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ON BRENTANO'S PSYCHOLOGY FROM AN EMPIRICAL STANDPOINT

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

David Morris William Travers, B.A., M.A.

The Ohio State University
1972

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PREFACE

All the quoted passages in this treatise have been numbered in order to make reference to them much easier.

Also, it is necessary in many places in this treatise to quote passages from the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. Professor Burnham Terrell has been kind enough to allow me to use his (as yet) unpublished translation of the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. I wish to thank him for this. All passages quoted from the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint are from Professor Terrell's translation. Each passage quoted from the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint has, of course, a footnote. The volume number and page number for each passage cannot be taken from Professor Terrell's translation, since it is still in manuscript form. The volume number and page number for each passage from the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint will therefore be from the original text.

Finally, I wish to thank my wife Janice for her help in the typing of this treatise.
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INTRODUCTION

This treatise is primarily concerned with Franz Brentano's views as set forth in his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. Brentano did alter some of these views in later papers, but I am not concerned with these later views. The reason for this is that Brentano's *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* is a work worth considering in and of itself. Finally, despite the fact that the *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* has had a tremendous influence on twentieth century philosophy, I am not going to be concerned with the views of later philosophers who have been influenced by Brentano (e.g. Gustav Bergmann), for that would take me far afield from the purpose of this treatise.

The structure of this treatise is roughly as follows. Since Brentano divides mental phenomena into three basic classes, viz. (1) presentation, (2) judgment, and (3) love and hate (i.e. feeling), each of these three main classes will be explicated in detail in the first three chapters. Further analysis and criticism of these views will be given in the last two chapters.
Chapter I

ON PRESENTATION

Before I can distinguish Brentano's three classes of mental phenomena from each other, I must first distinguish the material world of atoms, etc., from the world of phenomena. This distinction can be drawn roughly as follows. There is the world which science tells us about. In it we find light rays, atoms, etc., none of which we can directly perceive; we, in a sense, only perceive their effects. Thus, material color consists of light rays being reflected from an object, the light rays striking the retina of my eye, etc. Light rays have no color. Rather, the above mentioned material process in which light rays operate, produce color. Strictly speaking, therefore, all material objects have no color. Likewise, a material sound consists of vibrations in the air (water, etc.) of a certain wavelength. These vibrations, in turn, strike my eardrum, and the end result is a tone. This tone has a pitch. But strictly speaking, mere vibrations qua material have no pitch. Nor are mere vibrations heard. We hear tones, pitches, but never hear vibrations. Similar remarks can be made regarding the senses of touch, smell, and taste. Thus generally speaking one can say that material things cannot be sensed, whereas phenomenal things
such as colors, tones, tastes, etc. can be sensed. This is the basic way Brentano distinguishes the phenomenal from the physical. Brentano writes:

(1) ...the physical phenomena of color, sound, and temperature and even of spatial determination give us no idea of the realities which influence their entry into experience. We can say that there are such realities, we can assert some relative characteristics of them but what and how they are in and for themselves remains completely inconceivable. And therefore even if the physiology of the brain had reached its full development it would no more be able to inform us of the realities connected with those acquired tendencies than would pure psychological reflection. It would give us nothing but certain physical phenomena based on some unknown X as their cause.

First, note Brentano's use of the expression 'physical phenomena.' What he really means by 'physical' here is 'phenomenal,' i.e. the objects of the senses. Second, the cause of experience is some "unknown X." I suggest that he simply means that 'X' cannot be sensed. Knowledge of the 'X' is possible, but it is not sensuous knowledge. This is seen by the following passage in which he discusses the unsensed material world:

(2) Without giving any particulars concerning the absolute nature of this world, [physical science] is satisfied to ascribe to it powers which evoke the sensations and mutually influence each
other in their working, and to determine the laws of coexistence and succession for these powers.

Further:

(3) We can say there is something which comes to be the cause of this or that sensation under this or that set of conditions; we can probably also prove that relations must hold among them similar to those which spatial phenomena, shapes and sizes exhibit. But this is then all. What truly is, in and for itself, does not enter into experience and what appears within experience is not true.

Notice the last part of the last sentence of (3): "... what appears within experience is not true." This means, for example, that it is always false to say of a material (non-sensual) object that it is red. Colors, tones, etc. do not belong to the material world. That is all this last part of (3) means. Colors, tones, etc. exist, but only as something phenomenal. Brentano sums this up as follows:

(4) Thus, we have no right to believe that the objects of outer perception also truly exist just as they appear to us. Indeed they demonstrably do not exist outside of us. They are, in contrast to what truly and really is, mere phenomena.

I.e. the non-perceivable things that exist are those things
which the physical scientist tells about, things such as atoms, light rays, etc. But how can one make sense in (4) of the expression "mere phenomena," or the idea expressed in (4) that colors "do not exist outside of us"? In order to do this, I must now distinguish between act and object, i.e. between seeing and what is seen, between hearing and what is heard, etc.

Colors, shapes, tones, etc. are objects which are sensed. However, the objects which are sensed must be distinguished from the sensing of the objects; i.e. one must distinguish between act and object. In the following passage, Brentano refers to the sensing of colors, tones, etc. as "mental phenomena," and refers to the object (such as a color) which is sensed as "physical phenomena" (the use of these two phrases of Brentano's will be used in this treatise in exactly the same way unless specified differently):

(5) Every presentation of sensation or imagination offers an example of the mental phenomenon, and here I understand by presentation not that which is presented, but the act of presentation. Thus, hearing a sound, seeing a colored object, sensing a warm or cold, and the comparable states of imagination as well, are examples of what I mean....

Examples of physical phenomena, on the other hand, are a color, a shape, ... which I see; a musical chord, which I hear; heat, cold, odor, which I sense; as well as comparable images which appear to me in my imagination.

These examples may suffice as concrete illustration of the distinction
between the two classes. 5

Again the use of the expression "physical phenomena" does not entail that the material world of atoms can be sensed. There can be, however, an equivocation on the word 'physical,' viz. in 'physical world' and 'physical phenomena,' if one uses the term 'physical' instead of the term 'material' which I have used above.

I should like to draw out one important feature of (5). Note that Brentano talks of imagination. I can conjure up an image of a pink rat even though no pink rat exists; i.e. I can have a presentation of a pink rat, even though no pink rat exists. It is clear, then, that it does not follow from the fact that I have a presentation of some object to the conclusion that that same object exists. In this connection, consider hallucinations: Jones can hallucinate a pink rat if he has consumed too much alcohol, but that pink rat does not exist. Thus, my general conclusion is that we can be presented with objects which do not exist. This general conclusion will shortly be made much more detailed.

Kraus maintains that, for Brentano, the word 'object' is, by itself, meaningless. Put differently, ordinarily if I say 'I see an object,' then one will usually ask 'Which object?' or 'What kind of object?'; i.e. one is always talking in such a situation about a color which is seen, a shape which is seen, etc. One never talks in ordinary language just about an object with no more in-
formation given about the kind of object it is, any more than one just talks in ordinary language about an existent without mentioning what exists, such as a chair or a lion. It would make no sense to say 'I just saw an existent,' unless one were also willing to add something like 'I just saw a yellow lion' or 'I just saw a red square,' thus clarifying what 'existent' in 'I see an existent' means. Likewise, it would not make any sense to say 'I see an object' unless one were also willing to add something like 'It's an apple tree,' thus clarifying what 'object' in 'I see an object' means. I can summarize all of this by saying that there cannot exist a mental act of presentation without some particular object which is presented. Nevertheless, an object qua sensum may logically exist without a mental act experiencing that object. He writes:

(6) As certain as it is that a color only appears to us when it is an object of our presentation, it is nevertheless not to be inferred from this that a color could not exist without being presented. Only if being presented were included as one factor in the color, just as a certain quality and intensity is included in it, would a color which is not presented signify a contradiction, since a whole without one of its parts is truly a contradiction. This, however, is not the case. Otherwise it would be strictly inconceivable how the belief in the actual existence of the physical phenomenon outside of our presentation of it could have, not to say originated, but achieved the most general dissemination, been maintained with the utmost tenacity,
and, indeed, even long been shared by thinkers of the first rank.

Brentano still maintains that an act cannot exist without an object. All that he is claiming here is that it is logically possible for a (phenomenal) object to exist without a mental act experiencing it.

Brentano continues his refutation of Berkeley:

(7) ... not every case of thinking is a perception; and further, even if this were the case, it would only follow that a person could only think of trees perceived by him, but not that he could only think of trees as perceived by him. To taste a white piece of sugar does not mean to taste a piece of sugar as white.

At this point Brentano goes on to make a concession to Berkeley:

(8) It is not true, that the hypothesis that physical phenomena like those which exist intentionally in us exist outside of the mind in actuality involves a contradiction. It is only that, when we compare one with the other, conflicts are revealed, which show clearly that there is no actual existence corresponding to the intentional existence in this case. And even though this holds true in the first instance only as far as our experience extends, we will, nevertheless, make no mistake if we quite generally deny to physical phenomena any existence other than intentional existence.

Note that 'actual existence' in (8) refers to things in the material
world (of atoms, etc.); 'intentional existence' refers to things which can be objects of mental acts, things such as colors, shapes, tones, etc.. Thus, (8) basically says that colors, tones, images, etc. are not made up out of atoms. Thus, this "concession" to Berkeley does not really affect Brentano's refutation of Berkeley.

I should like to sum up the above in order to take account of how far I have come. First, Brentano distinguishes between the material world of science and the phenomenal world of experience. Second, the phenomenal world is divided up into act and object. Third, the object need not exist in order to be presented to the mind. Fourth, a mental act cannot exist without an object. Fifth, it is logically possible for a phenomenal object to exist without an act. Sixth, phenomenal objects are not made up out of light rays, atoms, etc.; i.e. phenomenal objects are qualitatively and numerically distinct from material objects in the world of atoms, etc..

I am now in a position to raise the following question: how can I be presented with a non-existing object? There is obviously no problem with an existing object such as a color which I see. But how can I, for example, see something which does not exist? (Note here that seeing a color is the same as being presented with a color.) In other words, how can I hallucinate, have illusions, etc.. Here, of course, I am not at all concerned with how the scientist
would explain hallucinations, illusions, etc.; for these non-existent objects (hallucinations, etc.) are not made up out of atoms. Nor am I concerned with the material cause of these non-existent objects, for I am concerned with the non-existent objects in and of themselves. Let me put the problem differently: if actual pink rats do not exist under any circumstances (even when I have had too much alcohol), how can I ever experience them? Brentano's answer to this is roughly as follows: even though one can distinguish an act from an object, an act cannot exist unless that act has an object. In other words, insofar as we are considering mental acts, every act without exception will have an object. Let me now consider these acts qua having objects. It is incorrect, strictly speaking, to say 'I see red' or 'I hear C#'. Rather, 'red' and 'C#' represent, for Brentano, properties (accidents) of the seeing and the hearing, respectively. Thus, 'I see red' is more correctly read as 'my seeing redly' and 'I hear C#' is more correctly read as 'my hearing C#-ly'. But 'seeing' and 'hearing' also, for Brentano, represent properties (accidents), specifically, properties of a single mental substance. Thus, 'red' and 'C#' represent accidents of the accidents represented by 'seeing' and 'hearing,' respectively; and the latter accidents are, in turn, accidents of a single mental substance represented by 'my.' One can now see how non-existent objects (such as pink rats) can be experienced. To say that a non-existent object can be experienced, i.e. can be the object of a men-
tal act, is just to say that objects, both existent and non-existent, are accidents and not substances. All perceived (thought, etc.) objects are accidents of accidents, specifically, they are accidents of mental acts such as those represented by 'seeing,' 'hearing,' etc. Thus, I can think of both Nixon and the Devil, and in this sense, I think of them in exactly the same way. In another sense, of course, I do not think of them in the same way, since the object of my thought which is Nixon has a material body made up out of atoms which corresponds to it, whereas the object of my thought which is the Devil, has no such corresponding material body. Further, note that, for Brentano, a pink rat becomes a complex accident of the accident, e.g., represented by 'seeing.' However, the fact that a pink rat is an accident of an accident does not commit one to say that the pink rat exists in its own right; for a pink rat, to exist in its own right, must be a substance or be correlated with a substance in the material world. The pink rat, in this case, is neither a substance nor correlated with a substance (made up out of atoms) in the material world. The end result of this discussion is that material bodies (made up of atoms) are needed to show conclusively that such things as Nixon exist.

I have raised the question of mental substance. It is now appropriate to indicate what Brentano means by this. He writes:

(9) Finally, we advance it as a distin-
guishing [feature] that the mental phenomena which someone perceives always appear as a unity despite their variety, while the physical phenomena which he may perceive simultaneously are not all presented in the same way as partial phenomena within a single phenomenon.

Brentano is making a very Kantian point here about the unity of mind. Brentano writes:

(10) It does occur that we compare a color we see with a sound we hear, and indeed we do this every time we take cognizance of the fact that they are two different phenomena. How should this presentation of their difference be possible if each of the presentations, one of color and one of sound, belonged to different things? Should we ascribe the presentation of their difference to the one or the other or to both of them together or to a third thing? Obviously to the one taken by itself no more than to the other, since it is alien to each one of the two objects compared. For the same reason, not to a third thing, if we do not choose to think of the presentations of the color and the sound as repeated and united in it. To both of them together, then? -- But who would not see that this too would be a ridiculous hypothesis? In fact it would be like saying that of course neither a blind man nor a deaf man could compare colors with sounds, but that if one saw and the other heard, the two together could have knowledge of their relationship. And why does this seem so absurd? Because the cognition which compares them is a real objective unity, but when we compare the acts of the blind and the deaf man, we never get anything but a collective, never a unitary real thing.
Brentano continues:

(11) Only if sound and color are jointly objects of presentation within one and the same reality is it conceivable that the two should be compared with each other. 12

Further:

(12) Anyone who hears a melody knows that while the one note is before his mind as present the other is before it as past; anyone who knows that he is seeing and hearing also knows that he is doing both at the same time. Now if the perception of the seeing takes place in one thing and the perception of the hearing in another, in which one does the perception of their simultaneity take place? In neither one, obviously. It is clear rather, that the inner cognition of the one along with that of the other must belong to the same real substantial unity. And if this holds of inner cognition of psychical activities, it must also hold... of these activities themselves. 13

(10) points out that if a person is presented with a color and a sound simultaneously, then he has to take account of the fact that he also knows that he is not just presented with the color or just the sound, but that he is simultaneously presented with both the color and the sound. Without analyzing what Brentano takes knowledge to be one can ask the question 'How is this knowledge of the simultaneity of two presentations possible?'. It is obviously not possible in the blind man - deaf man case, even though there is simultaneity; for although simultaneity is a necessary condition for
the knowledge of that simultaneity, it is not a sufficient condition for me to be simultaneously presented with a color and a sound and also know that the presentations are simultaneous. Brentano’s point is quite simple really. Trivially: I cannot be simultaneously presented with a color and a sound unless I am simultaneously presented with a color and a sound. The I is one thing, a substance, and can never be experienced or presented. Mental acts such as represented by 'seeing' are accidents of this one substance. Each person, of course, has his own substance, which is mental. Jones' mental substance is different from mine. Now, what else one can say about mental substance, Brentano fails to tell us. He does tell us in (10), (11), and (12), however, that a mental substance can have more than one accident at a time, that it persists through, say, the life of an individual, i.e., it lasts through time, and a mental substance can never be an accident nor vice-versa. Now, Brentano never says that we can become aware of our own mental substance. Rather, like Kant, without a mental substance, human experience would be impossible. For example, memory could not exist without mental substance, since a correct memory of mine presupposes that I correctly remember what one and the same I did or experienced some amount of time ago. Also, not only would simultaneous presentation be impossible without a mental substance since there would be no I for them to be presented to, but I could not even have one presentation at a time, since there would be no I for this presentation to be
presented to. Further, (12) points out that if I had no mental substance, then I could have no knowledge of time, i.e. of past and present. But obviously I do have a knowledge of time. So I have a single mental substance which persists through time. This time-argument, which argues from the knowledge of objects in time to the existence of a single mental substance, is very reminiscent of Kant's argument for the existence of mental substance.

I should like to make one thing clear at this point. In the above quoted passages Brentano is concerned with unity of the self. He is only concerned with the unity of mental phenomena, not with physical phenomena. Put differently: he is concerned with the simultaneity of the hearing the seeing and concerned with the unity of mental acts. He is concerned with the relation 'is simultaneous with' and not with the relations which the objects of mental acts have to each other.

Further, in (12) Brentano insists that a person can directly experience the simultaneity of two (or more) different mental acts. He points out that if a person can be certain of the existence of the simultaneity of \( x \) and \( y \) (two mental acts) as an accident of the single mental substance, then that person can also be certain of the existence of \( x \) and \( y \) qua accidents of the same mental substance which already has the accident represented by 'is simultaneous with.'

Brentano insists that a mental substance together with accidents (properties) make up a unity even though they (together) are not
simple. To say that they are a unity is only to say that all mental phenomena (accidents, properties, such as represented by 'seeing,' 'hearing') are accidents of one and the same mental substance. My mind has, so to speak, distinct "parts" such as the accident seeing, but these "parts" (which Brentano calls "divisives") are all attributes of one and the same mental substance. (Note that an accident can never be a substance, and vice-versa.) I will give an example. I see a color and simultaneously touch that color. It makes perfect sense to say this in ordinary language. Even though there is no apparent causal connection between the seeing and the touching, i.e. I could have seen the color without touching it, there does seem to be some connection, some relation between these two sensings. The relation is not that the seeing resembles the touching in any way. It is rather that it is the same I doing both the seeing and the touching. Further, even if the seeing of the color occurs today and the touching of a different color occurred yesterday, there is still the same relation between this seeing and that (past) touching; viz. it is still the same I who is doing both the seeing and the touching. Strictly speaking, of course, this relation is not a relation, for a "relation" is usually construed to be some sort of property. In Gustav Bergmann's terminology, the "relation" being discussed here is exemplification. This is not to say that Brentano adds exemplification to his ontology, for as far as I can see, he does not do this. It is merely to point out what
is involved in the use of that word. Thus, the mental life of a person is unitary in that all of his mental phenomena are attributes of his single, mental substance. Nevertheless, this mental substance is not simple in the sense that many different, varied accidents can be attributes of it. Also, with regards to the non-simplicity of a mental substance it can be pointed out that the temporal order of the accidents is, within reason, not necessary as it was for Leibniz. I add "within reason" because it is obvious that my mental states when I was an infant must precede those mental states which occur when I am an adult. Thus if I touch a color before I see it, I am not a different person than if I see the color first and then touch it. For Leibniz, of course, I would be a different person. Brentano, however, does not seem to hold any such view.
Chapter II

ON JUDGMENT

Judgments constitute Brentano's second category of mental phenomena. Before I go into the details of what a judgment is, I will first consider judgment in general. Brentano writes:

(13) By Judgment we understand ... an acceptance (as true) or rejection (as false).

What is it that is accepted as true or rejected as false in (13)? It is a presented object which is accepted or rejected, according to Brentano. Judgment is thus a kind of mental act, and is completely different from, although related to, presentation. I say that judgment is related to presentation, simply meaning that a judgment cannot occur unless there is an object which is presented, and unless that same presented object is then, in an act which is qualitatively distinct from the act of presentation, accepted as true or rejected as false. Concerning this, Brentano writes:

(14) ... nothing is an object of judgment which is not an object of presentation, but we maintain that when the object of presentation becomes the object of an affirmation or rejecting judgment, consciousness enters into a completely new kind of relationship to it.
(14) simply makes the point just noted above, viz. that a person cannot make a judgment unless he is first presented with an object. Once the object is presented, he can, of course, accept it as true or reject it as false. With regards to this, it should be noted that it is one and the same object which is both presented and judged. One does not multiply the number of objects merely because one takes an attitude of acceptance or rejection towards an object. Finally, recall that an object need not exist in order to be presented. It thus follows that I can make a judgment about a non-existent object. For example, suppose that I conjure up an image of a non-existent Pegasus. I then have an object of presentation. I can now judge, about about a non-existent Pegasus, that Pegasus is white; i.e. I accept the white, winged horse as true, say in reference to Greek mythology.

I should now like to consider in more detail how the act of presentation is different from the act of judging. Consider the following example. I see a red square. Now, simultaneously with this presentation, I judge that the square is red; i.e. I accept the red square as true, as being the case. But although the mental act of presentation and the mental act of judging occur simultaneously, they are nevertheless qualitatively distinct from each other. How, then, is presentation different from judgment? In a crude sense, it is the difference between staring blankly at an object with an aloof, non-committal attitude compared to an involved, committed
attitude of accepting the object as true or rejecting the object as false. For example, I could stare at a multi-colored map of Europe without ever judging that it is a map; I would merely see an array of colors. But it is an entirely different affair if I suddenly realize, i.e. judge, that it is a map and not just an amorphous blob. This difference, then, is roughly the difference between presentation and judgment.

Let me dwell somewhat on the connection between presentation and judgment. In saying that there can be no judgment without a presentation, Brentano is making the simple point that I cannot judge something to be true or false unless there is some thing about which I make my judgment. For example, I cannot judge that this object in front of me is red unless I see some object, real or hallucinatory, about which I make my judgment. Put differently: the predicate 'is red' alone does not state anything, for it does not state what is red. Only when I have that "what," have I made a statement. This analogy between statements and judgments is for heuristic purposes, however; for Brentano insists that the distinguishing feature of judgment is not the subject-predicate relation of a statement. Recall, in this regard, that judgment concerns itself with presented objects, not just pieces of language such as statements; i.e. judgment consists in accepting or rejecting presented objects, not statements. Concerning this, Brentano writes:
(15) ... the compound formed of subject and predicate is not at all essential to the nature of judgment. Distinguishing the two components has more to do with the conventional form of the linguistic expression.

(15) clearly makes the point that the analogy which I made above between statements and judgments was simply a heuristic device and nothing more.

I have yet to show exactly what a judgment is, however. Brentano writes:

(16) No one who attends to what goes on within him when he hears or sees and perceives his hearing or seeing can be deceived about the fact that this judgment of inner perception does not consist in the union of a mental act as subject with existence as predicate, but is a simple affirmation of the mental phenomenon present in inner consciousness. (italics mine)

Note the following points concerning (16). First, I put the 'and' in (16) in italics to emphasize that it is not merely the object which is affirmed or rejected, but that it is the conjunction of the object and the mental act (seeing or hearing, etc.) which is affirmed or rejected. Thus, the statement 'I affirm that I see a red patch' really boils down to 'I affirm my seeing redly,' which in turn boils down to 'my affirming of my seeing redly.' Second, the two 'my's in 'my affirming of my seeing redly' are grammatically
convenient but ontologically insignificant; i.e. there is only one mental substance referred to here, even though there are two 'my's.

Third, the entities referred to by 'my seeing redly' are such that the entity referred to by 'redly' cannot exist without the entities referred to by 'my' and 'seeing'; for recall that the entity referred to by 'redly' is only an accident of the accident represented by 'seeing,' which is in turn an accident of the mental substance referred to by 'my.' (This is not a logical impossibility, as pointed out in Chapter I above.) For this reason, the object referred to by 'redly' cannot, by itself, be the sole object of judgment. Rather, the object of judgment in this case is the whole referred to by 'my seeing redly,' this whole, in turn, having three "parts" referred to by each of the three words, respectively. Fourth, the reason why I put the word 'parts' in double quotes in the last sentence is that these parts (entities) have the peculiar feature that the accident represented by 'seeing' and the accident of the accident represented by 'redly' cannot exist without a mental substance, without an I that does the seeing redly. Furthermore, the accident of the accident represented by 'redly' cannot exist without the accident represented by 'seeing.' To put it in a somewhat cruder way: the parts represented by 'my seeing redly' are not like the parts of a wooden table which can be divided and dismembered at will. Rather, there is a much more intimate connection involved in the whole represented by 'my seeing redly.' It follows from this, again, that
the only proper object of judgment is, in this case, the whole represented by 'my seeing redly.' Fifth, since it is the whole here represented by 'my seeing redly' which is affirmed or rejected, the affirmation or rejection can only be an accident of that whole.

I am now in a position to consider the following passage:

(17) When we say, "A exists," this sentence is not as many have believed and still do, a predication in which existence as predicate is tied to A as subject. It is not the conjunction of an attribute, "existence," with "A," but "A" itself which we affirm. Equally, when we say "A does not exist," this is no predication of the existence of A in a contrary sense, no denial of the conjunction of an attribute, "existence," with "A." On the contrary, "A" is the object which we deny.

This might become quite clear if I were to call attention to the fact that anyone who affirms a whole inclusively affirms every single part of the whole. Therefore, anyone who affirms a conjunction of attributes, inclusively affirms each particular element of the conjunction. Anyone who affirms that a learned man exists, i.e. the conjunction of a man with the attribute, "being learned," inclusively affirms that a man exists. Let us apply this to the judgment, "A exists." If this judgment were the affirmation of the conjunction of an attribute, "existence," with "A", then it would include the affirmation of each individual element of the conjunction, and consequently the affirmation of A. But in what way would this simple affirmation of A be distinguished from the affirmation of the conjunction of A with the attribute, "existence," which is supposed to be expressed by the proposition, "A exists?" Obviously in no way whatsoever. Consequently we see that
the affirmation of A is the true and complete sense of the proposition and that
nothing besides A is the object of judgment.

Note the following concerning (17). First, when Brentano states that "anyone who affirms a whole inclusively affirms every single part of the whole", he is simply saying that if one affirms a conjunction as being true, then each conjunct of that conjunction is true. This is a trivial truth of logic. Second, 'A' represents a whole thing, whether that thing is a red patch, Napoleon, or this desk upon which I am now writing. By saying that it represents a whole thing, I mean that all the properties which are presented as "part" of A, are thought of as being part of what A is. For example, suppose that 'A' represents a large, yellow, velvet chair. 'A' would then be shorthand for 'this large, yellow, velvet chair.' Likewise, if 'A' represents a red square patch, then 'A' here would be shorthand for 'this red, square patch.' Etc.. Third, notice the unusual predicate 'exists' in the statement 'A exists.' One would ordinarily expect a predicate like 'is red,' 'is square,' etc.. Brentano considers the predicate 'exists' because 'A' represents the whole presented thing with all of its presented "parts" (i.e. properties): there is nothing more that one can say about the now presented A, for 'A' is shorthand for everything that can be said about that presented A. Since 'exists' does not seem to add anything to 'A', Brentano uses 'exists.' He then argues, in the second para-
graph of (17), why 'exists' does not add anything to 'A', i.e. why existence is not a property. Fourth since 'exists' does not add anything to 'A,' in terms of properties, existence is therefore not a property. Fifth, the object of judgment is thus A alone, but since 'A,' which represents A is not a proposition, we usually state 'A exists' or 'A is,' adding 'is' or 'exists' for grammatical correctness. But grammar clearly tells us nothing, in this case, as to what the object of a judgment is. Sixth, with regards to the fifth point just mentioned, it is obvious that, for Brentano, there is only one basic form of proposition, viz. 'A exists' or 'A is,' where 'A exists' means the same as 'A is.' All other so-called statements or propositions are reducible to either (it makes no difference which) of these two grammatical propositions. For example, consider the statement 'This patch is red.' This is equivalent to 'This red patch is' or 'This red patch exists.' Seventh, Brentano makes the point in the second paragraph of (17), that if someone affirms 'A exists,' then he also affirms A; but then 'exists' is redundant and adds nothing to A. Eighth, the word 'affirm' in (17) does not refer to any syntactical property of a (grammatical) proposition (such as represented by 'is true'). Rather, it refers to something mental, specifically, a mental attitude. Ninth, the object of a mental attitude of affirmation is always an object, never a grammatical proposition, unless, of course, I am specifically thinking about grammar. The result of this affirmation of an object is a positive
(though not necessarily a true) judgment.

Brentano goes on to discuss the proposition 'A does not exist':

(18) Let us examine the proposition "A does not exist," in the same way. ... If one who affirms a whole, inclusively affirms each part of the whole, it does not equally hold that one who denies a whole inclusively denies each part of the whole. Anyone who denies that there are blue and white swans does not on that account inclusively deny that there are white swans. And naturally so; for even if only one part is false the whole can not be true. Therefore, anyone who denies a conjunction of attributes in no way denies inclusively every single attribute which is an element of the conjunction. Anyone, for example, who denies that there is a learned bird, i.e. denies the conjunction of a bird with the attribute, "being learned," does not inclusively deny that a bird or learning exists in reality. Let us apply this to our case. If the judgment, "A does not exist," were the denial of the conjunction of an attribute, "existence," with "A," then A itself would not be denied at all. But no one could possibly maintain that. On the contrary, it is clear that nothing but this is the sense of the proposition. Consequently, nothing but A is the object of this negative judgment.

