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ION C. BRĂTIANU: THE MAKING OF A NATIONALIST POLITICIAN, 1821-1866

DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Everett Garrison Walters, B.A., M.A.

* * * * * *

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INTRODUCTION

In 1821 the territory of present day Romania was divided between three great empires. Bessarabia, on the Black Sea between the Pruth and the Dniester rivers, had been a part of Russia since 1812. The Banat, Bucovina, and Transylvania formed the eastern segment of the Austrian Empire. The bulk of Romanian territory and population, however, was concentrated in the Ottoman Empire. The principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were conquered by the Turks in the fifteenth century, but, unlike other Ottoman provinces, they were ruled as autonomous protectorates. Home rule was effectively suspended between 1711 and 1821 when the princely thrones (and the upper aristocracy) were dominated by Greeks, but native rule was restored as a result of the Greek revolution and a subsequent Romanian revolt in 1821. The change to native princes did not bring true autonomy, since from 1828 until the Crimean War, Russia controlled the political affairs of both Moldavia and Wallachia. The fundamental law of each country, the regulament organic, was decreed by the Russian governor, General Kiselev, in 1830.

The regulaments, in their social and economic aspects, were highly satisfactory to the boiars, the aristocratic landowning class of Romania. The fact that real political power lay outside of their respective states was a matter of indifference to most of them. Gradually, however, a group of dissidents began to demand more autonomy.
The leaders of this movement associated themselves from the beginning with Romanian cultural nationalism, a new but increasingly important factor.

The national movement was greatly strengthened by the fact that many of the dissidents sent their sons to the West, particularly to France, for their education. Once abroad, the young men were strongly influenced by the radical nationalism which pervaded student circles, and they returned to their countries as prophets of change. The new political generation which was created by the western experience was enormously productive. As a result of its efforts, Romania was able to take part in the revolutionary upheavals of 1848. Despite defeat, this action, combined with subsequent propaganda produced by the exiled leaders, brought the aspirations of the Romanians to the attention of Europe. Within ten years the Principalities were autonomous, within fifteen united and virtually independent.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of the early career of one of the leaders of the generation of 1848, Ion Constantin Brătianu. Brătianu was most prominent in the period after 1866, when his influence in Romania was analogous to that of his contemporary, Bismarck, in Germany. Nevertheless, a study of the first, formative half of his career is essential to an understanding of the later years. Despite his importance, no serious work has ever been done on Ion Brătianu. The only full length biography (Constantin Răutu, Ion C. Brătianu [Turnu-Severin:...
Tipografia Ion N. Bojneagu, 1940] is uncritical, carelessly researched, and does not pretend to be a scholarly effort. Moreover, this book is particularly weak with respect to the period 1821-1866. This paper, therefore, will attempt to describe the political growth and evolution of Ion Brătianu in those years. In so doing, the objective is to provide the foundation for a study of his entire career, as well as to show Brătianu's relation to Romanian history and the nationalist movement of mid-nineteenth century Europe.
CHAPTER I

1821-1848

Ion Constantin Brătianu was born at the village of Brătieni in the province of Argeș in 1821. The Brătianu family was a part of the boiar, or noble landowning class, and thus the social conditions to which he was born were much the same as those of the other leaders of the Romanian generation of 1848. In fact, in a remarkably homogeneous group, Brătianu was set apart chiefly by his age—he was the youngest.

Ion Brătianu's father, Constantin (Dincă) does not appear to have taken part in the events surrounding the revolt of Tudor Vladimirescu in 1821, although his brother, Toma Brătianu, was actively involved on the side of the rebels, and was a leader in the attempt to revive the revolutionary movement in 1826. Dincă's lack of involvement was not symbolic of political passivity, however, as he played a leading role in the politics of his province until his death in 1844. He served first as chief of his local district, and then as ispravnic or governor of the province of Argeș.

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2 Ioan C. Filitti, Framintările politice și sociale dela 1821 la 1828. ("Social and Political Unrest from 1821-1828.") (Bucharest: Cartea Românească, 1932), pp. 26, 137.
This was an important position not only because of the size and wealth of the province, but also because Argeș, with its capital at Pitești, was located on the Austrian frontier and controlled what was one of Wallachia's most important trade routes to the West—along the Olt Valley to Sibiu (Hermannstadt). Dinca's political involvement was not limited to local affairs, however, as he served many years as an elected representative of the boiars of Argeș in the Obșteasca Adunare (National Assembly) which met at Bucharest.

The whole question surrounding the origin, formation, and even the composition of the boiar class is one of the most controversial in Romanian history. There are only a very few factors which are consistently applicable. To be noble is to be privileged, and the boiars had two key privileges: exemption from all taxation and the exclusive right to participate in government. Wealth was another factor, and it eventually came to be the critical one. Modern scholarly analysis has demonstrated that, although the term 'boiar' was at one time synonymous with landownership, the establishment of the princedom, with the taxes, favors and persecutions that it brought, provoked a sudden difference in the heart of the boiar class, from the middle of which was created an aristocracy of high officials and great landowners. As the days passed, the differentiation continued to deepen.3

The results of this stratification were apparent at both ends of Romanian society, as a large portion of the boiar class sank down

to the level of serfs or bounded peasants or else hovered on the borderline. 4

Thus the stage was set for the Regulament Organic (Organic Statute) of 1831 which used the established economic facts to provide a formal, legal definition of the boiar class. The result was that in Muntenia (Wallachia) there were about 2 1/2 million residents of whom (in 1848) about 30,000 were landowners, but only 2,000 of this group were legally considered to be boiars. Of this group of 2,000 some seventy-five individuals from thirty-three families were entitled to the privileges of the rank of 'Great Boiar.' 5 The Regulament Organic permitted some non-boiar representation (from the middle classes, not from the peasantry) but power remained overwhelmingly with the boiars and especially with the 'Great Boiars' whose representatives elected a majority of the national assembly. 6

Dinca Bratianu's position within the boiar class was a good one. Although he did not qualify as a member of one of the 'Great Boiar' families, 7 he owned, at the time of his death, eleven

4Ibid., p. 349.
5C. Colescu-Vartic, Zile revolutionare ("Revolutionary Days") (Bucharest: Institutul de Arte Grafice Carol Göbl, 1898), pp. 85, 106.
6Ibid., p. 85.
7Ibid., p. 106.
estates of varying sizes as well as a house in Pitești. The income from the estates and from other houses and inns in Pitești was quite good. It is probable that his financial success resulted at least in part from adaptability and innovation in the management of his affairs, for Dincă Brătianu was not as thoroughly tradition-bound as many of his peers. He was the only member of the National Assembly to wear 'german dress' and he was sufficiently interested in manufacturing to apply for permission to establish a glass factory in 1831.

The Brătianu family was a large one; Ion was the fifth born of seven children. The oldest was Teodor who served many years in the army and then followed in his father's footsteps as ispravnic of Argeș. Later, he was also a deputy to the National Assembly and served as a member of the commission which regulated the affairs of Moldavia and Muntenia in the period between Independence and Union (1859-1862). Teodor was a conservative who often argued with his radical younger brothers. Next came two daughters, Maria, who became a nun and took the name of Maximilia, and Ana. The

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8 Sabina Cantacuzino, Din viața familiei I. C. Brătianu ("From the Life of the Family of I. C. Brătianu") (Bucharest: Universul, 1933), I, p. 18.

9 Al. Cretzianu, ed., Din arhiva lui Dumitru Brătianu ("From the Archives of Dumitru Brătianu") (Bucharest: Imprimeriile Independența, 1933), I, p. 7.

10 Ibid.

fourth born (1818), was Dumitru, and after Ion came two more daughters, Zinca and Cleopatra.

Ion’s mother, Anastasia (Sica) Tigvenu Bratianu, was a fiery creature who dominated her husband and received from her children the unaffectionate nickname of Cucoana (Lady) Sica. One of Ion Bratianu's daughters, Sabina Cantacuzino, whose Din viața familiei I. C. Bratianu ("From the Life of the Family of I. C. Bratianu") is one of the very few sources for this period, describes Anastasia’s approach to her family:

For this strange mother, the children were divided into three categories: First, the indifferents, among whom was Teodor, enjoying, however, the advantages of the first born ... and called nene [uncle] by his brothers. Beside him [in this category] were the sisters Maria and Cleopatra.

In the second category, that of the favorites, were Zinca and especially Dumitru to whom everything was given. After his departure for Paris, his mother blinded herself with tears, as they say in the family.

The third category, that of the persecuted, was composed of Ion and Anica.

Thus, while Dumitru remained at home under the watchful eye of his doting mother, Ion was sent to stay with distant relatives for the first four and a half years of his life. From the age of five he attended school with the other children at the family

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12 Cantacuzino, Din viața familiei, I, p. 9.
13 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
house in Pitești. The teachers who came to instruct them were for the most part Greeks, as was then the custom in Romania. The classes often included the sons of other boyar families from the Pitești region, and surprisingly, the Brătianu daughters, who, according to Sabina Cantacuzino, "...followed the same courses as the boys; my aunts recited passages from Homer and said with pride that they had not learned Greek, but Hellenic."\(^{15}\)

The decade after the crushing of the Tudor Vladimirescu revolt of 1821 was one of unrest and warfare. Although Ion Brătianu's childhood was sad, it was not lacking in adventure:

When the alarm signalled the arrival of the Turks or other invaders, in a second the horses were readied, blankets and pillows thrown from the windows, the carts were filled with the icons, silver, some furs, coats and food and then with the women and children the horses set off in a gallop for the mountains, accompanied by the men on horseback or by trusted servants.

If the invading band followed them, they stopped in a wood and hastily buried the most valuable items, then set off again. If they were lucky, they crossed the frontier (into Transylvania); if the pursuit stopped, they turned back, and searched, frequently in vain, for what they had hidden.\(^{16}\)

On at least one occasion, the Russian General Kiselev, was a guest of the Brătianu family at Pitești. Kiselev, who was governor of the Romanian Principalities during the Russian occupation and the prime mover in many reforms or attempted reforms (such as the Regulament Organic) took an interest in Dumitru and offered to send

\(^{15}\) Cantacuzino, Din viața familiei, I, p. 12.

\(^{16}\) Ibid., pp. 16-17.
him to Paris on a scholarship. 17 Dinca refused, saying that the boy was too young, 18 although the real reason was that, "He was too proud to accept such a gift from the representative of the conquering power." 19 Such a sentiment would have been remarkable if it had been expressed a generation earlier, but by 1830 the roots of nationalism had begun to take hold on Romanian soil.

The 1821 revolt of Tudor Vladimirescu and the Hetairist revolt of Ypsilanti which helped to stimulate it were quickly crushed (the purely Greek movement survived elsewhere, of course), but even in their failure, they started a chain of events which in turn led to the complete destruction of the ancien régime in the Danubian Principalities. The effect of the Greek movement was negative, but powerful and immediate, as it led to the complete collapse of Phanariot Greek influence within Romania and the Ottoman Empire as a whole. The result was not only the long overdue end to an exceedingly corrupt and stifling regime, but also the freeing of social groups within Romania, allowing them to seek new alliances and directions.

17 Cretzianu, Din arhiva, I, p. 5. Kiselev made similar offers to the sons of other boiars, and in general urged that they send their children to France to be educated. Kiselev was also in large part responsible for the changeover from Greek to French which occurred in many Romanian schools in this period. See N. Kretzulescu. Amintiri istorice ("Historical Memoirs") (Bucharest: Editura Ziarului 'Universul,' 1940), pp. 36-37, 43-44.

18 In fact, he was only twelve at the time.

19 Cretzianu, Din arhiva, I, p. 5.
The success of the Greek struggle for independence had the direct effect of fatally weakening the strength of Greek culture in Romania. The replacement of the Phanariotes was only a part of this process; in the long run, much more significant was the fact that the Ottoman Empire was decisively defeated by Russia. In fact, by the year 1830, Russia was the de facto if not the de jure controlling power over the Danubian Principalities. The great boiars, a majority of whom were ethnic Greeks who had secured their estates during the Phanariot period, were happy to support a country which had strongly supported the Greek War of Independence, which was fanatically pro-Orthodox, and which had acquired a well-deserved reputation as the most conservative power in Europe. An important side effect of the transition to Russian predominance, however, was that it provided the opportunity for the expression of powerful anti-Greek sentiments.

The revolt of Tudor Vladimirescu had important social overtones, but its most important lasting effect was to serve as a focus for pro-Romanian feelings. Even though a large proportion of the great boiar class was Greek or of Greek origin, a large percentage was purely Romanian; when all of the boiars were considered as a group, the Greeks were a very small minority. The non-Greek boiars (as well as the Romanian population as a whole) associated Phanariot corruption with the Greeks, and many were jealous of the growing power and financial success of the Greek-
dominated "dedicated monasteries." Thus many Romanians, men like Toma Brătianu, participated in the revolt of 1821 and at least in part through their anti-Greek (and, later, anti-Russian) sentiments they developed, in reaction, a pro-ROMANIAN outlook.

This development coincided with the appearance in Wallachia of the Transylvanian Latinists. The first of these was Gheorghe Lazăr who arrived in Bucharest in 1816 and began to teach at the College of St. Sava. Lazăr dropped the traditional Greek-language curriculum, and taught in Romanian, emphasizing the Latin basis of the language and the idea that the Romanian people were the direct descendants of Roman colonists. Lazăr's teachings, and those of his disciples, quickly provided the basis for a true nationalistic movement; Romania had not only a glorious past in Rome and the struggle against the barbarians but also a great mission to

20 These will be discussed later: Chapter VI, p. 186.

21 I do not wish to imply that anti-Greek feelings were the cause of the sudden growth of Romanian nationalism, but rather that this period of internal turmoil, with its ethnic overtones, provided an opportunity for the expression of ideas which had been developing for some time. There are a great number of sources which describe the emergence of forms of national consciousness in Romania prior to the Nineteenth Century—a factor which was becoming increasingly important due to the growing penetration of Western, and especially French, political thought in the Principalities. For a brilliant analysis of the impact of Western influence see John C. Campbell, French Influence and the Rise of Romanian Nationalism (New York: Arno Press, 1971).

fulfill—the propagation of Latin culture and, ultimately, the creation of a unified Romanian state.

The new ideas emanating from St. Sava were well received by that section of the boiai' class which was discontented and searching for an alternative. Thus it was, that in 1831 when Dinca Brătianu went to Bucharest to take his seat in the National Assembly, Dumitru went with him, and was enrolled at St. Sava. Three years later Ion was sent to a Romanian language school opened by a certain Simonide, a former student of Lazăr's. Ion was greatly influenced by his new teacher, even to the point that, "inflamed by the patriotic words of his Romanian professor, he broke the windows of the Greek schoolteacher at Pitești." 

Ion's new schooling lasted only a year, however, for in 1835, at the age of 14, he entered the army with the rank of Iunkar (cadet). He was strongly opposed to this, as he wished to continue his studies and follow Dumitru who went to Paris in the fall of the same year. His pleas were ignored, however, probably at the insistence of his strange mother, who was hardly sorry to see him go:

At his departure, he was heartsick when he came to say goodbye to his parents. His father kissed him and wished

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23 Cretzianu, Din arhiva, I, p. 6.
24 Cantacuzino, Din viata familiei, I, p. 12.
25 Ibid.
him well; his mother stood at the top of the stairs, and the boy climbed the last step and took her hand as if to kiss it; the hand, however, as a goodbye, struck him across the mouth. This was the only caress which the poor child received—he rapidly descended the stairs, in order not to break out crying in front of his unnatural mother.26

Teodor Brătianu was the commander of Ion's unit, and he made every effort to see that his younger brother did not get special treatment. Grigore Caracas, who became one of Ion Brătianu's closest friends, writes in his "Memoriul despre tinerețea lui Ion C. Brătianu" ("Memoir concerning the Youth of Ion C. Brătianu")27 that at first Ion was not even allowed to live with the officers, but stayed with the soldiers.28 Caracas invited him to come and live with him, and when the unit moved to Bucharest, Ion was immediately adopted as a member of the Caracas family.29

When Brătianu first saw his new friend's large library he was greatly impressed. Caracas offered to lend him as many books as he liked, but Ion replied that he was, "only able to read Romanian and a little Greek."30 At Caracas' urging, however, Ion took several volumes in French and "... with great effort, and by

27 Published in Din corespondența familiei Ion C. Brătianu ("The Correspondence of the Brătianu Family") (Bucharest: Imprimeriile Independența, 1933-35), V, pp. 521-524.
28 Ibid., p. 521.
29 Ibid., p. 523.
30 Ibid., p. 522.
himself, he learned to read them, and to gradually familiarize himself with that language."\(^{31}\) His serious, determined nature was the source of his success:

In truth, from his earliest days, Ion Brătianu differed from the majority of the officers in that his life was always modest. He never mixed at all with those of his comrades-in-arms who passed their time with card games, drinking, and licentiousness. Aside from the duties of his service, which he fulfilled with strictness, his occupations were to read and to study, while his main distraction was to share in the family life at our house, with our relatives and parents. No one among these ever had occasion to reproach him for any deed which was the least bit unseemly, but on the contrary, all loved and respected him.\(^{32}\)

Ion was not shy and retiring, however, as the following incident related by Sabina Cantacuzino demonstrates:

At a ball at [the palace of] Prince Ghica, one of the Prince's nieces, a young debutante, was sitting at the corner of a sofa upon which the Prince himself sat. No one asked her to dance ... Father, attracted by the beauty of Cleopatra Ghica, and by the neglect which she was finding, plucked up his courage, and under the nose of Prince Ghica, asked her to dance. The Prince, amazed by the daring of the youth, asked who he was and then said 'One can expect something from that young man.'\(^{33}\)

Brătianu was promoted to the rank of praporcie (sub-lieutenant) after three years,\(^ {34}\) but he never lost his desire to go

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\(^{31}\)Ibid.

\(^{32}\)Ibid., p. 523.

\(^{33}\)Cantacuzino, Din viața familiei, I, p. 15.

Paris and continue his studies. His desire and his effectiveness as an officer caused Colonel Odobescu, a superior officer and a close relative of Caracăș, to decide that Ion should be one of the officers that Odobescu planned to send abroad to study, and thus form the basis for an artillery service. The National Assembly refused to provide the funds required for scholarships, however, and Odobescu then went to Dincă Brătianu and urged him to send his son at his own expense. The elder Brătianu refused at first, noting that Dumitru had been in Paris for five years (this was in 1840) and that the expenses were great. Odobescu insisted, however, and as Ion's mother had died in 1839, the pleadings of the youngest son finally caused his father to yield.

It appears that Colonel Odobescu did not have the temptations of Paris in mind for his young officer, as Dincă Brătianu at first proposed to send Ion to Germany. Dumitru was firmly opposed to the idea:

> For myself, I am very much displeased that you are not coming to Paris where I am. I would like to believe that there is some reason, completely foreign to me, for which our father prefers to send you to Germany. In Germany there are Universities where education is carried out rather well, but despite that, unless you were younger and didn't have determined principles, it would be better for you to stay at home rather than to pursue your education in Germany.

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36 Ibid., V, pp. 523-4.
37 Cretzianu, Din arhiva, I, p. 111.
Dumitru's France or nothing, philosophy evidently convinced his father, for in July of 1841 Dinca wrote to Dumitru that permission had been secured from the authorities for Ion to go to Paris to study mathematics. The young officer was too impatient to linger more than a few months to settle his affairs, and by December of the same year he was safely installed in a Parisian pension.

Ion Brătianu's situation in Paris was much less comfortable than that of his elder brother; Dumitru had an apartment and a large library, while Ion, with only a fifth as much income, had an attic room so small that the bed had to be folded up in order to give him room to move around. He took his meals at a small pension where the food was so bad that he occasionally had to sprinkle it with vinegar before he could eat it.

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38 Ibid., p. 112.

39 Professor Iorga in his Activitatea politică și literară a lui Ion C. Brătianu ("The Political and Literary Activity of Ion C. Brătianu") (Bucharest: Librăriile Cartea Românească gi Pavel Suru, 1922), insists that Ion C. Brătianu did not arrive in Paris until 1845. The 1841 date is strongly supported, however, by a letter of Dinca Brătianu to Dumitru Brătianu, dated 22 December/3 January 1841/1842, which notes the receipt of "two letters, from you and from him," which constantly uses the plural form of 'you' (unlike an earlier letter), and which refers to Iancu with the inference that Iancu is with Dumitru (see Cretzianu, Din arhiva, I, p. 112). The material in Sabina Cantacuzino's Din viața familiei I. C. Brătianu, in the memoir of Caracâș, and in a memoir of Ion C. Brătianu himself ("1842-1846" MSS, BCS-ELS, Fondul Saint-Georges, CCVI/7) all indicate that he was in Paris in 1842.

40 Caracâș, "Memoriul despre tinerețea," V, p. 524.

41 Cantacuzino, Din viața familiei, I, p. 15.
Brătianu was not able to enter school at once, as he was ill throughout the first winter. Even then, he could not begin upper-level schooling immediately, but was required to take preparatory courses for a year and a half; given his background, it is a tribute to his talent and hard work that this period was not much longer.

Before he was able to complete his courses and enter college, news came from home that Dinca Brătianu had died. Dumitru left for home immediately, and Ion followed at the end of the term.

The division of the family estate seems to have caused some friction among the three brothers. Twelve separate properties were divided into three lots and Ion (perhaps because of his unhappy childhood) was allowed first choice. He selected the largest lot which included Tigveni, the estate where he had spent his first years, but Teodor, who had a wife and children, persuaded him to change his mind, and Ion eventually took the smallest lot. This group included Florica, which later became his residence, and four other small estates (of which only one remained in the family—the

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43 Ibid.
44 Cantacuzino, Din viața familiei, I, p. 18.
46 Ibid., p. 19.
other three were sold at various times to pay off Ion's debts.\textsuperscript{47}

On his return to Paris, Brătianu fell ill again and went to Ems, in Germany, for a cure.

At Ems, Brătianu made the acquaintance of the de Galhau family who, like the Caracal family, adopted him as one of their own. The senior de Galhau was a wealthy factory owner from Saarlouis (Saarland) and may have been the source of Brătianu's continuing interest in commerce and banking—an obsession which was shared by very few of his agriculturally-minded compatriots. The de Galhaus were advanced (at least relatively) in their social views, as Grandmother de Galhau, "...started the new custom that the servant's meals ought to be served before those of their master."\textsuperscript{48}

The friendship of this important family was a major factor in Brătianu's life, and he visited them whenever he could.

His illness continued, however, and in the winter of 1845 he again had a serious chest ailment. A doctor advised him to go south for treatment and Brătianu spent the rest of the winter in Naples. When he returned to Paris the following spring, he again visited the same doctor, who examined him and said: "Who ever gave you the absurd idea that you had a chest illness?" Brătianu showed him the prescription from his earlier visit, and the doctor

\textsuperscript{47}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{48}Ibid., p. 21.
could only say that, "Anyone can make a mistake." 49

The previous year, 1844, Brătianu had enrolled in the École d'État-Major (a military staff school). He was no longer in the army, having been released from service in 1843, 50 but he was treated as a foreign officer. His closest colleague was a tall, blonde Swede, and the two were nicknamed the 'Norman horse' and the 'Arab horse.' 51 There is no available information to indicate either a significant success or a striking failure at this school. It seems likely that either a dismissal or a certificate of graduation would have been noted, either by French judicial authorities in the case of the former, or by Brătianu himself, in the case of the latter, but no such information exists. It is probable that Ion, increasingly drawn by the student movement and the dynamic, revolutionary ideas of the Collège de France, gradually ceased to participate at his own school, and switched his activities to a new direction.

Paris had been a turbulent city throughout the 1840's, but by 1845 the general discontent and unrest which had been apparent

49 Sabina Catacuzino says that Ion Brătianu went to Naples in 1843-44, before he went to Ems (ibid., p. 20), but a note by C. A. Rosetti in his diary, "I received a letter from Brătianu who tells me that an illness forces him to go to Naples," is dated 20 Dec./1 Jan. 1845/46. C. A. Rosetti, Note intime, scris scrape zilnic. 1844-1846 ("Intimate Notes, Written Daily. 1844-1846") (Bucharest: Martinescu și Șerban, 1902-1903), I, p. 169.

50 Anul 1848, I, p. 12.

51 Ion Brătianu, "1842-1848."
earlier came to be focussed and organized as never before. Perhaps the most important center was the Collège de France, whose three great orators, Jules Michelet, Edgar Quinet, and Adam Mickiewicz, covered the Latin Quarter with a cloud of romantic, revolutionary mysticism. Frenchmen and the problems of France were not the sole concern of these 'immortals':

In France it was the intrepid attack upon the Jesuits which had the greatest reverberations. But to the large group of foreigners in Paris, many of them political exiles, anticlericalism made less appeal than the impassioned speeches of Mickiewicz on Poland's mission to liberate the Slavs and free Europe, of Michelet on the philosophy of history, on the revolution, on nationality, or of Quinet on the revolutions in Italy. It is almost impossible to recapture the atmosphere of those years, the unlimited emotional enthusiasm, generated by the romantic literature, by the new cult of the Revolution, and by sheer boredom and disgust with the foreign and domestic policies of the bourgeois regime, enthusiasm which lifted the professors to the status of prophets and sent their listeners out of the lecture hall transfigured...52

While the French students were inspired by the romantic, radical democracy of Michelet's *Le Peuple*, the foreign students added to this the nationalistic philosophy of Quinet, who was the French translator of Herder, and the poetry of Mickiewicz who, with his fellow Poles, "were the living symbols of oppressed peoples."53

The Poles were the undisputed leaders of the émigré society in those days, and the Romanian movement, both in Paris and in the

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52 Campbell, *French Influence*, p. 129.

Principalities always maintained close contact with them. Thus, the first Romanian national movement, that of Ion Câmpineanu in 1837-1840, was closely associated with the Polish leader Czartoryski's plans for a coalition of simultaneous anti-Russian revolutions. A nephew of Czartoryski's, Count Zamoisky, was a good friend of many of the Romanian students in Paris; these and other contacts strongly influenced the young Romanians.

In 1845 a large number of young Romanians organized a Society of Romanian Students in Paris. The avowed purpose of the society was the nonpolitical one of raising funds in order to allow young Romanians to carry out their studies in Paris, but the choice of a sponsor, the republican poet Lamartine, indicates the general

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55 N. Kretzulescu, Amintiri, p. 57. Count Zamoisky joined the Turkish army during the Crimean War under the name of Saïdyk-Pasha. See: St. Łukaśik, "Relațiile lui Mihail Czaikowski cu Românii" ("The Relations of Mihail Czaikowski with the Romanians"), Revista Istorică Română, II (1932), pp. 232-261.
political orientation of its leaders. The society never became a revolutionary organization (although it was often under attack as such) nor did it follow the common practice of forming a secret counterpart; rather, it served as an information center, using its resources both to foster unity among Romanians and to promote propaganda favoring the Romanian national cause.56

Ion Brătianu was a charter member of the Society of Romanian Students, but there is no indication that he served as an officer or took a leading role in the Society's activities.57 The Romanian students in Paris were from the very first caught up in the activities of the French far left, and it was in this direction that Brătianu appears to have channeled his energy.58

56 On the Paris group, see: N. Isar, "Societatea studentilor români de la Paris, 1845" ("The Society of Romanian Students at Paris, 1845") (România Literară, III (1970), no. 2. A counterpart of the association, a Literary Society, was organized in Bucharest in late 1843. This group did have a secret revolutionary counterpart, 'Fratia' (Fraternity), which continued through 1848, and whose motto, 'Dreptate-Frâţie' (Justice-Fraternity), was the motto of the forty-eighters. No one individual was a charter member of all groups, but there was extensive contact, and as students moved back and forth between Paris and Bucharest, the core of the membership became much the same. The membership of Fratia is not completely known, see: G. Zane, "Mişcarea revoluţionară de la 1840 în Țara Românească" ("The Revolutionary Movement of 1840 in Wallachia") Studii și Materiale de Istorie Medie, III (1963), pp. 185-314.

57 Brătianu's financial position was now much improved, however, and he was one of the major contributors. Anul 1848, I, pp. 81, 85.

58 Ion Ghica notes in his memoirs that, upon his arrival in 1835, the philosophy of Saint-Simon was dominant among the Romanians, while Fourier was also very popular. Ion Ghica, Scrisori către Vasile Alecsandri ("Letters to Vasile Alecsandri")
Dumitru Brătianu was no doubt an important influence on his younger brother in this respect, but probably more important was C. A. Rosetti, who became Ion's closest friend at about this time.\(^5\)

Five years older than Brătianu, C. A. Rosetti was nearly thirty, mature and accomplished when the two became friends. The Rosetti family was also of the boiar class, and also came from the region of Pitești.\(^6\) Rosetti was tutored at home (an unusual feature of his early education was the fact that he learned English),\(^6\) and then entered St. Sava for one year. In 1832, at the age of sixteen, he entered the army, but resigned four years later. In the following years Rosetti lived in Bucharest, occupying himself primarily with literature, and finally earning a reputation as a poet. Little is known about his other activities in this period.

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\(^5\)"From day to day I feel a great affection growing in me for the younger Brătianu." C. A. Rosetti, November 3/15, 1845 in his diary: _Note Intime_, I, p. 34.

\(^6\)Rosetti's father, Alexander, was of Greek origin, and was born at Constantinople. His mother's family, Obedeanu, however, was of native stock and was closely related to many of the leading boiar families. See: Marin Bucur, C. A. Rosetti. _Messianism si donquijotism revoluționar_ ("C. A. Rosetti. Messianism and Revolutionary Don Quixote-ism") (Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1970), pp. 7, 9.
except that he served briefly as Chief of Police at Pitești and was a member of the Commercial Tribunal of Bucharest. Rosetti did not take part in the revolutionary plot of 1840, but he was definitely involved with Frăția (although it has not been proven that he was a member), and was probably one of the early links between that group and the Society of Romanian Students in Paris.

Rosetti first came to Paris in 1842, and although he frequently returned to Romania on long trips, he lived there for five years. He was a member of the masonic lodge, L'Athénée des Etrangers, which had a strong leftist reputation. In May of 1846, Rosetti assisted at Ion's initiation ceremony. Brătianu was highly impressed, "When his blindfold came off and he saw us, it seemed to him, he told me, that this was how paradise would be after life. All day he talked to me about it." Brătianu remained a member of the lodge. Among the members listed, besides Dumitru, are: Ion Brătianu, C. A. Rosetti, and the French republicans D. Pilette and Paul Bataillard. Contemporary sources do not mention a lodge by the name of La Rose du Parfait Silence, and it seems likely that this group was a subsection, perhaps a secret one, of L'Athénée des Etrangers.

Ibid., p. 12. A. Ștefănescu-Galăți states that Rosetti was president of the Tribunal: Lui C. A. Rosetti, la o sută de ani de la nasterea lui ("C. A. Rosetti, One Hundred Years after his birth") (Bucharest, 1916), p. 1.


Bucur, C. A. Rosetti, p. 17. Al. Cretzianu in his Din Arhiva lui Dumitru Brătianu (I, p. 115) notes that among the papers of Dumitru he found a Tableau des Membres composant la R :: L :: de la Rose du Parfait Silence. Among the members listed, besides Dumitru, are: Ion Brătianu, C. A. Rosetti, and the French republicans D. Pilette and Paul Bataillard. Contemporary sources do not mention a lodge by the name of La Rose du Parfait Silence, and it seems likely that this group was a subsection, perhaps a secret one, of L'Athénée des Etrangers.


mason for the rest of his life, and founded the lodge "The Star of the Danube" immediately upon his return from exile in 1856.

Another activity in which both Rosetti and the Brătianu's participated was the radical student newspaper Les Ecoles. This journal was founded in 1845 (after the years 1845-1846, it continued for one more year under the title Le Journal des Ecoles) by a group of eighty students, and was considered to be the official paper of the students of the Collège de France; the Brătianu brothers were among the founding group of eighty and were, at least at the start, on the twelve-man editorial board. The nominal editor of Les Ecoles was Louis Blanc, and the editorial content of the paper was clearly in line with its sponsor's views. The bulk of the articles dealt with university reform and analysis of scholarly works (e.g., Quinet's Etude sur Herder), but there were also frequent discussions of social and political questions. In this respect

67I. T. Ulic, "Istoricul franc-masoneriei în România" ("The History of Franc-Masonry in Romania"), Paza, III (1923), nos. 9-10, p. 5.

68Campbell, French Influence, p. 135.

69Louis A. Garnier-Pagès, Histoire de la Révolution de 1848 (2nd ed., Paris: Pagnerre, 1866), I, p. 75, n. 1. Garnier-Pagès does not give a source for this statement, nor does the journal itself cite any names whatsoever. Supporting evidence is to be found in several letters of D. Pilette (also listed as a founder and editor by Garnier-Pagès) to D. Brătianu (Cretzianu, Din arhiva, I, pp. 115-117) in which the former refers to "our journal," and to the affairs of Les Ecoles. The editorial office of Le Journal des Ecoles was, in 1847, located in the same building as the Society of Romanian Students--3 Place de Sorbonne: Breazu, Edgar Quinet, p. 314, n. 1.
the tone was uncompromisingly socialist; the bourgeoisie is described as "the new royalty" and the working class as the only hope for the future. \(^70\) Les Ecoles even went so far as to publish a strong attack on Czartoryski, saying that an aristocrat could not be a true representative of his country, and accusing him of hastening the downfall of Poland.\(^71\)

In late 1846 Rosetti returned to Bucharest, and with the assistance of E. Winterhalder and E. Grant, established a bookstore and printing shop.\(^72\) In 1847, in Plymouth, England, Rosetti married Grant's sister, Maria (their father was the British Consul at Bucharest).\(^73\) Rosetti's new profession of shopkeeper scandalized his aristocratic relatives—a reaction which no doubt pleased him. The purchase of the printing press was a significant step, however, for it started Rosetti on his career as a publisher and editor, whose papers, *Prunul Român* ("The Romanian Infant"—in 1848) and *Românul* ("The Romanian") were to be powerful factors in Romanian politics. No less important was Rosetti's marriage, for the driving energy of Maria Rosetti was critically important to her rather frail and sensitive husband, and indeed, valuable to the Romanian movement as a whole.


\(^71\) Ibid., pp. 150-151.

\(^72\) Bucur, C. A. Rosetti, p. 18.

\(^73\) Ibid., p. 20.
Ion Brațianu was still in Paris when the revolution broke out in February of 1848. The only mention of his role is in a brief memoir which he dictated to one of his children (probably Ionel) on 19/31 August, 1888:

In 1848 he [Ion] was one of the first in the banquets, and at his place met for the first time the editors of Le National and [other] directors of the movement who until that time had been enemies. On the day when the Hotel de Ville was taken, he rapidly put on his blouse, took a pistol, and entered along with the first students ...a worker, seeing him dressed in a blouse and stockings of silk shouted at him "Farceur"! He approved the entrance of Michelet in the Hotel de Ville as he [Michelet] was unknown to ...[illegible] and could not enter. He [Ion] was also with the Romanian deputation to Lamartine.74

Recollections after forty years are often unreliable, but given Brațianu's contacts, this story seems quite plausible. Armand Lévy later made reference to Ion's having fought on the barricades 75--certainly an allusion to the events of February as Brațianu was in Bucharest by June.76 The revolution was merely a starting signal for the Romanian students in Paris--a group which hardly needed the glowing promises of support from the representatives of the new French Republic to encourage them to action. The

74Ion Brațianu, "1824-1848," MSS.
75Armand Lévy, Lettre à M. Jean Bratiano sur la question israélite en Roumanie (Bucharest: Aux Bureaux de l'Israelite Roumain, 1869), p. 61.
76Rosetti and Ion Brațianu also made reference to the barricades (Anul 1848, II, p. 135).
Brătianus left Paris for home in mid March, and, "By the middle of April there was scarcely a Romanian student left in Paris." Ion Brătianu's six years in Paris constituted a period of formation and apprenticeship. During the entire time he was not the leader of any organization, nor is he known to have authored even a single article. His relative obscurity can be traced to a number of factors—his youth, frequent illness, and poor educational background. The lack of any written expression of his views makes it impossible to draw a clear picture of his ideological beliefs; whatever conclusions can be drawn must be made from inference and association.

It is certain that Brătianu was an ardent Romanian nationalist. These views were clear long before his arrival, and could only have been expanded and reinforced by his contacts with other young Romanians, as well as with the crusading nationalism of the Collège de France. There is ample evidence that he worked to publicize the Romanian cause, distributing propaganda and asking the support of prominent Frenchmen. It can also be said that Brătianu's nationalism was democratically oriented, but beyond this point there is no solid evidence.

