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CONSCIENCE DEVELOPMENT IN DELINQUENTS AND NON-DELINQUENTS:
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MORAL JUDGMENT,
GUILT, AND BEHAVIOR

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

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* * * * * * *

The Ohio State University
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The problem of understanding an individual's values and how these influence his behavior is a central concern in the understanding of personality functioning. The study of conscience, i.e., the internalized rules for guiding behavior established by the individual, provides important information regarding the social, conceptual and emotional development of the individual. Discussions of faulty conscience development hold a key place in conceptualizations of abnormal personality functioning, particularly with regard to psychoneurotic and psychopathic disorders (e.g., Fenichel, 1945; Mowrer, 1964). Thus the study of various aspects of conscience development in both deviant and nondeviant groups aids our understanding of the construct of conscience.

Conscience is commonly considered to have three aspects (Kohlberg, 1963): (1) a cognitive aspect, i.e., the judgment made or value held by the individual; (2) an emotional component, i.e., the moral anxiety or guilt experienced when the judgment or value is violated in behavior; and (3) a behavioral aspect, i.e., the action taken by the individual on the basis of the held value and its accompanying emotion.

In the past, investigators largely have focused on one of these aspects in their study of conscience (see Kohlberg review of research on moral development, 1963). The present study investigated the interrelationship between all three aspects and specifically was concerned
with predicting moral behavior from cognitive and emotional manifestations of conscience.

The population chosen on which to evaluate these relationships was delinquent and non-delinquent adolescents. Delinquents commonly are felt to show disturbed conscience development (e.g., Aichorn, 1935; Johnson, 1949; Redl and Wineman, 1951). Studying the interrelationship between various aspects of conscience in such a population not only aids understanding of personality functioning in general but its functioning in delinquents in particular. Such understanding thus has both theoretical and applied value, as the construct of conscience is central to identification and treatment of delinquents from a psychological perspective. A control group was included to provide information on the generalizability of findings. Specifically, it provided data on differences in functioning of conscience in two groups commonly considered to differ on cognitive, emotional and behavioral manifestations of conscience. Since conceptualizations of the earlier stages of conscience development suggest the importance of situational factors in assessing aspects of conscience (Freud, 1957; Piaget, 1948), and since delinquents are felt to function at a relatively low level of conscience development (Aichorn, 1935; Kohlberg, 1958; Redl and Wineman, 1951) the present study also considered the effects of situational factors in predicting moral behavior.

The following hypotheses were made:

I. Delinquents will score lower than Controls on cognitive, emotional and behavioral measures of conscience.
II. Cognitive and emotional aspects of conscience considered in combination will predict moral behavior better than either aspect considered singly.

III. Measures assessing everyday life situations relevant to moral behavior of the individual will predict moral behavior better than measures assessing theoretical situations.

Previous studies investigating differences in conscience development between delinquents and nondelinquents provide evidence to suggest that delinquents manifest less guilt (e.g., Bandura and Walters, 1959; McCord and McCord, 1956; Shore and Massimo, 1964). In the only study which investigated cognitive aspects of conscience from a developmental perspective (Kohlberg, 1958) delinquents scored significantly lower than nondelinquents. Studies commonly use delinquent-nondelinquent classification as the behavioral manifestation of conscience, and previously no studies have employed other behavioral measures to differentiate the two groups. Thus, the present study's contribution lay in studying all three aspects of conscience simultaneously in the same groups of subjects.

Previously, no studies have considered cognitive and emotional aspects in combination in predicting to moral behavior. The efficacy of such an approach is suggested by conceptualizations of conscience emphasizing the interdependence and mutual influence of these factors on moral behavior (e.g., Freud, 1949, 1957). It is also suggested by the thinking of researchers stressing the importance of multivariate designs in behavior prediction from projective test responses (e.g., Lesser, 1957; Purcell, 1956; Rader, 1957; Saltz and Epstein, 1963). Attempts in previous studies to relate either cognitive or emotional aspects of
conscience, using projective-type measures, to behavioral aspects have been of varying success (see Chapter II). Thus it was felt by the author that employment of a multivariate design would enhance prediction of moral behavior as it has enhanced prediction of other kinds of behavior from projective-type measures.

One study (Porteus and Johnson, 1965) investigated both cognitive and emotional aspects considered singly in predicting to moral behavior. No significant relationships were obtained. Several methodological factors may account for these results. Primarily these have to do with the lack of similarity between assessment situations in the cognitive, emotional and behavioral measures and the use of behavioral ratings obtained from groups of subjects not sufficiently familiar with one another's behavior. The present study controlled for the latter and investigated the influence of the former.

Previously, no studies directly have been concerned with the issue of situational factors in predicting moral behavior. However, several studies indirectly are relevant. Hartshorne and May's (1930) findings of considerable inconsistency in moral behavior between various assessment situations led them to conclude that situational factors are a primary influence on moral behavior. Other studies (e.g., Allinsmith, 1960; Boehm, 1962; Johnson, 1962; Rau, 1963) have found inconsistencies in level of moral judgment in various assessment situations. These findings primarily were obtained with child populations, which one would expect to function at lower developmental levels. Previous research by Kohlberg (1958) and by the author (1967) suggests that delinquents also function cognitively at such lower levels. The moral concepts they tend
to employ are a mixture of cognitively immature and mature concepts and there tends to be considerable variability in their level of conceptualization in different situations. Thus, it is suggested that situational variability is characteristic of populations scoring at lower levels of development and thus situational factors are important in assessments obtained on such populations.

Another area of research which points out the importance of situational factors in predicting behavior is that done with the Thematic Apperception Test. Recently, sophisticated investigators (e.g., Forer, 1961; Murstein, 1963; Kagan and Lesser, 1961) consistently emphasize the importance of considering situational factors when making behavioral predictions from projective test responses. For example, if one is interested in predicting aggressive behavior, more accurate predictions can be made from TAT cards portraying situations highly suggestive of aggression similar to that assessed in the behavioral situation than from cards not particularly suggestive of such aggression (Lesser, 1958; Kagan, 1961). Previously, no study of conscience has been concerned with using assessment situations in the projective-type measures of cognitive and emotional aspects of conscience which are relevant to the behavior assessed. The third hypothesis in the present study reflects such a concern.
CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF RELEVANT RESEARCH

Theoretical background

Conceptualizations of conscience indicate that it is a difficult construct to define and operationalize since it can be viewed from a variety of vantage points and refers to behaviors which are subtle and complex. Freud and Piaget are the two major theorists who have generated most of the thinking and empirical investigations concerned with conscience development. Interestingly, although their theories focus on seemingly widely divergent factors in human development, the integral variables they emphasize have many similarities. Both focus on the developmental nature of conscience, which involves progressive maturation in the individual's ability to make value-based, nonegocentric evaluations regarding the morally correct action to take in a particular situation. Both emphasize that conscience involves cognitive, emotional and behavioral aspects and that these three aspects are interwoven and mutually influence development.

Piaget (1948) focused on the cognitive aspect of conscience. He studied the moral judgments of children, which he felt went through a sequence of differentiation and reintegration at a cognitively more mature level. He conceptualized moral development into two global stages: the heteronomous and the autonomous. In the heteronomous stage,
thinking is authority oriented and is characterized by egocentricity, concreteness and lack of differentiation. Rules are felt to be unchangeable, values are viewed as absolute, acts are evaluated as good or bad in terms of adult sanctions or punishment, and punishment must be severe and administered by authority. In the autonomous stage, thinking is characterized by a social perspective based on mutual respect between individuals, and concepts of justice formalized and differentiated. Rules are flexible in terms of situational circumstances, values are viewed relatively, judgments are made independently of external sanctions and obligations are defined in terms of rights of contract and exchange.

Piaget was not concerned with emotional manifestations of conscience, although he briefly referred to a sense of guilt accompanying various cognitive evaluations (p. 136, 160). He also devoted little attention to the behavioral aspects of conscience per se, although he was concerned with the question of the degree to which the child's evaluations in interview stories parallel those in "concrete action," i.e., everyday life situations (pp. 174-175).

In contrast to Piaget, psychoanalytic conceptualizations of conscience focus on the emotional aspect and show more concern for the behavior of the individual. Guilt in Freud's system is manifested in two major ways (Fenichel, 1945): (1) in an anticipatory fashion, in that the painful consequences of wrongdoing are anticipated by the individual and thus the behavior is inhibited or (2) in the experience of guilt proper, which is the painful self recrimination which occurs
when an act of transgression is committed. Guilt is thus the developmental successor of anxiety, which is concerned with fear of punishment by the environment. To simplify Freud's complex conceptualizations of guilt (Fenichel, 1945; Freud, 1949, 1957), early in development, the emotional experience accompanying a real or fantasied transgression is that of anxiety, based on fear of punishment by others. At these stages, external or situational factors considerably influence the behavior of the individual. Gradually, with cognitive and social growth (i.e., the development of the ego and the successful passing through of various psychosexual stages) the functioning of conscience becomes relatively independent of such external or situational factors. The emotional experience upon transgression becomes that of guilt over violation of internalized standards rather than anxiety due to fear of external punishment.

Both Freud and Piaget to some degree addressed themselves to defining the relationship between cognitive or emotional manifestations of conscience and the actual behavior of the individual. Freud posited (Fenichel, 1945, pp. 102-103) that during early stages of conscience, where anxiety is the motivating force for conformity, there is fluctuation in the degree to which the child conforms to "internalized parental prohibitions." With the appearance of guilt, there is increasing behavioral conformity, as guilt acts as a more effective inhibitor impulse-dominated behavior than did anxiety. Piaget (1948, p. 117) implies a similar process where there is inconsistency in thinking (and thus behavior, as he assumed the processes were parallel) between
various situations. He felt there were differences between the child's evaluations in theoretical situations and everyday life situations and that since "thought lags behind concrete action," thinking in everyday situations generally would be at the more mature developmental level. Thus the child's concrete thinking in the early stages of moral development, as in cognitive development in general, enables him to deal more effectively with familiar everyday situations as compared with theoretical situations which demand thinking at a more abstract level.

In summary, then, both Freud and Piaget suggest cognitive and emotional changes indicating growth of conscience. They further suggest that with development, there is an increasing interrelationship between the cognitive, emotional and behavioral aspects of conscience. Finally, they suggest that situational variability occurs during early stages of conscience development. Piaget specifically suggests that thinking in familiar situations more accurately reflects moral development than thinking in theoretical situations.

Review of relevant research

Kohlberg (1963) comprehensively has reviewed research on conscience development as well as discussed empirical support relevant to various theoretical issues concerning the construct of conscience. Thus this review will present a brief overview of studies investigating cognitive, emotional and behavioral aspects of conscience and focus primarily on research directly relevant to the hypotheses investigated in the present study. Since an adolescent population was used in the
study and since the evidence presented by Kohlberg suggests age difference on cognitive, emotional and behavioral manifestations of conscience, studies reviewed largely will be restricted to pre-adolescent and adolescent populations.

