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LIBERALISM AND EDUCATION: FOUR VIEWS

DISSER'TATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Academic conflicts and social debates on the nature and meaning of liberal educational thought have raged for years. Theorists expounding on the ideal of liberal education have exhibited great concern over the philosophical posture of the notion as well as the behavioral and attitudinal features that are fundamental to it. A survey of the literature of liberal thinkers, however, reveals that the product of this debate has not been a conclusive clarification of those basic features or fundamental tenets of liberal educational thought. This dissertation will establish a definition of liberal educational thought and as a methodological prerequisite will identify six central axioms which will hopefully clarify the misunderstandings which have created friction among educational liberals and their critics. The initial definition and accompanying tenets will function as a research standard in exploring the hypothesis under investigation. The major portion of this study will consist of an examination of the philosophical postures and theoretical content of the writings of Robert MacIver, Sidney Hook, Bertrand Russell, and John Dewey. This analysis will attempt to test the extent of liberalism in the theoretical stances of these four scholars against the author's definition of liberal educational thought.
Statement of the Problem

This thesis is designed to answer the question: "Do the works of Robert MacIver, Sidney Hook, Bertrand Russell and John Dewey evidence the essential characteristics of liberal educational thought?" In order to answer this question at the highest qualitative level, this dissertation has been divided into three unequal sections. The first part, as developed in Chapter I, is designed to generalize the elements inherent in liberal educational thought and to establish the criteria with which to test the thought of the four men investigated in this study. The following four chapters present an examination and analysis of the philosophies of MacIver, Hook, Russell and Dewey. The last section of the dissertation will advance conclusions, placing the educational ideas of the four men into the perspective of the six criteria of analysis.

Methodology

The research approach employed in this study is a combination of philosophical speculation and content analysis of the writings of Robert MacIver, Sidney Hook, Bertrand Russell, and John Dewey. The background of the study stems from the author's firm commitment to a liberal educational philosophy. The content presented in Chapter VI is a blend of personal interpretation of the theories under study and factual evidence. The studies of each liberal philosopher will be conducted in a systematic, objective, quantitative manner and will provide ample support for
the generalizations presented in Chapter VI.¹

To determine the extent to which MacIver, Hook, Russell, and Dewey qualify as liberal educational theorists, a thorough analysis of their writings will be completed. The tool employed in this analysis and the perspective in which it is to be accomplished is provided by the criteria for classification, the six fundamental tenets of educational liberalism. It is through this method of analysis, flavored with the author's philosophical inquiry, that the theoretical orientation of MacIver, Hook, Russell, and Dewey will be uncovered.

Six broadly overlapping and related principles have been selected to represent a composite picture of liberal educational thought. In several cases, these six principles are independently relevant considerations, but in some instances they can be differentiated only by nuances of emphasis. To facilitate this study, however, these criteria will not be interpreted in a rigid manner; instead, they will be adapted to the variations of that body of liberal writing to which they are applied. This dissertation will seek to identify the relative adherence to these principles of the writings of MacIver, Hook, Russell and Dewey. This standard will, then, serve to justify those conclusions reached in the final chapter, wherein the men studied will be weighed against the six principles and an evaluation of their commitments to educational liberalism will be offered.

The following six educational principles have been established for this study to represent touchstones of educational liberalism:

1. Education should be publicly financed and universally available to all social classes.

2. A reflective, scientific, critical educational methodology should be employed in order to encourage each student to discover "truths" for himself.

3. The greatest degree of personal freedom must be insured in both the classroom and society.

4. Openmindedness is an imperative quality in all teachers, as well as a desirable educational objective in all students.

5. Each student should be viewed as a relevant end in himself and should not be used as a means to benefit some other end or institution.

6. Individuality should be a treasured and respected quality, for only through the application of individual approaches to problems can society change and progress.

Selection of Content to be Analyzed

This dissertation is grounded in primary source research. The author contacted all of the major books and articles written by Robert MacIver, Sidney Hook, Bertrand Russell, and John Dewey. From these sources he selected the most representative and appropriate works relating to educational thought and subjected them to rigorous review, searching for each man's formulation of the characteristics of educational theory. The bibliography at the end of this dissertation is divided into five sections in order to provide a clear delineation of the sources consulted. The first section identifies general works employed in this study. The last four sections identify specifically the
works of each man relevant to this study.

**Definition of Terms**

In the process of thinking and writing about a topic, an author may form a subrosa definition for a specific term or concept which defies a standard dictionary definition and thus hampers the comprehension of a reader. The clarity of this dissertation rests on the eradication of several such problems. Initially, one must meaningfully define one of the most complex and difficult ideas imaginable: liberal education thought. This is best accomplished through the definition of the selected criteria employed in this study to delineate liberalism. It should be noted that these definitions will undergo ongoing development as is necessitated by their application to varying positions of the liberal thinkers being examined.

*Universal education* is that publicly financed schooling for young people which is encountered in the American elementary and secondary schools. It does not specifically exclude higher education, but this is not usually considered in discussions of universal education. A prerequisite for this universality is that the public acceptance of a specified minimum education is mandatory. Frequently associated with the imperatives of democracy, universal education is available to all in society without qualifications of social class, race, sex, property, or status.

*Reflection* is here defined as that process of inquiry which seeks tentative conclusions as the consequence of an interpretation of evidence. It refers to a method of seeking truth and yet rests upon
assumptions which value doubt and disqualify any conviction that final truth is known. Emphasis, in reflection, is concentrated upon the process rather than the products of education.

**Personal freedom** requires a two-sided definition. It is used in this dissertation to represent both negative and positive liberty. It adheres to the conviction of liberal educators which seeks to protect the students from both external control (i.e., community pressure, parental dogma, peer ideals) within the classroom, where one influence (possibly the teacher) might seek dominance over young minds. It is also used here to indicate the positive freedom to initiate and innovate. To seek one's own goals and to chart one's own course. **Personal** freedom is alternately used to describe the liberty of the teacher and the liberty of the students. The employment of these alternative uses is requisite to answer those challenges to liberty addressed in the theories under study.

**Openmindedness** is defined in this study as the prizing of doubt. It refers to the willingness to consider that the advocate of some least favored conclusion might be right. **Openmindedness** is that spirit which prompts the constant re-evaluation of tentatively held conclusions. It is further the avowed enemy of dogma and the theoretical foundation which demands that alternative views be available for critical inquiry into a problem.

That the student be accepted as an end is defined as the conviction that the students should at no time be forced, overtly or covertly, to make their own actualization subservient to the dictates of
some institution, the school, the government, or society.

**Individuality** will be used to mean the possession and expression of those unique features possessed by all individuals.

Final clarification is necessary because liberal educational thought is frequently erroneously misconceived as synonymous with the American progressive education experience. They are distinct and to be properly understood, they must be differentiated.

To place the objects of this study in proper perspective, it is just as important to indicate what liberalism is not as it is to indicate what it is. As a consequence of much sharing of principles, progressive education and liberal education are frequently confused. Those two orientations do touch and overlap, but it would be an error to make them a single entity. Dramatic differences separate them. Professor Lawrence Cremin, in *The Transformation of the School* (New York: Vintage Books, 1961) has contended that the progressive education movement in the United States was born largely as a factor of the wider social progressivism which spanned the late 1890's through 1914. The tide of industrialization and urbanization that brought forth social and political leaders and critics like Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Bob LaFollette, Lincoln Steffans, Ida M. Tarbell, and Upton Sinclair was to be felt in the educational community in its share of what Morton White, *Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957) has referred as the "revolt against formalism." Merle Curti and Cremin locate the roots of American progressivism in education in various sources. Horace Mann's universalism, Thomas Jefferson's republicanism, Ralph Waldo Emerson's idealism, and non-sectarian protestant moralism all contributed to the ideological birth of this movement. In 1919 the Progressive Education Society was formed in time to witness the waning of social progressivism. However, the educational progressivism was dominant throughout the 1920's. Harold Rugg and Ann Shumaker *The Child Centered School* (New York: Harper, 1928) were typical of this period. William Heard Kilpatrick became the principle propagandist for the movement and the chief interpreter of John Dewey, with his publication of *The Foundation of Education* (New York: Harper, 1925) in which he presented his project method of education. With the onset of the Depression, social and political progressivism was rekindled and the educational movement was to take on fresh liabilities. George S. Counts, reacting with alarm to the social dilemma of the Depression published his *Dare the School Build a New Social Order* (New York: John Day, 1932) in which he challenged American teachers to seize the power available to them to remake American society. He recognized that the indoctrination he counseled was an imposition, but he chose to justify it as the "supreme imposition."
Limitations of the Study

The limitations inherent in a study of this kind may be attributed in varying degrees to three general sources: (1) the nature of the problem under investigation, (2) the analytical method being employed, and, (3) the research skills and objectivity of the individual conducting the study. Despite these obstacles, however, the insights gained by critically analyzing a variety of writers in education and attempting to discover if they share a common commitment to liberal educational thought will hopefully make the difficult task of assembling this study worthwhile.

Initially, one is confronted with the difficulty stemming from the pluralistic and conflicting uses of the word "liberal." The idea is alternately employed in political and economic as well as educational of theoretical orientation is in opposition to educational liberalism is evident with reference to the criteria established for this study. The progressive education movement is further differentiated from educational liberalism by John Dewey's attacks, "How Much Freedom In The Schools" New Republic LXIII, 1930, pp. 204-206 ff. and Experience and Education (New York: Collier Books, 1938) as well as by Boyd Bode, Progressive Education at the Crossroads (New York: Newson and Co., 1938). These works issue critiques which condemn the anti-liberal extremes of naturalism and the lack of continuity in progressive educational ventures, as well as condemning the indoctrination of Count's work. By 1955 the Progressive Education Association collapsed and its journal folded two years later, in 1957. It was the victim of its own extremes and its disjointed quality. George S. Counts, the molder and remaker; Harold Rugg, the naturalist convert; John Childs, the frontier historian and William Heard Kilpatrick, the gentle teacher and propagandist -- all were progressives and yet so various were their orientations that they can only perilously be linked together. American educational progressivism established no orderly theoretical orientation and to the extent that this is true, it shows a deviation from the orientation of educational liberalism and serves to define the latter body of theory if only by establishing what it is not. Indeed, there were liberals in the progressive era, but they comprised only a part of the movement and not the movement itself.
perspectives. To even begin to comprehend the meaning imparted to the term "liberal" in each philosopher's work, one must begin with a process of differentiation that clarifies these distinctions. Further discrepancies of understanding may plague the scholar, for even if one manages to establish suitable distinctions between political and economic liberalism, one still encounters a state of confusion when attempting to isolate "liberal educational thought" from the numerous myths and misrepresentations which operate to incorrectly identify this term. The study is further limited as a consequence of the inherently conservative nature of the school in contemporary society. And this problem is further complicated by the scarcity of practical evidences

3The great diversity of opinion about the definition of "liberalism" and liberal thought can be easily observed by the most cursory appraisal of the literature available. Particularly instructive for purposes of comparison are the articles located in The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. IX, 276-282 and F. W. Coker, "Some Present-Day Critics of Liberalism," American Political Science Review, XLVII, 1953, pp. 1-27. Additionally, contrasting views can be extracted from R. Wolheim, "Without Doubt or Dogma: The Logic of Liberalism," Nation, CLXXXIII (July 28, 1956), pp. 74-76. Also valuable is L. Claude Jr., "Toward a Definition of Liberalism," Humanist, XVII, 1957, pp. 259-268.

of liberal works in the school classrooms.\(^5\)

The method of analysis places additional limitations on the study since it can only partially elucidate works of such philosophical breadth as those authored by MacIver, Book, Russell and Dewey. The academic disciplines encompassed by these four men — MacIver, a sociologist and political theorist, Book, a political theorist and philosopher, Russell, a mathematician and philosopher, and Dewey, a philosopher, political theorist and educational philosopher — is so diverse as to compound the difficulties of appropriately revealing the core fundamentals of their thought. Additionally, in all philosophical treatments there lies beyond the manifest level of presentation a so-called latent level of understanding.\(^6\) These depths of understanding are not easily amenable to comparative content analysis, and tend rather to be appreciated only by the philosopher, himself, and by his disciples.

A final limitation or problematic area of this study exists in the author himself. His central role in defining the problem, in organizing and selecting the works for study, in establishing the criteria for liberal educational thought, and in applying his philosophic


\(^6\)Berelson, *Content Analysis in Communication Research*, pp. 18.
perspective to the selected sources is obvious. Aside from the standard human shortcomings of personal and academic bias, the greatest problems which confronted the author in completing the study were the limitations of time and patience.

The Plan of the Study

This dissertation is divided into six chapters. Chapter I includes brief outlines of the problem to be studied, the methodological approach to be applied, and the content to be employed for definition. The introductory chapter also includes an appraisal of the limitations of the study. The following four chapters are each devoted to a seminal figure in liberal educational thought -- Robert MacIver, Sidney Hook, Bertrand Russell and John Dewey -- and his specific ideas relevant to this study. Finally, the concluding chapter will advance some conclusions on the relative degrees of liberalism of the men under study as is evidenced by their conformity and nonconformity to the six criteria that comprises the barometer for measurement.
CHAPTER II

Following is an analysis of Robert MacIver's educational theory. The wealth of his writings, relevant to education, will be examined. The perspective and structure of this examination will be derived from the six principle criteria of educational liberalism.

Universality of Education

It may seem overly simplistic to attempt to assess whether or not Robert MacIver favored a system of universal education. This fact may be rather easily demonstrated. This simplicity is deceptive, however, and may conceal the deeper purpose of this study which seeks to probe a more relevant type of consideration. It is the more subtle differentiations of view offered by the men studied that are valuable to a study of the four men. Instead of a treatment which determines whether or not a basic orientation is adopted in any of the theories, much of the study presented here focuses on an analysis of just what flavor or hue each orientation assumes.

Many of MacIver's writings afford insight into his position relative to the principle of universal education. One cannot focus solely on the educational works of MacIver to gain this insight. For MacIver, universal education was more than merely pedagogically related; it cut as an issue to the core of democracy as a belief-system, and in-
volved the entire question of the uses and misuses of raw power of all kinds. Nowhere is there a more clear presentation of this than in his essay, *Power Transformed*. After cataloguing the expressions of natural power (X-rays, gamma rays, microwaves, etc.) MacIver relates these to the factors of intelligence:

... Without physical power, some modicum of energy, nothing can be done. But by physical power alone, no human end be achieved, no conscious desire gratified. The wild beast cannot pounce upon his prey without the perception of his senses, without the guidance of his mite of intelligence. The power of man to achieve his ends has been the product of the combination of knowledge with energy, and the energy he employs has itself been multiplied a millionfold by his increasing knowledge. This, however, is but one aspect of the remarkable story of man's ever-changing utilization of power.¹

It is obvious that MacIver linked inexorably the properties of knowledge with the potential for exercise of power. It may be construed that this is an evidence of MacIver's support for the principle of universality.

MacIver continues in this vein, listing "the rise of the democratic principle" as his second stage of the transformation of power.² When MacIver discusses the early Greek attempts at democracy in this context and then critiques them, there is a conspicuous omission from his list of praise-worthy points characteristic of democratic principles. This is the absence of anything approaching a general educational system for the masses. Indeed, where this is absent or even curtailed, the


individual is doubtless excluded from his rightful share of that "energy . . . multiplied a millionfold" which could, through education, rest within his grasp.

MacIver identifies a number of long-trend social processes which so affected the power of groups with political status that they might no longer coerce other less powerful associations. One need not be surprised when MacIver caps off his listing of how this was accomplished with reference to the power of knowledge:

These processes transformed the power structure in several ways; first, by leveling out some gross disparities of power; second, by conferring new powers on those who had hitherto been relatively powerless, political powers such as the right to vote or the right to unionize; and third, by giving new play to noncoercive powers that had been previously limited by coercive controls, making possible the 'career open to talents' and widening the opportunities through the access to knowledge and to training in the arts.\(^3\)

Throughout, the writings of Robert MacIver betray a discernable allegiance to that concept that has almost become a slogan, "Knowledge is Power!"

When he chastises the ancient Greeks for supposing democracy in a time "when the social and educational conditions of enduring democracy had not yet been attained," he excuses the ancients as impossibly shackled by their perspective.\(^4\) Yet as he continues to advance the allegation that "No such excuse can be put forward on behalf of the

\(^{3}\)Ibid., p. 170.

modern philosophers," he appears to elevate education to so fundamental a position in the hierarchy of democratic prerequisites as to say that it is essential.

Taking this thought one step further, MacIver identifies this educational property as the attribute that prevents democracy from being open to criticism as the "rule of the incompetent" but rather as something far more noble. It is precisely this factor that accounts for,

the political liberation of all men from the chains of power. Democracy in origin and in action is a system devised to break the primal source of all tyranny, which is the coercive power of group over group, or of the few over the many.®

Doubtless, when MacIver focuses on an assault against tyranny, he intends that assault to score directly on those features of tyranny pertaining to the despotic holding of knowledge and its coercive misuse. Education is repeatedly indicated by MacIver as the tool with which this attack is to be launched.

In direct and indirect ways democracy works for the enfranchisement of the mind and the liberation of the spirit. Taking as its premise the equal rights of men it is thereby committed to provide the conditions for the reasonable exercise of equal rights. Which means that democracy is committed to educate its citizens, all its citizens. Universal education has been a gift of democracy, free education not only in the sense that it is provided without fees but also in the sense that freedom of thought and of discussion is not balked by the demand of government that the teacher become an agent of its policies.7

MacIver proceeds to further reveal his understanding of the socialization

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5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., p. 42.
7 Ibid., p. 51.
process, asserting his acceptance of that position which illustrates the existence in all educational systems of an enculturated bias. He even goes to the point of accepting the proposition that all education indoctrinates as well as informs just as the ways of a culture or region are imparted with ethnocentric bias to those who matriculate in the schools. However, he then draws the qualitative line and maintains:

But democracy does not, cannot, believe in 'thought control.' It does not make government an arbiter of opinion. It leaves open all the avenues of dissent, so long as dissent does not commit itself to methods of violence.8

It is the position of democracy, as visualized by MacIver, to stand in a very difficult posture and to seek a very difficult goal. It trusts its citizens as no other system ever has and makes extreme demands on its people, this accounting for its persistent social lag behind its ideals. Democracy, trusting in its own persuasiveness, makes the highest demands on its citizens' reason, integrity and faith "than does any other system."9

Reflection

That feature most easily sought in the theories of all of these men is a commitment to reflection as a pedagogic style. Liberals insist that this systematic approach should characterize the functions and obligations of both the teacher and the student. This reflective approach could be viewed as the total thrust of liberal educational

8Ibid.

9Ibid.
theories just as each of the other criteria common to liberalism could be properly viewed as representing merely features necessary for or auxiliary to the reflective process. Simply stated, most of what is liberalism in education is reflection.

Reflection, then, must be continually sought in the works of all of these men for it is suggested whenever there is a mention of open-mindedness, personal freedom, individuality and the like. It is not impossible, however, to seek where the authors have directed more specific attention to the "fine points" of reflection and have focused on the problems of methodology, the nature of the scientific method, and the need to continually re-examine and reinterpret old "truths." It is here where some meaningful distinctions in the theories of the men can be identified; a more superficial study might lead one to interpret the men as similar for it is only when one examines their orientation more specifically that meaningful and discernable discrimination can be advanced.

The work of Robert M. MacIver is no exception to the tendency identified above for his theoretical work offers much insight into his regard for reflection. What is distinctive in his study is the very original approach and perspective in which he treats this process in his various works. MacIver's Academic Freedom in Our Time is an excellent point of departure largely because of the unique perspective from which reflection is approached.

It is an hypothesis that the scientist keeps on testing, not a sacred doctrine that he keeps on defending. It is inferential. It is always subject to modification. Some seemingly well-
established constructs may be rejected altogether in favor of new ones that are more in accord with the behavior of the phenomena of the field.¹⁰

It is in his inspiring introduction to the above-mentioned volume that MacIver links the issue of academic freedom squarely with the spirit of reflection. This reflective spirit is what MacIver identifies as a fundamental purpose of the educational venture. The entirety of the reflective process is boiled down in essence to the uncorrupted search for truth, a search not affected by any other interests or cross purposes.