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77 A note in the papers of Paul Bataillard indicates their presence in Paris on the 10th of March (MSS, BCS-BLS, Fondul Brătianu, Pachet XLII, Doc. 3a).
78 Campbell, French Influence, p. 155.
79 Anul 1648, I, pp. 132-133, 136-137.
Brătianu's association with the Masons and his links with the radical Les Ecoles indicate a strong leftist direction in his interest, but that is all. In later years he mentioned Proudhon as one of his acquaintances, and also noted that he had been greatly impressed by Louis Blanc's *Histoire de dix ans.* Nevertheless, there is no evidence that his interest in socialism went any deeper than the highly superficial orientation of contemporary student groups. In fact, the only aspect of Brătianu's outlook which was demonstratably radical was his nationalism—a fact which was shortly to have a strong impact on his native country.

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80Ion Brătianu, "1842-1848," MSS.
81Ibid.
The Brătianus arrived in Bucharest shortly after N. Bălcescu and A. G. Golescu, probably between 11/23 and 16/28 April. The rather late arrival of the former is explained by the fact that Ion had had to borrow money in order to finance their trip, and also because they had stopped in Vienna for a conference with the Transylvanian Romanian students there.

Ion Brătianu still held his commission in the army, and one of his first acts upon his return was to present himself before the army commander, Colonel Odobescu. Brătianu asked if it would not be better if he handed in his resignation, "...in view of my liberal ideas." Odobescu would have none of it, however, and greeted Ion and Dumitru as if they were old friends. In this friendly atmosphere, Ion asked for and got permission to visit relatives at Pitești. Six days later he read in the official newspaper that,

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1A. G. Golescu is often described as 'negrul' or 'Arăpilă' (dark, swarthy) to distinguish him from his cousin, A. C. Golescu, called 'albu' (white).

2Rosetti, Note Intime, I, p. 17.

3Ion Brătianu, "Reminiscențe din revoluția dela 1848" (Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1848), MSS, ECS-BLS, Fondul Saint-Georges, CCVI/7, p. 53.

4Ibid.
"Praporcic of Artillery Ioan Brățianu, whereabouts unknown, is released from service." Brățianu's enquiries revealed that Odobescu was personally responsible for this order. Odobescu's action was certainly for the better, as it would have been rather awkward for Brățianu to remain in the army; he was already committed to overthrow the government.

Preliminary discussions with regard to the organization of a revolutionary movement in the Romanian lands were held in Paris, immediately after the French uprising. The details of these meetings are unknown, and the results can be discussed only in general terms. The students apparently had no difficulty in drawing up a program; they used essentially the same set of goals that were at the foundation of the abortive movement of 1840. The only stumbling block was where to begin. The Wallachians felt that the movement should begin in their area and then move to Moldavia, primarily because an important member of the Wallachian army, Colonel Tell, was a founding member of Frăția. The Moldavians

5 Ibid. The order is reproduced in Anul 1848, I, p. 341.

6 Bodea, The Romanians' Struggle, p. 144. Ion and Dumitru refused to attend one of the first meetings, however, as they considered its organizers to be too moderate (Ibid., p. 143). The final program, which was proclaimed in June as The Declaration of Islaz (see discussion below), was certainly not moderate.
refused, however, and insisted upon separate action at the same time in both principalities; they got their way, but by default and not by agreement. 7

Whether or not the planning in Paris included an effort at common action with the Romanians of Transylvania is unknown. The Romanian students in Paris had long maintained contacts with similar groups of Transylvanians, and their propaganda, especially in the last few years, had emphasized the idea of unity of all Romanians. 8 It is probable that the meetings of the Brătianu brothers with the Transylvanians in Vienna were held in order to organize some joint action. If so, it is doubtful that any firm decisions were reached.

Meanwhile, the news of the French revolution had reached Bucharest (Rosetti first heard on 5/17 March) 9 where it produced a flurry of activity among the members of Frăția. A series of meetings were held, mostly at Rosetti's bookstore, and a discussion of tactics began. The first decision was a moderate one; it was determined that an approach should be made to Prince Bibescu in order that he be encouraged to lead the movement for reform;

7Ibid., pp. 144-145.

8Ibid. Dr. Bodea's excellent work emphasizes throughout the concept of unity and the contacts between the Romanians of Transylvania and those of the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia.

Rosetti was chosen as the group's representative. Bibescu, though somewhat liberal in outlook, was not in a position to approve even if he had wanted to; the real power in Bucharest was at the Russian Consulate. The Prince's refusal was accompanied by an order that the meetings at Rosetti's shop would have to cease.¹⁰

At that time (late March) there were two main groups of dissidents in Bucharest. One, the Rosetti group, was composed primarily of young students who had been in Paris—Rosetti, Ion Ghica, the brothers Ştefan, Radu, Nicolae, and A. C. (Albu) Golescu, Cezar Bolia, and Ion Voinescu II, as well as A. G. Golescu (Arăpilă), N. Bălcescu and the Brătianus who joined them in April. It is interesting that none of these dozen or so revolutionaries ever emerged as a clear-cut leader. Bălcescu was the only one who consistently maintained the respect and friendship of all the others, but he seems to have lacked either the political skill or perhaps even the desire to take charge.¹¹ As a result, when forced to choose one of their own as nominal representative, the others usually chose N. Golescu, who was the oldest (39 in 1848, Ion Brătianu was still only 27) and perhaps the least outspoken.

The other principal group was led by Ion Eliade Rădulescu (usually referred to as simply 'Eliade') and was much more

¹⁰E. Winterhalder, "Desrobirea României" (The Freeing of Romania"), Pruncul Român, I (1848), no. 2, republished in Anul 1848, I, pp. 642-643.

conservative than the first. Eliade's chief supporters were military men, C. Tell, Gh. Magheru, and N. Plegoianu, most of whom were long-time members of Frăția. Eliade, who had been for a time head of the college of St. Sava, as well as a major force on the Bucharest cultural scene, also had quite a following among the merchants and artisans of the city. Tell, Magheru and Plegoianu all had important military commands outside of Bucharest. The student group had no material backing to compare to this, but what they lacked in support they made up for in zeal and determination. Most of the members of the younger group had quarreled with Eliade at one time or another. These difficulties were occasioned not only by his conservatism (he sharply criticized the movement of 1840 which was for the other group a point of inspiration) but also by his extreme conceit and arrogance. Eliade was so unpopular with the students that they had at first refused to elect him as a patron of the Society of Romanian Students in Paris, only relenting some years later after a special meeting of the charter members. The two groups needed each other, however, and shortly after the arrival of the Brătianus in April, they merged to form a Revolutionary Committee. The result was a union of necessity not of sympathy; the revolutionaries scarcely ever agreed on anything.

12Campbell, French Influence, p. 181.
14E. Winterhalder, Anul 1848, I, p. 643.
When and how to act was of course the first question to be debated. The gravity of this problem was accentuated by the fact that the revolutionary movement in Moldavia had already been crushed. During the last days of March (27, 28 March / 8, 9 April) a group of liberal Moldavians, combined with the large faction of opposition boiars presented a list of 35 demands to Prince Mihail Sturdza. Their claims were relatively moderate: personal liberty, ministerial responsibility, a new more representative assembly, an end to press censorship, repeal of the export tax on cereal grains (the boiar influence), a national guard and the amelioration of the condition of the peasantry, etc. Sturdza refused to panic, however, and citing especially the demands for a new assembly and a national guard as being in violation of the Regulament Organic on March 29 / April 10 he used force to silence the opposition. The key leaders were arrested and exiled, or, what amounted to the same thing, forced to leave the country.15

Not surprisingly, the overall effect of the Moldavian fiasco was to make the Bucharest group more cautious, and more concerned about careful organization and preparation. The idea of a brief postponement was especially welcome to the Paris group as they were the most concerned about the synchronization of their actions with events outside the Principalities. An important early concern was the possibility of a Polish revolt which had been

planned for 3/15 April. The cancellation of this plan was no doubt an even more severe blow to the Wallachians than was the disaster in Moldavia. Many of the leaders in Bucharest now felt that French assistance was indispensable in order to keep Russia occupied, and thus they opted to wait—hopefully Ledru-Rollin would come to power in France and send troops to assist them.

Another idea which now became increasingly important was that of enlisting the support of large numbers of Transylvanian Romanians who would help form a popular army. In a debate of the Revolutionary Committee on April 9/21 this course of action was strongly supported by one of the Brătianu brothers (probably Dumitru as he was then selected as the group's emissary to Transylvania) in preference to action by the military officers—a move which he suggested would be too much like a praetorian coup d'état.

D. Brătianu and a variety of other Wallachians and Moldavians participated in the meeting at Blaj in Transylvania from 3/15 to 5/17 May at which the Transylvanian Romanians elaborated their

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18 Gh. Georgescu-Buzău, "Activitatea lui Nicolae Bălcescu pentru pregătirea dezlănțurii revoluției din 1848" ("The Activity of Nicolae Bălcescu for the Preparation of the Unleashing of the Revolution of 1848"), Studii, IX (1956), no. 3, p. 61. This information is based on the observations of Bălcescu dictated to Ion Ghica in 1852.
national aspirations. General agreement on the idea of mutual assistance was reached, but without specific details.

The Bucharest group now began to plan in earnest. On May 10/22 the Revolutionary Committee was formally constituted and an executive committee composed of N. Golescu, A. G. Golescu (Arăpilă) and Ion Ghica was elected. The latter, however, was immediately sent to Constantinople as the group's representative to the Porte. Ghica's mission, aside from normal diplomatic activities, was threefold: the Sultan was asked to respect the original treaties in which the Principalities accepted Ottoman suzerainty, to allow the natives to change their constitution (the Regulament Organic) without outside approval, and to force Russia to stop meddling in local affairs. At about the same time Dumitru Brătianu was sent to Budapest to discuss cooperation with the Hungarians.

D. Brătianu's mission was a total failure. The Hungarians would not talk about military cooperation until the Romanians had a military, and they were understandably skeptical about the chances of French intervention. Furthermore, the Magyar leaders (and especially Kossuth) were unalterably hostile to the aims of the Romanian national movement in Transylvania. The question of Hungarian-Romanian cooperation was often debated during the summer

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19 Colescu-Vartic, Zile revoluționare, p. 135. Ghica was well received in Constantinople, and remained there throughout the revolution and even afterwards.

of 1848 and afterwards, but the problem of Transylvania always prevented agreement.

The Revolutionary Committee now began work on its platform and proclamation. Despite different outlooks, agreement seems to have been reached fairly quickly and easily. The platform itself was drawn from the Paris document (which was in turn based on the program of 1840) and was almost certainly the work of N. Bălcescu. The flowery language of the proclamation indicates that Eliade should be held responsible—it is not unlikely that he was assigned this task in order to distract him from criticism of the platform.

The 22 points of the Committee's program may be summarized as follows:

1. Administrative and legislative autonomy on the basis of the original treaties with the Porte.
2. Equal political rights.
3. General tax accountability.
4. A national assembly composed of representatives of all levels of society.

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22 Ibid., See also: N. B. Lăcusteanu, Ion Heliade și detractorii săi ("Ion Heliade and His Detractors") (Craiova: Tipografia Română 'Filip Lazăr,' 1898), II, pp. 391-440.
5. A responsible ruler from any social class elected for five years.

6. Restriction of the civil list and the elimination of corruption.

7. All ministers and all government officials to be responsible for their acts.

8. Absolute freedom of the press.

9. Compensatory payments to come from the country, through its representatives, and not from the Prince.

10. Each judêț (province) to elect its own officials.

11. Establishment of a National Guard.

12. Emancipation of the 'dedicated monasteries.'

13. Emancipation of the bonded peasants who are to become proprietors through a distribution of land.

14. Freeing of the Gypsy slaves who are also to become proprietors.

15. A Romanian representative at Constantinople.

16. Equal instruction for all Romanians of both sexes.

17. Elimination of titled ranks which are not related to function.

18. Elimination of corporal punishment.

19. Elimination, in fact as well as in theory, of capital punishment.

20. Penal institutions where criminals are to be cleansed of their sins and improved.

22. The immediate convocation of an extraordinary Constituent Assembly, elected by all the interests or occupations of the country, to draft a Constitution based on the preceding 21 points.  

During the night of 6/18-7/19 June Eliade and Stefan Golescu left Bucharest for Islaz, a small Danube river town in Oltenia (the region west of the capital). Islaz was chosen because the local military commander, Cheorghe Magheru, was a member of the revolutionary movement. Other strong sympathizers, including Tell and Plegoianu, controlled the bulk of the forces in the surrounding area. Thus there was no opposition when, on 9/21 June, Eliade read the Islaz Proclamation which included the 22 points mentioned above. In fact, a large crowd of friendly peasants had been gathered to cheer the great event, and no challenge to the change-over occurred at all. In the space of several days nearly all of Oltenia had gone over to the revolution.

Things did not go as easily in Bucharest, where a simultaneous action was planned. Prince Bibescu could not have failed to notice the revolutionary preparations; even if he had somehow managed to miss the obvious, the Russian agents would have corrected his oversight. Even so, Bibescu could not decide what to do. He

23The complete text of the Islaz Proclamation is published in Anul 1848, I, pp. 490-501.
issued warning proclamations to the peasants and kept the Bucharest garrison busy repeating oaths of allegiance, but that was all. Finally, however, during the night of 9/21-10/22, Bibescu began to order the arrests of known revolutionary leaders.

This action was much too late, for Eliade and Ştefan Golescu were safe in Islaz, N. Bălcescu was in the region north and east of the capital distributing revolutionary literature. Among the major leaders only Rosetti and Ion Voinescu were captured. N. Golescu was hidden by the British Consul, Colquhon, who refused to hide Ion Brătianu as well (he did not approve of Rosetti and Brătianu). Ion escaped by shaving his beard and mustache and donning blue glasses—a disguise so successful that even his friends couldn’t recognize him.

The next day the already tense atmosphere was heightened by an unsuccessful attempt on the life of Bibescu. The Prince was badly frightened, and asked the army to swear its support once more—only to find that the military’s confidence in the government was clearly failing. The following day, the 11/23 June, the revolutionaries finally made their move. At four in the afternoon all of the church bells of the city signalled the start, and large

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24 Ion Brătianu, "Reminiscențe," MSS, p. 56.
25 Ibid., p. 54.
crowds quickly formed and marched on the palace; at about the same time large groups of peasants began to enter the city. By seven o'clock the palace was surrounded by a huge crowd. Contingents of the military were present, but they took no action.

N. Golescu led a small deputation into the palace and was received by Bibescu. The Prince at first refused to subscribe to the points of the Islaz Proclamation, but eventually gave in, and signed a copy but with a proviso indicating that he had been forced to do so. Golescu then went on to the balcony and informed the crowd of their victory.

Meanwhile, Ion Brătianu, who had been working to organize groups of demonstrators, especially students, began to suspect that Bibescu was playing a trick—the mere swearing of support was hardly a significant capitulation. Brătianu pushed his way through the crowd and entered the palace; once inside he insisted that there should be a new ministry in order to safeguard the transition to the new constitution. Bibescu resisted, but Brătianu (who had brought a group of friends with him) threatened to stay until he received satisfaction. The Prince then sat down with Golescu on one side and Brătianu on the other, and created a cabinet according to the names dictated to him.

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27Ion Brătianu, "Reminiscențe," MSS, p. 54.
28Ibid., p. 56.
29Ibid., p. 57.
The new government consisted of N. Golescu as Minister of the Interior, St. Golescu as Minister of Justice, Eliade as Minister of Cults, N. Dălcescu as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Col. Odobescu as Chief of the Army, Gh. Magheru as Minister of Finance, and C. A. Rosetti as Prefect of Police. When Bibescu asked, "Which Rosetti?" Brătianu answered, "The one in Prison!" The officers at the Bucharest garrison were easily persuaded to support the change in government.

Bibescu was in an untenable position, and following the departure of the Russian consul, Kotzebue, he decided to abdicate, and on the evening of 13/25 he left for Bragov (Kronstadt) in Transylvania. The following day, the revolutionaries in Bucharest established a Provisional Government. The members were as follows: Metropolitan Neofit, President (Neofit was an unregenerate reactionary and was chosen only as a figurehead); Eliade, St. Golescu, Tell, Magheru, and Scurtu (a merchant). The government had four secretaries: A. G. Golescu (Arăpila), Dălcescu, Rosetti, and Ion Brătianu. The new ministry had N. Golescu (Interior), I. Câmpieanu (Justice), I. Voinescu II (Foreign Affairs), C. N. Filipescu (Finance), G. Mițescu (Public Comptroller), I. Odobescu (War), Eliade (Public Instruction and Cults), S. Cretzulescu (Commander of

Ibid.

Anul 1848, I, p. 556.
the National Guard), C. Cretzulescu (President of the Public Council), and M. Mogoiu (Chief of Police).\textsuperscript{32}

The news of the success of the revolution in Bucharest reached the Islaz group a day later, but following Eliade's decision, this group continued to march through Oltenia and consolidate its support. Bibescu's abdication caused Eliade to change his mind, however, and on the 16/28 June the group arrived in the capital. Their return was an occasion for celebration and rejoicing; it symbolized the apparently complete success of the revolutionary movement. The feeling of euphoria only lasted a few hours, for the severe ideological differences between the leaders had never even been partially resolved, and sharp, bitter arguments erupted almost immediately.

The following day, the 17/29 June, Ion Brătianu and C. A. Rosetti resigned as secretaries to the Provision Government.\textsuperscript{33} There was general agreement at the time that their resignations came as a result of a quarrel with Eliade, but the precise cause of the disagreement was not stated. Even so, it is not difficult to arrive at what were undoubtedly the primary factors. First, Eliade considered himself to be the leader, and was upset that the most important post, that of Minister of the Interior, had gone to

\textsuperscript{32}\textit{Ibid.}, I, p. 564.

\textsuperscript{33}\textit{Ibid.}, I, p. 635.
N. Golescu while Eliade was only in charge of religion and public instruction. Since Brătianu (along with N. Golescu) had suggested the composition of the first ministry (11/23 June) it is not surprising that Eliade's wrath fell upon him. Eliade also objected to several other appointments, especially the fact that Colonel Odobescu, who had never been associated with the revolutionary movement, was in charge of the army (the same position he had held under Prince Bibescu) while Magheru had been given first the Ministry of Finance and then no portfolio at all.34

In fact, the left-liberal group of Paris-trained students had stolen a march on their moderate-conservative rivals. The former had installed virtually all of its members in the government: the four most radical, Brătianu, Rosetti, Bălcescu, and A. G. Golescu (Arăpila) were in strategic positions as secretaries, while the rest held the more important ministries. Eliade's ministry was an important one, but his two closest associates, Tell and Magheru, as members of the government without portfolio, were not in a position of great influence. It is logical to assume that Brătianu expected that the appointment of Odobescu would keep a key position out of his rival's hands while avoiding the open conflict

that giving the post to one of his own group might have provoked. 35

Other issues had begun to surface as well. All of the revolutionaries were united in their implacable hatred of Tsarist Russia, but they were deeply divided with respect to the suzerain power, the Ottoman Empire. The leftists were strongly republican and were never inclined to humble themselves before the Porte; they felt that their only hope was the assistance of France and the success of a general revolutionary movement all over Europe—the cancellation of the Polish revolt, the June Days, and complications in the Habsburg lands were never sufficient to cause them to look upon the Sultan with anything but distaste.

The conservatives, however, limited their goal to that of an autonomous government, based loosely on the 21 points of the Islaz Proclamation, but under the protection of the Porte. This group considered itself to be much more pragmatic, but in reality its goal was no more feasible than that of the radical left. Indeed, France had the desire to aid the Wallachian revolution if not the means, while the Ottoman Empire lacked both. Many other issues later divided the revolutionaries, but it is probable that the questions of the composition of the government and the extent to which actions should be taken with a view toward placating the Porte, were the immediate causes of the argument that preceded Brătianu and Rosetti's resignations.

35 Mălcescu, Opere, IV, p. 280.
Brătianu and Rosetti soon became known as the 'reds,' an appellation which was derived as much from their methods as from their ideology. Thus, N. Bălcescu and D. Bolintineanu who were as leftist as Brătianu and Rosetti, sharply criticized their actions in resigning, noting that they had pledged to remain united until the end. Brătianu and Rosetti probably thought that they could be free to advocate their program by operating outside of the government. Rosetti's newspaper, the Pruncul Român, was already going strong and provided a powerful forum. Brătianu had had his first taste of popular agitation, and his success doubtless encouraged him to continue in this area. Nevertheless, within three days a rapid series of events had drawn them back into the government.

Brătianu's choice of Colonel Odobescu as Minister of War turned out to be a serious mistake, since the military man had no sympathy whatever for the revolution, and from the beginning was associated with boiar opposition groups. Odobescu was closely related to Grigore Caracag and to Rosetti, and despite Brătianu's recent experience with respect to his commission, Ion probably felt

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36 Poporul Suveran, no. 1, 19 June/ 1 July, 1848. Republished in Anul 1848, 1, p. 635. In his memoirs, Eliade says that Tell went to Rosetti and Brătianu and asked for an explanation, but they would only say that they could not live with certain members of the government. Tell tried to get them to change their minds, but according to Eliade, "Rosetti and Brătianu remained inflexible, and as they left, they advised Tell, in an amicable and prophetic manner, not to sleep in the palace any longer." Eliade's memoirs are full of similar statements accusing Rosetti and Brătianu of treason. See: Eliade-Rădulescu, Mémoires, pp. 109-110.
that personal ties would keep Odobescu in line. If so, he was wrong. On the 13/25th a group of dissident boiars gathered at the Metropolitan's palace to discuss resistance, but were dispersed by a crowd led by Brătianu. Odobescu was apparently not associated with this group for Brătianu took time out from his work to go to Odobescu's house to try to persuade him to withdraw his resignation (submitted the previous day) as Minister of War. Odobescu must have agreed, for the next day he agreed to continue in that capacity with the Provision Government—a position he used for the purpose of planning counterrevolution.

The Provisional Government was, as shall be discussed in detail below, greatly divided on what to do about point number thirteen of the Proclamation of Islaz—the part which stated that the peasants were free of obligations to the landlords and were to become proprietors through a land reform. The government constantly

37 Documente privind anul revoluționar 1848 in Tara Românească ("Documents Concerning the Revolutionary Year 1848 in Wallachia") (Bucharest: Direcția Generală a Arhivelor Statului, 1962), p. 267. "...the flaming revolutionary Brătianu gathered the people and led them [to the Metropolitan's residence] and frightened the boiars who jumped out of the windows and fled."

38 N. Bălcescu, in a letter to Ion Chica, stated that Odobescu's retention was to, "...keep good order in the army." Ion Chica, Amintiri din prigieția dinăuntru 1848 ("Memoirs from exile after 1848") (Craiova: Editura Scrisul Românesc, 1940), I, p. 48. Bălcescu, Opere, IV, p. 96.

39 Ibid.
emphasized that the principle of property was sacred and would not be touched, but their proclamations failed to reassure the boiars. Meetings of discontented landlords became more and more frequent, and culminated in a meeting on the 19th of June/1st of July at which the government's representative, Magheru, was shouted down and forced to retire without speaking. Later the same day Odobescu decided to act.

The Provisional Government had been scheduled to receive an honorary delegation from the Bucharest garrison, but instead of praising it the officers put the Government under arrest and surrounded the palace with soldiers. Odobescu, its leader, said that he was acting "in the name of the landowners." The entire Provisional Government was arrested, but Brătianu and Rosetti, having resigned as secretaries, were not present and were safe. As soon as he heard of the coup, Brătianu who was fast becoming an expert agitator, gathered a large crowd and led it back to the palace. One of the officers at the scene, Colonel Lăcusteanu, took a detachment of soldiers and set off for the barracks to get reinforcements and artillery. Brătianu saw them, however, and led

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40 Anul 1848, I, p. 556.
41 Colescu-Vartic, Zile revoluționare, pp. 176-177.
42 Ibid., p. 178.
a mob which overcame the soldiers and arrested Lăcusteanu. The Colonel noted that the crowd wanted to tear him apart but that Brătianu and Telegescu (another agitator) refused to give them up.\textsuperscript{44}

Lăcusteanu escaped from Brătianu, who then returned to the palace at the head of another crowd. In the meantime Odobescu had forced Eliade to go out on a balcony with him and proclaim a new, conservative government. The crowd did not act until Brătianu's arrival when he led a small group which broke through the guards and entered the palace.\textsuperscript{45} Brătianu personally arrested Odobescu, and forced him to release the members of the Provisional Government and order the troops surrounding the palace to withdraw.\textsuperscript{46}

The officer in charge, Solomon, began to retreat, but when the crowd started to move forward and call for his arrest, he ordered his soldiers to fire. Seven were killed, and eight wounded before the crowd forced the soldiers to flee to their barracks. The crowd armed itself (the staff at the Pruncul Român melted type into bullets) and with the aid of loyal troops laid siege to the barracks. More bloodshed appeared to be inevitable, but Brătianu

\textsuperscript{44}\textit{Ibid.}, I, p. 127.
\textsuperscript{45}\textit{Ibid.}, I, p. 128.
\textsuperscript{46}C. A. Rosetti, \textit{Scriseri din jum\text{\c{s}}e si exilu} ("Writings from Youth and Exile") (Bucharest: Tipografia 'Românul' Vintilă C. A. Rosetti, 1887), II, p. 21.
completed a busy day with a passionate speech on brotherhood, and Solomon, faced with imminent mutiny, surrendered.  

In his memoirs Ion Brătianu states that Eliade and Tell wanted to have Odobescu and Solomon executed immediately, but that he prevented this by making their guards responsible for their safety. Brătianu also laments the fact that Odobescu did not understand the revolution but thought that it was a simple coup d'état in the boiar style, i.e., the replacement of one prince with another. No matter what the reason, Brătianu badly misjudged Odobescu. The whole affair tended to enhance Brătianu's prestige with the masses, thanks to his heroic role, but it also widened the rift between him and Eliade, who in his jealousy and hatred came to consider Brătianu a traitor.

Odobescu, Solomon, and Lăcusteanu were tried by a tribunal which stripped them of their ranks, and then the first two were held for later trial in a criminal court.

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47 Ibid.
48 Albini, Anul 1848, VI, p. lx.
49 Ion C. Brătianu, "Reminiscențe," MSS, p. 57.
50 Ibid.
51 Eliade-Rădulescu, Mémoires, pp. 121-122. Eliade says that Solomon implicated Brătianu in the plot and also presents other 'evidence' of treason, primarily Ion Brătianu and Rosetti's efforts to see that Odobescu was not harmed (pp. 119-121). Brătianu and Rosetti's solicitude for Odobescu can be logically explained by family ties and friendships, and Eliade's case is further weakened by the fact that he does not mention Brătianu's role in preventing
An immediate result of the Odobescu affair was that the government began to take various steps to safeguard the revolution. One of the first actions was the creation of a corps of revolutionary commissars who would be sent to the provinces, particularly those areas suspected of reactionary tendencies, in order to explain their rights and obligations as well as to "...eliminate the sinful activity carried out by the enemies of Romania." This program was later entrusted to Bilbescu who turned the commissars into an enthusiastic and effective group. Another decision taken by the government in the wake of the abortive counterrevolution was to hasten the establishment of a National Guard. The original government had included C. Crețulescu as Chief of the National Guard, but no effort had been made to give him a real organization to go with his title.

The National Guard was established by a decree of 21 June/3 July and explained by a later decree issued by Crețulescu the same day. According to its commander, "The National Guard is a type of the coup—a fact supported by all of the sources. Eliade's accusations are cleverly contrived, but even a cursory analysis of Brătianu's actions shows the idea of his ever being a traitor to be absolutely absurd. Even N. Plesoianu, a close friend of Eliade's could not credit his comrade's claims—N. Plesoianu, Memoriu asupra revolutiei din 1848 ("Memoir on the Revolution of 1848"), MSS, BCS-BLS, no. 136/C/949, p. 15.

52 Anul 1848, II, p. 56.

53 Ibid., II, pp. 11-12, 14-15.
of association against malefactors and disorders," and all male citizens between the ages of 21 and 50 were required to register. The key problem, however, was not manpower but firepower; there were barely enough weapons for the regular army. Brătianu and Rosetti (who re-entered the government on 19 June/1 July)** launched an energetic campaign in the Pruncul Român with the object of encouraging citizens to join the guard and to help supply arms. The two signed an order to a French armorer for a quantity of lances, and Brătianu was active in securing financial support for the guard in Bucharest. Later, Brătianu was given responsibility for the general armaments of the nation. The task was hopeless, not only because of the lack of funds and sources of supply, but also because of the indifference of many government leaders who had no intention of defending the revolution militarily.

54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
57 Anul 1848, II, p. 61.
58 Ibid., II, p. 94.
59 Except, of course, against domestic revolt. Bălcescu, though generally critical of Ion Brătianu's role in the revolution, notes that he was one of the few that tried to provide the basis for an armed resistance. N. Bălcescu, Opere, IV, p. 282.
The first crisis was barely over, however, before a second began. The Turks had shown considerable restraint with respect to the revolution, even going so far as to accept Ghica as the Wallachian representative and thus extending de fact recognition. On the other hand, the Russians were completely opposed to any change that did not originate with the Tsar, and they did their utmost to effect a reversal. The Russians had many agents in Wallachia, the most important of which was Metropolitan Neofit; the churchman was a figurehead, chosen for obvious reasons, but he nonetheless participated in government meetings. Reports of the Odobescu coup attempt encouraged the Russians to even greater propaganda efforts. Their attack was two-pronged: First, the boyars' fear of losing their land was continually played upon, and no amount of government denials could lessen the anxiety and hostility that this idea engendered; secondly, rumors of the imminent arrival of a large Tsarist army were circulated incessantly, and the possible truth of these rumors was sufficient to plunge the government into an even greater degree of discord than usual.

There were only two possible courses of action in the event of a Russian invasion, to fight or to run. The idea of resistance was most vigorously supported by Ion Brătianu and N. Bălcescu. They felt that although the chances of success were virtually

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60 Colescu-Vartic, Zile revoluționare, pp. 205-206.
nonexistent, the moral legacy which a heroic defense would provide
was not only desirable but essential to the ultimate success of the
revolution. 61 Eliade, on the other hand, favored a retreat to the
Carpathians where the revolutionaries would be in a position to
flee across the frontier into Transylvania in the event that they
were threatened. On the 22 June/4 July news arrived from an officer
stationed at Brăila (on the Danube near the Moldavian frontier)
that a large Russian army had entered Moldavia and was heading
south. The government responded with an appeal to Tsar Nicolas
(the most futile gesture of all), and then began an acrimonious
debate about the future.

The discussions continued for four days, a fact which indi-
cates that Eliade was in the minority. Finally, on 27 June/9 July,
it was suggested that Ion Brățianu go to Focșani on the Moldavian
frontier to investigate the rumors about the arrival of Russian
forces. Brățianu says that he was also given the task of organizing
resistance, 62 and his statement is supported by the fact that he was
appointed chief of the border province of Rîmnicul-Sărat. 63 Upon
his arrival in Focșani, however, Brățianu not only did not find any
Russian troops, but he could not discover any reliable evidence

61 There are no written statements of either man from the
time in question, but their attitude was well known by their
contemporaries, and was later expounded in various writings.


63 Anul 1848, II, p. 156.
that any were in the vicinity or on the way. Accordingly, he hurried back to the capital, but when he reached the city limits on the evening of 29 June/11 July he was told that the government had fled and the boiars were again in control.

The day before the government had received the resignations of several army officers, and was also advised that Turkish troops were joining the Russians. This was too much for Eliade, who departed without even attending the government meeting called to discuss the emergency. Eliade was a poor leader, but he was popular with the masses, and his defection weakened the government to such an extent that they voted to withdraw. A proclamation calling upon the people to arm themselves and follow their leaders to the mountains was confiscated by the boiars, and only a handful of soldiers stayed to form an escort.

Brătianu found that the reactionaries had moved swiftly, and that most of the likely hiding places were unsafe. After a long and tedious search he went to the house of a certain Mănescu who was out of the country at the time. Mănescu's wife was the cousin of Odobescu's wife, however, and the Colonel, once again serving as head of the army, heard of Brătianu's hiding place and came to visit

64 Neofit himself started this rumor. Colescu-Vartic, Zile revoluționare, p. 208.
66 The following account of Brătianu's activities is taken from his memoirs—'Reminiscențe,' MSS, pp. 57-60.
him. Odobescu asked Brătianu to disavow his revolutionary connec-
tions and leave the country—otherwise it would be impossible to
guarantee Brătianu's safety in the event of boiar reprisals.
Odobescu was able to offer him safe transport out of the country,
however.

Odobescu left the house in order to give Brătianu time to
think, but the latter quickly escaped with the aid of Grigore
Caracâș (who was Odobescu's brother-in-law). The fugitive spent
the night at the house of Caracâș's sister (who had hidden
Brătianu's uncle, Toma, in 1825). The next morning he was again
discovered and barely escaped arrest. He then went to the area of
Radu Vodă where there were several schools (he had been assigned
from the very beginning to work with student groups) and again led
a crowd toward the palace. His work was made easier by leaders of
the city's commercial class, who had been informed by Brătianu on
the night before that there were no Russians on the way. The call
to action even reached beyond the city limits, and bands of
peasants began to appear.

The boiars had formed a Caimacamie (a sort of regency, in
this case it had two members) under the aegis of the metropolitan,
but the sight of the crowd frightened them, and they quickly fled,
leaving Neofit and Odobescu to face the music. Neofit was again
forced to change sides, and was kept busy blessing new proclama-
tions and revoking old ones. Odobescu was in a much more serious
predicament, and attempted to make a deal with Brătianu; he claimed that the government had forfeited its position by leaving and should be replaced by a new government led by Brătianu, Câmpineanu and a tradesman. Brătianu refused this offer stating that the old government was 'received by the entire country,' and now that the tables were turned, suggested that Odobescu leave the country as Brătianu could not be responsible for his safety. Odobescu wisely took this advice, made his escape, but returned to the garrison where he and Solomon prepared to lead the army against the city. After a day and a half of tense confrontation, during which time Brătianu harrangued the troops while the surrounding crowd dared them to open fire, Odobescu and Solomon gave up and left the country with a safe conduct and an escort.67 Later the same day (2/14 July), members of the government began to return to the capital.

The Isălz Proclamation itself was rather vague with respect to that all important aspect—the electoral base. Article 4 stated that the National Assembly would be composed of "representatives of all levels of society," while article 22 said that the Constituent Assembly should be "elected by all the interests or occupations of the country." The conservatives and moderates proposed that these articles be interpreted in such a way that the Constituent Assembly would be elected on a three class basis: one hundred boiars, one

67Colescu-Vartic, Zile revoluționare, pp. 222-225.
hundred tradesmen, and one hundred peasants. The opposition, led by
N. Bălcescu, demanded direct representation and universal vote.

Ion Brătianu supported Bălcescu, but surprisingly, Rosetti
took the other side. 68 This was the only major issue over which
Brătianu and Rosetti were divided during the first two decades of
their friendship. After considerable discussion, the direct and
universal point of view was accepted by the majority.69 This was
a relatively minor decision, however, for the elections were never
held. The government was never stable or secure enough to begin
the difficult organization involved, and its members, if they
hoped to achieve anything at all, were forced to abandon the idea
that all major decisions should be postponed until the Constituent
Assembly took over.

The most important problem which was at first delayed on the
basis of waiting for the Constituent Assembly was that of agrarian
reform. Article 13 of the Islaz Proclamation which promised that
the bonded peasants would be freed of their obligations and provided
with their own plots of land, not only frightened the boiars, but it
also had a striking effect on the peasants. Thus, within several
weeks reports began to arrive in the capital concerning all sorts of

68 Bălcescu, Opere, IV, pp. 281-282. The radicals had the
rather dubious honor of having Metropolitan Neofit as one of their
supporters. Ibid.

69 Ibid., p. 282.
unrest in the villages, from refusals to work the proprietors' land (the most common) to outright seizure of crops and land. The government threatened the peasants with punishment,\textsuperscript{70} and took actions to explain the workings of the revolution to them,\textsuperscript{71} but when this proved insufficient, a decree of 9/21 July called for the election of a Commission on Property to debate the whole problem.\textsuperscript{72}

The Commission did not begin its meetings until one month later, 9/21 August, when 17 peasants and 17 boiars (one of each from 17 districts) gathered in Bucharest. The ensuing ten days of bitter arguments are discussed in detail elsewhere,\textsuperscript{73} and in this context it is sufficient to state that no agreement was reached or even approached. The proprietors showed some willingness to surrender their rights to the peasants' labor, but they would not consider the division of even a part of their estates, with or without compensation. The Commission was finally dissolved on

\textsuperscript{70}Anul 1848, II, p. 314.

