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DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

David Stewart Adams, B.A., M.A.

The Ohio State University
1972

Approved by

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1970 The Red Cross: Organizational Sources of Operational
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The Purpose of this Study

This is a study of local chapters of the American National Red Cross in disaster operations. Like a number of other voluntary disaster organizations, notably the Civil Defense and the Salvation Army, Red Cross chapters make significant contributions to the relief of communities impacted by natural and man-made disasters. Red Cross chapters mobilize their members to provide emergency food, shelter, clothing, and medical care for the victims of the disaster. These organizational activities, however, differ markedly from those of the Red Cross chapter in "normal" or non-disaster periods. During "normal" times Red Cross chapter members provide such community services as collection and distribution of blood and instruction in first aid, water safety, and home nursing.

Shifting from one set of "normal" activities to another set of disaster activities is an organizational characteristic which Red Cross chapters share with the local units of the Civil Defense and the Salvation Army. Labor unions, too, must possess the capacity to shift from "normal" to strike activities; elements of the armed forces must be
prepared to change from peace-time activities to the tasks of war (Etzioni, 1961a:286-287; Barton, 1969:159). What organizational characteristics, it may be asked, require this shift in activities? What organizational arrangements facilitate this transition? In part, the purpose of this study will be to identify and analyze the features of the Red Cross chapter which, on the one hand, demand this shift and, on the other, make it possible.

This study, then, will be concerned with the goals of the Red Cross chapter which require this shift in activities and with the structures of the chapter which make this shift possible. In addition, this study will raise a third and complementary type of question: What operational problems are associated with this shift from "normal" to disaster activities? Are the several goals and structures of the Red Cross chapter dysfunctional as well as functional for its disaster activities? What adaptive problems face the Red Cross chapter as it responds to the impact of natural disaster? In an attempt to answer these questions this study will describe not only the goals and structures of the Red Cross chapter but also the mobilization of its members for disaster relief and their subsequent emergency operations. The analysis of this data will be informed by an understanding of both the disaster and non-disaster goals and structures of the organization.

Three major questions, therefore, concerning the Red
Cross chapter will be raised for consideration in this study:

1. What are the goals the local chapter of the American National Red Cross seeks to accomplish?

2. What are the organizational structures of the local chapter of the American National Red Cross by which these goals are sought?

3. What are the operational problems associated with the shift of the local chapter from the goals and structures of "normal" times to those of natural disasters?

Following the introductory chapter of this study are three chapters which deal, respectively, with these three questions. Chapter Two considers the "normal" and disaster goals of local units of the Red Cross. Chapter Three describes and analyses the "normal" and disaster structures of local chapters of the Red Cross and Chapter Four considers the effects of these shifting goals and structures on the disaster relief mobilization and operations of local Red Cross chapters. The final chapter contains a number of hypotheses derived from this study and some comments on the implications of this analysis for future organizational research and theory.

The study of a single organization has a central and honorable place in the sociological literature of complex organizations but, aside from the inclusion of Red Cross
chapters and personnel in a number of community disaster studies (e.g., Wallace, 1956; Moore, 1958; Form and Nosow, 1958; Bates, 1963; Taylor, et al., 1970) and disaster study reviews (e.g., Barton, 1963, 1969; Dynes, 1969), it has not been the subject itself of in-depth analysis. As one of the largest, most important, and most ubiquitous of voluntary associations, the Red Cross and its chapters do not deserve such neglect. An additional purpose of this study, therefore, will be to close, however incompletely, this gap in the descriptive literature.

The Constructed Type: The Data and Methods of this Study

The Constructed Type

Presentation of the descriptive data of this study will be in the form of an "individualizing constructed type" (McKinney 1966:31-33). Such types are methodological devices which function to identify, simplify, and order the concrete data of a case so that these data may be described in terms which make them comparable to other empirical cases (McKinney, 1966:18,216). Strictly speaking, then, the data of this study are not reported as case data, although (as will be explained later in this section) they have been

1 Its blood donor program has been studied: see Titmuss, 1970; and it has been studied historically: see Dulles, 1950.
holistically collected and analyzed. This distinction between the case study and the constructed type is pointed out by McKinney (1966:66).

The individualizing constructed type marks a first step away from the uniqueness of the case, in that it selectively pulls out what seem to be significant uniformities. That the construction of this type is only a first step away from the single case explains the spatial and temporal boundedness of many of the concepts which make up the individualizing type (McKinney, 1966:31-33).

This is not to say, however, that the selection from the data of "significant uniformities" for an individualizing type is an exercise in raw induction. The construction of individualizing types often requires the use of generalizing theoretical concepts (McKinney, 1966:31; Becker, 1970:196). The three principal concepts which have served as "sensitizing" concepts (Blumer, 1970b:91; McKinney, 1966:216; Diesing, 1971:209-210) in the construction of this Red Cross type are introduced later in this chapter. The constructed type is an element of pragmatic research methodology which functions as a bridge between relatively unstructured empirical data and systematic substantive theory (McKinney, 1966:38-39,96). In this study, the individualizing constructed type of the Red Cross chapter is a methodological device linking Red Cross chapter data and certain aspects of organizational theory. We turn now to a
description of the data base, the methods of data-collection, and the analytical and selective processes by which these data were identified, simplified, and ordered into a constructed type.

Data and Methods of Collection

The data for this study were gathered during a series of disaster field studies carried out by the Disaster Research Center (DRC) of The Ohio State University (Department of Sociology) over the past ten years. Twenty-three American Red Cross chapters have been studied in natural disasters during that time. (See Appendix A of this study for a complete list of Red Cross chapters and disasters studied.) Field studies like these do not rely on a single method of data collection nor are they intended to gather only a single kind of data. Rather, they involve a number of distinctive methodologies devised to collect various types of data (Zelditch, 1970:497). The data on which this study of the Red Cross chapter is based are of two types: (1) information on specific disaster "incidents" and "histories" and (2) information on "generally known rules and statuses" (Zelditch, 1970:497-499). The former data are essentially Red Cross chapter disaster operations case data; the latter, data on the social organization of the Red Cross chapter. Participant observation and informant interviewing were the methods employed in the collection of these two types of data. We shall define both types of data and describe the
rationale for the use of these two data-collection methods in this section of our discussion.

The Collection of Data Describing Incidents and Histories

An "incident" may be defined as a "configuration of many properties of the same object at the same time in the same place" and a "history", as a temporal sequence of such incidents (Zelditch, 1970:497). In this study information descriptive of natural disaster incidents was collected from Red Cross chapter respondents. Disaster mobilization and emergency action incidents, for example, were described by multiple respondents from the same chapter, each respondent contributing to a configurative reconstruction of these incidents and, when these incidents were placed in chronological sequence, to a history of the Red Cross chapter's disaster activities.

In addition to these purely descriptive data of disaster activities, the data also include the "meanings" attributed to disaster activities by the same chapter respondents. Such "meanings" have been treated in this study in two analytically distinctive ways. On the one hand, they have been regarded as part of the descriptive data base, interesting because they reveal what the respondent thinks--his perceptions, motivations, and his "world of meaning" (Zelditch, 1970:498). On the other hand, such "meanings" have also been interpreted as semi-objective observations and explanations of these
disaster incidents and treated, in effect, as substitutes for the direct observation of them by the researcher himself. When such use has been made of these data, they may be defined, not as part of the descriptive base collected from respondents, but as the report of informants acting as the researcher's observers (Zelditch, 1970:504-505). The same data, then, have been interpreted in two ways: as "purely" descriptive data collected from participants and as "semi-objective" reports of incidents which occurred in the researcher's absence but which were observed by informants.

This difference in interpretation has a methodological dimension as well. Although the data in both cases are interview data, analytically they were collected in two different types of interviews. On the one hand, descriptive data were collected by participant observation, a method which includes, among other techniques, interviewing the participants in an event (Zelditch, 1970:499); Diesing, 1971:143-145). When DRC field interviews were conducted, as they sometimes were, with members of a Red Cross chapter during the disaster event itself, the interviewee assumed primarily the role of respondent, describing and interpreting his activities in the disaster operation for the researcher. When interviewing on the disaster scene was not possible (as was most often the case), participants were interviewed as soon after the event as was feasible. Then
the interviewee often took on the additional role of informant, providing information about the activities of other chapter members and about disaster events which the researcher himself had not observed. Thus the second method of data collection was informant interviewing in which the interviewee acted as a substitute observer for the researcher. This distinction between participant-observation interviews and informant interviews is, of course, an analytical one; Red Cross members typically played both the role of respondent and the role of informant for DRC field teams.

Indeed, the interview schedules employed by DRC field team members required the interviewee to assume both roles. In the sections of the schedule which deal with the disaster event, the interviewee-as-respondent answered such questions as, "How did you first hear of the disaster?" and "What did you do when you first heard of the disaster impact?" Other sections of the interview asked the interviewee-as-informant to describe the activities of other members of the chapter and provide organizational data on the division of labor and standard procedures of the Red Cross chapter. (DRC maintains a complete file of all schedules used in these interviews.)

The collection and interpretation of this data in the first sense—as descriptive information obtained through participant observation—needs little justification. The interviewing of participants in an event includes among its major advantages the great range and variety of information
which can be collected as well as the potential for collecting information on the same event from many participants; thus, gaps in the data can be filled and clarifications of ambiguous or confusing incidents can be made (Diesing, 1971:149-151). Zelditch (1970:509) asserts that for the collection of descriptive data on incidents and histories, such participant observation methods are the most adequate and the most efficient methods available.

The second use of such data—as reports of observations and evaluations made by the informant for the researcher—is somewhat more suspect. Diesing (1971:151), for example, argues that

informant statements are not to be treated as quasi-objective descriptions of a subject by an outsider, but rather as part of the subject being studied. They are the subject's report about itself.

Zelditch (1970:505), on the contrary, states that "such a procedure is not only legitimate but absolutely necessary to adequate investigation of any complex structure." The inability of a researcher to be everywhere at once or to be everywhere in time, Zelditch argues, makes reliance on informants absolutely necessary. In addition, in organizational research there are often aspects of the structures being investigated which are not accessible to the researcher; he may, then, need to rely on the reports of his informants for data otherwise unobtainable. Cross-checking the information provided by several such informants permits the
researcher to estimate biases and interpret the information accordingly.

Non-interview data useful in the reconstruction of disaster incidents and histories have also been drawn upon in this study. These data sources include the tape-recorded on-the-scene observations of DRC field team members and Red Cross chapter news bulletins and releases, disaster handbooks and manuals, and after-action reports (both official and unofficial).

The distinctions between data interpreted as description and as observation and between the methods of participant observation and informant interviewing which we have made here all but disappear in the realities of field research—i.e., both methods collect interview data. These analytical distinctions, however, need to be identified to describe accurately the processes followed in the construction in this study of the Red Cross chapter type.

The Collection of Data on the Social Organization of the Red Cross Chapter

Data on the social organization of the Red Cross Chapter—its standard operating procedures, division of labor, and hierarchy of authority—have been collected through informant interviewing and the accumulation of a variety of written documents, published and unpublished, pertaining to chapter organization. The principal source of such data on the standard "normal" (as well as the standard disaster)
operations and structures of Red Cross chapters has been strategically located personnel of local chapters.

Those personnel who occupy leadership positions in the chapter or who have been recommended by chapter officials as "good" sources of such information have been interviewed. Such "theoretical sampling" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967:45) is justifiable for studies of social organization largely for reasons which are inherent in the subject matter itself. Sjoberg and Nett (1968:157-158) have summarized these justifications:

[M]embers of a social organization possess unequal amounts of knowledge about its operations...
[T]he process of institutionalization within large-scale systems induces an unequal distribution of rights and privileges— and consequently of knowledge....Persons who carry out leadership roles, as well as specialized roles within the system, are expected to view the system as a whole, whereas other functionaries tend to view it from the vantage point of their own immediate concerns.

That such a sampling procedure feeds into the construction of a model or type of the organization is also suggested by Sjoberg and Nett (1968:159); the researcher, they write, usually begins with some hypothetical model or image of the kind of social organization he is studying, and as he proceeds he checks this model with respondents, making various additions or deletions. Or he may check his original model against his observations [or the observations of his informants] of ongoing events. Ideally, the researcher proceeds until his key findings become repetitious and the inconsistencies either tend to disappear or can be accounted for.

The largest single source of social organizational data
on Red Cross chapters is, then, the DRC field interviews with Red Cross informants. These interviews range in content from relatively brief descriptions of chapter organization and activities to in-depth organizational interviews (lasting as long as two or three hours) covering both "normal" and disaster operations of the chapter and its members. Strategic sampling of chapter members, which has tended to include more professional staff than volunteer members, has been the standard data-collection procedure. In one large metropolitan chapter, however, in-depth interviews were conducted with all of the staff members of the chapter. Strategic sampling has also included interviews with chapter volunteers, especially with those who occupy leadership statuses in the organization. In one case, a sample of lower-level volunteers in Red Cross disaster shelters was drawn and each of these volunteers were interviewed.

2It should also be noted that DRC disaster studies have systematically emphasized "major" disasters, i.e., disasters which have impacted large communities. Thus, Red Cross chapters studied by DRC field teams have tended to be large-city chapters rather than small-town or rural chapters. The constructed type of the Red Cross chapter presented in this study, therefore, is based on large-city chapter data. To that extent this constructed type does not describe a "typical" or "average" Red Cross chapter; such a chapter would be smaller and less structurally complex (cf., Dulles, 1950:327). Rather, the constructed type of this study describes a representative large-city Red Cross chapter. This is consistent with the characteristic purposes of the constructed type: "The constructed type," writes McKinney (1966, 15), "does not necessarily refer to the most common form of a phenomenon, but usually to the most significantly representative form."
All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed (for a discussion of the advantages of this technique, see Bucher, et. al., 1956).

In addition to these interviews, other sources of data on the social organization of the Red Cross chapter have been employed in this study. Red Cross chapter organizational tables, job descriptions, and annual reports, for example, were obtained. National Red Cross publications—disaster handbooks, policy statements, resumes of Red Cross contributions to disaster relief, and similar official publications of the national organization—have provided useful information for the construction of the Red Cross chapter type. This study has drawn upon all of these data sources, but most heavily on the transcriptions of field interviews.

Two types of data are analyzed in this study: (1) descriptive data related to disaster incidents and histories and (2) social organizational data. These data were collected largely through field interviews with Red Cross chapter respondents-informants, that is, through participant observation and informant interviewing. In this section we have described the data and considered the rationale for the methods employed in the collection of this information. We turn now to a discussion of the analytical procedures which were followed as these data were simplified and ordered in the construction of the Red Cross type described in the body
of this report.

Analysis and Validation of the Data

The study reported in these pages is a qualitative, holistic, and empirically-based investigation into the goals, structures, and operations of the Red Cross chapter. As we have indicated, its data are qualitative. They have been collected (as described above) and analyzed in a holistic, case fashion. Although they describe a number of individual Red Cross chapters, the data have not been systematically treated as comparative data. Differences between chapters—in terms of size, complexity of structure, and operational problems and successes—have, of course, been pointed out, but the major thrust of the analysis has been to identify the similarities among the data; that is, to construct a type which will describe the Red Cross chapter. This type is an individualizing type: its concepts, are directly linked to empirical reality. Such concepts, for example, as "staff" and "volunteer" members, "normal" and "disaster" structures, are all derived from the Red Cross organization itself. They are not highly abstract theoretical devices. But even when the analysis is this "close" to the data, inferences from the data must be made (cf., Trow, 1970:143-149). It is the purpose of this discussion to describe the grounds from which these inferences were made.

"Readers of qualitative research reports," Becker (1970:199) writes,
commonly and justifiably complain that they are told little or nothing about the evidence for conclusions or the operations by which the evidence has been assessed. A more adequate presentation of the data, of the research operations, and of the researcher's inferences may help to meet this problem. But qualitative data and analytic procedures, in contrast to quantitative ones, are difficult to present adequately.... They frequently consist of many different kinds of observations which cannot be simply categorized and counted without losing some of their value as evidence.

The problem, then, is to describe how the inferences of the researcher—in this case presented in the form of a constructed type—were made. It may be useful to divide this discussion into two parts: the first considering the validity of the concrete data, both the descriptive data of disaster incidents and the social organizational data, and the second, the validity of the constructed type itself.

One of the distinct advantages of naturalistic research (participant observation, for example) is that the researcher is very close to the reality in which he is interested (Blumer, 1970a:139). Interviewing the participants in an event, at the time or ex post facto, puts the researcher face-to-face, as it were, with the subject of his investigation. Under such conditions, there is some justification for the assumption of the data's face validity. This is particularly true when observations of this kind are made for descriptive purposes rather than to infer the concealed dynamics of the situation (Selltiz, et. al., 1960:164).
Although such an assumption of internal face validity seems justified here for data which have been interpreted as "pure" description, this study has also made inferences from the data which go beyond description. As was noted, interview data are sometimes treated in this analysis as if the informant were the researcher's observer. Such treatment of data requires more than judgements of face validity to justify it.

Some external validity check to determine whether the informant is telling the truth thus seems necessary. The technique employed in this study is what Diesing (1971:147-149) calls "contextual validity" or "dependability". The dependability of an information source is "the extent to which its output can be taken at face value relative to other sources of evidence" (Diesing, 1971:149). By comparing the information provided by one Red Cross chapter informant with that provided on the same disaster incidents or organizational norms and practices by others, estimations of informant dependability can be made. In effect, the validity of evidence is checked by placing it in the context of other evidence gathered on the same event. Such tests of contextual validity have been, in fact, a major element in the analytical procedures of this study. The simplification and ordering of the empirical data to extract from them the constructed type has required a more or less constant process of mental comparison of the reports of Red Cross in-
formants against each other, seeking through this process to validate these reports and identify the themes which recur in them.

The analysis of this study has been concerned with the validity of the evidence not only at the level of the concrete data but also at the level of the constructed type itself. Indeed, it is difficult to isolate, in this type of study, any one point in the analysis which is not, in effect, a test of validity. Verification is actually an integral part of the process of discovery in the construction of types.

The first vague statement of a tentative theme is followed immediately by a search for further instances, which serve simultaneously to verify the existence of the theme and to specify its nature more exactly. After it is clear that the theme does exist in the data, its range of occurrence may next be investigated, and this search simultaneously serves as a test of its importance. The distinction between discovery and verification is analytical, made after the event (Diesing, 1971:230).

Such validation techniques are tests of construct validity (cf., Kerlinger, 1964:448-449), seeking evidence of the validity of the emerging type rather than of the data from which it is constructed. To the extent that the data of this study provided examples and illustrations of the themes being developed in the constructed type, this served as some indication, although clearly not conclusive, of the validity of the type. When negative evidence was discovered which could not be incorporated logically into the developing type,
the contradicted themes had to be discarded and fresh analysis begun to account for the same data.

The principal limitation of constructed types, particularly those which, like this one, are low in generalization, is the problem of nullification (McKinney, 1966:62). The question which cannot be answered altogether satisfactorily is, "What evidence would be required to disprove (i.e., invalidate) this type?" The best answers that can be given to the question are that the type appears to include more of the available data than it excludes and that the type appears reasonably coherent and well-organized (Diesing, 1971:230). The best single test of the validity of the type, therefore, is additional empirical research which through the discovery of new themes, tests the capacity of the constructed type to incorporate and explain new data. Should the type prove adequate to this test, additional grounds for its validity have been established by empirical test (cf., Kaplan, 1964:199). We shall return to this point in the concluding chapter of this study; the body of this report, however, contains the only answers to the question of nullification which can be offered at this time.

In the following section of this introductory chapter three theoretical concepts which have proven most useful in the analysis of this study are introduced. These are concepts from the organizational literature which have informed the inductive processes of this study of the Red Cross chap-
ter and to whose further development this study may contribute.

Three Sensitizing Concepts:

The Theoretical Framework
of this Study

In this section three concepts are introduced which have been employed in the analysis of the goals, structures, and disaster operations of Red Cross chapters. These concepts from organizational theory have served as sensitizing instruments in the construction of the individualizing type of the Red Cross chapter, providing a general sense of reference rather than referring precisely to the common attributes of a class of objects or events. They have suggested what to look for and where to look for it in the empirical data (Blumer, 1970b:91). As sensitizers, they have informed the construction of the type presented in the body of this study and, as will be suggested in the final chapter, this constructed type of the Red Cross chapter may contribute, in return, to the increased precision and definitiveness of these concepts.

The first of these constructs is "voluntary association", a typological concept which sets off organizations like the Red Cross chapter from such "involuntary associations" as economic organizations, kinship and family groups, and other collectivities in which membership and goals are non-voluntary. This concept has informed much of the discussion of the membership structures and goals of the Red
Cross chapter. The second and third concepts, "goal succession" and "structural succession", refer to temporal processes through which the Red Cross chapter (as well as other organizations) responds to changes in its social environment by altering, on the one hand, its output and, on the other, its divisions of labor and authority. These two concepts have proven particularly useful in simplifying and ordering the Red Cross chapter data on the goals and membership structures of the organization. This section of the introductory chapter is devoted to a discussion of each of these three concepts.

The Red Cross Chapter as a Voluntary Association

In some respects, the concept "voluntary association" lacks a clearly defined theoretical base (cf., Perrow, 1970: 94). It does not appear to represent a polar concept to "involuntary association" as, for example, "secondary group" represents the polar complement to "primary group" (Morris, 1965:186). The concept "voluntary association" more nearly represents "a set of interests and questions rather than a special kind of organization" (Warriner and Prather, 1965: 138). Despite its ad hoc qualities, the concept is a useful designation for organizations with at least the following

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3This critique is less valid in the anthropological literature where this usage is sometimes implied; see Banton, (1968) and Service, (1971).
two sets of characteristics:

1. **Membership in the association is voluntary.** It is based neither on ascription through the facts of birth nor on survival requirements, i.e., to earn a living. This is a theme which appears in much of the literature dealing with voluntary associations (cf., Warriner and Prather, 1965; Morris, 1965; Sills, 1957, 1968; Price, 1968; Aldrich, 1970; Hage and Aiken, 1970).

2. **The association itself is voluntary.** It is the independent creation of social actors seeking to achieve, collectively, some public goal or goals (cf., Warriner and Prather, 1965; Morris, 1965; Rohrer and Dakin, 1965; Sills, 1957, 1968; Hage and Aiken, 1970).

These two characteristics suggest that the expression "voluntary association" must be understood in two ways. On the one hand, the concept refers to voluntary associations; that is, associations in which the majority of members are unpaid volunteers. On the other hand, the concept indicates voluntary associations—organizations which are established and which persist solely by virtue of their members' interests. To restrict the concept to one of these meanings at the expense of the other would be to limit significantly its usefulness in understanding the activities and problems of
organizations like the Red Cross chapter. 4

Subsequent analysis of the data presented in this study will suggest that certain operational problems of the Red Cross chapter are understandable in terms of these two criteria. The convergence of walk-in volunteers on Red Cross chapters engaged in disaster-relief activities is, for example, a major problem in itself. Additionally, the characteristic voluntary and public goals of the Red Cross chapter help to explain certain interorganizational disputes over the respective domains of the chapter and other disaster-relief agencies. Beyond its usefulness in suggesting explanations for such operational problems as these, "voluntary association" may also serve, provided that its limitations for comparative analysis are acknowledged, to locate the Red Cross chapter within the larger universe of complex or formal organizations. In this study, the latter will remain a latent rather than a manifest contribution of the concept.

