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HIGH SCHOOL SOCIAL STUDIES

IN A MASS SOCIETY

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

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* * * * * *

The Ohio State University
1967

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Needless to say, any shortcomings this work may show are entirely my own responsibility, but I gladly share with many others any credit that might be given the endeavour which follows.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......................................................... ii
VITA .................................................................................... iii

Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................ 1
   Methodology
   Rationale for the Selection of Texts and
   Sociological Authorities
   Overview of the Presentation

II. PROBLEM SOLVING IN SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES .............. 10
   The Problem of Problems in Mass Society
   Problem Solving In Historical Perspective
   The Sociological Assumptions Presented in
   Four Methods Texts

III. A SOCIOLOGICAL MODEL .............................................. 61
   Private Troubles and Public Issues
   Psychological Problems and
   Sociological Problems
   The Model
   Definitions
   Employing the Model in Relation to
   Public Issues and Private Troubles
   Autonomy

iv
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IV. CURRICULUM AND TEACHER PREPARATION</th>
<th>81</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self as the Unit of Analyses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Uses of History and Biography</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nature of Curricular Content</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man as Content</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Implications</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Context as a Curriculum Guide</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Illustration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications for Teacher Preparation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V. CLASSROOM OPERATION</th>
<th>106</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teaching Strategies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Social Dynamics of Teaching</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching Techniques</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VI. THE FUTURE</th>
<th>118</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implications for Research</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary and Conclusions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| BIBLIOGRAPHY                           | 128|
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Problem solving has long served as a cornerstone of social studies education in America. In reviewing the nature of the dialogue which has taken place between and among social studies educators over the past eleven years, J. Wade Caruthers concludes that while there is substantial disagreement among scholars in the field concerning (a) the relationship between the social sciences and history, (b) curricular goals and (c) methodology (particularly technique) "There was no disagreement on the advantages of the problems approach or inquiry method of teaching."¹ If this analysis is correct, and there seems to be no reason to believe otherwise, it is certainly warranted to assume that problem solving is central to most approaches to social studies education.

Given the importance of problem solving in social studies education, it is reasonable then to have the minimal expectation

that the assumptions upon which problem solving approaches are based would take into account, or at least not contradict, the more recent findings and more significant theoretical constructs of the social sciences. Yet, it is one of the major postulates of the present study that this minimal expectation is not met, at least as this expectation is related to the field of sociology. It is further postulated that if the assumptions of the advocates of problem solving were altered in such a way as to take into account the findings of sociologists, there would be important implication for curriculum development, teacher preparation, classroom strategies and classroom techniques. Based upon these postulates the purposes of this study are: (1) To demonstrate that many of the sociological assumptions permeating the literature on problem solving do not correspond with, and often contradict, the findings of sociologists. (2) To point out how these misconceptions lead down "false roads" when the advocate of problem solving addresses himself to curriculum development, teacher preparation and classroom strategies and techniques. (3) To attempt to develop a model for the teaching of reflective thought which would incorporate more sophisticated insights from the field of sociology. (4) To point out some of the implications of the model so developed for curriculum development, teacher preparation and classroom strategies and techniques.
Methodology

The nature of the present study is such as to make it nearly impossible to employ a formal empirical approach to the questions confronted. The only formal analysis available, which might be even remotely useful would be some form of content analysis, but even here the limitations are so grave as to prohibit the use of this technique. Specifically, while certain types of problems where clear cut categories can be established are susceptible to content analysis, it is quite difficult to "pick up" connotation and implication by such a technique. Therefore, the following informal methodology will be employed in the present study: (1) The sociological assumptions underlying four separate (although not always different) approaches to problem solving in the social studies, will be analyzed in relation to some of the more recent findings and theoretical constructs from the field of sociology, by the method of comparison and contrast. Specifically the problems approaches advocated by Hunt and Metcalf in Teaching of High School Social Studies,2 Fenton in Teaching the New Social Science in Secondary Schools: An Inductive

Approach, Oliver and Shaver in *Teaching Public Issues in the High School*, and Massialas and Cox in *Inquiry in the Social Studies*, will be analyzed in relation to the sociological insights provided by a wide range of sociological writers and researchers including, but not limited to, David Reisman, William S. Whyte, C. Wright Mills, Robert K. Merton and Robin Williams Jr. (2) An effort will be made to develop a model for problem solving which takes into account the findings which result from the analysis of part "1" above. (3) The implications of the model developed in part "2" above for curriculum development, teacher preparation, classroom strategies and classroom techniques, will be drawn out and illustrated. (4) Finally, the implications of the findings of this study for empirical research will be explored.

**Rationale for the Selection of Texts and Sociological Authorities**

The four social studies education methods texts that were selected were not selected arbitrarily. The reasons for their

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selection are as follows: (1) All of the social studies methods texts selected clearly and explicitly advocate some mode of problem solving as the most viable approach to social studies education and have been or are currently being, used extensively in college methods courses throughout the nation. (2) Each book represents a slightly different position on the problems approach, and taken as a totality, I believe they represent the continuum of alternatives available to the social studies educators committed to a problems approach. Specifically, Hunt and Metcalf, with their emphasis on the "closed areas" and inter-disciplinary approach, represent the extremes of the continuum at the pole of total open endedness whereas Fenton, with his emphasis on the academic disciplines, particularly history, clearly sets limits on the type of inquiry or problem solving appropriate in the classroom. Oliver and Shaver, with the Jurisprudential approach and emphasis on personal commitment, stand somewhat closer to Hunt and Metcalf than they do to Fenton, whereas, Cox and Massialas, with their commitment to reflective analysis and structure of the discipline, stand somewhat closer to Fenton than they do to Hunt and Metcalf. (3) Each of these texts either implicitly or explicitly, confronts sociological issues as they relate to social studies education and with the possible exception of Fenton, purport to
take into account the implications of sociology for their positions. 6

In-so-far as the selection of sociological authorities are concerned, I have attempted to draw on the ideas and insights of a wide range of the leaders in the field. The selection of sociological frames of reference for the development of the model, however, is subject to much more criticism for being arbitrary than is the selection of social studies methods texts. It is granted that the sociologists and social philosophers who are most heavily drawn on in developing the model are of one general "school" of thought. Almost all of the authors who provide the theoretical basis of the model to be developed are considered by many sociologists to be highly impressionistic and nonempirical in their orientation. I believe, however, that there is significant justification for the selection of these authorities opposed to the selection of less impressionistic, theoretically more sophisticated, or more empirically oriented sociologists. My reasons are as follows: (1) Mass society is a fact with which we must live, and to which we must address ourselves. Yet, there is reason to believe that, at the present, the

6 This should not be taken to imply that Fenton is thereby sociologically more sophisticated than the other three sets of authors. Fenton simply does not confront the question of the implications of sociological issues for this program.
development of the field of sociology has not been such that, outside of rather impressionistic literature such as that selected here, the conceptual framework with which we operate is sufficiently developed to come to grips with some of the more important issues this development poses. In a recent collection of readings Bernard Rosenberg, the editor, himself a respected sociologist writes:

The conventional sociologists, striving for recognition within his closed fraternity, all too easily suffers an impairment of vision amid what Petrim A. Sorokin has called the "fashions, fads, and foibles" of the profession. How often it has been the relatively untrained, and un-tamed outsider who has seen past the unnecessary ob-scurities to the social realities he helps us to grasp.

(2) Even though many of the sociological writers and researchers selected for this study may stand accused of all manners of "academic heresy" within the ranks of sociology, their works have provided lively debate and inspired significant research. If the employment of these notions in the field of social studies education is equally productive the professional dangers to the person who uses them

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7 Bernard Rosenberg (ed.), Analysis of Contemporary Society (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1966), p. v. Five of the eight authors professor Rosenberg selects, represent some of the most cogent thought concerning contemporary American life, have been used extensively in the study presented herein. It is recognized that the position taken here is highly controversial in the field of sociology. There does seem, however, to be enough sociologists who take a position similar to the one presented herein to give some authority to the notion.
will certainly be offset by advances that will be made. ³ (3) It is my personal belief that many of the criticisms of the authors selected as authorities in this study, while often valid and telling, have generated a great deal of heat along with light.⁹

Overview of the Presentation

1. In the following chapter the four social studies texts selected for treatment will be analyzed in relation to the relevant sociological literature.

2. In Chapter 3 a model for problem solving will be developed.

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³ As one example of the kind of thought that these writers have inspired one need only read the defenses and rebuttals of Mills criticisms of the "Grand Theorists" and "Abstracted Empiricists" in his book C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1959) as they appear in book reviews and letters to the editors, in professional journals in 1959 and 1960.

⁹ For a good example of this one might look at the exchange between Vance Packard and William Petersen in connection with Petersen's review of Packard's book entitled The Status Seekers in the American Sociological Journal XXV, No. 25 (June, 1960), p. 408. Mr. Petersen takes Packard to task for using such "dubious sources" of authority as C. Wright Mills for his work. While I agree that much of Packards work is overly popularized sociology, there is a certain element of truth in Packards response to Petersen that the fact that he, Packard, was not in the "in group" accounts for some of Petersens' criticism. But the important point for our purposes is, that Mills, who is considered by many to be a brilliant sociologist, was written off by Petersen as a "dubious source," as if there was no need to justify that assertion.
3. In Chapter 4 some of the implications of this model for curriculum and teacher preparation will be set forth.

4. In Chapter 5 the implications of the model for classroom strategies and techniques will be discussed.

5. In Chapter 6 the implications of the findings of this study for empirical research, as well as the appropriate summary and conclusions, will be set forth.
CHAPTER II

PROBLEM SOLVING IN SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES

In spite of the fact that our understanding of modern social conditions is less than perfect, there is one thing that can be asserted with some assurance. It is that the nature of the problems, confusions, and difficulties confronting us are significantly different from the problems that have confronted man in the past. Carl Bridenbaugh catches the essential flavor of this change when he writes:

In attempting to epitomize what I conceive to have transpired, I have borrowed a term, appropriately I think, from biology. The nature of human existence has undergone a "great mutation."

The Great Mutation, or historical change, has taken place so rapidly, and life has sustained such sudden and radical alterations (in the long course of time) that we are now suffering something like historical amnesia. In the present century, first Western civilization and now the entire globe have witnessed the inexorable substitution of an artificial environment and a materialistic outlook of life for the old natural environment and spiritual world view that linked us so irrevocably to the Recent and Distant Pasts. So pervading and complete has been this change, and so complex has life become--I almost said overwhelming--that it now appears probable that mid-nineteenth-century America or Western Europe had more in common with fifth-century Greece (physically, economically, socially,
mentally, spiritually), than with their own projections into the middle of the twentieth century...

It may be true that there are persistent social problems which have confronted man through the ages. The social and cultural context in which these problems are manifest, however, conditions to some extent the way in which the problems are perceived, as well as the kinds of processes which are appropriate in confronting them.

It is the basic thesis of this study that social studies educators have not been sufficiently alert to the nature of the social changes which have occurred, and thus both the type of problems suggested for consideration, as well as the strategies and techniques suggested for bringing the students into some sort of confrontation with these problems, have often been quite inappropriate within the context of the mass society.

The Problem of Problems in Mass Society

In order to facilitate the discussion of problems in the mass society, and the comparative analysis to be undertaken later in this chapter, it will be convenient to adapt an intellectual model that has

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been used elsewhere by David Riesman. This model has become a widely used conceptual framework for the analysis of certain conditions of mass society. Riesman's model is subject to much valid criticism but is a useful tool to help us organize the ideas to be presented here. No claim is made that this model has a validity in and of itself, nor will I necessarily employ the model in such a way as to remain true to Riesman's original conception. Rather, I will use Riesman's conceptual framework, specifically his notions of tradition-direction, inner-direction, and other-direction only as convenient categories for a wide variety of ideas and notions concerning the nature of societies and psycho-social processes.

First, the essential meaning of the three conceptual tools which will be employed in this chapter should be set forth:

By tradition directed is meant that social condition wherein the conformity of the individual tends to be dictated to a very large degree by power relations among the various age and sex groups, the class, castes, professions, and so forth relations which have endured for centuries and are modified but slightly, if at all, by successive generations. The culture controls behavior minutely, and, while the rules are not so complicated that the young cannot learn them during the period of intensive socialization, careful and rigid etiquette governs the fundamentally influential sphere

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of kin relationships. Moreover, the culture, in addition to its economic tasks, or as part of them, provides ritual, routine and religion to occupy and orient everyone. Little energy is directed toward finding new solutions of the age-old problems, let us say of agricultural technique or "medicine" the problems to which people are acculturated.3

By inner-directed is meant a society wherein the primary character type is one in which:

... the source of direction for the individual is "inner" in the sense that it is implanted early in life by the elders and directed toward generalized but nonetheless inescapably destined goals.

As the control of the primary group is loosened, the group that both socialized the young and controls the adult in the earlier era, a new psychological mechanism appropriate to the more open society is "invented": it is what I like to describe as a psychological gyroscope. This instrument, once it is set by the parents and other authorities, keeps the inner-directed person... "on course" even when tradition, as responded to by his character, no longer dictates his moves.4

By other-directed is meant a society in which:

... contemporaries are the source of direction for the individual--either those known to him or those with whom he is indirectly acquainted, through friends and through the mass media. This source is of course "internalized" in the sense that dependence on it for guidance in life is implanted early. The goals toward which the other-directed person strives shift with the guidance: it is only the process of paying close attention to the signals from others that remain unaltered throughout life.5

3Ibid., p. 26. 4Ibid., p. 34. 5Ibid., p. 37.
The reader will note that Riesman's initial conception of inner-direction, tradition-direction, and other-direction as "character types" has been slightly altered, in the sense that I will be referring here to a set of social conditions wherein this type of character is likely to emerge, rather than to the character type itself. This use of Riesman's model is more in keeping with the use Riesman made of it in Faces In The Crowd\(^6\) than it is with the conception set forth in the Lonely Crowd.

Employing the Riesman model helps one to see more clearly the fact that social conditions alter both the nature of social problems as well as the means available for conceptualizing and coping with these problems. For example, in the tradition directed society the essential problem confronting man was to "live." Because of the delicate balance man had to maintain between himself and his environment in order to assure subsistence, those patterns of behavior which were conceived as somehow assuring this balance were enshrined in sacred tradition. Whenever the problem of "living" was not successfully met e.g. in time of famine or drought, the problem was generally cast in terms of restoring the balance

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which had obtained prior to the life catastrophe. Nature was seen as
tickle and whimsical. Man's task was to adjust himself to these un-
predictable changes in nature. It was felt that whenever imbalance
occurred man could restore the balance only by reaffirming the
tradition e.g. the ritual dance, or by placating nature through offer-
ing sacrifices or similar symbolic manipulations. The tradition
directed society was organized in such a way that the only solution
available was to attempt to bring nature back to the state upon which
the traditional patterns of behavior were predicated.