\textsuperscript{71}Ibid., II, pp. 315-316.

\textsuperscript{72}Ibid., II, pp. 359-360.

the 19/31 August, "Seeing that, instead of establishing a sincere belief in the possibility of agreement, each party proposes the impossible and thus divides even more." The same day the Pruncul Român published a bitter article by Ion Ionescu de la Brad, vice-president of the Commission and a strong advocate of agrarian reform, warning that matters could not continue as they were. The protests of the peasants and their supporters had little effect, for the government was faced with a more immediate challenge to its existence.

The reduction of pressure that appeared in early July was of brief duration, for on the 13/25 of that month a large Turkish army made camp at Ruse on the opposite bank of the Danube, but only about forty miles from Bucharest. The Ottoman commander was Suleiman Pasha who had been sent by the Porte to investigate affairs in Wallachia. Suleiman refused to receive an emissary of the revolutionary government, and on the 19/31 he crossed the Danube with a part of his forces and established a base at Giurgiu on the opposite bank. The Romanian leaders, unsure of what course of action to take, decided to 'consult the people' on the following day.75

74 Anul 1848, III, p. 541.

75 It seems likely that the call to meeting was not an official act of the Provisional Government. Ion Brătianu was the only member of the government known to have been there, but he was at that time not participating in the government. He did not sign any papers from 15 to 20 July, and a letter of I. Maiorescu to A. G. Golescu (Arăpila), dated July 15/27, notes that, "There is no unity in the government; Brătianu has withdrawn." Anul 1848, II, p. 520.
Some thirty to forty thousand people came to the meeting held at a place which had been named the 'Field of Liberty' as the result of a demonstration of 15/27 June. The first speaker was Ion Brătianu who attempted to explain the situation to the crowd. The cause of the Turkish invasion Brătianu said, was the fact that "enemies of the country and of our Constitution," falsely informed the Porte that the Constitution had been made and accepted by only a small number of Romanians. He then asked the crowd to answer the accusation, saying that, "You have had sufficient time since the 11th of June to judge and be convinced if this [the constitution] is good and in the interests of the people, if the government which you have selected from among yourselves corresponds to the wishes of the people." The crowd enthusiastically roared its approval of both government and constitution.

Encouraged by the support of the people, Brătianu adopted a rather threatening tone:

Brothers, I advise you not to lose courage. The Porte knows that it is in his interest that we be strong and free; besides that, France, Italy, England, Germany, the Hungarians, and especially our Romanian brothers from Transylvania, Banat, Bucovina, Moldavia and Bessarabia, who number eight million, will support our cause.... Remember our ancestors under Michael the Brave who, with 6,000 Romanians fought off hundreds of thousands at a time when all Europe trembled before the Porte."

76 Ibid., II, pp. 652-653.

77 Ibid., II, p. 653.
Brătianu went on to explain the old treaties with the Ottoman Empire, and followed by reading a proclamation of protest which the crowd was invited to sign. The meeting then broke up, and the people went to the palace where they shouted "Long live the Constitution, Long live the Provisional Government, Long live the Sultan." This demonstration led Suleiman Pasha's young and impressionable envoy, Tinghir Effendi, to embrace the tricolor of the Wallachian revolution. Bălcescu then asked the people to go home quietly, which they did.

Suleiman Pasha was something of a liberal, and seemed to be favorable to the Romanian cause, but he was in no position to let things stand as they were—Russian pressure was intense. Suleiman finally agreed to recognize the Constitution (i.e., the general lines of the Islaz Proclamation) if the government would change its configuration to that of a Locotenenta Domneasca. The government had already decided, at the insistence of Eliade, to make whatever concessions the Turks asked for, and there was general relief that such a relatively insignificant demand was the only one put forward. Accordingly, the people were again asked to assemble on the 'Field of Liberty' on the 23 July/4 August; Ion Brătianu, C. Bălcescu and C. Boliac addressed the crowd and explained the situation. The

78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid., II, pp. 701-702. The term could be translated as, "In place of the Prince," thus a sort of regency.
people quickly chose the rather obvious solution of electing the six members of the Provisional Government as the Locotenenta Domneasca.

Things were not to be quite so easy, however, for Suleiman Pasha claimed that there could be no more than three members of the Locotenenta Domneasca. More important than this demand was the fact that immediately after the election of the Locotenenta Domneasca the Turks issued a proclamation stating that new institutions could not come into existence without the approval of the Porte. In effect, this meant that the Sultan would have the right to control the selection of the Constituent Assembly (if it was permitted at all) as well as the power to accept or reject the provisions of the new constitution. Public opposition to any further concessions grew rapidly.

Popular assemblies were being held practically every day at the 'Field of Liberty,' and Ion Bratianu was one of the principal organizers and speakers. Bratianu had earlier acquired the nickname 'firfirică' (the name of a very small and common coin), "...because he was a man of the people who went from hand to hand." 82 N. Bălcescu remarked somewhat sarcastically, that "Bratianu and Rosetti have made tribunes of themselves and are always gathering the public on the Field of Liberty, engaging in all sorts of

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82 I. G. Bibicescu, 1848 în România ("1848 in Romania") (Bucharest: Institutul de Arte Grafice 'Carol Göbl,' 1898), p. 106.
insolence." Bălcescu was also deeply upset and opposed to any new concessions, and when (28 June/10 August) the government allowed the election of a three man Locotenenta Domneasca, Bălcescu was ready to leave:

When they were going to name the Locotenenta, they came to me and proposed to make me a member; it had been decided at a club. I refused and wanted to leave for Paris where we still didn't have anybody [diplomatic representative]. But at the moment of departure, Brătianu came to dissuade me. He told me that he too was opposed to the Locotenenta, but that since I had some influence over those gentlemen, I should remain to prevent them from making a mess; otherwise, he had decided to attempt to overthrow them.84

The three members of the new Locotenenta were Eliade, Tell, and N. Golescu; this triumvirate did whatever it could to placate the Sultan. A selected group of leaders was sent to Constantinople to plead the Romanian cause, and when Suleiman Pasha finally came to Bucharest he was given an elaborate welcome. There was little hope for any significant amelioration of the imposed conditions, however. In fact, the Russians were furious and were again pressuring the Porte with a view to completely eliminating all vestiges of the revolution.

On August 11/23 a rather striking thing happened; in the wake of a resignation, Ion Brătianu was made Chief of Police, and C. A. Rosetti was named Acting Minister of the Interior. Since Eliade and

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83 Probably a reference to anti-Turkish statements. Bălcescu, Opere, IV, p. 104.
84 Ibid., IV, p. 282.
Tell were bitter enemies of these two, it is difficult to understand the reason for their selection. The only logical explanation is that continued agitation had given the two increased popularity, and that, as Bălcescu noted, "Eliade was afraid of Brătianu." The new Chief of Police apparently continued to have influence, for on 23 August/9 September he asked for and received a considerable sum of money to be used in the creation of a municipal guard. Of the few remaining documents concerning Brătianu's term of office, the only ones of interest are a series of proclamations in which the Chief of Police attempted to calm tensions on the capital, but was finally forced to forbid people from appearing in public armed.

The external situation continued to deteriorate as well, and on the 19/31 August Suleiman Pasha was replaced by the conservative Fuad Effendi. Fuad, unlike Suleiman, maintained close relations with the Russian authorities, and was in fact charged with the destruction of the revolution. No definite action was taken at first, but on 31 August/12 September Turkish troops entered Wallachia from the east (near Galați). The same day Ion Brătianu was appointed diplomatic representative of the government to France.

85 Ibid.
87 Ibid., III, pp. 604-605, 671-672, 700-701, 711-712, IV, 146-147.
88 Ibid., III, pp. 547-551.
but he chose to postpone his departure in order to stay and agitate. 89

At a meeting on the Field of Liberty (August 31/September 12) Brătianu said that a large delegation should go to Giurgiu to protest the arrival of more Turkish troops. The next day some 10,000 marched to the Danube and presented a petition to Fuad Effendi. 90 Fuad's attitude did not become noticeably more conciliatory, and the Bucharest radicals decided to throw caution to the winds. On the morning of 6/18 September Brătianu (who was still Chief of Police) was observed "going from shop to shop, urging the tradesmen to go the Metropolitan's residence in order to be present at the reading of an important proclamation." 91 The purpose of the assembly was quite different, however, for Brătianu was preparing for a last act of defiance.

At eleven in the morning a large crowd gathered in front of the Ministry of the Interior and demanded the original and all the copies of the Regulament Organic, which were to be burned and

89 Ibid., IV, p. 148.
90 Ibid., IV, p. 195.
91 Documente privind anul, pp. 656-657. Most of the documents in this collection are taken from the records of hearings held after the revolution in order to determine who had been guilty of illegal actions. Thus, as in the case above, the accused claim that Brătianu misrepresented the nature of the meeting; others even went so far as to claim that Brătianu used his position as Chief of Police to coerce them. Ibid., pp. 380-381.
anathematized. Once they had been gathered, a mock funeral cortege was formed and to the sound of a burial march the mob moved to the Metropolitan's residence. Brătianu then gave a short speech, as did C. Boliac, who ended with an appeal to the Metropolitan to come out and bless the proceedings. The unhappy Neofit resisted as best he could, but was finally forced to comply and the ceremony began:

A man of the people, a peasant, was selected to carry out this solemn act. The peasant was the one who had suffered most from the Regulament, he more than any other citizen had felt the weight of its laws, thus he had more right than any other citizen to take the first step in the destruction of that code of slavery.92

After the Regulament was consumed by the flames, the Arhondologhia (a sort of table of ranks of the boiar class) was also destroyed. The Metropolitan then placed an anathema on the Regulament (both editions) and issued a proclamation to that effect. The crowd then moved to the hilltop above the Metropolitan’s residence where Brătianu read the proclamation and presided over the destruction of a monument which had been placed there in honor of the Regulament.93 The mood of euphoria lasted at least until the next day, for the Pruncul Român ended its description of the ceremony with these remarks:

Because both the Regulament and the Arhondologhia were burned and no longer exist, because neither boiars nor the boiar class can still exist, the editors of the

92 Pruncul Român, no. 37, 9/21 September, 1848. Republished in Anul 1848, IV, p. 245.
93 Ibid.
Prunclul Român believing that no Romanian can any longer desire that which has been cursed and anathematized, invite all citizens (former boiars) to send their diplomas [i.e., certificates of rank] to the editors, who will gather them and burn them, in the same manner as the Arbondologia. Their names will be published, so that the world will know that their titles were not their only merit.\textsuperscript{94}

One week after the burning of the Regulament, Turkish troops entered the capital, and Fuad Effendî declared the Locotenenta Domenească to be dissolved (September 13/25). All of the former members of the revolutionary government, including Ion Brătianu, were hunted down and arrested. The nature of Brătianu's actions during the last several days are unknown. He issued an order (probably on the 12/24th) stating that no citizen should appear armed at the arrival of Fuad Effendi. Pavel Zăganescu, whose detachment of troops were involved in an accidental but bloody skirmish with Turkish troops, says that Brătianu ordered him to have loaded weapons ("if the Turks enter as enemies, we'll teach them a lesson," but that Brătianu was forced to countermand his orders at the insistence of the Locotenenta Domenească (Zăganescu ignored the second order).\textsuperscript{95} Colonel Lăcustanu claims that on the 10/22 September

\textsuperscript{94}Ibid., IV, p. 247.

Brătianu, hearing of the approach of a Turkish army, "ran through the streets, calling on the people to rise, burn the city, and kill the boiars," but his information is both biased and secondhand.  

A petition of 15/27 September, asked the consuls of Britain, France, Germany (sic) Prussia, Greece, and Bavaria, to intercede to free the prisoners, return the Locotenenta to power, and that the "...post of chief of our police should be occupied as quickly as possible, by that official, whom the nation elected with one voice, and who carries the name of Ion Brătianu." Popular protests had no more effect than they had had earlier, and on the 19 September/1 October, Brătianu, Rosetti and a large number of other prisoners were put on a river boat at Giurgiu and sent into exile. A short time later Brătianu was back in Paris; the whole affair, from start to finish had lasted less than six months.

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96Crătescu, Amintirile, pp. 165-166.

97Anul 1848, IV, pp. 373-374.
CHAPTER III

EXILE

The period of the Romanian revolution of 1848 is one of the more difficult ones in Romanian history with respect to analysis. There is sufficient documentary evidence to provide a rather detailed description of events—most of it conveniently gathered in Anul 1848. Unfortunately, however, there is almost no material concerning the personal aspect, the interplay of forces within the government. None of the leaders kept any sort of diary, nor did anyone on the periphery attempt a detailed chronicle; there was no N. N. Sukhanhov to ease the burden of future historians. Only Eliade attempted to write a detailed account. His Mémoires, although a valuable source, is so strongly biased that his version frequently has to be discounted or ignored. In order, therefore, to analyze the actions of a given individual, the historian is forced to work by inference—an approach which is particularly necessary in the case of Ion Brătianu.

Brătianu's notes on 1848, although dictated some forty years later, appear to be accurate, but they are extremely brief and do not really mention intragovernmental problems. Furthermore, there are no letters written by Brătianu from this period, a fact which
makes it necessary to rely upon the letters, notes, and memoirs of others. Perhaps the most interesting view of Ion Brătianu is contained in the notes of Colonel Zablocki, a representative of Czartoryski who served as liaison officer with the Romanian army:

These last three (the Brătianus and Rosetti) were particularly republican in their ideas. Later, I was convinced that together with other youths they had the intention of seizing power, forming a government of terror. Everything was prepared, and if they didn't put their plan into effect, it was only because it was evident that such an undertaking would hasten the occupation of the country by the Turks and Russians. One of the Brătianu brothers, Ion, has lived abroad for a long time, but did not profit greatly from the experience; he was involved in many things, but doesn't know anything basic. However, he is an intelligent man, understands everything with ease, and expresses himself well in French—even better than in his native tongue. Nevertheless, he was the orator to whom the people listened with the greatest pleasure. He understands how to master a crowd so that at a signal from him they will do whatever he wants.

Zablocki's comments on Brătianu are somewhat contradictory, but they are still remarkably similar to those of Bălcescu's:

The younger Brătianu is a good revolutionary, but confused beyond measure, short on judgment, daring, and would be a good man if he had not had the misfortune to fall into the hands of Rosetti and his brother, who use him as an instrument.... Rosetti and Brătianu [Ion]... these are men of sentiment but not of thought. They lack a practical sense. There is no continuity in their ideas and they are incapable of studying questions before speaking about them.

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1 P. P. Panaitescu, Emigratia polonea si revolutia romană de la 1848 ("The Polish Emigration and the Romanian Revolution of 1848") (Bucharest: Cartea Românească, 1929), p. 103.

2 Bălcescu, Opere, IV, pp. 138, 279.
Bălcescu was not as detached an observer as Zablocki, and his personal jealousies sometimes intruded upon his judgment (he had the gall to describe Rosetti, the most aggressively republican forty-eighter with respect to class privilege, as "an aristocrat beyond measure."3) Nevertheless it seems clear that Brătianu distinguished himself as an agitator and a man of action, but not one given to calm long-range planning.

This analysis of Brătianu's character conforms closely to the major criticism leveled at him by most of his fellow revolutionaries—blind and unnecessary provocation of Russia and especially of Turkey. The whole problem of whether the revolution should present a moderate or a radical face to the protecting and suzerain powers was a bone of contention from the very beginning. As has been mentioned above, the pivotal factor was considered to be the attitude of the Sultan. The strong hostility of Russia was necessarily taken for granted by all concerned—the idea being that if the Porte could be sufficiently won over to the Romanian cause, the Ottoman diplomatic and military power could be used to frustrate Tsarist intervention.

If even the slightest hope of achieving this objective were to be maintained, the revolution would have to be very conservative indeed. The difficulty was the Regulament Organic; if that document were abrogated, the Romanians would be violating (at least in a

3Ibid., p. 137.
technical sense) the direct will of the Sultan and could expect intervention. On the other hand, the Regulament was so comprehensive that strict adherence would make the great Wallachian revolution into a rather superficial reform movement. The result was something of a farce. The movement in Oltenia was represented as a protest demonstration and the events of 11/23 June in Bucharest as nothing but a change of ministers. After Bibescu's abdication the former ministry created a Provisional Government, and claimed to be still operating under the Regulament. An absolute contradiction now presented itself: in what sense was the new government 'provisional'? Was it taking over to prepare for the election of an entirely new governing system based upon the Proclamation of Isai (thus violating the very essence of the Regulament), or was it merely awaiting the selection of a new Prince under the old system?

Faced with this dilemma, the leaders of the Provisional Government were completely lost. The Regulament Organic and the Proclamation of Isai could not exist side by side; no government could derive its authority from two such radically different philosophies, yet the abandonment of either one would cause the destruction of the revolution. Given the nature of the leadership (particularly the vacillating Eliade whose confidence did not match his conceit) and the seeming insolubility of the problem, it is not surprising that the Provisional Government chose to temporize. Action on sensitive issues (i.e., the selection of the Constituent Assembly and agrarian reform) was postponed indefinitely, pending the results
of a campaign to convince the Porte to accept the Proclamation of Islaz.

The Sultan himself could not set aside the Regulament unilaterally, however, for the Tsar had veto power over any changes. Nicolas I would never have given his permission for such a move; indeed, the reactionary nature of the Russian position was so clear that the Romanians never really tried to effect a change in that direction. Thus, the only way that the Turks could support the Romanians would be to defeat Russia in armed conflict and force a revocation of the latter's status as 'protecting power' in the Principalities. The Ottomans would certainly have liked to do this, but it is not logical to assume that they would go to war in order to transfer Moldavia and Wallachia from Russian control to complete local autonomy--thus getting little or no return for their efforts. Moreover, Turkey was obviously unable to defeat Russia without help, and there was none forthcoming; France was strongly sympathetic but not in a position to act, while Britain was not even interested.

Bătianu and Rosetti sensed the ultimate futility of the Provisional Government's policy of trying to pursue two policies at once, and, as outlined above, this was probably the reason for their resignation from the government only a few days after the revolution. The resignations were only a mildly negative gesture, and did not in themselves cause their critics to label them as 'lacking in practical sense.' The real source of these complaints was that the two young revolutionaries privately ignored government policy. The Pruncul
Român was not only consistently critical of Russia, but also showed it to be indifferent to the sensibilities of the Porte. The trend was at first mild and indirect, primarily in the form of urging the early enactment of the principles of the Proclamation of Islaz.

The dissolution of the Provisional Government and the establishment of the Locotenenta Domnească caused a sharp change, however, particularly in the activities of Brătianu. Brătianu's speech to the crowd at the Field of Liberty (see above) on July 20/August 1, even before the naming of the Locotenenta Domnească, was hardly a model of restraint. He boldly (and emptily) threatened the Turks with the claim that practically all of Europe supported the Wallachian revolution, and implied that the invaders might have to face the armed resistance of all (Transylvanian and Bessarabian as well as Moldavian and Wallachian) Romanians as well. If the crowd later shouted 'Long live the Sultan' it does not seem to have been the result of Brătianu's influence. As Chief of Police Brătianu tried to calm tensions domestically, but there is little doubt that at the numerous public meetings at which he spoke he used highly inflammatory rhetoric aimed at both Turkey and Russia.

The culmination of Brătianu's agitation was the burning of the Regulament Organic and the Arhondologia. He was severely criticized for this, particularly because his position as Chief of Police implied an official act. The government wanted to hush up the whole affair, but when the Pruncul Român described the events and emphasized Brătianu's role this was no longer possible. C. Filipescu,
the Minister of Finance, wanted to arrest Brătianu and suppress the
Pruncul Român. In a stormy interview between the two men Brătianu
answered his opponent's charge that he had destroyed the revolution by
saying that the others were all dishonest and hypocritical. The
fact that the Turks moved to crush the revolution only one week later
caused many Romanians, including some of the radicals, to feel that
Brătianu's actions from the beginning and especially the Regulament
affair, had hastened the collapse of the revolution.

The fact was the Brătianu's actions in September were consist­
tent with those of June. His goals were complete independence and--
much more ambitious--the unity of all Romanians; the means necessary
to the attainment of these aims were a matter of indifference. Thus
in the speech of 20 July/1 August he had mentioned the idea of
support from, "...our Romanian brothers from Transylvania, Banat,
Bucovina, Moldavia and Bessarbia, who number eight million." Further, he evoked the ideal of Michael the Brave who had briefly
achieved union in 1599-1601. The idea of the union of all Romanians
was not a new one--it was, as noted above, gaining ground among the
students in Paris in the years immediately before 1848. Even so, this
strong appeal to united action of all Romanians was unusual and
daring, particularly since the call was aimed at co-nationals in the
Russian Empire (Bessarabia) as well as those in the Habsburg Empire.

\^Eliade, Mémoires, pp. 300-301.
\^Anul 1848, II, p. 653.
Brătianu's philosophy was clearly enunciated in the lead article of Republica Română, the first issue of which was published in 1851:

Young Romanians! You who through your youthful hearts are able to understand the power of the Romanian people, and through your leadership are destined to prove—with words of fire and lives of devotion—to those who are still doubtful, that if in 1848 the Romanians, instead of trying to assist each other piecemeal, some through the Turks and some through the Austrians, instead of sending forty thousand compatriots into danger, and transforming three hundred villages into cinders for the assistance of the Emperor of Austria, instead of losing time in diplomacy and shouting in Wallachia "Long live the Sultan," and in Transylvania "Long live the Emperor," only to arrive at the end at the loss of those who sought for the flag of the one and indivisible Romanian republic, if, instead, from all corners of Romania, in a single day, ten millions rose up and with a single voice shouted "united and free or dead," there wouldn't be any power which would dare to attack or even to deny their sacred rights!

In a revolutionary pamphlet, published at about the same time, the idea of united resistance was spelled out in even greater detail. The format was that of a dialogue between a revolutionary and a peasant; the peasant has just commented on the huge number of Turkish and Russian troops which entered the country in September of 1848:

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7 The pamphlet, Catechismul Sătenilor sau sfaturi la vatra focului între un Revoluționar și un Sătean ("Catechism of the Peasants, or Deliberations at Hearthside between a Revolutionary and a Peasant") (Brussels: Tipografia lui J-H Denou, 1852), was coauthored by Rosetti and Brătianu. The contents of the quoted passages are so similar to sections of Brătianu's articles in Republica Română that there can be little doubt that he was the author of those passages. The Catechism will be discussed in more detail below.
Revolutionary: There were certainly many of them Ion! How many Turks and Russians do you think there were?

Peasant (Ion): Who could count them...?

Revolutionary: Do you know, Ion, the story of the gypsy and the wolves?

Peasant: Who doesn’t? He came with his hair standing on end from fright saying he’d seen a pack of a hundred wolves, but then he got hold of himself and the number fell and fell until it was proved that he had only seen some moving leaves.

Revolutionary: And that is exactly what we are doing. Do you know how many troops have come through the country in the last three years? Both Turks and Russians, big and small, fifty thousand Russians and fifteen thousand Turks.

Peasant: Amazing! I had thought there were hundreds of thousands! But in any case there were a lot of them.

Revolutionary: At the time of the Revolution, were you ever in Bucharest when the people gathered on the Field of Liberty? ...So you see, Ion, there were more than a hundred thousand Romanians...you see now that we were like the gypsy who was afraid of moving leaves? You see that the foreigners were not nearly so many as the number of ciocoii8 frightened us with. And you should also know that in our country alone [Wallachia] there are over two and a half million Romanian souls... If this country...rose up all at once, as did the two villages about which you spoke earlier,9 with guns, hoes, scythes, hatchets or whatever they had, do you really believe that they wouldn’t have beaten the Turks and Russians?10

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8Parvenu, upstart. The term was used often and loosely; generally it meant any boiar that the speaker strongly disliked.

9Two villages (one in Argeș, Brățianu’s home district) which resisted Cossack troops in 1848.

10Brățianu and Rosetti, Catechismul, pp. 24-26.
Brătianu went on to indicate that numbers were not the only factor:

The Turks and Russians are foreigners, and they do not know our roads, paths, fords or fortifications. Besides, that, they are beaten and tortured soldiers...who fight without heart, without knowing why,...[but] we are at home and they are on foreign soil, we fight with heart and devotion for our rights, while they fight through orders and force. But let me tell you one more thing; the Russians cannot send many of their troops abroad because they have among them millions of Poles, oppressed and tortured, ready to rise and overthrow the Empire.11

Brătianu also implied that a strong demonstration of the intent to resist might have been sufficient to prevent intervention:

The ciocoi tell you that the Russians came into the country because of the Revolution, but in fact they had entered Moldavia two months earlier—where there was no revolution at all. And why did they stay at our border for three months without moving?...That is easy to answer; the Russians are afraid of their own sort, and only when they see you weak do they rush in and fly at you.12

If this is a good sample of Brătianu's rhetorical style, it is not difficult to understand why his contemporaries often considered him to be wild and impractical. Bălcescu also favored armed resistance, but he went about the task of organizing in a careful and methodical way. The work of his village commissars was doubtless much more valuable than all of Brătianu's rabble-rousing speeches to the Bucharest mob. Nevertheless, one cannot fault Brătianu's conception of the general means to the end. The Romanian Republic could not achieve

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11 Ibid., pp. 29-31.
12 Ibid., pp. 27-28.
its existence with the consent of its imperial protectors—it would have to grow out of conflict. Brătianu, Bălcescu and some of the other radicals did their best to prepare a viable defense, but they were blocked by the moderates. Having failed in this respect, Brătianu tried in the final days of the Revolution to provide at least a symbol of resistance. The burning of the Regulament and the Arbondologhia was the grand gesture, but this too was a failure, for it served only to further divide the revolutionaries.

Another important point which divided the forty-eighters was the land question. Their contemporaries classed Brătianu and Rosetti as radicals and reds who wanted to take away all the boiars' land. Historians associated with the Liberal Party (which Brătianu and Rosetti later founded) have portrayed them as constant friends of the peasantry. Others have pointed out that they were not as outspoken in their support of agrarian reform as were Bălcescu, A. G. Golescu (Arăpilă) and Ion Ionescu de la Brad. This is true, at least in the case of Ionescu, but the arguments with respect to their views in 1848 have been seriously prejudiced by subsequent events, and do not have merit with respect to 1848 alone. The whole series of events leading up to the reform of 1863 will be discussed later, but at this point it is necessary to analyze their views in the context of the revolutionary movement.

John C. Campbell states that Rosetti and Brătianu (in this question it is absolutely impossible to separate their views) were
"indifferent" to the land question, Iorga says that "...the youth [Brățianu] just returned from France showed little zeal for the debates of the Commission on Property." There is no source given for these statements, as in fact there is virtually no evidence to support them. The only potential proof of a negative attitude is cited by Gh. Georgescu-Buzău who states that, "Ion Ionescu de la Brad complained that he was accused of partisanship toward the peasants both by the Locotenenta Domnească and by I. C. Brățianu, then Chief of Police of the Capital." In fact, however, Ionescu does not refer to Brățianu by name (he was not Chief of Police during the entire period) but merely states that, "The Chief of Police accuses me of partisanship in the recapitulation of the discussions and in my job." There is no indication as to what sort of bias Brățianu is being charged with—in favor of the peasants or the landowners—and Ionescu goes on to remark that both sides accused him of favoring the other.

Even if it could be shown that it was Brățianu and that he was in fact accusing Ionescu of favoring the peasants over the boiars,

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15 Oțetea, Istoria României, IV, p. 98.

16 Anul 1848, IV, p. 253.

17 Ibid.
that fact alone would hardly be sufficient to prove that Brătianu was negative or indifferent to the problem of the emancipation of the peasantry. Certainly the claim of indifference would be precluded by such an assumption—if he had followed the debates he would obviously be involved. More important than this speculation, however, is the demonstrable fact that the newspaper which expressed Brătianu and Rosetti's views, the Pruncul Român, consistently and aggressively supported the peasant cause. The Pruncul Român provided a forum for various leaders of the movement for reform, and especially for Ion Ionescu de la Brad. Moreover, the Pruncul Român strongly opposed the dissolution of the Commission on Property and unequivocally supported Article 13 of the Proclamation of Islaz, "Emancipation of the bonded peasants, who are to become proprietors through a distribution of land."18

The social views of Rosetti and Brătianu are best expressed in a revolutionary pamphlet, Catechismul Șteanilor sau sfaturi la vatra focului între un Revoluționar și un Ștean ("Catechism of the Peasants, or Deliberations at Hearthside between a Revolutionary and a Peasant"), which the two co-authored and published in 1852.19 The pamphlet itself was unsigned, and thus there is no direct indications as to which sections were authored by whom, but it is relatively easy to allocate responsibility for most of them. The passages

18Ibid., III, pp. 553-556.
19See note 7.
dealing with Romanian nationalism, national unity and revolutionary action (quoted in part above) are highly similar in style and content to certain of Brătianu's articles. The part dealing with the social relationships of Romanian classes can be similarly attributed to Rosetti. It should be emphasized again, however, that at this stage of their careers Brătianu and Rosetti were known for the identity of their points of view; the writings of one can safely be described as the outlook of the other. 20

The language and references of the Catechism (particularly in Rosetti's section) are Biblical, but hardly conservative in a social sense. The authors begin by citing the Bible as emphasis for the fact that all men were made in the image of God and are considered by him as his sons. The peasant notes wryly that what is written in books and preached in church does not prevent the peasants from being treated like dogs. The revolutionary replies that this is wrong, for:

God made all men equal, not that there should be great and small, master and servant, rich and poor. Do you not see that the wife of the boiar suffers in pain as does your wife? Do you not see that the child of the boiar is born naked as is yours? Do you not see that the boiar is a man like us, that there is no difference between him and us.... Are you not a Christian and have heard that in the

20 In a letter of Ștefan Golescu to C. Tell (Oct 16/28, 1852), Golescu speculates that in his opinion the writing was done by Rosetti, but that, "...the first idea or the outline was that of Ion Brătianu." Cornelia Bodea, Corespondența emigratiei după 1848 ("The Correspondence of the Emigration after 1848"), MSS.
end when the Gospel is read how Jesus said that all men are
brothers, that a man cannot rule over another man as the
shepherd over his flock, and that none has the right to
force another to work for him so that he might live off
the sweat of his brother with theft and usury?21

This powerful denunciation of social inequality is followed by
a series of analogies in which the boiar is compared to a grasping
stranger who enters the peasant's household and takes all of his
possessions up to and including his freedom and labor. After each
repetition of, "What would you say if someone came and ordered you
to do this or give him that?" the peasant responds, "I would laugh
at him!"22 In this manner the authors ridicule the economic as well
as the moral and social foundations of the boiar class. The posi­
tions of landlords and government officials were described as
fraudulent claims which the peasant should ignore:

Thus you now know Ion, that the boiar did not make the land,
that he does not work it, nor did he bring money from other
lands to pay for it; that you did not choose your leaders
and that regulament or code of laws was not made by you,
why, when the boiar from the estate or the ruler or sub­
ruler comes to rob you, don't you take a fencepost and
thrash him until it comes into his head to shout in
Romanian "Forgive me, I will do it no more."23

From this point, the Catechism goes on to defend the Revolution of
1848, and then to propose the revolutionary activity of all Romanians
(see above).

21Brițianu and Rosetti, Catechismul, pp. 4-5.
22Ibid., pp. 5-7.
23Ibid., pp. 10-11.
Taken as a whole, the Catechism provides undeniable proof that Brătianu and Rosetti were, at least at this time, strong supporters of a radical social revolution which had as one of its primary targets the destruction of the agricultural ancien régime.

The Romanian revolutionary movement which had only been nominally united during the summer of 1848 was even more sharply divided in exile. Most of the important leaders went to Paris,\textsuperscript{24} where they immediately began to engage in acrimonious recriminations about the past as well as angry debates about the future. The various factions fought each other ruthlessly, the disagreements of the past were transformed into hardened hatreds. The major split, not surprisingly, was between Eliade and his supporters on one side, and everybody else on the other. The former's primary weapons were to accuse their enemies of misusing government funds while at the same time spreading rumors of treason—even Bălcescu was not exempt from these attacks.

The revolutionaries did try to create a façade of unity with which to confront the outside world, but their mutual animosity was too great, and the attempt failed. A gathering of exiles at Bragov (Kronstadt) in Transylvania had named the members of the Locotenenta Domnească (Eliade, Tell, and N. Golescu) as heads of the emigration (October, 1848), but Eliade soon alienated the leaders

\textsuperscript{24}Some of the revolutionaries were interned at Brussa, in Turkey, but this group was composed more of supporters than leaders.
in Paris to the point that the authority of the three was never seriously recognized. The old problem of what attitude to take with respect to the Ottoman Empire was still a critically divisive issue.

The opposition to Eliade and his group was itself divided, however, and the movement was soon split three ways. The divisive issue in this case was the question of what sort of leadership to select. The moderates, led by A. G. Golescu (Arăpilă) favored a single leader, but this was strongly opposed by the radicals and especially by C. A. Rosetti who considered that such a format would create a dictatorship:

Let's select a committee, and a chief to head it in order to free the country. Very well, when Mr. Negri [the man proposed by Golescu to be chief] frees the country, what will the Romanians say? Long live Mr. Negri, long live Prince Negri, long live the dictator!25

An issue of particular interest to the Romanian exiles at that time (the winter of 1848-1849) was the fact that the flame of revolution had not yet been extinguished in one very important area—Hungary. The leaders of the Wallachian revolution had always been interested in some sort of cooperation with Kossuth's forces, but negotiations between the two sides had never made any significant progress. The chief difficulty in the discussions was always the problem of Transylvanian Romanians. The Magyar leaders, and especially Kossuth, were strongly opposed to even minor concessions insofar as minority national rights were concerned. The Romanians

25Chîca, Amintiri, I, p. 73.
refused to give up hope, however, and made every effort to achieve some sort of compromise. The anti-Magyar guerilla warfare carried out by Avram Iancu and the Transylvanian Romanians further complicated matters.

The Romanian leader most interested in cooperation with the Magyars was Bălcescu, who went to Hungary in the spring of 1849. Bălcescu talked with Kossuth and was sufficiently impressed by the latter's concessions to propose the formation of a Romanian legion to fight with the Hungarian forces. Iancu, however, was cool to the idea of switching sides, and no action was taken prior to the collapse of the Hungarian rebellion in September. In the spring of 1849, Ion Brătianu also had the intention of going to Hungary and joining the forces of the Polish General Bem, who was then winning a series of brilliant victories as the commander of the Magyar forces in Transylvania. Ion got a letter of recommendation (in the rather curious pseudonym of I. Marirosse Burghos) to General Bem from the British politician Lord Dudley Stuart. A reoccurrence of Brătianu's ill health prevented him from traveling at that time, however, and he went to Vandrevanges to stay with his old friends, the de Galhaus. Ion's stay was somewhat prolonged by a lack of funds; he spent most of the summer there.

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26 Cretzianu, Din arhiva, I, p. 211.
27 Rosetti, Note intime, II, pp. 45, 55.
28 Cretzianu, Din arhiva, I, p. 216.
While there, he continued to follow events in Hungary, and maintained a rather naive view of the situation, "The poor Hungarians are doing badly. I don't know how they will come out in the end. It is obvious that the generals are unworthy, there is no other way to explain the successes of the Russians." Brătianu did not give up his plans to go to Transylvania, and he finally arrived at Sibiu (Hermannstadt) on the 5th of August, 1850.

The failure of the Hungarian rebellion, as well as the inability of the Romanians to reach agreement with the Magyars on the Transylvanian question meant that Brătianu's mission was not the same as it would have been a year earlier. In fact, his objective was to distribute revolutionary propaganda to the Romanians of Wallachia and to establish contacts with the Transylvanian Romanians. Sibiu was well situated for both of these goals, as it was the political capital of the Austrian province of Transylvania as well as the northern outlet for such activity.

29Ibid., p. 213.
31Ion Brătianu's eldest son, Ionel, states in his memoirs that his father sat on a, "mixed commission composed of Ion Brătianu, A. G. Golescu (Arapilă), Andrassy, Teleki, and another Hungarian. After laborious discussions they agreed that the two national movements should not fight each other, determined that the situation of Transylvania should be solved ultimately by a plebiscite." See: Ion I.C. Brătianu, "Bln amintirile altora si ale mele." ("Some Recollections of Mine, and of Others.")", Cugetul Românesc, I (1922), p. 515. There is no record of such an agreement, however, and it is unlikely that Andrassy and Teleki would have so flagrantly ignored Kossuth's position.
of the pass which led through the mountains to Brătianu's home
district of Argeș.

