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HUMANITIES PROGRAM: CRITIQUE AND RATIONALE

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University

By

William Frederick Pinar, B.S., M.A.

The Ohio State University
1972

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INTRODUCTION

During the last twenty-five years criticism of the school has been especially incisive, at times virulent. Social critics like Goodman, Friedenberg, Henry and school critics like Holt, Herndon, Kozol and Kohl have been persistent and persuasive in their attacks. Perhaps such writing culminated two years ago with the publication of report of the Carnegie Commission, the comprehensive Crisis in the Classroom.

One theme common to almost all criticism is the contention that the schooling experience is a dehumanizing one. Whatever native intelligence, resourcefulness, indeed, whatever goodness inherent in man deteriorates under the impact of the school. The result is the one-dimensional man, the anomic man, dehumanized and, for some critics, maddened.

The latter charge has been made repeatedly and cogently by what might be termed a new school of British psychoanalytic thought, the most well-known spokesman of which is R. D. Laing. Two other analysts who seem to share Laing's fundamental belief that what is generally considered normal is actually dehumanized and mad are D. Cooper and A. Esterson.
This investigation is an exploration of this charge that socialization is roughly equivalent to going mad; specifically, it explores how the schooling experience contributes to this psychic deterioration. As well, we shall establish a rationale for a schooling experience which will arrest the deterioration and in fact promote growth—intellectual, moral, psycho-social.

The investigation has been conducted within what might be termed the philosophical-logical mode of inquiry. Whenever possible, empirical studies have been cited; however, the bulk of the research has been theoretical. It is hoped that the investigation will result in a conceptual framework useful to curricular theorists and designers in planning programs which do indeed foster human development. Moreover, it is hoped that the investigation will generate fresh questions regarding the nature of the educative process and the nature of an environment which fosters that process.

The study is organized in the following fashion: In chapter one we examine how the school drives children "mad," in the sense that Laing, et al. employ the term. In chapter two we critique the writings of five English educators, leading to the establishment of a rationale for a humanizing program, one comprised of an adequate image of man to which we might aspire and a model of psycho-
social development useful in conceptualizing growth toward the image. In chapter three we lay out the two components of the humanities program, the nuclear and the cortical, and discuss the importance of the former.
CHAPTER I
ANALYSIS

Much has been written about the deleterious effects schools have on children. However, the cogency of much that has been written is weakened because the criticism has usually lacked a firm, identifiable theoretical base. By providing such a base, both the clarity and cogency of criticism will be strengthened. As well, the outlines of reformation will be sharpened. One obvious and compelling base is the science of persons: psychology, or to employ a term more useful to our inquiry, the science of persons in relation to persons: social phenomenology. David Cooper's definition is pertinent here.

By 'phenomenology,' I mean the direct experience of a person or object without the intervention of preconceptions about that person or object. It is a matter of apprehending the person or object in its pristine reality rather than through the obscuring panes of glass that represent our preconcepts.¹

Thus, we will examine the lebenswelt (to use Heidegger's term), the world of lived experience of persons-in-school,

including various modalities of experience, such as thoughts, images, feelings, reveries, and so on. We will focus the inquiry on the impact of teachers on students, the impact of the oppressors on the oppressed. Only by such a focus can the effects of the process of schooling be elucidated.

Before explicating effects, it is essential to clarify what is meant by schooling. As many have pointed out, the informing image of young people implicit in American schooling is that children are basically wild, unpredictable beasts who must be tamed and domesticated. Hence they cannot be trusted until they have internalized the values of socially controlled and emotionless adults. One American psychologist, in a recent essay, summarizes this image thusly:

In sum, the view of the child as a wild animal to be tamed seems to be like an empty vessel to be filled. There is relatively little respect for the child's own resources and relatively great emphasis on control and doing things--albeit benignly conceived things--to the child.  

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1  

2 Teachers who employ the "banking" or "digestive" concept of education, to be explained in the following paragraphs.


4 Ibid., p. 73.
Hence to speak about American schooling is to speak about the "banking" or "digestive" concept of education, the latter term being the one Sartre employed to describe the process in which information is "fed" to pupils by teachers in order to "fill them out." The former term is explained by Paulo Freire in his *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*.

Education becomes an act of depositing, in which the students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositer. Instead of communicating, the teacher issues communiques and makes deposits which the students patiently receive, memorize, and repeat. This is the 'banking' concept of education, in which the scope of action allowed to the students extends only as far as receiving, filing, and storing the deposits. They do, it is true, have the opportunity to become collectors or cataloguers of the things they store. But in the last analysis, it is men themselves who are filed away through the lack of creativity, transformation, and knowledge in this (at best) misguided system.

Freire elaborates on the concept, noting that teachers are primarily narrators, bestowing knowledge as a gift upon those whom they consider to know nothing. Teachers project onto their students an ignorance which necessarily negates the possibility of education and knowledge as processes of inquiry. The effects are decidedly injurious. As he writes, "For apart from inquiry, apart from praxis,

---


6 Ibid., p. 58.
men cannot be truly human. Knowledge emerges only through invention and re-invention, through the restless, impatient, continuing, hopeful inquiry men pursue in the world, with the world, and with each other." (underlining mine)

Teacher-bankers, however, deposit rather than inquire. Freire lays out, in outline fashion, their attitudes and practices:

(a) the teacher teaches and the students are taught;
(b) the teacher knows everything and students know nothing;
(c) the teacher thinks and the students are thought about;
(d) the teacher talks and the students listen meekly;
(e) the teacher disciplines and the students are disciplined;
(f) the teacher chooses and enforces his choice, and the students comply;
(g) the teacher acts and the students have the illusion of acting through the action of the teacher;
(h) the teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with his own professional authority, which he sets in opposition to the freedom of the students;
(i) the teacher is the Subject of the learning process, while the pupils are mere objects.

What is the psychological, or more precisely, the phenomenal (in David Cooper's sense) impact of such attitudes and practices? The cumulative effect is mad-

---

7 Ibid., p. 59.
8 Ibid., p. 59.
ness, as we shall see.

From serious study of schools (both urban and suburban) and from considerable exploratory reading, this writer is able to identify and explicate twelve effects of schooling. In actuality, these effects cannot be clearly distinguishable. They overflow, if you will, into each other, and manifest themselves in the idiosyncratic manner of each individual. For purposes of elucidation and generalization, however, such analysis is useful.

Let us examine each effect in some detail in hope of giving us some sense of aetiology which can aid us in formulating a rationale for an ambience which is confirming and affirming, i.e., schooling for sanity.

**Hypertrophy or Atrophy of Fantasy Life**

Fantasy is an integral aspect of our experience. Schooling, however, often has two distortive effects upon fantasy life. To illustrate these distortions, let us examine briefly two fictional children, Dorothy and Paul.

---

9 In the sense R. D. Laing and D. Cooper often use the word. Roughly synonymous with de-humanization and one-dimensionality.

10 It is important to emphasize the synonymity of the term schooling with the banking concept of education.
Dorothy comes to school well-rested and nourished. During the first lessons of the morning she remains alert, listening carefully to the teacher and to the questions and comments of her peers. Perhaps she herself participates verbally. Soon, however, due to the narrative character of the experience and its alienation from her existential reality, Dorothy catches herself looking out the window, staring at the swing, wondering what recess will be like today, wondering if she will play with Paul, whom she likes more and more. "Dorothy, Dorothy!" prods the teacher. "Pay attention; you're daydreaming again." Dorothy's gaze returns to the teacher and again she listens to the lesson, but the sheer drone of the teacher's voice as he discusses the major rivers of Brazil lulls her into daydreaming about recess again. She continues to gaze at the teacher; she appears alert; however, she is not there; she is on the playground, at home, at some imaginary place, but she is not in the classroom. As Dorothy moves through the grades, teachers and guidance counselors may remark: "Oh, yes, Dorothy. A fine girl. Somewhat withdrawn, a tendency to daydream, a bit dull, but a fine girl." Such people might well take the advice Melanie Klein once

11 Pedagogy, p. 57.

12 Note again the imagery of banking.
gave to a child psychoanalyst:

One of the many interesting and surprising experiences of the beginner in psychotherapy . . . is to find in even very young children a capacity for insight which is often far greater than that of adults. To some extent this is explained by the fact that the connections between conscious and unconscious are closer in young children than in adults, and that infantile repressions are less powerful. I also believe that the infant's intellectual capacities are often underrated and that, in fact, he understands more than he is credited with.¹³

If Dorothy seems withdrawn and dull to school people, perhaps they should look to themselves in constructing an aetiology. As well as Klein's observation, one is reminded of a statement by another psychoanalyst:

Suffice it to say . . . that every child, before family indoctrination passes a certain point and primary school indoctrination begins, is, germinally at least, an artist, a visionary, and a revolutionary.¹⁴

In contrast to Dorothy, Paul, for numerous reasons (few of which are his own probably), forces himself to pay attention all of the time. Of course he catches himself daydreaming on occasion, perhaps he even wonders if he'll see Dorothy during recess, but he reprimands himself for inattention, and once again forcefully concentrates on the lesson. As the years pass, the task becomes simpler; his mind wanders infrequently; it is wedded to the lesson. Of

¹⁴Death of the Family, p. 25.
him his teachers may remark: "Paul? A bright boy. I always have his attention. A bit unimaginative, however, and it's difficult to get him to take the initiative, but a bright boy."

In both cases, recognizably prototypical to a frightening extent, what began as harmless responses to the schooling process took on an autonomy of its own. When one is "absent" for much of a six-hour period, day after day, year after year, one becomes "absent" most of the day, day after day. One is not in the "real world." In fact, one may be designated, at some point, as psychotic. On the other hand, when one is "present" most of the time, and that "presence" is achieved by violence, e.g., Paul forced his daydreams from his head, rendering his fantasy life lifeless, one loses an integral part of oneself. One is impoverished and made one-dimensional. Paul, long before he is graduated, has lost something of himself; he is no longer fully human. By the time he becomes middle-aged, Paul may be like the mother H.S. Sullivan describes in *The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry*:

The mother had become a sort of zombi—utterably crushed by the burdens that had been imposed on her. She was simply a sort of weary phonograph offering cultural platitudes, without any thought of what they did to anybody or what they meant. Though she was still showing
Division or Loss of Self to Others via Modeling

Regularly during the schooling process children are urged, implicitly and explicitly, to model themselves after others. In some cases, these models are political heroes such as George Washington or Abraham Lincoln or Martin Luther King, Jr.; sometimes they are "outstanding" (as designated by the teachers) peers, "straight-A" students, athletic stars, student government officials, or people who are combinations of these. Whom the child is to model himself after is of limited importance; it is the process of modeling, of being like someone else, that must be examined.

To get someone to desire to be like someone else, teachers must teach children to be dissatisfied with themselves. Dissatisfaction with oneself is almost always the introjected non-acceptance by a significant other. One psychoanalyst terms this phenomenon learning to see oneself with the eyes of the other. Such introjection is necessarily violent; internalization of external condemnation necessarily represents a violation of self. Such introjection means that "existent" along side the self is

16 Death of the Family, p. 8.
a non-acceptance of that self; the merging becomes a self turned against itself, a divided self, or, in extreme cases, a self lost to others. The phenomenon is commonly termed self-hatred, but the degree of non-acceptance need not be that extreme to cripple and even paralyze the self.

Freire discusses the phenomenon in more political terms.

The oppressed suffer from the duality which has established itself in their innermost being. . . . They are at one and the same time themselves and the oppressor whose consciousness they have internalized.17

Contrasting the consciousness of the oppressor with the consciousness of the oppressed, Hegel writes:

The one is independent, and its essential nature is to be for itself; the other is dependent and its essence is life or existence for another. The former is the Master, or Lord, the latter the Bondsman.18

The self turned against itself seeks to be like someone else. The seeking is dangerous; one's identity is constantly in question, since it resides outside oneself. One feels ontologically insecure,19 and such insecurity prevents and arrests man's ontological vocation of becoming more human, more himself.20 Such insecurity also

17Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 32.
18As quoted in Pedagogy, p. 34, footnote 5.
20Pedagogy, p. 27.
increases the likelihood of being designated schizophrenic.

Sartre, in *Being and Nothingness*, gives an example of modeling, which he terms "bad faith":

Let us consider this waiter in the cafe. His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid. He comes toward the patrons with a step a little too quick. He bends forward a little too eagerly; his voice, his eyes express an interest a little too solicitous for the order of the customer. Finally there he returns, trying to imitate in his walk the inflexible stiffness of some kind of automaton while carrying his tray with the recklessness of a tight-rope walker by putting it in a perpetually unstable, perpetually broken equilibrium which he perpetually re-establishes by a light movement of the arm and hand. All his behaviour seems to us a game. He applies himself to chaining his movements as if they were mechanisms, the one regulating the other; his gestures and even his voice seem to be mechanisms; he gives himself the quickness and pitiless rapidity of things. He is playing, he is amusing himself. But what is he playing? We need not watch long before we can explain it: he is playing at being a waiter in a cafe.

In schools, particularly in secondary ones and those for "higher learning," one notes countless "persons" playing at being a student, a professor, an intellectual, a bohemian, a "freak," a "politico," and so, playing at being some thing other than themselves. They are not themselves; quite literally, they are out of their minds; they are mad.

---

Appropriate here is Freire's posing of a central pedagogical problem, one which we must deal with:

The central problem is this: How can the oppressed, as divided, unauthentic beings, participate in developing the pedagogy of their liberation? Only as they discover themselves to be 'hosts' of the oppressor can they contribute to the midwifery of their liberating pedagogy. As long as they live in the duality in which to be is to be like, and to be like is to be like the oppressor, this contribution is impossible.22

Dependence and Arrested Development of Autonomy

One educator has written of the "risk that the children will be influenced by what-they-feel-they-ought-to feel, or by what-they-feel-the-teacher-things-they-ought-to feel.23 That risk is usually reality.

Students, "good" students that is, more than comply with the instructions of teachers. They come to depend upon them; they come to need them, just as they came to need the instructions of their parents. "One of the first lessons," David Cooper writes, "one is taught in the course of one's family conditioning is that one is not enough to exist in the world on one's own."24

22 Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 33.


24 Death of the Family, p. 9.
Mere compliance lays bare the political nature of the teacher-student relationship. To prevent students from seeing this reality, the school must make the student desire to be instructed, and eventually, to need to be instructed. For the need to be deeply rooted, the student must forget that he has this need; finally, the student will forget that he has forgotten he has the need. He will consider the necessity of instruction "natural" and he will look askew at any one who suggests otherwise.

This repressive process requires that the dependency the young child has upon his parents be transferred to the teacher in some form and to some extent. Such a transference is not difficult to achieve. Generally speaking, the difference between a transference relationship and a "real" relationship is never clear. Specifically, many parents predispose their children to respect and like their teachers, by stressing the "importance of education" or the "wisdom of teachers." And the warm, "out-going" teacher makes the transference easier and more complete. The collusion of parents and teachers in transferring the child's dependence and deepening it becomes evident, and so do the nature and outcome of the cooperation. A passage

25Ibid., p. 27.
from Erich Fromm's *The Heart of Man* is clarifying:

The pleasure in complete domination over another person (or other animate creature) is the very essence of the sadistic drive. Another way of formulating the same thought is to say that the aim of sadism is to transform a man into a thing, something animate into something inanimate, since by complete and absolute control the living loses one essential quality of life—freedom.26

With domination, concomitant dependence, loss of freedom, the development of autonomy is arrested. Autonomy means making one's own rules,27 being one's own instructor in a sense, and making "external laws conform to the internal laws of the soul, to deny all that is and create a new world according to the laws of one's own heart."28 The kind of obedience to authority, what Piaget (1932) termed the morality of the heteronomous personality, that schooling engenders is inherently maddening. It requires loss of self to the control of others, atrophying the possibility of morality as well as autonomy. For it is only to the extent that people have freedom to make choices that they can live as moral beings.29

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27 David Cooper, *Psychiatry and Anti-Psychiatry*, p. 36.
A quite different yet somewhat useful way to discuss this issue is to contrast the characteristics of children termed "field-dependent" with those termed "field-independent." Those who are "field-dependent" seem unable to free themselves from the constraints of the situation in which they find themselves. They tend to be dependent on environmental supports, i.e., other- rather than self-validating; they seem unable to initiate activities. In fact, such children have been found to be passive in many respects, readily submissive to authority. They evidently lack insight regarding their "inner life" (which is a charitable way of saying they have lost themselves); they usually fear their aggressive and sexual feelings; and, finally, they tend to have low self-esteem and low self-acceptance. In contrast, "field-independent" children do not seem to require environmental supports; they tend to be self-validating; they take initiative; they are active; they are aware of their "inner-life" and unafraid of their impulses, sexual or otherwise. They tend to like themselves. 30 Revealingly, parents of "field-dependent" children, on the whole, punished their offspring severely and often. They consistently forbad them to be assertive, independent, and generally imposed their standards. In

30 As quoted in Gordon Allport, Pattern and Growth in Personality, New York, 1961, p. 268.
contrast, parents of "field-independent" children encouraged them to make decisions, punished them little and then for being dependent. These children, in sum, were free to become autonomous to a much greater extent than their "field-dependent" peers. What is wrong with this research is what is wrong with much research, the pretense at objectivity and detachment. As Charles Hampden-Turner has written, "To detach oneself and treat others like so many objects is not to be value-free but to choose to de-value others." Those children who were incapable of validating themselves were not mere "field-dependent" (a "neutral" term); they objectified, "in-animated" shells of the human possibility. Their parents, as the Fromm passage would imply, were not merely more "strict"; they were sadists, engendering dependence, arresting the development of autonomy, and, therefore, turning their children into things, beings-for-others. Such "people" are dehumanized and dehumanizing; they have lost themselves to others; they are mad.

Criticism by Others and the Loss of Self-Love

The importance of self-love is almost impossible to overstate. Carl Rogers has argued that the lack of it

31 Ibid., p. 270.

32 Radical Man, p. 28.
represents man's basic disease.\textsuperscript{33}

Self-love is a prerequisite for love of others.\textsuperscript{34}
"One can no longer think of loving another person until
one can love oneself enough."\textsuperscript{35} It is also a prerequisite
to agency, as we saw in the preceding section.

Whether self-love is initially intrinsic to the person
or whether it is largely a function of the attitudes of
significant others is an issue beside the point here.
The point here is that the attitude toward self can be
altered, and often it is mutilated, by significant others.
Some of the ways families perform this feat has been well
documented;\textsuperscript{36} some of the ways schools perform it has not.

One important way involves the attitudes and behavior
of fellow students. However, this particular locus of
damage has an aetiology, crucial to an adequate understand­
ing of the process, too lengthy to be properly discussed
at this point. It will be examined in the context of
affiliative needs in the following section.

