NEO-CLASSICAL SATIRE: THE CONSERVATIVE MUSE

DISSERTATION

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FOREWORD

The basic premise of this dissertation, as reflected in its title Neo-Classical Satire: The Conservative Muse, is that where one very important literary mode is concerned an entire age presents an almost solidly conservative front. But another premise which gives meaning to my study is that conservatism wears many different faces. The conservatism of Samuel Butler is quite different from that of Ned Ward and Tom Brown, and their conservatism is, in turn, at a far remove from that of John Arbuthnot, John Gay, Alexander Pope, and Jonathan Swift. The conservatism of the last named satiric quartet interests me particularly; designated "dynamic conservativism," for reasons which will appear later, it is the focal point of the dissertation.

But before the differences in conservative thought can take on any meaning, the framework within which they develop must be examined. Such a framework is at hand in the list of key characteristics of Western conservatism drawn up by one of its representative Twentieth Century American spokesmen. These characteristics are:

1. an attempt to find a pattern in history "that may give some clues as to the possible and impossible in politics";

2. distrust of human nature, which is viewed as a mixture of the rational and the irrational;
3. belief in "moral order in the universe in which man participates and from which he can derive canons or principles of political judgment";

4. belief that government should be limited in power;

5. defense of the institution of property as opposed to defense of "particular arrangements by which goods are manufactured and distributed."

From another representative contemporary conservative, the English historian Keith Feiling, comes a strengthening of the framework. According to Feiling, the first principle lying behind the common cause made by British conservatives has been "a skepticism, amounting to disbelief, in any purely intellectual process as the means to explain rights and duties, or to justify political obligation." As a corollary to this feeling, the British conservatives distrust such general notions as 'the community'—"it is the people in all their sub-divisions and neighbourhoods and corporate interests which constitute the community, and not vice-versa"—and would argue that "the despotism of reason may cloak as much sinister interest and self-deception as any other tyranny."

Unlike the traditional liberal, Feiling says, the conservative is not by nature an individualist.

Individual will cannot determine political obligation. We are born into a community, or rather an interlocking circle of communities; the most profound of our relationships, of husband to wife, of parent to child, of neighbourhood, are by no means wholly voluntary.
Besides being a non-individualist who distrusts the intellect, the British conservative, observes Feiling, is to an extent pessimistic. Conservatism's origins being Christian and therefore imbued with the conception of some 'fall,' conservatism, he says, "has retained a reserve, a certain pessimism as to man's unaided efforts or ideas abstracted from the diurnal course of stresses and desires."^5

In the satiric writings of Arbuthnot, Gay, Pope, and Swift, we see a marked reserve and more than a certain pessimism. And being doctrinally and emotionally closer to conservatism's Christian origins than are Feiling's contemporary conservatives, they are more strongly "imbued with the conception of some 'fall.'" In respect of individualism these four men go beyond Feiling's "prescription": for them individualism is the enemy, or at least one of the shapes that the enemy assumes. They are not, however, distrustful of the general notion 'the community,' although they are wary of the maneuvers that various members of the ruling group conduct behind that concept. They are certainly suspicious of the intellect and vehemently opposed to "any purely intellectual process" which sets itself up as "the means to explain rights and duties, or to justify political obligation." Pessimistic, anti-individualistic, anti-intellectual (at least within
certain ill-defined limits which I shall later attempt
to draw), they are naturally distrustful of the "completely
free person, the man beholden to no one but himself." 6
In the neo-classical world there were not many men who
enjoyed—or even wanted—that kind of freedom, but what­
ever men or institutions even let their gaze wander in
that direction incurred the censure of these conservative
writers.

I have spoken of Arbuthnot, Gay, Pope, and Swift as
though they functioned as one when it came to defending
the conservative position. Actually the differences be­
tween them as social thinkers and artists are considerable.
Merely to suggest something of those differences, Swift,
the Anglican clergyman, was far more influenced in his
thought by Christian pessimism than was any of the other
three men.

Still their windows on the world adjoin, their satires
differ significantly from those of their neighbors. Be­
cause the difference is in the direction of greater free­
dom from satiric conventions, less rigidity in their
attitude toward existing institutions, and because their
satire contains an explosive quality alien to conservative
orthodoxy, I have chosen to call these artists dynamic
conservatives.

The dynamic conservative is first of all disinterest­
ed. 7 That does not mean, however, that he is a free­
floating, classless individual who feels he has no stake in society. But as much as any man's beliefs can be separated out from the socio-economic frame within which they grow, his beliefs underlie the positions he assumes and the actions he engages in. He does not, that is, formulate a rationale (consciously or unconsciously) to accord with the socio-economic attitudes most expedient for him to hold.

How for this to be so the dynamic conservative must be given to the kind of thinking that most conservatives are not usually prone to. The realistic conservative—to give a name to the generality of neo-classical satirists—is often quite capable of examining the springs of his beliefs, but prefers not to since he respects chiefly power and the instruments for obtaining it. And he has at his command a "battery of powerful weapons in the form of social authorities, institutions, laws, and conventions." In his satire he is likely to call on all of these forces.

Where the realistic conservative (both as satirist and as non-satirist) almost instinctively attacks intellectuals and intellectualism because he regards the probing, critical intellectual process as an ever-present menace to things as they are, the dynamic conservative attacks them because of his reasoned conviction that they constitute a threat to that society which he sees as part of a continuum. The
dynamic conservative, not bound to a particular party but rather to what he considers the whole society, is thus moved by different considerations than is the realistic conservative; and though he may seem to be moved to the same end, actually both his ends and his means of curbing the intellect are strikingly dissimilar to those of the realistic conservative. More aware of the various choices open to man and gifted with an insight into the intellectual process, the dynamic conservative is intellectual in his anti-intellectualism. The life of the mind holds a fascination for him which borders on love, and where he is writing satire part of the esthetic effect he obtains results from the ambivalence with which he approaches his victim.

Perhaps the dynamic conservative's profound skepticism is the layer of his mind on which his anti-intellectualism rests. He is at any rate militantly opposed to all schemes and systems that, springing full-blown from the intellect, make too light of human frailties. Above all he sets himself against that Utopianism which places a minimum value on existing reality. He is intensely aware of the flaws that run through his society, and convinced of the necessity for change, but he is fiercely critical of change which does not grow gradually and does not take sufficiently into account the enduring values in society.
The dynamic conservative satirist respects the past without revering it, respects the intellect but denies it paramountcy, respects reform and change but only within severe limitations. He is aware of a great many alternatives, something that his uni-dimensional realistic conservative brother is not.

My way into neo-classical satire, then, is via conservatism, which is the social matrix in which it develops. After an examination of that mold, a consideration of some of its social, economic, political, and religious components, my study turns to the approaches to history made by dynamic conservatism—its "uses of the past." Following on that chapter are two very closely related chapters, one on the anti-intellectualism of dynamic conservative satire, the other on its anti-utopianism. Anti-utopianism is really a species of anti-intellectualism, but so important a species that I feel it necessary to devote a separate chapter to it.

The principal figures in this study are, as I have already indicated, Arbuthnot, Gay, Pope, and Swift. A great many other satirists engage my attention, because although the focus of my interest is dynamic conservative satire, I believe that a consideration of it is productive of a great many insights into the larger body of neo-classical satire. Several times I go outside my self-
determined geographical bounds---Great Britain---and chronological limits---1660-1750---, but always in order to illuminate neo-classical satire.

And it is satire, not conservatism, which is the reason for being of the present study. I have tried to do something more than use a philosophical concept as a handy device for attacking an aesthetic problem; still it is on the aesthetic that this paper must stand or fall. Not what conservatism is or how it functioned in Queen Anne's day, but the way that conservative thought helped determine rhetorical strategies, permeated satirical imagery, and shaped ruling modes---these are the problems at the center of this dissertation.
Footnotes

Foreword


3 Ibid., p. 131.

4 Ibid., p. 133.

5 Ibid., p. 135.

6 This distrust, says Gertrude Himmelfarb, is the one ineradicable stamp of the conservative. ("The Prophets of the New Conservatism," Commentary, IX (January 1950), 80.)

7 Cf. A. E. Wolfe, Conservatism, Radicalism, and Scientific Method, (New York, 1923). Wolfe makes a distinction between interested and disinterested conservatism; the former, in this distinction, exists purely for the sake of protecting vested economic and social interests.

8 In my first chapter I distinguish another variety of non-dynamic conservative satire, Addisonian satire, I do not discuss it in the Foreword because it operates only in that one chapter, and because the really important distinction made in the dissertation is between realistic and dynamic conservative satire.

9 Himmelfarb, loc. cit.
CHAPTER I

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK

After the Restoration a new type of man, the political
arithmetician, was beginning to develop a language bare of
fanciful metaphors, a language which would be precise enough
and scientific enough to make possible the rationalization
of the embryonic social sciences. It was to be a language
that would describe the social situation and prescribe
courses of action without using figurative, emotion-charged
terms; it would speak of men in terms of their economic
usefulness rather than in terms of their responsibility one
to the other, and it would count out and measure and weigh
every commodity without recourse to some theological meta-
phor of all goods as being held in sacred trust.

This new language, the men who put it to use, and the
commercial interests in whose behalf it was used were all
to a degree revolutionary. But the revolution which they
participated in---it had begun as far back as Sir Thomas
More's day, when industrialization first made its impact
felt---was essentially a conservative one. It was designed
to achieve as orderly and stable a society as the one it
displaced, only a society that was to rest on economic
pillars rather than on moral ones. Part of my purpose in
this chapter is to sketch in the economic revolution I have
been alluding to, and to describe some of its consequences for neo-classical England, the England of the last four decades of the Seventeenth Century and the first half of the Eighteenth Century. This description is intended to make clear how pervasively conservative the temper of the time was. Having set the socio-economic scene, I then introduce, although not at the same time, three groups of writers whom I denominate by the terms "realistic conservative satirist," "Addisonian satirist," and "dynamic conservative satirist." I nowhere set forth a formal definition of these terms (which I make less clumsy by dropping satirist from each of them) because I feel that they are best defined through the way the actors they denominate perform than through a formal statement in a preface. In practice there is considerable overlapping among the terms; nevertheless certain distinctions do exist, and the most important purpose of this chapter is so to make those distinctions as to illuminate the intentions and some of the techniques of a number of important satiric artists.

The chapter, then, asserts that rhetorical illumination of much (not all) neo-classical satire can come from an understanding of the way the socio-economic framework creates most (not all) of the satirist's values. I have perhaps made of "socio-economic" a more flexible term than it ordinarily is; however, I think that this extension is empirically justified.
Part I: The Socio-Economic Background

The Political Arithmeticians

Sir William Petty, who is considered the first Political Arithmetician and who was one of the most important fashioners of the neo-classical socio-economic framework, announced in the preface to his book *Political Arithmetic* that

instead of using only comparative and superlative words, and intellectual arguments I have taken the course (as a specimen of the Political Arithmetic I have long aimed at) to express myself in Terms of Number, Weight, or Measure; to use only arguments of Sense, and to consider only such causes as have visible foundations in Nature; leaving those that depend upon the mutable minds, opinions, appetites, and passions of particular men, to the consideration of others.²

One of those things Petty thinks has a "visible foundation in Nature" is the commercial success of the Dutch, whom the English envied as intensely as they hated them during the last part of the Seventeenth Century. Petty attributes the Dutch success partly to the liberty of conscience extended to the people of the United Provinces. Because of this liberty, he says, dissenters have thrived among the Dutch, and "Dissenters of this kind are, for the most part, thinking, sober, and patient men; and such as believe that labour and industry is their duty towards GOD; how erroneous soever their opinions be."³

The tolerance Petty displays here is uncommon for the
Seventeenth Century and was hardly de rigeur in the early Eighteenth Century. I cite it not to illustrate the growth in England of a spirit of tolerance, but rather to observe that the tolerance of Political Arithmetic was not at all disinterested and that it was a means to a non-moral end instead of the other way around. Presumably if Petty had felt that intolerance were more conducive to a nation's trade, then that is the policy he would have favored.

Sir Josiah Child, whose *A New Discourse of Trade* appeared not long after Petty's book, shared the latter's admiration for the Dutch, attributing their prosperity to much the same causes that Petty did. Child too praised the Dutch policy of religious tolerance, pointing out that it had brought to the United Provinces a large number of industrious foreigners. And like Petty and almost every other political arithmetician, Child saw in the populousness of Holland the major reason for Dutch commercial success. "It is multitudes of people, and good laws," he wrote, "such as cause an encrease of people, which principally enrich any country...." Another of Child's tenets, one which fell far short of universal acceptance when he wrote, was that where wages are high a country is rich. In setting forth this tenet he makes it quite obvious that for him the nation's prosperity matters more than the individual's high wages, a belief that Petty, would
certainly not have quarreled with.

Child did not believe that multitudes of people in itself suffices to insure prosperity. The people must besides possess a high degree of skill and must have the means to exercise that skill, he thought. England's chief difficulty, as he saw it, was with its poor, who contributed nothing at all to the national economy. To enable them to make a contribution he puts forth, in a chapter entitled "Concerning the Relief and Employment of the Poor," a proposal for the association of all the poor into one province so that their wants might be systematically met and their talents systematically drawn on. But before he comes to this scheme he draws up a list of seven particulars regarding the poor.

The first particular he sets down is that the English poor have always been wretched, "uncomfortable to themselves, and unprofitable to the Kingdom...." Particular two is that the children of the poor, if they survive, because of idle habits contracted in youth are "rendered ever after indisposed to labour." Particular three is that if the impotent poor were provided for and those that could work employed, the public would gain some hundreds of thousands of pounds annually. Particular four—and this is as far as we need go with Child's list—is that "it is our duty to God and Nature, so to provide for, and employ the poor." The last three particulars are in the vein of the first
three; Number four exists in glorious isolation. To underline the obvious, for Child the nation's duty to the poor (or to God and Nature) is just one of a number of "particulars" having to do with the poor. It does not matter whether the idea of duty comes fourth or second or last in his list, the important thing is that it does not come first.

This was to be the dominant attitude of the Augustan Age. Certainly Petty and Child neither discovered it nor did they alone make it dominant, but both of them were important witnesses to the proceedings, which lasted for the better part of a century, that separated economics and politics from religion and morality. R. H. Tawney, in his classic *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, has described the process of separation and what followed on it in this way:

An institution which possesses no philosophy of its own inevitably accepts that which happens to be fashionable. What set the tone of social thought in the eighteenth century was partly the new Political Arithmetic, which had come to maturity at the Restoration, and which, as was to be expected in the first great age of English natural science...drew its inspiration, not from religion or morals, but from mathematics and physics. It was still more the political theory associated with the name of Locke, but popularized and debased by a hundred imitators. Society is not a community of classes with varying functions, united to each other by mutual obligations arising from their relation to a common end. It is a joint-stock company rather than an organism, and the liabilities of the shareholders are strictly limited. They enter it in order to insure the rights already vested in them by the immutable
laws of nature. The State, a matter of convenience, not of supernatural sanctions, exists for the protection of those rights, and fulfills its object in so far as, by maintaining contractual freedom, it secures full scope for their unfettered exercise.

Defoe, Mandeville, and Free Trade

I wish now to call two more witnesses to the break-up, two writers who came along several decades after Petty and Child had done their work and who therefore lacked a first-hand knowledge of what the union had been like. It is as observers of the economic scene, not as the satirists which they also were, that Daniel Defoe and Bernard Mandeville are of interest here.

Defoe rarely wrote about trade without becoming rhapsodic. Unlike Petty he made no claim to being a detached, dispassionate student of "Number, Weight, or Measure." This peroration from his Review, which he edited and published for nine years (1704-13), is typical of Defoe on trade and tradesmen:

I wonder sometimes at the ignorance of those people and nations whose gentry pretend to despise families raised by trade. Why should that which is the wealth of the world, the prosperity and health of kingdoms and towns, be accounted dishonorable? If we respect trade, as it is understood by merchandising, it is certainly the most noble, most instructive, and improving of any way of life. The artificers or handicraftsmen are indeed slaves; the gentlemen are the plowmen of the nation, but the merchant is the support and improver of power, learning, and fortunes. A true-bred merchant is a universal scholar, his learning excels the mere scholar
in Greek and Latin as much as that does the illiterate person that cannot write or read. He understands languages without books, geography without maps; his journals and trading voyages delineate the world; his foreign exchanges, protests, and procurations speak all tongues....

It is hardly surprising, in view of this unqualified admiration for trade, that Defoe should have been impatient of any obstacles placed in its way, whether of a political or an ethical nature. In all of his non-fictional writings the commercial good of the nation is the index of all things. All else must contribute to the nation's trade, which has become for Defoe and the majority of his contemporaries the end-all if not the be-all.

Yet this was the man who had been brought up a non-conformist and had never rejected non-conformism's highly moralistic code. This was the man who in *Moll Flanders* passionately defended the right of a human being to secure for himself the means of existence at no matter what cost, and who wondered aloud as to how many of the respectable and well-to-do would observe the niceties if they were without money. Moreover Defoe showed a great deal of compassion for the slave, although not enough to wish for the end of slavery. There is an apparent contradiction between Defoe the champion of commerce and Defoe the compassionate defender of human rights. The best explanation for it that I know of is Hans Andersen's: it is his thesis that for Defoe trade and morality existed in separate, water-tight
compartments, and that like most Twentieth Century businessmen
he succeeded so well in keeping the two apart that he was
never really aware of any contradiction in his thought.
This is a thesis wholly consonant with the one Tawney develops.

Bernard Mandeville was even less troubled than Defoe
by a seeming disparity between ought and is. A thorough­
going utilitarian, Mandeville regarded trade as the nation's
bedrock and moral considerations as relative matters that
formed a superstructure. He asked always "will the nation
profit by this program?" (e.g. free charity schools), not
"Is this the right thing, morally, to do?" If Defoe's
colly calculating espousal of the ethics of trade brought
no violent reaction, Mandeville's more radical doctrines
should have. Yet although there were many indignant replies
to the Fable of the Bees---most notably Bishop Berkeley's
and William Law's---and the book was ordered to be burned
by the Essex hangman, in general Mandeville aroused compar­
tively little furore. It would seem that by the second decade
of the Eighteenth Century, Mandeville's, and even more
Defoe's, way of thinking about trade had been widely diffused
and had taken deep root.

Neither Mandeville nor Defoe had been the first English
writer to advocate free trade, which in the Eighteenth
Century came more and more to be the desideratum for commer­
cial interests. But as Mandeville's great biographer and
editor F. B. Kaye has observed, Mandeville differed markedly from such predecessors as Sir Dudley North in that while they considered the welfare of the state as a whole and the interest of its individual inhabitants as not necessarily corresponding, Mandeville held that the selfish good of the individual is normally the state's good. Thus, as Kaye remarks, he "not only argued away a powerful reason for restriction, but furnished a genuine philosophy for individualism in trade."10

The Mercantilist Arrangement

The Defoevian-Mandevillian kind of individualism with its emphasis on free trade did not win out during the lifetime of either writer; it was the "wave of the future" which in the early Eighteenth Century was building up force. The dominant economic arrangement of the time was mercantilism. According to Professor Lipson, the underlying idea of mercantilism was "to consolidate the strength of a state by making it independent of other states in the economic sphere; in short it pursued a strategic economy based on power rather than a welfare economy based on abundance."11 In pursuance of this economy it advocated protection of industry, navigation acts, and corn laws, none of them measures conducive to free trading. Mercantilism, then, was less individualistic than the laissez-faire system that was to
replace it. It looked back to governmental involvement in nearly every phase of economic life.

But mercantilism was actually Janus-faced, because at the same time that it took this backward look it gazed very proudly into a future in which trade and the whole economic configuration existed autonomously. Equally with laissez-faire it created an atmosphere hostile to the pre-Restoration idea that the moral order was more important than the economic.

How the economic came to dominate over the moral has been described brilliantly by Tawney:

In such an atmosphere [one of concern with property rights to the exclusion of all else] temperatures were naturally low and equable, and enthusiasm, if not a lapse in morals, was an intellectual solecism and an error in taste. Religious thought was not immune from the same influence. It was not merely that the Church, which, as much as the State, was the heir of the Revolution settlement, reproduced the temper of an aristocratic society, as it reproduced its class organization and economic inequalities.... Not less significant was the fact that, apart from certain groups and certain questions, it accepted the prevalent social philosophy and adapted its teaching to it. The age in which political theory was cast in the mould of religion had yielded to one in which religious thought was no longer an imperious master, but a docile pupil. Conspicuous exceptions like Law, who reasserted with matchless power the idea that Christianity implies a distinctive way of life, or protests like Wesley's sermon on The Use of Money, merely heighten the impression of a general acquiescence in the conventional ethics. The prevalent religious thought might not unfairly be described as morality tempered by prudence, and softened on occasion by a rather sentimental compassion for inferiors. It was the natural counterpart of a social philosophy which repudiated teleology,
and which substituted the analogy of a self-regulating mechanism, moved by the weights and pulley and economic motives, for the theory which had regarded society as an organism composed of different classes united by their common subordination to a spiritual purpose. 12

Swift as Economic Theorist

As well perhaps as anybody, Swift in his sermons and in some of his tracts illustrates the religious attitude Tawney describes. In his sermon "On the Poor Man's Contentment" he advances the view hackneyed even by the early Eighteenth Century that the poor are better off than their social betters because they are healthier, less troubled in their sleep, and not subject to the envy of other men. Having proved the happiness of the poor, he then denies the "honor" of being poor to the greater part of those who are so regarded, saying that they are actually indolent. "Among the Number of those who beg in our Streets, or are half starved at Home, or languish in Prison for Debt, there is hardly one in a hundred who doth not owe his Misfortunes to his own Laziness or Drunkenness or worse Vices." 13 All this is standard Eighteenth-Century social thought, and not at all amiss among many Twentieth Century right-wing politicians.

So Swift in his role of Churchman. Swift as political partisan is equally orthodox, but it is an orthodoxy that only one half of the electorate, the Tory half, held to.
The chief tenet of this orthodoxy, which was to become almost a mystique, was that the Tories and the landed interest were indivisible, the Whigs wedded to the crassest commercialism. According to this view only those who derived their income from the land could really love and therefore speak for the country; those who made their money in trade and commerce, on the other hand, were seen as rootless creatures whose one love was money. This neat division hardly was invented by Swift or his contemporaries, and it certainly did not pass out of existence with the end of the Eighteenth Century; nevertheless it must be kept constantly to the foreground of any discussion of the neo-classical socio-economic arrangement, and the satire related to that arrangement.

Swift exploited this division most systematically in his 1711 pamphlet The Conduct of the Allies, which was enormously popular and quite influential. In this pamphlet Swift blames on the Whigs the national debt, which he says was the creature of upstarts who had practically no part in the Revolution but had made a great deal of money once it was over and had established themselves at Court through loans and funds which they had projected.\textsuperscript{114} These men had then created a national debt in order to bring into existence a moneved interest that might in time compete with the landed one. As to the continuing war of the Austrian
Succession, Swift blamed the monied men for having kept it going, all the time trading with stocks and funds and lending at great interest. War, he wrote, is their "perpetual Harvest." Why is England fighting? "We have been Fighting," answered Swift, "for the Ruin of the Publick Interest and the Advancement of a Private. We have been fighting to raise the Wealth and Grandeur of a particular Family; to enrich Usurers and stock-jobbers; and to cultivate the pernicious Designs of a Faction, by destroying the Landed-Interest."^5

Land, Money, and 18th Century Liberalism

Land versus money. There we have a vastly oversimplified formula for the basic socio-economic division of the age. An even greater oversimplification—and a very tempting one, from the point of view of this study, to make—would be that land goes hand in hand with a conservative world view, money with a liberal one; and that Swift, therefore, as well as those of his contemporaries who think like him are the neo-classical conservatives, while Mandeville, Defoe, and the others of that "school" are representatives of neo-classical liberalism. But the term "liberal" attached to Mandeville is meaningless, and Defoe becomes a liberal only when Twentieth Century political concepts are stretched (almost to the breaking point) so as to apply to Eighteenth Century situations in which those concepts
were unknown. Money traditionally is more flexible than land, commercial interests less firmly tied to time-honored methods than landed ones. And certainly in England the impetus for social reform has come more often from the middle-class traders than it has from the aristocratic land-owners. However social reform was no part of the make-up of early Eighteenth Century laissez-faire, whose proponents were every bit as attached to the existing social order as were the landed interests that were for the most part hostile to laissez-faire. We might say, then, that the division was between two conservatisms, one based on the land, the Church, and the Stuart dynasty; the other on commerce, non-conformism, and the Hanovers. This is still too neat a categorization, but it is good enough to do duty until some necessary qualifications can be made.

Part II: The Satiric Foreground

At least until the beginning of the Eighteenth Century English literature was largely an upper-class affair. Writers like Bunyan had an enormous appeal among the middle classes, but it was more a moral than a literary appeal, and anyway the literary tradition that Bunyan belonged to was pretty well submerged.

Satire was the literary form that was slowest to lose its aristocratic coloration. Even during the Puritan
Interregnum, when non-conformist pamphleteers were especially prolific, the overwhelming majority of satiric works came from pro-Cavalier, or at any rate anti-puritan, pens. And during the Restoration the major satirists were either like Rochester in being to the manner born, or like Dryden in hitching their wagons to the aristocratic star. Dryden's was hardly an exceptional case, either for his age or the succeeding one. Neither Pope, Gay, nor Swift was an aristocrat by birth, yet all three identified themselves with the upper class. In short the bulk of neo-classical satire (certainly that satire which counts for much artistically) had an aristocratic bias.

That is certainly true of realistic conservative satire, one of the two broad categories created, in my Foreword, to encompass the greater part of neo-classical satire. Harshly critical of middle-class values, the realistic conservatives were themselves rarely drawn from the upper classes. Some indeed made Grub Street their headquarters.

The Realistic Conservatism of Tom D'Urfey

Tom D'Urfey is a representative figure in realistic conservative satire. A staunch Royalist and Churchman, D'Urfey may have received some subsidy for his ventures in political satire. But in any case he surely would have sounded the same notes that are heard in his satire "The
Malcontent". Subtitled "A Satyr—Being the Sequel of the Progress of Honesty, or a View of Court & City," this long poem was published in 1684, a few years after the time when the Earl of Shaftesbury (Dryden's Achitophel) had made things uncomfortable for Charles II's court and its adherents.

The two principal characters, if they can be called that, in D'Urfey's satire are Errour and the Malcontent, who is also called the Satyrist. Most of the poem is given over to Malcontent-Satyrist's diatribe against Shaftesbury, Gilbert Burnet, the Duke of Monmouth, and other enemies of Charles, all thinly disguised under such names as Catiline, Cinna, and Cassius. The audience for this outburst is Errour, who has lately been converted to the Truth. The Satyrist, who is obviously D'Urfey's spokesman in the poem, links the anti-Charles leaders with the "rabble," and piles epithet on epithet when describing both. They are, he says, worse than murderers, arsonists, or adulterers.

As for Malcontent-Satyrist, he wishes only to live apart from the corrupt age, so he informs us in these idyllic lines:

Give me, kind Heaven, a peacefull humble seat,
Without dependence on the great,
Or knowledge of the Luxury of State;
Plac't in a little Cottage of my own,
Far from the noisie, factious, busie Town."
Now this is no more than an Horatian commonplace, and as such of little interest in itself. But it is interesting when seen against the background of D'Urfey's preface, wherein a Juvenalian commonplace makes its appearance. Satyr should "lash to the blood," D'Urfey says there, not "tickle till it smarts." For himself, the poet says he is a surgeon who takes as his model Juvenal, by whom a "Fool...was drawn like a Fool." The Horatian and Juvenalian do not go well together, but that does not bother D'Urfey who seems to be unaware of the contradiction between the two traditions. The recourse to both (though not at the same time) is sanctioned by satiric convention, and the realistic conservative satirist is above all devoted to the conventions.

Perhaps the hardiest of all satiric conventions is the representation by the satirist of himself as eminently respectable and concerned only for the common good. This is one of the ten satiric conventions which Carter Bishop, in his valuable study of Pope's dependence on rhetorical conventions, traces back through Boileau to Horace and Juvenal. Pope was to draw on it repeatedly, sometimes quite effectively (as in the Epistle to Arbuthnot, where Elder Olsen has examined its workings), but very often ineffectively, as I hope to demonstrate further on in this chapter. D'Urfey calls on the convention in The Malcontent; however it does not respond very well to his call since he
simply tells us how virtuous he is without giving us any dramatic proofs for his claim.

The good which D'Urfey claims to be defending he sees menaced by only one faction of the "factious, busie Town", because to the realistic conservative his own Tory-Church values are the only conceivable norm and all other values and their upholders fall under the heading of "faction." This is a withering epithet in the period, and one which perhaps springs more frequently to the realistic conservative's mouth than any other. As D'Urfey uses it it is meant to damn absolutely first of all those Whig leaders who in the 1670's and 1680's were making dissent a potent political weapon, then those dissenters (mostly in the City) of whom the weapon was being fashioned.

Ned Ward in Defense of the Established Order

D'Urfey was one of a number of second-string writers who partly for love and partly for money arranged themselves under the Tory banner. Somewhat more talented was Ned Ward, the "London Spy", who turned out a great many perishable satires. In imitation of Samuel Butler's Hudibras, a much imitated poem in the last few decades of the Seventeenth and the first few decades of the Eighteenth Century, Ward wrote a satire which he called Vulgus Britannicus or, The British Hudibras (1684). The occasion for this piece was a London disorder in which the mob burned
down a Low Church chapel. But Ward does not write his satire in order to pillory only the mob. His object is, rather, to ridicule both it and its victims—the non-conformists. For Ward, like D'Urfey and Roger L'Estrange and John Oldham, and like even John Dryden, makes no nice distinctions between various kinds of opposition; thus he lumps together as potential enemies of the established order the city mob, which was itself hostile to non-conformism, and the City non-conformists. Of course Ward's dislike of the mob introduces no new theme in English satiric literature, nor does his anti-puritan bias. His manner of expressing those feelings helps define, however, one of the characteristics of realistic conservative satire. Without anatomizing the nature of either the mob or the new middle class, without relating them to any conceptual scheme such as the great chain of being or Elizabethan degree—without, in short, betraying any awareness of the complexity of social organization, Ward lashes out at those groups that stand outside the state-Church-land complex. For Ward, as for most of the realistic conservative satirists, the battle lines are clearly drawn; the task of identifying what is to be conserved and from whom it is to be defended does not need to be undertaken at all. Realistic conservative satire moves directly and univocally. Thus it seldom makes use of irony, which is indirect and multivocal. In dynamic conservative satire,
on the other hand, irony is everywhere in evidence, is indeed the ruling mode.

In *Vulgus Britannicus* Ward's method is one of sustained narrative. On the whole Ward tells his story well, although he is overly given to digressing. Thus he stops his narrative at one point in order to deliver himself of an attack on the London city watch, first apologizing for the break in the narrative:

I therefore hope with all Submission, 'Twill not amount to a Digression; If by the way I give a Sketch, Of a true-Smoak-dry'd City Watch. (p. 99)

The Sketch itself is quite good in its way—Ward's specialty was local color—but it contributes nothing either directly or indirectly to the satire which is the poem's reason for being.

When he does settle down to the business at hand Ward reveals an unlimited capacity for invective; his idea of satirizing an opponent, like D'Urfey's, is simply to throw as much dirt at him as quickly as he can for as long as his arm holds out. Here he is in a characteristic description of the London mob:

'Twas then the very Dregs or Arse Of all the Jarring Universe, Spew'd out of Alleys, Jayls and Garrets, Grown sturdy with Neckbeef and Carrots; Some liquor'd well with Foggy Ale, Others with Glorious Mild and Stale; Informers, Lab'rous, Brothel-Keepers, Pimps, Panders, Thieves and Chimney-Sweepers, And all the rest oth' Heath'nish Race
That do our Grand Processions grace;
More Mad, worse Savage Brutes at best,
Than the Wild Herd the Devil possest
And more portentous when they rise,
Than blazing Comets in the Skies,
Unletter'd, Rascally and Base,
A Kingdom's Danger and Disgrace,
The High-born Traitor's Noisy Tools,
Govern'd by neither Laws or Rules. (p.5)

Invective was certainly no novelty in the satire of Ward's time; among the ancients Juvenal and Persius had made particular use of it, while Cleveland, Marvell, and Oldham, to name just three from among Ward's great predecessors, had relied greatly on it. And Cleveland, Marvell, and Oldham, just as does Ward, fall short of the first rank of satirists very largely because of the manner and degree of their reliance on invective. Invective as Juvenal uses it (and as Joseph Hall wrote it in the late Sixteenth and early Seventeenth Centuries) is a powerful satiric weapon; in the hands of such realistic conservatives as Ward, however, it is usually unproductive for the reasons that the passage I have just quoted is unproductive. In the first place Ward's proliferation of abusive terms is amusing enough but does more to display its author's virtuosity than to make believable the assorted villains Ward would have us condemn. After a certain point the law of diminishing returns sets in, and the law seems to me to begin operating about halfway through Ward's lines: the characterization of the mob as "Unletter'd, Rascally and Base" is hardly necessary, since
everything that we have already been shown concerning the
mob has enabled us to pass that judgment on it. Again, to
degrade your enemy, by means of invective, to the level of
the animal is a time-honored satiric method and very often
an extremely effective one. However, there are certainly
better ways of doing it than simply tossing out the epithets
"Savage Brutes" and "Wild Herd"—Pope's transformation of
"Sporus" into a "vile painted thing" bears witness to that.21
(In his satiric verse Andrew Marvell turned invective to as
little account as did Ward; relying on it for too many of
his effects, in such satires as "An Historical Poem" and
"Advice to a Painter," he overshoots the mark by far.)