Brătianu apparently did not feel the need of an elaborate
cover as he had the year before, and he registered with the local
authorities with his own name and passport. He did, however, follow
the revolutionary practice of maintaining two residences. In one of
these, the house of Dr. Fribel, he met Nicolae Barbu, a youth who
worked in the office of the Governor of Transylvania, Wohlgemuth.
This meeting was exceptionally valuable, as Barbu was able to use his
position to Brătianu's advantage:

There [Sibiu] I printed again the articles and memoirs
published at Paris and distributed them everywhere. The
printing was done by a Saxon [German] at the state print-
ing shop, who worked at night. A young Romanian, Barbu, from
the Chancery of Governor Wohlgemuth, secured for me trunks
with the imperial seal in which new laws arrived from
Vienna, and thus revolutionary manifestos travelled through-
out Transylvania and Bucovina in imperial trunks.

Communications with Wallachia were maintained primarily
through two of Brătianu's sisters who came to visit him (he dared not
try to enter the country himself) bringing news of events at home and
returning with revolutionary propaganda hidden under the pillows of
their carriages.

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32 Fruma, Ion C. Brătianu la Sibiu, p. 8.
33 Ibid., p. 10. Fruma's primary source was certain notes left
by Ion Brătianu, and the above quote is attributed to those notes. No
documents on this period are currently to be found in the Brătianu
papers, however, and it must be assumed that they were lost during
the war.
34 Ibid., p. 9.
Brătianu made important contacts in Transylvanian Romanian circles, as well, and was especially close to Axente Sever and Fogaș Balint. His description of the situation in the fall of 1850 was communicated to Bălcescu in Paris, who in turn described it in a letter to Ion Ghica (still in Constantinople) as follows:

Ion Brătianu, who is still at Sibiu, writes us that the news of war kindles the hopes of the Hungarians, who are working very well there; they say that they have arms and cannons still hidden. The intelligent Romanians are with the Emperor. The people are drawing near to the Hungarians, and it is to be feared that they would sacrifice nationality for liberty.35

By January Brătianu was convinced that there was no hope of an early revolution, and he decided to leave.36

The Austrian police were finally becoming suspicious, however, and a warrant for Brătianu's arrest was issued on January 23, 1851.37 A friend happened to hear the order being given, and the warning was sufficient to allow him to escape from Sibiu. Brătianu went to Cluj (Klausenberg) where the military commander was a relative of the younger de Galhau (who was himself a member of the Prussian Parliament). The general gave him a safe conduct, overruling the police, and he left the country.38 Brătianu had by now aroused the interest

35 Bălcescu, Opere, IV, p. 344.
37 Fruma, Ion C. Brătianu la Sibiu, p. 10.
of the Austrian central authorities, and on February 12, 1851, the
Minister of the Interior Alexander Bach received a note from the
Chief of Police at Vienna concerning his activities in the capital.
According to the policeman, Brătianu, "a partisan of the lower classes," had had relations with Romanian student leaders but nothing particularly suspicious. Bach's agents continued to follow Brătianu, and a letter from Bach to Felix von Schwarzenberg (23 March, 1851) noted his arrival in Paris where he was well received by revolutionaries and "the heads of many emigrations." Later on in the spring, the Governor of Transylvania was able to give von Schwarzenberg positive documentation of Brătianu's actions at Sibiu.

On his return to Paris, Brătianu again immersed himself in the turbulent world of French radical politics. From the beginning of exile, the Brătianus and Rosetti had been involved with the Parisian left, not only their old friends from the Collège de France, but also more radical types such as Ledru Rollin:

Ledru Rollin became the idol of the Romanian "Reds." They attended meetings of the Montange and "democratic and social banquets." At one meeting, at which Ledru was, in Rosetti's words, "sublime," he hailed Ion Brătianu, Rosetti, and Voinescu publicly as martyrs to


41 Ibid.
democracy and promised that as soon as France was free, she would free Romania.\textsuperscript{42}

Ledru Rollin was shortly forced into exile, but he continued to be an important contact for the Romanian radicals. Rollin was a charter member of Mazzini's European Central Democratic Committee, and his affiliation was doubtless instrumental in bringing about Romanian membership. Official adherence did not come until September of 1851 (a year after the establishment of the Committee), when the Romanian representative at London, Dumitru Brătianu, became one of the directors. In his journal, C. A. Rosetti noted that the event was a propaganda coup for the Romanians:

We received news from Dumitru Brătianu in London that we have succeeded in entering the European Central Democratic Committee, and that today the committee published a manifesto to the Romanians. We received this, however, yesterday and in a few hours Ion Brătianu especially succeeded in getting it [the manifesto] in \textit{La Presse}, \textit{L'Evénement}, \textit{Le Siècle} and \textit{Le National}, while today the manifesto was reproduced in six papers. Immediately thereafter, Ion Brătianu went to the printing shop of \textit{L'Evénement}, stayed there until fifty copies were ready, then went to some young Frenchmen, and through them to some provincial journals. This is what can be done by a man with heart and good sense. In a few hours Romania made as big a step forward as other nations could hardly make in two or three years and with great sacrifices. \textit{La Presse}, especially, has until now been hostile to the Romanians, and is today the enemy of Ledru Rollin, but despite all that, they have promised us their columns for the future. Other papers have done the same...

I can only say that Ion was active today, as he has been for three years, and that despite all the misery of our Romania, she will soon be free, united, and powerful.\textsuperscript{43}


\textsuperscript{43}Ibid., II, p. 78.
Brătianu also served as a contributing editor of Mickiewicz's journal *La Tribune des Peuples*. Publicizing the national cause was difficult, however, and the young Brătianu had to endure such exchanges as: "What did you say was the capital of your country?—Buchararest, Excellency"—Buchara! Oh, Buchara! Pray continue," and, "Romanian? So young and already a Romanian?" 44 A great deal of propaganda work was obviously needed, but as the Second Republic faded into the Second Empire, many of the Romanians, especially the "Reds," found themselves compromised by their associations with anti-Napoleon republicans. Not that the Romanians were at all favorable to the Empire, one of Rosetti's children had been so influenced by the conversation of her father and his friends that she was amazed when she first saw the Emperor and came home shouting that he had "a nose and mouth and ears like a man!" 45

Ion Brătianu's closest associations at this time was with the relatively moderate Collège de France group, especially Michelet and his son-in-law, Alfred Dumesnil (also a member of the Collège). Even so, there is evidence that he was becoming increasingly involved with the leftist opposition. He was known to have been greatly influenced by Proudhon, and was especially delighted at the prospect


45 Ibid., I, p. 130.
of meeting the great socialist in person. Brătianu's passion was such that Rosetti once referred to him as "our little Proudhon." But Proudhon was not in a position to lead the opposition to the regime, and the radical young Brătianu made contacts in more aggressive circles.

On the 16th of June, 1853, Ion Brătianu was arrested and charged with plotting to kill the Emperor. The plot, officially titled the Complot de l'Hippodrome et de l'Opéra Comique, was a complex affair involving three separate groups: "Deux-Cents," twenty groups of ten members, mostly workers; "Le Cordon Sanitaire," petit bourgeois; and "La Société des Écoles," primarily students. The police were watching all three groups carefully, and Brătianu as well—he had been on the dangerous list ever since the coup d'etat of 2 December, 1851. Despite the surveillance, however, no definite evidence was presented to show that Brătianu was a member of any of the groups.


48. La Gazette des Tribunaux, 7-8 November, 1853, p. 1066.

49. Ibid. A complete transcript of the trial was published in this journal, and is the source (unless otherwise specified), for all factual material related to it.
(though the police suspected that he was), but instead Brățianu was caught with a trunk containing a printing press and revolutionary pamphlets belonging to the conspirators.

The three groups merged sometime in 1853, with "Deux-Cents" and its leader, the stonemason Joseph Ruault, taking charge. Police intelligence appears to have partially broken down at this point, as they got to the point of an actual attempt on June 7 at the Hippodrome (assassins were present and armed, but decided to wait for a better opportunity and thus did not fire). Several leaders were arrested on the 8th and 9th, however, and the police began to search for the press and propaganda that Ruault had claimed was ready to be used. On the 12th of June Brățianu had left his room, and told his concierge that he was expecting the delivery of a trunk. It was duly delivered, but when Ion returned later in the day he discovered that there was no key. At the suggestion of a friend, he sent for a locksmith to open it, then sealed it with his personal insignia. When arrested, he claimed ignorance of the contents and refused to name the owner of the trunk.

Ironically, Brățianu's arrest came just at the time when he had succeeded in asserting himself as the leader of the Wallachian emigration. Saint Marc Girardin's La Presse published a long letter of Brățianu's two days after the arrest, and vigorously defended the young Romanian. Aldred Dumesnil's wife, Adèle, wrote that all would be well, for, "France would not at this moment dare to sacrifice the
head of Wallachia to Russia..." The concern of Brătianu's friends was heightened by the fact that Ion had been ill for some time, suffering with the same severe chest ailment that struck him during his first years in Paris.51

He immediately became sick at his first place of detention, Mazas Prison, and was quickly transferred to the infirmary at another prison, Sainte Pélagie.52 The prison doctor said that beside his chest difficulties, he had had "gastro-Hepatitis" for many years, and for the past 15 months had been afflicted with hemmorhoids; as a result, he had lost a great deal of blood, his condition was "alarming," and he ought to be sent to a hospital.53 The prison authorities were inclined to be cautious, however, and they called in a specialist from the Faculty of Medicine at the Sorbonne who concurred with the first diagnoses, but said that adequate treatment was available in the prison infirmary.54 Brătianu himself seemed resigned to his fate.55

50 Bucur, Documente, I, p. 214.
51 Ibid., I, pp. 161-162.
52 Archives of the Préfecture of Police. Paris, Dossier E A/78, f. 87.
53 Ibid., f. 86.
54 Ibid., f. 83.
Brățianu's friends did everything they could to bring pressure in his favor (Adèle Dumesnil said, "We are knocking on all the doors") but the results were negligible. It was not possible at first for him even to have visitors, but the indomitable Maria Rosetti went to the judge and was able to secure limited visiting privileges for close friends. The reason for all the security was quite obvious, for the official charge noted that:

He is the brother of Dumitru Brățianu, Wallachian refugee in London and member of the European Central Democratic Committee. Affiliated with the Wallachian committee in Paris, he was very active in printing a revolutionary catechism destined to demoralize the soldiers and peasants of Wallachia. Whatever he says, he is also involved in the political affairs of France. His opinions, his connections put him in touch with the most influential men of the demagogic party, so that if there is any real link between the secret societies of Paris and London, none is better placed than Brățianu to serve as intermediary. Moreover, he is known to the administration as a man who is supple but violent, and in any case, highly dangerous.

The trial finally began in November (the charge was membership in a secret society), and Brățianu was fortunate to have as his lawyer the brilliant Jules Favre, who later defended Orsini. Favre was able

56 Bucur, Documente inedite, I, pp. 221-223.
57 Ibid., pp. 223, 226-228.
58 Gazette des Tribunaux, p. 1066. Also: Albert Fermé, Les conspirations sous le Second Empire, Complot de l'Hippodrome et de l'Opéra Comique (Paris: Librairie de la Renaissance, 1869), pp. 35-38, and ibid., Brățianu Conspirator, încôrtea încercare de ucidere asupra Împăratului Napoleon III ("Brățianu the Conspirator. The Double attempts to assassinate the Emperor Napoleon III") (Bucharest: Cartea Medicală, 1939), p. 21. The charge against Brățianu was the longest of the 33 accused.
to make the most of the weaknesses in the prosecution's case, particularly the fact that the trunk was the only link between Brătianu and the others, and that he had made no effort to hide its presence nor was there proof that he knew its contents. Critical was the fact that, despite longtime surveillance the police could not place Brătianu at a single meeting of the conspirators nor could they provide any documentary evidence to support their claim that he was the go-between for revolutionary groups in London and Paris (the latter is surprising, as there is little doubt that he did function in that capacity, at least on certain occasions).

Brătianu denied all of the accusations bluntly and directly; the courtroom interrogation produced no advantage for either side. In his closing statement, Favre did everything possible to separate Brătianu from the rest of the accused. In fact, Ion was severely embarrassed when his lawyer cried out, "My client, Brătianu, what would he be doing in the midst of this mob?" Most of the summation, however, emphasized Brătianu as the leader of the Romanian national movement, and pointed out that this force could be of value to France:

Romanian youth was called to arms by him, they sheltered themselves in the mountains, enduring deprivation, hunger, misery, rather than serve the oppressor...but they need a chief, who can lead them to battle. A popular name is necessary. That chief is Brătianu. Give him freedom.

59 *Gazette des Tribunaux*, pp. 1068-1069.

He burns with desire to shed his blood for his country, and it is possible that his sacrifice will be the mark which will guide our armies to victory. 61

The prosecution was scornful of Favre's sensational and rather fanciful closing, but they must have been aware of the weakness of their case, for the closing charge was less positively stated than the original. Accordingly, the jury refused to convict on the charge of membership in a secret society. Brătianu was not freed, however, for there was an additional charge of possession of a clandestine press. In the interval, between trials, Brătianu fell ill again (this time with pleurisy) and was sent to the convalescent home run by a certain Dr. Blanche. 62 Thanks to the intervention of a close friend, Felix Colson (formerly with the French consulate at Bucharest), he was allowed to remain there during the second trial, January 11-16, 1854. 63

There were some tense moments during the sessions insofar as Brătianu was concerned. A printer, Augot, and a lawyer, Hubbard, admitted being the owners of the trunk and press but said that Ion was not involved. Augot's wife denied this, however, and said that Brătianu had promised to take over the printing. Augot then repudiated his wife's testimony, but the damage was done, and on

61 Ibid.
63 Ibid., f. 44.
January 16, Brătianu was found guilty and sentenced to three years in prison and 500 francs fine. He was considered to be a chief; most of the other accused got sentences of only one year and fines of 100 francs. Instead of being returned to Dr. Blanche, Brătianu was now incarcerated in the grim Conciergerie.

Colson again intervened, and this time was able to draw important support for his appeals on Brătianu's behalf. The reluctance of the judicial authorities was dissolved by a letter from Prince Jérôme Bonaparte:

Je vous demande avec la plus vrai insistance d'autoriser M. Brătianu à se faire soigner dans la maison de santé du Docteur Blanche.

Dr. Blanche promised to be responsible for Brătianu's good behavior during his entire term, and three days after receipt of Jérôme's letter Ion was back in the comfortable atmosphere of the maison de santé.

The terms of his confinement were hardly severe. There was no permanent guard, and his behavior appears to have been controlled by an honor system reinforced by occasional visits of local gendarmes. No limit was placed on visitors, however, and the house of Dr. Blanche became a meeting place for Ion's circle of friends. In the Spring of 1855, Brătianu asked permission to visit the libraries

64 Ibid., f. 49, 48, 47.
65 Ibid., f. 34.
66 Ibid., f. 46, 30.
of Paris (Dr. Blanche's was in suburban Passy) in order to pursue "historical researches"; the request was supported from the beginning by Prince Jérome, and, after some negotiations between the Ministry of the Interior and the Préfecture of Police, permission was granted.  

Jérome was also instrumental in the pressing of an appeal for pardon (based on Brătianu's pledge to renounce all political activity) which began in January of 1856. Finally, in July of the same year, the Emperor approved a pardon. Brătianu's son, Ionel, maintained that his father had had an interview with the Emperor after his release, but there is no evidence to support this claim. In fact, it is doubtful that such a meeting took place. As Dr. Campbell notes, it was one thing to see Jérome at the Palais Royal, but quite another to visit Louis Napoleon at the Elysée.

There can be no question, however, but that Brătianu's experience in the years 1854-1856 profoundly influenced his political outlook. The trend toward social radicalism which emerged, however faintly, in the years 1848-1853 ceased to develop, and was replaced

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67Ibid., p. 16.

68BCS-BLS, MSS, Fondul Brătianu, Doc. 5, Pachet LII.

69George Fotino, Din vremea ranșterii naționale Românești, Boierii Golescu ("From the Time of the Romanian National Renaissance, the Boiars Golescu") (Bucharest: Imprimeria Națională, 1939), I, p. 257.

70Campbell, French Influence, pp. 375-376.
with a single goal--the creation of a united, independent Romanian state by whatever means and on whatever basis necessary. Thus, the "red" republican forty-eighter was now an ardent supporter of the idea of a foreign prince for Romania, and the onetime admirer of Proudhon was now a determined backer of the Second Empire.
CHAPTER IV

IDEOLOGY AND ACTION

Ion Brătianu was primarily a politician and an orator; he was given to spontaneous expression of his thoughts, and when an oral outlet was available to him he wrote nothing at all. In the years of exile, however, opportunities for haranguing a crowd were rare (indeed, Rosetti felt that Ion abused those chances that he did have, and urged him not to speak so much at meetings), with the result that this period was the only time in Brătianu's life when he wrote extensively. Extensive for him, for the total of his efforts in the period 1851-1857 came to only a half dozen or so articles.

The first three of Brătianu's articles, "Republica Română" (The Romanian Republic), "România," and "Naţionalitatea" (Nationality), were all published in a journal entitled Republica Română. Republica Română had only two issues, the first appeared in Paris in 1851, the second was published at Brussels in 1853. The co-editors were the Brătianu brothers, Rosetti, and Cezar Bolilac (Boliac later quarrelled with the others, but at this time they

1 Rosetti, Note Intime, II, p. 34.
were very close). The lead article of the first number, with the same title as the journal itself, was written by Ion Brătianu.

In this article Brătianu gives a systematic, although rather brief, description of his world-view. The essay as a whole is divided into five parts, the first deals, appropriately enough, with the nature of man:

Man is not second after the angels, as the inflamed imaginations of some would have us believe, nor is he the first among the beasts, where he is put by the limited and incomplete science of the naturalists, nor the world in miniature as it pleases others to say. Thus, he is neither the slave of God nor the despot of nature.

Man is the general synthesis of the planet on which he lives, just as God on a higher level is the complete synthesis of the limitless universe. Man is the mirror, the center, the spirit of the planet, in which is reflected all of nature. . . . Man is the point at which all the sounds of nature are amplified to produce the harmony intended by the Creator.

Brătianu goes on to say that man is subject to certain immutable natural laws which limit his actions and which can never be broken. Even so, man is totally free within the confines of these natural laws, and his freedom extends to the point that he may challenge nature's laws, however futile the attempt may be. Brătianu notes that this freedom has caused much suffering in the past, as men slowly and painfully acquired knowledge of the limits imposed upon them. Even so, it would not be better if all natural

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3Ion C. Brătianu, Acte și cuvântări, I-1, p. 5.
law stood revealed, for then men would no longer be men:

God could certainly have saved us from these miseries, which through ignorance and freedom we have been forced to pass, by showing us all these laws at the beginning, and controlling us so that we would not be able to depart from them; but then man, lacking freedom and the power to advance through his own intelligence, and to carry out by himself, operations which are to a certain point a creation, then to what further purpose would his intelligence serve?

Intelligence, after all, is the only thing that separates man from the animals:

... He [man] is the only one with the faculties to discover and understand by himself those laws and relationships which exist, and knowing their sublimeness, their efficacy, and their use, to conform to them freely and with good will, as to any truth.

The logical result of this analysis, according to Brătianu, was that there existed a natural identity between freedom and the existence of man. If intelligence is the only feature that distinguishes a man, and if that critical faculty is useless without freedom, then a man could not be a man unless he was free. Human society, therefore, must be purged of those who attempt to restrict human freedom:

Thus it is, that through research, through science and with good reason, we are able to brand the masters, those who limit, however little, man in liberty and the means to perfect himself, as sacriligious men, enemies of mankind, of all nature, and of God himself, because in His name, they have stolen the freedom of man and prevented

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4 Ibid., p. 6.
5 Ibid.
the entire world from advancing toward its destiny the end which God established when he created man. 6

The second part of "Republica Române" concerns man's mission on earth:

Man is a perfectable being, without end . . . his mission on earth is to develop his moral, intellectual and physical faculties, to draw ever closer to the highest model, that of his creator, in order to be more completely the earthly synthesis of the planet . . . . However, since man, in order to live his moral and intellectual life, must first of all live a physical, material life, God put at the disposition of each one, without personal differences (for he created all men equal), the natural riches of the earth.

Among these public riches, some are changed into personal property, after a man demonstrates them to be proper to his use, after he seals them with his labor and gives them his personality, and they remain in that category for such a time as they show proof of the sweat of the man and of the rays of his intelligence. 7

This second section clearly reveals the strong influence of the French utopian socialists. The idea of the perfectability of man was common to this group; the use of the terms "intellectual, moral, and physical faculties", undoubtedly were taken from Louis Blanc, and the exposition as a whole appears to owe more to that writer than to any other. The last part of the above quote, which qualifies possession of private property according to fruitful labor, and implies that property or possessions not directly worked by a man, not marked with his sweat and personality, would be taken away, appears to be derived directly from Proudhon. Nevertheless, the

6 Ibid., p. 7.
7 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
socialist influence appears to be very general, as Brătianu does not take off on any tangents which might identify his thought with any particular individual to the exclusion of others.

The third section deals with the nature of society, and stresses the natural tendency of man to cultivate brotherhood and a communal life, not only in a moral and intellectual sense, but also in the physical or material sphere. Society is indispensable for man and for his development and happiness. The organization of society is based upon natural law, and contains the following elements: the individual, the family, the nation or country, race or tribe, and mankind as a whole. These must be the only elements for, "... in whatever society has allowed another classification to dominate, such as nobility, theocracy, etc., etc., that society was a monstrosity and could not produce other than unhappiness." 9

The fourth section is the most revealing, for in discussing the relationship of man and society Brătianu presents a clear picture

8Brătianu was extremely vague about the use of the words for 'race' and 'tribe.' Normally, he used the word gîntă, and meant race in the sense of the "Latin race," or the "Teutonic race." In this case, the word used is semintie, which may designate race in the above sense or in the more accurate sense of caucasian, negroid, etc. The latter case would appear to be unlikely, however, for Romanian has yet another word, rasă, which is normally used with that meaning.

9Ibid., p. 9.
of the powerful republican radicalism which determined the selection
of his friends and made him an object of interest to the French
police. Brătianu stated that even a "natural" society (i.e., one
purged of such foreign elements as nobility) must have some form of
internal regulations to govern relationships between society's mem-
bers. Necessary legislation should be based upon four great
principles: liberty, justice, solidarity, and brotherhood; there
were three possible legal systems, two current and one that was the
future goal of all men:

Legal systems are of three kinds: arbitrary, or
imposed through power, conventional or accepted through
the agreement of all levels of society, and natural, that
is to say that which the mind of man receives and con­
forms to out of free will, with pleasure, and used as is
any truth.

When a society is subjected to the first, it has not
only the right, but even the obligation to fling down,
shake off, and crush their yoke, as a monstrous thing,
unfounded and contrary to the nature of man, who we see
is to be free, and not to suffer any imposition by force,
not even the will of God.

When government is by the second system, then society
is free and sovereign; each branch of society is free to
take its part of sovereignty, and all together are as some
associates, as some contractors with rights and obliga-
tions on an equal footing. If even one of the adult citi-
zens would be impeded or stopped in the exercise of his
sovereignty, in its entire extent, then that society falls
into the ranks of the first, because from the point of
view of justice, numbers count for nothing; one can oppress
a thousand, or a thousand one, the fact is all the same,
oppression. 10

The final part of "Republica Română" was a call to arms—an
appeal to all Romanians to act as natural men, to overthrow the

10 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
oppressors of their people and achieve freedom.\textsuperscript{11} In November of 1851, the hopes of a quick successor revolution to follow the disasters of 1848 had faded, but Brătianu was not discouraged. In another article in the same issue, "România," he analyzed the cause of the 1848 revolution and predicted that another, successful, upheaval was inevitable.

Brătianu said that science was the key to human progress, but that in the past it had been the monopoly of the very few (the ruling classes) who had had the leisure time to make use of it. Despite this monopoly, however, knowledge gradually filtered down through society, and this science, by enabling man to simplify his tasks, tended to increase the size of privileged classes, in turn creating more knowledge and more progress. This process had continued for a long enough time that the final, explosive stage had been reached:

... and when the advancement of industry and agriculture makes it so that each worker can have a little free time, which he can use for other than material needs then, slowly, gradually, the light penetrates to the disinherited classes so that more and more, the People, obtaining consciousness and knowledge of their rights, and feeling capable of looking after their own interests (much better than those who work contrary to the public interest), destroy the privileged classes and society shows itself to us in its complete unity.\textsuperscript{12}

The revolutions of 1848 can thus be seen as the logical result of inevitable historical development. The failures, the complete crushing of the revolutions come as the result of insufficient

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{See above, pp.} for details of this section.

\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Ibid., pp. 17-18.}
preparation; the light had not penetrated with great enough intensity to large enough numbers of people. This situation would be remedied shortly, however, for the increased oppression that followed the victory of the reactionary forces was rapidly creating the conditions necessary for the final explosion:

This subjugation has today reached its critical point. In these three years of slavery and suffering, without limit and without precedent, each man and each people, has been forced, emboldened to study more determinedly all the vital questions of the future society. As a result of the battle which they had with the masters and their accomplices, they obtained an experience which years of peace could not give them, and now, ready in ideas, ready in means to realize them, united in brotherhood and solidarity, all the peoples await the favorable moment to rise together, to tear down forever all that existed through and for injustice, and to put down the foundations of the new society.13

The program of the new revolution was clearly outlined by Brățianu in the second issue of Republica Română. In an article entitled "Nationalitatea," he stated that only two key goals need be maintained. The first was simply the reorganization of Europe into national units (although not by force)—once this had been achieved, it would be quite easy for the peoples of the continent to freely organize themselves into a universal republic. The second point was that each individual state should have internal equality, all classes should be abolished so that each individual might secure his national rights; as a corollary to this, "... each individual

13 Ibid., p. 20.
ought to be offered the means to develop all of his faculties, so that he could fulfill nature's mission, giving him such and such ability."\(^{14}\)

Just as the development of the individual was basic to Brățianu's view of man, it was also, by extension, the critical factor in understanding the importance of nationality. In fact, the essence of Brățianu's view of nationality was based upon a continuous analogy between the individual and the ethnic nation:

What is said for individuals is also true for races, families, and nations: in truth, wouldn't humanity lose if there were only one race and one nation? Wouldn't there be a decline and lessening of value, when there were no longer types of personalities, varieties of forms, and possibility of different manifestations? Thus, what are race and nationality if not the forms and kinds of the manifestations of mankind?\(^{15}\)

Brățianu stated further the theory that nations were useless if they were not based upon nationality:

Just as the individual cannot be all that nature intended him to be, and cannot produce all that of which he is capable, except when the education he has been given takes account of his individuality, of his own faculties and even the turn of his spirit, that is to say when his own personality has not been drowned by a foreign one, so also, a nation cannot produce, cannot give humanity all that is in its power, except when it has developed in its proper elements and natural conditions, and does not move except through its own spontaneity.\(^{16}\)

\(^{14}\) Ibid., p. 39.

\(^{15}\) Ibid., p. 43.

\(^{16}\) Ibid., p. 51.
In a rather curious aside, Brătianu warned against any infringement of individuality, even in the name of equality:

The struggle between the defenders of privilege, of the exploiters of one against another, and the partisans of equality and brotherhood, has caused some eminent and generous persons to go to a communism wherein individuality is suppressed, and society becomes a monastery which leads the world to nothingness.\(^{17}\)

Brătianu does not discuss this issue any further, nor does he name the "eminent and generous persons." Nevertheless, this passage is interesting, for it shows that in Brătianu’s eyes, the principles of socialism and equality should not be allowed to interfere with the expressions of human freedom or individuality—and thus, by extension, nationality.

A large part of "Naționalitatea" is devoted to direct attacks upon those who have attempted to stifle national development. The Frankfort Diet was criticized for rejecting the aspirations of the Poles of Posen and the Italians of Lombardy and Venetia. The bitterest assault, however, was aimed at the Hungarians as a consequence of their attempts to Magyarize the Slavs and Romanians in 1848-1849. The latter were wrong to try to find shelter under the "despotic flag of the Habsburg House," but their actions were understandable and ought to be acknowledged:

The confusion was so great that all those who praised the Hungarians to the skies, were shameful in their treatment of the Croatians, who didn’t do anything but defend against

\(^{17}\)Ibid., p. 42.
the Hungarians the same rights that the Hungarians were defending against Austria.\textsuperscript{18}

Brătianu's approach to nationalism reflects what amounts to an undiluted affirmation of Mazzinian theory, fortified by French utopian socialism. There is very little in Brătianu's worldview that could be called original, certainly nothing of importance. The young Romanian simply followed the line maintained by his friends and associates—who were often the original thinkers. What is most interesting in his writings is his general restraint, a natural reserve in the face of controversy. The overall framework is quite clear—republican socialism and nationalism—but there can be no doubt but that the author has been very careful to homogenize and synthesize.

The fact that it is quite impossible to consistently identify Brătianu's thought with that of a particular philosopher is no accident. He always had a tendency to avoid unnecessary ideological conflict. Brătianu would fight with determination if he were strongly convinced of both the rightness and necessity of an action. The indication here is that Brătianu was not sufficiently interested in a particular variant to socialism to risk alienating the inevitable critics. He was far more cautious than Rosetti (who irritated Bălcescu by loudly advocating the abolition of all private property),\textsuperscript{19} and demonstrated a high degree of flexibility in his

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., p. 34.

\textsuperscript{19}Bălcescu, 	extit{Opere}, IV, p. 301.
idealism—when "Republica Românilă" and "Naționalitatea" were republished in Bucharest after the return from exile, the more radical passages were either deleted or edited in such a fashion as to be much less controversial.

One area in which Brătianu did display considerable originality was in his analysis of Romanian origins. He theorized that the reason for the Roman colonization of Dacia was the fact that the purer souls of the Empire, viewing the corruption and decay surrounding them, decided to go in search of a better place, much as the Puritans left England for America. As a result, though, "... Trajan scarcely suspected what was being done, the colonization of Dacia was done in the name of, and through the power of, an idea."\(^{20}\) The only documentation that Brătianu could provide to support this remarkable thesis was the fact that Dacia became one of the most prosperous parts of the Empire in less than a hundred years.

As a result of this proud heritage, "Romanians alone represented the democratic principle in Eastern Europe."\(^{21}\) In the centuries of barbarian despotism that followed, however, it was impossible for a free democratic state to exist, and the Romanians were forced to choose between becoming tyrants and oppressors, or slaves and oppressed. The choice was not difficult, as the first


\(^{21}\) Ibid., p. 23.
course amounted to "moral suicide" and the Romanians gladly chose martyrdom and the quiet preservation of their democratic traditions.

In an article published four years later, in 1857, Brătianu prudently refrained from repeating this rather fanciful thesis. Instead, in his "Studii istorice asupra originelor naționalității române" ("Historical Studies Concerning the Origins of the Romanian Nationality") he emphasized the fact that the current Romanian ethnic stock included important barbarian (Thracian, Celtic) elements and was by no means purely Roman in origins. This thesis was far more susceptible to historical proof, and no doubt reflected a wider acquaintance with the efforts of his co-nationals as well as his own research during the period of his detention. Even so, Brătianu's article provoked an angry response from the pro-latinists, led by the Italian adventurer Canini. Brătianu answered these and other charges in an article published the following year.

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22Ibid., pp. 163-171.

23Marcu Antoniu Canini, Studii istorice asupra originelui națiunii române ("Historical Studies on the Origin of the Romanian Nation") (Bucharest: Tipografia Copainig, 1858). Canini wrote Romanian in such a fashion that it looked almost exactly like Italian (and, as a consequence, was very hard for Romanians to read). He proposed that the Romanians study Italian in order to perfect their own language, and in general supported a dominant Italian cultural influence in the Principalities. See: Al. Marcu, "Romanticii italiene și români," ("Romanian and Italian Romantics") An. Acad. Rom. Mem. Sect. Lit., Seria III, Tom II (1924), pp. 21-145.

24Ion C. Brătianu, Acte si cuvintări, pp. 199-207.
but his initial efforts as an historian apparently did not hold his interest, for he never returned to the subject.

While he was still serving his prison sentence at the maison de santé of Dr. Blanche, Ion Brătianu wrote (in French) a Mémoire sur l'empire d'Autriche dans la question d'Orient which was presented to the Emperor and then published in 1855. The basic theme presented in this document was that the current weakness of the Austrian Empire was more apparent than real—in fact, Austria was on her way to resurrection. A new empire, "energetic and daring" and "... strengthened through revolution although retaining its conservative character," was rising from the ashes of 1848.

Brătianu analyzed in detail the program intended to effect a renaissance in the Habsburg realm:

... to force the residents to learn German, to take from each nation the most intelligent portion and denationalize it through functions in foreign lands, to absorb the activities of the people in an industrial movement under the dependence of the government, without any national character, to colonize the slavic, Hungarian, and Romanian lands with Germans.25

According to Brătianu, Austria's ability to carry out this program was largely due to the actions of the Hungarians. The Magyar aristocrats (Szechenyi was the only one mentioned by name) were only interested in preserving their privileges; they at first supported the national movement as a means to that end, but once

25Ibid., pp. 72-73.
defeated they quickly sold out and became ardent backers of Vienna.26 Following this statement, Brătianu, who was rapidly becoming a Magyarophobe, took a gratuitous swipe at the Hungarians:

In truth, these four and a half million Hungarians, without a family in Europe and less civilized than the other nations, are totally incapable, when they are on their own, of founding anything serious...27

This was not the case with the Slavs, who had the "knowledge of Bohemia" and the "chivalry of Poland" or with the Romanians who shared the "blood, spirit, and traditions of the entire Latin race which finds itself at the head of civilization."28

Besides the forced use of the German language, the most important manner in which Austria was denationalizing her subject peoples was in the creation of a true Imperial Army. This had not existed prior to 1848 (Brătianu claimed to have witnessed, "a bloody battle between a German regiment and a Polish regiment"29) and the new system was rapidly undermining an important focus of sentiment for the nationalities, with the inevitable result that the, "Austrian standard will cause the national standard to be forgotten."30

27 Ibid., p. 66.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p. 68.
30 Ibid.
Economic policy was even more significant than the cultural-political in Brătianu's view. He felt that the economic potential of the Empire had been vastly underrated, and that a policy of free industry and commerce would shortly lead Austria out of her present financial difficulties: "If she is given fifteen years of relaxation, her finances will be the healthiest in Europe." That such a policy would be carried out Brătianu did not doubt for a minute, otherwise, men like Bach and Bruch "whose only claim to fame is their competence in economic questions," would not have achieved such high office.

With respect to the final point of Austrian policy, colonization of foreign lands with German settlers, Brătianu believed that there would be no serious obstacles to an easy success. The destruction of the agricultural ancien régime in 1848 had not yet been followed by the creation of a viable new system, and thus there were many opportunities to move into disorganized areas. There would be no shortage of potential colonists, for the large numbers of Germans who emigrated to America ought to be easily persuaded to choose the safer and cheaper alternative of settlement in Eastern Europe.

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31 Ibíd., p. 69.
32 Ibíd., p. 70.
33 Ibíd., p. 72.
Brătianu painted a positive picture of the future of the new Austrian Empire, but the predictions for success did not cheer him, for he was the implacable enemy of the Habsburg system. To Ion Brătianu, the Austrian Empire was, "the death of every nationality." Moreover, once she had realized her internal potential, Austria would begin to expand, and would be a very real threat to all of Europe:

She has not only become stronger, more self-confident, and more daring; she also believes herself called to a new and great destiny; that through the superiority of her civilization and material wealth she will succeed in dominating the Orient (Near East) and through it dominate Germany and Europe.35

In order to achieve her immediate goals in the East, Brătianu believed that Austria would not hesitate to cooperate with Russia—especially insofar as the division of the Ottoman Empire was concerned. In line with this argument, Brătianu attempted to prove, rather unconvincingly, that Austria's actions before and during the Crimean War had been intended to assist Russia (one can imagine what Tsar Nicholas would have said to that). This, in fact, was part of the Austrian double game, for the Habsburgs received support at home and in the West for their role as a barrier to Russia:

Austria will not work against Russia until such a time as France no longer is what she is, or until Austria has succeeded in Germanizing the Empire, and at the head of

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34Ibid., p. 68.
35Ibid., p. 82.
all the Germans, transformed into the German Empire, will be its [France's] arbiter. But until then, she knows that the day that Russia ceases to be a great power, she too will disappear from the map of Europe. In truth, the nationalities of which she is composed, no longer fearing Russian intervention, will easily overthrow the yoke of the House of Habsburg, and Europe will let them do that, will even help them, when it no longer has need of the so-called dike against the Russian floods.36

Thus, the real, immediate, objective of Austria was the destruction or subjugation of France. Brătianu appealed to Napoleon III to heed this warning, and to pursue a policy in the Eastern Question which would frustrate the Austrian program. Despite all of her potential, Austria was still thoroughly vulnerable in the critical area of the nationalities question. France already had a strong following in the area, and her overt support of national aspirations would provide the impetus needed for ultimate success. The benefits which France would derive from such a transformation would be considerable. She could achieve not only the destruction of a powerful and dangerous opponent, but also the eternal gratitude of the peoples released from slavery.

