INFORMATION TO USERS

This dissertation was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.

University Microfilms
300 North Zeib Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
A Xerox Education Company
KEAN, Michael Henry, 1945-
STUDENT UNREST AND CRISIS: THE RESPONSE OF AN URBAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM.
The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1972
Education, administration

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

Copyright by
Michael Henry Kean
1972

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED.
STUDENT UNREST AND CRISIS: THE RESPONSE
OF AN URBAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

Michael Henry Kean, B. A., M. A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1972

Approved by

[Signature]
Adviser
College of Education
PLEASE NOTE:

Some pages may have
indistinct print.
Filmed as received.

University Microfilms, A Xerox Education Company
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many people have helped in shaping the development of this dissertation. From its genesis as an idea discussed briefly at a faculty seminar in 1969, it matured slowly, through the riots at Ohio State during the Spring of 1970, to an act of murder in early 1971 which threw a huge metropolitan school system into crisis. Throughout its entire development it has contributed tremendously to the experiences and education of its author.

Though the list which follows will, no doubt, be incomplete, I wish to acknowledge the assistance afforded me in completing this study, and extend my appreciation to:

Dr. Donald P. Sanders, my adviser in educational development, my committee chairman, and my friend, for the confidence and support he has shown in me throughout my doctoral program, and his willingness to always listen and help.

Dr. Ralphael O. Nystrand, my adviser in educational administration and a member of my reading committee, for introducing me to the study of urban education and assisting me in securing an experience which has put his teachings to the test of practice.
Dr. James K. Duncan, my adviser in curriculum and instruction and a member of my reading committee, for his assistance in planning my doctoral studies and advice in developing and refining this dissertation.

Drs. Ross Mooney and Moshe Smilansky, for their insight into that which is termed educational development, and for generating the idea from which this study grew.

Dr. Mark R. Shedd, former Superintendent of Schools of Philadelphia, for appointing me manager of the project from which part of this study emanated, for teaching me what urban school administration and crisis management are all about by allowing me to watch and participate as his assistant, and for his constant encouragement.

Messrs. David A. Horowitz, Michael P. Marcase, and Robert L. Poindexter, for sharing their vast backlog of experiences, and helping me clarify key points pertaining to the data which I collected.

My many other colleagues and friends connected with the School District of Philadelphia, for their assistance in providing information and encouraging the completion of this study.

Miss June Myers, for her assistance in helping me with the many University forms and requirements necessary for the completion of my doctoral program.
Miss Cynthia Mangos and Mrs. Richard Wagner, for their careful and efficient typing of the preliminary and final drafts of this manuscript.

Finally, to my wife, Connie, for her support, assistance, patience, enthusiasm, and most of all, her understanding throughout my doctoral program.
In Memoriam

Milton C. Kean

1906-1968
VITA

February 7, 1945 ............ Born - Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

1966 ....................... B. A., The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania

1967-1968 .................... Research Assistant, College of Education, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1968 ....................... M. A., The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1968-1970 .................... Research Associate, College of Education, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio


PUBLICATIONS


"The Public Views Education Concerns for the '70s," _Perspective_, December, 1970.


"Reading Program Shows Definite Improvement," _Perspective_, October, 1971.


**FIELDS OF STUDY**

**Major Fields:** Educational Development. Professor Donald P. Sanders

Educational Administration. Professor Raphael O. Nystrand

**Minor Field:** Curriculum and Instruction. Professor James K. Duncan
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................. ii
VITA ......................................................................................... vi
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................. xii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ...................................................... xiii

Chapter

I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY ........................................ 1

   Introduction
   Definition of Terms
   Background
   Objectives
   Purpose and Rationale
   The Study
   Activities and Procedures
   Usefulness of the Findings

II. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE ................................... 23

   Causes of Student Unrest-Related Crisis
      Non-Responsive Systems
      The Structural Dimension
      Four Major Studies
   Crisis and Development
   The Failure to Deal with Crisis
   The Role of the Administrator
   Responses to Crisis and Unrest
   Summary and Conclusions
## III. THE METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

Utilizing the Case Study

A Historical Overview
   The Approach
   The Examination of Incidents
   Changes and Generalizations

A Major System Crisis
   The Approach
   The Status of the Situation
   The Collection of Data
   An Overview of Process
   An Examination of Outputs

A Taxonomy of Inputs
   Group Inputs
   Individual Inputs
   The Board of Education

The Collected Inputs

## IV. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF STUDENT UNREST IN THE PHILADELPHIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS

The Incidents
   Incidents Prior to 1958
   Incidents Occurring Between 1958 and Spring, 1967
   Incidents Occurring Between Autumn, 1967 and Spring, 1970
   The 1970-71 School Year

The Changes
   Administrative Restructuring
   Police Relations
   Serious Incident Reporting
   Board of Education Policy on Disruption of Activities
   The Student Bill of Rights and Responsibilities
   Administrative Response to the Causes of Dissent
   Black History Courses
   Black Professional Personnel
Chapter

IV. Continued

Human Treatment of Students
Counseling Services
Improved Physical Facilities
Changes in Cafeteria Procedures
Better Student Government
Student Voice in Selecting Administrators and Coaches
Student-Run, Relevant Assemblies
Recognition of Puerto Rican Students

Generalizations
Generalization I
Generalization II
Generalization III
Generalization IV

V. A MAJOR SYSTEM CRISIS ................. 149

The Status of the Situation
Background
Participants
Causes
The Incidents
Immediate Responses
A Crisis Situation

The Collection of Data
Inputs Provided by Groups
  Professional Educators and Educational Resource Groups
  Civic-Educational Groups
  Civic Groups
Inputs Provided by Individuals
  Professional Educators
  Politicians
  Other Citizens

An Overview of the Process
Activities
Chronology of Events
The Board of Education
An Examination of Outputs
An Analysis of Outputs
## Chapter VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

- **Background Information**
- **Restatement of the Objectives**
- **Methods and Procedures**
- **The Results of the Study**
  - Chapter IV
  - Chapter V
    - General Results
    - Viewing the Process
- **Discussion of the Results**
- **Conclusions**
- **Implications for Practice**
- **Implications for Further Study**

### APPENDIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

Table                                                   Page
1. Serious Instances of Student Unrest and              81
   the Number of Schools Involved                       
2. Groups and Individuals Providing Inputs              96
3. Groups Inputs, by Type and Geographic Area          100
4. Analysis of Critical Incidents for the Month         128
   of December, 1970.                                   
5. Courses of Instruction Offered in Minority Group     136
   History, Culture, and Urban Problems in the          
   Philadelphia Public Schools, 1967-1971               
6. Number and Percentage of Black and White            138
   Personnel in Selected Positions in the               
7. Percentage of Black Pupils in the Philadelphia       148
   Public Schools by Year and Type of School            
8. Percentage of Black Pupils Enrolled in               305
   Philadelphia High Schools                            
9. Significant Response to Areas Related to Student     307
   Unrest                                               

xii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure Page

1. Roles Needed in Conflict Intervention ............... 47

2. The Elements of a Case Study and Action Research .......................... 76

3. The Context and Process of the Study ................. 89
CHAPTER I

AN OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

Introduction

Perhaps one of the more striking manifestations of crisis exhibited by educational institutions is student unrest and the violence which often accompanies it. It is extremely difficult today to read, watch, or listen to the news without being advised of the confrontations occurring on both college and high school campuses throughout the United States. The Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence at Brandeis University during the first half of May (1970) reported a number of disturbances which would have surely registered ten on the Richter Scale. More critical even than intensity, however, is the fact that during those tumultuous two weeks over two hundred campuses were experiencing violent disorders on any given day, and over a dozen closed their doors for the duration of the academic year. The second week of May (10-16) saw disturbances at 441 colleges and universities.¹

Though violent confrontation on college campuses seems to garner most of the mass-media coverage, public secondary schools

have become increasingly affected. "Bubbling like supercharged soda, student unrest exploded in 1968 and sprayed the high school landscape with boycotts, demonstrations, sit-ins, picketing, vandalism, and violence." It is almost as if high school students were saying to their university counterparts, "you've shown us how, now we'll try it at this level," for today even some of the most placid rural high schools are experiencing rumblings of dissent. By January of 1969, 59 per cent of the high schools and 56 per cent of the junior high schools in the United States had experienced some form of protest. The number of these occurrences in which violence played a major part is undoubtedly a significant one.

Alan F. Westin, Director of Columbia University's Center for Research and Education in American Liberties, reported that within a four-month period (November 1968 through February 1969) 348 high schools in 38 states underwent some type of disruption. During that time frame, 239 other schools reported "serious episodes." In addition, Westin estimated that by May 25 of that year, (the approximate

---


4"At War With War," p. 15.
closing date of most schools), around 2,000 student protests would have been staged.

Though the School District of Philadelphia has experienced "its share" of student unrest and violence, its problems in this area do not differ greatly from those of other major cities. In the autumn of 1967, violence flared when a large crowd of students was accosted by police while demonstrating at the Board of Education Building. Since then, scattered disruption, often of a violent nature, has taken place at practically every high school and many of the junior high schools in the city. Seldom have any of these incidents been prolonged. For the most part, though taken seriously by school officials, most incidents have tended to generate no more interest by the average citizen than would a small burglary (of which Philadelphia suffers hundreds a week, few ever reaching the newspapers).

Early Monday evening, February 1, 1971, however, the public lost its indifference toward student unrest and the violence it often precipitates. Samson Freedman, a veteran junior high school teacher, was shot to death as he left school, by a fourteen-year-old student whom he had suspended the previous Friday. Within twenty-four hours the teacher’s union demanded that the Superintendent of Schools resign his position; the Board of Education closed the schools to commemorate the deceased; peaceful integrated communities became polarized (the assailant was black, the victim, white); large portions of the public
called for stricter discipline measures; and a number of students were quoted as asking "if we get a day off from school for killing a teacher, how many will we get for killing a principal?"

Though violence is often a consequence of student unrest, it should not be thought of as being synonymous with crisis. "Most dissenters turn to violence in a desperate effort to communicate their profound feelings of grievance." Violence, then, may be avoided if potential crises are diagnosed and remedied or if actual crises are corrected early in their development. At a certain point, crises, if not resolved, may lead to violence, which usually will then create more serious crises. This seems to have been the case in Philadelphia.

The tremendous increase in the number of crises caused by student unrest and violence has produced a predictably large number of reactions. The majority of these reactions seem to deal with planning for emergency situations only, and do not begin to consider examining the causes of the crises. Very little attention has been paid to the notion that administrators, if they consider the causes of crisis,

5 "At War With War," p. 15.

6 For example, see Student Unrest (Harrisburg, Pa.: Bureau of Administrative Leadership Services, Pennsylvania Department of Education, 1970), and High School Student Unrest: An EDUCATION USA Special Report, op. cit.
can guide their institutions in such a way that the crisis leads to the further development of that institution. 7

Crisis has been cited as a key factor in producing change. 8 If the change is positive, then the traditional notion of crisis being something to be avoided at all costs, may no longer be valid, (f it ever was). The study proposed herein represents an attempt to determine the reaction of a large urban school system to several crises (caused by or related to student unrest and violence), and to examine the changes which have resulted from these crises.

Definition of Terms

As a prelude to the background that follows, it may be useful to establish some working definitions of the terms which will be used. Educational development refers to the process of restructuring an educational system so that the output better agrees with the expectations generated by the context, and the inputs are better utilized to produce outputs. 9 Development is a special case of change, in which there is

7 The paucity of the literature on crisis management, conflict resolution, and crisis intervention attests to this.

8 Moshe Smilansky, Faculty Seminars on "Basic Propositions for Developing Education for the Culturally Disadvantaged" (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, Faculty of Educational Development, June 17-July 22, 1969).

9 Donald P. Sanders, What is Development (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, Faculty of Educational Development, Working Paper). (Mimeographed, 1968.)
movement of an object or idea between two points during a specified
time period. Sanders noted that "Change, however, is not necessarily
development; an observed change may be redundant or aimless move-
ment." Change may occur in any direction, while development is
always, by definition, positive.

An educational administrator is one who is responsible for the
functioning and survival of a particular educational system (be it a
single school or an entire district). The traditional administrative
role in education is one of maintenance -- that is, seeing to it that the
system continues to function in a specified manner.

A system in which educational development is to occur de-
mands the leadership of an administrator-developer -- a person who, in
addition to performing the standard maintenance function, is able to
take a leadership role in both homeostatic change and planned change
by (1) identifying problems, (2) evaluating the context, and (3) pursuing
solutions.

A crisis refers to an institutional failure which is not accept-
able to the recipients of that institution's product. Such a failure

10Donald P. Sanders, "Toward a Theory of Educational De-


might occur as the result of (1) the omission of a particular action or element or (2) an unsatisfactory or inadequate performance of a task that does not meet the expectations of the recipients or clients. A crisis occurs because of a situation which is dysfunctional to the achievement of an institutional objective as perceived by the recipients or clients. Crises can originate as the result of a change in a system, but more likely are the result of the institution's failure to provide a needed change.

A system failure refers to the inability (of an organization or institution) to meet specific expectations related to the inputs, process, or outputs of that system. An input-related failure occurs when the inputs needed by an institution to produce the anticipated output are either unavailable or unattainable (i.e., the context is unwilling or unable to provide them). A process-related failure occurs when the process by which inputs are turned into outputs either does not function as anticipated, or is unacceptable to the participants in the process or other members of the context. An output-related failure occurs when the output produced by the institution does not correspond to the expectations generated by the context in which the institution exists.

Student unrest refers to a general state of students' feelings and actions ranging from uneasiness to turmoil. Dissent is a non-concurrence or difference of opinion voiced by a segment of the populace toward those in power to change those rules or procedures being
Protest is an outward declaration of dissent, and is commonly communicated in print, vocally, or physically so that those with the power to change the rules or procedures being contested are well aware of the dissenting group's feelings. Disruption is defined, for the purposes of this study, as an active manifestation of unrest during which established rules or laws are violated. Violence refers to intense, often destructive action, usually physical in nature. A confrontation is a meeting of two individuals or groups, often of differing views or opinions.

Unrest is often used as an umbrella term to include instances of dissent, protest, disruption, violence, and/or confrontation. In certain situations, unrest may lead to any of those five. This is not necessarily a causal relationship, however. (Does unrest cause dissent, or dissent cause unrest?)

Background

Crises result from organizational disequilibrium. (Organization and Institution are used interchangeably here.) In such a case, the members of the organization may come to advocate change because of dissatisfaction with its operations due to their realization of a sense of discrepancy between its reality and potential. 13 This gap is similar to

13"Members" as used here refers to someone directly related to an organization. In a public school setting, for example, the membership would include the administration, faculty, staff, and students.
that described by Coombs as responsible for the "world educational crisis." He notes that a cultural lag is created by the discrepancy between potential progress and actual progress, and that this is responsible for the "revolution of rising aspirations," a prime cause in the world student revolt. The reform of academic, social, and economic policies lies at the heart of this revolt. Before crisis can be viewed further, it may be helpful to consider briefly, organizational change.

After examining most of the major literature pertaining to organizational change, the staff of the Study of Institutional Vitality identified five reasons which make such change difficult:

1. Organizations are inherently passive.
2. Voluntary organizations attract members who agree with their activities.
3. Organizations tend toward institutionalization and ritualism.
4. Organizations which provide livelihoods for people tend to come to exist only as livelihoods for these people.
5. The maintenance of institutional effectiveness or achievement is only one of the problems that institutions must confront in order to survive. Other problems may take precedence over it.

Academic institutions must confront these general problems as well as certain other problems particular to their own distinctive

---


characteristics. In the case of the public schools, such problems include the following:

1. The purposes of such institutions are basically conservative, and their support is secured from generally conservative sources.

2. Teachers are extremely independent, autonomous professionals within the structure of the public schools.

3. Public schools are deliberately structured to resist change by virtue of a system of fragmented bureaucracy.

It is surprising, with all of the constraints, that any academic change takes place. Yet, the institution, by its very nature, must at some point comply with the needs of its constituency. Simon notes that:

In order to survive, the organization must have an objective that appeals to its customers, so that they will make the contributions necessary to sustain it. Hence, organization objectives are constantly adapted to conform to the changing values of customers, or to secure new groups of customers in place of customers who have dropped away. 16

The process of change is crucial, then to the survival of an organization.

Educational inertia is an institutional fact of life, however, and no manner of pleas for change will alone accomplish that change. Exhortation is an inadequate tactic; pressure is a more realistic strategy.

The pressures generally associated with organizational change may be of the internal variety (producing homeostatic change), or may result from external forces (seldom bent on homeostasis).

Internal change may generally occur when both the immediate and long-range reward produced by the change is expected to outweigh the reward of stability. However, so long as continual support can be found for the existing rules and program, whether a change would create additional benefits or not, it is unrealistic to expect that such a change will be forthcoming from those that direct an institution.

Pressure may appear in many forms; one such manifestation is crisis. Moshe Smilansky posits that because of political crisis, national reform occurs. He has also generalized this to academia by stating that through crisis situations, educational development takes place. General education in the United States has often been shaped by governmental reaction to cultural crises. In fact, practically all recent Federal aid to education has resulted from some national crisis—the Smith-Lever Act of 1914 and the National Defense Education Act of 1958 being particularly good examples.

Bridges maintains that present school practices produce

---


18 Smilansky, loc. cit.
crises which, in turn, lead to student-initiated reform. Crisis, he contends, is an occasion for decision that (1) is viewed as threatening to the highest priority values of an organization or decision-makers responsible for the organization's operation; (2) demands an unprogrammed decision (one that the decision-maker would not generally make); and (3) demands that a decision (response) be made within a limited amount of time.

If historians are correct, the dominant variables affecting change in education are (1) the availability of resources and support, (2) the receptivity of the system to proposed changes, and (3) the persons who advocate the change and what power they wield. Change may depend upon the availability and degree of each variable, and whether all three can be coordinated in some harmonious manner. The absence of availability, degree, or harmony may thwart change, and create, instead, a potential crisis. Throughout history, universities have experienced crises, and as a result, suffered "the shocks of drastic adjustment following periods of quiescence." No longer, however, is this limited to universities; "... outbreaks of student

---


20 Heffelin, op. cit., p. 49.

disorders, rallies, protest demonstrations, rule testing and violence... have reached... unprecedented proportions and threaten to take the city's high schools 'down the road to anarchy'." 22

It is a documented fact that violence has practically become a way of life in America. 23

Little societal interest seems to be generated by commonplace acts of violence; but when the act is spectacular (e.g., multiple murders), the victim famous (e.g., President John F. Kennedy), or the victim is a member of a group generally acknowledged as important to and supported by society (e.g., police officers assassinated by Black Panthers), a great clamor for reform often arises. Recently, single acts of violence have resulted in major studies of the problems associated with the particular incidents. The summer riots in Harlem, Watts, and Philadelphia resulted in the Kerner Commission Report of 1968 (The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders), and the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Senator Robert F. Kennedy prompted the Eisenhower Commission Report (The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence) two years later.

Though the sudden shocks of violence that sometimes

\[22\text{"High School Activists Are New Worry to Principals,"}
\text{The New York Times, January 28, 1969.}

accompany student unrest are less palatable to most than is continuous adaptability, the crises produced do seem to bring about a form of immediate change. Theoretically, perception of the threat of upheaval is sufficient to stimulate change. Though awareness of crisis, rather than the crisis itself, may bring about action, if the perception of trouble is not immediate, the crisis may become uncontrollable before some remedy is found. For this reason it is critical that the administrator be able to function as a crisis manager.

Perhaps the most difficult obstacle to this is persuading administrators that all is not right in their system. Educational administrators, for example, tend to view student unrest as something apart from a system malfunction, probably because of a reticence to admit to any system failure for which they would be responsible. O'Neil's analogy between business and education views the process that business undergoes when it suffers a setback:

A healthy chief executive demands information which will help to pinpoint the problem. If sales are slipping and customers complaining, the response is not to blame or to disregard them, but instead to repair the system.  

Unfortunately, the chief executives in most schools and school systems often tend to react quite the opposite of the business executive described above. It is not suggested here that education should strictly follow a business model. Callahan has pointed out the pitfalls such

24O'Neil, loc. cit. , p. 28.
actions have wrought.\textsuperscript{25} Nor is it suggested that administrators be trained toward becoming the superhuman organizer-director-executive, benevolent autocratic manager described by Cubberly earlier in this century.\textsuperscript{26} What is needed, however, is an administrator who is able to work in the midst of crisis, and harness the crisis situation so that the system undergoes development as a result of the crisis experience.

Little is known about how large urban school systems actually relate to crisis situations. Isolated reports of success and failure generally make news, but rarely is the process that makes for successful or unsuccessful crisis management examined. What are the critical variables with which an administrator must deal to lead his organization through a crisis situation with the fewest negative results? What inputs are available and how should they be utilized? Can systems relate proactively to crisis as well as reactively, and what difference does such behavior make? This study will examine these and other questions by viewing how a large urban school system reacts to student unrest-related crisis situations.


Objectives

The primary objective of the study is to examine and describe how a large urban school system reacts to crisis generated by student unrest in order to support the notion that the crisis can be constructive (lead to development) under certain (management) conditions.²⁷

There are two sub-objectives upon which this study is built. The first is to test the hypothesis that crisis situations lead to development by viewing it in terms of the macro-system (i.e., by a historical case study examination of crises related to student unrest in the Philadelphia Public Schools).²⁸ The second sub-objective is to analyze in detail one recent major system crisis (related to student unrest) in order to determine and examine the inputs available during the crisis, how they were utilized, and the outputs that resulted.

²⁷The basic criteria upon which most dissertation proposals are judged are (1) whether they intend to examine and/or explain something (an actual occurrence or a theory) that has not been examined or explained before; (2) whether they attempt to do so in a manner not previously employed; or (3) whether they utilize a different data base in testing and/or explaining an existing theory or hypothesis. This dissertation, I believe, clearly falls within these parameters.

²⁸The hypothesis that a system crisis, when properly managed, can lead to the development of that system, implies that a specially trained individual is necessary to manage a crisis situation. Today, the typical role of the school administrator tends to be viewed as "traditional"—that is, the administrator's major purpose is one of system maintenance. An administrator-developer, on the other hand, is prepared to cope with crisis, and is concerned with (1) identifying problems, (2) evaluating the content in which the problems exist, and (3) pursuing rational solutions to the problems.
Specifically then, the objective of the study is to examine the student unrest-related crises which have occurred in the Philadelphia Public Schools and their effects upon the system, and in doing so, to analyze in detail the responses to a specific major crisis in the Philadelphia Public Schools in order to determine the inputs to the crisis, how it was managed, and what resulted.

Purpose and Rationale

The major purpose of this study is to examine an educational system's response to crisis (macro-view) and to analyze inputs, administrative responses, and outputs in a specific major crisis (micro-view). There are also a number of other purposes for conducting such a study. First, the study will add to the existing knowledge of educational crisis, particularly that relating to student unrest, and serve as an example of how one system has approached the educational changes mandated by crisis. In addition, the study will provide an up-to-date chronicle of student unrest in the Philadelphia Public Schools, and will examine the effects that this force has had upon the system. Lastly, by exploring the nature of crisis as related to systemic development, support may be lent to the notion that a major function of the administrator-developer is to be able to assume leadership within a rapidly changing system, and to coordinate responses to crises in such a way as to assure that educational development is the result.
The rationale upon which this study is based is that:

1. Certain responses to crisis situations are more likely to be successful than others in terms of facilitating the educational development of a system.\(^2^9\)

2. One way to identify successful responses is to examine the inputs, reactions and outputs in a particular crisis situation.

3. Such an examination is a useful approach to providing administrators with examples of how they might function during times of crisis, if they hope to facilitate system development from that crisis.

The Study

The study will consist of six major sections, as follows:

1. The introductory section will explain the nature and objectives of the study, the rationale for such a study, the working definitions of important terms, and the study's limitations.

2. A review of the literature will include material pertinent

\(^2^9\)A successful response to student unrest (1) is one which in the short run prevents unrest from becoming disruption (or, in certain cases, disruption from spreading) by correcting the system malfunction that caused the unrest (or disruption) and (2) identifies and attempts to facilitate the resolution of the problem which caused the system malfunction to begin with. Both criteria are necessary for measuring success. Omission of either would indicate a lack of success (in the long or short run).
to the effect of administrative and systemic response to crisis in general, and particularly those crises related to student unrest.

3. Next is a section describing the methods and procedures used in gathering and reporting the information necessary for Chapters IV and V.

4. A comprehensive recent history of major events concerning student unrest-related crises in the Philadelphia Public Schools will comprise the next section. Particular emphasis will be placed upon reporting the resolution of such incidents and those changes which resulted from them.

5. A detailed study of the inputs to the system, the process by which they were utilized, and outputs which resulted from the system's reaction to a major crisis will comprise the fifth section.

6. The final section will summarize the study and will contain the conclusions and implications.

Activities and Procedures

The activities and procedures necessary to examine and analyze the response of a large urban school system to crisis situations (generated by student unrest) are as follows:

1. A review of the literature dealing with the effects of crisis and change upon school systems, and the effect of administrative action to these areas. Student unrest will also be examined in terms of its
relationship to crisis and the responses of the system to unrest-related crisis.

2. A review of major crisis situations generated by or related to student unrest in the Philadelphia Public Schools.

3. A compilation of all material gathered in number two (above) so as to enable an overview of the effects of such crises in the Philadelphia schools to be written.

4. Selection of a method or procedure for use in collecting, examining and organizing material and information concerning the major system crisis engendered by the recent shooting death of a teacher by one of his students.

5. The actual collection, examination, and organization of the material and information mentioned in number four (above).

6. Reporting and analyzing the material and information pertaining to the inputs, processes, and outputs of the system as it responds to a major crisis.

7. Interpretation of the results. This would necessitate a summary of the study and would allow for the formulation of conclusions and implications.

Usefulness of the Findings

It is paradoxical that a common assumption held by many is that educational institutions, because they are responsible for
introducing both old and new knowledge to their clients, are them­selves highly dynamic and capable of making necessary change when­ever and wherever necessary. Furthermore, it is assumed that educational administrators, because they are such highly specialized experts, are readily capable of evaluating new educational develop­ments and selecting and managing those which they deem to provide the greatest potential. As Evans points out, however, "Past studies of innovation in education have found little empirical evidence to support the above assumptions. 

This study will be of value in that it will examine the above assumptions in terms of the (administrative) responses of a large urban school system to crises related to student unrest. The study should be of immediate value to those persons responsible for the operation and development of The School District of Philadelphia. (This might include board members, administrators, faculty, and students.) Although no claim is made that the findings of this study will be generalizable to all other urban school systems, the results would certainly seem to be of some value to such institutions. Furthermore,

---


Ibid.

Ibid., p. 3.
the present body of information concerning crisis, crisis management, and student unrest will have been added to. Hopefully, this will provide persons in planning and decision-making capacities with an additional base upon which to begin thinking about specific problems in these areas.

Implications for administrative preparation and training may result also. Although it is not the purpose of this study to deal with administrative preparation programs, the findings may well provide a base for such work to be carried out at a later date.

In order to deal with the demands which will be made on education in the next decade, the role of the administrator must expand to that of a developer-administrator. Such an individual is one who understands the nature of change and of crisis, and accepts both, if need be, as necessary conditions for development. As a result of this study, it is hoped that the notion of crisis will become less frightening, and that educational leaders will come to view themselves, among other things, as "crisis coordinators." As such, they will be able to manipulate situations and people so that crises will be less disruptive while they are solving the basic problems which created the crises to begin with.

33 In Wayne County (Michigan), for example, a series of "crisis situation workshops" was held to assist high school principals and assistant principals in understanding student unrest, in dealing with crisis, and in planning for short and long term strategies. (The ASSIST Center Newsletter, Wayne, Michigan: Wayne County Intermediate School District, October, 1969).
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

The purpose of this study is to examine the response of an educational system to crises caused by or related to student unrest and violence. In selecting the topic, many related areas were reviewed. However, subjects such as organizational change, administrative behavior, and institutional structure have been dealt with so extensively in the literature that they now represent umbrella topics from which more specific areas may be culled. Tangential concerns, such as those mentioned above, have not been included in this literature review so that the more specific topic of a school system's reaction and response to crises caused by or related to student unrest and violence could be considered in greater detail.

This study is built upon the notion that certain current school practices have created crisis situations in education, and that very often, these crises are manifested in the form of student unrest. Further, it is hypothesized that crisis leads to change, and under certain conditions, may lead to positive change or the development of the system experiencing the crisis. Therefore, the first area to be reviewed concerns present school practices which have created (caused) student
unrest-related crisis. The next area deals with the notion that crises in education, if managed in certain ways, may lead to educational development.

Unfortunately, however, many of the student unrest-related crises in education are not dealt with properly. The reason for this may be attributed to (1) educational administrators' reluctance to admit that all is not going well, or (2) incorrect approaches in trying to resolve crises. Both of these reasons for administrative failure to guide a system in crisis toward development will also be explored in this review.

This leads to another series of crucial questions. It has been stated that systems in crises, if managed in certain ways, may experience development. What are those ways? What is the role of the administrator in dealing with crisis? What are the most optimal responses to crisis? What strategies are best employed in dealing with student unrest?

The notion of reacting or responding to a crisis implies an examination of behavior exhibited while dealing with a particular situation; the nature of the crisis itself is not the central point of interest. This literature review focuses upon how educational systems, (and the leaders of those systems), respond to, manage, and deal with crisis in general, and student unrest, in particular. The specific areas dealt with here are (1) the causes of student unrest-related crisis situations,
the relationship of crisis to development, (3) administrative reluctance to recognize crisis and failure to approach it properly, (4) the role of the administrator in dealing with crisis, and (5) current administrative responses to crisis and strategies for dealing with student unrest.

Causes of Student Unrest-Related Crisis

Although a considerable amount has been recently written about student unrest, the majority of this material has been primarily descriptive, and has simply reported serious situations and warned of what the future was likely to hold. Many descriptive case reports have appeared in mass media publications and popular education periodicals; little, however, has been reported in scholarly journals. The level of analysis of student unrest in the schools has reached the point where the causes of the problem are being considered with increasing regularity. The material contained in the part of the review of the literature dealing with causes of crisis has been gleaned from recent articles which dealt, in part, with responses to student unrest as well. Over one hundred articles on student unrest were examined, but were not included here because of their generality and failure to deal with the specific area of interest.

This section of the review of the literature is divided into three parts. The first views the failure of the educational system
(and those who administer it) to respond to the needs of students. Related to that, the second part examines the structure of the system as a cause of crisis. The third part reports the findings of four major student unrest surveys relative to the causes of unrest.

**Non-Responsive Systems**

Mark Chesler, of the Center for Research and Utilization of Scientific Knowledge of the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan, is considered one of the pioneers of crisis management. After extensive investigation, he noted that the fact that crises contain the seeds of change does not necessarily imply that such change will be positive. Without correct administrative response, in fact, it is likely that repressive or delaying action will result. The potential for positive change rests with the willingness of the system (particularly its participants in leadership capacities) to "unfreeze" traditional patterns and consider different alternatives. Chesler further recommended that before this potential can begin to be realized, the major participants in the crisis (usually students and administrators in student unrest-related crises) must desire to reduce the high level of chaos produced by the students' newly-found power.

---

coupled with the administrators' awareness of their own inability to manage by traditional methods. Often such a "meeting of the minds" entails administrative concessions to their subordinates (students) in terms of granting them additional freedom and flexibility.

Chesler posited that due to a history of non-response, change is unlikely to take place in most schools without pressure, such as that which has been created by student protest and disruption during the past several years. In order for change to have a genuine and lasting effect upon the system, it is essential that a means to institutionalize new forms and processes be developed. Chesler concluded that:

We cannot expect the protests, crises, and unrest in our educational systems to be eased or to cease without substantial reform in the character of these institutions. Moreover, inasmuch as these crises surface grievances and protests appropriately directed at larger elements of the American society, major reform in the society itself will have to begin before serious diminution of educational crisis and unrest really can be expected. 2

Brodbelt interpreted student unrest as an overt expression of the gap between the ideal and the real, and between theory and practice. 3 He attributed the general non-responsiveness of the schools to


the fact that the gap was basically societal in origin, and that the
schools were waiting for an indication that society was ready to move
before they would consider changing.

### The Structural Dimension

The structure of our schools, though often neglected, is a
critical element in viewing crisis in educational institutions caused by
student unrest. Fink and Cullers cited the structure of the public
schools as a major factor in causing student unrest, and built their
argument upon a number of different sociological views of the struc­
ture of institutions.

Goffman, in his book, Asylums, developed the notion of a
"total institution" as a place where a large number of similarly situ­
ated individuals reside for a period of time and lead a formally-
administered type of existence. Fink and Cullers likened the public
school to Goffman's idea of a total institution. They noted that the
difference between total institutions and other institutions or organiza­
tions rested with the type of participation expected from their members.

Most bureaucratic institutions expected pluralistic (segmental)

---

4 Newton W. Fink and Benjamin Cullers, "Student Unrest:
Structure of the Public Schools as a Major Factor?" Clearing House,

5 Erving Goffman, Asylums (Garden City, New York:
participation—involvement in a variety of organizations designed to meet the needs of the individual. Such participation, by providing different individualized experiences, tended to be rational rather than emotional. In addition, the cross pressures between organizations preserved the safety of each organization by keeping its participants from leaning to behavioral extremes. "Conversely, total organizations do not expect or permit segmental participation."6 Thus, schools, defined here as total institutions (organizations), would be structurally prone toward the behavioral extremes exhibited by their participants (students), manifested in what is commonly called student unrest.

Specifically, Goffman attributed three primary characteristics to total institutions. First, almost completely homogeneous spheres of life create undifferentiated social roles. Secondly, the echelon principle of control is utilized in total institutions. This implies that though a hierarchy may exist in a total institution, it does not extend throughout the entire organization, but rather sanctions a large number of staff or supervisory class personnel to discipline any member under them. Last, total institutions exhibit a "binary character"—a basic split between a small supervisory staff and a large managed group.

---

6 Fink and Cullers, op. cit., p. 416.
The existence of the binary character is the cause of much student unrest. Administrators tend not to recognize this, and instead, view students as the general source of the problem. The relationship of groups and the structure of the organization is generally ignored as a major cause of crisis. Until the structural dimension is recognized, the authors felt that administrators could not begin to serve effectively as crisis managers, for they would be operating under a misconception as to the actual cause of the crisis.

Support for Fink and Cullers' position may be found in Kerr and Siegel's article in Industrial Conflict. Kerr and Siegel claimed that violence occurred more often and continued longer in (industrial) organizations composed of isolated groups of people who did the same type of work and shared the same experiences. Unrest among workers with little social mobility and occupational stratification was high and was likely to result in violent behavior, and hence, institutional crisis. The totality of this institutional structure is similar to that of the public schools.

Argyris also examined the structure of large organizations, and found that they acted like parents by treating their employees as

---

children. Constantly admonishing and over-directing their employees' every activity, large organizations failed to provide sufficient versatility or flexibility, both of which were needed for mature individuals to function properly. Argyris noted that the school has also failed in this respect. Little or no allowance is made for the maturing student; first graders and twelfth graders are told exactly what to do in much the same way. Thus, in such total institutions, be they industrial corporations or school systems, a source of conflict is initiated, and cognitive dissonance between the individual and organization is assured.

Ornstein examined high school violence and attributed a great deal of it to the structure of the school organizations also. He viewed the major interactions between teacher, student, and administrator as related to the organizational structure of the school. "Indeed, there is no more important law than that the performers of certain roles shall heed the requests from superior role-performers."  

---


10 Ibid., p. 101.
Four Major Studies

The National Association of Secondary School Principals (NASSP) was the first group to conduct a major study of high school unrest.\(^1\) The study, which was made public in 1969, included in its definition of protest almost any activity that departed from the usual. It was reported that 59 per cent of the high schools and 56 per cent of the junior high schools studied had experienced some type of protest. The total sample contained over one thousand secondary schools, studied during the 1968-69 academic year. About 10 per cent of the principals who responded to the survey claimed that their schools underwent race-related protests.

The NASSP Survey was followed by a study conducted by the Center for Research and Education in American Liberties at Columbia University. Under the direction of Alan F. Westin, a systematic survey of American newspapers was made. The results of the survey showed that between November 1968 and February 1968, 348 high schools in 38 states had undergone disruptive activity, and 239 other schools were reported to have had "serious incidents." By the end of May (1969), approximately two thousand student protests had been recorded.\(^2\)


\(^2\)Ibid.
All of the 29,000 U.S. public, private, and parochial high schools were sent a questionnaire in what has been the most comprehensive survey of this type to date. The survey, conducted by the House Subcommittee on General Education for the year 1968-69, boasted a rate of response of over 50 per cent, and defined protest more explicitly than previous studies by actually listing such disruptions as strikes, riots, sit-ins, and boycotts. Racial issues were considered in a separate category.

Among the findings, of the above survey, four emerged as being particularly significant. Eighteen per cent of the almost fifteen thousand responding schools (approximately two thousand six hundred) experienced "serious protests." The primary causes of these disturbances were disciplinary rules, curriculum policy, dress codes, school services, and facilities. Race was a factor in over 50 per cent of the schools with more than 1000 students and in 30 per cent of the schools with fewer than that number. In addition, racial issues were four times as likely to be a cause of unrest in urban high schools than in suburban or rural high schools. Finally, 20 per cent of all schools which responded claimed a "significant increase" in minority group enrollment during the preceding five years, and 22 per cent of this

---

group experienced student protests, as compared to only 16 per cent of the schools not in the group.

The most recent comprehensive study on high school student unrest was conducted by Stephen K. Bailey and the Policy Committee of the Syracuse University Research Corporation during the spring of 1970. The study, involving 60,000 students in 27 high schools in 19 cities, also included school administrators, teachers, parents, police, community people, and school district officials. The general purpose was to investigate violent unrest in urban high schools in an attempt to identify those strategies which appeared to be most successful in dealing with such situations.

The survey found that 85 per cent of the schools which responded to its questionnaire had experienced some sort of disruption during the preceding three years. The five most significant conclusions reached were:

1) The size of the student body is a more important variable than the size of the city in which a school is located. Larger schools have more problems.

2) Disruption is positively related to integration. Schools which are almost all white or all black are less likely to be disrupted. This might suggest a policy of apartheid as a solution to disruption, but this option is unavailable. Among other drawbacks, it is unconstitutional. The Kerner Commission spoke of other drawbacks with considerable vigor. In sum, a society polarized between white and black would be almost impossible to

---

14 Bailey, op. cit.
manage without even raising the moral stature of the nation as a question. A segregated educational system would hardly train the young for an integrated future when they become adults.

3) Integrated schools with higher percentages of black students are less likely to be disrupted if such schools also have high percentages of black staffs. Conversely, schools with high percentages of blacks but with predominantly white staffs are more likely to be disrupted.

4) Disruption and average daily attendance are directly related. Where average daily attendance is lower, disruption is higher and vice versa.

5) Principals with the least experience in their office:
   - Report greater black enrollments.
   - Endorse a more active response to disruption (in contrast to "riding it out").
   - Report a greater concern for positive preventive training programs.
   - Are more hesitant to project the blame for disruption onto external, non-school factors.\(^\text{15}\)

The Bailey study team utilized interview, direct observation, and survey research to enable them not only to describe the phenomena, but to suggest how to remedy it. The three major causes of unrest identified in the study were (1) social codes, including dress and grooming rules; (2) policies limiting participation in school activities, such as clubs and athletics; and (3) participation in curriculum planning activities.

**Crisis and Development**

One of the key ideas upon which this entire study is built, is that crisis situations need not always be viewed from a totally negative

\(^{15}\)Ibid., pp. 10-11.
standpoint. Crises, if managed properly, can be constructive instead of destructive and may result in positive change or development. Perhaps the strongest proponent of this point of view in education is Mark Chesler. Though others have lately begun to work in this area, Chesler remains its driving force. His work is so respected that one of the four final recommendations made by Bailey in the report on Disruption in Urban Public Secondary Schools was to "Support and expand the kind of in-service training of schoolmen in conflict resolution that has been pioneered by Mark Chesler and his group at the University of Michigan." 17

Chesler's primary area of concern is with the notion that conflict and crisis in the education of students eventually lead to administrative crises capable of destroying entire educational institutions. 18 As one means of counteracting this eventuality, he proposed that:

Under the right conditions, crisis can be utilized to promote positive and on-going change in education, but immediate response to crisis by itself cannot produce such change. Interventions and programs for school change must not only focus on the dynamics of crisis, but on the underlying

---

16 An increasing number of independent educational consultants are attempting to deal with crisis resolution as developed by Chesler. In 1970, Haverford College (Pennsylvania) began the development of a center for the non-violent resolution of conflict.