In the inner-directed society, however, man no longer
conceived nature to be unpredictable. Man could control nature.
He need not simply reaffirm her vices and inequities. There were
natural laws and principles which man and nature adhered to, but
within the bounds of these laws man saw himself having considerable
latitude in the way in which he adjusted himself to his environment.
He no longer simply reacted to his environment but interacted with
it in such a way as to alter the environment and/or his own be-
havior.

This conception of man and his environment altered sub-
stantially the nature of social problems. It was a dynamic notion.
No longer was it enough just to "live." It now became possible and
important to produce. That is, man could seek ways to apply
principles, and seek principles to apply, which would force the environment to bring forth greater quantities of goods than the tradition directed man could have conceived. But, man was still confronted with difficulty of determining which principles to apply and how to apply those principles. It is important to note that the inner-directed man's world-view was one of a natural order and a normative order i.e., whenever the problem of production, for example, was not successfully met man did not look to tradition to discover the reason, rather he looked to natural law and principles of behavior.

Obviously, disagreement would arise about both means and ends. Thus, social problems in the inner-directed society could profitably be cast in terms of value conflict, i.e. conflict over ends and normative dissensus, i.e. conflict over which principles to behavior applied and how those principles applied.

In the other-directed society, however, social problems become quite different from either problems in the tradition-directed society or the inner-directed society. In the tradition-directed society the end, survival, was predetermined, and tradition dictated the means. In the inner-directed society the end, production, was given but it was a dynamic concept and allowed for a wide variety of interpretation, thus disagreement. Also, in the inner-directed society alternative principles and alternative applications of principles
allowed for the development of normative dissensus. In the other-directed society, however, neither the ends nor the means are pre-determined. First, other-direction seems to be accompanied by economic affluence. Thus, the problem of production is essentially solved. Therefore, cast in terms of the inner-directed society, the question of ends becomes meaningless.\(^7\) Second, since the other-directed man does not concern himself with inner directed principles of behavior but rather with the adjustment of his behavior to the behavior of others, the notion of normative dissensus becomes equally powerless.

For present purposes the important point of the foregoing discussion is that social conditions do alter the nature of social problems. The tradition-directed society had few social problems when cast in the framework of the inner-directed society. Tradition-directed man neither conceived social problems nor was he a problem solver. Rather, as Riesman points out, he was acculturated to the problems. Inner-directed man, on the other hand, was both a problem seeker and a problem solver. It is interesting to note that the very notion of problems is a product of the inner-directed society.

\(^7\)See John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1958), for a particularly lucid discussion of this notion see particularly the chapter entitled "Conventional Wisdom."
That is, a problem is a situation wherein something is out of joint or in a state of disharmony with a principle of action which is assumed to be correct. Disharmony, however, is anathema to the other-directed society. In a sense the other-directed society is strikingly like the tradition-directed society except that the tradition-directed society is relatively static wherein the other-directed society is dynamic.

If the sociologists and the social studies educators are to effectively come to grips with the social conditions of an emergent mass culture and its concomitant other-directed characteristics, it will be necessary to develop conceptual tools which are not dependent upon the cultural conditions of conflict and dissensus characteristic of the inner-directed society. In later chapters this notion will be explored more fully and an attempt will be made to devise, however crudely, conceptual models which will be more useful in understanding current social conditions.

**Problem Solving in Historical Perspective**

Historically, one could probably go back at least as far as Socrates for support for a problems approach to education, but in American education, emphasis on problem solving as a method of education is most clearly traced to John Dewey. It should be recognized that Dewey's "reflective method" may be quite different from
other "problems approaches" to education, but most problems
approaches to education find their fundamental inspiration in the
conceptions set forth by Dewey. As Jewett and Ribble point out, and
I think rightly so:

None of the lauded conceptions of structure, discovery, inquiry, heuristics of learning, and the inductive approach, which are purported as the cornerstones of the "new social studies" illustrate a marked departure from the reflective theory of education enunciated by John Dewey. 8

If it is granted that it was Dewey and his contemporaries who first gave real emphasis to problem solving, I believe that one gains a clearer understanding of why many modern approaches to problem solving evidence the relative sociological naivete postulated in the preceding chapter.

The intellectual and cultural milieux which surrounded Dewey and his contemporaries was not particularly conducive to the development, on the part of non-sociologists, of the necessary sociological sophistication to which this study is addressed. Indeed, if one looks at the American scene between 1910 and 1940, at least as that scene was reflected in the field of education, it becomes readily apparent that this was an age of psychology and philosophy.

In 1890 William James' seminal work, *The Principles of Psychology*, set a new course for the world of psychology, and the world of education. James addressed himself to both philosophical and psychological issues, and set a course wherein questions of mind and thought were removed from the exclusive domain of philosophy. Out of this influence an entire school of objective psychologists, e.g. Thorndike, began to explore the possibility of doing research and applying the findings of this research to educational practice.

John Dewey, like Thorndike et al., was also engrossed with conceptions of mind and thought, and Dewey like the objective psychologists, was influenced by James. There were, however, some very fundamental differences between Dewey and the school of "objective psychologist." For the most part, the objective psychologists viewed learning as a physiological-biological process, whereas Dewey was more directly concerned with the social dimensions of thought and education. Because the Thorndikein school of psychology was the most influential critic of Dewey's conceptions of learning, it was necessary for Dewey to concentrate a great deal on the psychological aspects of learning. That is, in that some of the most

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powerful voices raised against Dewey's notions were from the field of psychology, it was necessary for Dewey, and particularly Dewey's followers, to take the data presented by these critics into account in the development and presentation of alternative (to the "objective psychologists") conceptions.

It is equally important to note the philosophical tenets set forth by James, and developed and altered by Dewey, which has been labeled pragmatism, was an outgrowth of, and reaction to, nineteenth century idealism. Another philosophical school i.e. realism, also found its roots in the same reaction. The fact that these two philosophical schools developed somewhat simultaneously, and from the same intellectual base, is important for us for two reasons. First, while the "realists" never articulated the educational implications of their position, the implicit assumptions underlying many educational developments during the time Dewey was writing are clearly based upon "realistic" conceptions. Second, because both pragmatism and realism purported to be workable alternatives to nineteenth century idealism, there was a built-in need for each school to take into account the propositions set forth by the other in the ensuing struggle for intellectual and academic prominence.

Thus, due to the nature of the dialogue forced upon Dewey and contemporaries of like mind, and upon the "disciples" of these
men, there was a built-in bias toward psychological and philosophical sophistication. The question remains, however, why was there not an equally penetrating dialogue in terms of the sociological assumptions of Dewey's position. This question is even more perplexing when one considers that Dewey, more than any of his predecessors, placed great emphasis on the social content of learning, and was himself deeply concerned about the sociological implications of his ideas. The answer to this question, I believe, lies in several different places.

First, while Dewey clearly recognized the vital relationship between the school and society and was very concerned with reconstructing education in such a way as to meet societal needs, his conceptions of society and societies needs are more clearly drawn from his pragmatic theory and his conceptions of industrial democracy, than they are from sociological data. Dewey's emphasis upon the progressive aspects of education, clearly represented in his Reconstruction In Philosophy,¹⁰ lead him to emphasize the process of becoming, and thus the implications of education for future experience. It is certainly true (almost so much so to be cliche) that Dewey equally emphasized the effect of past experience on the educative

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process but careful reading indicates that this emphasis was much more psychologically oriented. That is, Dewey clearly recognized the implications of his educational program for the intelligent reconstructing of the social structure, and the importance (psychologically) of past and present experience, for reconstruction of mind, but he never seemed to be able to incorporate the implications of the present social structure into his intellectual constructs.

More specifically, Dewey did think structurally and therefore sociologically when he addressed himself to the implications of education for society, but when he considered the implications of society for the educative process he was forced to conceive them in psychological and clinical terms rather than sociological and structural terms. For example, Dewey constantly emphasized the individual nature of education (psychologically) and the individual nature of experience and experiencing. He also recognized that the nature of these experiences were social, and therefore learning was social. But he seems to fail to appreciate the distinction between individual experience and experiencing, which is clinical, and social experience which is related to and an integral part of a structural component at the societal level. Therefore, while he recognized the existence of social conditions in the learning experience, he could only bring these considerations into play in terms
of models of psychological problems, felt difficulties, or confronting situations. He did not seem to make clear the distinction between problems in terms of psychological and clinical components, and problems in terms of sociological and structural components.

A second reason for the lack of sociological sophistication in many modern problems approaches is also to be found in the intellectual milieux out of which this approach gained its initial emphasis. But here one must look directly at the field of sociology.

Objective psychology, philosophic realism, and pragmatism were all efforts to reconcile our ways of thinking about man and the universe with the new and almost overwhelming developments in the fields of science and technology. The field of sociology, too, was confronted with this problem. And the way in which the scholars in the field dealt with the problem was not substantially different from the way in which scholars who addressed the psychological and philosophical issues posed by the "scientific revolution" dealt with the problem. Indeed, some of the key figures in the development of sociological thought at the turn of the century, and in the first several decades following the turn of the century, were identical in psychology, philosophy, and sociology, and many others were closely connected both personally and intellectually. For example, the close connection between Dewey, G. H. Mead and Charles
Horton Cooley is well known, as is their common heritage in the works of William James. As Don Martindale points out, the entire sociological school of symbolic interactionism, which includes G. H. Mead and C. H. Cooley, found its essential philosophical base in the pragmatism of James and to a lesser degree, that of Dewey. Similarly, Martindale points out the indirect influence of Dewey on sociological functionalism.

There were schools of thought within sociology that certainly could have served as a source of constructive criticism for Dewey and his followers. It is interesting to note, however, that those sociologists who addressed themselves most clearly to the areas of concern to the educational philosophers e.g. Dewey, and to the concerns of educational psychologists e.g. Thorndike, tended to be from the symbolic interactionist school of thought. Therefore, they were least likely to be critical of the Deweans position and tended to support Dewey in his intellectual differences with the behavioristic psychologists. Almost by default, those who were advocates of problem solving as an educational tool found few, if

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12 Ibid., pp. 452-454.
any, critics of their sociological constructs in the field from which one would legitimately expect it i.e. sociology.

Another reason that there was little criticism of the sociological assumptions of the proponents of "problem solving" was the fact that the area of social problems or social pathology within the field of sociology was confronted with theoretical difficulties very similar to the sociological naivete evidenced by the proponents of "problem solving." Perhaps the most telling analysis of the condition of the study of social problems was written by C. Wright Mills in 1943 in an article entitled "The Professional Ideologys of Social Pathologists". In summarizing Mills' criticism of the field of social pathology, Bend and Vogelfanger write:

1. The model of social organization which the pathologists tended to adopt was that of the small town, blown up in scale. "The good society" was one where the intimacy and homogeniety of primary groups prevailed, where proper social change occurred in a slow and orderly fashion. The "good citizen" was one who joins and helps and is adjusted. Mills pointed to Cooley as one of the original architects of this model, through his emphasis on the "organic" (a harmonious balance of elements) and "processual" (continuous through time) nature of society.

2. Mills suggested that the concept of disorganization utilized by the pathologists quite often meant merely the absence of that type of organization

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described above. Social problems were often defined in terms of deviations by aggregates of individuals from the existing norms. They arise when numbers of individuals are unwilling or unable to conform to the status quo standards, as a result of encroaching urbanization, immigration, and soon. [sic] Norm violations were sometimes seen simply as biological impulses breaking through societal restrictions. This analysis was supported in Mills' remembered phrase, by "a paste-pot eclectic psychology."

In addition to the "deviation from norms" approach, another popular orientation to social problems centered about the concept of social change. The assumption in this type of analysis was that stability of any social pattern inevitably results in an adjustment to it, whereas change, except for the slow, orderly variety, invariably unlocks the Pandora's box of social problems. A frequent variant of the social change approach was that of culture lag, where social problems emerge out of the unequal rates of change of the different aspects of the culture.

The solutions to social problems served up by pathologists had as their major ingredient more and better socialization. In this way, individuals with problems could be adjusted or readjusted, and the repercussions of social change could be controlled more effectively.

3. The value uniformities which led to typical notions of social organization and disorganization also determined the principles for selecting and organizing problems in texts. For example, the method of presenting social problems was greatly influenced by the case-study approach of the social worker, in that problems selected leaned to the "practical problems of everyday life," problems of individuals in specific situations. The "situational approach" of W. I. Thomas contributed greatly to this mode of problems perception. The case-study approach plus the lack of any theory resulted in books that were "fragmentary collections of
scattered problems and facts" selected in a near random fashion, and characterized by an extremely low level of abstraction . . . 14

If one looks closely at these criticisms of social pathologists, it becomes readily apparent, that if these are legitimate criticisms of social pathology, they are equally legitimate criticisms of many of the sociological assumptions of the proponents of "problem solving." Even one only vaguely familiar with Dewey for example, certainly must recognize that while he addressed himself to the problems of urbanized industrial society, there was implicit in much of his writing the assumption of the inherent value of the small Vermont village and that many of the problems of industrial society were cast in terms of "the small town blown up in scale." 15 Nor can one who reads Dewey be unaware of his "feel" for harmony and equilibrium.

From the foregoing analysis, it can be seen that, historically at least, there is reason to believe that problems approaches have often been based upon sociologically naive conceptions. In the


following section, it will be demonstrated that modern approaches to problem solving have not significantly altered these circumstances, nor do they show signs of doing so.

The Sociological Assumptions Presented in Four Methods Texts

Before beginning the analysis, several organizational matters should be considered. First, the four texts to be analyzed do not necessarily represent a monolithic set of sociological assumptions. There are disagreements between and among the authors of these texts concerning sociological insights as well as contradictions and inconsistencies within single works. Therefore, the following format has been adopted for this section: (1) The major sociological assumptions upon which the authors of the four texts tend to be in agreement will be "pulled out" and examined in the light of the data and insights provided by modern sociologists. (2) Where the sociological assumptions ascribed to by the authors of the four social studies methods texts do not "square" with the findings of sociologists, an effort will be made to demonstrate how these faulty assumptions lead to misconceptions in terms of teaching strategy and techniques. (3) Other sociological assumptions found in these four social studies methods texts, but not necessarily ascribed to by all the authors, will be examined in the same manner. In this
latter case, however, the assumptions analyzed will be carefully selected with the primary purpose of demonstrating the nature of the sociological naivete represented in these texts and no effort will be made to provide an exhaustive list of all the assumptions made by all the authors.

All of the authors whose books will be analyzed accept as one of their basic postulates the existence, in America, of the social phenomena which social scientists refer to as cultural pluralism. Cox and Massialas write, "In our society our youth are growing up in an environment which is characterized by schisms, diversities, and a plethora of value alternatives."\(^\text{16}\) Hunt and Metcalf write, "There is not one heritage in the United States; there are many heritages."\(^\text{17}\) Fenton writes:

We are remarkably pluralistic; our population has origins in every land; our religions are as diverse as our sporting events; our political faiths and standards of behavior are remarkably disparate; the value system of different economic and social classes vary enormously.\(^\text{18}\)


Oliver and Shaver write, "Smaller 'societies' are still with us to maintain diversity and freedom within the national society.

