stations had received some help directly from the local Urban League in finding minority applicants. No scholarship program had been attempted.34

At Indianapolis, Indiana, a local bank was established in August, 1969. In an interview with the author, the chairman, Eldon Campbell, Manager of WFBM television, said that the bank was inactive in 1972 because individual stations were developing their own minority involvement programs and the bank was "no longer meaningful." The bank had no coordinator or scholarship programs. Campbell said the bank was "supposed to be handled through the Urban League, but this plan has been unsuccessful." He said the bank was necessary in 1969 but had become inactive as the FCC forced individual stations to develop their own programs.35

At Miami, Florida, a local bank was established in August, 1969. According to a report on file at the national
office of the Broadcast Skills Bank, the bank had continued to be very active through 1971. There had been only one chairman throughout that period, and he paid for a full-time coordinator out of his station's budget. The broadcasters in the area had pooled funds to provide scholarship training for minority group members who were interested in becoming broadcast engineers. Trainees were provided with loans from these funds and asked to pay them back after they had been employed for a period of time. The Miami bank and the local Urban League office operated separately.  

At Orlando, Florida, a local bank was established in May, 1970. In a report to the national coordinator of the Broadcast Skills Bank, the chairman, John Haberlan, Manager of WESH television, said the bank was operating "satisfactorily" in 1972. The coordinator held another position at WESH and assisted with the bank as an additional assignment. Bank officials maintained contact with the local Urban League office. No scholarship programs were reported.  

At Tampa, Florida, a local bank was established in November, 1970. In a report to the national coordinator of the Broadcast Skills Bank, the bank chairman, Robert Olson, Assistant Manager of WTVT television, said there was strong bank activity in 1972. Olson had been chairman of the bank since its inception. The coordinator held another position at a broadcast station in Tampa and assisted with the bank as an additional assignment. Bank officials maintained
contact with the local Urban League office. No scholarship programs were reported. 38

This section has described the scope of the study at the national and local levels. Several criteria were used to select three local Broadcast Skills Banks for further investigation. These banks will be evaluated in chapters three, four and five respectively. This section concluded with an overview of all the twenty-two local banks as they were operating in 1972.

Significance of the Study

The Broadcast Skills Bank "provided the framework for significant improvements in the hiring of minority group members throughout the broadcast industry," according to Marie McWilliams, Vice-President for Personnel, the American Broadcasting Company. 39 It was organized because industry leaders felt a national "overall program was necessary to deal with a dual problem"--a need to stimulate the industry to employ more blacks and stimulate blacks to apply for employment. 40 Although the networks, local stations and other organizations had plans of their own, "short-range crash programs that could not be sustained or that were not national in reach and in results were not the answer." 41

To guide the implementation of the bank, an Industry Advisory Committee was formed in 1965, consisting of industry executives from NBC, CBS, ABC and Westinghouse Broadcasting. 42 This committee met regularly in New York for several years,
maintaining contact with local banks operating in various cities.

In the Congressional Record of the 90th Congress, the Honorable Jacob K. Javits referred to the Broadcast Skills Bank as a "very productive plan" for recruitment, training and employment of minority group members. He explained that the bank "serves another valuable purpose in that the more minority group members are seen on TV as people rather than as stereotypes, the quicker the problems confronting the entire nation having to do with segregated housing, education and employment will be overcome."^43

When the Broadcast Skills Bank was being considered as a subject for possible dissertation research, the author received the following recommendation in a letter from the bank's national coordinator, George Norford:

[The Broadcast Skills Bank] is one of the few projects to involve the major elements of the industry--a very competitive one, as you well know, and one of the reasons it works is that no one, including us, seeks company or personal aggrandizement.

While I have provided information to various agencies, institutions and individuals interested in . . . using it as a model . . . as far as I know no one is writing a dissertation based on it.

However, the fact that it was the first effort of its kind in broadcasting, that it enlisted wide-spread support both inside and outside of broadcasting, and above all, contributed sizeably to breaking the barrier that kept minority group members out of broadcasting makes it a unique program and of historical significance. . . . I think it would be a
most fitting subject for your dissertation and
I hope your additional research serves to
substantiate this position.

Method of Research in the Study

This study utilized historical and descriptive analysis as the research methodology. The primary method used to gather data for this dissertation was the personal interview. To obtain information on the origin of the skills bank, key leaders at Westinghouse Broadcasting and the National Urban League were questioned about their roles. Letters, memorandums, news clippings and other written records were examined in several cities. To find out how various local banks had begun and developed, the interviewer questioned broadcast executives in three cities where local banks have been active. In addition, minority group members who have been assisted by local banks were questioned about their background and experience with their broadcast skills banks.

During the first interviews in New York City, the author talked with George Norford to make plans for the investigation of several local banks. Several weeks later, when the author had selected three representative local banks, Norford said he would contact bank leaders at these cities before the author's arrival, briefing them on his acquaintance with the author and asking for their cooperation in the research.

In addition to Norford's letters, the author himself contacted bank leaders in these cities by mail and telephone,
making appointments with the local bank chairmen and coordinators. In each city, he met with these leaders who gave him the names of other executives and minority employees who had participated in the Broadcast Skills Bank. These people were then contacted by the author and interviewed.

Use of Primary Sources

At the national office and in each of the local banks investigated, the author conducted a total of forty-two interviews (most of which were tape recorded) with Broadcast Skills Bank leaders and participants. Nineteen additional interviews were conducted by telephone, several of which were tape recorded. These tapes were then transcribed to assure accuracy in the use of statements expressed by the interviewees. To supplement these personal interviews, the author asked for additional material by writing to several bank officials in the offices at each city. These officials responded by mail to the author's questions concerning bank publicity programs and numbers of minority group members registered at each bank office.

Letters, conference summaries and inter-office memorandums were examined as primary data in the national and local offices. Where significant materials were made available, photocopies were obtained for later study and analysis. Information in these written documents was compared and contrasted with the data supplied in the personal interviews as the author evaluated the policies and procedures in each
Use of Secondary Sources

Although the interviews and documents described above served as the primary data for this dissertation, certain significant secondary sources were used. Various trade journals, newspapers, books and government documents were researched as indicators of government and industry involvement and reactions with regard to minority issues.

Indices such as the Index to Legal Periodicals and the Public Affairs Information Service Index were reviewed to identify sources of data on federal regulations and policies related to the purposes of the Broadcast Skills Bank. The Topicator and Business Periodicals Index were examined to reveal articles in trade journals reflecting industry attitudes toward minority involvement programs such as the skills bank. As the dissertation was written with a primary emphasis on personal interview research, these secondary sources, as available in the Ohio State University Libraries, were used to confirm dates, names of organizations and other facts which were not easily recalled by interviewees.

Problems of Research in the Study

In writing an historical and descriptive analysis of the Broadcast Skills Bank, the author sought to uncover relevant data through interviews and the study of documents. Some problems were encountered, relating to the role of the
Westinghouse' Broadcasting Company, availability of office files and interview circumstances.

**Defining the Role of the Westinghouse Broadcasting Company**

Some respondents found it difficult to discuss the history and operation of the Broadcast Skills Bank because of their uncertainty about the role of Westinghouse Broadcasting. The bank has a varied image, ranging from an "industry-wide effort" to an effort created by local stations. Although it was occasionally publicized as a Westinghouse project, it was usually described as a local program activated by broadcast executives who were concerned about their community responsibility.

Westinghouse Broadcasting has purposely maintained a "low profile" concerning the Broadcast Skills Bank although company officials in New York admit they developed it and were mainly responsible for its implementation. The Westinghouse Broadcasting area vice-president in San Francisco referred to the bank as a local effort, asking that it not be identified as a Westinghouse project.

In the early period of the bank's expansion, some industry leaders indicated they might not want to support the program because they did not want to "featherbed" what was publicized as a Westinghouse Broadcasting operation. Thus, in later years much of the Westinghouse-financed publicity referred to the Broadcast Skills Bank as an industry effort with little mention of Westinghouse Broadcasting.
At the local bank level this problem appeared in a slightly different form. Here the question was whether the local bank was a voluntary effort developing spontaneously among local managers, or a directed effort managed by the Westinghouse Broadcasting Company. Most of the broadcasters questioned in each city said the bank had been launched by Westinghouse but then continued on its own as a local project. However, in some cities, like Miami, broadcasters said that Westinghouse officials continued to visit local bank leaders for years after the local organization was established. In the chapters which follow, the author will discuss this matter further, showing how Westinghouse Broadcasting Company kept a close and continuing relationship with some local banks but not with others.

In some cities, like San Francisco, local leadership had changed several times over the years and new leaders were not always informed about the bank's history, particularly concerning the role of Westinghouse Broadcasting. For example, the bank coordinator in San Francisco in 1972 understood that that bank had always been a voluntary effort on the part of local broadcasters. Most of the bank publicity described it that way. But according to the national chairman of the Broadcast Skills Bank in New York, all the local banks, including the one in San Francisco, had been established by the Westinghouse Broadcasting Company although he explained, "We didn't want people to think it was a Westinghouse operation."
Evaluating the Office Files in Each City

Although a number of documents were located by the author in each city visited, he did not have complete access to all file materials. At the very beginning of the research in New York, George Norford explained that the author should request materials on the cities selected, and he would provide appropriate documents from the files. Thus, the author obtained letters, memorandums, journal articles and other materials from the national office files on San Francisco, Miami and Columbus.

At the local level, the author was given access to some of the files, with the understanding that personal and confidential materials could not be reviewed. This search provided additional written documentation of the facts related to the operation in each city.

The author therefore cannot claim to have examined all written evidence related to the Broadcast Skills Bank. He has seen the materials which national and local leaders defined as appropriate for his research. Financial data concerning the contributions of individual broadcast stations to scholarship funds were classified as confidential. One broadcaster referred to letters and memorandums discussing "internal bank problems" which he could not make available.51

It is likely that most material which would have reflected negatively on the bank operations was withheld. This limitation influenced the study significantly because it
was impossible for the author to research all problems related to Broadcast Skills Bank activities. As is explained in the chapters which follow, the reader should understand that each local bank operation is described in reasonably positive terms. If all types of data had been made available, a more balanced perspective would have been possible.

Conducting the Interview

Availability of personnel.—Several weeks before visiting San Francisco and Miami, the author wrote to local chairmen and coordinators to ask for assistance in setting up interviews and office research. Responses to these letters were cordial, brief and limited to a discussion of dates. The executives often assigned assistants to answer for them. The leaders could afford interview time but had little time for planning and correspondence.

The author had hoped to receive letters back from each local bank suggesting a schedule and listing names of employers and employees to contact. Instead, the schedule and contacts were developed after his arrival.

This arrangement left the author at the mercy of local bank leaders, and plans simply fell into place in each city. Instead of having a choice of respondents, the author had to interview those who were available. In each case, however, there was opportunity to interview a variety of skills bank leaders, employers and minority group employees.

When the author arrived in San Francisco, the current
bank chairman had been called out of town and was unavailable for the scheduled interview. However, he had been chairman for only three months and the previous chairman was knowledgeable about the bank's current operation. The author interviewed the previous chairman in person and called the current chairman to tape a long distance telephone interview one week later.

It was difficult to obtain information through the mail. Supplementary questions to bank participants and broadcast industry spokesmen were answered by phone but seldom by mail. The author attributes this problem to the rigorous schedules of broadcast executives and the amount of mail which they must handle.

Cautious attitude of executive respondents.—Some of the executives interviewed hesitated to make evaluative remarks concerning the local bank in their city. They had the impression that the author was a guest of the bank leaders and therefore did not want to suggest weaknesses in the bank's operation.

When the author explained that the purpose of the research was to obtain both negative and positive reactions to the program, most of these respondents became more candid about their feelings toward the bank. Some employers were contacted directly by the author by telephone with no introduction from bank leadership. They were more open about bank weaknesses.
Interviewer effects in the research.—In much of the research for this study the white author interviewed white respondents. Several respondents were members of minority races, however, and this raised the question of race-of-interviewer effects in the research. The author was forced to rely upon numerous interviews in this study because a limited amount of written evidence was available concerning the Broadcast Skills Bank. Many of the interviewees were the white executives who established and maintained the Broadcast Skills Bank. They related factual data and expressed their opinions in evaluating the data. These respondents were most important in the author's planning and execution of the study.

The following major questions were asked of broadcast executives involved in the Broadcast Skills Bank:

1. How effectively did the Broadcast Skills Bank serve your station as a means of involving minority group members in the operation?

2. What was the greatest contribution which the bank made to broadcasters in this city?

3. What are the major weaknesses you perceived in the skills bank program?

4. How would you suggest that the bank improve its efforts in this city?

Data obtained from minority group members who had been employed through the skills bank were often secondary in
importance because the applicants usually knew little about the bank organization. Their backgrounds, aspirations and knowledge of the bank were examined, but they were not expected to offer historical or organizational critiques of the program. A small number of these minority group members had had the opportunity to evaluate the skills bank operation, usually in the context of the training they received. In these instances, some of their opinions were included in the dissertation. However, the skills bank applicants were not interviewed to discover their evaluations of the bank program. Instead, the author asked them brief, factual questions about their experiences with the bank. Samples of these experiences are summarized near the end of each chapter which describes a particular city's Broadcast Skills Bank operation.

The following major questions were asked of minority group members who had been placed in broadcast positions or trained through the skills bank:

1. How did you hear about the Broadcast Skills Bank?

2. What happened, step by step, as you contacted the bank and found work or training with assistance from the bank?

3. Did the Broadcast Skills Bank assist you in obtaining a promotion after your first job in broadcasting? How?

4. What is your present job title and what duties do
you perform?

When bank coordinators were interviewed, they were questioned about the methods used in training and placing bank applicants. These minority group members occasionally volunteered evaluative statements but were not pressed to do so by the interviewer. Thus the responses from minority group members were for the most part factual statements. The opinion, attitude and evaluative responses usually came from white interviewees. The white author was himself a broadcast manager and felt that his research should emphasize the evaluative responses of white executives to avoid bias caused by racial differences.

An often-cited example of race-of-interviewer effects took place in the 1940s and was reported in Herbert Hyman's *Interviewing in Social Research*. In the study, 1,000 Memphis blacks were interviewed with approximately 500 cases handled by black interviewers and 500 by white interviewers. On nearly all the opinion or attitude questions the white interviewers obtained significantly higher proportions of "proper" or "acceptable" answers. Hyman reported a similar early study in New York which showed less evidence of interviewer effects. He concluded that Memphis blacks were more reluctant to talk freely to white interviewers than were New York blacks.

Another study related to race-of-interviewer effects was conducted by Duane Robinson and Sylvia Rohde in 1946.
Several types of interviewers were assigned to question New York City householders on the subject of attitudes toward Jews. In part of their experiment they sought to determine the degree to which anti-Semitic responses to a set of questions would be influenced by the Jewish appearance of the interviewer. They concluded that the more likely householders were to identify the interviewers as Jewish, the less likely they were to make anti-Semitic statements in the interview. Apparently, the respondents felt they should avoid making statements which they anticipated would be painful to the interviewer, or at least those with which the interviewer would disagree.55

In 1964, Allen Williams conducted a study involving 840 black respondents to discover sources of bias in the interview situation. The sample was drawn from two predominantly rural areas and two urban areas in North Carolina. Williams concluded that race of interviewer was a potentially biasing factor but only under certain conditions with certain types of interview questions.

Race of interviewer is shown to be consistently associated with bias only when social distance is high and when an interview question is highly threatening.56

A Detroit area study on the problem of race-of-interviewer effects was reported in 1971 by Howard Schuman and Jean Converse. These researchers reviewed Hyman's data and suggested that one may "project from the 1940s to the 1970s a decreasing effect of race-of-interviewer on Negro
respondents. Their suggestion was based on the Detroit study in which questions dealing with racial discrimination, income, education, occupation and personal background showed little interviewer influence.

The studies cited above suggest that racial bias in the interview situation is closely related to the kinds of questions which are asked. Hyman referred to opinion or attitude questions as those which were more likely to cause biased responses. Robinson and Rohde found that opinion questions concerning racial attitudes generated biased responses, depending upon the racial appearance of the interviewer. Williams concluded that highly threatening questions were associated with biased responses when interviewer-interviewee races were different and social distance was high. The Schuman-Converse study concluded that certain questions showed little race-of-interviewer influence, mainly those related to racial discrimination, income, education or occupation.

To reduce the possibility of interviewer-interviewee biases in this study, opinion and attitude questions were directed mainly to the broadcast executives who evaluated skills bank operations in their cities. Questions asked of minority group member applicants and coordinators were for the most part factual and did not involve threatening racial questions. The author purposely designed the study to evaluate white responses to the skills bank program and for that
reason interviews with minority group members were limited in number and content. As stated by Cannel and Kahn in *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, "To the extent that bias is associated with certain kinds of substantive questions, one can avoid the risk of bias by eliminating such content from the interview. . . ." 59

**Organization of the Study**

This introductory chapter has examined the scope, significance and research methodology of this dissertation. A section on research problems described some of the barriers which were encountered as data were gathered and analyzed.

Chapter two traces the history and development of the national office of the Broadcast Skills Bank in New York City. Chapters three, four and five examine local Broadcast Skills Banks in San Francisco, Miami and Columbus, respectively. Chapter six is a summary and conclusion, drawing together the major insights perceived through this research and suggesting areas for further study.
NOTES


7Letter to Donald McGannon from Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice-President of the United States, undated.

8Ibid.


10Broadcast Skills Bank, Career Opportunities in Broadcasting (March, 1966).


Interview with Donald McGannon.

Interview with George Norford, February 18, 1972.

Interview with George Norford, November 9, 1972.

Telephone interview with James King, Manager, KDKA television, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, November 13, 1972.

Telephone interview with Lawrence Carino, Manager, WJBK television, Detroit, Michigan, November 13, 1972.

Telephone interview with Lawrence Carino, Manager, WJBK television, Detroit, Michigan, November 13, 1972.

Interview with George Norford, November 9, 1972.


"The Broadcast Skills Bank in San Francisco and Los Angeles," a report from the national office of the Broadcast Skills Bank, August 12, 1971. (Mimeographed.)

Interview with Louis Simon, Area Vice-President of Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, Inc., at KPIX in San Francisco, June 28, 1972.

Broadcast Skills Bank, Career Opportunities in Broadcasting (March, 1969).

Interview with George Norford, November 9, 1972.

Interview with Elbert Sampson, Public Affairs Coordinator, National Association of Broadcasters, in New York City, November 10, 1972.


Interview with George Norford, November 9, 1972.

Ibid.

Telephone interview with Alan Andrews, Manager, WJAR radio, Providence, Rhode Island, November 10, 1972.

Baltimore Urban League, "Broadcast Skills Bank Proposal," prepared by Travis W. Vauls, Executive Director, and Maggie Lane, Associate Director, August 10, 1972.

Telephone interview with Charles Bergeson, Manager, WJW television, Cleveland, Ohio, October 31, 1972.

Interview with Elbert Sampson.

Telephone interview with Richard Reed, Manager, WLW-T
television, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 31, 1972.

32 Interview with Chuck White, Public Affairs Director, WBNS television, Columbus, Ohio, January 14, 1972.

33 Telephone interview with Ray Colie, Manager, WLW-D television, Dayton, Ohio, October 31, 1972.

34 Telephone interview with Carl Vandagrift, Manager, WOWO radio, Fort Wayne, Indiana, November 6, 1972.

35 Telephone interview with Eldon Campbell, Manager, WFBM television, Indianapolis, Indiana, November 6, 1972.


37 Interview with George Norford, November 9, 1972.

38 Ibid.

39 Telephone interview with Marie McWilliams, Vice-President, Personnel, American Broadcasting Company, New York City, November 9, 1972.


41 Ibid.

42 Broadcast Skills Bank, Career Opportunities in Broadcasting (March, 1966).


44 Letter from George Norford, December 9, 1971.

45 Broadcast Skills Bank, Career Opportunities in Broadcasting (March, 1969).

46 "Radio-TV Trainee Wants to Help Blacks Help Themselves," Call and Post, Columbus, Ohio, June 5, 1971.

47 Letter from George Norford.

48 Interview with Louis Simon.

49 Interview with Donald McGannon.
Interview with George Norford, February 18, 1972.

Interview with Chuck White, January 14, 1972.


Ibid., p. 154.

Ibid., p. 170.


Ibid., 44.

CHAPTER II

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
BROADCAST SKILLS BANK

Overview

This chapter examines the origin and development of the Broadcast Skills Bank. It is important in this chapter to note that a combination of factors led to the development of the Broadcast Skills Bank as a nationwide organization. A number of individuals and organizations were concerned about the need for minority group members in the broadcast industry, but the Broadcast Skills Bank did not take shape until several key people attacked the project as a group.

George Norford's involvement in the development of the bank was particularly significant. After leaving a broadcast network executive position, he became involved with a state commission which was investigating the problem of minority hiring in broadcasting. When he had completed his work with the commission, he became an executive with one of the companies he had been investigating--Westinghouse Broadcasting Company. Norford was instrumental in bringing a number of organizations together behind the early efforts of the Broadcast Skills Bank.

The role of Westinghouse Broadcasting and the National
Urban League in the Broadcast Skills Bank are studied in this chapter. It was important to understand the roles of these large organizations because their leaders did not want the bank to be perceived as belonging to any one person or group. It was to be an industry-wide cooperative effort and Westinghouse in particular did much to maintain a low profile in the operation.

A significant factor in the development of the Broadcast Skills Bank was the experimental pilot programs which were conducted by Westinghouse Broadcasting Company as it prepared to expand the bank into several cities. This chapter will discuss the company’s pilot program among its own employees and the way minority group hiring increased over a short period of time. In addition, the chapter will discuss the New York City pilot project which Westinghouse developed as its first city-wide bank. On the basis of the way this bank developed, national officials of the Broadcast Skills Bank launched local banks in other cities across the country.

Following a discussion of the sources used, the chapter will examine the events which led up to the establishment of the organization in 1964. Included in this description is an examination of the roles played by the National Urban League and the major broadcast networks. The next section of the chapter discusses the development and function of a national office of the Broadcast Skills Bank and the way this office established local banks in twenty-two cities.
In addition, the chapter describes the relationship of the national office to local bank offices and how that relationship changed between 1966 and 1971. The last section discusses a decline in national office activity which began in 1970.

Sources Consulted

This chapter is based on a variety of research materials ranging from government documents to promotional speeches. In some historical sections, bits of information from several sources were pieced together in an attempt to reconstruct the early activities of the organization. It is important to note that most of the data were supplied by officials at the national office and much of it had been designed for publicity purposes. Thus, the chapter carries an obvious positive tone with only a few references to skills bank problems.

Donald McGannon and George Norford were questioned about problem areas as they were interviewed. Their responses provided some balance in the chapter, along with some criticism raised by Adolph Holmes in a letter to the author.

Reports by the New York Commission on Human Rights and the Federal Communications Commission were used to describe the climate of concern for minority involvement in the years when the Broadcast Skills Bank developed. Speeches and mimeographed progress reports by national office personnel were used to describe the steps involved in skills bank growth.
Two Broadcast Skills Bank promotional booklets were used as references to provide examples of the organization's activities in establishing local banks. Both pieces were directed to employers and job seekers with the purpose of generating interest in the skills bank as a successful organization. Donald McGannon presented a similar message in a New York Times interview. His remarks on Westinghouse employment figures were quoted in the chapter. Further discussion of these research sources is included in the body of the chapter.

Factors Related to the Development of the Broadcast Skills Bank

According to Donald McGannon, President of Westinghouse Broadcasting, concern over minority involvement was developing at his company several years before the skills bank was launched. In the late fifties he was using administrative pressure to increase minority hiring. "I thought that simply emoting and mandating the situation would cure the problem. But for a period of two or three years we made very little progress."

Influence of New York State Commission for Human Rights

In the early sixties, as McGannon and other broadcast executives became increasingly aware of minority hiring problems, Governor Nelson Rockefeller asked the New York Human Rights Commission to search for solutions. In 1962 George
Fowler, chairman of the commission, set up meetings with the principal heads of the three major networks to express concern over the lack of employment opportunities for minority group members in television. Near the end of the year, George Norford was appointed full-time television consultant to Fowler. Norford, a black NBC executive, was given a year's leave of absence by the network to serve with the commission.  

As the commission's consultant, Norford met with ABC, NBC and CBS programming vice-presidents in New York. He talked with directors of national programs, directors of daytime and evening programs and casting directors. According to Fowler's report, "agreements were reached at these meetings for Mr. Norford to confer personally with every producer of every program appearing on every network" to arouse an awareness of the lack of employment opportunities for Negro, Puerto Rican and other minorities.

In another phase of the commission's work, Norford was sent to the large television production centers on the west coast for additional meetings with executives. In 1963 he talked with vice-presidents in charge of west coast program operations for ABC, CBS and NBC and with the major executives of studios producing films for, or in collaboration with, the networks. These included MGM, Revue, Desilu, Warner Brothers, Four Star, Screen Gems and Bing Crosby Productions.
Success of Westinghouse Pilot Training Program

Norford also had regular visits with multi-station owners and executives or "group broadcasters." In his meetings at Group W with Donald McGannon, he pointed to the need for further minority involvement at Westinghouse Broadcasting, suggesting the skills bank training concept as an idea to be tested. McGannon challenged Norford to make it work at Westinghouse, offering him the title of vice-president and general executive with the organization.

Although Norford had "enjoyed a pleasant and productive relationship" with NBC since 1952, he decided to make the change in order to "bring about a new situation in the industry—that is the acceptance of minority group people, their training, their advancing to positions of responsibility."^5

Early in 1964 a pilot minority training program was put into action throughout the Westinghouse Broadcasting facilities. McGannon assigned Norford to spend 80 per cent of his time on the program, securing minority group manpower for the Westinghouse radio and television stations, advertising companies, production company and community antenna system. Norford was to use the rest of his time making plans for an expanded Broadcast Skills Bank—one which would serve the entire broadcast industry.^6 With the contacts he had made as consultant to the State Commission for Human Rights, Norford had access to a variety of industry spokesmen who
could evaluate his expansion plans.

Norford considered the pilot a success. "In less than two years, employment of minority group manpower had increased over 200 per cent and there had been a sizeable number of such employees to begin with." In connection with this claim of minority employment increase, a New York Times article discussed the numbers involved in one two-year period at the company. Westinghouse Broadcasting reported 1,500 employees at its five television and six radio stations in 1966. Between January of 1965 and June of 1966 it had doubled the number of blacks employed in these stations in jobs above the laborer's level to a total of 76. They occupied such positions as "foreign correspondent, on-the-air newscaster, political commentator, TV drama critic, film editor, traffic manager, and sales executive."  

It is important at this point in the chapter to remind the reader that the interviews with Westinghouse Broadcasting Company personnel produced limited responses because of the McGannon-Norford perspective on the Broadcast Skills Bank. Their answers usually did not go beyond the data available in the printed promotional materials or news releases which they had written. Questions about skills bank problems were answered briefly or not at all. This left gaps in the description of the operation—gaps which could not be filled in by using the printed materials available.
Example of the National Urban League's Skills Bank

During his time with NBC, the Human Rights Commission and the pilot project at Westinghouse, George Norford frequently called upon the Urban League's National Skills Bank as a source of minority group personnel. The League's bank operated as a central clearinghouse or depository where blacks with all kinds of skills could register. Employers from industrial, educational and government agencies could draw upon the bank through any of the Urban League's seventy-two branch offices in thirty states.  

Adolph Holmes, Deputy Executive Director of Programs and Field Operations for the National Urban League, recalled an increase in requests for broadcast-type personnel in the early sixties. In a letter to the author, Holmes explained the problem this posed for the Urban League's skills bank program.

The National Skills Bank began receiving many requests from the networks and the major group organizations such as Westinghouse for personnel. . . . Applications were coming from various branches of the National Skills Bank operating at the various local Urban Leagues around the country. The National Skills Bank did not have the personnel to process the applications, the knowledge of the broadcasting industry, or contacts to achieve the maximum input it felt it should have.  

The author asked Holmes for more data about the history of the National Urban League and about the League's involvement with the Broadcast Skills Bank. However, Holmes' letter was a series of general statements rather than
specific answers to the author's questions. Out of six attempts to obtain more detailed information by telephone, one call was accepted by Mr. Holmes himself, but little factual material was provided. He was asked for several dates but provided none.

George Norford recognized the National Skills Bank problem and talked with the late Whitney Young, who was then executive director of the Urban League. They considered the idea of a Broadcast Skills Bank, but Young was concerned that other industries might also want specialized programs and the National Skills Bank would fragment, losing its strength as a central clearinghouse.

Norford argued that broadcasting was an industry unto itself, more important than others because it was a "conditioner of opinion and creator of images." He wanted broadcasting to develop more creative, personable and imaginative blacks—those whose appearance and performance could stimulate the flow of blacks into other industries. 11

After further discussion, Young was convinced that the Broadcast Skills Bank would work if appropriate funding were available. Norford informed McGannon of this need and McGannon agreed to underwrite expenses incurred by the League in operating the Broadcast Skills Bank. 12 Further details on costs were not made available to the author.

Concern of Major Network Executives

McGannon and Norford knew the Broadcast Skills Bank
could not serve the entire industry unless network officials were involved in the planning and direction of the organization. Together they visited the presidents of each network--ABC, CBS and NBC--explaining the purpose and program of the bank. According to McGannon, they received the executives' "wholehearted endorsement and pledge of support."\(^{13}\)

Representatives of the three networks met with McGannon in the fall of 1965 and adopted a cooperative program to recruit, train and employ Negroes and Puerto Ricans on a nationwide basis. The managers of 250 stations, including those in the fifty major market areas, were invited to cooperate. In his letter to the managers, McGannon asked for participation in solving the problem of discrimination.

The Broadcast Skills Bank has been seeking to solve, at least in part, this critical problem (locating, training and hiring Negroes and other minority representatives for broadcasting positions), to end the wasteful duplication of effort, to capture the great resources of creative manpower among the minority groups and finally to make a national contribution toward solving the civil rights unrest, due largely to lack of employment opportunity.\(^{14}\)

In a *New York Times* interview, McGannon reported the response of station managers was "strongly in favor" of the program.\(^{15}\)

An Industry Advisory Committee was formed when the networks became involved in the bank. In a 1968 speech at the Race Relations and Industry Convention, George Norford referred to the committee's membership.

Currently overseeing its [the bank's] implementation is an Industry Advisory Committee of which Donald McGannon is Chairman. Committee
members are George Fuchs, Vice-President--Personnel, NBC; Robert Kalaidjian, Director--Personnel, CBS; Marie McWilliams, Director--Personnel, ABC, and myself. Soon to join the Committee is a member of the Metromedia Broadcasting corporate family.16

In 1972, the author talked with three of the network officials who had served on the Industry Advisory Committee. Robert Kalaidjian explained that Donald McGannon scheduled the meetings and prepared the agenda for these sessions. Meetings were usually held every two months.17 Although the sessions had been valuable as a means of creating new methods for the Broadcast Skills Bank to expand, Marie McWilliams felt that the group could have done more to develop a solid base for continual expansion.18 David Gardan, who replaced George Fuchs on the committee in 1969, said that the bank had never expanded to its full potential because it registered too many entry-level jobs and applicants. He felt that it should have done more to assist minority group members who wanted to advance within the industry.19

The Industry Advisory Committee met regularly in New York for several years, maintaining contact with local banks operating in various cities. However, by August of 1972 the committee had ceased to function as such. In an interview with the author, Norford explained that the executives were "kept informed" but were no longer directly involved in the leadership of the bank.20 This change reflected the attitude of Westinghouse officials in later years that local banks operated more effectively under local leadership with little
Establishment of a National Office in New York

Late in 1965 Donald McGannon and George Norford met with network representatives and National Urban League officials to establish a national office of the Broadcast Skills Bank. Until that meeting, the organization had usually been referred to as the Westinghouse Broadcast Skills Bank. To give the bank an identity somewhat separate from the Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, leaders adopted the term "national office" and began referring to the bank in that way when they talked about efforts to expand the organization nationwide.

Based on the success of the Westinghouse Broadcasting Company's pilot program, the concern of network leaders and the willingness of Urban League officials to assist in the project, a national administrative office was established with McGannon and Norford as its chairman and coordinator, respectively. The national office was to begin immediately establishing local Broadcast Skills Banks in cities around the country. 21

As the organization took on a nationwide perspective, the leaders established four major purposes which were discussed in interviews, speeches and literature promoting the bank's operation. They will be examined at this point in the dissertation in some detail because national officials applied them to the total organization, including all local banks.
1. **Inventory and employment** was the first goal of the organization. The plan was to establish an inventory of qualified minority group applicants who wanted to work in broadcasting. Each employer who participated in the bank would advise the national office of all applicants with qualifications for immediate employment whom that employer could not use. The list at the national office would also include applicants who had applied through any of the National Urban League's seventy-two local offices. Each application would include an interviewer's personal appraisal of the applicant as well as the scores achieved on any tests he had taken.

All participating employers would alert the national office of openings in their organization for full-time employment and wait for the office to make any referrals. Concerning this employment process, a bank statement explained, "The movement of the same minority group personnel between participating employers would be discouraged with the emphasis being placed rather on the entry of additional such manpower into the industry."^22^

2. **Part-time employment** of minority group members was encouraged on the part of all participating employers, especially for applicants who were involved in college coursework. The idea was that employers would "sponsor" students by providing them with income to enable them to complete their education. In addition, employers were encouraged to hire the student full-time when he or she had earned a degree.
This part-time employment would foster an attitude among the minority group community that employment opportunities in broadcasting industry truly did exist. It would expose the college students to the disciplines and requirements of the broadcast environment. In addition, it was hoped that this employment program could acquaint employers with a number of minority group members who would soon be qualified for full-time work.

3. **Additional training** was also encouraged for minority group members who could not attend college. Employers were encouraged to establish on-the-job training programs for minorities which would be supervised by someone at the management level. It was to be a formal program rather than a casual haphazard affair. Trainees for these programs would be recruited from the national office inventory.

4. **Scholarships** would also be provided, particularly at Negro universities, or at major universities where academic programs could be expanded to include minority group members. Employers could publicize the availability of these scholarships through their own facilities and through university promotion departments.

These four statements of purpose were affirmed by the national office in the period when local Broadcast Skills Banks were beginning to develop although they were not mentioned by local chairmen in the interviews at San Francisco, Miami or Columbus. However, they will be referred to at
appropriate points throughout the remainder of the dissertation in order that the reader may understand how successful or unsuccessful the bank had been in accomplishing its goals.

**Functions of the National Office of the Broadcast Skills Bank**

The national office of the Broadcast Skills Bank had two major functions in its effort to develop minority placement and training on a nationwide scale. First, the office was to establish local banks in cities across the country. Second, it was to maintain contact with local leaders to ensure the development of each new local bank. Each of these functions will be discussed separately in the section which follows. Because the first local bank was established as a kind of pilot in New York City, it will be discussed in some detail.

**Establishing the First Local Bank in New York City**

In his role as consultant to the New York State Commission for Human Rights, George Norford had conferred with the vice-presidents and general managers of New York City television stations: WABC, WNBC, WCBS, WPIX, WOR, WNEW and WNDT. They recognized the need to broaden minority group representation through the city's media, and some asked Norford to develop a list of minority group programming personnel. They were particularly interested in spokesmen who could appear on local public affairs and panel programs. The
list was provided, along with a second list identifying local minority group journalists who were working on weekly and daily press assignments.24 This experience with New York broadcast executives prepared the way for Norford to set up a city-wide skills bank following the pilot at Westinghouse.

The New York bank began in June, 1966. It had a chairman who was the manager of one of the leading stations in New York, and he worked with a committee of broadcast executives from other stations. This group made decisions on how the bank should operate. A coordinator was appointed to recruit minority group members and place them at stations where there were openings. This local bank in New York operated separately from the national office although George Norford observed its operation carefully because he considered it a "pilot" to be evaluated as local banks were established in other cities.25

As the New York local bank was discussed with Norford, he said the operation served as a "catalyst" to "get stations, networks and groups moving in a direction to set up operations of their own."26 He explained that the New York bank was "phased out" in September, 1969, to permit the New York Urban Coalition to operate a broader Communications Skills Bank program.