The genuine teacher is interested in knowledge for its own worthwhileness, no matter what else it brings. The genuine student is interested in learning for its own sake, no matter what utility it may also serve. In seeking knowledge he is seeking truth.¹¹

No system of goals or purposes could more clearly identify the reflective process and the basic assumptions upon which it must be based than this assumption of truth as the ultimate goal. It should be clearly understood, though, that no one more clearly than MacIver understood the irony of this goal, that being its perpetual existence due to the utter impossibility of its objective ever being attained. No one can know that truth has been reached at any given point in their process of reflection, so the value of the goal is to continually initiate the uncorrupted process rather than to afford some easily identifiable end. The whole problem is firmly centered on the problem of defining what is true. It is in treating this precise quandry that MacIver most clearly


¹¹Ibid.
specified the nature of his reflection and the process taken as a whole.

We must pause here a moment, for the word 'truth' has different overtones from 'knowledge.' A statement is true when it is 'in accord with the facts,' that is, when the connection it asserts actually exists in the manner and in the place in which it is asserted to exist. The business of the scholar is with the discovered and discoverable relationships between things. He carries on this business by studying the data, the phenomena, and applying the logic of evidence.\textsuperscript{12}

This division operates to place MacIver's understanding of reflection in the liberal school. Knowledge is characterized as the data, always flexible, from which the scholar works in his attempts to ascertain what is true. Truth, here, is held to represent something more permanent, and indeed is very near the top of the value scale. Somewhat complicating the problem is that realization that truth is variously purported to emanate from widely disparate sources. For example, we might note that for many, truth is accepted as "revealed" or "God-given." This one category is variously represented, but there is one element that appears a constant, that being that the source is of unquestionable authority and blind acceptance is therefore dictated.

For others, truth is the product of their exercising of "their own ingenuity."

It should be obvious that when we speak here of the search for truth as the business of the scholar we mean truth in the latter sense alone. In our context the word "truth" is relevant only to knowledge that depends on investigation, that can always be questioned and retested, and that is never accepted on the ground that it is the deliverance of any authority human or divine.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{13}\textit{Ibid.}. 
But the conception of truth to the liberal educator goes even further than this disavowal of blind acceptance. Qualifications are laid down as well for even those self-discovered truths which are the culmination of a truly reflective endeavor. Actually, no reflective process can ever be accepted as completed and therefore, the truth must be held as, at most, tentative.

When the scholar says something is true, he means true so far as our knowledge goes, and no further. His truth has no finality, it is never absolute, and in this sense also it differs from what is claimed to be delivered or authoritative truth. It is not the whole truth about anything, for our knowledge never goes far enough.14

Our knowledge can never exhaust the data relevant to any problem or enigma and consequently one may never reflectively lay claim to having "the answer." But even those notions fail to appropriately represent the problem of reflection as relevant to the issue of academic freedom.

Up to this point knowledge has been viewed as it pertains to actual facts, however, incompletely or insufficiently comprehended by the scholar. Ironically, MacIver would also contend that knowledge goes considerably further into the more abstract, completely discounting a notion of knowledge as being separate bits of information. Knowledge is more than figures, graphs, instrument readings and facts; it embraces all conclusions rationally derived from the data, as well as the individualistic manner in which these factual "bits" are linked by various scholars. The limitations are not solely a function of man's inabilities in the acquisition of data, but embrace the nature of how tentative data is as well. All this provides foundation for the discussion of the

14Ibid.
"open mind" which will follow. For if our conclusions are formulated from data which is itself a non-codified interpretation, then little claim can be made for the sanctity or finality of discovered "truths." One can hardly be surprised, when viewing this problem from this perspective, to find that MacIver and all liberal educational theorists place their emphasis in teaching on the spirit of search and reflection rather than with clogging the heads of their students with a random collection of "factual" material. Value in the liberal's educational theory is relegated to the process of reflection and the examination and re-evaluation of conceptions rather than to any end product of the process. A brief quote from MacIver's work tends further to suggest a liberal spirit in his theory.

That the open search for truth has rendered great services to mankind can scarcely be denied — although the magnitude of that service is not sufficiently appreciated by society in general.

Finally, it should be noted that MacIver recognized the failings inherent in the human factor in reflection. His closing word with reference to reflection, citing various steps in the process and the rules of evidence, challenges the scholar to bridle his own prejudices and emotions in favor of the evidence. He indicates that one's "obligation as a teacher requires that he be more concerned to have his students think for themselves than to enroll them as his disciples. . ."17

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15 Ibid., p. 15.
16 Ibid., p. 11.
Reflection (seemingly equated by MacIver with scholarship itself) is therefore identified as the final value in education and, 

. . . the obligations of the scholar are in effect the conditions requisite for the all-round advancement of scholarship itself. 18

A very clear set of guidelines is therefore available to the liberal educator seeking to fulfill his obligations and advance scholarship — the furthering of reflection.

**Personal Freedom**

An ingredient vital to the processes of reflection, the maintenance of individuality, and the advancement of scholarship of any consequence is personal freedom. Liberal educational theories have always recognized and provided for this prerequisite. Of course, it is a two-sided coin with provision being made for the freedom of the student and the teacher. At times this issue has been referred to as "academic freedom;" this is generally done in reference to the necessity to resist forces from outside of the educational community which would seek to abridge the freedom of those (teachers and students) inside of the community of scholars. Another facet is very important as well and that is the necessary liberation of the spirit of the student from coercive pedagogy within the classroom. But, within the province of liberal educational theory, this freedom is understood to be one which can indeed be exaggerated as was well done by those who fell prey to the Rousseauian excesses of naturalism during the progressive heyday.

As is continually the case in any attempt to distinguish between

18 *bid.*
Robert MacIver and the other educational theorists treated herein, it will not be those broad strokes of theory that will offer a clue to differentiation, but rather those specifics that will illuminate their differences. Emphasis will shift from man to man and just as one will appear to lend his strongest insistence to the preservation of the freedom of the youngster within the classroom, others will place their greatest emphasis on academic freedom from external coercion.

In *Academic Freedom in Our Time*, MacIver comments on the proper limits of freedom in the educational venture. He places the great emphasis of his attention upon the preservation of personal freedom as it is threatened from sources and interests outside of the province of the school community. But it should be carefully noted that when MacIver defines this academic freedom,

> It is the freedom of the scholar within the institution devoted to scholarship, the "academy."[^1]

He should be understood to use the word *scholar* to embrace not only the teachers but also in an expanded sense, those growing and potential scholars, the students. Indeed, they should be properly considered as hierarchically lower on the achievement scale, but in no way fundamentally less in kind or worth.

It should not be surprising, then, that this educational theorist places great value on this freedom. MacIver has written extensively on the nature and needs of freedom and has not exempted educational freedom from those fundamental qualifications that he has indicated apply alike to freedom of all kinds. It is MacIver's intriguing formulation that

[^1]: MacIver, *Academic Freedom in Our Time*, p. 3.
freedoms and restraints are necessarily a duality, as inseparable as any natural duet in the state of nature. For it is the restraints according to MacIver that give meaning and preservation to the freedoms -- the two are seen as accomplishing a delicate and dynamic balance. It is reminiscent of one of the laws of physics -- for every freedom there is an equal but opposite restraint that preserves that freedom. Just as my freedom to be secure as a pedestrian depends upon a restraint on the conduct of motorists, the freedom of scholars to pursue truth rests upon a restraint on those who would coerce allegiance to some dogma, whether this be a teacher, his students, or someone outside of the educational community.

Since liberty does not exist in a void, but in the relations between men, all liberties depend on restraints just as all rights depend on obligations.  

MacIver has repeatedly demonstrated the importance he attaches to the relationship between personal freedom and academic freedom. This is clearly indicated by his characterization of personal freedom as one aspect of the freedom that redeems man alike from superstition and from brutal servitude, the freedom of the mind.

Academic freedom is, from this aspect a right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and investigator to interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions without being subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalization because these conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution. Here is the core of the doctrine of academic freedom. It is the freedom of the student within his field of study.


21MacIver, Academic Freedom in Our Time, p. 6.
Maclver is not without concern for the leadership role of the teacher and the consequent interaction between teacher and student. He cautions against the teacher's use of superior powers of sarcasm where they are employed to silence opposing viewpoints. The teacher is identified as a man with special competencies in one area, but having no special authority in other areas — "little more qualified than any layman."

He should not regard the rostrum of his class as a platform from which to broadcast his opinions on issues irrelevant to the courses he is teaching. 22

What this all points to is the freedom of a student to weigh data for himself and to make up his own mind. That this freedom is bound up with the freedom of an educator to freely teach is fundamental to any understanding of the problem.

It should not be difficult to comprehend, then, how two educators could find themselves in disagreement over so sweeping a principle. Maclver gained considerable attention in the early 1950's by his formulation that the principles of education dictated the necessity of including in public and university education a communist instructor wherever that individual could live up to the obligations he had outlined for the scholar. He felt it was fundamentally wrong to exclude any group as a whole from the educational venture simply upon their affiliations.

Are we then afraid to let the student judge for himself? Such a fear can surely be entertained only by those who have no trust in the virtues of our system, no faith in democracy. 23

22Ibid., p. 8.

23Ibid., p. 190.
He further contended that those who feared the communist instructor must believe that the ideas of one communist are far more potent than those of countless thousands of non-communists. He characterized this type of fear as residing only in those who are not true educators. MacIver felt that this type of restriction ran counter to and should be opposed by good teachers. Much of this discussion was in fact a public debate between MacIver and Sidney Hook, who in his volume *Heresy Yes – Conspiracy No*, outlined his justification for excluding communist instructors from the college campus.

MacIver was devoted to the study of the causes and cures of delinquency among the young. Much of the study that he did in this regard is quite pertinent to and indeed helped shape the theorist's views in regard to the student's requirement of personal freedom.

MacIver observed that the prevailing mood in those dealing with youthful delinquents was to launch a program of counter-indoctrination against them while confining them in some manner of "corrective" school.24 Almost uniformly this type of instruction had little or no effect as it was resisted by those youngsters who perceived their instructors to be agents of some alien culture.

> It is a struggle of wills, more particularly since the boys are subjected against their will to an external authority representing the alien culture. They devote their energies to eluding and stultifying the discipline thus imposed upon them and to re-

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affirming in their free relations with one another the old mores. 25

Maclver concludes with his application of this situation to all education, "No process of education takes place under such conditions." It is vital that the youngster to be "taught" be enlisted as an ally in the educational venture rather than be defeated by some conqueror-teacher.

Those formulations developed by MacIver to explain national and international politics again assist in an interpretation of his views concerning classroom politics and its proper, most propitious conduct. "Without law there is no order and without community there is no law." 26 This, when extrapolated into the perspective of the classroom, shouts loudly and clearly, that the youngsters require some controls for their own fullest appreciation of their freedom, but these controls ultimately rest on the students' willingness to accept them and their perception of their worth.

Openmindedness

Reflection cannot take place without and indeed assumes the existence of an open mind. No true reflective process can proceed where one is unable or unwilling to investigate all possibilities. From a variety of perspectives MacIver offers clues as to his convictions on this matter. Throughout a wide selection of his volumes, one can gain considerable insight into MacIver's formulation of the necessity for

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25 Ibid.

openmindedness. He attacks this problem from a variety of positions.

In *Life: Its Dimensions and Its Bounds* MacIver provides an insight into the position he accepted on the nature of knowledge which offers a clear implication for his later position on maintaining an open mind. In this series of fictional dialogues he represents knowledge as something other than easily codified truths. One would find it extremely difficult to move from this position into a stance where segments of belief could be ruled out prior to reflective examination.

Through the role of one of the participants in the dialogue, MacIver attacks that position which holds that the only knowledge is that which is verifiable by measurement, thus throwing open the door to a perception of knowledge as a far more tentative and uncertain property.

Obviously I'm not denying that measurement is the test of knowledge where the knowledge itself is concerned with measurable properties. What I claim is that no one has any right to assert that there is no genuine knowledge that is not verified by measurement.27

Clearly, when one perceives of knowledge and truth in these terms there is rendered impossible the formation of a "True Believer" personality. There is simply too much remaining unknown for the knower to feel that he comprehends everything about any subject. Solace and reward is relegated to the search for knowledge and the accompanying spirit which is associated with it.

It should be understood that this type of belief serves to attack two types of extreme positions -- that position wherein an individual

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claims to know the answer as well as that where the individual feels nothing is reflectively knowable and all knowledge, therefore, must rely for its acceptance on either faith or revelation. Clearly, the former of these extremes comes under attack most frequently by the liberal theorists, the latter extreme being dismissed as almost unworthy of an intellectual response.

But I emphatically object when people pontifically excommunicate the seeker after knowledge who doesn't bow to the one and only line.28

MacIver makes clear his contention that certainty in knowledge is a consequence of that knowledge becoming remote from human existence, because only when it is so divided from all human factors into a world of "quantitative abstractions" (divorced from human experience) can any degree of certainty be contended.29 This, however, is in the world of photons, electrons, and angstrom units and is very different from the world of politics, love and prejudice. All this only further verifies that man is frustrated in his attempts at certainty and is engaged in folly when he pretends to have accomplished it.

In one of MacIver's most recent volumes he is called upon to reminisce on his life and work. Considerable insight can be gained into the nature of his beliefs from his very philosophical epilogue, "Time, Myself and my Work." MacIver dispels any doubt that what allowed him to endure as a sociologist, educator and writer for over sixty years was the flexible dynamic of a growing mind. Openmindedness appears as an

28Ibid.

29Ibid., p. 20.
essential element in preserving MacIver's relevance throughout the first and into the second half of the twentieth century. No charge can be properly advanced that MacIver's life was characterized by a lack of conviction for he was a man of commitment. What distinguishes MacIver and the other liberals considered in this study was the manner in which commitments were unable to immobilize and hamstring him, never closing his mind to new insights. "The future is always a question mark . . ." insists MacIver. One does not note a tone of lament in this pronouncement, but rather the excitement of a man engaged in continual lifetime of search. 30

The open mind is particularly essential in the area of the social studies, where social facts are indeed little more than consensual valuations. From this point the only direction in which one can move is toward a position that dictates the existence of the maximum fairness in a pedagogical style that seeks a saturation of the various possibilities. Continually, the teacher is reminded of his limitations and cautioned against the temptation to pretend omnipotence. MacIver appears to be consonant with this view.

His competence lies in a particular field -- not in all fields. In most areas of knowledge he is little more qualified than any layman. On controversial issues within his proper field he should fairly present the evidences on both sides -- or on every side -- and should not exercise his powers of sarcasm on those who hold opposing views. He should recognize the limitations of his knowledge and the fallibility of the knower. 31


31 MacIver, Academic Freedom in Our Time, p. 8.
Here, again, the weight of the theorists' considerations rest firmly on a conception of knowledge as an imperfect entity and the consequent "holding" of knowledge as riddled with the immeasurable qualitative imperfection as must permeate any humanly tainted activity.

The necessity of open-mindedness is further illustrated by the nature of instruction counseled by the liberal educational school. That the good teacher is a good example should be easily acceptable as a sound principle. It is also true that liberal educators seek to imbue their charges with an appreciation for the open mind rather than that traditional reverence for the cataloguing of codified "truths."

Seemingly MacIver's references to the teacher in a student role further illustrate this attempt to impart, by example, to the youngsters the understanding that one never can pretend reasonably to hold the answer.

The genuine scholar is of the breed of Chaucer's clerk of Oxenford, 'Gladly would he learn and gladly teach.' The major obligations of the scholar merely spell out the ways in which he exercises the full freedom of the spirit of learning.32

At no point more than when he operates in the guise of a learner does the teacher reflect the qualities of an open and searching mind. For MacIver the playing of this role is clearly fundamental to the proper execution of the duties and obligations of a scholar.

Few places more eloquently insist on the value and necessity of an openminded approach to scholarship than MacIver's "The Rights and Obligations of the Scholar." It is here that MacIver demonstrates his respect for evidence. For in liberal educational theory the final and indeed the only criteria for decisions-making is the evidence available

32Spitz, Politics and Society, p. 11.
on the subject to be considered. Worthy authorities, divine and otherwise, must always remain subservient to available data for the liberal who seeks to reflectively manipulate a concept. And most specifically the liberal is instructed to handle with the most reverence that data which most severely challenges his prevailing formulations and ideological constructions.

More specifically, he is called on to be thoroughly scrupulous in his respect for evidence, and most of all for such evidence as may appear to be out of accord with his point of view or his doctrine or his interest. At the same time he must give fair and open-minded consideration to the arguments of those who reach different conclusions from his own. He must not yield to the temptation to magnify his conclusions, to overstate his evidences, to announce certainty where he has only some degree of probability. . .

In a world where the fine art of propagandism is supreme, he must set a somewhat lone example. . . 33

It would scarcely overstate the case to indicate that to the liberal educator all certainty is the greatest of enemies and the greatest weapon with which to combat it is the open mind, that prerequisite to sound reflection. This point will indeed be reiterated with a later consideration of Dewey's condemnation of the quest for certainty wherein he similarly excludes this type of endeavor from his definition of teaching. 34

The Student As The Educational End

It would seem appropriate at this juncture to take up the

33Ibid., p. 13.

principle of the student as an end in himself. At some instances this issue appears to blur with the related principle of student individuality but a simple formula for differentiation is available. The first of these issues to be pursued through the work of MacIver refers most directly to the uses made of the student by various institutions and interest groups, including the school. The second refers more directly to the tolerance of personality and interest differences on the part of the student by the school itself. This differentiation is in no way an absolute one and is employed here to secure an outline sketch rather than to offer some final point of definition between the two.

When we refer to a principle that upholds the necessity for a youngster to be considered as an end in himself, the true focus here is negatively emphasized. This means that most concern for the preservation of this principle is devoted to preventing incursions against student expression. Simply, energies are devoted to insure that the student is not subverted to some alien interest (which, in this sense would encompass any ends other than his own). More than that, the youngster's expression of his own ends are emphasized and we encounter the channeling of energies toward ensuring that no other ends are substituted for his own.

What is developed, as various pedagogic approaches are excluded, is quite sweeping! Most obviously excluded from sound pedagogy is propaganda, dogma, indoctrination and the interest biases of persons in authority. Repeatedly, these influences and devices are condemned as natural enemies to education by MacIver and his fellow liberals.
It would be naive to expect total success for this principle, for one must identify natural elements of socialization operating in all communities and to the extent that these elements are in operation, no student can be solely himself. To some extent he will be forced by his maturation and development to conform and shape himself to the culture or system in which he shares. This should not, however, be a signal for educators to of necessity "throw in the towel." Rather, what must be done is to infuse the youngsters with an awareness, non-judgmental in nature, of their culture. They then have the benefit of experiencing their educational and growth-producing life drama in a new type of perspective. No efforts on the part of educators can free youngsters from the often strangling grip of their own background, but this is not the purpose of offering them an overview encompassing a reasonable perspective of their own place in the cosmos. What is sought here, instead, is to allow the youngsters to know more accurately ways other than their own by allowing them the realization that their styles of living and valuing are but one possibility among many.

The approach most congruent with liberal educational theory, then, is to induce awareness of the problems growing out of socialization and to maintain uppermost in the student's consciousness that these forces are constantly in operation. Furthermore any overt or conscious attempt at socializing is to be soundly condemned by the liberal teacher. Simply because he acknowledges that some socialization is normal, that is no justification for encouraging or fostering overt indoctrination.

This does not prohibit liberal teachers from seeking to prepare youngsters to live successfully in the society in which they reside;
rather it condemns the closing of a youngster's mind only to those ways generally conceded as the "right" ways within the narrow vista of any given locality. A teacher would be negligent if the education that he afforded his youngsters was structured with no real attention to the existent problems, needs and demands that will be placed upon them by the society in which they live. Liberal theorists have repeatedly insisted on the necessary relevance of education as preparation to meaningful exercise of their power in the manipulation of society.