It is doubtful that any modern sociologists would disagree with this very basic assumption. But when the authors begin to draw the implication of pluralism for society and for the individual, there is considerable room for disagreement. For example, both Hunt and Metcalf and Oliver and Shaver employ this pluralistic conception in such a way as to provide an intellectual basis for a conflict model of society. Oliver and Shaver make this point quite clear when they write:

A conflict model of society such as has been presented above is required also to take into account the most important pragmatic reason for maintaining society in the first place, i.e., the interdependence of men and groups within a societal setting as a necessary condition of human fulfillment.

Hunt and Metcalf in an even more sweeping statement write:

Certain aspects of American culture are especially relevant to social-studies education. We shall discuss two such features. One is the presence of conflict on a wide scale, a characteristic of most societies at our stage of history. But compared with many other cultures,


20 Ibid.
our own is particularly conflict ridden, and for good reasons. Settled by peoples of diverse origins and outlooks, the United States has been, ever since its founding, the scene of competing political, economic, and social beliefs. Furthermore, the rate of industrialization itself tends to generate conflict. It speeds change, with a result that from generation to generation beliefs undergo marked alteration. Industrialization creates gulfs between children and parents, parents and grandparents. It also tends to fragmentize society into highly specialized occupational groupings, each with its own point of view and its peculiar interests.  

This conception of society leads Hunt and Metcalf to posit as the foremost purpose in social studies instruction in the secondary school, "the reflective examination of value conflicts now besetting American culture." Similarly, Oliver and Shaver write:

On the basis of these considerations about the pluralism and commonality of American society, two criteria for selecting content for general education in the social studies become salient. First, the student should be exposed to public problems within our society--situations over which individuals as well as the society are in conflict. And second, the student should be taught to analyze these public problems within some useful political and social framework. We are suggesting that initially the appropriate framework grows out of a Western constitutional tradition.  

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21 Hunt and Metcalf, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
22 Ibid., ix.
23 Oliver and Shaver, op. cit., p. 13.
The rationale for the selection of social studies content as well as the recommendations for the specific content to be selected is substantially different for Hunt and Metcalf and Oliver and Shaver. That is, Hunt and Metcalf's primary concern is to "... help the American people find consensus on the meaning of democracy--but in ways consistent with the requirements of democratic culture." Oliver and Shaver, on the other hand, while concerned about consensus building, place greater emphasis than do Hunt and Metcalf on the need for individual commitment (This latter emphasis on individual commitment accounts, at least in part, for their heavy reliance on the Socratic method). In spite of these differences, however, Oliver and Shaver and Hunt and Metcalf are equally committed to a set of sociological assumptions which presuppose the social conditions of the inner-directed society. This point is most clearly made by Oliver and Shaver when they write:

1. People often try to develop general principles of behavior to guide their action; the most general and basic principle in our society is a commitment to human dignity.

2. While respect for human dignity and the rights of the individual may be the essential basis of judgment in a controversial situation, it is often

24 Hunt and Metcalf, op. cit., p. 10.

25 Oliver and Shaver, op. cit., see particularly pp. 60-64.
difficult to understand or communicate the reasonabil-
ity of alternative decisions on the basis of this
principle alone.

3. Throughout history, men have developed
more specific values which, when followed, are
believed to promote the value of human dignity.
These specific values or rights may be thought of
as both elements of and bridges leading toward
the more basic value. Examples of such values
or principles are:

a. The right to think, to believe, to
speak, to worship as one's conscience and
personal experience dictate.
b. The right to be secure from physical
attack or injury.
c. The right to make agreements with
other men and have these agreements respect-
ed.
d. The right to have one's own personal
property protected from seizure and destruc-
tion.26

In the case of Oliver and Shaver, at least, not only are the
conditions of inner-directed society assumed but one is almost
forced to conclude that they predicate much of their position on the
assumption of liberal democracy. If one takes Riesman's analysis
at all seriously, the conjunction of these two assumptions is not at
all surprising. The development of the philosophical and political
constructs upon which liberal democracy was based was roughly
paralleled chronologically by the development of inner-directed
society. But it is important to note that this was a development

26Ibid., pp. 59-60.
which preceded the twentieth century. One of the most discussed developments of the twentieth century, at least among political scientists, is the emergence of mass democracy out of the conditions of nineteenth century liberal democracy. Oliver and Shaver almost entirely neglect this point. Yet any program of social studies education which does not take this rather well documented development into consideration must ultimately be suspect. Further, from the point of view of contemporary sociologists, any strategy of teaching or program for social studies education predicated exclusively upon the assumption of inner-directed society is equally subject to suspicion.

Specifically, both Oliver and Shaver and Hunt and Metcalf assume conditions in which individuals hold beliefs in the sense that inner-directed man holds beliefs. Without too much over simplification, one could say that these beliefs constitute the raw material upon which the programs of social studies education advocated by these authors are built. It is probably true that the assumption of this type of belief structure is still warranted to a considerable extent. But, there is increasing evidence that the beliefs held by students today are qualitatively different from the beliefs held by the ideal type "inner-directed man." For example, a great deal of research has been done in relation to reference group theory which
indicates that one's commitment to belief and/or principle may not be as important in determining behavior as is the desire for group solidarity or group identity. In another area, religion, where it is generally assumed that people have deep personal commitments, there is increasing evidence that these commitments are not so much related to commitment to principle as they are to the social context in which the actor finds himself and the way in which the actor defines the social situation.

These findings, in addition to many findings of a similar nature which have not been reported herein, provides at least some reason to question the viability of any pedagogical position which presupposes belief in the sense in which it is used by Hunt and Metcalf and Oliver and Shaver. In order to make the import of this assertion clearer, an example is in order.

Let us assume that a teacher is operating on the assumption that his students hold beliefs (in the inner-directed sense) concerning a particular event, development, or set of circumstances.

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The logical thing to do according to the position of Hunt and Metcalf and Oliver and Shaver is to determine the nature of those beliefs and then bring evidence to bear upon them which creates doubt, confusion, or disharmony within the psychological framework of the student. While the student may elect to employ some psychological escape mechanism in order to avoid confronting the situation, the probability and possibility of reflective examination and the development of tested beliefs is increased. What is overlooked, however, is the fact that the student who manifests some of the characteristics subsumed under the rubric "other-directed" may evidence the belief initially perceived by the teacher only because he has defined the social situation in which he finds himself in such a way that he has determined that the particular belief he manifests is most appropriate in order to gain acceptance from the group. The teacher, in presenting evidence to challenge the belief, makes the assumption that alterations of belief manifest by the student is the result of critical inquiry.

It may well be, however, that what has happened is the following: (1) The student initially defines the situation in such a way

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29 For a discussion of the various psychological mechanisms available to attack a problem, other than reflection, see Hunt and Metcalf, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-59.
as to determine that belief "A" is appropriate. (2) The teacher alters
the social situation by presenting data which makes it clear to the
student with his "antenna out" that belief "A" is no longer appropriate. (3) The student begins to "feel around" in order to determine what
kind of belief is appropriate. (4) The teacher, viewing his behavior,
gives approval on the basis of the assumption that the student is be-
having in a reflective manner in that he is developing alternative
hypothesis. (5) What may be happening, however, at least in the case
of the other directed student, is that the student is searching not for
warranted assertions but for cues whereby he can redefine the social
situation and manifest a belief which will be more appropriate in that
it will gain him social acceptance. (6) What this means is that the
teacher who assumes an inner directed belief structure on the part
of his student, may observe behavior which is strikingly similar to
reflective behavior and on the basis of these observations draw the
unwarranted conclusion that his strategy and techniques are "paying
off." But in-so-far as the student is concerned his, i.e. the stu-
dents, belief structure has been untouched. Specifically, the
student did not "hold" the initial belief in the sense of being committed

30In this particular case it may be, though not necessarily, that the teacher is functioning in the capacity of, to use a symbolic interactionist concept, a significant other.
to it as a principle, nor does he "hold" the newly manifest belief in the sense of being committed to it as a principle. In addition, his assumed reflective behavior has not been reflective at all but rather a search for social cues. Rather, he has simply found the manifestation of the initial belief, the overt characteristics of reflective behavior, and the resultant belief to be the most appropriate way to gain that in which he really believes, i.e. togetherness and/or acceptance.

Thus far I have dealt only with Hunt and Metcalf and Oliver and Shaver. Before proceeding with a similar treatment of Fenton and Cox and Massialas one additional note should be added. Hunt and Metcalf, unlike Oliver and Shaver, are not so overtly committed to the notion of liberal democracy. They make a sincere effort to "square" their position with the conditions of mass democracy. It is true, however, that their commitment to social consensus based upon reflective examination of value conflicts, leads them into difficulties quite similar to those of Oliver and Shaver. Specifically, because Hunt and Metcalf emphasize the importance of developing consensus as a problem. It is true that the authors' emphasis upon "closed areas" does provide the potential for viewing consensus as a problem, but the way in which this notion is employed by Hunt and Metcalf is not conducive to such a development. That is, Hunt and
Metcalf view the closed areas as "... areas of belief and behavior which are largely closed to rational thought." The implication of their entire argument concerning the "closed areas" is that they are closed precisely because individuals hold deep commitments to unexamined beliefs, and the intensity of these commitments is such as to prohibit rational thought. They overlook the possibility that there may be areas closed to rational thought precisely because people do not have deep commitments concerning them. For example, in a study done by Vidich and Bensman entitled Small Town in Mass Society, the authors employed a notion which they labeled "the principle of unanimity" to describe the tendency of various boards and groups to reach unanimous decisions on what appeared to be very controversial issues. There are several possible explanations for this tendency. The first, and certainly the most idealistic, is that in the course of consideration of alternative modes of action the participants carefully weighed the evidence and reached their unanimous decision according to the principles of rational consent, as described by Oliver and Shaver. A second, and more likely explanation, however, is that given the social milieux in which these

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31 Hunt and Metcalf, op. cit., p. 7.

groups functioned, the members of the groups perceived unanimity as a mechanism necessary to defend the integrity of the group in a hostile environment. A third explanation is that there were powerful influence leaders who let their will be known and the groups unanimous decision resulted from the inner play of these social forces. The important point, however, is that the public decisions made concerning the issues before these boards quite possibly were made with little attention to beliefs.

It can be argued that this is precisely the point that Hunt and Metcalf and Oliver and Shaver are making and that they see as the purpose of social studies education the alteration of these conditions. It seems to me, however, that the fact that the classroom represents a social system is overlooked as is the fact that all of the social forces which come to play on the groups reported by Vidich and Bensman also come to play in the classroom. One of the basic arguments of all four texts presently under analysis is that education cannot take place with disregard to the overall social context in which it occurs. Overlooking some of the recent findings in regard to group behavior as that behavior is manifest in mass society is a denial of this argument.

As was pointed out earlier, Cox and Massialas, like Hunt and Metcalf and Oliver and Shaver, assume the existence of cultural
pluralism. The implications they draw from this, however, are somewhat different. Because Cox and Massialas were undoubtedly influenced by Hunt and Metcalf, they hold some of the "conflict" views discussed earlier. However, Massialas and Cox are more directly concerned with normative patterns than they are with value orientations. That is, they are more concerned with normative dissensus and deviation than are Hunt and Metcalf. Yet when one "cuts through" the slightly different terminology that this different emphasis creates, one finds that sociological assumptions of Massialas and Cox are essentially the same as those of Hunt and Metcalf and Oliver and Shaver. They emphasize the "crisis context" in which modern education must take place. The crisis they see is created by modern "... conditions of change, instability and disjunction ... a decreasing agreement on the ways to solve ... problems."33 While Massialas and Cox, in their program for social studies education, place more emphasis on the social science disciplines and their structure than do Oliver and Shaver and Hunt and Metcalf, the basic postulates upon which they base their program are essentially the same and subject to precisely the same criticism.

33 Massialas and Cox, op. cit., p. 6.
Fenton does not address himself to the teaching of social studies from the same frame of reference as do the other three sets of authors. His primary emphasis is upon inquiry in the various disciplines. He recognizes that the environment external to the school influence the way in which the student perceives his universe and he recognizes that education may influence the way the student operates in society. But there is little evidence that Fenton is extremely interested in this social dimension of social education.

There is little doubt that Fenton's program for social studies education is exciting and for some purposes quite worthwhile. But there is little evidence to date to support the notion that even if it were possible to get the student to think like a historian, political scientist or sociologist, he would be better equipped to function in mass society. Some readers will undoubtedly suggest that the purpose of education is not to prepare students, at least in a direct fashion, to function more effectively in society but rather it is to come to know himself through the discipline of the scholar. I would agree that one cannot function effectively in mass society without some self awareness. Indeed, one of the major crisis of our age may be that the social structure of mass society

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34Fenton, op. cit., pp. 41-45.
is such that its effect on the individual is to cause him to lose his identity. But there is no evidence to support the notion that the scholar or one who understands the method and nature of the social science disciplines is less likely to lose his identity or to become alienated. Only half factiously, it could be suggested that the academician is one of the most alienated individuals in the modern world.

A second assumption common to the texts under examination is the assumption of the need for commitments to democratic ideology. While what is meant by democracy is somewhat difficult to determine from reading any one of the texts, all the authors do make an effort to be somewhat explicit about the nature of this commitment. Since we are not concerned at present with the philosophic meaning of democracy, no effort will be made to set forth the notions of democracy presented in the four social studies methods texts under examination. Because, however, this ideological commitment leads the authors to make certain sociological assumptions, it is worth while to simply note that all of the authors are clearly committed to democratic ideology.

Based upon the assumption of democracy, and the conditions which the authors assume to be necessary for the continuation and growth of democratic institutions, the following is postulated about the nature of American society: (1) American society is held together by a commitment to a common core of values. For example, Hunt and Metcalf write that:

... there will be general agreement among its democratic societies members as to its central values. While peripheral values may remain in flux, a democracy is in peril if its citizens cannot agree on an operational meaning of core values such as the dignity and worth of individuals, the method of intelligence, and political freedom.\(^{36}\)

Fenton writes in a similar vein:

> I think we can agree that we ought to teach them to abide by values which have been enacted into law .... Teaching these truths implies value systems, but like the behavioral values I spoke of earlier, the form the cement that holds our society together and permits it to function.\(^{37}\)

Oliver and Shaver evidence a similar assumption when they write:

... That is, we assume that most men will intuitively agree upon what behavior is brutish and uncivilized, what behavior is essentially human, and what behavior is within the realm of legitimate controversy. Beyond this point we can only assert that decisions must be made by rational debate.\(^{38}\)

\(^{36}\)Hunt and Metcalf, op. cit., p. 10.

\(^{37}\)Fenton, op. cit., pp. 43-44.