Ward's harsh strictures against the lawless and unruly
mob are little if at all different from those of Juvenal
or any one of a hundred satiric practitioners who came be­
fore the neo-classical period—the realistic conservative
is, as a rule, only too faithful to the conventions he
follows. What Ward has to say in Vulgus Britannicus about
the non-conformists, however, could have been said only
in the Seventeenth or the Eighteenth Century. Having already
labelled them a faction—a term he applies as well to
the mob—he then proceeds to describe them in these terms:

In e'ery Coffee-House Pro and Con;
Where Whigs of e'ery sort and size,
Began aloud to Tyrannize;
Some grave old Cits Nurs'd up in Trade,
Bettwixt the Church and Meeting bred;
Amphibious Christians who can run
To either, but be true to none;
Whose Dealings long have prov'd too plain,
They scarce know any God but Gain;
That Gold's the Standard of their Faith;
And Int'rest their Celestial Path. (p.139)

This passage is interesting for two reasons. First, because it is indicative of the kind of indiscriminate lumping together of the heterodox that, as I have already observed, the realistic conservative satirists are prone to engage in. Here they are called Whigs, but they might just as well have been designated saints or puritans. The Ned Wards make no distinctions worth mentioning among various kinds of dissent; to be outside the charmed circle of Church-Tory-King is to be guilty of a wilful perversion of the Good.

The second interesting aspect of the passage is the commercial imagery associated with the Whig dissenters. Over and over again in neo-classical satire the non-conformists have flung at them the gold pieces that supposedly sum up their political and religious principles. On this matter of non-conformist commercialism the realistic and dynamic conservative satirists are in agreement; only the Addisonian satirists, along with "free-lance" satirists like Mandeville, abstain. In an article on some of the antecedents of Swift's Tale of a Tub C. M. Webster has very carefully documented the reproaches hurled at the Puritans in English satire;22 and the one with the greatest staying power is that the puritans are the rankest
hypocrites, worshipping not the Christian God but the gold they are supposed to be so adept at securing. Ward, then, is following a well-trodden path when he goes in pursuit of the commercially successful dissenters. The trouble is that in Vulgus Britannicus it is a path which leads nowhere in particular, since it is not worked into the total structure of the poem. Moreover Ward's way is so much like that of the satirists who have taken the path before him as to create the suspicion that he is probably more familiar with its lay-out than he is with the look of contemporary dissent; the latter had certainly undergone considerable change between the 1580's when it had provoked Thomas Nashe to satire and the 1680's when Ward wrote Vulgus Britannicus, but you would hardly know it from reading Ward on dissenters. There is indeed a distressing sameness to the satiric punishment handed out to the middle-class non-conformists by neo-classical realistic conservatives: Oldham on this subject sounds much like L'Estrange who sounds much like D'Urfey who sounds much like Ward.
able to discover a great many techniques for tormenting the unorthodox that were beyond D'Urfey and Ward. For another thing Brown was a more conscious craftsman than most of the fraternity. For a third thing, when he turns to satire he displays a mind considerably more aware of the complexities of man and society than does Ward. Brown is hardly given to philosophical speculation on the nature of the "evil" he confronts in his satire; nevertheless, he is keenly aware of its network of sources, religious, political, social, and psychological, and very deft at catching off a surface portrait (usually quite skillful) of the carrier of evil. If he does not go more than an inch or two deeper than D'Urfey or Ward, he ranges hundreds of miles wider than they do.

Brown on dissenters is probably at his best in the chapter of his Amusements Serious and Comical (1700) entitled "A Presbyterian Meeting-House." In it he makes a direct attack on the famous (or notorious) Presbyterian minister Daniel Burgess, then moves from personalities to the realm of 'ideas.' There he arraigns the Presbyterians for being concupiscent, hypocritical, dissonant (in their singing), and interested only in money. Even the strained interpretations of the Bible that the Presbyterian ministers indulge in, he says, have a monetary end:
But this [the preacher "racking" his text] brings in money, and money buys lands, and land is an amusement they all desire, in spite of their hypocritical cant....If it were not for the sake of earthly comforts they would not be so conversant with heaven in their pulpits; but heaven's their traffic, and why should they spare a commodity which costs them nothing, yet brings them in so good a return?23

Now this is not appreciably different in kind from the Ned Ward approach to the subject, but it has a fine edge to it that is noticeably absent from Ward's satire. The cumulative effect in the first sentence of money...land...amusement, the deliberate balancing of earthly and heaven, and the nicely executed commercial metaphor of the last sentence—all these show a conscious artistry that distinguishes Brown from the lesser satirists; most of them operate under the wrong-headed belief that to be effective in satire one must dissemble one's art---in fact, must get as close to a "natural" state as literature permits of. This is a conception that I shall examine at greater length when I turn to the relationship between rhetoric and ideology.

Sometimes in his construction of a series of antitheses Brown shows himself straining too hard after the polished. Such is the case in the chapter of the Amusements Serious and Comical that he devotes to the Quakers. Having accused those people of not only trading and fornicating among themselves, but marrying also---their
matrimony, he says, is but "whoring with a witness"—he concludes: "Their religion, indeed, seems chiefly in their clothes, and so they have more need of tailors than teachers; for, they are a congregation without teachers; a church without sacraments; a religion without worship; formality without meaning; men without manners, and Christians without baptism." The method here strongly resembles that of the character writers, those past masters of antithesis. What lies within the folds of the method, so to speak, is a strong sense of the satirist's disdain for the social wrongness of dissent. Dogma does not interest Brown here or anywhere else; it is the sacraments, about which there should be no question among right-thinking men, that concern him. "Men without manners"—in the neo-classical age that says infinitely more in the way of reproof than it does in our own day.

So much of the resentment against the dissenter and the parvenu (ordinarily the two are synonymous) takes the form of strictures not on their wicked religious practices, their twisted politics, or their evil money-making, but on their gross social improprieties. The conservative is almost always a great respecter of the proprieties, since they not only represent the general, reasonable sense of the community made tangible, they also act as a link with the past; tradition, which is at the heart of the conservative
ethos, can have meaning and vitality only when men observe both the accepted religious and social sacraments. Even intellectual transgressions, for somewhat the same reason, come under the neo-classical satirist's interdict as much for their violations of decorum as for any other reason. I think that all of these factors operate in this passage from brown's "A Presbyterian Meeting-House":

'Tis true indeed, when the Holderforth has played the spiritual buffoon for two or three hours, he gives you a dessert to his harange, or what he calls a prayer, that is, a rhapsody of stuff without head or tail; for had it method, order, connexion, or sense, it would be exploded under the notion of a form of prayer, a goblin as frightful as the whore of Babylon, that has furnished many a zealous Scots Mass John with an exercise for his lungs, when sense and good doctrine are not at hand. But though they are such enemies to popery, yet they sympathize in praying in an unknown tongue, or at least in a jargon neither understands; for sense in their prayer, as well as in their sermon, would savour too much of human invention, and not give latitude enough for enthusiasm and cant.25

Addison and Steele placed an even higher premium on manners than did the realistic conservative satirists thus far looked at. Yet they dealt with transgressions in a much gentler manner. In their satire they never rely on invective. In fact they use the satiric conventions which are the realistic conservative's stock in trade hardly at all. Responding to a new kind of audience and conceiving of the purpose of satire differently than the realistic conservatives did, the Addisonian satirists fashioned a
satiric art of their own, one which owed little to the main stream of satire. But before I look directly at Addisonian satire I wish to examine the relationship between rhetoric and ideology which existed within all three categories of neo-classical satire. Having several times touched on this relationship as it existed in realistic conservative satire, it is with this category that I begin the examination.

Rhetoric and Ideology

Rhetorical strategies, perhaps especially in the creation of satire, should not be ends in themselves. Rather they should subserve the satires, which are, after all, works of art, that they appear in. And they can do that best by not directing attention to themselves and then containing that attention. One writes satire not to show off his ability to handle various conventions but to expose existing vice and folly. To do that one must display an exact knowledge of the world outside satire, a knowledge which seems to be matched by genuine concern for man in society. Exhibiting this knowledge and concern, satire of all literary forms comes closest, I believe, to stepping out of the bounds of art; it deals---at its best---so directly with the human situation that it is likely to appear rather an extension of that situation than a remaking of it.

Something like this view of satire may very well have
underlain the conception of satire as a rough hewn art, one that is less subject to the rules of art than other forms. As Dryden put it in the famous lines of his poem "To the Memory of Mr. Oldham,"

What could advancing age have added more?  
It might (what nature never gives the young)  
Have taught the numbers of thy native tongue.  
But Satire needs not those, and wit will shine  
Thro the harsh cadence of a rugged line.

The convention attendant on this view of satire has not, I believe, generally been conducive to the writing of first-rate satire. Joseph Hall, who was guided by it, wrote what I consider excellent satiric poetry. But John Marston did not. And neither did Andrew Marvell, who in his satiric verse showed himself to be a realistic conservative no more talented than either D'Urfey or Ward. (Marvell's satiric prose, notably The Rehearsal Transprosed, is another matter, one which is outside the scope of the present chapter.) Where in Hall's rough-hewn, harsh cadenced lines rack-renting and enclosure and a hundred other injustices of his time seem almost to leap out at you, to confront you immediately and urgently so that convention and technique are forgotten, in both Marston's and Marvell's poetic satires the governing conventions are always very much in evidence. Indeed they are so much so that the effect which their satire sometimes secures is of a form that has gone looking for follies and vices it can accommodate. Particu-
larly is that true of Marston's satire.

Marston and Hall are not neo-classical satirists, although the difference between their satiric purposes and techniques and those of the artists who wrote after the Restoration is not considerable. Marvell, at any rate, does belong to the period in which this study is interested, and the deficiency I have ascribed to his poetic satire applies also to the work of most of those realistic conservative satirists who came after him. Certainly it is true of Oldham and L'Estrange, both of whom write harsh satire (the one in verse, the other in prose) which betrays an impatience with form and a desperate desire to be at the enemy's throat without having to undergo the discipline of art. So too with D'Urfey and Ward; indignant, forced to write because of the evil which they see spreading over society, and inspired by the defense of virtue undertaken by preceding satirists—all attitudes recognized by rhetorical conventions—they conceive of themselves as being independent of the usual rules of art because of the urgency of their mission. But a self-conscious freedom from the restrictions of art quickly becomes subjection to a new and less productive tyranny; and convention hardens into dogma, which does not provide a very firm platform from which to denounce the foolish and evil. Especially not when the denunciation is supposedly based on close-up
observation of the ways of the fool and the evil-doer. What happens to realistic conservative satire, then, is that in looking more to the satires and satiric conventions of the past than to the state of things in the present it turns into a series of stereotypes, it becomes a literary exercise rather than the impassioned defense of a way of life that it purports to be. Because Ward's and D'Urfey's satires look so much like Marston's and Cleveland's they are more interesting as documents to be studied in connection with an evolving literature than as weapons in a once bitter fight whose issues are still of vital importance.

Addisonian satire may occasionally bow in the direction of Juvenal and Horace (the latter particularly), but beyond that it pays almost no attention to the rhetorical conventions of satire. Instead it develops certain techniques, or at least a kind of tone, which are to become conventions by the time of *The World* and *The Connoisseur* and a swarm of other *Spectator*-like periodicals which proliferated about the middle of the century. David Hume, writing in 1741 about the Ancients-Modern controversy, said that those who defend established opinion are always dogmatic and arrogant, those who attack it gentle and moderate because they cannot otherwise obtain a hearing. And that is the case with Addisonian satire, which almost always chooses the gentle way instead of the wrathful one of realistic conservatism. Of
course the Addisonian satirists are not so much attacking established institutions as they are trying to displace long accepted values which having been defeated in the political and economic areas still maintain pre-eminence in the areas of education and culture. Nevertheless, I think that Hume's generalization accounts at least in part for the moderation of Addisonian satire, just as it offers a partial explanation for the vehemence of realistic conservative satire. Thus with both varieties of satire the rhetorical reflects the ideological.

But in neither case is the rhetorical-ideological relationship worked out as well as it might be. Realistic conservative satire, as I have observed, becomes so enmeshed in rhetorical stratagems that its ideological aims become blunted. Addisonian satire, on the one hand desirous of obtaining a hearing from the guardians of entrenched opinion and on the other hand wishing to be both heard and heeded by the new middle classes for which it speaks, is so moderate as hardly to be satiric. Moreover it limits itself by conducting an attack on peripheral rather than on central socio-economic problems.

Dynamic conservative satire does not become a slave of the rhetorical conventions it draws on, nor does it shy away from the critical issues of its time. Embodied in Gulliver's Travels, in A Modest Proposal, in The Dunciad,
and in The Memoires of Martinus Scriblerus, as in most works of dynamic conservative satire, is the implicit appeal to recognize the virtuousness of their creators. Each of these works, besides, suggests that the satirist has been forced to satire by his vision of evil rampant in the universe. Dynamic conservative satire is indignant and impassioned, but its indignation never seems worked up for the occasion. Because the Modest Proposal, to take one example, does not explicitly link itself with the whole of satiric tradition, does not invoke past satiric masters, and does not go into an ecstasy of virtuous feeling, the indignation which marks every line of it seems spontaneous and unforced; it arises, moreover, not from the satirist's contemplation of the role satire has played in the past and self-examination of the reasons for writing, but from analysis of actual evils in a world very much with the artist. The satirist's indignation, then, is evoked by the folly and the evil of which he is a witness; and we who read his testimony are convinced of the rightness of it only insofar as he makes so vivid the evil which has aroused him that it seems to us to cry out for condemnation. This is certainly what Swift's Modest Proposal does. Reading it, even at this distance, we are angered by the human stupidity and callousness which we see to have produced a horrible situation. And we are at the same time moved by our sight of that situation.
We are angered and we are moved—great satire never evokes directionless anger, anger for the sake of anger—because we believe what Swift wants us to, that precious human lives are not commodities to be bought and sold, and are not symbols to be intellectually manipulated. We believe this because the action that the artist imitates has immediacy and urgency and seems to confront us directly, the rhetorical devices being as carefully kept out of sight as are the hands of the puppet-master. Thus the Modest Proposal does what realistic conservative satire self-consciously attempts and almost invariably fails to do—strikes its reader as an extension of the human situation. And it does it because by reason of Swift's art it seems to step out of the bounds of art. The continuing attacks on Swift (and on Pope too) that ignore the art in order to down a "misanthropic", or "cynical", or "pessimistic" artist bear unwilling testimony, I believe, to the successful manner in which Swift put his art to the service of his ideology. Not that ideology takes up where the art leaves off, the latter existing for the sake of the former, but that the two are wedded in the kind of marriage which only great art can make possible.

Addisonian Satire

Addisonian satire never attracts the kind of attention I have just spoken of; it arouses no desire to strike
through the mask at the artist. And it certainly does not evoke cries of misanthropy or charges of distilling hatred of all of society's political and religious institutions.

Both Addison and Steele are keenly interested in the religious and political questions that their predecessors had been preoccupied with, but they are even more interested in the dancing and dueling and reading and conversational habits of the predominantly middle-class audience for which they write. Infinitely more relaxed and genial than writers like Swift and Pope, Addison and Steele best represent one extremely important side of their age: that which was anxious to submerge all ideological differences and get on with the job of strengthening England's economy and smoothing out her culture. We have seen in the writings of the political arithmeticians and of Mandeville and Defoe a paramount concern with the first part of that task: in the *Tatler* and the *Spectator* we witness preeminently the second part of it.

Smoothing out the culture involved many things, but most of all it involved educating the rapidly expanding middle classes to the point where they might enjoy the social advantages that had hitherto been preempted by a small ruling class. Literature and the drama were certainly among those advantages, and Addison and Steele did yeoman work to make both available to those who socially and
politically were newly enfranchised. But the story had been told many times. This part of it only bears repeating here, that Addison and Steele saw the problem not only as one of changing the taste of the middle classes, but also as making literature conform to the essential values of those classes. So the form that their satire takes is consciously determined by a socio-economic belief. Of course the problem was made somewhat easier by the fact that they themselves—particularly Steele—shared a great many of the bourgeois values. Surely these values were operative when Steele wrote his moralistic comedies; when Addison wrote his criticism of Paradise Lost; and when the two of them together produced the great monuments to their literary talent, The Tatler and The Spectator. And in writing The Tatler and Spectator papers they pursued always a policy of moderation, of sweetness and light, which are not the qualities most conducive to the creation of great satire.

In fact the very designation "satire" for what Addison and Steele do in those Tatlers and Spectators where they are attempting to illustrate the skittishness of politically partisan ladies or the aesthetic blindness of a type of book collector (Tom Folio) or the absurdity of the man who neglects his family while greedily drinking in as much foreign news as he can—this designation is of doubtful preciseness. Perhaps it would be more accurate to
describe Addison's and Steele's exposures of folly as banter. Banter is a method of ridiculing foolish behavior which does not take itself or what it ridicules as seriously as satire does.  

To avoid further multiplying categories, however, I shall continue to speak of Addison's and Steele's writings as satire; banter is, after all, subsumed by satire.

Ordinarily Addison and Steele neither tried to blast the fool loose from his moorings, a la D'Urfey and Ward; or to reduce to complete absurdity the fool's doctrine, after the fashion of Marvell, Butler, and Swift; or to concentrate on folly a withering blast of wit in the Popeian fashion. Instead their method generally is to settle on a type (fortune-hunter, impractical visionary, etc.), good-naturedly exaggerate the characteristics of the type, then illustrate dramatically the by-ways into which he is likely to stray. All the time the reader is completely in the writer's confidence, is made to feel that the aberration being exposed to his view is not of really world-shaking import, and that anyway it is one which he himself would never be guilty of. When either Addison or Steele pokes fun at the bourgeoisie that fun is never malice-tinged and it always has a moral lurking just behind it.

Then, it is not the middle-classes at which Addison and Steele aim their sharpest satiric darts. One of the
most vigorous satiric attacks Addison ever mounted was the one he directed against the fox-hunting, Tory-loving, bigotted country squire. Much of the vigor of this Freeholder essay (#22) is drained off by Addison himself when he signals his satiric intention at the very start:

For the honour of his Majesty, and the safety of his government, we cannot but observe, that those who have appeared the greatest enemies to both, are of that rank of men who are commonly distinguished by the title of fox-hunters. As several of these have had no part of their education in cities, camps, or courts, it is doubtful whether they are of greater ornament or use to the nation in which they live. It would be an everlasting reproach to politics, should such men be able to overturn an establishment which has been formed by the wisest laws, and is supported by the ablest heads. The wrong notions and prejudices which cleave to many of these country gentlemen, who have always lived out of the way of being better informed, are not easy to be conceived by a person who has never conversed with them.

What follows this diatribe is an amusing enough portrait of the fox-hunter. In this essay Addison is doing what the realistic conservative satirists so often do, making themselves right with God and Country before going on the attack. The Addisonian satirist is not a whit less attached to the existing institutions than is the realistic conservative. But where the latter would regard the fox-hunting country gentleman as one of the solid pillars of the state, the Addisonian, whose socio-economic orientation lies elsewhere, sees him as just the opposite. The fox-hunting squire is a useless relic of the past; the present belongs to those who
engage in useful activity like commerce. Here in one of the Sir Roger de Coverley papers are the opposing forces:

Will Wimble's is the case of many a younger brother of a great family, who had rather see their children starve like gentlemen than thrive in a trade or profession that is beneath their quality. This humour fills several parts of Europe with pride and beggary. It is the happiness of a trading nation, like ours, that the younger sons, though incapable of any liberal art or profession, may be placed in such a way of life as may perhaps enable them to vie with the best of their family.

Addison developed a theory of satire that accords perfectly with his own practice and with Steele's as well. In an early number of the Spectator he made this promise:

I promise...never to draw a faulty character which does not fit at least a thousand people, or to publish a single paper that is not written in the spirit of benevolence and with a love to mankind.

Traditionally the satirist has disclaimed personal satire, but Addison is almost alone in the early 18th Century in actually making good on his disclaimer. And while not alone in his espousal of benevolence, he is far removed from the overwhelming majority of his satiric predecessors and his great contemporaries when he makes benevolence a condition of satire. Of a piece with his belief in benevolence in satire is what he says in Spectator 219 about ridicule:

If the talent of ridicule were employed to laugh men out of vice and folly, it might be of some use to the world; but instead of this, we find that it is generally made use of to laugh men out of virtue and good sense, by attacking every thing that is solemn and serious, decent and praiseworthy in human life.
Addison is being perfectly consistent, then, when in *Spectator* 209 he makes an invidious comparison between the old Greek satirist Simonides (whom he identifies as the author of probably the oldest satire extant) and Juvenal and Boileau. The Greek writer, says Addison, in satirizing women had meant to amend the faults of only "some of the lower part of the Sex, and not those who have been refined by a Polite Education," while both Juvenal and Boileau in their satires on women had failed to do justice to the "valuable part of the sex." Turning to Boileau alone he then makes this criticism:

Such levelling Satyrs are of no use to the world, and for this reason I have often wondered how the French Author above mentioned, who was a Man of exquisite Judgment, and a Lover of Virtue, could think Human Nature a proper Subject for Satyr in another of his celebrated Pieces, which is called The Satyr upon Man. What Vice or Frailty can a Discourse correct, which censures the whole Species alike, and endeavours to shew by some superficial Strokes of Wit, that Brutes are the most Excellent Creatures of the two? A Satyr should expose nothing but what is corrigible, and make a due Discrimination between those who are, and those who are not the proper objects of it.

If Addison's precept that satire should expose nothing but what is corrigible had been followed, there would have been no *Gulliver's Travels*. But then Mr. Spectator probably would have disapproved of that angry book just as so many of Swift's contemporaries and most of his Nineteenth Century successors did. Indeed the whole effect of Addison's and
Steele's writing, "practical" and theoretical, was in the direction of making satire gentler, of making it mild enough so as not to offend even the thinnest-skinned bourgeois.

That is why Louis Bredvold speaks so slightingly of Addison when he comes to describe the mood of the Tory satirists. Even as these artists were at work, Bredvold writes, "they were challenged by what seemed a more modern spirit, a more sympathetic and comforting way of looking at human nature." Strongest in Steele but present too in Addison ("more subtly pervasive" there, says Bredvold), this spirit flourished in Whig literary circles and was to prevail everywhere. Bredvold, quoting Spectator 381 where Addison expresses a preference for cheerfulness over mirth and asserts that only two things, guilt and atheism, can "reasonably deprive us of this Cheerfulness of Heart," makes this final comment on Addison:

Admitting that Addison does himself some injustice in this paper, granting that a perverse generation, perhaps of Tory fox-hunters, might really drive him at times to what Mark Twain called a state of mind bordering on impatience, the reader cannot but remark how perfectly this celebration of cheerfulness betrays Addison's limitations, his complacency, his lack of penetration. This is, indeed, the 'serene, peaceful state, of being a fool among knaves'. There is an abysmal division between men of this cast of mind and the satirists.

So Bredvold would absolutely deny the title satirist to Addison (and by implication to Steele and the Whig writers who clustered around the two men). I have already suggested
that banter would perhaps better describe the Addison-Steele efforts at dissuading from folly and vice. But the fact remains that what the two men were doing was, in essence, what those to whom the name satirist does unmistakeably belong had been doing—exposing folly by means of ridicule. The banter of The Spectator, etc., represented not a complete break with the aims and means of satire, rather a transformation of both. Addison and Steele took what had traditionally been a rip-snorting, fire-eating literary medium and made it gentle enough for the most sensitive of middle-class ladies. Their new-style satire could pass muster any time the hoary questions were asked, Is this piece of writing suitable for family consumption? Can even my young daughter read it?

Conservatism and Centrality

Addisonian satire, the bourgeois satire of accommodation, is not in any way radical. In form it represents a departure from the traditional, but in the direction of increased centrality. By that term I mean simply this: the satirist's attempt to establish himself at the center of his society, from which center he can look with jaundiced eye on all those peripheral (to his view, that is) persons and ideas which threaten the center.

I think a characteristic of all neo-classical satire, because all neo-classical satire is in some way conserva-
tive, is that it strives after centrality. Possibly this more than anything else distinguishes it from the satire of later periods when the satirist, while still attempting to set up his values as the norm—the satirist must inevitably do just that—did not attempt to fix himself at the center. To get there he must be, or seem to be, the representative spokesman for a considerable, homogeneous group; he must not, under any circumstances, appear as a solitary, a "sport" waving his own homemade banner. Blake does not do exactly that, yet always in his satire he raises his voice in the anguished cry of a man who stands alone. Burns nowhere in his satires speaks for the Church or the new middle classes or the old landed aristocracy or a humanistic ideal which he has inherited from a long line of satiric forebears. And Byron preeminently fashions for himself the role of lone wolf on the prowl for whatever folly attracts his roving satiric eye. These men, even Byron, all believe strongly in certain values which they feel are threatened and which they want to conserve. But the mere desire to conserve values does not make one a conservative. If that were the case the term would be meaningless, since it would be applicable to every man that ever drew breath. And judged by the working definitions of conservatism that have been at least implicit in this chapter, neither Blake nor Burns nor Byron is a conservative satirist.
The realistic conservatives, D'Urfey and Ward for example, try to achieve centrality through two seemingly contradictory methods: by portraying themselves as men of good will fighting a losing battle against a sea of wickedness that they feel absolutely impelled to battle; and, what we have already seen them do, by angrily consigning to outer darkness all those who fail to conform. Addison and Steele eschew these conventions for a very good reason: always they operate on the assumption that theirs are representative voices speaking to a mass of good citizens and good men who need only read about some deviation from good sense to mend their own ways. Evil can not be said to exist in this universe. Banter, never moving below the level of the social, directs itself against the timely and corrigible, leaving almost untouched the timeless and incorrigible.

Looked at in this way Addisonian satire is, after its fashion, entirely conservative. It does not conjure up a vision of society as chaotic or even terribly confused. It does not contain within it any powerful indictment of the present, or any unorthodox programme for the future. It never ventures very far beyond the present, which it professes to serve faithfully. If it believes in man's capacity to do a great many things that have not been done— in short, if it believes in progress—it is in step with its times. Rather than being a bridge between the satire
of the realistic conservatives I have discussed and that of the dynamic conservative satirists to whom I shall turn in a moment, this "new satire" is a detour that turns into a permanent and very important highway. Addison's and Steele's satire has no part of the toughness and pessimism that realistic conservatism shares with dynamic.

Arbuthnot's Satire: Genial Dynamic Conservatism

John Arbuthnot is very much like Addison in temperament. Urbane, judicious, moderate, he never gets unduly excited either in his private or his literary life. His satire for the most part is genial, without any sharply cutting edges. Still Arbuthnot's orientation in the most important respects differs markedly from Addison's. Where Arbuthnot acts most independently of the Scriblerus group, as in his History of John Bull, he comes closest to the Addisonian satiric ideal. Where he is most strongly influenced by the Scriblerian attitudes, as in the Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus, his affinity with "Addisonianism" is negligible, his resemblance to the principal dynamic conservative satirists, Pope, Gay, and Swift, very close indeed.

(There is of course the problem of just how far Arbuthnot's responsibility for the Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus, a communal enterprise, extends. According to the two best qualified authorities on the matter, Lester Beattie and
Charles Kerby-Miller, the major share of the credit is due Arbuthnot, although Swift certainly had a great deal to do with the satire. For purposes of this study, then, I have chosen to regard Arbuthnot as creator of Martinus Scriblerus. The Scriblerus club, whose most important members—from a literary point of view—were Arbuthnot, Gay, Pope, and Swift grew up under the auspices of the Tory ministry of which Harley and St. John were the leaders. Although it was something other than a politically partisan organization, the Scriblerian outlook was generally Tory, High Church, and anti-Hanoverian. Given his membership in this group it is hardly surprising that Arbuthnot should have displayed in his satire a world-view at bottom quite different from Addison's.

The History of John Bull exhibits the temperateness I have attributed to Arbuthnot. The Scots (Arbuthnot was one himself), French, Spanish, and Dutch; Marlborough and the Earl of Oxford; Grub Street hacks and lawyers; dissenters and Catholics all come in for a measure of censure, yet nowhere is the tone of the satire unduly harsh. If anything, Arbuthnot is so mild in this work as almost to vitiate his intended effect. Allowing, as he does, the reader to feel that nothing or nobody whom the satire aims at is guilty of any really deep-seated crime, Arbuthnot ends by letting his foes off too lightly. In this respect he is close to
the Addisonian standard. But Addison is usually more effective than the Arbuthnot of *John Bull* because his satiric targets are professedly not serious menaces to the values the writer is defending. Arbuthnot, on the contrary, too often tries to dispose of by *John Bull* laughter what could only be destroyed by the far more corrosive and penetrating laughter of a Swift.

The trouble, I think, is the calm certainty with which Arbuthnot takes up his central position as defender of the "plain Church of England" represented in the satire as *John Bull*'s mother. The satirist here suffers from a lack of *saeva indignatio*, the result being that while we are amused at the follies he points out to us we are made neither alarmed nor indignant. We are moved to laughter, but not beyond it, which is where the satirist, as distinguished from the comic writer, would have us move. If only the nation will stand by its plain old mother (the Church), Arbuthnot seems always to say, all will be well for England. As against her sweet reasonableness there is the madcap extremism of Jack, who stands for Dissent, and the wiliness, corruption and hypocrisy of Signiora Bubonia, whom the artist identifies in a footnote as "The Woman of Babylon, the Pope". Between these two is a vague alliance, Arbuthnot, as had numerous satirists before him, suggests.

Arbuthnot is being entirely conventional, in the fashion
of the realistic conservatives, when he sets up as guardian of the Church against threatening factions. But on another point he departs from satiric tradition—in John Bull he never cries woe, nor poses as honest man fallen among a world of thieves and forced by his conscience to attempt through satire to exercise the world's evil. This is surely one of the least valid of the conventions that we have seen the realistic conservatives adhere to. The satirist convinces nobody of his quintessential goodness by stridently proclaiming it. Nor is he ordinarily a convincing witness against a particular form of evil when he constantly wars against an abstract Evil. In John Bull Evil is made up of a considerable number of firm, hard particulars, and these particulars so cohere that the artist who has set them down emerges as a man with a generalized understanding of society and of how wide a sweep across society Evil makes. Because he does evince this understanding the satirist can convince us that he is guardian of the whole society, which he wants to keep from being fragmented. Both the realistic and the dynamic conservative satirist want always to be regarded in that way; however the former rarely convinces us that he should be. Dryden is a notable exception, but then Dryden is the exception to almost every adverse judgement I have passed on realistic conservative satire.

Another satiric convention that Arbuthnot wisely
dispenses with is the Golden Age convention: he never indulges in the purely literary practice of sighing for a Golden Age when all men were virtuous and society was uncorrupted. The dynamic conservatives generally, being tough-minded artists, shun that convention. So Arbuthnot in The History of John Bull, while indirectly positing an ideal society which is homogeneous, unfragmented, and embodies the older, non-commercial virtues, does not cry down trade and long for a return to a simpler, non-trading past. Instead, in the History England's dependence on foreign trade is recognized and her commercial policies in general are approved of. It is those things which threaten the simplicity of the economic arrangement that Arbuthnot scores. The conservative satirist (and I am referring now to both the realistic and the dynamic conservative; the two share much common socio-economic ground, even though the satire they build on it is so different) is at all times suspicious of middle-men, of such essentially parasitic creatures as stock-jobbers and entrepreneurs, of the nouveau riche generally. He has traditionally placed his faith in a clearly delineated hierarchy much like that of the Middle Ages, one with the farmer at its base, the land-owner and church functionary at its pinnacle, and artisans and necessary merchants in between. There is also room in this structure for the soldier, the doctor, and the lawyer, although the last named occupies what is at
best a shaky position in this universe built on productivity and a system of well-defined loyalties.

In *The History of John Bull* the machinations of the lawyer, which constantly ensnare John Bull and indeed provide the book with the title of one of its chapters ("The Pit of Law"), are one of Arbuthnot's primary targets. Certainly he had precedent enough for satirizing the legal profession, which almost every satirist on back to Juvenal had ridiculed, but his method has a solidity and a depth that is usually absent from the stereotyped satiric portrait of the lawyer. In *John Bull* the law, or rather the uses to which it is put through the chicanery and cupidity of lawyers, is more than a handy punching bag on which to work out one's satiric energy. It is a tangled undergrowth that continually impedes John Bull's efforts to live the simple, uncomplicated, common-sense life. It may not present itself as the grotesquely terrifying thing that law is in Kafka's fictional world; nevertheless in the allegorical world of Arbuthnot's creation it is a threat to the satirist's values and a menacing evil. Neither Ned Ward nor Addison could have conceived of legalism in this way. That Arbuthnot did is one mark of the important differences between him and both the realistic conservative and the Addisonian satirists.