The Urban Coalition had set up the new organization on a "pretty pretentious level," according to Norford, operating on an annual budget of approximately $100,000. "It
tried to get the support of all communications people—magazine publishers, book publishers and the publishers of trade journals and newspapers as well as broadcasters. It couldn't so it went out of business.²⁷

When the Communications Skills Bank ceased operation in January, 1971, no other organization replaced its function. Norford explained:

I fill in as much as I can in New York, but New York being the capital as it were of the broadcast industry, New York stations and networks and groups are the first to respond affirmatively. The premise is that we've got to show the way to recruit and to oversee the training program and the intern programs. So the ideal situation is for banks to phase out. The New York bank is phasing out. But it did go through that developmental phase from broadcast to communications. . . .²⁸

The preceding description of the New York local bank was distorted somewhat because the author was not provided with file materials related to its operation. Correspondence and file data concerning the involvement of the New York Urban League would have provided further insight, but the author was required to depend upon interview responses instead.

When national office personnel were pressed about the availability of these kinds of written resources, they provided journal article reprints, publicity pieces or simply explained that these items were stored in another building. If more inter-office memorandums, financial statements and committee reports had been made available to the author, this section would have provided a clearer picture of the
historical factors involved in the local bank operation in New York City.

Establishing Local Banks in Other Cities

Westinghouse Broadcasting developed the company pilot and city-wide Broadcast Skills Bank "with the object in mind that if it was successful, it could serve the industry as well."\(^{29}\) The national office began to establish local banks in 1966—New York, Pittsburgh, Detroit, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Washington, D.C.

Norford claimed that the usual pattern was for a manager in some city to call Westinghouse and ask them how to get a new bank started in their community. News of the bank's success would spread from city to city.\(^{30}\) However, when the author questioned executives in San Francisco, Miami and Columbus on this subject, they said Westinghouse had made the first move. By letter, telephone or personal visit, someone at Westinghouse contacted a local executive and asked if he wanted to get a local bank started.

To launch a bank, the local executive who had been in touch with Westinghouse Broadcasting arranged a luncheon for all the major broadcast executives in the city. McGannon and Norford would be guest speakers, describing the success of other banks and explaining how a new one could be established. McGannon described his presentation at these luncheons.

Broadcasting is such that if you get a group of managers in a room and kind of lay it on them and also show some leadership, you can get
tremendous response. I don't mean embarrass them or intimidate them, but you know, get down to the basic issues. Stop waiting for people to act on a totally spontaneous, voluntary basis because if you do you're liable to wait till the turn of the century.31

Following the luncheon the group of managers decided on a chairman and coordinator, and at times other officers or committees. Further meetings were held to work out the details of the bank operation. McGannon and Norford kept in touch with the new officers by phone and mail, motivating them to activate the bank program.

In a 1969 booklet published by the national office there was a description of the pattern of operation in local banks.

Each Broadcast Skills Bank is supervised by a local committee. The typical committee consists of a chairman from either television or commercial radio. He coordinates the bank's efforts in the community and supplies the direction and initiative to make the program meaningful. He is assisted by a vice-chairman and from four to six members enlisted from commercial, ETV, ethnic, local college or university radio or television stations. Some local chairmen elect to have on their committees representatives from craft and technical unions and from schools of communications in their immediate communities.32

It is important for the reader to note that the source just quoted was a publicity piece designed to emphasize positive aspects of the Broadcast Skills Bank. The booklet itself explains that it was designed with three objectives. It was prepared to describe the benefits of the bank to managers of stations who had not yet participated, to illustrate
the opportunities available for minority group members in broadcast industry employment, and to provide a model for other media of mass communication—newspapers, magazines, film producers and the trade press.

In San Francisco, Miami and Columbus, the local bank chairmen had each appointed a "coordinator" to oversee the day-to-day operation of the bank. The chairman in each case was a general manager of a major station and the coordinator was a minority group member. In each of these cities the coordinator had an office at the chairman's station.

Broadcast Skills Bank officials suggested that the coordinator in each city should give full-time responsibility to the bank operation. His job was to recruit and help screen minority group members for training or employment. In addition, officials at the national office recommended that this person maintain a continuing liaison with minority group organizations and other relevant institutions.33

Local chapters had taken various directions in employing and training minority group members. In some the managers pooled money and supported a broadcasting workshop designed for minority people. In others local stations provided scholarships to schools of communication. Many featured on-the-job training programs whereby various stations agreed to take on one or more minority group members for several months of experience with pay.34

The placement procedure in local banks was handled by
the coordinator. He (or she) kept a current file of applicants and job openings through his contact with minority group members and station managers. Application blanks were filled out by minority group members, and the applicants were interviewed or screened by the coordinator. When a manager would call with an opening, the coordinator was prepared to suggest appropriate applicants who might be available.

Although the twenty-two local banks were established over a fifty-three month period, most of them got started in the first sixteen months. Table 1 on page 10 in chapter one lists the local banks, indicating starting dates and, in five cases, dates when the banks became inactive or merged into other organizations. On pages 15-26 the history and operation of each of these local banks is summarized. The chronology shows fourteen local banks established in 1966-1967, a year of evaluation in 1968 and then eight more locals in 1969-1970.

Following the evaluation period in 1968, a "new thrust" was mounted to promote the bank throughout the communications industry and social agencies.

[The bank would] include the broad panorama of stations, groups and networks both radio and television, and craft unions and associations allied with the broadcasting industry. Its base for recruiting and motivating minority group manpower will include the widest cross section of social, civic, civil rights, governmental agencies, schools, colleges and other institutions, public and private concerned with
the employment, training and advancement of minority group members.\textsuperscript{35}

With this new thrust the national office also announced plans to work with all minority involvement agencies, not the Urban League alone. Thus, the NAACP, CORE, Opportunities Industrialization Center, Office of Economic Opportunity, Plans for Progress and similar groups were invited to participate with the bank to involve Puerto Rican, Mexican, Indian and other minorities in broadcasting.\textsuperscript{36}

When George Norford was questioned about the bank's early relationship with the Urban League, he explained that it became necessary to "phase out" the League as the major social agency related to the bank. For about a year, Westinghouse paid the salary of a Broadcast Skills Bank employee who was located at the Urban League office. "This turned off more organizations than it turned on," explained Norford. "I'm not saying we stopped working with the Urban League, but we started working with all organizations."\textsuperscript{37}

The skills bank evaluation period in 1968 was a year involving Federal Communications Commission activity concerning minority hiring practices. In that year the Commission noted the Kerner Commission's Report recommending Negro integration into all television programming and production.\textsuperscript{38} Various individuals and groups, in and out of government, pressured the Commission to adopt rules related to equal opportunity employment in broadcasting.

For example, the Department of Justice urged adoption
of antidiscrimination rules. In March, 1968, Assistant Attorney General Pollak wrote to the FCC explaining that "Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act] was not intended to circumscribe the authority of federal agencies other than the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to regulate employment practices." 39

In July, 1968, the FCC adopted a broad policy statement and Notice of Proposed Rule Making concerning nondiscrimination in employment by broadcast licensees. The Commissioners defined the broadcaster's responsibility as related to the seriousness of the problem.

To say, "We cannot find qualified Negroes" is not enough. What is called for is a commitment going beyond the letter of the policy and attuned to its spirit and the demands of the times. 40

One year later the Commission adopted specific rules, calling upon all licensees and permittees to afford equal opportunity in employment to "all qualified persons." In addition, the rules required broadcasters to establish programs of specific practices "designed to assure equal opportunity in every aspect of station employment policy and practice." Broadcasters were to review continuously and adopt training programs and other measures to insure genuine equality of opportunity. 41

The mention of "training programs" in the Commission's rules made the Broadcast Skills Bank an important option to broadcasters in some cities. The Broadcast Skills Bank
booklet published in 1969 listed cities where new efforts would be made to establish local banks—Indianapolis, Cincinnati, Dayton, Miami, Atlanta, Buffalo, Dallas, Houston, Kansas City, Minneapolis, Milwaukee and Seattle. Of the twelve cities listed, only the first four actually got underway.  

When asked why local banks failed to develop in some cities, or why established banks became inactive, McGannon and Norford had several explanations. In some cases executives would accept the chairmanship and then "do nothing." They took the job but had no "commitment." In other cases the coordinator's responsibility was given to someone who already had a full-time job. McGannon felt that the coordinators should have been full-time employees with skills bank responsibilities and nothing more.

Norford said a local bank should be evaluated on the basis of the "degree of commitment and the nature of the initiative brought to it by those involved on the industry side and on the community side." He also emphasized the need for a competent coordinator who could cope with the rivalry which develops among stations. If some managers got the idea that only one station was running the bank and getting the credit for minority hiring, they might not cooperate. Individual stations might then claim to be setting up their own training programs, and the skills bank ceases to exist.

Norford explained that some local banks became
inactive because the stations had developed training programs of their own. This was what he has wanted to achieve so that in time there would be no need for a national office. "This is the ideal situation because we will have achieved our goal when we are phased out." 

This description of national office activities is limited in scope because the author was not given free access to all file materials in the national office. Because there were only pieces of information available on many of the subjects discussed, it was necessary to combine and compare them in drawing conclusions about the activities of the national office. Most of the materials were provided by Broadcast Skills Bank personnel, and therefore this section has presented more positive aspects of the operation than negative ones.

Coordinating the Efforts of All Local Banks

From 1966 through 1968 the national office of the Broadcast Skills Bank maintained close contact with all local banks. The Industry Advisory Committee was meeting regularly in New York, and letters were sent out periodically by Donald McGannon, committee chairman, to keep local chairmen appraised of current activities in banks around the country. The letters explained new techniques which could assist chairmen in their administration of local banks. In addition to the mail contact there was personal contact
with the locals because Norford visited them regularly—some as often as every six months. After 1968, contact with the local banks decreased, and by 1971 Westinghouse Broadcasting officials felt "the banks should begin to think in terms of operating autonomously with a minimum of New York supervision." Norford explained that a number of companies were borrowing the bank idea, setting up their own recruitment and training offices. He also referred to "government pressure and community pressure" but did not elaborate on these factors.

The major contact with local banks in 1972 was a year end report which each chairman sent to the national office in December. Norford visited areas where new banks were being established—"the last was November, 1970—"and where a new chairman was coming into office at a local bank. McGannon sent a letter to the new chairman, "welcoming him aboard and spelling out what the bank's objectives are." There had been some opportunities for local bank leaders to consult with one another. From 1966 to 1970 the national office set up a publicity booth for the Broadcast Skills Bank at the convention of the National Association of Broadcasters. The purpose was to share information about available jobs and minority applicants. In addition, local chairmen who came to the convention would get acquainted and meet together to share news about the bank. Sometimes McGannon would address the group and recognize leaders who had
made significant progress in their local banks. Few coordinators were able to attend these conventions, however.51

Leadership was relaxed at the national level beginning in 1970, allowing local banks to operate more autonomously. Chairmen or coordinators in different local banks communicated by phone concerning problems in their areas. According to Norford, "It's a healthy thing. Now the stations themselves in groups are mounting their own affirmative action programs in the area of employment opportunity. So there's going to be less and less need for us and for banks, and this is ideal!"52

**Decline of National Office Activity**

According to Donald McGannon, national chairman of the Broadcast Skills Bank, efforts had begun in 1969 and 1970 to transfer the operation of the Broadcast Skills Bank as a nationwide operation to some other organization "better suited for the continuation of this kind of project." He did not want to identify any organizations being considered, but he said that several offers had been made and turned down. McGannon felt that Westinghouse Broadcasting had put the bank into operation, but it should be the responsibility of some other organization to keep it going.53

George Norford also felt that the bank operation should be transferred to another organization when he was interviewed in 1972. He said that it was difficult for Westinghouse to put pressure on broadcasters because "we are
one of them." However, if some outside organization could take over the operation of the bank, it would be able to maintain a more strict control over local banks and continually motivate them to increase their activity among minority group members. Both McGannon and Norford asked that no organizations be named in this dissertation.

It was clear to the author, however, that the Broadcast Skills Bank's national office was less active in 1972 than it had been in previous years. The fact that local banks were operating more autonomously and that records were not sent to the national office by a number of the local banks was a strong indicator. In conversations with bank chairmen and other broadcasters around the country, the author was told that the Broadcast Skills Bank had become inactive because the national office had not kept in touch with local operations. This was not true of all local banks, of course, but there were five or six chairmen who told the author that national office personnel did not seem to be as concerned about the bank as they had been a few years before.

It seemed that Norford was content to see the bank become less active at the national level because of his statements that the national office should be "phased out." In some cities where local banks had become inactive, however, it was not clear to the author that other organizations had replaced them or that individual stations had actually started minority involvement programs of their own. George
Norford seemed to be satisfied that the bank had done what it was designed to do—make local broadcasters aware of their responsibilities to hire more minority group members.

McGannon claimed that the bank activity was slowing down in 1972 because the activity of the Federal Communications Commission was speeding up. He said that he had warned broadcasters in the middle 1960s that they should more fully exploit the purposes of the Broadcast Skills Bank in order that the Commission would not have to enforce hiring regulations. McGannon seemed disappointed that the bank had not developed more vigorously, and he was perhaps ready to transfer the operation to another organization because he realized that the Federal Communications Commission was becoming more forceful about broadcasters' responsibilities toward minority group members.

Summary

This chapter on the national office of the Broadcast Skills Bank has described the development of the organization from 1964 through 1972. George Norford's involvement with the New York State Commission on Human Rights and the Westinghouse Broadcasting pilot training program for minority group members prepared him to establish a city-wide Broadcast Skills Bank in New York City and consider ways to expand the effort.

When Donald McGannon put Westinghouse Broadcasting money and interest behind the effort in late 1964, Norford
worked with the National Urban League's National Skills Bank in the development of a nationwide scheme. McGannon and Norford also involved network cooperation and began to establish local banks in cities around the country.

From 1966 through 1968 national office officials kept in close contact with local banks by mail, telephone and personal visits. After 1968, this relationship was relaxed and by 1971 national officials encouraged local banks to operate autonomously.

The sources available for the writing of this chapter included speeches, reports, letters, promotional booklets, newspaper references and personal interviews. Most of these materials had been designed to produce a positive image of the Broadcast Skills Bank. The speeches and booklets developed by national office personnel were purposely slanted to enlist support for the Broadcast Skills Bank program.

Because of the type of data which was available for the writing of this chapter, the description of national office activities is distorted with an abundance of positive and progressive characteristics. Bank spokesmen described their activities as "successful" but provided few percentages or numbers to back up their remarks. A number of questions about the national office operation were left unanswered because the personnel ignored them and the printed materials were limited in their scope.

In the chapters which follow, further insight on the
national office will be provided as local leaders present their views. Chapters three, four and five will examine local skills banks in San Francisco, Miami and Columbus, Ohio.
NOTES

1 Interview with Donald McGannon, New York City, February 18, 1972.


3 Ibid., p. 2.  4 Ibid., p. 10.

5 Interview with George Norford, New York City, February 17, 1972.


7 Ibid., p. 7.


10 Ibid.  11 Ibid.  12 Ibid.


15 Gent, "Jobs in TV."

16 Norford, 1968 speech.

Telephone interview with Marie McWilliams, Vice-President, Personnel, American Broadcasting Company, New York City, November 9, 1972.

Interview with David Gardan, Vice-President, Employee Relations, National Broadcasting Company, New York City, November 9, 1972.

Telephone interview with George Norford, August 23, 1972.

Interview with George Norford, February 18, 1972.


Fowler Report, p. 7.

Interview with George Norford, November 9, 1972.

Interview with George Norford, February 17, 1972.

Interview with George Norford, February 18, 1972.

Ibid.


Interview with George Norford, February 18, 1972.

Interview with Donald McGannon.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Interview with George Norford, February 18, 1972.


Letter to Federal Communications Commission from the
Justice Department, Assistant Attorney General Pollak, March 21, 1968, reproduced in full in 13 FCC 2nd 766, App. A.


42 Bank Booklet, 1969.

43 Interview with Donald McGannon.

44 Norford, 1968 speech, p. 7.

45 Interview with George Norford, February 18, 1972.

46 Interview with George Norford, February 17, 1972.


49 Interview with George Norford, February 17, 1972.

50 Ibid.

51 Interview with George Norford, February 18, 1972.

52 Ibid.

53 Interview with Donald McGannon.

54 Interview with George Norford, November 9, 1972.
CHAPTER III

LOCAL BROADCAST SKILLS BANK IN
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

Overview

In June, 1972, field research was conducted at the Bay Area Broadcast Skills Bank in San Francisco, California, where bank officials listed forty-two radio and television stations. This bank was one of the earliest local operations established by the national office.

Several broadcasters had served as chairmen of the Bay Area bank during its six-year history. The national office had suggested that local banks employ this "rotating chairmanship" technique. There was one inactive year at the Bay Area bank, however, because one of the chairmen failed to provide the type of leadership which the bank demanded. This inactive year is discussed in detail in this chapter because it demonstrates how a local bank can close its doors and reopen them again with an even stronger operation than it had before it closed. In addition, it is important to examine the ways in which various broadcasters in the Bay Area perceived the inactive period. Most of them described it as a temporary closing, but an official at a Westinghouse
Broadcasting Company station in the area said that the bank never became inactive.

It is significant to examine the role of the Bay Area Urban League in this local bank. League personnel directed the Broadcast Skills Bank for several years, and then it was taken over by local broadcast executives. It is valuable to study this transfer because the Urban League officials felt that they had been forced to give up control of the bank. It is also interesting to note that the Urban League continued to contribute its services to the bank even after the League had been removed from a leadership position. This section of the chapter will reveal other significant factors involved in the relationship of a local Urban League and a local Broadcast Skills Bank.

A board of directors composed of Bay Area broadcast executives administrated the work of the local bank. The chairman of the board had organized the broadcasters into committees which were assigned special roles related to the work of the Broadcast Skills Bank. Because of the carefully planned structure involved in these committee assignments, this chapter discusses the chairman's plan in detail and evaluates the results which it produced. The plan was a strategic part of the local bank because the chairman had designed it in order to maximize participation by all area broadcasters.

The chairman of the Bay Area bank said that its major
problem was the managers' failure to notify the bank office when they had openings at their stations. Some of the managers, however, said that it was the responsibility of the bank coordinator to call them regularly and ask about openings. This communication gap had caused some serious problems in the bank's operation. It will be discussed further in this chapter because it points up the need for clearly defined procedures within local skills bank operations.

The coordinator's salary was paid for by the local broadcasters. They were assessed fees each year by a bank treasurer and expected to give the amount specified, according to the size of their operation. The treasurer of the bank was the manager of a Westinghouse Broadcasting Company station in the area. A report from the national office of the Broadcast Skills Bank said that he made certain decisions concerning the Bay Area bank, but he denied this when questioned by the author. He wanted the bank to be recognized as a local effort, not as a Westinghouse Broadcasting Company effort.

Another important feature of the Bay Area bank was a scholarship program which had been funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity. Bank officials considered the idea at a local committee meeting, developed a proposal and were granted approximately $20,000 for the project. After the scholarship plan was put into effect, it became difficult to fulfill all the requirements. The plan provided scholarship
assistance to minority group members studying in the Bay Area, but it stipulated that each scholarship student also be provided with part-time employment at a local broadcast facility. When the plan went into effect, bank officials became frustrated because many of the local broadcasters said they could not provide the part-time employment. The issue developed into an argument between the broadcasters at large stations and those at smaller stations. It provides an example of the difficulties which may develop when local banks set up special projects with federal funding.

The first section of this chapter examines the sources consulted in this research. Next is a summary of information available on the history of the local bank. Third is a section describing the organization and officers in the bank, followed by a section explaining the bank's operation. This latter section includes a discussion of the Bay Area's unique scholarship project funded through the Office of Economic Opportunity and the experiences of some of the bank's applicants. The fifth section of the chapter evaluates the Bay Area bank on the basis of research interviews with broadcast executives and employees.

Sources Consulted

This chapter is based on several types of primary sources located at the national office in New York and at the Bay Area local bank office in San Francisco. The fifteen interviews conducted in the Bay Area included radio and
television executives, officials of the Bay Area Urban League and minority group members who had been assisted by the Broadcast Skills Bank.

A 1967 report on file at the national office provided some of the historical information on the San Francisco bank. A later report entitled "The Broadcast Skills Bank in San Francisco and Los Angeles" was filed at the national office in 1971. The purpose of both reports was promotional and both described the Bay Area bank as a thriving operation.

To discover some of the details and problems involved in the history and operation of the Bay Area bank, local bank officials were questioned about vague or confusing elements of these reports.

One document provided a detailed description of the scholarship program attempted by this local bank. It was the proposal written by bank officials to the Office of Economic Opportunity asking for a grant to the Bay Area bank. As with most financial requests, the proposal describes the local bank organization as one which is active and effective but in need of support to expand its services. The scholarship program is described in detail on pages 113-119 of this chapter.

Several letters were provided by the local bank officials as examples of the type of correspondence which was sent out to station managers by the chairman and coordinator to encourage payment of dues, cooperation in hiring minority
group members and feedback from member stations on how they wanted the local bank officials to develop special projects. One "applicant listing" sample is evaluated and included in Appendix A, providing an example of the newsletter mailings which were occasionally sent out to managers by the local bank coordinator. Also the application form developed by the local bank is discussed. It was filled out by prospective employees and kept on file at the local bank office.

Most of the interviewees and documents should be considered as "approved" by local bank officials. The written materials described above were provided by the chairman and coordinator, but the author was not given free access to either person's files. The interviewees were suggested by bank officials although some of them did not express complete satisfaction with the bank's operation. When the author asked about broadcast executives who did not participate in the bank program, he was told by the chairman and coordinator that almost everyone participated.

Parts of this chapter are based on a few materials covering a period of six years and leaving several gaps in the chronology. The interviewees were usually unable to remember enough to provide a satisfactory explanation. These problems will be discussed in the body of the chapter as they are pertinent.
Establishment of the Bay Area Broadcast Skills Bank

The bank at San Francisco was one of the first local banks established by the national office of the Broadcast Skills Bank. Although it had gone through a period of inactivity when leadership and interest were weak, the bank was active in the summer of 1972 when this research was conducted.

It began in September, 1966, and made strong progress during the first six months of operation. Although little information was available on what happened in September, a six-month report issued by the national office in March, 1967, reported that twelve minority group persons had already been hired directly through the bank program. Twenty-six local stations joined the bank during the first six months—five television stations and twenty-one radio stations including one radio station programming to blacks. The committee guiding the bank effort included four broadcast executives and three representatives of the Bay Area Urban League. 1

In the early part of 1967, the national office held up the Bay Area Broadcast Skills Bank as an example to the thirteen other local banks which had been established by that time. The national office listed seven procedures used by the Bay Area bank which had made it successful. 2

1. There were three teams made up of broadcasters and Urban League representatives which made regular visits to
radio and television stations in the area to discuss the Broadcast Skills Bank operation with management and department heads. This made all broadcasters aware of the bank's operation and encouraged non-participating stations to join.

2. An "Applicant of the Month" publicity piece was issued to broadcasters in the Bay Area. It included minority group members who were either trained, willing to accept training, currently employed at a station and seeking change or recent college graduates. One applicant was listed each month.

3. Urban League executives appeared on local stations to discuss the Broadcast Skills Bank program, its objectives and what was being done to implement the program.

4. Luncheons for broadcast executives were held regularly to review the bank's activities. Representatives from local stations and labor unions were urged to attend.

5. The Urban League, early home of the Bay Area Broadcast Skills Bank, invited local broadcasters to visit its offices to meet staff members, observe office procedures and develop an appreciation for the services available through the Broadcast Skills Bank.

6. Local radio stations without job openings were urged to make their facilities available to minority group members who wanted to make audition tapes to be sent to stations with openings.

7. In addition to the twelve minority group members
hired directly through the bank program, forty other minorities had been hired by broadcasters in the Bay Area during the first six months of the bank's operation. The 1967 report claimed that the "climate" generated by the bank was "undoubtedly responsible" for the employment of most of the additional minorities hired.

The source of information which included these seven procedures should be recognized as a report developed by the national office and used to encourage the development of local banks in other cities. It cannot be considered to be an objective report because it was composed by Broadcast Skills Bank officials and gives few details about the effectiveness of each of the procedures. For example, the report does not state how often teams visited stations or how often the bank was publicized on local stations. Of the fifty-two minority group members which had been hired, there was no mention of how many were included in various job categories although the report did say "engineers, accountants, secretaries, page boys, and trainees" were included. For the most part, these are entry-level positions.

According to Percy Steele, Director of the Bay Area Urban League, his personnel had staffed the Broadcast Skills Bank during the first two or three years of its operation. One of his field representatives, Carmen Smith, was the Urban League liaison with the Broadcast Skills Bank in June, 1972. She explained that the stations sent applications
directly to her at the League office in the early years. In 1966 she was in charge of the Broadcast Skills Bank, doing the interviewing and making recommendations when job openings were called in to her by stations. 4

By 1969, control of the Bay Area Broadcast Skills Bank had been transferred from the Urban League to a committee of local broadcast executives. The only information available on how this transfer took place came from Percy Steele at the Urban League. He explained that the Urban League had contributed a great deal to the launching of the Broadcast Skills Bank both at the national and local level, and "locally we staffed it for a considerable time, but when it was reorganized, they left us out." 5 Steele said the League was still interested in "committals [sic] and we invited ourselves back in" by arranging for Carmen Smith to continue her work as a "liaison" with the Broadcast Skills Bank.

In the reorganization, broadcast executives agreed on a policy of rotating the chairmanship of the bank among the leading stations in the area. According to a 1971 report from the national office, the new chairman each year would be selected by the chairman of the Industry Advisory Committee upon the advice and recommendation of the local Broadcast Skills Bank committee. The report lists the most recent chairmen as Neil E. Derough, Vice-President and General Manager of KRON (1970-1971) and Roger Rice, Vice-President and General Manager of KTVU television (1971-1972). 6
The 1971 report which listed these chairmen was brief and discussed only the accomplishments of the local bank. One learns nothing about the year the bank was inactive (1970-1971) because the report implies that the organization had been operating successfully since its beginning in 1966. However, this report was the only written information available on the bank operation following the 1967 report referred to earlier in this section. Because interviewees were unable to recall details about the bank's operation in the years between the two reports, 1968, 1969 and 1970 must be considered silent years in the bank's history. Other than the ouster of the Urban League as expressed by Percy Steele, no information is available on approximately three years of the Bay Area bank's past.

When Roger Rice was questioned about the early years of the Bay Area bank's operation, he said there had been a problem with the bank because Westinghouse had started it. Some broadcasters felt it was "showboating by McGannon who is constantly appearing before the Commission and getting the headlines." There was a certain pride of authorship involved and broadcasters resented it. Rice said he personally did not consider this a problem. Another executive, Donald Curran, General Manager of KGO television, said he felt "put out" when Westinghouse took so much publicity at the beginning of the bank, but as the bank developed he no longer felt that way.
According to local bank officials interviewed in June, 1972, broadcasters continued to control the bank's organization and operation once the transfer had taken place in 1969. The procedure of rotating chairmen continued and in April, 1972, Ken Gaines, Manager of KNEW radio, became chairman. Concerning his organizational plan, Gaines said he would be assisted by a coordinator, Mrs. Gay Cobb, and he would set up committees of station managers to handle specific assignments related to the bank. The bank's board of directors was made up of the entire group of Bay Area broadcast executives who participated in meetings where overall bank policy was established. Although some executives attended the meetings more regularly than others, all broadcasters in the Bay Area were considered to be members of the board.

This board was what the national office usually referred to as the "local committee." Mrs. Cobb was called executive director (her official title), director and coordinator by various broadcast executives, but in this study she will be simply designated by the title coordinator to help in the comparison with similar positions in other cities. Gaines felt that the board of directors should meet two or three times a year and that the committee meetings should be held every six months. Because he felt Roger Rice had such
a successful year as chairman, Gaines wanted to duplicate Rice's formula. ¹⁰

Rice had established four committees in charge of funding, education, community affairs and resources. The Funding Committee was responsible for raising money from all Bay Area stations to pay the salary of the coordinator and to publicize the bank's activities. The Education Committee was to investigate schools, colleges and scholarship programs which would be available to minorities in the area. A Committee on Community Affairs was assigned to work with local civic groups which were interested in minority involvement and broadcasting. The Resources Committee was to research other sources of assistance for the Broadcast Skills Bank such as government agencies, minority workshops and similar programs. ¹¹

The information about these four committees was provided in an interview; it was difficult for Rice to remember what each group was to do. It is significant that these committee responsibilities were not documented in writing or kept in a set of "guidelines" or code of regulations for the organization. According to Gay Cobb, no minutes were taken at the meetings of the board of directors, and therefore no written records were available to verify the existence of these committees. ¹² As will be explained later in this chapter, Rice's difficulty in articulating the committees' responsibilities was an indication that the groups' tasks were
not clearly defined. In evaluating the board's activity, one manager commented that there should have been "meaningful" committees rather than pseudo-committees.13

Because Chairman Gaines had taken over the chairmanship only two months before the author's visit to the Bay Area, he was unable to describe the bank's organization in detail. Therefore, the past chairman, Roger Rice, was questioned at length concerning officers and responsibilities involved in the Bay Area bank.

Chairman

When Roger Rice became chairman of the Bay Area bank, he was Vice-President and General Manager of KTVU television, Vice-Chairman of the California Association of Broadcasters and a member of fourteen boards. He described his responsibility with the Broadcast Skills Bank as "developing 100 per cent participation from the broadcasters in this area." Rice said he wanted to set an example in minority hiring and reported that 44 of his 165 employees were minority group members. He provided $750 scholarships for four minority students at the tuition-free college in the area every year and guaranteed them union-scale pay for one summer's work at his station. The $750 cared for incidental school expenses, and the summer work went on their record as bona fide commercial television experience. Several of these students were hired full time at KTVU following education.14

As in other local chapters, the bank chairman's
responsibility in the Bay Area bank was to administrate the work of the bank's board of directors. Rice arranged the luncheon for these men when he came into office in 1971 and set up the new organizational plan with his four committees. He helped interview the applicants for the coordinator's position and in general used his influence to persuade fellow broadcast executives in the area that the bank was an important organization for all stations to support.

Coordinator

Mrs. Gay Cobb was appointed coordinator of the Bay Area Broadcast Skills Bank soon after Rice came into office in April, 1971. When Rice and the other managers decided to hire a coordinator, they set up a screening committee to talk with several candidates. They wanted someone who was knowledgeable in the field of social work and was involved in ethnic communities. Mrs. Cobb was black and a graduate of Berkeley who had experience in social work and personnel counseling. Her husband was the editor of the California Voice, a black newspaper with a circulation of 25,000. She was appointed to the coordinator's position full time and provided an office at Rice's station, KTVU. Although he covered all office and telephone expenses, her salary was paid by fees assessed to member stations.

As coordinator of the Bay Area bank, Cobb handled the day-to-day operation of the office. She interviewed applicants who came in, kept their applications on file and kept
herself aware of positions which were open at the broadcast stations in the area. At times managers would inform her of openings, but usually she had to contact them and ask what was available. When an applicant seemed suited for a job opening, she would contact the applicant and give him the name of the person to see at the station. If the applicant was particularly well-qualified, she would call the station and explain her evaluation to the person doing the hiring.

In addition to her responsibility for this "clearing-house" function of the bank, Cobb occasionally visited stations, schools and community groups. She participated in the meetings of the board of directors with Roger Rice and the other managers. She did not organize these meetings, however. Neither did she oversee the work of any of the committees, including funding. These functions were handled at the chairman's level.

Treasurer

Louis S. Simon was an area vice-president for Westinghouse Broadcasting whose office was at KPIX television in San Francisco. He was appointed chairman of the Funding Committee and treasurer for the Bay Area bank. A fee structure was set up by the committee for annual charges to the forty-two stations in the area. It is shown in Table 2.

Simon sent out a letter asking for membership fees and explaining how they would be used. He and other members of his committee followed up those stations which did not
pay by calling the managers or writing additional letters. If all stations paid their fees, the total budget for one year would have been $16,300. Simon reported that over 75 per cent of the forty-two stations paid.16

**TABLE 2**

**FUNDING PLAN OF THE BAY AREA BROADCAST SKILLS BANK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Station Classification</th>
<th>Annual Fee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UHF television</td>
<td>$1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHF television</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class A radio</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class B radio</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class C radio</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because he was a Westinghouse Broadcasting area vice-president, Louis Simon occupied an important position in the Bay Area bank. According to a 1971 report from the national office, "In cities where there are Westinghouse Broadcasting Company stations, the Westinghouse executives play a major role in providing guidance for the effort, continuity between chairmen and in the raising of funds necessary to support the Banks' activities."17 The report also explained that Simon was responsible for recommending the Bay Area chairman, selecting the coordinator and "implementing the bank's program." The leadership role of Westinghouse stations was emphasized. "By their own employment policies and practices and use of the bank's program the Westinghouse stations set an example that, when followed by other stations, results in a sizeable percentage of their personnel being minority
The reader is reminded that the report discussed above was one which emphasized Westinghouse Broadcasting's role in the Broadcast Skills Bank operation nationwide. It discussed the San Francisco bank in the context of a twenty-two bank operation developing in various parts of the country. "The now nation-wide program was started by the Westinghouse Broadcasting Company as a pilot project in 1965" is one of the first statements in the report. Although the author was not informed of the report's purpose or use, it seems reasonable to conclude that it was distributed and read where Westinghouse needed promotion as a minority-conscious organization and employer. Although the Westinghouse stations are extolled for their high percentages of minority employees, no individual stations are mentioned and no percentages are listed.

**Education Chairman**

Of the four committees mentioned by Rice, the Funding Committee and the Education Committee were the two which developed active programs. Rice did not elaborate on the Community Affairs Committee or Resources Committee, but Gay Cobb—in a separate interview—said they existed in name only. The Education Committee became particularly active when the Bay Area bank received a grant for scholarships from the Office of Economic Opportunity. The grant project, which will be explained in the next section of this chapter, was
administered by the Education Committee chairman, Donald Curran.

Curran was the general manager of KGO television, the ABC affiliate in San Francisco. Like Rice, he had emphasized minority employment at his station, especially since 1970. In two and a half years minority employment at his station had increased from 5 to 25 per cent "through growth and natural attrition." Much of this change was accomplished through the skills bank, according to Curran.

Curran's comment about the bank's contribution to his own station's increase in minority hiring was repeated several times in the interview. Other managers made similar statements about the general benefit the bank brought to their stations. Few managers wanted to comment on the numbers they had hired through the bank's services, but most of them wanted the interviewer to understand that they favored the bank's continued existence. The implication was clear that broadcast executives were more concerned about the bank's continued existence than they were about how well it functioned in terms of numbers. Some said it functioned for them as a reminder of their responsibilities, and they considered this a most significant benefit of the Bay Area bank.

As chairman of the Education Committee, Donald Curran appointed committee members, held meetings and investigated possible scholarship projects for the Bay Area bank. Because most of the larger stations already offered their own
scholarship and training programs to minorities, Curran was especially interested in assisting smaller stations where there was a desire to offer scholarship training to minorities.

This section on the organization of the Bay Area Broadcast Skills Bank has described the offices of chairman, coordinator and committee chairmen in charge of funding and education. Background information on the people holding these positions was introduced in order that the reader might better understand the responsibilities of leaders involved in the local bank's operation.

It should be understood that the organizational structure described in the foregoing section was the stated or formal structure described by bank officials in the Bay Area. As with any other organization, there was an informal structure within the bank which was clear to those who did the work. It was impossible in this research to discover the makeup and significance of the informal structure. To do so would have required days and weeks of observation of the roles and status factors involved in the activities of bank leaders and probably some who were not in leadership positions. This study claims only to present the formal structure as it was stated by officials of the Bay Area bank.

Operation of the Bay Area Broadcast Skills Bank

The activities of the Bay Area Broadcast Skills Bank
may be divided into four broad functional areas. First, this section examines the work of the board of directors, composed of the managers of all participating radio and television stations. Second is a study of the procedures involved in placing applicants in broadcast positions. Next the publicity program of the bank is described, and finally this section provides details on scholarship programs which were available through the bank as well as the experiences of some of the bank applicants.