Let us focus upon the effect of criticism by teachers,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{33}Challenges of Humanistic Psychology, p. 124.
\item \textsuperscript{34}Eric Fromm, The Art of Loving.
\item \textsuperscript{35}Death of the Family, pp. 41, 42.
\item \textsuperscript{36}Ibid. R. D. Laing and A. Esterson, Sanity, Madness,
\end{itemize}
the implicit criticism of marks or grades, and the often resulting criticism of parents.

As we have seen, the student's relationships to the teacher is often a transference one, continuing and usually strengthening the initial dependence upon the parents. Thus the child comes to depend upon validation from these significant others, and his identity resides outside himself, in some way related to those who have taken him from himself. The child often attempts to model himself after prototypical "persons," approved by the authorities. These developments effectively prevent him from developing autonomy. In such a position, he cannot help but introject the self-hating attitudes that his teacher-bankers hold of him.

Even "liberal" teachers who hold "discussions" and employ the so-called inquiry method make children feel inadequate. Regardless of the method, as long as the "banking" concept is operative, the teacher pretends knowledge and projects ignorance onto the students. All questions have more or less correct answers, according to this view. Another expression of it is found in William Glasser's *Schools Without Failure*:

> ... almost all schools and colleges are dominated by the certainty principle. According to it, there is a right and a wrong answer to every question; the function of education is then ensure that each student knows the right
answers to a series of questions that educators have decided are important.37

The student grapples for the answer to the question, but simple statistical probability makes it unlikely he will come up with it. Even if the teacher "respects" diverse answers, one is still made to feel a bit remiss if one's answer does not coincide with the teacher's.

As well, one cannot possibly get "A" in all one's subjects; inevitably one is made to feel deficient in one area or another. The word "deficient" is important. If the child merely discovered that he disliked, say, arithmetic, the effect would be quite different. However, arithmetic is one of the "fundamentals"; the stress given it must mean it is very important; to earn less than "A" means, baldly stated, that one is less than what one should be.

Parents collude with teachers, criticizing their children if their marks fail to meet their standards which, of course, they often fail to meet. Again, at home, the child is made to feel deficient; he cannot possibly get "A" in everything; he must be only "above average" or "average," and since his attitude toward himself is contingent upon the attitudes of others, he necessarily comes to experience himself as "average" or perhaps even "below

37 William Glasser, Schools Without Failure.
average"; he comes to share the view he is "not living up to his potential." One's sense of worth, one's love for oneself, contingent as it has become upon performance and resulting attitudes of others, is bound to be diminished. Michael Novak says it well:

Success is perceived as luck, a grace, a gift; failure as the lot of the damned. The myth of success renders useless the concept of internal worth, and countless Americans seem to feel insecure, helpless, and worthless when the lottery of success has not selected them. Even the notion that one must work hard in order to be worthy of success is commonly absorbed into the syntax of success: one works hard, not with the sense of dignity that comes from inner growth, risk, and expansion, but with a hope of vindication from beyond. The myth of competitive work is seldom oriented toward an internal sense of dignity; it is other-regarding, outwardly expectant, full of foreboding.38

In the context of such dynamics, what is education?

"Education... is leading a person out of himself and away from himself."39

**Thwarting of Affiliative Needs**

People generally, not just children, need to feel affiliated with each other.40 The word is derived from the Latin: ad meaning to, and filius meaning son. The point

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39 *Death of the Family*, p. 10.

40 *The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry*, p. 370 for ex., or yourself.
is that affiliation is not to be understood in the modern connotation of membership in a club or similarly formed group, but as a feeling of association as strong as familial connections once were.

Several writers indicate that the affiliative needs are stronger and the consequences more deleterious if they go unmet during adolescence. For example, H. S. Sullivan characterizes the expression of such needs as one of those most important stages in the development of what he terms "the mature personality." He employs the term intimacy, defining it as "collaboration with at least one other, preferably more others, and in this collaboration there is the very striking feature of a very lively sensitivity to the needs of the other and to the interpersonal security or absence of anxiety in the other." He writes that "intimacy is that type of situation involving two people which permits validation of all components of personal worth." Its importance, in terms of human growth and development, cannot be overstated. Alfred Adler, in The Education of Children, emphasizes the desirability of the cultivation of friendship during the pre-

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41 Ibid., p. 310.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid., p. 246.
and adolescent years. "Children should be good friends and comrades with one another,"\(^{44}\) he writes. Regarding parents and teachers he insists that "in the period of adolescence only that type of parent and teacher can continue in this capacity of guide to the child who has hitherto been a comrade and sympathetic fellowman to his charge.\(^{45}\)

Even the most superficial observation of life-in-school reveals that affiliative needs not merely go unmet, they are actively thwarted, and in several ways. One way, which has examined with a different focus earlier, involves the fostering of a dependency relationship on the teacher. If the child comes to rely on the teacher for instruction (broadly defined), he cannot feel close to his peers. The tie is vertical, not horizontal, and because the relationship is a "transferred" one, the child competes for the "love" of the teacher just as he would for the "love" of the parent. As a result, his peers become his competitors, and ultimately, his enemies.\(^{46}\) As Freire

\(^{44}\) Alfred Adler, The Education of Children, New York: Greenberg Publisher, 1930, p. 214.

\(^{45}\) Ibid.

\(^{46}\) It is interesting and significant to observe in many "central-city" schools that black children often resist dependency upon teachers; their loyalties remain horizontal; consequently, their sense of community is immeasurably stronger than white children's.
writes, "the dominated consciousnesses is dual, ambiguous, full of fear and mistrust." 47

Competition for the affection and attention 48 of the teacher is not the only kind of competition operative in the school. The methodology of teaching is founded upon competition. One attempts to guess the answer first, complete the assignment first or best, and, of course, get the highest marks. Jules Henry comments:

In a society where competition for the basic cultural goods is a pivot of action, people cannot be taught to love one another. It thus becomes necessary for the school to teach children how to hate, and without appearing to do so, for our culture cannot tolerate the idea that babes should hate each other. 49

Yet, "without the experience of trust, the child will never become a trusting member of a society, who is able to love and care for others." 50 "Love one another" teachers and others mouth regularly; the real message, and the one many if not most children learn is "hate one another." If we ever become serious about our ideals, then we must begin

47Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 166.

48See section on Desiccation via Disconfirmation for a discussion of the need for "attention."


50Margaret Mead, Culture and Commitment (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1970), pp. 89-90.
living them, especially in school. Teachers must come
to love their students. What is love:

Love lets the other be, but with affection and concern. Violence attempts to constrain the other's freedom, to force him to act in the way we desire, but with ultimate lack of concern, with indifference to the other's own existence or destiny. 51

Rather than love, teachers continually intervene, instruct, and criticize. Such behavior from teachers cannot be absorbed, at least for long. One must defend oneself, and if possible, strike back. Anger is always reactive. 52

However, because the teacher is in a politically inaccessible position and because the teacher has formed a dependency relationship against the child, the child cannot risk very easily the teacher's rejection, for to do so would be tantamount to self-rejection, since in a parasitic relationship one's sense of self is usually contingent upon another's sense of oneself. Since the child cannot react to the violence of the teacher, i.e., vertical violence, he "displaces" his anger and aggression and expresses it horizontally. Quoting Candido Mendes Freire explains this phenomenon:

Chafing under the restriction of this order, they often manifest a type of horizontal violence, striking out at their own comrades for the pettiest reasons. 'The colonized man will first manifest this aggressiveness which has been


52As we shall see in Chapter III.
deposited in his bones against his own people. This is the period when the niggers beat each other up, and the police and magistrates do not know which way to turn when faced with the astonishing waves of crime in North Africa. . . . While the settler or the policeman has the right the livelong day to strike the native, to insult him and to make him crawl to them, you will see the native reaching for his knife at the slightest hostile or aggressive glance cast on him by another native; for the last resort of the native is to defend his personality vis-a-vis his brother.

It is possible that in this behavior they are once more manifesting their duality. Because the oppressor exists within their oppressed comrades, when they attack those comrades they are indirectly attacking the oppressor as well.53

In the context of the school, this phenomenon is manifested in disagreement, arguments, and fights among children. The general ill-will one finds in schools is a direct function of teacher-(and parent-) initiated violence. The damage done to the affiliative need is incalculable. Children grow up as if among enemies. When one considers the rather strong possibility that "the individual human's personality is determined by the quality of his relationships with other people,"54 is it any surprise that so many chronological adults are the way they are? As Hampden-Turner observed, "where injustice reigns between men it

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53 Candido Mendes, Memento do vivos--A Esquerda catolica no Brasil (Rio, 1966), as quoted in Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 48.

will reign also within them."  

Considering the horror that is the interpersonal reality of the school, one winces at these words of psychiatrist William Glasser:

In the context of school, love can best be thought of as social responsibility. When children do not learn to be responsible for each other, and to help each other, not only for the sake of others but for their own sake, love becomes a weak and limited concept. Teachers and children need not love each other in a narrow family way or even narrower romantic sense, but they must learn to care enough to help one another with the many social and educational problems of school.

This writer is reminded of a brief passage in F. Scott Fitzgerald's *The Crack-up*:

The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposing ideas in the mind at the same time and still retain the ability to function. One should, for example, be able to see that things are hopeless yet be determined to make them otherwise.

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Estrangement from Self and Its Effect upon the Process of Individuation

One aspect of self-estrangement is physical. The discomfort of school furniture results in a diminution of physical feeling. One simply cannot tolerate physical discomfort hour after hour, day after day, year after year, without suppressing such discomfort. One necessarily loses

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55 *Radical Man*, p. 88.


much of one's ability to experience tactile sensations. One becomes numbed.

What are the effects of the psychic discomfort caused by competition, criticism, and aggression? One effect is a continual, usually subliminal anxiety, the consequence of which is a "useless disturbance of the factors of sentience which immediately preceded its onset."58 In some cases, "the effects of severe anxiety reminds one in some ways of a blow on the head."59

How is the process of individuation—the "slow, imperceptible process of psychic growth"60—affected? The answer becomes clear as we examine in some detail the nature of the process. The extent to which it develops appears to be contingent upon the extent to which the ego is willing to listen to the messages of the Self.61 It can be real only if the person is aware of the process and consciously making a connection with it. The person must participate in his development.62

58 The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry, p. 152.
59 Ibid.
61 Ibid., p. 152, def. of Self.
62 Ibid.
We have examined already some of the ways schooling numbs children to their own experience, and we will examine ways in the sections upcoming. One way, appropriate here as an illustration, is the disconfirmation of self63 one observes in school. It is easy to imagine the following exchange. "I don't feel like doing this assignment," complains Mary to her teacher. "I don't care what you feel," the pedagogue replies, "do it." To a teacher, or to her parent: "I don't like school." "Mary, you just feel that way. You don't really. You like school." Of course, the disconfirmation is rarely that crude, but even subtler expressions of the same attitude have the same effect. The voices inside are systematically ignored, dismissed, or refuted by others. Almost inevitably, the child learns to ignore, dismiss, or refute the messages from within. The effect on the process of individuation is shocking and obvious.

The cognitive stress of schooling tends to make children think rather than feel. Often the child becomes more and more cerebral at the expense of his feeling, numbing him to the messages of his unconscious. The school, when especially effective, produces master "thinkers"

63 See section on Desiccation via Disconfirmation.
whose computations are as offensive as they are logical.\textsuperscript{64} Considerations of feeling are beside the point, evidently. The controversial psychotherapist Arthur Janov makes an important point about this matter. He writes: "Lack of feeling is what destroys the self, and it is lack of feeling which permits destruction of other selves."\textsuperscript{65} Placed in a Jungian context, Janov's point is clear. Von Franz, a Jungian, writes:

\begin{quote}
\textit{... in order to bring the individuation process into reality, one must surrender consciously to the power of the unconscious, instead of thinking in terms of what one should do, or what is generally thought right, or what usually happens. One must simply listen, in order to learn what the inner totality--the Self--wants one to do here and now in a particular situation.}\textsuperscript{66}
\end{quote}

Inattention to internal messages, especially perusal of philosophies external and in all likelihood, incongruent, with oneself, represents denial of self, atrophy of feeling and of self.

Adherence to externals is evidenced by social conformity. By the time children reach junior high school, they have lost touch with themselves and with each other to the point that they must mimic each other's speech,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{64} Examine the writings of Kahn or B. F. Skinner, for example.
  \item \textsuperscript{66} \textit{Man and His Symbols}, pp. 163-64.
\end{itemize}
dress, and habits in order to feel human and close. All such attempts fail, of course. One cannot simulate genuine humanity and interpersonal intimacy. Von Franz writes:

It is... useless to cast furtive glances at the way someone else is developing, because each of us has a unique task of self-realization. . . . The fact is that each person has to do something different, something that is unique his own. 67

Moreover, it is only by an unconditional devotion to one's own process of individuation that one can experience genuine intimacy. A corollary follows: self-estrangement means other-estrangement. I cannot get in touch with you if I cannot get in touch with me.

Self-direction Becomes Other-direction

"The fundamental fact in human development," writes Alfred Adler in The Education of Children, "is that dynamic and purposive striving of the psyche."68 In fact, he writes a few pages earlier, "From a psychological point of view, the problem of education reduces itself... to the problem of self-knowledge and rational self-direction."69 Under the influence of schooling, however, self-

67 Ibid., p. 164.
68 The Education of Children, p. 5.
69 Ibid., p. 3.
direction gives way to other-direction. The child, when forced to do an assignment he does not wish to complete or any order or instruction with which he does not wish to comply, must shift the origin of action from inside to outside. After several years of such shifting, activity is rarely initiated from the self, but by the other. Of course, a warm teacher and/or a highly competitive classroom effectively destroy the capacity to direct oneself. This phenomenon is pervasive enough that before a young person can ask himself "Who am I?" he must ask himself "Whose am I"? The political implications, as well as the psychic ones, are frightening.

Janov poses the problem as one of pathology.

The neurotic is often indecisive because he is split between repressed needs and doing the should. The normal can decide for himself because he feels that self and what is right for it.

The neurotic relies on others to supply the shoulds... In this way, he maneuvers his life so that people go on providing shoulds for him and he never allows himself to function according to his feelings. Such an analysis is overly simple to be sure but the point is there, nonetheless.

One phenomenon that accompanies this shift from intrinsic to extrinsic motivation is the muddling of

70 The Death of the Family, p. 6.

71 The Primal Scream, p. 149.
motives. It occurs when the child reads a story or works an arithmetical problem to please the teacher or his parent and it leads to writing essays to obtain a high mark rather than to communicate. The process is particularly prevalent in chronological adults, especially in those who have been schooled for many years. Such people often marry for financial or social reasons rather than for love, obtain Ph.D.'s for status rather than to inquire and to learn, and they often have children to vicariously live their emptied-out lives over rather than to propagate the species.

As David Cooper writes: "Any meaning derived from a source outside our acts murders us." 72

**Loss of Self and Internalization of Externalized "Self"**

Another dimension of this process of losing oneself to others is the possibility of filling the loss by internalizing the externalized, e.g., the other-directed self, resulting in objectification.

One loses one's self-centeredness, 73 the crucial capacity to live from the "inside out," or, to put it another way, the ability to live from the subjective center.

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72 *The Death of the Family*, p. 87.

73 *Psychiatry and Anti-Psychiatry*, p. 36. Also, *Death of the Family*, p. 23.
of one's being. One hemorrhages,\textsuperscript{74} loses one's life-blood, is filled with embalming fluid, which is the alien that is the estranged self, the self-fabricated by unaware compliance and collusion with significant others.

This "self" is a thing, an image such as "good student," intellectual, "hard worker," in any case, a role, but not a subjective being. The internalization of this role, this thing, objectifies the self, rendering it more or less stable but quite dead. As objects, as "things," the oppressed "have no purposes except those their oppressors prescribe for them."\textsuperscript{75}

Thus, schooling produces hollow men, obedient automatons programmed to compute the correct computations, strangers to themselves and to others, but madmen to the few who escaped, half-crazed, to search for what has been robbed them. The radical test for one of the latter "lies in his decision to be stronger than his condition and if his condition is unjust, has only one way to overcome it, which is to be just himself."\textsuperscript{76}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{74}See \textit{Being and Nothingness} for a brilliant discussion of this phenomenon.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{75}\textit{Pedagogy of the Oppressed}, p. 46.}

Internalization of the Oppressor: Development of a False-Self System

If the externalized "self" is not internalized, then the alienated "self" that is his teacher will be internalized, or the child will develop a false self-system, a facade, a mask to prevent friction with the instructor and/or to protect (or so he might think) the real self. Both these possibilities are dehumanizing and hence, to some extent, maddening.

The teacher—he who plays at being a teacher—has, as we have noted in the case of the child in the preceding section, externalized himself into the world, e.g., he has emptied his subjective reality into a role or object form of being-in-the-world, and he has internalized this objectification.

Because his own subjective, inchoate sense of identity has been arrested or eroded, the child needs to identify with another. If the transference has been achieved to an adequate extent, then the child will identify with the de-humanized object that is his teacher. The concomitant interiorization is mutilating, often

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77*Psychiatry and Anti-Psychiatry*, p. 35.

78See R. D. Laing, *The Divided Self*.

79See p. of this manuscript.

80*Psychiatry and Anti-Psychiatry*, p. 35.
deadly, to the developing being-for-itself. It is interesting to note that this madness has "official" sanction.

I would like to suggest that what the teacher must be, to be an effective competence model, is a day-to-day working model with whom to interact. It's not so much that the teacher provides a model to imitate. Rather it is that the teacher can become a part of the student's internal dialogue--somebody whose respect he wants, someone whose standards he wishes to make his own. It is like becoming a speaker of a language one shares with somebody. The language of that interaction becomes a part of oneself, and the standards of style and clarity that one adopts for that interaction become a part of one's own standards. 82

Freire puts it another way: "... the oppressed do not see the 'new man' as the man to be born from the resolution of this contradiction, as oppression gives way to liberation. For them, the new man is themselves become oppressors." 83

Perhaps the child has failed to transfer his dependence to the teacher; assume he has little need to identify himself via another. Assume he still wants to succeed. He must be obedient, but he need not believe in what he does. He comes to view the schooling process as a game, with a myriad of rules to follow in order to win, and himself as player. Such a schizoid state and concomi-

82 Jerome S. Bruner, Toward a Theory of Instruction. Except for the word "imitate," all underlining is mine.

83 Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 30. "Contradiction" denotes the dialectical conflict between opposing social forces.
itant development of a false self-system is probably characteristic of many students.