Arbuthnot is a satirist of parts, not of wholes, lacking as he does the patience to work completely any vein he
may discover. He is, besides, deficient in organizational ability, which is very important in a work as long as *The History of John Bull*. But those parts that he takes sufficient pains with are often excellent, and I should like to quote one of them before moving on from the Scottish physician. Here he is in farewell praise (mock, of course) of Grub Street:

Adieu, persuasive eloquence! the quaint metaphor, the poignant irony, the proper epithet, and the lively simile are fled for ever! Instead of these, we shall have, I know not what! The illiterate will tell the rest with pleasure.31

Two pages before this he had praised Grub Street for singing "in soft pastorals" the "flames of pampered apprentices and coy cook maids," and for recording "the stratagems, the arduous exploits, and the nocturnal scalade of needy heroes, the terror of your peaceful citizens...."32

The *Beggar's Opera*: Dynamic Conservative Satire

John Gay built better than Arbuthnot and had more staying power, at least in *The Beggar's Opera*, with which we move into the heart of dynamic conservative satire. Gay's comic opera has both a sustained spirit and sustained movement lacking in *The History of John Bull*. It has too, in common with *John Bull* and the best of dynamic conservative satire, an astonishing boldness of dimension; practically the whole of English society is directly or indirectly caught in its wide-sweeping net. But where Arbuthnot's world is socially
and religiously structured, Gay's is built along prevailingly economic lines. These lines are so drawn that it is the moneyed middle class represented by Peachum and Lockit roughly represent, which is most sharply satirized. However Gay does not stop with bourgeois morality; in the Opera the aristocratic virtues fare little better than the bourgeois, and the proletarian ones no better than the aristocratic. Realistic conservatism, which rarely engages in the kind of economic "analysis" we find in The Beggar's Opera, never dreams of looking this closely at the class structure, much less of turning it upside down.

Gay never makes the mistake that we have seen the Ned Wards make, that of proclaiming himself the champion of the public interest---then castigating whatever groups seem to represent a threat, no matter how remote, to the ruling class. For one thing, that rhetorical strategy could not possibly work very well in drama. For another thing, to carry off the role of champion requires a kind of seriousness which is absent from Gay's artistic equipment. It is exactly by not taking himself too seriously that Gay keeps the social satire of the Beggar's Opera from going slack and, moreover, makes it a more punishing weapon than nine-tenths of the English satires which had preceded it.

Through his very lack of insistence Gay succeeds in creating the effect of himself as a detached observer who,
uncommitted to one particular group, can impartially satirize the activities of all groups. Yet not once in the *Beggar's Opera* does he give the impression of being outside in his detachment, of being aloof from the goings-on he satirically describes, by virtue of his adherence to an entirely different, superior ethos. By their knowing tone the jokes on sex, politics, and manners that interlard the play make it obvious that these are the insights of an insider. If this is a rhetorical strategy, it is one that does not constantly call itself to our attention. There we have one of the distinguishing characteristics of dynamic conservative satire: it draws less on the conventional rhetorical devices of satire than realistic conservatism does, and when it does draw on them manages to keep them well in the background. Put in another way, we are almost constantly aware of the machinery of realistic conservative satire, while with dynamic conservative satire we are much more aware of the finished satiric product than of the methods of production.

Inside but detached, Gay is able to do much more than hit in turn the mob, the middle class, and the upper-class, then run. He is in excellent striking position to hit at the one thing that uniting all three classes corrupts them all—the cash nexus. Because it corrupts the bourgeois most of all—Peachit and Lockum are certainly the worst, in a moral sense, of the *Beggar's Opera*’s bad lot—they
come in for Gay's sharpest censure. But because the censure is diffused the way it is, the bourgeois sharing it with the other elements that make up Gay's society, the Opera does succeed to a great degree in convincing that it is a non-partisan document.

**Pope as Social Critic**

Pope is generally recognized as superior to Gay as a satirist. Still as a critic of the social scene, outside of *The Rape of the Lock* and *The Dunciad*, he seems to me nowhere to create sustained social satire as effective as that of the *Beggar's Opera*. In satire after satire he is, like Gay, intent upon slashing the cash nexus which he sees replacing older, more meaningful networks of values. The trouble is that too often he dilutes his satire with what I can only describe as rhetorical whining, and that he tries too hard to create for himself the role of public defender. With considerably more skill than Ned Ward or Tom D'Urfey but using essentially the same means Pope labors in a number of satires at fixing for himself flawless credentials so that he may best expose a flawed society.

F. W. Bateson's commentary on the "Epistle to Bathurst" points up just how hard Pope did sometimes labor at that task. The epistle, says Bateson, displays an indignation with "the wicked capitalists of the City of London" that is "obviously second-hand and worked up for the occasion."
Bateson is correct, I believe, in calling the poem labored and lacking in spontaneity. Because these things are true of the Epistle, Pope's effort to convince us of how close he is to the wickedness he is attacking and of the intensity of his feelings about it is unsuccessful.

The Epistle does contain the excellently done portrait of Sir Balaam as well as several brilliantly executed individual passages; this one honeycombed by images of wealth suggests the hymn to gold that opens Ben Jonson's *Volpone*:

Blest paper-credit! last and best supply!  
That lends corruption lighter wings to fly!  
Gold imp'd by thee, can compass hardest things,  
Can pocket states, can fetch or carry Kings;  
A single leaf shall waft an Army o'er,  
Or ship off Senates to a distant shore;  
A leaf, like Sibyl's, scatter to and fro  
Our fates and fortunes, as the winds shall blow:  
Pregnant with thousands flits the Scrap unseen,  
And silent sells a King, or buys a Queen.  (69-78)

But as against the vividness of these ironic lines, which give money a life and meaning (and therefore a dangerous quality) that is absent from the rather helter-skelter financial imagery of most realistic conservative satire, we must put tepid lines like these:

The sense to value Riches, with the Art  
T'enjoy them, and the Virtue to impart,  
Not meanly, nor ambitiously pursued,  
Not sunk by sloth, nor raised by servitude;  
To balance Fortune by a just expense,  
Join with Economy, Magnificence;  
With Splendour, Charity; with Plenty, Health;  
O teach us BATHURST! yet unspoiled by wealth:  
That secret rare, between th'extremes to move  
Of mad Good-nature, and of mean Self-Love  (219-228)
The moral essay, in an honored tradition, combines the satiric and the non-satiric. But this passage, where Pope characteristically joins homage to a great noble with wholly conventional praise of the virtuous life, makes no contribution to the satire on misused wealth which is the chief purpose of the poem. The satirical parts of the Essay build toward the positives, of which the celebration of the golden mean Bathurst represents is the most important. The positives should in some way give added meaning to the satire, underline the necessity for its existence, and this the passage fails to do. Pope's parade of his virtuous qualities and well-placed friends is an abstract calling of attention to the satirist and the rhetorical conventions his satire makes use of, when we want rather to be shown, if not concrete follies and vices, at least concrete virtues and a concretely virtuous man.

Even worse is the pastoral-like tribute to the Man of Ross, whose praises Pope sings in lines that probably represent the poet's nadir:

But all our praises why should Lords engross?  
Rise, honest Muse! and sing the MAN of ROSS:  
Pleased Vaga echoes through her winding bounds,  
And rapid Severn hoarse applause resounds.  
Who hung with woods yon mountain's sultry brow?  
From the dry rock who bade the waters flow?  
Not to the skies in useless columns tost,  
Or in proud falls magnificently lost,  
But clear and artless, pouring through the plain  
Health to the sick, and solace to the swain.  
Whose Cause-way parts the vale with shady rows?
Whose Seats the weary Traveller repose? 
Who taught that heaven-directed spire to rise? 
'The MAN of Ross,' each lisping babe replies. 
Behold the Market-place with poor o'erspread! 
The MAN of Ross divides the weekly bread; 
He feeds yon Alms-house, neat, but void of state, 
Where Age and Want sit smiling at the gate; 
Him portioned maids, apprenticed orphans blest, 
The young who labour, and the old who rest. 
Is any sick? the MAN of ROSS relieves, 
Prescribes, attends, med'cine makes, and gives. 
Is there a variance? enter but his door, 
Balked are the Courts, and contest is no more. 
Despairing Quacks with curses fled the place, 
And vile Attorneys, now an useless race. (249-274)

It does not really matter that Pope never laid eyes on the saintly character he portrays. Nor that he probably never saw such an Alms-house as the one he describes. What does matter is that his vision, when he turns it from those things he considers evil to those he wants us to keep in mind as inspiring his pursuit of evil, is worse than defective, it is downright false. From the honest muse which is asked to rise, to "yon mountain's sultry brow," to the lisping babes, to the holy Man of Ross himself all is a tissue of stale images that plead with us to believe in their sincerity. The dynamic conservative generally expresses concern for the poor whom he thinks society has a responsibility for and aligns himself with those who, like the Man of Ross, alleviate human suffering; but he does not, as Pope does here and elsewhere, wet the pages of his satire with his tears and insist continually that everyone examine his heart to see how righteous it is.
In at least one other place Pope indulges his taste for the false pastoral. (I am not damning the pastoral as such, only the use Pope puts it to in satire. Gay blends the pastoral with the satiric in his "Shepherd's Week," but the result is a heightening of the satiric—which is the effect that Pope himself achieves when he calls on the pastoral in The Rape of the Lock.) It is in these lines of the Imitations of Horace, Epistle I, i:

Here, wisdom calls: 'Seek virtue first,' be bold.
As Gold to Silver, Virtue is to Gold.
And then let Virtue follow, if she will.' (77-80)

Pope certainly has the moral right to damn London for its commercialism and venality, but he does not have the satiric right to be so naive about it, to posit a snow-white country as opposed to a coal-black city. At least Cowper, when he proclaims that "God made the country and man made the town," makes his country believable: it contains not one lisping babe.

Almost always when Pope emphasizes the positive values on which he is basing his satire he goes wrong. That is as true of his attempts to borrow prestige from the great as it is of his use of the pastoral. His invoking of Bathurst in the Epistle to Bathurst, his praise of the Earl of Burlington in the epistle on the use of riches, his application to Arbuthnot, in the Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot, for a letter of recommendation—all these may be rhetorical de-
vices sanctioned by a convention that stretches back to Juvenal and Horace and intended to provide their creator with the necessary (for satiric purposes) respectability and universality; nevertheless they act as a drag on Pope's satire. The Epilogue to the Satires, Dialogue I seethes with righteous indignation, but for the most part the righteousness expresses itself in powerful lines like these:

Lo! at the wheels of her triumphal car.
Old England's Genius, rough with many a scar,
Dragged in the dust! his arms hang idly round,
His flag inverted trails along the ground!
Our youth, all liveried o'er with foreign gold,
Before her dance: behind her, crawl the old!
See thronging millions to the pagod run,
And offer country, parent, wife, or son!
Hear her black trumpet thro' the land proclaim,
That NOT TO BE CORRUPTED IS THE SHAME. (151-160)

and the indignation in lines like this exchange with Fortescue in Dialogue II:

Pope: ...Suppose I censure---you know what I mean---
To save a bishop, may I name a dean?

Fortescue: A dean, Sir? no: his fortune is not made.
You hurt a man that's rising in the trade.

Pope: If not the tradesman who set up to-day,
Much less the 'prentice who to-morrow may.
Down, down, proud Satire; tho' a realm be spoiled,
Arraign no mightier thief than wretched Wild;
Or, if a Court or country's made a job,
Go drench a pick-pocket, and join the mob. (32-41)

How, after such sharp, clean thrusts, is the satire served by the long aside in Dialogue Two of the Epilogue where Pope enumerates some of the great men he has known and loved?

The roster is a distinguished one---Somers, Halifax, Shrews-


bury "the wise and great," Stanhope, Atterbury, Pulteney, Chesterfield, Argyll, and Wyndham "just to freedom and the throne"---but the lines in which it appears are not satire and are not even good verse. What is more, the recital of those great names convinces us less of Pope's non-partisan public-spiritedness than of his knowing a great many aristocrats, all of them, by an odd coincidence, in the anti-Walpole camp. The convention that Pope uses here is not intrinsically bad, it is Pope's use of it that is. If Pope had named fewer great men and been less effusive in his tribute; if he had not broken into the satire for so long a non-satiric passage; and if he had shaped his list into something lighter and less prosy---then perhaps he would have turned his noble friendships to better satiric account.

One of the things that makes The Rape of the Lock a great work of art is that in it Pope never once strains after the kind of rhetorical effect I have been describing. If he had the airy-light structure that is The Rape would have collapsed and the poem's satiric element would have withered. I shall not go into the exact nature of that element because the poem itself is only tangential to the thesis that this paper is developing; I introduce The Rape of the Lock at this point primarily to sharpen the point of the moral that the way for a satirist to appear as a
representative of the whole of his society rather than a fraction of it is precisely by not insisting on his representativeness. Where the Pope of the Epistles and the Moral Essays tells us over and over again about his centrality and representativeness, the Pope of The Rape of the Lock shows us that he possesses them.

As Cleanth Brooks has observed, in the Rape Pope pictures the world of Belinda con amore, yet with an amore that is informed with criticism. To separate out those two qualities, the affectionate and the critical, is almost impossible, so skillfully blended they are. But that does not mean that one negates the other: no matter how lovingly Pope conducts the satiric examination of the trivial and tinsel-like which make up the whole of upper-class existence, still he is carrying on an examination which very surely exposes certain unmistakable weaknesses. And it is just because the poet is so close to, and infinitely knowing about, those weaknesses that without ever demanding it for himself he assumes naturally the role of representative witness. He assumes at the same time the role of social arbiter whose right to arbitrate—and criticize—derives from his having so strong an attachment to the values on which he sits judgment that he could not conceivably sacrifice them for a different set.

Because of its greater socio-economic inclusiveness
The Dunciad is more to the point of this chapter. However I shall deal with it at greater length in two succeeding chapters than I do here, since it tell us even more about Pope's historical and intellectual attitudes than about his socio-economic views. Hugo Reichard finds in The Dunciad a more coherent and sophisticated expression of the conservative world-view than I think it contains. Nevertheless it is an extraordinarily interesting contribution to dynamic conservative satire—and however viewed, a great poem.

Pervading and unifying most of Pope's "human satire," says Reichard, is an "antinomy of mercenary and humane values," and that antinomy is at the heart of the Dunciad.35 Reichard finds that the "thematic movement of the poem—now Dulness progresses from 'booths, to theatre, to Court'—is the poetic reflection of the historical process by which ascendancy passed from landed gentlemen to business men."36

The Dunciad makes a significant statement about the business men who by Pope's time were in the ascendant, but Reichard exaggerates the importance in the poem of that subject, and what is more, abstracts a neat process which I do not find to exist. I think that he is much closer to the mark when he points out the use Pope makes in The Dunciad of a striking symbol: in Book IV Dulness, the deity of The Dunciad, fixes society to a bimetallic standard of lead and gold, very much as in the Epilogue to the Satires
Pope has the goddess Vice rule an avaricious world by means of golden chains.

In other ways too, as Reichard observes, The Dunciad implicitly arraigns the money culture that Pope, along with the other dynamic conservatives, despised. When in Book II Pope attempts to account for the decline of literature he parcels out responsibility among the nobility, the government, and the publishers, all of whom have made the money-power-prestige triad their god and have forced literary men to bow down before it. A fourth villain, if only implicitly, is "an indiscriminate public that consumes the stuff for which unscrupulous politicians, publishers, writers...and critics...are variously responsible. If these four groups do not themselves write trash, they preside over the process."37

One other comment Reichard makes is quite significant. Augustus, he says, not Cibber, is sovereign dunce of the land in The Dunciad. "The most potent and successful despoilers of the land are not the hireling scribblers, but the hireling peers, not the ministerial tools but the ministerial knaves of state, not needy cheats like Jonathan Wild...but opulent dignitaries like the director Blunt and the ubiquitous Sir Robert Walpole."38 With these remarks of Reichard in mind let us look again at a slice of dialogue earlier quoted from the Epilogue to the Satires:
Pope: ...Suppose I censure— you know what I mean—
To save a bishop, may I name a dean?

Fortescue: A dean, Sir? no; his fortune is not made.
You hurt a man that's rising in the trade.

Pope: If not the tradesman who set up to-day,
Much less the 'prentice who to-morrow may.
Down, down, proud Satire; tho' a realm be spoiled,
Arraign no mightier thief than wretched Wild;
Or, if a Court or country's made a job,
Go drench a pick-pocket, and join the mob. (32-41)

As pointedly here as anywhere, Pope reveals the understanding
with which Reichard credits him, the understanding of com­
mercialism as something more than a wanton greediness of
individuals who can easily be disposed of by being labelled
"London," or "Saint," or "Dissenter".

It is this larger understanding which is denied to the
realistic conservative satirists. They can see the wicked­
ness of particular men or the eternal (and eternally literary)
evil of society, but lack genuine insight into the inter­
play of the two. That is, they are too little aware of
the manner in which a society's rust eats into the minds and
hearts of the individuals that make it up. The rules by
which men live they see as absolute and perfectly clear, the
rule-breakers as men different from themselves and willfully
anti-social. They may occasionally mutter darkly about vice
and corruption in higher circles, but rarely do they compre­
hend its operation. For them the Jonathan Wilds represent
the worst evil— they hardly ever acknowledge the existence
of "mightier thieves," much less lament the obstacles in
the way of their satirizing them. Above all they are loyal to the men and values that prevail; and their loyalty precludes turning their satiric light on the very forces they are engaged in upholding. But that is exactly what the dynamic conservative satirist does continually, just as we can see Pope doing in those lines from the Epilogue to the Satires. There we encounter as objects of satire deans, bishops, and statesmen, where before were only non-conformists with neither the literary nor the political means to retaliate against their tormentors.

In The Dunciad, too, Pope shows a willingness to arraign the "mightier thieves" along with the "smaller fry." And he is equally prepared to particularize, rather than simply to throw out generalizations about the evil times that have befallen England because of the dereliction of its rulers. True the Grub Street hacks suffer most from his particularization; nevertheless, as Reichard has pointed out, Pope is quite specific in his attack on the publishers, nobles, etc., who are more interested in monetary than in artistic values. The Dunciad is crowded with representative figures and institutions, but never so crowded as to lose sight—or let the reader lose sight—of what is meant to be represented. There are few poems, or for that matter few prose works, in which as large a part of society is reproduced.
In fact it is a characteristic of dynamic conservative satire that it does its best work on an outsized canvas. Hudibras, which is at least a first-cousin to the breed; The History of John Bull; The Beggar's Opera; The Dunciad—all of them are tremendous in their scope. The semi-allegorical Hudibras and the allegorical John Bull, however, are much less convincing than the latter two works because the particulars that make up their generalized portraits of an age are far less convincingly individualized. To this quartet must be added Gulliver's Travels, in which practically every element of early eighteenth Century society is surveyed. But I read Gulliver's Travels as more an ideological than a socio-economic satire, although the socio-economic is certainly important in the book, and for that reason I have left its examination to later chapters of this study. The only one of Swift's satires that is central to the present chapter is the Modest Proposal, which I think beautifully illustrates Reichard's characterization of Pope's social satire as an "antinomy of mercenary and human values."

A Modest Proposal and the Mercantilist Concept of Man

For the bulk of my remarks on the mercenary values which the Modest Proposal satirizes I am indebted to Professor George Wittkowsky, whose article on the background
of the satire I shall follow closely. Wittkowsky, accounting for critical neglect of the work, attributes it to the fact that critics have regarded the Modest Proposal as being directed against conditions in Ireland rather than against "a set of theories and attitudes making possible these conditions." "...if one regards the Modest Proposal simply as a criticism of conditions," he goes on to say, "about all one can say is that conditions were bad and that Swift's irony brilliantly underscored this fact."³⁹

Mercantilism, which we examined at the beginning of this chapter, was Swift's chief target. The mercantilist writers, to resume Wittkowsky's thread of reasoning and retrace briefly my own footsteps, regarded people as a commodity, and with that conception to guide them conducted elaborate inquiries into the economic problems of the time. One of the most pressing of these problems, what to do with England's poor, was seen as subsidiary to the question of how best to use the country's manpower resources toward the end of making the nation economically supreme and its traders wealthy. The literature on these problems ran to grandiose titles, which were no less grandiose for often having a "modest" or an "humble" tucked away in them, e.g., "A Modest Proposal for the More Certain and yet more Easie Provision for the Poor..." Wittkowsky suggests that among other things Swift's Modest Proposal,
complete to the title, was intended as a parody on this mercantilist literature.\textsuperscript{40}

The satire, Wittkowsky says, is a burlesque project, a burlesque political arithmetic, and an attack on the general tendency of the age to regard people as commodities.\textsuperscript{41} The whole tone of the satire echoes that of the countless projects spewed forth during the neo-classical age; Swift, with his contempt for the doctrinaire and over-intellectualized---a matter I shall later go into in some detail---probably would have satirized the economic projectors even if he had been totally uninterested in the problems to which they were devoting themselves.

The satire on political arithmetic is fairly obvious. Compare the language of Sir William Child's essay, which I began this chapter by quoting, with this famous passage from Swift:

The number of Souls in this Kingdom being usually reckoned one Million and a half, Of these I calculate there may be about two hundred thousand Couple whose Wives are Breeders; from which number I substract thirty Thousand Couples, who are able to maintain their own Children, although I apprehend there cannot be so many, under the present Distresses of the Kingdom; but this being granted, there will remain an hundred and seventy thousand Breeders. I again Substract fifty Thousand, for those Women who miscarry, or whose Children die by accident, or disease within the Year. There only remain an hundred and twenty thousand Children of poor Parents annually born: The question therefore is, How this number shall be reared, and provided for?\textsuperscript{42}
In a characteristically Swiftian reversal the statistical analysis of the political arithmetician, the new political man, is turned back on him in language that savagely dogs his own. Petty's language and the thought that it mirrors, as the first section of this chapter attempted to demonstrate, were characteristic of the age. Therefore Swift, in parodying them, was from one point of view displaying 'subversive' tendencies. Addisonian satire we have seen to be never guilty of subversive activity; it was in almost complete harmony with the prevailing *zeitgeist*. Dynamic conservative satire, though, again and again attacks, and with real if controlled force, the socio-economic standards that were assuming paramountcy. It does not wish to conserve whatever the age has put its stamp on.

Wittkowsky's reading of the *Modest Proposal* has not gone unchallenged. Professor Louis Landa has written a solidly documented rebuttal to it in which he maintains that Swift, far from intending the work as anti-mercantilist, meant it rather as a complaint against England for leaving Ireland out of the mercantilist arrangement. Landa insists that the Swift of all the Irish tracts is strongly mercantilist, even to believing in the desirability, from the commercial point of view, of large populations. But if Swift is pleading in the *Modest Proposal* for an increased population, then the irony of the work boomerangs and knocks
the entire satire to pieces. To read the *Modest Proposal* as in any way a plea for Irish childbearing is to read Swift literally, which Landa certainly would not have us do.

Landa is correct enough in what he says about Swift's usual adherence to the mercantilist standard. However he credits Swift with a consistency that Swift was never guilty of. Pro-mercantilist or not, over an issue like the one provided by Irish famine and actual Irish starvation he was bound to enlist his satire under the humanistic banner. Discussing Swift's Irish phase Ricardo Quintana has written:

...the truth is that even when his patriotism was limited by the interests of one class its chief elements were bitter realism and a hatred of injustice, and his overpowering expression thereof has lived on to deny the narrow dogmatisms that time and place imposed on his mind.\(^{45}\)

The humanism and the sense of injustice combine to make of *A Modest Proposal* a passionate, bitter document which yet manages to engage in some close intellectual in-fighting of the kind carried on against the economic projectors. Still the combination never leads Swift to denounce absolutely the system that produces famine in Ireland. The dynamic conservative will take up arms against injustice and will pursue the perpetrators of it to even the highest and most powerful places, but he will not mount the barricades in order to overthrow the system that nourishes these men.
The realistic conservative satirist, adept at sniffing out dissent and expert at gloomily surveying a world gone wrong, nowhere comes as close to the barricades as Swift does in the Modest Proposal.

Swift's method in that work, as in so many of his best satires, is to adopt the pose of one who is plus royalist que le roi, wholly dedicated to the values which are actually being undercut. Thus he establishes himself, if only ironically, close to the sources of power it is his aim to subvert. Established there he can move worlds rather than merely small groups of men, and he can do so without insisting à la Pope on his own integrity and sense of injustice. That is what I meant, in my remarks on the relationship of rhetoric and ideology, when I described Swift's satire as a union of the two.

Dryden, Wholeness, and the Law

The technique that Dryden uses in Absalom and Achitophel is entirely different from Swift's ironic method although it is directed toward much the same end—the identification of the satirist with the "whole" society and the consequent outlawing of those who being in opposition constitute a faction. Dryden accomplishes this end by a massive (but never unwieldy) show of force to which he successfully imparts the weightiest moral sanctions. And this he does without ever involving himself personally;
the "I" of *Absalom and Achitophel* is as unlike the would-be virtuous "I" of Pope's less successful satires as he is unlike the ironic "I" of the "Modest Proposal" or *A Tale of a Tub*, or "An Argument Against Abolishing Christianity". The voice of "Absalom" is a public voice, as befits a self-appointed spokesman for the public.

Dryden first begins to establish a tone of authority tinged with impartiality in the long preface to the poem, where he represents himself as "only the historian," not the inventor of the action the poem describes. "Were I the inventor," he writes, "who am only the historian, I should certainly conclude the piece with the reconcilement of Absalom to David." Just before this comment he has evinced his impartiality by portraying Absalom (the Duke of Monmouth) with the same mixed colors that he is to use in the poem itself. Alas that so excellent a youth should have been led astray, he laments in prose what he will echo in poetry.

Besides being an historian, Dryden says in the preface, he is a surgeon. "The true end of satire," he concludes the preface,

is the amendment of vice by correction. And he who writes honestly is no more an enemy to the offender, than the physician to the patient, when he prescribes harsh remedies to an inveterate disease: for those are only in order to prevent the chirurgeon's work of an ense rescindendum, which I wish not to my very enemies. To conclude all: if the body politic have
any analogy to the natural, in my weak judgment
an act of oblivion were as necessary in a hot,
distempered state, as an opiate would be in a
raging fever.47

This is of course one of the traditional apologiae of the
satirist, one which we have seen even so feeble a satirist
as Tom D'Urfey avail himself of. Dryden, however, makes
this apologia a springboard, and medical imagery plays an
integral part in the poem.

In his role of historian Dryden is able continuously
to invoke tradition, whose sanctity he sees threatened by
Achitophel and the London mob at that politician's back.
Indeed the chief inference we are to draw from the Biblical
setting given the poem is that the state's problems never
change, that demagogues who can stir up the mob always
constitute a threat to it. By setting up this parallel
Dryden invests himself with satiric vision that has a tre-
mendous vertical span, reaching back as it does into the
historic past; an equally great horizontal span is his by
virtue of the number and representative quality of contem-
poraries he crowds into the satiric scene—Court, dis-
affected politicians, City merchants, religious leaders,
London mob. Encompassing in his satire the past and the
present, the "historian" Dryden emerges as a well-endowed
witness of the truth.

Truth in this case is all for the old, the established,
and the orderly. It enlists the services of Dryden not only
as historian and surgeon, but also—and most important—as custodian and interpreter of the law. Law is an important cohesive agent in Absalom; operating both structurally and image-wise. Its structural importance is most evident at the end of the poem where David-Charles, following Dryden’s careful build-up of him as a divine agent, delivers the long peroration intended to show his wisdom, mercifulness, and stern majesty. Nine times in this speech, to which Dryden gives the finest rhetorical polish, the king is made to use the word law itself or some component of it. It is Law on which he grounds his kingship: "The law," he says, "shall still direct my peaceful sway, And the same law teach rebels to obey." (991-992). He would rather, he declares, govern by grace than by law, but he is forced to resort to the latter:

'Must I at length the sword of justice draw?  
O curst effects of necessary law!  
How ill my fear they by my mercy scan!  
Beware the fury of a patient man.  
Law they require, let Law then show her face;  
They could not be content to look on Grace,  
Her hinder parts, but with a daring eye  
To tempt the terror of her front and die! (1002-1009)

David's closing lines are these:

'For lawful power is still superior found;  
When long driv'n back at length it stands the ground.' (1024-1024)

The poem then goes on to hail the great times which are to come, and ends on this note:
Once more the godlike David was restored;  
And willing nations knew their lawful lord. (1031-1032)

The conjunction of the satirist's and the monarch's voices 
invoking law provides *Absalom and Achitophel* with an ef­
fective capstone. The identification of the king with the 
state which he rules is thus finally legitimizd. And the 
memory of a merry monarch whose "vigorous warmth did various­
ly impart/To wives and slaves; and, wide as command,/ 
Scattered his Maker's image through the land"(8-10)--if it 
has lingered to spoil somewhat the picture of divinity has 
been dispelled.

Dryden's appeal to law and his deification of the king 
go far beyond the limits of satire; they are, rather, the 
cause---and the end-product---of the poem's satire. They 
are the cause in that it is their violation that marks 
certain men and groups for satiric attack. They are the 
end-product in that the satiric examination of those whom 
Dryden considers transgressors is after all a prelude to 
poetic reaffirmation of a divinely appointed king at the 
head of a state sanctified by law and tradition. There can 
certainly be no complaint that in *Absalom and Achitophel* 
the positive values which generate the satire are either 
obscure or ambiguous. But at the same time Dryden cannot 
be charged (and here lies part of the reason for the great­ 
ness of this poem) with sacrificing satiric effects to his 
positive purpose. The historic framework within which he
operates is strong enough and his poetic detachment believable enough to sustain the extra-satirical parts of the poem.

What I have thus far said about Absalom has had to do with the techniques designed to launch the satire. There still remains the question of the men and ideas the satire was meant to ridicule, also the question of how greatly the satire was furthered by the "legitimizing" techniques we have been examining.

The principal target is of course Achitophel (whom we know to represent Shaftesbury). He is seen in several roles, that of self-tormented statesman who could have done better things:

Oh! had he been content to serve the crown,
With virtues only proper to the gown;
Or had the rankness of the soil been freed
From cockle, that oppressed the noble seed;
David for him his tuneful harp had strung,
And heaven had wanted one immortal song.--(192-197)

of tempter and misleader of Absalom (the Duke of Monmouth), and of leader of the London mob. Whatever his role he appears as an isolated figure, one who belongs nowhere, least of all with the mob for whom he "Disdained the golden fruit to gather free," and to whom he has lent "his arm to shake the tree." His aloneness is magnified by the presence in the poem of those values which he has once shared in but now rejects. And because of this he emerges from Dryden's satire as much more than a discontented politician deserv-
ing of satiric rebuke; he is instead a satanic figure—the image of the tree that bears golden fruit reveals that—whose fall is tragic because it is a fall by a great man from a quasi-divine grace.

So too Dryden succeeds in isolating Absalom, the other key figure in the plot against the lawful and divine King-who-is-the state. Like Achitophel, Absalom at the same time that he is isolated, seen to be a solitary rebel against an ordered and just society, undergoes magnification: he too is cast in the role of great man manqué. Dryden's skillful blending of colors in portraying his 'villains' has been often enough commented on. I should like to add to the comments only the observation that in Absalom he can afford to be generous with the whites because he is so successful in creating and buttressing the image of an ordered society. Thus those who offend against it—Achitophel, Absalom, and Zimri (the Duke of Buckingham) particularly—are therefore completely ineffectual and can be dealt with in reasonably generous fashion.48

With the mob, however, the case is altered. Dryden takes off the kid gloves, thinking it unnecessary to administer the same ambivalent treatment to the assorted non-conformists that he has accorded Achitophel and Absalom. It is, after all, a mob, and as such its threat to the well-ordered society becomes minimized once its leaders have been
isolated. But that portion of the insurgent band which represents the monied and influential middle-class non-conformist element receives special attention from the satirist. Thus the infamous Titus Oates (the poem's Corah) is subjected to a withering attack. And London's lord mayor and sheriff take their places in the gallery of enemies of the state.

Dryden applies to the non-conformists and their activities the same derogatory epithets that Ned Ward does, chief among them "cant," "zealous," and "factious." (Throughout the poem he insists upon the factious nature of those who follow Achitophel; they are only a fragment, whereas the king in his role of society incarnated stands for the whole. As David-Charles says in his great peroration, "Votes shall no more established power control---/Such votes as make a part exceed the whole."(993-994). At one point Dryden refers to them as "dreaming saints...Of the true old enthusiastic breed." (529-530). But dreaming saints are not much of a threat to establish values. Unless, that is, they possess the power to transform their dreams, cant, and enthusiasm into some tangible means of undermining the state, some "powerful engines bent,/To batter down the lawful government." (917-918).