Board of Directors Functions

As chairman of the Bay Area bank, Roger Rice held meetings of the board of directors "once or twice a year." He described an "executive board" as the officers and committee chairmen, explaining that this group met once a quarter. Although he said the meetings of both these groups were "regular," another manager described them as "emergency sessions" which were always called to consider specific issues which had come up. Rice himself described an earlier year when the bank was "defunct" in terms of activity; evidently a past chairman had called no meetings over a twelve-month period. This inactive period will be described further in the "evaluation" section of the chapter. From several statements made by board members, it was evident that full board action was reserved for major decisions instead of operational questions or day-to-day procedural matters. For example, only the executive committee acted on the hiring of
a coordinator, but the entire board of directors met when Rice named his committees and sought funding for a new year of operation. 23

According to Gay Cobb, ad hoc committees were appointed at times to deal with short-term projects. When a summer media institute opened, for example, a screening committee was appointed to select skills bank applicants who were qualified for scholarship aid. These committees were usually appointed by the chairman and required no meeting of the entire board of directors. 24

The chairman, coordinator and treasurer also communicated with board members by mail. Correspondence on file at the bank office included a number of letters sent to station managers in the Bay Area. When the author asked if he could examine these letters, he was given several as samples. These are described below:

May, 1971.—Rice had been chairman for one month. He wrote a brief progress report and explained the possibility for grant money from the Office of Economic Opportunity. He proposed the idea of assisting minorities who were engineering students and asked managers to guarantee openings for engineers who would complete training over the next two years. 25

July, 1971.—Cobb sent out a memorandum titled "Progress and Prospects" which referred to a file of 150 applicants still seeking jobs. She expressed concern that most
minority group people were being hired at the entry level while the files included talented, experienced applicants "at all levels of the broadcasting spectrum." Attached was a listing of ten applicants, summarizing the education and experience of each. (See Appendix A.) It explained that complete résumés were available on request.

**August, 1971.** Simon issued a reminder to stations which had not paid their dues in April (four months earlier). He explained that the Bay Area bank was "fast becoming the outstanding operation of its kind in the country" and support was needed to maintain a proper level of efficiency. In addition he wrote, "If there is any reason you might have, that you feel you are unable to contribute, or you feel the amount allocated to your station is excessive, please call me."  

**February, 1972.** Simon wrote a letter introducing the new chairman, Ken Gaines, who would be taking over on April 1. He reminded all members that the dues for the year ahead should be paid by March 1. Enclosed was a statement billing each station for the proper amount.

**March, 1972.** Rice reported on the Scholarship Training Program funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity. He explained that some stations had guaranteed openings for minority group members involved in the program but expressed the need for four more openings. Managers were urged to contact the coordinator, Gay Cobb.
In evaluating these letters as examples of the mailings sent to managers in the Bay Area, the reader should remember that they were provided by the chairman and coordinator when the author asked to see correspondence on file in the office. Surely the correspondence file contains many more letters and announcements. However, these were not made available because the officials considered them "confidential." The letters provided show only a portion of the mail and probably a neutral or positive portion. No information was available on the telephone communication which took place between the chairman and managers or the coordinator and managers. Telephone conversations were probably more important than letters as means of persuading managers to contribute money or to participate in the bank's employment program. The chairman and coordinator explained that they "followed up" some of the letters with phone calls. When the author asked for further information about these calls, he was told that the calls usually repeated the messages contained in the letters.

In summary, the work of the board of directors was determined by the current chairman who called meetings and appointed committees as necessary. The information available from interviews and office files indicated that meetings were held only to introduce a new chairman or to discuss a current problem. Following the meetings, local bank leaders used telephone calls and letters to activate special programs
through committee work and assignments to individuals.

It is significant to note that the organizational structure established by Roger Rice was designed to demand the participation of all its members. By setting up committees for special tasks, Rice had required every broadcaster's involvement in the bank. However, two of the committees did not follow through on their assignments. To activate these committees, Rice would have had to spend more time with the chairmen and oversee their meetings and progress. He probably did not follow through with these committees because he could not afford the time to do so. His other involvements with the bank—handling board meetings, administrating the work of the coordinator, keeping in touch with local board members—would take much of his time and leave little for the two weak committees. More clearly defined responsibilities would have also encouraged the two weak committees to be more active.

**Applicant Placement**

The office of the Bay Area Broadcast Skills Bank was open during regular business hours when job seekers could come in for applications or interviews. Publicity on the bank identified its location at a local radio or television station, and this made it easy for applicants to visit or call in. The coordinator reported that applicants and phone inquiries came in every day making enough work for two people. A part-time secretary had been hired to assist the
coordinator in 1971, but this still did not give the coordinator enough time for public relations work away from the office.

Applicants were asked to fill out a one-page application, and if time allowed they were interviewed by the coordinator immediately. The application form, as shown in Appendix B, asks about education, work experience, licenses held, position desired and other matters. Although no space is designated for interviewer remarks, the coordinator would note certain characteristics as she talked with applicants. She explained to the author:

I have learned that there's a certain personality type that tends to survive once placed in a job. . . . I don't know how ethical it is. . . . They're not always qualities that I would look for in a friend . . . . a great deal of confidence, almost arrogance. [They need to] be willing to roll with the punch, [to have] the ability to stay in there . . . to accommodate themselves to adverse situations and continue on with them.30

In addition to this psychological characteristic, the coordinator looked for an "active interest in broadcasting."

A lot of people are interested in broadcasting, but that doesn't mean they'll ever be employed in it. The interest must be combined with some obvious attempt to get experience in the field. . . . A lot of people come to me and ask if there's any volunteer work they can do. That's impressive to me.31

Gay Cobb illustrated this second characteristic by referring to applicants interested in engineering. If a person came to her with an engineering license, it was a "plus." If in addition the person had participated in some electronics
project "actually doing the work" she had greater certainty that he would successfully hold a job in broadcasting.\textsuperscript{32}

At times applicants would arrive when the coordinator was away from the office. In these cases appointments would be made for later interviews. The majority of the applicants on file had been interviewed in person although in some instances they had been interviewed by telephone. In June of 1972 there were approximately 600 applicants registered, and for each of them a 3 x 5 card had been typed and filed according to job category. When positions became available, the coordinator checked these cards or the applications which were alphabetized without job classification.

According to Gay Cobb, managers in the Bay Area had agreed to call her when an opening developed at their stations. This was a part of their responsibility as skills bank participants. However, some stations notified her more consistently than others, and most stations hesitated to call in openings at the management level. She regularly heard about clerical jobs or training positions but seldom was informed about administrative positions where decision-making ability was required.

Some managers in the Bay Area reacted to Cobb's criticism by saying that she should call them more often to alert them of outstanding applicants instead of waiting for them to call in openings. Donald Curran, Manager of KGO television, complained that managers should not always have to
initiate. He suggested a regular newsletter from the chairman or coordinator which would report how many minority group members had been hired, presenting one-paragraph résumés of outstanding applicants.

Others, like Peter McCoy of KCBS radio, felt the communication from Gay Cobb and the bank was satisfactory. That's part of the whole affirmative action thing. We've got to reach out and find out what's happening. She's got an incredible job there. Is it dependent upon her to call fifty-five stations every week and say this is the deal and run down forty names? I don't see it that way.

In addition, McCoy said a newsletter would be "fine" but not absolutely necessary. He felt the newsletter could be late for some positions where openings occur rapidly and repeated his conviction that managers should phone in all jobs. McCoy's comment should be evaluated with the observation that he had only been in his management position for eight months. He admitted that his understanding of the skills bank was still incomplete. He had less experience with the bank than some of the other managers in the area.

Job openings were kept available in a card file on the coordinator's desk and were updated as often as positions were filled. The coordinator would contact several qualified applicants as soon as she became aware of an opening, sending them directly to the station and the supervisor who would make the decision on hiring. If one of the applicants was hired, he would report the details back to the
coordinator. At times these new employees would feel responsible to the skills bank coordinator to "help her out" by calling in openings which became evident through the "grapevine." Three employees mentioned that they had called Gay Cobb about openings before managers did. This practice will be discussed further in the "evaluation" section.

Regular contacts between the Bay Area Broadcast Skills Bank and the Bay Area Urban League added additional names to the skills bank register every week. Carmen Smith, the Urban League liaison to the bank, kept a supply of bank application blanks at the League office and referred people to Gay Cobb "almost every week." Occasionally, Cobb would interview an applicant whose interests were broader than broadcasting. She would refer them to Carmen Smith. Because the League office was located across the bay in a ghetto area, it received inquiries from a different community of minority job seekers. This helped to make the bank's services available to the entire San Francisco area.

It was convenient to have the skills bank office located at the chairman's station for several reasons. First, the coordinator had easy access to the chairman to discuss problems or plans. Rice said Cobb was in his office at least twice a week. Second, logistics support was provided, including telephone, office supplies and receptionist services. At times when the coordinator and secretary were out, the receptionist would take messages for the bank. Third, the
coordinator was constantly in touch with broadcast personnel at a major broadcast station. Gay Cobb consulted with engineers, salesmen and others to update continually her knowledge of broadcast operations.37

This description of Bay Area Broadcast Skills Bank placement procedures has examined the office operation involved in the coordinator's contact with prospective employees and employers. It has explained the relationship of the bank with the Bay Area Urban League and described the bank coordinator's difficulty in keeping up with recent openings at stations in the area.

It is significant to note that the coordinator's views were different from those of some managers concerning the flow of information on job openings to the bank office. Mrs. Cobb felt that it was the managers' responsibility to call her while at least some of the managers thought it was her responsibility to keep in touch with them. The chairman could have cleared up this kind of misunderstanding by sending out a letter to all the managers telling them what procedure should be followed. Another way to deal with the problem would have been a special meeting of the managers and the coordinator to discuss the situation. Or perhaps if more regular meetings of the board of directors had been held, the matter would have taken care of itself through the flow of communication which would have occurred at meetings. However, none of these solutions were attempted.
Perhaps there was a feeling that it would be best not to deal with this kind of problem at all, but simply let it work itself out differently in each situation. If the coordinator could say the managers were to call her, she could not be criticized for failing to keep up with all station openings. From the managers' point of view, if they could say she did not call often enough, they would be free of the guilt of failing to call in their openings. The author recognized the fact that everyone was ready to criticize on this issue, but few people were willing to take steps toward a solution.

Publicity

The coordinator discussed several means of publicity which had been used by the Bay Area Broadcast Skills Bank. When she was asked about the printing of newsletters, she said the bank had printed three or four newsletters but had not found time to do them with any regularity. Two printings went to Bay Area stations and two reached several hundred stations as they were distributed through the California Broadcasters Association.

The July, 1971, newsletter went to Bay Area stations. It lists ten applicants with only a sentence or two describing background, education and other data on each person. Some managers felt that more detailed data were necessary. It would also seem more valuable to provide managers with more names, particularly since this newsletter was printed at a
time when some 150 applicants were on file.\textsuperscript{39}

In addition to the newsletter, the coordinator mentioned "telephone publicity" as an important means of outreach. She indicated it was a substitute for personal appearances. Because she wanted to be available in the office to talk with applicants and managers throughout the day, she had little time to visit civic leaders and groups in the community. Although a national office report on the Bay Area bank said the coordinator visited "schools, institutions, and various social and employment organizations and agencies,"\textsuperscript{40} Gay Cobb indicated this was rarely possible.

Cobb said she needed a co-director so that one person would always be in the office while the other was in the field. A part-time secretary could not handle this kind of responsibility.

"You need a person who does nothing but sit here and interview applicants. . . . You also need a person who would be responsible for the recruitment of people, going out and seeking out fruitful sources of potential employees— at colleges and professional broadcasting schools.\textsuperscript{41}"

The person in the field would also visit broadcast stations according to Cobb.

"You need somebody in the field most of the time making contacts with stations . . . so you know . . . the employment situation daily, where an opening is going to be a month from now, who's turned in a resignation, and what kind of preparation would you have to give one of your registrants to get this job thirty days from now.\textsuperscript{42}"

The Broadcast Skills Bank national coordinator in New York also contributes to publicity for the bank according to
Twice a year visits are made to the Bay Area Bank by the national coordinator, George Nordford. While there, in addition to assessing the bank's operation, he visits schools, social, civic, government and especially minority group agencies, being himself a minority group member, to determine the effectiveness of the bank from their point of view and means of improving its productivity.

When Bay Area bank officials discussed publicity efforts, they did not mention on-the-air promotion, newspaper advertising or other means of mass-media publicity. They reemphasized the importance of telephone contact with various groups in the city, explaining that this was the best method possible within the time available for publicity and promotion. The coordinator considered the employment of additional staff crucial to the full development of the bank program.

This description of the Bay Area bank's publicity program has discussed newsletters, personal appearances and telephone contacts as the means used to promote the bank's efforts. The reader is reminded of the committees established by Roger Rice and Gay Cobb's remark that the "community affairs" and "resources" committees existed in name only. If these groups had been making contacts with community groups and agencies, they would have provided some of the publicity the coordinator said the bank needed. Another means of publicity was discussed on pages 86-87 of this chapter. It was one of the earliest programs established by the bank and
involved teams which would visit stations to make broadcasters aware of the Broadcast Skills Bank. This program was not in effect when Gay Cobb became coordinator, and it seemed clear that the broadcasters expected her to be responsible for several jobs in and out of the office. They may have felt they could transfer a number of voluntary group efforts to one new full-time employee, but it did not work out that way according to Cobb.

Scholarship Programs

The Bay Area Broadcast Skills Bank had been actively involved in several scholarship programs designed to train minority group members in broadcasting skills. In 1969 the Department of Communication at Stanford University made three scholarships available to students selected by the bank. They attended an eight-week Broadcasting and Film Institute taught on the Stanford campus and in two San Francisco television stations.  

During the same year the Bay Area bank cooperated with the San Francisco Unified School District to develop a radio and television workshop planned expressly for minority group members. Bank officials worked with the City College of San Francisco in designing the course to give young people an opportunity to explore job opportunities in the field of broadcast communication. It was the bank's responsibility to recruit students for this summer workshop and counsel them concerning future training or employment.
Three other scholarships were provided for minority group members in the 1971 Stanford University Summer Broadcasting and Film Institute. As in 1969, screening and selection was handled by a committee set up by the Broadcast Skills Bank. The scholarships were paid by Stanford in 1969, but in 1971 they were paid by the Bay Area bank. A special letter was sent to Bay Area stations to develop funding for the Stanford scholarships.

In addition to these summer scholarship programs, the Bay Area bank developed an extensive scholarship-training project with funding provided by the Office of Economic Opportunity. Gay Cobb explained that an OEO representative contacted the Bay Area bank suggesting that OEO money was available for scholarships. Cobb and Rice got further details from OEO and presented them to a meeting of the board of directors.

Scholarship chairman Donald Curran told the author about the board's discussion. Because several larger stations had their own scholarship programs, he said, the board wanted to develop a special scholarship arrangement for smaller stations. Managers of some radio and UHF television stations said they would provide practical experience by employing minority group students on a part-time basis, but they could not go beyond that to contribute scholarship money for education expenses. Thus, the group decided to write a proposal to OEO, asking them to provide the scholarship
money necessary for the smaller stations to participate in a training program.

Lou Simon, Westinghouse Broadcasting Area Vice-President, was the only board member who objected to the OEO idea. He argued that federal money should not be used for local broadcast responsibilities. Although he did not elaborate on the point, it seemed apparent in Simon's conversation with the author that he was questioning the managers' commitment to minority hiring. If they wanted minority employees, why did they have to use outside money to hire them? He warned the board that the project would encounter difficulties but did not explain his feelings further.48

Following the board meeting, Curran, Rice and Cobb developed a twenty-page proposal for the Office of Economic Opportunity. It begins with the following overview:

It is proposed that the Office of Economic Opportunity fund to the sum of $50,000.00 an initial twelve month training program for twenty minority trainees in the fields of Broadcast Engineering, Television Film, and Television Production. The Bay Area Broadcast Skills Bank will be designated as the sponsor for this program and will undertake the day to day operation of the same. Trainees will be drawn from low income, minority residents of the Bay Area.49

In the proposal, bank officials explained that the broadcast industry in general had not provided access for minorities in employment or programming. Referring to the "enforced lack of participation by large segments of the community," the proposal explained that the industry could not present a true or balanced portrayal of the lives, aspirations
and activities of society. In a description of the Bay Area bank's operation, the proposal explained that many stations were actively seeking and hiring minorities, but most invariably in low entry positions.

[The bank] has been successful in placing applicants at various levels of the broadcasting employment spectrum. It has become apparent, however, that the supply of minority persons trained in the technical areas of the field does not nearly meet the demand. This is particularly true in the areas of broadcast engineering, production, film camera, and film editing skills. It is confidently expected that the proposed OEO funded training project would solve this problem.

In its presentation to OEO officials, Bay Area bank leaders stressed education as the factor which would make the difference in minority hiring. The Federal Communications Commission First Class License was described as a "union card" which "practically guarantees" future employability in either radio or television engineering. The opportunity for advancement in production was described as excellent, although it was explained that "most production positions require specialized training and are unionized." The proposal to OEO also described the film area as "another highly skilled field which has usually been beyond the reach of minorities."

The conclusion presented to the Office of Economic Opportunity was stated as follows:

To sum up the need for a properly funded training program: the jobs are there, the employers are interested, but the skills must be developed before we will see minority persons in these positions.
The proposal was submitted to the Office of Economic Opportunity and accepted. Instead of the $50,000 requested, however, approximately $20,000 was provided for one year with the possibility for grant renewals one year at a time. The $20,000 was to be used to assist twelve students. Four students were selected by an ad hoc screening committee appointed by Roger Rice early in 1972. As promised in the proposal, these four were hired as part-time employees at radio and television stations. They were paid standard part-time wages by the stations and received approximately $1,000 each from the OEO money for expenses such as books, travel and child care.55

Part of the OEO grant was used for costs incurred by the Bay Area bank in administering the project. For example, the grant money made possible the hiring of a part-time secretary for Gay Cobb. Publicity, office supplies and other items related to the scholarship program were also purchased with OEO money.56

After the first four part-time work positions opened for OEO students early in 1972, Cobb, Rice and Curran began to ask stations for more. No timetable had been set, but they wanted to get twelve students involved as soon as possible because they had received the money. Several student applicants were screened and determined to be qualified, but they could not receive the OEO money until they were hired by a local station for part-time work; this went on for
several months. According to Curran, the smaller stations were not cooperating in a program "which many of them voted in at the local committee meeting."\(^{57}\) He said the first four openings were provided by large stations which already had their own scholarship programs, and it was time for smaller stations to participate in the program which was originally designed for them. Ken Gaines, Manager of KNEW radio, took the opposite position and said it was impossible for a station with a small staff to create a new part-time position. "Some smaller stations don't participate because they already have one or two minorities and feel they don't need the bank," he explained.\(^{58}\) This was the dilemma facing the Bay Area bank in June, 1972.

This section on scholarship programs has discussed workshops at Stanford University and the City College of San Francisco, as well as the ambitious program funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity to provide scholarships at various schools in the San Francisco-Oakland area. Although the treasurer, Louis Simon, warned against the project, the Bay Area bank board voted to write a proposal for OEO asking for $50,000. Approximately $20,000 was granted to pay the educational expenses of students who were selected by the bank and who were provided part-time jobs at participating stations. Four of these job positions opened quickly, but beyond that it was difficult for the bank coordinator to get commitments, especially from smaller stations.
The executives who had been most interested in the Office of Economic Opportunity scholarship money spent a great deal of time and effort preparing the proposal which requested the grant. From some of the interviews with Bay Area broadcasters, the author got the impression that very little time was used to discuss the proposal at board of director's meetings. It seemed that the broadcasters were enthusiastic about the prospect that federal money might be available to them and on that basis they decided to follow through on the project. It all looked different to them once the OEO money became available and they had to create part-time jobs in their stations. When the idea was first presented, the broadcasters thought it was a question of whether or not to make a proposal for federal money. After the grant was received, it became a question as to which stations would create new jobs for the employment of scholarship students.

Experiences of Bank Applicants

This section on the operation of the Bay Area bank has examined the work of the board of directors, the placement of applicants, publicity and scholarship programs. Through these activities the bank helped a variety of minority group members find entry-level or better employment in broadcasting. Five black employees and one Chinese (as indicated) were questioned about their experiences.

Pamela Watkins attended Illinois State Normal
University and Northwestern University studying political science and journalism for three years. She then spent three and a half years as production editor for McGraw Hill in Chicago and another year as assistant news editor and reporter for McGraw Hill, New York. Miss Watkins was interested in television and in 1970 moved to San Francisco to find work. After several non-broadcast jobs she met Gay Cobb who told her about an opening at KGO radio. By November, 1970, she was employed at KGO as full-time producer-director for telephone talk programs. The following year Cobb told Watkins about a part-time producer-director slot at KQED television. Watkins landed the television job and was continuing at both stations in the middle of 1972. She produced "World Press," a news program which examined current events as they were reported by newspapers in various parts of the world, for KQED.59

Ernest Fields was a junior at San Francisco State majoring in broadcasting. He was operating television equipment for the university and was told by a university staff engineer that summer employment was available through the skills bank. Soon after he applied he was accepted for summer relief work as an engineer at KTVU television. The next summer, following his graduation, he repeated the experience and was told that a permanent slot might open up for him at KTVU that fall. As of June, 1972, the permanent job had not yet materialized.60
Gregory Bradford graduated from Laney College in 1971 with a major in journalism. He had done news writing and reporting as a student and had taught an introductory course at Laney called Black Psychology. He served as advertising director for the campus newspaper, wrote poetry in various publications and founded a Journalism Forum on the campus. After graduation he sought employment for several months and contacted the Bay Area bank early in 1972. By February he had accepted a job as assistant to the director of advertising and promotion at KGO television. Although his major responsibility in the job was the writing of news releases, he was also given other assignments in advertising and sales work.

Rosemary Chu, a first generation Chinese, heard about the skills bank early in 1971 at a minority students' meeting on the campus of San Francisco State College. She was a senior there, majoring in broadcasting. As she inquired among students she learned that the bank was closed but might reopen by her graduation time in June. Sometime before June she heard that the bank office was operating at KTVU, filled out an application, and was interviewed by Gay Cobb. When she graduated the bank had no openings for her so she "walked the streets" and visited stations until she landed a receptionist's job at KABL radio. Not satisfied, Rosemary continued to contact the bank and was directed to similar work at two other stations. She was not interested and "didn't
follow through." In August, Gay Cobb called her about a "very good" secretarial job at KTVU television. Miss Chu was interviewed for this work and accepted the position of secretary in the art department later that month. Six months later she was promoted to "an assistant in the community affairs department." In this work she handled all public service announcements, acted as assistant to a program producer and produced her own minority affairs program, "All of the People." 62

Iola Mahogany was a clerk typist at a San Francisco insurance company when a girl friend interested her in the field of broadcasting. The friend was employed at a television traffic department and persuaded Iola to visit the skills bank office in June of 1970. Two weeks after her employment interview, Gay Cobb called Miss Mahogany to suggest she apply for an opening at a radio station in traffic. She went to the station but was told that she needed more typing experience. Cobb called again some time later about a switchboard opening at KCBS radio. Iola took the job and in four months was promoted to assistant traffic director for KCBS. As assistant traffic director, she cared for continuity books, updated commercial announcements and prepared programming logs. She planned to attend night school to improve her typing skills. 63

Larry Bell began looking for work during his senior year at the University of California in May, 1971, and the
Urban League directed him to the skills bank. When he graduated in June with an MBA in marketing, Gay Cobb referred him to KPIX television where "they were looking for a minority with management skills." At KPIX he was interviewed but no offer was made. In August he was hired by Pacific Telephone and placed in a management training program. He "didn't like that job" and accepted another position in October, doing office work for the Oakland Community Development Corporation. In April, 1972, Gay Cobb called Bell and suggested he contact McCann Ericson Advertising Agency about a position as assistant account executive. He was interviewed and hired almost immediately. His work for McCann Erickson involved regular contacts with clients, bookkeeping and "other paper work." He sent out advertising schedules to district sales managers to notify them of the dates when commercials were being aired.

The above applicants were suggested to the author by the coordinator of the Bay Area Broadcast Skills Bank. The author had requested that "a variety" of applicants be named. One applicant was referred by the Urban League and another by a university staff member, but the others heard about the bank through casual friendships. They often talked about learning of "Gay" instead of the bank, and each considered her a personal friend. This underlines the need for Gay Cobb to do publicity work through personal appearances, particularly at schools.
Five out of the six had taken college work related to broadcasting. These five also had some experience in radio or television although it was sometimes only in class exercises or campus broadcasts. Several comments by these applicants revealed the persistence which Cobb recognized as a sign of future success in skills bank placements. They moved across the country, accepted non-broadcast jobs, walked the streets and took leadership roles in their college experiences. These activities tend to indicate an above-average initiative or personal drive to succeed in finding the right job in the future.

To summarize, this description of the operation of the Bay Area bank has examined the work of the board of directors, the placement of applicants, publicity, scholarship programs and experiences of minority group members. It is important to note that this presentation has described the stated or formal operation of the Bay Area Broadcast Skills Bank. Informal operational patterns were not explained in the interviews or observed during the author's visit to the Bay Area bank.

While the author was talking with the coordinator, applicants came in to be interviewed. Mrs. Cobb preferred to set appointments for a future date, and there was therefore no opportunity for the author to observe an interview in process or to evaluate the coordinator's relationship with applicants. If newspaper advertising or special seasonal
mailings had gone out to managers or social service agencies, they were not evident in the samples provided by the bank officials. Concerning the OEO grant, the author saw only the proposal, not the acceptance statement nor any statement of conditions imposed upon the Bay Area bank restricting the use of OEO funds.

Only a limited number of applicants were interviewed and these were ones selected by bank officials so they cannot be said to be representative of the more than two hundred applicants who had been placed by the bank. They were probably the more successful applicants which stood out in the coordinator's mind. It would be reasonable for her to want a researcher to meet some of the best products of the Bay Area bank.

The next section of this chapter is an evaluation of the Bay Area skills bank based on the statements made by broadcast executives and minority group employees in the San Francisco-Oakland area.

Evaluation Based on Research Interviews

To evaluate the Bay Area Broadcast Skills Bank, this section will consider the stated goals of the bank and examine the extent to which the bank has or has not accomplished those goals. It will also examine a period of inactivity at the local bank and consider the relationship of the Bay Area bank to the national office. In the proposal to the Office of Economic Opportunity, bank officials summarized the
purposes of the skills bank as follows:

Basically, the goals of the bank are 1) recruitment of minority group members, 2) their employment, full or part time, 3) additional training where needed, including scholarships and 4) advancement within the industry. 65

Recruitment of Minority Group Members

Each of the broadcast executives contacted in the Bay Area made positive remarks about the work of Gay Cobb in recruiting minority group members. Some of these remarks can be attributed to the fact that the executives knew Cobb had sent the interviewer to talk with them. They were impressed with the number of people she had on file, her availability when they called her office and the way in which she was able to "identify" with applicants and executives alike. 66 Her index system facilitated ready reference to available applicants when calls came in, but it did not indicate varied abilities and personalities among applicants.

Promotion and publicity were mentioned by some executives as weak areas in the bank's recruitment program. The early practice of promoting the bank on the air had not been active for more than a year. Newspaper and other types of advertising were not utilized, and the telephone calls to social agencies and employment centers did not develop much interest in large numbers of minority group youth. Some minority group members said that "word-of-mouth" publicity was the best kind available to the bank coordinator. Rosemary Chu, an assistant in KTVU's community affairs department,
said she had told other minority group members about Gay Cobb when the bank was successful in finding her employment. 67

Two managers complained that the screening process was unsatisfactory. They said they had received unqualified applicants recommended by the coordinator for specific jobs. In one case, the manager of KCBS, an all-news station, wanted a person with a background and interest in news. When the applicant came to him for an interview, he demonstrated little ability of the kind necessary. 68 At a television station, an engineering applicant was hired but did not work out because he could not develop the technical skills necessary to operate that particular station's equipment. 69

The reader will recall other practices which made the Bay Area bank successful during its early operation. One was the opportunity for applicants to make free audition tapes at any of the bank's participating stations—in order to send the tapes to other stations where openings developed. The "applicant of the month" publicity release was another. Neither of these practices was continuing in June, 1972. Although a newsletter was printed on occasion, there was no regular monthly mailing to managers. 70

Employment

Roger Rice recalled a survey of the radio and television industry in the Bay Area in September, 1971, which reported 1360 jobs in engineering, programming, management and clerical areas. During 1971 the Broadcast Skills Bank
placed minorities in 70 of those jobs. Rice said, "That's not bad, but I'd like to see it a lot higher." In the previous four and a half years the bank had placed "over two hundred" minority group members in broadcasting according to a report from the national office.

Rice said he felt the major problem with the bank operation was that managers failed to notify the bank when they had openings. Gay Cobb confirmed this several times, referring to cases in which she was contacted only after the manager "had pretty well made up his mind on someone else." One minority group member referred to the bank as a "sham" because it was recognized by broadcasters as a false front to protect them from being accused of discriminatory hiring practices. She further commented that minorities saw little value in the bank other than as a place to get a job as a secretary. It is interesting to note that the bank had assisted her in obtaining a higher paying position as producer-director for a television station.

The early bank practice of having teams of broadcasters and Urban League representatives did not continue after the League lost control of the Bay Area bank. If it were to have continued, it would have served as a regular and personal reminder to broadcast executives that the bank was available to them. The "applicant of the month" publicity would also have been valuable in terms of the employment goals of the bank. Without it, broadcasters had to
rely on phone calls or interviews to become acquainted with applicants from the Broadcast Skills Bank.

In fact, the question of "who initiates" was regularly involved in the author's interviews with broadcast executives. Donald Curran, Manager of KGO television, was particularly concerned that the coordinator should be doing more to let executives know about availabilities. Peter McCoy, Manager of KCBS radio, was satisfied with the procedure whereby managers called Gay Cobb when they had an opening. Ken Gaines of KNEW radio wanted the bank to "develop more communication with all stations" and favored the newsletter approach. Lou Simon of KPIX felt the bank was operating satisfactorily in terms of publicity and said managers should continue to call Gay Cobb when necessary. The implication of these varied responses was that no one wanted to suggest a change which would endanger his relationship with the bank operation and coordinator. Curran asked for newsletters, but only on the basis that it would help him make use of the bank. McCoy played down newsletters because he was new on the job and was unsure of the pressure a newsletter would place upon him to increase his minority hiring practices. Gaines was very general in his request for "better communications"; he did not want to commit himself as the new chairman of the bank. Louis Simon, a Westinghouse executive, was careful to commend the bank for its current operation.
Additional Training and Scholarships

Because of the scholarship programs provided by stations and the skills bank in the Bay Area, the importance of training was emphasized by broadcast executives. The Stanford and San Francisco City College scholarships were mentioned as significant accomplishments, but the OEO project was discussed at length because of its controversial nature. Many managers felt that more part-time openings should have been provided for students in order that they could receive OEO support, but none of them felt that they could provide openings at their stations.

Donald Curran explained that most of the larger stations were part of a group ownership or at least had resources to set up their own scholarship program. Large stations could find or make ways to bring minorities in at something other than an entry level. But there was an inclination on the part of smaller stations to recognize the OEO project as a tool for the major broadcasters. Of course, all stations which had paid dues to the bank for the year could claim some credit for the OEO project whether they hired a student part time or not. However, the executives at the larger stations did not like to see the smaller stations getting credit without hiring a student in the program.79

As Curran and other managers discussed this problem from the major station point of view, it seemed that the OEO project problem was an indicator of a larger controversy
between small and large stations in the bank. It was the managers of major stations who accepted positions as chairman, committee head or director of some special project. The VHF television stations were more likely to pay dues than were the UHF stations. Managers of smaller radio stations were less active in the bank's program than were managers of larger stations. A pattern was evident in the bank's operation—larger stations were carrying the load but all the stations were getting credit for training and hiring minority group members. The issue with the OEO project was a particularly clear example of the unbalanced load, and many of the executives could see it. As a consequence of this problem, Curran was going to step down from his post as chairman of the scholarship committee—according to his interview with the author—and he was going to ask that a manager from a small station be appointed to chair the committee instead.

Louis Simon, Westinghouse Broadcasting Area Vice-President at KPIX television, objected to the OEO proposal when it was first presented at a local committee meeting. Perhaps he was aware of this deeper problem which he knew would surface if part-time positions were not forthcoming.

### Advancement within the Industry

In the proposal written to the Office of Economic Opportunity, Bay Area bank officials discussed the opportunities for advancement within the broadcast industry. The Bay Area bank was said to be interested in helping minorities
advance, but there was no explanation of the methods used. The proposal touched on production as an area where the opportunity to advance ... is usually excellent and in a mobile industry, such as the broadcast industry, a position in a production department in a major market such as the Bay Area is frequently a passport to a better position in a smaller market.81

In a 1971 report from the national office, the Bay Area bank was mentioned as one where advancement had been successful. This report also described the clearinghouse function of the national office.

In many instances, where jobs are available outside the Bay Area and Oakland, and employees are agreeable to relocating, résumés are sent to the office of the national coordinator in New York which serves as a national clearinghouse.82

However, the Bay Area bank coordinator reported that there were very few cases where this actually worked. Even though openings were reported to her, she could not find minority group members who wanted to move away for the purpose of advancement or entry into the broadcasting field.

Minorities are constantly advised to go to smaller markets and get their experience in smaller markets. That is not feasible for most minorities. It's just not the same situation moving someplace up north. It's easier for a white than for a black to establish himself in an alien community.83

The fact that jobs were not always called in to the office of the coordinator is also a factor to be considered in the bank's effort to advance minority group members within the broadcast industry. Gay Cobb reported that higher
paying jobs and management level jobs were almost never announced to her. Usually, someone was promoted from within the organization. She said this was particularly distressing to her when she would get conflicting stories from a manager and a minority employee who worked at his station. The manager would tell her he had no opening and the minority employee would tell her interviews were being held—both on the same day.84

In evaluating the work of the Bay Area bank in terms of its four stated goals, it is important to consider what Roger Rice mentioned as a "defunct year" of the bank's operation—from April of 1970 to March of 1971. He did not elaborate on the inactivity, and the author later questioned Louis Simon about it. Simon said that "it really wasn't inactive. That isn't a fair statement. It was always active."85 He claimed that the bank operated as usual but that the chairman was involved with some FCC problems and was unable to give his attention to his bank responsibilities. To find out what actually happened, other sources were consulted. In the OEO proposal, a summary statement of the bank's history referred to 1971 as the year when the bank was reorganized and "resumed operation." The coordinator for the bank explained that "there was no continuity from 1969 to 1971. In 1970 nothing happened because there was no Broadcast Skills Bank office and the chairman never got anything going. There was no coordinator."86 An applicant, Rosemary Chu, said a
friend told her of the bank in 1970 but said that it was closed and that she should wait until the following year to see if it would reopen. 87

No further information was provided on the year of inactivity. National office officials said the bank was never closed, but from the remarks above, it must be concluded that there was very little, if any, action during the period. Rice was free to mention it briefly because it was the year just before he became chairman—a year of great contrast when compared with his plans. Cobb discussed it because she had evidently tried to find out what happened herself and was irritated when no one would say much about it. Simon, the Westinghouse Broadcasting Area Vice-President, maintained a positive attitude toward the bank at all times and seemed unable to think that the bank was ever inactive. Perhaps the most important benefit of the "defunct year" was its effect upon the next chairman, Roger Rice. It seemed to give him great incentive to reestablish a viable operation with full participation from the stations.

The relationship of the Bay Area Broadcast Skills Bank to the national office in New York was discussed with Roger Rice. In general, he confirmed the explanation given by national office officials that little pressure was exerted upon the local bank operation. Although Rice remembered that McGannon and Norford were involved in the launching of the Bay Area bank, he could not recall exactly what roles they
played. In 1972 the Bay Area bank's only responsibility to the national office was to provide a year end report, according to Rice. The author examined Rice's report, dated December 17, 1971. It was little more than a page in length and was composed mainly of general statements emphasizing the accomplishments of the bank. For example, Rice explained that "local broadcasters have welcomed the notion of utilizing a central clearinghouse as their source of minority referrals." He mentioned the newsletter which had been circulated among the members of the California Broadcasters Association and the fact that a grant had been received from the Office of Economic Opportunity. The only specific datum in the report was a reference to fifty-one skills bank applicants who had been placed in positions within the Bay Area from the period April 1 through December 15. Approximately two hundred and sixty applicants were said to be on file.

In conversations with both Rice and Cobb, it became clear that there was little communication with the national office in the operation of the Bay Area bank in 1972. Cobb said she had met George Norford once but did not understand his role or the Westinghouse role in the skills bank operation. She said she would appreciate the opportunity for more "feedback" on what other local bank coordinators were doing and hoped the national coordinator would organize a meeting of the group. Her only understanding of the contact
with Westinghouse had come through her conversations with the chairman, Roger Rice.  

Cobb's limited understanding of the Westinghouse involvement is difficult to understand because a national office 1971 report stated that someone from the national office would visit the San Francisco bank every six months. Evidently this report was based on earlier practices and was directed to an audience where it would be important for Westinghouse to be perceived as an active agent in the coordination of all local banks. In addition, the report said that Louis Simon was actively involved in recommending new chairmen, selecting the coordinator and "implementing the bank's program," but Simon strongly denied that he did these things when he was interviewed less than a year after the report was written. In an interview with the author, Simon said that he acted "just as any other manager on the board of directors--all decisions are made by the group." When Roger Rice was asked how he was selected as chairman, he responded that Don McGannon had asked him to do it.