Researchers in the area of conscience development typically study one of the three commonly accepted criteria for the presence of conscience: cognitive, emotional or behavioral. The various theoretical approaches to the study of conscience focus somewhat exclusively on one of these criteria, often ignoring the other two. All too frequently researchers don't sufficiently acknowledge the complexity of the phenomena with which they are dealing when discussing results and making interpretive generalizations.

Workers in the Piagetian tradition focus on the cognitive aspect and study moral judgments made by children, at various ages and of varying sex and socioeconomic background (e.g., Boehm, 1962; Durkin, 1959; Johnson, 1962; Kohlberg, 1958; Lerner, 1937). Psychoanalytically oriented investigators generally focus on guilt and its relationship with various parental childrearing practices (e.g., Allinsmith, 1960; Grinder, 1962; Heinicke, 1953; Hoffman, 1963; Rau, 1963) and/or its ability to inhibit transgression behavior (e.g., Grinder, 1962; Heinicke, 1953, Rebelsky, 1963). A third group of workers focus on the behavioral aspect of conscience. Generally, these investigators work from a more varied theoretical framework. Some work within a combined psychoanalytic-learning theory framework and study behavior in experimental resistance-to-temptation situations as related to variations in age, sex, family
background, etc. (e.g., Bandura and McDonald, 1963; Sears, 1957).

Others are more atheoretical and are concerned with "various correlates of behavioral conformity (e.g., the Hartshorne and May, 1930; Havighurst and Taba, 1949; and Peck and Havighurst, 1960 studies of character development).

Research on children's moral judgments indicates that most of the dimensions posited by Piaget have received enough consistent empirical support both in America and Belgium to be regarded as genuine developmental dimensions, i.e., they increase regularly with age, regardless of the particular situations or cultural rules about which children are questioned (Kohlberg, 1963). Both socioeconomic status (e.g., Boehm, 1962; Johnson, 1962; Kohlberg, 1958; MacRae, 1954) and intelligence (Boehm, 1962; Johnson, 1962; Kohlberg, 1958; MacRae, 1954; Porteous and Johnson, 1965 but not McDonald, 1963) have been found to be significantly related to maturity on these dimensions.

Kohlberg (1958), drawing upon the thinking of Piaget, Baldwin and Meade, has developed a stage typological approach to studying the dimensions posited by Piaget. He has reconceptualized Piaget's heteronomous and autonomous stages into six stages and has empirically established these six stages as developmental in nature. Peer group participation and socioeconomic status were influential in developmental level attained by subjects, but age accounted for the majority of variance (.59 with IQ controlled). Developmental level of moral judgments was found to be significantly related to guilt. The author in a previous study on a delinquent population (Ruma and Mosher, 1967) found scores on the
Kohlberg moral judgment scale to be significantly correlated with a self-report measure of guilt ($r = .55$) and clinical ratings of guilt expressed in interviews ($r = .43$).

Kohlberg has shown some interest in relating cognitive aspects of conscience to behavioral aspects. He obtained correlations of .31 and .51 between teachers' ratings of "conscience" and "fairness with peers" and moral judgment level (1958). He also reports (1965) two unpublished studies, conducted by Brown and Milgram on college populations, which provide additional information about relationships between moral judgment level and behavior. In Brown's study, only one-ninth of subjects at the highest developmental stages transgressed in an experiment investigating cheating behavior as compared with one-half of those scoring at the middle stages of moral development. In Milgram's study, 75 percent of the subjects scoring at the highest stages, as compared with 15 percent of the subjects scoring at the middle stages, quit an experiment which required the participant to administer shock. However, Porteus and Johnson (1965), working from a Piagetian framework but using situations different than Kohlberg's, found nonsignificant relationships between moral judgment level and behavioral manifestations of conscience.

Hartshorne and May (1930) also present data relevant to the ability of cognitive aspects of conscience to predict behavioral aspects. In the 11-12 year old group, they obtained a correlation of .34 between moral knowledge and experimental measures of inhibition of transgression.
behavior, and a correlation of .43 between moral knowledge and ratings of character by teachers and peers.

A considerable number of studies have investigated various aspects of guilt as a manifestation of conscience. The evidence suggests that with regard to the influence of other variables on guilt, in addition to age (Aronfreed, 1961), it is influenced by socioeconomic status (Aronfreed, 1961; Hoffman, 1963) and perhaps by intelligence (Porteus and Johnson, 1965, but not Aronfreed, 1961). Studies investigating the relationship between guilt and behavioral manifestations of conscience have revealed the importance of the way the concept is defined in establishing such relationships. When guilt is defined so as to include a wide variety of responses, such as defensive manifestations (e.g., externalized blame), confession and attempts at restitution, these kinds of "guilt" responses frequently are not significantly related to behavioral manifestations (e.g., Allinsmith, 1960; Aronfreed, 1961; Bandura and Walters, 1959; Rau, 1963, Rebelsky, 1963). Aronfreed is the investigator who has most systematically investigated the acquisition and manifestation of various kinds of guilt responses (1960, 1961, 1963, 1965). He concludes (1961) that responses such as confession and attempts at restitution have a strong instrumental component (i.e., they are attempts to maintain adult approval and avoid punishment) and thus cannot be considered genuine manifestations of guilt.

Studies which employ definitions of guilt based primarily on self critical statements more often show statistically significant
relationship with behavioral manifestations of conscience. Allinsmith (1960), Aronfreed (1961), Heinicke (1953), MacKinnon (1938) and Märtimer (1966) have shown guilt defined in this way to be related to behavioral conformity in experimental resistance to temptation situations. However, other non-experimental studies do not consistently show such relationships. For example, James (1965) found TAT expression of guilt but not a self report measure of guilt to be related to peer ratings of inhibition of aggression. Porteus and Johnson (1965) found no significant relationships between story-completion measures of guilt and global ratings of conscience.

In summary, then, previous studies provide some evidence for relationships between cognitive, emotional and behavioral manifestations of conscience. However, they also point to the importance of the definitions and methods employed in establishing these relationships.
CHAPTER III

METHOD

Subjects

Subjects were male adolescents between the ages of 15 to 17, of average intelligence and lower to lower-middle socioeconomic status. The delinquent sample consisted of 21 boys incarcerated at the Training Institute of Central Ohio (a maximum security treatment institution) and nine boys living at Buckeye Boys Ranch (a residential treatment setting for delinquent boys in Columbus, Ohio). Only boys whose commitment offenses fell in the categories of common delinquent behaviors (i.e., assault, theft, vandalism and incorrigibility) were included. All boys in the delinquent group had lived together in small groups, over a period of six months or more, in "cottages" supervised by teams of adult "cottage parents." The control group consisted of members of Boys Clubs in the Columbus area who knew each other over a period of two or more years and had participated together in various group activities. A Boys Club population was selected as it was felt that, of the potential groups available in the community, this group was most comparable to the delinquent group in background (clubs were located in lower-class sections of the city) and in structure of the group (boys and staff knew each other in various life situations as they played sports together, attended camps together, etc.).
Measures

Cognitive measures. Two measures of moral judgment were used, both involving the same approach to assessment and evaluation but differing in the nature of the situations assessed. The approach consists of a structured interview in which a series of situations are verbally presented. The situations present a moral conflict between two values. For example, in one of the stories a man is thinking of stealing a drug to save his wife's life because he has no other way of getting it. In this instance, the conflict is between the value against stealing and the value for saving a life. The subject is asked to make a decision regarding the situation and is questioned regarding the reasons for his choice. Responses are assessed primarily in terms of the concepts the subject used in evaluating the moral conflict situation. The choice the subject makes is of secondary importance. This approach is based on Piaget's "methode clinique."

Kohlberg (1958) developed the instrument and a conceptual system for evaluating responses which is based on the thinking of Piaget and Baldwin regarding moral development. Responses are evaluated in terms of the concepts they reflect regarding such dimensions as the rights of others, justice, contractual obligations, attitude toward punishment, etc. Evaluation of the patterning of these concepts allows the individual to be classified in one of six stages of moral development, on the basis of his most characteristic level of functioning. Kohlberg has carefully delineated criteria by which these stages can be identified (see Appendix I for a description of scoring criteria).
The six stages, corresponding to three levels of conscience development, can be briefly described as follows:

Level I: Premoral level. Concern with avoiding punishment rather than with following an internalized value.

Stage 0: Acts are judged on the basis of consequences rather than intentions. No concern with human need is expressed.

Stage 1: Acts are judged on the basis of their instrumental value in meeting egocentric needs; rules are abided by on the basis of personal gain or loss.

Level II: Generalized Conformity level. Value resides in maintaining the conventional social order and expectancies of others.

Stage 2: The right thing is that which gains the approval of others.

Stage 3: A clear differentiation between right and wrong is made over and above others' approval; definitions are made somewhat rigidly in terms of the existing moral order.

Level III: Autonomous level. Value resides in the conformity of the self to standards of judgment based on the general rights of others.

Stage 4: Value is assessed by legalistic criteria based on maximizing results and minimizing cost in a particular situation on the basis of a social perspective.
Stage 5: A social perspective is maintained but there is more focus on an ideal set of values based on respect for the unique individual; values transcend a particular situation.

Research with the Kohlberg instrument discussed in the previous chapter provides some evidence for the construct and predictive validity of the measure.

In order to limit administration time to one hour, six of Kohlberg's ten moral conflict situations having the highest loading on the general morality factor were used in the present study (see Appendix II for a copy of the stories). Each of the stories was assigned a score corresponding with one of the six stages. As previous research with the instrument (Kohlberg, 1958; Ruma and Mosher, 1967) has indicated that delinquent populations tend to score at the lower stages, the stage "1" classification was divided into three subclassifications to enhance discrimination. "Pure" stage "1" responses were given a score of "1;" stage "1" combined with stage "2" responses were given a score of "2," and stage "1" combined with stage "3," "4," or "5" responses were given a score of "3." Thus scores were on a seven-point scale. To ascertain inter-rater reliability, 10 protocols were randomly selected, making a total of 60 comparisons. They were independently scored by two raters (r = .80, df = 58, ; .01).

The second moral judgment measure employed the same approach to assessment and evaluation devised by Kohlberg. It differed from the Kohlberg measure in the nature of the moral conflict situations presented.
The Kohlberg Moral Judgment stories (K-MJ) portray situations which infrequently, if ever, are apt to be encountered in the everyday experience of the population used in the present study (e.g., one story portrays a situation where a man's wife is dying and he is considering stealing a drug which will save her life; another story portrays an Army Captain who must choose one of his men to go on a mission which will probably result in the man's death). The stories constructed for the present study, called the Relevant Situation Moral Judgment stories (RS-MJ), portray situations which are relevant to the everyday life experiences of the boys participating in the study. For example, one story portrays a boy who must decide whether to keep a promise to a friend or abide by the group's rules; another story presents a boy who is losing playing cards and conditions are optimum for him to cheat. The RS-MJ stories were scored in the same manner as the K-MJ stories (see Appendix III for a copy of the RS-MJ stories). To ascertain the inter-rater reliability of the scoring, six protocols were selected randomly, making a total of 60 comparisons, and were independently scored by two raters (r = .85, df = 58; p < .01).