One cannot, however, "play the game" hour after hour, day after day, year after year, without coming to view one's life as a game, with the self split into observer/player. Such a "person" is incapable of authentic participation in anything: love relationships (any relationship for that matter), employment, child-rearing, etc. It is all a game, not for real, and the mask he brings to the "board" is as unreal as his perception. Such a Weltanschauung almost inevitably results in cynicism and possibly nihilism. When one is empty, one is completely vulnerable to the metaphysical emptiness outside, and too threatened by a real person to be accessible to what might help mend the split, what might fill/nourish the atrophied self. For, as several writers have pointed out, rather than protecting the self, the false self-system isolates it from genuine and intense contact with others, rendering the self crippled, violated, withered. It may die, leaving a walking-talking automaton who works, sexes, sleeps, but who neverlives. Or, if the self fights for life, the conflict, if manifested in socially unacceptable behavior, may earn the person the designation of "schizophrenic."

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84 See Laing, The Divided Self, for example.
In any event, the child is maddened. Schooling, as currently conceived, leaves him few options.

**Alienation from Personal Reality Due to Impersonality of Schooling Groups**

Membership in a group whose members number more than twelve to fifteen is depersonalizing. (Aside from considerations that will become obvious in the discussion to follow, the numbers chosen are not entirely arbitrary. See *Radical Man* for a brief but illuminating discussion of the historical significance of the number twelve.) Although these numbers are no guarantee of course, especially when one considers that even in a family of four the members can be quite ignorant of the personal reality of each other, larger numbers absolutely preclude the possibility of sharing, even to a minor extent, the personal realities of the members. Larger groups almost always have a mystique, an impersonality which facilitates one's forgetting of oneself, what Kierkegaard termed the "herd instinct." One tends to become one's surface, one's body, a being-in-itself. This tendency remains, even after leaving the school. H. S. Sullivan comments

85 *Radical Man*, p. 160.


87 See his *Diary*, trans. by Rhode.
that "there are a remarkable number of people who have ways of being social as the devil without having anything with the other people concerned. They live by very sharply restricted rules." 88

People who live hours, days, and years in groups whose reality is established by the teacher or by a curriculum guide often forget what one's personal reality is, if others have personal realities, or if everyone is "emptied-out" in exteriorized existence. People, especially some school children, must wonder what it would be like for someone, even the teacher, to actually do something, to express one's insides, something of one's personal reality. (Hence the at first blush bizarre behavior of some "Yippies," painting their bodies, sexing in "public," etc. Some authentic action to jar those asleep?) Certainly some so-called discipline problems are mere similar attempts at jarring the collective unreality of the school. Michael Novak views the matter this way:

... our society puts great stress on intimacy, the personal touch, communication, and unity, but it also teaches persons to be silent about their deepest feelings, fears, terrors, longings, even with those dearest to them. 89


89 The Experience of Nothingness, p. 57.
Often it is only in solitude that one's personal reality can be preserved, and its preservation is nothing less than the preservation of sanity. Kierkegaard considered solitude, as enriching inwardness, a *sine qua non* for individual development. In fact, he viewed the ability to be with oneself the supreme test of the individual, for those who cannot tolerate solitude are reduced to mere "social animals."\(^{90}\) A contemporary writer, the psychoanalyst Hannah Segal, also emphasizes the importance of solitude, contending that the basis of thought and communication is communication with oneself.\(^{91}\) The sheer impossibility of seclusion, of quiet in the school\(^{92}\) forces us to ignore ourselves and eventually empty ourselves out.

On this matter David Cooper writes:

> In our age we are totally conditioned to interference from others, we gravely lack the conditions for the full development of the capacity to be alone. For most of us the root of interference commences in the cradle and does not end before the grave. It requires considerable artifice to escape the process even momentarily. And yet I believe that it is only on the basis of an adequate capacity to be alone that we can find a true way of being with others. We have to rediscover the lost meaning of the Taoist principle of *wu wei*, the principle of non-action, but a positive non-action that requires an effort of self-containment, an effort to cease interference, to 'lay off' other people and give them and oneself a chance.\(^{93}\)

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\(^{90}\)Diary.

\(^{91}\)The Exploring Word, p. 23.

\(^{92}\)In this context, school becomes a metaphor for society as well.

\(^{93}\)Psychiatry and Anti-Psychiatry, pp. 74-75.
One must be able to be with oneself before one can be with others. One must be able to reflect on oneself, feel oneself, and develop a loving, caring, intimate relationship with oneself. Love, in this and any context, means letting oneself, or another, alone, with affection and concern. Only then can people genuinely be with each other, and not interfere with each other.

Desiccation via Disconfirmation

In human society, at all its levels, persons confirm one another in a practical way, to some extent or other, in their personal qualities and capacities, and a society may be termed human in the measure to which its members confirm one another.

The basis of man's life with man is twofold, and it is one—the wish of every man to be confirmed as what he is, even as what he can become, by men; and the innate capacity in man to confirm his fellow-men in this way. That this capacity lies so immeasurably fallow constitutes the real weakness and questionableness of the human race: actual humanity exists only where this capacity unfolds. On the other hand, of course, an empty claim for confirmation, without devotion for being and becoming, again and again mars the truth of the life between man and man.

Men need, and it is granted to them, to confirm one another in their individual being by means of genuine meetings: but beyond this they need, and it is granted to them, to see the truth, which the soul gains by its struggle, light up to the others, the brothers, in a different way, and even so be confirmed.

94Death of the Family, pp. 41-42.
95The Politics of Experience, p. 58.
96Psychiatry and Anti-Psychiatry, p. 74.
97Martin Buber, The Courage To Be, as quoted in Self and Others, p. 81.
Confirmation (not collusion of automata to perpetuate the mystification of reality) does not characterize the school. One waits for response, for genuine reply to one's being, but all one seems to get is questions, instructions, ignorance.

Let us briefly examine how the process of schooling works to disconfirm the child. Of course, any school whose operative principle is the banking concept of education necessarily ignores the child. However, even in a so-called "child-centered" school, a teacher cannot possibly adequately attend to the question that is the child's being. Often even the slightest recognition from another, which at least confirms one's presence in another's world, is absent. "No more fiendish punishment could be devised," William James once wrote, "even were such a thing physically possible, than that one should be turned loose in society and remain absolutely unnoticed by all the members thereof." Yet for how many in our huge, impersonal schools does this "fiendish punishment" come close to being the interpersonal reality? When one considers recognition in its deepest sense, in sensitive, caring reply to another's existential insides, have we not indeed constructed such a hell?

As a consequence, children learn to participate in symbolic forms of gratifying this need. However, all such symbolic attempts are bound to fail. Moreover, "the result
of any symbolic behavior is to shut off feeling,\textsuperscript{98} which, as we have seen, atrophies the emergent self. What are examples of such attempts? Some children frequently attempt to answer questions. This behavior elicits recognition, not genuine reply of course, but even so, it is acknowledgment. Unfortunately it is disconfirming. Often the answer is incorrect, or only partially correct, and in any case, with twenty to thirty students in a classroom, how often can each child expect such recognition, superficial and disconfirmatory as it is?

Another basic substitutive behavior is termed deviant or disruptive behavior. Teachers and administrators often explain such behaviors (from talking "out of turn" to throwing wads of paper) as "he merely wants attention" and dismissed as that. Often punishing these children is unsuccessful in that the disruptive is repeated. However, from one point of view, the behavior is successful. The child is at least acknowledged and his existence confirmed, even if negatively.

An illustration of this phenomenon follows:

Then one day as Lyndon sat watching Miss Schatzman, something about her reminded him of the ladies in the summer school back in Catherine County. Thinking back to that time he began to feel as he had often felt then. He wanted the

\textsuperscript{98}For a fascinating if wild discussion of symbolic attempts at need gratification, see The Primal Scream, for example p. 247.
teacher to pay attention to him. He wanted her to let him do something interesting, or better yet to show him something new and help him do it. He felt more and more fidgety and nervous. Then he stood up, walked quickly to an empty seat, and sat down again. All the moon lady did was to grasp Lyndon by the shoulder and guide him back to his assigned seat, without a break in whatever she was saying. At least she had noticed him, and so had most of the kids in the room.99

As R. D. Laing notes:

The need to be perceived is not, of course, purely a visual affair. It extends to the general need to have one's presence endorsed, or confirmed by the other, the need for one's total existence to be recognized; the need, in fact, to be loved.100

Yet, in American schools,101 one goes unnoticed, unloved, and if one is not to feel de trop, one must interfere with the lives of others. In our death throes, we mangle each other, leaving scarred fragments of what we might have been.

Atrophy of Capacity to Perceive Aesthetically and Sensuously

One obvious cause of the atrophy of the child's ability to perceive sensuously and aesthetically is the sheer dreariness of school architecture. School is in-


100The Divided Self, p. 128.

101School as metaphor for society also.
variably an ugly place, unimaginatively designed, its classrooms often an uninviting green or brown, the seats hard and overly straight: all has been built with one criterion—efficiency. One must learn to not see while living several hours daily for years in such places. One hardens, and begins to block out sensitive perceptions of the outside. One’s eyes become glazed, and after a while do not object to New Jersey.

In two other ways the schooling experience disables us to perceive aesthetically. The impulse behind this disabling is made quite clear by Eric Fromm:

While life is characterized by growth in a structured, functional manner, the necrophilous person loves all that does not grow, all that is mechanical. The necrophilous person is driven by the desire to transform the organic into the inorganic, to approach life mechanically, as if all living persons were things. . . . Memory, rather than experience; having, rather than being, is what counts. The necrophilous person can relate to an object—a flower or a person—only if he possesses it; hence a threat to his possession is a threat to himself; if he loses possession he loses contact with the world. . . . He loves control, and in the act of controlling he kills life.

One way the necrophilous drive is manifested in school involves the relentless inspection and explication of the

102 See Raymond E. Callahan, Education and the Cult of Efficiency, for a discussion of this matter.

103 The Heart of Man, p. 41.
alive and the beautiful. In the sciences, for example, one learns to see phyla, phenomena, losing the child's astonishment at the beauty of the natural world. No longer does one see a tree, one sees a sycamore or an oak, one observes photosynthesis; in brief, one learns to see everything but the tree. Laing and Cooper put it this way:

The analytic-instrumental approach to the world and to oneself entails a language which expresses the result of the analytic process, but the language then expresses an analytically reduced reality. ¹⁰⁴

In the Humanities one learns to understand "how a poem means,"¹⁰⁵ a novel means, and one learns to interpret, for there is latent as well as manifest content. Works of art come to have little or no impact upon the perceiver, unless it be a narrowly cognitive one. One learns to deflect the impact onto a critique, so that when one leaves a showing of, say Frank Gilroy's film "Desperate Characters," one comments on the acting of Shirley Maclaine, or on the direction, on anything rather than feel the desperation in the characters. We see but do not see. We respond but not feel. One English educator observes:


¹⁰⁵ See John Ciardi's How A Poem Means.
Emphasis on abstract verbalization, on intellectual concepts cut off from their roots in concrete sensuous experience, is destructive of literary sensitivity and enjoyment.  

Inspection renders the object lifeless, analysis murders, and the intellectual's gaze turns all to stone. Ours is an age petrified by cognition, moribund by scholarship. David Holbrook says it well:

The mind, trained in 'rigorous disciplines,' ceases to be 'open' and 'relaxed.' The student ceases to be able to allow doubts, uncertainties, disturbance in his own inner world, and so ceases to respond to literature in a creative way. He is defended against it by an intellectual approach—he no longer feels, no longer knows what he feels, and is no longer capable of being moved, or opened to fresh experience. He 'appreciates' rather than speaks his true responses. To be stirred, puzzled, moved, upset is to experience a range of reactions—trivial to fantastic—which, if he experiences them in the examination room, will lead to hesitancies and callownesses that will penalize him.

The context is limited but the point is not.

Aesthetic experience does involve feeling; it involves the shattering of the "existent" inner order, permitting a new synthesis. People who are fixed or frozen inside, whose order is inviolate, are only half alive. Nothing less than psychic rebirth into an order in flux, sensitive and alive to the fluidity outside, permits an identity capable

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107 The Exploring Word, p. 128.
of the sensuous and the aesthetic. David Cooper writes that some people achieve this:

. . . by momentary craziness, catching themselves up again before invalidation supervenes, or by lysergic acid diethylamide or mescaline or marijuana, or simply by getting drunk, or by listening to some music or seeing a picture which shatters their pre-established inner order and provokes an autonomous effort to piece themselves together again. All aesthetic experience consists in this sort of adventure.¹⁰⁸

The schooling process obviously precludes such experience. The focus is study, development of the intellect, and in a culture whose classic dilemma is the hypertrophy of the intellect,¹⁰⁹ such foci preclude the development of an aesthetic and sensuous sensibility.

The cumulative effect of the schooling experience is devastating. We graduate, credentialed but crazed, erudite but fragmented shells of the human possibility.

What can be done, if anything, when schooling is almost synonymous with living? What kind of curriculum can we as educators plan that might arrest the maddening process?. Is schooling for sanity possible?

This writer-educator answers these questions with a tentative "yes," and in the following chapter he will des-

¹⁰⁸Psychiatry and Anti-Psychiatry, p. 81.

ribe a rationale for a Humanities "program" that may indeed be schooling for sanity. It seems, at this historical juncture, nothing less will do.
CHAPTER II

CRITIQUE AND RATIONALE

At the heart of the school is the Humanities program. The school and its program must aspire to humanization, to sanity, or be doomed to triviality.

The word "program" is not meant in its conventional sense, i.e., as a course of study, courses to be taken or requirements to be fulfilled. The notion of ambience is more helpful. A Humanities program, then, means a humanizing ambience. "Ambience" denotes in art, especially in painting, the configuration of secondary designs and themes that enhance and extend the central design or theme. Retaining this sense of the word, ambience, in our context, refers to areas of study traditionally regarded as the Humanities, e.g., literature, philosophy, the fine arts. "They" enhance the central design or theme, i.e., the individual person's journey toward sanity, but they are clearly secondary. It is beyond the scope of this investigation to specify the methodology by which these traditional areas of study would be taught. Let it suffice to reiterate the obvious; "they" are not to be "deposited." "They" are precisely areas of study, useful only to the extent to which the individual person finds them helpful.
or in some way pertinent to his journey. It is this journey, i.e., the process of individuation, of psychosocial and moral development, that must be our central concern.

With such a curricular focus, then, it is clear that the individual is the programmatic point of departure, not the discipline, nor the structure of it. In contrast, Bruner writes:

The curriculum of a subject should be determined by the most fundamental understanding that can be achieved of the underlying principles that give structure to the subject.\(^1\)

This view, in fact any curricular view which focuses on materials, implicitly assests to non-human, and finally inhuman, bases for schooling. Such theoretical underpinnings inevitably become, in one form or another, the banking concept of education, the effects of which we described in chapter one. The issue here may be reduced to two questions.

Is man the measure, and end in himself, an active thinking, desiring, loving force in nature? Or must man realize himself, attain his full stature only through a struggle toward participation in, conformity to, a norm, a measure, an ideal essence basically independent of man?\(^2\)

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Man is an end in himself; his self-realization is his ontological vocation. The school is an ambience in which the individual aspires to realize his possibilities, in which the human chrysalis unfolds. Schooling is humanization; educators join with their students, bringing out of themselves and others all that is within and potentially without.

The compulsively cognitive emphasis of curriculum specialists during the nineteen-sixties accentuated much of what was already wrong with American society. In a culture whose classical dilemma has been and is the hypertrophy of the intellect at the expense of feeling and sensuality, this emphasis on the cognitive represents the continued cultivation of the maddened schizoid, frighteningly prototypical. How many of us recognize ourselves in this description:

... the schizoid individual despersonalizes his relationship with himself. That is to say, he turns the living spontaneity of his being into something dead and lifeless by inspecting it. This he does to others as well, and fears their doing it to him.

This process is termed petrifaction and it obviously can be subsumed under the more generic term schooling.

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3 Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 27.
4 Against Interpretation, p. 7.
5 The Divided Self, p. 120.
Michael Novak speaks to this point in a less psychiatric way.

... moment by moment our culture through its many institutions is trying to teach us its way of imagining reality and conferring maturity, and to turn us away from impulses, feelings and expectations it has no use for or fears. Who knows how much of the human experience—our own experience—we are obliged to neglect, forget, displace, repress, because it is out of joint with what our culture calls 'unreal' and 'immature.' How much of ourselves have we had to disown in order to be where we are today?6 (underlining mine)

Such considerations evidently seem beside the point to many curricular theorists. All of us suffer from their omission, the complete implications of which are beginning to make themselves disasterously clear. Jung has understood this for years.

Modern man does not understand how much his 'rationalism' (which has destroyed his capacity to respond to numerous symbols and ideas) has put him at the mercy of the psychic 'underworld'. . . . His moral and spiritual tradition has disintegrated, and he is now paying the price for the breakup in world-wide disorientation and dissociation.7

The individual must not only be the "point of departure," but the "point of termination" as well. Against him or her must every dimension of the "program," every aspect of the ambience, be evaluated. Any "program" committed to sanity and humanization is condemned to fail

6 The Experience of Nothingness, pp. 93-94.

7 Man and His Symbols, p. 94.
unless the individual person is the "point" around which
the curriculum is integrated. As we shall see, this means,
in an operational sense, opportunities both for solitude
and for intense, intimate relationships with others.

Katz, in *No Time for Youth*, documents the centrality
of human relationships in the growth and development of
college students. He asked college seniors, after learning
how they felt they had changed since their admission,
what they thought contributed most to those changes.
Between one-third and one-half of those questioned replied
that personal relationships contributed most. These per­
centages did not include responses to other questions Katz
asked regarding relations with other people in dormitories
and other living groups, other contacts made on campus,
and those relationships made via dating, love, and marriage.
Next in order of frequency in Katz' study were responses
in which the seniors reported their "inward disposition"
as major sources of change. Subsumed under the term are
self-awareness, personal philosophy, self-reliance, and
responsibility. Only between one-fifth and one-fourth of
the respondents named course work and professors as
important sources of change.8

We can conclude what we suspected: that inter- and
intra-personal relationships are at the heart of the

educative, developmental process. Even those respondents, and it was a small minority, who singled out what might be termed aspects of the stated curriculum, mentioned professors, indicating some form of interpersonal exchange. What contributed most to the education of these young people was not listed in the catalogue; it was the "hidden curriculum." 

Katz asked a narrower question and the replies to it permit us to focus more closely at the reality of growth and change at college. Katz asked to what did the seniors attribute the changes that occurred during the preceding three and one-half years. Only thirteen percent ascribed great influence to relations with teachers and other adults. Only one-fourth said that ideas presented in courses or by teachers during interviews had much influence. Hence it was relationships with peers that had the major developmental impact. Katz concludes: "Once more it is the sphere of their private lives, rather than academic pursuits or public concerns, that receive the lion's share of the students' attention."

We have seen already how the school's insistence upon attention to matters outside the private realm can cause

9See B. Snyder for a different yet interesting view of the "hidden curriculum."