It was evident that Simon had not been informed by the national office that the author had already done extensive research in other areas of the country including the national office. While in person Simon disclaimed responsibility for selecting chairmen, he wrote the letter dated February, 1972, which introduced the new chairman and made no mention of the board of directors' involvement in the decision. This
conflicting information may indicate a communication gap between the national office and the Bay Area bank. Or perhaps the national office report credited Simon with the responsibility because it made Westinghouse Broadcasting look good to have the company's vice-president in this significant role. Then again Simon might have denied his responsibility when he was interviewed because he wanted the author to perceive the Bay Area bank as a local function without outside direction.

There was no evidence from the written materials or interviews that any significant "nationwide exchange" of bank applicants was taking place. Although the national office had reported that the national coordinator provided national clearinghouse opportunities, only one person was reported to have left the Bay Area for a job as a producer-director in the midwest. Several of the managers explained that few people wanted to leave a city like San Francisco for a job in some other part of the country—unless it was to go to another large city—and there was no indication that this had taken place.

This evaluation section has discussed the Bay Area bank's stated goals to recruit minority group members, employ them, furnish scholarship training and work for the advancement of minorities within the broadcast industry. Included was an examination of an inactive year at the Bay Area bank and an analysis of the local bank's relationship with the
national office. The section analyzed the bank's accomplishments by referring to the statements of executives and minority group employees who participated in the bank program.

**Summary**

This chapter has discussed the Bay Area Broadcast Skills Bank in San Francisco, California. First it examined the history of the bank and its establishment in 1966. Next the chapter explained the organization of the Bay Area bank, listing bank leaders, their backgrounds and roles. In a section on the operation of the local bank, four areas of activity were examined: board of directors functions, the placing of applicants, publicity and scholarship training programs. Several examples of bank applicants were also included. The chapter concluded with an evaluation of the bank's stated goals with some assessment of how well the bank had and had not accomplished those goals.

It was significant to note that the Bay Area Broadcast Skills Bank first was operated by the local Urban League for two or three years and then taken over by local broadcasters. Then, when the League had lost control of the bank, it continued to cooperate with the bank coordinator and provide applicants as they seemed qualifiable for broadcast positions. However, Urban League leaders felt that their organization should have been represented on the board of directors which was responsible for the operation of the bank. Instead, the broadcast executives who made up the board decided that they
should limit its composition to radio and television personnel.

The board of directors was subdivided into committees which had special assignments related to the skills bank purposes. As chairman of the board, Roger Rice asked all broadcasters in the area to participate in the work of the bank. A fee structure was established so that all stations could help finance a coordinator who cared for the day-to-day responsibilities of the bank. This relieved the chairman of some of the bank office responsibilities such as the interviewing of applicants and contacts with station managers about job openings.

Each year a new chairman administered the work of the Bay Area bank. There was one year, however, when the bank became inactive because the chairman was unable to spend much time on bank responsibilities. The following year, a new chairman was appointed, and he took an active role in getting the bank back on its feet.

The scholarship program which was funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity became a serious issue among broadcasters involved in the Bay Area bank. Once the money was made available to the organization, scholarship students were selected and the bank asked stations to provide part-time jobs for them. Although the broadcasters had understood that this would be required when they applied for the grant, they did not realize how difficult it might be to create jobs,
especially in small radio stations. Twelve students were to receive scholarships during 1972, but by June only four had been awarded because the bank could not find more than four part-time positions for the scholarship students.
NOTES


2 Ibid.

3 Interview with Percy Steele, Director of the Bay Area Urban League, San Francisco, California, June 28, 1972.

4 Interview with Carmen Smith at the Bay Area Urban League, San Francisco, California, June 28, 1972.

5 Interview with Percy Steele.


7 Interview with Roger Rice, Vice-President and General Manager, KTVU television, San Francisco, California, June 26, 1972.

8 Interview with Donald Curran, General Manager, KGO television, San Francisco, California, June 27, 1972.

9 Telephone interview with Ken Gaines, Manager, KNEW radio, San Francisco, California, July 3, 1972. Tape recorded with permission of interviewee.

10 Ibid.

11 Interview with Roger Rice.

12 Interview with Gay Cobb, Executive Director, Bay Area Broadcast Skills Bank, San Francisco, California, June 26, 1972.

13 Interview with Donald Curran.

14 Interview with Roger Rice.
15 Interview with Louis S. Simon, Area Vice-President, Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, at KPIX television, San Francisco, California, June 28, 1972.

16 Ibid.


18 Ibid.

19 Interview with Gay Cobb, June 26, 1972.

20 Interview with Donald Curran.

21 Interview with Roger Rice.

22 Interview with Donald Curran.

23 Interview with Roger Rice.

24 Gay Cobb, a memorandum to the station managers of the Bay Area Broadcast Skills Bank dated July 1, 1971. This was also identified by Mrs. Cobb as a "newsletter."

25 Roger Rice, a letter to the Bay Area skills bank members dated May 19, 1971.

26 Gay Cobb memorandum, July 1, 1971.

27 Louis Simon, a letter to the Bay Area skills bank members dated August 6, 1971.

28 Louis Simon, a letter to the Bay Area skills bank members dated February, 1972.

29 Roger Rice, a letter to the Bay Area skills bank members dated March 29, 1972.

30 Interview with Gay Cobb, June 26, 1972.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Interview with Donald Curran.

34 Interview with Peter McCoy, Manager, KCBS radio, San Francisco, California, June 26, 1972.

35 Ibid.

37 Interview with Roger Rice.

38 Interview with Donald Curran.


41 Interview with Gay Cobb, June 28, 1972.

42 Ibid.


44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Interview with Gay Cobb, June 26, 1972.

47 Interview with Donald Curran.

48 Interview with Louis Simon.


50 Ibid., p. 3.

51 Ibid., p. 4.

52 Ibid., p. 6.

53 Ibid., p. 7.

54 Ibid.

55 Interview with Gay Cobb, June 28, 1972.

56 OEO Proposal, p. 16.

57 Interview with Donald Curran.

58 Telephone interview with Ken Gaines.


60 Interview with Ernest Fields, summer replacement engineer, KTVU television, San Francisco, California, June 26, 1972.

61 Interview with Gregory Bradford, Assistant to the Director of advertising and promotion, KGO television, San Francisco, California, June 27, 1972.
62 Interview with Rosemary Chu, Assistant, Community Affairs Department, KTVU television, San Francisco, California, June 26, 1972.

63 Interview with Iola Mahogany, Assistant Traffic Director, KCBS radio, San Francisco, California, June 27, 1972.

64 Interview with Larry Bell, Assistant Account Executive, McCann Ericson Advertising Agency, San Francisco, California, June 28, 1972.

65 OEO Proposal.

66 Interview with Roger Rice.

67 Interview with Rosemary Chu.

68 Interview with Peter McCoy.

69 Interview with Donald Curran.

70 Interview with Gay Cobb, June 28, 1972.

71 Interview with Roger Rice.


73 Interview with Gay Cobb, June 26, 1972.

74 Interview with Pamela Watkins.

75 Interview with Donald Curran.

76 Interview with Peter McCoy.

77 Telephone interview with Ken Gaines.

78 Interview with Louis Simon.

79 Interview with Donald Curran.

80 Ibid.

81 OEO Proposal, p. 6.


83 Interview with Gay Cobb, June 26, 1972.

84 Ibid.
Interview with Louis Simon.

Interview with Gay Cobb, June 28, 1972.

Interview with Rosemary Chu.

Interview with Roger Rice.

Roger Rice, letter to the Bay Area skills bank members dated March 29, 1972.

Interview with Gay Cobb, June 28, 1972.


Interview with Louis Simon.
CHAPTER IV
LOCAL BROADCAST SKILLS BANK
IN MIAMI, FLORIDA

Overview
In August, 1972, field research was conducted at the South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank in Miami. This local bank served the greater Miami area but had communicated with broadcasters and applicants throughout Florida and surrounding states on occasion. Only one person had been chairman of the bank since its beginning in 1969.

William Brazil, Vice-President and General Manager of WTVJ television, was appointed chairman by Donald McGannon and George Norford. Brazil hired the coordinator before other broadcasters were informed that a skills bank was starting in the Miami area. Then there was an initial luncheon with various community leaders and broadcast executives to launch officially the bank. According to the evidence available, no further group meetings of the broadcasters were held.

With no local committee or board of directors to direct the work of the bank, the decision-making process was centered in the chairman's office. He appointed one of his supervisory personnel at the station to handle the day-to-day administration of the bank and gave the coordinator a great amount of flexibility in setting up recruitment, placement and training procedures. Instead of pooling money from various broadcasters to pay the coordinator's salary, Brazil paid it out of his own budget, along with all other expenses incurred by the bank operation. Only once did he try to establish a cooperative financial base for a scholarship training program; the program was discontinued partly because the broadcasters were not providing adequate contributions.

Because the coordinator carried unusual authority and responsibility in the South Florida bank, some of her procedures in handling the bank operation were quite individualistic and unique. She looked for only one characteristic in bank applicants--initiative--and she felt that they demonstrated this ability if they "walked through" her door. Her occasional practice of accompanying applicants when they were interviewed by broadcasters irritated some of the executives, but she claimed it was necessary to be sure the applicants were treated fairly. In a limited way, she seemed more interested in making quick placement of the applicants than in finding out what they were particularly suited for. Her philosophy and procedures will be examined in detail later in this chapter.

The national coordinator, George Norford, visited the South Florida bank much more often than he had visited the Bay Area bank. He also kept in closer touch with this local
bank by mail and the sharing of ideas and applicant information. According to the South Florida bank coordinator, the national office had placed a number of Florida people in other cities around the country, and she had brought people into Florida through the efforts of the national office of the Broadcast Skills Bank. She considered this a positive factor in the bank's operation, but one of the broadcasters considered it a problem because he found it difficult to interview applicants who lived in other states. This will be discussed in the evaluation section of this chapter.

The first section of this chapter examines the sources which were consulted in the research on the South Florida bank. The second section presents an historical perspective on the bank, describing the initial contact between New York officials and Bill Brazzil as the chairman in Florida. Next is a section on the organization of the local bank which comments on the three major bank officers and their roles in the operation. The fourth section analyzes the operation of the local bank, explaining how the placement procedures, publicity program and scholarship plan were carried out. Several specific applicants are discussed in terms of their experiences with the South Florida bank. In the fifth section, the local bank is evaluated on the basis of remarks by broadcast executives in the greater Miami area. The goals of the bank are examined and there is discussion on how well these goals were accomplished, if at all. The relationship
of the local bank to the national office is also evaluated in this section. Finally, the chapter closes with a summary of the findings.

Sources Consulted

The sources available for research of the South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank were similar to those at the Bay Area bank. Primary sources included personal interviews with broadcast executives, personnel directors and minority group members who had been assisted by the bank. The public service director at the bank chairman's station acted as his assistant in many matters related to the work, and she was interviewed concerning her role in the operation. As will be explained further in the chapter, the bank leaders in Miami repeated one another almost word for word on certain subjects related to the success of the bank effort. This was probably because they had all worked in the same building for several years as employees of WTVJ and internal communication was easy. At San Francisco the leaders did not enjoy this privilege, and they held more divergent views about the bank operation and its effectiveness.

A number of "reports" were made available for the study of the South Florida bank. One was a ten-page "Year End Report" submitted by Miami bank officials to the national office in New York in January, 1972. It provided some statistical data on the number of applicants registered and the number placed during the year, a listing of the publicity
efforts and personal appearances made during the year and a brief description of the scholarship programs which had been planned or attempted. Several sample "Weekly Reports" were photocopied for the study. These were submitted by the coordinator to the chairman each week as a record of bank activities and plans; they were each about one page in length.

The South Florida bank office seemed to have a larger correspondence file than the one in the Bay Area. Although the author was not given free access to the file, he was told that most of the contact between the bank office and the broadcasters in the area took place by telephone or mail. The number and type of letters made available from the chairman's file indicated that he did a great deal of business through mail communication. As will be explained later in this chapter, the South Florida bank did not have regular meetings of the managers, and this required the chairman to use other means to explain ideas, motivate participation and provoke action among the other broadcasters. His detailed letters were designed to tell the whole bank story each time he wrote as chairman. Of course, there was no way to determine whether Brazzil himself had written the letters or whether someone else on the staff had done so. In the interviews, he did seem familiar with the content of the letters which the author was allowed to examine.

Much significant information was revealed in the letters sent out from the bank office concerning a scholarship
plan which was attempted. Since there were no board or committee meetings to discuss the plan, rather detailed letters were required to explain it to the broadcasters. In addition, there were letters from the bank to scholarship trainees listing their responsibilities while they received money from the bank. Several general newsletters which went to the broadcasters from the bank were also made available.

News releases were a major means of publicity at the South Florida bank. Approximately every six months a news release would be sent out to newspapers and broadcast stations. A sample of these items was available for study. They announced the opening of the bank, the acceptance of a scholarship trainee, his graduation, and periodic reports that the bank was still "alive and active."

References are made to several newspapers in this chapter. Articles on the South Florida bank appeared in the Ft. Lauderdale News, the Miami Times and the Liberty News. Bank office "Applicant Profiles" were examined as one type of publicity material sent out to encourage broadcasters to consider minority applicants. In addition, the author examined several special publicity items including holiday mailings, skills bank information folders designed for high school distribution and "Broadcast Positions" lists which named job titles which were available in the broadcast industry.

In chapter two the reader was reminded that most of the materials consulted were promotional in nature, designed
to highlight the accomplishments of the national office. Chapter three contained a similar caution, but there was less concern because the Bay Area bank officials had offices in four different stations—there was opportunity to check one person's remarks against those of the three other officials. However, in the South Florida bank the author detected such loyalty to the operation that it was difficult to find any problem or point of confusion in the information presented by various officials. There seemed to be a general agreement that they would only relate the bank's positive aspects and make every attempt to avoid negatives. For example, none of the officials wanted to comment on why the scholarship program had been discontinued. They did admit that two students had not repaid loans to the bank, but they would not say anything about weaknesses in the bank's plan. Therefore, it should be emphasized that this chapter is based upon much one-sided opinion from the skills bank officials. Only on a few occasions did the broadcasters themselves come out with serious criticism of the bank. These will be analyzed to provide as much balance as possible.

Establishment of the South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank

In the spring of 1969, Donald McGannon telephoned Bill Brazzil, General Manager of WTVJ television in Miami, and discussed the skills bank with him. According to Brazzil, Norford was introduced during the conversation and the three
talked by telephone about the possibility of a local bank in Miami. Norford explained "what Westinghouse had done, that they had taken on the national role of organizing a Broadcast Skills Bank composed of sub-banks on a regional basis." On the phone, Brazzil agreed to serve as chairman and suggested that the bank be called "South Florida" instead of Miami because it could serve a larger area than the city proper. Norford came to Miami sometime before July to work out details, explaining "the purposes of the bank and to some degree how the bank would work as Westinghouse conceived it and how it should get started with a luncheon of all the broadcasters and the resource agencies which would feed personnel into the bank."  

To assist him in setting up the bank, Brazzil asked the WTVJ public service director, Mrs. Jeanne Nicoll, to contact community leaders—especially blacks—and broadcasters who should attend the luncheon. He worked with Nicoll to find and hire a black coordinator for the bank. At the July 10 luncheon, Brazzil explained the need for a coordinator position and introduced the person he had hired, Mrs. Sylvia Rolle.  

In a news release announcing the luncheon, Brazzil referred to the Broadcast Skills Bank as "national in scope with heavy emphasis on local participation—a venture initiated by broadcasters." His release explained the aim of the bank: "To attract and develop applicants for the broadcasting
industry and to assist members of minority groups who are interested in careers in broadcasting to find such careers." McGannon was the principal speaker at the luncheon and Norford was present as a "special guest." The announcement implied that the meeting was a culmination rather than a beginning of cooperative efforts among the broadcasters. The luncheon was said to be "sponsored by the broadcast industry of South Florida" involving a program "which combines the energies of a competitive industry to achieve a common goal." Perhaps Brazzil was looking at the bank from a national perspective, recognizing cooperative efforts in other cities and renewing efforts in his own city through a more clearly organized structure.

Although McGannon spoke at the luncheon, he was not identified as the person who initiated the Miami effort. It was an "industry" effort and Westinghouse was to be involved only to coordinate the Miami bank with other local banks around the country. At this early stage, some broadcasters probably perceived the bank as a "Brazzil effort" and felt it only coincidental that Westinghouse had offered consultant and coordination services. In addition to the broadcasters, there were representatives from high schools, junior colleges, colleges, the state employment service, the community relations board, Eastern Airlines, youth industries and churches. Jeanne Nicoll reported that approximately fifty people attended.
In conversations with other broadcast executives in the city, the author found Bill Brazzil to be highly respected as the manager of a leading station in the market. WTVJ television was a CBS affiliate and a division of Wometco Enterprises—a corporation which included three television stations, three film companies, ninety theaters, twenty-one restaurants and seven vending companies in and out of the United States.\(^6\) Wometco Enterprises' main offices are located in the WTVJ building and some skills bank applicants have been hired there as secretarial, engineering, projection or other type of employees. Brazzil always paid the coordinator's salary out of his budget rather than pooling money from several stations—this seemed reasonable considering the size and structure of Wometco Enterprises.

Bill Brazzil was chairman of the South Florida bank for three years and planned to continue in that position when he was questioned in 1972. It was easier for him to supply the coordinator's salary instead of "pleading with the other men" every year through a pro-rata system, and he felt there was better continuity if one person continued as chairman instead of "trying to explain the job" to a different person every year.\(^7\) When asked why Donald McGannon selected him as the leader, Brazzil referred to earlier contacts with McGannon and a personal commitment to minority group members.

I've worked with Don on many other industry projects so perhaps he felt intuitively and correctly that I would be willing to assume this responsibility. I do have a strong personal
commitment to it, and I suppose the reason is that— if I can view myself, not necessarily objectively— I think I'm something of a human-itarian. I think these are human beings who deserve a break, and I think they should have it.

In December, 1969, the South Florida bank office issued a "Year End Report." It was written like a news release and was probably sent to area broadcasters and newspapers as well as the national office of the Broadcast Skills Bank. The report referred to the bank in Florida as "a united effort on the part of the members of the broadcast industry" and said the bank had received "the unqualified support of not only key people within the broadcasting industry, but of the minority employment groups and their representatives in the South Florida area." During the first six months of the bank's operation, only a "limited number" of minorities had been employed by the bank because of the number of positions available and the qualifications of the people considered for interviews. According to the report, nine blacks had been hired. The report closed with a warning and admonition for the future.

The existing problems must be met and solved, and the officials of the South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank believe that a slowly built, solid foundation with genuine potential is preferable to well-intentioned promises which, if unkept, can and will create additional frustrations to all concerned.

The problems referred to in the report were not explained. It is assumed that they were the "limited number of positions available."
In February, 1970, Bill Brazzil sent a letter to all the participating broadcasters to inform them of the applicants who had been hired and to identify the type of broadcast work in which they were employed. He listed eleven applicants and jobs but did not list the call letters of stations which had hired them. Four people had been employed in news, three in production, two in film and two in engineering. Although forty-two people had been screened and interviewed, the letter explained that "the first six months have been concerned primarily with organization, procedures, drafting of brochures, letters and forms." Brazzil told the broadcasters he was pleased with the progress and the national office had reported that the South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank had "shown a better than average performance" during its first six months of operation.

This section on the establishment of the South Florida bank has examined the roles of New York and Miami executives involved in launching the local bank. It has discussed some of the details related to the planning of the luncheon and the selection of a chairman. As in the establishment of the local bank in San Francisco, Westinghouse initiated the effort instead of local broadcasters. In fact, in this case Westinghouse officials selected the chairman before anything else developed. In interviews with other broadcast executives in Miami, the author found general agreement with the permanent chairmanship arrangement although it seemed that
these broadcasters were less committed to the bank than were those in San Francisco. Of course, they had no objection to the procedure whereby WTVJ always paid the coordinator's salary. There was perhaps more hesitation by the Miami broadcasters to criticize the bank operation than was true with the San Francisco broadcasters. This may have been due to the fact that WTVJ personnel had set up some of the interviews and the author was perceived almost as a member of their staff. For example, when Sid Levene of WKAT was asked if minority employment had changed at his station since the bank became operative, he responded as follows:

We had minority employment here before, we have it now. There wasn't enough before, and there still isn't enough. That's not to say the bank here doesn't have assets, but I don't know if the bank is responsible for any change.12

**Organization of the South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank**

Because the chairmanship of this local bank had remained at one station, there was little change in the structure of the operation from year to year. No one discussed "local committee meetings" as such, and most communication between the bank office and the managers was by telephone or letter. There were three people who communicated with the managers about bank matters most often. Although they were all paid by WTVJ as members of the station's staff, they served additional roles as bank officials. They are
identified in terms of their bank and station roles in the section which follows. The key officers in the bank are the chairman, public service director and coordinator.

**Chairman**

Bill Brazzil, Chairman of the South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank, first became associated with WTVJ in 1956 when he was hired as general sales manager. He had previously been involved with NBC network time sales and programming responsibilities for stations in Texas, Louisiana, Tennessee and Minnesota. By the time he became chairman of the skills bank in 1969, he had been promoted to vice-president and general manager of WTVJ, and in addition he served on more than twenty boards of other organizations—several of them as chairman. 13

Of the 160 employees at WTVJ, the station reported 26 who were members of minority groups. The station was adding minorities to increase this percentage, but Brazzil said he limited his intake from the bank because he did not want to give the impression that his station took the best people who applied. As an illustration, he said that he needed two engineers but had not taken two well-trained blacks from the bank "because we don't want to appear to be taking from the skills bank more than anyone else." 14 It seemed that Brazzil wanted to keep ahead of other Miami stations in terms of minority employment, but he did not want to identify all of his minority people as having come through the bank.
Describing his responsibilities with the skills bank, the chairman said his role was "to make certain that the objectives of the skills bank are attained—not to administrate but just to oversee generally." He in fact did not administrate because he had turned this responsibility over to the public service director of WTVJ, Jeanne Nicoll. The coordinator reported to Nicoll. In this sense, Brazzil was further removed from the operation than Roger Rice, chairman of the bank in San Francisco, who had Gay Cobb report directly to him. Although Brazzil received weekly written reports from the coordinator, any special problem for immediate action was cared for by Nicoll, who received carbons of the reports. Brazzil even admitted that his role was "nil" with regard to national office communication. Instead of the chairman being contacted by the national office, it was the coordinator in Miami who was usually contacted directly. "Communications between the bank and Westinghouse are very good, but my personal communications are obviously limited." 15

Thus, the chairman's responsibility was to be aware of the bank's operation and take action only when major problems or policy questions arose. Through his contacts with other leaders in the industry and community, he "represented" the bank as a titular head, but all the work was done by the other two officers.

Public Service Director

From the very beginning, Brazzil had involved the
WTVJ public service director in skills bank planning and action. Mrs. Jeanne Nicoll contacted many of the representatives who attended the luncheon, made suggestions concerning the hiring of a coordinator and in general cared for the day-to-day operation of the South Florida bank. She assisted Brazzil with correspondence, office procedures and news releases which were sent to newspapers and the national office of the Broadcast Skills Bank. Although she was given no title in her role with the bank, she acted as an administrative assistant—a buffer to isolate the chairman from most of the questions and problems associated with the bank operation.

Nicoll had college training at the University of Tennessee and Southwestern College in Memphis, Tennessee. She later served as news director and assistant station manager at WHER, Memphis. In 1966 she moved to Miami to accept the position of women's director for WIOD radio. The following year she became public service director at WTVJ. In addition to holding memberships in eleven professional organizations, she was listed in *Who's Who of American Women, 1971-72.*

**Coordinator**

Mrs. Sylvia Rolle had been doing social work in the black community when she was hired as the first coordinator of the South Florida bank in July, 1969. During her six-month stay with the organization, she established lines of communication between the bank and several community agencies,
set up file systems for applicants and jobs and developed a standard reporting form which was updated each week as it was sent to the chairman. When she received an offer for a better position in December, she resigned and suggested that Mrs. Ann Mitchell be hired as her replacement. Brazzil, Nicoll and others interviewed Mitchell, and she was hired as the new coordinator in January, 1970.

Mitchell was a graduate of West Virginia State College and a registered nurse. Before moving to Miami in 1966, she had worked in VA hospitals in New York and Chicago. She taught at the University of Miami and was chairman of the National Negro Business and Professional Woman's Organization.17 The 1971 year end report also listed her as "President of the Greater Miami Chapter of the Urban League Guild, Secretary of the Wometco Bowling League, Dean of Pledges of the Iota Phi Lambda Business and Professional Women's Sorority, Gamma Alpha Chapter in Miami, and an active member of Mt. Zion Baptist Church."18 Her husband was a major in the reserves. Like Gay Cobb in San Francisco, neither Rolle nor Mitchell had any broadcast background when they came into their positions as skills bank coordinators. Mitchell stressed the "ability to work with people" as most important and said it was essential to have the coordinator's office located in a television station because this facilitated her orientation to all aspects of broadcasting.19

In discussing the roles of bank officials, Bill Brazzil
suggested eight characteristics which should be considered when hiring a coordinator: (1) The person had to be a member of a minority group. (2) A sympathetic attitude toward applicants was necessary but was to be balanced with objectivity because "not every applicant to the bank is qualified or even qualifiable." (3) A characteristic described as "community spirit" was said to be important because of the coordinator's regular contacts with sources of manpower and other types of public relations work. (4) The coordinator must have counseling ability because some applicants have more serious problems than their need for employment. At times referrals must be made to professional agencies. (5) Although it was not necessary for the coordinator to "know the industry in detail," she should have enough curiosity to learn quickly and develop the skill of placing the right person in the right job. (6) Organizational skills were necessary to keep large amounts of data accessible and current. (7) A background or knowledge of management types and personalities was valuable because the coordinator must contact broadcast executives regularly. (8) The coordinator's enthusiasm for the work would make a major difference in how it was performed.  

Although Brazzil did not apply all these criteria to Ann Mitchell in his discussion, it was apparent that he felt she demonstrated most of the abilities he had discussed. He knew that his role as "permanent" chairman made him the
single person responsible for the operation. Brazzil asked about the author's report to the national office and indirectly indicated his desire to have the South Florida bank look its best. For this reason he may have credited Ann Mitchell with more ability and greater performance than was actually the case. The other managers in Miami appreciated her work but did not praise her as highly as Brazzil did. In the evaluation section of this chapter, the broadcaster's comments will be explained in further detail.

This section on the organization of the South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank has described the bank's three leadership positions and the persons who occupied them in 1972. With the chairman, public service director and coordinator all holding continuing positions at a single station, a kind of "family relationship" had developed. All three shared the same basic information about the bank's operation and success. They were not in complete agreement about every detail of the operation, but their common understanding of the bank was much greater than that expressed by the leaders of the Bay Area bank in San Francisco. The bank leaders at WTVJ presented such a positive picture of their operation that it almost seemed too good. Broadcasters at other stations presented a more objective picture of the skills bank as they discussed both positive and negative aspects of the operation. Some of their comments will be included in the sections which follow.
Operation of the South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank

Although the activities of the South Florida bank are similar to those of the Bay Area bank, they have features which are distinctive. Comparisons will be provided where appropriate in the section which follows. The operation will be discussed in terms of the broadcast executives' responsibilities, applicant placement procedures, publicity programs and scholarship plans designed by the bank. In addition, the experiences of several bank applicants will be discussed.

Broadcast Executives' Responsibilities

Although there was no local committee or board of directors involved in the South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank, managers felt they were involved in the bank operation because they received frequent calls from the coordinator. One executive said he felt the "communication from the bank" was fine and provided him with the applicant information he needed as he hired employees. He felt that he was an active bank participant.21 Several broadcasters mentioned their satisfaction with the way they were kept informed by the bank, but they all agreed that they usually heard from the coordinator rather than the chairman.

There were conflicting reports about Bill Brazzil's communication with bank members. Jeanne Nicoll, WTVJ public service director, said Brazzil always contacted the men by mail or phone, never in a group meeting except for the
initial luncheon. "He realizes these executives are very busy and doesn't want to ask them to take time for a group meeting," said Nicoll. Coordinator Ann Mitchell disagreed. In a separate interview, she said Brazzil "occasionally" called the men together for special sessions, especially to encourage greater participation in the bank's placement activity.

There was no evidence from the broadcasters' remarks that Brazzil called any meetings. They always talked in terms of telephone calls or letters, and they did not list group meetings as a need when they were asked to evaluate the operation. Brazzil himself said he saw no need for meetings with broadcasters. An examination of the correspondence provided by Brazzil supported this view. One factor was the type of mail he sent out to stations—each letter commenting in detail about the subjects being discussed. This would not seem necessary if the same subjects were being discussed in group meetings. In addition, none of Brazzil's letters referred specifically to meetings the way Roger Rice's did in the Bay Area bank. Finally, Brazzil's own comment that he depended upon the coordinator to do almost all the work confirms Nicoll's statement that no formal meetings were held after the initial luncheon.

Because there was no board of directors, there were no committees assigned to follow through on board decisions. Problems related to applicant training, scholarships or
special funding were all solved by someone at WTVJ—usually by the coordinator but occasionally by the chairman. In the interviews and printed materials supplied to the author, there was no evidence that any other broadcasters had the opportunity to make decisions or exercise authority in the organization. This implied that the broadcasters' major responsibility in the bank was simply to cooperate and comply with decisions made by the chairman and coordinator. As Jeanne Nicoll commented, "The other managers never call it a 'WTVJ bank' or complain about its singular location—they're happy to have Brazzil take care of the bills and the headaches as long as they can be listed as members."23

In addition to this major responsibility of "non-complaining cooperation," the managers called in openings which occurred at their stations. At the South Florida bank there seemed to be no problem in getting information about job openings. Neither the coordinator nor the managers had complaints about "who should initiate" in the flow of information. From the comments expressed in interviews, it seemed that this area was perceived as a "shared responsibility" and the coordinator called to "ask" about as often as the managers called to "inform." Also, the coordinator's phone, with three incoming lines, rang approximately once every five minutes during the two afternoons when the author was present. Some of these calls represented job openings; others were from social service offices in the city.
Several times in the course of the interviews, station managers said they had to interview and screen applicants who had been recommended by the bank. Although one man felt the bank screening was "completely inadequate," others said it was their responsibility to interview anyone from the bank and not to expect the coordinator to send them an applicant exactly qualified for the job.

It seemed that the bank coordinator directed several "qualifiable" applicants to stations where there were openings, giving only minimal attention to applicant backgrounds or job requirements. The coordinator indirectly referred to this practice in an interview with a Miami Times reporter.

We try to instill in all applicants the benefit of having some training prior to applying to the bank although most positions provide on-the-job training.24

Perhaps the broadcasters had the understanding that they should help with interviewing and screening because they did not have to pay for the services of the coordinator who sent applicants to them.

There was one occasion when managers did pay into a "pool" to set up a scholarship program for the training of engineers, but the rate was low: each station paid an amount equal to its lowest published daytime one-minute rate for commercial announcements. Although this amount was contributed four times a year when the program was operative, the amount was only a few dollars for many of the smaller radio stations. This scholarship program will be discussed
in further detail later in this chapter.

In summary, the South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank did not operate with a local committee or board of directors, but the broadcast executives still had certain responsibilities. They cooperated with the plans and projects set up by the office of the chairman and coordinator, called in openings when they occurred at their stations, helped interview and screen bank applicants and for a short time contributed to a pool of funds established for the training of broadcast engineers. Since there was no evidence that these responsibilities were established through a process of committee decision making, it is assumed that the chairman and coordinator, working with suggestions from the national office, created these responsibilities and asked the broadcasters to participate in them.

The chairman of the South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank communicated with broadcast executives through carefully prepared letters which explained exactly what he "proposed" that the bank should do. Some letters turned out to be more than proposals—they actually spelled out what the bank was going to do. In addition to these letters, the chairman called broadcasters to follow up on the responsibilities he had suggested in letters.

The coordinator also kept in close contact with broadcasters by telephone to determine where there were openings in radio or television. Although she did not always interview
the applicants who came to the bank, she made contact with broadcasters who were willing to interview them for some opening. It seemed that most of the broadcasters did not mind doing their own screening of minority group applicants as long as the bank would provide several applicants for each opening.

All expenses for the South Florida bank were paid by the chairman's station, WTVJ. He paid the coordinator's salary and all office costs. On one occasion, the broadcasters pooled funds to pay for a scholarship program to train engineers, but this program did not require large contributions from most of the stations.

**Applicant Placement**

The coordinator of the South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank was available in her office to meet applicants during business hours each day. However, she had no secretary and this meant the office was closed when she had to visit a broadcaster, speak to some group or be away for some other reason. The standard procedure was followed, asking applicants to fill out application forms and then interviewing them if time allowed. Ann Mitchell said she could use another person full time in the office because there were too many applicants and phone calls for one person to handle. As the bank had become better known in south Florida, more calls and correspondence had come in to request assistance of one kind or another. According to Mitchell, much of her
time was spent in explaining the operation to people who wanted to start a similar effort in another community.

The application form used by the bank may be examined in Appendix C. It asked for more detailed information than the Bay Area bank application, including medical background, languages spoken and whether the applicant had had drinking or drug problems. Although the form was identified with the South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank at the top, there was some small print at the bottom which clarified the Wometco Enterprises' policy on equal employment opportunity. This notice at the bottom of the form clearly identified the skills bank as a part of Wometco Enterprises although it was never explained as such anywhere else in the materials related to the bank. There was no room on the form for interviewer remarks, and Ann Mitchell said nothing about making written notes as she talked with applicants.

The "Employee Requisition Form" used by the bank is included in Appendix D of this study. It listed fifty-eight positions and asked the broadcaster to check those which were open at his station. There were four lines at the bottom to provide space for a "specific job description" and then three questions about hours, experience needed and salary. There was a place where the manager could indicate whether he would accept an applicant for on-the-job training. It was unfortunate that the fifty-eight listings took up most of the space on the page because broadcasters differ in their
understandings of the titles listed. It would have been more appropriate and useful to allow the broadcaster more space to define more carefully the job himself. Instead of a small square to check for "some experience required" it would have been more meaningful to allow adequate space for a careful description of the kind of experience preferred.

The coordinator explained that the application forms and employee forms were kept in file drawers but that it was difficult to find time for organizing and updating. Under further questioning she found it difficult to explain her filing system, and it seemed that her basic principle was to work with the information which was most current. Ann Mitchell's desk contained a number of both kinds of forms, and she would refer to these as phone calls came in from stations or applicants. The author observed several interviews in progress and noted that Mitchell seemed more interested in getting the applicants out for interviews than she was in discovering their abilities and interests. This may have been because she wanted to make a good impression on the author or she did not want to take too long with applicant interviews that day.

For example, one girl came in with an application form which she had completed at home. Mitchell looked at it and sent the girl to another office for a typing test. When the girl returned, she asked the girl several questions and then started making calls. She talked with three managers
or personnel directors before one asked her to send the girl to his office. After an explanation of the route to the station, the girl was excused and told to come back if it did not work out. A young man came in later and she asked him to fill out the application blank at her desk. When he began to write she asked him what experience he had in broadcasting. He referred to electronics training he had had in the military and she began to call stations. Again there were several calls, but shortly after he completed the form she had an address and name for him to contact. In both cases she did not refer to any "Employee Requisition Forms" but simply looked up phone numbers or dialed them from memory.

When Ann Mitchell was asked what she looked for in her interviews with applicants, she replied that it was "initiative and that alone." When asked to comment on this further, she said that a good applicant was one who knew how to "present what is on his mind." She also remarked that an applicant who was weak in his ability to communicate usually could be assisted "with a few hints" and still get into some kind of job in the industry. Again she commented, "What it really takes is initiative, and I know they have initiative if they will walk through that door."25

Ann Mitchell said there had been times when bank applicants were not treated fairly by station personnel who interviewed them. She referred to managers who always found
fault with applicants and explained that she had corrected some of this by accompanying the applicants to the stations for the interviews and tests the stations wanted to give. "It is difficult," she said, "for a manager to say that a girl can't type when I am sitting in the same room with them watching her take dictation and type up a letter." One of the broadcasters commented on this practice and claimed it was a waste of time.