Guilt measures. Two measures of guilt were used. One was the RS-MJ story completions scored for expressions of guilt. Subject's responses were scored using criteria commonly employed by workers using this method (e.g., Aronfreed, 1960; Hoffman, 1963; Rekelsky, 1963), which focus on self critical statements and expressions of subjective distress associated with transgression of some personally-held standard. Responses were evaluated on a four-point scale. The
extremes on this scale are defined as follows: a score of "4" was given to responses directly expressing guilty emotion, e.g., "I'd really feel bad doing that to someone who trusted me;" while a score of "1" was given when the concern was primarily with avoiding trouble or punishment, e.g., "I'd be scared to do that, someone might jump me." (See Appendix IV for Scoring Manual.) To ascertain inter-rater reliability of the scoring, 30 protocols were independently scored by two raters ($r = .81, df = 28, p < .01$).

Measures of guilt expressed in story completions have been found to show statistically significant relationships with moral judgment (e.g., Hoffman, 1963), with ratings by adults of various aspects of socialized behavior (McCord and McCord, 1960; Shore and Massimo, 1964), and with low cheating behavior in experimental resistance to temptation situations (Allinsmith, 1960; MacKinnon, 1938; McCord and McCord (1956) have used this method of assessing guilt to differentiate between delinquents and non-delinquents, while Bandura and Walters (1959) found TAT expressions of guilt to differentiate between aggressive and non-aggressive adolescents.

The second guilt measure used was the Mosher Guilt Scale. This scale is a self-report questionnaire consisting of forced-choice items dealing with a wide variety of morally-relevant content, primarily that of self-critical statements about feelings regarding lying, aggression and other conventionally-condemned behavioral acts. The Hostility and Morality-Conscience Guilt subscales were used in the present study. (See Appendix V for a copy of the Scale). The Mosher Guilt Scale (MGS)
was developed from a sentence completion measure of guilt using referents suggested by psychoanalytic conceptions of guilt (Mosher, 1961). Forced-choice alternatives were subjected to an internal consistency item analysis and matched for social desirability in college males. A multi-trait-multimethod matrix analysis of the three subscales and sentence completion, true-false and forced-choice versions, revealed that the forced-choice version has a split-half reliability in the .90's. Evidence of convergent and discriminant validity is beginning to be established for the instrument (Mosher, 1966).

Regarding findings with the MGS instrument on populations similar to those in the present study, several studies are relevant. Mortimer (1966), using a delinquent population, found scores on the MGS to correlate .53 with clinician's ratings of degree of guilt expressed by delinquents about their delinquent acts and to correlate .55 with the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Scale. However, James (1965) found no relationships between MGS and peer behavioral ratings of aggressive behavior in a Boy Scout population.

Behavioral measures. Two behavioral measures were used. The first was behavioral ratings by both peers and staff of the subjects' behavior in various everyday situations similar to those portrayed in the Relevant Situation Moral Judgment stories, (See Appendix VI for a copy of the behavior rating situations.) Scores given by each rater were averaged to obtain a mean score for each subject on each of the 11 behavioral ratings. The mean score for the 11 situations was used as the final behavioral rating score. Additional ratings were obtained
on "trustworthiness," "fairness," "power" and "likeability," but these data were not considered in the present study.

Previous studies using the behavioral rating method have obtained inconsistent results. The studies by James (1965), Mortimer (1966) and Porteus and Johnson (1965) employed behavioral ratings by peers and found them unrelated to measures of guilt or moral judgment. The present study attempted to make methodological improvements in these ratings suggested by the previous investigators. Care was taken to assure that all raters (both staff and boys) were well acquainted with the subjects' behavior in the situation rated, otherwise the rater did not rate the subject for that particular situation. The groups chosen were chosen on the basis of their suitability for such ratings as both boys and staff knew each other well and had the opportunity to observe the subjects' behavior in situations relevant to the assessment situations.

Two additional methodological improvements were made. Ratings for a variety of specific situations were obtained in addition to a global rating. Relevant situation-measures of moral judgment and guilt were obtained in situations similar to those in which behavioral ratings were made.

Previous studies using ratings by adults rather than by peers as behavioral criterion measures have more often shown statistically significant relationships between measures of moral judgment or guilt and of behavior. McCord and McCord (1960) and Shore and Massimo (1964) obtained significant relationships between guilt measures and staff behavioral ratings in populations of delinquents. Kohlberg (1958) found
teacher ratings to be correlated at a statistically significant level with scores on his moral judgment measure.

The second behavioral measure was a self-report questionnaire assessing frequency with which the subject has committed various acts commonly considered to reflect delinquent behavior. The scale was constructed by Arnold (1965) who has shown concern for adequately standardizing the instrument. The original pool of items was obtained from responses given by 100 percent of the sophomore class in six high schools in an urban but not metropolitan city of 200,000. Respondents were asked to report all of their delinquent acts since they started school.

A randomly selected sample of 200 protocols was used for the scalogram analysis of the three subscales of the Scale. The Theft subscale obtained an overall reproducibility of 93.9 percent; the maximum marginal reproducibility was .73 and the coefficient of scalability was .66. For the Vandalism subscale, reproducibility was 92 percent, marginal reproducibility was .79 and the coefficient of scalability was .55. The Attacks against Persons subscale had an overall reproducibility on the eight-item version of 94 percent; the maximum marginal reproducibility was .64 and the coefficient of scalability .66. Product moment intercorrelations between the three scales are as follows: between Vandalism and Attacks against Persons subscales, .57; between Vandalism and Theft subscales, .62; and between Attacks against Persons and Theft subscales, .08. Preliminary analysis of the data from the sample of 200 respondents revealed no significant differences between various socioeconomic levels in the frequency of committing delinquent acts.
Procedure

Subjects were told that the examiner was doing a research project as part of her course work at Ohio State University to find out how boys like themselves thought and felt about some things—not how others felt they should but how they actually thought and felt. They were told that their answers would not be seen by any staff member and their participation had no connection with the institution or Boys Club. They were then asked if they wished to participate. None in the potential delinquent sample declined. Five in the potential Boys Club sample declined.

The moral judgment interviews were then conducted; one-half of the subjects received the Kohlberg stories first and the other half received the Relevant Situation stories first, in order to control for any possible sequence effect. This part of the study took around one and one-half hours. After completion of the interviews, the paper and pencil measures were filled out by the subjects, individually or in supervised small groups. The Mosher Guilt Scale was given first, the Arnold Self Report of Delinquent Behavior second, and the Behavioral Ratings last. This sequence was followed as each of these tests progressively reveals more about the nature of the study.
CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

The first hypothesis made in this study was that Delinquent and Control groups would differ significantly on moral judgment, guilt, and behavioral self report measures. Differences on the behavioral ratings by boys and staff were not assessed. In this measure the nomination technique was used which divides the group equally along a four-point scale. Thus in each group the same number of boys received a score of "1," an equal number received a score of "2," etc. For this reason, total scores for each group are equal and no group differences can be attained.

Table 1 shows the differences between the two groups on (1) the two cognitive measures, Kohlberg Moral Judgment (K-MJ) and Relevant Situation Moral Judgment (RS-MJ); (2) the two guilt measures, Mosher Guilt Scale (MGS) and Relevant Situation Guilt (RS-G), and (3) the behavioral measure, the Arnold Self Report of Delinquent Behavior (ASR-DB).

The results revealed that no significant differences were obtained between the two groups on either moral judgment measure although there were trends (t = 1.23 and 1.25, significant at the .20 level) in the direction of the Delinquents scoring higher on K-MJ and
**TABLE 1**

Mean Differences between Delinquent and Non-Delinquent Groups on Moral Judgment, Guilt, and Self Report Behavioral Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>K-MJ</td>
<td>Delinquent</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.23  ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-delinquent</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS-MJ</td>
<td>Delinquent</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>1.25  ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-delinquent</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGS</td>
<td>Delinquent</td>
<td>104.07</td>
<td>27.16</td>
<td>3.63**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-delinquent</td>
<td>127.87</td>
<td>23.46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS-G</td>
<td>Delinquent</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>.57 ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-delinquent</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-SR DB</td>
<td>Delinquent</td>
<td>47.90</td>
<td>20.78</td>
<td>3.95**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-delinquent</td>
<td>37.20</td>
<td>19.79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**t** of 2.67 is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed test).

<sup>a</sup>K-MJ = Kohlberg Moral Judgment stories
RS-MJ = Relevant Situation Moral Judgment stories
MGS = Mosher Guilt Scale
RS-G = Relevant Situation Guilt
A-SR DB = Arnold Self Report of Delinquent Behavior

Non-Delinquents on RS-MJ. Highly significant t values were obtained for MGS and A-SR DB (t of 3.63 and 3.95 respectively, p < .01), indicating that Non-Delinquents reported more guilt and less delinquent behavior as compared with the Delinquent group. The two groups showed very little difference on the RS-G measure (t = .57 ns). Thus, Hypothesis I is supported with regard to guilt (as measured by MGS) and self reports of delinquent behavior, but it is not supported with regard to moral judgment.
The second hypothesis tested was that moral judgment and guilt considered in combination would predict moral behavior better than either variable considered singly. Table 2 and Table 3 present findings with regard to this hypothesis.

When results regarding this hypothesis are reported in the tables and text, the level of significance reported refers to that achieved by the single predictor alone or both predictors together. It does not refer to the significance level associated with adding a predictor. No tests of the statistical significance of adding a predictor were made in the case of Hypothesis II as the small number of cases in each comparison requires very great differences between correlations and F-ratios before the difference is statistically significant.

### Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Zero-order Correlations</th>
<th>Multiple Order Correlations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (K-MJ)</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (RS-MJ)</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.40**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 (MGS)</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td>.50**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 (RS-G)</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.31* , .47**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* of .26 significant at the .05 level.  
** of .33 significant at the .01 level.

K-MJ = Kohlberg Moral Judgment measure  
RS-MJ = Relevant Situation Moral Judgment measure  
MGS = Mosher Guilt Scale  
RS-G = Relevant Situation Guilt  
ASR-DB = Arnold Self Report of Delinquent Behavior
As is readily apparent from the correlation coefficients presented, the MGS guilt measure is by far the best predictor of absence of self reported delinquent acts of the four measures used (correlation of .45, p < .01). Considering either Moral Judgment measure along with the Mosher Guilt Scale does little to enhance prediction (the correlation changes from .45 to .50 adding K-MJ and .45 to .47 adding RS-MJ, p < .01 in both cases). Similarly, the RS-G correlation with ASR-DB rises from .22 to .47 when MGS is added as compared with the MGS single correlation of .45. Although in all three instances, prediction is higher when pairs of predictors are considered, almost all of the variance explained is due to the MGS measure alone.

Table 3 presents data relevant to the second hypothesis for the two behavioral ratings, Behavioral Rating-Boys (BR-Boys) and Behavioral Rating-Staff (BR-Staff).

The RS-MJ measure proved to be the best single predictor of BR-Boys (.29, p < .05) and adding either guilt measure, MGS or RS-G, enhanced prediction slightly (multiple correlation = .32, p < .05 in both cases). Considering RS-MJ with K-MJ enhanced prediction slightly more than considering it with the guilt measure, MGS (.30 vs. .26 both p < .05).