10No Time For Youth, p. 15.
the child to forget himself and eventually to lose himself. Katz' study indicates that any accurate description of the "college experience" must focus upon the inner lives of students. Obviously, however, more than recognition is warranted; it is the obligation of professional educators not only to acknowledge the importance of the private realm but to design an ambience that would have the effect of fostering and nourishing "it."

Katz found that adults had little influence in the lives of students. Given the developmental state of most adults, one takes comfort in that finding. Yet it need not be that way; it should not be that way. Difference in age and background necessarily creates distance, but educators could at least try to bridge the gap. Yet most teachers insist on playing roles that preclude the possibility of genuine communication. Novak gives an illustration.

When professors, for example, claim to speak not in their own personal voice, but in the name of science or of their professional discipline, their attempt at impersonality places them in the position of mouthpieces, not of men. Professors, indeed, are often tempted to play the role, "Reasonable, Objective, Unimpassioned Man." Such a pretence often provokes many students to charge their professors with a peculiar, specific kind of evasion: moral and political choice under the cover of value-free discourse. 'How do you know,' they say, 'when you are hearing your own professor's voice as a man, and when merely the professional
part of him? When are we ever exposed to hearing a man speak as a man?"11

We have seen the inauthenticity of such "bad faith."

We can be grateful that more and more of the college youth intuit this duplicity and reject it. Not until educators relinquish such roles, come out from behind their "professional" masks, and try to meet their students somewhere in the space that inevitably separates them, not until then can we envision the possibility of genuine communication and of mutual influence: of education. Speaking to this point but in another context, John Holt mentions another difficulty:

Academics are so accustomed to use language as a kind of display, like the tail feathers on a peacock or the stripes on a naval officer's sleeve, that it will be hard for them to learn this lesson.12

Several writers concerned with Humanities education have recognized, to some extent, the importance of the individual and his "inner life," and the importance of interpersonal encounter. As example, let us examine some of the writings of English educators, both to establish a sense of the historicity of this essay within the "literature" and to lay some preliminary theoretical groundwork for our curricular view.

11 The Experience of Nothingness, p. 43.

Louise Rosenblatt, in *Literature as Exploration*, asks: "How can the experience of literature foster a sound understanding of life and nourish the development of balanced, human personalities?"\(^{13}\) She answers:

Through books, the reader may explore his own nature, become aware of potentialities for thought and feeling—within himself, acquire a clearer perspective, develop aims and a sense of direction. He may explore the outer world, other personalities, other ways of life.\(^{14}\)

Rosenblatt states that growth in human understanding is a prerequisite for literary understanding, but aside from stating her belief that such understanding derives from literary understanding (a circular argument), she fails to address herself to the psych-social conditions necessary for growth.

In class, she argues, "an atmosphere of informal, friendly exchange should be created. . . . The class should be merely a friendly group, to come together to exchange ideas."\(^{15}\) However, her deeper, evidently "unconscious" political and cultural intent is revealed four pages later, in a long but significant passage.

A situation in which students did nothing but give free rein to their reactions, their likes

\(^{13}\) Louise Rosenblatt, *Literature as Exploration*, p. V.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., p. vi.

\(^{15}\) Ibid., p. 82.
and dislikes, would undoubtedly have psychiatric value. The psychologists have been warning us about the neurotic effects of the driving nature of our whole culture. In the compulsive atmosphere of the average school and college, where the emphasis is so much on fulfilling certain requirements, on living up to certain standards, a period when the pressure was relaxed and the student could feel that everything that he thought or said was equally valuable, might possibly have therapeutic effect. But such latitude would certainly not be conducive to the development of literary understanding. Our aim in the teaching of literature should be to give the student the form of emotional release which all art offers, and at the same time help him to gain increasingly complex satisfactions from literature. Therefore we cannot be content merely to permit the student to go on endlessly expressing untrammeled and untutored primitive emotions and ideas. We want to make it possible for him to have increasingly mature primary reactions to express.\textsuperscript{16}

(underlining mine)

Here it becomes clear that her essential attitude is patronizing and disrespectful. She, and her colleagues, evidently possess tutored, sophisticated emotions and ideas which she wants her students to be able to express. Freire rightly terms this kind of attitude "culture invasion."

Cultural invasion, which serves the ends of conquest and the preservation of oppression, always involves a parochial view of reality, a static perception of the world, and the imposition of one world view upon another. It implies the 'superiority' of the invader and the 'inferiority' of those who are invaded, as well as the imposition of values by the former,

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., pp. 86-87.
who possess the latter and are afraid of losing them.\(^{17}\)

One cannot have it both ways: "free exchange of conversation" and coercion, however subtle, of people into accepting the values of an oppressor class.

In fairness to Rosenblatt, however, one must emphasize her continually stated concern for the student's personal response to literature, with her hope that "the relationship to be fostered between the adolescent and literature... would give him a sense of the validity of his own personality and of his own personal responses to experience."\(^{18}\) In the preceding chapter we have discussed this "sense of validity" as the confirmation of one's experience, and its importance as a sine qua non for intellectual and emotional growth, indeed, for sanity, is immense. Yet one feels the claims made are exaggerated, that she hopes for too much. And, of course, the contradiction remains: she desires to change those responses while desiring to respect them. In her recent essay "Literature and the Invisible Reader," Rosenblatt's claims remain excessive, yet the beginnings of a basis for a genuinely "person-centered" curriculum are present:

They\(^{7}\) will study, not simply books, but the relationship of literary experiences.

\(^{17}\)Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 159.

\(^{18}\)Literature as Exploration, p. 204 (underlining mine)
to their other experiences. The great latent powers of literature may then indeed be realized in our schools and colleges. Students may learn how to feel the importance to their own lives not only of works of obvious immediacy but the relevance also of the vast realm of works of the past and of other cultures.¹⁹

(underlining mine)

One supports Rosenblatt's continued insistence that literary or aesthetic experience be integrated with the lebenswelt of the student. Such a dialectical relationship, with its explicit recognition of the private realm of the reader, is certainly a prerequisite for educative experience. However, to suppose that social sensitivity, self-awareness, etc., can be achieved merely or even primarily by reading and discussing one's readings is to ignore the dynamics of psycho-social-moral development, the theory of which must be the basis for any program, English or Humanities, which aspires to achieve such objectives.

Perhaps representative of British writers in this field are J. W. Patrick Creber, Frank Whitehead, and David Holbrook. On the whole, these writers tend to be more "humanistic" in their approaches than their American peers.²⁰ They, like Rosenblatt, help lay the initial foundation for a genuinely humanizing "program," as much


as that is possible, of course, in an inhumane and dehumanizing society.

Early in *Sense and Sensitivity*, Creber writes: "We cannot... accept... any dichotomy between the interests of the pupil and the interests of the subject."\(^{21}\) It is unclear what interests a "subject" might have, yet it is clear we have the same dialectic operative as we noted in Rosenblatt, a dialectic that can rarely lead to a synthesis. One cannot lead someone else to self-development via literature or otherwise.

However, Creber's commitment, at least at the verbal level, is strong: "In English teaching we are concerned with personality development..."\(^{22}\) And such a concern "means selecting material with little reference to any absolute aesthetic standard but with closest attention to the child's own interests and capacity."\(^{23}\)

In this last comment Creber does seem to go further than Rosenblatt, who never seems to relinquish her allegiance to traditional aesthetic standards, who genuinely cares about the development of her students, but especially as that potential can be employed for helping them express more "sophisticated" literary judgments.


\(^{22}\) Ibid., p. 97.

\(^{23}\) Ibid., p. 160.
Creber, as well, does not escape entirely the tacit proselytism of his class, the literary intelligentsia.

The importance of the teacher's own evident attitude to books cannot be exaggerated. If he is continually demonstrating their relevance to all kinds of topics in the classroom, and if he has the children's respect, then he will gradually begin to make converts. (underlining mine)

Creber never directly deals with the contradiction, but one feels he must be a teacher of unusual sensitivity who, although he never resolves the tacit political dimension of his pedagogical view with the stated humanizing aim, must establish an ambience in which students can explore themselves and each other. His intent is made even clearer when he quotes the Tessimond poem "The Man in the Bowler Hat," whom we recognize as the impotent, emptied-out object; the schooled, normal man of the "rational" twentieth century, i.e., the madman. Creber writes:

Indeed, the whole range of work in English that I have tried to outline is an attempt to ensure that fewer pupils who pass through our hands will be like the man described in Tessimond's poem:

The Man in the Bowler Hat

I am the unnoticed, the unnoticeable man:
The man who sat on your right in the morning train:
The man you looked through like a windowpane:
The man who was the colour of the carriate, the colour of the mounting Morning pipe-smoke.

24 Ibid., p. 181.
I am the man too busy with a living to live,
Too hurried and worried to see and smell
and touch:
The man who is patient too long and obeys
too much
And wishes too softly and seldom.

I am the man they call the nation's backbone,
Who am boneless--playable, catgut, pliable clay:
The man they label "little" lest one day
I dare to grow.

I am the rails on which the moment passes
The megaphone for many word and voices:
I am graph, diagram,
Composite face.

I am the led, the easily-fed,
The tool, though not-quite-fool
The would-be-safe-and-sound,
The uncomplaining bound,
The dust fine-ground,
Stone-for-a-statue waveworn pebble-round.25

It is T.S. Eliot's hollow man or J. Alfred Prufrock
or Charles Hampden-Turner's anomic man, but it is most of
us, who have been reduced to dessicated fragments of what
we might have been. To stop the mutilation, more than the
kind of humane English class these writers advocate is
necessary.

Frank Whitehead takes a different tack stressing what
he perceives to be the psychological effects of literary
experiences:

Here indeed lies the key to the supreme
power of literature; it is able, through its
symbolic representations to insinuate stable
forms of organization into feeling-aspect of

25 Ibid., p. 213.
our lives, and so help us maintain a balanced integrity between conflicting claims of inner and outer reality. . . . All children, whatever their role in life is to be, need experience of literature, they need the uniquely valuable organization if experience which is embodied in literature, if their personalities are to expand and flower into a capacity for fullness of living.26

Now literature may have performed such functions for Mr. Whitehead, and perhaps for literary intellectuals generally, but to insist it does so for the general population and ought to do so, is to project oneself onto others, assuming what was true for you will (should?) be true for me.

However, even on its own terms: what is the value of such a literary organization of one's experience? The detachment it suggests is akin to the detachment the schizoid and even the schizophrenic feels from his experience; it perpetuates the false self-system. Internal order achieved only through one's interiorizations of external order necessarily objectifies the self, atrophying the possibilities of expression and flowering Mr. Whitehead wrongly believes derives from such a literary organization of experience.

Aside from the considerable psychic effects, a literary organization of one's experience may preclude the possibil-

ity of living one's life. In this regard, this writer is reminded of a passage in Sartre's novel Nausea.

This what I thought: for the most banal even to become an adventure, you must (and this is enough) begin to recount it. This is what fools people: a man is always a teller of tales, he lives surrounded by his stories and the stories of others, he sees everything that happens to him through them; and he tries to live his own life as if he were telling a story.

But you have to choose: live or tell. ... That's living. But everything changes when you tell about life; it's a change no one notices: the proof is that people talk about true stories. As if there could possibly be true stories; things happen one way and we tell about them in the opposite sense.27

Whitehead has taken the affliction of the intellectual class, its moribund self-consciousness which often amounts to a petrifaction of experience or at the least an endless reflecting about experience but little experiencing, and makes it a summun bonum.

He, too, is caught in what might be termed the humanist-intellectualist dilemma: implicit (or explicit) belief in the absolute value of "high-brow" culture and belief in the absolute integrity of the individual person. However, one can rarely have it both ways; one is usually forced to choose one over the other, and if the choice is for "culture," the result for the student is maddening.

In a lengthy but significant passage Whitehead’s dilemma—actually the dilemma of "liberal" educators generally—becomes apparent, as does his political resolution of it.

At the centre of any sound conception of English teaching, there must be awareness that it is the child’s own speaking, reading, writing, thinking, and experiencing that really matters. But surely, it is sometimes objected, if we encourage children to be active in ways which they choose for themselves, they will just want to play all the time. There is a deep and disabling misconception here. Child study has shown incontrovertibly that children’s play is not a frivolous time-wasting occupation; it is on the contrary one of the central means by which the child extends his growing powers and fits himself ultimately to take his place in the adult world. Thus in the early years ‘the most fertile means of education... is the child’s own spontaneous play... which provides the normal means of growth in manipulative skill and imaginative expression, in discovery, thought, and reasoning...’ (Isaacs, 1935, p. 407) And in the same way the play activities for which children show such zest in the later years of childhood—their competitive and team games and their dramatic play, their hobbies,—need to be seen as important ways in which they develop their intellectual and imaginative experience, their powers of memory and persistence, and their capacity for social co-operation. Even at the secondary school stage the distinction between work and play (so obvious to most adults) has little real meaning to the child. The fundamental task for the teacher is to take hold of these powerful impulses toward growth and to guide them into the most fruitful channels, both in and out of school.28 (underlining mine)

28 The Disappearing Dais, p. 20.
What are fruitful channels? Who determines them? and for whom? and by what rationale? Like Rosenblatt and to a lesser extent like Creber, one senses that Whitehead values the spontaneous, the natural energy of the child primarily as it can be harnessed to accomplish his tacit political and cultural aims. This intent becomes clearer in later passages.

His /the teacher's/ own aim is to lead the child on from the book which offers the most immediate and easy enjoyment towards that which, at the cost of a somewhat greater effort of attention, pays a much higher dividend in satisfaction.29

Aside from the ugly pecuniary metaphor, the passage presupposes a couple of assumptions that need to be examined. First, it is assumed that one ought not be content merely with enjoyment which is immediate and easy. Secondly, it is assumed that satisfaction is a function of complexity. Clearly these are self-serving, justificatory assumptions made by a member of the intellectualist class intent on indoctrination, however subtly or "humanely," of the values of that class into the minds of students.

Even more distasteful are the assumptions implicit in this passage: "no one can be said to have fully mastered the art of reading until he is able not only to take in the meaning of what he reads but also assess its worth."30

29 Ibid., p. 56. 30 Ibid., p. 84.
The value of interpretation, i.e., "taking in" the meaning, is highly questionable. A number of writers\(^{31}\) point out that interpretation often amounts to little more than a philistine inability to leave the work alone. Implicit in the process is petrification, the dessication, of the living entity that is a work of art.\(^{32}\) The necessity to assess worth partly derives from our inability to accept a work for what it is, but it also derives from the larger acquisitive, capitalist culture,\(^{33}\) the mentality of which insists on placing a price tag on everything, even art. As well, the use of the term "worth" discloses Whitehead's allegiance to the notion of universal, absolute aesthetic standards; it reveals his inability to transcend the conformist, restrictive intellectualist class of which he is a member. This essentially elitist attitude is expressed clearly in a passage like this:

> We are led back again to the central task of all English teaching—the need to ensure that all children gain the widest possible acquaintance with forms of experience in all languages which are of a finer quality than those to which they are exposed in the home and the street.\(^{34}\)

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\(^{31}\)See Susan Sontag or David Holbrook, for example.

\(^{32}\)See section beginning p. 46 of this work.

\(^{33}\)See my "underpinnings" for a more detailed explanation of this relationship.

\(^{34}\)The Disappearing Dais, p. 90.
David Holbrook's *The Exploring Word* lays important theoretical groundwork for a genuinely humanizing Humanities "program." Again and again Mr. Holbrook stresses the importance of the intuitive, indicating a respect for internal processes largely untainted by elitist, oppressive attitudes. For example he writes:

> Education, especially the education of literacy, creativity and response to works of the imagination, is a natural subjective process, largely intuitive. It is also a process to do with love, with giving and receiving, and with sympathy and insight.\textsuperscript{35}

He emphasizes the point: "Since education deals with inward processes, and our experience of it is inevitably the experience of persons, it can never be other than subjective."\textsuperscript{36}

Rather than insisting upon helping students achieve more "complex satisfactions" from or determining the value of literature, rather than placing emphasis on the transmission of information--however disguised or liberally done--Holbrook states that:

> The needs of adult teacher and child pupil may be stated quite simply: they meet in the word. The essential process of teaching English is that of concern with whole meaning.\textsuperscript{37}

> ... it is a matter of responding to words: in the face of all the impulses and complexities I have been describing, to allow words to work

\textsuperscript{35} *The Exploring Word*, p. 4.


between us and experience, to foster change and growth in our personalities, to enlarge our capacities to explore and take hold of reality, and deal with it effectively.\textsuperscript{38}

More recently an American theorist has taken an essentially similar view. James Moffett argues that English is not a content area; it is not about anything in the same sense history, biology... are about something. English, French, and mathematics are symbol systems, into which the phenomenal data of empirical subjects are casts and by means of which we think about them. Symbol systems are not primarily about themselves; they are about other subjects. When a student 'learns' one of these systems, he learns how to operate it. The main point is to think and talk about other things by means of this system.\textsuperscript{39}

By distinguishing between symbolizing subjects and symbolized subjects,\textsuperscript{40} Moffett is dismissing the notion of English as a body of knowledge to be transmitted. English becomes "all discourse in our native language—any verbalizing of any phenomena, whether thought, spoken or written; whether literary or non-literary."\textsuperscript{41}

Thus the groundwork is more firmly laid; Rosenblatt calls for "free exchange of conversation," Holbrook for "meeting in the word," and Moffett, typically cognitive (the

\textsuperscript{38}Ibid., p. 149.


\textsuperscript{40}Ibid., p. 8.

\textsuperscript{41}Ibid., p. 9.
significance of which we shall see later), views English as the "verbalizing of any phenomena." Dialogue, or dialogical encounter, becomes central to an English program. Process and content merge, and rightly so. As Moffett points out (and it is a point Friere might make in a different context): "All knowledge is some codification by man of his phenomenal world." To view earnest dialogue as a process apart from the serious task of learning knowledge is to misunderstand both the nature of knowledge and of dialogue.

Moffett has cleared away much theoretical "deadwood," and one hopes for a genuinely student-centered curriculum. However, one is disappointed. Let us briefly examine why.

Moffett writes that "the sequence of psychological development should be the backbone of curriculum continuity." In order to determine "a proper learning order in English," he examines theories of child development and the various scholarly formulations of language and literature. Clearly Moffett is interested in theories of human development only as they aid him in proposing

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42 See Pedagogy of the Oppressed.
43 Teaching the Universe of Discourse, p. 8.
45 Ibid.
"curriculum units and sequence," which are "founded on different kinds of discourse." He uses psychological theory in the worst sense of the verb. He has his aims; he has substituted kinds and orders of discourse for specific works of literature or grammar exercises, but at the most fundamental level of lived experience at school, little has changed. The content, i.e., what is said, the style, how it is said, are changed; however, the process, the medium, is not. Rather than perusing the psychological literature to formulate a model of man around which a curriculum is designed, for which a curriculum is designed, Moffett, and one must not be overly harsh, for after all, most curriculum theorists do it, pillages the knowledge of the intricate process of human development in order to more effectively help the student accomplish Moffett's goals.