"We don't need her [the coordinator] to bring a kid over here. They can find their way. If they can't find their way, we'll send somebody for them. Appointments can't be set up because somebody at the bank can't be available at the time the kid is. You're getting three people together instead of two... There's a lot of wasted motion. There's a lot of wasted time."27

Mitchell explained that the South Florida bank had no direct connection or liaison with the Miami Urban League—"only a friendly working relationship." Although someone from the League came to the initial luncheon, that organization was no more important than any other represented. It was WTVJ which set up the bank. If applicants in the Urban League office asked about broadcasting, they would be referred to the skills bank, according to Mitchell. But she added, "Frankly, I don't get that many calls because most everyone through the area now knows about the skills bank, and people just automatically call or they will pick up the paper, read about the bank and come in for an interview."28 On occasion she would refer applicants to the League as they
had an interest much broader than broadcasting, but "usually only if they ask about the League." This remark was probably based on Mitchell's desire to convince the author that the bank stood on its own and did not require the assistance of the Urban League. It was not an indication that a barrier existed between the League and the bank because Mitchell had made several referrals through officials of the League whom she knew personally. She was president of the Greater Miami Chapter of the Urban League Guild when this study was conducted.

According to Willard Fair, Executive Director of the Greater Miami Urban League, the League and the bank worked with different kinds of applicants and were separate organizations.

We separated about two and a half years ago so we could each concentrate on our own areas. At the League we find jobs for people in construction, utility companies and local transportation rather than blue collar or middle-management positions. Fair said the League referred applicants to the bank when "it is called for," but there was no liaison between the organizations.

This section on applicant placement has discussed the day-to-day operation of the South Florida bank office and described some of the methods used to process applicants and help them find jobs in broadcasting. The application form used by the bank was identified in two ways. At the top it was called a skills bank application, but at the bottom it
explained the equal employment opportunity policy of Wometco Enterprises. This was the only printed evidence which identified the bank as a Wometco function. Analysis of the "Employee Requisition Form" revealed several ways in which the form could be more useful to broadcasters who sent in job openings. For example, there was little space for the broadcaster to write in a careful description of the job and even less space for him to indicate the kind of experiences which might be required for the position.

The coordinator did not have a clear system for organizing and updating the files at the bank office. She kept current information in various stacks on her desk but seemed unable to describe the way in which other data were kept in file cabinets. She made only limited use of the application forms and employee requisition forms as the author observed her interviewing two applicants and sending them out to talk with prospective employers. She was eager to put applicants in touch with station personnel and spent little time researching the paper work.

The South Florida bank operated as a separate organization with respect to the Greater Miami Urban League. Although there were times when leaders of the two organizations would share information, they had each decided to concentrate on different types of employment and applicants. Of the three banks visited in the research for this dissertation, the South Florida bank was the only one which maintained
a completely separate operation from the local Urban League office. The Urban League director in Miami felt that this separation was appropriate.

Publicity

The South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank was able to obtain regular coverage in local newspapers, and this was said to be the best kind of advertising to make applicants aware of the office. Usually the newspaper printed one of the bank's news releases and sometimes included pictures of applicants who had been placed recently. News releases were sent out under Bill Brazzil’s name whenever anything special was accomplished by the bank. When an applicant was chosen for a scholarship, a release went to all the papers and broadcasters. When he graduated, another release went out. Also there were releases approximately every six months providing statistics on how many applicants had been placed through the skills bank office.

Ann Mitchell was interviewed by a black newspaper, the Miami Times, in 1970, where she was quoted as saying that "the majority of applicants learn of the bank's services by word of mouth or through ... the Miami Times. Many learn about the bank while attending school." In her 1971 year end report to the national office, Mitchell said she had "visited many of the high schools for the purpose of trying to encourage potential graduates to attend colleges that would benefit them in the future, especially in broadcasting."
In the same report, Mitchell claimed that word of the bank had spread by newspaper and other means to several states.

Broadcasters recognizing the services of this bank include North and South Carolina, Virginia, Georgia and Alabama. Services of this bank have been requested at some time or other by broadcasters in the previously named states.32

Mitchell also said she had been contacted by WIVI radio at Christiansted, St. Croix, the Virgin Islands, where they were in need of personnel.

" Applicant profiles" were mailed out to broadcasters when the coordinator had an adequate number of names to put together on a list. From her description of the project, it seemed that a mailing would go out every two or three months. Each listing of applicants would include a dozen or more descriptions of minority group members who were looking for work. A paragraph of four or five sentences was provided for each applicant. Special mailings were also sent out during seasonal or holiday periods. An example was a New Year's message designed in the form of a greeting card. It was sent to various employment agencies and groups with the following message: "There are 3,592,765,432 on the face of the earth. For our new year happiness, can't you refer one?"33

The bank printed a folder for distribution in high schools and other groups of potential employees. It listed the major areas in which people were employed in broadcasting—sales, technical, programming, news, administration—explaining each of these areas in two or three paragraphs.
each. The folder also discussed the roles of "hosts and disk jockeys" as the glamor side of broadcasting representing only ten per cent of the employment in the industry. Students were encouraged to investigate "the big 90%" of jobs which were less competitive in the broadcast industry.34

To help prospective applicants better understand the terminology of broadcasting, the bank printed a one-page listing of some sixty job titles. These were used in conversations with applicants who "wanted to work in broadcasting but had no exact job preference."35

High school workshops were conducted by the coordinator on occasion. One year she arranged for certain interested students to spend a week in one of the radio or television stations in Miami, giving them an opportunity to assist in off-the-air duties. A special one-week workshop was conducted at one school to describe the status of broadcast industry employment. Tony Brown, Dean of the School of Communication at Howard University, was a major participant.

Thus, the publicity program of the South Florida bank included news releases, special printed materials, high school workshops and word-of-mouth promotion by applicants and broadcasters. On-the-air publicity was not mentioned, but Mitchell had been a guest on interview programs, and it is certain that she mentioned the bank. Although there was no way to determine the success of the bank's publicity program among prospective applicants, it seemed to be working
well in its contacts with broadcasters.

Scholarship Program

The chairman of the South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank said the training aspect of the bank's operation was secondary to the major purpose of applicant placement. In some instances, broadcasters provided on-the-job training at their stations for bank applicants who were qualifiable but not yet qualified. Another example of training was the workshops conducted in high schools. A third area involving training was the bank's scholarship program for engineers. It is explained in detail in the pages which follow because it was the one instance in which South Florida broadcasters cooperated financially on a skills bank effort.

In early 1970 the skills bank in Miami received increasing requests for broadcast engineers. Brazzil and Mitchell began to search for schools in the area and found that Radio Engineering, Inc. (REI) in Sarasota was "the only accredited and well-recognized school in the country." The school's main office was in Florida, but there were branches in several other states. It guaranteed the graduate a First Class Radiotelephone Licence which is often the key in obtaining a broadcast engineering job.

Brazzil contacted the school and found it would cost $700 for each student to complete the five-week course. In August, 1971, he sent a letter to broadcast executives in the greater Miami area asking them to support the following plan:
1. The Broadcast Skills Bank would establish a revolving scholarship fund for the training of engineers. Four men each year would be trained at REI. Then they would be "prepared for further on-the-job training and experience in the industry."

2. All broadcasters would contribute to the fund which would be administered by the Executive Director of the Opportunities Industrialization Center of Dade County. The $700 necessary for each student would care for tuition, rent, food, round-trip transportation, laundry and incidentals. Each student would receive the money as a loan, signing an agreement to pay it back within one year after he had found employment.

3. All scholarship applicants would be screened by a committee of "competent, technically-oriented members of the broadcast industry." Only those who showed strong ability to succeed would be chosen.

4. Each station would be called upon four times a year to contribute an amount equal to the station's lowest daytime one-minute commercial rate as published in Spot Radio Standard Rate and Data Service. Standard accounting principles would be followed, and the bank's records of these funds would be open to inspection at any time.37

The letter referred to above revealed Bill Brazzil's perception of his role as permanent chairman of the bank. It began with a brief review of the bank's first "successful"
year and described it as "phase one, activation of placement procedures." Then it discussed "phase two, training," and emphasized the need for engineers. The letter began to develop a "proposal," but after two or three sentences it had become a plan of action. By the end of the letter, Brazzil had asked for an exact amount of money from each broadcaster and told them to send "a check for the amount specified in this letter." 38

The first scholarship student, Matt Gibson, graduated from REI in December, 1971, obtained his First Class License and was hired as an engineer at WRBD in Ft. Lauderdale. 39 Unfortunately, he quit the job abruptly and disappeared without paying back any of the $700 loan to the skills bank. Neither the chairman nor the coordinator had heard from him by August, 1972. 40

The second scholarship student, Jack Gilbert, graduated from REI in April, 1971, obtained his First Class License and was employed by Western Electric. Neither the coordinator nor chairman were certain that he still worked there in August, 1972. They said he had not repaid the loan. 41

In addition to the fact that the loans were not repaid, it was difficult for the chairman to convince other broadcasters that they should continue to contribute to the scholarship fund. The men did not want to put their money into students who dropped out of sight, and the original plan called for a rotating arrangement whereby the money which
was returned would be used to provide funds for the next student. Early in 1971, Brazzil began having difficulties with station contributions, and he sent out a follow-up letter to delinquent broadcasters. It explained that $200 more was needed if the bank was to be able to send Jack Gilbert to REI. A copy of Brazzil's first letter to the stations was enclosed "with the thought that the original letter might have gone astray," and the "amount due" was clearly identified in both letters. Some extra pressure was exerted by Brazzil's reference to the Federal Communications Commission.

I believe you will agree that the function of the Skills Bank can be particularly helpful to you, especially in view of the new FCC Form 395 which requires a reporting of your employment practices. The purpose of the Broadcast Skills Bank is to serve your employment needs among minority groups.42

The reason that no further scholarships were provided after the first two was not clearly explained by skills bank officials. Brazzil commented that he wanted to revitalize the scholarship program and train minority group members in programming as well as engineering areas. Based on the evidence available, it seemed reasonable to conclude that the broadcasters did not support the program to the extent that Brazzil felt was necessary. He wanted it to develop as a group effort among broadcasters and therefore refused to put more than his share into the scholarship fund. He was willing to do his part in terms of correspondence and bookkeeping—some of the stations paid as little as $2.75 as their one-
minute spot rate, but they still received Brazil's individually typed letters and the printed news releases. The program did not develop as a cooperative effort among broadcasters and could not be promoted as such in the media or national office reports. Therefore, it was discontinued.

This examination of the operation of the South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank has described the responsibilities of broadcasters participating in the bank, the procedures involved in the placement of applicants, publicity programs and the scholarship plan designed for the training of engineers. Through these programs the bank assisted a variety of minority group members in their search for entry-level or better employment in broadcasting. Seven black employees were questioned about their experiences.

**Experiences of Bank Applicants**

**John Broner** graduated from Georgia Southwestern College in 1970 with a BS degree in Business Administration and began the search for employment. He had relatives in Miami and moved there in December. After going to several employment services in Miami, he went to the Model Cities Agency and was referred to the Broadcast Skills Bank. In his conversation with Ann Mitchell, she tried to persuade him to attend the REI school for engineering on a scholarship. He was interested in accounting instead, and after being interviewed by several stations he was hired by WIOD radio as an accountant.⁴³
Deborah Pemberton graduated from high school in June, 1971, and decided to go to work. Her sister had heard of Ann Mitchell and suggested that Deborah see her. Mitchell sent her to check on "several jobs for which I was not qualified." After several weeks, Mitchell accompanied Pemberton to WGBS radio where she was interviewed for the position of receptionist. She was accepted for that position in August.

Lorene Champion attended Kentucky State College and Lincoln Business College in Orlando. After several months in a secretarial position, she was married in 1971 and moved to Miami where her husband was employed. He knew Ann Mitchell and introduced her to his wife. Mitchell asked Lorene Champion to come to the skills bank office to find work. Wometco Enterprises had an opening for receptionist at the main office, and Champion was hired for the position in June of 1972.

Dorothy Bruton had a bookkeeping job but was looking for other employment. She went to several employment agencies before she saw a skills bank advertisement in the Miami Times. She went to the skills bank office and filled out an application. Two weeks later she received a phone call from Ann Mitchell suggesting she go to a station where there was an opening for a receptionist. Bruton went to the station but decided she did not want that particular position. Later Mitchell called again and informed her of an opening in the traffic department at WAIA radio. She was interviewed by the
sales manager at the station and became a traffic assistant there in August of 1970. In six months she was promoted to traffic manager, supervising two assistants. Bruton had completed two years of college work toward a BA degree in accounting. She planned to finish the degree. 46

Evonne West completed a year of business college and did secretarial work for eight years. In December, 1971, a friend told her to talk to Ann Mitchell about work in broadcasting. Two weeks after Miss West completed the application form, she received a call from Mitchell advising her to interview for work at WTVJ television. She went to the station and was hired that day as a clerk stenographer. West said she had no thoughts about changing jobs until the friend suggested the skills bank. 47

Willard Rawls graduated from the University of Florida with a BS degree in broadcast journalism in 1969. He took graduate courses for another year and then began looking for employment. At the Orlando, Florida, Broadcast Skills Bank he was referred to Ann Mitchell in Miami. In June, 1970, he talked with Mitchell, and she urged him to spend five weeks in Sarasota at the REI school for engineering training. He was able to do so at his own expense and passed the test for the First Class License in August of 1971. Ann Mitchell "was in touch" with him, and in September she assisted him in finding a job as newscaster at a radio station in Ft. Lauderdale. After several months he was promoted to news director,
and in December he received another call from Mitchell. She had heard of an engineering job with much better pay at WPLG television and suggested he interview for the position. In January, 1972, he was hired for the job of cameraman for WPLG.48

Patricia Harrell had taken courses in business education at the university level and transferred to Miami Dade Junior College to complete her training. A friend who worked at WQAM radio suggested she contact the skills bank for employment. When she called Ann Mitchell, she was told to come to her office that day because she knew of an immediate opening. Harrell was interviewed, given a typing test and hired in April, 1972, as secretary to the accountant for WTVJ television.49

As in San Francisco, the author asked the coordinator in Miami only to suggest a "wide variety" of types of applicants who had been assisted by the bank. The seven employees discussed above did represent varied backgrounds and stations although most of them had jobs in clerical or accounting areas.

Bank officials had said that most applicants heard about the bank through newspaper advertisements; only one of the seven listed an ad. Most of the applicants mentioned a friend or "someone at a station" who told them about the bank. There was one case involving a referral from another Broadcast Skills Bank in the state. As in San Francisco,
most of the applicants preferred to talk about "Ann" instead of the "bank." This is another reinforcement of the importance of coordinator appearances in high schools and youth meetings.

Although none of the applicants had broadcast experiences when they came to the bank, three of them had related experiences in accounting or stenographic work. Most of them had some college background—two had degrees. The range of educational backgrounds is wide when one considers some had only completed high school while another had finished one year of graduate study.

Perhaps the most impressive factor common to all these experiences is the speed with which the bank located jobs. In most of the cases it took no more than two weeks. The reader is reminded that these applicants were selected by the coordinator who thought highly of the South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank.

In describing the operation of the South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank, the preceding section has discussed the activities of broadcast executives, bank officials and several applicants who sought aid through the bank office. The next sections will evaluate the South Florida bank and summarize the chapter.

**Evaluation Based on Research Interviews**

William Brazzil, chairman of the South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank, said that the primary goal of the
organization was to "place minority group members in broadcasting jobs." This goal involved both recruitment and placement—each will be considered separately in this evaluation of the South Florida bank. The coordinator, Ann Mitchell, mentioned another goal of the bank. She explained in an interview with a *Ft. Lauderdale News* reporter that the bank's goal was to place minorities in "as many different jobs as possible." In addition to these three goals, this evaluation will consider a goal "of lesser importance" mentioned by Brazzil, that of training minority group members to qualify them for employment in the industry. Therefore, this section will begin with a discussion of the bank's four goals: applicant recruitment, applicant placement, variety of positions filled and applicant training. Later in this section the South Florida bank will be evaluated in terms of its relationship with the national office. This will include a discussion of the South Florida bank's relationship with local banks in other parts of the country.

### Applicant Recruitment

Between December of 1969 and December of 1970, the number of applicants on file at the South Florida bank increased from 42 to 133. By December of 1971 the number was up to 272, and in August of 1972 the coordinator estimated the total file of registrants numbered "near a thousand." The first three estimates came from a news release and year end reports for the national office, but the third estimate
was the coordinator's verbal statement to the author. It was difficult to find one source of information on the increase in numbers of registrants through the years. When the chairman was questioned on the subject, he referred the author to the coordinator. The coordinator commented that it was almost impossible to keep an accurate record of numbers. For this reason the "thousand" figure above is probably a generous estimate.

In January, 1972, the year end report claimed that the coordinator had visited "several of the high schools" in one section of Miami and "many high schools" in another. No total was reported and none of the high schools was named. When broadcasters were asked to evaluate the bank's operation, one manager said that recruiting was "obviously poor."

Sid Levene, Manager of WKAT, said that bank officials had failed to "go out into the field and get the people" because he had talked with a number of minority group members from several high schools who had not heard of the skills bank. In a further comment about the bank's weak publicity, he said he had talked with counsellors in some of these schools and they had said they had not been contacted by the bank. He referred to a high school in a ghetto area where the students had been given some used equipment to set up a radio club. These students were not aware of the skills bank operation.

Wometco's personnel manager, Douglas Craven, gave some support to this criticism, saying that the bank "could stand
greater publicity. . . . Ann appears on radio on occasion and there are newsletters that go out on occasion, but I still think it could stand more."57 He did not mention high school visitation as a means of publicity or recruitment.

The South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank made little attempt to recruit non-black minority group members such as the Cubans, Brazilians and Chileans who are numerous in the area. According to Jeanne Nicoll, Public Service Director for WTVJ, representatives of some of these groups were present at the initial luncheon, but they showed little interest in the bank once it became operational. She said that bank officials had made "several attempts" to involve other minorities, without success. Nicoll did not explain what actions these attempts involved.58 Bank officials explained that these other minority group members did not seem interested in getting into broadcasting. "The Cubans who are interested," commented Nicoll, "will go to work for one of their own radio stations in the area." Broadcasters estimated the number of Spanish speaking people between 200,000 and 400,000 in the area served by the bank. One manager of an English-speaking station said he had been particularly frustrated after repeatedly trying to hire a Cuban through the skills bank. Every time he asked he got a different excuse. The manager said he was not seeking an announcer. He wanted a Cuban salesman but never obtained one through the bank.

One year end report referred to the coordinator's
visit to two Indian reservations in South Florida "for the purpose of trying to interest the Indians in broadcasting." The brief paragraph did not explain why Indians were selected instead of Cubans or Brazilians. It simply concluded by reporting that "needless to say, this project was not too fruitful, but it was a great experience to visit with the people there that included Chief Buffalo Tiger and Chief Howard Tommie." There was no other reference in the report to non-black minority group members who had been served by the skills bank.

This evaluation of the South Florida bank's recruitment program has been based on bank reports and interviews with bank officials and broadcasters. Considering the evidence available, there was conflict between the reports of bank officials and broadcast executives. The year end reports gave the impression that most high schools were contacted, but broadcasters did not agree. Some of the minority group members whose experiences were explained on pages 184-187 provided additional insight on this question. Willard Rawls suggested that the bank program should be "publicized in high schools." Patricia Harrell said she had heard nothing about the bank in her high school, and Debbie Pemberton said it would have helped her if "someone had told me about the bank when I was in high school." Evonne West did not refer to high schools specifically but did suggest that more publicity would improve the efforts of bank
The author assumed that most or all of these applicants attended high school in the greater Miami area. Whether they did or not, it was clear that the minority group members wanted the bank to do more to make itself known through publicity.

**Applicant Placement**

The author was permitted to examine only selected portions of the files of the South Florida skills bank. Consequently he was not able to evaluate the placement program of the bank in terms of statistics which might have been in the files. This was the same problem experienced when the bank's recruitment program was examined. The numbers included in the discussion which follows were drawn from various sources and are not to be interpreted as official records of the bank office.

In a letter to South Florida broadcasters, Bill Brazzil reported in February, 1970, that the bank had referred twenty people and placed eleven. A July, 1970, article in the *Liberty News* black newspaper referred to forty-seven applicants who had been placed. The coordinator's year end report issued in January of 1972 began by stating that "a ninety percent increase in response to applications for job placement characterized the activities of the South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank during the past year." The percentage was not clearly explained in the paragraphs which followed, but it did mention that 119 minority group members had been
placed through the bank office by the end of 1971. In August, 1972, Bill Brazzil was questioned about the total number of applicants placed. He responded "somewhere between 135 and 140." Ann Mitchell was asked that question on the same date and reported 153.

As data were being gathered on the placement procedures of the South Florida bank, some bank officials suggested broadcasters who could comment on the operation. Jeanne Nicoll recommended Kerni Anderson, a black executive who had discussed the bank operation with her on several occasions and had been an active participant in the bank's program. Anderson managed WOCN, a "good music" radio station with a small staff, most of it white. In his remarks to the author, Anderson said there were times when he called in openings to the bank and unqualified applicants were sent to him for interviews. This was disappointing and at times made him reluctant to call in further openings. Jim Strawn of WOID radio said he had interviewed a number of people who did not have the qualifications he had listed in his written or verbal description of jobs. Sid Levene, WKAT radio manager, stated that he had experienced a similar case.

There was no screening, absolutely none. . . . I would say that a girl who doesn't know where the "n" is on the typewriter and doesn't know which finger you use to push the "n" is not ready to be employed as a typist. Now if she's slow, if she makes mistakes, that's something else. But if she doesn't know where the "n" is then she didn't finish her typing course and she shouldn't be here. . . . Either the screening process is wrong or she wasn't screened.
These kinds of remarks by broadcasters conflicted with a statement by Ann Mitchell in the *Ft. Lauderdale News* article of May, 1971, where she explained that "all of the applicants have been received beautifully by the station managers."\(^1\)

The broadcasters generally agreed that the minorities which were hired through the bank did stay on the job and continue as satisfactory employees. Few promotions were mentioned, but the men did say that they wanted to move minority people up as quickly as possible. According to the *Miami Times* article of May, 1971, eighty percent of all applicants placed through the bank were still on the job. The article did not give any explanation concerning the other twenty percent.\(^2\) Brazzil mentioned one man who had "not worked out" at his operation and said that his station (WTVJ) was probably at fault for not carefully examining his abilities before hiring him.\(^3\)

A manager who did not wish to be identified complained that the bank office had taken credit for "all blacks in the industry, whether they are hired through the bank itself or not." If his statement was true, the placement numbers discussed above were questionable. The manager said a minority group member had come to his station looking for work. The applicant said he was enrolled at a local vocational school, and the manager inquired of school officials. They gave him a strong recommendation and the manager hired him. In a few weeks the manager was surprised to see the applicant's name
listed as being placed at his station by the skills bank. His only explanation was that someone at the vocational school had mentioned the applicant to the skills bank. In addition, the manager said he had seen lists of "bank placements" which included minority group members who had been in the industry for many years and could not have been employed through the skills bank.

Ann Mitchell complained about broadcasters who used the bank "only at license renewal time." She said there were certain managers who became especially cordial with letters and even visits to the bank office about six months to a year before the renewal date. Mitchell said she did no special favors for these broadcasters because she did not feel they had a sincere interest in the bank's operation. One man came to her office and discussed his "special need" for minority group members during the renewal year. He sent her a follow-up letter which apologized for his lack of contact with the bank in previous years. In the letter he mentioned that he had never employed a bank applicant at his station but was hoping to do so in the near future. "The surprising thing," said Mitchell, "was that I had just placed two people at his station a month earlier through his supervisory personnel, and he didn't know anything about it." Although she did not identify the manager, the illustration raised the question of executive awareness concerning the bank's activities. On the other hand, if Mitchell was simply "taking
credit" for these placements, it may have been an illustration of the bank's alleged "all inclusive listing" of minority group members as products of the Broadcast Skills Bank.

There were differences of opinion among broadcasters as to what types of jobs should be called into the bank office. Jim Strawn said that his station called in "all openings except those where there will be internal promotion." Kerni Anderson of WOCN radio said he called in almost all openings. When asked to explain further he said that he would not call the bank for a news director, "but certainly I would for clerical jobs." Bill Brazzil indicated that his station would purposely avoid the bank on occasion in order that WTVJ would not take more than its share of the bank's applicants. Sid Levene said that he had directed his department heads to call upon the bank as often as possible. As was explained earlier in this chapter, the question of "initiation" of information flow on job openings did not appear to be a problem at the South Florida skills bank. Although the coordinator recognized the differences explained above, she did not raise objections to them. Perhaps she received enough calls from broadcasters like Strawn to keep her more than busy in the day-to-day operation of the placement program. Levene and others also commented that they were satisfied with the bank coordinator's contacts with them. "She calls up often enough to keep me aware that I am to
inform her of job openings," said Levene. 79

One problem regarding placement procedures was the coordinator's occasional practice of accompanying applicants to their job interviews at stations. The coordinator claimed that this was to insure "fairness" on the part of the interviewer. From the broadcaster's viewpoint, it sometimes seemed to be an intrusion upon his responsibility in decision-making and a mistrust of his personal judgment. In the case of Deborah Pemberton, as explained on page 185, an applicant had not found a job after several interviews and finally Mitchell accompanied her to the station where she was hired. It was not possible to determine whether the applicant had received fair treatment in the various interviews or whether the coordinator had exerted pressure through her presence when the girl was hired. However, the girl had not intimated any unfairness; she simply stated that they were positions "for which I was not qualified." 80

This evaluation of the placement procedure employed by the South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank has discussed the information available on numbers of minorities placed, problems voiced by broadcasters and bank officials and the extent to which information about job openings was made available to the coordinator. Although one bank official reported in a newspaper interview that 80 per cent of the applicants placed were still on the job in May of 1971, the figure seemed to be more of an estimate than a carefully calculated statistic. 81
Variety of Positions Filled

One of the bank's goals was to place minorities in as many different types of broadcast jobs as possible. Without the opportunity to examine the complete file of applicants placed, it was impossible to determine the numerical success or failure of this aspect of the bank's program. Some observations were written down as the author examined a partial listing of applicants in the bank office. It was dated January of 1972 and included eighty-one persons. They were not alphabeticized or categorized according to job title, station, city or date of placement. Some information was listed concerning job function, however. As much as it was possible to determine, there were fourteen persons in on-the-air positions, fifteen who did engineering or camera work, forty-six in clerical jobs (including receptionist, switchboard and bookkeeping positions), two who held administrative titles and five who could be classified miscellaneous.

This listing indicated that the bank had placed applicants in the major categories of broadcasting but showed a large percentage in clerical jobs. Because it was a partial list, there was no way to determine accurate percentages for total placement. In the miscellaneous category there were varied titles listed. One person was employed at a theater concession stand, two in an urban development project as "counselor" and "arts and crafts" workers, and one person was employed at a television station as an "upholstery repairman."
The list included the name of Sylvia Rolle, the former skills bank coordinator who was "currently unemployed." Although the sheet identified most of the people as working at some job in January of 1972, the title at the top was called "Skills Bank Applicant File for Job Placement." In the interview with the coordinator, Ann Mitchell, the purpose of the listing was not made clear. It may have been a combination listing—including persons without work and those who were seeking better employment. 82

Bank officials and broadcasters did not agree on whether the bank should place applicants in a large variety of positions. The chairman himself, Bill Brazzil, commented that it was a "broadcasting" bank; he did not feel it should be broadened to include print media, advertising agencies or general communications areas. 83 Strawn had exactly the opposite opinion, feeling that the bank should provide assistance to as many types of employers as possible. 84 Levene said he would "rather see the bank build vertically up into training programs, not build out into a broader base serving more industries." 85 Another question which made it difficult to evaluate the bank's effectiveness concerning this goal was the matter of "listing accuracy" and whether all the people listed in various jobs had actually been placed directly through the bank's efforts. Interview statements and file materials did not provide clear answers on this matter.
Applicant Training

Another goal of the South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank was applicant training. The reader is reminded that Brazzil placed this training goal in a secondary position in terms of the bank's responsibilities. He seemed to identify the REI scholarship program as an experiment rather than a major project. Although Brazzil wanted to see other training programs develop, he emphasized the fact that recruitment and placement goals of the bank were of primary importance.

Although Brazzil was not asked directly about the success of the scholarship training program, it was clear to the author that he was dissatisfied with the performance of the two graduates. Neither Brazzil nor Mitchell had any idea of the graduates' whereabouts, and both agreed that neither graduate had repaid any of the loan given to him. In May of 1971, Mitchell was questioned on the matter of repayment by Bette Markus, television editor for the Ft. Lauderdale News. At that time Mitchell replied that the graduates "made an effort" after they had been placed in engineering positions. Perhaps they had made some effort, but there was no evidence to support it in the interviews conducted for this research.

There had been difficulty generating broadcaster support for the scholarship programs at both the local skills banks discussed thus far. In San Francisco, the OEO grant
was provided on the basis that local broadcasters would make part-time positions available to students receiving grant support, but bank officials had trouble finding more than four openings for the program. In Miami, scholarship money was pooled by broadcasters and loaned to engineering students, but there was evidence that the broadcasters were not providing sufficient support for the program. The Miami research did not indicate why the broadcasters were dissatisfied with the program although they may have been skeptical about the loan repayment plan. Perhaps the men had become accustomed to having Brazzil pay all bank expenses, and they could not justify making regular payments into the scholarship fund. Some of the men paid only a few dollars each year, and they probably saw no reason why Brazzil could not pick up these expenses. Brazzil's reasoning for the plan emphasized the "group effort" which he wanted the scholarship program to reflect. He would probably have had better group support if he had called the men together to discuss matters such as the scholarship program.

Relationship with the National Office

The South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank seemed to have a closer working relationship with the national office than did the Bay Area bank in San Francisco. The only explanation for this difference was the comment by Bill Brazzil that the national coordinator, George Norford, visited the South Florida bank quite often--four to six times a year. This
regularity of visits was supported by Ann Mitchell who said that George Norford had contributed much to the success of the South Florida bank through his close contact with the operation. Mitchell seemed to know Norford personally whereas Gay Cobb in San Francisco said she had only met him once. In several of the "weekly reports" which Mitchell had submitted to Brazzil, there were comments about telephone calls from Norford making requests for samples of promotional materials, application forms and employee requisition forms. He was probably sending these samples to other local banks because he had told the author in New York that he considered the Miami bank one of the best in the country.

There was no indication that the Miami officials or national office officials ever questioned the idea that Brazzil should maintain the skills bank at Wometco Enterprises permanently. Although there was a common understanding that the general procedure was to rotate chairmen in local banks, both Brazzil and Norford felt that the permanent Miami location was an asset to the operation. The fact that the application form carried identifications for both the skills bank and Wometco Enterprises was indication that no change was anticipated. However, this was the only evidence which directly linked the bank with Wometco. The bank letterhead and promotional materials carried only the station address, not the call letters WTVJ or the name Wometco. Most references to the bank were designed to have it understood as an
"industry" effort, just like other local banks. In fact, a July, 1970, article in the *Liberty News* said that the bank "grew out of the recognition by several broadcasters that they had a responsibility to the community." The South Florida bank's connection with Wometco made it a much more secure operation—no evidence indicated that it had ever been inactive.

Because the South Florida bank had a closer relationship with the national office, it had also developed contacts with other local banks. Ann Mitchell said she had been in touch with broadcasters in several states to send and receive applicants who wanted to relocate. She felt it provided a better source of applicants if she could draw upon other cities and states, but Sid Levene said it made the hiring job more difficult.

The department heads here tell me that if they put in an order to the bank there's a better than 50-50 chance that they will be referred to somebody who is not in Miami or Florida—for example, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania. . . . I don't think that should be more than 50 per cent of the input. We have difficulty getting people over here.

This statement was supported by one of the "Applicant Profiles" listings which were sent out to broadcasters in the Miami area. It included a number of applicants who were currently employed in broadcasting in such cities as Chicago, Ann Arbor and New York City.

As an illustration of the way in which people came to the South Florida bank from out of state, the author was
introduced to Hal Grey, a newsman at WIAI radio in Miami. He had been working for a television station in New England in January, 1972, and talked with a friend who told him of a job opening in Florida. He was given Ann Mitchell's name and contacted her. In the same month he visited Ann and did an audition for the station. By February he had been hired for the job. Grey said he did not want to relocate but was looking for a more satisfying job. It is likely that his friend heard of the opening because Ann Mitchell wrote or called somebody at a station or at a skills bank in the New England area.

Summary

This chapter has examined the South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank located at Miami, Florida. Since its establishment in 1969, this local bank has been administered by one chairman, the manager of a Miami television station. The coordinator's salary and other bank expenses were covered by the chairman. As in the Bay Area Broadcast Skills Bank, a scholarship program had been attempted with only limited success. The bank's organization and operation were described, and its program was evaluated on the basis of goals which had been stated by bank officials. The South Florida bank had a close working relationship with the national office and had communicated with broadcasters in other cities and states to place applicants in various parts of the country.

A significant factor in the organizational structure
of this bank was its close interrelationship with one television station. The South Florida bank was actually a part of Wometco Enterprises, the company which owned the television station managed by the bank chairman. From the beginning of the bank, every step had been carefully planned by the national chairman, Donald McGannon, and the local chairman, Bill Brazzil. Brazzil selected a coordinator before he called the other broadcasters together to establish the bank program. He set the bank's policy and informed the other broadcasters of their responsibilities instead of having a local committee for decision making.

The chairman wanted to be a top administrator and nothing more. Brazzil made his public service director a second level administrative person in the bank operation in order that he would not have to handle every detail of the program. He also gave the coordinator a reasonable amount of freedom to take care of office procedures and placement activities. It was significant to note that these three people located at one station acted as "the bank" in South Florida although the news releases and other publicity from the bank identified it as a cooperative effort among all broadcasters in the area.

One of the issues raised in this chapter was the matter of broadcaster participation in the bank program. It seemed that the chairman and his station made all the decisions. However, broadcast executives did not seem
interested in increasing their involvement in the decision-making process. They simply wanted to be listed as members of the bank because it identified them with a program designed to involve minority group members in the broadcast industry. This kind of affiliation would be especially important to them at license renewal time because it could be listed on the renewal application submitted to the Federal Communications Commission.
NOTES

1Interview with Ann Mitchell, Coordinator, South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank, Miami, Florida, August 10, 1972.
3Interview with Jeanne Nicoll, WTVJ Public Service Director, Miami, Florida, August 9, 1972.
5Interview with Jeanne Nicoll.
7Interview with Bill Brazzil.
8Ibid.
10Ibid.
11Letter from Bill Brazzil to member managers of the South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank, dated February 3, 1970.
12Interview with Sid Levene, General Manager, WKAT radio, Miami Florida, August 11, 1972.
13Interview with Jeanne Nicoll.
14Interview with Bill Brazzil.
15Ibid.
16Jeanne Nicoll, Résumé.

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Interview with Ann Mitchell.

Interview with Bill Brazzil.

Interview with James Strawn, Comptroller, WOID radio, Miami, Florida, August 9, 1972.

Interview with Bill Brazzil.

Interview with Jeanne Nicoll.


Interview with Ann Mitchell.

Ibid.

Interview with Sid Levene.

Interview with Ann Mitchell.

Telephone interview with Willard Fair, Executive Director, Greater Miami Urban League, Miami, Florida, October 24, 1972.


The 1971 Year End Report.

Ibid.

South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank, promotional New Year's greeting card, 1972.

South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank, "Career Opportunities in Broadcasting," a promotional folder, nd.

Interview with Ann Mitchell.

Ibid.

Letter from Bill Brazzil to members of the South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank, dated August 5, 1970.

Ibid.

Letter from Bill Brazzil to Reginald Martin, Vice-
President and General Manager, WGBS, Miami, Florida, dated December 11, 1970.

40 Interview with Ann Mitchell.

41 Interview with Bill Brazzil.

42 Letter from Bill Brazzil to John Spottswood, President and General Manager of WKWF, Key West, Florida, February 11, 1971.

43 Interview with John Broner, Accountant, WIOD radio, Miami, Florida, August 9, 1972.

44 Interview with Deborah Pemberton, Receptionist, WGBS radio, Miami, Florida, August 11, 1972.


46 Interview with Dorothy Bruton, Traffic Manager, WAIA radio, Miami, Florida, August 9, 1972.

47 Interview with Evonne West, Clerk stenographer, WTVJ television, Miami, Florida, August 11, 1972.

48 Interview with Willard Rawls, Cameraman, WPLG television, Miami, Florida, August 11, 1972.

49 Interview with Pat Harrell, Secretary to the Accountant, WTVJ television, Miami, Florida, August 11, 1972.

50 Interview with Bill Brazzil.


53 The 1971 Year End Report.

54 Interview with Ann Mitchell.

55 Interview with Sid Levene.

56 Ibid.

57 Interview with Douglas Craven.

58 Interview with Jeanne Nicoll.
The 1971 Year End Report.

Interview with Willard Rawls.

