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1960
LABOR POLITICAL ACTION AT MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY:
A CASE STUDY OF THE CIOPAC CAMPAIGN OF 1944
AND
THE TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

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INTRODUCTION

The CIO Political Action Committee campaign of 1944 typifies a phenomenon which has been a significant factor in every national election of recent years. Presumably a study of PAC, therefore, would have value if only as a contribution to American political history. Campaign politics under labor auspices, however, is consistently controversial and regularly gives rise to demands for stringent legal regulation, if not prohibition—whether it be symbolized by PAC, LLPE (Labor's League for Political Education), or COPE (Committee on Political Education), the political arms respectively of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the American Federation of Labor, and, currently, of the merged AFL-CIO. In the campaign of 1944 such demands were tied to allegations that PAC was Communist-inspired and Communist-directed. Since then, if charges of Communist subversion have not been pressed, the implication has been, nevertheless, that union-sponsored political action is somehow improper, contrary to sound public policy, and fraught with peril for the American Way.

The political scientist may well address himself to the task of devising appropriate criteria for judging proposed regulations of labor (or other) pressure group activity, although, on the basis of democratic ideological considerations, it is doubtful how far regulations of political action can or should be employed deliberately to
curtail the influence—so long as it is not treasonable in the constitutional sense—of specified elements in society over the course of public policy or of institutional change. Whether or not regulation is desirable, however, PAC activity raises a number of questions worthy of exploration.

As originally conceived this research project was designed primarily to analyze the nature of the forces behind the PAC campaign of 1944. The primary question posed was: In addition to the practical considerations which appeared to give immediate impetus to the movement, what were the underlying ideological commitments, if any, and the ultimate objectives, stated or covert, of the organizations and individuals who made up the PAC? Since preliminary research suggested that a plethora of forces was represented in the federative entity which was the CIO, such a study demanded a case study approach. Moreover, given the insufficiency of contemporary conduct and declarations alone as a satisfactory key to motivation, resort to historical method was indicated.

The Textile Workers Union of America was selected as an initial case study subject and inquiry was undertaken, first, to verify its record as a significant participant in the PAC movement; then, to determine the political philosophy, public policy goals and traditional political behavior patterns of TWUA, its officers and staff, and of its most important organizational antecedents and individual mentors. Especial attention was paid, in view of 1944 campaign charges, to the relationship of union policy to the American
Communist party line on political action and other selected issues. The research span covered approximately thirty years of labor political history, through 1948. Major sources consulted, in addition to general works dealing with labor-liberal-leftist politics, included the journals and convention proceedings of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, TWUA, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, and the American Federation of Hosiery Workers (a TWUA affiliate); the 1944 convention proceedings of the national Democratic party; the reports and hearings of Congressional committees; the New York Times, and, by way of interviews and correspondence, the observations and recollections of TWUA, PAC, and other union personalities.

In time, the object of research became more utilitarian. Recognizing the 1944 campaign effort as illustrative rather than unique, what guide does it afford, at mid-twentieth century, to those who would "regulate" or merely understand labor political action? How far do the activities and objectives of a PAC genuinely mirror the wishes of rank and file union members? What motivating factors, ideological and/or practical, are most potent in drawing the leadership of organized labor into the political arena, particularly into channels such as those pursued in 1944? Conversely, how effective are restrictive measures and what kinds of circumstances and policies, governmental or non-governmental, appear to be best calculated to discourage labor political action and hence perhaps to alter or retard the institutional trends which it tends to reflect or
promote? In the latter respect have there been demonstrable (adverse or beneficial) consequences for the "American Way," stemming directly from labor's campaign operations as such, from successful electoral effort, or from the realization of its political and public policy goals?

In addition to election box scores, the areas of potential PAC impact are myriad and the significant questions raised for the student of government and politics are numerous. Among them, these may be suggested: Has organized labor, functioning politically through a PAC, demonstrated an ability to control major party nominations for public office or to compel selection of persons acceptable to it for appointive positions--of cabinet or lesser rank? Has it demonstrated the capacity to control the voting habits of its members and the outcome of elections? How have PAC activities affected overall voter eligibility statistics and voter turnout? What has been their impact upon the character of major party platforms and upon the campaigns waged by candidates and by party workers? Have the labor politicians helped to raise the quality of campaign propaganda? Has control of major party machinery shifted from the hands of "old line" party leaders and "bosses" to labor leaders? Has there been an appreciable change in the principal sources of party funds? Has PAC-type activity tended to bring about a sharper realignment of forces as between the Democratic and Republican parties or to pave the way for a serious national third party movement? Has PAC influence upon public officials beholden to its electoral support brought radical
experimentation with the free enterprise system? Has it tended to accelerate or impede the trend toward centralization of power which has increasingly characterized the developing American federal system in the modern era? What, if any, effect has labor's political activity had upon the methods employed by non-labor pressure groups?

If definitive factual answers cannot be given to all of these questions it is to be hoped that the data presented in these pages, and evaluated in the wider historical context, will afford a degree of insight into some of them and perhaps contribute to the kind of understanding which ought to precede the framing of public policy in any field. The following chapters comprise (1) general narrative accounts of the CIO-PAC movement, its initial organization and development, and its exploitation as an issue on which voters were asked to make electoral judgments; (2) a justification for selection of and an introduction to the case study subject; (3) a review of platform drafts to which the Textile Workers publicly subscribed and a presentation of basic biographical information on representative individual unionists; (4) extensive description of the 1944 labor campaign and of the developments immediately preceding, designed to demonstrate the reality of the "TWUA factor" in PAC, nationally and in the field, and to point up both the character and variety of PAC operations and the nature and scope of the entire CIO effort, organizationally and geographically and in terms of the PAC electoral potential; and (5) conclusions reached regarding questions such as those formulated above.
CHAPTER I

THE SETTING, THE ORGANIZATION,
PROBLEMS, AND PROJECTS

The United States had been at war with the Axis powers for some nineteen months. There were fully twenty-two months to go before the Nazis would surrender, twenty-five before the fall of Japan would bring the military campaigns of World War II to an end. In mid-1943 the decisive events which led inexorably to Allied victory still lay in the future. The Nazis had not yet been expelled from Soviet soil. No Allied invasion of southern or western Europe had been launched. Tedium "island hopping" was far from producing the spectacular progress which would one day foreshadow ultimate victory in the Pacific. For the news chroniclers the war was the news of the day.

In such a context the date of July 7, 1943 was sandwiched inconspicuously, within a ten-day period, between a series of Pacific Island landings (June 30) and the Allied invasion of Sicily (July 9). Major domestic news of recent weeks included race riots in Detroit and the inauguration of a pay-as-you-go federal income tax system. Only one of two popular almanacs in which the history of the time is presented in capsule form records the fact that on June 1, the "House vote[d] drastic anti-strike bill." Neither records the fact that on July 7 Philip Murray, president of the Congress of Industrial
Organizations, announced appointment, with CIO executive board approval, of a Political Action Committee. Yet the June 4 action and others taken shortly thereafter by the U. S. Congress represented for an important segment of the American body politic a climactic development in a trend to which the July 7 announcement constituted an "answer." For historians of American politics and of American trade unionism both dates are at least as significant as any of those associated with contemporary military developments within their own peculiar context. As a news topic only PAC can be said to have survived the year. Unlike the MacArthur landing in New Guinea or the invasion of Sicily, each of which was soon swallowed up in bigger war news, creation of the CIO Political Action Committee remained a live subject. PAC itself became steadily more newsworthy. Bitter controversy raged about its origin, its reason for being, its "representative" character, the loyalty and patriotism of its sponsors, the character, extent and effect of its activities. Within a year CIO PAC was to be a leading participant in the 1944 presidential and Congressional campaign. It was also to be an issue, in alphabetized form one of the neatest packages headline writers and campaign orators had had to conjure with since the New Deal first brought the alphabet into political prominence. On both counts, as an active entity in American political life and as an issue, PAC was to remain newsworthy and controversial for years to come.

The significant elements in the domestic scene into which PAC was thrust were also war-born. The second war for democracy was
proving even more conclusively than the first the necessity of sub-
ordinating civilian needs and wants to military requirements. Labor,
as worker, taxpayer and consumer, had felt the impact of executive
orders and legislative enactments. As an organized element in the
community it had been disturbed by the alleged inequities and inade-
quacies of public policies. As recently as April 8, 1943 the
President, to quote from the popular almanacs,

curbs prices, pay, job changing.

On April 11 he permitted to become law without his signature a bill

increasing the debt limit to $210,000,000,000
and carrying with it a 'rider' abolishing the
$25,000 net income executive order...

On May 1 he

ordered... Solid Fuels Administrator Ickes
to take over all the bituminous and anthracite
properties when 450,000 soft coal and 80,000
hard-coal miners did not return to work.

On June 4, as noted above,

House votes drastic antistrike bill.1

---


Trade unionists had not been inarticulate in the face of such devel-
opments. To the leadership of the CIO, the last straw in a series of
objectionable governmental acts or sins of omission came on June 25,
a rebellious Congress, angered by three coal strikes and other sporadic interruptions of war production, quickly overrode President Roosevelt's veto. And enacted into law the Smith-Connally anti-strike bill requiring 30 days' notice in advance of strike votes and providing criminal penalties for those who instigate, direct or aid strikes in government-operated plants or mines.

The vote to override was 56 to 25 in the Senate, 244 to 108 in the House, well over the required two-thirds majority.

One of the more important provisions of this War Labor Disputes Act empowered the President to "take possession of and to operate 'plants, mines, and facilities'" wherein strikes or other labor disturbances threatened to interrupt essential war production. Another obliged union officials to "give notice of disputes or threatened disputes," with the status quo being maintained for 30 days thereafter and a strike being lawful only on approval of a majority of the workers to be affected in an election conducted by the National Labor Relations Board. The measure purportedly had a sole objective: to prevent harmful interruptions, occasioned by labor-management disputes, in the production or supplying of war-essential goods. Nevertheless, a third provision amended the federal Corrupt Practices Act to render it unlawful and punishable by fine and/or imprisonment for any corporation... or any labor organization to make a contribution in connection with any election.
at which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in... Congress are to be voted for...

Penalties were prescribed for officers consenting to such unlawful contributions as well as for unions and corporations themselves and for recipient candidates and political committees. The Act was a


target for criticism on many counts. CIO leaders resented the imputation of bad faith. In their view most responsible unions were attempting to honor a voluntary "no-strike" pledge. The authors of the Smith-Connally Act, they argued, by telling labor how to go on strike in wartime, were deliberately endeavoring to "bait labor" into action which would bring unions into public disfavor. It was adding insult to injury to append to this measure a "rider" palpably intended to restrict the capacity of organized labor to resist similar enactments in future or to compel repeal or modification of existing law. That the CIO had ideas about cultivating its political potential—for just such a purpose—had been apparent since the beginning of the legislative session.

4 See, for example, a speech of CIO president Murray, delivered at Pittsburgh on July 11. NYT, 7/12/43, p. 16:2. See also Louis Stark in ibid., 5/15/43, p. 8.
In January CIO legislative director Nathan Cowan had warned a special CIO legislative conference that the number of "labor's defenders" in Congress had been cut in the recent off-year elections. If labor expected to protect itself or to promote the kind of public policies which would best serve the national interest a "drastic shakeup and speedup" was in order on labor's legislative and political front. It must adopt a "day-to-day approach," create special, functioning "legislative committees" at the local level and abandon the "three-alarm fire system by which too much of CIO's campaigning had been done in the past." In the weeks which followed CIO spokesmen had proclaimed themselves progressively more scandalized by the "shocking record" of the 78th Congress. While denying any thought that the President harbored any desire to incorporate "anti-labor" prejudices into national policies pursuant to the goal of "unconditional surrender," the CIO executive board had not withheld criticism of responsible administrative officials—for sins of omission or commission. Through news and editorial items the CIO News had acquainted readers with the CIO's own constructive policy recommendations. It had constantly apprised them of "anti-labor" measures pending before state legislatures and of the strategy of resistance being pursued at that level by alert CIO organizations. It had kept them informed of national developments. Such items, expressly or by implication, invariably invited unionists in the field to heed Cowan's admonitions and the follow-up exhortations from CIO headquarters. In

5The board criticized the War Manpower Commission under Paul V. McNutt for policies which "prevent(ed) workers leaving one
essential industry for another" and in the planning of which labor had little or no voice. It was especially critical of the Office of Economic Stabilization under James F. Byrnes for its application of a "Little Steel" formula to wage increases negotiated between labor and management. It openly urged the President to relieve Byrnes of his power to nullify more favorable wage "adjustment" decisions made by another agency, the War Labor Board. CIO News, 5/17/43, pp. 1, 4, 5. See ibid., for the executive board's demand for a price "roll-back" to levels of September 1942—to halt inflation and protect mass purchasing power. See also ibid., 1/18/43, p. 3; 3/8/43, p. 4.

February affiliates everywhere were urged to enlist cooperation for shared legislative objectives from non-CIO and non-labor groups. 6

6 See president Murray's hopeful announcement that soon "work on a united farmer-labor program" would be started by a joint legislative committee representing the CIO, the American Federation of Labor, the Railroad Brotherhoods and the National Farmers Union. Ibid., 2/8/43, p. 8.

In May and June editorial writers warned legislative incumbents and unionists alike that unsuccessful lobbying and determined electoral activity must go hand in hand. They asserted labor's readiness to "remember at the polls any member of Congress" who should vote for the "vicious Connally-Smith bills." They observed pointedly that it was "none too soon to start organizing politically" to ensure in 1944 an "election victory for all we are fighting for," by guarding against a repetition of the voter absenteeism which, in the CIO's judgment, accounted for the election in 1942 of "many anti-New Deal, obstructionist and even defeatist Congressmen," and for the harvest
of the "present mess of union-busting legislation. . ." On June 21

See, for example, Len de Caux et al in ibid., 5/17/43, p. 4; 5/31/43, p. 4; 6/1/43, p. 4. For other relevant news and editorial items see ibid., January-June 1943, passim.

the CIO News carried a page-one boxed appeal:

Write, Wire FDR Today! Veto the Smith-Connally Anti-War Bill!

As the national CIO solicited support for the bill's defeat and reacted to its passage two things were made clear with regard to this prospective ban on labor's political contributions: (1) the CIO's resentment at its allegedly hypocritical, discriminatory and undemocratic character, (2) the latter's determination to respond vigorously to its challenge. At no time in the past had labor been

The ban was said to smack of hypocrisy because it was irrelevant to the prevention of work stoppages, to be discriminatory in that no similar prohibition applied to "any other kind of unincorporated association. . . business, fraternal, church or farm." It was described as "class" legislation for its denial to workers of the "right to pool their meager resources through their unions to offset the political influence of the wealthy." CIO News, 6/21/43, pp. 1, 2, 4.

so vitally affected by public policies or the character of governmental personnel, hence so likely to be favorably disposed toward the idea of contributing financially to the political fortunes of candidates sympathetic to labor's interests. Three days after final passage of the Act the editor of the CIO's official organ averred that labor faced a challenge "it cannot dodge." Legislative and political activity must be increased, to defend worker welfare and "to protect our
country... Each union member should contact his Congressman during the coming Congressional recess, "individually or in delegations," "praise and encourage him if he voted right" on pertinent legislation, and "if not, show him where he was wrong and warn him that labor is not only keeping score but organizing politically for...

9Len de Caux in ibid., 6/28/43, p. 4. (Italics added.)

This, then, was the setting for the CIO announcement of July 7. To detect a direct and exclusive cause and effect relationship between passage of the Smith-Connally Act and creation of the PAC would be an oversimplification. Yet the Act was less a deterrent than a stimulus to immediate action and was acknowledged as such.

10Ibid., 7/12/43, p. 4.

Actually, the CIO executive board on July 7 authorized appointment of two committees and inauguration of two programs. First, there was to be a concentrated effort to entreat members of Congress to mend their legislative ways on their return to Washington. Second, ground work was to be laid for waging effective political warfare in coming election campaigns. Responsibility for the first task was given to a four-member "CIO Committee on Recess Congressional Action" headed by George Addes, secretary-treasurer of the United Automobile Workers; that for the second to a slightly larger committee headed by Sidney
Hi liman, president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America.

In both cases non-CIO labor and non-labor "progressives" were to be invited to cooperate. The Addes group's assignment was simple: Every CIO member and Congressional district resident was to be informed of the voting record of his Congressman. Every Congressman in turn was to be made aware of "public opinion" prevailing within his constituency on such issues as inflation and the need for price controls, taxation, social security, poll tax repeal, "labor-baiting," matters to be at stake also in the longer range program for election of public officials who supported the "war program of our Commander-in-Chief and enlightened domestic and foreign policies."

For legislative pressure purposes Congressional district committees composed of labor and non-labor representatives were to be formed.  

For further detail on this plan of action see president Murray's letter to all affiliates. "CIO Starts a Drive to Sway Congress to Views of Labor," **NYT**, 7/19/43, p. 13; CIO News, 7/12/43, p. 3. For references to subsequent local activity reports received by this committee see CIO News, 8/16/43, pp. 3, 5; 8/23/43; 8/30/43, p. 3. See also Murray's attack upon Congress for "hamstringing" the President's seven-point "anti-inflation" program and his subsequent CIO convention report. **NYT**, 7/12/43, p. 16; **CIO, Final Proceedings of the Sixth Constitutional Convention, Philadelphia, Nov. 1-5, 1943**, pp. 82-85. Cited hereafter as CIO, Proceedings, 1943.

The record does not show that the Addes committee developed any organizational machinery apart from the facilities of the CIO proper and of its affiliated unions. It did not survive the summer "emergency."

Other members of the Addes' committee were James B. Carey, national CIO secretary-treasurer, and the secretary-treasurers, respectively, of the United Electrical Workers and United Steel
Workers unions, Julius Emspak and David J. McDonald. CIO News, 7/12/43, p. 3.

Reasons for creating two committees are not entirely clear. Conceivably internal politics was involved. If the "Congressional Action" group was intended to have a longer life span, there was apparently an early realization that functions of the two groups were overlapping and, as such, sources of potential conflict. Implication of a CIO News report on a July 16 meeting of the Addes committee was that while it was now mainly concerned with the current Congressional recess, the Committee would have, as an independent agency, additional work to perform in the future. Subsequent CIO News stories indicated, first, that Addes committee members, along with the CIO's regional directors, would merely help "implement the work" of the Hillman committee; then, that the former group's separate responsibilities would soon end and "the contacts it had made would be utilized in the general field of political action." Ibid., 7/12/43, p. 5; 7/19/43, p. 3; 7/26/43, pp. 3, 5; 8/9/43, p. 3.

The second committee, initially designated merely as a Committee for Political Action, more than survived the summer. It acquired additional members and, as noted previously, became both permanent and controversial, a political "coordinating" agency for a movement aggregating at that time more than five million members. 13

13 Philip Murray in November 1943 estimated the CIO's dues-paying membership, exclusive of some 1,150,000 members in the armed forces, at 5,285,000. NYT, 11/2/43, p. 16:1. For CIOPAC members other than chairman Hillman see p. 203 below.

The Movement Gets under Way: the "Exploratory" Stage

Neither Murray nor his board was able to say at the outset precisely what organizational form the PAC movement would take. They did state that they were not officiating at the birth of any "third party," and commissioned the Hillman committee to spearhead, if it could, formation of a broadly based "labor league for action now and
in 1943. It was, frankly, expected to explore the possibilities of founding a coalition for concerted action by all major labor organizations, possibly something akin to an earlier non-party "Labor's Non-Partisan League," which in 1936 set out to harness the political energies of some unions adhering to the AFL as well as those comprising the new and not yet completely separatist Committee for Industrial Organizations. Had such explorations proved fruitful the 1944 campaign might well have featured an "NULL"--a "National United Labor League"--instead of a "PAC," leaving the CIO committee a phenomenon of little more than passing historical interest. Whether CIO leaders honestly thought a united political movement feasible, when long-standing AFL-CIO conflict showed no sign of early abatement, is a matter for speculation. The fact is, that despite some lower level cooperation during ensuing months, the American Federation of Labor opposed the movement, the Railroad Brotherhoods remained officially aloof, and the exploratory committee became the committee, the political wing solely of the CIO.

14 CIO News, 7/12/43, p. 3; NYT, 7/12/43, p. 16:2; 7/18/43, p. 28:1-3; Advance, 7/15/43, pp. 12, 13.

15 Early in September Hillman announced that no direct overtures would be made to the other organizations nationally until attempts had been made to cooperate at state and local levels. William Green, AFL president, had already told newsmen the AFL executive council did not wish to become "entangled." On September 10 Hillman stated that "efforts had been made to gain a political alliance with the AFL," but the latter insisted on steering a separate course." In March 1944 Green ordered AFL affiliates to
The "exploratory" stage may be said to have ended by November at the CIO's sixth constitutional convention. There, despite hopeful public remarks about a grand strategy involving fourteen million trade unionists, Sidney Hillman conceded that perhaps the CIO would have to settle for "parallel" rather than "joint" action.16 Whereupon

16 CIO, Proceedings, 1943, pp. 82-85; 212-251. Even so, CIO press releases during December signify a general reluctance to admit defeat. Thus identical terminology was employed in reporting appoint­ments to two regional PAC directorships. Both appointees (Jack Kroll and Joseph Salerno) were said to be "on friendly terms" with the AFL, the Railroad Brotherhoods, and other "liberal and farm groups," and both were "expected" to initiate creation of joint or parallel political committees in cooperation with these groups. Advance, 12/15/43, p. 7; CIO News, 12/20/43, p. 5.

the convention acted to approve the building of a national PAC apparatus which had the blessing only of members of the CIO family. Its purpose was to help coordinate and make more effective programs of political activity and education which had for "many years" been conducted by constituent CIO unions.17

17 See Hillman testimony before a House Committee on Campaign Expenditures. NYT, 8/29/44, p. 11.

PAC leadership worked strenuously before asking that conven­tion for its "unanimous rising vote" of confidence, both to seek out the thinking of union leaders in the field on PAC's future course and to "sell" the latter, if need be, on the idea which PAC represented.
By the end of August three regional conferences had been held—at Philadelphia, Chicago, and Birmingham. Among the conferees were field representatives and local leaders of a number of international unions. In the Midwest and East these reportedly represented memberships in excess of two million. All three conferences approved the

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18 One story from Philadelphia, concerned chiefly with the participation of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, noted the presence of ACWA delegates from Pennsylvania, Maryland, New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Massachusetts. Other unionists represented steel, auto, rubber, the maritime industry, textiles, "and many others." Other states represented included Delaware and the rest of New England. Advance, 8/1/43, p. 4. For other conference stories see ibid., passim; CIO News, 7/26/43, pp. 3, 5; 8/2/43, p. 3; 8/30/43, p. 3; 7/18/43, p. 28:1-3; 7/21/43, p. 26:2.

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July 7 action and ratified declarations on both substantive and procedural political policy. All adopted identical five-point statements of objectives, drafted by the Hillman committee and envisaging full mobilization of the CIO, local cooperation with non-CIO groups, progress toward creation of an "NULL," and electoral support for candidates, regardless of party, "who have demonstrated their consistent and unequivocal support of President Roosevelt on all major issues, domestic and foreign." In spite of some minority sentiment

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19 Quoted from a Hillman keynote speech at Philadelphia. Advance, 8/1/43, p. 4.

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at Philadelphia and Chicago, PAC sponsorship of national "third party" action was expressly ruled out as certain to "divide and divert the labor and progressive forces." Notwithstanding a universally
"pro-Roosevelt" atmosphere two other possible actions were also scrupulously avoided: (1) bestowal of any premature fourth-term endorsement for the Democratic President, (2) the making of any statement construable as giving "any political party a blank check in the coming campaign.\(^{20}\)

\(^{20}\)NYT, 7/18/43, p. 28:1-3; "C.W.E." in Advance, 8/1/43.

There was no comparable reluctance to discuss Congressional shortcomings. Thus the Philadelphia delegates agreed:

Congress has obstructed needed measures to stabilize our national economy, denied adequate appropriations to vital war agencies and enacted a discriminatory, undemocratic and provocative anti-labor law.

Threats were discerned, both on and off Capitol Hill, to the "President's program," the unity of the "home front," an early military victory, "unconditional surrender" and a "people's peace." Attention was called to the lack of Congressional planning for improved social security and post-war employment, and to the likelihood that the Smith-Connally Act was a "forerunner of further anti-labor legislation unless we teach Congressmen that labor knows how to defend itself at the ballot box." The five-point program imposed upon cooperating units no organizational blueprint for implementing this unique educational program. The implication was that functioning machinery would be created by the appropriate authorities. Soon after the regional conferences concrete plans for both regional and state political action committees emerged from similar meetings in at
least two tri-state areas. Under national PAC auspices at least

\[\text{NYT, 7/18/43, p. 28:1-3; CIO News, 7/26/43, p. 5. Meetings in Chicago and Cincinnati drew delegates from Indiana, Wisconsin and Illinois and from Ohio, West Virginia and Kentucky, respectively. Hillman personally addressed both. Significantly, a Chicago conference recommendation to state industrial union councils in that tri-state area suggested that state committees be known by such titles as "united labor leagues." Advance, 10/1/43, p. 4; CIO News, 11/1/43, p. 8.}\]

five significant developments transpired between the mid-summer regional gatherings and the November CIO convention. On September 1 the PAC chairman was authorized by his committee to petition heads of all CIO unions for cooperation in its first action project: a voter registration campaign to qualify all adult members of CIO families for participation in all elections, national, state, and local. The goal for the greatest labor vote in history and reversal at the polls of the legislative trend which all of the editorializing, legislative committee talk and lobbying of the recent past had failed to stem. Also in September CIO officers tentatively approved a PAC plan to establish fourteen regional offices, a headquarters in New York and an office in Washington. Sidney Hillman began to assemble a list of prospective staff members and with other committee members embarked on a six-week coast-to-coast tour to confer with more local unionists and to assist in organization.

\[\text{Cities scheduled for visits from Hillman and his associates included Detroit, Minneapolis, Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles,}\]
By month's end the PAC head had tentatively designated his first regional director. Finally, various union governing bodies were canvassed on their readiness to supply financial support. By convention time PAC was able to announce receipt of pledges totalling $750,000, a fact which tended to enhance the credibility of Philip Murray's convention statement that his decision to appoint a "Committee for Political Action" had been made only at the "urgent behest" of unionists from all over the country. By some reports Sidney Hillman confidently anticipated a total collection in excess of two million dollars.

23 This was August Scholle, whose selection was announced at a Detroit conference attended by some one hundred persons--Michigan state CIO executive board members, officers of state, county, and city industrial union councils, and leaders of major local unions. CIO News, 9/20/43, p. 2.

2h NYT, 11/5/43, p. 13:1; CIO, Proceedings, 1943, pp. 70-73. For ultimate PAC receipts see p. 61 below.

The CIO Convention Gives PAC Its Blessing and Mr. Hillman Builds His Organization

It was in a spirit not unlike that of the preliminary PAC regional conferences--one of commendation for FDR, condemnation for legislative "reactionaries"--that the CIO convention gave PAC its signal to proceed with recruitment of a staff and with the giving of
"stimulus, direction, guidance and organized expression" to labor's "growing awareness" of the need for political action. Delegates applauded an address by the wife of the President of the United States and officially agreed that Franklin D. Roosevelt had fought "more consistently than any other man in public life" for the objectives of "progressives." Still, they abided by Philip Murray's counsel against an untimely endorsement with its implications of approval for policies and party. Sidney Hillman admonished labor, along with everyone else, to apply itself diligently to the winning of the war, to help safeguard the rights without which military victory would be empty, and to promote public acceptance for policies the next Congress would have to support in the interest of domestic progress, international cooperation, and peace. On the domestic front, given an unsympathetic Congress, labor dare not assume even that collective bargaining was "here to stay" or that New Deal measures could not be emasculated through want of appropriations! In approving past and prospective PAC actions the convention conceived its task as properly one of "educating" union members for enlightened electoral action based upon an understanding of issues. The actual "burden of carrying on the day-to-day work of education and organization for political action," the practical fulfillment of programs and policies formulated by the committee, would, of course, necessarily fall upon the CIO's local unions and upon its state and local industrial union councils.25
International union support was equally indispensable to PAC's success. Even more important than their treasuries—which were to yield most of the sums collected on the November pledges—were the latter's officers and staff. Some of the national PAC staff recruited after November came "on loan" from the parent CIO. Others performed PAC services while remaining on the CIO payroll. Still other persons, an indeterminate number, who were for all practical purposes members of Hillman's field staff, came to PAC assignments, within their respective regions, by designation of their international unions. As of June 1944, there were from fifty to seventy-five persons so assigned—for part- or full-time PAC work. The value of their services can hardly be exaggerated. By far the greater number of the full-time PAC staff, however, were hired directly by the national committee or by regional officers operating with funds allocated by PAC headquarters. These included an assistant chairman, fourteen regional directors, and, by late August 1944, approximately 135 additional persons, of whom seventy-five were employed in New York and sixty-five in regional offices. The PAC organization included clerical, secretarial and stenographic employees, personnel and financial officers, and a variety of specialists and professional help: public relations and publicity
experts, specialists to head bureaus or divisions handling relations with women, Negroes, youth, students, and other population groups, researchers, writers, artists, etc. The bulk of this staff was hired in the summer of 1944 during and for the campaign proper. Major organizational appointments were made earlier, the assistant chairman or chief administrative assistant to Mr. Hillman and at least eight of his regional directors being at work before the end of January. It was, as a matter of fact, the financing of salaries and travel expenses for national and regional offices that accounted for nearly one-half of PAC's expenditures down to mid-August 1944.26

26U.S. Senate, Special Committee to Investigate Presidential, Vice Presidential, and Senatorial Campaign Expenditures, 1944, Hearing, on S. Res. 263, 78th Cong., 2d sess., Part I, June 13, 1944, p. 22 (cited hereafter as U.S. Senate, Hearing of Special Committee on Campaign Expenditures, 1944); U.S. House, Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures, Hearing, on H. Res. 551, 78th Cong., 2d sess., Part I, Aug. 28, 1944, pp. 5-6, 13 (cited hereafter as U.S. House, Hearing of Committee on Campaign Expenditures, 1944). See also CIO News, 1/31/44, p. 3.


The other major work which proceeded during the winter and spring, far from New York headquarters, was the planning and building across the country of machinery and procedures to handle the voter registration drive, the making of endorsements, the conduct of a campaign, the mobilizing of voters in primaries and general elections. Rates and degrees of cooperation varied with organization, personality and place. It was the duty of regional directors, as their
offices were activated, to help explain to leaders of affiliated
units, and to assist them in achieving a two-fold organizational
objective: i.e., organization based upon union structure and upon
geography and electoral districts. The directors acted, in fact, as
missionaries, as Hillman before them during the period of exploration,
attending area conferences, conferring with individual leaders,
making speeches to spread the gospel, and otherwise aiding in forma-
tion of political action committees and planning of action programs.

PAC Meets Challenges as to Its Legality

Technically, any serious question that creation of PAC or its
development after July 1943 was without proper authorization of the
CIO's constituent elements would appear to have been set at rest by
the autumn convention. Any question that PAC, with or without con-
vention approval, was created for a purpose essentially "illegal"
under the CIO constitution is readily disposed of in the negative by
reference to that document, although this was by no means universally
conceded. General acceptance of the committee's legality or of the

27 The executive board was authorized to "establish bureaus and
departments and create such committees as may be necessary to the
affairs of the organization." It was empowered also, along with the
president, to interpret the constitution, hence, presumably, to pass
upon the meaning of necessity with regard to means and upon the scope
of objectives encompassed by the word "affairs." Among those en-
umerated were these "political" objectives: "... to secure legisla-
tion safeguarding the economic security and social welfare of the
workers of America, to protect and extend our democratic institutions
and civil rights and liberties." See CIO, Constitution, Art. II; 
Art. V, sec. 2; Art. VI, sec. 2.
work carried on in its name under federal law was still harder to come by. Anti-PAC politicians were dismayed that the Smith-Connally amendment to the Corrupt Practices Act should prove so ineffectual. PAC's open defiance of the legislators' patent intent—to keep unions "out of politics"—inspired constant and frenzied protests. Repeatedly the question of compliance was raised with the Attorney General. Another major legal hurdle which PAC's detractors hoped would halt its activities were Hatch Act provisions governing campaign finance. Still another hazard lay in the propagation of an all-inclusive concept of "un-Americanism" both inside and outside the Congress. No sooner did Mr. Hillman and his legal advisors survive one challenge than another became the source of newspaper headlines, of campaign oratory, of investigation by public authorities—which investigation in turn eventuated in more headlines and more oratory.

The first legal skirmish of the 1914 campaign occurred in January; the last was not officially resolved until March 1915. PAC's legal status was questioned on two principal grounds during its formative days and throughout the campaign: (1) PAC was said to be in violation of the Smith-Connally prohibition on the making of "contributions" in connection with federal elections. (2) It was accused of violating the Hatch Act, which (a) limited to $5000 the size of individual contributions to candidates or political committees in connection with nominations or elections to federal office, and (b) limited to $3,000,000 the total funds which might be received or spent in any calendar year by any political committee. There was
also an allegation that persons who left government posts for jobs with PAC were in violation of a Hatch Act ban on political activity by persons on the government payroll. 28 There were at least two 

other highly publicized indictments: (1) that union members were being coerced into financing a partisan political project, (2) that PAC was the vehicle of Communist conspirators bent upon destroying the U.S. political system and the American way of life. Early in March 1944 Congressman Martin Dies asserted on the House floor that the American Communist party had disbanded with the sole purpose of furthering the program of the CIOPAC and predicted that Sidney Hillman soon would "succeed Earl Browder as head of the Communists in the United States." 29

The charges of coercion and communism PAC spokesmen denied categorically. The others were dealt with in terms of the relevant statutes. PAC's lawyers denied that it constituted a "labor organiza-
tion" within the meaning of the Smith-Connally Act. Assuming, under the strictest possible interpretation, that the law was applicable, it was contended that PAC's own expenditures—e.g., to promote voter
registration, to finance research and the dissemination of information on issues and candidates—did not represent contributions as contemplated by the Act but the direct exercise of constitutionally unassailable rights of "free speech, press and assembly." PAC conceded the making of contributions to some candidates for nomination but noted that primary elections were outside the Smith-Connally Act's coverage. It made no contributions to candidates for election. As an added precaution, following the nominating phase of the campaign, PAC voluntarily "froze" all funds remaining from the trade union donations, financing all activities thereafter (including those construed as strictly "educational") from voluntary individual contributions. Since the latter did not come from union treasuries international union solicitors could not fall under the Smith-Connally ban.30 As for possible Hatch Act transgressions, here, too, PAC

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30 The law defined a "labor organization" as one which negotiated with employers on problems of wages, hours and working conditions. Under the Hatch Act a "contribution" was "a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money, or anything of value, and including a contract, promise, or agreement... to make a contribution." PAC counsel argued that "What Congress proposed to outlaw under the Smith-Connally Act "was the transfer of corporate or labor union funds to a political candidate or political committee," not the direct expenditure of its own funds for "general political educational activity" or for the promotion of candidacies of persons running for public office through "distribution of leaflets, the holding of meetings... the use of radio time, etc." See testimony of John Abt, CIO PAC legal counsel, before House and Senate committees. U. S. House, Hearings of Committee on Campaign Expenditures, 1944, p. 27; U. S. Senate, Report on Investigation of Campaign Expenditures, 1944, p. 22. See also CIO News, 7/19/43, p. 3. See also p. 43 below.
questioned its legal vulnerability as an operating entity since it denied being a "political organization," one of whose major purposes, within the conventional meaning of that term, was to make nominations for public office. The national Political Action Committee made no nominations as such and bestowed endorsements for only two offices. Assuming again, however, that the law was applicable on

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PAC preferred to describe itself as "an educational organization in the field of politics." One of its major functions was to supply local organizations with information on the records of candidates but all endorsements, save for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency, were made by state, Congressional district and local units. See also testimony of Sidney Hillman. U. S. House, Hearings of Committee on Campaign Expenditures, 1914, pp. 53 et passim.

all counts, PAC not only scrupulously kept contributions to candidates for nomination--involving no more than eighteen Congressional districts--within the $5,000 limit but, no doubt to its own disappointment, found its total receipts as of November 1914 far under three million dollars. With respect to the large sums PAC received

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Congressional candidates received primary election aid in financial form from the national CICPAC in California (2), New York (1), Virginia (1), Georgia (3), Alabama (1), Oklahoma (2), Maine (1), Massachusetts (1). Some aid took the form of direct dollar contributions to candidates or their committees. Some represented money spent on behalf of candidates by regional PAC offices or field representatives. Amounts ranged from $40.00 in one Massachusetts district to $5,000 each in two New York districts. (One of the latter sums actually embraced several state office endorsees as well as a Congressional candidate.) All national PAC expenditures in these districts, including these "contributions," totalled a little more than $33,000. For the nation as a whole PAC "contributions and expenditures in primary and State elections" to August 15, 1914 totalled $67,320.48. U. S. House, Hearings of Committee on Campaign
Expenditures, 1944, pp. 13, 15. On the relationship of CIOPAC to local CIO and PAC organizations in the matter of endorsements and financial aid see ibid., pp. 43-47. For final PAC receipts and expenditures see p. 61 below.

From CIO affiliates (see accompanying table), as distinguished from contributions PAC made to candidates, the committee's position was simple: the Hatch Act could not be applied retroactively. At the time the trade union donations were received—on or about November 1943—PAC could not possibly be characterized as a "political committee." No endorsements had been made. No primary or election campaign activity was in progress. PAC was engaged solely in organizing and educating. 33

33 Retroactive application to PAC, it was argued, would justify equal liability to prosecution for any organization (e.g., corporation) lending money to a newspaper publisher if that newspaper should at some future date publish an editorial endorsing a candidate or political party. U. S. House, Hearings of Committee on Campaign Expenditures, 1944, pp. 54-56.

The CIO's labor political leaders from the outset manifested a healthy respect for legal requirements. 34 Even so, the levelling of

34 All regional PAC directors then appointed were forewarned as early as December 9, 1943 of the "necessity of scrutinizing all of the expenditures of your office to make certain that they are made in strict conformity with all of the provisions of law..." See text of CIOPAC letter, cited in U. S. Senate, Report on Investigation of Campaign Expenditures, 1944, pp. 21-22. See also CIO News, 7/19/43, p. 3; 12/13/43, p. 5.
# TABLE I

**CIO POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE**  
1943 TRADE-UNION PLEDGES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Pledges</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aluminum Workers</td>
<td>$1,000.00</td>
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<td>Amalgamated Clothing Workers</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Federation of Hosiery Workers</td>
<td>2,500.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>American Federation of Hosiery Workers (local)</td>
<td>1,255.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>American Communication Association</td>
<td>1,500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Newspaper Guild</td>
<td>1,631.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress of Industrial Organizations</td>
<td>100,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation of Glass, Ceramic, Silica, Sand Workers</td>
<td>5,000.00</td>
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<td>Federation of Glass, Ceramic, Silica, Sand Workers (local)</td>
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<td>International Union Shipyard Workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Fishermen and Allied Workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Fur and Leather Workers</td>
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<td>International Longshoremen</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Woodworkers of America</td>
<td>1,500.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers</td>
<td>10,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Maritime Union</td>
<td>5,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Workers</td>
<td>1,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State, County, and Municipal Workers</td>
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<td>Textile Workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Automobile Workers</td>
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<td>United Automobile Workers (local)</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing Workers</td>
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<td>United Farm Equipment and Metal Workers</td>
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<td>United Gas, Coke, and Chemical Workers</td>
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<td>United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Office and Professional Workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Packinghouse Workers</td>
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<td>United Rubber Workers</td>
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<tr>
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*Joseph Gaer, The First Round (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944), p. 177. Money actually received, including unsolicited contributions in excess of original pledges, totalled $671,214.11. Ibid., p. 181. (Gaer's table is headed: "Contributions.")*
charges by anguished politicians began in earnest when the Hillman committee had scarcely begun "organizing and educating." It started early in January when Congressman Howard W. Smith, Democrat of Virginia, petitioned Attorney General Francis Biddle to investigate PAC's "flagrant violation" of the Smith-Connally Act. The Attorney General complied but concurred (in April) in the CIO demurrer. Biddle found no violation of either the Corrupt Practices or Hatch Acts.35 A second inquiry was launched in January when Martin Dies, chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, elected to look into PAC's plan to "raise $2,000,000 to defeat members of Congress." Undeterred by Sidney Hillman's refusal to cooperate in a Dies' "fishing expedition," the pioneer "red hunter" from Texas soon issued a 215-page document which purported to expose the "subversive activities of the Communists" who, it was said, had decided to work through PAC. The report largely ignored actual activities and techniques of the Hillman committee and of cooperating CIO affiliates. Evidence comprised in the main a recitation of alleged Communist connections of a selected list of 35 officers or staff members of CIO unions and a listing of names of a number of unionists who at one time or another had been associated in some fashion with organizations catalogued as "Communist fronts." Save for Hillman's inclusion in the roster of suspect personalities the report failed to signify the relative importance to PAC of the individuals whose

numerous affiliations were so carefully enumerated. Whatever its shortcomings the Report emerged from the Government Printing Office on March 29, on the eve of several primary elections in which the CIO hoped to be influential. C. P. Trussell of the New York Times noted that it was being described as a "political handbook" and predicted—accurately—that it would be "employed vigorously in many parts of the country from now to November." Its major conclusions, greeted by Hillman with the flat assertion that "Martin Dies is a liar," were that PAC was trying to "undermine the whole parliamentary system of government," and that the movement was "Communist-inspired" and "Communist-directed." Apparently that which most aroused fears for "parliamentary" government was PAC's compilation of Congressional voting records on legislative issues. Times' man Trussell reported that in such compilations seven of the eight members of the Dies committee fared poorly by CIO standards.36


On April 10 the Attorney General opened his second inquiry. Soon thereafter the House of Representatives authorized a probe by a special committee on campaign expenditures. Both investigations derived in part from the persistent demands of Virginia's Congressman Smith, who was disturbed by the recent political fate of three House colleagues and who wanted, therefore, to "get at the CIO"
quickly "before the damage is done." On April 29 Congressman Dies ordered all PAC financial records subpoenaed, charging the CIO committees with trying to "buy" the elections and to "purge" certain Congressmen. Somewhat immodestly he averred that PAC had earmarked a quarter of a million dollars for his defeat alone. PAC officials declined to honor the subpoena, denying for the second time that election activities came within the purview of a committee on "subversive" activities. On May 2 the Justice Department answered in the affirmative an inquiry of a Senate committee on campaign practices as to whether PAC was within the law. Less than a month later, however, the GOP national chairman, Harrison E. Spangler, proposed that the Attorney General institute still another inquiry and a GOP Senator from Nebraska, Hugh Butler, called for a full-scale Senatorial investigation. Meantime another Republican, a pre-convention contender for his party's presidential nomination, was systematically telling audiences in widely separated parts of the country to beware of the threat posed by the PAC. The CIO, Ohio's Governor John W. Bricker told Texas Republicans, was a "powerful and dangerous group. . . which feeds off the laboring man and woman and seeks to dominate our government with radical and communistic schemes." The
PAC, he had been "reliably informed," was "prepared to spend $5,000,000" to re-elect President Roosevelt and "to take us down the road toward state socialism." Before a New Jersey audience he said the CIO's attempt to "interfere" in elections took it outside "its legitimate field of action," and Congress should act at once "to stop this subversive use of money to corrupt the approaching election." At a Washington press conference Bricker accused the CIO of "misusing" union funds and said if PAC's operations were not now "a violation law" then "they should be made a violation."  

At his own request in June, after voluntarily releasing an itemized financial statement through May 31, Sidney Hillman testified before the special Senate committee on campaign expenditures. He submitted to sharp questioning and adhered to a thesis he was to expound somewhat impatiently some ten weeks later before a House committee, namely, that PAC operations were no less "educational," no more "political," and, therefore, no less legal than, say, those of the National Industrial Information Committee of the National Association of Manufacturers. After this personal appearance of its chairman on Capitol Hill PAC won two moral victories over discrimination when both Senate and House resolutions authorizing campaign investigations were amended to include non-labor groups equally interested in influencing the conduct of government and
selection of governmental personnel. Even so, as will be de-


cribed in subsequent chapters, the more virulent anti-PAC investigating fever failed to subside. Rather, it rose during the summer months and Congressional challenges were given wide currency by reporters, editorialists and commentators, as well as by GOP campaign strategists.

PAC Refuses to be Diverted: Organization, Education, and the Washington Conference

It might be imagined from the foregoing that authorities at the New York headquarters had little to do during the first half of 1964 but hold "open house" for FBI and Congressional investigators and hold themselves in readiness for invitations to journey to Washington. Actually, as already indicated, organizational and missionary activity proceeded, the committee's intentions unaltered:

Our first concern is to bring the issues at stake to the attention of the people. Our second concern is to secure the widest possible participation in the determination of those issues through the use of the ballot. Our final concern is to bring to the American people the record of the candidates who solicit their support, to assist them in using their ballot intelligently and effectively.  

*Testimony of Sidney Hillman in U. S. House, Hearings of Committee on Campaign Expenditures, 1964, pp. 7-8*.
Although lobbying as such remained primarily the responsibility of
the CIO and its affiliates as union organizations, PAC personalities
and organizations, in pursuing PAC's "second concern," joined
labor's regular legislative representatives in seeking legislation
and administrative rulings to enhance the legal opportunities for a
big voter turnout in 1964. This they did on the widely touted
assumption that "when enough Americans vote they will vote right."\footnote{Ibid.} One reporter wrote: "The Hillman organization is
confident if the voters can be mobilized they will cast their
ballots overwhelmingly for the President for a fourth term, or, if
he should not run, for the Democratic candidate." Louis Stark in
\textit{NYT}, 3/5/\textsc{ll}, IV, p. 61.

Objectives included federal outlawry of the poll tax as a suffrage
barrier; and federal, state and/or local action to facilitate (1)
voter registration, (2) voting by war production workers, and (3)
absentee voting by armed forces personnel.\footnote{See, for example, \textit{PM}, 5/14/\textsc{ll}, p. 4; \textit{NYT}, 1/25/\textsc{ll}, p. 12:7; \textit{CIO News}, 2/7/\textsc{ll}, pp. 4, 9.}

As a first step in focusing attention upon issues the
Political Action Committee in mid-January held a two-day national
conference in New York City on "reconversion of industry and full
employment." Delegates heard some forty odd speakers drawn from
"labor, government, agriculture, small business and the professions,"
on the basis of whose knowledge and imaginative thinking PAC hoped
to work out "a comprehensive program to assure full employment in
the transition and post-war eras," a program to bring about a
"better life, not only for labor but for all Americans."\(^{43}\) Five

\(^{43}\) Sidney Hillman, "Forward," in CIO Political Action Com-
mittee, Full Employment, Proceedings of the Conference on FULL
Employment, Jan. 15, 1944.

Speakers came from more than a dozen CIO unions while non-
labor personalities included Vice-President Henry A. Wallace, New
York's major Fiorello La Guardia, the head of the National Farmers
Union, an editor of a liberal Catholic publication, a former OPA ad-
ministrator, the head of the Veterans Administration, a consulting
engineer, a Negro law school dean, the head of the Federal Public
Housing Authority, an advisor to the Federal Reserve System's Board
of Governors et al. NYT, 1/10/44, p. 19:3; 1/15/44, p. 26:1. See
also Gaer, The First Round, pp. 74-76.

months later, in Washington, a second national PAC conference unan-
imously ratified a "People's Program for 1944," which CIO spokesmen
were later to offer to the platform committees of the national party
conventions. Primarily the work of CIOPAC staffers, the program
text had been amended and approved by the CIO executive board. Con-
ference adoption signified acceptance by approximately 300 persons,
including members of both the latter and CIOPAC, the fourteen
regional PAC directors, and officers and other representatives of
at least twenty state and local PAC organizations, as well as of a
number of international and local unions. By Sidney Hillman's
description this platform constituted a comprehensive statement of
principles and concrete proposals designed
to assure full and uncompromising victory over the
enemy; to realize a just and lasting peace based upon
the friendship and collaboration of the freedom-
loving nations of the world, and to secure our goal,
here at home, of full production and full employment,
with security, freedom, and equal opportunity for all of our people, regardless of race, creed, or national origin.

H. E. House, Hearings of Committee on Campaign Expenditures, p. 7. See also Shipyard Worker, 6/23/44, p. 1; CIO News, 6/19/44, p. 2. The Program's final draft was apparently the work of Joseph Gaer, PAC Publications Director. Evidence suggests that proposals and tentative drafts had come from many sources within and outside the CIO. See Gaer, The First Round, p. 307. See also Hillman statement in The Hearings cited, p. 7. Corroborative remarks made to writer many years later by J. B.S. Hardman, editor, Labor and Nation. Interview, Dec. 18, 1951. (Hardman in 1944 was editor of the Advance, official organ of Hillman's Amalgamated Clothing Workers.)

Adoption of a platform geared to these lofty goals was accompanied by other decisions rather more readily recognizable as the tangible stuff of campaign politics. Until mid-May only political action committees in the field had made candidate commitments—though these had had the benefit of "consultation" with the national organization, as well as access, in a few primaries, to national PAC funds. Now, however, at Washington, the Hillman committee won a unanimous demonstration of approval for its first and, with one exception, only direct endorsements. Limited to the Presidency and Vice-Presidency the PAC recommendation, formulated in the preceding month, ostensibly confirmed resolutions which had been emanating for months from various CIO affiliates. The conference importuned President Roosevelt to accept nomination for a fourth term and urged the Democrats again to select Henry A. Wallace as his running mate. The only endorsement made subsequently was, again, for the Vice-presidency when Democratic rejection of Mr. Wallace necessitated
substitution of Senator Harry S. Truman on the PAC-endorsed ticket.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{45}U. S. House, Hearings of Committee on Campaign Expenditures, p. 8; CIO News, 5/15/lh, p. 3; 5/22/lh, p. 3/ 6/19/lh, p. 2.

Steps were also taken during the Washington conference to fulfill the original 1943 ambition to spearhead a progressive political movement broader than CIO alone, and plans were laid for future financing which would keep PAC a functioning entity and at the same time ensure its legality in the face of continued harrassment. The "NULL"-directed action--which left CIOPAC's structure intact--took the form of a new body, the National Citizens Political Action Committee (NCPAC) which, with the help of prominent names on its membership roster, was expected to magnetize non-CIO "liberals" and "progressives" (and their financial contributions) to the cause. Like CIOPAC the NCPAC was to be dedicated to mobilization of the electorate for "enlightened participation" in the 1944 elections, to assure renomination and re-election of Franklin D. Roosevelt and a "progressive" Congress. The precise attributes of "progressive" candidates were not rigidly spelled out. As Sidney Hillman later testified:

\begin{quote}
We do not care what party a candidate belongs to. We have got our program and we will support any Congressman who comes anywhere near supporting that program. Of course, we do not expect them to support the whole program. We are practical enough to know that.\textsuperscript{46}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{46}U. S. House, Hearings of Committee on Campaign Expenditures, 1944, p. 30.
With the usual quota of officers and its own executive board NCPAC, as it turned out, was to share PAC's New York office, even some officers and staff—including chairman Hillman. Beyond that it was to develop no elaborate field organization, although state and local committees sprang up under comparable names for related purposes, and the working relationship between the two national organizations was to be left more to improvisation than to planning. NCPAC's raison d'être was to supplement the labor committee's work, by financing additional literature, records, radio scripts, newspaper advertising, and the like, and, if need be, by making the type of campaign expenditure or contribution which would encounter special legal obstacles if made by the CIO or by a PAC beholden to "labor organizations" for operating funds. One regional PAC director, asked about the nature and extent of cooperation between the two groups, said such relationships as existed, like Topsy, simply grew or "happened." Interview with Charlotte Carr, Region II (New York) director in 1944, Nov. 28, 1951. For further data on NCPAC's birth and on the relationship between the two organizations see CIO News, 6/26/44, pp. 5, 6; Louis Stark in NYT, 7/31/44, p. 14:2. See also NYT, 5/17/44, p. 11:1; 6/18/44, p. 29:1; U. S. House, Hearings of Committee on Campaign Expenditures, 1944, pp. 9-12, 20-21, 27-28. U. S. Senate, Report on Investigation of Campaign Expenditures, 1944, p. 23; U. S. Senate, Special Committee Hearing on Campaign Expenditures, 1944, p. 26.

main out of funds solicited from individuals. In the case of CIOPAC this meant the "freezing," as of July 23, of the balance of its initial fund lest campaign use of the trade union donations become the basis for prosecution of either committee or contributors. Union spokesmen had already elected to be grateful for the "stimulation," however
vindictive, which had led the CIO to become more "self-reliant" politically, maintaining that labor preferred to spend its own dollars in its own way rather than to "contribute" them to candidates or parties. Now, as it locked up the union appropriations until after November 7, PAC chose to believe that a system of voluntary contributions would in the long run stimulate individual union members to greater personal interest and support.

Evidence suggests that PAC originally expected to use its "trade union" fund for direct election campaigning as well as for pre-nominating "educational" purposes. In November 1943, on announcing the union pledges Hillman asserted: "Since the Smith-Connally... Act prohibits unions from contributing to political parties in Federal elections, the money will be spent by the CIO itself in behalf of the candidate whom it supports." NYT, 11/5/43, p. 13:1. See also CIO News, 6/26/44, p. 6; 7/17/44, p. 6; U. S. House, Hearing of Committee on Campaign Expenditures, 1944, pp. 16-17.
CHAPTER II

PAC GOES TO A PARTY CONVENTION, CAMPAIGNS, AND HAILS THE ELECTION RETURNS

PAC's role in the Democratic convention represented one of the more colorful phases of the 1944 political picture--and one of the most controversial episodes in PAC's early life. CIO political actionists had little effect upon the Republican convention which met in Chicago in June. Van Bittner, PAC vice chairman, attended but his participation was confined to presentation before the platform committee of abbreviated highlights of the "People's Program." It could hardly be said that he was received with more than polite toleration.

The Democratic conclave, which also met in the Windy City, July 19-21, was something else again. The PAC force came both from within and outside that body. Sidney Hillman with important staff assistants maintained hotel headquarters from which they participated in off-the-convention-floor factional maneuvering. At the same time, PAC was

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1PAC staff members who accompanied Hillman to Chicago included C. B. Baldwin, assistant chairman; John J. Abt, legal counsel; J. Raymond Walsh, research director; Richard Rohman, publicity; Thomas Burns, special field representative; Verda Barnes, director, Women's Division; Henry Lee Moon, head of the Negro Section. Clark Foreman, NOPAC secretary, was also in the unofficial PAC delegation. NYT, 7/16/44, p. 26:6. Cf. Bittner's more lonely mission to the GOP. Ibid., 6/27/44, p. 14:2.

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represented by perhaps 100 CIO members and PAC personalities duly accredited as delegates or alternates. These included five PAC regional directors, several state PAC chairmen, presidents and vice presidents of several international unions, heads of state industrial union councils, officers of local unions. At least one CIO man sat on each of the four major committees—credentials, rules, permanent organization and resolutions. In the latter case at least two were entitled as committee members to hear Hillman and CIO president Murray, the latter himself a delegate from Pennsylvania, offer the PAC platform for consideration. One key delegation (Michigan) was chaired by an officer of CIO's largest affiliate. Forty delegates do not loom large numerically or proportionately in a body whose members held 1,176 votes. Obviously whatever actions conformed to PAC designs were taken by CIO Democrats in conjunction with elements much more numerous than themselves. PAC strength lay necessarily less in numbers than in enthusiasm, conviction and organizational skill. It lay also, in the belief of CIO publicists, in the knowledge of "the politicians" that
PAC represented a movement in process of mobilizing a vast array of voters capable of making their influence felt in November. One CIO newsman wrote proudly that the labor representatives were “repeatedly” consulted “on strategy, policies and nominations.”

Hardly a news story was written that did not refer to labor’s influence. . . When Philip Murray and Sidney Hillman appeared before the resolutions committee, the room filled to capacity for the first time and important party leaders came to cock an ear. When they held a press conference, between 150 and 200 newspapermen showed up. . .3


CIO influence was not readily distinguishable in the text of the party platform. Dedication to victory in war, to international cooperation for peace, to full employment and prosperity: these were cardinal aims of the “People’s Program,” but they were far from a labor monopoly as World War II approached its decisive stage. Concretely, the Democratic document did not incorporate specific CIO proposals for achieving these ends and rested in the main on the record and philosophy of the Roosevelt administration. On the rare planks that were contested—e.g., on racial equality—CIO was part of a liberal bloc which demonstrated a gain in intra-party bargaining power at the expense of southern “poll taxers.”4 In a ticklish dispute

4 The latter were unable to secure more than eight of the twelve states necessary to force the committee compromise to the floor. NYT, 7/21/hh, p. 1:8.
over credentials CIO observers credited their members with carrying some weight, in a manner which redounded to the benefit of PAC-endorsed candidates for both convention nominations.\(^5\) In that matter

\(^5\) The compromise decision to seat two competing Texas delegations with a half vote per member resulted in accretion to the President of perhaps a dozen votes he would not otherwise have received. It also improved the chances of the CIO favorite in the infinitely more critical vice-presidential contest. At one point in the latter balloting Texas gave Mr. Wallace 27 votes, of which 24 came from the "pro-Roosevelt" contingent as opposed to the so-called "regulars." The latter were enjoined by the state convention which elected them not to consider themselves even morally bound to support the convention's nominees unless they met with their personal approval. A CIO member of the credentials committee spoke on behalf of the successful compromise plan when it was contested on the floor. Democratic National Convention Proceedings, 1948, pp. 85-91, 106, 253-255, 261. See also CIO News, 7/21/1948; UE News, 7/29/1948, p. 5.

of nominations the PAC role was so conspicuous that it provided unwittingly what was soon to become the most assiduously cultivated slogan of the campaign, implication of which was that the great Democratic party had succumbed ignominiously to control by a labor pressure group.

PAC "clears" a Vice-Presidential Nomination with the Democrats

Mr. Roosevelt won re-nomination handily with a first ballot vote of 1,086 out of 1,176. Such near unanimity did not prevail in the vice-presidential balloting. Here, in sharp contrast to the relatively harmonious and, therefore, dull GOP gathering,\(^6\) Democratic factional

\(^6\) See, for example, Life, 7/31/1948; NYT, 6/26-28/1948.
cleavages were painfully exposed, as three fairly well defined elements struggled for dominance: 1) the so-called farmer-labor "liberals," "radicals" and/or proud "New Dealers"; 2) the "conservatives," including some leaders of the "southern aristocracy" and those with ill-disguised "anti-labor" and "anti-New Deal" proclivities; 3) adherents of the "big city bosses," men presumably indifferent to all considerations save those of practical politics and patronage. Ultimately more than enough

7 For a description of this three-way struggle within the Democratic party as of 1936, when the CIO made its first appearance on the political scene see William Allen White, What It's All About (New York: Macmillan, 1936), p. 72.

members of all three groupings were willing to combine behind Harry S. Truman. That the final vote—1,031 to 105 for Truman over Wallace—represented in fact a three-way unity compromise rather than a decisive defeat for the labor element in one of the three factions has been hotly disputed. Not controverted is the claim that PAC was mainly responsible for the remarkably good showing made by the incumbent as candidate of a farm-labor-liberal bloc. Another point widely conceded, at the time, was that PAC played a significant role in determining the identity of the ultimate winner by maneuvering which occurred before any names were placed in nomination.

8 In a token southern "revolt" 89 presidential nomination votes were cast for Harry F. Byrd of Virginia. One vote went to James A. Farley. For the vice-presidential nomination four candidates in addition to Truman and Wallace polled 1, 6, 26 and 4 votes, respectively, on the final tabulation. See Democratic National Convention Proceedings, 1948, pp. 110, 270.
PAC since its inception had been closely identified with the Vice-President. Probably no one outside the labor movement had been more in demand as a speaker before CIO and PAC audiences, and no endorsement save that for FDR more inevitable at the Washington conference. When Hillman arrived in Chicago PAC had "no second choice."  

Accordingly, some CIO Democrats, loyal to Wallace through the first ballot and the initial reading of the second, remained unmoved by the vote transfers on the final second ballot tabulation which gave the nomination to Wallace's chief rival. Some others joined their delegations on the Truman bandwagon only under protest. Still others shared the sentiments of a CIO man who moved "for the sake of unity" to "make it unanimous for Senator Truman." How many PAC adherents were in each of these categories has not been determined but the accuracy of the "no second choice" dictum is belied by the facts. PAC won general acclaim for the effort which pushed Wallace to a peak strength of 473
votes. Virtually everyone conceded that such a vote, many times the CIO numerical strength, would have been impossible without PAC activity in state caucuses and on the floor, and without PAC's non-delegate forces keeping in "constant touch" with "every important party leader."\(^{12}\) PAC, whose convention headquarters were next door to Wallace's Iowa delegation, was said to be in fact the only organization the Vice-President had to pit against the "bosses" who opposed his candidacy and the southern conservatives who in all probability would have bolted the party had he won re-nomination. Some held that PAC prevented Wallace's withdrawal from the race even before the balloting began.\(^{13}\) At the same time, Harry S. Truman too owed something to the

\(^{12}\text{CIO News, 7/24/48.}\)

\(^{13}\text{News writer Henry J. Taylor credited Richard Rohman of the PAC staff with calling Hillman "the man who kept Wallace in the race." According to Taylor, Wallace, estimating his first ballot strength at no more than 205 votes, contemplated withdrawal until Hillman assured him PAC "had an additional 200 delegates for him controlled by our men..." Columnist Thomas L. Stokes impliedly attributed to PAC most of the organizational enthusiasm and hard work which produced the Wallace votes, asserting that PAC "did very well, all in all," putting up "an effective battle for Mr. Wallace" and thus gaining "recognition as a political factor of consequence." Convention records show that Wallace polled 429 votes on the first ballot, 473 on the second before the transfers to Truman reduced his total to 105. Truman polled 319 votes on the first ballot, 477 on the second at the first completion of the roll call, then 1,031 after all of the vote shifts were in. On the first ballot fourteen additional "favorite sons" polled a total of 127 votes. Democratic National Convention Proceedings, 1948, pp. 256, 257-62, 270; Columbus Citizen, 7/24/48; 7/25/48. See also A. B. Magil, News Masses, 8/1/48, p. 5.
Political Action Committee. The Missouri Senator drew an appreciable nucleus of his first ballot strength from states loosely classified as within the orbit of the "big city bosses." He garnered an impressive number of initial second ballot votes from southern delegations previously supporting conservative favorite sons or the favorite sons of northern states identifiable with nationally prominent party bosses or machines. His final victory, however, was only partially dependent

14 Louisiana gave Truman her votes on the first ballot. He received only scattered votes from other southern delegations. See Democratic National Convention Proceedings, 1948, p. 256.

upon these and upon additional votes from similar sources accruing to him during the course of the bandwagon swing. Truman also won needed support from states in which farm-labor-liberal votes were initially in a majority and from scattered New Deal forces in other delegations, including some from the South. In all, fewer Truman votes (496½) came from camps apparently dominated on a state-wide basis by the southern conservatives or urban "bosses" than from areas and delegates—including some CIO members—plausibly classifiable with the farm-labor-liberal or New Deal camp (534½). Five hundred and eighty-nine were necessary to nominate. 15

15 Some votes in this latter category came to Truman on the first ballot (127), others on subsequent transfers from Wallace and other New Deal candidates (215). They were cast by delegates from north and south, and, particularly, from western, Mid-western and northern states whose initial voting pattern indicated relative freedom from an anti-New Deal or anti-Wallace "boss control."

The writer's analysis of the sources of Wallace's strength shows that 41 per cent of his first ballot votes came from 14 western and
midwestern delegations, from an apparent combination of farm-labor-liberal votes that gave him 73 per cent of the potential voting strength of the states involved. Thirteen per cent of his 429 1/2 first ballot votes came from four southern delegations, two of which cast unit votes for his nomination, 8 per cent from five of the six New England states, 5 per cent from five of the seven territories, and 33 per cent from the more populous states in the northern industrial orbit. On the final tabulation, after a slight accretion to Wallace and then the decisive shift to Truman, the bulk of the remaining Wallace votes came from the same western and midwestern delegations which had given him the highest proportion of their votes on the first roll call, states representing large farm populations as well as industrial. Those with a proportionately greater number of industrial (and CIO) constituents moved into the Truman column. See Martha Saenger, The CIO Political Action Committee (unpublished M. A. Thesis, Ohio State University, 1945), pp. 176-200.

Probably PAC's most significant influence on this order of convention business was represented by the insurance policy which it took out, before the succession of nominating speeches began, on the life of Democratic "liberalism." One clause of that policy consisted of a firm notification to party leaders that a certain aspirant believed to have the President's blessing was utterly unacceptable. The second comprised a tacit PAC commitment to Senator Truman as a palatable second choice. Mr. Roosevelt had tendered the incumbent Vice-President only a weakly consoling convention message that if he were a delegate he "personally would vote" for Mr. Wallace. By contemporary accounts the Chief Executive was sympathetic to the apparent first choice of the "bosses" and southern conservatives, all of whom were happy to be relieved of the odious necessity of repeating their 1940 acceptance of the "Chief's" personal preference. That first choice, described as the "focal point" of forces intent on preventing Wallace's renomination, was James F. Byrnes, War Mobilization Director. The prospects for
victory for this gentleman, easily assailable as labor's Public Enemy No. 1 for his part in the imposition and enforcement of certain wartime policies, were deemed so good that banners had already been designed for a "Roosevelt-Byrnes" ticket. Yet the latter formally withdrew from the race the day the convention opened! The ensuing victory of Senator Truman was interpreted in some circles as the "first great political beating ever given the CIO and the American equivalent of the French Popular Front," a beating administered by the "Democrats of the southern tier and the urban bosses of the north." This is at best a half truth. It was an open secret that Byrnes' withdrawal stemmed from a Presidential request and that the latter in turn was issued primarily in deference to a CIO declaration, communicated to him and/or to Democratic chairman Bob Hannegan by Sidney Hillman, that under no circumstances would PAC assent to Byrnes' nomination.

Newsman of all political leanings attributed Byrnes' withdrawal squarely to CIO influence and the New York Times concluded that the CIO, by inspiring Mr. Roosevelt to ditch his "assistant president, had established itself as the "dominant force" in the convention.

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16 See NYT, 7/18/44, p. 11; 7/19/44, p. 11; PM, 7/19/44; Democratic National Convention Proceedings, 1944, p. 63. See also p. 13 above.

17 E.g., Westbrook Pegler in Columbus Citizen, 7/22/44. See also Life, 7/31/44, p. 20; Ray Ghent and the Scripps-Howard weekly roundup in New York World-Telegram, 7/22/44.
over, there is reason to credit PAC, despite its supposed pro-Wallace intransigence, with narrowing the number of serious contenders in the post-Byrnes field to two New Deal alternatives. The "bosses" and the national party chairman, from Truman's home state, who could not alone or in combination swing the nomination, were assuredly the latter's chief promoters in the convention.  

19 In a seconding speech for Wallace, UAW vice president Frankenstein referred to the "few men from New Jersey," the "few men from Chicago," the "few men from Tammany Hall," and the "few men from Kansas City," those representatives of "shady city bossism" who were attempting to "steamroll" a Truman nomination against the wishes of "the majority." Democratic National Convention Proceedings, 1948, pp. 226-27.

business was about to be taken from the smoke-filled rooms to the convention floor, however, the President gave notice that he would "welcome" as a running mate either Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, whose availability was extremely remote, or Senator Truman, who was originally scheduled to place Byrnes in nomination and who, by his own testimony, had a fine speech ready for delivery for that purpose.  

20 Truman has also testified that, in the course of a telephone conversation with Hannegan which he was privileged to overhear—the day before the vice-presidential balloting—FDR had insisted that he, Truman, permit his own name to be placed in nomination. From Precinct to President, Some Reflections by Harry S. Truman, TV interview by Edward R. Murrow, February 1957, presented by the Columbia Broadcasting System, Feb. 2, 1958.
according to some reports, PAC leaders had let it be known and subse-
quently refused to deny that the CIO would not protest Truman's selec-
tion once they were persuaded that Wallace's cause was lost. Hence it
appears, without refutation in the balloting, that opposing factions
had discovered in the Senator not the candidate to "beat" Wallace, but
a "New Dealer" who was singularly acceptable to all of the party's chief
factional groupings.21 It appears, in short, that the party king makers

21 Cf. James Wechsler in PM, 7/19/44, and editorial, Life,
7/31/44, p. 13.

had done precisely what President Roosevelt reportedly pressed upon
chairman Hannegan with regard to the vice-presidential nomination, viz.,
not that they capitulate to but that they "clear it with Sidney."
Either that, or the "bosses," to their satisfaction had found themselves
confronted with a prospective nominee eminently satisfactory to them,
who had already been "cleared with Sidney" by the President.22

22 A Hillman biographer, Matthew Josephson, writes of the pre-
convention maneuvering that "Philip Murray strongly favored the renom-
ination of Wallace" and that Hillman, "though never keen for Wallace,
would give him full support as the CIO's first choice." But Hillman
was most concerned about "the determination of the 'Big Four' Demo-
cratic city bosses, Flynn, Hague, Kelly, and Crump, to block Wallace
and push through the nomination of Byrnes." As a consequence, "Hillman
reached a clear understanding with Roosevelt, according to which the
PAC group was to continue to support Wallace, as it had committed it-
self to do; but when it became plain that Wallace could not get the
nomination, then Hillman would do his best to keep the friends of the
CIO at the Chicago convention from opposing the choice of Truman as an
alternative." Josephson asserts that one of Hillman's major worries
centered about such high CIO figures as Murray; that Hillman, who had
already confided to Truman his willingness to accept the latter as
nominee, was constrained, after release of the President's "Truman or
Douglas" message, to "calm Murray down" and to persuade him of Truman's
acceptability. Murray, by this account, was so "agitated at the way in which the party bosses had combined in the end to 'put over' Truman" that he "talked of having the CIO-PAC bolt the convention." Sidney Hillman, Statesman of American Labor (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1952), pp. 613-25. (Italics added.)

According to the CIO News, 7/31/44, p. 2, Murray and PAC officers announced at the close of the convention that they were "eminently satisfied" with Truman. By Truman's own testimony years later, Byrnes, in asking the Senator to place his name in nomination, had declared himself to be the President's choice, but he (Truman) later learned that FDR, at "a meeting" in the White House fully a week before the convention, had indicated that the "Senator from Missouri" was his personal favorite to succeed Wallace. Murrow interview with Truman cited on p. 55n above. For further discussion of PAC at the Democratic convention see Saenger, The CIO Political Action Committee, pp. 151-201.

PAC Campaigns Successfully for FDR and a Progressive Congress and Is Hailed as a New Force in American Politics

With the Democratic convention out of the way the next tasks were clear. The new MCPAC had to recruit names and funds and to spend the latter where they would do the most good. CIOPAC had to continue to spur organization in the field, to raise money and to extend practical aid to PAC-participating units—in the form of tangible campaign materials and of advice on problems of finance, legality, organization, strategy, etc. Its leaders were to tread union and other public platforms on behalf of PAC endorsees and to come to PAC's defense in Congressional and other forums. Area PAC organizations, some of which were yet to be formed, had to recommend candidates for offices other than those on the national ticket and to promote solicitation and application of funds and energy for success of the CIO political program.23
Late in September Congressional district PAC chairman and committees in Region V received a memorandum from the regional PAC director on the nature of their work. One of their duties was to initiate joint labor committees for PAC-endorsed candidates. Primarily they were to serve as liaison, on the one hand, between endorsed candidates and CIO units within their respective areas, and, on the other, between endorsees and PAC organizations at state, regional and national levels. Objective in the first instance was to push PAC fund collections within the CIO organizations and to urge membership support at the polls; in the second, to channel additional financial aid into the district, where possible and advisable, and to supply both candidates and Congressional district committees with literature and/or raw materials for publication and other campaign use. Field Memo, Jack Kroll to CIOPAC Congressional District Committee Chairmen, 9/27/66.

The new committee in a relatively short time attracted to membership some 111 persons prominent in "the ranks of labor, farmers, businessmen, and professional people—men and women. . . native-born and naturalized. . . white and Negro." The Hon. George W. Norris, former Senator from Nebraska, accepted its honorary chairmanship. By the end of October NCPAC membership—which in reality, meant its list of financial contributors—had risen to more than four thousand.

Other officers were: Sidney Hillman, chairman; James G. Patton, president of the National Farmers Union, and Freda Kirchwey, publisher of the Nation, vice chairman; R. J. Thomas, UAW president, treasurer; James H. McGill, manufacturer, comptroller; and Clark Foreman, president, Southern Conference for Human Welfare, secretary. Besides these the executive committee of fifteen included CIO president Murray; Van Bittner of the Steelworkers; Verda White Barnes of the CIOPAC staff; former Governor Elmer Benson of Minnesota; James Loeb, secretary of the Union for Democratic Action; former GOP Governor Gifford Pinchot of Pennsylvania; Lucy Randolph Mason, southern gentlewoman and CIO staff member; Dr. Robert C. Weaver of the Mayor’s Committee on Racial Relations, Chicago, and A. F. Whitney, president of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. Listed in Hillman statement, U. S. House, Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures, Hearing on H. Res. 551, 78th Cong., 2d sess., Part I, Aug. 28, 1964, pp. 9-12.

As asked who bore the greater responsibility for "running" NCPAC one interviewee reminded this writer: after all, NCPAC was not a "functioning committee" but "just a lot of names." Interview with J.B.S. Hardman, former editor of Advance, Dec. 18, 1951.

In August the committee addressed an appeal for contributions to the general public, setting a goal of a million and a half dollars, which, along with a like total for the CIO committee, would constitute the maximum permissible for a single organization under the Hatch Act.

Some time earlier CIOPAC had announced its voluntary dollar drive among union members and had recommended a geographical distribution formula for collecting agencies to follow. Now, simultaneously with the NCPAC announcement, the CIO executive board set aside the four weeks beginning with Labor Day as the period for the most intensive effort.

Placed in nominal charge of the labor drive was a committee of four international union secretary-treasurers.25 Results in both cases fell

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25 These were McDonald of the Steelworkers, Potofsky of the Clothing Workers, Addes of UAW and Emspak of UE. The recommended formula for apportionment of contributions collected by the CIO solicitors called for transmission of one-half of each dollar, via the international unions, to the national CIOPAC, and for distribution of the remaining half among state and local PAC units for political activity at those levels. As originally conceived it appears that the general public, Congressional investigators, even some CIO leaders were confused as to the line of demarcation between CIOPAC and NCPAC. According to early announcements the new committee was to collect from CIO members as well as from other persons. Actually, each national organization made its own collections, had its own operating budget, kept its own distinct financial records. See NYT, 6/18/47, p. 29; 8/16/47, p. 36; CIO News, 6/26/47, pp. 5, 6; 7/17/47, pp. 4-5; 7/17/47, p. 6; 7/31/47, p. 2; 8/21/47, pp. 1, 3; United Automobile Worker, 7/15/47, p. 3;
embarrassingly short of the goal—and still farther short of fanciful figures such as those headlined by the Cincinnati Post over a June 17 story: "PAC Reveals Plan to Raise $5,500,000." Even when added to the 1943 union treasury donations the 1944 campaign collections scarcely reached half the Hatch Act limit. Sidney Hillman, maintaining grandly that the "real asset" of both committees lay not in money but in "the enthusiasm and the energetic cooperation and assistance of millions of Americans," told one insistent Congressional interrogator, "We could not possibly make use of that much money [three million dollars]." Final figures show that they were spared the necessity of trying.

TABLE 2

CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS AND NATIONAL CITIZENS
POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES: FINAL FINANCIAL REPORTS,
1943-1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributions*</th>
<th>Expenditures*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIOPAC Trade-union account</td>
<td>$ 647,903.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIOPAC Individual contributions account</td>
<td>376,910.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>$1,024,814.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Citizens Political Action Committee</td>
<td>380,306.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$1,405,120.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Combined receipts of the three national funds placed PAC in fourth place among committees reporting contributions in excess of $1,000,000. This was lower, as will be seen in the accompanying table, than the figure reported by one Republican committee for a single metropolitan area. It was only slightly higher than some party funds collected in individual states, whether by one or more committees. Contrasts of state PAC funds with those amassed by the major parties, particularly the Republican party, were equally sharp. So too were contrasts between the sums contributed by individuals. Save for a handful of loans and a very few contributions of $500 or more—mostly from non-labor sources—amounts of three and four figures on CIOPAC's
TABLE 3
ILLUSTRATIVE 1944 PARTY AND POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE FUNDS COMPARED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Committee &amp; Action Committee</th>
<th>Receipts#</th>
<th>Expenditures#</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican National Committee</td>
<td>$2,999,999</td>
<td>$2,828,651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic National Committee</td>
<td>$2,562,784</td>
<td>$2,056,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Republican Finance Committee for Metropolitan New York</td>
<td>$1,659,151</td>
<td>$1,260,593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIO and National Citizens Political Action Committees</td>
<td>$1,605,120</td>
<td>$1,327,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Finance Committee of Pennsylvania</td>
<td>$1,252,700</td>
<td>$939,934</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In California seventeen Republican finance committees reported receipts aggregating $1,056,065. Information received by this writer from the office of the secretary of state, Sacramento, California, 1/16/45.

account book were rare. One "liberal Philadelphia paper" observed early in July, in the light of horror stories on PAC "slush funds," that "it would take 20,000 union members at a buck apiece just to equal the contributions of seven Dewey contributors" on the "long list" of the GOP's committee for metropolitan New York. 27

27List of donors and donations excerpted from the Philadelphia Record, quoted in CIOPAC Clip Sheet, 7/7/44. Out of the CIOPAC's individual contributions account of $376,910, less than $12,000 came from donors (16) in amounts of $500 or more. One of these sums ($500) was from Sidney Hillman, another ($500) from Philip Murray. One CIOPAC staff member (J. Raymond Walsh, research director) and one NCPAC officer (Clark Foreman, secretary) lent the CIO committee sums of $1,750 and $5,000, respectively, during the period of July 23 to
Evidence of efforts by CIO affiliates—national, state, local—to step up the pace of PAC organization, to raise money, to promote voter registration, to spread "enlightenment" on issues and candidates, to get out the vote will be presented in later chapters. By far the most documentable aid given to the latter by the national CIO PAC lay in the supplying of vast quantities of literature. This, in addition to the output of the CIO Department of Research and Education, was important prior to the Democratic convention. After that event the PAC publication volume rose to veritable flood proportions: 1) to help recruit PAC workers and organize political machinery; 2) to "educate" PAC workers in proper, legal and effective campaign techniques; 3) to put into the hands of distributors the hundreds, thousands, even millions of copies of pamphlets, leaflets, posters, radio scripts, bulletins, letters, billboards, press releases, badges and other miscellaneous items which could be posted in public places or union halls across the country, reprinted in the labor press, broadcast on the radio, handed out at union meetings or plant gates, distributed by doorbell ringing neighborhood canvassers, etc.—all to the end that "Roosevelt and a progressive Congress" might be returned to Washington.
Initially PAC literature, like all PAC activity, was predicated on the announced assumption that "the people" needed only to be induced to vote. That they would "vote liberal," if they voted, was taken for granted. Later materials were more frankly partisan, though designed not so much to sell a Democratic future as to drive home the virtues of a New Deal past and to alert the beneficiaries of the New Deal to the menace posed by identifiable candidates of "reaction."  

New York's 1943 regional PAC director Carr maintained that PAC workers did little talking on "issues" until the end of the campaign, that the 1944 campaign was mainly a "crusade" to get people registered and to the polls. Interview with Charlotte Carr, Nov. 26, 1951. An end-of-the-campaign October leaflet "bombardment" was described by one reporter as designed to "work the workers into a froth against Governor Dewey or to frighten them at the prospect of losing their good jobs, good pay and other gains if President Roosevelt is not continued in office." Turner Catledge, NYT, 10/1/44, p. 12E:1.

The CIO Department of Research and Education produced a "Political Primer for all Americans" as early as November 1943. The earliest CIO PAC publications prepared for the recruiting and training of PAC workers came out in March 1944, the last in October. The first such pamphlet, on voter registration, introduced a series of three entitled "Every Worker a Voter." It began:

This pamphlet tells you why every worker should register so that he or she can vote in 1944. It tells you how to go about helping all the workers in your plant get registered.

Only one in 150 CIO workers will receive this pamphlet. It is distributed only to people like you, because we know that you already realize the importance of voting and registering. We count on you to help bring this realization home to other workers in your plant. . .

**Pamphlets:** "The People's Program for 1944," "The Negro in 1944," "Full Employment," "Jobs for All after the War," "A Business Man Looks at the Election"

**Leaflets:** "Lest We Forget," "Are You Registered?", "Back to the Breadlines with Dewey," "By Their Deeds," "It Could Happen," "PAC Needs $"

**Posters:** "We Vote," "We Are Americans--We Vote," "Register," "What's Cooking Mr. Dewey More Apples?", "PAC Needs $", "No Poll Tax Here"

**Billboards:** "Arm-Vote," "Our Friend" [picture of FDR]

**Fliers:** "Twelve Years of Progress," "Non-Partisan Churchmen's Statement," "Catholic Press Supports PAC," "Bette Davis' Speech," "Channing Tobias' Statement"

**Badges:** "Precinct Captain Badge," "I Registered. How About You?"

**Bulletins:** "Political Action News" (6 issues), "Labor Press Release" (weekly)

**Letters:** "Murray-Hillman Registration Letter," "Hillman Memo--Election Day Laws"

**Miscellaneous:** "Fund Raising Sticker," "Dewey-Hoover Postcard," "Ballots Are Bullets" (stamps), "Congress to Win the War and
Peace (CIO-PAC Reprint of New Republic Supplement)," "The Republican Party and U.S. Foreign Policy" (Union for Democratic Action Pamphlet)30

A complete list of CIOPAC publications, from which these titles have been excerpted, appears in ibid., pp. 305-310, along with the total number of copies printed of each item.

These items rolled off the presses in huge quantities, to be channeled to workers et al via participating organizations, largely through the facilities of the regional PAC offices. Turner Catledge of the New York Times wrote that leaflets were being shipped out of New York at the rate of ten million a week and PAC, proud of quality as well as quantity, estimated at the end of the campaign that some 85,000,000 copies of campaign literature of all kinds had been distributed. Catledge asserted:

For cleverness, potential effectiveness and volume this leaflet campaign and particularly the leaflets themselves, have been adjudged by many political observers as having had no parallel in the Presidential contests of the last quarter century.

Comments from other non-labor sources were equally laudatory.31

See Turner Catledge in NYT, 10/1/60, p. 12E:1. Life reported PAC's "spectacular use of posters, pamphlets and movies," and described its "products... among the brightest and most effective political propaganda now turned out." Time characterized the pamphlets and handbooks as "exceptionally able political writing." Billboard said it was "smart" and "shows savvy." Collier's declared it turned right-wing politicians "pale around the gills," and the United States News said PAC was leading labor into a campaign such as "American politics never had seen before." Cited in PM, 7/28/60. See also Life, 9/11/60; Gaer, The First Round, p. 305.
As for the effects at the polls of this sprightly literature
and of varied PAC activities, labor spokesmen agreed that they would
be difficult to assess. In many districts the CIO was non-existent
or a negligible factor. Even in CIO territory Congressional endorse­
ments were often not forthcoming or were tendered more as gestures of
sympathy than as harbingers of serious effort or hope of success.32

32 Asked why there were no CIO endorsements in nine of Ohio's
twenty-three Congressional districts a state PAC staff man replied
simply, "We concentrated where we felt PAC had a chance." Statement
by Tom Downs, Ohio CIO Council. Interview, November 1944.

Even where its potential was great PAC strength was by no means always
fully mobilized. Yet results were often strongly suggestive and con­
temporary observers, in reasonably full knowledge of the activities
of other politically active groups, tended to credit PAC on a nation­
wide basis with prime responsibility for reducing public apathy, for
inducing thousands of voter registrations, for inspiring unexpectedly
large voter turnouts in a number of strategic primaries (some
Republican, most of them Democratic), and for giving impetus to various
drives, labor and non-labor, pro- and anti-FDR, which in November made
many early election prognosticators look ridiculous.33 In many

33 See, for example, a report from Chicago that "apathy" was
being dispelled, that there was an increasing flood of applications for
absentee war ballots (more than "anyone had ever seriously predicted")
and much heavier registration than anticipated. A "good part of the
registration, which most "reliable poll-takers" interpreted as en­
couraging news for FDR, was attributed to the CIO PAC's "insistent, well­
organized, door-to-door drive." Turner Catledge in NYT, 10/15/44,
p. 10E:5.
contests credit was frankly assigned for kind as well as volume of votes cast.

Officially, those who spoke for PAC, while freely publicizing their opposition to certain incumbents, steadily disavowed any "purge" list and modestly accepted, after the fact, only "partial" responsibility for election victories. Some of PAC's most conspicuous successes, nonetheless, lay in the defeat, in the primaries, of certain "anti-labor" "reactionaries" and/or "isolationists," and labor papers in midsummer were gleeful that "the casualty list for extreme [Congressional] reactionaries" had mounted to nine.74 Defeated incumbents and

74 Cf., for example, NYT, 1/25/46, p. 12:7 and The Sun [Cincinnati, Ohio CIO paper], 8/4/46. See also Gaer, op. cit., p. 266.

journalistic observers alike assailed or acclaimed PAC for the political misfortunes of the former. Arthur Krock of the Times averred that, however inconclusive they might be in other respects, the primaries proved that Hillman's organization was

... a potent force in the selection and rejection of candidates for Congress. It won here and it lost there, but wherever the committee was active against an aspirant he had a fight on his hands. And in some instances PAC was credited with the success or failure of a candidate.

This columnist was so impressed that he was positive he detected real apprehension on the part of "big city Democratic bosses in the North" lest this helpful labor "appendage" become a "balance of power," itself creating "new bosses" in the cities. Life's tabulations showed that more than three-fourths of PAC's primary endorsees were
successful. Observers were almost equally lavish, later, in tracing


to PAC "phenomenal" registration and surprising general election totals.

In 1940 the total national vote was in excess of 49½ million. By CIO's regretful accounting the 1942 vote dropped to around 28 million—out of perhaps an 80-million ballot potential. Continued war weariness,


registration and voting obstacles for armed forces personnel and transient war workers, Democratic overconfidence in the political magic of the Roosevelt name, an alleged GOP faith in a "light" vote, these and other factors were expected to prevent a normal pendulum swing back in '44. Even when confronted by the registration totals and primary returns professional pollsters dared predict, as one did on October 4, that fewer than 40 million votes would be cast. In mid-October it

was speculated that union members not yet registered would be discouraged from qualifying before their respective state deadlines because of a refusal of the War Labor Board to recommend drastic modification of the "Little Steel" formula. There were predictions that WLB recalcitrance would seriously impair PAC's electoral offensive, that it gave labor a powerful reason for forsaking the President at the last minute. Yet Sidney Hillman late that month predicted a vote "at least as high" as in 1940 and the CIO News declared proudly that PAC's registration campaign had been "without parallel in American political history," stirring "millions outside CIO ranks." The professionals revised their estimates upward. Some organization Democrats, on viewing record registrations in communities within their territories, found themselves dispatching congratulatory messages to PAC offices.  

Indiana's Democratic chairman reportedly told regional PAC director McKeough, "too much credit cannot be given your organization." Elsewhere, too, despite earlier gloomy predictions, wrote Marquis Childs, "unbiased observers" were crediting PAC with "record registration rolled up in recent weeks" in many industrial states. New York Post, 10/26/44, p. 21.
On election eve, on the basis of regional reports, Hillman prophesied a greater "landslide" for FDR than in 1940. Some 60 million persons had qualified and state officials were estimating a probable turnout of 44,637,000. While the final statistics did not bear out the more optimistic Hillman outlook the Democratic presidential ticket did carry 36 of the 48 states, with a popular vote of 25,602,505 to 22,006,278 and an electoral vote ratio of 432 to 99. The total popular vote was 48,025,684. The CIO News found the quality of the Congres-

sional returns also to be gratifying. Some "notorious reactionaries" and "isolationists" had again "felt the wrath of the voters" and "many CIO-backed candidates, both for Congress and for local office were returned." Just before the balloting began the CIO's editorial voice pictured the emergence of labor as an effective political force as the outstanding element in the 1944 election. Afterwards, Hillman, whose CIO convention reception two weeks later was to be that of a conquering hero, made only "modest" victory statements, generously sharing credit with other groups and, perhaps too piously, viewing as PAC's "greatest achievement... that we were able to instill into the people their civic responsibility to vote...." Both CIO executive board and convention were sufficiently impressed to agree unanimously
to "thaw" the committee's "frozen" funds, to redesignate the incumbent PAC chairman and to declare the Political Action Committee a permanent instrument for political education and action. The labor organ-


tion's own post-election box score on Congress showed that of 35 Senate and 435 House seats at stake CIOPAC-endorsed candidates won approximately one-half of the former and more than one-fourth of the latter. On the basis of early incomplete returns, PAC, in conjunction with other labor and liberal groups, was credited with 17 Senate, 120 House victories. Later statements reduced the latter figure to 110. Most House victories involved Democrats. Two Senatorial winners were Republicans, the rest Democrats.

Attempts to poll the 14 regional PAC directors on results in their respective districts produced only limited success. They showed that 17 of 26 endorsees were elected to the House from the 38-seat tri-state Region V (Ohio, West Virginia, and Kentucky). All but three of the endorsees and all but two of the successful endorsees were Democrats. In Region XII (Colorado, Wyoming, New Mexico, Utah, Arizona) PAC endorsed Democrats for all 11 House seats. Six were elected. In Region I (New England: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts), with 27 House seats at stake, eight out of 19 PAC-endorsed candidates (all Democrats) were elected.

Two Senate seats were at stake in Region V (in Ohio and Kentucky), three in Region XII (Utah, Colorado, and Arizona), and four in Region I (New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, Massachusetts). Democrats were endorsed in Kentucky and Ohio. The former won, the latter lost. In Region XII endorsements were made only in Utah and Arizona. Both were Democrats and both won. In Region I endorsements were made everywhere except in Massachusetts. A PAC-endorsed Democrat
won in Connecticut and lost in New Hampshire while a PAC-endorsed Republican won in Vermont. Questionnaires filled by Jack Kroll, PAC director, Region V, 12/28/44; office of Amer Lehman, PAC director, Region XII, 2/2/45; Henry Anderson, Publicity, Office of Joseph Salerno, PAC director, Region I, 12/26/44.

In New Jersey, one of three states in PAC Region III, state PAC endorsements, made after consultation with county PAC leaders, were extended to Democratic Congressional candidates in six of that state’s 14 districts. Two won, four lost. In a seventh district local CIO leaders, reportedly in conjunction with local Democrats, made a “deal” with certain local Republican leaders whereby CIO support went to a GOP Congressional candidate “in return for support of... the Democratic Senatorial candidate.” The former was elected, the latter was not. Carl Holderman, New Jersey CIO Political Action Committee Report (mimeographed report of chairman), Jan. 21, 1945, pp. 26, 36, 39-44.

For further discussion of significant election results in these and other areas see Part VI below, passim.

Leading New Dealers encouraged the CIO to “stay in politics,” after extending warm appreciation for services rendered to the New Deal and the “common man.” One of them, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, proclaimed that “this generation...[would] never be able to repay what it owes to the CIO and its PAC.”\(^3\) Most political


writers construed the presidential outcome in particular as a victory for “Labor, militant, alert and organized as never before....” Marquis Childs described the national Democratic machine as being in a bad “state of disrepair,” and noted that much that the Democrats might have done to help their local organizations “was taken care of
this time by the regional offices of the Political Action Committee. Many local Democratic machines too were in less than peak condition. The New York Times concluded that "labor" support had never before meant so much in pivotal states. Veteran analyst Krock scoffed openly at disclaimers of old-line party leaders, suggesting that if they dared to dispute PAC's claims of voting certain "key" states into the Roosevelt column, the "burden of proof" was "on the regular organizations." Time magazine concluded that PAC had "perhaps, a major share" in the "phenomenal and unexpected increase in registration and voting," for the labor people "concentrated on war workers and migrants in industrial centers, got them well registered, then on Election Day hauled them to the polls, while PAC's women minded the voters' babies at home."\^\textsuperscript{144} Time's rival in the popular news magazine field, Newsweek, made still more sweeping assertions, attributing to PAC the "muscle, the energy, and to a great extent the brains, which swept the New Deal legions to the polls" in ten "great American cities" and scores of "lesser industrial centers." Indeed, this editorial voice declaimed that

\textit{\textbf{Election day 1944 was the true measure of a new force in American politics. Twenty-four hours before the voters went to the polls, the CIO's Political Action Committee—a year-old fledgling—was a question mark. By the time the votes were counted on Tuesday, this nation knew a new}}
political instrument had been forged. For the first time in American history, labor had been the organizational vehicle of a Presidential candidate.\(^5\)

\(^5\)Newsweek (Special Supplement), 11/13/48, p. 9. (Italics added.)

PART II

THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
AND THE PAC ISSUE
CHAPTER III
THE PRE-TEAMSTER PHASE: THE GOP DOMINATES
THE SCENE FROM THE CONVENTIONS
TO SEPTEMBER 23

What sort of force was the PAC? Its very appearance as a force commanded attention in all quarters—long before Dewey conceded on November 7—and few who beheld the CIO political movement could view it dispassionately. Recognition took the form of images—whether constructive or sinister—projected by participants and observers in the campaign. The more sinister of these images, in particular, tended to become stereotypes. PAC was more than a harmless "committee" maintained by a labor federation, more than an alleged "organizational vehicle of a Presidential candidate." PAC was in itself an issue, susceptible of exploitation—and one on which, as the record will show, strategists of both major political parties came to believe the election might turn. Indeed, however important the activities which the Hillman committee fostered, the full import of PAC as a potentially influential factor at the polls in 1944 can be appreciated only in the wider context of the campaign of words as it was waged after the party conventions were adjourned in June and July. In this and the succeeding three chapters the stages of PAC's emergence as an issue will be examined in detail and in relation to other issues and factors in the campaign.

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Representatives of the Political Action Committee and other members of the CIO who attended the Democratic convention had not long to wait to learn that their presence there might have a utility to the opposition far outweighing the effect of PAC-induced votes on roll calls in that body. John Bricker, since June 28 the Republican vice-presidential nominee, and Democratic Congressman Dies et al had long since learned that anti-PAC pronouncements made good news copy. Journalists hostile to the CIO had turned out an impressive number of column inches while the Democrats were in session, crediting Hillman with "running" their convention and describing him variously as a flagrant law violator, a collector of untold millions of dollars, and as a former "associate" of Earl Browder.  

1 See, for example, a story by H. J. Taylor which appeared under an eight-column headline in the New York World-Telegram of July 21, 1944, p. 2.

Following the Democratic exodus from Chicago writers on both right and left asserted that PAC had made itself felt in the Windy City. There was good reason to believe that this alleged demonstration of power could be converted into anti-Democratic political advantage as well as further sensational headlines—even though some interpreters of convention developments flayed the CIO for consummating an "unholy alliance" with bosses and conservatives while others revelled in labor's "glorious defeat" at those same hands. Such paradoxes aside and whatever the private judgment on this score of strategists in Republic party ranks, nothing could obscure the propaganda possibilities
inherent in the "control" exercised over the party of Franklin D. Roosevelt by "Sidney Hillman's PAC." All that was needed was to stamp on the voters' minds an impression of the PAC as a new internal force scarcely less menacing than the destructive power of which the Axis was still capable on the battle fronts of Europe and the Far East.

The Candidates Accept

Thomas E. Dewey, Governor of New York and successful contender for the GOP presidential nomination, gave little hint in his acceptance speech that he personally would focus attention upon the labor pressure group. Rather, he promised, with the aid of a cabinet composed of the "ablest men and women to be found in America," to end "one-man" government and the confusions and bunglings of an old, tired and quarrelsome administration. He pledged himself to finish the war abroad—shrewdly averring that this was outside politics—without tampering with the nation's superb military leadership. He promised to promote world peace by faithfully fulfilling a platform plank on "post-war cooperative organization among sovereign nations." Finally, he promised to

2 The GOP favored "responsible participation... in post-war cooperative organization among sovereign nations to prevent military aggression and to attain permanent peace." Asserting that "peace and security do not depend upon the sanction of force alone," and recognizing a need to consider the "basic causes of world disorder," the Republicans advocated development by such "cooperative organization" of effective cooperative means to direct peace forces to prevent or repel military aggression." From the Proceedings of the Republican National Convention, June 26-28, 1944, as carried in National Political Campaign, 1944, Part I, U. S. News.
re-win the people's *domestic* freedoms and to promote and maintain full employment in an expanding economy, objectives unattainable under an administration which had been "consistently hostile" to business and industry and which had demonstrated incapacity for leadership by accepting "continuing unemployment. . . with resignation."\(^3\)

\(^3\)Ibid.

Neither did President Roosevelt in a dramatic broadcast from a west coast naval base directly to the Democratic convention hall, exhibit any awareness of a "PAC issue," promising that he would not "in these days of tragic sorrow" campaign "in the usual sense,"—although he should "feel free to report to the people the facts about matters of concern to them and, especially, to correct any misrepresentation," the President also stressed the importance of winning the war quickly and "overpoweringly," of building world organizations and of making firm international arrangements "to use the armed forces of the sovereign nations. . . to make another war impossible within the foreseeable future." He too spoke of post-war employment, pointing proudly to the "steady, sure progress" of his administration in advancing the "lot of the average American citizen." He warned against entrusting the future to "inexperienced or immature hands," to those whose domestic records spelled apple selling, breadlines, and "the abyss of 1932," and to those whose foreign policy so long had
meant opposition to "lend-lease" and hostility toward "international cooperation against the forces of aggression and tyranny. . . .\(^4\)


The major themes each candidate hoped to pursue seemed clear enough. The Governor hoped to bar controversy over military and foreign policy and to concentrate upon domestic policy and administration. The President planned to stress international relations and the danger of sacrificing experienced and farsighted leadership in the quest for military victory and world peace.