17 Bailey, op. cit., p. 52.

18 A National Facility . . ., op. cit.
conditions of organization and instruction in school. Such interventions must not co-opt or neutralize fundamental forces for change either by avoiding limited change programs or by offering them as overall panaceas. 19

Violence and disruption in schools represent crises, but such crises, says Chesler, are generally viewed only as breakdowns in administrative operations. The effects of crises are as severe upon students, teachers, and community operations as they are upon administrative procedures. A comprehensive approach to crisis is necessary, such as one which views crisis as points of leverage for beginning positive educational change. "Disciplined utilization of conflict may represent a strategy for encouraging change in the structure and character of educational institutions." 20

The Failure to Deal With Crisis

Relatively few educational administrators have experienced a great deal of success in crisis management. This may be due primarily to the tendency exhibited by many public school educators of not being willing to acknowledge a system dysfunction when one exists. The most difficult thing for a sincere administrator to do, according to a recent Pennsylvania Department of Education monograph, is to

19 A National Facility . . ., p. i.

20 Ibid., p. 4.
admit that there are problems and that a potential crisis exists. "However, little can or will be done until the administrator, particularly the chief administrator, has the courage to make the admission."\(^2\)

O'Neil noted that for most educators, particularly educational administrators, crisis management is a new concept.\(^2\) Until recently many educators were loath to admit a system failure within the realm of their responsibility; now, however, they are beginning to realize that no institution is crisis proof. He suggested that the critical first steps in applying crisis management revolve around convincing the current power managers that a problem does, in fact, exist. Organizations (including education) must take the initiative in the change process; they can no longer afford to wait until change forces them to compromise their control of a given situation. The answer, according to O'Neil, lies in organizations demanding that their administrators develop sharper solutions to problems, conduct internal evaluations, and develop new programs.

An Education USA study demonstrated the administrative reluctance to deal with crisis when it reported that at the beginning of the


\(^2\)\footnote{John R. O'Neil, "What About Crisis Education?" \textit{Educational Leadership}, October, 1969, pp. 27-29.}
1969-70 school year, of a large national sample of principals, only a very small percentage of those who anticipated problems were working toward resolving them. A larger percentage had become sensitized to unrest and were considering alternatives to deal with it. The largest percentage of principals, however, were watching and waiting, while a small percentage refused to even consider the problem. This final type, the principal who refused to consider change, would be the least effective. "The most vulnerable principal is the inscrutable one locked behind his office door, coping with the routine work of school maintenance."  

Chesler (working with Alan Guskin of the Educational Change Team of the School of Education of the University of Michigan) found that most educators did not know what to expect or where to begin when attempting to plan for crisis intervention and educational change. "One of the most distressing products of these situations is the perspective that nothing of any educative value can be accomplished. " Administrative fear, use of police, mass student suspensions and expulsions, and high teacher turn-over exemplified the schools' inability

---


24 Ibid. p. 7.

to deal productively with crisis. In some cases, administrators were able to apply a patchwork solution to the problems, which generally forced the real concerns temporarily underground, until they built up and exploded with still greater force.

The Education U. S. A. special report, High School Student Unrest: How to Anticipate Protest, Channel Activism, and Protect Student Rights, clearly indicated that certain administrative responses produced negative change. Closed systems produced bitter harvests; where rigid control was emphasized, student unrest flourished at the expense of system development. Over 60 per cent of the administrators contacted in a 1969 poll had not developed written guidelines, nor intended to do so; even though dozens of these administrators had already experienced student unrest. This correlated with a 1968 survey by Nation's Schools which found that 70 per cent of a group of administrators, who expected college student unrest to filter down to the high schools, had not taken any action to cope with it.

The Pennsylvania Department of Education reported that the negative administrative approach to student unrest is characterized by unawareness, negative attitudes, runaround, evasiveness, subterfuge, and thoughtlessness; while the positive approach, on the other hand,

26High School Student Unrest... , loc. cit.
entails understanding, negotiation, response, effort, sincerity, and teamwork.  

Insight into those approaches for dealing with crisis, which were viewed as positive or negative by principals, was provided in part of the report of the Task Force on Easing Educational Tensions. This report addressed itself to determining which resources were needed to provide for more creative responses to crisis and a greater demand for educational change. Principals were asked to rank services which they viewed as potentially helpful in allowing them to respond more creatively to crisis. The results of the survey showed that the highest priority was given to assistance in establishing open communications within the school and community, between age levels, and between races. Next in order of importance was the need for developing new organizational skills and approaches in managing educational systems. In-service training of faculty members to develop more sensitive responses to societal problems was also highly ranked. Those approaches viewed as negative were ranked as lowest priority and included calling upon police, mediators, lawyers, or judges in times of crisis.

27 Student Unrest, op. cit., p. 11.

The Role of the Administrator

If crisis, then, does contain the potential for development, it may also result in resistance to development that may, in turn, negate efforts to neutralize even the immediate problems caused by the crisis situation. The key to the situation is the administrator who perceives crisis as an opportunity for change and the role he plays in guiding his system toward development in times of crisis.

Bailey found that practically all high school principals viewed themselves as the proverbial "man-in-the-middle" in terms of student unrest. Furthermore, he reported seeing only two or three old-style, authoritarian principals still in office in the urban high schools he studied; most principals interviewed saw the traditional role as being obsolete. The most successful principals he encountered were very public-relations conscious, and personally entered into dialogue with dissenting student and community groups. Almost all of the administrators interviewed saw conflict management as a primary task. Ninety per cent voiced a need for more training in conflict management; only 2 per cent did not.

Kudela also cast the principal in the "man-in-the-middle" role, and suggested that opening the lines of communication to all parties involved may be the principal's most critical function in cases

---

29 Bailey, op. cit., p. 49.
of student unrest. Previous positive contacts with various groups helped principals manage their system during crisis situations. To enable positive interaction, Kudela suggested that the principal should treat students as adults, and explain to them the rationale behind rules and regulations. In addition, the principal must be prepared to mediate between various groups, even, for example if it should mean defending students when over-eager teachers develop their own rules, which are either contradictory to or more stringent than the ones in force.

Because of the "man-in-the-middle" role, Griffiths concluded that "the secondary school principal is unable to postpone involvement." As such, he must respond to the multiple pressure groups which beseige him and attempt to reconcile their demands in such a way as to strike a balance between the rights of individual students and the demands of the institution. Griffiths pointed out that though the courts continue to produce decisions to help guide the school administrator, such opinions will never be a substitute for administrative creativity and effectiveness.


Atkins suggested that administrators become re-involved in the instructional process of the school.\textsuperscript{32} The major problem to be combatted, he contended, is that education is meaningless to the majority of students. The problems created by student unrest should not be blamed upon the militancy, indifference, unreasonableness, or incompetence of teachers, students, administrators, parents, or board members. The root of the situation rests in educators' failure to exert instructional, as contrasted to purely managerial leadership. Such a leadership role is necessary, claimed Atkins, because "the school as an institution appears to be paralyzed by its own institutionalization."\textsuperscript{33} Administrators must develop new means of responding to the needs of students that go beyond the traditional administrative role.

Chesler noted that the role of the administrator would vary, according to (1) whether he was working with a consultant, (2) what community and school board pressures he faced, and (3) the type of environment in which he operated. For example, a crisis in a large city high school might be viewed as an isolated event, unless other urban crises were operating simultaneously, in which case the entire city could "explode." Smaller towns might tend to view any school crisis as critical to the community. Regardless of the situation,


\textsuperscript{33}Ibid., p. 439.
however, a proper administrative response to crisis must be one which is geared toward quality education as opposed to merely maintaining order and the status quo in the school. Administrators who are able to relate to students, faculty, and community only on the traditional bases of control and authority will simply be unable to effectively manage crisis. 34

Chesler also identified three roles that are important in crisis intervention, and involve people skilled as (1) advocate interveners, (2) educational architects, and (3) system innovator/legitimators. He described the persons needed for each role as follows:

Advocate interveners are able to help different role or ethnic groups to articulate, organize, and mobilize their own interests and goals for change, and to aid negotiation or collaborative strategies in system-wide activities.

Educational architects are able to create, adapt and restructure designs for new learning climates, decision-making structures, communication linkages, and governance systems in line with the plural goals and needs of particular schools or school systems.

System innovator/legitimators are persons inside the school or system who have influence with major parties to the conflict and can provide legitimacy to the team as well as function in liaison roles to support major change. They may be experienced in creating, adapting, and adopting innovative programs and practices in schools and can counsel and help other administrators and faculty initiate innovations in their own schools. 35

34 Chesler and Guskin, loc. cit.
Figure 1 indicates Chesler's conception of the roles needed in crisis intervention, adapted from his proposal for a national conflict intervention network. As Chesler articulated these three roles, each was to be the responsibility of a different person. Though it would most likely be impossible for a single individual to function simultaneously in all three roles, a well-prepared administrator could be familiar with each of them. By being well versed in these three roles, an administrator would be in a better position to (1) manage crises more effectively, (2) supervise the other individuals who fill the roles, and (3) substitute in one of the roles if necessary.

The Pennsylvania Department of Education also recommended three important roles in dealing with student unrest, all of which could be managed by a single administrator.\footnote{Student Unrest, loc. cit.} Such an individual, it was suggested, should (1) analyze the situation and determine the potential for problems, (2) correct the causes of potential problem situations, and (3) develop contingency plans in the event of crisis.

Brodbelt and Gorton both defined the most important administrative roles in terms of the administrator's interaction with students. Brodbelt quoted the former Superintendent of Schools in Buffalo (New York), Joseph Manch, in noting that "the most important thing to recognize about the phenomenon called student militancy is that it exists
### Figure 1

#### Roles Needed In Conflict Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advocates</th>
<th>Social Architects</th>
<th>System Innovators/Legitimators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Knowledge and Skills</strong></td>
<td><strong>Knowledge and Skills</strong></td>
<td><strong>Knowledge and Skills</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Organizational diagnosis</td>
<td>1. Organizational development</td>
<td>1. Already visible and recognized as highly innovative educator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Crisis intervention</td>
<td>2. Management of different interest systems</td>
<td>2. Is inside a client system and has knowledge of the system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Conflict utilization for middle and long-range term change.</td>
<td>3. Implications of cultural revolution</td>
<td>3. Change agentry in schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Value inquiry</td>
<td>4. How to adopt and create alternative learning</td>
<td>4. How to initiate change and gain support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Translation of values to action.</td>
<td>5. Visions of long-term, constructive educational change.</td>
<td>5. Alternative learning environments and systems.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What he does</th>
<th>What he does</th>
<th>What he does</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Help organize and articulate group self-interests. Help groups develop clear visions, goals and priorities.</td>
<td>1. Works with advocates, system legitimators to design new learning environment, new decision-making structures, new communication linkages, etc.</td>
<td>1. Consults with other administrators and teachers from own experience with innovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Train different interest groups in change strategies, negotiation processes, collaboration processes.</td>
<td>2. Helps system set up evaluation and feedback systems on changes being made.</td>
<td>2. Reduces fear of change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Help system redefine its goals, set priorities, utilize differences for constructive change.</td>
<td>3. Helps develop self-renewing</td>
<td>3. Gives team legitimacy and is liaison with different interest groups.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Source:** A National Facility to Generate and Implement Information and Resources Relevant to Secondary School Crisis and Change (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Educational Change Team, School of Education, University of Michigan, 1970).
and that administrators would do well to think positively about it, and turn it towards the improvement of the educational effort. "37 The administrator, claimed Brodbelt, should lead students in identifying with societal concerns and working within the system to create positive change. 38 Gorton stated that "the fundamental issue was not whether schools should change, but how change should take place."39 Administrators, he contended, must take the lead in such a process, and could do so by responding to the needs of students in a number of ways. Of primary importance is exhibiting the administrative leadership necessary to evaluate rules and regulations, to be sure that they are palatable to all concerned groups. This is, perhaps, the most difficult role of all. Other areas of administrative initiative included the organization of a program of student involvement and the strengthening of communications channels at all levels. Gorton further stressed that equitable review of all student proposals is essential, as is maintaining a firm position in cases of extreme behavior. The most important role of the administrator, he stated, is to maintain the organizational structure of the school, administering penalties for deviant behavior when necessary.


38 Brodbelt, loc. cit.

Johnson and Johnson emphasized the importance of the role of administrative intervention in groups advocating change, particularly militant groups bent upon forcing that change by producing conflict. The authors felt that "the relative strength and salience of the cooperative and competitive elements in the conflict will determine whether it is handled constructively, through attempts to solve a mutual problem, or destructively, by mutual attempts at annihilating the opponent." The major role of the administrator, they pointed out, is to assist the group advocating change to articulate its concerns, develop clear objectives, and formulate means of accomplishing those objectives. Once a cooperative arrangement is reached, both parties would be able to work toward a single goal without conflict. The authors concluded that an administrator intervening in uncrystallized groups should do so without co-opting or manipulating; he should listen to the problem and attempt to facilitate a mutually agreeable solution before a crisis occurs.

The Johnson and Johnson article cited above is based at least partially upon work done by Deutsch three years earlier.


41 Ibid., p. 39.

42 Martin Deutsch, "Conflict and Its Resolution" (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1965). (Mimeographed.)
showed that when the cooperative elements of a conflict prevail, the groups involved were likely (1) to be more trusting and responsive, and (2) to view themselves as having attitudes and beliefs similar to the other group. Cooperation in conflict leads to the perception of a mutuality of purpose, whereas if competitive elements dominate, the opposite is likely to occur. Deutsch demonstrated that conflict fraught with competition produced groups that were uncommunicative, suspicious, and non-responsive. Such groups tended to escalate the conflict and make frequent use of power tactics. Administrators, it was concluded, had to be able to function in a leadership role that engendered cooperative problem solving and decision-making.

Responses to Crisis and Unrest

This final section of the literature review considers administrative response to crisis situations in education and specific strategies for dealing with student unrest. Chesler dealt directly with the development of methods for responding to crisis situations and suggested instituting necessary changes on three levels: first, immediate crises and confrontations must be responded to immediately; next, intermediate strategies must be developed to enable more comprehensive planning to take place; and last, long-term system-wide change strategies are needed to provide for the future. 43

43 A National Facility . . ., op. cit., pp. 5-10.
Among the immediate alternatives for use during crisis, Chesler suggested the development of a grievance procedure and an established means of formal negotiation. Prior to the use of immediate alternatives, a variety of middle-range strategies for change should be utilized. Such strategies might include, according to Chesler, (1) the decentralization of school decision making, (2) re-structuring the school so that students and faculty have greater opportunity for personal interaction, (3) greater in-service training in new instructional ideas, (4) the development of new role structures for students and teachers, (5) the organization of school-community problem-solving teams, and (6) the renewal of the basic school curriculum.

Chesler proposed a three-fold approach to dealing with change and crisis in educational systems. As mentioned above, this approach consists of short-, middle-, and long-range strategies. Since short strategies tend to be utilized most frequently, it is critical that immediate crisis intervention take place in order that the crisis situation may be sufficiently stabilized and tensions sufficiently reduced to allow the underlying issues to be examined. Generally, highly explosive emotional extremes characterize such a period. Examples of strategies for responding to such situations include:

1. Efforts to help all parties understand the roots of their own feelings and the feelings of other persons and groups.
2. **Efforts** to publicize and help responsive educators act upon their private acceptance of the legitimacy of student or community protests.

3. Development of cross-status problem-solving groups to identify grievances and plan reform.

4. Organization of homogeneous groups, according to race or position (students and educators), for example, to identify and articulate their own needs and desires.

5. Establishment of an ombudsman to lubricate the gears of a rigid bureaucracy. Other procedures for handling grievances may be instituted also.

6. Conduct of formal negotiations between differing parties.

7. Immediate hiring of minority educators and use of new curricula on racial issues as first steps in correcting racially unbalanced staff and content.

8. Training students and adults for negotiating or problem-solving.

Chesler warned that short-range strategies must be geared toward the development of longer-range solutions. He noted that "interventions in the midst of crisis hold the beginnings of meaningful change, but all too often such beginnings come to an end with the reduction of crisis and the press of daily routine."  

44Ibid., p. 6.
Middle-range strategies are developed to initiate fundamental change in schools and are viewed as being more permanent than short-range strategies. Their raison d'etre is the creation and utilization of new resources and structures for change. Because of the variety of views held concerning specific changes, multiple strategies may be necessary to cope with varying circumstances. Some examples follow:

1. Establishment and operation over time of internal problem solving groups of students, faculty, administrators, and perhaps community members.

2. Alteration of organizational structures--including faculty and administration sharing of power with students.

3. Retraining of teachers in new instructional philosophies and methods.

4. Continuing confrontation and eradication of racist advantage and disadvantage in class, informal teacher behavior, tracks, texts and social activities.

5. Involvement of persons and institutions from the community in making decisions about the affairs of the schools. Such programs are especially potent in poor and black communities unaccustomed to influencing school policies.
6. Retraining school principals and senior level administrators to support change in the school.

The predicted future needs and structures of educational institutions must be anticipated sufficiently ahead of time to provide for the problems which they will produce. For this reason, long-range planning strategies, based upon perceptions of future models of educational systems, are necessary. Such strategies require educational change, with the promise of both quantitative and qualitative improvement as a reward. Though few long-range strategies have been fully conceptualized, Chesler has suggested the following as examples:

1. New internal decision making structures in which students, faculty and local administrators have more direct control over management of their common life. This innovation would call for retraining participants for their new roles, the creation of new representational systems, the retrieval of scarce knowledge on educational policy and instructional theory for all participants to work with in making decisions, etc.

2. New patterns of community influence in school affairs which would make available additional community resources to the goal of quality education. This innovation would call for retraining community and school participants, developing new means for making schools accountable to publics, utilizing the conflicts inherent in professionals' reactions to control by non-professionals, etc.

3. Revision of the curricula in secondary schools so they may be elements in the creation of new learning systems. This would demand curricula for the needs of a wider variety of students than are now being effectively served, curricula open to more independent and flexible definition by individual students and faculty, curricula for teaching
learning about realities of race and ethnic relations and ways of relating positively across ethnic lines, curricula for dealing with the politics of school life and students' needs for training in change, and curricula for more effectively linking life inside the school and life outside the school.

4. New roles and the scrapping of some old roles in order that the learning system can be fundamentally alerted. This would demand rearranging time and content priorities in order that learners can act as teachers of their peers, that teachers can act as co-learners, and that principals can act as educational leaders, etc.

5. Reorganization of local school systems to accommodate the pressures generated by increasing interest group advocacy by groups and subgroups of black and white students, teachers, administrators and communities.

6. Free schools or "counter" schools which operate outside of the traditional educational structure. By their example these systems can have major impact on typical schools.

The choice between short- (immediate), middle-, or long-range strategies depends upon the nature of the situation. No single strategy is automatically applicable, nor does Chesler recommend beginning with a particular level unless the choice can be justified by local educators.

Chesler and Guskin also suggested four more specific approaches to crisis intervention which may be facilitated by a capable administrator. The first approach, principal orientation, is workable only with a principal who understands and accepts the notion

45 Chesler and Guskin, loc. cit.
that most disturbances arise from legitimate complaints. Another approach focuses upon community and school board orientation, and is geared toward helping such groups organize themselves and others to exert constructive influence on school decision-making. Unlike the principal oriented approach, "this approach deals mainly with those external elements which pressure schools to change; it usually tries to provide a buffer or stimulus for the school in situations where there is a serious community conflict or board-community tension." 46 Student advocate orientation is the third approach, and is meant to be used to facilitate students' goals and interests in crisis situations. The final approach deals with organizational change orientation, and focuses upon improving structural relations between varied parts of the educational system.

Fielder, like Chesler, viewed a team approach as the answer to conflict resolution in the public schools. 47 Working under the hypothesis that "... schools will be changed by conflict or they will be changed by attempts to prevent conflict ...," she developed a diversified team approach to conflict management which focused upon (1) the causes of friction and (2) how each member of the team

46 Ibid., p. 17.

could develop strategies of intervention. As a result of her experiences, Fielder concluded that the notion that a "good" school is free from conflict is erroneous, and that conflict often offers a potential for constructive action. She prophesied that the day will soon come when "... school administrators compare conflicts and the progress made toward their resolution as marks of a school's excellence, along with the expenditure per pupil, teacher-student ratio, and test scores."^48

Whereas Chesler, Guskin, and Fielder dealt with approaches to crisis in general, the following group of individuals were specifically concerned with strategies for use with student unrest. A number of articles serve as a framework for the actual strategies which were recommended, such as those contributed by Shoben, the ACLU, Ornstein, and Green.

Shoben analyzed the problems associated with student unrest in terms of the essentialist versus the existentialist viewpoint. He noted that the existentialist style of student leaders often provokes educational administrators to react defensively. Shoben suggested that, "... in spite of provocations to the contrary, administrative and faculty leaders must adjust their strategy and eschew the role of adversary in coping with student unrest and seek unremittingly for

^48 Ibid., p. 18.
methods of anticipating student concerns . . . "  

In addition, he claimed that administrators have become increasingly burdened with non-academic matters, and find it more difficult to stay involved in the process of learning. In order to effectively deal with unrest, administrators must find ways to again become so involved.

In September of 1968 the American Civil Liberties Union Committee on Academic Freedom issued a special statement dealing with "Academic Freedom in the Secondary Schools." Since that time, this statement has become a standard reference for many school administrators. In large cities, particularly, the ACLU has been quite active in securing students' rights, often to the chagrin of school officials.

The ACLU, however, did suggest three areas which they felt administrators should understand so their responses to student dissent might be most beneficial to all parties concerned. These three basically state that (1) freedom implies the right to make

---


mistakes, so students, therefore, must be permitted to act unwisely at times as long as their doing so is not dangerous or seriously disruptive; (2) students have the right to know the extent and limits of faculty and administrative authority; and (3) mere deviation from the opinion held by those in authority should not be seen as a danger to the educational system.

Ornstein recognized the importance of authority in an organization, but called for a re-evaluation of many of the facets of the present organizational structure, so as to attend to the needs and interests of students. He urged that the administrator, being the key authority figure in the school organization, take the lead in such reform. 52

In an article entitled "Confrontation or Cooperation," Green examined the reaction of students, adults, and administrators to student unrest. 53 The proper administrative response to student unrest, according to him, is built upon the notion that administrators acknowledge (1) that students have grievances, (2) that gaps do exist between the beliefs of students and teachers, (3) that education is more than the mere presentation of subject matter, (4) that the need exists to re-examine and restructure curriculum so it is more relevant to youth, (5) that schools cannot wait for society to solve all of

52Ornstein, loc. cit.
its problems, and (7) that traditional methods of student control are no longer considered appropriate.

The following pages contain more specific strategies for dealing with student unrest. For example, as part of his well-publicized study, Bailey identified five categories of responses to unrest, the most widely practical of which was the use of control devices. The least successful, but most often mentioned control device was the use of a security force, such as the police. Over half of the principals interviewed by Bailey's study team felt that the presence of uniformed police in their school caused more problems than it detered. For this reason, alternative types of security forces were recommended. Other means of control commonly found among the schools studied were suspension and expulsion, special counseling services, special schools for discipline problems, and emergency tactical procedures.

Four other categories of response to unrest, though not as common as the use of control devices, were viewed to be more positive in approach. They involved (1) a means of reducing academic rigidities; (2) developing new types of understanding, and recognizing, respecting, and honoring cultural differences; (3) enlarging student involvement in school decisions and activities; and (4) developing

---

54 Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 34.
means of engaging the school's "natural community." Bailey found that the engagement of a school's constituency was most successfully accomplished by use of standing crisis groups, non-academic school-community liaison personnel, paid neighborhood security aids working at the school, paraprofessionals, community ombudsmen or advocates, and meaningful methods of decentralization.

As the result of hundreds of interviews with high school principals over a four-month period, Bailey and the Policy Institute staff formulated three suggestions which they deemed as the basic strategies principals should use in dealing with student unrest. They recommended to:

1) Remember that disruptive events are rarely carefully planned or programmed. Disruption is triggered often by the smallest, apparently insignificant occurrence. The issue is not so much how the trigger was pulled. The best principals work very hard to create a whole school setting where the probability of an explosion is low but, should one come, careful preparations have been made in advance.

2) Know potential disrupters personally and develop a "feel" for how each one might respond in a tense situation.

3) Work very hard to obtain official authority to deviate from conventional administrative guidelines and practices should an unconventional disruptive situation arise. At the same time, show care that such deviation does not set a contagious precedent. Above all, maintain a professional bearing throughout a disruptive event. If a disrupting group, whether student, community, or a mix of both, senses that the prime authority
figure is rattled, the group will undoubtedly increase its "successful" disturbance.  

The Education USA report described examples of administrative responses to unrest which had proved effective. Creative ways of listening were examined in a dozen states. New organizations to facilitate listening were also recommended as a solution, while means of "oiling the grievance machinery" were suggested as still another alternative. Successful methods of involving students in decision making were discussed in a number of districts, with emphasis being placed upon student-initiated curriculum reform. Finally, the use of emergency guidelines in responding to crisis was explored, and examples of school prepared guidelines from seven districts across the nation were presented.

A special monograph on student unrest was published by the Pennsylvania Department of Education in 1969 and revised in 1970. Though the monograph is basically action-oriented, in that it recommended immediate administrative responses to student unrest, it also touched upon planning measures to avoid unrest and alluded to certain administrative attitudes desirable in rendering unrest non-lethal. In addition to the comprehensive section dealing with overt problems, a chapter on delineating actions that should be taken to avoid (and

55 Ibid., p. 51.
56 High School Student Unrest . . , loc. cit.
57 Student Unrest, loc. cit.
prevent) unrest was included. According to the monograph, the nine areas upon which an administrator should concentrate in order to prevent unrest are (1) communication, (2) curriculum, (3) control, (4) attitudes, (5) involvement, (6) school policy, (7) discipline, (8) grievances, and (9) faculty. Several other states have also published monographs containing strategies for dealing with student unrest, similar to that cited above.  

Ashbaugh presented a number of approaches for coping with conflict situations which he claimed had been successful under a variety of conditions. He suggested (1) to maintain open communication, the administrator should establish an information control center; (2) to maintain control of influences, the administrator should rigidly enforce attendance; (3) to restore order, the administrator must recognize and give status to student leaders before negotiating with them; (4) in negotiating with student leaders, the administrator should get them to verbalize their demands so they can be set down in print; (5) to bring closure to the situation, the administrator should

---

58 For example, see Student Unrest (Sacramento, California: California Association of Secondary School Administrators, 1967), and "Student Activism in the High Schools of New York State" (Albany, New York: The State Education Department, 1969).

listen to all sides and gather all necessary evidence; and (6) to settle
the problem once all of the information has been gathered, the ad-
ministrator should make an immediate decision.

Dr. John Spriegal, Director of the Lemberg Center for the
Study of Violence at Brandeis University, suggested that the school
administrator may control a potentially violent situation if, as soon
as he hears about the possibility of a disorder, he contacts student
leaders, hears their views, and attempts to negotiate a solution.
Such a solution should satisfy some of the demands of the student
activists while maintaining the authority of the administrator to con-
trol school processes in the best interest of the school community.
Spriegal noted that "in most instances, this compromise solution,
which requires a good deal of innovation and risk taking, heads off
more serious disorder." 60

As a final strategy for dealing with student unrest, Soares
and Soares recommend social learning as a useful approach in dim-
inishing social violence in many areas of human interaction. 61 They
suggested that four principles of psychology, if skillfully utilized by
school administrators, might have a significant impact upon student

60 John Spriegal, "Handling Student Unrest: What's the

61 Louise M. Soares and Anthony J. Soares, "Social Learn-
ing and Disruptive Social Behavior," Phi Delta Kappan, October,
1970, pp. 82-84.
unrest. Positive reinforcement of pro-social behavior, a good approach for use both prior to and during student unrest, rewards desirable non-violent action. Similarly, social imitation provides models who are rewarded for specific positive behavior. Extinction is a usable technique once disruptive behavior has ceased to be rewarded. This is contingent upon not publically "playing-up" undesirable behavior, and continuing normal institutional operations. Lastly, the authors stated that counter-conditioning might be used by associating something negative with the illegal goals of the dissenting students (e.g., jail terms). Though these four approaches seem to provide psychologically sound solutions to student unrest, as moral and ethical processes, they remain questionable.

Summary and Conclusions

The preceding literature review was guided by five theoretical constructs basic to the topic examined in this study. Areas tangential to the study were not considered in the review. Literature related to the following conceptions was examined:

1. The major cause of student unrest and the crises it frequently engenders is the inability of educators and educational systems to respond to the needs of students, often because of the rigid structure of those systems.

2. Under certain conditions, there is a relationship between crisis in an educational system and the development of that system.
3. Educational administrators have demonstrated both a reluctance and an inability to deal with system crises.

4. An educational administrator can play an important role in managing his system's response to crisis so that the system experiences development as a result.

5. Certain administrative and systemic responses to crisis and strategies for dealing with unrest have been used successfully.

Several persons found that pressure was necessary to produce reform in educational systems due to the inability of educators to respond to a need for change. The inability of educational systems to change was also attributed to their structure. A number of sociological studies were cited, linking, for example, the structures of asylums and industrial organizations with that of the schools, and demonstrating the commonalities between these organizations in terms of the structural antecedants of unrest. The four major national studies on student unrest were examined to establish (1) the increasingly common rate of student unrest, (2) the primarily substantive causes of student disturbances, and (3) a positive correlation between student unrest and the size of the student body, racially mixed schools, and the rate of average daily attendance.

Several persons, the most notable of whom was Chesler, supported the notion that disciplined utilization of conflict was a viable strategy for promoting positive change in educational systems.
Successful crisis management was viewed as a vehicle for creating educational development. 62

Failure on the part of educators to deal effectively with crisis was attributed to a reluctance to admit that all was not well within their system or the negative approach from which they confronted crisis. It was noted that many administrators are unable to recognize dysfunctions in their own system, and view student unrest as a crisis that can only result in the breakdown of the educational institution, the lives of its students, and the careers of its administrators. It was noted that the primary antecedents of administrative crisis decisions were the schools' abuse of authority, and passive and active student response to that abuse. When forced to act under a crisis situation, the typical school administrator was unable to function according to the classical model of rational decision making. 63 Administrative fear of crisis often resulted in the use of mass disciplinary measures and uniformed police. In spite of the perception of student unrest, it was found that a significant percentage of administrators had not, nor did not plan to develop guidelines for dealing with crisis situations.


63 Ibid.
In February of 1970, then U. S. Commissioner of Education, James E. Allen, Jr., urged school administrators not merely to develop contingency plans to cope with student disorders, but to identify the causes of such disorders and plan means of solving their underlying problems. The major role in dealing constructively with student unrest belongs to the administrator, said Allen, who added that more effective school management could be realized by sharing the decision-making responsibility. Allen’s message sets the tone for what was found in the literature regarding what the role of the administrator should be in dealing with crisis. Although a variety of specialized roles were delineated, there seemed to be general agreement that in times of crisis, the administrator was the proverbial "man-in-the-middle." Chesler identified the roles of advocate intervener, educational architect, and system innovator/legitimater as useful in crisis intervention; while several others stressed the importance of the administrator's role in terms of his interaction with students and intervention in militant groups. A composite approach to crisis would necessitate an administrator (1) understanding the origins of the crisis, and being able to (2) prevent crisis, (3) cope with it, (4) utilize it, and (5) respond to it creatively.

As a result of examining the literature concerning administrative response to crisis and specific strategies for dealing with student unrest, it was found that a growing number of administrators have taken the stance that "student activism is a healthy development which can add real vitality to the educational program if wisely channeled." It was noted further that those administrators who recognized the potential for the educational improvement inherent in the student movement tended to experience little or no trouble. Immediate (short-term), intermediate, and long-term strategies for dealing with crisis were suggested, as was a diversified team approach. Several of the articles provided a philosophical framework within which more specific approaches for dealing with student unrest could be viewed. Approaches which were reported as being successful included the use of control devices, increasing student involvement in decision-making, developing emergency contingency plans, reducing the number of unimportant rules, honoring cultural differences, developing fair workable grievance procedures, maintaining systems of open, two-way communication, and making known the willingness to negotiate differences.

Five basic propositions can be generated from the material reviewed here. These propositions form the foundation upon which

---

65 High School Student Unrest . . ., op. cit., p. 5.
this study is built and are examined in greater detail in subsequent chapters. The propositions are:

1. Student unrest is one of the major forces affecting education today.

2. Student unrest is often responsible for creating crisis situations throughout many of the operational areas of an educational system.

3. Crises in school systems, under certain management conditions, may lead to educational development.

4. The educational administrator may be the critical variable in dealing with crisis situations, so that they result in positive change (development).

5. In order for an educational administrator to facilitate the development of his system, he must be able to identify and solve problems, and function as a crisis manager when necessary.

In his analysis of the antecedents and consequences of crisis decisions, Bridges developed three administrative responses useful in dealing with crises caused by student unrest. Strategies for classroom reform and the development of channels of responsiveness are the two major means of preventing crises from occurring; if they are unsuccessful, the third response deals with handling

---

66 Bridges, loc. cit.
active crisis situations. In support of this finding, it has been suggested that since crisis situations are \textit{fait accompli} to organizations, there are two options open to effect a solution:

The first option is to attempt to train or educate present and future power managers to solve the basic problems that create crisis. The second approach is to educate leaders and potential leaders to nimbly manipulate situations and people so that crisis will be reduced and less disruptive.\footnote{O'Neil, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 27.}

Contrary to viewing crisis as a threat, it should be perceived as creating the opportunity for educators to (1) be introspective, (2) re-examine their goals, and (3) harness student pressure so it may lead to new ways of educating youngsters. "It is the context of seeing disruption as an opportunity for change, and seeing change as vital, that permits more creative responses to school crises."\footnote{Mark A. Chesler, "Student and Administration Crises," \textit{Educational Leadership}, October, 1969, p. 36.} Crisis leads to change, and under the proper managerial (administrative) conditions, crisis may result in positive educational change (development).
CHAPTER III

THE METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

The methodology for examining the effect of the student unrest-related crises on the Philadelphia Public Schools, and analyzing the system's reaction during a recent major crisis will consist of two basic parts. The first part will entail considering the extent to which student unrest-related crises have occurred in the schools, and their effects upon the system. The second part is geared toward examining in detail, (1) the inputs to the system, (2) the process by which they were utilized, and (3) the outputs which resulted from the system's reaction to a major crisis situation. The purpose of the first part is largely to place the entire problem into perspective, and to test, at the macro-level, whether student unrest-related crises have led to development, by determining how the system in question has responded to such situations. The second part will examine a single crisis in detail and view the inputs, process, and outputs on a micro-level.

Utilizing the Case Study

The basic methodology utilized in both parts of the study can be best categorized as a case study technique used as a piece of
action research. The first part (Chapter IV) is composed of a series of over three dozen incidents, and though the majority of these incidents are reported in vignette form, several of them (such as the November 17, 1967 Board Building melee and the Fishman Case), are examined in greater detail. The second part (Chapter V) uses a more structured and complete form of the case study to explore a single crisis situation in depth.

The case study technique if used properly, should take into account all pertinent aspects of a situation, utilizing as the unit for study, an individual, institution, community, or group. In a case study, "the complex situation and combination of factors involved in the given behavior are examined to determine the existing status and to identify the causal factors operating."1 The case study, as used here, may be viewed as a piece of action research because it "... can assist educators in developing a 'scientific-practical' approach to understanding individual and group behavior, and solving various types of problems ..."2

The case study is potentially one of the more valuable methods of research, for it can facilitate the synthesis of a variety of data,


thus providing for the identification and examination of many of the elusive personal factors and organizational variables needed to draw educational inferences. Olson supported this notion when he categorized the unique contributions of case studies to general knowledge under six headings, including the evaluation of programs and the formulation of generalizations about a body of information. Good pointed out the versatility of the case study as a research technique when he noted that it can be applied to individuals, institutions, and communities.

The five major phases of the case study explicated by Good and Scates are (1) status of the situation or unit of attention; (2) collection of data, examination, and history; (3) diagnosis and identification of causal factors; (4) adjustment, treatment, and therapy; and (5) follow-up of the adjustment program. Numbers four and five (above), however, are more often a part of the case-work cycle involving individuals than of standard institutional case studies.

---


6 Good and Scates, loc. cit.
Hill and Kerber identified the six significant elements of action research as being (1) identification of a problem area; (2) selection of a specific problem; (3) selection of a working hypothesis or prediction that implies a goal and a procedure; (4) recording of action taken and accumulation of evidence; (5) generalizations from the evidence concerning relations between actions and desired goals; and (6) continuous evaluation and retesting in action situations.

These two lists bear considerable relation to each other, as may be seen in Figure 2. The first three phases of the case study very closely parallel the beginning five phases of action research. Though Hill and Kerber’s action research phases do not specifically include a parallel to the case study phase of adjustment, treatment, and therapy, such action is understood, for it would not be logical to go from the generalization phase to the evaluation phase without having made (or considered making) an adjustment.

In spite of its potential usefulness, the case study has not been readily applied to many of the current problems besetting education. Cunningham stressed the need for (case study) research in the general area being dealt with by this study when he noted:

The student unrest case accounts of Nystrand are the only ones I know about which focus on current student militancy at the junior or senior high school levels. Much more needs to be done on this matter immediately—not for an elegant, esoteric "contribution to knowledge," but for much more pragmatic reasons.  

# Figure 2

The Elements of a Case Study and Action Research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Action Research</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Status of the Situation or Unit of Attention</td>
<td>Identification of the Problem Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Selection of a Specific Problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Selection of a Working Hypothesis or a Prediction that Implies a Goal and Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection of Data, Examination, and History</td>
<td>Recording of Action Taken and Accumulation of Evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diagnosis and Identification of Causal Factors</td>
<td>Generalizations from the Evidence Concerning Relations Between Actions and Desired Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjustment, Treatment, and Therapy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow-up of the Adjustment Program</td>
<td>Continuous Evaluation and Restesting in Action Situations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A Historical Overview

The Approach

Philadelphia, the fourth largest city in the nation, has a public school enrollment of over 290,000 pupils, and employs over 24,000 teachers, administrators, and other supportive staff. It is representative in many ways of a typical large urban school district. Unlike many big city districts, however, Philadelphia has developed over the past three years a reputation for meeting many of the problems of urban existence in a variety of innovative ways. The Parkway Program, the Pennsylvania Advancement School, and the Affective Education Curriculum Project are but a few examples of special programs which have become known nationally. In all, the Philadelphia Public Schools have over 100 innovative programs operating in addition to the standard curriculum. Yet, in spite of a reputation for approaching problems innovatively, Philadelphia seems to suffer many of the same difficulties other, not so innovative districts do with respect to student unrest-related crises. Whether Philadelphia has, in fact, been unsuccessful in dealing with these problems, and if so, how and why, are the basic questions explored in this study.


In order to begin to answer the above questions, a thorough examination of the crisis situations generated by student unrest in the Philadelphia Public Schools had to be undertaken. This examination was geared toward generating two types of information—-that which reported actual instances of student unrest and that which indicated any changes which might have been forthcoming as a result of those incidents. Once the incidents had been isolated and the changes identified, generalizations could be developed.

All readily accessible information from the year 1958 to the present was examined and when several important incidents prior to 1958 were mentioned during the course of interviews, they too were researched and added to the other situations. The beginning date was selected because there is considerable reason to view the school year 1958-59 as a crucial dividing point in education. Axelrod, et al., present strong evidence that "1958-59 marked the end of the old era and ushered in a new one."\(^{10}\) Among the reasons listed for singling out this year are:


---

2. The year 1958 saw the emergence of the current student activist movement with the founding of SLATE at Berkeley.

3. Education was beginning to react to the new demands made upon it by a nation outraged that it did not launch Sputnik.\textsuperscript{11} Materials were examined up to the close of the 1970-71 school year.

\textbf{The Examination of Incidents}

A total of thirty-seven different instances of student unrest were isolated and are reported in the first section of Chapter IV. These incidents represent the more critical student unrest-related problems experienced by the School District of Philadelphia during the past two decades. Thousands of not so serious incidents occurred during this time span, the majority of which might only be found in the anecdotal records of the students involved, for the current serious incident reporting system was not established until late 1967. Thirteen schools were involved in the thirty-seven incidents. Table 1 indicates the number of incidents and number of schools involved during each of the four time frames used to divide the examination.

The four time frames were selected for a specific reason. The rationale for using 1958 as a starting point has already been mentioned, so those incidents occurring prior to 1958 formed the first time frame. The years 1958 through 1967 represent that time during which student unrest began to appear as a problem situation\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
in the Philadelphia Public Schools. The leadership of the school system during that nine-year period was in the hands of two superintendents who were considered traditional by most. The year 1967 marked the arrival of a new, more progressive superintendent, whose first three years in office coincided with the most active period of student unrest known in this nation. The final time frame, which encompasses the past school year (1970-71), brings the study up to date and provides a backdrop for the consideration of the major system crisis examined in Chapter V.