This can never be accomplished where one ignores the nature of that culture within which one is operating. Finally, however, one must understand that this awareness need in no way be indicative of the intellectual subservience of the individual to his environment. In fact, this insight should become a tool that he can use to free himself from it.

In a program for the control of inter-group discrimination in the United States, MacIver confronts the problems encountered with the school's reflection of society.

In the first place the public schools are responsive to the socially dominant forces of the community. The policy that directs them is not prescribed by any central ministry of education. Not only has each state its own system but every city and town has its board exercising fundamental controls. The boards are subject to the political forces that determine popular election. Hence they vary widely in competence and insight.35

The entity that would seek to substitute his ends for those of the student is clearly not depicted here as some manner of all-powerful and

encompassing government. Instead, the precise absence of this entity is depicted here as allowing the existence of a void that is invariably filled with local interest and value representatives, bound to rendering the school subservient to societal interests by the very nature of the democratic and representative political process held dear in the United States.

In his discussions of the school's relation to the origins of juvenile delinquency, MacIver repeatedly blasts education's failure to accept the student as more than an entity to be fitted to the castings of a society. He identifies this shortcoming as a major factor in producing the wealth of dropouts. "Schooling should be, but frequently is not, adapted to preparing them for different conditions of living and employment." What comes under his scrutiny and criticism here is the failure of the schools to follow the needs or to accomplish the ends of society, let alone devoting their attention to accomplishing the ends of the youngster himself. Indeed, excellent satires such as that in The Saber-Tooth Curriculum have assaulted the folly of the schools in their failure to accommodate their curricular offerings to any goal other than the particularistic needs of the school itself, not to mention petty convenience and the lure of laziness.

Possibly the greatest instruction to a public school faculty on this matter was included by MacIver in his study of Unity and Difference


in American Life. He offers a statement from the former President of Manhattan's Hunter College which says much to the proper role of professorial opinion in teaching:

> While every member of the staff is entitled to his or her opinions, indoctrination in terms of these opinions is clearly limited by the rights of parents who send their daughters to us. Such rights cannot in any way circumscribe the process of scholarly or scientific inquiry which is inevitably in part subjective. But it is another thing entirely to undermine the courtesy which underlies our necessary acceptance of cultural pluralism by indulging in quite personal attacks on the convictions, sentiments and legitimate prides of student groups.38

It is further noted by MacIver that differences are not only legitimate, but have great value. In our attempts to reconcile differences, he is concerned lest we attempt to abolish uniqueness, creativity, and pluralism.

> The problem is not how to cancel these differences. That belongs to the dead past. The problem is how to get along with these differences.39

Pluralistic social and political themes are prevalent among all liberal theorists.

Finally, in Academic Freedom in Our Time, MacIver repeatedly insists on eradicating any posture from the school which would yield to external pressures to use the school to produce the student as a product for use to some specified end, no matter how allegedly worthy the end specified.


39Ibid., p. 152.
It is a primary duty of the governing board to resist the pressures of ideological groups and of special interests that for the promotion of their own ends would narrow its outlook.40

With special reference to the university, MacIver specifies:

The university cannot without distortion become an agency designed for indoctrination no matter how great or good the cause. The university is a body of scholars of very diverse scholarly interests... On most of the issues that divide other men, they, too, are likely to be divided.41

MacIver completes the above quotation with his vigorous assertion that unanimity is necessary among the faculty of a school only to accept the "intrinsic worthwhileness of the knowledge of things" and that the code of the teachers should be to "strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield."42

MacIver warns specifically against the number of "industrial, financial, commercial, and professional groups that strive to protect their particular interests by making the "education of the public" one of their major operations. MacIver wisely accepts that it is the nature of any organization to foster its own defense and promotion. What he cautions against, however, is the activities of those very powerful bodies that by virtue of their sheer size can mount an unbearable assault on any reticent non-believer. Where such campaigns are successful, the individual becomes the creature of the organ, rather than vice-versa.43

40MacIver, Academic Freedom in Our Time, p. 8.
41Ibid., p. 14.
42Ibid.
43Ibid., p. 42.
Individuality

A principle that is possibly as encompassing as that of reflection is individuality. To the liberal educator, this term is literally loaded with meaning and could be seen to encompass nearly all other facets of liberal educational theory. Generally, individuality is depicted as the right to express goals and modes of thought altogether different from those which currently hold the greatest acceptance among the majority in a given community. Liberal education feels that it is vital for an individual to be allowed to "march to a different drummer" as a prerequisite to ever being able to think reflectively and to make up his own mind as is best indicated by the available evidence, rather than being helplessly swayed by what is fashionable.

Further, individuality serves as a major contributing factor within a community to intelligent change and progress. Where conformity to an approved line of behavior is mandatory and compliance unswerving, the result expected can only be stagnation — on this point the lessons of anthropology and history are explicit. The social or political deviant must be tolerated and even prized as an agent of social change, for only through the application of individual solutions to problems can new ways be adopted or even recognized.

MacIver is continually providing in his writings for the preservation of individuality. Individuality is seen not as a matter of educational necessity only, but it is depicted as vital for the progress of any segment of society, as well as being a political foundation block of democracy. Instead of prescribing what elements are essential to define
"correct" behavior, MacIver approaches the definitional dilemma in a different way.

I would prefer to define in terms of minimum than of normal standards.  

In a sweeping addition to this type of conceptual framework, MacIver contends,

Strictly speaking, in a complex heterogeneous society there are, can be, no norms of acting and of living in the name of which we should regulate our fellows.  

The difficulty of accepting a different resolution to this problem is closely related to the myriad of social and political unknowns that permeate any pluralistic democratic society.

What are accepted standards of normal social life? Accepted by whom? Do we include ethical standards? Religious standards?  

MacIver counsels the adoption of certain objective minimum standards of behavioral conformity. For when an individual or group begins to prescribe general standards of any type, they are treading on uneasy ground. This is not to deny that for sound operation in any field some standards are very necessary. What MacIver insists is that the prescriber be acquainted with problems inherent in his actions.

MacIver has studied the concept of individuality and attempted to elucidate its semantic use in various manners. Noting the use of this term as a physical referent to denote individuality as existing separately from each other, MacIver asserts that this is not that type

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45 Ibid., p. 43.
46 Ibid.
of individuality critical to the proper education of a young person. To MacIver, biological individuality is similarly not the concept which bears educational significance. In fact, both the physical and biological approaches are identified by the sociologist merely to clear up misconceptions and as platforms to introduce the more meaningful concept that MacIver identifies as "sociological" individuality.\(^{47}\) It is in the explanation and revelation of this concept that MacIver appears most in agreement with liberal values.

We can now extend the meaning of individuality to its sociological reference and say that a social being has more individuality when his conduct is not simply imitative or the result of suggestion, when he is less the slave of custom or even of habit, when his responses to the social environment are not quasi-automatic and subservient, devoid of understanding or of personal purpose.\(^{48}\)

This is the individuality that MacIver would like to see expressed in the world of education and he has irrevocably differentiated between it and some token physical individuality which so frequently characterizes the pattern followed by "progressive" institutions which are not truly engaged in the freeing of the individual to be his own best person.\(^{49}\) MacIver continues to insist that individuality is that which allows the member of a group to be more than merely a part of a larger whole, "a center of activity and response expressive of a nature

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\(^{48}\) Ibid., p. 47.

that is his own."50

MacIver acknowledges that individuality is frequently expressed as the spirit or quality of an individual's being. He insists that individuality must be more than an imitative expression.

Individuality is further separated from mere difference with MacIver's contention that difference is a poor gauge for the measurement of individuality. Rather than defining individual variance, MacIver would seek to determine to what extent the person acted so as to be in accord with his own consciousness. This, he felt, was a truer indication of the extent to which individuality was present.

When the possessor of individuality does as others do, at least in matters which he deems important, he does it not simply because others do it, but because his own nature responds in the same way.51

MacIver continues that when an individual expression of individuality conforms to authority, he does so not merely out of compulsion. That is, he follows not simply to adhere to authority, but rather due to the consonance of the authoritative position with that of his own.

What MacIver would characterize, then, as his principle of individuality and its operation within the school is not unlike that principle of pluralism that contemporary sociologists have proclaimed vital to the sound operation of any democracy.52 Respecting individual differences -- indeed, treasuring difference -- is a vital necessity for

50MacIver, Society, p. 47.
51Ibid.
52An excellent example of this school of thought can be found in John F. Cuber, Problems of American Society (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964).
sound, viable democratic growth. MacIver personally demonstrates the need for the preservation of individuality in relation to coping with the passing of years.

Everyone needs to find his own mode of communion with the timeless, with what for him remains secure beyond the chances and vicissitudes of time.  

MacIver intended that this area of an individual's life be very much his own, and he ruled out no approach to the timeless, including religion or "any system of primary values." However, though MacIver was never overly prescriptive about the way individuals should reach for the deepest satisfaction in life, he did clearly perceive the need for many roads to truth. This intellectual pluralism is an essential characteristic of liberal theory and helps further to differentiate it from what was earlier revealed as "progressivism" in educational thought.

In an interesting discussion of the problems surrounding *Unity and Difference in American Life*, MacIver offers further insight into his own view of the proper extents of individuality. Among those educational goals deemed improper and which are disclaimed by MacIver are uniformity, coordination, or even simple agreement. What should be sought, he contends, is merely a state wherein the existent disagreements do not stand in the way of cooperation for the common good. What is sought, then, is "the cooperation of differences." He finishes on a simple note citing the myriad differences that comprise the universe (language, value, goals) and pledging his acceptance of them agreeing to stand by our differences. What he seeks, then, is not merely a kindly tolerance or a

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53MacIver, *Challenge of the Passing Years*, p. 127.

54MacIver, *Unity and Difference*, p. 152.
complacent patronizing indifference, but instead a dynamic attitude that we cannot make this diversely populated universe into a community of conformity.

Maclver makes emphatic his reference to the individuality of the student in his treatment of the topic of juvenile delinquency. To even begin to cope with its share of the problem of delinquency, the schools, he feels, must concentrate a greater share of their work on the students as individuals, detecting earlier and more clearly the nature of social malfunctionings. Increased guidance facilities as well as increased teacher awareness of individual problems is vital if significant strides are to be made in the problem of the dropout, the greatest prelude to the problems of delinquency.

Concluding Statement

Based upon a survey of Maclver's attitudes and positions relevant to the universality of education, reflection, personal freedom, openmindedness, the student as the educational end, and individuality, it is clear that he is committed to the tenets of liberal educational thought.

55 When one considers that individual emotional problems are frequently highly agitated by failure at school, the school is then clearly seen as sharing in the responsibility of social malfunction. With this recognition, Maclver identifies himself within the body of liberal educational theorists.
CHAPTER III

SIDNEY HOOK

Several interesting contrasts can be identified in the educational theories of Robert M. MacIver, and Sidney Hook. This might be expected, though, considering their differing disciplinary orientations -- Hook the philosopher and MacIver the sociologist. It is not surprising then, that Hook delves more deeply into minute semantic questions related to educational theory, where MacIver concentrates upon broader educational issues of socialization. Despite these substantive differences in their educational theories, one finds an amazing degree of agreement and consistency in their work. This chapter will detail the elements of Hook's educational thought which reveal his proximity to MacIver's thought.

Universality of Education

Sidney Hook suggests that a properly organized educational system must endeavor to provide all citizens with the best possible education. This notion of "best possible education" is defined along classically reflective lines and is framed in terms of the individual's personal growth.

We must conceive our educational task in the broadest sense. We must try to make it possible for as many individuals as we can reach through gifted teachers,
using the best pedagogical methods available, to find and develop themselves as persons who can live with themselves and others, and who can enjoy in an active and participating way, on levels appropriate to their capacities, the goods and values of "ideal society"... 1

Hook insists that although mass culture may foster mass education in order to function efficiently, it does not mean that public education must be "cheap" or "shoddy." Hook states that no one deplores the "inanities and frivolities of mass culture" more than he does. He advances the argument that educational mediocrity need not be accepted as a permanent characteristic of mass culture. 2 Expressing his faith in American youth and his contention that a "high culture" will continue to exist in this society, Hook believes that mass culture will not deaden American society to the "higher" scope of reason.

Hook offers support for the universality of education based upon his lifelong commitment to democratic principles. An educated citizenry is a crucial factor in the success of any democratic undertaking, and Hook is adamant about this fact. He reiterates that a democracy places considerably more dependence upon the competence and intellect of the public than any other system.

The democrat assumes vis-a-vis the despot, especially the benevolent despot, that most men in the open light of clash and criticism of interests are better judges of their own interest than anyone else. 3

1Sidney Hook, Education For Modern Man (New York: The Dial Press, 1946), p. 34.

2Ibid.

The implications for the school from such a position are clear. Just as the educational programs of dictatorships seek to elevate selected classes to positions of rule, so must a democracy seek to elevate the general populace to that same position of intellectual competence.

There is no doubt about the extent of Hook's commitment to democracy. An ample display of this may be found in his discussions relevant to the external threats to democracy such as that from international communism. Impassioned language is invariably employed by the philosopher to illustrate the necessity of preserving democracy against the communist onslaught.

At the present juncture of world history it is true that what is most precious in human experience is threatened on a global scale . . . by the expansion of communism and its regime of ruthless terror.\(^4\)

It is democracy that is deemed by Hook to be the most precious creation of human experience. What is most vital to its preservation and operation -- the education of its participants -- is vital to Hook.

Hook is careful not to confuse "democracy" with vague and spiritless conformity, the pervasive sameness that has been identified as undesirable in mass society. Rather, what he envisions for the ideal democratic principle is,

\[\ldots\text{ a principle of equality -- an equality not of status or origin but of opportunity, relevant functions, and social participation. The enormous literature and bitter controversy which center around the concept of equality indicate that it is only a little less ambiguous than the concept of democracy.}\]\(^5\)

\(^4\)Ibid., p. 102.

Hook rarely makes an unqualified statement, and his position on "equality" is no exception to that rule. Equality of opportunity is far too sweeping a generalization for Hook to employ without some thought toward qualifying it and consequently imbuing it with more philosophical meaning. He emphasizes that this is not to be an unthinking policy that proceeds by rote, but rather one possessing flexibility, intelligently accounting for reasonable differences.

It is not a mechanical policy of equal opportunity for everyone at any time and in all respects. A musical genius is entitled to greater opportunities for developing his musical talents than someone who is deaf. It is equality of opportunity for all individuals to develop whatever personal and socially desirable talents they possess and to make whatever unique contributions their capacities permit.®

This type of philosophical orientation pervades Hook's writings. Continually, the human factors relevant to the operation of a democratic society are cited and recited, with the attendant implications for the educational system being identified.

A democratic society is one ordered by laws; but the laws in such a society must be made or interpreted by individuals who, ultimately, are responsible to (and removable by) the community. The community must be one in which equality of civic status obtains, in which the laws ultimately rest upon the freely given consent of the adult population.7

A list cataloguing the instances in which Hook has supported the principles of democracy and the consequent freedom of individuals to decide issues of importance for themselves would be an endless one. In the final analysis, Hook observes, "The operating maxim of the democratic

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®Ibid., p. 38.

7Ibid., p. 41.
ideology is, 'whoever wears the shoe know best where it pinches.'

Related to the recognition that citizens are best suited to decide what is best for them, Hook notes that other attributes essential to democracy flow from this realization. He qualifies this praise, noting that popular majorities are not always right. What most recommends acceptance of democracy is its favorable comparison with other available systems of rule.

Hook continues his exposition on democracy and its consequent needs by citing the primary factor prevalent in a functioning democracy. What makes a democracy, he contends, is the imperative that individuals make their own choices, pursue their own happiness, rather than serve the needs of some mythical, eternal blueprint. Restrictions of any kind are tolerated only where some greater enriching of human experience can be demonstrated. Finally, he would insist that to justify abridgment of these conditions one would necessarily need to demonstrate the incumbancy of some common disaster.

Hook attacks this problem of balance at its core. For the preservation of democracy it must be understood. Rather than pursue the study of the evil ways of communism as became fashionable in the fifties, Hook would counsel that a more vital study is that of democracy itself. Where it is poorly understood it exists as a foundation built upon sand.

But it is not only the communist movement we must learn to understand but the meaning of democracy

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8Ibid., p. 109.
9Ibid., p. 123.
and the inalienable right of opposition, even of annoying opposition.®

The previous quote goes substantially beyond the theme - that the needs of democracy provide the principle support for the universality of education. It further serves to suggest in Hook's work the pursuance of other liberal educational principles, such as that which would hold the student as his own end in himself, and that which insists on the maintenance of an open mind. It dictates the total absence of dogma and doctrine from all educational endeavors.

Reflection

The central characteristic of Sidney Hook's educational thought is his unqualified commitment to the reflective process. It is not surprising that Hook can say, "All of Dewey's contentions about the process of thinking I was willing to grant."® It is well known that Hook was a student of Dewey. This fact, coupled with the previous quotation, correctly prepares one for the assumption that the reflective theory of both men is very similar and a comparison of Dewey's How We Think with the cognitive formulations Hook only further establishes the theoretical unity possessed by these two men. Hook is speaking of the same type of unity when he openly admires the work of Bertrand Russell, basking in the manner at which Russell reaches his conclusions with an air of crystal clarity. When he speaks of the manner in which Russell

10Ibid., p. 392.

eliminates opposing views he is actually citing that reflective feature of Russell's thought which demands a consideration of all sides of a question leaving no discernable alternative unconsidered.  

Granting that the view of reflection offered by these men must be quite similar, it remains to weigh them against the criteria selected, here, to represent the principle of liberal educational theory.

In his edited symposium, *Dimensions of Mind*, Hook advances his "pragmatic note" and speaks directly to the principle of reflection. While dispensing with notions that advance the possibility of certainty in any instance, Hoolc is prepared to contend that, "we can always devise some kind of test which will make one conclusion rather than another more probable." In this instance he speaks directly of the reflective process and stresses its tentativeness of conclusions, drawing upon the best available data to form the most warranted of available conclusions.

When one speaks in terms of reflection in a specific rather than in a general way what is identified is that sequential ordering of step by step processes, culminating in some tentative conclusion which for the moment appears to be more warranted by the evidence available than other alternatives. The technique of handling evidence most closely characterizes this process. Truth, in this regard, is held to be a relative property, relying for its acceptance not on some ultimate or enduring entity, but rather on the best momentary indications of the evidence. But far more is expected to stem from this empirical process

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than merely the arrival at correct conclusions. What Hook feels may be the ultimate benefits from this type of process is a new and better way of life.

What is common to all forms of empiricism is the belief that truth is an affair of observational consequences. Although the hypothesis may turn out to be false, it is not unreasonable to assume that where men are willing to test their beliefs, not by their alleged presuppositions, but by their observable consequences, they will probably be more willing to compromise their demands, to negotiate differences, to take the standpoint of the other, to live together and help each other to live rather than to fight and die together.\(^\text{14}\)

Clearly, Hook envisions the ultimate benefits of reflection as more than the introduction of a new problem-solving technique. The above quotation suggests that the philosopher views reflection as a means to turn about the course of human history. For Hook, reflection can illuminate new directions, new life-styles and values and even prolong life longer than was previously fathomed.

This may indeed appear to be the ultimate claim that can be advanced for reflection, but decisions of this type are purely normative. Hook offers still other perspectives from which to view reflection that might well be interpreted as just as vital and fundamental as that just considered. Hook would not balk at the contention that reflection is actually the foundation for freedom and that these two life features must occur together and are inseparable.

\[\ldots\] the free action is not the habitual action, not the coerced action, not the instinctive or impulsive action, but the action which is determined by reflection.\(^\text{15}\)


\(^\text{15}\)Ibid., p. 36.
One could hardly doubt the commitment to reflection of a man so known for his commitment to freedom. For Sidney Hook the two are an identity, one in the same, and what benefits one is necessary as well for the other. Where the conditions for existence demonstrate such a mutuality, there can be no favor of either, but rather only of both.

That freedom and reflection exist as an identity is further contended by Hook with his discussion of reasonableness and rationality, frequently used interchangeably with reflection in his work. In this regard he treats this property not as a product, but more directly as a process similar to sorting.