4For comparative analysis, however, these two criteria are inadequate. Even in concert, they are not discrete bases for setting off "voluntary" associations from all other types. Warriner and Prather (1965:138), for example, note that voluntary membership and voluntary creation of the association itself are "characteristic of all organizations in our society—not... feature[s] limited to a few. The difficulty of deciding whether churches, labor unions, or families are voluntary associations amply demonstrates this point." Etzioni (1961a) includes "voluntary" associations in his compliance-based typology of complex organizations, but the "voluntary" association is not systematically distinguished from other "predominantly normative" organizations like professional groups, colleges and universities, hospitals, political parties, churches, and certain labor unions.
Goal Succession in the Red Cross Chapter.

"An organization," according to Blau (1968:297-298), "comes into existence when explicit procedures are established to coordinate the activities of a group in the interest of achieving specified objectives." These objectives or goals may be "displaced" (Merton, 1968:253) by the tendency of organizational members to reify, as terminal values, the procedures originally established to achieve organizational goals. A variation on goal displacement has been identified by Blau (1963) as "goal succession". When organizational goals are achieved or when the organization's environment alters, the organization may seek to adjust to "success" or external change by defining new goals to motivate its members and justify its continued existence (Blau, 1963:243). The process of goal succession has been documented in Sill's (1957) study of the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis (the March of Dimes) and in both

5"Goals" is used in Perrow's (1967:202; 1968:308) sense of "product characteristics"; that is, in the sense of the type, quality, quantity, and cost of the "output" produced by the organization for its public rather than in the sense of the often latent functions which the organization performs for society or the "system states" desired for the organization by its key executives. Thus the concept "goal" is used in this study with much the same meaning as the concept "task." This is a usage which is consistent with Etzioni's (1961a) as well as with Perrow's (1967) earlier use of the concept "operational goal". The terms "activities" and "operations" will be used to refer to the actual, overt behavior of organizational members.
Zald and Denton's (1963) and Zald's (1970) study of the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA).

Succession of goals has also occurred in the American National Red Cross, particularly during the post-war periods in which the organization, both at the national and the local levels, had to adjust to a radically altered social environment (Dulles, 1950; Sills, 1957; 1968). After the Spanish-American War and after the First and Second World Wars, the Red Cross chapter, under the leadership of the national organization, redefined its goals, adding during the post-World War I period, for example, the goal of expanding the public health services available to Americans and, after the Second World War, institutionalizing the war-motivated blood donor program as a peace-time goal of the organization (Dulles, 1950). Goal-adjustment in the Red Cross chapter has continued to the present time, the most recent modification being in the organization's disaster mass-care and rehabilitation goals (American National Red Cross, 1971b:n.p.). These adjustments, which together with the earlier post-war goal successions will be described in Chapter Two of this study, appear to be organizational responses to changes in the inter-organizational environment, especially to the increasing role of the federal government and its various agencies in disaster relief (American National Red Cross, n.d., b).
The result of these successive goal adjustments for the Red Cross chapter has been the accretion of "normal" tasks. In addition to its charter-defined war and disaster goals (cf., American National Red Cross, 1964), the Red Cross chapter has taken on a number of "normal" goals such as public health and blood donor programs. These goals have not displaced those required by the 1905 Congressional Charter but have been added to them. The Red Cross may, then, be understood as a "multi-goal" or "multi-task" organization (Etzioni, 1961a:266; Zald, 1968:230-232).

Structural Succession in the Red Cross Chapter

Multiple goals in the same organization typically give rise to the problem, in Etzioni's (1961a:266) terms, of "neutralization" in which the efforts of an organization to achieve one of its goals counter its efforts to achieve another. The prison, with its dual goals of security and rehabilitation, is a commonly cited illustration of this problem (Cressey, 1961:168); mental hospitals also illustrate the neutralization problem (Price, 1968:170-171) as do police departments (Broom and Selznick, 1968:389).

Goal segregation, in one of two forms, may provide relief from this organizational dilemma. These two types are, first, "concomitant" segregation and, second, "successive" segregation (Etzioni, 1961a:266-269). In concomitant segregation, organizational goals are sought simulta-
neously by separate sub-units of the organization; the distribution of responsibility, the segregation of goals is spatial. On the other hand, separation of responsibility for goal achievement is temporal in successive segregation. Thus goal segregation of the latter type frequently requires a shift in the organization's structure\(^6\) as one goal succeeds another:

Some organizational goals require the performance of two quite different tasks at different time periods and in different situations. Unlike seasonal change..., serving two such different tasks requires a much more encompassing change in the amount, pace, and even substance of activity (Etzioni, 1961a:285-286).

The mobilization of the members of the Red Cross Chapter for disaster-relief operations requires such an "encompassing change" in organizational structure. Suspending for a time its "normal" activities, the organization must turn

\(^6\)The concept "structure" will be used in this study to refer to two principles of organization: the allocation and integration of organizational functions (Greer, 1955:6). Thus "structure" refers to the distribution among the members of an organization of responsibility for the performance of organizational tasks (i.e., its division of labor) and to the coordination of these responsibilities through the hierarchy of authority, the distribution of rewards and punishments, and the system of organizational norms. In voluntary associations like the Red Cross chapter, as compared with organizations like prisons and businesses, the normative means to integration and compliance must be employed rather than the coercive and remunerative (Etzioni, 1961a:40-54). Although this study will tend to focus on the formal (or official) structure of the Red Cross chapter more than on the informal structure, it is clear that this conception of "structure" can be applied usefully to both.
its attention to the contingencies of disaster. Although the impact of natural disasters is sometimes predictable, there remains, even in hurricanes—perhaps the most predictable of disasters—an inescapable element of surprise to which the members of the Red Cross chapter must respond quickly and effectively. Thus, the rapid shift (or succession) of the chapter's organizational structure is a function of its temporal segregation of goals—the Congressional disaster mandate on the one hand and the chapter's additional "normal" tasks on the other—as well as a consequence of the emergency nature of disasters. Together these features of the organization make structural change imperative, lending to much of the data of this study a dramatic quality which survives even the most deadly analysis.

The three concepts introduced here will serve as a theoretical context within which the unit of this study, the local chapter of the American National Red Cross, will be investigated. The chapter will be understood, first, as voluntary associations, that is, as complex organizations of which both the membership and the organization itself are voluntary. The process of goal succession will be described and its consequences, the multiple goals of the Red Cross chapter, identified. Finally, the process of structural succession will be investigated. Special attention will be paid to problems attendant on the chapters' shifts in struc-
ture from "normal" to disaster relief operations.

Thus, the constructed type of the Red Cross chapter which this study will present describes a complex voluntary association which has, through the accumulation (or succession) of goals, become a multiple-task organization requiring temporal segregation of these tasks and, hence, periodic successions of organizational structures.

This introductory chapter has identified the problems investigated in this study, described the data and their methods of collection, and introduced three sensitizing concepts which have been employed in the analysis of the Red Cross chapter data. In the next chapter we turn to an analysis of the goals of the Red Cross and of the process of goal succession in the organization.
CHAPTER II

MANDATORY GOALS AND THE SUCCESSION OF PERMISSIVE GOALS IN THE RED CROSS CHAPTER

This chapter has two purposes. First, it will identify the "mandatory" or charter-defined goals of the Red Cross chapter and, second, it will trace the accretion of "permissive" or "normal" goals as these have been added—and sometimes subsequently lost—to the Red Cross chapter in its successive adaptations to change in its social environment. In effect, this latter discussion will outline the major goal-changes in the Red Cross chapter through its ninety-year history. The purpose of this review, however, is less to provide a history of the Red Cross chapter than it is to provide a context for analyses of the dual structures of the chapter and of the activities of its members as they mobilize to meet the demands of natural disasters.

The Mandatory Goals of the Red Cross Chapter

Two mandatory goals of the Red Cross chapter are defined by the Congressional charter of the national organization. These goals, according to the charter, are defined not only by the Congress but also by the "spirit" and "conditions" of the Geneva Conventions to which the United States
became a party in 1882, a year after Clara Barton founded the American Red Cross. The first of these mandatory duties, according to the 1905 Congressional charter, is

To furnish volunteer aid to the sick and wounded of Armed Forces in time of war, in accordance with the spirit and conditions of the conference of Geneva...to which the United States of America has given its adhesion, and also to any other treaty or convention similar in purpose to which the United States of America may hereafter give its adhesion (American National Red Cross, 1964:3-4).

The second mandatory goal of the American Red Cross defines the organization's duties during peacetime. The 1905 charter states that it is the function of the Red Cross

to continue and carry on a system of national and international relief in time of peace and apply the same in mitigating the sufferings caused by pestilence, famine, fire, floods, and other great national calamities, and to devise and carry on measures for preventing the same (American National Red Cross, 1964:4).

This Congressional mandate requires that every Red Cross chapter must provide two services for the community in which it is located. The first of these is Service to Military Families. The 1905 charter stipulates that the Red Cross chapter is to be "a medium of communication between the people of the United States of America and their Armed Forces" (American National Red Cross, 1964:4). In times of both peace and war, the Red Cross chapter links the men and women of the armed forces with their families.
and communities at home by providing other casework services for members of the military, e.g., by obtaining emergency leaves, by offering professional counselling and financial assistance, and by making available reporting and communications services. The organizational structures which make possible these services will be briefly described in the third chapter of this study; no further discussion of the organizational goal itself seems necessary here. The present study concerns the other mandatory goal of the Red Cross chapter, disaster preparedness and relief.

Responsibility for this second goal lies with the Red Cross Disaster Services. It is a responsibility which the organization cannot escape:

The Red Cross has...both legal and moral mandates in the field of disaster relief and does not have either the power or the right to surrender these mandates. It may determine the scope, the policies, and the methods of its disaster relief program, within the framework established by the charter, but it must carry out its basic obligation to mitigate the suffering caused by disaster (American National Red Cross, 1971b:n.p.).

Broadly speaking, these obligations are divided into two parts by the organization: emergency mass care and long-term rehabilitation. The latter is the responsibility, in the main, of the national Red Cross organization and its area (or regional) offices; the former, of the local chapter.7

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7The relationships of the national and area offices of the American National Red Cross to the local chapter will be described in Chapter Three of this study.
Because the focus of this study is on the local chapter, mass care disaster goals will be discussed in more detail than rehabilitation goals. Following a brief description of rehabilitation, we shall turn to a specification of the Red Cross chapter's emergency mass care goals.

The Long-term Rehabilitation Goals of the National Red Cross

Left in the wake of natural disasters are individuals and families whose losses cannot be replaced from personal resources and whose position is such that they do not qualify for disaster loan or grant programs or other resources underwritten by governmental agencies. The Red Cross does not attempt to replace all losses for such disaster victims, but it will provide monetary gifts sufficient to restore victims to a position of independence. This policy has been frequently criticized and is apparently the source of much of what one disaster study (Moore, 1958:101-102, 179-180) called the "Wicked Witch" image of the Red Cross. Implementation of this policy of meeting need rather than loss has sometimes appeared to disaster victims to reward the improvident and punish the prudent. Documentation of such public criticism of the Red Cross has been provided by a wide range of disaster studies over the past twenty years (Klausner and Kincaid, n.d.:31; Dulles, 1950:522-523; Marks, et. al., 1954:278; Wallace, 1956:145-146, Form and
Comparing the public image of the Red Cross with that of the Salvation Army, Stoddard (1969) has suggested that the negative image of the Red Cross in disaster relief is a latent consequence of the organization's disaster mandate. Dependent on voluntary public support to carry out its mandate, the Red Cross has stressed efficiency and accountability in the dispensing of its disaster relief funds; this bureaucratic ethos has contributed to public charges of Red Cross impersonality and publicity-seeking in the midst of human suffering and loss. A similar explanation has been offered by Barton (1969:298-301) and Taylor, et. al. (1970:110-127). "The public image of an organization," Stoddard (1969:188) concludes, "arises from the manner in which the aid is rendered, rather than the quality of relief administered."8

Two reasons for assigning responsibility for the rehabilitation phase of Red Cross disaster goals to staff of the national organization may be suggested. First, this phase of Red Cross disaster relief is typically the more

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8Plagued with this negative image, the national organization may have been prompted by it as well as by the expansion of governmentally financed programs of disaster relief to reconsider its rehabilitation goals. For a description of recent revisions in Red Cross rehabilitation goals, see the discussion of goal succession in the latter part of this chapter.
expensive. Most local chapters do not have sufficient funds to support rehabilitation programs as well as emergency mass care. Nor are disaster fund-raising campaigns always successful enough to cover the expenses of rehabilitation goals. National funds are therefore made available for this phase of disaster relief and these funds are administered directly by or under the supervision of representatives of the national organization.

A second reason for the presence of national personnel in the rehabilitation phase of disaster programs may lie in the case-work procedures which must be followed in the distribution of long-term rehabilitation funds. These procedures require intensive and detailed investigations into the victims' disaster needs and their available resources and, thus, cannot easily be carried out by local volunteer members of the Red Cross except after relatively lengthy training. In lieu of such training, national staff who are already prepared to conduct or to supervise this case-work are employed in the rehabilitation phase. Especially in the Gemeinschaft-like social environments associated

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9 Recent modifications in both the emergency mass care and rehabilitation programs of the Red Cross, especially the standardization of emergency relief and emphasis in rehabilitation on referral of victims to other agencies, may reduce the necessity of employing national staff during many disaster operations (Popkin, 1971).
with post-disaster periods (cf., Wolfenstein, 1957; Turner, 1966; Shaskolsky, n.d.), professional Red Cross staff who appear as "outsiders" and whose actions are informed by a bureaucratic ethos may be negatively evaluated by the members of a disaster-impacted community.\footnote{The sources and characteristics of this post-disaster Utopia and its effects on the operations of bureaucratic organizations like the Red Cross are developed most fully in a recent study of the 1966 Topeka, Kansas, tornado (Taylor, et. al., 1970:68-75, 165-173). Sill's (1957:220-221) study of the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis and the March of Dimes suggests an additional dimension to this explanation. Both the March of Dimes and the Red Cross are voluntary associations with corporate structures, but the volunteer members of the former frequently perceive it as a federation rather than a corporation. This frequency, Sills reports, tends to increase with the distance between the local chapter and the national headquarters in New York. In the case of the Red Cross similar patterns of selective perception may occur. Thus, the local chapter's mass care disaster relief may be perceived as the contribution of a more or less autonomous organization, while the presence of national staff in the rehabilitation phase of disaster relief may contradict this perception by effectively eliminating the distance between the local chapter and the national corporation. Such perceptions would, then, identify the Red Cross chapter as an "outside" organization rather than a "local" one. Form, et. al. (1954:46) report such a shift in public perceptions and evaluations of the Red Cross during the post-impact period in the two communities they studied. Sills (1957:207-210) reports that some volunteer members of the March of Dimes cited the allegedly "top-heavy" corporate structure of the Red Cross as a contrast to their perceptions of the local autonomy of their own organization. As we have already noted, this is a characterization of the Red Cross which has been documented in much of the literature on the Red Cross in natural disasters.}

Additional information on the rehabilitation goals of the Red Cross disaster relief program will be provided in the course of this study, particularly when these goals
impinge on the mass care goals, disaster structure, and emergency operations of the local unit of the organization.

The Emergency Mass Care Goals of the Local Chapter of the Red Cross

As we have seen primary responsibility for the rehabilitation phase of Red Cross disaster goals lies with the staff of the national organization. The corresponding responsibility for the emergency mass care phase of these goals lies with the staff and volunteer members of the local Red Cross chapter. All chapters are required to establish disaster preparedness programs and to train their members in disaster relief skills, especially in those useful during the immediate post-impact period. Four major goals and a number of supporting goals are defined by the Red Cross as the primary responsibilities of the local chapter during this period. The major service goals are the provision of emergency food, shelter, clothing, and medical and nursing care. The support goals are necessary for the successful accomplishment of these major emergency services. These support goals include the conducting of a disaster fund-raising campaign, providing public information about the disaster, and maintaining equipment and supply services. In addition, the chapter is to make a disaster survey, determining the extent and severity of the damage, and to provide emergency communications and transportation facilities. These mass care goals, including both the major service goals and the supporting goals, are summarized in Table 1.
### TABLE 1
DISASTER SERVICE AND SUPPORT GOALS OF THE
LOCAL RED CROSS CHAPTER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Service Goals</th>
<th>Support Goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Food</td>
<td>6. Disaster Fund Raising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Clothing</td>
<td>7. Public Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Shelter</td>
<td>8. Disaster Surveyb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Medical and Nursing Service</td>
<td>9. Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Family Servicea</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Description:**
- **Major Service Goals**
  - **1. Food**: Provision of food for both victims and disaster workers, including immediate emergency feeding at the scene of the disaster, refreshment services at places where refugees congregate, mass feeding in shelters, and the delivery of food to isolated persons.
  - **2. Clothing**: Handling and disbursement of donated clothing.
  - **3. Shelter**: Provision of temporary shelter, if possible with relatives, friends, or neighbors; if necessary, in public shelters operated by the Red Cross.
  - **4. Medical and Nursing Service**: Provision of medical and nursing care in all Red Cross operated shelters, in emergency first-aid stations, and provision of blood as required.
  - **5. Family Servicea**: Provision of assistance to individuals and families by describing available sources of aid and by insuring that welfare communications are answered.

**Support Goals**
- **6. Disaster Fund Raising**: Development and management of disaster fund campaign.
- **7. Public Information**: Inform both victims and public of Red Cross disaster activities.
- **8. Disaster Surveyb**: Assessment in general terms of the size and type of disaster with an estimation of the necessary mobilization and performance required of the chapter.
- **9. Communications**: Establishment and maintenance of communication and transportationb among all Red Cross facilities.
TABLE 1—Continued

| 10. Equipment and Supplies | Coordination of procurement, storage, and distribution of Red Cross equipment and supplies. |

^aThe "Family Service" goal of the local chapter identifies responsibilities which overlap with the goals of the rehabilitation phase of Red Cross disaster relief.

^bRed Cross disaster manuals (American National Red Cross:1966a:29-30; 51-54) include survey, communications, and transportation under the rubric of disaster "service" goals. For the purposes of this study it seemed more useful to restrict that term to those goals which directly "serve" disaster victims and workers. Thus, they are here considered "support goals".
By comparison with the individual-centered casework policies governing the allocation of rehabilitation funds, the policies effective during the mass care phase of Red Cross disaster relief are relatively simple and standardized. Victims of the disaster are eligible for immediate assistance from the Red Cross on the basis of a statement of need; such assistance is provided in standard amounts for all disaster victims. Although the standardization of mass care services is a recent development in the Red Cross, the mass care policies of the organization have differed significantly from those of the rehabilitation phase for many years. Moore (1958:101-102; 179-180) reported that the public image of the local Red Cross during its immediate post-impacted phase contrasted sharply with the subsequent "Wicked Witch" image. The former he dubbed the "Great Mother" image, an epithet which suggests that dis-

11 The American Red Cross (1971b:3) defines "standardized immediate assistance" as follows:

By immediate assistance is meant provision, on the first contact with the family, of those items that are essential to enable the family to resume living as a family unit. By standardized is meant that the assistance provided on that first contact will be the same in each category [of assistance] for every person. For example, if a family of four needs food it will receive the same amount of assistance for food as every other family of four.

These definitions reflect recent changes in Red Cross disaster procedures; see the discussion of goal succession in this chapter.
aster victims have been appreciative of the local Red Cross chapter's largesse even if they have, in contrast, been critical of the national organization's rehabilitation policies.

Although the Red Cross chapter is required to pursue the same service and support goals in every disaster operation, their particular content will vary from chapter to chapter. This variation is in part a function of the differences in available resources among local chapters, but it is also a function of the variability of disasters themselves. Disasters are not alike, hence, the goals of the local chapters must be flexible to fit the range of possible disaster environments. Four types of disaster environments have been identified by Carr (1932): (1) instantaneous-focalized, (2) instantaneous-diffuse, (3) progressive-focalized, and (4) progressive-diffuse. The form that the service and support goals of the local chapter of the Red Cross take in two of these environments will suggest the flexibility of these goals.12

12Given the purpose of this study, it seem unnecessary to discuss the goals of the Red Cross chapter in all four types; types (1) and (4) will be used to illustrate the flexibility and variation of Red Cross disaster goals. For a discussion of variations in organizational response to all four types, see Dynes (1969).
Mass Care Goals in Instantaneous-Focalized Disasters

Some disasters impact with little or no period of warning. Such "instantaneous" disasters as tornadoes and explosions do not allow extensive pre-impact mobilization of workers or evacuation of potential victims. Frequently—although not always—such disasters are of a limited or "focalized" scope: the impacted area is relatively clearly defined. Tornadoes, for example, normally do not inflict physical damage on an entire community.

The need-not-loss policy of Red Cross disaster relief assumes that victims should be encouraged to make use of their own resources, interpersonal, physical, and financial, and should accept Red Cross relief only when these other resources are unavailable. Refugees are therefore encouraged by the Red Cross to seek emergency shelter, food, and clothing from relatives, neighbors, and friends who are nearby and have not been directly affected by the impact. Aid from these sources is most likely to be available following focalized disasters in which persons temporarily homeless are able to find shelter with other members of the community, thus relieving the Red Cross chapter of the necessity of opening public shelters. Normally, when such private sources of disaster relief are available, refugees need little encouragement to seek them out (Klausner and Kincaid, n.d.:31-42; Young, 1954:388-391; Quarantelli, 1960:263-264; Barton, 1969:
Red Cross personnel will, however, assist in this search.

Although public shelters in these disaster may not be required for refugees, the instantaneous impact of the disaster may require that "shelter" be available for rescue and clean-up workers. Because tornadoes, for example, cannot be prepared for in the same sense that hurricanes can, facilities for feeding and sheltering rescue workers must be provided ad hoc. Red Cross chapters frequently take on this responsibility. Whether or not these workers are Red Cross volunteers, they can receive Red Cross mass care. Such was the case in a metropolitan suburb impacted by tornadoes. All disaster refugees found temporary shelter, but policemen, firemen, and other rescue workers were provided food and shelter by the Red Cross chapter during the emergency period. For several days after the impact, this Red Cross "shelter" provided hot meals for some six thousand workers. The same chapter also assumed responsibility for feeding the National Guard troops cordonning off the impacted area.

In contrast to the changing form of the Red Cross chapter's food and shelter services, its Family Service is a disaster goal that tends to take the same form in all emergencies. Welfare inquiries from the relatives and friends of persons living in the stricken area always follow the news
of impact and, although the Red Cross chapter is not the only organization to which such inquiries are directed, it does receive many of them. Case workers and volunteers in the Service to Military Families unit of the local chapter normally take these inquiries and, through the refugee registration lists compiled by the chapter and the hospitals and through the coroner's report, attempt to answer all of them.