The Lesser Republicans and the Press Are Against "Clearing It with Sidney"

Despite the inevitable overtones of partisanship the acceptance speeches were not without an air of lofty purpose. Other straws, not so lofty, soon appeared in the wind. The subject which quickly came to the fore was the alleged Hillman plot to subvert not only big "D" democracy but all America. One reporter, riding the Dewey train through the Midwest, wrote of Republican forebodings lest a continued Democratic administration be so indebted to the CIO that FDR would be "virtually their servant." Some business and financial leaders who conferred with the GOP candidate reportedly were told that the CIO planned to assume control of war plants after the war!\(^5\) An open and

\(^5\)Thomas L. Stokes in Columbus Citizen, 8/1/44.
blatant announcement of the direction the campaign was to take came
from the East as Thomas J. Curran, New York's secretary of state,
accepted nomination for the U. S. Senate. Curran was quoted as
declaring that the GOP was not opposed by the Democratic party at all,
but by the "Browders, the Hillmans and the leaders of the PAC who will
do everything possible to change the form of this country as we have
known it since its infancy." Irving M. Ives, whose "labor appeal"
might have made him a formidable opponent for incumbent Senator Wagner,
himself placed Curran in nomination--asserting that "Our chief opponent
is the Political Action Committee of the CIO. . . "6 At the same time

6New York Times, Aug. 9, 1944, p. 30th. Cited hereafter as NYT.
(Publication dates for newspapers and similar publications hereafter
designated solely by numerals: e.g., 8/9/44, p. 30th.)

a leading "Young Republican" warned that PAC was the "most effective
and insidious organization for political influence in the nation
today" with a "slush fund" which would "undoubtedly" grow to exceed
"the combined financial funds of the Republican party."7

7Ibid., 8/6/44, p. 36t.

Editorial writers played up the "Hillman conspiracy." Sidney
Hillman, according to Life, was trying, with the eager connivance of
Earl Browder, to fasten "foreign" old world practices and institutions
upon the United States.8 The party of Jefferson--which followed in

8Life pointed to recent developments in New York state where a
right-left cleavage within the American Labor Party had resulted in
formation of a new Liberal Party, avowedly and actively hostile to the participation of Communists whereas the controlling majority of the ALP, of which Hillman was the new chairman, was not. *Life*, 8/21/44.

the tradition of Runnymede, Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence and the U. S. Constitution—was, according to the *Columbus Citizen*, a Midwestern Scripps-Howard affiliate, in the gravest danger.

Today a force is out to kidnap that party. ... the CIO Political Action Committee. ... whose objective is to exalt the state.

Indignation was rife over a report that David J. McDonald of the Steel-workers, finance chairman of PAC, had exhorted unionists to action with the injunction:

*Go out and get the dough if you want Political Action to succeed. ... The more we get, the more we can spend. The more we spend, the better Congress we will have.*

In repeated editorials the *Citizen* decried this CIO "cynicism." It recoiled in horror at PAC's "Political Primer" which, with a lead line paraphrasing the title of a well-known social scientist's textbook, described politics as "the science of how who gets what, when and why." It took exception to a reported public statement of UAW president Harold Lasswell, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How* and PAC secretary Thomas that he considered his membership on the War Labor Board a "union responsibility, not a federal service." Such an approach to federal job-holding, opined the *Citizen*, threw

... interesting light on what CIO leadership is likely to do with federal, state and local governments if it
succeeds in buying control of them. Plainly, we believe, the intention is to make them governments of the people by the CIO and for the CIO.10

In syndicated columns in the same newspaper Mrs. Walter Ferguson shuddered at PAC's "brazen materialistic doctrine" that "votes are for sale in our democracy," and Westbrook Pegler explained matter of factly that "the Communists," whose "own Communist auxiliary" had gone "underground a few months ago and emerged as the Political Action Committee," "all will vote for Roosevelt."11

In one column Pegler noted that Dewey's popularity in Iowa was "in proportion to the unpopularity, in a farm state, of the CIO-Communist alliance of the Industrial areas with its naturalized but unassimilated European preachers of contempt for the American system." For these quotations and other relevant Pegler essays see Ibid., 8/3/h; 8/6/h; 9/7/h; 9/8/h; 9/15/h. For the Ferguson quotation see Ibid., 8/9/h.

Other papers and other writers in the Ohio area similarly viewed with alarm. On August 27 the little Zanesville News pleaded: "Don't Hillmanize America." In the Columbus Dispatch author Louis Bromfield, announcing the imminent casting of his first Republican vote, assailed the CIO for moving from "legitimate" lobbying into campaign politics, a course "extremely dangerous" for the CIO and for "American democracy." CIO's political methods he termed "at times strange, foreign and deceptive to the American people. . ." The
column was headlined:

CIO REPRESENTS DANGEROUS ALIEN TREND IN AMERICA

In the same edition a Dispatch cartoon, captioned: "Sidney's Pipe Dream," pictured Mr. Hillman, as if daydreaming, standing in the White House driveway, "looking over his "White House apartments." With his baggage beside him and presidential advisor Harry Hopkins standing at his shoulder the PAC chairman was saying: "I think I'll take the room occupied by Lincoln with the same bed that Harry the Hop slept in."

The Hillman bags were labelled variously:

- Hillman-Browder Communism
- After-war regimentation
- Hillman pressure politics
- Hillman-Kelly-Hague Steam Roller Politics

One satchel bore a hammer and sickle. 12

Although a number of AFL affiliates were to support FDR's re-election bid in 1944, anti-fourth-term newspapers seized avidly upon reports of dissension in labor's ranks over PAC's legitimacy as a voice of "labor." Washington staffers for one newspaper chain wrote that "Every big branch of organized labor—except CIO—has declared itself opposed to Sidney Hillman's Political Action Committee" and enthusiastically reported an ominous reminder from one veteran Federation leader that "in every instance where the labor movement has become a front for a political party, it has eventually died." 13 After some

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12 Columbus Dispatch, 9/3/44. See also Columbus Citizen, 9/8/44.

13 See "Washington Calling" in Columbus Citizen, 7/29/44; 8/6/44; Fred Perkins in ibid., 8/12/44. Although its official hostility to PAC
was unmistakable, more than half of the members of the AFL executive
council reportedly supported Roosevelt in 1936; also twenty-one state
AFL organizations and a number of the Federation's city central bodies
in the larger cities. Labor Research Association, Labor Fact Book

"professional unionists of the opposition, or anti-CIO-Communist move­
ment" conferred with Governor Dewey in Pittsburgh, columnist Pegler
wrote eagerly that the GOP was "gathering a rather substantial labor
wing of its own." The Columbus Dispatch found newsworthy an editorial

1b Anti-CIO labor people, he said, viewed PAC as a creation of
the President's, designed to finance his perpetuation in office and
eventually to enable him to "strip" the labor movement "of its original
guise and run it, himself as a party, as Mussolini ran the Fascists."
Columbus Citizen, 8/1/48.

blast at PAC issued by one John E. Breidenbach in The Labor Union of
Dayton, Ohio. The latter had accused the CIO of bringing "discredit
and public unfriendliness upon the whole trade union movement," of
introducing the "evil and alien virus of class politics" and endangering
"American democracy." To him the "Communist hand behind the PAC" was
"unmistakable." Equally attractive to editors were stories out of

15See Columbus Dispatch, 9/1/48.

Utah and Rhode Island telling of defections from PAC of members who
said they had been told to "vote Democratic or resign," yet who stoutly
maintained they wished

... to be, and remain, free Americans with the right to
cast our votes as our forefathers intended, free from pres­
sure by any one man or group of men.
This was the dramatic affirmation issued upon the resignation of PAC officials representing two CIO locals in Utah. A similar statement was released by nine of the 21 members of the political committee of a union in Woonsocket, Rhode Island. See editorial, Columbus Citizen, 8/21/44; NYT, 9/1/44, p. 6:7. See p. 517 below.

Still another widely circulated case of disaffection was that of a William E. Mullins, political editor of the Boston Herald. In the September Readers Digest Mullins praised PAC's educational literature, conceded that its organizational skill had produced "certain successes" in the recent primaries, and that PAC was "energetic, intelligent, formidable." For that very reason he opposed it. He had not joined the American Newspaper Guild to have his economic "union affiliations" transformed into "political opinions" on "new, strange" issues outside the labor field, nor to have himself "represented in politics, without. . .[his] consent and against . . .[his] will," in "political company" and pledged to "political principles" and candidates he neither liked nor shared. Quite apart from the danger stemming from PAC's "Communist" taint Gompers had rightly advised labor to know its friends and enemies among "individual legislators" but to leave "Governors and Presidents" alone. The latter "do not make laws; they only enforce them." 17

Mullins cited financial contributions from "Communist-controlled" unions, Hillman's "open alliance" with "Communist-controlled unions" in New York's American Labor Party, the presence of a "known Communist" as one PAC legislative agent. Readers Digest, Sept. 1944.
Republican spokesmen at national, state and local levels tended
to follow the same line as this sampling of Midwestern journalism.
There were times when Dewey supporters centered their fire upon a
"Commander-in-Chief issue," bending every effort to persuade the public
either (1) that the war was almost over and the next President need not
be an experienced military leader," (2) that in any case this constitu­
tional designation of the President was purely nominal, originating in
the respect which the founding fathers felt for George Washington as
head of the armed forces, or (3) that the real test of a commander-in-
chief lay not in military victories won by generals and admirals but in
the President's ability to avoid and prevent war. The Pearl Harbor
disaster was measure enough of the present incumbent's ability in the
latter field. Occasionally Republican campaigners spoke of the

18 See, for example, remarks of House minority leader Joseph W.
Martin; Charles A. Halleck, chairman of the Republican National Congressional
Committee; and Rep. Francis Case of South Dakota. NYT, 9/18/44,

necessity for building international peace-keeping machinery or sug­
gested that post-war employment was properly a paramount issue. In

19 On at least one occasion Governor Bricker urged "adequate
machinery" for "arbitration and conciliation of international disputes"
and in general terms approved the use of force "if necessary" to pre­
vent war. Ibid., 9/24/44, pp. 1:2, 38.

the main, however, from the firing of the opening guns through the
entire first phase of the campaign, ample evidence supported a New York
Times forecast that the GOP would harp upon the existence of Democratic
bosses—as if the Republicans had none of their own—and would "attack the tie-up between the Political Action Committee... and the Democratic party, using Communism and the alleged assault on the American system of government as the battlecry." Like party chairman.

20 *Ibid.*, 8/9/64, p. 30:4; 9/1/64. Speaking before the women's division of the United Republican Finance Committee Governor Saltonstall of Massachusetts, himself a candidate for the U. S. Senate, averred that the "only issue" of the campaign was that of "providing jobs in private enterprise for all those able to work." The meeting was also the occasion, however, for a "concerted attack" on Sidney Hillman by Senator Brewster of Maine and others. *Ibid.*, 9/20/64, p. 16:4.

Herbert Brownell other Republicans gleefully chortled that "regular" Democrats were flocking to the GOP because of their resentment at the intra-party power game being played by "the Browder-Hillman group, the Wallace faction, and the so-called 'Boss' clique." They did not, however, leave the full flowering of this resentment to chance. 21


22 See, for example, the establishment of special GOP headquarters to combat the CIO's "grassroots" campaign in northeastern Ohio. Vinton McVicker, *Columbus Citizen*, 8/20/64. See also an announcement that since the CIO was mailing "reams of Roosevelt literature to members of the armed forces... the Republicans had no alternative but to adopt similar tactics." *Columbus Dispatch*, 9/3/64. See also a report from Michigan that it would take "work and money to offset" the PAC drive. *NYT*, 9/11/64, p. 1:2.
Everywhere they sounded the alarm. From non-party adjuncts to the Dewey cause emanated fearsome propaganda on the CIO-Hillman menace.23

23 Ex-Democratic Congressman Martin L. Sweeney undertook to parallel in Ohio the efforts of a national "American Democratic National Committee"—to organize for Dewey those Democrats who agreed that "When Browder and Hillman crawl into the Democratic party, it is time for Jeffersonian Democrats to walk out." Columbus Citizen, 9/7/44. Giving similar reasons, South Carolina's Senator Smith (newly defeated for renomination) started a "Farmers for Freedom" organization and a number of prominent individuals (including authors Booth Tarkington and Louis Bromfield and playwright Channing Pollock) set up an "independent Voters Protest Committee." NYT, 9/23/44, p. 9:1; 9/20/44.

Some of this was reportedly viciously anti-Semitic in character and torrents of propaganda from party sources warned against "Nazi" and "Fascist" techniques allegedly employed by Mr. Roosevelt and the CIO.24 Not even the Dies Committee report labelled the PAC chairman personally as a Communist but GOP Congressmen debating reconversion legislation expressed fear lest this "dictator" and "Communist" should "get the job of administering post-war reconversion." Marion E.

24 New England newspapers were said to be "flooded" on September 19 with full page ads accusing PAC of using "the tactics which swept minority groups to power in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, permitting them to impose ruthless tyrannies upon vast, unorganized masses of people," and "thousands" of national GOP leaflets allegedly referred to the "Nazi storm trooper tactics" with which President Roosevelt helped promote CIO unionization of hostile Montgomery Ward plants. See Victor Riesel, New York Post, 9/19/44, p. 2h; 9/26/44, p. 1h. As for anti-semitism, Marquis Childs noted that the "smear" attack on Hillman did not say "he is a Jew" but spoke of his "early rabbinical training," thus stirring fires of racial hatred which would "long outlast this campaign." Ibid., 9/15/44, p. 27. See also Victor Riesel who wrote of the "raucus anti-Semitic campaign" being waged by "isolationist Mid-West Republicans" and who cited the pamphleteering of Joseph F. Kamp, head of the "Constitutional Educational League, Inc." NYT, 9/21/44, pp. 15:3, 30; 9/25/44, p. 32; 9/28/44, p. 1h.
Martin, top woman Republican, warned the National Federation of Women's Republican Clubs against the CIO's "long range program to subvert democracy." Clare Booth Luce, Congresswoman from Connecticut, accusing the President of paving the way for a seizure of power four years hence by "some budding dictator nurtured in his own corrupted party," cautioned against permitting a flow of power to the "icy-minded men" who stood behind the "ramsquaddled do-gooding New Deal bureaucrats" and who were "bent on Balkanizing America politically, in order to convert it piecemeal to European totalitarian ideologies." Representative J. Harry McGregor of Ohio likened the PAC dollar drive to an "effort to levy a poll tax" for voting.\(^\text{25}\) And so on.

\(^{25}\) For the latter quotations, in order, see NYT, 8/31/uh, p. 30:s; Columbus Citizen, 9/8/uh; NYT, 8/10/uh, p. 13:s; Columbus Citizen, 8/4/uh.

Governor Earl Warren of California insisted upon "toning down" an anti-Hillman piece ghost written for him at national party headquarters.\(^\text{26}\) Other state executives were less reticent. Martin of Pennsylvania, Schoeppel of Kansas, Thye of Minnesota, Langlie of Washington, Kelly of Michigan, Edge of New Jersey all went on the air with stern warnings that the "corrupt" machines, Sidney Hillman and the "Communists and other disruptive elements" behind President Roosevelt

\(^{26}\) "Presumably," wrote Thomas Stokes, the CIO, which was "strong in California," had done a "good job of registering its voters" and the Governor was "taking no chances." Columbus Citizen, 9/5/uh. See also NYT, 8/31/uh, p. 30:3.
placed the nation, the American government and its economic system in the gravest peril. In the Illinois gubernatorial and U. S. Senate races GOP candidates devoted "considerable criticism to President Roosevelt and the New Deal" but their "chief targets" were Hillman, the Political Action Committee and Earl Browder. Undoubtedly two of the most active crusaders were the GOP vice-presidential nominee and senatorial candidate Curran of New York. The latter feared for the war veterans, should Browder come into his own. He feared for the "thinking men and women of organized labor," for the home owners and business men, should "Messrs. Browder and Hillman" henceforth "have a hand in the plotting of their lives." He feared for the farmer, should President Roosevelt, whose "Christmas tree growing" symbolized his entire Administration with its "tree... laden with... presents for the left-wing faithful," remain in office. He feared for everyone lest "the totalitarian system that Sidney Hillman, Earl Browder and their pseudo-intellectuals so heartily endorse" be foisted upon the U. S. through four more years of extravagance and of taxation designed to "penalize successful enterprise, redistribute wealth and promote social and economic revolution."
Governor Bricker, who had toured some twenty odd states prior to the nominating conventions, announced his readiness to continue to "carry the same message." On September 9 he entered upon a strenuous schedule that carried him in two weeks from French Lick, Indiana to Boston, Massachusetts and which alerted audiences in West Virginia, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Maine. He accused the New Deal of adopting the "basic doctrines of Nazism and Fascism," of spending "hundreds of millions" to propagandize the "indispensable man," of withholding the "facts" of Pearl Harbor, of freeing Earl Browder from prison to "bring his subversive Communists into line with the New Deal philosophy of politics in this campaign." He said the "Roosevelt regime" had fostered "gigantic bureaucracy," relegated Congress "to an inferior position," attempted to "subordinate the Supreme Court," and threatened to "fasten a totalitarian control" over the American people. From one platform pre-New Deal evidence was offered to show that these were "not mistakes" but "cold, calculated and deliberate acts." 29

29 With a 1931 quotation attributed to Rexford Guy Tugwell, Bricker accused the Administration of setting out "to undo a century of development— to change statutes, constitutions and government— and to lay rough, unholy hands on many a sacred precedent."

From another the New Dealers were accused of steering the nation on an "aimless course" of drift since 1933. But whether the New Deal was "planned" or just "happened," the Governor's efforts were unflagging— to awaken the voters to Hillman's "old world concepts of power politics and class hatreds"; to remind labor and the Democrats that they were
being put "up for sale" by the "Political Auction Committee"; to welcome into the Republican fold those "true Democrats, the Farleys, the Al Smiths, the Byrds, the Garners" who had been "cast aside" by the new radical bosses and who now must vote the Dewey-Bricker ticket to "save the Democratic party, the two-party system and our country."
The "one transcendent issue" of the campaign, posed by Browder and Hillman, Hague, Kelly and Hannegan, was: "representative government" versus despotism, state socialism regimentation and communism.  

For virtually all of the "lesser Republicans," "Clear it with Sidney" promised to be the catchiest campaign slogan. It had originated with New York Times columnist Arthur Krock and was first employed by him on July 25 in his report of a conference held by President Roosevelt with Democratic chairman Hannegan ten days earlier on a railway siding in Chicago.—The President was en route to the west coast; Hannegan was in the midst of convention preparations. According to the Times analyst, the President at that time instructed Hannegan not to permit the Democratic convention to name its vice presidential nominee until he had "clear(ed) it with Sidney."  

phase of the campaign had ended, as attested by the illustrative
data of the preceding pages, the phrase had been broadened by implication
to encompass the President's intentions in all aspects of governmental policy and administration, should he be elected to a fourth term.

Dewey Endorses the New Deal but
Believes that "It's Time for a Change"

The Republican candidate himself during the early weeks of the
campaign pointedly rejected the "racialism" with which some assaults
on Sidney Hillman were embellished, and for the most part he

32 Dewey's denunciation of "anyone who injects a racial or
religious issue into a campaign" as a "disgraceful, unAmerican act" was
inspired by Representative Hamilton Fish, Jr.'s criticism of "the Jews" for being "more or less for the New Deal." In similar vein Dewey reacted to "a sinister effort to smear the Republican candidate for vice president"—whereby the America First party of "rabble rouser" Gerald L. K. Smith nominated Governor Bricker to be Smith's running mate. NYT, 7/29/48, p. 1:1; 8/2/48, p. 1:3.

scrupulously left the "PAC issue" to the "lesser lights" in his party.
At Louisville on September 8 he dealt with the subject of foreign
policy. In his formal opener at Philadelphia on the preceding night
and in the remainder of his first half-dozen formal addresses he
devoted himself primarily to domestic affairs and, particularly before
west coast audiences— in Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, and Los Angeles— to the task of selling himself as a New Dealer in the realm
of substantive policy while dissociating himself from the peculiar
evils and frightening potentialities manifest in the incumbent New Deal administration and implicit in its alleged philosophy of government. Already on a pre-campaign trip to St. Louis for conferences with fellow Republican governors Dewey had taken part in a series of policy declarations which broadly criticized the national Democratic regime while simultaneously permitting the Governor to emerge as "exponent of a broad use of federal power, in cooperation with the states, to promote the economic and social welfare of the people." At Pittsburgh, enroute to St. Louis Dewey had advanced his first major campaign contention: that the next President would be "largely" a peacetime president, hence, that he must be someone other than the man who had given the nation the "Roosevelt depression," with "more than ten million unemployed continuously from 1933 to 1940," and who today was not sufficiently attentive to problems of peacetime reconversion and employment. Pittsburgh and St. Louis had set the key. It was, in the main, as an advocate of social progress, even, if you please, as a man who could advance and administer the New Deal more satisfactorily than the New Dealers themselves, that Dewey chose to present himself, eschewing for the time being "Clear it with Sidney" for another slogan better tailored to the immediate end in view: "That's why it's time for a change."33

33 At St. Louis the twenty-five GOP governors jointly approved federal irrigation, reclamation and power projects, expansion of the social security system, continuation of protective legislation for workers and farmers—all of which they promised to administer with less cost, less duplication, less wasted effort. Thomas L. Stokes in Columbus Citizen, 8/5/44; see also NYT, 7/31/44, p. 1:1; 8/1/44,
As he crossed the continent, meeting local politicians, conferring with interest group representatives and identifying himself with their problems and aspirations, holding press conferences and delivering himself of opinions on diverse matters, he did not hesitate to cultivate, where appropriate, the "PAC issue" being trumpeted more noisily by his partisan followers. Throughout his western trip Dewey reportedly made comments derogatory to Hillman and the PAC at press conferences and before rural audiences who "relished any attack" on the CIO committee and its chairman. Earlier, in industrial Pitts-

Mount, he held audience for labor delegations, one of whose spokesmen forecast that "the men who mine the coal... and those who work in war plants do not propose to follow Sidney Hillman and his crowd." In a message of greeting to the New York state CIO industrial union council convention Dewey openly attacked the PAC as a totalitarian...
"labor front." In his Seattle speech he ventured to exploit local AFL-CIO rivalries and an alleged New Deal favoritism to the CIO nationally, endorsing at the same time "better and stronger free labor unions" which would "drive both the racketeers and communists from positions of power in the labor movement." 36 Many times Governor Dewey

36 At Seattle the radio announcer for Dewey's "labor" address told the nation that some 200 local and state labor leaders attending the meeting had "endorsed" Dewey, an announcement which an embarrassed Republican state labor department official promptly denied. Warren Moscow in NYT, 9/21/44, p. 12E:2. For the Pittsburgh conference with union leaders and the New York IUC message see NYT, 8/1/44, p. 1:1; 9/8/44, p. 10:2.

alluded to Mr. Roosevelt's alleged totalitarian and anti-capitalistic proclivities and to the "class" divisions which he fostered, allusions which the perceptive citizen might well correlate with the PAC threat which was being discussed more directly from other platforms by other GOP personalities. 37 But on the whole the task to which the

37 See, for example, his Pittsburgh reference to a "totalitarian New Deal," his accusation at Philadelphia that the New Deal had no "faith" in the American people or their economic system, his declaration at Owasso, Michigan that the issue of the election was "continuance of our free system of government," his reference at Billings, Montana to the New Deal's "creeping collectivism." NYT, 9/6/44, p. 12:1-8; Warren Moscow in ibid., 8/1/44, p. 1:1; 9/10/44, p. 1:2; 9/15/44. See also Dewey's contention at Louisville that prospects for future world peace would be brighter if the voters would reject those leaders "who set groups of Americans against other groups of Americans." Texts, Thomas E. Dewey, "The Building of a Lasting Peace," 9/8/44; "American Labor Problems," 9/18/44 (issued by the Republican National Committee). See also NYT, 9/9/44, pp. 1:1, 28.
governor applied himself was to destroy the myth of Rooseveltian superiority—even indispensability—for policy leadership and administration alike, in the arena of foreign relations but especially in that of domestic affairs.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{38}Conceding that "We're making gratifying progress in the fighting of the war" (Pittsburgh, July 31), Dewey accused the Administration of making "absolutely no military preparations for the events it now says it foresaw" (Des Moines, September 11) and criticized current military strategy insofar as field commanders were beholden to direction and supplies from Washington. Thus at a press conference (Valentine, Nebraska, September 13) he deplored the "inadequate supply, inadequate air power and inadequate force" available to General MacArthur in the Pacific theatre. See Warren Moscow, NYT, 8/1/44, p. 1:1; 9/12/44, pp. 1:2, 36; 9/14/44. On promotion of post-war international organization for peace he took credit for initiating "bipartisan" cooperation; "repeated" his "insistence" upon close cooperation with Britain, Russia and China; demanded total disarmament and international supervision of the defeated nations and rejected the idea of a world-wide WPA. Dewey, "The Building of a Lasting Peace," speech text, 9/8/44.

Disabuse the electorate of any quaint notion of GOP responsibility for past economic catastrophe. Drive home the fact that after eight years the "Roosevelt depression" still featured ten million unemployed and the Administration "had to have a war to get jobs"; that even today it was "afraid of peace" and proposed to delay military demobilization after the defeat of Germany and Japan because, in the words of the director of Selective Service, "We can keep people in the Army about as cheaply as we could create an agency for them when they are out."\textsuperscript{39} Condemn wartime economic policies which brought distress

\textsuperscript{39}This contention first made at Philadelphia. NYT, 9/8/44, p. 12:1-8.
to consumers, workers et al, and Administration planning or lack of planning for the future—with or without proposing concrete alternatives. Above all, stress the essential acceptability of New Deal social legislation but attack the Administration for failing to go far enough with these bi-partisan achievements and for being in action "the most wasteful, extravagant and incompetent Administration" in America's history—as well as for being "tired, exhausted and quarrelsome" and for lacking faith in the American people and her free institutions. In observing these injunctions Dewey endorsed FEPC legislation, promised to reform and strengthen the Department of Labor, assured labor "he saw no need for restrictive national labor legislation, and called the Wagner Act a "good and necessary law" which suffered only from the evils of "bureaucratic maladministration" and "one-man government." He condemned the Smith-Connally Act (enacted over the President's veto) as a New Deal "interference with free collective bargaining. Before a movie star-studded audience in Los Angeles he characterized the Social Security Act as a tremendous social advance—while deriding Roosevelt for neglecting its "broadening" since 1935 and calling himself for expansions which one reporter opined

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40 See Dewey comments or the withholding of specific comment on the "bungling" OPA, wage ceilings, pending reconversion legislation, etc., NYT, 8/2/44, p.3; 8/6/44, p. 1:3; 9/12/44, p. 1:2. 36.

forced "Old Doc Townsend... look to his laurels."  Whether

Thomas L. Stokes, Columbus Citizen, 9/25/44. See also Warren
Moscow, NYT, 9/23/44, pp. 11, 9.

we like it or not," candidate Dewey asserted categorically at San

Francisco,

... and regardless of the party in power, Government is
committed to some degree of economic direction. ... and
must be the means. ... For meeting problems that are
too big for any one of us or any group of us to solve
individually.

Never, under Republican leadership, would the nation
return to the days of unregulated business and finance
... the days of unprotected farm prices... to leaf
raking and the dole...

In short, it was a better "New Deal" America which Governor Dewey held
out to prospective voters of the GOP ticket. The strategy was simple.

With agreement conceded on the substance of long range domestic, as
well as foreign policy, the Governor could safely concentrate on evils
in administration and demands for a "housecleaning" in Washington while
the lesser Republicans hammered away at Sidney Hillman and the PAC.

The only qualifications which he attached to his West Coast "progress-
sivism" were in the form of solemn assurances that he knew "when to
stop," that he knew how to reconcile "personal freedom and economic
security," that his administration would perform the services govern-
ment had to perform without succumbing to the dangers "inherent in
bureaucracy."

See also Warren Moscow in ibid., p. 1; editorial in ibid., 9/22/44,
The Commander-in-Chief Remains Aloof and a Few Democrats Commend Experience over Inexperience

The New York Times rushed to comment editorially on the Dewey pronouncements. The Times criticized his assertion that the New Deal interfered too much with labor relations while he himself proposed FEPC legislation. It took him to task for the oratorical pretense that the late depression was exclusively a Democratic responsibility, censured his charge that the Administration planned to keep men in the army to prevent unemployment, and prodded him unmercifully for his lack of specificity on the "cooperative means to direct peace forces to prevent or repel aggression" which were mentioned in the GOP platform and on the "use of force" which he endorsed at Louisville. The Times also berated him for his "misleading" claim that he accepted basic American military strategy while criticizing the necessary results of that strategy in practice. Most of the nation's press, however, was on the challenger's side. A sympathetic treatment of the "other side" of the picture had to come from the Democrats themselves or their partisans.

At the outset it might have appeared to the uninitiated that Mr. Roosevelt was "above politics," for he made no campaign tours and
no public addresses. But he was President and, to the chagrin of the opposition, Commander-in-Chief. As such he was constantly the source of news headlines—as were other high officials, like Mobilization Director Byrnes and War Manpower Commissioner McNutt, both of whom had official answers for charges that the Administration was "afraid of peace."45 The President's ceremonial acts, his performance of routine

45Byrnes announced the Administration's plans to maintain national income and employment after the war. Both he and McNutt denied that the government had any idea of keeping men in the army for "economic reasons." See ibid., 9/9/hk, p. 16; 9/10/hk, p. 1.2.

duties, his most casual press conference remarks were always news, usually of front page quality. So were his "corrections" of Republican "misstatements," his disdainful refusals to comment on Dewey speeches when he was in a "non-political" mood, his flippant rejoinders to the challenger's attacks when, apparently, he was in a political mood. In each case the "outs" could only gnash their teeth at the natural advantages accruing to incumbent office holders. 46

46Typical news-worthy actions were: a letter to the Budget Bureau asking for a survey "in order that I may most effectively fulfill my responsibilities... in the demobilization period," his order for "immediate planning by Government agencies for the demobilization of their civilian war machine, with its three million of personnel," a message to Congress just prior to the pre-election recess in which he urged "careful and early" consideration of legislation to "spread Federal establishments patterned after the TVA through most of the country west of the Mississippi River," a message to the United Automobile Workers convention asking for "uninterrupted production." Nyt, 9/9/hk, p. 1:2; 9/20/hk, p. 1:2; 9/22/hk, p. 1:3; 9/13/hk, p. 13:1.
Most indicative of the kind of campaign the President would wage when he finally took to the hustings were press conference comments like these:

Q: What did the President think of Dewey's Philadelphia speech?
A: He had read only about half of it.

Q: Was he "afraid to demobilize?"
A: Reporters could write that "the President smiled broadly, but did not answer this question."

Q: What did he think of the Hershey statement on the cheapness of keeping men in the army?
A: "Isn't it his job to get people into the Army?"

Q: Would he comment on Dewey's assertions that the Roosevelt Administration was "saturated with the defeatist theory that America is past its prime?"
A: Did the reporter think it was true?
Q: No. That was why he wanted the President's comment.
A: He didn't believe he would comment "as that was an awful thing to think about at five minutes after eleven o'clock in the morning."47

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Clearly the President was in no hurry to stump the country. His indifference or ostensible belief that re-election was inevitable must have been infectious. Or else the Democrats suffered from the want of spirited White House leadership. In any case, in the face of the Republican barnstorming and editorial brickbats, the Democrats were conspicuously inconspicuous—so much so that Freda Kirchwey of The Nation, herself a member of the National Citizens PAC, wrote of this first phase of the campaign: "Without the PAC this most crucial of all campaigns would have been the deadest and drearist." The fact that
Dewey adherents were concentrating so heavily on PAC she attributed in considerable measure to the degree to which the "regular Democratic organizations" had become "feeble and passive," nationally and in the states. PAC, she observed, was "almost the only political target within range."  

Freda Kirchwey, "Campaign Notes," Nation, 9/30/44.

The rather meager Democratic speechmaking prior to September 23, in sharp contrast to the almost daily dosages from such representative Republicans as Bricker and Curran can be demonstrated by reference to utterances of their Democratic opposite numbers. Not until August 31 did Senator Truman officially accept his vice-presidential nomination. A week later he addressed Labor Day audiences in Detroit. Two weeks after that he spoke at an American Legion convention. Bricker addressed the same group, warning that the republic was in peril. Truman discussed the "GI Bill of Rights." NYT, 9/19/44, p. 14:1. On one other occasion Truman made news copy by sharply criticizing Dewey's Portland speech in which, he said, the GOP candidate merely "concurred" in Administration policies. In his acceptance speech Truman stressed

Bricker addressed the same group, warning that the republic was in peril. Truman discussed the "GI Bill of Rights." NYT, 9/19/44, p. 14:1.

In his acceptance speech Truman stressed

Ibid., 9/21/44, p. 15:2. For text of the Dewey address see ibid., 9/20/44, pp. 1, 15.
the conviction, as did Senator Tom Connally who notified him of his nomination, that Mr. Roosevelt's experience was needed "no less as a peace negotiator than as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy at war," confirming Republican fears that voters would be appealed to on just that ground. He spoke of post-war reconstruction and reconversion. Did the voters dare entrust their government to politicians who had been either unable to conceive of the great social reforms of the New Deal or who had subsequently lacked the "foresight and courage to support them?" Dared they install in high office persons who had failed to appreciate the President's pre-war fight against isolationism, his program for national defense, his plan for lend-lease cooperation, with the other democracies? Could they afford to sacrifice his familiarity with other world statesmen, his knowledge of international problems, his experience in building foundations for peace?

The welfare of this Nation and its future, as well as the peace of the whole world, depends upon your decision on November 7th.

You can't afford to take a chance. You should endorse tried and experienced leadership—you should re-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt as President of the United States.51


At Detroit Truman's words appeared designed to allay labor misgivings, if any, over Chicago's "Missouri compromise." He reminded labor of its "duties as well as its rights" but recognized government's obligation to "see to it that you get a fair, square deal." He attacked
"economic wreckers" and "special privilege" monopolists and maintained stoutly that Democrats were not "resigned to the prospect of huge unemployment," that the nation could produce as effectively for peace as for war, and that, in his book, human welfare came first, profits second.52

52NYT, 9/5/lu, pp. 1:2, 13.

Delivering equally widely separated campaign appeals—some before labor audiences—was New York's Senator Bob Wagner, Democratic and ALP nominee for re-election. He also confirmed predictions that Democrats would argue the issue of experience v. inexperience. He scoffed at the Republicans' "naive" approach to the problems of making peace, chided Dewey for a "me-too" position on social welfare matters which contrasted sharply with his party's legislative record, rebuked him for saying FDR had "prolonged" the depression, and called attention to Republican policies which had "caused" it. He praised the New Deal for promoting an "increasing measure of economic good" and warned against "pseudo-practitioners who disregard experience and who believe that we can have prosperity just by sounding exuberant." He too denied the "delayed demobilization" plan allegation and at least once took cognizance of the PAC issue—accusing the GOP of trying to win the labor vote by instilling the fear "that there is something un-American or radical or dangerous about political consciousness on the part of labor."53
Two of his addresses were delivered respectively before the state CIO convention and a gathering of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union. NYT, 9/8/44, p. 10:2; 8/11/44, pp. 1, p. 9:1; 9/15/44; 9/17/44, p. 40:3.

A few other Democrats of national prominence occasionally competed successfully with Republicans for column inches in the daily papers. Vice-President Wallace, despite his rejection at Chicago, called Roosevelt still the "best liberal hope in politics" and held that the Democratic party was still the best vehicle for attainment of "liberalism," although some observers foresaw his availability soon after the election for leadership of a movement by "liberals" to control the party organization. Wallace also maintained that the only campaign issue was whether Roosevelt or Dewey was better qualified (1) to cooperate with foreign leaders in writing a "liberal, democratic peace," and (2) to assure full employment for all and good incomes for "farmers, white-collar workers, business and professional men." Harold Ickes,

Sponsored by the Independent Voters' Committee of the Arts and Sciences for Roosevelt, the Vice-President before a Madison Square Garden audience vied with Governor Dewey for the more impressive showing of aid and comfort from leaders in the entertainment and professional world. Columbus Citizen, 9/22/44. See also NYT, 9/23/44, p. 10:2; 9/24/44, p. 12R:5.

Secretary of the Interior, devoted his talents for colorful phrase-making, less to the specifics of a future Democratic administration than to the superiority of the present incumbent's record. He pelted the GOP candidate with sarcastic, belittling barbs, making much of the
latter's "inexperience," his inconsistencies, "the reversals, the contradictions, the affirmations which suddenly followed denials," nicely hitched to polls of public opinion," his "abdication" as commander-in-chief even in advance of the election.55

55See, for example, addresses before conventions of the American Labor Party and the UAW. NYT, 8/11/44, p. 9:1; United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Proceedings of the Ninth Convention, Grand Rapids, Michigan, Sept. 11-17, 1944, pp. 138-144.

Party chairman Hannegan was one of a handful of top Democrats to acknowledge directly the PAC issue. Once he countered insinuations that PAC was an "alien" importation by urging Herbert Brownell to repudiate his party's resort to "racial prejudice." He cited frequent allusions to Hillman as a "foreign-born labor leader" and a GOP campaign poster which read:

**THIS IS YOUR COUNTRY**
**WHY LET SIDNEY HILLMAN RUN IT?**
**VOTE FOR DEWEY AND BRICKER**56

56Hannegan displayed a picture from a Pittsburgh newspaper. As indicated the bill posting company had painted out the second line query, but, Hannegan said, the line was later restored "on demand of the Republican organization." NYT, 9/15/44, p. 13:4.

Hannegan also felt obliged to take a defensive stand. Without repudiating PAC support or collaboration57 he firmly denied the

57See, for example, a joint conference at PAC headquarters of Hannegan and Hillman with a group of Negro publishers. NYT, 8/9/44, p. 19:2.
validity of the "clear it with Sidney" legend, saying Mr. Roosevelt had never given him such instructions, "nor did he say anything else that could have been construed to convey that meaning. Indeed, the vehemence of his denial was generally attributed to intense Democratic alarm lest PAC prove to be "one of the President's heaviest liabilities." 58

58 So the originator of the "clear with" legend viewed the situation on September 12. Rehashing Democratic convention history Arthur Krock said positively that whether the quote was accurate, the sense was: Hannegan went to Chicago believing the President favored Byrnes for the vice-presidency, but Hillman visited FDR, told him the CIO "could not support a man who had 'held the line!'" for the "Little Steel" wage formula, hence the President's endorsement for "Truman or Douglas" and Hannegan's discovery on consultation with Hillman (at the President's suggestion), that Hillman's opposition to Byrnes was "unyielding." NYT, 9/13/44, p. 15:2. See also "Washington Calling," Columbus Citizen, 9/16/44; Ned Brooks in ibid., 9/17/44; NYT, 9/12/44, p. 36:1.

The Political Action Committee Defends Itself

As for PAC itself during this "first phase," much of its energy was perforce directed into defensive channels lest the Democrats' liveliest apprehensions be realized. For one thing, the labor-politicians were by no means done with legal challenges and government investigations. Late in July New York headquarters opened its books for a "spot check" by the FBI and scarcely after receiving a second clean bill of health in three months from that source faced renewed attack from the House Committee on Un-American Activities. The latter, convinced that erstwhile government personnel was involved in a "trick
to perpetuate the New Deal in power," now supplemented its pre-primary report with information purporting to show Hatch Act violations in the shift of a number of these persons to the PAC payroll. Chairman Dies on August 3 gave Attorney General Biddle "thirty days" to institute prosecutions—or face legislation "divorcing the CIO Political Action Committee from the government." That particular threat did not materialize and Biddle informed Dies that enforcement of the Hatch Act provision in question was outside his jurisdiction.\(^5\) The latter, however, made sure that PAC would have no respite by appointing a subcommittee of three to continue surveillance of CIO political activities. That the subcommittee would not lack zeal for its task was perhaps ensured by the fact that two of its members were lame duck Democratic Congressmen destined to retire to private life following primaries in which PAC endorsements had been extended to their opponents. The third, a Republican, had survived his campaign for renomination but he too had been opposed by PAC. Dies himself had withdrawn his candidacy in Texas in the face of formidable labor opposition.\(^6\)

\(^5\) For text of a Committee letter of August 4 to the Attorney General re possible violations of section 9 of the Act (making it unlawful for federal administrative officers and employees to engage in political activities) and for Biddle's reply see U. S. House, Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Investigation of Un-American Activities in the United States (pursuant to H. Res. 282), 76th Cong., 2d sess., Vol. 17, Sept. 27-29, Oct. 3-5, 1941, pp. 10213-10219. Cited hereafter as U. S. House, Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States, Sept. 27-29, Oct. 3-5, 1941. See also NYT, 8/3/41, p. 12:3; PM, 7/27/41, p. 17.

\(^6\) Late in August other Senate and House committees again delved
The two lame ducks were Joe Starnes of Alabama and John M. Costello of California. The third subcommittee member was J. Parnell Thomas of New Jersey. See PM, 7/30/1944, p. 5; 8/4/1944, p. 8; NYT, 5/13/1945, p. 1:2; 8/21/1945, p. 17:2; CIO News, 5/22/1945, p. 2; 5/29/1945, p. 6.

into PAC affairs. One looked into reports of PAC solicitations made by a CIO affiliate in New York City. The other put national PAC

The Senate's Special Committee on Campaign Expenditures heard that laundry operators in the metropolitan area were being "threatened" with "labor difficulties" by PAC fund solicitors of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America. The committee agreed on September 21 "that the matter did not warrant any further investigation." U. S. Senate, Investigation of Presidential, Vice Presidential, and Senatorial Campaign Expenditures, 1944 (pursuant to S. Res. 263, 78th Cong.), Rept. No. 101, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, pp. 56-57. See also NYT, 8/18/1945, p. 28:2.

personalities on the witness stand in a hearing on August 28 and on September 13 members of this House group visited PAC's New York office for its own "spot check" on contributions and contributors. In neither case, perhaps, notwithstanding vocal Republican minorities and vigorous GOP questioning of witnesses in the House hearing, could PAC fairly complain of unreasonable harrassment, although not even the House committee chairman disputed Sidney Hillman's plaintive reminder that thus far, with the election just two months away, other organizations, "overripe for inquiry," had not yet been subjected to comparable scrutiny. Nonetheless, exposed as it was to steady streams

Inquiry extended not only to finances but to endorsement policies, personnel, objectives, etc. U. S. House, Committee to
of suspicion and invective from the press and from politicians inside and outside the government, it is hardly surprising that PAC contributions to the development of campaign issues assumed a highly defensive coloration. PAC felt obliged to overcome the hostility of the general public, to convince endorsees that PAC enhanced rather than lessened their chances for election, to acquit itself of improper motives in the eyes of the CIO's own rank and file,--and, perhaps, to overcome its own misgivings lest PAC represent a misguided technique to the purest of objectives.

In addition to the provocation of those who saw "red" in PAC and those who feared its dollar potential at least two major practical hurdles stood between the labor politicians and rank and file unionists who needed to be shown that politics constituted both a legitimate and an effective trade union activity: (1) the failure to put across the CIO's vice-presidential candidate at Chicago; (2) the failure of CIO lobbying to date to achieve "liberal" reconversion legislation or comprehensive national planning for post-war prosperity. Whatever the Democrats had "cleared with Sidney" it was painfully evident that there were limits to PAC's influence. With labor backing for himself assured the President had no compelling reason to do battle for Wallace at Chicago, or, in Washington, to fight for CIO-endorsed legislation over
conservative opposition. A further possible deterrent to enthusiastic rank and file support was the extent to which Democratic campaigners appeared likely to smother progressive reformism completely under the weight of a "win the war" theme.

Hillman himself often attacked the GOP--at press conferences, at the ALP convention, at conventions of the New York CIO, the Rubber Workers and the Auto Workers, and elsewhere. He questioned Dewey's qualifications, citing his early opposition to lend-lease and his 1940 advocacy of a break in relations with our wartime Russian ally. He criticized Dewey's acceptance of the "enthusiastic support" of "extreme isolationists," accused him of being a "crown prince of Hooverism" surrounded by men who were "tools of reaction and selfish greed," and predicted that his election would usher in another "Hoover era" and plunge the nation into another "economic and international crisis." He scolded Dewey for trying to "capitalize on the small grievances of labor" although workers commanded "far better representation" in government than during World War I. He impishly demanded identification of the Labor Department secretary Dewey promised to choose from the...
ranks of labor. With obvious enjoyment he reminisced that when Dewey first ran for public office, labor supported him,—and still thought he "would make an excellent District Attorney." 65

65 Harold Seidman wrote in 1938 that the CIO, instead of "vilifying and obstructing" public prosecutors who attempted to drive racketeers out of the labor movement, had "extended them all possible assistance. . . . As Sidney Hillman expressed it, 'no honest labor organization has anything to fear from him.'" It was "with this in mind," that the ALP nominated Dewey for district attorney in 1937 and contributed "ninety-two thousand labor party votes" to help insure his victory. Labor Czars (New York: Liveright Publishing Corp., 1938), pp. 301-302. For sources of the above quotes see NYT, 8/11/38, p. 9:1; 9/10/38, p. 40:1; 9/15/38; 9/20/38, p. 15:1; Columbus Citizen, 9/12/38.

Fear of another depression was not an inconsiderable weapon in the PAC oratorical arsenal. More pressing, however, was the fear that the GOP would succeed in frightening voters away from FDR by equating PAC with illegality, political immorality and Communism. Press accounts of Sidney Hillman's public utterances throughout August and September show that his prime concern was to dispel the cloud of suspicion which hung over PAC and to answer the often mutually contradictory charges: e.g., that it intended to launch an independent party, that it sought to kidnap the Democratic party; that it was a creature of the Communists and a collaborator with big city bosses; that it was an invention of President Roosevelt's and that the President was a pawn of PAC and obliged to "clear everything with Sidney." Time and again Hillman declined to confess that PAC favored a third party or that it plotted to "capture" the Democratic organization, arguing that PAC was "truly non-partisan," supporting both Democrats and Republicans.
The New York Times reported that PAC was backing three Republicans for national office "either openly or informally": Gov. Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts, Sen. George D. Aiken of Vermont, and Rep. Charles La Follette of the 8th Congressional district, Indiana. Some PAC leaders reportedly were urging "outright" endorsements of a number of Republicans to bolster their refutation of the charge that they were out to "take over" the Democratic party. NYT, 9/23/WW, p. 1:2. PAC spokesmen liked to call attention to their delaying a formal endorsement for FDR "until it was obvious that the Republican party at this time represented the worst in the country." Ibid., 8/3/WW, p. 12:1; 8/7/WW, p. 2:6; 9/20/WW, p. 15:1, 16:5.

politicians, newsmen and voters to believe his protests that PAC was "scrupulously" conforming to Smith-Connally and Hatch Act requirements. He challenged anyone to produce a "single case" of "pressuring" union members for contributions to PAC. He denied that PAC support was a

A week later at Pittsburgh, where Hillman had issued his challenge, Gov. Bricker told a press conference that the father of an unnamed Republican member of Congress had been "coerced" into contributing $1.50 to PAC. NYT, 9/13/WW, p. 14:3; 9/20/WW, p. 15:1. See Hillman's testimony of August 26 in the Congressional hearing cited on page 112 above. See also p. 182 below.

hindrance to candidates and reminded skeptics who pointed to the Maine elections that a "Republican state" could hardly be considered a "test of PAC strength." Most vociferously he labelled the linking of

his name with Communists a "cheap kind of gutter politics."

I have fought communism in season and out for thirty years. I am opposed to the communist philosophy and to any totalitarian philosophy.
To be sure, there were "Communists in the PAC" as there were in "any labor political movement." But the percentage of Communists in PAC was "just about the same as the percentage in the country, possibly a little higher" and it was "a lie" to say PAC was "dominated" by them. On August 21 the PAC head met the charges of communism in the pages of the New Republic. PAC's "ideology," he wrote, was "clearly stated in the PAC platform" and involved "both a statement of principles and a concrete plan of action." It rested simply

... upon the belief that we can and must find a way to utilize the vast spiritual and material resources of this nation that every American who is reasonably industrious and prudent may enjoy at least the minimum elements of a good life. ... upon the belief that too many Americans have died and are dying in foreign lands in defense of democracy for us any longer to permit democracy to be betrayed here at home by social or economic barriers erected against anyone by reason of his race, religion, or national origin.

Nevertheless, whatever earnest desire there may have been to campaign consistently on such a thesis and on a positive presentation of the principles and policies which had led the CIO to endorse Roosevelt and "progressive" candidates for Congress was easily overshadowed by an
apparent conviction that defense and denial were the paramount necessity.

Probably the most unwelcome support the beleaguered PAC chairman could have hoped for came from Earl Browder. The former Communist Party secretary, asked by the House Committee on Campaign Expenditures if there was a "tie-up" between his new Communist Political Association and the PAC, replied casually that "some Communists" were "active" in PAC just as "some also were active in AFL political committees, the Kiwanis, the Elks, the Democrats, the Republicans, the ministerial association, and so forth." He added that his 160,000 members were behind FDR and that "the purposes of the Political Action Committee" were "laudable and should be supported." More welcome backing came

from other high CIO officials—like CIO secretary-treasurer Jim Carey who defended PAC against Dewey's critical message to the New York CIO convention. Philip Murray, who in his Labor Day message advocated cooperatively "planned" reconversion by "Government, industry and labor," and who praised the CIO's constructive program to "provide work for millions for generations to come," also thought it imperative to counteract the "vicious lies" disseminated by such "veritable scandal sheets" as the "Hearst and Scripps-Howard" newspapers. "There's not a
group in the country that doesn't have its own PAC,” he assured potential waverers in the UAW, and the "malicious deviltry" to which the CIO had been subjected indicated "some entrenched interests in the United States" were "hell bent on your destruction." At the Rubber Workers convention he denounced PAC's critics as spreaders of "diabolical lies" and deplored the attempts of evil men to "sow the seeds of racial bigotry." Those who would deride Hillman as a "Russian pants maker," he said, would castigate him "because he is a Jew" but "they would use similar methods if we had a McGillicuddy in that office." CIO's present intensive political activity, he insisted, was based upon the belief that Mr. Roosevelt was best fitted for national leadership and was dedicated to the welfare of the nation, not just "selfish interests." Non-union PAC personnel like research director J. Raymond Walsh and members of the National Citizens PAC like Max Lerner also defended the labor-political organization. Occasionally CIO affiliates in convention took actions which PAC leaders hoped would end the linking of labor political action to the Communists—who admittedly were not totally lacking in the labor movement. Thus there

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"Ibid., 9/19/lh, p. 16:3. See also Columbus Citizen, 9/13/lh.

"Walsh and Lerner, then chief editorial writer for PM, took the affirmative side in a Town Meeting of the Air broadcast devoted to the question: "Is the Political Action Committee an Asset or a Liability to Democracy?" Broadcast by the Blue Network, 9/21/lh."
was reason for jubilation when the Auto Workers reelected Walter Reuther to a union vice-presidency and chose other officers of the "Reuther faction" instead of candidates of the "Communist-supported Addes faction." 75

75 Fears lest the "Communist influence" which had long "agitated" the UAW react adversely upon PAC efforts on behalf of FDR were strengthened, the Times reported at one point, by the "poor showing made by PAC thus far in its campaign to register workers in such important centers as Detroit." NYT, 9/17/41, p. 35:4; 9/18/41, pp. 11:4, 21:8.

In response to the repeated assertions that PAC could not speak for "labor," special statements were released to "explain" the Utah, Rhode Island and Breidenbach-inspired newspaper items and to counteract anti-PAC interpretations of them as "healthy symptoms" that not all labor was "ready to have its nose held while Dr. Hillman pours his medicine down its gullet." The Utah "smear," said PAC, was typical of GOP "attempts to sow dissension in PAC ranks," having grown from a "revolt" (led by a Young Republican Leaguer) of five union members who had been "strongly denounced by their own two locals" and who "had been asked to resign" because "they were bucking the majority acts of the State PAC." The Rhode Island affair involved an internal "row" of a local union which had "no affiliation with either the CIO or AFL." As for John Breidenbach, the Dayton publisher was accused of being "on the pay-roll of the Republican party," and his paper characterized as a "personal organ" which could not be taken as representative of organized labor's views even in his own community. 76
See editorial, Columbus Citizen, 9/4/44; CIO News, 8/28/44, p. 5; CIOPAC news release, New York, 9/1/44; Jack Kroll, field memorandum sent by the Ohio PAC chairman to some 1,400 Ohio CIO unions and PAC units. Breidenbach demanded a retraction of Kroll's "libelous charges" but "sworn statements of expenditures by the Ohio Bricker-for-Governor Club" in 1940 and 1942 disclosed payments to Breidenbach for campaign purposes and it was disclosed that a new "national edition" of the Dayton paper was being distributed widely during its anti-PAC and anti-FDR campaign of '44. See The Ohio Teamster, 10/9/44, p. 16; Columbus Citizen, 9/20/44; Ohio CIO Council, Reprint from the Chicago Sun, 10/22/44, p. 1. See also p. 86 above.
CHAPTER IV
FROM THE TEAMSTER TO THE PRECINCT SPEECH:
FDR EMPLOYS RIDICULE AND THE DEMOCRATS
GIVE BATTLE (SEPTEMBER 23 TO OCTOBER 5)

Then, on September 23, amid the relative quiet of the Democratic politicians, the bombast of the Brickers and Curran, the west coast "progressivism" of Dewey, the troubled politicking of the CIO, the President left the wings for stage center. He chose to make his entrance before a labor audience, the AFL Teamsters Union. He mentioned neither communism nor PAC though indirectly he gave the latter his blessing. Instead, he chose to meet a host of other allegations, so phrasing each denial that the Roosevelt defense emerged as a skilled and telling counter offensive. Republicans had been characterizing the Administration as "tired" and "old." So the President began by jovially remarking,

Well, here we are again—after four years—and what years they have been. I am actually four years older— which seems to annoy some people. In fact, millions of us are more than eleven years older than when we started to clear up the mess that was dumped in our laps in 1933.

That set the tone. Throughout the address the President demonstrated what one acute newsman described as his "unvarnished contempt" for his adversary.¹ The governor had had a good head start, but the

Teamster speech made up for lost time. If the Democratic campaign was lethargic the resort to ridicule was precisely the medicine that was needed. The President "got quite a laugh" out of GOP advocacy of social welfare measures enacted originally over Republican opposition. He was amused at Republican efforts to gloss over the "breadlines and the starvation wages" of 1933 and the "long hard road" traveled since then by prating of a "Roosevelt depression"—like dictators who reject a "small falsehood" for a big one, hoping thus to make it "more credible."

Now, there is an old and somewhat lugubrious adage which says: "Never speak of rope in the house of one who has been hanged." In the same way, if I were a Republican leader speaking to a mixed audience, the last word in the whole dictionary that I think I would use is that word "depression."

In response to that "most ridiculous... campaign falsification(s)"—that the Administration had failed to prepare for war: he doubted "whether even Goebbels would have tried that one," recalling that GOP politicians who now wanted to conduct the nation's foreign and military policy had called "preparations for defense—before and after 1939... hysterical war mongering" and had only wakened "to the facts of international life a few short months ago." Dewey's demobilization shocker he disposed of by referring to the "method of speedy discharges" announced by the War Department the "very day that this fantastic charge was first made." As for labor, the President praised its patriotic accomplishments, and observed that the "occasional strikes," which were "picked on" by "labor baiters," were "condemned by every
responsible national leader. . . except one"—who was not, incidentally, "among my supporters."² With PAC in mind, he paid his mocking respects to candidates who "burst out in election-year affection for social legislation and for labor in general," yet who "still think you ought to be good boys and stay out of politics," and not give any dollars to "any wicked political party." Naturally, though, it was "all right for large financiers and industrialists and monopolists to contribute tens of thousands of dollars."

Fala, the White House Scottie, gave the Teamster speech its crowning stroke. Some Republican leaders, said Mr. Roosevelt, had . . . not been content with attacks upon me or my wife, or my sons. [Now, they] include my little dog Fala. Unlike the members of my family, he resents this . . . as soon as he learned that the Republican fiction-writers had concocted a story that I had left him behind on an Aleutian Island and had sent a destroyer back to find him—at a cost to the taxpayers of two or three or 20 million dollars—his Scotch soul was furious. He has not been the same dog since.

As for himself, the President was accustomed to hearing malicious falsehoods [like] that old wormeaten chestnut that I have represented myself as indispensable. [But] I think I have a right to object to libelous statements about my dog.

Having thus generated high good humor among all save those implacably anti-Roosevelt hearers who must have been enraged by the impudent tale, the President chose to stress gravely, in conclusion, the serious business of winning the war "as speedily as possible and with the least cost in lives," the task of "setting up international machinery" to
keep the peace, and the job of converting the economy to "purposes of peace." All of these responsibilities he promised not to "botch" as the GOP had done after the last war, noting that

We are even now organizing the logistics of the peace just as Marshall, King, Arnold, MacArthur, Eisenhower and Nimitz are organizing the logistics of this war.3

3Recognizing labor's impatience with current wage-price policies and business apprehensions about government ownership Mr. Roosevelt said he was sure "business and labor and agriculture" all had the same will to do for peace what they have done for war and that they would "assure full production and full employment under our democratic system of private enterprise, with government encouragement and aid whenever and wherever it is necessary." Text, Columbus Citizen, 9/21/44, p. 8A.

The Democrats Take Heart

At least one journalist described the President's opener as having "the fragility of an egg shell covered with a wonderful coat of varnish."4 Mr. Roosevelt himself seemed satisfied and allowed nearly two weeks to elapse before he spoke again. Senator Truman, who made two newsworthy speeches to Governor Bricker's seven in the days immediately following the Teamster speech (as recorded in the New York Times), continued to stress the imperative, with war's end a long way off, of choosing the "most qualified" man to "finish the job, including the writing of 'a world-wide and lasting peace.'"5 Senator Wagner too

4Arthur Krock in NYT, 9/26/44.

5From a Blue Network radio address of October 2. See NYT, 10/3/44, p. 15ib. See also ibid., 9/28/44, p. 16:5.
followed a similar issues path—marked out weeks in advance of his formal campaign opener of October 3—although, after asking plaintively what the issues were against him in his own reelection bid, he deviated from the "paramount issues" of "winning the war and... the peace" (tasks for which Dewey was "not a big enough man") long enough to deny insinuations that it was "against private enterprise." Assorted Democrats responded to some of the most assiduously cultivated criticisms of supposed Administration plans for demobilization and the post-war economy. A growing number freely cultivated labor support while meeting

6 Wagner thought it necessary to deny that public works and social security measures sponsored by him were meant to supersede "private enterprise" although he complained that "everything I have done is now approved by the Republicans" and taunted Dewey for "me-tooism" on social legislation at the same time that he criticized GOP "isolationism" and the "Hoover depression." Ibid., 10/3/44, p. 1h:3; 10/4/44, p. 1:2; 10/6/44, p. 15:1.

Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney, chairman of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, censured Governor Dewey's "ignorance" or "irresponsibility" in using the Hershey quotation on demobilization when the General was not authorized to speak for the White House or the War Department. Mobilization Director Byrnes told a radio audience the post-war task would be not one of demobilization but of mobilization—for peace and a "better world." Harry Hopkins, in a magazine article, offered a series of post-war economic proposals, including repeal of the excess profits tax and other steps to stimulate private business. Ibid., 9/28/44, p. 1:1; 10/1/44, p. 38:4; 10/3/44, p. 2h:2.

the GOP issues of communism and PAC. Secretary Ickes took Dewey to task for his "cold-pack isolationist supporters" and his "sneering" references to a world-wide WPA although he was more exercised over possible Dewey cabinet appointments and skeptical of the governor's "new-found ardor for labor"—in which connection he hoped the latter had taken "the precaution of collecting his campaign fund in advance,"
for he would have difficulty "reconciling the political religion that he got on the sawdust trail in Los Angeles with the Republican orthodoxy in which he was so carefully brought up." He offered PAC direct benefits of his caustic tongue, deplored "racist" references to Sidney Hillman as "foreign" and "Russian-born," and chiding Dewey for accepting a contribution from Hillman's union in one campaign and labelling him a "danger to our country" in another. 7 Senators Claude Pepper and

7On September 28 the Secretary released the text of a sarcastic letter of "resignation" he was sending Governor Dewey in reply to the latter's threat to "fire him" if elected President. Ibid., 9/25/W4, p. 18:2; 9/29/W4, p. 16:2.

Harley Kilgore and Vice President Wallace (who hoped PAC would increase its efforts) all gave rousing addresses before union audiences. All extolled experienced leadership. To Wallace, FDR represented the "doorway to the future," his reelection the avenue to speedy "victory in war, enduring peace and full post-war employment." To the two senators, respectively, Dewey's election presaged a cabinet housing Westbrook Pegler as Secretary of Labor and a "recessional" instead of "reconversion." 8

8Pepper also predicted that Herbert Hoover would be in a Dewey cabinet, along with John Foster Dulles, "biggest corporation and cartel lawyer in America" as Secretary of State. See NYT, 9/30/W4, p. 28:1 for Pepper's speech before the CIO Marine and Shipbuilding Workers (UUMSWA) convention. For Kilgore's remarks under auspices of the Greater New York CIO Council see ibid., 9/25/W4, p. 18:3. Wallace alone, in less than a week's time, addressed a "Citizens' Committee for the Reelection of President Roosevelt" in Buffalo, shipyard workers in Philadelphia, the UUMSWA convention in Atlantic City, an overflow crowd at Pittsburgh's Carnegie Music Hall, a Negro audience by radio in New York City, and a street audience in New Kensington, Pennsylvania,
where he had been barred from a high school auditorium because the
school board wanted to keep "politics out of the school." See Ibid.,

Attorney General Biddle, again in reply to a query from a
Republican Senator, rendered a new, favorable opinion on the subject of
PAC's legality; a Congressional committee chairman revealed that tax-

9 The senator was Moore of Oklahoma. Biddle, in the first
opinion regarding the National Citizens PAC, absolved both CIO and
NCPAC of any culpability under the laws governing political contribu-
tions. Ibid., 9/26/11, pp. 1:2, 14:2.

payers' money was helping to finance the GOP crusade against the PAC
and the "Red Specter of Communism" which was "stalking our country";
and Democratic Chairman Hannegan issued counter blasts against the "men
behind Dewey," employing guilt by association tactics and appeals to
prejudice not unlike those of the opposition—to prove that Dewey's
supporters were isolationist, anti-Semitic, anti-Polish, anti-
Catholic, and pro-Nazi as well as anti-New Deal. 10 The Congressional

critic was Representative Anderson of New Mexico, who attacked the
ethics of thirteen GOP colleagues who used their franking privilege
to distribute more than eighteen tons of paper bearing anti-PAC
propaganda—in the form of a speech reprint (some 3,116,000 copies) from the Congressional Record. The author was Congressman Busbey of Illinois. It was Anderson's misfortune that his scandalous disclosure touched only the voters' pocket book and that remotely.\textsuperscript{11} The more

\textsuperscript{11}Anderson conceded that the printing was privately financed. \textit{N\textsc{y} T\textsc{m}}, 10/4/48.

hapless Hannegan not only reaped editorial chastisement for his intemperate attack on Dewey's backers but found himself simultaneously in the embarrassing position of having to answer comparable attacks upon Democrats—presumably made by other Democrats and, according to the Republicans, springing from Political Action Committee sources.\textsuperscript{12} On

\textsuperscript{12}Thus Hannegan "apologized" to former party chairmen Farley and Flynn and to Col. John J. Bennett, Jr., 1942 Democratic candidate for governor of New York, for attacks upon them in a "guide for campaign orators" distributed "without his knowledge" by the National Committee. Republicans and Congressional investigators thought they detected a link between the PAC and publishers of the booklet but the charge was not substantiated. \textit{Ibid.}, 10/4/48, p. 14; 10/5/48, p. 10; 3. See also U. S. House, \textit{Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States}, Sept. 27-29, Oct. 3-5, 1944, pp. 10314-10316, 10318-10319.

the whole, however, these and other Democrats had taken heart from the Teamster Speech and were warming to the three-fold task of praising FDR's virtues, decriyng Dewey's shortcomings and answering or countering GOP charges.

Probably the least welcome of the President's supporters during this period of increasing Democratic boldness was, again, the Communist
leader, Earl Browder. The day after the Teamster speech Browder appeared at Chicago Stadium. As head of the Communist Political Association he aligned himself firmly on the side of "world-wide victory, peace and prosperity" and pleaded for "unity" of "capitalists and workers, farmers and professional people, Republicans and Democrats and Communists." He loudly denounced "red-baiting" as an aid to the nation's enemies—though he thought he saw signs that "Americans of all classes" were "learning to free themselves from the Hitlerite cult of anti-Communism," and generously defended the Political Action Committee, while deriding the "nonsense" talk about "someone capturing Roosevelt." Then, even as the President prepared to take to the air with a campaign speech in which he repudiated Communist support, news dispatches were telling of another scheduled Browder appearance. This was to be in connection with a musical revue in Boston—sponsored locally by the Communist Political Association and destined to go on the road thereafter under the sponsorship, according to a CPA spokesman, of "labor groups." The fact that local AFL, CIO and Democratic officials disavowed any knowledge of or connection with the show did not erase the fact that it was to be "friendly" to the Democrats and PAC and that it drew attention potentially damaging to the Roosevelt cause even in advance of presentation—when a local women's group sought (unsuccessfully) to have "The Bandwagon" banned from Boston's Symphony Hall.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{13}\textit{NYT}, 10/6/1944, p. 11:6. According to United Press, the production was backed by an art dealer and two unidentified friends as a
"personal contribution" to the Roosevelt campaign. Columbus Citizen, 10/4/36. At his Chicago Stadium appearance Browder happily recounted the reputed "so what" response of "a big capitalist, the President of the United States Lines, Mr. Basil Harris," when the latter was asked about his participation along with Browder at a testimonial banquet for a union official and the National Maritime Union. Earl Browder, "The War and the Elections," speech reprint from The Worker, 10/1/36.

Dewey Abandons Restraint, Employs Questionable Quotes to Prove New Deal Incompetence and Turns to Sidney for a Target

The seeming indifference of the President to the baser necessities of politics through early September had dismayed many who feared he would let the election go by default. The sensational effect of the Teamster speech was nowhere more strikingly manifest than in the swift response of the challenger. In an eloquent account of the immediate Republican reaction Tom Stokes described the lounge car scene aboard the Dewey train. Correspondents and Dewey aides had gathered to listen. All "grinned knowingly at one another" at the "din of shouting and tumult" from the Washington dining room and "whispered that the Teamsters were trying to outdo that cascade of sound" that had greeted Dewey at Los Angeles Coliseum. Dan Tobin's voice, Stokes wrote, sounded "like a fog-horn in . . . a storm-tossed sea." Then "that other voice" was there,

... strong, confident and masterful. . . the familiar Roosevelt political voice, unheard for so long, now sweetly ironic, now brutally sardonic, now raw with sarcasm, now rising to an emotional climax.

Pro-New Deal correspondents "beamed as they chuckled and hooted."

Hard-boiled newsmen "laughed in appreciation of the Roosevelt technique,"
and a "very pained expression came over the face of Henry Turnbull," GOP radio director.

He was not having any fun. There was a babble as the speech ended.

'The old Roosevelt'—'the greatest political speech he ever made'—'he canceled out this whole trip we've made'—'he took up every Dewey speech in this one,' and so on.

While FDR was still on the air Governor Dewey made a rear platform appearance in Needles, California. As the train pulled away, Stokes wrote, "somebody slapped red, white, blue stickers on the car windows, showing to the inside of the train the one word: 'Roosevelt.'"

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14 Columbus Citizen, 9/26/44. See also Warren Moscow in NYT, 9/25/44, p. 1:1.

Biographer Sherwood writes that aides were distressed by the President's apparent feeling that he had "done his duty by allowing his name to be placed before the American people, and if they did not went to reelect him, that would be perfectly all right with him." They felt he had to be persuaded to "descend from his position of dignified eminence . . . and get into the dusty political arena where he was still undisputed champion." The minute he saw the "Fala" paragraphs in the first draft of the Teamster speech Sherwood knew Mr. Roosevelt had no intention of remaining "on the lofty Commander in Chief plane." Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 820-821.

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In a hasty press release Dewey contended that the President had now proved he had "no program." Since he had "sunk to mere quoting from 'Mein Kampf', and to charges of 'fraud' and 'falsehood'" it was clearer than ever that four terms as President were "too many for any man." Since the President had dropped his "non-political" mask to campaign "on the remote past," he, Dewey, would now feel "free to examine FDR's record with unvarnished candor." The threat was made
good at Oklahoma City. There Dewey abandoned the relative dignity and decorum of the cross country speeches in which he had promised principally to administer the New Deal more efficiently. Patently resentful, he protested that he had been offering the people a program; that he had assumed everyone hoped the campaign would not impair national unity. He had been heartened by the President's decision not to "campaign in the usual sense. . . ." Now the "mud-slinging, ridicule and wisecracks" of the Teamster address showed that the "high-sounding pledge" had been forgotten. The governor had no desire to emulate his opponent. Nevertheless, he felt "compelled" to "divert this evening long enough to keep the record straight." So into the record Mr. Dewey went, reading with triumphant rancor a series of carefully selected quotations as authority for previous allegations against the Administration. Statements from Generals Marshall and Arnold, Senators Barkley and Truman, and from President Roosevelt himself were introduced to corroborate the charge that the nation's "shocking" unpreparedness before Pearl Harbor was the latter's responsibility. Special emphasis was given to the recollection that in 1940 Mr. Roosevelt had criticized a Dewey proposal for a "two-ocean Navy" as "just plain dumb," and to a 1937 statement that he was

... happy. ... that the circumstances of the moment permit us to put our money into bridges and boulevards.

... rather than into huge standing armies and vast implements of war.
Words from Selective Service Director Hershey proved the Administration intended to "keep men in the Army." AF of L statistics substantiated the assertion that Roosevelt had kept a depression going eleven long years." Quotes from Senator Truman and Boss Kelly belied FDR's denial that he had ever "represented himself to be indispensable."

Mr. Roosevelt was indispensable:

. . . to Harry Hopkins, to Madame Perkins, to Harold Ickes. . . to a host of other political job holders. . . to those infamous machines, in Chicago—in the Bronx—and all the others. . . to Sidney Hillman and the Political Action Committee. . . . to Earl Browder, the ex-convict and pardoned Communist leader.

But the American people would say "NO" in November to this "motley crew." Under "stress of war" they had "thrown off the stupor and despair" of the thirties. They would have no more of the "defeatist" Roosevelt philosophy and would have done with "everything that is summed up in that phrase 'the indispensable man'."

16 The charge of "defeatism" had been "documented" earlier at Philadelphia when Dewey quoted Roosevelt as saying in 1932 that "our industrial plant is built"; the task ahead was not "producing more goods" but "administering resources and plants already in hand." NYT, 9/8/44, p. 12:1-8. See also text, Thomas E. Dewey, "Candidate Roosevelt's Record Revealed as 'Desperately Bad,'" Oklahoma City, 9/25/44 (issued by the Republican National Committee).

The governor wound up his 6,700-mile round trip to the Pacific still forswearing "mudslinging" but indulging a new zest for the cheering which punctuated increasingly frequent attacks on New Deal personalities. Still he talked of the "Roosevelt depression," of the "magnificent growth" which would ensue in an economy freed of New Deal
shackles. Still he accused the Administration of fomenting disunity. Still he let it be known that he would bring the boys home "at the earliest opportunity." Still he anticipated war's end by January 20.

But increasingly in his public utterances he worried lest he not get to the White House in time to "clean house" and rid the Capitol of Secretary Ickes, Madame Perkins, the "elegant collection of loafers" brought in by the "bosses," the "Sidney Hillman crew of the PAC" and the associates of Mr. Browder "whom my opponent had to pardon so he could wage this campaign."^17

^17See NYT, 9/27/44; 9/28/44, p. 1:2; 9/30/44, p. 11:1. With respect to the economy, Dewey in one nation-wide broadcast in which he promised tax relief to virtually everyone (save persons with a peculiarly high stake in alcoholic beverages, tobacco and gasoline) stated that New Deal tax laws penalized business and had helped the New Deal stretch "a three-year depression" to "nearly eleven years." His most shocking revelation was contained in photostatic copies of Treasury notices to the Lincoln Electric Company which showed, he said, that the Treasury Department had deliberately discouraged high wages. Ibid., 10/4/44, p. 1:3.

The Lesser Republicans Continue to Fear for the American Way

The line of issues taken by other Republicans continued much as before. Republican Senator Joseph Ball of Minnesota announced that he was not yet prepared to campaign for Dewey since the latter had "not yet" convinced him he would "fight vigorously" for a foreign policy which offered "real hope of preventing World War III." Acid-tongued Clare Luce, who was so prepared, also stressed foreign affairs, questioning Roosevelt's alleged statesmanship and vision, flaying his
"fondness" for "secret diplomacy," accusing him of "lying" the nation into war. Senator Taft of Ohio hit alleged Presidential incompetence in matters of defense, diplomacy and war mobilization. Governor Bricker also attacked Administration planning for war, making free use of Truman investigating committee data in the process.18 Even so,

few Dewey adherents gave foreign affairs top priority and almost none could express themselves without invoking the devil of PAC, without painting the coming election in terms of a threatened domestic revolutionary upheaval and/or without alerting the public to New Deal corruption and an already dangerous erosion of the American constitutional system.

Mrs. Luce said FDR "played Charlie McCarthy to Sidney Hillman's Bergen"; Taft worried about bureaucracy and totalitarianism. Spread large upon the record was GOP Chairman Brownell's conviction that concentration upon foreign policy was far less likely to be productive at the polls than a constant drumming on the fact that defense of the New Deal depended not upon "regular Democratic leaders" but upon the Hillmans, Browders, and folk like Ickes. News dispatches from states other than Connecticut and Ohio suggested that the Brownell tack was daily stock in trade for GOP Senatorial, Congressional and gubernatorial candidates. "While devoting considerable criticism to President Roosevelt and the New Deal," wrote a New York Times reporter from Chicago, "the Republicans' chief targets [In Illinois] are Sidney
Curran in New York ceaselessly denounced the President's "acceptance" of Earl Browder's support and curried favor with the American Federation of Labor by noting that if the New Deal were reinstalled in Washington credit would go to Sidney Hillman's followers, not to the Federation. 20 The GOP vice-presidential nominee continued to inveigh against "radicals of today" who, "linked with irreligion," were trying to "take a stranglehold on our nation through the control of the New Deal."—This before a GOP state convention in revolution-scarred Boston. At New Haven and again at St. Louis Bricker was confident that the "New Deal, under the guidance of Sidney Hillman and Earl Browder" was "not going to take over the United States Government," that the voters would "crush once and for all the(se) malignant forces..." At Rock Island, Illinois he seemed less sure, for the "sale" of the Democratic party to the "Hillmans and the Browders and the radical element" represented a transaction which had been "in process of consummation for twelve long years." Here too he feared four more years would transform FDR's incumbency into a "reign,"

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surpassing the record of the greatest prime ministers and even that of most kings!  

21 Other related Bricker targets included the size of the federal payroll, fiscal policies which threatened "loss of representative government and free enterprise," New Deal autocracy, bureaucracy and "favoritism," and the "radical tendencies" of the National Labor Relations Board. NYT, 9/24/44, pp. 1:2, 38; 10/3/44, p. 36:2; 10/4/44, p. 1:2; 10/5/44, p. 10:1; 10/6/44, p. 15:5. See also Columbus Citizen, 9/23/44; 10/4/44.

Occasionally a Republican voice was raised to sell the national ticket as the standard bearers of true American liberalism and progress,  

22 E.g., Governor Warren in California—who at the same time condemned FDR's dependence upon "corrupt" city machines for his long tenure in office. NYT, 10/3/44, p. 15:2.

"liberal" newspaper editorialist on September 28 that "As soon as we leave the filtered air of Dewey's speeches, the Republican campaign consists largely of throwing stinkbombs at Sidney Hillman and the Political Action Committee." Even a columnist of staunchly Republican sympathies, who righteously condemned Bob Hannegan's transgressions in the field of religious prejudice, regretted the fact that Polish and anti-Communist voters were being "steadily urged to note that 'all Communists are for Roosevelt.'"  

23 Press support for the Republicans

too remained in the latter vein along with that of sympathetic non-

See, for example, a Talburt cartoon in the Columbus Citizen, 9/27/44. Captioned "That's My Boy Who Said That," the drawing depicted the New Deal as a bearded gentleman wearing a mortar board and holding a bottle labeled "From the Fountain of Youth." The hoary individual, standing on a packing box, was pointing approvingly at "FDR's Speech"—which stood in front of a microphone. The "Speech" was stamped: "OK—Cleared with Sidney." See also Westbrook Pegler in ibid.

party organizations and individuals of miscellaneous political and non-political backgrounds. Thus a publication of Joseph Kamp's "Constitutional Educational League, Inc." trumpeted: "Vote CIO and Get a Soviet America." Labor lawyer Louis Waldman, appearing on a radio forum, warned that the Communists were working through PAC for the "ultimate triumph of totalitarianism." John W. Hanes, a former Undersecretary of the Treasury under Roosevelt warned that the New Deal was leading the nation to "dogmas and doctrines we never believed in and never lived under." A typical sense of urgency gripped William M. Jeffers, president of the Union Pacific Railroad and lately the "rubber czar" in charge of building the wartime synthetic rubber industry. Jeffers, a one-time janitor, told a group of San Francisco executives he wanted opportunities preserved for other "freckle-faced" lads, saying he believed in unions "directed by Americans," but not in the PAC or in Sidney Hillman or "his kind of people." The GOP
even drew aid and comfort from such an unlikely source as Norman Thomas, the veteran Socialist leader. Thomas, in an open letter to Sidney Hillman, chastised the PAC head for "scuttling" an "excellent opportunity for independent political action" to become "one of the motley crew of bosses who control that extraordinary conglomeration of northern city political machines and Southern Bourbons known as the Democratic Party."\(^{26}\)

\(^{26}\)For the references cited see (re Waldman) NYT, 9/24/47, p. 40:1; (Hanes) Ibid., 10/5/47, p. 10:4; (Jeffers) Ibid., 10/6/47, p. 15:7; (Thomas) Ibid., 9/27/47, p. 18:6.

Proceedings of the House Committee on Un-American Activities continued to be admirably adapted to GOP campaign needs. Four days after the Teamster speech the Dies subcommittee opened the first of six days of hearings, the purpose of which was to publicize the fruit of the group's search for corroboration of its charges against the Political Action Committee. The committee had accused CIO unions of undertaking political action and of applying union funds to political ends without membership consent. It had alleged that PAC activities were Communist-directed. It now publicly interrogated a handful of local union personalities—representing locals of three internationals in two cities—who offered to substantiate these charges and the further accusation that local union officers who failed to cooperate with PAC or to acquiesce in Communist control of union affairs were subject to
Only five men were questioned extensively; seven of the ten who appeared represented a single local union. The unions represented were the United Electrical Workers (two witnesses from L. 1150, Chicago), the Packinghouse Workers (one witness, L. 25, Chicago), and the Shipbuilding Workers (seven witnesses, L. 43, Baltimore, Md.). For their testimony see U. S. House, Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States, Sept. 27-29, Oct. 3-5, 1944, pp. 10235-10251, 10251-10262, 10263-10276, 10351-10387.

The New Deal in power and had contended that persons on the government payroll were furthering the PAC campaign in violation of the Hatch Act. Its chief investigator now entered documentary evidence of communication between PAC and governmental personnel and traced the federal employment records of a number of PAC staff members. The subcommittee also questioned the managing editor of a research organization friendly to PAC, source of the controversial campaign booklet alluded to on p. 129 above. Ibid., 10212-10223, 10323-10325. See also ibid., pp. 10220-10223, for emphasis on the contention that PAC was "... really ... not the labor movement; it hasn't got anything to do with the labor movement..." but was, rather, "purely a political organization" which was "taking advantage of labor and using it "as a dupe..."

The House Committee on Campaign Expenditures late in August had also pursued the question of whether the Hatch Act ban on political activity applied to federal employees after they had taken non-governmental positions but while they were still collecting "annual leave" from the federal treasury. U. S. House, Hearings of Committee on Campaign Expenditures, 1944, pp. 67-70.
Louis previously alleged to have notorious Communist or Communist-front records. Other messages which had been commandeered were introduced to refute Sidney Hillman's insistence that his national office did not "dictate" candidate endorsements in the field. Finally,


approximately fifty pages of testimony were offered by research director J. B. Matthews to support Dies' most terrifying conclusion: namely, that PAC, particularly through the National Citizens PAC, represented the American Communists' "supreme bid for power." Supporting data, as in the pre-primary report on CIOPAC, consisted of information on the organizational affiliations of NCPAC personnel—including some of its union members—along with background on the suspect organizations. Most impressive of the Matthews' exhibits were his tabulations of alleged Communist-front associations, although at the same time that he stressed the large number of affiliations entered into by some individuals he hinted darkly that a small number of affiliations for any given individual may have denoted a sly attempt at avoidance of suspicion. Hence those with no incriminating associations at all were by inference conceivably among the most dangerous characters of all.

30 Matthews' first exhibits showed individual connections with twenty-five organizations on a list of "subversive" organizations released in 1942 by the Attorney General. Further analysis and tabulations were based upon the House Committee staff's own compilation of
alleged Communist-front groups. On the former list 82 of NCPAC's members were said to be culpable; on the latter the number rose to 119. Ibid., pp. 10220, 10301, 10303, 10332 and 10277-10309, 10331-10350 passim. See also NYT, 9/28/44, p. 16:1; 9/30/44, p. 11:2; 10/4/44, p. 17:1; 10/5/44, p. 11:6.

PAC Continues Its Defense

In the light of this continuing barrage CIO's political actionists dared not rest on the laurels of the President's Teamster speech. There were other adverse circumstances too. Labor leaders were demanding, without certainty of ultimate success, government revision of the "Little Steel" formula—while accusing the GOP of making the wage policy a "political football" by "daring" the Government to revise it before election day. They were fearful that too

31CIO president Murray joined AFL leaders before the War Labor Board to press for labor policy revisions. NYT, 9/26/44, p. 24:2. See also p. 70 above.

many unionists in the field, however genuinely "pro-Roosevelt," would fail to bestir themselves politically, in the dangerous belief that the election was "in the bag." At the same time, Hillman's following,

32See, for example, a warning from the president of the Transport Workers Union. NYT, 9/25/44, p. 18:3.

taking whatever comfort there was to be had from Biddle's latest decree of absolution, from Roosevelt endorsement resolutions currently emanating from CIO union conventions, and from evidence that many
non-CIO unions were with them in the Roosevelt camp, in spirit if not organizationally, continued, oratorically, largely on the defensive.\(^{33}\)

\(^{33}\)For action taken by the Rubber Workers, United Electrical Workers and the Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers see *ibid.*, 9/24/1912, p. 40:2; 9/26/1912, p. 24:2; 9/30/1912, p. 26:1.


Hillman's was not the only PAC voice raised, but his utterances were most highly publicized in the commercial press. The PAC chairman defended the President—against "misleading" quotes on foreign policy and against the attempt to identify him with communism by virtue of his willingness to accept PAC support. He defended PAC tirelessly; denounced the newspapers, the Brickers, the Dies Committee; decried the "red herrings" and "Jew-baiting"; scoffed at extravagant "slush fund" stories and wished CIO members would disbelieve them and "send in your dollar." He ridiculed the incompatibility of various anti-PAC arguments; disavowed any ambition to capture the party of Jefferson and Jackson or through it to "subvert" the Government, and generally sought to disabuse the public of any misapprehensions about labor's political intentions, meantime issuing a challenge to Congressman Dies to force his appearance in response to a subpoena served on him six months earlier and protesting against a double standard which permitted FDR and his backers to be stigmatized because
Communists probably would vote for him while Dewey escaped contamination by his "fascist" supporters.\(^3\)

\(^3\) For example, Gerald L. K. Smith on September 29 told reporters his "nationalist" America First party would support Dewey in states where Smith was not on the ballot though a week later he attacked both Roosevelt and Dewey as "low-heeled traitors" and declared that Dewey had won the GOP nomination only because "he was approved by the New York Jews and the Republicans knew they needed New York state to win." See NYT, 9/29/\dh, p. 17:1; 9/30/\dh, p. 11:4; 10/2/\dh, p. 12:4; 10/3/\dh, p. 14:2; 10/5/\dh, p. 10:1.

For a typical defense of PAC from a union leader other than Hillman see remarks of Richard Frankensteen of the UAW on radio's "People's Platform." Ibid., 9/21/\dh, p. 40:1.

For Hillman's vigorous defense of President Roosevelt on pre-war foreign and military policy see his remarks at the CIO Electrical Workers' convention. Here he denounced Dewey's "brazen effrontery" in offering as evidence of failure to prepare for war FDR's expression of pleasure at the expenditure of public moneys for "bridges and boulevards" instead of for tools of war. He recalled that the statement, made at the dedication of Chicago's "Outer Drive" in 1937, was contained in the same speech in which he demanded a "quarantine" of aggressor nations, a demand condemned at the time as "war-mongering and saber-rattling." Columbus Citizen, 9/29/\dh.
CHAPTER V

THE PRECINCT SPEECH AND ITS AFTERMATH:
THE COMMUNIST ISSUE COMES INTO ITS OWN
AND DEMOCRATS COUNTER WITH OTHER PERILS
(OCTOBER 5 TO OCTOBER 21)

Contemporary observers could not decide whether Dewey had planned his campaign that way or whether the Oklahoma City speech represented a gamble and "reversal of form." Roosevelt biographer Sherwood describes the Teamster Speech as disrupting Dewey's "carefully cultivated self-assurance," causing him to "start swinging wildly" and to sound "less and less like a "liberal crusader" and "more and more like... his running mate." Whatever relative advantage the President may have reaped from the Teamster-Oklahoma City exchange, however, and however much valuable publicity he commanded almost daily simply by being Chief Executive, he was in no position to relax. Some of the more extravagant Dewey charges were answered by members of his official family. On October 5 Mr. Roosevelt himself responded to repeated accusations—including the charge that his reelection would mean victory for the Communists.¹

¹For commentary on the Teamster-Oklahoma City addresses, see Warren Moscow, Arthur Krock et al in NYT, 9/26/44, p. E3; 9/25/44, p. 16:3; 9/26/44; 9/27/44, p. 17:2; 9/28/44, p. 18:5; 10/1/44, pp. 12E, E3; 10/22/44, p. 12E. See also Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 822-23. For Internal Revenue Commissioner Nunan's version of the Lincoln Electric story (see p. 139 above) see NYT, 10/6/44, p. 24:3. For typical FDR headline saturation see also ibid., 9/30/44, pp. 1, 4, 8, 28.
The President's second avowed political speech was dubbed the "Precinct Speech" because it was addressed (by radio) to party workers across the nation and synchronized with the start of New York City's voter registration drive. In it he demonstrated again his knack for sarcasm, recalling that an election was at hand—despite prophecies of "some politicians and a few newspapers" that "it was my horrid and sinister purpose to abolish all elections and deprive the American people of the right to vote." With disarming candor, after endorsing an end to "undemocratic" suffrage law "defects," he hoped that, whoever won, there would be "a large outpouring of voters" so there would be no doubt how the masses of the people wanted the election to go. Then to the issues. The war was not won yet, but ultimate victory was assured. The men would come home at the "earliest possible moment." War Department plans and statutory provisions in effect "since May 29" provided that "The War and Navy Departments shall not retain persons in the armed forces to prevent unemployment." Economic controls would end, as required by law. But the President's handling of the "red bogey" drew the headlines. He regretted "loose" use of the term "communism" to describe progressive legislation and the "views of ... foreign-born citizens(s). ..." He referred to the widely circulated Busbey reprint. "Fear propaganda," he said, was the tool of dictators and he believed that "the sound and democratic instincts of the American people rebel against its use." As for his own campaign, he never sought and did not welcome support from
those "committed to communism or fascism" or other foreign ideology which "would undermine the American system of government or the American system of free competitive enterprise and private property."^2

^2NYT, 10/6/44, pp. 11:1, 11h. See also pp. 128-29 above.

The Lesser Republicans Find FDR's Repudiation of the Communists Inadequate

Observers agreed that the disavowal was calculated to "take the curse off" PAC as it pushed its registration and vote drive, for, as Tom Stokes wrote, Republicans rarely failed to "mention Sidney Hillman and Earl Browder in the same breath" and the latter was far from self-effacing in extending his services to the Democratic national ticket. Only the night before, he had spoken at the Boston premiere of the pro-Roosevelt "Bandwagon" production, and UP reporter Lyle Wilson, in reporting the Roosevelt speech, noted that it was scarcely a week since Browder appeared in Madison Square Garden to summon his comrades to man the New Deal ramparts—even as "our great Communist forebears in 1860 and 1864 supported Abraham Lincoln. . ." Republican dissatisfaction was expressed immediately. FDR, said Chairman Brownell, didn't go far enough.

I trust the President. . . will let us know whether he repudiates the support of the Communist-controlled Political Action Committee, which is leading the fight to retain him for sixteen years in the White House. 3
Governor Bricker departed from a prepared text at Milwaukee to comment that "the American people" would believe the President "when he fires from high office the last Communist who draws Federal pay." Thereafter, as he followed a western itinerary, the Ohioan repeatedly underlined threats which the election posed for America's economy, its government, and party system--via government "by secrecy," government "by crisis," New Deal extravagance and bureaucracy, the "packed judiciary," and a host of other evils. Not the least of the hazards ahead stemmed from the company kept by New Deal candidates and the "subversive" and "foreign" ideologies in which members of that company were steeped. Hopkins and Tugwell were mentioned, and bosses Pendergast, Hague and Kelly. The names most frequently invoked were Browder and Hillman, "promoters and financiers" of the New Deal. The Bricker campaign in New York state seldom wavered from its similar pattern. Dewey, Curran asserted, never resorted to "un-American philosophies or strange ideologies" and never espoused "perpetual rule
of the country by one man," whereas Browder and Hillman "worship(ed) at the political shrine of totalitarianism." Leftists ran the Roosevelt campaign and "common sense" dictated that what was good for Browder's Communists and Hillman's PAC was not good for America.5


A few Republicans still inclined toward the President's preference for foreign affairs as a paramount political problem. Minnesota's Senator Ball on October 12 challenged both nominees to go beyond generalities in answering a series of questions relating to future American policy on collective security. Paraphrased, these were:

1. Would the candidate support formation and American entry into a peace-keeping organization before the end of the war?
2. Would he oppose American "reservations" which would weaken such an organization's powers?
3. Would he permit America's representative on an international security council to commit an agreed-upon quota of American military forces to international action without further Congressional approval?

Asked if he thought Governor Dewey could say "yes" to all questions without alienating isolationist supporters Ball said, "I doubt it." John Foster Dulles felt differently. He elected to frighten internationalist-minded citizens into voting Republican on the ground that the Senate would "no doubt" more readily support Dewey than President Roosevelt in this matter. Others curried favor with the same segment of the electorate by claiming that "One World" advocate
Wendell Willkie, who died early in October, would surely have endorsed Mr. Dewey.6

6The 1940 GOP nominee's widow appealed for an end to such speculation; she was sure her husband "had not made his decision." See ibid., 10/7/1*1*, p. 1:2; 10/13/1*1*, p. 12:6; 10/22/1*1*, p. 1:2. For Ball's challenge, the Dulles comments and a similar prediction regarding Executive-Congressional relations made by Senator Burton of Ohio see ibid., 10/13/1*1*, p. 5:5; 10/22/1*1*, p. 36:3.

Most Republicans, however, followed the path of least resistance. The comely but carping Congresswoman from Connecticut, intent upon fixing responsibility for pre-Pearl Harbor unpreparedness, shifted the onus of isolationism to Democratic shoulders and renewed her contention that the President had "lied" America into World War II. Yet she, like Brownell, Bricker, Curran, most GOP governors, much of the nation's press and an odd assortment of political bedfellows, palpably preferred to be haunted by other isms. Brownell invariably offered as evidence of a GOP trend reports of "resentment" over PAC activities and Communism—e.g., from Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, New Jersey, Michigan, and New England.7 As for Mrs. Luce, at

7Ibid., 10/18/1*1*, p. 17:3; 10/21/1*1*, p. 9:1; 10/22/1*1*, p. 37:2. For illustrative gubernatorial utterances, by Saltonstall of Massachusetts, Martin of Pennsylvania, Willis of Kentucky, Edge of New Jersey, Green of Illinois, see ibid., 10/11/1*1*, p. 9:5; 10/19/1*1*, p. 13:1; 28:6; Columbus Citizen, 10/16/1*1*.

For illustrative anti-Communist and/or anti-PAC campaign contributions by a Democratic politician, a clergyman, and Norman Thomas, see NYT, 10/13/1*1*, p. 15:3; 10/16/1*1*, p. 11; 10/21/1*1*, p. 10:2. For typical editorials, cartoons and advertising copy synchronized with this GOP campaign theme, especially for a series of full page ads sponsored vaguely by "Many Citizens of Columbus" and devoted to warnings against "reformers and theorists" and "social engineers" who would
"plan and organize our lives for us," etc., see Columbus Citizen (Ohio), October 1944, passim.

Pittsburgh, according to the New York Times, she made her "most extravagant charges yet" against PAC. She asserted that the Communists were pro-FDR because (1) Russia was in the war, and (2) they hoped to exchange "their support at the polls for the right to take over the whole CIO union today, and tomorrow the whole union movement, and the Democratic party." Inherently equating Sidney Hillman's motivations and ambition with theirs, she stated "without supplying identifications) that twenty of his "political council members" were "recognized Communists or fellow travelers"; accused him of opening the gate to the Trojan Horse—in the CIO, the ALP and the Democratic party, and called him the leader of "this plot hatched between the Communist Wing of the Political Action Committee and some power-hungry New Dealers." Later, Mrs. Luce declared that PAC had put her "pretty near the top of the list of people they are going to 'get' in this election," although, "If my head rolls in the basket... surely it's a more American head than Mr. Hillman's."8

8 NYT, 10/14/44, p. 9:2; 10/17/44, p. 14:3; 10/20/44, p. 12:2. (Italics added.)

Cultivation of that imputation of un-Americanism—with the essence of Americanism being linked to religious background, race and national origin as well as to political philosophy and associations—
was most uninhibited perhaps in certain non-party quarters. But party workers in many areas, desperately mindful of their long fall from power, also found it difficult to resist temptation. Max Lerner wrote in PM that the 1948 campaign was the "dirtiest" since "the Ku Klux Klan beat Al Smith because he was a Catholic." Only this year "group libel" had superseded personal abuse.

Time was when you accused the opposition candidate of having had an illegitimate child. Now you use a much subtler and more dangerous technique: You say he is the candidate only of the Jews, the foreign-born, the labor bosses and the Communists.

Warren Moscow, analyzing Republican strategy at one point, remarked that the state GOP machines, particularly in the twenty-six states with Republican governors, were "working efficiently" with Governor Dewey and that it was these organizations especially which were "capitalizing on the 'Clear it with Sidney' issue." Still another newsman was struck by an official GOP speakers' handbook suggestion regarding the usefulness of references to the future of American labor--as a struggle, thanks to the New Deal and its "un-American supporters," between European-minded labor leaders" and "corrupt labor racketeers" on the one hand, and, on the other, the "great mass of intelligent American workmen who want an American chance, under American auspices, to get ahead in the American Way." In at least one populous state, according to this source, the only voter appeal that seemed more promising than the "straight anti-Hillman" line was the one accusing the Administration of wanting to keep servicemen in the army after the war. Thus Victor Riesel reported that when controversial
signboards saying: "This is Your Country, Why Let Hillman Run It" were taken down after an intra-party row at Pittsburgh, they were replaced with: "If You Want Your Boy Home Sooner, Vote for Dewey and Bricker." ⁹

⁹See PM, 10/10/hh, p. 2; NYT, 10/22/hh, p. 12E; New York Post, 10/12/hh, p. 10; 10/24/hh, p. 18.