The transforming power, the thing that makes the non-conformists a threat in Dryden's conservative eyes, is money;
and Dryden continually associates dissent with money and the chief instrument for obtaining it, trade. There is nothing new in this satiric association, as the satire of practically every neo-classical writer so far scrutinized makes evident. The way Dryden uses it, however, is especially skillful, partly because the commercial motif, being only one of several motifs employed in connection with the non-conformists, never becomes obtrusive or insistent. Besides, it is worked into the total positive framework which I have described, and so takes its place as just one of many elements in a world in which order and the law prevail.

Cataloguing the various types of malcontents Dryden labels one type as motivated solely by interest. They "sought t'embroil the State,/To sell their duty at a dearer rate;/And make their Jewish markets of the throne,/Pretending public good to serve their own." (501-504). Shimei (the Sheriff of London, Slingsby Bethel), one of their leaders, is thus characterized:

Of zeal to God and hatred to his king,
[He] Did wisely from expensive sins refrain,
And never broke the Sabbath, but for gain. (586-588)

His hand a vare of justice did uphold;
His neck was loaded with a chain of gold.
During his office, treason was no crime;
The sons of Belial had a glorious time;
For Shimei, though not prodigal of pelf,
Yet loved his wicked neighbor as himself. (595-600)

The repeated juxtaposition of the mean and the noble, of the commercial and the religious, makes this passage an
extremely effective piece of irony. In nine lines Dryden succeeds in indicting his non-conformist foe for religious hypocrisy, traduction of justice, and undue love of monetary gain. Dryden's is the language of religion—"zeal to God," "expensive sins," "the Sabbath," "the sons of Belial," and "loved his wicked neighbor as himself," a paraphrase of the famous biblical injunction with the addition of that one adjective, "wicked"—since Shimei represents a group that is peculiarly loud in its religious protestations. But a running accompaniment to the religious theme is provided by the commercial one; "executive," "gain," "Chain of gold," and "pelf" are its components.

Once in Absalom and Achitophel Dryden relaxes his guard and "admits" that the point of view for which he is spokesman does have a very real interest in the economic arrangement. Of course in doing so Dryden, making a personal appearance in the poem (to the detriment, I feel, of the detached effect he has achieved), uses an almost philosophic language rather than the language he reserves for the non-conformist economic interest. Propounding and accepting the Hobbesian concept of men being bound to the state by an historical covenant they had agreed to, he says:

How could his [Adam's] forfeit on mankind take place?
Or how could heavenly justice damn us all,
Who ne'er consented to our father's fall?
Then kings are slaves to those whom they command,
And tenants to their people's pleasure stand.
Add, that the power for property allowed
Is mischievously seated in the crowd;
For who can be secure of private right,
If sovereign sway may be dissolved by might? (772-780)

Even the fortifying of Hobbes with orthodox Christian doctrine does not succeed in lifting this passage above the level of partisanship to the high plane of disinterested love of form and order on which the poem most often rests. These lines can be read as nothing other than argumentation, and partisan argumentation at that.

But this is a relatively minor flaw in a magnificent work of art. Outside that one passage Dryden is uniformly successful in reaching his desired end, the creation of the image of an ordered society headed by a divinely sanctioned monarch who represents the whole of that society; and the corollary creation---so that it may be destroyed---of a faction which is without order, is lawless, and is motivated by commercial greed masquerading as religious zeal.

I have deferred discussion of Absalom and Achitophel until now instead of taking it up in connection with other realistic conservative satiric works because it does supremely well so many of the things I have set down as hallmarks of dynamic conservative satire. In one very important respect, however, it differs from the satire of Pope, Gay, and Swift. Where the satires of those writers are intended primarily to reaffirm a set of ethical values
which are as little regarded by those in the places of religious, political, and economic power as they are by the overt enemies of those values, Dryden's satire is designed rather to give support to the existing social framework. Thus Dryden reads like an official spokesman for the conservative point of view, something that can never be said of Gay or Swift and only occasionally of Pope. Dryden's reliance on law, as it finds expression in both the explicit appeal that Absalom makes and in the poem's imagery, is perhaps the best indication of that difference. Only Arbuthnot among the dynamic conservative satirists, as The History of John Bull illustrates, uses law as a principal motif—and then it appears as a negative force. But Absalom and Achitophel is no less great for being officially conservative and therefore markedly different from The Dunciad and Gulliver's Travels.

So in the final analysis Dryden's conservatism, after the fashion of realistic conservatism, issues in a defense of constituted authority. Idealistic it may be, but never radical, never subversive of existing values and institutions. Dynamic conservative satire, however, is both radical and subversive, because it is intent less on acting as a bulwark for a historic present than in bringing that present into line with the permanent, absolute values of an a-historic past. Its uses of the past is the subject of my next chapter.
Footnotes

Chapter I


3 Ibid., p. 342.

4 Sir Josiah Child, A New Discourse of Trade (London, undated), passim.

5 Ibid., XI.

6 Ibid., pp. 87-88.


10 F. B. Kaye, ed., The Fable of the Bees (Oxford, 1924), CII.


12 Tawney, p. 161.


15 Ibid., p. 59.

17 Ibid., Preface.

18 Carter Bishop, "'Peace is my Dear Delight,'" West Virginia Univ. Bull., Philological Studies, IV, 64-76.


20 Edward Ward, Vulgus Britannicus (London, 1710). Edward A. Richards, Hudibras in the Burlesque Tradition (New York, 1937), is a rich mine of information on the satires which, like Ward's, were written in imitation of Samuel Butler's mock-epic. Richards also provides a very illuminating commentary on Butler's purpose and methods in Hudibras.


22 Clarence M. Webster, "Swift's Tale of a Tub Compared with Earlier Satires of the Puritans," PMLA, XLVII (1932), 171-178. Webster points out that practically all the anti-Puritan themes of the Tale of a Tub had appeared in some of the dozens of anti-Puritan satires written between 1580 and 1704. Ben Jonson, Thomas Nashe, John Marston, Samuel Butler--almost every notable seventeenth Century satirist at some time or other turned on the Puritan. According to Webster, Swift's anti-Puritan satire makes only a few departures from tradition. One in particular is important to this thesis: that in the Madness and Aeolist sections of the Tale Swift goes beyond the dissenters to include all men who aspire foolishly. The realistic conservatives are almost always satisfied to stop with the dissenters, or the commercial classes, or whatever group it is that they are satirizing; particulars are what chiefly interest them, which is one reason why their satire is so much more topical than that of the dynamic conservatives.

24. Ibid., p. 96.

25. Ibid., p. 89.


27. Hugh MacDonald, "Banter in Controversial Prose after the Restoration," Essays and Studies, XXXII (1946), 21-39, observes that during the last decades of the Seventeenth and the first decades of the Eighteenth Century banter, along with its first cousin raillery, became increasingly popular. Paralleling this rise in popularity was the decline of formal satire, on which see Raymond D. Havens, "Changing Taste in the 18th Century," PMLA, XLIV (1929), 501-536, and Andrew M. Wilkinson, "Decline of English Verse Satire in the Middle Years of the Eighteenth Century," RES, III (July 1952), 222-234.


29. Ibid., pp. 17-18.


32. Ibid., p. 194.

33. Bateson, ed., Epistles to Several Persons, XXXIV.


36. Ibid., p. 425.
37 Ibid., p. 421.
38 Ibid., p. 434.
40 Ibid., p. 88 and passim.
41 Ibid., p. 101.
44 Landa, English Literature 1660-1800, p. 916.
48 There was also a very practical consideration in the way of Dryden's being unduly hard on those of noble rank—the ancient medieval statute, De scandalis magnatum, which had been revived from desuetude in 1676. "Every lord of parliament was, in law, a great officer of state because he was required to support the king by his advice; and the statute De scandalis magnatum gave them a special protection against critics and enemies." (David Ogg, England in the Reign of Charles II (Oxford, 1934), II, 465.)
CHAPTER II

THE USES OF THE PAST

The Englishmen of the Augustan Age did not suddenly lose interest in the past or feel that it was no longer relevant to their day. But generally they became so preoccupied with the present, and so charmed by what they saw in it, that increasingly they came to regard all of history as a prelude. And for the majority of the men of the Enlightenment that prelude was worth listening to only because its flatted notes and discords provided an object lesson to the modern orchestrator. What Carl Becker said about the philosophes applies equally well, I believe, to Augustan Englishmen. "We may well be interested in the shackles that bind us, and that was just the sort of interest the Philosophers had in the past: they wished to learn why it was that men were still, after so many centuries of experience, bound by the follies and errors of their predecessors."¹

Now it is my thesis, as developed in this chapter, that the dynamic conservatives were less given to this way of viewing the past than were most of their contemporaries. Well pleased with their own time (relatively speaking), Swift, Pope, and company nevertheless were keenly aware of the continuing contributions made by times past. Consonant
with their refusal to take their economic and political values from existing institutions, they vigorously resisted all efforts to ennoble the new in art or in any other intellectual area simply because of its newness---and with equal vigour resisted the less frequent attempts to freeze into eternal grandeur all that which was old. And out of their efforts to keep alive and dynamic the past, emerged some notable satiric effects.

Almost entirely absent from this chapter are the realistic conservative satirists who played so important a part in the consideration of the socio-economic position of neo-classical satire. The reason is that the realistic conservatives rarely went to the past, or if they did, went there for those conventional rhetorical effects already looked at. Their absence, then, is at least as significant as would be their presence.

Is it not evident, in these last one hundred years (when the study of philosophy has been the business of the Virtuosi in Christendom), that almost a new Nature has been revealed to us?—that more errors of the school have been detected, more useful experiments in philosophy have been made, more noble secrets in optics, medicine, anatomy, astronomy, discovered than in all those credulous and doting ages from Aristotle to us?—so true is it, that nothing spreads more fast than science, when rightly and generally cultivated.2

There you have the voice of one of the representative men of the age, John Dryden, poet, playwright, critic, and member of the Royal Society. But Dryden was as many-voiced as he
was many-sided, and to pass off the foregoing quotation as "Dryden's historical outlook" would be to distort the meaning of John Dryden. Others of his voices have already made and will continue to make themselves heard in this study. For the moment, though, I want to look closely at Dryden's pronouncement on the scientific and philosophic accomplishments of his time.

This is the way that Dryden always felt about the scientific and philosophic advances his contemporaries made. What is more, so did the majority of his compeers. The Royal Society from Dryden's day right through Pope's was at the heart of the scientific advancement; the tributes to it by such men as Cowley, Waller, Sprat, and Joseph Glanvill are well known, and in practically every case praise of the Society was coupled with the kind of derogation of the past that Dryden here engages in.

Dryden uses four very important words in the passage quoted above: "Virtuosi," "School," "Nature," and "Aristotle". I shall not explore these terms to their sources or trace their progress in this period, because that would involve writing a full-scale intellectual history of the period. However I would like to observe this much about the quartet: "Virtuosi," which Dryden here uses as a term of approval, later on assumed an entirely different connotation, becoming almost as much a catch-all term of opprobrium as "Red" has
become in our day; "school" takes care of several centuries of Medieval philosophy in as neat a fashion as possible, a fashion Butler, Rochester, Pope, Swift, Johnson, etc., all followed; "Nature" suggests the tremendous upheaval effected by the new learning and new science, the entirely new way of looking at the physical world—and man's place in it—brought about particularly by two of the sciences Dryden mentions, optics and astronomy; "Aristotle" does not simply mean "a Greek philosopher who lived in ancient Athens," it means the whole of civilized antiquity. Along with Homer, Aristotle was a touchstone for the Augustans. If you wanted to declare yourself a traditionalist in all things, you praised him unreservedly and for all his accomplishments, literary, scientific, and philosophic; while if you wanted to declare your independence of the "credulous and doting ages" that had led up to your own, you questioned some part at least of his great authority.

The collocation of "school" and "Aristotle" with the latter's function as a terminus a quo is very interesting. What Dryden is suggesting—if not saying explicitly—is that history can be divided into just two parts: Time Present, when the Virtuosi perform "useful experiments," and Time Past, when assorted has-beens like Aristotle and the Scholastics committed errors of every variety.

Samuel Butler, too, when he wrote Hudibras and his
prose characters, gave short shrift to former times. The Presbyterian colonel Hudibras is made to talk a jargon compounded of, among other things, scholastic terms. Moreover in its very form Hudibras makes fun of the antiquated romance of Spenser, Tasso, Ariosto. Ricardo Quintano has said of Butler:

His anti-Aristotelianism, his contempt for scholasticism, his ridicule of every species of occultism and superstition, his analysis of pedantry and the disease of verbalism, his preference for the Moderns over the Ancients sometimes parallel---up to a certain point---the Baconian critique. And on occasion Butler even convinced himself that he shared the Baconians' enthusiasm for positivistic values and a life of practical activity.³

If Dryden, the representative writer of the late Seventeenth Century, and Butler, the non-representative writer who nevertheless was enormously popular when he wrote, both looked at history in this way---as a record of "les crimes et les malheurs," in Voltaire's phrase---who was there to oppose the tide of modernism? The answer that emerges from Richard F. Jones's Ancients and Moderns: A Study of the Background of the "Battle of the Books" is that on the English side of the Channel, not very many men were in opposition during the last decades of the Seventeenth Century.⁴ The nature of that opposition and some of the issues involved in the Ancients versus Modern battle must be understood before the background against which the dynamic conservatives worked out their attitudes toward the past can be
considered even partially complete.

A relatively obscure physician, Henry Stubbe, fired away at the Royal Society and its eulogist Joseph Glanvill in two books, *The Plus Ultra reduced to a Non Plus* (1670)—Glanvill had written a defense of the Society entitled *Plus Ultra* (1668)—and *Legends no Histories* (1670). The Society, Stubbe charged, was trying to demolish all classical learning, to raise in its place an education with a materialistic and mechanical base. In this counter-attack against what was coming to be variously called the New Learning or New Science, Stubbe defended Aristotle as philosopher. He also spoke well of the Stagyrite's medical knowledge, which he compared favorably with that of Hippocrates and Galen. Besides Stubbe there was Meric Casaubon, scholar son of the great scholar Isaac Casaubon, to uphold the classical cause against the Moderns' encroachments. But neither of these men was of much more than nuisance value in the assault on the Society and what it stood for.

With Sir William Temple's entrance on the field, however, what had been desultory skirmishing became a battle of sizable proportions—the so-called "Battle of the Books." The campaign history of this battle has been written by a half-dozen very capable scholars, so I shall deal only with those aspects of it that are central to this thesis. Temple as historian is of interest here because his
reading of the record of the past differs greatly from the accepted one of his time. In his "An Essay Upon the Ancient and Modern Learning" (1690) he looked at history not as a unilinear force that reached its apex in 1660, but as a cyclical pattern in which an earlier cycle, the Graeco-Roman, represented the ultimate height which man could hope to achieve. The literature and arts of the ancients, Temple said, were greatly superior to those of the moderns. Even in science, the strong-point of his own period, Temple claimed superiority for the Greeks and Romans. Now this does not mean that Sir William, like Miniver Cheevy, "wept that he was ever born". Instead, he seems to have been in all respects a successful and well-adjusted gentleman, perfectly at home in the Seventeenth Century world he inhabited. Still he did take up the extreme position which I have described.

Bernard de Fontenelle, one of the most active of the French warriors in the Trans-Channel Battle of the Books, put in a claim for the Moderns almost as sweeping as the one made by Temple for the Ancients. Indeed William Wotton, who had written Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning (1694) as a Royal Society-sponsored reply to Temple's 1690 "Essay", thought it necessary in that work to reproach Fontenelle for his temerity in placing Modern writers above the Ancient ones. Wotton, a more moderate partisan of the
Moderns than Fontenelle, distinguished between science, which he said was always progressing, and the arts and philosophy, which he did not think necessarily progressed.

Fontenelle believed that not only had there been continuous progress in the past, but there must inevitably continue to be progress in the future. The inevitability of progress was not part of Wotton's doctrine. You get some indication of Fontenelle's role as prophet of Progress in this passage of his Digression sur les Anciens et les Modernes:

> Si les grands hommes de ce siècle avaient des sentiments charitables pour la posterité, ils l'avertiraient de ne les admirer point trop, et d'aspirer toujours du moins à les égaler. Rien n'arrête tant le progrès des choses, rien ne borne tant les esprits, que l'admiration excessive des anciens.

These lines bear quoting because they indicate a new development in the Ancient-Modern argument, a preoccupation with the future that is missing from the writings of the English partisans of the Modern. The men around the Royal Society, if they envisaged scientific experimentation as getting always bigger and better—which they undoubtedly did—nevertheless did not make a dogma of their belief in the benefits they were bestowing and would continue to bestow.

Temple, then, proclaimed the greatness of the past, Wotton of the present, Fontenelle that of a present stretching into an ever more glorious future. Yet it does not
follow, as it seemingly should from what we have so far seen of the French writer, that Fontenelle was totally blind to the greatness of the classical past. With Charles Perrault he led the attack in the French Academy (of which he was secretary) on the classicists whom Boileau marshalled in behalf of the Ancients and the superiority of Latin over French as a literary language; alone he raised the banner of Progress and asked men not to think too long or well about the ancients—still when he wrote his Dialogues des Morts Anciens et Modernes he dedicated it to Lucian who had done the outstanding work in this essentially classical genre. What this reveals is that no matter how loud neoclassical Frenchmen and English were in their praise of things Modern and dispraise of things Ancient, they nevertheless were practically unanimous in their respect for classical art. At least they all—even Daniel Defoe—paid lip-service to the writers of antiquity.

What about the scholar Richard Bentley? Was he the destroyer of the past that a long line of satirists accused him of being? Writing to Wotton in 1700 the philologist said, in what was to be the preface to his A Dissertation upon the Epistles of Phalaris:

But I must take the freedom to profess, that I write without any view or regard to your controversy; which I do not make my own or interpose in it. It is a subject so nice and delicate, and of such a mixed and diffused
nature, that I am content to make the best use of both Ancients and Moderns, without venturing with you, upon the hazard of a wrong comparison, or the envy of a true one. That some of the oldest Books are best in their kinds, the same person having the double glory of invention and perfection, is a thing observed even by some of the Ancients....But the choice of Phalaris and Aesop, as they are now extant, for the two great inimitable originals, is a piece of criticism of a peculiar complexion, and must proceed from a singularity of palate and judgement.  

Aside from the rather arrogant last sentence this statement breathes moderation in every line. What is more, Bentley was entirely right in his scholarly appraisal of Phalaris and Aesop, and in setting the record straight on the semi-legendary Sicilian tyrant's letters and the semi-legendary Greek slave's fables he was certainly not undermining the whole structure of classical literature. His own great competence in that literature was displayed, among other places, in his translation of Horace. How then explain the extraordinary onslaught that greeted Bentley's participation in the Battle of the Books?

Of course the satiric attack on Bentley was not motivated entirely by philosophical considerations. The personal element was strong in it, particularly in its initial phases when it was the Christ Church wits who were firing away at the philologist.  

But our interest here is not in the personalities of Seventeenth Century logomachs. When we turn from this
aspect of the Battle we encounter the fact of Bentley's close association with the Royal Society. Friend of Wotton and of Newton, Bentley was himself a practitioner in his literary scholarship of what can only be called the scientific method. In an article on William King, one of the first satirists to ridicule Bentley, Colin Horne writes,

By attaching his Dissertation to Wotton's Reflections Bentley had, in King's eyes, virtually become an ally of the Royal Society and to that extent at least a supporter of the new science. Scholars of an older tradition were uneasily aware that there was something more behind this, that Bentley's methods in classical scholarship were not dissimilar to those pursued by the Royal Society in its investigation of the physical world, and they distrusted them all.¹²

This mistrust stemmed partly from the fact that these traditional scholars had their stronghold in Oxford, especially in Christ Church College, where the Aristotelian method still prevailed. To quote Horne again,

To the Christ Church men...Bentley's methods were ridiculous trifling, an absurd distortion of values; but they were also a challenge to established authority in literary studies, and by the light of such studies they had been trained. Behind all their smaller and personal objections to Bentley was the resentment of conservative taste at the successful restatements of the inductive scholar. To this extent the men of letters like King and Pope, and a large section of the University men, were defending themselves against a new scholarship that owed something of its inspiration to science.¹³

I would add to the designation "men of letters like King and Pope" this codicil: conservative satirists generally
were rubbed the wrong way by Bentley, whom they saw as the epitome of the New Learning (= New Science), which made all of them uncomfortable in varying degrees. A thrust at Bentley, then, constituted, albeit negatively and by indirection, a defense of the past against those who would minimize it. No matter that Bentley did not regard himself as an enemy of the classical, the important thing is that the conservative satirists cast him in that role.

Only with the intervention in the Ancient-Modern dispute of the Christ Church Wits and, later, Swift, did the element of satire enter the English phase of the dispute. In both England and France only the cause of the Ancients enlisted satirists in its behalf. The defenders of established opinion, as we heard from Hume, are always dogmatic and arrogant, while its attackers affect gentleness and moderation because only in that way can they secure a hearing.14

King fired several salvos at Bentley, the first in 1698 and the last in 1712. It is the second salvo, the 1699 Dialogues of the Dead Relating to the Present Controversy Concerning the Epistles of Phalaris, that bears most directly on this study, for in it King reached back into the past in a way that was to become standard practice for the dynamic conservative satirists. That does not mean that King figures in this chapter merely as a "source";
he was a good second-rank satirist whom I find very readable quite apart from any consideration of his historic importance.

The principal character in the Dialogues of the Dead is Bentivoglio, a "snarling critic" who is unmistakably Bentley. But Bentivoglio does not appear personally in any of the dialogues. Instead King very cleverly has the various speakers discuss him, one person in each dialogue posing as his champion while the other person attacks him. In the first dialogue Lycophron tells Charon that while Charon had been unintelligible by choice, it was Bentivoglio's natural genius that made him so. This is obviously a variation on a MacFlecknoe theme, yet it is by no means slavishly imitative, and given a dramatic framework it is quite effective comedy. The "pro-Bentivoglio" Lycophron relates to Charon the details of a battle that had been occasioned by the introduction of Bentivoglio's works. Dionysius, a pedant, inspired by Bentivoglio's observations on the measure of anapastic verse, had put one hundred youthful little shades to work scanning anapastic verse, correcting any that ended with a short syllable. This had aroused Buchanan, who had sent for a detachment of school boys from Grotius and one from Scaliger, and with these troops defended against Dionysius the shortness of the last syllable of anapastic verse.

In the dialogue entitled "Chronology" the astrologer
Lilly, a notorious Seventeenth Century charlatan, converses with one Helvius. Helvius is a detractor of Bentivoglio, about whom Lilly rhapsodizes. Lilly, in resentment against being addressed by Helvius as "brother," answers:

The great Bentivoglio may indeed call me Brother, since the Publication of his Eternal Labours. He equals the Chronological Tables that I yearly publish'd, and then he is the most exact Man at the original of a Sicilian City, that amidst never so great Variety of Authors, he can tell you the Man that laid the first stone of it. There was not a Potter in Athens, or a Brasier in Corinth, but he knows when he set up, and who took out a statute of Bankrupt against him.15

What one sees happening in both these dialogues is that Bentley, who befouls the past by his heavy-handed approach to it, is crowned with the withered and stinking laurels that he himself has gathered. King says, in effect, "Here is what your pedantry does when it lays hands on the ancients: it reduces classical verse to a matter of long or short syllables, it measures the ages of antiquity by a yardstick of its own devising, paying no attention to antiquity's standards, and thus falsifies the classical past." But the Modern, Bentley, is not so advanced as he would like to think---in fact he and Buchanan, Grotius, and Scaliger are really contemporaries, and all four co-exist in time with the Roman Dionysius. Pedantry, King suggests, knows no limits of time or space. (Lilly, too, who had thrived during the Commonwealth, is a brother under
the skin of Bentivoglio-Bentley). As for Francis Bacon's famous image of the Modern as a dwarf sitting on the Ancient's shoulders, it comes to this in "Chronology": Lilly, after citing some of Bentivoglio's findings, e.g., that Mrs. Turner had introduced yellow starch into England, is asked if any of these things is in Usher's Annals or Simpson's Chronicon. His answer is, "Perhaps not; but we stand upon their Shoulders, and therefore see things with greater exactness, perhaps never Man came to the same pitch of Chronology as the much Esteem'd Bentivoglio."\(^{16}\)

By the very form in which he cast his satire King was affirming his own, as well as Bentley's, continuity with the past. For what was apparently the first time in England he was using the imaginary conversation as Lucian, its inventor, had used it, that is, as a satirical weapon. He thus manages to simultaneously link the philologist with the pedants and charlatans of the present and past, and with all those fools whom Lucian had satirized in his Dialogues.

How differently the arch-Modern Fontenelle had used the Lucianic dialogue. Dividing his dialogues into three parts, Des Morts Anciens, Des Morts Anciens Avecs des Modernes, and Des Morts Modernes, the French writer had used the form to belittle contemporary defenders of antiquity. Thus in Dialogue V of the Dialogues Des Morts Anciens Aesop speaking
to Homer mentions "les grands mystères" hidden in the latter's work, and when Homer vigorously denies their existence, says,

Cependant, tous les savans de mon temps le disaient; il n'y avait rien dans l'Iliade, ni dans l'Odyssée, a quoi ils ne donnassent les allegories les plus belles du monde. Ils sentendaient que tous les secrets de la théologie, de la physique, de la morale, et des mathematiques même, étaient renfermés dans ces que vous aviez écrit.17

This is the easiest kind of satire, where the dead are brought forth to deny the validity of an interpretation some living followers are making of their work. One more episode from Fontenelle's satire is worth quoting. This time the characters of the dialogue are an Ancient and a Modern, Socrates and Montaigne. Socrates expressing astonishment that since his day men have not become more reasonable, Montaigne assures him that on the contrary they are madder and more corrupted than they ever were in Socrates' time, "ou regnait tant de probité et de droiture." There are no more giants walking the earth, says Montaigne, to which Socrates replies that the Ancients have been too highly regarded at the deliberate expense of the Moderns. "...et nos ancêtres," he goes on, "et nous, et notre posterité, tout cela est bien égal." The Greek philosopher's final words to Montaigne are, "L'ordre général de la nature a l'air bien constant."18

After King, the next English satirist of importance to go to hell for his satiric effects was Tom Brown. Brown
called his dialogues of the dead Letters from the Dead to the Living, and in them introduced an incredible assortment of Englishmen, Frenchmen, and figures from antiquity; some of them had been as long decomposed as Cyrus the Great, while others of them, like the actors Joe Haines and James Nokes, were still warm. Somewhat prematurely Bentley is consigned to this hell, where we encounter him under the name "Dr. Bentivolio." (Brown drops the "g" from the name which King had created, prefaces the name with the honorific "Doctor"). Nokes tells Haines, newly arrived down under, of a recent meeting that he, Nokes, had had with Phalaris, who had sworn to trounce Dr. Bentivolio for having robbed him of his epistles. "'I have my brazen bull, heaven be praised,' he had told Nokes, "'ready for him, and as soon as he comes into these quarters, will shut him up in it and roast him with his own dull volumes, and those of his dearly beloved friends the Dutch commentators!'" This is not very subtle satire, but then subtlety never was one of Brown's strong points. (What Brown did do supremely well, and what I have never seen him adequately praised for, was satiric portraiture; the portraits of an old male Quaker and a Puritan harridan in his Amusements Serious and Comical are particularly colorful character studies.) My reason for quoting this particular bit from the Letters is that in it we can see Brown working the same vein that
King had worked and that Swift and Pope were to work. Brown too, who shared many of the attitudes but not the intellectual awareness or penetration of the greater dynamic conservative satirists, leveled out history and "allocated" those Moderns whose approach to the past was either a patronizing and/or a deadening one to that area outside time where, to quote King's Lycophron, their "natural genius" indicated that they belonged.

The leveling out process is seen at what is perhaps its most brilliant in Swift's Battle of the Books, where King's and Tom Brown's old target, Bentley, was most sharply satirized. Although Bentley does not, in Swift's satire, have his permanent residence in Hell, it is to Hell that he goes when vanquished in the great battle. In company with Wotton he appears as the apotheosis of the Modern in Swift's satirical contribution to the Ancient-Modern controversy. Flanking these two are a motley group, among whom are Dryden, Boileau (who certainly did not belong in the Modern camp), Ogilby, Perrault, Fontenelle, Sir Roger L'Estrange, Scotus, and Aquinas. To be eligible for entrance into the Modern army, it is implied, you need not be prominently associated with the Royal Society (as Dryden, Bentley, and Wotton all were), or with the Modern faction in the French Academy, vide Perrault and Fontenelle. It is enough that, like L'Estrange, you be a mercenary
scribbler, or like Ogilby a hack translator, or like Scotus and Aquinas metaphysical obscurantists. And to be a Modern does not necessarily mean to be living in England or France in the year 1700—Scotus and Aquinas furnish adequate proof of that.

I do not wish to contend for the Battle of the Books as an all-out condemnation of the Moderns written by one who had nothing but reverence for all things Ancient. Those critics are right, I think, who argue that Swift's satire is motivated more by dislike of the Moderns than by reverence, in the manner of Swift's patron Temple, for the Ancients; and more by amused contempt for the entire proceedings than for any other reason. J. C. Maxwell's comment on the Battle is worth quoting in this connection:

What Swift does succeed in conveying is the strength of his own revulsion from the pedantry and malignity he attributes to the moderns. The unsubstantiality of what he sets up in opposition to them is a close parallel to the lifelessness that characterizes the Houyhnhnms in contrast to the Yahoos.20

In the very fact of Swift's refusal to take perfectly seriously the rather exaggerated claims of the Temple-led Ancients lies substantiation for the thesis that I have been developing; just as the conservative satirist disdains the claim to superiority of the Modern qua Modern, so he refuses to burn incense at the shrine of his classical forerunners simply because of their ancient lineage. Believing as they
do in the uses of the past, they scorn the impractical sentimentalism of ancestor worship and the equally impractical arrogance of "modernism."

On one of the few occasions that he mentions, poetically, the Ancient-Modern difference, Pope jeers at the artificiality of the distinction being made and demands "la carrière ouverte aux talents." Addressing George II (Augustus) in "The First Epistle of the Second Book of Horace: To Augustus," Pope says that the English people arc

Foes to all living worth except your own,
And advocates for folly dead and gone.
Authors, like coins, grow dear as they grow old;
It is the rust we value, not the gold. (33-36)

Chaucer's worst ribaldry and the obscenity and scurrility of Skelton are learned because Chaucer and Skelton are properly aged; Ben Jonson is treated in exalted fashion because he too is long dead. Several lines later Pope asks,

If time improve our wit as well as wine,
Say at what age a poet grows divine?
Shall we, or shall we not account him so,
Who dy'd, perhaps, an hundred years ago? (49-52)

To the poet's request that the King end all disputes and fix the precise year when an English poet becomes immortal, Augustus-George replies, "'Who lasts a century can have no flaw,/I hold that wit a classic, good in law.'" (55-56).

But suppose he's a year short of a century, Pope comes back, "And shall we deem him Ancient, right and sound,/Or damn
to all eternity at once, / At ninety-nine, a Modern and a Dunce?" (58-60). The King answers that there will be no quarrel over a year or two, which elicits from Pope:

Then by the rule that made the horse-tail bare,
I pluck out year by year, as hair by hair,
And melt down Ancients like a heap of snow:
While you, to measure merits, look in Stowe,
And estimating authors by the year,
Restow a garland only on a bier. (63-68)

For the next forty lines of the Epistle Pope looks with a critical eye at some of his illustrious predecessors, including Shakespeare, Cowley, Jonson, Beaumont and Fletcher, Sidney, and Milton. The purpose of his scrutiny is not to elevate himself and his contemporaries at the expense of the dead, but to point out that even Shakespeare and Milton, among others, had faults commingled with their admitted excellences. The moderation he practices in this critical survey can be seen in these lines where he links up Milton and Shakespeare---with Bentley forming a kind of bridge between them:

Milton's strong pinion now not Heav'n can bound,
Now serpent-like, in prose he sweeps the ground,
In quibbles, angel and archangel join,
And God the Father turns a school-divine.
Not that I'd lop the beauties from his book,
Like slashing Bentley with his desp'rate hook,
Or damn all Shakespear, like th' affected fool
At court, who hates whate'er he read at school. (99-106)

Throughout the Epistle Pope rejects unreasoned admiration of the art of the past and equally unreasoned condemnation of the art of the present. In a rather petulant pair of
couplets he says,

I lose my patience, and I own it too,
When works are censur'd not as bad but new;
While if our elders break all reason's laws,
These fools demand not pardon, but applause. (lls. 115-118)

The professional censurers of works "not as bad but new" when they join to their censure a gloating over whatever is old receive the designation "antiquarian". The antiquarian as a type in satiric literature is only too much in evidence; the roll-call of satirists who have pilloried him includes Marston, Hall, Ben Jonson, John Earle, Samuel Butler, Addison, and Fielding, to name but a few. Earle's character of "An Antiquary" is typical of the breed: "Beggars coozen him with musty things which they have rak't from dunghills, and he preserves their rags for precious Reliques. He loves no Library, but where there are more Spiders volumes than Authors, and looke with great admiration on the Antique work of Cob-webs." 21 This is clever enough as general satire of the kind that could be turned with equal effectiveness on the Puritan, the courtier, the boaster, or what have you. The dynamic conservative satirist, on the other hand, fitted the antiquarian into a more systematically worked-out scheme. To the dynamic conservative the antiquarian seemed doubly false: false first of all to his own time, which was not by definition less important and less vital than former times, and then false to the very past that he ostensibly pledged his only
allegiance to. So Bentley, in the Dialogue to the Dead in which King has the astrologer Lilly boast of the philologian's extensive knowledge of Athenian potters and Corinthian braziers, is represented as playing tricks on the classical dead by ignoring their real achievements to concentrate on their trivial ones. The pedant and the antiquary are interchangeable in this view of things, and indeed in Tom Brown's, Pope's, Swift's, and Arbuthnot's satire, as well as in King's, pedantry and antiquarianism almost always are intertwined.