Four sources of information were used to develop the incident descriptions in Chapter IV—interviews, newspaper articles, other miscellaneous documents, and personal observation or involvement in the incident in question. The initial interviews were conducted with several high ranking administrators, each having many years of service, in the hope that they would (1) provide a base of information upon which to build and (2) suggest additional individuals whose knowledge might be of value. Both expectations were realized from these initial interviews and as a result, many more were scheduled and completed. 12

---

12 A word here about the nature of the interviews might be appropriate. A set interview schedule was not used because of the variation in experiences possessed by each of the individuals interviewed. Instead, questions were formulated to get at those areas of insight peculiar to their involvement with student unrest.

The modus operandi of each interview was (1) to explain the
## TABLE 1

SERIOUS INSTANCES OF STUDENT UNREST AND THE NUMBER OF SCHOOLS INVOLVED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
<th>Number of Schools Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 1958</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958 to 1967</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967 to 1970</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10(^b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 to 1971</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
<td><strong>13(^c)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Denotes academic years, from September to June. Time designations should be read (September) 1958 to (June) 1967.

\(^b\) Does not include the November 17, 1967 Administration Building incident, since the participants came from most of the City's high schools.

\(^c\) Indicates the total number of different schools involved during all four time frames.
Among the persons interviewed from the School District were representatives of the Office of Informational Services, The Superintendent's Office, The Division of Pupil Personnel Services, The Division of Administrative and Survey Research, The Division of Field Operations, The Division of Maintenance and Operations,\textsuperscript{13} The Office of Legal Affairs and The Office of Community Affairs and Intergroup Relations. In addition, during the course of the study, the topic was discussed with other key individuals such as the Superintendent; Deputy Superintendents; several district superintendents; and elementary, junior high, and senior high school principals. Newspaper reporters and secretaries were also useful sources in gathering information.

All three local daily newspapers, dating back to September, 1967, were examined, and each provided a wealth of information. It was possible, in the case of each incident being researched, to compare how it was reported in \textit{The Bulletin}, \textit{The Inquirer}, and \textit{The Daily News}. In addition to these three Philadelphia daily newspapers,\textsuperscript{13} Includes the Chief of Facilities Security.
The Philadelphia Tribune, a bi-weekly publication serving the black community, was examined.

A variety of other documents was used, including information on gangs provided by The Office of Community Affairs and Intergroup Relations, comparative racial percentages and other statistical summaries provided by The Division of Administrative and Survey Research, critical incident reports provided by the Chief of Facilities Security, and a tremendous amount of miscellaneous information provided by The Office of Informational Services. Actual involvement in monitoring several Administration Building demonstrations and the experience of assisting in the situation control room during several periods of difficulty also provided valuable insight into the area being studied.

Changes and Generalizations

The six general areas of change which followed instances of student unrest were identified in much the same manner that the incidents themselves were. Interviews again played a key role, as did the miscellaneous materials recommended by several of the persons interviewed. The changes made in terms of administrative restructuring were identified solely through interviews. Though interviews played a major role in identifying changes in the areas of police relations and serious incident reporting, information was also found in
a number of memorandums. Miscellaneous materials furnished the bulk of information concerning the Board policy on disruption of activities, as well as smaller amount of data concerning the Student Bill of Rights and Responsibilities and the administrative response to the causes of dissent. Knowledge of the latter two areas, mentioned above, was acquired primarily through newspaper articles. The generalizations which completed Chapter IV were formulated as a result of the information gathered about the incidents and changes, from the sources and by the methods already mentioned.

A Major System Crisis

The Approach

The second part of the study involves the examination of the recent major system crisis caused by the murder of Samson L. Freedman, a teacher, by Kevin Simmons, a student whom Freedman had suspended. The crisis itself was examined first, followed by an examination of the responses to the crisis in terms of the inputs to the system, the processes by which the inputs were handled, and the outputs which resulted.

The section required the following steps:

1. An examination of that recent crisis situation, including the background, causes, participants, and actual incident.

2. An analysis of the immediate systemic response to the
incident, and the development of a rationale for viewing the situation as a crisis.

3. The identification of major referent groups and individuals from within and outside of the system.

4. The collection of relevant information about each group and individual.

5. The development of a taxonomy of inputs.

6. The collection and examination of the inputs provided by each referent group and individual from within and outside the system.

7. The categorization of the collected inputs according to the taxonomy.

8. The collection and examination of information relevant to the process utilized by the system to (a) deal with the available inputs and (b) involve other inputs.

9. The identification and examination of the outputs resulting from the crisis.

10. An analysis of the outputs.

Using a version of Good and Scates' phases of a case study as a model, Chapter V was organized into four parts—(a) the status of the situation, (b) the collection of data, (c) an overview of the process, and (d) an examination of the outputs.
The Status of the Situation

The general problem area with which this part of the study deals is student unrest-related crisis and the development of educational systems. The specific problem is to determine the effect of a major crisis situation upon an urban school system and to analyze why the crisis affected the system the way it did. The working hypothesis is that certain responses to educational crisis situations will result in the development of the educational system which has been affected by that crisis.

In this section, the crisis situation was completely examined in terms of the background, the causes, the participants, the actual incident, the immediate system responses, and the rationale for viewing the situation as a crisis.

The Collection of Data

This section consisted first of identifying the major referent groups and individuals (both from within and from outside of the school system) supplying inputs to the situation. Next, a taxonomy of inputs, or more correctly, a taxonomy of those groups and individuals providing inputs, was developed. Once this had been accomplished, the data were collected for each group (and certain specific

14 Inputs may refer to either physical resources available to the system or ideas and information similarly made available.
individuals), and the complete context of their inputs to the situation was examined and reported. Other relevant information concerning the groups, individuals, and their relationship with the school system was also noted.

An Overview of Process

The third section differs somewhat from the Good and Scates model, in that generalizations are not formulated concerning the relations between goals and action. The section does deal with the process by which the inputs were gathered and generated into outputs. Particular emphasis was placed upon the process used by the central administration to deal with the inputs resulting from the crisis. Also, questions concerning how decisions were made, who was involved, and what additional inputs were gathered from where, were explored.

The overview of the process contains a section on activities, a chronology of events, and an examination of the part played by the Board of Education in it. The eight activities considered were (1) preliminary planning, (2) staffing, (3) determining necessary inputs, (4) organizing to secure inputs, (5) collecting inputs, (6) analyzing and reviewing inputs, (7) generating outputs, and (8) revising outputs. The chronology of events reported the start or completion of major

15 These generalizations will be formulated as part of the final chapter.
activities, to help place the process into perspective, and differed from the examination of the eight activities in that events, unlike activities, do not consume time, personnel, or resources.

An Examination of Outputs

The final section is similar to the Good and Scates model in that it examines the outputs generated by the crisis and contains an analysis of each one. The first three drafts of the Superintendent's recommendations were considered in this section so that the process by which the inputs were converted to outputs could be more readily seen. The fourth and final draft (containing the twenty recommendations and the corporal punishment amendment), was examined in detail.

Perhaps the methodology articulated in the four preceding steps would be made clear if the context and process which was dealt with is portrayed graphically. Figure 3 represents an attempt to do so. This simplified diagram indicates that the crisis within the School District of Philadelphia resulted both from causes created by the school system and by the society in which it operates. The crisis has affected, in turn, both school-related groups (e.g., The Home and School Council, and the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers) and non-school groups (e.g., The Philadelphia Bar Association and The Philadelphia City Council). Many of these groups provided the school
Figure 3
The Context and Process of the Study

SOCIETY

Non-School Groups

SCHOOL SYSTEM

CRISIS

Referent Groups' Inputs

Process

School-Related Groups

Societal Causes

School Causes

Inputs

Outputs
system with inputs in the form of ideas and suggestions as to how to deal with the situation. (Some dealt with correcting the underlying causes of the crisis, while others suggested ways to minimize the disruptive results of the crisis.) In addition, the crisis produced additional tangible inputs as well as a reassessment of those already available.

These different types of inputs were then utilized (acted upon) by powers within the school system in such a way that outputs were generated. The direct outputs in this case were a set of recommendations designed to alter the system in specific ways. These outputs, once they have been implemented, should indirectly affect the tangible output (the final product) by producing a somewhat different type of student. The recommendations (output) have the potential to affect the school system or society, or indirectly, both.

A Taxonomy of Inputs

The large number and variety of groups and individuals providing inputs, both positive and negative, necessitated the development of a method of organizing and categorizing them, if their inputs were to be clearly reported, examined, and analyzed. The taxonomy developed for use in categorizing the inputs, or, more correctly, those providing the inputs, distinguishes first between groups and individuals. A group input is one which reflects the opinion of a
majority of either a formal or informal organization. Such an input need not be, in fact, rarely is, presented publically by the entire organization. Generally, a single representative acts as spokesman in presenting the feelings of the organization. An individual input, however, is taken to reflect only the opinion of a specific person; though many other individuals may share that opinion, they have not organized to present a collective front. A group input, then, connotes agreement and support by an organization, which Simon defines as "a system in equilibrium, which receives contributions in the form of money or effort, and offers inducements in return for these contributions."\(^\text{16}\) An individual acts as a member of an organization or group "when he applies the same general scale of values to his choices as do other members of the group, and when his expectations of the behavior of other members influence his own decisions."\(^\text{17}\)

Group Inputs

Three types of groups provided inputs on violence and discipline—(1) professional education and educational resource groups, (2) civic-educational groups, and (3) civic groups. Professional education and resource groups are comprised of members who earn


\(^{17}\)Ibid., p. 151.
their living by working directly for the schools. Teachers' unions and administrators' organizations are the most common examples of professional education groups, while examples of educational resource groups might include the school custodian's union or the cafeteria workers association.

Civic-educational groups, on the other hand, are comprised of individuals who do not depend upon the schools to earn a living, but are interested in them just the same. Bailey has been quoted as noting that members of this type of group "live for the schools rather than from them." Such groups exist only because of their interest in school affairs; were it not for the schools they would have no raison d'etre. The Philadelphia Home and School Council, the Citizens Committee for Public Education in Philadelphia, and various school advisory committees serve as examples of civic-educational groups.

The authors of The Organization and Control of American


Schools differentiate between organizations which exist only because of their interest in the schools (civic-educational groups) and other "civic associations which only occasionally focus their attention on education." The latter type, simply termed "civic groups" here, view education as a secondary concern. They are voluntary organizations which exist for general societal betterment, and which consider educational questions only on occasion. Examples of such groups include The Urban Coalition, NAACP, the Lions Club, and other various community service organizations.

**Individual Inputs**

The individuals providing inputs on violence and discipline were grouped into four categories—(1) professional educators, (2) politicians, (3) parents, and (4) other citizens. Professional educators are individuals who rely upon education (public, private, or university) to earn their living. They may be employed directly by a school system or serve as a consultant to it. Such individuals as teachers, administrators, and university professors would be included in this category.

Politicians are active in many phases of political activity, either presently holding office or seeking it. Included in this category would be the mayor, city councilmen, district attorney, or

\[20\] Ibid.
individuals who are presently candidates for any of these positions.

Individuals designated as parents are those whose primary reason for providing inputs is that they have children currently attending public school. Should such persons fall into either of the two preceding categories, they would not be considered as part of the "parents" category in this taxonomy.

The fourth and last category of individuals is termed "other citizens," and includes all persons not covered by the above three categories. This miscellaneous section might encompass ministers, non-educational professionals (e.g., attorneys and physicians), taxpayers, and students.

The taxonomy of those providing inputs on violence and discipline, then, is simply divided into two classes—those inputs supplied by groups and those presented by individuals. Each class is sub-divided into a number of categories. In its skeletal form, the taxonomy looks like this:

I. Groups
   A. Professional Education and Educational Resource Groups
   B. Civic-Educational Groups
   C. Civic Groups

II. Individuals
   A. Professional Educators
B. Politicians
C. Parents
D. Other Citizens

The Board of Education

The Board of Education has been purposely omitted from this taxonomy for several reasons. First, the Board, in this situation, was supposed to receive inputs from other groups and individuals, not provide them. In actuality, however, though most of the inputs were transmitted through the Superintendent, the Board made very definite inputs to both the content of the recommendations (the output) and process by which it was generated. Secondly, the unique position of the Board prevents it from being placed in any of the group categories established within the confines of the taxonomy. Lastly, though the Board is legally constituted as a body (group), the role played by each member often varies. Board members could not be accurately categorized as individuals either. For these reasons, the impact of the Board as a whole, and of its individual members, was considered in a separate section of Chapter V, as part of the examination of the process.

The Collected Inputs

There is little doubt that the shooting death of Samson Freedman and the subsequent crisis within the Philadelphia Public
**TABLE 2**

**GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS PROVIDING INPUTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taxonomy</th>
<th>Number Providing Inputs</th>
<th>Percent of Sub Total</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
<th>Number Providing Multiple Inputs</th>
<th>Percent of Sub Total</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Groups</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Educators &amp; Educational Resource Groups</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic-Educational Groups</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Groups</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub Total</strong></td>
<td>63</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individuals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Educators</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Citizens</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub Total</strong></td>
<td>69</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>132</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Not quantified, but general inputs are included in Chapter V.
Schools resulted from and, in turn, produced thousands of inputs that never reached the top decision-makers of the system. Nevertheless, a great number of inputs from a wide variety of sources were considered by the central administration in reacting to the crisis situation. All of those inputs were examined in this study, along with dozens of others.

The primary sources of inputs included (1) those specifically requested by the Superintendent and/or Board of Education, (2) unsolicited speakers at Board of Education Meetings, (3) private testimony before the Superintendent or Board regarding violence and discipline in the schools, (4) letters, (5) petitions, (6) formal resolutions by local groups, (7) newspaper articles and editorials, and (8) telegrams and phone calls.

Table 2 indicates the number of group and individuals providing inputs. A total of 63 groups were identified, 13 (or 20 per cent) of which provided inputs on more than one occasion. (A complete list of those groups is contained in the Appendix.) Among the professional education and educational resource groups, 11 professional organizations and unions provided inputs, 5 of which had bargaining power at the time.\footnote{In May, 1971, the Philadelphia Principals' Association merged with the School Administrators' Alliance to form the Philadelphia Association of School Administrators (PASA).} Also included were two ethnic lodge groups of educators
(the Columbus Forum of the Order of Sons of Italy in America and the Educators' Lodge of B'nai B'rith) and two informal faculty groups. The Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, designated (by a majority of teachers) as the official bargaining unit, was the strongest teacher group, but not the only one. Two dissident groups within the PFT (the Committee for New Leadership and the Progressive Caucus) also voiced an opinion, as did the disenfranchised Philadelphia City Education Association, an N.E.A. affiliate. Six of the fifteen groups provided inputs more than once, several on an almost continual basis.

Only two of the twenty-one civic-educational groups provided inputs more than once, which is not surprising since fourteen of these groups were local associations of the Home and School Council. Other key groups, in addition to the Philadelphia Home and School Council, included the Council of Student Association Presidents and the Citizens Committee on Public Education in Philadelphia.

The inputs of twenty-seven civic groups were collected, including four religious-ethnic groups and five mental health organizations. Among the other better-known organizations contributing suggestions or criticisms were the American Civil Liberties Union, the Commission on Human Relations, the Urban Coalition and the Urban League. Five of the groups provided inputs on more than one occasion.
Over half of the total number of groups providing inputs were organized on a city-wide or more extensive basis. However, twenty-six of the groups were of the local community or school area variety. Table 3 indicates how that latter group was geographically distributed throughout the city, using as boundaries the eight local districts which comprise the School District of Philadelphia. Community groups provided inputs in all but one district. District Six, the district in which Leeds Junior High School is located, had the greatest number of local inputs.

Though hundreds of telephone calls and letters relating to the crisis from individuals were received by the Superintendent's Office, few are reported in Chapter V. Most were from concerned parents, who did little but express their concern. Though they were all examined, only a few were sampled. It is primarily because of the sheer number of these types of inputs that they are not quantified here, though they are considered in Chapter V.

Key contributions made by thirty-three professional educators are listed. Those individuals were mostly administrators, and included the Assistant Superintendent of the Philadelphia Archdiocesan Schools and several high school principals. Twenty of the thirty-three were listed as providing multiple inputs, many on a continuing basis. Among the six politicians making major inputs, were two mayorality hopefuls (an ex-police commissioner and a Polynesian
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Area from which the Constituency is Drawn</th>
<th>Professional Educators &amp; Educational Resource Groups</th>
<th>Civic-Educational Groups</th>
<th>Civic Groups</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District One</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Two</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Three</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Four</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Five</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Six</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Seven</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Eight</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City, State, or Nationwide</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Prince), a city councilman, and the District Attorney. Parental responses were not quantified here, but the "other citizens" category contained thirty responses. Included in this miscellaneous category were three ministers, numerous students, and several high-ranking police officials.
CHAPTER IV

A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF STUDENT UNREST IN THE PHILADELPHIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS

The purpose of this chapter is to examine crises related to student unrest in the Philadelphia Public Schools in order to (1) provide background sufficient to place Chapter V (A Major System Crisis) into context, and (2) test the hypothesis that crisis situations may lead to development. The intent established in the methodology section was to view unrest in the system between 1958 and the present. Through a series of interviews with veteran police officials and school administrators, however, several instances of student unrest prior to 1958 were also identified.

The chapter is divided into three sections--(1) incidents, (2) changes, and (3) generalizations. In the section on incidents, specific instances of student unrest are examined within four time frames. The year 1958 was chosen as a beginning point for the examination of incidents, but the identification of several important situations prior to that date necessitated their inclusion in the first time frame. The 1958-59 school year through the 1966-67 school year makes up the second division. The third begins with the start
of a new Superintendent, (the 1967-68 school year), and continues through the 1969-70 school year, while the fourth time frame consists of the immediately preceding (1970-71) school year.

The second section will view those changes which have been instituted as a result of the incidents identified in the first section. Changes in the structure of administrative offices to more effectively deal with unrest, changes in school-police relations, development of a serious incident reporting mechanism, and the advent of the Student Bill of Rights and Responsibilities will be examined here. In the third section, a series of generalizations, developed from the information provided in the first two sections, will be presented.

The Incidents

Incidents Prior to 1958

One of the earliest instances of student unrest, according to those interviewed, took place at Gratz High School during the 1952-53 school year. The killing of a popular student (and gang member) by a rival gang resulted in violent fights in the halls and necessitated uniformed police being stationed in the school to maintain discipline and control. The situation which generated the slaying was indicative of the "Blackboard Jungle" type of atmosphere existing in tough urban schools throughout the nation in the early fifties. Gratz High School,
even then, had a history of juvenile gang confrontations dating back fifteen years.

Whereas the Gratz problems were primarily caused by more than a dozen gangs operating in the immediate area, the situation at South Philadelphia High School was more racially oriented. Gratz had been a majority black school for several decades (and is virtually 100 per cent black today), while South Philadelphia High School was about one-third black in the early fifties (and is about one-half black today). The area immediately surrounding South Philadelphia High School is solidly Italian and provides difficult access for many black students. For several years (1954 and 1955) rival black and white gangs which had been fighting in the streets carried their hostility into the school building. During the spring of both of those years the situation became so critical that large numbers of state highway patrolmen had to be brought into the school to contain almost daily fights.

**Incidents Occurring Between 1958 and Spring, 1967**

During the 1959-60 school year, an Italian student was killed by a black gang, sending most of South Philadelphia, particularly that section closest to South Philadelphia High School, into an uproar. Gang activity, which had somewhat diminished, began anew, and the various neighborhoods, particularly the Italian areas, became "armed camps." The number of weapons arrests at South Philadelphia High
School soared, and it was not uncommon to have police escort armed non-students from the building. For two months there was a police car on almost every block in the area.

In 1961 and 1962, a W. E. B. DuBois Club began operating in the Gratz High School area. Because of constant police surveillance (for the club was listed by the FBI as a Communist front organization), it moved its location. The interest in organized protest it was supposed to have initiated, however, began to replace open gang warfare in that area. During the Girard College demonstrations of the mid-sixties, many Gratz High School Students became involved in the civil rights movement. A former head of the police civil disobedience squad noted that during the Girard College demonstrations, gang activity markedly declined, for most of the gang leaders had channeled their energies into organized picketing and like activities.

In October of 1963, violence hit two Philadelphia high schools -- Bok Vocational-Technical and South Philadelphia High. The disorders began with a week-long series of clashes between black and white students, and then spread to the streets. More than a dozen students were injured in racial attacks. Much of the trouble was precipitated by stormy Board of Education meetings, followed by peaceful picketing by adults and calls by civil rights groups for students to boycott their classes. Such a boycott never materialized, however.
Between 1965 and 1967, Germantown High School experienced problems. The majority black school (85 per cent in 1970) was losing white population (74 per cent in 1959; 32 per cent in 1967), and was "invaded" by black militant organizers on a half-dozen occasions during that period. South Philadelphia High School had a series of organized protests over a controversial teacher in 1966, but, for a change, there was no violence. Benjamin Franklin High School, however, underwent constant student conflict that year because of the twenty gangs operating in the area of that predominantly black (95 per cent) school.

The year 1967 marked the first time since a brief period in 1963 that racial tensions among Philadelphia high school students erupted into violence. Six schools experienced student disorders prior to the major confrontation of November 17. In early April, local NAACP President Cecil B. Moore demanded the firing of a white teacher at South Philadelphia High School, whom he accused of making inflammatory remarks about Negroes. Trouble started the day Moore had set as the deadline for that teacher's dismissal, when fighting between black and white students broke out in the hallways. Ten students were injured, nine persons arrested, and 2000 (of the school's 3,645) students were absent the following day.

On April 17, a peaceful sit-in was held in the auditorium of the William Penn High School (for girls) by 900 pupils protesting
temporary classes being held elsewhere to relieve overcrowding. For three days unrest simmered at the virtually all black (95 per cent) and Puerto Rican (4 per cent) school, and finally erupted and spread to the nearby Benjamin Franklin High School (for boys). Near riot conditions caused the cancellation of classes at both schools.

A gang of white boys beat three black students returning from a Friday night dance at John Bartram High School in early May. The following week, seven interracial fights broke out, resulting in high rates of absenteeism and continued tension.

Incidents Occurring Between Autumn, 1967 and Spring, 1970

After a racially tense summer, civil rights activists moved their operations from the streets to the schools. Bok Vocational-Technical High School was the first to be affected, when, in late September, a near riot erupted in the cafeteria. Several students were arrested for carrying concealed deadly weapons. October 3 saw South Philadelphia High School once again experiencing a series of fist fights, this time resulting in ten injuries and twenty-one arrests. Over 200 policemen were required to regain control of the school.

Gratz High School was the next to experience disorders. In this case, a fire alarm sounded as a Black Power rally was getting underway across the street from the school, resulting in classes
being dismissed early and creating an "atmosphere of extreme restlessness." On November 5, Overbrook High School was beset by rumors of racial unrest following a rally led by Cecil Moore and comedian Dick Gregory. The high rate of absenteeism the following day was credited with preventing any actual incidents.

On November 17, 1967, after fewer than three months as Superintendent, Dr. Mark R. Shedd faced his first major crisis—a situation spawned by student unrest. A massive black power rally at the Board of Education building turned into a wild melee as stick-wielding policemen descended upon a crowd of over 3500 students, most from the city's majority black high schools. Seventeen people were injured and thirty-three arrested. ¹

The protest was called by militant civil rights leaders who demanded an "independent black school board," ² and urged "black schools to unite against the white policy of the public school system." ³ The rally was also in support of sixteen black students suspended or expelled from Gratz High School and Bok High School for


²Handbill distributed by the Philadelphia Chapter of CORE, November, 1967. ( Mimeographed.)

³"Black Schools Unite," Handbill, November, 1967. (Mimeographed.)
creating racial disturbances earlier that month. The crowd, virtually all teenagers, began to gather around 10 A.M., but the fighting did not occur until 12:30. By 2:15 the Board headquarters was again quiet, but bands of students continued to roam the downtown area damaging automobiles and knocking down several shoppers.

Police Commissioner Frank Rizzo, who was personally involved in the riot, activated the entire police force and asked the Fire Commissioner to place his department on "ready alert." Rizzo was severely criticized by Board President Richardson Dilworth, who noted that the police civil disobedience squad had the situation under control until the Police Commissioner, without the Board's request, "saw fit to loose a couple of hundred men, swinging clubs and beating children."

At the time the violence broke out, Dr. Shedd and other school officials were meeting with about thirty students, concerning the addition of African history classes to the School District's curriculum. The meeting was terminated at that point. Later that afternoon, Shedd and Dilworth were observed by reporters to have "stormed out of Rizzo's office" at the Police Administration building. They

4Ibid.

5"Pickets Battle Police . . .," loc. cit.

returned directly to the School Administration building for an emergency Board meeting. A joint statement was issued by Dr. Shedd and Mr. Dilworth, parts of which stated that

... the arrangements with the police called for the use of non-uniformed men at the scene of the demonstration. At no time did the School District request the use of uniformed police at the scene. We deplore the injuries which were sustained.

In an effort to meet the concerns of the demonstrators, a representative delegation of some 30 students were meeting with the Superintendent and other school officials at the time uniformed police appeared on the scene. That meeting, which was terminated when violence broke out, had been a serious discussion and we believe headway was being made. We also feel very strongly that the dialogue begun around that table must be continued and expanded, and look for immediate opportunities to do so. There is no doubt in our minds that the students not only have a right to be heard, but that some of their concerns are quite legitimate. 

In order to be able to continue constructive dialogue, however, the Board recognized that an atmosphere of chaos could not continue to exist. They, therefore, recommended that two remedial measures be taken:

First of all, if necessary we will seek an injunction to prevent further unscheduled entry of the schools by outsiders. Second, the legal regulations concerning school attendance will be maintained and enforced. We must return the schools to a viable atmosphere for continuing the instructional program of students, - continuing it and taking real steps to improve the relevancy of the school experience, particularly for Negro students.

7 Official statement issued to newsmen by Dr. Mark R. Shedd and Mr. Richardson Dilworth, November 17, 1967.

8 Ibid.
Commissioner Rizzo, not to be outdone, viewed the Board statement to be of small consequence, and charged that "Dilworth and Shedd are absolutely remiss in this. They have not done their job." In the week that followed, the city showed various signs of polarization resulting from the November 17 disturbance. Dilworth charged that the police provoked the student riot, while Rizzo expressed pride in his men's performance. Rizzo "blasted" Dilworth for not carrying out his original plan to obtain an injunction against the demonstration, and, in turn, a formal complaint was filed against Rizzo in the Mayor's Office by the two black Board members. On November 19, the Philadelphia Crime Commission praised the police's work at the demonstration, while the ADA called for Rizzo's resignation. It has since been observed that the roots of the split between the schools (Superintendent Shedd and Board President Dilworth) and the city (Police Commissioner Rizzo and Mayor James H. J. Tate) can be traced to this occurrence.

Additional student disturbances were generated by the events of November 17. The following day, between 300 and 500 boys, most of them students at Benjamin Franklin High School, rushed the nearby George J. Murray, "Rizzo and Dilworth Trade Charges Following Violence," Philadelphia Inquirer, November 18, 1967, p. 1.

William Penn High School (for girls) in an attempt to get their "soul sisters to come and join the demonstration." The doors were locked to outsiders and the principal and vice principal talked the majority of their student body out of leaving the school; only about 200 girls joined the demonstrators. Gratz High School and Germantown High School also faced similar occurrences that day.

The evening of November 19, a group of 300 blacks, meeting at a West Philadelphia church, voted to petition Dr. Shedd to close the public school system immediately or face a boycott. Earlier that day, the NAACP had compared Police Commissioner Rizzo to former Birmingham, Alabama, police chief, Bull Connor, and demanded that he resign.

November 20 saw student disturbances at two other high schools and the Police Administration building. Benjamin Franklin High School students picketed police headquarters; elaborate security precautions were taken and the demonstration remained orderly.


12 Ibid.


This was not the case at Edison High School, however, where 500 students threw bricks and dishes at police cars. Around noon, a racially-oriented student disruption flared at South Philadelphia High School, but was contained by police within an hour.

The following day, the Board of Education requested, and was issued, a court order banning further Black Power demonstrations at public school facilities. Richardson Dilworth was quoted, however, as saying that "seeking the injunction does not represent a change in the position he took (the previous) Friday . . . ."15 Later that day the Justice Department in Washington announced that the FBI would investigate the alleged instances of police brutality during the November 17 demonstration.

Olney High School, which served a rapidly changing neighborhood, made headlines in October, 1968 when black students interrupted a senior assembly, throwing bottles and injuring several students. Later that week, 500 black students staged a sit-in at the school, but eventually were dispersed without further incident. No injuries were reported.

Perhaps the major student-related crisis of the 1969-70 school year in Philadelphia was the much publicized "Fishman Case." On October 20, two dozen black pupils boycotted a social studies

class at West Philadelphia High School because, they claimed, the instruction was not relevant. Ironically, the teacher, George Fishman, had written extensively in the area of Negro History. A protest march through the school was dispersed by security guards, and several adult pickets appeared outside of the school, stating that they would not stop until Fishman was removed.

Two days later the school principal recommended that Fishman be transferred, touching off Philadelphia Federation of Teachers' (PFT) threats to strike if the transfer was carried out, on the grounds that the teacher "has been denied due process, subjected to a private tribunal without representation and has undergone so-called evaluations not consistent with the union contract." Two days later, school and union officials met to avert a strike by agreeing to continue talking before such action was taken. The PFT had already polled their members concerning a strike, the results of which were released the following Monday and showed a 9 to 1 margin favoring a strike if Fishman was transferred. The union blamed the movement to remove the teacher on a student he had flunked. Fishman claimed that he was the victim of an "administrative frameup."

---


On October 27, the Board of Education promised to thoroughly investigate the case, refused to act in haste, and announced that they would make a decision once they had received the Superintendent's recommendation on November 10. Two days later, the Board ordered an end to the students' boycott at West Philadelphia High School, and instructed the Superintendent and Principal to see to it that all pupils attended class and that no harassment of teachers be allowed to take place. On October 31, sit-ins, corridor marches, and mass meetings closed the school. The next day, the Board arranged to meet with seven student leaders from the school in an attempt to resolve the dispute. Meanwhile, several hundred pupils at four high schools staged demonstrations backing the Fishman transfer. In addition to West Philadelphia, students at Germantown, Overbrook, and Gratz high schools held noisy, but orderly demonstrations.

On November 4, a temporary injunction was issued in a suit to halt the student boycott against Fishman. The suit also enjoined the PFT from striking or threatening to strike over that matter.

19 Memorandum to Newsmen from J. William Jones, Director of Informational Services, October 27, 1969.


After several days of conferences between Board members, union officials, and students, agreement to end the boycott was reached, and a consent decree was approved, thus removing the injunction. On November 10, the Superintendent announced his decision that Fishman would remain at West Philadelphia High School:

In the Fishman case, reports from the principal and district superintendent do not offer sufficient grounds for transfer due to unsatisfactory service. Furthermore, the Superintendent cannot conclude that Fishman's transfer would be "for the good of the service." While student reactions by law must be taken into account in assessing the performance of a teacher (Public School Code, Section 1123), this cannot be the sole criterion. If such were the case, any group of students in any school, with or without cause, could demonstrate, boycott, or otherwise disrupt school activities in order to force a decision to transfer a teacher, a principal, or other employee. Such a procedure would be clearly in violation of the law's intent and the rights of the individual affected. To follow a course of making student opinion the sole criterion for decisions about the assignment, transfer, or tenure of school personnel ultimately would undermine the Board's powers to operate an orderly school system and, in my opinion, inevitably lead to chaos.

Therefore, it is the Superintendent's decision that George Fishman be retained in his present position as a teacher at West Philadelphia High School, that he be required to comply with all reasonable requirements of the principal and district superintendent concerning the improvement of his teaching, and that the established procedures for the evaluation of all professional employees be followed.

Though officially resolved, the "Fishman Case" remained a "hot issue" for the duration of the 1969-70 school year.

---

23 A formal statement legally binding upon those who make it.

The 1970-71 School Year

The 1970-71 school year was one of continual crisis. In addition to two actual teachers' strikes, two "almost" strikes, and the critical financial situation, instances of student unrest were reported by every high school and most of the junior high schools in the city. The high water mark of student unrest was reached on February 1, with the killing of a teacher by one of his students. (Complete details are reported in Chapter V.) Major disturbances were also experienced at four high schools prior to that incident.

Benjamin Franklin High School (called Malcom X High by its students), was the first to face disturbances when, in early November, two students were denied permission to speak at a pre-election assembly because of their reputed Black Panther affiliations. The police civil disobedience squad had to be called in to clear the school's halls. Eight students were suspended, five of whom were subsequently transferred to other schools. Two weeks later, four of the five students who were transferred brought suit against the Board

25 The severe "cash flow" difficulties which were anticipated, if the State did not provide the revenues they had committed to Philadelphia by early Spring, actually occurred in late May. All pay checks after June 1, 1971 were paid in script, redeemable several months later. Fortunately for the District's 24,000 employees, the banks agreed to discount the script at full value.

of Education to reinstate them at Franklin because of the "irreparable harm" the transfers had caused them.\textsuperscript{27} The basis for the students' legal action was that (1) an additional ten minutes travel time was required to reach the new school and (2) a special history class, which they had taken at Franklin, was not offered there.\textsuperscript{28} On the first day of the hearing about fifty Franklin students marched from the school to City Hall to watch the court proceedings.\textsuperscript{29} After five days of hearings, during which the school's administrators and several teachers were asked to testify, the judge took the case under advisement and eventually upheld the transfers.

Olney High School was the next school to suffer racial unrest when, on December 2, fifteen students were injured during a battle between white and black youths.\textsuperscript{30} The melee was precipitated by the arrest of a black student who was chased into the school by a white policeman and was apprehended just as a class period ended and 4100 students poured into the halls. The following day violence again

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
erupted, resulting in three injuries and three arrests. The school was
dismissed 45 minutes earlier than usual, and the faculty met to try to
"come to grips" with the situation. 31 Two members of the Board of
Education expressed their displeasure at not having been kept advised
of the situation which, by then, was still "tight," 32 but under control. 33

Dobbins Vocational-Technical High School experienced dif­
ficulty on December 17 when about 200 students demanded the ouster
of a mathematics teacher they considered "too tough." 34 A peaceful
meeting was held in the school auditorium between the principal and
dissident students, but a dispute over the presence of police prevented
any meaningful discussion. About 100 students walked out of the
school and some classes were disrupted; however, no injuries or ar­
rests were reported. The Young Lords, a militant Puerto Rican
organization was reported to have distributed the inflammatory leaf­
lets calling for the meeting. The trouble continued the next day, caus­
ing an early dismissal of classes and three arrests.

31 "Three More Hurt in Violence at Olney High," Philadelphia

32 William T. Kennedy, "Olney Principal Calls Situation

33 William T. Kennedy, "Board Members Demand Consultation

34 David J. Umansky, "Teacher Too Tough, 200 at Dobbins
Say, Demand Her Ouster," Philadelphia Inquirer, December 18,
That same day, about 100 Edison High School students, led by a substitute teacher from Africa, broke windows and "kicked-in" doors in protest over the school's refusal to permit the showing of a North Vietnamese revolutionary movie. Mohamoud Togane, a citizen of Somalia, and a large group of pupils forced their way into the principal's office, "shouting racial slogans, and demanding answers to questions without giving him time to answer." Togane jumped on the principal's desk while pupils swept papers from his conference table. The substitute teacher had not been told that he could not use the film; the principal had only suggested that it be shown in conjunction with a carefully-planned lesson.

After meeting with the principal and Board of Education, the Superintendent announced that (1) Togane would be fired, (2) the student ringleaders would be suspended, (3) a court injunction would be sought to prevent individuals from causing further violence, and (4) police would be on hand to prevent trouble when Edison reopened on the following Monday. In addition, a warrant was issued for

---


Togane's arrest. Two days later the former substitute teacher surrendered to the police at City Hall and was charged with "inciting to riot, corrupting the morals of minors, malicious mischief, breach of the peace, and conspiracy." Togane denied the charges saying he was only interested in questioning the relationship between pupils and teachers at the school. He was released on $1000 bail, but returned to Africa and never came to trial.

Student-related serious incidents also occurred at Overbrook, Germantown, West Philadelphia, and Gratz high schools. Three youths were stabbed when a series of fights broke out during a dance at Overbrook High School. Police reported that members of eight different teenage gangs were in the building during the dance. Germantown High School closed its cafeteria indefinitely because of insufficient paraprofessional supervision. The principal said that the closing did not result from incidents during lunchtime, for "Right now, the gangs are at peace with each other," he said. "We're not in a crisis situation." His decision was readily accepted by the central office administration, due, in part, to the tense situations at other schools.

---


West Philadelphia High School remained tense for several days and reported scattered incidents related to the forced transfer of a student to another school for reasons of discipline. The student in question spoke at several public Board meetings and was forcibly ejected from the second. Several of his fellow students and a teacher also spoke in his behalf.

Prior to the Mohamoud Togane incident at Edison, several hundred students left three North Philadelphia high schools to attend a memorial service for the two Black Panthers killed in a gun battle with Chicago police a year before. Minor scuffles broke out at Gratz, Edison, and Dobbins high schools.

The preceding summary of events by no means covers all of the instances of student unrest in the Philadelphia schools during the 1970-71 year. Sit-ins took place in several Northeast Philadelphia high schools to protest the institution of an extended school day to make up time missed as a result of two Autumn teachers' strikes. A rally scheduled to protest the Board's failure to pass the Student Bill of Rights and Responsibilities was held, even though the bill in question was approved. This demonstration was one of a half-dozen held at the Board of Education building during the course of the year. Even the wearing of hot pants in the schools became an issue, though it was settled without incident.
The Changes

Six general areas of change have been identified as having resulted from the numerous instances of student unrest reported in the first part of this chapter. These areas of change are (1) administrative restructuring, (2) police relations, (3) serious incident reporting, (4) Board of Education policy on disruption of activities, (5) the Student Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, and (6) administrative response to the reasons for student dissent.

Administrative Restructuring

As far back as 1957, specific responsibility was assigned to a particular office to deal with problems created by student unrest. This responsibility was delegated to the Associate Superintendent for School-Community Relations, whose office was a combination of today's Office of Informational Services and Office of Community Affairs. Little or no planning was engaged in, however, with regard to preparing for student disturbances, let alone trying to remedy their causes. It was not until the arrival of a new superintendent in 1967 that a more effective means of identifying student unrest and communicating its existence to key persons was developed. The separate Offices of Community Affairs, Informational Services, and Plant Security were established at that time.

40 Marcus Foster, the Associate Superintendent for Community Affairs left Philadelphia early in 1970 to become Superintendent of Schools in Oakland, California.
Police Relations

Between 1950 and 1954 the Juvenile Aid Division of the Philadelphia Police was located right in the Board of Education building. When the JAD left, it was only because the expansion of administrative functions created a need for more office space. Historically, the JAD had been the major link between the schools and the police in times of student difficulties. In 1964, however, the civil disobedience squad was formed, and became the major point of contact with the schools in dealing with student unrest. Since 1967, the Chief of Facilities Security (formerly called the Security Specialist) has been the direct School District link to the police, while the Chief of Internal Security (formerly called the Legal Liaison Officer) commands the School District's own mobile security force, security guards, and non-teaching assistants (NTAs).

Serious Incident Reporting

In October of 1967, Millard Meers, the man who had formed the police civil disobedience squads in Philadelphia and New York under Police Commissioner Leary, returned to Philadelphia to set up a serious incident reporting system for the Philadelphia Public Schools. The procedures for reporting serious incidents developed,

41 The civil disobedience squad was formed under Police Commissioner Leary who left Philadelphia to take that same position in New York City.
and recently revised, are as follows:

A. After emergency steps have been taken, the Principal or his designee should telephone a complete summary of the details of the incident to the School District Radio Dispatcher, and then to the office of his District Superintendent.

B. The Dispatcher will:

1. Assign a control number to the incident. All subsequent reports pertaining to the same incident will carry the same control number.

2. Call the Office of Informational Services between 8:30 A.M. and 5 P.M., Monday through Friday, and report the incident and control number. (At all other times, such information will be recorded and referred to Informational Services on the next working day, except in case of serious incidents generating extensive news coverage, which will be referred immediately to the Director of Informational Services at his home.)

3. Call the Legal Liaison Office.

4. Complete the information required on the control number register, which will serve to insure that follow-up reports are submitted.

5. Prepare an incident report (three-part, snap-out form), time stamp the back of the third copy, and distribute copies as follows:

   a. First Copy - Informational Services
   b. Second Copy - School Principal
   c. Third Copy - Maintenance and Operations

C. Informational Services will prepare and distribute serious incident reports within the Administration building.

D. Informational Services will make available advice and assistance to principals receiving requests for information about serious incidents from the news media. Principals may talk with the news media directly; ask
Informational Services for advice in dealing with new media to Informational Services.

E. The Principal will, upon receipt of a copy of the original incident report from Maintenance and Operations, prepare an Incident Follow-up Report using the same control number and fully explaining the details of the incident. The Principal will file one copy of the Follow-up Report, forward one copy to the District Superintendent, and one copy to the Division of Maintenance and Operations. In incidents involving damage, loss or theft of property, a fourth copy should be sent to the office of the Executive Director of Services Operations.

F. Maintenance and Operations will collect all incident information and maintain it in a Central Reporting System file. 42

In addition to watching over the above reporting process, the Chief of Facilities Security is responsible for (1) activating the situation control room (next to the Superintendent's Office) in times of emergency and (2) issuing periodic serious incident analyses. The situation control room contains a complete communications network through a school emergency dispatcher, the police department, and key school administrators; in addition, all necessary demographic data are displayed. During all disturbances, a status board is maintained and the complete situation is recorded and filed. In the event of emergencies, in addition to the status board and situation book, a member of the police civil disobedience squad works in the situation control room with the Chief of Facilities Security so that the school security

force and police department efforts are coordinated.

Reports analyzing serious incidents are released on a monthly basis during the school year. In addition to a textual explanation of the report, one or more classification areas (e.g., forcible entry) are reported on in depth. Finally, each monthly analysis contains a compilation of reported offenses, including the crime classification, code, the number of offenses reported that month, the number corresponding for the month last year, the number this year to date, the number last year to date, and percentage change between the two years. Table 4 is an example of such a compilation. Since it is for the month of December, the last three columns (bracketed) can be used to determine totals for 1969 and 1970, and the difference between the two.

**Board of Education Policy on Disruption of Activities**

Because of the number of instances of student disruption in the schools during the Autumn of 1967, culminating in the November 17 demonstration at the Administration building, the Board of Education devoted several meetings to developing a formal policy on the disruption of school activities. Seven items were adopted by the Board on December 1, 1967. They were:

1. Pupils will not be granted permission to leave classes for purposes of attending unauthorized political rallies or demonstrations and infractions of these rules will occasion the usual disciplinary measures. If students remain absent from school for such purposes, the truancy laws will be enforced.
## REPORTED OFFENSES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime Classification</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>This Month</th>
<th>Same Month Last Year</th>
<th>This Year To Date</th>
<th>Last Year To Date</th>
<th>Per cent (%) Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assault of Student</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault of Teacher</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>+30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol - Use</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol - Possession</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs - Use</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs - Possession</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>+91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marijuana - Use</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>+100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marijuana - Possession</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forcible Entry - Weekday</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forcible Entry - Weekend</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Disturbance-Students</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Disurbance-Outsiders</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>+250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery - Student Victim</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery - Teacher Victim</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest Demonstration</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gang Fight</td>
<td>935</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trespassing</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>+53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons - Possession</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>+107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons - Use</td>
<td>946</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>+100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

2. Every possible means, including injunctions, will be employed to prevent outside influences from conducting activities that are disruptive to the normal program of the schools.

3. The Board of Education will continue to encourage all suggestions for the improvement of the school system and desires that all complaints be registered. It has long since established the mechanisms for such communication. The Superintendent will regulate the scheduling of meetings with all groups, but the orderly process of appeal for hearing must be observed.

4. The Board insists on the maintenance of solid discipline within the schools and on school property. By Board policy, incidents of a violent nature must be promptly reported to the office of the Superintendent and appropriate disciplinary measures must be taken by all principals to assure the safety of students and faculties.

5. We will continue to rely on the police force to prevent unauthorized persons from entering schools. The School District will determine if the services of additional police under extraordinary circumstances are required in any school.

6. The Board of Education will pursue the course it has undertaken to improve conditions in the schools. The price of years of neglect is not easily paid, but the community must be prepared to bear the burden now. Where necessary, extraordinary measures must be taken to relieve the overcrowded conditions that breed tension and disorder.

7. Through the Recreation Coordinating Committee, the School Board is in the process of working for the unification of all regulations having to do with the use of public buildings and grounds. 44

Unfortunately, no means of implementing this policy was established.

nor were specific individuals, in most cases, assigned explicit re­
sponsibility for the items. Dates by which the policy should be fully
implemented and should take effect were not established for those
seven items, nor for the two which were added by a majority vote of
the Board almost a year later:

8. No persons will be allowed to address students without
permission of the principal.

9. No school facility may be used for meetings which ex­
clude persons on account of race. 45

No method of monitoring any of the above items was established.

The Student Bill of Rights and Responsibilities

Although suggestions regarding the development of a student
bill of rights in Philadelphia can be traced back to 1967, it was not
until Spring, 1969 that formal action was begun. In May (1969) the
Deputy Superintendent for Instruction, acting on behalf of the Super­
intendent of Schools, presented to the Board of Education a proposal
for the development of a "Manual of Students' Rights and Responsi­
bilities." 46

A year later, the Bill of Rights for Senior High School Stu­
dents, written by a 21-member committee of pupils, parents,

45 "Board of Education Policy on Disruption of Activities,"
Amended, October 23, 1968.

46 "Proposed Manual of Student Rights and Responsibilities,"
memorandum to Members of the Board of Education from David A.
Horowitz, May 21, 1969.
teachers, and administrators was accepted by the Board of Education.

The Bill contained eight items:

1. The rights of students respecting freedom of expression; such as, dress, posters, leaflets, meetings, press, and speech shall be governed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the policies of the Board of Education.

2. In each high school there shall be established an elective and representative student directed government with offices open to all students. All students shall be allowed to vote.

3. There shall be student advocates, elected by students, whom students may consult for advice in any matter concerning an apparent infringement of rights. The obligations of advocates as students must not be neglected in the performance of their counseling tasks.

4. Students shall have the right to be represented by parents, guardian, or legal counsel in matters concerning suspensions beyond 3 days, transfer, and expulsion.

5. Students shall have the right to participate in deliberations leading to decisions affecting curriculum.

6. Students shall have the right to be consulted on deliberations leading to decisions affecting disciplinary policy.

7. Academic performance shall be the only criterion for academic grades.

8. Students shall be guaranteed freedom from any punishment not in accordance with law and existing School District regulations. 47

In accepting the Bill, however, the Board made it clear they expected

it to be somewhat revised as the result of the two public hearings on it, which the Board had scheduled. Back-up materials, including a recommended grievance procedure, a grievance procedure form, and a comprehensive delineation of the selection and function of the newly-created position of student advocate.

The second public hearing on the Bill was a particularly "stormy" one, with many sharply divergent opinions being expressed. Student government presidents were joined by the Philadelphia Principals' Association, The Fellowship Commission, and the American Civil Liberties Union in endorsing the Bill. Among those speaking against it were the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers and three local Home and School Associations. 48 In the revised Bill, finally passed by a split vote on December 21, 1970, the original eight items had been expanded to twelve:

1. The rights and limits of students respecting freedom of speech, press, and assembly shall be in accord with the first amendment of the United States Constitution.

2. In each high school there shall be established an elective and truly representative student directed government with offices open to all students. All students shall be allowed to vote. This government shall be elected annually on the basis prescribed by the constitution of each individual school.

3. At the discretion of the student government in each school, there may be ombudsmen, elected annually by students,

who shall be trained to offer counsel as to students' rights.

4. Students shall have the right to counsel and due process procedures in the matters of suspension, transfer and expulsion.

5. Students shall have the right to participate in decisions affecting the curriculum through student representatives duly designated by the Student Government.

6. Students shall have the right to participate in the establishment of regulations regarding discipline through student representatives duly designated by the Student Government.

7. Academic performance shall be the only criterion for academic grades.

8. Students shall not be subjected to unreasonable or excessive punishment.

9. Students shall not be subjected to corporal punishment.

10. In light of the creation of these orderly procedures for dealing with student concerns, no student shall disrupt the education process within a school.

11. Every member of the school community, including student, parents, the school staff, has the responsibility to promote regular attendance at school, orderly conduct and behavior, freedom from fear of insult or injury, and maximum opportunities for learning on the part of each student.

12. No rule or regulation shall be established which diminishes the right of any student as set forth in Student Bill of Rights and Responsibilities.49

The commentary provided as part of the Bill dealt with such areas as

freedom of expression (including the use of bulletin boards, distribution of printed materials, circulation of petitions, and the wearing of buttons and badges); student government; school communications; and forums (including a section on the selection and training of ombudsmen). In addition, a detailed grievance procedure was included along with a further delineation of (1) students' right to counsel and due process, (2) the participation of students in decisions affecting the curriculum, and (3) freedom from unreasonable or excessive punishment.

Within two weeks of its passage, a detailed schedule of implementation for the Student Bill of Rights and Responsibilities had been developed by the Superintendent, as had specific responsibilities for managing its progress. The Bill was to be fully operational by the beginning of the 1971-72 school year.

Administrative Response to the Causes of Dissent

Finally, in examining those changes resulting from instances of student unrest, it seems logical to view the students' major areas of complaint in order to determine to what extent those areas had been dealt with. In considering the many causes of unrest, certain ones had been linked more frequently to particular incidents than others. These included the desire for (1) the development of black history courses; (2) more black teachers, department heads, administrators, and coaches; (3) more "human" treatment of students; (4) better and
more relevant counseling services; (5) improved physical facilities; (6) changes in cafeteria procedures; (6) better student government; (7) a student voice in the selection of administrators and coaches; (8) student-run, relevant assemblies; and (9) recognition of the Puerto Rican culture and the needs of Spanish-speaking students.

**Black History Courses.** -- The appeal by students for the inclusion of black history and urban-oriented civics courses was, perhaps, the students' strongest demand. When the new Superintendent (Dr. Mark R. Shedd) began his duties in September, 1967, the first two such courses were initiated. Prior to that time none had existed. (See Table 5.) The Administration building demonstration of November 17 was organized around a demand for increased black history courses, so the following year six high schools began to offer Afro-American History. The 1969-70 school year saw a total of 22 such courses, 10 of which were separate offerings. By the 1970-71 school year, a total of 29 courses were being taught throughout the system, including 11 separate offerings. The most common course of this type offered by 13 high schools, was Afro-American History. Table 5 contains a complete listing of all such courses offered from 1966 to 1971.

**Black Professional Personnel.** -- The School District of Philadelphia has shown a steady increase in the number of black teachers, counselors, and principals. As of September, 1970,
**TABLE 5**

COURSES OF INSTRUCTION OFFERED IN MINORITY GROUPS HISTORY, CULTURE, AND URBAN PROBLEMS IN THE PHILADELPHIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 1967-1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latin American and African History</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afro-Asian History</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contemporary Issues -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American and African History</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afro-American History</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African History</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Cultures</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Minorities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Problems</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems of the Inner City</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Affairs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Relations</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Culture of Puerto Rico</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Different Types of Courses Offered                  | 2         | 6         | 10        | 11        |           |
| Percentage Increase Over Previous Year                    | 200       | 200       | 67        | 10        |           |

| Total Courses Offered                                     | 2         | 12        | 22        | 29        |           |
| Percentage Increase Over Previous Year                    | 200       | 500       | 83        | 32        |           |

Philadelphia had more black principals and vice principals than the New York City Schools, a system many times its size. 50 In 1970, approximately one-fifth of Philadelphia's 317 principals were black, as were one-third of the 150 vice principals. (See Table 6)

Philadelphia had 4,284 black teachers (or one-third of the total) in 1970. The number of schools without integrated faculties had been lowered from 119 in 1966 to 35 in 1970. 51 Only one school in the system did not have any black faculty members in 1970 compared to 18 in 1966 and 89 in 1960. However, the percentage of black department heads was much lower than that of black teachers--only 7.2 in 1970.

Human Treatment of Students. -- The Student Bill of Rights and Responsibilities was viewed by many as the single most necessary item to assure more "human" treatment of students. Explicit rights were listed therein, and a fair grievance procedure was provided. When the Board of Education passed the amendment to the Superintendent's recommendations on discipline, providing for the use of corporal punishment, the notion of "human" treatment seemed to have been compromised, however.

50 This refers to actual positions, not percentages. The percentage, of course, would be several times greater.

51 A racially imbalanced faculty in a secondary school is defined as one with over 90 per cent of the staff of one race, and at the elementary level one with over 80 per cent of one race.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Black No.</th>
<th>White No.</th>
<th>Total Identifiable No.</th>
<th>Total Not Identifiable No.</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>4,284</td>
<td>8,829</td>
<td>13,113</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>13,542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department Head</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>4 2.1</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department Chairman</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counselor</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>9 2.9</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>97.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Principal</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>5 3.3</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>96.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,554</td>
<td>9,685</td>
<td>14,239</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>14,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>96.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


- Excludes 14 (physical education) department chairmen.
- Physical education only.
- Includes all counseling positions (counseling teacher, counselor aide, counselor assistant, special program counselor, and guidance counselor).
- Includes all levels of principalship positions, from Elementary Principal I to Senior and Technical High School Principal VII.
Counseling Services. -- The number of counselors in the school system increased from 452 in 1966 to 548 in 1970 to encompass such expanded counseling demands as information on the draft, the lowered voting age, and the many financial and academic complexities of college entrance. College guidance programs have been improved to the point that the college-bound rate has increased from 30 per cent in 1966 to 40 per cent in 1970. In addition, the elementary school career exploration program has been expanded to reach 32,000 pupils, and more than 4000 junior high school students have participated in a survey of job aspirations.

Nevertheless, a shortage of black counselors still exists, and is particularly acute in terms of male counselors, to work at the junior and senior high school levels. Although almost 30 per cent of the system's counselors are black, the great majority of this group are women.

Improved Physical Facilities. -- The total building program for 1966 through 1971 resulted in three new high schools, four new middle schools, twenty-five new elementary schools, seventy-seven major additions, thirteen supportive facilities, providing an additional 48,000 additional student spaces to handle an increased student population of 17,000 and ease overcrowding by 31,000 pupils. This is a school building program unmatched anywhere else in the country.
The building program also has resulted in $53 million in alterations and improvements to existing schools. This massive effort placed well-equipped libraries and instructional materials centers in all 200 elementary schools where only two existed in 1965, and resulted in substantial improvements to all other school libraries in the city.

Changes in Cafeteria Procedures. — Though the school system recently announced a massive new free and reduced price lunch program which will more than double the present output of 70,000 government food platters a day and will, for the first time, make some 20,000 free lunches a day available to the city's needy children, besides boosting the number of 10¢ platters from 28,000 to about 80,000, the problems associated with junior and senior high school cafeterias still exist. In most cases, the lunch room is the most disruptive area in the school building. Changes in the physical design of cafeterias are being explored, as is the notion of turning high school lunchrooms into "MacDonald's" type fast-food operations and serving only hamburgers, french fried potatoes, cokes, and milkshakes.

Better Student Government. — Three significant steps toward more meaningfully involved high school student governments have been taken within the past several years, the most important of which, according to most students, is the passage of the Student Bill of
Rights and Responsibilities. Also important is the Council of Student Association Presidents which meets on a regular basis to consider problems common to most high schools and often provides their inputs and recommendations to the Superintendent and Board of Education. In addition, a staff member from the Office of Community Affairs now serves as a direct liaison between secondary school student organizations and the central administration.

Student Voice in Selecting Administrators and Coaches. — Though, on a number of occasions, student groups throughout the city have indeed made their voices heard, they have, in actuality, had little effect upon the selection of athletic coaches and administrators. In several districts, students have been involved as members of administrative screening committees, but generally, due to only token representation, they have made little difference in the outcome of the selection.

Student-Run, Relevant Assemblies. — In this area, unlike the above, students have made inroads in terms of actual involvement in planning for assembly programs. Though far from being able to unilaterally select all programs, in many schools students do play a key role. In addition, the pervasive fear of politically-oriented assemblies held by most administrators has been gradually lessened to the
point where peace and civil-rights are not uncommon themes for as-
semlies in many high schools.

Recognition of Puerto Rican Students. --There are over 8000
Spanish-speaking students attending the Philadelphia Public Schools,
the overwhelming majority of whom are Puerto Rican. 52 This popula-
tion, comprising almost 3 per cent of the total number of students, has
received a significant amount of special attention through an extensive
bi-lingual education program, now in its fifth year. A course in "The
World Culture of Puerto Rico" was initiated in one of Philadelphia's
high schools in September, 1970, and further expansion of it is being
considered. There are few Puerto Rican teachers in the system, how­
ever, and as of September, 1970 not a single Puerto Rican held a
regular administrative position.

Generalizations

After examining the major instances of student unrest oc-
curring in the Philadelphia Public Schools during the past decade and
a half, and the most important changes resulting from those incidents,
four generalizations may be posited. One deals with types of student
unrest, another with a chronology of types, a third with the relation­
ship of racial change and student unrest, and the last with the

52 As of January 1, 1970.
relationship between the present administrative leadership and the system's reaction to unrest.

Generalization I

The first generalization states that: The incidents of student unrest which have occurred in the Philadelphia Public Schools can be categorized into three groups—isolated incidents, gang activity, and organized dissent. Isolated incidents, the most commonly occurring of the three types, differ from the others in that they generally (1) involve only a few people, and (2) are not linked to an organization or group. Most instances of pupil misbehavior, if sufficiently serious, could be labeled as isolated incidents. Such incidents could be caused by any number of situations, including teacher-student disagreement or student-student disagreement; and for a great variety of reasons, not the least of which is racial conflict.

Gang activity is that behavior, often anti-social in nature, manifested by a group of organized youths. Though teenagers form the dominant age group in most gangs, younger members are common, as are "alumni" members—usually high school drop-outs or military returnees, often in their twenties. The schools face many problems because of hostile gang activities, the most serious of which include (1) gangs' inhibiting and/or interfering with learning, (2) staff and student fear, (3) rumors, (4) adverse effect upon faculty morale, (5)
adverse effect upon the regular school program and extra-curricular
activities, (6) hostility and bodily harm, (7) stealing, thefts and shake-
downs, (8) safety to and from school, (9) bringing weapons, alcohol
and narcotics into the schools, (10) poor attendance, and (11) defacing
property. 53

Organized dissent is similar to gang activity in two ways—
both involve a group or organization and both have a specific purpose
for existence. In the case of organized dissent, however, the group
is considerably more organized and usually carefully plans its activi-
ties, which are then generally carried out by the entire group.

Gang activity may be planned, but is more likely to be spontaneous in
nature. The raison d'etre for organized dissent is based upon the non-
concurrence or a difference of opinion voiced by the dissenting group
toward those who possess the power to change the conditions being
protested. The most common conditions dealt with by means of
organized dissent are in the area of civil rights, human dignity,
peace and justice. Gang activity, on the other hand, is generally bent
upon destruction, revenge, or defense of one's turf—not exactly the
most noble ends toward which man might direct himself.

53 "Gangs (Hostile Behavior): A School and Community
Generalization II

The second generalization states that: The three types of student unrest enumerated above can be chronologically linked to specific periods. Isolated incidents can be traced far back into antiquity to the first time a student rebelled against his tutor. Such incidents have changed somewhat in recent years, however, in terms of the increasing frequency of their occurrence and the severity of the form in which they are manifested.

Juvenile gang activity was not uncommon in the mid-thirties and can be attributed to the depression. It somewhat diminished during the Second World War and reappeared in the early fifties. The decade of the fifties saw teenage gangs capture the minds of Americans, as best exemplified by Evan Hunter's novel, *Blackboard Jungle* (1954) and the Broadway musical, *West Side Story* (1957). There was another lull in gang activity during the first half of the 1960s, but since 1967, Philadelphia has led the nation in juvenile gang-related deaths.

Organized dissent, though, in its most modern form, can be readily traced back to Montgomery, Alabama in the fifties, but did not have any real impact upon Philadelphia high school students until the mid-sixties. The 1964 Democratic Convention (held in Atlantic City) and the Girard College demonstrations which began in 1965 were major factors in initiating local students to the civil rights movement, and subsequently, other arenas of organized dissent.
Chronologically, then, the three forms of student unrest during the last two decades in Philadelphia may be viewed as follows:

Isolated Incidents: 1950-1971
Organized Dissent: 1964-1971

Generalization III

The third generalization states that: Changes in the racial make-up of the city and the composition of its schools during the past decade are related to the frequency and severity of student unrest. This is far from an original hypothesis, and has been demonstrated in two recent studies. A survey conducted by the House Subcommittee on General Education found that (1) of the schools surveyed, 20 per cent had experienced a significant increase in minority group enrollment during the last five years, and (2) of this group, 22 per cent experienced protests compared to only 16 per cent of those schools which had not had a significant increase in minority group population. ⁵⁴

The 1970 Syracuse Survey also presented several conclusions in this area. Bailey and his staff found that disruption was positively linked to a heterogeneous school population, and that schools which were almost all black or all white were less likely to suffer from

student disruption. They further noted that integrated schools with higher percentages of black students were less likely to be disrupted if they also had a higher percentage of black staff members.

These findings, coupled with the data contained in Table 7, showing an increasing percentage over time of black student enrollment in the Philadelphia Public Schools, help to establish the third generalization. Figures with regard to Spanish-speaking students were unavailable until 1969, at which time this group made up approximately 2 per cent of the District's population. By 1971, that figure was closer to 3 per cent.

Generalization IV

The fourth generalization states that: Only since the present Superintendent of Schools took office in Autumn, 1967, have significant changes taken place in dealing with student unrest. This generalization was formulated (1) as a result of interviewing several high ranking administrators who have been in such positions for at least a dozen years (and during the administrations of two superintendents prior to Dr. Shedd) and (2) by examining the changes which have been instituted to deal with student unrest over the past decade and a half (as enumerated in the second section of this chapter).

TABLE 7

PERCENTAGE OF BLACK PUPILS IN THE PHILADELPHIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS, BY YEAR AND TYPE OF SCHOOL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Schools</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior High</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational-Technical</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jr. High &amp; Middle</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHAPTER V

A MAJOR SYSTEM CRISIS

The phases of a case study, as developed by Good and Scates, serve as a model for this chapter by providing a structural framework for examining a major system crisis. ¹ The first part deals with the status of the situation and focuses upon the general context of the incident, including the background, causes, participants, and immediate responses. Also considered as part of the first section are a time sequence of the actual incident and the rationale for viewing the resulting situation as a major system crisis.

The second part of the model provides for the collection of data. It is dependent upon first, identifying the major referent groups which contributed inputs to the situation, then collecting and categorizing those inputs. The third part is geared toward diagnosing the situation by formulating generalizations about the process by which the inputs were gathered and utilized in formulating the outputs. In the last part, the adjustment and treatment of the crisis, the outputs generated by the crisis situation are examined.

The Status of the Situation

Background

The Superintendent of Schools and three of his staff members had been meeting with representatives of a large publishing company concerning supportive services for the city-wide reading program. The meeting room in the Bellvue-Stratford Hotel was inadequately heated for that frigid first day of February, so most of the individuals present sat hunched over their coffee awaiting the announcement for dinner. The call at 5:30 P.M. was not from the maître d', however, but from the Director of Informational Services, seeking the Superintendent. After a brief conversation, the Superintendent returned to the conference table and announced unbelievingly that confirmation had been received from Chestnut Hill Hospital that Samson Freedman, the junior high school teacher wounded by one of his students earlier that afternoon, had just died.

Leeds Junior High School, where the deceased teacher had taught ceramics since its opening in 1957, is located in a neighborhood of immaculate, post-war brick row homes, sometimes called Mt. Airy and sometimes West Oak Lane. When originally developed in the early fifties, the area became predominantly Jewish, due to the influx of several thousand middle-class families, moving from
older, transitional areas of the city. In the mid-sixties, however, a number of middle-class black families moved into the area, and a mass exodus of the whites began. By 1969, Leeds Junior High School, which had been over 90 per cent white when it opened, was 75 per cent black; in September, 1970, that percentage had increased to 80.

With the rapid turn-over in the composition of the area, racial tensions became more apparent. Leeds, which had never been included among the list of junior and senior high schools plagued with a high number of serious incidents, began to experience gang activity. In April of 1970, six students were assaulted by gang members. The next month, a fifteen-year old boy was stabbed and his companion beaten.

Samson Freedman, the murdered teacher, lived only four blocks from the school at which he taught. He was as dedicated to his neighborhood as he was to the school, and was known as a civic leader

---

2 A list of eighteen secondary schools, only three of which were junior high schools, was sent to the Superintendent by the Chief of Facilities Security shortly after January 1, 1971. The list indicated those schools which had experienced the greatest number of serious incidents during the past calendar year. Although Leeds had never been mentioned on the list, Germantown High School, the recipient of the majority of Leeds' graduates, was mentioned regularly.


4 Ibid.
who worked for harmony in the face of a racially changing neighborhood. He headed the District Six Human Relations Commission for two years and was president of the Northwest Neighbors Association.  

Ironically, it was he who wrote on behalf of that group to the Superintendent of Schools on September 10, 1970 to request that security guards be placed at the entrances to Leeds.  

One hundred and twenty-five area residents signed the request for security guards, copies of which were also sent to the District Superintendent, the School Principal, and the City Councilman from that area. A week later Freedman also drafted a letter to the Mayor requesting that a youth conservation worker be assigned to the area to help with increased gang activity.

Philadelphia was not the only city to experience student attacks upon teachers during the first week of February. In Newark, New Jersey, twenty-five youths attacked about twenty striking

---


7Youth conservation workers are hired and paid by the City of Philadelphia, not the Board of Education. Though the Board had requested additional persons to work with gangs, for several years, the City had turned them down because of lack of funds. Philadelphia, meanwhile continued to claim the highest number of juvenile gang deaths in the nation--over 150 between June 30, 1969 and January 1, 1971.
teachers with clubs, fire extinguishers, and chains. The assailants, members of the Black Civil Defense League, also set fire to the car of the Union president. Six white teachers required hospitalization.

Though the Newark situation bears some similarities to that in Philadelphia, the impact upon the latter city was far greater, in that it created a crisis that transcended the educational system by seriously affecting the social, political, and economic systems as well. It is that system crisis which the remainder of this chapter will examine.

Participants

Martin Mayer, in his book, *The Teachers Strike: New York, 1968*, borrowed a technique from the Elizabethan and Restoration dramatists by prefacing his case study with *dramatis personae*. This study might also benefit from such a device, for the cast of characters is indeed long and confusing. Though relatively few persons will be listed, compared to the total number involved, those who are mentioned played the most important roles in the crisis.

---


Richardson Dilworth: President of the Board of Education. Dilworth, a prominent attorney, was twice mayor of Philadelphia (1955-1962) and was considered a prime mover in the renaissance of that City and the restructuring of its schools. He served as co-chairman of the Citizen's Education Campaign Committee made up of civic leaders who worked for the passage of the Educational Home Rule Charter. A strong liberal Democrat, he rarely hesitated to voice his opinion on anything, and often enraged conservative elements by accusing them of perpetuating the "white noose" around inner-city Philadelphia. He was the Superintendent's staunchest supporter and understood the complexities of urban administration better than any other board member.

Samson Freedman: Murdered teacher of ceramics at Leeds Junior High School. Freedman had taught there since the school opened and lived in the immediate neighborhood. He was a civil rights activist and urged his fellow Jewish neighbors to work for racial harmony as the neighborhood became integrated.

The Reverend Henry Nicholas: Vice-President of the Board of Education. Pastor of the Janes Methodist Church of Germantown and an indomitable fighter for the rights of inner-city blacks, Nichols was considered too conservative by certain militant groups. Generally supportive of the Superintendent, he was an individualist and a strong proponent of using corporal punishment when necessary.
Nichols' educational philosophy puzzled many; though he fought for certain innovative programs, he vehemently resisted changing other pedagogical practices which he claimed, worked when he was growing up, and still did.

**Celia Pincus**: Assistant to the President of the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers. Miss Pincus, a retired teacher and former vice president of the teachers' union became a union activist in the early thirties and was known for her barbed tongue and ability to move a crowd. It is said that she never lost an argument. In recent years her opponents questioned her rationality and noted that some of her views and methods had failed to mature along with the union movement in education.

**Mrs. A. Sherwood Platt**: President of the Philadelphia Home and School Association. Extremely active in school affairs, Mrs. Platt rarely missed speaking at a Board of Education Meeting. She could always be counted on to keep the Board informed of her feelings as well as those of the local Home and School Associations (which replaced Parent-Teacher Associations). She vigorously opposed corporal punishment in the schools and fought for parents' having a greater voice in public education.

**Bernard Rafferty**: President of the Philadelphia Principals Association. Principal of one of the largest high schools in the city, Mr. Rafferty was well respected by both the central office
administrators and the 400 members of his organization. Generally supportive of the Superintendent, under his leadership a generally amiable working relationship between the Principals' Association and the Board of Education was developed.

Frank Rizzo: Democratic candidate for mayor. Rizzo, who resigned his position as Commissioner of Police early in 1971, had been at odds with the Superintendent and President of the Board of Education since 1967 when the latter two publically denounced his sending night stick-wielding policemen to disperse a student demonstration at the central administration building. A strict law and order candidate, he often denounced the schools as being too permissive. Rizzo stated during his campaign that as mayor one of his first priorities would be to get rid of Dr. Shedd. 11

William Ross: Member of the Board of Education. Ross, President of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, and a supporter of civil rights causes, was the Superintendent's severest and most constant critic. In addition, his verbal exchanges with the Board President during televised meetings became well publicized. Mr. Ross consistently supported increased community involvement in educational decision-making and just as consistently criticized the

11 Though the mayor has no direct means of ousting a school official, he does appoint the Board of Education, which does have such powers.
Board's spending on what he saw as innovative frills and non-basic programs.

**Kevin Simmons:** Fourteen-year old, ninth-grade student at Leeds Junior High School, accused of the shooting death of a teacher, Samson Freedman.

**Dr. Mark R. Shedd:** Superintendent, School District of Philadelphia. Shedd, recognized nationally as one of the most innovative urban school superintendents, was caught between union accusations, a split board, and a generally supportive but indignant public, all demanding that violence be eliminated and discipline be restored to the city's public schools. Shedd's tremendous stamina and administrative expertise in working with a dedicated staff enabled him to weather the crisis and begin to develop solutions to the problems pointed up by it.

**Frank Sullivan:** President of the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers (Local 3, AFL-CIO). Sullivan lost the respect of some teachers and citizens when he attempted to make Samson Freedman's death into a political issue, by blaming it on the Superintendent. He accused Shedd of being indifferent to violence in the schools and initiated a referendum calling for his resignation.

**Causes**

The underlying causes of the Freedman slaying were glossed over by the mass media in favor of the more "sensational"
incident preceding the shooting. The fact that Mr. Freedman had taken the initiative to have Kevin Simmons suspended the previous Friday was played up by the newspapers to indicate revenge as the motive. This may, in fact, have been the force behind the student's act, but the real reasons lay buried in a series of events dating back over an eighteen month period.

Kevin Simmons was assigned to Wagner Junior High School in September, 1968; he was transferred to Leeds Junior High School a year later. The interim events leading up to his transfer go beyond the counselor's report that he was aggressive in both language and manner toward both peers and teachers; that he seemed unable to accept authority and was often involved in threatening teachers; and that he did little classroom work and was generally disruptive. 12

The key to understanding Kevin may be that on several occasions, after threatening a confrontation with a teacher, he ran out of school and telephoned his father who came to school and aggressively attacked the teacher. The most serious such incident resulted in Kevin's father, Henry Simmons, being arrested. Kevin had been seriously disruptive during an assembly program, and upon being reprimanded by a male math teacher, ran out of the school and called

12 Memorandum to the Director of Pupil Personnel and Counseling Services regarding the facts behind the transferring of Kevin Simmons from Wagner Junior High School to Leeds Junior High.
his father. Mr. Simmons then came to school and physically attacked the teacher. When another adult tried to intervene, Mr. Simmons completely lost control and had to be overpowered by several policemen. Subsequent to this incident, Kevin was transferred to Leeds Junior High School, where he began in September, 1969.

While at Wagner Junior High School a counselor worked with both Kevin and his father, but was unable to sustain any gains in controlling the aggressiveness of either of them. Mr. Simmons was found to be extremely defensive and "anti-school." It was felt by the counselor "that there was little in the home to support any lasting change in Kevin's behavior."13

The Incident

On Friday, January 29, 1971, Kevin Simmons got into a verbal argument with another student and began cursing at him. Samson Freedman, Kevin's ceramics teacher, told Kevin to report to the office for cursing at him, which resulted in his subsequent suspension. (Kevin maintained that he had never cursed at Mr. Freedman, but had still been cursing at the other student.14) Standard procedure in handling such situations called for the student not to be readmitted to school until he brings in a parent to confer with the principal or one

13Ibid.

14Weisenbach and Lintz, loc. cit.
of his assistants. Thus, Kevin Simmons was told to return on Monday with his mother.

On Monday, February 1, Kevin returned to Leeds with a gun instead. He left the weapon in his locker and was later spotted in the halls, and sent to the room where disciplinary problems were detained. He spent the rest of the day there, and was dismissed along with the rest of the school at 3 P.M. After retrieving the gun from his locker, he waited outside of the building with it in his belt.

Samson Freedman was shot shortly after 3 P.M. as he walked across the playground adjoining the school. (He lived only four blocks away.) Freedman was shot in the back of the neck, and was taken to Chestnut Hill Hospital where he died an hour later, without regaining consciousness.

Several students witnessed Simmons removing the gun from his belt and firing it. One stated that Kevin had told him that he planned to shoot Freedman, while other pupils claimed that he also mentioned shooting Mrs. Taylor, the vice principal in charge of discipline. Kevin, himself, contended that the gun misfired as he was adjusting his belt. He was quoted as saying, "I just wanted to scare him."¹⁵

Simmons was arrested at his home at 7 P.M., at which time

he claimed the shooting was accidental. The gun, recovered later at the Simmons home, was a pre-World War I Smith and Wesson .45 automatic, and was so large Simmons had to hold it in both hands to fire it. 16

Immediate Responses

The 11 P.M. news on all three local T.V. stations carried the Freedman slaying as their lead story. The Superintendent of Schools issued a brief statement about the tragedy. The leadership of the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, however, reacted as if the PFT intended to avenge the death of one of its members by "opening fire" on the Board and Superintendent. Frank Sullivan urged the PFT to stay away from school as a testimonial to Freedman and "as a demonstration against Dr. (Mark) Shedd's indifference to violence in all of the schools." 17

Sullivan charged that, though police records showed the incident to be the first time a teacher had been killed by one of his students in Philadelphia, countless others had been threatened with violence, and that Dr. Shedd had taken no action. The blame for the shooting was placed "squarely on the school administration building"

16 Haskin and Griffenberg, loc. cit.

17 Weisenbach and Lintz, loc. cit.
by the union. In a public statement, Sullivan said, "We hold the school authorities responsible for this because they have shown no will to try to check the thing." He went on to state, "Our teachers are absolutely terror stricken . . . We are going to demand more security in and around the buildings."

Celia Pincus added fuel to the fire when she urged that every teacher refuse to re-enter the schools until both Dr. Shedd and Mr. Dilworth resigned. The local PFT founder and former officer said, "Shedd's permissive policies have set the stage for violence and anarchy in the schools. If he is allowed to go on, he will destroy the school system."

The Superintendent refused to take the Union's bait and enter a shouting match. "Do we put a cop in every classroom," he asked; "maybe that's one alternative." Instead he called for the PFT, other school labor groups, and the Home and School Association to make

\[^{18}\text{Montgomery, loc. cit.}\]


\[^{20}\text{Ibid.}\]

\[^{21}\text{Ibid.}\]

recommendations to improve discipline in the system.\textsuperscript{23} The Union, however, was vindictive in its approach and asked that the newly developed \textit{Student Bill of Rights and Responsibilities} be repealed because it prohibited locker searches and suggested that students should be treated as adults.\textsuperscript{24} Mr. Sullivan blamed permissiveness for the breakdown in discipline and stated that students are and should be treated as juveniles. He (1) charged that disciplinary schools were underutilized and asked that special facilities for pupils with particular learning problems be developed, (2) called for an assurance of teacher safety, and (3) demanded more non-teaching assistants (NTAs) be hired.\textsuperscript{25}

The day after the murder, in spite of the "mud-slinging" already occurring, the two largest daily newspapers accentuated the positive. A \textit{Bulletin} editorial noted the irony of the situation and said that "beginning to tighten-up discipline is a step in the right direction,"\textsuperscript{26} while the \textit{Inquirer} chose to laud Freedman's community work.


\textsuperscript{24}Adopted by a Board resolution on December 22, 1970.

\textsuperscript{25}NTAs are employed by the schools to perform many of the student supervisory and monitoring activities which teachers formerly conducted (e.g., hall patrol and lunch room duty).

and involvement in the civil rights movement.\(^2^7\) The Daily News, a more sensationalist tabloid publication, called the incident a "mirror of the racial nightmare in the big cities . . . "\(^2^8\) It stressed as significant the fact that Freedman was a Jew living and teaching in a previously all Jewish, now racially-mixed neighborhood with an increasingly high crime rate. One Daily News columnist wrote that students who brought guns to school should be expelled forever, but since expulsion was considered part of "old fashioned discipline," it didn't fit with modern education.\(^2^9\)

The day after Samson Freedman was murdered saw Philadelphia more emotional than anyone could remember it ever being over its schools. "With all the SOBs in that building, they had to shoot him,"\(^3^0\) said a neighbor. "He was completely dedicated to everyone's kids."\(^3^1\)

Samson Freedman's funeral was on Wednesday, February 3, and the Philadelphia Public Schools were closed in his memory. In


\(^2^9\) Campisi, loc. cit.


\(^3^1\) Ibid.
announcing the closing, the Superintendent said that he hoped the day would "lead everyone to deep thoughts about working and reasoning together to prevent this kind of senseless violence in the future." It was the first time schools had ever been closed to honor a teacher. Five thousand people attended the funeral, many waiting outside for hours. There was no eulogy, as Freedman had wished. Dr. Bernard Kelner, Superintendent of District Six (the district in which Leeds is located), and a long-time personal friend of Freedman, spoke briefly, along with his Rabbi, who left the mourners with the maxim Freedman lived by—"What is hateful to us, do not practice on our neighbors." Though the schools were closed that day, not everyone had the luxury of mourning or sombre reflection. The Superintendent and his staff spent the day (after attending the funeral) working. Their situation, however, was very unlike that described by Robert Frost:

No more to build on there. And they, since they were not the one dead, turned to their affairs.

There was much more to build on, and their affairs were to determine

---


why it occurred and how to prevent similar occurrences in the future.

Dr. Shedd met first with twelve high school principals to discuss their disciplinary codes. Later in the day, Board President Richardson Dilworth joined him in meeting representatives of the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, Administrators' Alliance, Philadelphia Principals' Association, Local 1201 (maintenance men, custodians, and bus drivers), Local 434 (cafeteria workers), and the Home and School Council. The purpose of the two-hour meeting was to discuss the discipline problem from a variety of perspectives, and request the assistance of each group in formulating recommendations for improving the situation. With the exception of the PFT, which charged Shedd and Dilworth with permitting discipline to become lax, the other groups at the meeting were amiable. Following that meeting, the Superintendent announced to newsmen that he had promised to submit a plan for tough discipline to the Board of Education by February 15. The inputs to that plan; the process by which they were solicited, examined, and integrated; and the outputs which resulted in the form of recommendations will be examined in the remainder of this chapter.

A Crisis Situation

Before proceeding with the inputs, the rationale for viewing

this situation as a crisis will be examined. A crisis was defined previously as an institutional failure which is not acceptable to the recipients of that institution's product. Such a failure might occur as the result of either the omission of a particular action or element, or an unsatisfactory or inadequate performance of a task that does not meet the expectations of the recipients or clients. The institution, in this case, is the School District of Philadelphia, the direct recipients of which are the pupils. The indirect recipients include parents, teachers, and administrators. These other members of the system must also be attended to, for inability of the system to meet their specific expectations related to inputs, process, and outputs may result in a system failure. Since these other members make major contributions toward the input, process, and product of the system, an event affecting any one of them could have major ramifications for the operation of the entire system, as well.

Within the Philadelphia Public Schools, certain minimum standards of achievement, both academic and personal, are expected of all students. Within the realm of personal achievement, particular behavior standards are set to conform with general societal expectations and specific school policies. Crises occur (1) when students fail to conform to these expectations, (2) when the expectations are unacceptable, (3) when a proper mechanism for facilitating the achievement of their expectations does not exist, or (4) when teachers, administrators, or the public do not support the behavioral expectations
they, themselves, have generated. A combination of these factors were, in fact, occurring in Philadelphia prior to Samson Freedman's murder.

Immediately after that incident, a crisis occurred as the direct result of the feeling that (1) necessary actions and elements had been omitted and (2) the performance of specific tasks had not met the expectations generated by the context. For example:

1. The Philadelphia Federation of Teachers called for the repeal of the Student Bill of Rights and Responsibilities.

2. A new trespass ordinance was introduced into Philadelphia City Council holding school principals legally responsible for any damage caused in their schools by unauthorized persons.

3. The Superintendent was asked to review all existing policies on discipline and make recommendations concerning their improvement and strengthening.

4. The Board of Education and public debated adopting a provision allowing the use of corporal punishment in the schools.

5. The Philadelphia Federation of Teachers called for the resignation of Dr. Shedd and Mr. Dilworth, and went as far as to hold a referendum mandating the Superintendent's recall.
6. Several members of the Board of Education severely criticized what they viewed as the Superintendent's permissive discipline policies. This touched off heated public debate among Board members, resulting in one member also calling for the resignation of Dr. Shedd.

7. Frank Rizzo, who resigned as Police Commissioner to run for Mayor only days prior to the Freedman murder, called the schools too permissive, and hinted that the blame rested with the Superintendent.

8. Civic and educational groups throughout the city called for an examination of the schools' discipline procedures and new approaches to dealing with the violence permeating the city.

Claude Lewis, popular Bulletin columnist, wrote:

I never knew the popular teacher at Leeds Junior High. But I am diminished by his death because all of us are diminished by it. All over the city people are shaking their heads sadly, exclaiming how terrible the whole thing is and they are right.

The only thing that is more terrible is our inaction and canned "outrage," over the death of Mr. Freedman, the man we "honor" today. 37

---

The Collection of Data

Inputs Provided By Groups

Professional Educators and Educational Resource Groups

The Philadelphia Federation of Teachers. --Perhaps no other single group had a greater impact upon the crisis situation than the "teachers union." (Hereafter called the PFT.) Many groups and individuals, in fact, condemned the PFT for making "political hay" out of the Freedman murder, and blamed it for precipitating the system crisis. The PFT's attack upon the Superintendent added to the polarization of the teachers, administrators, and public. A columnist stated that for the PFT "to intimate that the school superintendent is responsible for the death of Samson Freedman is one of those exaggerations which only heighten fear and hatred." 38

The PFT representatives who attended the special meeting of the four school bargaining units and the Home and School Council called by Dr. Shedd and Mr. Dilworth on the day after the Freedman killing were totally uncooperative. A follow-up meeting was scheduled for several days later, for which it was decided that a single

38 Sandy Padwe, "It Takes Discipline to be Disciplined," My Philadelphia (Column), Philadelphia Inquirer, February 8, 1971.
person would represent each group. The PFT refused to send a single person and demanded their entire delegation be present. When this demand was denied, they boycotted the meeting entirely.

At a meeting held on February 5 to discuss the Freedman killing, Celia Pincus, retired PFT vice president, called for Dr. Shedd's immediate resignation. The 600 teachers present gave her a standing ovation. "This is an evil man," said Miss Pincus, who continued by stating that "another year or two under Shedd would mean total deterioration of the school system." Frank Sullivan called for the abolition of the Student Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, charging that it violated the union contract. In addition, he announced that a referendum would be submitted to teachers in the near future calling for Dr. Shedd's ouster. "Let us use our expertise to get this heinous offender of our schools out of this system," added Miss Pincus.

On February 8, the PFT sent Richardson Dilworth a list of nine proposals relating to discipline in the schools, which the union had approved at their February 5 meeting. Contained in the letter of transmittal was the request that a separate meeting with the PFT be arranged to discuss their proposals, for "the first meeting of the


committee you convened on February 6, 1971, indicated that a white-wash of the administration was about to begin and that scape-goating the teachers would be the result of its recommendations. The nine "Positions on Discipline in the Schools" submitted by the PFT follow:

1. To provide a better education for all the children and to assist in the teaching of regular classes of pupils, more supportive services shall be made available, and shall be utilized immediately after such services have been requested. Such services shall be provided to administer to the needs of the following types of typical children regardless of age or grade level:
   - underachiever
   - emotionally disturbed
   - disciplinary or otherwise disruptive
   - attendance problems
   - retarded
   - brain damaged
When necessary such pupils shall be assigned to small classes (no more than ten pupils) within their schools or in other schools conveniently located to the pupil involved where classes shall be conducted in the regular curriculum (including courses necessary for a diploma, if appropriate) as well as special courses in citizenship if needed. Such classes shall be staffed by teachers specially trained for the particular assignment. The principal and teachers selected by the faculty shall have the right to reassign pupils with severe emotional or disciplinary problems.

2. A new set of specific, graduated and mandatory disciplinary steps shall replace Administrative Bulletin 22A so that starting in kindergarten, no individual behavior problems shall persist for undue lengths of time without a resolution beneficial to all concerned. A copy of the revised policy shall be given to each parent at the beginning of each school year.

---

41 Letter from John Sullivan to Richardson Dilworth, February 8, 1971.
3. Withdrawal of Student Bill of Rights

4. Remove OCA\textsuperscript{42} from participating in anything having to do with student relationships.

5. NTA\textsuperscript{43} staff and security personnel in the schools are to be increased so that there can be adequate personnel when needed.

6. Each Building Committee shall present to its principal demands necessary for the establishment of the proper educational and disciplinary climate in the school.

7. After suitable period of discussion, the Building Committee will notify the Federation if the principal refuses or is unable to reach agreement.

8. Once a plan for improving discipline in the schools has been agreed upon, deviations or failures of performance must be reported immediately by the principal to the Building Committee in writing. The Building Committee shall forward these reports to the Federation office immediately.

9. The administration shall furnish copies of all incident reports as the incidents occur. The Federation will forward one copy of the report to the Building Representative so that the faculty may know what incidents are being reported to the administration and what incidents are being covered up. An acceptable definition of a serious incident requiring a report shall be established.\textsuperscript{44}

At the February 8 Board of Education Meeting, seventeen of the twenty-seven groups testifying about violence and discipline in the Philadelphia Public Schools disavowed the PFT demand for Dr. Shedd's

\textsuperscript{42}Office of Community Affairs.

\textsuperscript{43}Non-teaching assistant.

\textsuperscript{44}"PFT Positions on Discipline in the Schools," February 8, 1971.
resignation. Following this show of public support, John Ryan appeared subdued in saying only that "the Shedd administration has hampered efforts in school after school to obtain discipline."46

The PFT seemed to have discontinued their hard line against the Superintendent when, in response to Dr. Shedd's plans on dealing with violence and discipline in the schools, Mr. Ryan said that Shedd had made a "good start in his recommendations, even if it is only aimed at securing publicity."47 Ryan added, however, that he thought it was unfortunate that Dr. Shedd did not repeal the Student Bill of Rights and Responsibilities.

Nevertheless, soon thereafter, the PFT distributed a referendum, authorized by its members at a meeting earlier that month, calling for the Superintendent's resignation. The cover letter equated excusing Dr. Shedd with pardoning the actions of Adolph Eichmann in Germany because he was an innocent tool of the Third Reich:

> Although they are willing to hold him responsible for improvements in the school system, a cry has gone up from the Superintendent's allies that no individual can be held responsible for the breakdown of discipline—that it is "all of society" that causes the misfortunes in our schools. Individuals are responsible for the actions that they take and the programs

45 Treasurer and chief negotiator of the PFT.


that they institute. To hold otherwise is to excuse as only innocent tools the commissars of the Stalinist purges, Eichmann in Germany, and members of lynch mobs in South Carolina. 48

In addition, the PFT charged that Shedd had personally encouraged the deterioration of discipline in the schools:

The Superintendent has not merely watched discipline deteriorate. He has encouraged the downward movement, he has sent paid agents to the schools to arouse students against their teachers and against each other. He has authorized staff development programs that have encouraged employees not to cooperate with the courts against juvenile offenders. He has engaged in radio broadcasts to stir up feelings of animosity and hatred of teachers among students, parents, and the community. He has tried to strip teachers of meaningful authority over students. 49

The results of the referendum, released on February 27, had to have been disappointing to the PFT, though they stated otherwise. Only 4,175 teachers, or about one-third of the union members cast ballots, with 2,514 voting in favor and 1,661 opposing the referendum. 50 The PFT interpreted the vote as a victory, but refused to comment on what action would follow. Their apparent decision not to press for the Superintendent's dismissal still did not stop John Ryan from stating that the system's greatest need was for "an end to the administration-supported anarchy in the schools." 51

48Referendum Authorized by the Membership Meeting of February 5, 1971.

49Ibid.

50"Teachers Want Shedd to Quit Poll Reveals," Philadelphia Inquirer, February 27, 1971, p. 3.

The Progressive Caucus. --Several factions of the PFT declined to support the union leadership's proposals concerning discipline, and thus approached the situation differently. The Progressive Caucus, a group of about five hundred PFT members, publically disagreed with the PFT leadership in early February by calling for full implementation of the controversial Student Bill of Rights and Responsibilities at the same meeting Frank Ryan called for its abolition. 52

In addition, in a later news release, the Caucus urged teachers to vote "no" on the referendum calling for Dr. Shedd's resignation. They claimed that the referendum only served as a smokescreen to cover up the more complex issues. 53 The Progressive Caucus proposed a five-point plan that they claimed would deal with the actual problems, in place of that plan presented by the PFT's leadership. The five points were to:

1. Expand facilities and supportive services for emotionally disturbed children.

2. Hire more community people to serve as teaching aids and in supportive service positions.

3. Phase out junior high schools and replace them with middle schools on a 4-4-4 plan.

52"PFT Calls for Resignation of Shedd," loc. cit.

4. Fully implement the Student Bill of Rights and Responsibilities.

5. Develop and implement innovative programs geared toward making education more meaningful and relevant.

The PFT made no public comments on the Progressive Caucus' proposals.

The Committee for New Leadership. -- A smaller and more left-wing splinter group of PFT members called themselves The Committee for New Leadership. The Committee was actively involved in the national political scene as well as the local school situation, and linked the war in Viet Nam to the crisis in the schools. In a handbill headlined "Defend Farinas and Davis," the Committee urged the PFT to "take the side of youth by resolving to support the struggle against political repression..." They noted that the youth revolt was a product of social, political, and economic crises, and that teachers and other union workers were faced with similar oppression. In urging that the PFT attempt to work with students rather than against them, the Committee for New Leadership stated:

The act of Kevin Simmons was the desperate act of a young student faced with a system dedicated to his destruction along with that of all youth and workers. Kevin Simmons did not see the way in which youth and workers could struggle for victory. This too is the meaning of the attack upon Newark's striking black and white teachers by bands of youth. 54

54 "Defend Farinas and Davis!", mimeographed handbill from the Committee for New Leadership.
Philadelphia City Education Association. --The PCEA, an NEA affiliate which lost most of its members and all of its power when the PFT was chosen as the sole bargaining agent for Philadelphia teachers, came out against the PFT's demand that Dr. Shedd be ousted. They asked that he remain in this post "to pick up the pieces . . . and bring order from the chaos." Mary Mealey, PCEA President, presented that organization's recommendations on discipline at a Board meeting in March. The group urged (1) the prosecution of students who committed criminal acts, (2) increased staff development, and (3) rigid enforcement of the then newly-passed trespass law. Present practices with regard to transfers and suspensions were also questioned. The PCEA proposed four specific actions to be taken immediately:

1. Curriculum for each grade and subject be written and followed by all teachers involved. The principal be made accountable for seeing that teachers follow the curriculum and use effective teaching techniques.

2. The School Board develop a city-wide handbook of rules and regulations--a code of discipline, and appropriate penalties to be imposed for deviations.

3. Automatic promotions be eliminated.

4. The School Board officially sanction corporal punishment.

Other Teacher's Groups. -- Two other teachers' groups, neither of which was a formal organization, provided inputs on violence and discipline in the schools. Most of the teachers participating in the Affective Education Project met shortly after the Freedman slaying for an in-service workshop, and devoted a portion of their time to a discussion of the situation. They made the following eleven recommendations:

1. Provide a room for students to "let off steam," equipped with such articles as punching bags, and boffers. 56
2. Mix tenth, eleventh, and twelfth grade students by converting to non-graded instruction in high school.
3. Eliminate unnecessary rules (e.g., wearing hats in buildings).
4. Absolve the schools of unnecessary responsibilities (e.g., supplying all books and materials).
5. Allow students to leave the school for lunch.
6. Hire more school psychologists.
7. Institute a less stringent lateness and cutting policy, similar to colleges.

56Boffers are styrofoam clubs, used like swords by two persons wishing to rid themselves of aggressive feelings. They come with goggles and ear guards and provide a safe and painless way to "let off steam."
8. Integrate school cleaning ladies (charwomen).

9. Assign the NTA's supervisory activities to teachers.

10. Pay students to do the NTA's manual labor tasks.

11. Restructure the school year so it consists of four terms, and give students the option to take-off any term they choose.

Only one school faculty responded as a group, and they urged that the dignity and safety of all teachers be protected in every possible way. Toward that end, they recommended that:

1. Information concerning the abuse of teachers not be suppressed.

2. Parents be held accountable for the behavior of their children.

3. Parents cooperate with teachers in educating their children toward responsible citizenship.

4. The City, State, and Federal government provide more funds for child care, and rehabilitative and corrective help for children and adults who do not respect the rights of others. 57

A representative of the Pennsylvania School Counselors' Association addressed the Board of Education at the February 9 meeting. In addition to several suggestions related to strengthening the role of counselors in the schools, he strongly supported the recently-passed Student Bill of Rights and Responsibilities and urged the Board not to repeal it as the PFT had requested.

57 Telegram received from the faculty of the Pennell School.
The Philadelphia Principals' Association. -- Though not affiliated with a union like the PFT, the Philadelphia Principals' Association (hereafter referred to as the PPA) was rapidly gaining strength as an organization and was respected by both the central administration and the Board. In spite of having taken issue with the actions of the Superintendent and Board of Education several times in the past, the PPA came out against the scapegoating being attempted by the PFT. Bernard Rafferty, President of the PPA and principal of one of the largest high schools in the city, stated that, despite certain strong disagreements, the PPA did not feel that any member of the Board or the Superintendent was "deliberately working to destroy the efficacy and integrity of our schools."

The PPA pledged to work with any groups or individuals sincerely seeking a solution, and announced that a PPA special committee had already presented a list of "specific constructive suggestions to Dr. Shedd on possible solutions, alternatives, and priorities in respect to discipline." The PPA's list of suggestions, considerably more extensive than those presented by most other groups,

---

58 Statement made by the President of the Philadelphia Principals' Association at the Philadelphia Board of Education meeting of February 8, 1971.

59 Ibid.
contained the following recommendations:

1. School board and superintendent should adopt and actively support policies on discipline.

2. Through contractual modification with PFT time should be provided for staffs to meet after school hours to work for the positive resolution of peculiar disciplinary problems.

3. Teachers should be restored to supervisory duties.

4. School District should adopt a basic Code of Behavior for all school employees and students.

5. School Board must appeal any case that rules against established policies.

6. Delay implementation of Student Bill of Rights and Responsibilities pending an adopted disciplinary plan by the Board.

7. All threats and assaults on school personnel be referred to the Legal Division for immediate prosecution.

8. The carrying of any weapon be referred to the Legal Division for immediate prosecution.

9. Student(s) involved in #6 or #7 must be reassigned to a different school.

10. A security officer must be assigned to every school building.

11. Establish a vestibule school in every district to house disruptive and court involved students.

12. Disruptive 17 years and older students must be assigned to programs other than the regular daytime programs.

13. Facilities be made available for identified emotionally disturbed students immediately.

14. Eight full time psychiatrists be hired immediately.

15. Establish a psychiatric out patient clinic for the school district.
16. **Full documentation on all trial transfers must precede arrival of student at receiving school.**

17. **Policy should be formulated and enforced that would hold parents accountable in seeking help for children when recommended by individual school, outside agencies, or central administration or children would be excluded from regular school program.**

18. **Establish additional residential schools to take care of students who do not fit into a regular school program (use of surrounding camp sites).**

19. **Board reinstitute court action on non-attendance cases.**

20. **Parents should be compelled to assume full responsibility for pupil's acts resulting in damage to property and/or injury to persons, by Board directive and law.**

21. **No student shall be readmitted to school without a satisfactory parental interview regardless of time element.**

22. **A suspended student who returns to school without parent will be sent to the local police district to await the arrival of a parent.**

23. **Trespassers should be prosecuted.**

24. **Issue I. D. cards with pictures to all students to teach responsibility and for use on public vehicles for reduced student fare rate.**

25. **School authorities must retain right to inspect lockers and any other school property.**

26. **The School Board must not permit outside agencies to usurp its authority in school policies such as pupil assignments.**

27. **The Board must not accept any new programs to be introduced into schools without adequate supervision built into the implementation plans such as lunch program.**

28. **The Board must develop specific policies to handle drug cases.**
29. The Board should develop a policy to discipline any School District employee whose direct action and/or counseling encourages or provokes disruption.

30. Decision of principal must be final and supported by higher administration as to person(s) or groups that may request entrance into a school building.

31. Establish a standing committee to review disciplinary policies of the school district periodically instead of reacting to a tragedy.

32. Revive the Central Case Review Committee with the active participation of the Superintendent.

33. School Board and central administration develop a closer relationship with all schools especially those having problems by spending time in these schools in an attempt to assess the situation. 60

Later in the month, after the Superintendent had released his recommendations on violence and discipline, a group of principals met with him to discuss those recommendations. After that meeting, the principals were described by the press as being "skeptical." 61

Mr. Rafferty, speaking for the group, said, "the long range proposals sound good, but we need some help immediately." 62 The PPA's concern for a practical solution which its members could utilize at once

60 Memorandum to Mark R. Shedd from the Philadelphia Principals' Association containing "recommendation for school discipline," February 8, 1971.


62 Ibid.
was reflected in their criticism that the Superintendent's plan placed considerable responsibility on the school principals without giving them the tools thus needed to carry out the job. The PPA announced their willingness to share the responsibility for solving the problems, but refused to be held responsible for what they viewed as being more than their share.

The School Administrators' Alliance. --The School Administrators' Alliance, whose membership was open to any type of educational administrator, served the majority of administrators who, because they were not principals or vice-principals, were not eligible to join the PPA. The Alliance, with a fairly extensive membership was still not a particularly powerful group, especially in terms of salary and contract demands. This was due primarily to the fact that its membership was extremely diverse and many of the members represented upper-level management.

The Alliance was one of the original six groups asked to submit recommendations dealing with the crisis brought about by the incident at Leeds Junior High School. On February 5, they delivered to the Superintendent a memorandum on discipline, drawn up by a committee of their members. Partly philosophical and partly pragmatic, 63

---63 Ibid.
the following specific recommendations on dealing with extremely dis-ruptive behavior were contained therein:

- Students whose behavior constitutes a threat to the safety of other students or to adults working in the school organization, should be removed from school.

- Such students should be sent to some kind of rehabilitation school, center or institution, whether this be a disciplinary school as those now in existence, or a newly-created type of school organization.

- Students thus affected should receive the kind of attention which would take into account the various causes which created their problems and be treated accordingly. This may involve the kind of trained personnel which is not now available in their treatment.

In addition, recommendations were made in many other areas, the implementation and effectiveness of which were viewed as being the responsibility of top-level administration and the Board of Education. Those recommendations follow:

- There should be established a clear-cut relationship and cooperation between the police department and the school district so that school principals are ultimately apprised of police records which clearly indicate potential crime, violence or serious threat to the student body or school personnel. This would entail a highly confidential file available only to the highest authority in a given school.

- Where laxity exists with regard to attendance in class, and
where "cutting" class appears to be condoned, steps should be taken to eliminate such practice.

-More attention should be paid to some form of planned, supervised student activity during so-called free time in auditoriums, libraries, lunchrooms and school yards.

-Legal means should be found to condemn, and, if necessary, close public lunch counters and similar facilities where students congregate with clear evidence that their character, behavior and even health are being impaired.

-School lunchroom food and facilities should be improved to the point where more students would wish to remain within the school rather than frequent outside areas where occasionally manners and morals are in jeopardy.

-The job description of NTAs should be re-evaluated in relation to the extent of the serious problems and threats facing students and school personnel alike.

-An effort should be made to provide certain schools, if not all schools, with a specially trained person who can communicate with young people, who understands their social mores, and who can win their trust. The job description for such a person will not be the same as for a teacher, a counselor, a social worker or a psychologist. Ideally, however, a person endowed with a little of all of the above people would be most desirable.
Provision should be made for meetings of school personnel to exchange and compare information and seek solutions to the current crisis in discipline, crime and violence. This should take the form of a crash program in which meetings might be attended by representatives of the fields of medicine, psychiatry, and law enforcement agencies.

A clear and, as nearly as possible, complete delineation of responsibility should be formulated and made known to every segment of the schools and the school system.

Such a list of responsibility should then be adhered to in all sections of the city, with the minimum amount of deviation where special situations warrant.

The question of student responsibility must be regarded as a corollary of the above.

Top administration should make it possible for all supervisory personnel to function more effectively in their specialty fields so that they can assist teachers, especially inexperienced teachers, in the organization of class procedures and teaching techniques. Such assistance by people who had been singled out as exceptional teachers and placed in supervisory positions through merit and examinations, could contribute substantially to more effective teaching and learning, which in turn would help curtail disinterest, disruption, cutting and even explosive behavior.
The Black Educational Forum. --Like the Columbus Forum of the Order of Sons of Italy in America and the Educators' Lodge of B'nai B'rith, the Black Educational Forum was bound by ethnic, (or in this case, racial) similarity. Unlike those two, however, the Black Educational Forum was not organized as a fraternal, lodge-type group, but came into being as the result of a feeling that the existing general educational organizations did not speak to the specific needs of black teachers, administrators, or children. Open to black educators at all levels, the Forum was quick to point out that the irrational emotionalism which occurred immediately after the Leeds incident dodged the real issues of "overcrowding, insufficient teacher and counseling personnel, and too few models to whom students may turn in time of trouble." 64

Unlike most other groups which submitted their recommendations on discipline almost immediately, the Black Educational Forum waited until the February 22 Board of Education meeting to make a public presentation. At that meeting, the chairman of the Forum's Discipline Committee beseeched the School Board and administrators to:

1. Improve the process of the selection of staff members who work in our schools.

64 Statement made by a representative of the Black Educational Forum at the Philadelphia Board of Education meeting of February 8, 1971.
2. Change the roles of teachers who use offensive and/or abusive language to students.

3. Identify applicants with extreme patterns of emotional behavior either before employment or after--especially before tenure.

4. Establish school review committees that include students to participate in decisions that affect students.

5. Re-establish the youth conservation corps.

6. Encourage the business community to aid in the development of youth-power programs that lead to employment.

7. Staff the counseling offices with counselor aides and/or mental health aides to increase the effectiveness of the school guidance counseling program.

8. Utilize the talents of teachers by involving them more judiciously at the decision-making level.

9. Adjust numbers of employed staff who serve in the schools to be apportioned in accordance with the experience level of the staff, the turnover of personnel, the numbers of transfers in and out of the school, the socioeconomic status of families, the size of the student body, the degree to which the community has declined.

10. Encourage teachers to write his or her goals with a statement of their commitment to improve the quality
of instruction.

11. Increase communication among teachers that they may benefit from successful strategies affected by their colleagues.

12. Define disruptive students.

13. Use its influence to improve the functions of Youth Study Center, day treatment centers, various rehabilitation centers and the court procedures as they influence troubled youths.

14. Employ and train more community people to assist in the educative process.

15. Retool the thinking of all employees who contact the students in the school to improve effectiveness.

16. Agree on minimal well-defined goals for all students.

17. Encourage use of alternative strategies for implementing achievement of desired skills.

18. Affect a program that will help staff members to be more understanding of the children and community they serve.

19. Establish achievement centers for disruptive students and for students with extreme emotional impairment employing community people to assist teachers, psychologists and counselors.

20. Supervise school work programs paying a higher salary
to an employee who trains and supervises student work groups.

At the Board meeting of March 22, the Forum again provided inputs on the discipline issue; this time the major concern was corporal punishment. The Forum listed the pros and cons of corporal punishment, discussed the legal ramifications of its use, and concluded that its drawbacks outweighed its advantages. In place of it, the Black Educational Forum urged school administrators to encourage human (not humane) treatment of all children, and stated its belief that the teacher "whose own work is fulfilling, has little difficulty enabling his or her students to develop their minds and bodies toward the acceptance of productive goals."65

The Columbus Forum. --This group of 800 professional and technical employees of the School District of Philadelphia came out strongly in defending Dr. Shedd. The Columbus Forum, whose diverse membership included low-ranking technical positions and as high a position as a deputy superintendent, comprised the Educators' Lodge of the Sons of Italy in America. In one of the strongest statements at the February 8 Board of Education meeting, Frank Fragale, speaking for the Executive Board of the Forum, chastised any groups

attempting to place the blame on one specific individual, and urged all to "share the blame for the despair and violence in today's society, and work together for solutions." 66

The Columbus Forum did not present a formal list of recommendations to the Superintendent, but in addressing the Board and public, a number of suggestions were made. Included among them were the following:

1. The severest penalties allowed by law should be applied to anyone committing a violent act in the schools.

2. Swift disciplinary action should be prescribed for persons carrying deadly weapons.

3. Persons "who would fan the flames of prejudice and hatred with their words" should be barred from the schools.

4. Administrators and teachers should exercise their option to file charges for the prosecution of lawbreakers.

5. The courts must also fulfill their responsibility in dealing with hard core offenders.

6. Alternative educational programs for habitually disruptive students should be developed away from regular school settings.

7. Teachers must be supported and protected from bodily harm in every way possible. 67

In reacting to the PFT charge characterizing Mark Shedd as an evil

66 Statement made by a representative of the Columbus Forum of the O. S. I. A. at the Philadelphia Board of Education meeting of February 8, 1971.

67 Ibid.
man, the Columbus Forum labeled it "irresponsible and vicious," and praised him as "a man of great integrity and strength of character, who is sensitive to the well-being of all children and School District Employees." 68

The Educators' Lodge. --Developed along the same lines as the Columbus Forum, the Educators' Lodge of B'nai B'rith was composed of a diverse group of school district employees, but in this case, Jewish, not Italian. The Lodge was a fairly new group, and was not considered a particularly powerful voice among local Jewish groups. It was placed in a particularly difficult position by the events of February first, because (1) Samson Freedman was a Jew, (2) Jewish teachers had complained of increased black anti-Semitism during the past several years, (3) several traditionally Jewish sections of the city had recently become heavily black, igniting a variety of racial incidents, and (4) the militant Jewish Defense League, by virtue of its actions and accusations, had placed more moderate Jewish groups in much the same position the Black Panthers had placed the NAACP.

Because of these and other factors, the Educators' Lodge chose carefully what they said. In brief speeches before the Board of Education on February 8 and March 8, the President of the Lodge implored all parties to put aside the charges coming from both camps

68 Ibid.
and come together as reasonable men dedicated to the task of bringing calm and security to the schools so that all could get to the real task . . . the education of children for a productive and fruitful life. 69 A formal list of recommendations was not presented to the Superintendent or Board at that time.

The Philadelphia Public School Nurses' Association. --Of the three educational resource groups having bargaining agreements with the Board of Education, the Nurses' Association was the only group of professionals (the other two being the custodians and the cafeteria workers). The Nurses' Association was among the groups initially asked to submit recommendations for dealing with violence, and discipline in the schools, and responded immediately by suggesting nine areas requiring attention. The Nurses' Association recommendations reflect a greater emphasis upon dealing with the basic causes of disruptive behavior than those proposed by most other groups:

1. Recognition by the administration that available knowledge about growth and development of children be re-evaluated--and used. In many cases, programs are instituted which ignore fundamental facts with the result that many children may be subjected to pressures

69 Statement made by the President of the Educators' Lodge of B'nai B'rith at the Philadelphia Board of Education meeting of February 8, 1971.
they are not ready to cope with--either physically, mentally or emotionally--with disruptive behavior becoming the inevitable by-product.

2. Recognition by the administration that for too long, a very basic psychological need of all children has been overlooked: the necessity for definite limitations to be set up. Contrary to what has been verbalized by many, we do the children a distinct disservice by not setting up specific guidelines as to acceptable behavior.

3. Recognition by the administration that moving a child out of the first year without his mastery of the skills, dooms him to being pushed further back with each succeeding year. By the time he is literally shoved into junior and senior high, he must mask his ignorance with blustering bravado to keep others from discovering how little he knows and to keep his own fright at facing the outside world ill-equipped, from surfacing.

4. Recognition by the administration that the schools should not assume the parent role in toto. Too long now have we generated the idea that everyone else will take over rather than help the parent understand
how he must help his child. (Perhaps the schools should be closed to pupils for one term and parents brought in—so that they can be informed as to how much help their children need from everyone in order to deal with today's complicated pressures.)

5. Recognition by the administration of the necessity to make parents see that children are daily faced with confused values and need a great deal of help to discern which are worthwhile. Something must be done to bestir those parents who are apathetic. Educational --and medical--defects need the cooperation of parents for correction. Until this is accomplished, we will have problems.

6. Recognition by the administration that education should prepare the child for life in the outside world; the word "discipline" must be cleansed of the disrepute into which it has fallen. No one truly can do just that which he chooses in the world; the schools are excellent places for development of self discipline.

7. Recognition by the administration of the role of the school nurse in our complex society. Too often the administration's answer to a problem (i.e., the drug scene) is to write a new guide. Unfortunately, this is not turning
the child away from drugs. Much of the disruption can be traced to the drug scene. Perhaps a new approach is needed. The special relationship between the school nurse and the students has not been utilized to the fullest extent.

8. Recognition by the administration that some controls need to be instituted, particularly in our secondary schools, to curb children from wandering in and out of schools at will.

9. Recognition by the administration that too often a child's cry for help may not be recognized because sufficient attention is not given to the forms these cries for help may take. Here, again, the nurses' know-how could be better utilized.

The International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers, Local 1201. --The larger of the two non-professional unions, Local 1201 of the AFL-CIO, included custodians, cleaning women, maintenance specialists, and bus drivers. This Union's relationship with Dr. Shedd had been better than any others, due, in part, to the steady leadership of John Shay, its president. Local 1201's members met problems of the same magnitude that many teachers confronted, however, the former group's non-professional status proved detrimental to their being able to deal with those problems. As a result, the
communication from 1201 to the Superintendent expanded on the problems faced by its members, but did not offer many recommendations for solving them.

One of the biggest problems was that which bus drivers encountered in all dual-shift schools which required bussing. Since there was no supervision in loading the busses, the drivers could not control the children once they were on the bus. Reports with regard to seats being slashed, windows being broken, children smoking and writing on the interior of these busses had been made since the chauffeurs had to drive with their backs to these children, they were constantly being harassed, subjected to foul language, and even had objects thrown at them. Two drivers were physically assaulted by children while they were behind the wheel of the bus. Though the incidents were reported on a daily basis, the drivers felt there was no use in reporting them because nothing was ever done to correct the situation.

The Maintenance Department, which consists of mechanics, helpers and trainees throughout the School District had also been exposed to similar circumstances such as students knocking down ladders while employees were using them, and tools being stolen. In many cases they were harassed and threatened to the extent that these employees were forced to leave their buildings.

Local 1201 made five fairly specific recommendations
concerning violence and discipline in the schools. They suggested that:

1. All students be required to carry an I.D. card in elementary, junior, and senior high schools.

2. No one or group of students be permitted to return once they are dismissed unless with a sponsor (employed by the School District) who will conduct them directly to exit of building at the end of the activity. This may require assignment of NTAs during these hours at various areas in the schools.

3. When cooperation could not be secured from the principal's office in the case of physical attacks, authority to call the police directly should be granted.

4. The Student Bill of Rights and Responsibilities should be re-evaluated.

5. Disciplinary schools be created and troublesome students be properly assigned to these schools, "not for a brief respite from their own surroundings, but sufficiently long enough to be impressive upon them."  

In a public presentation before the Board of Education, John Shay noted that the implementation of their recommendations

... requires the steady hand of experience. Delays of a new inexperienced Superintendent as to the current problems cannot be tolerated.

The resignation of Dr. Shedd under these conditions can only serve to the detriment of needed immediate action. It deserves no further consideration.  

School Cafeteria Employees, Local 434. --The newest non-professional group to gain union recognition, Local 434, was the only

70 Portions of a letter to Dr. Mark R. Shedd from John J. Shay, President of Local 1201, February 8, 1971.

71 Statement made by the President of Local 1201, AFL-CIO at the Philadelphia Board of Education meeting of February 8, 1971.
group of hourly-paid workers employed by the School District. Though they had often differed in negotiations with the present Board and Superintendent, Local 434 stated that they had always been treated fairly, and that they would work with Dr. Shedd "to seek ways out of the current crisis." The School Cafeteria Employees expressed concern about school discipline, especially in the junior and senior high schools, for, as they pointed out, "it is in these cafeterias that many of the incidents occur that plague our schools."

Two series of recommendations relating to discipline were presented by Local 434—one relating to cafeterias and food service, and another containing general recommendations on discipline. Their suggestions concerning cafeterias and food service follow:

1. Adequate help is needed to speed the line so that students get fast service, have ample time to eat, relax and partake of fellowship.

2. Speed is needed at the cashier station—with the possibility of developing new procedures where there exists a uniform lunch price—again to keep the line moving fast and avoid unnecessary delay, horseplay and frustration.

3. Student participation in the policing of cafeterias through student government, student patrols or other means developed within the philosophy of the Student Bill of Rights is necessary.

72 Statement made by a representative of Local 434, AFL-CIO at the Philadelphia Board of Education meeting of February 8, 1971.

73 Recommendations made to Dr. Mark R. Shedd on a "Disciplinary Program for the Philadelphia Public Schools" by Local 434, AFL-CIO, February 5, 1971.
4. The Board of Education should accept feeding as part of the educational experience of the student. Therefore, what may be needed is a review of the role of the professional staff towards feeding - if this is essential to learning. There seem to be more incidents in the cafeterias since professional staff no longer has any responsibility for the lunch room. Especially is this true in those elementary schools having inadequate cafeteria facilities, where the only place to serve a nutritious lunch is in the regular classroom.

If we accept the philosophy as we hope the School District does, that proper nutrition is essential to learning, then the disdainful stigma attached to food service must go. A professional teacher-in-charge might make a great difference.

5. The Grade III Cafeteria worker may be able to play a more constructive role in cafeteria control if he has sufficient time and assistance and is not overburdened during the lunch hours. Assignment of more Grade III workers in some of the larger cafeterias would help.

6. The elimination of cafeteria service in many schools because of dual enrollment or other factors has aggravated the situation. We recommend the Board move ahead on the concept of a nutritious lunch available to every child in the school system, and implementation of the proposal for breakfasts in poverty neighborhoods.

7. We recommend constant re-evaluation of the quality of food to eliminate justifiable complaints, thus improving lunch-room morale.

8. Size of cafeterias should be considered in future planning. They should be small enough to permit no more than 200 students to eat together at one time. This would necessitate building several dining rooms in each school clustered around one central food service center. Supervision, under this plan, would be easier.\textsuperscript{74}

Local 434 urged that "a directed program of self-discipline"
be developed by "the entire school family." Toward that end they recommended:

1. The Student Bill of Rights should be implemented immediately. Opposition and delay and interference with implementation have added to the frustrations of the students.

2. Training of Student representatives and staff should be trained on grievance procedure, and on their rights and responsibilities under the student "union contract" (Bill of Rights). Philadelphia union leaders can especially help in such training.

3. Cafeteria workers should be included in the human relations training given School District staff. We find ourselves in close touch with the students and can both benefit from the training and hopefully make our contribution. If students see the school family functioning as an integral and respected part of the total community, they will take pride in being part of the family.

4. The Board of Education should provide leadership on community issues such as drug control, support of institutions like "The Bridge" (a therapeutic rehabilitation center for teenagers), changing of housing patterns that hinder school integration, etc. Timidity because of fear of financial reprisals have no place in today's schools.

5. The schools should become community centers on afternoons, evenings and weekends with parents encouraged to bring their organizational meeting there. Acceptance of the school as the 24-hour, 12-month center of community life would add to its respect and help maintain both physical care and improve attitudes of students.

6. Large-scale planning of a sound educational program for the truly "disruptive child" should take place so that his individual needs are met without interfering with the education of other children. Increased use of psychologists would help.

7. The curriculum should include vocational education, so that students see their schooling as meaningful.

\(^{75}\text{Tbid.}\)
8. **Work-study programs**, relating education to the world of work, should be developed for all students—college bound or non-college bound.

9. School awards in the name of Samson Freedman should be established for students and staff who contribute most to intergroup progress in Philadelphia schools.  

---

**Civic-Educational Groups**

The Philadelphia Home and School Council. --Of the twenty-one "civic-educational" groups whose inputs concerning violence and discipline in the schools were considered, eighteen were local home and school associations, school advisory committees, or school community associations. The most powerful and certainly most active of the three other groups was The Philadelphia Home and School Council. This organization replaced the Parent-Teacher Association (PTA) in Philadelphia, and maintained an office in the central administration building with a local home and school association in every school. The Home and School Council was the only "civic-educational" group included in the meeting called by the Superintendent the day after the Freedman killing. Three days later they transmitted to Dr. Shedd an extensive list of suggestions emphasizing rules and regulations, smaller classes, and the involvement of the entire "school family":

There should be uniformity of rules in every school, uniformity

*76* Ibid. (edited by the author)
of communication/information in every school, and uniformity of enforcement of rules.

The disruptive pupil program should be evaluated to insure it is working.

A case review board should be organized for each district, a disruptive pupil committee in each school, a disruptive pupil class in each school, and discipline school in each district.

Mental health programs should be started early.

More RE, RT, and ED classes are needed.

More thorough spot checks of buildings inside and out for unauthorized persons are needed.

Lockers should be spot checked each day.

Strong measures must be taken and enforced against weapons being brought into the schools. Violators must be reported immediately to the police.

A lobby for gun control laws should be organized.

When court action is necessary, prompt action should be taken and notification to the school of the hearing date and the outcome should be made.

Parents should be held responsible for the damages done by their children. Punitive action should be taken against parents. Court action should be taken against parents of students carrying weapons.

Parents must be contacted immediately when a child is suspended. The child should make the phone call. No child may return to school without a parent.

If a child is disruptive, a parent should spend time in the school:
  First offense  - patrol the school
  Second offense - fine
  Third offense  - jail

Parent volunteers should be provided in each room to be supportive to the teachers.
The disruptive child must not be abandoned. Help must be given until a solution to the problem is found.

A child who does not properly complete grade requirements should not be promoted.

Help must be given the victim of violence, including transferring to another school to insure peace of mind and safety.

If students are taught established procedures, the Student Bill of Rights may not be necessary. The Student Bill of Rights should be re-evaluated.

Students in a discipline school should be prepared for career or college.

Pupils should not be abused.

I. D. cards are needed for all students.

Students should be held responsible for their own acts - such as cleaning off graffiti from the walls.

Help should not be denied a child because one parent refuses, while the other wants it.

Teacher training programs in discipline are needed, as are more teachers trained in special education for discipline school classes, and teachers given courses in child psychology.

Teachers should have yard and hall duty.

Teachers should be in school before the children and not walk out ahead of the class.

Substitute teachers should have adequate training.

Measures should be taken to halt Friday and Monday absenteeism of teachers in the schools.

NTAs should not be disciplinarians. More selective criteria should be developed for hiring NTAs.

Home and school visitors should be more proportionate to pupil numbers, and more authority given to them.
More counselors are needed in each school, as is more effective counseling. Counselors should not be used as office personnel.

One psychologist is needed for every four schools, as is a halfway house for those who need it, counseling for parents with problems, more trained professionals to help children with discipline problems, counseling to prepare for middle and junior high schools, and mental health teams. Parents should be made aware of programs in special education for children who need them.

Information should be checked out, and erratic behavior reported immediately to the appropriate authority. Administration, staff, parents, and students who come forward with information must not be subject to reprisals.

Authority for discipline should be given back to the principals, with support of administration, teachers, parents, and students. Teachers, principals, parents, and students must be responsible, each in his own way, for the discipline in the schools.

The entire school family should be apprised of the rules and regulations of the school system. New employees must be fully oriented in policies and procedures.

The entire school family must display mutual respect for each other.

The entire school family must work in cooperation with one another.

No employee of the School District should be allowed to incite students.

To carry out programs, to oversee policies, to enforce rules and regulations there must be adequate staff in each school. 77

After the Superintendent's recommendations were released in mid-February, the Home and School Council was one of the first

---

77 "Suggestions from the Philadelphia Home and School Council on Discipline. Taken from the meeting at the Greenfield School, Friday, February 4, 1971." (Edited by the author).
groups to publically support them in toto. 78 At that time the council urged that in order to insure appropriate discipline in the schools, the recommendations be uniformly enforced, and that the guidelines be implemented equally, regardless of district, school, or individual.

At the March 22 Board of Education meeting, the Home and School Council was the first group to go on record as opposing the adoption of section 1317 of the State Code, allowing corporal punishment. 79 The council, which had announced its intention to poll a large sample of parents of school children through its local associations concerning corporal punishment, reported that the parents contacted opposed its adoption, five to one.

The Citizens Committee on Public Education in Philadelphia.-- The oldest, and one of the more active education groups in the city, The Citizens Committee on Public Education in Philadelphia (hereafter referred to as the CCPEP) joined numerous other groups in voicing its support for Dr. Shedd in the face of the call for his resignation by the PFT leadership. Founded in 1880, the CPEP's board of directors included many prominent citizens, as did its list of supporters.

78 Statement made by Mrs. A. Sherwood Platt, President of the Philadelphia Board of Education meeting of February 22, 1971.

79 Statement made by Mrs. A. Shwerood Platt, President of the Philadelphia Home and School Council at the Philadelphia Board of Education meeting of March 22, 1971.
A detailed series of recommendations were presented to the Superintendent on February 8, the major points of which follow:

**A - SERVICES FOR BEHAVIORALLY DISTURBED CHILDREN**

Our primary recommendation is immediate and serious consideration of the contribution of Dr. Marvin Wolfgang as consultant to the Collaborative Study on Special Education more than two years ago. We consider Dr. Wolfgang's proposals for the treatment of behaviorally disturbed children so timely that we take the liberty of providing the following detailed excerpts:

1) At present, the method of handling disruptive children is placement in one of three Remedial Disciplinary (RD) schools. As an alternative to this method, the disruptively disturbed child should be kept within his local neighborhood school whenever possible.

2) The present RD schools should not be closed in one single operation in time but should be phased out as experiment and demonstration of an alternative system (outlined below) proves efficient, effective and economical.

3) All presently defined cases of disturbed children who previously would have been sent to an RD School and who are 12 years of age or younger should no longer be sent to an RD School but should be retained in their present local schools.

4) Recommended for immediate experimentation, demonstration and evaluative research is the establishment of a system of Adjustment Specialists.

5) Adjustment Specialists should be persons trained, or rapidly trainable, in handling emotional and behavioral problems of children and youth, should have ability in working with faculty and administration, with parents and community agencies.

6) Adjustment Specialists need not necessarily have degrees in Education per se, may be social workers
or other professional representatives who have the talents needed for the tasks.

7) The Adjustment Specialists should be placed immediately in the present secondary schools which are the major contributors to the flow of referrals to RD Schools.

8) Concomitant to the establishment of Adjustment Specialists should be a modified version of the "crisis intervention" class. This term is used to connote the real fact of considerable variability in each child's case. Some children will get along well with all but one or two teachers; other children will be disruptive in half their classes; a few in all their classes. Rosters will vary and there will be need for an Adjustment Specialist to maintain close contact with each teacher from whose class the child is withdrawn so that the academic or other work schedule is kept up to date. But the Crisis Intervention Classes will also have group experiences derived from experiments in behavioral, or conditional, therapy; and there should be many opportunities, with much flexibility, to engage in a variety of discussions ranging from problems of adjustment to the school setting to life in an urban environment in general. A considerable mobility and fluidity of children and types of experiences should characterize these classes. Whenever possible, the Adjustment Specialist, who will organize and conduct these classes, should enlist the assistance of adjusted, non-disturbed, non-disruptive children in the local school to participate in the group experiences. The Crisis Intervention Class could become an exciting experience in group life for all participants, and thereby avoid the ugly labeling of a place for rejecting and rejected children. School leaders who have made appropriate adjustments should be encouraged to engage in these group meetings at specific times for the challenge of helping others is an enormous appeal to youth. Moreover, all of the participants will have opportunities to give vent to their grievances with the school, with the older generation, with the larger social system.
B - SERVICES FOR CHILDREN WITH LESS SEVERE PROBLEMS

There are many children in the school system who do not manifest behavioral disturbance but whose physical and emotional problems can and do lead to such manifestation if ignored. For this group, we recommend early identification and immediate help.

C - COUNSELING

All children in the system should have the opportunity for understanding and constructive counseling. The complex personal, family, social as well as academic problems which beset youth in a rapidly changing society make such counseling on an individual and/or group basis of the utmost importance.

D - SCHOOL SAFETY

Education cannot go on in an atmosphere of either fear or repression. The need for properly trained Non-Teaching Assistants (NTAs), competent in maintaining order as well as sensitive to human relations, is clearly understood. Such personnel should be available in each school as needed, with every effort made to recruit them from the community by the school and to integrate their activities closely with the entire school family—administrators, teachers and students. We further urge the creation of a system for the confidential reporting and immediate investigation of potentially dangerous situations as a means of ensuring maximum safety for all school participants.

E - CURRICULUM

We recommend the continuation and intensification of current efforts to provide a curriculum flexible enough to meet the needs and interests of students of all ages and from all backgrounds. 80

80 Memorandum to Dr. Mark R. Shedd from the Citizens Committee on Public Education in Philadelphia regarding "Recommendations in Response to the Leeds Incident."
The CCPEP built their recommendations upon the use of an adjustment specialist, because if such an individual were present in the local school, intervention and referral of disruptive children would undoubtedly be made earlier than the present "last resort" referral to an RD School. Earlier intervention meant earlier in the school year, earlier in the degree of disruptiveness, and earlier in the age of the child. In addition, more disturbed children would be identified, diagnosed and treated earlier in their biographies, problems would be handled more quickly at a lower level of disturbance. This would result in more cases appearing among the younger age groups and fewer deeply-rooted chronic cases in the later adolescent ages. Truancy alone would not ordinarily constitute a case for the adjustment specialist, but because close contact would be maintained with each disturbed child in his present school there would be a much higher degree of regular attendance by the cases in the charge of the adjustment specialist, and the 40 per cent of cases now not in school in the RD Schools should be reduced far below half that amount in the alternative scheme.

On March 22, the CCPEP presented another quite lengthy statement to the Board of Education, this time containing its reactions to the Superintendent's recommendations on violence and discipline. 81

81 Statement made by a representative of the Citizens Committee on Public Education in Philadelphia at the Philadelphia Board of Education meeting of March 22, 1971.
Each recommendation was dealt with individually, and specific comments were made with regard to strengthening or rewording several of them. The additional provision for the use of corporal punishment was rejected in favor of the committee's suggestion to temporarily remove disruptive students to special classes. Generally speaking, the CCPEP's few points of disagreement with the Superintendent's recommendations were far outweighed by an overall approval of the document.

The Council of Student Association Presidents. - - A special meeting attended by almost all of the two dozen senior high school student association presidents was convened during the second week in February. The first part of the meeting was spent discussing plans for implementing the Student Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, which, in spite of increasing negative criticism, had not been held in abeyance. Immediately after that, the student association presidents met with Dr. Shedd and his two assistants to discuss violence and discipline in the schools, and develop recommendations to deal with the existing situation. Twelve recommendations resulted from that meeting. Most of them, however, described perceived needs, without suggesting specific solutions. The council recommended that:

1. Apathy needed to be combatted by greater student involvement.

2. A means to deal with extortion be developed.
3. The problem of over-crowding must be solved.

4. Student-teacher relationships be improved.

5. Student officers should be more visible among their peers so that student government is taken more seriously.

6. The current system of suspension is inadequate and should be restructured.

7. Student courts are not doing an effective job and should either be restructured or done away with.

8. NTAs need specific human relations training.

9. Petty rules should be re-evaluated and those judged necessary should be equitably applied in all schools.

10. The handbook in each school should be revised.

11. Students should take a more active role in community affairs.

12. Education must be made more relevant to the needs of all students. 82

Local Home and School Associations and School Advisory Groups. --The eighteen local school groups from which inputs were gathered were those which presented statements directly to the Superintendent and Board of Education, either by letter or in person at a Board meeting. A great many other local associations provided inputs to the Philadelphia Home and School Council (presented earlier in this chapter). As would be expected, a number of the recommendations were repeated by several of the groups. The two most common

82 From notes taken at the meeting.
recommendations, for example, dealt with corporal punishment and parents' relationship to discipline. A bare majority of the local home and school associations opposed corporal punishment, generally stating that "only parents should administer such treatment." Most groups opposing corporal punishment viewed the hope that it would further education as illusory, and claimed it would instead merely open the door to increased degradation and abuse of children. Approximately one-third of the local groups supported the use of corporal punishment by teachers, and openly voiced their support of the discretion exercised by most teachers. Several groups stated that they would support the use of corporal punishment if a means of regulating its abuse could be devised. One local association supported the teachers' "right to restrain any child in case of attack." As many groups could not reach consensus on the issue as favored it, however. Said one group: "We decided we couldn't vote yes or no when everyone has a different idea of what corporal punishment means."

The role of and relationship to the discipline process which ought to be maintained by parents was dealt with by many of the groups, utilizing divergent approaches. Several groups simply suggested that


parents be held responsible for their children's actions. One group disagreed, and noted that punitive measures against parents of problem children might only cause additional problems if (1) the pressure on parents aggravates their inability to care for their children or (2) parents are unable to hold the school system accountable for the school environment. Monetary penalties for parents were also proposed: "Rather than suspension for the problem child, perhaps a fine imposed upon the parent would remedy the situation immediately." Other less punitive suggestions were made, including making the parents of problem children attend classes on how to discipline their youngsters, or utilizing educational television to help parents overcome their misconceptions regarding discipline and learn to cope with children without resorting to constant physical punishment.

Recommendations were also made concerning the need for additional specialized personnel. Additional counselors were suggested by one home and school association, while another urged that one psychologist be hired for every four schools. It was also recommended that stronger relationships with community mental health agencies be developed.

A request that disciplinary schools providing specialized


treatment be established was made by several groups, one of which specified that one disciplinary or residential facility be provided for each of the eight districts. The notion of a disruptive room for each school was also presented. Such a room, geared toward pupils with emotional problems who could not be contained in a normal classroom set-up, would be staffed with a specially-trained teacher and aide.

Among the dozens of other recommendations made by local home and school associations and school advisory committees, the following were most common:

1. Permanent security guards be assigned to school buildings, and not brought in only after an emergency had occurred.

2. Additional school-community coordinators (community residents, approved by the principal working as liaisons between the school and the surrounding area) should be hired.

3. A working case review committee should be established in each district and school to consider special problem children.

4. A handbook of rules and regulations should be developed by the central office, distributed to all students, and rigidly adhered to.

5. A trade should be taught at an earlier age to children who are neither interested in the academic subjects nor motivated toward learning.

6. Juveniles guilty of a school-related crime should be
prosecuted by the teacher involved, who in turn should be guaranteed safety from recriminations.

7. Guidelines regarding the transfer of disruptive pupils most be developed.

8. Teacher training programs introducing new techniques for dealing with problem children should be instituted.

9. More individualized attention and specialized programs for children experiencing difficulty in school should be implemented. In addition, programs which have already proven effective should be expanded.

10. Substitute teachers should be upgraded by means of a required orientation program prior to their appointment. It is critical that their treatment of children conforms to the established regulations.

**Civic Groups**

Among the many civic groups which reacted to the school system crisis and provided inputs to the Board or Superintendent, half a dozen bear particular mention, either because of the frequency with which they contributed, the point of view voiced, or the nature of the organization.

_The Philadelphia Urban Coalition._ --An extremely active group, the Urban Coalition joined the numerous other organizations
which supported the Superintendent, and called the PFT demands for
his resignation "invalid and irrelevant." The coalition was also
quick to react to the call for suggestions regarding violence and dis­
cipline, and presented four recommendations, first to Dr. Shedd, then
publically to the Board of Education.

The Philadelphia Urban Coalition's primary recommendation
cconcerned the establishment of a learning center in each of the eight
districts whose sole purpose would be to house and provide for those
pupils who had been designated as either disruptive or chronic dis­
cipline problems. The centers would offer a wide range of courses
which would provide for opportunities in higher education and job
placement. Each center would be equipped with supportive psycho­
logical service; close scrutiny would preclude the possibility of these
centers becoming a dumping ground for unwanted pupils.

Next, it was suggested that system-wide discipline and punish­
ment standards be established by the Central Administration after
suitable involvement and input from all concerned and interested per­
sons, so that pupils, administrators, teachers, and parents would
know exactly what the limits were. The spirit of this suggestion was
in keeping with the recently passed Student Bill of Rights and Respon­sibilities.

Third, it was felt that a combined effort directed toward obtaining the services of additional youth workers, whose hiring had been prevented by a lack of funds, should be instituted. Evidence has shown that increased youth services reduces the probability of gang-related violence. Finally, the Urban Coalition made it known that the resources of its Education Task Force were available for assistance in implementing these proposals. 89, 90

The Philadelphia Urban League. --The major responsibility for discipline, according to the Urban League, should rest with the classroom teacher. The league stated that a solution to the discipline problem could be effected if teachers became sensitive to the needs of their students and if parents were permitted to become actively involved in the operation of their children's schools, and, therefore, more knowledgeable about the system. 91 A list of nine recommendations to improve discipline in the schools was issued by the Urban League on February 8, followed a month later by a critique of the

89 Ibid.


91 Statement made by a representative of the Philadelphia Urban League at the Philadelphia Board of Education meeting of February 8, 1971.
Superintendent's recommendations and some additional ones of its own.

In the earlier set, the league urged

1) removal of NTAs and armed security guards which create an atmosphere of a police state;

2) cessation of existing innovative programs geared toward improving discipline and implementation of activities geared towards "humanizing" teachers and administrators, so they relate to students as individual human beings, not as a student number;

3) classroom management programs for teachers to include early symptoms of problems, nature of problems and how to deal with problems as they occur;

4) early psychological and psychiatric examinations of students suspected of having adjustment problems, with the consent of and in consultation with parents;

5) cessation of transferring students from class to class or school to school, instead of dealing with the problems;

6) re-examination of the reasons students are suspended and transferred (sometimes arbitrarily) and proper follow-up activity;

7) redefinition of the role of the "disciplinarian" in the schools;

8) immediate implementation of the Student Bill of Rights;

9) establishment of local centers, to be staffed by members of educational and community organizations concerned with improving the educational system, available to parents in the evening so they can discuss concerns for their children in the classroom and in the system. 92

The Urban League, after examining Dr. Shedd's recommendations on discipline, proposed a number of amendments to the

92 Ibid.
Superintendent. Suspension, for example, should not be used as a means of punishment, they contended, and urged that procedures be developed for reviewing suspension prior to their implementation.

Also recommended was that training programs for all substitute teachers and prospective substitutes, in the rudiments of teacher-student interaction and classroom management, be mandatory before they be allowed to enter a classroom. Similarly, it was suggested that all NTAs and security officers should receive proper training in student-NTA and student-security officer relationships.

The Urban League recommended that the organization of dual shifts be studied and evaluated until an alternate system could be used to replace it. The dual shift system (prevalent in many high schools and some junior high schools) was cited as having created many of the trespassing problems in the schools as well as a situation of non-communication between upper and lower classmates.

It was also recommended that students be involved in the proposed intensive programs of parent and community involvement in the discipline process in each district and school. Furthermore, the amendment to include a corporal punishment provision as part of the recommendations was rejected in favor of the District's current policy.

Four other recommendations were made by the Urban League
in addition to those proposed by the Superintendent of Schools:

1) A complete study and re-evaluation of the present system of psychiatric and psychological testing in the Philadelphia Public School System because:
   a) testing is one of the methods of distinguishing the difference between a "discipline" problem and a psychological or innate physiological problem,
   b) the testing system should be designed towards positive diagnosis of the behavior of our children, not negative labeling,
   c) testing children suspected of having adjustment problems is a service rendered by the Board of Education and is too expensive for our parents to provide for individual testing of their children.

2) Cessation of existing innovative programs geared towards improving discipline and implementation of activities geared toward humanizing teachers and administrators, so they relate to students as individual human beings, not as a student number.

3) Immediate implementation of the Student Bill of Rights.

4) Establishment of local centers, to be staffed by members of educational and community organizations concerned with improving the educational system, available to parents in the evening so they can discuss concerns for their children in the classroom and in the system. 93

The Equality League. — Also called the Education Equality League, the organization was founded in 1932 and had approximately one thousand members in 1971. Open to any interested party, its membership included community people, teachers, and administrators. The league did not make specific recommendations concerning

93 Statement made by a representative of the Philadelphia Urban League at the Philadelphia Board of Education meeting of March 8, 1971.
discipline, but like many other organizations, it assailed the PFT for using the death of Samson Freedman as a means of seeking Dr. Shedd's resignation. The action taken by the PFT showed it needed a change in leadership, said a league spokesman. 94

The Committee of Seventy. --One of the most prestigious groups in the city, the Committee of Seventy, was composed of wealthy, socially prominent, and influential individuals. Many of the famous names of Philadelphia were represented in the group, which had been likened to a civic-oriented version of the famous "New York Four Hundred," and tended to view themselves as the group whose task it was to guide the welfare of the city. Raymond K. Denworth, representing the committee, chastised the PFT's "personal and vindictive attack" as being "nothing more than narrow prejudice." 95 He continued by noting that the School Board's task was far more complex than "merely preparing a safe warehouse for the young people of Philadelphia," but he did not elaborate specifically as to what that task might be. 96


96 Ibid.
The Committee to Improve Neighborhood and Community
Harmony. --Comparatively recent in origin, this organization appealed
to each community to involve itself in community programming and
activities which made for better understanding between neighbors.
The group's major input regarding discipline was to urge the Police
Department to place foot patrolmen on school premises in view of
all students.  

The Jewish Defense League. --The only group of any type
besides the PFT to blame the incident and subsequent crisis on the
Superintendent, and call for his resignation, was the Jewish Defense
League. The local chapter of this national organization claimed that
the killing could have been prevented if the league's demands con-
cerning Leeds Junior High School, made in June of 1970, had been
heeded. At that time, several members of the group, including its
spokesman, Rabbi Harold Novoseller, refused to leave the school
principal's office which they had forcibly occupied, and were subse-
quently removed by the police.

Novoseller told Board President Dilworth and Superintendent

97 Former Police Commissioner Frank Rizzo had done away
with all but about one hundred foot patrolmen on the Police Force. In
doing so, he pointed out that crime prevention was not a practical
reality, but criminal apprehension, by police in squad cars was
feasible.

98 "School Board Hears 27 on Classroom Discipline,"
Shedd that "The buck stops here. You are responsible for what goes on." The league made three demands concerning discipline:

1. Security measures in all schools should be increased.
2. All trouble makers should be suspended and not be permitted to return to school until satisfactory disposition is made of their situation.
3. Incorrigibles should be transferred "out of the system."

Mental Health Organizations. --Five mental health organizations spoke to the Board of Education regarding violence and discipline in the schools, and unanimously opposed the use of corporal punishment as a solution. One group, from a solidly black area, condemned both the white and black establishment for trying to impose physical abuse upon underprivileged black children, and directed the Board to "call together some nitty-gritty, gut-bucket parents" to help make the decisions that would affect their children. A physician who directed the psychiatric center of a local children's hospital testified that physical punishment would not work, and instead would create more volatility and would have a detrimental effect upon the

99"Board Hears Groups Give Shedd Support," loc. cit.

100Statement made by a member of the Executive Board of the Community Mental Health Board, Catchment Area 4, at the Philadelphia Board of Education meeting of April 12, 1971.
overall growth and development of children. The local chapter of
the National Association of Social Workers came out against adoption
of the Superintendent's recommendations as they were originally is-
sued, and suggested that they be revised so as to improve clarity and
specificity. In addition, the association volunteered their services in
the five areas which were felt to be most critical--(1) staff training,
(2) special schools and classes, (3) cooperation with mental health
agencies, (4) courses in the causes of disruption, and (5) restructur-
ing the secondary school program and programs of parent and com-
munity involvement in the discipline process.

Northwest Area Civic Organizations. -- An ad hoc organiza-
tion, composed of fifteen autonomous groups from the general area of
the city in which Samson Freedman lived and taught, was formed to
present a united front in reacting to the crisis. The group claimed
membership in excess of 7500 families. Working as a single organi-
zation, the groups recommended that:

1. All persons in every community do involve themselves
in community programming and activities which provide for
better understanding and fellowship between neighbors and com-
munities.

101 Statement made by a representative of the St. Christo-
pher's Hospital for Children, Child Psychiatry Center at the Phila-
delphia Board of Education meeting of March 22, 1971.

102 Statement made by a representative of the Philadelphia
Chapter of the American Association of Social Workers at the Phila-
delphia Board of Education meeting of March 22, 1971.
2. The Police Department place foot patrolmen at school premises, especially at opening and closing times, in plain view of all pupils. "There is no effective substitute for the visual presence of uniformed policemen on school grounds."

3. Mayor Tate utilize the funds made available by City Council to engage additional youth or gang workers; and City Council establish a Youth Services Commission.

4. The School District of Philadelphia keep trained security guards within the premises of any school where the school administration deems this necessary, particularly at the opening and closing of school. In this respect, it was strongly recommended that such security guards be thus placed on a permanent basis and not temporarily in response to the Freedman murder.

5. The School District and others increase and intensify the number of special programs geared for disruptive pupils in the public schools, including a more effective means of dealing with disciplinary cases, such as programs instituted in sub-schools, independent schools, or experimental non-school environments.

6. The School District consider the need for special programs for faculty and parents intended to focus upon the quality of education and nature of life style in a particular community.

7. Appropriate and effective gun control legislation be enacted that would make it very difficult to obtain lethal weapons. ¹⁰³

Other Civic Organizations. --Over a dozen other civic organizations submitted a primary reaction to the shooting or a later reaction to the Superintendent's recommendations on violence and discipline in the schools. Some were quite specific (e.g., the

¹⁰³Statement made by a representative of the Northwest Area Civic Organizations at the Philadelphia Board of Education meeting of February 8, 1971. (Edited by the author.)
American Civil Liberties Union was concerned about a possible overreaction to the situation which might deprive students of their legal rights, but most, however, simply called for a rational but firm approach to solving the problems. About half of these groups supported the Reverend Nichols' corporal punishment amendment, and most of them urged a strict trespass law be adopted. There was agreement with most of the Superintendent's recommendations, and, as might be expected, over-reaction by a few more conservative area organizations. One group, for example, placed the following recommendation at the top of its list:

All pupils shall be required to wear clean clothes and be properly washed and groomed. Ragged dungarees and similar garments shall be banned.

The precise relationship of the above recommendation to violence and discipline was not dealt with by the group from which it emanated, however.

Inputs Provided By Individuals

Professional Educators. — Almost half of the individual inputs examined in this chapter were provided by professional educators.


105 Statement made by a representative of the Greater Olney Community Council at the Philadelphia Board of Education meeting of February 8, 1971.
educators, practically all of whom were connected with the School District of Philadelphia. The one notable exception represented the Philadelphia Archdiocese. About fifteen School District administrators gathered for two extended "brainstorming sessions" early in February. In addition to their own ideas, inputs from other staff members were "fed into the mix" during those sessions. Each of the eight district superintendents also provided Dr. Shedd with their inputs, which will be considered in this section, too.

Father David E. Walls. --Assistant Superintendent of the Philadelphia Archdiocesan Schools (which include the five-county metropolitan area), Father Walls was interviewed several days after Mr. Freedman was killed. His comments were vague, in that he felt it would be inappropriate for him to discuss a school system other than his own. He admitted, however, that the Archdiocesan authorities "did not know if they could have handled the situation any better than the public school authorities."106

In general, Father Walls seemed to indicate that the public schools were not strict enough in maintaining discipline and, therefore, preventing violence. Nevertheless, he observed that "It is evident that strong local public school leadership must be successfully

106Interview with Father David E. Walls conducted by the Supervisor of Intersystem Cooperation.
handling many potential cases of violence. "107

Interestingly enough, the problem of discipline consumed the parochial schools a month later, but as the result of a less violent act. Racial strife broke out at Roman Catholic High School, subsequent to which the principal installed and enforced "martial law" at the center city school. Though a group of priests dissented by publically denouncing the principal's "dehumanizing tactics," the parents upheld the administration, and an uneasy calm prevailed. 108

**Brainstorming Sessions.** Two brainstorming sessions were held in order to discuss the "who, why, and how" of violence in the schools and to generate alternative solutions for dealing with the situation. Included at these meetings were the Superintendent; the four deputy superintendents; the two assistants to the Superintendent; the Directors of the Child Development Center, the Parkway Project, the Office of Community Affairs, the Office of Health Services, Pupil Personnel and Counseling, and Career Development; the Chief of Internal Security; the Chief of Facilities Security; two high school principals; and the General Counsel (the chief Board attorney).

Several dozen recommendations were generated by the individuals who attended the brainstorming sessions. The following

---

107Ibid.

paragraphs contain those recommendations, as well as pertinent background information:

1. The public schools' image of permissiveness must be overcome and dispelled. To do so, a hard line must be taken with kids who commit violence, assaults, or carry weapons. Expulsion, suspension, or alternative programs should be mandated. In addition, a hard line in forbidding revolutionaries to come into schools should also be taken.

2. An improved communications system is needed that will report all incidents, with a mechanism for taking prompt action and communicating that action (e.g., a standard order of procedure for principals that will give the assurances that incidents are being reported and action reported back).

3. All staff members should be encouraged to prosecute in cases of violence. Such teachers and principals should be supported publicly, particularly when they are under attack by other voices in the community.

4. A mini-school might be one alternative for students who are prone to violence. Each high school might have such an auxiliary school which would be located in a three-story row house separate from, but in the general neighborhood of the school. The school would include:

   a. 35-40 students

   b. Two full-time, one part-time person. (Full-time
teacher and community person.) The staffing would also include five periods per week in each personal and community studies, and image building.

c. One day a week psychiatric services with a Black psychiatrist. Program would also include an evening program and performing arts (drama, music, and media). This would be the focal point of other community programs such as the Gang Control and Turf Out Program (where gang leaders meet and work to break up developing neighborhood gang problems).

d. A job placement component that assures a job for any kid who wants part-time work (for money while in school), plus assurance of full-time job placement upon graduation from school.

5. To overcome the notion that people in the central office do not know that real world is like, it should be required of all staff to spend a minimum of five to ten days per year in the schools teaching in classroom or filling an administrative post. People released could visit or participate in planning between offices of the administration building and various offices of the districts.

6. Money should be allocated to schools, groups of teachers, and groups of students in the schools for funding of staff development programs carried on at the local school level. Money
could be assigned to children to decide what kind of programs they feel the teachers need.

7. Certain standards for hiring of new teachers should be upgraded and made more explicit. For example:
   a. A minimum of successful student teaching in an intercity situation.
   b. A minimum of five days per year spent with faculty, parents and students in a joint planning conference.

8. A basic code of behavior and sanctions for students should be developed.

9. Renewal teams should be instituted in each junior and senior high school so that the staff can take a look at their school in light of its operation by viewing some of the innovations that may be taking place in other schools throughout the system.

10. Board should establish set policies and must be consistent in enforcing them.

11. The Board should be moderate in its public behavior. Outbursts and arguments at public meetings set a poor example.

12. At the school level it is necessary to be consistent in dealing with offenses of a major nature, such as carrying weapons. Sensitivity in dealing with the causes of such incidents must be developed.

13. Principals must spend more time in their schools. Some
spend 50 per cent of their time in meetings away from the school. This must be reduced to below 25 per cent. If meetings must be conducted, they should be held after school hours. Principals must be visible to students and teachers.

14. A basic skill should be added to our list of others--to teach human relations to children. (How to deal with people and ways to eliminate violence.) This should not mean, however, the addition of more specialists which would increase the number of adults to which kids must relate.

15. There is a necessity for restructuring the disciplinary schools. The quest must be to educate and rehabilitate; to enable them to carry on a regular career. The experience should be supportive rather than what now exists at Boone, Cornman, and Catto. Most important in this kind of treatment is consistency.

16. Record keeping and communication between school and central office should be made more comprehensive and greatly improved. The present suspension and transfer policy is useless.

17. Line administrators should be trained in reporting incidents and in techniques for dealing with them.

18. The central office should identify what support can be provided to field administrators and teachers. Examples might include:

   a. Instant expert psychiatric service
   b. Instant legal advice in racial crisis
c. Help in dealing with other community concerns.

19. A series of workshops would be helpful for administrators to come to agreement on basic discipline procedures and then for teachers and administrators to come to agreements at their level.

20. The trust level between teachers and administrators should be worked on. A good many administrators do not report situations downtown because they are concerned that they will be viewed as not functioning correctly.

21. An evaluation of the disruptive pupil programs now in operation is needed to determine their impact. Also the case review committee operating in certain districts should be examined and considered for possible expansion.

22. Schools have given up on trying to monitor and do something about class cutting. Each school should determine why cutting exists and how to get teachers to cooperate with administrators in making it their responsibility to correct the situation.

23. The Superintendent should point up to the Board the ramifications of constructing large junior and senior high schools, and tell them to be prepared for consequences. Smaller schools are necessary.

24. Linkages must be sought with local psychiatric and mental health institutions.

25. The Superintendent should, if possible, spend a large
block of time in the schools so he will be viewed as having a greater interest in the community.

26. A conference should be held with PFT leadership to seek cooperative agreements regarding the role of the teacher in the discipline process.

27. NTA services in the schools should be examined in terms of how they affect students.

28. The kind of support teachers need from administrators when "up against the wall" with a discipline problem should be determined.

29. A statement from the Superintendent and Board as to what constitutes acceptable behavior should be issued.

30. Basic school security operations in terms of physical plant and personnel, should be assessed.

31. Recreational and physical education services should be evaluated and extended, and a cost benefit analysis should be undertaken.

District Superintendents. -- Each of the eight district superintendents were requested to submit recommendations on dealing with violence and improving discipline. Every district superintendent met with all or part of his staff to discuss the situation and formulate suggestions for remedying it. The results of those meetings were
submitted individually by each district superintendent. Since, however, there was a great deal of duplication, the recommendations will not be considered district by district, but instead have been analyzed so as to eliminate repetition and combined into a single group. The number of district superintendents suggesting any given solution will also be noted in each case.

A good many recommendations related to the role played by teachers in disciplining their students. Several district superintendents (hereafter referred to as DSs) recommended that the priority item be to recognize the fact that discipline begins in the classroom with the relationship between the teacher and pupil. Teachers, therefore, should be held accountable for classroom discipline and for supporting the school discipline program in all relationships with pupils. In order to accomplish this, it was urged (by three DSs) that individual and group assistance be provided to teachers to build an understanding of the causes of pupil behavior, intelligent and appropriate handling of disciplinary infractions, and effective methods of classroom management. Several DSs also advised that principals be required to give teachers assistance and supervision in dealing with pupils. Such assistance might include observations followed by conferences and plans for helping the teachers.

\[109\] The Deputy Superintendent for Instruction had requested each of the eight district superintendents to provide him with this information almost immediately after the Freedman killing.
Reducing teacher absenteeism was another area touched upon. One of the most consistently advocated points (by four DSs), however, was that teachers should be reassigned to lunchroom and hall duties. At present, teachers are exempted from participating in such duties by the PFT contract on the grounds that they are non-professional duties, and teachers are professionals.

A greater utilization of mental health facilities was prescribed, especially the part-time use of local mental health consultant services. One DS recommended the development of the position of "community mental health aide" and the subsequent training and hiring of such personnel for use in the schools. Another DS advised the organizing of a coordinated mental health team in each school, to include the principal, counselor, teacher, and medical representatives working to improve the overall school and classroom climate as well as to give attention to individual pupil adjustment. The movement to provide increased psychiatric and psychological services in the schools was also commended by several DSs.

Special personnel to deal with disciplinary problems before they lead to violence were included on each DS's list. Only one suggested a crisis intervention teacher (similar to Chesler's approach), but four of the eight DSs urged additional security personnel. Several specifically desired some type of security officer on regular duty at certain elementary schools, while additional NTAs were recommended
for all junior and senior high schools on an on-going basis, not just in
times of trouble.

Two DSs presented the notion of a discipline team composed
of teachers, students, parents, and other community persons to deal
with special problems. Such a team might also develop roles and
regulations geared toward the needs of that particular school and com-
munity. Also suggested was a pupil services team, based in each
district, to function as a consultant on behavior to the district's
schools.

New forms of cooperation between the disciplinary staff and
counselors were sought by another DS. Merely punishing misbehavior
was viewed as insufficient; there was a need seen to discover the
causes of certain behaviors. Misbehavior, for example could be the
result of boredom, poor verbal skills, hostility toward parents, or
low self-esteem. The pupil-counselor ratio was also viewed as need-
ing careful reassessment in order to insure a more productive and
viable relationship between the counselor and student. A staff de-
velopment program for all personnel coping with discipline was also
prescribed, especially for NTAs.

A half dozen of the DS's recommendations on violence and
discipline dealt with disruptive pupils. One of the most crucial of
these recommendations (mentioned by three DSs) was the early identi-
fication of individuals whose behavior indicated serious emotional
problems. Several DSs practically demanded that city-wide uniformity and consistency be maintained in dealing with disruptive pupils. The handling of disruptive pupils generated three closely-linked suggestions, the most immediate of which was to develop a means for a pupil's entire record to follow him if he transferred (or was transferred) from one school to another. Such a system would assure that the counselor at the receiving school was advised of any special behavioral problems which might lead to violence. It was advised that these records be required reading for the transfeeree's new teacher as well. Also advocated was a trial transfer procedure such that certain students would be transferred on a trial basis, with their records reviewed periodically. One DS pressed for a special form, prepared by the central office, to inform parents of their child's suspension.

Several types of alternative facilities were proposed as another means of dealing with the problems created by violence and the lack of discipline in the schools, the most common alternative (proposed by three DSs) being to establish additional classes for disruptive pupils or an entire RD (remedial disciplinary) organization at each district level. The children in such a facility would receive the benefit of intensive psychiatric services and programs especially tailored to meet their needs. Another DS suggested that an evaluation and detention center for disruptive students be established in each district on a long- and short-term basis. Regardless of the type of
facility, several DSs agreed that more extensive use could be made of the three existing totally RD facilities once their program had been examined and modified so as to enable the centers to be more responsive to the needs of disordered children. Existing community facilities were viewed as providing the necessary space for the treatment of disruptive students until the Board of Education could secure their own buildings.

Two other alternatives in terms of facilities were proposed--a "mini school" and a "half-way house." The mini school concept, which was currently being piloted in one of the districts, provided for a conversion of a row home in the vicinity of a high school to a special facility for maladjusted pupils. The half-way house, which would provide residential care for seriously disruptive and emotionally disturbed students, would also prepare such students for readmission to a public school by conducting an intensive guidance program.

The central administration was also charged with a number of responsibilities in conjunction with revising the school discipline program. Foremost in the minds of three DSs was the need to completely revise the existing administrative bulletin dealing with discipline. This bulletin, developed in the mid-1950s, was viewed as ambivalent by many, and included no specific guidelines for action. A strong central policy dealing with discipline problems and disruptive students was called for, with effective support for teachers and field
administrators. A joint statement by the Board, Superintendent, PFT, and Home and School Council that effective discipline is endorsed and supported was urged as a first step by one DS, while another viewed the establishment of constructive citizenship and character education programs by the central office as requisites for improving discipline.

In the area of curriculum, a number of adjustments and additions were recommended. (If more than one DS suggested any of the following, the number who did so follows in parentheses.) It was recommended that:

1. The Student Bill of Rights and Responsibilities not be implemented until its implication for discipline be clearly resolved. (3)

2. The funding level of the Disruptive Pupil Program should be increased. (2)

3. Well-planned "vestibule classes" be established.

4. A serious reassessment of the entire secondary education program be made.

5. A re-examination of the "house plan" concept be instituted.

6. School administrators should visit secondary schools which have been identified as having developed success programs for dealing with discipline problems.

7. School administrators need to develop and expand, particularly at the elementary school level, alternatives employing the
principles of behavior modification in the education of behaviorally disordered children.

8. Study halls should be removed from the school program.

9. The lunch program should be reassessed in terms of menu and environment.

10. Vocational education and the school-work program should be made available to greater numbers of students. (3)

The role of students was also considered in terms of their being involved in assessing their role relationships and responsibility to the school community. Several DSs stressed that students should be involved meaningfully in the formulation of school policies affecting them. Ironically, however, it was suggested that the implementation of the Student Bill of Rights and Responsibilities be delayed by one of the same DSs who called for increased student involvement.

The role of the line administrator, particularly the school principal, was viewed as critical to an effective discipline program; hence, a number of recommendations were related to such individuals. Principals, it was noted by two DSs, should be personally responsible for making sure that teachers' referrals (of problem students) are handled promptly, with immediate feedback provided to the teacher as to the action taken. The amount of clerical work required of principals was also of some concern, in that it often took so much of the principal's time that it prohibited thorough supervision of teachers.
It was recommended that priorities relating to the tasks performed by principals be reassessed in the hopes of freeing principals to perform a more extensive leadership role in each of their schools.

More authority was also requested for line administrators in dealing with disruptive students, along with complete support from the central office and Board of Education. It was further recommended that support be given at every administrative echelon for the principal's decision in disciplinary cases—no higher authority should overrule the building principal's judgment. 110

It was suggested also that the administrative staff of each school be expanded so that more persons would be available to work with parents and community groups on the improvement of the school operation. Coupled with that suggestion was one that a structure be created whereby parents must deal with principals first, rather than higher-level administrative officers.

Finally, the DSs made a number of recommendations that did not fit readily in any of the previously examined categories. These miscellaneous suggestions, however, included some of the most important ones articulated thus far, and stressed that:

1. The police should be notified of every act of violence perpetrated against school personnel.

110 This recommendation directly contradicts the Student Bill of Rights and Responsibilities which provides an appeal mechanism from the principal, to the DS, to the Superintendent, to the Board of Education.
2. School personnel should be given the option of pressing charges. However, in the event that charges are not pressed, the case should be referred to the School District Legal Division, which would determine what action could be taken.

3. The School Board should insist that parents assume a greater responsibility for their children. (2)

4. Corporal punishment should be reinstituted as a means of discipline.

5. The recently released Decentralization Report should be reconsidered in terms of its possible effect in weakening the administration of consistent discipline practices. (2)

6. A centralized rumor control office should be established. (2)

7. City Council should pass the school trespass ordinance which they had been currently considering.

8. Pupils who bring guns or other potentially deadly weapons to school should be automatically prosecuted.

Politicians

Frank Rizzo. --One of the most controversial citizens of Philadelphia, Frank L. Rizzo, resigned his position as Police Commissioner several weeks prior to the Freedman killing to run in the
May primary election as a Democratic candidate for mayor.\footnote{Rizzo subsequently won the Democratic nomination in the May primary by garnering 176,000 votes compared to liberal Congressman Bill Green, Jr.'s 128,000 votes and black, State Representative Hardy Williams's 45,000 votes. Rizzo carried 37 wards; Green 26 wards; and Williams, 3 wards.}

As a strict "law and order" candidate, Rizzo's tactics were labeled facist by some, and he was generally unpopular with the liberal wing of his party. His dislike of Mark Shedd and Richardson Dilworth went back to an incident which occurred at the school administration building in the Autumn of 1967 (described in Chapter IV).

Three days after the Freedman slaying, Rizzo released his first statement as a mayorality candidate concerning education, claiming that the public schools were too permissive and that discipline had broken down completely. He noted that as Police Commissioner he had eighty patrolmen assigned to the public schools to maintain discipline, and not one in a parochial school.\footnote{Frank Heick, "Rizzo Raps Schools for 'Lack of Discipline'," \textit{Philadelphia Inquirer}, February 5, 1971, p. 1.} His answer to students attacking teachers was indicative of the man--"If some big bully is going to get up and threaten a teacher and wants to fight, I think we ought to have people around to accommodate him."\footnote{"Schools Too Permissive, Need Discipline, Rizzo Says," \textit{Philadelphia Bulletin}, February 5, 1971, p. 1.}

Ten days later Rizzo directly criticized Dr. Shedd by
blaming him for the breakdown in discipline and accusing him of "one man rule." The present administration, he said, prevented principals from exercising a free hand in dealing with discipline problems.  

As an example of this he cited the rule requiring principals to secure permission from the central administration building before calling in police in an emergency situation. He contradicted himself in a subsequent statement when he opposed calling in the police because their presence was often quite provocative.

Vaiinupo J. Alailima. --The only other mayorality candidate to be actively involved with the question of school discipline was both president of a group called Wynnefield Concerned Citizens and a Samoan Prince. Alailima's candidacy on the Republican ticket was taken about as seriously as that of Jimmy Breslin and Norman Mailer in New York City. Nevertheless, he presented public statements at practically every School Board meeting, and regularly suggested methods for improving discipline and amendments to the Superintendent's recommendations. Just as his political platform rested upon the notion of giving the city back to the people, his educational philosophy was built upon greater parental and community involvement. A frequent quoter of the Scriptures, "The Prince" (as several newsmen

called him) maintained the expected posture on corporal punishment--
"Spare the rod and spoil the child."

**Philadelphia City Council.** --Although most of the city council-
men voiced great concern for the schools, the Democratic Majority
Whip, Isadore Bellis, garnered most of the headlines. It was Bellis
who introduced a bill into Council banning strangers from entering
schools without first securing permission from the school principal,
the intent of which was praised by educators at all levels. To "put
some teeth" into that legislation, however, Bellis added a clause pro-
viding criminal penalties for principals who failed to summon police
immediately to evict trespassers. When the Superintendent and the
Philadelphia Principals' Association attempted to explain that such a
clause was (1) unsatisfactory in terms of probable strained relations
with parents and community members and (2) completely unrealistic
and unsatisfactory to the principals who would be expected to enforce
it, Bellis accused Shedd of "equivocating on the issue of student un-
rest."115

**The District Attorney's Office.** --Arlen Spector switched
parties to run for district attorney as a Republican and subsequently
built a reputation as a politically astute but honest civil servant.

115Desmond Ryan, "Bellis Accuses Shedd of 'Equivocating'
Spector's office was involved at several points in time following Samson Freedman's slaying. On February 5, formal action was initiated to have Kevin Simmons tried as an adult so that the D. A. could seek a first degree murder conviction and life imprisonment. The same day, the Board of Education requested that the D. A.'s Office examine the legal liability of Kevin's parents for leaving a firearm within the reach of minor children.

A week later, D. A. Spector attended a special meeting at the Superintendent's request, along with three high-ranking police representatives. Most of the inputs Mr. Spector provided were in response to specific questions asked by Dr. Shedd, such as, "What could be done to stop alcoholism in the schools?" To this, Spector suggested treating intoxicated students the same as drunken drivers. In terms of the overall discipline program, he opted for a "tougher line," but added that students had to be assured a "full measure of Constitutional rights" if a conviction was hoped for.

When pressed, Mr. Spector admitted that the city court system was very bad in terms of delays and taking out-of-court disciplinary action. He pointed out, however, that juvenile court was better

---


than adult court and had been disposing of cases within about one month's time. He suggested bringing parents into the picture by providing, as an alternative to sending their children to reform school, a probation period during which the parents and students would attend group sessions two nights a week.

The D. A. did not feel that joint training sessions involving NTAs and community (as someone had suggested) were feasible, though he supported community involvement. What the majority of parents would support, he felt, would be a tough, uniformly administered discipline policy.

Assistant District Attorney Winokur also made the recommendation that (1) when a critical incident report is recorded and (2) when the named individual is "picked up," the District Attorney's Office should be notified immediately. This would enable one of their representatives to be on hand at the Youth Study Center (a detention facility) for the hearing. Without such a procedure, a number of seriously disturbed minors would continue to be released on the recognizance of their parents, only to commit another similar crime within a short period of time. Such a student would often appear back in school the day after he had been arrested (for carrying a gun, for example), thus seriously undermining teacher morale.
Other Citizens

To attempt to describe the inputs provided by each of the parents and citizens who made recommendations on violence and discipline would not only be a tremendous task, but a less than practical one as well, for the majority of the recommendations were repetitive. Hundreds of letters were received by the Superintendent and Board of Education, most of which were constructive. Some, however, like the following example, typify the less than rational, hate-oriented reaction exhibited by other individuals:

Two years ago I moved from Mt. Airy to the Northeast and not a minute too soon.

People are told to stay calm after some black bastard shot and wounded a wonderful man Mr. Freedman who soon died.

Many people feel now that Mt. Airy is the same kind of neighborhood as West Philly. I agree.

If a white kid had shot Mr. Freedman he would be locked up and never heard of again but since the killer was a nigger he will get off easy. Watch and see.

You say more security measures will be taken - BULL- If any are taken at all they will be only very temporary.

If the police had any sense they would shoot the 14 year old black animal that is guilty and make everyone concerned happy.

I wouldn't be surprised if something like this happened again at Leeds. You ask how can I be so sure well it's just common sense with black students and white teachers.

The above portion of a letter was signed by a member of a group called SPONGE--Society for the Prevention of Niggers from Getting Everything.\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{118}Letter sent to the Superintendent of Schools, February 3, 1971.
Many students also provided inputs concerning the handling of discipline in their own schools. A compilation of their recommendations indicates that they were most concerned that:

1. A national gun control law be passed.

2. Alternatives to suspensions be developed. As presently structured, suspensions are merely viewed as a "day off."

3. A larger NTA force be hired and trained properly for that position.

4. Increased psychiatric and counseling services be made available. (Better qualified counselors were also needed.)

5. Parents be made more aware of their responsibility toward their children.

6. Human relations training be available to children, beginning at an early age.

7. Student government be given some real authority so it will be taken seriously by teachers and students.

8. Teachers be educated as to the importance of the Student Bill of Rights and Responsibilities.

9. Parents, teachers, and students meet together as a single group to share their points of view on discipline.

10. Suspension be eliminated altogether.

11. Students be taught to manifest hostility verbally instead of physically.
12. Police not be routinely assigned to schools.

13. Students be more involved in planning and implementing programs.

14. A more effective means of in-school communication be developed. Since most students find the public address system distracting, its use should be limited to certain times during each day.

15. Dual-shift schools be discontinued.

16. Substitute teachers not be assigned to teach particular subject matter unless they are qualified in that specific area.

Other major inputs concerning discipline were made by several high-ranking police officers from the Civil Disobedience Squad and the Juvenile Aid Division (JAD). It was recommended that top priority be given to training NTAs and other school security personnel. When such persons are called in, they had often been told to "take over" by the principal, without any set guidelines for action. Often each principal had a different concept of what mobile security personnel were to do when they arrived. It was also suggested that principals were not contacting the operation control room immediately in times of crisis, thus delaying the dispatching of special assistance.

Two of the police officials opted for the use of student identification cards and non-transferrable plastic rosters as a means of preventing outsiders from coming into the schools. The entire area
of pupil control was linked to the use of identification cards, with times of mass movement, such as class changes, lunch periods, and shift dismissals, being particularly difficult.

Finally, it was recommended that a new mechanism be developed to secure cooperation between principals and the police. Because of the existing situation, the police were often forced to gather their own information without the assistance of the school administration. In addition, principals had refused to allow police to question students in connection with incidents which had occurred at that very school. It was suggested that the image of the Juvenile Aid Division be changed from one intent on arresting delinquents to one interested in helping children.

An Overview of the Process

The third section of this chapter deals with the process by which the inputs were gathered and generated into outputs. Its approach to process breaks somewhat from the Good and Scales model in that it does not attempt to formulate generalizations concerning the relations between the action and goals. Such generalizations will be developed as part of the final chapter.

Process will be viewed here from three perspectives--first, the activities, from the initial planning to the revision of the recommendations will be described; next, a chronology of events will be
reported; and finally, the relationship of the Board of Education to this process will be considered.

**Activities**

Activities are defined, in the context of a network, as tasks in a project requiring the utilization of personnel and resources over a period of time. The process which took place as a direct result of the crisis situation consisted of eight readily identifiable activities—

1. preliminary planning,
2. staffing,
3. determining necessary inputs,
4. organizing to secure said inputs,
5. collecting the inputs,
6. analyzing and reviewing the inputs,
7. generating outputs,
8. revising the outputs.

**Preliminary Planning.** The initial planning process took place, as might be imagined, in an atmosphere of extreme crisis. The day following the murder, Dr. Shedd requested that each of the five groups holding collective bargaining agreements with the Board, and the Home and School Council, meet with him and Board President Dilworth. The purpose of this meeting was to begin to plan a means of dealing with the problems caused by violence and lack of discipline in the schools. The PFT attempted to take over the meeting, however,

---

and the only activity short of shouting was an agreement by all six groups to provide the Superintendent and Board of Education with their separate recommendations. Later that afternoon, after meeting with a group of principals, the Superintendent called an emergency meeting of his Executive Cabinet to discuss possible strategies for dealing with the situation. Three things were decided— that a special brainstorming session would be held the following day, that the immediate objective was to formulate a report to the Board including recommendations on violence and discipline in the schools, and that one of the Superintendent's two assistants would function as project manager of the effort to develop the report and generate the recommendations.

Staffing. -- Once the project manager was appointed, he began functioning immediately. After receiving assurance that until the task was completed it would be the number one priority of the system, he proceeded to secure the full-time services of a proposal writer/researcher and arranged for considerable assistance from the Superintendent's other assistant. All necessary secretarial help was provided for, and because the Executive Cabinet was involved in the preliminary planning, each of its members was alerted to cooperate

---

120 The Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, the Philadelphia Principals' Association, the Philadelphia Public School Nurses' Association, Local 1201 AFL-CIO, Local 434 AFL-CIO, and the Philadelphia Home and School Council.
in every way necessary. The staffs of several members of the Executive Cabinet also contributed significant pieces of their time in assisting with the task.

**Determining Necessary Inputs.** -- The entire number of group and individual inputs ultimately utilized was not generated at the outset of the project; many inputs were volunteered or requested during the course of the task. Dr. Shedd suggested a number of inputs which might first be examined. The following day, at the brainstorming session, a great number of additional suggestions as to sources were made. Still others were generated by members of the task force.

**Organizing to Secure the Inputs.** -- As each potential source of an input was generated, it was recorded and plans were made to "tap it." By the end of the third day, an extensive list of sources had been recorded. The sources were then ranked as to their priority and the projected difficulty in securing them (in terms of time and effort). A specific individual was then matched with each source. Such an individual was responsible for securing the inputs (tapping the source), and was selected on the basis of knowledge of and access to the source being considered. Certain high-level sources, like the District Attorney or Police Commissioner, were best contacted directly by the Superintendent, while lesser sources could be tapped by less influential individuals working on Dr. Shedd's behalf.
Collecting the Inputs. --The actual collection of inputs was accomplished in a variety of ways. Certain background material was gleaned from numerous books and articles, identified through a less than comprehensive literature review. It was not the intention of the task force, however, to rewrite the Kerner Report. Two all-afternoon brainstorming sessions were held, during which approximately fifteen invited persons worked in smaller groups and as a committee of the whole to attack the problem. In addition, a great many requested inputs were prepared in written form and transmitted to the task force, examples of which include those from the "union" groups and the district superintendents. Individual group meetings were also held with the DSs, students, and certain civic organizations. When specific inputs were needed from an individual or group, they were requested, usually over the phone and often in person. Interviews with non-school individuals were quite common. Several special "symposiums" involving diverse, yet related, individuals (eg., the District Attorney, several ranking police officers, and several Executive Cabinet members) were also held.

Analyzing and Reviewing the Inputs. --Once all inputs had been collected, they were analyzed and reviewed by (1) the project manager and his assistants, (2) the persons making up the second special brainstorming session, and (3) the superintendent. The
inputs were first grouped according to their general area, duplications being eliminated in the process, but being noted as an indication of strong support. Next, inputs were ranked as to their order of importance, feasibility, and immediacy (e.g., the construction of new types of physical facilities was viewed as one solution, yet costs, it was decided, might mitigate against certain suggested ideas; or time needed for planning and construction might result in the classification of certain other recommendations as "long-range").

Generating Outputs. --Once the inputs were analyzed and reviewed, the political realities which would be brought to bear upon each were considered. It was expected that the Superintendent's recommendations would reflect a stricter attitude toward discipline than had previously been exhibited. Dr. Shedd had been severely criticized by a number of factions for being "too modern" in his approach to discipline. Great pains were taken to frame recommendations that would (1) reflect the intent of the task force, (2) appear to take a "hard line" in punishing miscreants, yet (3) avoid extremes which would, themselves, reflect violence in the form of a backlash. The actual generation of outputs was accomplished by the task force, under the guidance of the Superintendent.

Revising Outputs. --After the initial set of recommendations was prepared, the Superintendent and his Executive Cabinet reviewed
them and made specific suggestions for additions, deletions, strengthening, and rewording. Once a second revision was prepared, Dr. Shedd reworked it himself in preparation for a final private critiquing by Richardson Dilworth. This being accomplished, the twenty recommendations were presented to the Board of Education in a conference session, where they were discussed and modified. (They had been delivered to each Board member in advance of the meeting.) It was in this session that the controversial twenty-first recommendation, calling for the reinstitution of corporal punishment, was introduced by the Reverend Henry Nichols.

Chronology of Events

"Events represent the start or completion of an activity and do not consume time, personnel, or resources."\(^{121}\) The events listed here do not rigidly follow the above network definition, but generally indicate a specific initial or terminal action related to a more inclusive activity. No attempt has been made to prefix each event with "begin" or "complete"; nor is every initial event coupled with a terminal event, or vice versa. All events which are listed as beginning did, in fact, end (and vice versa). The reason the opposite designations were not always included is because they were not considered as critical to the process as those which were listed. The following chronology represents only the major events which characterized the

\(^{121}\)Cook, op. cit., p. 11.
process of reacting to the crisis; hundreds of minor events also took place during the first three weeks in February.

**February 1, 1971**

Samson Freedman shot by Kevin Simmons, and dies as the result of the wound.

Mark Shedd arranges to meet with the five groups with which the Board holds bargaining agreements, and the Philadelphia Home and School Council.

**February 2, 1971**

Mark Shedd and Richardson Dilworth meet with representatives of the six groups mentioned above, and request their inputs in developing recommendations on violence and discipline in the schools (hereafter referred to as "the recommendations").

Mark Shedd meets with twelve principals.

Mark Shedd, his Deputy Superintendents and Assistants meet to plot the strategy for dealing with the situation.

One of the Assistants (hereafter referred to as the project manager) is appointed to coordinate and manage the project. Tentative understandings on support and the scope of the problem are reached.

**February 3, 1971**

Mark Shedd announces to the mass media that he will present a list of recommendations on violence and discipline in the Philadelphia Public Schools to the Board of Education within three weeks.

The Project Manager assembles his task force and determines the inputs necessary to develop the recommendations.

The first brainstorming session is held.
February 4, 1971

Project Manager meets with the Director of Career Development and the Chief of Facilities Security (who is responsible for the critical incident reporting system).

Task Force revises list of needed inputs and makes plans for securing them. Responsibilities for securing specific inputs are assigned.

On-going assistance from the School Legal Division is secured.

February 5, 1971

Recommendations are received from Local 434, The School Administrators' Alliance and The Public School Nurses' Association.

The Assistant Superintendent of the Philadelphia Archdiocesan Schools is interviewed.

Individual recommendations are received (as requested) from the eight District Superintendents as to (1) how to improve discipline, (2) weaknesses in the present discipline procedures and policies, and (3) successful programs currently in operation.

The Task Force meets to consider the inputs received thus far.

February 6, 1971

The Task Force meets to develop a preliminary set of recommendations.

February 7, 1971

The Task Force members expand on the preliminary recommendations and develop a working draft of each suggested area of action.
February 8, 1971

A meeting is held with the Assistant District Attorney responsible for juvenile problems.

Recommendations are received from The Philadelphia Principals' Association, The Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, Local 1201, the teachers in the Affec­tive Education Program, and The Urban League.

The Task Force expands their collected recommendations.

The Board of Education meets in a public (televised) session, during which time speakers representing over twenty-five groups make statements concerning the current crisis and violence and discipline in the schools.

February 9, 1971

The Task Force assembles the first draft of the recom­mendations.

February 10, 1971

The first draft of the recommendations (containing 33 primary recommendations and 7 "others") is com­pleted.

The second brainstorming session is held, to consider the completed first draft.

February 11, 1971

Recommendations are received from The Citizens Coun­cil for Public Education in Philadelphia (CCPEP), The Philadelphia Urban Coalition, and The Phila­delphia Home and School Council.

Dr. Shedd meets with the District Attorney and several high-ranking police officers.

The first draft of the recommendations is rewritten so as to reflect the comments made in yesterday's brainstorming session and additional group recom­mendations.
February 12, 1971

The second draft of the recommendations (containing 30 primary recommendations and 8 "others") is completed.

A meeting is held with representatives of the bargaining units and other interested groups to consider the recommendations.

A meeting is held with the Council of Student Association Presidents to discuss violence and discipline in the schools.

February 13, 1971

Mark Shedd revises the second draft of the recommendations after receiving the inputs from the seven bargaining units and interested groups participating in yesterday's meeting.

February 14, 1971

Mark Shedd completes third draft of the recommendations utilizing a new format discussed with the Task Force earlier that week.

February 15, 1971

Mark Shedd meets with Board President Richardson Dilworth to discuss the third draft of the recommendations.

Mark Shedd and the Project Manager meet to discuss the new format and third draft of the recommendations.

February 16, 1971

A meeting is held with sixteen high school students representing five schools from throughout the city.

The third draft of the recommendations is edited and cast into final parallel format.
February 17, 1971

The third draft of the recommendations (containing 20 primary recommendations only) is completed.

February 18, 1971

A Board Conference is held to review the recommendations.

The Executive Cabinet meets to review the recommendations and discuss the Board's reaction.

February 19, 1971

Mark Shedd, the Project Manager, and the Task Force meet to discuss the Board's reaction and make plans for the final revision of the recommendations.

February 20, 1971

The recommendations are revised for the fourth time.

February 21, 1971

The fourth revision (mainly rewording) is completed and typed.

February 22, 1971

A Board Conference is held to discuss the revised version of the recommendations which will be presented publically that evening.

A public (televised) Board of Education meeting is held, during which the Superintendent's twenty recommendations on violence and discipline in the Philadelphia Public Schools are presented and amended by Board Vice President Henry Nichols to include a provision for reinstituting the use of corporal punishment. The vote is delayed pending public testimony.

March 8, 1971

Public reaction to the Superintendent's recommendations
is voiced at the regularly scheduled bi-monthly Board of Education meeting. The reaction is generally favorable.

March 22, 1971

A public hearing is held on the Superintendent's recommendations on violence and discipline, as part of the regularly scheduled Board meeting. Thirty-one speakers participate, the majority of which favor the twenty original recommendations, but oppose the corporal punishment amendment.

The Board of Education

Though the Board of Education was not supposed to play anything but a minor role in the process, its members were, in actuality, involved to a much greater degree than merely receiving and acting upon the Superintendent's recommendations.

Perhaps the major impact of the Board upon the process of reacting to the system crisis was created by its failure to take prompt action. The key to this dilemma rested with the Board members' opposing views concerning the inclusion of corporal punishment as the twenty-first recommendation. The amendment was publically introduced by Henry Nichols at the Board meeting of February 22, though he had placed it on the table for discussion at the Board conference on February 18. The Reverend Nichols cited the 1949 Public School Code which permitted a teacher to act in loco parentis, and stated that "the day has come when students must realize there are
consequences for their behavior." He justified its use by saying:

It is an old idea, but a teacher had to be killed before people would listen. . . . If you swat, you do it with love. . . . If you want the policemen out of your school, we need discipline. 123

Board reaction to the Nichols amendment was immediate and divergent.

Those who supported the notion of corporal punishment were less vocal than their leader, and generally let him do most of the talking. The opposition all had something to say, however.

Board President Dilworth noted that corporal punishment was explicitly banned in the recently approved Student Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, and called Nichols's amendment a case of overreacting. "As a free man," Dilworth said, "no one has the right to lay a hand on me or my children." Mrs. Tobyann Boonin, another Board member, called the amendment "a throwback to the time of Charles Dickens." Because of the split, and because of the public's desire to be heard on the recommendations, Board action was delayed for a month.


124 Gardner, loc. cit.


126 Ibid.
At the March 22 Board meeting, the vote was again delayed, even though, of the fifty-odd people who had addressed the Board on discipline since the Freedman killing, only five had favored corporal punishment. The following day, the Reverend Nichols told reporters that he had the necessary five votes to pass the corporal punishment amendment, but was unsure when the actual voting would take place.

On March 29, the Board met in special session and adopted the twenty-one point discipline program, including the corporal punishment amendment. The amendment, which was limited to grades one through eight, was, itself, amended by Gerald Gleeson, so that it could not be implemented until a committee of School Board members drew up guidelines for its use. The discipline recommendations were considered in toto, and passed by a narrow four to three margin, which, in actuality, indicated the displeasure of the three Board members with the amendment only. Voting for the total group of recommendations were the Reverend Nichols, Mr. Gleeson, Dr. Washco, and Mr. Sebastian; voting negatively were Mr. Dilworth, Mrs. Boonin, and Mrs. Greenfield. Mr. Hutt abstained and Mr. Ross was absent, though he sent a message opposing the amendment.

An Examination of Outputs

The fourth and final section examines and analyzes the outputs generated by the crisis situation. The analysis includes an overview of the outputs in terms of their origin, support, estimated costs,
expected benefits, and anticipated difficulties in implementation.

In order to understand better how the final recommendations were developed, the first three drafts will also be briefly considered here. By doing so, the process by which the inputs were converted to outputs can be better understood.

The first draft of recommendations served the purpose of pulling together most of the inputs, without placing any priorities. Thirty-three recommendations were listed, with seven "additional" (those which the School District had no direct power to implement, but were of sufficient importance to deserve mention) recommendations included at the end. In extremely abbreviated form, the first draft recommended that:

1. Prior to the opening of school in September, 1971, a directive be developed detailing (a) disciplinary offenses, (b) how to secure help from the central administration in dealing with discipline problems, and (c) the responsibilities of school personnel.

2. The existing administrative bulletins dealing with "Discipline for Constructive Citizenship" (22 and 22B) be replaced with a new standard code of discipline.

3. The job of discipline is the duty of every adult in the school, including all teachers, administrators and supportive personnel.

4. Criteria for entrance into school buildings be developed
to eliminate trespassers.

5. New guidelines for dealing with suspensions be developed.

6. Existing disciplinary school be phased-out, with each district developing alternative disciplinary programs, instead.

7. Special facilities be developed for children with emotional and social adjustment problems.

8. Residential facilities be built for seriously disturbed children.

9. Disciplinary transfers from one regular school to another be terminated.

10. Work-experience and community activity programs for students be enlarged.

11. To report all serious incidents to the Office of Security Operations be mandatory.

12. A student's complete record be transmitted to any new school which he enters.

13. Central office and district office administrators spend at least ten days per year in a school.

14. Identification and rehabilitation of emotionally disturbed children begin at the elementary level.

15. Smaller junior and senior high schools be planned in order to reduce the size of the instructional setting.

16. Study halls be abolished and alternatives to the present
school lunch program be generated.

17. Principals' meetings be scheduled during after-school hours to permit him to spend more time in his building.

18. The principal be more visible to his students and faculty by spending less time in the school office.

19. Teacher absenteeism be more tightly monitored and controlled.

20. A program of pre-service instruction in the rudiments of teacher-student interaction and classroom control be developed and made mandatory for substitute teachers.

21. At no time is it legitimate for an employee of the School District to act in such a way as to provoke, participate in, or lead disruptive or violent activity.

22. The role of NTAs in the school be re-evaluated.

23. Linkages with community mental health agencies be established.

24. Secondary school counselor's job descriptions be re-defined, and appropriate pre-service and in-service training programs be developed for such positions.

25. Plans to remedy student absenteeism and class-cutting be developed.

26. The Student Bill of Rights and Responsibilities be fully implemented.
27. Greater attention be devoted to the constructive activities of the schools by the mass media.

28. High school student handbooks be revised by a joint committee of students, faculty, administration, and parents.

29. Exemplary disciplinary practices be disseminated on a continuing basis.

30. Instruction in crisis management be provided for teachers and administrators.

31. Children be taught to deal with people and respond to conflict in non-violent ways.

32. Parents assume a major responsibility for shaping their children’s attitudes and behavior.

33. An intensive program of community involvement in dealing with anti-social behavior be developed.

The seven "additional" recommendations state:

1. The investment in the administration of justice and prevention of crime at all levels of government should be doubled or tripled.

2. Universities and colleges preparing teachers and school administrators should include, as part of that preparation, human relations training, inter-group practices, and student control.

3. A greatly expanded program of exploration, development, and experimentation in the area of preschool education should be
made a national priority and funded accordingly.

4. Greater effort should be made by those who control and regulate the mass media to evaluate the way in which violence is dealt with publically, and the frequency with which it is presented.

5. Federal, state, and municipal authorities should develop an acceptable means of licensing all firearms and all deadly weapons should be registered.

6. Massive efforts should be initiated and funded at the Federal level to deal justly with the social ills and inequities responsible for creating the frustration and unrest which are in turn responsible for much of the violence in our society.

7. Race and poverty must be made the number one national priority if we hope to solve the problem of violence in our schools and society.

The second draft of the recommendations did not differ in a great many ways from the first in terms of content, but was considerably more explicit. Three new items appeared in the second draft. One urged that teachers and principals be held explicitly responsible for an accurate and consistent daily report on absenteeism and class-cutting. It was the feeling of the Task Force that the tremendous rates of increase in these areas were due, in part, to the laxity of school personnel in reporting offenders. Another new item charged the principal of each school with forming a committee to highlight the
positive efforts of young people, and to present them as models of good
citizenship to be emulated. Lastly, it was recommended that ways be
developed and implemented to involve parents in solving the problem
on three levels: (1) by increased participation in policy development;
(2) by providing instructional programs on child-parent relationships,
child development, and child psychology; and (3) by holding parents
legally responsible for the criminal acts of their children.

One more item also appeared in the "additional" recommenda-
tions section. It noted that the residential treatment centers, men-
tioned previously, could only be viewed as a viable alternative to the
present means of handling disciplinary problems if they received im-
petus in terms of Federal funding.

Because the differences between the third and fourth draft
were merely editorial, a discussion of the third draft will be omitted
in favor of proceeding immediately to the fourth and final draft--that
which was eventually approved by the Board of Education. The fourth
draft, containing the final, revised recommendations, differed signi-
ficantly, however, from the second draft. The number of recommend-
ations was cut to twenty and they were grouped into six general areas.
(The twenty-first recommendation was added as an amendment to the
final twenty.) Each recommendation was explicitly stated, followed
by several paragraphs of comments, and concluded by an assignment
of responsibility for that recommendation and an indication of the date
by which each was to become effective. Following is a list of those recommendations, placed within the six areas, along with the persons responsible and date each was to take effect. (In the interest of brevity, the back-up comments are not included.)

Area I

All school personnel are directed to take prompt and affirmative action against all acts of violence and criminal behavior on school premises.

1. Any individual who commits a violent or other criminal act on school property shall be removed from the school premises immediately and arrested when warranted.

   Responsibility: Principal
   Effective: Immediately

2. All staff members, students, and parents have a duty to report and testify in all criminal cases.

   Responsibility: Total School Family (students, parents, teachers, administrators, and supportive personnel)
   Effective: Immediately

3. A new standard code of student behavior will be prepared to replace existing administrative bulletins dealing with "Discipline for Constructive Citizenship" (22A and 22B).

   Responsibility: Associate Superintendent for Field Operations
   Effective: September 1, 1971

4. The Superintendent and the Board of Education support immediate adoption by City Council of an effective school trespass law and direct all school personnel to press its full implementation.

   Responsibility: Principals
   Effective: Immediately upon adoption by City Council
5. **Strict new guidelines will be drawn up concerning the suspension and/or transfer of students.**

*Responsibility:* Director of Pupil Services  
*Effective:* Immediately

**Area II**

District Superintendents and Principals are directed to exercise their authority and leadership to create in each school conditions free from violence and fear.

6. **All critical incidents shall be acted upon, recorded, and reported promptly by the principal to the Superintendent of Schools.**

*Responsibility:* Principals  
*Effective:* Immediately

7. **All personnel assigned to schools are instructed to spend as much time as possible in school and visible to students and school personnel.**

*Responsibility:* All Administrators  
*Effective:* Immediately

**Area III**

Teachers, counsellors and all supportive personnel shall exercise their authority and responsibility to assure sound discipline and conditions for learning.

8. **Training programs for teachers, counsellors, paraprofessionals, and all other school personnel in the handling of disruptive students will be conducted in each district during the 1971-72 school year.**

*Responsibility:* District Superintendents  
*Effective:* September 1, 1971

9. **Training Programs for substitutes and prospective substitutes in the rudiments of teacher-student interaction and classroom management will be offered.**
Responsibility: Deputy Superintendent for Instruction  
Effective: September 1, 1971

10. Handbooks including job descriptions and responsibilities of NTAs and School Security Officers will be prepared, and training programs for these personnel offered.

Responsibility: Associate Superintendent for Field Operations  
Effective: September 1, 1971

Area IV

Improved methods and programs for the prevention and rehabilitation of disturbed and disruptive students will be instituted.

11. Alternatives to the three disciplinary schools presently in operation must be developed.

Responsibility: Deputy Superintendent for Planning in cooperation with District Superintendents and Director of Special Education  
Effective: Guidelines will be developed by September 1, 1971

12. Additional small classes for emotionally disturbed and/or disruptive pupils will be organized in selected elementary schools.

Responsibility: District Superintendents will be responsible for selecting schools, setting goals, defining programs, and establishing evaluation procedures  
Effective: September 1, 1971

13. A plan will be developed to effect better cooperation with the mental health agencies of the Philadelphia area in dealing with the disruptive child.

Responsibility: Directors of Health Services, Special Education, and Pupil Personnel and Counseling  
Effective: September 1, 1971

14. A course dealing with the causes of disruption and violence will be developed and included in the total school curriculum at all grade levels.
Responsibility: Deputy Superintendent for Instruction  
Effective: Staff development sessions will be ready for the summer of 1971. Curriculum will be ready for the opening of schools in September.

15. Work-experience programs for students must be increased.

Responsibility: Directors of Vocational Education  
Effective: September 1, 1971

Area V

Schools, especially secondary schools, must be recreated into better places for learning.

16. A task force of principals, teachers, pupils, parents, community, and central administrators will be convened to restructure the entire secondary school operation.

Responsibility: Deputy Superintendent for Planning  
Effective: The task force will be convened by April 1, 1971. It will make a preliminary report to the Superintendent of Schools by September 1, 1971, and will make final recommendations by December 31, 1971.

Area VI

Students, parents and others in the school community must assume greater responsibility for improving attendance and discipline in the schools.

17. Parents should be held accountable for the criminal actions of their minor children.

Responsibility: General Counsel  
Effective: April 1, 1971

18. Intensive programs of parent and community involvement in the discipline process will be developed by each district and each school in the community.

Responsibility: The District Superintendent will be
19. Teachers will be held responsible daily for accurately and consistently reporting student absenteeism and cutting; principals will be held accountable for reporting such information to the District Superintendent, and the District Superintendent will be responsible for developing programs for dealing with chronic truants.

**Responsibility:** District Superintendents, Principals, and Teachers  
**Effective:** Reporting absenteeism, immediately; Dealing with Truants, September 1, 1971

20. All secondary schools will either develop new student handbooks or revise current handbooks to include the new code of behavior.

**Responsibility:** Middle, Junior, and Senior High School Principals  
**Effective:** January 1, 1972

The twenty-first recommendation was proposed as an amendment to the twenty recommendations on violence and discipline presented by the Superintendent. This recommendation, made by the Reverend Henry H. Nichols, and seconded by Mr. William Ross and Mr. Robert M. Sebastian, stated that Section 1317 of the Public School Code of 1947 be added to the others. Section 1317 reads as

127 "Violence, Discipline and the Public Schools of Philadelphia," February 10, 1971. (Quoted material edited by the author.)

follows:

Section 1317. Authority of Teachers, Vice Principals and Principals over Pupils. Every teacher, vice principal and principal in the public schools shall have the right to exercise the same authority as to conduct and behavior over the pupils attending his school, during the time they are in attendance, including the time required in going to and from their homes, as the parents, guardians or persons in parental relation to such pupils may exercise over them. (Amended July 25, 1963, P. L. 315.)

Thus, on March 29, the twenty-one recommendations were adopted by the Board of Education, which, in turn, instructed the Superintendent to proceed with their implementation.

An Analysis of Outputs

Following is a brief, anecdotal analysis of each of the twenty-one recommendations dealing with violence and discipline, approved by the Board of Education. The origin, support, cost, benefits, and (anticipated and actual) difficulties in implementation are included for each.

1. Any Individual Who Commits a Violent or Other Criminal Act on School Property Shall be Removed From the School Premises Immediately and Arrested When Warranted.

Crimes such as assault, carrying a deadly weapon, the sale or use of drugs, and robbery are included in this recommendation, the

129 Mr. Ross, who was not able to attend the March 29 Board meeting to vote on the recommendations, sent a letter informing the Board that, though he had originally backed the corporal punishment amendment, after listening to the people of Philadelphia, he would have voted against it, were he present.
origin of which included essentially all levels of school personnel. The PFT had pressed particularly hard for such action, since they viewed school principals as not doing a sufficient job in this area. It was a logical selection for the first recommendation since it carried the tone of the Superintendent's introductory words: "Schools must be safe and free of fear." Universal support could be expected, though the onus of responsibility for deciding whether the offender should be merely suspended or arrested rests with the principal, who is the critical individual in this recommendation.

Costs to the School District would be minor, since a new mechanism for its implementation need not be developed, nor additional personnel hired. The benefits expected would be those which result when rules are firmly and consistently enforced. Major difficulties in implementation could be caused by teachers failing to cooperate with principals in reporting the individuals committing the specified crimes, and principals not fulfilling their responsibility or not providing the teacher with feedback as to the disposition of the situation.

2. All Staff Members, Students, and Parents Have a Duty to Report and Testify in all Criminal Cases.

This recommendation is the second of five grouped under the general heading of "All school personnel are directed to take prompt and affirmative action against all acts of violence and criminal behavior on school premises." It springs from central office administrators,
who had received daily complaints concerning students returning to school the day following their arrest, and creating additional chaos. Upon investigation, it was found that in the majority of such cases, teachers, who were the witnesses, refused to press charges.

The recommendation noted that individuals who refused to report and testify, whether out of fear or apathy, help to perpetuate the conditions for crime to flourish. Though cooperation from teachers was the most crucial aspect of this recommendation, it was not expected to receive wide support, even with a School District statement pledging protection in case of intimidation or reprisal. Even the School Board's legal counsel had strong reservations concerning how hard people should be pushed to press charges.

Costs to the School District would be fairly low, and would entail mainly legal compensation and hiring substitutes for those teachers having to spend time in court. The benefits in terms of creating respect for the law are obvious. Anticipated difficulties in implementation were discussed in the previous paragraph.


This recommendation resulted from reactions (by teachers and line administrators) to the failure of the present Code of Behavior to be consistent and to clearly enumerate punishments. Support was universal, and teachers, parents, students, and administrators were
to be involved in the preparation of the new code. The estimated costs, which ordinarily would include the man-hours needed to develop such a document, were even lower, since Bulletin 22A was already being revised at the time when the crisis occurred.

The benefits would be significant since (1) the Bulletin had not been revised in over a dozen years and simply was not relevant to current difficulties; and (2) pupils and their parents were to receive copies of the revised rules, a practice not previously undertaken. Preparation of the new Bulletin was not expected to be an overly difficult task, especially since the Office of Field Operations, which worked regularly with such problems, was assigned major responsibility for the task.

4. The Superintendent and the Board of Education Support Immediate Adoption by City Council of an Effective School Trespass Law and Direct all School Personnel to Press its Full Implementation.

The origin of the School Trespass Ordinance rested initially with the School District, which had asked City Council for such a law, since the courts had ruled that the City trespass law did not apply to school buildings. The multiple crises of the 1970-71 school year forced the passage of the following ordinance on March 18, 1971:

10-824 Unauthorized Entry on School Premises

(1) Prohibited Conduct. No person who is neither employed by The School District of Philadelphia nor a student enrolled in The School system shall enter any premises of The School District of Philadelphia without the express consent of the person in charge of the premises. Failure to obtain consent within 15
minutes after entry on those premises shall be presumptive evidence of violation of this ordinance. Employees of The School District of Philadelphia and students within the system shall only enter school premises where they are regularly assigned unless expressly authorized to enter other premises of The School District by the person in charge of those premises.

(2) Exemptions. This ordinance shall not apply to:

(a) Any governmental official going on the premises within the scope of his official duties.

(b) Any person desiring to enter premises of the School District of Philadelphia who does not engage in any speech or other communication, demonstration, protest, confrontation or any other activity other than that necessary to seek consent to enter the premises.

(3) Penalty. The penalty for violation of this section shall be a fine of not more than $300.00 and imprisonment for not more than 90 days.

The above version of the ordinance was the final revised form; the initial form, championed by one of the councilmen, made building principals legally liable for failing to arrange for the removal of trespassers, whether the principals knew of their presence in the school or not.

Once the final version was passed, the ordinance was universally supported. It was one of the first recommendations to be fully operationalized. The only costs involved were the fees for printing poster-size copies of the ordinance, in English and Spanish, to be prominently displayed at every entrance to a school. Since many of the disturbances in secondary schools resulted from outsiders coming into the schools, the recommendation was expected to be
useful as a deterrent. However, within a month of its passage, questions were raised as to how rigidly the ordinance should be enforced, particularly because it seemed to contradict the notion of the "community school" in some neighborhoods.

5. **Strict New Guidelines Will be Drawn Up Concerning the Suspension and/or Transfer of Students.**

Because the current guidelines for the suspension of students did not succeed in rehabilitating them or getting to the causes of poor adjustment, the fifth recommendation was initially suggested by field and central office counseling personnel. The PFT, however, was also concerned about disciplinary transfers and teachers receiving "problem" students without being apprised of their past problems. As a result, strict guidelines were ordered developed in place of amorphous and inconsistent policy. The support was again universal, particularly for the prohibition upon transferring students charged with a felony from one regular school to another. Estimated costs were minimal and expected benefits, maximal. Implementation was not expected to be difficult, though it depended upon (1) the district superintendents' developing interim or alternative programs and activities for students not reinstated in their regular schools and (2) the records sent to a receiving school prior to a student's regular transfer being read by the counselor and forwarded to the teacher, if necessary.

6. **All Critical Incidents Shall be Acted Upon, Recorded, and**
Reported Promptly by the Principal to the Superintendent of Schools.

Recommendations 6 and 7 both directed district superintendents and principals to exercise their authority and leadership to create school environments free from violence and fear. Number 6 was initiated by school administrators on all levels, and was directed specifically toward principals, who, either because of lack of understanding or neglect, had failed to follow the established critical incident reporting procedures.

The costs in implementing this recommendation would be low, since the procedure was already in existence, though some expenditures for in-service training were anticipated. The results would provide for a more effective system of communications, the benefits of which need not be belabored here. Several "loopholes" were found in the plans for implementation of this recommendation, particularly regarding the reporting of rumors. As long as the PASA is heavily involved in the implementation process, however, all such difficulties should be resolved.

7. All Personnel Assigned to Schools Are Instructed to Spend as Much Time as Possible in School and be Visible to Students and School Personnel.

Originating with the central office administrators, this recommendation was not received as well as would be desired. The support of the building principal was viewed as the key to accomplishing it, but the Principals' Association, though they agreed that the
visibility of the principal was vital, questioned how a principal could be expected to physically participate in activities when he had also to attend to much administrative trivia in his office, due to the lack of supportive staff. The absence of funds to hire additional secretaries was a major "roadblock" in implementing this recommendation.

8. Training Programs for Teachers, Counsellors, Paraprofessionals, and All Other School Personnel in the Handling of Disruptive Students Will Be Conducted in Each District During the 1971-72 School Year.

Recommendations 8, 9, and 10 are based upon the notion that teachers, counsellors and all supportive personnel should exercise their authority and responsibility to assure sound discipline and proper conditions for learning. Initiated centrally, the eighth recommendation was strongly supported by all concerned parties except the most critical one—the PFT. Union leadership had been becoming progressively more vocal in its belief that teachers should not have to be concerned with discipline problems, for their job was "only to teach." The PFT passed the buck to the administration, saying that the principal was responsible for facilitating the teachers’ being able to teach, and should therefore take care of all discipline problems. The Board and Superintendent viewed discipline as everyone’s responsibility, and hence made the recommendation.

Costs would be entailed, for the plan was to develop teams of school personnel with superior skills for handling disruptive students.
These "experts" would provide in-service training in each district. The benefits anticipated would be quite valuable, assuming discipline was accepted as everyone's responsibility. In addition to the Teachers' Union difficulties mentioned above, the existence of other problems in implementation depended upon how the district superintendents managed their responsibility.


Since substitute teachers often faced more discipline problems than regular classroom teachers, this recommendation was particularly well supported and likewise, well received by all. The district superintendents were particularly influential in initiating it, although it might mean some short-term inconvenience in securing substitute teachers. The expected benefits were so high that a plan for training substitutes was developed within three months. The plan necessitated considerable costs to provide for the intensive training desired, however, and due to the financial crisis, was deferred in early June, 1971 until sufficient funds could be secured.


Students and their parents were particularly concerned with the relationship of NTAs and school security officers to the enforcement of discipline, as were many teachers and administrators. Thus,
recommendation 10, the purpose of which was to define more accurately the duties and responsibilities of such security personnel, was strongly supported on all levels. The costs were not anticipated to be excessive, since money was already allocated for training such personnel. The Office of Field Operations had to work with the Chiefs of Security to develop specific guidelines and train the personnel accordingly. The PFT, whose stance supported NTA's being responsible for all discipline, supported the recommendation and opted for increasing the number of security personnel.