Dewey Now Feels "Compelled" to Discuss Political Morality and the Communist Threat, and Exchanges Ensue with White House Analysts

There was no dearth of speechmaking from Governor Dewey himself in the interval between the President's second and third campaign addresses. While the lesser Republicans were letting the public know they found the latter's Communist repudiation inadequate the governor was issuing statements and proclamations and was answering and evading press conference queries on innumerable matters, foreign and domestic. Thus he set up an advisory committee to promote successful post-war reconversion in New York; committed himself to a "floor under the coal mining industry"; withheld comment on a Missouri Valley Authority; proclaimed National Business Women's Week, and parried inquiries about requests for a special session of the state legislature to extend voting hours. He cast suspicion upon "secret" Roosevelt intentions regarding future Polish boundaries; praised tentative international organization proposals and declined requests that he "reconcile" a pledge to keep the war "out of politics" with his charges re the alleged inadequacy of supplies sent to MacArthur and the Administration plan for military demobilization. And he expressed
delight after meeting with sponsors of a "Double the Vote for Dewey Day," that women of the nation were so "aroused." 10


He also made four important speeches in as many states. The first of these comprised a second "reply," again, as if the governor rather than the President were on the defensive. He left Albany for West Virginia, announcing that he would now be "compelled" to discuss the Communist issue" quite openly." Plainly, FDR himself had vindicated the faith of the lesser Republicans in the "red" issue while persuading Dewey that he too might profitably shift from "major domestic issues" to this more exciting text. In Charleston he ran through virtually the entire inventory of reasons why it was "time for a change," quoting enroute from Harry Truman, Henry Wallace and UAW vice president Frankensteen, and pointing to a war agency of which Sidney Hillman had been co-chairman to support charges of bureaucracy and administrative incompetence. He reiterated earlier promises, from labor policy to the timing of the end of the war and "non-partisan" cooperation for peace. 11 Naturally, the "answer" to the Precinct

11 Observers detected a determined effort to corral eastern "internationalists" in hints that even Secretary Hull might be kept on by a Republican administration. See NYT, 10/8/44, p. 35:1; 10/9/44, p. 14:2.
Speech, gave reporters their lead sentences. FDR's "soft disclaimer" of Communist support Dewey described as "a trifle late." Only last week, Earl Browder, that draft dodger and convicted perjuror (pardoned so he could "organize" the fourth term campaign), had proclaimed to cheering thousands that Roosevelt's reelection was "essential to his aims." Ample proof of this lay in Roosevelt's record. Communist aims were "best served by unemployment and discontent" and the Communists remembered that under the New Deal "we had to have a war to get jobs." An even more compelling reason for Browder's support lay in the fact that the New Deal was developing "its own form of corporate state." New Deal and Communist aims for a "government-owned" America coincided. Both sought "a system where government would tell each of us where we could work, at what, and for how much." Governor Dewey documented this with a quotation from Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle:

> Over a period of years the Government will gradually come to own most of the productive plants in the United States.

The GOP nominee grimly allowed that we were well on our way; for today there were "fifty-five Government corporations and credit agencies with net assets of twenty-seven billion dollars" while the government also owned or operated "one-fifth of the manufacturing plants of this country!"

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There was no retaliatory presidential address. Following a discreet time lapse, the White House released two reassuring letters
and a "factual analysis" of ten charges (grounded largely in the deceptive quote from context) made at Oklahoma City. One letter was from Major General Hershey, who was sure everyone "understood" he (who "never withheld the information" that he was a Republican) had "no responsibility" for demobilization, and that his oft-quoted "personal opinion" was totally at variance with government policy. The other was from Assistant Secretary Berle, who looked askance at Dewey's "surprisingly dishonest effort" to prove that the President's objectives were communist. True, he (Berle) had written in a 1939 memorandum of the possibilities of government ownership of "most of the productive plant of the United States," but this sentence represented, not advocacy, but the result Berle foresaw if private capital failed to "flow into necessary enterprise." The "factual analysis" showed that in virtually every case—including the "bridges and boulevards" excerpt from FDR's famous "Quarantine Speech"—additional sentences from the same sources would have reversed or seriously altered the implications of the quotes employed by Dewey on September 25. Governor Dewey dealt in a single statement with all three White House releases, stating blandly that the "analysis" corroborated "every single statement" he had made and producing additional Berle quotes to show that under FDR the nation was headed for socialism or communism.13

13See ibid., 10/15/Wh, pp. 1:2, 38:1, 38:6, 39; 10/16/Wh, p. 1:2. See also ibid., 10/8/Wh, p. 36:8. See p. 133 above.
The delayed demobilization issue was too good to drop. His party chairman had called this a "truth-telling" campaign, a crusade to put "honesty" in the White House.\footnote{\textit{NYT}, 10/7/\textsc{hh}, p. 9:3. See also \textit{ibid.}, 10/1\textsc{l/h}/\textsc{hh}, p. 1:3.} At St. Louis on October 16, therefore, Dewey fired new ammunition--borrowed from Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, and Frederick A. Delano, uncle of the President and author of a report on Post-War Readjustment of Civilian and Military Personnel. The latter "proved" conclusively that the Administration was "afraid" to demobilize. This issue, which the \textit{New York Times} labelled "as spurious" as the communist issue (and which brought a second and speedier "factual analysis"), consumed a large part of the St. Louis speech, but the charges of corruption and communism were neither gone nor forgotten. Here in the home state of Truman and Pendergast Governor Dewey pledged himself anew to "clean house" and to rid the Capitol of machine politicians, bureaucrats, Communists and fellow travelers.\footnote{For the Dewey speech, the text of the "Demobilization Section of Planning Board Report" from which Dewey quoted, and the White House analysis see \textit{ibid.}, 10/17/\textsc{hh}, pp. 1:1, 15; 10/18/\textsc{hh}, p. 15:1. See also \textit{ibid.}, 10/\textsc{hl}/\textsc{hh}, p. 1:2, and editorials in \textit{ibid.}, 10/7/\textsc{hh}, p. 12:2; 10/18/\textsc{hh}, p. 20:2.}

At the \textit{New York Herald Tribune}'s annual Forum on Current Problems two days later he spoke again on foreign policy and answered
affirmatively the first two of Senator Ball's provocative questions. The major part of the address was given over to a ruthless indictment of the "personal secret diplomacy" of a president who presumed (ineptly) to be his own Secretary of State, and to a bald coveting of various nationality bloc votes. He said FDR's diplomacy was costing American blood and jeopardizing the peace. The New York Times was shocked at sympathy the governor expressed for defeated, enemy Italians as alleged victims of that diplomacy. No less shocking in its implications was a Dewey revelation related to the communist issue: namely, that an American agreement with Rumania had been signed by a representative of the Soviet Union! To which the President remained silent, although the State Department "replied" that Marshal Malinovski as theatre commander had signed a "military document"—as General Eisenhower had signed the Italian armistice for our Soviet and British allies.16

16 For the Dewey speech, the State Department reply, and the Times' editorial see NYT, 10/19/44, pp. 1:1, 12; 10/20/44, pp. 12:1, 18:2.

At Pittsburgh, in his second "labor speech," Dewey set about an unenviable task: to depict the GOP as the trail blazer and guarantor of future progress in labor and social welfare legislation; to picture the New Deal as a regime which had merely continued a humanitarian "trend" fostered by Republicans, and which now was totally bankrupt and living on its past. Less delicate was the task of capitalizing
upon specific grievances of some (non-CIO) segments of organized labor. Nothing new was advanced anent PAC but Dewey promised "both economic security and personal freedom" and remembered that back in 1919, under another "tired" post-war Democratic administration, the nation was so "torn by cleavage and insecurity" that the American Communist Party was born, "dedicated to revolution." Optimistically, he reported a "great upsurge" in popular feeling that it was "time for a change." Even Democrats, resentful of the "kidnapping" of their party by Communists and the PAC and "fed up" with twelve years of "quarreling, waste and decay," joyously awaited a Republican victory.  

17Ibid., 10/21/44, pp. 1:1, 11.

Notwithstanding the hopes of Democratic leaders, the President adamantly refused to be lured into more frequent public appearances. Yet he was by no means above politics, as attested by the White House analyses and by duly publicized acts and utterances which ostensibly had nothing to do with the campaign. He refused to comment on Dewey's Herald Tribune speech and gave leave to reporters to interpret his remarks as meaning he "was not very much interested in its contents." But he had already made his own sympathetic overtures to voters of foreign extraction--including the Italians--and dealt with much of that speech (and others) on a piece meal basis. This he could do most handsomely in the case of Dewey's unfortunate remarks on the "neglect" of the Pacific theatre of war, while simultaneously flaunting
GOP minimizing of the commander-in-chief role. For at this point
General MacArthur triumphantly returned to the Philippines, and
inquiring reporters ascertained that the President had participated
directly in invasion planning while at Pearl Harbor earlier in the
summer.18

18For press conference comments and other indirect campaign
contributions (via letters, messages, etc.), including some in
refutation of charges that his Administration was unduly partial to
labor, see NYT, 10/12/11, p. 1:5; 10/13/11, p. 1:5; 10/14/11, pp.
1:2, 26:1; 10/17/11, p. 29:1; 10/18/11, p. 6:3; 10/20/11, pp. 1:6,
1:8; 10/21/11, pp. 1:1, 18:2.

Assorted Democrats Warn against Isolationism and Reaction

From Oklahoma City onward Governor Dewey's speeches and the
mounting incidence of Administration replies, direct and indirect,
indicated that both sides had qualms about the ultimate outcome.
Surprisingly, save for the Berle denial after Charleston, the
Democrats, after the Precinct Speech, repressed somewhat their earlier
frantic determination to deny each and every "red herring." They
essayled, rather, to impress the voters with two evils as loathsome as
Communism, Incompetence or Corruption: viz., Reaction and Isolation-
ism. If men behind Roosevelt were to be stigmatized, those behind
Dewey must be stamped indelibly as foes of social progress and inter-
national cooperation.

This was true of Senator Truman, who never abandoned his
initial theme of FDR's superior experience and vision and who protested
as the worst "political chicanery" Dewey's penchant for quoting from context, particularly his alleged distortion of excerpts from (Truman) War Investigating Committee reports. It was true of Senator Wagner, who accused Dewey of "recklessly toying with the heartstrings of every American family whose sons are overseas" by treating the war "lightly" as if it were practically over." On foreign policy Truman made

**Footnote 19:** For Mr. Roosevelt's own awareness of the nation's "heartstrings," see, for instance, his message to the National Convention of American War Dads. *NYT*, 10/18/44, p. 14:6.

targets of the Hearsts and McCormicks, the Tafts and the Nyes. On domestic policy he prompted suspicion of a candidate who "represented himself" as a "liberal" in the Northwest whereas in the East he was "going to repeal all the liberal laws" and sought "reactionary" support by charging FDR with "fellow travelling" with Communists. Wagner promised to fight the "defenders of tariff barriers and the torch-bearers of isolation" and to work for world organization for peace, although his chief endeavor was to explode "empty *empty promises* regarding social welfare—as if he were not convinced of the truth of his own statement that "the people" knew where the "humane, constructive programs" came from.  

dispensing wit, humor and ridicule throughout his trek across the continent, matched Mrs. Luce's Trojan Horse with one bearing a "prize group of isolationists and rabble-rousers" who would "impose upon America and the world" their own "narrowness, bigotry and hatred."

He also challenged the "ersatz, synthetic Mr. Dewey of luminous convictions" to say whether he shared the opposition of "interests now supporting" him to the New Deal's wealth-creating projects of the West. Other Democrats during this period monotonously cultivated the same distrust, summed up once by Vice-President Wallace in the warning that Dewey's "conversion to the New Deal" was no better than his "death-bed recantation of his isolationist past."21

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21 Ibid., 10/21/44, p. 10:5. For further Wallace speeches see ibid., 10/12/44, p. 21:5; 10/14/44, p. 8:2; 10/22/44, p. 33:5. See also Columbus Citizen, 10/13/44, p. 10. For reports on Ickes' speeches see NYT, 10/9/44, p. 14:1; 10/11/44; 10/17/44, p. 14:3.

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Certain non-party sources shared the Democrats' belief in both the validity and probable potency of their line on foreign policy and some Willkie Republicans publicly joined the Roosevelt camp. Few, however, seemed to agree that now was the time to merchandise domestic New Dealism.22 Even some Democratic utterances at times had the same

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22 See, for example, the New York Times endorsement for Roosevelt, 10/16/44, p. 18:1-3. See also sentiments expressed by four political writers and commentators on a radio forum. Ibid., 10/22/44, p. 33:3.

On support from the Willkie camp (from Marcia Davenport, Mrs. Kermit Roosevelt, and Bartley C. Crum, see ibid., 10/7/44, p. 9:2; 10/10/44, p. 21:1; 10/17/44, p. 14:4.)
(domestic) defensive quality as the White House analyses, for they included continued remonstrances against the demobilization fiction and—especially in the case of Senator Wagner, who was constantly confronted by Curran's diatribes—echoes of the Berle quotation clarification respecting New Deal devotion to free enterprise. Several kept up their defenses on the PAC issue and defended this CIO "meddling in politics." Eleanor Roosevelt and Henry Wallace each publicly acknowledged personal contributions to the Political Action Committee, and Senator Truman, asked by newsmen about the "clear with Sidney" slogan, answered with a blunt "Never heard of it," but

That's no reflection on Sidney. He's got religion since Dewey ran for Governor. You know he used to support Dewey.

Attorney General Biddle berated the GOP for unwarranted use of the "bossism" issue and said Republicans had "resurrected" the "Red Bogey Man" only because they had no "major campaign issue." On the whole, however, during this phase, direct Democratic recognition of the PAC issue represented a dutiful encumbrance on a counter campaign of fear-mongering in which the "red bogey" was to be drowned in a sea of isolationism and reaction.23

23 For Biddle's remarks, see ibid., 10/10/44, p. 15:5; 10/21/44, p. 30:6; for the Truman quotation see ibid., 10/16/44, p. 30:2. On Mrs. Roosevelt and Wallace see Columbus Citizen, 10/3/44; 10/14/44.
PAC Spokesmen Say FDR's Repudiation of the Communists Does not Apply to Them

Alas for PAC, the Precinct Speech and the subsequent shift of most Democrats to issues on which they could take the offensive were not interpreted in labor quarters as relieving the CIO of the prime necessity of self-defense. PAC acquired no new aura of respectability when Herbert Brownell charged that it now had a companion in a "War Millionaires PAC." Nor was it spared the odious necessity of trying to shake off the "red" label, by the non-revolutionary behavior of Earl Browder at the Boston performance of the "People's Bandwagon." In his intermission discussion of "economic problems of war and peace," Browder criticized labor elements which were restive under the no-strike pledge and placidly accepted the fact that "a radical redistribution of the national income" was "politically unacceptable" to a majority of Americans. The revue itself was apparently harmless enough both in content and immediate repercussions--although a Woman's Political Club picketed the place and firecrackers went off in the lobby.--But nothing save further compulsion toward self-defense was Sidney Hillman's lot when he was obliged in great embarrassment to withdraw from a speaking commitment on the Herald Tribune Forum because that newspaper ("innocently") announced that the labor leader would "represent" the Democratic party. Hannegan protested, Hillman protested, and the newspaper apologized, but the PAC chairman refused to reconsider his withdrawal and President Roosevelt later declined to address the Forum. Some conservative Democrats lent aid and comfort to the GOP by complaining (as did Senator Edwin C. Johnson of
Colorado) that Browder, Hillman, and Wallace were "a millstone around
the President's neck" and ought to be put "in cold storage along with
Eleanor" for the rest of the campaign; while some "liberal" appeals
to Hillman to dissociate himself from the "Communist ALP" must have
been equally distressing.2h

2h For the Brownell accusation see NYT, 10/21/44, p. 9:1; the
"Bandwagon" story, ibid., 10/7/44, p. 7:6; the Herald Tribune fiasco,
ibid., 10/9/44, pp. 14:5, 17:4; 10/15/44, p. 1:2; the Johnson remarks,
ibid., 10/14/44, p. 8:3. See also a New York Post editorial plea to
Hillman to take "PAC and himself" into the new Liberal Party of New
York, where they "really belong," 10/18/44, p. 25.

In any case, while CIO and PAC speech makers, like the party
politicians, seized upon routine local issues to exploit--such as the
accessibility of the ballot and alleged GOP efforts to keep voters
from exercising their franchise--and although they joined the Democrats
in invoking typical magic "hate-words": "isolation" and "reaction" for
Bricker; "inexperience," "vacillation," "me-tooism" and "double-talk"
for Dewey; "do-nothing Hooverism" and "narrow, stupid nationalism" for
the GOP's platform, etc., never did they overlook the fact that they,
like Mr. Roosevelt, were on trial. Constantly they struggled to quiet
misgivings regarding their relationship and intentions respecting FDR
and the Democratic party. PAC had no "special interest" in the latter
as such, said Hillman at the Ohio CIO Council convention:

We not only would not take it over,
they couldn't force it on us.
The CIO, he maintained, "probably would not have made any [presidential] endorsement," had Wendell Willkie not been "eliminated by the Old Guard Republicans."

As for the most serious charge of all, the PAC chairman's almost instantaneous response to the Precinct Speech, via a prepared statement, bespoke the concern with which it was viewed. The President's repudiation of the Communists, Hillman declared, was not directed at PAC. Neither PAC nor its chairman was at issue. The real question, raised by the Republicans, was whether "workers and other common men and women of America" had a right to organize "for full and effective participation in politics." The "torrent of abuse" heaped on PAC for "exercising that right" was a "foretaste and a warning" of what was in store "if those forces [which made PAC their target] should prevail on November 7."

It was not PAC which was "alien," but those who had imported "every ideological weapon from the arsenal of fascism into this campaign," those who used "the technique of the big lie constantly repeated." It was no less preposterous to make PAC the "pet whipping boy" for a "Communist smear campaign"--just because Earl Browder endorsed FDR--than it would be to insist upon labelling every Republican voter a "Fascist or a Fascist fellow traveler" because "all the Fascist vermin in this country want to see Mr. Roosevelt defeated."25

25 For the Hillman statement, his Ohio address, and a speech before a CIO audience in Philadelphia, see NYT, 10/8/Wh, p. 37:1; 10/10/Wh, p. 16:1; 10/12/Wh, p. 19:1. On the franchise issue, which flourished in New York, New Jersey, and Ohio see ibid., 10/11/Wh, pp. 1, 25:6; 10/12/Wh, p. 1:2; 10/18/Wh, p. 23:8; 10/19/Wh, p. 1:2; 10/21/Wh, p. 9:5; 10/25/Wh, p. 1:2; 10/31/Wh, p. 1:2. See also "Ohioans in Washington," in Columbus Citizen, 10/15/Wh.
There is no evidence that the President ever contemplated giving in to GOP determination to keep voter attention riveted on domestic affairs. As the election drew near it became ever clearer that voters were not to be permitted the luxury of balloting in blissful disregard for the world scene. On October 21, after a 51-mile rainy-day tour of metropolitan New York—calculated to combat a whispering campaign about the state of his health, Mr. Roosevelt delivered a major address before the Foreign Policy Association.\(^1\) Here the President for the first time answered Senator Ball's three questions—all of them in the affirmative, including the one his adversary had ducked: should an American representative in the projected international organization be able to commit the United States to the use of armed force in emergencies without waiting for an act of Congress? Without mentioning his opponent by name (an habitual omission) the President contradicted

\(^1\)It was estimated that the President was seen by from one to three million persons. Cultivation of the health issue had been largely sub rosa but it was said to be an "open secret" that "a questioning of the President's health" was expected to affect the election. See for example, \textit{NYT}, 10/13/\textit{hh}, p. 20:2; 10/18/\textit{hh}, p. 1:2; 10/22/\textit{hh}, pp. 1:1, 12E; Thomas L. Stokes in \textit{Columbus Citizen}, 10/23/\textit{hh}.\n
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Dewey's insistence that foreign policy was not at issue. It was very
much so, in terms of "sober, solemn facts"—such as the generally
"isolationist" record of the GOP since 1920, and the fact that "positions
of commanding influence and power" in a Republican-controlled Congress
would fall to the same "inveterate isolationists" who had fought recent
extensions of the reciprocal trade agreement program, Selective
Service, Lend-Lease, and repeal of the arms embargo. The Democrats'
superior world view was apparent in the Good Neighbor Policy, Philippine
Independence, recognition of the Soviet Union; in the effort of Senate
Democrats to take the U. S. into the World Court, and in Mr. Roosevelt's
own futile attempts in 1937 and '39 to aid democratic resistance to
totalitarian aggressors. The highlight of the message lay in the
President's explicit declaration that "The Council of the United Nations
must have the power to act quickly and decisively to keep the peace by
force if necessary." He used a homely analogy:

A policeman would not be a very efficient policeman if,
when he saw a felon break into a house, he had to go to the
Town Hall and call a town meeting to issue a warrant before
the felon could be arrested.

[As for the United States]... If the world organiza-
tion is to have any reality at all our representative
must be endowed in advance by the people themselves, by
constitutional means through their representatives in
Congress, with authority to act.

There was more to the address. But on the main point columnist Stokes
commented that a "sizzling issue" had been thrown into the campaign,
leaving it now squarely up to Governor Dewey and the Republicans to
indicate whether they would go as far as the Roosevelt commitment.
Most Republicans and the Anti-New Deal Press
Still Prefer the Red Menace to Foreign Policy

The challenge did not appreciably alter the general course of Republican campaigning. Governor Bricker offered perfunctory endorsements for "world organization for peace" and a world court but his dominant foreign policy motif was one of criticism of Roosevelt on defense, disarmament and diplomacy. His primary concern remained internal affairs. Back in Ohio on November 4, after eight weeks and 16,000 miles of travel in thirty-one states, he envisioned a Republican victory and, in its wake, a "return of confidence and enterprise," new shops and factories, jobs "multiplying everywhere because of spreading economic opportunity," and "men from the ranks of labor becoming proprietors of their own businesses." The expectations which logically flowed from most of the 170-odd speeches just concluded were less sanguine. It was a New Deal America of regimentation and class strife which the Governor had elected to describe. It was fear of an America dominated by Rooseveltian advisors and "alien" supporters that he had most painstakingly cultivated. In industrial Detroit, relying heavily upon Dies data he "analyzed" the "actual working relationship" of the PAC vis-à-vis the Communists and the federal government. His summation, after attacking Sidney Hillman as an immigrant who did not "accept our system of government," was:
The man behind Franklin Roosevelt is Sidney Hillman. The man behind Sidney Hillman is Earl Browder. And back of him are the class hatreds, the alien philosophies and the economic slavery of the old world.

At Philadelphia he promised to do "everything within my power" to prevent American boys from coming home to find "Sidney Hillman with his alien philosophies of government sitting at the right hand of the President, and Earl Browder, a draft dodger... and a convicted perjuror, sitting at the left hand of the President." At Denver Bricker criticized recent refugee admissions, implying that perhaps "this group was 'cleared with Sidney.'" At Dallas he warned Democratic "regulars" that FDR was a "political prisoner" of Communists. At Shawnee, Oklahoma he was glad "laboring people" were waking up to the fact that they were "being exploited for political gain" now that "Hillman... and Earl Browder" and the Communists were "sitting in the driver's seat." In Missouri he hit federal aid to education, whereby the "social theories of a Sidney Hillman, and Earl Browder" and a "Rex Tugwell" might be foisted upon our public school system. At Paterson, New Jersey, FDR's endorsement of free enterprise was dismissed as election year lip-service--since he had not disowned Tugwell, Wallace, Hillman or Browder "for planning our economy on European ideologies."3

In crucial New York, save for variations occasioned by local necessities, Secretary of State Curran in the main continued in like vein. It was still New Deal "sabotage" of our "traditional form of government," the fourth-term threat to the "American way of life" which must be eradicated. The greatest danger of all was that the major parties and the independents would not get out the vote in sufficient numbers to defeat the "radical vote" mobilized by the PAC.

I say to you [Democrats as well as Republicans], the only way to destroy... the Communist forces which threaten the foundation of this Republic—and which threaten the continuance of the two-party system in this country—is to vote for the Republican candidates next Tuesday.\(^4\)

\(^{4}\) NYT, 11/5/44, p. 43:2. For almost daily accounts of the Curran campaign during this period see ibid., 10/22/44-11/7/44, passim.

So with others in the GOP camp. As befitting time and place all made customary genuflections before the enfranchised members of the American business community, labor, Negroes, nationality groups, veterans, et al. Many devoted some attention to the Roosevelt "sizzler" although they were not unanimous in the character of their response. Most resumed the attempt to demonstrate Mr. Roosevelt's "isolationist" past (while denying their own), and/or to depict the GOP as the party of true international cooperation,\(^5\) although at least one articulate Dewey

\(^{5}\) See, for example, the protests of publisher Frank Gannett, Senator Millikin of Colorado, and assistant GOP chairman Marion Martin. Ibid., 10/23/44, p. 10:2; 10/25/44, p. 12:6; 10/28/44, p. 10:7.
supporter brought rather dubious support to the "Willkie vote" quest by frankly commending the GOP ticket as the voters' bulwark against implementation of the President's declaration regarding power in advance for American participation in international police action. This was Robert Moses, New York City's Parks Commissioner, and his "reply" to the New York Times' mid-October editorial endorsement for FDR—pegged almost entirely to the preeminence of the foreign policy issue, and to the less equivocal qualifications of FDR and the Democrats in this department—appeared in an expensive full page newspaper ad sponsored by the Republican National Committee. In some quarters the delayed demobilization argument (also employed by Mr. Moses) was dinned into the ears of war-weary parents and their war-weary offspring. Columnist Samuel Grafton wrote in the New York Post on October 31 that radio stations in New York City were "thundering, at so much per minute, that the President intends to keep soldiers needlessly in the services after the war." Moses hoped on November 3 that there was "still time" for people to understand "what the so-called international intellectuals are up to" and to realize that one of Mr. Roosevelt's "temperament and ambitions" was "not likely to bring the boys back home very early." He doubted that the latter wanted to "spend the next twenty years rotating as members of an international army, available for every conceivable armed conflict."^6

Even so, few in Dewey's party appeared genuinely convinced that foreign affairs comprised the issues area within which the election would be decided. Most of his supporters from outside the party organization also stuck closer to a domestic chamber of New Deal horrors. Even Mr. Moses worked references to Hillman and Browder into his foreign policy rebuttal to the Times. A GOP advertisement on November 6 publicized movie star Gary Cooper's dislike for "the company" Mr. Roosevelt kept and for the New Deal's borrowing of "foreign notions." Several more Democratic "names" publicly acknowledged preference for the GOP ticket—in order to save the country and their party from communism and the PAC, and anti-PAC remarks continued to issue from Socialist nominee Norman Thomas, along with his criticisms of both major parties.  

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7 See for example, NYT, 10/21/Lh, p. 10:2; 10/23/Lh, p. 11:2; 10/25/Lh, p. 22:3; 10/30/Lh, p. 10:2; 11/1/Lh, p. 40:3; 11/2/Lh, p. 15:5; 11/6/Lh, p. 15.  

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anti-New Deal press also kept the PAC issue very much alive,8 and a

8 See, for example, in addition to a routine budget of columns, unsigned editorials and cartoons aimed at the "Browder-Hillman Axis," a special series of articles on the "red menace," carried in the Columbus Citizen (Ohio) toward the end of the campaign, October 20-28, 1944.

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Dies subcommittee report rolled off the presses in handy pamphlet form, bearing a summarization of allegations made against the Political Action Committee, including the month-old charge that NCPAC represented the Communists' "supreme bid for power" and the further charge that
both national PAC's were rallying points for Communist seizure of a major political party.9


The GOP's official assessment of the relative merits of the various campaign issues at this time was apparent in Chairman Brownell's references to Earl and Mrs. Browder, Harry Bridges' participation in CIO political activity, and Sidney Hillman's "Communist connections" with the "Garland Fund" in the 1920's. It was glaringly evident in an election day newspaper advertisement which carried a picture of "CIO members" at Todds Shipyard, Brooklyn--bearing a poster which proclaimed: "We Want Dewey--'No PAC.'" In Pennsylvania, as revealed in a Senate committee hearing on October 31, the campaign finale entailed a gigantic door-to-door distribution of a 32-page illustrated booklet entitled: "Clear Everything with Sidney." This, notwithstanding a somewhat peevish eleventh hour clarification by Arthur Krock and a demand from the New York Times itself that Republicans cease attributing to it the authority for the ubiquitous "Clear It with Sidney" legend. The Times was especially annoyed that, despite assurances that the offensive material would be deleted, the GOP National Committee as late as October 27 was still sponsoring a one-minute recorded radio broadcast which ran:

"Clear everything with Sidney." These ominous words were spoken by the President to Chairman Hannegan of the
Democratic party, reported by the New York Times of July 25. And what does this "Clear everything with Sidney" mean? It means the Democratic convention was left in charge of Sidney Hillman, top man in the Radical PAC.

NYT, 10/27/44, p. 11:2. The columnist protested on October 23 that he had not meant to suggest that FDR had ordered the entire Democratic convention proceedings placed "in charge of Sidney Hillman." His words had applied only to the vice-presidential nomination. A week later Krock lauded PAC's "nonpartisanship," its "indirect" assistance to some Republican candidates, its concern with "issues" as a basis for candidate endorsements. See ibid., 10/24/44, p. 22:6; 10/25/44, p. E3:1. For the Brownell references and the GOP ad cited, see ibid., 10/22/44, p. 37:2; 10/26/44, p. 36:2; 10/28/44; 11/3/44, p. 14:6; 11/4/44, p. 10:4; 11/7/44, p. 18.

Party sponsorship of the Pennsylvania booklet had been deliberately obscured and the state GOP chairman denied knowledge of the reasons behind the method of distribution, although he testified that the party's first order to the printer was for 1,000,000 and the second for 3,000,000 copies. Others described the literature as "virulently anti-Semitic" and claimed that it was so "scurrilous" that it was banned from the mails. It purportedly linked both Hillman and President and Mrs. Roosevelt to "convicted murderers" as well as Communists.

The Lesser Democrats: International Cooperation
Post-war Prosperity, and the Defense
against "Red Herrings"

If there was some doubt in Republican ranks as to the adequacy of any single issue, there was parallel uncertainty in the President's camp, despite Democratic jubilation over the multiple effects of the FPA address. These included the vigorous demonstration of presidential health, Senator Ball's announcement two days later that he would vote for Roosevelt, and the shadow cast upon Dewey's internationalist protestations by the Moses ad and its open GOP sponsorship. Most leading Democrats did, however, manage to keep FDR's experience in foreign affairs, his demonstrated capacity for world leadership, and the contrasting GOP record in this field high if not always at the top of their respective lists. Senator Truman, who found himself under attack on the rumor circuit for an alleged past membership in the Ku Klux Klan (a charge which he denied as "just another red herring"), repeatedly challenged Dewey to disown his "isolationist" backers. He even risked jeopardizing his own party's fortunes in Massachusetts by discussing the "isolationist" record of a Democratic solon and Senate committee chairman from that state. Some, like Senator Wagner and Vice-President Wallace, gave high priority also to contrasting prospects
for post-war employment and prosperity under Dewey and Roosevelt.

Wagner, notably, covered the whole range of domestic issues on which he rested his own case for reelection as a New Dealer.\(^\text{13}\) Mrs. Roosevelt

\(^\text{13}\)For almost daily press coverage of the Truman and Wagner speeches see NYT, 10/21/\text{UU-11/7/\text{U}}, \text{passim}. For Wallace speeches see \text{ibid.}, 10/22/\text{U}, p. 33:5; 10/28/\text{U}, p. 10:3; 11/3/\text{U}, p. 13:U; 11/4/\text{U}, p. 11:1.

and the peripheral campaigners—such as present and former administrative associates of Mr. Roosevelt who were drawn into the political fray for one-shot or infrequent statements or speeches—inevitably stressed the Commander-in-Chief and foreign policy leadership angle or gave FDR their blessing in the interest of war, peace, and post-war prosperity. One at least, at the opening of this last phase of the campaign, delivered what logically might have been a final answer to the tediously refuted "delayed demobilization" allegation, by pointing out that the National Resources Planning Board not only made no such recommendation but that its "sweeping and comprehensive program for returning veterans" already had been enacted into the GI Bill of Rights. As for Rooseveltian competence in war and peace, helpful testimonials came in one form or another from Secretary of State Hull, Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, Assistant Secretary of State Berle, former War Production Board chairman Donald M. Nelson, Joseph E. Davies and W. Averell Harriman, former and current ambassadors to the Soviet Union, Jesse Jones, Commerce Secretary and RFC head, and others, including War Mobilizer Byrnes, whose first post-Democratic convention
declaration for the President came on October 30.\textsuperscript{1}\textsuperscript{1} Even so, an

\textsuperscript{1}\textsuperscript{1}See ibid., 10/25/\textit{llh}-11/\textit{llh}, passim. The NRPB statement cited was made by a former vice chairman of the board, Dr. Charles E. Merriam of the University of Chicago. Ibid., 10/2/\textit{llh}, p. 40:3.

impressive number of these and other testimonialists ventured to reassure the business community that the free enterprise system was safe with Roosevelt--Byrnes thoughtfully dissociated himself from the President's "New Deal" entourage--and FDR's more avowedly "political" partisans reiterated their denials that support for the ticket from either Hillman or Browder foredoomed the U.S.A. to ultimate communization. Henry Wallace, who felt compelled at a Liberal party rally to allay suspicion that either Roosevelt or Truman was a "reactionary," thought that "after the way Sidney has been kicked around, ... we... should take off our hats to him for what he has done." In a mocking one-way conversation from a Connecticut platform the Vice-President announced: "Under the Constitution, Sidney Hillman is just as good an American as you are, Clara." Mayor La Guardia joked about PAC by introducing Senator Wagner to a Madison Square Garden audience with a mock phone call: "Hello, Sidney. I've got a speaker I want to clear with you--It's Bob Wagner." The irrepressible Secretary Ickes allowed that Earl Browder and the Communists were "about as relevant to the issue as mashed potatoes" and called the "Clear it with Sidney" slogan the most "contemptible \textit{campaign} twist" since 1928 although
he did not recoil from the opportunity it afforded for lobbing
charges of hate-mongering at the GOP. 15

15 For Wallace, La Guardian, and Ickes addresses see NYT,
10/27/44, p. 36:4; 11/1/44, p. 1:3; 11/2/44, p. 12:1; 11/3/44, pp. 1:2,
16:2, 18:6; 11/4/44, p. 8:2; 11/6/44, p. 14:2. See also, Senator
Wagner's response to the "labor baiters," "near-Fascists," and

Eleanor Roosevelt, when confronted with a campaign poster in
which she, Hillman, and others were depicted as conspiring to "capture
the Democratic party and the fourth term," calmly labelled it "part
of the effort to tie the President and myself to the Communist Party"
and asked the public to view with a "jaundiced eye" some of the
"extraordinary things that get distributed." Chairman Hannegan
betrayed greater anxiety over the controversy which swirled about
Hillman by publicly defending the latter on a nationwide radio hookup—
in the company of the President himself, in an appeal directed pri-
marily toward Democratic party workers. He seemed infinitely more
perturbed over this matter than over the Klan charge against Truman,
his Republican counterpart's unwillingness publicly to accept Truman's
denial, or over a newly sprung "revelation"—perhaps more reconcilable
to the traditions of American politics—that Democratic campaign
contributors of $1000 or more belonged to a "club" whose members would
receive special favors in Washington. 16 Goaded by Dewey in Boston to

16 Ibid., 10/25/44, p. 23:8; 10/26/44, p. 12:5; 10/28/44,
deliver his PAC defense, Hannegan was emboldened by Arthur Krock's October 23 disclaimer and fortified by copy in three Catholic publications, all of which denied that PAC was Communist-controlled and at least two of which maintained "that the PAC program is well within American constitutional procedure and is more like a papal encyclical on labor than a Marxian tract."  

\[\text{NYT, 10/27/44 (CIOPAC reprint). The three publications were The Liquorian, official organ of the Redemptorist Fathers; America, Jesuit weekly; and The Commonweal. Equally strong defenses of PAC program and personnel were published in the Pittsburgh Catholic, official organ of the Diocese of Pennsylvania, and The Wage Earner, publication of the American Catholic Trade Unionists (ACTU). See also NYT, 11/7/44, p. 21:3; The Wage Earner, 11/3/44, pp. 6, 7.}\]

Probably the most eloquent defense of Sidney Hillman in the entire campaign also came in the final week—in a national broadcast by newspaper columnist Dorothy Thompson, ardent internationalist and a 1940 backer of Wendell Willkie. Perhaps the only Roosevelt advocate to go beyond a flat denial that the "clear with" phrase was even spoken, Miss Thompson outlined the basic provisions of the "liberal" (not "Communist") PAC program, and coolly "explained" the slogan as a symbolic recognition of the fact that a Democratic vice-presidential nominee had to be a compromise candidate who could please at once conservatives, machine supporters, labor, and the liberals. Whether or not FDR gave the controversial order to Hannegan he had quite legitimately "conveyed that thought." "Any knowledgeable student of the American labor movement" knew that Hillman had "done more to stamp out
communism in our trade unions than all the Republicans put together and laid end to end.\textsuperscript{18}

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\textsuperscript{18} Speech text, Mutual Broadcasting System broadcast, sponsored by the National Independent Committee for Roosevelt and Truman, 10/29/HH.
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\section*{PAC Doggedly Continues Its Defense}

To the very end PAC was dogged by Congressional investigators. Leaders in the field, as well as at national headquarters, received new subpensas from committees surveying campaign finance. In one case a state CIO body filed counter charges. One last investigatory flurry by the House Committee on Campaign Expenditures was inspired by an Indiana Republican Congressman's charge that a member of his own family had been forced as a union member to contribute to the Roosevelt campaign. --This inquiry was dropped after the committee received affidavits showing that the dollar receipt introduced into evidence represented not a PAC contribution but a regular annual international union assessment.\textsuperscript{19} Another inquiry was instigated by

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\textsuperscript{19} United Automobile Worker, 11/1/HH, p. 2.
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Senator Robert A. Taft who requested a Senatorial look into the publication and distribution of an anti-Taft pamphlet, funds for which came from the Ohio CIO Council treasury. The Ohio CIO in turn accused the Senator of trying to stop CIO campaign broadcasts, of making
"excessive expenditures" and of conducting a "scurrilous and libelous" campaign. Neither as complainant or defendant did it obtain satisfaction before election day, although Ohio CIO president Jack Kroll testified in response to a committee subpoena on October 31.\textsuperscript{20}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{20}The Senate committee on December 1 closed the CIO case against the Senator as being unsubstantiated. The Taft charges were turned over to the Attorney General for a "test case." The Justice Department's ruling subsequently followed earlier precedents, \textit{viz.}, that the Smith-Connally ban on contributions applied only to the giving of money to political committees and candidates." U. S. Senate, \textit{Report on Investigation of Campaign Expenditures, 1944}, pp. 57-59, 72-73; \textit{Columbus Citizen}, 3/27/45. Cf. 29-30, 31 above.
\end{quote}

As for the character of PAC contributions to the battle of words which raged outside the legislative chambers, no marked change occurred following the FPA climax of the President's campaign. At union meetings and political rallies the plea was still for a tremendous voter turnout and the pretense was maintained that FDR's reelection would follow as a necessary and logical consequence. That the labor leaders actually believed this was not always obvious. Nor did they always behave (as the \textit{CIO News} intimated) as though theirs was "a more constructive, reasoned and intelligent approach than has ever marked an American political campaign." Philip Murray, for example, thought he was required to answer the "type of billingsgate" which he said Dewey and Bricker were using to "breed distrust and racial and religious prejudice and bigotry," to defend PAC before some two thousand CIO political action workers at a gathering in Pittsburgh, and to assume full personal responsibility for establishing the Political Action
Committee and for recommending it in the first place "before Sidney Hillman appeared on the scene."  

Hillman's own final statements also tended to fall short of high standards for constructive discussion—such as those which had been set months earlier at the PAC's Full Employment conference. Concrete solutions for pressing problems, which the electorate might expect from a PAC-influenced administration, were not uppermost in his reported utterances. Dewey's "belittling" of the "vital role of Commander-in-Chief," Republican efforts to "delude" the people into "writing off the war" prematurely, the "black" GOP record on international cooperation, Dewey's "deceptively" sweeping endorsements of social legislation (for which he failed to "speak up" in the past)—these were more compelling topics, along with the endless defenses of PAC. The PAC chairman steadfastly ridiculed the Dies committee charges, insisting,

Everyone knows that the committee made no investigation. Its charges are just propaganda and falsehoods.

... [and] part of the campaign to defeat the New Deal.  

He demanded proof of his alleged dealings with the Communist party and again (without success) dared Dies to force him to testify. He had never met Earl Browder and had opposed Communists "in and out of season" for thirty-five years—but he didn't feel he had to be against...
everything the Communists were for. He denied that PAC was an appendage to or that it sought to "capture" the Democratic party—or that anyone ever ordered anything "cleared" with him. As the Senators were taking testimony on the mysteriously circulated "Clear It with Sidney" booklet he scored the exploitation of bigotry and asked plaintively: "What difference does it make whether I am a Russian pants maker or an oil mogul?" In retaliation for the personal assaults upon him he remarked that Dewey had cemented his "alliance with the most out-spoken proponents of native fascism," condemned the "bare-faced political hypocrisy" of the latter's Boston speech (November 1), and predicted that before the polls opened the GOP would feed the public "more lies," one of which he anticipated in such detail that Chairman Brownell asked sarcastically if this was "confession before charges." A final measure of the gravity with which

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22 Whether because it was not contemplated or as a consequence of the Hillman statement, the expected propaganda blow did not materialize. It consisted, according to Hillman, of a photostated copy of an alleged telegram from Harry Bridges to the PAC chairman, purporting to show that the west coast labor leader--described as having been "active in the PAC along with other Communists and Communist-tainted persons"—had been "paying tribute" to Hillman "at the rate of $15,000 monthly, or weekly" in return for the latter's Washington "influence" to prevent Bridges' deportation as a Communist. NYT, 11/3/44, p. 14:6. See also ibid., 10/27/44, p. 14:4; 10/30/44, p. 9:1; 10/31/44, p. 12:4.

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PAC viewed its own possible impact as an emotionally charged issue may be discerned in the distribution during the closing days of the campaign of a CIOPAC leaflet summarizing and quoting from the vigorous
Catholic defenses of the Hillman committee which were alluded to on page 181 above.

**Governor Dewey Tries to Shift the Burden of Isolationism, then Desperately Pins His Hopes on Promises for a Return to Governmental Morality, a Speedier Victory in War, and an End to the Hillman-Browder Menace**

As Mr. Roosevelt spoke before the Foreign Policy Association the Associated Press reported from Albany that the Governor was "tuned in" and would reply to any rebuttal the President might make to Dewey's attack on "personal secret diplomacy." Dewey verified the AP story by postponing a scheduled farm speech in Minneapolis, although newsmen could elicit no advance information on his reaction to the President's challenge. He was uncertain

... to what extent I will commit the party or myself to a precise formula on a matter which is still subject to negotiation... It is a matter to be worked out between the executive and legislative branches and will be, I am sure, successfully.  

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Confusion remained after his "reply." He appeared to agree that an American Security Council delegate should not require Congressional approval for every decision. Yet he emphasized that it was up to Congress to stipulate the quota of force to be made available and "what discretion... our representative [would have] to use that force,"—then declined to suggest how much discretion he thought Congress ought to give. He was content to proclaim that a harmonious President and

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23NYT, 10/22/61; 10/22/61, p. 1:1.
Congress would authorize "adequate power" and to brandish before his live audience a handful of telegrams in which, he said, leading Republicans in Congress promised that there would be no reversion to isolationism. Beyond that, nettled by presidential references to quotes from context Dewey elected, with another careful selection of facts and quotes, to "fill in the context which Mr. Roosevelt forgot in his speech Saturday night." Thus he recalled such unpleasant historical items as the London Economic Conference, explaining apologetically that it was Administration insistence that had brought foreign policy into the campaign.24


Enroute to Chicago and in an address there Dewey returned to the tones and terms of Oklahoma City, dwelling upon the "simple," "moral" and "fundamental" questions of "honesty and good faith," and exhorting women voters to root out the "cynics" who had "for twelve years infested our nation's capital." Betrayal of the 1932 Democratic platform, a false 1940 declaration that there would be no fourth-term campaign--these were but two samples which he cited of New Deal immorality. Now there was a new one: a plan, concocted at the White House, to "sell" the right to help formulate government policies to donors of $1000 to Democratic campaign offers! This shameless plot was typical of an approach to politics as "the Science of How Who Gets
What, When and Why"—the same one which accounted for the coalition of corrupt bosses with PAC and the Communists. The Republicans, Dewey promised, would end "special privileges for individuals, groups or sections of our people." His evidence was contained in a letter of October 16 from Democratic headquarters at Little Rock, Arkansas. It purportedly solicited memberships at $1000 a head in a "One Thousand Club," whose members "undoubtedly" would be granted "special privileges and prestige" and who would be "called into conference from time to time to discuss matters of national importance and to assist in the formulation of administration policies." National chairman Hannegan said he had not seen the letter and that any quotation in it attributed to the President was "wholly without substance" and "unauthorized." State party officials said Dewey had "misinterpreted" their letter.25

The delayed farm speech was broadcast from Syracuse. Rural voters were promised continued government support for farm prices, rural electrification, "sound" programs for crop insurance, soil conservation, etc.—without the evils of administrative inefficiency and bureaucratic irritations. Labor and agriculture alike were promised an era of prosperity once New Deal "scarcity theories" were abandoned. For voters in general there were familiar assurances: (1) peace was imminent, (2) there would be no change in "our military command," and (3) a Dewey regime would "bring our fighting men home promptly" after

25 NYT, 10/26/44, pp. 1:1, 12:5-6, 13; 10/27/44, p. 13:5. See also Columbus Citizen, 10/26/44.
victory. Then, during a whirlwind finish that took him to several cities where the CIO was at work to "corral the labor vote," the governor fulfilled forecasts that the content of his remaining speeches would depend largely on "ammunition fired by President Roosevelt."

He touched many subjects, but none more energetically (or hopefully) than the cause of anti-communism. At Rochester he described FDR's philosophy of 1932—i.e., "divide what we have left"—as one which meant "follow the doctrine of the Communist Party." At Buffalo he promised that his commitments to "free enterprise" were trustworthy. On tour in Massachusetts he warned against the imminence of monarchy, but for his climactic Boston speech of November 1 Dewey again reached for his Hillman-Browder notes, to embellish what the United Press described as his "bitterest personal denunciation" of the President.26

26 For speeches at Syracuse, Utica, Rochester, Buffalo, and in Massachusetts see NYT, 10/29/ulh, pp. 1:3, 36:6, 37; 11/1/ulh, pp. 1:1, 18; 11/2/ulh, p. 15:1. Selection of cities for delivery of some of the final speeches was tied by observers directly to CIO activity. Reporters also credited to PAC, Dewey's "reluctant" decision to call a special session of the New York legislature to extend voting hours. See ibid., 10/27/ulh, p. 1:2; 10/28/ulh, p. 1:3; 10/30/ulh, p. 1:2; 10/31/ulh, p. 13:3. See also Columbus Citizen, 10/29/ulh.

"Once every four years, late in October," Dewey began, "my opponent announces that he believes in the enterprise system." The rest of the time he "wages war" on it. A "fresh and united administration," he argued, would speed the war's end and the "return of our fighting men." It would brighten an otherwise dismal future, for the New Deal could not provide jobs, opportunity or national unity. Why? Because
of "the kind of people to whom it would owe its election..." The One Thousand Club was dethroned from its brief reign as Public Enemy Number One. Once again the PAC and the Communist party were dubbed the "highest bidder" for the once proud Democratic party—which Mr. Roosevelt's "overwhelming" ambition had placed on the auction block. If the Browders and Hillmans with their "pagan [Communist] philosophy" were to seize control the "fundamental freedoms of every American would stand in gravest jeopardy," including the right of the individual to "worship, vote or think as he would, or conduct his life as his own..." There loomed the frightening prospect of

state ownership of all property, including your house, your farm and the factory, the shop, the office in which you work...

To emphasize the extent to which freedom of religion was endangered, Dewey quoted Earl Browder:

We stand without any reservation for education that will root out beliefs in the supernatural.

We Communists do not distinguish between good and bad religions, because we think they are all bad for the masses.

If it be imagined that Mr. Roosevelt's supporters dismissed the fearsome Boston speech as just so much rhetoric, refutation is handy. In it were aired all the familiar charges and catch-phrases associated with the names of Hillman and Browder. One of its paragraphs formed a major peg for a November 4 newspaper ad sponsored by the National Independent Committee for Roosevelt and Truman. The ad's long list of sponsors (Republican, Democratic, and Independent) denied that the
"American way of life" was in peril, "whoever wins." One of the Dewey statements which they especially resented as "irresponsible" ran as follows:

In Russia, a Communist is a man who supports his government. In America, a Communist is a man who supports the fourth term so our form of government may more easily be changed.27

Nothing new was added as Dewey ended the 20,000 mile "traveling phase" of his campaign. At Madison Square Garden on November 4, on the heels of a presidential rejoinder to the Boston philippic, Hillman-abetted decay in the "moral fiber of government" was subordinated to a herculean effort to convince the electorate that a blundering administration was sacrificing the "blood of our fighting men" and "delaying the day of final victory," while a united nation under Dewey would speed victory and "insure lasting peace." But it was there, along with denunciations of the "One Thousand Club," "capricious, personal Government," the New Deal depression, the Administration's "fear of peace," and other desperate reasons why it was "time for a change." Out in the audience in the vast Garden the Governor could see placards among the American flags, announcing that "local unions of the Congress of Industrial Organizations protest against PAC."28

27 NYT, 11/2/lh, pp. 1:1, 1h. See also ibid., 11/lh/lh, p. 8:6-8; Columbus Citizen, 11/2/lh.

Finally, in a fifteen-minute election eve broadcast which scarcely managed to include a token "non-partisan" request that voters go to the polls, Dewey's last bid went over the air. It was another bitter attack, in which the 1944 election was said to be perhaps "the most fateful in all our history." Were we, Dewey asked, "knowing we need a new administration," ready to "make the change necessary to speed victory and to build the peace to come?" Home front "confusion" which sabotaged our fighting men, even the housewife's "struggles with a new rationing problem every week" were exploited, as was a heart-rending letter carrying a remarkably succinct summation of the GOP party line. It was "from a brave American woman whose son will never return," who shared the governor's hope that he might end the "nightmare of past years," the twelve years of domestic "turmoil and disension," of "cynicism and conflict," and restore "the kind of America [her son] would have wanted to come home to." 29

29 Ibid., 11/7/44, p. 1:2 (italics added).

FDR Foresees Sixty Million Jobs, Plays Up the Commander-in-Chief, Dramatically Belittles the Communist Threat, and Subsides Into Lofty Non-Partisanship

Candidate Roosevelt was not idle while Governor Dewey moved toward his Boston climax. As he parried press conference queries about future speaking engagements the White House released "factual" statements "correcting" Dewey "misrepresentations." The President and Commander-in-Chief himself routinely made news, much of it heavily laden with
political implications, e.g., an announcement that the Japanese navy in the Philippines had been routed, messages pledging aid to Greece and hailing the anniversary of the Czech republic, a joint communication with the Director of Selective Service on the importance of job procurement for returning service men. Reporters were referred to Robert Hannegan for comment on the "One Thousand Club," but the White House answered, with statistics, a Dewey allegation regarding responsibility for critical pre-war military budget cuts.30

30See NYT, 10/25/44-10/29/44, passim.

On October 27 FDR set out on a frank two-day quest for closely contested electoral votes stretching from the middle Atlantic states through Indiana and Illinois. He spoke that night in Philadelphia's Shibe Park--after upwards of half a million persons had had a glimpse of him on a four-hour, forty-mile tour of armed service installations and of business, residential and factory areas. As in New York he again travelled in miserable weather, a "drizzle, cold downpour and a trace of snowfall." In that fourth campaign speech he spoke solemnly of the war and of the New Deal's "preparedness" record. And, wondering slyly what had become of the suggestion that he "had failed for political reasons to send enough forces or supplies to General MacArthur," he referred to "remarkable" successes overseas, employing the first person singular intentionally--as if daring Mr. Dewey to declare (as he did at Buffalo) that he would "never use his office to
claim personal or political profit from the achievements of the American people, or from the sacrifices of their sons and daughters. . . .

Mr. Roosevelt blandly said he realized "it is considered by some to be very impolite to mention the fact that there's a war on, and he knew he was "not supposed to mention" that he was Commander-in-Chief. Unfortunately, both were true and he was not ashamed of the way he had discharged his duties. He took the people into his confidence on over-all war strategy, stressed details of planning and quoted devastating statistics which he too found hard to grasp, and said he was proud of his "old, tired and quarrelsome" administration, while calmly asserting that we were constantly investigating and publicizing "our whole management of the war effort." He praised America's allies and her own fighting men—who would be "returned to their homes just as rapidly as possible. . . no strings attached." He praised labor, business and the farmer for patriotic teamwork and decried the "ugly implication" that GOP Congressmen would cooperate only with a Republican president in meeting the people's "very deep desire to avoid the death and destruction which would be caused by future wars."31


The next day, at Chicago's Soldier Field, Mr. Roosevelt delivered his one major domestic policy speech. He began with the mocking observation that this was "the strangest campaign" he had ever seen. The Republicans promised to undo neither New Deal domestic nor foreign
policies, yet arrived at the strange conclusion that it was "time for a change!" He ended with a resounding declaration which might have rung down the curtain on a Republican rally: a glowing tribute to America as a "land of action," of "adventurous pioneering," of "growing and building;" as the land of the democratic creed--where liberty is acquired and kept by folk who are strong, self-reliant, just, understanding, generous and "capable of disciplining themselves." In between that beginning and finale he repeated the Economic Bill of Rights outlined to Congress in January as a "new basis of security and prosperity," hailed "free enterprise," and promised a post-war program to keep America a land of high pay and adequate return for farm and factory products. Indeed, he looked forward to what Dewey was to list at Buffalo among the New Deal's "worthless" promises: sixty million productive jobs in America free of price, production, and wage controls.32

32 Specifically, the President promised public works (dams, airports, highways, etc.), continued aid for farmers, a return to free collective bargaining, a permanent FEPC, incentive taxation for business and industry, protection to small business, and special opportunities for the latter "to buy government-owned plants, equipment, inventories" and to obtain "special credit and capital requirements." Ibid., 10/29/44, pp. 1:1, 34.

The Chicago profession of faith in free enterprise was undoubtedly inspired by Dewey's Charleston speech, a belated response consistent with the President's refusal to emulate his opponent in scrapping previously scheduled addresses to reply directly or immediately to forensic challenges. The day Dewey was to speak at Buffalo he first deigned to acknowledge the "One Thousand Club" exposé--with
an absurd press conference confession which led reporters good
humoredly to "kid" him about the "special privileges" he anticipated as
a member. Then, the night after Dewey's Boston volley, and seemingly
unruffled by it, he spoke from Washington—about production, the war,
the peace, the post-war economy. He cautioned against undue optimism
over news from battle theatres, scrupulously credited everyone who had
made sacrifices in the war, censured those who threatened that a GOP
Congress would not cooperate with a Democratic president for peace, and
hinted that only an experienced administration could provide the world
leadership the statesmen of other lands were looking for. After which,
with elaborate condescension, he observed that an irresponsible
exploitation of the general longing for peace—and "other aspects" of
the campaign—had been "distasteful." Still, he would not "answer in
kind," even though he anticipated "more wicked charges." The voters,
he was sure, would decide the election "on the record." 33

33 Ibid., 11/3/44, pp. 11:1, 12. For FDR's "One Thousand Club"
remarks see Ibid., 11/1/44, p. 40:6. He told newsmen everyone had
laughed when he suggested a $100,000 (or possibly a $10,000) club to
help finance the campaign. So he had come down to $1000 and promptly
forgot about it—until "a man from Chicago" handed him a certificate
of membership in return for his usual party contribution.

The day after this second precedent-shattering campaign speech
from the White House the President himself entrained for Boston, after
answering press conference queries about some of the "hysterical last-
minute accusations" he had been expecting. His Boston speech, was
typically Rooseveltian. There were the usual references to "the record"
and the familiar glowing vision of the future in the hands of inexperienced and venturesome men, the same simple appeals to fair play, the same apparent candor about personal ambitions; above all, the same adroit use of ridicule, which drew laughter and applause. Mr. Roosevelt began by making fun of insinuations about his health—remembering that in 1928 Al Smith had assured him it didn’t take "an acrobat" to be Governor, then lamented appeals to "bigotry and intolerance." He deliberately acknowledged his 1940 pledge not to send American soldiers into foreign wars, saying that "any real American" would have chosen to fight back when the United States was attacked, as he would do "again and again and again." Even the calculated use of that phrase seemed to take the sting from this frequent anti-Roosevelt gibe. The "record" showed we were "better prepared" for World War II than for any previous war. As for the future—the people wanted no repetition of 1929-33 and were dubious about turning new domestic "fortifications" over to men who had fought them all—e.g., soil conservation, unemployment insurance, collective bargaining rights, protection of bank deposits, etc. True, there had been mistakes in administration, but at least his administration had never made the "inexcusable mistake" of "substituting talk for action." He had his little joke about the "two-sided" GOP campaign—with one candidate demanding "added government expenditures," the other "less"—and the slogan: "That's why it's time for a change."
Then he turned to Governor Dewey's direst warning. He made no mention of PAC, Hillman or Browder. Yet he gave the impression of one who sought not to neglect or evade but merely to put in proper perspective an accusation of little merit and the candidate who made it. Asking forgiveness for "quoting correctly," he noted that at Boston the governor offered to thwart seizure of the government by Communists, while at Worcester he promised to end the threat of "one-man government... of monarchy in the United States." "Now really—which is it—communism or monarchy?... I do not think we could have both... even if we wanted either—which we do not." Confessing that often he had been "tempted" to speak with "sharper vigor and greater indignation," he said "Everyone knows" he had been reluctant to run again.

Now, after "such misrepresentation, distortion and falsehood," and appeals to intolerance, he was frankly "most anxious to win." As for the Communist issue,

When any political candidate stands up and says, solemnly, that there is danger that the Government of the United States—your Government—could be sold out to the Communists—then I say that candidate reveals shocking lack of trust in America... a shocking lack of faith in democracy—in the spiritual strength of our people.

In 1933 the people might have fallen for "alien ideologies"; instead, they demanded and got not less but more democracy. Remembering his first inaugural statement: "We have nothing to fear but fear itself," and predicting that Americans never would cast a majority of votes for "fearful men," the President concluded with a buoyant declaration.

Just as the nation had fought the Revolution, the "wilderness," and
poverty and disease, so it would emerge from the present war with the "greatest material power of any nation in the world" and wage the battle for peace, "for America and for civilization" in "association with the United Nations." At a whistle stop in Hartford FDR criticized the Republican "campaign of fear" and fulfilled a press conference prophecy that he might be moved in that city to call attention to the safety of insurance policies and savings accounts—which in 1936 and '40 the insurance companies were saying "would not be any good" if he was re-elected. NYT, 11/5/44, p. 39:1-2; 11/5/44, pp. 1:1, 3B. See also ibid., 11/4/44, p. 1:3.

That was the Saturday before election. Monday night, after a day of "neighborly" extemporaneous remarks on tour through his own New York countryside, he went on the air with a final temperate message conspicuously lacking in overt partisanship. Like Governor Dewey he spoke of the victorious fighting men—who were "counting on us" to show the world "our kind of government" was the best. He hoped the voters, with their freedom from secret police, their freedom of choice at the polls, would turn out fifty million strong, to "make certain that we win for them, the living and the dead, a lasting peace." He hoped too that after election the people would watch over and advise their public servants, "raise your voices in protest when you believe them... to be wrong, back them up when you believe them to be right..." He asked for "divine... guidance" for the nation and for strength to attain a just peace, to guard freedom "for the least among us," to "make us ill content with the inequalities which still
prevail among us," and to "Preserve our Union against all of the divisions of race and class which threaten us."\(^{35}\)

\[^{35}\text{Ibid., 11/7/44, p. 1:2. See also Ibid., 11/6/44, p. 1:1;}\]

\[^{11/7/44, p. 1:2.}\]

The restrained finale contrasted sharply with the flagrantly "political" last-minute Republican bid—not because of the latter's dependence upon fear, but because of its sordid play upon petty irritations, its maudlin appeal to sentiment. Mr. Roosevelt's message was not without its appeal to fear (of World War III), and it was by no means devoid of "politics" in the broad sense. But the Dewey approach smacked of desperation. The President, on the other hand, as if supremely confident, looked down almost benignly from a higher plane of statesmanship to eschew "partisan politics" and issue an earnest call to civic responsibility. It was now up to the electorate.
PART III

OUTLINE FOR AN ANALYSIS OF THE CIOPAC;
THE TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA
A CASE STUDY
CHAPTER VII

WHO WAS PAC? A STUDY STUDY JUSTIFIED

Was the Political Action Committee in 1944 the vehicle for entry of a "new"—and insidious—force into American politics? Mr. Roosevelt chose in the closing hours of the campaign to treat the question as frivolous. Whether or not many voters deemed it to be irrelevant—or subordinate to other issues—is something for pollsters and public opinion analysts to try to determine. As described in the preceding chapters, few campaigners had allowed themselves the luxury of indifference to the contention that PAC symbolized an "alien" and a "subversive" influence, even a "Communist conspiracy." Republicans had looked hopefully, Democrats with apprehension, upon the extent to which the electorate might be swayed by this particular appeal, believing, on the one hand, that fear of a "red menace" had somehow to be made real, or, on the other, that such a bogey had to be dispelled in order to achieve electoral victory. It is because labor political action is perennially an issue as well as a fact of contemporary American life—because hostile judgments of it continue to range from "improper" to "unpatriotic," and because suspicion persists with respect to the unionists' ultimate goals—that an analysis was projected into the political character of the pressure group whose leaders, symbols and associations in 1944 so dominated the thinking and the speech-making of
virtually all of the politicians—not to mention the literary and artistic efforts of headline writers, editorialists, columnists, commentators and cartoonists. An outline for such an analysis follows.

Who Was PAC?

Before a study can be undertaken to ascertain what PAC was, it must first be determined who PAC was. It was, of course, Sidney Hillman—plus vice chairman Van Bittner, one-time miner and vice-president of the CIO Steelworkers, and secretary R. J. Thomas, president of the United Automobile Workers. It was also David J. McDonald, secretary-treasurer of the Steelworkers, and, completing the committee roster, Albert J. Fitzgerald, Sherman Dalrymple, Emil Rieve and John Green, presidents, respectively, of the CIO unions in the electrical, rubber, textile and shipbuilding industries. All save Rieve and Green were named at the original board meeting at which the PAC was formed and these two were added before or during the 1944 campaign.¹ PAC was,

¹Originally it was stated that either Bittner or McDonald would serve on the committee. Both remained as the organization was consolidated. Precise dates for the two later appointments have not been ascertained. According to testimony of Sidney Hillman on June 13, 1944, Rieve was by that time a member of the committee; Green appears to have been the last member added. A TWUA staff member states: "Our office has no record of the actual date of the appointment of Rieve to the CIO PAC. We do know that it was prior to the 1944 campaign." Sources consulted include Lawrence Rogen, TWUA Education Director, personal letter, May 29, 1953; U. S. Senate, Special Committee Hearing on Campaign Expenditures, 1944, p. 37; CIO, Final Proceedings of the Seventh Constitutional Convention, Nov. 20-24, 1944, pp. 203-209; CIO News, 7/12/43, p. 3.
in addition, such national CIOPAC staff members as C. B. Baldwin, assistant chairman; James P. Warburg, writer, advisor and consultant; Henry Lee Moon, head of PAC's Negro division; Thomas R. Burns, special field representative and assistant to Hillman; J. Raymond Walsh, director of research; Lee Pressman and John Abt, legal advisors; Verda White Barnes, head of the Women's Section; Thomas Amlie, director of Congressional research, and others, whose work centered in the New York office. Some of these came from prior or contemporary jobs elsewhere in the labor movement. Walsh, for example, a former college professor, was Research and Education director of the CIO. Pressman was General Counsel for the CIO and both he and Abt were union attorneys. Burns was a member of the United Rubber Workers' executive board, Amlie a former Congressman. Some, like Baldwin, came to PAC from federal administrative posts, thus giving rise to the campaign contention that PAC was a tool of FDR's, fashioned from within the government to perpetuate the New Deal in power and to violate the Hatch Act in the process. ² PAC was also the fourteen regional PAC directors,

²Baldwin had been an Assistant to the Secretary of Agriculture under Henry A. Wallace, an assistant Administrator of the Resettlement Administration, an Assistant Administrator of the Farm Security Administration and, from 1940 to 1943, FSA head. In 1943 he resigned after brief service as Area Director for Economic Operation, Relief, and Rehabilitation in Italy to take the PAC post. A number of labor people who accepted national or regional PAC appointments also held government posts—primarily with regional or local offices of federal war agencies. For a description of the "National Office," see Joseph Gaer, The First Round (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944), pp. 161-168.
at least half of whom were veteran trade unionists. Non-labor appointees were selected, "naturally," not only for their presumed knowledge and skill in government and practical politics but with due regard for their "sympathy with and knowledge of the labor movement."

3See statement of Philip Murray in the American Magazine, as quoted in CIO News, 1/3/44, p. 5.

Names of the regional directors appear on pages 206-207 along with states under their jurisdiction, their union affiliations and other background information.

But PAC was infinitely more than these, whether reference be had to career unionists like Hillman, Burns, Abramson and Kroll, or to the "hired hands" like Abt and Baldwin, Carr and McKeough. PAC was in fact an idea and a movement rather than a single clearly identifiable mechanism, a committee, or its employees. As a functioning entity it was a complex of cooperating organizations and individuals, virtually all of whom were members of the CIO family, save for some of CIO PAC's staff employees and for the non-labor or non-CIO members of its National Citizens committee adjunct. Still, it would be inaccurate to state categorically that with these exceptions PAC was merely the CIO under another name for, as Sidney Hillman often protested, his organization existed merely as a "service" and "coordinating" agency for CIO affiliates that wanted to be "coordinated," i.e., for those whose dominant leadership and active membership wanted to engage in political action and to campaign for "Roosevelt and a progressive Congress."
CIO POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE
REGIONAL DIRECTORS (1944)*

Region

JOSEPH SALERNO, one of the founders, an international vice president and regional director, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America; president, Massachusetts Industrial Union Council; former organizer, state director and executive council member, Textile Workers Union of America.

II New York: New York City
CHARLOTTE CARR, assistant to vice chairman, War Manpower Commission, 1943-44; director, Hull House, Chicago, 1937-43; former official during 1920's and 1930's, New York and Pennsylvania Departments of Labor.

III New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland: Newark
IRVING ABRAMSON, president, New Jersey State Industrial Union Council; chairman, National CIO War Relief Committee; member, Textile Workers Union of America; former organizer, TWUA and ACWA.

IV Pennsylvania: Pittsburgh
JOSEPH A. DONOHUE, Philadelphia.

V Ohio, West Virginia, Kentucky: Cincinnati.
JACK KROLL, President, Ohio CIO Council; member since 1914 of Amalgamated Clothing Workers; an ACWA international vice president and manager, Cincinnati Joint Board, ACWA.

VI Michigan: Detroit
AUGUST SCHOLLE, CIO regional director; recent president, Michigan State Industrial Union Council; former local union officer, Federation of Glass, Ceramic, and Silica Sand Workers of America; former president, Toledo Industrial Union Council.

VII Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin: Chicago.
RAYMOND S. MCKEOUGH, regional administrator, Office of Price Administration; former Democratic Congressman, 2d Illinois District, 1935-43; employee for sixteen years, Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railroad, including a post as assistant to the operating vice president.

VIII Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, Mississippi, Florida, Louisiana: Atlanta.
GEORGE S. MITCHELL, U. S. Foreign-Economic Administration, 1943-44; assistant administrator, Farm Security Administration,
Region

1939-43; other administrative positions, with U. S. Department of Interior and with Resettlement Administration, 1934-39; former economics instructor, Columbia University; author, books on labor, including *Textile Labor and the South.*

IX Texas: Dallas.
CARL McPEAK, assistant regional labor representative, War Production Board; veteran member, district and local officer, Oil Workers Union; former president, Oklahoma Industrial Union Council.

X Arkansas, Missouri, Kansas, Oklahoma: Kansas City, Missouri.
W. A. HOLLOWAY, chief clerk, Missouri State Auditor's Department.

XI Minnesota, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska: Minneapolis.
JOHN M. JACOBSON

XII Colorado, Wyoming, New Mexico, Utah, Arizona: Denver.
AMER LEHMAN, chief, cooperative section, Farm Security Administration, Denver.

XIII California, Nevada; Los Angeles.
GEORGE B. ROBERTS, former West Coast director, international executive board member and organizer, United Rubber Workers; former president, Los Angeles Industrial Union Council, 1937; former AFL organizer, 1933-36.

ROY W. ATKINSON, CIO regional director; member, Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers; former local union officer, United Mine Workers of America.

The CIO family in 1943-44 consisted of the parent Congress of Industrial Organizations, no fewer than 39 national or international unions and organizing committees, possibly upwards of 10,000 local affiliates of the latter and a scattering of directly affiliated local industrial unions; plus 36 state industrial union councils (IUC's) and 232 such councils functioning at county, city or district levels. The international unions varied in size from as few as 3,000 members for the tiny Inlandboatmen's Union of the Pacific to more than a million for the United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), and contained within themselves a number of local units ranging from as few as six for the Boatmen to as many as 1,400 for the United Steelworkers of America. The IUC's similarly varied greatly in size, the maximum membership potential of each being coterminous with the membership of all CIO unions in their respective areas. PAC as a fourth-term campaign factor consisted not automatically of these in toto any more than of the national Political Action Committee and staff as such, but of (1) all individuals, anywhere within the organizational complex which was CIO, who helped to bring the

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Total membership and affiliated unit estimates for the period vary widely. Sidney Hillman on one occasion referred to as many as thirty to forty thousand union subdivisions. Sources consulted include CIO, Proceedings of the Sixth Constitutional Convention, Nov. 1-5, 1943, pp. 20-21; Florence Peterson, Handbook of Labor Unions (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1944); Florence Peterson, American Labor Unions, 2d ed. (New York: Harper, 1945); U. S. Senate, Special Committee Hearing on Campaign Expenditures, 1944, p. 48; Life, 9/11/44, p. 94.
PAC movement into being and/or who worked to promote its objectives after July 1943 and (2) all those international and local unions and industrial union councils which as collective bodies were also a part of the trend which resulted in creation of PAC and/or which were direct participants in the campaign which followed.

Despite the proud claim—or accusation—that "Hillman was PAC,"

5 Labor columnist Victor Riesel has asserted that Hillman "was PAC for a long time." Regional PAC director Charlotte Carr, asked for comparisons in enthusiasm for PAC within the CIO, declared flatly that this was "Hillman's project." J.B.S. Hardman, for many years education director of the Amalgamated and editor of the ACWA journal, stated that any statement that Sidney Hillman "owned" PAC would be inaccurate and it would be difficult to say who "ran" CIOPAC. At the same time, it would be correct to describe him as a "prime mover." Certainly he was the "strongest determinant." Statements made to the writer in the course of interviews with Riesel (Dec. 7, 1951); Carr (Nov. 28, 1951); Hardman (Dec. 18, 1951).

neither he nor his committee, resting, not at the top of an elaborate pyramidal structure but off to one side of a federative system, could have developed into anything more than a futile gesture of the CIO executive board without subsequent approval by the CIO convention and the practical support of affiliated organizations. Thus on the witness stand in June 1944, Hillman objected to the use of the word "subordinate" by a Senate committee member in alluding to the relationship of CIO affiliates to the PAC:

Hillman: They are not subordinate... Because we have no constitution to make them subordinate. All we do is counsel with them and give them advice. They don't have to take that advice... We have no authority over them outside of giving them our advice.
Bestowal of a Roosevelt endorsement by a national PAC conference would have been unlikely had there not been a steady stream of executive board, conference and convention resolutions emanating from international unions and their subdivisions, as well as from state and local IUC's, which are themselves "service" and "coordinating" bodies created to aid the unions in fulfillment of their purposes. It is

During 1943 and the first half of 1944 policy declarations of many CIO bodies implied future electoral support for President Roosevelt. Among the international unions express endorsement a fourth term, in convention or by executive board action, prior to the PAC conference of June 1944, were: in 1943—the United Rubber Workers (convention); the United Automobile Workers (convention—this was a "conditional" endorsement); the United Farm Equipment Workers (executive board); the United Electrical Workers (convention); the Transport Workers (convention); in 1944—the United Shoe Workers (executive board); the United Steel Workers (convention); the Amalgamated Clothing Workers (convention); the Oil Workers (executive council). See United Rubber Worker, Oct. 1943, p. 1; UAW, Proceedings, Oct. 4-10, 1943, pp. 235-240; FE News, 12/20/43, p. 2; UERMWA, Proceedings, Sept. 13-17, 1943, p. 112; The Bulletin (Transport Workers Journal), Nov. 1943, p. 15; CIO News, 5/22/44; USA-CIO, Proceedings, May 9-11, 1944, pp. 113-150; PM, 5/11/44, p. 4; ACWA, Proceedings, May 15-19, 1944, pp. 70-72; Oil Facts, 5/25/44, p. 1. Some of the same conventions and executive boards also indicated support for Vice-President Wallace. Other unions, in regularly scheduled conventions held after June 1944, also adopted endorsement resolutions as did executive boards of unions holding no conventions in that year.
doubtful that PAC could have carried any weight with the Democrats at Chicago had there been no CIO Democrats in the delegate register and had party leaders been ignorant of the political machinery burgeoning in the field under union and IUC auspices. For all the feverish activity at PAC headquarters little could have been accomplished after July without enlistment in the cause of union officers and staffs and without the enthusiastic cooperation of unionists nearer the grass roots. Only the organizations in the electoral districts could provide the man- and woman-power to canvass the CIO voter potential, to distribute the literature, to solicit the dollars, to urge workers and their wives to register, to get them out to meetings and rallies, to mind their babies on election day, to get them to the polls and to watch the counting of the ballots. Hence, while the PAC as movement and organization bore unmistakably the stamp of the Hillman personality it bore, equally unmistakably, the stamp of all constituent elements of the CIO which were more than nominally involved in its being. This being so, it remains to devise a meaningful formula for character analysis.

Subjects and Object of a Definitive Analysis

Manifestly, any definitive inquiry into the forces behind PAC must necessitate, first, careful scrutiny of the activities carried on by members or under the auspices of all unions represented directly at the highest level of the PAC apparatus. These were the seven largest international union affiliates, with, as shown here,
## TABLE 4

**SEVEN LARGEST CIO INTERNATIONAL UNION AFFILIATES**

1944 Membership*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union</th>
<th>Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UAW (auto)</td>
<td>1,052,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA (steel)</td>
<td>798,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UE (electrical)</td>
<td>430,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWUA (textile)</td>
<td>342,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACWA (clothing)</td>
<td>325,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUMSWA (shipbuilding)</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URW (rubber)</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,317,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Memberships aggregating well over half of the CIO's estimated five and a half million members. Logically, an attempt at political character reading should follow in each case, barring only those instances, if any, in which it might be perceived that such an affiliate did not actually contribute materially to the PAC campaign beyond nominal representation on the Political Action Committee. Mere membership on the committee would not constitute proof of enthusiastic political action by the union so represented, nor even of the individual representative. This would be particularly true once the national PAC had become a functioning organization to implement a policy decision of the national CIO convention. Obviously its members could not participate in any practical way in day to day administrative (including policy) decisions made in the Hillman office.
Given the determination of appropriate criteria for sampling, analysis should extend also to a representative group of the smaller CIO unions and of the IUC's which were demonstrably a part of the PAC movement. In some electoral jurisdictions the so-called "smaller" unions were numerically superior to any of the "Big Seven" while in others they were quite capable of contributing zeal to PAC greater than that of larger co-affiliates. As for the IUC's, in many states and localities these provided the principal machinery through which PAC work was channeled.  

8 See presidential report of Philip Murray to the CIO convention. Proceedings, Nov. 20-21, 1944, p. 61.

In the case of each PAC-participating organization it would be in order, insofar as they prove susceptible to labelling, to ascertain whether the dominant and politically active elements were in all probability appropriately classifiable as Communists or party liners; whether they might be, on the contrary, non- or anti-Communists. It would be in point to inquire whether unionists documentably associated with promotion of PAC within a given CIO affiliate were, moving from right to left, perhaps nominal Republicans, "old-line" Democrats, New Dealers, Socialists, or miscellaneous left-wingers who defy accurate cataloguing. Research might yield evidence that labor's most fervent fourth-term apostles were no more than hard-headed "business unionists," devoid of deep political convictions or party partisanship but thoroughly persuaded that a continuation of
the incumbent regime was more conducive than a GOP administration
would be to a sympathetic climate in which they and/or unionism might
flourish.

Basically, however, analysis must be directed less toward
determining the applicability of stereotyped classifications than
toward divining the substance of each subject's beliefs and objectives
and, for both individuals and organizations, the kind of philosophy
of government and politics which they consistently fostered among
those subject to their influence. In part at least, the potential
impact of a PAC, as a force to be feared or favored, must be sought
in an illumination of each PAC participant's attitudes toward a variety
of issues and concepts—to wit, the class struggle, the rights and
prerogatives of organized labor in economic affairs and in the realm
of political action and public policy formulation and administration;
the proper role of government in labor-management relations; the
nature and scope of governmental responsibilities in general. It
must be sought in evidence of apparent dedication, indifference or
hostility to democratic institutions and processes, in attitudes
toward representative government and the party system. Finally, both
the reality and the potential which PAC represented must be assayed
in the light of the specific public policies (foreign and domestic)
which PAC participants recommended and opposed and, especially, those
for or against which they worked as well as resolved—along with the
circumstances which they found conducive to action as well as verbal
commitment.
Why an Historical Approach?

That the pattern for analysis must be historical is patent, even if one's interest were confined solely to PAC rather than to the general phenomenon which it exemplifies. A conservative newspaper columnist "surmised" in June 1944 that the Political Action Committee was born to help re-elect FDR.

This, however, was only part of the motive. The CIO has purposes which the Democratic national committee, and the Democratic party, decidedly do not share. Here, really, is what the public most needs light on. What are the political purposes of CIO, especially the ultimate ones? ... and of the other left wing organizations trying to bring about a fourth term. . .

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9Mark Sullivan in the Steubenville Herald-Star (Ohio), 6/13/44.

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For the contemporary voter it is doubtful that much light was shed by the campaign oratory reviewed in Part II above. For the historian and analyst, however, the question is legitimate and the implication not inappropriate: namely, that ostensible policy commitments for 1943-44 alone—represented, for example, by a union's acceptance of PAC's People's Program, by its own convention resolutions or the contemporary pronouncements of officers and executive board—no more adequately illumine the motivation behind a PAC than party platform planks in a given year blueprint policy decisions about to ensue from politicians turned public officials.

Viewed in isolation, labor declarations issued during that first PAC campaign period, whether on substantive or procedural
political policy, have no intrinsic reliability as an all-inclusive index of long-range intent. Certainly, neither they nor the kind of activities undertaken alone afford an insight into trends which may have had their origin in pre-PAC years. Nor can they suffice to prove whether publicly avowed objectives were genuine or a probable camouflage for "ulterior motives"—which might, as alleged, include the institution of revolutionary changes in the American Way at the behest of rulers in the Kremlin. Notably with respect to this "Communist angle," any competent analysis must weigh attitudes, and policy alignment and behavior patterns of PAC participants, over a period of time, patterns which may cumulatively tend to be symptomatic (if not conclusive) of subjection to influences "subversive" of openly advanced goals. It would be unrealistic in any case to stake an appraisal of either an individual or an organization solely upon contemporary professions and actions, but for this latter reason, if for no other, a search for PAC's raison d'être must extend in point of time beyond the 1943-44 foray into politics, to years preceding and immediately following that campaign.

Long experience demonstrates no consistent public adherence by the American Communist party to fixed political goals or tactics, for America or for American labor, but rather a fluctuating course of "line" adaptation to requirements of the International Communist movement. Hence patterns and time tables of political preference change, rather than the preferences themselves, do have an especial import in connection with the question of possible Communist influence.
and may tend to intensify, falsify or temper conclusions drawn from the contemporary picture alone. The fact that a CIO "purge" of a number of affiliates on grounds of "Communist domination" occurred several years after 1944 in no wise supplies automatic answers to questions regarding inspiration for the PAC movement, significant sources of its support (within the CIO as a whole or within separate unions and IUC's), or the nature of the ends toward which leaders of the various cooperating organizations were striving—nationally or at the so-called "grass roots."

Why the Textile Workers' Union of America?

Manifestly, the composite picture which was PAC can be fully appreciated only by way of a series of case studies. There were, plainly, forces—not just a force—behind PAC. In terms of "controlling" leadership, in terms of an internal distribution of factional elements, there is no such thing as a "typical" CIO unionist or a "typical" or "average" international or local union, industrial union council (IUC) or area PAC adjunct. Hence for an initial study an approach was sought which would lead to thorough delineation of character for a single case study subject while simultaneously affording useful insight into as broad a segment of PAC as possible. To meet the latter objective, the international union palpably, affords a more practicable focal point than either the local union or the IUC. Limitations of the local union are self-evident. The IUC, for its part, is narrowly confined in terms of geography whi
at the same time presenting, as a federated entity, the same problems which attach to analyses of the national CIO and of PAC itself. Characterization of a collective personality, which partakes necessarily of the distinctive qualities of member units and their individual representatives, must be incomplete at best without some knowledge of the latter within their respective home or parent organizations, which, in the case of the IUC, means the international union. Selection of one of the larger internationals as a starting point finds justification in at least two considerations over and beyond its relative size within the CIO. One of these is the fact that the international union is a national organization, with a central headquarters, officialdom and staff, whose influence, like that of the political party, radiates into many states and electoral jurisdictions—toward a local leadership (if not rank and file membership) which is possibly more tightly knit into a hierarchy of allegiances than is that of the party itself. Another lies in the utter and fortuitous impossibility of pursuing the politically significant behavior of individual union personalities without observing the latter—and members of the subject union's co-affiliates as well—within the framework of the CIO as a whole. Hence without the researcher being deflected from a subject judiciously delimited, his inquiry must inevitably render possible the drawing of at least qualified conclusions regarding the diverse or predominant political forces present in the larger CIO or PAC organizations of which the
subject union is a part, from the Hillman committee and the national CIO to the smallest city or county industrial union council.

Preliminary inspection of journals and convention proceedings of more than a third of all CIO unions—including the seven largest—for evidence of PAC commitment and activity and for data likely to facilitate trustworthy characterization has led to concentration upon the Textile Workers Union of America as a singularly useful case study subject and it is with this union as a focal point that the PAC movement and first campaign will presently be described in detail.\(^\text{10}\)

\(^{10}\)Publications of the national CIO were examined for scattered evidence relating to the political activities of all CIO affiliates. In addition, convention proceedings and/or union journals were examined, some more and some less intensively, and for varying periods of time, for all of the "Big Seven" internationals and for the following smaller affiliates: National Maritime Union (NMU); American Newspaper Guild (ANG); Oil Workers International Union (OWIU); United Packing House Workers of America (UPWA); United Shoe Workers of America (USWA); United Stone and Allied Products Workers of America (USAPWA); Transport Workers of America (TWU); International Woodworkers of America (IWA); United Farm Equipment and Metal Workers of America (FE); and the United Paper, Novelty and Toy Workers International Union (UPNTWU).

Such inquiry indicated at the outset that TWUA would satisfy one basic requirement, namely, that it be a CIO affiliate which did demonstrably cooperate in the movement which culminated in November 1944 in claims of a "labor" victory at the polls. TWUA was by no means unique in this regard. Promotional activity of some sort for PAC, at some operational level or levels, occurred under the auspices of all of the "Big Seven" beginning with financial contributions which accounted for nearly three-fourths of the Hillman committee's
initial $669,761 in pledges. Nor can it be said that TWUA satisfied preconceived criteria for determining the most useful subject. Few

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**TABLE 5**

**PAC PLEDGES AS OF NOVEMBER 1943**

**SEVEN LARGEST CIO INTERNATIONALS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International</th>
<th>Pledge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UAW (auto)</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA (steel)</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UE (electrical)</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACWA (clothing)</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUMSWA (shipbuilding)</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWUA (textile)</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URW (rubber)</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total $1495,000


Central records were kept on the basis of which meaningful activity comparisons might be made and, in any case, no reliable scale has

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**11** Palpably, some internationals proceeded at a more rapid pace than others in efforts to activate their locals politically. Some collected more dollars per capita. Some IUC's were quicker than others to undertake PAC activity. Local union leaders manifested varying degrees of enthusiasm. And so on. But correspondence initiated by this writer on the subject of PAC organization, activity, financial collections, endorsements, election successes, etc., revealed a high degree of decentralization and confusion with regard to the total picture. Thus a query directed to a regional PAC director drew the suggestion that contact be made with the national PAC office since that office "conducted all research having to do with the CIOPAC..." The same query addressed to a state PAC chairman within the same region elicited the suggestion that the writer contact the regional PAC director who, he was sure, would "be able to supply the information you are seeking." The response of the national office to a similar communication was: "I am afraid that your letter has been
passed from one desk to another several times primarily because the information which you request is most difficult to obtain. We wish we had such accurate information on PAC organization. It is almost impossible to obtain it because the regional offices of the PAC maintain contact primarily with the regional offices of the various international unions who were, in turn, responsible for the mechanical work of the PAC of their local unions or, in some cases, the regional directors worked with the State Industrial Union Council and the County and City Councils. These, in turn, were responsible for the local union political action organization. We here are most sorry that the material that you want is not available. The only way to obtain it is to go direct to the city and state councils in the separate states. We are not sure that you could obtain the information even then. Letters to writer from R. S. McKeough, PAC Director, Region VII, Jan. 12, 1945 and March 12, 1945; from Samuel Levin, president, Illinois IUC, and state PAC chairman, March 7, 1945; from F. Palmer Weber, Research Staff, CIOPAC, March 10, 1945. See also Hillman testimony re the national PAC's lack of knowledge of the number of political action committees in existence on June 13, 1944. U. S. Senate, Special Committee Hearing on Campaign Expenditures, 1944, p. 48.

been devised either for measuring zeal or for computing the relative importance on a nation-wide basis of organizations whose political action records, chalked up by units and members in the field, as well as by national officers and staff, compared favorably in some jurisdictions, unfavorably in others, with those of co-affiliates in the CIO. Degrees of importance, aside, there is, moreover, no evidence in hand to suggest that TWUA's political personality any more than its activity record was "average" or "typical" of the CIO, although there are facts which tempt the researcher to claim that it was in 1943-44 an effective purveyor of influences into the stream of American politics which were derived from and therefore representative of a much larger segment of the labor movement than that contained within TWUA alone.12
As described in the following chapter, TWUA was initially the product of organizing efforts by unionists then or previously identified with several internationals. Furthermore, many who had a hand in the earliest CIO attempts to unionize the textile industry and thus presumably in the moulding of the TWUA character still were a part of CIO in 1944 and devoted servants of PAC—though not then under TWUA's banner: e.g., Thomas Burns, of the Rubber Workers and of Hillman's PAC staff, and Charles Gillman of the UAW, Georgia IUC and PAC head in 1944. On the latter see Lucy Randolph Mason, To Win These Rights (New York: Harpers, 1952), pp. 37 et passim.

TWUA in 1943-44 was the fourth largest CIO union, the median union of the "Big Seven," its membership—representing perhaps a third of the country's textile workers—variously estimated at from 342,000 to 450,000, organized in approximately 500 local unions and joint boards, and distributed over some 34 states stretching from Maine to California and from Minnesota to Louisiana. TWUA's major membership concentrations were found in three sections of the country—in states which in 1948 accounted for no fewer than 22% votes in the electoral college, all but five of which were cast in the Democratic column.

The joint board is a central coordinating agency which may unite, for collective bargaining or other purposes, all local unions of the same international within a city or similar bargaining area. Peterson (see p. 208n above) sets TWUA membership, organized in 497 units, at 400,000 for 1943, at 342,000 for 1944. Textile Labor, official union organ, used the figure 450,000 in October 1944.

The bulk of this membership was concentrated in New England and the Middle Atlantic states. Third place went to the South, with a vast but still largely un-unionized industry potential, and fourth and fifth places respectively to scattered locals of the Mid-and Far West.
While it must be obvious that potential influence must be viewed realistically on an electoral district rather than a sectional basis, and in terms of total population, voting statistics and other environmental factors, rather than of internal union strength, the accompanying table does demonstrate the widespread geographically of possible PAC influence as represented by the Textile Workers' membership. Given a natural propensity of union spokesmen for over- rather than under-estimation of membership strength, most estimates doubtless are exaggerated, although the area of potential influence would in any case extend beyond the union's own membership, depending upon the character of its political education program and campaign activity. Non-union workers, friends, relatives, and others were geographically within reach at plant gates, on the streets, in the neighborhoods, at public rallies, etc. On the other hand, one interviewee has observed that most of the unions' PAC work in 1941 was confined to the membership directly—speech-making and literature distribution at regular union meetings, the personal canvassing of union members on voter registration and the like.\footnote{Interview with Witherspoon Dodge (TWOC-TWUA organizer, 1937-43), executive director, National Religion and Labor Foundation, Feb. 2, 1954.}

Even so, a membership distribution pattern which made it potentially a factor of political consequence in a number of states was not peculiar to TWUA. Nor were final persuasive arguments for choice of this particular international union for more searching analysis to be
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>1943 TWUA Convention Representation*</th>
<th>1944 Electoral Votes and Partisan Distribution**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Locals</td>
<td>Other Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New England</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>135</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Atlantic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-West</td>
<td>Locals</td>
<td>Other Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Joint board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Joint board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Joint board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Joint board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Joint boards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Joint boards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Joint board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Joint board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far West</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Joint board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Joint board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td>359</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Prepared from credentials report in Textile Workers Union of America, Proceedings of the Third Biennial Convention, New York City, May 10-14, 1943, pp. 194-203. Not all locals which were organized by 1944, or even all of those in existence in 1943, were represented in this nearest convention year to the 1944 campaign, and at least seven states in which there was some TWUA organization were totally unrepresented. Convention records do not reveal the geographical location of the absentees but it is believed that the missing data would not drastically alter the proportionate sectional distribution shown. In all, 531 units (including 27 joint boards) were entitled to 1,131 delegates, as compared with 884 in actual attendance. The poorest attendance record was apparently that of units affiliated with the semi-autonomous Hosiery Federation.

found, alone or cumulatively, in its size, its total national voter potential, or its relative numerical or voting strength within the Congress of Industrial Organizations. On the CIO executive board where the PAC program was initiated and within the CIO convention which ratified it, TWUA's influence in terms of votes was neither more nor less than that of any other of the "Big Seven," although on demand for a roll call on the question in either body (a rarity in CIO proceedings) the union's voting strength would have been in direct proportion to its membership.  

Rather formidable arguments might have led to selection of the United Automobile Workers, whose million-odd members were also spread from North to South and from coast to coast. The UAW's impressive concentration in a single state (Michigan) gave it a potential electoral college influence in excess of that enjoyed by TWUA in the state of its greatest membership. A case might also be made for the UAW on the ground that it encompassed within itself several strongly competing factions, each of which tended to typify dominant elements in other CIO affiliates.
What then are the considerations which justified choice of TWUA in preference to some other union? They are the following: (1) It appeared that an impressive number of documentably active personalities plausibly identifiable with the TWUA label were in a position (a) to help determine the nature of the CIO labor-political movement of 1943-44 and (b) to help stimulate mobilization of pro-Roosevelt votes in a field extending far beyond the confines of the Textile union—in their capacities as members of the national PAC and its staff, as heads of state or local political action committees, as international union assignees to PAC, as working delegates to the Democratic national convention, as influential members of politically important industrial union councils. (2) It was apparent that meaningful investigation into TWUA’s political background would require a parallel penetration, equally valuable in itself, into that of a sister CIO affiliate, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA), with which TWUA had organizational ties of great intimacy and which for its own part was heavily involved in PAC—as an operating organization and as the source for an equally outstanding number of dedicated PAC workers, not the least of whom was Sidney Hillman. (3) The Amalgamated and TWUA jointly accounted for a greater number of regional PAC directors than any other comparable union combination as well as for the third largest international union membership functioning under the banner of the CIO.16 (4) It

16 For background on directors Salerno, Abramson and Kroll, and on George S. Mitchell see p. 206 above.
appeared that within this union complex—including TWUA, ACWA and TWUA's largest constituent affiliate, the American Federation of Hosiery Workers—there was a continuity of dominant leadership influence over a sufficiently long span of years to make a reasonably reliable analysis feasible. Indeed, in terms of viable organization and personnel continuity the ACWA-TWUA combine comprised as among the seven largest CIO unions that segment with its roots deepest in the past—particularly through the Amalgamated and the Hosiery Federation, home organizations of Sidney Hillman and TWUA president Rieve.\(^{17}\) In

\[^{17}\text{Not a few leaders of other internationals could trace their personal union careers back many years but not always within the same industry or union jurisdiction. Thus Philip Murray was active in the United Mine Workers of America long before USA-CIO was born. But UMWA was not a factor in the CIO of 1943-44 and the CIO steel union had no institutional history prior to 1942. Its AFL forerunner, the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers, was organized in 1876 but UMWA was the major source for leadership in the drive begun in 1936 by the Steel Workers Organizing Committee—CIO. See Edward Levinson, Labor on the March (New York and London: Harpers, 1938), pp. 125, 187-191 \textit{et passim}.}\]

sharp contrast, for example, was the relatively short life span of the UAW, organized in 1936 without benefit of personnel continuity from long established or stable organizations in either the same or related fields. In marked contrast, too, many of the auto workers' factional leaders over the years formed shifting alliances in intra-union politics which tended to complicate systematic examination of the broader political orientation of the various factional members active in PAC.—This, quite apart from the fact that UAW's internal political cosmopolitanism by no means accurately mirrored the proportionate
strength of diverse political elements within the CIO as a whole. 18

18 Not only was UAW no CIO in microcosm but the vigorous open intra-union factionalism which prevailed in UAW (with or without its larger political overtones) was itself un-characteristic.


(5) Finally, exhaustive study of TWUA, AFHW, and the Amalgamated as political entities is justified, after the fact, by the review which it has compelled of more than three decades of general labor political history at the individual union level—or, more precisely, from within a selected section of the labor movement. Such a review cannot but sharpen understanding of the context within which American labor in general has functioned (or neglected to function) politically during this period. It is this context within which the 1943-44 episode must be evaluated, in the light of which one may intelligently speculate on what present and future labor political action may portend, and on the basis of which one may contemplate the formulation of wise and/or workable public policy in this field.
This is not the place for an elaborate history of the Textile Workers Union of America or of its trade union forebears. No special relevance attaches, for example, to matters of internal organization or to organizing tactics, picket line struggles or notable cases of success and failure in collective bargaining. That is, these and many other matters properly comprehended in a complete union history are unimportant here as such. Insofar as they bear upon TWUA's development as a factor in American politics or aid in evaluating the PAC phenomenon, they are pertinent and will be alluded to in due course. Here it is sufficient to sketch certain introductory information: when TWUA came into being, why and under what auspices; who its leading creators were and what its constituent elements; how deeply its roots were embedded in the past, the nature of its ties to a prior unionism, the identity of the predecessor and tutelary organizations whose political traditions are especially germane to an exploration into the political character of TWUA-CIO.

**Setting and Inspiration for CIO's Textile Drive, 1937**

There had been numerous attempts to organize the textile industry before 1933. The American Federation of Labor and the
Industrial Workers of the World both had invaded the field. Socialists, Communists, "business unionists" had tackled mills both North and South. None had been very successful, despite spectacular strikes and certain short-lived gains. The AFL United Textile Workers of America (UTW) was organized as early as 1901 from a merger of earlier unions. This was a highly competitive industry, however, notorious for its low wages and long hours, its hostility to unionism, its propensity for employment of intimidation and violence. Prior to the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 the UTW, which had undergone many secessions and reaffiliations, had not appreciably cracked the defenses of management anywhere. Then, under the NIRA and its famous Section 7(a),¹ there ensued a period of militant activity which

¹This "required the inclusion in every code of fair competition the provision that employees had the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. . . ." Harry A. Millis and Royal E. Montgomery, Organized Labor (New York and London: McGraw-Hill, 1945), p. 191.

in 1934 brought an estimated 475,000 textile workers out on picket lines up and down the east coast, not excluding the South, whence many companies had moved to exploit a traditionally more compliant labor force and a governmental climate highly unsympathetic to unionism. During this period the UTW rose briefly from 65,000 to some 350,000 members. It fell precipitately after 1934 and never again rose to such proportions though the industry itself at the
beginning of the New Deal era employed approximately a million and a quarter workers. 2

2 The UTW in August 1935 "claimed 79,200 members, a drop of more than 220,000 from its high point in the summer of 1934." Edward Levinson, Labor on the March, p. 76.

In 1935, the same year in which Congress replaced Section 7(a) of the invalidated NIRA with the more comprehensive National Labor Relations [Wagner] Act, 3 the president of the UTW, Thomas W. McMahon, was one of the eight international union presidents who, despairing of prospects for organizing the unorganized under conservative, craft-conscious AFL policy, united to form the Committee for Industrial Organization. Early in 1937, UTW leaders, again with a membership of barely 65,000, dramatically signified recognition of their own past impotence in trying to organize a durable movement—even with the impetus given by the Wagner Act—by cooperating with the CIO, in defiance of the AFL, to establish the Textile Workers Organizing Committee. Under the chairmanship of Sidney Hillman, president of the then 23-year old Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, the TWOC, to which the UTW surrendered the responsibility of leadership, led a
new organizing drive which netted a claimed 400,000 members in the industry before the end of 1937.

Serving with Hillman on TWOC, by appointment of CIO chairman John L. Lewis, were individuals drawn from Lewis' own United Mine Workers (Thomas J. Kennedy), from the Rubber Workers (Thomas F. Burns), the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (Charles Zimmerman), the UTW (Francis J. Gorman), the Amalgamated (Charles Weinstein) and the American Federation of Hosiery Workers. Emil Rieve, the AFHW representative, became executive director for TWOC. Out in the field with him were nearly 400 organizers, including crusading souls sprung during 1937-38 from a variety of sources, some of whom were to remain indefinitely in the CIO textile union fold, some of whom were later to return to their own unions or, if they had not previously been in the labor movement, to find niches with other unions.