Interview with Patricia Harrell.

Interview with Deborah Pemberton.

Interview with Evonne West.

Letter from Bill Brazzil to managers dated February 3, 1970.

The 1971 Year End Report.

Interview with Bill Brazzil.

Interview with Ann Mitchell.

Interview with Kerni Anderson, General Manager, WOCN radio, Miami, Florida, August 9, 1972.

Interview with Jim Strawn.

Interview with Sid Levene.

Bette Markus, "Industry Banks on Needs."


Interview with Bill Brazzil.

Interview with Ann Mitchell.

Interview with Jim Strawn.

Interview with Kerni Anderson.

Interview with Bill Brazzil.

Interview with Sid Levene.

Ibid.

Interview with Deborah Pemberton.


Interview with Bill Brazzil.
Interview with Jim Strawn.

Interview with Sid Levene.

Interviews with Bill Brazzil and Ann Mitchell.

Bette Markus, "Industry Banks on Needs."


Interview with Sid Levene.

Early in 1969 officials at the national office of the Broadcast Skills Bank in New York contacted broadcasters in Columbus, Ohio, to investigate the possibility of a local bank in that city. Donald McGannon talked with Richard Borel, Vice-President and General Manager of WBNS radio and television in Columbus, and Borel agreed to become chairman of the bank. At a June luncheon, Donald McGannon and George Norford joined Richard Borel and other broadcasters in the city as the local bank was officially established. Although the Columbus Urban League and other minority organizations were represented at the luncheon, they were not involved in the decision-making structure of the organization. The officers of the Columbus bank were broadcast executives, and the only organizations included at local committee meetings were local broadcast stations.

Chairman Borel appointed a WBNS television personality, Charles (Chuck) White, as the coordinator of the bank. Problems developed when White's work load increased and he found it difficult to handle both station and skills bank
responsibilities. The situation became even more serious when he was promoted to public affairs director and still continued in responsibilities as talent, producer and coordinator of the skills bank. Skills bank applicants found it difficult to contact White because of his studio responsibilities, and the time he had available for the bank was increasingly restricted. Sometimes he was unable to do more than distribute the incoming application forms to broadcasters at other stations. When the bank developed a training program for minority group members, White was asked to do the initial screening of applicants and to work closely with each trainee as a counselor or tutor. This matter of the coordinator's work load will be discussed in detail as the chapter develops.

There was only one other officer to assist the chairman and coordinator of the Columbus bank. A scholarship chairman was appointed to consider scholarship training programs which the bank should undertake. David Abbott, General Manager of WLW-C television, had the responsibility and was involved in the training program which the bank started early in 1971. There were no formal meetings of the three officers. The local committee meetings themselves were informal "information-sharing" meetings where the coordinator discussed recent application forms turned in and asked the broadcasters what openings they had available.

Of the fifty applicants which the bank placed during
its two and a half year history, at least thirty were employed by the chairman's and coordinator's station, WBNS. This was the cause of some complaint from executives at other stations who said that the bank was not benefiting all stations equally. One broadcaster was irritated when he learned that WBNS personnel had made decisions about the bank without informing other members of the local committee. This issue of cooperation among broadcasters will be discussed further in this chapter.

When some disinterest was developing at the local committee meetings early in 1971, one of the broadcasters suggested that the bank begin a training program in conjunction with the Ohio State University's educational stations. Funds were pooled and two minority group members were trained and placed at local radio stations. There were mixed reactions among the broadcasters concerning the value of this kind of training, however, and the program was terminated because individual stations were developing their own minority training programs. The development of this project and its value to broadcasters will be analyzed in the latter part of this chapter.

In December, 1971, the local committee in Columbus decided to cease operation of the skills bank. The factors involved in the decision will be discussed in detail in the evaluation section of this chapter. For one thing, Richard Borel retired from his position with WBNS and his work with
the skills bank. He had been a dynamic leader of bank activities who kept interest high among all broadcasters in the city. A second factor related to the bank's termination was the work load of the coordinator and his feeling that the task was too large for one man. The competition among Columbus broadcasters was also a factor, and the local committee had come to a point where regular meetings no longer seemed necessary or appropriate.

The relationship of the national office of the Broadcast Skills Bank to the Columbus bank will be discussed in the evaluation section of this chapter. National office personnel rarely visited Columbus. Several weeks after the Columbus chairman and coordinator had resigned, the national coordinator was unaware that the bank was not functioning as usual. This matter will be analyzed further at several points in this chapter.

The next section of this chapter reviews the sources consulted in preparation for the writing of this study of the Columbus bank. Then follows a section on the establishment of the bank and issues involved in the first few months of its operation. The fourth section explains the organization of the Columbus bank and its three officers. The fifth section is an analysis of the bank's operation in terms of local committee action, applicant placement, publicity efforts and the scholarship training program. Then the final section of the chapter provides an evaluation of the bank's effectiveness
in accomplishing its goals in Columbus. This will include an analysis of the reasons for the bank's termination of activity. It will also discuss the bank's relationship to the national office in New York.

Sources Consulted

The primary sources for this study of the Columbus Broadcast Skills Bank were interviews with broadcast executives who had participated in the bank's local committee. These personal interviews conducted with radio and television managers were supplemented with interviews with minority group members who had been assisted by the bank. Because the author had been informed at the national office that local banks usually worked closely with local Urban League offices, the Columbus Urban League director was interviewed as a part of this study.

When the field research on the Columbus bank was conducted in 1972, written materials were examined at the office of the bank coordinator, the Ohio State University broadcast stations (where training was conducted) and newspaper offices. The author examined a report by Michael Taylor, a graduate student at Ohio State University, who had evaluated the scholarship training program conducted by the Columbus bank. The author also used a news release published by the university in 1972 which announced that the training program would be using university facilities.

The broadcast executives were interviewed only a few
months after the bank's local committee had decided to cease operation. They were hesitant to respond to some questions because the decision to terminate was still fresh in their minds. They asked the author how their statements would be used and if there was some effort to revitalize the bank. One executive asked if the questioning was related to the fact that Ohio broadcasters had to renew their licenses in 1973. It seemed that the decision to close the bank had been reached after heated discussion at the local committee meeting. Most of the broadcasters hedged on the question of whether the bank should be reopened because no one wanted to be listed as being responsible for its closing. On the other hand, every broadcaster provided a strong argument for his own training program and explained that it was superior to anything that the bank had accomplished.

Although no one refused to be interviewed, several broadcasters said they had already received one or two other requests for information about the skills bank. Only one of the sources was identified—a questionnaire from the black newspaper in Columbus, the Call and Post, which was sent to broadcast executives in August, 1972. According to one manager, the questionnaire was several pages in length and asked for a detailed breakdown of statistics on each station's hiring and programming practices as related to minority group members and community needs. It also asked pointed questions about the extent to which each station had participated in
the Columbus skills bank program. The manager, who did not wish to be identified, said he had sent the questionnaire to his legal counsel, and it had not been returned to the Call and Post.

Because the local bank had recently ceased activity, license renewal time was drawing near and one or two skills bank questionnaires had already come to these executives, they seemed less willing to express their opinions than had the executives in Florida and California. The author explained that the research was for dissertation purposes and that the recorded interviews would be restricted to this use. Once this had been clarified, there was no objection to the recording or questioning. However, some answers were provided only with the understanding that their sources would be kept confidential.

In addition to the interviews with broadcast executives, the author talked with the director of the Columbus Urban League and several minority group members who had been assisted by the bank. In this latter group the author included both applicants who were trained in the Columbus bank's scholarship program conducted at the Ohio State University broadcast facilities.

Written material consulted for the research included articles in three Columbus newspapers, letters written by the bank chairman and coordinator and a number of internal office memorandums in the files of the bank coordinator and the
director of the university radio and television stations. A research project on the scholarship training program was conducted by Michael Taylor, a graduate student, in late 1971 to evaluate the instructional objectives of the bank training. His written report is discussed in the evaluation section of this chapter.

When this research began in 1972, the chairman of the Columbus Broadcast Skills Bank had already retired and moved to another part of the country. The author wrote Richard Borel and asked questions about the Columbus bank. Borel's written reply was cordial and brief, suggesting the names of other executives at WBNS who would have "all the information necessary."¹ It was apparent that Borel did not want to comment on the bank following his retirement from WBNS. Richard Wolfe was a vice-president under Borel during the operation of the Columbus bank and moved into Borel's position as president at the time of Borel's retirement. Wolfe was interviewed at length about the bank and seemed eager to assist in the research on behalf of the former chairman.

In summary, the primary sources consulted for this research included a variety of personal interviews with broadcast executives and minority group members. Written materials were used to substantiate what had been reported in the interviews and to fill some gaps in the chronology of the bank's development. The written sources included office memorandums, letters, a news release, research report and
newspaper articles from three Columbus newspapers. The broadcasters interviewed were concerned because they did not want their remarks to identify them as uninterested in minority hiring—the bank had ceased operation just a few months before the interviews were conducted.

Establishment of the Columbus Broadcast Skills Bank

Early in 1969, Donald McGannon contacted Richard Borel, President of WBNS radio and television, to discuss the possibility of setting up a skills bank in Columbus. Richard Wolfe was a WBNS vice-president in 1969 and was involved in some of the skills bank planning. Wolfe did not recall whether McGannon and Borel met at a convention or if McGannon called Borel by telephone. However, Wolfe and other broadcasters confirmed the fact that there was no interest in a Columbus bank until McGannon suggested the idea. Borel agreed that the bank was needed in the city, and when McGannon asked him to be the chairman, he accepted. Borel asked Chuck White, a black television personality at WBNS, to be the coordinator. According to Wolfe, White had developed a close working relationship with Borel on other projects and agreed to serve as coordinator of the bank.

McGannon sent George Norford to Columbus in April to help set up the bank program. He met with various executives at WBNS and other stations and talked at length with Borel and White about the way the bank operated in other cities.
Then a date was established for the "kick-off luncheon" and Norford returned to New York. He kept in touch with Borel by phone as plans were finalized.

On June 11, 1969, the luncheon was held at a Columbus hotel; Wolfe estimated the attendance at 250. According to a Columbus Dispatch article, "every broadcasting facility, commercial and educational radio and television in Columbus was represented." The meeting was hosted by the WBNS stations and attendance was large because stations had each been asked to bring "several administrators or supervisors." Leaders of organizations representing minority group members were in attendance according to Richard Wolfe. He mentioned the Urban League in particular but said the leaders of several similar social service agencies were present.

The luncheon program featured McGannon as the main speaker, introduced by Richard Borel. Norford also spoke to the group. The speeches included brief references to successful bank operations in other cities, the need for training of "qualifiable applicants" and the interest of Ohio State University academic departments such as the School of Journalism. Norford referred to the value of "visibility in the industry" and illustrated the need for blacks on television by citing examples such as Diahann Carroll, Flip Wilson and others.

In the weeks following the luncheon, Borel and White worked out the details of the bank operation. Norford called
Borel often by telephone and urged him to activate the "local committee" procedure with other broadcasters in the city. Borel delegated this responsibility to Chuck White who began to establish a schedule of meetings and work out plans for the placing of applicants. White indicated it was unfortunate that Norford made all his contacts with Borel. "He should have been in touch with me because I was the one actually doing the work," said White.

In summary, the Columbus Broadcast Skills Bank was established because Donald McGannon asked a leading broadcaster in the city, Richard Borel, to generate interest and develop a working program with other broadcast executives. The luncheon and other preliminary steps in the bank's establishment were comparable to those in other cities. The Urban League and similar organizations were represented in the initial stage of the bank development although no one from the League spoke at the luncheon. Following the luncheon, the coordinator, Chuck White, was given increasing responsibilities in the bank operation, but he was seldom contacted by the national coordinator, George Norford. Norford's phone calls and letters usually went to chairman Borel, a procedure which White did not appreciate.

Organization of the Columbus Broadcast Skills Bank

As the organization of the Columbus Broadcast Skills Bank began to take shape in late 1969 and early 1970,
chairman Borel considered what appointments should be made in addition to the coordinator. He asked David Abbott, Vice-President and General Manager of WLW-C television, to serve as scholarship chairman for the bank. Based on the information available, these three officers were the only positions involved in the leadership of the Columbus bank. Each of the individuals who occupied these positions will be examined in this section of the chapter along with some discussion of their respective duties.

**Chairman**

Richard Borel graduated from Ohio State University in 1934 with a major in business administration. He became business manager of WBNS radio in the same year and was promoted to general manager for radio in 1937. In 1949 he was promoted to general manager for radio and television at WBNS and remained in that position seventeen years before he became president of the operation. When he accepted the skills bank chairmanship in 1969, he was a member of more than a dozen boards and past chairman of several civic groups. In addition he had served as chairman of the CBS Television Affiliates Advisory Board and as a member of the National Association of Broadcasters Television Code Review Board.

Richard Wolfe explained Borel's intense interest in the bank as a significant need for Columbus broadcasters in 1969. Borel was "intrigued with the idea as a personal project" and gave special time and attention to the bank to make
it succeed. Chuck White said that Borel picked up McGannon's suggestion about the bank quickly and took it "by the horns to spearhead what happened." In conversations with Columbus broadcasters, the author detected the feeling that the bank might never have started in that city if Borel had not been the man McGannon decided to contact.

In his responsibilities as chairman, Borel maintained contact with the national office and motivated local broadcast executives to participate in the bank and support its programs of placement and training. His contact with the national office was with Norford rather than McGannon. Although he may have talked briefly with McGannon in the weeks and months following the initial luncheon, Chuck White said that most of Borel's contacts were with Norford. Instead of dealing with Columbus broadcasters directly, Borel assigned Chuck White to this job. There was no evidence that Borel kept up written and telephone communication with local broadcasters the way Bill Brazzil had done in the South Florida bank. Instead, Chuck White held local committee meetings with the men and discussed available applicants.

Perhaps Richard Borel discovered in 1970 that the skills bank was developing into a more demanding responsibility than he had realized when he accepted the chairmanship. He did contribute much time and effort in 1969 when the bank was established but delegated much of the work to the coordinator in 1970 and 1971. Broadcasters who commented on
the last two years spoke of Chuck White as the key person in the operation. Once Borel got the organization structured, he turned most of the day-to-day procedural matters over to White. Bill Brazzil had proceeded in a similar manner in the South Florida bank. Brazzil gave Ann Mitchell much responsibility and authority in the second year of that bank's operation. He even had Mitchell report to his public service director and assistant manager to separate himself further from minute operational details.

Coordinator

Chuck White was first employed at WBNS television in 1957 as an assistant in the news department. He transferred to several other departments in the years which followed, serving as floor director, talent for a children's program, film editor and producer. He had come to WBNS with a degree in psychology from Ohio State University. As his responsibilities with the station developed, he became involved with a number of community organizations including Citizens Research, Planned Parenthood, the Ohio Council of Churches, the Urban League and the NAACP. He made personal appearances in the community as speaker and singer, having copyrighted 125 songs of his own. Some of his music was used as advertising jingles on stations in the Columbus area.13

As an active and personable member of the WBNS television staff, White was Borel's choice for coordinator of the Columbus Broadcast Skills Bank. Other broadcast executives
knew him because they had seen him on the air. Leaders of minority group organizations knew him as a friend and fellow member. White told the author that he took the job because he "enjoyed doing something for my own people." However, he admitted that the work became burdensome after the first two years, particularly when he was appointed public affairs director of the station in August, 1971. It seemed that more responsibilities were being added but none were transferred away from his office.

As coordinator of the Columbus Broadcast Skills Bank, Chuck White was initially responsible for the recruiting and placement of applicants at radio and television stations in the city. This involved publicity, interviewing applicants, evaluating and maintaining a file of application forms and communicating with broadcasters about the applicants who were available for job openings. As a special training program was developed by the bank early in 1971, White was given a considerable responsibility for its operation. He was to select applicants for the program, maintain close contact with them during their training (as a kind of counselor-tutor) and place them in broadcast positions soon after their graduation. This was a significant task because the plan called for two applicants to be in training at all times. In addition, a new graduate was to be ready for placement every three months. White said it was like carrying two full-time jobs at once during that period of increased bank activity.
The coordinator's position with the Columbus Broadcast Skills Bank required only fifteen to twenty hours per week when the bank was established in 1969. But the requirements multiplied as more and more applicants were processed—especially when the training program was developed.\textsuperscript{16} The local chairman or national officials should have planned for an increased work load in the coordinator's office when they saw how fast the project was developing. Perhaps the coordinator should have been given a full-time position with no WBNS responsibilities in 1971 when the work increased. Another alternative would have been the hiring of a new full-time bank coordinator at the time Chuck White was promoted to public affairs director in August, 1971. As will become more evident later in this chapter, the overload of work in the coordinator's office was one of the factors which led to the termination of activity in the Columbus skills bank.

\textbf{Scholarship Chairman}

David Abbott began his career in broadcasting in the sales department of WBZ-TV, a Westinghouse Broadcasting station in Boston. For several years he served as northwest sales manager for the Official Films Company. From 1957 to 1968 he was general sales manager of WHDH-TV, Boston. Abbott became sales manager at WLW-T, Cincinnati, in 1968 and was promoted to vice-president and general manager of WLW-C, Columbus, in March of 1969. He was a member of numerous civic organizations and had served as chairman or president
of community groups throughout the Columbus area. 17

As chairman of the Columbus bank's scholarship committee, Abbott was concerned with financial assistance programs for minority group members who would "not normally have the opportunity to go to college." 18 The bank in Columbus was designed with long-range goals to assist young people who wanted to train and work hard to advance within the industry, not simply to find "a job to tide them over until they find something else." 19 According to Abbott, his major role as scholarship chairman was to work out the details of a training program developed by the Columbus bank in cooperation with the Ohio State University's educational broadcast facilities. He helped screen some of the applicants by reviewing their application forms. Abbott had extensive experience with training programs because he had helped develop staff training programs for personnel at AVCO Broadcasting Corporation of which his station was a part. Although his own station had a training program in 1971, Abbott felt it would still be useful to develop a city-wide effort to train minority group members and place them in all radio and television stations. 20

As the skills bank training program developed, the broadcasters contributed to a scholarship fund which paid the salaries of minority group members while they were in training at the university facilities. Once the first applicant entered the training program, officials at the university
took over the training program and Abbott's involvement was minimal. He supported the program and felt that it was a "workable idea" at the time, but after two applicants had been trained he said that "local station training is probably more satisfactory." His reactions and those of other broadcasters will be discussed further in the evaluation section of this chapter.

The organizational structure of the Columbus Broadcast Skills Bank did not involve formal meetings of the three officers discussed above because there were frequent telephone calls and contacts at the local committee meetings when the officers could discuss matters. In the author's discussions with the individual officers, however, it seemed that the bank chairman and coordinator conferred seldom with the scholarship chairman. Although Abbott did not explain the matter in detail, he said that it was unfortunate when "WBNS officials made decisions about the bank without informing other members of the local committee." Because WBNS and WLW-C were major competitors in the Columbus market, it was understandable that this kind of communication gap could make serious problems for the bank. This factor of industry-competition will be discussed further in the evaluation section of this chapter.

In summary, the organization of the Columbus Broadcast Skills Bank involved three officers who did not have formal meetings but who were in contact as there was time at local
committee meetings. The chairman, coordinator and scholarship chairman each had distinctive responsibilities, but the coordinator's role became too much for one man to handle as bank programs and responsibilities increased in the third year of operation.

Operation of the Columbus Broadcast Skills Bank

The activities of the Columbus Broadcast Skills Bank can be discussed in four major categories. This section will discuss the work of the local committee of broadcasters, placement procedures used by the Columbus bank, the bank's publicity efforts and the scholarship program developed in conjunction with the Ohio State University. Following the examination of the bank's operation, this section will describe the experiences of several minority group members who were assisted by the Columbus bank.

Local Committee Functions

The local committee was composed of the managers of all Columbus radio and television stations. Some of the members attended the committee meetings more often than others. The group met approximately every three months to discuss current job openings at broadcast stations and minority group applicants who were available. David Abbott remembered six to eight of these meetings and said there were times when more than three months elapsed between sessions.
Borel and White would call the group together and ask each station representative to bring information about current openings or future openings at radio and television stations. White was in charge during most of each meeting, discussing applicants he had met and passing out application forms which had been completed by minority group members. If any of the broadcasters had openings, they were encouraged to discuss them at the meeting or ask about particular kinds of personnel which might be available through the bank.

Often the broadcasters would take application forms with them to study further, or they would receive application forms through the mail from Chuck White. They were to report back to White on any of their openings which applicants seemed qualified to fill. Occasionally they would take a "qualifiable" rather than a "qualified" applicant and provide on-the-job training. During the first year the bank office was working with the local committee mainly as an "information agency," according to the coordinator. Instead of the coordinator trying to match applicants and jobs himself, he simply distributed application forms and let the broadcasters decide for themselves which were appropriate for their operation.

One broadcaster said the first two or three meetings of the local committee went well, but then interest lagged because some of the participants felt that the channeling of information could be handled just as effectively by mail.
Sharon DeBord, Vice-President of Administrative Operations for WCOL radio, said that the minority group members and broadcasters needed more information from the bank office. "When the applicants were not counselled about the tight job market in broadcasting and the broadcasters had nothing more than an application form, the flow of information was limited." DeBord explained that many bank applicants were looking for on-the-air positions and were not informed of the many other possibilities in broadcasting and communication where jobs were more readily available. She implied that the applicants were not interviewed carefully and therefore the coordinator could not say much about applicants when questions came up at the local committee meetings. "The same thing happened at every meeting," according to Carl Wagner, General Manager of WTVN and WBUK radio. Wagner was referring to the disinterest which developed as broadcasters recognized a routine in the way the meetings were handled.

Early in 1971 there was some renewed interest in the local committee meetings when Abbott, Borel and others began to consider plans for the scholarship training program of the bank. The "scholarship" section of this chapter discusses the program at greater length.

The major work of the local committee was to meet at regular intervals and discuss openings and minority group applicants for work in the Columbus broadcasting industry. This section has discussed the significance of these meetings and
referred to broadcaster reactions concerning the importance of the sessions. Most of the stations were represented at these meetings, but top executives sometimes sent assistants to sit in for them, particularly in the second year when interest began to lag.26 The major problem with the local committee meetings was that the information presented could easily be obtained by reading application forms. Broadcasters would have preferred more insight into the applicants; they would have appreciated more extensive interviewing on the part of the coordinator.

Applicant Placement

Although the Columbus skills bank was located at WBNS television, no special office was designated at the station for bank operations. Because Chuck White was the coordinator, his office became the bank office. During the first two years of the bank, White was a television personality and producer; in the third year he was public affairs director. Whenever minority group members would come to the station seeking employment, they were first asked to fill out a WBNS application and then were sent to see White.27 Much of the time he was in the studio and not available for interviews so the applications were accepted by a secretary to be given to him later. Even after he became public affairs director, he continued to host several regular programs including his own weekly one-hour musical program; this meant that he was never able to give a full week's attention to the
I

Because television studio production schedules changed frequently, it was difficult for secretaries to predict when he would be available for interviewees who wanted appointments.

As applications came in, White sent them to WBNS supervisors or managers of other stations where he felt there might be openings. When the applications were returned, he filed them for future reference. He had no file system for openings because he depended upon the local committee meetings to reveal this information. When it was possible to interview an applicant who came "at the right time" or one who had outstanding recommendations and could be scheduled, White talked with him and tried to ascertain the kind of job he was best suited for.

During the two and one half years of the Columbus bank's operation, the office took in approximately two hundred applications. By March, 1970, the bank had placed seventeen blacks at local stations according to an article in a black newspaper, the Call and Post. By December, 1971, approximately thirty to thirty-five additional minorities had been placed according to Chuck White. White commented that this would make a total of fifty minority group members who had been placed by the bank; he estimated that thirty were placed at WBNS radio or television and twenty were placed at other stations.

Richard Wolfe did not recall exact numbers but said he thought 90 per cent of all applicants hired were employed at WBNS stations. "Not very much use had been made
of the bank by stations other than ourselves," said Wolfe. He reported a total of approximately two hundred employees at WBNS radio and television in 1972, explaining that 13 percent of these employees were minority group members. Of the minority group members employed at WBNS, most of them were black. Wolfe did mention, however, one Indian girl who was at the switchboard.

Other stations found it difficult to hire through the skills bank procedure, but some of the broadcasters interviewed found it difficult to explain why. Carl Wagner of WTVN and WBUK radio said jobs were simply not available.

The problem with the bank was very simple in my opinion. We've got six radio AM stations, commercial, and one non-commercial. We've got three television stations and one non-commercial television, and we have six FM stations. There just are not that many jobs available in the market. . . . There are too many broadcast journalists coming out of college right now to find jobs too.

David Abbott of WLW-C television said he had hired only one person through the bank and "that person did not work out." He said that the person was not qualified as well as it had seemed when he hired him.

The skills bank turned out to be more of an employment agency than anything else. At every meeting we'd go through this long list that Chuck White had developed. We would review them, but our needs didn't always match up with the available people. Also the time of our need never seemed to match up with the times when people were available.

Sharon DeBord of WCOL radio said she had hired three
persons through the bank, and they had worked out satisfactor­
ily, continuing on the job. DeBord had other comments about
the bank's placement program. She said that it became dif­
ficult for her after the first two or three meetings of the
local committee because there were fewer applications cir­
culated each time.

In the beginning we got ten to twelve applications
every six weeks. In the next few months that
number dwindled down to six applications or less
in a group. We just had to have several quali­
fied applicants to draw from and the choice be­
came too limited.35

According to Chuck White, the skills bank had no
direct connections with the Columbus Urban League, "but we
did call each other occasionally and mention an applicant who
might find work at either of our offices."36 He said that the
Urban League had been consulted when the bank was established
in 1969, but no direct ties were set up for the future.
Sharon DeBord said that it would have been more appropriate
to have invited minority group organizations to the local
committee meetings instead of simply limiting the attendance
to broadcasters.37 Another broadcaster who did not wish to
be identified said that Borel "phased out" the Urban League
soon after the bank operation developed.

Robert Brown, Executive Director of the Columbus Urban
League, told the author that his organization had been repre­
sented at the luncheon which initiated the local bank. In
addition, Brown said he was consulted by Richard Borel
before the luncheon took place as George Norford and the others discussed plans for the Columbus operation. Following the luncheon, however, Brown was not invited to participate in the local committee meetings. He was not aware of the bank's activities in terms of numbers placed, stations which participated or values of the bank as perceived by various broadcasters. "After the luncheon they just took the organization themselves and ran with it," said Brown.  

Brown commented that his organization in Columbus had a file of approximately 15,000 minority group members who were seeking work in all types of occupations. On an average, the Columbus Urban League had placed 3,000 persons in jobs each year. Almost 400 of these were placed during one year's time through on-the-job placement programs. Brown said he would like to have contributed more to the Columbus bank but was unable because he was not represented on the local committee. He himself would have represented his organization at committee meetings because he felt the need for his type of organization to be involved in the bank's program. When asked if his office could provide a liaison person to keep in close touch with the skills bank coordinator, Brown commented that this would be "most appropriate and beneficial to both organizations."  

This section on placement procedures has discussed the methods employed by the Columbus Broadcast Skills Bank in recruiting and placing applicants at broadcast stations. It
has included several comments by broadcasters who felt that the placement procedures could be improved. Although it was not mentioned in the quotations in the section above, several broadcasters noted the busy schedule of the coordinator. It seemed that most of the station executives realized that Chuck White was too busy to do an effective job as the skills bank coordinator.

Publicity

When the three skills bank officers were questioned about publicity used by the Columbus bank, they emphasized newspaper articles as the major means utilized. Articles appeared in the Columbus Dispatch, Citizen-Journal or Call and Post announcing that an applicant or group of applicants had been placed or trained over a certain period of time. Articles published in May, June and September of 1971 were found in these papers and will be referred to in later sections of this chapter. The Ohio State University News Service also put out a release in September of 1971 announcing that two persons had been trained by the bank through the scholarship program and the university broadcast facilities.

The Columbus bank did not print any local publicity materials like those used by the South Florida bank. There was no mention of visits to high schools or other gatherings of young people and no regular use of the broadcast media for advertising the bank. On occasion Chuck White or some other
broadcaster would mention the bank as part of a public affairs program, but the bank itself had not produced spots or conducted a publicity campaign through the media to alert minority group members to its existence.

White said that he was too involved with other activities to do much publicity himself. Since two hundred applied to the bank despite its limited publicity, many more would likely have applied if additional publicity efforts had been possible. Then there would probably have been ample applications for all broadcasters at the local committee meetings or mailings of application forms.

**Scholarship Program**

By the end of 1970, the coordinator of the Columbus Broadcast Skills Bank was becoming aware of the difficulties of keeping up his responsibilities with two jobs. White said he was using personal time to accomplish bank work and “getting calls at home from skills bank applicants when I should have been spending time with my family.”40 This increased pressure had an effect upon the local committee meetings, and disinterest was growing among broadcasters. According to Richard Hull, Director of WOSU radio and television, “We were asking ourselves what to do at these meetings and started to evaluate our goals.”41 Hull said the broadcasters had discussed the need for training several times and had referred to the broadcast learning resources available at the university, but no plans had been made.
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I had asked myself a number of times, "What should our contribution to the skills bank be?" We had facilities in both radio and television and a professional staff which had been involved in the training of student and full-time personnel.42

As discussion about training programs developed among the broadcasters at local committee meetings, Hull suggested the idea that bank trainees be sent to his facilities for a six-month formal training period. His stations were university owned and operated and therefore were educationally oriented; it seemed they would be the most appropriate broadcast operations in the city to provide training. In further discussion with the scholarship chairman, David Abbott, a plan was drawn up for the six-month program to be activated. Hull said his staff would contribute the training without cost, and the commercial managers agreed to contribute a fund of about $10,000 to be used to pay applicants during their training. The rate of pay was established at $2.00 per hour; it would therefore cost approximately $2,000 for each applicant's six months of training.43

Once the local committee decided to go ahead with the scholarship training plan, Hull and his assistants at the university stations worked out the details. After the coordinator helped screen applicants, he was to keep in close contact with trainees as they studied at the university, acting as a counselor or tutor where necessary. According to an internal memorandum issued by Hull's director of special projects, John E. Burke, applicants would be screened...
by the skills bank coordinator and then sent to the university stations for further screening before being accepted into the training program. Applicants were to be referred to the university stations only if they met the following qualifications: (1) high school diploma with a reasonable aptitude for training in the broadcast industry; (2) personal disposition with an eagerness and willingness to learn; (3) need for financial assistance in beginning a new career in broadcasting; (4) interest in and talent for some specific area of radio or television; and (5) ability to provide their own transportation to and from university stations.

A university news release quoted William Ewing, Hull's associate, explaining the schedule during a typical six-month training period.

During a trainee's first three months, he will work in different areas such as traffic, production, news, and announcing. Hopefully, the trainee will find something that interests him more than anything else and for which he is better qualified. He will concentrate on a job in that one area in the last three months.

The program was designed to place one trainee in radio and the other in television for each of the six-month training periods. It was desirable to start one applicant every three months in order to stagger the dates when graduates would become available for placement in the commercial stations. Because Hull's stations were providing the training, he made no commitment to hire graduates. The internal
memorandum referred to above stated, "Due to budget restrictions, the [university stations] cannot guarantee employment beyond the training period."\(^{46}\)

The training program was designed to allow applicants to select one of several "emphases" as they moved into the last three months of their training in either radio or television. These emphases were listed as follows:

- Radio or Television Programming or Administration
- Production-Direction
- Audio Recording
- Photography, Graphics
- News Reporting and Editing
- Traffic and Continuity
- Engineering and Technical Operations
- Publicity and Promotion\(^{47}\)

The first trainee in the program completed his work in October of 1971 and was placed at a Columbus radio station as a newscaster. The second applicant was scheduled to finish the training in March, 1972. However, during the training of the second applicant at the university stations, the bank's local committee meetings ceased because Chuck White's new position as public affairs director at WBNS had demanded increasingly greater amounts of his time. A special meeting was called in December, 1971, and the broadcasters decided to discontinue operation of the bank.\(^{48}\) This termination of bank operations will be discussed further in the evaluation section of this chapter.

Hull and his associates at the university stations decided that they should continue to train applicants until they had used up the funds contributed by commercial
broadcasters. Thus, the second applicant finished the training in March, 1972, and was employed as a disk jockey at a Columbus radio station. The third is scheduled to complete his work in March, 1973. According to university officials, only three applicants could be trained with the money available because some of the commercial stations did not contribute, making the total funding for the project approximately $6,500 instead of the $10,000 which was originally projected.49

Broadcasters in Columbus who were asked to evaluate the training program generally said that it looked better on paper than it did in actual operation. One supervisor referred to it as a "farce" because it cost too much money for the type of training which the applicants received. Carl Wagner of WTVN and WBUK said it was a "sizable amount" to contribute, especially because he had to "retrain" one of the graduates who was placed at his station. "The university stations do not operate like commercial stations, and they can't train personnel for my needs," he said.50 He said he had his own training program for minority group members and would rather train his employees himself. Sharon DeBord of WCOL radio said she felt it was unfortunate that the university training program "did not work out." Since she had not been "involved directly with the training" she did not want to comment further.51

David Abbott, the chairman of the bank's scholarship
committee, had the strongest criticism for the university training program. He did not want to criticize the university personnel but said he had "learned a lot" through the experience with the training program and did not agree with the concept that stations could set up a central training program. "We may have needed it several years ago, but we don't need it now because most of the stations in Columbus now have developed training programs of their own." Because of his disagreement with the concept, he said that the funds had not been used effectively. This was not a reflection upon the university stations' efforts; it was an admission on Abbott's part that he and other bank officials had made a mistake when they thought the central training program would work.

This section has discussed the scholarship training program attempted by the Columbus Broadcast Skills Bank. The program was developed early in 1971 when bank officials felt that broadcasters were becoming disinterested in the bank. They decided to develop a training program because they had recognized a need for training in many of the applicants they had discussed at local committee meetings. Officials at the Ohio State University stations worked out the details of the training program, and commercial broadcasters contributed to a fund used to pay the applicants' hourly wages during their training. Although the training program accepted three applicants, local committee meetings were discontinued because
of the coordinator's busy schedule, and there was a decision to terminate operation of the Columbus bank as the last two applicants completed their training. Broadcasters expressed appreciation for the university stations' efforts but felt that they should set up their own training programs at each station instead of continuing the "central training" project.

Experiences of Bank Applicants

To examine the operation of the Columbus skills bank further, this section will summarize the experiences of several black applicants who were assisted by the bank. Because of the significance of the bank's scholarship training program, the author interviewed each of the three trainees who were accepted for scholarships through the bank. In addition, three other applicants were questioned about the way the bank assisted them in finding employment in broadcasting.