Note the following points concerning (18). First, when Brentano says that "it does not ... hold that one who denies a whole inclusively denies each part of the whole", he means that if one denied that a conjunction is true, then one need only deny that at least one conjunct is true. This is, again, a trivial truth of logic. Second, A, again, represents a whole thing, as explained in the para-
graph immediately following passage (17). Third, note that in (18) when Brentano states "If the judgment, "A does not exist, "were the denial of the conjunction of an attribute, "existence," with "A," then A itself would not be denied at all", he does not take non-existence to be the attribute in question. Rather, he takes existence to be the attribute represented by 'does exist.' Notice that the 'not' in the predicate of 'A does not exist' drops out in the process. This occurs because the negation is taken care of by the denial, which is something like a mental attitude, and which is mentioned in the above quoted sentence. Thus, one cannot have both the 'not' in the sentence 'A does not exist' and the denial, for that would result in the affirmation that A exists, contrary to Brentano's intention here. Fourth, since the 'not' drops out of 'A does not exist,' Brentano really only has to consider 'A exists,' but this has already been dealt with in (17). Thus, again A is the sole object of judgment in 'A does not exist.' Fifth, in both (17) and (18) Brentano talks of a conjunction of attributes. One must be very careful here, however; for he does not mean to say that the subject 'A' of the proposition 'A does not exist' represents a mere collection of attributes. To the contrary: for recall that no attribute (accident) can exist without a substance. What is the substance here (or anywhere)? It is always the mental substance represented by 'I.' Sixth, if one denies that A exists, then according to my first point following (18), we are either denying A or
the attribute existence. I am assuming here, for the sake of argument, as Brentano does, of course, that existence is an attribute. But if we deny only A, then we must also deny that A exists. This entails, however, that, according to our assumed analysis of 'exists,' we must also deny the existence of A, where existence here is an attribute belonging to A. For how can we affirm A without affirming that A exists? The same holds for the converse. If we deny A's existence, then we surely cannot affirm A; for, by hypothesis, A cannot exist without the attribute existence. It follows from this, that this assumed analysis of existence, where existence is thought to be an attribute, is absurd, or at least circular. For the analysis is somewhat as follows: Why does A exist? Because A has the accident existence. Why does A have the accident existence? Because A exists. Thus, the "analysis" explains nothing at all. But I will not elaborate any further as to why Brentano held this view. Seventh, the word 'denies' in (18) does not refer to any syntactical property of a (grammatical) proposition, but instead refers to a mental attitude. Eighth, the mental attitude of denial is considered by Brentano to be the opposite of the mental attitude of affirmation, using the word 'opposite' in a very loose sense. In this sense, hot and cold are thought to be opposites. Ninth, the object of the mental attitude of denial is always an object and never a (grammatical) proposition, unless, of course, I am thinking only about grammar. Finally, the result of a denial of an object is a negative, though
not necessarily a true, judgment.

Let me digress for a moment. I have discussed at great length how grammatical propositions do not, for the most part, enter into a judgment. There is a relation between proposition and judgments, however, viz. for every judgment there is a proposition which corresponds to it. He writes:

(19) In our opinion ... a categorical proposition corresponds to a judgment which can be just as well be expressed in the existential form....

Further:

(20) The reducibility of categorical, indeed the reducibility of all propositions which express a judgment to existential propositions is ... certain.

Recall that, with regard to (19) and (20), even though a proposition corresponds to a judgment, a proposition is never identical to a judgment. Even in the case where the object of a judgment is a (grammatical) proposition, the judgment itself is still a mental attitude of denial or affirmation and not (never) a (grammatical) proposition.

So much for the digression. I must now pay attention to a very important feature of Brentano's doctrine of judgment, viz. self-consciousness. I can sum up what self-consciousness is rather crudely: whenever I am aware of an object, I am also aware that I am a-
ware of an object. This, however, says very little, and can only serve as an introduction to Brentano's view of self-consciousness.

Brentano writes:

(21) The consciousness which accompanies the presentation of the sound is not so much a consciousness of this presentation as of the entire mental act in which the sound is present and within which the consciousness itself concomitantly exists. The mental act of hearing, apart from the fact that it presents the physical phenomenon of the sound, at the same time will be object and content for itself taken as a whole.

In (21) Brentano makes the point that I cannot see, for example, a red patch unless I am aware (conscious) that I see that red patch. That is not to say that if I were to assert 'I see a red patch yet am not aware of it,' that I would be uttering a contradiction; but it would, to say the least, be very strange and possibly meaningless.

Before I continue to discuss (21) in any detail, consider the following passage:

(22) We can call the sound the primary object, the hearing itself the secondary object of the act of hearing.

I am now in a position to analyze (21) and (22) in more detail. Note the following points. First, the term 'primary object' in (22) refers to an object of presentation such as a table, red patch, etc..
Recall that in Chapter I, I distinguished between act and object, between, e.g., the seeing and what is seen. This kind of object is what Brentano means by 'primary object.' Second, the term 'secondary object' used in (22) refers to the unity of an act with its object; it refers to neither the act nor the act's object separately. Rather, it refers to the entire episode of act plus object. Thus, if I see a chair, the primary object is the chair. Taking the analysis of objects given in the last chapter into consideration, the primary object in this case is the set of accidents symbolized by 'chairly' in 'my seeing chairly.' The secondary object in this case, however, includes more than what is symbolized by 'chairly' alone or 'seeing' alone. The secondary object is what is represented by their combination, viz. 'seeing chairly.' In all of this discussion, of course, the existence of a mental substratum is presupposed. Third, I can summarize the above two points by putting the whole matter commonsensically. One can ask the question 'What does self-consciousness include?' One cannot answer this question by saying that if I am conscious that I see a chair, then I am conscious of that chair alone and not also conscious of my seeing of the chair. Nor can one answer this question by saying that if I am conscious that I see a chair, then I am conscious of my seeing alone and not also conscious of the chair itself. Brentano writes regarding this:

(23) A presentation of the hearing without a presentation of the sound ... would
be an obvious contradiction. 28

The only answer one can end up with to this question is, therefore, that self-consciousness includes not just the object alone nor just the act alone, but rather includes both of them as a unity. Fourth, in (22) the expression 'the hearing itself' must be understood to mean 'the hearing of the sound.' Otherwise, one of the rejected options mentioned in the third point immediately above becomes possible. Fifth, the phrase 'the entire mental act in which the sound is present' in (21) must also be understood in the manner explicated in the third point immediately above. Sixth, the term 'object' in the last sentence of (21) must not be understood in the sense of primary object. Rather, what Brentano means is that the hearing is part of the secondary object, which includes both the hearing and the sound. Seventh, the term 'content' in the last sentence of (21) means that the hearing is the act via which the primary object, viz. the sound, is experienced. Eighth, one learns from (21) that both the primary and the secondary objects exist simultaneously. Why this is the case should be clear; for if the primary object existed without the secondary object, then there would be no consciousness of the perceived primary object. Recall that, for Brentano, all mental acts are conscious. Note also that the secondary object could not possibly exist without the primary object, since the secondary object is completely parasitic on the primary object: for there can be no consciousness (i.e. secondary object) without that consciousness being
of something (i.e. of a primary object (plus its act)). Thus if one were to have a primary object without a secondary object, one would violate Brentano's notion that there can be no unconscious mental acts; for a primary object without a secondary object would certainly be just that, viz. an unconscious mental act. Ninth, it is always one and the same mental act which is aware of the primary object and the secondary object. Notice, however, that a mental act, in having a secondary object, must be aware of itself, and in so doing Brentano has one and the same mental act turning back onto itself, as it were, i.e. being aware of itself. Thus, for example, if I see a red patch, then the seeing is aware of itself, i.e. the seeing is aware of the seeing. Actually, it is not that "simple." The seeing is really aware of the whole seeing redly, of which the seeing is only a part of that unity. Tenth, in having one and the same mental act being aware of its primary object and itself (i.e. the seeing qua seeing redly or the redly qua seeing redly) at the same time, Brentano avoids having a regress of mental acts as in a system like Bergmann's, where, for example, no mental act is ever aware of itself. Rather, a second mental act is required to be aware of the first mental act, a third mental act to be aware of the second mental act, etc., etc., etc. Brentano simplifies matters by simply stopping at the first mental act which is aware of itself. The avoidance of the regress, however, depends on the assumption that all mental acts are conscious. This latter assumption he explains in the following passage:
There are no unconscious mental acts, for wherever one exists with greater or lesser strength, the same strength will belong to a presentation that exists along with it and of which it is the object. That is to say that the strength or intensity of the object is equal to the strength or intensity of the mental act which has that object as its primary object. It follows, then, that if the strength of the object is zero, i.e. non-existent, that the strength of that object's act will also be equal to zero, i.e. non-existent. Thus, both an act and an object must have a strength greater than zero in order to exist: Brentano takes this to be a self-evident truth. He writes:

The intensity of the act of presentation is always equal to the intensity with which what is presented makes its appearance; i.e. it is equal to the intensity of the phenomenon which forms the presentation's content. This can pass for an obvious truth...

Having "established" the truth of (24), Brentano then moves on to show that one and the same mental act which is aware of the object, e.g. red, must also be aware of itself qua being aware of the primary object red. He writes:

If there is not to be any unconscious consciousness, there is only one assumption which seems able to avoid an infinite complex. That is, namely, the
assumption which states that hearing and what is heard are one and the same phenomenon, in that it thinks of the hearing as directed upon itself as its object.3

(26) simply states that one and the same mental act is both aware of its primary object and aware of itself (secondary object) at the same time. This is all he means when he says in (26) that the "hearing and what is heard are one and the same phenomenon".

A confusion might arise, however, with regards to primary and secondary objects; for if we consider any primary object, e.g. red, we find that that primary object is also part of another object, viz. the secondary object. Is one to conclude from this that these two objects are really numerically different from each other? Brentano answers "no," for even though Brentano talks about two kinds of objects, viz. a primary and a secondary object, he is really only talking about one object which has two functions. Concerning this, he writes:

(27) We have seen, now, that the act of seeing and its presentation are bound up together in such a way that the color, in being the presentation content of the seeing contributes at the same time to the presentation content of the presentation of the seeing. Therefore, the color, though it is present to the mind both in the seeing and in the presentation of the seeing, is still not present more than once.4
Most of (27) has already been explained above. I shall therefore explain, for the most part, the phrases in (27). First, when he says that the color is "the presentation-content of the seeing", he is simply saying that the color is the primary object of the mental act of seeing. Second, when he says that the color is also "the presentation-content of the presentation of the seeing", Brentano is saying that the color is part of the object of which I am aware; the object of which I am aware can be represented, e.g., by 'seeing redly'. Finally, his conclusion in (27) is that one and the same object can have two functions in one mental act. To draw an analogy, if I write with a pen on a piece of paper, the piece of paper in turn having another piece of paper under it, and if I press on the pen very hard as I write, it will turn out that my writing has gone through to the bottom page as well as appearing on the top page. In this case, one action has produced two effects. An analogous thing happens in the mental act case, except that the object's two functions are not causally related to each other as the writing is causally related to the paper. Brentano is very explicit on this point. He writes:

(28) Whenever a mental act is the object of an accompanying inner cognition, it includes, besides its reference to a primary object, itself in its entirety as presented and known.

This alone makes possible the infallibility and immediate evidence of inner perception. If the cognition accompanying a mental act were an act in its own right, a second act added on
to the first one; if its relation to its object were no different from that of an effect to its cause, somewhat like the one which holds between sensation and the physical stimulus which evokes it; how then could it be certain in and of itself? Indeed, how should we ever be convinced of its infallibility at all?33

(28) is another way of making the same point that (26) makes, viz. that in being aware of a single mental act, one can avoid an infinite regress of mental acts. (28) makes the point in a very interesting way, however. (28) assumes, first of all, that I do have infallible knowledge of my own mental states. Brentano then asks the Kantian question: granted that we have a priori knowledge of our mental acts (which include a primary object for each mental act), how is such knowledge possible? It is not possible, Brentano argues in (28), if a single mental act, by itself, is not aware of itself. In order to see this, assume that one needs a second mental act in order to be aware of the first mental act. Also assume, contrary to (26), that the infinite regress of the second mental act needing another mental act to be aware of it, etc., is not a problem but can be handled in some way. Brentano is essentially arguing in (28) that even if all of these assumptions were true there would still be a problem; for if a second mental act is needed in order to be conscious of the first mental act, then not only does the existence of the second mental act become a contingent matter and thus allow for at least the possibility
of the existence of an unconscious mental act, viz. a first mental act existing without a second mental act existing to be aware of the first mental act, but also the relation between, e.g., the first and the second mental acts becomes contingent, very much like the relation between cause and effect. But we have no infallible knowledge of causes or effects because of this contingent relation between them. Likewise, we could have no infallible a priori knowledge of our mental states (act plus object) if this knowledge depended upon a contingent relation. There is no way that this regress of mental acts can be modified, however, in order to turn this contingent relation into a necessary, a priori relation. One is forced to abandon the regress of mental acts, therefore, and assume that every mental act includes a secondary object, i.e. every mental act is aware of itself. Apart from this argument for secondary objects, however, notice the important point in (28) is that we do have infallible a priori knowledge of our mental states. Somewhat later, Brentano continues along this same line:

(29) The truth of inner perception can not be proved in any way. But it is more than that; it is immediately evident. Anyone who attempted to made a skeptical attack of this ultimate basis of cognition would find no other on which to erect a structure of knowledge. So there is no need for justifying our trust of inner perception, but there is a need for a theory of the relation between such perception and its object which is compatible with its immediate evidence. Such a theory,
as we have said, is no longer possible when perception and object are separated into two distinct mental acts, of which the one would be only an effect of the other, say. Descartes' well-known comment has already made this clear, for at any rate a possible infinitely powerful being would be in a position to produce the same effect as the object. So if that real unity, that peculiar nexus which earlier we discovered between the mental act and the accompanying presentation does hold between it and the inner perception as well, the evidence of its cognition would be an impossibility."

First of all, when he uses the term "inner perception" or "perception" in (29), he means the awareness of an act _qua_ being aware of the act and its object. Second, the secondary object is not caused by the primary object, i.e. consciousness of the primary object is not caused by the primary object itself. Rather, the primary object could not exist unless it were conscious, i.e. unless it included a secondary object within the same mental act to which it (viz. the primary object) belongs. Third, if the primary object is separated from the secondary object by separating them into two distinct mental acts, then the secondary object could exist without any primary object. But the second mental act is about the first mental act here, in terms of the second act making the first act conscious. If the first act does not exist, however, then the second act is about something which does not exist in any sense of 'exist'; not even in the sense of some objects not existing, such as a pink rat which I hal-
lucinate. This second act is very fallible, indeed, in this case. In order to avoid this, Brentano thinks that it is necessary to combine the two acts into one single act: every object then not only becomes conscious of itself, but then a priori knowledge of one's inner states is possible. Secondary objects become very important, therefore, in Brentano's explication of knowledge, for they make a priori knowledge of one's mental states possible. Brentano's claim is actually stronger than this, however. For the secondary object (i.e. inner perception) is really a judgment. Brentano writes:

(30) Consequently, there is a twofold inner consciousness bound up with every mental act, a presentation which refers to it and a judgment which refers to it, the so-called inner perception, which is an immediate evident cognition of the act.35

I thus affirm every mental act and object which occur during my mental existence. But it is a curious kind of affirmation, for it is not a verbal affirmation: it is rather a mental occurrence which I have no say about at all, but which must occur if I can properly be said to have any mental states at all. I am thus passive with this kind of judgment, and have no control over it whatsoever. I neither make nor can make any decision as to whether or not an already existing mental act of mine shall be a conscious one: for all mental acts are conscious. What sense, therefore, does it make to actively decide that, e.g. this already conscious act I shall make
conscious? It makes no sense at all. I am, therefore, completely passive with regards to this kind of judgment. I shall have more to say later on, however, with regards to this active-passive distinction.

Thus, whenever I am conscious of an act and an object, it follows from what has been said above, that such consciousness is a judgment. It would then seem to be a trivial consequence of this that all perception, not just inner perception (i.e. the act alone), is judgmental. It also follows that all perception, including outer perception which he defines as the awareness of an object qua being aware of the object's act and the object itself, is passive. Brentano writes:

(31) ... every perception is counted as a judgment; whether it is a cognition or an act of taking something, even if erroneously, to be true.

What kinds of objects can I perceive? I have dealt with this question on a superficial basis in Chapter I, but I would now like to fill in some of the details. Generally speaking, Brentano claims that a person only perceives simple kinds of physical phenomena. Consider, for example, the second paragraph of passage (5) in Chapter I. In that paragraph, he speaks of the following kinds of perceived objects: a color, a shape, a musical chord, heat, cold, odor, and "comparable images which appear to me in my imagination." How are these physical phenomena "simple," as I just stated they were? Consider a plain,
white, rectangular-shaped piece of typing paper. Imagine how a small infant would perceive this object. The child would simply perceive this object as having a certain color and being a certain shape. Since we are concerned with what the child perceives and not with his verbal description of what he sees, it is of no importance that the child does not yet know the words 'white' and 'rectangular.' Now suppose that I, an adult, look at this same piece of paper. I must admit that that is all that I, too see: viz. that it has a certain color and a certain shape. I do not see, for example, that the object is a piece of paper; that, rather, is a fact which I have learned by previous encounters with this kind of object. To put it as Berkeley would have put it: I immediately perceive the color and the shape (and perhaps some other features of a similar sort), but I infer from the color and the shape (and perhaps some other factors) that it is a piece of paper, and more, that it is a piece of typing paper. This inference surely involves a very sophisticated knowledge of the world, and cannot possibly be derived from immediate experience (perception) alone. Let me now apply this analysis of physical phenomena to other objects. For example, it would follow that I never see a leaf, but only see green and a certain shape. Likewise, I never see a landscape, but only certain colors and shapes. Also, I never smell a hamburger, but only a certain odor. In order to see a leaf or a landscape or smell a hamburger, very complex concepts need to somehow enter the analysis of mental acts, according to Brentano.
In other words, judgments such as 'Socrates is a man' are of a more complex sort than ordinary perceptual judgments which we have considered up to this point. For with these more complex judgments, Brentano has to bring in the external, unperceived world of science, which was briefly discussed in Chapter I. When I judge, for example, that Nixon is a man, I judge that the object of my mental act has a material, atomistic object corresponding to it. This is surely a different kind of judgment than judging that a phenomenal patch is red; for that patch may have nothing in the world of atoms which corresponds to it, even though it is still true that it is red (as in the case of imagination or hallucination).

But even though all perception is judgmental, according to (31), it should be noted that only inner perception, as defined above, can be self-evident or a priori; outer perception can never give infallible knowledge; for it is clear that my knowledge of any physical phenomena is always contingent, not necessarily true. But one thing is certain, according to Brentano: viz. that, by the definition of judgment which he gives, knowledge without affirmation is non-existent as is error without denial. He writes:

\[(32) \ldots \text{affirmation or denial constitutes knowledge or error.}\]

But note in (32), if it has not already become clear in what has been said above, that Brentano is concerned here with the act of judging or affirming rather than with the object which is judged or
affirmed. There can, of course, be no affirmation without an object which is affirmed, but that does not change the point which is being made here.

At this time it is necessary to become more clear about the nature of affirmation and denial, however. Let me summarize how far I have come in this regard. First, I have shown that it is always a whole thing (object) which is affirmed or denied. Second, an act may play two roles, as in the case of consciousness: e.g. where an act of seeing can also be an act of affirmation of the, e.g. seeing redly. Third, I have shown that many affirmations, as in the cases of consciousness of a mental act and object are passive and not active. The terms 'active' and 'passive' must be further clarified, however, as promised above. Generally speaking, I am active towards some object x if I can prevent x from occurring without also, say, objects y and z. I am passive towards x, if the opposite is the case. For example, I am active towards imagining a red triangle, for I can prevent myself from imagining anything, if I so desire. On the other hand, I am passive with regards to seeing this paper in front of me; for if I stare in that direction with my eyes open (the y and z factors), then I have no choice but to see the paper. Consciousness of a mental act and object is passive in this sense; for if there is an act and object at all, then it must be a conscious one: I have no choice in the matter.

Let me now continue to clarify the nature of affirmation and
denial by distinguishing between perception and thinking. Passage (7) in Chapter I is quite clear on this point. I assume that in (7) Brentano is addressing himself to Berkeley, who confused conceiving or thinking of something with perceiving it. Now surely, thought and perception have one thing in common, viz. that they are both composed of act and object. But Brentano's point in (7) is that an object of thought may not be specifically identical, in terms of properties, to a perceived object. I experience one object when I sit in a closed room and think about a tree outside the room and out of my present sight; and it is another thing to be standing before the tree and see it in all of its splendor or lack of splendor. In this regard, Brentano's point in (7) is a simple one. But (7) is more important than it would seem, for this affects our explication of affirmation and denial. For if I can think about an object and not merely be limited to perceiving it, then I can actively decide whether to affirm or deny the object of my thought. Affirmation or denial can thus be active as well as passive. In imagination I can likewise be active as well as passive. There is one further point that should be noted in this regard, viz. that if I can think about an object which I do not now perceive, then I can certainly think about an object while I am actually perceiving it. In this case I would simply have more than one object before my mind. In such a case, whether I affirm or deny the object of my thought can affect whether I affirm or deny the object of my perception. This can occur, for example, in the case of an hal-
lucinatory pink rat. I may think about this object, viz. the pink rat, and finally decide to deny it. In this case, I am thus active with regards to a perceived object. It is clear, then, that affirmation or denial can be active as well as passive. This is my fourth point concerning affirmation and denial.

I will now add a passage by Brentano to further explicate affirmation and denial. He writes:

(33) ... a judgment ... has two intensities. First of all, it has an intensity in the sense in which such a quality also pertains to presentations. In the second place, it has a kind of strength peculiar to judgment, namely the degree of conviction with which the judgment is made. If either one became equal to zero, the judgment would no longer exist.

The first kind of intensity mentioned in (33) is the kind of intensity which was discussed in (25) above and pertains to presentation. It is relevant here since no judgment can exist unless the judgment is made regarding some object which is presented. The second kind of intensity is just the intensity of the affirmation or denial of an object. According to Brentano, I can affirm or deny an object either vigorously or feebly. (33) points out that we can talk about this second kind of intensity by talking about the degree of conviction with which a person affirms or denies something. Thus, the fifth point concerning affirmation and denial is that Brentano is
talking about, in what he considers a more precise analysis, is the degree of conviction with which we hold a belief. For example, if we consider perception of the so-called external world, we find that we affirm our objects of outer perception which are close to us with a very high degree of conviction. But as regards objects at a great distance, it seems that our degree of conviction often decreases as our distance from the object increases. For example, I see a structure at a distance, and am unsure whether it is a barn or a house.

We must be careful, however, not to carry this example of distance too far. Brentano writes:

(34) We have yet to consider, then, only the strength which is peculiar to the judgment as judgment, the degree of conviction. Here we find nothing which would resemble the functional relationship which has been discussed. Indeed, the amount of conviction which belongs to the accompanying cognition is not a function of the mental act it accompanies at all. Whether it is a presentation, a judgment, a desire or any other kind of mental phenomenon, the increase or decrease of its intensity does not affect the intensity of the conviction with which we know it.

His point in (34) can be illustrated with examples such as the following. A firm believer in mysticism may have a very faint religious experience, yet his degree of conviction pertaining to that religious experience may be very great. On the other hand, the ob-
jects of outer perception have, according to Brentano, a weaker degree of conviction directed towards them than do the objects of inner perception. This is the case even though the objects of outer perception may often be presented with a greater intensity than the objects of inner perception. Concerning this, he writes:

(35) The strength of conviction in the judgment which accompanies and affirms the mental phenomenon proves to be an equal, constant amount in every case. And this amount is not that lesser degree of acceptance appropriate to a weak and budding opinion, say, but it is the highest conceivable. With every inner perception we have that fullness of conviction which belongs to immediately evident truths. This fact, more than any other, is what naturally lends support to accepting the universality of the accompanying cognition.

Since Brentano wants to ground all knowledge on the certainty of inner perception, he must justify such a move. In (35), he justifies it by stating that inner perception has the highest degree of conviction of any possible object which exists. Therefore, our knowledge concerning inner perception is the most certain of all knowledge.

There is one final point which I should like to make concerning affirmation and denial; viz. that the degree of conviction attached to a judgment is entirely mental or subjective, and has nothing to do with one's behavior towards an object in the atomistic world. We can, of course, correlate behavior to degree of conviction, but that is
the best we can do. A mere correlation, however, does not make them identical to one another.

Brentano, to sum up, has the following kinds of judgments: (1) self-conscious judgments, which include (a) judgments about inner perception; (b) judgments about outer perception; and (2) judgments about the correspondence between a phenomenal object and a material object, as in the judgment 'Nixon is a man.' With regard to (2), this may involve a combination of at least two mental acts, viz. first, the mental act which has, e.g. the phenomenal Nixon as its object, that act also being aware of itself, and second, the act in which I judge that the phenomenal object of the first mental act corresponds to a material object composed of atoms. Finally, with regards to (1b) above, these objects may or may not have material objects which correspond to them. There are two ways that they may fail to have presently existing scientific objects which correspond to them. First, it may be an imagined centaur present in order to make a judgment about it. Concerning this, Brentano writes:

(36) ... the proposition, "a centaur is a fiction," does not demand that there should be a centaur, but only that there should be an imagined centaur, i.e., the fiction of a centaur, and so forth.

I can truly state, then, that a centaur is a fiction, since no material object corresponds to my imagined object.

But secondly, the material object may have once existed but no longer exists, e.g. Socrates. Regarding this, Brentano says that 'is
dead does not represent any attribute (accident) at all in the way that 'is learned' does. For 'is learned' can truly represent an accident of some man, but 'is dead' cannot, for a dead man, states Brentano, is no man at all. He writes:

(37) A learned man is a man; a dead man, however, is not. Hence the proposition, "a dead man is" does not presuppose the existence of a man, but the existence of a dead man.

Thus, in the case of a dead man such as Socrates, we look to such evidence as bones, people who knew him, etc. That is simply the best we can do.
I will now turn to Brentano's third category of mental phenomena, viz. the category of feeling or love and hate. Before I give a detailed explication of feeling, however, I will first consider feeling in general. Brentano writes:

(38) Experience shows that frequently there is not only a presentation and a judgment, but a third kind of consciousness of the mental act within us, namely a feeling which refers to the act, a liking or a dislike we have for it. ... hearing a noise is often accompanied by a feeling as well. It may be liking, as at the sound of a soft pure young voice, or it may be dislike, as at the scratching of a violin being played badly.

What is it that is liked or disliked in (38)? It is not the material object. It is rather the mental act of presentation plus the presented object which accompanies that mental act. Brentano writes:

(39) ... this feeling also has an object to which it refers. And this object is not the physical phenomenon, the noise, but the mental phenomenon of hearing, for obviously it is not really the noise.
that is pleasant and agreeable to us, or which torments us, but hearing the noise). Consequently, this feeling also belongs to inner consciousness. We find something similar in seeing beautiful and ugly colors and in other cases.

Thus, if I like to eat apples, it is not the material, atomistic apples which please me, but their taste. If I enjoy viewing the Mona Lisa, it is not the material painting itself which I take pleasure in but rather the seeing of the painting. But when we use expressions like "the tasting of the apple" or "the seeing of the Mona Lisa," it is clear that we have here a particular tasting (at a particular time) which is the object referred to in (39).

Elsewhere Brentano discusses, in a general sort of way, this third class of mental phenomena:

(40) The lack of a very appropriate single expression is greatest for the third class, whose phenomena we designated as emotions, as phenomena of interest or as phenomena of love. On our view, this class is supposed to contain all mental phenomena which are not included in the first two classes. But emotions are commonly understood to include only affects which are associated with noticeable physical agitation. Anger, anxiety, passionate desire everyone will call emotions; but in the general way in which we use the word, it is supposed to apply in the same way to any wish, any decision, any intention....

The expression, interest, is also ordinarily used chiefly only for certain special acts which belong to the region
circumscribed here; namely in cases in which curiosity and inquisitiveness are aroused. Yet no one can deny that pleasure or displeasure taken in something can always be designated as interest without its being completely inappropriate and that a wish, a hope, a voluntary decision is always an act of taking interest in something.

Strictly speaking, I ought to have called the class love or hate, instead of using the simple term love; and in the interests of brevity I have let the one term stand by itself for the pair of terms.... But even leaving that aside, many may accuse me of using the term too broadly. And it is certain that it does not cover the entire region in every sense. The sense in which we say that someone loves his friend is different from the sense in which he loves wine; the former I love in that I wish good things for him, the latter in that I desire it as a good thing itself and take pleasure in it. Now I believe that in every act which belongs to this third class something is loved in a sense like that which the word has in the second case, or strictly speaking it is either loved or hated.

The first two paragraphs of (40) are mainly devoted to showing in what ways the terms 'emotion' and 'interest' are inappropriate to designate the third class of mental phenomena. The term 'emotion' is not appropriate since it includes physical effects, such as a red face of a person who is angry; but physical effects surely cannot be a part of mental phenomena. Likewise, in the case of interest, Brentano points out that if a person's interest is aroused, then he will engage in curious or inquisitive behavior. Thus, the word 'interest'
does not quite correctly describe the third category of mental phenomena. In these same first two paragraphs, Brentano does, however, give a list of some of the phenomena included within this third class, viz. a wish, hope, decision. Finally, in the last paragraph of (40), Brentano distinguishes between two kinds of love. The first kind, love of a friend, he says is not the main kind of phenomena he is concerned with. Here he seems to equate the term 'love' with the expression 'desire(s) good things to happen to some person.' Brentano seems to reason that if I love a friend, it is not so much a matter of desiring him or her, but rather a matter of desiring good things to happen to him or her. It is thus not the friend which I desire, but other things. This is not the case with the wine, however; for the wine I desire in itself, and desire, at the moment I savour the wine, nothing else beyond it. Thus, the category of love and hate is nothing else than the class of desires. As we shall see later, however, there are many different shades and intensities of desire.

I should now like to turn to one of the more general features of love and hate. Brentano writes:

(41) As every judgment takes an object to be true or false, in an analogous way every phenomenon which belongs to the third class takes an object to be good or bad.

The ideas expressed in (41) will eventually serve as a basis for Brentano's moral philosophy. If we compare (41) with (38) and
(39), it appears that pleasure is equated with good(ness) and dis-
plesure is equated with bad(ness). This is surely a very naturalis-
tic view.

I will now consider love and hate in more detail, particularly
how this class of mental phenomena is to be distinguished from mere
presentation. Brentano writes:

(42) We do not find any contraries among
presentations besides those of the ob-
jects which are contained in them. In-
sofar as warm and cold, light and dark,
higher and lower pitch and the like con-
stitute contraries, we can say that the
presentation of the one is opposed to
that of the other. There is no other
sense in which any contrasts at all are
to be found in the entire range of these
mental activities.

When love and hate enter in, an en-
tirely different kind of contrast arises.
The contrast of love and hate is not a
contrast in their objects, for the same
object can be loved and hated; it is
a contrast in their reference to the
object. This is certainly a clear sign
that here we have to do with a class
of phenomena in which the nature of the
reference to the object is entirely dif-
ferent from what it is in presentations.

Note the following points concerning (42). First, in the first
paragraph of (42), the term 'contraries' can best be understood by use
of an example. Consider a single musical tone, a pitch. It is ob-
vious that it cannot be both high in pitch and low in pitch at the
same time, where 'high' and 'low' are understood in terms of the same
given pitch as a reference point. Thus, one pitch cannot have both
these (extrinsic) properties at one and the same time. That is to say that these two properties are contraries of each other. The specific meaning is somewhat more complex for Brentano, however; for as I have shown in (17), an object of presentation is a whole, a unity, an accident of an accident of a mental substratum. Thus, the contraries discussed here are "part" of a whole, that part being an accident of an accident of a mental substratum. Accidents of accidents of mental substrata are also, of course, physical phenomena. In speaking of contraries, I am therefore, speaking of contrary properties of physical phenomena, i.e. contrary properties of the objects of mental acts.

The second point to note concerning (42) is that Brentano here does not refer to love and hate as contraries, but rather talks about the contrast of the one to the other. The reason for this is quite clear: love and hate are not part of an object of a mental act; but in order to be contraries they must be part of an object of a mental act (by the definition of 'contraries' given in the first point immediately above). They are rather a kind of mental act, i.e. they are mental phenomena and not physical phenomena. This mental act has as its object another mental act plus its object, similar to the case of judgment. This is what Brentano means when he says that "it is a contrast in their references to the object." This can be put somewhat differently: I can love (desire) an object, but it does not make any sense to say that I desire qua desire and not qua desiring some
particular object. Put differently: desire qua desire or love qua love cannot be an object of any mental act. I can only desire qua desiring some particular object. In other words, although it is the case that love or hate is never the same as mere presentation, it is nevertheless true that a loving or hating (a feeling, desiring, etc.) is also based on a presentation, i.e. directed towards some presented object. Brentano talks in one place, for example, of "the necessity of the feeling being based on a presentation." The reason for this is as follows. If I love or desire, I do not love or desire simpliciter, but I always love or desire some particular object. Loving or desiring is literally meaningless unless some object is loved or desired. Suppose, for example, that Jones told you "I very much desire." "Desire what?" you would ask. "Oh, nothing," says Jones. "I don't desire any particular object in the universe. I just desire." Could we really understand what Jones was saying? I, for one, would not be able to make any sense of Jones' desire; for to desire or love is always to desire or love something. That is Brentano's point here. Love or hate must always be directed towards some object; i.e. it must always be based on a presentation. Love or hate is very similar to affirming or denying, in this respect; for I have shown in the last chapter that judgment, too, must always be based on a presentation. At any rate, since the second paragraph of (42) is concerned solely with desire qua desire or love qua love, it follows that love and hate (the third class of mental phenomena) can never be an object
of any mental act. It should be noted, however, that love qua loving some particular object can be the object of some mental act. It is obvious, of course, that with love and hate an entirely different kind of contrast is present than exists with presentation alone. In presentation alone there is only a contrast in the objects of presentation, whereas in love and hate there is a contrast in the mental acts themselves. This is sufficient to show that presentation is not the same kind of phenomenon as love and hate.

It is not entirely correct, however, to refer to love or hate as a separate mental act. It is rather part of a mental act in much the same way in which affirming as true is part of a mental act which also includes within itself an act of presentation plus the presented object. Brentano writes:

(43) This accompanying feeling also turns out, when it appears on the scene, to be contained in the phenomenon it accompanies and to belong to it intrinsically, like the presentation and perception which refer to the phenomenon. If the relationship were different here, the accompanying feeling would be a second mental act, which would be accompanied by consciousness itself once again. But in the presentation referring to it we would necessarily have before our minds not only the feeling itself, but also its content, the mental act to which it refers. That act would be present twice, then: once by way of its own presentation of itself, existing within it and belonging to it, and secondly by way of the presentation of the emotion, which belongs to the accompanying emotional act. Experience reveals nothing of the sort; in-
stead it leaves only one hypothesis open, that the inner emotion felt toward hearing, seeing and every other act of which we are inwardly conscious in this way, like the presentation and perception, is fused with its object and included within the object itself.

The following points can be made concerning (43). First, the feeling referred to in the first sentence of (43) can be a pleasure (liking) or displeasure (disliking), desiring or abhorring. In short, it can be any mental phenomenon which is neither a presentation nor a judgment. Second, the phrase 'when it appears on the scene' in the first sentence of (43) makes it clear that there can be mental acts towards whose objects I am absolutely indifferent: I neither desire nor abhor such objects. For example, if my present object of presentation is the white wall of my study, I do not obtain any degree of either pleasure or displeasure from it. Although such a case is possible, however, it is clear that passage (48) below denies that this ever actually occurs. Third, one also learns from the first sentence of (43) that there can be no act of love or hate without an act of presentation. (I have already discussed this point with regard to passage (42) above.) For only when an object is presented can I love or hate it. Put differently: 'I love' or 'I desire' mean little, if anything, by themselves. They only make complete sense when it is specified what it is (which object it is) that I love or desire. This is what Brentano means when he says that a feeling
turns out "to be contained in the phenomenon it accompanies and to belong to it intrinsically..." Fourth, recall passage (31) in Chapter II in which he states that "... every perception is counted as a judgment...." Note the word 'perception' in (43). What Brentano is concerned with in (43) is thus, indirectly, judgment. He claims here that the analysis of an act of love or an act of hate must be very similar to his analysis of judgment and self-consciousness. I have already presented his view on judgment and self-consciousness in the last chapter of this treatise. The reader will recall that one and the same mental act is aware both of a primary object and a secondary object, the primary object being the object of presentation, and the secondary object being that act of presentation plus its mental act. It seems that now we have what we might call (although Brentano does not) a tertiary object, viz. the mental act plus its object qua being liked or disliked. Thus, within one mental act there can be three objects. There cannot occur, of course, a situation in which the same entity occurs more than once. Thus, in a mental act in which there is a presentation, a judgment, and a love or a hate, there are still only two entities, viz. a mental act and its object. The act, however, has three functions here: (1) it presents the object of presentation; (2) it affirms (or denies) the mental act (i.e. itself) plus its object, act and object here taken as a whole; (3) it either likes or dislikes the mental act (i.e. itself) plus its object. Fifth,
Brentano spends most of (43) arguing for the fourth point which I have just made immediately above. He argues as follows. If the feeling were not intrinsically included within a particular mental act, then it would have to be included within some second mental act, numerically different from the first mental act. Both mental acts must be conscious, however: I have shown this in the last chapter of this treatise. One must consequently be conscious of the same object twice: the first time as the act and object of the first mental act, and the second time as the primary object of the second mental act via which that act and object is liked or disliked. We are not aware of the same act and object being presented twice, however. It follows that the act of love or hate (i.e. the feeling) must be included within the original mental act, and cannot consist of a second mental act.

I would now like to return to the problem of distinguishing between presentation and love or hate. Brentano writes:

\[(44) \quad \text{Further, in presentations the only intensity involved is the greater or lesser sharpness and vividness of the datum.} \]

\[\text{When love and hate come into consideration a wholly new class of intensity supervenes, the greater or lesser energy, the vehemence or moderation in the power of these feelings.} \]

It has already been seen in passages (24) and (25) in Chapter II above that the intensity of the object of presentation can vary, but that the intensity of the act of presentation is always equal to
the intensity of the object of presentation which accompanies that act. The intensity of the object of presentation by itself has no emotions, however: squeeze the primary object as much as you will, no more emotion or feeling will come out of it than will water come out of a rock which you squeeze. Likewise, the act of presentation either by itself or with its object yields no feeling or emotion. Only when there is an additional ingredient, viz. feeling, can we obtain feeling, emotion. With regards to this feeling, it should be noted that the feeling also has an intensity which is independent of the intensity of the presented object towards which the feeling is directed. For example, I may see a sunset either clearly or poorly, depending on the condition of my eyes, but the same powerful feeling of pleasure can arise in both cases. At any rate, the argument here is very similar to the argument Brentano gives in passage (42): since something additional is involved in love and hate than is involved in presentation alone, the class of presentation cannot be the same as the class of love and hate.

Brentano also distinguishes between presentation and love and hate in a manner similar to passage (41). He writes:

(45) Still more. There is no virtue and wickedness in presentations, no knowledge and no error. All that is inherently alien to them, and we can call a presentation morally good or bad, true or false, in a homonymous fashion at best. For example, a presentation is called bad because anyone who loved the pre-
sentation would sin, and false because anyone who affirmed what is presented, would err; or also because the presentation involves a risk of that love, a risk of that affirmation. 

Further:

(46) If we say that every affirmative judgment is an act of taking something to be true and every negative judgment an act of taking something to be false, this does not mean that the former consists in predicating truth of what is taken to be true and the latter in predicating falsity of what is taken to be false. Our previous discussions have demonstrated, rather, that what the expressions denote is a distinctive kind of intentional reception of an object, a distinctive kind of mental reference to a content of consciousness. The only correct interpretation is that anyone who takes something to be true will not only affirm the object but, when asked whether the object is to be affirmed, will also affirm the object's to-be-affirmedness, i.e. (for this is all the barbaric expression means) its truth. The expression "to take something to be true" may be connected with this. The expression "to take something to be false", on the other hand, will be explicated in an analogous fashion.

In the same way, then, the expression of which we make an analogous use here, "to be agreeable as good", "to be disagreeable as bad", do not mean that in the phenomenon of this class goodness is ascribed to something agreeable as good or badness to something disagreeable as bad. Instead, they mean a distinctive way in which the mental act refers to a content. Here, too,
the only correct interpretation is that one whose consciousness refers to a content in such a way will consequently give an affirmative answer to the question whether the object is of such a kind that one can take up toward it the relation concerned; which means nothing but ascribing goodness or badness, value or disvalue to it. 53

Note the following points concerning (45). First, just as an object cannot be affirmed or denied without a mental act which affirms or denies it, so too an object cannot be loved or hated unless there is some mental act which loves or hates it. Put differently: an object can give us neither pleasure nor displeasure unless we are aware of that object in some manner other than mere presentation, viz. in a loving or hating manner. Second, it is convenient at this point to understand love and hate as being pro and con attitudes towards objects of presentation, so long that these pro and con attitudes are understood as being mental and not physical. Third, pleasure or displeasure, love or hate, are, for Brentano, the foundations of ethics (moral philosophy): without pro and con attitudes towards objects, there can be no morality. Thus, without love and hate there is "no virtue or wickedness." Fourth, Brentano has a legitimate point in noting the connection between morality and pro and con attitudes. Ethics is quite clearly something which often involves very strong pro and con emotions, attitudes. If we discuss whether or not the United States is right in being in Indo-China, for example, it is not a matter of dry, aloof, intellectual concern, but it is often a mat-
ter of intense emotions, i.e. of intense pro and con attitudes. Emotions, of course, often serve as a basis for action: from this the result is often moral or immoral physical actions, e.g. demonstrating against the Indo-Chinese War. Fifth, for Brentano, it is not strictly correct to say, as I do in the fourth point immediately above, that physical actions can be moral or immoral. It is rather only the attitudes towards physical actions which can be moral or immoral. This is what he means when he states in (45) that "a presentation is called bad because anyone who loved the presentation would sin...; or also because the presentation involves a risk of that love...." Sixth, when Brentano states that a presentation is called bad because it involves a risk of a person loving it, he is simply saying that presentations may cause us to love them, even though it is morally wrong to love them. Such was the mythical fate of Eve when she ate the forbidden fruit.

I shall now turn to passage (46). Note the following points. First, Brentano's phrase "predicating truth of what is taken to be true" should not be understood literally. For, literally, predicating can only occur in grammatical structures such as a sentence, in which a predicate is predicated of a subject. Brentano is not at all concerned with grammar here, however. He is rather concerned with accidents. Specifically, he raises the question in the paragraph of (46) as to what kind of accident truth and falsity are. Second, the only question which is raised in the first paragraph of (46) is "What
kind (level) of accident is truth and falsity? It is assumed that they are both accidents of some kind or other. Further, the only question which is raised in the second paragraph of (46) is 'What kind (level) of accident is goodness and badness?' Again it is assumed that they are both accidents of some kind or other. Third, Brentano contends that truth is in no way to be distinguished from the mental act of affirming: they are identical. Likewise, falsity is in no way to be distinguished from the mental act of denying. Fourth, since truth and falsity are the same as the mental acts of affirming and denying, respectively, it follows that they are both accidents of a mental substratum: they are not accidents of the object of presentation which accompanies the act of affirming or denying. Fifth, if the object of presentation which accompanies a mental act of affirming or denying were to have an accident truth or falsity attributed to it, then this accident would be redundant, since the truth or falsity is already present in the mental act of affirming or denying (by Brentano's own definition of 'truth' and 'falsity'); for one would be taking something as true (i.e. affirming it) which one already knows to be true since the object is presented as true. Truth would thus be a part of the presentation, and there would, consequently, be no need for a redundant act of affirming. Similarly, one would be taking something to be false (i.e. denying it) which one already knows to be false since the object is presented as false. Falsity would thus be a part of a presentation, and there would, con-
sequently, bo no need for a redundant act of denying. Truth and falsity are not, however, presented to us: no such guarantee can be given to us in our presentations. I can, at best, only take something which I hope to be true, to be true; or take something which I hope to be false, to be false. Sixth, since truth and falsity are identical to the mental act of affirming and denying, respectively, then it would seem that any sincere affirmation yields the truth and any sincere denial yields the false (by the definitions of 'truth' and 'falsity'). Seventh, one finds in the second paragraph of (46) that the accident referred to by 'to be agreeable' or 'to be agreeable as good' is identical with goodness or value, and the accident referred to by 'to be disagreeable' or 'to be disagreeable as bad' is identical with badness or disvalue. Eighth, the question 'What kind of accident is goodness and badness?' must be answered as follows. Goodness, according to Brentano is an accident of a mental substratum, as is badness: they are not accidents of accidents of a mental substratum. Further, goodness is not an accident of the object of presentation which accompanies the act of loving. Nor is badness an accident of the object of presentation which accompanies the act of hating. Thus, strictly speaking, it is always incorrect to speak of an object of presentation as being good or bad. One could not correctly say, for example, that Hitler, qua object of presentation, is bad or evil. Ninth, just as Brentano's view of truth and falsity is extremely subjective (as discussed in the sixth point
immediately above), so too is Brentano's view of goodness and bad-
ness. Here one feels much more at ease, however, than with truth
and falsity; for, as noted above, morality does involve subjectivity,
viz. emotions, vested interests, etc.. Brentano's subjectivity sim-
ply reflects what we all feel is present in ethics anyway. The only
question which will remain is: has Brentano done it correctly? Tenth,
recall that loving or hating is not an act separate from presentation,
but is part of the same act of which presentation is also a part.54
Finally, if loving is a kind of mental act, then it would be redundant
to also put love (goodness) in the object of presentation. For then
it would seem that one would love that object which is already loved
by that person. Loving (goodness) would be a part of the presenta-
tion, and there would be, consequently, no need for a redundant act
of loving. But it is the act of loving which is present here: thus
there is no need for goodness to be a part of the object of pre-
sentation. Nothing is added by attributing goodness to the object
itself.

I have now distinguished between presentation and loving or
hating. Judgment has entered the picture only incidentally. I would
now like to distinguish between judgment and loving or hating. In
judgment, I either affirm an object as true or deny it as false. As-
sume that I affirm object A as true. Am I then compelled to love it?
No, for I can affirm an object, e.g. a neo-fascist Jones as being
pale, and yet hate Jones with all the possible con-attitudes which I
can muster. Nor, if I deny an object and reject it as false, am I compelled to hate it: I may, for example, hallucinate a pink rat, be aware of the pink rat as being an hallucination, and still find the pink rat very agreeable (i.e. love it). Likewise, I can deny an object yet hate it, or affirm an object as well as love it. Thus, since loving or hating and affirming or denying are independent of each other, it follows that they cannot be identical with each other. I have therefore demonstrated that love or hate and judgment are not identical with each other.

At this point, some interesting questions can be raised. For example, can feeling exist without judgment, or can presentation exist without feeling or judgment? Brentano seems to answer 'no' to these questions. He writes:

(47) We have seen that the inner consciousness accompanying every mental phenomenon included a presentation, a cognition and a feeling, all directed upon it. It is obvious that each of these factors corresponds to one of the three classes of conscious activities which have now emerged.55

Further:

(48) Furthermore, we know that the three classes are of the utmost universality; there is no mental act in which they are not all represented.56
Further:

(49) But it can be conceived without contradiction that a consciousness might exist which lacked one species or even two, and the capacity for them as well. 57

Note the following points concerning (47), (48), and (49).
First, according to (47) and (48), no one of the three classes of mental phenomena can occur by itself. It must occur simultaneously with the other two classes of mental phenomena. Thus, for example, presentation cannot occur without judgment, nor judgment without feeling, nor feeling without judgment, etc. Second, it is clear from (49) that it is purely a contingent fact that all of these three forms of consciousness always occur simultaneously in human beings. Brentano is mostly concerned, of course, with human consciousness and not with the consciousness of other species. At any rate, (49) indicates that it is not a contradiction to state that a presentation could exist without a judgment; i.e. that it is logically possible, though not physically (mentally?) possible for human beings, for a presentation to exist without a judgment. Third, the term 'species' in (49) refers to a class of mental phenomena, e.g. judgment. Fourth, it has already been shown that judgment cannot occur without presentation, viz. that nothing can either be affirmed or denied unless there is some presented object which is affirmed or denied. This entails, of course, that presentation occurs whenever judgment occurs. Why would
it not be possible, however, to have presentation alone without judgment? Could I not just stare at an object yet neither affirm nor deny anything about it? No, for in order to stare, I need to affirm that there is an object present at which I can stare. But this means that I must make a judgment. Thus, presentation cannot occur without judgment. Fifth, it has already been noted that feeling cannot occur without presentation, because someone cannot desire unless there is a presented object which is desired. Sixth, one might speculate as to why Brentano feels that all three classes of mental phenomena must occur together. Recall that in a mental act one and the same mental act has three objects and three functions. Since one mental act can perform all three functions simultaneously, it might be hard to imagine why it would only have one function on one occasion, two functions (two objects) on another occasion, and three functions (three objects) on yet another occasion. There seems, on the surface, to be no reason as to why mental phenomena should occur so randomly. It "simplifies" matters, therefore, if one just assumes that a mental act always performs the three functions simultaneously and behaves in a very orderly manner. Seventh, one can inquire whether or not feeling can occur without judgment. Here, again, the answer is 'no,' for he contends that all feeling is rational, and to be rational entails that judgment is present. He writes:

(50) And if one love generates another, if one thing is loved for the sake of
another, this never happens without a belief in certain connections between the one and the other playing some part. Depending on what judgment is made about the existence or non-existence, probability or improbability of what is loved, the act of love will be joy on the one occasion, on another, sorrow, hope, fear, and will assume a variety of other forms. In fact, then, it seems inconceivable that a being should be endowed with the capacity for love and hate without possessing that of judgment.

To continue: a person does not love or hate something merely in a blind manner. According to Brentano, love is never blind: it may act stupidly, but never blindly. Put differently: I cannot love or hate an object unless I either affirm or deny that object's existence of probability. It is true, of course, that such a reason as to why one loves or hates an object may be a bad one, but a bad reason is still a reason. Harry may love a particular wine because it is his favorite color, viz. pink; i.e. he affirms the existence of this pink wine. John, on the other hand, loves the wine because of its delicate taste; i.e. he affirms the existence of the wine's taste and need not affirm the existence of the pink wine (John, for example, may be blind).

Eighth, it may appear that (49) and (50) contradict each other. I do not believe that this is the case, however; for (49) does not specifically refer to human consciousness. It seems, rather, that (49) is concerned with non-human consciousness, e.g. worm consciousness-
ness. The contradiction between (49) and (50) is thus only apparent and not real. Ninth, all of the above points are made simpler if one keeps in mind that, in human consciousness, one and the same mental act always has three functions. If the intensity of the act of presentation is greater than zero, then the intensity of the acts of judgment and love or hate must also be greater than zero, since all three mental acts are really numerically identical to each other, leaving basically only one mental act. Tenth, judgment cannot occur without feeling. I obtain this primarily from the ninth point immediately above.

Having now covered the relation of the class of feeling to the other two classes of mental phenomena, it is now appropriate to once again consider the class of feeling (love or hate) by itself in more detail. The main question which I shall address myself to here is: what kinds of feelings are included within the class of feeling? It will turn out, among other things, that willing is included within the class of feeling. In this regard, it will be necessary to consider the age-old question of the freedom of the will, but it will be seen that Brentano has a unique answer to this question. Brentano writes:

(51) Just as we separate presentation from judgment, we unite feeling and will.

In explaining why he is going to put feeling and will in the same class, he writes:
(52) We shall follow the same course here that we did in our study of the relationship between presentation and judgment. Above all, therefore, we appeal to the testimony of direct experience. Inner perception, we say, here clearly reveals the absence of a fundamental distinction here, as it did the presence of one there. And here it reveals an essential agreement in the kind of reference to an object as there it revealed a thoroughgoing difference.

Further:

(53) Let us take the following series as an example: sadness -- yearning for the absent good -- hope that it will be ours -- the desire to bring it about -- the spirit to make the attempt -- the decision to act. The one extreme is the feeling, the other an act of will; and they seem to stand at a great distance from each other. But if we take note of the intermediate members and never compare any except adjacent ones with each other, do we not see the most intimate attachment and an almost imperceptible transition everywhere? -- If in classifying we wished to divide them into feelings and strivings, to which of the two basic classes should we assign the particular cases? -- We say, "I feel yearning", "I feel hope", "I feel a desire to bring this about for myself", "I feel enterprising enough to attempt this" -- the only thing which no one will say is that he feels a decision. Is the boundary line perhaps here, therefore and do all the intermediate elements still belong to the basic class of feelings? If we permit popular linguistic usage to settle the matter for us, of course we shall
make such a judgment. ... But does not a germ of the striving already lie unnoticed in the yearning? And does it not germinate in the hope, and bloom in the thought of possibly doing something oneself, in the wish to act, in the spirit to do so; until finally the desire overcomes both the aversion to any sacrifice involved and the wish to reflect any longer and so ripens into a decision? — Surely if we still wish to divide this series of phenomena into a number of basic classes at all, we may no more group its intermediate members together with the first one under the term feeling and contrast them with the last one, than we can group them with the last member and contrast them with the first under the term will or striving. No, nothing will remain but to consider each phenomenon as a special class in itself. But in that event, it will be unmistakable to anyone that the distinctions between these classes are not so deep and incisive differences as the one between them and all other mental phenomena. The character of our data given in inner consciousness requires us, then, to extend the unity of one and the same basic class over the entire area of feeling and striving.

Note the following points concerning (51), (52), and (53).

First, feeling, loving, desiring, hating, disliking, being sad, yearning, desiring, deciding, wishing, and willing are all basically the same kind of mental phenomena. Second, in (52) 'here' is used to refer to the distinction between feeling and will, and 'there' refers to the distinction between presentation and judgment. Third, Brentano states in (52) that the best evidence to prove the unity of feeling and will is given by inner experience. He elaborates on this main
point in (53). Fourth, the lack or presence of a distinction between feeling and will cannot, according to (53), be demonstrated on any linguistic basis whatsoever: only inner experience can provide such a foundation. Fifth, I am now in a position to state what kinds of mental phenomena belong to the class of love or hate (feeling). Some of these phenomena are as follows: being sad, yearning, hoping, desiring, loving, feeling a desire (hope, etc), making a decision, hating, disliking, wishing, finding agreeable or disagreeable, etc. These certainly cover a wide range of phenomena. Sixth, note that moods (such as being sad) are included in the class of feeling. It is clear why this is the case, since a change in mood can directly alter the attitude which a person takes towards an object. Given a happy, jovial mood, I might find a particular painting very agreeable, but given an extremely sad mood, I might find the same painting very unpleasant. Seventh, when Brentano speaks in (53) of "a germ of the striving already ... in the yearning," he seems to be stating that it would seem very strange, indeed, if, before we ever strove to obtain a particular object, we never desired to obtain it or yearned to have that presently unobtained object. In other words, decisions to obtain certain objects do not fall from nowhere, out of the blue, but they are the causal result of a perhaps long period of reflection, a period in which we reflect on our desire to have some object, and finally decide to make the attempt to obtain that object. I might see a particular painting, for example, and desire to possess that painting. If the
desire is then strong enough or grows to be strong enough, then I might, for example, will to cut down on the amount of money I spend on beer, etc. If I save up enough money and the painting is still available, then I can will to buy it. Such examples are very common, indeed. Eighth, simply to state that desiring is causally related to willing is not to have a complete picture of what Brentano has in mind here; for it overlooks the question 'What do desiring and willing have in common?' To give the answer 'A causal relationship' is not to answer the question at all, in this case; for Brentano feels that more must be involved in the answer. The 'more' in this case is being either a pro or a con attitude towards some object. Is it not true, for example, that if I desire an apple and strive to obtain the apple, that in both cases I have a pro attitude towards the apple? Not only do I have a pro attitude in both cases, but in the case of the striving my pro attitude is definitely much stronger than in the case of the mere desiring. This is Brentano's point: that the strength (intensity) of a pro or con attitude can grow (intensify) and result in an act of the will; and an act of the will can, in turn, result in a physical action. Ninth, since a mere desire is a very weak pro attitude and an act of the will is a very strong pro attitude, then are we overlooking important differences between them if we group them both in the same class of feeling? Should they not be grouped in different classes? Brentano answers 'no'; for even though mere desire
and willing have important differences between them (e.g. a difference of intensity), their similarities are much more important than their dissimilarities. Given their similarities, we can understand what kind of sequence of similar attitudes will finally lead up to an action. Further, if we are to classify desiring, willing, etc. according to their differences rather than according to their similarities, then any difference whatsoever between two things will justify our grouping them in different classes. But the process of grouping items in the same class is only helpful if they are grouped according to their basic similarities rather than their differences. Why do we put both Fords and Cadillacs in the same class, viz. the class of cars? Can we really say that because a Ford has so many different features from a Cadillac (e.g. a Ford is built with cheaper materials), a Ford therefore is not a car? To the contrary: the differences between a Ford and a Cadillac are, for the purposes of classifying them both as cars, irrelevant. The only thing that is relevant is their similarities, viz. being both capable of transporting at least one but not more than eight persons, needing a driver, the power of the vehicle not being dependent on human energy (as a bicycle, for example), etc. Brentano's point really boils down to this: if we classify an object solely by its differences in properties from other objects, then ultimately every single object in the universe will have to be in a class all by itself; for given
any two objects in the universe, there is always going to be some difference between them, no matter how small. In the case of the mental acts of seeing red and seeing blue, for example, even though they are both similar in being acts of seeing, they are both different in so far as one is the act of seeing-redly and the other is the act of seeing-bluely, according to Brentano’s analysis. These are different kinds of seeings, therefore, if we are to classify things according to their differences instead of according to their similarities. It follows that seeing red must be put in a completely different class of mental phenomena from seeing blue. Matters become quite absurd at this point, however; for it is clear that both acts here are acts of presentation. They are therefore put in the same class of mental phenomena. Brentano does the same sort of thing with desiring and willing; their similarities justify us putting them in the same class. Brentano therefore avoids classifying by differences, thereby avoiding the reductio ad absurdum problem of only being allowed to have a maximum of one object in any given class. He therefore puts objects in a given class according to significant similarities between them. Finally, it should be noted regarding (53) that willing or the will is viewed by Brentano as basically a very strong pro attitude towards an object. As such, the will is not such an abstract thing as, e.g., Kant would have it (Kant’s will being in the unseen world which contains things-in-themselves).