Many of the earliest organizers, according to Witherspoon Dodge, were mill workers who "knew the language," while some others, who went into the villages to "sign up" workers, were volunteer organizers, "idealists," "crude greenhorns," so far as the labor movement was concerned. Among the outstanding professional organizers

was Carl Holderman of New Jersey, a former Hosiery representative and, according to Edward Levinson, one of the "progressive... leaders of the old United Textile Workers." John Peel, who took the "upper South," was a UTW vice president. A. Steve Nance, who initially undertook the TWOC task in the "lower South," was an Atlantic printer. Richard Roy Lawrence, who succeeded to that post upon Nance's untimely death was also a member of the International Typographical Union and a past president of the North Carolina Federation of Labor. Charles Weinstein in Philadelphia was an organizer for the Amalgamated, as were Abraham Chatman in upstate New York and Frank Rosenblum in Chicago. So were Hyman Blumberg, who was assigned to the New England area, and Joseph Salerno of Boston, his deputy, who had taken time out from union activities several years previously to acquire a law degree. Albert George Clifton, also of New England, came from a varied union career which included the presidency of a local union of Hotel and Restaurant Employees and a post as business agent with the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers and Iron Shipbuilders.

Among the novices was Lucy Randolph Mason, who took on a job as TWOC and CIO public relations representative extraordinaire. A 55-year old gentlewoman of the South, Miss Mason's career had included work with the YWCA, the National Consumers League and miscellaneous charitable enterprises. Her mission, in the main, was to soften the hostility of Southern community leaders and employers to the coming of union organizers and to protect the latter from or secure redress
for violence and violations of their civil rights. Franz Daniel, who also went to work in the South and who later became an organizer for the Amalgamated, was a young graduate of Union Theological Seminary. Witherspoon Dodge, another volunteer from the clergy, had been successively, since before World War I, a Presbyterian and Congregational minister in South Carolina and Georgia, a teacher at Oglethorpe University, and a radio churchman in Atlanta. His particular avenue of entry into TWOC was, by his own description, his friendship for Steve Nance, developed as the reverend Mr. Dodge "spoke occasionally" at the Atlanta Labor Temple. There were countless others to whose ideas and ideals, presumably, CIO textile unionists were exposed—directly or indirectly—as TWOC, and, after 1939, TWUA, brought into the union between a quarter and a half million workers. More of the earliest organizers were drawn from the Amalgamated than from any other single source and ACWA was indisputably the most powerful single influence in bringing CIO unionism to the textile industry, but these few names suggest a variety of conditioning influences.5

5When the writer, in conversation with Max Sillins, a veteran ACWA organizer (May 26, 1954), referred to the Amalgamated as one important influence upon TWUA and as one factor in bringing TWUA into existence, the interviewee indignantly asked what other unions had anything to do with its organization! Witherspoon Dodge, asked to recall his earliest impressions of the TWOC drive in the South, remembered a meeting at which ACWA assistant president Potofsky gave a talk to TWOC organizers. Interview, Feb. 2, 1954. For the role of ACWA managers, local union officers and staff members in the "first hectic year of TWOC campaigning" see Elden La Mar, The Clothing Workers in Philadelphia, ed. by J.B.S. Hardman (Philadelphia Joint Board, 1940), p. 165. For a colorful picture of some of the UTW organizers who threw themselves into the TWOC drive see Kelly, *passim*. See also, as sources for data presented above,
While not all of TWOC's claimed recruits as of late 1937 were consolidated into permanent membership, the results at the time were imposing. For this successful consorting with the enemy, however, the United Textile Workers were expelled from the American Federation of Labor in 1938, after which one UTW faction, led by Francis Gorman, UTW president, 1937-38, withdrew from the CIO to reaffiliate with the AFL. In 1939 the remaining faction, headed by George Baldanzi and with the blessing of Thomas McMahon, UTW member since 1904 and union president from 1921 to 1937, joined with TWOC to found the Textile Workers Union of America-CIO. To this new international union the old UTW now brought 126 local units with approximately 75,000 members. TWOC contributed 302 locals and an estimated 250,000 members. Included within these totals in this new "quasi-industrial" union were workers "connected with textile and cloth in all its branches," the TWOC having set out to unionize workers in "linen, woolen, rayon, cloth, silk, rugs and carpets, thread, textile trimmings,"
yarn, and cotton materials." Included also were members of two UTW-

7 Levinson, Labor on the March, p. 239.

affiliated federations which, while retaining a certain amount of
autonomy in the disposition of dues monies, brought some of the more
highly skilled workers in the industry within the jurisdiction of the
new union: the American Federation of Hosiery Workers and the
Federation of Dyers, Finishers, Printers and Bleachers. 8

8 By special dispensation part of the per capita dues which each
federation paid to the international was returned to it for organizing
work and direct servicing of its own local affiliates, an arrangement
stemming from the days when the federations, in the face of UTW incap-
cacity, had functioned with some degree of success. See, for example,
organizing successes of the Hosiery Workers in difficult Reading,
Pennsylvania hosiery district in 1936-37 prior to establishment of
TWOC. Elias Lieberman, Unions Before the Bar (New York: Harpers,
Works, Research Director, Harry A. Millis (New York: Twentieth Century
Fund, 1942), p. 500. Cited hereafter as Twentieth Century Fund,
How Collective Bargaining Works. See also remarks of Emil Rieve, TWUA,
60-61.

Under CIO leadership the Hosiery Federation in 1938 pooled its
Southern organizing staff with TWOC and the Amalgamated. In 1940
Textile and Hosiery Workers "agreed to separate their staffs again,
but [to] continue to work together on common problems." Hosiery
Worker, 7/15/38, p. 1; 5/2/41, p. 3.

Each of these federations, only two of several previously in-
corporated into UTW, supplied one of the top three officers of the new
union: George Baldanzi of the Dyers, who was to be TWUA's executive
vice-president for more than a decade, and Emil Rieve, from the larger
Hosiery union, who was to be TWUA president through the first half of
the 1950's. The Dyers' union, admitted to the UTW in 1934, was then of recent origin, having emerged under the leadership of the youthful Baldanzi, who had entered the dyeing industry in 1927. 9 The Hosiery

9 As a department within the UTW the Dyers assumed jurisdiction over all workers "employed in and about places of business engaged in the dyeing, finishing, printing and bleaching of all textile fabrics." Peterson, Handbook of Labor Unions, pp. 101-102. Nominating Baldanzi for reelection as TWUA executive vice-president in 1943, Joseph Knappi recalled that "some ten years ago a little revolution started in the blood-covered streets of the city of Paterson, New Jersey... the history of whose labor organizations dates back over 150 years. In that struggle there flowered a young man who rose head and shoulders over the rest and assumed the leadership of probably one of the most militant organizations of its kind... He formed what was known as the Federation of Dyers, of which he was the first president. In 1936 he was elected to the vice-presidency of the old UTW. The Dyers' loss was the Textile Workers' gain..." TWUA, Proceedings, 1943, pp. 157-158. See also Textile Labor, 5/1/40, p. 4.

Workers traced their lineage to pre-World War I days. Organized in 1913 by local craft unions previously directly affiliated with the UTW, the Hosiery Federation (known until 1933 as the American Federation of Full-Fashioned Hosiery Workers) left the AFL union not long thereafter, only to reaffiliate on its semi-autonomous basis in 1922 after a seven-year period of independence. Just before TWOC came on the scene it accounted for the bulk of UTW's membership. 10 Rieve, who

10 According to one source, the 1936 UTW convention was attended by delegates representing approximately 80,000 textile workers in 300 locals. The Hosiery Federation at its own convention earlier in the year was said to have a membership of 60,000. Hosiery Worker, 9/18/36, p. 1; NYT, 4/29/36, p. 215. Josephson put AFHW membership at half of the Textile Workers' approximately 60,000 bona fide members." Sidney Hillman, p. 417.

had helped organize the "first Hosiery Workers Union in the city of Philadelphia," became AFHW president in 1929 and was later credited both for leading his union out of the "industrial catastrophe" of that time and for presiding over the quintupling of its membership in a decade. Both federations were to be sources for serious deflections from TWUA several years after the fourth Roosevelt campaign, but both were integral elements of the Textile union family from 1939 through the period under consideration here.

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12 The Dyers in 1948, with 61 locals and 26,000 members, voted in accordance with a TWUA constitutional amendment in which they had concurred, to dissolve their federation and to affiliate as individual locals on the same basis as all other TWUA units. The Hosiery Workers were expelled from TWUA by the convention of that year, following a suspension resulting from failure of AFHW locals to pay an increase in per capita tax voted by the 1946 convention. The AFHW had unsuccessfully sought peaceable withdrawal from TWUA and direct affiliation with the CIO as an international union. In 1950 the AFHW was still functioning as an independent union; the following year it was admitted to the AF of L. In 1952 elements adhering to Baldanzi nominated a full slate of candidates to oppose the Rieve administration. Rieve won; Baldanzi shortly thereafter was expelled from TWUA, along with five other union officials. See TWUA, Proceedings, 1946, pp. 55-61; TWUA, Executive Council Report to the Sixth Biennial Convention, May 1-5, 1950, pp. 78-80; U. S. Department of Labor, Brief History of the American Labor Movement, Bulletin No. 1000 (1957 Revision), p. 79. Data also obtained from NYT, 1951-52 passim.

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Baldanzi was just thirty-two when TWUA was formed, a native of Black Diamond, Pennsylvania, the son of a miner and blacksmith and himself a former boy worker in the mines. He was first president of
the Dyers and, when the UTW-TWOC collaboration of 1937-39 gave way to merger, was both "temporary successor" to UTW president Gorman and assistant executive director of TWOC.\(^{13}\) Forty-seven at the time of the merger, Rieve too could trace his industrial and union experiences to boyhood days. Of immigrant origin, he came to the United States from Poland in 1905. The son of a textile mill machinist, his first job was in a Reading hosiery mill. He moved from city to city, "where there was hosiery work," and, according to the Hosiery Journal, was a "full-fledged knitter" in Philadelphia by the time he was eighteen. He was also by that time a trade union member of three years standing. He pioneered in unionizing drives in the latter city and in Milwaukee, where, from 1917 to 1929 he helped build one of the strongest branches in the federation, relinquishing his machine in the mill for the first time in the latter year to accept a poorer paying job as AFHW president.\(^{14}\)


\(^{14}\) Textile Labor, June 1939, p. 7. In 1917, nearly 20 years later, the federation's national executive board granted salary increased to its three highest officers--after which they continued to rank among the "lowest paid" national union leaders. After the increases the president and secretary-treasurer were each to get $7,500 annually, the first vice-president $7,250. Hosiery Worker, May 1947, p. 4. As TWUA president, Rieve's salary was $7,000 until May 1943 when it was raised to $10,000. \textit{NYT}, 5/14/43, p. 15:6.

In the early days Rieve went from Reading to Ft. Wayne, Indiana, then to Northampton, Massachusetts and Philadelphia. Hosiery Worker, 6/2/39, p. 4. See also Dickerman and Taylor, p. 299. Taylor writes that around 1910, "the full-fashioned hosiery industry was composed of a few mills located principally in Philadelphia. A union of a few
boarders and knitters in Philadelphia, established in 1909, was the ancestor of the [AFHW]. As knitters 'travelled with the trade' to such scattered producing areas as Fort Wayne and Northampton, they organized local unions directly affiliated with the [UTW].


Associated with Baldanzi and Rieve as first secretary-treasurer of the CIO textile union was 40-year-old William Pollack, son of a weaver, a native Philadelphian, and head of the Textile Workers joint board in that city. Pollack had been a member of the UTW since 1920 and a general organizer for TWOC. A final, leading personality attendant upon the birth of TWUA and representative of its fourth principal founding element was TWOC chairman Hillman, whose union had lent not only many crack organizers but several hundred thousand dollars to make the TWOC drive a success. Hillman, who became chairman of TWUA's international executive council (IEC), would, like Rieve, look back in 1939 upon nearly thirty years of union activity, beginning in 1910 when, as a recent immigrant from Lithuania (1907), he had joined the AFL United Garment Workers. In 1914, at twenty-seven, he had helped UGW insurgents found the Amalgamated and was in 1939 still its first and only president. During most of the intervening years, 1915-39, the ACWA had existed as an independent union, having been admitted to the AF of L only in 1933, and expelled, along with other members of the CIO, in 1938.15

15 The CIO unions were suspended by the AFL in the latter half of 1936 and their locals ordered expelled from state and local AFL bodies early in 1937. The following year their charters were officially revoked. See Millis and Montgomery, pp. 213-219; Levinson,
The Importance of the Amalgamated

As described earlier, other unions than Hillman's contributed both financial resources and manpower to the initial CIO textile drive, but no contribution was more generous or more continuous than that of the Amalgamated, whose championship of hosiery and textile unionism dated at least from 1919. This was not solely a matter of brotherli-

ness and altruism. Amalgamated concern for conditions in textile communities was heightened by their direct impact upon standards in the clothing industry. Elden La Mar in his chronicle of the Amalgamated in Philadelphia notes that clothing shops "beat a track to the mill towns where a sick industry had left large pools of labor idle and where mill domination kept unions at arm's distance." In the mid-1930's
the unorganized South in particular was becoming a major problem to clothing and shirt workers.\(^{17}\)

\(^{17}\)The Clothing Workers in Philadelphia, pp. 159-160; 164.

Union spokesmen often disclaimed any suggestion of Amalgamated "interference." Nevertheless, the Clothing Workers were, patently, in a position to help determine the fate of textile organizing efforts, and, concomitantly, to affect the character development of the unions in the field. Hence exposure to ACWA influence is not to be discounted as a conditioning factor in the political life of TWUA--even after 1911 when Hillman declined reelection to his IEC post because of the pressure of other responsibilities, including government service as associate director of the Office of Production Management.\(^{18}\) The

\(^{18}\)NYT, 4/20/41, p. 37:2. Rieve in 1943 praised ACWA's unprecedented job of "assisting" and "creating" TWUA, while emphasizing that "at no time" during the period of tutelage had "any officer or member of the Amalgamated interfered with our internal or external affairs." TWUA, Proceedings, 1943, p. 98. Charles Weinstein told TWUA's founding convention that the ACWA in Philadelphia gave "advice" only when asked, and "When we felt we had completed our job, we left the Textile Workers Joint Board, after its organization under Bro. Pollack, to your textile workers to run it." Ibid., 1939, p. 35.

financial umbilical cord was not cut until 1943 when ACWA "wrote off" as a "gift" a longtime "advance" of $523,378.75 which had been made to the textile union. The Textile convention that same year explicitly acknowledged another kind of indebtedness to Sidney Hillman when, on the advice of union officers, it agreed to leave vacant the office he
had filled, offering the explanation that it had been created in the first place so that the Textile Workers could avail themselves of his "advice and assistance." Not until some time after 1914 did TWUA leave its rented national office in the Amalgamated building in New York City for its own fine new building, to function without physical proximity to ACWA headquarters. Even as ties of dependency were

19Hillman made clear that the half million dollar "advance" had always been intended as an "outright contribution." It had been carried on Amalgamated books as a "loan" to "protect your organization during its formative period in the event of litigation from any source." TWUA, Proceedings, 1943, pp. 97, 160. For reference in the 1946 convention to the purchase of its own building, after "eviction" by the Amalgamated, see Ibid., 1946, p. 93.

being severed the Amalgamated remained in some jurisdictions an object of direct allegiance for individuals who functioned as dual ACWA-TWUA personalities. In Massachusetts future regional PAC director Salerno was a director of organization for both unions until January 1942 and a member of both international executive bodies until 1943. 20 In

20His resignation from TWUA office was attributed to the burden of other duties—with the ACWA and as state CIO president. Textile Labor, Feb. 1942, p. 11.

Minnesota as late as 1944 a single individual (Sander Genis) was Twin Cities joint board manager for both unions. There is other evidence to suggest that the Amalgamated remained, in matters of policy, a potential example and/or inspiration to which Textile unionists had ready access long after the Hillman IEC chairmanship was terminated.
Throughout the 1940's ACWA was a constant source for popular speakers at TWUA gatherings, at one of which president Rieve was at pains to recall, as a prelude to a Hillman address:

This organization has often cleared it with Sidney... He watched over us when we were young and feeble.  

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21 TWUA, Proceedings, 1946, p. 78.

Subjects for the TWUA Campaign Story and Analysis

For purposes of this study the TWUA factor in PAC is by definition (a) the CIO Textile Workers' international union and (b) all TWUA-affiliated units which were actively involved in the PAC movement. It is also, and perhaps primarily, since movements are people as well as organizations, (c) all officers, staff and rank and file members of TWUA and its affiliates who at any level of operation, within the confines of TWUA alone or of broader CIO or PAC machinery, helped to develop or reflect their union and/or CIO policy in connection with the first PAC campaign; and (d) all CIO or PAC personalities whose prior associations within the Textile family (with TWOC, TWUA, AFHW or the Dyers) might properly lead to the conclusion that they were part creator or product of the kind of "force" which it represented. The propriety of including the latter category under a TWUA label may be questioned. Inclusion is warranted by the purpose originally proposed: namely, to subject to political character analysis a PAC-participating segment of the CIO which involved as broad a membership
as possible while being susceptible to treatment as a case study subject. It is, after all, PAC which is under scrutiny, not TWUA as such.

Manifestly, it is these various components of TWUA-PAC whose identity must be established and which, upon identification, are properly subject to the kind of historical analysis projected in the preceding chapter. Manifestly, too, it is idle to contemplate an understanding of a collective personality and political force without recognizing the various agents by and within which that personality must have been moulded and that force defined. Hence inquiry must extend, insofar as practicable, beyond those elements immediately present in TWUA-PAC as of 1944, to principal individuals and to the predecessor, constituent and tutelary unions which have been revealed as conditioning and/or continuing influences in the life of the subject union. In some measure at least, not even the AFL textile union can be excluded from study, even though the latter was, in the non-political sphere, to so great an extent a model for TWOC and TWUA to avoid rather than to emulate.

The validity of such inquiry as an avenue to an appreciation of the TWUA factor in PAC is supported by facts set forth in the historical sketch just concluded and by further review of union leadership continuity in this sector of the labor movement. TWUA's three highest officers in 1944 were precisely those who had been chosen at its founding in 1939 and who still were to be in office in 1948. Of the nineteen vice-presidents who made up the union's
first international executive council (IEC), fourteen retained their IEC membership when PAC came into being and seven in 1948. Of the nineteen vice-presidents of 1943-44, ten remained on the 1948 roster. It may be added that several of TWUA's first IEC members who were still being reelected in 1948 were one-time UTW staffers or officers. At least one had been elected to the AFL union's executive body as far back as 1917.\(^{22}\)

\(^{22}\)This was Joseph White whose retirement in 1949, three years before his death, ended a union career which spanned almost half a century. See Kelly, *Nine Lives for Labor*, pp. 89-90, 98-107.

Turnover on the Hosiery Workers' national executive board (NEB) was somewhat greater. Only five out of fourteen 1943 NEB members were on the 1948 board although at least one of these (William Leader, a TWUA-IEC member as well, elected by three successive conventions through 1943) had served continuously since the 1930's. Of the federation's four highest officers, however, one (secretary-treasurer William Smith) had held office since the mid-1920's, and all in 1944 traced their tenure at least back to 1939. All but one held the same posts when the Hosiery Workers were expelled from TWUA a decade later. Emil Rieve himself in 1939 had been AFHW president for ten years. The Dyers' three highest officers remained unchanged throughout the 1940's, until dissolution of that federation in 1948.

Of the fifteen vice-presidents who made up the Amalgamated general executive board (GEB) when participation in the first PAC campaign was decided upon, all had held identical posts when that
union's 1910 political policy was set. Nine were still GEB members when political decisions were being made four years later. At least eight had been on the board as long as twenty years while at least six had been among the UGW dissidents of 1911 who issued the convention "call" which led to ACWA's founding. As for the union's two chief officers, Sidney Hillman was its only president until his death in 1916; Jacob PotoFSky, who became secretary-treasurer in 1910 on the retirement of his only predecessor (Jacob Schlossberg), held that office until his own elevation to the presidency in 1916. PotoFSky's successor as secretary (Frank Rosenblum) was also an ACWA founder and a GEB member with tenure from 1920.23

23 Survey of union leadership continuity prepared from data in convention proceedings (TWUA and ACWA), union journals (Textile Labor, Advance, Hosiery Worker), and miscellaneous sources.

Even this picture of personnel continuity is sharpened by disclosure of the fact that within all of these organizations, most officers and executive body members who were "new" to these high posts in 1911 had union careers which stretched well into the past, while countless colleagues of lesser status, some of whom had been or who were to be elevated to higher office in the future, also were active in political and other union affairs over a considerable span of years. 24 Significantly, in national conventions, wherein CIO

24 Thomas McMahon, UTW president from 1921 to 1937, is an outstanding example of union leaders who, like generals, only "fade away." First elected to the UTW executive council in 1906, McMahon was a TWUA staff man from 1939 to his death--just as the PAC campaign was getting
McMahon, in fact, was "pre-UTW. He went back to the days when Terence Powderly and the Knights of Labor were cracking up over the Haymarket affair and Gompers and Strasser were putting the crafts together into a new organization called the American Federation of Labor."Kelly, pp. 65-66.

political decisions were made or ratified, composition of TWUA and Amalgamated delegations varied little over the years. Finally, since it is contended here that this slice of labor political history has meaning for the present, as the 1950's draw to a close, it may be added that the head of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers is still Jacob Potofsky and the highest officer of the Textile Workers Union of America is William Pollack, TWUA secretary-treasurer until Emil Rieve's retirement.

The Research Plan, Sources of Information, and Qualifying Remarks

In preparing the research program it was deemed inappropriate to dwell overlong on UTW history. Practical considerations ruled out any concentration at all upon the miscellaneous unions other than the Amalgamated, to which, through TWOC, might be traced some of the significant political influences to which prospective TWUA-PAC personalities were exposed. Similar considerations and, it is believed, a balanced perspective, dictated that only one of the TWUA-affiliated federations, the older and larger Hosiery organization, be studied systematically as an entity apart from TWUA, either for evidence of cooperation in the PAC movement or for information leading to appreciation of the implications of PAC activity under such auspices. Exhaustive study,
In terms of research this means only that Dyers’ publications have not been examined. Members and units of this federation, whose activities and political sympathies are revealed in other sources employed in this study, are accorded precisely the same treatment as all other TWUA units and personalities.

however, was projected into relevant aspects of ACWA history and into the character and career of Sidney Hillman, as far back as the days of World War I. As described above, Hillman and his union were in a position to exert the strongest single influence on the CIO textile union at its inception and were especially well situated to command respect as an example thereafter. For these reasons the ACWA-Hillman influence must not be minimized. In a sense it may be said that the influence of Emil Rieve himself was a part of the Amalgamated impact upon TWUA—even though Rieve was never a member of the clothing workers’ union! Such an interpretation is in order if, as has been alleged, the leadership whose power was consolidated at TWUA’s founding convention owed its ascendancy to the organizing apparatus of which Hillman was the guiding force.

One student of the American labor movement, writing critically of the original CIO policy of launching organizing drives through tightly-held organizing committees instead of chartered, autonomous international unions, observed that only when such a committee—as TWOC—had through the consolidation of a “permanent machine” ensured the control of the new union by “moderates,” did the CIO foster conversion of the organizing committee into a bona fide international union. See Lens, Left, Right and Center, p. 301.

The total research plan called first for investigation to document the existence of a TWUA factor in the PAC movement—as an element
which helped bring it into being and to make it a going concern, and for verification of an electoral potential subject to its influence of sufficient magnitude to warrant the analysis contemplated. The second imperative was to ascertain the nature of the objectives toward which TWUA-PAC activity was ostensibly directed, by studying the utterances of individuals and the programs and policies formally subscribed to by the subject organizations. The third was to provide a sound basis for evaluating contemporary manifestations of intent and motivation—by examining pertinent biographical data on individuals; and by exploring the politically relevant aspects of TWUA's total history and the examples set by and within the UTW, the Hosiery Federation, and the Amalgamated.

For the latter purpose four distinct periods were posited for study and comparison, with special attention to be paid to the general economic and political climate within which labor political policy was framed during those several periods; to the attitudes and behavior of individuals whose identification with TWOC, TWUA, and TWUA-PAC had already been established; and to similarities and dissimilarities of union (including individual) and Communist party lines in illustrative topical areas. Five "line" areas chosen as affording, cumulatively, telltale clues to probable or improbable subservience to CP discipline or fellow traveler influence, covered attitudes or action with respect to the following: (1) labor political action itself; (2) American foreign policy, (3) class warfare and welfare; (4) democracy, civil rights and totalitarianism, and (5) the acceptability of Communists in
the labor movement. The periods selected for chronological consideration were: the pre-TWOC years (subjects—UTW, AFHW, and ACWA); then, successively, the 1937-40 period of tutelage, the 1941-44 years of what is here denoted as the "PAC trend" and campaign, and the quadrennium which followed 1944 (subjects—ACWA, AFHW, and TWUA).

This research plan has been carried out in its entirety and it will be in the light of the longer historical perspective that answers to questions formulated in the introduction to this study will be framed. In the remainder of the present work, however, extensive documentation will be offered primarily in evidence of TWUA-PAC activity in connection with the fourth Roosevelt campaign, along with basic biographical information on illustrative union personalities and data testifying to the contemporary justifications for political action which were offered both by subject organizations and individuals.

It would be idle to pretend that research for either description or analysis has been equally productive with respect to all components of the TWUA factor. Individuals introduced in the following chapters as elements in the "TWUA force" behind PAC have been selected according to no arbitrary standard of status or performance and without regard for immediate sources of authority for activity described or implied—whether the national CIO, CIOPAC, TWUA headquarters, the AFHW national office, or any one of a number of industrial union councils or local TWUA affiliates. Most of them are international union personnel, since reliance has been, in the main, upon published national union sources—union journals and convention proceedings—and upon
supplementary interviews and correspondence in which questioning was
directed toward amplification of clues contained in those publications
or toward eliciting information on specifically named union personali­
ties.

In keeping with the primary objective, preoccupation in docu­
menting the campaign story was with the identification of personnel
and the fact of their involvement, not with the precise nature of their
activities, and it was not feasible, in a single project embracing
national, state, and local developments, to develop the picture "in the
field" by extensive interviewing or polling, or by systematic inspec­
tion of area publications. Union journals, it must be remarked, are
organs of union headquarters and as such are designed more to stimulate
than to report local activity.

Because corroborative inquiry was not always practicable names
of some persons whose actual commitment to PAC may have been perfunctory
may appear in these pages indiscriminately alongside those of truly
dedicated PAC workers. Others of key significance in cultivating the
PAC idea may be totally ignored—because their names did not appear
in the published sources examined. For obvious reasons, reference
cannot be made to still other individuals for whom the immediate
flowering of a thoroughgoing moral commitment to PAC and to FDR's re-
election may have been precluded by the pressure of other overriding
obligations. In communities where gigantic hostility to unionism
prevailed, often aided and abetted by governmental authority, political
action may have seemed logically imperative. Where union organization
or survival were questions of great immediacy, however, it was not easy to give PAC high priority. Region VIII PAC director George Mitchell was asked, for example, if meaningful comparisons in "political zeal" might be made as between individuals or across international union boundaries. No categorical reply was forthcoming. There was "a mixture of genuine competing interests and the feeling that organization had to come first, anytime." 27


Mindful of such qualifications, it is submitted that the sources exploited in preparation of the TWUA-PAC chronology and sectional surveys of the following chapters adequately establish the existence of a significant TWUA-PAC electoral potential; that they demonstrate incontrovertibly the official commitment to promotion of PAC of leadership at the highest union levels; the practical enlistment in the cause of officers and staff; the nominal or active acquiescence in TWUA's political course by the controlling elements of local affiliates (as represented in the international convention); 28
Not infrequently articulate members of local convention delegations are international union staffers—who may be expected to reflect the international union outlook. At the same time, according to one former organizer (1937-43) who had himself represented local units in TWUA conventions, any international representative carrying local credentials would be sure to know the will of the local leadership on important policy questions and, conversely, the local from which he "wangled the privilege" would be well aware of his stand on such issues before selecting him as a delegate. Interview with Witherspoon Dodge, previously cited.

and, finally, that they reveal types, variety, and in some cases scope of activity, along with the identity, in widely scattered electoral jurisdictions, of innumerable individuals who comprised by definition integral parts of the TWUA force behind PAC.

As for inquiry into ideological conditioning and goals, it must be remarked that for this purpose the union journal is conceded to be one of the best available references—in its disclosure and dissemination of official union positions and sympathies on important public as well as trade union policy issues, including procedural political policy. Convention proceedings too, through their preservation of resolution texts, speeches, debates (or discussions), and votes on issues, are indispensable sources for evidence of this nature, not only for organizations but also for individuals, who, by virtue of their positions, may be expected to help formulate as well as to reflect union policy. Surveyed over a period of years, both journals and convention proceedings afford ample basis for judging the relative importance of diverse kinds of resolutions and utterances as serious
clues to motivation and intent. Both are invaluable indicators of

In interviews with the writer, both Lawrence Rogin, then TWUA education director, and former Advance editor J.B.S. Hardman emphasized that journal coverage of local union activity was restricted both by space limitations and by dependence of the editorial offices upon the initiative of non-professional local correspondents. Interviews, December 1951. Reynolds and Killingsworth observe in this connection that for certain types of studies, trade union publications are strictly subordinate to direct observation and other documentary materials. For example, the "actual relations between union leaders and political party organizations. . . like the internal politics of the unions themselves, must for the most part be observed directly," particularly in state and local politics. The content of such publications does, nevertheless, reveal the general nature of union political tactics (e.g., the use of candidate endorsements). Furthermore, for studies of union objectives and of the beliefs and theories of trade unionists, these authors note, union publications constitute a major source of evidence. Lloyd G. Reynolds and Charles C. Killingsworth, Trade Union Publications (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1945), Vol. I, pp. 25, 28.

union and individual orientation with respect to the Communist party line. For review of the latter miscellaneous sources have been consulted, including volumes by Earl Browder and William Z. Foster, and, especially for delineation of the CP line on labor political action, the monthly magazine, New Masses. A comprehensive list of all sources explored along with the union publications themselves, for understanding of the labor-liberal-leftist developments of the entire period under scrutiny, will be found in the bibliography at the conclusion of this work.
PART IV

THE TEXTILE UNION PARTICIPATES IN A PAC TREND
(1941-1943)
CHAPTER IX
THE TREND BEGINS IN TWUA:
1941-42

The announcement of the Political Action Committee's appointment in July 1943 did not come without prior warning—even if some politicians, when they got around to noticing the Committee, did treat the phenomenon as if it were a bolt from the blue. The pages of the CIO News had hinted strongly at some kind of special labor political effort throughout the first six months of 1943. Moreover, there had been a series of successive and rather obvious steps, antedating January 1943, by which the CIO had been edging its way—it clearly did not "plunge"—into the PAC movement of 1943-44. Fully two years before creation of PAC a special emergency CIO legislative conference—convened by president Murray—had issued a declaration of policy branding in advance as "enemies of labor" all legislators who should vote for then pending "anti-labor" bills. At Detroit in November 1941 dele-

1UE News, 7/12/41, p. 1.

gates to the national CIO convention had heard appeals for "greater interest and activity" in the legislative and electoral field from Philip Murray and from at least one future regional PAC director.2
They had resolved collectively, if timorously, to empower the CIO executive board to explore means of implementing Murray's hope that in future elections labor would not content itself "with the defeat of anti-labor candidates" but would "seek the election of definitely pro-labor representatives" who would "not require a deluge of telegrams, letters, and delegations before they act and vote pro-labor." The resolution dedicated the CIO to "full participation in the political life of this country. . . with all other liberal and progressive forces." While stating that "the best source of . . . reliable pro-labor representatives comes from the ranks of our own labor movement," concretely the resolution merely authorized the board to "give serious consideration to this problem, looking toward. . . formulation of a program to guarantee and assure an independent role for organized labor."³

³Ibid., pp. 110-111, 210-214.

Nothing tangible in the way of political machinery had come from this pious authorization. In June 1942, however, the CIO board had proposed a national labor conference to consider problems of war production, the need for "increased labor participation in the executive and administrative branches of the government" and the

possibility of developing combined labor support for candidates for public office who "support . . . the President . . . and the war effort," and it had ordered CIO officers to pursue this "suggestion" to a successful conclusion. While nothing had come of this feeler either toward national political collaboration with AFL unions or the Railroad Brotherhoods, CIO officialdom, as the 1942 Congressional elections approached, had spelled out certain criteria for measuring the fitness of candidates, warning their own members to heed the "storm warnings" of the primaries, to shake off their off-year "apathy" and to undertake "house-to-house and worker-to-worker political campaigns." The executive board itself had even made one Congressional candidate endorsement.¹

¹See NYT, 6/6/42, p. 28b; 9/2/42, p. 16b; CIO News, 6/8/42, p. 3; 8/3/42, p. 4; 8/24/42, pp. 3-5; 9/7/42, p. 3; 10/12/42, p. 3; 10/19/42, p. 5; 11/2/42, pp. 1, 4. For CIO endorsement criteria see pp. 277 below.

Notwithstanding these appeals from on high, delegates to the 1942 CIO convention had met in the wake of a serious electoral setback and it was "evident," in president Murray’s understatement of the year, "that labor in many areas had not succeeded in marshalling its fullest strength." Even then CIO leaders drew no concrete plans for any grand entry into campaign politics, despite Murray’s sorrowful observation that the recent experience "again emphasized the necessity for improvement of the organization of CIO affiliates for political and legislative education and action."⁵ The convention did
5 The CIO's legislative department, he mourned, was equipped only to offer "information and guidance" to affiliates upon request. Sidney Lens notes that Labor's Non-Partisan League, organized in 1936, had disappeared from among CIO's organizational adjuncts along with John L. Lewis and his United Mine Workers. Left, Right and Center (Hinsdale, Ill.: Henry Regnery, 1949), pp. 316-318, 391.

call for accelerated pressure and propaganda activities to counteract the fresh electoral defeat—in a resolution which asked labor to "focus attention" on the actions of public officials, and to voice America's insistence upon "unity" behind the Commander-in-Chief, regardless of party. It was this rather innocuously worded resolution on the "Recent Elections" which provided a peg, if any were needed, for the January 1943 legislative conference and for the feverish agitation of the following months—whereby the CIO sought to expose and stop the "anti-labor" trend which reached its climax nationally in the Smith-Connally Act. The resolution encompassed future election activity only indirectly and, if anything, president Murray seemed over-anxious to gavel through and be done with debate on matters political when several delegates sought to broaden the language of the resolution in that respect.6 Conceivably the Murray


impatience was motivated by a superior sense of timing rather than indifference. The imminence of the first session of the 78th Congress;
the early convening of many state legislatures lent an urgency to the contemplation of traditional pressure politics that did not attend the idea of election politics in mid-November 1942. In any case, the pre-election political feelers of 1941 and '42, however inadequately implemented, and the political implications of Murray's 1942 convention report, suggest strongly that anyone who observed the frenzied CIO reaction to legislative developments during the following winter and spring could hardly have been genuinely surprised at the July 1943 announcement. It is abundantly clear that there had been a pre-PAC "PAC trend."

What—or who—was responsible for this "PAC trend?" Philip Murray and his staff? Or the CIO executive board—acting in a vacuum? Murray's own explicitness on this point was deceptive. In setting up the Hillman committee, he said in November 1943, he and the board had merely acceded to requests and proddings. PAC had been created at the "urgent behest" of union members from all over the country. He did not identify their unions. Hence it becomes pertinent to demonstrate the extent to which parallel or anticipatory developments may have been occurring within the Textile Workers Union of America or under the inspiration of Textile personalities.
The 1941 TWUA Convention Is Politically Conscious and in the Roosevelt Camp

TWUA's second biennial convention, held in New York City during the latter part of April 1941, featured no open endorsement for Franklin D. Roosevelt for re-election. It was a little early for that. On what was probably the most controversial issue of the time, however, the union delegates demonstrated "unqualified support" for the President's leadership. By resolution they concurred in his belief that Nazi aggression constituted a direct threat to the United States and approved "overwhelmingly" his policy for meeting that threat: the development of Army, Navy and Air Forces capable of meeting "any emergency," the sending of aid to Europe's embattled democracies. Almost no one took the floor in opposition and high union leaders pressed its adoption, including president Rieve, executive vice-president Baldanzi and IEC chairman Hillman. Similar action was taken the following week at the Hosiery Federation convention.8

subsequently, barely two weeks before Pearl Harbor, Rieve and Irving Abramson, a former assistant state TWUA director and a future regional PAC director, both spoke in the 1941 CIO convention in ringing reaffirmation of the pro-FDR foreign policy alignment.9

8 See TWUA, Proceedings, Apr. 21-25, 1941, pp. 108-123. See also Advance, May 1941, p. 5; NYT, 4/22/41, p. 18:2; 4/25/41, p. 14:5; Hosiery Worker, 5/2/41, p. 2.

9 CIO, Proceedings, 1941, pp. 131 ff. See also Hosiery Worker, 11/28/41, p. 1.
More directly foreshadowing forthcoming electoral activity were 1941 TWUA convention developments stemming from "anti-labor" domestic policy trends. Speakers from inside and outside the union denounced proposals to curb union activity, particularly the right to strike. While vigorously proclaiming labor's willingness to make voluntary sacrifices for national defense and for the stocking of the Roosevelt "arsenal for democracy," virtually all, including Rieve, Sidney Hillman, and Secretary of Labor Perkins, resented "anti-labor" propaganda which magnified the number and scope of work stoppages. Probably the outstanding domestic policy resolution on the convention agenda was one opposing a "Vinson anti-strike bill," under which wages, hours and conditions of labor would be "frozen," protection would be given to the "open shop," and "criminal penalties" would be imposed "on workers seeking adjustments to meet fluctuating costs of living." Of scarcely less importance was one which condemned state laws, based upon a "model anti-sabotage bill." These, according to Hosiery vice-president Alfred M. Hoffman, were designed to "shackle" workers in the exercise of legitimate rights although enacted "under the guise of national defense." The resolution urged union locals to resist passage unless such bills effectively guaranteed the "right to strike, to picket, to organize, to bargain collectively." A similar political climate prevailed at the Hosiery gathering—where Federation president Alex McKeown, like Emil Rieve, directed attention to growing public acceptance of the "anti-labor" trend.
Recognition of a need for lobby or electoral action was also foreshadowed by convention advocacy of positive policy advances: e.g., administrative adoption of a 40-cent minimum wage throughout the textile industry, the setting up of a commission (proposed by Senator Wagner) to "plan now for full post-emergency re-employment," Social Security Act extensions, passage of the "Geyer Bill to render illegal the operation of state poll tax laws in Federal elections." Indeed,

political awareness was omnipresent, though neither convention featured resolutions dealing expressly with labor political action. Thus George Baldanzi, during discussion of "post-emergency reconstruction," observed that the remedy for the social ills, which elsewhere had brought on dreaded "isms" was for the trade union movement ". . . to use our power, our political power, our economic strength and our intelligence. . . ." Robert Oliver, manager of Local 122, Yonkers, New York, speaking on an Education Committee report, recalled that politicians had a habit of "satisfying" labor by "incorporating some of labor's ideals into [their] platform."
We must demand through our organizations and through our political activity that they carry into actual practice those ideals.

Charles W. Ervin, ACWA publicist, reminded TWUA delegates that without labor political action FDR would not still be in the White House. Several delegates, including IEC members Roy Lawrence and Joseph R. White, paid their respects to laws and practices under which certain "anti-labor law" authors had gained public office: lack of a secret ballot, the "unit vote" system and the poll tax. White, ending his remarks on the Vinson bill resolution with a threat frankly directed "to the sunny South," predicted:

The day is coming when we shall pick out the men and women who are going to represent us in the halls of Congress.\(^{12}\)

\(^{12}\)Lawrence represented Local 118, Atlanta; White, L. 17, Cleveland. For quotes from Baldanzi, Oliver, Ervin, Lawrence and White see TWUA, **Proceedings**, 1941, pp. 74, 127, 88-89, 27, 28-29. (Italics added.)

The minimum wage resolution also inspired references to political action. Sol Stetin, TWUA manager in South Jersey, warned that reliance upon government was not without hazards. "What the government gives... it can take away." To obtain "higher minimums" from government and to prevent such "taking away," therefore, it was necessary to build unions strong enough to wield such influence, and to strengthen their "organization in the political field."\(^{13}\) At the

\(^{13}\)Ibid., p. 32. (Italics added.)
Hosiery meeting one of the federation's top officers enviously cited the role being played by representatives of organized labor in wartime Britain. What was to be done about the "anti-labor" trend? How could "the spread of democracy" be ensured and "the civil rights of all citizens" protected? The answer lay in "a wider participation by labor in the federal, state and local government." William Smith, AFHW secretary-treasurer and a TWUA trustee, recalled recent successful challenges to the "domination of English political life by the upper classes." The "big thing" for labor in America also was

... to organize itself politically, to show that it means business and that it is determined to share equally on the boards and councils of government... Then and not until then, will American labor win its goals.14

14Hosiery Worker, 5/2/41, p. 3. (Italics added.)

The twin interest of CIO textile and hosiery unionists in furthering the Roosevelt policy on foreign aid and national defense and in preventing perversion of that policy to labor's detriment was evident prior to the April conventions and it continued so throughout 1941. It was evident in the proceedings of union conferences, the speeches of national officers, the news and editorial content of union journals. Thus a late February conference of TWUA representatives from eleven midwestern states followed president Rieve's lead in endorsing "all aid, short of war and consistent with our own national security, to the people of England, China and Greece." Rieve admonished the same conference to keep an eye on state legislative attempts
to enact the "model sabotage acts" which "have only as their main purpose the abolition of the rights and liberties of labor."  

Significantly, an early post-convention edition of *Textile Labor* which carried on page one Rieve's personal appeal to workers to buy defense bonds and otherwise to support the President on national defense published, on another page, the names of thirty-one Congressmen who had promised to vote against the Vinson bill.

The same dual concern was apparent in the Unions' own proposals for achieving goals of labor and the nation and in their demands that even Mr. Roosevelt heed the "dollar-a-year" men a little less, the nation's labor leaders a little more, in planning and administering manpower, production and other economic policies. While union voices felt it necessary on occasion to beseech the President to "show a little faith in American labor and refuse to follow the fascist steps" taken by enemy nations in "chaining free labor," however, they never indicated
a loss of faith in Mr. Roosevelt comparable to their dissatisfaction with many members of Congress. A final 1940 Hosiery Worker editorial had alerted labor to be "On Guard" on the lobby front, advising "every branch" of the federation to maintain a "legislative committee to see to it that union members are informed and that they act effectively"—against "anti-labor" legislation. One in mid-1941 attacked state bills "ostensibly aimed at subversive elements" but potentially useful to an employer to "get rid of an active union leader." As 1941 ended, with America in a state of belligerency, AFHW officers declared their full support for the government at war. Simultaneously, a first post-Pearl Harbor Hosiery journal editorial urged members to write their Senators to kill the "anti-labor" Smith Bill.\footnote{See Hosiery Worker, 12/27/140, p. 8; 5/16/41, p. 5; 7/11/41, p. 8; 8/8/41, p. 2; 12/12/41, p. 2.}

There were other, more direct 1941 harbingers of future electoral action. TWUA and Hosiery representatives in the November CIO convention apparently assented to its "exploratory" political action resolution—which inspired little discussion and no significant opposition—and some six weeks before that Textile Labor had put labor's political imperative in plain language: If labor got a "raw deal" in the national defense effort, it would not be the fault of President Roosevelt. It would be the fault of those who opposed him—in Congress and within the Administration.
Unless labor awakes to its part in the Government and gives its support, it will deserve the trouncing it is bound to get.

Elections are coming. It is time to think.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{19}Textile Labor, 10/1/41, p. 7. (Italics added.)

1941: Textile Personalities in the Field Echo National Political Trends and Engage in a Congressional By-Election

Beginning in August of 1941 Textile Labor announced that it was ceasing to be "primarily an organ of news about the union itself" and that henceforth it would "carry summaries about the labor movement in general, and national and international events." Such news coverage thereafter may well have been at the expense of broader coverage of local area activity. In any case, whether it was inability to compete for space, a normal lack of zeal on the part of local amateur correspondents, or an actual lack of local political news, Textile Labor yields little evidence during 1941 (before or after August) of a TWUA political trend out "in the field." Miscellaneous sources, however, contain fragmentary evidence of this nature. TWUA members, it appears, were involved in state level CIO hints of future campaign activity. At least four southern state CIO conventions in which TWUA was a factor put political matters high on their resolutions agendas—Virginia and Tennessee, Georgia and Alabama. In the former two states state IUC secretary-treasurers were, respectively, Lloyd P. Vaughan of the Dyers Federation and Paul Christopher, a CIO regional director and recent member of TWUA's international executive council.
In Virginia delegates representing an estimated 100,000 CIO members demanded "greater political recognition of the growing strength of the CIO and... abolition of the poll tax." In Tennessee, CIO News excerpts suggest, a convention highlight was a speech by Christopher in which he discussed a variety of political issues and attacked the Democratic machine of "boss" Ed Crump of Memphis.20

20 Other resolutions in one or more of these gatherings included endorsement for Murray's "industry council plan" and a demand for the withholding of funds from the Dies Committee which, in CIO eyes had already concerned itself unduly with union personnel. In Alabama and Georgia TWUA was represented in IUC vice presidencies by H. S. Williams, a new member of TWUA's IEC, and John Holt, respectively. See CIO News, 6/9/41, p. 2; 6/30/41, p. 7; 7/7/41, p. 8.

In New Jersey one Textile unionist, Sol Stetin, was sufficiently exercised over the "wave of legislative reaction" to write to the editor of Textile Labor. His letter, appearing in the same edition as the "It is time to think" editorial, urged members of all three great labor organizations to "organize immediately!" Everyone, he said, knew of the "corruption and greed and favoritism of the rich against the working class" that "still goes on in the so-called 'two major parties.'" Fortunately, "we [in Camden county and New Jersey] have a great opportunity to organize politically now on a twelve months a year basis." Talk of "defending democracy," he said, was nonsense. "We must unite our political forces now for extension of democratic rights and improved standards for the working people."21

21 Textile Labor, 10/1/41, p. 8. See p. 266 above.
Nothing in the Textile journal points toward TWUA activity in local or state elections in the autumn of 1941. Before the year was out, however, Textile unionists were engaged in a crucial and successful Congressional by-election. This was in the Seventh Massachusetts district where a Joint Labor Committee representing half a dozen CIO unions worked successfully in the Democratic primary for the nomination of state senator Thomas J. Lane of Lawrence. The labor committee, which "managed" Lane's campaign, asked voters to subordinate interest in local or purely "labor" issues to foreign policy. They employed radio, held public meetings, conducted a house-to-house canvass, and recruited hundreds of autos to get voters to the polls. In the "last ten days of the campaign a battery of speakers from the labor unions used the radio every night." The TWUA journal account singled out as "only a few" of the unionists who participated in the campaign eight from TWUA, in addition to state CIO president Joseph Salerno, along with a comparable number for the latter's Amalgamated Clothing Workers and a handful of representatives of additional CIO affiliates. Textile's representation included John Chupka, a former UTW local president who was about to succeed Salerno as state TWUA director; J. William Belanger, a former AFL and UTW organizer and also a future state TWUA director; Daniel J. Gallagher, J. W. Bamford, Wanda Pilot, and Ralph Arivella. Manifestly, this concentrated effort, involving appointees of the international union office, as well as local officers and staff, represented more than casual local politicking. If it was "time to think" in October it was time to act in
December, as the exigencies of war brought the likelihood of increased government intervention in the handling of labor problems—and as Emil Rieve, along with other CIO and AFL leaders, was to join with management in pledging a moratorium on strikes and lockouts during the war emergency.22

22 Along with seven ACWA members (besides Salerno) the TWUA journal named as participants in the Lane campaign members of the Leather Workers (2), Electrical Workers (1), Rubber Workers (1), Newspaper Guild (1) and the state Labor's Non-Partisan League (2). See Textile Labor, Jan. 1942, pp. 1, 3; Advance, 1/1/42, p. 5; Hosiery Worker, 12/26/41, p. 2.

Lane campaigned as a supporter of President Roosevelt. He polled more than 17,000 votes, as compared with 4,500 for an avowed "America Firster," 9,000 for his nearest opponent, and 2,000 for a fourth contender. An unopposed GOP candidate polled a little more than 5,000 votes. C. W. Ervin in Textile Labor, Jan. 1942, p. 3.

The Textile Workers Offer to Help with the War but not to Return to "Sweatshop" Wages

In many ways 1942, for the TWUA family, was a carbon copy of 1941—only more heavily inked! No TWUA convention was held but AFHW convention proceedings, along with declarations of officers and the tenor of editorial copy in both journals reveal little if any deviation from the pre-Pearl Harbor posture on political matters. Continued misgivings about the administration of certain domestic policies to the contrary notwithstanding, the general disposition toward Mr. Roosevelt remained almost adulatory,23 that toward Congress

23 See, for example, C. W. Ervin, "The Real Roosevelt," Textile Labor, Mar., Apr., 1942.
bitter if not belligerent, as union leaders and their organizations pledged much, if not quite their all, to "win the war." Such public pledges came from New York Joint Board manager Jack Rubinstein, in a welcoming speech for 1,000 new TWUA members; from George A. Meyers, president of Local 1874, Cumberland, on taking office as head of the industrial union council for Maryland and the District of Columbia; from CIO president Salerno in Massachusetts, who set out to cooperate with state AFL leaders to promote the "no-strike" pledge and to prove that "free labor" could outproduce "slave labor." In New Jersey a state CIO convention under president Irving Abramson promised a production effort "to meet a military offensive on the Western Front and any other military offensive necessary to defeat the Axis powers." Discussions and speeches relating to war and post-war problems monopolized much of the Hosiery federation convention. The IEC called TWUA members to further sacrifice by recommending, in addition to the "no-strike" pledge, a governmentally-sponsored and CIO-approved plan for surrender of some of labor's premium pay benefits. The Hosiery Worker exchanged a revolutionary injunction from Thomas Jefferson for a patriotic slogan atop its editorial page.

Whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends—Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness—it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it.

This gave way to such lines as "Remember Pearl Harbor—Buy Defense Bonds" and "Hit the Axis Where It Hurts—Put 10 Per cent in War Bonds."
Still, those who had resisted the whittling away of labor rights in the guise of national defense in 1914 were not ready now to translate wartime patriotism into justification for renouncing labor's legitimate interests without enforcing "equal sacrifice" from management. Hence Emil Rieve's "priorities unemployment control" plan for workers in the wool and carpet branches of the textile industry and the promotion of a war industry planning program in New Jersey's CIO convention by two Textile unionists destined for future PAC roles, Abramson and Carl Holderman. Hence also the assurance of Joe Salerno as he led his state CIO into the "no-strike" pledge that labor would "not allow the profiteers to pick our pockets..."25 Protest meetings were held under TWUA auspices against the "shameful campaign" of press and politicians "to create an anti-labor hysteria..." and to make possible the slashing of wages and a return to sweatshops and "unholy profits." So spoke visiting CIO president Murray in March at a meeting in Charlotte, North Carolina arranged by southern TWUA director Roy Lawrence. In New Orleans Textile representative Paul Schuler went on

24 Cf. Hosiery Worker, 19h1 and 19h2. See also Ibid., Sept. 19h2, p. 8 for a "win-the-war" editorial signed by AFHW president McKeown.

Sources for other data in this paragraph: Textile Labor, Jan. 19h2, p. 10; Feb. 19h2, p. 10; NYT, 1/5/42, p. 11h; 3/31/42, p. 16h; 4/13/42, p. 32; Advance, 4/15/42, p. 5; Hosiery Worker, July 19h2, p. 1.

25 See NYT, 1/5/42, p. 15h; 4/17/42, p. 32; 1/5/42, p. 11h. See also Ibid., 5/27/42, p. 13:3-4.
the air to answer "unfair charges." Labor committees sprang up, letters were sent to the newspapers, a special issue of *Textile Labor* was printed for the joint board, and a rally of some 1,500 textile workers on April 12 condemned the "6th columnists" who were attacking labor "even at the expense of losing the war." Labor columnist Ervin spoke and Emil Rieve was on hand to warn the demonstrators that though labor had patriotically given up some of its premium pay benefits "attempts to end overtime pay were in reality attempts to cut wages."26

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26 Rieve's New Orleans remarks paralleled those of Murray at Charlotte. See *Textile Labor*, May 1912, p. 10; *NYT*, 3/30/12, p. 9:2.

Electoral implications in these developments were not diminished by the appearance of important politicians at the labor protest rallies.27 The Hosiery convention renewed numerous legislative demands

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27 Gov. Broughton was "on the platform" at Charlotte along with other "political leaders." *NYT*, 3/30/12, p. 9:2.

and both journals routinely agitated for effective lobbying, particularly against the poll tax barrier to full-scale voting by southern workers. Journal editors conscientiously covered labor replied to "anti-labor" attacks and President Roosevelt's admonition to Capitol Hill to beware of "rash legislation" against labor. Finally, union members were warned not to be "fooled" by recent votes on the "Smith amendment to repeal the Wages and Hours Law." If elections were not
so near, Textile Labor opined, some who voted against it probably "would have voted for it."

Let us be guided by the over-all record of a Congressman, and especially by his vote on Smith's previous bill to deny labor the right to strike.28

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TWUA Appoints a Political Committee and Participates in the 1942 Elections

In July the IEC met in Minneapolis, voted to support a CIO fight against pending tax legislation, and, in fulfillment of implied forecasts out of Charlotte and New Orleans as well as of more recent national CIO executive board entreaties, set up a committee to back labor's friends and oppose its enemies in the coming elections. Indeed, TWUA's July action anticipated by several weeks the resolutions by which the national CIO officers and board (including Emil Rieve) were to reiterate the CIO's intent to spur labor action in the precincts—

for candidates who supported President Roosevelt in the New Deal days and who now favored aggressive prosecution of the war, control of the cost of living, curbs on profiteers, an adequate and equitable tax program, elimination of the poll tax and protection of workers' health and welfare at home.29

29 NYT, 9/2/42, p. 16:3. See also CIO News, 8/24/42, pp. 3-5; 9/7/42, p. 3.
At the same time president Rieve dispatched Robert Oliver as a new "liaison man" to headquarters in the national CIO office, to "assist the national officers of TWUA to correlate the union's activities in the complex Washington scene and in political action throughout the country." He himself assumed the chairmanship of the new TWUA political committee, whose other members were IEC members William Gordon of Brooklyn, a former member of the Dyers' executive board (1934-1941), and Carl Holderman of New Jersey.30


Philip Murray's post-election appraisal of the "grass roots" CIO follow-through has been alluded to elsewhere and there is no reason to believe that TWUA was exempt from his indictment of political inadequacy. Neither the activities of Mr. Oliver nor of Rieve, Gordon and Holderman as a committee are recorded in the Textile journal, but there is fragmentary documentation on TWUA involvement in a 1942 prelude to the 1943-1944 PAC project. Evidence ranges from typical verbal exhortations delivered at labor gatherings and editorializing in union publications to union member candidacies for public office, endorsements, and even organized campaign activity. Some of the latter produced negligible results; some seemed to augur well for the future.

In the speech-making category attention may be called to the convening of a brand new CIO industrial union council, presided over
by George Jabar, state TWUA director, and to a state TWUA conference visited by Emil Rieve. The setting was the rock-ribbed Republican state of Maine. Jabar emphasized the need to "work for improvement of labor legislation" while Rieve told some seventy-five or more TWUA conference that they could "become such a powerful force in Maine that no governor can be elected without their support." On union

member candidacies it may be noted that a South Carolina local (Local 269 at Gaffney) boasted modestly of having helped during the past year to place eight union members on "various local boards and commissions," including the city council. At least one TWUA member (in Oregon) won a Democratic nomination, another (in Rhode Island), election, to a state legislature. In the latter state Frank Benti, vice-president

of the Dyers Federation, was state CIO president and Albert Clifton, formerly of TWOC, now a TWUA national representative, was executive vice-president. At least three TWUA members sought Congressional
nominations—in New Jersey, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania. Pre-PAC CIO or joint labor political operations in some form were undertaken in Minnesota, where IEC (and ACWA) member Sander Genis was state IUC president;33 in Massachusetts, where an ACWA-TWUA team (Salerno and Belanger) held two of the top IUC posts; and Virginia, where the Dyers' Lloyd Vaughan, a CIO field representative, was still state CIO secretary-treasurer. In Ohio—where TWUA was numerically, as in Oregon, only a minor CIO affiliate—Textile unionists were reportedly active in at least one local political campaign, and they shared at least nominal responsibility for a state CIO convention committee recommendation, hard on the heels of the November election, for a state political action committee program whose authorization and beginning implementation were to antedate PAC by more than six months. Here one of the TWUA delegates voiced seemingly contradictory goals: (1) that any new labor political machinery should be "non-partisan" so that in a GOP-dominated constituency labor could "enter a candidate in the Republican primary" and "get him elected," and (2) that the Ohio CIO waste no time in "form(ing) this political activities com­mittee for the start of the formation of a new liberal Labor party in the state of Ohio."34

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33The state CIO convention approved the national CIO political action recommendation of mid-summer; later, endorsements were extended to Farmer-Labor candidates in state, Congressional and Senatorial elections. CIO News, 8/17/42, p. 2; 9/21/42, p. 6.
Chairman of the convention's fifteen member Committee on Political Action was George R. Bass of the Rubber Workers. The two TWUA members were from Piqua and Toledo. The latter, August Bahr, participated in the floor debate. A Toledo representative of another CIO international (UAW) testified that in that city "every unit of the CIO" had participated in the election campaign just concluded. (The text of the 1942 Ohio resolution actually did not call for creation of a state-wide political action committee but Bahr and some others persisted in talking in such terms. Ohio CIO, Convention Proceedings, Nov. 27-29, 1942, pp. 11, 105-107.

As already suggested, results in 1942 were by no means uniformly encouraging. In New Jersey there was organizational progress—encompassing some local union TWUA involvement—as the state unit of Labor's Non-Partisan League converted itself into an "American Labor League" on the recommendation of a convention committee headed by Sol Stetin, and labor was reported "active" in a number of New Jersey primaries—including a Senatorial nomination race. In the Eighth Congressional district Irving Abramson himself won the Democratic nomination, and won a direct endorsement from the national CIO executive board. According to the CIO News, he ran with support from "all camps" of labor, although testimony introduced in the 1943 TWUA convention indicated that intra-union factionalism contributed to his ignominious defeat by GOP incumbent Gordon Canfield. Dyers' president Joseph Knapik alleged that some in labor's ranks actually campaigned for his "reactionary" opponent, thus helping him to lose by a greater margin.
than that suffered by any other Congressional candidate in New Jersey's history. More heartening were results in Virginia, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, and in Pennsylvania, one of two "bright spots" detected by the Hosiery Worker in the wake of 1942's "veritable Republican landslide."—The other was said, without elaboration, to be in Wisconsin. In Philadelphia William M. Leader, president of Hosiery Branch 1, a member of the federation's national executive board and a recent participant in successful labor lobbying for federal "soldier vote" legislation, ran for the Democratic nomination for Congressman-at-large. He lost, but he lost as a "close second" after running as an "independent" "without organized support." He carried "virtually all of the organized labor districts," polling 165,000 votes, only 3,000 less than the winner. Notwithstanding this defeat, the Hosiery journal editorialized joyfully in November that a "United Labor Committee" had waged the "real Democratic campaign" in the

36TWUA, Proceedings of the Third Biennial Convention, May 10-11, 1943, pp. 64, 174. See also Textile Labor, Aug. 1942, p. 4; Oct. 1942, p. 9; CIO News, 9/21/42. Lawrence Rogin, then TWUA Education Director, has recalled that there was sharp disagreement within the New Jersey CIO at this time over the wisdom of running labor candidates for public office. Interview, Dec. 17, 1951.

37See editorial, Hosiery Worker, Nov. 1942, p. 2. Here, in AFHW's Milwaukee territory, a Democrat defeated the incumbent Republican (fifth district) Congressman. Earlier the journal had reported that a veteran member of AFHW Branch 16 was seeking nomination to that post as a Progressive. Ibid., Sept. 1942, p. 5.
important Philadelphia area and was laying plans to become a "permanent" organization.38

38 According to this source Leader in the primary carried every district and ward in Philadelphia county and won "large majorities" in other counties where hosiery or textile workers lived or were employed. His candidacy was backed by the state LNPL and "organized labor throughout the state." See Hosiery Worker, June 1942, p. 5; editorials in ibid., Oct. 1942, p. 2; Nov. 1942, p. 2.

None of the publications examined offer much illumination on developments in Massachusetts. Limited evidence attests to the apparent willingness with which representatives of the TWUA family contributed to the climate of opinion which was to make PAC possible. Joseph Salerno issued his state CIO's "call" for a special convention to organize support behind "win-the-war" candidates. J. William Belanger, new IUC secretary and central Massachusetts TWUA director, was quoted as declaring that the decision to foster a repetition of the 1941 CIO by-election effort meant that labor would spare nothing to "defeat the Quislings and the appeasers at the polls." Delegates to the special convention, who aspired to attain a "democratic peace" and Henry Wallace's "Century of the Common Man," announced support for candidates, for both state and national offices, who were, regardless of party, pre- as well as post-Pearl Harbor supporters of the Administration's foreign policy. Textile Labor, which indulged a similar enthusiasm for war aims as defined by the Vice President, exulted over these political steps and in September columnist Ervin observed in its pages that despite the fact that the press was "75 per
cent sold to the big interests," "more workers every years are getting wise to the use of political action in the interest of labor." He was especially impressed with current trends in New England, saying TWUA "showed in 1940 that they knew what organized political action meant, and they are on the job again." 39


Actually, primary election results were spotty and November produced no startling upsets. Republican Congressman Joseph Martin, a prime labor target, easily retained his seat. Still, Joseph Salerno, welcoming the national CIO to Boston less than a week after the election, boasted that "in this great commonwealth... we have not done so badly politically" though elsewhere "the enemies of our great President have been elected." He introduced CIO-endorsed Governor Leverett Saltonstall, Republican, and Maurice Tobin, Democrat, Mayor of Boston, and declared that the CIO had "assured" the latter's reelection. Presence of both office holders on the convention platform, he said, proved that in Massachusetts the CIO had become a "political force." 40

40 Salerno indicated that the CIO blessing for Saltonstall had been a matter for controversy. He did not elaborate on the nature of CIO (or TWUA) activities in the campaign. See CIO, Proceedings, 1942, p. 8 ff. See also Textile Labor, July 1942, p. 5. For reference to a TWUA endorsement for an electrical worker candidate for the Massachusetts legislature see UE News, 7/25/42, p. 5.

Earlier, in the primary, a CIO-endorsed candidate for the U.S. Senate won nomination; Tom Elliott, a "consistent Roosevelt
supporter," sought unsuccessfully to wrest the eleventh district Democratic Congressional nomination from James M. Curley. CIO News, 9/21/42, p. 3.

One of the most ambitious political efforts undertaken by Textile unionists in 1942 was launched in the homeland of the "Smiths and Vinsons." Small wonder that Democratic Congressman Howard Smith of Virginia was so persistent in his demands two years later that the Attorney General do something about the "PAC menace!" Virginia was the site of TWUA's second largest southern contingent of organized textile workers and ground work was laid here in the spring for "effective political action" to help rid Congress of some of its "poll Tax politicians." High hopes were entertained by headline writers at national union headquarters:

VIRGINIA LABOR AWAKES TO POLITICAL ACTION;
A GREAT FUTURE LOOMS

As in New Orleans a TWUA unit in Roanoke, Local 11, bought radio time and newspaper space to answer anti-labor assaults. It also took steps to oppose renomination of sixth district Congressman Clifford A. Woodrum. Union leaders had no illusions. They did not expect "immediate victory" but "a start must be made" and they were encouraged by signs that "Woodrum is worried." As it reported the Roanoke developments Textile Labor also disclosed that Rep. Smith of Alexandria, in the eighth district, had a "bad name" among Viscose workers (TWUA, Local 371), and that he too would face primary opposition. Site of Local 371 was Front Royal in Warren County,
bordering on the eighth district. By midsummer TWUA in Virginia had joined other labor groups for a concerted drive. They won neither of these primaries and little could be done in November to change the complexion of the House delegation from this one-party domain. But TWUA was prominently identified with an organized attempt to do so.

At the Virginia CIO convention a resolution was passed calling for the defeat of Howard Smith. At Richmond the state IUC set up a committee, headed by the CIO regional director (Ernest B. Pugh of the Woodworkers), to work for nomination of AFL leader Emmett C. Davison over Smith and for that of "liberal" Moss Plunkett over Woodrum. Three Textile unionists were on that committee: Vaughan, R. A. Johnson, and W. A. Richards of Front Royal. The latter two were among the state CIO's nine vice-presidents and Johnson, like Vaughan a member of the Dyers Federation, was president of his local (TWUA Local 27) and of the Richmond IUC.—Only the UMW had as many representatives on the state CIO council. Vaughan, in a statement accompanying the state IUC endorsement announcement, noted that because of the poll tax "only about 10 per cent of the people" in Smith's district were voters and that during his incumbency Smith had "not cast a single vote in the interest of the poor people of his district." The poll tax was the bête noire in the sixth district also. There, according to a post-primary report, TWUA, the AF of L, and the Railroad Brotherhoods joined in a "permanent" United Labor Committee—of which Silas Switzer of TWUA was vice-chairman—to "coordinate the political and economic efforts of the working people." One ULC project, a protest meeting
inspired by the lack of labor representation on state and local wartime agencies (WPB, OPA, etc.), helps explain in part perhaps the tremendous fascination which "labor representation" in the President's cabinet was to have for authors of Governor Dewey's "labor" speeches in 1944. In the electoral field the ULC examined the "records," endorsed Plunkett, and campaigned for him. "Thousands of leaflets" were distributed. Unhappily, the organization was formed only six weeks before the primary. "Radio addresses and press advertisements," Local 11's education committee chairman reported regretfully, were not enough if people were not qualified to vote. Hence the Roanoke committee's next job was to build an effective state-wide organization to seek extension of the franchise to everyone without requiring payment of a poll tax.\footnote{C. C. Cochran of the AFL Machinists was chairman of the ULC. The offices of treasurer and secretary went to the brotherhoods. For documentation on these Virginia developments see CIO News, 8/31/42, p. 6; Textile Labor, June 1942, p. 6; July 1942, p. 5; Sept. 1942, p. 6; Union Voice (organ of the Paper, Novelty and Toy Workers), July 1942, p. 3; Dickerman and Taylor, Who's Who in Labor, p. 180. See pp. 31-35 above.}

\footnote{Probably the most exuberant reports on political action to come before the 1943 Textile convention were from Rhode Island, which sent the second largest of all New England delegations and the fifth largest of all state delegations to that body. Albert Berube of Esmond (Local 392) happily stated that while labor elsewhere was asleep, TWUA in his state was busy sending "liberals" to Congress and into state and local government. Labor's vigilance, he said, had been}
well rewarded, for it could "get almost anything it wants in the way of [state] legislation" and could "stop anything it does not want. Why? Because the governor. . . [J. Howard McGrath] . . . is on their side."

As for Congress, Rhode Island labor had performed the best job in the entire USA, sending "labor's representatives back to Washington 100 per cent." Two of their best leaders, he said, were Albert Clifton and Frank Benti. The former, delegate Berube praised for his radio speeches; Benti he lauded for "making speeches and getting executive boards in different organizations together" to take the message back to workers in the shops. Two others confirmed this testimony: Benti himself, who related state and local achievements of Rhode Island's "United Labor for Victory Committee," and Joseph Sposato, who contrasted Rhode Island's "inspiring" successes with the "disgraceful" defeats suffered in his own state of Connecticut. Benti said cautiously, "I think we are making a little progress," but offered an impressive summary: all labor organizations of consequence had joined in the ULVC—the textile workers, of which "we have a lot," the dyers, steel, rubber, the AFL and the brotherhoods. TWUA, he said, had with the Dyers

... planned large meetings, planned social activities and invited those candidates whom we had endorsed...

We have toured the state... and by a big majority [despite the anti-New Deal trend elsewhere]... have elected a New Deal administration right down the line. [Furthermore] we ran two [labor] candidates for the state legislature... and we were fortunate to elect one of our own textile workers.
It was a record to be proud of and Benti wanted unions everywhere to "be on the job" and to "groom our people" for government office, from local communities to the nation's capitol. From some constituencies, he remarked, some of the "most reactionary screwballs" ever elected were sent to Congress in 1942—because workers supported them.\(^{42}\)

\(^{42}\)TWUA, Proceedings, 1943, pp. 67-68, 73; 174. (Italics added.)

However accurate the Berube panegyric for Clifton and Benti, however "bright" the spots in Philadelphia and Wisconsin, none of the scattered and sketchy reports reviewed here would have justified alteration in the overall labor disposition to view the election triumph of "reactionaries" and of "labor baiters" in 1942 as a portent of "grim days" ahead.\(^{43}\) On the whole, they tend to strengthen that gloomy assessment while at the same time demonstrating that within TWUA there was an awareness of a need for labor political action, that there were members who were gaining practical political experience, and that TWUA was by no means to be asked to indulge in a totally new experiment when the national PAC came on the scene.

\(^{43}\)See, for example, a Federated Press column in Hosiery Worker, Nov. 1942, p. 8.
CHAPTER X
TWUA TAKES THE 1912 DISASTER TO HEART
AND ANTICIPATES THE JULY 1913 CIO ANNOUNCEMENT

With national TWUA leaders as with Philip Murray, presumably, it was first things first after the electoral calamity of November 1912. At least the CIO convention record discloses no initiative from within the Textile union to transform the "Recent Elections" resolution into one on "Future Elections," and both Hosiery and Textile journal editorializing for formation of functioning legislative committees paralleled or anticipated the legislative pressure program urged at the emergency CIO conference on January 1913. Launching of TWUA's 1913 legislative program was announced in March.\(^1\) Subsequent

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\(^1\) This called for creation of legislative committees by all locals and joint boards; for an exchange of information between national and local offices and committees; and for committees to become acquainted with their Senators and Representatives and state legislators and to keep them "informed" of labor's views. Textile Labor, March 1913, p. 2. See also Hosiery Worker, Jan. 1913, p. 8.

reports of local level compliance from several parts of the country were enthusiastic. A local journal correspondent from Missouri reported on the "leading part" played by TWUA in CIO lobby efforts in his state, saying all St. Louis Textile units were establishing legislative committees. Arthur McDowell, who represented the St. Louis joint board at the TWUA convention in May, corroborated this

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dispatch and attributed Missouri labor's success on the lobby front to its uncompromising opposition to the "torrent" of "anti-labor" bills that had come up. He also vouchsafed the impression that men from the shops, serving on local legislative committees, commanded more respect in legislative committee hearings that "professional hired men of the union" like himself. 2 In the spring TWUA's Paul Christopher, state IUC president since mid-1942, announced the defeat of several "labor-crippling" bills in the Tennessee General Assembly—as a result of combined efforts by CIO, AFL and railroad unions. 3

At the same time, harbingers of electoral activity are not wanting. In Tennessee, according to IEC member Joseph White, "We have actually taken away the poll tax... because the voters woke up." Furthermore, in Chattanooga "the CIO got together, and they elected their mayor and their city administration." 4 Reference has already been made to an Ohio CIO convention at which TWUA representatives supported inauguration of a new political program months before the

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4 See TWUA, Proceedings, 1943, pp. 69-70, 77. (Italics added.)
national CIO gave birth to PAC. At a later date, Ohio CIO records reveal, TWUA's regional director, W. J. Tullar, was enthusiastic about the work of Tom Downs, new director of the state CIO's burgeoning program for "political education and organization." Prospects for political action were implicit if not explicit in debate which occurred in another state CIO convention. In New Jersey as elsewhere dissatisfaction with the confining "no-strike" pledge was becoming an explosive force, and here some Textile unionists rejected the leadership of their own Irving Abramson when they urged an otherwise "harmonious" gathering to petition national CIO leaders to "reconsider" that pledge—"unless labor leaders received government posts of authority and unless equality of sacrifice was enforced at once."

Although the proposal was defeated even Abramson, who insisted on adherence "for the duration," was sympathetic.

The resolution threatening abrogation was introduced by UAW Local 365. It was supported, according to the Times, by "delegates from the Textile Workers Union." This account does not indicate whether all TWUA delegates were involved or whether they followed the UAW lead in voting against the proposal following a spirited three-hour debate in which Abramson implored the delegates to "adopt measures of importance commensurate with its [the IUC's] responsibility" in wartime. NYT, 12/13/42, p. 63:3; 12/14/42, p. 9:5.

TMUA's editorial voices harped repeatedly upon the outcome of the 1942 election. Columnist Ervin, in the first post-election edition of the union journal, deplored the low voter turnout which had
almost ended Democratic control of Congress and which, he said, had already brought prompt Congressional attacks on past progressive achievements. In a column headlined moralistically: "Labor's Election Lesson," he challenged union leaders to view this unhappy situation as a "rallying point for all labor." This was December. In January Ervin discussed the bi-partisan "reaction" of the last Congress and the author of an unsigned editorial echoed his sentiments, again lamenting the November returns and pleading the need for good citizenship. In February Textile Labor proclaimed editorially that the recent election trend to the "right" "must not be allowed to happen again."

With the spring convention season came further growth in TWUA quarters of a climate of opinion within which a PAC movement might have been expected to take root. In Massachusetts, along with declarations on substantive policy matters, the state IUC convention, addressed by both Sidney Hillman and Emil Rieve, took future electoral activity for granted, advising affiliates to hold "conferences of locals in Congressional and Senatorial districts before endorsing candidates for office." In New York at the thirty-second annual convention also went on record in favor of a reduction in the minimum voting age. Advance, 6/1/43, p. 4.
convention of the Hosiery Federation president McKeown keynoted proceedings with the warning that labor faced its greatest peril since 1922 and that it must "reorganize itself. . . to take a more profound and active interest in political affairs" if it was not to lose its rights and social gains. No new political party was necessary, nor any "new concept of political action." What was needed was a

... realignment of progressive forces of both major parties into a second party movement, one which labor could wholeheartedly sponsor and honestly support.

Labor must develop an "enlightened interest" in order to be capable of "enlightened action" in 1944 and it dared not rely passively upon the personal leadership of President Roosevelt or of "our most able Vice President Henry Wallace" to "salvage a political party whose lesser leaders strive mightily to destroy what they have toiled so arduously to create."9 Similar warnings of impending doom, if steps

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9 Hosiery Worker, May 1943, p. 2; Textile Labor, June 1943, p. 11.

were not taken in time, pervaded virtually every session of the TWUA convention the following week. Scarcely a resolution or a committee report was without political implications. Delegates applauded vociferously a host of guest speakers, nearly all of whose remarks were, in whole or in part, deliberately or inadvertently slanted to needle them into entering political combat. They adopted without dissent resolutions for immediate, continuous and intensified
pressures upon Congress and the state legislatures, and they approved activity at all levels to reverse the "anti-labor" trend at the polls.

Textile Unionists in Convention Attack Governmental Policies but Avoid Criticizing the President

One of the most fertile fields for oratory presented itself in the alleged shortcomings of administrative agencies dealing with wartime industrial and labor problems. Curiously, however willing they were to dangle threats of electoral reprisal before members of Congress there was no such readiness on the part of Textile representatives to threaten Franklin D. Roosevelt with popular repudiation. The IEC in a journal convention report sharply criticized the War Production Board for not insisting upon the "concerted Industry planning" which TWUA considered essential to maximum textile production, and the absence of which, it felt, contributed to labor absenteeism and an unhealthily large labor turnover. The President, to whom WPB was accountable, was for all practical purposes absolved of blame as the union executives berated industry and attacked government officials who were "recruited principally on a dollar-a-year basis from industry. . . ."\(^\text{10}\) Remarks were protracted on wage and manpower policies. President Rieve was probably as restrained in his choice of language as any, yet with respect to a so-called "hold the line" wage stabilization directive issued in the President's name on April 8, Rieve voiced the union's

\(^{10}\text{NYT, 5/10/43, p. 10:1.}\)
official judgment that it "condemned 'hundreds of thousands of textile
workers to a substandard condition of living, froze inequalities and
perpetuated gross injustices." Fellow officers Baldanzi and Pollack,
visiting CIO secretary-treasurer James B. Carey, and a host of less
prominent TWUA delegates expressed similar sentiments. There was an
insistent clamor that the controversial "Little Steel" formula for
computing permissible wartime wage increases be abandoned. Nothing
but scorn was meted out for a "clarifying" statement on the April 8
order which emanated from Economic Stabilizer Byrnes' office. Rieve,
the first major union leader to comment publicly on the "clarification,"
told a wildly applauding audience that the kind of concession that had
been made was "not what labor wants." Labor wanted an end to the
formula and to the setup under which the War Labor Board's power to
approve wage increases in collective bargaining contracts was nulli-
fied by Byrnes' power of review. Some delegates were ready to

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11 The Rieve statement preceded a similar demand made by the
CIO executive board at a meeting in Cleveland. See NYT, 5/13/43,

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threaten cancellation of the "no-strike" pledge. Rieve himself
forecast a possible labor withdrawal from the WLB—on which he served
along with Van Bittner of the Steelworkers (another TWUA convention
visitor), even though both rated the tripartite board, in terms of
labor representation, the most satisfactory administrative agency
in wartime Washington. Yet, like Abramson in New Jersey, Rieve
successfully held back the tides which would have swept away the
patriotic vow, and from the union president on down there was a
reluctance, even a studied refusal, to saddle President Roosevelt with
responsibility for labor's grievances. Thus Rieve softened his bitter
discourse on wage policy:

> We are all for the support of winning the war [and]  
> ... for the support of the President of the United  
> States... [TWUA was only] appealing to him to get  
> rid of some of his mis-advisers [so] his third admin-  
> istration... may become the shining example that his  
> first administration was.

Later, following a conciliatory speech of Sidney Hillman's, Rieve
hastened to explain that despite its strong criticisms of specific
policies, TWUA "was not critical and is not critical of the President
of the United States," a statement for which, the Proceedings show, he
was applauded. 12

12 In his keynote speech Rieve denounced violation of the "no-
strike" pledge by John L. Lewis and the UMWA, declaring his union
would abide by it until "victory over fascism and its Japanese allies"
was won. NYT, 5/11/43, p. 231; see also TWUA, Proceedings, pp. 89-96,
103-109, 119.

No one was ready to attribute to FDR any fundamental backsliding
as a "pro-labor" President. Typically, Joseph Knapik, president of
the Dyers, heatedly attacked the wage policy but gallantly apologized
to Mrs. Roosevelt (who was about to address the convention) for saying
"even the President deserves some criticism today." The rest of the
sting was removed from that judgment by an expression of belief that
the President's advisors had "sold him a gold brick." An equally
one-sided discussion occurred on a War Manpower Commission order which
in effect "froze" war workers to their jobs and hence was especially obnoxious to workers in the relatively low paid textile industry. Also solicitous of the President's feelings, secretary Pollack thoughtfully tempered his criticism by reproaching Mr. Roosevelt not for the policy but for surrounding himself with "inefficient administrators" in the field of domestic policy. Pollack, moreover, explained in passing that he was in 1943 "as great a rooter for our great President" as he had been "in 1932."13

13 For these and other remarks on the wage and manpower resolutions see TWUA, Proceedings, 1943, pp. 29-40, 103-109.

The Guest Speakers, Committee Reports and Resolutions

Among the guest speakers Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt was as frank as any to suggest that a solution for the grievances that were being aired lay in political action. Administrators, she explained patiently, "have to more or less meet what people in Congress say the people want," and if citizens in a democracy wanted that Congressional assessment of the people's wants to be accurate then it was up to them to act accordingly.

You can be as powerful as you get together... as you study the questions of the day, as you see that your representatives in Congress really represent you, and that you use your vote to see that it means the thing that you want it to mean in the government of the people.

Secretary of Labor Perkins judiciously skirted any discussion of election politics although she hoped labor was doing some "constructive thinking" and would communicate its ideas on post-war problems to those
"in charge technically" of the government—since such communication was essential if the latter was "to remain a people's government."

She even avoided characterizing the "trend in the 1943 legislatures" which, she said, "underscored" the need for labor to show that "restrictive labor legislation was unnecessary. This, in conjunction with an appeal for continued adherence to the "no-strike" pledge.

Attorney General Biddle's remarks were more candidly "political."

He remembered that he had helped to "draft and sell" the National Labor Relations Act and twice reminded labor that its strength lay not only in the industrial world but on the "political and judicial side."

Charles Ervin told the delegates their resolution for "independent political action" was the most important on their agenda and told them to take to heart Mrs. Roosevelt's preaching that "you get from Washington just what you deserve by either doing something or doing nothing." The only reason "the politicians have ceased to truckle to you" was that "you have become apathetic." More of the same came from Jim Carey, who said it was labor's failure to leave the production lines long enough to vote in 1942 that had strengthened the "worst element in Congress" and given the southern Democrats their "stranglehold" on the Democratic party and their power to "dictate terms to the administration." Van Bittner disdainfully maintained that the best government could do for labor was to help keep open the door of opportunity through which labor could work out its own problems. Yet, as if in self-contradiction, this future PAC
officer held that under President Roosevelt labor had "made more gains in ten years than it had in 150 years before 1933." 14

Oddly, probably the most "non-political" remarks to come from the convention rostrum were Sidney Hillman's. He appeared more as an Administration apologist than as representative of a sister union.15

Of all the formal speeches Emil Rieve's address of welcome contained the baldest references to political action. It was an omnibus message featuring a recitation of union gains, problems, grievances and aspirations, toward the end of which the TWUA president, as Bittner was to do after him, called to mind labor's debt to the New Deal. But this was no time to count past blessings secure. War had brought "a concentration of monopoly control of industry" and a new "self-assertiveness" by big business, "particularly in the political field." Labor too must realize that before the next TWUA convention there would be another presidential election. It was, said Rieve

... timely for us to prepare ourselves now for the 1944 elections, so that we perpetuate the New Deal candidates in office.16

14 For the speeches from which the excerpts quoted above have been taken see TWUA, Proceedings, 1943, pp. 110-114 (Roosevelt), 40-50 (Perkins), 59-63 (Biddle), 172-73 (Ervin), 79-85 (Carey), 89-96 (Bittner).


16 Ibid., pp. 3-8. See also NYT, 5/11/43, p. 23:1. (Italics added.)
There were other straws in the wind. A resolution of approval for an elaborate statement of post-war objectives presented by the IEC contained a clause urging serious discussion and use of that program "as the basis for education and political activity of all types in the communities. . . ." Jack Rubinstein, reporting for the convention's committee on organization, called attention to the ever increasing entanglement of labor with government in the "new government-regulated economy" of a nation at war, counselling "keener interest in our national economic and political institutions. . . ." and stressing the need for participation "in the administration of these new laws and functions." Political action was vaguely implied in a report by Elizabeth Nord for the committee on education and in one by William Belanger (for the committee on officers reports), who lauded the IEC for recognizing that "our union has a wider function than it has ever possessed" and that "We must assure a sound economic, social and political world after this war. . . ." 17

17 TWUA, Proceedings, 1943, pp. 114-17, 212, 121-26, 126-28, 141-44.

Had these political references in formal addresses and reports been isolated phenomena it would doubtless be a mistake to view them as of much moment. In the context, however, of a convention in which the most spirited and prolonged discussions occurred on resolutions dealing with governmental policies and trends, they assume added significance, particularly when viewed alongside the avowedly "political"
resolutions. Of thirty-nine resolutions, texts of which appear in the convention Proceedings and nearly all of which were adopted, only seven appear to have been applicable primarily to internal union affairs. All but one of the rest dealt either with objectives which could be attained only through government action or with government aid—or with the tactics labor should pursue in the political world to attain these objectives. The resolutions committee, which recommended most of the resolutions, was a star-studded group chaired by Dyers president Knapik. All but six of its eighteen members were officers of one of the constituent federations or current or future members of the TWUA executive council. Serving on the committee on legislation, which introduced several of the measures dealing expressly with political action, were "liaison man" Robert Oliver as chairman and several additional IEC members.

IEC members on this committee were William Leader, Paul Christopher and H. S. Williams. Resolutions committee members included Alex McKeown, APHW president and IEC member, and Edward Callaghan,
AFHW second vice-president. Current IEC members other than McKeown were William Gordon, Roy Lawrence and Sander Genis, while members who would become IEC members before 1950 included George Jabar (elected by the 1943 convention), William Tullar and Mariano Bishop (1946), Samuel Baron and Joseph Hueter (1948), and James Bamford. The remaining committee personnel also included persons identified here as participants in area political activity occurring during the 1941-43 period, e.g., Silas Switzer of Roanoke (committee on legislation), and Daniel J. Gallagher of Massachusetts (resolutions committee). For the full committee rosters see TWUA, Proceedings, 1943, pp. 192-93.

**Resolutions on Political Action**

No fewer than seven resolutions lay directly in the political action field—three on suffrage, two on lobbying, two expressly on campaign activity. Two which proposed extensions of the franchise were adopted almost perfunctorily. One recommended federal legislation to qualify transient war production workers as voters in national elections. Another put TWUA behind a voting age minimum of eighteen—since anyone "old enough to fight for democracy" was "old enough to vote." The third asked locals to join the international in pressing Congress to abolish the poll tax "forever" "as a prerequisite to the right to vote." The seven delegates who jumped at the chance to talk on this one represented a fair cross section geographically of the territory under TWUA jurisdiction: Minnesota, Pennsylvania and New Hampshire, and North Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia. Testimony of the southern representatives in particular underlined the

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21 Ibid., pp. 29, 56, 204, 210.
sense of desperation and frustration that led labor to seek a national government guarantee for what was in other parts of the country taken as a sacred right to vote for President of the United States. William B. Frazier of Memphis credited CIO lobbying with helping obtain repeal in Tennessee but noted that the repealer was tied up in the state courts "so that those politicians who have run that state for the last 100 years can be reelected." Edward F. Callaghan, AFHW's second vice-president, explained why labor outside the South was equally agitated over this issue, invoking the Congressional Record rather than democratic ideology as his witness. These members of House and Senate who opposed elimination of the poll tax, he said, were

... the same gentlemen who fought and voted against the Child Labor Amendment, the National Labor Relations Act, the Social Security Act, and everything that was beneficial to the people of this country.\(^{22}\)

\(^{22}\) Callaghan represented Local 706, Philadelphia. Frazier, representing Local 571, was an AFHW representative from 1935 to 1942 and a TWUA representative during 1942 and 1943. In July 1943 he joined the CIO Steelworkers' staff, in which capacity he was serving during the 1941 campaign. His biographical sketch in Who's Who in Labor (1946), p. 120, identifies him as an area PAC director. See also remarks of W. Cedric Stallings, a veteran hosiery organizer, former AFHW executive board member and convention representative of AFHW Local 107, Charlotte, North Carolina. For full coverage of this discussion see ibid., pp. 167-69.

The major themes of at least two resolutions inspired by contemporary legislative trends are scarcely distinguishable from those recorded in the 1941 Proceedings. One called for an immediate
flood of delegate telegrams to members of Congress, to register TWUA's "grim opposition" to the Connally bill and other "union-crippling amendments." Another urged local unions to help prevent or repeal state "anti-labor" laws. A third reiterated CIO and Textile leadership recommendations of the preceding winter for establishment of local legislative committees "which shall function actively to protect labor's rights and to advance labor's program for the extension of democratic rights," and which should "initiate conferences and other activities that shall be most effective." The remaining two political action resolutions dealt with candidate endorsement policy and requested the national CIO to "found a national political movement"—in language forecasting almost directly just such an organization as the CIO Political Action Committee was initially intended to be.23

23 For texts of the five resolutions (Numbers 44, 54, 5, 2, 67) see TWUA, Proceedings, 1943, pp. 208, 209, 210, 211.

The Connally Bill and State Anti-Labor Laws

Of the five "action" resolutions only the one dealing with local union legislative committees failed to evoke torrents of oratory. It was introduced by the committee on legislation and carried without debate.24 Condemnation for the Connally "anti-strike" bill, the

second order of business following initial warmup addresses and routine convention preliminaries, was something else again. This consumed virtually the entire first afternoon session. It carried "unanimously" after a procession of eight individuals vented their fury at the proponents of such legislation. Beginning with George Baldanzi these included William Belanger and Bob Oliver; Joseph Hueter, manager of the Philadelphia joint board, and William Gordon of Brooklyn, both members of the resolutions committee; and H. D. Lisk, George Jabar and Arthur McDowell, representing affiliates in North Carolina, Maine and Missouri, respectively.25 All, directly or indirectly, posited an end to labor derelictions in the electoral field—as well as the immediately projected telegram shower—as an imperative which labor would neglect at its peril if it would stem the "anti-labor" trend. For, as repeatedly stressed, this Connally bill was not an isolated phenomenon nor an innocent attempt to free the war effort from crippling production tieups. It was, rather, like the "anti-sabotage" bills of 1941, part of a "well-planned," "premeditated effort to shackle labor," to "have labor where they want it when this war is over."

 Oliver contended that the President already had authority to deal with wartime strikes. In further confirmation of the suspicion

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25 Lisk represented Local 216, West Durham, N.C.; Jabar the Lewiston joint board, Maine; Gordon Local 1790; McDowell the St. Louis joint board; Belanger the Central Massachusetts joint board, Oliver Local 277, Newark, N.J.
that the measure was meant to render labor impotent after the war both
he and Baldanzi submitted that the bill had not been assigned to the
Senate Labor committee and that it had passed the upper chamber without
labor having had an opportunity to testify at a committee hearing.
Baldanzi sarcastically remarked that now the bill was before those
"great champions of democracy," the "Dies and the Coxes and the Smiths."
Another Baldanzi target in this one-way debate was Senator Robert A.
Taft, "whose mental processes still range back in the year 1600." His
amendment to this already obnoxious bill would make WLB decisions
subject to judicial review, and so further prolong an already
tortously long path to a decision.

There was some disagreement as to the degree of responsibility
assignable to political parties as such. Oliver said workers' pre-
occupation with war production kept them from the polls; hence, a
"number of reactionaries" were elected,

... and I say the Republicans represent the reactionaries....

Jabar, a self-confessed "registered Democrat," pointed to the obvious:

Connally is not a Republican. Neither is Smith.

Nevertheless, agreement was fairly universal: (1) that the instig-
ators and promoters of punitive legislation merited condemnation,
(2) that a direct cause of the latter's ascendency was labor's failure
to vote, and (3) that a repetition of 1942 must be averted in order,
as William Belanger put it, to prevent the wiping out of "the beneficial laws that have been put on the statute books since 1934."
McDowell of St. Louis would have added an open threat of electoral reprisal to the anti-Connally bill wires, a tactic followed in Missouri in connection with comparable state legislation. To those who voted for the bill, he said, the messages had conveyed "our undying enmity until you are driven into oblivion and disgrace from the political life of the state. That is our promise and we hope to perform on it."\(^\text{26}\)

\(^{26}\) For the Connally resolution debate see TWUA, Proceedings, 1943, pp. 16-27. See also NYT, 5/11/43, p. 23:1.

McDowell and Baldanzi spoke two days later in the course of another one-way "debate," along with William Leader, the Philadelphia Congressional aspirant of '42. The resolution advocated "careful watch" on state legislatures and a "thoroughgoing campaign" to repeal state laws which already were "sabotaging our supreme effort to destroy fascism abroad, by undermining and crippling democracy at home." Baldanzi enumerated typical restrictive measures—the licensing of union organizers, the requirement that the latter be "natives" of the state in which they operate, prohibitions on the closed shop, etc. The others related heartening personal recollections of successful lobbying spurred by United Labor Committees. Leader called for vigilance at all levels of government—since anti-labor bills defeated in Washington invariably turned up in state assemblies, and thought that aside from organizing the unorganized, political activity was "probably the most important thing before this convention." He thought
too that labor would get results if it worked as hard at the one as it had at the other since 1937. Philadelphia, he indicated, was showing the way. Its United Labor Committee, "an affiliation of the dues-paying membership of the AFL, the CIO, and the Brotherhood of Railway Workers all combined," had scheduled a convention for May 21, just ten days from now, "for the purpose of agitating legislation for the benefit of labor in Pennsylvania, and to combat anti-union labor legislation that may come up from time to time." More ULC's elsewhere would not only be good for labor. They would give support to "our great President," now "surrounded by a united reactionary movement."27

27TWUA, Proceedings, 1943, pp. 100-103, 204. See also p. 290 above.

For Continuation of the New Deal and a New CIO Political Movement

A shade less unanimity obtained with respect to the resolutions relating expressly to election campaign activity. Still, the record is silent as to any negative votes that may have been registered on either resolution and the remarks of the semi-dissenters would have comforted neither visiting Republicans nor laborites who construed Gompers' dictum in its narrowest sense. The gist of the dissatisfaction voiced amant resolution No. 2, which dominated the second afternoon session—and which Sol Stetin for one wanted to send back to committee—
was that it was not strong enough. Presumably, since it replaced
other draft proposals, there were some who took exception also to the
language of substitute resolution No. 67 on "Independent Political
Action" which was processed three days later. The latter, however,
compensated for some of the shortcomings of No. 2 and did not differ
materially in import from the one other draft text (No. 79, which was
apparently rejected in committee) which appears in the Proceedings.
No one vouchsafed any objection to No. 67 and Robert Oliver salvaged
the harsher features of No. 79 for incorporation into his remarks on
this order of business. On the whole, the character of the debate,
as well as the resolution texts, dispels any possible suspicion that
the CIO announcement of July 1943 was unwelcome to or unrepresentative
of the sentiments of the active leadership of its affiliated members
in the Textile Workers Union.

Resolution No. 2
1944 Elections

RESOLVED, That the Textile Workers Union of America. . .
calls for a continuation and extension of the humane policies that have characterized the Roosevelt administration since March 1933 and urges the support by every member of the union for candidates committed to such principles; and

RESOLVED, That every member of the Textile Union of America examine the records of all candidates for office in 1943 and 1944 and give their political support to candidates who are pledged to the cause of labor and the welfare of the common man, regardless of their political affilia-
tions.28

28 TWUA, Proceedings, 1943, p. 204.
Resolution No. 2 thus was a formal precursor of PAC's 1944 endorsement for "Roosevelt and a progressive Congress," and it anticipated PAC's avowed commitment to partisanship based upon principles and policies rather than upon party as such. Resolution No. 79 would have chastised severely "Tory representatives in key positions posing as Democrats," who were "conspiring" with "Tory" Republicans in Congress to impede "further progress on the part of the organized workers..." and even to "destroy all the progress they have made..." Since Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed the Presidential chair." It would have insisted that if the reactionary trend continued in both major parties labor would have no recourse but to "seek expression through independent political action," a thinly veiled third party threat for whose fulfillment, however, no time table was set.29

29It would also have reminded the Democratic party that "without the votes of the workers," stimulated "solely" by achievements brought about "under the guidance of our great President," a Democratic victory would have been impossible either in 1936 or in 1940. See text in ibid., p. 212.

Under the whereases of substitute resolution No. 67 also, members of both parties were accused of planning legislative crimes against labor; the parties themselves were censured for failing in many jurisdictions to offer voters meaningful alternatives, and workers were criticized for helping to elect "reactionaries" by themselves failing to vote for "democracy and liberalism." Therefore, be it resolved that the Textile Workers Union of America call upon the Congress of Industrial Organizations
... to found a national political movement of broad progressive aims based upon organized labor and inclusive of all working men and women, working farmers, and all liberal and progressive citizens.

Let it further be resolved that the national CIO leadership

... be urged to influence the affiliates everywhere to use and expand existing independent labor political machinery where it exists in state or city in preparation for the solid establishment of a national labor party.30

30Ibid., p. 211.

If resolution No. 2 was a forerunner of PAC's 1944 endorsements, Clause One of No. 67 was just as surely a forerunner of the July 1943 CIO action creating PAC and looking toward formation of a "national labor league." Clause Two served notice that labor votes were not in the bag for any political party. Possibly the only difference between the two TWUA resolutions (No. 2 and 67) and those which were to be adopted later by the national CIO board and regional PAC conferences, lay in the former's open national labor party threat and in the degree of emphasis placed by the latter upon FDR as Commander-in-Chief rather than primarily as a symbol for humanitarian domestic policies.31 In light of the discussions which preceded adoption the

31See pp. 15-21 above.

labor party discrepancy appears to have been of little moment.

Number 67's "labor party" clause also lacked dates and deadlines and was, from the conservative standpoint, a safe sop to delegates who may
have nurtured notions about the imminent wisdom of translating "independent political action" into independent party action nationally. Only Robert Oliver of four speakers who addressed themselves to No. 67 actually tried to frighten Democratic delinquents with the prospect that labor was truly on the verge of giving their party one last chance to merit continued labor confidence, and he was willing to extend that chance. Others, like Berube of Rhode Island, offered proof that it was possible to attain labor objectives within the two-party system.  

Earlier, during consideration of resolution No. 2, president Rieve had advised against premature third party politicking in language almost identical with that Sidney Hillman was to employ as PAC got under way. A new party on the national scene would divide the "liberal and progressive" camp and be certain to guarantee installation of a "reactionary" in the White House. Rieve conceded that he had for years favored independent labor political action and "affiliation with minor political parties."

But I am here to tell you I am through with these types of affiliation. I am here to tell you that American labor has got more in the last ten years under the New Deal than it ever did in the history of America.

Furthermore, while it was far too early to speak openly of presidential candidates, it was an "idle dream" to talk of electing Henry Wallace—mentioned along with FDR by preceding speakers who were uncertain of
Mr. Roosevelt's intentions for...—or anyone like him on an independent party ticket.  