The results show that the BR-Staff measure consistently had a higher relationship with the predictor variables than the BR-Boys measure (the majority of the correlations were in the .40's to .50's as compared with the .20's to .30's). In the case of the BR-Staff measure, the RS-MJ and MGS are about comparable as single predictor variables,
## TABLE 3

Zero-order and Multiple-order Correlation Coefficients for Pairs of Predictors Predicting to the Behavioral Measures, BR-Boys and BR-Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>BR - Boys</th>
<th>BR - Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zero Order</td>
<td>Multiple Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 K-MJ</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 RS-MJ</td>
<td>.29*</td>
<td>.30*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 MGS</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.26*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 RS-G</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* r of .26 is significant at the .05 level.
** r of .33 is significant at the .01 level.

K-MJ = Kohlberg Moral Judgment measure
RS-MJ = Relevant Situation Moral Judgment measure
MGS = Mosher Guilt Scale
RS-G = Relevant Situation Guilt
BR-Boys = Behavioral Rating by Boys
BR-Staff = Behavioral Rating by Staff

as the correlation with RS-MJ is .39 and with the MGS is .41 (p < .01 in both). Both considered together raise prediction over either single predictor (the correlation rises to .52). Similarly, they improve the predictive efficiency of RS-G to about the same degree (RS-G alone correlates .30 with the BR-Staff, adding RS-MJ it correlates .47 and adding MGS .48, p .01 in both cases). Adding either RS-MJ or MGS to K-MJ changes the correlation with the BR-Staff from .03 to .41 (p < .01).

Summarizing the findings, Hypothesis II is confirmed subject to several important qualifications. Findings vary with the particular moral judgment, guilt and behavioral measures used. Using either ASR-DB
or BR-Boys as criterion measures, the best single predictor usually predicted almost as well as this predictor in combination with any other measure. Other combinations of moral judgment and guilt usually improved prediction. However, combinations of two moral judgment or two guilt measures also improved prediction. Using BR-Staff as the criterion measure, moral judgment and guilt combined showed higher prediction than the best single moral judgment or guilt predictor.

The final hypothesis tested in this study was that the Relevant Situation Moral Judgment measure would predict to the behavioral ratings better than the Kohlberg Moral Judgment measure. As discussed previously, the Relevant Situation stories were assessed along the same conceptual dimensions as the Kohlberg stories, but differed in that the stories involved situations similar to those encountered in the everyday life of the subjects and to those assessed in the behavioral ratings, e.g., situations portraying cheating at games or sports, borrowing money or objects, keeping or breaking a promise to a friend, lying, etc. The Kohlberg stories, on the other hand, depict situations more remote from the behavioral ratings and the subject's everyday experiences, e.g., stealing a drug to save a life, ordering a man to his death in combat in order to save the lives of many others, etc. Table 4 presents the correlations between the two moral judgment and two behavioral rating measures for Total, Delinquent, and Control Groups. Total group comparisons were made as the groups separately did not significantly differ on the K-MJ and RS-MJ measures.
### TABLE 4
Comparison of K-MJ and RS-MJ Correlations with the Behavioral Ratings, BR-Boys and BR-Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Measure(^a)</th>
<th>BR-Boys(^a)</th>
<th>BR-Staff(^a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>(N = 60)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-MJ</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS-MJ</td>
<td>.29(^c)</td>
<td>.39(^d)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(t = .90 \text{ ns})</td>
<td>(t = 2.61 \ p \ .02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Delinquent:</strong></td>
<td>(N = 30)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-MJ</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS-MJ</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.41(^c)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(t = .94 \text{ ns})</td>
<td>(t = .74 \text{ ns})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control:</strong></td>
<td>(N = 30)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-MJ</td>
<td>.40(^b)</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS-MJ</td>
<td>.34(^b)</td>
<td>.34(^b)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(t = .45 \text{ ns})</td>
<td>(t = .52 \text{ ns})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)K-MJ = Kohlberg Moral Judgment measure  
RS-MJ = Relevant Situation Moral Judgment measure  
BR-Boys = Behavioral Rating by Boys  
BR-Staff = Behavioral rating by Staff

\(^b\)Significant at the .10 level.  
\(^c\)Significant at the .05 level.  
\(^d\)Significant at the .01 level.

For the Total group, RS-MJ as compared with K-MJ showed considerably higher correlations with both behavioral ratings (.29 and .39, vs. .16 and .03), although only with the BR-Staff is the difference between the two correlations statistically significant (\(t = 2.61, p \leq .02\)).
Findings with the Delinquent group are similar to those with the Total group (correlations with RS-MJ are .22 and .41 while with K-MJ they are .06 and -.22) although neither difference is significant. In the Control group, K-MJ predicts better than RS-MJ (correlation of .40 vs. .34) using BR-Boys as the behavioral criterion, while the BR-Staff shows results in the same direction as obtained for Delinquent and Total groups (correlation of .25 vs. .34) although not to as marked a degree. None of the differences in correlations when Delinquent and Control groups were considered separately was statistically significant.

Thus, Hypothesis III received consistent support using BR-Staff as criterion in terms of the directions of correlations although only with the Total group comparison are differences statistically significant. Using BR-Boys as the criterion, less support is obtained. Although in the Delinquent Group RS-MJ predicted better than K-MJ, in the Control group K-MJ resulted in better prediction than RS-MJ. With the groups combined there were no significant differences in correlations obtained, probably because of the reversal in the Control group.

Intercorrelations between the moral judgment and guilt measures and correlations of these with the three behavioral measures are presented in Tables 5 (Total group) and 6 (Delinquent and Control groups separately).

The K-MJ and RS-MJ are the only measures showing statistically significant intercorrelations (.35 in the Total group; .52 in the Control group, p < .01; but only .17 in the Delinquent group). All other measures show low order interrelationships (ranging from -.03 to .19 in
### Table 5

Inter-correlation Matrix and Correlations between the Moral Judgment, Guilt and Behavioral Measures. Delinquent and Non-Delinquent Groups Combined, N = 60

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 K-MJ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 RS-NJ</td>
<td>.35***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 MGS</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 RS-G</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 ASR-DB</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.45***</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 BR-B</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.29*</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 BR-S</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.39***</td>
<td>.41***</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.51***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*An r of .26 is significant at the .05 level.
**An r of .30 is significant at the .02 level.
***An r of .33 is significant at the .01 level.

*K-MJ = Kohlberg Moral Judgment measure
RS-MJ = Relevant Situation Moral Judgment measure
MGS = Mosher Guilt Scale
RS-G = Relevant Situation Guilt
ASR-DB = Arnold Self Report of Delinquent Behavior
BR-Boys = Behavioral Rating by Boys
BR-Staff = Behavioral Rating by Staff

The Total group: -.12 to .26 in the Delinquent group; -.16 to .14 in the Control group. Intercorrelations between the behavioral measures show a moderately high correlation between the behavioral ratings in the Control group (r = .77) but a moderately low one between them in the Delinquent group (r = .27); they show about the same level of relationship both groups between the self report behavioral measure and Staff behavioral ratings (Total r = -.18) and Boy behavioral ratings (Total r = -.04). Staff behavioral ratings correlate higher with ASR-DB than Boys (Delinquents, .18 vs. .04; Controls, .19 vs. .06). These findings suggest that the measures have a moderate degree of communality yet are not measuring the same thing.
### TABLE 6

Intercorrelation Matrix and Correlations between the Moral Judgment, Guilt and Behavioral Measures. Delinquent and Non-Delinquent Groups Separate, N=30 for Each Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 K-MJ</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 RS-MJ</td>
<td>.52***</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.36**</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.41**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 MGS</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.33*</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 RS-G</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.41**</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 ASR-DB</td>
<td>-.29</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 BR-Boys</td>
<td>.40**</td>
<td>.34*</td>
<td>.32*</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 BR-Staff</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.34*</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>.33*</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.77**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*An r of .31 is significant at the .10 level.  
**An r of .36 is significant at the .05 level.  
***An r of .46 is significant at the .01 level.

Correlations for the Delinquent Group are above the diagonal; Correlations for the Control Group are below the diagonal.

bK-MJ = Kohlberg Moral Judgment measure  
RS-MJ = Relevant Situation Moral Judgment measure  
MGS = Mosher Guilt Scale  
RS-G = Relevant Situation Guilt  
ASR-DB = Arnold Self Report of Delinquent Behavior  
BR-Boys = Behavioral Rating by Boys  
BR-Staff = Behavioral Rating by Staff

The level of correlations of the moral judgment and guilt measures with the behavioral measures varies with the particular measures compared and the groups considered. The self report behavioral measure (ASR-DB) shows a significant relationship only with the MGS independent variable (r = .45), when groups are combined. However, in the Delinquent group, RS-MJ and RS-G correlate .36 and .41 respectively (p < .01) and MGS correlates .33 (p < .05). Only the K-MJ measure is insignificant (r = .04). Correlations in the Control group with the same variables
range from \(-0.29\) to \(+0.29\) but no relationships are statistically significant. Thus, it is largely in the Delinquent group that the independent variables predict to self reports of delinquent behavior.

In contrast, it is in the Control group that the highest relationships exist between the independent variables and the second dependent variable, the behavioral rating by Boys. Correlations of \(0.40\) (\(p < 0.01\)) and \(0.34\) and \(0.32\) (\(p < 0.05\)) are obtained with K-MJ, RS-MJ and MGS respectively. No significant correlations were obtained in the Delinquent group and only RS-MJ was significant with both groups combined \((r = 0.29, p < 0.05)\).

As was suggested previously, the BR-Staff measure more consistently showed statistically significant relationships with the moral judgment and guilt measures, although this is largely due to the findings with the Control group rather than the Delinquent group. Only correlations with RS-MJ were significant in both groups considered separately \((r = 0.41\) in the Delinquent, and \(0.34\) in the Control group). Correlations with MGS and RSG were significant in the Control group \((r = 0.43\) and \(0.33\)) and in the groups combined \((r = 0.41\) and \(0.30\)). Only K-MJ consistently showed no relationship with the Staff behavioral ratings.

On the whole, the findings with regard to the variables used in the study suggested their predictive utility. The RS-MJ and MGS measures seem to be the best over-all measures of moral judgment and guilt.
The somewhat inconsistent results obtained with regard to the three hypotheses tested in the present study suggest caution is in order when making generalizations from these findings. In drawing conclusions, it is important to specify on which population and with which measures do the specified relationships occur.

With regard to group differences, the finding that the Delinquent and Non-Delinquent groups did not differ on the moral judgment measures is somewhat surprising. These results are inconsistent with Kohlberg's findings (1958) on a small sample (N=12) of delinquents. In the present study not only were group differences non-significant but the trend was for Delinquents to show a higher rather than lower level of moral judgment on the K-MJ measure as compared with the Non-Delinquents. On the RS-MJ measure the trend was for Non-Delinquents to show a higher level of moral judgments than the Delinquents.