An added bonus to France would be the creation of a united Romanian state (here Brătianu included a brief history of the Romanians) which would be tied to her by the bonds of Latin kinship—a link far stronger than mere gratitude. The strategic importance of a Romanian state would be considerable:

36Ibid., pp. 90-91.
Romania, surrounded by great rivers and the Black Sea, crisscrossed by a host of streams, cut diagonally by the Carpathians, which are at the same time reservoirs of wealth and impregnable fortresses, in communication with Central Europe through its greatest river, with other countries through the Black Sea, and possessing the mouths of the Danube, which are of the same importance in the Eastern Question as the Dardanelles, Romania is one of the most beautiful lands of Europe, and has one of the greatest futures.

The creation of a Romanian state, according to Brâțianu, would not only assist in the destruction of Austria, but would also ("once cleansed of unhealthy elements of Russian origin") serve as the vanguard of Western civilization in the East where it would take over Austria's role as barrier against barbarian Russia. In short, France would gain, "all the advantages of a colony without any of the expenses."

Ion Brâțianu's final propaganda effort during the years of exile, Mémorie sur la situation de la Moldo-Volachie depuis le traité-de Paris was published in 1857. Essentially, this

37 This is a clear demonstration of the fact that Brâțianu by now considered Transylvania to be an undisputed part of Romania.

38 Ibid., p. 98.

39 Ibid., p. 99.

40 This last statement was actually made in an earlier memoir to Napoleon III, "Memoriu asupra Românilor dat Împăratului Napoleon III" ("Memoir concerning the Romanians given to Emperor Napoleon III"), in 1853. Ibid., p. 32.

brochure provided a critique of the Treaty of Paris, insofar as Moldavia and Wallachia were concerned, as well as an attack on the Ottoman firman concerning the organization of electoral assemblies in the Principalities. Brâțianu's approach to the treaty itself was cautious; he had no qualms about attacking Austria directly, and he made oblique references to Russia's "cleverness" in making a virtue out of necessity (the Romanians were practically unanimous in their skepticism about the sincerity of Russian support of Romanian independence and unity), but he would not attack England or France.

Brâțianu's key objection to the treaty was the use of the term "suzerainty." The Ottoman Empire is consistently referred to in its relationship with the Principalities, as the 'Suzerain Power.' The thrust of Brâțianu's opposition to this usage was the feudal implication that suzerainty implied the sovereignty of Turkey in the Romanian lands, whereas Brâțianu maintained that this was impossible since the Principalities were themselves sovereign--their relationship to the Ottoman Empire was a legal contract sealed by treaty. The argument about the nature of the early treaties is long and complicated (Brâțianu made no original contribution) and will not be pursued here. Whatever conclusion might be reached about the de jure relationship between the two parties, however,

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\textsuperscript{42}The drafting of the firman began in September of 1856, but final approval did not come until January of 1857.
there can be no question that the Ottoman Empire had long functioned as de facto suzerain. Other than with respect to national pride, the legal argument had importance chiefly in determining whether the Turkish capitulations would continue to apply to the Principalities.

A corollary to the Conference's view of the Ottoman Empire as suzerain in the Principalities was the decision to allow the Porte to serve as the Conference's agent. The Treaty of Paris removed Moldavia and Wallachia from the domination of Russia, and placed them under the joint protectorate of the Powers; at the same time it was stipulated that the people of the Principalities should be consulted about their political aspirations. Brătianu, taking it for granted that the Romanians would opt for independence and unity, called the intervening period an "interregnum" and strongly rejected the choice of Turkey as the most important regent during this critical period.

Brătianu felt that the choice of Turkey as 'regent' was bad not only because of the dispute about Romanian sovereignty, but also because the Turks were essentially dishonest:

For if the Turks have learned to pronounce the word 'legality,' when they are at Paris, it is beyond their competence to conform to it in fact when they are at Constantinople.

Proof of this, according to Brătianu, was the fact that the Turks had already begun to violate the Treaty of Paris by attempting to

Ibid., p. 117.
reassert direct control over the Principalities, sending their agents to Bucharest and Iași, "as if to Aleppo and Damascus." The Porte had issued firmans which suppressed the free press, suspended commercial concessions to foreign companies, and prohibited the return of the revolutionaries exiled in 1848.

The most important firman, however, was the one concerning the elections of the Divans ad hoc—assemblies which were to express the aspirations of the people. The Porte had been specifically authorized by the Treaty of Paris (article 24) to oversee this affair:

His majesty the Sultan promises to convocate immediately, in each of the two provinces, a divan ad hoc composed in a manner to constitute the most exact representation of the interests of all the classes of society. These divans will be called to express the wishes of the population with respect to the definitive organization of the Principalities.

Bătianu saw this as a limited mandate:

If this interpretation of article 24 extends the influence of the firman of convocation to the fixing of the general principles of the electoral laws, in order to assure the true representation of the nation, it however does not extend to the right to decree an electoral law in all its detail.

The Porte had, in fact, done just that. The firman of January, 1857 was a complete electoral law, and provided details for all

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44Ibid.
47Ion C. Bătianu, Acte și cuvintări, I-1, p. 119.
phases of the electoral process. Not surprisingly, this document was extremely conservative in approach, and heavily favored the reactionary elements of Romanian society. In accordance with the phrase, "the interests of all the classes," the electorate was divided into five electoral colleges: the clergy, the landed boiars (vaguely defined), the rest of the boiars (also vaguely defined), the towns-men, and the peasants.48

In his Mémoire sur la situation de la Moldo-Valachie, Brătianu attacked not only the collegial principle, but also the electoral definition of each college. The use of colleges, he said, was an attempt to impose a feudal system on the Romanians:

Why this feudal regime, which we have never had and whose existence we could not suffer to be imposed on us, today when Europe has finally gotten rid of it?49

Brătianu said that just as God had taken a handful of clay and created man, so the Turk was trying to take some dirt and create a nobility.50

The first of the five electoral colleges was formed by representatives of the Orthodox Church. Only the higher officials

48 In all fairness to the Forte, it should be emphasized that all the Powers were consulted about the firman and all approved the draft. The French ambassador to Constantinople, Thouvenel, intervened often in favor of limiting the power of the boiars, but his suggestions tended to be counterproductive. See: Riker, The Making, pp. 79-80.

49 Ion C. Brătianu, Acte și cuvîntări, I-1, p. 121.

50 Ibid., p. 122.
participated, the village priests were not considered to be clergy. Brătianu pointed out that these officials were selected directly by special boiar assemblies and were completely subservient to them. Moreover, this group had little to do with the spiritual strength of the country:

But what do they represent, this class created by article one of the firman? Some church? No, for the single category of the Romanian clergy which serves the churches, assists at deathbeds, introduces the newborn into society, consecrates the most sacred bond of marriage, and keeps the acts of civil standing, is the regular clergy; that is to say that body of eight thousand priests, who in the past have been the healthiest and most patriotic part of the nation, but which this firman excludes from the class of the clergy.  

Brătianu considered the definition of the clergy to be unjust, but the definition of great boiar (the second electoral college) was simply ludicrous. In order to be a member of this category one had to be both a large landowner and the holder of a title. All Wallachian titles were based on service, but more in theory than in practice, as all manner of titles could be purchased. This second class was called the class of the large proprietors, but the title requirement made a mockery of this definition:

Is it really the class of the great landowners? Not in the least, for you could be the owner of half of the Principality, but if you don't have a title, or if your father didn't have the fantasy to buy one, then you don't belong to this class.  

51Ibid., p. 123.

52Ibid., p. 126.
In fact, such a person would not be able to vote at all, for his holdings would exclude him from the other classes.

Brătianu's most important objection to the second class was the disproportionately large number of votes it would control in the future assembly. Out of 102 total seats, 34 were directly selected by the great landowners; to this number it is necessary to add the twelve belonging to the clergy for, as previously mentioned, the great boiars controlled the selection of the upper clergy. As a result, the reactionary elements of society had a dominant position, as there was little chance that the other three colleges would vote as a bloc. Brătianu had nothing but contempt for the great boiars, "There are in Wallachia only some 70 or 80 great boiars, most of them compromised with foreigners, and whose incompetence and customs of prevarication have become proverbial." 53

The third class, that of the landowners who did not qualify for the second class, held little interest for Brătianu who merely pointed out that they belonged to the privileged elements of society and could be expected to add their 17 votes to those of classes one and two. With respect to the fourth class, the peasantry, Brătianu emphasized that their representation (also set at 17) was woefully inadequate, and noted that the electoral procedures provided tremendous opportunities for outside interference. The peasantry, he said, "was condemned in advance." 54

53 Ibid., p. 136.
54 Ibid., p. 129.
The direction of Ion Brătianu's interests was clearly signalled by his discussion (the longest) of the fifth class—the townsman. This class had 22 votes, but the franchise was severely restricted, as to age, place of residence, profession and nationality. Brătianu felt that the townsman, who formed the Romanian tiers-état were the most important group of all. The bourgeoisie were the representatives of progress and the natural leaders of the peasantry (although this would be difficult—the collegial system was to extend even to assembly committees); besides these two classes, "there are only drones, who live to the detriment of the country."

The firman's stipulation that the Metropolitan should be the president of the assembly was, to Brătianu, the crowning blow. It not only showed that the Turks were determined not to allow the Romanians the right to make any decisions, but it also completed the mockery of a representative system:

And as for the naming of the Metropolitan as president of the assembly, it would be better to select the Sheik of Islam, for we could at least imagine how the

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55 Those enjoying foreign protection were excluded, but there were still a large number of non-Romanians, especially Greeks and Bulgarians, eligible. Foreign merchants and craftsmen were concentrated in the larger urban areas; in the smaller towns the Romanians were more prominent, but only residents of the major cities could vote. Brătianu strongly objected to this.

56 Ibid., p. 131.
latter had served in order to secure his eminent position in the body of the Ulema.57

In conclusion, Brătianu said that despite its faults, the Treaty of Paris was a great step forward, for it showed that Europe had recognized the existence of ten million Romanians. The firman of January 1857 was a disaster, however, and ought to be revoked:

We have seen that it gives 34 deputies to the boiars, whose number does not exceed 3,000, and whose importance and utility is highly questionable. Then how much more numerous ought to be the representation of the tiers-état, whose interests are those of the nation itself! Well, the firman only gives them 22 deputies; so that the tiers-état, even united with the peasantry which has only 17 deputies, could at the most, in the future assembly, oppose 39 votes to the 63 of the three privileged classes, whose interests are hostile to progress and ruinous for the country.58

Work on the Mémoire sur la situation de la Moldo-Valachie occupied a great deal of Ion Brătianu's time following his pardon and release in the summer of 1856. During most of the first year of freedom, he stayed away from Paris—no doubt with the intention of avoiding compromising meetings with his former associates. The first few months were spent with the de Galhau family in Germany and this period was followed by an extensive stay at Thann. Here he stayed at the house of Charles Kestner, an industrialist who was related to Michlet. Shortly after his arrival, in September, Brătianu became engaged to Kestner's daughter, Mathilde. The couple

57Ibid., p. 135.

58Ibid., p. 133.
must have known each other for some time, but the engagement came as a surprise to the Rosettis—who were very definitely not pleased.

Both C. A. and Maria Rosetti pretended to approve of Brătianu's decision, but they were unable to conceal their hostility. Constantin wrote that he (Ion) had, "abandoned his country," and added that, "I have just written to you in French, as vengeance for your marriage."\(^{59}\) Rosetti also remarked that, "Without you, you know that we must work day and night, but even so, we can't do all that you could do for her [Romania],"\(^{60}\) and further lamented that he wanted to write another catechism, this one on the topic of union, with one for peasants and one for tradesmen, but needed assistance.\(^{61}\) Maria was more subtle, her letters often spoke of the difficulties of marriage, but they gradually became sharper. Mathilde was suffering from some sort of nervous disease, the details of which Brătianu did not reveal, and Maria finally asked if perhaps it wasn't a trick to keep him away from Paris.\(^{62}\)

The opposition of the Rosettis was certainly of great importance for Brătianu, but this was not the only negative factor. Mathilde's illness implied a delicacy which was highly undesirable

\(^{59}\)BCS-BLS, MSS, Fondul Brătianu, Doc. 5, Pachet LII, 9f. C. A. Rosetti to Ion C. Brătianu, Sept. 24, 1856.

\(^{60}\)Ibid.

\(^{61}\)Ibid., no. 9g. C. A. Rosetti to Ion C. Brătianu, Dec. 4, 1856.

\(^{62}\)Maria C. A. Rosetti to Beppo (Ion C. Brătianu), Ibid.
for the wife of a young revolutionary. More important, however, was the fact that her family insisted that the couple spend at least two or three months of every year in France, and asked that Ion Brătianu combine his name with the Keatner's. Brătianu would not go that far, and he broke the engagement in January or February of 1857.

Brătianu now began to make plans to return to Romania, but he quickly encountered difficulties. The Porte had issued a firman confirming the exiled status of the forty-eighters, and was resisting intense diplomatic pressure to rescind it. Added to this rather formidable obstacle was the fact that Brătianu was flat broke. His elder brother, Teodor, who managed his estates, wrote that he had sent money, but that the mails were not safe and it had probably been lost. It was finally decided to send the money directly, using a cousin as courier. Teodor seemed very glad to hear of the termination of Ion's engagement, having noted earlier that, "these nervous diseases are rather endless."

In June of 1857 the Porte finally yielded to the demands for the return of the forty-eighters, and by the end of July, most of them, including Ion Brătianu, were back in their respective Principalities. These men had long before agreed on the substance of a unionist program, and they immediately began to organize for the

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63 Cantacuzino, Din viața familiei, I, pp. 24-25.

64 Teodor Brătianu to Ion C. Brătianu, 30 January and 14 March, 1857. BCS-BLS, MSS, Fondul Brătianu, Doc. 4, Pachet XII.
elections to the Divan ad hoc. In Moldavia, the unionists quickly found their task to be impossible. Austria and Turkey, both totally opposed to union, decided to concentrate their efforts in this province. Systematic falsification of electoral lists, intimidation of voters (particularly peasants), etc., produced a majority opposed to union in a July election. The voting had been rigged so flagrantly, that no one even bothered to discuss the matter. An international crisis followed.

France and Russia were committed to support the complete union of Moldavia and Wallachia, and they strongly challenged the actions of Austria and Turkey. The key to the crisis was the position of Great Britain, which, although opposed to union, was anxious to prevent any serious estrangement over the issue. The result was a compromise (the Pact of Osborne, August 9) between France and Britain, in which the former agreed to renounce complete union (but, "... while retaining their separate governments, they should have a common system in respect to all things civil and military") and the latter promised to press for a new, fair election. The new election was finally held on 29 August/10 September, and resulted in an overwhelming unionist majority.

66 On this subject see ibid., pp. 130-140.
In the meantime, the elections in Wallachia were carried out with a minimum of conflict. Rather surprisingly, the authorities chose to interpret the laws in a liberal sense, and there were relatively few disqualifications. The results of the election contrasted sharply with the predictions that Ion Brătianu had made in his *Mémoire sur la situation de la Moldo-Valachie*.

The reactionary great boiars, who were largely opposed to union, found themselves in severe difficulties as the result of the unionist fervor which was sweeping the country, particularly after the results of the second election in Moldavia. As a consequence, many great boiars suffered defeat at the hands of moderate and even liberal opponents. A striking feature of the new assembly was the presence of a great many of the forty-eighters, including the two most radical, Ion Brătianu and C. A. Rosetti. Brătianu was elected at Argeș as a large landowner, while Rosetti was the second highest votegetter in Bucharest (after N. Golescu). The political tenor of the assembly (which first met on 22 September/4 October) can be seen in the selection of N. Golescu as vice-president (the effective leader, as the Metropolitan commanded no support), while the five secretaries, D. Brătianu, C. A. Rosetti, St. Golescu, Dumitru Brătianu was elected from the city of Pitești. Teodor Brătianu was the administrator of Argeș district.

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67 Documente privind Unirea Principatelor ("Documents Concerning the Union of the Principalities.") (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1963), I, p. xxx.

68 Ibid., pp. xxxiv-xxxv, 523. Dumitru Brătianu was elected from the city of Pitești. Teodor Brătianu was the administrator of Argeș district.
Constantin Kretzulescu, and Scarlat Turnavitu, were all forty-eigheters.

The work of the Divan ad hoc of Wallachia was not difficult. The purpose of the assembly was to express the political aspirations of the nation, and this task was simplified by the fact that the Divan's counterpart in Moldavia had already formulated and published its views, and the Wallachians had only to make minor modifications. The Moldavian declaration was summarized in five points; a Wallachian deputy reduced these to four and presented them to the Divan on 8 October as an urgent proposition. A committee of nine including Ion Brătianu, was selected to study the proposal, and the next day Brătianu read a report which recommended immediate passage.

The four points were as follows: first, the guarantee of Wallachia's autonomy on the basis of the original treaties with the Porte, and the neutrality of Romanian territory; second, union of Moldavia and Wallachia in a single state with a single government; third, the election of a foreign prince, whose family was to establish a Romanian dynasty and adopt the religion of the country; fourth, a representative constitutional government, with a single assembly, which was to be, "... drawn up on a large electoral base, so that it would represent the general interests of the Romanian population."\(^{69}\) The resolution, which was meant to express the will of Wallachia to the Powers, was unanimously accepted on October 9.

\(^{69}\) Ion C. Brătianu, *Acte și cuvântări*, I, pp. 149-150.
None of the points is particularly surprising, except the idea of a foreign prince, which would at first glance appear to be at odds with the ideology of the left. Given the context of the times, however, this support of monarchy was inevitable. The Second French Republic was dead, buried, and practically forgotten. Continued support for a republican form of government for Romania would serve only to enhance domestic conflict and minimize the chances of outside assistance. Since the left was nationalist first and republican second, the new direction in its philosophy did not cause any particular difficulty.

Once the initial rationalization had been made, the foreign prince idea became a central part of leftist thinking. They were quick to realize the strength which such a solution would give to an independent Romania. Domestically, it would prevent the constant struggle for the throne among the great boiars which had marked Romanian history in the past. As the French revolutionary Paul Bataillard pointed out, the elective prince idea had been in the Principalities, as in Poland, a major source of national ruin. A foreign prince would also have the potential of limiting the influence of the great boiars. In international affairs, a foreign dynasty would enhance Romania's status and thus decrease her vulnerability.

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It was understood from the first that the new dynasty could not be Turkish, Russian or German.\textsuperscript{71}

Once the four point resolution was passed and forwarded to the Powers, the solidarity of the Divan ad hoc of Wallachie disintegrated. At the urging of the commissioners representing the Peace Conference, the Divan of Moldavia had begun debates on internal organization with emphasis on the formulation of a fundamental law or constitution. The Wallachians were advised to follow suit, but under the leadership of Ion Brătianu and the radicals, the Divan at Bucharest refused to take any action. Brătianu noted that they had not yet been told what sort of state they would be allowed to have and they could not expect to pass meaningful legislation in such a situation:

A strong state, for example, with a stable form of government will immediately inspire in all of Europe the confidence necessary for a profitable loan; and thanks to that credit, we could create a financial system like those of the other European states, systems which are the glory of modern society, and the well-being of those countries who were able to adopt them. On the other hand, if we have a state like that of today's Romania, where one cannot set up any financial institution, then it will be a question of depending on taxes on landed property or on persons in order to meet the daily needs of the government.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{71}N. Corivan, \textit{Din activitatea emigrantilor românii în apus, 1853-1857} ("On the Activity of the Romanian Emigrés in the West, 1853-1857") (Bucharest: Cartea Românească, 1931), p. 38. It was felt that a German Prince might be subject to Austrian influence.

\textsuperscript{72}D. A. Sturdza et al., eds., \textit{Acte și documente relative la istoria renascenteii României} ("Acts and Documents relative to the History of the Romanian Renaissance"), VI-2, p. 335. Divanul ad-hoc al Munteniei, proces-verbal 15 (11/23 November, 1857), p. 335.
Brățianu felt that the Divan ad hoc had the authority to consider internal problems and fundamental laws, but that to do so before the Powers agreed on the form of the new government would permit the Peace Conference to interfere. Only after autonomy had been guaranteed could there be free and unhindered discussion of internal affairs. Brățianu thus proposed that the Divan remain in session and that action be postponed until word came from Paris. This point of view was rejected by the conservatives who felt themselves to be too weak to risk confrontation on the crucial question of an electoral law. They denied the competency of the Divan ad hoc in this area and pressed for a dissolution.

Brățianu and the radicals were backed by the peasantry, but the support of this group was not as firm and as unwavering as the conservatives thought. The desire of the peasants to assert their rights conflicted with Brățianu's desire for strict unity at least until the Paris Conference had made up its mind. Prior to the passage of the four points, a peasant deputy, Gh. Lupescu, had proposed an amendment to the last point, the aim of which was to emphasize the democratic aspect of future elections and assemblies.

73 Ibid., pp. 344-345.

74 The conservatives were, as Brățianu himself pointed out, in the majority (see: Ibid., pp. 381-382). Nevertheless, many of these were fairly moderate and opposed to the interests of the great boiars; the latter group was very worried about the influence of the forty-eighters.
Ion Brătianu led the opposition to Lupescu's proposal; he said that he understood the peasants' problems, and would feel the same way in their place, but that all must now sacrifice for the good of the country, as all were in the struggle together, and must seek a new start:

We [the radicals] were the first to combat in the assembly the passions and problems of the past—because we know that all have suffered, even those who sat on the Prince's chair, if they had hearts, suffered more than the ploughman.75

Lupescu's proposal was soundly defeated, but the scattered support which it received indicates that certain elements of the peasantry were not moved by Brătianu's rhetoric, and did not agree with radical tactics. Later, some of the peasant leaders opposed the idea of waiting, and wanted to take up a discussion of internal affairs immediately. They eventually changed their minds, and instead chose to threaten the boiars with retribution if peasant interests were ignored. Contemporaries saw the hand of Ion Brătianu in this manoeuvre. D. Ghica remarked that Brătianu was in continual contact with the peasants and that he dominated them.76

The correspondent of a French newspaper, Le Nord, wrote that:

The most violent of our democrats, Mr. Brătianu, had the nerve to threaten the conservative party during a

75Ibid., pp. 102-103. The last phrase was often taken out of context and used by Brătianu's enemies to show that he was hostile to the peasants.

76Ibid., p. 384.
session [of the Divan] . . . he sent forward the peasant deputies who stood up and claimed their right to participate in all future assemblies.  

Radical control of the peasantry was not sufficient to secure approval of Brătianu's program of waiting, however, and on the 12/24 December, moderate elements forced a compromise, and the Divan ad hoc was adjourned until 20 January/1 February, 1858. At this point, the Sultan, at the request of the Powers, issued a firman of dissolution for both Wallachia and Moldavia, and the Divan at Bucharest never reconvened.  

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77Ibid., VII, pp. 7-8.
CHAPTER V

FROM THE DOUBLE ELECTION TO UNION

The Romanian unionists, who were anxiously awaiting the response of the Paris Conference to the program of the Divans ad hoc in the first months of 1858, did not know that France had already agreed not to press for union and a foreign prince. The key word here is "press," for when the Conference opened on May 22 the French representative, Valewski, spoke strongly in favor of union and a foreign prince (and was dutifully supported by the Russian delegate, Count Kiselev), but once he was on record, he remained faithful to the Fact of Osborne, and dropped these demands. Instead, the French worked to secure the maximum amount of legislative and administrative unity possible, believing that the British had agreed to this at Osborne, though the British later denied this. The atmosphere became very tense, as the British increasingly aided with the Austrians and Turks who opposed even the slightest degree of unity.

In early July, "... when a violent brochure appeared, discussing the imminence of war with Austria, the fact that it was attributed to the [French] government precipitated an immediate panic on the bourse."¹ The title of the pamphlet was L'Empereur

Napoleon et les principautés roumaines. A liberal French politician, Alfred Darimon, wrote in his diary that, "The newspapers attribute to it a very high origin. But it is definitely the result of a collaboration between Armand Lévy and Brătianu."2 Darimon, who describes Brătianu as, "un Orsini au petit pied" and says that together with Rosetti he "personified French influence in Romania," noted that, "Brătianu sees the Prince Napoleon, but secretly."3 Since Darimon also observed that Jérome was then entering the inner circles of the Emperor, it does seem likely that the pamphlet was officially inspired.4

The French were not seriously thinking of war, however, but were merely pulling out all the stops in the diplomatic struggle. Nevertheless, the equally determined attitude of their opponents forced the French to compromise on most of the key points. The Convention of August 19, 1858 served as a constitution for both Principalities, but the two remained separate political entities.5 Each was to elect a native prince for life and the power of each was to be great. Both would have the right to approve or reject legislation; each would appoint and dismiss the ministers, who in

3Ibid., p. 196.
5The text is in Damé, Histoire, pp. 411-421.
turn would not be responsible to the legislature except that by a
two-thirds vote the assembly could request that a minister be im-
peached by a court of cassation. The assemblies would have the
initiative for most legislation, although this function was shared
with a central commission (composed of eight Wallachians and eight
Moldavians, and meeting on the border at Focșani) which would inter-
vene with respect to "laws of common interest."

Beside the rather vague functions of the Central Commission
the only other common factors were a high court of justice and
cassation (also at Focșani) and a common commander-in-chief for the
two militias. There was no overt symbol of union—the idea of a
common flag had been rejected after a long, acrid debate—but the
new state(s) had the title of "The United Principalities of
Moldavia and Wallachia."

The decision of the Paris Conference which had the greatest
long-term impact was its revision of the franchise. As has already
been noted, the electoral provisions established for the Divans
ad hoc were hardly liberal, but they at least allowed for some
representation of and by the lower classes. The Convention of 1858
changed this and substituted a flat property requirement which
disenfranchised all but medium to large landowners and wealthy
bourgeois. The exclusion of the peasantry and the urban masses was
a severe blow to the Romanian left, which was now doomed to the
status of a permanent minority.
On his return from Paris, Ion Brătianu immediately went to work preparing for the December elections for the new Assembly. These elections would be especially important, for the Adunarea electivă ("Elective Assembly") as well as selecting the new Prince was charged with the elaboration of that part of the governmental structure not defined by the Convention. The significance of the elections did not escape the leaders of the right, who were hard at work plotting ways to eliminate the forty-eighters. The conservatives were assisted in their machinations by the vagueness of the Convention and the sympathy of the reactionary caimacams and the agents of the Porte. The method they decided upon was simplicity itself—the arbitrary elimination of undesirables from the electoral lists.

Not surprisingly, two of the first group of individuals treated in this fashion were C. A. Rosetti (Bucharest) and Ion Brătianu (Argeş). This action might have proved fatal to the hopes of the radicals had not one of the caimacams, I. Al. Filipescu (who was also Minister of Justice) gone against his two colleagues and ordered the courts to give a fair hearing to appeals. As a result, most of the electoral alterations were reversed by the courts—the tribunals in fact tended to go the other way, and some (possibly including Rosetti) who did not meet the strict property requirements were allowed to vote and run for election.

Brătianu had a more difficult time asserting his rights than did Rosetti. The tribunal of Argeş restored him to the electoral
lists, "... to the great delight of an audience of more than a hundred and fifty san culottes," but the caimacams, citing his French criminal record, ordered that his name should not be restored to the lists. The caimacams were probably acting at the insistence of the Turks, but their decision was of doubtful legality.  

Brătianu protested vigorously to the French consul at Bucharest, Béclard. When the latter refused to intervene, Brătianu, who struck Béclard as being "tres exalté," demanded that telegrams should be sent to Walewski and Prince Jérôme in his name. At the very last minute the caimacams gave in; the ironic result of their sudden change was to insure Brătianu's election:

The ispravnic of Piteşti ... admitted to vote, on the day of the direct elections, all of the electors approved either by the administration or by the tribunal. The electoral college thus found itself made up of 28 voters, 14 conservative and 14 progressives. Among the latter was Ion Brătianu. The admission of Mr. Brătianu and of certain of his friends, registered at the last minute as the result of judicial decrees, irritated in the extreme the 14 conservatives who, until then, had considered themselves to be in the majority. These latter gentlemen withdrew and went to Bucharest where they filled the town with their noisy protests. While they were away, the other 14 voted for Ion

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6 Fotino, Boierii Goleşti, IV, p. 274.
8 Ibid., 20 and 31 January, 1859, pp. 234-235.
Brătianu and Nicolas Rosetti who were named deputies.9

Despite certain isolated successes (Argeș and Bucharest were the two bright spots) the position of the Wallachian left was much weaker in the elective Assembly of 1858 than it had been in the ad hoc assembly of the previous year. Their decline was a result of the reduction of the franchise and did not emanate from electoral falsification. The left might have been crushed and ignored at this point, had it not been for two key factors. First, the conservatives were, as anticipated, bitterly divided with respect to the election of the new Prince. There were three serious candidates, and none was too proud to refuse support from any quarter. Secondly, certain of the leftist leaders, especially Ion Brătianu and Cezar Bolliac, were skilled agitators ever ready to whistle up the Bucharest mob (and back them with peasants from the provinces if necessary).

The major candidates in Wallachia were the ex-Princes Bibescu and Știrbey, and Al. Ghica. The left talked of the election of N. Golescu or Ion Brătianu, but the victory of either one was impossible and they knew it. Barred from election in the normal way, the radicals began to plot a forced election or coup d'état.

9Ibid., 31 January 1859, p. 254. The elections in Argeș were a matter of considerable concern for the left. Radu Golescu asked his cousins to transfer some of their land to him so that he could vote there rather than in his own district. Fotino, Boerii Goleston, IV, pp. 251-252.
Their task was made immeasureably easier by the participation of D. Ghica who was Chief of Police of Bucharest. Ghica was conservative socially, but he was strongly nationalist and unionist and vehemently opposed the two reactionaries, Bibescu and Stirbey. The radicals and moderates were loosely allied, and it is most unlikely that they ever had a common candidate. D. Ghica supported his uncle, Al. Ghica, while the left kept the candidacy of N. Golescu alive, probably in the hope that he could be forced on the assembly in a confused situation. The cooperation of the two factions was more anti-reactionary than it was pro anything.

The Moldavians held their election before the Wallachians, and they surprised everyone by electing a little-known army officer, Col. Al. I. Cuza. Cuza had made a name for himself by resigning in protest against the fraud in the elections for the Divan ad hoc, but outside of that and the fact that he was a staunch unionist, the new Prince of Moldavia was a complete mystery to the overwhelming majority of his countrymen. Yet that very anonymity was his greatest advantage, for his aloofness from the quarrels of the great boiars was tremendously refreshing to all those who were disgusted by the ceaseless intrigue. On the other hand, the fact that he was one of the Moldavian forty-eighters appealed to the former revolutionary leaders, while the totally undistinguished nature of his role prevented him from being anathema to the conservatives.

10 The left was not violently opposed to Al. Ghica, however, and it would have accepted him readily, especially if the choice were between him and Bibescu or Stirbey.
The idea of a double election (Modavians were eligible in Wallachia and vice-versa) was suggested immediately after Cuza's election (5/17 January), but it was slow to catch on. One reason for this hesitation was the fact that such an action was clearly contrary to the wishes of the Powers, and annulment would have been a very real possibility. More important, however, was the fact that the Wallachians were preoccupied with their own affairs and there was no solid block of opinion in favor of Cuza's election at Bucharest. Rosetti's newspaper, the Românul, hailed Cuza's victory, but it did not suggest that the Wallachians should follow the Moldavians lead, nor is there any evidence to suggest that the left in Bucharest even considered such a possibility. Most of the talk of a double election came from Jassy, not from Bucharest. 12

The Wallachian assembly began its deliberations on the 22 January/13 February amid scenes of general confusion. The left did not yet have any hope of success for its candidate, and resigned itself to cooperating with the moderates in order to prevent the election of Bibescu or Stîrbey. To this end, Ion Brătianu led a large crowd into the courtyard of the assembly building but did not openly menace the conservative deputies. The first day passed peacefully (though not without tension) while the election returns

116/18 January, 1859  
12Ogetea, Istoria României, IV, p. 305.
were validated. The following day proceeded in the same fashion until a contingent of troops appeared and tried to push the mob away from the building.

The French consul, Béclard, who was present as an observer, noted that as soon as the soldiers appeared, Brătianu jumped up and shouted, "The Assembly is surrounded . . . we cannot debate under the pressure of bayonets." The crowd seemed to respond to Brătianu's cries, and the atmosphere became extremely tense.

Finally, Brătianu and D. Ghica addressed the crowd and asked them to remain calm, and not violate the law. When a rightest deputy explained that the troops were only there to maintain order, and that if Brătianu were to gain power the next day he would do the same, Brătianu responded:

The troublemakers are those who violate the laws and who, in all their acts, show themselves to be unworthy of the trust which is confided to them. Practically every day, for three months, I have protested against the illegal acts committed by the caimacams. I protest again, at this time, against the despatch of troops who constitute, at the same time, an illegality and a provocation. We did not ask for soldiers. Why did the caimacams send them to us? Is it because the caimacams, on leaving the assembly yesterday, were welcomed by the insults and hisses of the crowd? This punishment was just. The caimacams have lost all right to feel indignation. Power is now in our hands, and it is we who should use it, for the time has passed when Princes reigned by the grace of

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God. The will of the people, obedience to the law, these are today the only support of thrones.\textsuperscript{15}

When some of the deputies, frightened by the rhetoric and the mob, moved to adjourn, Brătianu became even more threatening:

Those who wish to end the session do not know what responsibility they are undertaking. The people are exasperated, and, when they are told that we have done nothing today, perhaps even I will be incapable of restraining them.\textsuperscript{16}

This naked challenge had the desired effect, and the assembly stayed in session long enough to finish the debate on the electoral returns, then hastily adjourned. The election of the Prince was set for the following day, the 24 January/5 February.

In later years Brătianu claimed credit for having secured the election of Cuza in Wallachia. In a speech delivered ten years later he said that two days before the election (the night of January 22/February 3) he went to see the commander of the army, General Vlădoianu. Brătianu said that the General's advisors wanted to "... make the streets flow with blood," but that the general would not permit it:

For in the heart of Vlădoianu there had been awakened the feeling of a Romanian and the fear of God. When I arrived there the rooms were all lit up and the officers were gathered to discuss what to do on the following day ... [Vlădoianu asked] What do you want? I am ready to give you my hand, do you have a candidate? Is it N. Golescu? No! I answered him, Then who is it? The

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 269.
\textsuperscript{16}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 270.
Prince of Moldovia. . . . General Vlădoianu gave me his hand for life and for death. Those who boast today that they made the 24th of January, well that didn't even come into their minds; while they argued over who was to be Prince, General Vlădoianu and I made the decision. 17

When General Vlădoianu was questioned about Brătianu's story, he gave a somewhat different version. He said that the idea had been first mentioned to him by Cezar Boliac, and that he had consulted with Cuza about the possibility before the meeting with Brătianu, which took place on the evening of January 23/February 4, not January 22/February 3—that is to say on the eve of the election. 18 Vlădoianu's version is almost certainly the correct one, and there is evidence to show that Brătianu and his group were the last to agree to support Cuza. If anyone was boasting, it was Brătianu.

General Vlădoianu was in fact closely allied with the moderate-unionist group of D. and Al. Ghica. The mob which responded to the shouts of Brătianu on the 22 January/4 February was largely composed of peasants from the nearby estate of Al. Ghica, and Vlădoianu had done everything possible to avoid conflict between his troops and the mob. 19 Indeed, on the following day he disobeyed an order to

17 Răcutu, Ion C. Brătianu, p. 66. Românul, 7 February, 1859.
18 Trompeta Carpaților, 13/25 March, 1859.
19 Béclard to Walewski, 7 February, 1859. Acte și documente, IX, p. 271.
disperse the crowd surrounding the assembly. The Ghica circle took the lead on the eve of the election in pushing forward the candidature of Cuza. Brătianu and Rosetti's radical group was reluctant to agree.