**Erwin Cochran** was the first applicant to be accepted in the scholarship training program. He graduated from a Columbus high school and began working as a producer at Capsoul, a Columbus record-production company. He obtained part-time work at WBNS television and WLW-C television as a delivery truck driver but was never able to move up into on-the-air work. In March, 1971, he talked with Chuck White and was referred to the university stations for interviews as a possible skills bank trainee. He was accepted and trained from April through October, 1971. At the conclusion
of his training, he was hired by WCOL radio as a full-time news reporter.55

Thomas (Tom) Pope completed two years of broadcast studies at Ohio State University in the Department of Speech.56 He heard about the skills bank through students at the university and went to see Chuck White in August of 1971. White referred him to officials at the university stations, and Pope was accepted as the second trainee in the bank program. His training period concluded in March, 1972, and he was employed as the host of an evening jazz music program on WBUK-FM in Columbus. After working at WBUK for several months, Pope decided to continue his studies in broadcasting at Howard University in Washington, D.C.57

Eddie Dozier graduated from a Columbus high school and found work in a local grocery store. While on that job he continued to look for other work and became interested in the field of broadcasting. He visited a black station in Columbus, WVKO, and befriended Les Brown, one of the announcers there. As Dozier continued to visit Brown at the station on evenings and weekends, Brown took a personal interest in him and suggested he apply for training at the skills bank. In July, 1972, Dozier talked with Chuck White who said Dozier should go directly to William Ewing at the university stations to inquire about the training program there. Ewing asked several staff members to interview Dozier, and he was accepted as the bank's third and final trainee. He began
training in September, 1972, and is scheduled to complete the course in March of 1973.58

Gamalial (Skip) Hilson graduated from Ohio State University in the summer of 1970 with a major in speech education. As he began to look for employment in the broadcast industry, a friend told him that there were openings at WBNS television. Hilson was directed to Chuck White, but he did not remember whether White was identified with the bank or simply WBNS television. He made an appointment with White and was interviewed in October, 1970. Approximately one month later he received a phone call from WBNS and was asked to come in to discuss a "skills bank opening" in the news department. Near the end of November he was hired as a news reporter. After a short period of training he was assigned to cover news stories in various parts of the city and also placed on the air as a studio reporter.59

Sandra Byers was working at a youth camp and looking for year-round employment when she met the director of the Ohio Youth Commission in 1969. He suggested that she investigate WBNS because he had heard of the skills bank operation. When she saw Chuck White in August, he said there was an opening for a film editor and she could be trained for the position. She was interviewed by a supervisor and hired for the job on August 4. In January of 1971, Byers was promoted to assistant to the production director for WBNS television.60

Michael Reeves was unemployed in 1969 and interested
in broadcasting as a career. He saw an article in the Columbus Dispatch about the skills bank and talked with Chuck White. Three months later White contacted him about an opening at WLW-C television for a floor director. Reeves was interested and hired for the position. While working at WLW-C he became acquainted with a staff member at WVKO radio, a black station in the Columbus market. Reeves did an audition for the station and was hired as a weekend announcer. After one year in his work with WLW-C, he left the television station to accept full-time employment as a program host at WVKO radio. In May of 1972 he was promoted to music director for the radio station.

In evaluating the experiences of these applicants, it is significant to note that four of the six heard of the bank by word of mouth. One read a newspaper article, and another could not remember how he had heard of the bank. Based on the experiences of the coordinators in San Francisco and Miami, the Columbus bank would have benefited from several carefully planned publicity programs. For example, both Gay Cobb and Ann Mitchell said that their personal appearances at high schools had greatly increased the amount of word-of-mouth publicity they received.

Only one of the six applicants interviewed was a college graduate; two of the applicants had actual broadcast experience before coming to the bank. Also, there were two of the applicants who received promotions in relatively
short periods of time at the stations where they had been employed by the bank. Examining the small amount of formal training and experience which these applicants had, it seems reasonable to conclude the Columbus bank had been successful in locating qualifiable minority group members. In addition, both of the scholarship training applicants were placed in jobs in Columbus radio stations soon after their study was completed. However, one of the trainees, Tom Pope, did comment that he had hoped the bank would get him a job in television. He hoped that a television opening would develop in the near future.

This discussion of the operation of the Columbus Broadcast Skills Bank has examined four major areas of activity in the bank's program. First there was a section on the function of the local committee and the way in which the committee's activities were limited to the sharing of information about bank applicants and positions. Second, the placement procedures employed by the Columbus bank were examined. There were problems in these procedures because the coordinator was unable to be in the office throughout much of the day. The third area of activity discussed was the limited publicity program offered by the bank. It depended upon newspaper articles and word-of-mouth promotion. The final section reviewed and analyzed the scholarship training program conducted by the bank in cooperation with the Ohio State University radio and television stations. The program had been carefully
planned on paper but was somewhat frustrating to the trainees and instructors because it demanded more time, effort and individual attention than was originally projected.

To conclude this discussion of the Columbus Broadcast Skills Bank, the experiences of several applicants were examined. Their experiences illustrated several ways in which the bank benefited minority group members. In the pages which follow, the Columbus bank will be evaluated in further detail, particularly as it was perceived by broadcast executives who participated in the bank program.

**Evaluation Based on Research Interviews**

In his message at the broadcasters' luncheon which opened the Columbus Broadcast Skills Bank, Donald McGannon discussed the organization's objective as "positive discrimination." He explained that the local bank would locate, employ and train qualifiable minority group members. Chuck White reemphasized these three areas of concentration when he was asked about the bank's goals. As the Columbus bank is evaluated in this section, the recruitment, employment and training of minority group members will be discussed as separate goals of the organization. In addition, the matter of the bank's termination of activities will be analyzed as well as the relationship of the Columbus bank to the national office in New York.
Recruitment of Minority Group Members

Over the two and one half year history of the Columbus Broadcast Skills Bank, the coordinator estimated a total of two hundred minority group members who turned in application forms and were listed in the bank's records. There were no statistics available on minority group members other than blacks, but Richard Wolfe said that the predominance of the registrants were of that particular group.65 Most of the applicants who came to the bank were evidently motivated to do so by hearing of the organization by word of mouth or in a newspaper article. The publicity efforts of the bank were quite limited compared with those of the San Francisco and Miami banks. White said that newspaper articles served as the main channel for announcing the bank's availability to minority group members. He said a few applicants had heard about the bank through someone already employed in broadcasting.66

White made no special visits to high schools or other groups strictly for the purpose of promoting the bank. No special publicity materials were printed or prepared for broadcast on radio or television. Although there were occasional remarks on the media—on a public affairs talk show, for example—that the skills bank was operating, there was no concerted effort on the part of Columbus broadcasters to plan and execute a campaign publicizing the bank.

The reader is reminded of three factors which relate
to this lack of publicity in the Columbus bank. First, the local committee meetings were not designed or utilized as planning sessions for the purpose of expanding the bank's program or publicity; these meetings concentrated on the sharing of information about available applicants and job openings. Second, the chairman had delegated much responsibility to the coordinator of the bank soon after it was established. It is likely that Richard Borel assigned publicity responsibilities to Chuck White. Third, the coordinator was already involved in a full-time job when he was given the task of the Broadcast Skills Bank; he did not have time for speeches, public appearances or other types of publicity for the skills bank.

If White had been completely free to devote all his time to the bank projects, many more applicants could have been recruited. As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, an increase in the number of registrants would have given all broadcasters a wider selection of applicants when job openings developed at their stations. The fact that applicants became increasingly scarce in the last few months of the bank's operation was one reason suggested for the bank's inactivity and termination. 67

Placement of Minority Group Members

The coordinator of the Columbus bank estimated that fifty minority group members had been placed in broadcast stations during the bank's period of activity. There were no
statistics available on how many persons had been placed in different types of positions, but one broadcaster said the applicants usually requested on-the-air positions when they filled out application forms. Sharon DeBord of WCOL radio said that "more realistic counselling" was necessary to help applicants understand the wide variety of jobs involved in broadcasting. She commented on the small number of positions available in the Columbus market for on-the-air work and said that the bank was ineffective as a source of clerical workers and other "non-studio" personnel. 68

It was impossible for the coordinator to screen carefully all the applicants who applied for bank assistance because of his schedule of WBNS commitments. When he passed their application forms on to other broadcasters at the local committee meetings, some of the men hesitated to follow through with their own interviews with applicants because they had no clear leads on which persons were qualifiable. Carl Wagner of WTVN radio emphasized this point in his evaluation of the bank by explaining, "When you put a person in a job, you want him to succeed so you are very careful in your selection." 69 The broadcasters wanted more guidance from the coordinator concerning the types of applicants who had turned in application forms.

The fact that most of the applicants had been placed at WBNS radio and television drew serious criticism from some executives. David Abbott complained that the bank was
too closely identified with one broadcast operation in the market.

The bank was dominated by one station in town. Some of the other broadcasters, perhaps myself included at times, took exception to their taking all of the credit going for everything that was done.70

An executive who did not want to be identified said that the bank had been used to find work for employees who were laid off by WBNS during an austerity program. This only increased competitive feelings among the broadcasters and did not contribute to an "atmosphere of cooperation" at the local committee meetings, according to the broadcaster who made the complaint. Another manager, David Abbott, said that "individual training programs at each station will serve the purpose better than a group of broadcasters sitting down and trying to swipe black employees from each other."71

Although several Columbus broadcasters pointed to the problem of WBNS dominance of the bank, the coordinator of the bank reversed the charges and said that he was seldom informed of job openings outside his station.

I had applicants here who had backgrounds in certain areas, and I would always ask all the station managers whenever there were openings at their stations to please call me first and let me pick from the applicants that I had. Well, rather than call on me, often they would seek from some source other than the skills bank. This was unfair to the applicants we had in the file since we were attempting to have a combining effort here.72

Perhaps the Columbus bank would have benefited from one of the procedures employed by the chairman of the South
Florida skills bank, Bill Brazzil. Brazzil said he had purposely not hired excellent bank applicants at times because he did not want to give the impression that the bank was designed mainly for his own operation. Of course, the fact that Brazzil had a full-time coordinator with no other responsibilities made it a difference, too. Coordinator Ann Mitchell had more time for the bank than did Chuck White; she could call the broadcasters often and ask them about openings instead of depending upon them to call in the openings on their own.

Training of Minority Group Members

The scholarship training program established in 1971 was the only effort of the Columbus Broadcast Skills Bank designed to train minority group members. Several broadcasters who contributed to the $6,500 funding of the program felt that it was too much to be spent on only three applicants. Some felt that the university educational stations were not appropriate training grounds for people going into commercial broadcasting. The coordinator said that he found it difficult to find jobs for the trainees once they had completed the course of study. Although the program was designed as a cooperative effort with many stations contributing, the benefits were limited to a few which were willing to hire the trainees after their six months of study and experience. 73

The training program was a burden for some of the instructional personnel at the university stations conducting
the program. According to William Ewing, an associate di­
rector in charge of the radio and television stations, super­
visors had to "make time" to conduct training sessions in
the midst of their regular work schedules. He was concerned
about the periods when bank trainees had to "sit and watch"
station personnel doing their jobs--it would have been much
more effective if the trainees could have been directly in­
volved in the various tasks they were to be learning. One
of the trainees confirmed the seriousness of this problem
when he was interviewed by the author.

When I had learned a particular skill, I had
to continue observing in the department for
hours or days later because it had been
scheduled that way. Then whenever I was
moved to a new area I was asked by the super­
visor to rehearse everything that I had done
all over again. When I finished explaining
what I had learned to do, I was often told
to observe further until I could prove that
I had mastered the skill.

Comments by other trainees and supervisors involved in
their training indicated the need for extensive coordination
and planning for each applicant who was trained by the uni­
v ersity stations. Although there were qualified profession­
als working in many areas of radio and television (such as
the areas listed on page 243), these supervisors or adminis­
trators were not necessarily teachers. In addition, they
admitted that they did not have the time to spend several
days each week training personnel from the skills bank. Bruce
Mathews, Supervisor of the Instructional Television studio,
discussed the problems he had experienced.
We have often had a full schedule of responsibilities when skills bank trainees were assigned to be trained in our part of the operation. I like to give them as much attention as possible, but I cannot completely drop my other responsibilities. Unfortunately, we have often felt that we did not give the most effective training to skills bank people after they had left our area.76

Mathews referred the author to a graduate student, Michael Taylor, who had written an evaluation of the skills bank training, particularly concerning the need to identify instructional objectives as training programs were developed. Taylor told the author that much of the university training of skills bank applicants was haphazard and emphasized the "observation" method. He said that "many of the personnel are under pressure to get their own work done and when a trainee is assigned to them they take it as an imposition upon their schedule."77 He said there was a difference between "training an outsider and training a new person in your department." According to Taylor, station personnel felt much less responsibility to involve skills bank trainees as participants in their department because they were only scheduled for short time periods in each area.78

A similar philosophy was expressed by Roger Rice, the chairman of the Bay Area Broadcast Skills Bank, who had trained a number of minority group members at his own station. Rice said that "people who sit and watch do not learn much. When I discovered this fact I immediately changed my minority program to a 'hire and train' method." Rice found that his
supervisors gave much more attention to minority group members whom he had "added as extras" as it became possible in various departments. "Engineers let them run equipment, secretaries let them type and they experienced real on-the-job training which usually resulted in a successful new employee." Of course, Rice had the budget and facilities to create additional positions in certain departments of his television station. He also had developed agreements with engineering unions which allowed some flexibility for the training of minority group members. However, his suggestions about involvement and participation could have some application to the Columbus training program.

Mike Taylor's report also recommended that the skills bank trainees should be allowed to participate in various departments with an on-the-job approach. He interviewed the supervisors who had conducted the training in the Columbus program and asked them to list specific ways in which trainees could be involved in the performance of various departmental tasks. In addition, he asked what behavioral responses would indicate that trainees had reached a level of competence in particular types of work. He concluded that the entire training program should be redesigned according to "behavioral objectives which are appropriate to each department and supervisor." In his plan, the training would be carefully structured to avoid lengthy observational periods, repetition of fundamentals common to many departments and haphazard
scheduling which gave the trainee the impression that he was constantly being routed from one office to another. 80

Termination of Skills Bank Activities

When the chairman of the Columbus bank, Richard Borel, retired in late 1971, the local committee met to consider what should be done about the future of the organization. Already there was some dissatisfaction among the broadcasters because the number of available applicants had decreased, local committee meetings were irregular and the training program had become a slow laborious project. 81 According to William Ewing of the university stations, the last meeting in December of 1971 was final. "The broadcasters decided to cease the activities of the bank because so many of the stations are setting up their own minority involvement programs," he said. 82 Chuck White told the author that he resigned as coordinator although he did not put the statement in writing. His reason was simply "overwork." 83

The broadcasters evidently did not even consider electing a new chairman. When Richard Wolfe was appointed to replace Borel as president of WBNS radio and television, there was no comment about his replacing Borel in the bank program. Neither Wolfe nor White wanted to be too specific about the bank's inactivity. Wolfe explained it as "a kind of quiescent state," 84 and White said the operation was in a "temporary hold position." 85 Because the bank had been so effective for WBNS in hiring minority group members, it was
reasonable that neither Wolfe nor White would want to admit that the bank was dead. In fact, they both commented that they would like to see it revitalized, but in addition they both said that White should not be the coordinator because it identified the bank too closely with one station.

Chuck White's role as coordinator of the Columbus bank was a major factor in the bank's termination of activities in 1971. Not only his identification of the bank with one station, but also his extremely crowded work schedule made it difficult for the organization to function as a forceful and cooperative effort in the city. When Borel placed the major burden of the work on White's shoulders soon after the bank was established, he should have taken immediate steps to remove other responsibilities from his office. This was an administrative error on his part because he placed too much responsibility upon one person who was already carrying a full-time work load. It is even more difficult to understand why Borel did not adjust White's skills bank responsibilities when he promoted him to public affairs director. Perhaps he realized that his own retirement was near, and he would leave the problem for someone else to evaluate and handle.

In addition to White's overwork and the fact that the bank was closely identified with one station, there was little guidance of the Columbus bank by the national office in New York. Compared with the number of visits which George Norford made to the Miami bank, his visits to the Columbus
bank were few. White estimated that Norford returned to Columbus "once or twice" after the luncheon, and it was frustrating to White that Norford always dealt with the chairman, Richard Borel. The reason his contacts were with Borel instead of White was unclear. Norford had simply told the author earlier that his visits varied from city to city—sometimes with chairmen and sometimes with coordinators.86

Other factors have been discussed throughout this chapter which relate to the Columbus bank's termination of activities. The fact that the application form carried the call letters WBNS in bold type at the top had a negative psychological effect upon the managers of other stations examining applications. Publicity was weak and was limited to occasional newspaper articles or word-of-mouth promotion. The local committee meetings were used for the distribution of application forms instead of making policy decisions and plans for expansion of the bank. Whether it was the "base station" or not, it seemed unfair that 60 to 90 per cent of the applicants were always being placed at one operation. The chairman should have had the foresight to make plans for his replacement long before his retirement date arrived.

Finally, individual stations had started to set up minority involvement programs of their own. This last factor was the explanation used most often when the broadcasters were asked why the bank had become inactive; if the bank had continued, it would have been repeating the efforts of the individual
stations and this would not have been worthwhile.

Summary

This chapter has discussed the local Broadcast Skills Bank in Columbus, Ohio. The bank was established by personnel from Westinghouse Broadcasting at a luncheon which included both broadcasters and organizations representing minority group members. However, the local committee meetings which followed the initial luncheon were attended only by broadcasters and were used to discuss available applicants and job openings. The chairman of the bank, a leading broadcaster in the city, appointed one of his staff to be the coordinator. The coordinator's work load became a serious issue, and he was unable to give sufficient attention to the bank after its first two years of operation. When the chairman himself retired and left the city, the coordinator resigned from his bank position because he could no longer handle the task. The local committee decided to terminate the activities of the bank after two and one half years because there was a lack of interest and many of the stations had developed their own minority involvement programs.

Several significant weaknesses in the Columbus bank's operation were uncovered in this research. This chapter has explained how broadcaster competition, poor publicity and overworked leadership served to limit the bank's effectiveness. It has also explained and evaluated the Columbus bank's scholarship training program which was conducted at the
broadcast facilities of the Ohio State University. The program was financed by contributions from Columbus radio and television stations, but it did not seem to be worth the cost as it was evaluated by the broadcasters themselves.

It was significant that the Columbus Urban League was not invited to participate in the bank's local committee meetings. The League was consulted as plans were being made for the bank, but the only organizations included in local committee meetings were broadcast stations. If the Urban League director had been present at the meetings, he could have suggested ways in which his organization could supply applicants to the coordinator of the skills bank on a regular basis. With a file of 15,000 minority group members seeking jobs, the Urban League would certainly have had some with qualifications for broadcast training. Assistance from the Urban League or similar organizations representing minority group members would have helped solve one of the Columbus bank's major problems—lack of applicants.

To overcome other problems which led to the termination of the Columbus bank, the local committee members should have spent more time evaluating their problems and progress as an organization during their regular meetings. When the meetings were used only for the discussion of available applicants and job openings, it was reasonable that they should in time become meaningless—especially when the number of applicants became scarce. The committee should have been
informed of the chairman's upcoming retirement early in 1971 in order that a replacement could have been considered. At the same time, it would have been wise to appoint a new full-time coordinator or at least provide clerical assistance for Chuck White.

An important feature of the Columbus Broadcast Skills Bank was the scholarship training program for minority group members. It became separated from the local committee and for that reason it developed on an educational broadcasting base with little relevance for the commercial stations. If the program had been studied and observed by various members of the local committee, it could perhaps have been revised and strengthened during its first two or three months of operation. This again was a reflection on the inadequacy of the local committee meetings. Perhaps the broadcasters felt that they could meet less often once the training program had begun—it would seem that the opposite was true. Regular meetings to discuss the progress of the training program would have provided some evaluation for the instructors at the university stations. They could have revised their content and their approach in order to prepare better the trainees for work in commercial stations.

One more issue was significant for analysis in this chapter—the relationship of the national office of the Broadcast Skills Bank to the local bank in Columbus. If the national coordinator, George Norford, had been in touch with
Richard Borel or Chuck White in 1971, he would have realized that the bank's progress was unsatisfactory. He should have known about Borel's upcoming retirement and the pressures exerted upon White. He should have been asking for reports about the training program so that he could assist the local committee in the improvement of the program. However, there was no evidence to suggest that Norford had any contact with the Columbus bank after 1970. When he talked with the author in February, 1972, he was not aware that the training program had been instituted, the chairman had retired or the coordinator had resigned.
NOTES


2 Interviews with Richard Wolfe, President, WBNS radio and television, Columbus, Ohio, August 25, 1972; David Abbott, Vice-President and General Manager, WLW-C television, Columbus, Ohio, October 13, 1972; Richard B. Hull, Director, Telecommunications Center, Ohio State University, Columbus, October 26, 1972.

3 Interview with Richard Wolfe.


5 Telephone interview with Sharon DeBord, Vice-President, Administrative Operations, WCOL radio, Columbus, Ohio, October 20, 1972.

6 Interview with Richard Wolfe.

7 Houk.

8 Interview with Charles (Chuck) White, Director of Public Affairs, WBNS television, Columbus, Ohio, February 14, 1972.

9 Richard A. Borel, résumé.

10 Interview with Richard Wolfe.

11 Interview with Chuck White.

12 Ibid.

13 “This is TV-10 in Columbus,” Call and Post, March 14, 1970.

14 Interview with Chuck White.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

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17 David Abbott, résumé.
18 "This is TV-10 in Columbus."
19 Interview with Chuck White.
20 Interview with David Abbott.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Interview with Richard B. Hull.
24 Telephone interview with Sharon DeBord.
25 Interview with Carl Wagner, General Manager, WTVN and WBUK radio, Columbus, Ohio, August 28, 1972.
26 Interview with Chuck White.
27 Interview with Richard Wolfe.
28 Interview with Chuck White.
29 "This is TV-10 in Columbus."
30 Interview with Chuck White.
31 Interview with Richard Wolfe.
32 Ibid.
33 Interview with Carl Wagner.
34 Interview with David Abbott.
35 Telephone interview with Sharon DeBord.
36 Interview with Chuck White.
37 Telephone interview with Sharon DeBord.
38 Interview with Robert Brown, Executive Director, Columbus Urban League, Columbus, Ohio, November 1, 1972.
39 Ibid.
40 Interview with Chuck White.
41 Interview with Richard B. Hull.
42 Ibid.
Memorandum from John Burke, Director of Special Projects, WOSU radio and television, Columbus, Ohio, re Columbus Broadcast Skills Bank Scholarship Training Program, dated April 1, 1971. Cited hereafter as Training Program Memorandum.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Interview with William H. Ewing, Associate Director, Telecommunications Center, Ohio State University, Columbus, August 15, 1972.

Interview with Martha Haueisen, Business Manager, WOSU radio and television, Columbus, Ohio, November 1, 1972.

Interview with Carl Wagner.

Telephone interview with Sharon DeBord.

Interview with David Abbott.


Interview with Erwin Cochran, News reporter, WCOL radio, Columbus, Ohio, September 1, 1972.

"OSU Students Enter Broadcast Bank Program," Call and Post, September 18, 1971.

Telephone interview with Thomas (Tom) Pope, student in School of Communications, Howard University, Washington, D.C., September 18, 1972.

Interview with Eddie Dozier, skills bank trainee at WOSU radio and television, Columbus, Ohio, October 27, 1972.

Telephone interview with Gamalial (Skip) Hilson, News reporter, WBNS television, Columbus, Ohio, October 30, 1972.

Telephone interview with Sandra Byers, Assistant to
the Production Director, WBNS television, Columbus, Ohio, October 31, 1972.

61 Telephone interview with Michael Reeves, Music Director, WVKO radio, Columbus, Ohio, October 31, 1972.

62 Telephone interview with Tom Pope.

63 Houke.

64 Interview with Chuck White.

65 Interview with Richard Wolfe.

66 Interview with Chuck White.

67 Telephone interview with Sharon DeBord.

68 Ibid.

69 Interview with Carl Wagner.

70 Interview with David Abbott.

71 Ibid.

72 Interview with Chuck White.

73 Ibid.

74 Interview with William H. Ewing.

75 Telephone interview with Tom Pope.

76 Interview with Bruce Mathews, Supervisor of Instructional Television, Ohio State University, Columbus, August 15, 1972.

77 Interview with Michael Taylor, Ohio State University graduate student, Columbus, December 3, 1971.

78 Ibid.

79 Interview with Roger Rice, Vice-President and General Manager, KTVU television, San Francisco, California, June 26, 1972.


81 Interview with Chuck White.
Interview with William H. Ewing.
Interview with Chuck White.
Interview with Richard Wolfe.
Interview with Chuck White.
Interview with George Norford, February 19, 1972.
CHAPTER VI

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

This concluding chapter will analyze the Broadcast Skills Bank concept and operation, evaluating the cooperative efforts which developed among broadcasting and social service organizations to produce a multi-city minority involvement program. First there is a section summarizing the research purpose and methodology. The next section critically examines the major questions raised in the study and evaluates relevant data which suggested answers to the questions in each chapter. Next there is a section on recommendations for further research. Finally, there is a description of the Broadcast Skills Bank's success and failure as a national organization.

Summary of the Research

Beginning in the Reconstruction Period, members of minority groups in America have sought an equal opportunity for economic, political and social advancement. To guarantee these rights, a number of federal agencies were created through legislation enacted in the late 1950s and the middle 1960s.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the strongest civil
rights legislation in United States history. As it was being implemented, a number of federal programs were created to provide training for under-privileged youth who lacked the education and skills necessary to obtain jobs. In addition, some companies and industries developed training programs of their own without federal assistance. One of these, the Broadcast Skills Bank, was instituted by the radio and television industry.

The purpose of this dissertation was to describe and analyze the history and operation of the Broadcast Skills Bank at the national and local levels. The bank was established in 1964 when officials of the Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, National Urban League and major broadcasting networks agreed on a cooperative effort to involve minority group members in broadcasting. George Norford, a black executive at the National Broadcasting Company, was appointed a television consultant to the New York State Commission on Human Rights in the early sixties. Norford interviewed broadcasting executives and leaders of minority employment agencies about the need for minority group members in the broadcast industry.

Through his contacts with executives at the Westinghouse Broadcasting Company and the National Urban League, he conceived a plan to screen, train and employ "qualifiable" minority group members in radio and television positions. Donald McGannon, President of Westinghouse Broadcasting,
hired Norford as a vice-president with the responsibility of making the minority involvement plan work at his company. Following a year's pilot program at the company, McGannon and Norford expanded their efforts to involve broadcast stations throughout New York City and then to other cities around the country. In the introductory chapter of this dissertation, the New York City bank was discussed in some detail because it was considered a pilot effort and was observed carefully by national leaders who later started banks in other cities. After three years, it merged into another organization which had similar goals.

The author used historical and descriptive analysis as the methodology in this dissertation to evaluate the development and operation of the Broadcast Skills Bank. He interviewed leaders of the bank in four cities as primary sources for the research. These leaders included personnel at Westinghouse Broadcasting who had set up a "national office" of the skills bank in New York. After a preliminary investigation of some twenty-two local banks established in cities around the country, the author selected three for field research and further investigation. Officials of the Urban League's national office in New York City and local offices in the three other cities were interviewed because of the League's close relationship with the Broadcast Skills Bank in the early years of the bank's development. In addition, broadcast executives and minority group members who
participated in or benefited from the bank's program in each city where questioned about the skills bank operation.

Office materials and publicity items were examined in each city as additional primary sources for this research. These included office memorandums, letters, a proposal for federal financial assistance, description of local bank plans, newspaper articles, application forms, employer requisition forms and other materials. Government documents and statements from the Federal Communications Commission were examined as they related to the regulatory climate in which the bank was established and developed. Secondary written sources included articles from the trade press and various journals which commented on the significance of minority involvement in the broadcast industry.

The national officers of the Broadcast Skills Bank were Donald McGannon and George Norford. They held positions as national chairman and national coordinator, respectively. McGannon held meetings with executives from the major national networks to discuss problems and develop overall policy for the bank program. Norford kept in touch with the leaders of local banks and provided advice or encouragement when problems developed in some cities. Both men met with local broadcasters in cities each time new banks were established. Early in the bank's development, local Urban League officials were also involved in the establishment of city banks. National officials of the Urban League worked with
McGannon and Norford to assist the Broadcast Skills Bank at the national level.

The three representative local banks selected for field research were located in San Francisco, California, Miami, Florida, and Columbus, Ohio. Several factors related to these banks made them appropriate for contrast and comparison. The first two reported active, continuing programs in 1972, but the Columbus bank had ceased operation at the end of 1971. The San Francisco bank rotated chairmen each year, but the Miami and Columbus banks had permanent chairmen. In addition to their being widely separated geographically, each of the banks had a special training program for minority group members who wanted to enter the field of broadcasting.

The Bay Area Broadcast Skills Bank in San Francisco was established in September of 1966 and operated with a different local broadcaster as chairman each year. A local committee of broadcasters met to discuss problems and help guide the organization. Various station executives in the Bay Area contributed to a fund used to pay the salary of a full-time coordinator. It was her job to handle the day-to-day activities of the bank's placement program and also to oversee a scholarship program funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity.

The South Florida Broadcast Skills Bank began in August of 1969 and was directed by the manager of a leading
television station in Miami. As permanent chairman of the bank, he established policy and paid a full-time coordinator out of his station's budget. In contrast to the San Francisco bank, the Miami bank had no local committee—the chairman made all major decisions and communicated them to other broadcast executives by letter or phone calls. For approximately one year, several broadcasters pooled funds to develop an engineering training program for minority group members in the Miami area. This program was short-lived, however, because the two trainees involved did not repay the loans, and the broadcasters did not continue to provide sufficient financing. The South Florida bank coordinator kept in touch with other local banks in and out of Florida, sometimes placing or finding positions for applicants in cities some distance from Miami. Very little of this inter-bank sharing had been reported by the San Francisco or Columbus organizations.

The Columbus Broadcast Skills Bank began in 1969 as a project of the leading television station in Columbus, Ohio, with the manager of the station acting as chairman. Local committee meetings were held, but they were information sessions—concerning applicants and job openings—rather than the "problems and progress" discussions held at the San Francisco bank. The Columbus chairman appointed a television personality as coordinator of the bank, but the workload increased to the point where he could not handle coordination
of the bank effectively. When the chairman retired in 1971, local broadcasters decided to terminate the bank. A training program which had been established in cooperation with the Ohio State University also ceased operation. Although it involved a pooling of broadcaster funds like the Miami bank's training program, the Columbus training was not limited to engineering areas. It was designed to cover all aspects of radio and television.

In the investigation of these three local banks, the author interviewed directors of local Urban League offices to discover the relationship of various League offices with local Broadcast Skills Banks. As explained earlier in this section, National Urban League officials had been active in the establishment of the Broadcast Skills Bank in 1964, and it was important to study the relationships of League and bank offices at the local level. In San Francisco, a field representative at the Urban League acted as liaison with the Bay Area bank, but in Miami and Columbus the two organizations operated separately. However, Urban League officials had been more directly involved with each of the three local bank operations at the time they were established. In San Francisco, the Urban League actually operated the bank for its first two or three years.

It is important to note that the interview method has certain limitations as a research tool. Because it is time consuming, for example, the researcher is often forced to
rely upon a relatively small number of respondents for much of his data. These respondents become quite important as sources of data, and if they provide insufficient information, the study may suffer somewhat in terms of validity. In some of the interviews in this study, respondents were sensitive to the subject of minority employment. This was particularly evident at the beginning of several interviews when broadcasters were uncertain about the range of the questioning which would follow.

For example, Louis Simon, Westinghouse Broadcasting Company Area Vice-President in San Francisco, asked the author about the purpose of the research before the interview began. He was perhaps wondering if he would be asked about the number of minority group members employed by the Westinghouse Broadcasting Company— or by KPIX, the Westinghouse station in San Francisco. In addition, he seemed concerned about questions related to the role of Westinghouse Broadcasting Company in the bank. As explained in chapter three, Simon wanted to be sure the bank was perceived as a local broadcaster effort, not a Westinghouse effort.

Other examples of this sensitivity occurred in Columbus where the local bank had been closed a few months before the author began his research. Again, the hesitation was most evident at the beginning of the interviews. For example, one broadcaster asked why the interview was being tape recorded. He did not want it to be played for a group but did
not object to its use for dissertation research. He seemed to be anticipating questions about minority employment statistics at his station.

The subject of minority employment statistics is difficult for broadcasters to discuss because they are concerned that their percentages could be used against them in the future—to prove that they had smaller percentages than other stations or that they did not increase minority hiring from year to year. Most broadcasters feel that they do enough minority employment reporting when they file the FCC Form 395 each year. It is understandable that they hesitate to respond to interviews and questionnaires on the subject.

At a few points in this study, the author referred to remarks by broadcasters "who did not wish to be identified." These remarks often dealt with some broadcaster's criticism of a fellow broadcaster. Sometimes they touched on serious problems in the skills bank operation—decisions made by bank leaders without consulting other broadcasters, reasons for the failure of scholarship programs, or criticisms of bank coordinators or chairmen. The broadcasters who offered the most criticism of the skills bank were the ones who most often asked that they not be identified.

However, the most relevant material for this study was provided by the broadcasters with little hesitation. In evaluating the validity of this research on the Broadcast Skills Bank, the reader is also reminded that written
documents were used to supplement the data obtained by interviews. In addition, it is important to note that the questions asked of broadcast executives were designed to be reasonably non-threatening in nature. They were asked about the operation of the skills bank, not about their own station's statistics on minority hiring and programming. Questions about the efforts of all broadcasters (the bank operation) were answered with little hesitation. However, had the author been conducting a formal survey of minority statistics for the Federal Communications Commission, broadcasters would have been much more guarded in their replies. In this research, however, the broadcasters seemed quite willing to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the multiple station bank program.

Conclusions Drawn from the Research

In the first chapter of this dissertation, several questions were introduced to identify the major areas which this study would investigate. Throughout the remainder of the study these questions have been dealt with as they related to the national and local offices of the Broadcast Skills Bank. To state the major conclusions drawn from this research, each of the questions will be examined separately in the pages which follow, analyzing the issues as they have developed in the preceding chapters.

1. What factors contributed to the origin and development of the Broadcast Skills Bank as a national organiza-
tion? One factor which must be recognized as a contributor to the skills bank program is the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Following its enactment, the Federal Communications Commission and other organizations pressured radio and television broadcasters to implement equal employment opportunity programs in their stations. Donald McGannon said he had not been forced to increase minority hiring at Westinghouse Broadcasting, but it was clear to the author that McGannon would not have felt so concerned about developing a minority involvement program had there been no FCC statements applying the Civil Rights Act to the broadcast industry. In various businesses—in and out of broadcasting—studies were being conducted and plans were being developed to expedite civil rights rulings through specific programs.

A second factor which contributed to the origin and development of the Broadcast Skills Bank was the influence of the New York State Commission on Human Rights and its television consultant, George Norford. The fact that Norford made very regular visits to McGannon's office and was welcomed there was an indication that the two understood each other and that a business relationship was possible. Norford's questions and suggestions seemed to coincide with McGannon's concern, and it seemed reasonable to conclude that the Westinghouse pilot and skills bank training program were a direct result of the Human Rights Commission's probing.
It is significant to note that the pilot training program itself was a factor which made the national bank concept more appealing. When McGannon and Norford realized that they had made significant strides in increasing the minority group employment at Westinghouse Broadcasting, they were ready to expand their program and make it available to New York City and other cities around the country. The network executives, most of whom probably knew Norford through his relationship with the Human Rights Commission or in the case of NBC because of his previous employment there, had no objection to the program. They were feeling pressure themselves and needed something to show that they were actively implementing large programs of their own to overcome discrimination.

A fourth factor was the role of the National Urban League. The fact that the League had already developed a successful National Skills Bank program, was willing to let Norford and McGannon adopt their skills bank name and offered the help of experienced, functioning League banks was significant. It meant that McGannon and Norford were relieved of detailed planning and testing on a city-to-city basis. They could consult with experts at the League office and transfer their program to the broadcasting industry. Whitney Young and Adolph Holmes made their local League offices available all over the country for the establishment of local Broadcast Skills Banks. Of course, it did not
always work as smoothly as was planned because many of the local Urban League offices had not been involved with broadcast employment or broadcast industry leaders. However, the Urban League had developed a working model, and George Norford used it as a design for the creation of local Broadcast Skills Banks.

A fifth factor should be mentioned briefly. It was the willingness of local broadcasters to cooperate in a program which was imposed by an outside organization. They were feeling the civil rights pressure, too, of course, and in their search for a meaningful program of equal employment practices they were willing to try the bank proposal as one way out.

2. How has the national office of the Broadcast Skills Bank facilitated the origin and development of local branches of the organization? The most important factor which facilitated the development of local banks was the freedom given to an executive like George Norford to spend time on bank growth. When Donald McGannon allowed Norford 80 per cent of his time and practically an unlimited expense account to make the bank a success, Norford began to make use of his contacts at executive levels throughout the broadcast industry. Of course, McGannon himself gave a large share of time to speeches, personal visits and letters about the need to establish banks in local communities. The broadcasters who had met him in the cities visited by the author said that he
made a strong impression upon them as a sincere yet forceful person who talked their language and made them believe that the bank could not fail. One executive said McGannon conducted the opening luncheon "in an almost ministerial fashion," assigning responsibilities and giving their reasons as if he had supernatural insight into the problem and its solutions.

In addition to the executive power which was exercised, the national office provided a minimal amount of support to local banks in terms of publicity, letters which explained already successful local bank operations and contacts among bank leaders at the conventions of the National Association of Broadcasters. This service of the national office to the local banks was weakened by the fact that there was no regularity of publicity or information mailings. The Broadcast Skills Bank booklets could have been updated and reprinted much more often, and they could have been distributed to all the cities with some local identification stamped on the covers.