In addition to the convergence of welfare messages, disasters invariably produce a convergence of donated household items. Clothing is most frequently contributed. Again, the Red Cross chapter is not the only organization subject to this convergence, but it does receive many of these gifts and undertakes their sorting and distribution. Local units of the Red Cross and the Salvation Army are the organizations most often engaged in this disaster task. Analysis of disaster convergence behavior (Fritz and Mathewson, 1957) suggests that the convergence of unsolicited gifts, volunteer workers, sight-seers, and demands for information is a characteristic of the post-impact period of all disasters. The demands made by all disasters, however, are not the same;

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13 The Red Cross disaster manual (1966a:33-34) offers this advice for dealing with clothing convergence: Unsolicited gifts of used clothing begin to arrive almost with the first news of a disaster, and plans must be made for the receipt, storage, and distribution of the appropriate serviceable donated items. It is seldom necessary to make an appeal for clothing.
in instantaneous-focalized disasters, for example, donated clothing is sometimes virtually useless. Its storage and distribution may create problems for the Red Cross chapter rather than contribute to the successful achievement of its disaster goals. In one community disaster, for example, clothing donated to the Red Cross for distribution to victims had accumulated until it filled an entire warehouse. As there was no significant demand for this clothing among the refugees, the problem was what to do with it. Outright destruction of this clothing seemed to one Red Cross member an unacceptable option, yet at the time there seemed few other alternatives.

All Red Cross relief operations are preceded by a survey of the disaster. This survey provides a basis for estimating the probable scope of the chapter's participation in the emergency operation, suggesting not only the mass care services the chapter will have to provide, but also the support necessary to facilitate these services. Demands on the communications and transportation systems and on the chapter's equipment and supply resources can be roughly estimated from an initial survey. In Chapter Three of this study the analysis of the mobilization of the Red Cross chapter will provide additional information on these support goals.

The accuracy of the disaster survey and the availability of adequate communications, transportation, equipment, and
supplies are all directly related to the capability of the Red Cross chapter to achieve its mass care goals. Two other support goals, by comparison, are somewhat more indirectly related to the major service goals of the Red Cross chapter. The public information goals of the chapter in disaster relief are

\[
\text{to interpret the needs of disaster victims and the role of the Red Cross in meeting these needs to the community or communities affected and to the public at large (American National Red Cross, 1963b:Chapter 5:3-4).}
\]

The release of this information contributes to the public image of the organization in disasters, positive or negative, and thus may affect the willingness of the public to support the Red Cross disaster goals and contribute to its disaster fund-raising campaigns. On fund-raising itself, the Red Cross disaster manual (1963b:Chapter 5:16) states:

\[
\text{The occurrence of a disaster results in spontaneous activity on the part of the affected and nearby communities. This activity principally consists of direct relief measures, such as donations of food and clothing and contributions of funds....Providing an opportunity for people to contribute funds for the relief of disaster victims is an essential part of a disaster relief operation.}
\]

When such special campaigns do not raise sufficient funds to cover the costs of the disaster operations, both local chapter disaster funds and disaster monies from the national organization are utilized to support the program. Local mass care goals, therefore, are not completely dependent on the success of the local chapter's fund-raising campaign.
Mass Care Goals in Progressive-Diffuse Disasters

Disasters like floods and hurricanes are likely to impact an area after a relatively extended warning period. Frequently their effects are felt over a very large geographical area. Their impact, in these senses, is both "progressive" and "diffuse" (Carr, 1932). Goals undertaken by the Red Cross chapter during the pre- and post-impact periods of such disasters differ in some respects from those associated with instantaneous-focalized disasters, but these differences stem from variations in the disaster environment, not from any basic alterations in the goals of the organization.

When a pre-impact warning period permits the evacuation of persons threatened by the disaster, the Red Cross chapter may participate in this evacuation, but the organization assumes no official responsibility for the successful completion of this goal. Authority in this operation resides with other agencies, frequently the local Civil Defense organization.\footnote{Because evacuation of persons threatened by the impact of disaster is a governmental responsibility, the Red Cross chapter cannot assume authority to enforce evacuation of disaster-affected individuals or families. The Red Cross disaster manual (1963b:Chapter 1:3) states: The Red Cross supports and assists the work of the government and authorities in alleviating the distress caused by disasters, but does not assume responsibility for governmental function.} Red Cross chapter headquarters, however, are sometimes subjected to requests from the public...
for assistance in evacuation, but these requests are normally referred to the local Civil Defense. In one city chapter preparing for the impact of a hurricane, Red Cross staff assigned to telephone inquiry during the warning period were certain from the volume of calls and from their content that someone had mistakenly issued a statement that the Red Cross was in charge of evacuation. Although the public confusion which resulted was never completely cleared up, the division of labor between the Red Cross and the Civil Defense was reasserted.

The major goal which the Red Cross chapter officially undertakes during the warning period preceding a progressive-diffuse disaster is the provision of shelter and food for those persons expected to be temporarily homeless. Providing this service is the principle operational difference between focalized and diffuse disasters for the Red Cross chapter. Unlike focalized disasters, diffuse disasters dis-

15 That Red Cross chapter personnel sometimes overlook the differences between focalized and diffuse disasters is noted by Barton (1969:194): The American Red Cross has a notable record of providing mass shelter for evacuated flood victims in the great river-valley floods.... When tornado disasters struck Beecher, Worcester, and other areas, the Red Cross tended to think of the evacuees as needing mass shelter. In the tornado disasters such mass shelter was invariably almost unused by victims, although it sometimes served later as quarters for imported rescue and cleanup workers.

locate so many persons over so broad an area that all af­
fected persons cannot find temporary food and shelter with
relatives, friends, or neighbors. Under these disaster
conditions, the Red Cross chapter is responsible, by the
organization's interpretation of its charter mandate, for
the operation of public shelters. During the warning pe­
period, therefore, the goals of the Red Cross chapter are to
alert employed staff and voluntary personnel who manage or
assist in the management of these shelters, to assure that
these shelters are stocked with the necessary food and
other supplies, and to inform the public as well as other
disaster-related organizations of the location of these
shelters.

For the duration of the emergency mass care phase of
these diffuse disaster operations, the major service goals
of the Red Cross chapter are those mandatory goals defined
by the organization's charter: to prevent and mitigate the
sufferings caused by disaster. Thus, the provision of shel­
ter, food, clothing, and nursing and medical care for the
victims of disaster are the unique responsibilities of the
Red Cross chapter, regardless of the particularities of a
disaster environment. The Federal Disaster Relief Act of
1970 delegates over-all coordination of disaster operations
to the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP), but in its
published statements (cited in American National Red Cross,
n.d.,b:2) on implementation of this Act, the OEP specifically recognizes the chartered obligations of the Red Cross chapter:

The disaster relief capabilities of the American National Red Cross shall be utilized to the maximum extent in accordance with the Memorandum of understanding between the OEP [and the American National Red Cross]. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to limit or in any way affect the responsibilities of the American National Red Cross as stated in Public Law 58-4, approved January 5, 1905 (33 Stat. 599).

In metropolitan areas repeatedly subjected to hurricanes or floods, the operation of public shelters can be an enormous undertaking. The support goals required to sustain a dozen or more public shelters over several days are necessarily large-scale as well. Conducting a disaster survey over a large area, maintaining communications between many shelters and the chapter headquarters, acquiring and transporting supplies to these shelters are themselves major responsibilities. Portions of Chapters Three and Four of this study will focus on Red Cross chapters' activities as their members seek to implement these mass care support goals.

In such diffuse disasters public information and fund-raising goals remain essentially the same as in focalized disasters. Such differences as may occur tend to be in the scope of these support goals. Public interest in and response to progressive-diffuse disasters, given the pre-impact suspense and the large areas affected, is likely to be more
national than local; the responsibilities of public information and fund-raising personnel are to that extent likely to be expanded.

Summary

The American Red Cross has been a disaster-relief organization since its founding in 1881. Since that time—in an increasing volume of operations—Red Cross chapters have responded to literally thousands of disasters (Smith, 1957: 120). These operations have been conducted in addition to the organization's mandatory war-related activities. Although disaster relief policies and procedures have been modified over the years, the basic goals of the organization have not changed: they remain the provision of emergency shelter, food, clothing, and medical care for victims of disasters and the provision, when necessary, of long-term rehabilitation grants for disaster victims who lack sufficient personal resources or who do not qualify for other public assistance.

During its ninety-year history, however, the Red Cross and its local chapters have taken on a number of permissive or non-mandatory goals as its social environment has been altered by major economic and political events. In the following sections of this chapter, these permissive goals and their succession will be described.
The Permissive Goals of the Red Cross Chapter

Certain non-disaster goals of the Red Cross chapter are "permissive" in the sense that they are neither mandated by the congressional charter of the organization nor does the national organization require that the local chapter initiate programs associated with these goals. Rather the local chapter undertakes such goals on its own perogative, the services it offers being determined by the available resources of the chapter and the needs of its community. Thus Red Cross chapters vary considerably in their involvement in these permissive goals. Large city chapters may establish programs in all of these services and employ professional staff to coordinate them; small town and rural chapters, on the other hand, may participate to a lesser extent, if at all, in these permissive goals. Five such goals are defined by the American National Red Cross (cf., 1971a: 6-23); they are summarized in Table 2.

Nursing Activities and Safety Activities are included under the Red Cross rubric, Community Health and Safety Programs. The first of these permissive goals—Nursing Activities—includes educational programs in home nursing, mother and baby care, disaster nursing, and the training of mother's aides; Safety Activities include, among other programs, the conducting of classes in first aid, water safety, and small craft operations. A third permissive goal of the Red Cross chapter is the Youth Service Activities which include the
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<td>PERMISSIVE GOALS OF THE LOCAL RED CROSS CHAPTER</td>
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1. Nursing Activities
Courses in home care of the sick and in mother and baby care are offered. Local chapters also keep rosters of professional nurses who are willing to do volunteer work, and provide student nurses with opportunities to engage in community service. Over one thousand Red Cross chapters have programs in home nursing, for example.

2. Safety Activities
These goals include public instruction in water safety, small craft operations, and first aid, as well as programs related to highway safety, such as the maintenance of mobile first-aid units. Twenty-five hundred Red Cross chapters participate in the first aid and water safety programs.

3. Youth Service Activities
Programs are designed for primary and secondary school students in which they participate in local, national, and international relief operations of the Red Cross. College programs recruit and train students to assist in chapter activities.

4. International Relations
Local chapters may participate in the international program of the American National Red Cross which includes the provision of relief supplies and technical assistance, prisoner-of-war programs, and the maintenance of an international inquiry service to locate missing persons.

5. Blood Program
several programs conducted by the Red Cross in primary and secondary schools. Children receive Red Cross magazines and contribute to "friendship boxes" and "school chests" which are shipped abroad by the Red Cross. International Relations is a fourth permissive goal of the Red Cross chapter; this program is carried out through the local and the national levels of the organization and includes such activities as exchange programs between American and foreign chapters and international search programs for persons dislocated by wars and other calamities.

The Blood Program, the fifth of these permissive goals, involves a nation-wide network of collection, storage, and distribution centers maintained by the national Red Cross organization. More than half of the Red Cross chapters take part in this program by serving as centers for the collection of blood from voluntary donors. Unlike chapter participation in other of the permissive goals of the Red Cross, participation in the Blood Program must be coordinated directly by the national organization. The professional and technical staff required for the program and the necessity of integrating each of its elements into the larger system precludes unilateral participation by local chapters.

The Succession of Permissive Goals in the Red Cross

Of the social variables which influence the setting of
goals in complex organizations, the environment in which
the organization is located is of particular importance to
this analysis. If organizational goals are viewed as
variables rather than constants, then goal-setting may be
understood as the on-going interaction of the organization
with its social environment. This is the perspective
suggested by Thompson and McEwen (1961:177): "Because the
setting of goals," they write,

is essentially a problem of defining relation­ships between an organization and its environ­ment, change in either requires review and
perhaps alteration of goals. Even where the
most abstract statement of goals remains con­stant, application requires redefinition or
interpretation as changes occur in the organ­ization, the environment, or both.

16 Goal-setting, logically, is affected by both in­ternal and external variables (cf., Blau and Meyer, 1971:
108-109; Etzioni, 1961a:265-266; Hage and Aiken, 1971:
72ff). We shall be more concerned in this analysis with
the external environmental variables. Relevant internal
variables have been identified in the literature on goal
displacement, i.e., the tendency of employees to maximize
job security by translating organizational means into
(1963:246-249), however, has suggested that job security
may have the opposite effect, that of promoting goal suc­cession. Other internal variables which may affect goal­setting include the organization's compliance structures
(Etzioni, 1961a), conflicts of interest between the pro­fessional staff and the organization's trustees (Perrow,
1961), the age of the organization (Starbuck, 1965), the
technologies of the organization (Perrow, 1967), and the
diversification of organizational products and hetero­geneity of its members (Hage and Aiken, 1971). Sills
(1968), treating organizational goals as independent
rather than dependent variables, suggests a relationship
between the degree of institutionalization and the ratio
of professional to lay members in the organization, and
the goals of a voluntary organization.
They suggest, therefore, that the more unstable the environment and the more intangible and difficult to measure the organization's products, the more likely is periodic reappraisal and adjustment of these organizational goals (1961:178-179). Hage and Aiken (1971:72-72) suggest that such an organizational-environmental relationship constitutes a "dynamic" model of organizations in contrast to the "static" model in which "relations between an organization and the environment reach some degree of stability." In their analysis of organizational change, internal complexity (in the sense, for example, of a high degree of occupational diversity within the organization) is the "triggering mechanism" for the development of the dynamic style, but an unstable relationship between the

Two interpretations, both in the functional mode, of such periodic goal-reappraisals are possible (Etzioni, 1960; 1961a:78-79): on the one hand, they may be seen as survival requirements; on the other, as attempts to increase the effectiveness of the organization in serving its goals. Thompson and McEwen's interpretation suggests that goal-reappraisal is necessary for the organization to exist at all (1961:180); studies of voluntary associations which have virtually disappeared or declined significantly as a consequence of an inability or unwillingness to adjust to environmental change lend credence to this interpretation (Messinger, 1955; Gusfield, 1955; 1957; cf., Sills, 1957; 1968). Both Etzioni (1960; 1961a) and Perrow (1968), however, have criticized this interpretation on the grounds that it may be misleading (Perrow, 1968:305-306), theoretically unproductive (Etzioni, 1961a:78-79), or logically tautological (Perrow, 1968:307). They favor an effectiveness interpretation in which goal-adjustment is seen as an organization's attempt to improve its goal-serving capabilities. Hage and Aiken's (1971) analysis of organizational change suggests the same interpretation. In the discussion of the succession of goals in the Red Cross chapter, we shall follow this latter interpretation.
organization and its environment, they suggest, tends to make this organization style more probable.

We have argued that the variable of complexity is likely to be the triggering mechanism that leads to the dynamic organizational model. But given stable and nonchanging relationships between the organization and its environment, then the dynamics...will less likely occur.... But given conditions other than a static equilibrium between the organization and its environment, the process that grows out of organizational complexity is likely to occur. (Hage and Aiken, 1971:81-82).

In the following sketch of goal succession in the Red Cross, this organizational-environmental dynamic will serve as the theoretical context.18

The unique position of the American National Red Cross as the only officially recognized voluntary disaster relief organization has informed, perhaps more than any other factor, the sometimes uneasy relationship between the organization and its social environment. The major adjustments of the Red Cross to its environment, which have taken the form of added permissive goals, have coincided with demobilization after the organization's wartime efforts to fulfill its charter obligations to the members of the nation's military. In order to cope with its drastically reduced responsibilities, yet retain the enthusiasm generated by

18All information in the following two sections of this study is derived from Dulles (1950).
the war-time effort, the Red Cross has added during the post-World War I and post-World War II periods a number of non-disaster, permissive goals.

**Post-World War I Goals**

The Congressional Charter of 1905, which replaced the first Red Cross charter of five years earlier, was itself a response to post-war changes in the organization's environment. Charges of inefficiency and financial mismanagement of Red Cross operations in the Spanish-American War led to the attempt, in the 1905 charter, to clarify the purposes of the Red Cross and to guarantee, through annual governmental review of the organization's financial records, reasonable assurances that the administration of the Red Cross was conscientious in its stewardship of its voluntary funds. Further, Dulles (1950:78-79) suggests that the broadening of the services of the Red Cross which the 1905 charter recommended was consistent with the national emphasis on "bigness": "In an age of big business--of increasing bigness in every economic and social activity--the American National Red Cross was also to become big."

Measured by the increase in paid employees of the Red Cross, the organization had become by 1919 almost one-hundred times bigger than it had been even five years earlier (Dulles, 1950:215). This expansion was, of course, largely a consequence of the massive activities of the Red Cross in World War I, but, prompted by its new charter and, per-
haps, by the idea of bigness, the organization's charac-
ter had begun to change even prior to the war. Between
1909 and 1914 four permissive goals had been added by the
organization: the home nursing and first aid service in
1909, the rural nursing service in 1912, and, in 1914, the
water safety program (Dulles, 1950:96-100). In 1917 a
fifth permissive goal was added, the Junior Red Cross
(Dulles, 1950:169). To these changes were added the spec-
tacular increases in personnel during World War I, not only
in paid staff but in volunteer members as well: by the end
of the war volunteer members numbered more than twenty mil-
lion. At the same time the aggregate worth of the organi-
zation was $127 million (Dulles, 1950:223).

The post-World War I question, then, was whether the
Red Cross was to return to its prewar status, limiting its
goals to disaster relief and military-related welfare ac-
tivities, or to continue on an increasingly national scale
its more or less tentative prewar expansion into non-dis-
aster goals. A survey questionnaire addressed to this ques-
tion was distributed to all local chapters in 1919. Its
returns were somewhat disheartening, especially for those
members of the national organization who were dedicated to
the expansion of the organization's goals: in effect, chap-
ter response was that the Red Cross should "give its mem-
ers a rest" (Dulles, 1950:217-218). National officers,
Dulles (1950:218) comments, were "discouraged but not dis-
There was a natural desire on their part to see the American Red Cross maintain its position and still broaden its field of usefulness, not only for the sake of whatever contributions could be made toward improving the conditions of American life, but for the sake of the organization itself. (emphasis added)

The extent to which the post-war succession of Red Cross goals was a move to increase the effectiveness of the organization itself is difficult now to determine; some circumstantial evidence, however, can be submitted. The first professional chairman of the national Red Cross, Dr. Livingston Farrand, came to the organization in 1919 personally acquainted with the needs of the nation in the areas of public health and social welfare (Dulles, 1950:216-217). That these two areas would become the foci of the post-war expansion of the Red Cross is a datum that may not be altogether gratuitous. Additionally, although the national organization drastically reduced its number of paid personnel after the war--by 1922 the number was cut by fully two-thirds (Dulles, 1950:232)--the number never declined to the prewar level. The presence in the organization of a variety of professionals in significant numbers and strategically placed in the decision-making bodies contributed to the heterogeneity of the Red Cross and may itself have increased the tendency of the organization to diversify its goals (cf., Blau, 1963; Hage and Aiken, 1971).
Finally, the practical benefits that goal succession would likely bring to the organization could be identified by any official familiar with the disastrous results of the 1919-1920 Red Cross drive for funds and members: less than three-fifths of the financial goal was reached and membership declined by over fifty percent (Dulles, 1950:225).

Opposition to any new goals came from critics inside and outside the organization and the issues, pro and con, were debated well into the decade of the 1920's. Nonetheless, in 1919 the Red Cross officially added to its goals a national public health program, a service which had been presaged by the home nursing and rural nursing services begun before the war. The program was to be implemented at the local chapter level and included the establishment of community health centers, the development of public health nursing, classes in home hygiene and care of the sick, and education in nutrition. In the same year, the national organization endorsed the Civilian Home Service, a social welfare program which, like the public health goal, had a limited precedent in Red Cross experience. In this case it was the military welfare work which the organization had performed during World War I. The Civilian Home Service was an extension of Red Cross welfare activities to the non-military population (Dulles, 1950:221-222).

Local chapters of the Red Cross were encouraged to par-
ticipate in these programs and the national organization was prepared to offer whatever assistance it could, but local chapters were to exercise considerable autonomy in determining what their community health and welfare goals would be (Dulles, 1950:220). The purpose of these new permissive programs, beyond their direct benefit to American society, was, according to a spokesman for the Red Cross, to make the organization something more "than a drowsy giant to be aroused only by fire, sword, storm and flood--acts of God, war and pestilence" (Dulles, 1950:210). The answer to the post-World War I question was, then, that the Red Cross would not return to its prewar form, but that it would continue to add non-disaster goals to its organization.

Post-World War II Goals

The depression of the 1930's--itself a progressive-diffuse disaster--and the federal government's response to the severe economic crisis undercut, almost completely, the need for the permissive goals accepted by the post-World War I Red Cross. As New Deal programs in welfare and public health were enacted, the Red Cross withdrew from these areas. At the same time the incursions of government into disaster relief began to raise serious questions about the sanctity of even the mandatory goals of the Red Cross (Dulles, 1950:322). Adjustments in its disaster program, prompted by these environmental changes, will be described in the
The post-World War II goal additions, however, were generated, like those of World War I, by the demobilization of Red Cross war efforts rather than by the expansion of governmental services. As in 1919, the Red Cross found itself in the post-war 1940's in a situation which Cyert and March (cited in Perrow, 1968:309) have called "organizational slack": a situation in which a surplus of resources--funds, information, personnel, or material--in the organization is "taken up" by accepting goals which under other less prosperous conditions the organization would not be able to afford. The blood donor program, begun during the war on a local chapter permissive basis, was redefined after the war as a national goal of the Red Cross. The new program was to be administered by the national organization, the local chapters and their volunteers subject to its control in policy and procedure (Dulles, 1950:530). The purposes of the new goal were several, meeting both the needs of the country and of the organization itself (Dulles, 1950:528-529).

Apart from meeting a very real need, the national blood program also appeared the best possible thing for the Red Cross to undertake on its own account. Just as health activities had been promoted after the First World War to give the chapters something to do as well as to advance public health, so the new project was expected to provide an outlet for volunteer activity in the new period of peace which would bring together, in one unified undertaking, the varied
interests of the volunteer services. Nor were the public relations aspects of the program ignored. It was described as providing the means to meet a "continuing day-to-day emergency" which would develop into an activity "that would be constant and thus keep the Red Cross continuously in the minds of those upon whom it depends for support."

Here was a goal, then, to replace the World War I public health and welfare goals lost to the government in the 1930's, which did not appear likely to overlap with future governmental services and which, at the same time, was consistent with the traditional ideals of the Red Cross. The consequences of the succession of this new goal for the organization were to increase the influence and the fund-raising potential of the Red Cross in a peace-time environment (Sills, 1968:371).

Recent Modifications in Red Cross Goals

The federal government, however, has expanded into other areas of the organizational domain of the Red Cross and these expansions have disrupted the organization's environment to the extent that goal adjustments, if not succession, have been necessary. The adjustments described do not constitute goal succession. They are important enough, however, to the disaster programs of the Red Cross to warrant attention and, because they appear to be largely a response to the organization's changing environment, they are considered here.
ment has increased significantly the relief and rehabilitation resources it makes available to disaster victims. The Disaster Relief Acts of 1969 and 1970 (Public Laws 91-79 and 91-606) have made available, among other benefits, low cost loans, granted on the basis of loss, from the Small Business Administration and the Farmers Home Administration; surplus commodities and food stamps through the Department of Agriculture; disaster unemployment insurance through the Department of Labor; flood-insurance subsidized by the federal government; and emergency housing through the Department of Housing and Urban Development (American National Red Cross, n.d.,b:passim).

By its charter the Red Cross cannot surrender its disaster relief and rehabilitation mandate to other organizations as it could its permissive goals of public health and welfare. Nonetheless this recent legislation authorized the federal government to engage in disaster relief activities. Thus an organizational problem had been created which the Red Cross had foreseen as early as the 1930's and the 1940's. The response of the organization to this problem has been to retain its chartered goals while modifying its disaster policies and procedures.

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20A 1946 Red Cross publication includes the following statement (Dulles, 1950:523):
The Red Cross cannot relinquish to Government the responsibility placed on it by Congressional Charter; however, it should welcome the co-operation and assistance of Government in meeting its responsibilities.
Certain modifications in the emergency mass care procedures of the Red Cross have already been discussed; the standardization of mass care services were described in the section dealing with the disaster goals of the local Red Cross chapter. In addition, a recent Red Cross publication (n.d.b:2-3) indicates that this phase of disaster relief has been modified by a number of other procedural changes: increased attention is paid to the identification of Red Cross facilities and personnel; greater cooperation is sought with other voluntary relief organizations; and more effective Red Cross operations are possible by assigning larger numbers of staff even, according to the Red Cross, to the point of over-staffing. A logistics officer has been added to the disaster staff to ensure that available resources are utilized most effectively.

In the rehabilitation phase of its disaster operations, Red Cross modifications have emphasized the somewhat new function of the organization as a referral rather than a dispensing agency. A recent Red Cross statement (1971b: n.p.) on its disaster relief policies describes this change in emphasis:

The Red Cross...helps domestic disaster victims needing additional long-term recovery assistance to utilize all available resources so that they can resume living in keeping with acceptable standards of health, safety, and human dignity. Such resources include those of the family as well as those of federal, state, and local agencies with disaster loan or grant programs.
or such sustaining programs that would benefit the victims.

Individuals and families who do not qualify for such aid or who are victims of disaster for which no Presidential Disaster Declaration has been issued (a Declaration is necessary to release many of the federal funds) will be eligible, on the basis of need, for long-term rehabilitation aid directly from the Red Cross. The basic rehabilitation goals of the Red Cross, thus, have remained unaltered; new governmental programs, however, have removed much of the responsibility for long-term disaster rehabilitation from the Red Cross. The effects of these changes can be measured by the reduction in the amount of average Red Cross assistance to disaster-affected families: in the 1955 Eastern states floods the average was over $1,100; after hurricane Celia in 1970, the average was slightly over $350 (American National Red Cross, n.d.,b.:2).

Summary

The history of the American National Red Cross and of its local chapters is in part a series of adaptations to a changing environment. The changes in both post-World War I and post-World War II environments were countered by the succession of a series of permissive, non-disaster goals: the public health and welfare goals of the 1920's and the blood donor program of the 1940's. More recent modifications in the disaster procedures of the Red Cross and its
chapters, while not altering the basic charter-defined goals of the organization, have nonetheless been adaptations to a changing relationship between the Red Cross and other organizations in its environment, notably the federal government.

The effect of the succession of permissive goals in the Red Cross has been to transform it into an organization with multiple goals. On the one hand, it possesses a set of mandatory goals set by an external collectivity, the United States Congress (cf., Etzioni, 1961a:265); on the other hand, the organization has, in response to changes in its environment, set a number of permissive goals for itself. In Chapter Three of this study we shall consider the structural consequences of these multiple goals for the Red Cross chapter.
CHAPTER III
NORMAL AND DISASTER STRUCTURES
IN THE RED CROSS CHAPTER

The structure of an organization can be understood as the patterns of differentiation and coordination (or compliance) which emerge as the members seek the goals of the organization. These goals, as we have seen in Chapter Two, may be set by agencies outside the organization or by the organization itself as it defines and redefines its "niche" in a changing environment, i.e., as it seeks to identify its clientele and its work (Zald, 1970: 50-51). Organizational goals, therefore, may be analyzed as dependent variables, subject to the effects of extra- and intra-organizational forces (Perrow, 1968:310); this was our position in Chapter Two. On the other hand, organizational goals may be analyzed as independent variables, constraining and directing the activities of members of the organization and contributing, thus, to the orderliness and predictability of organizational behavior. In this

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21 See, for example, Zald (1962) in which three types of goals---"custodial", "mixed", and "treatment"---are used to predict the control structures of correctional organizations. Organizational goals may also be understood in this sense as institutionalized symbols, experienced by the
chapter we shall view the multiple organizational goals of the Red Cross chapter from this perspective. The normal and disaster structures of the Red Cross chapter may then be viewed as the means by which the members of the organization seek the goals of the chapter.

In the first part of this discussion we shall consider the "normal" or non-disaster structure of the Red Cross as a means by which staff and volunteer members of the organization seek to perform the chapter's permissive or non-disaster goals. In the second part of this discussion we shall describe the mobilization of the chapter's members as they seek to perform the mandatory disaster goals of the Red Cross chapter.

The Normal Structure of the Red Cross Chapter

Before describing the internal structure of the Red Cross chapter, its place in the national organization will be briefly outlined. This outline will locate the chapter in its own larger corporate environment. The American National Red Cross is a four-level corporation composed of the national office, four area (or regional) offices, a number of chapter divisions, and the local chapters themselves.

members of the organization as real "social facts" which make it possible for members to account for their own and other members' organizational behavior. See Silverman (1970:126-146) for a discussion of this phenomenological approach to organizational analysis.
The national office is the policy-making level of the Red Cross. Under the direction of a fifty-man Board of Governors (thirty of whom are elected by chapter members), the national officers are responsible for defining the policies and procedures which will apply to all Red Cross chapters and operations. In addition, the national office maintains financial control of the organization and is a source of administrative and technical advice and guidance which reach the local chapters through the professional staff of the four area offices (American National Red Cross, 1971b:n.p.).

The area offices of the Red Cross serve local chapters by providing assistance in normal and disaster situations. Under the direction of the area manager, area staff—known as "field representatives"—advise local chapters in establishing and maintaining both mandatory and permissive programs. Area staff are also responsible for interpreting national Red Cross policy to local chapters and may serve as arbitrators when internal difficulties threaten the effectiveness of chapters. Unlike the national office and the local chapter, the area office does not typically include volunteer personnel, either as workers or as members of boards of directors. There is, however, a volunteer advisory council at this level of the organization. Its function is not that of a policy-making body; rather, it
is to act as a medium of communication among the local chapters, the area office, and the national organization. Area offices, thus, interpret policy to the local chapter and communicate the interests and concerns of the chapters to the national organization. Area personnel are, in this sense, "staff" not "line": only in some disaster operations do area staff exercise authority over staff or volunteer members of the local chapter.

The division is a third level of administrative structure in the American Red Cross. It is described by the national organization (1971b:n.p.) as "a group of chapters organized to facilitate providing uniform services throughout a large area." The organization of all chapters into divisions is as yet incomplete; the Red Cross plans, however, that every local chapter will ultimately be located in a divisional structure (American National Red Cross, 1971b:n.p.).

According to the national organization (cited in Dulles, 1950:324), the chapter is

the local unit of the Red Cross...responsible for all local activities of the Red Cross within its territory, subject to the policies and regulations of the national organization.

Like the national organization, the local chapter is governed by a volunteer board; unlike the area offices, its activities are in the main carried out by volunteer workers; and, like both the national and the area offices, it is supported
entirely by voluntary donations (American National Red Cross, 1964:n.p.). Red Cross chapters were to be estab­lished on a county basis according to the original plan, but the enthusiasms for Red Cross work generated by World War I led to the founding in a number of counties of multiple chapters. Although this proliferation of chapters did not continue, neither have many of the chapters so established disappeared. Indeed, Dulles (1950:324-326) reports that the total number of chapters in the nation remained remarkably stable for many years, even while total membership fluctuated greatly. Divisional coor­dination of activities among neighboring chapters has led to some centralization but, as was indicated, such inter­chapter coordination is not yet characteristic of all chapters.

The following description of the normal structure of the Red Cross chapter will be divided into two parts: the first will describe the professional staff structure of the chapter; the second, the volunteer structure of the organ­ization. Particular attention will be paid to the division

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22 Between 1918 and 1925 total membership in the American National Red Cross declined from twenty million to three million, a decrease of eight-five percent; during the same period, however, the number of Red Cross chapters declined by less than ten percent, from 3,864 in 1918 to 3,527 in 1926 (Dulles, 1950:225, 243,325). The 1971 Annual Report of the American National Red Cross (1971a:15) indi­cates that there are now 3,210 Red Cross chapters in the nation.
of labor and lines of authority and coordination among the members of the chapter. Tables of organization will present graphic summaries of the structure of the Red Cross chapter.

The Staff Structure of the Red Cross Chapter

At the top of the staff structure of the Red Cross chapter is the chapter manager (or executive secretary) and his assistant. Together these two positions are charged with the administration of the local chapter. The chapter manager is directly responsible to the chapter's board of directors and exercises authority over all of the paid staff of the organization. The service divisions are the major subunits of the staff structure of the Red Cross chapter; they are defined by the several goals of the organization and each division is headed by a professional director. Although most of these divisions serve the permissive goals of the chapter, one mandatory service is typically organized as a division: this is the Service to Military Families required of all Red Cross chapters. Normally there is no separate divisional organization for the mandatory disaster services of the Red Cross (only in the very largest metropolitan chapters does Disaster Service appear as a division in the normal structure); rather, all staff members of the chapter are mobilized in disaster operations. The patterns of disaster mobilization will be described in the second part of this chapter.
Each of the division directors works under the authority of the chapter manager and his assistant and each director exercises authority over any professional staff who work in his division. In one large chapter (thirty-six paid staff), the director of Safety Services (first aid and water safety), for example, supervises the activities of three paid staff instructors and the director of Services to Military Families, those of five case workers. In the same chapter, however, the director of Nursing Services constitutes the entire professional staff of that division. A secretary, shared half-time with another service division of the chapter, assumes the duties of the nursing director in the director's absence. Other chapter divisions which, like the Safety and Nursing Services, reflect the permissive goals of the Red Cross are also typically headed by professional staff in large city chapters; these may include Educational Services (primary, secondary, and college programs), Volunteer Services (coordination of all Red Cross volunteer activities), and the Blood Program. Figure 1 summarizes the organizational differentiation and lines of authority among five of these divisions and the chapter administrators in the Red Cross chapter.

The additional paid personnel of the chapter provide support for these major service divisions. The office of public information, the comptroller's office, secretarial
FIGURE 1
Administrative and Service Division Staff of the Red Cross Chapter

For an outline of the responsibilities and goals of each of these divisions (as well as the other permissive goals of the Red Cross chapter), see Table 2 of this study.
and maintenance personnel may be included under this category. The relationships among the members of these offices and the chief administrative officers of the chapter—the manager and assistant manager—are outlined in Figure 2.

The staff structure of the Red Cross chapter cannot be described, however, apart from its volunteer structure. The Red Cross is a voluntary association, in the sense of its goals (both mandatory and permissive) and its volunteer membership.23 Associated with the professional staff of every service division of the chapter is an advisory committee composed of volunteers which functions as a directing body for the professional staff and the volunteer workers of that division. The professional staff of the Safety Services division, for example, are responsible to the volunteer members of the division's advisory committee. Likewise, staff of the support offices of the Red Cross chapter are responsible to their advisory committees: the comptroller must make periodic financial reports to the volunteer members of the Financial Advisory Committee. This pattern of organization is found in each of the service divisions and offices of the Red Cross chapter: the divisions of Service to Military Families, Educational Services, Volunteer Services, and Nursing Services each

23Over fifty percent of the Red Cross chapters in the United States are made up of volunteer members only (American National Red Cross, 1971a:15, 24).
FIGURE 2
Office (Support) Staff of the Red Cross Chapter

Chapter Manager (Executive Secretary) — Secretary to the Manager
  
  Assistant Manager — Secretarial Staff

Office of Public Information — Office of the Comptroller
  
  Director — Comptroller — Physical Property (Maintenance)

  Assistant — Assistant — Building Superintendent

  Porter
have advisory committees; the office of public information as well as the comptroller's office has an advisory committee associated with its professional staff.

Individual administrative staff members of the Red Cross chapter, like the several divisions and support offices of the chapter, have volunteer counterparts. The chapter manager's position in the staff structure, for example, is mirrored in the volunteer structure by the chapter's chairman's position, the latter being the executive status in the volunteer dimension of the organization. Similarly, the staff member who serves in emergencies as disaster director has a volunteer counterpart in the chapter's disaster chairman. The nature of the relationship between staff and volunteer incumbents of these matched statuses is variable, dependent in part on individual personalities but, more importantly for the purposes of this study, affected by the intra-organizational structure in which their respective positions are located.

Officially, staff members are professional experts whose expertise is, in exchange for salaries, made available to the non-professional membership to assist them in effectively serving the goals of the organization. Red Cross professionals, thus, are "staff" rather than "line" members of the chapter; they are hired by the volunteer membership to administrate and coordinate the day-to-day ac-
tivities and disaster operations of the chapter and to advise the volunteer members much as the staff themselves may be advised by area office field representatives. Although professional staff are linked to one another by lines of authority, they are responsible to the "real" members of the chapter, the volunteers. The by-laws of the national organization make this point explicitly (American National Red Cross, 1964:n.p.; emphasis added):

Nationally and locally the American Red Cross is governed by volunteers, most of its duties are performed by volunteers and it is financed by voluntary contributions.

Figure 3 presents this official definition of the relationships between the major volunteer officers and advisory committees and the staff structure of the Red Cross chapter.

In practice, especially noticeable under the extreme conditions of natural disaster, deviations from this official definition of staff-volunteer relationships may occur. Even under "normal" conditions, there appear to be structural pressures and contradictions which may lead to systematic variations from this official definition. Within the corporate organization of the national Red Cross, the local chapter is not free to initiate policy; it must implement the policies established at the national level of the organization. Within the structure of the local chapter, the members most knowledgeable about these poli-
FIGURE 3
The Volunteer Structure of the Red Cross Chapter

Board of Directors

Chapter Chairman

Chapter Manager

Vice Chairman

Assistant Manager

Welfare Advisory Committee

Educational Advisory Committee

Safety Advisory Committee

Volunteer Advisory Committee

Service to Military Families Division

Educational Services Division

First Aid and Water Safety Division

Volunteer Division

Public Information Advisory Committee

Nursing Advisory Committee

Financial Advisory Committee

Office of Public Information

Nursing Services Division

Office of the Comptroller

--- Staff

--- Volunteer
cies are likely to be professional staff rather than volunteers. The governance of the local chapter, however, is officially in the hands of its volunteer members, thus creating the potential for staff-volunteer role conflict. We shall return to these matters later in this study. Now we shall describe certain aspects of the volunteer structure of the Red Cross chapter.

The Volunteer Structure of the Red Cross Chapter

The multi-dimensions of the Red Cross—its disaster and non-disaster goals, its national, area, and local levels, its staff and volunteer structures, and its quasi-governmental and voluntary characteristics—cross-cut each other so that it is difficult to consider one aspect of the organization without taking others into account at the same time. Fundamentally, however, the Red Cross chapter is a local voluntary association: its core structure is the volunteer structure. As we have noted, professional staff in the chapter assist and advise its volunteer members. Although unintended organizational pressures may tend to redefine that relationship, the chapter is manifestly a volunteer organization.

Similar potentials for staff-volunteer role conflict were found in the National Foundation-March of Dimes (Sills, 1957:49-52). In theoretical terms, this conflict results from the contradiction between the functional requirements of voluntary associations, like the March of Dimes and the Red Cross, as "normative compliance structure" and as complex, on-going organizations (Etzioni, 1961a:294).
Volunteer members of the Red Cross chapter are of two types depending on their location in the volunteer structure of the organization. On the one hand, there are "recruited" volunteers who serve on the chapter board of directors or the several advisory committees. "Recruited" members of the chapter's board of directors are intended to represent the local community, an idea which was originally emphasized by the national leaders of the Red Cross who succeeded Clara Barton in 1904. Barton had been charged with running the organization as a personal enterprise through "cliques" of her own selection and her critics argued that the governing bodies of the Red Cross, at all levels, should include representatives of the "respectable" members of the entire community (Dulles, 1950:67-68, 336-338). The latent snobbishness of these principles contributed to the sometimes self-perpetuating character of local and national boards and gave to the Red Cross an oligarchic structure that was frequently criticized. Post-World War II amendments to the organization's charter established more democratic procedures for the selection of the members of chapter boards of directors and delegates to the national Red Cross conventions as well as procedures by which members of local chapters could bring their grievances to the attention of national officials (Dulles, 1950:535-538).²⁵

²⁵Sills (1957:213) suggests that the emergency ori-
The recruitment of members of the chapter advisory boards is carried out by the directors of each of the chapter's service divisions or offices together with the volunteer and staff officers of the chapter. They seek members for these committees whose positions in the community are relevant to the work of the division or office. The members of a Financial Advisory Committee, for example, may include a bank officer and other persons whose occupations are associated with the management of organizational funds. The membership of a Public Information Advisory Committee, similarly, would be likely to include representatives of the community's media: an editor of a local newspaper, a radio and television station executive, and an advertising director, for example. Bringing their professional competence to the Red Cross chapter, these "recruited" volunteers offer technical advice and consent to the members of the service divisions and offices of the organization. As representatives of the community, these volunteers also bring their names, their respected positions,  

Perrow (1970:114-116) suggests that the issue itself is likely to be raised in voluntary associations only when excess organizational power leads to disputes over the selection of "derived goals". Such disputes characterized the succession of permissive goals in the Red Cross after both World War I and World War II.
and their knowledge of the local community, advising chapter members of the community's resources and needs.

The second type of volunteer member of the local Red Cross chapter is the worker whose services are, by contrast with those of the "recruited" volunteer, "unsolicited". Such volunteer members of the chapter themselves may be divided into two types: first, the trained volunteers who make up the core of the chapter's working committees and from whom the volunteer officers of the chapter are likely to be selected and, second, the "walk-in" volunteers who join the chapter only during emergencies. The latter type will be considered in the discussion of

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26Sills' (1957) study of the March of Dimes suggests that this distinction between "recruited" and "unsolicited" volunteers may be more apparent than real. He reports (1957:102-103) that only ten percent of the volunteer members of the March of Dimes could be said to have truly "volunteered"; ninety percent joined the organization after having been asked to join. It seems likely that the decision to join the Red Cross chapter is also "triggered" by invitations to membership. Nevertheless, the distinction between "recruited" and "unsolicited" volunteers seems useful here as a device for identifying two types of volunteer members in the structure of the Red Cross chapter: those, on the one hand, who are recruited to serve on chapter boards and those, on the other hand, who volunteer to work in the chapter. Perrow's (1970) essay on volunteers as resources in the organization suggests that there is a third type of Red Cross volunteer: those who contribute money rather than time and energy to the organization. The Red Cross recognizes such members. Under its by-laws as amended in 1947, membership in the American National Red Cross is open to all people of the United States upon payment of one dollar in dues (Dulles, 1950:57). We shall not be concerned in this study with this third type of volunteer member.
disaster mobilization in the second part of this chapter.

"Unsolicited" volunteer workers bring their services—their manpower and their personalities—to the Red Cross chapter as resources on which the organization can draw. The chapter deploys these volunteer workers among the various task committees of the organization (e.g., the disaster food committee, the family services committee, and the like) where the new members are trained in the responsibilities and skills of these positions by the chapter's professional staff and already experienced volunteers. In comparison with other organizations, however, the Red Cross chapter is limited in its capacity to attract specially qualified members, systematically screen them, and delegate responsibilities once they have joined the organization. Unlike, for example, a political party which can offer extrinsic rewards to its volunteer members, the Red Cross chapter cannot; it has no access to the favors of office. The chapter can only offer the intrinsic satisfactions of "good works": in exchange for their contributions, volunteer workers take from the organization the satisfactions of "helping others", of noblesse oblige, of fulfilling interpersonal, community, and organizational role responsibilities (Perrow, 1970; Sills, 1957:109-115,233-252). In effect, just as beggars cannot be choosers, the Red Cross chapter must take the volunteer workers it can get
and, for the same reason, once it has taken them is stuck with them (Barton, 1969:158).

Relatively clear authority relationships can be drawn between the "recruited" volunteers of the chapter's advisory committees and board of directors and the professional staff whom these volunteers advise. Authority relationships between "unsolicited" workers, particularly those who occupy the administrative positions in the chapter's volunteer structure, and the professional staff are somewhat more problematic. Indeed, the authority relationships between the incumbents of matching volunteer-staff positions like chapter chairman (volunteer) and manager (staff) are left somewhat unspecified. This lack of specificity is suggested in Figure 3 by the horizontal lines which link the volunteer officials of the chapter with their professional counterparts in the organization. Vertical authority relationships, on the other hand, link the "recruited" members of the chapter's board of directors and advisory committees and the professional staff (see Figure 3).

An explanation for these variations in the clarity of authority relationships may be found in the differential statuses of the two types of volunteers, within both the community and the Red Cross chapter. The "recruited" volunteers are requested by the local chapter to serve on committees or the board of directors on the basis, at least in
part, of their status in the community. Form, Nosow, Stone and Westie (1954:118-119) report that the high community status of such volunteer members of the Red Cross chapter relative to the community status of chapter professionals provides these volunteers with sufficient leverage in the organization to demand deference from members of the staff. "Unsolicited" workers may not enjoy the same status advantages and, thus, may be unable to demand the same deference. As amateurs, the latter may instead defer to the professional judgements of the chapter's staff who are hired, in fact, as expert advisors to the volunteer workers of the organization.

Thus, the power of "recruited" volunteers appears to lie in the inequality of the exchange between them and the chapter. When advisors accept Red Cross recruitment--when they do the chapter a favor by lending it their name and agreeing to serve on one of its advisory groups--the chapter incurs an obligation to them in return. Structurally, this obligation can be worked out through deference behavior:

27 National survey data have documented the positive relationship between socio-economic status and participation in voluntary associations (Wright and Hyman, 1958). Sills (1957:31,57-58) found that the majority of volunteer members of the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis were middle class. That the Red Cross chapter attracts similar volunteer members seems likely. Although data are not available to substantiate this assertion, the tendency, noted, for example, by Sills (1957:30), of members of voluntary associations to join several such organizations would seem to lend credence to the argument.
"recruited" volunteers may be repaid by granting them some control over the organization itself (cf., Selznick, 1949: 181; Perrow, 1970:115). Such power as "unsolicited" volunteers enjoy may lie in their option to quit the organization. Dissatisfied with their position in the chapter or with the intrinsic rewards of volunteering, they are free to leave the organization just as they were to join it. Their obligation to the organization is effectively as minimal as the organization's rewards to them may be; the exchange between "recruited" volunteers and the Red Cross chapter would seem likely, by contrast, to be significantly more binding.

The authority relationship, then, between "unsolicited" workers and paid staff seems to be based on their respective competences in performing organizational tasks. It is a relationship between amateurs and professionals. It is also a relationship between part-time and full-time members of the organization. Differences in the temporal boundaries

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28 That members of voluntary associations leave as well as join the organization "voluntarily" suggests a dimension of organizational analysis which might prove useful in clarifying the differences between voluntary and "non-voluntary" organizations; i.e., is it possible for a member of a voluntary organization to be "fired"? Sills (1957:30), for example, reports high membership turnover in the March of Dimes. Specification of the conditions which lead to resignation from such organization might be revealing.

29 This hypothesis cannot be tested with data collected for this study.
of participation, as well as in the "depth" of participation in the organization, may add to the dominance of professional staff over amateur volunteers (cf., Etzioni, 1961a:294-295). On the other hand, the relationship between "recruited" volunteers and Red Cross staff appears likely to be affected by the differential community statuses of the volunteer and professional chapter members. The tendency to assign an individual to a new status congruent with those he already occupies, rather than to one which would be incongruent, is more likely to enhance the position of the "recruited" than the "unsolicited" volunteer in the Red Cross chapter, (cf., Form and Nosow, 1958: 214-215; Homans, 1961:248ff). The effect of this tendency toward status congruence may be to aggravate the role conflict identified earlier between the professional Red Cross experts (staff) and the volunteer members officially charged with the governance of the local chapter ("recruited" volunteers).

Summary

As a voluntary association the Red Cross chapter must satisfy two distinct functional requirements: first, it must attract a contingent of volunteer workers to carry out its chartered mandates; second, it must possess a cadre of more permanent members to maintain the organization in its routinized day-to-day existence. The history of the Red Cross
demonstrates that the attractiveness of the organization to volunteers increases dramatically during national emergencies but is subject to precipitous declines in "normal" times (Dulles, 1950: passim). As we have seen in Chapter Two of this study, the Red Cross has responded to these environmental changes by adding permissive goals which gave the organization a raison d'etre for "normal" as well as emergency conditions. We may now see these successive goals as helping to satisfy the functional requirement for an effective on-going organizational structure. The organization, therefore, must possess a structure which not only is capable of accommodating rapid and significant increases in membership, but, at the same time, can maintain itself despite potentially disruptive changes in its environment.

The separate volunteer and staff structures of the Red Cross chapter may be understood as the organization's attempts to meet these two requirements. In Etzioni's (1961 a: 294-295) terms, these structures are "intermittent" in the sense that they tend to be temporally segregated. The chapter's volunteer structure is subject to mobilization—expansion and activation—in emergencies; in "normal" times it is less active and smaller. The chapter's staff structure is more nearly an organization constant, coordinating the efforts of chapter members, both staff and volunteer, in carrying out the permissive goals of the local organiza-
tion during "normal" times but subject to mobilization during disasters. In the following section of this chapter, we shall describe the succession—the expansion and activation—of the volunteer structure, as well as the reorganization of the staff structure, as the local Red Cross unit mobilizes to meet the demands of natural disaster.

The Disaster Mobilization of the Red Cross Chapter

In this discussion of the mobilization of the volunteer structure of the Red Cross chapter, attention will be focused on the "unsolicited" volunteers, both those who are trained for their positions in the chapter and, somewhat more briefly, those who volunteer their services during the emergency itself, the so-called "walk-in" volunteers. Following this discussion we shall turn to a description of the mobilization of the staff structure of the Red Cross chapter.

The Mobilization of the Volunteer Structure of the Red Cross Chapter

The disaster mobilization of the Red Cross chapter does not affect all of its volunteer members in the same way. The organizational responsibilities of some "unsolicited" volunteers are, of course, directly related to the

30 "Recruited" volunteers, because they serve in an advisory capacity during both "normal" and disaster periods, are not subject to disaster mobilization in the same sense that "unsolicited" volunteers are. Hence, the former are not discussed here.
disaster goals of the chapter but, for others, little
relationship holds between the volunteers' chapter respons-
sibilities and the demands of natural disaster. Volun-
teers trained in the operation of public shelters, on the
one hand, are mobilized in disasters to carry out those
tasks: on the other hand, volunteers whose Red Cross tasks
are associated with one of the chapter's permissive goals
(water safety, for example) may take on disaster tasks
largely unrelated to those they perform for the chapter in
non-disaster environments. In one chapter such discontinu-
ities have been institutionalized: a number of volunteers
are designated as "disaster auxiliaries" with no assign-
ment in the disaster structure of the organization. As
free-floating members they are to be available to assist
wherever they can be useful in the chapter's disaster oper-
ations.

Disaster mobilization, then, activates some volunteer
members of the Red Cross chapter while it deactivates
others. Some volunteers work for the chapter only when the
threat or the impact of disaster makes their emergency serv-
ices necessary. Other volunteer members of the organization,
in effect, are out of work in disasters. Thus the disaster
mobilization of the Red Cross chapter might be said to pro-
duce both organizational "actors" and "re-actors". The
"actors" are those volunteer members whose organizational
roles are activated in disaster mobilization; the "re-actors" are those whose organizational roles are suspended during mobilization and whose reactions to disaster demands may be understood as more or less ad hoc attempts to define new roles appropriate to the disaster situation (cf., Adams, 1969:130-136).31

If "re-actors" find their role in the disaster structure of the chapter problematic, the "actors" may discover that their roles in the "normal" structure of the organization are undefined. The disaster handbook of one Red Cross chapter contains the following reasurances to such disaster

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31Taylor, et. al. (1970:110-111,127) suggest that in post-disaster periods the major vehicles of immediate relief are "ephemeral institutions"--ad libbed roles in ad hoc groups--and that the members of the Red Cross chapter typically act as if they were members of such emergent groups rather than of a formal bureaucratized organization. This interpretation is consistent with the collective-behavior framework of Taylor's study; the organizational framework of this study leads us to emphasize the established rather than the emergent context of Red Cross disaster behavior. Barton (1969:114-121) reports the results of an unpublished study of role performance among members of organizations involved in disaster relief which suggest that the more structured and routinized the disaster role and the closer the informal social relationships among co-workers, the more likely are organization members to perform their roles without interference from their extra-organizational affiliations, e.g., their family roles. The implication seems to be that predictable performance of organizational roles in disaster is likely only when these roles are full-time and routinely practiced in "normal" times, conditions which cannot be met in the Red Cross chapter by either volunteers or staff but which are characteristic of public utility workers, firemen, policemen, and military personnel. Within the national Red Cross organization, however, certain area staff who specialize in disaster relief work may meet these criteria.
volunteers, stressing their importance to the organization despite their inactivity during "normal" periods"

As a volunteer assigned to a disaster post you are most important. The fact that you are on standby duty without day-to-day activity may seem to lessen the importance of your assignment. Actually, the very fact that you hold yourself in readiness to serve this community on short notice during critical time makes you one of the most valuable volunteers of the Red Cross.

Such role discontinuities as these appear to be the necessary consequences of the temporal segregation and succession of the "normal" and disaster structures of the Red Cross chapter. Disaster mobilization activates a volunteer structure which otherwise remains more or less dormant during the often extended periods between community emergencies. Likewise, it deactivates certain other volunteers who normally carry out their chapter responsibilities as part of the daily routinized activities of the chapter. The deactivation of the "normal" activities of the chapter staff will be described in the final section of this discussion.

When disaster strikes and the mobilization of the chapter's trained volunteers is required, the organization employs a telephone fan-out system to alert its members. Chapter disaster handbooks often include a diagrammatic "Who Calls Whom for Disaster Duty" such as the example presented in Figure 4. In addition to telephone communications, the Red Cross chapter also employs the mass media—radio and
FIGURE 4
"Who Calls Whom for Disaster Duty":
A Red Cross Chapter Telephone Fan-out System
television—to alert its members to the threat of disaster or its impact. The information input to the Red Cross may be from a variety of sources depending on the nature of the catastrophe: the weather bureau, for example, in the case of tornadoes, the Red Cross hurricane watch system, or the local fire or police departments or Civil Defense unit in the event of fires, explosions, and the like. Metropolitan Red Cross chapters are typically equipped with receivers which permit the chapter to monitor the radio transmissions of the local police, fire or sheriff's departments. Input, too, may be from the members of the Red Cross chapter themselves.

The result of this mobilization is depicted in Figure 5—"The Disaster Structure of the Red Cross Chapter". This diagram represents a structural expansion of the organization through the activation of its disaster volunteers, the only members of the chapter who, as members of the Red Cross chapter, specialize exclusively in disaster-related services. Under the direction of the chapter chairman and disaster chairman, the volunteer members of the organization are assigned to a number of disaster service and support divisions, each headed by a deputy chairman, to carry out the mandates of the local chapter. Three of these divisions are responsible for the provision of the major disaster relief goals of the chapter—mass care services (i.e., food, shelter, and clothing), medical and nursing services, and
THE DISASTER STRUCTURE OF THE
RED CROSS CHAPTER

Chapter Manager

Disaster Director

Disaster Action Teams

Chapter Chairman

Disaster Chairman

Executive Deputy Chairman

Deputy Chairman (8)

Public Information

Chapter Treasurer

Fund Raising

Office of Volunteers

Family Service Division

Casework

Emergency Section

Recovery Station

Mass Care Division

Inquiry and Information

Medical Division

Food

Shelter

Clothing

Support Division

Volunteers

Medical

Nursing

Survey

Communications

Transportation

Supply

Maintenance

Planning and Consulting Services

Liason Relations

Administrative Services

Volunteer Recruitment and Resources

Staff
family services. The members of the fourth division facilitate these disaster services by performing the necessary support tasks: disaster survey, communications and transportation tasks, disaster logistics and supplies, and maintenance. Thus the volunteer members of these four divisions are responsible for the basic relief services the Red Cross chapter provides in natural disaster. Every Red Cross chapter is required by the charter of the organization to provide these services and must, therefore, train their volunteers in the tasks associated, directly or in a support capacity, with them. In this sense, the Red Cross chapters' volunteer disaster structures do not vary significantly from one chapter to another however much they may vary in numbers and the specifics of the division of disaster labor.

The additional four divisions of the volunteer disaster structure outlined in Figure 5 are "luxury" divisions which are unlikely to appear as differentiated services except in the very largest of Red Cross chapters. The Planning and Consulting Services and the Administrative Services divisions, for example, include members whose professional and technical knowledge of fields associated with disaster relief and whose managerial and executive skills are useful to the deputy chairmen and members of the chapter's disaster service and support divisions. The members of the Liaison Relations division are volunteers who occupy
positions in other community agencies and organizations from which the Red Cross chapter solicits assistance, cooperation, and active participation in emergencies. The members of this division function as representatives of the Red Cross chapter in other organizations. Finally, the Volunteer Recruitment and Resources division is charged with the mobilization and assignment of volunteers who wish to serve the chapter during emergencies. Under its jurisdiction falls the responsibility of assigning "walk-in" volunteers to the various operational and supportive activities of the chapter in disasters. In small chapters many of these functions may be performed by members of the service and support disaster divisions rather than being delegated to such separate organizational subunits as these "luxury" divisions.

The Disaster Action Teams associated with the executive deputy chairman reflect a relatively new concept in Red Cross disaster structure (cf., American National Red Cross, n.d.,b:2; 1971:n.p.). These teams are three- to six-member units, representative of the full range of Red Cross services available to disaster victims and prepared around the clock to respond immediately to emergency conditions. According to the national organization (1966b:1), such a team "serves as the chapter's first on-the-scene con-
tact with the disaster situation."\(^{32}\) In one large city chapter these teams are frequently the sole representatives of the Red Cross in the comparatively limited relief operations which follow emergencies involving fewer than five families.\(^{33}\) Of the more than 500 emergencies to which this chapter responds yearly, the majority involve only members of the chapter's Disaster Action Teams.

The Mobilization of "Walk-in" Volunteers

"Walk-in" volunteers are a part of the convergence which accompanies virtually every disaster (Fritz and Mathewson, 1957). The Red Cross chapter is often one of the focal organizations (others include the Salvation Army

\[^{32}\text{The national organization (1966b:2) defines the specific functions of these teams in the following statement: the Disaster Action Team}
\]

Meets the immediate urgent needs of the disaster victims for necessities such as food, clothing, shelter, first aid, and other personal humanitarian services as required.

Makes contact with ranking public officials and other appropriate authorities at the scene of the disaster. Makes a rapid appraisal of the total situation and immediately gets this information to chapter headquarters....Determines the immediate need for additional Red Cross services and support and relays this information immediately to chapter headquarters.

Makes sure that all Red Cross activities are well identified.

\[^{33}\text{By Red Cross criteria, more than five families must be involved in an emergency to qualify for Red Cross disaster relief. Assistance is available, however, for five or fewer families who have been subjected to similar "helplessness and suffering" as a result, for example, of fire (American National Red Cross, 1963b:Chapter 1:7).}\]
and the Civil Defense) attracting these volunteers who "walk-in" to offer their services during the emergency (cf., Dynes, 1968:48). These volunteers, however, are not always easily assimilated into the organization's disaster structure.

The mobilization of Red Cross chapter volunteers who have previous associations with the organization is, as we have seen, problematic itself, both for those volunteers whose organizational roles are activated by disaster and, especially, for those whose chapter roles are deactivated in disaster mobilization. The convergence of additional volunteers lacking previous experience with the Red Cross may create serious problems for the organization. Places must be found within the expanding volunteer structure of the chapter for organizational novices whose lack of experience and training may require that they be assigned to the least demanding of disaster tasks (making sandwiches, for example) or that they be subject to the supervision of experienced staff or volunteer members of the chapter, thus contributing to the reduction of the effectiveness of these chapter members in carrying out their assigned responsibilities. These and other organizational problems associated with the "walk-in" volunteers will be discussed in Chapter Four of this study. We turn now to the patterns of disaster mobilization within the staff structure of the Red Cross chapter.
The Mobilization of the Staff Structure of the Red Cross Chapter

One of the first responsibilities of the Local Red Cross chapter in the event of disaster is to inform the area office in whose jurisdiction the chapter is located. Chapters are required to report at once the occurrence of the disaster to the appropriate area office representative by the quickest means of communication, stating the nature of the disaster and giving all available information about the situation and the Red Cross action being taken (American National Red Cross, 1963a:2).

On the basis of this information, disaster staff and resources to supplement those of the local chapter are mobilized by the area manager. With consent of the national Disaster Services division, the manager may delegate authority for the "administration, direction, and control" of disaster operations to a field director, chosen from among area disaster staff (American National Red Cross, 1963b: Chapter 2:3). All area and national staff subsequently assigned to disaster relief are under the direction of the field director; he, in turn, is responsible to the manager of the area in which the disaster occurred.

Normally, the field director and his staff are appointed from the area directly affected by the disaster, but if these staff are unavailable, personnel from outside the area may be assigned. In major disaster, staff from all four areas may be involved in relief work: in 1965, for example, Hurricane Betsy relief work involved over 800 national and chapter staff from 48 states (American National Red Cross, n.d., a:1).
In progressive disasters like hurricanes, however, area staff may be mobilized before impact. The Red Cross Hurricane Watch, a program which provides weather information to local chapters in advance of storms, gives area offices and local chapters "more time to implement preparedness plans with maximum effectiveness" (American National Red Cross, 1962:1). From the Southeastern, Eastern, and Midwestern area offices hurricane weather information is released to certain local chapters along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. These chapters, the headquarters of Red Cross chapter districts, serve as operational centers for area staff assigned to the disaster. Certain other chapters, not likely to be directly impacted by the hurricane, serve as "staging points". Here, reserve staff, equipment, and supplies are centralized, ready to be dispatched as required to disaster-stricken communities. Other inland chapters are designated as "evacuee reception points" and provide mass care services for refugees sent to them from the impacted areas (American National Red Cross, 1962: 2-3).

By contrast with area offices, local chapters of the Red Cross do not employ full-time disaster personnel. Like chapter volunteers, chapter staff are part-time disaster workers whose responsibilities in "normal" periods may bear little relationship to their emergency tasks. With the
exception of those of the Service to Military Families staff, the "normal" roles of Red Cross chapter staff are associated with one or another of the organization's permissive goals. Only as staff may be involved from time to time in the formulation of disaster plans and handbooks, the training of volunteers in disaster-related skills, and similar preparations for emergencies do they engage in disaster taks during "normal" times.

When disaster strikes all "normal" permissive roles are deactivated. Because disaster services, as mandatory goals, take priority over all permissive goals the chapter may assume, professional staff—including secretarial and clerical personnel—take on new tasks in emergencies. As a result, discontinuities between "normal" and disaster roles are characteristic of most Red Cross chapter staff. Personnel who normally perform educational or secretarial roles, for example, take on inter-organizational liaison or shelter communications roles in disasters. Table 3 summarizes the "normal" and disaster roles of the staff members of one Red Cross chapter. The degree of discontinuity between roles varies among the staff from the relatively

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35 Only members of the Service to Military Families division of the local chapter continue to perform essentially the same tasks in disaster situations as in "normal" times. Their tasks, like disaster services, are mandatory and can be neither abandoned nor delegated to another organization.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>&quot;Normal&quot; Role</th>
<th>Disaster Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Manager</td>
<td>Chapter Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Manager</td>
<td>Disaster Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of Nursing Services</td>
<td>Disaster Nursing Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of Service to Military Families</td>
<td>Welfare Inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caseworkers (5)</td>
<td>Welfare and Telephone Inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of Youth Program</td>
<td>Telephone Inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant</td>
<td>Civil Defense Liaison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of Safety Services</td>
<td>Physical Property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructors (3)</td>
<td>Physical Property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Information Officer</td>
<td>Public Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant</td>
<td>Public Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comptroller</td>
<td>Security Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Secretary</td>
<td>Administration and Telephone Inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>Shelter Contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretaries (2)</td>
<td>Telecommunication System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>Telephone Inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Superintendent</td>
<td>Physical Property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porter</td>
<td>Physical Property</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
low discontinuity between the "normal" and disaster roles of the director of Nursing Services to the personnel of the Youth Program and Safety Services divisions.

The disaster activities of this staff are supervised by the assistant chapter manager in his emergency role as "disaster director". DRC data suggest that this designation of the assistant manager as part-time disaster director is a fairly standard, if nonobligatory, practice in Red Cross chapters. Another chapter's assistant manager, for example, serves during "normal" periods as coordinator of the organization's college program, international affiliations, and professional personnel; in emergencies he is the chapter's disaster director. If the chapter employs several professional assistant managers, one of these is typically singled out as coordinator of disaster services. Even within such highly specialized chapter structures, this position does not require the full-time attention of its incumbent. In one such metropolitan chapter, an assistant manager-disaster director observed that his disaster duties occupy no more than one-third of his professional time: if those were his only responsibilities, he said, "I would pace the floor the other two-thirds of the year."

Nor could other members of the chapter staff be justified as full-time disaster service personnel. Their disaster responsibilities, however vital during emergencies,
would not in themselves constitute full-time professional roles. Thus, like the Red Cross chapter's volunteer structure, the staff structure, too, is characterized by temporal segregation into distinctive "normal" and disaster versions. Disaster mobilization of chapter staff requires the succession of the one structure over the other, i.e., a role-shift by virtually all members of the chapter staff from their "normal" responsibilities to their disaster duties. Unlike the many disaster volunteers who are inactive in "normal" periods and are activated only in disaster mobilization, chapter staff must always deactivate their "normal" chapter responsibilities in favor of their disaster roles. It seems likely that the ease of this role-shift will vary inversely with the degree to which a staff member's "normal" and disaster roles are discontinuous. Staff, for example, whose "normal" roles are disaster-relevant (like nursing personnel) may be, like Boy Scouts, always prepared; those whose "normal" roles have less relevance to the demands of disaster (like youth workers and secretaries) may make the transition with less certainty.  

Extensive revisions in national Red Cross disaster

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36A study of a public works department in disaster (Adams, 1969) suggests that these patterns may appear in non-voluntary organizations as well as in voluntary ones. See footnote 31 for additional citations appropriate to this point.
manuals in the last decade have taken into account other variables which affect the disaster role-shifts of chapter staff: the variations among chapters, first, in the size of the organization's membership and, second, in the disaster-proneness of the community in which the chapter is located. By dichotomizing these two variables, the national organization (American National Red Cross, 1963a: 74) has identified four basic patterns of disaster structure, one of which should fit most local chapters:

Pattern A: large, strategically located chapters with a history of or clear potential for major disasters;

Pattern B: large chapters whose communities have no history of or are unlikely to be impacted by major disasters;

Pattern C: small chapters with a history of or obvious potential for major disasters; and

Pattern D: small chapters with no history of or obvious potential for major disasters.

Basic Red Cross disaster services are, of course, required of the chapter in all four patterns. The differences lie in the national organization's definition of what constitutes a minimal disaster structure in each pattern to meet effectively the demands of community emergency. In pattern
"A", for example, minimum chapter structure for disaster operations includes eight separate emergency divisions: disaster food, clothing, and shelter services; medical and nursing service; family service; and survey, communications, and transportation support units. Minimum chapter plans for disaster in pattern "D", on the other hand, require assurance only that the mandatory services will be carried out by chapter volunteers and that the disaster director will contact his area office for additional instructions (American National Red Cross, 1963a:74). Patterns "B" and "C" define minimum appropriate disaster structures for large chapters with little potential for disaster and small disaster-prone chapters, respectively. These structures are not so complex as those defined in pattern "A"; they are more sophisticated than those of pattern "D".

Thus, these four patterns of disaster structure point up two important features of all Red Cross chapters. First, that the national mandate requires of all chapters, whatever their size and location, viable disaster mobilization plans. Second, that the wide variations among chapters in resources available for disaster services and potential for community disaster must be taken into account in developing these plans for disaster mobilization.

Summary

The structure of the Red Cross chapter has been analyzed along two dimensions, the staff-volunteer dimension
and the "normal"-disaster dimension. The resulting four elements—the "normal" staff and volunteer structures and the disaster staff and volunteer structures—together compose, as it were, the four sides of the Red Cross chapter's organizational framework. We have characterized each of these structural elements in terms of their goal-orientations and their members' role relationships and paid particular attention to their mobilization patterns. It is through the latter that the total chapter shifts from one organizational set (the "normal" structures) to the other (the disaster structures). A summary of these four structural elements is presented in Table 4.

We have employed the concepts of goal succession and structural succession in identifying and ordering these elements and their interrelationships. The Red Cross chapter, we have suggested, is a voluntary association with two distinct sets of goals: its mandatory disaster relief goals (and military service goals) on the one hand, on the other, its several permissive goals. The succession of these permissive goals in the Red Cross, described in Chapter Two, was interpreted as a response to the problems of organizational effectiveness given an environment subject to rapid alterations, e.g., the post-war changes from emergency to "normal" conditions. Permissive goals were added, we suggested, to help to retain the organization's
TABLE 4
DOMINANT GOALS, ROLE RELATIONSHIPS, AND MOBILIZATION PATTERNS IN THE FOUR STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS OF THE RED CROSS CHAPTER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant Goals</th>
<th>Role Relationships</th>
<th>Mobilization Patterns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Normal&quot; Structures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Permissive</td>
<td>Defined by professional specializations and bureaucratic authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>Permissive</td>
<td>Advisory relations between recruited volunteers and staff, staff &amp; unsolicited volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster Structures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
<td>Coordination to assistant manager; area office field manager may be present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
<td>Convergence of trained volunteers and unsolicited walk-in volunteers; disaster chairman coordinates</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
war-induced membership and enthusiasm. "Normal" staff and volunteer structures have been interpreted in this chapter as a response to these new organizational goals. The "normal" staff structure is a particularly effective means of meeting the day-to-day functional requirements of the organization during non-emergency periods when chapter activities are directed towards these permissive goals. The chapter's cadre of professional staff represents the organization's only full-time permanent members, thus providing for continuity in organizational structure during "normal" and disaster periods.

Disaster mobilization—the activation and enlargement of the volunteer structure and the shift from "normal" to disaster roles among chapter staff—may now be understood as structural succession required by environmental changes from "normal" to emergency conditions. Thus structural succession in the Red Cross chapter complements the patterns of goal succession in the organization, the latter process contributing to the organization's transition from emergency to "normal" conditions and the former being the periodic transition from these "normal" conditions back to disaster structures.

In Chapter Four of this study we turn to some of the operational consequences for the Red Cross chapter of these goal and structural successions.
CHAPTER IV
OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE RED CROSS CHAPTER IN DISASTER RELIEF

In Chapter Four of this study we shall consider some of the problems which the local unit of the Red Cross encounters as its members mobilize to carry out the organization's mandatory disaster goals. Disaster mobilization of the Red Cross chapter results, as we have seen, in the expansion of the organization. This characteristic is also found in other disaster-relevant associations like the Salvation Army and the Civil Defense; it is notably absent, however, in certain other local organizations which are active in disaster operations, e.g., the police and fire departments (cf., Quarantelli, 1966; Dynes, 1968). Many of the Red Cross chapter's operational problems will be seen to stem from this expansion of the organization, particularly from the active participation in the chapter's disaster work of normally inactive volunteers, new "walk-in" volunteers, and mobilized area staff. The focus, then, of much of this discussion will be on problems which affect the performance of the local chapter's disaster mass care services and which are associated with the disaster expan-
The largest part of this chapter will discuss problems in the provision of disaster food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. This discussion will be in two segments: the first will consider problems which are associated with the mobilization of Red Cross staff, both area and local; the second, operational problems in mass care which are associated with the activation of volunteers, both trained and "walk-in". In addition, this chapter includes relatively brief discussions of problems encountered in the performance of three Red Cross disaster support tasks: disaster survey, transportation, and communication. Because it precedes chronologically all other disaster operations, the survey is discussed first.

**Operational Problems in Red Cross Disaster Survey**

Preliminary surveys of the scope and severity of physical damage, the number of persons killed and injured, and the boundaries of the impacted area are invaluable to the Red Cross chapter in estimating the resources which must be mobilized to meet the emergency. As was noted in Chapter 37

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37 This discussion should not be understood as a criticism of the American National Red Cross. If the disaster accomplishments of the Red Cross chapter are not stressed, this is simply because they are assumed. Indeed, its accomplishments are achieved in spite of many of these problems. To the extent that the problems the Red Cross chapter faces in disaster are major ones, its accomplishments are that much greater.
Three, the disaster director or some other representative of the local unit is required to relay this information as quickly as possible to the area office in whose jurisdiction the disaster occurred.

Disaster surveys, however, are not always possible immediately after impact. Diffuse disasters, like floods, may make surveys impossible because of the large areas affected. Estimates of the extent of the flooding after Hurricane Betsy in 1965, even within the New Orleans area, were very approximate for two days after the initial impact of the flood. Generally speaking, it may be correct to say that reasonably accurate surveys of progressive-diffuse disasters are more difficult to obtain than surveys of the damage accompanying instantaneous-focalized disasters.

Nonetheless, in the latter type of disaster other factors over which humans have no control may complicate the survey task. The timing of impact, for example, may effectively force the postponement of disaster surveys. When tornadoes touched down in Topeka, Kansas, in the early evening, surveys of the damage had to be left until the following day. All that could be known with any degree of certainty during the first night were the outside limits of the stricken area; no information on the severity of the damage or the number of persons affected was available. Because a Red Cross survey is, in one staff member's words, "a foot-
by-foot walk through the disaster area", it is virtually impossible to carry out after dark and extraordinary difficult when the impacted area is large.

The Red Cross chapter, therefore, may be faced with difficult problems immediately after disaster impact. If a disaster survey is impossible, how can the chapter determine the personnel and resources necessary to meet the emergency? Which of its personnel and resources should be committed to disaster relief? The Red Cross chapter's alleged hesitation in providing disaster services (for which it is sometimes criticized) may, thus, be a function of the difficulties the chapter faces in estimating immediately the extent of the disaster's impact and, hence, of determining the mobilization appropriate to the situation.38

Operational Problems in Red Cross Mass Care39

The expansion of the Red Cross chapter in disaster has two sources: additional staff from the area offices and national organization may be mobilized and normally inactive volunteers (trained and "walk-in") may swell the ranks of

38Barton (1969:296) suggests that such hesitation may also evidence the Red Cross pattern of "husbanding its funds to achieve the maximum return to self-support in the long run." Publically accountable for its financial operations, the Red Cross chapter may be understandably anxious not to over-commit its resources to a single emergency.

the local chapter. In this section we shall consider, first, some of the operational problems contingent upon staff expansion and, second, those whose are associated with the expansion of the volunteer structure of the local organization.

Mass Care Problems and the Mobilization of Red Cross Staff

Certain operational problems in Red Cross mass care may be understood as the result of two intra-organizational staff relationships sometimes observed in disaster relief. These may be called "functional overlap" and "structural isolation". The former refers to the merging of local and area staff disaster responsibilities and the latter, to the physical and social separation of local and area staff during disaster operations. When both of these conditions are present—when local and area staff are engaged in the same disaster activities, yet are operating more or less independently of each other—then problems in task duplication, contradictory decisions, and failed communication seem likely to result.

Functional Overlap

Officially, the emergency mass care phase of disaster relief, for which the local chapter is responsible, is separate from the rehabilitation program, for which the area staff are responsible. Mass care relief is normally phasing out as rehabilitation begins. Thus, the shift from the one
type of Red Cross disaster relief to the other should be accomplished with little or no difficulty. This separation of functions and staff, however, does not always hold. Area staff often arrive in the community during the mass care emergency phase (or even before disaster impact as in the case of hurricanes); on the other hand, the disaster work of the local staff does not always end with the termination of the mass care phase. Area staff are expected to integrate local chapter members into the rehabilitation phase of disaster relief: the Red Cross Manual for National Personnel (1963b:Chapter 2:37-38) states:

The relief activities during the emergency [i.e., mass care] phase of a field operation are carried on principally by the chapter. It is essential that chapter officials and volunteers continue to be an integral part of the organizational pattern during the rehabilitation phase of the operation.

Local personnel have first-hand knowledge of the community and its population and access to information concerning available resources; they can, therefore, advise area staff on rehabilitation procedures appropriate to the local community. Often area staff end their work in a community before the total rehabilitation phase of disaster relief is completed; chapter officials then have the responsibility of completing this phase of disaster operations (American National Red Cross, 1963b:Chapter 2:37). If local personnel have not been involved in rehabilitation work, they will be
unprepared to assume responsibility for it when the area
field office closes. Thus, division of labor by opera-
tional phases and of authority by organizational level is
not always possible or desirable in Red Cross disaster
relief. Operational problems which result from these
overlapping responsibilities will be discussed below.

The severity and scope of disaster damage may also
contribute to the merging of functions and authority be-
tween levels in the Red Cross. When damage is severe and
widespread—when the disaster is progressive and diffuse,
affecting a large area for an extended period of time—a
large number of families may require public shelter for
many weeks. Mass care programs must continue long after
area staff have begun their rehabilitation work. Such was
the case in a large city impacted by hurricane wind and
rain and by diffuse flooding from a hurricane-caused tidal
surge. Hurricane shelters which normally were in operation
for only a few days housed many refugees for nearly a
month. Because the mass care phase was long-term and
clearly beyond the capacity of the local chapter to finance,
local and area Red Cross personnel consolidated their
efforts in a "super shelter". This shelter replaced the
dozens of separate shelters which the local chapter had
found increasingly difficult to staff and supply. Only by
transferring its authority for the mass care phase of dis-
aster relief to the area office could the local chapter
solve the operational problems this disaster had precipitated. In the following statement, a member of the chapter summarized the conditions his chapter faced which led to the shift in mass care authority from the chapter to the area field director:

In other past disasters we've been fortunate enough just to have the emergency phase and then when that's over to have everybody return to their normal assignment and the national organization takes over [the rehabilitation phase]. But this thing was so enormous and went on for so long and so many volunteers were needed in the relief center as well as at the shelters, that it would seem that the operation should be conducted by [the area field director].

This merging of the two phases of disaster relief, although it resolved some problems, helped to create others: it contributed, for example, to authority problems among the local Red Cross staff. Just as area officials became involved directly in the mass care phase of disaster relief because of its extra-ordinarily large scope, so did local staff find themselves active in the rehabilitation phase. In this disaster some 34,000 families were eligible for rehabilitation relief. To serve so large a number of victims required many more personnel than the area offices and the national Red Cross could provide; consequently, chapter members and "walk-in" volunteers had to be mobilized for rehabilitation casework. In itself, the use of chapter staff and volunteers in rehabilitation is not, as we have seen, unorthodox, but normally these personnel
have previous casework experience or can be trained and supervised by area staff. In this case the program was so large that supervision of volunteer workers by trained staff was often impossible. Instead, local staff, sometimes inexperienced themselves in the policies and procedures of this phase of Red Cross work, supervised volunteer caseworkers. "I didn't have the authority to make decisions for the national organization," one such chapter member said. "I felt that my place was out in the community with our people...yet I couldn't leave [these volunteer rehabilitation workers] because nobody was there to represent Red Cross."

Thus, one consequence of the overlapping of the disaster functions of the local chapter and the area office may be to create what Dynes (1968:66) has called "authority vacuums" into which chapter officials, staff or volunteers, may be unwillingly pulled. When organizational domains are unclearly defined, decision-making authority may also be rendered problematic. Such ambiguities are characteristic of many "expanding" disaster organizations: in the case of the Red Cross, they may appear along the functional and authority boundaries between the local chapter and the area

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40 Standardization of emergency relief and emphasis on referral in rehabilitation may alleviate some of these problems in using local volunteers in both mass care and rehabilitation (Popkin, 1971).
office of the national organization.

Such intra-organizational problems as these may be aggravated by the differing perspectives which chapter and area staff bring to their Red Cross disaster activities. Area staff, to the extent that their allegiance is to the national organization, are more "cosmopolitan" than chapter staff whose perspective is "local", i.e., their organizational allegiance is owed to the chapter and the community (cf., Gouldner, 1957:1958). In "normal" times these two points of view are located at separate levels of the organization; in disasters, the distance between the national organization and its local affiliates decreases and those who hold these different perspectives may confront each other directly as area and chapter staff participate in disaster relief (cf., Sills, 1957:220-221).

Reflecting generally on these differences in perspective and purpose between area and local staff, one chapter member offered the following characterization of area and national staff:

They are merely professional people, staff people to offer guidance and to make sure that certain routine things and certain casework activities are carried out by the people they bring with them. But it is the local chapter, he said, which is responsible for the public relations, for the effectiveness of the disaster relief, and for the actual relief.41

A more direct confrontation between these national and chap-
ter perspectives was reported by a local public information officer. He described the techniques he used in dealing with a national information officer with whom he had differed when they worked together on a previous occasion:

I was always afraid he was going to louse up our relations [with the local media]. The first time we had him in our office at an extra desk, but none of that this time. He was up on the second floor. And we took his phone away and dispatched him as soon as possible.

The interests of the local public information staff—establishing and maintaining good relations with representatives of the local media—and of the national staff—"telling the Red Cross disaster story" through both local and national media—may be divergent, if not contradictory, when both must be served in the same situation.42

If local staff sometimes view area and national personnel as "merely professional people", evidence indicates that these professionals sometimes see all local chapter members, staff as well as non-staff, as "volunteers" (Form

41This is a view of the area and national Red Cross staff which is frequently held by the public as well; see the discussion of the rehabilitation goals of the Red Cross in Chapter Two of this study.

42That this confrontation was exacerbated by personal ill-will is revealed by the respondent's additional statement, "We didn't want the national office to feel that we weren't cooperating with them, so we knocked ourselves out to be as cooperative as we could with the other people they sent." See Boggins (1966:83ff) for additional examples of local-national differences among Red Cross public information staff.
and Nosow, 1958:211-213). In effect all "locals" are, by definition of the professional staff, "amateurs" (cf., Moore, 1958:178). This point of view was suggested by a local Red Cross staff member in the following statement on the national staff's criticisms of the local chapter's use of volunteers:

Our national people...thought that we weren't doing a particularly good job....They had reference to the fact that we were using so many volunteers who had just come in off the street, but our staff was pushed so far and spread so thin that we had to use [volunteers]. With just a minimum of instruction they went to work for us and many of them did an outstanding job, but some of our national people didn't appreciate this.

Again, these difficulties appear to stem from the boundary confusions which are characteristic of "expanding" organizations like the Red Cross chapter. The chapter expands in emergencies by adding both disaster-experienced area and national staff and disaster-inexperienced volunteers. These "new" members may make organizational membership boundaries uncertain and ambiguous (Dynes, 1968:66). Simplification of organizational categories (e.g., "merely professionals" or "volunteers") may provide a working answer to the question, "Who is a member of the organization?", but it may do so by categorizing some as "second class" members who consider themselves to be full-fledged members in good standing. Under these conditions the potential is present, then, for reciprocated feelings of unappreciation between local and area staff who are forced by the situation to deal with each
Barton (1969:189) offers this suggestion for dealing with such problems:

It is a wise leader who knows his own members. Cooperation with outsiders can perhaps best be achieved if everyone is clear about who is inside.

The operational problems of the Red Cross chapter in disaster relief which we have reviewed here stem from the addition to the chapter of area and national staff whose functions, while officially distinct from those of chapter staff, often overlap or merge. When this occurs, either by design or the contingencies of disaster situations, problems may result.

**Structural Isolation**

Given that the problems of overlapping function are associated with the presence in the local chapter of area and national staff, one solution to these difficulties would be to simulate during disaster operations the distance which normally separates the two levels of the organization. This solution—which we shall refer to as "structural isolation"—may itself be problematic. Such a solution was employed by the chapter and national public information staff cited above. Another chapter member suggested that this separation was not limited to public information personnel

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43"The area [staff] felt that we could do more and the local people thought the national could have done more," said one chapter staff member.
but was a characteristic of the relationship between all members of the two staffs:

It was like a void. Local people would be on one side of the room and national would be on the other and they'd look at one another. It was like we had a big board right down the middle.

This "void" was created, he suggested, by some members of the local chapter who unrealistically expected that the area and national staff would take over the entire disaster operation: "The national staff moved in," he said, "and the contention was, 'Well, national staff is here, we don't have to worry any more.'" In effect, local chapter members felt they could retire from disaster service when the professionals from the national organization arrived. Such a pattern clearly threatens the effectiveness of the Red Cross disaster effort. Not only does the local chapter need the assistance and resources of national and area personnel, but the latter require, as we have noted, the local expertise of chapter members.

This "contention" is an example of what Wallace (1956:158) calls "cornucopia thinking": local emergency organizations may rely excessively on outside assistance, thus ignoring inefficiencies, duplications, and waste in their own operations. Such thinking, Wallace states, leads to "a sort of autonomy and duplication of organizations in the midst of plenty."

This dependence of national staff was nicely suggested by a local Red Cross member: "Half of [these national people] don't even know how to get off the [highway] to get [downtown]. I heard two men from the national staff trying to pronounce [the name of a certain street]. They couldn't
Structural isolation--the independence of local and area staffs--thus creates conditions which may generate serious operational problems. The disaster director of one Red Cross chapter indicated in the following statement that he was aware of the problems of structural isolation but that he had not determined how to solve them:

The whole operation up here [was complicated] because the area staff had taken over across the hall. We had recognized this as being one of the problems [in a previous disaster operation], but we hadn't figured out how to solve it, the fact that you've got two separate operations involved here.

An incident which points up the problems of local and national staffs working independently in disasters was described by another member of the same chapter staff:

The fatality list...was taken from the coroner's office by the national staff without notifying the proper chapter personnel. This resulted in extreme embarrassment to the chapter representative who went to pick it up from the coroner's office, and a rather poor opinion of our intelligence on their part.

With two independent Red Cross disaster operations, the normal communications and decision-making difficulties of disaster relief work are compounded. When this isolation is combined with overlapping responsibilities and unclear authority lines, the situation seems optimal for problems.

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even write it, let alone pronounce it. They didn't know where it was."
On the other hand, when clearly defined and mutually acceptable divisions of labor and authority have been drawn between the local staff and national personnel, the physical and social separation of their relief programs can be an operational asset. When a local chapter's staff are experienced in disaster relief and its volunteers are trained to provide Red Cross mass care services, then the establishment of a separate unit, staffed by area and national personnel, for the rehabilitation phase of disaster relief is desirable. Under such conditions, in fact, failure to set up independent operational units may lead to problems; the following statement from an area office staff member indicates why:

This building is serving two disaster functions right now. The...chapter has their own disaster within their own jurisdiction....So the chapter is handling this job. And then in the meantime we have been coming in and the chapter's making space available to us. This is very nice of them, but we are going to have people coming in from all over [the country] and setting up the overall headquarters, so then we consider it wise to shop around in the community for a headquarters. In a sense, it doesn't pay to have two jobs going on in one building because it causes confusion in the minds of people.

Two operations in the same location may also cause confusion, he suggested, in bookkeeping: local and national disaster accounts become mixed up when the merchants who fill relief orders for disaster victims are given the same billing address. The local chapter is billed for national expenditures and vice versa. "You know how it is," he said,
so we establish separate headquarters."

Separation of the disaster functions of the national and area offices from those of the local chapter is the official policy of the Red Cross. This discussion has suggested that, for a variety of reasons, this separation is not always possible in disaster situations. When the two overlap or merge, operational problems, particularly those associated with authority, may result. When, on the other hand, separation of local and national functions amounts to structural isolation, operational problems may also result. Optimal conditions for effectiveness in Red Cross disaster relief appear, then, to lie somewhere between these two extremes.

Mass Care Problems and the Mobilization of Red Cross Volunteers

The disaster expansion of the Red Cross chapter takes place not only within the staff structure but also in its volunteer structure. Here, too, expansion is accompanied by a number of operational problems related to the organizational roles of the chapter's "new" disaster members. However, the roles of the "new" volunteer members and those of the "new" staff members differ considerably. Area and national staff, as we have seen, possess pre-defined professional roles which may be fitted, more or less successfully, into the structure of the local host chapter or located in an operational unit separate from the local chapter. The
organizational roles of volunteers, on the other hand, are markedly different: trained volunteers are likely to possess disaster roles which are less well-defined than those of professional staff while "walk-in" volunteers may possess none at all.

In this discussion of operational problems in Red Cross mass care, we shall consider some of the consequences for the organization of the mobilization of such volunteers: first, the activation of trained volunteers; second, the mobilization of "walk-in" volunteers.

Trained Volunteers

Disaster mobilization activates the organizational roles of many Red Cross volunteers who during "normal" periods are relatively inactive in the chapter. Called upon in community emergencies to assume their responsibilities in the disaster relief efforts of the chapter, some may fail to do so, either by remaining inactive or by acting outside of the prescriptions of their organizational roles. Quantitative data on the failure of volunteers to respond actively to disaster mobilization is limited: Form and his associates (1954: 99-100) report that of seven volunteer chairmen in their Red Cross sample, two failed to respond immediately to mobilization, doing nothing until the day after the disaster impact; in their sample of lower status Red Cross volunteers, all responded immediately to disaster mobilization. Data from the same study, however, led to the conclusion that "prac-
tically all of the membership of the local Red Cross behaved as individuals rather than as functionally integrated members of an organization" (1954:100). This individualistic and spontaneous behavior on the part of volunteers is one of the major problems which the Red Cross chapter faces in disaster operations: if it is chronic such behavior leads to the break down of the system of organizational roles which makes orderliness and predictability possible.

This kind of particularistic and autonomous behavior is illustrated in the following statement from a volunteer chapter chairman in which he describes his own behavior following the impact of a tornado in his community:

I got into the [impacted] area and started doing several things. I ran back to my home again to make sure that my family was o.k.... [My wife] and my daughter were in the basement so they were all right. And then I ran out to see if our radio station towers had stood up, and they had. [He is the owner of the radio station.] We lost a building out there, but the towers were all right and the main building...and equipment were all right. And then I came back and went down to the Civil Defense office.

He remained at the Civil Defense headquarters for the rest of the night. Whether there were any official representatives of the local Red Cross chapter at the scene of the disaster during this immediate post-impact period he did not know. He suggested that some of the personnel who were there had received Red Cross training, even though they were not members of the chapter:
I think every policeman and ambulance driver and fireman and all those people who would be on the scene early have all had Red Cross first aid training and carry Red Cross cards, so...I think there were people capable of administering first aid properly...But there were no chapter representatives out there to my knowledge unless they were just out there on their own, just simply going into the area.

Coordination of volunteer efforts under such conditions is clearly impossible as the same volunteer chairman admitted:

Everyone is asking us questions now, why [Red Cross disaster relief] just fell apart here locally, somehow or other. But we weren't prepared, really, the first six hours. And there's no point in trying to [hide it]. That is just a plain and simple fact. We didn't know what the hell to do.

Only when the representatives of the area and national organization arrived was some coordination of the chapter's relief work possible:

Of course, as soon as [the area and national people] got there, I think that everything went real well...when we had someone to more or less tell us what to do. But until that point, we just simply weren't ready. I have made a million promises to myself since this thing hit that we're going to be ready the next time.

Although this example is unusual and, as the chapter is relatively small, unlike most of the Red Cross chapters examined in this study, it does reveal the seriousness of the problems confronting all chapters as they mobilize their volunteers for disaster relief.

The major structural source of these problems is the temporal segregation of the volunteer disaster structure
from the "normal" on-going activities of the Red Cross chapter. As this is a feature of all Red Cross chapter, the operational problems which it generates also tend to be endemic. Volunteers who are active in the organization only in disasters are more likely, it would seem, to lose interest in their Red Cross affiliations during "normal" periods than are volunteers whose contributions are made more regularly.46 "One of the most difficult things to keep an interest in," observed one Red Cross chapter manager, "is a disaster plan." Given this tendency toward waning interest, it is not possible to assume that the volunteers included when the plan was written will respond in their organizationally defined roles when disaster strikes.47 In the following statement, a Red Cross staff member described how his chapter's disaster plan has been written to take this problem into account:

We have purposefully not structured our disaster plan to be a rigid plan, but a flexible, flowing plan. I'm not in favor of writing beautiful plans on paper and putting a bunch of names on there and saying, "These are the

46When disaster contributions are regular, this hypothesis may not hold. We shall consider the conditions under which this regularity is possible later in this discussion.

47One chapter executive estimated that in the seven years between the writing of his chapter's disaster plan and its revision, two-thirds of the volunteers included in the plan were no longer even living in the community.
people [who will be responsible for these duties]." Because once you are locked into that kind of plan, if these people do not show up, then there's no shifting of gears. ...What we have done in our planning, for instance...is try to be as flexible as possible, involve as many people as possible in our planning, so that the people that are available to do the job that needs to be done [when a disaster strikes]...are ushered into these jobs....We don't try to lock each person into a specific job at a specific place at a specific time.

Similarly, a large Red Cross chapter's disaster plan includes this advice to all disaster volunteers:

Flexibility is the keynote in your assignment. As a disaster worker, you must be prepared to meet various needs as they arise. Plans are always being upset. Supplies are of an emergency type only. Even though you may have been assigned because of some specialized knowledge Red Cross depends on your ability to "roll with the punches".

Thus, disaster volunteers whose roles in the "normal" structure of the Red Cross chapter are unclear (as was indicated in Chapter Three) may also be unclear of their responsibilities in the disaster structure of the organization. Indeed, they may not even identify their disaster actions with the organization, as the findings of one study suggest (Form, et. al., 1954:100). While this breakdown of organization roles appears frequently in Red Cross chapters whose

48 Of these data, Form and his associates write: "A major difference between the higher echelons and the lowest ...was that those in the higher echelons felt that even as they functioned as individuals they were under the direction of the Red Cross; those in the lowest did not."
communities are impacted by disasters, it does not always occur. We turn now to a discussion of the conditions under which such disorganization is notable for its absence.

Red Cross chapters, like certain other emergency-relevant organizations, especially public utilities (Barton, 1969:94-97), may develop more than "paper" preparedness for disasters if their members more or less regularly are subjected to experience with disaster. When this is the case, a "disaster subculture" (Moore, 1964) may develop in which organizational response to emergency becomes institutionalized and "disasters" become "normal emergencies" for which the members of the organization, volunteer and staff, are prepared. Disaster impact is not "disastrous" in the sense that it places new and unexpected demands on the Red Cross chapter; rather, the volunteers and professional staff of the chapter know from past experience where they should go, what they should do, under whom they should work, and so forth. In one city chapter, for example, which is subjected to flooding on virtually a yearly schedule, an especially severe flood did not present many problems which the volunteer members of the chapter were unable to meet with their "normal" emergency procedures. The chapter manager offered the following observations on the capabilities of his volunteers in meeting operational problems:

In our operation there were very few problems that sufficient manpower hasn't been able to solve for us....The problems that came up and
were called to my attention were not unsolvable. It was just a question of who did we have who could get on that problem and come up with what appeared to be the best answer.

A member of the Red Cross national staff assigned to the city during this flooding concurred with the manager's positive evaluation of the disaster structure of the organization:

[This city] happens to be very fortunate in that they've got a well-trained disaster staff. They've got plenty of volunteers who know their functions. They've got a good volunteer organization.

Collective experience with "normal emergencies" may generate, as a social component of the technical disaster subculture, a feeling of cohesiveness and solidarity between chapter staff and disaster volunteers. The manager of this chapter commented on the absence in his organization of any invidious distinctions between "staff" and "volunteers"; everyone, he said, is "staff":

There are some of us here who report to this office every day of the week and make our livelihood out of it and then there are others... who make their livelihood somewhere else, but we try hard to see that there's no "He's staff, I'm volunteer" comments. We are all staff. The only difference is that some of us are paid and some of us are unpaid staff.

A combination of such characteristics—a history of disasters, the development of a disaster subculture, and a de-emphasis on staff/volunteer differences—makes for an unusually effective volunteer disaster structure, one which
is unlikely to experience the breakdown of organizational roles described in the first part of this discussion. The disaster experience of most Red Cross chapters would seem to fall somewhere between these two examples.

For most Red Cross chapters faced with community disaster, the situation is unique, volunteers and staff have little or no previous experience as members of the organization with disaster operations, and the members of the two structures have not had to coordinate their activities and decisions under the crisis conditions of the post-impact period. Speaking from a background of many years in Red Cross disaster work, the disaster director of one of the largest chapters in the country indicated that independent and spontaneous behavior by both staff and volunteers is a predictable element of the organization's initial reactions to disaster:

I have never seen a disaster plan work the way it was planned to go because people simply don't follow a plan when disaster strikes. Everybody is on his own for the time being.

This discussion has suggested that the explanation may lie in the structure of the Red Cross chapter, perhaps more than in the human propensity to deviate from plans during a crisis. Structural segregation, which is functional for Red Cross effectiveness in "normal" periods may contribute significantly to operational difficulties in disasters. The disaster event, then, is a kind of catalyst, revealing
organizational deficiencies and strains within and between the volunteer structure and the staff structure (both local and national) which otherwise would be concealed by the segregation of these structures from one another.

"Walk-in" Volunteers

The problem with the trained volunteer in disaster relief is that he does not always do what he was trained to do. The problem with the "walk-in" volunteer is that he was not trained to do anything. Merton (1969:xxi-xxii) suggests that this lack of preparation may pose a difficult problem for disaster organizations which accept "walk-in" members:

The wish to "do something" may release the crisis-induced personal motivation but does not create the trained capacity to do something that is genuinely helpful. The attempt of people to engage in roles for which they are unprepared produces the self-defeating exercise of good will. For good will that is unorganized in functionally organized roles produces the random behavior that interferes with the adaptive behaviors that are being mobilized....How to harness these motives, once they are activated to effectively organized efforts remains one of the principal problems...of emergency social systems that develop after great disasters.

In disasters organizations are subject to varying degrees of stress. "Organizational stress" may be conceptualized as a consequence of dramatically increasing demands concurrent with constant or even decreasing capabilities (Haas and Quarantelli, 1964). The convergence of "walk-in"
volunteers on expanding organizations like the Red Cross chapter is part of the increase in demands made on the organization in disaster. "Walk-in" volunteers demand something to do; they cannot be turned away without risking damage to the organization's sometimes dubious public image. The capability of the chapter to supply this demand for something to do, particularly as these volunteers have no previous experience with the organization and hence must be closely supervised, is reduced, as Dynes (1968:66-67) suggests, because those personnel best qualified to serve as supervisors are required elsewhere in the organization. Staff members, precisely because they are familiar with the policies and procedures of the Red Cross, serve in coordinating, liaison, and contact positions rather than at the level of direct supervision of chapter volunteers.49 (It is for this reason, too, that the breakdown of the organizational roles of trained volunteers is so crucial a disaster problem for Red Cross chapters; staff are not available to supervise directly the activities of these volunteers either. This point raises again the issue of chapter governance which we considered in Chapter Three: generally speaking, chapter staff are probably more familiar

49 Two-thirds of the professional staff listed in Table 3, for example, have disaster assignments which may be considered coordinative rather than supervisory. It seems likely that this pattern appears in most Red Cross chapters.
with Red Cross policy than chapter volunteers, but it is the volunteers who are officially designated as chapter governors.)

When the problem of "walk-in" volunteers—how to channel their motivation to "do something"—is placed in the context of organizational stress, two divergent evaluations of their disaster contributions which frequently appear in the data of this study become understandable. On the one hand, "walk-in" volunteers are viewed negatively by Red Cross staff and trained volunteers; they are seen as part of the problem of disasters rather than part of the solution. On the other hand, Red Cross personnel evaluate the contributions of "walk-in" volunteers very highly, even extravagantly. We shall suggest in this discussion that a variable which helps to explain these apparent contradictions is the degree of organizational stress engendered by these "walk-in" volunteers.

The following statement comes from a staff member of a Red Cross chapter and expresses, very clearly, a negative evaluation of "walk-in" volunteers:

It will probably take years to undo the harm done the chapter by the use of untrained and uncontrolled volunteers. This is by no means a criticism of those trained volunteers who did such a magnificent job, but only of those ["walk-in" volunteers] who gave out misinformation wholesale, who loudly criticized the organization within earshot of clients, and those who were mentally ill....Unfortunately, for a considerable time, [Red Cross] arm bands and other identification items were completely
accessible to anyone. These were picked up by a considerable number of neighborhood bums, who stole everything not nailed down, including the porter's uniform.\(^{50}\)

Such volunteers make enormous demands on the organization; they require, as this respondent suggests, constant supervision and control. Under disaster conditions the chapter cannot afford such supervision; hence, these volunteers are organizational liabilities rather than assets.

An incident related by the disaster chairman of another Red Cross chapter refers to both the dearth of supervisory personnel in an emergency period and, in this case, to a positive evaluation of the "walk-in" volunteers. His evaluation is positive because these volunteers did not require supervision:

I did hear one story about...[some "walk-in" volunteers] making sandwiches to feed [the evacuees] and someone said, "Well, what do we do about this?" and [one of the women] said, "Well, what are you asking me for? I'm a volunteer." And before they got through they found out that everybody there was working like mad and they were all volunteers. They had all Indians and no particular leaders... which is kind of unique.\(^{51}\) The leaders were

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\(^{50}\) Another staff member, commenting on the same problem, was somewhat less negative although he, too, recognized the difficulties involved in using "walk-in" volunteers: "So the door was pretty much open and anybody who came in with a willing face and willing arm, why, we put a Red Cross band on him and put him to work, which is a dangerous process. But sometimes you don't have time to take pedigrees and find out what the person's motive is."

\(^{51}\) Contrary to this respondent, such a situation is not "kind of unique": Dynes (1968:66) writes: "Expanding
out making contacts and here were all these people doing one dang of a job and they're all "walk-in" volunteers.

"Walk-in" volunteers such as these who did not require chapter supervision are often members of pre-existing groups which volunteer their services as a group to the Red Cross chapter. A number of disaster studies have indicated that group volunteers are, in the main, more effective and less problematic in disaster relief operations than those who volunteer as individuals (Barton, 1969:190-191). Such groups, in effect, bring their own supervisors with them. When they can be employed by the Red Cross in relatively low level positions--preparing sandwiches, unloading, sorting, storing, and distributing supplies, and the like--they are clearly assets to the chapter's mass care operations. Comparing his experiences with group volunteers with the problems of individual "walk-in's", one Red Cross staff member commented:

We were very fortunate in being able to work with groups which helped tremendously....This was not the case [at the downtown chapter headquarters], I understand. They worked through individuals and, of course, when you need as many volunteers as we needed in this thing, you'll just spend all your time trying to recruit individuals and this should not be.

organizations have many workers but few managers. This perhaps seems paradoxical since, often in situations of high demands, the accusation is made that 'everybody wants to manage and no one wants to work' or, more graphically, 'all chiefs and no Indians.'
School and college groups, civic and fraternal organizations, and religious groups all volunteer as groups in disaster situations. Of one group of Mennonite volunteers, a chapter staff member made this assessment: "They just float in and say, 'Here we are'. They go about their work and in a few hours it's done and then they said, 'Goodbye'. They do a beautiful job." That they work within their own group context seems to account in large measure for the "beautiful job" they do.

Not all "walk-in" volunteers, however, know when to say "Goodbye". Such difficulties were associated in one disaster with high school and college volunteers. Unlike most adult "walk-in's", young volunteers do not have family and job obligations which preclude their assistance after the immediate emergency period. Rather, according to a Red Cross staff member, it began to look as if the boys and girls were never going home; they were, in fact, spending the nights in the chapter house. This staff member took it upon himself to send them home. In the following statement he explained why:

It was not that I thought anything was wrong, but it just didn't seem right. It was an opportunity for something to happen that would bring bad publicity and bad public relations to our side if anything would happen to one of those teen-age girls. They were sleeping in the building with the teen-age boys and college boys around all the time.

Thus, these volunteers became organizational liabilities when
their presence required supervision; during the emergency phase they had, according to this Red Cross staff member, "worked like Trojans" but, "after the real push was over... it became a problem in knowing that [these kids] were in it for a lark."

An additional problem is that the convergence of "walk-in" volunteers is not constant through the emergency phase of disaster operations. Their willingness to contribute to the relief effort appears to vary with such independent factors as the time of day and the day of the week of the disaster impact. Evenings and weekends, according to Red Cross staff in several cities, are optimum times for "walk-in" volunteers. More people are free of occupational obligations and are available to assist in emergencies than would be during the day, Mondays through Fridays. Given these variations and the typical service time of "walk-in" volunteers which does not extend beyond the excitement and Gemeinschaft social relations of the emergency period, it is sometimes necessary for Red Cross chapters to hire additional personnel to perform the continuing tasks of disaster relief previously performed gratuitously by "walk-in" volunteers.52

52 "Walk-in" volunteers, however, may become permanent volunteers as one chapter manager reported: "Some of the volunteers who were, quote, "walk-in" volunteers have now become more formally affiliated with the organization.... We've involved four or five doctors.... We have more nurses
Volunteers are problematic for the Red Cross chapter when they must be directly supervised in disaster operations. This generalization appears to hold for both trained volunteers and "walk-in's". Because the chapter's supervisory resources must be deployed elsewhere during the emergency period, volunteers, especially those who "walk-in" as groups, who do not require supervision are organizational assets; those who do, are organizational liabilities. The source of volunteer problems of this sort was nicely identified by one chapter member when he observed: "Red Cross says, 'We have a place for everybody.' Well, we don't have a place for everybody." At best the chapter has only a problematic place for volunteers who require supervision and control; for trained volunteers and those who can work independently, on the other hand, the Red Cross chapter does have a place in its disaster operations.

Operational Problems in Red Cross Support Tasks

If the mandatory mass care services of the Red Cross chapter are to be carried out, chapter personnel must provide the communications and transportation support necessary for them. In this final section, we shall briefly discuss some of the problems encountered by the Red Cross chapter in facilitating mass care services through two basic support tasks: communications and transportation. In this discussion...
we shall be more concerned with material than with personnel problems; some note will be made of the organizational ties of Red Cross chapters with other community organizations during disaster operations.

Communications

Typically, Red Cross disaster plans rely on the telephone as the principal means of communication for mobilizing personnel and coordinating mass care services. Most convenient certainly, the telephone is generally an unreliable medium of communication in disaster, especially during the immediate post-impact period when Red Cross personnel are required to make great use of it. Even when telephone service is not disrupted by the disaster impact, Red Cross chapters discover that existing switchboard systems are insufficient to carry the load of incoming calls. Additional lines installed for the emergency help alleviate the communications convergence, but rarely relieve the problem completely.

The problem, according to many Red Cross personnel, is not so much with the incoming calls as with intra- and inter-organizational communications. Messages to Red Cross volunteers working in shelters, for example, are difficult to send by telephone; similarly, feedback from workers in the disaster area is often delayed because Red Cross personnel cannot reach the chapter headquarters by telephone.
Inter-organizational communications between the Red Cross chapter and other disaster-relevant organizations are often haphazard at best. The disaster director of one chapter described the problem in the following statement:

You had to make sure that you got all your business transacted [while you were on the telephone] because you never knew whether you could call back or not. A lot of people would say, "Well, call me back." Of course when you tried to reach them later, you couldn't get through and they didn't know you were trying to reach them, so they weren't returning your call. This presented some problems.

He said that attempts were made to keep a few lines open for outgoing and intra-organizational calls but that these attempts were foiled. Duplication of efforts was a major dysfunction of these communications difficulties, according to the same staff member:

People would call in and they'd get you on one line and then you'd be cut off and they'd get somebody else on another line. So that'd be two people working on every project.

As other emergency organizations have discovered, communications is least problematic when a radio system is available to members of the organization. Many Red Cross chapters incorporate amateur radio groups into their disaster structures and during disaster operations use these facilities for intra-organizational communications. Such radio systems are especially useful in maintaining contact between Red Cross shelters and chapter headquarters. Mobile radio systems are also very helpful in disaster survey. A
chapter communications volunteer reported that surveys of the extent and severity of flood damage were greatly facilitated by mobile radios: "The only way you can survey something," he said, "is if you can get the information back to headquarters. This is the way we do it."

Large city chapters which can afford the investment may be equipped with their own radio system and mobile units. Such chapters, therefore, do not require the services of amateur groups and, in fact, members of one large chapter staff indicated that they discourage amateur radio operators from volunteering on the grounds that they tend not to be serious about their work. Alternate sources of radio communications systems are available for chapters which cannot afford the equipment themselves. Taxis with two-way radios and other businesses which possess delivery or service vehicles with radio systems may be recruited for Red Cross use. When these systems are employed as back-up communications to be mobilized if telephone service is inadequate or disrupted, the dependence of the chapter on the telephone as the principal means of alerting dispatchers and drivers may, of course, be self-defeating.

Transportation

The inter-organizational division of labor in disaster operations relieves the Red Cross chapter of all transportation services except those directly related to the operation of public shelters and other mass care facilities. The Red
Cross chapter is not officially responsible for evacuation of persons threatened by disaster, transportation of disaster victims to hospitals, or even the transportation of refugees to Red Cross shelters. These tasks are delegated to the police, fire, and, most frequently, Civil Defense units. Members of Red Cross chapters often become involved in these tasks—indeed, this may be part of the organizational breakdown during emergencies—but these tasks remain outside the mandatory obligations of the organization.

Like communications support, however, the collection and distribution of disaster supplies is a crucial Red Cross support task which must be adequately performed if the mass care services of the chapter are to be carried out. Again, like communications, transportation often requires equipment which most Red Cross chapters do not possess.

In addition to the use of the private vehicles of volunteer members of the chapter, many Red Cross units also have agreements with businesses or public agencies, like delivery services and defense installations, which make vehicles and, in some instances, drivers available for chapter use during disasters. Pre-disaster plans may be made with food companies in which the companies agree to make the emergency deliveries themselves. Or, as in one city chapter frequently impacted by hurricanes, markets located close to shelter facilities are selected as suppliers of emergency food, thus minimizing the transportation problems. Such plans as these
are always subject to disruption: when disasters strike on a weekend, for example, owners and managers of food stores and suppliers of other necessities (e.g., ice for food preservation) are often difficult to contact. When the disaster is so diffused that new shelters must be opened for which no preparations were made, supplying the evacuees housed there is a very difficult problem.

Generally speaking, the problems the Red Cross chapter faces in adequately performing communications and transportation support tasks are problems of material as much, if not more, than they are of personnel. Compounding these difficulties is the fact that frequently the Red Cross chapter must rely on other organizations and agencies for the necessary equipment. While Red Cross chapter mass care services have been somewhat jealously guarded against intrusion from other organizations, the support tasks which make these services possible cannot be carried out by most Red Cross chapters without the assistance of other agencies.

Summary

In this chapter the focus has been on some of the disaster dysfunctions of the structural arrangements of the Red Cross chapter described in Chapter Three. We have not attempted to review in detail all of the problems the organization may face in disaster operations, but have emphasized instead those which appear to be most directly related to the process of structural succession as it occurs in Red
Cross disaster mobilization. The segregation of the staff and volunteer "normal" and disaster structures is an effective organizational device, given the dual goals which the Red Cross chapter serves. In disaster situations, however, the confrontation of the members of normally separated local and national staffs and of local staff and volunteer structures may lead to difficulties in coordination, authority, and the distribution of disaster tasks. In many cases, such problems appear to be largely unavoidable given the infrequency of community disasters; where disasters have been "normalized" and a disaster subculture has developed, many of these problems may be successfully avoided. To the extent that Red Cross chapters can simulate this "normalization" through periodic disaster drills and rehearsals, these problems may be minimized.

In the final chapter of this study, we shall bring together some of the major themes of our analysis of the Red Cross chapter and consider some of its implications for organizational research and theory.
CHAPTER V
THE RED CROSS CHAPTER CONSTRUCTED TYPE:
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study has presented a constructed type of the Red Cross chapter, focusing on the goals, structures, and disaster operations of that organization. The data on which the study has drawn most heavily are the field interviews collected by members of the Disaster Research Center of The Ohio State University over the past ten years. Thus, the Red Cross chapter data analyzed in this study are descriptive of a series of chapters which have been directly involved during the last decade in emergency relief following natural disasters. That these data have been presented in the form of a single type is a methodological and heuristic device; the Red Cross chapter described in this study is not a statistical average, but a constructed type. The themes which are its content have been derived from the data which DRC has accumulated on Red Cross chapters in the United States. These themes have also been informed by data collected in other research into the Red Cross and its disaster operations and by three theoretical concepts from the literature on organizations.
In this final chapter we shall consider first the general implications of this Red Cross chapter type for the three sensitizing concepts employed in this study: (1) voluntary association, (2) goal succession, and (3) structural succession. Secondly, we shall outline the major elements of the constructed type as it has been developed in this study and, finally, we shall suggest a number of tentative propositions about the organization and operation of the Red Cross chapter which have been derived from the type. Further investigation of the Red Cross along the lines suggested by these hypotheses will contribute to the explanatory power of the type and to a more conclusive understanding of the Red Cross chapter.

The Red Cross Chapter and Organizational Theory

We return in this discussion to the three concepts which have informed much of the description and analysis of this study: voluntary association, goal succession, and structural succession. We shall review each of these concepts in terms of the investigation of the Red Cross chapter presented in this study.

The Red Cross Chapter as a Voluntary Association

As was noted in Chapter One, the concept "voluntary association" is less than adequately grounded in organizational research and theory. Serious questions may be raised about the usefulness of the concept insofar as its referents
are difficult to distinguish from those of its antonym. That its antonym, presumably "involuntary association", is even less established than "voluntary association" reflects the conceptual difficulties associated with the concept.

Two characteristics attributed to voluntary associations were identified in Chapter One. First, the membership of such organizations is voluntary in that it is not based on ascription or an economic necessity; second, the organization itself is voluntary in the sense that it is the independent creation of its members collectively seeking some public goals. This study of the Red Cross chapter as a voluntary association indicates that these two criteria may vary independently of each other and, thus, that the sense in which a given association may be said to be "voluntary" may also vary through time. A review of the membership and the goals of the Red Cross chapter in these terms will reveal these variations.

Four types of members\(^53\) of the Red Cross chapter have been described: (1) local staff who are members of the organization in both "normal" and disaster periods; (2) area and

\(^{53}\text{"Member" is used here to refer to individuals whose activities may be said to be defined by the organization; thus, a "member's" activities may be evaluated positively or negatively, as in the case of "walk-in" or trained volunteers who either adhere to the prescriptions of their organizational roles or deviate from them.}
national staff who are members of the corporation and may become members of the local chapter during their disaster service; (3) regular trained volunteers who are members of the chapter in both "normal" and disaster periods but may be relatively inactive during "normal" periods; and (4) "walk-in" volunteers who become members during disaster relief operations but whose membership is likely to terminate with the emergency.

Of these four types of members, volunteers are the most "voluntary"; staff members as paid professionals earn their living through their affiliation with the Red Cross chapter. Their affiliation is economic; their compliance is utilitarian (Etzioni, 1961a). Of the two types of volunteer members, it may be argued that the "walk-in" volunteers are the more "voluntary" if only in the sense that their services appear to be proffered more freely and, for that matter, terminated more freely than is true of trained volunteers. This difference appears more clearly when the conditions under which "walk-in" volunteers and "recruited" advisors become members of the Red Cross chapter are contrasted. The former are motivated by the emergency to help (Taylor, et. al., 1970:60-61); the latter's assistance is actively solicited by members of the Red Cross chapter. The difference between "walk-in" and "unsolicited" volunteers is less apparent, but Sills' (1957:102-103) data on the voluntary members of the March of Dimes suggest that most
"unsolicited" volunteers are, in fact, solicited by friends and associates. If this is also true of Red Cross volunteers, our argument will gain credence. Thus, there appear to be some grounds for the tentative assertion that, of the types of members of the Red Cross chapter, the "walk-in" volunteer is the most "voluntary".

Two types of organizational goals have been described for the Red Cross chapter. On the one hand, there are the mandatory goals defined for the organization by its external chartering agent, the Congress of the United States. Disaster services and services to military families are thus obligations of the Red Cross chapter which it cannot abjure. On the other hand, the Red Cross has taken on in the course of its history a number of permissive goals, including its public health and blood donor programs. These permissive goals, as we have seen, are voluntary in the sense that the corporation assumed them of its own volition and, on occasion, has dropped them. Local chapters are also free to initiate efforts directed toward these goals or not as their resources and the needs of their communities dictate. Of these two sets of goals, then, the permissive set is more "voluntary" than the mandatory set.

Along the "voluntary-involuntary" dimension both membership and goals of the Red Cross chapter are variables, ranging from voluntary "walk-in" members to involuntary staff members and from voluntary permissive goals to involun-
tary mandatory goals. A simple four-cell table defined by these two variables indicates how they are related to each other in the Red Cross chapter. See Figure 6.

Cells 1 and 4 in which membership and goals are consistent on the "voluntary-involuntary" dimension are combinations which are not typical of the Red Cross chapter. "Walk-in" volunteers do not carry out the permissive services of the organization; staff and trained volunteers do (Cell 1). Professional staff, on the other hand, are responsible for the performance of the chapter's mandatory disaster goals, but they are not the principal agents of these goals; trained and "walk-in" volunteers are (Cell 4). Cells 2 and 3 fit more closely the operations of the Red Cross chapter. Permissive services are staff responsibilities during "normal" times (Cell 2) and, in disaster, the mandatory goals of the Red Cross are served by activated volunteers and "walk-in" volunteers who wish to contribute to the relief effort (Cell 3).

Two observations about the Red Cross chapter as a voluntary association seem to be suggested by this analysis. First, the two criteria we have employed as defining characteristics of voluntary associations are not, in the case of the Red Cross chapter, congruent in the organization. If we look for the voluntary goals of the organization we are led to its involuntary members, the staff. This is not to say, of course, that volunteers are not involved in the per-
## FIGURE 6

**VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY GOALS AND MEMBERSHIP IN THE RED CROSS CHAPTER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Red Cross Chapter Membership</th>
<th>Voluntary Goals</th>
<th>Involuntary Goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>Permissive goals/Walk-in volunteers</td>
<td>Mandatory goals/Walk-in volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involuntary</td>
<td>Permissive goals/Professional staff</td>
<td>Mandatory goals/Professional staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Diagram showing the relationship between Red Cross Chapter membership and voluntary/involuntary goals]
missive services of the chapter; we have seen that they are. But the goals which the greatest number of voluntary members of the chapter serve are not the permissive, but the mandatory disaster goals of the Red Cross. When we look for the involuntary goals of the organization, we are led to the most voluntary of its members, the "walk-in" volunteers. These two criteria for voluntary associations are analytically distinct; in the Red Cross chapter they appear to vary independently of each other.

The second observation is related to this first one. The Red Cross chapter is not a static organization. Its staff and volunteer structures are subject to major alterations as its members respond to changes in the organization's environment. These structural alterations are related directly to the variable goals and membership of the Red Cross chapter. When the chapter's goals shift from permissive to mandatory (from voluntary to involuntary) as a result of disaster, the organization's membership also shifts. The latter shift, however, is from involuntary to voluntary (from staff to volunteers). The sense in which the Red Cross chapter may be said to be, by our criteria, a "voluntary association" is subject to variation through time: in the sense of its membership, the chapter may be more "voluntary" in disaster operations than in "normal" periods; in its goals, the chapter is more "voluntary" in
"normal" operations than it is in disasters. To say that the Red Cross chapter is a voluntary association requires, then, some specification. In exactly what sense is it "voluntary"? Is it always "voluntary" in that sense? Or is its "voluntariness" subject to change over time?

These questions may contribute to the clarification of some of the ambiguities and inconsistencies in the concept "voluntary association" itself. There has been a tendency in the literature to employ the concept "voluntary association" only where it can be applied least ambiguously; where it is problematic, such organizations are analyzed under other rubrics (cf., Sills, 1968:363-364). Clarification of the concept would seem to be more likely if it is applied where it is problematic but where, intuitively at least, it seems a useful designation. Such is the case with the Red Cross chapter. Intuitively, the chapter is a voluntary association; on closer examination it appears more correct to say that the Red Cross chapter is sometimes in some respects a voluntary association; at other times in other respects it is a voluntary association. This is to say, also, that at all times in some respects the Red Cross chapter is not a voluntary association. It may be that the voluntary-involuntary distinction in organizational theory will ultimately lose its *prima facie* validity and become a single dimension applicable to all organizations as the formal-informal distinction has become (Blau and Meyer,
The questions which this study of the Red Cross chapter as a voluntary association raises seem to imply answers which lead in that direction.

**Goal Succession in the Red Cross Chapter**

Organizations are located in an environment. When the environment alters or when the organization's relationship to the environment changes, problems, sometimes of crisis proportions, are created for the organization. The understanding that even highly bureaucratized organizations are not rigid unchanging structures but rather adapt and shift as their environment changes has contributed significantly to the sociological theory of organizations. Blau's (1963: 243ff) revision of the goal displacement process to include its complement, goal succession, has informed our analysis of the goal-setting process in the American National Red Cross. While we have been particularly interested in the effects of this process on the local chapter of the Red Cross, Chapter Two included a sketch of some of the more dramatic of these adjustments as they occurred in the national organization over the past seventy years.

"The most crucial choice an organization can make," observes Zald (1970:50),

...is that of its basic work: Who are to be the target groups? What is to be done? What means are to be used? In brief, what are the organization's goals?

The choices which the Red Cross has made have increased the
scope of the organization's "normal" activities; the public health and blood donor programs, for example, are permissive goals which justify organizational activity in non-emergency conditions. Increasing emphasis on permissive services, however, was not associated with de-emphasis on the organization's disaster services. In this respect, the career of the Red Cross appears to differ somewhat from that of the YMCA (Zald, 1970). In the latter organization the succession of its "general service" goal was accompanied by a de-emphasis on its original evangelistic goals (Zald, 1970:69-70). In the case of the Red Cross, its charter prohibited any major de-emphasis of its disaster goals even though the organization assumed new permissive goals. In effect, "goal succession" in the Red Cross appears to have been "goal addition", a variation on Blau's concept. The most recent changes in the Red Cross, however, suggest that a more similar pattern may be emerging. As the YMCA adapted to the secularization of its social environment by de-emphasizing its evangelical orientations, so the Red Cross may be adapting to governmental centralization of social services by redefining its rehabilitation goals, serving increasingly as a referring agency during the rebuilding phase of disaster relief rather than as a dispensing organization.

Nonetheless, the Red Cross has remained a disaster or-
ganization. Its mass care relief services have not been significantly altered during its history; it is still defined—and still defines itself—as the "official" relief organization in all natural disasters. What John W. Davies, legal counsellor to the Red Cross, wrote to the chairman of the Red Cross War Council in 1918 still applies to the Red Cross:

When any question arises as to the scope and activities of the American Red Cross, it must always be remembered that its charter is not only a grant of power but an imposition of duties....It owes, therefore, to the government which it serves the distinct duty of discharging all those functions for which it was created (quoted in American National Red Cross, 1963a:7).

Whenever new governmental disaster relief programs have been established, they have carefully left the chartered duties of the Red Cross inviolate. The Red Cross remains the "official" disaster mass care organization.

The Red Cross, like a number of other complex organizations, accepts as legitimate enterprises a variety of goals. Like the university, for example, which serves both knowledge-generating and knowledge-transmitting goals, the Red Cross serves both emergency and non-emergency goals. It is for this reason that the concept "structural succession" appears to make sense of much of the patterned behavior of members of the Red Cross chapter. We turn now to a summary consideration of this concept in the light of our analysis of the Red Cross chapter.
Structural Succession in the Red Cross Chapter

Organizations with multiple purposes can manage these goals by segregating, in space or time, the personnel responsible for them. Etzioni (1961a:265ff) has referred to these two options as "concomitant" and "successive" division of compliance; we have employed the term "structural succession" to identify the process through which the disaster (or mandatory) goal structures of the Red Cross chapter replace the "normal" (or permissive) structures. Disaster mobilization may be understood as the patterned shift of the Red Cross chapter from its "normal" to its disaster structures, i.e., as structural succession.

This succession of structures implies, of course, that the two structures (each of which were subdivided into staff and volunteer components) are temporally segregated. A number of operational problems which the Red Cross chapter faces in disaster relief are consequences of this separation of structures. The breakdown of organizational roles among trained volunteers, for example, and the problems of supervision and control which often accompany "walk-in" volunteers seem to result, at least in part, from this segregation of chapter structures. Similarly, the difficulties chapter staff sometimes experience in working with area and national personnel would seem to be consequences of the "normal" segregation in space of these two organizational levels. Red Cross disaster mobilization is problematic, not
simply because the effects of disaster threat or impact are disruptive, but also because the structure of the organization itself generates operational problems.

This is not to say that major problems in disaster mobilization are inevitable in Red Cross chapters because their "normal" and disaster structures must be segregated. The continuity of the disaster roles of chapter staff with their "normal" responsibilities is one factor, for example, which may significantly affect the extent to which mobilization is problematic. The greater the continuity between these roles, the less problematic is disaster mobilization likely to be. Because, however, some discontinuities between "normal" and disaster roles seem inevitable (almost by definition) and because chapter staff cannot be permanently mobilized for their disaster responsibilities, it seems unlikely that the operational problems associated with these role discontinuities can be completely avoided. Chapters, however, can assign disaster roles among their staff in such a way as to maximize continuities and minimize discontinuities.

Volunteer problems, too, are not inevitable. Mobilization activates the disaster roles of many volunteer members who are normally inactive. When experience with Red Cross disaster relief is sufficient to normalize these emergency roles, volunteer members can apparently assume them with
little difficulty. When normalization of these disaster roles creates a disaster subculture, the mobilization of trained volunteers may become almost automatic. "Normal" periods during which Red Cross volunteers do not actively play their membership roles may not significantly diminish their capacity to assume those roles when disaster strikes. In communities where such disaster subcultures have not developed, disaster rehearsals may contribute to more effective organizational operations when an emergency does arise. The familiar observation that disaster plans are not worth the paper they are written on unless they are activated probably does not need repeating here.

This analysis of disaster mobilization as structural succession admittedly is partial. The Red Cross chapter not only shifts its structure as it mobilizes for disaster, it also shifts back to its "normal" structures when it demobilizes. No data are available on this complementary shift, but it too is a process of structural succession. The Red Cross chapter, like labor unions and military organizations, passes periodically through a complete cycle of structural succession. In the Red Cross this cycle takes the organization from its "normal" to its disaster structure and back to its "normal" structure. The study of structural succession in the Red Cross must, therefore, await the collection of data on the demobilization process. Such a study might also explore the effects of disaster mobilization on the
organization, i.e., the extent to which the organization "learns" from its disaster experience and the sense in which the "normal" structure to which the organization returns differs from its pre-disaster "normal" structure. For the analysis of organizations like the Red Cross chapter, the concept "structural succession" appears a useful one.

The Red Cross chapter has been analyzed in this study as a voluntary association with multiple goals and with segregated "normal" and disaster structures. Disaster mobilization has been interpreted as the succession of one set of organizational structures over the other and the systematic shifting of the organization from permissive to mandatory goals. In this discussion we have offered some final comments on these three sensitizing concepts and have suggested some possible contributions which this constructed type of the Red Cross chapter may make to the refinement of these concepts.

The Red Cross Chapter Constructed Type: Summary

The constructed type which has been described in this study is an attempt to simplify and order interview and other data collected from Red Cross chapters in natural disasters. The type is composed of four basic elements, two of which may be considered essentially structural components—the goals and membership of the chapter—and two of which have as their empirical referents certain patterned
changes in the chapter through time—**goal succession** and **structural succession**. "Goals" has reference to the mandatory and permissive responsibilities of Red Cross chapters; "membership", to the staff and volunteer personnel whose activities are defined by their organization roles. "Goal succession" is defined by the historical process through which the organization has added permissive responsibilities, and "structural succession" refers to the disaster mobilization (and demobilization) process in the local chapter.

The relationships among these four elements are summarized in Figure 7. If goal succession is understood as the historical context within which this individualizing type is located, then the principal axes of the type are defined by the chapter's "normal" (or permissive) and "disaster" (or mandatory) goals and by the staff and volunteer members of the organization. The four cells which are derived correspond to the major structural subunits of the chapter described in the body of this study:

1. the "normal" staff structure,
2. the disaster staff structure,
3. the "normal" volunteer structure, and
4. the disaster volunteer structure.

Structural succession, then, is the process by which staff and volunteer "normal" structures are succeeded by their disaster counterparts. Demobilization is structural
FIGURE 7

SUMMARY OF THE RED CROSS CHAPTER CONSTRUCTED TYPE: THE FOUR STRUCTURAL UNITS AND THE PATTERNS OF STRUCTURAL SUCCESSION

Membership

Goals

Normal (Permissive)

Normal staff structure

Disaster (Mandatory)

Disaster staff structure

Staff

Volunteer

Normal volunteer structure

Segregation/Succession

↑ ↓ 1

↑ ↓ 2

↑ ↓ 3

↑ ↓ 4
succession in the reverse direction. The complement to these patterns of succession is, of course, temporal segregation, a condition which appears to be related to many of the problems associated with Red Cross chapter disaster operations. (Some of these relationships will be noted in the hypotheses presented later in this section.) The "normal" structures [(1) and (3)] and the disaster structures [(2) and (4)], therefore, are not only theoretically distinct in this constructed type, but are temporally segregated in the history of the Red Cross chapter.

The analytical distinction made in this study between the staff structures [(1) and (2)] and the volunteer structures [(3) and (4)] is less clearly defined. The relationships between staff and volunteer members of the chapter are variable, dependent in part on the type of volunteer in question and his position in the chapter. For this reason, we made low-level descriptive distinctions among "recruited", "unsolicited", and "walk-in" volunteers whose statuses in the Red Cross chapter appear to be related in varying ways to the staff. For example, "recruited" volunteers appear able to exercise from their positions on the several advisory committees and boards of the chapter some authority over staff members. "Unsolicited" volunteers, on the other hand, appear to lack such normatively defined authority; their relationships with chapter staff are less clearly defined. "Walk-in" volunteers, whose chapter status
is least well-defined and whose membership in the organization is relatively limited, are difficult to characterize *vis a vis* the chapter staff. Such considerations as these, in fact, go somewhat beyond the data available for this study. This is one crucial area in which further empirical investigation is required before the relationships among the structural units of the Red Cross chapter can be clearly understood. The absence in Table 6 of any single specification of the relationships between units (1) and (3) or (2) and (4) represents this deficiency.\[^{54}\]

Despite this deficiency in the data, the constructed type presented here appears reasonably coherent and consistent in accounting for the themes and uniformities which have been identified in the data. A necessary characteristic of type analysis is the inconclusiveness of its conclusions; this inconclusiveness cannot be avoided, except through the continuation of the research process which type construction begins. In the final section of this study we shall identify some of the hypotheses which further research can more conclusively test, contributing in that way to the expansion and refinement of this type.

**Suggested Hypotheses for Further Research**

The hypotheses presented in this section suggest re-

\[^{54}\] It may be that the descriptive distinctions among chapter members made in this study will prove inadequate in clarifying the staff-volunteer relationships precisely be-
relationships among the basic elements of the Red Cross chapter constructed type. They define, hypothetically, relationships between the goals of the Red Cross chapter, its various members, and its structural units. These are not abstract propositions, but empirically-derived hypotheses. As such, they reflect the peculiar purposes, characteristics, virtues, and limitations of the constructed type.

1. The larger the professional staff of the Red Cross chapter, the more diversified and complex will be these permissive programs of the chapter.

2. The larger the volunteer membership of the Red Cross chapter, the more complex will be the disaster structure.

The rationale for these two hypotheses rests on the distinctions between the permissive and the mandatory goals of the Red Cross chapter and between its professional and volunteer members. Professional staff, responsible for the day-to-day operations of the organization, take greater part in the permissive programs of the chapter than they do, proportionately, in the disaster programs. Disaster mobilization of the chapter is, in large measure, the activation of otherwise inactive volunteer members; hence, the larger the volunteer membership, the more complex and elaborated cause these distinctions are so close to empirical reality.
the disaster program. Conversely, the larger the staff membership of the chapter, the more elaborated the permissive programs.

3. The greater the concentration of knowledge about Red Cross policy and procedures in the staff of the chapter, the greater the potential for staff-volunteer authority conflict.

Officially, the governance of the local chapter of the Red Cross is the responsibility of its volunteer members. Staff are available as advisors to these volunteers. Structural pressures, however, within the organization may contribute to staff-volunteer tensions: fundamentally, these are related to the greater professional knowledge and expertise about the organization's policies which staff are likely to possess and exercise as a consequence of the functional demands for efficiency in the organization and of the stress associated with disaster operations. External conditions, too, may contribute to these internal strains. In disasters, for example, the contradiction between the Gemeinschaft-like social environment and the professional ethos of chapter and national staff may effectively alienate volunteer members of the chapter (as well as the chapter's public, the disaster victims).

4. The greater the role continuity between the "normal" and disaster responsibilities of staff and volunteers of the chapter, the fewer the problems in disaster
mobilization.

5. The greater the number of volunteer members of the chapter whose organizational roles are deactivated in disaster mobilization, the greater the potential for problems of coordination in disaster operations.

These two hypotheses have reference to the segregation and succession of the "normal" and disaster structures of the Red Cross chapter. When "normal" and disaster roles are discontinuous, the transition from the one to the other appears to be more problematic than is the case when these organizational roles are more or less continuous. Role discontinuity seems more likely among staff because they are, by definition, engaged full-time in the "normal" programs of the chapter. For many volunteers, on the other hand, disaster responsibilities may be their only role in the organization. Assuming adequate preparation for these roles—either through rehearsals of the chapter's disaster plan or through previous experience in disaster operations (as, for example, in chapters which are part of a disaster subculture)—the mobilization of such volunteers may be relatively unproblematic. For those volunteers who have organizational roles in the "normal" structure only, disaster mobilization may require them to ad lib their responses to the emergency. Such individualistic and autonomous behavior is one of the most crucial problems which the Red Cross chapter faces in disaster
6. Individual "walk-in" volunteers are more problematic for the Red Cross chapter than are group organized "walk-in" volunteers.

"Walk-in" volunteers contribute to the organizational stress of the Red Cross chapter in disaster operations. The less, therefore, the demand which such volunteers make on the organization's supervisory resources, the less problematic such volunteers are. Additionally, group organized "walk-in" volunteers are more likely to be positively evaluated by members of the chapter than are individual "walk-in's". This proposition may hold even when the actual contributions of the volunteers are held constant.

7. The more the operational responsibilities of national and local staff overlap in a disaster, the greater the potential for authority and coordination problems.

8. The greater the isolation or segregation of national and local disaster operations from each other, the greater the potential for communication and coordination problems.

The expansion of the Red Cross chapter in disaster operations occurs at the bottom of the organization (with "walk-in" volunteers) and also at the top of the organization with national and area staff. When staff expansion creates the conditions identified in hypotheses 7 and 8, the potential for problems in authority, communication,
and coordination between local and extra-local Red Cross staff seems very high. To the extent that such overlap and isolation are built into the organization, these hypotheses suggest structural sources of a number of difficult operational problems. The "normal" distance between local and area-national staff is eliminated in emergencies when these staff are required to coordinate their efforts under extreme conditions.

9. The more professional or bureaucratic the behavior of the chapter's personnel in disasters, the more negative will be the organization's public image.

The reference in this hypothesis is to the "classic" problem of the Red Cross chapter, its public image. Here, too, the hypothesis suggests that an important source of this problem is the structure of the organization itself; specifically, its segregation of local and national structures during "normal" periods and their convergence in disasters. Caught between the organization's demands for rationality and efficiency and the disaster environment's demands for particularistic responses, Red Cross chapter staff and volunteers find themselves caught in a double-bind. Recent modifications in the organization's disaster role may reflect, in part, the difficulties of this position. We have also suggested in this study that there may be a tendency for professional staff of the Red Cross chapter to respond in one way and for volunteers to respond in
another, the latter deviating more frequently from their
less clearly defined organizational roles.

This predicament points up again what has been the
principal assertion of this analysis, that the structural
elements of the Red Cross chapter--volunteer and staff,
"normal" and disaster--differ fundamentally from each other.
When they are brought together in emergency situations,
their convergence creates serious problems for the organi-
zation. These problems, furthermore, do not appear to be
the "fault" of the individuals involved. Our analysis of
the elements of the Red Cross chapter suggests that the
source of these problems is to be found in the structure
of the organization itself. This assertion, of course,
is fundamental to social organization studies in the sense
that it is, in one form or another, the basic hypothesis
generated by and motivating such research. "An empirical
criterion for determining the existence of a social organ-
ization," writes Greer (1955:7):

is that if the group's characteristics are
known, one can predict the behavior of
individuals without reference to personality
or character. Furthermore, behavior can be
predicted more efficiently by referring to
the group's characteristics than by using
the individual's characteristics and ignoring
the group.

The hypotheses presented here concern the basic units
of the Red Cross chapter constructed type: its goals,
membership, and structures. The next step in the development of this type is empirical and quantifiable research along the lines suggested by the nine hypotheses discussed in this final section of the present study. Such investigations not only could contribute to the verification of this type by testing hypotheses such as these, but also could contribute to the expansion of this type by filling in the gaps left in this initial study. A constructed type can only be evaluated as it is used. If this Red Cross chapter type proves useful in understanding the organization, then the analysis of this study is validated.
## APPENDIX A

### RED CROSS CHAPTERS AND DISASTERS STUDIED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Disaster</th>
<th>N&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 1963</td>
<td>Indianapolis, Indiana</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1963</td>
<td>Fitchville, Ohio</td>
<td>Fire</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1963</td>
<td>Baldwin Hills, California</td>
<td>Dam Break</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1964</td>
<td>Attleboro, Massachusetts</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1964</td>
<td>Cincinnati, Ohio</td>
<td>Flood</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1964</td>
<td>Anchorage, Alaska</td>
<td>Earthquake</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 1964</td>
<td>Santa Barbara, California</td>
<td>Fire</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>September 1964</td>
<td>Jacksonville, Florida</td>
<td>Hurricane</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>October 1964</td>
<td>New Orleans, Louisiana</td>
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<td>December 1964</td>
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<td>Northern Indiana</td>
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<td>April 1965</td>
<td>St. Paul, Minnesota</td>
<td>Flood</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1965</td>
<td>Minneapolis, Minnesota</td>
<td>Tornadoes</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>New Orleans, Louisiana</td>
<td>Hurricane</td>
<td>69</td>
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<td>June 1966</td>
<td>Topeka, Kansas</td>
<td>Tornadoes</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>April 1967</td>
<td>Oaklawn, Illinois</td>
<td>Tornadoes</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>August 1967</td>
<td>Fairbanks, Alaska</td>
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<td>May 1968</td>
<td>Jonesboro, Arkansas</td>
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<td>July 1968</td>
<td>Waterloo, Iowa</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 1969</td>
<td>Minot, North Dakota</td>
<td>Flood</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
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<td>June 1969</td>
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<td>May 1970</td>
<td>Lubbock, Texas</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 1971</td>
<td>Los Angeles, California</td>
<td>Earthquake</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

^aN^ equals the number of interviews conducted by members of DRC field teams. In some cases Red Cross chapter members may have been interviewed more than once; hence, "N" does not necessarily indicate the number of Red Cross chapter members interviewed.
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