These findings need cross-validation, but if they are replicated, they lend support to an alternative theoretical conceptualization regarding the structure of conscience development in delinquents. Conceptualizations of character structure of the "psychopath" (e.g. Cleckey, 1964) often emphasize that it is not the judgment process, at least as measured by psychometric tests, which shows impaired functioning. Clinical studies also indicate delinquents verbally can
distinguish between right and wrong (Aichorn, 1935; Redl and Wineman, 1951). Rather it is in the emotional area where distinct differences between "psychopaths" and "normals" occur, reflected in shallow emotional relationships in general and the inability to experience guilt in particular (Cleckey, 1964; Johnson, 1949; Redl and Wineman, 1951). The findings with regard to differences in self-reported guilt, as measured by MGS, provide concurrent support for this point of view. Findings in the present study are consistent with findings by others (e.g., Bandura and Walters, 1959; McCord and McCord, 1960) that delinquents score lower on measures of guilt than non-delinquents.

However, the RS-G measure of guilt did not show similar group differences. The RS-G measure consisted of scoring Relevant Situation story completions for expressions of guilt. As such, it is more of a method of assessment than an instrument per se. Although the RS-G did show significant relationships with the ASR and Staff-ER criterion measures, indicating that the measure has some predictive utility, probably it is not sufficiently sensitive a measure to differentiate between groups at a statistically significant level. Other studies (e.g., Allinsmith, 1960; MacKinnon, 1938) have found guilt measured by this method to be related to behavioral manifestations of conscience. Bandura and Walters (1959) with samples of aggressive and non-aggressive boys roughly comparable to the groups assessed in the present study, obtained statistically significant group differences in expression of guilt in TAT stories. It may be the TAT is a more sensitive instrument for assessing guilt and thus is better able to discriminate between groups.
The finding that the Delinquent group reports performing significantly more delinquent acts as compared with the Control group provides evidence for the validity of the ASR-DB measure. However, one must consider the possible meanings of this finding. It may be the groups differ in the willingness to report delinquent acts rather than differ in the number and severity of acts actually committed. In either event, the Control group subjects significantly more often give responses reflecting an awareness of what is socially accepted. As Loevinger (1965) states in her article on ego development, "the tendency to describe oneself in socially desirable terms is a conspicuous aspect of the conformist stage of ego development" (1964, p. 197). As she points out, the dimensions stressed by Kohlberg as dimensions of conscience development are components of ego development. Thus, whether or not subjects' responses to the ASR-DB measure reflect their "true behavior," they do reflect an attitude which is relevant to a certain stage of conscience development. Thus, the finding of group differences in self reports of delinquent behavior is meaningful and, like the findings with regard to guilt, suggest differences in conscience development between delinquents and non-delinquent adolescents.

The findings with respect to the second hypothesis suggest that it was conceptualized too simply. Although with all three criterion behavioral measures most predictor pairs were more effective than single predictors, in two instances the best single predictor for all practical purposes was as good as the best predictor pair. Furthermore, results obtained suggest that it was not necessarily considering both
a moral judgment and a guilt variable which enhanced prediction, but rather it was using the two best measures—whether they were of moral judgment or of guilt.

These findings suggest that it is the psychometric value of the instrument per se which is most important. The instruments with which statistically significant relationships between the variables studied were most consistently obtained were psychometrically more sophisticated than the remaining measures. As suggested by their description in the Methods section (Chapter III), the ASR-DB and MGS are the most psychometrically refined instruments. and they performed consistently well in the present study. The RS-MJ measure was constructed to tap the same behaviors as were evaluated in the behavioral ratings. Results indicate that this methodological concern was fruitful. This instrument predicted moral behavior as well as the MGS measure on the Staff behavioral ratings and better than the MGS on the Boys behavioral ratings.

The Staff ratings generally showed higher relationships with moral judgment and guilt measures than did the Boy ratings. It may be that the adult raters were more self consistent in their ratings than the boy raters and thus their ratings were more reliable. The BR-Staff measure showed enough promise to work on its refinement. One future methodological improvement (which has not been done in previous studies using this technique) might be to obtain ratings in a way in which assessments of reliability could be made.

Results regarding the relative predictive value of the various measures used in the present study are felt to be one of the most
important findings of the study. Previous investigators have had difficulty in developing measures of conscience which could predict moral behavior with any degree of accuracy. Although the amount of variance accounted for still remains too low for individual prediction, the level of relationships obtained between the best measures of moral judgment, guilt, and behavior in the present study exceed those of most previous investigations. For example, correlations with these measures are in the high .40's and low .50's, compared with Porteus and Johnson's finding (1965) of no significant relationships between moral judgment, guilt and behavior, and Hartshorne and May's (1930) results showing correlations in the middle .30's-.40's between tests of moral knowledge and assessments of moral behavior.

The effectiveness of the measures differed somewhat with the population used. Some measures worked best in the Delinquent group while others worked best in the Control group. Kohlberg's findings of moderate-level correlations between his measure and behavioral ratings by adults were established on a sample comparable to that of the Control group in this study. In the Control group, the K-MJ measure showed moderate level correlations with the Staff Behavioral rating. However, in the Delinquent group, the RS-MJ measure predicted better than the K-MJ measure. The differences in the magnitude of relationships between the measures of moral judgment, guilt and behavior in the two groups suggest that refinement of measures and cross validation of findings is necessary before definitive statements about delinquency and conscience can be made.
The present study has shown that phenomena defined under the constructs of moral judgment and guilt can be measured with sufficient adequacy to show statistically significant relationships with moral behavior. The establishment of these relationships lends further support to the view of conscience defined as a personality variable rather than as situationally determined. However, the magnitude of these relationships indicates that only a small portion of the variance was explained. Measurement error probably accounts for part of the problem. However, also it may be that the only moderate level relationships reflect genuine behavioral variability in the group studied.

Conceptualizations of the adolescent stage of development emphasize variability in thinking, feeling, and behaving as an important characteristic of this stage (e.g., Blois, 1963). Since subjects in both the Delinquent and Control groups characteristically tended to show a relatively low level of moral judgments (only 21 percent score at the principled conformity level, 30 percent score at the approval-oriented conformity level) then considerable variability would be expected as moral concepts do not consistently predominate in guiding their actions. These findings are consistent with the thinking of Freud and Piaget with regard to situational variability at the earlier stages of conscience development.

Further research investigating the same variables on different populations needs to be done, to establish the contribution of population variability to the size of relationships obtained between
aspects of conscience development. An important direction for such research would be toward establishing norms for various age groups on the consistency between the various aspects of conscience development. Such data would be useful in identifying and evaluating deviations from normative functioning, e.g., in predicting delinquency proneness in pre-adolescents and adolescents.
CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY

The present study investigated the interrelationship between moral judgment, guilt, and moral behavior in a sample of 30 delinquents and 30 controls. Delinquents were average intelligence, lower socio-economic class adolescents ages 15-17, incarcerated in treatment institutions for common delinquent offenses. Controls were comparable in social class and intellectual level to the delinquent group and were long-time Boys Club members.

Differences in the expression of guilt and performance of delinquent acts but not in the level of moral judgment were obtained between the two groups, lending limited support to the hypothesis of group differences on these variables. Moral judgment and guilt considered together rather than singly sometimes but not always enhanced prediction of moral behavior. Thus the hypothesis regarding an increase in prediction using pairs of moral judgment and guilt predictors also received limited support. Findings depended both on the measures used and, to a lesser extent, on the group studied. The hypothesis that a measure assessing situations relevant to those assessed in the ratings of moral behavior would predict better than a measure not considering such situational factors was confirmed in the case of ratings by Staff but not by Boys.

It was concluded that the study provided evidence for the theoretically posited interrelationship among cognitive, emotional and
behavioral aspects of conscience as well as suggested the predictive utility of some of the measures used. Further refinement of methods of measurement, as well as theoretical conceptualizations, is needed in order to specify more accurately the structure and functioning of various aspects of conscience development in different populations.
APPENDIX I

MORAL JUDGMENT SCORING CRITERIA
Description of Moral Judgment Levels

Level I - Premoral Level

No real differentiation of moral values and conformities from self-serving and conventional conformities. Value resides in need-relevant happenings rather than in persons or rules. No sense of an ideal self, of a self conforming to standards or guiding action. Self-esteem is not based on conforming to others or to standards.

Type 0 - Heteronomous Type

1. Value. Value is "Syntelic" and "Projective." Both acts and consequences have a quasi-intrinsic, quasi-physical badness which is not reducible to needs, intentions, rules, etc. "Good" and "bad" are not judgments of merit but events appended to the self. A person is "morally bad" because undesirable, painful (bad) labels and sanctions are inflicted on him. The worse person is the one who has performed the act for which he will more likely be caught and sent to jail. A person's value tends to be perceived in terms of what he can do (power) and what he has (possessions) regardless of the value of these attributes to others.

2. Choice. Decisions are efforts to predict the external order. Believes the interviewer has the right answer without seeing him as possessing any special wisdom. See nothing wrong with being bribed to change their minds. Suggestible. Makes up facts as to the power of authority, and the likelihood of sanctions.

3. Sanction. The major sanction is avoidance of external punishment. The conforming part of the self acts only as a predictor of punishment, not as a judge. Punishment involves both hedonic and projective value, so that being punished means becoming a bad person. That which is "internalised" or identified with the self is the willingness to accept or believe in the superior power of other persons. It is not the wish to realize the will or aims of such persons.

4. Standard. Orientation to the avoidance of bad events, of bad acts and bad consequences. The badness of these events is not seen as established by rule, e.g. "a good rule is, 'Don't do bad things.'" Persons in authority, not rules, are obeyed. There is nothing abstractable from events to which persons are oriented in acting and evaluating. Unity of evaluation or decision is based only on everyone anticipating the action of the police as defining the value of the act. The police are not seen as part of a system to maintain some general state of affairs, e.g. social order and welfare, but as punishing bad acts and persons.

"Duty" is what one has to do because of external force or to avoid a bad consequence, rather than corresponding to some real or ideal person's expectation or claim.
6. **Authority.** A basically egalitarian attitude to others. "Respect" is a function of instrumental use for the other's function for the self. Expect people to dislike authorities who impose punishment or restrictions on one. All people are seen as having the same basic selves or needs. Differential role behavior is simply a function of habit and different self interests.

7. **Content.** Least advocates conforming to the social authority and rules of any of the types. The only "virtue" or "rules" strongly held or "internalized" aside from being smart is that of exchange of services and of vengeance, and distributive equality.

**Level II - Generalized Conformity Level**

Value resides in good and bad roles, in maintaining the conventional order and the expectancies of others. Self esteem based on general conformity to the external social order.

1. **Value.** Value is based on positive personal feeling for and empathy with persons. Rewards and punishments are not simply things of value to be instrumentally sought or avoided, but are expressions of positive or negative attitudes in others. Persons are recognized as having a different kind of value than things, based on a somewhat particularistic empathy with them and the concern of others for them. On a much higher level than Type 0, evaluation is "syntelic" in that there is an assumption that the evaluation of others are based on a common empathic evaluation of the situation and a common appreciation of virtue.