What are his goals?

The essential purpose of such a curriculum based on the hierarchy of abstraction would be to have the student abstract at all ranges of the symbolic spectrum and progressively to integrate his abstractions into thought structures that assimilate both autistic and public modes of cognition. . . . The goal is not so much to attain the higher levels as it is to practice abstracting all along the way. No greater value is ascribed to one level than to another. . . . To be the master, and not the dupe, of symbols, the symbol-maker

46 Ibid., p. 10.
must understand the nature and value of his abstractions.\textsuperscript{47} (underlining mine)

We have seen, in chapter one, how crucial to sanity it is to live from one's inside out, from the subjective center of one's being. We have also seen that public modes of being are almost always characterized by bad faith and madness. Yet Moffett desires some kind of integration of the two, and to achieve it, he rightly prescribes "practice."

Essential to dissociation is the split between one's insides and one's behavior. Practice enough, and the dissociative process necessarily commences. And, of course, he is not serious about being value-free (even if such a posture were possible);\textsuperscript{48} clearly, to abstract higher connotes sophistication, intelligence, a higher level of thought. Why "practice" if it isn't valuable? Furthermore, to avoid being duped by "symbols," one must hold allegiance to the messages that come from within. Cognition is no defense at all.\textsuperscript{49}

It becomes apparent that Moffett, after making an important beginning, has fallen prey to the worst naive assumptions of a rationalist, intellectualist mentality. One's suspicions soon receive further corroboration:

\textsuperscript{47}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 25.

\textsuperscript{48}\textit{Radical Man}, p. 28.

\textsuperscript{49}\textit{The Human Possibility}, p. 12.
I am not talking here just about dry data and intellectual matters. I am trying to talk simultaneously about effective thought, emotional health, and active values. The relations among feeling, thought, and values are such that this course not only possible but in the end necessary. Psychological disorders are as much as anything else, cognitive disorders.\(^\text{50}\) (underlining mine)

His narrow, blinding cognitive bias is made even clearer:

Our behavior is very dependent on our information, on what we think is so and what we think the meaning of something is. The more he becomes conscious of his own abstracting, the more he understands that his information is relative and can be enlarged and modified. By perceiving, inferring, and interpreting differently, he enlarges his behavioral repertory, sees new possible courses of action, and knows better why he is acting as he does. Choice becomes more real. The function of informing is essentially to guide action.\(^\text{51}\) (underlining mine)

Let us examine one final revealing passage.

If a student becomes aware of his abstractive process by discoursing progressively up the hierarchy, and by examining his discourses in collaboration with peers and a guiding adult, he has an opportunity to correct and adjust his cognition.\(^\text{52}\)

Correct and adjust one's carburetor? The image of man from which Moffett writes is clear; it is mechanistic. A human being is a thinking machine, albeit a complicated one, but a machine nonetheless. Like a computer, a man's behavior or output is a function of input, or information.

\(^\text{51}\)Ibid., p. 27.

\(^\text{52}\)Ibid.
The more information he can process, the more varied will be the possible outputs, or to put it in Moffett's words, the more enlarged is one's behavioral repertory. Feelings? Values? They are simply a function of cognition. "Psychological disorders are... cognitive disorders."^3

This is the rationalist mind-set which has produced the Bomb, "protective-reactions," Vietnam, and which has been cogently and comprehensively critiqued long before these fruitions of its "labor" by such important writers as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Sartre, Camus, and others. The foundation of Moffett's theory is simply inaccurate, or at least it should be. One way of viewing his theory is to regard it as an indicator of the extent to which people in this seventh decade of the twentieth century have been de-humanized, automatized, maddened, so that indeed, they are machines. However, description is not prescription, an "is" is not an "ought"; we must reject insanity and its manifestations in theory.

We have seen how these writers have laid important and necessary groundwork for humanizing English classes. We have also seen, excluding Mr. Holbrook, their inability to resolve the contradiction of allegiance to two "poles": respect for the discipline and respect for the person. More fundamental, is their failure to provide an adequate model

^3For a fascinating if frightening elaboration of this view, see the writings of Albert Ellis, especially Rational-Emotive Psychotherapy.
of man and of his development at the "center" of their rationales. However, one must not be overly harsh; one suspects a genuinely humanizing experience is quite unlikely in the context of a classroom, whatever the subject-matter or how humanely taught. We must step back from the individual subject-areas and take a broader view. With such a view, it is clear that we have asked the impossible of the study of literature, the fine arts, the social sciences. A new construct is necessary: a Humanities ambience, at the center of which would be the individual person and his psycho-social-moral development, and on the periphery of which, almost in resource fashion, are the traditional disciplines. Within such an ambience the maddening process that necessarily accompanies living in a maddened world might be arrested; in fact, we might learn to grow toward sanity. In both an historical and personal sense, education in such a setting might make an important difference, a difference between personal madness and sanity, and between a world gone mad and a world in which we might learn to live sanely.

An adequate conceptualization of such education necessitates the establishment and examination of three constituent elements, elements we found lacking in the writings of the Humanities educators we critiqued. The first component is an adequate image of man, one that reflects the reality and, most importantly, the possibility that
is human being. Secondly, we must establish and explicate a viable model of psycho-social development. Thirdly, we must establish and explicate an activity we believe permits, in fact, fosters psycho-social development, i.e., growth toward the image of man we seek to become, i.e., sane men.

Image of Man

Central to our formulations is acute awareness of the importance of the individual to any curricular conceptualization.

Jung affirms this view when he writes: "The individual is the only reality. The further we move away from the individual toward abstract ideas about Homo sapiens, the more likely we are to fall into error."54 Hampden-Turner takes a similar stance: "One cannot know persons in general, not with all the psychological knowledge yet compiled, but only particular persons here and now."55

Allport insists that "the outstanding characteristic of man is his individuality,"56 and he quotes Dobzhansky who concurs: "Every human being is, then, the carrier of a unique genotype."57 The psychic analog can be found in

54 Man and His Symbols, p. 58.
55 Radical Man, p. 53.
57 Ibid., p. 5.
Jungian psychology; it is postulated that each person has a center, a self that is inborn and which grows slowly and imperceptibly.\(^5^8\)

Such uniqueness that is each person means, of course, that each sees the world in a different way. What is on the periphery of my world may be at the center of yours. Explicating three recent works by Sartre,\(^5^9\) Laing and Cooper comment on this aspect of one's individuality.

Each particular perspective, each particular point of view, that is, precisely, each person, is the centre of his own world, but not the centre of anyone else's world—although many people strain to make themselves so. Each point of view is an absolute, and at the same time absolutely relative; the collisions between points of view are the occasion of the endless instability of humanity, the collusions are efforts at some measure of stabilization.\(^6^0\)

These writers go on to explain Sartre's concept of totalization, the synthesis each continually makes of his experience, which might be said to be one's developing point of view. Of each person's perspective, Laing and Cooper suggest the following:

One begins to suspect that no totalization has the whole truth, that none need, however, be totally false. Each is relative. Yet each can have relative validity. And in all this

\(^{5^8}\)Man and His Symbols, p. 161. This growth is contingent to a large extent upon the ambience. See p. 162.

\(^{5^9}\)Saint Genet, Comedien et Martyr (1952), Questions de Methode (1960), and Critique de la Raison Dialectique (1960).

\(^{6^0}\)Reason and Violence, pp. 11-12.
one finds oneself making a synthesis in turn of all these other syntheses, and may even pride oneself that one's own synthesis contains the overall truth—until one discovers that someone else has incorporated one's own synthesis into his synthesis, detotalized one's totalization, and so on, ad infinitum.61

So we see again, from a different point of view, that education is synthesizing, the continual development of a unique perspective, occasionally colliding and occasionally colluding to depasse62 what one was to become, what one is and what one will be. Hence the person is hardly the static, empty vessel teacher-bankers seem to assume; each is a Subject, an agent, continually learning.

Sartre views personal life as "constituted—constituting," as "a synthetic unity of what we make of what we are made of, moulding ourselves out of how we have been moulded."63 This forward movement, if you will, is at the core of what is human, that is, what is sane.

Man is characterized above all else by the depassment of a situation, because he is able to do or undo what has been done to him. . . . We find his depassment at the root of what is human. . . . 64

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61Ibid., p. 12.  
62Sartre uses the verb depasser in a special sense. The closest English translation is "to exceed."  
63Reason and Violence, p. 12.  
64Ibid., pp. 23-24.
Coming from a different philosophic framework, Allport makes an essentially similar observation. First speaking of animal life, then of human life, Allport notes:

Every young animal... seems to have the capacity to learn. That is to say, there is something inherently plastic in his neuro-psychic nature that will make changes in response possible. If he is normally endowed the human infant will in time develop a conscience, a sense of self, and a hierarchical organization of traits. He will become some sort of structural system, self-regulating and self-maintaining. What is more, he will exert himself to become something more than a stencil copy of the species to which he belongs.65

This view is shared by many humanistic psychologists, a good example of whom is Bonner, who writes:

... we are all proactive—that is, possessed of some degree of forward movement—in different life situations. The degree and extent of pro-action will depend on the degree and extent of encouragement or suppression of the natural forward movement of the healthy organism.66

Bonner stresses that the extent to which the individual moves forward, i.e., develops psycho-socially, is very much contingent upon two factors. One is the degree of facilitation or suppression which characterizes the human ambience in which the person dwells; the second is the courage he has to face his freedom,67 although it would


66 Challenges of Humanistic Psychology, p. 61.

67 Ibid., p. 63.
seem this second factor is partially a function of the first. The picture these psychologists are beginning to paint suggests that if the "world" in which the child finds himself is nourishing and supportive, then he or she will tend to realize his or her psycho-social and moral potential.

Allport argues that the process of personality development is governed also by a dynamic inherent to the person, that is, by a predisposition to actualize one's possibilities, and to become characteristically human, which this writer assumes to mean sane. And of these possibilities, the one Allport sees as most urgent is "... individuation, the formation of an individual style of life that is self-aware, self-critical, and self-enhancing."68 Bugental concurs with this view.69

An important question becomes: if human beings can realize their possibilities, what if those possibilities are primarily angry or violent ones? Is it not "human nature" to express anger and hatred? Significantly, the answers to these questions are "no." Allport explains:

Aggression and hatred... are reactive protests, aroused only when affiliative tendencies are thwarted. A patient in treatment, we know, makes progress toward

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69 *The Human Possibility*, p. 44.
health in proportion as his resentments, hostility, and hatred lessen, and in proportion as he feels accepted and wanted by therapist, family, and associates. Love received and love given comprise the best form of therapy. But love is not easily commanded or offered by one whose whole life has been marked by reactive protests against early deprivation. This view resembles Erik Erikson's famous aphorism that those who have been violated violate others. It also mirrors Simone Weil's observation that whoever is uprooted uproots others. R. D. Laing puts it this way: "If we can stop destroying ourselves we may stop destroying others." Arthur Janov argues that the neurotic is unable to let others be what they are because he has not been permitted to be what he is. Writing about the continually angry man, Janov contends that

... the angry man is the unloved man—the man who could not be what he was. He is usually angry at his parents for not letting him be and angry at himself for carrying on this denial of self. But need is basic; anger is secondary—it is what happens when need is not fulfilled.

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70 See Chapter I, p. 27 for Laing's definition of the term.

71 Becoming, p. 32.


73 The Politics of Experience, p. 76.

74 The Primal Scream, p. 248.

75 Ibid., p. 322.
In a long passage worth quoting, H. S. Sullivan puts the matter in his engaging way.

One of the great social theories is, you know, that society is the only thing that prevents everybody from tearing everybody to bits; or that man is possessed of something wonderful called sadism. I have not found much support for these theories—that man is essentially a devil, that he has an actual need for being cruel and hurtful to his fellows, and so on—in the study of some of the obscure schizophrenic phenomena. And so as the years passed, my interest in understanding why there is so much devilry in human living culminated in the observation that if the child had certain kinds of very early experience, then this malevolent attitude toward his fellows seemed to be conspicuous. And when the child did not have these particular types of experience, then this malevolent attitude was not a major component.

And the pattern that appeared was approximately this: For a variety of reasons, many children have the experience that when they need tenderness, when they do that which once brought tender cooperation, they are not only denied tenderness but they are treated in a fashion to provoke anxiety or even, in some cases, pain. A child may discover that manifesting the need for tenderness toward the potent figures around him leads frequently to his being disadvantaged, being made anxious, being made fun of, and so on, so that according to the locution used, he is hurt, or in some cases he may be literally hurt. Under those circumstances, the developmental course changes to the point that the perceived need for tenderness brings a foresight of anxiety or pain. The child learns, you see, that it is highly disadvantageous to show any need for tender cooperation from the authoritative figures around him, in which case he shows something else, and that something else is the basic malevolent attitude, the attitude that one really lives among enemies—that is what it amounts to.76 (underlining mine)

76 The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry, pp. 213-14.
When one seriously reflects on these observations and on the interpersonal reality of the school,\textsuperscript{77} one almost is amazed that the world is not peopled by even more malevolent persons than is already the case.

It becomes indisputable that, in a significant way, "The individual human's personality is determined by the quality of his relationships with other people."\textsuperscript{78} Even a writer primarily concerned with the study of literature makes a similar observation. Rosenblatt notes that anthropologists have found that each culture has the effect of nourishing certain aspects of the human personality and ignoring or suppressing others. She concludes that there would be an incalculable difference in the personality of a person raised in a culture which valued gentleness and cooperation and one that valued aggression, violence, and self-serving individualism.\textsuperscript{79} G. H. Mead underscores the contention that the self is predominantly a function of the social milieu.\textsuperscript{80} John Dewey speaks to the same point.

Honesty, chastity, malice, peevishness, courage, triviality, industry, irresponsibility are not private possessions of a person.

\textsuperscript{77}See Chapter I, section on Thwarting of Affiliative Needs, p. 23, for a review of this matter.

\textsuperscript{78}The Conditions of Human Growth, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{79}Literature as Exploration, p. 176.

\textsuperscript{80}G. H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).
They are working adaptations of personal capacities with environing forces.\footnote{81}

While these views seem overly deterministic, they do state an important truth. A certain sensitivity and caring are a \textit{sine qua non} for the psycho-social-moral development of the person. As Sullivan notes: ". . . the need for tenderness is ingrained from the very beginning of things as an interpersonal need."\footnote{82}

With this need met, with an ambience characterized by tenderness, gentleness, sensitivity, what image of man unfolds? Because we are historically rooted, and in an essentially malevolent culture, we can see only glimpses of what man might become, what Nietzsche termed the "overman," Hampden-Turner the "radical man," what we term the sane man. Nonetheless, we do have glimpses, tentative and overly broad as they are. Let us examine a few of them.

In an essay importantly entitled \textit{The Human Possibility}, Bugental sketches this picture. Man, he writes, is a being in process; he is continually evolving. He never matures, in a final and complete sense, nor is he ever educated, in the sense of a process terminated. Man creates himself through his process; by reflection he defines what he is, what he will be, and what his "world" is and will be.


\footnote{82}{The \textit{Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry}, p. 40.}
Bugental suggests that the best way to help a person develop is to help him be what he is, permit him to do what he desires to do, help him obtain what he wants, and finally, aid him in feeling competent and fulfilled where and as he is. He notes that people differ fundamentally in certain essential aspects of what they seek, what they value, what they need, and the ways in which they learn, behave, and develop. He insists that such differences be respected, if each person is to develop his potential. Bugental argues that what a person wants to learn coincides with what he needs to learn which coincides with what he will learn when he is granted freedom and support. As a corollary, extrinsic measurement, segregations, discipline, motivation, or assessment and grading are not only inane but detrimental to the genuine learning process. Bugental does not regard education as some sort of preparation for life. Rather it is an integral dimension of one's life which is operative throughout one's life; moreover, it is as essential to the mind and spirit as food is to the body.83

Obviously his strokes are much too broad, but he does portray a certain truth about human beings under certain circumstances. The implications of such a view are equally broad. After affirming that education must be directed

83 The Human Possibility, pp. 77-78.
toward individuals, not groups, and that it must not be imposed on persons, but be made available to them, Bugental advises that a new system should:

* Help individuals lead the lives they wish to live.
* Help individuals accomplish what they want to accomplish.
* Help people discover whatever level of awareness that permits them to acknowledge their true needs and strive to fulfill them.\(^{84}\)

Again, we realize that these formulations are not especially helpful in themselves, although they do point, in a general way, to the kind of schooling necessary for sane people. One important dimension of such a program, as Bugental points out, is "helping" people discover their insides, their unfolding natures that form one "side" of the dialectic whose synthesis is the human being at any given moment. Bugental writes:

When a person realizes his intentions and appetites he can understand or be more in harmony with his own intentionality. Then it becomes possible for him (with or without help, depending on the individual) to explore that intentionality further. He can come to recognize alternative intents, to become aware of his own preferred ways of doing things and relating with others, and to identify his own person. These sorts of insights will lead to recognition of what he needs to learn, what materials and tools he requires, what com-

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\(^{84}\) Ibid., p. 78.
panionship and sharing he wants, and how he wants to go about his purposes. This is an idealized picture, and in some measure it is quite possible and is, indeed, occurring in some places and for some people.85

One writer terms such people "self-actualizing," a characterization which we shall examine shortly. Before we do, however, let us examine further this notion of intentionality. It suggests, in Reisman's term "inner-directed," in the educationists' jargon "intrinsic motivation," or simply self-direction.86 The idea goes deeper than these terms indicate. In Jungian psychology, it connotes the development of the psyche, the process of individuation, the gradual unfolding of what one is.87 Von Franz describes this matter metaphorically. A tree, he writes, does not become annoyed if its growth is blocked by a rock, nor does it formulate strategies to overcome the obstacle. A tree merely "feels" whether it should grow toward one direction rather than another. Like a tree, Von Franz contends, the person must attend to the almost imperceptible yet powerful impulse which derives from the inherent urge toward unique self-realization. This attending means seeking that which is unknown to anyone else, that which gives the "ego" only guiding hints.88

85 Ibid., p. 80.
86 See Chapter I for a discussion of this matter.
87 Man and His Symbols, p. 163.
88 Ibid., p. 164.
Thus intentionality precludes imitation of others. Even a great spiritual leader must not be mimicked. "To follow in the steps of a great spiritual leader," writes Von Franz, "does not mean that one should copy and act out the pattern of the individuation process made by his life. It means that we should try with a sincerity and devotion equal to his to live our own lives." 89

As we have seen, failure to know and follow oneself results in dissociation and madness. There is a political corollary.