Other suggestions are in order at this point. Yearly conferences could have been held in Chicago or New York so the coordinators and chairmen could meet specifically to discuss skills bank programs. Expenses for the chairmen's and coordinator's travel and accommodations could have been covered by each chairman's station—most of them were large stations with sizeable budgets. Cost for the convention
hall, speakers and entertainment could have been shared by various organizations: Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, the National Urban League, major broadcasting groups and networks. To help plan the programs, Norford would have needed one or more associates operating at his level with sufficient clerical support.

As one analyzes the work of the national office, it becomes clear that the office provided a limited amount of discipline and counselling for local bank leaders. When Norford would remind chairmen that their year end reports would be due soon, they gave more serious thought and effort to the bank program and its effectiveness. In addition, Norford made it clear in his correspondence with local chairmen that he was available to help with problems. He asked that local coordinators call him whenever he could suggest solutions to problems or use the influence of his position to assist at the local level.

In the author's evaluation of local organizations, he emphasized the need for improved communication with the national office. There were occasions when local chairmen or coordinators could have called George Norford but did not. For example, when the Bay Area bank in San Francisco had difficulty with the scholarship training project funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity, neither the chairman nor the coordinator called the national office for assistance. Perhaps Norford or McGannon could have suggested ways to
enlist the active participation of smaller stations in the Bay Area when the local managers said they could not create part-time jobs for minority group members. Another example was the Columbus bank coordinator's workload. When the local coordinator recognized this as a barrier to the bank's growth and effectiveness, he could have expressed his frustration to the national coordinator, but he did not. Had he done so, Norford could have contacted the local chairman and urged him to adjust the coordinator's responsibilities. In both of these examples, it seemed that the local coordinators were not well enough acquainted with the national coordinator to feel free to ask him for help. If Norford had been able to visit each bank every six months, contacting local chairmen and coordinators during each visit, the local leaders would have more readily called upon him for assistance.

3. In what ways have local banks of the Broadcast Skills Bank related to the national office in their function as minority training and placement services? Based on interviews with Roger Rice, Bill Brazzil, Richard Wolfe and other chairmen of local Broadcast Skills Banks, it seemed that local leaders contacted the national office regularly during the early months of local bank operations. Just after the luncheon featuring McGannon and Norford, interest was high and bank leaders checked many details with the national office leaders as they put their local program into action. After about six months of operation the calls and letters
diminished, and local banks either got going on their own or gradually became less active.

The author got the impression that Norford himself began to ease off on contacts with local banks approximately six months after each bank was established. He seemed to feel that the local banks should ask for his help instead of his constantly investigating their activities to see how well they were performing. Norford wanted each bank to develop support from local broadcasters, calling upon the national office only when local resources had been exhausted. He felt that he should follow a "hands off" approach in order to give local banks complete freedom for individualized growth. At the same time, he wanted local leaders to feel that he was available at any time when special help was needed. He had a difficult task in his responsibility to maintain strong local banks without dictating activities from the national office.

In fact, it seemed that he removed himself too far from some local banks, such as Columbus, and therefore was out-of-touch with local leaders when their banks began to weaken. Instead of calling him when the first sign of disinterest developed, they waited until he asked for information, usually in a year end report. By that time they would be ashamed to tell the whole story so they would create a report which gave the impression that bank activities were continuing satisfactorily.
It is important at this point to note that other problems developed because of the national coordinator's "hands off" approach. Some coordinators like Gay Cobb in San Francisco were hungry for information about other banks but did not get it often enough. She had not become well enough acquainted with Norford to call him, and his principle of non-interference kept him from calling her. At times Chuck White in Columbus considered placing someone in another city, but again he did not have contact with Norford and nothing materialized. For some reason, Ann Mitchell in Miami had a closer contact with the national office. Therefore she knew what was happening in many of the other cities and had assisted other coordinators in placing people in Miami. The fact that the Miami coordinator called upon Norford more frequently than did the coordinators in San Francisco and Columbus revealed the influence the local coordinator could have in drawing support and council from the national office.

There were other factors in the relationship of the local banks to the national office. It was significant to note what happened when coordinators needed information and yet did not feel free to call the national office. They would ask the chairman for advice, contact a broadcaster at another station or simply set a project aside. For example, Chuck White had thought of publicity ideas in Columbus but wanted assistance from the national office on ways they had publicized the bank. He did not get it. Other kinds of
information which coordinators wanted involved placement procedures at other local banks, names of coordinators at other banks and new ideas from other leaders who had attempted special programs in their cities. The only way these coordinators could get this information was from the national office. When asked why national officers did not simply mail this information out, coordinators said they did not know, but one suggested that it would take too much effort.

4. Why do local banks differ widely in their organizational patterns and procedures in cities where they have been established by the national office? How do they differ? Several factors contributed to the differences among local banks. One factor was the differences among cities themselves—population, ethnic makeup and percentages, numbers of broadcast stations and jobs available. In large coastal population centers like San Francisco and Miami, one finds minority group members in large numbers. This provides a wide variety of sources from which the bank coordinator may draw outstanding applicants.

At the same time, these centers have an abundance of radio and television facilities with a reasonable amount of turnover in entry-level jobs. It was understandable that the skills banks in these cities had large registration files and that they placed a sizeable number of applicants each year. On the other hand, the bank in a medium-sized city like Columbus, Ohio, with fewer minority group members and
broadcast stations had more difficulty finding applicants and jobs.

Another factor which contributed to differences among the banks was the leaders whom Donald McGannon selected. The chairman leading a local bank had a strong influence on the kind of organization which would develop. Some men like Bill Brazzil in Miami liked to run things themselves; others, like Roger Rice in San Francisco, liked to encourage group participation. In addition, McGannon picked chairmen who were leaders and innovators. Thus, each local organization would be built around the chairman's idea of effective organizational planning. This also was responsible for the differences apparent in publicity efforts and scholarship programs. In the cities where permanent chairmanships were established, however, McGannon ran the risk of a terminated bank when chairmen retired—Richard Borel's retirement in Columbus contributed much to the bank's termination. One may predict a similar effect if Bill Brazzil were to retire in Miami.

Finally, there was the factor of the broadcasters themselves. If the broadcasters in a community felt an urgency about the problem of discrimination in their industry, they welcomed the skills bank as an important organization for their membership and active participation. This urgency could be created by new and strict government regulations, community pressure groups or the fact that license renewals were near and minority group members were scarce among the
stations' employees. Donald McGannon tried to foster this urgency when he spoke to broadcasters at the luncheons which launched local banks in various cities. The success of local skills bank programs depended heavily upon how many of the broadcasters were willing to participate in the organization on a sustained basis. In Columbus, there was sufficient willingness to participate for three years and then the urgency dissipated. Two facts contributed to the easing of the urgency at that bank: the absence of the chairman's influence (when he retired) and the programs which individual stations were developing for minority group members.

Some of the interrelationships among these three factors should be analyzed. In larger cities with many broadcasters McGannon had a larger group to choose from when he selected a person for the chairmanship. In addition, it was easier to establish a bank in a large city because there were many broadcasters, and it was not necessary that they all be willing to participate in the program. As long as the major stations were represented, the bank could progress satisfactorily; it was not necessary that all the smaller stations take part. On the other hand, there were problems in establishing banks in smaller cities because there were fewer leaders to choose from, and a larger percentage of stations had to be willing to participate. At Columbus, Ohio, for example, there was a limited number of executives who could have successfully replaced Borel as chairman.
In addition to these factors which contributed to differences among the banks, there was the obvious factor of national office influence. It often played a minor role in the differences among locals. Donald McGannon and George Norford only made suggestions to new bank leaders. Instead of providing guidelines or directives, they explained basic patterns which existed in other cities. For this reason there were the similarities among local banks which have been referred to often in this study. These included the "local committee" concept, rotating chairmanships, the coordinator positions and scholarship-training designed by local banks.

To conclude this discussion of local bank differences, it is important to recall the role of the Urban League. In San Francisco there was a close relationship between the skills bank and the League, but in Miami and Columbus the groups operated as separate organizations. This can be attributed to differences in bank leaders, local Urban League leaders and the types of informal relationships which existed among these kinds of leaders and organizations in different cities. The League was not represented on the local committee in any of the three cities studied, but in San Francisco the "liaison person" at the League office communicated with the skills bank coordinator often about the placement of applicants. It was unfortunate that this kind of relationship did not develop in the Columbus bank when applicants
5. To what extent has the Broadcast Skills Bank been successful in accomplishing its goals, as evaluated by broadcast executives? This question has been answered for each city studied in the "evaluation" section of chapters three, four and five. To facilitate the overall evaluation of the Broadcast Skills Bank goals, this section will discuss them in four categories which summarize the national and local emphases. The categories will be recruitment, placement, training/scholarships and advancement.

There was a close relationship between the goals of the national office and those of the local offices. The national office listed four goals: (1) employment, (2) part-time employment, (3) additional training and (4) scholarships. These are discussed in detail on pages 58 to 60 in chapter two. As explained in that section, the national office listed "inventory" in addition to "employment" in the first goal. The office encouraged the development of an inventory listing of applicants as they were recruited and employed.

In the study of each local office, the author determined the goals on the basis of interviews with local officials and the study of file materials. It seemed that national leaders had expressed their goals to local leaders and encouraged them to follow the same pattern. Each of the chairmen had received skills bank booklets, news releases
and other printed materials which listed the four major goals.

In Columbus, the three local bank goals emphasized recruitment, placement and training for minority group members. The Columbus training program involved scholarships because stations paid all expenses. In addition, the Columbus coordinator said he placed people in part-time as well as full-time jobs. Thus the three Columbus goals matched up reasonably with the first three goals listed by the national office. In Miami, four goals were determined: recruitment, placement, training and a desire to involve as large a variety of broadcasting jobs as possible. As in Columbus, the Miami coordinator placed minority group members in part-time and full-time jobs, and the training program had included scholarship arrangements. Other than the "variety of positions" goal, the Miami bank goals lined up closely with the national goals. San Francisco bank leaders listed their objectives as recruitment, employment, additional training and scholarships, and advancement within the industry. These goals were also quite similar to the national office goals. Even though the "advancement" goal had not been listed in the national office printed materials, the national chairman told the author in 1972 that he was concerned that this be developed as an objective throughout the skills bank.

The following discussion will evaluate these national and local emphases in four major categories.
In terms of numbers, recruitment efforts had been most successful in the South Florida bank which reported nearly a thousand persons registered. The author was not permitted to see files on this bank which would have revealed how recently these registrants had applied, what backgrounds they had or what kind of interest they had in broadcasting. The San Francisco bank did the most effective recruiting job in categorizing, organizing and updating files of available applicants. Recruitment in Columbus operated satisfactorily when one considers there was only limited publicity used by that bank. The major problem noted in each of the three cities was that few minority groups other than blacks were represented.

Placement procedures varied widely from city to city, and the executives within each city had difficulty evaluating the success of the skills banks concerning this goal. The broadcasters in San Francisco generally felt that they received what they asked for when they called in openings to the bank office. Miami broadcasters were less satisfied with the way applicants were matched with job descriptions, and this was due in part to weaknesses in the coordinator's screening procedures. Also, the form used by Miami broadcasters to describe job availabilities was inadequate. The Columbus broadcasters evaluated bank placement procedures as ineffective in many cases due to the fact that the coordinator had insufficient information about available applicants.
Training and scholarship programs had been attempted at all three of the banks studied in this dissertation. The most complex and carefully planned of the three was the Columbus program which utilized the facilities of the Ohio State University. As it developed, the training program demanded more staff time than university officials had predicted. In addition, the broadcasters became dissatisfied with the training and stopped supporting it financially because it was oriented toward educational rather than commercial broadcasting. In Miami, the engineering scholarship program produced two certified broadcast engineers, but they both failed to repay the scholarship loans which they had been granted by the South Florida skills bank. As in the Columbus program, the broadcasters lost interest in maintaining finances for the plan. San Francisco had attempted several training programs, and one was funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity to pay the expenses of students at area colleges and universities. In that situation, the broadcasters failed to support the program by not creating part-time jobs at their stations (an OEO requirement).

Advancement within the industry for minority group members was not usually discussed by the executives interviewed for this study. Although there were some examples mentioned by coordinators in Miami and Columbus, it was not always clear that the bank had been directly responsible for the advancement or promotion involved. None of the banks
had been able to place or promote a black person into a management position, and there were comments by some chairmen that this would be a future goal for the Broadcast Skills Bank. Donald McGannon referred to this area as a serious need for the bank's future activities. He felt that the bank had done well in the areas of recruitment, placement and training programs, but he was concerned that more effort should be given to the advancement of minority group members within the industry.

A number of the minority group members interviewed in this research had been in their positions with a broadcasting station for only a few months, and there had not been sufficient time for a promotion to occur. Those who had received promotions were usually in jobs titled "assistant" or "assistant to," and the responsibilities they carried were not actually supervisory or administrative. For example, Iola Mahogany in San Francisco had been promoted to the position of assistant traffic director at KCBS radio. Although she had clerical help, she described her own job as procedural work rather than decision-making or supervisory work. She kept the copy books in order and up-to-date, but the real administrator was above her. This raises a question: Are the minority group members given actual promotions or promotions in name only? The isolated cases available for this study made it difficult to determine an answer.

To provide for further advancement of minority group
members within the industry, the skills bank could develop more scholarship programs for employees themselves. Most of the skills bank training has been designed to train minority group members who want entry-level jobs in the industry. In addition, there should be scholarships for those who have entered the industry and are ready to become supervisors, administrators or research workers. Courses in business administration, marketing and other areas at colleges and universities could provide this kind of advantage for these employees.

Although some of the local bank officials said they had looked for better qualified applicants who could immediately be hired as supervisors, they had not been successful. Two of the coordinators mentioned that they had difficulty finding highly qualified job seekers because they were not interested in the skills bank. This related more to talent than administrative personnel however. For example, blacks who demonstrated professional skills on television immediately received calls from stations in and out of the market; newsmen in particular were in high demand if they could perform well.

To conclude this discussion on the goals of the Broadcast Skills Bank, it is significant to note that there were differences in the degree to which the various local banks were successful in carrying out their goals. In the evaluation sections in chapters three, four and five, individual
goals were analyzed as the author discussed the success and failure of each bank. The factor most responsible for differences in the local banks was leadership. Both the chairman and the coordinator felt high degrees of responsibility for carrying out bank goals. In every local bank the goals which were accomplished most successfully were those which the chairman and coordinator emphasized in their planning and work. A secondary factor responsible for differences was the "group awareness" of bank goals on the part of local broadcasters. As local committee sessions were used to stress certain goals, the broadcasters felt a greater need to concentrate on these goals. When little was said about goals in committee meetings or mailings to broadcasters, they became less concerned about accomplishing the objectives of the bank.

As mentioned in chapter two, Donald McGannon and George Norford had discussed the possibility of transferring the Broadcast Skills Bank to some organization other than Westinghouse Broadcasting. They felt that the bank could be more effective if it was identified with an organization representing a broad spectrum of broadcasters rather than just one broadcasting operation. The author was asked not to mention specific organizations which had been considered by McGannon and Norford.

**Recommendations for Further Research**

Several additional studies are suggested by this
research. In the section which follows, these studies will be categorized in three groups. First is a group of comparative-analytical studies which call for comparisons of programs within cities or among cities involved in bank programs. The second group lists some hypotheses which were suggested in this research; further study could develop programs to test these hypotheses. Finally, there is a group of descriptive studies which would be designed to draw out, organize and analyze further details about some aspects of the skills bank programs.

Comparative-Analytical Studies

1. One comparative study suggested by this research would examine the operation of several local committees or groups of broadcasters. In the city banks investigated, it was apparent that the broadcasters had special views about the way local committee operations should be handled. To understand and analyze these views, future research would be required. All the executives who attended the meetings could be interviewed concerning the manner in which meetings were conducted, how individual members interacted with each other and how each person felt the meetings could have been improved.

This comparative study could provide answers to the following questions which were raised in the present research: (a) How effectively do various types of local committees function to facilitate the purposes of local banks?
(b) What factors contribute to optimum group cooperation in the operation of local committees? (c) What are the comparative values of various local committee structures? For example, some committees operate with sub-committee structures while others operate on the principle of the "committee-of-the-whole." Why do these structures develop and how well do they function in certain communities of local broadcasters?

This study would be valuable to committee chairmen as they evaluate their leadership and consider methods for improvement.

2. Another study could involve the comparison of training programs for minority group members who want to enter broadcasting. The author was able to uncover several basic differences among the programs, and these differences suggested the need for further study and comparison. Programs in various cities at local banks could be compared, or bank training programs could be compared with other types of programs such as those conducted by individual stations, independent film and television groups. In a city like Columbus, it would be worthwhile to interview managers about the exact nature of their training programs at individual stations, comparing these programs with each other and with the bank program developed by all the stations together.

Several questions raised in this research suggest the need for further study of training programs: (a) How do various local committees decide to launch training programs
for minority group members? (b) Why do the broadcasters feel these programs will be more valuable than individual programs at each station? (c) What factors contribute to the success or failure of training programs launched by broadcast groups? (d) Which training programs have been most valuable in producing qualified employees for radio and television stations? (e) Which have been least valuable in the eyes of broadcast executives? (f) Why do broadcasters in some cities prefer group training programs while broadcasters in other cities prefer individual training programs at local stations? (g) When broadcasters decide to terminate a group training program (Columbus for example) because individual stations are developing their own programs, what characteristics of the group program carry over to the individual programs? Why? (h) How successful are the individual programs?

This would be a worthwhile study because it would reveal differences among various training programs and help broadcasters optimize their efforts in planning future programs. They would have a better understanding of the factors in each program which worked well in specific circumstances and could apply this knowledge in their planning.

3. In another comparative study, one could seek to determine relationships among broadcaster statements and actions, particularly concerning the hiring of minority group members. It appeared in this study that a number of broadcasters told the coordinator and the author one thing but
performed differently. By using a combination of questionnaires and interviews, a researcher could determine to what extent various broadcasters differ in terms of statements and actual behavior.

This study would be valuable in providing answers to the following questions: (a) To what extent do broadcasters commit their organizations to the hiring of minority group members? (b) In their statements to a skills bank coordinator, for example, do managers say they will call in "all openings" or do they qualify their commitments? (c) How do they qualify their statements? (d) Do they commit themselves to the hiring of certain numbers of applicants over a specified period of time? (e) How well do the broadcasters follow through on their commitments by actually calling in openings to the bank office? (f) If they have made commitments in numbers, how well do they follow through on these? (g) How do skills bank organizations and chairmen effect the performance of local broadcasters in terms of commitments made and kept? (h) Are there certain procedures which bank leaders can follow to encourage more commitment and action? (i) Why do some broadcasters make strong commitments without following through? (j) How can skills bank personnel assist them in being more consistent?

The value of this study is in its emphasis on the broadcaster's personal communication and action. National leaders and local chairmen would find a study like this
valuable in their preparation of future skills bank efforts among local broadcasters. The present research did not reveal enough about these differences between executive words and actions to draw any conclusions. Further research would make this possible.

Studies Designed to Test Hypotheses

Several hypotheses were suggested in this study and these should be tested in further research. Some of these hypotheses are listed below along with suggestions as to how they might be tested.

4. Hypothesis: Improved publicity will increase the bank's recruitment efforts. A local radio and television publicity campaign concerning the bank could be designed to encourage qualifiable applicants to apply to the bank. The campaign would be carefully designed with several announcements on all local radio and television stations each day. The announcements would be designed to motivate qualifiable applicants—those with strong interest in media work—instead of asking everyone to apply.

The hypothesis would be tested by comparing the rate of registration (of qualifiable applicants) before the campaign with the rate of registration during and after the campaign. It would require that the coordinator make some judgments on which applicants are qualifiable. This study would reveal the value of radio and television publicity for local skills banks. If it worked in one city, it could be
applied in other cities with local banks.

5. **Hypothesis**: Increased communication among bank coordinators will improve local bank effectiveness. This hypothesis was suggested during the author's interviews with local coordinators. A weekly newsletter could be sent to all banks by the national office. It would emphasize placement procedures—ideas which have been found successful at various local banks.

Rather than an elaborate information piece about all aspects of the bank, this newsletter would describe some innovative placement plan which had worked successfully at a local operation. In this sense it would be an information-sharing publication, emphasizing placement procedures which had worked well at various local banks. Each week a different plan would be described, along with a brief word of encouragement from the national coordinator urging local coordinators to try the plan in their city.

To test this hypothesis, one would compare the average rate of placement nationwide before the newsletter started with the average rate of placement several months after the newsletter had been in publication. This study would reveal the value of a special kind of newsletter. It could assist national leaders as they decide what kinds of publications they should develop to assist local banks. Areas other than placement procedures could be emphasized in future newsletters.
6. **Hypothesis:** If minority leaders participate in local committee meetings, more applicants will be recruited and placed at local stations. Several times in chapters on local banks this hypothesis was discussed. It was suggested by leaders of the Urban League and some coordinators. The researcher would work with national office personnel to select a city where minority leaders could be introduced into the local committee meetings without causing unnecessary friction. Then the researcher would work with national and local leaders to facilitate the change in participants at local committee meetings. Perhaps only the Urban League director would be invited.

To test the hypothesis, another "before and after" comparison would be arranged. The researcher would obtain statistics from the local bank officials concerning the rate of applicant placement over several months' time and then compare this with the rate of placement over the same amount of time following the change in local committee makeup. This test would provide valuable insight for national office personnel as they talk with local leaders about the involvement of leaders of minority group communities in their decisions. If future local banks develop, the results of this test could be valuable for new bank leaders.

**Descriptive Studies**

7. A descriptive study should be designed to reveal the attitudes of minority group members toward the skills
Coordinators in San Francisco, Miami and Columbus mentioned the need for this kind of study. A researcher who is a member of a minority group should interview applicants who have been placed, trained or advanced through the efforts of the bank to discover how the employees react to the bank program, coordinator and other factors involved in the bank operation. This could provide important feedback for bank officials as they make plans for future programs or expansion of existing programs.

Listed below are some of the questions this study should be designed to answer: (a) How do the applicants usually hear about the skills bank program? (b) What is it that convinces them they should apply for assistance? (c) What factors in the coordinator's procedure are most successful in preparing applicants for interviews at broadcast stations? (d) How do applicants evaluate various training programs conducted by the bank? (e) Do they feel the training prepared them for the kind of work they wanted? (f) Why or why not? (g) Was the training paced properly? (h) What other strengths and weaknesses did they note in the training program? (i) What do they think should be done to improve the training?

8. It would be of value to discover the ways in which local banks operated to facilitate the origin and development of individual minority involvement programs at stations in certain cities. The present study revealed a need for this
kind of research as various local bank chairmen said that stations in their cities were developing individual programs because of the bank. In Columbus, for example, the bank was terminated because broadcasters said they were starting their own individual programs. It would be interesting to determine what factors in the bank led to the development of these local programs. In addition, a researcher could ask how local individual minority involvement programs could be developed through a community of broadcasters without going through the "skills bank stage."

Further research could reveal answers to the following questions which were raised in the present study: (a) What factors influence the decision of broadcasters to set up individual training programs at their stations? (b) What is the influence of the skills bank on this decision? (c) In what ways are individual programs similar to or different from skills bank programs? (d) What factors in the bank's training program have influenced the nature of the individual programs? (e) What does this research suggest concerning ways in which individual stations may be encouraged to develop their own training programs (in communities where skills banks have not existed)?

Each of the above recommendations for further research would provide valuable data to be used by national leaders of the Broadcast Skills Bank as they continue to counsel the leaders of local banks. In addition, this research would be
of benefit to broadcasters who are involved in skills banks, planning skills banks or planning individual minority involvement programs for their stations. In particular, the chairmen and coordinators of local banks would find this kind of research worthwhile as they evaluate their own skills bank programs.

**Success and Failure of the Broadcast Skills Bank**

At the conclusion of this descriptive analysis of the Broadcast Skills Bank, one may question the meaning of the study for future, similar efforts. What does it all mean in terms of success and failure for cooperative efforts to involve minority group members in the broadcasting industry? What is the significance of this study for the broadcasting industry and for other organizations which continue to face the problem of discrimination? This concluding discussion addresses these important questions.

This evaluation of the Broadcast Skills Bank has dealt with the subject of equal employment opportunity in the radio and television industry. In the middle sixties, the founders of the skills bank had asked a simple question: How can we bring sufficient numbers of qualifiable minority group members into the broadcasting industry and thus overcome existing discrimination? In broadcasting and every other industry top administrators must act in the best interests of their organization as they make major changes, particularly changes
in personnel. For this reason, the significant word for Donald McGannon, George Norford, Whitney Young and others was the word "qualifiable." What could they build into their plan which would guarantee adequate qualifications in these new employees?

As the organization developed, it became a broadcast industry employment agency, complete with publicity, recruitment, screening and placement functions. However, it included several unique features: an emphasis on minority group members, the opportunity for special training offered to qualifiable applicants, and the concept of voluntary cooperation among the broadcasters responsible for its success.

The bank was most successful in its role as a catalyst, drawing communities of radio and television managers together to address the minority problem with a new sense of urgency. When strong leadership emerged and guided the effort, it took shape and became a viable force in the community. As managers developed successful local organizations, the banks became useful agencies for their employment purposes. They also became central offices for minority group members seeking broadcast employment, offering them the special advantages of scholarship money and training.

The major point of failure in the skills bank program was its inability to consistently involve the leaders of communities which it claimed to serve. Leaders of the Urban
League and other organizations representing minority group members were always invited to initial luncheons, but somehow they got left out of the local committee meetings where the real business of the bank was conducted. Broadcast executives wanted an organization which would facilitate the employment of minority group members, but they wanted to maintain complete control. In this sense the bank became a tool which they could use as necessary to prove that they were community-minded and had strong interests in hiring minority group members.

Other efforts seek to achieve the same goals as the Broadcast Skills Bank. One is the activity of citizen groups—challenging broadcast stations' licenses at renewal times. Although these groups want stations to employ more blacks, they also want more programming directed to black communities. In contrast with the Broadcast Skills Bank, citizen group activities are more forceful and immediate. They demand specific hiring quotas and programming changes. The skills bank can accomplish the same purposes over longer periods of time and without direct confrontation or emotional clashes between black leaders and broadcast executives. As more minority group members are employed at stations, it is reasonable to assume that the stations will increase their percentages of programming directed to black communities. An effective skills bank is also superior to citizen group efforts because it offers stronger possibilities for continued
progress in the hiring of minority group members at broadcast stations.

Another effort may be compared with the skills bank plan. The Federal Communications Commission requires an annual report from radio and television stations concerning the percentages of minority group members which they employ. In 1972 a number of stations received letters from the Commission asking for further information about their equal employment opportunity programs—their reports had not shown sufficient increases in the numbers of blacks and women hired during the previous year. However, in most cases, the Commission has been lenient with stations which do not have sufficient numbers of minority group members. When compared with the work of the Broadcast Skills Bank, the FCC's annual report is weak as a means of encouraging stations to hire more minority group members. It can be strengthened by the FCC if it will take action against the stations which do not demonstrate viable affirmative action programs. Of course, efforts such as the FCC forms were sometimes a motivation for broadcasters to participate in Broadcast Skills Bank programs.

An organization such as the Broadcast Skills Bank can serve as a facade for administrators who want to create the impression that their industry is concerned about minority group members. They can design a rather elaborate organization with goals, officers and even a budget to pay a minority
group member (coordinator) who appears to have authority. However, when the leaders of black communities and other minority groups are not directly involved in the function and development of the organization, it becomes what some minority group members call "window dressing," "cosmetics," or a "good press" to cover discrimination instead of dealing with it. The coordinator becomes a part of the tool and is paid to maintain the organization's image, suppressing information about its true nature.

This criticism is not meant to be applied wholesale to the national office and local offices of the Broadcast Skills Bank. It is mentioned here as a note of caution for readers who may have some part in future programs designed to facilitate the hiring of minority group members in a large industry. Many of the skills bank leaders used a direct approach in addressing the problem of discrimination; they took the necessary risks involved and hired qualifiable minority group members. Others seemed to sidestep the true intent of the organization as they developed promotional plans, inventory plans or experimental training programs to prove the bank's existence. Future bank efforts will be of most value to minority group members when they force broadcasters to commit themselves to the hiring of applicants. Bank efforts will be of least value when the bank is used as a tool to present the image of concern with little real action to back it up.
The objective of the bank program is to hire minority group members. When too much attention is given to the program, it becomes an end in itself and the importance of hiring may be overlooked in the process.
APPENDIX A

BAY AREA BROADCAST SKILLS BANK APPLICANT LISTING
CURRENT APPLICANTS FROM THE BROADCAST SKILLS BANK FILE... a very partial listing

*** Young woman, former Corporation for Public Broadcasting Career Fellow, desires a beginning position in radio or television. Has had extensive experience as a production assistant and researcher with the Children's Television Workshop (NYC); and script writer, script and tape editor, producer and interviewer in public radio.

*** Articulate young man (age 31) with 10 years experience as a graphic artist, wants position in a radio news department. Graduate of Ron Bailie School of Broadcasting - special emphasis on newscasting. Has done news and sportscasting for educational television. Third Class License.

*** Male, age 23, with Masters Degree in Business Administration seeks position as management or sales trainee in radio or television.

*** Male with experience in T.V. promotion department, seeks position as promotion assistant or in news department. Young and personable. Excellent trainee candidate.

*** Engineer with First Class License needs work. Recent graduate of John O'Connell School. Educational T.V. experience.

*** Young, gifted, and black producer-director seeks production position. Headed own production company - major network exposure. Developed and marketed T.V. series on black life and culture.

*** Attractive young lady, presently a part-time disc jockey with FM rock station, wants to move into major market. Special interest in news reporting and writing (B.A. in English.) Clerical skills too! Third Class License.

*** Young man, having worked with an independent production company, would like production assistant opportunity in television. Now engaged in computer programming, of all things.

*** Attractive young lady with good secretarial skills, and a degree in community affairs would like trainee or secretarial position in public/community affairs department or in news.
APPLICANTS CONTINUED

July 1971

*** Secretary, with accounting and billing experience at a Seattle radio station, has relocated to Bay Area. Wants to re-enter the field.

********

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION ON THESE OR OTHER APPLICANTS, PLEASE CONTACT THE BROADCAST SKILLS BANK AT 839-5028. COMPLETE RESUMES ARE AVAILABLE.
APPENDIX B

BAY AREA BROADCAST SKILLS BANK APPLICATION FORM
### Applicant Information

**Return form to:**
Gay P. Cobb  
Bay Area Broadcast Skills Bank  
66 Jack London Square  
Oakland, California 94607

**Date**

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<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<th>Address</th>
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**Radio | Television | Other**

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**Education**

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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elementary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| | Name and Address of School | Years Attended | Did You Graduate? (Year) | Diploma or Degree | Major Courses |
| | From | To |

| High | | Yes | No |
| | Yes | No |

| College | | Yes | No |
| | Yes | No |

| Other | (Specify) | Yes | No |
| | Yes | No |
Special Training, Skills, Licenses Held

Previous Employments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company Name and Address</th>
<th>Date:</th>
<th>Salary Range</th>
<th>Nature of Work and Name and Title of Immediate Supervisor</th>
<th>Reason for Leaving</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From:</td>
<td>Starting:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To:</td>
<td>Ending:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From:</td>
<td>Starting:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To:</td>
<td>Ending:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From:</td>
<td>Starting:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To:</td>
<td>Ending:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How did you learn about the Broadcast Skills Bank?

Do not write below

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Referred To</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C

SOUTH FLORIDA BROADCAST SKILLS BANK APPLICATION FORM
## Employment Application

**SOUTH FLORIDA BROADCAST SKILLS BANK**

### Personal Information
- **Name:**
- **Date of Birth:**
- **Social Security Number:**
- **Height:**
- **Weight:**
- **Position Applied For:**
- **Address:**
- **Salary Requested:**
- **Willing to Relocate:**
- **Driver’s License Number:**

### Education
- **High School**
- **Business or Vocational**
- **College**
- **Further Education or Business Training**

### Employment
- **Dates of Employment:**
- **Employer’s Name and Address:**
- **Job Title:**
- **Summary of Primary Duties:**
- **Supervisor’s Name:**
- **Salary Start/Last:**
- **Reason for Leaving:**
**MILITARY**

Have you ever been a Member of the U.S. Armed Forces? [ ] No [ ] Yes
Branch
Presently a member of [ ] Yes [ ] No
Reserves or Active Reserve [ ] Yes [ ] No

**MEDICAL**

Do You Have, or Have You Ever Had, Any of the Following?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heart Attack/Disease</td>
<td>☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rheumatic Fever</td>
<td>☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Blood Pressure</td>
<td>☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varicose Veins</td>
<td>☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ear/Throat Problems</td>
<td>☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drinking Problem</td>
<td>☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Addiction</td>
<td>☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head/Eye Injury</td>
<td>☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequent Headaches</td>
<td>☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skin Problems</td>
<td>☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allergies</td>
<td>☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asthma/Key Fever</td>
<td>☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asthma/Key Fever</td>
<td>☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chronic Cough</td>
<td>☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuberculosis</td>
<td>☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chest Pain</td>
<td>☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convulsions/Seizure</td>
<td>☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backaches</td>
<td>☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diabetes</td>
<td>☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paralysis/Pin</td>
<td>☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensitivity to Chemicals</td>
<td>☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidney/Ureteral</td>
<td>☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renal/Ureteral</td>
<td>☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rupture/Effects</td>
<td>☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Have you ever had a job connected disease, injury or accident? [ ] No [ ] Yes
Explain

Have you ever received compensation for an injury, accident or disease? [ ] No [ ] Yes
Explain

**REFERENCES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>ADDRESS</th>
<th>TIME KNOWN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"I understand that as part of normal procedure for processing employment applications and employment requests, a routine inquiry may be made concerning information on character, general reputation, credit, personal characteristics, and mode of living. I authorize such investigation and acknowledge that information on the nature and scope of such a report, if one is made, is available upon written request."

I voluntarily extend my permission to the Company to investigate all information I have provided and release from all liability or responsibility those persons or companies which may provide the Company with information concerning my past employment and activities. If employed, I voluntarily agree to participate in such tests or examinations which may be prescribed from time to time by the Company and I understand that any misrepresentation or omission of facts on this form is sufficient grounds for immediate dismissal.

**Signature**

**Date**
EMPLOYEE REQUISITION FORM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Radio or TV Station</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Phone</th>
<th>Submitted by</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(To be completed by Skills Bank)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Received</th>
<th>Mailed</th>
<th>Phoned in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Submitted</th>
<th>By</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**JOB CATEGORY REQUESTED:**

**TECHNICAL**
- Engineer
- Asst. Engineer
- Technical Supervisor
- Studio Supervisor
- Video-Tape-Recorder Supervisor
- Film Editor
- Cameraman
- Audio Technician
- Recording Technician
- Lighting Director
- Craftman

**NEWS**
- News Director
- Sports Director
- Writer & Editor
- "Stringer"
- Reporter/Cameraman
- ON-THE-AIR
- Announcer
- Performer
- Newscaster
- Commentator
- Program Moderator
- Disc Jockey
- Host

**SALES**
- General Sales Manager
- National Sales Manager
- Asst. National Sales Manager
- Local Sales Manager
- Sales Traffic
- Sales Service
- Sales Research
- Account Executive

**PROGRAMMING**
- Program Manager
- Production Manager
- Program Traffic
- Production Assistant
- Copy Writer
- Special Projects-Events
- Public Service
- Director
- Film Librarian
- Scenic Designer
- Program Researcher
- Music Librarian
- Promotion Assistant

Specific Job Description

---

HOURS: Day □ Night □ Part time □ Full time □

SOME EXPERIENCE REQUIRED □ On-The-Job Trainee □

SALARY RANGE $ ___________ to $ ___________ month
SOURCES CONSULTED

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DeBord, Sharon. Vice-President, Administrative Operations, WCOL radio, Columbus, Ohio. Telephone interview, October 20, 1972.

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Harrell, Patricia. Secretary to the Accountant, WTVJ television, Miami, Florida. A personal interview, August 11, 1972.

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. Letter to the Bay Area skills bank members dated March 29, 1972.


. Letter to the Bay Area skills bank members dated February, 1972.

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Rice, Roger. Year end report on San Francisco bank to George Norford, National Coordinator, Broadcast Skills Bank, dated December, 1971.


Miscellaneous

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News release from the Ohio State University News Services re skills bank training program, dated September 10, 1971.

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Norford, George E. Address presented at a seminar sponsored by the Race Relations and Industry Publication, Hotel Roosevelt, New York, February 16, 1968. (Mimeographed.)