2. **Choice.** There is a need to be good or nice in all ways. Considerable indecision in conflict situation due to desire to conform to all labels and the natural wishes of all the others in the situation. Efforts to compromise of a naive sort. Responsive to adult and group pressure as long as it has some show of thought to it. Sees self as basically good, but not as a judge of right and wrong, nor as attempting to get others to do right or accept his judgment. Distorts or makes up facts to indicate the goodness of authority and rules.

3. **Sanction.** Seeks approval and thinks that it is good and virtuous to seek approval and status. Approval is a mixture of personal and objective factors. Disapproving reactions are seen as "hurting" the parent because of parents' liking for the child, and they hurt the child because of his liking for the parent. At the same time they are seen as oriented to a general perception of the good in a situation. Little concept of completely objective or ideal evaluation and approval. Believes in sacrificing hedonic interests to be good and to gain approval, but usually equates maximizing the self's long range interests with conforming.
4. **Standard.** Oriented to good-role stereotypes. These are both what most people in the role do or want to do, and what they should do. Action is evaluated as expressing desirable dispositions of a self or role, e.g. good motives or abilities, even though the individual act itself falls under a bad label, violates a rule, or has bad preventable consequences.

6. **Authority.** Conformity to authorities is based on do-gooding personal attributes ascribed to them, e.g. their desire to be helpful, and their superior abilities or knowledge as to the self’s welfare. Respect is awarded for helping other people even if the self is not helped, and for past help as well as anticipation of future help. Status roles are seen as awarded to occupants on the basis of an evaluation of their general personal merit.

7. **Content.** Being good is basically liking, helping, pleasing and thinking of the welfare of other people or of the role partner. In some upper middle class "other-directed" children, the content is ability to "get along with other people." These children are more peer and competitive achievement oriented but virtue is still identified with approval and generalized conformity to the wishes of others.

**Type 3**

1. **Value.** A clear differentiation of "right and wrong" from other modes of value. A sense that some conformities and values are "important" and others are not. An orientation to actual harmful consequences, and avoiding causing harm. Some association of virtue with effort, deprivation and pain. A separation of the right from the aims and tendencies of the natural self.

2. **Choice.** Rather rigid and definite in choice. Verbally tend to stick to the rules "regardless." Not legalistic however, and a situation can be set up where a demand for conformity to the rule and authority is carried too far in terms of bad consequences.

3. **Sanction.** Considerable reliance on punishment to define and maintain right action in others and in the self, but as symbolic of the firmness of authority, not as hedonistic deterrent. While guilt is involved, it is an auxiliary rather than substitute for punishment. Primarily negatively oriented to avoiding blame or wrong rather than to winning approval. Punishment represents the social order and may be used as indicating the degree of wrongness of act.

4. **Standard.** An orientation to maintain the existing moral order as they have understood and accepted it. Oriented to right and wrong as a unity, rather than being oriented to avoiding particular bad acts as in Type 0. Right corresponds to fixed and unitary claims of the general order which any individual may claim or represent.
A concept of duty, i.e. of a definite set of consequences or tasks for which the self has been assigned responsibility. While obligation is oriented to right and wrong, its focus is more in terms of role than in terms of a set of general rules. Duties correspond to definite claims which other individuals can make. These claims are based on a generally accepted social order and rules. Rules are seen as a system for guiding righteous behavior. The claims of others are not that their welfare be considered, but are fixed expectations which they have earned or are entitled to.

6. Authority. Authorities are seen as having a legitimate claim to be respected. Respect is due to an authority because he represents and maintains the social order. It is also due because authorities themselves conform to this order and must work hard and deprive themselves to be authorities.

7. Content. Some emphasis on work, task, discipline, control, for its own sake. Highest concern for property of any of our types, but no confusion of physical value with human and moral values as such.

Level III - Autonomous Level

Value resides in the conformity of the self to some shared or shareable standards of judgment. Duties are defined by general rights of others.

Type 4 - Democratic Legalists

1. Value. Value is seen as defined by a social perspective. Relativism of value means more than judgment being dependent on interest (Type 1). It means varying group or role-perspectives or shareable lines of thought which a given individual may take toward an issue. A strong emphasis on majority opinion or agreed upon rule as the ultimate perspective. A set to community utility and to a logic of maximizing results or minimizing cost.

2. Choice. A tendency to clearly separate actions which can be subsumed under agreed-upon clear rules and those which are seen as matters of individual preferences or motives. Resolution of conflicts with no agreed-upon solution tends to be on prudential situational grounds. No real hierarchy of personal loyalties, but a sense of some loyalty as required in any personal relation.

3. Sanction. A considerable preoccupation with community or group reputation and peer approval. Parents, peers, outside authorities are all seen as basing their evaluation in terms of the evaluations of others. Some tendency to see moral conformity in terms simply of a necessary framework of rules which are accepted and within which one maneuvers to gain status. "Guilt" is irrelevant good boy talk.
4. **Standard.** Duty or role obligation is defined in terms of a set of agreed upon defining rules, i.e. a code which need not have the sacredness of "right." Law itself is oriented to as the ultimate judgment of right, though its evaluative impact is limited by other considerations felt in earlier types. Some separation of the value of consensus and stability from the actual value of the concrete rule and some sense of necessary arbitrariness to rules. However, there is a general set to law as for the majority welfare, and a consideration of social utility.

Duty is also defined contractually and in terms of the violation of the will of individual others. There is some sense of general unearned rights which limit the rights and duties of any given status.

The self-image conformed to tends to be that of an intelligent or reasonable person without much distinction between prudential intelligence and achievement on one hand and moral rightness on the other. The goal is that defined as appropriate by the group and is taken for granted rather than being expressed or displayed as "being good." The self is differentiated from others by rational achievement or intelligent means in reaching those goals.

6. **Authority.** Roles are seen as freely chosen by the occupant, and the occupant as selected from a field of competing applicants in terms of ability. A role personality and its value is defined less by the role-activities and more by how it got there. Admiration is accorded to others for superior abilities indicated by status and reputation, and involves a shade of envy. A respect for the judgment of the "expert" within his sphere of competence. This "field" is a delimited science or art, not a general virtue and wisdom about life or about the right as in Type 2.

7. **Content.** A stress on maintaining contract and "reasonable" expectations of others. Stress on getting along with others. Sense of not imposing on the will of another.

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**Type 5 - Conscience or Principle Orientation**

1. **Value.** Moral value is to a large extent objective, ideal and public. Thus the value of a given human life is independent of the actual functional value of the individual or of the self's particular relation to him. It is based on the fact that everyone ought to give an absolute moral value or respect to an individual human life. Action ought to be based on a correct appreciation of the values in the given situation, rather than on habitual good motives. There is an expectation that everyone in a situation ought to be oriented to the common value situation in making any claim. A claim on an actor is not completely legitimate or binding. A logic more of inclusiveness and consistency of valuing than of economy and efficiency of valuing (Type 4).
2. **Choice.** Thoughtful but consistent in choice. "Takes a position."

3. **Sanction.** Invocation of guilt or self-judgment for actions which violate belief, even if they would involve no external disapproval or punishment. Concern about the respect of others rather than their approval. Such respect implies an objective evaluation by the partner in some moral transaction. It implies living up to the partner's trust in the self's worthiness.

4. **Standard.** Some orientation to principle. A principle is a rule of choice and judgment, with some appeal to logical generality and consistency for its support. It is not an actual socially agreed upon and enforced rule. In general, a responsibility for the value consequences in a situation beyond rule and delegated task. The limits of responsibility are not simply given but are set in terms only of more primary responsibilities in the situation, or by the limits which must be put on human beings in general. Some sense of a higher law than human law. Conformity to law and majority will are generally right or best but they do not in themselves make an individual act right regardless of all else. Moral right is differentiated from legal right.

6. **Authority.** Authority is no longer equated with formal authority roles but with elements potentially belonging to any human. A belief that the right judgment in a given case may be embodied in anyone. A sense of obligation to those who respect the self.

7. **Content.** Concern for public welfare. Some sense of personal task. Concern about avoiding deception, and maintaining personal trust.
APPENDIX II
KOHLBERG MORAL JUDGMENT STORIES

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Moral Judgment Situations (Probing questions included)

Situation III:

In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1,000 which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.

1. Should Heinz have done that? Was it actually wrong or right? Why?

2. Is it a husband's duty to steal the drug for his wife if he can get it no other way? Would a good husband do it?

3. Did the druggist have the right to charge that much when there was no law actually setting a limit to the price? Why?

4. If the husband does not feel very close or affectionate to his wife, should he still steal the drug?

5. Suppose it wasn't Heinz's wife who was dying of cancer but it was Heinz's best friend. His friend didn't have any money and there was no one in his family willing to steal the drug. Should Heinz steal the drug for his friend in that case? Why?

(Questions 4 - 5 asked only if S thought Heinz should steal the drug.)

6. Would you steal the drug to save your wife's life?

7. If you were dying of cancer but were strong enough, would you steal the drug to save your own life?

(Questions 6 - 7 asked only if S thought Heinz should not steal the drug.)

8. Can something be wrong that most people would do? Why?

9. Heinz broke in the store and stole the drug and gave it to his wife. He was caught and brought before the judge. Should the judge send Heinz to jail for stealing, or should he let him go free? Why?
10. Would the judge think Heinz was wrong to steal it? Should the judge's decision be largely based on whether he thinks it is wrong? Why?

11. The druggist had a change of heart and came to the judge and asked him to let Heinz go free. Should the judge follow the request of the man Heinz had stolen from? Why?

Situation V:

In Korea, a company of marines was way outnumbered and was retreating before the enemy. The company had crossed a bridge over a river, but the enemy were mostly still on the other side. If someone went back to the bridge and blew it up as the enemy were coming over it, it would weaken the enemy. With the head start the rest of the men in the company would have, they could probably then escape. But the man who stayed back to blow up the bridge would probably not be able to escape alive; there would be about a 4 to 1 chance he would be killed. The captain of the company has to decide who should go back and do the job. The captain himself is the man who knows best how to lead the retreat. He asks for volunteers, but no one will volunteer. If he goes himself, the men will probably not get back safely as he is the only one who knows how to lead the retreat.

1. Should the captain order a man to go on this very dangerous mission or should he go himself? Why?

2. Does the captain have the right to order a man if he thinks it best to? Why?

3. Which would be best for the survival of all the men ordering a man or the captain going himself?

4. If it were absolutely certain that many more lives would be lost if he went himself and were killed should he order another man to go against his will?

(Questions 3 - 4 asked only if S says not to order the man.)

Situation VI:

The captain finally decided to order one of the men to stay behind. One of the men he thought of was one who had a lot of strength and courage but he was a bad troublemaker. He was always stealing things from the other men, beating them up, and wouldn't do his work. The second man he thought of had gotten a bad disease in Korea and was likely to die in a short time anyway, though he was strong enough to do the job.
1. Should the captain send the troublemaker or the sick man? Why?