The reasons for the hesitation of the left are not hard to understand. The ascendancy of the mob, which (whatever its origins) was very definitely under its control, doubtless made them feel that a show of force might bring about the election of N. Golescu or Ion Brătianu. Furthermore, it had every reason to be skeptical of Cuza. The man himself was an unknown, and might well have been a puppet. If so, he would undoubtedly be controlled by the Moldavian liberals, a group which was socially much more conservative than its Wallachian counterpart. Five years later, Brătianu himself noted that the Moldavians had had "little taste" for the Wallachian left.

Brătianu and Rosetti were confronted with a conflict between their

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20 As a pretext, Vălădoianu claimed that the order for dispersal was invalid as it had only been signed by two caiacams.


23 Din scrierile lui Ion C. Brătianu (1921 ed.), p. 533.
radical political ideas and their nationalist aim--union. The fact
that they chose the latter course was not really an ideological
decision, however, for they must have realized that without the
police and the army, controlled by the Ghicas the mob was a feeble
weapon. Thus it was that Brătianu and Rosetti signalled their
support for Cuza on the eve of the election. The following morning,
D. Ghica went to the conservatives and secured their support as
well. The right was too terrorized to do otherwise.24

The conservatives promise of support was not sufficient for
their opponents, however, and there was ample preparation for a
doublecross:

The liberal-unionist committee decided that as soon as
any of the conservatives or whites in the assembly tried
to persist in the election of Bibescu, the people from
the hill and the courtyard of the Metropolitan [where the
assembly building was] and the people from Filaret [a
nearby field] should rush in to the assembly chamber and
force the selection of the choice of Moldavia.

The signal was two handkerchiefs: a red one and a
white one, both in the possession of the deputy Ion C.
Brătianu. The red handkerchief was the signal for the
entrance of the people in the assembly chamber, while
the white one stood for peace and union; that is to say
the proclamation of Alexander Ioan Cuza as Prince of
both Moldavia and Wallachia.26

24Filitti, "Retusâri," p. 10.


26I. G. Valentineanu, Din memoriile mele (O paginá de istoria
moderná). Alegerea, detronarea, si inmormintarea lui Cuza Voda,
1859, 1866, 1873. ("From My Memoirs I A Page of Modern History] The
Election, Overthrow and Burial of Prince Cuza, 1859, 1866, 1873")
(Bucharest: Tipografia Moderná 'Gr. Luis,' 1898), p. 10.
The red signal was unnecessary. The conservatives could not recover their nerve and the election of Cuza was unanimous. When Brătianu waved the white cloth, a great shout of "Long live Union!" came from the waiting crowd.  

The attitudes of the Powers toward the double election were consistent with the points of view expressed at the Paris Conference. France, supported by Russia, strongly approved, Britain was hostile, while the Turks and Austrians were violently opposed. The anti-unionist forces were at a great disadvantage as a result of the fait accompli, however, and the deepening crisis in Italy soon caused attention to be focused elsewhere. The Austrians and Turks drew some consolation from the fact that union under a native prince was not nearly as bad as union under a foreign prince. Moreover, given the turbulent state of affairs in the United Principalities, there was a good chance that even the present degree of union would not endure for long.  

Cuza's position was indeed precarious. That he had never sought the offices he now held might be considered an advantage in some respects, but it presented some serious drawbacks. Not only was the new Prince completely lacking in governmental experience, but his sudden rise had left him without contacts and a natural constituency. He would have to build down from the top. This should

27Ibid., p. 10.
have been easy, given his immense popularity, but it must be remembered that public adoration was aimed at Cuza the symbol of union, not Cuza the man. The extreme awkwardness of his situation was demonstrated by the fact that he was compelled, in his first address to the Powers following the double election, to emphasize the desire of the Romanians for a foreign prince. 29

The double election of Cuza did not complete the nationalist program; true union and complete independence were still immediate goals, and irredentism aimed at the integration of the United Principalities with the Banat, Transylvania, Bucovina and Bessarabia was a growing factor. Nevertheless, the internal situation was not stable enough to permit the emergence of true political parties. The affiliation of Ion Brătianu and C. A. Rosetti has been variously described as left, radical, red, socialist, and even communist—the latter three appellations used in a pejorative sense by conservative opponents. Nevertheless, their true orientation did not really become clear until after 1859. Their enemies continued to call them whatever they pleased, but Brătianu and Rosetti called themselves liberals. 30

The best way to describe the objective of the Liberal Party is to cite its program of 1861. This platform was circulated during

29 Acte și documente, VIII, no. 2599.

30 The term used was simply, The Romanian Liberal Party. After World War One they took the name of National-Liberal.
the elections of that year in the form of a petition, which voters were to fill out and sign, then give to their candidate. The idea was that the candidate was to pledge himself to refuse to vote the budget until the following reforms were instituted:

1. The army is to be organized after the Swiss or Prussian system.

2. There is to be a 'citizen guard' for the whole country.

3. The electoral law should be altered so that all interests would be truly represented in the national assembly.

4. The government is to have representatives in all possible countries and should strive to establish good commercial and moral relations with all liberal countries. Romanian union is to be completed.

5. The constitution of the Central Commission should be modified in a liberal sense, especially with reference to personal liberty and freedom of press and petition.

6. A law is to be passed assuring the independence of the judiciary and making it in reality one of the three powers of the state.

7. A law is to be passed to organize the more intense development of municipal institutions both in urban and rural areas.

8. The law establishing chambers of commerce should go into effect at once.

9. A national bank should be created.
10. The Ministry of Public Works should be separate from the Ministries of Agriculture and Commerce.

11. There should be an Office of Accounts, and the quick regularization of budgets as in all 'well organized countries.'

12. Stamp taxes and all other indirect taxes should be eliminated and replaced with one single tax.

13. Juries should be organized for all correctional and criminal courts.

14. The situation of those monasteries called 'dedicated' should be regularized without delay.

15. The principle that deputies to the National Assembly should not at the same time hold public office should be established.

16. The National Assembly should demand that the government function ceaselessly until the foregoing fifteen points are in effect.

This program was certainly liberal in the classic nineteenth century sense of the word. All of the traditional demands for constitutional guarantees and full civil liberties are present (the expansion of educational facilities was not mentioned, but this was a frequent topic of Brătianu's speeches), while the omissions are equally significant. The program called for electoral reform, but

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there was no mention of universal suffrage; the key issue of rural reform was not mentioned at all.

In an article entitled "Burghezia" ("The Bourgeoisie"), published in February of 1858, Ion Brătianu clearly demonstrated a preference for the urban, commercial class, noting that, "... although agriculture is a level of civilization, it is only the first level, for only industry and commerce give the true character of civilization to a land."\(^2\) Brătianu went on to explain that he did not wish to imply a lack of respect for agriculture, but emphasized that the development of an urban, industrial society was inevitable and highly desirable. Rome, he asserted, had fallen because it lived off the products of conquered bourgeoisies and failed to develop its own middle class.\(^3\) The rural, agricultural society of the past was doomed, and was fated to be replaced by a new social order in which agriculture was "... destined to become a branch of industry."\(^4\)

Brătianu took pains to emphasize that he was not contemplating a blind, slavish imitation of the West:

There was a time when I would have liked to see the transformation of Romanian society after the fashion of France. But after a more serious study of the social sciences and an extended study of our national history, without changing my admiration for western societies, I

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 192.

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 185. Unfortunately, Brătianu never explained exactly what he meant by this last statement.
have moderated my desire to imitate them, to follow them at any price without method or planning.\(^{35}\)

This disclaimer was not accepted by all of Brătianu's contemporaries, however, and he and Rosetti were often pictured as unrealistic francophiles.

The real problem with the Wallachian Liberal Party (or radical-liberals) was the fact that it lacked a strong constituency. The very program of the party revealed its weakness, for it did not represent current interests, but instead had as its goal the creation of a new society. The party could not hope to have strong backing until some or all of its program was achieved. Escape from this dilemma was extremely difficult. Conditions were not ripe for a revolutionary overthrow of the existing regime. Not only the inherent weakness of the radical-liberals, but also the threat of 'foreign' intervention made this course of action an unlikely possibility for the foreseeable future. Propaganda and the inevitable penetration of the industrial West would eventually bring about change, but this process was too slow for the dynamic Brătianu.

The only meaningful strategy for the immediate future was some sort of alliance with another group, but this proved to be impossible for some time. The completion of the unionist program actually tended to diminish the prestige of Brătianu and Rosetti, for they had garnered most of their support as energetic leaders of the

\(^{35}\)Ibid., p. 179.
national movement. As this issue declined in importance, their influence declined. The Liberal Party continued to be ultranationalist, but this was no longer the decisive issue, and was insufficient as the basis of party strength—the other parties were nationalist as well.

Alliance with the conservative boiars was impossible. Although the liberals did not call for immediate land reform, the boiars rightly suspected that that was one of their eventual goals. Even if it had not been, the objectives of the two groups were radically different. To the conservatives, the liberals were 'reds'; to the liberals, the conservatives were 'whites.' Neither would have regretted the destruction of the other. Moreover, the conservatives were firmly in control of the Wallachian Assembly and did not need any help. In between the two extremes was a loose group of moderates who favored some reform but who considered the radical-liberal leaders to be much too radical. This latter group included a substantial number of forty-eighters, men like Eliade-Rădulescu, Tell, Costaforu, Boerescu and Vernescu.

The only other possibility for a coalition was the group of Moldavian liberals led by Mihail Kogălniceanu. Unfortunately, however, this party was temperamentally and ideologically too far removed from its Wallachian counterparts for any fruitful cooperation. Referring to Brătianu and Rosetti, Kogălniceanu later remarked that, "We are lambs by comparison; our comrades from Wallachia carry
their revolutionary airs to the point of making us tremble."36
Kogălniceanu also noted that the difference in temperament between the two groups might well be explained by the fact that the Moldavian leaders were educated in Germany, the Wallachians in France. 37

The social background of the two liberal parties was also quite different. The Moldavian liberals were primarily intellectuals of the upper classes; landowners who were morally convinced of the necessity for rural reform. They were scarcely interested in the problems of the bourgeoisie, in large part because that class in Moldavia was overwhelmingly composed of Jews who had no political rights whatsoever. In Wallachia many of the merchants and tradesmen were also foreigners (mostly Greeks and Slavs) but the purely Romanian element was much stronger, and there was greater communication between them and the liberal leaders. Not that the Wallachian liberals had that firm a base, for, as I. Tanoviceanu points out, men like Brătianu and Rosetti were elected, ". . . not because they


37Ibid., p. 251.
had liberal principles, but despite their liberal principles; they were elected because they had friends and relatives in that [boiar] class."^{38}

The failure of the Moldavian and Wallachian liberals to agree on a joint program was all the more tragic because the former, and particularly their leader Kogălniceanu, were quite close to Cuza. The Prince shared their hostility to the conservative boiars and was interested in general progressive change, especially rural and electoral reform. Cuza had no use for the Wallachian radical-liberals, however, and he made no effort to acquire their support. In fact, within the first year of the Prince's reign an incident occurred which served to poison relations to the point of no return.

In view of the weakness of their political situation, the control by the Wallachian radical-liberals of the influential Bucharest newspaper, the Românul, had become of prime importance to their continued existence. Thus, when in the Autumn of 1859 the president of the Wallachian cabinet, N. Kretzulescu, ordered the paper suspended because of minor criticism of his policies, the liberals were enraged. A protest meeting turned into a riot and had to be suppressed by the police. Cuza, who appointed the cabinet, might have reversed Kretzulescu's action but he did not. Nor did the Moldavian liberals show any particular interest in protesting this breach of the freedom of the press.

^{38} Ibid., p. 253.
The result of this situation was that Brătianu and Rosetti's Liberal Party was forced to go it alone during the first part of Cuza's reign. The political roles of the two were quite different: Brătianu, "possessed of an indescribable personal charm and an oratorical talent of an original nature," was the parliamentary leader; Rosetti was conspicuously lacking in those talents, but he was a good journalist and a skillful politician. Despite their different personalities, the two formed, "a single political individual in two bodies."  

In the assembly Brătianu assumed the status of guardian of the primacy of the legislature vis-a-vis the government and the Prince. He took particular interest in parliamentary structure and organization (often remarking upon the procedures of other assemblies—notably the British) and served on a variety of committees. He opposed voting by colleges and the idea of deputies holding administrative jobs, and favored open voting and a simple majority instead of two-thirds. An interesting example of Brătianu's point of view was a resolution barring the government from sending soldiers to the vicinity of the Assembly without that body's permission—the resolution was passed.

39 Ibid., p. 255.
40 Ibid.
41 Monitorul Oficial al Țării Românești, 1859, pp. 903, 904, 905, 907.
42 Ibid., pp. 1084-1085.
Brătianu at first refrained from attacking Cuza directly (although he did favor a drastic reduction of the civil list), but he showed no such scruples with respect to the ministers. The chief object of Brătianu’s wrath was the government’s failure to deal with the commercial crisis in the Principalities. It affected both agriculture and industry; rural problems resulted from insufficient markets and low prices, not from natural disasters. Brătianu repeatedly stated that the source of the depression was the export tax on cereals which priced Romanian products out of the west European market. Pointing out that export taxes in general were undesirable, Brătianu urged immediate repeal. The Minister of Finance, Barbu Catargiu, agreed with this analysis but said that a new source of revenue would have to be found first. Brătianu replied that unless there was swift relief, there would be no sources of revenue at all.

With reference to the commercial side of the economic crisis, all parties were agreed that the key problem was a general lack of credit. The government hoped to ameliorate the problem by extending short term loans to certain large bankers. Brătianu was violently opposed to this. He stated that the individuals in question were nothing more than land speculators who had received their just deserts—helping them would not help the economy as a whole.

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43 Ibid., p. 870.
If anything beneficial were to be achieved, Brătianu said, the government would have to make a large sum available to a larger number of people. Moreover, although the problem was urgent, a permanent and not a temporary emergency credit institution was necessary for public confidence to be gained. To that end, Brătianu proposed, in March of 1859, the creation of a national discount bank.

The institution proposed by Brătianu in 1859 was not to be a bank of issue, but rather a source of loans and a means for the discounting of commercial paper, and the handling of deposits. The bank's initial capital was to be derived exclusively from domestic sources, half from the treasury and regular sources of government income, and half from a national bond issue. Despite the fact that Brătianu's proposal was thoughtfully conceived and conservative in scope it was rejected by the assembly in favor of the government's original plan. As Brătianu had predicted, this project was scarcely effective at all, and the economic crisis was still severe a year later when Ion Brătianu himself became Minister of Finance in a Liberal cabinet.

The year between Cuza's acquisition of power and the first Liberal government was a turbulent one. Cuza at first tried a

46 The text of the proposal is given in ibid., pp. 476-481.
47 Brătianu wanted to include revenues from the 'dedicated monasteries' as part of the capital.
coalition government in Wallachia but this proved to be incapable of inspiring the confidence of any part of the Assembly— which was finally dissolved at the end of 1859. New elections were held on 19 February/2 March, and the new Assembly, which was still dominated by the conservatives, met on 10/22 April. The holdover cabinet, headed by Ion Ghica, had no better luck with the new deputies than with the old, and resigned in May. To replace them, Cuza chose a Liberal cabinet which included N. Golescu as President and Minister of War, C. A. Rosetti as Minister of Cults (Religion) and Education, D. Brătianu as Minister of the Interior and Ion Brătianu as Minister of Finance. 48

Ion Brătianu had spent most of the winter as a member of the Municipal Council of Bucharest, 49 but he resigned in time to return to Argeș to be reelected to his seat in the assembly. 50 During the short tenure of the Ghica cabinet Brătianu was one of the government's most violent critics. Most of his speeches were on the topic of the electoral system. He felt that the whole system was unjust; not only was the basis of the franchise (property and capital) unfair, but the government had too much influence over the election itself. The government considered the election a law, 51

48Monitorul, 1860, p. 781.
49Ibid., pp. 59-132.
50Ibid., p. 166.
51This included the election of the members of the Central Commission. Ibid., p. 257.
and said that therefore it must, like all laws, be sanctioned by the Prince. Brătianu was outspoken, but unsuccessful, in his opposition to this theory.  

In general, Brătianu favored a system of checks and balances. He renewed his attack on the practice of deputies holding administrative positions, "If this assembly is composed of administrative functionaries, where is its independence, and especially where is the counterbalance it ought to provide with respect to executive power?" To Brătianu power was divided as follows: the Prince was the executive (the cabinet was under him), the Central Commission was the legislative branch, and the assemblies served as controls over the other two. The cabinet, though appointed by the Prince, ought actually to be responsible to the Assembly which alone had the right to interpret laws. To buttress the whole system Brătianu proposed the immediate setting up of a court of cassation (this institution was required by the Convention, but had not yet been established) and the creation of a strong, independent judiciary. The last demand came as a result of the

52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., p. 230.
54 This was only in national terms, as the Central Commission considered only problems of "common interest." Strictly local issues were considered directly by the respective assemblies.
55 Ibid., p. 251.
56 Ibid., p. 230.
57 Ibid., p. 273.
Minister of Justice's stipulation that the status of judges, "... be verified at their entrance in service and at their leaving." To this Brătianu responded, "Is it possible that there could be a greater attack on this body [the Judiciary] than that?"

Brătianu was also among those who were critical of the Prince's Message from the Throne (a sort of State of the Union address) and opposed the favorable response voted by the assembly. In particular, he felt that the Message was too weak with respect to the sovereignty of the United Principalities vis-a-vis the Protecting Powers. He especially emphasized the right of the Principalities to elect whatever Prince they desired—even a foreign one.

In view of all this opposition it is obvious that Cuza did not select a Liberal cabinet as the result of a newly-found friendship. Nor had it resulted from a rapprochement between the Moldavian and Wallachian Liberals. The obvious answer is that Cuza decided to give the Liberals plenty of rope, based on the reasonable theory that they would quickly hang themselves with it. The Prince was not disappointed.

The new cabinet was in a hopeless position from the very beginning. The program of the new ministry stated that it had come

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58 Ibid., p. 303.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., pp. 378-379.
to power in order to, "... contribute to the construction of a new social edifice." This was a noble idea, but hardly auspicious in view of the fact that a solid majority of the Assembly was firmly opposed to any change of the social order. In fact the cabinet lasted only about seven weeks, from 28 May/10 June to 5/17 July, and no meaningful reforms ever got past the talking stage. The cause of its downfall was not the opposition of the conservatives, however, but the indiscretion of Rosetti and Brătianu.

Cezar Boliac, who was (at that time) a close friend and political ally of Rosetti and Brătianu had been elected to a seat in the Assembly. The validity of his election was challenged by the Austrian Consul and a Turkish Pasha who accused Boliac of stealing some diamonds entrusted to him by a Hungarian during the 1848 revolution. When the question arose in the Assembly, Rosetti took the floor and proclaimed that the Assembly could not, "... put to the vote the exclusion of a deputy who is accused of wrongdoing by a government hostile to our autonomy and nationality." Another member of the cabinet then rushed to the podium and stated

61 Ibid., p. 530.
62 For the background of this affair, see Ghica, Amintiri, III, pp. 11-24.
63 A. D. Xenopol, Istoria Românilor din Dacia Traiana ("The History of the Romanians from the Time of Trajan's Dacia") (Bucharest: Cartea Românească, 1926), XIII, p. 78.
that Rosetti had spoken "as a deputy and not as a Minister." The effect of this disclaimer was immediately spoiled by Brătianu, who proceeded to repeat Rosetti's charge and add similar criticism of the Turks as well. Cuza demanded and received the cabinet's resignation on the same day.

During his term of office Brătianu's one positive achievement was the elaboration of a legislative proposal entitled, Acts relative to the Organization of Public Credit in the United Principalities and the Establishment of a Bank of Issue and Discount. The scope of this work does not permit a detailed analysis of this interesting document, but certain key points will be mentioned. First, the elaborate nature of the project (which was similar only in part to the project of 1859) reveals that Brătianu had a keen understanding of the organization of banks and their role in the economy. He understood the process by which banks create money, and he fixed the reserve ratio at a conservative but workable twenty percent (with respect to currency issue).

64 Ibid., p. 79.
65 Ibid.
Secondly, Brătianu realized that a bank of issue cannot function effectively without general confidence, and he specified a complicated system of controls to keep the bank free from scandal. Finally, Brătianu was in economics, as in all other things, an economic nationalist. Most Romanians believed that the availability of credit could not be improved without a massive foreign loan and the entrance of foreign capital. Brătianu repeatedly stressed that large amounts of capital were not necessary for banks of issue and discount; a well-regulated financial system which inspired general public confidence could make a little capital go a long way.

The improvement of the availability of credit and of our general financial status cannot be done except by a national bank; without a bank, even if billions were to be available, they would be useless.67

Brătianu was not opposed to foreign capital, in fact he welcomed it. Nevertheless, he insisted that Romania was a rich country with tremendous resources, and that she ought to be careful to distinguish between foreign help and foreign domination. When certain deputies proposed that the Regulament Organic be interpreted so as to permit groups of foreign colonists (Germans) to purchase land in Wallachia,68 Brătianu was the most energetic opponent of the idea.

67Monitorul, 1861, p. 2.

68The Regulament was still in force where not superseded by the Convention. Normally, foreigners could not own land in either Principality.
The proponents of the plan favored it because the colonists were pledged to bring in large sums of money. Brătianu said that this capital would probably not get into the hands of Romanians, and if it did it would be useless unless there were well-organized credit institutions. Overall, he also opposed any increase in the number of foreigners participating in the Romanian economy.

Their brief and unhappy tenure as cabinet ministers drove the radical-liberals into an even more determined opposition which now included direct attacks on Cuza. N. Golescu stated that the cause of the resignation of his cabinet had resulted from, "... an imperfect understanding between the Prince and the ministers with respect to the extent of ministerial responsibilities." This was certainly not true insofar as the immediate cause was concerned, but there is little doubt that that had been a problem and would soon have become a definitive conflict. Cuza was increasingly showing a tendency toward personal government.

In December of 1860 Brătianu accused Cuza of having ordered the government to act against the opposition press. This was the last straw for the radical-liberals and the attack began in earnest: in a speech to the Assembly Brătianu said that the Prince had violated the constitution:

69 Ion Brătianu, *Din screrite*, p. 247.
Sirs, we have always asked the ministers, that insofar as the Prince is concerned, at the very least to respect this constitutional regime by not injecting the person of the Prince into our discussions. But now a minister dares to say to me, 'Didn't the Prince say so at the Palace?' I would greatly prefer, gentlemen, that not a single for­eigner should be here to see how we understand the idea of a constitutional regime, that which Europe considered us prepared for . . . Whatever might be the words of the Prince at the palace, they do not in the least concern the administration of the land; that which the Prince says in an official message, countersigned by the ministers—only that has meaning for the govern­ment; for in a constitutional regime the ministers govern, and they govern because they are responsible.72

In October of 1860 a group of small shopkeepers at Craiova, a city west of Bucharest, rioted in protest of government licensing laws. After the police arrested some of the demonstrators, a larger mob began a siege of the local jail. Troops were called in, and in the ensuing battle eight of the mob were killed and fourteen wounded. A few days later there were disorders at Pitești, a city north of the capital. The radical-liberals defended the demonstrators in the assembly and maintained that their protest was the result of bad government, i.e., failure to act to resolve the commercial crisis.73 Brătianu asserted the right of the assembly to carry out an investigation, but the government blocked this.74

72Monitorul, 1860, p. 1397.
73Ibid., 1862, pp. 2, 61.
74Ibid., p. 3.
of the cabinet, Epureanu, openly accused Brătianu of encouraging revolutionaries, but there was no attempt to prosecute.75

At the same time as the debate over the Craiova affair the liberals began to press on the issue of electoral reform. The issue was highlighted for them by the fact that on 12/24 January C. A. Rosetti announced to the Assembly that in view of a decline in his financial position, his capital had fallen to the point where he was no longer eligible to serve and must resign.76 After Rosetti's statement Brătianu delivered a speech in which he stated that the electoral base would have to be altered if there was to be any hope of maintaining a constitutional regime:

... that [electoral law] of today is not favorable to any class for it is arbitrary, and it is not in the interest of any party that the government should be able to create a chamber after its own wishes, and, by extension, laws after its own pleasure--this can only be detrimental to all the classes.77

While the liberals stepped up their attack on Cuza the conservatives, who had long been relatively passive despite their majority, now began to assert themselves. They found an eloquent and brilliant leader in Barbu Catargiu who was the first to overcome petty differences and create a real conservative organization. The combination of criticism from the left and right was too much for

75 Ibid., p. 2. Deputies had parliamentary immunity, but this could be suspended with the consent of the Assembly.
76 Ibid., p. 1.
77 Ibid., p. 2.
Cuza who ordered a second dissolution of the Assembly on January 19/31, 1861.

In the elections of April Ion Brătianu did not run in his home district of Argeș, but presented himself in Bucharest instead. He was elected, along with C. A. Rosetti and N. Golescu; Dumitru Brătianu won in Argeș. The overall victory went to the conservatives, however, who quickly ousted the Epureanu cabinet on a vote of no confidence. Cuza responded by naming the first all conservative cabinet, which took office on the 13/25 April. The President of the Cabinet, Barbu Catargiu, was soon deeply enmeshed in conflict with the Prince, and the conservative government was even more ephemeral than the Liberal government of 1860.

Catargiu wanted to be the real head of government. He insisted that the Prince should bow to the Assembly in all matters— even stating that Cuza's right to appoint certain officials (e.g., members of the Central Commission and the Court of Cassation) was subject to his approval. Catargiu also wanted to take advantage of conservative supremacy to pass legislation on the electoral and agrarian question. Cuza would not agree on appointments and he

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78 Ibid., No. 76, 5/17 April, 1861. Dumitru did not take Ion's seat, however, for he ran as a small proprietor and Ion as a large proprietor. Ion later claimed that the government had interfered with the elections at Argeș, ibid., no. 95 1/13 March, 1861.

79 Technically, Cuza was not obliged to respect this and he could have refused the resignations of the ministry, as the latter were under his control, not the Assembly's.
would not allow the legislative proposals to be discussed. Catargiu, completely frustrated in his plans, then finally resigned on 10/22 May.

After the conservative debacle, Cuza appointed another moderate government and when that fell in June, replaced it with a nonpartisan group and then another conservative cabinet. While these changes were taking place, Cuza was preparing to petition the Powers to allow complete union. The Prince went to Constantinople with a large delegation, and in December the Powers agreed to union. Cuza officially announced the fact to the nation on 11/23 December, 1861.
CHAPTER VI

THE OVERTHROW OF CUZA

The declaration of union meant that the separate governments of Moldavia and Wallachia were finally abolished and replaced by a single assembly and administration, both located in the new capital of Bucharest. The political effect of the change was to create a crisis. The old system was so complex that a great deal of time had been wasted on irrelevancies. In the new situation, however, all recognized that the really serious problems of state would have to be faced directly. Political power relationships in Romania were now of critical importance.

In January of 1862 a peasant leader, Mircea Mălăeru (a former member of the Assembly of 1857 and one of the chiefs of the peasant movement at the time of Cuza's election at Bucharest in 1858) appeared at the head of a huge mass of peasants. The apparent object of this effort was to duplicate the achievement of 1859, and force the conservatives to accept a radical-liberal ministry. When it became known that some 10,000 peasants were within two miles of Bucharest, the government used force to stop them. The masses were dispersed (not without violence) and large numbers were arrested.

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Cuza was not intimidated by outside pressure and he again bowed to the conservative majority and asked Barbu Catargiu to form a government. The key to Catargiu's program was the passage of a rural law, drawn up by the now defunct Central Commission, which would release the peasants from all feudal obligations, but without land. The liberals, especially the Moldavian branch led by Mihail Kogălniceanu, mounted a bitter resistance to the project, but as they were in a clear minority their protests were relatively unimportant.

The Wallachian radical-liberals, though strongly opposed to the conservative rural law, preferred to avoid the subject altogether. Brătianu concentrated his parliamentary attacks on the government on the subject of the prisoners taken at the time of the January rebellion. He noted (on February 20/4 March) that many peasants were still being held without charge, and that illegal searches of residences were being made on a large scale. Brătianu then demanded to know if the government investigation had uncovered any political basis for the uprising. This was a veiled reference to the fact that public opinion considered Brătianu and Rosetti to be the real leaders. Finally, on 31 March/12 April, Brătianu and Rosetti resigned in protest of the treatment of the peasant prisoners.

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2 The reasons for this approach will be discussed later.

3 Monitorul, 20 February, 1862, no. 47, p. 4.

4 Ibid., 3 March, 1862, no. 92, p. 7. They were returned as the result of special elections. Ibid., 16 November, no. 5, pp. 2-3.
Shortly after the resignation of Brătianu and Rosetti the debate over the rural law became intense. Vasile Alecsandri, a friend of Kogălniceanu and an enemy of Brătianu, said that the latter's resignation left the opponents of the legislation in a bad situation, but felt that Kogălniceanu was a far better orator than Brătianu. More than oratory was needed, however, for the conservatives were determined to make their project into law.

The final stages of debate on the rural law coincided with the fourteenth anniversary of the beginning of the revolution of 1848 in Wallachia, 11/23 June. To celebrate this occasion the radical-liberals planned a large demonstration at the historic "Field of Liberty" which was quite close to the building where the Assembly met. The explosive potential of this meeting frightened the conservative leadership which got the Assembly to vote to suppress the celebration of 8/20 June. As Barbu Catargiu left the Assembly that evening in the company of the Prefect of Police, a single assassin stepped forward and shot him dead.

The murder of Barbu Catargiu had a strong impact on Romanian history. The conservatives were unable to replace him for over a decade, and the right quickly reverted to its earlier state of chronic disorganization. Equally important was the fact that the killer was never caught. Suspicion, public and private, suspicion,
served not only to enhance the separation of the right from the left but also provoked considerable distrust amongst the liberals.

Popular suspicion was overwhelmingly concentrated on the radical-liberal leaders, Brătianu and Rosetti. This was partly because their party benefitted from the disorganization of the conservatives, and partly because both, but especially Brătianu, were considered to be violent men. Thus it was not a surprise when the two became the chief targets of the police investigation. The outcome of this investigation was inconclusive, however, and in fact only served to deepen the still unresolved mystery.

The Prosecutor of the Criminal Court, Iancu Degliu, acted immediately to seize the correspondence of the Brătianu brothers and C. A. Rosetti, and they were requested to appear before the Prosecutor on 12/24 June. On the previous day 11/23 June, however, Rosetti's Românul published a violent attack on Degliu who was then replaced by I. Găinescu at the orders of the government; Brătianu and Rosetti were not called to testify and the investigation was no longer actively pursued. Anghel Demetrescu, a friend of Catargiu's and an enemy of Brătianu and Rosetti, notes that:

It was said that Rosetti had threatened the Prince through one of his followers, that if he were not left in peace, he would denounce before the country and

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Europe the true murderer of Catargiu, implying that the Prince was not a stranger to the crime.\(^7\)

This version is sharply disputed by Alexander Lapedatu, an historian who was one of the first to see the documents of the case (they were not made available until after World War I). Lapedatu notes that the Prefect of Police, N. Bibescu, had impeded the separate investigation conducted by Degliu's office, and that relations between the two were, "strained and even hostile."\(^8\)

Degliu's removal, according to Lapedatu, was provoked by his attempt to question Bibescu, not by his actions with respect to Brătianu and Rosetti.\(^9\) Lapedatu, in his last article on the subject written in 1939, flatly denies that there was any reason to suspect Brătianu, Rosetti, or their associates of involvement in the affair, and in fact strongly implies that Cuza or someone close to him was the real author.\(^10\)

Lapedatu's argument is based on two points. First, he points out that the motive for the killing was probably the desire...
to destroy the conservative leadership and thus divert the drive for
a rural law which did not provide for land distribution. The
radical-liberals were as opposed to the project as was Cuza, but the
Prince and not Brătianu and Rosetti would have to cope with the
crisis resulting from passage. The conservatives without Catargiu
would be less competent in challenging a princely veto than if their
leader were alive (this proved to be the case). The second point
involved the question of a certain Hungarian adventurer, George
Bogathy, who was widely suspected of being the actual assassin. The
investigation of Bogathy was dropped at the same time that Deșliu
was removed, and the suspect held a government post in Moldavia
until 1866 (the date of Cuza's overthrow) when he moved to
Transylvania.11

Lapedatu's article contains a rebuttal by Nicolae Iorga,
who held to the exact opposite point of view—rejecting any
involvement on the part of Cuza, but strongly implicating the
Wallachian radical-liberals. Iorga pointed out that Cuza had the
right to dismiss the government and veto any law he wished; the great
historian and not the rural law was the passionate issue of the
moment; the Wallachian left had a history of violence, and these
men, who had close ties to the French revolutionary left, were no
doubt influenced by the fact that the revolution of 1848 in France

11Ibid., p. 29.
came as the result of the suppression of a banquet. Iorga also noted that Bogathy had had certain contacts with known Mazzini-ites.\textsuperscript{12}

Lapedatu's arguments are the stronger of the two—Iorga does not acknowledge the fact that Cuza was facing a serious conflict with the conservatives, the connection of the Wallachian left with violence and assassination is tenuous at best, and Bogathy had contacts with all sorts of people, including Cuza's Prefect of Police, Bibescu.\textsuperscript{13} The fact is that there was no solid evidence against anyone. Several historians, including A. D. Xenopol, have cited the following exchange between Brătianu and Kogălniceanu (in the National Assembly, 11/23 February, 1866) as implicating the former:

Ion Brătianu: Barbu Catargiu was not killed by a Romanian, Mr. Kogălniceanu must know that.

Mihail Kogălniceanu: I don't know.

Ion Brătianu: A person is still living who could tell you about it.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., pp. 102-103.

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., p. 29. With respect to the debate between Lapedatu and Iorga, it should be noted that both of these men were prominent politicians as well as historians. Lapedatu was a leader of the National Liberal Party and a close friend of the Brătianu family; Iorga was an outspoken critic of both.

\textsuperscript{14}Demetrescu, "Prefața" in Catargiu, Discursuri, p. 43. A. D. Xenopol, Istoria Românilor XIII, p. 142.
This statement by Brătianu, far from serving as evidence of some guilty secret, merely suggests that Brătianu was one of those who believed that the Hungarian, Bogathy, was the killer.

The most logical explanation is that Cuza suspected that someone close to him had organized the affair, an hypothesis which would explain the Prince's decision to terminate the investigation. It is most unlikely that Brătianu or Rosetti ever possessed any incriminating evidence or they would have used it— but they probably shared the same suspicions. If the origins of the plot (assuming there was one) were not in Cuza's entourage, it is difficult to explain how the authors were able to avoid suspicion or apprehension. The truth of the matter will probably never be known, but there is no question that the death of Catargiu, by depriving the conservatives of strong leadership, had an important effect on political developments during the reign of Cuza.

Immediately after the murder of Barbu Catargiu the assembly passed the conservative rural law by a vote of 62 to 35 (11/23 June). As expected, however, Cuza refused to sanction the law. The conservative government then resigned in protest and was replaced by a moderate government led by Nicolae Kretzulescu which remained in power until October of 1863; the assembly, its regular session over, remained in recess until November of 1862. During this period Ion Brătianu, who had married in 1859, retired to the family estate and did not take an active part in politics until the assembly reconvened.
The government of Nicolae Kretzulescu was in reality a personal government of Cuza since it could not command a majority in the assembly—in fact it did not seriously attempt to do so. This change in the structure of government inevitably produced a reaction in which the entire political spectrum of Cuza’s opponents united in opposition. A special early session of the assembly was called in November of 1862 to consider the budget, but failed in its purpose when the deputies demanded an itemized budget. When the regular session began in December the question of the budget quickly produced a conflict between the assembly and the government. The cause of the disagreement was the problem of the so-called "dedicated monasteries."

Dedicated monasteries differed from ordinary monasteries in that surplus income (profit) from the land was dedicated to holy places outside the Principalities. The establishments were under the control of foreign churchmen (usually Greeks) who paid little or no attention to local needs and interests, with the result that a significant proportion of the best land in Romania constituted a debit rather than a credit to the national economy. This situation had developed during the period of Phanariot rule and was permitted to continue because the Orthodox Church had sufficient influence on the Russian government to cause it to oppose interference with the operations of the dedicated monasteries.