\(^{38}\)Oliver and Shaver, op. cit., p. 51.
Massialas and Cox approach this question from a slightly different perspective than do the other authors. Writing as they do within the context of "cultural crisis" they do not find it necessary to postulate the existence of a core of values although they do see a core of values as a necessity for an integrated society. They write:

... what is needed by the citizen in a time of culture crisis is a way of making judgments by which the society may eventually bring itself to consensus on enough matters of crucial importance to heal the cultural rifts. By focusing on a method of inquiry which proposes to reach social consensus at some future time, he acknowledges the postponement of the formulation of an acceptable substantive core of values which will give the culture a new integration.  

(2) It is further assumed by the authors of the four texts that conflict concerning basic values, i.e., core values, is ultimately disintegrative to the social structure. (3) One final assumption is that resolution of conflict which is not the result of rational consent is ultimately undemocratic whereas resolution of conflict which is the result of rational consent, is ultimately democratic.

This leads the authors through separate and sometimes very different procedures, to advocate programs for developing within the

39 Massialas and Cox, op. cit., p. 5.

40 I do not believe it is necessary to further document this assertion as evidence of its validity is implicit in passages previously cited.
students the ability to analyze issues (public issues, issues within the
discipline and value conflicts) and their own values. Thus, the
authors hope to create the conditions for the perpetuation of, or in
the case of Massialas and Cox the creation of, an integrated demo-
ocratic culture.

I have little quarrel with the ideals and many of the basic
pedagogical procedures advocated by these authors. Nor is there
reason to believe that most sociologists would disagree with the basic
assumption of "a core of values." It is true that different schools of
sociologists might take exception with the notion that a single core
of values permeates the entire culture. Most sociologists would
agree, however, that a common core of values is essential to the
social cohesion of a social unit. But when it comes to the nature and
content of the core values which are assumed to be either presently
existing or necessary for the existence of democratic institutions,
one will find considerable grounds for questioning. Specifically, all
four texts either implicitly or explicitly postulate, as a necessary
part of their position, the existence of, or the recreation of, what
William H. Whyte, Jr. has called (following Weber) The
Protestant Ethic.\textsuperscript{41} That is, commitment to such values as the
dignity and worth of the human individual, government by rational
consent of the governed, and the sacredness of private property.

It is Whyte's contention that the protestant ethic is slowly
being replaced by a new ethic which he calls the Social Ethic. By
social ethic he means:

\ldots that contemporary body of thought which makes
morally legitimate the pressures of society against
the individual. Its major propositions are three: a
belief in the group as the source of creativity; a be-
belief in 'belongingness' as the ultimate need of the
individual; and a belief in the application of science
to achieve the belongingness.\textsuperscript{42}

If Whyte's analysis is valid, there are certainly clear cut implica-
tions for any position which assumes the necessity of commitment
to the Protestant Ethic. Since each of the texts under consideration
makes such an assumption, it will be worthwhile to explore some of
these implications rather fully. Because, however, each text em-
ploys the assumption of the Protestant Ethic in different ways, it

\textsuperscript{41}For verification of this assertion the reader might com-
pare Whyte's discussion of the Protestant Ethic in Chapter 1 & 2 in
William H. Whyte, Jr., \textit{The Organization Man} (New York: Simon
and Schuster, Inc., 1956), with the appropriate chapters in the four
methods texts reported here. For example, Oliver and Shaver,\textit{ op. cit.}, Chapter 4; Hunt and Metcalf, \textit{op. cit.}, Chapter 1.

\textsuperscript{42}Whyte, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 7.
will be necessary to consider them separately. Oliver and Shaver will provide a point of departure.

Because Oliver and Shaver are most clearly dedicated to the notion of individual commitments and the exploration of the rights of the individual, the assumption of the Protestant Ethic takes on a particularly important dimension in their proposals. If the reader will refer to the rather lengthy citation from Oliver and Shaver on pages thirty-three and thirty-four of the present study, the assumption of a humanistically oriented commitment to the Protestant Ethic becomes readily apparent. What this means in terms of their program for social studies education is also relatively clear. Specifically, Oliver and Shaver's proposals advocate as the bulk of their program the:

... analysis of public issues which have at their core legal-ethical dilemmas. This approach suggests that the social studies curriculum emphasize rather than avoid the inner conflicts of the American liberal tradition as well as the conflicts among groups and factions within the society. 43

While this approach certainly has much to commend it and is undoubtedly preferable to some of the rather bland, though more "safe," conventional approaches, there is reason to question its applicability

43 Oliver and Shaver, op. cit., p. 239.
in mass society. For example, in the liberal tradition of American
thought the individual, his commitments, beliefs, and actions were
the basic unit of analysis. Thus we have within our intellectual
framework little intellectual equipment to deal with the legal-ethical
dilemmas presented by groups and large scale organizations. It can
be argued that the United States Constitution was predicated on the
assumption of the necessity of recognizing the importance of the
interests of groups and factions. This argument is certainly valid.
All one need to do is to scan the Federalist Papers to confirm this
point. But to use this political-ethical recognition of groups and
group interests to argue that there is within the American liberal
tradition a meaningful way of conceptualizing and dealing with the
problem of organization life is to misuse history. Thurman Arnold
points out powerfully and clearly the fact that the tendency to think
in terms of individuals has lead to tremendous distortion and
bizarre legal definition when we are forced to cope with the large
scale corporate entity. 44 For example, to conceive property rights
for the individual in the same legal and ethical framework as one
conceives property rights for the corporation is a distortion of mani-
ifest reality. Yet our penchant for thinking in individual terms

44 Thurman Arnold, The Folklore of Capitalism (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1937).
almost forces us to adopt such a distorted conception. Oliver and Shaver's emphasis upon the analysis of problems and issues growing out of the American liberal tradition which is in many ways related to, if not dependent upon, the existence of inner direction and/or the Protestant Ethic may, in fact, be dysfunctional for the student confronted with a society which is increasingly other-directed and permeated by the Social Ethic. It can be argued that the emergence of other-direction and the Social Ethic is undesirable and that one of the functions of the social studies curriculum is to reaffirm the basic postulates of the American liberal tradition. Even if this argument is granted, one must still question the advisability of teaching students to think about the problems of mass democracy in ways which are more appropriate to the analysis of the problems of liberal democracy.

A second point at which Oliver and Shaver use the assumption of the Protestant Ethic causes them some difficulty is in their emphasis upon rational consent. By rational consent Oliver and Shaver clearly mean a type of consensus building dependent upon the reflective examination of issues, alternative courses of action, consequences and values. What this means is something quite close to the "method of science." While I would not quarrel with their insistence that such a process is necessary in a democratically
inclined culture, the fact that they overlook the emergence of the
Social Ethic causes some misgiving. Specifically, if Whyte's analy-
sis is correct within the Social Ethic:

There should be, then, no conflict between man and
society. What we think are conflicts are misunderstand-
ings, breakdowns in communication. By
applying the methods of science to human relations
we can eliminate these obstacles to consensus and
create an equilibrium in which society's needs and
the needs of the individual are one and the same. 45

On the surface, Oliver and Shaver's insistence upon the necessity
of developing commitment on the part of their students seems to be
antithetical to the essential core of this social ethic. But they over-
look that such substantive commitments may be quite superficial if
one ascribes to the Social Ethic. That is, the students may be com-
mited to such core values as "belongingness, togetherness, and the
application of science to achieve belongingness,"46 rather than the
substantive values superficially manifest by their profession of
commitment.

Most of the criticism made of Oliver and Shaver are equally
ture for Hunt and Metcalf. In addition, Hunt and Metcalf's insistence
upon the necessity of unexamined beliefs in the "closed areas" leaves

45 Whyte, op. cit., p. 8.
46 Ibid.
them subject to one other criticism. That is, if Whyte's analysis holds up, substantive beliefs become unimportant to the student who ascribes to the Social Ethic. Hunt and Metcalf's program which is theoretically designed to challenge untested beliefs of a substantive nature and bring about consensus through building a system of tested belief (again substantive belief), may very well overlook a most important part of the social studies program. That is, if one of the purposes of the social studies is to get students to examine and reach consensus on the core values permeating his culture, a program that concentrates on substantive beliefs in the "closed areas" may very well miss the point and the core values may never be submitted to critical analysis. Specifically, Hunt and Metcalf's assumption of the value of the method of intelligence, if not carefully conceived and made operational, may simply reinforce, in the other-directed student, his already uncritical acceptance of the value of science, belongingness, and togetherness which are not substantive beliefs but process values.

Massialas and Cox, who assume explicitly and implicitly the existence of cultural disintegration within American society, are not quite so dependent upon the assumption of the Protestant Ethic. But they too tend to develop approaches to social studies education which implicitly, at least, assumes a conceptual framework more
appropriate for a child who ascribes to the Protestant Ethic than one who ascribes to the Social Ethic. By advocating an approach to social studies education which focuses "on a method of inquiry which proposes to reach social consensus at some future time"\(^{47}\) and acknowledging "... the postponement of the formulation of an acceptable substantive core of values which will give the culture a new integration,"\(^{48}\) Massialas and Cox indicate their assumption of the conditions of the Protestant Ethic. That is, they assume that such process values as belongingness and togetherness are temporary phenomena which will eventually be replaced by substantive core values. It is true that Massialas and Cox do not directly discuss the existence of belongingness and togetherness as core values but the fact that they assume that core values must be substantive, rather than processual if integration is to be achieved, indicates that they have overlooked the emergence of the Social Ethic as a relatively permanent structural fact.

Fenton does not address himself as clearly as do the other authors to the question of core values. His insistence that those values which we have enacted into law forms the cement that holds

\(^{47}\)Massialas and Cox, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

\(^{48}\)Ibid.
our society together, certainly indicates a lack of sociological sophistication. It is probably unfair to Professor Fenton to assert that he is as naive as this statement indicates. But one gets the uneasy feeling in reading Fenton's treatment of values that when one moves beyond rules for classroom behavior and civil laws, Fenton could learn quite a bit from sociologists and political scientists like Petrim Sorokin and R. M. MacIver.

The final part of this section of the present study will deal with the tendency of the authors of the four texts under examination to equate problems in the psychological sense with problems in the social sense. Here Fenton must be entirely excluded because his orientation does not lead him to deal with the kind of content to be discussed. I have the feeling that one could probably make similar criticism to those that will be made concerning social problems if one focused Fenton's treatment of problems in the disciplines. Because this study is limited to a treatment of sociological assumptions, however, I will not indulge in such an excursion. Further, because all of the authors, except Fenton, make the same kinds of, what I consider to be errors, there will be no attempt to differentiate between them. Rather, illustrations will be used in terms of convenience, clarity, and because they are representative of the basic postulates of all the authors.
In a previous section of this chapter, it was pointed out that Dewey tended to think in psychological, and, therefore clinical terms, rather than in the structural terms characteristic of sociology. Because this tendency has carried over, at least to those advocates of problem solving we are considering, it is worthwhile to explore this notion further.

The notion of structure as it is generally employed by modern sociologists is a particularly powerful concept. When the sociologist speaks of structure he means a relationship which has an appreciable degree of regularity. As R. M. Williams, Jr. puts it, structure means:

\[\ldots\] complexes of action, thought, and emotion (1) shared by many individuals, (2) repeated in many successive situations, and (3) definitely related to other patterns in the same social aggregate.\(^{49}\)

If one explores this notion, it becomes readily apparent that structure can exist in situations where there is conflict, competition, and contradiction. Conversely, it is possible to have the absence of conflict competition, and contradiction and not have structure. The question of structure is only a question of the predictability of behavior.

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Building on the notion of structure modern sociologists have developed the concepts of structural tensions and functionally based conflicts. While these notions are employed differently by different sociologists, the essential meanings are as follows: structural tensions are those patterns of relationships which operate in such a way as to create points of conflict or contradiction within the structure. Functionally based conflicts are tensions which result from the nature of social functions.

Using these concepts it becomes clear that it is possible to have within a social aggregate conflict, competition, and contradiction which creates tensions but is not disintegrative. Indeed, the structural tensions and counter tensions may provide an integrative force. It is also clear that some conflicts, at least, are a result of social functions and may be vital to the ongoingness of the social unit.

The basic ideas underlying these notions were certainly expounded by the conflict theorists of the nineteenth century but they did not take their present form until relatively recently. This is at least in part due to the effect of some conceptions of Weber's which gained prominence among sociologists. Specifically, Weber's ideal typology of bureaucracy placed emphasis upon standardization and internal harmony. While this was only one aspect of Weber's
thought, it was the aspect that gained the greatest exploration. As a
consequent, many students of social organization were prone to con-
ceive evidence of disharmony as indicative of social disorganization.
Recently, however, some sociologists have begun to suggest that
conflict and disharmony too can be structured, organized, and inte-
grated. While this is not a new notion, its modern form has lead
some sociologists to suggest that the lack of structural tensions and
functionally based conflict may be as disintegrative as their existence
is popularly conceived to be.

The position of the authors of the social studies texts we are
examining concerning the psychological aspects of problems, leads
them to emphasize the existence of a problem in the psychological
sense. From a clinical point of view, there is little here with which
I would quarrel. But there is a marked tendency among all of these
authors to superimpose this psychological model onto social prob-
lems. This point is made most clearly by Hunt and Metcalf when
they write:

There are two levels of conflict. Interpersonal
conflict arises when individuals or other groups hold
beliefs sharply opposed to those of other individuals
or groups. We often refer to conflict on this level
as 'controversial issues.' Persons on each side of
an interpersonal conflict, or dispute, may be quite
consistent in their own outlooks, even though in
sharp disagreement with the opposing position. In
our culture such conflict arises between capital and labor, among social classes, among racial, religious, and ethnic groups, among age groups, and sometimes between sexes.

Interpersonal conflict tends to become internalized within the personalities of individuals so that they are at war with themselves. Caught in a culture in which interpersonal conflict is always present, they often accept as true and good both sides of many issues, thus incorporating cultural conflicts into their own personalities. When individuals become aware of their own incompatibilities of outlook, the resulting internal struggle may be referred to as intrapersonal conflict. Although the content of an intrapersonal conflict may be no different from that of an interpersonal conflict, it may exact a greater toll because it can lead to disintegration of personality. 50

In fairness to Hunt and Metcalf especially, as well as to the other authors, it should be pointed out that they do recognize the positive contributions healthy conflict can make to both the individual and to society. But their emphasis upon conflict, cultural crisis, and social chasms leads them to accentuate the import of special types of controversial issues at the expense of what may prove to be an even more important issue, i.e., the lack of controversy. Furthermore, it seems to me to be dangerous to imply, even by omission, that social problems are constituted of the same "stuff" that constitute psychological problems. The individual may be able to work his way through his personal psychological dilemmas but problems of

50 Hunt and Metcalf, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
nuclear war and world depression are beyond the intellectual grasp and personal power of any individual. If a student is to live in mass society, he is certainly going to have to know why he believes what he does in relation to these overwhelming issues but if this knowledge is to have any impact he is going to have to be equipped to do much more than "problem solving" in only a psychological sense.