Probably the outstanding feature of all debate contributions on the political action resolutions, not excluding those from the handful of avowed labor party enthusiasts, was the pronounced tendency to talk of New Deal politics and New Deal candidates. Even Sol Stetin, facing up to the inadequacies of resolution No. 2, envisaged the mission of an "independent organization" as one of electing "Roosevelt or Wallace in 19**". Robert Oliver set forth an impressive bill of particulars

Stetin said, "we [in New Jersey] are talking about forming a labor party to support Franklin D. Roosevelt for president in 19**. (Applause) In Philadelphia, the United Labor Committee has organized and the Democrats and Republicans are beginning to wonder. In Michigan the CIO and the State Federation of Labor movement is becoming articulate and effective, and they are talking about an independent political organization..." If labor was to support "a New Deal philosophy," he asked, "where would that be if it could not be found in either of the major parties?" His own answer was: "I think we ought to form some sort of an independent political organization so that we can elect Roosevelt or Wallace in 19**." TWUA, Proceedings, 19**3, ibid., pp. 70-72.

against the Democrats: They had offered no program to attract workers to the polls in 19**2; their party had "stood for absolutely nothing" since 1937; all but two Democrats holding committee chairmanships in Congress were hostile to labor. One of their major sins, however, lay in the fact that local Democratic machines in 19**0 had "sabotaged," not labor, but FDR—who represented the "aspirations of
the working people. Among the seven delegates who addressed them-

35 Ibid., p. 171.

selves to resolution No. 2 besides Rieve and Stetin were Dyers federa-
tionists Knapik and Benti and IEC members White, Williams and
Genis. 36 Their themes were almost tediously complementary. All were

36 The other two were John Lyding, Local 93, New York, and
Joseph Sposato, Local 110, Stonington, Conn. Lyding spoke explicitly
of "an independent political party," but he justified his demand for
a new party on ground that "The men in the halls of Congress" had
"left the President and the people... down..." Ibid., p. 67.
(italics added.) See also p. 268 above.

37 Finally, to avoid a repetition of

convincing of the necessity of defeating "reactionaries," Republican
or Democratic. They were determined to keep alive the story of
America's rescue from apple-selling and breadlines--by FDR and the New
Deal. They were psychologically prepared to have the CIO lead a poli-
tical crusade in '48 for the man whose current wage and manpower
policies had them fighting mad, yet whom they, in the words of Sander
Genis, considered the first President under whose administration
labor was "beginning to get a little standing" and some of the things
it was "entitled to all its life." They were uncertain of FDR's
intentions. Manifestly, none was ready to dispute Joseph Knapik
who thought "he should run for a fourth term." For this confession,
the record shows, "... the audience applauded and cheered and
shouted and whistled..."
LABOR POLITICAL ACTION AT MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY:
A CASE STUDY OF THE CIOPAC CAMPAIGN OF 1944
AND
THE TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA

VOLUME II

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
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Department of Political Science
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PART V

THE TWUA FORCE BEHIND PAC: BEGINNINGS, NATIONAL ASPECTS, PLATFORMS, AND PERSONALITIES
CHAPTER XI

PAC GETS UNDER WAY IN 1913
WITH A TEXTILE WORKERS' BLESSING

It would be far from warranted on the basis of the foregoing to allege that pre-PAC developments within TWUA or within CIO councils under the guidance of Textile personalities were of greater moment than developments which may concurrently have been predisposing other CIO affiliates toward a PAC program. Certainly it would be specious to contend that the CIO Political Action Committee was dependent for its very being exclusively upon inspiration from within the TWUA household. Conceivably, officers and staff members of some other internationals had been even more frequently articulte on the need for political action. Other journals than Textile Labor and the Hosiery Worker may have devoted more column inches to political editorializing, more space to news of local political pioneering by individuals associated with their respective union labels. Possibly more spectacular campaign ventures were undertaken under auspices other than TWUA. But no comparisons are in order. The burden of the chapters just concluded has been solely to establish the fact that the CIO action of July 7, 1913 reflected a demand for an intensified political program which was sufficiently solid within the TWUA branch of CIO for it fairly to be designated as a factor which helped bring PAC into being.
If any lingering doubt of TWUA's receptivity to a—or the—PAC movement is not erased by its May convention record then reference may be made to the involvement of Textile affiliates and personalities in at least two states in post-convention developments which also antedated July 7. In New Jersey, where, as Sol Stetin had said, "labor" was "talking about forming a labor party" to back FDR in '44, the American Labor League, with an affiliated membership of 300,000 held its seventh annual convention, was addressed by Irving Abramson, elected Carl Holderman to his seventh term as chairman, set up a committee to push local political organization, and decided to organize a state labor party which would "work closely" with the American Labor Party of New York. ¹

¹Shipyard Worker, 5/28/43, p. 3; 6/18/43, p. 3; Guild Reporter, 6/1/43, p. 8. See pp. 281, 314 above.

In neighboring Pennsylvania Philadelphia's trade unionists, still chortling over the "vigorous united campaign" of 1942 which had almost defeated the local GOP machine, held a constitutional convention to put their United Labor Committee on a "permanent" footing, providing in the process an echo of many aspects of the recently adjourned TWUA convention and a precursor of the Philadelphia regional PAC conference to come. ² This consolidation of the ULC was in harmony

²See pp. 282-83, 308-309 above.
with recent convention resolutions of the state industrial union
council--of which former Hosiery organizer Harry Boyer was the new
secretary-treasurer.\(^3\) It was, in addition, apparently, consonant with

\(^3\) Boyer in 1943 had been with the Steelworkers for three years. He had been with the Hosiery Federation for a dozen years before that and a general organizer for the AFL and UTW in the mid-thirties. Marion Dickerman and Ruth Taylor exec. eds., Who's Who in Labor, (New York: Dryden Press, 1946), p. 35.

The IUC convention urged all locals to set up "their own permanent organizations for practical political work" and to cooperate with non-CIO labor, farm and liberal forces for "winning the war and a just and durable peace." CIO News, 4/19/43, p. 2.

the ambitions of non-CIO labor in the area, for the ULC convention of May 22-23 attracted approximately a thousand delegates from more than fifty international unions, only a third of which belonged to the CIO. The gathering was graced by a "pro-Roosevelt" breeze and by a strong wind which boded ill for "anti-labor" politicians. Some delegates and speakers nurtured the idea that the end result of their labors would or should be labor party machinery. One of the most outspoken of the latter, however, Dean Alfange, 1942 ALP gubernatorial candidate in New York (who had also addressed the New Jersey American Labor League convention), followed Joseph Knupik's example, hailing the man in the White House and proposing that this Democratic incumbent be "drafted" for a fourth term if the war should still be on in 1944. Moreover, as the TWUA delegates had just done and as the regional PAC conference were to do, the Philadelphians declined either to commit themselves formally to any presidential candidate or to honor journalistic predictions by transforming their ULC into a potentially abortive party
The ULC convention achieved precisely what the July PAC conference was to set forth as one of its five points: viz., unity across politically artificial union jurisdictional boundaries. Indeed, the regional PAC meeting was to specify the desirability of organization spanning the great labor federations, "preferably" on the Philadelphia model. The ULC convention's Textile contingent was by no means its largest or most influential element. With delegates for 6,000 Hosiery and 4,700 other TWUA members it did comprise the third largest CIO representation in a total reported membership of 136,000. Along with the Amalgamated, with a membership of 20,000, Emil Rieve's people pushed the largest single union contingent (the AFL Teamsters with 27,292 members) into second place. No TWUA of AFHW leader was elected to any of the ULC's four highest offices—which were split evenly between AFL and CIO, but both of the latter went to the Amalgamated and one, the vice-chairmanship, fell to TWOC's Charles Weinstein.

Jack Feldman of the ACWA joint board was elected secretary, Joseph McDonough, chairman of the Philadelphia Central Labor Union, treasurer. James L. McDevitt, president of the Pennsylvania State Federation of Labor was elected president.

Among CIO unions the UE was second largest with 15,141 members in its ULC-affiliated locals; USA-CIO had 5,190. Other major AFL
affiliates included the ILGWU (14,682) and the Hod Carriers (11,275). The Advance reported that the Railroad Brotherhoods were also represented but listed the number of participating locals as 33 AFL and 18 CIO. 6/15/43, p. 4.

Then, on July 7, came Murray's announcement and, two days later, an additional illustration, from a third state, that Textile unionists were not waiting passively for this national CIO response to their union's convention challenge. The setting was New York, where a "third" party was a reality. The New York Times of July 9 records the involvement of three TWUA personalities in what was soon to develop into an acrimonious struggle for control of the American Labor Party. The three, who along with nineteen other CIO leaders in the metropolitan area affixed their signatures to a declaration of support for one of two ALP factions, were Sam Baron, general manager of the Textile Workers Joint Board; Jack Rubinstein, TWUA regional director, and William Gordon, the Dyers manager from Brooklyn who had served with Rieve and Holderman on TWUA's 1942 political committee. While the New York situation differed in detail from both Philadelphia and New Jersey, the spirit, in terms of national presidential politics, was the same: the twenty-two signatories were recommending for retention as ALP officers persons who had "consistently supported the President's foreign and domestic policies" and who had "given unstinting support to the New Deal." 7

7NYT, 7/9/43, p. 8:6.
TWUA in the Field, and National PAC Policy after July 7

One of the first things national CIO and PAC spokesmen endeavored to do after July 7 was to disavow and discourage national labor party ambitions. Before the end of August Textile unionists had their opportunity once again, at the exploratory regional conferences, to concur in or to protest majority decisions to go along with the Hillman committee in rejecting the lure of such ideas. At Philadelphia on July 17 two delegates out of 125 from New England and the Middle Atlantic states doggedly voted to reject a program which did not encompass an immediate third party movement. Neither dissenter was a member of TWUA, however, and whatever disappointment there may have been on this score among Textile representatives is not revealed in the public record. None of the union journals examined indicates whether TWUA representatives generally were reluctant or willing members of the conference majority. Labor columnist Ervin apparently recognized a need to mollify some of his readers. Thus he stated that the CIO political program got off to a "fine start" at Philadelphia, observed that "There has been much recent discussion... about an independent labor party," then wrote diplomatically that "no one" at the regional meeting "attacked the idea" although "it was soon evident that the overwhelming majority... were not in favor of launching one at this time." One TWUA personality interrogated has
stated flatly that so far as New England was concerned, "third, labor party" sentiment within his union in 1943 was practically nonexistent. Another gave a resounding "No" regarding possible labor party sentiment within TWUA in the one-party South.10


Plainly, nothing in the PAC plan precluded TWUA members from participating, in keeping with their own convention resolution, in labor party movements confined within state boundaries and dedicated to the same immediate proposition: organization for action to elect candidates who supported Roosevelt in foreign affairs and war and who were pledged domestically to preserve the New Deal. It is in point, therefore, to observe that a New York conference of CIO unionists summoned by the same twenty-two leaders referred to above adopted a declaration of policy on July 21 in which these ALP factionalists made clear their adherence to national CIO policy. They expressly recognized that state "election law technicalities" barred successful
"formation of a nationwide third party" and they specifically "approved
the appointment of Sidney Hillman as chairman of a CIO political com-
mittee," while lining up in opposition to Hillman in internal ALP
organization matters.11

11 Out of more than 200 delegates, representing 102 local units
of sixteen CIO internationals, only one (from a union other than TWUA)
voted against the statement of policy. NYT, 7/22/43, p. 38:1.
(Italics added.)

Observance of the "no third party" dictum was even more impres-
sive in New Jersey, where leading CIO figures showed their willingness
not only to eschew a national new party experiment but to continue to
work within the two-party framework of their own state. Thus on
July 12 the New York Times reported that two New Jersey labor leaders
had been conferring in Washington with an aide of the President,
their objective being to gain his support in uniting factional elements
within the Democratic party behind a 1943 gubernatorial candidate
"acceptable" to labor. Both CIO and the American Labor League were
said to be unalterably opposed to A. Harry Moore, reputedly the choice
of Mayor Frank Hague of Jersey City, because of Moore's "poor voting
record" in the Senate, his "coolness" to labor delegations, his
criticisms of "both the President and the New Deal." The labor poli-
ticians were Irving Abramson and Carl Holderman. Both, it appears,
were undisposed to allow the ALL's recent labor party declaration--
even for state level operations--to interfere with the manipulations
of practical politics within the existing system. They were prepared
to compromise on a gubernatorial nomination which would promote harmony between two "powers" in Democratic politics--Governor Charles Edison and Jersey City's "boss" Hague. Their success in this, despite defeat the following November, logically militated against diversion of effort into the third party channels envisioned by the ALL convention in May.\(^{12}\)


Only meager evidence has been uncovered on political activity by TWUA personalities in the field for the remainder of 1943. Still, knowledgeable students and practitioners of labor journalism have cautioned against reliance upon union journals for comprehensive coverage of local affairs and there is some further documentable basis for asserting that individuals here classified as elements in the "TWUA force" engaged in off-year election activity and in preparations for 1944. Heading the list were such veteran unionists as Joe Salerno and Irving Abramson who, along with Jack Kroll of the Amalgamated, gave the ACWA-TWUA combine three of the half-dozen regional directors selected by Sidney Hillman for his PAC staff before the end of the year.\(^{13}\) The list included dual ACWA-TWUA representatives, heads of

\(^{13}\)The other three appointed at this time were McKeough, Atkinson and Scholle. CIO News, 12/6/43; 12/13/43; 12/20/43, p. 5. See pp. 206-207 above.
local TWUA and federation units, officers of state and local IUC's, TWUA staff representatives, and Textile personalities then on CIO or other union payrolls.\(^{14}\)

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\(^{14}\) Salerno drew his salary neither from PAC nor TWUA but from the Amalgamated, Abramson his as a national CIO representative. Several other regional directors also drew no more than small expense allowances from the national PAC. They were in effect simply "borrowed" from other union or CIO staffs. See testimony of Sidney Hillman. U. S. Senate, Special Committee to Investigate Presidential, Vice Presidential, and Senatorial Campaign Expenditures, 1944, Hearing on S. Res. 263, 78th Cong., 2d sess., Part I, June 13, 1944, pp. 41-42. Cited hereafter as U. S. Senate, Hearing of Special Committee on Campaign Expenditures, 1944.

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Among the scanty local political items in Textile Labor was one in August from Amsterdam, New York, reported by business manager Fred Krokenberger. This former AFHW-NEB member reported with great satisfaction that the "spirit for this kind of movement" was "running high among our workers," that the possible potency of the local's new and very first political committee had already been impressed upon local politicians in search of endorsements. The committee had approved a slate of American Labor Party candidates and was prepared to try to "get our workers to register" in the ALP.\(^{15}\)

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\(^{15}\) Whether the Amsterdam local's political committee was on the same side of the statewide ALP intra-party cleavage as Baron, Rubinstein and Gordon is not indicated in the journal file. Nor is the extent to which this apparent enthusiasm bore fruit. Krokenberger stated that "this is our first year to show any interest in the political field." Textile Labor, Aug. 1943, p. 2. See pp. 322, 32k-25 above.
The Hosiery Journal in both July and October referred to progress on the political front in several communities, including Reading, Pennsylvania, where a "Farmer Labor Federation" was said to be getting established for *uh*, and Philadelphia, whose ULC by mid-autumn was said to have boosted its total affiliated membership to more than 175,000. By that time too the ULC was deep in a municipal election fight, having already, before the national Political Action Committee had had time to get off the ground, hastened to show that it was more than a "paper" organization, duly recorded in the press and then forgotten. By mid-summer ULC had hired two full-time directors, one of them Franz Daniel, TWOC's divinity school recruit of 1937. A ward-precinct organization was a-building under their leadership and a second system of financing was being inaugurated, which, along with its predecessor, provided a parallel to the dollar collection schemes destined for future adoption by the national PAC. ULC's first budget called for trade union financing although it differed from the PAC's initial fund in calling for a fixed sum per capita (25 cents) from every affiliated union. The second, in response to complications introduced by a state level forerunner of Smith-Connally, was to rest upon individual contributions. By July also the Philadelphia unionists had decided the time was ripe to "show the nation that the so-called 'anti-Roosevelt trend' was . . . wishful thinking in Republican circles. . . ." To this end they had undertaken a voter registration program which promised such dividends that, according to one source, local GOP authorities had deliberately
concocted new regulations governing changes in residence to discourage re-registration. In October ULC endorsements were a matter of record—for a Democratic mayoralty nominee (who was to be pelted subsequently with the charge that his labor supporters were "racke-teers") and a slate of "reform candidates," principally Democrats, for other offices. This was the answer of a "solidly" organized labor movement to Republican "misrule" and an "anti-union political boss." ULC-endorsed Democrats for City Council included William M. Leader of the Hosiery Workers.16

16 Other labor candidates came from the CIO Steelworkers, the AFL Retail Clerks, the Typographical Union, the Railway Trainmen. See Advance, 6/15/43, p. 4; 7/15/43, p. 5; Hosiery Worker, July 1943, p. 2; October 1943, pp. 1, 4. Without indicating whether members of its own union were involved the AFHW journal also cited labor political progress in Dayton, Cleveland, Grand Rapids, and Chicago.

In New Jersey early in December, the identity of speakers at the sixth annual state CIO convention, the subject matter of their addresses, the content of resolutions adopted, all indicate a continued pro-politics inclination on the part of Textile personalities in positions of leadership. Possibly one of the more significant developments of this convention lay in something which did not happen. A New York Times reporter had speculated that it would witness an explosive end to what he termed the CIO's "honeymoon" with Hague. This rupture, which he predicted would be precipitated dramatically by IUC president Abramson over the machine's notorious violations of civil liberties in Hudson county, did not materialize, thus
strengthening an impression that the Abramson-Holderman team's politicking still was of a kind which conformed to the national PAC line against ventures off the major party reservations.17

17Convention speakers included J. Raymond Walsh of PAC and Clinton S. Golden, veteran unionist and one-time ACWA representative, a vice-chairman of the War Manpower Commission and of the War Production Board. See NYT, 12/5/43, p. 67:3; 12/6/43, p. 23:1; CIO News, 12/13/43, p. 2. For reference to a special convention tribute to local unions for successes in recent elections in Camden county see Shipyard Worker, 12/10/43, p. 3.

In Vermont, under the presidency of TWUA's Harold Daoust, TWUA director for both Vermont and New Hampshire, another state CIO council was doing some ambitious planning. The CIO as a whole had a claimed membership of less than 5,000 and the IUC was scarcely a year old, but a planning conference on November 11 looked hopefully toward statewide political organization and the development of local political action committees. It was attended by representatives of both CIO and non-CIO unions. Leo Krzycki of the Amalgamated, on tour for PAC, was a guest speaker. Primary responsibility for getting Vermont's PAC program going rested with John Lawson of the Stone Workers, secretary-treasurer of the IUC and of his own international, but "Daoust was the man who with Lawson sparked the setting up of the program."18 In Benti and Clifton's Rhode Island bailiwick another

18Albert G. Clifton, 1944 TWUA-PAC representative, Questionnaire, July 27, 1953; CIO News, 5/10/43, p. 2; Advance, 11/1/43, p. 13; 12/1/43, p. 3; Dickerman and Taylor, Who's Who In Labor, pp. 80, 205.
state CIO convention also had political action on its agenda and followed national PAC policy by rejecting proposals for a third party movement. In Minnesota under president Genis state IUC developments included a unanimous convention recommendation for a fourth term for Roosevelt and participation of CIO leadership, along with other farm, labor and political leaders, in a "tremendous" reception for Sidney Hillman when the latter entered the state on his midwestern organizing mission for PAC. Finally, a pair of labor journal items point toward TWUA-PAC promotional work in the South before the end of the year. One dealt with a pace-setting PAC dollar drive conducted by TWUA Local 515 in Charlotte, North Carolina, the other with the "great job" done by "organized labor" in and around Richmond, Virginia in the Democratic primary.\(^\text{19}\) Monetarily an outstanding example of local union readiness at this time to work for PAC's success is to be found in the $1,255 contribution pledged to the Hillman committee by a single AFHW branch although commitments were solicited only from the international unions.\(^\text{20}\)

\(^{19}\) No specific reference is made to any union other than the paper workers in this latter story emanating from a PNTW international representative in Virginia. Union Voice, Sept. 1944, p. 7. See, however, pp. 285-87 above. For the North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Minnesota references see Textile Labor, Jan. 1944, p. 1; CIO News, 12/13/43, p. 2; 9/20/43, p. 2; Advance, 10/1/43, p. 4.

\(^{20}\) See p. 33 above.
The International Union Helps Sell PAC

Again, national stimulus for such state and local efforts to make PAC something more than an idea was no monopoly of the Hillman committee or of the CIO as such. Both encouragement and exhortation came from TWUA and AFHW headquarters. Witness, in this connection, union journal content for this six-month period, the pronouncements and directives issued by top union officers, the political aspects of conferences held under international union auspices. Witness also the apparent acquiescence of those representing the "TWUA force" in the national CIO convention's declaration of approval for PAC and the pledging of funds to the new committee not only by TWUA but by the Hosiery Workers as a separate organization. This latter phenomenon was sufficiently remarkable—or valuable testimonial-wise—to rate a special allusion by Sidney Hillman as he reviewed the record of financial promises received down to convention time.⁴¹


All of this, it should be remarked, derived easily from union constitutional provisions no less flexibly permissive of political projects than those of the Congress of Industrial Organizations itself. The TWUA document authorized the international union to accomplish its several purposes

... by organizing the unorganized workers in the textile industry, educating its membership, negotiating collective bargaining agreements with employers, securing legislation, and by all other appropriate means.⁴²
The Textile Workers' 1943-46 financial report does not indicate that any part of its 1943 donation of $25,000 to the CIOPAC's "trade union" account was obtained from the union's per capita tax, initiation fees or other regular treasury source. Even so, the IEC, between conventions, was constitutionally designated the union's "supreme governing body" as well as executor of specific convention decisions. As such it was fully empowered to "authorize the expenditure of union funds..." and union treasury funds were employed in furtherance of the PAC cause to the extent that officers, employees and regular staff facilities (such as Textile Labor) found PAC promotion among their respective responsibilities. A case in point would be

the inclusion of discussions of labor in relation to "local political situations" in the curriculum of a training program attended by sixty TWUA staff members at Black Mountain, North Carolina. Another would be a PAC conference attended by more than eighty delegates from twenty-two TWUA locals in Connecticut. The conference was called by state TWUA director Joseph Leeds and addressed by Emil Rieve—who took as a platform target the voting records of Connecticut's representatives in the houses of Congress.

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22 TWUA, Constitution, 1943, Art. II, Sec. 2. (Italics added.)

It might be contended that such items are picayunish bits and pieces. Similarly, one might discount a report of George Baldanzi's appearance before a St. Louis audience of wholesale and retail workers—at which he attacked the "Little Steel" formula and passionately insisted that labor must go into politics to maintain New Deal policies and principles. Conceivably it might be denied that the failure of any TWUA representatives to rise to challenge the CIO convention's "unanimous rising vote" for PAC guaranteed their enthusiastic or even tacit approval. Still, the sketchy Black Mountain and Connecticut news items must be considered in the light of the overall tone and content of the journals, which will be dealt with presently. So too the probable genuineness of the pro-PAC performance of individuals who embodied the "TWUA force" in the CIO convention must be related to other intelligence respecting their sentiments and activities. Virtually every member on TWUA's ten-man delegation and most of the Textile-associated figures who represented CIO councils in the November convention are identifiable in some fashion with other post-1940 labor political developments, either before or after creation of
the national PAC. Rieve, Baldanzi and Pollack headed this inter-
national union contingent as Philadelphia for the third time in six
months became a site for ratification of the PAC idea. With them were
William Smith, TWUA trustee and AFHW secretary-treasurer, IEC members
Lawrence, Knapik and McKeown, and, in addition, Joseph Leeds, Joseph
Hueter and H. D. Lisk, the latter two of whom were destined for service
on the IEC in later years.26

Hueter was elected to the TWUA executive council in 1948; Lisk replaced
Joseph White on the latter's retirement in 1949.

Among the state IUC delegates at the 1943 DIO convention were
Salerno of Massachusetts, Genis of Minnesota, Benti of Rhode Island,
Abramson of New Jersey, and Christopher of Tennessee. Local CIO
councils in Portland, Oregon; Torrington, Connecticut; New Castle,
Delaware; and Berks County, Pennsylvania, sent Douglas Anderson and
Joseph R. White, both TWUA staffers and IEC members, Gilbert Lewis, and
Harry Boyer. White, whose support for TWUA's own pre-PAC political
trend has been cited in previous chapters, was an "old school"
organizer whose career (UTW, TWOC, and TWUA) antedated World War I.
He was also, according to an admiring biographer of TWUA's veterans,
one whose last staff assignments in the late 1940's were to include
faithful attendance at PAC conferences.27

27 Richard Kelly, Nine Lives for Labor (New York: Praeger,
For none of these is there reason at hand to question their fundamental accord in the political temper of the CIO convention—as expressed in Philip Murray's theme that "a third party would only... divide labor and the progressive forces, resulting in the election of political enemies," in the convention's indictment of the "reactionary forces" which dominated the Seventy-eighth Congress and which had "their greatest concentration" in the Republican party, or in its agreement that "the primary political task" ahead was to weld the unity of all workers, farmers and other progressives behind candidates, regardless of party affiliations, who support the war program of our Commander-in-Chief and enlightened domestic and foreign policies.

Nor is there reason to question their agreement with Hillman and Murray to "make our candidate commitment for 1944 in 1944," or their concurrence in the contradictory thesis of the former that, despite just grievances against the Administration, if an election were held within the next two or three months he would vote for a fourth term for FDR. 28

28 See NYT, 11/1/43, pp. 1:2, 36:2; 11/5/43, p. 13:1. For similar expressions by Van Bittner and George Addes see ibid., 11/8/43, p. 32:2. See also pp. 19-25 above.

This was plainly "agreed" business, for these persons as individuals and for the Textile and Hosiery leadership most of them represented, officially or unofficially. Interestingly enough, the TWUA journal paid virtually no attention to the Addes committee, for whose special legislative pressure program some other CIO affiliates
displayed marked enthusiasm. It yields no evidence that Textile's officers and staff exhibited any unusual zest for contacting fence-mending Congressmen at home on recess. It does advertise an early

29 This is not to say that the union discontinued routine lobby activities or that TWUA locals did not cooperate with other unions in special labor lobby projects. See, for example, UE News, 8/28/1943, p. 3; Textile Labor, Oct. 1943, p. 4. Cf., however, the files of Textile Labor with those of the United Automobile Worker and the UE News, 1943. See pp. 16-17 above.

and thorough high level cooperation with Hillman's committee. Journal content of a political character during PAC's "exploratory" phase--news, features, opinion copy--included routine coverage of legislative and administrative matters affecting labor, a Congressional voting chart which had both lobby and electoral implications, reports on national and regional PAC organizational developments, and occasional items on labor political successes as far away as Canada and Australia. All of this, presumably, was calculated to inspire as well as to inform. See, for example, the editorialized headline treatment given to the Hosiery Workers' October story on the Philadelphia ULC:

Philadelphia Labor Shows Way in Politics

Journal copy extolled the superior qualities of leadership displayed by both FDR and Vice-President Wallace although much of this, in point of fact, was geared to issues "education" rather than to the idealizing of personalities, per se, even as the PAC prospectus proclaimed. 30
See, for example, columnist Ervin's praise for the President's veto of the Smith-Connally Act. **Textile Labor, July 1913, p. 5.** See also the editorial and speech text coverage given to an address by the Vice-President in Detroit on July 25. **Ibid., Aug. 1913, pp. 5, 8-9.** The congressional voting chart, which became a regular TWUA journal feature, was prepared by the UAW research staff and distributed through the CIO Publicity Department. For this and other data cited above see **Textile Labor, Aug. 1913, pp. 7, 16; Sept. 1913, pp. 3, 10; Oct. 1913, pp. 8, 10; Nov. 1913, p. 8; Hosiery Worker, Sept. 1913, p. 5; Oct. 1913, pp. 1, 4.** See also **United Automobile Worker, 8/15/13, p. 2.**

The total volume of political copy was not really overwhelming at any time. PAC-relevant material often came off second best in competition for space with strictly union news. 31 Yet the same issue of **Textile Labor** which carried the Amsterdam news note alluded to above and which ran the text of a Wallace speech also featured a story with obvious promotional implications under the head:

**Smith-Connally Analysis Shows:**
Unions CAN Spend 
Money For Politics

32 **Aug. 1913, p. 2.** See p. 327 above.

There were hortatory editorials. One in the Hosiery journal advised labor to recognize that its own "failure to vote in 1912" was "responsible for the licking it got" in the last Congress and to
prepare NOW for "1944 Congressional reprisals." Another specifically approved the new PAC and counselled that only local labor political action could defeat the Smiths and the Connallys. In one full page appeal for "Grass Roots Unity" the Hosiery Worker belabored this point further. Only "precinct, ward and district organization of trade unionists in every town" could "defeat the ban which has been put on trade union political contributions" and guarantee that labor would not be defeated by its "internal enemy" while engrossed elsewhere in war with external forces. A more eloquent word to the wise was to be found in a likening of native legislative assaults on labor to the fascist invasions of France, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Holland and Poland, to the bombing of London and the "rape of Lidice."

33 See Hosiery Worker, July 1943, pp. 2, 8; Aug. 1943, p. 8; Oct. 1943, p. 8. (Italics added.)

In October Textile Labor, addressing itself to "Unionists as Voters," reviewed statistics which showed that in many southern communities the number of industrial workers alone exceeded the total number of persons who voted in 1942. The following month an editorialist, writing of "Taxes and Politics," insisted that it was up to "labor and other win-the-war voters" to impress Congressmen with the fact that the kind of politics being practiced in Washington endangered both the war and "their own prospects for re-election."
During two of the last three months of 1943 this journal gave page one prominence to steps taken by the international union to cooperate with PAC. The first story rated a full page headline:

**All-Out Political Action Program**
**Launched by TWUA Council**

Under a sub-head which

**Urges All Members**
**To 'Back Attack' With Their Dollars**

the journal announced that the IEC was squarely behind the new CIO committee. "Smarting under the shackles of the Smith-Connally Act," the story ran, TWUA was launching a campaign for funds to "drive their enemies from the Capitol" and to replace them with liberals. For the first time in its history TWUA had "authorized the collection of funds for political purposes." How did the IEC justify this innovation? The answer was simple. This was "the first time that the need for political action by labor unions ever has been so great."

Each affiliate was free to devise its own method of collection. The IEC would advise and assist. It recommended only that a dollar per member be set as an appropriate goal and that the resultant fund be apportioned for use at the several levels of government and of union organization. --The apportionment formula was identical with that which CIOPAC was to recommend nearly a year later.35

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35 The IEC recommended retention of half the money collected for use by local unions or other appropriate local organizations, with the other half to go to the international union for transmission to CIOPAC. *Textile Labor*, Oct. 1943, pp. 1, 5. Presumably this was the
source for the $25,000 pledged to PAC and reported at the November CIO convention. See p. 23, 33 above.

Textile Labor's "lead" story in November outlined five steps TWUA was taking to put its political plan into motion: (1) all state and district directors were being assigned responsibility for the fund drive among locals and joint boards within their jurisdictions; (2) TWUA officers were preparing a political "Order of the Day" for distribution to every union member; (3) contribution pledge cards were being printed for similar distribution; (4) close contact was being established with the CIOPAC to ensure effective coordination of TWUA's efforts with the larger movement; (5) plans were being readied for international union officers and staff members personally to tour textile territory to explain the purpose of the political program and to push the fund drive.36


Finally, in its last edition of 1943 the TWUA journal, which gave chief play to the IEC's newly formulated wage increase demands, announced the appointment of a new legislative representative, who was to set up a "permanent" office in Washington, and reported that the IEC was implementing the political action program inaugurated in September. The promised "Order of the Day," for example, was on its way to locals through union directors in the field. The new appointee was John Edelman, a former AFHW research director (1926-37), editorial
consultant of *Time* and *Life*, and member of several U. S. Government agencies. He was also a former CIO regional director (1937-39) and a member of the American Newspaper Guild.  


political action story included quotes from executive vice-president Baldanzi—his insistence that labor must become "more articulate, more politically active," his worry, in the light of New York state's recent swing to the "right," that the entire nation might be facing the prospect of a president of the calibre of Warren Harding.  

CHAPTER XII

TWUA AND PAC IN 1944
NATIONAL ASPECTS

The specter of another Harding in the White House did not
vanish with the advent of the new year. TWUA in 1944 pursued precisely
the political course which might have been anticipated. In policy
matters the Roosevelt administration was sometimes applauded, some­
times reproached. Emil Rieve and the IEC could just as easily
castigate FDR for advocating a "slave law" in the form of "national
service" legislation as they could praise him for a stinging veto of
a tax bill which he scornfully described as affording "relief for
the greedy" instead of for "the needy." They could just as readily
attack "misguided" Administration labor policies as they could "lash
out" at Congressional "reactionaries" and at Congress' failure to
legislate effective price controls. \(^1\) On the very threshold of the

\(^1\)See Textile Labor, Jan. 1944, p. 11; Feb. 1944, p. 1; Apr.
1944, p. 9; July 1944, pp. 1, 2.

voting booth Rieve battled with other labor representatives to modify
the hated "Little Steel" formula and on failing did not hesitate to
sign a minority protest against the War Labor Board's decision. \(^2\)
The three other dissenters were R. J. Thomas (CIO) and, for the AFL, George Meany and Matthew Woll. NYT, 10/12/1944, p. 1:3. See p. 70 above.

Even so, notwithstanding the qualifying phrases attached to the Roosevelt commitments of the preceding year, TWUA made no dramatic pre-election attempt to blackmail the President into overriding the WLB judgment, either by threatening to abrogate a recently reaffirmed "no-strike" pledge or to withhold electoral support. If there was an unpublicized latter day "slowdown" in this union's 1944 campaign effort evidence to that effect has not been uncovered. Evidence is available from January onward of high level cooperation with the Hillman committee and of continued reinforcement of TWUA's own PAC blueprint of the preceding autumn. January saw participation of Emil Rieve as one of the speakers in the PAC's post-war domestic policy (Full Employment) conference. It also saw appointment by Rieve of a special TWUA representative to work with Joe Salerno in his capacity as director of PAC region I, where TWUA's voting potential was viewed with considerable optimism. This was Albert Clifton, the Rhode Island IUC official and state TWUA director whose work in the last Congressional elections had rated such high tribute at the 1943 Textile convention. According to Clifton's own testimony, his appointment
represented the earliest formal and practical compliance of any
international union with the national PAC office and program in the
New England area. ¹

¹ It was national PAC policy for "international unions with sub­
stantial membership in a region. . . to assign a full-time staff man
to work with the Regional Director. TWUA assigned me and I started
January 1, 1944. It was months later in the campaign that other CIO
unions furnished men." Questionnaire, July 27, 1953. See also Textile
Labor, Feb. 1944, p. 11. On appointment of at least two other inter­
national union assignees in New England for IUMSWA and ACWA, see
Shipyard Worker, 3/1/44, p. 1; Advance, 5/5/44, p. 18.

Textile Unionists Endorse Roosevelt and Wallace,
Go to Chicago and Resolve Anew to Mobilize Dollars and
Votes for FDR, Truman, and a Progressive Congress

The Roosevelt reelection goal became official during the spring
and early summer. In April the Hosiery Workers' National Executive
Board tendered the President its unanimous endorsement. Shortly
after the CIOPAC's Washington conference the TWUA executive council
also met, giving full approval to the "People's Program" and to a
prospective Roosevelt-Wallace ticket. ⁵ In July several TWUA member

delегates to the Democratic national convention strove to translate
these union endorsements into positive accomplishment. The IEC then
planned its second dollars-for-politics drive in less than a year and
further staff assignments were made to PAC.
As labor representation went, TWUA was extremely well represented at Chicago. Indirectly the nature of the "TWUA force," as here defined, was symbolized by such persons as Charles Gillman of UAW, Georgia CIO director and IUC president, and by ACWA's Charles Weinstein of Pennsylvania. More immediate representative were one future and three present members of TWUA's executive council: Antonio England, who was to be elected to the IEC in 1948; George Jabar, Douglas Anderson and Sander Genis, who had been elected in 1943 to their first, second and third IEC terms respectively. Jabar was a delegate-at-large from Maine, Anderson a delegate-at-large from Oregon and Genis a delegate from Minnesota's fifth Congressional district. England was from Massachusetts' ninth district. Three of these TWUA Democrats received fully half of the convention committee assignments which, so far as has been ascertained, were held by members of the CIO. Jabar was one of Maine's two representatives on the important committee on platform and resolutions. Anderson sat as the sole Oregonian on the committee on rules, Genis as the long Minnesotan on the committee on permanent organization.6 Jabar and

6Other CIO personalities identified as having received committee appointments: R. J. Thomas of Michigan, UAW, platform committee; Roy Atkinson, Washington, and Paul R. Tinge of Minnesota, credentials. Tinge, an official of the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota, had only recently become state political director for the Electrical workers. He was previously associated with the AFL Teamsters. UE News, 4/22/44, pp. 1, 5. For complete delegate and committee rosters see Democratic National Committee, Official Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention, July 19-21, 1944, pp. 112-174, 140-148. Cited hereafter as Democratic National Convention Proceedings, 1944. The largest single CIO international union contingent and the most concentrated appears to have been that of the UAW,
with at least five delegates and three alternates, most of them from Michigan. The ACWA was represented by at least three delegates: Weinstein, Genis, and Kroll of Ohio.

Genis have been introduced previously in these pages. England, a charter member of TWUA and in 1944 director of the New Bedford Textile Workers Joint Board, has been described as one of the organizers who as recently as 1943 "turned New Bedford into a TWUA stronghold." 7

7Kelly, Nine Lives for Labor, p. 56.

He was also chairman of the New Bedford CIOPAC and an active Democratic worker in state and local politics. Who's Who in Labor (1946) identifies England as a member of the Democratic City Committee (New Bedford) and of the Democratic State Committee. Textile Labor noted in July 1944 that he had run for office on several occasions and was currently serving "in a number of labor and government [including WLB and WMC] posts. Anderson had been TWUA's west coast director for three years, president for two years of the Oregon Commonwealth Federation and, more recently, a member of the CIO's War Relief Committee. At the time of the Democratic convention he was Oregon's state CIOPAC director. Soon thereafter he was to leave the latter post to become, for the remainder of the campaign, director of education for the International Woodworkers of America-CIO, another job which was to entail concentration, throughout the Northwest, upon education for political action." 8
Just when Anderson held the OCF presidency has not been determined. The organization came into being during the 1930's. See Sidney Lens, *Left, Right and Center* (Hinsdale, Ill.: Henry Regnery Co., 1949), p. 317. The TWA journal indicates that the Oregon IUC convention heard regional PAC director Atkinson speak early in 1944 and forthwith petitioned the national CIO to appoint a state PAC director. Anderson was named shortly thereafter and was one of two state directors carried on the national CIO PAC payroll for PAC Region XIV, as of the Committee's June 1944 accounting to Senatorial investigators. See *International Woodworker*, 1/12/44, p. 1; 3/8/44, p. 1; 8/16/44, p. 1; *U. S. Senate, Hearing of Special Committee on Campaign Expenditures*, 1944, p. 41.

The writer has no evidence that any decisive votes, on the floor or in state caucuses, came from or were induced by Democrats who comprised the "Textile influence" in the party convention. The latter were associated, however, with the losing battle for Wallace and at least two stood by the Vice-President to the bitter end. Within his delegation Jabar tried, unsuccessfully, to stem the trend which finally put Maine on the Truman bandwagon, after having had a hand in increasing an initial Wallace vote from one to four. In the end he was, willingly or unwillingly, party to a "unanimous" delegation vote for Truman. England was a member of the Wallace contingent from his

The writer has not positively identified the delegate who tried to prevent announcement, prior to the final casting of the state's 10 votes, of a vote shift which would have changed Maine's Truman-Wallace ratio of 6 to 4 to 9 to one. On the first ballot Wallace had one to Truman's five, the remainder being cast for Lucas and Barkley. Queried with respect to the pre-bandwagon votes for Wallace, TWUA-PAC representative Clifton has stated, "Jabar cast the lone vote [first ballot], and while I have no facts, believe he had some influence in the buildup to four." *Questionnaire*, Apr. 15, 1954. See also *Democratic National Convention Proceedings*, 1952, pp. 256, 258, 263, 267.
state (approximately one-third of the delegation) on both vice-presidential ballots and presumably went along when Massachusetts later threw its full vote to Truman.\textsuperscript{10} Genis' entire Minnesota delegation of twenty-four, on the other hand, remained steadfastly for Wallace throughout the balloting. The Oregon delegates, also unanimously for Wallace on the first ballot and bound by primary election vote until released by the candidate, did not remain 100 per cent loyal. Anderson was apparently one who did for he was the recipient of a letter of thanks from the Vice-President for his support in the convention.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{10}Clifton, Questionnaire, Apr. 14, 1954. The Proceedings record no protest and no request for a polling of the delegation when the chairman announced: "Massachusetts casts 31 votes for Truman," pp. 256, 262, 264.

\textsuperscript{11}Not all who defected turned to Truman. An equal number of votes were cast for Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas on the final ballot and Wallace still polled six of the state's 14 votes. See Democratic National Convention, Proceedings, 1954, pp. 256, 260, 270. See also International Woodworker, 7/19/54, pp. 2, 3; 9/27/54, p. 3. See pp. 45-57 above.

In August TWUA headquarters announced assignment of its "first full staff to work with our locals" in promoting the PAC drive for funds and asked membership support for the Roosevelt-Truman ticket and a "progressive Congress." It also announced that political action was to head the agenda for all official TWUA personnel henceforth, through November. Baldanzi was to "coordinate the NCPAC
campaign with the union." Pollack was to keep the membership "in continuous touch with procedures" and to instruct all international vice presidents, state and regional directors, local unions and joint boards to promote establishment of political action committees. Emil Rieve himself was by now a member of the national CIOPAC and one of 80 prominent citizens to lend their names to the new National Citizens PAC.\textsuperscript{12} On August 17 the union set September 11 to 30 as "mobilization days" for the new dollar drive, although the "tremendous task" of contacting "450,000 rank and file members" led to a later extension of time through October. As before, methods of solicitation were left to local discretion and the "voluntary" character of the drive was emphasized. Instructions were issued to guide field directors, however, and again a 50-50 apportionment formula (now bearing the CIOPAC seal of approval) was recommended. Furthermore, all area directors were advised to hold staff meetings to plan drives in their respective jurisdictions and the national office suggested that funds might be collected in the shops, during lunch period, at general membership meetings, at community gatherings, or under whatever circumstances seemed practicable. It was emphasized that non-union people too should be "given an opportunity to give."

\textsuperscript{12} See \textit{Textile Labor}, Aug. 1944, p. 1. See also pp. 43, 203 above.

\textsuperscript{13} See \textit{Textile Labor}, Aug. 1944, p. 1; Sept. 1944, p. 1; Oct. 1944, p. 1. The writer has been unable to obtain a final figure on CIO Textile's dollar collection. Neither the voluntary collection nor

Finally, a week before the election an IEC resolution reminded all union members of the benefits they had gained under the New Deal and reaffirmed candidate recommendations. 11

Since 1944 was not a convention year there was no opportunity for expression of the collective TWUA will apart from that made by the executive body. Such an expression did come in September from the constituent Hosiery Federation's annual convention. The AFHW vowed cooperation with the CIO's industrial union councils in resisting "repressive legislation," and, in keeping with the earlier NEB action, endorsed the Democratic national ticket and the PAC fund drive. By journal account the convention was keynote by "aggressive plans" for the federation for the following year and for the post-war world, and "for a vigorous entry into political action. . ." Its endorsement for Roosevelt and Truman was uncontested. A resolution to back PAC with dollars and as "speakers and organizers"—described by the Hosiery Worker as one of the "most important" items on the agenda—was adopted by the approximately 150 delegates without debate, following a "stirring address" by Thomas Burns of PAC and in the wake of approving remarks delivered by officers McKeown and Smith and by William Leader, "a PAC leader in Philadelphia." The Hosiery
Worker reported that "many speakers and delegates" urged support for FDR and PAC and cited contributions to the pro-PAC atmosphere of the gathering made by Emil Rieve and by Carl Holderman, who was by now PAC director in his own state. Other speakers, whose political orientation has been demonstrated elsewhere in these pages, included William Pollack, Joseph Knapik, John Edelman. The candidate endorsement resolution was the work of a convention committee but it was at once a composite of drafts submitted by many branches and patently represented more than casual leadership sentiment. President McKeown recalled that he had been emphasizing the "importance of political action by labor" for thirty-four years, averred that the "social gains we have won under [Roosevelt] face weakening" if the President were not reelected, and underscored his conviction that AFHW activity should be channeled through the Political Action Committee—since political objectives were no more attainable by a single union in isolation than were its economic goals.15

15 See Textile Labor, Oct. 1944, p. 4; Hosiery Worker, Sept. 1944, pp. 1, 2, 11, 18.

Officers and Staff Apply Themselves to PAC

Implementation of the political program may be seen in the record rolled up by union officers as campaign orators, for PAC as such and for its electoral objectives, throughout 1944. George Baldanzi showed up as a spokesman for PAC at Textile conferences at Lynchburg, Virginia; Reading, Pennsylvania, and Lewiston, Maine; at
United Labor Committee conferences in Maine and Vermont, at a PAC gathering sponsored by the Amalgamated Clothing Workers in Boston, and at a Steelworkers political rally in Buffalo.  

Journal accounts of such political travelling salesmanship are no more than illustrative. Politics was freely injected, not, surely, without the honored guest's wholehearted assent, into a special meeting in Baldanzi's honor which was sponsored by the Free Italy-America Labor Council of which he was secretary. Both Sidney Hillman and Senator Claude Pepper of Florida addressed the meeting.

and Rieve also hit the road, to address wider CIO as well as TWUA audiences. Rieve, for example, addressed the Virginia and Massachusetts state CIO conventions, a Dyers Federation testimonial dinner for Sidney Hillman and the Hosiery convention. During a single three-week period in September, according to Textile Labor, one or the other of TWUA's top triumvirate spoke at most of the "scores of political meetings" held by local unions, joint boards, and other textile organizations.  

\[18\]

\[NYT, 10/13/44, p. 15:6.\]
Oct. 1944, p. 1; Aug. 1944, p. 11. For post-campaign evidence of the latter’s support for PAC see his address before the Rhode Island CIO convention—in which he declared that the electoral effort just concluded was "only a starter." Ibid., Dec. 1944, p. 11.

examples, has stated that "of course" Rieve and other TWUA officers came into the southern states to deliver speeches for FDR and PAC.19


How tirelessly officials of either of TWUA’s constituent federations may have borne an oratorical burden such as that ordered by the Hosiery convention has not been determined. Dyers’ president Knapik was on record early in the year as pledging the support of TWUA to the Political Action Committee.20 The Hosiery Worker reported

20See his speech at the Hillman testimonial dinner given by the Dyers on April 25 in New York. Advance, 5/15/44, p. 22.

a post-election statement of that federation’s second vice-president Callaghan in which the latter rejoiced over the reelection of an administration "friendly to labor." The last pre-election edition of the same journal had carried a boxed statement signed by all four principal AFHW officers in which they urged members to heed the convention’s candidate recommendations. Thus the Messrs. McKeown, Smith, Hoffman and Callaghan stated that while the federation had never endorsed a political party, it had always endorsed political action—
in situations where genuine opportunities for choice prevailed.


\[21\] Hosiery Worker, Oct. 1944, p. 6. See also ibid., Nov. 1944, p. 1. Indicative at least of his own view that assumption of political responsibilities was a routine matter for union leaders, Witherspoon Dodge, when queried regarding the activity of various individuals, remarked of Callaghan that he did "anything that needed to be done," and that, therefore, he "would have been active for PAC." A similar statement was forthcoming respecting first vice-president Hoffmann: an "all-out fellow" who did whatever "needed doing." Interview previously cited.

No intensive research has been undertaken to discover in what manner the Hosiery Federation employed its own field staff for PAC as distinct from that of TWUA. Just what was meant by the TWUA statement regarding the midsummer assignment of a "full staff" to PAC is hazy. As related above, Rieve and his fellow officers all accepted responsibility for PAC. But no one person was commissioned as a TWUA director of political action.  

\[22\] Lawrence Rogin, Interview previously cited.

the number or identity of more than a few staff members who received special instructions to work with their respective regional CIOPAC directors. So far as can be ascertained, the entire staff, in New York and in the field, automatically became a part of the PAC.
mechanism within the limits imposed by local circumstances. Indeed, it is likely that many TWUA personalities who were most active politically were so simply in conscientious and sympathetic response to the union's general directives to all personnel to devote as much time as possible to the campaign. To start the ball rolling for the $1 dollar drive, according to Textile Labor, "nearly half a hundred" state and regional TWUA directors, possibly a third of the field staff, "set an example" for fellow staff members at their mid-August meeting by volunteering to give, apart from their time as the union's hired hands, at least a week's salary to the cause.23

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23 Some contributed in cash, others authorized a weekly check-off. That TWUA shared the general confusion regarding the relationship of CIOPAC to the new NCPAC in the latter's earliest days is apparent in a journal report to the effect that the TWUA staffers' political contributions would go to the National Citizens' committee. Textile Labor, Sept. 1944, p. 1.

Sources examined do not disclose the precise size of the TWUA staff at this time. In May 1943 it had a "staff of three officers, 139 organizers and 51 clerks and others" for a total of 193 full-time employees of the international union. By February 28, 1946 a staff of 264 included the three officers, 208 organizers, 53 clerks and others. See convention report of secretary Pollack, TWUA, Proceedings, 1946, p. 89.

The only two special PAC assignees other than Albert Clifton who have been positively identified were both in Region VIII—Garland Brooks of Georgia and Helen Gregory in the Carolinas. Both also were pre-primary appointments made before the union assigned its "first full staff" to the project. Struggling to exist in a pathologically hostile environment, many units were still seeking in 1943-44 to gain recognition and to consolidate themselves for collective bargaining
purposes. Hence the availability of either local unionists or international union staff for political work was necessarily restricted.  

24 Initial recognition by no means ensured successful collective bargaining. See, for example, Lucy Randolph Mason's story of the Marlboro mills in South Carolina, where a "short, peaceful strike" in the spring of 1937 was followed by "one of the first [contracts] negotiated in the South." But, "So far as I can learn there has not been a collective bargaining agreement involving the Marlboro Mills since 1938." To Win These Rights (New York: Harpers, 1952), pp. 40-42. Similar testimony comes from former organizer Witherspoon Dodge. Asked about certain Georgia locals represented in the TWUA convention of 1941 but not of 1943 Dodge stated matter-of-factly that they probably were no longer in existence. Interview, Feb. 2, 1954.

Nevertheless, such special assignments not only were made but they were apparently more continuous than those made by most other CIO unions in this part of the country. Other staffers under routine assignment in the same locale demonstrably assumed an obligation to help stimulate political activity. 25 Files maintained by PAC director Mitchell indicate that TWUA was one of the unions which "worked hardest" on PAC in the South, that it was among the internationals which "gave special help" on pre-primary poll tax payment and voter registration drives, and that it was one of two internationals which continued

25 Asked specifically about the PAC work of three TWUA representatives, R. C. Thomas and Tom Moore in the Carolinas, and Paul Schuler in Louisiana, Education Director Rogin wrote: "Our records do not show the assignments of our staff to the PAC. I would guess that Thomas, Moore and Schuler were active as a part of the specific direction to all TWUA personnel to spend as much time as possible on the campaign. I am sure that this was the case with Schuler. Schuler has a great interest in politics and has always been active." Questionnaire, May 29, 1953. See pp. 539-40, 547-48, 559-60 below.
throughout most of the general election campaign "to assign full-time workers." 26

26 The "worked hardest" judgment was arrived at by James Tracy Crown after perusal of Mitchell's records. Crown also limits the Hosiery Federation as among "other unions" which participated in the PAC campaign "at least to the extent of making a special effort to register their membership." Other unions which supplied "special help" during the spring were UAW, the Amalgamated, the Steelworkers and the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, while MMSW is identified as the other of the two unions which kept staffers on PAC work throughout the campaign. The Political Action Committee of the CIO in the Southeast, 1944-1945 (unpublished M. A. thesis, University of Florida, Sept. 1950), pp. 17, 37. Asked for elaboration on the criteria leading to the "worked hardest" evaluation, Mitchell responds: "Don't know Crown's criteria. My own would have been a mixture of follow-through action by numerous local unions of the international concerned, plus assignment of staff to my office, and keeping the assigned staff person actively there. . . ." George S. Mitchell, 1944 PAC director, Region VIII, Questionnaire, Jan. 6, 1953. (Italics added.) See also pp. 540, 555 below.

In New England the appointment of Albert Clifton, which ran the length of the campaign, was the only one applicable to the entire region. In addition, TWUA placed a number of staff people at the service of the Region I office as "advisors," and Clifton's appointment was supplemented by assignment of regular staffers to PAC duty in important local areas later. By Clifton's own testimony:

I was the only TWUA man covering all New England. However, after Labor Day, many TWUA staff members were given assignments in local areas, which were expected to take full time in some heavy TWUA centers. 27

According to another authoritative source, TWUA education Director Rogin, failure of the international union to allocate more staff to PAC on a full-time basis in this important region attests, paradoxically, not to relative political inactivity or indifference but to the fact that this was territory in which TWUA was sufficiently strong to wage an effective political effort without being obliged to look to its New York office for special help. New Jersey is a similar case in point. No special international union assignment to PAC was made here by TWUA at any time during 1944. It is likely that comparable apparent derelictions occurred in other jurisdictions although, again, the inference does not necessarily follow that such an omission was attributable to lack of political zeal. In any

28 Questionnaire, May 29, 1953. (Italics added.)

29 Under questioning nearly a decade later state PAC chairman Carl Holderman in New Jersey professed ignorance of the reasons for TWUA's failure to make special PAC assignments in his state. Questionnaire, May 27, 1953. Conceivably, the regional PAC office made no such request of the Textile union. Holderman's own year-end (1944) report on New Jersey PAC operations yields the information that "At the request of Regional Director Abramson and your chairman, National PAC arranged for the assignment of International Representatives from the six largest unions... whose job it would be to work on getting the full PAC program adopted by their various local organizations throughout the state." No reference was made to any smaller union in this connection and TWUA was not among the six largest CIO
case, as will be described in subsequent chapters, the "TWUA force" in New England, in New Jersey and elsewhere, came to life quite as meaningfully, for purposes of this study, in the person of state or local IUC or CIOPAC personnel—in Connecticut and Rhode Island, for example, where two Dyers' federationists headed state political action committees; in New Jersey, too, where both regional and state PAC offices were by virtue of CIO appointment in the hands of Textile personalities.

Members of the field staff were not the only international union employees enlisted in the PAC crusade. So too were editors of both TWUA and AFHW journals and other members of union education and publications departments. Education and press committee chairmen at the first TWUA convention following the '46 campaign both testified to the increased importance of their departments in the political field, the latter, William J. Tullar, calling attention to the use by "reactionaries" of "every medium of communication."  

30 The labor press, he said, was especially needed to "give full effect to such movements" as the then current (1946) union organizing drive and that of the CIOPAC. Elizabeth Nord for the education committee observed that the union's "educational work has always been closely integrated with all of the work of the union; handling grievances, political action, community activity. . . ." TWUA, Proceedings, 1946, pp. 65-67, 127-128. (Italics added.) Corroborative testimony also obtained from Education Director Rogin. Interview, Dec. 17, 1951.
TWUA saw to the distribution of "lots" of PAC literature in 1944 and at least some of it originated with TWUA rather than CIOPAC. In fact, according to one source, some of the TWUA material superseded rather than supplemented the CIOPAC leaflets and fliers which showed so much "savvy." The Textile union was not fundamentally a "New York union," and some of the CIO committee's output was deemed "too sophisticated" for practical use. In some places it probably never left the desk of the local union secretary who received it for distribution. However that may be and however much TWUA ad writers may have "simplified" the political message, its essential nature was not strikingly dissimilar and the leaflet with which the international union launched its 1944 dollar drive on September 11 contained a familiar CIOPAC theme. A smiling picture of FDR appeared on the cover and the "sales pitch" was to the effect that

PAC Needs
A Dollar You Won't Miss
To Elect a Man
You Can't Afford to Lose

On the inside readers were told that

A Dewey-Bricker Ticket Means HOOVERISM,
And that Your Dollar Works Against
Hooverism for Roosevelt and the Welfare of All.

PAC dollars, to be surrendered voluntarily by the workers to their shop stewards or other local union solicitors would, the leaflet said, counteract the "Millions put up" by the Pews, the Duponts, and

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31 Rogin. Interview previously cited. See p. 66n above.
the rest of the "friends of Hooverism." They would help "to fight for a post-war America that would keep its promise of dignity and security for every American worker." The essence of "Hooverism" was not left to the imagination. It meant:

Breadlines for the hungry
Hooverville shacks for the homeless
Apple-selling for the jobless
Starvation pay for those with jobs
Bayonets for hungry veterans
No jobs for union members
States' Rights instead of security

Some of the benefits for which labor could thank the New Deal were spelled out and illustrated in cartoon form:

The right to organize without fear... THE WAGNER ACT
Independence in old age... THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
Better Wages... THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
Low-cost homes for workers... THE FEDERAL HOUSING ACT
Safe bank deposits... THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
More parks and playgrounds, schools and streets... through FEDERAL WORKS PROGRAMS
Power and protection for the farmer... THE RURAL ELECTRIFICATION ACT, the Farm Security Administration

The TWUA dollar, it was explained, would be divided evenly for use by the national CIO Political Action Committee and "for Political Action in your state." It would do the following things:

Work for the re-election of President Roosevelt.
Work for the election of progressive Congressmen.
Get out the largest possible vote.
Carry the PAC message to the nation.

It would, in short, help to

DEFEND AND EXTEND DEMOCRACY ON THE HOME FRONT!
Excerpts from leaflet issued under the name of the Textile Workers Union of America, Emil Kieve, president; William Pollack, secretary-treasurer; George Baldanzi, executive vice-president.

TWUA and AFHW Journals Push the Campaign and Election Post-Mortems Reveal No Regrets

Turning to journal content as a measuring rod, one finds abundant documentation for the Textile family's cooperation in this CIO venture into national politics. Scarcely an edition of Textile Labor went to press which did not carry at least one and usually more than one specimen of each of three types of political copy: (1) stories on the political speeches, directives and actions of TWUA officialdom; (2) politically stimulating editorials, columnar comments and special articles, and (3) reports on the political activities of TWUA members and organizations in the field. There was also continued coverage of national CIOPAC developments—the appointment of regional directors, Sidney Hillman's appearances on Capitol Hill, the winning of primary election victories, etc. 33 Not only quantity but placement of political copy, particularly from July onward, bespoke firm dedication to the proposition that political action must be popularized as well as reported.

33 See, for example, Textile Labor, June 1944, p. 3; July 1944, pp. 4, 8.
Several exercises in campaign influence came from the pen of John Edelman. When his column did not appear or was devoted to some topic other than politics this oversight was more often than not remedied under the Ervin byline. At the same time, unsigned editorials, special articles and political news openly slanted and


In hortatory vein complemented the more or less fixed Edelman-Ervin feature. In January, a month after he became TWUA's Washington representative, Edelman directed a familiar plea to locals to create effective "legislative and political action committees" to stimulate and "train the membership to make its wishes count." Addressing himself specifically to the South, he begged TWUA members to recognize and exploit their electoral potential. In February the burden of a PAC-directed editorial on "Tory Congressmen" was reinforced by a sympathetic article on labor political action by the Very Rev. Msgr. Reynold Hillenbrand. In March the journal carried an editorial reprint from the Tennessee CIO News entitled: "I Gave My Dollar."

The following month Edelman wrote of TWUA's devotion over half a dozen years to the lifting of one and a quarter million southern textile workers from economic degradation. Today, he exulted, the union was "coming to grips with another part of the job, that of enfranchising a great segment of the American people" who so far, because
of political unawareness, the poll tax and other obstacles, had played "almost no role" in American political life. In May the same writer drew back from the abyss of overoptimism to depict a United States going Republican in November—unless local PAC's everywhere got busy. He marshalled gloomy statistics. To be sure, a majority of the people were still for FDR. But, if they didn't get out to vote, the worst could happen. Columnist Ervin, as the campaign

35 Textile Labor, Jan. 1944, p. 5; Feb. 1944, pp. 2, 5; Mar. 1944, pp. 3, 5, 6; Apr. 1944, p. 5; May 1944, p. 5.

progressed, wrote of political action as the key to "Jobs in the Post-War Era," attacked the GOP for "impudent" platform promises "to do everything they failed to do from 1920 to 1932 and which the New Deal did between 1933 and 1944," criticized the Dewey campaign, and stressed labor's "important obligation" to vote for FDR and a liberal Congress.36

36 See, for example, Textile Labor, June 1944, p. 10; July 1944, p. 5; Sept. 1944, p. 2; Nov. 1944, p. 5.

For typically heavy saturation of the journal with both news and opinion copy of campaign significance the September issue of Textile Labor may be submitted as evidence. The dollar drive announcement and other political items, accounted for all of page one. Inside there were: an article by Sidney Hillman, an Ervin column and two political action editorials, a story on TWUA-PAC developments in
Connecticut, and two human interest pieces on individual PAC donations. One of the latter was inspired by a five dollar contribution for FDR from a "TWUA Sailor" and former TWUA organizer; the other by a $34.00 collection sent from the high seas to PAC director Carl Holderman in New Jersey by another Textile personality currently in the U. S. Navy. The September issue also included two full pages of pictorial contrast: the Great Depression v. the social and economic betterment which flowed from the New Deal—via insured bank deposits, TVA dams, housing loans, etc.37

37 Textile Labor, Sept. 1944, pp. 1-4, 8-9, 16. The five dollar donor was identified as Bill Du Chessi. The other was Al Barkan, who in 1948 was to become his union's national political action director. See Textile Labor, 1/17/48, p. 2.

October and November editions strike a corresponding political imbalance, with headlines to remind readers of "AN IMPORTANT OBLIGATION" to vote for FDR and a liberal Congress, while informing them editorially that "PEACE RIDES WITH FDR" and, in a news story, that "ROOSEVELT VICTORY HINGES ON TEXTILE VOTE IN MANY STATES." Strengthening the impact of these headlines presumably was another over a testimonial item: "BETTE DAVIS ASKS WOMEN TO VOTE FDR." News columns in the same issues featured PAC-relevant items from nearly a dozen states (Maryland, the Carolinas, Alabama, New Jersey, Missouri, Rhode Island, Virginia, New York, Massachusetts, and Vermont) and two full pages of cartoons and speech excerpts bearing upon Governor Dewey's disqualifications for the Presidency.38
Going to press during and after the weeks of unavailing protest against the "Little Steel" formula, pointedly applicable as it was to textile industry cases then pending before the War Labor Board, neither of these last campaign editions of the TWUA journal gives any hint that those in positions of authority regretted the union's endorsement or that their enthusiasm had waned. Whatever their reservations they were able to divorce their pique over present Administration shortcomings from a greater concern for calamitous changes in long range national policy which might occur under a Republican president. After the election the union was proud to have helped reelect FDR and what it hoped would be a "more liberal Congress." In "every textile state," the journal editorialized, TWUA votes were important. In some they were "controlling." The election results proved: "If the common people vote, they can win."39


To quote at length from the Hosiery Worker, under the editorship of AFHW vice president Alfred Hoffmann, would be burdensome in the extreme. Its pro-FDR and pro-PAC orientation, also manifested alike in news and editorial copy, was monotonously akin to that of

38Textile Labor, Oct., Nov. 1944, passim.
TWUA: This year, the journal insisted, labor "must deliver politically. . . with votes, primary political organization, doorbell pulling and the art of influencing people." Why were the "reactionaries" fighting PAC so frantically? Why was the Dies Committee attacking it as "un-American?" The explanation was not obscure. Reactionaries had nothing to fear so much as "an enlightened citizenry."

Was FDR really so invaluable? Well, as a CIOPAC poster proclaimed, he was "1A In Our Draft." How vital was this particular election? The answer was solemn: Voters were to make one of the "most important and momentous decisions" of their lives. The New Deal concept of "humanitarian government" was at stake and along with it hopes for a real "peace." These are excerpts from some of the campaign year editorializing. There were, in addition, cartoons, pictures, election informational features, local political items, reports on national PAC organization and the CIOPAC platform, pro-PAC Hosiery convention speech texts, and so on. Page one makeup of the AFHW convention issue permitted equal headline treatment for the election of union officers and the delegates' endorsement for FDR.

It is noteworthy, however, that the convention's political decisions (for FDR and PAC) were jointly listed first among nine convention
"highlights." \[41\] Finally, electioneering in one form or another found its way into page after page of the last edition before election. One full page was reserved for a picture of FDR, another for the Roosevelt record. Reprints of Hosiery Worker headlines out of the "good old days" of GOP "prosperity" blazed eloquently forth:

NORTH CAROLINA MILLS CUT WAGES
KENOSHA LOCKOUT BEFORE U.S. SENATE
YELLOW DOG CONTRACT IS STRIKE ISSUE

On the first page a giant head told that:

WORKERS PREPARE TO VOTE
AS CAMPAIGN NEARS CLIMAX

Subjects of late campaign coverage included the scotching of rumors of the President's poor health, denunciation of the KKK charges against Senator Truman, the "outraged" protests of the three Catholic publications against the linking of the PAC to "communism and subversiveness." At the conclusion of the leading election story it was noted that AFHW branches

... have been active to a large degree in their localities both in the registration of new voters, in the follow up to get out the vote and in working for the election of Congressmen of either party who will support win the war, win the peace and pro-labor policies.\[42\]

\[41\] Hosiery Worker, Sept. 1944, p. 1. For texts of political action resolutions and speeches (by Rieve, Holderman, Burns et al) see ibid., passim.

\[42\] See Hosiery Worker, Oct. 1944, passim.
When the returns were in the Hosiery journal interpreted the President's re-election and the CIO's demonstrated political effectiveness as a "green light" for labor to "solidify its position" with the biggest union organizing drive in history. Moreover,

POLITICAL ACTION, MATURE, MUST CONTINUE

\[43\]

Few TWUA-PAC personalities distinguished themselves in the November CIO convention as vocal, individual supporters of the PAC idea. Once again, however, as in 1943, all evidence suggests that this was "agreed" business. No one opposed the resolution to make "permanent" a political instrument which had proved its worth. No one of the 1,200 delegates challenged the chair's judgment that the resolution was ratified by a "unanimous rising vote." If TWUA or AFHW figures sat on their hands during the unprecedented, tumultuous half-hour ovation which was given to Sidney Hillman as the undisputed symbol of the campaign effort, they were not only in a lonely minority. They were, assuredly, individuals in need of psychiatric attention, for virtually all were persons who have been or who are about to be identified in these pages as participants in that effort.

\[44\]

\[44\] The New York Times reported that the PAC chairman was accorded a 30-minute ovation before he spoke and that it took 15 minutes to restore order after he concluded. One interviewee, asserting that there was "great enthusiasm" for Hillman among members of all unions represented at the convention, declared that the ovation was without precedent. "Bedlam broke loose" as delegates "pounded
furniture, tore paper, broke ash trays, threw table cloths up on the chandeliers." Phil Murray, who rarely had "trouble" maintaining order, had plenty this time, for Sidney Hillman had been martyred and PAC had won the election! Interview, Julius Uehlein (member, United Steelworkers of America), Ohio CIO Council staff, Dec. 1, 1952. See also NYT, 11/23/1951, p. 1:2; 11/18/1951, p. 1:2; 11/21/1951, p. 17:5; CIO, Proceedings, Nov. 20-24, 1951, pp. 202-224.

Six of the ten members of the 1943 TWUA delegation again represented the international in the: Rieve, Pollack and Baldanzi, McKeown, Smith and Lawrence. The six (sic) who served in addition to these holdovers were IEC members William Gordon, Elizabeth Nord and Herbert Payne, plus Horace White, Mariano Bishop and William Tullar, the latter two of whom were to win executive council seats in 1946. The number of delegates who represented the "TWUA force" by virtue of IUC credentials increased from a minimum of nine in 1943 to at least fifteen the following year. Fully seven state CIO councils were so represented--by Jabar of Maine, Christopher of Tennessee, Clifton of Rhode Island, Abramson of New Jersey, Genis of Minnesota, Salerno of Massachusetts, and Boyd E. Payton of Virginia, Among city and county IUC delegates were, again, Gilbert Lewis, Harry Boyer, Douglas Anderson and Joseph White from organizations in Delaware, Pennsylvania, Oregon and Connecticut, and, additionally, Herbert S. Williams for Gadsden, Alabama; John J. McCoy for Chattanooga, Tennessee; H. B. Lisk for Mecklenburg, North Carolina; and Robert Johnson for the Tidewater Council, Virginia. Among those not previously identified, McCoy was a future AFMWA second vice president (late 1940's); Payton a future TWUA-IEC member.
Finally, for the more remote symbols of the "TWUA force" who also acquiesced in the post-campaign CIO vote of confidence in PAC, reference may be made to the presence of the Amalgamated delegation with its familiar TWOC-associated names--Hillman, Weinstein, Blumberg, Rosenblum and the rest, to IUC representatives who had similar ACWA-TWOC records, and, at the risk of expanding this elastic concept a step too far, to individuals like Powers Hapgood, sent by the Howard County, Indiana IUC, who was 1944 chairman of the Indiana Political Action Committee. The unions for which this idealistic Harvard-educated union organizer had worked since the early 1920's are too numerous to enumerate. They include both the Amalgamated and the UTW during the years immediately preceding formation of TWOC (1930-35).45

45 Dickerman and Taylor, Who's Who in Labor, p. 149.

Whether directly or indirectly typifying the "TWUA force," if any of these objected to either form or substance of the CIO resolution or to the PAC machinery which it authorized to continue he held his peace. Functioning in this national forum they were not sorry, on the basis of evidence in hand, to have "cleared" a national political campaign effort "with Sidney."
CHAPTER XIII

PLATFORMS AND PERSONALITIES

Once during the period of the "PAC trend" and again just before the 1944 party conventions TWUA officially subscribed to comprehensive pronouncements covering domestic and foreign policy aspirations and recommendations. In the former instance the April 1943 convention approved a document bearing the signatures of union officers and IEC members, which purported to "trace out the broad pattern of the world of tomorrow." In the latter the international executive council endorsed the national CIO Political Action Committee's The People's Program for 1944. ¹ Convention acceptance of TWUA's own program, Toward a New Day, emanated from the same delegates who repeatedly advertised their attachment to Roosevelt and who sanctioned in advance Philip Murray's appointment of the CIOPAC. A year later sponsors of the People's Program--including Emil Rieve as a member of the PAC and, by implication, the IEC--frankly dedicated themselves to the election of FDR and of other candidates "... who have given our President their consistent support and whose record assures us that they subscribe to and will help realize the following

¹See pp. 301, 345 above.
Palpably, examination of both documents is warranted even though, in point of fact, both on occasion were wanting in specificity and the "New Day" sponsors disclaimed any intent to "blueprint the peace in minute detail."—The CIO committee, with perhaps less justification, offered its platform so that "all may know clearly what we stand for and what we are against—without any equivocation."^2

^2 Introductory statement over the signature of the CIOPAC. CIO Political Action Committee, The People’s Program for 1944. (Italics added.) The Committee pointed out, however, that its program was of necessity "limited to highlights." For further elaboration of CIO views on issues and goals one must see other CIO publications. For quotations employed above and in succeeding pages from the 1944 CIOPAC program, see Joseph Gaer, The First Round (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1944) in which the pamphlet is reproduced in full (exclusive of photographic material), pp. 185-212. See p. 345 above.

The "Payne Outlook"

A Textile unionist biographer has written that the TWUA post-war program bore in title and text "the imprint of the . . . outlook" of Herb Payne, one of its IEC sponsors. Payne had "served as treasurer of the League for Industrial Democracy and . . . urged TWUA to consider and Harry Laidler of the LID to sketch a statement of post-war goals not just for labor but for American democracy." In Toward a New Day Payne, who saw his own mission in life as one of helping to bridge the gap "between democracy’s promise and its fulfillment," was "thinking ahead, encouraging others to think ahead. . . ."^3

How far the "Payne outlook" genuinely mirrored the real world concept which his fellow CIO textile unionists had of "democracy's promise" is not readily apparent in the unanimity with which the TWUA convention adopted its post-war document. No less than for delegates to political party conventions and for candidates for office, formal adherence to omnibus declarations of goals and policies may represent for individual trade unionists personal feelings ranging from unbounded enthusiasm to indifference, even to opposition on specific platform particulars. Moreover, for them and for their union as a collective entity, it still remains to be seen how faithful a reflection of deep-seated conviction and of practical political determination may be read into the planks of either the People's Program or Toward a New Day.

A Roosevelt in 1932 could call for economy in government and an Eisenhower twenty years later could build a campaign crusade about demands for a balanced budget. In neither case are historians able to demonstrate that platform planks or campaign oratory constituted insurmountable obstacles in the way of contrary demands upon candidates turned public officers. On innumerable issues "safe" generalizations typically lend themselves to diverse interpretations, hence it has become commonplace to relegate the party platform to a subordinate place in the political scheme of things. The "informed voter" no less than the cynic prefers to "look to the record" of party and man to predict where the prospective recipient of his vote is likely to go in matters of policy once installed or reinstated in office.
Assuredly, for comparable reasons, judgment with respect to the "kind of America" or the "kind of world" envisioned by PAC or TWUA-PAC in 1964— as well as an evaluation of its actual or probable impact upon the American Way, irrespective of intent— must be based upon something more than a one-shot representation of labor's supposed objectives, even though it may be argued that interest groups and party platforms are not entirely analogous. — One might perhaps logically expect more frankness regarding real goals from an IEC bent upon "educating" its members than from a party faced with the prospect of electoral contest and direct responsibility for the conduct of government. On the other hand, the conclusion is inescapable, particularly on reading many paragraphs of the People's Program, that a PAC staff writer, practicing the art of platform draftsmanship in an atmosphere polluted by hostility and suspicion, had learned to seek refuge in the same generalization resorted to by Democrats and Republicans bent upon averting party schisms or the alienation of any considerable segment of the "independent vote."

It is, then, with emphasis upon the limitations of these formal TWUA and CIOPAC programs as clues to the fundamental character of TWUA-PAC that the following platform reviews are presented. As suggested in an earlier chapter, telling clues to political characterization are less likely to be found in platforms as such than in degrees of emphasis and consistency displayed in successive policy statements over the years, or in resolutions adopted and actions taken on individual (particularly highly controversial) issues.
International Cooperation: The Route to Victory in War, the Indispensable Condition for Peace

Foreign policy commanded the opening pages of text in both prospectuses. In the People's Program searchers after PAC's foreign policy objectives were referred to the U.S. Constitution, the Four Freedoms, the Good Neighbor Policy, the Atlantic Charter, and the United Nations Declaration. On its part TWUA posited seven goals to strive for "if the post-war world is to be a world in which the century of the common man begins to be realized. . . ." The first was: "international organization and cooperation to strengthen the sinews of democracy and strike at the roots of war."

PAC and the IEC alike rejected isolationism and imperialism as guideposts for America's future international relations. Both demanded continued and improved wartime collaboration among the United Nations, Great Power cooperation after the war, and the perfecting of an international organization to promote a climate for peace and to deter or punish aggression. Such an organization, in the PAC outline, must

destroy the basis of militarism and fascist power in Germany, Japan, and their satellites. . . [and] maintain international peace and security by taking prompt collective action against any future aggressor.

The IEC's "democratically controlled" peace-keeping body should be "instrumented. . . for the mediation and arbitration of international disputes" so the democracies could "halt future aggression . . . before it gains impetus," and the United States should lead the way toward a world society with an "international police force. . . to
prevent any nation or group of nations from imposing dictatorial sway
over any other. . ." The TWUA program called also for a closely knit
world labor organization to tackle the problem of economic insecurity
and to help remove everywhere "those bases of fear and want upon which
dictatorship and aggression rest,"--by promoting civil liberties,
collective bargaining, "far-visioned" social and labor legislation,
improved health and housing standards, and an end to discrimination
based upon race, color, religion or national origin.

TWUA demanded effective labor representation at the peace table
and PAC a voice for labor in formulating and administering all
programs suggested in its foreign policy planks. Both favored war
relief and rehabilitation measures and post-war international machinery
for extension of long-term credits to industrialize and raise living
standards in "backward" countries. PAC rejected the typing of
"political strings" to such an attack upon war-breeding "poverty,
unemployment and economic insecurity," while presupposing that
recipient nations, in developing their resources, would assure their
peoples "the enjoyment of the Four Freedoms. . . [and] the right of
all workers to organize and join unions of their own choosing. . ."

Authors of Toward a New Day recommended the "policing" of economic
as well as political aggression (private or governmental), urged all
nations to drop "unreasonable tariff barriers and monopoly control of
raw materials," and proposed a "lend-lease" program in technical
knowledge, tools, etc., and international credits for re-construction
as well as new industrialization. The latter frankly insisted that
conditions be imposed upon both lenders and borrowers—to guard against exploitation of workers anywhere in the world. Thus there must be provisos respecting minimum standards for wages, hours, working conditions, the right to bargain collectively, etc., to protect workers in recipient countries and to prevent international competition based upon low wages. Terms for repayment of international loans must be "reasonable and equitable" so that no nation—including the United States—should be led "into economic imperialism." Similarly, in extending emergency war relief, "help dictated by a democratic conscience... should not be permitted to aid the foes of democracy."

The PAC program contained additional planks for "extension of the right of asylum for persecuted minorities..." and for post-war international agreements to protect racial, religious and political minorities.¹

¹For PAC program excerpts see Gaer, pp. 192-98. For the TWUA foreign policy planks see TWUA (Emil Rieve et al), Toward a New Day (14-page booklet), pp. 1-4, 14.

Domestic Objectives

For a summary statement of fundamental domestic goals, as distinguished from concrete policy proposals, reference was made in the People's Program to the "new Bill of Rights" proclaimed by President Roosevelt in his January 1944 message to Congress:

The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries, or shops or farms or mines of the Nation;
The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation;
The right of every farmer to raise and sell his products at a return which will give him and his family a decent living;
The right of every businessman, large and small, to trade in an atmosphere of freedom from unfair competition and domination by monopolies at home or abroad;
The right of every family to a decent home;
The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health;
The right to a good education;
The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, accident and unemployment;
All of these rights spell security. And after this war is won, we must be prepared to move forward, in the implementation of these rights, to new goals of human happiness and well-being.5

5Quoted in Gaer, p. 199.

TWUA set forth its six domestic aims as follows:

A domestic economic, social, and political order that will preserve and strengthen the Bill of Rights and infuse the Four Freedoms /freedom of religion and expression; freedom from want and fear/ with reality.
A guarantee of full employment to all, at productive work and at wages that will permit high standards of health and decency.
Control of industry for the many, not for the few.
Rescue of the farmer from the uncertainties of the present agricultural system.
A tax system based four-square on the principle of ability to pay.
Free and equal access to education for all.6

CIOPAC's Domestic Program

As the cardinal key to realization of the economic goals enunciated by the President and, concomitantly, as a bulwark for "our basic civil rights and freedoms," the Political Action Committee advocated national economic planning. Congress should declare the new Bill of Rights "the basic objective of our National policy" and it should authorize establishment of a "permanent National Planning Board," with tripartite representation of industry, labor and agriculture. In cooperation with other government agencies such a board should make legislative recommendations to Congress and encourage formation of industry councils to assist in formulating and administering "plans for full production and full employment within... each industry." The latter would be "composed of representatives of labor, management (or agriculture, where appropriate), and government."

Authors of the People's Program recognized that responsibility for full employment rested primarily with private industry. Nevertheless, they asked the federal government to endorse "the principles of the guaranteed annual wage" and to "encourage its incorporation in collective bargaining agreements" as a guarantor of the consumer buying power necessary to sustain full production. Moreover, they proposed that there be a governmentally prepared program of jobs "at useful work, with standard wages and working conditions, if and to the extent that private industry falls short of the latter goal."

They advocated immediate planning of a "comprehensive public works
program," financed by federal, state and local funds, to provide "public services which private industry cannot undertake," e.g., flood control, public power, soil conservation, rural electrification, road building, school construction, etc.; and, insofar as private housing construction should fall short of need, they recommended governmental action at all levels to ensure a minimum million and a half new dwellings a year.

Under the heading, "The War Economy and Reconversion," PAC outlined the way to "effective economic stabilization:"

a policy permitting wage increases. . . [realistically reflecting] the rise in living costs. . . ; effective price and rent control and rationing. . . to prevent further price increases, with food subsidies. . . to hold prices at present levels while maintaining farm income. . . ; heavier progressive taxes on high personal incomes and on corporate profits. . . [tax relief for persons] whose incomes are at or near the subsistence level. . . [and an end to] all regressive tax measures. . .

It favored "prompt. . . and orderly reconversion" to peacetime production, with "full protection against fraud" in terminating the government's war contract obligations, and legislation based upon "the principles of the Kilgore Bill" for "centralized planning," with labor participation, to meet the "human aspect of reconversion. . . "—via re-employment of displaced workers, the payment of "supplementary Federal unemployment insurance," etc. PAC proposed further

that the sale to private industry of any government-owned plant or facility be made with full protection of the public interest and conditioned upon a guarantee that the purchaser will fully utilize its entire productive capacity.

Architects of the PAC program remembered the farmers. There must be continued "price guarantees to. . . encourage full production
and assure farmers of a fair return. . .;" "social and economic benefits enjoyed by city dwellers" should extend to the farm population, and all programs—for farm purchase, soil conservation, etc.—should protect the "family owned and operated farm." For "small business" and the consumer there must be aid in the form of research, engineering and marketing services, government credits for purchase of surplus government property, vigorous enforcement and strengthening of the anti-trust laws. For veterans of the armed forces PAC favored "generous" hospitalization benefits and physical and occupational therapy, government-financed educational and vocational training, demobilization pay, loans for purchase of homes and businesses, a job placement service and liberal federal unemployment benefits.

There were CIGPAC planks of general application on social security, education and civil rights. To meet "human needs arising from sickness, maternity, permanent disability, old age and transitional unemployment" PAC advocated immediate enactment of the "Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill." To improve and extend the quality and equality of educational facilities and opportunities PAC proposed federal grants to the states, "without interference with private educational institutions or local control." To guarantee "full economic,

7Such grants should establish a minimum wage scale for teachers and minimum educational standards "based on the principle that every boy and girl is entitled to free education through. . . high school. . . with advanced study for those of demonstrated ability." Grants were also to eliminate rural-urban and Negro-white differentials in quality of education obtainable and to finance free hot school lunches and a nursery school program for children of working mothers.
political and civil equality" for all Americans PAC endorsed a
"permanent Fair Employment Practices Committee with adequate appro-
priations and enforcement powers"; legislative prohibitions on
activities or propaganda directed against individuals because of
race, religion or national origin; anti-poll tax legislation, outlawry of "other restrictions on the right to vote," and "enactment
of a genuine soldier vote bill." Finally,

free, strong and responsible labor organizations /and/
extension of the process of collective bargaining
throughout American industry must be encouraged as an
objective of national policy /and the/ right to join
labor unions of their own choosing must be guaranteed
and protected for all wage earners /in public or private
employment/.

8 All quotes from Gaer, pp. 199-212. (Italics added.)

In its preamble the CIO program identified past policy achieve-
ments of the Roosevelt administration, support for which was to supply
a standard for candidate evaluation. These included advanced "on
the social security front," the "farm front," in housing, conserva-
tion, finance and national security: e.g., old age and unemployment
insurance; crop insurance; the ever-normal granary; HOLC, FHA, TVA,
SEC; lend-lease, etc,—and "unparalleled leadership on our march
toward victory. . ." Heading the list was

ON THE LABOR FRONT: The guarantee of labor's right to
organize and bargain collectively; Minimum Wage legis-
lation; the outlawing of child labor.9

9Ibid., pp. 189-91.
"Toward a New Day" on the Domestic Front

The "People's Program" was avowedly campaign literature, circulated after June 1944. TWUA's post-war program, conceived and ratified a year earlier—for long range "educational" as well as imminent political purposes, is in some respects a bolder as well as a wordier document, containing more extensive exposition of the philosophic and practical motivation behind its concrete policy proposals and, in some particulars, leaving less to implication and conjecture. In only one major instance does the PAC prospectus seem to suggest more drastic economic invention: viz., its proposed grafting of a [recommendatory] national planning board and an industry council apparatus upon a basically private enterprise economy. On the whole it was the IEC's "New Day" which in the long run bid fair to eventuate in a more startling transformation of the American system.

TWUA and PAC provisions on the "human" aspect of military demobilization and industrial reconversion were comparable. Additional concrete TWUA suggestions included the making of job opportunities through governmentally-aided development of "new industries and processes" as well as through public works. Where PAC called for a

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10 Also proposed was federally financed re-training of war veterans and displaced war workers, where necessary. See sections on "Full Employment of Labor," "War Workers After the War," in "Toward a New Day, pp. 5-6. Attention was called specifically to the fact that already production was "lagging" in many fields and that many textile workers were engaged in part-time work.
specific bill by name and for "the progressive strengthening" of all social security legislation TWUA program authors were expansive. Such "strengthening" should encompass almost limitless liberalization of unemployment and old age and survivors' insurance coverage—in fields covered, size and duration of benefits, eligibility requirements, etc. Moreover, in virtually all essentials, since economic insecurity "knows no state boundaries," the social security system should be federalized. To ensure jobs, to all who "are denied

Unemployment benefits should be adequate and uniform and paid from a national fund under one administrator. Assistance to the aged, dependent and blind should match need, not size of state contributions. Like PAC, TWUA also proposed to insure the "sick and disabled" and, without specifying methods or levels of financing, to improve public health facilities, preventive medicine, maternity and child care, etc. TWUA also endorsed legislation for occupational disease and industrial accident control, maintenance of healthful working conditions, the raising of "food standards," free school lunches, the assuring of a minimum family income "necessary to purchase good foods." The social insurance recommendations affected agricultural and domestic workers, farm operators, workers in government and other non-profit establishments, members of the armed forces and persons on work relief. See "social Security" and "A Health Program" in Toward a New Day, pp. 7-8.

private employment" the IEC, like PAC, advocated a "broad public works program," in connection with which it proposed a "permanent planning agency," inter- and intra-governmental cooperation, and the "decentralization" of planning programs "as rapidly as possible." As a leading public works item on a list similar to that of the PAC the TWUA program—noting that thousands of textile workers lived in slums—included slum clearance and new housing construction.
In its farm plank the Textile Workers' platform recognized as a threat to the union's own members the basic insecurity of the farmer and the farm hand, especially the movement of adults and children from farm homes into the mills—to work for "scanty wages" which helped to keep "earnings in textiles among the lowest in the country." The answer to this menace lay in social insurance against "drought, floods, and agricultural blights," and extension of "public credit and subsidies" for a variety of purposes. TWUA also advocated encouragement of "bona fide" farmers' (consumer and producer) cooperatives.\(^{13}\)

\(^{13}\) Parity prices were not mentioned in the TWUA program. Other provisions included: development of "government import and export boards to facilitate and regulate the international flow of farm products"; "public control of rural banking facilities and the encouragement by the government of land-use planning. . ." See "Labor and the Farmer" in Toward a New Day, p. 12.

TWUA anticipated the PAC recommendation for "adequate federal aid" to states and cities for education and espoused financial assistance for "needy" college and high school students. It too urged "adequate" teachers' salaries and "freedom of teachers to organize, and freedom of teaching." It also touched upon curriculum, endorsing technical training and training in the social sciences, in the problem of government, in international affairs and
in cultural studies as will make for the greatest possible contribution by the young men and women graduates to the solution of the industrial, social and political problems of today.

Above all, "the educational system must be permeated in administration as in teaching with the true spirit of democracy..." and must inspire in students "... an unquenchable passion to serve their fellowmen and an unaltering devotion to the democratic way of life."

In justification for federal aid special attention was paid to the plight of "tens of thousands of children of textile workers," especially in the South, where state financial resources were "strained" to provide even an "unsatisfactory" education.\(^\text{11}\)

\(^{11}\) No reference to racial inequalities in educational facilities appeared in the TWUA document, nor any admonition against unwarranted federal "interference." See "Education" in ibid., p. 13. Cf. p. 383n above.

On taxes TWUA favored "progressive" income, inheritance and gift taxes, insisted upon continued wartime income tax rates until the war-induced public debt should be "wiped out," and proposed that revenues from federal and state taxes based upon the principle of ability to pay be made available to local governments to forestall the latter's resort to sales taxes. It also recommended "a basic educational program... on the purposes and values of proper systems of taxation" to combat the notion that lower tax rates mean better government and advised use of the taxing power "to take the profits out of war and to aid in a more equitable distribution of wealth and..."
The major features of the remaining planks, three of which contained the word "democracy," all revolved about a common theme closely compatible with the tax planks: namely, that there was nothing so sacred about private enterprise or private profit as to militate against the post-war continuance of social controls or against the entry of government into new fields of ownership and service.

Under "Social Controls" TWUA scolded corporations for allegedly extracting unconscionable wartime profits from government and public; approved contemporary "controls over production, distribution, profits, prices, services and wages" to the extent that they were "effectively applied," to curb inflation and promote equitable distribution; and counselled resistance to the doctrine that peacetime controls were "un-American ..." Industries must "serve the people..." and controls should prevent inflation and assure full use of "human, technical and mechanical resources for the common good." Under "War Plant Conversion" TWUA recognized that the U.S. Government at war had come into possession of industrial facilities worth "more than 18½ billions of dollars." Unlike Governor Dewey, the IEC did not view this fact with alarm. "These plants are our plants" and "must be made to serve the purposes of the people," not by sale "to
private interests for a few cents on the dollar," but by government operation "through a federal authority such as the TWA," both to "check monopoly" and directly to "aid the people of the nation."^16

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16. By way of "loans, investments, purchase contracts, and other commitments in connection with the war" the government now owned "more than 1,300 plants for the production of ships, planes, tanks, guns, ordnance, magnesium, aluminum, steel, copper, other metals, synthetic rubber, high octane gasoline, machine tools, pipe lines, and industrial establishments almost without end." Toward a New Day, p. 10. Cf. p. 156 above.

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Under "Public Utilities" the "New Day" sponsors asserted the "desirability" of popular control over big public utilities in "transportation, communication and electric light and power."^17

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17. It was not clear whether they had reference to a single level of government or whether any form of non-governmental (e.g., cooperative) ownership was envisioned. "Our telephones, our telegraph facilities, our railroads, our gas and electric industry are in the hands of powerful monopolies and semi-monopolies. . . . [Within each] small groups of industrialists and financiers hold the economic and social welfare of millions of workers in the palm of their hands." In the national interest, therefore, these should be run "by the many and not by the few; by the democratic community and not by private monopolists." Toward a New Day, p. 10.

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"Community control" should extend too over "all of our natural resources"--coal, iron, oil, forests, water, etc. For two objectives at least, restoration of forests to a "productive condition" and the conservation and harnessing of water power, "public acquisition and management [versus] the only means." Citations included the multitudinuous benefits of the Tennessee Valley Authority. In a special plank on "Monopolies" "numerous" other unspecified industries,
not catalogued traditionally as public utilities, were marked for "extension of community control... whenever the safety, the security, the health, the general welfare, and the freedom of the nation demand such extension."\(^{18}\)

\(^{18}\) Reference was made, without illustration, to industries wherein "monopolistic practices exist(ed)," leading in private hands to "irresponsible concentration of power, to high and rigid prices, to low purchasing power... to unemployment and hard times." *Ibid.*, p. 11.

These domestic policy provisions of the THUA program began and ended with reference to rights of labor. In an initial section "democracy" was equated with a denial of the "lust(s) for wealth, prestige and power" which constituted "the root of the rising flood that now engulfs us..." Attention was called to a universal struggle of "common people of the world... for the extension of democracy"; to the fight in America "to give meaning to the Bill of Rights--to freedom of speech... press... assembly, and freedom of worship"; to *THUA*'s struggle "against the historic feudalism" of the textile industry and a host of associated evils: "management's denial" of the right to organize and bargain collectively, the "industrial spy system," the "blacklist," the "terrorists called company police," the "unemployment and part-time employment, which the textile industry has reduced almost to a science," "company stores... peonage... the blight of company houses," and the "political, educational and social control of whole communities and entire states by the industrial overlords of the... industry."
TWUA's remedy was more "Democracy in Government and in Industry." Specifically this meant abolishing the poll tax—which disfranchised Negroes and whites, including many textile workers. It meant an end to economic and political discrimination based on race, color, religion or national origin. It also meant building consumers' cooperatives and stronger unions and maintaining (or re-asserting where temporarily forfeited) and extending collective bargaining rights and the right to strike, picket and boycott. The Wagner Act should be strengthened and governmental machinery perfected for mediation of industrial disputes. Federal guarantees must be extended to "workers in businesses conducted wholly within a state." Furthermore, since the post-war era would see "increasing thousands of workers... in the employ of public industry," public employees too must have the right to organize and bargain collectively and to settle disputes "before an impartial arbitrator." Finally, since "reactionary forces loose today... mobilizing to 'put labor in its place' and, if possible, to crush it," labor must "war against" its enemies and "counter with a constructive program for the extension of democratic institutions."19 At the conclusion of the document this theme was reverted to as everyone under the textile union's standard was urged to do political and legislative battle against the "labor-baiters," the "labor-haters," the "enemies of progress," the "foes of
democracy" who were forging deadly weapons in an "unholy crusade against the forward march of the common man... toward a better day." 20


Biographical Background on Members of the TMUA-PAC Cast

In the absence of comprehensive research of a kind quite outside the scope of this project, how much if any weight should be given to general biographical data on individual participants in the PAC movement is problematical. Viewed in proper perspective, however, some such information must make for a fuller appreciation of the nature of the TMUA-PAC force, by clothing subject unionists with flesh and blood and by suggesting some of the possible political determinants in their lives. As a prelude, therefore, to a geographically segmented picture of TMUA-PAC in the field, and a final evaluation of PAC's meaning for America, the remainder of this chapter will be devoted to information relating to age, education, place of birth, religion, size of family, father's occupation, period of entry into the labor movement, interests and organizational affiliations. This information is derived in the main from the "authorized biographies of the men and women who lead labor in the United States..." as contained in the 1946 Dryden Press publication, Who's Who in Labor. 21
Marion Dickerman and Ruth Taylor, exec. eds. Other miscellaneous sources have yielded occasional bits of information in these categories. Albert Clifton, 1944 TWUA-PAC representative, has been especially helpful in this regard. For detailed characterizations of several TWUA personalities who figure in this study (Tom McMahon, Herb Payne, Mariano Bishop, Ed Doolan, Joe White) see Kelly, *Nine Lives for Labor*, passim.

Data in most topical categories have been assembled on all but three of the twenty-one TWUA leaders named as sponsors of *Toward a New Day*, and, in the several categories, upon varying numbers of additional Textile personalities. A few of the latter are associated with PAC only inferentially by virtue of union offices or staff positions, international or local. Most have been or will be introduced in these pages in direct connection with the political developments of 1941-44. The fifteen (out of eighteen) IEC members surveyed, in addition to officers Rieve, Baldanzi and Pollack, are John Chupka, Edward Doolan, Sander Genis, William Gordon, Carl Holderman, James Kelly, Joseph Knapik, R. R. Lawrence, William Leader, Alex McKeown, Elizabeth Nord, Herbert W. Payne, Milton Rosenberg, Joseph R. White and Herbert S. Williams. Attention will be directed then toward

Since sources examined have yielded no PAC-relevant information regarding two of the three remaining IEC members (Griggs of North Carolina and Wallace of Philadelphia) these are perhaps not properly subject to analysis anyway. The third for whom biographical data is lacking is Douglas Anderson. Save for Chupka, a replacement appointed subsequently to an IEC vacancy, all were elected at the 1941 TWUA convention.
these and, for comparison and contrast, toward selected groups of unionists functioning during 1941-44 in two major sectional areas, New England and the South, and in a single middle Atlantic state, New Jersey. Amounts of background information assembled on different individuals vary and the sole criterion for selection has been the pragmatic one of availability of material. Actually, the sectional samples too represent, in the main, international rather than local union personnel—and they overlap the officers' sample. Moreover, the total number comprises only a fraction of the persons who cast 1943 convention votes to ratify *Toward a New Day*, who took part in the IEC's endorsement of the People's Program, who made speeches or actively pioneered for a or the PAC, as described in preceding chapters, or who helped to organize and promote CIO and union participation in the '44 campaign.

It is of more than casual interest that out of seventeen officers on whom information on age is in hand ten were under 35 in 1932. Moreover, seven were under thirty, thus it was at a relatively youthful age that a majority were caught up in or exposed to the distress of the Great Depression, the Roosevelt-Hoover election campaign, and the excitement of the initial years of the New Deal. Seven still were 40 or under as of 1944, the very youngest being a trio of Dyers Federationists—Baldanzi, Knapik and Gordon. Gordon just turned 21 in 1932, becoming manager of his Brooklyn local the following year and, in 1934, a member of the Dyers' executive board. Only four of the seventeen had reached the age of 50 at the time of
the first PAC campaign: Joe White, the eldest, who was 61, and Hosiery veterans Rieve, Holderman and McKeown. Out of sixteen on whom dates or periods of entry into the labor movement have been ascertained, all had union careers which antedated TWOC while most, like Elizabeth Nord, lone feminine IEC member, had been a part, not only of the frustrating story of textile unionism under the UTW but of the spectacular general strike of 1934. At least eight had joined a labor union prior to 1930. Four came to textile unionism—in or during or before TWOC—from unions in other fields.23

23Genis of ACWA, Kelly of the United Mine Workers, Lawrence of the Typographical Union, Williams of the Pressmen.