... mass repression leads to the same result as individual repression; that is, to neurotic dissociation and psychological illness. All such attempts to repress the reactions of the unconscious must fail in the long run, for they are basically opposed to our instincts.90

Yankelovich and Barrett make essentially the same point in their study of *Ego and Instinct*.91

The converse is also the case. "... an uncondition- al devotion to one's own process of individuation also brings about the best possible social adaptation." 92 Or, to put it another way:

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89 Ibid., p. 217.
90 Ibid., p. 222.
92 *Man and His Symbols*, p. 223.
But if a single individual devotes himself to individuation, he frequently has a positive contagious effect on the people around him. It is as if a spark leaps from one to another. And this usually occurs when one has no intention of influencing others and often when he uses no words.93

This reminds one of Charles Reich's much disputed contention of revolution by consciousness. It could be argued that underlying the "new" consciousness, consciousness III, is loyalty to self, or living from the inside out. Some critics have charged the so-called counter-culturists with tribalism, primitivism, and a general rejection of "civilization." Von Franz' comments regarding the function of dreams hint that such charges may indeed be accurate, if differently regarded.

Our dreams, however, are not as a rule primarily concerned with our adaptation to outer life. In our civilized world, most dreams have to do with the development (by the ego) of the 'right' inner attitude toward the Self, for this relationship is far more disturbed in us by modern ways of thinking and behaving than is the case with primitive peoples. They generally live directly from the inner center, but we with our uprooted consciousness are so entangled with external, completely foreign matters that it is very difficult for the message of the Self to get through to us. Our conscious mind continually creates the illusion of a clearly shaped, "real" outer world that blocks off many other perceptions. Yet through

93 Ibid., p. 224.

94 A term employed by Simone Weil. Heidegger used "shipwrecked," Erikson "violated." All three suggest our schizoid, dissociated state.
our unconscious we are inexplicably connected to our psychic and physical environment.\textsuperscript{95}

These same themes surface in the writing of the American psychologist Abraham Maslow. Rather than individuation, Maslow theorizes about self-actualization. In an article written in 1965, Maslow summarizes, in a somewhat nondescript way to be sure, behaviors that lead to self-actualization. We get yet another glimpse of an adequate image of man.

"First," Maslow writes, "self-actualization means experiencing fully, vividly, selflessly, with full concentration and total absorption."\textsuperscript{96} It means, he continues, experiencing without the "self-consciousness" characteristic of the adolescent. Secondly, Maslow portrays life as a series of choices, which can be roughly differentiated as "progression" choices and "regression" choices. The former indicate movement toward openness, risk, authenticity; the latter toward defense, safety, toward being fearful. Thirdly, Maslow points out that the process of self-actualization presupposes the "existence" of a self. A human being is not a \textit{tabula rasa}; he has a center which will emerge if one is attentive to what Maslow terms "impulse voices." Most of the time, he argues, we

\textsuperscript{95}Man and His Symbols, p. 208.

\textsuperscript{96}Challenges of Humanistic Psychology, p. 281.
listen not to ourselves, but to the introjected voices of our parents and other authority figures. Fourth, Maslow advises us to be honest rather than not. Fifth, he reviews what he has suggested thus far: experiencing without self-awareness, making growth rather than regression choices, listening to impulses, being honest, and taking responsibility for oneself. All of these, he suggests, are steps toward the actualization of self; the person will come to learn what is constitutionally right for him. He will come to know who he is. "One cannot choose wisely for life unless he dares to listen to himself, his own self." Sixth, Maslow wants to say that self-actualization is a process as well as an end-state. One must attempt to actualize one's possibilities at any time and in any amount. Seventh, peak experiences are transient moments the self-actualizing person experiences. They are periods of ecstasy which cannot be sought, but which accompany the process. Eighth, Maslow cautions that he who attempts to discover who he is, what he is, what he likes and dislikes, where he is going, opening himself to others and to himself risks psychopathology. Self-actualization means the identification of defenses and their relinquishing them; it means becoming oneself, becoming sane.97

97Ibid., pp. 281-284.
Carl Rogers presents a view which is in basic agreement with Maslow's. Rogers argues that intrinsic to man is a tendency to actualize himself. Within a human being is the urge to expand, extend, develop, mature; within him is the tendency to express and actualize all the capacities of his organism. This tendency, Rogers allows, often becomes buried under layers of psychological defenses; often it becomes hidden behind elaborate facades which seem to deny its existence. Rogers believes, however, that this tendency "exists" in every individual; it "awaits only the proper conditions to be released and expresses."\(^{98}\)

In an important passage, Rogers describes the process of becoming a person.

... a favorable psychological climate a process of becoming takes place; ... here the individual drops one after another of the defensive masks with which he has faced life; ... he experiences fully the hidden aspects of himself; ... he discovers in these experiences the stranger who has been living behind these masks, the stranger who is himself. I have tried to give my picture of the characteristic attributes of the person who emerges; a person who is developing a trust in his own organism as an instrument of sensitive living; a person who accepts the locus of evaluation as residing within himself; a person who is learning to live his life as a participant in a fluid, ongoing process, in which he is continually discovering new aspects of himself in the flow of his experience. These are some of the elements which seem to me to be involved in becoming a person.\(^{99}\)

\(^{98}\)Carl Rogers, *Becoming a Person*, p. 350.

To become a person might well be the objective of our Humanities "program." Instead of the de-humanized, automatized, maddened men the school now "produces," we aspire to establish the "favorable psychological climate" Rogers mentions so that our students might become persons, become themselves, become sane. We have now seen the broad outlines of such people. We have established a viable image of man, rooted in reality, yet aspiring toward the ideal.

To accompany this essential constituent element of our rationale, we must provide a conceptual framework from which to examine the process of individuation, of becoming a person. Perhaps the most satisfactory model of human development currently available is the Hampden-Turner one, described in his book Radical Man: The Process of Psycho-Social Development. It would be accurate to describe it, in Sartre's terminology, as a totalization of previous synthesis in the field. Paraphrased, Hampden-Turner is suggesting that a "radical" man's existence projects into the world his own intellectual, moral, and psychic synthesis. At segment "a" of the cycle, the person perceives the world as it is, yet does not flinch in the face of injustice and absurdity; he remains determined to redress the imbalance and make it just. At segment "b" the person reaffirms his identity, what he is and what he is becoming, and this process of identifying himself he
A Model of Psycho-Social Development

Man exists freely

a) through the quality of his perception
b) the strength of his identity

c) and the synthesis of these into his anticipated and experienced competence
d) he invests this with intensity and authenticity
e) by periodically suspending his cognitive structures and risking himself

f) in trying to bridge the distance to the other(s)

i) each will attempt to integrate the feedback from this process into mental matrices of developing complexity
h) and through a dialectic achieve a higher synergy
g) he seeks to make a self-confirming, self transcending impact upon the other(s)

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100 RADICAL MAN, p. 31.
examines and understands. At segment "c" he seeks and develops different competencies and strengthens already "existent" ones. At "d" he intensely and authentically invests himself in his human environment, committing himself to those he finds there. At "e" he risks his sense of identity by suspending his assumptions and disclosing his vulnerable self to friends and to forces of reaction. At segment "f" he bridges the distance between himself and others, especially to those who are often designated as "deviant," those who are despised, the so-called minority groups, so-called "enemies" of his country, in hope of making contact, discovering novel forms of life, and generating compassion. At "g" he finds confirmation of self and the meanings he comes to invest transcend his own personality and become part of a collective consciousness, the consciousness of a community. At "h" he forms cooperative relationships of higher synergy, but often only after threatening and desperate confrontation and ensuing struggle to understand. At "i" he integrates these experiences, utilizing the concepts which have emerged from the encounter to expand or "heighten" his consciousness.101

Complementary to the Hampden-Turner model is the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Scale.

Stage 1. Obedience and punishment orientation. Ego-centric deference to superior power or prestige, or a trouble-avoiding set. Objective responsibility.

Stage 2. Instrumental Relativists. Naively egoistic orientation. Right action is that instrumentally satisfying the self's needs and occasionally others. Awareness of relativism of value to each actors' needs and perspective. Naive egalitarianism and orientation to exchange and reciprocity.

Stage 3. Personal Concordance. Good boy orientation. Orientation to approval and to pleasing and helping others. Conformity to stereotypical images of majority or natural role behavior, and judgment by intentions.

Stage 4. Law and Order. Authority and social order maintaining orientation. Orientation to "doing duty" and showing respect for authority and maintaining the given social order for its own sake. Regard for earned expectations of others.

Stage 5. Social Contract. Contractual legalistic orientation. Recognition of an arbitrary element or starting point in rules or expectations for the sake of agreement. Duty defined in terms of contract, general avoidance of violations of the will or rights of others, and majority will and welfare.

Stage 6. Individual Principles. Conscience or principle orientation. Orientation not only to actually ordained social rules but to principles or choice involving appeal to logical universality and consistency. Orientation to conscience as a directing agent and to mutual respect and trust.

Ibid., pp. 120-21.
This writer contends that the fully developed and developing person, the sane person who lives from his subjective center outward, who has grown up among friends, will reach some form of stage six on the Kohlberg scale. Such a person will closely mirror the image of man outlined in this chapter, and he will live in such a manner that the various segments of the Hampden-Turner cycle will evident. Such "courage to be," to stand without crutches, is obviously very difficult. However, it is possible. It is our responsibility as curricular theorists and as educators to design an ambience in which possibility becomes actuality.
We can conceptualize the Humanities ambience by differentiating between two types of components: the nuclear and the cortical.

The nuclear component refers to the center of the ambience, the curricular nucleus of human growth and development, while the cortical component refers to peripheral elements. They are, however, interdependent and mutually supportive; together they constitute a total humanizing ambience in which persons can develop their intellectual, moral, and psycho-social potentialities.

The nuclear component is the basic encounter group or the Training group. It is within this setting that intense, genuine, synergistic meetings among persons occur. In this setting people can come to discover who they are, how they are with people, and who and how they want to become. This component is indeed nuclear to our Humanities program and we shall discuss and defend it now at length.

After this discussion and defense, we shall briefly describe the cortical component.
Nuclear Component

One index of the maddened person, of the psycho-socically and morally undeveloped individual, is the degree to which he relies upon tradition and convention to facilitate his interpersonal "transactions."1 Hampden-Turner discusses this index in an interesting passage on the "formal system as safety harness." People use formal structures to fall back on, and the word "back" is important. People, Hampden-Turner contends, tend to experiment more in small groups of friends and in personal relationships characterized by trust and intimacy. However, such relationships, often tentative, passionate, and novel, involve much risk (segment e); hence they are more likely to break down. "When this happens," Hampden-Turner continues, "frightened men fall back on previously established communications in the form of social structure."

He gives an example. When a marriage breaks down, the partners resort to the legal system. As expensive, crude, and generally unsatisfactory as this solution is, it is evidently more desirable than direct and honest expression of the bitterness that in all likelihood accompanies the breakdown in the relationship. Similarly, the failure of

1See the writings of psychiatrist Eric Berne for a formulation of "transactional analysis."
a manager and his subordinate to agree usually results in the manager "pulling rank" and imposing his view on the other. Whenever such people can no longer tolerate the anxiety of prolonged and heated disagreement in, say, a meeting, they resort to the hierarchical structure. Obviously those with higher status prevail.2

Of course resorting to such techniques—and how many teachers and parents so resort?—makes human relations indirect, dishonest, and finally, inhuman. Such falling back upon established structures is partly a function of the Zeitgeist in our technocratic age, a fundamental premise of which is that every human action is perfectable if it is isolated, studied, and its determining variables identified. Psycho-social development, however, "consists of being surprised, excited and confounded a large proportion of the time while maintaining a balanced integrity between perception, communication, action and thought."3

Such mechanistic ways of being-with-others is dystrophying. In fact, the person "... can only grow in relationship to 'significant others' with whom he forms synergistic relationships."4 While affirming that truth,

2 *Radical Man*, pp. 135-36.
we must again emphasize the importance of solitude to human development. With that component firmly in mind, must allow that "... all existing persons have the need and possibility of going out from their centeredness to participate in other beings."\(^6\)

One measure of such participation is the degree of self-disclosure. Sidney Jourard has done considerable work on this dimension. However, as Hampden-Turner points out in his critique of Jourard's work, this measure is not adequately sensitive for the estimation of psycho-social development. Included in the highly developed relationships recorded by this instrument are people whose compulsion it is to disclose themselves. Nevertheless, evidently "there are significant if modest relationships between high self-disclosure and strength of the cycle."\(^7\)

Self-disclosure, essential to growth, must not be compulsive, nor can it be dishonest. One must be oneself authentically, and hence, experience the attendant anxiety. The more one discloses, the more vulnerable one usually feels; it is this sense of anxiety and vulnerability which permits development. Hampden-Turner puts it this way:

\(^5\)See section on Alienation from Personal Reality, p. 40, of this work.

\(^6\)Radical Man, p. 45.

\(^7\)Ibid., p. 45.
only if radical man has periodically 'immolated himself in the purging fires of his own anxiety, conflict, and self-suspension can he also transcend his 'final' death, and rise like a Phoenix from the ashes, so that those who know him may 'have life and . . . have it more abundantly.'

One precondition for such self-suspension and usually one outcome of it is the building of trust. Trust is not meant in the sense that the infant, who is completely and necessarily reliant upon another, is trustful. The trust that we are discussing here is a mature trust, learned by exposing one's suspended and vulnerable self to another, discovering if that trust is warranted, and if it is absent in the relationship, learning how to establish it.

One learns to develop trust in one's own ability to dwell honestly in an "I-Thou" relationship, and one's ability to resynthesize the dialectic operative in such a relationship.

Of the "I-Thou" relationship Hampden-Turner writes:

It is direct, mutual, present, sharing rather than possessing; valuing the relationship for itself, not imposing upon the other but helping him unfold.

Such a relationship is synergistic, i.e., mutually enhancing, so that, to refer to the Hampden-Turner model of psychosocial development, "... their respective segments \[\text{a-i}\]..."
are developed and strengthened. It consists of an affective and intellectual synthesis which is more than the sum of its parts. .."

Such syntheses are the sine qua non for development of a strong sense of identity, one definition of which is "an awareness of and accrued confidence in, one's own presence before others." And it is this precisely sense of identity which is strengthened by participation in synergistic relationships. As we have argued:

... the active investment of one's personal synthesis involves the translation of the human personality into the reality experienced by others, and ... the strength of such investments can be estimated by their intensity and by their authenticity.12

This "dialogical encounter," this participation in other beings, permitting oneself and others to unfold in a context of trust, is as necessary for societal development as it is for individual development.

Harold Laski speaks generally to the point:

Civilization means, above all, the unwillingness to inflict unnecessary pain. ... Those of us who needlessly accept the commands of authority cannot yet claim to be civilized men. Our business, if we desire to live a life not utterly devoid of meaning and significance is to accept nothing which contradicts our basic experience merely because it comes to us from tradition or convention or authority. It may well be

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11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., p. 105.
that we are wrong; but our self expression is thwarted at the root unless the certainties we are asked to accept coincide with the certainties we experience. That is why the condition of freedom in any state is always a widespread and consistent skepticism of the canons on which power insists.13 (underlining mine)

Albert Camus puts this issue, which is really the issue of human development and liberation that has been the focus of this investigation writ largely, in another yet familiar way. "The program for the future is either a permanent dialogue or the solemn significant putting to death of any of us who have experienced dialogue."14 In another book he makes a related observation:

If the injustice is bad for the rebel, it is not because it perpetuates the silent hostility that separates the oppressor from the oppressed. It kills the small part of existence that can be realized on this earth through the mutual understanding of men... The mutual understanding and communication discovered by rebellion can survive only in free exchange of conversation.15

It is the Humanities ambience we envision that fosters "free exchange of conversation" and encourages "dialogical encounter," that encourages synergistic, "I-Thou" relationships all contributing to the psycho-social and moral development of the individual, in his search for himself

13 Ibid., p. 106.


15The Rebel, p. 283.
and others in the desert of technocratic, maddened "civilization." The traditional areas of study are no longer adequate, if they ever were, to the task at hand, which is no less than the generation of true civilization as Laski has briefly described it, a culture in which persons realize their possibilities, most importantly, a civilization of real persons, rather than atrophied automata. No longer can we be reliant on disciplines to achieve such tasks; we have but one "place" to turn as the apocolypse approaches, and that is to each other. We must come to discover ourselves, and then share that discovery with our fellows, trustfully, caringly, in hope of mutual humanization. We may be indeed a lost species, lost to ourselves, lost to our eschatological potential, but the cause of our dis-ease may also be our cure. We must turn to ourselves. So the curricular center of our "program" is the individual, in solitude, and in encounter.

The activity currently available to us and which offers the possibility of encounter, of intense and authentic meetings among persons, is the Training Group, the T-Group, or what Rogers terms the basic encounter group. It is the experience we can design that is most likely to develop the segments of the developmental cycle, 16

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16See Carl Rogers, Carl Rogers on Encounter Groups.
despite individual differences,\textsuperscript{17} and without serious casualties. It unites "theory and activity, intelligence and affect, and strengthens simultaneously various segments of the cycle, according to the special imbalance in each individual."\textsuperscript{18}

Hampden-Turner contends that certain characteristics of encounter groups promote the psycho-social developments of those involved. They include: (1) Existential nothingness— an encounter with the Absurd; (2) the small group climate; (3) the enforced confrontation; (4) the moratorium; (5) the rebellion against authority.\textsuperscript{19}

Commenting on number one, Hampden-Turner writes that "this social vacuum has a strong stimulant effect upon man's free existence and upon segments (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) of the cycle."\textsuperscript{20} With no external existent definitions or meanings in the environment, "... every meaningful statement is perforce creative and a denial of nothingness."\textsuperscript{21} In Chapter III of \textit{Radical Man}, he writes that the radical man, accepting his identity (segment b),

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17}"Individual differences" can be a positive factor as well.
\item \textsuperscript{18} \textit{Radical Man}, p. 156.
\item \textsuperscript{19} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 157.
\item \textsuperscript{20} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 158.
\item \textsuperscript{21} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 159.
\end{itemize}
discloses to others that which is inside him. The abolition of everything external to the individual has the effect of removing his "role," facilitating this process of genuine self-disclosure. The social vacuum that is the encounter group requires the establishment and encourages the expression of the inner needs and personal identities of the participants. All seem to desire external definition, yet they discover they have only one resource from which they can produce such definition; it is their inner selves.\textsuperscript{22} Hampden-Turner writes:

\begin{quote}
The translation of inner needs to fill the outer vacuum is, of course, the act of investment (segment d), and this the vacuum stimulates. Many techniques of risk reduction and non-suspension (segment e) are also rendered difficult. Who can practice elitism without recognized status or social structure?\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}

Small groups (the second characteristic), especially those with nine to twelve members, have great potential as contexts for psycho-social development. There are few enough people that, if they meet over a long period of time, they can develop deep insights (segment a) and intense investment (segment d) in others. However, there are not too few persons so that they collude with each other, possibly denying the larger cultural reality and creating privatistic fantasies which cannot be transferred to contexts outside the group.\textsuperscript{24}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{22}Ibid., p. 159. \quad \textsuperscript{23}Ibid. \quad \textsuperscript{24}Ibid., p. 160.
\end{flushright}
The enforced confrontation is an important stimulant to various segments of the cycle. Hampden-Turner contends that this dimension of the encounter group experience is especially potent in developing powers of perception (segment a), the investment of one's identity and competence in the setting (segments b, c, and d), the ability to struggle dialectically toward the achievement of synergy (segment h), and the acceptance of feedback and responsibility for oneself (segment i). Restating the function of this characteristic of group experience which contributes to psycho-social development, Hampden-Turner appropriately quotes from Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians, XIII, 12: "For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face; now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known."