The Romanian Assembly at the time insisted that the budget include the revenues of these monasteries, but the government, which
all the benefits secured after so many centuries of struggle and sacrifice.16

As evidence of the unconstitutional outlook of the Prince, the authors noted that there had been five dissolutions and sixteen ministries in four years.17

The project then went on to defend the Assembly against the Prince's charge that it had a "reactionary spirit." The authors cited its progressive achievements, from Cuza's election to the passage of the government's various budgetary proposals. They noted that progress had occurred despite the restrictive electoral law, they urged electoral reform, but chastized Cuza for having discussed it at Constantinople, for this they considered to be a violation of Romania's autonomy.18 With reference to unconstitutionality, the authors also mentioned the rural law of 1862 which, "... passed by the Assembly but unsanctioned rests in the hands of the government of Your Majesty as a sword of Damocles hanging over the head of the nation."19

16Ibid., p. 272.

17It should be remembered, however, that for three of those years (1859-1862) there were two governments and two assemblies.

18Constantinople implies more than negotiations with the Turks, for the Powers' representatives to the Porte were in fact ambassadors to Romania as well; the representatives in Bucharest were only consuls.

19Ibid., p. 273.
was engaged in delicate (and ultimately successful) negotiations with the Powers on the subject of sequestration, refused. The Assembly was adamant, however, for many considered that the real question was one of national sovereignty. While the debate raged, the budget remained unvoted upon, and before long a new and even more serious dispute overshadowed the question of the dedicated monasteries.

Cuza delivered his annual address to the Assembly at the time of the special session in November, but the deputies were too involved with budgetary matters to consider a response until January. The committee charged with drawing up the response ultimately produced a document which was essentially uncritical of the Prince. This approach encountered determined opposition from a minority report or project which was sharply critical of Cuza.

The wording of the minority project was polite, but it nevertheless constituted a direct attack on the Prince. The authors began by applauding the fact of union, with thanks to the Powers and especially to Napoleon III, but then said that in the year since achieving union, Romania had:

... not only not made a single step forward, but there appeared now a government which was trying to destroy the basis of constitutional government, to damage the fact of representative government and thus to place in jeopardy

15The text, including the names of the proponents, is published in Ion Brătianu, Din scri erile, pp. 270-274.
The minority project had the backing of all the radical-liberals, but its significance lay in the fact that many moderate liberals, including two very important former associates of Cuza, A. Panu and Ion Ghica, were among its most active supporters. After some parliamentary maneuvering discussion of the two versions of the response to the throne began on 22 January/3 February. M. Kogălniceanu was the chief spokesman for the group which opposed any criticism of the Prince, but his great oratorical skill was not sufficient to carry the day. During the month-long debate a large number of conservative deputies were won over to the minority project. Finally, when the issue came to a vote on 18 February/2 March, the minority project was adopted by a vote of 52 to 5, with 50 abstentions. The grouping of liberals and conservatives which effected this fundamental attack on Cuza came to be known as the "monstrous coalition."

At the time of Cuza's election in 1859 such a coalition would have been unthinkable, and no one would have thought it possible in the future. In 1863 the two camps were still sharply divided on most issues, but both took such issue with the Prince that differences were put aside in order to unite against the throne. The key question was the role of Cuza as a constitutional monarch; the leading proponent of the idea that the Prince must reign, but not govern was Ion Brătianu.
Brătianu's turn to speak came on 11/23 February, and he responded with the longest speech of his career to that date. The first part of his talk made it clear that there was only one issue, "There are two camps: some want a constitutional government while others favor a personal government, that is to say the existing government." Brătianu vehemently attacked Kogălniceanu's contention that the Prince was not susceptible to criticism by the assembly:

Either the head of state is a fiction or he is a person. If he is a fiction, as Mr. Kogălniceanu says, then he is sacred. But if he is a person, he cannot be sacred; a man is not sacred. If he is a sacred person, raised above all values as has been claimed here in the Assembly, then, Sirs, such a person does not administer; because those who are a fiction, who have sanctity and inviolability ... that is to say who are no longer persons, cannot govern ... as a result, the Prince does not govern, his ministers do.

Brătianu went on to emphasize that he had often quarrelled with the representatives of the right, but that this group was changing and it too could now understand the dangers of the situation:

Certainly it is in the nature of things that the party of the past should have fought for the system which gave it first place in the power structure. When, however, it begins to realize that it can no longer have this monopoly; when it sees that it can only have despotism and arbitrariness for a man or a few men, not
for an entire class, then it will say that it is better to have liberty for all the world than slavery for all, then grovelling in the mud together in front of a tyrant.\(^{23}\)

The task of uniting the right and the left was greatly facilitated by the fact that it was Cuza's supporters and not Brătianu and the radical-liberals who were pushing for a major rural reform. As will be discussed later, Brătianu had settled on a gradualist approach to this central issue; he would never have supported the conservative law refused by Cuza in 1862 as a solution, but he merely stated that, though far from perfect, the law was a step, and that in any case the Prince had no right to make a final decision.

Brătianu also brought up the highly explosive issue of a foreign prince. He explained that he had originally opposed the idea, but that he had changed his mind in view of the fact "one part of Romania was in the hands of Russia, and another in those of Austria."\(^{24}\) The new state needed a foreign dynasty in order to give it sufficient prestige to ward off its enemies. Brătianu did not directly call for the overthrow of Cuza and the selection of a foreign prince, but the implication was clearly made by the fact that he emphasized the continuing danger to the country.

\(^{23}\textit{Ibid.}, \text{pp. 284}-285.\)

\(^{24}\textit{Ibid.}, \text{p. 297}.$
The passage of the minority project was a direct challenge to Cuza, but the Prince was unafraid, and he struck back vigorously. When the deputation from the Assembly came to read its address to him, Cuza dismissed it, giving the not unreasonable explanation that he already knew the contents. The Assembly considered this an insult, but there was little it could do other than to refuse to vote the budget. The regular session ended on 2/14 March and the deputies were forced to leave, as Cuza made no move to call a special session. The government did not resign.

March, 1863 really began Cuza's personal rule, but whether or not it was truly unconstitutional is unclear. The Prince was not by the constitution required to keep the Assembly in session, nor was it necessary to have a current budget—Article 22 of the Convention of 1858 clearly stated that the previous budget could be used in default of a new one. The radical-liberals tried to encourage non-payment of taxes, but failed dismally.\( ^{25} \) The Convention, despite the claims of the Assembly, was very vague on the question of ministerial responsibility. Technically, Cuza may have had the right to ignore the Assembly in the selection of the government, but in so doing he was certainly violating the spirit if not the letter of the Convention.

\( ^{25} \) Rosetti refused to pay, and as a result his business was temporarily seized and some of his furniture sold. \textit{Românil}, May 15, 1863.
After March of 1863 there was a long period of reduced political activity—the Kretzulescu government continued until October, the Assembly did not reconvene until November. The general level of tension within the country was not reduced, however. Cuza's opponents continued to talk of a foreign prince, and the government forcibly prevented the circulation of a petition to this end. The Prince, on the other hand, began to consider alternatives which would strengthen his political position within the state. On 25 March/6 April, the Românul published a report from a French newspaper stating that Cuza had been talking to the Powers about assuming extraordinary powers. The outbreak of the Polish revolt added fuel to the fires. Cuza, though sympathetic to the Poles, prevented a band of Polish insurgents from crossing Romanian territory.

This incident, combined with others in which the Prince was constrained to protect Romanian neutrality, gave the opposition press the opportunity to make the rather absurd charge that Cuza was pro-Russian.

That the coalition of left and right was still in existence was evidenced by the fact that Cuza withdrew an offer to the conservative I. C. Cantacuzino to form a government after the latter


27. The Poles were disarmed after a brief battle, then allowed to continue.
insisted that Ion Brătianu be a member of the cabinet. Shortly thereafter, Cuza drew up a plan for a coup d'état and a new constitution (closely patterned after that of Louis Napoleon) and submitted it to the ambassadors at Constantinople. This too became known to the opposition, and it responded by sending several representatives to the West to stir up public sentiment against the Prince. Particularly important in this respect was the mission of A. Panu, which began in August.

Finally, in October, Cuza resolved to make a last effort at reconciliation; he dismissed the Kretzulescu government and called M. Kogălniceanu to form a cabinet. This arrangement required certain commitment from both sides. Kogălniceanu demanded that the Assembly be reconvened and that the government should be responsible to it. Cuza accepted on the provision that positive and progressive action be taken on the two key issues of rural and electoral reform. Despite the fact that Cuza was still discussing a new constitution with the Powars (again made public by a French newspaper) the government of Kogălniceanu got off to a good start. There were two reasons for this. First, the government took quick and decisive action to effect the long-awaited secularization of the dedicated monasteries. This was well received by Romanians of all political

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28 Cuza said that he personally did not care, but that Brătianu's hostility to Louis Napoleon would produce repercussions. This was a transparently false excuse, since Brătianu hardly ever mentioned France without praising her Emperor. Cuza to Negri, 7/19 June, 1863. BAR, MSS, 4863, f. 178-180.
views and greatly enhanced Kogălniceanu's prestige. Secondly, the "monstrous coalition" began to show signs of imminent collapse.

The occasion for this latter development was the debate on an Army reorganization Law. The opposition, led by Brătianu and the radical-liberals proposed an amendment that would create a large, broadly based national guard. The government quite naturally opposed this attempt to establish an independent armed force which could quite easily be turned against it. The idea was also anathema to many conservatives, who realized that a national guard, composed of townsmen and peasants, might well be turned against them after it had dispensed with the government. The amendment passed the Assembly, though with a very slight majority, and the Prince refused to sign the resulting legislation.

The general level of tension between the right and left was increased by the fact that the latter was ideologically closest to the government with respect to rural and electoral reform. Although no concrete evidence is available, it is clear that the radical-liberals, in the first months of 1864, had reason to believe that a reconciliation with Cuza was possible. Kogălniceanu had stopped persecution of those involved in non-payment of taxes and was not taking advantage of the restrictive press law. These measures improved relations with the radical-liberals, but no act of reconciliations (i.e., inclusion of radical-liberal leaders in the cabinet) had been taken before debate on the rural law began in April. The
reason for the government's failure to offer a coalition is obvious: bringing some radical-liberals into the government would have increased the hostility of the conservatives without producing a majority in the Assembly. Nevertheless, the decision was unfortunate, as the radical-liberals, who had good reason to distrust the government (i.e., Cuza) were forced to remain in opposition and eventually driven back into cooperation with the conservatives.

As had already been noted, the position of Brătianu and Rosetti with respect to rural reform was rather ambiguous. They had faced the problem squarely in 1848 (though it must be admitted that they were more interested in other matters), and had discussed it in exile. Since 1857, however, they had avoided the question to the point of being rather conspicuous by their silence. In 1858 Brătianu opposed debate on the issue for fear it might prejudice the national question. In 1863, when the Assembly began debate on the conservative rural law, Brătianu and Rosetti were absent, having resigned their seats shortly before. In 1863, when the "monstrous coalition" was formed, Brătianu skirted the heart of the subject with considerable finesse. It was only in 1864 that the radical-liberals found themselves unable to avoid a confrontation.

Critics of Brătianu and Rosetti have offered a variety of ignoble reasons for their silence. Modern historians in particular have implied that since Brătianu and Rosetti were in fact landowning boiars (as were many of their most important allies--e.g., the
Golescus) they were really out to protect their own status; their claims to have at heart the interests of the peasantry were hypocritical. Another explanation originates with those defenders of Cuza who believe that Brătianu and Rosetti, drunk with ambition and hatred, suppressed the rural issue in order to facilitate an alliance with the conservatives.

The fact is that neither of these theories (other attacks are all variants on these themes) provide anything like a satisfactory explanation. In the *Catechismul* Brătianu and Rosetti had shown considerable contempt for the moral and economic foundations of the boiar class. Other speeches and writings reinforce this; certainly the conservative boiași considered them to be dangerous radicals. No doubt they would have objected to the expropriation of all boiar land (Brătianu at least, would have been impoverished by such a move) but such a program had never been suggested. The notion that their silence was intended to make possible an alliance with the conservatives seems reasonable, until one realizes that that silence had been evident for nearly five years before there was any thought of coalition—and during those five years Brătianu and Rosetti were constantly attacking the conservatives.

The explanation of Brătianu and Rosetti's attitude with respect to the rural issue is much simpler than their enemies thought. As Brătianu explained in his long speech of February 11/23 1863, the issue was so explosive that it might easily destroy the
achievement of the nationalist movement:

This question cannot now be discussed in complete calm, with the sang froid that it requires; thus we must wait until tempers have calmed, until the landowners see that the property system of today is not the most profitable for them, that there are better alternatives provided for them than those of the current laws. We should begin with other reforms, cleaning up the bureaucracy, providing commercial guarantees and institutions of credit, means for all to participate in commerce, so that it can be seen that all the evil is not in the property question but in other problems as well. The peasant has gotten it into his head that the cause of all his troubles is the landowner. If it blows stones or rains frogs the reason is that the landowners have property. Thus I said to the Head of State, when I was in the government; let us not touch the property question, we should first try to calm tempers, to enlighten both sides... let's create first the necessary institutions so that when we resolve the property question we do it in such a way that it will lead to the regeneration of Romania, instead of putting our national existence in peril, for a civil war is the greatest of calamities, and only this problem could cause one.29

This sentiment was repeated a year later when Ion Brătianu began the first series of articles the Românul had ever published on the subject.

A newspaper which is the organ of a party, and especially when that party is the party of progress, of reform, has the obligation to discuss any question which is at issue at any time, particularly when that question is of great significance. If the Românul has not done so, the reason is not that it does not recognize its obligations, nor that it lacked provocation from its political enemies, but rather because we believed that to agitate this question would be to add fuel to the political fires.30

29 Ion Brătianu, Din scriserile, pp. 285-286.
30 Ibid., p. 315.
As an explanation for Brătianu and Rosetti's reluctance to discuss the rural property question, the above statements make sense. They are consistent with the arguments used in 1858, and no one can deny that the radical-liberals did support the sort of reforms which Brătianu described as natural prerequisites to the successful application of a progressive rural law. The most important of these was electoral reform, as the character of the Assembly (Brătianu and Rosetti would not support action by the executive alone) would of course determine the type and extent of land redistribution. Electoral reform had, in fact, been the first priority of the radical-liberals since 1858.31

Whatever the reasons for their actions in the past, by the spring of 1864 it was clear to Brătianu and Rosetti that rural reform could not be postponed any longer. Not only was Cuza determined that there should be immediate action, but it was also obvious that peasant discontent (at least partially fanned by government agents) was reaching critical levels. The pressure was so great that even the conservatives realized it was hopeless to try to free

31 It was, however, somewhat played down in the February 1863 speech in order not to harm the coalition. Brătianu also asserted that one of the reasons for radical-liberal reticence was the fact that, in 1858 and 1862, Kogălniceanu had insisted that they (the radical-liberals) withdraw from political discussions (i.e., discussion of the rural question) in order not to compromise things as a result of their extremist reputation. Kogălniceanu may well have said it but men like Brătianu and Rosetti would have taken his advice only if they already agreed with it. Ibid., p. 343.
the peasants without land, and instead concentrated on saving for themselves as much property as possible, while getting the highest possible prices for the rest. When the government project (written by Kogălniceanu, a man who had given many years of thought to the problem) appeared on 16/28 March, the conservatives were shocked by the extent of redistribution proposed. They recovered quickly, however, and a parliamentary struggle of unparalleled animosity began.

The position of Brătianu and Rosetti vis-à-vis the government project was only mildly vacillating. Basically, they supported it; the Românul published the project in full, and followed with several days of favorable comment. The radical-liberals still distrusted the government, however, and since they had not yet received any offers of coalition from Kogălniceanu, they endeavored to maintain communications with the right. In Brătianu's series of articles in the Românul, "Chestiunea Clăcașilor" ("The Question of the Bonded Peasants") one can observe a shift in attitude. The first article, published in 11/23 April, was strongly favorable to the government point of view, and presented a rather original attack on the conservative boiar theory of land tenure. The last article (18/30) comprised little more than a series of criticisms of Kogălniceanu, and his project—none of them major, but all of them bitter.

Brătianu at first tried to be a mediator. He was elected to the committee of the Assembly charged with studying the government
proposal and on 3/15 April, the Românul published a letter from Brătianu in which the author stated that as yet the committee had not split into two camps, and there was reason for optimism. A few days later, however, the Românul began a series of sharp attacks on the conservative position, and it became obvious to all that no agreement had been reached. 32 When the study committee presented its report to the full Assembly on April 13/25, the majority favored a counter-project which amounted to a complete rejection of the government proposal; the land allotments and other aspects had been so drastically altered that the condition of the peasantry would have been worsened.

Ion Brătianu was now in a rather uncomfortable position. His attempts at reconciling the conservatives to something close to Kogălniceanu's project having failed, he had to find a way to save face. He could never accept the conservative project, and unqualified support of the government position would have amounted to meaningless surrender. 33 Brătianu thus decided to offer a counter project of his own, but his views were of little consequence to the angry, conservative-dominated Assembly and Brătianu had a very difficult time getting permission to read his project.

32 Brătianu even had a "violent clash" with his conservative elder brother, Teodor, over the rural law. Din corespondenta, I, p. 23.

33 Meaningless because nothing Brătianu could do would effect passage of Kogălniceanu's project in the Assembly.
In a brief opening statement Brătianu said that he had long expected agreement on a common project, and thus had had little time to elaborate a proposal of his own. In fact, his plan was, with certain modifications, little more than a copy of the government program. There were three key differences: land redemption bonds (for the former landowners) were to pay seven and half per cent over ten years as opposed to five per cent and twenty years in the government version; peasants were to receive no more land than that they were actually working (thus landless peasants—household servants, etc.—would get nothing); the right to secure firewood alone was substituted for the existing forestry laws. In the rather critical area of the amount of repayment, Brătianu avoided conflict by leaving the spaces blank—presumably to be filled in after negotiation. There were no negotiations, however. The conservatives were too angry to consider Brătianu’s attempts at compromise (nor did Kogălniceanu show any interest), and his counter-project was never even discussed.

The right was in fact so enraged that it ignored the rural law entirely and proposed a vote of no confidence. The conservatives were unhappy not only about the government’s failure to

34 The text of Ion Brătianu’s project is in D. C. Sturdza-Scheanu, ed., Acte și legiuri cu privire la chestia țăranescă (“Acts and Laws with Respect to the Peasant Question”) (Bucharest: Socec, 1907), series I, II, pp. 780–789; the text of Kogălniceanu’s project is on pp. 734–745, the conservative proposal, pp. 762–771.
compromise but also by the fact that intensive government propaganda efforts had so aroused the peasantry that passage of anything less than the Kogălniceanu bill might well lead to a revolt. In the debate over the vote of no confidence Brătianu opposed that action without supporting the government. There was a rather curious exchange in which Brătianu took offense at Kogălniceanu being called a revolutionary:

Though I have become very conservative, when there is talk of revolution I am like an old war horse . . . I think that in old age I will be far more revolutionary than Mr. Kogălniceanu will ever be.  

Once his revolutionary credentials were established, Brătianu launched a long attack on Kogălniceanu's government, criticizing virtually every action it had taken since its beginning in October of 1863. He made it clear that he did not consider the government to be free of Cuza's influence "... I am more afraid of despotism that comes under the mask of liberalism [an allusion to Kogălniceanu] than of despotism which is frank and open." Brătianu also attacked the government's rural law, but his criticism was qualified:

I am, gentlemen opposed to this project in its detail, and especially with respect to its applicability; despite all that I must say that it is a step forward, and no matter how impractical it is, it is still better than

\[35\text{Monitorul, April 13/25, 1864, p. 1640.}\]

\[36\text{Ibid., p. 1659.}\]
nothing, especially when one considers that the solution
of this problem, delayed for so long, has today become a
question of the utmost urgency.37

Thus, it was that Brătianu vehemently opposed the vote of no confi-
dence. The situation was bad, and he did not in fact have confi-
dence in the government; nevertheless, to destroy the government
would prevent action on the rural law and lead to chaos.

Kogălniceanu (who was presiding over the debates) pointedly
refrained from answering the bulk of Brătianu's charges, and merely
noted that Brătianu's counter-project was, "... no different,
aside from the question of compensation, than our project."38 The
radical-liberals voted against the no confidence motion, but to-
gether with the regular supporters of Cuza they could only muster 36
votes against 63. The result was the last constitutional crisis of
Cuza's reign. The Prince refused the government's resignation, and
on 15/27 April he ordered the Assembly prorogued until 2/14 May;
there was no mention of new elections. When the Assembly reconvened,
Kogălniceanu read a message from the Prince limiting action to the
passage of a new electoral law. When the deputies refused, the
Assembly was dissolved and the hall cleared with the aid of troops.

37Ibid., p. 1661.

38Ibid., p. 1663. Brătianu attempted to develop the dif-
fferences between the two in a series of articles published in the
Românul just before the coup d'état. Din scririile, pp. 347-357.
During the debate Brătianu called Kogălniceanu deceitful and noted that he could have had his support, but had refused it. Kogălniceanu replied that Brătianu had supported him, "... as the rope supports the hanged."39

On the same day, 2/14 May, Cuza announced a new, amended constitution which concentrated power in his hands, and governing by force of edict, promulgated the rural law and an electoral law which established universal manhood suffrage. These acts were reinforced by a plebiscite in late May (which, à la Napoleon, was won by the government 682, 621 to 1,307) and a trip to Constantinople where the Powers reluctantly accepted the fait accompli. Once assured of its position, the government followed the basic social revolution created by the rural and electoral laws with a whole series of far-reaching reforms. Free and compulsory primary education, the adoption of the Napoleonic Code, judicial independence and trial by jury, separation of church and state, the establishment of elective chambers of commerce—these were some of the more important reforms decreed by the government. In fact, Kogălniceanu was rapidly carrying out the program proposed by Brătianu and Rosetti in 1861.

The radical-liberal leaders were scarcely in a position to comment, for they had lost their public voice—the last issue of the

39Monitorul, April 13/25, 1864, p. 1672.
Românu appeared on July 9, 1864, one of the first victims of a stringent press censorship law. Rosetti published a string of successors, but none survived long enough to serve as an effective outlet for radical-liberal views. Brâtianu, whose prime impact had been as an orator, not a writer, was deprived of a forum by the constitutional change. Technically, he could have run for the new Assembly, but this body was at best a pseudo-chamber, lacking in any meaningful power, and Brâtianu did not attempt to secure a seat.0

Although it was widely anticipated, Cuza’s coup d’état had the effect of disorganizing and demoralizing the opposition for over a year; from May of 1864 until June of 1865 there was scarcely any political activity outside of the government. Even within the government, conflict was for a long time kept at surprisingly low levels. When disagreement came, however, it was significant. Nicolae Kretzulescu was a politician of exceptional ambition, and he gradually used his friendship with Cuza, as well as his influence over the "camarila" of political hangers-on surrounding the Prince, to undermine Kogălniceanu’s position. Cuza apparently also became

\(^{40}\)When the Assembly was finally convened in December, there were only seven members of the old Assembly present as deputies. The new Assembly shared its modest duties with a Senate, appointed by the Prince.

\(^{41}\)Olimpiu Boitös, Contribuții la istoria misiunii lui A. Panu în Apus ("Contribution to the History of the Mission of A. Panu to the West") (Cluj: Cartea Românească, 1935), pp. 20, 41.
jealous of the popular adulation which the head of government received, and the lack of confidence increased until 26 January/7 February 1865, when the Prince accepted Kogălniceanu's resignation.

The loss of Kogălniceanu was a fatal blow to Cuza's government. Whatever faults the President of the Cabinet may have had, his presence gave the government enormous prestige; once he was gone the administration was alienated from all of the important political leaders of the time. Coincident with Kogălniceanu's departure the euphoria produced by the initial series of reforms faded, and the government was faced with the difficult problem of putting its promises into effect. Meanwhile, the "monstrous coalition" was reconstituting itself. The passage of the rural and electoral laws removed the major obstacles to cooperation, and enabled the right and left to combine against a common enemy—Cuza's increasingly arbitrary personal government.

The "monstrous coalition" was officially reorganized in June of 1865, when a group of the most important leaders of left and right (Ion Brătianu, C. A. Rosetti, A. Panu, Ion Ghica, D. Ghica, C. Brătîoiu, and Gh. Stirbei) met and signed the following agreement:

We the undersigned, considering the situation of the country, political and geographic, and its foreign and domestic interests, and keeping in mind the votes of the nation in 1857 for the four points as well as the votes cast by the Divans ad-hoc of 1858 and the Assembly of Jassy on 5 January 1859—we have taken an oath that, in the case that the throne becomes vacant, we will support
by all means available to us the election of a foreign prince from a dynasty reigning in the West. Thus we swear on our honor to vote for a foreign prince, and to persist in our efforts until that end is achieved. 42

The only thing which prevented this statement from being treason was the phrase "in case the throne becomes vacant." Since the meeting and the substance of the agreement soon became known, it is not surprising that many felt the signers intended to create a vacancy. The government, more than ever immersed in the difficulties of applying the rural law, took no action, however, and it was at this strikingly inopportune moment that Cuza decided to leave the country and take a cure at Ems, in Germany. The folly of the Prince's decision was heightened by the fact that rumors were circulating to the effect that Cuza was trying to get Louis Napoleon's approval for the founding of a dynasty. Many felt that his real destination was Paris, not Ems. 43

Shortly after Cuza's departure, August 3/15, a riot broke out in Bucharest. Something of the sort had been generally expected, and no one was taken by surprise. Indeed, two days prior to the event a Bucharest newspaper, Sentinela Română, published an open letter from Ion Brătianu to the Prefect of Police in which the author discussed

42 D. A. Sturdza, Treizeci de ani de domnie al Regelui Carol I ("Thirty Years of the Reign of Carol I") (Bucharest: Institutul de Arte Grafice Carol Göbl, 1897), I, p. xiv.

43 Riker, The Making, p. 471. Cuza had no children of his own, but he had recently adopted the sons of his mistress, Maria Obrenovici.
the talk of a revolt. Brătianu said that a revolt would be wrong, since the country was not suffering from foreign domination or the control of an oppressing social class. Nevertheless, he warned that the Romanian people were "still very young in their political life" and might make a mistake. The tone of the letter does not sound like the sort of thing one planning a revolt would use, but Brătianu was among the first arrested.

The nature of the Bucharest revolt strongly indicates spontaneity. It began with a demonstration by street vendors against certain regulations on their activities which had been recently imposed. The protest spread in a highly disorganized fashion, and was easily contained by the police (although there were some casualties). That the opponents of Cuza had been discussing action there can be no doubt, as both the police and the foreign consuls were aware that a meeting had been held on the previous night. The Austrian consul, Eder, reported that the conservatives had urged action, but that the left, doubtful of its ability to raise the peasantry against Cuza, had resisted.

The fact of the meeting, Brătianu's letter to the newspaper, and the story that a section of the mob had gone to Rosetti's house

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44 Ion Brătianu, Din scriserile, pp. 399-402.
and urged Brătianu and Rosetti to join them caused the police to arrest the radical-liberal leaders. Their residences were searched, but no compromising evidence was found, nor could it be proven that the meeting had been treasonous or that any of those arrested had actually participated in the rioting. In a series of letters to his wife, Brătianu joked about his imprisonment and seemed quite certain that no evidence would be presented against him or his friends; he noted that he had only been interrogated once. Brătianu and the rest of the captives were released, after nearly a month in jail, when Cuza returned to the capital. Their release appeared to be the result of the Prince's benevolence, but in reality it stemmed from the fact that the government was unable to produce any evidence against the accused.

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48 Din corespondenta, I, p. 46.

The affair of 3/15 August was probably spontaneous, the result of the very high level of tension then prevalent in the capital. All available evidence about the discussions of the opposition indicate that it could not agree on the proper course of action; if it had, it seems likely that the revolt would have been better organized. On the other hand, the claims of the accused that the whole affair was a police plot aimed at framing them are equally unlikely, for the police did not have any evidence against them, manufactured or otherwise. The real effect of the August revolt was to push the monstrous coalition back together. In the fall of 1865 active planning for the overthrow of Cuza began.

The new secret committee included all the important men of the left and right. The conservatives were still leaderless, however, and the more energetic radical-liberals were clearly in control. \^C. A. Rosetti organized the plot domestically while Ion Brătianu (probably because of his many contacts in France, and especially his friendship with Louis Napoleon’s cousin Jérome) was sent to the West to propagandize against Cuza’s regime.

Brătianu, accompanied by two friends, arrived in Paris on 5/17 December after a short visit with the de Galhau family in Germany. \^Once in the French capital, Brătianu began an intensive campaign against Cuza, enlisting even his French friends (especially

\[^{50}\text{Domé, Histoire, pp. 148-149.}\]

\[^{51}\text{Din corespondentă, I, p. 57.}\]
Armand Lévy and Paul Bataillard) in the struggle. The most important result of his propagandistic efforts was a pamphlet entitled *Le Panslavisme. Le Prince Cuza. La Roumanie. La Russie.* which he wrote in late 1865 and published in January of 1866. This brochure comprised a violent, sometimes irrational attack on Cuza. The Prince was pictured as the man who had destroyed Romania's "regeneration" by crushing democracy and constitutional government (Brătianu was correct in labelling Cuza a dictator, but he was too biased to admit that the *coup d'État* had effected many important reforms which would otherwise have been impossible. The second part of *Le Panslavisme* was moreover, aimed at marshalling French Russophobia against the Romanian government. Cuza was certainly not a Russophile, and Brătianu's arguments to that effect were manifestly unjust—the Prince had done no more than maintain a tactful and diplomatic relationship with respect to his dangerous neighbor. Nevertheless, Brătianu's arguments met with official as well as popular sympathy. Cuza had arrived at the point where he was "... considered to be a Francophile by the Russians and a Russophile by the French, and was then abandoned by both." Thus, Brătianu was


received by the French Foreign Minister, and the French consul at Bucharest wrote that:

They say that Mr. Brătianu has written from Paris to the opposition that the French government supports, it is true, the Prince, but that if the country overthrows him it [the French government] will do nothing to restore him. The Austrian newspapers say that Mr. Brătianu was received with distinction by Your Excellency, and by His Highness the Prince Napoleon.51

Brătianu's task was not all that easy, but the attitude of the French government turned out to be very much as described.55

While Brătianu labored in Paris, Rosetti's plotting at home was meeting with success after success. Opposition to Cuza's government, now in the hands of N. Kretzulescu and the corrupt and incompetent "camarila," was growing rapidly. In January the Assembly rejected several government proposals, and even the appointive Senate developed a strong critical minority. More important, however, was the fact that a number of key army officers joined the plot. Early in the morning of 11/23 February Cuza was arrested by his palace guard, forced to sign a proclamation of abdication, and the next day


55 A rather frightening moment for the Romanians came when authoritative rumors were circulated to the effect that Napoleon had offered to allow Austria to annex Romania as compensation for Venetia. On 9/21 January Brătianu wrote to his wife that, "I have found our question in a very bad state, our best friends want to give us to Austria." Din corespondența, I, p. 67.
he was escorted out of the country. A provisional government, including both conservative and radical-liberal members, assumed power under a Locotenentă Domnească of three members. The new government then called the Assembly and Senate into a special joint session which proclaimed the Count of Flanders the new Prince of Romania.  

When Brătianu, still in Paris, received the news from Bucharest he immediately began to plan his return to Romania. He wrote to his wife, "Now that Cuza has fallen and the nation has once again taken complete possession of its sovereignty, my role has finished, and I will be able, without any worries, to return to you and remain with you." This statement is quite revealing, for it shows that at that time (the letter is dated 13/25 February) Brătianu believed that the Count of Flanders would accept. This is confirmed by a further letter, dated 16/28 February:

I don't know if Rosetti has written you that the government has asked me to remain here for an official mission which they plan to entrust to me. I think that it must be to take part in the deputation sent to

56 The Count of Flanders was the brother of King Leopold II of Belgium. The success of Belgium as an independent state impressed many Romanians, a fact which is illustrated by the decision of the Romanians to pattern their new constitution (1866) after that of Belgium.

57 *Din corespondența*, I, pp. 73-74.
the Count of Flanders, therefore a mission of short duration. 58

Brătianu's hopes of an early return were soon dashed, however, for his new mission was quite different from that which he anticipated. Although the Count of Flanders did not formally decline until 18/30 March, doubts about his acceptance were current long before that. The major difficulty was the fact that Flanders' family was closely related to the House of Orleans, which hardly shared the confidence of Louis Napoleon. Accordingly, Brătianu's new mission was to find another candidate; he was assisted in his efforts by the new government's representative to France, Ion Bălăceanu.

Brătianu had long had someone else in mind, and on 12/24 March he sent the name of Charles (Carol) of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen

58 Ibid., p. 75. Three years later, when the radical-liberals were again in violent opposition to the conservatives, Brătianu expressed a somewhat different version. He said that the radical-liberals had disagreed with the plot against Cuza because of its secrecy—the conservatives would not permit the participation of the masses. Brătianu said that he had favored popular participation so that the world would know that Cuza was without support. He also maintained that the naming of the Count of Flanders was a conservative trick to get one of their own number named instead, as it was generally known that the Belgian would refuse. Both of these statements are patently false. Rosetti was one of the plotters and probably the leader; the masses were not called because, as in August of 1865, they were not considered to be reliable. Although it is true that some of the conservatives hoped to get Louis Napoleon's permission to place a son of the former Prince Bibescu on the throne, Brătianu's letters clearly show that in late February he expected the Count of Flanders to accept. Ion Brătianu, Acte și Cuvântări, I-2, pp. 99-102.
to the government at Bucharest. Carol had been mentioned to Brătianu by some of his contacts in Paris, notably Madame Hortense Cornu who was an intimate friend of Napoleon III, and perhaps also by the De Galhau family. Brătianu first met Carol on the 18/30 March, and two days later sent the following telegram to Bucharest:

Carol of Hohenzollern accepts the crown without conditions; he has immediately been put in contact with Napoleon III.

59 Sturdza, Treizeci, I, pp. xv-xvi. Carol's family was a cadet branch of the line of King William I of Prussia.

60 On Carol's impressions of Brătianu see: Notes sur la vie du Roi Charles de Roumanie, par un témoin oculaire (Bucharest: Imprimerie de l'Indépendance Roumaine, 1894-1901), I, p. 6. German and Romanian language versions of this book are cited in the bibliography.

61 Sturdza, Treizeci, I, p. xvi. The story of Brătianu's selection of Carol has been the subject of considerable controversy. The key question is whether or not Brătianu was telling the truth when he told Carol that Napoleon supported his candidacy. The evidence is unclear, especially because one of the Emperor's advisors, Emile Ollivier, first said that Brătianu was correct, then denied it. The only author who supports Brătianu is Pamfil Georgian in his Întemeierea dinastei române ("The Establishment of the Romanian Dynasty") (Bucharest: Cartea Românească, 1940). Georgian, however, bases most of his argument on the alleged meeting between Brătianu and Napoleon in 1856, but his only source for this is George Fotino, who gives no evidence whatsoever. In fact, as discussed earlier (see above, p. 103), it is highly doubtful that any meeting ever took place, either in 1856 or in 1866. See: Marcel Emerit, Madame Cornu et Napoleon III (Paris: Les Presses Modernes, 1937); Paul Henry, L'abdication du Prince Cuza; P. P. Panaitescu, "Urcarea în scaun a principelui Carol de Hohenzollern" ("The Coming to the Throne of Prince Carol of Hohenzollern") Revista Fundațiilor Regale, VI (1939), no. 5, pp. 249-267.
Brătianu's statement was premature, for although Carol had expressed interest, he had also noted certain important reservations, notably need for the permission of the head of his family, William I. Nevertheless, Brătianu sent the telegram and then quickly returned to Bucharest (arriving on 30 March/11 April) where he helped organize a popular referendum for the acceptance of Carol as Prince and founder of a dynasty. The plebiscite began on 2/14 April and continued until the 8/20; the radical-liberals supported it with vigor, even publishing a brochure, Carol I, which described Carol as a liberal. The vote was highly favorable, but Brătianu showed his penchant for the fait accompli by sending the following telegram to Carol's father on 4/16 April (i.e., while the referendum was still in progress):

Five million Romanians acclaim as their sovereign the Prince Carol, son of Your Royal Highness. All the churches are open and the voice of the clergy is united with that of the people in blessing the elected and rendering him worthy of his ancestors and of the confidence which the entire nation has placed in him.