2. Who would it be fairer to send?

3. Would it be fair to send the troublemaker as a punishment?

Situation VII:

Two brothers had gotten into serious trouble. They were secretly leaving town in a hurry and needed money. Alex, the older one, broke into a store and stole $500. Joe, the younger one, went to a retired old man who was known to help people in town. Joe told the man that he was very sick and he needed $500 to pay for the operation. Really he wasn't sick at all, and he had no intention of paying the man back. Although the man didn't know Joe very well, he loaned him the money. So Joe and Alex skipped town, each with $500.

1. If you had to say who did worse, would you say Al did worse to break in the store and steal the $500 or Joe did worse to borrow the $500 with no intention of paying it back? Why?

2. Would you feel like a worse person stealing like Al or cheating like Joe?

3. Why shouldn't someone steal from a store anyhow?

4. Who would feel worse, the storeowner who was robbed or the man who was cheated out of the loan? Why?

Situation VIII:

While all this was happening, Heinz was in jail for breaking in and trying to steal the medicine. He had been sentenced for ten years. But after a couple of years, he escaped from the prison and went to live in another part of the country under a new name. He saved money and slowly built up a big factory. He gave his workers the highest wages and used most of his profits to build a hospital for work in curing cancer. Twenty years had passed when a tailor recognized the factory owner as being Heinz, the escaped convict whom the police had been looking for back in his home town.

1. Should the tailor report Heinz to the police? Would it be right or wrong to keep it quiet? Why?

2. Is it a citizen's duty to report Heinz? Would a good citizen?
3. If Heinz was a good friend of the tailor, would that make a difference? Why?

4. Should Heinz be sent back to jail by the judge? Why?

Situation IX:

During the war in Europe, a city was often bombed by the enemy. So each man in the city was given a post he was to go to right after the bombing to help put out the fires the bombs started and to rescue people in the burning buildings. A man named Diesing was made the chief in charge of one fire engine post. The post was near where he worked so he could get there quickly during the day, but it was a long way from his home. One day there was a very heavy bombing and Diesing left the shelter in the place he worked and went toward the fire station. But when he saw how much of the city was burning he got worried about his family. So he decided he had to go home first to see if his family was safe, even though his family was a long way off and the station was nearby and there was somebody assigned to protect his family's area.

1. Was it right or wrong for Diesing to leave his station to protect his family? Why?

2. Suppose Diesing was just a volunteer and wasn't paid. Would that make a difference? Why?

3. Suppose it was against the law to leave one's post and only a few men besides Diesing did it. Should Diesing be punished? Why?
APPENDIX III

RELEVANT SITUATION MORAL JUDGMENT STORIES
Relevant Situation Stories (probing questions included)

A. Larry wanted to use Ray's transistor radio so Ray lent it to him. It was an old radio but Ray liked it very much and listened to it a lot. When Larry was using Ray's radio, he accidently dropped it. He heard something break inside and the radio stopped playing. He tried to fix it but he couldn't.

1. What should he do? Would he be right or wrong not to say anything to Ray? Why?

If right
2. What if Ray were bigger than him would that make a difference? Why?

3. What if Ray acted like he didn't like Larry anymore after that, would that make a difference? Why?

If wrong
5. What if he didn't like Ray, would that make a difference?

6. What if Ray never returned things to him in good condition?

7. What if Ray told Larry that he could forget about repaying him for the radio, should Larry do it? Why?

8. What would you do?

9. If you had to give a reason why you should return something in the same condition as you borrowed it, what would it be?
B. Jack came up to Bob and said "Bob, I've got something to tell you if you promise you won't tell anyone about it." Bob said he wouldn't. Jack showed him a six-pack of beer he'd managed to smuggle into the cottage (club). Jack said he was going to hide the beer so none of the other boys would find out about it and he and Bob could have some later. After Jack left, Bob got to thinking about the beer and wondered if he should tell the cottage leader (staff member) about the beer, since it was against the rules to have beer in the cottage (club). Then he thought about his promise to Jack. Jack was a good friend and had always treated him right.

1. What should he do? Would it be right or wrong for him not to tell? Why?

If right
2. What if Bob didn't like beer, would that make a difference?

3. What if he hadn't promised Bob he wouldn't tell, then should he?

4. What if Bob and Jack weren't very good friends, then should he tell? Why?

If wrong
5. What if the cottage parents had no way of finding out Bob knew about the beer unless he told them, then should he tell? Why?

6. What would you do? Why?

7. If you were to give a reason as to why a promise should be kept, what would it be?
C. Bob decided not to say anything to the cottage parents (staff member). But one of them found the beer which Jack had hidden. The cottage parents called in each boy one at a time and asked whether he knew anything about the beer. Bob was worried and wondered what he should say, if he should tell about Jack when the cottage parents asked him. He remembered his promise to Jack but he also worried about telling the cottage parents he didn't know anything about the beer.

1. What should he do? Would he be right or wrong to say he didn't know anything about the beer? Why?

   Not tell

2. What if there was no chance he'd get in trouble with Jack and the other boys if he told, then should he? Why?

3. What if he and Tom were not very good friends, would that make a difference?

   Tell

4. What if there was no chance that he would get in trouble if he didn't tell on Jack, then should Bob still tell?

5. What if Jack is Bob's best friend, would that make a difference?

6. What would you do?

All answer

7. If the cottage parents (staff members found out that it was Jack's beer and Bob hadn't told them it was, should Bob be punished? Why?
D. Jack decided not to tell the cottage parents (staff member) that it was Jack's beer. One of the things he thought of doing instead was to tell them that he saw Leroy with the beer. Leroy was a boy he didn't like because Leroy was always causing trouble. He lied about the other boys and started fights.

1. Should he say that it was Leroy's beer. Would he be right or wrong to do this? Why?

If wrong
2. What if the cottage parents (staff member) had no way of finding out Bob was lying, then would it be all right? Why?

3. What if most of the other boys didn't like Leroy either and would probably be pleased with Bob if he got Leroy in trouble, would that make a difference? Why?

4. What if Leroy had once blamed Bob for something he hadn't done, then would it be all right? Why?

All answer
5. What would you do? Why?

6. If you were to give a reason why a person shouldn't blame someone for something they didn't do, what would it be?

7. If the cottage parents (staff member) found out that Leroy hadn't done it as Bob said, should Bob be punished? How?
1. What should he do? Would he be right or wrong to not say it was his? Why?

If right
2. What if the cottage parents (staff member) accused someone else, who hadn't taken the beer, then should he tell? Why?

3. What if the cottage parents (staff member) said he was going to take away the group's evening privileges (next outing) if they didn't say whose beer it was, then should Bob say something?

If wrong
4. If there was no chance that the cottage parents would find out it was his beer unless he told them, should he still tell? Why?

All answer
5. What would you do?

6. If you were to give a reason why a person is not supposed to lie, what would it be?

7. If the cottage parents found out that it was Jack's beer and he had told them he didn't know anything about it, should Jack be punished? How?
F. Greg was playing cards with three other boys. He had been playing a long time and he hadn't been winning much at all. He began to wonder what was going on because only one boy, Fred, was winning. He began to wonder if Fred was cheating, because he knew he did that sometimes. He watched him carefully but couldn't tell for sure, except Fred kept on winning most of the time. Greg kept getting more and more disgusted so finally he thought that maybe he would stack the deck so he would have a chance. He was an expert at stacking the deck so he knew he could do it without the other boys knowing. The other boys were beginning to make fun of him and call him a lousy card player.

1. What should he do? Would he be right or wrong to stack the deck? Why?

**If right**

@. What if the boys he was playing with were all good friends of his, would that make a difference?

**If wrong**

3. What if he knew for sure that the other boy was cheating, then would it be all right for him?

4. What if he knew the other boys wouldn't make any trouble for him if they found out he was cheating, would that make a difference?

**All answer**

5. What would you do?

6. If you were to give a reason why a person shouldn't stack the deck what would it be?
G. Joe borrowed a dollar from Jim and told him he would pay him back as soon as he got some money. Joe got some money a few days later. When he saw Jim, Jim didn't ask him for the money.

1. What should Joe do? Would he be right or wrong not to give Jim the dollar since he didn't ask for it? Why?

If right

2. What if Jim was a good friend, would that make a difference? Why?

If wrong

3. What if Jim often didn't pay him back, would that make a difference? Why? Should it?

4. What if he didn't like Jim, would that make a difference? Why? Should it?

All answer

5. What would you do?

6. What reason would you give if you had to give a reason why people should repay money they borrow?
Two cottages were playing baseball. Before they started playing they decided they wanted to change the rules of the game and play that there were only two strikes instead of three and two outs instead of three. They wanted to play this way to speed up the game. They took an informal vote on it and the majority agreed to the change in rules. It was the last inning and two men were on base and Ron was at bat. Ron was really anxious to get a hit because of the two men on base and because his team was losing 5-4. He already had one strike. On the next pitch, he let the ball go by because he thought it was too low and he had trouble hitting low balls. The umpire called a strike and called him out. The other team said they had won the game. But Fred began to get angry. He hadn't wanted to play the game by these new rules anyway, because that just wasn't how baseball was played. He told the umpire that he had another strike coming to him. Some of the other boys on his team began to say "Yeah, that's right, three strikes, not two."

1. Was Fred right or wrong to argue with the umpire over the change in the rules? Why?

If wrong
2. What if most of the boys on his team kept telling him he wasn't out, would that make a difference?

3. What if the umpire agreed with him, then would he be right?

All answer
3. What would you do?

4. What reason would you give if you had to say why one shouldn't argue about the rules when playing a game?
I. The argument over the game got to be a big one and the pitcher, catcher, and basemen came over to present their side to the umpire as the other team already had a bunch of players there. The umpire hadn't called time out and the runners on base came in home and claimed they'd scored and won the game, because no one was on base to tag them out.

1. Was it right or wrong for them to come in? Why?

If wrong

1. If it was very important for the team to win then was it all right for them to do it?

2. If the other team had not stuck to the rules, then would it be?

If right

3. If the other team always stuck to the rules, would that make a difference?

All answer

4. What would you do?

5. Can you think of a reason why the team shouldn't have come in?
J. Rich and Jim liked to listen to records a lot. They didn't have as much money as most of the other boys and often couldn't buy the records they wanted. Rich went to a record store and took the albums he had been wanting when no one was around to see him. Jim went to Mike, a boy he knew who had a large record collection. He asked Mike if he could borrow the albums he wanted while Mike was away at camp. Mike said "okay." Mike was going to be gone a week and Jim was being released (moving) in three days, although Mike didn't know this. Jim planned to keep Mike's records as Mike had no way of getting them back from him.

1. If you were to say who did the worst, Rich who took the records from the record store, or Jim who borrowed them from Mike with no intention of giving them back, which one would you say? Why?

2. Which would you have felt worse about, doing what Rich did or what Jim did? Why?

3. If you were to give a reason why one shouldn't take records from other boys with no intention of returning them, what would it be?