These companions received the closest attention and most comprehensive treatment in The Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus, one of the projects of the Scriblerus Club to which Pope, Swift, Parnell, Gay, and Arbuthnot, among others, all belonged. Arbuthnot is today assigned principal credit for the Memoirs, which was conceived of as a satire on the abuses of learning.\(^22\) Cornelius Scriblerus, Martinus's father, is an antiquarian whose proudest possession is a parchment that bears the Scriblerus genealogy, which includes in it Pliny the Elder, Paracelsus, and the Scaligers. Informed of the birth of a son, Martinus, Cornelius rushes into the room, snatches up the child, and is "infinitely pleas'd to find that the child [has] the Wart of Cicero, the wry Neck of Alexander, knots upon his legs like Marius, and one of them shorter than the other like Agesilaus."\(^23\)

In the famous "A Dissertation upon Play-things" Cornelius,
after a preliminary exposition of the history and meaning of play, lists those games sanctioned by antiquity that his son is allowed to engage in. "I would not," he says, have Martin as yet to scourge a Top, till I am better informed whether the Trochus which was recommended by Cato be really our present Top, or rather the Hoop which the boys drive with a stick. "Neither Cross and Pile, nor Ducks and Drakes are quite so ancient as Handy-dandy, tho' Macrobius and St. Augustine take notice of the first, and Minutius Felix describes the latter; but Handy-dandy is mention'd by Aristotle, Plato and Aristophanes."

Cornelius, it is apparent, is not the dunghill raking (or garden variety) antiquarian. He is rather the mixture of antiquary and pedant which I mentioned earlier, with large doses of the virtuoso and the metaphysical quibbler thrown in. Whatever the area of learning in which he operates, though, he is revealed as a slavish worshipper of a past that he makes sterile by his very use of it.

Cornelius's pleased discovery that his son had the "wry neck of Alexander" would seem, on the surface, a curious one, since no Alexander appears on the roster of great pedants and virtuosi produced by Europe. Cornelius's Alexander is indeed no pedant, being none other than the Macedonian king who once ruled most of the known world—Alexander the Great. His presence in the Memoirs is a rather subdued echo of what is one of the loudest and longest played motifs of the conservative satirists: the essential pettiness or worse of Great Men, past and present.
A dozen or so years before Martinus's *Memoirs* (first published in 1724, they had been written between 1714 and 1727) Tom Brown had suggested the general direction in which satire of the Great Man was to travel. In his *Letters from the Dead to the Living* (1700) he has Paul Scarron, the author of *Le Virgile Travestie*, write to "Lewis le Grand" (Louis XIV). Scarron tells Louis that everybody in the lower world is agreed that since Diocletian, Louis is Hell's greatest benefactor, inasmuch as he is perfectly willing to consign to it at least half a million of his subjects. Nero, "an odd sort of a spark, with his hat buttoned up before, like a country scraper," had tried to tell Scarron of his gloriously bloody achievements, but Scarron---as he writes Louis---had ignored the Roman emperor and had proudly recited to him all of the much greater deeds of Louis. One of the greatest was starving a million Huguenots.

The hero had not always been treated so. In fact throughout the Renaissance and the Seventeenth Century the poets had celebrated his deeds without any resort to Brownian or Fieldingesque irony. Cromwell had attracted a particularly notable cluster of hymning poets, among them Milton, Waller, Marvell, and Dryden. However not all these men had praised the heroic Cromwell without reservation; Marvell, for one, in his Horatian Ode, had expressed
an ambivalent attitude toward Cromwell and toward Charles I. As late, however, as Addison's "The Campaign", with its hosannahs to Marlborough, the tradition begun in English literature during the Renaissance of fervent praise for the contemporary hero was still in existence.

Some years after his ode to Cromwell (1658) Dryden helped set in motion the anti-Great Man movement. He did this in the Preface to Examen Poeticum (1693), where, writing of Homer, he said that the epic writer "forms and equips those ungodly mankillers whom we poets, when we flatter them, call heroes; a race of men who can never enjoy quiet in themselves till they have taken it from all mankind." Except for his use of Homer, Dryden's strictures on the hero are essentially those of almost all the dynamic conservative satirists. The exception is an important one, however; the dynamic conservatives rarely criticized Homer in this way, while such writers as Blackmore, Defoe, and Richardson all were more positive than Dryden in their expression of dislike for the Greek poet.

In the "Digression Concerning Critics" of A Tale of a Tub Swift expresses a sentiment closely akin to Dryden's. Having traced the lineage of the modern critics (Dennis, Bentley, etc.) back through Zoilus to Momus, he then says that the origin of these critics has been placed, by admiring and grateful men, in Heaven, along with that of
Hercules, Theseus, Perseus, and other great Deservers of Mankind. But Heroic Virtue itself," he goes on,

hath not been exempt from the Obloquy of Evil Tongues. For it hath been objected, that those Antient Heroes, famous for their Combating so many Giants, and Dragons, and Robbers, were in their own Persons a greater Nuisance to Mankind, than any of those Monsters they subdued... 28

There is one important difference between Swift's handling of the Great Man in the "Digression" and Dryden's treatment of him in the preface to Examen Poeticum. Dryden, looking down from the superior eminence of modern times, condemns Homer's barbarous heroic creations; Swift, looking back at time past and straight ahead at his own time, joins together in a mock-heaven the bully-boys of antiquity (real and legendary) and the false critics of modernity. So Swift, the dynamic conservative, in two ways makes use of the Great Man theme in his satire; he uses it to cut down to size the would-be tyrant and political impresario, and he uses it to assert once more the meaningfulness of tradition—an endlessly flowing stream that carries with it as great a load of junk as of beautiful objects.

It is in the digression on madness of the Tale of a Tub that Swift makes his most famous and most trenchant statement on the nature of great men. "The very same Principle that influences a Bully to break the Windows of a Whore who has jilted him," he declares, "naturally stirs up a Great Prince to raise mighty Armies, and dream of
nothing but Sieges, Battles, and Victories."²⁹

Several times in Gulliver's Travels Swift brings in the Great Man, always to administer a beating to him. In Book III Gulliver, newly arrived in Glubbdubdrib where he is given the opportunity to summon up the spirit or whomever he wishes, first has Alexander, Hannibal, Brutus, and Caesar appear before him. Alexander assures Gulliver "upon his honour that he was not poisoned, but died of a fever by excessive drinking."³⁰ Caesar confesses to him that the greatest glory that had befallen him was the losing of his life. Only Brutus of this quadruplet escapes Swift's ironic disapproval.

Brutus figures again in Swift's thinking in a letter written to John Gay after Swift had seen a printed copy of the Beggar's Opera. To Gay, Swift wrote, "I did not understand that the scene of Lockit and Peachum's quarrel was an imitation of one between Brutus and Cassius, till I was told. I wish Macheath, when he was going to be hanged, had imitated Alexander the Great when he was dying."³¹ So Swift, commenting on his friend's satire, reveals the same attitude toward the Great Man that he displays in his own satire. He would have Gay irreverently go to the past in order irreverently to comment on the present. But this is not the kind of easy familiarity with the dead great that Defoe, approaching Homer, exhibited; it is rather the
recognition that "Greatness", just like every other quality, is as likely to flourish in one's own time as in Ancient times—and vice-versa. This, I think, is the use of the past that dynamic conservative satire makes whenever it introduces the Great Man theme.

It is the way Gay uses the past——on the few occasions that he does use it—in The Beggar's Opera. Beyond the Brutus-Cassius analogue the classical age does not, so far as I can discover, figure in the anti-Great Man satire of the Opera. Instead the poet uses a thin slice out of a different segment of the past to shore up the theme. Macheath, whose impending capture Peachum regrets because it "grieves one's Heart to take off a great Man," several times is compared with the heroes of romance and epic. Polly tells her lover that she has no reason to doubt him because "I find in the Romance you lent me, none of the great Heroes were ever false in Love." Later Peachum echoes his daughter when he sagely observes to Macheath that "The greatest Heroes have been ruin'd by Women." And Lockit, speculating on Macheath's being taken out of circulation, says of him, "Truly, if that great Man should tip off, 'twould be an irreparable loss. The Vigour and Prowess of a Knight Errant never sav'd half the Ladies in Distress that he hath done."

In all these episodes Gay, like Swift, is directing
his satire simultaneously at the "romantic" past and the "heroic" present: Macheath's heroic posturings are minified by the "genuinely" heroic past, which at the very same time is being brought into proper perspective by the juxtaposition with Macheath's words and actions! This is precisely the way that Samuel Butler works in Hudibras, where the knight-errant Presbyterian colonel and his "authentic" predecessors in knight-errantry are made to work against each other. (It is not, however, the way of that best of realistic conservatives John Dryden, for in Absalom and Achitophel the Biblical past is invoked to shrink parts of the Stuart present, magnify other parts; but it is not itself put on the endless time-belt the dynamic conservatives fashion.)

When Pope deals with the Great Man he does so without the irony usually attendant on portrayal of the hero. In fact, it is in the Essay on Man, not in one of the satires, that Pope develops his attitude toward Greatness. Greatness, he says, lies among the Heroes and the wise.

Heroes are much the same, the point's agreed, From Macedonia's madman to the Swede; The whole strange purpose of their lives, to find Or make, an enemy of all mankind! (Epistle IV, 219-222)

In these lines Pope is straightforwardly denigrating the Great Man. The only irony here is in the word "Heroes"; but what follows is not meant at all ironically.

So Pope, like Tom Brown and Arbuthnot, and Swift and Fielding, who in some ways resembles the dynamic conserva-
tive satirists, sees Greatness as a chronic disease, the Great Man as a perennial menace. Antiquity was just as capable of producing "Great Men"---or virtuosi, pedants, dunces, madmen---as is the Augustan age, and the reverse is of course equally true. The past teaches us that although outward change is constant, the essence of things remains always the same. That is why in A Tale of a Tub Swift, in thrusting at the "madmen" Lucretius and Epicurus, views them exactly as he does his contemporary antagonists, and regards their philosophies as no less pernicious for being somewhat older than Descartes' and Hobbes's.

It is not my thesis that the dynamic conservative satirists largely ignored the differences between their own age and the classical one, nor that they saw the past as an undifferentiated continuum. Like many of their contemporaries they were rather patronizing toward the literature of the Seventeenth Century, be it metaphysical verse or Restoration comedy; regarded Shakespeare as an unsophisticated, "natural" artist, and Chaucer as something of a curiosity. Yet it was Pope who modernized Chaucer, overhauled Donne, and loved Shakespeare's art as a living art. Beyond Chaucer in English literature lay a vast monkish waste. In their scheme of history, then, there were several pasts; but it was only the Graeco-Roman past that was regarded as a peer of the Augustan present.
That Pope, for one, was acutely aware of the distance between his own time and the classical age is evident in all that he wrote about the epic, particularly Homer's epic. (Of course the very fact that for Pope the epic still held the highest place in the literary hierarchy and that, as he told Spence, he himself at one time planned to write an epic,\textsuperscript{36} tells us something about his sense of the past. As Austin Warren has suggested, it was partly because he found it irrelevant to his age (an indictment not of Homer, but of the Eighteenth Century) that he did not write his proposed epic.)\textsuperscript{37}\textsuperscript{37} Douglas Knight makes clear that although Homer had living immediacy for Pope, still Pope did not regard him as a contemporary. In his annotations of the \textit{Iliad} Pope is constantly concerned with Homer's "antiquities". So it is within a context which concedes historical change that Pope interprets Homer's many permanent aspects. "Homer, Knight says, "is not made a sacrifice to history, but no more is he worshipped as a timeless god who needs no place in history."\textsuperscript{38} \textsuperscript{38}

Thomas Parnell felt toward Homer and the epic much as Pope did. In the "Essay on the Life, Writings, and Learning of Homer" which prefaced the first volume of Pope's \textit{Iliad} (1715), the Scriblerus Club member Parnell discussed Homer as a moral teacher---the great teacher of antiquity---who was by no means dated.\textsuperscript{39} Parnell commented that Homer had
seen the dissension of his time and in the *Iliad* had shown its evil effects; the obvious inference to be drawn from this observation is that dissension is a perennial threat which always has ill effects, and that one of the functions of the epic writer, regardless of when he writes, is to defend society against dissidents. This was one of the values that Pope, too, found in the epic. Knight has said it best in these sentences:

As Pope sees him, Homer is not merely an author to be translated, or a model to be imitated, but a primary means of maintaining ordered values in poetry and criticism for a society constantly threatened with the loss of them. Pope could not write the great original poem which would have achieved these ends; but through Homer he was enabled to prolong, for his own day, poetry's precarious place at the center of man's deepest concerns.40

Knight's commentary on Pope's use of Homer is so perspicuous---and lends itself so well to the purpose of this chapter---that I wish to quote at even greater length from it.

The chief function of a heroic style is to convey [a] feeling of urgency, of constant pressure and constant significance...the method is after all not fixed. Milton or Pope shares quite concernedly with Homer and Virgil a way of looking at man, but the precise ordering of this view must vary with time and the language. And beyond all questions of the origin of Pope's style in the Homer stands the question of its ends. This is after all what we mean when we speak of Pope's interest in tradition rather than history; he is interested finally in the result rather than the source. Pope is not Homer because in order to be true to the primary fact that Homer writes heroic poetry Pope must work with the heroic mode as it comes to him. Generalized language or
traditionally used diction or couplet organization is not Homer's means even though we can see strongly suggestive parallels in his own procedure. But they are ways, and for Pope the only ways, of honoring Homer by maintaining the Iliad in the tradition which it initiated.

And this final borrowing from Knight:

Having accepted a duty to both times, [Pope] must somehow reconcile them to one another. But the reconciliation never allowed him to deny all the elements which could not be brought together out of Homer's past and his own present into one poem. He himself makes clear how many of those 'alien' qualities in Homer he understood; indeed as we compare his notes with his poetry we can see how consistently the first provides a setting for the second, a context which helps us to notice what is being done in terms of what cannot be done. Pope's world and Homer's are two sides of a triangle; the completed translation which is the third must not only depend upon each, but relate each to the other. It must recognize that Homer is alive but also that he is different.

The non-dynamic conservative neo-classical writers, in and out of their satires, underscored Homer's antiquity and minimized his aliveness. Bentley ridiculed the idea that Homer had either learning or the desire to instruct mankind. "Take my word for it," wrote Bentley patronizingly, "poor Homer in those circumstances and early times had never such aspiring thoughts. He wrote a sequel of Songs and Rhapsodies, to be sung by himself for small earnings and good cheer, at Festivals and other days of Merriment."

And the painter Jonathan Richardson, in his Explanatory Notes and Remarks on Milton's Paradise Lost (1734),
vigorously denied to any epic of antiquity the right even to be compared with *Paradise Lost*.

Milton, Richardson maintained, had profited by all that his predecessors, ancient and modern, had done, and had gone on beyond them. Therefore comparing him with earlier epic poets was like comparing Westminster Abbey or St. Paul's with the Pantheon—which Richardson thought had been far outstripped by modern architecture.

Another voice in the anti-Homeric chorus was Samuel Richardson's. Pamela's creator, echoing the Dryden attitude toward Homer that we glanced at in connection with the Great Man theme, several times complained of the cruelty of the epic, which he held chiefly responsible for the warlike spirit that had since prevailed among men. In *Sir Charles Grandison* occurs this remark:

> But men and women are cheats to one another. But we may, in a great measure, thank the poetical tribe for the fascination. I hate them all. Are they not inflamers of the worst passions? With regard to epics, would Alexander, madman as he was, have been so much a madman had it not been for Homer? Of what violences, murders, depredations, have not the epic poets been the occasion, by propagating false honours, false glory, and false religion?45

Although we cannot absolutely equate Richardson with this character in his novel, still it is evident that most often Charlotte is a spokesman for her creator. Besides, Richardson outside this novel commenting on the epic reads
very much like Charlotte.

Defoe, as little classically oriented as Richardson, got in several sly digs at "poor Homer" (to use Bentley's epithet) and the continuing use that was made of him. Glancing at the practice of ornamenting political arguments with classical parallels, Defoe sneered, "It is easy to tell you the Consequences of Popular Confusions, Private Quarrels, and Party Feuds, without reading Virgil, Horace, or Homer." The always practical Defoe saw nothing but affectation in quoting the classical writers but it was in a discussion of the controversy about Pope's unacknowledged collaboration on the Odyssey with Fenton and Brome that Defoe made the most revealing self-commentary on his feelings toward the classical past. At the same time he was revealing a great deal about the place to which he assigned literature. Addressing himself to Applebee, the publisher of Applebee's Journal in which his remarks appeared, Defoe offers a lengthy comparison between the various processes in manufacturing a product and writing a book, concluding the comparison by asserting that in both operations, which depend upon a great number of persons to carry them on it is impossible to say "who is the greatest cheat." Finally Defoe gets around to "our cousin Homer [who] himself was guilty of the same Plagiarism." There then follows a highly "imaginative" portrait of Homer as a
blind old ballad singer who had a Spartan named Andronicus and an Athenian philosopher working for him, turning out poems. Defoe caps this fiction with a question directed to the mute Applebee:

Now, Mr. Applebee... was not Cousin Homer a Knave, for imposing thus upon the Grecian world. In a Word, it seems to me that old Homer was a mere Mr. Pope, and Mr. Pope, in that particular, a mere Homer; so that there's ne'er a Barrel the better Herring, except the Master Manufacturer; who like a Bawd to a---, knew the Fraud, and imposed it upon his Customers, and so has been worse than both of them.43

Now Defoe clearly does not expect these lines to be read literally. But if there is hyperbole here, there is no irony in what Defoe says. There you have an Eighteenth Century journalist speaking, a man whose air of easy familiarity with the great men of antiquity only betrays his own provinciality as well as his ignorance of the past. This is what non-dynamic conservative satire comes to when it attempts to make use of the past. All of these ways of looking at the past—Jonathan Richardson's, Samuel Richardson's, and Defoe's—are destructive of that past because they refuse to understand or, if they do understand, to recognize the uniqueness of earlier times; there is an overweening smugness to so many of the comments the non-dynamic conservative men of the period make on Classical art, particularly when they mean to say complimentary things.
Sir Richard Blackmore thought he was being complimentary to the Classical past when he wrote two epic poems, *Prince Arthur* (1695) and *King Arthur* (1697). Where Pope later was to fear to tread, the City physician rushed in, and the result, according to those who have ventured on a reading of the two poems, was a pair of monumental failures. At least part of the reason (the most important part was that Blackmore was no poet) was the basically wrong conception underlying the two *Arthurs*: Sir Richard, who shared the moralistic dislike of the Homeric epic already alluded to, proposed making them great Christian epics. Thus the moral superiority of the Eighteenth Century was to be asserted within a literary framework that had been carved out by the Classical writers.

Blackmore's efforts constituted the grossest travesty of epic tradition, and this was undoubtedly one of the reasons that Pope and Swift singled out Blackmore for satiric attack. The latter, indeed, was eminently qualified for the role in which he was cast: along with his friend Richard Bentley he was more often satirized by the dynamic conservatives than any other Augustan.

But not everyone regarded Blackmore as the dynamic conservatives did. Addison, for one, thought that his use of the past was praiseworthy, and so did John Dennis. In fact, Dennis, who had led off two of the vigorous
attacks directed by London wits against Blackmore, by 1717 was hailing him as a rival to Lucretius. Praise for Blackmore came also from John Hughes, John Locke, Samuel Wesley, and Defoe; and Dr. Johnson insisted that Blackmore be added to his edition of English poets. But I am getting ahead of my story, which has to do not with the break-up of the conservative camp under the impact of middle-class sentimentalism cum pietism, but with that camp's satiric uses of the past.

Only the moralistic writers with their infinitely patronizing attitude to the pre-Christian and therefore morally inferior past could write, or consider writing, Christian epics at a time when serious artists had come to realize that the epic—Christian or otherwise—could no longer be written. Only the dynamic conservative satirists, on the other hand, could write mock-heroic poetry because only they approached the past con amore, without either condescension or pious horror or stultifying awe; they alone saw the writers of antiquity as something other than well protected museum curiosities. It would be presumptuous for me to expatiate on the subject of the neo-classical mock-epic when Geoffrey Tillotson, Austin Warren, Maynard Mack, Winsatt, and Douglas Knight have all written on it, and all with real excellence. Writing on the Rape of the Lock, Tillotson has, I think, come closest to what the
mock-epic means in terms of the dynamic conservative satirist's approach to the past:

The epic, a dying mammoth, lives long enough to see its perfected self-criticism in Pope's poem.

But the triumph of the mock-heroic is not its mockery of a literary form. The mock-heroic poets laugh at the epic form but also at men. This is the reason why Addison's 'Praelium inter Pygmaeos et Grues Commissum' cannot be considered in the line of development. Addison is back again at the Battle of the Frogs and Mice where the mockery, if it touches life at all, only touches life as it is lived in epics. It is as if the Rape of the Lock consisted solely of its sylphs. The best mock heroic poets mock at the literary form for carrying the contemporary 'low' material, but they mock more severely at the material for being so unworthy of the manner. For though the mock-heroic poet adopts a different angle from the epic poet, he is standing on the same ground. Both are serious, morally interested, and in earnest. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries considered the moral element in the epics their first glory, and they did not mock at that as they mocked at the machinery. Indeed, the literal mockery, like the gilded carriages of the time, was intended to get you somewhere worth getting to.

Two things remain to be said, glosses on Tillotson's comment that will serve as summary for this chapter. The dynamic conservative satirists in writing mock-heroic poetry were laughing at the epic, but laughing affectionately and understandingly. And if they were serious and moral, they were not hushedly reverent and moralistic. Their seriousness can best be explained by Austin Warren's insight that "The mock-epic reminds an unheroic age of its own nature:
by historical reference, it defines the 'civilized' present."

By historical reference the dynamic conservative satirists always tried to reach an understanding between past and present that violated the integrity of neither.
Footnotes
Chapter II


5. On the "Battle of the Books" see especially Jones's Ancients and Moderns, Anne Burlingame's The Battle of the Books in Its Historical Setting (New York, 1920), and J. F. Bury's The Idea of Progress (New York, 1932). For the capsule history of the battle which I have presented I have made greatest use of Miss Burlingame's and Professor Jones's books.


9. The Protestant view of history had traditionally been orientated toward the past. The future was important only because it would take place the working out of a pattern begun in the past. Of the gradually developing interest in the future, which was to culminate in general acceptance of the Idea of Progress, Ernest Tuveson [Millenium and Utopia (Berkeley, 1949)], p. 59, writes:

"It is likely that ideas of progress could not develop until the Protestant interpretation of history itself had undergone a reorientation. A new interpretation of the Apocalypse and of the eschatological pattern which yet preserved the great polemical points..."
and permitted advancement rather than decay had to be created.


11 Christ Church College of Oxford was a center of humanism and was decidedly hostile to the New Learning in all its forms. Charles Boyle was closely associated with the so-called Christ Church Wits—among whom was William King—and when Bentley behaved rudely toward Boyle his Christ Church friends retaliated by bringing out a reply, under Boyle's name, to Bentley's Dissertation upon the Epistles of Phalaris. This reply, entitled *Boyle on Bentley*, was more a satire on the great scholar than an analysis of his work. On this whole controversy see Colin J. Horne, "The Phalaris Controversy: King Versus Bentley," *RES*, XXIII (October 1946), 289-305.

12 Horne, p. 297.

13 Ibid., p. 303.

14 See p. 30 and fn 29 of Chapter I.


16 Ibid., p. 313.


18 Ibid., pp. 189-191.


22 I have dealt with the problem of authorship in my first chapter, where I followed Lester Beattie and Charles Kerby-Miller in assigning to Arbuthnot major credit for the *Memoirs*. 
On the poetic celebration of the Hero during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries see Patrick Cruttwell, "The War and Fortune's Son," Essays in Criticism, II, No. 1 (January 1952), 24-37. Cruttwell, as one indication of just how far from this tradition the Eighteenth Century moved, calls attention to the fact that Samuel Johnson praised Shakespeare for having no heroes in his plays.

Dryden's acid comment on Homer vis-à-vis the Hero does not prevent him from recognizing and paying tribute to Homer's greatness. Right after the sentence from the Examen which I have quoted he adds, "...This is Homer's commendation; and such as it is, the lovers of peace, or at least of more moderate heroism, will never enjoy him. But let Homer and Virgil contend for the prize of honour [as the greatest epic writer] betwixt themselves; I am satisfied they will never have a third concurrent."


38 Douglas Knight, "Pope as a Student of Homer," Comparative Literature, IX (Winter 1952), 75.


41 Ibid., p. 66.

42 Ibid., p. 67.


45 Samuel Richardson, Sir Charles Grandison (London, 1812), VI, 315.


48 Ibid., p. 140.


50 Austin Warren, Rage for Order (Chicago, 1948), p. 46.
CHAPTER III

THE LIMITATIONS OF REASON

The contemporary English historian and spokesman for British conservatism, Keith Feiling, has written that the first principle of British conservatives has been "a skepticism, amounting to disbelief, in any purely intellectual process as the means to explain rights and duties, or to justify political obligation." From a critic of conservatism, the sociologist Karl Mannheim, comes agreement with this analysis. Writes Mannheim,

Conservative mentality as such has no predisposition towards theorizing. This is in accord with the fact that human beings do not theorize about the actual situations in which they live as long as they are well adjusted to them. They tend, under such conditions of existence, to regard the environment as part of a natural world-order which, consequently, presents no problems. According to this view of things, which I believe is substantially correct, the conservative is almost invariably going to be anti-intellectual. The liberal, on the contrary, historically has regarded intellectualism as the key which will open all society's sticky doors. Mannheim says of this attitude:

The rise of the bourgeoisie was attended by an extreme intellectualism. Intellectualism, as it is used in this connection, refers to a mode of thought which either does not see the elements in life and in thought which are based on will, interest, emotion, and Weltanschauung---or if it
does recognize their existence, treats them as though they were equivalent to the intellect and believes that they may be mastered by and subordinated to reason.5

The attitude Mannheim describes here is precisely the opposite of that which the conservative holds and always has held. For him will, interest, emotion, and Weltanschauung are all of the utmost importance. They are, indeed, more important than intellect. What the dynamic conservative satirists see as an attempt to have them "mastered by and subordinated to reason" makes these artists react satirically. Not that in the neo-classical period the dynamic conservatives had a monopoly on distrust of naked reason—their response was the universal one, shared by every significant satirist of the time as well as by a very large number of non-satirists. But dynamic conservative anti-intellectualism, as I hope to demonstrate in this chapter, expressed itself in a different way from the pervasive anti-intellectualism which it grew out of.

Mannheim, describing German conservatism's reaction to liberal intellectualism, has put his finger on what I believe is true of conservative thought everywhere and at every time:

As opposed to this mere 'opinion', this bare subjective image [Hegel thus saw the liberal idea of the Enlightenment], the conservatives conceived of the idea as rooted in and expressing itself concretely in the living reality of the here and now. Meaning and reality, norm and existence, are not separated here, because the
utopian, the 'concretized idea', is in a vital sense present in this world. What in liberalism is merely a formal norm, in conservatism acquires concrete content in the prevailing laws of the state. In the objectifications of culture, in art and science, spirituality unfolds itself, and the idea expresses itself in tangible fullness.4

Thus looked at, conservative thought is implacably anti-intellectualistic but not necessarily anti-intellect. It may, that is, recognize and respect the workings of reason; it will not, however, grant reason first priority, will instinctively fight to keep it in its place. Arthur Murphy has made just this point about William James, who "saw clearly," he says,

...and argued eloquently...that our experience is frequently distorted and impoverished by the use of interpretative ideas too narrow and abstract to do justice to its immediate richness and variety. When men are so misguided as to accept not what they see and feel and live through but rather what their preconceptions tell them must be so, they are, according to James, the victims of a 'vicious intellectualism,' a philosophically illegitimate use of ideas to narrow rather than to widen the total area of significant experience.5

To maintain the distinction made above, anti-rationalism (which is how I shall hereafter denominate anti-intellect tendencies) can exist on two levels, one conservative after its own fashion and the other profoundly non-conservative. The first variety is the purely unconscious one of the generality of men, who live lives barely touched by reason—which they almost instinctively hold suspect—and who cling
tenaciously to the existing social forms. The second variety is the possession of men who themselves intellectuals celebrate the feelings and emotion as the only true ways of knowing ourselves and each other. Usually artists—Blake, D. H. Lawrence and Céline are representative examples—they exalt the individual, care almost nothing for the society of which he is a part. If it is at all possible to place them politically, they come under the rubric of philosophical anarchism, which is at a much greater remove from conservatism than is liberalism.

The distinction I have been making between anti-rationalism and anti-intellectualism is of importance because nothing could be more misleading than to read into neo-classical satire, dynamic conservative or otherwise, the anti-rationalism which was unthinkable before the Romantic period. The neo-classical was, after all, the Age of Reason. Just how important the concept of Reason was in the Eighteenth Century is indicated by what Ernst Cassirer has said of it:

All the various energies of the mind are...held together in a common center of force. Variety and diversity of shapes are simply the full unfolding of an essentially homogeneous formative power. When the Eighteenth Century wants to characterize this power in a single word, it calls it 'reason.'
The Restoration Distrust of Reason

But right from the start of the Age of Reason there were cautionary words spoken about reason. After the Restoration, Harold W. Smith tells us, most influential Englishmen associated intellectualism, or "pursuit of reason in the abstract, as against sensory empiricism," with the Puritan Revolution. Under reason were grouped by Thomas Sprat, historian of the Royal Society, Aristotelianism, intellectualism, Protestantism, occultism, romance, rhetoric, and metaphor. These curiously disparate ideas, beliefs, and modes were so grouped because they have in common the workings of mind separate from matter; and because, as Smith puts it, they represent "the complications of thought and disembodied cerebration without an unequivocal empirical guarantee of validity." Rochester, Dryden, and Samuel Butler, each in his own highly individualistic way, all manifested the distrust of reason Smith talks about, and it is their poetic expressions on the subject—satiric and non-satiric—which I wish to consider before focussing on the dynamic conservatives.

Rochester and Right Reason

In his "Satyr Against Mankind" Rochester spoke of Reason as an "ignis fatuus of the Mind, /Which leaves the Light of Nature, Sense, behind." The poet picks up the divines' argument that man is made in God's image and that
it is by Reason "We take a Flight beyond material sense"
only to mock at it in these lines:

Our Sphere of Action is Life's happiness,
And he that thinks beyond, thinks like an Ass. (96-97)

The poet champions right Reason,

That Reason, which distinguishes by Sense,
And gives us Rules of Good and Ill from thence; (100-101)

Harry Levin makes an interesting comparison between
Rochester's "Satyr" and Boileau's eighth satire, which it
was modeled on.

The French poet had also stressed man's bestial
attributes and minimized his intellectual
achievements...But Boileau merely complains
that this rational animal is often unreasonable,
whereas Rochester attack the reason itself.
Boileau, like a scholar, thinks that other men
are unlike himself and therefore fools. Rochester,
the man of the world, knows that other men are
like himself and therefore knaves. While
Boileau---with the traditional ironies of the
humanist---is praising folly, Rochester, in
all seriousness, is castigating knavery. Of
the two, he is the intransigent moralist,
who observes that duchesses and kings can
be prostitutes and stallions; the uncompromis-
ing rationalist who thence concludes that all
men and women must be irrational yahoos and
beasts that want discourse of reason.12

According to this reading of the two poets Boileau is the
reasonable man, the intellectual, who from the vantage point
of Reason surveys man's aberrations from it; Rochester, on
the other hand, Levin sees as the anti-rationalist con-
temptuous not just of the aberrations, but of Reason itself.
However, the poet who manipulates such concepts as Reason
and "right Reason", even if doing so in order to downgrade
the former, is operating out of an intellectual base. If anything, Rochester's thrust at reason suffers from an overdose of reasoning; it is more or less logical exposition, occasionally broken into by an energetic image or a particularly forceful denunciation of man.

**Dryden: Faith vs. Reason**

Dryden's distrust of Reason has different roots than Rochester's and produces a different flower. It manifests itself not in his satires, but in some of the plays and in the expository poems, such as "The Hind and the Panther" and "Religio Laici." The *locus classicus* for Dryden's kind of anti-intellectualism is the famous opening lines of "Religio Laici":

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Dim as the borrow'd beams of moon and stars
To lonely, weary, wand'ring travelers
Is Reason to the soul; and as on high
Those rolling fires discover but the sky,
Not light us here; so Reason's glimmering ray
Was lent, not to assure our doubtful way,
But guide us upward to a better day.
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Where Rochester deposes Reason in order to grant dominion to "right Reason", which corresponds with fair exactness to common sense-instinct, Dryden puts in its place Reason—the evidence of things seen, but seen only dimly—so that Faith, the evidence of things not seen, can occupy its rightful place at the center of man's world.