Rationality or reasonableness in conduct is the ability -- which men possess -- to envisage alternatives of action, to apply the test of observable consequences to conflicting proposals, and to accept or reconstruct these proposals in the light of consequences.16

Hook asserts that this process when institutionally expressed represents the only communal process of deliberation and "critical assessment" which can yield a freely given consent.17

Nearly limitless are those instances in which Hook identifies the unity of content and purpose found in the reflective and democratic models. That the democratic way of life fosters the free interplay of ideas and the most graceful mutual consultation is repeatedly cited by the philosopher.18 Further, Hook would contend that the quality of the conclusions that grow out of the process of public discussion, criticism, criticism,

16Ibid., p. 207.

17Ibid.

18Hook, Political Power and Personal Freedom, p. 52.
argument and rejoinder are invariably more suitable than those which are dictatorially imposed even when they are our own. Simply stated, this manner of reflective operation is prerequisite on a broad social scale to the existence of any authentically democratic rule. The willingness to sit down together and consider the alternatives is further characterized by Hook as the "imperative" and the rules of evidence and reflection are advanced as the only methodological absolutes to which one must commit. This accomplished, one satisfies the demands of the naturalistic humanism that Hook so aptly espouses.

The degrees of certainty depend for their conviction upon the available evidence also appears to be supported by Hook. In a discussion of the belief in God, Hook most eloquently advances an example designed to impart the tenuous nature of the most convincing evidence which remains the product of observable phenomenon.

... It is difficult to see how anything can be demonstrably known to exist with a greater certainty than the truth of mathematics. And, although under special conditions I can hear the beating of my own heart, I am more certain that "twice three are six" than that "it is my heart I hear beating" or that "it is my heart that is beating."19

With his assertion that it is far more likely that at some future date he will be compelled by the evidence to withdraw the latter conclusions than the former one he gives us considerable insight into his regard for the differing nature of evidence and his failing faith in the properties of observation and the poor constancy of their results. The surety preferred by mathematics is to Hook far less enmeshed in variables than

19Hook, *Quest For Being*, p. 223.
nearly any product of increased human observation where he feels the possibility for some incongruous error is greatly magnified.

Hook is not unmindful of the necessity for holding reflective conclusions as tentative rather than regarding them as some form of codified truth. He repeatedly points out the need to regard the products of reflection as tentative. This product, he cautions, represents "a reality, not the reality." That some conclusion represents at a given time the best and the most real way of perceiving some phenomenon is not to be confused with an ultimate and timeless truth. Of this fact Hook is fully cognizant.

Finally, as one would expect from a thinker of Sidney Hook's reputation, he irrevocably links reflection with his personal philosophy. In almost any sense, the reflective process so prized by this theorist is seen as a route through which one can seek knowledge and truth. Another identity is created with Hook's assertion that the purpose of philosophy is the "pursuit of wisdom" -- a purpose identical with that of the ends of reflection.

Whatever else philosophy is or has been in the present or past, the only conception of philosophy which explains the continuity of the philosophic tradition from Socrates to John Dewey, and gives the philosopher a distinctive function even if the notion of a distinctive philosophical knowledge is discarded, is that philosophy is the pursuit of wisdom.

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20Ibid., p. 233.

As an educational theorist, Sidney Hook repeatedly deals with the dilemma of personal freedom. He is concerned with freedom for the student, the teacher and for the institution of the school. In order to be free from external coercions which would seek to inhibit the free exercise of its exploratory powers, the school must be able to delve into myriad concerns. Hook has adopted for study and explored varying perspectives on personal freedom and the many differing rationales which implore its preservation at all costs against assaults upon it from all quarters.

Hook pursues the principle of personal freedom from some quite interesting postures as well as seeking to offer some common justifications for its qualified maintenance. One of the more unconventional defenses is advanced in his volume, Man's Quest for Security. Here he seeks to negate security as a valid educational end and opts for the freedom of "risk taking." Doubtless in a school the usual teacher interprets as a part of his responsibility the preservation of the youngster's safety or security. Seen from a perspective similar to that of Hook's, this can be interpreted as presenting an overt infringement on the young person's freedom or as a deprivation of his experiential background which would impair his ability to grow. In the writings of Sidney Hook it is obvious that he feels all people of all ages have a right and a need to take what could be best identified as "risks." How else, he would ask, can their lives have any true meaning except from the vantage point of one who has experienced the unsure and ventured
risks? "We fear risks but must take them in order to find our ex­
perience satisfying."22

This is not, however, the extent to which Hook proceeds in
extolling the virtue and need of taking risks. It is his further con­
tention that what awaits those deprived of their right to venture risks
is calamity, for their need will increase and their consequent experi­
mentation might be excessive and possibly quite destructive.

Give him a world in which there are no risks and it
will seem stale and unprofitable to him. He will
find occasion to create risks in irrational ways
beyond fathoming . . . the facts seem indisputable
that for many persons an element of gratuitous risk-
taking seems necessary to give spice and savor to
their life. Even children when unobserved sometimes
will take breathtaking risks walking the glazed
ridges of tenement roofs -- not altogether explain­
able by their childishness. . .23

It seems from the above passage that Hook has a strong conviction that
youngsters need to be free to do even those things that sound judgment
might deem patently unwise.

Previously, Hook grounded the rationale for granting personal
freedom to young people in the psychological requirements of their
personalities. However, in the aesthetic domain Hook locates the man­
date for personal freedom and the justification for this assertion in
the properties of the works of art themselves. In Art and Philosophy
Hook contends that it is utterly impossible to apply any rank ordering
between different genres or styles of art and that even the critical
discrimination that seeks to base its judgments on the observable skills

22Sidney Hook, Man's Quest For Security: A Symposium (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1966), p. 11.

23Ibid.
and complex effects of the aesthetic piece are relatively unsound in their claim of legitimacy.\textsuperscript{24} The implications from this that bear upon the school are many faceted, but most obvious would be the dictum to teachers, parents and institutions to allow the maximum of freedom to youthful endeavors in the aesthetics, for few standards of any consequence exist to justify any manipulation or channeling of young people in this area.

To the teacher, Hook instructs the introduction of improvisation, that facet of education where individual teachers bring the full bounty of their personal talents to come to bear on their instruction. He counsels that steps be taken to plan time into the curriculum for attempts in the field of improvisational instruction. This withdrawal from a system where all teachers steer the same course tends to support a view of Hook's philosophy as consonant with that of liberal education in so far as it prizes personal freedom. Flexibility and freedom are necessary to provide for unknown contingencies:

Any intelligent system of education must allow for improvisations; no one, however, can be so sure of the future as to plan for all of them now.\textsuperscript{25}

As one notes with Hook's perceptions of reflection, the issue of personal freedom is seen by the philosopher to be thoroughly bound up with the principles of democracy. Democracy is interpreted by Hook to dictate certain responses to the exercise of personal freedom that can only preserve its free experience. After asserting that it is not a


\textsuperscript{25}Hook, \textit{Education For Modern Man}, p. 20.
policy which would restrict one's right to be different, Hook continues.

It is a policy of encouraging the freedom to be different, restricting only that exercise of freedom which converts talents or possessions into a monopoly that frustrates the emergence of other free personalities.26

This notion culminates in the assumption that a democracy requires more than an equality of freedom. What is vital is that the system go beyond the conceptual acceptance of this principle to an achievement of some facility in the exercise of the equality of freedom.27

Another hue of personal freedom is cited by Hook and it appears to relate closely to his conception of an individual's right to take risks even in the face of a wealth of countervailing data which might operate to make the "free" action appear to be sheer folly. This is identified by Hook as "the freedom to err."28 It is Hook's contention that just as important as the preservation of those conditions which allow an individual to find the truth is that provision which safeguards his right to be absolutely wrong. It is not difficult to imagine how this might tie in with the philosopher's consideration of reflection. As vital as any other prerequisite to the process of reflection is the ability to speculate. This action allows one to pursue countless and frequently futile avenues, seeking the best tentative conclusion. Reflection is a process of continually retracing one's steps to begin afresh pursuing a new idea down another avenue. What is obviously vital

26Hook, Political Power and Personal Freedom, p. 39.
27Ibid.
here is the willingness and security to be wrong, free of sanction and of reprisal. In no other way can this process operate, and the teacher must diligently preserve the possibility of this approach.

We cannot expect someone of Hook's stature to err so greatly, however, as to overlook the obvious and absolute limits that exist naturally on the exercise of personal freedom. He very properly notes, for instance, that no individual is ever capable of complete self-direction and control in an activity or experience not of his own making and design. Where one has not created and is not the source of a phenomenon its operation will be beyond his complete manipulation and control. Consequently, his freedom will be, to this extent, limited. It should not be a great jump from this insight to a realization that since no one determines his own birth there will be many things in their life that are beyond their manipulation and control.²⁹

On the issue of personal freedom, however, Hook is not without more than one side. Of the Supreme Court, Hook has said our "duty is . . . to obey it and not necessarily to agree with it."³⁰ Surely the emphasis of this type of approach is away from the freedom of the individual and toward the notion of citizenship obligations.³¹

³⁰Hook, Religion In a Free Society, p. 8.
³¹It is not within the scope of this study to detail Professor Hook's many observations concerning the Supreme Court. It would be negligent, however, not to question (in the light of his previous statement) Hook's possible reaction to court decisions such as that of Plessy vs Ferguson (1898). That Hook would counsel blind obedience to this decision seems most unlikely.
On the other side of the issue, however, one can note with confidence that on matters concerning religious practice relative to the school, Hook firmly encourages the complete reliance upon a system of personal freedom as the final arbiter. This is resoundingly worded in the new classic Religion in a Free Society wherein Hook advances,

My main point so far has been that a genuinely democratic state, especially one which contains a plurality of religious faiths, should be neutral in matters of religion, and regard it as essentially a private matter.\(^{32}\)

Of course, much hinges here on the interpretation applied to the term "neutral." We can safely assume that people of varying persuasions could ascribe to the above quotation and yet envision a myriad of diverse practical approaches to the proper handling of religious questions in the schools and the government. However, the main thrust of Hook's position is clear.

Finally, one cannot help but recall a speculation undertaken by Hook about six years ago in which he puzzled over the results that would arise if a number of individuals were to look back over their lives, cataloguing their regrets over what they had done or hadn't done. It was his decision that more people would express regrets over some failure of action in the face of the opposition of the main stream of traditionalism, than would regret some action taken.

The most deplorable insecurities are those which prevent human beings from deviating from traditional routines, which prevent them from living their own lives in their own reflective styles.\(^{33}\)

\(^{32}\)Ibid., p. 27.

\(^{33}\)Hook, Man's Quest For Security, p. 16.
If this is true then surely the worst possible action of the school would be one seeking to extend the confines of the customs and traditions of a society like manacles over the imaginative frontier spirit of the youngsters entrusted to their care. No greater violation of their trust could be advanced than blunting the inquisitive and experimental tendencies in the name of something so dim as "the old way."

Openmindedness

It was very early in Sidney Hook's life that his intellectual experience directed his interest to the open mind. It is his story that so great was the impression made on him by "a few snatches of amateur epistemological discussion" in Martin Eden that he was set aflame with the need to interpret the terminology that was so tantalizingly weaved. In the obscurity of the passage there was revealed to Hook worlds of astonishment and imagination. He could but seek the key to unlock the mysteries so ingeniously taunted. It is out of this beginning that Hook launched his debate with the great philosophers and where he could not refute their logic and save the foundations of the universe, he developed an imperative to carry over into his dealings socially.

I resolved that none of my friends should enjoy the luxury of unapprehensive dogmatism, and set about infecting them with the virus of doubt.34

Here is the germ of a principle of openmindedness, that one need not seek certainty and indeed must spurn it even when it might appear to have come to fruition, for doubt is vital to continued reflection. It appears to be his implication that the absence of doubt is the product

34Hook, American Philosophy, Today and Tomorrow, p. 206.
of one's deluding himself, and in this sense it is a property of fantasy. For an open mind to be maintained and reflection made possible, no dogma or doctrine can be blindly followed, for when this occurs, an individual has abrogated the greater part of his creative imagination and is limited. He is, therefore, a less apt thinker, if indeed he remains any kind of thinker at all. The liberal educator is, then, the enemy of all dogma and indoctrination, always maintaining in reserve the suggestion of some better solution to emerge in the face of some new discoveries. Dogmatism is invariably identified as an evil and is frequently used by Hook to disqualify varying approaches, and this is without regard to what is dogmatically propugnated.35

Hook is well aware, from his own intellectual development, that it is no easy matter to give up the certainties that one has grown up accepting. In the blindness of this approach there is a sense of felt security no matter how false the sensation, and only with a struggle is this ever surrendered.

It was not easy to surrender the paradise of subsistence and the comforts of truths necessary and universal in all possible worlds.36

What is left, then, is an ironic paradox; the reflective liberal can never accept that he has found truth, for this is what he must devote himself to looking for.

Different patterns of study, however, facilitate the ease with which one can free himself from the chains of total answers. For Hook,

35Ibid., p. 207.

36Ibid., p. 215.
his study of social and political philosophy tended to reinforce this learning, "My Marxism had taught me to be suspicious of absolutisms of every kind. . .". It is obvious that the study of the same material has had mind-closing effects on others, and so one would be unwise to adopt as a formula for the creation of an open mind the study of any specific material. Quite obviously it is not the material studied, but rather the nature of the study undertaken which holds influence with the type of mind-set that grows out of it.

A good case for the open mind and a reservation of complete commitment is provided by Hook in a philosophical discussion, "A Pragmatic Note," which comprises a chapter in his symposium, The Dimensions of Mind. Dealing with this principle from a different perspective, Hook cites examples to indicate the impossibility of at least being always certain. There are some things that we simply cannot know for sure, no matter how explicit the evidence. In this regard Hook refers to a hypothetical man found dead in the desert. One can cite evidence indicating the great probability that the man perished from thirst, but if he expired alone, no one can be sure. Similarly the man who dies of fright in his sleep establishes similar conditions which defy certainty. This establishment that there cannot be certainty in all cases begins to lay a foundation questioning whether certainty is impossible in any situation. Where Hook is thusly weighed, he clearly tends to reinforce the view that one must remain open to new evidence and suggestions.

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37Ibid., p. 217.
38Hook, Dimensions of Mind, p. 206.
The full brunt of this area of Hook's logic is brought to bear by the philosopher on those student radicals that he feels would destroy academic freedom to achieve their momentary ends. His basic criticism centers around their youthful unwillingness to maintain an open mind and consider the possibility that they might be wrong. To their complaints that they have tried appealing to the public and working democratically through the system without results, Hook has an answer. It is his position that possibly the democratic process is in this instance performing as a scientific process of elimination. Their failure to win converts, he suggests, may reflect on the quality of their evidence. Simply, he considers the possibility that their lack of success by democratic means is an indication that they are wrong. What bothers him most is that he feels this viewpoint is entirely overlooked by the inspired and zealous radicals.39

The need for openmindedness is further reflected in Hook's commentary on aesthetic studies. In the field of art he insists that evaluation unavoidably reflects, "... the developments and stages in the evolution and history of different techniques." Any appraisal in this domain, then, must be flexible and subject to amendment with the passing of time.40 Since, as Hook continues, there is not a fixed set of rules for art to follow, the critic must approach his decisions and discriminations very openly.

Just as the entirety of Hook's work and theory is related to the demands of democracy, so also is his concept of openmindedness. As the instruments of peace and harmony, the dual principles of democracy and openmindedness are touted.

The willingness to understand another man's point of view without necessarily surrendering to it makes it more likely that different points of view may negotiate their differences and learn to live peacefully with one another.41

Hook notes that even a democratic society cannot expect to be free from strife in a world where so many glaring inequalities exist. It is his contention, however, that employment of the above principle could do a lot to alleviate or to convert it to "socially harmless" forms.42

On the issue of intellectual assaults from outside of the school, Hook asserts that no dogma or censorship is allowable in a democracy.

The democratic ideology should not fear the competition of communist ideology, it should welcome it.43

His faith rests in that scientific quality of the democratic process to discriminate between alternatives, and rely on the best decision being made, most of the time. No alternative to this technique is palatable to Hook.

Finally, Hook returns to a theme found throughout the writings of all of the educators considered here. All of the men explain the problems attendant to the closed mind in very nearly the same manner. Uncertainty and insecurity go hand in hand, and in an effort to escape

41Hook, Political Power and Personal Freedom, p. 51.
42Ibid.
43Ibid., p. 125.
the agonies of ignorance and insecurity, men profess to and even delude themselves into believing that they have found the ultimate truth. This frees them from concern over troubling new evidence which might dispute their beliefs and render them again stripped of their ability to be positive. When countervailing evidence occurs, it is not confronted, but rather ignored.

... the very uncertainty and ignorance about those dread things and events lies at the heart of our insecurity.44

This is doubtless anti-reflective on their part, and Hook is quick to condemn its occurrence. It violates the very core and fibre of democratic and reflective principle and is therefore characterized as the enemy by all liberal theorists. Hook's acceptance of this stance lends further credence to his classification as a liberal educational theorist.

The Student As the Educational End

It is vital in a democracy and in a liberal reflective theory for an individual to be protected against those interests and institutions that would seek to deprive him of his right to determine what ends he will strive for. Liberal theorists establish that any person should be considered an end in himself and not merely the means to some other end. They feel that it is disastrous for some institution to attempt to force the individual into conformity with its and not the individual's interests and purposes. This sanction applies equally to all quarters with no exception. To the liberal theorist, no church, government or

school can rightfully abridge an individual's right to select his own course. Additionally, no difference is seen between overt coercion or subtle subterfuge. If an individual is diverted from his own purposes for any reason and in any manner to the ends of someone other than himself, then the liberal educational theorist must declare a fault.

Hook has spoken to this issue from several different perspectives. The most frequently adopted, though, is that where he considers the place of the church and religion in the public schools. Discussing the role of religious dogma in the schools Hook can envision only one appropriate opportunity for its inclusion. That is an objective study. To indoctrinate is forbidden by Hook, in every instance, and critical evaluation of religious doctrine is precisely what advocates of religious instruction in schools do not want. It is Hook's choice, therefore, to eliminate it altogether.

Imagine what an outcry would arise from religious organizations if their sacred dogmas were critically evaluated -- and possibly rejected.45

If this be the case, then the only type of religious instruction satisfying to the church is unacceptable to the conditions of proper educational practice.

This conviction of Hook's appears again to explain a portion of his philosophical development.

This is one of the reasons, besides its demonstrable falsity, why I could never share the position of those who called themselves orthodox Marxists -- people who having given up traditional religions still believed in a church, the Party, and who when

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45Hook, Education For Modern Man, p. 158.
challenged, fell back upon a new religion based on
the inevitability of socialism.\textsuperscript{46}

This type of person, according to Hook, has yielded his own
purposes for one or another reason to the larger entity of the party,
and has accepted the party's ends in place of his own. Whether prompted
by ignorance or the quest for security, the result is the same -- the
party uses the individual as a tool in the completion of its own goals.

This has had specific application in the American school system
throughout history. For Hook the experience of the Second World War
looms most clearly. He speaks of a time when the schools demonstrated
an obsession with indoctrinating the minds of the young people with a
contempt for all things representative of German culture. The clear
attempt was made to shape the attitudes of the youngsters so that they
would not discriminate for themselves in evaluating German individuals
but rather would adopt, by rote, an attitude designed to be most con­
venient for their government.\textsuperscript{47} One would be amiss not to note that
Hook does not identify this as a national governmental program. It
appears to be his contention that these misdeeds grew out of a plethora
of poor teachers who simply didn't know any better, so poor was their
training.