4. Who do you think felt the worst, the record store owner or Mike?
APPENDIX IV

SCORING MANUAL FOR RELEVANT SITUATION GUILT
**SCORING MANUAL FOR RELEVANT SITUATION GUILT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description of Responses in Total Protocol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>No expressions of concern for either avoiding punishment or trouble; no expressions of guilt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Expressions of anxiety, such as concern with avoiding punishment or trouble. For example, expressions of avoiding getting &quot;Mad,&quot; &quot;Beat-up,&quot; or &quot;Locked-up&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Expressions of concern about others getting into trouble and this in turn getting oneself in trouble or Direct expressions of &quot;feeling scared&quot; or &quot;feeling mad&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Indirect expressions of guilt, which are not spontaneously given but rather are in response to a question which pulls for such a response. For example: (?) It'd be on his conscience&quot; &quot;He wouldn't want to get his friend in trouble&quot; or Any response which indicates a spontaneous concern for maintaining a relationship, avoiding the censure or others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Any direct expression of guilt affect. For example, &quot;He'd feel bad about doing that&quot; or Expression of concern about violating some personal moral standard. For example, &quot;I'm not the kind of person who would do a thing like that&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX V

MOSHER GUILT SCALE
Mosher F-C Inventory

This questionnaire consists of a number of pairs of statements or opinions which have been given by college men in response to the "Mosher Incomplete Sentences Test": These men were asked to complete phrases such as "When I tell a lie..." and "To kill in war..." to make a sentence which expressed their real feelings about the stem. This questionnaire consists of the stems to which they responded and a pair of their responses which are lettered A and B.

You are to read the stem and the pair of completions and decide which you most agree with or which is most characteristic of you. Your choice, in each instance, should be in terms of what you believe, how you feel, or how you would react, and not in terms of how you think you should believe, feel, or respond. This is not a test. There are no right or wrong answers. Your choices should be a description of your own personal beliefs, feelings, or reactions.

In some instances you may discover that you believe both completions or neither completion to be characteristic of you. In such cases select the one you more strongly believe to be the case as far as you are concerned. Be sure to find an answer for every choice. Do not omit an item even though it is very difficult for you to decide, just select the more characteristic member of the pair.

Your answers are to be recorded on a separate answer sheet. If alternative A is more characteristic of you for a particular item blacken the space in the column under 1. If alternative B is more characteristic of you for a particular item blacken the space under the column headed 2.
1. When I tell a lie...
   A. it hurts.
   B. I make it a good one.

2. To kill in war...
   A. is a job to be done.
   B. is a shame but sometimes a necessity.

3. Women who curse...
   A. are normal.
   B. make me sick.

4. When anger builds inside me...
   A. I usually explode.
   B. I keep my mouth shut.

5. If I killed someone in self-defense, I...
   A. would feel no anguish.
   B. think it would trouble me the rest of my life.

6. I punish myself...
   A. for the evil I do.
   B. very seldom for other people do it for me.

7. "Dirty" jokes in mixed company...
   A. are common in our town.
   B. should be avoided.

8. If I killed someone in self-defense, I...
   A. wouldn't enjoy it.
   B. I'd be glad to be alive.

9. If I felt like murdering someone...
   A. I would be ashamed of myself.
   B. I would try to commit the perfect crime.

10. If I hated my parents...
    A. I would hate myself.
    B. I would rebel at their every wish.

11. After an outburst of anger...
    A. I usually feel quite a bit better.
    B. I am sorry and say so.

12. I punish myself...
    A. never.
    B. by feeling nervous and depressed.

13. If I killed someone in self-defense, I...
    A. would still be troubled by my conscience.
    B. would consider myself lucky.

14. When I tell a lie...
    A. I'm angry with myself.
    B. I mix it with truth and serve it like a Martini.
15. When someone swears at me...
   A. I swear back.
   B. it usually bothers me even if I don't show it.

16. When I was younger, fighting...
   A. was always a thrill.
   B. disgusted me.

17. After an argument...
   A. I feel mean.
   B. I am sorry for my actions.

18. "Dirty" jokes in mixed company...
   A. are not proper.
   B. are exciting and amusing.

19. When I was younger, fighting...
   A. never appealed to me.
   B. was fun and frequent.

20. One should not...
   A. knowingly sin.
   B. try to follow absolutes.

21. To kill in war...
   A. is good and meritable.
   B. would be sickening to me.

22. I detest myself for...
   A. nothing, I love life.
   B. not being more nearly perfect.

23. "Dirty" jokes in mixed company...
   A. are lots of fun.
   B. are coarse to say the least.

24. After an argument...
   A. I usually feel better.
   B. I am disgusted that I allowed myself to become involved.

25. A guilty conscience...
   A. does not bother me too much.
   B. is worse than a sickness to me.

26. If I felt like murdering someone...
   A. it would be for good reason.
   B. I'd think I was crazy.

27. Arguments leave me feeling...
   A. that it was a waste of time.
   B. smarter.

28. After a childhood fight, I felt...
   A. miserable and made up afterwards.
   B. like a hero.
29. When anger builds inside me...
   A. I do my best to suppress it.
   B. I have to blow off some steam.

30. I regret...
   A. getting caught, but nothing else.
   B. all of my sins.

31. When I tell a lie...
   A. my conscience bothers me.
   B. I wonder whether I'll get away with it.

32. When caught in the act...
   A. I try to bluff my way out.
   B. truth is the best policy.

33. When I tell a lie...
   A. it is an exception or rather an odd occurrence.
   B. I tell a lie.

34. If I hated my parents...
   A. I would be wrong, foolish, and feel guilty.
   B. they would know it, that's for sure!

35. If I robbed a bank...
   A. I would give up I suppose.
   B. I probably would get away with it.

36. Arguments leave me feeling...
   A. proud, they certainly are worthwhile.
   B. depressed and disgusted.

37. Sin and failure...
   A. are two situations we try to avoid.
   B. do not depress me for long.

38. When anger builds inside me...
   A. I feel like killing somebody.
   B. I get sick.

39. If I robbed a bank...
   A. I would live like a king.
   B. I should get caught.

40. After an argument...
   A. I feel proud in victory and understanding in defeat.
   B. I am sorry and see no reason to stay mad.

41. Sin and failure...
   A. are the works of the Devil.
   B. have not bothered me yet.
42. When anger builds inside me...
   A. I always express it.
   B. I usually take it out on myself.

43. Capital punishment...
   A. should be abolished.
   B. is a necessity.

44. I tried to make amends...
   A. for all my misdeeds, but I can't forget them.
   B. but not if I could help it.

45. After a childhood fight, I felt...
   A. sorry.
   B. mad and irritable.

46. I detest myself for...
   A. nothing, and only rarely dislike myself.
   B. thoughts I sometimes have.

47. Arguments leave me feeling...
   A. satisfied usually.
   B. exhausted.

48. After an argument...
   A. I usually feel good if I won.
   B. it is best to apologize to clear the air.

49. I hate...
   A. sin.
   B. moralists and "do gooders".

50. Capital punishment...
   A. is not used often enough.
   B. is legal murder, it is inhuman.
APPENDIX VI

BEHAVIOR RATINGS
BEHAVIOR RATINGS

In this part of the study, you are going to rate some boys in your Club. On the next sheet there are a list of questions. You will rate each boy on each question. Here is how to rate each boy:

The first question asks you to choose the boys from the list that you would most often, least often, next most often and next least often loan things to. Fill in the Rating Sheet like this:

(a) Choose six boys from the list who you would most often loan things to. Put a "4" in the square beside their name in the column under Question #1.

(b) Choose six boys who you would least often loan things to. Put a "1" in the square beside their name in the column under Question #1. You now have 12 squares filled in in the column under Question #1.

(c) Choose six boys (from the ones which don't have a number given to them already) who you would next most often loan things to. Put a "3" in the square beside their name in the column under Question #1. You now have 18 squares filled in in the column under Question #1.

(d) Choose six boys who you would next least often loan things to. Put a "2" in the square beside their name in the column under Question #1. You now have 24 squares filled in in the column under Question #1.

Go on to each of the rest of the questions and fill out the Rating Sheet, assigning a number to each of 24 boys for each question. Remember: "4" is the number assigned to boys who most often, "1" for least often, "3" for next most often and "2" for next least often. When you are finished, all the squares on the sheet should be filled in.

Note: Before you begin, cross out the names of the boys on the Rating Sheet who you do not know. Draw a line through their name and all the squares in the row beside their name. Do not rate boys that you do not know. Try to rate 24 boys for each question. If you do not know that many to rate, that's okay, just reduce the number of boys you give the ratings to. But be sure to give some "4's," "3's," "2's" and "1's."
1. Name six boys in your cottage who you would (most often, least often, next most often, next least often) loan things to (like cigarettes, money) because you would be pretty sure you would get paid back.

2. Name six boys in your cottage who would ___________ lie to keep themselves out of trouble.

3. Name six boys who ________________ cheat at games, like cards.

4. Name six boys in your cottage that you think would ___________ steal from boys who wouldn't make trouble for them for stealing (for example, boys who would steal from boys who are littler but not from boys who are bigger).

5. Name six boys who ________________ lie to get other boys in trouble.

6. Name six boys who ________________ cheat at sports like baseball, football, basketball.

7. Name six boys who ________________ keep their mouth shut when told something and are asked not to tell (for example, something personal, like a secret).

8. Name six boys who ________________ lie to protect other boys.

9. Name six boys who ________________ argue about the rules of the game, like when they are playing cards or playing sports.

10. Name six boys in your cottage that you would ________________ let use your things (like clothes, radio, shaver) because they would return it in good condition.

11. Name six boys who ________________ steal from anyone anytime they get the chance.

12. Name six boys who you ________________ trust.

13. Name six boys who you think are the ________________ fair.

14. Name six boys who ________________ can get other boys to do what they want them to do, are clever at getting their way.

15. Name six boys who you ________________ like to spend your time with, because you like them.
APPENDIX VII

ARNOLD SCALES OF DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR
ARNO LD SCALES OF DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR

SUBSCALE ITEMS are listed in order of decreasing proportion of positive responses as obtained in Arnold's original sample. SCORING IS as follows:

0 = None  
1 = one or two times  
2 = three or four times  
3 = five to ten times  
4 = ten or more times

A. Vandalism Scale:

1. Walked on some grass, yards, or fields where you weren't supposed to...

2. Marked with a pen, pencil, knife, or chalk on walls, sidewalks, or desks...

3. Thrown eggs, tomatoes, garbage, or anything else like this at any person, house, or building...

4. Broken out any windows...

5. Broken down anything such as fences, or a flower bed, or a clothes line...

6. Put paint on anything you weren't supposed to be painting...

7. Broken out any light bulbs on the street or elsewhere...

8. Let the air out of somebody's tires...

B. Assault Scale:

1. Disobeyéd your parents...

2. Purposely said mean things to someone to get back for something they had done to you...

3. Had a fight with one other person in which you hit each other or wrestled...

4. Disobeyed teachers, school officials, or others who told you what to do...

5. Defied your parents' authority to their face...

6. Made anonymous phone calls just to annoy the people you called...

7. "Beat up" anybody in a fight...
C. **Theft Scale:**

1. Taken little things (worth less than $2) that you were not supposed to take...

2. Taken things from someone else's desk or locker at school that the person would not want you to take...

3. Taken things of value (between $2 and $50) that you were not supposed to take...

4. Taken a car for a ride without the owner's permission...

5. Taken things of large value *(over $50)*...
REFERENCES