Brătianu then returned to Germany, arriving at Carol's residence in Dusseldorf on April 19/ May 1. The following day Carol accepted the throne despite opposition of the Powers, who had ordered the Romanians to elect a native Prince. Carol's father and

62 Notes sur la vie, p. 6.
64 Notes sur la vie, p. 6.
William I finally gave their permission (needless to say, Bismarck approved as well) and Carol left for Romania on April 29/11 May. The new Prince travelled incognito, for he had to cross Austrian territory, and the Austrians were hostile both to the election and to the Hohenzollern family. Brătianu travelled separately until he joined the same Danube steamer at Belgrade; the two did not speak until the steamer touched Romanian soil at Turnu-Severin. The captain of the ship, noting that Carol’s ticket was for Odessa, tried to dissuade him from debarking:

During this discussion, Ion Brătianu and Lieutenant Leng [a Romanian officer] approached and pushed the Prince, who alertly jumped onto the dock and left the boat behind him.65

This final push was highly symbolic, for it not only began a new era for Romania, but also said much about the future relationship between Carol and Brătianu. During the next quarter-century of Ion Brătianu’s political career, the Prince would often find it necessary to jump as the result of Brătianu’s push.

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The year 1866 marks the beginning of the most important phase of Ion Brătianu’s career; in the ensuing twenty-five years one can say without hesitation that he was Romania’s most important political leader. Prior to that time he was certainly important, but

65Ibid., p. 15.
can only be considered one of many significant figures. Nevertheless, his career during the year 1821-1866 constituted the period in which his political personality was defined.

The only truly consistent thread in Ion Brătianu's philosophy was his nationalism, and this one factor was dominant to the extent that it shaped his other views as well. Brătianu was always within the mainstream of the radical nationalism which sprang up in Europe during the middle of the nineteenth century. He was touched by the romanticism of the Collège de France and then of Mazzini and his circle, but would easily qualify as one of those nationalists who, to use R. R. Palmer's phrase, became "tough minded" after 1848. The acceptance of the principle of hereditary monarchy during the years of exile is adequate demonstration of this fact. In 1858-59 Brătianu showed none of his republican idealism of 1848.

Indeed, a transition from idealism to realism is the major direction of Brătianu's philosophy after 1856. The purpose of the change was always, however, an attempt to serve the national interest. Thus, the Paris-educated youth who was an ardent admirer of Proudhon and Louis Blanc abandoned his earlier tendencies toward socialism and became a liberal. If Romania were to survive she must regularize her commercial situation and build an industrial foundation. The most important class for the future was the bourgeoisie; the situation of the peasantry was to be ameliorated, but the hopes
of the country did not reside in agriculture, which was to become "a branch of industry." 66

Brătianu emphasized, however, that the industrial development of the nation should be kept in private, local hands. Private, because he believed that government-run businesses were not as efficient as similar independent operations. 67 Local, because Brătianu was keenly aware of the danger which foreign commercial development presented to a relatively unskilled emerging nation. Foreign capital was welcome, indeed, it was to be sought after, but every precaution should be taken to prevent control of the economy from falling into non-Romanian hands. Unlike the conservatives, who tended to equate material progress with Western assistance, Brătianu felt that Romania was capable of carrying out her own modernization.

During the reign of Cuza overt national issues were muted. Brătianu did not hesitate to criticize the Prince's foreign policy, but his views were different primarily in that they displayed the freedom of one who lacked the responsibilities of power. Brătianu was one of the most ardent of Romania's irredentists, and he never missed an opportunity to mention the plight of those Romanians who were living in the Austrian or Russian Empires. Nevertheless, the ideal of a greater Romania was one which was shared by virtually all of that state's political leaders. However, that issue alone could not carry Brătianu and his party to power.

66 Ion Brătianu, Acte și cuvîntârî, I-1, p. 185.
67 Monitorul, 1864, pp. 1450-1451.
Thus, the final fact of Brățianu's political growth comes to the fore. In 1864, during the debates on the rural law, Brățianu observed to the Assembly that, "Eu am început, cum vedeti, să mă albesc" (I have begun, as you see, to turn white). This change was referred to in a political sense, and, unlike earlier changes, was not so much inspired by nationalism as Brățianu's desire for political power. The young man who was a leader in 1848, in exile, and in 1858-59 was too dynamic and energetic to sit on the sidelines and watch others govern.

The responsibility for the lack of understanding between Cuza and the radical-liberals does not lie entirely with the latter. Cuza was from the very beginning in a political bind which would have taxed the genius of the greatest of statesmen—an appellation which he certainly did not deserve. The Prince wanted serious social and economic reform, something which he could not get in a country whose constitution placed the bulk of political power in the hands of men who were conservative if not reactionary. Cuza should be praised for trying to rectify this situation, but he must be faulted for failing to even try to secure the cooperation of the radical-liberals who shared similar goals.

As the years passed, Cuza, who was certainly not a personally ambitious man at the beginning, began to concentrate more and more power in his own hands. While he was doing this, Brățianu, whose

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68 Ibid., p. 1658.
hopes for personal political power depended on the goodwill of the Prince, became increasingly bitter and hostile. The radical-liberals still had hopes of joining Cuza in 1864 (they would have jettisoned the still embryonic "monstrous coalition" in a flash), but the call did not come. Instead, following the coup d'état, the Prince returned to his temporarily suspended policy of suppressing all criticism. Given Brătianu's frustrated ambition, as well as the very real violations of constitutional government which Cuza perpetrated, it is not surprising that, fearing a permanent dictatorship, Brătianu and his party chose to cooperate again with the conservatives and overthrow the Prince. Thus in 1866, Ion Brătianu, the republican revolutionary turned monarchist, the socialist turned liberal, the idealist turned realist, but still possessed of his unwavering nationalism, stood ready to begin a new and historic career.
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List of Symbols:

BAR Academy Library, Bucharest.
BCS Central State Library, Bucharest.
BN Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.
LO Ecole de Langues Orientales, Paris
I Bibliography and Historiography

BAR II 43237
II 70297 2nd ed.

BAR P. I 19875

Now in manuscript form at the Iorga Institute of History, this massive piece of research is scheduled for publication in 1971-1972, and is expected to fill at least five large volumes. Tentative plans called for publication at the Editura Academiei under the general editorship of A. Oşetea.

BAR P. I 33172
An uncritical listing, but still useful.

BAR II 539378
A highly selective introduction.

This is a well organized listing of all books and articles published in Romania from 1944 to 1969. All Romanian titles are translated into French.

Similar to the above, but not as well organized.

   Very Valuable.

    A chronological reference. Useful.

    Extras: BAR II 550801
    This is still the best historiographic-bibliographic survey, despite the fact that it does not include any postwar material.

    An alphabetical listing of all periodical publications during the period 1790-1918. Extensively annotated.

    Incomplete and outdated.

These volumes provide a highly valuable research tool, the first result of an extremely ambitious research project which has just gotten under way. All articles (even including letters to the editor) published during a given period are abstracted and listed under subject headings. Only a partial listing for the period 1851-1858 is currently available.


II 463525 - in French

A very brief survey.


Especially valuable with respect to works published by the Romanian emigres in France. Does not include articles from periodicals.


An excellent, although uncritical, introductory listing.


A valuable survey.


Important.


A partial listing of Professor Nicolae Iorga's enormous contribution to Romanian and world history.

BAR II 193662

There is a short, but interesting, section on history.
II General Histories of Romania

BAR II 232152
This is Iorga's great synthesis, and like much of his work, it is highly erratic. Many areas are treated brilliantly, while others, such as the reign of Cuza, are scarcely discussed. Volumes IX and X cover the period dealt with in this paper. The French edition is preferable to the Romanian, primarily because of more careful editing.

BAR II 167725
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BAR II 552950

BAR II 533459
Both of these works by Professor Giurescu are careful, well-written surveys.

Four volumes to date. 
BAR II 422264
This is a massive collective effort which brings together vast quantities of previously unused material. The authors emphasize economic and social history, areas which have been largely ignored in Romanian history up until now. Nevertheless, the balance is overshifted, and this work tends to be skimpy on political history. Volume III goes to 1848, volume IV ends at 1878. Both volumes have useful bibliographies at the end of each chapter.
   This is still the best history in English, but it is seriously outdated.

   Outdated and often in error, but still indispensable for any study of this period. Volumes XIII and XIV provide an excellent analysis of the reign of Cuza.
III-A Unpublished Documents

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BAR Biblioteca Academiei Române
BCS-BLS Biblioteca Centrală de Stat-
Biblioteca de Literatură Străină

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Paris Archives du Préfecture de Police
III-B The Period 1821-1866: Published Documents

   Essential for the study of 1848. The collection includes newspaper articles as well as government decrees, the debates of the Property Commission, etc.

   Publishes the correspondence of many Romanian exiles found primarily at the Bibliothèque Historique de la Ville de Paris. Contains some letters of I. C. Brătianu to Alfred Dumesnil as well as a great amount of material relating to the Rosetti family. Dr. Bucur was kind enough to let me use the manuscript of Volume II, which has not yet been published.

   Contains a very rich mass of the correspondence of the generation of '48, including most of what remains of the Rosetti-Brătianu correspondence.

   Useful as a supplement to Anul 1848.

   Volume I (on internal affairs, 1854-1857) and III (political correspondence, 1855-1859) are extremely important.

DCS V 1521

This is a major source for the study of Romanian history, but only volumes X, XVII, and XVIII are concerned with the period of this study.


Indispensable for the reign of Carol I, this source also includes some material on the selection of the new sovereign in 1866.


BCS III 1678

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III-C The Period 1821-1866: Secondary Works


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   This is an excellent study of the growth of the Romanian national movement. The emphasis at all times is on the links between the Romanians of Transylvania and the Banat with their compatriots in Moldavia and Wallachia. The English version (no. 56) includes a valuable bibliography, but lacks the series of documents published in the original.

54. "Momente din lupta revoluționară pentru unitatea națională a Românilor între 1835-1848." (*Moments in the Revolutionary Struggle for National Unity of the Romanians between 1835-1848.*) 
   BAR P. I 19875
   BCS P. I 148

55. "Le problème de l’unité nationale roumaine, 1835-1848." 
   BAR P. I 33172

56. The Romanians’ Struggle for Unification. 
   BAR II 550943
   See number 53, above.
BAR P. I 28922

BAR II 65699

BAR II 133143

BAR II 133705

BAR II 103531

BAR II 163332
One of the more important monographs for this period. An extensive annex reprints a large number of newspaper articles (mostly French) concerning the Romanians, 1848-1849.

BAR III 104050

64. Bonjuga Alibeichoi, N. I. Fărănicia partidului național-liberal față de împrișoare de la 1858-1918. ('The Hypocrisy of the National-Liberal Party with respect to Land Reform from 1858-1918.') Tulcea, 1922.
Not consulted.
BAR P. I II 10734

BAR II 108875
BCS III 2448

BAR II 157755
BCS III 4117
Publishes a great many valuable documents.

BAR P I II 20
An important article.

BAR II 113173
BCS III 2468


BAR II 189801
BCS II 16406

BAR P. I 11022
BAR II 176309
BCS III 15731

BAR II 90558
A thoughtful, perceptive study, especially valuable for the atmosphere of the Collège de France.

75. Michelet și Românii. "Michelet and the Romanians.")
Cluj, 1935.
BAR II 133808


BAR II 260049

BAR P. I 19160

This is one of the major works in Romanian history. The author does an excellent job of correlating a vast amount of information, and his analysis is always balanced and perceptive. The bibliography is somewhat outdated, as this edition is the first publication of a 1940 Harvard dissertation.

BAR P. I 19160
BAR I 66044
Part of a polemic between the author and Ion Brâtianu.

BAR P. I 4888

BAR II 36226

BAR I 54949
The best history of the revolution in all of the Romanian lands.

85. Cernătescu, P. I. Istoria contimpurăna de la anul 1815 pînă la înzilele noastre ("Contemporary History from the Year 1815 until Our Days.") Bucharest, 1871. 
BAR I 31797

BAR P. I 19875
BCS P. I 148

87. Ciachir, Nicolae. 100 de ani de la Unirea Principatelor. ("One Hundred Years since the Union of the Principalities.") Bucharest: Editura Militară, 1958. 
BAR II 385840
BCS III 24275

BAR P. I 28922

BAR II 10542
This is still the best narrative of the 1848 revolution in the Romanian lands.


BAR F. I 35834

BAR II 87712
BCS III 1180

BAR II 208848
BCS III 6065

BAR P. I 4189

BAR II 110554
BCS III 2456
Valuable.
BAR P. I 30338

BAR II 416034

BAR P. I 30338

BAR P. I 7364

BAR II 157015
BCS III 63334

BAR II 210873

BAR P. I 7364
BAR P. I 7364

BAR P. I 19936

BCS II 124187

107. Cristea, G. "Manifestări antidinastice în perioada venirii lui Carol I în România (Aprilie-Mai, 1866)," ("Antidynastic Demonstrations at the Time of the Arrival of Carol I in Romania April-May, 1866.") Studii, XX (1967), no. 6, pp. 1073-1091.
BAR P. I 19875.

BAR I 131159
An important source on 1848.

BAR I 386232
BCS II 47475

BAR I 60436

BAR I 176872
BCS I 10554
112. Damé, Frédéric. *Histoire de la Roumanie contemporaine.*
Paris: Félix Alcan, 1900.

BCS III 29733

An excellent general history. The Romanian translation (below) covers the period through 1866.


BAR II 117369

BCS III 36580


BN 80Lb35 3335


BAR II 147887


BAR II 124217

BCS II 101188


BAR II 131816

BCS III 66638


BAR II 134026

BCS III 66564

BAR P. I 7364


BAR I 2057

BAR II 142638 
One of the best works on the agrarian problem


BAR P. I. 15566

BN 80 Lb56 3420

BAR II 110671

BAR II 135882

BAR II 38968 
A Classic study.

BAR II 117400

BAR II 126409

BAR II 135882

BAR II 128314

137. Proprietatea solului în Principatele Române pînă la 1864. ("The Ownership of Land in the Romanian Principalities until 1864.") Bucharest: Institutul de Arte Grafice 'Bucovina,' 1935.
BAR II 129853

BAR P. I 19075

BAR P. I 1438
BAR P. I 28922

BAR P. I 4888

BCS P. I 10820 (II)

BAR II 92039

BCS II 10118


BAR P. I 7491

BAR P. I 33435

BAR I 440839
BAR II 539073

BAR I 206682

BCS I 54103


BAR I 192931

BAR II 416034

BAR P. I 19875

BAR II 550949
BCS II 106457

The best study of the reign of Cuza.
BAR II 416034


BAR II 464091

BAR II 121298

BAR II 2813


BAR II 105377
BAR II 42538

Publishes many important documents.

BAR II 473118

BAR II 193034
BAR I 166258

BAR P. I 33172


BAR P. I 4189

BAR II 182515

BAR P. I 8302


BAR II 108909

BAR P. I 2727
BAR I 230535

BAR I 61337

BAR II 113051

BAR P. I 4189

BAR II 7900

BAR I 232205

183. Partea lui Napoleon III în Unirea Principatelor. ("The Role of Napoleon III in the Union of the Principalities.") Bucharest: Editura 'Ilegei pentru Unitatea Culturală a Tuturor Românilor,' 1915. 
BAR II 41338


BAR P. I 4189

186. 100 de ani de la nașterea lui Cuza Vodă. ("One Hundred Years since the Birth of Prince Cuza.") Bucharest: Tipografia Cultura Neamului Românesc, 1920. 
BAR I 56401 
BCS I 14628
187. Unirea Românească. ("Romanian Union.") Bucharest: Editat de Societatea 'Tinerimea Română', 1934. BCS III 64525


Kossuth seems to have confused Ion and Dumitru Brătianu.
196. Kretzulescu, N. Amintiri istorice. ("Historical Memoirs.") Bucharest: Editura Ziarului 'Universul,' 1940. BCS II 9487
   An important source for the period before 1849.


198. ———. Austria și reforma agrară din 1864. ("Austria and the Agrarian Reform of 1864.") Bucharest: Imprimeria Națională, 1947. BAR II 205808

199. ———. Un aventurier Ungur în Principatele Române în epocă Unirii lor (Ch. Bogathy). ("A Hungarian Adventurer in the Romanian Principalities at the Epoch of Their Union [Ch. Bogathy].") Bucharest: Imprimeria Națională, 1939. BAR II 168216

200. ———. "In chestiunea disgrațiierii lui M. Kogălniceanu de către Cuza Vodă," ("The Question of the Disgrace of M. Kogălniceanu by Prince Cuza,") Arhiva Românească, IX (1944), no. 1, pp. 73-86. BAR P. I 1438

201. ———. Ion Cîmpineanu. Bucharest: Cartea Românească, 1936. BAR II 155090

202. ———. In Jurul asasinării lui Barbu Catargiu. ("At the Time of the Assassination of Barbu Catargiu.") Bucharest: Imprimeria Națională, 1933. BAR II 120977
BAR II 168233

204. Omul dela 2 Mai- Invinsul dela 11 Februarie. (''The Man of the 2nd of May - The Vanquished of the 11th of February.'') Bucharest: Imprimeria Națională, 1942.
BAR II 183854

BAR II 189168

206. 11 Februarie 1866 în perspectiva istorică a trei sferturi de vechi. (''11 February 1866 in the Historical Perspective of Three Quarters of a Century.'') Bucharest: Imprimeria Națională, 1941.
BAR II 179890

BAR II 113173
BCS III 2468

Ion Brătianu is supposed to have been the co-author of this pamphlet.
BAR II 350505
BAR II 416635


BAR P. I 11022

212. Lupuș, I. Istoria Unirii Românilor. ("The History of Romanian Union.") Bucharest: Fundația Culturală Regală 'Prințele Carol II,' 1937.
BAR II 8401


BCS III 12790

BAR P. I 28922

216. "Organizarea mișcării pentru Unire în anii 1855-1857 în Moldova și Țara Românească," ("The Organization of the Movement for Union in the Years 1855-1857 in Moldova and Wallachia.") Studii, XII (1959), no. 1, pp. 43-76. 
BAR P. I 19875
BAR P. I 33172

BAR II 68379
BCS II 40237

BAR II 104872
BCS III 2717

The author emphasizes the relations between Romanian and Italian revolutionaries.

BAR P. I II 10734

BAR II 113173
BCS III 2468

BAR II 464285

BCS II 55285

BAR II 101044
BP 28876

BP 20646


BAR II 62450


BCS II 98533

BAR II 395529

BAR P. I 27351

also: Memorii Regelui Carol I al României de un martor ocular Seventeen volumes. Bucharest: Editura Ziarului 'Universul,' 1912.
BAR II 81629
BAR II 38558
234. Onciul, Dimitrie. Alegerea Regelui Carol I al României. (''The Election of Carol I of Romania.'') Bucharest: Editura Ministerului Colțelor și Instrucționii Publice, 1906. BCS II 54256


237. 'Insemnarea istorică a Unirii.' (''The Historical Significance of Union.'') Studii, XII (1959), no. 1, pp. 21-41. BAR P. I 19875

238. Unirea Principatelor Române. (''The Union of the Romanian Principalities.'') Studii, XIX (1966), no. 1, pp. 5-16. BAR P. I 19875


240. Panaitescu, P. P. 'Cuza Vodă și unitatea națională a Românilor.' (''Prince Cuza and the National Unity of the Romanians.'') Arhiva pentru Știință și Reformă Socială, VIII (1929), no. 4. BAR P. I 4827

241. Emigrația polonă și revoluția română de la 1848. (''The Polish Emigration and the Romanian Revolution of 1848.'') Bucharest: Cartea Românească, 1929. BAR II 100236

242. Planurile lui Ion Căpîrineanu pentru unitatea națională a Românilor. (''The Plans of Ion Căpîrineanu for the National Union of the Romanians.'') Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Națională (Cluj), III (1924-1925), pp. 63-106. BCS P. I 3698


BAR II 206411
II 549159 2nd edition.
A provocative essay.

BAR I 13365
ECS I 8216

BAR I 464372
ECS II 94076

An excellent work. It is unfortunate that the authors completed only one volume (1866-1876).
BAR II 93916

Extras from Gindul Vremii, II (1934), no. 8.

BAR II 139058

BN 8° In° 53436

BAR II 50229
BCS III 28992

BAR II 113173
BCS III 2468

257. ______. Organizarea statului în timpul domniei lui Cuza Vodă. ("The Organization of the State at the Time of the Reign of Prince Cuza.") Bucharest: Cartea Românească, 1932.
BCS III 3986

BAR II 172507

BAR P. I 8302
BAR II 25022


BAR II 145969


265. *Făuritorii de seamă ai natării României*. ("Important Authors of Romanian Independence.") Bucharest: Monitorul Oficial și Imprimeriile Statului, 1940.
BCS III 10089

BAR II 9510
A fundamental work.

Interesting.

BAR II 104486

BAR II 466615
   BCS II 125162

   BCS III 4064

   BAR II 72707

   BAR II 188454

   BAR II 183976
   BCS III 5247

275. *Literatura economică Românească pînă la Unirea Principatelor. ("Romanian Economic Literature until the Union of the Principalities."") Bucharest: Tipografia Remus Cioflec, 1944.
   BAR II 193997

   BAR II 193898
   BCS III 10669

   BAR II 128693
   BAR P I 6916
   Extras from: *Mélanges de l'Ecole Roumaine en France. XI (1933).* There are a considerable number of errors in this work.
278. Șoimescu, Savva D. Politica domnului Rosetti-Brătianu și politica ce ar trebui să urmăm. ("The Politics of Mr. Rosetti-Brătianu and the Policy which We Ought to Follow.") Bucharest: Imprimeria Iwan Weiss, 1869.  
BAR I 105940  
BCS I 5101


BAR P. I 8302


BAR P. I 19875

BAR II 137908

BAR I 37967

BAR II 28410  

BAR II 27840  
BCS IV 1231  
287. Insemnătatea europeană a realizării definitive a dorințelor roșite de Divanurile Ad-hoc în 7/19 și 9/21 Octombrie, 1857 ("The European Significance of the Positive Realization of the Wishes Expressed by the Divans ad hoc on the 7/19 and 9/21 October, 1857.") Bucharest: Institutul de Arte Grafice Carol Göbl, 1912.
BAR II 28410

("A Page of Contemporary History, 1859-1866.")
Bucharest: Tipografia Voința Națională, 1897.
BAR I 47545
BCS I 2348

289. Zece Maiu. ("The Tenth of May.") Bucharest: Institutul de Arte Grafice Carol Göbl, 1900.
BAR II 106870


LO Pcr. 1283
An excellent article.

EN 8° G 13614

EN 8° Lb56 3471


BAR II 142794
BAR I 65556

BAR F. I 20468

BAR II 102340

BAR II 25287
BCS II 38006

BAR I 35941
BCS II 5221

301. Ulic, I. T. "Istoricul franc-masoneriei în România." ("The History of Franc-Masonry in Romania.") Paza III (1923), nos. 9-10, pp. 3-16.

BAR P. I 8302

BAR I 13476
BCS I 20822

BAR III 113329
BCS V 1544
BAR II 35475

BAR P. I 10185

307. Văcărescu, T. "Venirea în țara a regelui Carol." ('The Arrival in the Country of King Carol.') *Convorbiri Literare,* XLVII (1914), pp. 955-1032.
BAR P. I II 20

BAR I 63352

BAR I 106108


BAR P. I 33172

BAR P. I 19875


BAR P. I 19875
BAR II 482528
BCS II 98314

BAR II 171309
BCS III 4696

BAR P. I 28922

BAR P. I 1


BAR II 106630
BCS III 17731
An essential starting point for the study of Romanian political parties.

BCS III 18328

BAR II 126740
BAR P. I 28514

BAR P. I 33172

325. ______. Marx și Bălcescu. ("Marx and Bălcescu.") Iași: Institutul de Arte Grafice și Editura Viața Românescă, 1927.  
BAR II 89730


BAR II 463832

BAR P. I 19875

BAR P. I 33172


BAR II 64855
IV Ion Constantin Brătianu

a. Primary Sources

1. Brătianu, Ion C. Acte și Cuvântări. ("Acts and Words.")
   Edited by C. C. Giurescu, N. Georgescu-Tistu,
   C. Grecescu, and G. Marinescu. Bucharest: Cartea
   Românescă, 1930-1943.
   Vol. I-1, 1938
      I-2, 1935
   II- See Discursuri, scrisi, acte și documente (No. 3)
   III, 1930
   IV, 1932
   V, 1934
   VI, 1936
   VII, 1940
   VIII, 1941
   IX, 1943
   BAR II 209925
   BCS III 35065
   This series republishes all speeches, articles, and
   pamphlets of Ion Brătianu during the period June, 1848 -
   June, 1884. Volume I, part 1 covers 1848-1859, while part 2
   begins in 1869. The missing ten years, 1860-1868, are
   included in the volume Din scrierile și cuvântările lui
   Ion C. Brătianu, 1821-1891, number 12 below. The editing
   is generally quite good; precise references are given.
   In case of speeches, a brief résumé of intervening comments
   is given. The Din scrierile volume, unfortunately, does
   not provide good coverage of parliamentary debates— the
   official government newspaper, the Monitorul Oficial must
   be consulted in this respect.

2. Din corespondenta familiei Ion C. Brătianu.
   ("The Correspondence of the Brătianu Family.")
   Edited by Ion Nistor. Bucharest: Imprimeriile
   Independența, 1933-1935.
   Vol. I, 1933
      II, 1934
   III, 1934
   IV, 1935
   V, 1935
   BAR II 232212
   BCS III 13060
   Only correspondence between the immediate
   members of Ion Brătianu's family is included in
   this series. Thus, it begins only in 1859 with
   letters between Brătianu and his wife; volume I
goes to 1883.

Ion Brătianu was not much of a letter writer. His closest friends, the Rosetti family, constantly complained about his failure to keep up his end of the correspondence. Whatever letters were sent to the Rosettis were almost certainly destroyed by a fire which destroyed Rosetti’s papers in 1884. All in all, there are very few letters of Ion Brătianu in existence—practically none for the period before 1869.


Forms volume II (parts 1 and 2) of Acte și Cuvântări, number 1 above.

4. Instrucțiunea publică. Epistolă către d-l director al Ministerului Instrucțiunii publice, adresată cu ocasiunea cuvântului oficial pronunțat de domnia-sa la împărțirea premiilor. ("Public Instruction. Letter to the Director of the Ministry of Public instruction. Addressed upon the Occasion of the Public Speech given by Him at the Presentation of Prizes.") Bucharest: Tipografia C. A. Rosetti, 1865. BAR II 109235

Republished in Din scriserile (no. 12), pp. 383-391.

5. Memoar ... dat Marii Sale la întâia sa venire, prin mijlocirea d-l Dimitrie Sturdza. ("Memoir ... Given to His Majesty upon His First Arrival, by means of Mr. Dimitrie Sturdza.") Bucharest, 1859. BAR I 61385

See Din scriserile, pp. 182-191.


Republished in Acte și Documente (III-B, 8), vol. III, pp. 149-179.


BAR II 102534

BAR II 176379
BCS III 120163
Selected excerpts from Brătianu's speeches and writings.

BAR II 422513

BAR II 111285
BCS II 25371

12.  Din scriserile și cuvântările lui Ion C. Brătianu, 1821-1891. ("From the Speeches and writings of Ion C. Brătianu, 1821-1891.") Bucharest: Institutul de arte grafice Carol Göbl, 1903.
BCS III 32546

13.  and Rosetti, C. A. Catechismul Șătenilor sau sfaturi la vatra focului între un Revoluționar și un Șătean. ("Catechism of the Peasants, or Deliberations at Hearthsides between a Revolutionary and a Peasant.") Brussels: Tipografia lui J-H Denou, 1852.

A shipment of these pamphlets was discovered by the Ottoman police at Constantinople and confiscated, so that this joint effort was never distributed. Only two copies are known to exist— one is in the rare book section of the Biblioteca Centrală de Stat, the other is at the Nicolae Bălcescu Museum at Bălcești pe Topolog.
b. Secondary Sources


BAR II 48139

BAR II 142643.

BAR II 161084
Primarily on the period after 1866.

BAR Mp. 217
A brief description of Brătianu's actions during the Romanian Revolution 1848. Based entirely upon Anul 1848.

BAR II 61625
BCS III 60707
Much the same as the text in Din scrierile și cuvintările lui Ion C. Brătianu, number 17 below.

BAR I 111119

BAR II 111442
("Some Recollections of Mine, and of Others.")
Cugetul Românesc, I (1922), pp. 513-23.
BAR P. I 5913
By Brătianu's eldest son.

10. Biografia marelui om de stat al României Ion C. Brătianu
precum și o parte din celebrul discurs rostit la
înmormântare în ziua de 8 mai 1891 de Dl. D. A.
Sturdza. ("The Biography of the Great Romanian
Statesman Ion C. Brătianu together with a Part of
the Famous Speech Delivered at His Burial by D. A.
Sturdza on the 8th of May 1891.") Bucharest, 1902.
BAR II 60086

11. Cantacuzino, Sabina. Din viața familiei I. C. Brătianu,
1821-1891. ("From the Life of the Family of Ion
C. Brătianu.") Bucharest: Universul, 1933.
BAR I 114 525
BCS II 6362
A history of the Brătianu family written by
Ion's eldest child. Mrs. Cantacuzino wrote these
memoirs many years after the events in question, and
there are many errors.

12. Caracâș, Grigore. "Memoriul despre tinerețea lui I. C.
Brătianu." ("Memoir concerning the youth of Ion
C. Brătianu.") Published in Din corespondența
See IV-A, no. 2.

13. Costea, Mihail. Ion C. Brătianu și Franța. ("Ion C.
Brătianu and France.") Bucharest: Institutul de arte
grafice "Răsăritul," 1927.
BAR I 96267

14. Cretzianu, Al. "L'activité des frères Brătianu à Paris à la
veille de la Révolution de 1848." Revue des Études
Roumaines, VII-VIII (1961), pp. 77-82.

15. Dame, Frédéric. J. C. Bratiano. L'Ère nouvelle. La
dictature. 2nd ed. Bucharest: Bureaux de
l'Indépendance Roumaine, 1886.
BAR II 111297
BCS II 61594
Highly critical of Brătianu. Concentrates
on the 1880's.
BAR II 117667

BAR II 61624
BCS III 35515
Contains most of the documents published in volume I-1 of Acte și Cuvântări, and a short biography covering the period 1821-1866. The author of the text (unknown) does not provide any supporting documentation for his statements. Often cited as: Lui Ion C. Brătianu.

BAR II 116772

BAR I 61346
A defense of Brătianu and the Agrarian question by one of the leaders of the Liberal Party.

BAR II 99308
BCS II 90683
Excerpts those parts of Albert Ferme's Les conspirations sous le Second Empire that concern Brătianu.

Filitti takes a very critical view of Brătianu's role at two turning points in Romanian history.
BAR II 151208

BAR II 61876

BAR II 111461

BAR II 73476


BCS III 50376


BAR II 191491

BAR I 411190

BAR I 112346

32. Păun, Vasile D. 1848 sau Ion Brătianu și Bibescu-Vodă. ("1848 or Ion Brătianu and Prince Bibescu.") Bucharest, 1901.
BAR I 162576
BCS I 14886
BAR II 172525
BCS II 37507
This book is uncritical, carelessly researched and makes no pretence at being a scholarly effort, but it is still the best biography; all of the other works suffer from the same faults only to a much greater degree.

BAR I 171772
BCS II 220577

BAR II 60086

BAR II 68964


BAR II 165636

BCS II 63566
V-A Vasile Alecsandri

a. Primary Sources


Publishes a great many letters; important mostly for the period after 1866.

b. Secondary Works


2. ______. Catalogul corespondenței lui Vasile Alecsandri. ("Catalog of the Correspondence of Vasile Alecsandri.") Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1957. BAR III 18797


V-B Nicolae Bălcescu

a. Primary Sources

   BAR II 206055 (I 1-2)
   BAR II 444862 (IV)
   Volume I, parts one and two publish Bălcescu's writings. Volume IV contains correspondence only; it is not complete. For more correspondence see the articles by Cornelia Bodea and Paul Cernovodeanu (b, 2, 3, 4) below.

   BAR II 50649
   Also published in volume I of Opere.

b. Secondary Works

   BAR I 545540
   A good, short biography.

   BAR P. I 19875
   Extras: BAR II 340386

   BAR P. I 19875

   BAR P. I 19875
   Extras: BAR II 444194
BAR P. I 19875
Extras: BAR II 373421

BAR II 182164
BCS II 9715
Very brief.

BAR P. I 35834
BCS III 12790

8. Panaitescu, P. P. Contribuții la o biografie a lui Nicolae Bălcescu. ("Contribution to a Biography of Nicolae Bălcescu.") Bucharest: Tipografia 'Convorbiri Literare,' 1924.
BAR II 74983
Short but scholarly.
V-C Dimitrie Bolintineanu

a. Primary Sources

   BAR II 103537

   BAR II 97163

   BCS I 10379
   Bolintineanu was a close friend of Cuza's and served as a cabinet member and political advisor during the latter's reign. Also published under the title: *Cuza Vodă și Căminii Săi.* ("Prince Cuza and His Men.")

   BAR P. I II 2396

b. Secondary Works

   BAR I 440905

   BAR II 113402

   Good bibliography.
V-D Dumitru Brătianu

a. Primary Sources


BAR II 374614


BAR II 101121

BAR II 86390


BAR II 124737
Contains some 250 letters, all but a few from the period before 1866--extremely valuable. There is a good, short biography by Cretzianu in volume I.

BAR II 105225

6. Secondary Works

BAR II 128249
Too short to be of any real value.
V-E Ion Eliade-Rădulescu

a. Primary Sources


2. ______. *Une Dacie cossaque et une Roumanie Turkophile.* Constantinople, 1854. BAR II 101150


5. ______. *Mémoires sur l'histoire de la régénération roumaine.* Paris: Librairie de la Propagande Démocratique et Sociale Européenne, 1851. BAR II 25012


7. ______. *Scrisori din exil.* ("Letters from Exile.") Bucharest: Tipografie modernă 'Grigore Luș,' 1891. BAR II 76833 BCS III 1986

8. ______. *Souvenirs et impressions d'un proscrit.* Paris: Imprimerie Preve et Cie., 1850. BAR II 101054

b. Secondary Works


Good Bibliography.
V-F Ion Ghica

a. Primary Sources

   BAR II 101151

   One of the major sources for the history of the Romaian exiles. Primarily correspondence and documents.

   BAR I 102014
   These memoirs are very valuable, despite the fact that Ghica's recollections (thirty to forty years afterwards) were not always accurate.

   BAR II 385607

b. Secondary Works

   BAR II 105084

2. Georgescu-Tistu, N. Ion Ghica, Scriitorul. ("Ion Ghica, the Writer.") Bucharest: Academia Română (Studii și Cercetări, XXV), 1935.
   BAR II 131899

   BAR II 442185
BAR II 461617
A solid biography. Excellent bibliography.

Seria III, Tom. XXV, Mem. 28.

a. Primary Sources

   BAR II 24185
   One of the most important of the pamphlets published by the exiles.


   BAR II 105446

   BAR II 86397

b. Secondary Works

   BAR II 66684

   BAR II 168302
   IOR II 965.L
   Volume I is a history of the family. Volume II, III, and IV contain over 600 letters of the Golescus, 1834-1871. This is one of the major sources for the history of the period.

V-II Mihail Kogălniceanu

a. Primary Sources

BAR I 395641

2. _______. Dorințele partidă naționale în Moldova. ("The Aim of the National Party in Moldavia.") Cernăuți, 1848.
BAR I 103096

BAR II 50024

BAR II 528304

6. Secondary Works

BAR II 83695

BAR I 446976
BCS II 83775

BAR I 60512

BAR II 54909

A good article.
BAR II 397604

V-I. C. A. Rosetti

a. Primary Sources

1. Lui C. A. Rosetti, la o sută de ani de la nașterea lui. ("C. A. Rosetti, One Hundred Years after His Birth.") Bucharest, 1916. BAR II 175778
   Includes a short (60 pages) biography by A. Ștefănescu-Galați, as well as articles, notes, letters, etc. Most of the material dates from the period up to 1866.

   Contains a great deal of material concerning the Liberal Party.

   Rosetti's diary. Important, but fragmentary and often obscure. The material from 1846 on is published in Lui C. A. Rosetti, number 1.


   This was the only volume published.

7. Scrieri din jumătate și exilu. ("Writings from Youth and Exile.") 2 vols. Bucharest, 1885. BAR II 62400
   Volume II contains most of Rosetti's political pamphlets.
A rather skimpy collection of correspondence. Most of Rosetti's papers (presumably including Brătianu's letters to him) were destroyed by fire.

b. Secondary Works