The sense of moratorium provided by encounter groups can have the effect of freeing one's existence; it allows one an opportunity to re-form one's identity. As well, the sense of moratorium also tends to increase the intensity of investment (segment d), and to permit one to suspend heretofore unexamined assumptions (segment e). One has the opportunity to "work through" a number of developmental tasks that might have been uncompleted before.

25 Ibid., p. 162.  
26 Ibid., p. 163.  
27 Ibid.
Hampden-Turner questions the wisdom and utility of a group leader. He contends that his presence diminishes the sense of vacuum and of absurdity. Rather than rebelling against the nothingness, members of a group which has a leader often "fall back" on him or her, asking for self-definition and structure. Even if the leader "abdicates" his authority, his presence may still have the effect of lessening the impact of the experience of nothingness. Or, participants may direct their energy in attacking him, attempting to overcome their reliance upon Authority.28

There is considerable amount of data regarding the effects of group experience. While this writer takes such empirical verification with great caution, he does find it appropriate to provide at this point a sampling of this information. One study indicates that "T-Group training reduces race prejudice, stereotypes, and anomie, while increasing 'human-heartedness,' self-acceptance, and acceptance of others. . . ."29 Two tables Hampden-Turner provides in Radical Man are also of interest here.

28Ibid., pp. 164-65.

Reported Changes in the Behavior of Participants in T-Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Segments of the Cycle</th>
<th>In general and on average participants increased over controls in their capacities to...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Existence</td>
<td>Express new ideas; experiment with new ideas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Perception</td>
<td>Show sensitivity for others' feelings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Identity</td>
<td>Show areness of own behavior; show insight into self and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Competence</td>
<td>Reflect self-confidence; control manifest anxiety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Investment: authen-</td>
<td>Communicate and 'send behavior' in general (no data); express stronger feelings with less inhibition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tic and intense</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Suspension and Risk</td>
<td>Exhibit greater flexibility; take bigger risks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Bridging the Distance</td>
<td>Accept and tolerate greater shortcomings in others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) Self confirming, Self transcending impact</td>
<td>Relate successfully to others; involve others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h) Dialectic leading to Synergy</td>
<td>Take a stand on an issue; encourage participation, create interdependence with others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) Integration of Feedback and Complexity</td>
<td>Tolerate new information; receive communications; (no data on complexity)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Effects of a T-Group Laboratory on Interpersonal Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Segments of the Cycle</th>
<th>Content analysis of reports made by participants 6 months after training revealed the following % responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Existence</td>
<td>(no data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Perception</td>
<td>35% report increased intellectual understanding; awareness and insight about other people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Identity</td>
<td>40% report more tolerance, acceptance and more liking for self; a less critical view of self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Competence</td>
<td>23% report friendlier, easier to get along with, improved behavior with people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Investment: authentic and intense</td>
<td>18% reported more aggressive, outgoing behavior and more honesty, confidence and willingness to reveal themselves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Suspension and Risk</td>
<td>23% reported being more relaxed, at ease, less tension, more flexibility toward self and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Bridging the Distance</td>
<td>31% reported being better able to solve differences between people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) Self Confirming, Self Transcending Impact</td>
<td>41% reported either that others became more friendly, sympathetic and supportive to them, or that in general people reacted more positively towards them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h) Dialectic leading to Synergy</td>
<td>31% reported success in solving the human relations problems (also reported under bridging the distance). 60% reported at least one of the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


following: more appreciation, interest, acceptance, warmth, and closeness to others. Greater balance in behavior styles found through F.I.R.O. questionnaire.

1) Integration of Feedback into Complexity

29% report that in various ways they receive more personal and confidential information from people. Increased intellectual awareness also reported: (see segment a).\textsuperscript{31}

This is but a sampling of data that is accumulating, attesting to the effects of encounter-group experience upon psycho-social, intellectual, and moral development. However, this writer cautions the reader not to be reliant on this kind of substantiation. Even without such data, we can understand the need for genuine encounter and we know the results.\textsuperscript{32} One writer expresses the need this way: "The search for interpersonal encounter is a central human quest. Perhaps the most pressing existential crisis of our age is the pervasive sense of aloneness which so many of us feel so much of the time."\textsuperscript{33} We need not justify the inclusion of genuine and intense meetings in


\textsuperscript{32}The word "know" is not meant in the narrow cognitive sense, but a total, integrated sense.

\textsuperscript{33}Gerard V. Haigh, "Psychotherapy as Interpersonal Encounter," \textit{Challenges of Humanistic Psychology}, p. 220.
the curriculum by citing utilitarian outcomes. Our often mangled, empty lives attest to the need. Empiricism, in fact, as one dimension of the larger Western culture, can be said to be one of the causes of our dehumanization, as well as one of the consequences. By adhering to the results of test and studies, we have introjected prevailing modes of maddened existence quite at variance with basic human instincts.\(^34\) Acculturation, a more generic term than schooling although roughly synonymous in American society, is the process of interpersonal repression, a requirement of maintenance of the inhuman culture. Hence, for those who failed to completely adequately acculturate, i.e., those who are still partly alive, life is a continual "struggle between interpersonal repression and interpersonal disclosure."\(^35\)

One model for growth may be found in humanistic psychotherapy, a process which such therapists often view as moving from alienation toward absorption. It is alienation—from self, from others—that is the primarily determinant of the aloneness that seems to be the major experiential complaint. Alienation is viewed as a function of the incongruencies between the prevailing zeitgeist and the experiential reality of the individual person.\(^36\)

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\(^{34}\) Ego and Instinct, Chapter 22.

\(^{35}\) Ibid., p. 222.

\(^{36}\) This coincides with Laski's observation, previously quoted.
incongruent and maddening societal programming is maintained by repression, or in the case of he who seeks psychotherapy, via neurotic anxiety and sense of shame. When participants in the therapeutic relationship encounter each other, they risk self-disclosure, with its attendant anxiety and shame. To the extent, however, they achieve genuine encounter, i.e., bridge the distance in Hampden-Turner's terms, is the extent to which the client's shame and anxiety tends to dissolve, as he experiences confirmation of his interior reality. Outcomes of such encounters include acceptance, for of self and others, and absorption, in oneself, in others, and in the world.  

Encounter also enhances openness, in the sense that stereotypical ways of perceptions tend to be replaced with approaching situations with few preconceived ideas or theories of explanation or prediction. To encourage such experiencing, one psychotherapist suggests his clients ask themselves questions like "What is going on here? Just what am I experiencing now?". He asks his clients to let themselves move into their existent feelings without forcing. "I deemphasize the question 'Why?' since asking a person to explain why he did something usually results in rationalization of behavior, not understanding.  

37 Haigh, p. 224.  
38 Ibid., pp. 229-30.
Intellectualism is often just such rationalization, untied, as it were, to the center of the person, split from his feelings. True intellectuality and intelligence, it has been said, overly simple to be sure, is the ability to think what you feel and feel what you think. This writer contends such connection is the beginning of genuine intelligence. The point is, in any case, that one must know oneself, and hold allegiance to that self. It is this loyalty that has been pinpointed as common to those people who live from their insides out, in the "here and now." Gerard Heigh makes the point this way. "There are both theists and atheists who are considered to be existential in their viewpoints. What then is the common denominator? To me, it is the willingness to use one's own experience as the final authority for truth."  

This living from one's center out is self-centeredness in the good sense. One comes to realize that "if there is an answer to the problem of meaning in my life, it does not lie out there someplace, but within me." This view mirrors, in a general way, Emerson's oft-quoted sentence in the essay Self-Reliance: "Nothing can bring you peace

39 The Primal Scream, p. 397.
40 Ibid., p. 228.
41 David Cooper's writings.
42 Haigh, p. 231.
yourself." This largely forgotten truth is surfacing in the poetry of the counter culture. For example, Cat Stevens sings in his song entitled "On the Road to Find Out":

There's so much left to know, and I"m on the road to find out, ooh.
Then I found my head one day when I wasn't even trying, and here I have to say, 'cause there is no use in lying, lying. Yes the answer lies within so why not take a look now... the answer lies within.43

And from "Paraclesus":

Truth is within ourselves; it takes no rise From outward things, what' er you may believe . . . and to know Rather consists in opening out a way Whence the imprisoned splendour may escape, Than is effecting entry for a light Suppose to be without.44

This sense of inwardness, this attending to self, so necessary for self-knowledge and knowledge of others, is, as we have explained, disallowed in the school. And, as we have also indicated, the school reflects and creates the larger culture, dialectically. To fully recognize this dialectical relationship between the school and the culture, and the reasons for the prevailing Zeistgeist, one must be able to figuratively "step out" of it, and take a broad view. This is very difficult, if not impossible, for many of us; it represents, in Freire's term, our


"limit situation."

One psychologist poses the dilemma differently. He contends that twentieth-century man is encapsulated, and that if he is to gain a more inclusive world-view, he must break through the layers of cocoon within which he is encapsulated. Of course, the first step is to realize one's encapsulation. One influential form this encapsulation takes is what has been termed the error of reductionism, i.e., the "invalidation" of those insights, often intuitive, which are not amenable or reducible to empirical confirmation. We have briefly mentioned empiricism as one cause and consequence of our human deterioration; encapsulation within such an epistemology practically precludes symbolic and intuitive modes of knowing. It is starvation at this intuitive and symbolic level which leads to "mental" disturbance, just as biologic starvation leads to physical deterioration. Another psychologist summarizes this matter this way: "The diagnosis of the sick society, then, is quite simply that it provides more or less abundantly for the biological needs but starves the spiritual ones."  


Another way of discussing this encapsulation is to mention hypnosis. Cooper, Laing, and others have shown how, in a very real sense, we are hypnotized from birth into experiencing ourselves and others as emptied-out, object-ified automata.

Breaking through one's "cocoons" to a less limited awareness, another way of stating an objective of our Humanities "program," evidently can be accelerated by the cautious, guided use of the so-called psychedelic drugs. Curricular theorists may find their use a helpful adjunct to the encounter group in the achievement of our goals of humanization and sanity.

A number of psychologists have done fascinating work in this area. One researcher outlines what he terms the "psychedelic ethnic":

... the beliefs that scientific determinism is inadequate as a personal philosophy or world view, that man has the capacity to transcend his past at every moment, that psychological health requires more than the absence of illness, and that a meaningful personal identity must be continually created through self-exploration and passionate commitments.

47 Death of the Family.
48 The Politics of Experience.
49 Harman, ibid., p. 323.
Such an ethic, with its emphasis on intuitive knowledge and commitment, would seem to be humanizing and liberating. Evidence that the chemical known as LSD-25 has such effects is abundant. Mogar, for example, found that when LSD-25 was employed as an adjunct to more conventional Freudian analysis, it tended to have these effects: reduced defensiveness, more meaningful reliving of childhood memories, and increased awareness of unconscious motives.\(^5^1\) He concludes that "... LSD serves a catalyst for inducing rapid and profound changes in the subject's value-belief system and in his self-image."\(^5^2\)

Others contend that

... the psychedelics... enhance the sense of meaning or vitality, or beauty and sheer intensity of existence... to say the very least, these psychedelic experiences alter man's conception of himself and the world... They are a way of looking at the cosmos, and therefore belong to the central core of man's needs as a thoughtful being.\(^5^3\)

This seems like hyperbole, but enough respectable academic psychologists make similar statements that one must consider seriously the possibility that may be true, at least for some people in some circumstances. Maslow

\(^5^1\)Mogar, ibid., p. 142.

\(^5^2\)Ibid.

says this: "in the last few years it has become clear that
certain drugs called 'psychedelic' often produce peak
experiences in the right people under the right circum-
stances." (Underlining mine)

Certainly we must underscore the controversy in the
medical professions regarding the biologic consequences of
their use. At the same time, we must attend to claims
like: "... psychedelic experiences may have a part to
play in helping us to discern the true meaning of the verb
'to be.'

Clearly we must acknowledge the possibility that these
drugs have great educative consequence. With Blake we
might say:

If the doors of perception were cleansed,
everything would appear to man as it is,
infinite.

For man has closed himself up, till he sees
all things thro' narrow chinks of his cavern.

There is one criticism non-medical in nature to which
we must attend. It is Roszak's, who argues, oversimply,
that the so-called psychedelic revolution is reducible to

54 Maslow, ibid., p. 328. Abraham Maslow, Religion,
Values, and Peak Experiences (Columbus: The Ohio State Uni-
versity Press, 1964), p. 27, as quoted in Harman, ibid.,
p. 328.

55 See footnote 53 on preceding page. (Murphy, 1965,
p. 79) "Human Psychology in the Context of New Knowledge,"
Main Currents, March-April, 1965, 75-81, as quoted in Harman,
ibid., p. 328.

56 William Blake, "The Marriage of Heaven and Hell,"
as quoted in Harman, ibid., p. 326.
this syllogism: change the prevailing consciousness and one changes the world; the use of dope *ex opere operato* changes the prevailing consciousness; therefore, the universal use of dope will change the world.\(^57\) As we have seen, there is tentative yet impressive evidence that the syllogism may be true, although one append to such a judgment that the data we have derives from the thoughtful and careful use of these drugs. This writer would tend to be skeptical that indiscriminate use of any drug ensures a healthy change in consciousness. Roszak's skepticism, however, goes deeper. He asks what if American society "turned on"? Would then the revolution have come? Would we find ourselves suddenly blessed with a society characterized by freedom, gentleness, and love? If that were to occur, he continues, what must we conclude about the integrity of our organism? Would we not be forced to confess that the behavioral technicians and engineers had been correct from the beginning? That we are the mass of chemical and electrical circuitry some have maintained we are, and not persons capable of achieving awareness and growth by native ingenuity?\(^58\)

It is undeniable that we are chemical and biological beings, but of course that is not all we are. We have

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\(^58\) Ibid., p. 177.
integrity--when we are free--and we can choose to place ourselves in situations which help us to grow, help us actualize our potentialities. The important point here is freedom; it is the precondition for integrity and growth.

"... Freedom is... the condition of being able to choose and carry out purposes... A person is free to the extent that he has the capacity, the opportunity, and the incentive to give expression to what is in him."59 The unfortunate fact is, and it is this fact of which Roszak writes as if he were somewhat unaware, that so many people are encapsulated by reductive and inhuman epistemologies, so many are hypnotized into some quasi-human, one-dimensional state, that they are unable to choose, to feel their freedom. The cautious and guided use of psychedelic drugs evidently can help a person break through such blinding barriers and come to themselves. These drugs probably do not permanently change one's mode of consciousness by themselves; they certainly may help initiate, however, the once static process of development that does culminate in altered consciousness.

Let us return the focus of the investigation to the curricular center of our Humanities "program." It is within the context of freedom of the encounter group that...

59Professor H. J. Muller, as quoted in by Bertalanffy, ibid., p. 340.
persons tend to become more spontaneous, flexible, more close to their feelings, more open to their experience, and closer and more overtly intimate in their interpersonal relations. Yet people who value suppression of feelings, operation from a firm set of principles, who do not trust their reactions and experience but rely upon authority, and who keep more or less aloof in their interpersonal relations, regard the group process as a dangerous force.

To comprehend that openness and authenticity are for many a dangerous and possibly shocking possibility is to realize once again just how estranged we have become from each other. H. S. Sullivan, in describing what he terms "pseudosocial rituals," people are busily engaged with other people, yet nothing personal transpires. He goes on to say that "... there are a remarkable number of people who have ways of being social as the devil without having anything with the other people concerned. They live by very sharply restricted rules." Of course many live by such distancing rules because they have been hurt or in some way violated by others in

64 See Chapter II, p. 85.
the past. In many cases, especially in the middle class, negative judgments or violations are internalized. As a consequence, many can not respect themselves; they have introjected the non-respectful attitudes of significant others. And, as is often the case with such people, they exteriorize the interiorized judgment, almost as if to rid themselves of it. Sullivan notes that respect for oneself is a *sine qua non* for respect of others. People high in self-respect, those whose life experiences have convinced them of their capacity for satisfactorily living with others, have no particular difficulty respecting others, even those whose successes indicate a superior competence. For the mass of people, however, such self- and other-respect is difficult. Attempting to prop their own inadequate self attitude, they disparage others.\(^\text{65}\)

It is the expression of disparagement which often hurts others, driving them away, into or out of themselves. Insofar as self-respect has been nourished and has grown without restrictions, due either to reasonably unwarped personal development or to remedy of warped psycho-social development, there is no sense of impoverishment and attendant anxiety connected with discovery say, that someone has given a more meritorious performance in your particular field. However, people who have been disparaged

\(^{65}\text{The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry, pp. 308-309.}\)
and have interiorized the disparagement customarily isolate themselves socially—either physically or psychically—and practice some form of limitation or stipulation on their contact with others. Such minimization of anxiety by social isolation and concealment usually results in atrophy of the self and in manifestation of dissociative processes. Sullivan illustrates the point.

Another aspect of these people with customarily low esteem is that anxiety and other disjunctive motivations—many of which, such as hatred, are derivatives of anxiety—tend to be channeled, in interpersonal relations, in a number of ways that are not perfectly obvious. Since conjunctive—that is, tender, friendly—relations with significant others are very difficult for these people, many of them have a direct exploitative attitude, to which psychiatric slang has attached the term 'passive dependency.' (underlining mine)

Another expression of this interpersonal anxiety is termed substitutive activity, some sources of which we examined in Chapter I. Sullivan notes that such activity is not primarily addressed to others; it is addressed instead to avoiding a certain conscious clarity regarding one's motives, etc. It is commonly called, for want of a more descriptive term, self-pity. One form this attitude takes is a massive preoccupation, an extraordinary capacity to fill time, in referie or in conversation, with long series

66 See Chapter II.
67 The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry, pp. 351-52.
of thoughts that often render the speaker in tears over how wretched fate has treated him. Summarizing, Sullivan writes:

In other words, the substitutive processes are primarily addressed to minimizing or avoiding anxiety, whereas the more exploitative techniques are ways of getting what one wants but feels one could not get on one's face value. 68

The consequences of the thwarting of affiliative needs are obviously complicated, and it is beyond the scope of this investigation to explore them further. Let it suffice to say that our needs for affiliation, for collaboration, for tenderness, for intimacy, in a word, for love, are immeasurably strong. Their frustration is the cause for estrangement and alienation. It is this condition that we work to correct. With the encounter group at the curricular core, we have the opportunity.