My high school teachers, in those days a miscellaneous
lot of men who had failed to get into other professions,
ranted against everything German, without having read a
line of Kant. . . \textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{46}Hook, \textit{American Philosophy, Today and Tomorrow}, p. 208.
\textsuperscript{47}Hook, \textit{American Philosophy, Today and Tomorrow}, p. 208.
\textsuperscript{48}Ibid.
This was to be far from the worst of the attempts to subvert the independent course of school children during that war, as teachers and government officials attempted to make the students useful for their purposes. Hook reports that students were "terrorized by teachers and student-patriots" as they assailed any deviation from the support of the purposes of their government.49

What must be kept uppermost in our minds is that the function of the school to the educational liberal is not to develop the child into what we would have him become, but rather that he be allowed to develop into his own best self. The function of the teacher in this process is that of facilitator. The teacher could properly be likened to the fireman on an old steamship, just as he could less appropriately be compared to the helmsman. Teacher suggestions are in no way prohibited or out of bounds, for the teacher need not apologize for knowing more than his students. What he must not do, though is to attempt by deception, force of personality, or any other means to convert the legitimate ends of the students to his own purposes.50

Hook, appearing to demonstrate consonance with this principle, links the principles of a good classroom with those he would prescribe for a properly functioning democracy. The two are seen as virtually the same to Hook in spite of the obvious impairments attendant to the youngster's age.

In nurturing the capacities of each individual so that they may come to their greatest fulfillment, we can best share our existing stores of truth and

49Ibid.

50Hook, *Education For Modern Man*, p. 150.
beauty and uncover new dimensions in these realms.\textsuperscript{51}

He continues to wonder how anyone dedicated to those values of science and art could repeatedly oppose a policy that would increase the likelihood of further development and advancement in those areas. Hook asserts that this kind of regard for the differing potentialities of all men fosters less acts of cruelty to others or ignorance of their needs.

In keeping with Hook's pronouncements on the topic of security, one can see that it has relevance to his discussion of the student being his own rightful end independent of use from outside himself. Hook notes that feeling secure and being secure are two very different things in the world of infinite confusions and misconceptions. Indeed, this is precisely the type of mistake that can be expected of a man who has been channeled into the service of some doctrine, not his own. Hook demonstrates that we can use this dilemma as an aid in identifying when this misuse is being undertaken, for the man who feels secure and actually is secure can be readily identified as a man whose pursued ends are his own and who is not a puppet of some cause espoused by an institution.

War is that condition that Hook identifies as most destructive to the individual's pursuit of his own goals.\textsuperscript{52} The implications of this choice are quite severe, for what else exists as more steady and permanent throughout the course of human history? If Hook is accurate in his appraisal, then the picture is quite bleak for those who would

\textsuperscript{51}Hook, \textit{Political Power and Personal Freedom}, p. 51.

\textsuperscript{52}Hook, \textit{Man's Quest For Security}, p. 4.
seek to be our own guides and navigators through our own period of
growth. We seem to be doomed from the outset of ever having any chance
to develop in our own best way. The alternative which presents itself
is the abolition of war, and to those who are unable to envision the
reformation of alienated society into some more closely utopian structure,
there is virtually no hope in this cause.

In a conclusion reminiscent of that discussion hook devoted to
risks, he offers some hope for the individual who would seek to be his
own end. It is his contention, that to develop as one chooses in a
meaningful way he must suffer the use of some other entity and by this
comparison appreciate more fully his own independent choices.

Individuallity

Lastly, Hook directs his study to individuality, so prized and
fostered by liberal educators; for it is through the application of in­
dividual solutions that social problems are solved and progress is
accomplished. Nowhere does he more interestingly examine the importance
of individuality and its preservation than when he regards the aesthetic
field. It is his contention in Art and Philosophy that uniform
standards are a gross impossibility when one attempts to dictate quality
in some area of art.

Just as soon as anyone offers a criterion or rule
for a judgment of excellence, someone else will
show that in fact we make judgments of excellence,
which are widely shared by competent critics, in-

53 Ibid., p. 7.
54 Ibid., p. 17.
dependently of the criterion, or that some work of art to which the criterion or rule clearly applied was not uniformly judged excellent by competent critics.55

There are in this area (and many liberal educators would argue in many areas) too few dependable touchstones or barometers to allow for reasonable dictation of standards, techniques, styles or contents. In the face of this type of situation the reasonable educator is allowed no choice other than to allow the student to pursue in as many ways as possible, his own course. There can be no certainty that the deviant, held in suspicion today, will not be the revered intellectual pioneer of another age.

Just as we cannot properly expect to have uniform standards for all artistic work on all occasions, we can take this line of reasoning a couple of steps further. It is wrong to expect that widely accepted standards can be applied equally appropriately in all instances.

All this suggests that when a critic characterizes a work of art as a masterpiece or pronounces it "excellent," the term does not have the same meaning for him on each occasion of its use. The history of aesthetic taste seems to me to reinforce this suggestion.56

The ease with which this contention can be verified tempts the analyst to push a step further and to suggest that, a given artist, properly appraises his own work by continually varying standards in the light of differing perspectives, relative to his collections of skills. The implication again glares -- the teacher working in the aesthetic domain

55Hook, Art and Philosophy, p. 49.

56Ibid., p. 51.
is on unsound ground when he speaks with any pretensions of certitude as to the "right" or "wrong" operations to be performed by a student.

The above conceptualization forms the basis for the entire liberal attack on inhibitions of individuality. Where are the timeless standards that justify the inhibition of experimentation? They simply do not exist. The argument can be advanced with a glance at what are referred to as matters of "taste."

In the area of tastes, Hook insists that there can be no grounds for conflict, but rather that conflicts arise only when action is required.

Concerning tastes there is no disputing. Coffee tastes pleasant to me, it does not taste pleasant to you. No argument can alter the facts. Never is there a conflict of attitudes towards coffee as an experienced taste here and now. The difference in attitudes might become a conflict in attitudes when some such question is asked as: Should we order coffee again? 57

So to Hook there is not even an argument possible prior to an assertion that some action relative to a taste should be taken, but this is not the point at which he would uniformly impose wills and demand conformity. Rather, as is evident from his discussion of personal freedom, Hook would not interpret a difference as something to be converted or amended. Instead it would be regarded as something to foster and nourish in most cases.

This grows out of Hook's belief that people can see things oppositely without being wrong. Hook's belief rests most solidly on his disbelief in the ultimates and certainties societies offer and his

57Hook, The Quest For Being, p. 54.
abiding faith in a relativist notion that insists not in the existence of a truth but in the existence of many truths. Difference, then, is not a function of right or wrong, but rather a function of human values. To attempt to qualify or modify these differences is therefore an attempt at artificially altering the nature of normal human existence, and requires for its justification considerably more data than is available. People exist in different situations possessing different, though equally legitimate perspectives, and the desirability of forcing a similarity of perspective is nowhere established.

... to a man in the agonies of toothache happiness is the possession of sound teeth. So those who lack adequate clothing, shelter, and medical care are apt to define security in terms of measures required to relieve distress—that is, in terms of a specific program of social security.58

Dealing further with the issue of security relative to individuality and its demanding requisites, Hook has proclaimed that security and insecurity are acceptable to different individuals in differing degrees. "In the hierarchy of values each individual must make his own choice."59 If this be true and if this notion is then coupled with the now trite realization that little in the realm of choices does not involve some valuation or normative deliberation, then the course is clear. One individual cannot properly seek to alter or abridge the course of another where there is not exceeding evidence to indicate a contrary course as preferable, and this evidence and the deliberation over its merits is properly the function of both men, not merely that

one seeking to make converts. The implication for the school is identical.

After the above it seems fair to indicate Hook's conviction that to appreciate a student as an individual and to make the necessary compensations for the individual natures of their students, a teacher must know each individual child and tailor wherever possible her teaching to his own nature.60

Concluding Statement

Based upon this survey of Sidney Hook's positions and attitudes relevant to the universality of education, reflection, personal freedom, openmindedness, the student as an educational end, and individuality, it is clear that he is committed to the tenets of liberal education.

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60 Hook, Education For Modern Man, p. 193.
CHAPTER IV

BERTRAND RUSSELL

Following is an analysis of the educational theory of Bertrand Russell. His many writings, relevant to education, will be examined. The structure and perspective of this examination will be taken from the six principle criteria of educational liberalism.

Universality

The principle of universality is not neglected in Russell's works. It is considered in regard to his devotion to democratic principles in all forms.

If there is to be universal compulsory education, it is practically unavoidable that it should be financed by the state.¹

Russell's specific charge is that where education is universally decreed it must also be publicly financed. This stand, however, is secondary to the position that education is universally desirable. It appears to be Russell's contention that this position grows out of a belief in self-rule and democracy. Evidence of Russell's adherence to democratic principles is quite prevalent and there is no need for cataloguing it in

A relevant point that Bertrand Russell does examine is the consequence of that universality and public finance he has suggested. If the government is to assume the costs of universal public education, a situation develops that Russell believes warrants concern. He fears the substantive control of the schools by government agencies -- a product of economic administration. Russell sees the dangers of the government issuing edicts on the nature of what is to be taught in the schools. This fear, although not alloyed, is set aside by Russell who interprets it as a lesser of two evils. He recognizes that the only private organization ever willing to take over the project of educating the young is the churches. That frightens Russell into an acceptance of the government's role in administering a wide scale program of education. That the churches teach the young not to think is accepted as axiomatic by Bertrand Russell and he "doubts whether an education designed to prevent thought is the best possible."

Here again, Russell's well known disdain for organized religion directs his opinions and energies, shaping his position relative to the finance and control of universal education. This same disdain is to be expressed throughout Russell's work and is fundamental to understanding much of what he prizes or abhors in his most practical of philosophical positions.

Therefore the advantages of an education conducted by organizations other than the state must be ad-

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2 An excellent example of Russell's thought in this area is to be found in *Freedom Versus the Organization* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1934).

mitted to be problematical in the present state of opinion.4

It is interesting that Russell defines the role of universal education as the imparting of minimum standards for social competence and not the instilling of a wealth of doctrines. Viewed this way, the education of the masses can easily be interpreted as the responsibility of the state and yet remains consistent with the liberal charge that no abridging of the purposes or ends of the student are permissible. Rather than "making over" the student into a useful individual for the profit of the state, Russell is very careful to charge only the imparting of those things to the young that are necessary for them to be able to seek the good life as they see it. They are to receive knowledge fundamentally necessary for their coping with their environment. It is a process of arming the individual so that he might be his own leader and make choices for himself as a citizen. It must never degenerate into the indoctrination of the young to adhere to the "establishment" line.

When Russell speaks of the "necessary minimum of knowledge without which a man cannot play his part in a modern community" he cites such general items as reading and writing. He further recognizes that as a society advances, the minimum level of knowledge that is necessary expands. It is clear that Russell seeks those competencies that will enable maximum possible self-actualization. The teaching of these things is entrusted to the state as its moral responsibility. He feels that this trust is violated with the indoctrination in American

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4Ibid.
schools that youngsters should become 100% American, "that America is God's own country."\

If anything is to be inculcated in a democratic education, Russell feels that it is a spirit of tolerance; indeed, he would identify it as a duty of democratic society to universally disseminate this tolerance.

. . . believers in democracy ought to do everything in their power to cause a tolerant spirit to be inculcated in education.\

Nationalism is identified by Russell as one of the greatest evils in the system of universal education today. The ends of universal education are thus subverted in his view, for, "This does not make for the peace of the world."\

For an example of how universal education is misused by national governments, Bertrand Russell has cited the teaching of history. "To make democracies peaceable rather than warlike is mainly a matter for the schools." It is Russell's contention that the exact opposite course is generally taken. Whereas he feels that history should be taught as the rise of a civilization, it is generally taught as a nation's history, slanted appropriately to glamorize the country doing the teaching. Anything less is usually interpreted as a lack of patriotism and where this fervor is absent, an individual teaching

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\[5\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 257.}\]

\[6\text{Bertrand Russell, Fact and Fiction (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), \text{p. 95.}}\]

\[7\text{Ibid.}\]

\[8\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 97.}\]
history can find himself in jeopardy relative to his employment security. For a man who has dedicated his life to the furtherance of peace in the world, it is little surprise that he would assert this as the proper aim of universal education.

All this, if it were done throughout the world, would immensely diminish the warlike proclivities of democracies.9

It can be seen at a glance, then, that Bertrand Russell envisions the role of universal education as far more than the equipping of citizens with weapons of an intellectual nature, insuring their survival in society. What he seeks is not the dogmatizing of youngsters to secure their obedience or allegiance to some doctrine, but rather the imparting of a sense of the need for world peace. He opposes instilling youngsters with some militant nationalistic dogma.

Reflection

The whole of any liberal educational theory is shot through with the principles of reflection. Just as each of the other men cited in this dissertation deal with reflection as a specific entity, so, also, does Russell. This more specific treatment most effectively provides the analyst with a basis from which to compare the theorist with the criteria of liberalism employed in this study.

To attain complete truth is not given to mortals, but to advance toward it by successive steps is not impossible.10

9Ibid.

In this quotation Russell has captured the process and the ends of reflection in their most simple grandeur. What is sought by reflection is not final truth but rather the sequential advancement toward it, in an unending process. This process dictates the means employed in effective educational programs. Russell's enemies would break off this systematic march toward the truth. Russell notes that this is frequently a combative experience, the reflective person encountering many obstacles in his path. His initial prescription for all that would embark on such an endeavor is courage. His adversary in this task is his lifelong antagonist, the church, who he feels would oppose the march toward increased knowledge with, "a regretful hankering after the past."¹¹

Reflection is cited as the means to attain Russell's goals for mankind, peace and the gentle rationality. What Russell would do is impart to men a sense of not indulging immediate desires for the reward of their future tranquility. He feels that men, suffering from a lack of reflection, tend to cut off their noses to spite their faces. Using interchangeably the terms of reflection and rationality, Russell contends.

> If men were rational, they would take a more correct view of their own interest than they do at present; and if all men acted from enlightened self interest the world would be a paradise in comparison with what it is.¹²

Russell seems to make a strong case for the principle of reflection by linking its production with a paradise on earth. This is precisely what


Russell advances as the consequence of its widespread exercise. Finally, Russell redefines reflection and rationality in terms of the rules of evidence. He states that rationality is the practice of remembering at any given time all of our relevant desires and not merely those which appear to be most pressing. This is simply, in the language of reflection, the ability to vary one's perspectives in place and time, examining all sides of an issue.

It is Russell's criticism, that this reflective capacity is sorely lacking in the schools. The schools turn out people able to read, but who are unable to weigh evidence or to "form an independent opinion." He relates this to his contention that the schools are misused. It is his assertion that rather than teaching youngsters to think properly, the schools devote their energies to propaganda exercises, instructing the young that, "... Blank's pills cure all ills ... and that Germans eat corpses." If this overstates the anti-reflective nature of public instruction, it is only by degree. Again, the necessary balm to salve this ill would be the introduction of reflection into the schools and consequent elevation of the condition of the students coming out of those schools. Again, reflection is cited as the healer:

If there is to be toleration in the world, one of the things taught in schools must be the habit of weighing evidence. ...

The cynical skepticism of youngsters educated in this manner, demanding

13 Ibid., p. 29.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 34.
evidence for all assertions, would serve as an immunization, making
"the children in later life immune from those appeals to idealism by
which decent people are induced to further the schemes of scoundrels." Here, the reflective method is cast in the role of medication. Russell
refers to this quality as the scientific temper. It is a manner of
looking at things and evaluating the world rather than a set of com-
pleted notions about the nature of how things are. He represents this
as a regenerating force for mankind.17

Evidence forms the cornerstone of reflection, and is repeatedly
considered in the theory of Bertrand Russell; procedures are carefully
laid out for the evaluation and analysis of evidence. Much of this
occurs at the expense of what is called self evidence. Repeatedly,
matters of subjective certainty are discounted in favor of observable
phenomena.18

In Mysticism and Logic, Russell refers to reflection as a
desirable habit. In "The Place of Science in a Liberal Education" he
contends that even rote adherence to reflection is a justifiable end of
education, conceding here one of the liberal educator's few supports for
habits or rote performances of any kind. It indeed could be suggested
that rote performance in anything other than reflection is anti-
reflective. One might suggest that even this habit is subject to the
same criticism.

16Ibid., p. 35.
17Ibid., p. 36.
18For Russell's complete discussion of this type of evidence
consult The Analysis of Mind (London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1921),
p. 216.
In "Characteristics of Scientific Method," Russell cites the many variations in which the scientific method has been described. Russell outlines a simple three step example of what he considers this process to be. It will appear in no great contrast to the more frequently used five step example of Dewey's.\(^1\) It is valuable for its simplicity and clarity.

...the first consists in observing the significant facts; the second in arriving at a hypothesis, which, if it is true, would account for these facts; the third in deducing from this hypothesis consequences which can be tested by observation. If the consequences are verified, the hypothesis is provisionally accepted as true. \(^2\)

It is exactly this that Russell feels would provide the salvation for the human condition. To this extent, reflection represents to him religious experience in Dewey's sense of that word.

Additional terminology is introduced by Russell in "The Aims of Education." He identifies a property called "cognitive sensitiveness" which translates directly into "habit of observation." This denotes a general reflective manner of experience, experience evaluation and perception.\(^3\) The emphasis is here again not on some codified set of answers, but in a way of doing things or a manner in which to view the world and interpret the meanings of what we see. Interestingly, Russell again appears to be speaking of a habituated process and finds no dis-


comfort in doing so. Similar treatment is offered to "intelligence."

No doubt the word "intelligence" properly signifies rather an aptitude for acquiring knowledge than knowledge already acquired. . . .

It is no great wonder that where the ideas of liberal theorists are adhered to in classroom methodology the emphasis is on process rather than product. Similarly, when Russell states that this "aptitude" is acquired only through its exercise, he makes an explicit charge to the classroom teacher seeking to impart a sense of this to her pupils. Doing and experiencing are irreplaceable prerequisites of learning; there are no substitutes of any kind. The techniques and strategies vital to this lesson are therefore procedurally explicit, rather than theoretically abstract.

It is only through this exercise that curiosity can be matured and developed.

Intelligence demands an alert curiosity, but it must be of a certain kind. The sort that leads village neighbors to try to peer through curtains after dark has no very high value. . . . Curiosity properly so called, on the other hand, is inspired by a genuine love of knowledge. . . .

Bertrand Russell takes this idea one step further, bringing it more in line with his assertion that procedure outranks, in importance, final answers. He does this with his insistence that curiosity about general propositions shows a higher level of intelligence than curiosity about specific facts. Russell shows no favor for mechanical memorization of data, but ranks this below the ability to manipulate concepts. This

\[22\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 183.\]

\[23\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 185.\]
directly charges teachers as to the type of material they should teach. For example, the history teacher is counseled to provide a quest for meanings and not dates. This "cultivation" is what Russell defines as the central purpose of education.\(^{24}\)

**Personal Freedom**

Issues of personal freedom stimulate liberal theorists in all fields and the educational theory of Bertrand Russell is consistent with this. The personal freedom of the students, teachers, and the school are each thoroughly evaluated by Russell. The nature of liberty complicates sharing a uniform opinion on matters of personal freedom. This is vividly demonstrated by a debate between Russell and Sidney Hook. In an exchange of article, rejoinder and re-rejoinder, Hook and Russell locked horns on the issues of freedom and its consequences. With reference to the perceived threat to freedom advanced by the communist world, Hook and Russell argued. In his reply to Hook's "A Foreign Policy for Freedom and Survival," Russell assailed what he interpreted as Hook's position that even death is a superior freedom to that afforded by a communist victory. Here, one could assert, two great educational theorists, arguing from the same favorable disposition to personal freedom, arrive at seemingly polar attitudes with respect to a specific political issue.\(^{25}\)

For teachers, Russell appears to counsel complete freedom of instruction with very few, if any, qualifications, as long as the

\(^{24}\)Ibid., pp. 184-185.

education provided is not deficient in providing those minimum necessities to equip the youngster for survival and independence in his society. It is his assertion that,

... a teacher in a state school shall not suffer by reason of his opinions, or the opinions which he expresses in teaching, or his activities outside school hours, so long as there is no fault to be found in the actual knowledge of his pupils.26

To cite an example of what he considers to be a violation of these rights, he notes the practice of dismissing married women teachers in England, or the dismissal in New York of teachers who advocate any revolutionary replacement of a government.27 Certainly, in the case of the latter example, countless examples of this denial are to be found throughout the United States today.