The greatest danger I see with the tendency to employ a psychological model for social problems is at the level of action. If all the student knows is his own position psychologically and intellectually, he cannot help but feel increasingly powerless, alienated, and without meaning. Such an education might well convert "... what would seem in other times a bill of no rights into a restatement of individualism."51

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51 Whyte, op. cit., p. 6.
CHAPTER III

A SOCIOLOGICAL MODEL

Thus far in the present study the major point of focus has been upon the sociological shortcomings of various approaches to problem solving in social studies education. In this chapter an effort will be made to develop a conceptual model for reflectively oriented teaching in the social studies which will be sociologically more sophisticated than those approaches that have been previously considered. It should be noted that very little issue is taken with the basic philosophical and psychological orientation of the social studies methods texts examined in the previous chapter. That is, it is assumed that the reflective examination of the crucial issues of the culture, the implicit questions of value that arise from the examination of these crucial issues, and the development of tested beliefs, is a worthwhile goal for the social studies. Further, it should be pointed out that it is not asserted in the present study that the authors of the texts that have been examined are unaware of the sociological insights which will be developed in the present chapter. Every text, with the possible exception of the one
authored by Fenton, makes explicit reference to much of the sociological data upon which the model developed in the present chapter is based, but their focus is more clearly related to what should be taught than it is to the process of teaching. For example, all of the authors referred to recognize that the development of mass society is a very important phenomena. The major emphasis they give to this development, however, is in terms of teaching students about mass society. They overlook the fact that the child coming into the classroom is a part of the mass society and thus the way in which he will learn about that society is at least partially conditioned by his position in it.

The present study was designed to overcome this shortcoming. Therefore, in the present chapter I am going to attempt to develop a model for teaching which not only encourages the student to gain a fuller understanding of his society and his position within it, but also takes into account these two factors in developing programs to bring about this understanding. In order to achieve this goal, several points must be born clearly in mind.

(1) The model must be both psychological and sociological. (2) The conditions of mass society must be accounted for within the framework of the model, at least insofar as these conditions are presently understood and conceptualized by experts in the field. (3) The model
must be simple enough to be useful to the practicing classroom teacher.

In connection with the first point mentioned above, the psychological dimension of the model is essentially the same as the one used by the authors of the social studies methods texts which have been examined in the present study. The knowledgeable reader is undoubtedly aware of subtle differences between the psychological orientations of these authors but, as was pointed out in Chapter II of the present study, almost all modern approaches to problem solving in social studies education rely heavily upon the reflective model initially set forth by John Dewey.

For the sociological dimension of the model to be developed the works of C. Wright Mills, particularly his book *The Sociological Imagination*, have been extremely useful; especially his notions of public issues, private troubles, history, biography, and social structure. Taken together the Deweian psychological model and the Millsian sociological model provide us with the conceptual tools which take points two and three above adequately into consideration.

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Private Troubles and Public Issues

Mills defines troubles and issues as follows:

Troubles occur within the character of the individual and within the range of his immediate relations with others; they have to do with his self and with those limited areas of social life of which he is directly and personally aware. Accordingly, the statement and the resolution of troubles properly lie within the individual as a biographical entity and within the scope of his immediate milieu—the social setting that is directly open to his personal experience and to some extent his willful activity. A trouble is a private matter; values cherished by an individual are felt by him to be threatened.

Issues have to do with matters that transcend these local environments of the individual and the range of his inner life. They have to do with the organization of many such milieux into the institutions of an historical society as a whole, with the ways in which various milieux overlap and inter-penetrate to form the larger structure of social and historical life. An issue is a public matter: some value cherished by publics is felt to be threatened. Often there is a debate about what that value really is and about what it is that really threatens it. This debate is often without focus if only because it is the very nature of an issue, unlike even widespread trouble, that it cannot very well be defined in terms of the immediate and everyday environments of ordinary men. An issue, in fact, often involves a crisis in institutional arrangements, and often too it involves what Marxists call 'contradictions' or antagonisms.²

²Ibid., pp. 8-9.
Given the conditions of mass society, there is considerable evidence that most modern approaches to problem solving in the social studies do little, if anything, to equip the student to deal with public issues in the sense that Mills uses the term.

The essential core of Mills' argument is that within the context of modern society it is increasingly difficult, in fact dangerous, to attempt to understand private troubles without coming to grips with the structural issues which may be directly related to them. Mills writes:

... Accordingly, to understand the changes of many personal milieux we are required to look beyond them. And the number and variety of such structural changes increase as the institutions within which we live become more embracing and more intricately connected with one another. To be aware of the idea of social structure and to use it with sensibility is to be capable of tracing such linkages among a great variety of milieux ... .

If Mills' thesis is at all accurate, the implications for reflectively orientated teaching in the social studies are very important.

**Psychological Problems and Sociological Problems**

If one looks carefully at modern approaches to problem solving in the social studies it is quite clear that what is meant by a

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3Ibid., pp. 10-11.
problem is very similar to what Mills calls troubles of private milieux. At least for all the authors we have examined, one of the major problems they consider is related to situations in which "values cherished by the individual are felt by him to be threatened." This position is most clearly taken by Hunt and Metcalf and is certainly shared by the other authors. Fenton may not endorse this position quite so strongly because of his emphasis upon the "discipline" but where he does address himself to the question of values, he shows a striking similarity to the other authors. In order to understand the significance of this approach, as well as its dangers within the context of mass society, it will be necessary to look closely at some of the changes that have been brought about by the development of mass society.

It is impossible to accurately describe the social structure of nineteenth century America in that we have not got enough empirical data to make definitive statements. But by drawing on such perceptive observers of American society as Alexis de Toqueville and Lord Bryce, it is possible to construct some ideal types which if not

4Ibid., p. 8.

definitive are highly suggestive. If the reader will bear in mind that
the following discussion does not lay claim to being an adequate
description of nineteenth century "reality," I believe we can gain
some useful insights into our present problem.

Nineteenth century America was probably much less diverse
and offered the individual fewer alternatives than is the case in modern
mass society. That is, American society in the past, taken as a total
structure was more homogeneous than is modern society. Yet in
terms of personal milieux, those areas of social life of which the
individual is directly and personally aware, there was probably
greater diversity. Specifically, the child reared in the small town
was confronted with the village atheist, local clergymen, the town
drunk, and the richest and poorest people in the community. He was
directly and personally confronted with the conflicts, cleavages, and
disharmonies these differences created.

In modern mass society, with increased specialization and
rapid transit, the child is often geographically and socially removed
from these differences. That is, the child in the slums only knows
the "rich kid" via very superficial contacts through the mass media
and literature. Conversely, the upper-middle class child living in
the suburbs only knows poverty as a social problem, if at all. He
has never had to play, work, or go to school with the "poor kid."
While many further illustrations would be possible, I believe enough has been said to give the reader an understanding of my general mode of thought concerning this subject. It is recognized that there are many very real criticisms of what is being implied here but I believe there is enough validity in the foregoing description to warrant consideration.

In a more specific vein, what is being suggested is that while the world in which the modern child lives is more diverse and conflict ridden than was the world of rural America, the nature of the social structure is such that the world which the child directly and personally experiences is more homogeneous. Given this situation, there are certainly many implications for social studies education.

First, without too much over simplification one can assert that the world that the child of nineteenth and early twentieth century America personally experienced was more nearly an accurate representation of the social structure in which he operated than is the case of the individual in twentieth century mass society. Therefore, if the individual learned to deal with his personal troubles it was much more likely that he was learning simultaneously to deal with public issues than is currently the case.

Second, the individual in mass society has no way of coming to grips with public issues in terms of his own social milieu. In fact,
as will be pointed out later, even his assumed private troubles may find their source outside of the realm of his personal experience.

Third, the pseudo-homogeneity of mass society may create a situation in which the individual finds it difficult, if not impossible, to establish a personal identity so long as he is bound by the constraints of his limited social milieu. For example, it is one thing to be superficially aware that there are people in the world with different values, aspirations, and goals and entirely another thing to have to interact in terms of a human relations situation. Many respected social psychological theories see the dynamics of conflicting group loyalties as essential to the development of "self." The fact that the conditions of mass society at least somewhat "protect" the individual from significant confrontation with these conflicts may at least in part account for such phenomena as alienation and identity diffusion.

Finally, because private troubles in mass society are increasingly related to public issues, it becomes more difficult to deal with these troubles within the limited context of personal social milieu. Indeed, efforts to do so may only increase the already overwhelming development of anxiety and alienation. It is no longer enough for the student to understand and be able to deal with personal troubles which result from clashes in his own value system or threats
to values cherished by him. He must be able to look beyond troubles, no matter how widespread to the structural components to which his troubles may be related. Otherwise, "... the more aware they become, however vaguely, of ambitions and threats which transcend their immediate locals, the more trapped they ... feel."^6

In summary, it is held in the present study that given the conditions of mass democracy, an approach to social studies education that does not lead the child to deal with personal troubles in relationship to the structural components which may define them is inadequate. Further, it is held that such an approach may increase some of the most pervasive difficulties within mass society, i.e. alienation, anxiety, and identity diffusion. For a social study to be adequate it must enable the student:

. . . to take into account how individuals, in the welter of their daily experience, often become falsely conscious of their social positions. Within that welter, the framework of modern society is sought, and within that framework the psychologies of a variety of men and women are formulated. By such means the personal uneasiness of individuals is focused upon explicit troubles and the indifference of publics is transformed into involvement with public issues.^7

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^6Mills, op. cit., p. 3.

^7Ibid., p. 5.
Thus:

... the individual can understand his own experience and gauge his own fate ... by locating himself within his period, ... he can know his own chances in life ... by becoming aware of those of all individuals in his circumstances.®

The Model

When the sociologist addresses himself to the nature of the arrangement between social institutions, as well as within those institutions, the notion of social structure becomes quite useful. Other concepts which the sociologist employs in describing these relationships are the concepts of role and position. In an effort to develop a meaningful way of conceiving the individuals relationship to this structure, the social-psychological notion of self has proven to be most useful. And it is these notions i.e., the concepts of social structure, social institutions, position, role, and self, which provide the fundamental outlines of the model which will be developed. Before proceeding with the development of the model, it is worthwhile to define some of these terms.

The reader should be warned that there is no single definition of any of these concepts which is acceptable to all those who

®Ibid., p. 5.
employ them. It can be argued that this lack of definitive meaning imposes serious limitations upon the use of these ideas. But if one views these concepts as sensitizing rather than precise ideas, they possess great utility.

Definitions

Social Structure. This notion was previously defined in Chapter II and there is no reason to alter the meaning there given in the present chapter. Suffice it to say that the idea of social structure generally points to the existence of patterns of relationships as well as relationships between and among these patterns, as they occur within a social system. For example, the existence of mutual expectations of those who fill the position of father and son in the family system implies structure in that the relationship is relatively permanent and predictable.

Social Institution. This conception generally refers to those norms and values which adhere around some segment of human life. They are "systems of social relationships which people feel loyal because these systems are judged to embody the ultimate values that these people have in common."\(^9\) In other words, a social

institution is the way in which, and the patterns of relationship by which, a society attempts to satisfy basic needs.

**Position.** Some sociologists make a distinction between the notion of position and the notion of status. While such a distinction is sometimes useful, such precision is unnecessary herein. Further, the rhubric status has not been used because of the connotations that this word may have for many lay readers. Consequently, the general content of the notion of status has been incorporated within the definition of position which will be employed in the present study. As herein used, position will mean the relative placement of the different functional entities within a social structure. Generally, as Milton S. Yinger points out:

A position in the social structure is indicated by a role label: teacher, superintendent, minister, married woman and the like. Positions can be thought of as slots, or niches in the social structure, successively filled by different persons.\(^\text{10}\)

**Role.** The idea of role, while extremely useful, is perhaps the most difficult for which to develop an adequate definition. Not only do different sociologists define the concepts differently, but the social psychologists and the psychologist also employ the notion

quite widely. The emphasis of the social psychologist and the psychologist, particularly the latter, upon the individual aspects of human behavior leads them to use the notion of role in such a way as to make its existence dependent upon the individual personality characteristics of the actor filling the position to which the role is related.

From a sociological view, however, this individualization of roles is unacceptable. A role is not actual behavior. Rather, a role is the expected behavior appropriate to a given social position. These expectations of behavior remain relatively constant and predictable regardless of the personality characteristics of the individual who may be filling a given social position at any particular time.

Self. This notion refers to a set of reflexive attitudes which the individual has about his own personality. C. H. Cooley and G. H. Mead have provided what many consider to be the most provocative and insightful discussions of this notion. It is generally agreed that the idea one gains of self is closely related to the individuals perceptions of the roles he fills as well as his evaluation of his adequacy in filling those roles. Imagination plays a large part in the development of these reflexive attitudes which we call self. That is, self depends upon the ability of the individual to behave as if he were separated from his own personality and evaluating his personality as he perceives others evaluating it. In order to account for
this imaginative process, Cooley developed the notion of "looking glass self"\(^{11}\) and Mead employed the notion of "generalized other."\(^{12}\) For our purposes the important point to note is that an adequate definition of self depends not only on one's perception of his own position, but also upon one's perception of others in relationship to himself.\(^{13}\)

**Employing the Model in Relation to Public Issues and Private Troubles**

Public issues are tensions or difficulties within the social system, and as Mills points out, they often involve "crisis in institutional arrangements . . . 'contradictions' or antagonism."\(^{14}\) Private troubles are largely the result of disharmonies between the individual and that limited aspect of the social system with which he has direct and personal contact.


\(^{13}\)For a readable, and at the same time relatively sophisticated discussion of the notion of self, see John F. Cuber, *Sociology: A Synopsis of Principles* (New York: Appleton, Century and Croft, 1963), Chapter 16.

The notion of social structure makes it possible to begin to conceptualize public issues in a meaningful context. The teacher and the student who begins to develop a sense of structure within society and to employ this notion in the analysis of the tensions and conflicts which permeate our culture are more apt to be able to articulate the precise conditions of the issue under analysis. For example, the student who is brought to see the relationship between the family structure and the economic structure, is more likely to be able to conceptualize the issues surrounding the right of a woman to work and her duties to her offspring in terms of being at home, than is the child who can only view these tensions clinically.

Since self is a concept which refers to attitudes largely dependent upon perceptions of private milieux, the employment of this notion gives the student and the teacher a better grasp of the environmental factors related to private troubles. For example, the child who understands the structural requirements of a technological society may be in a better position to evaluate the pressure he confronts when attempting to gain admission to college than is the child who sees these pressures only in terms of his own situation, and reacts to these pressures as if they were directed at him alone.

The notions of institutions, positions, and roles makes it possible to begin to conceptualize the relationship between private
troubles and public issues in that these interlocking concepts make it possible to view self in relation to the more wholeistic nature of the social structure. That is, the structural notions of institutions, position and role, as they are related to self, makes it possible to see the self in relation to the social structure.