The "Satyr against Mankind" is only intermittently satiric. So is "Religio Laici," which does not purport
to be satire at all, but which nevertheless satirically turns its attention to deists and dissenters in such emotion-filled lines as these:

This was the fruit the private spirit brought,
Occasion'd by great zeal and little thought.
While crowds unlearn'd, with rude devotion warm,
About the sacred viands buzz and swarm,
The fly-blown text creates a crawling brood;
And turns to maggots what was meant for food. (415-420)

There is a strong foreshadowing of Pope in this passage, where men are imaged as insects in lines that themselves seem to swarm. But Dryden does not sustain this satirical tone, and more often resorts to the expository writing of this passage:

And after hearing what our Church can say,
If still our Reason runs another way,
That private Reason 'tis more just to curb,
Than by disputes the public peace disturb.
For points obscure are of small use to learn;
But common quiet is mankind's concern. (445-450)

There you have the coolly reasoned argument against private Reason of a Boileau, or of a Swift when in a non-satiric mood: the latter's sermon "Of the Trinity" advances practically the same argument against private Reason and for the "public" Church in which the religious mysteries repose that these lines of Dryden do. Moreover, Dryden's verse is not appreciably more poetic than Swift's prose where Reason is involved. The imaginative distance between "The fly-blown text creates a crawling brood" (419-420) and "For points obscure are of small use to learn" (449) seems to me vast and unbridgeable. Dryden, when he con-
trasts Reason with Church-guarded truths, is undoubtedly of interest to the historian of ideas, but he is creating a meagre aesthetic effect.

The Poetry of Statement

Now if I may reintroduce Rochester I should like to make the same observation about the satiric respects he pays Reason. Like Dryden, he is least effective as a poet and a satirist (remembering of course that the total design of "Religio Laici" is not satiric) when he resorts to argumentation untransformed by imagery. Not that the "Satyr against Mankind" is in greater part a dispassionate treatise verging on the prosy—nothing could be further from the truth—still it does exhibit an over-dependence on the language of statement, even if that statement is most often powerfully, indeed savagely, propelled.

Lest I be misunderstood, let me qualify this judgment by saying that I recognize the importance and the value in our poetry of "mere" statement: I am not making a categorical criticism of the "Satyr against Mankind" and "Religio Laici" because they frequently rely on statement. Rather, my criticism stems from the conviction that to achieve real effectiveness satire directed against Reason must not itself use the ordinary forms of Reason in a prosily ordinary way. Especially not when, as in Dryden's poem,
the limit assigned to Reason is a rather arbitrary one, and the territory which is said to lie beyond is surveyed through quite reasonable eyes. There is nothing of the mystical in the insight or the language of "Religio Laici," and there is not even, except in occasional passages such as the one involving the "fly-blown text" which I quoted above, the vigor and warmth of Rochester's satire. Perhaps this is being sophistical, but another critical objection to a primarily expository attack on Reason would seem to present itself: if the poet is going to deal explicitly with philosophical concepts, then he is going to have to submit to a logical scrutiny of his arguments; if they are seen to be untenable or not worth serious consideration, then the poetic configuration in which they exist will stand naked and shivering before the critic. Rochester's philosophizing in the "Satyr Against Mankind" is jejeune, sophomoric. Because it does not undergo poetic transformation, it demands conceptual rather than aesthetic judgment; thus looked at it is doubly damned, since it is not the poetry it purports to be, and as philosophy fails of either unusual lucidity or penetration.

Samuel Butler's Hudibras

Poetic transformation does take place in Samuel Butler's Hudibras, which is not on that account, however, a better poem than either the "Satyr Against Mankind" and "Religio
Laici," or Butler a better poet than Rochester and Dryden. Hudibras's emasculating structural defects and the monotony of its never-ending hexameters have to be reckoned with. Nevertheless for short flights Butler is sometimes a first-rate satiric poet and some of the best of those flights are over intellectualist terrain. Particularly in the first canto of Part I, where Sir Hudibras is introduced and his many talents described, is intellectualism satirized. The Presbyterian "hero's" ability to chop logic, his rhetorical skill, metaphysical speculation, and theological disputation—these are only the most important intellectual activities to come under Butler's satiric scrutiny. Butler may not directly attack Reason, but his indictment of most of Reason's fruits is all the more effective for being oblique.

According to Ricardo Quintana, the most important element in Butler's philosophy is rational Protestantism of the kind expounded by the post-Restoration Anglican rationalists. With one strain of rational Protestantism however, Butler had nothing to do: the sentimentalism which arose mainly as a gesture against Hobbesianism and neo-Stoicism and which was to become one of the dominant elements in the thought and behavior of eighteenth century England. Further, rational Protestantism, while it placed great stress on man's Reason as an instrument of
knowing, did in theory at least ultimately subordinate Reason to that which was to be known, the Christian God. I can find no trace in either Hudibras or Butler's prose characters of a writer whose principle interest in Reason was keeping it free of excrescences so that it might fulfill its highest, religious purpose.

Before we can hope to come closer to the artistic consequences of various satirists' attachment to or detachment from Reason, we must probe deeper into the thought-processes of an age in which Reason obviously did mean so much—or so many things—to the writer of satire. Let us, however, first try to make more orderly, without erecting a system, the particulars examined so far.

In a "reasonable" fashion Rochester lashed out at that Reason which, a higher faculty of mind, distinguishes man from the lower animal forms and enables him to know truth. Against it Rochester advances the claims of "right Reason," which is concerned less with any higher truths than it is with pleasure. Dryden is almost equally scornful of the human intellect, but for a different reason; he regards it as at best an imperfect instrument, of use only when attached to faith. For Dryden, then, Reason does not go far in the direction of leading man outside himself; it partakes too much of the private, while it is the public that matters most. In Butler's vision, too,
Reason smacks overly of the private, therefore is anti-social, fanatical, and useless, as is the case with Hudibras's intellectualizing and the speculations of the scientists in the two poems "The Elephant in the Moon" and "Satyr upon the Royal Society." Perhaps Quintana is right in commenting that in these poems Butler is attacking not science but a species of intellectual folly; nevertheless those species which attract his satiric interest are so numerous and his construction of a positive norm so poor—that he seems to go beyond anti-intellectualism to a position midway between it and anti-rationalism. In place of Reason Rochester offers us "right Reason," Dryden a faith channeled into the Church, Butler dry bread or, better, bread with a spread of wit. Satire contains an affirmative core somewhere in it. That core, if it exists in any of Butler's satirical works, prose or poetry, has thus far escaped my attention.

Rochester was far from being a partisan of enthusiasm or a Romantic manqué. He had as little liking for the idea of a society in which every man formed his own judgments and taste as either of his great contemporaries. Like them he believed that Reason was equally accessible—or inaccessible—to all men, and that those whose speculation, metaphysical, political, or scientific, carried them past the commonly agreed upon limits into a purely
private realm were at best comic figures, at worst potential destroyers.

The "Sin of Pride"

Those who exceeded the limits were thought to be guilty of the "sin of Pride" that Professor Lovejoy has brilliantly described. The sinners, from the neo-classical point of view, included all those who, in Lovejoy's words, made the "attempt to be unnaturally good, and immoderately virtuous, to live by reason alone." That this could and should be done was the belief of the neo-Stoics, against whom Anglican-sponsored sentimentalism was mustered and who, Lovejoy informs us, were seen as the most sinful of those guilty of the sin of Pride. But the neo-Stoics managed to stay pretty well within the rather narrow confines of books, whereas dissenters, virtuosi, and (in much smaller numbers) antiquarian-pedants unrestrictedly roamed London. And each of these groups, in their different ways and in varying degrees, exhibited to the neo-classical gentlemen the earmarks of the "moral overstrain" characteristic of the Prideful. The dissenters were supremely eligible for admission to the gallery of sinners because, in those delightful lines of Butler where Ralpho's wonderful ability to unriddle mysteries is described,

Whate'er men speak by this new light,
Still they are sure to be i' th' right.
'Tis a dark-lanthorn of the spirit,
Which none sees by but those that bear it:  
A light that falls down from on high,  
For spiritual trades to cozen by:  
An ignis fatuus, that bewitches,  
And leads men into pools and ditches,  
To make them dip themselves, and sound  
For Christendom in dirty-pond;  
To dive, like wild-fowl, for salvation,  
And fish to catch regeneration. (First Part, Canto I)

"Which none sees by but those that bear it." There, wrenching from its enclosing metaphor, with its grotesque tail of illustrations that becomes ever more besmeared, is the heart of the argument against dissent. In an age of intellectual disparagement it is an exclusive thing that makes for itself—or so its detractors maintain—grandiose claims to knowledge.

As for the virtuosi, they too repeatedly stumble while pursuing their isolated way. In William King's *Dialogue of the Dead* entitled "Modern Learning" the scene opens with the entrance to Signor Indifferentio of Signior Moderno, all dirty. Moderno, just come from a ditch where he has been tadpole hunting, is asked if it is not too early in the season for tadpoles, to which he replies, yes, "but a Man is so sated with the Winter-Sports within Doors, as Rat-Catching, Mouse-slaying, Crevice-searching for Spiders, Cricket-dissecting, and the like; that the spring leads us into the Fields upon its first approaches." The price of moral or intellectual Pride is a dousing in the ditch; Swift, too, in both the *Tale of a Tub* and the
Mechanical Operation of the Spirit, makes the sinner pay that price.

I have been brazenly violating neo-classical categories, stretching Lovejoy's concept of Pride to where it is hardly recognizable, wandering afield after Puritans and virtuosi until I have myself come near to ending up in a ditch. It is impossible to construct a compartment water-tight enough to keep the neo-classical concepts of Reason, Pride, Common Sense, and Nature, to name only four, from spilling all over each other. "Right Reason," as used by Rochester and some of his contemporaries, very closely approximates common sense; to attain it, one need only follow Nature. But Reason too, which Rochester is attempting to overthrow, demands only an adherence to Nature. Are not the neo-classical rules consonant with Reason because founded on strict adherence to Nature?

Some scattered comments of Bolingbroke, cited by D. G. James in his The Life of Reason, epitomize, I think, the tangled attitudes I have been attempting to describe. Bolingbroke, having scourged the Philosophers, in particular Plato, for being creatures of imagination, accuses Plato and his followers of raising "an immaterial, intellectual world," and in the process showing that they "knew little, imagined much, built beyond nature." Elsewhere he wrote:
...it is a strong instance of the perversity of the human will, but it is true in fact, that men attempt often to go beyond nature, for no better reason than this, because they cannot go up to it; or than this, because they do not find that to be, which imagination has told them might be. These men are metaphysicians...19

The attempt "to go beyond nature" is a perverse one, to be stigmatized by such terms as "intellectual" and "metaphysical." There you can see as clearly as anywhere in neo-classical literature the conceptual and terminological "cross-breeding" of which I have been speaking. You can also see how the intellectual pride which Bolingbroke is castigating could fuse almost imperceptibly with moral pride; in the neo-classical period intellectual, moral, and aesthetic considerations were very closely intertwined—vide the criticism of John Dennis, Pope, and Addison.

It is my thesis that anti-intellectualism is one of the driving forces of dynamic conservative satire; that when the dynamic conservative satirists give expression to their anti-intellectualism in non-satirical writings, e.g., Pope in the Essay on Man and Swift in his sermons, particularly the one "On the Trinity," they are no more impressive than many of their less artistic but equally anti-intellectual contemporaries; that when they turn to satire as a medium and eschew the pose of philosophical spokesman we have seen Rochester strike, they produce perhaps the most telling anti-intellectual documents of their age.
An excellent index of the distance between what is best called conventional anti-intellectualism and the "higher" anti-intellectualism of the dynamic conservative satirists is Thomas Shadwell's comic drama The Virtuoso. That it is comic rather than satirical, making of its central figure, the virtuoso Gimcrack, a type of the man obsessed with a humour rather than a character with real roots in the intellectual soil of his time, is a partial gauge of that distance. Another one is that in the play Shadwell has other follies to ridicule than the scientific; the virtuoso's scientific experiments frequently yield to a love affair between Gimcrack's daughter and her lover. Shadwell's dislike for the New Science obviously did not go very deep; his anti-intellectualism, imbibed from the Restoration atmosphere, was reabsorbed into that atmosphere without electrically charging it in the slightest.

When the dynamic conservative satirists set out in pursuit of intellectuals, scientific or otherwise, they are not deterred by romance or anything else. Three Hours Before Marriage, the play that Gay, Pope, and Arbuthnot all had a hand in, is the one notable exception to this generalization. Mixed in with the satire on Dr. James Woodward's peculiar brand of scientific investigation is a considerable amount of comic material that in no way relates to the life of the mind.
The Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus, Arbuthnot's chief contribution to anti-intellectual conservative satire, takes cognizance of love, but only as a means to the Memoirs' anti-intellectual end. Thus Cornelius, the father of Martinus, had taken as a wife a "Lady of singular beauty, whom not for that reason only he espoused, but because she was undoubted daughter either of the great Scriverius, or of Gaspar Barthius."

Almost always in the satires of the Scriblerians the lineage of the "hero" and of those intimately associated with him is set forth in this manner. Cornelius's own pedigree is far more elaborately described than is his wife's. By providing Cornelius with a mate and supplying a past for both the virtuoso and his mate Arbuthnot creates a fictional matrix for his satire; that matrix he later strengthens in various ways, such as by giving Cornelius a brother Albertus, who in his commonsensical fashion helps check some of Cornelius's more excessive attempts at living the life of reason according to the ancient prescriptions.

Writing about Pope as satirist, Maynard Mack has said that "All good satire exhibits an appreciable degree of fictionality...." Fictionality is, I think, one of the distinguishing characteristics of dynamic conservative satire, and a characteristic that both of Arbuthnot's
major satires, The History of John Bull and Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus, exhibit.

Besides its fictionality (which is, however, incomplete as I shall demonstrate later on) the Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus on another side displays a resemblance to the anti-intellectual efforts of Arbuthnot's fellow dynamic conservative satirists. Like them it gains much of its effectiveness through the burlesque process of reversal, of turning back on the progenitors of some intellectual absurdity their own patterns of thought, only in somewhat altered shape. This kind of reversal can be seen at work throughout Scriblerus, possibly nowhere better than in the following extended passage on Martin's education by his father Cornelius:

Cornelius having read, and seriously weigh'd the methods by which the famous Montaigne was educated, and resolving in some degree to exceed them, resolv'd he [Martin] should speak and learn nothing but the learned Languages, and especially the Greek; in which he constantly eat and drank, according to Homer. But what most conduced to his easy attainment of this Language was his love of Gingerbread; which his Father observing, caused to be stamped with the letters of the Greek Alphabet; and the child the very first day eat as far as Iota. By his particular application to this language above the rest, he attain'd so great a proficiency therein, that Gronovius ingenuously confesses he durst not confer with this child in Greek at eight years old; and at fourteen he composed a Tragedy in the same language, as the younger Pliny had done before him.22
The satirist here stays quite close to the variety of intellectualism he is ridiculing. He carefully observes the forms of classical learning, sprinkling his sentences with such distinguished names as Montaigne, Homer, Gronovius, and Pliny; and making a deep bow to the "learned Languages, and especially the Greek." The switching about of Homer and Montaigne—the former is made to comment on the latter's education—and the nonsense of the gingerbread are handled in such soberly pedagogical fashion and fitted so well into the scholarly context that the unwary reader is likely to miss their significance. Arbuthnot thus has subverted an absurdly intellectualistic attachment to classical learning by going along with it—and then continuing on beyond the point of reasonableness. Just as in The Rape of the Lock and Gulliver's Travels, then, a penetration to the innermost places of the "enemy's" mind and heart has been effected.

The same kind of penetration is made in the Memoirs when Arbuthnot describes the attempt of Cornelius's brother Albertus to stop Cornelius from having his son's spleen cauterized; Pliny had purportedly recommended this operation in order that a youth might run faster and not laugh immoderately:

Albertus was a discreet man, sober in his opinions, clear of Pedantry, and knowing enough both in books and in the world, to
preserve a due regard for whatever was useful or excellent, whether ancient or modern: If he had not always the authority, he had at least the art, to divert Cornelius from many extravagancies. It was well he came speedily, or Martin could not have boasted the entire Quota of his Viscera. What does it signify (quoth Albertus) whether my Nephew excels in the cursus or not? Speed is often a symptom of Cowardice, witness Hares and Deer.---Do not forget Achilles (quoth Cornelius) I know that running has been condemn'd by the proud Spartans, as useless in war, and yet Demosthenes could say "Αυτὴ ὅρεσθαι καὶ πάλιν μαχητεύειν," a thought which the English Hudibras has well rendered.

For he that runs may fight again, Which he can never do that's slain.

That's true (quoth Albertus) but pray, consider on the other side that Animals spleen'd grow extremely salacious, an experiment well known in dogs. Cornelius was struck with this, and reply'd gravely; 'If it be so, I will defer the Operation, for I will not increase the powers of my son's body at the expense of those of his mind. I am indeed disappointed in most of my projects, and fear I must sit down at last contented with such methods of Education as modern barbarity affords.'

In the passage quoted above the cutting instrument is wielded by the perfectly reasonable Albertus, who at the same time that he solemnly makes the utmost use of reason to level hyper-intellectualism, provides the satire with a strong, clearly visible norm.

Again the satirist, after the fashion of dynamic conservatism, has displayed his mastery of the forms and techniques of intellectualism in order to undercut them. Where Rochester and Dryden deliver frontal attacks on the intellectualist position, Arbuthnot, Pope, Swift, and Gay
continually come in from behind, using burlesque and irony as their chief means of subverting the subversive.

Scriblerus, however, fails to go all the way in its fictionality. Having distanced himself, by means of fiction, from the intellectual abuses being satirized, and having secured a measure of our belief in the virtuoso Cornelius, Arbuthnot causes us to end the suspension of our disbelief by systematizing Cornelius's intellectual foibles. The book very shortly becomes a series of mechanically worked out expositions of the diverse ways in which intellectualism makes fools of us. These expositions, particularly the one involving Cornelius's public display of his ability with the ancient lyra, are almost invariably clever and display no lack of wit, but they make impossible any real unity. Arbuthnot, then, moves beyond Rochester and Dryden when for abstract concepts he substitutes fictively worked out varieties of intellectual folly, and when for himself as reasoning foe of the intellect he substitutes semi-fictional characters who act out those varieties of folly. He moves beyond Butler because he makes a tighter weave of the different strands of intellectualism; while Butler, in Hudibras, rather haphazardly assigns to the Presbyterian colonel patterns of metaphysical, rhetorical, and theological thought that we would not expect to find summed up in one dissenting soldier, Arbuthnot has the
excesses satirized in Scriblerus all derive logically enough from Cornelius, the pedantic virtuoso who is inordinately fond of Ancient thought and behavior. In short, Arbuthnot's superior fictional sense, although it gets caught in the poorly functioning machinery he devises for it, nevertheless enables him to function on a higher level as anti-intellectual satirist than Rochester, Dryden, and Butler.

The Beggar's Opera

With Arbuthnot we always know just where we stand. There are no loose ends in his satire, no puzzling ambiguities; the bright light of reason shines directly on reason turned wilful and greedy. When we turn from Arbuthnot to the Gay of The Beggar's Opera, the light flickers, the ambiguities multiply rapidly. That is one reason that Gay's comedy appeals more to our critical sensibilities than either of Arbuthnot's principal satires. The Beggar's Opera is not so easily encompassed by critical canons.

Neither will it fit comfortably into any of the categories of anti-intellectualism outlined above. In the first place its primary aim is not to satirize intellectualism---in fact it is primarily a comic rather than a satiric play. Yet the satiric component is an important one, taking in much more than the satiric treatment of the Great Man
and of Italian opera. And Bertrand Bronson's observation that Gay is simultaneously ridiculing a low society and a high one, while an apt comment, still does not exhaust the play's satiric possibilities.

What we are looking for in Gay's comic opera, an element of anti-intellectualism in some way related to that of the other conservative satirists, is hardly ever explicit in the play. There are very few bits of dialogue that we can point to and remark, "voilà, anti-intellectualism." Nevertheless just that element suffuses the play.

Both Peachum and Lockit are devout partisans of Reason. They are men of the world who understand perfectly the roles that they themselves play, as well as those played by the lawyer, the highwayman, the needy aristocrat, and the politician. Peachum, the more important of the two, never loses sight of the demands that reason makes. To his wife, distraught at the prospect of Polly's marrying Macheath, he says, "Dear Wife, be a little pacified. Don't let your Passion run away with your Senses." (I.i.x). (Almost an echo of this speech is Lockit's admonition to his daughter Lucy, like Polly betrayed by love for Macheath into romantic behavior: "Out of my sight, wanton Strumpet! you shall fast and fortify yourself into Reason, with now and then a little handsome Discipline to bring you to your Senses.—Go." (III.1.).
Peachum and Lockit are the special villains of the piece; they are apostles of Reason, foes of passion; therefore it seems that we are asked by Gay to embrace pure freedom and pure passion, stripped of Reason's confining dress. This is of course sheer nonsense, which is why it is framed in a nonsensical fashion. Peachum advances Reason's claims against his wife and against his daughter; his wife's emotional outburst results from her feeling that Polly, in marrying Macheath, has made a terrible social and financial blunder; Polly throughout recognizes her love for Macheath as an aberration, and at no time ceases to think and to act in as socially calculating a fashion as her parents—or if she does, she knows herself to be so acting in despite of her "better" reason. Listen to Polly with her father:

Polly. I know as well as any of the fine Ladies how to make the most of my self and of my Man too. A Woman knows how to be mercenary, though she hath never been in a Court or at an Assembly. We have it in our Natures, Papa. If I allow Captain Macheath some trifling Liberties, I have this Watch and other visible Marks of his Favour to show for it. A Girl who cannot grant some Things, and refuse what is most material, will make but a poor hand of her Beauty, and soon be thrown upon the Common. (I.vii)

These are also the sentiments of Lucy Lockit, who is as well aware as Polly that in her attempt to secure Macheath as lover and husband she is acting against all that is
reasonable, which is what she believes in.

There still remains Macheath, the object of Peachum's and Lockit's rancor and of Polly's and Lucy's passion. Is he not the play's norm, and are we not asked to applaud his free-and-easy conduct, his liberality and fierce independence? I think not, although Macheath unquestionably attracts to himself the greater part of whatever sympathy the play evokes. But it must be remembered that Macheath is, after all, the Great Man. And even if Gay's satire is directed more at the type of the Great Man than at the highwayman himself, still Macheath is left without the support necessary for a viable norm. Again, Macheath is a weak reed on which to lean the play's anti-intellectualism because his flair for the free and uncalculated life does not carry him very far beyond sexual anarchy in one direction and in another direction the assuming of an ethical code and a style that belong properly to a different class than his. Moreover, that Macheath's ebullience has its "reasonable" bounds is made evident in his dealings with Peachum; even after he is betrayed by that fence he restrains his gang from taking vengeance because of Peachum's strategic economic position.

The satiric laugh, then, would seem to be at the expense of all the characters whom Gay has created for his comic opera. The laughter is graduated, Peachum and
Lockit—the most reasonable characters—coming in for the loudest, but not even the far more sympathetic Polly and Macheath escaping satiric censure. As Bronson and William Empson have commented, Gay turns society upside down not in order simply to ridicule the high made low, but to show the absurdity of both high and low. And, I have tried to make clear, to show the absurdity of the life lived according to "Reason", whether it be the pure economic "Reason" of a Peachum or a Lockit, or the impure one of a Polly or a Macheath. The airy tone with which the whole burlesque is played out is a deceptive one: it constantly puts us off our guard and asks us how we can possibly take seriously the highly stylized goings on, punctuated by bursts of mock-operatic trilling, that occupy the state. But the continually repeated jokes on Tyburn tree, on the next Session, and on death are grim, and the world that is suggested by Gay's play is devoid of the values that we think worth belief. Swift knew what he was doing when he sprang to the defense of the Beggar's Opera.

In saying that the world Gay's comedy calls forth is one without values I am not attempting to convert Gay into a post-Romantic amoralist. On the contrary, I am saying that he was so moral an artist that the world he looked out on appeared as a wasteland. I do not think that Gay was himself aware of the extent to which the
Beggar's Opera reflected so grim a vision; nevertheless the vision gives a weight to the play that makes it something other than comedy or comic satire. Now Maynard Mack has said of satire that it is one end of the literary spectrum, tragedy being the other end.

Tragedy tends to exhibit the inadequacy of norms, to dissolve systematized values, to precipitate a meaning containing—but not necessarily contained by—recognizable ethical codes. Satire, on the contrary, asserts the validity and necessity of norms, systematic values, and meanings that are contained by recognizable codes.

Great satire has, I believe, a way of slipping out of the spectrum, or of containing within it an element that threatens always to move beyond satire to—tragedy. The two ends of the spectrum can meet. I do not think that they actually do meet in the Beggar's Opera, but I think that the play exhibits the inadequacy of norms and tends to dissolve systematized values in just the way that Mack says tragedy acts. There are no characters of anything approaching tragic dimensions, and the comic muse continually engages us; still the world view that peeps out from behind the play's masks has a decided tragic bent. Although they do so in entirely different ways, I believe that the Dunciad and Gulliver's Travels reveal a similar movement toward the tragic. What this movement tells us about the anti-intellectualism of conservative satire is very slight and indeed negative, but it is nevertheless of some significance.
For a satirist to venture onto tragic ground, even if it is only a few feet onto it, is a tacit admission of the inability of the ordinary satiric weapons to inflict heavy enough damage. The ordinary weapons are all used in a satire like Arbuthnot's *Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus*, where the satirist manages always to adhere to the forms of reason while doing battle with Reason overstraining itself. Arbuthnot may distort the modes of Reason or he may even ironically invert them, but he never subverts them in the way that Gay does. The music and the swagger and the jokes of the *Beggar's Opera* may soften the blow that is being struck against the life of Reason, but they cannot turn the blow aside.

Gay is most assuredly not a nihilist. Besides, the satirist—-to repeat what has already been said---is not required to posit a programme or to draw up blueprints for the ideal society which is to replace the one he has satirically blasted. What he must do, though, is at least to suggest (no matter how indirectly) the standards by which he measures and judges. This is just what Gay does not do in the *Beggar's Opera*, and no amount of ducking and weaving in and among "ironies" or "tensions" can disguise that fact. While succeeding in the transformation of the conceptual into the aesthetic Gay fails to make clear the positive base of the concepts so trans-
formed. This failure in no way lessens the comic impact of the play, but it does limit its satiric effectiveness.

The Dunciad on Intellectualism

Unlike the Beggar's Opera but like the Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus, the Dunciad attacks a number of clearly identifiable species of intellectualism. (It also of course satirizes other varieties of folly, but they are not the concern of this chapter.) The attack is most sustained in Book IV, where practically the whole world of learning is represented as groaning under the subjection of Dulness. Lines 21-34 best suggest the extent of Dulness's reign:

Beneath her [Dulness's] footstool, Science groans in Chains,
And Wit dreads Exile, Penalties, and Pains.
There foamed rebellious Logic, gagged and bound,
There, stript, fair Rhetoric languished on the ground;
His blunted Arms by Sophistry are borne,
And shameless Billingsgate her Robes adorn.
Morality, by her false Guardians drawn,
Chicane in Furs and Casuistry in Lawn,
Gasps, as they straiten at each end the cord,
And dies, when Dulness gives her Page the word.
Mad Mathesis alone was unconfined,
Too made for mere material chains to bind,
Now to pure Space lifts her ecstatic stare,
Now running round the Circle finds it square.

There is in this passage no break with what had become the conventional manner of arraigning intellectualism. The false is everywhere dominant. And the false and the mad, in this case mathematics, are regarded as closely allied,
which is hardly an alien insight to satire.

Nor is there anything startlingly original in the satirical speech on verbalism that the poet puts in the mouth of the "pale Boy-Senator" of line 149:

Since Man from beast by Words is known,
Words are Man's province, Words we teach alone.
When Reason doubtful, like the Samian letter,
Points him two ways, the narrower is the better.
Placed at the door of Learning, youth to guide,
We never suffer it to stand too wide.
To ask, to guess, to know, as they commence,
As Fancy opens the quick springs of Sense,
We ply the Memory, we load the brain,
Bind rebel Wit, and double chain on chain;
Confine the thought to exercise the breath;
And keep them in the pale of Words till death. (149-160)

This is, on one level, no more than good straight Baconian-Hobbesian-Swiftian mistrust of "mere words," the same mistrust that gave an added impetus to the jabs so often directed at Aquinas and the Schoolmen. On another level it is the protest of the gentleman, the humane man of letters, the Wit, against that pedantry which, short on taste and a sense of the beautiful, is long on learning and knowledge.

Closely allied to the sentiment of this passage is that of the one I am about to quote. The speaker this time is Bentley, who thus addresses his patron Dulness:

'Ah, think not, Mistress! more true Dulness lies
In Folly's Cap, than Wisdom's grave disguise.
Like buoys that never sink into the flood,
On Learning's surface we but lie and nod.
Thine is the genuine head of many a house,
And much Divinity without a Nous,
Nor could a BARROW work on every block,
Nor has one ATTERBURY spoiled the flock.
See! still thy own, the heavy Canon roll,
And Metaphysic smokes involve the Pole.
For thee we dim the eyes, and stuff the head
With all such reading as was never read:
For thee explain a thing till all men doubt it,
And write about it, Goddess, and about it:
So spins the silk-worm small its slender store,
And labours till it clouds itself all o'er. (239-254)

As always in neo-classical satire the metaphysical is, to put it mildly, suspect. So too are undue prolixity and complexity. In these lines, then, as in the others quoted from Book IV, the satiric butts are familiar brands of intellectualism.

What is not so familiar is the comprehensiveness with which they are surveyed. In passage after passage of Book IV, against type after type of intellectual error, Pope trains his satiric guns. But despite the comprehensiveness of the attack it is never diffused as it is in Hudibras, nor does it become mechanical, which is what happens in the Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus. Negatively considered, Book IV succeeds in its comprehensiveness because it does not string a large number of conceptual beads on a string whose ends the satirist can always be seen manipulating. Pope in The Dunciad does not shy away from such abstractions as Reason, Wit, and Metaphysics; he just makes them over poetically and uses them fictionally, that is concretely.

The basic fictive premise of The Dunciad is that Dulness is a great goddess whom most men worship, and that
she and her worshippers are to be accorded epic tribute. The minor premises are that Dulness's worshippers choose a king from among themselves and that a number of very important ceremonies attend the choice and the seating of that king. Of course we are not asked to believe in Dulness the way we are asked to believe in Huck Finn or Becky Sharp; nevertheless Pope's satire does demand our entrance into its mythological framework and, once inside it, our willingness to accept the terms on which that framework has been constructed. In other words The Dunciad requires of us not that we suspend disbelief from the moment we enter its mock-epic world, but that we recognize the solidity of that world, see it as something more than and different from 1729 or 1743 London at the same time that we make ourselves fully aware of its intimate connections with Grub Street and Smithfield. We must recognize Bentley as Bentley and other-than-Bentley, Cibber as Cibber and other-than-Cibber.

Equipped with this awareness we can see in a new perspective the passages from Book IV that I quoted earlier. The first passage, which describes Dulness's great triumph over Science, Wit, Rhetoric, etc. now takes on a different coloring than it originally wore; its 'high' rhetoric is perfectly congruous with the exaltedly heroic language that comes at the beginning of Book IV;
its quasi-catalogue of intellectual deviations is seen to be more than a spleenful listing drawn up by the poet—this is rather one of the voices of the poem speaking, that of the epic chronicler.

The second passage quoted, the one that begins "Since Man from beast by Words is known," comes from a different realm entirely. The note of doom that marks the lament for Dulness's victims is missing, and in its place is a sophisticated, almost jaded tone that asks for our approval of its kind of intellectualism. The defense of verbalism on the surface appears, at least for a number of lines, to be reasonable. Only when we fit the passage into context are we made aware of the ironic technique Pope is using, having a character damn himself and his doctrine out of his own mouth.

So with the lines given Bentley to address to Dulness. Again we are asked to listen to an eminently "reasonable" man, albeit one who sets his words to a distressingly slow tempo that curiously reflects the plea he is entering for "Metaphysic smoke" and for dimming the eyes and stuffing "the head/With all such reading as was never read." (249-250). Again intellectualism unwittingly damns itself. The technique is the same as in the defense of verbalism, the tone a little different. In both passages a naïf, granted fictive existence as part of the crowd assembled
by Dulness, is seen to give his own cause away. But he "succeeds" in doing so only because of the inverted norm, Dulness, which Pope has brought into existence: the naif's plea is perfectly consistent with Dulness's standards, and it is its very consistency to what we have come to recognize as a destructive force that damns it. Pope may strike out with varying degrees of intensity at different manifestations of intellectualism, but always he makes it quite apparent—as in what he says about Science being subjected by Dulness—that it is not learning itself or knowledge itself or reason itself he is satirizing, but their excesses. In The Dunciad this positive standard is never insisted on, still it is implicit throughout. It is not a matter of a constructive Pope against a destructive Gay; Pope offers no more of an alternative to what he satirizes than Gay does. It is rather a matter of Pope's consistently embodying in his satire the point of view from which he satirizes while Gay fails to do so. But both artists alike avoid the moralistic and the sentimental, choosing instead to cast their anti-intellectualism in dramatic and fictional form.