Occupational pursuit of the subject's paternal parent has been determined for fourteen of the highest TWUA leaders. Just one, Herb Payne, was the son of a textile employer. A young man of thirty when Franklin D. Roosevelt first campaigned for the presidency, the younger Payne by that time already had forsaken an incipient career of his own on (textile) management's side of the bargaining table for a life inside the labor movement, moved, in the late 1920's, according to biographer Richard Kelly, not by "economic necessity," the "accidents or pressures of environment," or by "a random impulse to help others," but by a reasoned decision "to live his life in a certain way. . . ."24 At least four of Payne's colleagues—president

24Kelly, Mine Lives for Labor, p. 11.
Rieve, secretary Pollack and IEC members Doolan and Gordon—were sons of men who worked in the industry. Their fathers were listed in Dickerman and Taylor as, respectively, a "textile mill machinist," "a weaver," a "textile operative" and a "textile worker."

others were also men who worked with their hands. Two were miners, two railroaders, one a puddler in a steel mill. One was designated in the labor "Who's Who" simply as "a laborer." These were, in order, the fathers of Baldanzi and Kelly, Holderman and Leader, McKeown, and Chupka. Of the remaining three, two were contractors and one a farmer (fathers of Lawrence, White and Williams).

If the factor of relative youthfulness is outstanding among union officialdom it is even more so in the case of the sectional groups. As of 1944, more than two-thirds of a New England sample (20 out of 27) were between the ages of 32 and 43, thus a majority were in their 'teens and twenties when FDR told a desperate nation it had nothing to fear but fear itself. A comparable proportion of a southern sample of twenty (13) were in the 30-40 age bracket in 1944. Out of a group of eleven, address New Jersey, fully eighty percent (9) were between the ages of 31 and 39 in 1944. Carl Holderman, at fifty, was the oldest. No more than two of the New Jersey group were born before 1900, just under one-quarter (7) of the New Englanders and just under one-third (7) of the southerners.

The southern group of twenty consisted of W. T. Adcock, Paul Christopher, Douglas Eames, William B. Frazier, Lloyd A. Gossett, Robert A. Johnson, John Kabler, Roy Lawrence, Boyd E. Payton, Paul T. Schuler, W. Cedric Stallings, Roland C. Thomas, W. J. Tullar, Horace P. White, Grant L. Williams, Herbert S. Williams, James Wilson, Lucy R. Mason, James A. Dundon and Carl Albrecht. (Albrecht in 1914 was functioning as a southern representative for ACWA, his home union. He had previously worked for TWOC and in 1911 attended the TWUA convention as a delegate from an Ohio Textile local. Dundon was located in the border state of Maryland, all the rest in the bloc of states classified generally as "the South.")

The eleven New Jersey unionists were Irving Abramson, George Baldanzii, Evelyn Dubrow, Vito Fritz, Carl Holderman, Joseph W. Knepik, George Nejaeh, Charles Serraino, Ralph Spinelli, Sol Statin, and Irving Zeichner.

As for entry into the labor movement, for most members of three slightly smaller geographical samples this coincided with the onset of the New Deal or the years immediately preceding. Seventeen of 20 New Englanders entered the labor movement before they were 30, most of them during the 1930's or late 1920's. Only one traced his union membership no farther back than 1940. Another, Joe White, received his first union card in 1901 at the age of 20. At least three others joined unions at 20 or younger—including Joe Salerno (in 1913), George Carignon (1924) and Mariano Bishop at 18 (1924). No more than four out of a southern sample of eighteen were over 30 when they first
joined a union—including R. C. Thomas in 1932 at the age of 34, Paul Schuler in 1938 at age 33, and Lucy Randolph Mason in 1937 at 55. Eleven of the latter group entered the labor movement between 1930 and 1938, five between 1916 and 1930 (four of this latter group via unions other than UTW or its associated federations). Periods of entry have been ascertained for nine of the New Jersey eleven. Carl Holderman became a union man in 1918, the rest during the 1930's. Only one, Evelyn Dubrow of AFG, was not from the outset associated with a union in the textile field. All but two of the nine had entered a labor organization no later than his twenty-fifth year. One (Charles Serrano) was under 20 when he joined Dyers Local 1983 in 1932. 27

27 The twenty New England unionists on whom such data was obtained: Arivella, Belanger, Benti, Bishop, Chapka, Clifton, Daoust, Dickens, Doolan, England, Gingras, Jabar, Frank, Kullas, Nealon, Novo, Salerno, White, Wilcox and Carignon. The southern group of eighteen consisted of all those named in the preceding note save Tullar and Grant Williams. Similarly, the New Jersey subjects included all listed in the preceding note save Abramson and Knapik.

Study of the New England and southern groups reveals some considerable contrast in father's occupation. Of a southern sample of twenty, one-quarter might be said to have been "born into" the textile industry, although one of the five parents was a cotton mill superintendent and another a part-time farmer as well as a textile worker. 28 As high as 40 per cent (8) of a New England sample of
This group of five included Tennessee PAC leader Paul Christopher, who learned cotton weaving from his mother, silk-weaving from his father. His father was a loom fixer and an "ardent union man" who was blacklisted in 1917 and obtained jobs thereafter under an assumed name. See Calvin Kylte, "Union Organizer," The Reporter, 3/28/50, pp. 16-18. The other four included W. T. Adcock, whose father was also a loom fixer. For the complete southern group surveyed see p. 398n above.

Of the remaining fifteen in the South, at least three had fathers in government or professional service (identified as "War Department," "army man," and minister). One described his father as a "collector." None of the New England fathers fell into a similar category although one was a "city employee." Five southern fathers were in farming or business (two farmers, two building contractors, one lumber man). In New England just one was a contractor, another a farmer and carpenter, another a grocery owner and mill hand. Two of the southern parents were railroadmen and four were workers skilled respectively in carpentry (2), tool making, and tailoring. The remaining eight in New England...
included two machinists, two railroad employees (including a locomotive engineer), one barber, one brick layer, one laborer and one hotel steward and waiter. Occupational data covers a sample of only seven New Jersey unionists. Two of these indicated that their fathers had worked in the textile industry (George Najmah and Ralph Spinelli). Only one of five others offering such information indicated that his father was an employer (a building contractor). The other four worked in the mines, on the railroads, or in industry, none in the professions. Allowing for some slight distortion because of the duplication of half a dozen names on the two lists, if one combines the officer and sectional samples one is struck unavoidably by the heavy concentration—perhaps up to 70 per cent—of all of these TWUA subjects as children in households of workers outside of agriculture or the white collar world.30

30 Out of 61 subjects (six of the officers appear also in the sectional groups—two each in New Jersey, New England, and the South), 31 per cent (19 or 20) came from textile industry families alone; less than 30 per cent came from families in which the paternal parent was a farmer or business operator, or in a (possible) professional or white collar employee category.

Place of birth and national descent are of especial interest in view of the frequent allegation that PAC represented an "alien" factor in American politics. Place of birth has been ascertained for 21 southern and 27 New England unionists. All of the former were native Americans and, notwithstanding the demonstrated mobility of union organizers, seventeen were born in the South or (2) in
neighboring border states. Nineteen of the New England group were

The remaining four came originally from Ohio, Michigan, Indiana and Vermont. One additional unionist (not covered in Who's Who in Labor) has been added to the twenty named on p. 398: Witherspoon Dodge, who left TWUA in 1943 for work with the War Production Board. Dundon and Payton were born, respectively, in Maryland and West Virginia. The Midwesterners were Albrecht, Gossett and Tullar; the Vermonter, Paul Schuler.

born within and eight outside the United States, each of the latter (a naturalized American citizen) coming from a different country--the Azores, Czecho-Slovakia, England, Canada, Syria, Ireland, Portugal and Italy (Bishop, Chupka, Dickens, Gingras, Joseph, McMahon, Novo and Salerno). Birthplaces of all but two of the native-born--Bamford, who first saw light of day in Philadelphia, and Benti in New Jersey--were in New England. National descent has not been estab-

This list of subjects is identical with the one on p. 398. (McMahon birthplace obtained from Kelly, p. 68.)

lished statistically for native-born members in either geographical area although a recitation of names is perhaps not unfairly suggestive. For the South the names which appear to be typical are Johnson, Lawrence, Mason, Thomas, Williams, White, Wilson and the like. On the other hand, while the "Who's Who" compilation for New

This, notwithstanding the presence also of a Savoie (in New Orleans), a Schuler and a Switzer in southern TWUA ranks. (Neither Switzer nor Savoie is listed in Dickerman and Taylor.)
England also comprehends such names as Brown, Clarke, Taylor, White and Wilcox, these unionists tend to be outnumbered by others whose names suggest a variety of nationality backgrounds not duplicated in the South—from Arivella, Belanger, Cansano, Carignon and Cavanagh, to Daoust and Doolan, Jabar, Phelan and Sposato. A list of nine A vivid description of nationality groupings among the mill workers of New England—the Portuguese and French in Fall River; the "tumbled generations of the Italians, the Poles, the Greeks, the French, the Irish in the mills sprawling for miles along the Merrimack [In Massachusetts and New Hampshire]," etc., see Kelly, Nine Lives for Labor, p. 144 et passim.

New England names in addition to the twenty-six found in the Dickerman and Taylor volume was submitted to TMUA's Albert Clifton for checking on several factors. With regard to nationality Clifton identified four as of Irish extraction and one each as French-Canadian, English, Italian, Portuguese and Polish. One of the eleven


New Jersey subjects named on page 396 above, Sol Stetin, was a former Polish immigrant and a naturalized American citizen. The rest were native-born and all were born either in New Jersey (1) or in neighboring New York (3) or Pennsylvania (3), into families of east, west or south European birth or descent. As for officers and executive
council, place of birth has been determined for sixteen of the twenty-one. Three (less than one-fifth) were born on east European soil—Rieve in Poland, Chupka in Czechoslovakia, Genis in Russia. The rest were born in New York state (White, Rosenberg and Hofferman), Pennsylvania (Baldanzi, Pollack, Kelly, Leader, McKeown and Payne), and one each in Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina and Tennessee (Doolan, Gordon, Lawrence and Williams).36

36See p. 394 above.

Information on educational achievement is incomplete but it is clear that few officers had extensive formal schooling and that only a fraction of the illustrative sectional samples obtained "higher" education. For just under a third of the officers (four to six out of seventeen) and a comparable fraction of the southern and New Jersey samples (six out of twenty and three out of eleven) elementary school represents the upper limit of formal education attained. Probably one-half of a New England group of thirty-three did not go beyond the eighth grade in public or parochial school. At the other end of the scale two IEC members had law degrees (Genis and Gordon), one New Jersey subject had an LL. B. (Abramson) and another a Ph.D. (Zeichner). At least nine others from the three sectional groups in the aggregate had some college level work37 while the rest acquired varying amounts

37Two of these were in New England, four in the South, three in New Jersey. Conceivably some of these had degrees although most, in their Who's Who in Labor biographies, merely specified "courses" or
number of years attended. E.g., Joseph Salerno's education included four years, Suffolk Law School, and unspecified periods of study at Boston University, the Modern School of Literature and Expression and the College of the Spoken Word, Brookline, Massachusetts, two years. Dickerman and Taylor, p. 311.

and kinds of schooling beyond the elementary grades, ranging from "night course" or "correspondence course," "technical school" or "one year of high school" to high school graduation. Neither president Rieve nor executive vice-president Baldanzi went beyond grade school and not more than three to five of the officers surveyed earned high school diplomas. 38

38 Genis, Gordon, McKeown, and possibly Pollack and Lawrence. Data obtained is unclear. The subjects for this educational survey comprise all officers and IEC members save Anderson, Knapik, Griggs and Wallace; all of the southern unionists previously listed save Tullar, with Witherspoon Dodge added; all eleven of the original New Jersey group, and all but one (Stanelia) of the 27-member New England group named on p. 398 above, plus seven additional persons on whom Albert Clifton has supplied relevant data. Clifton is the source for information in this category on McMahon, Casey, Gallagher, Pilot, Sullivan, Sylvia, Nord, Gelissen, Chupka and Gingras. See pp. 394, 403 n above.

Domestic data derivable from the "Who's Who" biographies shows, as of 1946, that at least fourteen officers and IEC members had married and that they had a total of 28 children, ranging from none to five. A minimum of sixteen out of twenty southern subjects and seven of the New Jersey eleven were married and, as of 1946, averaged 2.37 and 2.14 children, respectively, per family unit. As of 1944 all but one of the Southern group had been married eleven years or more, all of the New Jersey group a minimum of eight. By the same date at least
of the New England "Who's Who" subjects had married, twenty-one of them five or more years previously. Fifteen had been married more than one and seven more than two decades. As of 1946 the New England group averaged 1.91 children per family unit.\(^{39}\)

Considerable diversity is revealed in a consideration of religious background although there is little on the surface to lend credence to campaign intimations that PAC represented a forward thrust of atheistic elements. A southern sample was predominantly Protestant, two out of seventeen being Catholic while the rest were Baptist (7), Methodist (4), Episcopalian (1), Presbyterian turned Congregationalist (1), "Protestant" (1), New Thought (1). By contrast, 28 out of 33 New Englanders were Catholic while one each has been identified as "Protestant," Methodist, and Lutheran, and two as "non-Catholic."\(^{40}\) Three out of five New Jersey subjects signifying religious affiliation or preference were Catholic, one Episcopalian and one Jewish.\(^{41}\) Religious data on TWUA officers appears in the labor

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\(^{39}\) See p. 398 above.

\(^{40}\) Southern subjects: Adcock, Christopherk Dodge, Frazier, Gossett, Johnson, Kabler, Lawrence, Payton, Stallings, Thomas, G. Williams, H. Williams, Wilson, Mason, Albrecht, Dundon. The New England subjects include all of the 27 named on p. 398 above save Stanelum and Taylor and, in addition, those whose names were submitted to Clifton. See p. 403 above.

\(^{41}\) Fritz, Mejah and Serraino; Holdeman and Zeichner.
"Who's Who" in only eight cases and information from other sources accounts for only two additional personalities. Of these ten, four were Roman Catholic, two Baptist, two Congregationalist, one Episcopalian and one other "non-Catholic."  

Officers and IEC members on whom this information has been obtained (from Albert Clifton and Dickerman and Taylor): Chupka, Doolan, Holderman, Kelly, Lawrence, McKeown, Nord, Pollack, White, and Williams.  

Borrowing again from Dickerman and Taylor, only a few categories remain which may be of some value in assessing the nature of the TWUA force: secular (including political) organizational affiliations, public services (present or past) and "interests." Here the diversity of data precludes systematized presentation. Selecting at random three alphabetized series of Textile personalities on whom such information appears in Who's Who in Labor (half a dozen from New England, four from New Jersey, five from the South), one finds under "public activity" at least twenty memberships on state or lesser area wartime agencies such as the OPA, WMC, WLB and WPB (as panel members, advisory committee members, etc.); at least two on industry committees operating under the Fair Labor Standards Act. At least five memberships are listed in an American Red Cross committee or executive board while nine involve war relief agencies, War Chest or War Bond drives, the Community Chest or other comparable causes. Other organizations in which a single membership or office is cited include: the YWCA (industrial), a county social planning council,
a city Defense Council, a state unemployment compensation commission advisory committee, a community recreation association, a Southern School for Workers, the Southern Conference for Human Welfare, a Salvation Army advisory board, a state education committee, the Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children, a Consumers League. 
One single individual in this group of fifteen (Frank Benti) specified service on state councils and committees having to do with war finance, veterans' retraining and employment, manpower, and health. One recalled service in the U.S. Army, World War I. Another cited activity for many years in national, state and local elections while one each reported a top office in a county, city or state PAC.¹³

¹³Subjects for this breakdown were Benti, Carignon, Chupka, Clifton, Daoust, Dichard, Mejneh, Serraino, Spinelli, Zeichner, Payton, Schuler, Stallings, Thomas and White. See p. 398 above.

Among the same fifteen, just five acknowledged a partisan political association: all Democrats and all but one resident in the South.¹⁴

¹⁴Three (one in each sectional group) specified "PAC" but this is obviously misleading since those who neglected to make such references include such known PAC activists as Clifton and Schuler.

As many as six in this tri-sectional group supplied no information regarding possible club or other memberships outside the field of party, political, or other public service. Among those who did there is slight duplication although membership in fraternal and insurance orders was fairly common.¹⁵
Two of the southerners reported membership in both the Junior Order, United American Mechanics and in the Improved Order of Red Men. Other orders cited—in each case by one of the southern contingent—include the Moose, Masons, and Woodmen of the World. One of the New Englanders reported membership in a Loom Fixers Club and the Sacred Heart Society. The New Jersey sample encompassed memberships in a Jewish Men's Club, the Dover Club, two Italian-American organizations (an Italo-American Anti-Fascist Club and the Free Italy-America Labor Council), and the Workmen's Circle, described at one time by Sidney Hillman as the "largest insurance organization among workers." See ACWA, Proceedings, 1931, p. 297.

Exploration into the secular affiliations and public service responsibilities of international union officers and IEC members also yields a variety of connections with governmental, political fraternal, social, nationality group, occupational, social welfare and civic organizations. More than a dozen of these highest union leaders had served or were serving on one or more governmental bodies—from the NRA of the '30's and the FLSA through Selective Service, the National Defense Mediation Board, WPB, WMC, and the War Labor Board. President Rieve and secretary Pollack had attended international labor conferences on American delegations or served on advisory committees for international bodies. Rieve held an office in the National Planning Association and membership on boards of directors for the American Arbitration Association and the Foreign Policy Association. George Baldanzi was on the executive council of a Council for Democracy and secretary of the Free Italy-America Labor Council. Roy Lawrence had an office in the Southern Conference for Human Welfare. Alex McKeown was vice-president of the Carl Mackley
Apartments, AFHW housing project in Philadelphia; Ed Doolan, treasurer of a Fall River Textile Workers' Credit Union, trustee of the Bradford Durfee Textile School and member of the Bristol County Infantile Paralysis Committee. James Kelly was on the Carbon county (Pennsylvania) Board of Relief and Mother's Assistance. Herbert Williams had been a Baptist choir director for fourteen years. Joe White was a future recipient of the "Bishop McAuliffe award for promoting the standards of social justice according to the teachings of his church."

And so on. Other civic, social, and fraternal affiliations (not often duplicated) ranged from the ARC, the USO, the YMCA, and the League for Industrial Democracy to the Knights of Pythias, Knights of Columbus, Elks, Masons, the Dover Club (Paterson, New Jersey), the Broadwood Athletic Club (Philadelphia), the Press and Radio Club (Birmingham) and the Lighthouse Boys Club (Philadelphia).

Twelve of the officers covered in Who's Who in Labor specified a political preference or activity. MeKeown described himself as "non-partisan"; Holdeman, Kelly and Leader listed "PAC"; four called themselves Democrats and three said they were members of the American Labor Party of New York (Doolan, Lawrence, White, and Williams; Rieve, Gordon and Rosenberg). One indicated past Socialist affiliation and "later" membership in the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party (Genis). IEC member Anderson's pre-PAC work with the Oregon Commonwealth
Federation has been cited elsewhere. Herbert Payne, according to biographer Kelly, once "attended meetings of the Socialist Party" and "meetings of A. J. Muste's Committee for Progressive Labor Action. . . . But] was never really a party man."47

47 Ibid., p. 17. For brief review of the CPLA of the late 1920's and early '30's see Sidney Lens, Left, Right and Center, pp. 260-62. See also p. 347 above.

Professions of interest in one or more of a variety of sports were made by more than a third of the TWUA officers covered in the Dickerman and Taylor directory while other interests and hobbies ranged widely from gardening and poultry raising (Kelly), "musicals and movies" (Doolan), "speaking and debating" (Genis), to "song-writing and labor history and politics" (Leader). Sports and hobbies apparently attracted a majority of the subjects comprising the sectional samples reviewed above while smaller numbers of all the unionists surveyed here cited "reading" or otherwise manifested interest in intellectual or cultural pursuits. Significantly, despite the dearth of diplomas, more than one individual appears to have continued his education zealously outside the school house, in books as well as in the union hall and on the picket line. It is of interest that the Hosiery Worker, on the occasion of Emil Rieve's first election to the TWUA presidency, was at pains to point out that although he went into the mills at a tender age--at three dollars a week for a 12-hour day which precluded school attendance--"he read all
available texts on economics and attended night school whenever he could. . . " On Alex McKeown's accession to the Hosiery Federation presidency the same journal noted that when the latter was not engaged in union business he might be found fishing in Lake Hopatcong or off the Jersey coast—or at home "nose buried deep into a book on economics. . . ."

\[48\] Hosiery vice-president Alfred Hoffmann too was said to enjoy gardening and reading—and his preferred subjects were said to be economics and labor. See Hosiery Worker, 6/2/39, p. 4; 10/6/39, pp. 3, 5.

Amalgamated Contrasts

Without embarking upon a second survey comparable to that just concluded it may be remarked that a limited study of some of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers' personality contributions to the 1944 PAC cast of characters reveals rather marked contrasts in background in several categories across the two unions' jurisdictional boundaries. Skeleton Who's Who in Labor biographies are available, for example, on president Hillman, ACWA secretary Jacob Potofsky, and twelve of the fifteen members of the union's General Executive Board. With respect to this group only, the national origin picture presented by TWUA is reversed. Just two out of fourteen were born in the United States—one in Milwaukee, another in New York City. The remaining twelve (all U. S. citizens) were of European birth, one being born in England, another in Italy, and the rest in eastern Europe—Russia, the Baltic countries, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
In their Who's Who biographies only five of the fourteen ACWA subjects made specific reference to religion, one citing membership in the Freethinker Society for Ethical Culture, the others signifying adherence to or training in the Jewish faith. Information on education, available on only eleven subjects, is more like that on TWUA personalities. One of these cited "business college and Benton College of Law," another "evening school, mostly self-educated." The others specified grade or public school (3) or some level of high school or other training. Paraphanetically, it may be noted that both the Amalgamated and the Hosiery Federation in pre-TWOC days had their own educational programs and encouraged members to attend Brookwood Labor College, a workers' school at Katonah, New York (1921-1937) which undertook primarily to train students for union leadership while seeking also to promote "ideological unionism" and social change.49 Both ACWA and the Hosiery Workers financed union member scholarships for attendance at the college. TWUA education director Rogin was on the Brookwood teaching staff (1935-1937), while one of the union's field staff, described in 1944 as a "queen among canvassers," Helen Gregory, was a one-time Brookwood student. So too was AFHW vice-president Alfred Hoffmann, who, by AFHW journal account in 1939, got a "deeper insight" into unionism when a federation
scholarship sent him to a term "at the late lamented Brookwood Labor College."50

50 See, for example, Hosiery Worker, 10/15/28, p. 3; 10/6/39, p. 5; ACWA, Proceedings, 1924, p. 309. Information also obtained from Lawrence Rogin, Interview, Dec. 17, 1951. See p. 549 below.

Apart from national origin perhaps one of the most startling differences between the TWUA and ACWA subjects lies in age levels and in periods of entry into the labor movement. For many of the Textile subjects, as previously indicated, one is impressed, especially, by their relative youthfulness at the time of their exposure to the overwhelming economic forces which culminated in the Great Depression and by the fact that for a majority of those surveyed introduction into the labor movement came during a short span of years preceding or contemporaneous with the heyday of the New Deal. This, notwithstanding the fact that initiation into trade unionism came for some, like Rieve, Hosiery president McKeown, and such an outstanding PAC figure as Carl Holderman, as far back as the first or second decade of the century. Like the Textile subjects, most of the Amalgamated leaders became union members at an early age. However, initiation into unionism for most of them came long before the economic debacle of 1929. None was yet 30 and at least four were under 20 years of age when they first joined a union. Virtually every one of the group had joined the Amalgamated, its predecessor (the United Garment Workers) or another trade union some time prior to (11) or during (2)
1914, the year the ACWA was founded. By 1944 only two of the group were under 50 and four were 60 or over. 51

51 Subjects for this ACWA survey: Sidney Hillman, union secretary Jacob Potofsky and GEB members A. D. Mariapietri, Samuel Levin, Hyman Blumberg, Charles Weinstein, Dorothy Bellanca, Abraham Chatman, Frank Rosenblum, Louis Hollander, Jack Kroll, Murray Weinstein, William Reznicek and Leo Krzycki. The "oldest" of this group, in terms of union membership, were Krzycki of Milwaukee, who joined the Amalgamated in 1919, and Reznicek of New York, who became an ACWA member through the affiliation of the Journeymen Taylors' Union in 1936. Krzycki dated himself as "active in the labor movement since 1898." In 1904-08 he was an officer of the Lithographic Press Feeders Union (AFL). Reznicek held local JTU office as far back as 1904 and a JTU executive board post in 1911. Dickerman and Taylor, passim. GEB members as of 1944 for whom such data as the above has not been compiled: Joseph Catalanotti, Abraham Miller and Stephen Skala.

PAC Activists Are of as Well as Within the Community

If one would be hard put to assume that all individual components of the TWUA factor in PAC shared a universally high degree of acceptance for the separate planks in the TWUA and CIOPAC platforms of 1943-44, he would be equally hard put, on the basis of the foregoing, to attribute a common enthusiasm for PAC and FDR—within as well as across international union boundaries—to an identical social and cultural heritage, notwithstanding many demonstrated similarities in background and experience among the subject unionists. Marked differences occurred, as described, among members of TWUA's official household and within and across geographical boundaries, notably in the provinces of education, religion, and national descent.
Even though the samples are small and admittedly unscientifically selected, the folly of presuming to relate practical political preferences and/or PAC predilections automatically to given levels of formal schooling (or to special schooling), to age, to church affiliation, to national origin, to parental occupation, etc., would seem to be obvious from the data presented above.

If, however, PAC is to be appreciated in terms of people, the value of such a résumé of elementary biographical facts, along with the other socio-economic data touched upon here, lies precisely in its resultant emphasis upon diversity as well as uniformity, among the different individuals involved in the PAC movement. It lies, also, paradoxically, in the extent to which the collective character of PAC was moulded (nationally and in any given geographical setting) by individuals who shared common experiences, interests, affiliations, and associations, with an infinite number of non-labor citizen voters as well as with fellow trade unionists; and by persons whose general background, outside or apart from the labor movement, tends to represent something common rather than unique in the total population picture.

Thus, apart from the evidence presented of domestic, social, and civic obligations assumed by individual subjects, as by common garden variety citizens throughout America, the character of each of the sectional samples can be readily correlated, in several significant particulars, with that of the larger community of which it was a part. For example, one finds the highest percentage (just under
50 per cent) of subjects with parents in a non-industrial occupational category in that part of the country which was least industrialized, the South. One finds sizable percentages of Catholics and of persons of immigrant origin in New England, where this was true of the population at large, and, in sharp contrast, a preponderance of Protestants and of the native-born in the South—as was also true of the total southern population. Similarly, the higher incidence of foreign born and of adherence to the Jewish faith among Amalgamated GEB members as compared with the TWUA officers can be correlated with the fact that the clothing industry was heavily concentrated in the large metropolitan centers of the North and with the fact that the union picture in these respects tended to conform to that of the industry as a whole, employers as well as employees.52


In this connection, attention has been called to the fact that despite the immigrant origins of most ACWA members in the union's early days, by the beginning of the 1950's the degree of "Americanization" reached was reflected in the fact that the union journal was then "issued only in English, as the overwhelming majority of the members read no other language." Statement of president Potofsky, cited in Matthew Josephson, Sidney Hillman, Statesman of American Labor (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1952), p. 313n. In 1920 Amalgamated publications were printed in French, Russian, Lithuanian, Bohemian, Polish, Italian, and Yiddish, as well as in English. See GEB Report, ACWA, Proceedings, 1920, 176.

In the realm of politics, despite the skimpiness of the samples, it is of interest that while no one in any region specified membership in the Republican party, some of the TWUA subjects in the
North described themselves as "independent" or "non-partisan."

Among the southerners who supplied information on personal politics, none submitted such a designation. A few identified themselves with PAC. The rest listed themselves as Democrats or identified themselves with both PAC and the Democratic party. Finally, to turn to more frivolous evidence that those who played PAC roles were as well as within the American community, it is of interest that in the realm of recreational passions the word "baseball" appears perhaps more often than any other single sport.
PART VI

TWUA AND PAC "IN THE FIELD" IN 1944
CHAPTER XIV
THE ELECTORAL POTENTIAL

The view which is about to be presented of TWUA-PAC "in the field" is admittedly less conclusive than the picture of "headquarters" commitments described in the preceding chapters. That picture alone may afford sufficient justification for an analysis of the "force" which was TWUA-PAC. Still, if the latter posed a threat to the "American Way" it was, palpably, less because a Hosiery Worker or Textile Labor editorial urged the reelection of FDR than because there were voters somewhere who were in a position to be influenced by it and because they were sufficiently numerous to be

1 Union journals were not universally a successful medium for political propaganda. Although the ratio was to be reversed in three years; as late as 1943 approximately 70 per cent of Textile Labor Union circulation was channeled to members through the local unions; 30 per cent by direct mail. Actual receipt of the paper thus was often dependent upon a member's presence at union meetings. One former staffer recalled that perhaps 30 or 40 out of a membership of 600 would attend meetings—more if contract re-negotiation were on the order of business. He added that members were often quite legitimately "too tired" to come out to meetings, but whatever the reason for non-attendance, interest in labor publications was "not what it should be." Local officers "took the journal seriously" and encouraged members to read it but many of the latter who did attend meetings did not even take their copies home. Witherspoon Dodge, Interview, Feb. 2, 1954; TWUA, Proceedings, 1946, pp. 127-28.

able to contribute significantly to a Roosevelt plurality; less because a convention or executive body proclaimed the necessity of
returning "progressives" to Congress than because union members, alone or in conjunction with cooperating labor elements, were numerically capable of affecting Senate and House contests. It was not because TWUA enjoined its field staff to push PAC but because staffers demonstrably did so. Plainly, if TWUA was a "threat", it was not because a Rieve served on the CIO Political Action Committee but because Textile personalities of lesser stature supported the cause as IUC and PAC heads at state, city and county levels, as local union officers and PAC chairmen, as "grass roots" canvassers in voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives. It was, furthermore, even where no measurable electoral influence was discernible in '44, because TWUA's political actionists were gaining valuable experience for the future.

Without attempting localized study which might be corroborative of actual electoral impact let attention be directed first, then, at TWUA's electoral potential in selected states and political subdivisions; following that, at evidence of PAC promotional developments occurring under TWUA auspices, and at evidence that leading or supporting roles were played by Textile personalities in the campaign drama acted out under the aegis of the larger CIO.

**Could TWUA Swing an Election? The New England Picture**

According to **Textile Labor**'s election forecast a Roosevelt victory would "hinge" upon the "textile vote in many states." The journal later thought that the returns bore this out. For illustrative
material the forecaster had turned to New England. He cited a TWUA membership of 30,000 in Massachusetts, pointed to "sizable" textile votes in Maine and New Hampshire. He observed that TWUA was "important" in Connecticut—though proportionately less so than in Massachusetts or Rhode Island, which latter state was "safe" for the Democrats. Even in the South union strength was implied as TWUA members were exhorted to muster big majorities for the President and for liberal Congressmen.²

²Textile Labor, Nov. 1944, p. 1. See also p. 367 above.

Pardonable press agentry aside, how strong was TWUA politically, assuming that some members were already so disposed and that the rest, in fulfillment of the opposition's worst fears, could be educated, cajoled or coerced into voting for PAC-endorsed candidates? Was there ever an equivalence between its potential and the size of a Roosevelt plurality? The search for reliable union membership figures to arrange alongside cold and official Census Bureau or election statistics has been only partially fruitful. For obvious reasons union spokesmen are reluctant to disclose actual figures, particularly as broken down geographically, and are more prone to inflate than to underestimate totals. Contract representation statistics also leave much to be desired since not all employees in covered bargaining units necessarily hold union membership. Representation of local units in convention provides at best a faulty guide. In TWUA's case no
convention was held in 1944 and representation of affiliates in 1943 and 1946 derived, in any event, from average membership (based upon per capita taxes paid to the international) over a period stretching as far as two years prior to the convention call. Even then, local delegates represented not an absolute figure but a possible membership range within a graduated scale. Moreover, not all locals availed themselves of convention credentials to which they were entitled and the official Proceedings do not reveal relative size or geographical location of absentees. Finally, it goes without saying that even with the most complete membership figures not all members can be assumed to be of voting age or legally resident within the electoral jurisdiction of their union. On the other hand, there are

If a roster of absentee locals could be compiled it would comprehend old, stable and relatively powerful units as well as tiny, weak organizations. See, for example, the failure of TWUA Local 706 (AFHW Branch 1) to send a delegation to the 1946 TWUA convention. In 1943 this Philadelphia Hosiery unit sent the largest of 31 local delegations from Pennsylvania, with ten of the state's 108 delegates. TWUA, Proceedings, 1943, 1946 passim. See also p. 225 above.

E.g., some Bristol county, Rhode Islanders worked in Fall River, Massachusetts. Albert G. Clifton, 1944 New England TWUA-PAC representative, Questionnaire, Apr. 15, 1954. In the absence of an authoritative membership breakdown by residence these Rhode Island residents must (erroneously) be credited to the TWUA electoral potential of Massachusetts.
factors which tend to compensate for the over-rating of a union's electoral potential as calculated from membership estimates. Not all PAC endeavors were confined to the union membership and one may assume that not all appeals addressed outside the family fell upon deaf ears.  

6See, for example, p. 472n below. See also p. 223 above.

It is with these precautionary qualifications and assumptions in mind, that working figures will be set forth to suggest that electors bombarded with anti-PAC propaganda did have quantitative reasons to be interested if not apprehensive about the true nature of TWJA-PAC. It may be added that the greater the magnification of union strength in the public mind, whether by anti-labor zealots or union publicists, the greater must have been the justification for contemporary popular concern, if PAC was to be proven a party to an alien conspiracy.

New England was the site of TWJA's greatest strength. On the authority of one labor figure, first rank in size among all CIO affiliates went to the Textile union in at least three New England states—Massachusetts, Rhode Island and New Hampshire, while it held second place in Maine and Vermont, and third or fourth in Connecticut. According to this same source TWJA in 1944 represented upwards of 50 per cent of the affiliated membership of the state IUC in Massachusetts, 60 per cent in New Hampshire, from 70 to 85 per cent in Rhode Island.
Clifton adds that not all local CIO unions were affiliated with the state bodies.

All of these, along with Connecticut, "went Democratic" in the 1944 presidential election. Another contemporary source estimated total CIO membership in New England at 200,000 for Massachusetts; 25,000 for New Hampshire; 60,000 for Rhode Island; 100,000 for Connecticut; 30,000 and 10,000, respectively, for Maine and Vermont. Assuming the accuracy of these rounded numbers and the validity of the TWUA percentage figures just cited TWUA membership alone might have accounted for virtually the entire Roosevelt plurality in Rhode Island, for most of his margin in Massachusetts and for many more than the votes which spelled victory in New Hampshire, where Democratic presidential pluralities were, respectively, 51,869; 113,916 and 9,717. A more modest picture of TWUA's probable size emerges using the Clifton percentages and the Anderson estimates TWUA membership in these three states would have been, in the order named, approximately 51,000 (using the maximum 85 per cent figure); 100,000 and 15,000.
from a union survey showing the number of workers under TWUA contract as of 1946:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. Information obtained from Lawrence Rogin, TWUA education Director, Questionnaire, May 29, 1953.

Membership totals for a group of eight states, based upon dues payments before the end of 1945, appear in a 1946 convention report.

Included on this list are Massachusetts with 36,000 and Vermont with 2,400 members. Convention representation records for 1943 and 1946 afford another divergent picture. Taking no account of absentee locals, they suggest the following possible statewide membership ranges:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>(Locals)</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>(Locals)</th>
<th>1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>21,446 to 31,500</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>32,866 to 48,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7,327 to 12,100</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8,848 to 14,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6,820 to 10,600</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6,611 to 11,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4,885 to 7,200</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2,192 to 7,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4,728 to 7,000</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5,719 to 8,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,864 to 2,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These are approximate minimum and maximum membership figures for delegations of the size indicated in the convention credentials.
reports, as computed from the representation formula described in the international union constitution. If one arbitrarily splits the difference between the two possible maximums he finds that a fully mobilized TWUA membership in 1944, so calculated, could theoretically

12 Local unions of from seven to 200 members were entitled to elect one delegate; from 200 to 500 members, two delegates; 500 to 1,000, three delegates. Those having "500 or more members in good standing shall be entitled to three delegates for the first 500 members and one additional delegate for each additional 300 members or majority fraction thereof." Each "joint board and subordinate organization" was entitled to one delegate. Art. V, sec. 6, 7; Art. IX, sec. 1. See p. 423 above.

have accounted for more than a third of the Roosevelt plurality in Massachusetts; roughly one-fourth in both Rhode Island and Connecticut, and more than three-fourths in New Hampshire. The electoral

13 FDR's plurality in Connecticut was 44,619. See p. 425 above.

potential becomes more formidable if one assumes that each TWUA member was capable of influencing a minimum of one additional vote within his or her immediate family. Even if this fanciful picture of intra-union unanimity or of universally susceptible kinfolk is rejected the impression of potential PAC significance persists as one reflects that TWUA, on a statewide basis and in many lesser electoral jurisdictions, was but one of several politically active CIO unions. Locally, not infrequently, TWUA had its being in a one-industry, hence a one-union town.
In few electoral jurisdictions throughout the country did the Roosevelt victory margin of \( \frac{1}{4} \) surpass that of 1940. More often it was smaller, numerically and proportionately, usually in a reduced voter turnout. Only intensive area studies might reveal the extent to which erstwhile Roosevelt supporters or prospective pro-Dewey stay-at-homes may have been terrified into voting Republican by the specter of a PAC-promoted Sovietism such as Governor Dewey conjured up at Boston on November 1. That cultivable TWUA votes may or could have lent substance to those fears or actively prevented the overall Roosevelt plurality decline from being more precipitate than it was, can be thrown into sharp relief by reference to a number of New England areas. Unless otherwise indicated the union membership estimates introduced in this and the following chapters for selected counties, cities and Congressional districts, are calculated, like the state membership ranges presented above, from TWUA convention attendance records. Election and other statistics, unless otherwise documented, are taken or computed from data contained in or based upon official government reports.\(^1\)

\(^1\)Sources include state by state votes for presidential electors and for all nominees for U. S. Senate and House seats in the 79th Congress, in U. S. House, Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional Election of November 7, 1944, Compiled by William Graf under direction of South Trimble, Clerk, 1945, pp. 1-54; "Popular and Electoral Votes for President by Principal Parties and by States 1900-1944" and "Electoral and Popular Votes for President and Vice President (All Parties), Election of Nov. 7, 1944" in U. S. Senate, Electoral and Popular Votes for President (1900-1944) and Congressional Election Statistics (1942-1946), compiled under direction of Carl A. Loeffler, Sec., 1946, pp. 1-5; 6-7; "Votes Cast for Senators in 1942, 1944 and 1946" and "Votes Cast for U. S. Representatives . . . in 1942, 1944 and 1946" in ibid., pp. 7-17; "Voting Statistics,"
Massachusetts

A first illustration may be drawn from Massachusetts, where the President's plurality fell by approximately 23,000 votes from 1940, where a PAC-endorsed Democrat (Maurice Tobin) won the governorship by a much larger margin, and where an "unopposed" GOP candidate for the U. S. Senate (Leverett Saltonstall) swamped his unendorsed Democratic opponent by more than half a million votes. Both the first and second Congressional districts, cutting with wild abandon across county lines in the western third of the Bay State, included a number of Textile communities—Westfield and Holyoke in Hampden county and the first district, Chicopee Falls and Ludlow in Hampden county and the second district; Pittsfield, Adams and North Adams in Berkshire county and the first district, Northampton and Easthampton in Hampshire county and the second district, etc. In the first district a PAC-endorsed Congressional candidate was a "near winner" in an attempt to unseat a GOP incumbent who had won easily in 1942 and was
to do so again in 1916. TMUA membership, probably between 2,200 and 4,800, could not conceivably have supplied the district-wide increase in Democratic Congressional votes over 1912.15 At the same time, James McAndrews (D) polled 62,550 votes to 63,671 for John W. Heselton (R). The latter's 1912 margin was 50,302 to 36,257; that of 1916 was 59,222 to 40,549. TMUA's 1913 convention delegates from Westfield and Holyoke, Pittsfield and North Adams, represented a possible maximum of 2,200 members. Delegates from these same cities and towns and from Adams, represented up to 4,800 members in 1916. The first district encompassed all of Berkshire and Franklin counties, and portions of Hampden, Hampshire and Worcester.

Presidential results in Hampden and Berkshire counties, particularly in the city of Holyoke, suggest that further exploration anent possible TMUA influence—improving the Congressional party ratio and in protecting the President's plurality—might prove rewarding. In Berkshire county, with a TMUA membership range of up to 1000 and 3,300 (in 1913 and 1916), the total vote, Democratic vote and Democratic plurality all were down from 1910, but the President's drop in plurality was a slight 265 votes and his percentage of the major party vote actually increased. In Hampden county his vote exceeded that of 1910 by 2,342 votes. The GOP lost 1,209 votes, giving the President a plurality increase of 3,551 and raising the Democratic share of the major party vote a full percentage point. An even greater percentage improvement in Roosevelt's showing occurred in Springfield—where TMUA was not a direct factor, but the territory surrounding that city produced more than two-thirds of the county's 1914 Democratic plurality, giving the President 61.7 per cent of its
major party vote. In Holyoke, which had perhaps 1,000 TWUA members out of a countywide total of up to 2,700, the total vote and Democratic vote both declined. But Holyoke gave FDR a bigger margin than he enjoyed in Springfield, a city nearly three times its size, and kept his vote drop from 1940 to 58 votes—compared to an 812-vote GOP loss.16

The one other county in Massachusetts to produce a Roosevelt increase accompanied by a Republican decline—although not a plurality for the President—was Norfolk county, which had small scattered TWUA locals with a combined membership of perhaps 1,000 to 1,700.17

Norfolk county returns brought an increase over 1940 of 1,917 in the total major party vote. The President's share of that total was up .7 per cent, increasing by more than the full amount of the total vote increase. Perusal of official returns in Norfolk county's textile communities might dispel any notion that TWUA voters contributed to the President's gains. Still, the increased Democratic
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1940</th>
<th></th>
<th>1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D 1,076,522 53.1%</td>
<td>R 1,035,296 52.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R 939,700</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>R 921,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T 1,956,616</td>
<td></td>
<td>T 1,956,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P1 136,822 (D)</td>
<td>P1 113,946 (D)</td>
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**Massachusetts**

(population 3,316,721)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1940</th>
<th></th>
<th>1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D 32,620 55.67%</td>
<td>R 24,630</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R 25,973</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>R 24,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T 58,593</td>
<td></td>
<td>T 56,012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P1 6,647 (D)</td>
<td>P1 6,382 (D)</td>
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</table>

**Berkshire county**

(122,273)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1940</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D 89,477 58.1%</td>
<td>R 63,293</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R 64,502</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>R 63,293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T 153,979</td>
<td></td>
<td>T 155,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P1 24,975 (D)</td>
<td>P1 28,526 (D)</td>
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**Hampden county**

(132,107)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>1940</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D 53.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td>D 56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R 30,339</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>R 30,339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T 24,951</td>
<td></td>
<td>T 24,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P1 8,273 (D)</td>
<td>P1 8,273 (D)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Springfield**

(129,554)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1940</th>
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<th>1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D 17,873 65.18%</td>
<td>R 8,735</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R 9,547</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>R 8,735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T 27,420</td>
<td></td>
<td>T 27,420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P1 8,326 (D)</td>
<td>P1 9,080 (D)</td>
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</table>

**Holyoke**

(53,750)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D 125,998 52%</td>
<td>R 118,228</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R 116,134</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>R 111,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T 242,132</td>
<td></td>
<td>T 230,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P1 9,864 (D)</td>
<td>P1 6,270 (D)</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

**Essex county**

(496,613)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1940</th>
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<th>1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D 27,683 72.2%</td>
<td>R 11,914</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R 10,635</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>R 11,914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T 38,318</td>
<td></td>
<td>T 38,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P1 17,048 (D)</td>
<td>P1 12,194 (D)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Lawrence**

(81,323)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bristol county</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(364,637)</td>
<td>D  97,511</td>
<td>D  90,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R  60,113</td>
<td>R  60,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T  157,714</td>
<td>T  151,409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P1 37,428 (D)</td>
<td>P1 29,649 (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New Bedford</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(110,341)</td>
<td>D  33,432</td>
<td>D  30,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R  13,571</td>
<td>R  14,801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T  47,003</td>
<td>T  45,472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P1 19,858 (D)</td>
<td>P1 15,870 (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fall River</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(115,428)</td>
<td>D  33,355</td>
<td>D  31,249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R  13,766</td>
<td>R  13,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T  47,121</td>
<td>T  45,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P1 19,589 (D)</td>
<td>P1 17,444 (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taunton</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(37,395)</td>
<td>D  9,687</td>
<td>D  8,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R  7,106</td>
<td>R  6,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T  16,793</td>
<td>T  15,278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P1 2,581 (D)</td>
<td>P1 2,012 (D)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Breakdown of all city election returns obtained from Edward J. Cronin, Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, March 1, 1951. All other statistics drawn from sources cited on p. 428 above.

*Symbols: R - Democratic  T - Total  T - Republican  P1 - Plurality

*All population figures for 1940.

*Sources examined do not reveal whether the Democratic vote in Springfield was up or the Republican vote down from 1940. This is computed from the total vote and Democratic percentage for 1944.

*Ballots cast for "other presidential candidates" fell from 1,141 in 1940 to 441 in 1944; the number of "blank" ballots jumped from 289 to 569.
turnout should have given cause for alarm for the future if it followed PAC vote mobilization drives engineered by "suspect" labor forces.

In Bristol county immediately south of Norfolk, an "active" TWUA might legitimately have contributed still more to the allegedly growing concern over the "PAC issue." For here the union had its

---

18 In changing Massachusetts' classification from "safely Democratic" to "doubtful" late campaign observers foresaw an expanded Republican vote stemming from "resentment over the Communist influence in the PAC." At the same time, the CIO PAC "get-out-the-vote" drive was said to be a factor which made the outcome uncertain. NYT, 9/20/45, p. 16; 10/5/45, p. 11; 10/22/45, p. E7:1-3.

---

largest Massachusetts affiliates and its greatest membership in relation to total population—four per cent if one assumes a TWUA membership of at least 15,000. Union convention records for 1943 and 1946 show membership possibilities of 7,000 to 9,000 and 16,000 to 20,000. Locals in the county's two largest cities, Fall River and New Bedford, had the bulk of this membership, up to a possible 7,700 in the former city (1946), 10,800 in the latter. Indications are that these may be conservative estimates even for 1945. Reference was made during 1946 convention debate to memberships of 12,000 in each of the two cities. Both cities separately and the

---

19 See TWUA, Proceedings, 1946, pp. 142-43. Richard Kelly writes: "In a series of NLRB elections in the middle of 1942, over 10,000 Fall River workers voted TWUA in nine mills—and the time was ripe to move into New Bedford." The latter became a "TWUA stronghold in 1943." Nine Lives for Labor, p. 56.

Seven delegates from three New Bedford locals attended the 1943 convention; fifteen locals sent 52 delegates in 1946; five Fall
River units sent 26 delegates in the former year; three sent 29 in the latter. Other Bristol county cities and towns with smaller TWUA locals included Attleboro, Taunton, North Dighton, and East Taunton.

county as a unit produced smaller votes of confidence in Roosevelt in 1944 than in 1940— before the successful advent of TWUA. Even so, more than one-quarter of the plurality which saved the state's 16 electoral votes came from Bristol county and TWUA members could have formed an impressive nucleus for much if not all of the Roosevelt margin in that area. In Fall River the President scored his best major party percentage for the dozen largest cities in all New England (69.31%). His second best showing (67.45%) was in New Bedford, which had earned first place four years previously. CIO Textile Workers could have formed an important nucleus for a (reduced) Roosevelt plurality also in Taunton, a smaller Bristol county city.

20 See Table 7, p. 433. Taunton locals had possibly up to 900 members (1943 convention). Here too there were reductions from 1940 in Democratic and total votes while, as in a number of TWUA jurisdictions, there was an increase in the "blank ballots" cast. Increases in "blanks" occurred also in Attleboro, Fall River, Holyoke, Lawrence, New Bedford and Peabody. Information obtained from Edward J. Cronin, Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, March 1, 1951.

Essex county affords perhaps the most striking conjectured correlation between TWUA numerical strength and a Roosevelt plurality. Union membership was possibly between 6,500 and 8,700 (maximum potentials measured by 1943-46 convention delegations). Familiar Democratic plurality and percentage decreases as compared with 1940 occurred
even in the major textile community of Lawrence. Yet FDR's Lawrence vote was 67.4% per cent of the major party vote and TWUA membership in this "safely Democratic" city could have been important, first in contributing to a voter registration increase of 823 over 1940, later to the President's 12,194 vote margin over Dewey. Lawrence was the site of Local 227, largest single TWUA local in New England. It had 5,000 or more members and the city had the largest concentration of CIO textile unionists anywhere in the state. The Lawrence membership alone could conceivably have accounted for virtually the entire Roosevelt plurality in Essex county.21

21 Lawrence's TWUA members comprised possibly 5.9 or 8.1 per cent of the city's population, according to the 1940 census and TWUA convention representation maxima. Local 227 had 18 delegates for a membership of up to 5,000 in 1943, 21 delegates for up to 5,900 in 1946. In 1946 five additional locals sent a delegate apiece for a combined membership range of up to 1,000. Other TWUA locals in Essex county were located in Peabody, Andover, Salem, Haverhill and Methuen.

Local 227 subsequently grew to a peak membership of approximately 14,000 although by 1954 a management decision to shut down its giant mills in Lawrence because of "uneconomic operation" found the union with fewer than 2,000 members employed, others collecting unemployment compensation and asking helplessly about their future. Peak employment had been far greater than peak union strength. Information obtained from Edward R. Murrow, "See It Now," CBS Television documentary, Feb. 2, 1954.)

For the Lawrence voter registration reference see NYT, 10/22/48, pp. 1:3, 38.
Rhode Island and the Rest of New England

Election statistics from "safe" Rhode Island also give rise to interesting speculation regarding TWUA's political capabilities. Early in October "impartial observers" forecast a Democratic victory by as few as 20 to 25,000 votes while Republicans, who had not captured the state's electoral votes for twenty years, were predicting that they had a "fair" chance. "Dissension in the ranks of labor" bred GOP optimism. So did a reputed GOP "trend" among "Italian and Polish" voters and "disaffected" "Irish Catholic Democrats." Yet the Republicans fell proportionately farther than the Democrats from duplicating their 1940 showing. Surrounded by states in which their percentage of the presidential vote declined Rhode Island Democrats actually experienced a percentage increase (see Table 8) and the numerical size of their plurality reached a new high. Moreover, four instead of three of her five counties went Democratic. All registered percentage Democratic gains from 1940 (see Table 9), a rather remarkable phenomenon to follow from a situation of mounting "disaffection." Two of the four Roosevelt counties were TWUA member constituencies. In the remaining
### TABLE 6

**DEMOCRATIC PERCENTAGE OF MAJOR PARTY PRESIDENTIAL VOTE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>53.6%</td>
<td>52.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source cited on p. 429n above.*

### TABLE 9

**PRESIDENTIAL VOTE: RHODE ISLAND**

*MAJOR PARTIES ONLY*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>181,122 56.7%</td>
<td>175,356 58.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>138,211</td>
<td>123,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>319,080</td>
<td>298,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>12,908 (D)</td>
<td>51,869 (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providence county</td>
<td>115,236 59.3%</td>
<td>137,216 61.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>99,134</td>
<td>87,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>214,670</td>
<td>221,403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>15,802 (D)</td>
<td>50,026 (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kent county</td>
<td>14,790</td>
<td>14,059 50.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14,333</td>
<td>13,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29,323</td>
<td>27,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>1,57 (R)</td>
<td>349 (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington county</td>
<td>9,223</td>
<td>8,233 43.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6,001 39.4%</td>
<td>6,119 43.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15,224</td>
<td>11,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>3,222 (R)</td>
<td>1,814 (R)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Taken or computed from sources cited on pp. 428-29 above.

*Symbols: D- Democratic; R-Republican; T-Total; P1-Plurality*
county, Washington, paradoxically, despite a GOP victory, the Democrats scored an actual vote increase and their highest increase in percentage of the major party total \(^{21}\). Interestingly enough, TWUA in the latter county had at once its smallest membership and possibly its greatest internal electoral potential—as measured by population and 1944 voter turnout (see Table 10). Dewey carried the county by almost 2,000 votes, but the President had gained 418 votes over 1940 to raise his total \(4.4\) percentage points. In Kent, which the GOP won four years earlier, the Democratic vote loss was slight and it was mathematically possible for TWUA members alone to have supplied much more than the margin by which the President took the area. Or, put another way, a withholding of 350 pro-FDR TWUA votes could have kept Kent Republican. In Providence county, where the four Democratic electors won most of their statewide plurality—and where, again, the Republicans dropped more votes than the Democrats—TWUA had its largest membership and greatest potential statewide impact. Based upon 1943 TWUA convention representation maxima, CIO Textile Workers in the state as a whole comprised a higher percentage of the (1940) population than in any other New England state:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{21}\)Bristol and Newport counties, which also registered Democratic increases, had neither TWUA nor other CIO organization. Albert G. Clifton, Questionnaire, April 15, 1951. See, however, p. 423n above.
## TABLE 10

### RHODE ISLAND TWUA ELECTORAL POTENTIAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TWUA Membership&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>TWUA&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt; in Proportion to Population&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>TWUA Percentage of&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt; 1944 Major Party Vote for President</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rhode Island</strong>&lt;sup&gt;**&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>29 locals: 7,327 to 12,100 population: 713,346 1.6%</td>
<td>total: 298,843 4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Providence county</strong>&lt;sup&gt;**&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>18 locals: 3,242 to 7,600 550,298 1.38%</td>
<td>total: 224,406 3.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kent county</strong>&lt;sup&gt;**&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6 locals: 1,511 to 2,600 38,311 4.45%</td>
<td>total: 27,769 9.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Washington county</strong>&lt;sup&gt;**&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5 locals: 921 to 1,900 32,493 5.84%</td>
<td>total: 11,652 12.28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Possible membership range based upon 1943 TWUA convention representation. See pp. 426-27 above.

<sup>b</sup>Maximum possible membership, based upon 1943 TWUA convention representation.

<sup>c</sup>1940 census.

TWUA alone, had it enjoyed 100 per cent voter eligibility and a solid Democratic inclination, could have been no more decisive in other major Rhode Island races than in the presidential balloting. It could have been significant, in conjunction with other labor elements.<sup>25</sup>

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25. There was an important independent textile union in Woonsocket and, scattered throughout the state, "Probably the AF of L was larger numerically" than the CIO. "They had very little in textiles and were strong... mainly in the Building Trades and Teamsters Union." "The AFL had some organization in Newport... and some to a lesser extent in Bristol county." TWUA-PAC representative Clifton writes specifically that "the Newport group were active" for FDR. Questionnaire, April 15, 1951. See p. 439n above.
In further refuting the predictions of a GOP "trend," The PAC-endorsed Democratic gubernatorial incumbent received a greater plurality than the President. 26 Reputed "resentment" over PAC apparently did little harm to the political fortunes of endorsees Forand and Fogarty for the state's only two Congressional seats. Both were Democratic incumbents and both added percentage improvements as well as normal numerical gains to their last "off-year" count. Their combined total was almost identical with that of FDR. The combined GOP vote was smaller by nearly 5,000 votes than that polled by Governor Dewey (see Table 11). Both districts were TWUA constituencies. 27

26 McGrath (D) polled 179,010 votes; McLeod (R) 116,158. Information obtained from Henry Anderson, Regional CIO PAC staff. Dec. 26, 1944.

Illustrations of TWUA political capabilities sufficiently large to instill hope or fear in area politicians may also be drawn from Connecticut and New Hampshire, which, along with Massachusetts, placed among the first ten of the 48 states with respect to citizen participation...
### TABLE 11

**RHODE ISLAND CONGRESSIONAL RETURNS**

*(MAJOR PARTIES ONLY)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Republican</th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Plurality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1st District</strong></td>
<td>1942</td>
<td>58.9%</td>
<td>68,212</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>54,233</td>
<td>102,412</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2d District</strong></td>
<td>1942</td>
<td>57.4%</td>
<td>69,111</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>51,471</td>
<td>120,582</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1st and 2d Districts</strong></td>
<td>1942</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
<td>137,653</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>98,951</td>
<td>236,604</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Republican</th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Plurality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>38,702</td>
<td>57,357</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a Taken or computed from sources cited on pp. 428-429 above.*

*b Symbols: D-Democratic; R-Republican; T-Total; P1-Plurality.

### TABLE 12

**PRESIDENTIAL VOTE: NEW HAMPSHIRE AND CONNECTICUT**

*(MAJOR PARTIES ONLY)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Republican</th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Plurality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>New Hampshire</strong></td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>53.2%</td>
<td>125,292</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>110,127</td>
<td>235,419</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Connecticut</strong></td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>53.6%</td>
<td>417,621</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>361,019</td>
<td>779,640</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1944</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>55,802</td>
<td>435,116</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>390,527</td>
<td>825,673</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a Taken or computed from sources cited on pp. 428-429 above.*

*b Symbols: D-Democratic; R-Republican; T-Total; P1-Plurality.*
in the 1944 election. In the former state, less than a month before

New Hampshire ranked second with 52 per cent of her (estimated) 1945 population, Massachusetts sixth with 48 per cent, Connecticut tenth with 47 per cent.

the election, "unprejudiced observers" conceded the President a margin of no more than 25,000. Some gave him just a "slightly" better chance than Dewey to win the eight electoral votes at stake. Again, resentment against PAC was cited—within labor as well as among Democrats. On the other hand, Democratic hopes were said to depend upon a war industry expanded and PAC-registered "labor vote." New Hampshire's four electoral votes too were said to be "doubtful," with a 5,000 vote plurality possible for either side. As stated previously, both remained Democratic, by more comfortable margins than predicted, even, in Connecticut, in the face of heavier voting than in 1940 (see Table 12). 29

Notwithstanding a greater Republican than Democratic increase "labor" attributed Connecticut's improved voter turnout directly to PAC and was not loath to claim credit for the President's victory and for the unseating of a GOP Senator and four GOP Congressmen. 30

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29 See NYT, 10/8/44, p. 38:1; 10/10/44, p. 15:1.

30 CIO News, 11/13/44, p. 6. All of the successful Democratic nominees, as well as unsuccessful Democratic candidates for the governorship and the two remaining Congressional seats had formal PAC endorsements. At least one of the latter was a union man. Information obtained from Henry Anderson, Regional CIOPAC staff, Dec. 26, 1944; and from UE, Proceedings, Sept. 25-29, 1944, pp. 96-98.
could have played only a minor part in most Congressional races, including the highly publicized—and almost successful—PAC effort to wrest Connecticut's fourth district seat from Congresswoman Clare Boothe Luce. TWUA membership did suggest a formidable electoral capability in Connecticut's second district. Affiliates accounting for up to 6,200 members were located within three of the district's four counties: Tolland, Windham and New London. PAC-endorsed

Mrs. Luce had announced publicly that she was running for re-election only because a "threat of 'purging' her at the polls by Sidney Hillman's PAC" was "a challenge I cannot ignore." NYT, 8/1/44, p. 12:8. See also p. 152 above.

The district membership range was between 3,406 and 6,200 for 16 of the state's 22 local TWUA units. The 1946 picture shows only slight variation. See p. 126 above.

Mrs. Chase Going Woodhouse took the House seat with a plurality of 3,040 and 51.2 per cent of the major party vote. Roosevelt-pledged electors in the same four-county area won 52.7 per cent of a somewhat larger total vote and a plurality of 6,754. Most of this was attributable to the two counties with the largest TWUA memberships, although as compared with 1940 the President lost a few votes in Windham county and, as may be seen in Table 13, Middlesex as well as the other TWUA constituencies produced some accretion to the Democrats. The district "went Republican" in 1942 by 2,492 votes.

Of great interest is the President's showing in a single county in New Hampshire, where he suffered a heavy statewide plurality loss.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TWUA Members</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRESIDENTIAL VOTE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second District&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>D 63,988 53.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(population 269,312)</td>
<td>2.11%</td>
<td>R 56,346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of population P1 7,462 (D)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolland county</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>R 56,346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(31,866)</td>
<td>3.13%</td>
<td>R 56,346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of population P1 7,462 (D)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windham county</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>D 12,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(56,223)</td>
<td>3.73%</td>
<td>R 27,606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of population P1 2,914 (D)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New London county</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>D 28,286 54.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(125,224)</td>
<td>3.11%</td>
<td>R 23,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of population P1 4,946 (D)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE 13 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TWUA Members</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middlesex county (55,999)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>R - 13,436</td>
<td>R - 14,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D - 13,014</td>
<td>D - 13,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T - 26,480</td>
<td>T - 27,866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P1 - 392 (R)</td>
<td>P1 - 764 (R)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SECOND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT CONTEST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>46,426</td>
<td>63,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>43,931</td>
<td>59,973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>90,360</td>
<td>122,986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>2,492 (R)</td>
<td>3,040 (D)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

^a^ Taken or computed from sources cited on pp. 128-29 above.

^b^ Symbols: D - Democratic; R - Republican; T - Total; P1 - Plurality.

^c^ Tolland, Windham, New London and Middlesex counties; all population figures for 1940.

^d^ Possible membership as represented in the 1943 TWUA convention.
He was saved from defeat by pluralities in four of the state's ten counties. Three of these had some TWUA membership and one, Hillsboro, had between four and five thousand of the statewide membership. Here, where TWUA was the "dominant" CIO affiliate, the 1940-44

\[33\] This was primarily in Nashau and Manchester. The Shoe Workers were "next and I believe the only CIO union in the area at the time." Albert G. Clifton, Questionnaire, July 27, 1953.

vote decline was greater in the Republican column and the President's plurality rose by exactly six votes to 16,385 as compared with 16,379 in 1940. This, despite a reported state and county Democratic "split" which was calculated by the GOP as certain to penalize the President. \[34\]

\[34\] NYT, 10/8/44, p. 38:1. Clifton writes: "My notes do not record that we (CIO or TMUA) were involved" in the Hillsboro intra-Democratic dissension. Questionnaire cited above.

Hillsboro county delegates in the 1943 TWUA convention represented from 4,057 to 4,800 members. The 1946 picture was comparable. See p. 126 above.

Even in Maine and Vermont a superficial look at presidential and Congressional returns suggests that localized research might yield evidence of direct TWUA electoral effectiveness. Conservatively estimated CIO Textile Workers in Maine could have been responsible for much of the Roosevelt plurality in one of the four counties (York) carried by the President and for a nucleus of more than a third of his plurality in another (Androscoggin). \[35\] In Vermont, that other citadel...
Pluralities were, respectively, 3.264 and 8.151. TWUA convention representation for 1943 reveals a membership range of up to 2,400 in York county, 3,000 in Androscoggin; that for 1946 suggests a higher membership while Albert Clifton (in 1953) recalls a still higher 1944 TWUA potential: "probably... 10 to 12,000" in Lewiston (Androscoggin county), "about 6 to 8,000 concentrated in Biddeford-Saco area" (York).

of Republicanism, Roosevelt's plurality in the largest county, Chittenden, was greater than in 1940 and it is conceivable that TWUA members could have cast or induced the bulk of that county-wide margin. 36

36 FDR carried four of Vermont's 14 counties. His Chittenden county margin (in a reduced total and Democratic turnout) was 3,275. One large local here, in Winooski, had up to 2,000 of Vermont's 2,400 TWUA members (1946 convention representation). Other CIO organization in this county (in Burlington) included UAW and ACWA. Clifton, Questionnaire, July 27, 1953.  

PAC endorsed Democrats for four of the six House seats held by the latter three states (three in Maine, two in New Hampshire, one in Vermont). All lost their electoral bids. One of two PAC endorsees for the upper house, Republican Senator Aiken of Vermont, was re-elected, and TWUA could have had some impact on this and some other races, either statewide or on a district basis. Aiken led his one House colleague in Vermont by more than 14,000 votes and the CIO ascribed President Roosevelt's showing, such as it was, to PAC activity in the cities. He ran more than 7,000 votes better than the PAC-endorsed Democratic Congressional candidate and more than 11,000
votes ahead of the non-PAC-endorsed Democrat who opposed Aiken. The regional PAC office was elated that Republican incumbents in New Hampshire's Senate and first Congressional district seats were returned only by "the closest margin in their careers," but PAC made no endorsement at all in the second district—where the largest of the Hillsboro county TWUA locals was located. The GOP margin here exceeded 9,000 votes.\(^{37}\)


In Maine both of two PAC-endorsed Congressional aspirants in the September "trial runs" lost by two to one margins. Indeed, in the first district, Democratic nominee Andrew Pettis, a local union president and member of the General Executive Board of the CIO Shipbuilders, lagged more than 7,000 votes behind his predecessor of 1942, while his GOP counterpart earned nearly 10,000 votes more than he had polled in the previous year, a phenomenon which lent itself easily to optimistic GOP theorizing that PAC support for FDR in November would surely constitute a "kiss of death."\(^{38}\) One of the few

\(^{38}\)See NYT, 9/20/46, p. 16:4. The PAC-endorsed Democrat actually ran better in the second district, where some CIO people feared the state PAC endorsement "was an error"—because a fight was so "hopeless" against a "well liked" Republican (Margaret Chase Smith), and where, as a consequence, the PAC campaign was not so "intensive." Clifton, Questionnaire, July 27, 1953. Pettis, who had sought both major party nominations, was an "enrolled Republican."
Industrial centers carried by Pettis, however, was Biddeford in York county. Moreover, the November returns disclose a tremendous narrowing of the gap between the parties, with most cities having CIO locals—in shoes, shipbuilding and textiles—going into the Roosevelt column. On the list cited by the CIO News were Portland, Lewiston, Waterville and Biddeford. The latter three were all in CIO Textile territory. Lewiston and Biddeford had the state's largest and second largest TWUA concentrations.39

39 The total Republican vote in Maine's three district races was 129,910; that cast for the Democrats was 53,861. By November the GOP vote (for President) was up by 25,524 to 155,134. The Democratic vote increased by 86,770 to 104,631. The New York Times, while editorializing that the GOP had delivered the PAC a "sound rebuff," reported nevertheless that the "thumping September victory" was registered in the "smallest voter turnout in any September of a national election year since 1916." NYT, 9/13/46, p. 15:4; (editorial) p. 18:2; Week in Review in ibid., 9/17/46, p. 2E:5. See also CIO News, 11/13/46, pp. 6ff; Shipyard Worker, 11/13/46, p. 8.

TWUA Outside New England: Selected Illustrations

Some of TWUA's largest state contingents were in states wherein the Textile union represented a much smaller proportion of both population and CIO membership. Thus, in New Jersey, neither a membership of between 17,350 and 23,450 (1943 and 1946 convention representation maxima), nor a TWUA contract coverage figure of 10,000 (based upon the 1946 survey previously cited), represents more than a small fraction of the total affiliated membership of the CIO, a claimed quarter of a million by 1946. At least six CIO internationals exceeded
TWUA's New Jersey membership. One of these alone, TUMSWA, had an estimated 125,000 members in April 1944. Even so, New Jersey's 16 electoral votes were retained by the Democrats, in the face of increased Republican strength, by a margin of 26,539, little more than twice TWUA's minimum 1943 membership of 12,307. Moreover, while in Passaic county, which accounted for nearly one-half of the state's TWUA members, the President's plurality was a slim 881 (as compared with 4,357 in 1940), Paterson, the county's largest city, produced a Democratic plurality of 6,564 (55.9 per cent of the major party vote). TWUA's probable minimum membership range fell somewhere between 6,200 and 7,100 in Paterson, between 7,400 and 8,600 in the county as a whole.140

Membership estimates based upon 1943 convention attendance. Only 30 New Jersey locals were represented in the TWUA convention of 1943, h2 in 1946. According to a reliable source, there were in 1944 fifty TWUA affiliates in this state, including eight Hosiery and ten Dyers locals. Hence membership may have exceeded the figures cited. See pp. h26n and h27n above. See also Shipyard Worker, h1/7/h4, p. 1; TWUA, Proceedings, 1946, pp. 1-2; Carl Holderman, New Jersey CIO Political Action Committee Report, p. 8.

In neighboring Pennsylvania TWUA membership was also probably below a 1946 contract coverage figure of 40,000— as compared with a Roosevelt plurality of more than 100,000. Nevertheless, more than one-half of FDR's 1940 margin had been wiped out. As part of a state IUC-affiliated membership estimated at 325,000 TWUA could have helped preserve that which remained. It could have played a comparable role in Philadelphia where, again, TWUA was but a fraction of the
"labor" potential—with 12,000 members at most. The Democratic presidential plurality, despite an internal decline from 1940, surpassed that of the state as a whole, reversing the city-state relationship of the former year. FDR's margin (see Table 1h) was approximately 150,000. It may be recalled that the total labor force involved in Philadelphia's pre-PAC labor political pioneering of 1943 was said to be 136,000.1

1 TWUA's maximum Pennsylvania potential, based upon 1943 convention attendance, was 22,300. A Philadelphia membership of up to 7,200 was represented in the 1946 convention but a single (1946) absentee local had accounted for up to 2,600 members in 1943. Reference was made during 1946 convention debate to a Philadelphia membership of 12,000—in an "absolute closed union shop." TWUA, Proceedings, 1946, pp. 142-43. See pp. 321, 423n above. State CIO estimate for 1944 cited in CIO News, 4/24/44, p. 11. TWUA contract figure obtained from Lawrence Rogin, Questionnaire, May 29, 1953.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1h</th>
<th>PRESIDENTIAL VOTE: PENNSYLVANIAa (MAJOR PARTIES ONLY)b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>D - 2,171,035 53.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(population 9,900,180) R - 1,889,618</td>
<td>R - 1,835,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T - 4,060,683</td>
<td>T - 3,775,527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P1 - 281,187 (D)</td>
<td>P1 - 105,431 (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>D - 532,149 59.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1,931,334) R - 351,678</td>
<td>R - 346,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T - 887,027</td>
<td>T - 842,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P1 - 177,271 (D)</td>
<td>P1 - 149,987 (D)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Taken or computed from sources cited on pp. 128-29 above.
b Symbols: D - Democratic; R - Republican; T - Total; P1 - Plurality.
c Population figures for 1940.
In none of the southern states was the Textile union, alone or in conjunction with other CIO unions, large enough to have been "crucial" in the presidential balloting. Even given their notoriously low voter turnout TWUA membership almost universally was equivalent to a puny fraction of the winning margins. Witness, for example, the returns in Georgia, which ranked forty-fifth in voter participation (11 per cent of her 1945 population). Despite the intrusion of an "Independent Democratic" ticket—which polled 3,373 anti-Roosevelt votes—the President emerged with 81.7 per cent of the 321,693 votes cast under major party symbols. His plurality was 211,681. The highest contemporary estimates put 1944 state CIO membership at no more than 26,000. TWUA contracts covered approximately 10,000 workers in 1946, probably fewer in 1944. Union convention credentials reports suggest possible 1943 and 1946 membership maxima of only 2,100 and 1,300.42 Similarly, in South Carolina, it would be difficult to conceive of a TWUA vote of statewide significance in 1944. A scant six per cent of her (1945) population put this state forty-eighth in voter participation. The Democratic presidential slate polled 90,601 votes, the Republicans 4,547, and the "Southern Democrats" 7,799. TWUA had an estimated 6,000 members, the CIO as a whole no

42 Contract data obtained from Lawrence Rogin, Questionnaire previously cited. Georgia IUC president Gillman (in 1949) estimated state CIO membership for 1944 at 26,000. Regional PAC director Mitchell in March 1944 put the figure at 20,000, half of which was said to be in Atlanta. Crown, The Political Action Committee of the CIO in the Southeast, pp. 17-18.
more than 11,000. In North Carolina the President's plurality
was over a quarter of a million votes—and more than four times the
size of the entire CIO family, estimated at 60,000 by PAC director
Mitchell in March 1944. TWUA membership, calculated from union
convention records, was under 10,000 in 1943, somewhat higher in 1946,
although no more than 27,000 workers were under TWUA contract even in
the latter year. A Democratic presidential plurality in a vote of
198,918 to 194,540 in Alabama could in no way have been dependent upon
the conscientious exercise of suffrage rights by something under 6,000
dues-paying CIO Textile Workers. The entire CIO had no more than
50,000 members, of whom perhaps two-fifths were Negroes who did not
find it easy to "crack registration procedures." Even in Tennessee,
George S. Mitchell, PAC director, Region VIII, Questionnaire, Jan. 6, 1953. Alabama estimates based on Mitchell reports,
as cited in Crown, p. 18; 1946 TWUA convention representation (nine
locals), and a 1945 union report cited in TWUA, Proceedings, 1946,
p. 91. (Seven locals in the 1943 convention represented up to 3,000
members.) TWUA contracts in 1946 covered approximately 12,500 Alabama
workers. Lawrence Rogin, Questionnaire previously cited.
where more of a contest prevailed, the Roosevelt plurality of 108,396
was many times TWUA's size although the entire CIO in 1944 was
estimated at considerably more than half the Democratic margin.46

46 See p. 464 below. Tennessee's 1943 TWUA convention delegates
came from six locals. The largest (Local 513, Knoxville) had only 400
to 500 members; the other five, four of which were AFHW units—in
Knoxville, Memphis (2), Clinton and East Chattanooga—sent a delegate
apiece. The membership range for ten locals in 1946 was from 849 to
2,700. See p. 427n above.

Still, it is not impossible, even in the South, to find
electoral jurisdictions within which a TWUA membership could have
been responsible for a Roosevelt plurality, or where it could have
been important in helping to offset a defection of traditional
Democrats to the GOP or to tickets of Democratic dissidents. In
Roanoke, Virginia—which state, next to Tennessee, "went Democratic"
with the smallest percentage of the major party vote of all the
southern bloc—the Roosevelt slate polled a small increase over 1940
and held onto a plurality roughly comparable to TWUA membership.47

47 Local 11, Roanoke, sent ten delegates (for a membership
range of 2,450 to 2,600) to both 1943 and 1946 union conventions.
The Roosevelt plurality in 1944 was 2,227 votes. It had been 3,389 in
1940. The total Roosevelt vote increased from 6,942 in 1940 to 7,332
in 1944.

Virginia ranked forty-third in voter participation, Tennessee
forty-first in 1944. The former cast 62.5 per cent of its major
party vote for the Democrats, the latter 60.6 per cent. Voter turnout
in relation to (1945) population in the two states was 14 and 18 per
cent, respectively.
In Richland county, including the city of Columbia, site for TWUA's two largest locals in South Carolina, a near doubling of the Republican vote made no appreciable dent in the election outcome: 6,590 for Roosevelt, 1,440 for Dewey. Of this state's five most populous counties, however, this was the only one to show an increase in votes cast for the national Democratic ticket (from 1,781 in 1940 to 6,590 in 1944). The TWUA locals had a combined membership of 2,000 or more.

Huntsville in Madison county, Alabama affords another interesting picture. One writer has described this state as second only to Texas as a "hotbed" of "revolt" in 1944, a "revolt" against Roosevelt financed chiefly by "steel, coal and textile interests." Huntsville, which made Madison county the home of TWUA's largest county-wide membership in the state, assumes especial significance because, beginning in June, it became headquarters for a new radio personality whose advocacy of a "Peace Now" movement ran directly counter to the Roosevelt "win-the-war" foreign policy, support for which constituted a major ingredient in so much of the Democratic and CIO political literature and oratory. The President did lose votes
This was a local parish priest, Arthur W. Terminiello, subsequently dubbed the "Father Coughlin of Dixie." See Stetson Kennedy, Southern Exposure (New York: Doubleday, 1946), pp. 158-239. See also Hosiery Worker, Mar. 1944, p. 2.

In Madison county. However, whereas on the state level his vote declined proportionately as well as numerically, percentagewise Madison county ballots for FDR actually increased! TWUA's Huntsville affiliates had perhaps from 1,200 to 2,000 members, as indicated by 1943-1946 convention representation maxima. The county's total presidential vote in 1944 was less than three times the latter figure (see accompanying table).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRESIDENTIAL VOTE: ALABAMA(^a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MAJOR PARTIES ONLY)(^b)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(population(^c))</td>
<td>2,832,961</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>250,726</td>
<td>198,918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>1,12,181</td>
<td>1,41,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>292,910</td>
<td>213,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>208,552 (D)</td>
<td>154,378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madison county (66,317)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>5,515</td>
<td>4,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>6,071</td>
<td>5,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>4,959 (D)</td>
<td>4,496 (D)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Taken or computed from sources cited on pp. 428-29 above.

\(^b\)Symbols: D - Democratic; R - Republican; T - Total; P1 - Plurality.

\(^c\)Population as of 1940. Huntsville population was 13,050.
The kind of area research which would be indispensable to a meaningful analysis of election results might well demonstrate the remoteness from reality of such a parade of possible correlations between union membership and the returns of 1944. An investigator in Huntsville might discover TWUA members among the stay-at-homes who reduced rather than protected the President's plurality. Another in New Bedford might uncover TWUA votes among those which augmented the Republican total. For purposes of this study, as previously suggested, it will be sufficient to demonstrate that articulate and active Textile personalities and TWUA affiliates were undertaking to cultivate what was or what might become a formidable labor political force. In the South even more than elsewhere exploration into the implications of TWUA-PAC becomes important less because of immediate than because of prospective strength. At the onset of the CIO's southern organizing drive in 1946 Emil Rieve himself put TWUA's dues-paying membership throughout all of the South at no more than 80 to 90,000. Yet, in South Carolina alone, where the 1944 presidential vote, major and minor party, was only 103,375, the textile industry alone was said to have a working force of 115,000! As of April 1946 TWUA had 31 offices scattered across the South, with "35 staff people, clerks and office girls, in those offices." Nationally, the union had at work more than 300 organizers, business agents and managers of locals, and 175 offices manned by approximately 100 staff
During the 1944 election campaign many of these same members were busily engaged in union organizing and in political action, and it is to the latter activity and the identity of its TWUA practitioners that attention will now be directed.

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CHAPTER XV

TWUA IS AN ACTIVE AS WELL AS A POTENTIAL "PAC FORCE" : TENNESSEE AND NEW JERSEY

From one international or local union to another, from one part of the country to another, and among the countless individuals who gave PAC its "character," opinions varied on techniques and tactics to employ. Various sources have been consulted on this point. TWUA Education Director Rogin testifies that there were "lots of rallies" for FDR in New England. Southern PAC director Mitchell, on the other hand, cannot recall that either unions or IUC's within his jurisdiction held "any such meetings"—for Congressional candidates or for FDR. ¹ New York's regional PAC director suggests that she was inclined to scoff at such enterprises as political dinner parties with their "big name" attractions. She reserved her enthusiasm for the "grass roots" canvassing which would eventuate in registration and election statistics. Director Carr was also one who saw little merit in promoting "little candidacies" for lesser offices just for the sake of proving that labor was in politics. She believed in "picking berries where there were berries to be picked."² Virtually everyone agreed

¹Lawrence Rogin, Interview, Dec. 17, 1951; George S. Mitchell, Questionnaire, Jan. 6, 1953.

²
Thus she was impatient with candidacies which in effect made the American Labor Party function as a third party rather than as the endorsing mechanism and balance of power which it was in state and national politics. Charlotte Carr, Interview, Nov. 28, 1951.

that some form of "precinct pacing" was the sine qua non of effective political action. But more than one person wryly admits that in this respect profession and practice did not always go hand in hand. 3

Al Zack, a Newspaper Guildsman in Springfield, Massachusetts in 1944, recalls rallies and crowds which gathered because they were for FDR. He also remembers that everyone who believed in PAC believed that organization and activity in the wards and precincts was "necessary." Alas, despite elaborate plans they just "didn't get around to it." Interview, Oct. 3, 1952.

A TWUA staffer has said that the extent to which rank and file and officers and staff alike were likely to "involve their unions in politics" varied with many factors— including the past political traditions of their respective organizations and their own personal experiences and connections. According to this source, TWUA's PAC activity was "largely" a matter of "speechmaking" and of distributing "millions of pieces of literature." Nineteen hundred and forty-four witnessed only a "beginning" toward the kind of work which held the greatest promise, i.e., intensive precinct activity. 4

Rogin indicates that no record was kept of the volume of literature which went out under TWUA sponsorship— with its own or a national CIO PAC imprint. Nor does he recall how widely TWUA employed other media such as the film cartoon, "Hell Bent for Election," produced by the United Auto Workers at a cost of from twenty to thirty thousand dollars. He does recall that "we did have some prints of
George Mitchell is equally unable to supply such quantitative information—for the CIO or for particular affiliates. "All the literature" which came into the South "from National PAC office came through my office, and I redistributed according to my best judgment. Volume was goodish, but not huge." As for the movie, it "went quite well where we could get some local person to be responsible for a machine and performances. I don't remember that it went any better down the channels of any particular International." Mitchell, Questionnaire, Jan. 6, 1953.

Nevertheless, there was such a beginning, and the speechmaking and the literature distribution are not to be discounted. Moreover, pursuit of the TWUA label in association with PAC in '44 has turned up illustrations of a variety of activities and projects, some common, some unique, some ambitious, some modest and extremely limited in potential effectiveness.

The inadequacy of union journals for information on local operations has been alluded to elsewhere. Testimony about to be introduced from these and other sources ranges from the sketchy to the comprehensive and it cannot yield the kind of statistically reliable generalizations on nature and scope of activity for TWUA as a national phenomenon which might emerge from a more geographically restricted survey. It can, however, satisfy requirements of the present study, (1) by demonstrating that labor's electoral potential was the target for political "activation" by individual and affiliated components of the "TWUA force," acting in communities scattered from one end of the country to the other, from areas of relatively slight TWUA organization to those of the union's greatest importance—\ldots"
relation to internal membership distribution, to total CIO strength and/or to total population and potentially eligible electorate; and (2) by identifying some of the TWUA-PAC personalities, in as many electoral jurisdictions as possible, while bearing in mind the limitations, even occasional distortions, which may follow from rejection of intensive local area research.  

5See pp. 252-56 above.

To precisely the same extent that it is less than the truth to say that "Sidney Hillman was PAC" so it would be inaccurate to maintain that Carl Holdeman or Paul Christopher was PAC. Yet to perhaps the same degree that Sidney Hillman was PAC, so were these energetic political activists in the field: one in New Jersey, the other in Tennessee. By the same token, PAC was also Arthur McDowell in Missouri, Paul Schuler in Louisiana, William Leader in Philadelphia, Douglas Anderson in Oregon, Helen Gregory in North Carolina, George Jabar in Maine. . . and a host of others. To the extent that CIO was PAC, so also was TWUA, operating through these and other individuals.

Paul Christopher Exemplifies CIOPAC in Tennessee

The importance of Paul Christopher, assessed by one careful student of PAC in the South as second only to that of regional director Mitchell, 6 is pointed up by the fact that when a successor to Mitchell
was to be chosen it was this one time textile worker who received the appointment, which he fulfilled from the spring of 1945 until he became head of the CIO organizing drive in Tennessee the following year. By 1944 Christopher had been CIO director for Tennessee for four years. Prior to that appointment he had been an IEC member and South Carolina TWUA director, and before that a UTW and TWOC organizer. By the end of 1932, when he was just four years out of his teens, it was already a decade since he had first gone to work in a mill in Greenville, South Carolina; he had played a leading role in the gigantic textile strike of that year and he had become a vice-president of the North Carolina Federation of Labor as well as head of the UTW in that state. During the first half of 1944 he was completing a second term as president of the Tennessee IUC. During the latter half he assumed office as IUC executive secretary-treasurer, a post he had first held from 1940 to 1942 and which he was to hold again until demands of the 1946 organizing drive compelled his resignation.

On the state IUC, whose affiliated membership more than quadrupled during Christopher's presidency (from 11,300 to more than 65,000), other officers included Newspaper Guildsman W. A. Copeland, Memphis CIO director and successor to Christopher as IUC president; Matthew Lynch of TWUA, a veteran Hosiery Federation organizer, as first vice president; and Grant Williams, another TWUA representative,
as one of ten other vice presidents. Also in the latter group was William B. Frazier of the Steelworkers, who as recently as 1942-43 had been a TWUA representative and who for the preceding seven years had been on the AFHW staff. Lynch, Williams and Frazier all represented Tennessee locals in the last pre-PAC TWUA convention and, as the PAC movement developed in Tennessee, all appear to have welcomed the political stimulus which came from Christopher as CIO regional director. Tennessee's new state TWUA director (as of June 1944) and one of TWUA's "active" delegates in the 1944 state IUC convention was William Tullar.7

7Textile Labor, Aug. 1944, p. 8. See also pp. 292, 360 above and p. 470 below. (Tullar represented a Chicago local in the 1943 TWUA convention.)


TWUA was small as compared with some internationals in the larger mass production industries, both in Memphis, site of greatest CIO membership (approximately 25,000 out of 65,000) and in the state's other major cities.8 It was important, nonetheless, in these several
personnel contributions to the IUC and PAC—as well as in the sense that "every vote is important" in a democracy. Lynch's name was submitted by the writer to PAC director Mitchell along with those of half a dozen other TWA representatives, for comment as to whether they "made significant contributions to PAC in 1944." Mitchell's reply: "I don't remember about _____ or _____ but the rest [Including Lynch] all helped; most of them worked hard." That he and other Textile and Hosiery unionists should have contributed to the CIO record of political accomplishment is all the more noteworthy in that they belonged to that company of organizers, enjoined to promote both union organization and political action, who learned all too often that PAC was a convenient whipping boy for employers engaged in massive resistance to unionization. At Old Hickory, not far from Nashville, where an organizing campaign was in progress at the Dupont Mills, a "terrific fire" was rained upon the PAC in an unsuccessful effort to defeat the union in a bargaining election. In Lawrence county a stubborn Lawrenceburg mill owner actually rebelled at some of the anti-Hillman literature being made available to employers by one of the southern "hate sheets," declaring that he did not "care to use
poisoned weapons. . ." A painful reminder of why they were involved in politics turned up in an AFHW journal item from Athens, Tennessee in September. It told of the adoption of a city ordinance requiring a year’s residence and the licensing of union organizers. This, the Hosiery Worker asserted, was to stop the Hosiery Federation, even as a similar ordinance in Georgia had been invoked against TWUA and the Steelworkers.\(^{10}\)

\(^{10}\) On another page currently assigned southern organizers were named (including Matt Lynch); Tennessee was listed as one of four states in which organizing activity was concentrated; and Branch 102, Chattanooga, was commended for its organizing efforts. Sept. 1911, pp. 13, 14. The Old Hickory and Lawrenceburg references are taken, respectively, from Buffalo Union Leader, 11/2/11, p. 6, and Kennedy, Southern Exposure, pp. 233-35. See also Kennedy, pp. 299-300.

Tennessee has been described as one of four southern states in which CIO PAC programs were under way by February of ’11, even before establishment of Mitchell’s regional office. Asked to elaborate on the “earliest” movers Mitchell has said briefly, “generally Tennessee,”\(^{11}\) and the consensus seems to be that although credit must redound to Copeland and others, it was Christopher who towered about the rest as he applied himself to a task which a few years later was to bring unstinted praise from fellow unionists and excoriation by his enemies—as no less a political “dictator” than Democratic “Boss” Crump.\(^{12}\) The Tennessee PAC did little that was spectacular in
This was the judgment of the Knoxville Journal which declared, after election of Estes Kefauver to the U. S. Senate, in 1948 "that the people of Tennessee had swapped Ed Crump for Paul Christopher as their political dictator." Cited in Mason, p. 145. Miss Mason decries this "false statement" but assessed Christopher as the "most powerful single force" in promoting organization of "thousands" of workers in Memphis and other parts of the state, in "bringing Tennessee's industrial unions to their present considerable proportions" and thus in "increasing their political importance." She also reports that she herself worked "in the political field... (in the background)" with Hillman, Christopher et al, for nearly two years, beginning in 1924 when the national PAC chairman asked CIO Organization Director Haywood to "allot half my time to the newly formed CIO Political Action Committee..." Ibid., pp. 31, 145-47.

connection with the November election and the returns perhaps amply demonstrate why few formal Congressional endorsements were made. Despite a lower voter turnout than in 1940, a GOP increase, and a Roosevelt plurality loss of more than 74,000 the Democratic presidential slate still won a relatively easy victory with 60.6 per cent of the major party vote--308,707 to 200,311. Most Congressional districts "went Democratic" by safe margins and in the Republican first and second districts the PAC approach was essentially a negative one of opposition to incumbents. However, PAC had tried to exert positive influence in a few primaries, supporting two successful Democratic incumbents (Gore and Priest) against challengers in the fourth and sixth districts and an unsuccessful candidate in the second district GOP primary. Fundamentally, it was assumed that the major

Support would also have gone to incumbent Democrat Estes Kefauver (third district) had he encountered primary opposition. Information supplied by PAC director Mitchell. Dec. 29, 1944. Mitchell
informed Hillman in March 1941 that the CIO "could never find a pro-
labor candidate to support" in the tenth district (including Memphis),
where the CIO's greatest strength lay, because of AFL acceptance of
Crump's candidates. See Crown, pp. 106, 117. See also pp. 455, 465
above.

The task was not to make noble but futile endorsements or noisy—and
hazardous—public protestations of support for favorites, but to
canvass poll books and to awaken the civic consciousness of unregistered
union members, to help them to qualify, and to get them to the polls.
The Tennessee PAC put some 200 campaign workers into the field on
election day to achieve the latter goal. Education on issues was not
ignored but the main approach conformed to national PAC doctrine that
"when the people vote, they vote right," and November found Tennessee's
PAC leaders already planning for the future on the basis of the record
just chalked up by CIO voters and non-voters. 114

114 Crown, pp. 46, 86. In subsequent campaigns CIO leadership
acted even more on the theory that the more quiet their efforts the
less likely they were to threaten endorsees with a "kiss of death." See Kytle, article previously cited.

To be meaningful the Tennessee program had to begin early—to
meet a May 24 ($2.00) poll tax payment deadline. The movement had
several organizational sendoffs: e.g., a state convention called by
a "Federated Labor Committee for Political Action in Tennessee,"
which laid plans for an "all-out" voter registration drive; a state
TWUA conference, which endorsed that union's first PAC fund drive;
and the state IUC convention, which, after hearing George Mitchell
"talk PAC," endorsed Roosevelt and approved get-out-the-vote plans. In all of these developments of winter and early spring Christopher played a leading role. He discussed the PAC program with the TWUA conferees. He was prime mover behind the "Federated Committee," to which some non-CIO unionists and representatives of the National Farmers Union adhered. He was head of the state CIO. 15 Spurred in


part at least by his inspiration IUC's in all principal cities were "active"; political "education" crept into the Tennessee edition of the CIO News, into speeches delivered at local union meetings, into "regular workers' education classes." "Top CIO officials" and "members of various internationals" held PAC conferences in cooperation with the Highlander Folk School. 16 Directors of one of these special

16See Crown, pp. 24-25, 44-45, 100 for data drawn from regional reports to national PAC headquarters, March 1944 to May 8, 1945.

CIO sessions at Monteagle, Tennessee included Christopher and J. Raymond Walsh of the national PAC. "Highlight of the term," according to the Advance, was a "political action and postwar employment conference at Chattanooga" sponsored by the Chattanooga IUC. Grant Williams is identified in the (1946) Who's Who in Labor as past secretary of that CIO council and, along with William Frazier, as a member of the
"Young Democrats of Chattanooga." The latter is also identified as an "area director" for PAC. Relative importance of TWUA's Hosiery contingent here may be suggested by the fact that John J. McCoy, a future AFHW vice president, represented the local IUC in the 1941 CIO convention. 17

17 Dickerman and Taylor, pp. 120, 378. See also Advance, 6/15/44, p. 1. See p. 465 above.

Crown writes that Christopher as IUC officer did his utmost to make men and funds available for PAC and saw that "adequate clerical help was hired or recruited to take care of paper work (pamphlets, bulletins, reports, etc.)." One full-time PAC worker was on the payroll throughout the campaign and the months immediately following. 18

18 Crown, pp. 44-46.

At the outset the IUC appropriated $1000 for PAC purposes—a larger sum than that granted by any other council in the South. (Later it was to inaugurate a per capita system of financing.) Estimates based upon "scraps of information" showed that the voluntary dollar drive down to November 1944 had yielded around $2,000 for use at various levels of operation although not more than a "few hundred" dollars reached the state organization. Only one other southern state (Alabama with $4,500) surpassed this figure. 19 The IUC box scores on poll tax payment and
No breakdown was available by internationals, and no uniform distribution formula was followed by collecting organizations. Mitchell noted that many locals sent no contributions to state or national CIOPAC, either because funds were inadequate or because of "indifference." Crown, pp. 91-95. Information obtained also from Mitchell directly. Dec. 29, 1944; Jan. 29, 1953.

Voter registration, dependent in part on expenditure of these funds, were in the long run infinitely more important. Crown writes, on the basis of Mitchell's correspondence with Hillman, that the "general feeling," in the absence of statistical verification, was that new registrants voted "heavily" in southern primaries. With the aid of incomplete data supplied by CIO directors Mitchell concluded that PAC contributed heavily to the new registrations, estimating at the end of 1944 that about 20 per cent of all CIO members in his region had qualified to vote. Through the efforts of all labor he thought as many as 75,000 "new votes friendly to labor had gone on the books." In Tennessee it appeared that at least 14,300 out of 35,000 new registrations were induced by CIOPAC, with affiliates of Christopher's own international and its Hosiery Federation being responsible for at least 1,000, a not inconsiderable figure in the light of TWUA's relatively small size. Among the communities in which PAC claimed

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20 The Rubber Workers were credited with 4,000, UAW with 3,000. At least five other unions were credited with 1,000 or 1,500 new registrations. Crown, pp. 83-86. Mitchell points out that these statistics refer to "people induced to register through CIO channels. Not all would be union members; some would be kinfolk of union members." Questionnaire previously cited, Jan. 6, 1953. For TWUA membership see p. 455n above.
the greatest gains in voting potential were not only the major cities—like Knoxville, Memphis and Chattanooga but even the mill town of Besis where years of struggle by UTW, TWOC and TWUA were climaxed during 1944 by the winning of a first NLRB election majority for the CIO textile union.21

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21Crown's list of places where the CIO made its greatest gains in voting strength (pp. 81*-85) includes Jacksonville and Besis with 850 new registrants. For the vicissitudes experienced by TWUA organizers in Besis, throughout the 1940's and after, see Kelly, Nine Lives for Labor, pp. 159-182; Mason, To Win These Rights, p. 147.

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Carl Holdeaman and CIO Political Action in New Jersey

The total picture of PAC activity and achievements in New Jersey were alike disappointing to CIO leadership. But the program initiated at the state level was ambitious. It bore some fruit and it bore the stamp of a TWUA personality no less dedicated to the political campaign than was Christopher in Tennessee. In fact, TWUA personalities held top positions in both the state IUC and PAC organizational structure. When delegates met in Trenton on February 13 at the behest of the state IUC, to adjust their campaign thinking and machinery to national CIO policy, it was Irving Abramson, still IUC president and Hillman's PAC director for the tri-state Region III, who presided. After the convention replaced the American Labor League with a New Jersey Political Action Committee it was Carl Holdeaman, IUC secretary-treasurer, who for the eighth time was elected to head a New Jersey state labor political organization. Several hundred
delegates were in attendance, representing, by one account, 19 CIO unions and six IUC's.22

22Estimates vary widely on the size of the gathering. See NYT, 2/15/44, p. 123; Guild Reporter, 3/1/44, p. 4.

Holdeman was first elected IUC treasurer in 1939; Abramson became president in 1940. Executive secretary, from Abramson's first election as president, was Peter Flynn of IUMSVA, who was inducted into the army some time before May of 1944. See Shipyard Worker, 5/19/44; CIO News, 11/27/39; 12/30/44, p. 7; 12/17/45. For earlier New Jersey developments see pp. 281, 314, 319 above.

If Holdeman could not, subsequently, be said to be PAC in New Jersey, he at least established a claim to fame as an official campaign historian. The painstakingly detailed report presented under his name to the post-election state PAC convention bespeaks a devotion to realistic precinct as well as endorsement politics that could hardly have been exceeded elsewhere.23 To promote PAC in the field


he and Abramson solicited and received the services of representatives from half a dozen internationals. Each of these was initially to cultivate his own union potential. Later they and other union and CIO field staffers "were given geographical assignment and worked more or less through the various county committees in their districts..."24

24Ibid., pp. 7-8. See p. 359 above.
To work with Holderman as PAC chairman the February convention named a secretary, a treasurer, eight vice-chairmen and an executive board of twenty-five. In time, pursuant to convention authorization and local developments, the board was expanded to include eleven county or multi-county PAC chairmen and the head of a Women's Division, which, along with a "Minorities and Nationalities Division," gave the state like the national PAC both appearance and substance comparable to that of a political party. Holderman wrote:

This committee [i.e., the Minorities and Nationalities Division] did not begin functioning until we were well into the election campaign. Problems among the Negro, Italian and Polish voters were the most acute. Our opponents were using as many divisive tactics as they could to discourage those voters from supporting President Roosevelt.

While CIO does not look with approval on segregated divisions even in the field of political activity, we found it necessary to establish a Negro Division because of the precedent set by the major parties. . .25

On the surface representation of the Textile factor among PAC officialdom appears disproportionately high in view of its membership inferiority in this state. In part this was because in New Jersey, which had given birth to the Dyers Federation, the latter and TWUA and the Hosiery Federation were treated as separate internationals. The former two ranked among the state's eight largest CIO unions (after IUMSWA, USA, UERMWA, UAW, ACWA and URWA) and by virtue of this fact supplied two of the Committee's vice-chairmen: Edward Remery
(Dyers) and Sol Stetin (TWUA). For the same reason they supplied nearly one-sixth of the twenty-five executive board members: William Hayden and Louis Melango from the Dyers, Frank Kiss and James Green from TWUA. County leaders added subsequently included George Nejmesh of TWUA, PAC chairman in Passaic county, where, it was said, there were more CIO members in proportion to potential electorate than in any other county in the state. 26 Also signifying the "TWUA influence" was board member Evelyn Dubrow, head of the Women's Division. A member of the American Newspaper Guild and of the United Office and Professional Workers, Miss Dubrow was on the state IUC staff as assistant to the president. She had previously been Abramson's secretary (1942-43) and before that, education director for TWUA in New Jersey (1940-42) and a Textile organizer (1937-40). 27 Three out of nine

26 Ibid., pp. 39, 42. See pp. 450-51 above.

27 Dickerman and Taylor, p. 96. Miss Dubrow is also identified as education director for the New Jersey CIO Council. Ibid., p. 463. At least one other member of the nine-member Women's Division, Marion Fidone, also represented TWUA (from Passaic). Identification supplied by Holderman, Questionnaire, May 27, 1953.

state PAC officers who comprised a smaller "campaign committee" were of TWUA stock. This committee, whose job it was to "supervise" campaign expenditures and "to be responsible generally for the overall work that was to be done. . . ." was chaired by a member of the Amalgamated; one member each represented the other five largest
unions; Miss Dubrow represented the state IUC and Stetin and Melango, TWUA and the Dyers. 28

28 Sixteen internationals were represented on the 25-member PAC executive board, including two each for the nine unions with the greatest numerical strength. The posts of secretary and treasurer went to members of IUMSWA and UAW, respectively. Organization at the February convention and later personnel developments described in Holderman, New Jersey CIOPAC Report, pp. 3-6, 26-27.

Reference has been made to the fact that TWUA made no special staff assignments to PAC in New Jersey. Apparently such an omission is of doubtful significance. Most Textile family unionists on the state PAC applied themselves to the political task in their home territories and Sol Stetin, New Jersey TWUA director since June of 1943, worked "very closely with Abramson, and devoted a large part of his time to the campaign." Holderman, a predecessor of Stetin's as state TWUA director and recent superior of Irving Abramson's in that capacity, was himself the latter's sole associate regional PAC director. 29 For both Holderman and Abramson, in their respective roles as regional and state PAC heads, their IUC address in Newark served as political headquarters although presumably this fact did not refute Sidney Hillman's statement (made in response to questions of

29 Holderman had been TWUA's New Jersey director and Abramson assistant director in the early '40's. See Textile Labor, 5/1/40. Comment on Stetin's 1944 PAC activity obtained from Lawrence Rogin, TWUA Education Director, Questionnaire, May 29, 1953. Corroboration also from Carl Holderman, Questionnaire, May 27, 1953. See p. 359n above.
finance) that regional PAC offices and "CIO union offices" were not "combined."  

Letterheads, letters to writer from Holdeman and Abramson, Dec. 29, 1944; Jan. 2, 1945. See also U. S. Senate, Hearing of Special Committee on Campaign Expenditures, 1944, p. 41.

The State Program: From an Affiliation Plan and FDR and Voter Eligibility Polls to "Education" for Registration and a Right Vote

Before turning to TWUA's record of cooperation as a union it would appear in order to demonstrate for a second time what was planned and/or done by a politically organized state CIO under a Textile personality. Unless otherwise documented all information is from Carl Holdeman's own 54-page mimeographed report. Probably of least importance, according to Holdeman's own scale of values, were Roosevelt endorsement and dollar drive resolutions adopted respectively by a state IUC political action rally in the spring and a state IUC convention in the fall and the pro-PAC addresses which he and Abramson delivered before sundry labor gatherings. These may

E.G., Holdeman's speeches before the Hudson county IUC and AFHW conventions, and Abramson's addresses to a New Jersey ACWA political action conference and the IUMSWA convention. NYT, 7/17/44, p. 9:5; Hosiery Worker, Sept. 1944, p. 5; Advance, 6/16/44, p. 1h; Shipyard Worker, 10/9/44, p. 12. For the state IUC meetings cited see Shipyard Worker, 6/2/44, p. 1; 10/16/44, p. 2; CIO News, 10/16/44; NYT, 10/7/44, p. 9:3.
have been valuable as stimuli to action but, plainly, they were subordinate in themselves to the activity which the PAC most sought to promote—and which Holderman undertook to advance as instructor of a weekly political action course at the New Jersey Labor School in Newark: namely, organizing, fund collecting, educating, campaigning.  

32 This ten-week course was described as similar to one offered southern CIO leaders at Monteagle, Tennessee. CIO Clip Sheet Service, May 22, 1944. See p. 170 above.

The February convention agreed that county, city, ward and district organization was imperative and voted to effectuate a formula for financing state committee operations. Under this program local unions were asked to "affiliate" with the state PAC at one cent per member per month. Other international union affiliates (e.g., district councils), local IUC's and county PAC's were to be "chartered" for ten dollars per year. The international union assignees were recruited to further this affiliation scheme, to get locals to set up their own PAC's, and to "carry on a strong drive to get union members registered through plant and local union campaigns." For the New Jersey PAC made a familiar assumption: a big vote would be a right vote.

To test this assumption the state office, paying "close attention... to good research procedure," embarked in March upon a "statewide sampling by the secret poll method" to "find out how CIO rank and file... felt about various possible presidential candidates." Some 22,750 ballot cards were distributed to locals for addressing to every tenth member. The cards were returnable to the state office for mailing and the ultimate recipients were, in turn, to mail them back to the state PAC as self-addressed pre-paid mail. Names of four prospective Republican and two Democratic candidates appeared on the ballot. Another survey was instituted to find which of "our people [including their families]... were registered and which were not," and which were eligible to become registered. Local union and plant registration committees had to be set up. The state office printed "hundreds of thousands of cards" for the local committees to distribute and collect. Cards of persons who had already established voter eligibility were then to be forwarded to the state PAC for future campaign use while the local organizations were to retain cards of non-registrants for follow-up work. Qualifying of the latter was to be facilitated by various means: lobbying for liberalized registration opportunities, transporting workers to registration places, taking mobile registration facilities to the workers, etc.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., pp. 10-11, 13-15. See also pp. 485-86 below.
This "educational" work on registration was to continue through the late September deadline. So was organizational effort. In addition, endorsements were to be made by state and county PAC's; further lobbying was to be undertaken to extend voting hours; a get-out-

See Holderman's unsuccessful appeal to Governor Edge to summon a special session of the state legislature to extend voting hours beyond the 7 a.m. to 8 p.m. limits to accommodate war production workers. NYT, 10/21/44, p. 9:2; 10/25/44, p. 1.

35 See Holderman's unsuccessful appeal to Governor Edge to summon a special session of the state legislature to extend voting hours beyond the 7 a.m. to 8 p.m. limits to accommodate war production workers. NYT, 10/21/44, p. 9:2; 10/25/44, p. 1.

the-vote-drive was to run through election day, and a fund drive to finance avowed campaign activity. This dollar drive began soon after the national party conventions adjourned. Responsibility for success was essentially a matter between locals and their internationals and it was a conference of union leaders summoned by the regional CIO (not PAC) director which planned the fund drive. Even so, the state PAC was dependent upon a share of the dollars collected and promotional work from that office for this and other purposes was not wanting. The state CIO council sponsored non-partisan radio broadcasts on voter registration—in cooperation with civic organizations. It shipped "literally tons of registration literature" for use "in plants and by house to house canvassers or at meetings large and small." The state PAC publicized registration in its own "The Political Reporter" and the state CIO News "devote(d) space to our campaign..." "Speakers at union meetings were asked to mention this registration program... Records secured from National PAC were played at union gatherings."

For the entire campaign "More than three million pieces of literature,
not including press releases and weekly news sheet issued to the
local unions and sympathizers, passed through the state office. . . . "
Special leaflets, speakers, sound trucks, and radio were used in
the effort to keep racial and national minorities in the Roosevelt
camp. The PAC Women's Division pushed organization of local units
among union members and their relatives, looking to them for neighbor-
hood canvassers, clerical workers, and telephone campaigners and for
planners and promoters of "card parties, fashion shows, minstrels,
meetings and rallies. . . ."36


The Results

In terms of organization, dollars, registration and election
returns results fluctuated widely—apparently with degrees of en-
thusiasm and with obstacles encountered. Not the least among the
latter was Democratic inactivity in important jurisdictions and the
fact that both Republicans and powerful machine Democrats chose to
concentrate upon a "phoney" proposal for state constitutional revision—
to the neglect of the national campaign. Holderman wrote, for example,
that on election day,

. . . in practically every county where PAC had organi-
ization, we manned the polls, often finding that our
workers were the only Roosevelt supporters in a district. . .
[Earlier PAC had been] forced to undertake the burden of
securing a large registration in the key counties. . . [and]
of bringing the national campaign issues to the fore. . . .
When it was all over the returns were interpreted as proving:

that the efforts of PAC contributed greatly to the Roosevelt victory. While the President's plurality dropped many thousands from 1910 the most sensational successes of the campaign can be noted in the counties where PAC had the strongest and best organized groups.

Two "obvious" facts were illuminated:

first, that the Roosevelt votes brought out in these key counties were directly attributable to the rise in registrations scored in these counties; and second, that successful registration campaigns hinged on well running county PAC's, and that personal contact canvassing in the neighborhoods, as well as cooperation by local unions, were responsible.

Often with unexpected detail and candor the author of the New Jersey résumé recited, county by county, strengths and weaknesses in organization, obstructive factors, results in voter registration, election turnout, Roosevelt vote and plurality losses (see Table 16), other contests won and lost, each area's future promise. Significantly, by PAC reasoning, if the state's "model" Servicemen's Ballot Law had been as effective as claimed, producing soldier ballot returns not of 36.2 per cent, but on a par with that of the civilian electorate (82.7 per cent of registrants), there would have been a final Democratic plurality in New Jersey of over 70,000.37

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### TABLE 16

**PRESIDENTIAL VOTE: NEW JERSEY**

*MAJOR PARTIES ONLY*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1944</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>1,016,806</td>
<td>987,874</td>
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<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>945,175</td>
<td>961,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>1,962,981</td>
<td>1,949,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PI</td>
<td>71,333 (D)</td>
<td>26,539 (D)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Taken or computed from sources cited on pp. 428-29 above.

Symbols: D - Democratic; R - Republican; T - Total; PI - Plurality

Voter registrations in New Jersey fell from 2,361,080 in 1941 to 2,351,516 in 1944. According to Holderman, this decline was "entirely in non-industrial counties which normally give Republican majorities." There was a "substantial rise in registration in certain industrial sections" of the state and "even some of the best known reactionary papers grudgingly admitted our success." As for the fortunes of endorsees other than those on the presidential ticket: a Democratic Senatorial candidate [Menge] was defeated; two out of six Democrats endorsed for House seats, both incumbents, won election, as did four out of eight union member (Democratic) candidates (including one AFL) for the State Assembly. A third (Republican) Congressional candidate bearing a local PAC endorsement, also was elected. No endorsements were made in the other seven Congressional district races.38
Confirmation that it was not wishful thinking to attribute to CIO members a preponderance of pro-Roosevelt sentiment came from the presidential preference poll, following a response said to be better percentagewise, therefore, quite as reliable as many professional polls. The secret ballot showed CIO workers 69.08 per cent for FDR, 19.05 per cent for Dewey, with 11.87 per cent divided among the other listed candidates and write-in preferences—including "a few wise cracks such as a vote for Winston Churchill." The one other Democrat on the ballot was War Mobilizer Byrnes, whose 51-hundredths of a per cent showing behind all of the listed Republicans—Dewey, MacArthur (5.08 per cent), Willkie (3.49 per cent) and Bricker (.86 per cent)—may or may not have lent substance to the determined labor opposition to him in the Democratic vice-presidential maneuvering. The Roosevelt-Dewey ratio fluctuated widely within as well as across international union boundaries. The highest percentage for FDR in a single locality came from the UAW in Mercer county—77 as compared with 10 per cent for Dewey. By contrast, the Auto Workers' largest local, in Passaic county, gave only 58 per cent to FDR, 27 to Dewey. TWUA members polled in eight counties (exclusive of the
Dyers) were in the forefront of the Roosevelt entourage: 73 per cent for the President, 16 per cent for Dewey. All unions produced Democratic majorities. "Other unions polled, with similar results," included the Dyers Federation.39

39Ibid., pp. 11-12. Other "personal choices," representing 1.32 per cent of the returns, included Henry Wallace, Norman Thomas, Senators Byrd and Barkley, James A. Farley, Harold Stassen, Cordell Hull and Johnston. Of 22,750 cards consigned to locals for addressing, 11,891 were returned for mailing to individuals. There was a return of 19.05 per cent on the latter, as compared with professional polls "considered reliable on a return of from seven to fifteen per cent." Holderman documented the PAC's conscientious employment of "scientific" methods by citing comparative smaller samplings handled differently from the bulk of the balloting. For example, one group of 100 cards, distributed and collected on the job, showed a 100 per cent return and a 90 per cent preference for FDR—which "may well have represented an unconscious selection [by] . . . the shop steward of union people likely to be partial to the President." Ibid. See p. 480 above.

The state PAC kept box scores on other data susceptible to such treatment. Attempts to foster functioning local "women's divisions" were not markedly productive although where they did "get going, they proved to be indefatigible workers. . . ." and, in any case, "many CIO women members were involved. . . in the work of PAC," whether or not special women's divisions were set up. Results fell short of the goal in the building of city PAC's although one tri-county and ten county committees came into being, encompassing all eight counties where "for the most part our members live or work (Bergen, Camden, Essex, Hudson, Mercer, Middlesex, Passaic and Union) 40. As for the

40Ibid., pp. 5, 18, 30.
"affiliation" device for financing the state "educational" program, the goal of a PAC in every local union, and the voluntary dollar drive, results in each case will now be summarized briefly. Special attention will be paid to cooperation manifested by the Textile family.

In interpreting the performance of local organizations in carrying out the affiliation and assessment system Holderman observed sadly, yet with optimism for the future:

I am convinced that these figures prove definitely that where local union leadership took the initiative and brought the whole PAC picture to their membership, affiliation was secured. Where local leadership itself was apathetic or for selfish reasons reluctant to give PAC the proper build up affiliations did not come through.

One hundred and fifty-three local unions out of 369 (less than half) affiliated; four out of six local IUC's obtained PAC charters; four out of seven district councils and joint boards "came through." The TWUA family picture was fairly impressive. Only four out of eight Hosiery units affiliated and the one AFWW council failed to do so. But the Dyers outdistanced every other International— with nine out of ten locals affiliating. Eighteen out of 32 other directly-affiliated TWUA locals gave the Textile union, without counting the two out of three joint boards which affiliated, a cooperation record of 56 per cent, bested percentagewise only by the Dyers (90 per cent), the Amalgamated (80 per cent), and the Shipbuilders (57 per cent). If all TWUA affiliates are counted as a single international, they represent 61.1 per cent cooperation, second only to Sidney Hillman's
union. ACWA, it may be added, had only twenty locals as compared with TWUA's fifty. The dollar receipts which eventuated from this program of affiliation totalled $15,288.85 and the total taken in by the state PAC from all sources, as distinguished from receipts of its campaign committee, was only a fraction over $20,000.\footnote{The UE had the second largest number of local units--12--of which 17 (40 per cent) affiliated with the state PAC. These figures, of course, do not indicate relative membership size or the per capita yield. IUMSWA, with the largest membership, had only seven locals, of which four signed up for the cent a month per member commitment. IUMSWA Local 1 contributed $4,500 for use in the registration campaign. State PAC receipts from all sources, including "hall rents," "mimeographing fees" and "contributions," from March 1 to December 31, 1944, were $20,068.85. The largest disbursements went for salaries, stationery and printing. See ibid., pp. 6-7, 28, 53. See also p. 179 above.}

Even fewer local unions created their own political action committees. Locals of fifteen out of 36 internationals failed completely to respond to the affiliation request. Eighteen internationals lacked a single political committee among their affiliates. Altogether only 11\frac{1}{4} local union PAC's materialized. "The surface was scarcely scratched" in this department. TWUA was no exception. Apparently not a single Hosiery branch set up a political committee; the Dyers accounted for only two; TWUA proper could point to just ten. Still, this was the fourth highest number of local union PAC's for an international, placing TWUA (with or without the Dyers) behind the UE, the Steelworkers and ACWA in that order. Percentagewise among
the largest internationals, the best records were those of the Amalgamated (with 16 out of 20—i.e., 80 per cent); IUMSWA (with four out of seven—57 per cent), and USA-CIO with 22 out of 40 (55 per cent). Twenty-three out of 42 UE locals (54.7 per cent) set up PAC's, and TMUA was next with 31 per cent.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{12}Holderman report, pp. 7, 9.

The outcome of the campaign dollar drive amply justifies this Holderman commentary:

\ldots There were times during the campaign when we found ourselves laughing, perhaps a little cynically, at the charges in the newspapers that union members were being hounded and threatened to "get up that buck or else."

Comparing a total state PAC expenditure of $25,101.10 with approximately half a million dollars spent by the GOP,\textsuperscript{13} the New Jersey chairman laid responsibility for niggardly PAC collections squarely upon local union leadership. The latter, he intimated, may well have underestimated the readiness of workers to respond to direct financial appeals or their susceptibility to "education" on the need for funds. Cash receipts of the Campaign Committee were $6,084.00. That portion

\textsuperscript{13}Holderman noted that Republican expenditures, exclusive of $46,811 "spent to elect U. S. Senator Smith," reached $467,534 in New Jersey. Ibid., p. 29. Tabulations made from official reports filed with Congressional authorities reveal an even sharper contrast between GOP and all pro-Democratic funds. See U. S. Senate, Investigation of Presidential, Vice Presidential, and Senatorial Campaign Expenditures, 1944 (pursuant to S. Res. 263, 78th Cong.), Rept. No. 101, 79th Cong.; 1st sess., 1945, pp. 110-11, 127.
of this sum which came in the form of "voluntary contributions" was only $3,981.69—of which some apparently came in the form of donations from other sources than union member solicitation. Indeed, the percentage distribution formula established by the state PAC was followed faithfully it would appear that no more than $1,539.15 accrued to the state PAC from the dollar drive as such, for Holderman's compilation shows a monetary harvest made by sixteen internationals of just $10,261.57. Of this 50 per cent was destined for the national and 35 per cent for county PAC's. Holderman wrote that "results were good" in "some small local unions where the leadership took the responsibility for collecting," and hailed locals of 500, 600 and 1,500 members in which membership response was, respectively, 98, 80, and 40 per cent. But "Not one major local union pressed the dollar collection with any degree of zest." The Dyers do not appear on the list at all. A collection of $35.18 for a single Hosiery affiliate is cited, giving the federation a rank of fourteenth among the 16 internationals. Much of TWUA's local leadership also lacked "zest," although in amount collected it lagged behind only three union—each of which was superior to it in size:
At the same time it outranked other larger unions—e.g., the Steelworkers, eight of whose 40 locals collected $492.40 (for 8th place), and the Rubber Workers, six of whose 30 locals collected $308.31 (for 10th place). IUMSWA took in only $912.00 in "voluntary dollars" although as a union its largest local had made a handsome contribution to the voter registration campaign.

Data excerpted and rearranged from tables in the Holderman report pp. 6-7, 27-28. Conceivably small collections came in from unions not here recorded for Holderman refers to a total dollar drive collection of $10,536.26. See also p. 168 n above. (Italics in Holderman quotations added.)

Plainly, while TWUA and its federations are subject to the same indictment of inadequacy which Holderman leveled, irrespective of union labels, its overall performance compares favorably with that of other unions. What the character of the record was for individuals behind this state's "TWUA force"—other than Holderman—or for TWUA units in specific localities has not been greatly illuminated in sources examined. In Holderman's summary, for obvious reasons, comparisons likely to be construed as invidious—between work or achievements under different union banners or personnel were avoided. Data to be presented in the following paragraphs is, then, fragmentary and suggestive only.
Passaic county, fifth most populous in the state, was fourth among the chief industrial counties in potential and actual voter registration in 1944. It had "the highest proportion of CIO members of any in the state"—in auto, electrical, clothing, rubber, etc.—and was capable of producing TWUA's most striking picture of political activation. In practice results were especially disappointing.

\[\text{46}\] Passaic county's (1940) population was 309,353; potential electorate was estimated at 203,000. Actual registrants numbered 165,433; the major party presidential vote 136,593, of which 68,737 votes were cast for Roosevelt, 67,856 for Dewey. See Holdeman report, pp. 39, 46 et passim. See also pp. 451, 476 above.

Many locals (parent unions not identified) took no part in the campaign and only "spotty" work was done in building local political committees. Voter registration was up 1.7 per cent but FDR's plurality declined by 3,000 from 1940 and GOP Congressional incumbents whose districts encompassed different parts of the county won with safe pluralities in contests in which PAC endorsements were ruled out as futile.\[\text{47}\] Ben Manney of TWUA, a future county PAC chairman, lost a bid as a PAC-endorsed Democrat for an Assembly seat. Holdeman recounts factors which hampered effective activity: a nearly "defunct" Democratic party weakened by internal factionalism; continuous wrangling among both Democrats and PAC elements; inter- and

\[\text{47}\] J. Parnell Thomas' seventh district was "almost entirely agricultural and upperclass residential." Gordon Canfield's eighth district included the industrial cities of Passaic and Paterson. Holdeman report, p. 43. See pp. 281-82 above.
Intra-union disagreements, particularly in Paterson; the alleged "buying off" of several Negro leaders by the GOP, plus "hard work" by Republicans to offset prospective PAC gains in registration.

In the face of all these, George Nejaeh's task as county chairman was difficult. Nevertheless, Holderman detected bright spots and local Textile unionists at a later date had proud recollections that the county PAC did "a terrific job" in the town of Passaic in 1944 even though elsewhere efforts were "not effective enough." Holderman's review of voter registration showed that the city PAC in Passaic had "functioned very well," under John Penella of URW as chairman and John Condron of the Dyers as secretary-treasurer. This city was one of the few places in which a functioning women's division was established. Inquiries made some years later regarding Textile unionists from this area who held official posts in the state PAC or whose names had come to this writer's attention in perusal of other sources, elicited replies from Carl Holderman indicating that most could accurately be listed among PAC "activists" of '44: e.g., the Dyers' Edward Remery and William Hayden in Paterson, and Charles Serraino, also of the Dyers and business manager of the Passaic county TWUA joint board. Serraino, whom Holderman described as "very active," is identified in Who's Who in Labor with the pre-PAC American Labor League and the state PAC. In the same labor directory another
Dyers federationist, Ralph Spinelli of Paterson, cited "Labor Party" affiliation and identified himself as a PAC county committeeman. Sol Statin's acceptance of PAC responsibility has been alluded to. In September, in response to his summons, according to *Textile Labor*, Passaic county TWUA officers, executive board members, stewards, committeemen and active members met to push dollar and vote drive plans. 49

49 *Textile Labor*, Oct. 1944, p. 2. See also pp. 476, 477 above. The only Passaic county TWUA names which elicited a negative response or a blank from Holderman in answer to the question: "Were these people active PAC leaders in their respective communities?" were Dyers officers Knapik and Fritz. Questionnaire, May 27, 1953. For other Passaic county data reviewed above see *CIO News*, 4/22/46, p. 3; Holderman, *New Jersey CIO PAC Report*, pp. 22, 23, 26, 30, 38, 42; Dickerman and Taylor, *Who's Who in Labor*, pp. 321, 336.

TWUA organization was small and no spectacular achievements were to be expected of it in New Jersey's three largest industrial counties—Essex, Hudson and Union. Largest TWUA convention representation in 1943 was from Hudson—for a maximum of 900 members. Nevertheless, James Green (Essex) rated an affirmative answer from Holderman regarding identification of state PAC officers who were genuinely "active" for PAC and Irving Zeichner of Weehawken (Hudson), identified in the labor "Who's Who" as president of TWUA's Hudson-Essex County Joint Board, won a "Yes, very active" response to further questioning as to whether listed individuals were "active" or made "outstanding" PAC contributions. The Essex county PAC evoked a rather glowing account of organizational efficiency and of registration
and election achievement in Holderman's official report. In boss Hague's Hudson county bailiwick, PAC organization was said to be "loose" and lacking in "central direction." Democratic activity was described as conspicuously light—on registration, national issues and candidates. The Democratic presidential vote fell markedly and ran behind the "nay" vote on state constitutional revision. Whatever of significance was done on voter registration (down from 1940, however, Holderman attributed to PAC, singling out an IUMSWA local, the UE and the Dyers for their activity.50

50 One of four CIO members elected (three were reelected) to the state assembly was John Grogan of Hudson county, national IUMSWA secretary-treasurer. Parts of Hudson fell in at least four Congressional districts, two of which reelected PAC-endorsed Democrats (Norton and Hart). Holderman report, pp. 20, 21, 23, 26, 37, 39, 43, 44; Questionnaire, May 27, 1953. See p. 182 above.

Camden county, major territory for CIO's Shipbuilders, ranked just behind Passaic in industrial worker potential. Its PAC record, as reviewed by Holderman, was good—registration work was "excellent"; organization and activity under PAC chairman Bloom (of IUMSWA) was "outstanding." A "fine relationship" obtained between the local Democratic organization and a joint labor (including AFL) ABC committee, which Camden labor had been "perfecting" since 1940. Two labor members of the state assembly were reelected, with better pluralities than in the past and President Roosevelt's total vote and plurality both were higher than in 1940. No reference to TWUA (or other smaller union) appears in the official PAC report, but
PAC "activity" questions relating to TWUA personalities resident in the Camden area drew positive answers from Holderman for three out of four names listed—Frank Kiss, state PAC board member, and John Sadowski and Stephen Hyk, both of whose names had cropped up in research in connection with pre-1944 CIO political action.51

51 Textile Labor, June 1942, p. 5; Shipyard Worker, 6/12/42, p. C; Holderman response to questionnaire, May 27, 1953; and report previously cited, pp. 19, 23, 30, 36, 39, 44. No Congressional endorsement was made in the tri-county Camden-Salem-Gloucester district.

No references to PAC activity of consequence under Textile auspices appear in any of Holderman's other county summaries though such an omission is of slight import since references to specific unions are scarce throughout—even where PAC organization was "excellent."52 At least two additional sentences in the New Jersey report

52 See, for example, references to Mercer county where Fred Clarici of the Steelworkers was county PAC chairman. TWUA had at least two locals here. Holderman report, pp. 21, 23, 30, 38, 41, 44.

perhaps express as well as any the fact of TWUA's moral and practical commitment out "in the field." In Middlesex county, the "Textile Workers Union, having only been newly established in Johnson & Johnson, could not give as much time as the officers and staff would have liked." In Sussex county, "almost wholly rural and reactionary to the nth degree. . . ." PAC "expected no action at all. . . ." and "no county PAC was organized. . . ." But, "four local unions. . . in the
town of Newton (1940 population: 5,537) set up a PAC organization and activated their members making sure that they were registered to vote." The four were Fur, the Amalgamated, TWUA and the Dyers.53

53 Ibid., pp. 22-23. TWUA records show one local in Newton represented in the 1943 and 1946 TWUA conventions, with one delegate in the former year, two in the latter; one local (Local 455) with one delegate from New Brunswick (in Middlesex) in 1943, three locals with seven delegates in 1946—for a membership of up to 1,500. Sol Stetin represented Local 455 in the latter year.
At the time of the early Maine election post-mortems and about the time that many TWUA staffers were receiving special PAC directives, a New York Times reporter vouchsafed the opinion that CIO political leaders in New England were not merely "active" but "influential." Only the naive would discount PAC influence as a result of the traditionally Republican Maine returns. The regional PAC organization, he maintained, had "plenty of money"—a factor which most labor people would have disputed and which available statistics do not corroborate—and "astute local leadership that knows the ins

1Regional office expenditures were made from a revolving fund supplied by the national CIO Political Action Committee. As of August 15, less than six weeks prior to the Times story, a CIOPAC financial statement showed regional office disbursements, from the individual contributions account (for all parts of the United States), of $3,700. Funds made available from the original PAC trade union account for expenditures in Congressional primaries totalled approximately $8,000 for all New England (out of a national total of $33,013.48): $1,000 for the Pettis contest, the rest for four district primaries in Massachusetts, nearly $4,000 of which was spent in a single district. U. S. House, Hearings of Committee on Campaign Expenditures, 1944, pp. 13-15. See also p. 358 above.

and outs of regional politics from way back." The Maine experience was no source of dismay to PAC. This state would have "gone Republican" if labor's Pettis had not been the Democrats' choice for Congress. It
had been a "sort of testing ground." Errors spotted here could be "ironed out" later in the more populous states of Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island.²

²See Lawrence Dane in NYT, 9/24/19, p. 8E. (Italics added.)

Such a rendition of PAC's function in Maine may or may not conform to that held by the unionists themselves. It is conceivable, however, that an "ironing out" of errors did occur—even in Maine, where Democratic presidential votes surpassed the total for all three of the party's Congressional candidates by a figure three times as great as the strength gained by the GOP in the same September-November interval.³ As explained previously, any attempt to advance a conclusive correlation between spirited TWUA-PAC activity and registration and election statistics in any given area would be hazardous (and impertinent) in light of the limited local inquiry undertaken.⁴ It is necessary, nevertheless, for purposes of this

³See pp. 449-50 above.

⁴Even the accurate pinpointing of a potential correlation between union membership and election returns can be truly meaningful only within areas for which complete election statistics are available and within which the union membership was relatively concentrated. TWUA membership, even where sizable on a statewide basis, was often widely dispersed in many small cities and towns. Presidential and Congressional election statistics were readily accessible to the writer only on a county or Congressional district basis, respectively. Moreover, to cite a single example, in Massachusetts as of 19th,
virtually every county with TWUA organization fell within the boundaries of from three to seven different Congressional districts. See also p. 423 above.

study, to establish the fact that the Textile element, at regional, state and local levels, was trying to demonstrate political astuteness, that it was applying itself, under IUC, PAC, or TWUA auspices, to cultivation of the New England "labor vote." For this purpose, in the following pages, major reliance is placed upon the recollections of Albert G. Clifton, New England's TWUA-PAC representative in 1944, as communicated to the writer in response to questionnaires.5

5 Two questionnaires (ten and eleven pages respectively) were addressed by mail to Mr. Clifton, one in 1953, the other the following year, when he was acting as legislative agent for the Massachusetts IUC. Some answers appear to derive from personal notes made during the 1944 campaign but for the most part replies were based upon memory: "When I moved back to Massachusetts from Rhode Island, I had quite a bit of information as to the activities I was engaged in during the year of 1944. It was packed away and I have been unable to locate it. It would have been most helpful." Excerpt from letter accompanying reply to first questionnaire. All information credited to this source in the remainder of this chapter is derived from letters and/or questionnaire replies dated July 27, 1953 and Apr. 15, 1954.

Identifications of IUC and PAC personnel have been obtained principally from Clifton, the CIO News and union journals, and from Dickerman and Taylor's Who Who in Labor.
Textile Personalities in the New England CIO and CIOPAC

By the most optimistic count, as described on pages 424-27 above, a fully mobilized CIO, quite apart from non-members within the unions' spheres of influence, could have been the "controlling" factor in the presidential balloting in the four New England states which "went Democratic." Only in Connecticut did TWUA personalities fail to command one or both of the major offices of the state CIO council.

Here IUC president Edward Lavery and secretary-treasurer John J. Driscoll were members respectively of USA-CIO and IUMMSW. TWUA was represented on the officers' roster by Daniel Gallagher as one of three trustees and by Wanda Pilot and John Bello among thirteen vice presidents. Bello was a Dyers Federation organizer and a local business agent. Miss Pilot, a former AFHW organizer, and Gallagher were TWUA staffers.6

6 CIO News, 12/13/43, p. 2; 10/2/44, p. 9; 11/27/44; Hosiery Worker, 1/24/44; Clifton correspondence. According to Clifton's recollection UE was the CIO's largest affiliate here; IUMMSW was second and UAW or TWUA third.

In Massachusetts Joseph Salerno and J. William Belanger remained the two highest elective IUC officers and the Benti-Clifton team still was in command in Rhode Island.7 In New Hampshire, where the state

7 Algernon E. Hartsorn of the Steelworkers, second ranking affiliate in Rhode Island, was elected IUC secretary-treasurer in 1944. UE was the third largest CIO union. Information from Clifton and CIO News (Mass.), 4/12/43, p. 2; 7/17/44, p. 6; (R.I.) 12/13/43, p. 2; 12/18/44. See pp. 279, 283 above.
CIO council was in its first year, Francis V. Phelan and Frank W. Dichard, both of TWUA, were recording secretary and secretary-treasurer, respectively. Louis J. Guilmet, state TWUA director, was president briefly—until his induction into the armed forces, at which time he was replaced by vice-president George O. Fecteau, a regional director of the Shoe Workers. Even in Maine and Vermont TWUA directors Jabar and Daoust held IUC presidencies, though Daoust, whose union responsibilities were chiefly in New Hampshire, was succeeded in his post before the end of the '44 campaign by Anthony Jenkins of the Amalgamated. Throughout the period the Vermont secretary-treasurer was John C. Lawson, veteran officer of the United Stone and Allied Products Workers of America and of its AFL predecessor, the Quarry Workers International Union. Vermont vice-presidents included two TWUA members, one of whom (Thomas Nealon) was a part-time TWUA organizer as well as a local officer and business agent.  


9 Executive vice-president in Vermont and the IUC's legislative representative was John Mitchell, also of USAPWA. Clifton ranked the shipbuilders the largest CIO union in Maine, the UAW first in Vermont. Personnel identifications from Dickeman and Taylor, passim; Textile Labor, Feb. 1943, p. 4; July 1944, p. 7; Nov. 1944, p. 11; CIO News,
Of this even dozen representatives of the "Textile influence" among New England's CIO officialdom all but one, Joe Salerno, were accredited to the TWUA convention which had asked for a CIOPAC movement. Most of them, as TWUA staff members, were subject to international union directives which spurred or supplemented whatever initiative they were prepared to exercise in connection with their respective CIO bodies. The point cannot be overstressed that responsibility for PAC in the field rested heavily upon state directors of the several unions and upon IUC leaders and staff even more than upon area PAC's, the latter of which were not basically autonomous bodies but administrative arms of CIO councils. The international union representatives who served upon them were expected, not to make policy, but to promote an "agreed" program, and the number of such representatives for any given union did not necessarily denote relative numerical strength. It may simply have reflected the organizational structure of the union in question and the administrative machinery available for implementing its PAC commitment.\(^\text{10}\) Significantly, in generalizing about the New England states which he described as "most active" for PAC in '43, Albert Clifton made no mention of state PAC's.

\(^{10}\) Statement of Al Zack, Assistant Publicity Director, Congress of Industrial Organizations. Interview, Oct. 3, 1952.
He referred only to IUC's and their staffs. Even so, however slight
their importance functionally, it is at least symbolical of TWUA's
political involvement (and corroborative of its prestige rating
within the CIO) that Textile personalities were associated with the
formal PAC organization in most of these states at the highest level.
Elected by PAC conferences called by their respective CIO councils
John Bello and Ferdinand Sylvia, both of the Dyers staff, were state
PAC chairmen in Connecticut and Rhode Island, respectively, and
Albert Clifton was PAC secretary-treasurer in the latter state. 1

Sylvia, according to Clifton, was "originally from New
Bedford. His unionism goes way back to the UTWA. I believe he also
served as member in the House of Massachusetts legislature."

In Massachusetts Edward F. Doolan, an IBC member and TWUA director
for Fall River apparently shared headship of the state PAC with Rubber
Worker Salvatore Camelio. In New Hampshire it appears that top CIO
officers doubled as PAC officials. 12

The United Rubber Worker reported Camelio's election as
Massachusetts PAC chairman. Apr. 1944, pp. 1, 3. See, however, in-
closure of Doolan's name along with Camelio's in a listing of state
chairmen on a regional CIOPAC letter head, Dec. 26, 1944. George O.
Fecteau's name appears on the same letterhead as chairman in New
Hampshire while Frank Dichard is identified in Who's Who in Labor (1946)
as PAC secretary-treasurer. It is not clear whether the Vermont IBC
created a formal PAC organization. Maine's chairman was Henry
Steinfeld (identified tentatively by Clifton with IUMSWA or the ANG).
Further evidence of TWUA's prominent identification with PAC in New England may be seen in the full roster of names beneath that of Salerno on the letterhead of the regional PAC office. Albert Clifton was one of seven persons assigned to PAC by their internationals. William J. Casey of Lawrence, also of TWUA, was one of three additional persons assigned to Salerno for PAC purposes by the state IUC—which also furnished the regional office headquarters. Antonio England of New Bedford was one of a trio of legislative advisors attached to the office. Finally, TWUA and the Dyers placed eight members on a regional "advisory council" of twenty-eight. In company with two representatives of the Amalgamated and a veteran Hosiery Worker then currently associated with another international (Hugh Brown), they gave the ACWA-TWUA combine roughly 40 per cent of the council's personnel. The remaining seventeen "advisors" represented fully a dozen international unions. The TWUA list includes Jabar of Maine, Phelan of New Hampshire, Daoust of New Hampshire and Vermont, Benti of Rhode Island, and, from Massachusetts, IUC secretary-treasurer Belanger, James W. Bamford, Mariano S. Bishop and John Chupka. All of the latter three, the only ones not holding

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13 England is listed in Who's Who in Labor (1946) as a TWUA subregional director and assistant state CIO legislative agent. Casey's fellow IUC-assignees were from ACWA and UE. Information from Clifton and from CIO PAC letterhead previously cited. See pp. 344-47 above.

14 Brown has been tentatively identified with the Shipbuilders in 1944. He was formerly with the AFHW in Philadelphia and subsequently went on the TWUA staff, representing the Lowell, Massachusetts joint board in the 1946 TWUA convention. Identification sources
include Clifton; CIO News, 12/28/42, p. 2; 12/16/46, p. 9; Hosiery Worker, 10/6/39, p. 1; 7/12/40, p. 6.

Clifton notes that advisory council appointments were made after "solicitation of Salerno to their international union (usually the New England director if there was one)." A number were state IUC officers and Clifton suggests that some appointments may have stemmed from IUC's rather than from the unions as such. See p. 358 above.

High IUC offices, were in 1944 on the TWUA staff. Bishop (in a 1946 listing) was Northern Cotton director, Chupka and Bamford director and assistant director, respectively, of TWUA's Woolen and Worsted division. Bamford was a former AFHW staff member; Bishop a one time organizer, officer and business agent of a Dyers' local in Fall River and member of his federation's executive board. All eight "advisors" had been exposed or contributed to the political atmosphere of the 1943 Textile convention and some had been involved in the 1941 labor politicking in the territory of Bamford's home local, Local 227, in Lawrence.15

15 In addition to Jabar, Bishop, Bamford and Gallagher the 1943 convention's 18-member resolutions committee included Phelan and two other New Englanders (Middleair from Connecticut, Novo from Rhode Island). Dichard was one of six New Englanders on the committee on legislation. See pp. 272, 301-303 above.

Background on individuals from Dickerman and Taylor, passim; (Bamford) Hosiery Worker, 1931-41 passim; (Chupka) Textile Labor, Apr. 1942, p. 3; (Bishop) Kelly, Nine Lives for Labor, pp. 40-61.
Clifton Testimony Confirms the Reality of His Own and TMUA-PAC Activity

It has been suggested that a presumption of "activity by appointment" is no more supportable than the notorious presumption of guilt by association. Superficially at least, the fact that practically all individuals named in the preceding paragraphs publicly labelled themselves "Democrats" encourages the supposition that they gave more than just the prestige of their names to the PAC drive. Indeed, one interviewee, resident in Massachusetts in 1964, questioned the value of examining this state for evidence of PAC influence because, he said, of its strong Democratic sentiment per se within labor. 16

16 Al Zack, Interview previously cited. New England TMUA members listing themselves as Democrats in Dickerman and Taylor include Belanger, Bishop, Dougan, England, Salerno, Clifton, Jabar and Phelan; also Ralph Arivella, Henry Kullas and Joseph Dickens, all of Massachusetts; Arthur Taylor and Thomas J. Mealon (Vermont); Frank Joseph (Maine), and Joseph White (Connecticut). Bamford called himself "independent." Dichard designated "PAC" membership.

That most of these persons did in fact translate sympathies into deeds is vociferously contended by TMUA's regional PAC representative. Indeed, Albert Clifton confidently explains the failure of several Rhode Island Textile unionists to specify their politics in official biographical sketches as solely a matter of "oversight." With equal assurance he intimates that apparent variations in cooperation practiced by state CIO organizations had less to do with differences in leadership fervor for PAC than with availability of
manpower and other resources and with practical prospects for success. He declines to nourish the slightest suspicion that Textile family enthusiasm for PAC anywhere was anything but genuine and extensive. It is of interest that the Textile factor was especially evident in the composition of two of the three state IUC's which he described as "most active:" viz., the Massachusetts council, which had access to "full time" staff people for PAC work, and that in Rhode Island, which had not.--The third "most active" was the Connecticut IUC which, like that in Massachusetts, "published a paper and had staff people of one or more working full time. . ." Significantly, in all three, Clifton observed, the general political climate and tradition were relatively more favorable than elsewhere and capable of producing electoral triumphs at some level(s).

An internal union authority may legitimately be suspect as a reliable source for unprejudiced information regarding his own organization. There may also be some doubt with respect to the accuracy of information obtained from such a source many years after the fact. Individual memories are not infallible and there is reason to believe that political campaign recollections tend with the passage of time and subsequent campaigns to be blurred or telescoped into more general impressions not easily pinpointed in time. Justifiable skepticism aside attention will now be directed to further testimony of Albert Clifton on PAC "in the field." However inclined he might be to overstate the case for TWUA as a PAC-participant, the very thoroughness of his response to interrogation, his admissions of uncertainty, his
frequent use of the tentative "I believe," all tend, in this writer's view, to enhance the probable credibility of testimony from this quarter. Moreover, the relevance of his statements and evaluations to this study is patent if only they stand as unchallengeable testimony to the reality of the TWUA factor in PAC—by illuminating the personal dedication of this international union appointee to his PAC assignment and the pride with which he assessed his union's political initiative and enthusiasm.

17 See p. 500n above.

Clifton has described TWUA, including its semi-autonomous federations—neither of which, however, save for the Dyers in Rhode Island, accounted for much of TWUA's numerical strength in this part of the country—as among the "most cooperative" of all unions in New England. Throughout the Northeast in '44 Textile family locals and joint boards fostered functioning political action committees. As for specific individuals, questions were drafted to ascertain whether in any sense membership on Salerno's "advisory" council might properly be construed as having a passive connotation. The Clifton reply was unequivocal. Textile's contingent on that body were all active for PAC in their respective territories. Indeed, six out of seven of them were "very" active. As a group they met with Salerno and his staff to discuss and plan "literature distribution... meetings... election day work," etc. Individually it was incumbent upon
them to arrange for the circulation of campaign materials, to plan rallies, to make speeches for FDR and PAC at union and/or public meetings. It was their job to help organize PAC's in local unions, counties and Congressional districts, and to render assistance in the conduct of voter registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns. Some did all of these things and the imputation of a lesser degree of activity to one council member was modified by Clifton's own explanation that the individual in question (Bamford) was under pressure of other "local problems." Besides, "his area of Lawrence was always considered safely Democratic. . ." so that political effort there could be confined largely to the presidential race and concentrated at the end of the campaign. In point of fact, every Textile personality on the regional PAC council had "other responsibilities," but it seems likely that a comment regarding Massachusetts TWUA director Chupka was equally apt for others: he "had other duties, but gave much time [to PAC] and wielded much influence."18 Mariano Bishop for one was

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18See p. 505 above. Frank Phelan had not been identified by the writer as a Textile unionist at the time the list of seven was submitted to Clifton for evaluation. "Most of the Advisory Committee were active locally; some engaged in all the functions [covered in text above] set forth in your question." The use of the word "very" was volunteered by Clifton in filling the questionnaire blanks following the names listed. The question called merely for check marks under alternative columns: "Active" and "Not Active," then for "Special Comment" in connection with each name.

"exceptionally active" in Fall River, along with Ed Doolan—with whom he had worked as an organizing team since the early 'thirties, when as
business agents respectively for Dyers' and Weavers' locals they were experiencing the kind of disillusionment with craft unionism which was later to lead them and others from UTW to TWOC and TWUA.19 Of

19 For a vivid picture of the Bishop-Doolan team in action see Kelly, Nine Lives for Labor, pp. 40–64.

Frank Benti in Rhode Island Clifton writes: "... he and I organized CIO forces intensively."

In summarizing his own activities Clifton writes proudly that with Patrick J. McDonough, Salerno's chief political assistant and a state legislator who was "extremely well versed in politics," he... visited all the New England areas, usually meeting with state CIO Council leaders first, then arranging for state PAC conferences, speaking at local union meetings and setting up PAC committees with local union officers. We both acted separately and jointly as trouble shooters wherever friction developed or organization PAC problems existed.20

20 McDonough (no union affiliation) was one of five full-time salaried employees working out of the New England PAC office. The only other regional office with as many staffers on the PAC payroll, as of June 1944, was that of George Mitchell. U. S. Senate, Hearing of Special Committee on Campaign Expenditures, 1944, p. 40.

By way of illustration, on April 2 Clifton, McDonough and Franz Daniel, the one-time TWOC (by now an ACMA) organizer, joined Salerno and others in pep-talking a New England CIO PAC conference for action—particularly on the immediate task of voter registration. All supported the familiar thesis, uttered by Salerno, that politics
demanded the same ardor which they were wont to muster for industrial activity. "We must," he averred, "stop sending good telegrams and lousy Congressmen to Washington." Good Congressmen elected by an alert and informed electorate would not require pressure by wire to vote as they should.21

21Advance, 5/15/44, p. 18.

Attention was by no means confined to the states with the most promising outlook, nor to those in which Clifton's own union was "dominant." For example,"McDonough and I made several trips" into Vermont. Maine too--where the Shipbuilders were to exult over helping Portland "go Democratic" for the first time in fifty years--had its visitations from the Clifton-McDonough team. One occurred early in the year as a United Labor Committee conference (attended by representatives of the CIO, the railroad brotherhoods and "some individuals who are members of AFL unions") endorsed a fourth term for Roosevelt and the Pettis Congressional candidacy. In this instance too Joseph Salerno accompanied Clifton and McDonough, along with CIO regional director Frank Carmichael, IUMSWA president John Green, TWUA's George Baldanzi and labor columnist Charlie Ervin.22

22See Shipyard Worker, 4/28/44, pp. 1, 3; 11/13/44, p. 8. See also pp. 449-50, 502n above.
With respect to regional PAC procedure and responsibility,

... the [entire] Committee met regularly early in the year. [Then] as the campaign became more active contact was made by Salerno, McDonough and by letter and phone, and by reports of staff people who were on "part or full-time" assignment to PAC.23

23 It is not entirely clear whether this reference to the "Committee" is to the several state PAC chairmen, regional PAC staff and/or Advisory Council.

In addition to his work throughout the six-state area, and while McDonough "functioned to a considerable degree in Massachusetts," TWUA's regional assignee in his "spare time" concentrated upon Rhode Island "as the campaign reached the late summer and fall." He also grasped opportunities to cultivate good public relations for the badgered and beleaguered CIOPAC:

I should add, that among my duties were speaking engagements to non-union groups, schools and clubs, such as Kiwanis and Lions. Considerable interest existed outside the unions, as to what PAC was and what CIO's future policies in the political field were shaping up to.

From Maine to Massachusetts

As a collective entity TWUA was "active" in both Maine and Vermont—in the laying of campaign plans, the bestowal of endorsements, and in followup activity through IUC's, PAC's, ULC's and/or state TWUA conferences. Daoust and Jabar were "very" active, the former even more in New Hampshire than in Vermont. Jabar was one of two "leading personalities" in the launching of Maine's United Labor Committee. (Pettis of IUMSWA was the other.) Moreover, "TWUA lent
considerable push to Pettis' own campaign and "our TWUA locals" in Lewiston, which had the state's largest TWUA membership, "were very active in getting over the issues and all the activities of registration and getting out the vote."\[2\]

Maine's ULC apparently took the place of functioning Congressional district PAC's. In addition to IUMSWA and TWUA the only other CIO union mentioned by Clifton in this connection was the "local Newspaper Guild in Portland [which] furnished some active workers." For Maine TWUA and ULC developments, the divided course of non-CIO labor re ULC, and the exploitation of a "PAC issue" and "red-baiting" in an "abortive" AFL "raid" on Pettis' Portland local see Advance, 6/15/\[UU, p. 10; Textile Labor, Feb. 19\[UU, p. 9; NYT, 9/10/\[UU, p. 39:1; 9/11/\[UU, p. 9:1; 9/12/\[UU, p. 1:1; 9/17/\[UU, p. E3:1, 2; CIO PAC News Release, 7/21/\[UU; CIO News, 6/26/\[UU, p. 1; Guild Reporter, 6/15/\[UU, p. 10; Shipyard Worker, 1/28/\[UU, pp. 1, 3; 6/9/\[UU, p. 3; 6/23/\[UU, p. 8; 7/17/\[UU, p. 3. On Vermont IUC and ULC developments see CIO News, 10/2/\[UU, p. 9; Advance, 4/15/\[UU, p. 5; 6/15/\[UU, p. 10; 9/22/\[UU, p. 9. See also pp. 147-50 above.

Charles W. Ervin and Joseph Salerno went to a state PAC meeting in Hartford on February 27 to help arouse enthusiasm for the campaign in that state. Thereafter PAC did pretty well in Connecticut in spite of losing the battle for Clare Boothe Luce's House seat. Within TWUA staff members were eager to encourage cooperation. In 1943 under Joseph Leeds, Connecticut Textile leaders had "conferred" themselves into the CIO PAC program. Leeds died, was succeeded by Joseph White, who had been on assignment in the Nutmeg state once before in the early 1920's, mid-way through his long career as an organizer successively for UTW, TWOC and TWUA. Under White's guidance in the late summer of 1944 approximately 70 delegates to another Connecticut conference unanimously endorsed FDR and pledged
their twenty-two locals to take part in the PAC dollar drive.

According to Clifton, White personally "was active statewide, furthering PAC policy set down by TWUA for staff members." The "same applied to the local areas covered by Daniel Gallagher and Pamela Pilot." Gallagher "kept close contact with the . . . state CIO Council." State PAC chairman Bello too was active "on a local level"; however, "he had other duties as an organizer and business agent." All three of the latter had attended the 1943 TWUA convention for locals in Connecticut's second Congressional district.

Although the House contest in this four-county district lacked the national interest which attached to the Luce-Connors race, attention has been called to TWUA's potential importance as a critical electoral factor in this area. Clifton states that there was a functioning political action committee, that it was "composed of all local union CIO leaders" and that "TWUA and its Dyers affiliates were the only CIO unions" in the area.

Sources for Connecticut data (in addition to Clifton): Advance, 1/1/44, p. 16; Textile Labor, Feb. 1944, p. 4; Sept. 1944, p. 3; NYT, 10/10/44, p. 15f1. For background on and previous references to White in this work see Dickerman and Taylor, p. 376; Kelly, pp. 89-108; and pp. 266, 291, 335, 371, 398, 410 above. See also pp. 441-456 above.
Rhode Island readers of the TWUA Journal were warned at the last minute that although their state was conceded to be "safe" for the Democrats the votes remained to be cast. How much of the new high Roosevelt plurality which ensued was inspired by this admonition or induced by TWUA vote canvassers is undetermined. Albert Clifton has encouraged the impression that PAC flourished in this smallest, most highly urbanized and most densely populated state and business transacted at the state CIO convention soon after the election attests indirectly to the general satisfaction—or lack of dissatisfaction—with which the delegates, preponderantly from TWUA, must have assessed TWUA secretary Pollack's political remarks and the recently concluded IUC-sponsored campaign activity: reelection of both Benti and Clifton to their high council posts (in each case without a contest), and a vote to support a permanent state PAC. Late in the campaign the journal reported the appearance of Benti and Clifton at annual meetings of locals in Natick and Esmond.²⁷ Clifton writes that

²⁷See Textile Labor, Oct. 1944, p. 12; Nov. 1944, p. 1; CIO News, 12/18/44. See also pp. 353-54n, 437-42; 508, 513 above.

"Benti and I got our local unions set up early in the year" and that together, throughout 1944 "... [we] organized CIO forces intensively." He confirms contemporary reports that they cooperated with non-CIO labor, through an especially created "United Labor Political Action Committee," which, as distinguished from CIO PAC, was primarily
interested in reelecting Congressman Fogarty and apparently was responsible for little "grass roots" work. The ULPAC was headed jointly by Ferdinand Sylvia and state AFL president Christopher Hopkins. Other members were from the railroad brotherhoods and the Industrial Trade Union, an unaffiliated textile union in Woonsocket with from eight to twelve thousand members. Wide publicity was given to the joint labor committee when the secretary of the Providence Central Federated Union (AFL) withdrew as an ULPAC officer and when nine members of the ITU's political action committee resigned from that group, declaring that labor should "leave politics alone" and asserting that they had discovered that one person associated with "control of the ITU PAC" had Communist connections. Contrary to implications in general news dispatches Clifton writes that the ITU was "predominantly French and Democratic in politics" and that its leadership "repudiated" the anti-ULPAC statement of its "dissident" elements. "Needless to say the repudiation received no publicity." Hopkins "was in throughout the campaign as co-chairman."
The Benti-Clifton political lead, according to Clifton's recollection, was directed toward "union members [who were] in Rhode Island as a rule... more politically conscious than the average," and it was ably supported by TWUA leaders all down the line. Adelard Gingras of Pawtucket, a local union president [Local 486] for twenty years and a past president of the state IUC, was "always active in every union matter [including political action] within his local union group and the state CIO Council." Veteran IEC member Elizabeth Nord, whose organizing days antedated TWU, was "very" active for PAC. 30 Asked to volunteer the names of politically active New England TWUA personalities other than those suggested by the writer, Textile's regional PAC director cited John Cavanagh of Pawtucket. Asked whether the TWUA people who neglected to cite political affiliation in their Who's Who in Labor biographies were in fact "active for PAC," his reply was categorical: "The fact is that all CIO and TWUA people [in Rhode Island] were exceptionally politically enthusiastic." As a result of and reason for labor political action he added: "We had Fogarty, a labor man, in Congress,"
Senator Green was "highly regarded, as was Congressman Forand. And relations with Governor McGrath were excellent."\(^{31}\) One of the

\(^{31}\)For a meeting of ULPAC leaders with Vice-President Wallace and Governor McGrath see \textit{UE News}, 9/23/44, p. 6.

"Who's Who" personalities who failed to disclose political affiliation was Frank Benti himself!\(^{32}\) One of TWUA's "grand old men,"

\(^{32}\)Others included Joseph C. Novo, a joint board manager and TWUA organizer and future state TWUA director; Arthur Wilcox, local union officer and a Dyers field representative; and local unionists Henry Bamber, Mrs. Ellen J. Clark and Albert Stanelum. Both Bamber and Wilcox did specify "PAC" in their biographies. Dickerman and Taylor, passim. Clifton responded affirmatively to a PAC activity query re Wilcox and thought the others were delegates to the state PAC organization and/or that they "probably were active" in their local unions.

Tom McMahon, was a Rhode Islander whom Kelly describes as a TWUA pensioner "who never retired." McMahon's obituary appeared in the May 1944 issue of \textit{Textile Labor}. Clifton was asked if, before his death, the 73-year-old McMahon had contributed in any way during 1943-44 to the promotion of PAC. Answer: "McMahon was always active in Rhode Island politics, and we used him whenever possible as a speaker at union meetings."\(^{33}\)

\(^{33}\)See Kelly, pp. 86-87. See also pp. 232, 248-49n above.
In Massachusetts delegates to another state CIO convention
registered approval of the CIO political program while the campaign
was still young—by reelecting incumbent IUC officers, endorsing FDR
for a fourth term and "standing behind" Henry A. Wallace for a
second. Both Joseph Salerno, who explained why "the corporations
hate Roosevelt," and Emil Rieve made addresses on the importance of
political action and requested funds to finance it. Other guest
speakers, who also exhorted the convention to "turn thumbs down on
Dewey," included national PAC officers Thomas and McDonald. By

public accounting later, in the only report of its kind for any of
the New England states, the Massachusetts CIOPAC announced that it
had collected and spent $10,432.94. Assuming that this comprised
the state's proper share of PAC dollars under nationally- and state-
recommended distribution formulae (fifty cents of each dollar to the
national PAC plus a 50-50 allocation of the second half dollar to
state and local units), the local affiliates of all internationals—
TWUA, the next ranking UE, the Amalgamated, the Steelworkers and
the rest—would have collected altogether, for use at all levels of
operation, just four times that amount, a sum scarcely approaching
the goal of a dollar per member, whether modest or inflated CIO
membership estimates be taken as a guide. Since an itemization of
sources is not available it is by no means certain that all of the
state PAC's $10,000 fund represented union member contributions. If it did not, overall dollar drive estimates would have to be reduced accordingly. On the other hand, while virtually no evidence in hand supports the conjectures of one of Sidney Hillman's most persistent Congressional interrogators—that each PAC unit at every level of the CIO organizational hierarchy would amass a fabulous sum guaranteed barely to miss inviting prosecution for Hatch Act violation, 35 TMUA's leading individual New England symbol for PAC has

35 See, for example, the half dozen pages of the proceedings of one House committee hearing which revolved about the insistence of Republican Rep. Church of Illinois that the PAC fund distribution formula would facilitate the spending of "hundreds of thousands of dollars in one congressional district..." U. S. House, Hearings of Committee on Campaign Expenditures, 1944, pp. 79-85.

volunteered the intelligence that state PAC reports alone afford an inadequate clue to total sums collected. Clifton's suggestion is not that the Massachusetts committee nefariously kept one set of books above and another below the table, that its receipts were revised downward in public accounting, or that local unions made vast unreported collections. He merely suggests, not without a trace of pride, that the state's $10,132 was in all probability somewhat less than one-quarter of all PAC funds collected by all CIO unions in the state for national, state and local use. Adherence to the recommended 50-25-25 dollar allocation pattern was strictly a matter for local decision. Autonomy in money matters was a cherished
prerogative, and not all local units, Clifton believed, honored the
obligation to contribute to the state PAC's upkeep:

The Massachusetts PAC dollar was apportioned as recommended. But I am quite sure that the 25 per
cent due the state was not always paid. Some
locals kept all but the 50 cents that went to the
national PAC. 36

36Cf. George Mitchell's observation based upon experience in
the South. See p. 172n above.

Without access to actual records Clifton would not hazard a
guess as to TWUA's share of responsibility for Massachusetts' state
PAC treasury. He recalled that at least three Textile communities
(New Bedford, Fall River and Lawrence) did "an especially good job
on the PAC dollar drive in '48," and his best impression a decade
later was that the total Textile collection—before allocation—was
"probably... from 25 to 35 thousand." Unsubstantiated from any
other source this figure, in relation to contemporary popular TWUA
membership estimates, would represent something better than a "buck a
member." If one were to postulate such good fortune for PAC solici-
tors throughout all internationals in Massachusetts and the faithful
dispatch of 50 per cent of the purse to Sidney Hillman in New York,
then by even the most implausible CIO membership estimates the
amount retained for use within the state still would have left the
GOP undisputed title holder as Number One Fund Gatherer. Fully a
dozen pro-Roosevelt committees, including the state PAC and the
Democratic state organization, reported receipts in the aggregate of $153,424.66. The state GOP committee collected $761,732.65.\(^{37}\)

\(^{37}\) Even by Henry Anderson's unlikely estimate a 100 per cent CIO member dollar collection would have left no more than $100,000 for PAC use within the state. See p. 425 above. For campaign receipts and expenditures see U. S. Senate, Report on Investigation of Campaign Expenditures, 1944, p. 108.

There is additional testimony, outside the realm of campaign finance, that CIO and TWUA in Massachusetts were "activated" politically. From the western sector of the state one labor informant recalls that "pro-PAC sentiment" was "strong" in 1944 among affiliates of all unions— including TWUA— in and around the city of Springfield in Hampden county.\(^{38}\) This same source also advances local confirmation from this first and second district territory for Education Director Rogin's admission that, theoretical commitments aside, elaborate plans for "grass roots" political organization and activity did not come to glorious fruition on any grand scale in 1944 and that ward and precinct organizations existed primarily "on paper." Pro-PAC sentiment was fairly universal. "Getting down to brass tacks" to organize for it was something else again. More traditional campaign operations were easier to recall: political rallies were

\(^{38}\) Other "active" CIO unions included the Clothing, Rubber and Electrical Workers, plus some members of his own union, a newly organized Newspaper Guild unit which was necessarily more immediately concerned with contract negotiations than with politics. Al Zack, Interview previously cited.
held and literature was distributed—a "fair amount" of the latter at plant gates, although not so extensively as in later campaigns when labor's political techniques were further developed. "Big crowds" were drummed up for the President when he "whistle stopped" through the state.\(^{39}\) Albert Clifton was consulted about TWUA's possible

\(^{39}\)Ibid. In point of fact, the President did little "whistle stopping" or rear platform speaking in '44. As he entrained for his previously unplanned Boston speech late in the campaign, however, reporters wrote that he would make four rear platform appearances in "doubtful" Connecticut and Massachusetts. NYT, 11/4/44, p. 1:3. See p. 161 above.

"prominence" in the first district, in the area which included "Holyoke, Adams, Pittsfield, etc." His answer was that TWUA was "very active in the three areas referred to. . . . The Holyoke TWUA has always been politically conscious, due to local leadership of Anne Sullivan, Joint Board manager. . . ." A later query about other individuals elicited this confident reply:

I do not recall these people. They probably were active as this was Ann Sullivan's district. She serviced a big TWUA local in Ludlow and as I recall was responsible for PAC activities, for the Springfield IUC set up area supervisors for PAC.\(^{40}\)

\(^{40}\)(Italics added.) For election returns and the TWUA potential in western Massachusetts see pp. 429-31, 432 above.

At the extreme northeastern corner of the state, where the city of Lawrence contributed modestly toward Massachusetts' record voter registration of two and a half million,\(^{41}\) the Textile Workers,
Some of the largest increases in eligible voters over 1940 occurred in cities where TWUA was not a factor or where it was relatively less important than other unions. See NYT, 10/22/44, p. 1:3.

As previously noted, submitted one of the state's best PAC dollar receipt books. Some of TWUA's Essex countians had an opportunity also to contribute to a Roosevelt plurality, to cast ballots for one of their own number (William P. Casey of the Wood and Ayer local) for reelection to the state legislature, and to vote for one of two successful PAC-endorsed Massachusetts Democratic Congressional incumbents. This easy victor, by many more votes than TWUA members alone could possibly have mustered, was Thomas J. Lane of the seventh district.

See pp. 272-73, 433, 435-36 above. The seventh district, comprising parts of several counties, encompassed the bulk of TWUA's Essex county membership, notably in Lawrence and Peabody. Combined membership of locals in these two cities was in excess of 5000 in 1943, probably between 5,986 and 7,300 as measured by 1946 convention representation. Lane won by a vote of 78,008 to 36,877. The other Massachusetts winner was Rep. John W. McCormack of Dorchester (twelfth district). CIO News, 11/13/44, p. 6. PAC endorsements were made in only five other districts: the first, ninth and fourteenth, and, according to Clifton, probably two of the following—the second, fourth or eighth. Number of endorsements supplied by Henry Anderson, Dec. 26, 1944.
Regional PAC council member Bamford's "activity" for PAC in the Lawrence area has been confirmed by Clifton. The local unionist who headed the labor campaign for Congressman Lane was Ralph D. Arivella, business agent for Local 227 and legislative agent for both his local and the Greater Lawrence IUC. Arivella had joined a Woolsorters Union in Lawrence in 1934, the UTW in '37. He had become a volunteer organizer for TWOC—also in 1937—when CIO organizers under ACWA's August Bellance took up where the UTW's Woolen and Worsted federation had tried in 1936 and where the IWW had left off many years before that. Viewing the '36 campaign in retrospect, for labor's "Who's Who," Arivella noted that he was co-chairman of the seventh Massachusetts Congressional district PAC. Under "Writings," he proudly listed: "newspaper article for PAC during last Roosevelt national election."

Clifton was uncertain of the identity of Arivella's co-chairman but thought "there was a loosely-knit CIO-AFL setup" and that the other co-chairman was "AFL." For background on Arivella and on unionism in Lawrence, see Dickerman and Taylor, p. 9; Kelly, pp. 119-119.

Albert Clifton has testified to the "active" or "very active" status—for PAC—of at least three international union staffers (Belanger, Chupka and Henry Kullas) whose home territory was Worcester county, which had a scattered membership as of 1943 of up to 5,900. He is also the source for affirmative data regarding the

See pp. 505-506; 509-510 above.
Like both Belanger and Chupka, Kullas first entered the field of textile unionism via UTW. Dickerman and Taylor, p. 199.
Worcester county was also once home ground for Harold Daoust, former president of Local 40 at Farnumsville. (Roosevelt's plurality in Worcester county was 25,026, representing a vote loss from 1940 of 9,101, as compared with a loss of 2,051 for the GOP.)

Political action records of several Textile unionists in Norfolk and Bristol counties, each of which, like Worcester, added to the mélange of counties, cities and towns that made up Massachusetts' Congressional district map. Norwood, in Norfolk county, was in the thirteenth district. Three other Norfolk county towns with TWUA units—Franklin, Medway and Walpole—were in the four-county segmented fourteenth, along with Taunton, most of Fall River, and several other Bristol county cities and towns which were TWUA constituencies. Bristol county's city of New Bedford and a section of Fall River were in the ninth district.\(^6\) Clifton writes that TWUA was the only CIO union in the ninth district and that this district as a whole, "as set up in 1940," comprising three entire counties and parts of three others, "had very little TWUA membership" and was "hopeless for a Democrat." The outcome of the Congressional election in the fourteenth, where TWUA was "by far the largest CIO union," suggest that it was equally so. Nevertheless, although the dismal outlook with respect to the ninth district seat led to concentration there upon the presidential campaign, Joe Martin in the fourteenth was "... vigorously opposed"—as "always"—and there were PAC
endorsements for Democratic challengers in both districts. TWUA's New England PAC coordinator was confronted with the fact that FDR in Bristol county experienced one of his greatest vote losses in the state, as compared with 1940, and was asked whether this largest TWUA organization was really politically active. The questioner's implication was overridden:

TWUA was probably even more active in this county than in some others. At least the activity was equal. We had in New Bedford and Fall River well experienced union leaders on politics, and in the Attleboro-North Attleboro area we had also in the numerically small jewelry union aggressive leaders. . .

Clifton chose to take comfort in certain negative aspects of the presidential returns, calling attention to the casting of a "lesser number of blanks. . . in Attleboro, Taunton, Fall River and New Bedford. . ."47 He was proud of TWUA's outstanding work on the

47 "Blanks," he explained, were "used as a barometer in Massachusetts to check voter interest in relation to certain candidates or offices. The voter interest was particularly keen in these areas in 1944." Presumably Clifton's comparison was to numbers of ballot "blanks" for other offices in 1944, rather than to other years (?). As compared with 1940, statistics for these four cities as well as for important Textile centers in other counties (Holyoke, Lawrence and Peabody), show that the number of "blanks" increased in each case. Presidential election returns obtained from Edward J. Cronin, Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Mar. 1, 1954.

dollar drive. Here was where PAC advisory council members Bishop and Doolan were in action and this was where Antonio England won his berth on the Democratic national convention delegation. Clifton offers the name of at least one other TWUA staff member who was a PAC
activist in Bristol county in 1944—George Carignon, a former Hosiery unionist (Branch 12 in Northampton, Hampden county) and member of the federation's National Executive Board. The question called for names of "some of the... leading New England Textile union personalities who were active in the '44 campaign who had also been active for Roosevelt in 1940..."

"Who's Who" yields the name of at least one Textile unionist in Norfolk county, Joseph Dickens of Franklin, a local union president and officer of his county CIO council. Textile Labor for June 1944 identifies another, William J. Munroe, president of Local 119, Walpole. Dickens, a "Who's Who"-recorded Democrat, was a member of the advisory board of the Franklin Democratic Town Committee and Clifton verifies the presumption that he was "active" for PAC. Munroe, a member of TWUA's Central Massachusetts Joint Board, was identified by the journal as a candidate for a Democratic state legislative nomination, as a former public office holder and as chairman for a decade of the Democratic Town Committee, Medway.

The handful of items carried by Textile Labor on local PAC progress includes one each on the two chief Bristol county cities. One, from Fall River, reported preparations of the local Political
Action Committee for a mass meeting on October 28 at which Emil Rieve was to speak, along with Senator Truman. Another identified the leaders and called attention to some of the work and accomplishments of the New Bedford PAC and of a "PAC Women's Auxiliary." Antonio England was chairman of the former organization. Other TWUA personalities, flanked by ladies from the Amalgamated, headed the Auxiliary. The fifty members of the latter group, it was said, "got together every Tuesday evening to hear speeches on political action," to receive instructions on canvassing techniques, and "to enjoy special political entertainment." As for major pre-election achievements, the journal's New Bedford correspondent proudly announced some early results on voter registration, stating flatly that that city's "all-time high" was attributable "largely... to the New Bedford TWUA Joint Board's PAC work."  

50 Textile Labor, Nov. 1944, p. 6. The Auxiliary's "entertainment" included such things as presentation of an original skit entitled, "Who's That Knocking at My Door?" and a showing of the UAW-PAC film, "Hell Bent for Election." Louise Lima and Elizabeth Sylvia, both of TWUA, were chairman and secretary-treasurer respectively of the ladies' group. The vice chairmanship and post of "education director" were held by ACWA. The unions other than TWUA may have been quite small. Clifton writes that "The 1944 District 9 had no other CIO union but TWUA to my knowledge in it."
CHAPTER XVII
TWUA AND PAC IN THE SOUTH

Below the Mason-Dixon line local officers, international union
staffers and state and local IUC personnel identifiable with the
Textile union family all helped to fulfill the political promise
implicit in the debate contributions of delegates from southern locals
in the 1941 and 1943 TWUA conventions. Paul Christopher and Textile
and Hosiery workers in Tennessee represent only a segment of the
total southern picture of TWUA-PAC, a valuable glimpse of which has
been preserved in the study made by James Tracy Crown in his The
Political Action Committee of the CIO in the Southeast, 1944 to 1945.  

1 See p. 11 above.

Crown was concerned with the work of all PAC activists, irrespective
of union labels, and he cites regional director Mitchell's reports to
national PAC headquarters to the effect that everywhere, "without
exception," state CIO bodies and their staffs became involved in
political activity, and, as of October 3, that "practically all"
local unions had set up political action committees, though the
extent of their activity varied. 2 In his conclusions Crown echoes a

2 See p. 467 above.
Judgment of Mitchell's, that "None of the CIO leadership and little of the membership dispute the necessity of linking political and economic activity," and avers that, at the end of the campaign, membership acceptance of PAC as a proper permanent adjunct to union organization was fairly general. Another southern observer, Witherspoon Dodge, is less sanguine on the latter point while agreeing that neither staff nor local officers needed to be "sold" on PAC. PAC was not "imposed" from above. Leaders in the field were ripe for political guidance and assistance. As for most rank and file workers, interviewee Dodge pointed to their relatively low educational level and confided that it was as difficult to develop their interest in political action as in unionism itself. TWUA or other union members, he lamented, would vote to retain the most "reactionary rascal" in office—just because he happened to be a former textile worker. 3


Notwithstanding his broader non-discriminatory generalizations, Crown does attempt some tentative evaluations of the relative importance of the several internationals, particularly with respect to work on voter registration. He also pays tribute to a number of individuals who, as he interpreted the regional records, made memorable contributions to PAC. TWUA fares rather well in both cases. Several southern states, including Louisiana and the Carolinas, had no state CIO councils. In these and in each of the remaining states
in the region Crown designates the area's CIO regional director as the man who was, in effect, "head man" for PAC. Among these only Christopher in Tennessee and, by extreme extension of the "TWUA force" concept, Charles Gillman in Georgia (both of whom were IUC presidents and state PAC officers as well) were symbolic of TWUA-PAC.

\[^1\] See Crown, pp. 35, 48, 51, 55, 62, 67. CIO regional directors for Virginia, the Carolinas, Alabama and Louisiana were, respectively, Ernest B. Pugh of the Woodworkers, Earnest L. Sandefur and Carey Haigler of the Steelworkers, and R. W. Starnes, a former "small business man." Identifications from Dickerman and Taylor, passim; CIO News, 10/4/43, p. 2; 10/29/45, p. 9; Mitchell, Questionnaire previously cited; Mason, To Win These Rights, pp. 81, 114-142.

It may be recalled, however, that Crown rated the Textile union as one of those which "worked hardest" on the 1914 campaign and other TWUA personalities did hold significant IUC offices--notably Lloyd Gossett, president of Local 118, Atlanta, as secretary-treasurer, and Garland Brooks, TWUA international representative, as second vice-president of the Georgia council; and Boyd Payton, TWUA regional director, as president in Virginia.\[^5\] Indeed, in every state in Region VIII save...

\[^5\] Both Gossett and Brooks were reelected to their IUC offices in 1944 and Roy Dyer of the Hosiery Federation was named to the Georgia IUC executive board at the same time. Textile Labor, Aug. 1944, p. 6. In Virginia Payton succeeded CIO director Pugh as president during 1944. The secretary-treasurer's post went to members of the Amalgamated in both 1943 and 1944. TWUA's Lloyd Vaughan, once again on the CIO field staff, was returned to that office in 1946 following a wartime interlude in the armed forces. CIO News, 6/8/42; 5/31/43, p. 2; 5/15/44, p. 2; 4/22/46, p. 10. See also pp. 270, 280, 285-87, and preceding note.
Florida and Mississippi—neither of which had any TWUA organization—illustrations may be found in apparent justification for Crown's most complimentary assertions regarding the Textile Workers. Even in the latter state, where there was precious little CIO organization, TWOC's Lucy Randolph Mason, according to Crown, was a chief PAC emissary. 6

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6 Crown, pp. 59-60. Miss Mason herself refers to PAC activity only in the Carolinas, Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee. See Mason, p. 31. See also p. 468n above.

In one instance, in the light of personal observations as of 1948, Crown refers to the comparative "political lethargy" of the "more conservative leadership" of TWUA in one area, as opposed to affiliates of certain other unions "with their politically-conscious left-wing leadership." His own descriptive detail regarding 1948 PAC activity, however, does not strengthen this image of relative TWUA indifference, nor does Mitchell countenance any suggestion of such a "pattern." Crown, pp. 53-54; Mitchell, Questionnaire, Jan. 6, 1953. See p. 357 above.

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Dollars, Voter Registration and Endorsements

Regional PAC records on accomplishments of IUC's and internationals alike—financial and otherwise—were incomplete. Relying upon scattered reports only, Mitchell on November 1, 1948 reported the collection of only $24,200 within eight of the nine states in his jurisdiction—for PAC use at any and all levels of operation. For only four states—Virginia, the Carolinas and Mississippi—was he able to assign responsibility by unions and then only in highly generalized fashion. In Virginia, however, $4,000 reported at that time was described as coming in the main from three unions—NMU, ACWA and the Textile Workers—while two-thirds of a $1,500 collection in
North Carolina and the bulk of a $1,000 collection in South Carolina were ascribed in each case largely to TWUA. Mitchell stressed that these were totals collected, not amounts available to the Hillman committee. Indeed, many of the local receipts never reached the national organization. Moreover,

In Virginia, Tennessee, and Alabama, the sums from the dollars which reached state PAC treasuries amounted in each case to not over a few hundreds. In the other states, less. In North Carolina and South Carolina and Mississippi there were no state PAC's.7

Information obtained from Mitchell, Dec. 29, 1951; Jan. 6, 1953, and from Crown, pp. 91-93. With respect to the different internationals Mitchell cautions against unwarranted comparisons: "Crown's table's too small and incomplete for inferences. . . Some places and people and locals paid off. Some didn't." (Italics added.)

Save for a reference to its members in South Carolina as being 80 per cent registered Crown indicates that TWUA's achievements in promoting voter registration were documentable (separately from the CIO as a whole) only in an equally tentative fashion. Mitchell thought the CIO deserved credit, in most of his nine states, for registering from five to 6,000 persons not previously qualified.

In a chart prepared from fragmentary data in Mitchell's hands as of September 1, 1951 Crown attempts to show, on a state by state basis, the unions "which counted most heavily" in producing registration increases and the areas where the CIO made its greatest gains in voting strength. TWUA appears on the respective lists of unions for all states in which it was organized save Virginia—for which no
list appeared—and Crown's lists of cities and towns are replete with names of places in which TWUA units were organized.

At least three out of six Alabama cities cited were TWUA territory (as of the 1913 and/or 1916 union convention)—Huntsville, Gadsden and Anniston. So were four out of nine in Georgia (Atlanta, Dalton, Greensboro and Lafayette); one out of one in Louisiana (New Orleans); four out of five in North Carolina (Durham, Charlotte, Leaksville and Spray); both of two in South Carolina (Columbia and Spartanburg); two out of seven in Virginia (Richmond and Roanoke); four out of ten in Tennessee. So far as CIO membership was concerned

8 See pp. 472-73 above. For all states except Georgia and Tennessee cities are listed without corresponding information on number of registrants; similarly, for most states unions "which counted most heavily" are apparently named without regard for order of importance and, save for Alabama and Tennessee, information on number of registrants is not supplied. See Crown, pp. 17, 83-85. (Some other places listed may also have been sites of TWUA units.)

Queried further about relative achievements of certain internationals Mitchell observed that a union with a large Negro membership (such as MMSW in Birmingham) had great difficulty hurdling barriers to registration of its members, however great the will to do so. "In any large local of mainly white people in 1914," on the other hand, "there were a whole lot of people who hadn't registered, were half-way willing to, and for PAC urging would go do it." Questionnaire, Jan. 6, 1953. (Italics added.) Former organizer Dodge emphasized that TWUA was almost exclusively "white." Interview previously cited. See p. 454 above.

at least some of these were "exclusively TWUA." Thus Witherspoon Dodge noted that the "big industry" in Dalton was textile and described the following as "one-industry" towns: Lafayette and Greensboro; Charlotte, Leaksville and Spray; and Columbia and Spartanburg.
Useful comparisons across union boundaries with respect to election day and other activities are also elusive. Crown cites state PAC estimates regarding the number of persons they had at work on November 7 to help "offset the defection from the Democratic party of Southern conservatives:"
40 each in Georgia and South Carolina, 200 in Tennessee, 900 in Virginia, 1000 in North Carolina. Which unions did they come from? Mitchell, who relayed the figures to New York, states: "I would simply have had a letter, or a few telephone calls, saying that so many people had been rounded up. Mostly the bigger locals, I would guess."

Neither Mitchell nor Crown, after examining the latter's reports, has attempted to tag with a specific union label any of the Congressional primary or November election results—although the CIO was rated a significant factor in some of the former. TWUA members formed part of the CIO voter potential in primaries involving PAC-supported Senatorial candidates in both of the Carolinas and one Congressional district endorse in North Carolina (fifth district). It formed part of the "labor vote" in Georgia's seventh district, where there was apparently CIO backing for a Congressional primary.
aspirant. In Louisiana, Mitchell testifies, "we did some work

11Endorsees listed by Mitchell in letter to writer, Dec. 29, 1944.

None of three Georgia districts where the CIO "actively" supported challengers against incumbents (first, second, eighth) was in TWUA territory, and Mitchell states: "We played no active part in other primary contests, though we were for the primary candidate against Senator George..." Crown, however, adds the seventh district as one in which there was an endorsement (possibly informal?) and notes that the CIO supported the fifth district incumbent in the general election. (This district too encompassed some TWUA membership.) See Crown, p. 118.

against Hebert and Maloney [first and second district] incumbents in New Orleans," site of virtually all TWUA and CIO membership in the state. In Alabama TWUA was organized in at least two of three districts in which there was CIO primary activity as well as in the statewide constituency of Senator Lister Hill, for whom, according to Mitchell, "We worked up and down the state... against his allegedly Democratic primary challenger..." "We were strongly for Deason, primary challenger of Carter Manasco," incumbent in the seventh district, and "our membership vigorously campaigned for Rains versus Joe Starnes," incumbent in the fifth. Presumably CIO primary support would have been forthcoming for John Sparkman in the eighth Alabama district--also a TWUA constituency--had his House seat been contested.12

12The other district specified by Mitchell was the ninth, where "We actively backed Luther Patrick" against incumbent John Newsome. Letter previously cited. Although Mitchell in this 1944 communication did not include Sparkman's name Crown lists him as a
recipient of CIO support and also notes that there was a Congressional district PAC in the fourth district of "anti-labor" incumbent Sam Hobbs. Crown, pp. 63, 118.

Although more than half of the southern PAC endorsees failed to win their Senate or House nominations there were several victories; Mitchell observed that PAC-promoted Vivian Page in Virginia's second district "barely" lost his bid for nomination, and more than one incumbent was forewarned of future CIO political effectiveness. In the thirteen primary contests cited above just five PAC-supported candidates won: Olin D. Johnston over Senator "Cotton" Ed Smith in South Carolina; incumbent Representative John Folger in North Carolina's fifth district; Senator Hill and Albert Rains and Luther Patrick over incumbent Congressmen Starnes and Newsome in Alabama.13

13Mitchell also stated with respect to the Virginia second district seat: "Our members locally are believed to have voted generally for the candidate successful in the primary [Daughton], but I should not say that he had our formal endorsement." Letter previously cited, Dec. 29, 1944. For further coverage of PAC endorsement policy, activity in various races, identification and fate of endorsees see Crown, pp. 101-24.

TWUA and PAC "Sparkplugs": Johnson and Virginia

TWUA personalities singled out in the Crown study for PAC contributions (besides Christopher and Miss Mason) include Robert A. Johnson, R. C. "Ted" Thomas, Helen Gregory, Garland Brooks, Paul Schuler and Lucille Savoie, all of whom—save for Johnson and Miss Savoie—were on TWUA's international union staff. Another TWUA "name"
which appears in Crown's work is that of organizer Tom Moore, who figures as a PAC collaborator in an account of Miss Gregory's voter registration activity in North Carolina. Also relevant perhaps is the name of James P. Mooney, described by Crown as the only "full time" international union assignee whose services were available to Mitchell during one period following the primaries. Mooney, whom Crown characterized as the "single person who did the most for PAC" in Alabama, was chairman of the Jefferson county and ninth Congressional district PAC. In 1944 he was associated with the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers but during the CIO's southern organizing drive, which began not long after, he moved into the textile field and, subsequently, to the TWUA and TWUA-PAC staff. 1


supplied Crown with even half as many illustrative individual representatives of the force(s) behind PAC in the South. 15

15Other names may well have appeared in the Mitchell files, but save for TWUA a review of individuals mentioned in the Crown manuscript shows reference to no more than three persons most closely identifiable with any single union.

Robert A. Johnson of TWUA Local 27, it will be recalled, headed the Richmond IUC in 1942 and served on the state CIO political com-
mittee of that year. In '44 he not only headed the Tidewater IUC and two PAC's (CIO and Citizens) for the same area, but he "ran the second district Page7 Congressional campaign"—one of five southern Congressional primaries in which a contribution ($150) was made from national PAC funds—which "very nearly brought the candidate to an upset victory over the Byrd machine supported incumbent." The Tidewater PAC was hailed also by Crown for outstanding work on the presidential campaign and regional director Mitchell sustains the latter's evaluation of Johnson's role by saying in response to a request for comparisons: "In the Tidewater IUC I think Robert Johnson pretty soon came to the top."16 Actually, CIO membership in this area was small

16Crown, pp. 50-51; U. S. House, Hearings of Committee on Campaign Expenditures, 1944, p. 15; Dickeram and Taylor, p. 180. The latter volume also identifies Johnson as a CIO field representative and as acting legislative chairman, Virginia state IUC, Norfolk. See also pp. 285-87, 539 above.

and both Page's "near" primary triumph—he lost by 425 votes—and gains which President Roosevelt made in some parts of the district, as in the state as a whole, become all the more remarkable in light of the fact that in both cases labor was openly challenging entrenched state Democratic leadership. In Johnson's words, Senator Byrd, who kept Virginia "under the heels of [his] dictatorship," was "too busy to come down into the districts... and put in a word for Franklin D. Roosevelt's fourth term."17 In point of fact Byrd's alleged
negligence manifested itself in positive acts of hostility, both to FDR and to the CIO. The Senator helped to launch a campaign-year organization dedicated to "Four Freedoms on the Home Front,"—one of which was "Freedom from racketeering labor leaders." He was an unreluctant object of a "Draft-Byrd-for-President" movement and his leadership was reportedly responsible for the state Democratic convention's quiet tabling of a proposal to support the President's renomination and for its binding of Virginia's national convention delegation to opposition to Vice-President Wallace.18 Robert Johnson's activity in the second district presumably reached beyond the small CIO membership. In his "Who's Who in Labor" biography, for example, it is recorded that he wrote "Radio scripts for Tidewater Citizens PAC, presidential campaign, 1944."
Sections of Virginia other than the Tidewater and other unions than TWUA were a part of the campaign picture and it has been pointed out that although it was "strong" the Textile union was not "dominant" in the state scene. Nevertheless, an impression of TWUA-PAC

19 Lawrence Regin, TWUA Education Director, Interview, Dec. 17, 1951. TWUA convention representation from Virginia in 1943 suggests a membership of from 1,000 to 5,000, well over one-third of the delegates (10 out of 25) being from Roanoke. The remainder were from Danville, Richmond, Lynchburg, Front Royal and Covington. In 1946 there were 64 delegates from 18 locals, and half a dozen additional towns were represented. Some 24,000 textile workers were then under TWUA contract. Regin, Questionnaire, May 29, 1953. See p. 224 above. 


significance is enhanced rather than weakened by additional fragments of information from statewide and lesser areas. The Mitchell-Hillman correspondence, for example, indicates that state Political Action Committee members were drawn primarily from areas of TWUA jurisdiction—i.e., from thirteen local unions "in the areas where the small, but strategically concentrated CIO membership was located"—primarily the Richmond, Danville, Lynchburg-Radford-Roanoke areas. 20


The state IUC convention of May 15, which "laid plans for intensive political action" and endorsed a fourth term for FDR, heard Emil Rieve talk on major political issues and made regional TWUA director Boyd Payton council president, and it was under Payton's presidency, at the end of the campaign, that the IUC agreed to finance a "permanent"
Mitchell confirms the presumption that Payton’s personal commitment to PAC was actively implemented while interviewer Witherspoon Dodge conveys the impression that questions pertaining to the depth of political feeling on the part of Payton or other TWUA representatives in Virginia (or elsewhere in the South) were absurd. Of course, they "must have been active!"

So far as he knew, all were "thoroughly in favor" of PAC.

Although a few names presented to Dodge for PAC-relevant recollections were unfamiliar to him, such assurance was expressed for Payton, Lloyd Vaughan (whom Mitchell did not recall and who may have been in the army at that time), and J. D. Pedigo in Virginia. Dodge seemed to recall a routine TWUA interest in politics in the South: "strong speeches" were made at union meetings—by state directors and local presidents—in which the need for PAC was stressed and workers were urged to pay poll taxes and to vote. Mitchell, Questionnaire, Jan. 6, 1953; Dodge, Interview, Feb. 2, 1954.

Of five TWUA personalities from Virginia in the 1946 labor "Who's Who," two (Johnson and Payton) specified Democratic affiliation; one (Ray O. Barger of Roanoke) cited membership on a local union legislative committee and another (Douglas R. Banes of Danville) membership on the Virginia Citizens Political Action Committee.

Crown writes that some "basic precinct canvassing" was undertaken in Richmond in '44 and Mitchell recalls that "pretty much all" of the unions in that vicinity "worked well" on behalf of PAC.

"Nobody dominated." Despite a 1940-44 decline in percentage of the total presidential vote (from 76 to 72 per cent), FDR polled the
largest vote in this city's history, receiving a plurality greater by 546 votes than in 1940. 23 In Danville and Lynchburg the Roosevelt vote declined slightly but in Roanoke, seat of TWUA's largest Virginia affiliate, his vote was a trifle greater than in 1940 and his reduced plurality could have been dependent upon TWUA voters. Both Danville and Lynchburg figured in rare journal items touching upon political action in the field. A February report dealt with a TWUA conference at Lynchburg; a brief announcement in November told of a meeting of Local 549 members in the same city. In each case PAC was under consideration—with George Baldanzi on hand in the former instance, national representative J. D. Pedigo and regional director Payton in the latter. 24 An April column by John Edelman carried a

23 CIO News, 11/13/44, p. 6; Mitchell, Questionnaire, Jan. 6, 1953; Crown, p. 49. (FDR's vote here increased from 19,332 to 22,584; the Republican vote from 6,031 to 8,737.)

24 Textile Labor, Feb. 1944, p. 2; Nov. 1944, p. 3. See also p. 455 above.

Local 549, chartered only in December 1942, eloquently demonstrates the extent to which local leaders were compelled to give first priority to non-political matters. The local's first contract was signed in March 1943. A year later major attention centered upon an appeal against an adverse regional WLB decision on a union request for a 2½ cent wage increase. In the latter part of June frustration occasioned by national WLB delays led to a two-day protest strike—Virginia's deadline for poll tax payment was in early May. See Kelly, Nine Lives for Labor, pp. 138-39; Crown, pp. 24-25. (Payton was one of four representatives of Local 549 in the 1946 TWUA convention.)
glowing reference to TWUA work on poll tax payment and voter registration among folk who had previously been politically passive. Now, he wrote, there were "whole mill villages" in Virginia and Alabama and Georgia where mill people had "scraped together their pennies, paid taxes, and have qualified to vote," though scarcely a "handful" had voted in 1942. The story under the Danville dateline in May told of the candidacy of four TWUA members for city council and of the prospect that with their election TWUA would gain "complete control of the . . . governing body" in this city, home of some of the biggest cotton mills in the world.  

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Crusaders and Canvassing Queens in the Carolinas

Textile and AFHW staffers and local union leaders were "active" for PAC in both North and South Carolina. Some were closely allied locally with the Democrats, notwithstanding an anti-Roosevelt and anti-CIO bent of nationally prominent party leaders. One veteran Hosiery organizer and one time local AFL official who specified both "Democratic" and "PAC" affiliations in his Who's Who in Labor biography, W. C. Stallings, stated that he had been "active in city, state and national elections since 1934 in Durham and the state of
North Carolina. Two other "Who's Who" TWUA Democrats have also been "verified" as PAC activists: southern regional director Roy Lawrence of Charlotte and R. C. "Ted" Thomas of Spartanburg, director of organization for South Carolina. In the latter state all TWUA units but

26 Dickerman and Taylor, pp. 204, 338, 351; Dodge interview previously cited. See also pp. 266, 301 in above.

Lawrence Rogin cited Columbia, South Carolina as an example of an area where TWUA leadership interest in politics was "tied in" with the Democratic party. Interview, Dec. 17, 1951. See also Crown, p. 51.

one were said to have active PAC's and a house to house voter registration canvass was undertaken in many Textile communities, including Columbia, Greenville, Gaffney, Cherokee and Spartanburg, all of which, according to Dodge, were "exclusively" TWUA so far as CIO organization was concerned. In North Carolina too TWUA affiliates developed functioning PAC's and engaged in some grass roots "precinct work." 27

27 Crown, pp. 51-52; Dodge, Interview previously cited. Regional PAC director Mitchell states: "TWUA had some precinct work--not a whole lot--in Durham, maybe in Charlotte." Questionnaire, Jan. 6, 1953.

A handful of PAC items involving TWUA affiliates and personalities in both states appeared in the union journals. One of these covered a conference at which some one hundred South Carolina textile unionists "unanimously" endorsed the Roosevelt-Truman ticket. Director Thomas presided and urged the delegates to go home and implement their endorsement resolution.--Crown alludes to much more
dramatic evidence of Thomas' dedication to (and martyrdom in) the PAC cause—to wit, his victimization by apparent anti-PAC vandals while delivering a PAC talk in Spartanburg.\textsuperscript{28} One exuberant journal report from Roy Lawrence in January told of the first local in the South to report a 100 per cent response to the first TWUA dollar drive. This pace setter Textile Labor identified as tiny Local 515 in Charlotte, organized only a little more than a year earlier. Another story concerned a novel, unsophisticated technique employed by Local 234 at Lumberton to enliven its dollar drive kick-off meeting of the following September. This meeting, it was said, turned into

... an old-fashioned testimonial meeting, with one worker after another getting up to express his faith in President Roosevelt's ability to lead the country so that workers would not become forgotten men again. One elderly member said he would be happy to give a dollar every week to help keep in office the only President he had lived to see who was willing to help workers get a decent living.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{28}See Textile Labor, Oct. 1944, p. 9; Crown, pp. 52-53.

\textsuperscript{29}Textile Labor, Jan. 1944, p. 1; Oct. 1944, p. 2. See also Hosiery Worker, Apr. 1944, p. 5 for reference to AFHW and IUC PAC activity in Durham. (Maximum possible membership for these several locals, as represented in 1943 or 1946 TWUA conventions, ranged from under 200 to between 400 and 500 members.)

One of TWUA-PAC's most newsworthy subjects was Helen Gregory, a TWUA field representative and former local Hosiery officer in Knoxville. She was assigned to Mitchell's office for duty in both Carolinas and acquired the enviable title of "a queen among canvassers"
while on this assignment. In North Carolina alone, according to one publicity release, this woman spoke at union meetings, helped establish local PAC's and joint labor (AFL-CIO) political groups, assisted in building precinct organizations—and made registration a by-word in seventeen North Carolina unions! Most noteworthy was the fact that she personally "guided, cajoled and accompanied... some 5,000 North Carolina workers to registration offices." Indeed, more than that many union members were registered for the first time as a consequence of Miss Gregory's efforts.  


In the latter state as elsewhere regional PAC spokesmen fore­swore invidious comparisons among unions as they congratulated the CIO on its political achievements. It may be noted, however, that Congressman Folger's victory occurred in a district which included at least four Rockingham county textile towns and that two of these were among those reportedly producing the best CIO gains in voter registration. --Locals in Leaksville and Spray, together with units in Draper and Reidsville, sent 17 delegates representing up to 3,000 members to the 1943 TWUA convention—nearly a third of the entire North Carolina contingent. Folger's two to one victory in November followed a contest in which the GOP challenger campaigned openly against the CIO and although the labor backing was unofficial, the CIO News chalked Folger's reelection up on the positive side of its 1944 score sheet,
along with maintenance of a large statewide majority for President Roosevelt—withstanding an anti-FDR Democratic effort which cut into his 1940 plurality—and the failure, earlier in the year, of Senator Robert Reynolds to seek renomination. George Mitchell wrote

31 CIO News, 11/13/44, p. 6. (Reynolds was associated with such anti-Roosevelt groups as the American Democratic National Committee and the American Nationalist Committee of Independent Voters. See Kennedy, p. 148.)

of the fifth district contest: "We endorsed no one in the general election, but our members all liked Folger, and I suppose voted for him."32

32 Letter to writer, Dec. 29, 1944. See pp. 537, 539 above. The point has been made that in some parts of the South, particularly after 1944, CIO endorsements were deliberately withheld lest they hurt the recipients. Witherspoon Dodge has opined that PAC was "unwise" in the beginning, endorsing some candidates and "branding" others. This, he said, tended to ensure defeat for good candidates and so PAC "got nowhere." Interview, Feb. 2, 1951. See p. 469n above. See also Crown, p. 118.

For further information on PAC in the Carolinas see Crown, pp. 16, 18, 20, 21, 27-30, 42, 49-52, 59-60, et passim.