Autonomy

One of the greatest difficulties confronting man in the mass society, as was pointed out earlier, is the crisis of personal identity. A notion very closely related to this crisis in identity is the notion of personal autonomy. Many sociologists, social philosophers, and other students of the human condition use the notion of autonomy rather widely. But it is difficult to determine a precise content for this conceptualization. Yet there is reason to believe that it is in the area pointed to by the vague notion of autonomy that one of the greatest challenges to the social studies is to be found. Therefore, it is worthwhile to explore briefly the kind of content that might be subsumed within the conceptual framework provided by the notion of autonomy. Perhaps the best way to approach this content is to examine first what the autonomous individual is not and then examine what he might be.

There seems to be general agreement among those writers who address themselves to the question of personal autonomy that
the autonomous individual is not alienated from himself, nature, or society. 15 From the literature it is further safe to assume that the autonomous individual does not suffer from identity diffusion. 16 Beyond these negative qualities, however, it is difficult to determine with any precision precisely what is meant in the literature by personal autonomy. For example, while Riesman addresses himself directly to the notion of autonomy, one is left with the feeling that somehow the notion is either not clearly conceived or its meaning is lost in the presentation. 17 While I do not purport to be able to provide the reader with a definitive statement of all the things necessary for personal autonomy, I would suggest that there are some fundamental attributes and abilities which, if absent, certainly indicate the lack of autonomy. Specifically, it seems to me that the autonomous individual must be able to exercise both freedom and rationality. That is, if one is to maximize the chances for the development of personal autonomy, it is necessary to maximize the


conditions which lead to the development of freedom and rationality. Among other things, freedom implies the ability to perceive possible alternatives within a given social structure as well as the ability to develop alternatives to the existing social structure which would provide even further alternatives. Further, freedom implies the ability to act on the knowledge so gained. This means an awareness of the "pressure points" or levers within the existing social structure which one can use to gain a particular alternative or employ to alter the existing arrangement. Rationality implies not only an adequate conception of self but also a notion of which of the existing alternatives are available to a person in a given set of social positions within the existing social structure. It also implies the ability to project the consequences, both in terms of personal values and group values i.e., those values implicit in the social structure, of electing one alternative as opposed to the others. In other words, rationality as herein employed is largely the ability to operate in terms of what Dewey called "the method of intelligence."

One of the most promising ways to maximize freedom and responsibility, and thus personal autonomy, is to develop a social studies program which fosters the reflective examination of "self" in relationship to the social structure in which the individuals biography is enacted. It is further held that this social structure
can only be understood in terms of its history, and in the bold relief of comparative analysis of contemporary social structures.

The present emphasis upon structure _al la_ Bruner within social studies education may lead to distortion or misconception of what is being said herein. I am not advocating that the student necessarily need to understand the structure, if such exists, of, for example, the discipline of sociology. Nor am I particularly convinced that the student need understand how the sociologist goes about determining the nature of the social structure. What is important is that the student develop a perspective wherein he can come to some understanding of and appreciation of the consequences for his biography as it intersects history within the social structure. If there are those who find this to be a narrowly sociological perspective, I can only say that it is such a perspective which seems to me to hold the greatest promise for the development of social studies education in modern America.
CHAPTER IV

CURRICULUM AND TEACHER PREPARATION

The implications of the model developed in the preceding chapter are widespread. In the present chapter we are going to examine two areas in which the implications are most obvious i.e., curriculum and teacher preparation.

Any school system or teacher who employs the model developed in Chapter III of this study in conceptualizing the nature and purpose of the social studies program, must immediately become aware of the fact that to get maximum benefit from the model considerable curricular revision will be necessary. First, in terms of the model presented a discipline approach is probably a rather poor way to organize the social studies curriculum. Nor does it make considerably more sense to organize the curriculum around the analysis of "problems" as this notion is generally employed in the professional literature. A discipline approach, even the highly vaunted structure of the discipline al la Bruner, does not have implicit in it the tools and organizational principles which will lead the student to gain some sense of the structure of society. If the
student does gain some notion of social structure, even in the study of sociology, it is more likely to be a by-product of attaining other goals than it is to be the result of explicit design. It has already been demonstrated that most problems approaches are equally weak in this regard. If a student learns to deal with value conflicts or persistent social problems outside of a historical and comparative framework, the knowledge so gained may be quite dysfunctional. Therefore, some rather radical revisions in curriculum are going to have to be considered.

**Self as the Unit of Analysis**

One of the most significant contributions made by Hunt and Metcalf to the field of social studies education, is their emphasis upon interpersonal and intrapersonal conflicts. Because, however, they tend to emphasize the psychological dimensions of learning, they are led to postulate personal beliefs and values as the basic unit for study within the social studies curriculum. Given the model developed in the present study for the sociological dimension, and the general framework provided by Hunt and Metcalf I believe a quite different unit becomes central to social studies curriculum. In this model the notion of self becomes as important as beliefs and values are to Hunt and Metcalf. All private troubles lie in the domain of
self, through the conception of self that it becomes possible to lead students to an understanding of public issues in a structural context. These points should be considered further. First, private troubles may result from at least two different sources: (1) faulty perceptions of self and/or inadequate definitions of self (2) faulty perceptions of the roles which the position one fills entails and/or conflicts between and among the roles and positions which the individual occupies. The first source is clearly psychological and more within the legitimate domain of the clinical psychologist and therapists than it is legitimate content for the social studies curriculum. The second source, however, is clearly social in content and therefore the legitimate content of the social studies. This does not mean that one's perceptions of one's role or conflicts between and among roles is not relevant to one's self perception. The important point is that the difficulty experienced by the child which result from role perception and conflict is the result of misperceptions of social reality or conflicts within social reality, rather than distortions of manifest reality within one's own psychological makeup. Second, by beginning with those private troubles which exist therein it becomes possible to use the existing doubts, confusions, and disharmonies which the child brings with him to the classroom as a point of motivation for a clearer understanding of self in relationship to social
reality. In pointing to what he feels to be one of the greatest needs of modern man C. Wright Mills writes:

It is not only information that they need—in this Age of Fact, information often dominates their attention and overpowers their capacities to assimilate it. It is not only the skills of reason that they need—although their struggles to acquire these often exhaust their limited moral energy.

What they need, and what they feel they need, is a quality of mind that will help them to use information and to develop reason in order to achieve lucid summations of what is going on in the world and of what may be happening within themselves. ¹

The Uses of History and Biography

In pointing out what he considers to be the essential core of the social sciences, C. Wright Mills writes:

Social science deals with the problems of biography, of history, and of their intersections within social structures... these three... are the coordinate points of the proper study of man... ²

In using the notion of history and biography, Mills gives a very special meaning to these terms. There is no single place where he specifically defines what is meant, but the context of his total discussion leaves little doubt that biography is a historical-­psychological notion wherein history is a historical-cultural notion.

¹C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1961), p. 5. While a part of this quotation appeared elsewhere in the present study, it is worth restating in the present context.

²Ibid., p. 143.
Specifically, by biography Mills means that set of life experiences which leads a person to a particular conception of self at a given point in time. By history he means those accumulative group experiences which have preceded and underly the contemporary structural characteristics of a society. If we focus on private troubles which result from role perception and role conflicts, the student is more likely to gain an accurate understanding of his private milieu. At the same time, at those points at which private troubles are related to or the result of issues within the structure, we increase the likelihood that he will gain the ability to conceive himself in relation to the social structure in which he must act out his biography. To stop here, however, would be narrow, parochial, and in terms of future orientation, probably miseducative. The private troubles of the highschool student are not necessarily the same as or equivalent to those he will face in later life. Therefore, a third point to consider is the necessity of bringing the student to examine the private troubles of individuals in similar circumstances in contemporary social structures. In addition, it is important that the students aspirations as well as the aspirations of others in similar circumstances be taken into consideration. These aspirations, too, must be considered in terms of historical social structures as well as in terms of alternative contemporary social structures. What is
meant by this latter point is that the student must be brought into con-
tact with those structural characteristics of those positions he might
aspire to fill as well as an awareness of his "life chances."

In summary, what is being advocated is that the social
studies curriculum be revised in such a way as to revolve around
those personal troubles which are related to perceptions of the social
structure or result from conditions within the social structure. It is
further advocated that these personal troubles be used as motivational
devices to foster the reflective examination of one's biography in re-

tionship to the historical structure in which biography is enacted.

The Nature of Curricular Content

In addition to postulating the desirability of a reflectively
oriented examination of self in relationship to social structure, the
model developed in Chapter III has some rather clear cut implications
for the type of content which would be included in the curriculum.
Obviously, the model implies a cross-cultural and historical approach
to social studies education. But the nature of the history as well as
the cross-cultural materials to be included would be substantially
different from that which is included in most present day curricula.
The history would not be a history of events, epochs, or trends.
Rather, it would be a history of social structures with an emphasis
on the biographies of ordinary men as they enacted these biographies within these social structures. The reader should be warned that biography as used here does not imply a conventional biographical approach to history. All that is meant is the study of how men come to be whatever they are within a given social structure. Some of the questions with which the content of the social studies curriculum must come to grips are:

... What varieties of men and women now prevail in this society and in this period? And what varieties are coming to prevail? In what ways are they selected and formed, liberated and repressed, made sensitive and blunted? What kinds of 'human nature' are revealed in the conduct and character we observe in this society in this period? And what is the meaning for 'human nature' of each and every feature of the society we are examining. 3

The cross-cultural materials which would be included would also place heavy emphasis upon those materials which would shed light upon man as he is related to his social structure. While these materials would undoubtedly be useful in reducing ethnocentrism, and increasing understanding of other societies, these results, while important, would be secondary. Of prime importance is the utility of these materials in helping the student understand alternative social structures as well as helping him to conceptualize the "life chances"

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3 Ibid., p. 7.
of individuals in circumstances similar to his own within other social structures.

**Man as Content**

The notion that man and society are the legitimate subject matter of the social studies is widely accepted by most social studies educators and curriculum designers but the essential meaning is often lost in the act of implementation of programs. Most social studies programs either implicitly or explicitly have as their purpose a deeper and more meaningful understanding of what it is to be man in the world. Almost always, however, the programs that are developed indicate that this understanding is to be reached via some vehicle other than a direct confrontation with that which is to be studied i.e., man and his social environment. For example, Hunt and Metcalf's emphasis upon the value conflicts which permeate the culture obviously exposes the student to one aspect of the human condition. But it leaves out many other interesting and equally important dimensions of man's life. To select value conflicts as the determinate of course content overlooks the equally important content of social harmony. Fenton's inductive approach to the social studies and Massialas' inquiry in the social studies may lead the student to develop an understanding of one of man's creations in his
world i.e., the social studies. It does not, however, necessarily lead to a greater understanding of that which is social and that which is social is man. What is being said is that the legitimate enterprise of the social studies curriculum and thus the content of the social studies is the study of man as a social being. This means not only a study of man as a psychological organism, but also a study of those things and systems man has developed in his quest for humanity. Thus, it is not legitimate to study history, sociology, economics, or any other discipline for its own sake, at least at the secondary level. Since, however, these disciplines are creations of man which have been developed as a result of man's attempt to study himself, these disciplines and their methods are legitimate studies insofar as they shed light upon what it is to be man. The foregoing has been stated in the full awareness of the fact that some readers will be prone to suggest that it all is a meaningless play on words. But I believe there is a legitimate point contained herein and one that is too often overlooked. Specifically, to encourage a student to examine his beliefs and supposed forms of knowledge in order that he might have more well founded beliefs seems to me to miss the point. To have a student examine his beliefs in order that he might better understand them, see how he arrived at them, and recognize conceivable alternatives to them is much more to the point. In addition, if the student
comes to recognize the structural nature of his beliefs as well as the consequences of this structure for himself and others in like circumstance, he will be arriving at a clearer conception of what it is for him to be specific man in his world.

In summary, the curriculum of the social studies must have as its core not the social science discipline, not value conflicts, nor even the political and ethical dilemmas which man confronts. Rather, the social studies curriculum must have at its content man himself, in all of his variety, his aspirations, potentials, and limitations.

**Organizational Implications**

There are undoubtedly many different patterns of curriculum organization which would lend themselves to the use of the model here-in presented. There is, however, one approach which seems to me to hold more promise than most other available alternatives. For lack of a better label, I will call it an "institutional approach." This label does not mean a history of social institutions, nor does it imply the sociological analysis of social institutions. Rather, I find the notion of institution a convenient way in which to organize a wide variety of social science materials which comes to grips with how man deals with some rather persistent social needs. Most of all I find it a useful way to organize materials in order to maximize the opportunity
of the student to begin to deal reflectively with his personal troubles in relationship to the social structure.

The sociologists differ widely in what they call institutions. Generally, however, there is agreement on at least the following categories: (1) The sex-marriage-family and kinship institution (2) the institution of education (3) the religious institution (4) the governmental institution. I am suggesting that these categories be used as organizational outlines for the social studies curriculum. My rationale is as follows: (1) Because of the nature of social institutions, these categories encourage the examination of what Engle has called "persistent social problems."\(^4\) (2) Because of the structural components of social institutions, one is quite able to examine what Hunt and Metcalf and Oliver and Shaver have called "value conflicts."\(^5\) (3) Because these social institutions are represented in some form or degree in every society known to man, this manner of organization makes it possible to incorporate cross-cultural materials. (4) Because institutions are historical entities,


history as I have used the term, is readily included in the framework provided. (5) Because institution is in itself a structural notion which subsumes both positions and roles, such an organizational arrangement lends itself to bringing the student into contact with questions of a structural nature. (There is a sense in which the student brings the psychological dimension to the classroom and this type of curricular organization increases the opportunity for him to see his private troubles in terms of the public issues which may be shaping them.) (6) Because of the current organization of the academic disciplines in the social sciences, it is obvious that the findings of some of the disciplines will be more relevant to the analysis of particular units within the suggested organizational structure than they will to other parts thereof. Institutional organization maximizes the opportunity to use the separate discipline but at the same time provides sufficient flexibility to prohibit a narrowly defined "discipline approach." (7) The traditional dominance of history in most social studies curricula and the recent pressure to add some of the social science disciplines to the curriculum makes the organizational pattern suggested particularly attractive. Specifically, this pattern capitalizes on the historical bias of the social studies program while at the same time making it possible to introduce sophisticated and useful concepts from the other disciplines.
In the following section of the present chapter, a concrete illustration of the kinds of materials that might be included in a curriculum based upon the presently advocated model and organized around the principles herein suggested will be presented.

**Social Context as a Curriculum Guide**

Before presenting the specific materials which will be included in the illustration presented in the present section, some further observations should be made. While the model and organizational principles which have been suggested provide a general orientation for curriculum design in the social studies, they do not dictate the precise content to be included in the curriculum. In fact, it is one of the major tenents of the present study that the content of the curriculum will be determined by the specific social context in which the curriculum is developed. For example, it seems to me to be ridiculous to assume that the same type of content would be useful in both the inner-city school and a school located in an upper-middle class suburb. (1) The private troubles of the child in the inner-city school are often quite different from the private troubles of the child in an upper-middle class environment, at least in degree if not in kind. (2) The "life chances," roles, and aspirations of the child from different parts of the social structure are necessarily
different. To use an extreme example the child from a Negro family in the slums of a large eastern city and a child from an extremely wealthy family from the same city not only occupy different positions in the social structure but also have quite different "life chances." For example, the child from the slums and the child from the wealthy family may both aspire to the position of President of the United States. But it is obviously true that while it is theoretically possible for both to attain their aspirations, the private troubles they will experience as well as the public issues which will shape those experiences will be different in both quantity and quality.