The following question can be raised at this point: were I never
to experience an act of the will, a willing, although I had experienced desires, could I nevertheless imagine what a willing would be like by simply imagining a very strong desire? The question seems to be very similar to Hume's question in which he asks: if I had experienced all the colors of the spectrum except for one color, could I conjure up in my imagination what this missing color would look like? Brentano, contrary to Hume, answers his (own) question negatively. He writes:

(54) It is beyond any question that the occurrence of volition can not be derived from any other mental phenomena. And I do not mean by this just that the particular hue of volitional activities can only be known through specific experience; for that is something which is equally true of other special classes of love and hate. The particular hue of hope as compared with the pleasure of ownership, the particular hue of higher spiritual enjoyment as opposed to the lower bodily pleasures are also undervariable. Something else is responsible for the fact that precisely the will appears to be especially incapable of derivation, and brings about the inclination to interpret it as the activity of a special primitive faculty.

Every volition or striving in the stricter sense refers to an action. It is not simply a desire that something should happen but a desire that something should occur as a result of the desire itself. An act of will is impossible for someone who does not yet know, or at least suspect, that certain phenomena of love and desire directly or indirectly produce the loved object.
Note the following points concerning (54). First, the terms 'volition,' 'the will,' 'striving,' and 'act of will' seem to mean exactly the same thing. Second, Brentano very clearly separates two questions from each other in (54): (1) In order to know what an act of the will is, must I experience a very strong desire? (2) In order to know what an act of the will is, must I first experience a causal connection between desires and loved objects? As regards the first question, Brentano states that all mental phenomena in the class of love and hate (and presumably in the classes of presentation and judgment as well) must, for human beings, be experienced in order to be known by a person. The will is therefore not unique in this respect; for every shade, hue, or intensity of hope, desire, pleasure, displeasure, color, hardness, etc. must be experienced by a person in order to be known by him or her. The will, however, has the unique characteristic that it is not only causally influenced by the external world as are our desires, hopes, etc., but that the will can also have an effect on the external world. The will can also be affected by the world, of course. Suppose that I hope to purchase a particular vase, of which there are no duplicates. I go to the store where this vase is in order to buy it. As I pay for it, the salesman drops the vase and it shatters into a thousand pieces. The breaking of the vase completely changes the hue of my hope to obtain that vase; for before this incident I had high hopes of obtaining the vase, but now my hopes have been shattered and disappointment enters the pic-
ture. The will is in a similar situation. The world can, and often
does, force me to make certain decisions (acts of will) and force me
to change certain desires, hopes, etc.. The will, however, can also
act upon the world in an active way: it is not only influenced by the
world, but it can also influence the course of events in the world.

It is this feature of the will which cannot be known through any act
of introspection (i.e. inner perception) which has a mere desire as
its object. Third, this leads us to the definition of the will, which
Brentano himself provides in (54): "It is not simply a desire that
something should happen but a desire that something should occur as a
result of the desire itself." 'It' in this quotation refers to the
will, of course. His point here is not only that the will is a
strong desire, but also that that desire must be consciously re­
cognized as capable of producing effects in the world. In other
words, the strong desire (will) in this case must be recognized as
a cause of certain physical phenomena and certain things in the real
(scientific) world (of atoms). Brentano writes:

(55) Someone who has made any affirmative or
negative judgments at all can bring any
other judgment before his mind concretely
in presentation as soon as he knows what
it is affirmatively or negatively directed
upon. No matter how often someone has en­
gaged in activities of love and hate, at
various levels of intensity, on the other
hand, if he had never specifically willed
anything, stating the distinctive character
of will in the respects mentioned could
not represent the phenomenon to him per­
fectly in its own peculiar nature.
basically states that in judgment the only variation which occurs is one of intensity. If I have experienced all the various intensities of affirmation and denial, then I can affirm or deny any object whatsoever: the fact that I have never experienced an object before does not prevent me in the slightest way from affirming or denying this previously unknown object. Affirmations and denials do not, in themselves, causally produce effects in the world. It is consequently not necessary (nor possible) to make the experience of the causal connection between affirmation or denial and the world a feature of the explication of affirmation and denial. I must take this into consideration with the will, however. If I have only experienced desires, hopes, etc., but have never experienced the causal connection between my desires and the world (in terms of my desires causing effects in the world), then there is no way in which I could know what an act of the will is.

I should now like to turn to the age old question of the freedom of the will. The freedom of the will has been used as a way (justification) to put feelings and willings into two different classes. Regarding this, Brentano writes:

Let us suppose that there is complete freedom in the area of will, creating the apparent possibility of one choice or the opposite choice or no choice at all in the same individual case. That certainly does not exist throughout the entire area; it might possibly exist only where either different ways of act-
ing or at least acting and not acting each comes into consideration as a good in its own way. ... But ...
there are also free acts to be found among the mental activities which can not be called acts of will and which we ordinarily count among feelings. The pangs of remorse over a previous misdeed, malicious pleasure, and many other phenomena of joy and sorrow are held to be acts no less free, then, than the resolve to alter one's life and the intention of harming someone.

Further:

(57) It is also certain, on the other hand, that we can no more call every act of will free than we can every act of feeling. This suffices to show that the cleft between feeling and will is not widened by acknowledging the existence of freedom and that this gives no support to the traditional classification.

I will consider both (56) and (57) together. First, the "traditional classification" referred to in (57) is the classification of feeling and will in two separate, entirely non-overlapping and different, classes. Second, the will is not the only thing which is free: desires, wishes, hopes, etc. can also be free. I may be free, for example, to love or hate my neighbor. If my neighbor is a very obnoxious sort of individual, it may be very difficult to love him or her, but it is nevertheless possible. I am also free to feel sorrow at the death of someone not very close to me, someone I was not par-
ticularly fond of or perhaps never even knew. This can happen occasionally when one reads in the newspaper about some tragedy in which, e.g., a small child dies. Third, if all of the mental phenomena in the class of feeling (i.e., love and hate) can be free, then one cannot distinguish the will from hopes, wishes, etc., on the basis of the freedom of the will; for hopes, etc., are free just as much as the will is free. The freedom of the will argument is thus worth very little here, since it establishes nothing whatsoever regarding wishes, hopes, etc. vs. the will.

I shall now, in concluding this chapter, turn to a different aspect of the will. Brentano writes:

(58) Every act of will has to do with an action we believe to be in our power, a good which is expected to result from the act of will itself.

It is a trivial truth to state that a person would never will something if he knew at the time that it were impossible to achieve that goal to any degree whatsoever. (This has been more traditionally stated as: 'ought' implies 'can.') Personal beliefs about the possibility of achieving a desired goal are thus a crucial element in willing. It may be the case, of course, that the desired goal is actually impossible, even though the person in question believes that the goal is really possible to achieve. I may will to climb a certain mountain, for example, without the use of ropes, and fully believe
that it is possible, though difficult, to climb its cliffs with my bare hands and feet. After making this attempt to climb the mountain in such a manner, however, I may find out that what I had thought of as possible is actually impossible.
I have, in the above chapters, explicated in considerable detail
Brentano's ontology. It is now appropriate to evaluate Brentano's
ideas in order to see whether or not they are correct. The points
which I will make will be both general and specific. I will start
with a rather general observation concerning a particular kind of ar­
gument which Brentano offers quite frequently.

First of all, Brentano never argues in any cogent form for the
existence of mental acts. He seems to assume that they exist. It is
important to note here that one can easily accept the undeniable fact
that people see, hear, believe, desire, etc. without accepting the
existence of mental acts; for mental acts are part of an analysis of
how we see, hear, etc.; and if the analysis is incorrect, then sure­ly one can reject it without denying the existence of seeings, hear­
ings, etc.. Thus, the description of the phenomena to be explained
is to be distinguished from and is never the same as the analysis of
those phenomena. I am convinced that Brentano blurs this distinction,
and for this reason he never seems to question the existence of men­
tal acts. He seems to feel that doubting the existence of mental
acts would amount to doubting the obvious fact that people see, hear, etc. It would make no sense to doubt the latter, but it surely makes sense to doubt the former.

At any rate, Brentano assumes that mental acts exist. His main concern is, therefore, to simply find out what these assumed-existing mental acts are like. I say that Brentano never argues in a "cogent form" for the existence of mental acts, since there is a peculiar kind of argument (or implied argument) for their existence. This strange argument runs somewhat as follows. He very often argues from what one might call a "conceptual truth," i.e. a statement which everyone would have to admit to be true, perhaps trivially true, to a conclusion which is not at all justified when given that conceptual truth as that argument's only premise. He writes, for example:

(59) There are occasions -- no one can very well doubt this -- on which we are conscious of a mental phenomenon while it exists within us. For example, while we have the presentation of a sound, we are conscious of having it.

Further:

(60) We think, we desire something, and know that we do so. But we have knowledge only when we make judgments. So it is beyond a doubt that in many cases together with the mental act there exists within us not only a presentation which refers to it but also a judgment which refers to it.
As regards (59), everyone, except someone who is deaf, perhaps will admit that we are very often conscious of hearing certain sounds, i.e. that we very often hear a sound and, at the same time, are conscious that we are hearing it. No one can deny this. If I grant this, however, it seems that Brentano wants me to admit the existence of such things as presentations, presentations being part of his analysis of how we see, hear, etc., and not a mere description of the phenomena themselves. The admission of the truth of a "conceptual truth" thus becomes the basis for an invitation to introspect and find such entities as mental acts and presentings.

(60) is very similar to (59). We all, certainly, have at one time or another thought of something, desired to have it, and been aware at that time of our thoughts and desires. We may also admit that there cannot be knowledge without any judgments. At this point, again, Brentano invites us to introspect and find such entities as mental acts, presentings, affirmings and denyings. In admitting to a conceptual truth, therefore, he expects us to accept everything he has to offer in his ontology. In this case, for example, he expects us to immediately admit the existence of mental entities called "judgments." One can, of course, admit the conceptual truth in (60) yet deny the existence of mental acts called "judgments."

In a previous passage, viz. (53) in Chapter III above, Brentano argues from conceptual truths about yearning, sadness, hope, etc. to the similarity of the assumed-existing mental acts of feeling and will-
ing, and finally to the unity of the class of the mental acts of feeling and willing. This conclusion is surely not justified by the premises which he gives.

Somehow Brentano feels that these conceptual truth arguments justify the existence of mental acts. Put differently: these conceptual truths show us certain things about the existence of certain entities in inner experience. He writes:

(61) We may express the result of our discussion by saying that inner experience clearly reveals the unity of the basic class for feeling and will. It does so by showing us that there is no sharply drawn boundary between them and that there is a common characteristic of their reference to a content which distinguishes them from other mental phenomena. The things said about them by philosophers belonging to the most diverse schools, even those who divide them into two basic classes, gave clear indications of this common characteristic and confirmed, as did the language of the people, the correctness of our description of the phenomena of inner perception.

First, regarding (61), it should be noted that I have not discussed the views of the "philosophers belonging to the most diverse schools," since this did not seem relevent to explicating Brentano's views. Second, the phrase "the language of the people" refers to, for the most part, the conceptual truths (of language) which serve as the premises to his conceptual truth arguments. Third, inner ex-
perience does not clearly yield any support for his analysis, as Brentano assumes it does. Once again, Brentano confuses a description of the phenomena to be explained with the analysis of those phenomena. An analysis of the phenomena must surely be self-consistent (i.e. not self-contradictory) and consistent with a description of the phenomena. For example, if a certain analysis had the consequence of denying that people see, hear, etc., then that analysis would be incorrect since it was not consistent with the phenomena. But there may be, and usually are, more than one analysis to choose from and, in that case, one would use additional criteria of the acceptability of the analysis, e.g. simplicity. At any rate, it should be noted that I am not denying, at this point at least, that mental acts exist. I am merely trying to show that Brentano in no way demonstrates that they do. Put differently: he has not yet shown us why we should accept his analysis of the phenomena of seeing, hearing, etc. instead of someone else's analysis.

I would like to return, for a moment, to the contrast between an analysis of certain phenomena vs. a description of those phenomena. It might be argued that there is no need to prove that mental acts exist. After all, do I need to prove that there is a sheet of paper upon which I am now writing in front of me? Could it not simply be obvious that mental acts exist just as it is obvious to me now that the paper upon which I am writing exists? No, for matters are much more complicated than that. Of course, it is obvious that this sheet
of paper exists. It is also obvious that I see colors, hear sounds, etc. In the case of the paper, however, it is not obvious that a perceived piece of paper is an accident of an accident of a mental substratum. That analysis has to be argued for. What is not obvious in the case of perception is that there is a non-material ('material' in the sense of being composed of atoms) seeing, hearing, etc., i.e. mental acts. Remember that Brentano is not just affirming that we all have experiences, for that is a conceptual truth which no one can deny. He is rather saying that a certain kind of mental entity exists which is, as it were, one of the ultimate building blocks of experience. The conceptual truth does not in any way entail the existence of mental acts. It would be somewhat like arguing as follows. This metal box is red. Therefore, the red is identical to the mental act referred to by 'my-seeing-redly.' The premise here may be true, but the conclusion in no way follows logically from it.

2.

I should now like to discuss the subject of truth as explicated in Chapter II above as well as in Chapter III. Recall passage (46) in Chapter III above. In my sixth point concerning and immediately following passage (46), I remarked that since truth and falsity are identical to the mental acts of affirming and denying, respectively, it would seem that any sincere affirmation must yield the truth and any sincere denial must yield the false, i.e. that sincerity is the criterion for truth and falsity. Surely, however, truth and falsity
cannot be analyzed so subjectively; for sincerity clearly cannot be a criterion for truth or falsity. If I have drunk too much alcohol, for example, I may sincerely affirm that a pink rat is running around the room. This sincerity does not alter the fact, however, that there is no pink rat running around the room. Similarly, I may sincerely deny that a pen is lying on top of the table, yet be incorrect. Perhaps my denial here is due to poor vision, such that I do not see the pen lying on top of the table. At any rate, sincerity simply does not guarantee that what I affirm is true or what I deny is false. It is necessary to have some more objective criterion for truth and falsity, 'objective' here simply meaning that we need a criterion, or an explication, of truth and falsity which does not have the serious defects which Brentano's explication has. I do not claim that I can give such a criterion or explication. I merely claim that Brentano's criterion is a hopeless abyss.

3.

The third main point which I now wish to make is somewhat indirectly related to my first criticism above of Brentano. The fourth point pertains to Brentano's methodology, i.e. the progression of his thought and arguments, and also pertains to his notion of the infallibility of inner perception. I will discuss this fourth point in section 4. below in this same chapter.

I will first consider infallibility as discussed in passage (29) in Chapter II, as well as in the paragraph immediately following (29). Brentano argues here that inner perception is infallible. His argu-
ment is basically that the infallibility of inner perception is the "ultimate basis of cognition." If we remove this infallibility, then we destroy this basis and we will be able to find no better basis of knowledge. The question which I want to raise, however, is whether inner perception is really as infallible as Brentano claims it is.

Suppose that I am walking across an open field. Near the path in this field is a small cluster of small, yellow flowers. Being heavily engrossed in thought, however, I may see them but not pay particular attention to them. About one hour later, a friend of mine approaches me and asks, "Did you see that small cluster of small yellow flowers in the field as you walked through?" My immediate response is "No," but thinking for a moment I then respond, "On second thought, I think that I do vaguely remember that I did see some small, yellow flowers there, but I did not pay attention to them at the time." The question then becomes whether I can see something and not know that I see it. I did not notice the flowers when I passed them; does this mean that I did not see them? Perhaps not. It may mean, however, that I did not know that I saw them when I saw them. In other words, I was not conscious of them when I saw them, as previously stated. Put differently (on the level of analysis): could there be a primary act (and object) here without a secondary act (and object)? When the question is rephrased in this manner, it becomes more interesting. Could Brentano argue: of course a secondary object exists here; for how else could I vaguely remember that I saw the small cluster of yel-
low flowers? This move is not open to Brentano, for, he argues, memory (which is involved here) is notoriously unreliable. He writes:

(62) But the content of an act of memory is not the act of memory. And what is our guarantee that the memory and its content, as they are not identical, are to be ascribed to the same substantive unity? If knowledge provided by memory were immediately evident, we could draw inferences from this fact as we did with inner perception. But memory is notoriously not evident, indeed it is subject to numerous illusions.

Note the following points concerning (62). First, the "content" referred to in the first sentence is the alleged original experience which the memory is supposedly about. Note my use of the terms 'al­
leged' and 'supposedly' here. I use these terms to emphasize that a memory may not be correct concerning what it is about. Second, the 'act of memory' referred to in (62) is my actual remembering, regard­
less of whether it is correct or incorrect. Third, I wish to stress the point, as Brentano does, that the content of the act of memory and the act of memory are not in the least, and can never be, identical to each other. This will become more clear in the fourth point im­
mediately following this one. Notice that this third point has been put in the language of the level of analysis. I have done this because I am interested, with this particular point, to make Brentano's ideas clear. Fourth, it sometimes happens to people that they think that they remember something which in fact someone else has told them; such
a person, in this case, is not remembering what he or she previously perceived, but is remembering what someone else had previously perceived and has told them about. The content of the act of memory and the act of memory thus belong to two completely different persons in this case. This is what Brentano is concerned with when he is worried about whether or not the memory and its content "are to be ascribed to the same substantive entity," i.e. belong to the same person, the same mind.

I should now like to return to the example of the small cluster of small yellow flowers. Speaking on the level of analysis, since the content of the act of memory, viz. the alleged seeing (i.e. presentation) of the small cluster of the small yellow flowers, and the act of remembering (memory) are not, and cannot be, identical, according to Brentano, Brentano cannot use memory to assert, without a shadow of a doubt, that a secondary act existed at the time that I saw the flowers (I am fairly certain at this point that I did see them) but did not pay particular attention to them, i.e. notice them; for a memory is only a memory and not the original act of seeing. Memory thus cannot provide any evidence here for the existence of the secondary act which is in question, according to Brentano's own views on memory. Could Brentano, at this point, say "Yes, but I could have asked you, just after you passed the small yellow flowers, if you knew that you had just passed those small, yellow flowers"? Unfortunately, even this move is not possible for two reasons. First,
memory is still involved here, even though the lapse of time between the perception (which may not include a secondary act) and the memory of the perception is much shorter. In some cases, of course, there is no noticeable lapse of time involved (e.g. when I see a small cluster of small, yellow flowers, and am simultaneously aware (i.e. I know) that I am seeing this small cluster of small, yellow flowers), but memory still presents a problem; for a small cluster of small, yellow flowers is something I can recognize only because of prior learning processes, e.g. learning in childhood about colors. Thus, since memory is always involved in every perception, it follows that, on Brentano's own grounds, I can always be mistaken about my perceptions, because of the fallibility of memory. Further, even if the problem of memory is disregarded with regards to present perceptions, Brentano still meets another difficulty. Suppose, for example, that I have a sharp pain and immediately and infallibly know that I have it (where no lapse of time is involved). This quickly meets the Cartesian difficulty of one being able to have knowledge of the present, but not of the past or future ('knowledge' here means 'infallible knowledge.'): for when the pain disappears, I can never know for certain, according to Brentano's own grounds, whether or not my memory of having a pain just a moment ago is correct. I would claim, therefore, that even if one grants the infallibility of inner perception (i.e. knowledge of my present mental states), such knowledge is nevertheless quite useless; for truths of inner perception could only
be useful for a moment, and then become dubious. Such knowledge could never be used to explain any phenomena, solve any problems, or do much of anything, except watch (with the mind's eye, as it were) their truth come and fade into the realm of the dubious. Nor would infallible knowledge of certain inner states such as pains, colors, etc. give me infallible knowledge of other inner states such as emotions; for if, e.g., John is asked if he loves Mary, it is a meaningful response to say "I don't know yet." In other words, Brentano claims that I always have infallible knowledge of all inner states, yet with emotions one clearly does not have this certainty all of the time.

It might be pointed out, at this point, that I am purposefully blurring together two senses of the term 'memory.' 'Memory,' in the first sense, refers to the memory while it is still engaged in the learning process, e.g. a child's memory of what 'red' means before he can pick out, e.g., red things from blue things. 'Memory,' in the second sense, is what I have and use now to pick out, e.g., a red object. This ability to distinguish a particular color (e.g. red) from another color, a particular shape from other shapes, etc., is commonly referred to as a concept. A concept may, of course, be a very rough one or a very sophisticated one. At any rate, I purposefully blur these two senses of 'memory' together because, it seems to me, a concept is completely determined and structured by the learning process. If the learning process has been adequate, then the resulting
concept is a good one; but if the learning process has not been adequate, then the resulting concept is a very poor and inadequate one. Also, it is surely the case that concepts, once they are acquired, are not unchanging and stagnant, but rather seem to be continually modified and changed as one grows older. My concept of red, for example, is surely much different now than it was when I was five years old; I have since learned various subtle variations of red, which are called shades of red. Nor have I any reason to suppose that I have seen or imagined all the shades of red which exist, and surely a seeing of such a previously unseen shade of red could change my present concept of red. It seems, therefore, that a concept is simply a moment or a cross-section of a continuous learning process. It is for this reason that I have blurred together these two senses of 'memory.' It thus does not help, in the above discussion of memory, to distinguish how I came to know that something is yellow from how I now know that something is yellow.

The second reason why Brentano's move, mentioned in the second paragraph above before this present paragraph, will not work is because the only phenomenon which would be consistent with the existence of a secondary act (on the level of analysis) in the flowers case is the actual conscious noticing, at the time of perception, of the small cluster of small, yellow flowers. That phenomenon's existence is precisely the thing which is in question here, however. Brentano thus seems unable to support his claim that secondary acts exist in
all cases of perception, even if one grants him, as has been done, the existence of the primary act and object, viz. the seeing-of-small-cluster-of-small-yellow-flowersly.

I shall now summarize the preliminary results. I have shown that there are certain cases in which the existence of a secondary act and object can be held to be dubious, or at least not provable beyond a shadow of a doubt. In showing this, I have not questioned the existence of primary acts and objects in all acts of perception. Indeed, I have granted, for the sake of the argument, the existence of the primary act and object in this case. In doing this, I have shown that inner perception, i.e. secondary acts and objects, can conceivably (i.e. consistent with the description of the phenomena under consideration here) be non-existent while the primary act and object are still very existent. Put differently: the existence of a secondary act does not seem to be a necessary condition for the existence of a primary act; nor does a primary act seem to be a sufficient condition for the existence of a secondary act. A primary act is however, a necessary condition for the existence of a secondary act.

Again, all this assumes the meaningfulness and significance of mental act discourse (an assumption which I shall not grant later on in this treatise). Further, these conclusions cast doubt upon Brentano's insistence that the connection between a primary act and a secondary act is a non-causal one; for the basis for claiming that the connection was a non-causal one was the infallibility of inner percep-
tion. I have shown that inner perception is not infallible, however, in the above discussion on memory. Further, it is an easy step from the claim that a secondary act need not exist in all cases in which a primary act exists to to the stronger claim, via Ockham's razor, that a secondary act does not exist in all cases in which a primary act exists, e.g. a primary act but not a secondary act exists in the small, yellow flowers case. Indeed, one could credibly assert that the existence or non-existence of a secondary act, again granting the existence of mental acts, is the distinguishing feature (i.e. difference) between acts where I consciously notice the object at the time of perception and acts where I do not consciously notice what I am perceiving. There is no reason, at present, as to why one should accept Brentano's analysis rather than this analysis. But, Brentano would argue, one must then separate the primary act from the secondary act. The secondary act thus becomes an act among acts, not intrinsically tied to any particular act. He would continue, stating that since all consciousness is conscious, my (i.e. Travers') analysis is inadequate, i.e. cannot account for the fact that all consciousness is conscious; for on my (i.e. Travers') account, a second mental act must exist in order to be aware of the first mental act, a third mental act must exist in order to be aware of the second mental act, etc. My reply to Brentano is simply that all consciousness is not conscious (an unconscious consciousness being a primary act existing without a secondary act). Indeed, if all con-
sciousness were conscious, I would be exhausted at the end of a day. Think of how many things one sees as one drives to work every day, yet to which one pays no attention. I can perhaps recall some of these items at the end of the day, like the small cluster of small, yellow flowers, but most such items are incidental to perception. Our perception tends to focus in on the more interesting or needed objects, while other objects fade into the perceptual background. The background I may sometimes be vaguely conscious of, but most of the time it seems to be like a constant undercurrent: one knows that it is there in the sense that I know that there is food in the freezer even though I have not looked there for a long time; but that does not mean that I am conscious of it at every moment. Perhaps Brentano is correct that, concerning the objects on which we focus our attention, that these perceptions are always conscious. It is just that he cannot explain the phenomenon which I have referred to as "background."

I would now like to discuss the relation between primary and secondary acts. I have shown that the relation ('relation' here is to be taken in a rather loose sense) cannot be a necessary one, 'necessary' meaning here that if one thing occurs or is the case, then another thing must occur or is invariably the case. For example, if it is true that I am a man, then it must be true that I am a human being. This sense of 'must' is thus a non-causal 'must'; for in causal discourse no such sense of 'must' exists.75 In Brentano's
case, if a primary act occurs, then a secondary act must occur; but Brentano is mistaken on this point, as I have taken pains to point out. If, then, the relation is not a necessary one, what is left except a causal one? After all, do not such factors enter in as focus of attention, quality of eyesight, etc.? If I had consciously focused my attention on those small yellow flowers instead of thinking about some problem, the secondary act undoubtedly would have occurred in conjunction with the primary act of those flowers (level of analysis here). But even this assumes that my eyesight was strong enough to make out what those objects were and what color they were if my eyes should have chanced to have focused upon them. In other words, there are many causal factors that are involved here, and many of them causally affect the existence or non-existence of this particular secondary act. There is something very curious here, however, for it seems that we are no longer talking about Brentano's notion of a secondary act. Recall that in such passages as (29) in Chapter II Brentano insists that a secondary act is not really numerically distinct from its primary act. In such passages he seems to be applying the Duns Scotus distinction between real and formal distinctions. For example, Scotus states that although we can and do distinguish between God's existence and His essence, this is merely a formal distinction; for in God himself such a distinction does not exist, as God is a unity, a one, etc. God's existence is actually identical with his essence. The distinction between my left
hand and my right hand is a real distinction, however: my left hand is not a part of my right hand, nor vice-versa. To return to Brentano: he wants to say that there is no real distinction between a primary act and its secondary act: there is only a formal distinction, for they must both be integral parts of a single mental act. This, however, can no longer work, since, on my analysis, a primary act can exist without a secondary act being part of it. What is a secondary act, then? It must be a numerically distinct act from its primary act. Further, a primary act is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the causing of a secondary act.

I have thus placed secondary acts in a causal framework. It is this, along with the above problem of memory, which destroys their infallibility; for in causal discourse the word 'infallible' has been shown not to be applicable. Even in those cases in which a secondary act occurs simultaneously with a primary act, no infallibility can be obtained.

Since the basis of Brentano's infallibility has been destroyed, what other basis for infallibility can there be? According to Brentano himself there can be none. Both the external world (made of atoms) and the objects of outer perception fall within the causal framework, and hence cannot be infallible. This much is clear from passage (29). The only entity left for possible infallibility is the self, i.e. the mental substratum. The mental substratum must likewise, in (29), be ruled out as being infallible. The reason for
the non-infallibility of our knowledge of the mental substratum is not made clear in (29), however. Nevertheless, from what has been said in this and the previous chapters about mental substrata and memory, it is possible to conclude the following: first, a mental substratum serves a main function of giving unity to one's mental life, i.e. a person's different experiences all "hang together" because they all inhere in one and the same mental substance, viz. his own. Brentano himself feels that there is no infallible knowledge of the mental substratum: one can, at best, only offer arguments for its existence. Second, a mental substance is a non-perceivable entity: for only accidents or accidents of accidents are perceivable. Third, a mental substance is non-observable in the sense of being observed in inner perception, for a mental substratum is not included among the objects of inner perception. Both this point and the second point immediately above show how difficult it would be to successfully claim that knowledge of the mental substratum is infallible. There is an additional fourth point, however, viz. that Brentano admits in passage (62) that memory is notoriously unreliable. Thus, even if I could perceive, observe, or remember my mental substratum, my memory may not be accurate.

There is no part of Brentano's ontology which can therefore be used as an infallible basis of cognition. I would like to raise an interesting question at this point, viz. is there any infallible basis of cognition? Put differently: is there any infallible know-
ledge of any kind whatsoever? In this regard, I should like to con­sider arithmetic. Surely it has been said (by such philosophers as A.J. Ayer) that 1+1=2 is necessarily true and could not possibly be false. In reference to Ayer's views I am not concerned with the fact that '1+1=2' is provable within a mathematical system. Gödel has made us too sophisticated for that move, I hope. If he has not, then I need only point out that it does not follow from the fact that a statement is provable within a mathematical system that that state­ment is necessarily true in all cases (i.e. a theorem in all "similar" systems): it only follows that it is necessarily true within that system in which it is a theorem: i.e. given at least these axioms and rules of inference, then this formula is a theorem in such a system.

There is thus evidence (proof?), such as arithmetic or mathe­matics can give us, that '1+1=2' is true in all such cases and cannot possibly be false in such cases. There is the problem, of course, that '1+1=2' is false in some arithmetical systems (e.g. those arith­metical systems not based on logarithm 10). It is true, of course, that '1+1=2', in the arithmetical system based on the logarithm 10, can be translated into other arithmetical systems based on other logarithm bases, but that is beside the point. At any rate, I should like to attempt a more fruitful approach, viz. I should like to con­sider the real (external) world along with '1+1=2'. If one is count­ing pennies, and if one adds one penny to one penny, one comes up
with two pennies. Thus, '1+1=2' is true in this case. Likewise, if one takes a quart of water and a quart of alcohol and combines them, then one would expect, according to the statement '1 quart plus 1 quart = 2 quarts', that one would end up with two quarts of liquid. But what happens, as a matter of fact, is that one ends up with only about 1.8 quarts of liquid. Thus, in this case, one has '1+1=1.8' as true. One could, I assume, develop an arithmetic within which '1+1=1.8' was true (not using the logarithm base of 10), in which case this arithmetic could possibly be used to describe the result of mixing one quantity of water with another quantity of alcohol. The point which I want to make, of course, is that '1+1=2' is not necessarily true and is, in fact, false in such cases as the one just mentioned. But, it could be argued, the number of nuclear particles in the mixture has not decreased because two quarts of different molecular structures were combined. I agree, of course, with this point, but the point proves nothing; for I am decisively not interested in knowing the number of such nuclear particles, but am rather interested in the bulk quantities involved. My point is, contrary to Ayer, that I can meaningfully change my mind about arithmetic just as easily as I can change my mind about the world: no reasons have been given to show why this is not a real possibility.

"Yes," it is replied, "but you have failed to distinguish between pure mathematics and applied mathematics. It can happen, of course, that an arithmetic based on the logarithm 10 may not be able
to be used in the alcohol example, but it does not follow that '1+1=2' is thereby false; for '1+1=2', qua part of pure mathematics, can be viewed as neither true nor false, even though it cannot be applied to the alcohol example." This move will not help, however; for although I can surely grant that mathematicians can say some very sophisticated things about '1+1=2' without mentioning the counting of pennies or the like, I ultimately cannot understand '1+1=2' without such examples as the counting of pennies, stones, etc.. I am concerned with the meaning of '1+1=2', and distinguishing between pure mathematics and applied mathematics here does not help me with that; for the distinction only results in the claim that '1+1=2' is meaningful in pure mathematics alone, qua being a well-formed string of marks, but does not indicate what '1+1=2' means, aside from simply being a well-formed string of marks. I am claiming, therefore, that, in this respect, '1+1=2' is similar to the sentence 'This is red': although the grammarian can say some very sophisticated things about the grammar and structure of the sentence 'This is red' without mentioning various red things in the world, I ultimately cannot understand the sentence 'This is red' without talking about various red things in the world. The same holds of '1+1=2'. All of this can be summed up as follows: the ultimate cash value and meaningfulness of pure mathematics is applied mathematics.

Let me put the whole thing somewhat differently. Numerals may be used in various contexts to accomplish various tasks such as the
counting of pennies, etc. It does not follow from this, however, that numerals therefore refer to numbers, i.e. to abstract entities. Numerals can simply be viewed as convenient for certain linguistic purposes ('linguistic' being construed broadly so as to cover arithmetic), but do not refer to any abstract entities. The numeral '1' can therefore be viewed as a linguistic rule for picking out units. Thus, just as the numeral '1' does not refer to the number '1', there is no reason why the numerical expression '1+1' must get at or refer to the number '2' (where the numerical expression '1+1' retains the same meaning as in '1+1=2', where the latter expression is used to count pennies). In other words, if the numerical expression '1+1' retains the same meaning as when I use '1+1' to count pennies, then there is no reason why '1+1' cannot now equal 1.8 instead of 2; for surely the meaning of '1+1' has not been changed in the alcohol example, and is the same as the pennies example. Put differently: the expression '1+1' is a linguistic rule for picking out the result of combining two units. Similar remarks about abstract entities can also be made about such things as sets, of course. This does not preclude the use of mathematics in physical theories, of course. To the contrary: mathematics is quite essential to physics.

I should now like to consider another kind of knowledge which has interested philosophers, viz. deductive logic. I shall limit my enquiry here to the so-called propositional (sentential) calculus. Are there any necessary logical truths? Consider the so-called law
of the excluded middle. If 'P' stands for a simple sentence (or statement), '¬' stands for 'not,' and 'v' stands for 'or,' and if '¬' and 'v' are interpreted (defined) as in a typical propositional (sentential) calculus, then one has the following theorem: 'Pv¬P'. This theorem, because it is a theorem within a given system, is provable, given certain axioms, rules of inference, etc. Can one conclude from its probability within a system that 'Pv¬P' is therefore necessarily true? No, for a theorem is only provable or necessarily true ("necessarily true" here means "provable") relative to a system: it is not necessarily true in all possible systems or, at least, its truth in one logical system does not guarantee its truth in a completely different system. Thus, if 'necessarily true' means 'true (i.e. a theorem) in all possible systems within which the formula is a meaningful string of marks,' then one is not entitled to conclude that 'Pv¬P' is necessarily true because it has not been shown that it is true (i.e. a theorem) within all such systems. As a matter of fact, intuitionist logic does not include 'Pv¬P' as a theorem within its systems. The parallel with arithmetic is quite apparent here. It has already been pointed out that there are some forms of arithmetic in which '1+1=2' is false. At this point, it may be objected that it is possible to use truth tables with 'Pv¬P' whereas it is not possible to use truth tables with '1+1=2'. After all, it is argued, truth tables show conclusively that 'Pv¬P' is necessarily true, 'necessarily true' here meaning 'cannot possibly be false' or 'true in all possible cases.'
This is not such an easy and victorious move as it may seem, however; for it is not so clear to me exactly what truth tables show. Consider the following case. Let 'P' stand for (be interpreted as) 'This water is hot.' 'Pv¬P' so interpreted then reads: 'Either this water is hot or it is not the case that this water is hot' or, alternatively, 'Either this water is hot or this water is not hot' or ... etc.. For my argument it is unimportant as to which alternative one chooses here. Also, it should be noted that I include the 'this' in 'This water ...' to indicate that I am referring to a particular batch of water, e.g. the water in this cup which I am now holding. The question which I want to raise is: is 'Either this water is hot or it is not the case that this water is hot' true or false? In order to find out, I stick my finger in the water. At this point, I have some difficulty in responding, for neither disjunct of 'Either this water is hot or it is not the case that this water is hot' seems to be correct. The reason for this is that the warmth of the water seems to be a borderline case. I do not want to say that 'It is not the case that the water is hot' is true, for the water is extremely warm. On the other hand, I know that I have felt much warmer (hotter) water than this batch, and therefore do not want to say that 'This water is hot' is true. To this it might be replied that the meaning of 'hot' is somewhat ambiguous in this context. One must therefore specify precisely what 'hot' means, e.g. one could stipulate that something is hot if and only if it is exactly 119°F. or more? Or 121°F. or more? The meaning of 'hot' be-
comes totally arbitrary at this point. Further: there is surely no firm basis upon which to disallow the above interpretation of 'Pv-P'. Nor is Russell's Theory of Descriptions at all helpful here, for the expression 'this water' is not intended to be at all similar to an expression like 'the author of Waverly.' The expression 'this water' refers to an individual and can be referred to, in the predicate calculus only by an individual constant. It would perhaps be more accurate, therefore, if instead of interpreting 'Pv-P' as 'Either this water is hot or it is not the case that this water is hot,' that 'Pv-P' be interpreted as 'Either this is hot or it is not the case that this is hot.' There is a more trivial reason as to why Russell's Theory of Descriptions is not helpful here, however; viz. that Russell's Theory of Descriptions cannot be used in the propositional calculus, which is the only calculus I am considering here. The Theory of Descriptions can only be used when one has the logical machinery of the predicate calculus. At any rate, the point which I am making is that experience (and the world) is much richer than the statement 'Either this water is hot or it is not the case that this water is hot' allows for: such a statement assumes that there is a precise dividing line between something being hot and something being not hot or not being hot. There is, in fact, no such dividing line, for the world is much too complex to fit into such a neat and simple mold. There is no precise temperature where water suddenly ceases to be not hot and miraculously becomes hot; or, more accurately, there is no
precise moment when 'It is not the case that this water is hot' sud-
denly is false and 'This water is hot' suddenly is true. Nor is my last statement entirely correct, for I do not want to assert that a true statement (not sentence) can change into a false one. At any rate, I hope that the point which I am trying to make is clear. To continue: to state that neither disjunct of the statement in question is entirely true reflects this variety, and basically states that there are not only two mutually exclusive alternatives here, but are, in fact, many more. If this were not the case, change in the world would be impossible. It would be impossible for something which is not hot to become hot. In order to see this, consider the following. It is easy to put some cold water in a pan, put the pan on the stove, and gradually heat the water to a boil. There is a gradual transition from being not hot to being hot. But it is impossible to skip any or all of the intervening steps, and to make the cold (or not hot) water suddenly come to a boil without also being lukewarm, warm, etc., before it comes to a boil. (Note that although boiling water is hot, it is not the only degree of warmth which is hot.)

I should now like to return to the statement 'Either this water is hot or it is not the case that this water is hot.' I have shown in the above paragraph that neither disjunct is entirely true in this statement. According to the rules of logic ('rule' here taken in a loose sense clarified by its context in this sentence), therefore, one must conclude that both disjuncts are false. It should not be
assumed here, however, that a paradox has arisen due to the fact that both one statement and its negation are false. A paradox only arises if one uses the artificial device of truth tables to neatly divide up the world in a way that it cannot be accurately divided. Also, remember that I am considering an interpreted formula (and calculus) here. My conclusion is thus that since 'Pv-P' is false in at least one case (i.e. false under one interpretation), 'Pv-P' cannot be necessarily true, i.e. true under every interpretation or true in all cases. Although I have only considered one interpretation of 'Pv-P', it should be noted that similar arguments could be given in the areas of tastes, smells, colors, etc. to show that there are other cases in which 'Pv-P' is false.

I cannot emphasize strongly enough that my conclusion about 'Pv-P' goes much deeper than merely worrying about the law of the excluded middle; for in attacking the law of the excluded middle, I have also attacked the very meaningfulness and significance of truth tables in terms of their proving the necessary truth of various axioms and theorems of a propositional (sentential) calculus. The logician now only has provability (this has been left untouched) for his necessary truths which are now only necessarily true relative to a given axiomatic system. He is far from securing the kind of necessary truth (i.e. true under all possible interpretations) which he had hoped truth tables would give him. 'Necessarily true' now simply can mean 'provable within a given system,' i.e. it is possible to have a theorem
within a system $S$, $S$ being a consistent axiomatic system, which is
provable within $S$ yet false under certain interpretations and not
provable within certain systems (as in my example of 'Pv-\neg P'). (Intu-  
tuitionist logic, for example, does not have the law of the excluded
middle, in its traditional form, as either an axiom or a theorem.)
The traditional notion of validity in the propositional calculus is
also brought into question here, since validity is shown here in terms
of truth and falsity, i.e. in terms of truth tables. Further, it is
assumed in propositional calculus that if one knows that a proposition
is false, that its negation must therefore be true. I have shown, I
believe, that this is not necessarily the case; for in 'Pv-\neg P' both
$P$ and $\neg P$ were shown to be false under a particular interpretation.

At the risk of boring the reader, I should like to consider the
law of the excluded middle from another standpoint. Everything mate-
rrial in the universe is constantly undergoing change. Water is con-
stantly evaporating, the molecules in the air are constantly moving,
colored objects are constantly losing some of their color (i.e. fad-
ing), electrons are constantly in motion (even in solid objects),
etc.. Thus, if I state that 'This car is red,' there is a sense in
which that statement gives a distorted "picture" of the world; for
although it captures the present color of the car (I assume that the
statement is true), it does not capture the color of the car as now
undergoing change, as fading, even though, of course, I do not see
the paint now fading; fading, in this case, is too slow a process.
Thus, if 'P' stands for 'This car is red,' then 'P' leaves out an important element of the predicate 'is red': viz. it leaves out the principle of change involved in the property red fading, and makes a property into a stagnant item in the world, which it is not. Many similar examples of change could be given, of course, but my claim is that change, for at least some things, is continuous. It also seems that this claim can be made stronger, by inductive generalization, thereby concluding that change in all things is continuous. If anyone is unhappy with such a generalization, then a counter-example is needed, viz. an example of something which does not undergo continuous change. For myself, I can find no such counter-example. At any rate, in the world the sentence 'P' may be true today and the sentence '-P' may be true five years from now. But 'Pv-P' does not "picture" such a transition; for built into 'P' is no way of reflecting P changing into (not merely 'being replaced by') -P. When I state that 'P changes into -P' I am speaking of what 'P' and '-P' refer to in the world, not about one grammatical structure changing into another grammatical structure, which would be absurd. 'Pv-P' therefore, in a sense, falsifies reality, i.e. the world composed of matter. If truth tables show that 'Pv-P' is necessarily true, it follows that truth tables must be rejected as being incapable of proving a statement to be necessarily true. In other words, logic cannot be an infallible basis of cognition. Also, even though such things as 'Pv-P' may be very useful in certain contexts, it does not follow that 'Pv-P' refers
to any abstract entities. Various parts of logic, like numerals in arithmetic, can simply be viewed as convenient for certain linguistic purposes ('linguistic' again being broadly construed), but do not refer to any abstract entities.

From still a third standpoint, a certain form of Intuitionism rejects the law of the excluded middle as being necessarily true, since it is not intuitively obvious that it is necessarily true, i.e., true in all possible cases.

4.

In the section immediately above, I have taken three forms of knowledge which have been assumed by various philosophers to be infallible. I have shown various problems which arise with all of them. Further investigations could and should be made into other forms of so-called "infallible knowledge," but I would suggest that it is rather dubious, given the above discussion, that any kind of knowledge can be infallible. I therefore suggest that Brentano's search for an infallible basis of cognition is misdirected and pointless. Scientists learned this a long time ago, when Aristotelian astronomy (or astrophysics), which had been more or less accepted for hundreds of years (in such systems as that of Ptolemy), was replaced with the astronomies (or astrophysics) of Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton, the later physics in turn being extremely modified by Einstein. Scientists today no longer accept any theory as being the final word on the subject, as being the absolute, unalterable, infallible truth. Some
philosophers seem to have either ignored or misunderstood this lesson from the history of science, however. In most cases I seriously doubt that philosophers have ignored this lesson. I tend to think that Brentano, like many other philosophers, misunderstood the lesson. He may have even understood the lesson to the point of its application to science, but he did not appreciate the depth to which this lesson reaches; nor did he realize that it applies not only to a scientist doing science, but that it also applies to philosophers doing philosophy.

I would now like to probe this "lesson" in some depth. The depth will be somewhat limited, however, since a complete probe of its depth would entail a detailed analysis of the work and writings of such people as Galileo. I can only hope, in a treatise of this sort, to give the broad outline of this "lesson", to the point where, it will be helpful in analyzing Brentano's arguments and reasoning.

A scientist who does things correctly, is a materialist, i.e. he believes that everything in the universe is material. Further, he believes that everything which exists is material. This latter statement would exclude a belief in God, although the first statement in this paragraph would not. (God may exist outside of the universe, for example.) Galileo and Einstein fall under the first statement but not the latter, as both believed in God. Thus such a scientist is to some extent a straw man. This admission will not, for all practical purposes, hinder us in our enquiry, as I am concerned with
how a man such as Galileo did science, and beliefs which do not affect or interfere with this work are not that relevant to this treatise.

Such a scientist also believes that there are discoverable laws of nature which makes matter behave (in a non-teleological sense of 'behave') in one way or another, e.g. the law of gravity partially determines the physical relation between the earth and sun.

Such a scientist will also deny the existence of absolute truths, i.e. infallible knowledge. He has learned this, as noted above, from the history of science.

The above characterization of a scientist who goes about things correctly can serve as a basis to enquire into such a scientist's method of inquiry. We are often told that a scientist first makes observations, develops a theory, (explanation, or conclusion) to explain these observations, and then performs experiments to test his theory. We are told that this is the so-called "scientific method." This, however, is not the method of inquiry used by such scientists as Galileo. A scientist will proceed in three steps. First, he will have a particular problem in mind. Second, he will collect data which is relevant to his problem, whether by simple observation or by experimentation. Third, he will sum up the data in the form of a conclusion or theory which explains how his data fit together. This conclusion is not taken by him as final, for he must now collect new data relevant to his original problem, sum up his experiences with respect to this new data combined with old data, and revise his ori-
ginal conclusion into a new and different conclusion if necessary. Such a process is repeated as often as necessary. The result of all this is hopefully a comprehensive theory which explains how all the data fit together in terms of various (i.e. one or more) laws of nature. I will illustrate this latter method of inquiry with Galileo's problem concerning the rate (speed) of fall of a falling body and his subsequent inclined plane experiments. The problem is this: what happens to a body when it is dropped to the earth from any height? Does its speed never change from the moment it is dropped to the moment it reaches the earth; i.e. does it accelerate, or does it perhaps decelerate? Note that these questions are not intended as possible theories explaining the phenomena of falling bodies: I merely include these questions in order to make Galileo's problem as clear as possible. Having set up his problem, he proceeded to carry out his famous inclined plane experiments. Galileo describes these experiments as follows:

(63) A piece of wooden moulding or scantling, about 12 cubits long, half a cubit wide, and three finger-breadths thick, was taken; on its edge was cut a channel a little more than one finger in breadth; having made this groove very straight, smooth, and polished, and having lined it with parchment, also as smooth and polished as possible, we rolled along it a hard, smooth, and very round bronze ball. Having placed this board in a sloping position, by lifting one end some one or two cubits above the other, we rolled the ball, as I was just saying, along the channel, noting, in
a manner presently to be described, the

time required to make the descent. We

repeated this experiment more than once

in order to measure the time with an

accuracy such that the deviation between
two observations never exceeded one-tenth

of a pulse-beat. Having performed this

operation and having assured ourselves

of its reliability, we now rolled the

ball only one quarter the length of the

channel; and having measured the time of

its descent, we found it precisely one-

half of the former. Next we tried other
distances, comparing the time for the

whole length with that for the half, or

with that for two-thirds, or three-fourths,
or indeed for any fraction; in such ex-

periments, repeated a full hundred times,
we always found that the spaces traversed

were to each other as the square of the
times, and this was true for all inclina-
tions of the plane, i.e. of the channel,
along which we rolled the ball....

For the measurement of time, we em-
ployed a large vessel of water placed in

an elevated position; to the bottom of

this vessel was soldered a pipe of small
diameter giving a thin jet of water, which

we collected in a small glass during the
time of each descent, whether for the

whole length of the channel or for a part

of its length; the water thus collected

was weighed, after each descent, on a

a very accurate balance; the differences

and ratios of these weights gave us the
differences of the times, and this with

such accuracy that although the operation

was repeated many, many times, there was

no appreciable discrepancy in the results.

Galileo's problem, then, was to explain the behavior of falling

bodies in terms of some law of nature. With this problem in mind, he

then proceeded to collect data with his famous inclined plane experi-
merits. Only after he had collected a great amount of very precise data did he offer any conclusion which would sum up or "explain" his data, his conclusion being that "the speed of a falling body, except for the almost negligible factor of air resistance, depends only on the length of time during which it falls, and not on its weight or the force moving it, as Aristotle had supposed. 86

The method of inquiry, as illustrated by Galileo above, will be referred to as the "appropriate method of inquiry." The other method of inquiry, referred to in the second sentence of the paragraph immediately preceding passage (63), will be referred to as the "inappropriate method of inquiry."

Before applying the above discussion of methods of inquiry to Brentano, some additional comments are necessary. First, the appropriate method of inquiry should be used instead of the inappropriate method of inquiry because, given the inappropriate method of inquiry, one can confirm any theory whatsoever which one wants to confirm, regardless of that theory's correctness or incorrectness: all one needs to do is to use biased statistics. I am not saying that a person using the inappropriate method of inquiry would consciously use biased statistics. It is just that it is easier to keep an open mind using the appropriate method of inquiry where the theory is the last step in the reasoning process, than it is with the inappropriate method of inquiry where one already seems to have chosen which theory is the best one. After all, with the inappropriate method of inquiry, why
choose this theory to test instead of some other theory? This very choosing seems to imply that one has already decided that it is the best theory available; thus the temptation, conscious or unconscious, to use biased statistics is present. This temptation can only be avoided by using the appropriate method of inquiry.

Second, the ultimate justification for using the appropriate method of inquiry is a pragmatic one: it brings about surer results than the inappropriate method of inquiry. There is not enough space here to give a list of examples of people who have used both methods of inquiry, as well as a list of their successes and/or failures, although I would be prepared to do this in a more suitable time and place. I simply want to indicate here what a justification would be for using the appropriate method of inquiry instead of the inappropriate method of inquiry. Third, I mean to imply by the expression 'appropriate method of inquiry' that there is only one such method for any area of inquiry. Thus, although physics and philosophy have different areas of concern, they should have the same method of inquiry. Fourth, with the appropriate method of inquiry, the theory must be testable and decidable, i.e. the theory must be capable of being confirmed or disconfirmed. Fifth, although it is possible and, in fact, has happened many times historically, for the inappropriate method of inquiry to yield a correct theory, the appropriate method of inquiry is still the superior method; for unless elaborate investigation, observation, and possibly experimentation had preceded
the formation of a theory, how could one possibly know whether or not one had a good theory? At the very least, the inappropriate method of inquiry can waste a lot of time and expense. At the very best, one obtains a good guess, in which case the probability of obtaining such a good guess is not much superior than the odds involved in playing a one-armed bandit in Las Vegas, Nevada. Sixth, the appropriate method of inquiry may and often will involve the use of previously obtained knowledge in the formation of the problem, provided that this previously obtained knowledge has been confirmed to a highly successful degree and is not widely disputed. Finally, my discussion of the methods of inquiry has nothing whatsoever to do with what has been called the "logic of discovery." I am not concerned with how a scientist comes across a problem, but am rather concerned with how he attempts to solve a problem once he is concerned with solving this problem. A scientist might discover a problem quite accidentally in the laboratory, discover it by means of an apple dropping on his head, etc.: that is of no concern, however, as far as the present discussion of methods of inquiry is concerned.

I would now like to inquire as to how the above mentioned methods of inquiry apply to Brentano. With this in mind, I would like to once again look into Brentano's "conceptual truth arguments" which I analyzed at the beginning of this chapter. I have tried to show that Brentano seems to assume the existence of mental acts. The "conceptual truth arguments" which he gives for their existence are extreme-
ly weak. Why, then, does he offer such weak arguments? I contend that these weak arguments are a direct result of his method of inquiry, that method of inquiry being the inappropriate one outlined above. I should therefore like to consider how this inappropriate method of inquiry applies to Brentano. First, Brentano correctly observes that we see colors, hear sounds, smell smells, taste sweet or sour things, etc. In other words, he observes that human beings are conscious beings and have experiences (e.g. seeing red, feeling pain, etc.). Second, he develops a theory, explanation, or conclusion which "explains" these observations, viz. his explanation involving the existence of mental acts. His explanation or theory, however, is the kind of theory which is not testable in the sense in which scientific theories are testable; i.e. one can with scientific theories, at least in principle, perform experiments to confirm or disconfirm them. But one cannot perform experiments to confirm or disconfirm the existence of mental acts, any more than one can perform experiments to confirm or disconfirm the existence of universals or God. Indeed, if such experiments could be performed, then we should now be agreed as to whether or not God exists, for example. This point is made more clear by the fact that Brentano can only offer arguments to support his theory or conclusion. In this regard, it is very significant that Brentano never claims that it is possible to perform experiments to confirm or disconfirm the existence of mental acts, or to confirm or disconfirm the infallibility of inner perception. As a
matter of fact, he would surely deny, in the case of demonstrating
the infallibility of inner perception, that experiments are possible.
At any rate, it is for this reason that Brentano can only, and does
only, offer arguments to support his theory or explanation. Third,
he takes his theory or explanation, in some places, as the conclusion
of a number of arguments. With his conclusion in mind, therefore, he
then seems to seek premises which would show that his conclusion is
true (biased "statistics"?). In some cases, these premises turn out
to be what I have called "conceptual truths." Since Brentano seems
totally convinced of the truth of these conclusions (e.g. that mental
exist), it seems that he is not so much trying to justify his conclu­
sions as he is trying to rationalize his assumed-true conclusion.
Contrast this with the appropriate method of inquiry. With the ap­
propriate method of inquiry, one does not, in the beginning, claim
that one already knows what the truth is, i.e. what the correct so­
lution to the problem is. One has no assumed-true conclusions or as­
sumed-true claims. To the contrary: the problem which one is inves­
tigating is a problem precisely because one admits that one is not
at all certain as to what the correct explanation or solution to the
problem is. One must engage in elaborate investigation before one
can determine where the truth in this matter lies. The contrast be­
tween Brentano's method of inquiry and the appropriate method of in­
quiry brings out why I stated above in this same paragraph that Bren­
tano seeks to "rationalize" the truth of his conclusions, i.e. to
"rationalize" his assumed-true conclusion; for, given his investigation up to that point, what possible reason could he have for believing that he is justified in claiming that mental acts exist? (It should be noted that the question as to what investigation in this case would involve is dealt with in Chapter V.) None whatsoever. Thus he resorts to these conceptual truths which, in themselves, lend no support whatsoever to his conclusion; yet Brentano seems so wrapped up in the assumed truth of his conclusion that he doesn't notice this at all. This is a rather critical mistake for Brentano to make, however, since this theory or conclusion, viz. that mental acts exist, serves as the basis of everything else he says which I have discussed heretofore. If this basis is incorrect, therefore, it will cast doubt on everything else he says which rests on that basis. Note, however, that I have not said Brentano's theory or conclusion being discussed here is incorrect; I merely contend that neither his arguments for it nor his method of inquiry lend any support whatsoever to its truth.

Brentano's method of inquiry has consequences which affect other segments of his work. I criticize above (in this same chapter) Brentano's notion of infallibility. Once again he assumes the truth of some conclusion without investigation. He never once considers the possibility that inner perception could be fallible. Once again one finds his argument for his conclusion, viz. the infallibility of inner perception, extremely weak; and once again, for reasons similar to those cited above, I contend that the reason he is forced to ar-
gue in this way is his inappropriate method of inquiry. In this case, however, I am in a somewhat better position to criticize Brentano's conclusion, since I tried to show above that this conclusion of Brentano's is false; viz. where I tried to show above that inner perception is not, and cannot be, infallible, on Brentano's own grounds.

I shall conclude this chapter with a brief remark concerning my above discussion of methods of inquiry. My reason for discussing methods of inquiry is not to be able to have at my disposal a subtle psychological probe into the reasoning process of Brentano, nor is it to be able to develop an elaborate and sophisticated ad hominem against Brentano. My reason is twofold. First, if one can become clear as to how Brentano fell into his pitfalls, e.g. the infallibility of inner perception, then perhaps one can not only avoid falling into those particular pitfalls, but can avoid others as well. Philosophers have paid much attention to particular trouble spots into which other philosophers have gotten themselves, but they have seldom examined the kind of path, i.e. method of inquiry, which got that philosopher into that trouble spot in the first place. Thus, to speak metaphorically for a moment, if philosophers are going to continue to explore jungle terrain, then they had better become better map-readers, knowing not only the swamps, but also the better roads on which to journey. Second, the appropriate method of inquiry can be used as a basis for solving various philosophical problems. In the following chapter, I attempt to use the appropriate method of
inquiry to solve the mind-body problem. This approach clears away a lot of the old philosophical underbrush, which has, I believe, delayed a solution of this problem. With the appropriate method of inquiry, I am convinced that many philosophical problems are not quite as complex (or as insurmountable) as philosophers have previously assumed them to be.

I have already admitted above that the scientist who does things correctly is to some extent a straw man; but I have not specified to what extent he is a straw man. Such a specification is not important for the purposes of this treatise, however; for the ultimate value of my discussion of the two methods of inquiry does not lie in whether or not it is a totally accurate description of how such scientists as Galileo work, but rather lies in its success or failure in solving or avoiding the kinds of problems mentioned in the paragraph immediately preceding this one. I might add that even if Galileo were not, at some point, to use the appropriate method of inquiry, one might still be justified in saying: yes, but he should have.
Chapter V
LOVE AND HATE RECONSIDERED

I shall, in sections (3) and (4) of this chapter, have some general considerations regarding materialism and idealism. Generally speaking, however, the procedure which I will use in this chapter will be very similar to the procedure which I used in the last chapter; to wit, the points which I will make will be both general and specific. The first criticism which I shall make concerns the general relationship between the three classes of mental phenomena, viz. presentation, judgment, and feeling (i.e. love and hate).

1.

The most obvious criticism concerning the general relationship between the three classes of mental phenomena is that, contrary to passages (47) and (48) (and indirectly (49)), in which Brentano claims that all three classes of mental phenomena must always, for human beings, occur together, we can and do experience, e.g., seeing an object and knowing what it is (i.e. making a judgment about it) without feeling any pleasure or displeasure, i.e. pro or con attitude towards that object. While writing this treatise, for example, I have often glanced up at the wall in front of me without any feeling or attitude whatsoever towards that wall. Similarly, a person may
truly say of a painting or some other appropriate object: "It does nothing to me. I neither like nor dislike it." Surely this is evidence enough to indicate that Brentano is simply wrong in (47) and (48), i.e. the analysis in passages (47) and (48) is not consistent with a description of the phenomena involved. With regards to this, I should like to enquire as to why Brentano might make a claim such as the one he makes in passages (47) and (48). With this in mind, I should like to call attention to the ninth point immediately following passage (49), which notes that one mental act has three functions. In connection with this ninth point, I should like to once again discuss method of inquiry. In reconstructing Brentano's argument which supports the claim made in passages (47) and (48), his conclusion is clear: viz. that there is only one mental act in any particular experience of any given object, that mental act always including the members of all three classes of mental phenomena, viz. a presentation, a judgment, and a feeling. The premises which support this conclusion are given in the fourth point immediately following passage (43) in Chapter III above. These premises, given informally, run roughly as follows. Suppose that I now see a vase, affirm it, and love it. If my mental act of being presented with that vase were numerically different from my act of affirming that vase, and if these two acts were in turn numerically different from my act of loving that vase, then the vase would have to be presented three times: once in the act of presentation, once more in the act of af-
firming that vase, and a third time in the act of loving that vase. This is impossible or false, however, since, by hypothesis, there is only one vase and not three. Therefore, there is only one mental act within which the vase is presented, known or affirmed, and loved. All three classes of mental phenomena must thus be contained within every mental act. This last statement is, in substance, Brentano's conclusion mentioned above. The above premises have already been attacked in section (3) of Chapter IV above. Nor does my analysis of mental acts, which follows this attack, have to include any triplication of objects; for one and the same mental act plus its object (in this case the vase) could be the object of a second mental act of affirming as well as the object of a third mental act of loving. Here there would be three mental acts but no duplication or triplication of objects: that vase would be the object of the act of presentation, that act plus its object (i.e. the same identical vase) would be the object of the two additional and numerically distinct acts of affirming and loving. Brentano's only reply can be that all consciousness is conscious, which would rule out the possibility of more than one mental act existing with regards to the consciousness of any given object. This reply has already been refuted in section (3) of Chapter IV above, however. At any rate, the point here is that Brentano's premises in his above argument are false, and that there are other arguments and analyses more correct than Brentano's (since they avoid his mistakes) which are available. I do not wish
to dwell at length, however, as to which premises could support which conclusions. The main point which I want to make here concerns methodology. That is to say, in supporting a position it is not sufficient to give arguments for that position. What is also needed is an appropriate method of inquiry which will hopefully lead to correct arguments for a position. To give arguments for a conclusion which is simply assumed to be true without any investigation whatsoever is bound, in most cases, to lead to failure, or, at least, to no sure guarantee of success as an appropriate method of inquiry can guarantee. To merely present arguments without investigation is putting the cart before the horse, and cannot succeed in pushing the cart forward to any significant extent. William James seems to be concerned with precisely this issue in his essay *Pragmatism* where he writes:

(64) The history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of human temperament. Undignified as such a treatment may seem to some of my colleagues, I shall have to take account of this clash and explain a good many of the divergencies of philosophers by it. Of whatever temperament a professional philosopher is, he tries, when philosophizing, to sink the fact of his temperament. Temperament is no conventionally recognized reason, so he urges impersonal reasons only for his conclusions. Yet his temperament really gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective premises. It loads the evidence for him one way or the other, making for a more sentimental
or a more hard-hearted view of the universe, just as this fact or that principle would. He trusts his temperament. Wanting a universe that suits it, he believes in any representation of the universe that does suit it. He feels men of opposite temper to be out of key with the world's character, and in his heart considers them incompetent and 'not in it,' in the philosophic business, even though they may far excel him in dialectical ability.

2.

On the level of the description of the phenomena, it is true that people love, hate, feel sorrow, feel angry, yearn (e.g. to possess some object), will, etc. It does not follow from this, of course, that it is correct to analyze these phenomena as being non-material things, i.e. as being mental acts. I would thus like to consider whether or not Brentano's analysis is consistent with a description of the relevant phenomena.

Suppose that Jones claims that he loves a particular object very much ('loves' here being on the level of the description of the phenomena). Smith, upon learning this, proceeds, in Jones' presence, to totally destroy that object. (Smith is a very evil sort of person.) Upon seeing Smith destroy the object, e.g. a vase, Jones starts to laugh and states that he (i.e. Jones) is obtaining a tremendous amount of pleasure from watching this act of destruction. Further, assume that Jones' joyous behavior here is sincere and not faked (out of fear of Smith, for example). In addition, assume that Jones makes
no effort whatsoever to prevent Smith from destroying that object. If one assumes that Jones is, according to all objective standards, sane, then there is no way in which Jones' original claim (viz. that he loved that particular object very much) could have been true: i.e. Jones' original claim, in the context of this situation is just false. (I am assuming, of course, that Jones does not suddenly change his mind with regard to that object, i.e. suddenly stop loving that object and just as suddenly start hating it.) Jones, then, is either lying or uttering pure, meaningless nonsense. Since I have assumed that Jones is quite sane, I can only conclude here that Jones is lying. The point which I am trying to make here is that certain physical behavior is just as much a part of the analysis of love or hate ('love or hate' here being on the level of the description of the phenomena) as are various experiences ('experiences' here being on the level of the description of the phenomena) such as feeling sorrow, pleasure, etc.. If one does not include physical behavior as an essential part of the analysis of the phenomena of love or hate, then one must claim that Jones' original claim can be true in the above context: for love is just something mental on Brentano's analysis, and involves nothing physical whatsoever (except the loved object which is not the focus of this discussion). I should like to make an analogy here between trying (to do something) and loving. What is involved in trying to do something? Regarding this, Richard Taylor writes:
(65) In case what one is trying to do is something requiring physical effort, as it usually is, then the trying itself involves the exertion of actual physical effort. It does not consist in just having something called "trying" occurring in one's mind; it is not just a spiritual effort of the soul. Thus, one tries to jump over a fence by actually jumping, and if the jump does not carry him over, then he has tried and failed. One could not possibly be telling the truth, if he said he was trying to jump over a fence, at the same time just sitting there and doing nothing in the way of jumping, but just mentally trying.

Similarly, loving is not simply "a spiritual effort of the soul." Loving an object always involves some kind of active behavior towards the loved object. In Jones' case, it would involve Jones at least not laughing, perhaps displaying (physical) anger (e.g. frowning), or (if Jones is stronger than Smith) perhaps Jones attempting to prevent Smith from destroying the loved object. Brentano's analysis cannot account for such behavior which must be present in any love-situation if one can truly assert that, e.g., Jones loves a particular object very much; for, according to Brentano, love or hate is just "a spiritual effort of the soul," and nothing more. The most Brentano can say is that a mental act of loving can cause me to behave in certain ways, e.g. actively preventing Smith from destroying the loved object. But Brentano cannot, on his analysis, say that certain physical behavior is an essential ingredient in the
loving of an object. Physical behavior is an essential part of loving an object, however. Brentano's analysis of love and hate ('love and hate' here again being on the level of the description of the phenomena) is, therefore inadequate. Finally, I might note that since the question as to whether or not mental acts can be causes is discussed below, I will not consider it here.

I would like to consider the question as to what love or hate is from a different perspective. I shall limit my discussion here to one small part of this class, viz. the emotion which is called love, referred to, for example, by 'loves' in 'John loves Mary.' Note the following points. First, a person can sometimes find out what his emotions are by observing his own behavior. John, for example, may observe himself unable to concentrate on anything, constantly looking for Mary in all sorts of places where she frequents, unable to sleep at night, frequently asking Mary for dates, etc. After observing his own behavior for a period of time, he may suddenly realize that he is doing all of these things because he loves Mary. This emotion, then, is inferred by John from his own behavior. In this regard, it surely happens very frequently that a person is asked if he loves, e.g., Jane, and he replies 'I really do not know yet.' In other words, knowledge of such inner states as emotions is not infallible or self-evident. Second, one can conude all of the data which Brentano gives regarding feelings, emotions, etc. without having to grant that his analysis of feelings,
emotions, etc. is correct.

3.

It is now appropriate to bring materialism into full view. In doing this, I hope that many of my above remarks will become more clear. In this discussion, I will contrast materialism with idealism, although idealism, as I will define it, will be defined somewhat differently than it is usually defined. I hope that the usefulness of the definitions of the terms 'materialism' and 'idealism' will be the justification of these definitions. It should be noted, however, that only the broad outlines of materialism and idealism will be given in this treatise. I will simply provide enough detail to enable me to analyze some of Brentano's claims in more detail than has been done above, e.g. his claim that mental acts exist.

I will first consider materialism. First, a materialist believes that everything which exists is material, composed only of matter. (The scientist, ultimately, is the person who tells us what matter is, e.g. atoms.) This claim or belief must be taken quite literally; otherwise, inconsistency in the materialist's position is inevitable. One consequence of this is that a materialist, in order to be consistent, must deny the existence of such non-material things as, e.g., the null set. It must be further noted, in connection with this point, that a scientist, in explaining the world materialistically, often (correctly) uses mathematics, set theory, etc. His use
of these things, however, does not entail that he accept the existence of such non-material entities as the class of all classes of pairs, the null set, etc. I will admit that it is true, of course, that modern physics uses set theory, and that set theory must include the null set. It does not follow from this, however, that the symbol symbolizing the null set must refer to an existent.

Consider the following. Language, among other things, is something which is used to evoke certain responses. Imperatives and requests are the most obvious cases of this. Further, a language may serve many functions, but it is certainly true that a language helps us to manipulate and change the world. Now, set-talk is certainly very useful in getting certain things done in which the scientist is interested. It does not follow from this, however, that sets exist; for one can get along without the higher functional calculus, thus eliminating the necessity to quantify over predicates or have sets. With this in mind, we can use set-talk, if we wish, without being committed to the existence of such abstract entities as sets. The issue as to whether or not we use set-talk is purely a pragmatic one. Set-talk can thus be viewed as a convenient piece of language which can be used to evoke a particular response on the part of the scientist, viz. a prediction. Likewise, language in general, so viewed, is a complex stimulus which evokes many varied responses, e.g. receiving a glass of water, getting some new information, fear, hysteria, making predictions, etc. It is true, of course, that language
(e.g. English) contains terms ending with the suffix '-ness' or
'-ity', e.g. redness, triangularity, but it does not follow from
this that such terms refer to abstract entities, as Wilfred Sellars
has taken pains to point out. The point is that the causal ef­
ficacy of a piece of language does not entail that any term in that
piece of language refers to things in the world, to existents (al­
though, of course, a term may refer to something in the world.) My
saying, for example, "The Devil is coming now for your soul" may pro­duce the response of fear in you, if you believe that the Devil
exists; but the fact that I used this piece of language as a stimulus,
to evoke the desired response of fear, does not entail the existence
of either the Devil or your soul ('soul' here referring to a non­material entity). Likewise, the use of the null set in set theory
may enable a physicist to evoke the desired response of various pre­dictions, but his success in that matter does not entail the existence
of the null set. Further, if a physicist were eventually to find a
better (i.e. simpler) mathematics to replace set theory, I assume
that he would not hesitate to do so. This, in itself, is indicative
of the point I am making. Are we to conclude that the null set exists
as long as the physicist uses it, but that it would suddenly cease to
exist if set theory were to be replaced by something else? Surely
not, for there is no reason to assume that the null set existed in
the first place. An analogy begs to be made here with geometry,
where it was assumed, until Einstein, that Euclidean geometry truly
described physical space. Einstein's theory of relativity made people rethink that assumption, however. Further, the case of arithmetic (e.g. '1+1=2') has already been discussed in section (3) of Chapter IV above. Further, if one is asked 'What is the difference between two possible worlds, one in which the null set exists and the other in which no null set exists?', the only answer which can be given to this question is: 'In one world the null set exists and in the other it does not.' This is strange, however; for in the case of material objects, the complete removal of any one of them from the universe (including every last nuclear particle of that object) would eliminate the gravitational pull of that now non-existent object on every other object in the universe. This change could, in principle, be measured. The removal of the null set would have no such effects, however. This alone should be enough to urge us to view the existence of the null set with suspicion. Finally, it should be noted that if mental entities are considered, as by Brentano, to be non-identical to anything material, then a materialist, so defined, would have to claim that such mental entities do not exist. It does not follow from this, of course, that so-called 'mental predicates' such as 'sees red,' 'feels pain,' 'believes that God exists,' etc. are meaningless. That would be an absurd position. A materialist would claim, rather, that particular mental predicates refer to particular brain states or body states. Likewise, he need not deny (and would not deny) that consciousness, i.e. experiences exist: he would simply claim that
every experience is identical to a brain state or a body state. (The term 'experiences' here refers to such things as seeing, hearing, feeling, believing, knowing, etc.. Also, experiences are not something in addition to seeing hearing, etc., any more than color is something in addition to red, green, etc..)

Second, a materialist believes that there are certain material forces (nothing mysterious is meant by 'force') which determine how the various "bits" of matter in the universe interact with each other, such material forces being commonly expressed by "laws of nature"; and that these material forces are, in principle, discoverable. For example, the law of gravity tells us about such a force, that force partly determining, e.g., the path of a stone which I throw. A force, as such, is a property of material bodies. These properties are expressed by laws of nature. I do not want to discuss such classical problems as action at a distance, for this is the scientist's problem, not the philosopher's. That problem can only be solved when the scientist finds out more about what gravity is and how it works. Third, a materialist believes that science has enough evidence to conclude that matter changes, evolves, and that atoms do not simply combine and recombine in configurations which are repeated over and over again (even though the number of such configurations is extremely large) as Democritus believed. One element can change into another element, for example: e.g. uranium changes into lead. Also, coal, under certain conditions, will change into diamonds.
(I might note that man has, to a certain extent, been able to bring about some of these changes himself: e.g. the production of synthetic diamonds.) Darwin's theory of evolution is another example of the modern materialist's conception of the evolution of matter. By 'evolution' I do not mean to imply any teleology, of course. (I might note that I have already defended this notion of change in general in Chapter IV above, where I discuss truth tables and the law of the excluded middle.) Fourth and finally, a materialist will (or better: should) use the appropriate scientific method of inquiry as discussed in Chapter IV above.

I should now like to turn to idealism. Although (as I am using the term) there is only one consistent kind of materialist, there are, in the same vein, two kinds of idealists. The first kind of idealist, whom I shall refer to as an explicit idealist, accepts at least one statement as being true which a materialist would reject as false, since (and this is important) accepting that statement as true would entail that at least one non-material entity exists. It is important to note here that this does not include every disagreement between a materialist and someone else; i.e. only when a claim entails the existence of some non-material entity can the person making such a claim be considered an explicit idealist. I assume that such a claim by the explicit idealist would occur, for the most part, on the level of analysis. The second kind of idealist, whom I shall refer to as an implicit idealist, uses terms in his explanation, theory, or claim (on the level of analysis) which do not explicitly refer to or
describe\textsuperscript{97} material entities, when an alternate set of terms, which do explicitly refer to or describe material entities, is available. In other words, the implicit idealist accepts some statement as true which a materialist would not necessarily consider false, but to which there is some materialist alternative. For example, if a person has a choice of discussing an issue either in terms of body states, brain states, atoms, etc. or in terms of rules of language ('rules of language' not obviously [i.e. explicitly] referring to body states, brain states, atoms, etc.), then the implicit idealist will choose the term (expression) 'rules of language.' The materialist, on the other hand, is not stuck with talking about static states\textsuperscript{98}, e.g. rules of language, but talks rather about inter-relationships among active, changing things. Put crudely: the materialist would claim that in order to explain any given aspect of the material world, one must replace, where possible (i.e. where there is a choice), all terms which do not explicitly refer to material things, by terms which do explicitly refer to material things. The materialist does not claim, of course, that all of the terms in a theory must refer to material things.

It is obvious that I have defined 'idealism' in terms of my definition of 'materialism.' It is also clear that while my definition of 'materialism' is not a radical departure from common philosophical usage, my definition of 'idealism' is such a departure. I will justify my first definition here by the following considera-
tions. First, there is a precedence for such a usage. Karl Marx and V.I. Lenin use the term 'idealism' (in both senses) in a similar manner, for example. Second, it is my hope that idealism, so defined, can be used to point out important similarities between various philosophical views which would otherwise perhaps not be so perspicuous. Third, philosophers who are traditionally classified as idealists would also fall into the classification of idealism as I define 'idealism.' Berkeley, for example, claims that mental substances exist, mental substances being non-identical to the brain or anything material. Berkeley is consequently classified, according to my definition of 'idealism,' as an idealist. Berkeley's classification here is thus consistent with the traditional classification. I would now like to discuss the second and third points immediately above together. Kant, on my view, is an idealist; for he too claims that mental substances exist (although, of course, his notion of mental substance is fundamentally different from Berkeley's), mental substances here again being non-identical with anything material. This classification does not overlook the fact, of course, that Kant affirmed the existence of the Noumenal World. It might be argued, of course, that my definition of 'idealism' is too broad, since it classifies various philosophers as idealists who are ordinarily not considered to be so. After all, is not idealism usually defined as a position which claims that everything which exists is mental, e.g. either a mind or inhering in a mind (à la Berkeley)? I would argue,
however, that the usual definition of 'idealism' is too narrow; for it fails to show the influences of such philosophers as Berkeley on later philosophers such as Kant; i.e. there is such a chasm between 'materialism' and the usual definition of 'idealism' that it is hard to see the relation of the one position to the other. My definition of 'idealism,' however, enables one to bridge that "chasm." It can be used, for example, to show in what general and specific ways Kant was indebted to Berkeley, Sellars to Kant, etc. In other words, I would be prepared to argue, in some more appropriate place, that Berkeley's system cannot, ultimately, withstand certain fatal criticisms (e.g. Hume's). Thus, Kant revised Berkeley's view of Ideas and called the results "appearance." Kant admitted, of course, a world of what one might call material bodies (non-appearance or noumena), even though he had little to say about it. At any rate, Kant thus preserved from Berkeley what we see as being non-material, i.e. mental. This analysis of the relation between Berkeley's and Kant's systems is, of course, patently incomplete, but it seems to justify calling Kant an idealist. Likewise, Sellars saw certain problems with Kant's system, and, I would be prepared to argue elsewhere, relegated appearance to a more materialistic place. At any rate, it is such comparisons (though, of course, in more detail) which would ultimately justify my first definition of 'idealism.' Finally, I might note that 'materialism' could just as easily have been defined in terms of 'idealism' with exactly the same above
The central concern of this treatise is much more limited than the concerns briefly discussed in the preceding paragraph. The above definitions of 'materialism' and 'idealism' have been developed with the specific purpose in mind of using them to analyze some of Brentano's ideas and claims which I have outlined in the first three chapters of this treatise.

4.

Having given my general definitions of 'materialism' and 'idealism,' I am now in a position to analyze Brentano's view that mental acts exist, as do their objects, and that both are non-material entities, i.e. mental entities. He believes that mental acts and brain states are radically different kinds of entities, although he believes as well, of course, that an object, if it is correctly affirmed, is correlated, though not identical to, a material object. I want to question now whether it is reasonable to assert that the term, e.g., 'seeing' refers to a mental, i.e. non-material, entity; and whether it is reasonable to assert that the term, e.g., 'red' refers to a mental, i.e. non-material, entity. I shall first consider the experiences (e.g. seeing hearing, smelling, etc.) and not what is experienced (e.g. red, square, etc.). I use the term 'experiences' here because it is ontologically uncommitted, i.e. experiences may be either mental or physical. That question, as to whether they are mental or physical (i.e. material), has not yet been answered. (Note the "appropriate method of inquiry" which I am attempting to use here
to handle this question.) Further, the term 'experiences' is
simply a shorthand notation for such things as seeing, hearing,
feeling, believing, knowing, desiring, etc. In other words,
experiences are not something in addition to seeing, hearing, any
more than color is something in addition to red, green, etc. There
is no doubt, of course, that I am conscious, that I see, hear, taste,
smell, touch, think, imagine, dream, etc. A materialist cannot deny
this, and has no reason to deny it; nor can the idealist deny this,
or have any reason to deny it. ('Idealist' here in the first sense,
i.e. 'explicit idealist'; unless otherwise specified, only the first
sense will be used in this section.) The question therefore is: what
is the nature of these experiences? Are they mental or material.
The idealist here claims that they are mental (Brentano, among
others), and the materialist claims here that they are material.
I will consider both positions in terms of arguments or actual evi-
dence in favor of and against both positions. Until these arguments
and evidence are taken into full consideration (as much as space and
time will allow), no conclusions will be drawn as to which position
is correct. Which position is considered in which order thus makes
no difference here.

I shall first consider the idealist's position, viz. that
experiences are mental, i.e. non-identical to anything material, and
I shall consider several arguments. It should be noted here that not
all of the arguments for the idealist's position which I shall pre-
sent are the kinds of arguments which Brentano might present, were he to argue more extensively for the claim that experiences are mental. The first argument which I shall present, for example, Brentano would not accept, not because he claims that experiences are spatial, but because he claims that it is not clear whether or not they are spatial. He doesn't argue for the existence of mental acts, but rather already assumes, in his comments, that mental acts exist, i.e. that experiences are mental. My fourth argument, however, is clearly consistent with Brentano's ideas, even though he does not present such an argument. Finally, there are many more arguments for the idealist's position than those which I present. I shall limit my presentation of the idealist's position to some of the main arguments which have been presented in one form or another, however.

The first argument for the idealist's position, which I shall refer to as the "known space argument," is as follows. Suppose that I now am seeing. (It is assumed, of course, that I am seeing something. What I see is not relevant to the present argument, however.) If any part of my body (including my brain) were to be opened up, examined, or cut into, no seeing could be found: you would only find neurons, gray matter, blood, etc. After all, what would a seeing look like? It is certainly not colored, for only an object of an act can be colored. Nor can a seeing be extended, for it makes no sense to ask how large or small a seeing is. At any rate, you certainly know that what you see in the space occupied by my body is not
any experience, e.g. a seeing. Further, since the seeing cannot be found in my body, and since it is agreed that my seeing exists (on the level of the description of the phenomena), it therefore follows that my seeing is not in the space occupied by my body. One of the essential properties of my body, however, is that it is spatial. It must be concluded, therefore, that my seeing is non-spatial; for although it is my seeing, it is not in the space occupied by my body. But something which is non-spatial cannot be identical to something which is spatial. It follows that my seeing cannot be identical to any part of my body. If it is assumed that my body is material, it then follows that my seeing is non-material, i.e. mental. Similar arguments could be given to show that other experiences (e.g. hearing, smelling, etc.) are non-material, i.e. mental.

The second argument for the idealist's position, which I shall refer to as the "unknown inner states argument," is as follows. I can talk and think about my experiences without talking or thinking about brain states or inner (material) states. But if I talk or think about something such as the fact that I am now seeing, I know what I am talking or thinking about. If it is assumed that my body is material, it follows that my experiences are non-identical to my material body, i.e. that my experiences are non-material, i.e. mental. Nor can it be objected to this argument that experiences such as seeing can be correlated with brain states, a correlation which Brentano himself would agree could eventually be accomplished; for
such a correlation has no bearing on what I know I am talking or thinking about.

The third argument which I will present for the idealist's position, which I shall refer to as the "privacy argument," is as follows. My experiences are peculiarly private, i.e. only I can have my experiences and only you can have yours. It is always false to state that you can have my experiences. Your seeing may be similar to my seeing, but similarity does not entail identity. The only way for your seeing to be identical to my seeing is for you to be identical to me. It is not the case, in other words, that you can inspect or examine my experiences, or put them under a microscope. This is not the case with my body, however. My body is "public," i.e. anyone can examine it; and the same thing applies to all other material objects. There is a radical difference between experiences and material objects, therefore: viz. experiences are private, not capable of being inspected by anyone else other that the person who, e.g. sees, and material objects are public, i.e. anyone can inspect them. It must thus be concluded that experiences are non-material, i.e. mental, since an essential characteristic of material bodies is their being public, a characteristic not present in experiences.

The fourth argument for the idealist's position, which I shall refer to as the "intentionality argument," is as follows. No material object, whether it be a rock, a door, or my body, can desire,
see, hear, love, yearn for, etc. Now, a rock is, for the present purposes, ultimately no different from my brain or my body, since my body is composed of such kinds of matter as salt, water, iron, etc. It must be concluded, therefore, that experiences are not identical to anything material, i.e. are non-material, i.e. mental, since material bodies cannot desire, see, etc., whereas material bodies must be able to desire, see, etc. if experiences are material.

I will discuss each of these arguments in their respective order. As regards the known space argument, the idealist has not shown that it is impossible for seeing to be found in my body. Nor has he shown that it is impossible to find someone else's experiences in a brain dissection; for if, in fact, an experience, e.g. seeing, is no different from, i.e. is identical to, a particular brain state or body state, then we can see other persons' experiences. Put differently: there is no reason to assume that experiences are non-spatial, and the assumption that experiences are non-spatial boils down to the assumption that expressions such as 'seeing' cannot refer to material bodies. That is what the argument claims to show, however: this argument is therefore circular. At any rate, I should like to continue the discussion concerning the claim that it does make sense to say that I can see another persons experiences, i.e. seeings, hearings, etc.. If I see $x$, and $x$ is identical to $y$, then it follows that I also see $y$. I may not know that $x$ is identical to
y, but that makes no difference. If, for example, I see a certain building, and that building is called University Hall, then it follows that I also see University Hall, even though I may not be aware of that fact at the time. This happens very frequently. For example, someone asks me, "Did you see City Hall when you were in Boston?". I respond, "No." He then replies, "But your hotel was right across the street from it," and then proceeds to describe City Hall to me. I then reply, "Oh yes, I did see it. I just did not know that it was called City Hall." Note that I am not claiming here that 'seeing' refers to brain states or body states: I am simply claiming that the idealist here has not shown that it is either false or meaningless to say that 'seeing' refers to a material object, e.g. a body or a brain.

As regards the idealist's unknown inner states argument, it cannot be denied that his premise, viz. that I can talk about my experiences without knowing anything about brain states or body states, is true. His conclusion, however, does not follow from this premise (his conclusion being that experiences are non-material, i.e. mental); for I can likewise talk about a table without knowing anything about the kinds of materials out of which it is constructed (e.g. some new, synthetic material). It does not follow from the fact that I know nothing about this material, that the table is not identical to this material (shaped, of course, in a certain way). Put differently: what I know is not important here. My ignorance proves nothing. I
am not claiming, of course, that experiences are not non-material. I am simply claiming that the idealist here has not shown that experiences are non-material.

As regards the idealist's privacy argument, it can be pointed out that "privacy" here may simply be due to the fact that I do not have your brain and you do not have my brain. Thus, the premise 'It is always false to state that you can have my experiences' may be admitted to be true without the conclusion of the idealist's argument (viz. that experiences are mental) being true. Further, notice here that the idealist's claim that experiences cannot be publicly examined seems to imply the known space argument; for why is it that experiences cannot be publicly examined, except for the fact that experiences are assumed to be non-spatial? The privacy argument is thus a subtle variation of the known space argument, i.e. 'private' boils down to 'non-spatial.' It must therefore be concluded that the privacy argument is circular, for the same reasons that it was shown that the known space argument is circular.

As regards the idealist's intentionality argument, it is sufficient to point out that one can only assume the premise 'No material objects ... can desire, see, hear, love, yearn for, etc.' to be true here if one has already assumed that experiences (seeing, hearing, etc.) are non-material, i.e. mental; for recall that the term 'experiences,' as well as the terms 'see,' 'hear,' etc., are ontologically uncommitted. The argument therefore is circular; for it
assumes what it set out to prove.

With respect to Brentano, it has already been pointed out that he too assumes that terms such as 'see,' 'hear,' 'love,' 'desire,' etc. refer to mental entities. He then takes what I shall call his "Cartesian turn." His Cartesian turn runs as follows. Having assumed that experiences are mental, he then combines this assumption with a conceptual truth like 'If I hear (a sound) and I see (a color), then I hear (a sound) and see (a color)' (an assumption made in passage (10) above) and, combining this, in turn, with the assumption made by the idealist in his intentionality argument (viz. that no material object can desire, see, etc.) and the assumption that material objects constantly undergo change, he concludes that no material object can have a mental property. The above mentioned conceptual truth is essential here; for he seems to use this conceptual truth as the premise in a "conceptual truth argument" whose conclusion is that the term 'I' in the conceptual truth above refers to one and only one non-changing entity since, and this is implied by the above conceptual truth, the term 'I,' no matter how many times it occurs in the 'If' clause of a similar conceptual truth with a similar grammatical structure (e.g. 'If I hear (a sound) and I see (a color) and I desire (some wine) and ...'), can always be replaced by a single 'I' in the 'then' clause. Further, this one non-changing entity must be mental since everything which is material changes. Thus, there is a single mental substance to which the 'I' refers.
As regards Brentano's Cartesian turn, it can be pointed out that the idealist has not yet shown that one must assume that experiences are mental in order to explain the various phenomena discussed in this section of this chapter. If experiences are not shown to be mental, however, the conclusion of this Cartesian turn does not have to be true.

Returning to the idealist's intentionality argument, the point can be made that if one assumes that: (1) experiences are non-material, i.e. mental; (2) hearing is, in some sense, a property ('property' being used here on the level of the description of the phenomena) of something; (3) a term referring to a mental entity can never truly (or instead of 'truly,' 'meaningfully') be predicated of a term referring to a material entity; then, given these three assumptions, one must conclude that an additional mental entity, e.g. some kind of mental substance, exists. The idealist in the intentionality argument grants that the first assumption is true, perhaps unintentionally. He must further grant that some version of the third above assumption is true. ("No material objects ... etc..") Further, he would surely grant the second above assumption, or if he did not grant it he would have to admit that it is consistent with his position, i.e. the first and third assumptions do not contradict it. If one grants the first and third assumptions above, then, it is a very easy step to affirming the second assumption, thereby affirming the conclusion. Brentano, of course, does not have to be convinced
to take this step; for I have tried to show in the above that he, either implicitly or explicitly, takes all three above assumptions to be correct.

It is now appropriate to sum up the above presentation of the idealist's position. None of his arguments, as the criticism of these arguments show, demonstrates that his position must be accepted as the best one. Nor can he claim that the fact that experiences exist support his position; for that would beg the question. This does not show that there are not other, additional arguments which he could present in order to support his position. I have, however, tried to give what seem to be the main arguments that have typically been given to support the idealist's position. It should further be noted that the reason why the criticisms did not question the idealist's assumption in all four arguments that material bodies exist is that it was assumed here that the expressions 'material object' and 'material body,' when they occur in the premises, are used on the level of the description of the phenomena. The expression 'non-material,' however, is used on the level of analysis and occurs in the conclusion of each argument. Because of this there was no reason to question the idealist's assumption of the existence of material objects. Perhaps the expression 'physical object' or 'physical body' would be more appropriate here; but I have avoided the expression 'physical object' here since this has certain implications for Brentano's ontology.
I shall now consider the materialist's position, viz. that experiences are material, 'material' here, of course, being used on the level of analysis. It should also be noted that there are more arguments for the materialist's position than those which I shall present (as in the case of the above presentation of the idealist's position). I shall limit my presentation of the materialist's position to some of the main arguments which have usually been offered in defense of the materialist's position, however.

The first argument for the materialist's position, which I shall refer to as the "brain localization argument," is as follows. Neurophysiologists have been able to determine the functions of the various areas of the brain which include, for example, the areas of seeing, hearing, touching, remembering. The expression 'the areas of seeing, hearing, touching, remembering' is used instead of the expression 'the areas correlated with (associated with) seeing, hearing, touching, remembering' for two reasons. First the area of hearing is not specific as to what sounds are heard, i.e. experienced; for although, regarding this area, it is not specific as to which sounds are heard, i.e. experienced, e.g. it makes no difference as to whether C# or D# is heard, the area is specific regarding which experience occurs, viz. hearing occurs and not seeing. Second, it is certainly true to state that without that area of my brain (viz. the area of hearing) existing, that hearing could not occur for me. Further, the knowledge of these areas has been expanded through brain surgery, in which
a surgeon may apply a small electrical impulse to the various areas of the brain. The patient's responses (verbal or otherwise, since he is awake during this "mapping") are then noted and the areas "mapped" accordingly. For example, an application of this electrical impulse may produce a remembering of the patient's fourth birthday party. It should be noted here, of course, that my exclusive discussion of the brain does not exclude other areas of the human material body being involved in experiences.) Further, it has also been discovered that when a person learns (i.e. one of the last knowings in a series of knowings) that his hearing (a sound) is followed by his seeing (a color), then the alpha waves from his visual cortex drops in amplitude. A crucial feature of the above discussed examples of experiences and brains, however, is that the evidence indicates that the experiences here occur simultaneously with certain specific brain states. But it is a necessary although not a sufficient condition for claiming that two things are identical to each other that they always occur simultaneously together.

This point regarding identity, however, requires a more detailed explanation in terms of how an identity between "two" objects is discovered. Suppose that I investigate two persons: Sir Walter Scott and the author of Ivanhoe. I should note that Russell's theory of descriptions is not relevant here; for I could just as well have chosen to talk about one person with two names, e.g. the one person who went both by the name Vladimer Ilyich Lenin and Vladimer Ilyich...
Ulyanov. At any rate, I find that the author of Ivanhoe was born in Edinburgh on August 15, 1771, that his mother was Anne Rutherford, that he had poliomyelitus as a small child, that he wrote the poem "The Lay of the Last Minstrel," etc. As regards Sir Walter Scott, I find that his father was Walter Scott, a lawyer, that Sir Walter Scott was very sick as a small child, wrote poetry, etc. It is obvious that the more details I fill in with respect to both people, the more I will suspect that they are really one and the same person, e.g. when I find out that Sir Walter Scott's mother was Anne Rutherford, that he was born in Edinburgh on August 15, 1771, that he was not a twin or a triplet or ... etc., that the author of Ivanhoe was likewise not a twin, triplet, etc. The chances of two people being born on the same day in the same small town by a mother of the same name becomes slim indeed, precisely because of the simultaneous occurrence of two sets of events. It might be noted, as an additional example here, that this is the way a scientist goes (or went) about discovering that lightning is identical to an electrical discharge caused by the ionization of water vapor in the atmosphere, viz. there is the simultaneous occurrence of two sets of events, which, in this case, may, before the scientist has discovered the identity, appear to be quite different kinds of phenomena and non-identical; but their constant, simultaneous occurrence together eventually led the scientist to conclude that these "two" things were identical. I should now like to return to the experience and brain examples above.
It has been shown that, at least in the above examples, that experiences here occur simultaneously with brain states. The same presumption concerning lightning and electrical discharge can be made with respect to brain states and experiences. It can therefore be concluded that experiences are identical to brain states and/or body states. If experiences are identical to brain states and/or body states, and if brains and bodies are material, it therefore follows that experiences are material.109

A second argument for the materialist's position, which I shall refer to as the "experiential disorder argument," is as follows. If one does not hear or see clearly, one goes to a medical doctor in order to correct one's hearing or seeing. It is true, of course, that if I do not hear clearly, that I do not hear (sounds) clearly. The doctor is not thereby interested in the sounds if he asks me about the sounds: it is rather that what I tell him about the sounds will aid him in correcting my hearing. (There is the additional point, of course, that this argument concerns experiences and not what is experienced. Therefore, what is found out about the sounds will not be especially relevent to my hearing.) The success in the medical treatment of experiential (e.g. hearing, seeing) disorders is also an important factor here. At any rate, when a doctor treats a hearing disorder, he treats my material body, e.g. by prescribing some material medicine. It is further clear that to treat a hearing disorder is no different from treating my material body. As a mat-
ter of fact, if a doctor did not treat a hearing disorder as a dis-
order of my material body (i.e. as identical to a disorder of my 
material body), but instead advised me to, e.g., read the Bible (as 
a Christian Scientist might), then I would conclude that the doctor 
did not know his business. But if a hearing disorder is identical 
to a disorder of my material body, then hearing must also be identi-
cal to a state of my material body. (Note here that a disorder of 
my material body is a state of my material body; also, a certain set 
of body states in a certain temporal sequence are no different from 
(are identical to) my material body and my material brain, respective-
ly.) To this it might be objected that even though a hearing dis-
order is treated by material objects such as medicine, that it does 
not thereby follow that the experience is identical to a state of my 
material body; for it is consistent with the claim that hearing is 
treated by material bodies (e.g. medicine) that hearing is mental and 
not material, i.e. that the medicine (a material body) is the cause 
of the cure of a hearing which is mental. Because of this "consis-
tency," it is appropriate at this point to digress, presenting an 
idealist's argument, not for the position (i.e. not trying to prove) 
that experiences are mental, but for the position that it is reason-
able to assume that experiences are mental since such an assumption 
is consistent with the doctor point made in the materialist's ex-
periential disorder argument (not all of which has been presented 
yet).
The idealist's argument for the position that it is reasonable to assume that experiences are mental, which I shall refer to as the "mental act causality argument," is as follows. Assume that experiences are mental. It occurs many times that a desire of mine is followed by a change in the state of my material body, e.g. my desire (of the raising of my right arm) is followed by the raising of my right arm. Hume is surely correct, however, in asserting that to state that event A causes event B is at least to say that the occurrence of event A is constantly followed by the occurrence of event B, i.e. constant conjunction. But my desire (of the raising of my right arm) is consistently (constantly) followed by the occurrence of the raising of my material right arm, excluding, of course, such things as my arms being tied behind my back which would prevent me from raising my right arm, i.e. excluding other causal factors which would prevent the raising of my right arm. A mental event (entity), e.g. a particular desire, can thus be reasonably construed as being the cause of a material event, e.g. the raising of my right arm. Thus, since the assumption that experiences are mental is consistent with a correct explication of causality, it is reasonable to assume that experiences are mental, i.e. non-material. In other words, experiences viewed as mental can play an important role in the causal framework. As regards the experiential disorder argument case, it is likewise reasonable to state here that the material body (e.g. the medicine) which cures my hearing disorder is a material cause (viz. the medicine) of a mental
event (viz. my hearing better).

I will now discuss the idealist's mental act causality argument. Richard Taylor, in his book *Action and Purpose*, shows that this argument is inevitably circular. He writes:

(66) Now in any true causal relationship one can always, in case he knows what both events are, describe them independently of each other. If, for instance, I know that a window was broken by the impact of a brick, I can describe this cause quite informatively without any reference to the breaking of the window, which is its effect. I can say, that is, that this cause was the motion of a brick of such and such description, having such and such weight and moving at such and such speed, striking the window in a specific way, and so on. Similarly, a physiologist can give some sort of description of the causes of my heart beats, or the growth of my hair, without necessarily mentioning these effects at all. But it is quite impossible to describe any volition or act of will except in terms of its alleged effects. Can anyone, for instance, describe the volition to move one's index finger in the motion of a figure eight without the reference to that finger and that motion? Can anyone describe such a volition, adequately to distinguish it from, say, the volition to make a similar motion of the middle finger without reference to either finger? Can any particular volition be described at all? Seemingly not. If we ask just what is the volition to move one's finger, we only get as a reply that it is the internal or mental cause of just such a motion. The only thing that distinguishes it from the volition to move another finger is that it in fact caused the motion of
this finger. Such an alleged cause is, evidently, pure fiction. 110

Further:

(67) ... decisions, choices, desires, tryings, intentions, and the like serve no better than volitions as the causes of actions, and for precisely the same reason — namely, that it is impossible, as it is not in the case of any instance of a real causal connection, even to begin to say what these events are without describing them in terms of their alleged effects. What will be left, for instance, in one's description of the choice to move one's finger after we have eliminated all reference to the motion of the finger? And how shall we distinguish that choice from the choice to move one's toe without any reference to the motion of the toe? The only thing anyone can say, apparently, is that one is the choice to move the finger, and the other the choice to move the toe, adding, perhaps, that neither of these choices is a physical event but is, instead, a mental one — and we are absolutely right where we started, in total ignorance. 111

The following points can be made concerning passages (66) and (67). First, the question as to whether willings, desires, decidings, etc. are free is independent of the question as to whether or not willings, desires, decidings, etc. are (can be) causes of material events. (Brentano would agree with this.) If the second question is answered in the negative, as Taylor answers it, then the first question becomes trivial, since the first question entails (i.e.
assumes) that a willing, e.g., can be a cause of some motion of, e.g., my material body; i.e. a willing can only be free if it can also be a cause. Second, constant conjunction is not the only important element in causality. The evidence concerning causes and effects which we possess confirms that a cause of a particular event can always be described independently of its effect. The case of the brick breaking the window shows this very clearly. This independence of the descriptions of the cause and its effect is absent in the case of mental events such as willings, desires, etc. One must conclude, therefore, that if experiences are mental, then it is more than reasonable to assume that they can never be causes of anything whatsoever. If experiences are mental, however, it follows from a consideration of the independence of the descriptions of causes and effects, that experiences can be neither causes nor effects of anything whatsoever. At this point, it can surely be questioned whether it is still reasonable to assume that experiences are mental.

So much for the digression. It is now appropriate to return to the materialist's experiential disorder argument for the position that experiences are material. The above discussion of passages (66) and (67) has shown that, if experiences are mental, then a material body (viz. medicine) cannot cure a hearing disorder; for the change in the hearing here (viz. hearing more clearly) is surely the effect of the medicine. Thus, the identity between the experience of hearing and a state of a material body is justified. It follows, therefore,
that experiences are material.

I will discuss each of these two arguments for the materialist's position in their respective order. It should be noted, however, that since the idealist has not shown why we must accept his position as the correct one, the best the idealist can hope for is a stalemate with the materialist; i.e. the best he can hope for is that the materialist will also, ultimately, be unable to offer any evidence or sound arguments for his position. This would leave both alternative analyses of experiences equally acceptable, viz. experiences are mental vs. experiences are material.

As regards the brain localization argument which the materialist presents for his position, to refute the argument it is not sufficient to point out that the area of hearing of the brain is specific to the kinds of things which are experienced (viz. sounds are experienced and not colors) as well as the area of hearing is specific to the kind of experience which occurs (viz. hearing instead of seeing); for this concerns what is experienced instead of the experience itself, which is the subject of the argument. It can be pointed out, however, that although some evidence concerning the simultaneity of the occurrences of experiences and brain states, there is surely not enough evidence to be able to conclude, as the argument does, that experiences are identical to brain states or body states, i.e. to be able (justified) to conclude that experiences are material (even though one is, in the lightning case, justified in claiming that
lightning is identical to an electrical discharge caused by the ionization of water vapor in the atmosphere).

As regards the experiential disorder argument for the materialist's position, it only shows that if experiences are causes or effects, then experiences must be material and cannot be mental. If one denies that experiences are causes or effects, then one need not conclude that experiences are material. This is, of course, the parallelist's view, or, at least, a variation of it. On this view, there is no causal relationship whatsoever between any mental events, nor between material bodies and mental events. This does not preclude, however, material bodies causally interacting with each other. The following points can be noted concerning this parallelist's view. First, this position is even more difficult to maintain than the epiphenomenalist's position; for whereas the epiphenomenalist can explain, in his analysis, how mental events come to be or occur, the parallelist here cannot offer any such explanation. Mental events, for the parallelist, are at best nomological danglers. Second, according to the parallelist's view, there is a one to one correlation between mental events and body states, i.e. between mental events and material events. Regarding these material events, there is already, of course, a rather sophisticated set of biological laws about the human brain, the rest of the human body, as well as other organisms. There is no such set of scientific laws about mental events. All that is required for science to carry on its work, how-
ever, is that there be one set of scientific laws. Biology, along with the other sciences, provides us with such a set of laws. The existence of mental events thus becomes unnecessary and redundant, and with a quick slice of Ockham's razor their existence can be denied. This, of course, severely weakens the parallelist's position, with the consequence that the experiential disorder argument substantially bolsters the materialist's position that experiences are material.

It is now appropriate to sum up the above presentation of the materialist's position that experiences are material. Although the brain localization argument for the materialist's position does not conclusively show that experiences are identical to brain states and/or body states, it nevertheless does present some (indirect) evidence that experiences are identical to brain states and/or body states. I say that there is indirect evidence for materialism, because there is no direct evidence for materialism. There is rather inductive evidence for the correctness of science. The objects with which the scientist is concerned today, however, must be construed as material, e.g. atomic particles in physics. There is just too much evidence to indicate that, e.g. electrons are not just convenient myths. I do not have the space here to give a more detailed defense of this position, although I would be prepared to provide this detail elsewhere. At any rate, the fact that the objects with which the scientist is concerned must be construed as material is the only sense in which
materialism is confirmed as opposed to idealism. As regards the experiential disorder argument, since the materialist can describe any given experience independently of any other experience and independently of any material object which lies outside of my material body, he at least has the necessary machinery to explain what causal role experiences have in the material world. Thus, if experiences are causes or effects of other material events, then the materialist is capable of explaining how they function in the world. The case of medicine in this argument surely shows that experiences can at least be effects, however. It therefore follows that the materialist has the machinery to explain how experiences can be the effects of various material causes.

It is now appropriate to sum up the above arguments and discussion concerning the idealist's and materialist's positions, i.e. whether experiences are mental and not identical to any brain state or body state, or experiences are material and identical to brain states and/or body states, respectively. The idealist is unable to show why one must accept his position as the only acceptable one. The materialist, on the other hand, is able to give some (indirect) inductive evidence, however incomplete, for his position, the sense of 'indirect' being explained in the above paragraph. The following conclusions can therefore be drawn. First, there is no compelling reason as to why the idealist's claim (that experiences are mental) instead of the materialist's claim (that experiences are material)
must be accepted; for the materialist can explain, with his analysis, all of the same phenomena which the idealist can explain with his analysis. Second, even if one accepts the idealist's alternative here, there is no compelling reason as to why one has to accept Brentano's analysis of, e.g., love and hate; for I have shown that there is an equally good, if not better, idealist's analysis of experiences, which I discuss towards the first part of section (1) in this same chapter above, and also in section (3) of Chapter IV above. Third, there is no longer any compelling reason now as to why one must accept the existence of a mental substance; for if one takes the materialist's alternative, then mental substance is no longer required in the analysis of experiences. A mental substance is only needed if one assumes that experiences are mental; but if one assumes that experiences are mental, it then becomes necessary for many experiences of one person to be related in some way. In order to see this, see passage (12) and my discussion concerning Brentano's Cartesian turn. At any rate, there is no necessity for having an entity such as mental substance (or mental substratum) if experiences are identical to brain states and/or body states. It makes no difference here whether the mental substance is Brentano's kind of mental substance, Berkeley's kind, Kant's kind, etc.. They are all equally unnecessary and equally dispensable. Fourth, the materialist's experiential disorder argument shows that the materialist's analysis is a reasonable one; for the fact that a person always expects a doctor to give
a material cure for, e.g., a hearing disorder supports my first conclusion in this same paragraph. Finally, it turns out that the materialist's analysis is the only analysis acceptable to science, i.e. indirectly confirmed by science. Thus, I conclude that the materialist's analysis regarding experiences is the best available one.

Before I continue, I should like to point out a rather important feature of the above discussion of the status of experiences. It may have been wondered in the last chapter how a philosopher could make use of the appropriate method of inquiry as exemplified by Galileo. The above discussion of experiences in this section of this chapter is an example of such a philosophical use of the scientist's appropriate method of inquiry. I started the discussion with a problem, viz. whether experiences are mental (non-material) or material. No conclusion, theory, or explanation was offered at this point, and the question was left entirely open as to which answer was correct. I then presented arguments and/or evidence for both positions, this presentation being fair, I think, to both sides. I then evaluated the arguments and/or evidence in order to see what was correct and incorrect. This data (i.e. arguments and/or evidence) was then summed up in the form of a conclusion, theory, explanation.

The task of this section of this chapter is not completed yet, however; for it has not been shown what the correct status is of what is experienced, e.g. red, square, tree, etc. which are experienced. The problem here, then, is whether what is experienced is material
(material objects being composed of atoms) or mental (non-material, not identical with anything composed of atoms, e.g. Berkeley's Ideas or A.J. Ayer's sense data). No conclusion can be given at this point as to which position is correct. As regards the idealist's position, it must be pointed out that the claim that an experienced object is mental does not entail the claim that the experienced object must be experienced in order to exist. Put differently: experiences have been discussed independently of what is experienced, and what is experienced will be discussed independently of the experiences. Thus, even though it has been shown above that experiences are material, it does not follow that the experienced objects must also be material; for recall that nothing whatsoever is entailed by the ontologically neutral expression 'what is experienced' or the expression 'experienced object.' Thus, if the idealist can show that what is experienced is mental, then it does not automatically follow that what is experienced must be experienced in order to exist: that additional claim must be argued for. Again, keep in mind here that the term 'mental' here is defined only negatively as 'non-material.'

I will first consider the idealist's position, viz. that what is experienced is mental, i.e. non-material. I will present four arguments for his position that what is experienced is mental. It should be noted that there are, of course, many more arguments for the idealist's position than the four which I will present. I shall
limit my presentation of the idealist's position to some of the main arguments which have been presented, in one form or another, for his position.

The first argument for the idealist's position, which I shall refer to as the "relativity-of-position argument," is as follows. What is experienced varies tremendously, in some cases, from person to person. I may see an object as yellow, for example, and you may perceive the same object as orange. The color of the object varies depending upon the angle (position) from which it is viewed. The same object cannot be both yellow all over and orange all over at the same time (assuming that you and I both see the same object at the same time), however. It follows, therefore, that we are not seeing the same object. If the object we are both seeing is a street sign, and it is assumed that there is not more than one street sign in front of us, and it is also assumed that the street sign is a material object, then it follows, since we are both not seeing the same object, that the object which each of us sees is not material. The object which each of us sees must therefore be non-material, i.e. mental.

The second argument for the idealist's position, which I shall refer to as the "immersion argument," is as follows. A straight stick, when immersed in water, will appear to be bent. The straight stick which is immersed in the water is a material object. The object which I see is bent, however. The same object cannot be both
straight and bent at the same time, however. It follows that what I see is not the material object, viz. the straight stick, but is a non-material object, i.e. mental.

The third argument for the idealist's position, which I shall refer to as the "perceiver variability argument," is as follows. An object may vary in color, depending on who is seeing it. Changes in color vision are produced by ingesting the drug mescal, for example. Color-blindness to various colors is another case readily at hand. Suppose that Jones, a person with normal vision, sees a traffic light as green, and Smith, suffering from color-blindness, sees the same traffic light as gray. Suppose, further, that both Jones and Smith are seeing the same traffic light at the same time, and that the traffic light is a material object. The same object cannot be both green all over and gray all over at the same time. It follows that the objects which Jones and Smith see are not material, i.e. are mental, and that each of us sees a different mental object.

The fourth argument for the idealist's position, which I shall refer to as the "hallucination argument," is as follows. If Jones has taken some drug or has had too much alcohol to drink, he may hallucinate, e.g. a pink rat. There is, of course, no material object which is a pink rat in the room. Nor can anything in Jones' brain resemble or be identical to what he sees. In this regard, it should be pointed out that although the experienced object is pink (i.e. has the property pink), no part of Jones' brain is pink. But if "two"
things are identical, they must share (have in common) all the same properties. (This has already been admitted by the materialist in his second argument for the position that experiences are material.) The experienced object has the property pink, however, whereas Jones' brain is not pink (i.e. does not have the property pink, 'property being used here on the level of the description of the phenomena.) It therefore follows that the experienced object is not identical to Jones' brain. Similar arguments could be given to show that the experienced object is not identical to the other parts of Jones' body which are all involved in Jones' seeing the pink rat, and that the experienced object likewise is not identical to any other material object. (It is assumed, of course, that Jones' brain (and his body) are material.) Thus, it follows that what Jones sees (viz. the experienced object) is non-material, i.e. mental.

I will discuss each of these arguments which the idealist presents in their respective order. As regards the idealist's argument which I have referred to as the relativity-of-position argument, it is sufficient to point out that merely because the color of the object varies from position to position, it does not follow that what is seen is a non-material object. It may turn out, for example, that the object has a particular sort of texture such that the color which is seen at one angle is different from the color which is seen at another angle because of the different wave lengths of light which are reflected off the object to my eye at the different angles. At one
angle only the wave length described by the term 'yellow' is reflected by the object to my eye, and at another angle only the wave length described by the term 'orange' is reflected by the object to my eye. Thus, the same material object is being seen under different observational conditions in the two cases of seeing the object as yellow and seeing the object as orange. It does not follow, therefore, that you and I are seeing different objects, i.e. that the objects which each of us sees is numerically different; nor does it follow that the objects which we see are non-material, i.e. mental. We are simply seeing the same object under slightly different observational conditions.

As regards the immersion argument, it is sufficient to point out that the straight stick appears to be bent when immersed in water, because of the refraction of the light rays in the water. When I see the straight stick in the air, the light rays reflected from the stick to my eyes are not refracted (i.e. bent), and the straight stick immersed in water the light rays reflected from the stick to my eye are refracted (i.e. bent), and the straight stick therefore appears to be bent. It thus does not follow from the fact that the stick is seen as bent when immersed in water that the object which I see is non-material; for the observational conditions under which I see the object as straight are different from the observational conditions under which I see the object as bent. In both cases, however, I am seeing the same object.
As regards the perceiver variability argument, it is sufficient to point out that the observational conditions under which Jones and Smith see the same traffic light, but here the differences in the two sets of observational conditions lies in the perceptual apparatus itself. It does not follow, therefore, that Jones and Smith are seeing different objects, nor does it follow that the objects which Jones and Smith see here are non-material, i.e. mental. Jones and Smith are seeing the same object under different observational conditions.

As regards the hallucination argument, the following points should be noted. First, it is clear that Jones sees a pink rat because he has ingested either some drug or too much alcohol. The condition of Jones' material body is different from the condition of my body, since I have not ingested any drug or drunk too much alcohol. The conditions under which Jones sees and I see are quite different. It thus does not follow from the fact that Jones here sees a pink rat that the pink rat exists or that the object which Jones sees is non-material, i.e. mental. This is not to deny, of course, that it is true that Jones sees a pink rat: it is rather to explain Jones' hallucination of a pink rat in terms of the material conditions of Jones' material body. Second, it does not follow from the fact that Jones hallucinates a pink rat that there is (i.e. exists) a something which is pink and ratlike; i.e. it does not follow that an experienced object exists in any of Brentano's senses of the
word 'exist' explicates in Chapter I above. It therefore does not follow that there is a something which is non-identical to a brain state and/or a body state and which is mental. Prichard refers to such an inference as the "sense-datum fallacy." He writes:

(68) ... grant for the sake of argument that on some occasion I am apprehending in the form of perceiving a particular color, a particular sound, and a particular feeling of roughness. Then, no doubt, any one of them is being thus apprehended by me. Nevertheless it is not a something which is being thus apprehended. If I am eating a number of things, say, some cheese, some bread, and some salt, they together form a certain numerical group, viz. the totality of the things which I am eating. But their membership of this group does not constitute these things having a common character, and so things of a common sort for which the term would have to be "things which I am eating," or "things which are being eaten by me," or perhaps "things which are being eaten by someone." There is no such sort. The things which I am eating are united simply by my eating them; and my eating them does not constitute them things of a certain sort. Indeed to speak of a something which is being eaten by me, or a something which is being eaten by someone, is merely verbal, because to be being eaten is not a character of anything. Similarly, the color, the sound, and the feeling of roughness which I am thus apprehending are united solely by my thus apprehending them; and though each is one of the things which are being thus apprehended by me, none is a something which is being thus apprehended by someone.\textsuperscript{116}

Third, I have already discussed the case of the lightning which one
seems being identical to an electrical discharge caused by the ionization of water vapor in the atmosphere. The lightning which I see is white, bright, etc., but this does not prevent one from correctly asserting that the lightning is material, i.e. non-mental, and is identical to an electrical discharge caused by the ionization of water vapor, that electrical discharge being neither white nor bright. There is thus nothing which prevents one from claiming that the hallucinated pink rat is identical to a brain state and/or body state which is neither pink nor ratlike. Fourth, it has already been shown above that the materialist's analysis of experiences is acceptable. The materialist could thus claim here that the experienced object (viz. the pink rat) is a brain state and/or body state, that both the experience (viz. the seeing) and the experienced object (viz. the pink rat) are material, i.e. identical to a brain state and/or body state, and that both the experience and the experienced object are both found in a single brain state and/or body state. Thus, it can be admitted, as Brentano would hold, that there can be no seeing without an object which is seen, without also having to admit that what is seen is mental. Brentano's conceptual truth here (viz. that there can be no seeing without an object which is seen) can consequently be affirmed without also having to affirm that experienced objects are non-material, i.e. mental.

A digression at this point is necessary which concerns all of the above arguments for the idealist's position. I will present an
idealists argument, not for the position (i.e. not trying to prove) that what is experienced is non-material, i.e. mental, but for the position that it is reasonable to assume that what is experienced is mental since this assumption is consistent (i.e. does not contradict) with the claim that objects which we experience causally interact with one another in various ways. The argument, which I shall refer to as the "sense data causality argument," is as follows. Assume that experienced objects are non-material, i.e. mental. It occurs frequently that the objects which I experience causally interact with each other. I see, for example, one billiard ball strike another billiard ball and cause the second billiard ball to move away from the first. I do not, of course, experience causality. (Hume is correct.) I merely experience one set of events followed by another set of events. I analyze these events in terms of cause and effect, but it makes no difference whether these events are material or mental, i.e. non-material; for the terms 'cause' and 'effect' only concern how the events fit together (i.e. are analyzed) and not what kinds of events the events are, i.e. material or mental. The analysis of causality is thus similar to a game of chess: it makes no difference what the chess pieces are made of (wood, glass, ivory, etc.) so long the rules of chess are preserved. Objects which are experienced are analogous to the chess pieces here (they can be either material or mental) and causality is analogous to the rules of chess (which event causes which event to occur in the world is the same regardless of
whether the events are material or mental. The idealist's argument here may at first glance seem quite convincing. Berkeley, as a matter of fact, claims exactly that. In order to analyze this argument, I shall use the term 'sense datum' to refer to any mental object. Further, a sense datum, according to sense data philosophers, always occurs in space which is private; i.e. the perceived space in which your sense data occur is non-identical to the perceived space in which any other person's sense data occur, and all of these private spaces are non-identical to the material space which the physicist talks about. It should also be noted that all of the idealist's arguments above for the position that experienced objects are mental assume that perceived space is private. This assumption is therefore crucial to the idealist's position. At any rate, the difficulty which the argument immediately runs into is similar to the difficulty regarding experiences which Taylor points out in passages (66) and (67) above, viz. that a sense datum (or sense data) which is a cause cannot be described independently of the sense datum (or sense data), and vice-versa. It is true, of course, as I have noted above, that in order for a sense datum to exist it is not necessary that it be experienced. The point here is rather that a sense datum which is a cause cannot be described independently of that sense datum which is its effect, and vice-versa. In order to see this, consider the following. Can anyone describe a red sense datum (the cause), adequately to distinguish it from another similar red sense datum (the effect)
without reference to either sense data (e.g. consider one red billiard ball striking a second red billiard ball, the second one moving after the impact)? 'Yes,' it is replied, 'for if the description of each sense datum contains the spatial location of each sense datum, then this is sufficient to describe each sense datum independently of any reference to the other red sense datum.' This will not help, however, for the space within which the two red sense data occur is private; so how can one describe one's private space? Do I simply correlate my private space with everyone else's private spaces? How is such a correlation even possible? There seem to be two possibilities here. The first possibility is pre-established harmony, which I assume is not a reasonable answer since it is quite mysterious as to how pre-established harmony works. The second possibility is an elaborate correlation between all individual private spaces. It would seem, however, that even an extremely elaborate correlation is impossible. In this regard, it can be pointed out that a necessary condition for such a correlation is the use of language in the descriptions of the various private spaces. But language is both public, i.e. a private language makes no sense, and publically learned. It is clear, therefore, that I cannot describe private spaces with a public language, and that the very idea of such a correlation is meaningless. Suppose that, however, for the sake of argument, that one assumes that such a correlation is both meaningful and possible. It is clear that this correlation would have to be an extremely ela-
borate one. Would it not be much simpler (enter Ockham) to simply assume that perceived space is public and not private? But if one assumes that space is public, one may as well have material objects instead of sense data; for sense data are only introduced in the idealist's system in order to account for why what I see in my private space is different from what you see in your private space. On the other hand, if we both see the same object in the same public space, the need for sense data disappears. Finally, if I now withdraw the assumption which I only made immediately above for the sake of argument, viz. the assumption that the correlation between private spaces is meaningful and possible, then there are two possible conclusions which one can draw regarding sense data. The first possible conclusion is that the very notion of a sense datum is meaningless and incoherent, since it involves the idea of private space. The second possible conclusion is that a sense datum must be construed as non-spatial, thus avoiding both the incoherency of the notion of private space as well as the existence of material objects in public space. It makes no difference which conclusion one chooses; for in either case the spatial location of a sense datum cannot be included in the description of that sense datum.

It is perhaps for reasons such as those discussed in the above paragraph that Gustav Bergmann claims that a sense datum has a substratum which he refers to as a "bare particular." In other words, in addition to the red in the first sense datum there is also a bare
particular (a mental substratum) which is referred to in the description of the first sense datum, and this bare particular is just different from the bare particular which is referred to in the description of the second red sense datum. Such a move only disguises the fact that one red sense datum cannot be described without reference to the other red sense datum, when one wants to adequately distinguish, in these descriptions, the first red sense datum from the second red sense datum. In other words, Gustav Bergmann reifies the problem here in the form of a solution which simply restates the problem in such a way that it appears that he has solved the problem while in fact he has not.

Thus, a sense datum which is a cause (e.g. the red billiard ball case) cannot be described independently of the sense datum which is the effect of the first sense datum, nor vice-versa. It follows from this and considerations regarding passages (66) and (67) that sense data can be neither causes nor effects of anything whatsoever; i.e. if one assumes that what is experienced is mental, then one must deny that experienced objects can causally interact with one another. In the above billiard ball example, it must consequently be denied, according to a consistent idealist's position that the perceived first billiard ball caused the perceived second billiard ball to move by striking it; for the first billiard ball cannot be described adequately enough to distinguish it from the second billiard ball without reference to both billiard balls. Such independence of the de-
criptions of a cause from its effect is essential if one can say that one event caused another event to occur. Any event in the world of sense data can thus cause nothing else to occur, and everything in the world of sense data becomes similar to a Leibnizian monad, i.e. it is just there but can have no causal influence on anything else whatsoever, nor can it be influenced (i.e. be an effect) by (of) anything whatsoever. Thus, epiphenomenalism is refuted, since, according to the epiphenomenalist, sense data are the effects of the material world. Parallelism raises its head again, however, except that here it pertains to experienced objects rather than to the experiences themselves. My previous comments regarding parallelism, which occur in my discussion of the experiential disorder argument, are, of course, equally applicable here; i.e. parallelism is not an acceptable position.

It should also be noted that it will not help the idealist to say: "How sense data causally interact is explained by the assumption that, in addition to sense data, material objects exist, material objects causing sense data (a la Kant?); i.e. to explain how sense data causally interact is ultimately to explain how material objects causally interact"; for sense data cannot be causes or effects, and consequently cannot be the effects of material bodies. Also, Ockham's razor can be used here, resulting in the claim that since only material objects are ultimately needed in order to explain how what is experienced causally interacts, and since sense data cannot be the
effects of material bodies, only material bodies exist. Therefore, it is surely not reasonable to assume that what is experienced is mental, for this assumption is not consistent with the claim that experienced objects causally interact with one another. Finally, even if one ignores Ockham's razor here and admits that both material objects and sense data exist, there is still a problem: viz. what is the connection between the private spaces of the sense data and the material (public) space of the material objects? This connection is left a complete mystery.

At any rate, causality is not analogous to a chess game, for if events which are experienced are mental, then these events cannot cause other events which are experienced to occur. The idealist has no machinery with which to explain causality. (It must be kept in mind, of course, that parallelism is no longer an acceptable alternative theory.)

It is now appropriate to sum up the above presentation of the idealist's position. None of his arguments, as the criticism of these arguments show, shows that his claim that what is experienced is mental is correct. I have not presented other arguments for his position since these other arguments meet similar difficulties as the four arguments which I presented met. It has further been shown that the idealist's position entails that experienced objects do not causally interact with one another, and as regards this, it has been shown that parallelism is an unacceptable position. Thus, the best that
the idealist can hope for is a stalemate with the materialist; i.e. the best he can hope for is that the materialist will also, ultimately, be unable to offer any evidence or sound arguments for his position, and that the materialist will likewise have no machinery with which to explain causality. This would leave both alternative analyses of what is experienced equally acceptable, viz. what is experienced is mental vs. what is experienced is material.

I shall now consider the materialist's position, viz. that what is experienced is material. I shall only offer two arguments for his position. The first argument for the materialist's position, which I shall refer to as the "non-perceivable entities argument," is as follows. One cannot adequately describe what is experienced unless what is experienced is described independently of the experience of it. I surely do not say very much if I simply state that an experienced object is red; for such a description does not enable one to predict, for example, what color the experienced object will appear to be under different observational conditions. In this regard, it must be pointed out that this method of explanation has enabled scientists to find out as much about the world as they have. Put differently: in order to explain the world, one must go beyond the properties which one sees (hears, touches, etc.) in the experienced object to such entities as atoms which cannot be experienced. Since this is the only kind of explanation which is capable of explaining how experienced objects causally interact with one another, it fol-
lows that experienced objects or what is experienced is material.

The second argument for the materialist's position, which I shall refer to as the "adequate description argument," is as follows. What is experienced can be described independently of the experience of it and independently of the description of any other experienced objects. The color green, for example, can be described in terms of light rays, the retina of the eye, etc. Light rays are not, of course, experienced objects. Thus, a green object which is experienced can be described independently of both the experience of that green object and the description of other objects which are experienced. It is impossible to describe an object adequately, however, if one does not describe the experienced object independently of both the experience of that object and the description of other objects which are experienced. It follows, therefore, that what is experienced is material.

I will now discuss each of the materialist's arguments for the position that what is experienced is material in their respective order. As regards the non-perceivable entities argument, it has already been shown in the above criticism that various things (objects) which are experienced cannot be explained adequately unless one goes beyond what is experienced to what is not or cannot be experienced. (I am referring here to the criticism of the four arguments for the idealist's position that what is experienced is mental.) For example,
what is experienced is mental, why an otherwise straight stick appears
to be bent when immersed in water is left a complete mystery unless
one goes beyond the apparent bentness of the stick to a discussion
of such unexperiencable things as light rays and refraction of light
rays. Likewise, as regards the idealist's perceiver variability ar-
gument for the position that what is experienced is mental, why most
people see a traffic light as green yet some people see it as gray
is left a complete mystery unless one goes beyond an examination of
the traffic light to also include an investigation of the perceptual
apparatus of the person who sees the traffic light as gray. Saying
that the color-blind person sees the traffic light as gray because
he sees a gray sense datum is to explain nothing and leaves us still
in total ignorance as to why he sees it as gray instead of green; for
saying that a gray sense datum exists here is simply reifying the
problem in such a way that it looks like a solution to the original
problem, even though, in fact, it is simply a restatement of the
original problem. Similar remarks could be made with regards to the
relativity of position argument and the hallucination arguments for
the idealist's position that what is experienced is mental. Thus,
the unperceivable entities argument for the materialist's position
that what is experienced is material is correct.

As regards the materialist's adequate description argument for
the position that what is experienced is material, it has already been
shown that only if what is experienced can be described independently
of both the experience of that object and the description of other experienced objects, can one have the necessary machinery to explain how objects which are experienced causally interact with one another. The materialist clearly has such machinery. The case of the brick breaking the window discussed above with regards to passage (66) shows this. The materialist's adequate description argument shows, then, that if there are such things as causes and effects in the world, then the materialist has the machinery to explain how one event can cause another event to occur. Since parallelism has been shown to be an unacceptable position, one cannot deny that there are such things as causes and effects in the world. The materialist, of course, assumes that there are causes and effects in the world. This adequate description argument for the materialist's position therefore is correct.

It is now appropriate to sum up the above arguments and discussion concerning the idealist's and materialist's positions, i.e. whether what is experienced is mental and not identical to anything material such as atoms or whether what is experienced is material and identical to such things as atoms, respectively. Note the following points. First, the idealist is unable to give any evidence or sound arguments to support his position. The materialist, on the other hand, has presented two arguments (viz. the adequate description argument and the non-perceivable entities argument) which, I have argued, are correct. Second, the idealist must further deny, in order
to have a consistent, i.e. non-contradictory position, the existence of any material objects whatsoever. Third, it has been shown that the idealist here does not and cannot have the necessary machinery in order to explain how one event causes another event to occur. He must therefore deny that the world, i.e. the objects which are experienced, can be explained in terms of causes and effects, if, once again, his position is to be consistent, i.e. non-contradictory: Brentano must likewise deny this. But this is the parallelist's position which has already been shown to be unacceptable. At any rate, the idealist cannot hold both that sense data are the effects of material bodies and that sense data cannot be either causes or effects. The materialist, on the other hand, has the necessary machinery in order to explain how one event can cause another event to occur. Further, the materialist's non-perceivable entities argument for his position that experienced objects are material shows that he can give an analysis of experienced objects which is acceptable. Fourth, it has already been noted that although there is indirect inductive evidence for materialism, there is no evidence of any kind for idealism. From all of these points it can be concluded that one is not compelled to accept Brentano's claim that what is experienced is mental; for an alternative materialist's analysis is available, which is at least as acceptable and, in fact, more acceptable as Brentano's since the materialist can explain (analyze) everything which Brentano explains (analyses) without encountering the difficulties which Brentano's
analysis does. In this regard, it is clear that Brentano's analysis, unless modified, is self-contradictory, since he claims that what is experienced is mental and that material objects exist which cause these mental objects. Finally, my last conclusion in this summation is that one can reasonably state that experienced objects are material, not mental.

Before I continue, I should like to point out a rather important feature of the above discussion of the status of what is experienced. The above discussion of what is experienced (i.e. experienced objects) is another example of a philosophical use of the scientist's appropriate method of inquiry (as exemplified by Galileo). I started the discussion with a problem, viz. whether what is experienced is mental (non-material) or material. No conclusion, theory, or explanation was offered at this point, and the question was left entirely open as to which answer was correct. I then presented arguments and/or evidence for both positions, this presentation being fair, I believe, to both sides. After each position had been fully presented, I then summed up the results in the form of a conclusion, theory, or explanation.

There is one final task here which must be completed before this chapter can be concluded. The first sense of 'idealism' (viz. 'explicit idealism') has been used in all of the above discussions of the status of experiences and what is experienced. These discussions present, however, a justification of the second sense of 'idealism'
Suppose that a philosopher "prefers" to analyze what is experienced in terms of some such thing as sense data, even though he freely admits that it is also possible to explain (i.e., analyze) what is experienced in terms of brain states, light rays, the retina of the eye, etc. It turns out that, by making such a choice in terms of which analysis to use, that he must end up denying, if his position is to be consistent, that any material objects exist. The implicit idealist therefore turns out to be the first kind of idealist in disguise. This is the justification for my definition of 'implicit idealism.' It should be noted here that since it is acceptable to claim that both experiences and what is experienced is material, Brentano's claim that inner perception is infallible need not be accepted; for, on his own grounds, inner perception can only be infallible if, among other things, experiences and what is experienced must be non-material, i.e., mental. This, then, is an additional "refutation" of his claim that inner perception is infallible. Regarding Brentano's notion of the infallibility of inner perception, Roderick M. Chisholm writes:

(69) Brentano has shown, repeatedly and in detail, that it is "an absurd undertaking to try to use reasoning to guarantee the evidence of what is self-evident." He has been reproached for "never having considered the problem of the logical presuppositions of his so-called a priori evident judgments." If he is guilty of this charge, at least he may be said to have asked why anyone should suppose that there
is such a problem. Presumably these mysterious "logical presuppositions" are themselves known. What is the nature of this knowledge, then? Does this knowledge also have "logical presuppositions" or is it ultimate — that is to say, directly evident and justified in itself? Surely one is not blind to the fact that either (i) we should give up all talk about knowledge, or (ii) we may reason in a vicious circle, or (iii) we must admit that there is ultimate knowledge — i.e., that there are judgments which are self-evident and justified in themselves. If there is anyone who doesn't see this, then, as Aristotle put it, we can only leave him behind.

The above discussions of experiences and what is experienced clearly show that (ii) and (iii) in passage (69) can be rejected. (ii) may be rejected because if one uses the scientist's appropriate method of inquiry, one does not reason in a vicious circle, yet one can solve various problems. (iii) may be rejected because the above discussions, in which it was shown that both experiences and what is experienced can be analysed as material, imply that all infallible knowledge can be rejected; for recall that the rejection of infallible knowledge is an essential part of the materialist's view, i.e. an essential part of the definition of 'materialism.' (i) can also be rejected, since a discussion of knowledge can be acceptably viewed as boiling down to a discussion of the appropriate scientific method of inquiry. Self-evident knowledge can thus be replaced with the scientist's appropriate method of inquiry. It is true, of course, that the scien-
tist's appropriate method of inquiry does not guarantee that one's conclusions, theories, or explanations will be correct. 'It is just that the scientist's appropriate method of inquiry is the best thing which is available,' the materialist would claim.

Finally, similar conclusions regarding presentation and judgment could be made in light of the above discussion of idealism and materialism, viz. that Brentano's analysis of presentation and judgment are not the only acceptable analyses of the relevant phenomena which are available: both the idealist and the materialist have analyses which are at least as acceptable as Brentano's. There is no compelling reason as to why one must accept Brentano's views on these matters.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

1 Franz Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Linde- 

2 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 138.

3 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 28.


5 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 111-112.

6 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 130-131.

7 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 131.

8 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 132.

9 'complex' here is to be contrasted with 'simple.' An accident 
of an accident of a mental substance is simple if and only if 
this accident of an accident consists of exactly one quality 
(property). Thus, the single property red, referred to in 'my- 
seeing-redly' by 'redly' is a simple accident. An accident of 
an accident is complex if and only if this accident of an acci-
dent consists of two or more qualities (properties). Thus, if 
the two properties red and square are both seen in one and the 
same object, then this seen object is identical to the combina-
tion of the properties red and square. Perceived objects are
therefore merely collections of properties found together. Thus, in the expression 'my-seeing-redly-squarely,' the expression 'redly-squarely' refers to the complex object which is the red square. The same sort of analysis would apply to the pink rat case. (The expression 'redly-squarely' would refer, of course, to the accident of the mental substratum, viz. seeing.)

10 Brentano, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 137.


12 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 227.

13 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 227-228.

CHAPTER II

14 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 34.

15 The reason why I use the term 'presented object' instead of simply 'object' will become clear below, beginning with passage (16).

16 'qualitatively' is used here in a rather broad sense, as will become clear later on in this chapter. It will turn out that the act of judging is an accident of a mental substance, an accident which is numerically identical to, yet distinguishable from the act of presentation.


18 I will discuss this in more detail when I discuss passage (27) below.
Passage (19) below will point out that although a judgment is not identical to a statement, a judgment can nevertheless be expressed by a statement.

Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 201.

Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 169.

Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 188-189.

Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 196.

Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 198-199.

Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 203.
CHAPTER III

41 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 62.
42 Ibid.

43 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 203.
44 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 203-204.
46 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 36.
48 See passage (17) above and its explication.
49 Brentano, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 213.
50 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 204.
51 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 66.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 89-90.
54 A discussion concerning this point follows passage (43) above.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 125-126.
58 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 128.
59 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 83.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 84-86.
62 See the seventh point immediately above.
63 See David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, 


65 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 103-104.

66 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 110-111.

67 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 111.

68 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 103.

CHAPTER IV

69 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 176-177.

70 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 195-196.

71 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 100.

72 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 239.

73 See passage (28) in Chapter II above.

74 See passage (23) and my subsequent remarks. Also, see passage 
(21) above.

75 I realize that I am taking a stand on a controversial issue 
about which an extensive philosophical literature exists, but I 
do not have space to defend it here. Also, there is no need to 
defend my stand here, since Brentano holds the same view.

76 See the third sentence of passage (29) above.

77 I offer one such argument in Chapter V, which I refer to as 
"Brentano's Cartesian turn."

1936, chapter IV.
See, for example, Willard Van Orman Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," in From a Logical Point of View, Harper & Row, 1961, pp. 20-46.

See, e.g., Benson Mates, Elementary Logic, Oxford University Press, 1965, pp. 101. But note that I am considering here an interpreted calculus only; for I am asking whether 'Pv-P' is true in all cases.

Truth and falsity are, of course, interpretations themselves.

The term 'picture' here is meant to be taken in a very loose sense. I do not mean to imply Wittgenstein's picture theory of language.

'Materialism' will be discussed in considerably more detail in Chapter V below.

See I. Bernard Cohen, The Birth of a New Physics, Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1960. He makes a similar point in his book, but does not refer to it as "the appropriate method of inquiry."

I put 'explains' here in double quotes to indicate that not every explanation is a correct one nor an intelligible one.

Notice that my use of the term 'theory' is much broader than the use of the term 'theory' as it occurs in the expression
'scientific theory.' If one is dissatisfied with my use of the term 'theory' here, one could perhaps use the term 'explanation' in its place. At any rate, I assume that my use of the term 'theory' is clear in the present context.

CHAPTER V

92 See section (3) of Chapter IV for a previous discussion of this point.
94 See Wilfrid Sellars, Science and Metaphysics, Humanities Press, 1968, chapters I, II, and III.
95 'refer to particular brain states or body states' should be taken in a very loose sense here. I do not mean to imply here, for example, that the reference theory of meaning is correct. On the level of the description of the phenomena, it is clear that we very often use terms to refer to things, e.g. I use the
'Nixon' to refer to Nixon, etc. Thus, 'refer to particular brain states or body states' must be taken here on the level of the description of the phenomena, i.e. on a commonsensical basis.


'refer to or describe material bodies': see footnote (95) above.

The materialist must deny, according to my third point (in this chapter) characterizing the materialist that static states exist.

See, for example, V.I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, International Publishers Company, Inc., 1970

See Wilfrid Sellars, op. cit., chapter I. Although Sellars defends materialism, he is a kind of Kantian.

That is to say, the first kind of materialist, whom could be referred to as an explicit materialist, accepts at least one statement as true which an idealist would reject as false, since (and this is important) accepting that statement as true would entail that at least one non-mental entity exists. The second kind of materialist, whom could be referred to as an implicit materialist, uses terms in his explanation, theory, or claim (on the level of analysis) which do not explicitly refer to or describe mental entities, when an alternate set of terms, which
do explicitly refer to or describe mental entities, is available. In other words, the implicit materialist accepts some statement as true which an idealist would not necessarily consider false, but to which there is some idealist alternative.

His philosophical motivation for his claims about mental acts and objects can be traced back, I believe, to the old Greek idea of 'like knows like' or 'like causes like.' The problem is this: how can a mental act, which is mental (i.e. non-material), be active and intend things if it has an object which is material and is therefore completely passive (inert) and unable to intend things? A mental act seems to have completely contrary properties to a material object. How, then, can a mental act ever be united with a material object into one act? Making such a unity would seem like the impossible task of putting water and fire together, without the fire being extinguished. But if a mental act cannot have a material object as its object, then what characteristics can that mental act's object have? That object, it seems, must certainly be mental, for then the contrary properties between the act and its object immediately disappear. Thus, it must be the case that 'like knows like,' or 'like is presented with like,' or 'like loves or hates like.'

Note the section where he talks about shared ratios.

See Brentano, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 120-124.

For additional arguments see J.J.C. Smart, "Sensations and Brain Processes," Philosophical Review, LXVIII (1959), pp. 141-156. The arguments which he presents would have to be modified somewhat in order to be consistent with my presentation; for he confuses experience with what is experienced.

See, for example, W. Penfield and T. Rasmussen, The Cerebral Cortex of Man, Macmillan, 1950. Among other things, they discuss the results of the application of a small electrical charge to the human cerebral cortex of patients who are awake during this procedure. Also, see W. Penfield and L. Roberts, Speech and Brain Mechanisms, Princeton University Press, 1959.


The term 'two' is not to be taken literally, since it turns out that there was only one thing all along which someone mistakenly
believed to be two things.

108 See footnote (107) immediately above.

109 See J.J.C. Smart, op. cit. Also see U.T. Place, "Is Consciousness a Brain Process," British Journal of Psychology, XLVII (1956), pp. 44-50. There is, of course, a rather extensive literature on identity theory.


111 Ibid., pp. 72.

112 I am, of course, using Feigl's expression here, except that I follow J.J.C. Smart's use of this expression; i.e. I use the expression to refer to the dangling entities themselves, whereas Feigl uses it to refer to the laws via which the entities (i.e. the experiences) dangle. In this regard, see Herbert Feigl, "The "Mental" and the "Physical"," Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. II, University of Minnesota Press, 1958, pp. 428. See also J.J.C. Smart, op. cit., pp. 143.

113 For a very detailed discussion of this correlation, see Feigl, op. cit., pp. 370-497.

114 I only want to consider here versions of Brentano's Cartesian turn. I do not want to consider the view that two kinds of properties (viz. mental and material) can belong to the same thing, viz. a person. For such a view, see P.F. Strawson, Individuals, Methuen and Company, Ltd., 1959, chapter 3.


117 Gustav Bergmann, for example, holds such a view in his book Realism, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1967. See pp. 75.

118 In other words, Wittgenstein is correct in his refutation of the possibility of a so-called "private language." See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Macmillan, 1953.

119 See, for example, his paper entitled "Acts" in Logic and Reality, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1964, pp. 3-44.

120 This kind of mental substratum is obviously much different from Brentano's mental substratum, for it serves a different function from Brentano's. This kind of mental substratum, unlike Brentano's, gives no unity to one's mental life. The only similarity between these two kinds of mental substrata is the sharing of the third assumption involved in Brentano's Cartesian turn, viz. that a term referring to a mental entity can never truly (or meaningfully) be predicated of a term referring to a material entity. Here 'red' is taken to refer to a non-material entity, and it must therefore be predicated of another mental entity, viz. a bare particular.

121 Bertrand Russell, for example, leaves this connection a mystery. See his book The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 1959.

122 Franz Brentano, Versuch ueber die Erkenntnis, edited by Alfred
Kastil, Felix Meiner, Leipzig, 1925.