Alabama, Georgia, and Louisiana

The Textile Workers may have had little to do with keeping Alabama Democratic but Mitchell derived satisfaction from the fact that PAC's seventh district favorite lost by "only" a few thousand votes, and he was convinced that the CIO vote (including TWUA) was vital in Senator Hill's successful renomination contest and in the fifth
district primary defeat of Dies committee man "Joe" Starnes—by a man who, according to the CIO News, had "represented CIO unions in a legal capacity." Sources consulted disclose no specific reference to TWUA activity in the latter district but three Etowah county locals represented in the 1946 TWUA convention had a membership of up to 2,300—
in Alabama City, Attalla and candidate Rains' own city of Gadsden. Both Helen Gregory and Ted Thomas were among the organizers dispatched by TWUA to this anti-union territory in 1942 as the CIO launched campaigns to organize steel, rubber and textiles.33


The primary outcome which inspired greatest CIO jubilation in Alabama was in a district of no Textile-significance (the ninth), while the eighth district, which had the oldest Textile unions and possibly the greatest TWUA membership, afforded the CIO no opportunity to prove itself in Congressional balloting.34 In the fundamental work of promoting poll tax payment and voter registration, however, TWUA in the latter district—specifically in Huntsville, Madison county—affords an outstanding example of the kind of enterprise which helped to make Alabama one of the earliest "movers" in the PAC crusade. As early as February state director Herbert Williams reported
Local 230's 100 per cent response to the international union's initial appeal for PAC dollars. He also announced that more people from Local 230 were eligible to vote than members of any other group in Madison county. In April he radiated even more optimism. Alabama was no "political paradise" yet but "things [were] certainly looking up." All over the state officials had been persuaded to set additional registration days. He referred to "live-wire" campaigns, to AFL promises to cooperate, to the soliciting of aid from "union-minded legislators," to political meetings held by "every local IUC." TWUA's locals in Huntsville especially distinguished themselves, along with the local IUC, with an ingenious program of financial aid to facilitate poll tax payment for union members and Williams predicted that by primary election day some 1,500 would be eligible to vote.35

35At this accounting about 800 Lincoln Mill workers (Local 230) had paid poll taxes, out of their own pockets or with loans from a special union fund of $2,500. Williams predicted that all 600 members at the Dallas Mill also would be able to vote and reported that the local IUC had also made funds available ($300) for poll tax loans. Textile Labor, Apr. 1941h, p. 2. See also ibid., Feb. 1941h, p. 2. Mitchell observed that "the Huntsville device was a freak; interesting, and well-managed, but seldom copied." Questionnaire, Jan. 6, 1953.

This in a textile town which had a typical background of long and bitter resistance to unionism.36

36See 1939 TWUA convention remarks, including Roy Lawrence's reference to Huntsville, where the "Manufacturers Association attempted to break the TWOC in the South." TWUA, Proceedings, 1939, pp. 137-38. See also Lucy Randolph Mason's account of the TWOC battle
against a "citizens' committee"-supported union-busting campaign in Huntsville and the intervention of the NLRB, Eleanor Roosevelt and the President of the United States. Mason, pp. 54-59.

Head of Local 230 was William T. Adcock, president of his union "almost continuously" since 1933, president of the Huntsville CIO council and chairman of the legislative and political committees for both Local 230 and the IUC. Corroboration of Adcock's leading role in affairs of his local, including PAC, comes from Witherspoon Dodge and PAC director Mitchell, both of whom also confirm TWUA director Williams' application to PAC business long after poll tax and registration deadlines had passed. That Williams--once an organizer for an AFL union, a former president of the Allied Printing Trades Council in Nashville, and a textile unionist since 1931—required no "conversion" to labor political action after appointment of the Hillman committee is evident from his contributions to the preceding one-sided TWUA convention political action debate. Attending as a representative of Local 196, Jacksonville, this self-identified "Who's Who" Democrat warned against state as well as national "anti-labor" laws, said Alabama had "legislation set up prohibiting strikes, forcing arbitration," etc., and advocated that the labor people go home and "start cleaning house now." In his state, Williams had promised at that pre-PAC date, 90,000 CIO members would be "eligible to vote in the next election," despite a cumulative poll tax—which was $1.50 annually, cumulative up to $36.00 and payable as early as February 1 as a prerequisite for voter registration.
In October 1944, Textile Labor reported an enthusiastic greeting for Williams from some 60 local union delegates who met in Gadsden to plan their campaign dollar drive.  

37 Dodge interview and Mitchell questionnaire previously cited; Crown, pp. 24-25; Dickerman and Taylor, pp. 2, 378; Textile Labor, Oct. 1944, p. 2; TWUA, Proceedings, 1943, p. 73. See pp. 454-57, p. 536. For previous reference to Williams see pp. 271n, 302n, 315 above.

Sources consulted give little reason for supposing that TWUA voters in Georgia played crucial roles in any statewide or Congressional contests. However, the best-contributing cities on CIO voter registration included communities wherein textiles comprised the major or only industry,  

38 See pp. 453, 536 above. (A Hosiery local in Union Point, which was also on the list, was represented in the 1941 TWUA convention.)

...territory was so appallingly low that TWUA or TWUA-influenced votes could have accounted for a local Roosevelt plurality. In Dalton, for example, TWUA membership lay between 600 and 1,000 (minimum 1943 and maximum 1946 convention representation potentials). The Roosevelt margin for all of Whitfield county (population 26,105), in which Dalton was the county seat (population 10,448), was 1,804 in a total major party vote of only 3,850.  

39 Without singling out any individuals
Population for 1940.
Crown cites "numbers of registrants" for the Georgia cities. The figure given for Dalton is 350 but it is unclear whether these are workers registered for the first time or all union registrants newly registered for 1944. See Crown, pp. 84-85. See also p. 472n above.

Interviewee Witherspoon Dodge testifies that the "Dalton bunch" were all "very active politically." Crown notes that PAC in the seventh Congressional district—which had at least seven TWUA locals with up to 3,400 members as of 1946 (in Dalton, Lafayette, Rome, Dallas and Aragon)—supported an unsuccessful Congressional primary challenger in 1944 but according to Mitchell's contemporary testimony active efforts in Georgia primaries were confined to the first, second and eighth districts and to an unsuccessful attempt to replace Senator Walter George. 40

40Dodge, Interview, Feb. 2, 1951; Crown, p. 118; Mitchell letter to writer, Dec. 29, 1944.

On a statewide basis Georgia had one of the earliest functioning CIO PAC programs and in Atlanta, where fully half of Georgia's CIO members worked, excellent progress on voter registration was reported as of March 1. Although Crown questions whether the man actually "worked at PAC for the full period" for which he was ostensibly assigned "full time" by his union, he described TWUA staffer Garland Brooks as one of two PAC "spark plugs" at work in Georgia outside the Atlanta area. The other was Annie Maude Creel of the Amalgamated.
Dodge has described Brooks as "very enthusiastic" and as probably "always active" in TWUA's political program, and Mitchell confirms the presumption that Lloyd Gossett of Local 118, Atlanta, was also among those who made genuine contributions to the "A campaign. Both Brooks and Gossett were reelected to their IUC offices by the same state CIO convention which, appropriately enough, endorsed Roosevelt and Wallace and exhorted affiliates to back the PAC campaign, on the very eve of President Gillman's departure for the Democratic national convention. 41

41 Crown, pp. 55, 57, 193; Dodge interview and Mitchell questionnaire previously cited; CIO News, 7/24/41, p. 2. See also pp. 346, 356, 533 above.

(The Georgia IUC's first vice-presidency went to R. E. Starnes of USA-CIO. A single vice-president elected in 1943 was Eunith Painter of TWUA. CIO News, 7/19/43, p. 7.

TWUA had only the one local in Atlanta (with from four to 500 members) but according to Mitchell that union was among the strongest and most active in the area—along with UAW, USA-CIO, ACWA, and the Packinghouse Workers which furnished the PAC chairman. No one union "surpassed what others did." "All the unions. . . worked on the PAC business, in getting people registered, in getting people to pay poll taxes, in mapping precincts and trying to set up precinct organizations, and in getting out the vote. 42 Every Roosevelt vote mustered

42 Questionnaire previously cited.

Gossett has been identified as a past president of the Atlanta IUC but it is not clear whether he held this post in 1944. Both he and the one other TWUA member from Georgia listed in the labor "Who's Who" (Horace P. White, state TWUA director as of 1946 and
chairman of Georgia and Atlanta IUC legislative committees) are identified as Democrats. Dickerman and Taylor, pp. 137, 37h. For further Georgia and Atlanta PAC detail see Crown, pp. 55-57, 79, 95-96, 193 et passim.

by TWUA, therefore, must be credited with helping to produce what was for the South in 1944 an extraordinarily good Democratic-Republican ratio. The Democrats' share of the major party vote in Atlanta rose from 85.3 in 1940 to 86.3 per cent in 1944 while the actual Roosevelt vote in Fulton county (the great bulk of which was cast in Atlanta) increased sufficiently to produce a statewide gain as well, notwithstanding a statewide decline in percentage of votes cast—and the fact that no more than 14 per cent of the population bothered to go to the polls (see accompanying table).

More than a score of CIO unions were involved as the PAC movement took organizational shape in Louisiana in the spring of 1944—at a convention addressed by Charlie Ervin. Some 300 delegates from 22 unions attended and more than 400 persons signed pledges to "study legislation affecting the welfare of the nation," to work for FDR and for progressive legislation, to carry the message of political action to friends, neighbors, etc. Like virtually all CIO...
TABLE 17

PRESIDENTIAL VOTE: GEORGIA*  
(Major Parties Only)"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Georgia (population</td>
<td>D = 265,194 85.1%</td>
<td>D = 268,187 81.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3,123,723)</td>
<td>R = 46,362</td>
<td>R = 56,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T = 311,556</td>
<td>T = 321,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P1 = 218,832 (D)</td>
<td>P1 = 211,681 (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulton county (392,886)</td>
<td>D = 31,311 83.8%</td>
<td>D = 37,161 83.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R = 6,033</td>
<td>R = 7,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T = 37,344</td>
<td>T = 44,270</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P1 = 25,278 (D)</td>
<td>P1 = 30,042 (D)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Atlanta (302,288)</td>
<td>D = 218,832 (D)</td>
<td>D = 268,187 81.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R = 56,506</td>
<td>R = 56,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T = 321,693</td>
<td>T = 321,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P1 = 211,681 (D)</td>
<td>P1 = 218,832 (D)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a Taken or computed from sources cited on pp. 1428-29 above.

*b Symbols: D - Democratic; R - Republican; T - Total;

P1 - Plurality.

*c 1940 census.

organization Louisiana's PAC set up was confined primarily to the city

of New Orleans, which was coterminous with Orleans and Jefferson

parishes. 1111 TWUA, with perhaps 1,500 members, was by no means

1111 There were also PAC's in three neighboring metropolitan area

parishes. All five were linked in an "Interparish PAC"—the equivalent


See also Textile Labor, May 1944, p. 12; Advance, h/15/44, p. 5.
"dominant" numerically and Mitchell was uncertain where initiative lay for the New Orleans PAC program prior to establishment of his office in February 1944: "I think Fred Ted Pieper of UAW, then CIO regional director set it up, but that was before I came." His files show that TWUA was but one of half a dozen major union contributors on voter registration and they reveal someone other than a Textile personality as PAC's "head man." At the same time, they indicate that

some of Louisiana's "spark plugs" did wear TWUA buttons and that the Orleans parish PAC, embracing the most populous parts of two Congressional districts, perfected the "most satisfactory precinct organization in the South." This was under Paul Schuler as chairman and the latter's most valuable administrative assistant appears to have been Lucille Savoie, executive secretary of the TWUA joint board in New Orleans at the time of the 1942 political developments referred to in an earlier chapter. Miss Savoie was on Mitchell's payroll "for several months" for work in the area. Although PAC's regional director in retrospect has hesitated to give these two anything like exclusive credit for PAC accomplishments here it was Miss Savoie, "an industrious and imaginative girl with unusual ability to get things done on her own," who, according to his 1944 reports to Hillman,
"carefully scheduled" the ward and precinct meetings which were being held in workers' homes by mid-July of 1941. It was she who produced the weekly bulletin used by precinct workers. And it was under Schuler, who devoted "months of his time" to PAC, that the Orleans PAC by August could boast of an organization thoroughly blanketing the city's 17 wards and 207 precincts, with ward and precinct leaders who were, as Crown interpreted the records, truly functioning PAC personnel.\(^6\)

\(^6\)Crown, pp. 67-68. See also pp. 275-76, 357n above. Mitchell wrote in 1953: "Schuler and Savoie worked hard," but "So did many others. . ." Questionnaire previously cited. (Miss Savoie attended both the 1941 and 1943 TWUA conventions from Local 351, New Orleans. Schuler was a member of the same delegation in 1943.)

The follow-through on PAC endorsements in two Congressional primaries produced no upset victories over reaction but in the post-election assessment one incumbent (Maloney in the second district) was said to have been "put on notice" and results generally, apart from registration gains, were deemed satisfactory, if only because of experience gained.\(^7\) The only comfort PAC was in a position to

\(^7\)George S. Mitchell, Letter to writer, Dec. 29, 1964; Crown, pp. 66-67, 118-20. See also p. 538 above. (Crown states that the Orleans and Jefferson PAC's functioned as separate Congressional district committees but Schuler in the labor "Who's Who" is identified as 1944 chairman of the New Orleans PAC and parish population figures indicate that the bulk of the population in each district was contained within the city of New Orleans.)
take from the presidential returns stemmed from the likelihood that it helped prevent more precipitate declines from 1940 than did occur in the state and in Orleans and Jefferson parishes—in Democratic percentage of the major party vote and/or in the size of the Roosevelt plurality. (In Jefferson both FDR's vote and plurality were larger in 1944 but declines were registered on all counts in the much larger Orleans parish and in the state.) New Orleans was headquarters for the dissident "Draft-Byrd-for-President" Democrats early in 1944 and Louisiana Democrats at Chicago were solidly in Byrd's camp. In addition, half of the state's ten Democratic electors chose to abandon their right to cast Louisiana's electoral college vote rather than bow to a state party committee demand that they pledge support to the national ticket. Significantly, Senator Truman incorporated New Orleans into his campaign itinerary, there to confer with CIO leaders and to deliver a confident prediction that the Solid South would remain solid. The Orleans PAC had previously acknowledged existence of an "anti-FDR Plot" as it condemned the refractory anti-Roosevelt electors.48

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48 See Kennedy, Southern Exposure, p. 133; Democratic National Convention Proceedings, 1944, pp. 61, 104; NYT, 9/24/44, p. 16:6; 10/12/44, p. 18:4; Shipyard Worker, 10/23/44, p. 1; International Woodworker, 8/2/44, p. 6.
TWUA in the Midwest and Far West was significant numerically only on a limited community basis. In the remaining eastern states as well its relative importance as part of a CIO electoral potential was small, not excepting Pennsylvania and New York which ranked just behind Massachusetts in internal union (TWUA) strength. Contract coverage figures for 1946 disclose a mill worker potential for TWUA-PAC to cultivate of approximately 35,000 in New York, a potential greater than that represented by existing contracts with mill operators in any southern states, or in any New England state outside of Massachusetts. In the metropolitan New York area alone a dozen units accounted for more TWUA members than any southern state except North Carolina or Virginia, yet they were swallowed up in the total CIO complex.\footnote{Data obtained from Lawrence Rogin, Questionnaire previously cited. For convention representation comparisons see pp. 224-25 above. Locals in New York City, Staten Island, Brooklyn and Yonkers had a membership range of up to 7,600 (1943 convention). Cf. the "master file" of 600,000 CIO members used by the Greater New York IUC in planning its 1944 vote mobilization campaign. \textit{NYT}, 8/27/44, p. 34:6.} In Pennsylvania workers under TWUA contract were far outnumbered by sister CIO affiliates—even in Philadelphia, where more than a third of them were employed. Statewide TWUA was a pygmy
compared with the giant Steelworkers—whose membership increase for a single year was probably triple the entire TWUA membership. If, how-

ever, this union is an appropriate subject for analysis because of the work of a Helen Gregory or a Carl Holderman, or because of an actual or prospective electoral impact in any of the constituencies previously described, it is equally so—and for the same reasons—wherever else a TWUA-PAC missionary was at work or a TWUA unit was caught up in the PAC movement.

In New York state the labor political movement became increasingly complicated in the spring of 1944 as a faction led by Sidney Hillman won control of American Labor Party machinery. The major battle was waged in contests for state committee posts, the successful slate being committed to a plan for party reorganization which the incumbent regime charged would invite future domination by labor and political leaders who hewed to the Communist party line. The defeated "rightists" seceded and created a rival "Liberal" party. At least one prominent TWUA personality, Greater New York joint board manager Sam Baron, transferred his allegiance to the Liberals—after resigning his union post in protest against an official TWUA position that Textile unionists in this matter must hew to the Hillman line. At least two others who, along with Baron, had publicly associated
themselves with the ALP "right wing" a year earlier, remained with Emil Rieve in the ALP after the bitter primary fight was concluded: state director Jack Rubinstein and William Gordon, manager since 1933 of TWUA's largest affiliate in the New York City area (Dyers), Local 1790, Brooklyn. Rieve presided over the convention which reconstituted the state ALP executive committee with Hillman as chairman and Rubinstein accepted one of 18 ALP vice-presidencies.3

3See NYT, 2/7/54, p. 17:6; Textile Labor, Feb. 1954, p. 1; Shipyard Worker, 4/14/54, p. 3; CIO News, 9/17/54. Information also obtained from TWUA Education Director Nogin, Interview, Dec. 17, 1951; Questionnaire, June 25, 1953. For previous identification of individuals and reference to ALP factionalism see pp. 274, 278, 301, 303n, 322, 324-25 above. See also Dickerman and Taylor, passim, for data employed throughout this chapter on Gordon and other individuals.

In some measure ALP and PAC in New York state were synonymous but an observation of regional PAC director Charlotte Carr, herself a member of ALP, suggests that many who wished to effectuate PAC aims found it necessary— or desirable— to supplement if not to bypass the Labor Party mechanism. Thus she recalls that in her territory PAC got off to a "late start" because of an erroneous assumption that ALP, whose office was "next door," could "do the job." She has stated further that some CIO unions in the metropolitan area eschewed political cooperation with the Greater New York IUC— whose leaders had zealously promoted the "Hillman plan" for ALP. Notwithstanding the upper echelon and formal TWUA identification with the Labor Party just described, a national TWUA staffer places TWUA among the latter unions and individual Textile unionists among those who preferred
not to work through ALP. He does not recall that Textile unionists in any locales engaged in "grass roots" ALP activity. He does maintain that TWUA participated in PAC and Miss Carr has stated categorically that affiliates of all unions were "active" in some fashion.¹

¹NYT, 5/7/44, p. 36:1-4; Lawrence Rogin, Interview previously cited; Charlotte Carr, Interview, Nov. 28, 1951.

Miss Carr referred to ALP as one of PAC's "biggest problems," saying "we paid little attention to their little candidates throughout the state." The objective was Roosevelt's reelection. As for the relationship between the Greater New York IUC and activities of the various unions, "Saul Mills' office" [Mills was IUC secretary-treasurer] did "not touch the activities of ACWA, UAW, etc." Cf., however, the fact that a request for information on PAC endorsements, sent to the Carr office, was turned over to the state IUC, then by the latter to ALP—for a reply which was not forthcoming. Questionnaire addressed by writer to Miss Carr; Reply from Harold J. Gurno, state IUC secretary-treasurer, Feb. 27, 1945. See p. 460 above.

Limited local area research has not disclosed how many of Baron's associates may have emulated his defection to the Liberals but it is patent that such party association need not have entailed sabotage of PAC since both ALP and the new party were in the Roosevelt camp. Moreover, not only ALP "right-ists" at the height of the intra-party controversy but some of the outstanding "names" who adhered to the Liberal Party later were at pains to insist that abandonment of ALP should not be construed as opposition to the Political Action Committee.⁵

⁵See, for example, New Masses, l/3/44, p. 1h; NYT, 1/15/44, p. 26h; 2/23/44, p. 13; 2/30/44, p. 9; 7/28/44, p. 10.
Union journal or other published items touching TWUA-PAC activity in New York state are not numerous but scattered evidence renders plausible a presumption that it contributed to the registration totals and election day returns which led observers to laud ALP, the Liberals and PAC for carrying the state for FDR—in the face of what was characterized in some districts as a "disintegrating" Democratic machine. 6 Dewey polled 2,987,646 votes; Roosevelt, on the

6 Thus James A. Hagerty wrote on October 25 that CIOPAC and ALP were compensating for Democratic derelictions in the "comparatively few industrial cities" of the heavily Republican 10-county sixth Judicial District in south central New York. As a result, at least two of these counties (including Binghamton, whose labor force included one small TWUA local) were now "doubtful" instead of sure for Dewey. NYT, 10/25/48, p. 15:1.

Democratic ticket, only 2,478,598, but he polled 496,405 votes under the ALP and 329,235 under the Liberal label for a total of 3,304,238. Similarly, Senator Wagner received only 2,485,735 votes as a Democrat, as compared with 2,899,497 polled by his GOP opponent. But 483,785 ALP and 325,056 Liberal Party votes gave Wagner a total of 3,291,576. 7

7 Unless otherwise specified, sources for these and other election statistics cited in this chapter are listed on pp. 428-29 above.

William Gordon, who headed his local's political action committee, indicated in 1946 convention debate that, in retrospect at least, he took his PAC chairmanship as a conscientious assignment—however reluctant he may have been about ALP. 8 Milton Rosenberg,

8 TWUA, Proceedings, 1946, pp. 86-87; Regin, Questionnaire, June 25, 1953.
Baron's successor as joint board manager, indicated that he was at least nominally acquiescent in the policy Baron had spurned by specifying ALP membership in his (labor) "Who's Who" biography. Significantly, perhaps, neither Gordon nor Rubinstein supplied any party affiliation for this volume. A Textile unionist of lesser stature was the subject for one of the infrequent local PAC stories in Textile Labor. This was one Frank Grout of tiny Local 601, in Lockport, Niagara county. A life-long Republican," Grout "joined PAC and was elected chairman," in which capacity he turned in an "enthusiastic job of collecting dollars, distributing literature and working for Roosevelt and other PAC candidates." In another journal item from neighboring Erie county Buffalo joint board manager Charles Sobol was reported in attendance at a dinner given by the Niagara Frontier PAC for Vice-President Wallace. Still another labor paper pictured TWUA representative Charles Cena among union and ALP leaders who greeted the Vice-President on his arrival in Buffalo.9 TWUA was

9Textile Labor, Nov. 1944, p. 4, 12; Buffalo Union Leader, 9/28/44, p. 1.

far from a leading affiliate in this part of the state but Sobol served on the ten-member Niagara Frontier PAC, whose job it was to supervise the CIO's registration and fund-raising campaigns in eight western counties, at least four of which had some TWUA organization—Erie, Niagara, Chautauqua and Cattaraugus.10
To credentials report in TWUA, Proceedings, 1946. Steel
and Auto unionists held top offices in the Greater Buffalo IUC and
at least two posts each on the Niagara political committee. Buffalo
Union Leader, 9/21/44, p. 2; 9/28/44, p. 3.

By an immediate post-election evaluation of presidential
returns in the New York Times FDR was said to have "run well"
wherever there was "extensive industry and organized labor. . . ."
Moreover, despite a Democratic margin in Greater New York, Dewey's
chance to carry the state was lost "in the up-state industrial cities
where the activities and influence of the PAC and the Labor party
cut heavily into the usual Republican pluralities." The reporter
cited the seven counties (out of 62) which were in the Roosevelt
column—by virtue of Democratic or Democratic and ALP or Liberal
votes, and a number of pro-Roosevelt cities in counties which "went
Republican." The former included five which had varying degrees of
TWUA (and other union) organization—Erie, Albany, Monroe, New York
and Kings; the latter included Utica, one of the largest centers of
TWUA organization outside of New York City. Indeed, this Oneida
county city gave the President a greater proportionate share of its
presidential vote—58.1 per cent—than in any previous election. 11

11 See James A. Hagerty in NYT, 11/9/44, p. 17. Eighteen
delegates from eight Utica affiliates attended both 1943 and 1946
TWUA conventions. Maximum membership potential in 1946 was 3,600.
As computed from a total major party vote of 49,018 (apparently
including ALP and Liberal votes) and percentages cited in the Gallup
Political Almanac, the Roosevelt plurality in Utica was slightly
under 6,000. See pp. 428-29 above.
This notwithstanding heavy GCP concentration upon the anti-Communist theme—as manifested in the Curran Senatorial campaign—and a Dewey victory prediction of state campaign manager Schwartz on the basis of registration figures and the "assurance" of "many labor leaders" that "the PAC and Communist organizations will not control the vote of the worker."12

Pennsylvania's state CIO council in convention early in 1944 endorsed the "fourth term" and renewed its 1943 advocacy of an effective political program. Harry Boyer was continued as IUC secretary-treasurer and presumably helped plan the state CIO conference the following July which "urged 'a rally to the call of liberalism' in the general election campaign" and created the Pennsylvania Citizens Political Action Committee. The name of this former Hosiery (turned Steelworker) organizer does not appear on the officers' roll of the new group. His identification with PAC promotional work, however, is documented in a lone Hosiery Worker item of June 1944 while the various offices and connections listed in his 1946 Who's Who in Labor biography include the chairmanship of the Pennsylvania CIO Political Action Committee. Just when Boyer assumed the latter post is not clear and the distinction, if any, between CIO and Citizens PAC's in Pennsylvania is hazy. See, for example, a union convention reference regarding the necessity for setting up PAC's
"outside the union"—because Pennsylvania law prevented unions from contributing to political action "or even campaigning for a political candidate. According to the journal story Boyer was one of two

13 *Proceedings*, Sept. 25-29, 1944, pp. 100-102. See also p. 328 above. An attempt to communicate with Boyer in 1953 for clarification on this point was unsuccessful. The New York Times (7/30/44, p. 28:2) identified John A. Phillips, state IUC president, as chairman; A. J. Federoff of Pittsburgh, CIO regional director, as secretary-treasurer, and (regional PAC director) Joseph Donoghue as state director of the Citizens committee. Boyer succeeded Phillips as state CIO head in 1946. Federoff is identified in Who's Who in Labor as secretary-treasurer, Pennsylvania PAC-CIO. (See also *Advance*, 11/15/44, p. 10.)

Apparently no CIO-PAC organizations made financial accounting to state or national authorities. A Philadelphia Citizens PAC reported receipts and expenditures of approximately $175,000 from September 1 through the election; seven county Citizens PAC's reported funds of around four and three thousand dollars respectively, and the state committee $6,592.56. Information from Mrs. John J. Zimmerman, Assistant Director, Bureau of Elections and Legislation, Pennsylvania Department of State, Jan. 30, 1945. Cf. p. 62 above.

principal speakers—the other was PAC director Donoghue—at a special institute on political action and voter registration sponsored by the education committee of AFHW Branch 10 in Reading for shop officers and political committee members. This was the only journal copy unearthed of especial relevance to a study of TWUA-PAC in this state, aside from a *Textile Labor* reference to a workers' conference discussion of TWUA's PAC program—also in Reading. Branch 10, still in process of organization in 1944, was the second largest Pennsylvania Hosiery delegation in the 1946 TWUA convention, representing up to 2,900 members although its 1943 delegates represented no more than 500.
Despite this dearth of documentation Pennsylvania's Textile unionists, particularly in Philadelphia and Reading, were among those said to be most likely to "involve" their unions politically—whether in public rallies, lobbying, literature distribution, organization of district or ward clubs, or other activity. Additional intimations of probable 1944 PAC activity are contained in the (labor) "Who's Who" facts compiled on Joseph Hueter, Philadelphia joint board manager; James Joseph Kelly, state director and an IEC member, and AFHW Branch One president William Leader. Hueter held both city and state IUC vice-presidencies, described himself as a "Democrat" and listed "Philadelphia PAC" among his "public activities." Kelly, who began his union career with UMW, specified "PAC" membership, chairmanship of a Lower Luzerne PAC, and a past chairmanship of the Carbon County Non-Partisan League. Leader, who submitted "labor history and politics" as two major interests—in addition to baseball and
songwriting—included "Political Action Committee" and the chairmanship of a North East Philadelphia PAC among his activities and offices. At least one journal verifies the latter’s role as a practicing labor politician—as might have been anticipated in view of his political prominence during the "PAC trend." Thus the Shipyard Worker, which identifies him as chairman of the Northeast Philadelphia Citizens PAC, records Leader’s appearance at a CIO PAC campaign rally and the "unanimous" assent of his audience to his suggestion that Henry Wallace, the rejected Vice-President, be made Secretary of Labor. 16

16 Shipyard Worker, 10/16/41, p. 12. Accounts of local political activity in additional areas of TWUA organization are not wanting although they carry no references to TWUA personnel. See, for example, Guild Reporter, 5/1/41, p. 2, on spirited "united labor" activity in Wilkes-Barre and Luzerne county. For Philadelphia developments involving Leader, prior to 1941, see pp. 282-83, 308-309, 319-22, 328-29 above.

From Maryland and Delaware to Missouri

Brief journal stories testify to PAC activity by several TWUA subjects in Delaware and Maryland: e.g., Gilbert Lewis in Delaware, a former local union head in Wilmington and a New Castle county IUC delegate to national CIO conventions (1943 and 1944); Richard E. Boyden, president of Local 187b, Cumberland; and James A. Dundon of the TWUA staff, a former president of the latter local and, according to Dickerman and Taylor, a state IUC and PAC officer. At one point during the campaign Dundon made news by "confering" with Vice-President
Wallace, from which encounter he emerged grateful for the honor and privilege of talking with "one of the world's great men."—Local 1871 had at least 3,900 members as of 1943, over 7,000 by 1946. The CIO was many times TMUA's size in Maryland but FDR's statewide plurality was only 22,541.17

17 See Textile Labor, July 1944, p. 8; Oct. 1944, p. 1. Information also obtained from Shipyard Worker, 11/13/44, p. 8; Kelly, Nine Lives for Labor, p. 27; Rogin, Questionnaire previously cited.—Boyd Payton was also a former Local 1871 and Maryland IUC president. See pp. 274, 543 above.

Moving westward with scraps of PAC-related information on TMUA, the financial report of the Ohio CIO Political Action Committee shows that the Textile union—with fewer than 5,000 out of an affiliated CIO membership of several hundred thousand—had a share in the campaign in that state, to the extent monetarily of at least $36.75 which reached the state committee as part of a total collection of $1396.4118 In Kentucky, where it was also a minor member of the

18 Ohio CIO PAC, Statement of Receipts and Expenditures, filed with the Ohio Secretary of State by George de Nucci, secretary-treasurer, Nov. 17, 1944. (The membership range for 16 scattered Ohio TMUA locals, as of 1943, was from 1,684 to 5,000.)

CIO family, Who's Who in Labor data indicates that TMUA contributed at least one individual, joint board manager Lillian Yadon Morello, to an active, functioning PAC program in the city of Louisville.19
The 1946 volume identifies Mrs. Morello as secretary-treasurer of the CIOPAC and as a vice-president of the state IUC. Past activities listed included: organizer, ACMA and TWUA, and secretary-treasurer, Louisville IUC. For reference to PAC activity under auspices of Louisville and state IUC's see Advance, 2/1/44, p. 4; 6/4/44, p. 7; Shipyard Worker, 12/17/43, p. 6; 1/1/44, p. 6; 11/13/43, p. 18.

Similarly in neighboring West Virginia and Indiana where James Brough of Martinsburg and R. W. Stellhorn of Ft. Wayne were identified respectively as legislative committee chairman of Local 308 and state IUC vice-president, and as Ft. Wayne IUC secretary-treasurer and Branch 121 Legislative and Political Action Committee chairman.

In Missouri the TWUA staff was the source for an active albeit unsuccessful candidate for the twelfth district Democratic Congressional nomination, Arthur McDowell, Missouri Valley TWUA regional director from 1941 to 1945. Undaunted by his own defeat in the state where Democratic Senator Bennett Champ Clark was vanquished by what he termed the "Communist-controlled CIO," McDowell's name found its way into two PAC dispatches in the October TWUA journal. One told of a political action talk which he made to joint board members and local shop stewards in St. Louis--and of his praise for the 100 percent participation of Locals 193 and 194 in the dollar drive. The other, datelined Kansas City, covered a two-day conference of Missouri Valley Textile unionists directed by IEC member Herbert W. Payne as the union's Midwest Coordinator. McDowell, who joined Payne
and regional PAC director Holloway in leading conference discussions, boasted "that in proportion to membership, textile workers in the district have contributed more than any other group to the 'dollars for Roosevelt' campaign." According to Textile Labor the half a hundred local union conference delegates all reported on vigorous voter registration campaigns, and "it was indicated that the increase in registration among TWUA members in the area has been better than 75 per cent,"—notwithstanding an anti-PAC campaign waged in the press. The Greater St. Louis PAC, whose jurisdiction embraced most of TWUA's members, later was credited with piling up a 63,900 vote Roosevelt lead in that city—enabling the President to carry the state by 33,666 votes.20

20 See Textile Labor, Oct. 1944, p. 3; Advance, 11/15/44, p. 10. For the Clark reference see NYT, 8/3/44, p. 11. Six Missouri locals (each with one delegate) were represented in the 1943 TWUA convention, three from St. Louis, two from Kansas City. Eight small locals were represented in 1946. For previous reference to McDowell see pp. 290, 306, 308 above. (When Who’s Who in Labor went to press McDowell was director of organization for the AFL upholsterers union.)

Two additional St. Louis unionists identified with TWUA in Dickerman and Taylor labelled themselves "Democrats": Frank J. Swanson, who also cited membership in the St. Louis County Democratic Club, and Frank Mapiotano of both TWUA and ACWA, who specified membership in PAC.

Wisconsin, Minnesota and Oregon

No copy appears in either TWUA or Hosiery journals to associate Emil Reive's old local or other Wisconsin affiliates with the work of PAC or of the United Labor Committee which functioned in that
state. That there was high level encouragement to this end is
documented in a boxed appeal by president McKeown in the September
AFHW journal. McKeown personally endorsed federation-approved
Democratic candidates for governor, U. S. Senator and Congress (fifth
district) and urged the support of all members of Milwaukee Branches
16 and 16-A, which together accounted for a majority of TWUA's
Wisconsin membership. All three, along with FDR, also had ULC back-
ing.21 Moving farther westward, resort, again, to official TWUA

21 Only victor was Andrew J. Bemiller for Congress. He had
not commanded CIO backing in the primary. See Hosiery Worker, Sept.
1943, p. 13; Advance, 11/3/44, p. 13; 11/15/44, p. 12; NYT, 8/17/44,
p. 18:3; 10/22/44, p. 39:1. (Socialist, Socialist-Labor and
Progressive candidates were also in the Wisconsin picture.) TWUA's
Milwaukee membership had a possible range of up to 2,100 in 1943,
slightly less in 1946.

member biographies discloses involvement of at least one Minnesotan
other than Sander Genis in political developments of the period:
Al Esnough of Local 66, Minneapolis, largest TWUA unit in the state
with from 650 to 1,400 members (1943 minimum and 1946 maximum con-
vention representation). Esnough was a member of state and county IUC
executive boards, of a United Political Action Committee and of the
Democratic Farmer-Labor Party. Genis, whose presence at the Demo-
cratic national convention is documented elsewhere, was still presi-
dent of the state IUC, whose convention in 1944 again went "all out"
for FDR.22 In the spring he was luncheon host to the Hosiery Workers'
A more significant journal reference dealt with his service on the committee "which worked out the details of the merger" between the Democratic and Farmer-Labor parties. In reports to his own international (ACWA) Genis indicated that all unions were engaging in serious campaign operations. Thus in the Advance of November 3 he hailed the D-F-L merger as a "success," noting that "in every district, every ward and every precinct" there was a "functioning organisation" which posed the first real threat to the GOP. Work on voter registration, in conjunction with the regional PAC, gave reason for genuine optimism, as "large committees from every union... applied themselves to door-to-door work." St. Paul and Minneapolis had "record turnouts." PAC and the D-F-L people were working "in complete cooperation." Other committees were active, including a "United Labor Volunteer Roosevelt Committee" recruited from all three labor federations. In its election resume on November 15 the Advance reported that FDR took the state by a "comfortable margin," was pleased with certain state legislative and Congressional successes in St. Paul and Minneapolis, and anticipated a still brighter future—when the new party should have selected more, good candidates.
The Advance might also have directed attention to the fact that Minnesotans, in a greatly reduced turnout, gave Mr. Roosevelt 52.8 per cent of the total major party vote instead of the 51.9 per cent of 1910. Moreover, his vote decline in Ramsey county (St. Paul) was kept to a trifling 200 odd votes while the GOP lost more than 4,000. In Hennepin county (Minneapolis) the President picked up more than 3,500 votes while the GOP lost more than 6,000. More than 60,000 of the President's statewide plurality—he won, 589,864 to 527,416—came from the Twin Cities and in each case there was an even more impressive increase over 1910 in his share of the major party vote. St. Paul's percentage rose from 58.1 to 59.9, that of Minneapolis from 55.9 to 58.2. Here again TWUA was not a major CIO affiliate but members of its half dozen locals could have helped account for these salutary returns and for the much more niggardly margins by which two D-F-L Congressional nominees were elected. That they may

In the third district (Minneapolis) the D-F-L margin was a little over 2,500; in the fourth (St. Paul) it was around 4,000. TWUA membership in Minneapolis lay between 700 and 2,700, minimum
1943 and maximum 1946 TWUA convention representation. Only one small St. Paul local was represented in both years, and one from Duluth.

have been influenced by TWUA political activists appears in an "aside" in the Minnesota section of the General Executive Board report to the 1944 Amalgamated convention: The Twin Cities (ACWA) Joint Board, "which did its share toward winning Minnesota for President Roosevelt in 1940 [was] concentrating on doing an all-out political job in the 1944 elections." Sidney Hillman had recently visited the area and a political movement had arisen to embrace all major labor groups and the Democratic Party. Regional PAC director Jacobson was "working closely with Brother Genis, who [was] chairman of the 5-state committee working out political problems," and the Clothing Workers were "determined to build a powerful organization" to "bring results in the 1944 elections." Genis, it was added, also managed TWUA's joint board, and "Amalgamated and Textile Worker locals cooperate closely."26

As one last illustrative TWUA facet in the 1944 CIO political panorama reference may be made again to the role of Douglas Anderson in the Far West, first as Oregon state PAC director, then, following the primaries and Democratic convention, as education director for the Woodworkers, a leading Oregon IUC affiliate. In fulfilling both appointments voter registration was the first objective. Next came the filling of an Oregon Senate seat with a more labor-acceptable
public servant than incumbent Republican Senator Holman (a prime target on what the CIO declined to characterize as a "purge" list) and the harvesting of Oregon's six electoral votes for FDR. Successes were scored on all counts. Voter registration in the state's biggest city, Portland, was greater than in 1940-199,336 as compared with 193,536. Wayne L. Morse, former law school dean, dashed Holman's hopes for renomination and won election in November, with support of all major labor groups, including the CIO—though the New York Times described Morse as "charging all over Oregon... calling for the ousting of the Roosevelt Administration" and noted that reputed "Communist influences" had tried unsuccessfully to have the Oregon CIO endorse a straight Democratic ticket. The former professor defeated Holman, 47,152 to 39,891, and his November plurality was close to 95,000.27


President Roosevelt suffered a 1.6 percentage loss in his share of the major party vote from 1940 and won by a far smaller margin than Morse—although the total presidential vote was greater by more than 30,000. At the same time, increased registration in Multnomah county (Portland), where between a third and a half of the state's entire presidential vote was cast, presaged numerical and proportionate increases in the Roosevelt vote and plurality. (See
Table 18. From PAC's standpoint one of the most interesting aspects of the Oregon returns lay in the discrepancy between the partisan ratios registered in different statewide contests. In a state in which all four Congressional district seats "went Republican" a GOP Senatorial victory should not be startling—notwithstanding the

**Table 18**

**PRESIDENTIAL VOTE: OREGON**

(MAJOR PARTIES ONLY)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1944</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>D = 258,114</td>
<td>D = 248,635</td>
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<td>(population)</td>
<td>R = 219,555</td>
<td>R = 225,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T = 477,970</td>
<td>T = 474,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PI = 38,360 (D)</td>
<td>PI = 23,270 (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multnomah county</td>
<td>D = 97,595</td>
<td>D = 105,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(population)</td>
<td>R = 73,612</td>
<td>R = 78,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T = 171,207</td>
<td>T = 183,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PI = 23,983 (D)</td>
<td>PI = 27,237 (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portland</td>
<td>D = 56,455</td>
<td>D = 83,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(population)</td>
<td>R = 63,231</td>
<td>R = 63,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T = 116,686</td>
<td>T = 146,366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PI = 19,904 (D)</td>
<td>Pi = 27,237 (D)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Taken or computed from sources cited on pp. 428-29 above.*

**Symbols:** D - Democratic; R - Republican; T - Total; PI - Plurality.

1940 population

presidential outcome. Morse's vote surpassed Mr. Dewey's and that of FDR. Additional meaning can be read into Morse's victory, however, when his experience is compared with that of Guy Gordon in a Senatorial
contest which attracted a greater number of voters than the Morse-Smith race. A non-PAC-endorsed Republican running for an unexpired term Cordon lagged more than 8,000 votes behind Morse and won with a plurality more than 26,000 votes less than that of his fellow partisan (260,631 to 192,305). Morse's Democratic adversary trailed him, 171,110 to 269,095. The New York Times was willing to attribute this disparity in Senatorial pluralities directly to "labor's vigorous backing of Mr. Morse." Textile union affiliates, with no more than

1,000 dues-paying members, as of December 1945, could have made only a fractional contribution to Oregon's PAC victories. How much credit is due Douglas Anderson as an individual for inducing or influencing CIO and/or IWA—or TWUA—votes is not immediately apparent but like virtually every other Textile personality whose name appears in this study Anderson sat as a delegate in the TWUA convention which demanded that the CIO launch a PAC program and innumerable union journal items subsequently attest to his participation in the 1944 campaign.

TWUA's 1945 membership cited in TWUA, Proceedings, 1946. For further references to Oregon IUC personnel, to endorsements and other political activity under Oregon IUC and/or Woodworker auspices, and to Anderson's involvement in PAC matters for both see International Woodworker, 8/11/43, p. 1; 9/29/43, p. 4; 1/12/44, p. 1; 4/4/44, p. 1; 5/10/44, p. 4; 7/19/44, p. 1; 8/16/44, p. 1; 8/30/44, p. 1; 9/27/44, p. 7; 10/11/44, p. 1; 10/18/44, p. 1. See also pp. 346-49 above.
Here then, as in the Midwest, on the East Coast and in the southern tier of states, TWUA members were demonstrably part of the CIO voter potential which, under the influence of Sidney Hillman's PAC, allegedly imperilled the American Way of Life. Here too organized units and/or individual components of the TWUA factor in PAC, as defined, shared with Sidney Hillman a sense of mission regarding the mobilization of labor votes for "FDR and a progressive Congress." Hence across the nation, in the field as well as at union headquarters, is established the proposition that the "TWUA factor" was an integral element in PAC, as movement and mechanism, and appropriately subject to analysis in any attempt to capture the meaning of CIO PAC for American Democracy.
PART VII

IN CONCLUSION:
PUTTING PAC INTO PERSPECTIVE
CHAPTER IX
PUTTING PAC INTO PERSPECTIVE

This research project was directed principally toward general description, identification of PAC-participating organizations and individuals within a single sector of the CIO, and an historical analysis of the motivation behind PAC. Some of the fruits of that research raise perhaps as many questions as they answer. Reviewing the PAC picture of the early 1940's as here described, however—the general CIOPAC chronology, the campaign issues narrative, and the TWUA-PAC story—and interpreting it in light of the longer sweep of labor political history surveyed, particularly as it involved the ACWA-TWUA union complex, certain general conclusions have emerged. They relate to major purposes and motivation, to immediate results, and to long range impact of labor political activity upon some aspects of the "American Way" for which concern has been expressed; to prospects for voluntary withdrawal of organized labor from the arena of campaign politics; and to the kind of philosophy which ought to govern public policy in this field.

1944 and After: PAC's Immediate Impact

Some of the immediately visible effects—or lack of effect—of PAC activity in 1944 can be summarized readily. As described, electoral results fell short of labor's stated hopes and expectations—
and of the ambitions imputed to it by others. So did policy results which flowed from the election returns during the remainder of the Roosevelt incumbency and the life of the seventy-ninth Congress.

PAC's "voice" in the 1944 national Democratic convention was far from "controlling." Its influence on platform was negligible, on the presidential nomination inconsequential. The vice-presidential nomination constituted a negative, or preventive victory. Most successes scored by PAC-endorsed Congressional candidates in a relatively small number of crucial primaries were also, at bottom, negative victories, involving rejection of unacceptable incumbents and in a few cases protection of incumbents against challengers, rather than the conscious promotion of new, labor or outstandingly pro-labor candidacies. The November election featured a modest number of endorsements in U.S. Senate and House (and state) contests and a still more modest victory score card. As illustrated in TWUA-PAC jurisdictions, no more than a fraction of these involved union member candidacies.

The legitimacy of caring about the character of a PAC-influenced electoral potential has been demonstrated quantitatively. The kind of research pursued has not illuminated labor's actual share of responsibility for Congressional victories or presidential pluralities. Nor has it provided measurable evidence of PAC responsibility, as an issue, for FDR's plurality losses. That the national level of voter eligibility and turnout was higher than it would have been in the absence of PAC appears to be a supportable conclusion, even
without definitive area studies. Some of the increase patently stemmed directly from PAC's mobilization of its own people, some from its stirring of a wider "New Deal" electorate ignored by indifferent Democratic machines, some from its arousal of local Republican organizations. Some followed persistent labor lobbying for legislative and administrative rulings making for easier access to the ballot.

It does not appear that PAC's participation appreciably raised the quality of the campaign as manifested in the intelligence level of voter appeals or that it greatly enhanced the opportunity of voters to make informed electoral decisions—save perhaps as, for better or worse, the labor literature and oratory accurately emphasized a superior claim of FDR and the New Deal wing of his party to a past record of initiative for popularizing and implementing a New Deal philosophy of governmental responsibility. Almost no one attempted genuinely to debate concrete issues with which the next President and Congress would be confronted. Evidence examined does not show that programs like Toward a New Day were in fact widely employed as provocative contributions to serious discussion—or that, like the candidates and parties, the PAC forces did not prefer to talk about the past as they construed it, or about the future in highly generalized fashion. As usual, the campaign was largely a steady and monotonous exchange of promises and warnings, assertions and counter assertions, of charges, counter charges and denials.
The adequacy of public reporting on campaign finance is notoriously deficient. In the main, PAC's controversial dollars do not appear to have altered drastically the party ratio of years past. Quantitatively the earmarked labor-collected funds on which information has been obtained—as distinct from the employment of union resources accounted for in routine budgeting for staff and facilities—fail to corroborate, on a national or an area basis, allegations of widespread union member coercion or intimations of wholesale vote-buying or candidate-buying. Insofar as dollars in and of themselves may be construed as a corrupting influence (a construction which becomes increasingly untenable as costs of political communication rise), PAC and Democratic funds in combination (as compiled by Senate investigators) did not begin to rival those of the GOP. The ratio between Republican and Democratic camps (including labor and other non-party adjuncts) remained as formerly, slightly under two to one for the GOP.¹ Within both parties reliance remained principally

¹Tabulations for national and state party committees, plus supporting organizations (including national, state, and local PAC organizations), showed GOP receipts of approximately $15,000,000 and Democratic receipts of slightly over eight and a quarter million dollars. U.S. Senate, Investigation of Presidential, Vice Presidential, and Senatorial Campaign Expenditures, 1964 (pursuant to S. Res. 263, 78th Cong.), Rept. No. 101, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, p. 133.
obtain support in small amounts from followers in the lower income brackets.

While no systematic study has been made here of PAC relationships with or within the Democratic party organization, "labor," as represented by PAC, plainly remained an element within the Democratic camp in the wake of Roosevelt's reelection. It did not claim the national party machinery as a prize. Nor was there a dramatic or automatic displacement of state and local Democratic leaders and "bosses" by the PAC leaders who helped to produce the Democratic victory. Research has yielded eloquent evidence that the CIO did not "control" significant presidential appointments as a result of its 1944 activities. It fails to show that the unionists themselves received patronage appointments from FDR such as traditionally fall to wealthy contributors to party coffers, or that President Truman on his accession to the presidency "cleared" similar decisions with Sidney. Thus, for example, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., rather than Henry Wallace succeeded Secretary Hull as head of the State Department under FDR, while Wallace got a consolation prize in the Department of Commerce. Moreover, labor influence in the new Congress was too slight to prevent separation of RFC responsibilities from the latter department before the CIO favorite was entrusted with that new job. When Truman became President he made James F. Byrnes, PAC's chief Democratic convention target, Secretary of State. When Wallace defied Truman administration foreign policy in 1946 no PAC influence over the President prevented Wallace's involuntary resignation. Names of unionists themselves are conspicuously absent from cabinet rosters.
under FDR and HST, from the ambassadorial lists, and from the lists of other high administrative appointments which might have been available for election payoffs—unless one includes, for example, the appointment to the U. S. Maritime Commission of a Raymond S. McKeough—who was a Democratic politician and a Congressman before he became a regional PAC director.

Regional director Charlotte Carr spiritedly rejected any suggestion that personal political ambition played a part in her recruitment to the PAC staff. So far as she was concerned her "Hit" campaign job was strictly and solely a vote mobilizing "crusade" for FDR. Interview, Nov. 26, 1951.

Nor did PAC "control" the seventy-ninth Congress any more than its predecessor. CIO and union publications reveal the same apparent necessity for frenzied lobbying that had previously prevailed, the same anguish at failures, the same apparent need to concentrate, as during the "PAC trend," not upon promotion of far-reaching programs of reform and social progress, but upon defense against measures deemed inimical to labor's interests. The latter emanated from both executive and legislative branches of government and included, in the spring of 1946, a striker draft proposal made by the Truman administration itself in the midst of a railroad strike.

See, for example, labor reaction to the "Hobbs bill," the "Smith-Arends bill," etc., with their "union-stifling" and politically restrictive provisions, and the "unusual display of labor /CIO and non-CIO/ unity" in face of the inability of labor representatives to get a hearing before House committees which were considering the measures. PM, 10/31/45, p. 5; 11/1/45, p. 6; 12/5/45. See also Philip Murray's
appeal to the U. S. Senate to reject the "anti-labor" Case bill and
Truman's proposal to "crush labor" via a "draft into military

Major Purposes and Motivation: The Preeminence of
Practical and Protective Considerations

In light of the foregoing, was the activity under the banner of
the Hillman committee on balance an exercise in futility? The answer
can be affirmative only if one assumes that its primary motivation
lay in ideological conviction--in a determination to bring the advent
of a "New Day" closer; or in overweening ambition to commandeer or
build a political party machine, from which to "control" governmental
personnel and policy. In point of fact, research suggests the pre­
eminence of more modest desires much closer to the Gompers tradition.

One cannot probe the minds of PAC's guiding spirits. In all
sources and testimony studied, however, covering roughly three
decades (1918-1948) and not excluding the comprehensive 1943-44 labor
platforms to which the Textile Workers formally subscribed, a con­
sistency of emphasis is fairly overwhelming throughout the ACWA-TWUA
family with regard to major political purposes.

Most if not all of the PAC-linked names introduced in the
preceding chapters of this work are associated also, along with those
of PAC-participating colleagues in the Amalgamated, with pre- and
post-1944 political planning and/or activity of some kind--from
labor party, Socialist party, and "non-partisan" endorsement to
precinct politics. The nature of the vehicle employed and of activity
engaged in varied from place to place and from time to time, and with individual personalities. The extent of direct union involvement, as opposed to that of individuals, also varied markedly.\(^4\) Whatever

\(^4\) See pp. 612-14 above.

the medium or method, however, the outstanding impression is one of dedication to defense, not offense. The greatest impetus to involvement of the unions themselves in campaign politics came not in pursuit of millenial goals; not in implementation of Socialist candidate endorsements (e.g., an Amalgamated endorsement for Eugene Debs in 1920, an AFHW endorsement for Norman Thomas in 1932); nor, in the classic tradition, as a substitute for ineffective economic methods of class struggle in times of vast unemployment distress, but to protect or restore limited labor and social gains already won—by rewarding friends and defeating the enemies of labor. Union participation in politics in 1932, at the depths of the Great Depression, was almost nonexistent as compared with 1936, when CIO unionism was on the march and a non-socialist government had proved it could and would act to alleviate suffering and inaugurate social reforms, and as compared with 1944, when, despite labor grievances, there was virtually full wartime employment.

The unionists frequently boasted that their interests went beyond "narrow" and immediate "labor" interests and one need not doubt the validity of their claim. In 1943-44 endorsements for
enlightened foreign trade policies, and for collective security as well as for "winning the war," were no doubt sincere and platform planks favoring aid to small business and agriculture equally so. One need not imagine that proposals for social control of natural resources and comprehensive national economic planning were merely nostalgic throwbacks to days of Socialist enthusiasm. Yet, on the record, planks like these, alone or cumulatively, did not propel Clothing, Hosiery or Textile unionists into the fourth—or preceding—Roosevelt campaign(s), or into campaigns of succeeding years, or account for their most vigorous lobbying efforts at national and state capitols. All could have been dispensed with and there still would have been a PAC. Toward a New Day was adopted almost perfunctorily by the TMUA convention of 1943 and its most radical provisions represented neatly compartmentalized hopes and aspirations—which Textile's leaders might well have been happy some day to see implemented, if and when the American public as a whole (including rank and file trade unionists) should be "educated" to want and accept them.

Essentially, in light of the historical record, the primary reason for pushing PAC was authentically stated in the 1941-44 talk of the "anti-labor" "reactionary" trend. For the entire research span the most fervent journal editorializing, the most prolonged convention debates, and the most explosive oratory, touching upon political objectives and activity, were directed toward defensive and protective, hence conservative ends. As one looks for factors which
in fact inspired action as well as verbal commitment, one impression
towers over all others. It can be expressed in a cliche: "The more
things change, the more they remain the same." The unionists'
sights were riveted upon public policy affecting the trade union
as a functioning organization and the value to union members of the
fruits of collective bargaining. To a slightly lesser but ever
increasing extent they were directed toward the general body of
social welfare legislation as that became an established part of the
status quo. At the head of any list of "first" considerations must
be placed the union's freedom to recruit and keep members, to picket,
to strike, to bargain collectively; the objectives for which the
union might or must bargain; job security for union members, and
union security. Significantly, some of the most impassioned cries
for political action came in the course of union convention discus­
sion on resolutions to "organize the unorganized."

This kind of stress is easily documented. Thus a veteran
Amalgamated leader, Frank Rosenblum, justified union participation
in the political developments of 1924: Injunctions, he declared,
not only prohibited picketing during a strike, but

The courts attempt to tell us that we cannot approach
and discuss with the worker in the shop the question
of organization; that we cannot invite him to become a
member of the organization. . . Unless we take poli­
tical action, organizing work will become criminal
before the Law."

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5ACWA, Documentary History, 1922-24 [Including the Proceedings of the Sixth Biennial Convention, Philadelphia and New York,
In 1929 the Hosiery Worker editorialized against the injunction, yellow dog contracts, and the labor spy system, and averred that almost nothing was more important than getting rid of "legal obstacles" to "legitimate trade union activities." The "most obvious, the most democratic and effective manner" of dealing with such problems was through "passage of proper legislation" and the "election of [sympathetic] public officials." If an end to judicial repression of labor organization was a foremost political goal, the elimination of child labor as a threat to union wage standards was almost equally high in the pre-New Deal scale of political priorities. Thus in 1928 the UTW Journal on election eve carried a statement of AFL president William Green advising local unions to create non-partisan political campaign committees, to get their members to register, and to influence them "to vote in accordance with the dictates of their consciences." The AFL would supply information on candidates' records and the hope was that "no loyal citizen" would vote for candidates who opposed anti-injunction legislation or who were unwilling to protect children from industrial exploitation.6

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Following the advent of the Roosevelt regime the political objective became doubly defensive and protective, for now labor had a vested interest in preserving labor protective and social welfare legislation already on the statute books—against judicial nullification, legislative emasculation, or maladministration. Now the big fear was that the New Deal would be demolished and, as Frank Benti put it in 1943, that there would be a return to pre-NRA days,

... to the old stretch-out systems in the textile mills, to the various other conditions which we have sacrificed for, which we have worked so hard to get away from. We will go back to the same days when the mill owners would control us and let us work the number of hours that they alone would relish.7

7TWUA, Proceedings, 1943, p. 69. See also a 1946 convention resolution urging state legislation comparable to the Norris-La Guardia Act and appealing to state courts to adhere to the "anti-injunction" policy as enunciated in that federal law. TWUA, Proceedings, 1946, pp. 37, 173.

From 1936 onward, as other forces sought to slow down or swing the pendulum back, the prime labor objectives remained constant although emphasis in time shifted by force of circumstances to resistance to new national and state labor legislation which the unionists construed as repressive rather than as bulwarks for their rights.

If any two pieces of legislation may be said to typify labor’s positive political motivation, they are the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Probably nowhere more than in the textile industry has labor encountered greater employer resistance to unionization; nor have the unionized
segments of any other industry been more plagued by plant migration and/or by competition grounded in sub-standard labor conditions, resulting in destruction of union standards and the loss of jobs themselves. Hence it was that the chief policy pegs for the first foray of clothing and textile unionists into a New Deal campaign were the prospect of wage-hour legislation to replace the invalidated NIRA codes and the faith that under Roosevelt a way would be found to prevent or override judicial nullification of the second attempt to put governmental sanction behind collective bargaining rights. Hence

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8See, for example, Hillman's remarks in the 1936 UTW convention. NYT, 9/16/36, p. 36:7.

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it was that, from TMUA's founding in 1939 through 1948, minimum wages and the purchasing power of the wage dollar were consistently close to the top of its convention agendas,9 and the leading bête noire in

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9See also Emil Rieve's first important lobby appearance following the 1944 election--before a Senate subcommittee on behalf of a proposal to raise the minimum wage from 50 to 65 cents an hour. NYT, 11/18/44, p. 1:1.

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virtually every convention and electoral effort was effective or threatened governmental policy (national or state) denying or limiting the freedom of unions to operate. Thus Emil Rieve justified PAC activity in remarks before the 1946 Textile convention: the time was "past when labor was willing to stand aside and let the enemies of
labor undermines the gains it has already made and sabotage all efforts for advancement." A southern organizing drive was getting under way, but "unless we succeed in political action we might as well pack up and go home. . ." 10


As the decade of the 1950's approaches an end, apart from proposed regulation of internal union organization and procedures, it is in this same tradition that labor's most compelling reasons for entering and remaining "in politics" have come, for example, from proposed "right to work" measures limiting the latitude of labor-management negotiations respecting union security and from the nullification by governmental action (judicial or administrative) of supplemental unemployment benefit provisions already written into union contracts. 11—Back in 1946 one of TWUA's chief sources of pride was

11 See, for example, the standards applied by the Ohio AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education in making its 1958 gubernatorial endorsement. News and Views, 9/26/58.

the extent to which union negotiators had persuaded employers to accept the union shop and to "recognize it as a stabilizing influence." 12
Since 1943 "35 per cent of TWUA contracts now provide closed shops," 38 per cent "union shops," and 5 per cent "modified union shops." TWUA, Proceedings, 1946, pp. 7, 146-47. See also p. 620 below.

In a 1950 report the Textile Workers' International executive council succinctly summarized the main reasons why "the whole future of our union, and of all American workers, rests on how well we do our work at the polls." PAC's raison d'être derived from the need to resolve, in the New Deal tradition, the conflict between the competing philosophies of the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947. The former "recognized the helplessness of the individual worker in modern society. It frankly put the weight of the federal government behind the principle of collective bargaining--without suggesting in any way what the results of such bargaining should be." Taft-Hartley, on the other hand, "ignores the social necessity for collective bargaining" and "concentrates on the 'right' of the individual to 'bargain' for himself--disregarding the obvious inequalities of a 'bargain' between a single worker and a multi-million dollar corporation. . . ." The "doctrine" of Taft-Hartley was "that government should be 'neutral,' not between management and labor, but between collective bargaining on the one hand and individual bargaining on the other." 13

How Much Did PAC Owe to CP Liners for Inspiration and Direction?

The record shows—as Martin Dies contended—that the Communist Party did presume to advise and encourage the CIO to intensify its legislative and political activity programs, that it did convert itself into a Communist Political Association—six months after PAC was born, and that it eagerly supported both PAC and FDR in 1943-44.\(^1\)

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It shows that some individuals who served the national CIO and CIOPAC staffs and who promoted PAC in the field in 1943 were subsequently to adhere to a political policy line which the CIO condemned and the Communists approved, and it indicates strongly that some at least of these were accurately and fairly subject to designation as "pro-Communists" or party liners.\(^15\) It shows that among PAC—

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\(^15\) See the public testimony of attorney Lee Pressman regarding his past membership (1934-35) and continuing Communist party sympathies until his avowed disenchantment in 1950. NYT, 8/29/50, p. 1:1; CIO News, 9/14/50, p. 9.

cooperating organizations were some subsequently to be "purged" or expelled from the CIO for alleged Communist domination.\(^16\)
See, for example, revocation of the Greater New York industrial union council charter for "slavishly" following the CP line. CIO News, 11/29/48, p. 1h. In 1949 flere of TWUA and Potosky of ACWA were among the first members named by president Murray to the trial boards which brought about removal of CIO board members (and expulsion of unions) for subservience to the CP line. CIO News, 11/7/49, pp. 1, 3; 11/14/49, p. 8.

Some interviewees, conceding the presence of this element within the CIOPAC camp, asked wryly: Where could you possibly find more energetic application to a task in hand? At least two were willing to suggest that PAC's non-Communists in some jurisdictions might in fact owe a debt of gratitude to the "Commies" for their example of energy and "know how." But virtually no evidence supports the thesis that PAC in any sense owed its origination to CP inspiration or that a "red" hand was a determining influence in fundamental matters of national PAC policy or administration during the fourth term campaign. Within that segment of the CIO family with which this study has been primarily concerned, certainly, there is scant evidence that the parallelism of official union and CP lines on procedural political policy was more than coincidental. There is reason to believe that no more than a handful of local unions or of individuals identified with TWUA-PAC are likely to have been beholden to CP discipline or susceptible to significant fellow traveler influence. Many, in fact, were consciously and actively hostile toward Communists and fellow travelers alike—and rejected the idea of collaboration with them, even when their respective policy lines converged. Moreover, there is
abundant evidence, other factors remaining the same, that if the contemporary CP line had been in opposition to FDR, demands for invention of a PAC still would have arisen within the Textile family. A labor campaign for Roosevelt still would have had direction and enthusiastic support from both the TVUA family and the Amalgamated. Hillman and Rieve still would have been identified with it and, along with them, Benti and Belanger, Clifton and Christopher, Holderman, McDowell and McKeown—and virtually all of the rest of the TVUA-PAC personalities previously introduced in these pages, as well as other Amalgamated officers and staff.

If one must be wary of correlating line parallelism automatically with line following the same kind of necessity does not obtain in interpreting line deviationism. One whose course of action or advocacy parallels that of the CP is not necessarily a "CP liner." The very essence of party line-ism, however, consists of faithfully promoting the course prescribed. It is, then, of some import, that in eight presidential elections, from 1920 through 1948, policy on labor political action for the subject unions coincided substantially with that of the CP just once—in 1944. To detect in that coincidence a cause and effect relationship one must ignore the factor of personnel continuity and the fact that for the unions the 1944 campaign was consistent with patterns previously established and subsequently followed.

In 1924 the UTW, the Hosiery Workers and the Amalgamated all were in the camp of "independent" presidential candidate Robert M.
LaFollette. Only the Communists among leftist-labor-liberal forces condemned LaFollette—after being denied admittance to the convention which sponsored him, the Conference on Progressive Political Action. Moreover, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, which, along with some other organizations (including the Communists) had hoped a labor party movement would emerge from the CPPA development, pointedly repudiated two area conferences which the Communists managed to commandeer and the abortive labor parties which were born in each—at Chicago in 1923 and St. Paul in 1924. Furthermore, ACWA leadership subsequently maintained that support for the Wisconsin Senator had been proper and no "loss to the labor movement," although for Communists the non-Communist labor campaign of 1924 was strictly the "LaFollette fiasco."

In 1936 Earl Browder, the CP presidential candidate, indirectly supported Roosevelt's reelection. The Communist line moved to this position, however, only after the CP had been rebuffed in attempts to achieve a "united front" and a common ticket with the Socialists; only after representatives of Hillman's Amalgamated had helped prevent the launching of another premature national labor party—by a Chicago
conference whose labor party potential the Communists had again strenuously cultivated; only after Browder initially condemned the setting up Labor's Non-Partisan League as the CIO's first vote-mobilizing mechanism for the New Deal; and only after both AF of L and Amalgamated conventions had endorsed FDR's reelection. Earl Browder's appreciation of the latter's virtues came only on an "if you can't lick 'em, join 'em" basis and within embarrassingly short weeks after CP and party line voices had derisively characterized the New Deal as "bankrupt" and the President as a demagogue and the "Smiling Medicine Man of the New Deal." In New York the Communists tried to

enter the new American Labor Party—after that state level organization emerged following negotiations between Sidney Hillman and other labor leaders with right-wing "Old Guard" Socialists who complained that the Socialist party (with which their connections had just been severed) was becoming increasingly tainted by Communist influence.

See, for example, NYT, 3/6/36, p. 9; 4/29/36, p. 2:5; 6/1/36, p. 2:3; New Masses, 4/28/36, pp. 4:5; 5/5/36, pp. 6-8; 5/12/36, p. 3; 6/2/36, pp. 3-4; 6/9/36, p. 6; 6/30/36, pp. 3-4; Advance, June 1936, p. 10; July 1936, p. 9. (The UTW convention, which also endorsed FDR, was not held until autumn.)

In 1940 party liners in the labor movement were by definition bound to applaud the defection of John L. Lewis from the Roosevelt camp, to oppose FDR endorsement resolutions, and to support withdrawals of endorsements adopted prior to that magic date in the autumn of 1939 after which the demands of Soviet foreign policy transformed the President into a warmonger. In 1946 it was their destiny to agree with the Progressive Citizens of America—and, subsequently, the new Progressive party—that the Democratic party had "betrayed the principles" of FDR and was beyond hope of regeneration, and to concur in Daily Worker editorial sentiments that Henry Wallace "alone among the possible [presidential] candidates speaks for the interests of the common man and a democratic America."²⁰


In both 1940 and 1946 all unions in the ACWA-TVUA complex followed a national political course which was anathema to the Communists. All but a fraction of the Textile (and Amalgamated) personalities whom research has identified with the '44 campaign, demanded, accepted, and/or faithfully promoted these union lines, nationally and in the field. Some strove actively and conspicuously, in one or both years, to align area CIO industrial union councils and labor political bodies (LNPL units, the ALP, ULC's, PAC's, etc.) with the political course opposed by the Communists. Thus in 1940
it was Irving Abramson, with Carl Holderman as chairman, who led a floor fight—-involving both Textile and Amalgamated delegates—which kept the New Jersey LWPL in the Roosevelt camp, and in 1948 it was Jack Rubinstein who helped put the New York CIO on record in repudiation of the Wallace movement.21

Nationally, Emil Rieve was one of the first CIO leaders to repudiate John L. Lewis in 1940. Months earlier he had led his IEC into a "draft Roosevelt" declaration. In 1948 he was the first to endorse Harry S. Truman following the Democratic convention. Previously he had been in the forefront of those—in the anti-Communist Americans for Democratic Action—who tried first to persuade the Democrats to abandon an incumbent who "couldn't win" for a name like Dwight D. Eisenhower which might pull "liberal" Congressional candidates to victory. Before that, he had branded Wallace a "good catch for the Communists."22 Hillman in the former year was attacked in party line quarters as a "front man for the Duponts" on the National Defense Advisory Commission, criticized for seeking a "blank check endorsement" for FDR from his own union, and berated for "rigging" a

21 See NYT, 4/8/40, p. 1; Advance, May 1940, p. 28; Textile Labor, 5/1/40, p. 4; 1/17/48, p. 3.

New York state IUC convention—with the aid of unions "owned" by
him (e.g., TWUA)—in order to get a Roosevelt resolution from that
body. His successor, Jacob Potoffsky, and other ACWA leaders who were
abandoning the American Labor Party over the Wallace question, were
condemned in 1940 for having been "seized with sudden vertigo at the
thought of such a movement becoming nationwide and genuinely inde-
pendent. ..."\^23

\^23See NYT, 11/8/40, p. 13:3; New Masses, 6/14/40, p. 19;
10/1/40, p. 18; 10/22/40, p. 15; 1/13/48, pp. 7-9.

On other questions as well as political action policy leaders
in this sector of the labor movement demonstrated consistently over
the years their independence of CP discipline or example in making
up their collective or individual minds. Let illustrations be cited
from just one of the topical areas selected as appropriate for
evaluating union-CP line relationships—foreign policy. Following
the outbreak of World War II and prior to the Nazi invasion of the
USSR in June 1941, again during "Cold War" developments of the latter
1940's, all of the subject unions were at variance with the CP in
supporting the major features of U. S. defense and foreign policy—
as symbolized in forthright condemnation of the Nazi-Soviet Pact,
open sympathy for the west European victims of Nazi aggression,
approval for the policy of making America the "arsenal of democracy,"
and in support for the European Recovery Program, which in CP jargon
was a tool of imperialist warmongers.\^24
Even during 1941-1944 it must be remarked that within TWUA--and among its most articulate PAC enthusiasts--there was outspoken criticism of alleged CP line voices in the labor movement on several inflammable issues: e.g., on government wage policy, the "no strike" pledge, "national service" (i.e., labor draft) proposals, civil rights in the Soviet Union (as manifested in the execution of two Polish Socialist labor leaders), even on political action policy itself. On the controversial and ill-fated Hillman plan for ALP reorganization TWUA's position represented neither deliberate nor unwitting followership of the CP line. It was, on the contrary, conscious, nominal, reluctant, and uncomfortable adherence to a Hillman line, dictated solely and exclusively by a desire not to embarrass the Textile union's long time benefactor publicly or, as a possible consequence of repudiation, to jeopardize the unity of the labor campaign for FDR.²⁵ Even within the Amalgamated "Hillman line" following on

²⁵See TWUA debate on the Soviet executions and on Administration wage policy; Riepe's reaction to labor draft proposals and to suggestions for a post-war "no-strike" pledge. See also Riepe's unenthusiastic announcement that TWUA must "inevitably" support "CIO policy" on ALP and the text of Sam Baron's protest, including his
intimation that even Sidney Hillman may have had second thoughts about the wisdom of that policy. TWUA, Proceedings, 1943, pp. 150-55, 210, 108-10; Textile Labor, Feb. 1943, p. 11; July 1943, pp. 1, 2; NYT, 2/7/43, p. 17/6. Cf. New Masses, 4/13/43, p. 9; 5/25/43, p. 5; 6/1/43, pp. 9-10; 1/25/43, pp. 8, 10; 2/1/43, pp. 20-21; 6/13/43, p. 20. See p. 563 above.

This question was for some simply a matter of not contesting it or of adhering to it publicly when the alignment question was reduced to one of personal loyalty to the union chief. 26

26 See, for example, the resignation of the vigorously anti-Communist Advance editor J.B.S. Hardman after a quarter century association with the Amalgamated—after the election was over and FDR was safely reelected. CIO News, 12/18/43, p. 11. See also the initial adherence of ACWA as well as TWUA personalities to the right wing in the right-left ALP cleavage of 1913-1914. NYT, 7/9/43, p. 8/6.

PAC, the Political Process, the Two-Party System, and the Democratic Party

Every indication is that PAC, for this segment of the labor movement, was genuinely motivated by traditional pressure group interest in substantive governmental policy and that it represented no fixed intent to transform the fundamental character of the governmental or political system. This is not to say that the subject unions and individuals did not act upon determined convictions regarding organized labor's rights—and necessities—in the political sphere, or that their activity did not have important institutional implications.

Probably PAC's outstanding contribution to the American political scene lay in its tendency to break down as unreal, in fact
If not in law or folklore, distinctions commonly made regarding the legitimacy of three categories of pressure group activity. This it did in 1944 by flamboyantly and provocatively dramatizing the assumptions on which labor unions—particularly within the CIO—had already been operating for some years, with varying degrees of energy and success.

The first assumption, not always consciously formulated, is common to all pressure groups, whether they exist solely as political instruments or seek to wield political influence in support of other primary purposes: namely, that organized pressure group effort to influence government on behalf of membership interests is a natural and inevitable feature of a democracy wherein formal representation is based upon geography, the principle of majority or plurality rule, and a resultant two-party system—in which the character of the party is such that the individual cannot look to it for direct and exclusive representation of his peculiar interests. The second is that the labor union, as attested by its constitution and the expectations of its members, is a service organization, whose capacity to fulfill those expectations is increasingly bound up in the nature of governmental policies. Thirdly, unions and membership welfare are affected by policy of all levels and branches of government, including the Presidency. Finally, all avenues to political influence are interrelated and there can logically be no moral distinction drawn in a democracy as to the fundamental legitimacy of employing organization resources in one or all of the three routes whereby service organizations—with equally far-reaching or fateful consequences—may
undertake to influence the course of public policy: (a) by educating—or propagandizing—their own members or the general public on issues relevant to the making of electoral judgments; (b) by direct or indirect lobbying calculated to influence the legislative product, public appointments, or the decisions of administrative bodies; (c) by engaging directly—or indirectly—in activity in connection with elections, in order to affect the selection of elective public personnel in the first place.

Although this latter assumption was to remain in controversy, labor inside and outside the CIO was to continue to adhere to it, notwithstanding the erection of additional legislative hurdles beyond those imposed by the wartime Smith-Connally Act, and the instituting of legal as well as legislative committee challenges.  

27 In 1956 the AFL-CIO national Committee on Political Education (COPE) reportedly "had $520,291 to spend for strictly political purposes...[T.e., voluntary collections usable for direct candidate contributions], and $726,741 [from union dues] for 'educational' work among AFL-CIO voting members [the publicising of Congressional voting records, etc.]." Fred W. Perkins in Columbus Citizen, 12/9/56. On disagreement within the U.S. Supreme Court as to constitutionality of impairing "First Amendment rights" by prohibiting the use of union funds for promoting candidacies for public office see NYT, 3/12/57.

to formal candidate endorsements other elements in the community too—in industry, business, and the professions—were increasingly to recognize its practicality while continuing to deny or resent its validity for organized labor.  

28
See, for example, decisions of the American Medical Association, first to levy a special assessment, then to employ general dues money, for "a continuing public education campaign" against compulsory health insurance, the "use of federal funds to educate physicians, nurses and other health personnel," etc., while undertaking to persuade "every doctor" to get "on the firing line" in his home district. Charles Lucey in Columbus Citizen, 12/9/49. "Nationally," Lucey wrote, "with physicians exerting influence through patients and otherwise, this could be an important factor in the 1950 Congressional elections."

See also a post-election News Letter of the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, January 1951, Vol. 5, No. 1, in which pride was taken in the contribution made by physicians, "working as individuals in the political organization of their choice," to the 1950 election outcome, the defeat of "leading Socialists" in Congress, the victory of Senator Taft, "in the face of Labor's millions," etc. "The discovery of this heretofore latent political power of American physicians is probably the most encouraging result of the election. . . ."

Two other aspects of PAC's permanent impact on American politics stand out: its tendency, as confirmed after 1944, (1) to strengthen the two-party system, by further consolidating attachments and practices within that framework for a sector of the community likely, on the basis of past history, to be attracted to third party experiments, and (2) to solidify the national reputation and attraction of the Democratic party as having a labor "class" orientation while at the same time contributing to preservation of its coalition character.

For unions in the ACWA-TWUA-AFHW complex, the fundamental reality of 1944 was their recognition of the general futility of third parties as electoral vehicles; their acknowledgment of the possibility of attaining positive goals within the two-party system; and their realization that with the growing involvement of government in
affairs of concern to labor— in ways as likely to be detrimental as beneficial— the stakes were too high for heroic defiance of that system. The first two of these had supplied justification for LMPL in 1936 when, after nearly two decades of sporadic national and local labor party, Socialist, and "non-partisan" gropings, 29 the New Deal

29 For "non-partisan" political pioneering led by Carl Holdeman in New Jersey, and the apparently greater success of Democratic than Republican endorses, see Hosiery Worker, 10/15/28, p. 1; 11/15/28, pp. 1, 4; 9/16/29, p. 2; 11/15/29, p. 4. See also "non-partisan" activity (including labor candidacies in Republican primaries) and labor party threats of Philadelphia unionists under local AFHW president McKenna et al. Ibid., 9/16/29, p. 4; 1/31/30, p. 1; 3/15-31/30, p. 3.

had given the unionists a vested interest in supporting an incumbent national administration drawn from one of the major parties— even as they reiterated routine labor party dreams. If this was fairly described as a policy of expediency in 1936, it was definitely one of conviction (if not principle) by 1944. By the end of the 1940's their own continued and emphatic admonitions to local leaders and the rank and file regarding the folly of third party excursions supplied national union leaders not susceptible to "outside" influences with a powerful practical deterrent to abrogation of their own policy as enunciated in 1933-44. 30

It would be unwarranted to say that the union leaders were ever ready only to bet on a sure thing. Yet for virtually all of them after 1936—and for Sidney Hillman as far back as 1921—policy respecting a national labor party was invariably one of readiness to act if and when the prospect of "mass" labor and liberal support should make it at the outset a likely imminent successor to one of the major parties in a two-party field, or when major party alternatives presented such a dismal picture as to make a probable labor party failure no more catastrophic than abstention from politics altogether. 31


As for labor's pro-Democratic orientation, in 1936 and after Hillman and others spoke hopefully of a new realignment of forces as between the parties. Developments like those of 1943-44 militated both for and against it. Throughout the New Deal and Fair Deal era members of the Hillman-Rieve family won prestige as government "advisors," public appointees (usually in administrative agencies concerned with labor welfare), as Democratic convention delegates and committee members. 32 Labor and labor-endorsed candidates for elective

32 For Democratic ties strengthened by the prestige of public appointment see Tom McNa hon's resignation from the UTV presidency to become director of labor in Rhode Island in 1937; Antonio England's
appointment in 1949 as "director of the unemployment Insurance system in Massachusetts;" Emil Riefe's service on the Hosiery Code Authority under the NRA and on industry committees under the Fair Labor Standards Act, his appointment in 1936 as delegate to an International Labor Conference on textiles and in 1942 to an Inter-American Conference on social security; and Sidney Hillman's role as a labor advisor to FDR and as an administrative appointee from the NRA to the NDAC and the OPM. Sources include Textile Worker, 2/13/37, p. 2; Albert G. Clifton, Questionnaire, Apr. 15, 1934; Hosiery Worker, 6/2/39, p. 4; Dickerman and Taylor, Who's Who in Labor, pp. 163, 299.

posts were more often successful under Democratic than Republican labels; Democratic candidates and office holders—outside the one-

party South—were on the whole more "pro-labor" than their GOP counterparts; the latter, in office and on the campaign trail, more hostile to labor demands, more ready to promote "anti-labor" legislation and to denounce labor political action. To the extent then, that the image was fostered of a Democratic party of labor and "liberalism," despite constant protests that they were "for FDR," not his party, organized labor's gravitation to the Democratic party took on an element of permanency and a sharper dichotomy between the parties was encouraged. The realities of the federal and electoral system, however, remained paramount determinants of party character. Consequently, insofar as the unionists and their favored candidates acknowledged the necessity for compromise within the party they helped to perpetuate rather than to weaken its coalition character,
ironically, in the process, leaving the door open for the playing of genuine bi-partisan endorsement politics in specific contests and jurisdictions.

Humorously symbolic of the prevailing attitude toward the parties—and only negatively complimentary to the Democrats—was the assertion of Textile Labor’s chief editorial writer in May 1948 that, despite labor’s desire for a better choice, it would naturally support Harry S. Truman if he should be the Democratic nominee. Why?—Because an acceptable GOP aspirant (such as Wayne Morse of Oregon) had “about as much chance of being the party’s choice as your joint board manager.”

\[Textile Labor, 5/8/48, p. 5. \text{ For typical post-1944 statements regarding third parties and/or bi-partisanship, by Hillman, Rieve, and McKeown, see TWUA, Proceedings, 1946, pp. 3-17; 79-82; Hosiery Worker, Dec. 1947, p. 1; Textile Labor, 9/20/47, p. 1.}\]

PAC, the Presidency, the Federal System, Free Enterprise, and the Proper Role of Government

PAC’s impact upon these aspects of the American Way is impossible to separate from that of other factors. For the unions of Hillman and Rieve unquestionably the import of the PAC political message—as of legislation enacted with their approval during the 1930’s and 1940’s—was to promote acceptance of a strong presidency, a strong national government, and what has come to be known as the “welfare state.” Long before Toward a New Day was drafted Emil Rieve boldly advocated that labor “nurture and foster a broad concept of
the function of government." In '44 he predicted flatly that "private enterprise" after the war would not be the "free enterprise" of the past, for "without considerable help from government and workers' organizations" it could not "provide full production and full employment. . ."35

35 Cf. a 1932 objection to narrow "labor" issues as inadequate criteria for candidate measurement. See also Rieve's 1949 argument: "We do not deal with industry as it ought to be, but as it is. That's why we need the welfare state." Quarry Workers Journal, Nov. 1932, p. 7; Hosiery Worker, 9/22/39, p. 3; Textile Labor, June 1944, p. 8; NYT, 11/27/49, p. 66:3.

In assessing long range influence, however, attention must be called to the extent to which advocacy was pragmatic rather than ideological, and to the degree to which it was an attitude of sympathy for labor welfare in a basically private enterprise economy—as much as specific legislation—which endeared these unionists to the New Deal.36 Their reaction to Smith-Connally and Taft-Hartley

36 See p. 310 above. See also the Hosiery Worker's evaluation of FDR's 1944 victory as a signal, not for pressing for radical policy innovations in Washington, but for organizing the unorganized. See p. 370 above. Cf. the IEC's 1950 report on the "Concentrated Attacks on Textile Unionism," most of which were said to stem from the Taft-Hartley Act or from the "spirit it engendered," pp. 26-35. See also the concrete listing of piece meal and "reformist" legislative goals by Emil Rieve in 1932 at the height of his personal attraction to the Socialist party. Hosiery Worker, 9/9/32, p. 12.

eminently demonstrate that they had no preference for strong government as such, even as elements in the business community subordinate
a contrary predilection for non-governmental interventionism when it is a question of subsidies and tariffs rather than of restrictive regulations.

A President who for a dozen years had been "friendly" and "humanitarian"; a Congress demonstrably more willing or able than state legislatures to cope positively with problems of concern to labor; more ready to sanction labor "rights," less susceptible to "anti-labor" pressures; state and local authorities unwilling to concede the social utility of unionism; private enterprisers demonstrably unable alone to ensure full employment and unwilling to admit organized labor into partnership in planning toward that or more limited ends—all these in 1944 were prime factors behind the championing of dynamic executive leadership, a continued trend toward centralization in the federal system, and a "New Dealish" concept of governmental responsibility, under which private enterprise was less than sacred and government was endowed with an obligation to experiment, regulate, aid, serve, and plan in the general welfare. Hence if these conditioning factors were to change, union attitudes could be adjusted accordingly.

Organizing the unorganized—in a capitalistic society—was never displaced as a paramount goal. Moreover, despite a pre-New Deal tradition of Socialist sympathies and notwithstanding records of strike militancy against intransigent anti-union employers, a chief source of pride for Hosiery Workers and the Amalgamated, well into the New Deal era, lay in the amicable relations and "enlightened"
labor-management cooperation which obtained within the unionized sectors of their industries. This, even though for the federation these "mature" labor-management relations meant the resolute carrying out of a program of wage deflation—to rescue jobs and companies from liquidation or migration. 37


(Hillman, it should be noted, never had the close personal Socialist ties of many of his colleagues in the ACWA. Cf. also George Baldaoni of the Dyers, who, as late as 1936, was an officer of a national Labor League for Thomas and Nelson, and Rieve and McKeown who in 1932 headed similar national and local leagues respectively. David A. Shannon, The Socialist Party of America (New York: Macmillan, 1955), p. 246; Hosiery Worker, 10/28/32, p. 1.)

As for the Amalgamated, study of its pre-New Deal history yields the impression of a union president markedly disinclined to regard government as a major agency for reform and seemingly enamored of the inevitability of unlimited progress ahead, given the uninterrupted development of a strong stable union—in a private enterprise economy. As late as 1930 it was someone other than Hillman, speaking before an ACWA convention, who stressed the inadequacies of the trade union in a declining economy—and who, in effect, rebuked the Amalgamated president for presuming to imagine that union-management-negotiated unemployment insurance programs (with which the ACWA had pioneered) could begin to solve the major problem of the times. A shift in Hillman's approach came only after a continued
worsening of the depression was accompanied, in November 1930, by an augmentation—not as a result of any concentrated labor activity—of the "liberal" contingent in Congress.38

More recent indication of the practical—even opportunistic—union approach to government v. private responsibility and at the same time of the extent to which a fundamental governmental responsibility had come to be assumed—may be seen in the fact that whereas initially labor turned to government for social insurance because of the failure or inadequacy of unionism on this front, during and after World War II it was government restrictions and/or the niggardliness of (federal and state) governmental advances in this field that led to stress in contract negotiations upon pensions, health insurance, supplemental unemployment benefits, and the like.39


39 See, for example, 1948 AFHW pension goals and Rieve's 1946 progress report on group health insurance contracts—at the same time that the TWUA convention unanimously endorsed a "National Health Bill." Hosiery Worker, June 1948, p. 6; TWUA, Proceedings, 1946, pp. 8, 131-32.

PAC, Trade Unionism, and the Union Member

as a Free Citizen

Perhaps no assertions were made more often in 1944 than that labor political action represented a "diversion" of union resources and
that PAC invaded the political freedom of individual union members. Both suggest appropriate areas for further study. On the former point, if one equates legitimacy with tradition, then so far as the subject unions are concerned, the thirty-year survey conducted establishes no firm basis for viewing PAC as a novel excursion out of trade union legitimacy (even though TWUA's executive council itself could differentiate as late as 1950 between political action and "the traditional union field")—unless one assumes (1) that degree, scope, or level of activity, or prospect of probability of successful electoral influence, rather than activity itself determines legitimacy; or (2) that the functions and precise methods of the labor union (unlike those of government and of other social institutions) have been decreed by some law of nature and must remain static for all time—though circumstances, including the framework of public policy, should dictate change and a shifting scale of priorities. Significantly, the TWUA constitution sets forth union organization and collective bargaining, not as ultimate objectives, but as means, with others, toward improved wages and hours, job security, advancement of the workers' "economic, social and cultural interests," etc.  

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10 Art. II. See also p. 332 above. Cf. the language of the Wagner Act, which sanctioned the right to organize, to bargain collectively, "and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." Millis and Montgomery, Organized Labor, p. 522. (Italics added.) Even if PAC were unique it is noteworthy that, particularly within the Amalgamated, experimentation and pioneering with different types of programs had been more "traditional" than a static approach to the functions and responsibilities of unionism.
As previously indicated, PAC had various national and local forerunners initiated or supported by or within the Hillman-Rieve union complex. Nineteen forty-four did represent a climactic point in a trend (much older than the "PAC trend") whereby these and other unions increasingly essayed to make political education and voter mobilization—as well as legislative lobbying—a major project rather than a verbal or sporadic undertaking; and to devote time, manpower, and/or money (directly or indirectly) to this purpose on a scale not hitherto practiced, even though the degree to which the "paper" program was implemented, particularly at local union and precinct levels, invariably fell short—before, during, and after 1944. The TWUA record, as here surveyed, does not show that PAC activity in the field was at the expense of other union duties or that the international union compelled unwilling local union cooperation. See a regretful IEC admission in 1950 that "naturally" not all TWUA affiliates had responded to the PAC program with a "maximum amount of enthusiasm..." TWUA, Executive Council Report to the Sixth Biennial Convention, 1950, p. 70. See also pp. 473, 487-97, 521 above.

show, through 1950, no likelihood whatsoever of a voluntary downgrading by the international union of the importance that had come to be attached to PAC-type activity as a permanent part of the union program. Imposition in 1947 of a Taft-Hartley Act prohibition on trade union expenditures as well as contributions in connection with elections brought not retreat but an advance toward more elaborate political programming and staffing, and in 1950 the IEC referred proudly to its
initiative in "departures from what used to be called 'business unionism.'" They represented "acknowledgment of the fact that politics, economics and global relations are at least as important to the welfare of textile workers as the essential skills of collective bargaining and organizing the unorganized."

In 1948 TWUA created its first "Political and Legislative Department." An initial staff of two, the "director and the Washington representative," grew to fifteen, then dropped to eight after the November election. In 1950 this "PAC department" had a staff of twelve. Its purpose was that of "to build labor's political strength at the grass roots, by promoting local political action committees, ward and district organizations, and voter eligibility of union members." TWUA, Executive Council Report, 1950, pp. 1, 69-70. Cf. pp. 355-56 above. (Italics added.)

Data gathered is far too incomplete to judge the extent to which PAC accurately represented a response to rank and file wishes or demands, within TWUA and its constituent units—or within the once tutelary Amalgamated. One may refer to the New Jersey PAC's presidential preference poll of 1944 and to national Gallup Poll statistics on major party preferences of union members to suggest that a majority of members in the ACWA-TWUA family were probably personally in favor of the PAC presidential endorsees of the period. It does

See p. 485 above. See also 1936-44 labor vote surveys cited in "Gallup Poll Almanac" excerpts reproduced in Kieran, Information Please Almanac, 1948, pp. 116-17. The Gallup figures for 1944 showed a CIO member Democratic preference of 78 per cent.—This is not the same as saying that union members were persuaded by PAC, except, perhaps, to vote as already inclined. See also pp. 289, 532 above.
not necessarily follow that the same majority approved union policy to promote that candidacy (or others) with union resources. Insofar as active members were concerned—i.e., those who take their membership sufficiently seriously to participate in union affairs, including the election of convention delegations—majority approval or acquiescence in international union policy may be traced to the overwhelmingly positive actions taken in convention.

Corroboration of such an assumption obviously would require intensive study of the degree of democracy possible or prevailing within the local union affiliates—quite apart from formal constitutional requirements. See p. 255n above.

The chief question raised by the politicians, however, and one of especial interest to the political scientist, was not whether PAC policy was majority policy, but whether union policy, however arrived at, and/or its implementation, impaired the rights of individuals who dissented either from candidate endorsement(s) or from the policy of engaging in political work at all—directly or through sponsorship of auxiliary machinery, and whether on behalf of specific candidacies or merely to get out the vote. In important particulars this is a question of opinion and of public policy, not of fact, and will be treated as such in the following section. Suffice it to say here, first, that credit due to PAC for enhancing the opportunity of union members and others to exercise citizenship rights at the polls—by encouraging and facilitating their eligibility—can hardly be contested. Moreover, although most of the sources consulted were of the
sort unlikely to be revealing on this point, none of them (including Congressional committee testimony on PAC, election statistics, and labor's own election post-mortems) afford clues to probable coercion of union members in this sector of the labor movement, in the form of compulsory voter registration, coerced dollar contributions, or disciplined voting. Nor does evidence in hand suggest that individual union members were threatened with union reprisals for failure to register or vote or to vote "the right way," or for publicly working for candidates or parties not enjoying PAC endorsement. Nor does it appear from data studied that local union officers were penalized for failure to cooperate actively in the PAC program of the union or of area IUC's. 145

145 Cf. pp. 140-41 above.

It does appear, emphatically, that staff members are not conceded an inherent right to retain their posts as hired hands of the union if they choose deliberately to flaunt official union policy. Thus staffers who disagreed with official TWUA policy of "going along" with Hillman on ALP either acquiesced in it--or resigned, as Sam Baron did. Within the Amalgamated, although violently opposed to that same policy, Advance editor Hardman remained at his post until the election was over.146 ACWA vice-president Leo Kraycki resigned

146 See pp. 563-67, 609 above.
from the Socialist party in 1936 to work in the LNPL campaign for Roosevelt—after serving as the party's national chairman and despite his own continued preference for the Socialist nominee. Somewhat comparable was the action of Sander Genis in the ACWA convention of 1924. A member of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor party and a strong exponent of a national labor party, Genis subordinated his personal enthusiasm to serve in effect as an invited spokesman for Hillman's course of caution and rejection. In like manner, in 1948 withdrawals from national CIO and ACWA staff positions were forthcoming from persons who chose to work for the Wallace Progressive party.

The Amalgamated General Executive Board met in January to denounce the Wallace candidacy and to vote for withdrawal from the ALP in New York if that party should endorse Wallace. At that time it announced that attorney John Abt had been granted a "leave of absence" as special counsel—so he could participate in Wallace's campaign. Abt resigned simultaneously as counsel for CIOPAC. CIO News, 1/12/48. At least one local union officer in TWUA chose to work for Wallace. Daily Worker, 1/9/48, p. 10. Research has disclosed no references of this nature regarding the international union staff.

David Shannon writes that "Krycki... explained to Thomas that his connection with Hillman required that he resign from the Socialist Party and support Roosevelt even though he still personally wished the Socialists success." The Socialist Party of America (New York: Macmillan, 1955), p. 116.
Conclusions Summarized: the Price of a New Union Outlook on Government and Politics; and a Recommended Approach to Public Policy on Labor Political Action

Of all of the conclusions which have emerged from this research the following are outstanding: that, in general, for that sector of the labor movement studied, (1) greater impetus to determined political activity flows from conviction regarding immediate practical need than from idealistic aspiration or ideological line following; (2) choice of vehicles and tactics derives more from climate, circumstance, and experience than from doctrine; (3) organized labor's most aggressive efforts are directed toward defense of rights and standards long claimed or previously won on political or economic fronts; (4) politically restrictive measures which seem punitive or discriminatory are prone to intensify rather than to deter action.

If they cannot be dignified as formal conclusions, the following impressions are at least equally strong: (1) major deterrents to PAC-type activity lie outside government or in the realm of public policy other than that of political regulation; (2) PAC in 1944 was more a response to circumstances than a generating force and, like its predecessors and successors, its noticeable influence upon the "American Way" was perhaps less remarkable than the extent to which it symbolized an accommodation to it; (3) given the exposure of union members and others to a free market in "political education" from all sources—including political parties, diverse and competing pressure groups, the press, and other media of information and propaganda; given labor's stress upon the importance of issues and the virtues of voting (whatever the merits of official union positions on specific
issues or candidates), and the knowledge and training in practical political procedures and techniques which its political program affords individual PAC workers, PAC's potential for strengthening democracy is at least as great as its potential for perverting it.

The price of labor's voluntary withdrawal from campaign politics is high if not totally fanciful. So, perhaps, on the historical record, is a major voluntary re-orientation of its approach to procedural political policy--or to substantive policy goals, with their consequent effects on institutional trends. Incentive lies obviously in elimination or adjustment in the kind of conditioning factors which inspire PAC's in the first place. Given their continuation, some form of union-sponsored activity in connection with elections is inevitable, whatever further successors there may be to Smith-Connally and Taft-Hartley political restraints.

Determination to circumvent legal restrictions does not perforce render that determination virtuous. It does suggest that goals to be achieved by political regulation ought to be carefully formulated and all of their implications thoughtfully canvassed--including the possibility that regulations aimed at groups rather than acts may foster among those affected a sense of disillusionment with representative government and the democratic process. Nothing in the democratic creed—or in American experience or the U.S. Constitution—decrees that the political party shall be the only organized force in political life, or that lawful interests in society should not be permitted—even encouraged—to wage battles over public policy openly in the political arena.
It has been alleged that employment of union dues in furtherance of electoral objectives affronts the democratic conscience, particularly in cases of so-called "compulsory unionism." Certainly government should vigilantly guard the freedom of the individual to behave according to the dictates of his own conscience in the political field. But the (highly debatable) question of the union shop should be dealt with on its merits, not in the guise of regulating political action, and care should be taken that proper solicitude for the citizenship rights of an individual—as an individual—be not perverted so as to frustrate the will of a lawful group in society to promote and protect common interests through the strength of organization, by means not unlawful in themselves.

It ought plainly to be public policy in a democracy to encourage that kind of membership participation in labor—or other pressure group—organizations which will ensure that group influence brought to bear upon public, parties, and government does represent a genuine and not a spurious majority will—whether in the realm of propaganda, lobby, or electoral activity. But unless, as the PAC episode of 1943-44 suggests, they deliberately choose to add an additional element of martyrdom to the motivation behind political activity, public policy formulators interested in the health of democracy ought to be wary of applying to one element in society and to one avenue of political influence (either by compulsion or prohibition) a rule of unanimity rarely applicable elsewhere in American life—even in the conduct of elections.
Most union sources both concede and deplore the fact that save in situations of crisis members stay away from meetings in great numbers. See p. 420n above. Cf. evidence that "a vast majority" of members of the American Legion, traditionally one of the more potent organizations on the lobby front, "pay their dues year after year but seldom attend meetings, vote or add a voice to Legion affairs." John V. Wilson, Scripps-Howard Staff Writer, in Columbus Citizen, 8/9/55.
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APPENDIX
A GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACWA or ACW - Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America
AFHW - American Federation of Hosiery Workers
AFL - American Federation of Labor
ALL - American Labor League (New Jersey)
ALP - American Labor Party (New York)
ANG - American Newspaper Guild

CIO - Congress of Industrial Organizations
CIOPAC - CIO Political Action Committee (as organization or movement)
CP - Communist Party

GEB - General Executive Board (ACWA)

IEC - International Executive Council (TWUA)
ILGWU - International Ladies Garment Workers Union
IUC - State or local industrial union council (CIO)
IUMSWA - Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America
IWA - International Woodworkers of America

LNPL - Labor's Non-Partisan League (CIO)

NCPAC - National Citizens Political Action Committee
NEB - National Executive Board (AFHW)
NYT - New York Times

PAC - National or local CIOPAC organization; political action movement, encompassing both CIOPAC and NCPAC

TWOC - Textile Workers Organizing Committee
TWUA - Textile Workers Union of America (CIO)

UAW - United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America
UE or UERMWA - United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America
ULC - United Labor Committee (Philadelphia, Wisconsin, etc.)
UMW - United Mine Workers of America
URW - United Rubber Workers of America
USA-CIO - United Steelworkers of America
UTW or UTWA - United Textile Workers of America (AFL)