Further, if either child is to develop an adequate appraisal of the consequences, both personally and structurally, of pursuing his aspirations, as well as his chances of attaining that to which he aspires within the existing social context, he is going to have to address himself to quite fundamentally different questions. In addition, the levers and pressure points within the social structure available to each of these students is at least in part determined by their present position within the social structure. Therefore, the following illustrative material is presented not as a definitive statement of what ought to be contained in the curriculum but rather as suggestions for the kinds of things that might be contained in a curriculum orientated in the manner herein described. In order to belay
the fears of those who might suspect that the proposals presented are too idealistic or utopian, I freely and openly admit that the program I am advocating is not guaranteed to "make every man a king." But I do believe that it increases the opportunity for the student to determine his chances of "being king." In addition, he will be in a better position to evaluate the personal cost of whatever course he might take. Cost in terms of both his own behavior and values, and the values and normative structures of those groups of which he is a part. In addition to giving the individual the opportunity to more adequately appraise his potentials, it also gives him the opportunity to see his limitations both because of personal shortcomings and structural constraints. As Mills points out "in many ways it is a terrible lesson; in many ways a magnificent one." With these cautions, observations, and disclaimers in mind specific illustrations seem appropriate.

An Illustration

Let us assume that we are launched upon a study of the family institution. One of the most perplexing troubles facing adolescence is the uneasiness caused by the mixed loyalties to family and to the peer group. This widespread private trouble among

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6Mills, op. cit.
adolescents in America provides one very obvious point of entry for a curriculum such as the one advocated in the present study. Some questions quickly come to mind which could lead the student to a reflective examination of himself in relationship to the social structure of which he is a part. Specifically, is the trouble the result of the fact that the adolescent does not properly define his roles within the social structure? Or, is the trouble a result of the fact that the role of the adolescent lacks clear definition within the structure itself? Or, is the trouble the result of conflicts between and among the roles which the adolescent is called upon to fill? Perhaps the difficulty is the result of a configuration of all of the above? In any regard, what alternatives are available to the adolescent who is caught in the web of these troubles? In the next chapter, which deals explicitly with teaching strategies and techniques, I will address myself directly to the ways in which these questions might be handled in the classroom. In the present chapter, however, I will limit myself only to the kinds of materials which might be of use to the classroom teacher who determines to employ such a framework in the ongoing classroom situation.

There are many excellent resources which would be useful in shedding light on the structural issues and personal difficulties to which the above mentioned questions point. Therefore, I have been
very selective in the materials to be presented. The only intention is to give the reader some notion of the scope and type of materials which lend themselves to the recommended program.

One highly useful and readable book which can serve very well as an orientating device for the teacher or a book of common readings for the student (particularly eleventh or twelfth graders) is The Family in Various Cultures by Stuart A. Queen, Robert W. Habenstein, and John B. Adams. In this book the authors survey twelve family systems from different cultures and/or historical periods. While the treatment of each of these systems is necessarily limited and somewhat superficial, it provides the reader with an interesting contrast. In addition, the authors' emphasis upon the structural characteristics of the family unit as well as their uniform system of analysis makes it relatively easy to develop comparisons or alternative structures. The scope of the treatment in this survey is much wider than the troubles and problems related to adolescence, but there is adequate material to shed at least some light on the questions set forth above. Ruth Benedict's classic work,

Patterns of Culture, \(^8\) provides another highly useful resource. Some of the same kinds of data included in the first mentioned work are also included in Benedict's book; although Benedict goes into somewhat greater detail. The notion of structure and its relationship to issues and troubles is explicit in Benedict's work but the recognition of this fact calls for slightly more sophistication on the part of the reader that is the case in the book by Queen et al. Other books which may be useful for the teacher and the student are some of the works of Margaret Mead; particularly Growing Up in New Guinea\(^9\) and Coming of Age in Samoa.\(^{10}\) Although more technical and sophisticated, the work of Coleman entitled The Adolescent Society might also have some utility; particularly for the teacher.

Thus far we have presented materials almost exclusively within the fields of sociology and cultural anthropology. The field of literature also provides a valuable resource. For example,


Mark Twain's Tom Sawyer and Huckleberry Finn give the reader an interesting insight into adolescent life in a particular historical epoch and within a rather fascinating social structure. Some of the differences, at least between Tom Sawyer and Huck Finn, can be fruitfully studied in the light of the different positions they held in the fictional society of which they were a part. Salinger's The Catcher In The Rye, while certainly explosive and controversial, provides the more mature student with some interesting insights into the structural components of the private troubles of at least some modern adolescents.

The Edward R. Murrow recording, "The Slaying of Michael Farmer,"\(^1\) provides a dramatic, if somewhat bizarre, picture of the attitudes of a very select group of adolescents toward civil authority as well as the general constraints of social structure. Another recording of some use is the NAEB recording entitled, "Home Sweet Home."\(^2\) A much longer list of materials could be compiled from the fields already mentioned, as well as from other areas of


\(^{2}\) Professor Walter Goldschmidt and Len Peterson, "Home Sweet Home," The Ways of Mankind, National Association of Educational Broadcasters. (This recording is a dramatized comparison of a Chinese peasant family to an American family).
intellectual inquiry. For example, the whole area of biography and autobiography has remained untouched as well as some of the very interesting reports of the role of the adolescent in the economic marketplace. I believe, however, that those materials that have been included give the reader a general notion of the types of material which could be used. In addition, I believe this rather sketchy exploration of the materials available justifies the assertion that the viability of the position herein taken is not dependent upon the availability of suitable materials.

It is recognized that some readers may charge that the area selected for illustrative purposes is unusually rich in both "troubles" and materials. To a certain extent I must plead guilty to both charges. There is, however, reason to believe that quite a few troubles exist in other areas as well as useful materials for their articulation and analysis. Further, it seems to me that carefully contrived research and well executed curricular development programs would provide us with more than a sufficient quantity of troubles and materials. This point will be taken up in more detail in the final chapter of the present study.

**Implications for Teacher Preparation**

Obviously, if the point of view developed in the present study is taken seriously, it has serious implications for teacher
preparation. But it has even more serious implications for the selection of people who will be encouraged or permitted to be social studies educators. It is in this latter area that the field of social studies is in a rather unique and, I believe, enviable position. Almost any way one approaches the problem, there are more people being prepared to teach secondary social studies than there are positions to be filled. This means that once some criteria for selection and retention are determined, the social studies program can afford to be highly discriminating in terms of teaching personnel. The difficulty is in selecting the appropriate criteria. Since the problems inherent in developing these criteria have provided sufficient subject matter for many doctoral dissertations and will undoubtedly provide a raison d'etre for many future doctoral dissertations, it would be foolhardy to attempt to engage in such a task in the limited space available. I would, however, like to make a few suggestions as to the general direction to which one should look for criteria if one takes the program developed in the present work seriously.

First of all the program developed in the present study has a strong humanistic orientation. Therefore, to place teachers in charge of the suggested curriculum who do not have this type of orientation would be to defeat the purpose of the total program. In the final analysis I am convinced along with Kenneth E. Eble "... that whatever is in the curriculum is not important as who is in the classroom."\textsuperscript{15}

Second, since the curriculum is strongly oriented toward reflection, it seems to me to be imperative that the teacher have a demonstrated ability to behave in a reflective manner.

Third, since this program intentionally deals with some of the most intimate difficulties confronting the student in the classroom, it is extremely important that the teacher be an empathic person. While all of these qualities are undoubtedly useful for every teacher, the program herein advocated places a special emphasis upon the humane qualities of the teacher.

Insofar as the training of the social studies teacher is concerned, the specific requirements that I am about to put forth are based more on hunches and speculation than upon empirical evidence. The reason for this is relatively simple. There is hardly any

empirical evidence to indicate what kind of outcomes can be expected from different types of experience with teachers in training could be exposed. If the model that has been developed in this study is used as a base, however, some relatively justifiable conclusions concerning the types of experiences which might be promising can be deduced.

First, the nature of the orientation of the program the model implies suggests that the teacher should be broadly trained in the social sciences, and deeply trained in the history of social structures.

Second, because of the structural emphasis and psychological basis of the program, the teacher should be cognizant of the theoretical dimensions of the social science disciplines, historiography, and learning theory (particularly field theory). The reader may legitimately ask where all this material is to be placed in the already overcrowded curricula of most teacher training institutions. I would like to offer a few tentative suggestions. (1) Many teacher training institutions already give considerable blocks of time to such subjects as introductory psychology, adolescent psychology, general teaching methods, educational theory, and special teaching methods. I would think that these courses could be reorganized in such a way that the necessary insights into adolescent behavior could be provided while simultaneously providing the student with the opportunity to see the relevance of these psychological principles
for learning theory; particularly as it relates to social studies education. I cannot help but think that it may be more important for a prospective social studies teacher to have some insight into the theories of Piaget than it is to understand the motivational factors involved in a rat's manipulation of some imaginatively contrived maze. (2) While I ascribe to the view that a teacher cannot teach without a deep understanding of the content, there is more than one way to gain that understanding. I suspect that undergraduate students could be exposed to the theoretical underpinnings of most of the social sciences long before they are in many colleges. I seriously doubt that a student need know "all" of American history or world history before he is introduced to the ways in which a historian operates. If this is not the case, Fenton is certainly quite far afield. I have the same doubts in terms of sociology, economics, and the other social science disciplines. What is being suggested then is that the social studies teacher needs to know the facts but he needs to know these facts in relationship to some organizing ideas, principles, or theories. But what he needs most of all is an understanding of the different perspectives the various social science disciplines provide when they address themselves to their common task i.e., coming to some understanding of what it is to be man in the world.
A third type of experience which seems to me to be important for the social studies teacher is a relatively sophisticated exposure to the notions of social psychology. The concept of self is central to social psychology. Therefore, the study of this field provides the prospective teacher with the opportunity to gain insight into one of the basic conceptions of the model which has been presented herein.

Beyond this I would recommend that the prospective teacher should have some understanding of alternative philosophies of education. In addition, the teacher training program should provide him with a rich background in literature.

All of the above may sound like a rather large order to be filled in four short years. But, if those in charge of preparing social studies teachers would carefully scrutinize present programs, I believe we would come closer to achieving this goal than is generally the case at the present.
CHAPTER V

CLASSROOM OPERATION

One of the fundamental strengths of the approach to social studies education advocated in the present study is that it provides the teacher with an overall strategy for classroom operation while allowing flexibility in the area of teaching tactics. In fact, the utility of the model presented is largely dependent upon the assumption that the teacher can use the model as a basis for orientation and with this orientation develop tactical materials and programs which are consistent with the social situation in which he is teaching.

Teaching Strategies

Before the social studies faculty of a given school can determine the nature of specific materials to be included in the curriculum, they are going to have to determine the general place of the students and the school system within the social structure. This means the teacher is going to have to be able to operate in a relatively sophisticated social-scientific manner. An alternative to this, of
course, is that the teachers who staff the social studies faculty could determine the nature of the questions to which they would need answers, and then acquire the services of professional social scientists in attaining those answers. Among these questions would undoubtedly be the following: (1) In general, what is the social class composition of the school? (2) What general value orientations seem to be manifest by the student body? (3) What are the aspirations of the students in the school in terms of occupation, family, and so forth? (4) What are the actual patterns of employment, geographic mobility, and future education of students who have completed the high school program? (5) Where aspirations are inconsistent with actual patterns, what are the structural conditions which may account for this difference? A much longer list of questions could be prepared but these are representative of the general quality of questions which need to be asked and answered. Obviously, different schools will need to ask different questions, and much of the success of the program is going to be dependent upon the ability of the professional staff to determine which questions and which data are relevant for them.

The reader may legitimately ask if it is not unrealistic to suppose that the individual school system can engage in such a formidable task? Undoubtedly, the level of sophistication which the research implied will reach will vary from school to school. Among
other things, this will be dependent upon the training and ability of the teachers, the financial resources available to the school system, and the willingness of the leaders in the school system and the community to cooperate with such an undertaking. I believe, however, that the models for research provided by Dahlke, Coleman, and Vidich and Bensman, among others, could be usefully adopted for use in a local school system. It is recognized that most of the researches mentioned above, as well as many others which would have utility, are the result of long term, highly financed, projects by professional social scientists. Therefore, one could not expect the local school to engage in such sophisticated projects. By employing the model this kind of research provides, however, I believe a social studies staff could gain a great deal of useful information. While the information so gained might not be definitive, it would be much better than the "folk wisdom" upon which many current efforts at curriculum design and teaching techniques are based.


Second, while each school system represents in some ways a unique dimension in the social structure, and the students each represent unique individuals in the human variety, the very fact of the common effort of educating adolescents makes it possible to cut across school lines and develop a generalized body of knowledge which would be relevant. The researchers mentioned above (Dahlke et al.) indicates that such a body of knowledge already exists. The difficulty is in locating it, classifying it, and drawing from it implications for curriculum in a particular system.

A third task in terms of teach strategies is that of evaluation. Obviously, one who adopts the approach to social studies I have advocated cannot adequately evaluate outcomes in terms of simple retention of content, formulas, or generalizations, although these certainly provide indicators of outcomes. Nor is it adequate, even assuming it is possible, to evaluate outcomes strictly in terms of thought processes. While these are important, as was indicated earlier in the study the ability to reflectively examine issues, value conflicts, and persistent social problems is not a guarantee that the student has developed an adequate understanding of who he is in relationship to the social structure. Nor does it guarantee that the student has an adequate appraisal of his life chances, the alternatives open to him, and the personal and group cost of acting upon his
understanding. The program advocated herein calls for a whole new look at at least this one dimension of evaluation. It will be useful in terms of developing strategies and approaches, to do follow-up studies on students who have undergone the experience of the program. While it is still unclear what the precise nature and content of these studies would include, I would risk the following speculations and suggestions: (1) Some means of determining relative degrees of alienation will have to be developed. It is rather difficult to define in positive terms the nature of personal autonomy, in negative terms one can say that the autonomous individual is not alienated from himself, his fellow man, or from nature. (2) Ways of determining relative degrees of anxiety will have to be developed. Some psychologists have already begun research in this area. (3) Since one of the most pervasive difficulties for the human individual seems to be identify diffusion, some indicators of personal identity will have to be developed. Here the work of such men as Erik H. Erikson and Erich Fromm might be useful. While these writers are not

\[\text{References}\]


necessarily cited as the best or only authorities, their work is highly suggestive and stimulating.

The above paragraphs on evaluation bring to mind one caution. The teacher need be very careful that the approach to social studies education developed in the present study does not result in some bland form of "life adjustment." The purpose of this program is not to prepare the child to "accept his fate" rather, it is to help him gain an understanding of what he is and what he might become. It is an article of faith which underlies this study that while such understanding does not guarantee that the individual can control his own identity, without such understanding one is helplessly caught in the drift and thrust of forces beyond himself. Furthermore, it is this feeling of helplessness which contributes to the destruction of autonomous man. Therefore, it is the ultimate purpose of the advocated program to increase the likelihood that the individual will have greater control over his own fate and destiny than he would have under other circumstances, not that he resign himself to whatever his conditions may be.

The Social Dynamics of Teaching

In developing techniques for classroom teaching the teacher must keep many factors in mind. In addition to the psychological factors which bear on learning, one must be constantly cognizant of
the fact that learning takes place in some social setting. The essential burden of the present study has been to indicate the extent and importance of this latter fact for social studies education. Before discussing teaching techniques, however, it will be worthwhile to review some of the more important social factors which come to bear on the teaching-learning process.

First, while the social studies teacher is explicitly and implicitly dealing with values, he must keep in mind that generally speaking he is dealing with two different kinds of values. \(^6\) (1) He is dealing with those values held by individuals. (2) He is dealing with values which are held by and implicitly in group structures. That is, the teacher must be constantly aware that when he is bringing a student into a position to examine values some of the values which the student examines will be values unique to him and contradictory to the values which are implicit in the groups to which the student belongs; at least to some of the groups. In addition, some of the

\(^6\)There are many ways of classifying and categorizing values. For example, Hullfish and Smith use three categories when speaking of values. See H. Gordon Hullfish and Philip Smith, *Reflective Thinking: The Method of Education* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, Inc., 1961), pp. 118-120. They are, however, speaking in terms of the quality and function of values, where I am speaking of the source or locus. Therefore, while I claim no inherent validity for my categories, I do believe that they represent a useful way of conceptualizing values for the purpose of this study.
values which the student is brought to examine are implicit in and reinforced by the groups to which the student belongs. Therefore, the teacher must encourage both the individual examination of these values, and the examination by groups of values manifested by them.

Second, since the self is one of the basic units of analysis, one's beliefs are not the fundamental unit for reflective analysis. Rather, the fundamental unit of analysis is the attitude one has towards one's beliefs. In other words, what is the significance and import of the belief to self and to what extent does this belief square with social reality?

Third, the teacher need be constantly aware of the structural conditions which are related to the private troubles manifest by the students in his classroom. In addition, he needs to determine the nature of the private troubles manifest by his students and use them as motivational devices to bring about the reflective examination of these troubles in the light of the structural components which may be shaping or determining them. Finally, the teacher must realize that everything he says or does has a social connotation as well as intellectual import. Therefore, he must take into consideration the affect the cues he gives may have on the environment in which learning takes place.
Teaching Techniques

One of the first tasks of the classroom teacher who operates within the framework provided by the present study is to determine the nature and extent of the private troubles which come into his classroom via the students. In addition to the research techniques suggested in the preceding section, the teacher has at his command certain tools which can be employed only in a classroom setting. For example, by a judicious and imaginatively devised use of the Socratic method advocated by Oliver and Shaver\(^7\) the teacher can gain insight into the kinds of troubles which may be operative in his classroom. In addition, this method has the advantage of helping the student begin to articulate his troubles in a way which may help him to understand them in terms of the structures which may be shaping them. Another example of tools available to the classroom teacher for the determination of the nature and sources of private troubles is the whole notion of "role playing." By putting the student into the position of playing roles which range from those with clearly defined requirements to those in which the role requirements are quite vague, the teacher can gain considerable insight into the

\(^7\)Donald W. Oliver and James P. Shaver, Teaching Public Issues in the High School (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966).
students ability to perceive roles and thus perceive social reality. At the same time, the student is brought into contact with the effect of role perception and role definitions within the context of a situation which precisely because it is artificial is not extremely threatening.

Once the teacher has some base, in terms of the private troubles of students, he is able then to use these troubles as sources of motivation to examine public issues of a more structural nature. By employing some of the techniques suggested by Hunt and Metcalf, Massialas and Cox, Fenton, and Oliver and Shaver, the teacher can bring the student to confront himself with the structural variables which may be shaping his troubles. In addition, by helping the student see the consequences of alternative resolutions of these troubles, he can lead the student to the examination of the troubles and issues related to the social positions implicit in the alternative resolutions available. Specifically, the student can be brought to see that in some cases at least resolution of his troubles require him to accept other positions and roles or rearrange relationships between these positions and roles. In either case, the consequences of these resolutions include explicitly and implicitly further private troubles and a different perspective on the public issues which may be shaping them. For example, by employing the very fruitful notion of Hunt and Metcalf of starting with conflicts or contradictions,
one can bring the student into many fruitful confrontations with social reality. The very notion of role conflict makes Hunt and Metcalf's approach most useful. Once a conflict between or among roles is pointed up, the student could be brought to develop hypothesis concerning alternative structural arrangements which would reduce or alleviate the tensions and contradictions which are purported to exist. In addition, by projecting consequences, other troubles and issues are left open for examination. The most obvious source of data for evaluating these hypothesis is contained in the historical and cross-cultural materials suggested in the chapter immediately preceding. In addition, these data provide material for developing the students understanding of consequences of these alternatives developed.

The teacher should develop techniques which in addition to orienting a student toward structural issues as they relate to his private troubles, also insist upon the students ability to project consequences, develop alternatives, and test these in the light of substantive historical and cross-cultural evidence. In this latter regard I believe the methods and techniques recommended by the authors of the four social studies texts examined in Chapter II of this study are highly commendable. The only alteration I would make would be to bring these methods to bear directly upon an understanding of the human condition rather than upon an
understanding of the social science disciplines, value conflicts, legal and ethical dilemmas, or persistent social issues. Each of these latter mentioned orientation seems to me to lead to a needless and potentially harmful fragmentation of the students understanding of who he is in relationship to the social structure.
CHAPTER VI

THE FUTURE

Thus far in social studies education the primary focus for research has been on the psychological dimensions of learning. That is, research of widely varying quality has been done in connection with the applications of certain psychological principles and theories of learning to the task of teaching students specific bodies of knowledge and processes of thought. Some work has also been done in what is called "the affective domain." The emphasis, however, has been primarily on the effect of different educational programs on what might be called "output." There has been relatively little attention to the whole area of what herein will be referred to as "input." Specifically, in our heavy emphasis on what we call "behavioral objectives," "educational outcomes," or what the layman calls "results," we have sorely overlooked the implications of what the student brings with him to class for our teaching program regardless of our objectives.
Implications for Research

The present study carries with it rather explicit assumptions about what the objectives of social studies education ought to be. On purely philosophical grounds these objectives can be rejected. Empirically, one can argue that while the objectives of the program I am suggesting are highly desirable, the present state of our knowledge concerning man and society makes it impossible to achieve these goals. Thus it can be argued that it is better to reject the objectives I have set forth and settle for that which our present state of knowledge makes practical.

While I cannot accept either one of these basis for rejection of the advocated program, I do recognize there is a legitimate argument in both cases. That is, it is my belief that the present state of our knowledge about man and society while far from perfect is sufficient to allow us to develop programs which have as their ultimate purpose helping students to gain a better understanding of themselves in relationship to their social world. Obviously, the knowledge so gained would be quite limited in terms of social reality but it would be the best knowledge available at the present time. And in the end I must freely admit that I simply believe that it is better for man to know and be aware of the most reliable knowledge he has, even if it is fragmentary, rather than operate on the less reliable
assumptions of folk wisdom and superstition. If the reader will allow wide latitude to the notion, I would therefore advocate that the only knowledge that we have to offer the student is that knowledge which has resulted from the conscious and disciplined inquiry into the condition of man; that is, scientific knowledge.

There is, however, one aspect of the thesis presented in this study that I do not believe can be rejected regardless of one's philosophical or empirical assumptions. That is, that education and particularly social studies education has overlooked for too long the implications of social-scientific knowledge for the ongoing operation in the classroom. It is not that we have been unaware that the nature and condition of society has implications for education. Nothing could be further from the case. But our orientations toward society and social-scientific knowledge has been in terms of output rather than input. Specifically, we have consciously and systematically looked to society (historically and sociologically) and to man psychologically and philosophically to determine what our educational objectives ought to be. We have overlooked, however, particularly at the societal level, that what man and society presently are has great implications for any program designed to achieve any set of objectives. The desire to meet the needs of society and the individual is certainly not to be disparaged. But our tendency to overlook the
import of the condition of man in society for programs designed to meet these needs is certainly a serious shortcoming.

The perplexing part of this problem is that there is a considerable amount of knowledge available concerning the condition of man and society, both historically and in terms of contemporary social structures. The fact that teachers and professors are sufficiently cognizant of this knowledge to attempt to relate it to others in courses such as political science, sociology, and history is evidence of its existence and our awareness. The interesting thing is that those of us in education, particularly those of us in social studies education, have not taken the knowledge which we have and which we teach and turned it in upon ourselves and the educative process. We have seen this knowledge in terms of output i.e., that which we should foster in our students but we have not seen it in terms of input i.e., that from which we should draw implications for the processes by which we bring about our objectives.

Of course, there are some marked exceptions to this general set of circumstances. Social studies educators might profit from examining the methods and outcomes in these areas of exception in order to gain some insight into the nature of the task they set for themselves when they determine to become as cognizant of social input as they are of the output of their programs. It may be helpful
to look briefly at a couple of these areas as illustrations of what might be done on a wider scale. In this analysis, no effort will be made to be specific; rather I shall simply develop a general overview.

It is interesting to note that a vast and rich literature relating to the school and the relationship between the school and the social order is already existent and relatively well organized within the sub-field of sociology of education. Yet very little effort has been directed toward asserting the implications of many of the findings in this field for the "representative" classroom. But great use has been made in employing the concepts and insights which have developed in the field of sociology of education when attempting to create programs for the so called "culturally deprived" student.

While the employment of these notions has varied widely in terms of sophistication, the fact that educators have adopted a stance which encourages the use of social-scientific knowledge to look in on themselves is indeed encouraging. I suspect that a careful analysis of the success and failures of some of the rather special programs

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1It would be inconsistent with the position taken in this study to speak of the "representative" school in a longitudinal sense. Structurally, however, I believe we can speak of "representative" schools. One of the reasons that many of the findings concerning education in the inner-city school has viability beyond a single school system is due to the similar structural components which affect inner-city schools and school populations.
developed as a result of this approach, might be fruitful in terms of a much wider spectrum of the school population than our current programs and approaches would lead us to believe. While there are those who would argue that psychology is not a social science, I believe that educators could profit greatly by examining critically the ways in which educators have been able to employ concepts and insights from this field in the development of their program. If there is one area in which educators have reason to believe that they have relative sophistication in drawing out the implications of an academic discipline for the ongoing classroom, it is in the area of psychology. Perhaps the manner in which psychological principles have been incorporated into curriculum design would provide some models for the incorporation of principles and understandings from the other social science disciplines.

Let us now take a look at some specific kinds of research that need to be done if the program herein advocated is to have maximum utility. Since certain kinds of research have been indicated elsewhere in this study, I will limit myself to those specific projects which have not been mentioned but which are basic to making the program operational and to determining its ultimate usefulness. First, it may be highly useful to determine whether there are private troubles which tend to be more pronounced in certain age levels,
intelligence levels, and sex groupings than they are in others. Second, it may be important to determine whether the private troubles of students from one kind of social environment are essentially the same as those of students from another kind of social environment. Conversely, it will be important to determine which troubles are related to the fact of adolescents in the American society, which troubles are a result of being an adolescent in a particular sub-structure in American society, and which troubles are the result of occupying certain positions in our society whether one is an adolescent or an adult.

Third, it will be significant to know what variables i.e., age, sex, social class and so forth, are related to private troubles which are most closely identified with given institutional structures in our society. Given the institutional arrangement of curriculum that has been suggested, such knowledge would help us to determine the relative placement and emphasis to be given to each of the units of study in order to maximize the motivational aspects of the study.

A fourth and final type of research project I would suggest is in connection with the development of curricular materials. Would it be possible, for example, for experts from the various social science disciplines to develop a wide range of curricular materials which relate to the kinds of concerns inherent in the
advocated educational approach, while at the same time providing the
teacher with wide lattitude in determining the specific materials which
would be employed? One promising development along these lines is
a project undertaken by the American Sociological Association sup-
ported by The National Science Foundations. Those in charge of the
American Sociological Association project are currently engaged in
developing *Sociological Resources for Secondary Schools*,\(^2\) one aspect
of which is to develop around forty teaching episodes. Each of these
episodes would include a teachers manual, a student manual, and
suggested activities for the student. They are designed to take
approximately two weeks of classroom time but this time factor is
largely dependent upon the purposes and techniques of the classroom
teacher. The basic advantage I see to this approach rather than to
an overall course or curriculum materials project is that it provides
the teacher with an excellent source of material from which to choose
those specific materials which have the most relevance for his
specific classroom situation. As Dr. Angell, the director of the
project put it in a recent address at Ball State University, "it pro-
vides the teacher with a smorgasbord from which he can select one
piece or all." Only a small portion of the project is now completed.

\(^2\)This project is now centered at the University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, under the general direction of Dr. Robert Angell.
Therefore, it is impossible to evaluate the utility of these specific materials in the life of the program we have developed herein. It does seem, however, that such an approach to the development of curricular materials might have great utility in a program such as the one that has been the major thesis of this study.

**Summary and Conclusions**

In this study it has been pointed out that many of the current approaches to the teaching of social studies are predicated upon sociologically naive conceptions. It has been pointed out that this naivete may lead to serious shortcomings both from the point of view of overall programs and specific classroom operations. It has been suggested that a more sociologically sophisticated model might overcome some of these difficulties, and an effort was made to develop such a model. Based upon the model an institutional approach to the teaching of social studies has been developed and the implications of this approach for curriculum, teacher training, classroom strategies, and classroom techniques have been explored.

While no empirical research has been done to test the utility of the model and the curriculum, the kinds of research that will be needed to accomplish this task have been indicated. Further, it is one of the contentions of the present study that significant research in social studies education, as well as in the social sciences, can only
be done in relationship to some theoretical structure. It will be up to future researchers to gather empirical evidence to justify accepting or rejecting all or part of that which has been postulated herein. One of the chief advantages I see to the model presented in this study is the fact that it does not depend on the student holding substantive beliefs. Rather, it depends upon the reflective examination of attitudes one holds toward his beliefs and the beliefs of others. Given the nature of mass society with the apparent tendency toward other-direction and the crisis in identity which so dominates the thinking of many social scientists, this factor alone seems to me to be a valuable basis for recommendation of the program herein developed.

In conclusion, I do not claim that the approach to social studies education developed in this study is an answer to all of the ills which permeate the field. I do believe, however, that this model provides a basis for integrating some of the best notions of social studies educators with some of the more recent and sophisticated insights from the social science disciplines. My main hope is that this study will provide a basis for future studies and thereby increase the odds that the social studies student of the future will grasp more clearly than is presently the case "what it is to be man in the world."
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