11. Alternatives to the Three Disciplinary Schools Presently in Operation Must be Developed.

Number 11 and the four subsequent recommendations are concerned with improving methods and programs for preventing and rehabilitating disturbed and disruptive students. Among the alternatives considered in recommendation 11, the concept of the "mini school" received the strongest support, though it was agreed universally that the three existing disciplinary schools were inadequate.

Implementation of the suggestion was rapid, with a special task force onrehumanizing the high schools being formed almost immediately. A short time thereafter, it was agreed (1) to allocate "disruptive pupil funds" to finance facilities and programs for mini schools and (2) to close one of the disciplinary schools in June, 1971. In addition, the leaders of the Antioch College (Ohio) Intern Teacher
Program expressed an interest in studying the mini school and possibly developing and operating one, attached to a Philadelphia high school. A special task force on mini schools was organized and headed by the Deputy Superintendent for Instruction. With the necessary support and financial backing, it appears as if several of the alternatives to existing disciplinary schools will be implemented on an experimental basis, without much difficulty.

12. Additional Small Classes for Emotionally Disturbed and/or Disruptive Pupils Will be Organized in Selected Elementary Schools.

This recommendation was supported universally, but faced a number of difficulties in implementation related to costs. Based upon the belief that initiating remedies for disturbed children at the junior high school level was too late, the district superintendents were held responsible for selecting schools, setting goals, defining programs, and establishing evaluation procedures for a program in their districts. Though the benefits would, no doubt, be great, the current financial crisis may eliminate a large percentage of the funds anticipated for use in such an endeavor. Since reducing class size by one pupil across the District costs almost $5 million, the institution of specialized smaller classes may not become a reality until new monies can be found.

13. A Plan Will be Developed to Effect Better Cooperation With the Mental Health Agencies of the Philadelphia Area in Dealing
With the Disruptive Child.

Shortly after the Freedman killing, many parent groups and community councils contacted their local mental health agencies and were greeted with a sincere willingness to become involved in the school's problems. Once initiated by school and community groups, the notion of creating new linkages with mental health agencies continued to be championed by the central administration, which was already involved in developing a proposal to provide comprehensive health and human services to all children. The Director of Pupil Personnel and Counselling is currently collecting information on existing programs, with plans for expansion as the next step. Because of the cooperative basis upon which the program is being developed and the hope for Federal funds, costs have not as yet proved to be a deterrent. The implementation of such a massive endeavor, though moving slowly, has progressed up to all expectations thus far.

14. A Course Dealing With the Causes of Disruption and Violence Will be Developed and Included in the Total School Curriculum at All Grade Levels.

Initiated by the Superintendent of Schools, this suggestion was supported on all levels, but with varying degrees of commitment. Because the recommendation called for pre-service and in-service staff development sessions for principals, teachers, paraprofessionals and supportive personnel to be built into the curriculum, as well as a process for evaluation, the estimated costs were substantial.
Nevertheless, the expected benefits prompted immediate action, and the Director of Social Studies Education proceeded to ready a course for use by September, 1971. A staff development program involving principals was planned for August, but as of July, money was not available to pay the participants, and the Principals' Association balked at the idea of attending without compensation.

15. **Work-Experience Programs for Students Must be Increased.**

This recommendation was initiated simultaneously by several district superintendents, home and school associations, civic groups, and central administrative personnel. It was based upon the belief that work experience will be valuable for disruptive pupils because (1) the students would value the experience, (2) it would be applicable to obtaining employment upon graduating, (3) it removed the disruptive youngster from the larger school setting, and (4) rehabilitation measures individually suited to the student's needs could be prescribed for him. Though supported universally because of its expected benefits, several problems may defer its complete implementation. Such a program would (1) be costly to develop and supervise, and (2) depend upon a high degree of cooperation from local businesses and labor unions, which historically have been reluctant to take on minority group apprentices. To deal with the first problem, a Federal grant is currently being pursued which would provide several million dollars
for development over a three-year period.


As the result of inputs from practically every conceivable source, the Superintendent and his deputies initiated the task force proposed here, based upon the notion that schools, especially secondary schools, must be regenerated into better places for learning. Support was garnered at all levels, as is evident by the broad base of participants. In order for the task force to be of value, its members were prepared to make recommendations in the areas of improving (1) the physical environment of the classroom, (2) the preparation of teachers for schools in the urban community, and (3) the types of schools currently being constructed.

The task force began meeting prior to April 1, 1971 and was moving ahead rapidly, when in late Spring, it had to be temporarily discontinued until the financial situation could be resolved. Even once its recommendations are completed, however, the anticipated political and financial ramifications of what it suggests may render implementation a long-range reality at best.

17. Parents Should be Held Accountable for the Criminal Actions of Their Minor Children.

Proposed initially by the Superintendent and Board of Education, this recommendation received wide support from all quarters.
Questions were raised, however, concerning its legality, which prompted the Board Legal Counsel to enact the following:

The Act of July 27, 1967, P. L., No. 58, 11 P. S. 2001, imposes liability upon parents for the personal injuries or theft, destruction or loss of property caused by the wilful, tortious acts of children under eighteen years of age. The liability of the parents is limited to $300.00 for injuries to the person, or theft, destruction, or loss of property suffered by any one person as a result of one wilful, tortious act or continuous series of wilful, tortious acts. The liability of parents is limited to $1,000.00, regardless of the number of persons who suffer injury to the person, or theft, destruction, or loss of property as a result of one wilful, tortious act or continuous series of wilful, tortious acts.

The recommendation was discussed with the District Attorney and procedures were to be developed for follow-up on claims.

The estimated costs were negligible compared to the anticipated benefits of curbing vandalism, assaults, and other disruptive activities. Difficulties in implementing such a recommendation stem from the fact that many of the parents of children who would commit such offenses are welfare recipients, and would be hard pressed to make financial compensation for damages.

18. Intensive Programs of Parent and Community Involvement in the Discipline Process Will be Developed by Each District and Each School in the Community.

Like the previous recommendation, this one also places part of the responsibility for discipline on the parents and community. Initiated by many groups and individuals, it received strong support in all quarters. The cost was not expected to be excessive, though
the dollar figure would depend upon the type of program undertaken in each district. Each district superintendent was to work with the principals in his district to develop and implement the program.

19. Teachers Will be Held Responsible Daily for Accurately and Consistently Reporting Student Absenteeism and Cutting; Principals Will be Held Accountable for Reporting Such Information to the District Superintendent, and the District Superintendent Will be Responsible for Developing Programs for Dealing With Chronic Truants.

Initiated centrally, this recommendation was aimed specifically at those principals and teachers who had neglected to enforce attendance rules by failing to report accurately, student absenteeism and cutting. District superintendents were advised that studies had shown a high correlation between low attendance and student unrest, and that poor attendance was viewed as a passive means of expressing hostility toward school. With the DSs being held directly responsible for enforcing the rules in their districts, the principals were pressured to report regularly all required information. No additional costs would be incurred since the recommendation merely dealt with carrying out an already established policy. A means for monitoring the implementation was developed by the Director of Auxiliary Instructional Services, who also issued periodic reports on the subject.

20. All Secondary Schools Will Either Develop New Student Handbooks or Revise Current Handbooks to Include the New Code of Behavior.

Initiated at the central office level, this recommendation was not considered of high enough priority for any group to make a point of
strongly backing it. Though viewed as innocuous by most, its benefits as a communications device were sufficient to warrant its inclusion as one of the recommendations. The costs of its implementation would depend upon how lavish a product each school desired to produce; a simple, unbound booklet, for example, could be mimeographed for practically nothing. Difficulty in implementation was not expected. The onus of responsibility was placed upon school principals, though no means of monitoring their progress was provided for at the outset.

21. The "Recommendations on Violence and Discipline" be Amended to Include the Section From the Public School Code of 1949 on Authority of Teachers, Vice Principals and Principals Over Pupils. Section 1317 Reads as Follows:

Every teacher, vice principal and principal in the public schools shall have the right to exercise the same authority as to conduct and behavior over the pupils attending his school, during the time they are in attendance, including the time required in going to and from their homes, as the parents, guardians or persons in parental relation to such pupils may exercise over them. (Amended July 25, 1963, P. L. 315)

The origin of this recommendation was several members of the Board of Education, led by the Reverend Henry Nichols. It was passed by a narrow four to three vote in spite of a statement that it did not reflect the feeling of the Superintendent or his cabinet. The backers of the amendment viewed its major benefit as being a deterrent. Though it cost nothing, its implementation was delayed pending the development of guidelines to govern it by members of the Board.
CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

If labeled more accurately, this final chapter should be entitled "Summary, Results, Conclusions, and Implications," for the results and implications are certainly also important sections. The results of Chapters IV and V are discussed in greater detail so as to "set the stage" for the conclusions which follow. The implications, which are of value in all studies, are particularly crucial to a case study such as this, which has been designated as a piece of action research. No attempt has been made here to summarize all of the information examined in previous chapters. Only that material essential to understanding the study is presented, and that, in abridged form.

Background Information

Although a great deal has been written about student unrest during the past several years, the majority of such contributions have been of the most general nature. Incredible as it may seem, after being buffeted so continuously by the winds of student dissent and disruption, many educators have still not progressed any further than merely recognizing that such unrest exists. The current literature
reflects this trend, in that articles dealing with the causes of unrest are just beginning to appear, and material geared toward analyzing the causes and developing suitable solutions is scarce.

This study consisted of an in-depth historical examination of an urban educational system's response to student unrest, as well as a detailed case study of a recent major system crisis linked to student unrest. A number of areas were considered in the study including the following concepts:

1. Student unrest is one of the major forces affecting education today.

2. Student unrest often leads to major crisis situations in educational systems.

3. Among the major causes of student unrest and the crises which often accompany it, are the inability of systems, often because of their structure, to respond to students' needs.

4. Under certain management conditions, crisis may result in educational development.

5. Educational administrators can play a crucial role in guiding a system through crisis and toward development.

6. Educational administrators, however, have demonstrated both a reluctance and an inability to deal with crisis.

7. Certain responses to crisis and strategies for dealing with unrest have been used successfully.
8. In order for an educational administrator to respond successfully to crisis and facilitate the development of his system, he should be able to delineate and solve problems, and function as a crisis manager when necessary.

Restatement of the Objectives

The major objective of this study is to examine and describe how a large urban school system responds to crisis generated by student unrest. The purpose of the objective is to test the notion that crisis, under certain management conditions, may result in positive change or development.

The above primary objective is dependent upon two sub-objectives. The first is to examine, over a period of years, crises related to student unrest and the response of the (School District of Philadelphia) educational system to such crises. This historical macro-view of the system is to test the hypothesis that crisis situations may lead to development. The second sub-objective is to analyze a single, recent major system crisis (micro-view) related to student unrest, in order to determine and examine the inputs available during the crisis, the process by which they were utilized, and the outputs which resulted. The rationale for selecting the objectives appears in Chapter I.
Methods and Procedures

The methodology employed was characterized as a case study technique used as a piece of action research. The procedure consisted of two parts. The first considered the extent to which student unrest-related crises occurred in the Public Schools of Philadelphia, and their effect upon the system. The second part examined in greater detail the inputs to the system, the process by which they were used, and the outputs which resulted from single recent major system crisis linked to student unrest.

Chapter IV (the first part) reported a total of thirty-seven incidents. Most are in vignette form, although several are described in greater detail. These incidents represent the more notable instances of student unrest experienced in Philadelphia during the past twenty years. A total of thirteen different schools were involved, and were grouped into four time frames before being examined. (These time frames were: prior to 1958, 1958-1967, 1967-1970, and 1970-1971.) Four primary sources of information were utilized to develop the incident descriptions—interviews, newspaper articles, other miscellaneous documents, and personal observation or involvement. The same sources of information were used to identify the six areas of change which followed the instances of student unrest.

In Chapter V (the second part) a more structured and complete form of the case study was employed to explore a single crisis
situation, in depth. A version of Good and Scates' phases of a case study was used as a model to organize the chapter into four parts—(1) the status of the situation, (2) the collection of data, (3) an overview of the process, and (4) an examination of the outputs. In the section on the status of the situation, the crisis was completely examined in terms of its background, the causes, the participants, the actual incident, the immediate system responses, and the rationale for viewing the situation as a crisis.

Collection of the data was dependent upon first developing a taxonomy for categorizing the groups and individuals which provided inputs. The taxonomy which was constructed first distinguished between groups and individuals. These two classes were then divided into sub-categories. Three categories of groups were identified—professional education and educational resource groups, civic-educational groups, and civic groups. The individuals contributing inputs were divided into four types—professional educators, politicians, parents, and other citizens. Once the taxonomy was completed, inputs from the major referent groups and individuals (which had been previously identified) were collected, categorized, and examined.

The third section dealt with the process by which the inputs were gathered and generated into outputs. In this section, the process was examined by means of an overview of eight types of activities, a chronology of the major events, and a look at the impact of the Board
of Education. The fourth and final section examined the outputs generated by the crisis. An analysis of the outputs, in terms of their origin, support, costs, expected benefits, and anticipated difficulties in implementation is included in the final section of Chapter V.

The Results of the Study

The results of the study can best be reported if the two parts are examined separately. Once this has been completed, the results will be viewed in toto in the "Discussion of the Results" section.

Chapter IV

Chapter IV contained a historical overview of student unrest in the Philadelphia Public Schools. The chapter was divided into three sections— one examining the actual incidents, another viewing the changes that followed, and a third containing generalizations based upon the first two. The following four generalizations comprise the major findings of this part of the study:

1. Three types of student unrest have occurred in the Philadelphia Public Schools— isolated incidents, gang activity, and organized dissent. Isolated incidents are the most common variety, generally are not linked to any organized group, and involve only a few people. Gang activity is typically anti-social behavior, manifested by an organized group of youths. Though all three types of unrest may involve violence, it is most commonly linked to gang
activity. Organized dissent, like gang activity, usually involves a group with a specific purpose for being; however, it is in such purpose that the difference lies. Organized dissent focuses upon protesting a specific human condition, whereas gangs are generally concerned with destructive or defensive activities only.

2. The three types of student unrest—isolated incidents, gang activity, and organized dissent—can be chronologically linked to specific periods in Philadelphia. Using 1950 as a point of departure, isolated incidents have occurred from that point to the present (1971); gang activity has been most evident between 1952 and 1960, and from 1966 to the present; and organized dissent, which was first noted in 1964 and has been continuous through the present.

3. The changing racial composition of Philadelphia and its public schools during the past decade is related to the frequency and severity of student unrest. Between 1959 and 1970 the percentage of black students attending public school in Philadelphia rose from 45 to 60. The sharpest rise took place at the senior high school level, where the number of black students doubled (29 per cent in 1959; 54 per cent in 1970). This figure does not merely represent an increasing number of blacks going to black schools, however. In 1970, 38 per cent of Philadelphia's senior and vocational-technical high schools had between 30 and 70 per cent black enrollments.\(^1\) Table 8 indicates the percentage

\(^1\)The parameters set by the School District of Philadelphia as
of black enrollment in Philadelphia high schools. These figures coupled with a steady increase in the number of unrest incidents (see Table 1 of Chapter III) lends support to this contention.

**TABLE 8**

PERCENTAGE OF BLACK PUPILS ENROLLED IN PHILADELPHIA HIGH SCHOOLS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per Cent Black</th>
<th>Number of Schools</th>
<th>Per Cent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>91-100</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-90</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71-80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61-70</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-60</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1969-70 Negro and Spanish Speaking Enrollment in the Philadelphia Public Schools

4. Only since the present Superintendent of Schools took office in Autumn, 1967 have significant changes taken place in dealing with student unrest. The most significant change has been the Superintendent's willingness to meet the crucial issues and take action concerning their resolution. The two superintendents prior to indicating a racially mixed student population are not less than 30 per cent and not more than 70 per cent of one race.
Dr. Mark R. Shedd were more traditional in approach and made little effort to respond to the causes of the student unrest beginning to disrupt the School System. Table 9 contains a list of major changes which have been made as a result of student unrest and areas identified as causes of student dissent. An "x" marked next to the category indicates that administrative or systemic action was taken to deal with it within that period of time. Only three of the fifteen areas received significant attention prior to the 1967-68 school year, when Dr. Shedd assumed the superintendency; thirteen of them received significant attention since that time.

Chapter V

In viewing the results of that part of the study dealing with the examination of a major system crisis, the results of the crisis, as a whole, have been considered along with the process used to manage it and the impact of that process on its resolution.

General Results

The following results can be reported:

1. The crisis was promptly identified as such, and dealt with accordingly.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area Related to Student Unrest</th>
<th>Prior to 1967-68</th>
<th>Since 1967-68</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Restructuring</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Relations</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious Incident Reporting</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy on Disruption</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Bill of Rights</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black History Courses</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Professional Personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Treatment of Students</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better Counseling Services</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved Facilities</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved Eating Facilities and Food</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meaningful Student Government</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of Personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevant Assemblies</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognition of Spanish Speaking Students</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. The immediate crisis was resolved, and steps were taken to develop and implement middle- and long-range strategies for avoiding similar occurrences in the future.

3. The process employed by the Superintendent of Schools in dealing with the crisis situation indicates a systems approach, a development orientation, and an understanding of crisis management.

A rationale for viewing the events subsequent to the murder of Samson Freedman as a crisis is contained in Chapter V. As conceptualized previously in the study, student unrest may often result in crises which spread throughout the system. This is precisely what occurred in this instance. The initial event created a number of minor crises which had to be dealt with immediately. These minor crises, which formed segments of the total crisis situation, occasioned the following responses:

1. The call for the repeal of the Student Bill of Rights and Responsibilities was viewed as a move which (a) had no direct relationship to the crisis situation and (b) would create another, perhaps more serious, crisis; hence, it was deferred and ultimately ignored.

2. The impending trespass ordinance, though badly needed, was unacceptable in its original form, which imposed unfair responsibility upon principals; hence, pressure was exerted to alter the ordinance, which was ultimately passed in its revised form.
3. Pressure by the Board of Education to develop a series of recommendations on violence and discipline in the schools, and demands by the public to examine the current discipline process and procedures was viewed as critical; hence, the major administrative response to the crisis took the form of a carefully developed group of recommendations, implemented immediately following Board approval.

4. A recommendation that corporal punishment be reinstituted in the schools was viewed as detrimental to the nature of the recommendations; nevertheless, the Board narrowly approved it over the administration's objections. Since implementation was contingent upon the development of guidelines, however, an opportunity for further refinement was provided, and appropriate planning could be brought to bear.

5. Criticism by the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, several Board members, and several public officials (and candidates for public office) was responded to individually, and as positively as possible. Though the PFT's request for the Superintendent's resignation was sharply rebuffed, the Union was offered every opportunity to provide inputs into the development of the recommendations. The final draft of the recommendations was worded so it would meet as complete Board consensus as possible. In doing so, however, it was unnecessary to compromise the intent of any of the recommendations.
Viewing the Process

Perhaps the most significant result of studying this major system crisis was, through observation, to isolate the steps of the process used to deal with it. The approach which was employed was clearly systematic, showed knowledge of planning, and had the development of the system as its goal. The steps that were utilized have been identified as follows:

1. **Comprehension of a system dysfunction and admission of a crisis situation.** This first critical step took place within 12 hours of the initial incident. Had the realization of the situation and the commitment to act taken place later, the crisis would have spread unchecked, and been more difficult to deal with.

2. **Request for complete context information.** This step enabled the decision makers to become fully aware of the status of the situation, and to react to immediate system crises. Arrangements were also made to receive all necessary information on an on-going basis.

3. **Awareness of the problems.** Both the immediate and longer-range problems were identified here—the immediate problems so follow-up could be instituted, and the longer-range problems so planning could be initiated. Without initial identification of the areas causing the dysfunction, the following steps could not be executed.
4. **Identification of goals.** Goals were viewed as broad, general areas of concern which had to be delineated immediately. Key members of the Executive Cabinet met with the Superintendent to develop the general goals prior to meeting with the Board.

5. **Selection of targets.** The specific targets (operational statements of the goals) were also discussed prior to meeting with the Board of Education. Basic targets were then presented to the Board, and were revised and clarified so that the task could begin.

6. **Collection of inputs.** This task was begun at once so that all possible alternatives would be identified. Inputs continued to be gathered after the initial recommendations were formulated, with the notion that revisions would undoubtedly be necessary.

7. **Identification of necessary changes.** This step was possible once the status of the situation was known, the goals and targets were set, and alternative solutions were being gathered. It was viewed as a tentative step, however, for the alternatives had yet to be thoroughly scrutinized.

8. **Evaluation of the inputs.** This was accomplished on an informal, but rigorous basis. In most cases each different alternative was considered in a number of contexts by over a dozen people and on several occasions.

9. **Testing of the selected inputs against the constraints posed by the system.** This served as an evaluation of feasibility, and
was a crucial step in the planning process. Certain alternatives, in their original form, could not be implemented because of specific Board, organization, or community objections. Advance knowledge of this enabled the group developing the recommendations to restructure those alternatives or adopt more palatable substitutes for them.

10. **Restructuring of the goals where necessary.** At this juncture, the goals were inspected so as to compare them with the alternatives being considered. Although it was generally the alternatives which were adjusted to meet the goals, the process was structured so that if justification could be made, the goals, themselves, would be altered.

11. **Development of the recommendations.** With this step, the first output of the process was generated. The output resulted from all of the ten previous steps, and at best, the recommendations (output) were viewed as tentative.

12. **"Testing" the recommendations.** Initial "testing" was accomplished by sharing the tentative output with selected persons prior to its presentation to the Board of Education. Their suggestions were then discussed by the task force and those which indicated a need for changes in the recommendations were held for the next step.

13. **Restructuring the recommendations.** This was accomplished by comparing the initial output with the suggestions indicated above. The restructuring consisted of clarifying some items, and
adding or deleting others. This testing-restructuring operation actually took place several times.

14. **Presentation for approval.** As a third step in the testing process, the revised recommendations were here presented to the Board of Education for their approval. The Board made a number of minor changes, and added a major recommendation before granting permission to proceed with implementation.

15. **Implementation of the recommendations.** Included as part of each of the twenty-one recommendations was a person or group designated as responsible for implementing it, as well as a date by which a specified portion of the implementation process was to be completed. Once the Board formally approved the recommendations, the Superintendent set the implementation process in motion.

16. **Monitoring the implementation.** A single individual was assigned to monitor the implementation process, and report its progress to the Superintendent and Executive Cabinet on a regular basis. In addition, the Board was scheduled to receive similar information several times during the six months that followed.

**Discussion of the Results**

The major hypothesis upon which this study was predicated—that under certain management conditions crisis may result in educational development—seems to have held true in this case. In the
maco-view, 37 incidents were examined over a twenty-year period and 15 significant responses to such instances of student unrest were identified. Though few of the responses could, in most cases, be related to one particular incident, it was established that they were, in fact, instituted as reactions to student unrest. The micro-view established the relationship more succinctly. In studying a single major system crisis (linked to student unrest) by examining the inputs to the crisis, the process by which they were used to generate outputs, and the outputs, themselves, a direct relationship can be established between the crisis and those outputs directed toward positive change, or the development of the system.

Certain conditions clearly led to the outcomes described, whereas the data was insufficient to relate other conditions to the results. Though the crisis, itself, was not responsible for the development which occurred, the way in which it was managed was the key. The crisis situation was immediately diagnosed as such, and no reluctance was shown in dealing with it. A proactive "management approach" was taken and, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, a planning orientation was evident. Critical to the success of this approach was the involvement of the various constituencies which composed the context of the system. Every effort was made to gather inputs from all possible sources, with particular energy being exerted in the identification of groups and individuals which might have
divergent solutions to the crisis.

On the other hand, though the system had made great strides in dealing with the causes of student unrest, such advances had proved insufficient to prevent the incident described in Chapter V and the crisis which resulted. The Superintendent moved quickly to deal with the crisis, but realizing that he could not devote full time to its resolution and continue to administer the school system, he appointed a project manager to work with him. All of the steps enumerated in the section on "Viewing the Process" were not laid out in advance of the situation, though immediately after the incident, a network was developed for dealing with it. The efforts of a single individual, therefore, were not solely responsible for the outcome, but the way in which he utilized available resources must be attributed to him. The incident which provoked the crisis was not anticipated, though it is doubtful that it could have been prevented. In acknowledging the crisis, however, system dysfunctions were admitted, and the ramifications which could cause further crisis were dealt with. Specific guidelines for coping with student discipline and violence had not been developed beforehand, and could not have led to the outcome of the situation. Nor were there specific contingency plans available to deal with such a crisis, and impact upon its resolution.

At the outset of the study it was contended that little attention had been paid to the notion that administrators could guide their
systems through crisis in such a way that the crisis would lead to the development of that system. This study dealt with that notion as one of its central foci, found that an administrator can function as stated above, and provided a detailed examination of how it was accomplished in one large urban school system. Bridges' finding—that present school practices lead to student-initiated crises and, in turn, to system reform—is also supported by this study.

The "management approach" to dealing with crisis (as reported in Chapter V) was examined in that chapter and analyzed more thoroughly in the final section of that chapter. Though that approach succeeded in this particular situation, it would be erroneous to assume that it is generalizable, in that form, to all such situations. It would be more correct to state that a general two-part approach, which anticipates the likelihood of crisis occurring, may be used successfully in working toward educational system development. This approach relies upon (1) a planning orientation to administration being internalized as standard operating procedure and (2) an acknowledgment of crisis when it occurs and a willingness to confront it, utilizing management and planning skills so that the changes that result are positive.

An example of a general planning orientation to educational administration is one which views the administrative process systematically and utilizes the steps basic to planning as a tool for problem solving and decision-making. Such an orientation is based upon
determining a set of decision alternatives for action in the future, geared toward accomplishing a specified goal by the most optimal means. Dror described the necessary steps in planning as (1) describing the environment, (2) awareness of the problem, (3) identifying the goal, (4) setting the targets, (5) determining the amount of change that will have to take place, (6) viewing the feasibility of that change, considering the constraints posed by the system, and (7) restructuring when and where necessary. The approach which was used to manage the crisis described in Chapter V coincided closely with these steps.

The reason that the Superintendent was able to successfully manage his system during crisis is that he did not function as might a traditional administrator, whose major purpose is one of system maintenance. Instead, he functioned as an administrator-developed—an individual who is prepared to cope with crisis, and is oriented to (1) identifying problems, (2) evaluating the context in which the problems exist, and (3) pursuing rational solutions to the problems. The administrator-developer deals with the changing educational system as well as the larger community in which it exists, so that the students produced by the system meet certain goals specified by the community. As such, he is concerned with utilizing inputs (e.g., teachers, facilities) to the school system in the most efficient way to produce the outputs (e.g., educated students) desired.
In the review of the literature in Chapter II it was found that administrators were reluctant to admit to dysfunctions in their systems. Therefore, the crises which often resulted were not acknowledged as such and could not be managed. In the case studied here, however, the Superintendent and his Executive Cabinet actually anticipated the crisis which the initial incident would produce before it occurred and took immediate steps to respond to it. That response demonstrated that there was no reticence in identifying system dysfunctions, several of which were merely tangential to the crisis.

Although the response to the crisis which resulted from the Freedman slaying was immediate, it was not a plan that could be implemented without further planning. It would have little real impact until it was fully implemented. Steps were taken to begin implementing each of the recommendations, and some of them were carried to fruition in a short length of time. However, due to the intrusion of another crisis—a financial one—the implementation of many of the recommendations was delayed. The full potential for development generated by the crisis will not be realized until the financial crisis is also resolved.

The literature study also demonstrated that when administrators did acknowledge the existence of crisis and attempted to respond to it, the crisis was usually so far developed that it was too late to plan for constructive change emanating from that incident.
Administrators who have faced crisis in their system tended to plan for its recurrence, but such responses generally were of an emergency/contingency plan nature. The causes of the crisis were seldom examined. This was not the case in the situation examined here, however. The antecedents of the crisis were studied and responded to as if they presented an active emergency. Contingency plans were operable prior to the situation, so that considerable energy could be devoted to middle- and long-range change strategies, rather than just to immediate survival.

By examining the inputs and outputs to the crisis situation studied, the fact emerges that the notion of meeting the needs and expectations of the schools' constituency in a large city is an extremely complex task. There were dozens of different client groups to be dealt with during the crisis, many of which had divergent expectations as to how it should be resolved. Flexibility is necessary in attempting to mediate between a variety of expectations.

To be effective, an administrator must be able to make rational decisions based upon valid information. He must also be cognizant of the expectations of this constituency, for the planning process includes such considerations. An administrator's final decisions and recommendations can be made only after considering all inputs and alternatives.

This raises a question of the relationship between expectations
and objectives. It was found in this study that specific goals and objectives had not been established to deal with student unrest prior to the crisis. This made a consideration of many alternatives voiced after the incident more difficult. Had such goals and objectives already been established, the freshly-voiced expectations could have been used to revise or refine them. However, since goals and objectives were not available, they had to be formulated "from scratch" as the initial step of the planning process, and tempered with the expectations of the system's clients in order to generate the recommendations.

Conclusions

Any generalizations based upon the results of this study must take into account the nature of the population, the definition of terms, and the methodology utilized to collect the information. However, as a result of the findings, the following conclusions seem warranted:

1. At a certain point, a system dysfunction will lead to crisis, which if not resolved, may, in turn, lead to disruption. Disruption is often of a violent nature, and will generally create more serious crises.

2. It is necessary to meet the needs of many diverse groups of clients to avoid and to resolve crisis in a large urban school system. The very survival of a school system depends upon its leaders'
ability to identify and progress toward those goals and objectives which are most important to its clients. To reiterate what Simon has said, "To survive, an organization must have an objective that appeals to its customers, or contributions to sustain it will not be forthcoming." 3

3. The above statement does not take into consideration that very different objectives may appeal to different sets of clients. Those who support a school system financially (parents and taxpayers) may hold certain expectations to which those who attend the schools may strongly object. One of the most difficult tasks an administrator must face is to mediate between such disparate points of view in establishing the goals of the system, designing the system's policy, and managing its implementation.

4. The best planning and the most expert crisis management will not eliminate student unrest. Active student unrest has been recorded for almost a millennium, and there is no reason to expect that it will cease in the near future. 4 Planning and crisis management can, however, affect the changes caused by such unrest so that they are


geared toward the development of an educational system rather than toward its destruction.

5. Philadelphia has been successful in dealing with student unrest in terms of the development which has resulted. Continued incidents, however, should be expected, for the changes which have been initiated will be implemented slowly. It may take years for their effects to be felt.

6. A successful administrator must be able to manage organizational disequilibrium—that is, the discrepancy between how an organization actually functions and its potential to operate more effectively. The gap between the actual and the potential may create crisis.

7. The major variables affecting educational development are (a) the pressure for change, often manifested in terms of crisis, (b) the general receptivity of the system, (c) the persons who advocate the change, (d) the power such persons wield, and (e) the process by which the change is introduced and managed.

Implications for Practice

Though further research is undoubtedly necessary in the areas of student unrest, crisis management, and educational development, the findings of this study prompt the author to cite the following implications for practice:
1. The study has far-reaching implications for the training of school administrators, particularly in terms of their orientation toward change and knowledge of management. Of foremost importance is the belief that the basic approach to school administration should be changed from a traditional "seat-of-the-pants" type of reaction to problems, to a systems approach, utilizing evaluative information as a basis for decision-making. It is said that nothing is so powerful as an idea whose time has come, and the time has, indeed, come to begin preparing individuals to become administrator-developers. The traditional administrator can no longer provide adequate leadership in education.

2. Administrators should also be well informed about change, including its theoretical constructs and implications for practice. Included as a portion of such knowledge should be an orientation toward educational development, as well as an understanding of the relationship between crisis, change, and development.

3. The necessity for administrators to meet the expectations of a number of different client groups indicates a need for (a) a carefully structured, democratic program of community involvement; (b) a close-working relationship with administrators', teachers', para-professionals', and non-professional workers' unions; and (c) a way by which the feelings of local opinion leaders can be communicated to the administration on a continuous basis. This will only provide
information to the administrator, however; in order to respond to his constituency he must know how to use information to make decisions.

4. Sometimes crises, no matter how well they are managed, take so much time and energy to resolve that administrators are not able to devote sufficient time to other critical areas. For example, the implementation of several of the recommendations on violence and discipline had to be deferred while emergency budget revisions were being developed. Because such situations are not uncommon, it would seem wise for a chief executive to routinely delegate the responsibility of managing the project to another individual, who would brief the chief on a regular basis. This would enable a superintendent, for example, after guiding policy decisions, to monitor their implementation without having to spend a great deal of time doing so. Thus, in times of crisis he would be able to devote his energy to its resolution without allowing other areas to deteriorate.

5. Although it may not be possible to directly manipulate the

---

5 When this point was raised during an all-day budget revision session, a high-ranking administrator, after expressing his chagrin at having to defer implementing several of the recommendations, noted philosophically: "When you're up to your ass in alligators, it's not time to think about draining the swamp."

6 For a discussion of the role of the project manager in education see Desmond L. Cook, Educational Project Management (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1971).
variables affecting educational development, an administrator may
certainly have some impact on them. For example, he might work
with a community to create pressure for certain needed changes and
to break down the barriers of resistance to others. He should become
familiar with the local power structure and attempt to enlist its support
in crucial fiscal issues. Also important, of course, is that he be able
to manage the change once it has been instituted.

6. Theoretically, the perception of a threat will bring about
change. It is essential, therefore, that administrators be able to
identify problem areas before they become active crises. To do so,
evaluation and monitoring skills are necessary.

7. It has been contended that it takes external pressure to
generate development, and that pressure from within rarely results in
more than system maintenance. Certain management approaches and
tools, however, have proven to be useful in initiating internal changes,
and might be utilized by the administrator for that purpose. Incentive
programs, creative tension, and the use of an ombudsman are included
in this group. Unless an environment for change is created, however,
it is doubtful that internal change will be forthcoming. Whether
changes are initiated internally or externally, an administrator must
be able to evaluate the potential of all new developments by assembling
the information about each necessary to make rational decisions con-
cerning their installation.
8. Teachers' unions may be extremely effective change agents. The Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, for example, exerted a great deal of pressure after the Freedman slaying, and had much to do with the situation becoming a crisis. Several of the recommendations were closely linked to their concerns.

It is essential when dealing with a group having bargaining power, as does the PFT, that any changes officially adopted be implemented as intended. Because the PFT strongly backed the adoption of certain recommendations, failure to implement them would be viewed as a broken agreement, and would become a demand when bargaining for their next contract began. The Union will not allow management to forget its commitments, and every time a teacher is involved in an incident related to discipline, the implementation of the recommendations to deal with such problems will be questioned.

9. In order to deal effectively with change, educators must be willing to admit that certain current programs are not complete successes. Weak programs are sometimes protected by administrators who view replacing them as an admission of personal failure. Such attitudes may be difficult to alter, but unless they are changed, development may not be a practical reality.

Implications for Further Study

The major reasons for greater in-depth study of an educational system's response to crisis and its relationship to development
are that (1) such information can assist administrators in facilitating
desired educational outputs, (2) crisis, if not managed properly, has
the potential to destroy an educational system, and (3) comparatively
little is known about the topic. In that few case studies of this type
have been used to examine the subject, a similar approach in other
cities might be of value. A more refined version of this approach
might also prove to be a useful vehicle for such a study, as would, no
doubt, many other methods. Any study which would add to the rather
scant body of knowledge concerning responses to crisis and their ef-
flect upon educational development would be a significant contribution.

Particular topics for study might include the following:

1. If there is correlation between crisis and change, should
a system consider deliberately incubating crisis as a technique for
development?

2. Under what circumstances does dissent lead to disruption,
or protest lead to confrontation? Are different management strategies
necessary for different types of student unrest-related crisis, or can
a single approach be modified to work in all such situations?

3. Can the anatomy of a crisis be studied?

4. At what point does an unresolved crisis spawn violent or
disruptive activity?

5. What is the best preparation for crisis management or
conflict resolution in education?
6. Can administrator-developers be prepared better by universities, or by industry or government? Could a program be structured from existing university courses?

7. What is the actual relationship between organizational objectives in education and public expectations?

8. Can and should techniques of crisis management be taught to classroom teachers? How would it benefit their students?

9. What are the political, social, and financial antecedents of educational crisis?

10. At what point will the gap between a system's actual and potential output produce crisis? How can the gap be dealt with?

11. Can mechanisms for releasing pressure or channeling it into other areas be developed? Is this a viable tactic for coping with potential crisis?

12. What is the relationship between accountability and crisis?

13. How can organizational objectives be made palatable to divergent groups?

14. How can internal pressure best be used for the development of an educational system?

15. What are the correlates of administrative crisis perception?

16. What responses to crisis are most commonly successful,
and why?

17. What are the attitudes held by administrators concerning student unrest and related crises, and how do such attitudes affect administrative action?

18. How would an "affective approach" to education influence student unrest?  

The preceding are but a few examples of related areas which might bear further investigation. What is critical is that educators cease to view the destructive effects of crisis as a fait accompli and, instead, learn to manage crises so that they bring about the development of educational systems.

---

APPENDIX

GROUPS PROVIDING INPUTS

Professional Educators and Educational Resource Groups

Affective Education Project Teachers
Black Educational Forum
Columbus Forum, Order of Sons of Italy in America
Committee for New Leadership, Philadelphia Federation of Teachers
Educators' Lodge, B'nai B'rith
International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers, Local 1201
Pennell School Faculty
Pennsylvania School Counselor's Association
Philadelphia City Education Association
Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, Local 3
    AF of L, CIO
Philadelphia Principals' Association
Philadelphia Public School Nurses' Association
Progressive Caucus, Philadelphia Federation of Teachers
School Administrators' Alliance
School Cafeteria Employees, Local 434

Civic-Educational Groups

Anderson Home and School Association
Barrett Junior High Home and School Association
Barry Home and School Association
Bridesburg Home and School Association
Brown Home and School Association
Carver Home and School Association
Citizens Committee on Public Education in Philadelphia
Community Advisory Committee-Hamilton School
Council of Student Association Presidents
Douglas School Community Association
Farrell Home and School Association
Finletter Home and School Association
Henry Home and School Association
Kenderton Home and School Association
Olney Home and School Advisory Committee
Philadelphia High School for Girls Home and School Association
Philadelphia Home and School Council
Sayre Junior High School Advisory Committee
Shawmont Home and School Association
Strawberry Mansion Junior High School Home and School Association
West Philadelphia High School Home and School Association

Civic Groups

Adolphus Civic Association
American Civil Liberties Union
American Jewish Committee
Anti-Defamation League - B'nai B'rith
Area C Community Action Council
Citizens of Tioga - Nicetown
Children's Psychiatric Center - St. Christopher's Hospital
Children's Service, Inc.
Committee of 70
Committee to Improve Neighborhood and Community Harmony
Commission on Human Relations
Community Mental Health Board
East Mt. Airy Neighbors
Equality League
Feltonville Civic Association
Germantown Community Council
Greater Olney Community Council
Jewish Defense League
Ludlow Community Association
Northwest Neighbors
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
National Association of Social Workers
Southeastern Mental Health Association
Urban Coalition
Urban League
West Side Neighborhood Council
Young Great Society
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


Articles


Chesler, Mark A. "Student and Administration Crises." Educational Leadership, October, 1969, pp. 34-38.


Unpublished Materials


Philadelphia Federation of Teachers. "PFT Positions on Discipline in the Schools." February 8, 1971. (Mimeographed.)

. "Referendum Authorized by the Membership Meeting of February 5, 1971." (Mimeographed.)

Philadelphia Home and School Council. "Suggestions from the Philadelphia Home and School Council on Discipline, Taken from the Meeting at the Greenfield School, Friday, February 4, 1971." (Mimeographed.)


Sanders, Donald P. "What is Development." Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, Faculty of Educational Development, 1968. ( Mimeographed.)


Smilansky, Moshe. "Basic Propositions for Developing Education for the Culturally Disadvantaged." Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, Faculty of Educational Development, Faculty Seminars, June 17-July 22, 1969. (Typewritten.)

"Student Activism in the High Schools of New York State." Albany, New York: The State Education Department, 1969.


Miscellaneous Materials


"Black Schools Unite." Philadelphia: November, 1967. (Mimeographed handbill.)


------. "Board of Education Policy on Disruption of Activities." December 1, 1967.

------. "Board of Education Policy on Disruption of Activities." Amended, October 23, 1968.


Columbus Forum of the Order of Sons of Italy in America. Statement presented at a meeting of the Philadelphia Board of Education, February 8, 1971.
Community Mental Health Board, Catchment Area 4 Executive Board. Statement presented at a meeting of the Philadelphia Board of Education, April 12, 1971.


"Defend Farinas and Davis!" Philadelphia: Committee for New Leadership. (Mimeographed handbill.)


Pennell School Faculty. Telegram, February 5, 1971.


School Cafeteria Employees, Local 434, AFL-CIO. Statement presented at a meeting of the Philadelphia Board of Education, February 8, 1971.