In The Dunciad, in Book IV especially, Pope rises to an emotional intensity that he nowhere else reaches. Kept within the bounds of the poem's mythic framework it is a constantly sensed force which at the end of the
poem develops amazing power. F. R. Leavis, writing of the requiem with which the Dunciad closes, has said of it:

The passage seems to me finer than anything in Dryden...It has a greater intensity (an intensity that Dryden, with his virtues of good humour and good nature, was incapable of), and this is manifest in the very much tauter and more sensitive verse [Leavis is comparing the close of The Dunciad with that of Mac Flecknoe], the finer life of the movement.26

And Judson B. Jerome, in an unpublished paper that studies the relationship between The Dunciad and Mac Flecknoe, has described the greater intensity which Leavis feels to exist in Pope's poem. I think that what Jerome has to say about two seemingly parallel passages from the two poems is of extraordinary interest. The passages are these:

Some Beams of Wit on other souls may fall,  
Strike through and make a lucid intervall;  
But Sh's genuine night admits no ray,  
His rising Fogs prevail upon the Day;

Mac Flecknoe, 21-4.

Oh ever gracious to perplexed mankind,  
Still spread a healing mist before the mind;  
And, lest we err by Wit's wild dancing light,  
Secure us kindly in our native night.

Dunciad, I, 173-6.

Here is Jerome's commentary:

Dryden is more apt to provoke laughter.  
His intention to provoke laughter is clear,  
and he has, as though consciously, eliminated every overtone of his image which does not bear toward that end. Compare his 'genuine night' with Pope's 'native night.' Dryden's is absolute in its blackness, definitive
in its impenetrability; it is a solid counter that means perfectly what it needs to mean and no more. A 'native night', however, associates dullness with all the dark beginnings of civilization; night becomes a state out of which man has uncertainly risen and to which he can all too easily relapse. And mankind is involved in Pope's lines, whereas Dryden's 'other souls' permits the reader to escape the judgment of the image. There is, in the passage from Dryden, the genial assumption that all of us normal people may laugh comfortably at the aberration of Shadwell. But we count ourselves among Pope's 'perplexed mankind.' The 'healing mist' proffers a tempting promise to any of us who may have been perplexed; the night which can 'Secure us kindly' is one that we have all, in weak moments, wished for; wit's threat of error is a threat which I feel at this moment overshadowing my precarious critical flight. Finally Dryden's 'beams of Wit' are a steady, dependable force in the universe, streaming from a constant sun: reason. If we only let it through, reason will warm us and dispel the fog. But who knows or trusts the source of 'Wit's wild dancing light'? Pope's ironic smile does not overcome the impact of Gibber's image. We cannot help recognizing the aptness of the metaphor and conceding that the source of wit may very well be infernal.

As testimony to the emotional pull of Book IV there is the commentary of Gilbert Highet, who meaning to condemn The Dunciad, wrote:

We can only believe that one man could hate all these persons and their works and their ideals. It is not hard to hear, in this universal shriek of loathing and despair, the voice of Gulliver among the Yahoos....

All his work, except the Dunciad, is infused with a spacious baroque optimism which is directly opposed to the thesis that sin and barbarism are spreading wider and wider
through the world. Much of it does indeed contain fierce criticism of individual barbarities or barbarians. But only in the Dunciad are these separate criticisms transcended by a general indictment of the human race.29

Like Jerome I would regard as praise what Highet intends as damnation. Only I would first moderate Highet’s statement about Pope’s “general indictment of the human race.” The Dunciad contains no such indictment; what it does contain is that tragic view of life which I have suggested can be glimpsed in The Beggar’s Opera. In The Dunciad as in so much great dynamic conservative satire the satirical strain deepens and takes on some of the characteristics, if not the form or techniques, of tragedy. What gives Book IV its added dimension is the contemplation by the epic historian of the chaotic state into which his society threatens to sink. Not the least of the forces threatening to bring on chaos is rampant false intellectualism:

See skulking Truth to her old cavern fled,
Mountains of Casuistry heaped o’er her head!
Philosophy, that leaned on Heaven before,
Shrinks to her second cause, and is no more.
Physics of Metaphysics begs defence,
And Metaphysics calls for aid on Sense!
See Mystery to Mathematics fly!
In vain! they gaze, turn giddy, rave, and die.

(IV, 641-648)

These are lines that convincingly demonstrate the kind of fusion of the conceptual with the metaphoric, the whole informed by powerful feeling, which the dynamic conserva-
tive satirists alone among neo-classical satirists achieve. Anti-intellectualism may not be a desirable part of our daily diet, but in *The Dunciad* it helps sustain the life of the poetry.

 Arbuthnot turns reason on reason in defence of Reason; Gay with a light-heartedness shot through with images of death and desire makes the life of Reason untenable; Pope makes uninhabitable the kind of society that has come to be ruled by a reason twisted to the purposes of a false intellectualism. He does so by having false intellectualism's representatives stick their heads in rhetorical nooses of their own devising; by breathing into the 'objective' comments that he gives himself as epic writer a fiercely emotional spirit; and by creating a pattern of imagery appropriate to the controlled hate which animates the poem. The embryonic imagery of Book I, the recurring insect imagery, the images of madness and of chaos—all help make up that pattern. Certainly an important part of it is the scatological imagery scattered abundantly through Book II. The scatological is an appropriate enough preparation for the idea of chaos that echoes and re-echoes throughout the poem, to assume the chief role at the end.
Scatology versus Intellectualism

I bring in Pope's scatology neither to defend nor attack it. I wish only to account for it and relate it to Swift's much more prevalent scatology, at the same time suggesting the significance for both men's anti-intellectualism of the scatological. I think that I may first assume that neither Pope nor Swift ever (or hardly ever) indulges in smut for smut's sake. I think it is a valid generalization that scatology, which reduces man to his minimal nature, is per se the strongest expression—though not necessarily the most effective—of anti-intellectualism possible to language. Scatology says by its very presence that man's intellect is but a superstructure, man's body the essential structure. The use of physical horror, as Martin Price commenting on Swift's Modest Proposal has observed, functions in much the same way as scatology:

The use of physical horror—the plan for 'buying the children alive, and dressing them hot under the Knife'—has much the same function as the use of disgust in other works. Just as Man's pride in his rationality must be confronted with a concrete image of his animal drives in the Yahooos, the benign theorizers about economic man must be made to see their abstraction come to life at the very moment when their inhumanity is most flagrant.50

Of course neither Pope nor Swift offers the scatological as a final judgment on man. Rather they use it as a check on man's presumptions, as a reminder that although reason
has its uses, below reason and capable always of wiping it out is the animal. The late Middle Ages had its memento mori, the neo-classical period its memento animalis.

By his scatology and his use of physical horror Swift asserts the power and inevitability of unreason. Man cannot, as he is constituted, escape his own irrational component. That does not mean, however, that Swift asks us to glorify the irrational as having an equal claim on us with the rational. He was neither a Manichaean nor a Twentieth Century philosophical anarchist. Besides, he believed as fervently in the possibility of Reason as he did in the inescapability of unreason. Listen to him, for example, in his sermon "On the Trinity":

...it would be well if People would not lay so much Weight on their own Reason in matters of Religion, as to think every thing impossible and absurd which they can't conceive. How often do we contradict the right Rules of Reason in the whole Course of our Lives? Reason itself is true and just but the Reason of every particular man is weak and wavering, perpetually swayed and turned by his Interests, his Passions, and his Vices.31

Reason may be an almost ineffable force, yet it does exist and can be apprehended. Indeed its accessibility is one of the basic tenets of the neo-classical system of beliefs, a tenet which every one of the dynamic conservatives accepted unquestioningly. What followed from belief in this tenet is described by Lovejoy:
The presumption of the universal accessibility and verifiability of all that is really needful for men to know implied that all subtle, elaborate, intricate reasonings about abstruse questions beyond the grasp of the majority are certainly unimportant and probably untrue. Thus any view difficult to understand, or requiring a long and complex exercise of the intellect for its verification, could be legitimately dismissed without examination, at least if it concerned any issue in which man's moral or religious interests were involved. A 'system' was a legitimate object of suspicion simply because it was a system.\(^2\)

Lovejoy calls this attitude rationalistic anti-intellectualism, a term that perhaps best names the whole complex of anti-intellectual ideas with which this chapter has been dealing.

Certainly Swift is rationalistic in his anti-intellectualism. No one defends Reason more vigorously than he does. No one is more firmly convinced that it is in constant need of defence, since men violate it continually.

Among the multitude of violators are Grub Street hacks, antiquarians, and poetasters. Against all of them, in *The Battle of the Books* and *A Tale of A Tub* particularly, Swift is vehement enough. But these are relatively minor offenders, presenting no grave menace to the thin fabric which is society. They may tamper with reason, but they do not have it in their power to subvert it. Ernst Cassirer has observed that for the Enlightenment ignorance was not the "gravest obstacle to the investigation of truth.... Of much deeper effect are those divergences
from truth which do not arise from a mere insufficiency of knowledge but from a perverted direction of knowledge." Dogma rather than doubt, he points out, was regarded as the worst enemy of knowledge. And the force which was thought to inflict "the mortal wound on knowledge" was ignorance pretending to be and wanting to pass for truth. "For here it is not a matter of error but of deception, not a matter of an illusion arising inadvertently but of a delusion of the intellect into which it falls by its own fault and in which it becomes more and more enmeshed." 

Those with the greatest power to subvert in Swift's time are the non-conformists and the virtuosi, both of which groups Swift thought to be suffering from "a delusion of the intellect." Not only are the non-conformists guilty of social and political heresy, of constituting a faction, but they are guilty of even graver intellectual sins: they sin against common sense/reason by their outrageous cant, their "enthusiasm," and that unreasonable opposition to the traditional Church forms and ceremonies, and they sin against "Reason itself" by claiming to have direct, intuitive knowledge of God and of God's law. Dropping his ironic guard in "A Discourse on the Mechanical Operation of the Spirit" Swift says:

For, I think, it is in Life as in Tragedy, where, it is held, a Conviction of great Defect, both in Order and Invention, to inter-
pose the Assistance of preternatural Power, without an absolute and last Necessity. However, it is a Sketch of Human Vanity, for every Individual, to imagine the whole Universe is interest'd in his meanest Concern. If he hath got cleanly over a Kennel, some Angel, unseen, descended on purpose to help him by the Hand; if he hath knocked his Head against a Post, it was the Devil, for his Sins, let loose from Hell, on purpose to buffet him. Who, that sees a little paultry Mortal, droning, and dreaming, and drivelling to a Multitude, can think it agreeable to common good Sense, that either Heaven or Hell should be put to the Trouble of Influence or Inspection upon what he is about?35

There you have an additional offense against Reason (and at the same time against "common good sense") by the non-conformists. They assume for man an importance out of all proportion to his role in a world he never made. For all these intellectual sins the non-conformists are harshly dealt with at the end of the "Mechanical Operation" when they are overwhelmed by the scatalogical, which completely smothers all intellectual pretensions. In Swift's words,

Let That be as it will, thus much is certain, that, however Spiritual Intrigues begin, they generally conclude like all others; they may branch upwards towards Heaven, but the Root is in the Earth. Too intense a Contemplation is not the Business of Flesh and Blood; it must by the necessary Course of Things, in a little Time, let go its Hold, and fall into Matter. Lovers, for the sake of Celestial Converse, are but another sort of Platonicks, who pretend to see Stars and Heaven in Ladies Eyes, and to look or think no lower; but the same Pit is provided for both; and they seem a perfect Moral to the story of that Philosopher, who, while his Thoughts and Eyes were fixed upon the Constellations, found himself seduced by his lower parts into a Ditch.36
In Gray's Elegy the paths of glory lead but to the grave, in Swift's satiric scheme of things they lead to the ditch. That is the final resting place in the passage just quoted not only of the philosopher of the little story, but also of the conductors of "spiritual intrigues" and the "Lovers for the sake of celestial converse." All are equally guilty of the sin of "too intense a contemplation."

"Too intense a contemplation is not the business of flesh and blood." That might well be the slogan for dynamic conservative anti-intellectual satire. At any rate it sums up admirably the attitude Swift takes toward the virtuosi. In A Tale of a Tub and most tellingly in the "Voyage to Laputa" section of Gulliver's Travels Swift displays the consequences of too intense a contemplation of the physical world. Even more than the non-conformists the virtuosi are seen by Swift to represent the height of intellectual presumption. Their desire to know more than man can or should know represents an attempt to hurdle the natural barriers that Reason erects and to meddle with the "mysteries" that huddle behind it.

But the greatest sinner of all, the man most guilty of excessive intellectualism, is neither a non-conformist nor a virtuoso. He is Gulliver, the simple ship's doctor. Gulliver's sin, however, is best dealt with in the chapter on dynamic conservative anti-Utopianism, a chapter closely
related to the present one since anti-intellectualism and anti-Utopianism often overlap. The purpose of this chapter is best served by pressing into service this lengthy quotation from Robert C. Elliott's study of "Gulliver as Literary Artist":

[Gulliver's] is the pride of the Stoic—or the neo-Stoic—whose principal doctrine it was that man should govern his life solely by the exercise of unimpassioned reason; for the neo-Stoic the passions were totally vile and were to be brought completely under the domination of reason. The Houyhnhnms exemplify perfectly the principles of neo-Stoicism; as Gulliver says, 'their grand Maxim is, to cultivate Reason, and to be wholly governed by it.' Now that kind of life may be very well in Houyhnhnm-land, where reason is not 'a Point problematical as with us...but strikes you with immediate Conviction; as it must needs do where it is not mingled, obscured, or discoloured by Passion and Interest'. But men are not Houyhnhnms; men are notoriously creatures of passion....To try to evade this reality, to try to live by pure reason, by what Lovejoy calls this 'lofty and strenuous moral temper' was to be guilty of a sort of 'moral overstrain.' This overstrain is a form of pride...Lovejoy calls it an 'attempt to be unnaturally good, and immoderately virtuous, to live by reason alone.' This is precisely the case of Gulliver; his 'overstrain' is symbolized in his galloping gait and his whinnying tone, and his pride is presented dramatically as he scorns the good about him and settles for the shadow of a shadow: two horses and the smell of the stable.37

So Swift in defence of a Reason which man is capable of though he seldom attains it strikes down the proud man who would deny his species even the potentiality of Reason while himself attempting to live by an impossible intellectual code. For all the dynamic conservative
satirists Reason is a force which is constantly threatened, the gravest threat coming from precisely those who are most ambitious for it. Its limitations are sever, but then man, at best a flawed creature, must always live within certain limits. Thus in the dynamic conservative view Reason is a precious quality to be fought for passionately with every satiric weapon available.
Footnotes

Chapter III

3 Ibid., p. 108
4 Ibid., p. 209.
6 Lionel Trilling, "Sherwood Anderson," The Liberal Imagination (Garden City, N.Y., 1953), pp. 36-37, makes this profound statement on the nature of anti-rationalism:

Anderson never understood that the moment of enlightenment and conversion—the walking out—cannot be merely celebrated but must be developed, so that what begins as an act of will grows to be an act of intelligence. The men of the anti-rationalist tradition mock the mind's pretensions and denounce its restrictiveness; but they are themselves the agents of the most powerful thought. They do not of course really reject mind at all, but only mind as it is conceived by respectable society. 'I learned the Torah from all the limbs of my teachers,' said one of the Hasidim. They think with their sensations, their emotions, and, some of them, with their sex. While denouncing intellect, they shine forth in a mental blaze of energy which manifests itself in syntax, epigram, and true discovery.

9 Ibid., p. 125.
10 Smith, loc cit.

12 Ibid., Introduction, pp. 5-6.

13 The Works of John Dryden, X.


15 See R. S. Crane, "Suggestions toward a Genealogy of the 'Man of Feeling,'" ELH, I (1934), 205-230.


17 King, Dialogues of the Dead..., p. 326.


19 Ibid., p. 246

20 Arbuthnot, Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus, p. 95.


22 Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus, p. 106.

23 Ibid., pp. 113-114.


26 F. R. Leavis, Revaluations (London, 1936), p. 89.


28 Ibid., p. 13.

29 Gilbert Higget, "The Dunciad," MLR, XXXVI (1941), 342.


34 Cassirer, loc. cit.


36 ibid., p. 291.

A state of mind is utopian when it is incongruous with the state of reality within which it occurs. This incongruence is always evident in the fact that such a state of mind in experience, in thought, and in practice, is oriented towards objects which do not exist in the actual situation. Utopia, then, in Karl Mannheim's view is a state of mind as well as—or perhaps, before—it is that paradox, a systematically worked out nowhere. As either state of mind or existing program—this chapter deals with both, the first under the rubric Utopianism, the second under the heading Utopia—it is of course a commentary, and necessarily an unfavorable one, on the society that has produced the Utopia-maker; if one's own society is all that it should be, then an excursion beyond the state of reality is pointless. Of course the Utopian is forced to draw to a considerable extent upon either an existing or a past society (or on both together) for some at least of the features of his ideal one. So Plato levied on both an idealized Sparta and Athens for his Republic. But the look of the face is always different no matter how many of the old features are retained.

As cautiously as he may tread in his projected paradise, as conservatively as he may deal with things as they
are, every Utopian is still a potential disturber of the peace. One of those most likely to be disturbed is the satirist, for as Maynard Mack has observed, "Satire... asserts the validity and necessity of norms, systematic values, and meanings... contained by recognizable codes."2

Beginning with such meanings, the Utopia-maker must at some time leave them behind.

The satirist as conservative finds Utopian thinking and planning particularly uncongenial. Mannheim has described the natural antipathy of conservative thought for Utopianism:

Conservative mentality as such has no utopia. Ideally it is in its very structure completely in harmony with the reality which, for the time being, it has mastered. It lacks all those reflections and illuminations of the historical process which come from a progressive impulse. The conservative type of knowledge originally is the sort of knowledge giving practical control. It consists of habitual and often also of reflective orientations towards those factors which are immanent in the situation.3

Threatened by opposing classes, however, the conservative reflects on his historical-philosophical situation. And out of these reflections, Mannheim points out, "arises a counter-Utopia which serves as a means of self-orientation and defence."4 What better agent in the management of counter-Utopia than the satirist?

It is the purpose of this chapter to define the nature of neo-classical counter-Utopianism and to discover the
role played in it by dynamic conservative satire. The problem is, I believe, largely an historical one; therefore I shall proceed along historical although not strictly chronological lines. Rather than write a history of counter-Utopia, I shall make a rough cross-section of it, including in my cross-section occasional views of Utopia. Counter-Utopia is incomprehensible without some understanding of what exactly it is going counter to.

Some Early Anti-Utopias

Not much is known about the very early creators of Utopias, but we do know that Plato was not their "onlie begetter." That literary Utopias were being erected even before Plato is evidenced by the fact that Aristophanes set to work undermining them in his The Ecclesiazusae (variously assigned to 389, 392, and 393 B.C.). In that play Prexagora, the leader of the group of women who have taken over the rule of the city by disguising themselves as men and voting in the assembly, outlines the ideal state which she expects to emerge now that her sex is in power. Since all things are to be held in common in this state, such vices as thieving and gambling will cease to exist. It will be a society, Prexagora says, in which

...all shall be equal and equally share
All wealth and enjoyments, nor longer endure
That one should be rich, and another be poor.
How does the crusty conservative Aristophanes handle this dream of fair woman? By making the dreamer speak so rhapsodically and naively about the whole thing that our disbelief is never for one moment suspended. Utopian speculation annoyed the Greek playwright, but it obviously did not represent to him a major threat, one that required the satirist's heavy weapons.

Lucian satirized the Utopian mentality in his little dialogue, *Hermotimus* (C.165). Hermotimus is the eternal undergraduate who at forty is still waiting for the philosophical revelation that will illuminate his life. A pupil of Stoic teachers, he might just as well have set at Epicurean, or Peripatetic, or Cynic feet. As he so innocently reveals to his interrogator—and tormentor—Lycinus, he had chosen the Stoic school in which to study because its popularity and the impressive appearance of its teachers had convinced him that the Stoic doctrine was the correct one. What Hermotimus is after is the nowhere of rarefied intellectual converse and pure wisdom, where the dross of worldly striving after money and knowledge is exchanged for undistilled nectar. There is, he believes, one Answer and one Answerer, and if a man follows after the Answerer long enough he will have surcease from all those evils that afflict both the flesh and the spirit.
Lucian and Aristophanes have this in common: although both regard Utopianism of any variety with distaste, neither thinks it a menace that threatens to overturn all established values at any moment. Thus the blows they direct at it are relatively playful ones. An important distinction between their approaches to Utopia is that where Lucian's satire seems to arise out of a wholly intellectual—or anti-intellectual—feeling, Aristophanes' is rooted in the more easily recognizable conservative dislike for political and economic upheaval. But then of course Lucian is satirizing a state of mind, Aristophanes a state with tangible political and economic forms.

Renaissance Utopianism

While men surely went on dreaming of ideal states they do not seem to have written much about them between the classical period and the early Renaissance. Then in the early part of the Sixteenth Century Sir Thomas More sent Raphael Hythloday on a voyage to Utopia; and Rabelais, in the third book of his Gargantua and Pantagruel, imagined an ideal life in the fictional Abbey of Thélème. According to Samuel Putnam, the Frenchman owed the Utopian concept to More. However the Abbey of Thélème is strikingly different from More's Utopia and from all other projected Utopias: the one rule of its order is "Fay ce que vouldras." As Rabelais envisaged things,
In the enjoyment of their liberty, the Thelemites entered into a laudable emulation in doing, all of them, anything which they thought would be pleasing to one of their number. If anyone, male or female, remarked: 'Let us drink,' they all drank. If anyone, said: 'Let us play,' they all played.

A rule but no rulers or ruled, and pleasure as a primary consideration, these things set Thélème off from other Utopias. How unlike, for example, More's imaginary state with its fairly rigid discipline that prescribes slavery for adulterers and those taken outside the city limits without a passport. Or Plato's Republic with its rigid social stratification. Or W. H. Hudson's Crystal Age, where the sexual instinct is crushed out. Almost every Utopia but Rabelais's makes extraordinary demands within the tightly closed system that it creates.

Neo-classical counter-Utopian satire pounds on those closed systems, offering in their place extreme mobility. On the stage, in Molière's Le Misanthrope, it is social mobility, but in the non-dramatic satiric literature of the period it is actual physical mobility. That is the case with The Dunciad, Gulliver's Travels, and Samuel Johnson's Rasselas. In all three works there is a wide-sweeping movement by the central figure or figures of the satire; the spatial sense is very strong in this trio of satires: the whole of London seems to come kaleidoscopically to view in The Dunciad; Gulliver journeys beyond
what is known to Europeans and touches on unknown (and of course unknowable) shores; and Rasselas goes on a pilgrimage which takes him through much of northern Africa.

The mobility of Gulliver and of Rasselas is, however, in a way deceptive. It seems to exist to suggest man's limitations rather than the converse. Both Lemuel Gulliver and Rasselas conclude their journeys where they had begun them, and in neither case has any of the societies discovered yielded up any image of perfection. Unlike Rasselas, Gulliver does think he has come upon the perfect society, but as I hope to demonstrate later in this chapter, Gulliver's standards are definitely not those that ultimately prevail in Swift's book. In neither Gulliver nor Rasselas, then, does Utopia turn out to be someplace "out there." Before I turn to these works I wish to look at the one non-English, dramatic satire of the time which is relevant to my thesis.

Molière's Alceste does not project any system. Still he is a Utopian, and as such makes the same extra-human demands of his fellows that Utopians always make. Le Misanthrope (1669), in which Alceste is the central figure, is more comic than satiric, but the element of satire is of considerable importance in the play. (Molière's play is the first considerable treatment of Utopianism after the reappearance in the Renaissance of literary Utopias.)
Within the two centuries following the publication in 1516 of More's *Utopia* Joseph Hall wrote *Mundus Alter et Idem* [c.1605]; Andreae, *Christianopolis* [1619]; Campanella, *The City of the Sun* [1623]; Harrington wrote *Oceana* [1656]; yet all during that period no Aristophanes or Lucian seems to have come forward with so much as the gentlest satiric admonition to the Utopia-markers. 9

Of the several satiric strands worked into Molière's play, one in particular is of interest here, the one involving the efforts of the misanthrope Alceste to remodel the Parisian sophisticates through whose salons he moves. Unquestionably Alceste exerts great satiric pressure on the generally shallow and hypocritical society creatures. But at the play's end salon society is successfully withstanding the pressure applied to it, and its severest critic is himself an object of ridicule. Alceste, in his incessant demand for a perfect society—a Utopia—becomes guilty of intellectual and moral pride. And his decision to break completely with society is in a way anti-climactic, since he has already imposed a sort of spiritual isolation on himself. His self-exile I cannot see as having been intended by Molière to invoke either applause or emulation; as in *Tartuffe*, the characters to whom our sympathy goes are those fallible humans who, while aware of their own and their society's
shortcomings, are willing to live with them—in *Le Misanthrope*, Alceste's friend Philinte and his sweetheart Célimène.

Molière has by no means represented Alceste as a downright crank worthy of no sympathy. On the contrary he is an attractive, intelligent young man whom we at first feel to be a sensitive critic of an artificial, nature-stifling world. Even his growing misanthropy does not invalidate entirely his criticisms of a smug and artificial society, no more than Lemuel Gulliver's savage indictment of the European society he has known is erased because of his misanthropy. But in *Le Misanthrope*, written in the seedtime of neo-classicism for a closely knit, homogeneous group, the standards by which Alceste is appraised and his Utopianism found in excess of human capabilities are clearly defined. They are, moreover, fairly positive standards and, as I have tried to establish, win a positive victory.

So Molière in reaffirming the values he and his contemporaries live by declares himself a conservative. Unlike the majority of realistic conservative satirists whom I discussed in my first chapter, however, he is a conservative who has taken thought and in the process has become aware of the various alternatives open to man. Thus he recognizes in Alceste the attractiveness of a life lived
according to the individual's rather than society's dictates. Furthermore, in choosing from among them he does not base himself on that which is and therefore should and must be. He does not, in short, worship the status quo, nor does he in defending it demand an absolute obedience to it. In these important respects he closely resembles the dynamic conservative satirists. He resembles them too in refusing to cheat on those alternatives he rejects. Alceste is granted a considerable measure of autonomy, enough so that it is quite possible for Molière's audience to identify with the misanthrope and to feel that the real misanthropy is that of the Parisian society which rejects Alceste's values.

Some Neo-Classical Utopias

The year before Le Misanthrope was written, in 1668, Henry Nevile had created one of the few full-scale Utopias of the neo-classical age. The Isle of Pines is interesting more for what it represents historically than for any intrinsic value it might possess. Nevile's Utopia in one way looks like Rabelais', since it postulates a life lived much according to the desires of its inhabitants. As A. L. Morton says of it, it represents "the triumph of natural goodness left to assert itself." But that goodness is a peculiarly rationalistic one, and instead of Rabelais' merry-making scholars, soldiers,
priests, etc., those who live the ideally good life according to Nevile are soberly rationalistic Englishmen much like Nevile himself and his friend John Harrington. "If the setting here anticipates that of Crusoe's island," Norton comments, "the spirit is rather that of Diderot and the French Enlightenment."¹¹

Indeed that seems generally to have been true of those English Utopias envisaged in the decades just before and after The Isle of Pines was written, as well as of the more numerous and more important Utopian ideas and schemes. William Petty, the political arithmetician whom we have seen run afoul of Swift because of his transformation of people into commodities, in 1666 had projected a combined school, workman's college, and hospital, with a museum and a library which were to give training to all, especially in mathematics and the practical arts.¹² And Dr. Wilkinson had proposed just such another establishment sometime in the 1650's. We have a letter from John Evelyn to the scientist Robert Boyle in which Evelyn refers to "that mathematico-chymico-mechanical school designed by our noble friend Dr. Wilkinson as "another Solomon's House."¹³ The allusion is to the house of learning in Bacon's very systematized Utopia, New Atlantis. (The latter Utopia had, incidentally, called forth several continuations during the Restoration, one of them by Joseph Glanvill.)¹⁴
What most of these examples of Utopianism seem to have had in common was the desire to reshape (certainly not to completely remake) society along more orderly lines. Perhaps Wallace Stevens' phrase "a rage for order," although used by Stevens for a wholly different purpose, could be applied to the Utopians. And accompanying it was that prerequisite of most Utopian thinking, the belief that man and society are infinitely malleable, infinitely perfectable. Utopia is above all an optimistic place.

The curious thing is that the neo-classical Utopian ideas did not attract more unfavorable attention than they did. (The realistic conservative satirists were almost completely silent about them). One probable reason is that they rarely were embodied in world-shaking literary creations. A more important reason is that they seemed to be literary creations and little more. A plan for a "mathematico-chymico-mechanical school" might bring a loud snort from the humanist, but it would not cause the ruling classes to fear being overthrown. To quote Mannheim once more, it is only when the conservative is threatened by opposing classes that there "arises a counter-utopia which serves as a means of self-orientation and defence." Then, too, a certain strain of what can only be called Utopianism was part of the neo-classical make-up. As witnesses to that claim we might call such a hard-headed but representative Englishman as Bernard Mandeville, to
whose grandiose schemes for promoting trade and employment J. Max Patrick has applied the label Utopian; Defoe, who spawned a great many largely unrealizable projects designed to make the world a better place; and any one of a number of members of the Royal Society who had elaborate blueprints for a better England. Politically Augustan England may have been at dead-center and glad to be there, but in the sciences, in its rapidly growing technology, and in its education Utopian or quasi-Utopian thinking was very much in evidence.

So the realistic conservative satirists, closely attached to the existing order, refrained from anti-Utopian satire. Thus the mere fact that anti-Utopianism came from only, or at any rate primarily, dynamic conservative pens becomes significant.

Arbuthnot: The "Universal Benefit of Mankind"

But not all dynamic conservative anti-Utopianism is of equal importance. In Arbuthnot, for instance, anti-Utopianism is a secondary motif in the sprawling symphony of the Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus. Yet looked at in one way the whole of the Memoirs is a Utopia. Certainly there are in literature few characters whose state of mind is more "incongruous with the state of reality within which it occurs" than Martinus Scriblerus. Still, as I suggested in an earlier chapter, the book fails to develop
completely a single point of view, and is most profitably read as a congeries. If we view the Memoirs in that way, then it is the last section of its first book which is most important to our Utopian analysis. In it Arbuthnot ironically asks us to realize that all Martinus's studies were "directed to the universal Benefit of Mankind." 17 (On the title page of Swift's A Tale of a Tub the reader is informed that the book was "Written for the Universal Improvement of Mankind," wording which differs only slightly from Arbuthnot's.) The satirist then lists a number of Martinus's projects; the list, an impressive one drawn from nearly every important area of science and philosophy, includes "A compleat Digest of the Laws of Nature," "Projects of Perpetuum Mobiles," and a project to "pierce the first crust or Nucleus of this our Earth quite through, to the next concentrical Sphere..." 18 Besides his scientific and philosophical contributions, Martinus has added to "the universal Benefit of Mankind" in the political sphere by writing "whole Treatises, Advices to Friends, Projects to First Ministers, Letters to Members of Parliament, [and] Accounts to the Royal Society." 19

Now projects and projectors of every type were fair game for the neo-classical satirists generally. At a certain point, however, what begins as a project goes over into Utopianism. Arbuthnot recognizes that point, senses
the threat it poses to the set of values he holds and to the society which embodies those values. His is hardly a blinding vision of the transformation being worked by contemporary Utopian thinking, but then Arbuthnot is at no time a visionary. Nevertheless I think it significant that this dynamic conservative satirist should have been aware at all of the profoundly revolutionary consequences possible in the Utopianism of the New Philosophy and the New Science. Utopia can, after all, work with other than political or economic instruments; and the Christian humanist convinced of man's—and therefore society's—inherent limitations is from his point of view perfectly right in regarding with hostility even that Utopianism which is seemingly non-political and non-economic. Anti-intellectualism when it recognizes the role abstract thought can play in preparing for concrete societal change inevitably gives rise to anti-Utopianism.

The Mathematical Way to Utopia

If the easy-going Arbuthnot was no visionary, Pope on the contrary was. The Dunciad, as I have previously observed, is an intensely visionary poem, particularly in its last book. And partly responsible for the gloom suffusing Pope's vision is a facet of Utopian thought peculiar to the neo-classical age—mathematical Utopianism, for want of a better name. Here is one view of how Chaos looks to Pope:
Morality, by her false Guardians drawn,
Chicane in Furs, and Casuistry in Lawn,
Gasp, as they straiten at each end the cord,
And dies, when Dulness gives her Page the word.
Mad Matheusis alone was unconfin'd,
Too mad for mere material chains to bind,
Now to pure Space lifts her exstatic stare,
Now running round the Circle, finds it square.