In Authority and the Individual Russell details some of the natural and unavoidable factors which mediate against the exercise of individual freedom. An excellent illustration of this could be derived from the family's role in shaping the individual, without concern for his own will or self-direction. What is significant about this is not the role of the family, but rather Russell's recognition of it. He clearly recognizes absolute limits on personal freedom as the cost of family living. For the security and benefits provided by the family an individual must compromise. It places his comments in a perspective of reasonableness and helps to demonstrate that he does not ignore the realities of sociology. It also lends credibility to his goals.28

26 Russell, Prospects of Industrial Civilization, p. 252.

27 Ibid., pp. 252-253.

To the extent that freedom and happiness are unified, Russell sees them both under attack from modern society. He notes that with the exception of modern society's proclivity for war, it has aimed exclusively at seeking security. It is Russell's belief that security in no way guarantees freedom or happiness. Indeed, in some more "primitive" societies the opposite can be demonstrated to be true.\(^{29}\) Like Hook, Russell recognizes that security can be restrictive.

After demonstrating the obvious geographical limitations on the exercise of personal freedom, Russell proceeds to indicate exactly why he feels that society has little fear from the exercise of individual liberty. It is his belief that a virtual instinct for social cohesion exists to unify man, thus rendering less dangerous a society's willingness to risk the free exercise of individualistic aptitudes. Unlike the natural sciences where a spinning centrifugal force might hurl asunder a collection of properties, Russell assumes that some equivalent to the gravitational pull which maintains the continuity of celestial conformity will produce a social cohesion among groups. This he asserts is an instinct.\(^{30}\)

Again, demonstrating the reasonableness of his goals, Russell asserts that it is not his desire to tear down the fabrics of cohesive social life. He only seeks to infuse a greater flexibility into the structure. He feels that this can best be accomplished by an increase in local autonomy and a less "oppressive" human spirit.\(^{31}\) In the same

\(^{29}\)Ibid., p. 9

\(^{30}\)Ibid., p. 19.

\(^{31}\)Ibid., p. 36.
fashion he alleges that competition in the modern era has been misconceived; indeed, he accuses competition of attacking personal freedom. The penalties for coming in second are simply all too frequently far too extreme. In support of this he quips,

Football would not be desirable as a sport if defeated teams were put to death or left to starve.32

It is further Russell's allegation that the fabric of the modern democracies are inhibitive of personal freedom in most cases.

Democracy, as it exists in large modern states, does not give adequate scope for political initiative except to a tiny minority.33

This is in opposition to the very fibre of the liberal's creed and is seen by Russell as a challenge to be vigorously met. It is his insistence that individuals need frequently to live on impulse. "I don't mean every transitory impulse of every passing moment," declares Russell, "I mean those major impulses that really govern our lives."34 As an extension of this line of reasoning he would insist that

. . . if you deny those impulses, provided that they do not infringe upon the liberty of another, you stunt your growth.35

One need only appreciate the primacy of growth as a goal in his thought to gauge the gravity of Russell's statement.

Finally, Russell interprets the problem of personal freedom as a problem of perspective. He contends that the general public views the

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32 Ibid., p. 43.
33 Ibid., p. 45.
34 Bertrand Russell, How To Be Free And Happy (New York: The Rand School of Social Science, 1924), p. 29.
exercise of freedom from an improper perspective. Experimentation and innovation from the past is accepted by the public. It is, however, expected to satisfy current requirements for innovation. True current innovation is never easily accepted and the freedom to so act is often restricted. Concerning the freedom to innovate, the public often seeks to rest on its laurels.

It is the innovators who have difficulty in being allowed to exist and work. Each generation is only tolerant of past innovations.36

With the enthusiasm of a reformer, Russell places the entire domain of free thought and opinion clearly outside of the proper field of control by the public.

It ought to be as free, as spontaneous as is possible to those who know what others have believed.37

He continues that the state is justified in insisting that small children shall be educated, but it is not justified in insisting that the education proceed on some uniform plan and be directed to the "production of a dead level of glib uniformity."38

Openmindedness

The open mind is something that can be characterized in two ways relative to reflection. It can be treated as a feature of reflection, something fostered by the scientific methods of inquiry. Or it can be viewed as occurring prior to reflection as a prerequisite for reflective

36Russell, Political Ideals, p. 106.
37Ibid.
38Ibid., p. 121.
activity. Russell deals with this at some length, holding up for exami-
nation the qualities of openmindedness. He appears to attack all final
answers and dogmas that fail to encourage the consideration of every
causal possibility.

Almost unavoidably, he deals ruthlessly with his chosen enemy --
religion. It is seen by Russell, in its organized form, as the destroyer
of the open mind. Its emotional foundation he characterizes as fear.
Indeed, fear is identified as the founding father of religion.

Fear is the basis of religious dogmas, as of so much
else in human life. Fear of human beings, individually
and collectively, dominates much of our social life,
but it is fear of nature that gives rise to religion.39

Little doubt is left by the above quotation as to Russell's views relative
to the propriety or impropriety of religious instruction in the schools.
Clearly he would not allow it in the form in which it is invariably
sought; that manner of religious instruction borders on dogma and in-
doctrination. This would all be best classed as anti-reflective in
nature and operating at cross purposes to the true and proper role of
the schools -- teaching young people to question and analyze. Indeed,
when one considers that he holds truth, the search for truth is broken
off.

The great weight of Bertrand Russell's work on the importance
and vitalness of the open mind is presented in direct condemnation of
the policies of instruction of organized religion. In Why I Am Not A
Christian, Russell assails the whole of organized religion and the

Catholic Church in particular for their stands pertaining to the proof of the existence of God. It is primarily their brand of "reason" that he finds so objectionable.

You know, of course, that the Catholic Church has laid it down as a dogma that the existence of God can be proved by unaided reason. That is a somewhat curious dogma, but it is one of their dogmas. To Russell the "curiousness" of this formulation is only outreached by the further peculiarities of those arguments that attempt to establish the proof (first cause, natural law, etc. . .).

It should be obvious that an individual's capacity to maintain an open mind rests very heavily upon some prior capacity to doubt one's own preconceived notions and any other mind-set which an individual might find in contradiction to the alleged new understanding. Without the capacity to doubt, one's reflective abilities are greatly reduced and one's mind is only slightly open. So doubt certainly plays a major role in maintaining an open mind. To indicate the extent to which Russell would have one doubt he has turned to Shakespeare.

Doubt that the stars are fire,
Doubt that the sun doth move.41

Shakespeare had utilized these lines to indicate what he considered to be the ridiculous extremes of skepticism and yet in his lifetime at least one of these contentions had been questioned and of course in the light of current modern scientific data both rest on fractured foundations. It is Russell's intention in citing just this example to

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Indicate that what is most vigorously accepted as a foregone conclusion in one time might be equally vigorously caricatured in the next as folly. A little less arrogance and a great deal more doubt, he implies, stand one on much firmer ground intellectually.

Russell reconsiders the relationship between fear and the open mind. His contention is that every crisis situation launches an attack on reflection and its prerequisite doubt. Individual's seek an "answer" or "solution" to simplify complex dilemmas, and so enhance their perception of their own security.

In every misfortune it is a natural impulse to look for an enemy upon whom to lay the blame; savages attribute all illness to hostile magic. Whenever the causes of our troubles are too difficult to be understood, we tend to fall back upon this primitive kind of explanation.\(^2\)

More serious than the incorrect nature of the primitive explanation is the quality of mind it represents. It is indicative of more than a misconception; it is illustrative of a closed mind that, due to its frustration, has stopped seeking answers and rather settled upon one for a sense of security. When seeking stops so does reflection, and the mind then closes. This is surely a more serious ill than possessing the wrong answer. Having the wrong answer is never so serious as believing that one has any final answer at all.

Russell is quite direct when he speaks of the church, wishing "that every kind of religious belief will die out."\(^3\) He offers his assertion that religion has not been on balance a force for good. The

\(^2\)Russell, *Authority and the Individual*, p. 44.

\(^3\)Russell, *The Will To Doubt*, p. 17.
suppression of free thought is the principle evil that Russell assigns to the church and in this instance he is speaking of the enthusiastic suppression of those qualities of openmindedness, search, and doubt.44

There can be little doubt that Russell's own life experiences account for the venom with which he attacks the church. For in Russell's own words his father was a reflective man (free thinker) and sought to have Bertrand raised, as such, outside of the church. Upon his death his specific will was prejudicially set aside by those who sought to have young Bertrand raised in a religious atmosphere. For this action Russell harbors a great resentment, recognizing that the converse would not have occurred had some "free thinker" thought to repeal the will of a "religious" man. It is his contention that this unhappy childhood saddled him with many pieces of anti-rational baggage from which he needed to divest himself, prior to his embarking on an intellectual life.

Russell is further disturbed by the ironies of certainty in the world for he considers it easily demonstrable that doubt is to be prized.

If it is admitted that a condition of rational doubt would be desirable, it becomes important to inquire how it comes about that there is so much irrational certainty in the world.45

He concedes that some of this is attributable to human nature, but contends further that "this seed of intellectual original sin is nourished and fostered by other agencies."46 He would include in this list of

44 Ibid.
46 Ibid., p. 24.
offenders not only the church, but also the schools as well.

Finally, it is the lack of certainty, the doubt, the openmindedness that Russell casts in a savior-like role for the society of today.

Only a large measure of skepticism can tear away the veils which hide this truth from us.\(^{47}\)

In this light, doubt is the true and only route to truth, and this is the role of the open mind, so very fundamental to Russell's thought. It is not, however, presented by the philosopher in an imbalanced manner, as he is always eager to recognize the other side of a coin which he is handling. Russell is able to perceive circumstances that require the hasty dispelling of doubt and the non-reflective springing to action.

In this regard he speaks of a shipboard emergency which depends for its safe resolution on the unquestioning obedience toward a captain's orders, even as the commands are barked.

But if the captain were obliged, like the government, to explain the principles of currency in order to prove his commands wise, the ship would sink before his lecture was finished.\(^{48}\)

This concession of circumstances requiring the blindness of faith and dependency, is not a concession on the worthiness of doubt, but rather a balancing recognition of a fundamental fact of life and experience. To Russell doubt remains supreme in all but extraordinary conditions.

\(^{47}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 50.}\)

\(^{48}\text{Russell, Authority and the Individual, p. 41.}\)
The Student as the Educational End

The whole of liberal educational theory is devoted to the preparation of students to be self-actualizing and self-directing, pursuing their own best purposes. It would not be logical for the youngsters to be so equipped, if there was no thought of allowing them to exercise their capacities in a self-directed manner. It is, then, a fundamental tenet of liberal theory that each individual be treated as an end in himself and never as the mere means to some external ends of institutions or other individuals. People were not intended in the eyes of the liberal to be used as fodder to feed some organization's purposes whether it be a church, a state, or some other institution. Bertrand Russell has said much concerning this principle which assists the analyst in his efforts to determine the validity of his liberalism.

The national governments are particularly guilty in Russell's eyes of attempting to subvert the individual's purposes in favor of their own. The guilt, in this regard, Russell would lay clearly at the feet of the schools, particularly in the teaching of history.

The false ideas as to the history of the world which are taught in the various countries are of a kind which encourage strife and serves to keep alive a bigoted nationalism. For a solution to this Russell advocates an unlikely measure, that being the submission of all history curricula to an international commission. Russell thus seeks to assure the unbiased and accurate portrayal of the facts. It is his obvious contention that under the present system, these courses are being used to subvert the clear understanding of the youngsters.

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49 Russell, Selected Papers, p. 94.
in such a way as to produce a conformity in their convictions with the purposes of the state.

Russell reiterates this notion in "The World As It Could Be Made." He characterizes a more ideal educational setup where there would be, "less desire to fill their minds with a set of beliefs and mental habits regarded as desirable by the State, chiefly because they help to preserve the status quo." 50

Russell treats this principle as have the others in this work,

When I say that pupils should be regarded as ends, not as means, I may be met by the retort that, after all, everybody is more important as a means than as an end. 51

This line of reasoning contends that what a man is as an end dies with him and consequently passes into obscurity, but that what he represents as a means continues to the end of time. Russell does not dispute this but rather chooses to dispute the consequences deduced from it. 52

Russell illustrates his objections with the example of a bad man (a criminal) who murders a tyrant, seeking to punish him for his crimes. Here, the end effect of the action was good, although the man perpetrating the action and the action itself were obviously bad. What is established here is the incongruity in the contention that there is any identifiable unswerving identity between a man's means and ends. This counters any notion that one can be infallibly deduced from the other with any degree of certainty. The strength of the argument here,
illustrates that no individual can be evaluated solely on the enduring quality of their means as some would allege. This is not offered by Russell as an establishment of his case but rather as an effective refutation of countervailing arguments.

This same line of reasoning is pursued throughout Russell's consideration of the proper varieties of discipline. He is certainly willing to indicate his belief that there is a need for discipline,

... but it should be that discipline that comes from within, from the realization of one's own needs, from the feeling of something which one wishes to achieve. 53

He indicates his belief that nothing worthy is ever achieved without discipline and indicates his disenchantment with "modern educational theorists" who he feels fail to recognize the importance of discipline. But, he draws a very clear line, recommending discipline determined by an individual's own desires and needs and not forced upon them by society or some external authority with whom they may not be in concert.

Russell is clearly consonant with John Stuart Mill in his recognition of the coercive power of public opinion and the influence, intimidation, and fear promoted by it. Little else could exert such force in amending individual purpose and forcing a conformity with its own dictates than the encompassing wreath of public opinion. That it is oppressive and stultifying is accepted as axiomatic by Russell who considers the only question as being the degree to which this subversion takes place.

Fear of public opinion, like every other form of fear, is oppressive and stunts growth. It is difficult to

53 Russell, How To Be Free And Happy, p. 32.
achieve any kind of greatness while a fear of this kind remains strong, and it is impossible to acquire that freedom of spirit in which true happiness consists, for it is essential to happiness that our way of living should spring from our own deep impulses and not from the accidental tastes and desires of those who happen to be our neighbors. . . .54

Surely an individual's happiness must rank as at least one of his own selected ends for himself and this is deemed an impossible realization by Russell in those cases wherein imposition is forced upon him by an external force.

Russell has identified what he perceives to be specific violations of the principle, holding an individual to be considered as an end in himself. New York State statutes are attacked by the philosopher where they would deny the issuance of a teaching credential to anyone who would teach the overthrow of a government by force. Further he reiterates his attacks on the common mode of teaching social studies which is designed to inculcate feelings of patriotism in a manner approved by the state. Wartime perversions of the image of non-allies is similarly castigated by Russell who finds this type of instruction obnoxious and an attempt to infuse into an individual these convenient purposes which are congruent with those of the state.55 The "my country --right or wrong" slogan is a sentiment, particularly offensive to Russell's orientation. The unfortunate extreme of this state position is demonstrable by Russell's illustration that both Jesus Christ and George Washington would have to be considered too morally depraved to


be allowed access to the New York schools, and the advocacy of them and their positions by a teacher under the current state restrictions would certainly result in his dismissal or suspension.

Much support for allowing youngsters to pursue their own ends can be found in the principle of motivation. Russell demonstrates that a young person will toil long on the trek up the side of a snow covered hill, pulling behind him his toboggan all for the reward of a few brief seconds spent in the immediate and glorious descent of the hill. If he were instead promised some reward, not his own, for an even less arduous task, his energies would quickly flee him and he would stagnate. Purely from a standpoint of motivating the youngster, a teacher should endeavor to accept the purposes of the child and allow his labors to be vented on his own project.56

Attacking once again the imposition of political creeds for the diverse purposes of the individual, Russell makes his final charge to the world’s educators as regards the acceptance of a young person’s own ends.

We shall not create a good world by trying to make men tame and timid but by encouraging them to be bold and adventurous and fearless except in inflicting injuries upon their fellowmen.57

The courageous individual willing to pursue his own best route to truth is seen as a far more valuable asset to the advancement of any land than the manipulated individual, following in trail-horse fashion the road dictated for him by those who place their mission ahead of his. Finally,

56 Russell, Authority and the Individual, p. 38.
57 Ibid., p. 79.
Russell appears in agreement with the reflective and doubting nature of the liberal theorist. He counters any assertion that a group or institution can achieve such a degree of certainty so as to justify a substitution of their ends for another individual's.

Individuality

In this age characterized by sociologists as the era of the "mass man," individuality is not something that is always prized; quite the contrary, it is all too often the cause for holding someone suspect. Individuality is violently suppressed in many quarters and some have advanced that its occurrence is steadily diminishing. Without offering comment on whether the so-called "rugged individualist" is a thing of the past, liberal educational theorists do offer a commentary which indicates that there are in modern society innumerable forces enthusiastically working to thwart individual expression. It need not be determined that there are no innovators or experimentors to establish that their function is not greatly praised. It need not even be determined that there was ever a time in the past when their function was more prized. To establish that the individualist (that person operating with independence in pursuing his own course) is continually

oppressed, one need only examine the workings of modern society and this
is exhaustively done by all of the educational theorists in this study.
It is their judgment that the school in modern society is as guilty of
this offense as any of the many other institutions operating in society.
Their charge is that this is an offense and that a turn-about in the
policies of the school is necessary, should the schools seek to execute
their proper role of stimulating that individual action in which lies
the best hope of society for progress and betterment.

Cooperation and group cohesion are identified by Russell as
instincts in the human animal. Those who fear individual expressions
may take some heart in this, but to Russell there is a great drawback
to be found in this human quality. Whereas in the lives and experiences
of bees great efficiency is derived from this concert of action, Lord
Russell is quick to note that bees and ants are not known for the pro-
duction of great works of art. The implication he draws from this is
that insect-like cooperation among humans might deny mankind of many of
its most valuable creations and achievements.\textsuperscript{59} This notion cannot be
put off lightly, when one is willing to conduct the most fleeting mental
survey of the great accomplishments of man and measure the degree of
individuality which they represent.

Further, Russell reports what he perceives as the psychological
dangers in forcing a man to live a life that permits too little indi-
vidual expression.

\textsuperscript{59}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 2.
People who live a life which is unnatural beyond a point are likely to be filled with envy, malice and all uncharitableness. He continues to indicate his contention that those in this dilemma might develop strains of cruelty or merely lose all joy in life so that they lose their enthusiasm and become unable to exert the requisite effort in life to improve their sorry condition.

The greatness of the prophets is denied to a society that would advance the suppression of individuality and this is precisely the unfortunate state of affairs that Russell would suggest engulfs us at the present time in the modern world. So great is the drive for centralization and organization, "that individual initiative is reduced to a minimu." This is a feature of our condition that Russell has chosen to designate as the inferiority of our age. Russell would claim that only a very small minority of our people have the freedom to be individuals without considerable and prohibitive degrees of inhibition placed upon them.

Artists and writers are nowadays almost the only people who may with luck exercise a powerful and important initiative as individuals and not in connection with some group. Probably the most clearcut difficulty arising out of this suppression of individuality is that men are simply made to be unhappy and lose their zest for living. Russell has likened this problem to the technological age in which we live, indicating that a "mechanical mold" is employed to
make us to increasingly "resemble each other" in such a way that the individual is "sacrificed." Finally, he indicates that this kind of life is not one where the individual is likely to love life. Interestingly, then, to his audience of humanistic socialists, Russell proclaimed, "It is the individual that is important."64

In a slightly different vein Russell explains that a person's feelings toward the expression of individuality is a function of the direction in which they are facing. Looking forward an individual will prize it and looking at his feet an individual might not. He relates it to the classic differentiation between an optimist and a pessimist.

Those whose minds are dominated by fear of a relapse towards barbarism will emphasize the importance of law and order, while those who are inspired by the hope of an advance towards civilization will usually be more conscious of the need of individual initiative.65

Russell professes to recognize that both of these views are necessary but insists that success for a society resides in the allowance of both to freely contend for sway in the arena of public opinion. This is not usually the actual circumstance and this begins to account for some of the difficulty. He indicates that the latter of these two positions is not accorded its share of public sway in the opinion arena today.

Again expressing concern for the two major sources for organized and systematized education, the state and the church, Russell identifies what he considers to be their prevalent defects, individuality seen as again suffering immeasurably.

63 Russell, How To Be Free And Happy, p. 39.

64 Ibid., p. 41.

65 Russell, Political Ideals, pp. 105-106.
State education has the vices characteristic of the modern world: nationalism, glorification of competition and success, worship of mechanism, love of uniformity, and contempt for individuality.66

Church-sponsored education is interpreted by Russell as "medieval," with its principle thrust being toward the submission to authority. Whereas he is unwilling to state with certainty which of these educational authorities "does the greater damage to the minds and hearts of children" one can confidently speculate from previously quoted works of Bertrand Russell that he would be most negative toward the church.

Concluding Statement

One is forced to note that the social picture painted by the knowledgeable Russell is bleak. Little ground is offered for hope in the future. His study of modern education is actually a pathology, cataloguing the myriad ills of this ailing body. This differs from the liberal stance, though, for liberalism is characterized by a faith in the powers of reflective man and generally speaks of an optimistically higher potential. He satisfies the requirements of the six liberal criteria, and appears consistent with educational liberalism.

66Russell, Prospects of Industrial Civilization, p. 249.
CHAPTER V

JOHN DEWEY

It would be difficult to exaggerate the role played by John Dewey in shaping educational theory during the twentieth century. As a stabilizing agent in the American progressive education movement, Dewey's intellectual production both as an innovator and critic is incalculable. It was his great sadness that American education lived up to his expectation no better than it did. Dewey recognized the great rift that exists between theory and practice; nowhere is it more evident than in the public and private schools in the United States. Indeed, it was ironic that Dewey had to watch patently ridiculous and indefensible classroom sins committed in his name. What Dewey's educational theory actually advanced will be evaluated in the following analysis. His theoretical formulations will be measured against the six central principles of liberal educational thought which are the core of this dissertation.

Universality of Education

The inevitable social and political dilemmas of a dynamic world confronted John Dewey. It appears that this fact prompted him to identify education as a necessity for all young people. In no other way could the fruits of this changing society be made available to the most
possible people. The responsibility for this charge he attributed to the state. He indicated that this was the only organization with sufficient resources to facilitate its execution. He was not entirely satisfied with this situation, though, for he recognized that much of the informal education of young people was completed prior to their coming under the jurisdiction of the state. This means that irreparable damage could be inflicted upon a child's social perception even before he begins to attend school. The parents, then, were the focus of Dewey's concern.

There has been a steady tendency for the education of children to be regarded as properly a state charge in spite of the fact that children are primarily the care of a family. But the period in which education is possible to an effective degree is that of childhood; if this time is not taken advantage of the consequences are irreparable. The neglect can rarely be made up later.¹

The facts are, however, that if left to the family exclusively, the vital job of education would not be done. Further, the consequences of a widespread lack of education exceeds the damage done to the individuals so miseducated. Society would be the principle sufferer in such a situation and therefore it devolves on them to take hold of the problem and initiate an attempted solution. The state remains the only answer.

Dewey's belief in democracy is central to his view of the universality of education, the dependence of democracy on a citizenry capable of concerted action, is obvious. Universal education, then, emerges as vital for political survival in a world of impending disaster.

The reflective method is a democratic prerequisite and strongly suggests the necessity of universal education, that all individuals might be able to discharge their civic responsibility. The processes involved in conducting a democracy (majority rule, popular debate), "involve a consultation and discussion which uncover social needs and troubles." \(^2\)

Collective thinking is viewed by Dewey as the most efficient route to the best answers. This explains his reverence for democracy and indicates his consistent demand for the universality of education.

Finally, Dewey identifies as the major problem of the "public," the improvement of the channels for open discussion and a common consideration of problems and their resolution.

The essential need, in other words, is the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion. That is the problem of the public. \(^3\)

Doubtless, the quality of this public debate and concerted decision-making is a direct function of the intellectual level of the population as a whole. This notion grows out of Dewey's understanding of society itself. It is his assertion that society is properly defined in terms of groups of individuals, "working along common lines, in a common spirit, and with reference to common aims." \(^4\) Where the school fails to achieve its proper ends, Dewey feels it does not facilitate this common pursuit. Clearly, this is another strong assertion of the necessity of universality of education.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 206.

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 208.

Barkening back to the classic description of democracy as "government of the people, for the people and by the people" Dewey finds additional arguments for universal public education. He continues to champion the responsibility of every member in society for the conduct of that society.

Therefore, everyone must receive a training that will enable him to meet this responsibility, giving him just ideas of the condition and needs of the people collectively, and developing those qualities which will ensure his doing a fair share of the work of government.\(^5\)

He insists that if we teach our young only to take orders, they will not have the confidence or ability to think for themselves. They will be unable to make their own decisions as they are dictated by shifting times and issues. They will be ill-prepared for their eventual dependence on themselves.

The awesome power of so universally influential an instrument as the school must be carefully safeguarded, and Dewey was not unmindful of this fact. He recognized that the forces of industrial and business combinations would seek to employ it as their instrument, for indoctrination rather than enlightenment. Dewey, expressing his belief that the young should not be subverted to purposes other than their own, warned that educational goals should be held uppermost and should not in any instance yield to external forces. This is vital in a democratic society, Dewey felt, because of the sweeping nature of the school. Although many tend to overlook this problem, where a school is organized

on a genuinely democratic basis, its vulnerability is very great and it demands a more diligent safeguard.

The democracy which proclaims equality of opportunity as its ideal requires an education in which learning and social application, ideas and practice, work and recognition of the meaning of what is done, are united from the beginning and for all.

In "Education as a Public Business," Dewey outlined another difficulty or conflict which arises with a universal and democratic education. That is the persistent pleas of the professional educator for the lay public to defer to his expert judgments on matters concerning the education of their young people. Likening himself to a doctor or a lawyer, whose counsel is not subjected to public debate and public assent or denial, the professional educator is invariably denied this freedom of action. Specifically because his area of competence embraces the education of society's young, he is continually restricted. It is the awesome power of the school that has ignited this disputation of his control. In this instance power has spawned fear.

To an extent characteristic of no other institution, save that of the state itself, the school has power to modify the social order.

For this reason, "Education is a public business with us." Dewey would contend that it had to be this way, while lamenting the ignorance directed at the expert's suggestions.

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6Ibid., p. 244.
7Ibid., p. 226.
Dewey dissociates himself from those radicals who completely condemn the use of the schools as a social instrument. Dewey accepts that the school must play a vital role in establishing continuity for society as well as fostering individual independence and self respect. Viewed from this perspective, the school emerges as an arm of society to do its bidding. Dewey differs from the radicals and accepts this, as an inevitable and fair execution of a duty necessitated by circumstances.

Further, Dewey would insist that if this use of the school is properly executed, there would be no conflict between the educational interests of the individual and the duty of the school to advance the condition of democratic society. It is the job of education, then, to, open to students the scientific and social possibilities of important occupations of society, and through this vista, they will become more genuinely practical as well as more liberal.

Final emphasis is directed to this same notion of social responsibility in Dewey's famous "pedagogic creed,"

---every teacher should realize the dignity of his calling; that he is a social servant set apart for the maintenance of proper social order and the securing of the right social growth.

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9Ibid., p. 9.


Reflection

Just as the totality of liberal educational theory is connected with reflection, so too, is John Dewey concerned with this aspect of educational thought. The discussion of reflection in Dewey's writings takes two forms. Reflection is important to his concept formulation as well as occupying a place as a major consequence of this formulation. It is impossible to examine any of Dewey's work without encountering much consideration of reflective processes in all areas of experience.

In *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, John Dewey provides a characterization of reflection and the circumstances which he insists must surround it. He catalogues the requisite conditions for reflective experience as well as listing in step by step fashion the process itself. It is his contention that the reflective process is begun with the identification of an initial doubt or the presentation of some dilemma. This is followed by the speculation about a probable solution or the framing of a hypothesis. What follows is a combination of reasoning and the gathering and analysis of evidence. Dewey has chosen to identify those steps as "common sense." The same process is exhaustively re-interpreted in *How We Think*, wherein it is stressed that reflection involves no lock-step performance of specific tasks, but a flexible process which must be fitted individually to the reconciliation of varying problems.

Reflection is characterized by Dewey as simply, "The better way

of thinking. As Dewey understands reflection, it involves far more than a mere sequence of ideas. It is the flow of successive ideas that is most significant, with one idea emerging from that one which preceded it.

Order and discipline of thought are at the heart of reflection, as well as being a prerequisite to it. Reflection is interpreted by Dewey as a series of thoughts or mental pictures of something absent; thinking, then, is a succession of pictures approaching a conclusion.

Considerable time is devoted in How We Think to rules of evidence, for it is the evidence which forms the basis for all conclusions and beliefs. Evidence dominates the senses of the reflective person, continual energy being spent to suppress unrelated factors in favor of what is warranted by evidence,

Thinking . . . is that operation in which present facts suggest other facts (or truths) in such a way as to induce belief in what is suggested on the ground of real relation in the things themselves. . .

That mental discipline is a vital factor in effective reflection is reiterated by Dewey in his discussion of employing novelty in classroom situations. Granting that novelty can serve a worthy motivational function, and reduce the drudgery of classroom experiences, Dewey cautions against its indiscriminate and inappropriate usage. He is


14Ibid., p. 4.

15Ibid., p. 5.

16Ibid., p. 12.
convinced that novelty in the classroom has been employed all out of proportion to its worth:

Novelty is treated as if it were an end in itself, when in fact it is simply a stimulating occasion for the exercise of observation and inquiry. Variety is carried to the point where it is incompatible with that continuity that is essential for good thinking.¹⁷

It is from this orientation that Dewey based much of his criticism of the naturalistic elements within the progressive movement in American education.

The hallmark of the reflective process is that all decisions must be supported by evidence; Dewey is emphatic on this point.

What is important is that every inference be tested inference; or (since this often is not possible) that we discriminate between beliefs that rest upon tested evidence and those that do not, and be accordingly on our guard as to the kind and degree of assent or belief that is justified.¹⁸

Other fallacies that inhibit proper classroom reflection are similarly catalogued by Dewey. He asserts that faulty teaching results in the isolation of facts from their meaning, the failure to follow up reasoning, the isolation of deduction by commencing with it, the failure to provide for experimentation, and the failure to summarize not accomplishment.¹⁹ Should the teacher evidence any of these instructional pitfalls, the results can be disastrous for the reflective experience of the students.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 53.
¹⁸Ibid., p. 97.
¹⁹Ibid., pp. 184–189.
Arriving at answers is but a tiny part of the significance of reflection for its true value is the establishment of a frame of mind and a way of evaluating the world. Actually, the assumption of final truth is taken by Dewey to indicate that reflection has stopped. In the Quest for Certainty he clearly seeks to discourage the holding of solidified answers. This is characterized by Dewey as a pathological error of thought, motivated by attempts to minimize one's fears. This does not, however, suggest that the reflective individual cannot seek answers.

... it is not out of the question to aim at making the methods of learning, of acquiring intellectual power, and of assimilating subject-matter, such that they will render behavior more enlightened, more consistent, more vigorous than it otherwise would be.20

The location of the best tentative answers is the goal of the process of reflection.

In the classroom it is clear that the educational process is more important than the factual product. The material under consideration is never as vital as the way in which it is handled; the true value of an educational program is the manner in which factual information is manipulated. The only really viable concern for material selection is its motivational value.21 It is nearly impossible to establish, according to Dewey that any particular set of facts has any inherent value.22

20Dewey, Moral Principles in Education, p. 3.


22Ibid.
Dewey would further differentiate his concept of reflection from what he classifies as thoughtless "empiricism." It is not the amount of ideas of any kind that he values, but the usage assigned to ideas. Where ideas are "employed in experimental activity as working hypotheses," Dewey values them as worthy reflective endeavors. Where they are viewed as hard and fast conclusions he discards them as nearly worthless. Again his emphasis is placed on the process involved and not on the material manipulated.

**Personal Freedom**

Largely as a consequence of placing so much emphasis on the reflective process, John Dewey considers in depth the proper extent of personal freedom accorded to those involved in the educational venture -- teachers and students alike. Of course this is not freedom without discipline, for just as Russell recognized the need for discipline in education, so does Dewey. It is rather freedom to pursue an organized and disciplined search for the truth that is prized by the liberal theorists and it is against this standard that Dewey must be measured.

In *The Schools of Tomorrow* the proper degree of freedom is vaguely interpreted by John Dewey and his daughter Evelyn as "growing room." If the purpose of the school is to facilitate the growth of young people into responsible adults, capable of caring and choosing for themselves, then it is logical that liberty must be accorded the youngster to allow for his growth and assumption of new powers and experiences, forming his background.
... a consistent plan of education must allow enough liberty to promote that growth.\textsuperscript{23}

They continue with the assertion that prior to the effective use of imagination, thought, and emotion in education there needs to be a considerable degree of freedom from "harassing questions of self-support."\textsuperscript{24} Youngsters required security and freedom from persistent criticism to learn.

Dewey discounts many objections to giving man the ability to express his free will. Hobbesian notions that mankind will express violence when not rigidly controlled are vigorously challenged by Dewey.\textsuperscript{25} He demonstrates little concern that man might be granted too much freedom. It is his concern that man has too little opportunity to be free. Dewey sees this as wrought by an endless series of social and political factors which conspire to imprison his free expression. He notes that those things which at any age are taken to be "human nature" are usually explainable in terms of the current social trends of that age. We are then, at the most fundamental level, dictated to by the conventions of the society in which we live.\textsuperscript{26} Further, the artistic expression of any age is seen by Dewey as further shaping the character of man.

\textsuperscript{23}John Dewey, \textit{Schools of Tomorrow}, p. 100.

\textsuperscript{24}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 168.


\textsuperscript{26}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 113.
there was a saying that if one could control
the songs of a nation one need not care who made
its laws.27

An even more fundamental factor can be identified which mediates against
the expression of personal freedom and demonstrates inappropriate fear
of individual digressions. To Dewey, it is the simple fact that "each
of us is born an infant." The infant is in every way immature, helpless
and "dependent on the activity of others."28 He cannot escape being
molded by society.

Dewey attacks traditional education which would substitute
preparation for the acceptance of freedom for the actual granting of
freedom.29 Dewey defines freedom in such a way as to make its denial
appear a dehumanization.

It seems to contain three elements of importance,
though on their face not all of them are directly
compatible with one another. (1) It includes
efficiency in action, ability to carry out plans,
the absence of cramping and thwarting obstacles.
(11) It also includes the capacity to vary plans,
to change the course of action, to experience
novelties. And again, (111) it signifies the
power of desire and choice to be factors in events.30

This definition is completed with an explication of what Dewey
felt it meant to be a liberal educator.

27Ibid., p. 10.


29John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: H. Holt and

30Ibid., p. 279.
To be liberal is all one with being liberating, with effecting a release of human powers.  

This would hardly be consistent with the suppression of individual desires and motivations, and further illustrates Dewey's understanding that personal freedom is a prerequisite for a reflective education. In John Dewey's theory, proposed educational techniques are always pitched in a liberating direction, freeing the individualistic motives of the young to expand and grow into maturity. In this same vein Dewey expresses his contempt for the classic definition of liberal education. He interprets it as too confining and limiting a type of study.

The idea that an adequate education of any kind can be obtained by means of a miscellaneous assortment of a hundred books, more or less, is laughable when viewed practically.

Rather than facilitating a process of freeing the individual, such a curriculum would operate toward the confinement of ideas in a dust covered prison where little "new" knowledge could be expected to spawn.

Dewey also laments the deplorable influence held over education by forces external to the school.

Education and politics are two functions fundamentally controlled by public opinion.

Where he is willing to concede that the conduct of the schools and the efficacy of their results is a matter properly judged by the public, this should not be construed as a surrender to interest groups. Rather, this is posited in answer to the following question. If not public


32Ibid., p. 149.

control and scrutiny of the schools, then whose? Dewey qualifies his answer in this regard to this question by noting that the lay public is critically unable to make decisions operable for the schools, in many regards, and at many levels.

One need not cite further cases of the incompetence of the lay public to deal with technical questions of school methods.34

He depicts the manner in which well-meaning people blunder when they embark upon the dictation of school policy. It is Dewey's contention that this same public group is generally competent enough "to judge of the aims and results of school work." Where they fail, he would indicate, is when they overstep the realm of their competency and pretend competence in the specialized area of school strategy and technique.35

Certain exertions of influence upon the youngster are not interpreted by Dewey as an infringement of the youngster's proper exercise of personal freedom. For example, guidance is not interpreted by Dewey as representing "external imposition." Instead, it is characterized by Dewey as "freeing the life-process for its own most adequate fulfillment."36 Throughout How We Think continual reference is made to the necessary discipline demanded by the process of reflection. It would be folly to interpret the impartation of this discipline as an infringement on an individual's freedom.

34Ibid., p. ix.

35Ibid.

It enables us to act in deliberate and intentional fashion to attain future objects. . . .37

It is obvious, then, that one can justify the exercise of control by the benefits reaped by the student in later self-actualization. But a further and critically more important qualification is offered by Dewey in regard to the application of this discipline, if indeed it can be in any sense "applied."

Dewey suggests that effective discipline is ideally the product of an actual life experience.

In critical moments we all realize that the only discipline that stands by us, the only training that becomes intuition, is that got through life itself.38

It is difficult to offer satisfactory justification for much classroom discipline, for if it is not experience-related as outlined Dewey, it is merely discipline for discipline's own sake. Possible nowhere is this more clearly stated than in Dewey's classic Democracy and Education. The educational process and the respective roles of student and teacher are defined in terms of the proper amount of control to be exercised by each. The student's proper freedom is established by Dewey's definition of the teacher's role as that of nurturer and facilitator. The teacher is instructed to work with the powers, weaknesses, drives and ambitions of the youngster, never suppressing or supplanting these with some pre-conceived design of his own.39

37Dewey, How We Think, p. 17.
38Dewey, The School and Society, p. 17.
Openmindedness

John Dewey dealt with the phenomenon of the open mind in many different ways and through a variety of perspectives he considered the problem of the open mind in terms of human functioning and perceiving, in the light of its effect on reflective activity, and as it pertains to the most basic difficulties of human nature and security. Possibly the most general and sweeping treatment of openmindedness is to be found in Dewey's The Quest for Certainty. It is the basic theme of this work that individuals and societies sacrifice their doubt and openmindedness for final answers to unsolvable problems. In their perceived solution, they can huddle, undisturbed by the facts of a confusing world and bask in the charade that permits them to ignore discrepancies and contradictions in their thought. New evidence is simply declared out of order and never receives illuminating (or disturbing) consideration.

From Dewey's perspective man faces the world and its wealth of fearful hostilities with two responses: he can immerse his expression in ceremonial rite and supplication to accepted "ultimates," or he can "invent arts and by their means turn the powers of nature to account. . . ."40 For Dewey, the former of these two responses is considered to be no response at all. It symbolizes for him the ostrich who seeks to hide his head in the sand and, by choice, remain ignorant of the changing circumstances that surround him. This second course of "changing the world through action," is the only stance acceptable to Dewey and its impli-

cations are clear. The maintenance of an open mind, continually flexible and willing to reconsider the nature of its existence, is basic to this preferred manner of action. This is interpreted as a liberating process, since the individual grows more capable of determining his true destiny as he becomes increasingly aware of the actual nature of the world and its forces.

It should be noted, however, that the entirety of this philosophy rests upon the individual's willingness to see the facts as they are, and not merely to recognize them as they conform to his presuppositions or other preconceived religious or social belief systems. The open mind, is, then a precondition vital to the achievement of actual awareness.

Dewey recognizes the difficulty with which the open mind is maintained. He would readily agree that even the most unworthy opinions are likely to be vehemently defended by the person challenged.

Opinions are at once the most superficial and the most steel-plated of all human affairs. This phenomenon of human nature is not the only factor that operates against the exhibition of openmindedness. Grand theories on the nature of the universe function in a manner that is exclusive of new ideas not previously a part of the theory. They invariably purport to answer all of the questions which arise.

Any monolithic theory of social action and social causation tends to have a ready-made answer for problems that present themselves. The wholesale character of this answer prevents critical exami-

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41Ibid.

42Dewey, Freedom and Culture, p. 47.
nation and discrimination of the particular facts involved in the actual problem.\textsuperscript{43}

To Dewey's displeasure, factors such as these operate in violation of the principle of openmindedness. He feels that this is detrimental to effective and efficient decision-making.

Dewey insists that the principle enemy encountered by reflection is not man's natural instinct. Rather he is sure that instincts are subject to modification. Customs, Dewey contends, possess the greatest staying power, resisting change and enduring as if they are valuable for their own sake.

\ldots it is precisely custom which has the greatest inertia, which is least susceptible of alteration; while instincts are most readily modifiable through use, most subject to educative direction.\textsuperscript{44}

The schools, then, must strive to open minds, and social customs provide the greatest obstacle to the educational endeavor, seeking to restrain the mind and spirit of the young.

An open mind is vital to reflection; doubt is a first step in any reflective undertaking. Dewey would claim that reflective activity, involves (I) a state of doubt, hesitation, perplexity, mental difficulty, in which thinking originates, and (2) an act of searching, hunting, inquiring, to find material that will resolve the doubt, settle and dispose of the perplexity.\textsuperscript{45}

If this process is an attempt at the resolution of doubt, it is reasonable to assume that doubt must precede the initiation of the process.

\textsuperscript{43}Dewey, Freedom and Culture, p. 100.

\textsuperscript{44}Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 102.

\textsuperscript{45}Dewey, How We Think, p. 12.
Doubt, and the open mind that spawn it are, then, properly considered as prerequisites to the operation of rational thought.

Dewey's specific charge to teachers contains a complete prohibition against all dogma. Any pedagogy which excludes new outlooks clearly violates the responsibility of the teacher. For Dewey, the teacher

... has to avoid all dogmatism in instruction, for such a source gradually but sure creates the impression that everything important is already settled and nothing remains to be found out.46

The Student As The Educational End

When considering the liberal educational theorist's conviction that young people in school should be accepted as their own best and most relevant end, the church is frequently the focus of study. As was particularly true in the case of Bertrand Russell, and as is also the case among all of the theorists being examined in this study. Religious attempts to use the schools to solidify their position in youthful belief systems are soundly condemned. For John Dewey, the church and its educational operations provide sound justification for his strong belief that young people in school should be regarded as ends and not means. This is most emphatically indicated by his disdain for all that is church-related.

In his classic lecture on the nature of religion, A Common Faith, John Dewey offers a searing appraisal of the church and all organized religions in the world. It was his feeling that in almost every instance

46Ibid., p. 40.
they operated in a manner destructive to sound educational principles. He further contends that the educational energies of the church are generally misspent and that they represent shameful human waste.\textsuperscript{47} Energies devoted to the supernatural would be better employed on the process of inquiry devoted to identifying and securing the good life.

The objection to supernaturalism is that it stands in the way of an effective realization of the sweep and depth of the implications of natural human relations. It stands in the way of using the means that are in our power to make radical changes in these relations.\textsuperscript{48}

Dewey recognizes the impediments that exist to the free exercise of an individual's pursuit of his own ends. He can accept that to some degree it is impossible for an individual to pursue ends other than those dictated for him by the very nature of his social condition. One indication of this is evident from a glance at the aesthetic domain. Referring to even the most personal creative pieces of an artist, Dewey has contended,

\begin{quote}
Aesthetic experience is a manifestation, a record and celebration of the life of a civilization, a means of promoting its development. . . .

For while it is produced and is enjoyed by individuals, those individuals are what they are in the content of their experience because of the cultures in which they participate.\textsuperscript{49}
\end{quote}

So, then, the individual is unwittingly forced to pursue ends dictated for him by the culture and arts which compromise his environment. His


\textsuperscript{48}Ibid., p. 80.

individual will is subverted and supplanted even prior to his environment. His individual will is subverted and supplanted even prior to his awareness of his own life. To Dewey, it was clear that even as a young person learns the speech of his culture, he acquires their purposes as well. Such is the process of acquiring language skills that one simultaneously receives a manner of thinking with it.50

It is Dewey's concern that as the western world has modernized and produced technological advances before undreamt of, the process of supplanting a person's ends for those of some other institution (for example the state) has been perfected and developed to an alarming degree. Indeed, national governments have now within their grasp the power to persuade as never before. This is a great danger; an individual might not be granted his right to pursue those goals meaningful to him. What makes this all the more serious is that he would not be likely to even suspect that he was being so grievously misused.

For negative censorship it has substituted means of propaganda of ideas and alleged information on a scale that reaches every individual, reiterated day after day by every organ of publicity and communication, old and new. In consequence, for practically the first time in human history, totalitarian states exist claiming to rest upon the active consent of the governed.51

When this difficulty is considered in the perspective of the public school it can be seen to exist in varying degrees. Dewey illustrates that even when the school is not facing an attempt to employ it for the total transference of some idea system, it is not free


of the problem considered here. Dewey points out that in almost all situations where the above condition is not existent it is regardless expected that the school will have, "... a mental picture of some desired end, personal and social ..." that is intended for transmission to the youngsters through the offices of the school.52 Therefore, in virtually no instance is the school operating without some intent to abridge the purposes and goals of the students in favor of some preferred end of its own. If, as Dewey insists, the school exists

... that the young shall themselves learn to judge, purpose and choose from the standpoint of associated behavior and its consequences.53

The consistent educator must feel great discomfort with a system that at any level makes choices for the student, in many instances even without his knowledge that a choice has been made. Surely this is counter to reflective procedure and denies the student the opportunity to even begin to perceive the quality of his own goals and purposes.

There are two more ways in which this principle carries specific importance for classroom teachers and the classroom strategies they employ. A traditional violation of this principle is the supposed education of the young for full life's participation at some time in the remote future. This assumes that the student will repress his desires for actualization at the present time. This is doubtless quite frustrating for the young person and without sound justification. No evidence is available to justify this view of educational growth and considerable evidence does in fact indicate that in terms of individual student


53Ibid., pp. 24-25.
motivation this course is disastrous! Students simply are not content to spend considerable lengths of time getting ready to live their lives. It is Dewey's contention that to remain consistent with the principle of a student being accepted as his own end, the materials for study must not be defensible only in their applicability for later life, but they should possess,

... sufficient justification in their present reflex influence upon the formation of habits of thought.54

Another area in which Dewey feels the teacher must proceed with caution lest he erringly substitute his own ends for those of the student is the area of personal influence upon the impressionable young. A warm and engaging personality can assist a teacher in discharging his responsibilities as an educatory, but Dewey has cautioned that the use of teacher personality as a motivational tool should never be substituted for the motivational properties of the material under study or to make saleable material that would be otherwise unsuited for class study.55

Individuality

Dewey is at pains to indicate unreservedly that it is the function of human nature to produce individuality. He is not ignorant of the great social forces that encourage community cohesion. He labels the contemporary theories that claim the product of human nature is wholly individualistic, as merely the result of a "cultural individualistic

54Dewey, How We Think, p. 51.
55Ibid., pp. 60-61.
movement.\textsuperscript{56} All Dewey is willing to contend in this regard is that, human nature, like other forms of life, tends to differentiate, and this moves in the direction of the distinctively individual, and that it also tends toward combination, association.\textsuperscript{57}

One is forced, then to look beyond the demands of human nature for a vigorous support and defense of the value of individuality.

Greater support for this doctrine can be located in the peculiarities of democratic political philosophy. The singular nature of desires and wants further indicates individuality. Dewey has employed both of these orientations to maintain the necessity for allowing individuality. Of democracies, Dewey has noted that their very structure is so intended that it might provide, "room for a great variety of shades of political opinion and practical policies. . . ."\textsuperscript{58} He notes further that the will of the majority is the collected wills of individuals, and where it is anything else it is a perversion of the democratic process.

Wants, choices and purposes have their locus in single beings; behavior which manifests desire, intent and resolution proceeds from them in their singularity.\textsuperscript{59}

Dewey is quick to recognize that it is wrong to derive from these facts that the process is a wholly individual one, but the above position provides adequate justification for the principle that he would seek to preserve.

\textsuperscript{56}Dewey, \textit{Freedom and Culture}, p. 21.

\textsuperscript{57}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{58}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 53.

\textsuperscript{59}Dewey, \textit{The Public and Its Problems}, p. 22.
To this is added the indisputable fact that, "At some place on the globe, at some time, every kind of practice seems to have been tolerated or even praised." If this is fact, then one is put at great difficulty to establish anything as "right" and anything else as "deviant." It makes it much more difficult to establish logically that any mode should be adhered to without deviation. Importantly, Dewey does not seek a total break with the past; now carpenters and artists will not be expected to develop their individualistic styles unassisted by the wealth of technic already previously explored and experimented with. What Dewey seeks is toleration so that persons are permitted to leave the previously paved avenues and to explore the frontiers hidden in the forest. Rather than being praised as adventurers or frontiersmen, all too frequently those who deviate are treated in a condescending and openly negative manner. This, Dewey would agree, is a function of our system which he brands as dysfunctional.

With our present system of education—by which something much more extensive than schooling is meant—democracy multiplies occasions for imitation not occasions for thought in action.

One need not refer to controlled research to establish that our schools and our society rewards the proficient duplicator of established ways more than any innovator. Innovators only win reward after their innovation is an institutionalized product of the established society. The

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Individualist is not trusted, but is regarded with suspicion, if not frequently with contempt.

In "The Lost Individual" Dewey examines the effect of advancing years on the individual. He establishes that as the "advancement" of society produces a greater amount of stress and their consequent fears, the position of the individual is significantly diminished.

Where fears abound, courageous and robust individuality is undermined. Just as the advance of technology ushers in a new security of sorts, it has heightened some types of insecurity (i.e., job security) and this is undeniably destructive to individuality and its hearty expression.

Much of the structure of the school violates this principle of individuality. As Dewey illustrates even the furniture arrangement is part of the conspiracy of the school to stifle individuality and treat school children as groups. The school is so arranged for,

... dealing with children on masse, as an aggregate of units; involving, again, that they be treated passively.

Dewey contends that as children act they individualize and this is prevented by the form and method of the schools. The school is a place, as it is currently structured, for student listening rather than for student acting and experiencing.

Dewey is ready to indicate how he feels the schools could be changed so as to foster individualist. His complete curricular philosophy as revealed in The Child and The Curriculum is designed so as to

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64 Dewey, The School and Society, pp. 32-33.
facilitate the development of student individuality. Rather than molding a student to a present curriculum, Dewey has reversed the process and dictates the shaping of the curriculum to the child and his individual purposes. The child becomes, then, the "starting point" of the curriculum; he remains the middle and as well. All material is adapted and selected with this growth of the child in mind. No learning of knowledge is placed ahead of the student's self-realization, for he is what is important in the educational process.65

Finally, Dewey notes repeatedly throughout his work that it is the tolerance of individuality that creates growth, which is the first goal of all Dewey's work.66

Concluding Statement

The proceeding analysis of John Dewey's educational theory illustrates his commitment to educational liberalism. His consonance with the six principle criteria of educational liberalism is easily demonstrated. The universality of education, reflection, personal freedom, openmindedness, the student as an educational end and individuality are all evident in his writings and provide the shape of his theoretical formulations.


CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The proceeding analysis of the writings of Robert McIver, Sidney Hook, Bertrand Russell, and John Dewey demonstrates that all four of the men are clearly within the previously established criteria which denote educational liberalism. Each of the four men exhibits a definable commitment to the universality of education, reflection, personal freedom, openmindedness, the student as the educational end, and individuality. It is the purpose of these six principles to function as a conceptual construct against which the theoretical formulations under study could be measured. Despite differing disciplinary perspectives, the four men emerge as consonant with these criteria. This can be further demonstrated by considering each individual principle, illustrating the manner in which all four men conform to it.

Universality of Education

Universal education was defined in this study as publically financed schooling for young people. The mandatory imparting of minimum educational standards has long been considered as a prerequisite for democracy. Universal education is further described as being available without restrictions as to sex, race, property or status. The previous analysis demonstrates that in a general pattern McIver, Hook, Russell,
and Dewey all adhere to the dictates of this principle.

It has been demonstrated that their shared commitment to democracy unites all four of these men in their allegiance to a system of universal education. Further, their advocacy of and support for a system of universal education extends beyond their common democratic fervor. MacIver has justified universal education as the diffuser of power, and similarly "the great equalizer." Sidney Hook's commentary on this issue sought to characterize universal education as the extension of equal opportunity. He further indicated his belief that it was the only sensible way to equip individuals to make decisions for themselves. Bertrand Russell's belief in a system of universal education is clear, but not without reservations. His contempt for nationalistic schooling could sway him from public education were this fear not secondary to that.

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3Ibid., p. 170.


5Ibid., p. 109.


of church education. John Dewey, recognizing the legitimate function of universally available schooling to provide society continuity, cautions this power must be safeguarded.

Based upon analysis of the four men and their theories, and a comparison of these results with the principle of the universality of education, this study has established that on this point all four men qualify as educational liberals.

Reflection

For this study, reflection was defined as the process of inquiry which seeks tentative conclusions as the consequence of an interpretation of evidence. It is a method of seeking truth which prizes doubt and disqualifies notions of final certainty. Its emphasis is concentrated in the process rather than the products of education. In a very consistent manner Robert MacIver, Sidney Hook, Bertrand Russell, and John Dewey each satisfy the liberal requirements of this definition. All demonstrate a commitment to reflection.

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8 Russell, Prospects of Industrial Civilization, p. 250.


10 Ibid., p. v.

Nuances of difference are present in the four men's works, but each stresses the importance of search and places emphasis on educational process rather than product. Just as MacIver identified this principle as the goal of all education, Hook, Russell and Dewey also identify great bounty to emerge from reflective schooling. Evidence is prized in these men's theories, and it is their common goal that children be taught how to manipulate evidence and to think for themselves.

On this specific principle MacIver, Hook, Russell and Dewey clearly do qualify as educational liberals.

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Personal Freedom

This tenet of liberal education was defined in this study to encompass both positive and negative liberty. It refers to the protection of students from pressures external to the school as well as from teacher dominance. It sanctions teacher freedom, also. All four of the educational theorists, examined in this study evidence clear subscription to this principle. Each man recognizes the importance of teacher freedom. In spite of their adherence to this principle of personal freedom, these theorists are not blind to the many inhibitions on the exercise of personal freedom, however. They uniformly cite these impediments to bolster their contention that the schools' proper function is the extension of personal freedom. The theorists under study also


approach this issue from varying perspectives. To Sidney Hook it is vitally important that young people be allowed the freedom to err and take risks. Russell has contended that one must be allowed to follow his impulses. Dewey asserts the need of individuals to find discipline within themselves. It is in this guise that John Dewey defined the function of the liberal educator. To be liberal, he insisted, was to be "liberating" or "freeing." Based upon the findings in this study, all four men clearly qualify as educational liberals.

Openmindedness

The open mind was previously defined as the mind which "prizes" the doubt." It is the spirit which prompts the constant re-evaluation of tentatively-held conclusions. The open mind is the enemy of dogma and it demands that all available alternative answers to problems be considered critically. All the theorists considered here have demonstrated enthusiastic acceptance of the value of an open mind.

19Sidney Hook, Quest for Being, p. 14.


22Dewey, How We Think, p. 38.


Differing perspectives are employed by the men to indicate their regard for the open mind. They alternately exalt doubt\textsuperscript{25} and condemn dogmatism.\textsuperscript{26} Finally, evidencing the variety of their many academic disciplines, diverse additional support is found in all of the men's theories to strengthen their commitment to the open mind.\textsuperscript{27} On this specific principle, the men under study are clearly consonant with liberal educational theory.

The Student as Educational End

That the student be accepted as an end was defined as the conviction that the students ought not be forced, in any way, to make their own actualization subservient to the needs of any institution — the school, the government, or society. Robert MacIver, Sidney Hook, 

\textsuperscript{25}Robert MacIver maintains that the teacher must be a seeker of knowledge and as such a good example for his students in Spitz ed., \textit{Politics and Society}, p. 11. For Sidney Hook, all certainty is an attempt to escape insecurity in \textit{Man's Quest For Security: A Symposium} (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), p. 6. See also Bertrand Russell, \textit{The Will To Doubt} (New York: Philosophical Library, 1958), p. 50. For John Dewey, doubt is the necessary beginning of reflections in \textit{How We Think}, p. 12.


Bertrand Russell and John Dewey each deal with this concept in their educational theories. The analyses found in Chapters II, III, IV, and V, clearly demonstrate that all these men are consistent with the liberal stance. Understandably the men vary in their manner of expressing this value, but remarkable consistencies are observable. All the men caution against sources external to the school which seek to use individuals in the schools for their own benefit.28

Whatever the aggressor they caution against, the theorists considered in this study clearly posit that discipline, to be of true value, must come from within.29 Whereas they accept it as only natural that an institution seek to perpetuate itself,30 all indoctrination is ruled out of order in education.31 Even the personality of the teacher is to be checked,32 in an effort to foster a maximization of individual fulfillment.

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29Bertrand Russell, How To Be Free and Happy, p. 32.


31Ibid.

32Sidney Hook, Education For Modern Man, p. 150. See also Dewey, How We Think, pp. 60-61.
One of the principles which holds that a student should be considered as an independently relevant end in and of himself, all of the men considered in this study are in agreement with the liberal posture. 

**Individuality**

This liberal principle was initially defined as the possession and expression of these unique features possessed by all people. It is based on the conviction that social progress and change is advanced only where the exercise of individual and innovative solutions to problems can be freely offered. It carries the most central implications for educational pedagogy as well as political behavior and artistic expression and it is from these and other perspectives that this principle is treated by the theorists in this study. An analysis of their writings shows that Robert MacIver, Sidney Hook, Bertrand Russell, and John Dewey all ascribe to that liberal creed which encourages the maximal extension of individuality. It is the repeated refrain of these men that individuality fosters growth and impediments to the expression of individuality can

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even cause psychological damage to an individual. 36 Indeed, one of the four has likened society devoid of individuality to a colony of insects. 37

To MacIver, we are individualists when we follow our conscience and are not imitative. 38

On the specific issue of individuality all four men clearly qualify as educational liberals. 39

36 Russell, Authority and The Individual, p. 8.
37 Ibid., p. 2.
39 The conformity of these men's theories with the central criteria of educational liberalism only further suggests an inherent implication of this study. Accepting that these principles represent a potential program of some value to the schools, massive changes are indicated for their implementation. In several areas -- teacher training and selection, curriculum revision, the physical plant of the school, evaluation, and countless other areas -- major changes would be a necessary prerequisite to the realization of liberal education. The current centers of teacher education do very little beyond the dispensing of an amount of content and a minimum of practical experience. Little personality-screening is possible under the present system and yet the nature of the teacher's personality is clearly a central feature in the accomplishment of a reflective educational endeavor. However, a reordering of the priorities in teacher colleges would only offer partial fulfillment of the ends of liberal education. Wholesale curriculum shifts would be demanded in the public schools; a shift from state-wide and district level materials adoptions, to an individually tailored educational program for each youngster is vital. Doubtless, this type of schooling would require more adequate funding, and suggests a needed change in the process of educational finance. Most existent school buildings are unsuited for individual instruction and renovations would only partially facilitate the vitally important individual concentration. The unfortunate implication is that the already reluctant public must be convinced of the need for a fresh start in the area of school buildings and the thorough renovation and possible abandonment of existing structures. Popular techniques of evaluation would necessarily fall before implementation of liberal educational processes. "Grade-hunting" is unacceptable to the liberal educator, and again teacher training would in this regard face some mandatory alterations. Space prohibits thorough cataloguing of liberal changes required of the present educational system, and yet so dramatic are the demands of liberal education that a reasonable perspective on these issues is unattainable without some attention to the problems they raise.
Concluding Statement

Based upon an analysis of the writings of Robert MacIver, Sidney Hook, Bertrand Russell, and John Dewey and a comparison of their theoretical formulations with the six principles of educational liberalism, it is the finding of this study that the writings of all four men meet all the requirements of educational liberalism.
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