One goal of the encounter group is "... increased awareness of and sensitivity to emotional reactions and expressions in himself and others." 69 Especially in the light of the preceding discussion, the importance of this goal cannot be overstated. A related goal involves "... greater ability to perceive and to learn from the consequences of his actions through attention to feelings,

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68 Ibid., pp. 354-55.

his own and others'. Both of these goals may be subsumed under the general goal of learning how to learn from one's continuing experience in the realms of self-awareness, sensitivity to phenomena of inter- and intrapersonal behavior and experience, and understanding of consequences of behavior, both one's own and others'. As we have suggested, learning in these areas requires a willingness to openly and honestly explore one's motives and feelings and utilize the reactions of others as feedback regarding outcomes of one's behavior. As well, one can and must be willing to experiment with different ways of behaving.

Encounter group theorists postulate that persons learn about themselves and others to the extent to which they expose their needs, values and patterns of behavior (segment e) so that others may honestly reply to the questions that is one's being. Behavior then becomes a "currency" for transaction, the effect of which may be self-confirming and self-transcending.

During the transactional process, the person is able to confirm or "correct" his tacit assumptions. He learns to recognize his feelings, and he utilizes this recognition to evaluate his behavior, making it more congruent with his

70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., p. 191.
72 Ibid., pp. 191-92.
intentions. Barriers to such learning---defensiveness, withdrawal, fear, distrust---are often reduced so that the complexities of interpersonal relationships may be understood on deeper levels.\textsuperscript{73}

In this process of learning, the notion of interdependence takes a different meaning. Learning viewed as a transactional process means active interactions among peers rather than among superiors and subordinates. Such a view implies mutual aid in coping with difficulties that cannot be solved by a teacher-banker. The leader, if present, is himself a member of the process. He also must be willing to disclose himself authentically and intensely to the others.\textsuperscript{74} In Freire's terms, he must be the teacher-student, not a teacher-banker. In summary, one T-Group theorist reiterates that:

Each individual needs the satisfaction of participating with others and of being accepted by them. Each discovers part of his own identity as he relates to others. Each should both influence others and be influenced by them if, together, they are to solve problems collaboratively.\textsuperscript{75}

The core of the theory of group process suggests that the major issues persons bring to the situation are their orientations toward authority and intimacy. As we

\textsuperscript{73}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{74}Ibid., p. 192.

\textsuperscript{75}Ibid., p. 193.
have seen in our analysis of the effects of schooling, these two developmental issues are rarely openly labeled and dealt with during one's adolescent years due to the school. So, in groups, one notes these behaviors, which work to prevent satisfactory resolution of these matters and consensual validation of experience: rebelliousness, submissiveness, withdrawal—all characteristic forms of response to authority, and destructive competitiveness, emotional exploitiveness, withdrawal as characteristic responses to peers."76 It is, of course, these ways of being that are symptomatic of warped psycho-social development and which group experience may help remedy.

One can note progress in these issues as the group develops. One consequence of group development is that "the criterion for evaluating a contribution is no longer who said it, but what is said."77 Other indications and outcomes of growth include: (1) Members come to accept one another's differences non-judgmentally; (2) conflict centers around substantive issues rather than transferred emotional ones; Cooper terms this development a "progressive depopulation of the room." (3) Consensus is attained as an result of reasoned discussion rather than a compul-

76 Ibid., p. 251.
77 Ibid., p. 258.
sive need for unanimity; (4) members become aware of their involvement in the group process without alarm; (5) members become more important to each other. Communication is facilitated and a deeper understanding of how others think, feel, and behave is achieved. Expectations are personal and realistic rather than the previous stereotypical, role expectations.\textsuperscript{78}

Rogers discusses the behavioral outcomes in these terms: persons become more self-directing, less rigid, more open to the experience provided by their senses, better organized and integrated, and more similar to the ideals they have chosen for themselves. Rogers also wants to make the point that by the establishment of certain external conditions, we can foster internal control by the individual, in pursuit of internally chosen goals. Thus, we as curricular theorists can establish conditions which, in all likelihood, will result in various categories of behaviors—self-directing behaviors, sensitivity to internal and external realities, abilities to adapt flexibly—that are manifestations of authentic, humane, sane persons.\textsuperscript{79}

The choice that Rogers sees between behaviorism and humanism is the same choice that faces curricular theorists

\textsuperscript{78}Ibid., pp. 264-65.

We can choose to use our growing knowledge to enslave people in ways never dreamed of before, depersonalizing them, controlling them by means so carefully selected that they will perhaps never be aware of their loss of personhood. We can choose to utilize our scientific knowledge to make men happy, well-behaved and productive, as Skinner earlier suggested. . . . Or. . . we can choose to use the behavioral sciences in ways which will free, not control; which will bring about constructive variability, not conformity; which will develop creativity, not contentment; which will facilitate each person in his self-directed process of becoming; which will aid individuals, groups, and even the concept of science to become self-transcending in freshly adaptive ways of meeting life and its problems. 80

(Underlining mine)

The encounter is one use of the knowledge of behavioral sciences that is humanizing and liberating. It is important to emphasize, as well, that group experience does not eliminate pain, paradox, loneliness and suffering. However, it is clear that it does help participants differentiate between pain, paradox, loneliness and suffering which are self and institutionally imposed and those which must be accepted as inherent, although not necessarily incapable of future diminution, in the human condition. 81

Such a differentiation is a starting point for the process of individuation, of psycho-social, moral and intellectual development.

80 Ibid.

81 T-Group Theory and Laboratory Method, p. 244.
The process of group experiences may be compared to some extent to the process of conscientizacao: "... learning to perceive social, political, and economic contradiction, and to take action against oppressive elements of reality." Such contradictions can be perpetuated only as long as people have been depersonalized, objectified, maddened: contradictions in themselves, housing as they do, both the oppressor and their Selves. It is this internal as well as political contradiction that mirrors the choice Rogers outlined earlier.

The conflict lies in the choice of being wholly themselves or being divided; between ejecting the oppressor within or not ejecting him; between human solidarity or alienation; between following soli-prescriptions or having choices; between being spectators or actors, between acting or having the illusion of acting through the action of the action of the oppressors; between speaking out or being silent, castrated in their power to create and re-create, in their power to transform the world.

Although Freire has framed the dilemma in more political terms than Rogers, the point is essentially the same. We are faced with the choice of increasing control or freedom, of deepend humanity or depersonalization, between a world frightening similar already to Orwell's nightmare or the possibility of human world: it is the difference between sanity and madness. And one terribly

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82 Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 19.

83 Ibid., pp. 32-33.
important place the choice can be made, indeed, is being made, is the school. It is no wonder the school, secondary and "higher," has become the battleground it has become.

Both the design and the content of the Humanities program will be in flux, changing as student-teachers and teacher-students see the needs for changes. Educators must come to realize more than they appear to realize presently that creativity is not possible unless one has rebellion against old ideas. Constructive acts are also acts of negation to that which is preceding. A basic premise in the implementation of a humanizing Humanities program is that administrators must learn to take criticism and rebellion. As long as educators do not understand that the right to rebel, create, and synthesize is crucial to human development, then the antagonism between teachers and students, the ostracism by peers of those who obey authority, and the suppression of those rebellious students whose potential contribution is the greatest by teachers and administrators, will continue to cripple the school system, and perhaps destroy it.

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84 Ibid.
85 Radical Man, p. 195.
86 Ibid., p. 197.
The Humanities program obviates this paralyzing state of affairs by operating from different premises. We do not assume that "good standards" are external to people, derived from curriculum guides or whatever, and to which students must aspire; rather this program assumes that man is an end in himself and that standards are within persons and are discoverable through processes of personal expression. Permit people to create and communicate openly that which is inside and those characteristics which comprise competence will be manifested. People, under the right conditions, will develop persistence, exactitude, and intellectual excellence in order to demonstrate that their ideas, or those of their group, are viable and pertinent. They will become demanding critics because their own released creativity will demand it. Hampden-Turner cites a recent study of creative persons who exhibited what was termed "the brief-case syndrome." That is, highly creative people often impose very disciplined habits upon themselves as the necessary concomitant of their work. For those who have formulated their own totalization, it is a matter of commitment to disclose themselves and their ideas to others for validation and feedback.

87 Ibid., pp. 197-98.
88 Ibid., p. 198.
89 Ibid.
Hampden-Turner conceptualizes this matter in terms of conservative versus radical philosophies of human socialization. The former, he explains, is a low-risk alternative while the latter is a high-risk one. Most parents and schools are able to develop a child from Stage two on the Kohlberg Scale into Stages Three and Four, in which egotism gives way to deference to laws and role expectations. However, to teach someone to integrate his needs with those of his environment, to help him unfold, to let him become, takes much more human love and interpersonal caring and competence. The risk is that if the school fails at generating achievement of Stage six, then the child is most likely to reach only Stage two. The superiority of a radical philosophy, then, is not absolute, but contingent upon the existent and potential psycho-social and moral "skills" of those involved. The higher the risk, the higher is the possible achievement and the possible failure. Conservatism, contends Hampden-Turner, is equivalent to hedging one's bets.90

It is prudent to acknowledge the limits of radicalism. A person can be only as radical as to the extent to which he is psycho-socially developed. This is not to say a person will not occasionally overextend himself; it is to

90 Ibid., p. 272.
say that if those taking responsibility for the Humanities program perpetually over-reach themselves that the program is likely to fail. The more developed the person, the more freedom he can face. To force, however, freedom onto someone so maddened and impotent that he cannot face what he has already is to cripple him further. In such cases, in the words of Hampden-Turner, "the developmental idea has failed to become a psycho-social reality." There is much to be said for Karl Jasper's concept of truth as communicability.

Hence, the freedom we make available to persons is relative to their wishes and to the stage of development they have attained. Excessive freedom too soon can be a paralyzing burden and a source of angst if those involved are insufficienly developed to know what to do with it. It is important to realize here that freedom is more a psychic concept rather than a political one. It resides in the human personality, not in some abstract system. As Hampden-Turner points out, even if we in America were to experience a revolution, our goals would be betrayed for lack of truly free and compassionate men to humanize the

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91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., p. 274.
93 Ibid., p. Challenges of Humanistic Psychology, p. 16.
new regime. "All that we have to give to others is ourselves. And human culture is itself diminished when we become small-minded and embittered through weary years of struggle so that we have nothing left to give."94

With such a cautioning note in mind, we must not commit the same errors typical of the technological mind-set, which is to fail to grasp that human feeling is lawful in itself, that there is a logic to human development. The outburst may not be irrational at all, but an indication that the tacit and unexamined normative premises on which a program had been built are woefully inadequate and violate the laws of man's psycho-social, moral and intellectual development.95

One personification of this mind-set is George A. Miller, who evidently believes that "the central problem of education is to make the student want it." He continues: "We know how to break up a unit into small steps and drill each step separately... but we do not know how to inject the urge to learn into a student's heart."96 Thus Miller's solution for the problems educators face is to instill the need for achievement into the hearts and minds of our children, by a "deliberate public program of

94Radical Man, p. 277.
95Ibid., p. 320.
96Quoted in Radical Man, p. 322.
personality modification.\textsuperscript{97} Education, as discussed in this investigation, obviously means something very different. It means that persons must be free to design their own learning environment in collaboration with peers and teacher-students. The important point is that persons find themselves, and then develop their potentialities, which implies freedom from formal or technical dictation. Hampden-Turner cites 1969 study conducted by Daniel Yankelovich which illustrates the poles. Yankelovich was able to discriminate between two types of college students: the reformers wished to reform society in the image of their own values and ideals while the "practicals" viewed their college experience as a tool by which they could extract from society the greatest personal benefit and prestige.\textsuperscript{98} The "practicals" would emphasize the importance of a successful adaptation to the \textit{status quo}, with the programmed self or role that is societal expectation. The "reformers" would adhere to their genuine selves and work to make the larger culture congruent with the humanity within. In extreme terms, we have once again the difference between sanity and madness.

Within this context it is easy to understand why some students have protested so vehemently. Educators have come

\textsuperscript{97} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{98} \textit{Radical Man}, p. 345.
to be viewed as in collusion with the corporate and political interests of the society. Thus, what these students are protesting is the threatened end of their psycho-social, moral and intellectual development. The presence in the school of military recruiters and R.O.T.C. with their explicit confirmation of the more regressive traits in the more regressive students also threatens their end as developing persons.

Insofar as any one problem predominates, however, it would be our individual capacity to "tolerate the fires of existential anxiety." Hampden-Turner contends that the primary reason radical students often lack access to administrators, why black Americans generally lack access to white Americans, and why this country seems to prefer to spend innumerable billions on "defense" rather than negotiate with our so-called enemies, is that those who are avoiding the others can guess what they might hear and they can do nor wish to hear it. Hampden-Turner suggests that if some administrators and some radical students were locked in a room together for, say, sixteen hours the former would emerge changed men and so probably would the latter. It is doubtful there would be any physical violence. The radical

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99 Ibid., p. 365.
100 Ibid., p. 369.
101 Ibid., p. 392.
students would prevail verbally, emotionally, politically, and creatively, and that psycho-social superiority is the substance of the fear they inspire.\textsuperscript{102}

If each of us can grow only by leaping across an ever-widening abyss between ourselves and others, then it is somewhat reassuring to remind ourselves that, in a sense, we are not alone but linked together. One's admiration for those who continually make huge leaps in attempting to bridge the distance to others is qualified by two questions: Do they genuinely wish to reach the other side? If they fall, will they drag others into the abyss with them? Whatever the dangers of impatience are, they must be considered against the backdrop of our rapidly deteriorating civilization and the seeming hopelessness of gradualism. For many the Apocalypse seems fast approaching; we must proceed cautiously yet rapidly. Auden once remarked: "We must love one another or die." Hampden-Turner suggests that we must radicalize or die.\textsuperscript{103} This writer submits that, once again, the choice we face daily is between sanity and madness, and the choice is being made against us.

\textsuperscript{102}Ibid., p. 393.
\textsuperscript{103}Ibid., p. 389.
Cortical Component

The realms of meaning which constitute the cortical dimension of the ambience are precisely that—realms of meaning. Persons dwell in them and experience them as they find such experiencing helpful to the central concern of individuation or development. Hence the realms mentioned here are illustratory and prototypical; their role in the life of the student and their status in the total ambience is contingent upon the particular institutional setting and the needs and desires of the participants.

It is important to emphasize that the cortical component is not simply a rearrangement of the disciplines traditionally subsumed under the generic term Humanities. Rather they are realms of meaning in which a person immerses himself, to the extent he or she finds fulfilling, and always within the larger and central context of self-development. What is germane about the realms is the individual person's inner experience of them, and how they affect that experience. With such a conceptualization, then, it makes much sense to include solitude as an important realm in which a person finds meaning. In solitude the student synthesizes (segment i) his experiences, both in the nuclear component and in other realms of the cortical component, and he permits his internal dynamic to "flow" uninterruptedly. Similarly, in dance, another realm, temporal like solitude, a person may find meaning
and expression of internal processes. Again, however, the focus is development of the person, which in most cases would preclude a slavish devotion to say, dance. The devotion is to oneself.

Other prototypical realms include the experience of literature, of the fine arts, of music, of philosophy. These are areas of investigation, peripheral to the nucleus, useful as they nourish the total development of the person.
AFTERWORD

We have examined, in chapter one, the impact of schooling, identifying twelve effects upon the emerging personality of the child. This examination was phenomenological in nature; we hypothesized about the lebenswelt of the person in school. It has been our contention that by only such a perception could we comprehensively understand the dynamics of schooling in a theoretically unified manner.

In chapter two we examined and critiqued five writers in English education. We saw the theoretical inadequacies of their rationales, and we pointed toward the direction we felt a rationale for a genuinely humanizing school experience must go. We then sketched an image of man, one rooted in reality and yet one which permitted a glimpse of the ideal. Finally we laid out a model of psycho-social development, providing us a conceptual framework from which we might estimate and assess growth toward the ideal. With the inclusion of a moral judgment scale, we concluded our rationale.

In the final chapter we identified two components of a truly humanizing Humanities program: the nuclear and the cortical, and we defended and explained at length the importance of the former.
From the findings of the investigation, four recommendations follow:

1. Throughout primary and secondary schools pilot projects should be instituted embodying the principles and the curricular components of this Humanities program. These projects should initially involve a limited number of students and teachers, as the departure from current curricular activities creates institutional, professional, and personal dissonance. These "problems" must be attended to carefully and continually, instructing both participants and interested others, such as parents, administrators, and other educators in the philosophic underpinnings of the program, and the anticipated behavioral outcomes of its implementation.

2. Teacher education programs must mirror, in fundamental respects, the Humanities program. Prospective teachers must understand, in both the theoretical and experiential senses, the dynamics of a humanizing ambience. An additional component is necessary, however. Prospective teachers need to synthesize a totalization--in the Sartrean sense--which encompasses the humanizing ambience and their participation in it. That is to say, prospective educators, as they devote themselves to their psycho-social, intellectual, and moral development, as they devote themselves to their individuation process, presumably will discover their calling or profession, which is to educate others, i.e.,
to help bring out potentialities in others. It is this discovery that is crucial and that distinguishes teacher education from other kinds of education. Sane persons, those who live from their Selves, will follow the vocational calling within. Hence, the perennial problem that teacher educators face of those who wish to become teachers for the wrong reasons, i.e., non-pedagogical reasons, will be eliminated.

3. In colleges and universities pilot Humanities programs should be established. The number of those involved will, of course, be determined by interested persons, including students, faculty, and administrators, although it is anticipated that the number initially will be small. Concomitant problems must be attended to as outlined in recommendation number one.

4. As a corollary to these recommendations, it is urged that Schools and Colleges of Education devote substantial effort, in terms of faculty, research, and so on, to the study of the dynamics of a genuinely humanizing ambience. Thorough examination of assumptions at all levels on an ongoing basis is necessary.

Throughout the investigation the urgency of implementing such programs has been emphasized, perhaps in chapter three to an excessive extent. However, the writer has risked the accusation of repetition intentionally.
Cynicism aside, it is anticipated that the message within will not be adequately heard and understood. This anticipation is not meant disrespectfully. The Zeitgeist is such that it is quite likely that a cry for sanity will be misunderstood or ignored, by psychologists as well as by educators. It is hoped that by sheer emphasis at least parts of the message and the concomitant sense of urgency will be heard. At this historical juncture, it is imperative that it be heard.
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