(Martius Scriblerus, incidentally, is "honored" by Arbuthnot for having "enrich'd Mathematicks with many precise and Geometrical Quadratures of the Circle." In his final look at Chaos Pope writes:

Physic of Metaphysic begs defence,
And Metaphysic calls for aid on Sense!
See Mystery to Mathematics fly! (IV. 645-647)

The connection with anti-Utopianism in these two passages may appear tenuous; however, Louis Predvold, in a searching exploration of the background of neo-classical thinking on mathematics, has disclosed just how firm a connection between mathematical thought and Utopianism did exist. The "hope of a millenium through exact science," he observes, was strong in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries; "its inception was in the minds of mathematical scientists, and its formulation was controlled by the methods and ideals of mathematical reasoning." Descartes, Predvold points out, clearly aspired to build a universal science on the foundations of mathematics:

"...he lived and died convinced of the possibility of a complete mathematical philosophy of the universe, including human life and personality...." Hobbes too entertain-
ed such a hope, as this passage from the Epistle Dedicatory to his De Cive demonstrates:

And truly the géométricians have very admirably performed their part...If the moral philosophers had as happily discharged their duty, I know not what could have been added by human industry to the completion of that happiness, which is consistent with human life. For were the nature of human actions as distinctly known, as the nature of quantity in geometrical figures, the strength of avarice and ambition, which is sustained by the erroneous opinions of the vulgar, as touching the nature of right and wrong, would presently faint and languish; and mankind should enjoy such an immortal peace, that (unless it were for habitation, on supposition that the earth should grow too narrow for her inhabitants) there would hardly be left any pretence for war.

In Pope's own day the philosopher Francis Hutcheson wrote a fascinating document, one which can be considered in direct line of descent from the Political Arithmeticians Child and Petty. Hutcheson's Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, of interest today mainly for its aesthetic view-points, contains a section devoted to "an attempt to introduce a Mathematical Calculation in subjects of Morality." The first two paragraphs of this section are all that need be reproduced to capture the flavor of the whole scheme:

To find a universal Canon to compute the Morality of any Actions, with all their Circumstances, when we judge of the Actions done by our selves, or by others, we must observe the following Propositions, or Axioms.

1. The moral Importance of any Agent, or the Quantity of publick good produced by him, is in a
compound Ratio of his Benevolence and Abilities:
or (by substituting the initial Letters for the
Words, as \( M = \text{Moment of Good} \), and \( \mu = \text{Moment of
Evil} \) \( M = B \frac{\mu}{A} \).

Of all these attempts to put mathematics to the service of
the universal betterment of mankind—attends which he
thinks are reflected in the passages from The Dunciad
quoted above—Fredvold says:

The eighteenth century felt that it was ever
on the very verge of a complete and final under­
standing of the nature of man, that the intellect­
ual conquest of man over his own weaknesses the
next immediate step after the intellectual
conquest so recently achieved over nature. The
Utopianism of the age might be defined as the
aspiration of every radical thinker to be the
Newton of ethics or the Newton of politics.27

Gulliver’s Travels, Utopia and
Anti-Utopia

Book Three of Gulliver’s Travels reveals some of the
same strands of anti-Utopianism found in both the Memoirs
of Martin Scriblerus and The Dunciad. Lagado is infested
with Utopian projectors of every possible variety, the
scientific, pedagogic, and political being perhaps best
represented. Laputa is ruled by men for whom the whole
of existence is summed up in mathematics. But it is on
the island of Luggnagg that Utopianism best shows itself---
and is most savagely satirized. Gulliver, made familiar
with the Struldbrugs, or Immortals, becomes rhapsodic
over the possibilities of immortal life. Given immortality,
he thinks, he would be in an incomparable position to see
the continuous and boundless improvement of mankind. "I should then see," he declares, "the discovery of the longitude, the perpetual motion, the universal medicine, and many other great inventions brought to the utmost perfection." He goes on in this vein:

What wonderful discoveries should we make in astronomy, by outliving and confirming our own predictions, by observing the progress and return of comets, with the changes of motion in the sun, moon, and stars.

Before his Luggnaggian adventure is over, however, Gulliver's limitless optimism has changed to a sober recognition of the horrors bound up with eternal life. From his Utopian soarings he is dashed to earth by direct confrontation of biological and psychological reality; the sheer physical limitations on man are displayed with crushing finality in these pages.

The lesson Gulliver learns in Luggnagg has no lasting effect on him. His is an incurable Utopianism, for no sooner is he disillusioned in respect of one absolute then he allows himself to be even more captivated by another one—the perfectly rational and therefore perfectly good society of the Houyhnhnms. Or so Gulliver sees the Houyhnhnms order. When last we see him at the end of the Travels he is smothered in middle-class domesticity, but obsessed with the desire to occasionally smell the horses in his stable so that he may be reminded of the (to him)
idyllic life of the Houyhnhnms. Having brushed up against perfection he is doomed to everlasting regret over his loss of it. For him the necessity to leave Houyhnhnmland and return to England has constituted a hard fall from grace.

What about Gulliver's creator, though? Are Swift's standards those of Gulliver, and does he too yearn for the Houyhnhnm past? If that is the case, then Book IV of Gulliver's Travels must be read as primarily a Utopian tract. But such a reading I believe is astigmatic, for as John Ross and Robert C. Elliott have demonstrated, there is serious trouble in paradise: the Houyhnhnm way contains flaws that only so naive a booster as Lemuel Gulliver could overlook. For one thing, Houyhnhnm culture is negligible; Swift's horsey set we are told has no books or written literature (only oral poetry), and no mention is made of music, painting, or any other art form. For another thing, the Houyhnhnms, who at first refuse to believe in the very existence of Gulliver's society, are about as insular as men (or horses) can get. As for Houyhnhnm reason, so superior a quality in Gulliver's eyes, it rules out all emotion, and at the end its most ardent admirer, Gulliver, is broken, spiritually, because of it. Perhaps the most telling commentary on Houyhnhnms' failure to recognize any limitations is the Houyhnhnms' failure to recognize any limitations on their order of things. "The word Houyhnhnm,"
writes Gulliver, "in their tongue, signifies a horse, and in its etymology, the perfection of nature."\(^{32}\)

Now these are limitations on Utopia only if Gulliver's faulty vision is not the book's only instrument for seeing. If we accept the Elliott analysis, then we understand the way in which Swift, who has fashioned in Gulliver not a spokesman but a continually evolving, semi-autonomous character, in Book IV gradually dissociates himself from Gulliver and Gulliver's increasingly misanthropic behavior. It is through Swift's eyes that we see a Gulliver who begins as an ingenu (to use Professor Elliott's term) turn so misanthropic as to be unable to understand or appreciate a simple act of human kindness like that of the Portugese captain; it is through Swift's eyes---and using Swift's, not Gulliver's, standards---that we watch a Gulliver made unfit for the ordinary round of human actions regard his unoffending family with something of the Houyhnhnm loathing for the Yahoos. Elliott thus sums up Gulliver's evolution toward misanthropy:

In short, Gulliver's long and painful education has been too much for him. Late in life he has come to know the nature of evil in man. The knowledge is traumatic, begetting instead of wisdom a folly as extreme as his early naivete. Gulliver-author, from the vantage point of his experience, was fully aware of the weakness in the younger Gulliver's vision of reality, a vision that accepted without question the 'world' as it was. But the fictive author had no compar-
able objectivity toward the later Gulliver (he of the fourth voyage) who totally rejected the 'word' in favor of obsessive devotion to an 'idea.' The objectivity is there, but it is Swift's.

Elliott makes an interesting observation on the background against which Gulliver's education is unfolded. In that background, he points out, the domestic life to which Gulliver always turns briefly (and happily) between voyages "stands as a kind of norm of humble though enduring human values. Against its simplicity, the extravagances of the voyages are thrown into bold relief; and against the values which it represents is thrust Gulliver's wild rejection..."

Fessimistic though it is, Swift's book does not end on a note of total despair; Gulliver is one man, a self-isolated man, and though his mordant criticism of his fellow men can by no means be regarded as cancelled out because of his misanthropy, still both the man and the indictment he has drawn up are qualified by his misanthropy and by the existence of that norm which Elliott describes.

A most ingenious paradox has presented itself for our inspection. Book IV of *Gulliver's Travels* is a satire on Utopianism which yet manages to keep its hardest blows from falling on Utopia. Just as Gulliver's misanthropy does not totally vitiate the criticism in Book IV of European society, so it does not erase the very real and positive Houyhnhnm virtues that he sees and describes for
us. As we have seen, there are flaws in the Houyhnhnm pattern, but that does not make the pattern a worthless one.

What happens, then, to the thesis advanced earlier, that in *Gulliver's Travels* Swift is unfurling the flag of Anti-Utopia. That thesis still exists, but has undergone a number of modifications. First of all, Swift obviously admires many aspects of the Houyhnhnm culture, although in more qualified fashion than Gulliver does. But the Houyhnhnms' state is by no means perfect—and anyway the Houyhnhnms themselves cannot ultimately be judged by finite human standards. Gulliver can be so judged; it is his failure to recognize man's inability to transcend his animal limitations that Swift's satire is focussed on.

The Houyhnhnms are not humans. They are not subject to emotional pulls and can live according to "pure" reason. But Europeans—Gulliver's fellows—are humans and cannot live by reason alone, cannot therefore hope ever to attain the virtues inherent in the Houyhnhnm way (if that way is really a desirable one.) It is not, then, the Houyhnhnms who indulge in Utopianism, but the humans (human, rather) who do.

Anti-Utopianism is the corollary, in some ways the extension, of the dynamic conservatives' anti-intellectualism. The political and economic strains in their anti-Utopianism are wholly insignificant. This is not true
at all of Aristophanes' anti-Utopianism and is certainly not the case with Twentieth Century works in that genre. Again, dynamic conservative anti-Utopianism, while far from being topical is rooted in particulars. It is not against some vaguely defined "New Philosophy" or "New Science," or just against the spirit of the times that Arbuthnot, Pope, and Swift cry out in their satires, but against particular Utopian ways of thinking which seem to add up to a potentially radical threat to their society. Yet they never in their struggle with the Utopian absolutes oppose absolute to absolute. Swift, indeed, we have seen treat with more than passing sympathy one kind of Utopia at the same time that he is destroying a variety of Utopianism. But then it is not in the nature of dynamic conservatism to deny the possibilities that society may improve. Rather, it is passionately convinced that there exist certain fixed limits to mankind; limits fixed by the continuing past, by man's faulty reason, and by the hierarchical structure of the Great Chain of Being (vide Pope's Essay on Man). The Utopianism which goes against his sense of the past and his anti-intellectualism provokes the dynamic conservative to satire. (I do not wish, however, to minimize the role played by social class in dynamic conservative anti-Utopianism. As my first chapter tries to make clear, Swift and his friends had a very precise idea of the workings of
money and political power. They may—and I think that they did—sometimes have transcended purely class considerations, but they were by no means classless. If I have played down the socio-economic in relationship to neo-classical anti-Utopianism, it is because the Utopian attitudes against which it reacted were less explicitly socio-economic than they were philosophical.

Samuel Johnson's Rasselas

Any victory that anti-Utopianism gains in Samuel Johnson's Rasselas, which was written (1759) in the twilight of neo-classicism, is tinged with the sombre hue that is the dominant color of this darkly pessimistic novel. Johnson's anti-Utopianism is a double-edged weapon. With one edge he hacks away at the carefully arranged systems of intellectual monomaniacs (encountered by the Ethiopian prince Rasselas in Cairo), each with a perfectibilist program that could be carried out only—nowhere. The proponents of a life led according to nature, of a stoical subduing of the passions, of a life in which reason is supreme, all are seen by Rasselas to have only a partial view of the truth, if even that. The presumption which the satirist attacks is that any perfect state can come out of the speculations and labors of imperfect man. Rasselas, at first the eager searcher after the formula for human happiness, learns this lesson.
'I will confess,' said the prince, 'an indulgence of fantastic delight more dangerous than yours [he is speaking to his sister]. I have frequently endeavoured to image the possibility of a perfect government, by which all wrong should be restrained, all vice reformed, and all the subjects preserved in tranquillity and innocence. This thought produced innumerable schemes of reformation, and dictated many useful regulations and salutary edicts. This has been the sport and sometimes the labour of my solitude, and I start when I think with how little anguish I once supposed the death of my father and my brothers.35

Armed with the disillusioning knowledge of the impossibility of perfection, at the end of the book Rasselas wearily returns with his sister to the Happy Valley from which he had originally escaped. But the other edge of Johnson's sword has already sheared away the Happy Valley's Utopian pretensions, and the place that the young Ethiopians return to is seen to be not truly good, but only less bad than other possible alternatives.

Unlike his princely pupil, Imlac does not undergo the progressive disillusionment that accompanies Rasselas's intellectual voyaging. He has already discovered the "vanity of human wishes." Life can not be positively good, Johnson tells us, and all efforts at making it so are insane,. but if we follow the way of Imlac, the reasonable man, life can be endured. This minimal doctrine carries us a long way from Aristophanes and Lucian; in the satire of those writers the victors over Utopianism do more than merely endure. And Johnson's Christian pessimism
gives his anti-Utopia an even darker coloring than those of the dynamic conservatives.

19th Century Utopias

The Nineteenth Century produced a spate of Utopian works, notably Bulwer-Lytton's *The Coming Race*, Theodor Herzka's *Freeland*, William Morris's *News from Nowhere*, Samuel Butler's *Erewhon*, and Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward*. Only the last book, however, occasioned full-scale replies, and none of them of lasting literary value. Vernon L. Farrington, Jr., in his *American Dreams: A Study of American Utopias*, has commented on these anti-Utopian satires, which bore such titles as *Looking Within*, *Looking Further Backward*, and *Mr. East's Experiences in Mr. Bellamy's World*. Written by pamphleteers rather than artists, none of these books is relevant to the present study.

Today when we discuss Bellamy (and anti-Bellamy) we tend to use the term "Utopian" so that the full force of its pejorative connotations comes through. Despite the fuss that the avowedly socialistic *Looking Backward* kicked up, we know now how far removed from reality is the perfect state projected by its author. From this distance both Bellamy's attack on 19th Century American society and the satiric counter-attack look more like a literary battle than anything else.
The one thing that we cannot say about the two great anti-Utopian satires of our day is that they are merely "literary," that the questions they raise are only those in which a student of literature would be interested.

In this respect Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* and George Orwell's *1984* represent a return to the Swiftian tradition rather than a continuation of any tradition stretching out from Swift's time to our own.

**Utopia in the Modern View**

If there be a norm in *Brave New World*, it is the Southwestern reservation on which the Shakespeare-reading Savage is found. Or can we perhaps say that the whole of western civilization anterior to the brave new world, that more relaxed and infinitely less efficient society which Bernard Marx and Helmholtz Watson hanker after in their different ways, represents the standard of goodness for Huxley and the reader? But the Savage's reservation is as destructive of individual rights as the brave new world is heedless of them, the Savage himself is a half-formed emotional child, and the old order a shadowy world for which no positive claims can be made. (After all, the Savage's mother, a physically and mentally shapeless figure, degenerates into something resembling a woman of the "old order" when she loses her post-Ford identity.) At any rate, whatever standard of goodness exists in the
novel is irrevocably lost and the standard-bearers either dead (the Savage) or neutralized (Bernard Marx and Helmholtz Watson) when the novel ends.

In *1984* Winston Smith and the girl Julia represent, for those at least of Orwell's readers who live this side of the Stalinist paradise, the only sane people in an insane world. Behind Smith lies a dimly remembered England of the 1950's, the time just prior to Big Brother's accession to power. In a way this England is a norm. Still it is not a very compelling one, being as it is a wasteland inhabited by played-out people ripe for totalitarian picking. In a different way Julia represents a recognizable norm that helps us to gauge the full extent of dehumanization reached by western civilization; a wholly non-political creature, she contains within her the eternal life-force, or in another, less sophisticated, cliche, she is the eternal female. But this life-force is snuffed out just as completely as is the feeble force of Winston Smith, and though we know, or think we know, that there will always be Julias, we also know that it is the O'Brien who will prevail in the world that stretches grimly out beyond Orwell's fictional one.

So great is the pressure exerted by both Huxley's and Orwell's inverted Utopias, and so overwhelming is their power, that the Utopias seem sometimes to emerge
as norms; in both novels those characters (Bernard Marx in *Brave New World*, Winston Smith in *1984*) who question the all-perfect state need constantly to question their own motives and indeed normalcy in the face of the unbroken front of completely self-assured uniformity that they find themselves up against. Isolated, ineffectual, they are among the most futile characters in all fiction.

Satire, anti-Utopian or otherwise, can go no further. Indeed, it stops somewhat short of the Huxley and Orwell climaxes, since the note of tragedy sounded in each of these novels drowns out the satiric note.

In *Gulliver's Travels*, on the contrary, the satiric mood hovers over the very last page, where we remark Gulliver's intransigeant attitude toward mankind.

But the Houyhnhmms, who live under the government of reason, are no more proud of the good qualities they possess, than I should be for not wanting a leg or an arm, which no man in his wits would boast of, although he must be miserable without them. I dwell the longer upon this subject from the desire I have to make the society of an English Yahoo by any means not insupportable; and therefore I here entreat those who have any tincture of this absurd [pride] that they will not presume to come in my sight. 37

This is satire, but of Gulliver, the proud man who has rejected the actual and the possible for the Utopian, not satire of the England that Gulliver had once dissected with a measure of skill. This is the pay-off for Gulliver's intemperate and frenzied attack on his civilization.
and his kind. In *Brave New World* and *1984*, the critics are paid off in exile or death.

With those two Twentieth Century versions of Utopia we have come a long way from the urbane *Le Misanthrope* and the quietist *Rasselas*, an even longer way from the "laughing satire" (John Dennis's term) of Aristophanes and Lucian. And the dynamic conservative anti-Utopias I have examined stop considerably short of the cataclysmic world pictures Huxley and Orwell paint.

Further, in each of these pre-20th Century works the Utopia held up to ridicule is one that has proceeded no further than the blue print stage, if that far. If Huxley's *Brave New World* and Orwell's *Oceana* have not gone beyond the drafting room, nevertheless their blue prints are terrifyingly close to being reproductions of our existing society. That is of course particularly true of Orwell's *Utopia*. In both novels *Nowhere* bears a frightening resemblance to *Somewhere*. And in neither is there any awaking from the nightmare which is Utopia; the perfect state has converted all its members to perfection. As bitter as things may get in Molière, as dark as they may look in Pope or Swift or Johnson, men still endure, essentially the same flawed creatures that they have always been.
Footnotes

Chapter IV

8. Ibid., p. 200.
9. See Lewis Mumford, The Story of Utopias (New York, 1941). Mumford's is the most comprehensive history of Utopia I have encountered.
11. Ibid., p. 85.
14. Morton, p. 79.
15. See note 4 above.
18. Ibid., p. 168.
19. Ibid., p. 169.
20 Ibid., p. 166.

21 Louis I. Redvold, "The Invention of the Ethical Calculus," in The Seventeenth Century..., Richard F. Jones et al. For all my remarks on the relationship of mathematics to Utopianism I am greatly indebted to Prof. Fredvold's article.

22 Ibid., p. 165.

23 Ibid., p. 167. Louis Katsoff, "Man is the Measure of all Things," Philosophical and Phenomenological Research, XIII, No. 4 (June 1953), 153, offers this comment on Descartes' view of mathematics:

What made the application of mathematics to experience so important was that it appeared to offer a substitute for revelation in the search for absolute truth. Descartes' quest for a universal mathematics was in essence the elevation of reason as the final arbiter in questions of truth.

The dynamic conservatives, all of whom believe in truths beyond reason—-in Christian revelation—-could hardly have been expected to accept uncomplainingly this claim of Cartesian mathematics. It is not an accident that in A Tale of a Tub and elsewhere Swift attacks the Frenchman vigorously.


25 Quoted by Fredvold, "The Invention of the Ethical Calculus," p. 182.

26 Ibid., pp. 170-172.

27 Ibid., pp. 172-174.


29 Gulliver's Travels, loc. cit.


Gulliver's Travels, p. 218.

Elliott, p. 60.

Elliott, loc. cit.


Gulliver's Travels, pp. 307-308.

This fine phrase is the title of a book by Arthur Morgan (Chapel Hill, 1946).
CHAPTER V

SUMMARY

With each succeeding decade of the Eighteenth Century there was a marked decline in the number of satires written. Bond's register of burlesque poems records 65 such poems between 1730 and 1759, only 35 between 1740 and 1749. And the 1750's saw burlesque at its lowest ebb. Concurrently discussion of the general subject of satire fell off sharply, the journals largely ignoring it. In such periodicals as Rambler, Connoisseur, Bee, Citizen of the World, Lounger, and Microcosm there was, during the 1750's, no discussion at all of the subject.

Probably the principle reason for this state of affairs was the sentimentalism which increasingly gained ground as the century wore on. The sentimental view of man, which regards him as much more an agent of good than of evil, coupled with the belief in progress, which also emphasizes man's goodness and his capacity for continual improvement, hardly provided a favorably atmosphere for either the reading or writing of satire. Eschewing satire in 1735, Hildebrand Jacob, who had been "honored" by Pope with inclusion in the Dunciad's gallery of dunces; had ended his poem "Reasons for not Writing Satire" with these lines:

219
For all these Reasons I refuse,  
To tempt, my wanton Muse,
In Satire her low Flight to prove,
Contented still to sing of Love.

Satire had often before been relegated to a low place in the literary hierarchy, but rarely had it given way to love.

Sentimentalism stressed the individual rather than society. And Eighteenth Century satire, even where it reflected nothing of the new sentimentalism, as it got further away from the neo-classical period dealt more and more with the individual. In his satire Churchill was far less concerned with society than Pope and Swift had been, Cowper even less so than Churchill, and Eyron, who like Churchill admired intensely Augustan satire, moved considerably further away from interest in society than Cowper had. None of these men---Byron excepted---wrote of individuals wholly apart from society, but at the same time none of them focussed satirically on those men or ideas which were the common property of their age. To take one example, Churchill, the form of whose satires bears so strong an outward resemblance to the verse satires of Dryden and Pope, devoted much of his satiric energies to such subjects as the Scots who were increasingly numerous in London, Samuel Johnson and his ghosts, Tobias Smollett's newspaper adventures, and rival actors on the London stage. While Pope frequently dealt in personalities (Lady Mary Wortley Montagu and Lord Hervey testify to that) and did
invariably tackle the great social problems of his time, nevertheless his most important satire displays a very lively interest in the vital issues of the early Eighteenth Century.

The Anti-Jacobins, most prominent among them George Canning, were prolific satirists at a time when the literary sentimentalism of the middle and late Eighteenth Century was thrust roughly aside. During the Napoleonic wars England presented an almost uniformly conservative front, and Canning and his literary associates were among the foremost spokesmen for it. Here are two examples of their speaking out, the first one from a 1797 prospectus:

We have not arrived (to our shame perhaps we avow it) at that wild and unshackled freedom of thought, which rejects all habit, all wisdom of former times, all restraints of ancient usage, and of local attachment; and which judges upon each subject, whether of politicks or morals, as it arises, by lights entirely its own, without reference to recognized principle, or established practice.

We are prejudiced in favor of her [England's] establishments, civil and religious, though without claiming for either that ideal perfection, which modern philosophy professes to discover in the other more luminous systems which are arising on all sides of us.

The second example is a burlesque of Southey's "Friend of Humanity" (the Lake poet was the anti-Jacobins' favorite whipping-boy). Called "The Friend of Humanity and the Knife-Grinder," it describes a situation in which a knife-grinder, asked for the story of how he came so low,
answers his humanitarian questioner that it was through a tavern scuffle. He then offers to drink the health of the Friend of Humanity if the latter will give him sixpence, at the same time informing the Friend that "But for my part, I never love to meddle with politics, sir."

To this the Friend of Humanity answers:

I give thee sixpence! I will see thee damned first—wretch! whom no sense of wrongs can rouse to vengeance—Sordid, unfeeling, reprobate, degraded, Spiritless outcast!°

This retort is followed by the stage direction "Kicks the Knife-grinder, overturns his wheel, and exit in a transport of Republican enthusiasm and universal philanthropy."

The satirists responsible for this manifesto and burlesque were men who regarded the Augustan satirists, Pope in particular, as their spiritual forebears. Yet how different is their satire in technique, in tone, and in underlying philosophy from that of the artists whom I have been styling dynamic conservatives. In the manifesto we are given an almost oppressively official attachment to the existing political establishment and its attendant economic and religious arrangements. Where in Pope's or Gay's or Swift's satire do we find the State as the fixed point from which the satire radiates? In the burlesque we are given the kind of clever reduction that contemporary conservative journalism engages in time and time again. Which one of the dynamic conservatives takes
his beliefs so much for granted and holds opposing views
in such easy contempt that he tries simply to wave them
out of existence? And when does dynamic conservative
satire lump together all the attitudes it dislikes and
fears under a general heading like "Jacobin"? That of
course is what the hotly partisan anti-Jacobins do; when
everything else fails them, they always have that "defence"
to fall back on in their very personal attacks on Southey,
Fox, Horne, Tooke, and Tom Paine.

This kind of official conservatism, basing itself on
the ruling church-state apparatus, is quite like the
realistic conservatism I delineated in my first chapter.
It is this variety of conservatism of which it is fair to
say with Gertrude Himmelfarb that it "has at its dis­
posal a battery of powerful weapons in the form of social
authorities, institutions, laws and conventions. There
cannot be too many of these deterrents. They may be
physical or moral, real or fancied; the conservative does
not care so long as they have the desired effect."6 But
the same thing cannot accurately be said of the dynamic
conservative satirists. Although they are strongly attached
to a particular party and, with the one exception of Pope
the Roman Catholic, to a particular church, they are not
in the true sense of the term "party men." They are, in
fact, as intent on ridiculing those in power as those out
of power, as intent on satirizing the way in which society now runs as in the way projectors, virtuosi, etc., would have it run. Several of Pope's moral essays, Gay's Beggar's Opera, and Swift's Modest Proposal and Gulliver's Travels reserve their most telling satiric blows for the enemy within, the men and ideas which in 1720 and 1725 and 1730 shape English policy. In their very willingness to explore, satirically, social areas which for most of their literary fellows are terra incognita---the underside of society turned up in The Beggar's Opera, the Irish world of poverty and degradation revealed in A Modest Proposal---they show themselves to be conservatives who refuse to be bound by the accepted "institutions, laws, and conventions."

Their refusal to accept a static socio-economic code is matched by their unwillingness to adopt a static view of the past. Traditionalists, as all conservatives must be, the dynamic conservative satirists ridicule alike the worshippers and the denigrators of the past as past. Their satire is unsurpassed for tough-mindedness and concreteness, and both those qualities are singularly absent from those minds which create either an ideal past or a barbaric past. The first creation is an escape from the present, which obviously fascinates the dynamic conservatives and which they retard as being of primary
importance. The second creation minimizes the achievements of the historical past and overlooks the continuity of society. It does so in the belief that what is happening now, the things Eighteenth Century man is accomplishing, is much more important than anything belonging to the past; and today's achievement will not only continue into the future, it will be surpassed then. The Idea of Progress as such was unformulated when Swift and Pope wrote, but the approaches to it were all laid down. And it is one of the distinguishing characteristics of dynamic conservative satire that it understood better than did neo-classical satire generally the nature and seriousness of the threat to long accepted values which the New Philosophy and the new economics posed. That is why once I have left behind me the political and social considerations dealt with in the first chapter of this study, the categories "realistic conservative" and "Addisonian satire" have disappeared.

Because they were concerned more with society than with individuals, and because they were tough-minded believers in and practitioners of the concrete, the dynamic conservatives were anti-intellectual. Reason, as my chapter on anti-intellectualism tries to demonstrate, they held sacred, but reason alone was not enough, they believed. Abstract reason, which is always potentially subversive of the concrete here and now, they regarded
with the deepest suspicion. Particularly did they look critically (which for them meant writing satirically) on abstract ideas that were erected into systems. The abstraction made system took too little account of existing reality, and they were above all believers in the particular and the realistic; it tended to overlook the human element, and they were humanists in the fullest possible sense of the word; it paid too little attention to man's inherent limitations, and they were imbued with the belief that man was limited because of his peculiar relationship to God, because of his unbreakable link with every moment of the past, and because of his flawed reason. Perhaps more than any other dynamic conservative satire Gulliver's Travels represents the working out of both the intellectualist and the anti-intellectualist idea. The one is as naive and boundlessly optimistic as Gulliver is before his discovery of Houyhnhnm perfection, while the other is as skeptical and darkly pessimistic as the Gulliver who has come to despise everything in Western society. Yet the latter Gulliver does not have the last word, just as a hopeless pessimism is not the most authoritative voice heard over the whole land of dynamic conservative satire. The flawed and limited reason of Western man, allied with a groping but genuine sense of decency, asserts itself in opposition to Gulliver's misanthropy;
the worst sin, *Gulliver's Travels* seems ultimately to say, is the refusal to recognize the fact that man is limited but that within his limits he has at least the potentialities for goodness and creativity.

A limited freedom would seem, then, to be all that the dynamic conservatives believe possible and desirable. Always in their work there is the emphasis on limitations. That can be seen best in their anti-Utopian satires, particularly again in *Gulliver's Travels*, where the limits are physical as well as intellectual. Every society Gulliver discovers has, whether he becomes aware of them or not, ineradicable flaws. And he himself must settle finally for the same old England where his travels began. A similar physical-intellectual journey takes place in Samuel Johnson's *Rasselas*, and there too the traveller winds up his journey in the same place he has begun it, with the realization that no amount of extending physically our boundaries is going to provide us with some absolute, some Utopia. But there is this important difference between Swift's and Johnson's anti-Utopias, a difference which has impelled me to hesitate to place Johnson in the dynamic conservative category I have created: while in *Gulliver's Travels* the emphasis is on man's limits rather than on the margin for freedom he possesses, nevertheless freedom is of vital importance. Brobdingnag, which is more just and more reasonable than European society, clearly earns the
approval of Swift even while it earns the naive Gulliver's disapproval. And the Houyhnhnm way has in it many qualities which we are certainly asked to admire, despite the very real failings of this purely rationalistic society. The life of reason, the life free from irrational hate, prejudice, hypocrisy, and war, makes the most powerful appeal to Swift—and to Swift's audience—at the same time that its limits are being sketched in. In Johnson's anti-Utopia, on the other hand, a kind of quiet desperation is all that is attained to; Rasselas learns what his mentor Imlac had learned before him, that simply to endure is all that is available to man. Now this is not the position Johnson assumed in his essays or in his conversation, where he reveals himself as a man with a passionate sense of injustice which will brook no arguments against trying to better the lot of the ordinary man based on the idea that it is futile—or wicked even—to tamper with the divinely ordained order. But the fact remains that in Rasselas quietism is approved of, whereas in every one of the dynamic conservative satires there is some positive norm which rules out merely enduring. Dynamic conservative satire is anti-sentimental and anti-optimistic, still it is usually not pessimistic, or if it is, is only guardedly so. Perhaps The Dunciad, with its deeply pessimistic Book IV, is the exception to this generalization. But
even its pessimism is less absolute than that of such a work as 1984, since it is after all Dulness that is triumphant in it, not a poetic replica of some existing group which is perilously close to destroying, physically, the traditional social framework.

The preceding sentence in a way sums up the approach one must take to dynamic conservatism. All along the line qualifications are called for: Dynamic conservative satire is anti-optimistic—but it is not pessimistic. Dynamic conservative satire is anti-Utopian—yet in its most important manifestation, Gulliver's Travels, it reveals considerable admiration for a Utopia. Dynamic conservative satire is traditionalistic—but it is as likely to laugh at the heroic past as it is to speak reverently of it. Dynamic conservative satire is the expression of men who believe in the social, political, economic, and religious forms dominant in their society—yet subject those forms to almost constant satiric attack. The first half of each of these statements points up the genuinely conservative nature of the satirists we have been looking at; the second half of each statement makes clear that these artists held to few absolutes, that theirs was a satire capable of rapid, purposeful movement against whatever force appeared to endanger their values—that it was, in short, a dynamic satire. To hold together these
two seemingly contradictory elements of their art, conservatism and the dynamic quality, they most often called upon irony. Rather, irony, the double vision, underlay their satire. But thereby hangs another dissertation.
Footnotes

Chapter V


2 See Andrew M. Wilkinson, "Decline of English Satire in the Middle Years of the Eighteenth Century."


5 Ibid., pp. 23-24.

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I, Harold Joel Harris, was born in Paterson, New Jersey, December 15, 1924. I received my secondary school education in the public schools of Paterson and Roselle, New Jersey. My undergraduate training was obtained at Rutgers University, from which I received the degree Bachelor of Letters in 1949. In 1950 I received the degree Master of Arts from Rutgers. In 1950 I received an appointment as graduate assistant in The Ohio State University Department of English. I held this position for three years, then for one year held the position of assistant instructor while completing the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy.