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THE IWW IN OHIO, 1905-1950.
The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1971
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1971
THE IWW IN OHIO, 1905-1950

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

Roy Theodore Wortman, B. A., M. A.

* * * * * *

The Ohio State University
1971

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CHAPTER I

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE IWW AND SOURCES FOR

THE STUDY OF ITS ACTIVITIES IN OHIO

"With the I. W. W.: The Poor, the Oppressed, the Exploited, the Bindle Stiff, the Prisoner, the Revolutionist, the Slave, the Burden Bearer, the Despised, the Wretched, Those of Revised Hope.


Solidarity, August 9, 1913

"They are inspired with the zeal of either the Christian martyrs or of the fanatics."

George Bell, Statement on the IWW, California Commission on Immigration and Housing. Chief Clerk's File, number 20/77, Records of the Department of Labor, National Archives and Records Service, Record Group 174

* * * * * *
The image of the Industrial Workers of the World, from the organization's inception in 1905, has been inextricably bound with American folklore and mythology. The IWW, in its peak years, 1905-1917, was reviled by business interests, politicians, and large segments of organized labor as a threat to the prevailing social order. But the IWW also had defenders and troubadours who saw it as an exuberant youthful experience and as a form of rebellious martyrdom for the oppressed.

Until the mid-1960s there was a paucity of historical material on the IWW. In literature and popular culture the IWW image, although historically inaccurate, was not neglected. The IWW, emanating from the West, effused an aura of primordial strength representing "an heroic age and seedbed of . . . national virtu and pietas." It was a paean for Mabel Dodge's salon radicals and for a host of writers: Sherwood Anderson, Eugene O'Neill, Jack London, [1]See bibliographical essay.


Carl Van Vechten, Floyd Dell, and John Dos Passos. James Jones, in *From Here to Eternity*, expressed the mystique and appeal of the IWW through Jack Malloy, a former Wobbly turned soldier:

There has never been anything like them, before or since. They called themselves materialist-economists, but what they really were was a religion. They were workstiffs and bindlebums like you and me, but they were welded together by a vision we don't possess. It was their vision that made them great. And it was their belief in it which made them powerful.

... Nobody ever really understood them. They had the courage, and what's more important, they had the soft heart to go with it. Their defeat was due to faulty technique of execution, rather than to concept. But also, I don't think the time was right for them yet.

The spiritual meaning and vision of an ideal enveloping the totality of humankind is seen in religious as well as secular themes. Dorothy Day of the Catholic Worker movement, in her essay "On Pilgrimage," affirmed the all-embracing mystical body of Christ which encircles humanity. The IWW in its own simple way also perceived the mystical concept of this commonalty when it said "an injury to one is an injury to all."

Hunter S. Thompson extended the essence of the IWW to the California Hell's Angels motorcycle pack. Admitting that the Angels would not recognize a Wob from a snake, and conceding that the IWW

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5Catholic Worker, January, 1970.
had a utopian view of the future while the Angels were nihilistic, Thompson drew a parallel between the groups: both evidenced suicidal loyalty to their own kind; each professed fanatical group loyalty; and both were on the periphery of society, perpetually at war with their worlds. Ultimately, both groups became pariahs, Ishmaels whose wrath toward society was a futile gesture and a lost cause, losers in a hostile world. Although losers to Thompson, the IWW image was victoriously transformed by the New Left counter-culture of the middle 1960s; in the underground comic art of the East Village Other the fictitious "Trashman of the Sixth International" joined troopers of the "Joe Hill Brigade, Wobbly Militia."

Wobblies, all things to all people, were praised and reviled from all sides. During the First World War, members of the IWW, "Imperial Wilhelm's Warriors," were accused of aiding the German war effort by burning crops, sabotaging machinery, "and by every other damnable and cowardly thing." In the postwar era the IWW, to some observers, was synonymous with the international Communist conspiracy. On the other hand, Communists, for tactical reasons, 6

heaped invectives upon the IWW for refusing to subordinate itself to a highly disciplined, tightly centralized, anti-democratic totalitarianism. Communists accused the Wobblies of practicing pacifism and denying the validity of the dictatorship of the proletariat; and denounced Wobbly leaders as cowards, opportunists, short-sighted, incompetent, vacillating and reactionary.  

Communists also used the IWW. William D. Haywood, a founder and luminary of the IWW, was converted by Communists into a rough-hewn precursor of American Bolshevism. Less blatant in approach but not in substance is Philip Foner's study of the IWW. A Marxist-Leninist, Foner claims to admire the IWW's "heroic militancy" but criticizes the organization for "serious flaws in its ideology."  


10J. Louis Engdahl, "William D. Haywood--'Undesirable Citizen'," The Communist: A Theoretical Magazine for the Discussion of Revolutionary Problems, VII (July, 1928), 441. Hagiographical distortions of Haywood remind one of the dialogue between Vyshinsky and Bukharin at the Stalinoid show trials of the late 1930s: Accused Bukharin: "It must be said for the sake of historical exactitude..." Comrade Prosecutor Vyshinsky: "Don't trouble to speak for history, accused Bukharin. History will itself record what will be interesting for history." Robert C. Tucker and Stephen F. Cohen, eds., The Great Purge Trial (New York, 1965), p. ix. For additional information on Communist duplicity with Haywood's autobiography, see bibliographical essay at end of dissertation.  

Melvyn Dubofsky’s point is well made: Foner’s brand of Marxism-Leninism serves as an absolute against which the IWW was adjudged and belittled for infantile leftism. 12

Socialist treatment of the IWW was divided. Eugene Debs, a founder of the IWW, broke with the organization but maintained sympathy for it. 13 Max Hayes of Ohio, on the other hand, asserted that the IWW consisted of "egotistical, phrasemongering anarchistic elements," agents provocateurs in the employ of the plutocracy assigned to wreck the Socialist Party and the labor movement. 14 In the 1930s, when the IWW made strong gains in Ohio and elsewhere, orthodox De Leonites of the Industrial Union Party saw the IWW’s resurgence as nothing more than "fat-chewing over imaginary successes of the past, which it enjoys with all the rapture of the ham actor who has returned from the sticks," and described the Wobblies themselves as revolutionary panhandlers reorganizing on the garbage heaps of history. 15


14 Cleveland Citizen, July 18, 1914.

15 Industrial Unionist, II (September, 1933), 2. (Reprinted New York, 1968).
The IWW, abused and misinterpreted by Socialists and Communists, has also received harsh assessment from a member of the democratic center, John P. Roche. Drawing heavily on the anti-IWW stance of Stuart R. Holbrook and the anti-Nazi position of Hermann Rauschning, Roche asserts that the IWW had no vision of the future; rather than constructing a new world, the Wobblies emphasized destroying the old. Roche links the union to European syndicalist movements which later became fascist. As Roche interprets the sweep of history, parallels between the IWW and fascism include love of force and violence, irrational scorn for political processes, and a denial of "bourgeois values" amounting to "endorsement of revolutionary gangsterism." According to Roche, "the Wobblies were consumed by a ferocious nihilism; they were capitalism's


17 Stuart R. Holbrook, The Rocky Mountain Revolution (New York, 1956), accepts the argument that the IWW was prone to physical violence; Hermann Rauschning, The Revolution of Nihilism (New York, 1939).

18 Roche, p. 53.

19 Ibid. Following his statement about the hopelessness which the IWW envisioned for bourgeois society and their rejection of democratic political programs, Roche notes, "For a discussion of the constructive Socialist position versus the nihilistic Nazi one, see ... . . ." The Wobblies, by innuendo and implication, fell into the camp of nihilism and Nazism. Roche, p. 275, n. 16.
The IWW, operating on the frustrations and despair of the lumpenproletariat, was akin to Italian squadristi and early Nazi cadres who built their base on "the revenge of the alienated."

Marxist Socialists envisioned a future; the IWW viewed the world in combative terms in which the historical process became a conspiracy against the disinherited. Roche argued that the essence of the IWW's existence was exploitation in an unjust industrial society. Thus,

... this system of near-peonage could not provide moral validation for the excesses of the IWW, but it does help to explain the basis of Wobbly power. While in any historical period one can find brave men who in the name of one nihilistic credo or another engage in daemonic resistance to the status quo (the European Secret Army in Algeria is a recent example...), the question which must be asked is not why these men are so committed (a problem for psychiatrists) but what rottenness in society threw leaders of this sort to the top.\(^{20}\)

The fact is that the IWW was neither demon nor sanctified martyr; it was, rather, an understandable outgrowth of industrial society. The IWW's growth, its anti-fascist stance in the 1920s and 1930s, and its utopian faith in the inherent goodness of man made the organization anything but protofascistic. Wobblies likened themselves to pre-Civil War abolitionists; the latter fought against human slavery, the former, "modern abolitionists fighting against wage slavery."\(^{21}\) Powerless, poor, unorganized people found in the IWW

\(^{20}\)Ibid., pp. 54-55.

a means for righting the wrongs of industrial society. The IWW, promising hope, dignity, self-respect, and a sense of belonging, offered an alternative to "the culture of poverty."22 Ultimately, the IWW envisioned an industrial society for use rather than profit in which the disruptions and dislocations of war, poverty, and nationalism would be replaced with a nonviolent, harmonious apolitical entity governed along industrial lines.23

Basically American in origin and devoid of foreign ideology, the IWW advocated syndicalism, a concept which espoused direct action, the general strike, abolition of the wage system, and a society


23 Statement by Frank Cedervall, in oral history interview with Frank Cedervall, Toivo Halonen, and Mike Kaciban, October 31, 1967; "You've Asked the Questions, We're Proud to Answer--About the I. W. W.," (Chicago, n. d.), pp. 1-8; Justus Ebert, The I. W. W. in Theory and Practice, fifth revised edition (Chicago, n. d.), pp. i-iii. First published in 1920, this booklet gave the post-World War I viewpoint which was less utopian and more practical than earlier IWW rhetoric. With the disruption of the IWW through the Wilson administration's political prosecutions, the union in the 1920s turned from labor organization to theories of scientific management of capital resources. Many technocrats of the 1930s received their start with the IWW in the 1920s. In the 'teens the IWW envisioned the ideal society as a classless entity in which labor would no longer be persecuted. In the 1920s the Wobblies saw a society managed along the lines of the Plumb Plan (railroad management by the total railroad industry, including unions) and Thorstein Veblen's industrial society controlled by a council of technicians. Additional views of the future may be found in Joyce Kornbluh, ed., Rebel Voices: An I. W. W. Anthology (Ann Arbor, 1964), and in Dubofsky's excellent treatment of ideology and utopia in We Shall Be All, pp. 147-170.
controlled by labor. Although accused of advocating violence and industrial sabotage, the IWW was in fact never adjudged guilty of overt physical acts against people or property. Wobbly sabotage consisted of work slowdowns and verbal maligning of an employer's product. It was not directed toward physical injury of human life.

The rhetoric of the IWW, like that of the Populists, was both

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24 Statement by Frank Cedervall, in oral history interview with Cedervall, Halonen and Kaciban; Donald M. Barnes, "The Ideology of the Industrial Workers of the World," (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1962), p. 3; Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, pp. 361-367, 146-170. The seminal statement is Louis Levine, "The Development of Syndicalism in America," Political Science Quarterly, XXVIII (September, 1913), 451-479. Levine noted that American and French syndicalism were concomitant developments; the IWW's syndicalism, renamed "industrial unionism," was not an "imitative gesture" but rather an accommodation to Western frontier and mining conditions. Haywood visited Europe in 1908 and made contact with members of the Confederation Generale du Travail, but his own form of syndicalism was developed before he met CGT officials. Conlin, "The Wobblies: A Study of the I. W. W. Before World War I," (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1966), pp. 27, 95, and his Bread and Roses Too, pp. 8-35, contends that the Wobblies were a native product, as American as the rugged individualism of the West, but their brand of industrial unionism could not be considered as syndicalism. Conlin's cogent and scholarly argument merits attention, within the somewhat confined semantic area he develops in defining syndicalism, but the preponderance of evidence is with those who recognize the IWW as syndicalist.

25 Eldridge F. Dowell, A History of Criminal Syndicalism Legislation in the United States (Baltimore, 1939); "The I. W. W. is actually one of the least violent of organizations." Paul Brissenden, "The I. W. W. in California," p. 14, in unpublished reports, United States Commission on Industrial Relations, Wisconsin Historical Society. "Monarchs have been slain, but monarchies persist. One king is laid low, but another rises; and the net result is probably the strengthening of the kingdom." "Uselessness of Assassination," Industrial Union Bulletin, February 8, 1908.

26 Walker C. Smith, Sabotage (Chicago [1913?]), p. 2.
humanistic and bombastic. Sometimes it had to be toned down. In 1912 Walker C. Smith was suspended as editor of the *Industrial Worker* because his editorials were too intemperate and called for sabotage in lieu of legal defense for strikers at Little Falls, New York, and Patterson, New Jersey. Ben H. Williams, IWW editor and philosopher, recognized that "tactics are inseparable from organization" and was deeply concerned over the image of a violent and irresponsible union. He suggested that a more judicious approach to rhetoric would be tactically advantageous. The IWW lauded social change stemming from political reform and did not reject child-labor and minimum-wage laws. Where certain radicals saw in human suffering impending revolution and turmoil, the IWW rejected the dictum of "the worse the better" and welcomed amelioration of poverty within the existing political system. Moreover, during the Great Depression era, when the survival of the IWW was at stake, Wobblies

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accepted the New Deal's labor policies. Had it not been for those policies, the moribund Ohio IWW would not have been able to take control of Cleveland's metal and machinery shops. 30

It is difficult, almost impossible, to label the IWW or to assign it to a neatly compartmentalized cubicle in the ideological spectrum. The union was not monolithic. Libertarian and eclectic, it had no standardized dogma, and no one single polemicist, philosopher, or spokesman. Critics interpreted the IWW to suit the temper of the times or their own views and panaceas.

A substantive parallel between the Wobblies and the Populists does not exist. But in form analogies may be drawn: both groups were indigenous to America and were outgrowths of societal tensions and inequities; each had a program regarded as utopian and dangerous for its time; each had a style—at times intemperate—which sometimes couched ideals and programs in emotional, oversimplistic, and bombastic terms; and both Populism and the IWW have been used historiographically to legitimate the particular ideologies of their interpreters. Ultimately, the Populists were incorporated into the two-party system, while fragments of the IWW program were incorporated into the CIO. But where Populism's program was almost completely absorbed by the political process, it would be inaccurate to say that the same

30 Frank Cedervall, in oral history interview with Cedervall, Halonen and Kaciban.
happened to the IWW. "One big union" was partially realized by the CIO, but Wobbly ideas and programs never materialized.

Generalities and judgments on Populism and on the IWW have made stereotypes, often without a fair trial. Richard Hofstadter, Victor Ferkiss, and other scholars reacting to the excesses of fascism and of the McCarthy era, viewed Populism as a prototype of native American demagoguery and xenophobia; Norman Pollack, on the other hand, sees the movement as a grass roots reaction to industrialism. For Pollack, Populism was humanistic, innately socialist, and an expression of a radical critique of America. 31

Historical scholarship, whether hostile or favorable, has contributed toward our understanding of Populism, but sweeping generalizations and categorizations are invalid. Before a full understanding of Populism can be achieved, the movement must be studied in depth at various levels to perceive specific as well as general behavior. 32 Only then can the historian view the topic with perspective and balanced


judgment. The same approach holds true for the study of the IWW.

* * * * * *

It would be presumptuous to assume that a study of the IWW in Ohio will drastically revise the two historiographical landmarks on the Wobblies. Paul Brissenden's study, published in 1919, is still the magnum opus in the field. Melvyn Dubofsky's book, published fifty years after Brissenden's work, is a masterful and humanistic synthesis. Where Brissenden wrote with sympathetic detachment, Dubofsky approached the IWW with a commitment which resulted in a work of love, painstaking research, and compassionate scholarship.33

The IWW in Ohio, with the exception of the Akron rubber strike of 1913, has generally been ignored or mentioned in passing by researchers. Extant source materials reveal that the IWW was as much alive in Ohio as it was in the forests and mine fields of the West and in the textile mills of the East. Sporadic attempts at organization were made not only in Akron, but also in the coal fields of eastern Ohio, and in numerous other cities and towns.

As far as the IWW was concerned, the period from the 1913 Akron strike to the 1920s served as a barometer of industrial unrest. The rise of the IWW occurred in what Robert Wiebe calls the "distended

33 Paul Brissenden, The I. W. W.: A Study in American Syndicalism (New York, 1919); Dubofsky, We Shall Be All.
society." Early twentieth-century America, lacking the certitudes and values of pre-Civil War agrarian society and the stability later given to organized labor by the New Deal, showed the strains of industrialization and urbanization. In an era of shifting emphases and values the IWW filled a void; unorganized wage-earners, powerless in controlling their environment, found in the IWW a representative for their grievances, frustrations, and hopes. The era of the First World War also revealed the dichotomy between the American dream and wartime reality, between liberty and order. During the war and postwar years Ohio was a microcosm in which this duality was clearly manifested.

The unique aspect of the IWW in Ohio was its phoenix-like transformation in Cleveland during the Great Depression. From 1934 to 1950 Metal and Machinery Workers' Industrial Union 440 was a viable force in organized labor. Under the protective umbrella of New Deal policies on organized labor and collective bargaining, IU 440 used the political process to increase IWW strength. Utopian commonwealths belonged to the future; for the present, IU 440 emphasized a solid, pragmatic job union. New wine in old bottles, with new cellarmasters, best describes the Ohio Wobblies of this period. IU 440 brought a breath of life to a moribund organization which had

already seen its zenith. A study of IU 440 is significant because it shows the tensions within an avowedly revolutionary industrial union.

Where is the dividing line drawn between ideals and practice? Are tactical gains worth the compromise of idealistic goals? These issues, which eventually dismembered the IWW, are magnified in the Ohio case.

It is possible to show these trends in the Ohio IWW, but a complete recreation cannot be made due to gaps in source material. Destruction of IWW records in the 1920s by order of a federal court caused an irretrievable loss for historians. Membership lists, organizers' reports, and the status of the IWW in various industries—foundation material for any study of the IWW—went up in smoke.

To overcome the loss of primary material I have resorted to various research expedients. Thus, in studying the Akron strike of

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1913, I used the city's newspapers, the IWW press, state documents, and an oral history interview. Unpublished reports of field investigators for the United States Commission on Industrial Relations provided the best material on the background of labor strife in eastern Ohio. For the coal field strike of 1914 I relied mainly on local newspapers and the Wobbly press. Sources on the IWW during the First World War are more available. An overview of the American Protective League activities is available from papers of the Mayor's Advisory War Committee (Cleveland), Harry L. Davis Collection, Western Reserve Historical Society. Recently declassified military intelligence reports offer a general picture of radical labor activities. Records of numerous government agencies in the National Archives further amplify IWW activities in Ohio during the First

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36 Six linear feet of unpublished United States Commission on Industrial Relations investigative reports are archived in the Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin. I also consulted unpublished USCIR reports in U.S., Department of Labor, NA, RG 174, in an attempt to plug missing gaps in the WHS collection. The USCIR's printed findings are a familiar source to researchers, but the unpublished field reports are rarely consulted by researchers. For the suggestion to examine the unpublished reports I gratefully acknowledge Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, p. 535.

37 U.S., War Department, General Staff, Military Intelligence Division, The European War: Weekly Intelligence Summary (1917-1919), Western Reserve Historical Society.
Material in the Labadie Collection, University of Michigan, rounded out the overview of anti-radical activity in Ohio.

Sources for Ohio's IWW are sparse for the 1920s but abundant for the Great Depression era. Scrapbooks, press releases, pamphlets, minutes and proceedings, and other IWW memorabilia supplemented the Industrial Worker, Ohio newspapers, and IU 440 material. I employed oral history interviews to obtain broad-based concepts and attitudes rather than detailed factual data. In cases where specific events were covered in interviews, material was cross-checked against available written sources, but in scope and theme the interviews emphasized personal biography and intellectual outlook.

38 Papers Relating to the President's Mediation Commission, October 1917-January 1918, Papers of Louis Levine, and Justice Department Prosecution of Labor Agitators under the Espionage Act of 1917, all in War Labor Policies Board, NA, RG 1. Records of the Department of Justice, NA, RG 60, screened for all Bureau of Investigation material before I was allowed to use them, were of tremendous help. General Records Relating to Political Prisoners, NA, RG 204, contained much information on the IWW, and also contained clippings, letters from Roger Baldwin and other citizens protesting the excesses of the Wilson administration. General File Papers, numbers 205-209, in William Wilson, Secretary of Labor, Department of Labor, NA, RG 174, were of ephemeral value.

39 James W. Wilkie, "Postulates of Oral History Center for Latin America," Journal of Library History, II (January, 1967), 46; Wilkie, "Oral History of 'Biographical Elitlores' in Latin America," Wenner Grenn Foundation for Anthropological Research (New York, 1967), pp. 37-42. Although centering on Latin American political elites, the essence of both these excellent papers were applicable to oral history in any Western environment. With modification, model questions from Wilkie's scheme were applied to labor history in the United States, and with fairly good results.
In the absence of other sources I have used newspapers, pamphlets, a printed court decision and some lower-level court materials. 40

The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and the United States Department of Labor granted me permission to examine case files relating to IU 440-management conflicts in Cleveland. 41 Material for the post-World War II era bearing on IU 440's disaffiliation with national IWW over the Taft-Hartley non-Communist affidavit issue was available through the private labor history collection of Mr. Richard Tussey, AFL-CIO.

Missing or destroyed sources of the IWW make any study incomplete. Nevertheless, a portrait, impressionistic rather than photographic, emerges from available evidence. The portrait reveals the nature of a militant labor union, its shifts from the progressive era through 1950, and the limitations and capabilities not

40 The best document is State v. Lindway, 131 O. S. 166. An examination of the Court of Common Pleas materials, Criminal Branch, County of Cuyahoga, Cleveland, Ohio, microfilm reel number 44663 revealed a certified copy of sentence, an indictment sheet of the Common Pleas Court, cost bills for transportation to penitentiary, and a list of witnesses in attendance under recognizance subpoena. A transcript of the trial has not yet been located.

only of the union, but also of the milieu in which it functioned. Recognizing gaps in sources and the fallibility of the human mind through which historical materials are synthesized, refracted, and interpreted, I hope that this study will transform shadow into substance.
CHAPTER II

THE EARLY YEARS, 1905-1914

"Labor strife is today centering on the I. W. W. ideal of expropriation instead of the A. F. of L. ideal of shorter hour[s] and higher wages. To check the first we must take the second."

_Akron Beacon Journal_, June 27, 1913

Extant sources reveal little about early IWW activities in Ohio. The IWW was founded in 1905; its first action in Ohio is thought to be the Youngstown steel strike of that year. ¹ By 1907 Wobblies established unions in Canton, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Glencoe, Hamilton, and Youngstown.² Fostoria, Lorain, Martin's Ferry, and Massillon had locals by 1910.³ In Columbus, Wobblies were "rapidly organizing" in the Jeffrey railroad shops.⁴ By 1912, Local 54 was established at the Columbus Malleable Iron


²IWW, "General Summary of the Financial Conditions of the Organization from October 1st, 1906, to August 31st, 1907," in IWW Pamphlet Collection, Microfilm roll number P 34898, WHS.

³_Industrial Worker_, February 5, 1910; _Solidarity_, August 13, 1910.

⁴_Industrial Union Bulletin_, July 6, 1907.
Company; its nineteen members were opposed by a company-sponsored Militia of Christ unit, an anti-radical arm of the Roman Catholic church. 5 In Cleveland an IWW organizer reported "things shaping up for an effective organization," and hoped that locals would raise money for IWW propaganda. 6

The first record of an IWW strike in Cleveland took place in 1910 when Wobblies struck Marcus Fedder's "London Whiffs" cigar factory. 7 A strike in 1912, led by IWW organizer Walter Glover against the Cyclone Fence Company's Cleveland plant, was directed against a wage cut "and the attempt to thus reduce us to a lower standard of life, to degredation." 8 Free speech confrontations, a tactic used by the IWW in the West, came to Cleveland in 1912, when four Wobblies were arrested for preaching anarchy. Brought to court, the IWW quartet sang in typically Wobbly humorous style:

Long haired preachers come out every night,
Try to tell you what's wrong and what's right.
But when asked how about something to eat,

5 Solidarity, June 29, 1912. For a description of the Militia for Christ and the tactics of its founder, Father Peter Deitz of Ohio, see Marc Karson, American Labor Unions and Politics, 1900-1918 (Boston, 1965), pp. 241-260.

6 Industrial Union Bulletin, July 13, 1907.

7 Solidarity, January 29, 1910. The outcome of the strike was not reported in subsequent issues of the paper.

8 Ibid., November 9, 16, 1912.
They will answer with voices so sweet:

You will eat by and by,

In that glorious land above the sky.

Work and pray; live on hay,

You'll get pie in the sky when you die.

Judge Levine allowed the Wobblies the right to express views on government. "You have the right to meet, and I found the charge you were preaching anarchy is baseless."[^9]

By the end of 1912 other locals were established in Rhodesdale, Conneaut, Niles, Sidney, Toledo, Springfield, and Elyria.[^10]

Activity up to 1913 was sporadic and fragmented, but the Akron rubber strike pushed the IWW into the public limelight.

"Akron remains, to this day, the supreme mistake of the I. W. W.," declared One Big Union Monthly in 1920. "Never in the history of the I. W. W. has a strike that opened with such alluring prospects led to such a crushing disillusionment."[^11] The "supreme mistake" was the Akron rubber strike of 1913. After the 1870s Akron

[^9]: Ibid., September 7, 1912.

[^10]: Industrial Worker, December 26, 1912.

grew rapidly as an industrial city. In addition to incentives offered by the city to the rubber industry, Akron had a large labor pool. Seventy per cent of the rubber strikers were native-born Americans who came from rural areas of Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia; an immigrant work force from Central and Eastern Europe, lured to the United States by travel agents' glowing pictures of wealth, comprised the remainder. By 1913, eight corporations—Goodrich, Firestone, Goodyear, Star, Swinehart, Buckeye, Miller, and Diamond—were active in rubber production. Firestone's growth best illustrated the quick rise of the industry. In 1902, Harvey Firestone had twelve employees. "We really were a big family," he said, emphasizing the sense of community and commonality between employer and employee. By 1913, Firestone, a self-made man who espoused company paternalism and the gospels of wealth and efficiency, had 1800 employees. As his company burgeoned from a "family" into a corporation, the bond between employer and employee was lost. "I don't even know the names of my foremen," Firestone lamented.


13Solidarity, March 1, 8, 1913; letter from Paul Sebestyen, May 17, 1969, to RTW. Immigrant groups included Hungarians, Germans, Serbians, Poles, Roumanians, and Syrians.

"It used to be different." The rubber industry's trade journal agreed. Production efficiency and acceleration made for a depersonalized industry in which foremen didn't know the wage-earner's problems and grievances. Wobblies, too, perceived the shift when they noted that "Akron has become a city of furnished rooms," with 800 workers moving in and out of the city monthly.

As the industry grew, labor attempted to organize. In 1906, 500 rubber workers organized in an embryonic union which was quickly suppressed by management. The union's office was burglarized, its records stolen, and every union member fired. Akron's Chamber of Commerce asserted "oppression of labor is so uncommon as to be almost unknown . . . ," and declared that rubber factories had modern, fireproof buildings with ample sanitation, ventilation, and light. Wage-earners and state senator William Green, a Democrat from Coshocton and a staunch opponent of the IWW, disagreed. Green contended that the rubber industry, overcapitalized


16 India Rubber World, XLVII (April, 1913), 365-366.

17 Solidarity, March 8, 1913.


19 India Rubber World, XLVII (March 1, 1913), 301-302.
and with watered stock, received protective tariffs from the government and was allowed "enormous profits from the American people." In a populistic vein Green asserted, "Notwithstanding the favors extended to them by the people's government, these corporations have assumed an autocratic and arrogant attitude, refusing to meet with employees to hear grievances and to settle differences." Grievances included the Taylor speed-up system, which granted employees bonuses if they produced more than their peers. Management argued that this system rewarded employee initiative and efficiency. Rubber workers countered that the system forced them to work faster, causing exertion and injuries to health. With the exception of Good-year's eight-hour shifts in the tire-building department, hours for male workers in the industry ran between ten to eleven for daytime work, and thirteen for night work. Women employees worked a fifty-four hour week. Rubber workers also complained that they would be discharged if they voiced their problems to management.

The Green Committee, appointed by the Ohio Senate in

20 Senate Resolution Number 29, in Ohio, Eightieth General Assembly, Senate, Journal (1913), CIII, p. 247. Green's resolution to investigate the strike and to subpoena witnesses for testimony was adopted in the state senate by a vote of 30 yeas to 3 nays. Green (1870-1952) served as secretary-treasurer of the United Mine Workers of America, 1912-1924, and became president of the AFL in 1924.

February, 1913, to investigate the causes and conduct of the strike, recognized the workers' fear that complaints would lead to reprisals, but maintained that "no overt act on the part of the men in highest authority . . . would justify the employes in entertaining such belief." None the less, the Committee realized the natural fear of wage-earners toward their employers. Many superintendents and foremen were fair, but "... failure to correct complaints, adjust grievances and convince the employes of their purpose and desire to treat with any employe who had a grievance without prejudice or punishment by any of those in authority has contributed largely toward the discontent among the employes in the rubber factories." Related to this complaint was the workers' fear of the blacklist system. The Green Committee found "no conclusive evidence" that a list formally existed. Despite this finding, each company's employment department maintained "a minute description" of each worker which, in essence, constituted a dossier. Employees reacted strongly to this system. "They seemed to regard the minute description of them taken upon the employment card as an unfair and humiliating espionage." Management asserted that this system was needed to protect the industry from workers with bad work backgrounds, while employees saw it as a de facto blacklist. The Green Committee observed that rubber industry wages "compare favorably" to other industries. At issue, however, was the piece-work system which
made for wide disparities in some cases. 22

These complaints, coupled with unsanitary conditions and wage cuts in 1912 and 1913, led to frustration and resentment. 23

The time was ripe for the IWW. In the summer of 1912, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, speaking in Akron, urged organization "from cellar to roof." Flynn exhorted workers dissatisfied with conditions to support the IWW. "What was done in Lawrence textile mills may be done in Akron rubber shops." 24 Six months later the IWW in Akron had burgeoned into a huge, awkward union. Wobbly organizer Walter Knox saw Akron's industries as a huge trust. Why not organize a "labor trust"? 25 Rubber workers, unorganized since 1906, seemed ready for unionization. The IWW seized the moment.

In 1912, IWW organizers from Cleveland infiltrated Akron to form Rubber Workers' Industrial Union 470. The union, fearing the labor spy system which had destroyed the AFL organization six

22 Ibid., pp. 208-209, 211.

23 Akron Beacon Journal, February 13, 1913. For an individual case of a wage cut and for complaints on poor sanitation, see O. S. Miller's testimony to the Green Committee, Akron Beacon Journal, March 5, 1913. Discontent and confusion over the piece-work system are best expressed in the testimony of A. E. Mapes and Elizabeth Bryan, ibid., March 10, 1913.

24 Solidarity, August 17, 1912.

25 Ibid., February 8, 1913.
years earlier, remained "secret and subterranean in its propaganda." 26

Wobblies had from 15 to 150 members 27 and were apparently ineffective until Firestone introduced new machinery designed to produce more tires per work day with a corresponding reduction of piece-work rates. In protest, on February 11, twenty-five tire finishers went on strike. 28 This small, unorganized, and spontaneous protest spread until 300 Firestone workers walked off the job. 29 The company refused to negotiate with the strikers. After they walked out, Firestone posted a notice: "All tire makers and . . . finishers who leave the building . . . and who do not return for work this afternoon, we will consider as having given up their positions. . . ." 30 Despite this announcement, the strike spread rapidly to other departments within the plant, and then to other companies. Governor James Cox ordered the State Board of Arbitration to visit Akron and attempt a settlement. The companies refused to negotiate with the strikers and

26 "The Story of the I. W. W.," 44.

27 "Green Committee Report," p. 210, stated that Wobblies, prior to the strike, had between 15-50 members. Solidarity, February 22, 1913, citing a United Press dispatch, gave the figure as 150 members before the strike.

28 Akron Beacon Journal, February 12, 13, 1913.

29 Solidarity, February 22, 1913.

30 Akron Beacon Journal, February 13, 1913.
vetoed the services of the Arbitration Board. By shutting channels of communications between labor and management, the rubber companies helped the IWW swell the ranks of unorganized strikers.

To Wobblies, the spontaneous strike came as a surprise. IWW units in Cleveland and Akron were weak, and IWW leaders were involved with the textile strike in Paterson, New Jersey. The Socialist and Socialist Labor Parties of Ohio, however, were friendly toward the IWW and aided with strike leadership and organization. Socialist allies of the IWW included William Bessemer, Frank Midney of Youngstown, and Marguerite Prevey of Akron. Prevey, Knox, and the Reverend William Davis urged public support for a nonviolent strike. A strike committee representing various language groups was organized on February 13, and announced that it would attempt to post pickets and intercept men going to work on the morning shift. As organizational strength coalesced and as the strike mushroomed, IWW


32 "The Story of the I. W. W.," 44-45. Biographical data on Midney and Bessemer are not available. Prevey was born in Canada and was one of the founders of the Socialist Party of Ohio. She practiced opticianry in Akron, and later became one of the five founders of the Communist Labor Party of Ohio. On October 1, 1919, she was elected vice-chairman of the Left-Wing (Communist Labor Party) faction of the Socialist Party. Ohio Socialist, October 1, 1919.

33 Solidarity, February 22, 1913; Akron Beacon Journal, February 13, 1913.
veterans of the Spokane free speech fights appeared. Arturo Giovanitti, a leading participant in the Lawrence strike, noted the climate of Akron: "I tell you that Akron is shaken. . . . All creeds, colors, and flags are represented in the strike." Despite a jittery citizenry, even the India Rubber World reported that strikers were peaceful. The Akron Beacon Journal, a Progressive Party organ, corroborated this observation by noting that "Not a single address was made which in any way could be calculated to inspire hatred or violence."35

In the strike's early days membership in the Akron IWW increased to more than 2000. Organizers Glover, Knox, and Swasey reported working an eighteen-hour day. With robust glee a Wobbly wrote: "Haven't seen a cop since I have been here . . . and everybody says it's the most peaceful strike ever heard of. All hail the rebel proletaire! Hurrah for the strike! Less booze for the bosses! More bread for the workers!"36 In the strike's fourth day, over 12,000 men were out. Strikers, although peaceful, alarmed Mayor Frank W. Rockwell, who telegraphed Governor James M. Cox:

"Situation here alarming. . . . Local authorities will be unable to

34 Letter from Paul Sebestyen, May 17, 1969 to RTW.

35 India Rubber World, XLVII (March 1, 1913); 301; Akron Beacon Journal, February 13, 1913.

36 Solidarity, February 12, 1913.
cope with it if it breaks loose. Request two companies ONG, with more available." Ohio's Adjutant General stated that Guard units from Cleveland, Youngstown, and Warren were within a one-hour railroad trip from Akron. But Governor Cox refused to send troops. Instead, he replied to Rockwell by sending the State Board of Arbitration "to establish amicable relations." As previously noted, management refused arbitration. Despite rejection of its services and lacking coercive power, the Board attempted to exercise moral suasion on city officials and strikers. One member, D. H. Sullivan, a former miners' organizer with a reputation for fairness, met with Akron police chief Durkin, who told him that no trouble was expected. On February 17, with IWW membership now estimated at 6000, Board members met with Wobbly organizers George Speed and Walter Glover, who assured the arbitrators that strikers would "remain quiet." "We believe in your assurances," replied the Board, and "we find you a good natured crowd, not intent on violence." Such judgment was perhaps based on speeches made earlier.

38 Ibid.
40 Akron Beacon Journal, February 17, 1913.
in the day by Speed and Glover:

It is not the laboring classes who resort to violence and rioting. . . . It is the so-called upper classes, the capitalists, who resort to such means; they have robbed the working man and all their wealth was gained by violent, unscrupulous methods. What chances has an honest man in such an age? . . .

No, use no violence, boys; show the bosses that the laboring men have the brains to stand together and organize; show them that you do not depend on violent methods to gain your purpose and you are sure to win out in this strike.  

On February 18, the IWW—with some exaggeration—claimed 12,000 members out of a total of 20,000 rubber workers.  

Sheriff Ferguson stated that he would take no action against the strike unless required. Wobblies announced control of the situation, with "all the red ribbon in town . . . sold out," and triumphantly paraded with an eighteen-piece marching band followed by strikers holding signs reading, "We are the I. W. W.,” and "Thirteen hours killed father." On February 22, after consulting with strikers, the IWW finalized forty-two grievances into three main groups: first, all employees fired because of strike participation must be rehired; second, an eight-hour day and

41 Ibid., February 17, 1913.

42 Ibid., February 18, 1913. Given the inflated IWW figures on the one side and the underestimates of company officials on the other, perhaps the most reliable source for strike membership came from the Green Committee, which estimated the highest number of strikers and sympathizers at 15,000. "Green Committee Report," p. 206.

43 Akron Beacon Journal, February 19, 1913.
a six-day week; and third, a general wage increase. But despite the enthusiasm and elan, the IWW had passed its zenith. In the third week of the strike fewer strike badges were seen in streets. Cold weather reduced the number of pickets, and many foreign-born workers went back to the job. Ben Williams, editor of Solidarity, had hopes for a sustained strike, but his aspirations never materialized.44

The IWW strike committee called for 5000 pickets at the Goodrich plant; 200 showed, met by as many police officers and deputies. For the first time in the strike, one of the leaders, Frank Midney, editor of the Youngstown Socialist, was arrested for "promoting disorder." Midney, awaiting sentence, told his audience that Spartacus and Jesus were among the world's first strikers, 45 but his grandiloquence had no effect upon Akron.

By February 28, the general strike committee, which wanted compromise with management, ejected three adamant strike leaders who were against making concessions. H. E. Pollock, spokesman for the committee, said that the IWW alienated strikers. On the same day, William D. Haywood visited Akron to bolster sagging morale by urging unity and non-violence. But he recognized that the strike was lagging, and looked to future tactics. "If the boss starves you back

44Solidarity, March 1, 1913.

45Akron Beacon Journal, February 26, 27, 1913.
to work then you . . . win this strike on the inside of the factory.

Don't use the speeding-up, but the slowing down process. **Despite this attempt at regrouping the strike force, workers continued to lose interest in the issue. By March 3, while the Green Committee was probing the causes and grievances of the strike, workers began returning to the factories. Mayor Rockwell, who had earlier sensed tensions in the strike, now allowed saloons to reopen. The emergency period was over.**

With the Green Committee investigating the strike, there was some hope for a possible settlement; the crisis situation had passed. Workers, placing practical self-interest above ideology, went back to work, to the dismay of the IWW. What Wobblies did not realize was the lack of ideological consciousness on the part of their evanescent membership. For workers, getting back to the job was more important than the IWW.

Haywood doubtlessly recognized this when he spoke again on March 6. "Do not depend on the Senate Probe Committee to help you," he said to an audience of 1000. "Get out on the picket line . . .

I know how anxious you are to go back to work. You are like an old

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horse which has been on a treadmill. It doesn't know what to do. But hold out a little while longer. Don't give in. Wobblies signed up only thirty-seven new members that day. Older hands had returned to their jobs.

On the evening of March 7, the first serious disruptions occurred when police clashed with strikers. The disorders were repeated on March 8, when, against city orders, 350 strikers picketed the Goodrich plant. Sheriff Ferguson's officers charged the crowd, making seven arrests. In the melee Ferguson got too close to the flailing club of a policeman, and received a blow on the nose and mouth, causing him to lose some front teeth. Despite Governor Cox's admonition ordering Mayor Rockwell not to interfere with free assembly and speech, Rockwell was determined to break the strike. Two Socialist city councilmen protested police interference, but their resolution was defeated. When police-striker confrontation flared up again on March 11, Ferguson warned against gatherings of three

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48 Ibid., March 6, 1913.

49 Ibid., March 7, 8, 1913; Leslie H. Marcy of the International Socialist Review delighted in Ferguson's bad luck. "We hope that Officer Viereck who accidentally clubbed the sheriff will receive a raise in pay for strict adherence to duty." "800 Per Cent and the Akron Strike," 724.

50 Solidarity, March 15, 1913.

51 Akron Beacon Journal, March 11, 1913.
or more people on public streets. Prominent Akronites, fearing the
strike leaders, formed a Citizen's Welfare Association, a deputized vigilante group led by the Reverend George P. Atwater, "bible in one hand and a wagon spoke in the other." This mobile strike force, with approximately sixty automobiles for its deputies, blamed the IWW for all of Akron's trouble, and deported forty to fifty "outsiders," thus breaking up IWW organization. Governor Cox, asked by strikers to stop this "mob of the rich," refused to act.

With the return of many workers to the job, and with the formation of the Citizen's Welfare Association, two nails were driven into the strike coffin. An additional nail was driven home when the strike lost the support of the Central Labor Union, AFL. Cal Wyatt, AFL organizer who had competed with the IWW for membership at the Little Falls, New York, and Lawrence strikes, now entered Akron. Under his aegis, Rubber Workers' Union 14407, AFL, was formally organized, with members wearing small American flags in contrast to the red ribbon of the IWW. Wyatt tried to influence

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54 Ibid., March 15, 1913.

55 Ibid., March 1, 1913.
public opinion against the IWW. When the conciliatory Green Committee entered Akron, he stated, "I do not see how these I. W. W. people can be very anxious for such an investigation . . . as up to this time they have been stating that they cared nothing for government, and they were not expected to favor having the legislature take up this matter." 56 Wyatt's efforts at AFL organization, however, were not successful, and the AFL Rubber Workers' Union had a "poorly attended" meeting. Wobblies estimated AFL membership at about 100. 57 Wyatt cautioned Akron's Central Labor Union against supporting an IWW general strike, an admonition which the CLU obeyed. 58 Ironically, the anti-Wobbly AFL did not endear itself to manufacturers; Goodrich and Goodyear declined negotiation with the conservative CLU. 59

In the third week of March, three quarters of the striking rubber workers returned to work as the strike lost momentum. Wobbly activists were not rehired because rubber companies feared sabotage. An additional cut at IWW organization came when strike headquarters at Reindeer Hall was closed on the grounds that the

56 Ibid., February 26, 1913.
57 Ibid., February 25, 1913; Industrial Worker, March 6, 1913.
58 Ibid., February 20, 1913; March 15, 1913.
59 Ibid., March 20, 1913.
meeting place needed plastering. Moreover, Wobblies claimed that Roman Catholic priests fooled their foreign-born congregations by stating that the strike was over. A sudden, massive flood in the Cuyahoga Valley gave the final blow to the strike. Public opinion shifted to the new crisis, and by March 25, the strike was broken.

A post-mortem dissection reveals a variety of factors which caused the strike's failure. The strike was spontaneous, while the opposition was established and well prepared. Akron's Chamber of Commerce, rubber manufacturers, police, and two of the city's three newspapers posed a formidable fist to the IWW. Management, reluctant to accept the State Board of Arbitration's services, vitiated the bargaining power of the IWW. Moreover, personal differences between IWW organizers Trautmann and Speed weakened the Wobblies internally. Provocateurs instigated fights on picket lines, bringing police action against the IWW. Industrial espionage was not unique to Akron; it was, as federal investigators asserted, a nationwide trend used by segments of industry to infiltrate and destroy union organization. The Sherman Detective Agency and the Corporations Auxiliary

60India Rubber World, XLVII (April 1, 1913), 366; Akron Beacon Journal, March 22, 25, 1913; Industrial Worker, April 3, 1913.

61Letter from Paul Sebestyen, May 17, 1917, to RTW.

Company, both with headquarters in Cleveland, hired out as union-breakers. What Selig Perlman said about the Lawrence strike applied equally to Akron and the eastern Ohio coal fields: "Hand in hand with the system of blacklisting goes a system of espionage."63

This was borne out when J. W. Reid, an employee of the Diamond Rubber Company, admitted that he was an operative for the Corporations Auxiliary Company. In this capacity he was also the IWW's secretary-treasurer and helped keep local 470 alive. Reid publicly confessed that 470's president, vice-president, secretary-treasurer, recording secretary, and two other members were industrial spies who controlled the strike's outcome. The IWW membership book was surreptitiously taken to the Portage Hotel where stenographers recorded names of union members. Reid, told to abscond with the union's treasury, had qualms of conscience and confessed all in a public affidavit.64 It was no wonder, then, that


authorities knew in advance every move the IWW would make. If industrial spies were management's intelligence unit, the police, deputies, and the Citizens' Welfare Association were the janissaries. E. C. Shaw, vice-president of Goodrich, sent a gift of $2000 to Akron's police department "as a slight token of our appreciation for services rendered, not so much to ourselves as to the city generally."65

The IWW, reflecting upon the strike, added another contributing factor to the defeat when national character was used as a rationalization for lost victory:

The American element was predominant in Akron. Unlike the foreigners whom the I. W. W. had led at Lawrence and Little Falls, the American striker is unschooled... in picketing and unamenable to the mass enthusiasms which mean so much to the success of a strike. The American temperament is too phlegmatically individualistic.66

In fact the rubber workers were usually ignorant of or indifferent to IWW ideology; the union offered an escape valve for immediate frustrations and tensions, but that was as far as the IWW reached. The overwhelming majority of strikers who joined the IWW during the strike did so without concrete knowledge of Wobbly doctrine. A. E. Mapes epitomized this sentiment when he told the Green Committee that he signed up with the Wobblies without even reading its constitution. Mapes simply felt that the IWW would better working

65India Rubber World, XLVII (June 1, 1913), 480.

conditions. The central issue was simply union organization. Akron epitomized the difficulties of unionization and collective bargaining in an environment totally hostile to any form of labor organization. Management's fear of Wobbly doctrine was a superficial excuse which clouded the real issues of the strike.68

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The IWW's "last fling" in Akron consisted of a letter, both angry and humorous, from Frank Dawson, Wobbly publicity director, to Mayor Rockwell.

This day is April Fool's day. That is why I write to the man who holding the highest municipal office, has proven himself the biggest ass since the poor animal died, that Jesus rode into Jerusalem on. I have adhered to the motto, 'Appropriateness is the first of virtues.'69

Humorous invective aside, the IWW's upsurge in Akron was over. Mayor Rockwell refused, after the strike ended, to grant the Wobblies a permit for street meetings;70 Akron's organization remained dormant until prodded by the federal government during the Great War.

Between 1914 and 1920, rubber workers gained the eight-hour day, voluntary factory sanitary regulations, and "the big money"

67 Akron Beacon Journal, March 10, 1913.
68 Roberts, p. 77.
69 Akron Beacon Journal, April 1, 1913.
70 Ibid., May 27, 1913.
from lucrative war contracts. With the exception of Goodyear's "Industrial Republic," which channeled potential industrial discontent into company unionism, rubber workers lacked organization. Deserted by the AFL a few months after the strike, Akron's rubber workers made no tangible gains in union organization and collective bargaining until the advent of the New Deal. The eight-hour day and war production profits comprised the positive side of post-strike gains, but segments of rubber working force still encountered such occupational diseases as lead, analine coal-tar, benzol, naphtha, carbon disulphide, and phenol poisoning.  

Almost four months after the end of the strike, Akron's feeble IWW local 470 made its plea for direct action and the inevitability of the historical processes:

If you dam up the river of progress,
At your peril and cost let it be.
That river will seaward despite you;
'Twill break down your dam and be free.
And we heed not thy pitiful barriers

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That you in its way have downcast;
For your efforts but add to the torrent
Whose flood must o'erwhelm you at last.  

IWW grievances, representing the torrent of industrial unrest, were channeled, however slowly, into the mainstream of the political process through the New Deal. The dam did not break, nor did the torrential apocalypse appear. In the long run, the IWW contributed to its own demise by placing societal inequities in the public limelight. Wobblies, like the Populists, were ahead of the times; the grievances of third party movements and of blocs of the dispossessed were eventually enveloped, in part, by the two-party system. New Deal NRA codes in the rubber industry achieved what the Wobblies started.

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As the Akron strike declined in March, Wobblies hoped to make gains elsewhere in Ohio. Sporadic activity was seen in Cleveland's rubber industry and the pottery factories of East Liverpool in March, in Cleveland's packing houses in April, Toledo's metal shops in July and August, and a free speech confrontation in Columbus at summer's end.

On March 4, 1913, 1300 rubber workers from Cleveland's Mechanical Rubber Company struck in sympathy with the Akron workers. IWW leaders, optimistic about a nationwide rubber

Solidarity, July 12, 1913.

Akron Beacon Journal, March 4, 1913.
strike, prepared for successful action in Cleveland. Demands included a higher wage scale, and workers received the assurances of management that strikebreakers would not be hired. Although Wobblies emphasized non-violence, organizer Walter Glover said the men were hard to control. On March 5, and again on March 8, violence broke out. The strike lacked sustaining strength, and by March 14, 200 workers reapplied for their former jobs at the old wage scales. The rank and file, by March 16, called off the sympathy strike. Once again, Wobbly leadership was unable to restrain strikers who were essentially non-ideological. Two days after the strikers returned to work, Walter Glover of the IWW announced that the union had officially called off the strike, a rationalization which covered up the strikers' desire to return to work.

The unexpected strike . . . threatened to throw the plant into the power of the United States Rubber Company, backed by J. P. Morgan. . . . It would be in the interest of the combine to have a prolonged labor dispute so that the stock could be depressed and the property bought for a song.

Our fight would then be transferred to the Morgan interests. 77

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On March 20, 1913, 700 girl workers of the conservative Pottery Workers' Union struck for higher wages in East Liverpool,

75Cleveland Leader, March 6, 7, 9, 1913.

76Ibid., March 14, 1913; Solidarity, March 16, 1913.

77Cleveland Leader, March 18, 1913.
Ohio. The AFL, the Boosters' Club, and Billy Sunday's East Liverpool evangelists cautioned the strikers against affiliating with the IWW, but this did not stop Matilda Rabinowitz of Akron from attempting to organize strikers into a Wobbly union. Rabinowitz, refusing to leave town, was arrested and brought before the town judge, a Billy Sunday convert. She asked for a jail sentence but received, instead, a ten-dollar fine plus costs, a sentence suspended on condition that she not make inflammatory speeches. An IWW local of forty members lost strength when Akron strike leaders refused to overextend their efforts to East Liverpool. "All reds welcome," said East Liverpool's Wobbly correspondent, but IWW strength rapidly dwindled. 78

East Liverpool was followed by Wobbly action against Cleveland meat-packing firms. When the chairman of local 145, IWW Packing House Workers, was fired for his union activities, workers went on strike. In addition to his reinstatement, strikers demanded a three cent per hour increase, a ten-hour workday, improved sanitation, and a guarantee that employers show no prejudice toward union men and strikers. Organizers Freitag, Novak, and Arnold respectively explained IWW ideas to strikers in German, Bohemian, and English. A small packing company was willing to settle, but Wobblies held firm, refusing to bargain on an individual basis. Collective bargaining

78 Akron Beacon Journal, March 20, 1913; Solidarity, March 29, 1913.
on an industry-wide level was preferable to fragmented gains. "The bosses," argued the IWW, "are setting up all sorts of howls about sausages rotting, etc., etc., but the workers have answered that all the sausage in Ohio can rot before they will break ranks."\(^7^9\)

In the second week of the strike pickets were arrested, one striker shot, and workers were threatened with blacklisting if they protested the impure meats of the packing houses.\(^8^0\) Extant sources do not reveal the strike's outcome, but Solidarity usually reported successful strikes and dropped coverage on those which failed.

Wobblies were unsuccessful in Cleveland and East Liverpool. Toledo, on the other hand, saw gains. On May 29, 1913, Jack Whyte, a Wobbly veteran of the Fresno and San Diego free speech fights, arrived in Toledo. Whyte, described as having "a pleasing personality, . . . young, virile, and full of the fire of rebellion," helped raise funds in Toledo for the Paterson strike. As organizer for local 86, IWW, he held street meetings and plant meetings at the Overland Automobile Plant and the Toledo Metal Wheel Works to protest the Taylor speed-up system of industrial

\(^7^9\)Solidarity, May 10, 1913.

\(^8^0\)Ibid., May 10, 1913.
efficiency. 81 Workers at the Toledo Metal Wheel plant refused to answer the whistle on July 14. Whyte articulated their demands: an eight-hour day, a 25 per cent wage increase, better sanitary conditions, and abolition of the thirty cents per month mandatory insurance fee. When Whyte finished his speech he was arrested, given a lecture by Toledo's police chief, and dismissed. Thomas O'Malley, an IWW, added, "By the way, the Central Labor Union AFL disowns us. Amen." 82 Indefatigable, the IWW took the Chamber of Commerce motto, "You will do better in Toledo," and added, "if you organize under the banner of the Industrial Workers of the World." The strike spread to the Gendron Company on July 21, where rank and file AFL members, excluding workers from the International Association of Machinists, walked off the job. Whyte, assisted by Joseph E. Moran, addressed 2000 strikers. 83 Moran, arrested for calling non-strikers

81 Solidarity, July 19, 1913; August Walquist, "Toledo on the Move," Solidarity, June 14, 1913. In 1915, Whyte's last year of life, he was accused of participating in the dynamiting of a newspaper plant at Tonopah, Nevada. He was released after a preliminary hearing, and, while dining at the home of a sympathizer, was gunned down by a gambler, Robert L. Stegall. Whyte's spinal column was severed, and he remained paralyzed. Before transferral to McNutt Hospital in San Francisco, where he died on February 2, 1915, Whyte refused to swear out a warrant against his assailant. His assassin was released on $500 bond. Whyte was best remembered by the IWW for his role in the San Francisco free speech fights where he gained fame by remarking, "To hell with your courts." Solidarity, February 13, 1915.

82 Ibid., July 26, 1913.

83 Ibid., July 19, 1913.
"scabs," was brought before a police judge. Moran pleaded not guilty, and asserted that he was not allowed a fair trial in a "court of injustice." Fellow Wobblies provided bail, and two days later the police judge found Moran guilty but refused to impose sentence. The judge, mindful of Western IWW free speech confrontations in which Wobblies forced local officials to adhere to the Bill of Rights, had no desire to make an issue of the case. "Free speech is not suppressed in Toledo," the judge said. Refusing free publicity for the IWW, he concluded: "I do not intend to give you a chance to telephone or telegraph to other places that free speech is not tolerated in Toledo or that the laboring man is being persecuted."84

On July 27, the Toledo firms decided for negotiation. Gendron and Toledo Metal Wheel workers voted to accept a nine-hour workday, a 10 per cent salary increase for all piece-work, a 12 1/2-to 25-cent increase for full-time workers, non-discrimination by management against strikers, and sanitary improvements.85 Wobbly activity then spread to the Foyer Brothers wheel plant, where the Taylor system was recently introduced together with a reduction in piece-work rates. Led by Whyte, the workers struck. The factory owner asked the IWW, "What have I ever done to you? What do you

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84 Toledo News Bee, July 21, 1913.
85 Solidarity, August 2, 1913.
fellows want? Send a committee into the office and we will talk over our differences. If I don't treat you right, you can have the factory."
The IWW replied that it "did not want his factory at the present time." Foyer, relieved, granted all Wobbly demands. "No contract, no compromise!" was a Wobbly war cry, but IWW leaders, desiring to make tangible gains after the Akron failure, compromised for tactical gains. Approximately 1000 workers in Toledo struck, and returned to their jobs with higher wages and better conditions. Despite these gains, no permanent union was built in Toledo. "Short strikes, and lots of them," was an IWW tactic for Ohio, but once the rank and file received material gains, IWW organization weakened.

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Wobblies, with the exception of Toledo, were unsuccessful, but they continued their efforts. In July, 1913, the IWW addressed "all Bohemian and Slovak rebels," pleading for solidarity and support. Prumyslovy Delnick, an IWW Bohemian newspaper was founded in hopes of winning Cleveland's immigrant support. "The revolutionary I. W. W. organ in . . . Bohemian . . . will carry no advertisements of capitalist parasites. . . ."88 In 1914, the IWW, in Cleveland's

86 Ibid., August 2, 1913.
87 One Big Union Monthly [Series I], II (April, 1920), 43.
88 Solidarity, July 5, 1913.
Public Square, distributed copies of Solidarity, and "Jungle Cook" Kelly, a peripatetic Wobbly "on his way through . . . gave the slaves a stirring up that they will not soon forget." But Cleveland's workers did not stir until the Depression Era.

In Columbus, in the summer of 1913, Wobblies demanded equal time with Salvation Army speakers at the corner of Broad and High streets. When the missionaries finished their services, two Wobblies, Sullivan and McNally, jumped on the podium and began to preach the IWW gospel. A riot followed, and police were called in to quell the disturbance. After the riot, Columbus' safety director prohibited the IWW from speaking from downtown street corners.

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From 1905 to 1912 the IWW in Ohio feinted and probed for weak spots in industry. Wobblies, seizing the time in 1913, directed strong thrusts toward Akron's unorganized rubber workers. Management parried, and, with the Citizens' Welfare Association, successfully countered the trusts. More significant than the strength of the opponent, however, was the weakness of the IWW. The organization, theoretically, was the nerve center which controlled tactics, but physical strength came from unorganized, non-ideological workers.

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89Ibid., May 9, 1914.

90Ohio State Journal, August 16, 1913.
In Akron, as elsewhere, workers looked for immediate gains. Lack-
ing sustaining power, workers, temporarily organized by the IWW, weakened against the counterthrusts of management. The spirit, epitomized by the IWW leadership elite, was strong; but the "flesh"--the rank and file--was weak. Defeated in 1913 but refusing to yield, the IWW tried again in 1914 when it crossed swords with the coal operators of eastern Ohio.
CHAPTER III

MARGINAL ACTIVITY IN THE COAL FIELDS, 1914

Up to 1914 Wobblies in Ohio failed to establish permanent industrial organization. The pattern of filling a void ignored by organized labor worked only in Toledo and there only briefly. Pressing issues brought to the surface by IWW agitation were alleviated by public attention and managerial efforts to correct or gloss over grievances. These factors, together with the non-ideological stance of workers who sought immediate economic gains rather than long-range goals of the IWW, epitomized the dilemma of the Wobblies. The pattern emerged again in the coal fields of eastern Ohio. Here the IWW found itself on the periphery, competing for membership with the United Mine Workers of America, fighting local governmental authorities and coal mine operators, and attempting to operate in the milieu of a declining industry.¹

¹A chronology of major events include passage of the "mine run" law in February 1914; the beginning of the strike, April 1, 1914; settlement of the strike in Ohio on July 29, 1914 in all regions except Belmont and Jefferson counties; UMW state condemnation of the IWW, July 11, 1914; treason charges against Joe Kobylak, IWW and UMW organizer, July 21, 1914; treason charges against Joseph J. Ettor, July 19, 1915; and federal arbitration for settlement of the strike in most parts of Jefferson and Belmont counties, April 23, 1915, with settlement taking place May 23, 1915.
Eastern Ohio's bituminous coal industry illustrated the failure of small competing companies to rationalize industry. Expansion, coupled with the growth of canals and river navigation, and later with railroads, pushed miniscule monopolies into a highly competitive market. With numerous independent operators vying for profits in a broader market, cooperation and stabilization became essentials of orderly industrial process. Disparities in working conditions, varying productive levels of mines, and shifts in markets all suggested the necessity of what E. A. Suffern, federal investigator for the Industrial Relations Commission, called "change and readjustment." In the absence of federal regulation of competition, conservation of resources and mine safety standards suffered. Mine operating costs were almost equal to the margin of profits. By 1914 operating expenses in the bituminous coal industry were rising because of the surplus of mines, "and the accompanying competition to offset the even greater losses which would result by permitting the mines to stand idle." Compounding the situation in Ohio were 47,000 miners whose "natural immobility" required native and immigrant workers to share


\[3\]Ibid.
available work in the coal mines. Coal operators, using tactics of "divide and conquer," played groups of miners against each other. As Suffern observed,

Under a free competitive system the operators, instead of restricting their output to meet the demands, extended production to the point where the sale of their coal gave but meagre earnings on the capital invested and hardly enabled them to pay subsistence wages to their employees. This policy was further encouraged by the fact that production at loss for a period of time was often preferable to a more serious loss which might result from deterioration of the properties by shutting them down entirely.

Another federal investigator, A. M. Daly, noted the opposition of mine operators to organized labor resulted in protest strikes. From this situation emerged a system of contracts in which mine operators, instead of dealing with miners on a union district-wide basis, came to terms on smaller, sub-district bases. Thus, there was no uniform wage for miners in Ohio. What little collective bargaining existed came from overproduction and labor immobility. Both UMW and operators opposed governmental arbitration of wage scales on the ground

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4Ohio, Industrial Commission, Department of Investigation and Statistics, Statistics of Mines and Quarries in Ohio, 1914 (Columbus, 1916), p. 11.

5Suffern, Appendix VII, p. 5.

6Ibid., p. 1.

7A. M. Daly, "Bituminous Coal Mining in Ohio With Special Reference to Industrial Relations," pp. 1-2, unpublished report, USIRC, NA, RG 174.
that there were "too many technicalities about this industry to permit
of intelligent and fair settlement by outsiders." Attempts at equitable
compromise over wages failed because of divergent views about method
of payment. Miners had traditionally been paid on the "mine-screen
basis" in which coal was passed over an inch and one quarter screen;
only coal which did not fall through the screen was considered for pay-
ment. Operators, however, found a market for pea and slack coal
which went through the screen. Miners therefore argued that since
coal which fell through the screen was sold, they should receive pay-
ment for their labor on a "mine run" basis. Operators objected,
arguing that payment on the "mine run" basis would reward miners for
impurities and require expensive rebuilding of tipples. Ohio coal op-
erators, however, were not of a single mind. Senator William
Green's mine run bill, passed in February 1914 and implemented in
May of that year, brought settlement to a wage strike in Guernsey and
Jackson counties and in the Hocking Valley. In Belmont and Jefferson
counties, however, eastern Ohio operators refused settlement and the
strike continued. 9

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8 Suffern, Appendix VII, p. 1.

9 S. L. Moser, "Digest of Report by A. M. Daly on Bituminous
Coal Strike, April 17, 1914," p. 2, unpublished report, USIRC, NA,
RG 174; Ohio, Coal Mining Commission, Report (Columbus, 1915), pp.
33, 35-41; Ohio, Industrial Commission, Bulletin: First Annual Re-
port . . . to the Governor, Covering the Fiscal Year Ending November
15, 1914, II, pp. 21-22. For the legislative background to Green's
T. L. Lewis, editor of the *Coal Mining Review and Industrial Index* of Columbus, predicted in March 1914 that because of the mine run law Ohio would become an "industrial storm center."\(^{10}\) Lewis's correct prognosis was made on the basis of the expiration of contracts on April 1. Under the new mine run law, miners asked for 49.64 cents a ton for machine-dug coal, and 71 cents for pick coal; mine operators offered 41.12 cents and 61 cents respectively. The miners refused the offer. The operators responded by shutting down their mines, and the miners went on strike. As of April 1, 1914 the strike involved almost 50,000 miners in Ohio, together with sympathizers in Pennsylvania and Kentucky.\(^{11}\) A settlement was reached three months later in all regions except eastern Ohio's two counties, Belmont and Jefferson, which remained deadlocked until May 23, 1915. A few pockets of resistance held out until 1916.\(^{12}\)

As in Akron at the beginning of the 1913 rubber strike, the

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short-lived anti-screen mine run bill, see Hoyt Landon Warner, *Progressivism in Ohio, 1897-1917* (Columbus, 1964), pp. 283, 403, 418-419 n. 46.

\(^{10}\) *Coal Mining Review and Industrial Index*, II (March 1, 1914), 6.

\(^{11}\) *Daily Independent* (Bellaire), April 1, 2, 1914; dispatch from Joseph J. Ettor to *Solidarity*, June 27, 1914.

coal strike was peaceful. Seventeen days into the strike, federal observers reported that "good order prevails." Militia were not requested, nor were company gunmen present. Governor Cox, J. M. Roan of the state Division of Mines, the Industrial Commission of Ohio, and the president and secretary of the UMW all advised against investigation by the Federal Industrial Relations Commission on the ground that such an inquiry would be "indiscreet" and interfere with negotiations between contending parties. 14

In July 1914 a compromise wage agreement of 47 cents a ton for machine-mined coal and 67.6 cents for picked coal was reached in most of Ohio's coal fields. 15 UMW officials at Columbus agreed to allow each local to make its own decision on the compromise scale; 16 Jefferson and Belmont county locals held out. Roving bands of miners in this district ordered non-striking mine caretakers off the job and water collected in the mines. 17

With no settlement in sight, the IWW, hoping to bastion its fluctuating membership, entered the area. Wobblies, active in 1914

14 Ibid.
15 Ohio State Journal, July 4, 1914.
16 Daily Independent, July 8, 1914.
17 Ibid., July 9, 1914.
in the Marine Transport Workers' Union in the Pacific, and in Montana, Nevada, Iowa, Philadelphia, Paterson, and Pittsburgh, hoped to re-establish a base of operations in Ohio after the Akron defeat. The IWW's justification for entering the dispute was based on the belief that UMW ideology was dominated by National Civic Federation's "harmony of interest" philosophy. UMW tactics, asserted Wobblies, were "admirably united to the needs of the operators . . .," and in a larger sense excluded workers from the management of industry, thereby denying the productive value of labor.19 Joseph J. Ettor, replying to the conciliatory stance of the Ohio Valley Trades and Labor Assembly, extended the argument: "Labor's freedom is not to be attained by indulging in Civic Federation banquets, nor with uniforms of the Militia for Christ, and much less by Boards of Arbitration." To Ettor, AFL craft unionism was "a mesh in which workers are caught in the harmony-of-interest between slaves and masters tied up to capitalism by time contracts. . . ."20 Max Hayes, an influential right-wing Socialist editor, viewed this IWW approach as disruptive to working class unity: "J. J. Ettor, the egotistical little I. W. W.


19[IWW], "Craft Unionism--Why It Fails," IWW Collection, Microfilm P 34898, WHS.

20Solidarity, July 11, 1914.
organizer... has been busying himself down around the Ohio river trying to create diversion among the striking miners, thus playing into the hands of the operators. What Ettor needs is a little bath, and the union UMW miners would be justified in leading him down to the river and seeing that he gets one." 21

In July 1914 J. M. Roan, Chief Deputy and Safety Commissioner, Division of Mines, assured Governor Cox that if the UMW state convention would condemn the IWW and agree to allow mine pump operators to maintain the mines, the coal fields would be ready for operation as soon as a settlement was reached.22 Roan's wish was fulfilled by the UMW convention which passed a resolution condemning the IWW. 23 The United Mine Workers' Journal added to the chastisement of the Wobblies:

Miserable, indeed, will be your fate if you listen to their rainbow promises. We ask you to choose between their empty promises, and the real performances of the genuine labor unions of America. ... The I. W. W. has accomplished nothing but its own destruction, and left upon the miserable reeks of poverty those deluded workers who believed in their false pledges. 24

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21 Cleveland Citizen, July 4, 1914.


24 United Mine Workers' Journal, XXV (July 2, 1914), 1.
On July 7, 1000 miners at Bellaire, Ohio cheered a motion protesting the alleged connection between the UMW and the IWW and condemning the Wobblies for disruption.25

Despite hostility toward the IWW, the UMW in eastern Ohio was faced with militant members who refused to accept a wage compromise they considered unfair.26 Strikers forced pumpers off the job, causing flooding of mines. Pumpmen in Belmont county refused to return to work unless Sheriff Anderson provided fifty guards per mine.27 Miners complained to J. M. Roan that pumpmen were replaced with mine bosses and foremen, and that some operators asked miners to accept a compromise based on the screen coal standard of 1913.28 Roan, as an intermediary between Governor Cox and the miners, tried to keep peace and Cox's popularity with the labor vote. At a mass meeting at Bellaire's city hall, Roan spoke to strikers, reminding them of obedience to UMW officials.29 Implied in his remarks was the possibility of strikers disobeying their leaders and turning to the IWW. Roan's fears were borne out on July 12, when the "turbulent

25Daily Independent, July 8, 1914.
26Steubenville Daily Gazette, July 6, 1914.
27Ibid., July 8, 1914.
28Roan, July 11, 1914, to Cox, OHS
29Ibid.
element, "composed chiefly of Italian miners, broke away from UMW control. 30

Thus far no property destruction had taken place, but fear of the strikers stopped pumps in over twenty mines around Bellaire. The "turbulent element," Anderson wired the Adjutant General of the National Guard, might stop mines which supplied fuel solely for Bellaire industrial plants rather than the general coal market. If these mines were shut down, local industry would halt. Anderson's attempt to deputize fifty citizens by subpoena failed; out of seven who complied, five quit. 31 Mine operators, fearful of exacerbating strikers' feelings, made no attempt to start mine pumps and fans. 32 The violence which Anderson feared did not erupt.

Anderson's failure to obtain deputies had ramifications underlying undertones of public opinion which, if not sympathetic to strikers, indicated hostility toward management. Residents of Belmont county had no special sense of solidarity with foreign-born strikers; on the contrary, they believed that the foreigners were cheap economic competitors to native-born residents. A letter from Roan to Cox

30 Ohio State Journal, July 13, 1914.
31 Ibid.
32 Daily Independent, July 10, 14, 1914.
illust rates the rationale for not assisting the Sheriff:

English speaking people are not in sympathy with the parades that have been going on in that district, and in fact condemn it; but when asked why they did not volunteer their services to assist the Sheriff in preventing their marching, their answers were all along the same line—that the companies were to blame for putting this class of labor in the mines, and further argued that there were many instances where English speaking people had asked for work and were refused, and at the same time, companies were needing miners and hired Foreigners to do their work, and that in their opinion, the companies were now receiving that which they deserved. 33

The St. Clairsville Gazette, under the masthead, "Believes in Jeffersonian Democracy," editorialized that Belmont county "should keep at least one hundred rioting guns in reserve..." for strikes 34 and the Bellaire Commercial Club unanimously approved Anderson's call for militia. 35 The Sheriff, however, received no state aid. Roan and Major Harold N. Bush of the Ohio National Guard advised Cox that the situation in Belmont County was within the control of local authorities. 36 When troops were requested for the coal fields, Cox followed his Akron decision and vetoed the use of militia. In the coal strike, however, Cox took an additional step, threatening to remove the Sheriff

33 Roan, July 11, 1914, to Cox, OHS.
34 St. Clairsville Gazette, July 23, 1914.
35 Daily Independent, July 18, 1914.
36 Roan, July 11, 1914, to Cox, OHS; Ohio State Journal, July 14, 1914.
from office if order could not be maintained. Anderson, holding the penalty of jail sentences over the recalcitrant citizenry, finally managed to conscript deputies who arrested "I. W. W. agitators." Anderson was vindicated, but Belmont county's manly honor did not go unscathed. "It is humiliating to know," editorialized Bellaire's newspaper, that "with its many thousand able bodied men, Belmont county can not maintain order. Such condition is a disgrace to the manhood and will certainly largely increase the sentiment in favor of female suffrage." To underscore this remark, Bellaire's postmaster, at a town meeting the next day, moved that the county's fourteen candidates for sheriff all volunteer for service under Anderson. The motion did not pass. Major Bush, on hand as an observer for Cox, remained firm in refusing troops: "I have been in a dozen lively scrapes, but never saw a more peaceful situation than I see here." Nonetheless, two regiments of militia were held in reserve for Belmont county, "but they will not proceed with my orders," said Cox, "under the present conditions." Roan reported "that the people of

37Daily Independent, July 17, 1914.
38Ibid.
39Daily Independent, July 17, 1914.
40Ibid., July 18, 1914.
Bellaire and vicinity are very much pleased over the way you have handled matters . . . in not sending troops; and they now realize that had troops been sent . . . it would have caused a great deal of trouble, destruction of property and bloodshed." Cox, a progressive pro-labor Democrat who courted John R. Commons to help with Ohio's constitutional convention reforms and who staunchly backed William Green's Workmen's Compensation Law, retained the support of Belmont county.

Jefferson county showed no evidence of Sheriff Anderson's quandary. One reason for Jefferson's success in law enforcement came from the cooperation of coal companies which paid deputies five dollars a day and furnished them with arms. Coal companies in Belmont county, fearful of public opinion, refused to cooperate. Sheriff Huscroft of Jefferson county had sufficient strength to prevent 500 IWWs and their sympathizers from compelling UMW miners to stop work at the United States Coal Company's mines at Bradley. Wobblies received an additional blow when Bradley UMW miners were willingly

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42 Roan, July 23, 1914, to Cox, OHS.


deputized by the Sheriff "in the interests of good order." The IWW, persisting in attempts to organize at Bradley, therefore found itself fighting county deputies who were members of a rival union. Shots were fired, with no casualties reported on either side. A number of Wobblies were arrested, causing Belmont county's editor to gloat, "The I. W. W. people are handled without kid gloves in Jefferson County."

After the skirmish Jefferson county officials arrested Joseph Kobylak, aged 32, who held dual membership in the IWW and the UMW. Constable E. D. Lucas preferred the charge of treason and Squire Henry Lawson placed Kobylak's bail at $10,000. Kobylak's life illustrated the difficulties of radical labor organizers. Born in Bohemia in 1882, he emigrated to the United States in 1903. Married, with four children, Kobylak first worked in the Ohio mines of Dillonvale, Bradley, and Plum Creek. In 1907 he received the post of UMW mine committeeman, a position which made him responsible for observing safety

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45 Steubenville Daily Gazette, July 15, 1914.
46 Ibid., July 15, 16, 1914.
47 Daily Independent, July 20, 1914.
48 Letter from Paul Sebestyen, May 17, 1969, to RTW; Steubenville Daily Gazette, July 21, 1914; Daily Independent, July 21, 1914. It was not uncommon for Wobblies to hold two cards—a trade union card and an IWW red card.
conditions in the mines. His troubles began when he reported safety violations to the State Mine Inspector in 1908. Four years later, as secretary-treasurer of local 2735, UMW, he was twice arrested—documents do not reveal the charges—but the grand jury refused to indict. Blacklisted in Ohio, Kobylak started anew in West Virginia where he was elected check weighman of local 2210, UMW. Again he complained about management practices, this time charging that company weighmen were unfair. For speaking in behalf of fellow union members Kobylak was arrested, tried by a justice of the peace in the company store on the charge of "being a disorderly person," and ordered to leave town in twenty-four hours, although, in the words of a federal investigator, "There had been no disorder whatever." Returning to Rush Run, Ohio, Kobylak was elected secretary-treasurer of local 1962, UMW. He was again arrested—this time for trespassing on property belonging to the United States Coal Company on March 29, 1913. Citizens of Smithfield, Ohio, apparently holding Kobylak in high esteem, offered to pay his fine. Refusing their offer, he remained in jail ten days. Five months later, in the midst of a strike, Kobylak was arrested by the Sheriff of Jefferson county. Kobylak asked what charges were preferred against him. The sheriff

49"In re the Charge of Treason Against One Joe Kobylak in Jefferson County, Ohio," unpublished report, USIRC, WHS.
replied by charging him with rape. Kobylak's neighbors recognized the charge was false and designed to prevent him from organizing miners. Once again, the grand jury refused to indict. 50 In the 1914 strike Kobylak was arrested on July 20 without warrant 51 on the charge of treason: "Malicious [ly] and unlawful [ly] levying war against this state, and knowing he was adhering to the enemies of the state by giving them aid and comfort; and . . . he is charged with knowledge that certain persons were about to commit treason and that he unlawfully neglected to give information thereof to the governor, judge, or president of the United States." 52 Following a forty-three day stay in jail the court reduced his $10,000 bail to $5000, which was furnished. After Kobylak's release three hearings were held; the grand jury refused to indict him on the charge of treason, and on November 16, 1914 the charges were dropped. 53

Kobylak's arrest and his process through the slow-moving wheels of judicial administration hampered IWW organization. Kobylak's harassment indicated the lengths to which county authorities went to vitiate such inroads the IWW had made. After Kobylak's

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.

52 Daily Independent, July 22, 1914.

53 "In re the Charge of Treason Against One Joe Kobylak."
arrest on July 20, the flurry of strike activity in Belmont and Jefferson counties abated. Pumps and fans in mines attempted normal operation under armed guard. Six Wobblies in the Purseglove mine area were arrested for "trespassing, rioting, and assembling with intent to wound," but the coal company refused to enter charges. The Sheriff then pressed charges which held the Wobblies in jail.

Toward the end of July an attempt was made to link the IWW with an alleged plot to assassinate the district president of the UMW. Bellaire's newspaper, hardly sympathetic to the IWW, questioned Wobbly complicity in the plot, and Major Bush of the Ohio National Guard discounted the rumor.

The wage agreement made on July 29, 1914 excepted 12,000 miners in Jefferson and Belmont counties and left miners in these counties without employment or union relief funds. A letter from a Wobbly to the readers of Solidarity poignantly revealed the plight of

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54Roan, July 23, 1914, to Cox, OHS.
55Ibid.
58Steubenville Daily Gazette, September 5, 1914.
As we are on strike so long for the plain cause to gain a larger piece of bread for our families and the capitalists are not willing to give in all this time and not for a good while yet, all members of our union are laughed at on the streets. Oh, there goes an I. W. W. Anarchist, and they have arrested and put behind bars 19 of our members. . . . Our children are crying and calling for a piece of bread to satisfy their hunger and we are without funds to supply them with even that . . . .

Defeated but undaunted, the Wobblies refused to give up their fight.

Joseph J. Ettor, a prominent IWW organizer, entered Bellaire on January 15, 1915, to rally miners. Ettor, "short, stocky, nimble-footed," with "boyish manner, fat, rosy cheeks," and "big soft jaunty hat" left Pittsburgh at 10 A.M., July 19, 1914 arriving in Bellaire at 1 P.M. At 1:45 P.M. he was arrested by twenty deputies and, like Kobylak, charged with treason. Joseph Margolis, attorney for Ettor, reported that the district attorney feared the IWW as "cutthroats, bomb throwers, traitors, and assassins." According to the affidavit, Ettor . . . unlawfully, maliciously, and traitorously did encompass,

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59 Solidarity, September 5, 1914.

60 Solidarity, January 15, 1915.

61 Industrial Worker, May 23, 1912. Ettor, born of Italian parents in Brooklyn, New York in 1886, was a leader in the Lawrence textile strike. After the First World War he retired to a California fruit farm. He died in 1949. John Nicholas Beffel typewritten ms, Joseph J. Ettor File, Labadie Collection, University of Michigan.

62 Solidarity, January 30, 1915.
imagine and intend to raise and levy war, insurrection, and rebellion against the State of Ohio, and to carry into effect said malicious, traitorous, rebellious and revolutionary intent, did on the said 19th day of January, A.D. 1915, at said County, with a great number of divers persons whose names are to this affiant unknown; they . . . to the number of One Hundred and upward, armed and arrayed in a war-like manner . . . with guns and swords and other war-like weapons, as well offensive as defensive, . . . did in a war-like and hostile manner, attempt to subvert the Government of the Estate of Ohio . . . and there distributing . . . a certain inflammatory, revolutionary, and traitorous document, in the words and figures following, to wit:

"MASS MEETING AT BELLAIRE:

Fellow workmen: under the auspices of a group of revolutionists on the 19th day of January, 1915, at City Hall, at 7:00 o'clock P.M., the well-known agitator, J.J. Ettor, of New York, will give a lecture on the subject, against war, for the classes; war against all capitalists by workmen of all states. Do not fail to come to hear this lecture of the noted agitator, especially at this time while the great European conflict is on. Anybody will be given the floor after the lecture.

COMMITTEE"

And by then and there gathering together in the number aforesaid, at and near the time and place aforesaid, with intent aforesaid.

(Signed) JOHN C. ITTINGS

Affirmed to before me by said John Ittings and by him subscribed in my presence this 19th day of January, A.D., 1915.

HENRY DAVIES,
Justice of the Peace

The UMW lawyer, a former county district attorney, told Margolis that "although no conviction could be had on the charge of treason, yet they county authorities could keep Ettor in jail for several months." On the advice of the county attorney, Justice of the Peace Davies dismissed the case.

Ludicrous though the treason charges seemed, they blocked IWW efforts at organization. The strike, although settled in other parts of the state, continued in Jefferson and Belmont counties with even weaker feints by the UMW and IWW; the two unions, faced with a common enemy, were still at odds. Ohio's new governor, Frank B. Willis, a Republican, recognized that the strike impaired the state's general welfare. Coal business was transferred to other states, "our workingmen are unemployed, our property values diminishing, our business vanishing." Willis, acknowledging neither "authority nor desire nor purpose to even attempt to name a basis" for settlement between operators and miners, spoke of "a spirit of mutual helpfulness, cohesion and forbearance" to assuage the misery of the strike.

64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 "Address Delivered by Gov. Frank B. Willis Before the Conference of Miners in Attempted Settlement of Strike, Canton, Ohio, Courtland Hotel, April 23, 1915," typewritten ms. Papers of Governor Frank B. Willis: Governor's and Personal Papers (1915-1916), Box 5, Folder 3, OHS.
Willis's rhetoric was complemented by conciliatory action. On March 17, 1915, the Eastern Coal Miners' Association and commercial clubs from nine cities requested and received federal arbitration. In April 1915 a meeting was called at Canton by Willis. Federal arbitrators helped find a wage scale acceptable to operators and the UMW. 67 Two months after the settlement prospective miners were warned to stay away from eastern Ohio. With coal buyers slow in returning to the eastern Ohio market, some small companies, bankrupt, could no longer provide employment. 68 Competition between numerous small mines was intense in 1915 and 1916, and younger single men left the coal fields after the strike to find employment elsewhere. The result was felt in a labor shortage in the mines during the First World War, and in a decline in UMW membership. 69

Caught in the environment of resistant operators, public apathy, governmental hostility, UMW enmity and economic dislocation after settlement had been made, the IWW received defeat once again.


68United Mine Workers' Journal, XXVI (June 24, 1915), 13.

69M. B. Hammond, "Report of a Preliminary Investigation of the Reasons for the Present High Prices of Coal in Ohio [1917]", "Papers of the Council of National Defense, Ohio Branch, Box 3, File 9, OHS. Hammond was secretary of the Ohio Coal Mining Commission."
Progressive measures in Ohio gave impetus toward labor reform in state inspection of factories, workmen's compensation, child labor, maximum hours for women, and an eight-hour day on public works. But in the eastern Ohio mine region distendedness was too severe; centripetal forces negated the possibility of immediate reform in the complex environment of the mines. In the case of eastern Ohio the IWW appears to have been operating in an expedient manner, attempting to obtain advantages for itself. But once again the Wobbly battle for effective organization was lost.

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70 Warner, p. 487.
CHAPTER IV

SURVEILLANCE AND REGULATION, 1917-1920

The roots of the dossier state were nurtured in the domestic experience of the First World War. By the time the United States entered the conflagration, bureaucratization had concomitantly grown with industrialization and urbanization. Modern bureaucracy with its concepts of office, hierarchy, files and methods of operation provided the managerial framework for wartime expediency of total regulation for total war. Centralization of economic functions for wartime efficiency in transportation and natural resource allocation was paralleled by attempts to influence public opinion and to check ideas and practices deemed detrimental to national security. The quest for regulation in the Wilsonian crusade to make the world safe for democracy raised—but did not answer—questions about the nature and limit of dissent, political and ideological surveillance, and the lengths required for the state to protect itself from real or imagined enemies. Total war, in

sum, was a testing ground for constitutional liberties.

Anti-alien and anti-radical strains came to a peak in the First World War with the IWW bearing the onus of public fear, hysteria, and reaction. Accompanying nativism and wartime panic was federal bureaucratic action formed largely as a response to the threat of the IWW. Governmental action was directed against suspect hyphenate-Americans, political and religious pacifists, and radical or allegedly radical groups. Of all these groups the IWW was the focal point for governmental surveillance and action. In Ohio that action centered about Cleveland with its heavy ethnic population but it also manifested itself in other parts of the state.

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Writing in 1919 John Lord O'Brien, Special Assistant to the United States Attorney General, observed that excessive emotionalism and zealous, well-meaning local patriotism was responsible for "spy mania" which proved an embarrassment to constitutional rights. O'Brien was correct, but only in part. An examination of governmental

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activity, especially at the federal level, reveals a bureaucratic process which rounds out O'Brien's incomplete picture. In Ohio state surveillance activity was subordinate to federal procedure in political monitoring, but surveillance on both levels took place within an atmosphere of fear and represented an attempt at ideological hegemony for the war effort.

The tenor of the times was such that the religious pacifism of 181 Ohio Mennonite bishops, ministers, and deacons was equated with violations of the Espionage Act. Under the watchful eye of the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Ohio, newspapers disagreeing with the war effort were monitored for possible violations of sedition laws. Books regarded as detrimental to the war effort were proscribed in an eight-page list submitted to Ohio librarians. The list requested the withdrawal of works by Albert J. Beveridge, Franz Boas, John W. Burgess, George Brandes, Max Eastman, Ferdinand Schevill, Nietzsche and Treitschke. State Fire Marshall T. Alfred

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4Records of the Department of Justice, NA, RG 60, DJ File 194642.

5Ibid., DJ File 188967-8.

6Confidential Directive, June 28, 1918, "To the Several State Councils of Defense," Papers of the Council of National Defense, Ohio Branch, Box 12, File 4, OHS. The directive noted that "Great care must be exercised in the use of this list. It could be a grave error to give it any publicity." Ibid.
Fleming, in an address entitled "Hunting the Hun in Ohio," observed that "Ohio smokes in a powder mill, while outside, in the grass of camouflage, lurk the Hun agents, like serpents seeking at all times, an opportunity to strike at our sources of food, clothing, and munitions." Fleming linked the IWW to the German menace by reporting that one of his men, "crossing a thoroughfare bridge, spanning two main trunk lines of importance to the Government, found the sign manual of the I. W. W. with the date set for a national uprising that was fortunately nipped in the bud." Fleming did not elaborate on the alleged conspiracy, nor did he say when the supposed uprising was to have taken place. Yet his view was neither odd nor isolated for the time. Military intelligence reported that five radical groups--Socialists, the Socialist Labor Party, Wobblies, Syndicalists and Anarchists--attempted to consolidate in December 1917. Of these groups intelligence listed the IWW, with three to five hundred thousand "active, able-bodied members," as the most potent element in the United States.®

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8U. S., War Department, Military Intelligence Division, The European War: Weekly Intelligence Summary, IV (Week of February 9, 1918), pp. 20-23, WRHS.
To pursue the IWW the federal government had to rely not only on military intelligence and the Bureau of Investigation, but also on volunteers. The balance sheet for Woodrow Wilson reveals, on the positive side, his opposition to military trials on the domestic wartime front. On the negative side, however, Wilson allowed the Military Intelligence Division to interfere in matters of internal security and surveillance, and permitted other federal agencies to operate unchecked within their own sphere of bureaucracy without regard for responsibility to a single governmental policy on intelligence and surveillance. Wilson's tolerance of unchecked bureaucratic agencies provides grounds for understanding Department of Justice support and recognition for the quasi-official volunteer organization of amateur spyhunters, the American Protective League. Serving "without reward, and with abundant zeal" from 1917 to 1919, the APL provided voluntary investigative footwork for the undermanned Bureau of Investigation.

In the first month of United States entry into the war Charles


10Emerson Hough, The Web (Chicago, 1919), p. 12. This is the authorized history of the APL which is balanced by Jensen's more critical study. It is impossible to reconstruct a total picture of APL activities in Ohio. With the exception of five states--New York, North Carolina, Arkansas, California, and Kansas--all APL state records were destroyed by archivists at the National Archives. For a bibliographical note on this matter see Jensen, p. 314.
A. Otis, president of Cleveland's Chamber of Commerce, asked all members to keep a watchful eye on people whose actions might injure national security. 11 Otis had nothing to fear. Citizens too old for military service could still aid the war effort by volunteering information to the federal government. One such volunteer "Wobbly hunter" from Ohio epitomized the patriotic zealfulness of war service in a pencil-scrawled letter to the Attorney General of the United States:

I have found numerous I. W. W. working in factories and the boot legger by car load lots and believe if I had of had the authority I could of unearth some real good inflammation in Alliance, Ohio in regards to the I. W. W. as well as two or three other places. and in case the Government has a vacant place in this line I would love to have the chance to show I will make good at the work allotted to me. how every I have no one to interceed for me unless Senator Myers of Mont. still remembers me as I was on the Democratic Central Committee during his first election. . . . I met Mr. G. H. Mac donald here in this city this evening at dinner who is employed by the Dept. of Justice is what induced me to put in my aplication for such a job as I can gather more in a week by working than . . . any kid glove well dressed fellow can in a year. how every I do not go round like a tramp but am a mechanic and follow my trade at horse shoeing or running a steam hammer in the factories. . . . 12

It is not known whether the services of the volunteer were accepted,

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11 Greater Cleveland Growth Association, Chamber of Commerce, Minutes, typewritten ms, April 17, 1917, WRHS.

12 Charles Presnall, November 12, 1917, to Attorney General, NA, RG 60, Department of Justice File 186701, Box 2088: Ohio Folder. Thomas Watt Gregory served as Attorney General from August 29, 1914 to March 4, 1919. He was replaced by A. Mitchell Palmer who served until the end of the Wilson administration.
but Ohioans had ample chance to serve through the newly-organized APL which was granted investigatory jurisdiction in areas vital to the war: Socialistic propaganda, sedition, espionage, sabotage, alien enemies, and pro-Germanism. 13

The APL's official historian noted that the organization "probably knows more about you and your affairs than you ever thought anyone could know. If you were not loyal, those facts are known and recorded. . . ."14 Drawing from all walks of life, with leadership from the ranks of business, the APL's quarter of a million volunteers comprised a "web" which observed all segments of American daily activity. Cleveland's web had a total of 1551 members: a chief, six assistant chiefs, inspectors, an office staff housed in Cleveland's Federal Building, eighteen companies of men, one women's company, and 500 operatives. 15 Cleveland APL operatives had an average of

13 A total of sixteen areas were subject to APL investigation. Additional categories included slackers, false questionnaires, deferred draft classifications, war insurance allotments, bootlegging, vice complaints, Liberty Bonds and thrift stamps, AWOL military personnel, and character and loyalty investigations of personnel considered for work with the War Department, Red Cross, and Salvation Army.
A. Clifford Shinkle, APL State Inspector for Ohio to F. C. Craxton, Chairman, Ohio Branch, Council of National Defense, Papers of the Council of National Defense, Ohio Branch, Box 21, File 3, OHS.

14 Hough, p. 29.

15 Ibid., pp. 257-258; Cleveland Plain Dealer, September 2, 1917.
400 case loads per month and were kept busy by the city's ethnic population, "naturally indeed a hot bed for Socialism, I. W. W. work and Bolshevism. . . ." 16 All radical meetings and speeches were recorded by volunteer operatives who reported to the Bureau of Investigation. 17 The APL, financed by the Cleveland Mayor's Advisory War Committee, 18 made a total of over 60,000 investigations, of which 1,529 were for IWW and other radical activities, and 7,113 for seditious and treasonable utterances. In Youngstown 183 investigations were made into IWW activities, and 81 in Cincinnati. 19

Upon the APL's dissolution on February 1, 1919 John Lord

16 Hough, p. 257.

17 Edwin Wertz, United States Attorney, Northern District, Ohio, December 30, 1918 to Attorney General, NA, RG 60, DJ File 186233; Hough, p. 257. Clevelanders with dubious or unreliable ideological views were observed and reported. Cleveland's Mayor's Advisory War Committee requested citizens to report upon the status and views of their fellow citizens. Informants' reports were then turned over by the MAWC executive secretary to C. A. Longhill of the APL for further investigation. MAWC, Correspondence, Container 29, Folder 3: APL, WHRS.

18 Financial statistics for the funding of Cleveland's APL are available for 1918 in Mayor's Advisory War Board, Proceedings (January 1, 1918-March 31, 1918), pp. 226, 228, 232, 238, 243, 249, 250, 255, 271, 272, 277, 281; for April 1, 1918-June 30, 1918 in ibid., pp. 309, 312, 313, 317, 331, 332, 335, 337, 342, 355, 357; and for July 5, 1918-September 25, 1918 in ibid., p. 3761 all in Papers of the MAWC, Container 13, Folder 2: Correspondence III, H-MA, WRHS.

19 Hough, pp. 257, 267, 386.
O'Brian wrote to Edwin S. Wertz, United States Attorney in Cleveland:
"As the American Protective League was designed as a war auxiliary, there is no doubt whatever in our mind that operatives of that League should not now engage in this kind of work surveillance." O'Brian disliked amateur detectives but recognized the right of the Justice Department to cover radical political meetings in Cleveland "provided that work be conducted without any oppressiveness. . . ." He reminded Wertz "that it is vitally important that the Government does not engage in any oppressive or suppressive activities against . . . radical movements." A. Mitchell Palmer, United States Attorney General, corrected O'Brian's statement about amateur detectives. Palmer stated to Wertz that the Justice Department "welcomes information" from voluntary citizen surveillance groups such as the Loyal American League, "but it is important that such League be given no affiliation, sanction, or special recognition by federal authorities." O'Brian abjured citizen groups but Palmer discreetly accepted them. A. Bruce Bielaski, Chief of the Bureau of Investigation, also disagreed

20O'Brian, 1919, to Wertz, NA, RG 60, DJ File 186233-108-42.


22O'Brian, 1919, to Wertz, NA, RG 60, DJ File 186233-108-42.

23Palmer to Wertz, ibid., DJ File 186233-108-44.
with O'Brian. Bielaski believed that APL surveillance had to continue in peace time. Despite Germany's defeat

The need for the American Protective League is as great now as it has been in the past and I am entirely satisfied that the need for this organization will continue for some time to come without regard to the progress of the peace negotiations. The tremendous machines which have been organized by the government for the prosecution of this war cannot be stopped abruptly and must continue to operate for many months under any circumstances. 24

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The earliest recorded surveillance of IWW activity in Ohio took place in May 1917 in Columbus, when the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Ohio expressed concern over anti-conscription handbills printed and disseminated by the IWW in Columbus, Cleveland, and other Ohio cities. The United States Attorney urged that "drastic action" be taken immediately to stop IWW propaganda. 25 His request for authority to stop distribution of the handbills was denied. To raid the printing office, said Assistant Attorney General William C. Fitts, "would . . . give notoriety to the circulars

24A. Bruce Bielaski, Circular Letter, December 6, 1918, to National Directors of the APL, MAWC, Container 14, Folder 3, WHRS.

which they have not now, and do not deserve to have." Surveillance of IWW activity on the Great Lakes was initiated by private business groups rather than the federal government. In some instances fear of unionization was clouded by the issue of wartime fervor. Frank H. Ray of the Lake Carriers’ Association reported that a number of foreign-born crewmen on the steamship Cuyler Adams had failed to register with the government; the German-born second assistant engineer of the steamer Francis Widlar espoused "anarchistic and I. W. W. sentiments"; and one of the firemen, an unnaturalized Austrian, was quoted as saying "to hell with the war." "I beg leave to report," concluded Ray, "that this is a very good illustration of conditions on the Lake steamships." The Department of Justice replied that the matter would be given attention but the outcome of the episode remains unknown. Surveillance in Columbus and on the Great Lakes, minor investigative cases, were not to be dismissed too easily; they were a portent of things to come.

On July 11, 1917 official policy was promulgated by Attorney General Thomas Gregory who saw the IWW as a serious threat financed

26 Fitts, May 29, 1917, to Bolin, ibid.


"by some hostile organization." Gregory instructed Department of Justice personnel to gather "data which may be useful to the Department in determining what action may be taken under the various criminal statutes of the United States . . . or would be useful to state authorities." 29

On September 5, 1919 the federal government coordinated a nationwide sweep on IWW headquarters in all parts of the United States, seizing records and publications for use as prosecution evidence. Cleveland's IWW, rumored to have planned strikes in that city and on the Great Lakes, was raided by personnel from the Bureau of Investigation, the American Protective League, and special deputies of the United States Marshall. Records were seized from Finnish and Hungarian IWW halls and government agents took everything including pictures from the wall at IWW main headquarters. 30 The government hoped to find a link between the Cleveland IWW and German financing, 31 and Wertz and the Cleveland Bureau of Investigation agent went to Washington to confer about the IWW and to receive "secret


30 Cleveland Plain Dealer, September 6, 1917.

instructions. After the raids Mayor Harry Davis and his safety
director banned the IWW from meeting in Cleveland and from dissemi-
nating propaganda.  

After the first raid a secondary sweep was made on September 7 in which several dozen men were arrested on grounds of failure
to register with the draft. Four Wobblies were arrested on a charge
not made public by the Bureau of Investigation. These activities
were followed up by a December 1917 raid on a Cleveland plant which
printed IWW material and with the wartime internment of seven
Wobblies for their activities. Akron was the only other Ohio city in
which Wobblies were raided in September. As part of the nationwide
sweep the Akron headquarters were raided on September 5 resulting in
the confiscation of membership lists, records and pamphlets.  

United States Attorney General Gregory justified the raids on
grounds that the IWW received German money used to hamper the war
effort and an Allied victory. The IWW had a different perception,

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32 Cleveland Leader, September 9, 1917.

33 Ibid.

34 Cleveland Plain Dealer, September 9, 1917.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid., December 14, 1917.

37 Akron Beacon Journal, September 6, 1917.
however, arguing that they were suppressed for their organizing campaigns to raise wages. But the IWW accommodated and obliged the government by reinforcing the belief about German ties. Under the title of "Official Correspondence" the IWW press printed the following to the Kaiser:

Wilhelm Hohenzollern
Berlin, Germany

Dear Bill:

Wass iss loss? Already yet ve got not your check for us. Be gvick a leedle! Der money iss oudt. . . . Maybe der geldt got lost. All der time der bapers say ve got idt, but ve aindt. If der money don't come soon ve can no mor Hock der Kaiser, ve haff to hock der overall.

Imbeerial Wilhelms Warriors. 39

In a more serious vein the IWW publicly abjured the Kaiser by proclaiming itself against "any Kaiser whether his name be Bill or Weyerhauser or John D. . . ." 40

The federal government continued its policy of netting IWW members in Ohio as elsewhere. By October 1917 the government had

38Industrial Worker, September 12, 1917. At William D. Haywood's trial the federal government found no evidence that the IWW had received German money or funds from other foreign enemies of the United States.

39Ibid., October 13, 1917.

40Ibid., September 12, 1917.
jailed four Ohio Wobblies for sedition, transferring them to prisons in the vicinity of Chicago where federal trial would be held. One hundred and sixty-six Wobblies were tried in three centers—Chicago, Wichita, and Sacramento—for their antiwar stance. An additional method of dealing with the IWW was through the non-judicial administrative policy of internment and deportation. It was a successful deterrent to IWW wartime activity. Several case studies of federal action toward Ohio's IWW will illustrate administrative regulation of suspect persons.

In one case an alien IWW who entered the United States without passing through immigration authorities was interned at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia. He was held suspect because he left the boiler room of a Cleveland place of employment while full steam pressure was up. The suspect, a mechanical engineer, worked next door to a room in which government sweaters were made. His internment sheet cites neither intent nor conspiracy in leaving the boiler room and his length of stay away from the room was not mentioned. The suspect, 

41 The number of IWWs jailed for sedition by October 1917 included sixteen in Illinois, ten in Minnesota, ten in Washington, eight in California, seven in Pennsylvania, five in New York, four each in Utah and Oregon, three in Oklahoma, two in Michigan, and one each in South Dakota, Colorado, Montana, Rhode Island, New Jersey, and Texas. Industrial Worker, October 20, 1917.

42 Ibid., November 24, 1917.
the government alleged, contacted German agents through the IWW, of which he was an ardent member. After his internment period he was deported. Significantly, the suspect's internment and deportation were administrative procedures which took place without trial. The Department of Justice claimed that its policy was not to arrest aliens for membership in the IWW but it is interesting to note that dossiers of interned persons contained a section for "Political Associations (I. W. W., Anarchist, Russellite, etc.)" located between sections categorized as "Any Record of Insanity or Disease" and "Evil Habits (Drugs, Moral Pervert, etc.)".

A second case involved a Hungarian IWW arrested in Cleveland on December 8, 1917. Keeping in mind the Wilson administration's policy of not interning people for their political affiliations we note that this Wobbly's dossier, in the section entitled "Statement of Activities Leading to Arrest," mentions that he was an "Active organizer in Cleveland IWW," that he collected funds for IWW defense expenses at the Chicago trials, and that he was an "effective speaker." The alien admitted to a federal agent that he was an "ardent believer".

43Summary Sheet for Disposal of Interned Alien Enemy, NA, RG 60, DJ File 9-16-1294.

44John T. Creighton, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, November 10, 1919, to Charles Recht, Attorney-at-Law, NA, RG 60, DJ File 9-16-2176-3. Recht had inquired about the status of interned alien IWWs from Cleveland.
in IWW doctrines and refused to give up his work for the duration of the war. Initially placed in the Cuyahoga County jail by United States Marshall Charles W. Lapp, the Wobbly was transferred to Cincinnati and then placed in the Fort Ogelthorpe camp where he became internee number 1060. The Swedish consul in Cleveland then interceded in behalf of the Wobbly's destitute wife and children. Wertz notified Gregory of the situation and requested "steps to hurry along the care of women and children in cases of this kind." Since neutral Sweden's consul was involved, the Department of State was notified. In lieu of social workers the Bureau of Investigation was used to report on the condition of the family, but no federal provisions existed for assisting internees' children unable to be cared for by their mother. A year later the internee requested repatriation for himself and his family but stated that he couldn't afford travel funds. The

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45NA, RG 60, DJ File 9-16-12-2176-1, -4.

46Wertz to Attorney General, ibid., 2176-2.

47O'Brian, May 10, 1918, to the Secretary of State, ibid.

48Wertz, April 17, 1918, to the Attorney General, ibid., 2176-3.

49Ibid.

50Internee number 1060, Austro-Hungarian Hilfskomite, War Prison Barracks, Fort Ogelthorpe, Georgia, April 29, 1919, to Department of Justice, ibid., 2176-4.
Figure 1. -- File of an interned IWW. Source: National Archives and Records Service.
federal government was unable to furnish the Wobbly with funds.\textsuperscript{51}

F. E. Rennebaum, president of Cleveland's Republic Steel packaging Company, notified the Department of Justice that the interned Wobbly and two fellow IWWs, if granted parole, would be employed. Charles Recht, representing Rennebaum, reminded the Attorney General that the Wobblies "were not guilty of any infraction of the law, but merely arrested for their membership in the I. W. W. . . ."\textsuperscript{52} John T. Creighton, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, replied,

\begin{quote}
The Department invites your attention to the error in your statement that these men were . . . arrested for their membership in the I. W. W. No alien enemies were interned primarily because of their membership in the I. W. W. or any similar organization. In the cases of the comparatively few I. W. W. alien enemies who were interned, the Department acted upon the recommendation of local officials who were convinced that the activities of the men arrested were interfering with the prosecution of the war and were dangerous to the United States.\textsuperscript{53}
\end{quote}

Despite Creighton's assertion a disparity existed between statement and practice. Internee 1060 was in fact arrested for membership in the organization but not for overt physical acts against the war effort. In essence, he was interned for his beliefs, while in another case an IWW

\begin{footnotes}
\item\textsuperscript{51}O'Brien (n. d.), to Internee number 1060, \textit{ibid.}
\item\textsuperscript{52}Charles Recht to Department of Justice, \textit{ibid.}, 2176-5.
\item\textsuperscript{53}Creighton, November 10, 1919, to Recht, \textit{ibid.}
\end{footnotes}
was denied parole "on account of his I. W. W. activities and affilia-
tions."54

In another case an alien IWW in Cleveland was interned for
his activities and associations with other Wobblies implicated in the
alleged boiler plot. Special Agent Charles De Woody of the Bureau of
Investigation's Cleveland office suspected this Wobbly's complicity but
admitted that suspicions were made without substantiation. The case
ended when the suspect was deported to Germany on September 26,
1919. 55 Suspicion of alleged illegal activity existed in this case but
the same cannot be said for an Austrian-born Cleveland Wobbly whose
brief dossier entry tells us that no regulations were violated. A leader
in a Cleveland local, this IWW persisted in holding "pro-German"
meetings which "caused labor trouble." The dossier does not specify
the nature of this trouble but it tersely states "Internment ordered to
break up 'local' . . . ." Arrested in Cleveland on January 12, 1918
the IWW leader was interned at Fort Ogelthorpe for over two years. 56

Authorities fearful of labor organization simply halted unionization

54U. S. Attorney, Northern District, Ohio, to O'Brian and
Bureau of Investigation, DJ Correspondence Slips, NA, RG 60, File
9-16-12-2938-11.

55Memorandum for O'Brian, January 30, 1918, initialed OGS
and HRW, NA, RG 60, DJ File 9-16-12-2200.

56Summary Sheet for Disposal of Interned Alien Enemy, NA,
RG 60, DJ File 9-16-12-2382.
activities which were broadly construed as being pro-German in nature.

The hunt for IWW members continued. Three weeks after the armistice the Attorney General received a telegram from Wertz requesting authority to arrest an Austrian alien IWW for "advocating revolution in Cleveland." Authorization was granted, and two days later Marshall Lapp informed Gregory of the arrest. 58 Charged with being "a danger to the public peace and safety of the United States," 59 the alien was jailed on December 16, apparently released three days later, and returned to jail on December 20 on orders from Wertz, who considered him "no good" and "a dangerous man." The alien IWW was held "for further investigation." 60 The arrest merits attention because it reveals that the suspect was apparently arrested merely for his views. This alien entered the United States in 1913 and joined the Wobblies in the West. He was arrested in a poolroom on Cleveland's Detroit Avenue for making seditious remarks. Detective Kiehl of the

57 Wertz, Telegram December 14, 1918, to Attorney General, NA, RG 60, DJ File 9-16-12-7493-1.


59 Department of Justice Form Letter, December 14, 1918, to Lapp, ibid., 7493-1.

60 Wertz, December 20, 1918, to Attorney General, ibid., 7493-3.
Cleveland Police Department stated the Wobbly told pool hall frequenters that he preferred a Russian system of government to the American, and that the United States operated for the benefit of the few rather than the many. "We have been unable to find any of the frequentors who were supposed to have heard the statement," concluded Wertz's investigative report. 61 The Department of Justice, following up Wertz's remark, also noted that witnesses were not available to verify the Wobbly's alleged remarks. 62 Despite the unavailability of witnesses the suspect became internee number 402 at Fort Ogelthorpe. He expressed a desire to be returned to Roumania, his native land, but was repatriated to Germany. 63

A red necktie figured prominently in the deportation of a Hungarian-born Cleveland Wobbly when he was arrested for stealing that object from a store. Authorities searched the Wobbly, found IWW literature in his possession, and notified the Department of Justice. The record reads:

He admits that he is an I. W. W., is dissatisfied with the present form of government in the United States, would

61 Wertz, December 23, 1918, to Attorney General, ibid., 7493-4.

62 Memorandum from Special Agent A. M. Crosby, December 28, 1918, to O'Brian, ibid., 7493-4.

like to see it overthrown, but without bloodshed, does not believe in the assassination of public officials, denies he is an anarchist but wears a red necktie which he indicated signifies internationalism. 64

On orders from the Attorney General the IWW with a penchant for red neckties was delivered to the immigration inspector for deportation. 65

The final illustrative case concerns James Slovick, one of the 166 IWWs arrested in the nationwide sweep of September 5, 1917 and tried in Chicago with 113 other Wobblies. Slovick, a marine fireman and secretary-treasurer of Marine Transport Workers' Union 200, IWW, headquartered in Cleveland, was a leader and an opponent of the war. In February 1917 Slovick suggested to William Haywood that if the United States entered the war a general strike should be called in protest. Slovick distributed English and foreign-language IWW literature and stickerettes and displayed his antagonism to the United States in a letter in which he called the government a "hireling" of the steel trust which is "using the Federal bulls to do their dirty work for them." 66

Slovick's views, as recorded in government files, also

64 Memorandum for O'Brian, April 12, 1919, DJ enclosure with letter from O'Brian, April 16, 1919 to Secretary of Labor, DJ File 9-16-12-7715-7.

65 Palmer, June 4, 1919, DJ File 9-16-12-7715-10.

66 Slovick File, Application for Executive Clemency in Behalf of Political Prisoners, I. W. W.'s, etc.: Petitions, Papers and Reports, General Records Relating to Political Prisoners, Records of the Pardon Attorney's Office, NA, RG 204.
included an opinion about the United States written to Dan Buckley, a fellow Wobbly. Slovick stated that he was "threatened with deportation from the land of the iron heel to the land of blood and iron (Holy Russia). Damned little difference between those two in my notion. . . "67 On August 30, 1918 he was fined $20,000 and sentenced to ten years in federal prison. As prisoner number 13142 admitted at 28 years of age to the United States Penitentiary, Leavenworth, he was commended by the prison chaplain, Herman V. Allen, for rendering "valuable service in assisting with the Penitentiary Night School."

Beyond this commendation and three reprimands for talking at breakfast, we know little of Slovick's stay in prison. On June 19, 1923 Slovick was granted conditional commutation subject to deportation along with twenty-two other Wobblies. 68

Slovick was one of 679 Wobblies arrested and tried between September 1917 and midsummer 1919. This figure excludes alien Wobblies administratively interned by federal authorities, Wobblies caught in the Palmer raids of January 1920, and the over 1000 IWWs arrested or sentenced in the fall of 1920. 69


68 Record of James Slovick, Number 13142, United States Penitentiary, in ibid.

69 For an incomplete list of arrests and convictions see One Big Union Monthly, II (March 1920), 5-21. The list does not include IWW members in Ohio administratively interned.
The selected examples of individuals from Ohio illustrate in microcosmic form the activity of federal authorities toward the IWW. In only one case, that of the man who left the boiler room unattended, was there any hint at involvement in any overt physical act. As John Lord O'Brian observed, "there were no instances in which sabotage was proven" after the United States entered the war. 70 In most cases alien IWWs were removed from Cleveland to the internment camps at Fort Ogelthorpe because of their organizational skill and their anti-war views. Regardless of whether an IWW was in a leadership position and tried at the federal level, as in Slovick's case, or administratively interned as in the example of the IWW with an affinity to red neckties, one theme emerges. Wobblies in Ohio as in other states were often restrained for their views and beliefs rather than for actions. It was the government's contention that these views were dangerous in time of national emergency, with the resultant conclusion that IWW thoughts were transformed into tangible offenses against the state.

John Lord O'Brian tried to balance liberty with order. Liberty he defined as "obedience to law, self-control and self-restraint." 71 Order for O'Brian included professionalism in law enforcement and a

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71 O'Brian, "Uncle Sam's Spy Policies," p. 407.
disavowal for voluntary quasi-official vigilante groups such as the APL. O'Brien was in the minority, overruled by the hysteria of war on the one hand and excessive discretionary powers of administrative officials on the other. Functionaries from the Department of Justice, postal inspectors, military intelligence personnel and officials at the state and local levels had a mind-set which viewed the IWW as a dangerous threat. The IWW was first subject to surveillance, then regulated through emergency measures, and finally dismembered by judicial prosecution or internment.

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In 1919 the IWW, hampered in its organization work in the war, again attempted unionization in Ohio. Societal tension and disillusionment with the war led to a proliferation of radical activity in northern Ohio. Military intelligence stated the IWW in Cleveland was actively cooperating with the Bolsheviks and Socialists and described the situation as critical. Arch C. Klumph, chief of Cleveland's APL, shared the view of military intelligence when he told the Chamber of Commerce Committee on Bolshevik Activities that Cleveland had organizations desiring the overthrow of the nation and its laws. The city's chief of


73 Cleveland, Chamber of Commerce, Minutes, typewritten ms, February 8, 1919, WRHS.
police granted that the danger of revolution existed but saw it as a possibility rather than a probability.\(^74\)

Authorities in Akron claimed that the IWW distributed inflammatory and incendiary material to that city's black population. The pamphlets urged blacks to seek redress of grievances which authorities construed as inciting to riot. Two alleged headquarters of the Akron IWW were raided to stop the agitation.\(^75\) In an editorial the New York Times admitted that evidence against the IWW was insufficient to hold up in court but declared "no other group of people living in this country would do such a thing, and . . . the record of the I. W. W. shows that among its members are men quite capable of it."\(^76\) Wobblies accused the AFL of contributing to racial tension by refusing to admit black workers, whereas the IWW "extends the cordial hand of fellowship to all workers of whatever race or color. . . ."\(^77\)

On May 5, 1919 workers at the Ford Plate Glass Company in Rossford, near Toledo, struck in sympathy for twenty-four grinders who sought a ten cent per hour wage increase.\(^78\) Seven hundred

\(^74\)Ibid., February 11, 1919.

\(^75\)New York Times, October 7, 1919.

\(^76\)Ibid., October 8, 1919.

\(^77\)Ohio Socialist, October 8, 1919.

\(^78\)Toledo News Bee, May 6, 1919.
strikers, including many Polish immigrant workers, sought a reduced work day of eight instead of ten hours, a closed shop, and recognition of the IWW affiliated International Glass Workers' Union of America. To protect the factory the sheriff, deputies, and prosecuting attorney left the Wood county seat at Bowling Green for Rossford. With the strike in progress Toledo IWW organizers entered Rossford to extend Wobbly principles and to insist on peaceful picketing. The organizers also established a strike fund directed by the Rossford strike committee. To opponents of the strike the situation was exacerbated by the arrival of sixteen "uniformed soldiers said to be I. W. W. sympathizers" who encouraged Rossford strikers to attend a rally in Toledo sponsored by the Soldiers', Sailors' and Workers' Council on May 11. Eight chartered trolley cars transported the strikers to Toledo. After a public meeting in Memorial Hall the strikers joined a mass meeting of 15,000 sponsored by the Countil in front of police headquarters on Market Street.

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80Organizer's report, May 14, 1919.

81Toledo News Bee, May 9, 1919.

82Organizer's report, May 14, 1919.
Native American workers' sentiment in Rossford was hostile to the immigrant Wobbly strikers. The town's newly-formed American Labor League, a rival union to the IWW, requested backing of the Toledo Central Labor Union, AFL. The request was denied; AFL organizers were unavailable because of their involvement with Toledo's Autolite and Willys-Overland strikes. Despite the absence of the AFL, IWW efforts were weakened by Rossford grocers' threats to cut off credit to strikers and by the arrest of Clyde Smith, an IWW organizer, who failed to leave town within the two minutes allotted by authorities. 

Although the IWW urged peaceful tactics, deputy sheriffs, company officials and workers loyal to Ford anticipated trouble and stockpiled shotgun and revolver ammunition. Ford refused strikers' demands for a ten cent wage increase and the eight-hour day. The company then gave strikers final paychecks and reopened with 400 new workers, all native Americans, many of whom were armed and deputized. IWW efforts were further weakened by the actions of the local Roman Catholic church. Marc Karson, a labor historian, observed that the Roman Catholic church influenced the essentially conservative character of the American trade union movement by exerting pressure against radical

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83 Toledo News Bee, May 9, 1919.
84 Ibid., May 10, 1919.
85 Ibid.
forms of labor organizations. An interesting footnote to Karson's observation is seen in an IWW report on Rossford:

The next morning... when the Polish strikers' children attended the Catholic Sisters School in Rossford, they were asked if they had been in the parade in Toledo the day before. Upon answering that they... had been in the parade they were told that they were bad little children, were I. W. W.'s, Bolsheviks, etc., and that if their parents continued on strike none of them would be allowed the privileges of the Catholic Church or confession. Upon being told this most of the children went home in a flood of tears.

Dissent now existed among the Polish strikers. The IWW's attempts to keep unity failed when a person with a knowledge of foreign languages infiltrated the Polish strikers, spreading rumors and confusion. As a result of this agitation the rank and file called for a special meeting over the issue of retaining or rejecting IWW organization. Most of the IWW strikers were on picket lines at the time of the meeting, but those present voted 32 to 12 in favor of retaining the IWW. The Wobbly victory was short-lived. Pressure from the church, suspension of credit in local stores and threats of boxcar deportation of strikers contributed to the decision to expel the IWW from the strike.

By May 14 the situation was stabilized to management's

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86 Marc Karson, American Labor Unions and Politics, 1900-1918 (Boston, 1918), Chapter 9, "The Roman Catholic Church and American Labor Unions."

87 Organizer's report, May 14, 1919.

88 Ibid.
Figure 2. --Soldiers, sailors and marines were enlisted as deputies to combat the IWW in Rossford. Source: Toledo News Bee, May 9, 1919.
Figure 3. -- Mike Lipka, Rossford IWW organizer, searched by Frank Bain, a deputy from Bowling Green. Source: Toledo News Bee, May 9, 1919.
Figure 4. --IWW organizers Clyde Smith and Alex Skal handcuffed at Rossford. Source: Toledo News Bee, May 9, 1919.
satisfaction. The Glassworkers' Union disintegrated as Wobbly organizers were arrested or ordered to leave town. IWW organizational strength was further lessened when immigrant workers, claiming that they were misled by the IWW, asked for rehirement. Management consented on condition that each striker personally reapply for his job, turn in his red IWW card, and sign an agreement that he would not join a labor union. The workers were promised restoration to their former jobs in June when the factory resumed full operation. The opposition was strong and had the backing of the authorities while the IWW failed to coalesce the strikers into a solidified unit. This, plus community pressures against the strikers contributed to the demise of the IWW in Rossford.

With the Rossford strike a failure the IWW in Toledo attempted to make headway in that city's strike. The Toledo Americanization Board, formed to combat the IWW, used "flying squadrons" of speakers to counter IWW propaganda. The arrest of IWW members late in May 1919 was followed a month later by a federal raid in IWW headquarters which resulted in seizure of literature and correspondence.

89 Toledo News Bee, May 14, 1919.
90 Ibid., Organizer's report, May 14, 1919.
91 Toledo News Bee, June 12, 1919.
92 Ibid., May 21, 22, 1919.
93 Ibid., June 27, 1919.
Wobbly hopes for postwar Toledo vanished with the raid.

State legislation provided additional checks on the IWW in Ohio. Criminal syndicalist laws enacted during the anti-radical hysteria and the national move for the open shop in 1919 restricted the goals and aims of organizations and the advocacy of beliefs by individuals. Criminal syndicalist laws, presented and justified as protection against the overthrow of the states, expressed the mood of the time; such laws in fact were not needed because regular criminal codes already protected the states and federal government against acts of violence. 94

The Ohio General Assembly, following the pattern of other states, passed a criminal syndicalist law in 1919. The law, adopted as emergency legislation "necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace and safety," defined criminal syndicalism as a felonious doctrine which advocated violence to accomplish political and industrial reform. Ohio's law also provided that the teaching, advocacy, or oral or written expression of such doctrines were crimes. These categories, together with the printing, publishing, editing, distribution or public display of syndicalist ideas, and membership in or voluntary assembly with an organization espousing syndicalism, were

punishable by a ten-year sentence, a fine of not more than $5000, or both. To further hamper the advocacy of criminal syndicalism the law held that an "owner, agent, superintendent, janitor, caretaker, or occupant of any place, building or room" who knowingly allowed a meeting of people defined in the act was guilty of a misdemeanor and liable to a maximum of one year in jail, a fine of not over $500, or both.\(^5\)

Seven months after passage of the criminal syndicalist law the General Assembly passed a joint resolution calling for the deportation of aliens "associated together in movements deliberately designed to inspire class hatred, provoke racial antipathies and social prejudices, and to cause, by violence, the destruction of the American form of government. . . ." The resolution, aimed at Bolshevism,\(^6\) could also embrace the IWW which in the public mind was synonymous with communism. Voluntary groups supplemented state legislation. The Columbus Labor News Corporation, devoted to AFL principles "and the betterment of mankind in general," was founded in 1919 to fight "the Bolshevik menace . . . and to combat the I. W. W. element in all, or

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any organized or unorganized groups of wage-earners. "

The anti-radical offensive of 1919 continued in January 1920 with the nationwide Palmer raids. In Ohio the raids were coordinated by the Department of Justice and carried out with the assistance of local authorities and the volunteer Loyal American League. The sweeps in Cleveland, Youngstown, and Toledo, mainly directed against the Communist and Communist Labor Parties, also included members of the IWW. The Palmer raids put an end to the feeble efforts of the IWW in Ohio during the First World War. Those raids finalized surveillance and regulation which began with United States entry into the war.

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From 1917 to 1920 fears and perceptions of the IWW shifted with changes in world events. The German threat gave way in the public mind to the Bolshevik menace of which the IWW was considered an appendage. Within the context of these two shifting threats to national security the IWW remained a persistent sore to governmental authorities and afforded the expansion of operations on the part of regulatory

97Articles of Incorporation, March 17, 1919 in Record of the Proceedings of the Incorporators, Stockholders and Directors of the Columbus Labor News Company, State Archives, OHS.

98Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 3, 4, 1920.
bureaucratic agencies and quasi-official citizen surveillance groups. The IWW as an actual or conjured threat served as a testing ground and provided foundation reference points for later governmental policies in the cold war era.

Where the IWW in the pre-1914 period served as a gadfly with free-speech confrontations in an effort to force local authorities to uphold the Bill of Rights, the organization's mere existence in the war was a test for the strength or weakness of civil liberties in time of crisis. The Wilson administration forestalled the possibility of military tribunals and if there is any consolation in negative action, it is to be found in recognition that the Wilson administration might have acted in an even more rigorous fashion than it did. On the other hand, executive reliance on the APL, administrative internments and deportations, and prosecution for the advocacy of ideas left a blot upon the record of President Wilson whose public rhetoric embraced a crusade against autocracy. As evidenced by the microcosm of activities in Ohio, World War I raised issues relating to the nature and definition of loyalty and security and which inaugurated the dossier state.

Not unexpectedly the issue of unionization in time of war also came into play. Felix Frankfurter, Chairman of the War Labor Policies Board, asserted in 1918 that the Department of Justice used the Espionage Act against labor organizations "in a partisan endeavor to
settle difficulties." A less subtle rebuke of Department of Justice anti-labor activities emanated, ironically enough, in a resolution adopted by the National Union of Police and Prison Officers of England and addressed to the Attorney General of the United States:

... This Executive Committee deplore[s] the action of the Government of the United States of America in its treatment of Officials of Labour Organizations as instanced by the many lamentable rigorous measures adopted towards various members of the Industrial Workers of the World.  

99 Frankfurter, July 1, 1918 to Attorney General, NA, Records of the War Labor Policies Board, RG 1.

100 J. H. Hayes, General Secretary, London, November 18, 1919 to Attorney General, NA, RG 60, DJ File 186701, section 1.
CHAPTER V

PRELUDE TO RESURGENCE: ATTITUDES AND ACTIVITIES OF THE IWW IN THE DEPRESSION ERA

The experience of the First World War paralyzed the IWW as a labor organization. By circumstances the IWW, at its nadir in the twenties, was converted from a union into a self-defense and propaganda organization working alone, aloof from the overtures of the Communist Party. Wobblies, fearing the regimentation of Communism, refused to endorse the Third International in 1920. In 1921 the IWW declined an invitation to participate in the Red International of Labor Unions and rejected the armed insurrection clause of the Communist Party's "Appeal to the I. W. W."¹ Wary of the so-called workers' state in Russia, the IWW was isolated and dismembered. With Wobbly leaders imprisoned or in voluntary exile in Russia as a result of the Wilson administration's prosecutions, the organization's membership declined

¹The Communist, II (December 15, 1920), 2; One Big Union Monthly, II (December 1920), 57; One Big Union Monthly, III (January 1921), 51; IWW, The I. W. W. Reply to the Red Trade Union International (Moscow), (Chicago, 1922), Microfilm reel number P34898, WHS; Minutes of the Thirteenth Convention of the IWW (1921) WHS.
in the 1920s. Public opinion was hostile and the organization itself was beset with strife between decentralizers and centralizers.  

Additional factors intensified the IWW's demise. Federal immigration laws in the twenties cut off potential Wobbly membership; construction projects leveled off after the war; and the second-, third-, or fourth-hand Ford ("the flivver") gave rise to transient harvest families in the West who replaced the single male itinerant who had been the mainstay of IWW strength in harvest regions. With the Great Depression the docility and dormancy of the IWW changed.

Communists, Coughlinites, Technocrats, and New Dealers all had programs for alleviating the Depression. The IWW maintained its position of "revolutionary industrial unionism" advocating abolition of capitalism and the control of society along industrial lines. Wobblies considered themselves "red" in the radical sense but divorced themselves from "the hairbrained whiligig nonsense of the Communist Party or the blood and thunder preached by equally illogical freaks. . . ."

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2 Conlin, Bread and Roses Too, pp. 146-147; Fred Thompson, The IWW: Its First Fifty Years (Chicago, 1955), pp. 150-151.

3 Industrial Worker, August 22, 1925. See also John S. Gambs, Decline of the I. W. W. (New York, 1932), for an overview of Wobbly demise.

4 Industrial Worker, October 2, 1937.
Wobbly opposition grew as the Communist Party gained strength in the United States in the thirties. Apostates who betrayed the IWW by joining the ranks of Communism received derisive scorn:

Ex-Wobbly scribe
ex-roach, ex-bum.
Ex-spy, ex-guide to
"kingdom come."
When FIGHTING WOBBLIES
strike, ah then
Come forth your worst, to lie,
ex-MEN!\(^5\)

For Wobblies, Soviet leadership, "generated by the Eurasian priesthood, in the secret temples of Pope Stalin," distorted Marxian philosophy, restrained freedom, and opposed the general strike.\(^6\)

In the eyes of the IWW traditional Russian icon worship was supplanted by messianic worship of machine technology, with Lenin as the prophet. IWW Soviet Russia was "state capitalism" under pure and simple dictatorship.\(^7\)

We dance to the tune the piper plays,
Shout the words Stalin writes.
Oh funny, oh funny are the ways
The ways of the Comical Knights.\(^8\)

\(^5\) _Industrial Solidarity_, September 15, 1931.
\(^6\) _Industrial Worker_, October 20, 1934.
\(^7\) _Ibid._, June 14, 1930.
\(^8\) _Ibid._, September 20, 1930.
Added to fear of dictatorship was derision of intellectuals who venerated "proletarian art." Wobblies believed that "prolecult" such as Mike Gold's *Jews Without Money* or the pieces in the *New Masses* were insincere, dogmatic, waste "sprinkled with the official holy water of Moscow." John Reed Clubs and *New Masses* writers failed, in Wobbly terms, to capture the essence of the American people. Besides, sneered the IWW, "the influence of Communism on literature has not extended further west than Fourth Avenue." When Communist unions rivaled embryonic IWW unions in the thirties, injury was added to insult.

Although Communists tried to infiltrate the IWW without success in the early twenties, no such efforts were made in the thirties. Lines of demarcation were clearly drawn between enemies, and the IWW had reason to fear Communists. According to an IWW pamphlet, Wobblies who fled Wilsonian prosecution in 1919 for the "haven" of the

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9Ibid., March 20, 1934.

10Ibid.

11This was especially true in the maritime industry. Marine Transport Workers' Industrial Union 510, IWW had made gains in the Great Lakes, the Gulf, and the west coast, only to be "raided" by the Communist-dominated Marine Workers' Industrial Union, newly founded with a name similar to the Wobbly union. *Industrial Worker*, April 9, 1934.

12Mike Kaciban, in oral history interview with Cedervall, Halonen, and Kaciban, October 31, 1967.
Kuzbas Colony of Russia, a settlement for American expatriates, were eventually eliminated as political deviates by the Communists. The same process took place during the Spanish Civil War when IWW volunteers in the Lincoln and Mackenzie-Papineau Brigades were eliminated by Communist political commissars. 13

Steeled by time and duplicity, the IWW refused any alliance with Communism. As one Wobbly put it, "I never want to see a United Front between the I. W. W. and these Commie snakes." 14 Frank Cedervall, organizer for Metal and Machinery Workers' Industrial Union 440, IWW in Cleveland during the Depression, expressed his aversion to Communism:

Call me a Commie baiter if you will; I plead guilty. I have no sympathy with them or their aims. I believe that the bondage of workers in Russia is worse than the bondage in America. Here I can just loaf for six months a year, and just starve to death if I please. If I were in Russia I could not loaf for one day without being shot for my pains. . . . The vicious state capitalism of the Kremlin will get no support from me, for I have had first hand experience with the union-busting tactics of the Communists during the great

13 The IWW's feelings toward Soviet Communism are best expressed in "Chicago Replies to Moscow!" pamphlet in Private Labor History Collection of Richard D. Tussey, AFL-CIO. See Appendix C.

unorganized Briggs Body strike of 1932. I saw what the Commies will do to gain control. 15

Wobblies were skeptical of other panaceas for the Depression and rejected Father Coughlin's Social Justice as an answer, seen through "Roman-colored glasses." 16 Another cure-all, Howard Scott's technocracy, was viewed with potential favor. Scott, in the early twenties, was employed by the IWW Bureau of Industrial Research but was chastized for organizing outside the Wobbly sphere in the thirties. 17

The IWW had little faith in political parties, regarding Republicans and Democrats alike as ineffective since both received support from capitalism. Third parties such as the Farmer-Labor and Socialist parties of the twenties were deemed failures because of their reliance on what the IWW considered as social nostrums "and similar panaceas of a half-baked nature." 18 Separate labor parties were ruled out as failures since, in Wobbly eyes, the backbone of American labor, the AFL, always backed the winning party within the


16Industrial Worker, February 23, 1935.

17Ibid., March 20, 1934.

political system. IWW rhetoric held that reformers repaired the existing system of capitalism while Wobblies built "the structure of the new within the shell of the old." New Deal measures were thus regarded as temporary stopgap measures. Franklin D. Roosevelt, "a so-called progressive, but within the bounds of party discipline," saved capitalism. Wobblies would have preferred Roosevelt to endorse the general strike and workers' management of industries for the implementation of social change. The AFL, which in Wobbly perspective was integrally bound up with the New Deal, was regarded as a bitter enemy of industrial unionism, siding in a "united front" with employers to combat the IWW.

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In 1932 John S. Gambs, necrologist of the IWW, described the Wobblies as mild and gentle, a circuitously gracious way of saying

19Ibid.
20J. P. Thompson, quoted in ibid., February 13, 1934.
22Industrial Worker, January 19, 1935.
23IWW, Metal and Machinery Workers' Industrial Union 440, Shop Bulletin (November 1935), 1, Labadie Collection.
that the organization was virtually dead. Two years after this description the IWW was operating at full force in Cleveland and was active in other parts of the United States as well. The IWW viewed the Depression as an operative milieu through which the organization could gain strength to end Hoovervilles.

In Hooverville the nights are cold,
the clothing is threadbare and old;
the rations short and thinly doled,
For 'charity' is loud extolled,
In Hooverville.

In Hooverville, by some queer twist,
The 'Rugged Individualist'
Contented is to just exist;
there is no clenched, defiant fist,
In Hooverville.

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In Hooverville, the boastings, proud,
That once 'The System' roared aloud,
No more with magic are endowed;
It guarantees not e'een a shroud,
In Hooverville.

In Hooverville all manhood dies,
For manhood lives on high emprise;
Oh ye who rot--Arise! Arise!
In ONE BIG UNION organize!
Lead not the life that curs despise,
In Hooverville. 25

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25 Covami, "In Hooverville," Industrial Worker, December 20, 1932. Covami was the pen name of Covington Hall, an IWW poet.
The time was ripe for Wobbly organization. In 1930 the *Industrial Worker*, noting that freight trains were loaded with the despondent unemployed, observed: "It is now merely a question of our present membership becoming active." The organizational push surged from Brooklyn Wobbly halls in the East, to Cleveland, to a lone but zealous delegate at Murry's Cafe in Eureka, Utah, and then to the Pacific northwest. The IWW began anew.

An impressionistic picture from the pages of the *Industrial Worker* reveals a collage of exuberant optimism for organizational prospects in the Depression. In Brooklyn the Junior Wobblies epitomized this renewed elan when little Hilda Iannello opened the curtains at the IWW hall, followed by Mamie Crisalli's speech: "We children of labor are going to try our utmost by taking the flaming red flag from our fathers' worn-out hands and carry it to the top of the world."

Marie Mangano, Nancy Russo, and Mamie Crisalli performed for the audience, and Emma Penna read Ralph Chaplin's "The Red Feast." Professor Pompieri and his Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse played the Wobbly hymn, "Solidarity Forever."
The organization disseminated propaganda in English, Finnish, Hungarian, Italian, and Czech and saw additional needs for material in Polish, Spanish, Bohemian, and Croatian. Wobblies were instrumental in aiding the unemployed of Seattle and made progress in western mines and public works projects, and built a strong organization among the lumber workers of the Northwest. Organizational ideals were stressed through education in IWW schools in New York City, where Sidney Hertzberg of the New York Times and labor editor of the New Leader taught labor journalism, and in Duluth, Minnesota, where the IWW maintained a residential Work Peoples' College. In Cleveland IWW educational programs included classes in

29Industrial Solidarity (Chicago) and Industrial Worker (Seattle); Tie Vapauteen and Industrialisti in Finnish (Duluth); Bermunekas (Chicago and Cleveland); Jedna Velka Unie, Czechoslovakian (Chicago); and Il Proletario, Italian (Brooklyn, New York). A complete history of the IWW foreign language newspapers is in Industrial Worker, April 10, 1937.


31Industrial Worker, April 18, 25, 1931; ibid., February 14, 21, 1934, Minutes of the Twenty-second Convention of the IWW, Labadie Collection.

32Industrial Worker, November 9, 1935.

33The Work Peoples' College was originally founded in 1904 as a seminary for Finnish Lutherans. In 1907 liberal Finns purchased and reorganized the college, which transferred hands in 1908 to the Finnish Socialist Federation. After the IWW and Socialists split, the Wobblies'
labor history, parliamentary law, and public speaking, and combined social activities with educational propaganda for the city's Hungarian Wobblies. An attempt to reach children of IWW members was made through the Junior Wobblies Union. The Cleveland chapter aided in leafleting the city's metal and machinery shops during Wobbly strikes and provided a social and educational forum for young members.

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In 1934 Joseph Wagner, the IWW general secretary-treasurer, could say with optimism: "We are definitely headed away from our period of stagnation and comparative inactivity. The period of decline assumed control of the school. In the Depression era the residential college offered a five-month course which included Marxian economics, sociology, labor history, public speaking, labor journalism, and accounting. Entrance examinations and recommendation letters were not needed; the only admission requirements were possession of the Wobbly card, and the ability to read and write. The WPC, although aimed at general IWW membership, had a special affinity with Finnish Wobblies, on whom the college made a tremendous impact. Industrialisti, the Finnish IWW newspaper which served as a focal point for Finns in Ashtabula and Cleveland, Ohio as well as Michigan and Minnesota, was a direct outgrowth of the WPC. Jack Parnack, "Work Peoples' College: From a Sky-Pilot Institution to a Revolutionary Labor College," Industrial Worker, November 29, 1930.

34 Industrial Worker, February 23, 1935.

35 See, for example, Szabadsag, December 30, 1937.

36 Industrial Worker, June 22, 1935; Toivo Halonen, in oral history interview with Cedervall, Halonen, and Kaciban, October 31, 1967.
in membership and prestige is behind us." In large part the impetus for growth came with the development of Metal and Machinery Workers' Industrial Union 440 of the IWW. IU 440 was formed in 1918 and by 1921 had delegates in Warren, Hamilton, Cincinnati, Dayton, Cleveland, Toledo, and Canton. Prior to 1934, 440's biggest gains were made in Detroit's automobile industry. As was the case with other Wobbly unions, 440 was autonomous in decision-making powers, but it followed general IWW policy in refusing to affiliate with the AFL or the Communists. Until the United Automobile Workers established a base of operations in Detroit, unionization in the auto industry attracted Communists, Musteites, Lovestoneites, Socialists, Coughlinites, and Wobblies. IU 440 publicity was first achieved in Detroit through daily IWW radio broadcasts on station WEXL. In 1933 Frank Cedervall and fellow Wobbly organizers Fred Thompson, Carl Keller, Leon Podi and others succeeded in implementing the first organized strike at the Murray and Briggs body plants.

37 "Report of Joseph Wagner, General Secretary Treasurer," Minutes of the Twenty-first Convention of the IWW (1934), Labadie Collection.


Detroit's 440 was supplanted by the UAW, but its impetus passed to Cleveland, where for sixteen years (1934-1950) 440 maintained between 1600 to 3000 members. The history of Cleveland's 440 is significant because this branch of the supposedly "utopian" and "revolutionary" IWW transformed itself into a pragmatic, stable contract-signing union which used the political process of the New Deal to achieve tangible gains above long-range goals. Survival dictated this policy lest rival unions in the AFL and CIO raid potential 440 membership. Pragmatism was the key to the union's successful operation in Cleveland. Although the IWW attempted permanent job control with Philadelphia's longshoremen, 1914-1925, and with lumber workers in the Pacific Northwest, 1918-1921 these efforts were dwarfed by the achievement in Cleveland, an episode of sixteen years.

Membership rolls for Cleveland's 440 are unavailable. Fred Thompson, November 3, 1967, to RTW, estimated Cleveland's membership at 1600. Spencer Fullerton, Cleveland labor columnist, placed the figure at 3000. Cleveland Plain Dealer, August 8, 1937. The discrepancy of figures does not necessarily imply a lack of accuracy. Membership waxed and waned with various National Labor Relations Board elections and with concrete gains made by 440. Cleveland's 440 competed with the CIO for the right to represent hundreds of workers at the American Stove Company. When 440 won the NLRB-supervised election in 1937 the union received a reputation for stability and tangible gains for its members which attracted additional members in other plants.

Thompson, November 3, 1967 to RTW.
unique to the IWW. But because Cleveland's 440 leadership saw much to be gained by working through the New Deal's policies on labor the distinction between Cleveland 440 and the rest of the IWW developed from a small fissure into an ultimate break by 1950.

*I. W. W. Return Here,*" heralded a small innocuous clipping in a Cleveland newspaper. IU 440, in temporary headquarters at the Stadium Hotel on West Sixth Street and Saint Clair Avenue, heard Frank Cedervall speak on "Industrial Unionism: Labor's Road to Power." A variety of factors contributed to the resurgence in Cleveland. First, the Cedervall brothers, Frank and Tor, came from Cleveland. Moreover, Cleveland had the foundation of stable Hungarian and Finnish Wobbly families going back to the World War One era; unlike the transitory Wobbly population in the West, whose floating membership traveled with harvests, Cleveland's old Wobbly families were well settled. This stable building bloc, expressing itself through the Hungarian **Bermunkas** and the Finnish **Industrialisti**, owned homes which were often put up as security bonds for arrested IWW pickets. A Junior Wobblies Union gave additional aid by providing footwork and assistance

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42 Clipping, Cleveland Press, January 1934, in scrapbook in possession of Toivo Halonen.
in handbilling during incipient IWW organization. 43

The situation received organizational guidance and leadership from the Cedervall brothers, Frank and Tor, who piloted Cleveland's 440 through the formative years. The Cedervalls were of Scandinavian Lutheran background. Their father, a Republican, was a member of the AFL Elevator Construction Union. 44 Tor Cedervall, a former seaman, salesman, metal worker, and Work Peoples' College instructor, was a branch secretary of 440 and was instrumental in organizing workers in Lorain, Ohio. 45 Frank Cedervall drifted toward agnosticism at about 15 years of age. At 16 he became a plasterers' apprentice and through affiliation with union plasterers and the influence of his father, he became interested in labor unionism. Additional stimulation for this interest came from the Cleveland Public Library, where Cedervall read widely in the areas of sociology, philosophy, economics, "and a smattering of psychology." In the teens and twenties, attracted by the soapbox speeches of radicals on Cleveland's Public
Figure 5. -- Frank Cedervall, ca. 1935. Source: Clipping, Feczko Collection.
Square, Cedervall's interest was stimulated even more, and by 1924 he became an "unattached radical." The executions of Sacco and Vanzetti had a profound impact on him; his concern over labor mounted and, after investigating the programs of various labor organizations, he joined the IWW in 1931. An eloquent speaker, Cedervall was sent on a speaking tour in the Illinois coal fields to raise funds for the defense of Jones and Hightower, Kentucky miners imprisoned for shooting company gunmen who attacked a miners' picket line.46 After organizing automobile workers in Detroit, Cedervall returned to Cleveland in 1934, where for three years he was chief organizer for 440. As a result of his organizing activities during the Depression, Cedervall was arrested in Detroit, Cleveland, and Lorain, Ohio. The arrests, described by Cedervall as police harassment of IWW unionization, resulted in not a single conviction. Blackmail and threats of personal and property injury were the most serious charges leveled against him during the National Screw and Manufacturing Company strike in 1935. Cedervall was acquitted by the jury. 47

46W. B. Jones, William Hightower, and five other miners were sentenced to life imprisonment as a result of a gun battle in Evarts, Kentucky on May 5, 1931 in which three company gunmen were killed while attacking a miners' picket line. The Jones and Hightower case attracted the interest and sympathy of John Dos Passos, Waldo Frank, Quincy Howe, and other prominent figures.

47Oral history interview with Frank Cedervall, January 2, 1968; Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 6, 1935; Industrial Worker, June 15, 1935.
A militantly anti-Communist and anti-Fascist union organizer, Cedervall accepted the Marxist theory of surplus value and the materialist conception of history but abjured the Marxist-Leninist concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Nor did Cedervall accept De Leon's belief that Marxism could successfully be integrated into the American political system as a separate political party. Although influenced by Prince Peter Kropotkin's writings, Cedervall believed that Kropotkin's goals were utopian and unobtainable. Summing up his creed, Cedervall said

I am non-political, not anti-political. I am non-religious, not anti-religious. I am against nationalism and for the recognition of the universal brotherhood of all men. I am opposed to violence whether committed by governments or individual men. . . .

A tribute and mark of respect for Frank and Tor Cedervall came from Spencer Fullerton of the Cleveland Plain Dealer, a newspaper hostile to IWW activities in the thirties. "... This reporter has heard some of those most violently opposed to labor say they would rather sit down at a conference table with the Cedervalls than with any labor leaders in Cleveland."

\[48\] Oral history interview with Frank Cedervall, January 2, 1968.

\[49\] Spencer Fullerton, "On the Labor Front," Cleveland Plain Dealer, August 8, 1937.
during the Depression⁵⁰ it was of significance that some employers, according to Fullerton, "regard Frank and Tor Cedervall, heads of the I. W. W. here, as two of the most capable and trustworthy labor leaders now organizing here."⁵¹


⁵¹Spencer Fullerton, "On the Labor Front," Cleveland Plain Dealer, August 8, 1937.
CHAPTER VI

PRAGMATIC JOB UNIONISM IN THE DEPRESSION ERA

"The IWW, for the first time in its history, signed contracts with the employers, and these contracts were renewed with substantial wage increases each time that they expired. And the IWW proved itself to be a very substantial labor union . . . able to gain great success at the bargaining table. . . . No longer was the IWW called 'I Won't Works' and 'the long-haired radicals' around Cleveland."

Frank Cedervall, Oral History Interview, October 31, 1967

The shift in the IWW image paralleled a distinct shift in tactics and leadership which transformed 440 in Cleveland into a pragmatic job-controlling union which placed immediate gains over long-range ideological goals. Recognizing that stable union membership could never be built on rhetorical propaganda alone, Cleveland's 440, under the leadership of Frank Cedervall and others, used the tactic of establishing contact with industrial workers, emphasizing tangible gains in income and working conditions.

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In 1934 liaison was established between 440 organizers and the small nucleus of Hungarian and Finnish IWWs. From late January to March 1934 the IWW mimeographed promotional leaflets which were distributed to workers in Cleveland's metal and machinery shops. At first efforts were discouraging but Wobbly pamphleteering finally paid off when a molder from Buckeye Brass Company went to the IWW office on Buckeye Road to tell organizers that workers in his plant and in the enameling division of the Ohio Foundry Company were dissatisfied with conditions. Acting on this lead 440 organizers disseminated IWW literature and called a meeting which was attended by only seven workers. The size of the meeting was surpassed by the enthusiasm of those who attended it; the workers urged their fellow employees at Ohio Foundry to go to a second meeting which was well attended. Within a few months of the initial push the IWW became a well established and growing fact in Cleveland's labor community. ¹

Workers signed up with the IWW for a wide variety of ideological and practical reasons. Some joined out of idealism and concern for labor. The late Bill Feczko, who wrote dispatches on Cleveland 440 to the Industrial Worker was described as "a very idealistic person who left home at 16 to get involved in the labor movement (I. W. W. variety)"

Figure 6. --IWW Shop Bulletin, issued by Cleveland IU 440, IWW, 1936. Source: Labadie Collection.
in Cleveland. And he got involved in most every possible way—from sweeping the floors, to passing out handbills, organizing, writing, etc. "2 Others saw the IWW as a viable alternative to systems more nefarious. The Communist Party, to one Wobbly who came from a Finnish background, enforced "slavish worship" of Party leaders, violated free speech, in general denied the democratic process, and betrayed the utopian ideals of the old socialists and radicals. The IWW, by contrast, maintained these ideals, respected the democratic process, and became a total social institution which "assumed the role of a church, an institution to replace other social institutions."3 Although idealism swayed some members, it would be inaccurate to say that all 3000 members of 440 were motivated by ideology. This contention cannot be thoroughly explored through an assessment of motivations of former rank and file members, but 440's leadership recognized and reluctantly accepted the fact that the bulk of its membership was motivated by factors other than ideology. Frank Cedervall hinted at this when he noted that although 440's rank and file "is by no means familiar to the enth degree with the ultimate aims and objectives of the I. W. W., there is every hope that in the course of another year . . . they will be much improved in theoretical understanding of the

2Mrs. Elizabeth Feczko, April 16, 1968, to RTW.

3Toivo Halonen, in oral history interview with Cedervall, Halonen, and Kaciban, October 31, 1967.
Labor Movement. "4 It is dubious that IWW "theoretical understanding" permeated the rank and file; on the contrary, it appears that the majority of Cleveland's membership signed up with the IWW because 440 established a record of solid achievement in collective bargaining and because the union often filled a non-union vacuum, or promised to offer better representation than a company union, the AFL, or the CIO. That 440 bargained well for its rank and file is not contested; indeed, at the American Stove Company in Cleveland the IWW obtained wages which were higher than the company's plants in other cities, and during the Second World War conditions were so good that the plant was referred to as "Coconut Grove." 5

IU 440 members affirmed loyalty to their union and placed confidence in it. Yet, at least on the part of some members, the continuous exposure to IWW philosophy did not seem to rub off. Fred Thompson of Chicago, a member of the IWW who assisted in Cleveland's organization and who was sent by the General Executive Board in the early 1940s to investigate the status of 440 which had become a "conservative" scion of the organization, observed that despite a loyal membership there was "only evidence of a very slight absorption of IWW philosophy." But on the other hand Thompson concluded that

4"440 Cleveland Report."

5Fred Thompson, November 11, 1967, to RTW.
More may have been absorbed than showed: All the longer standing members in our shops were ready to show solidarity with any group of workers in or out of the IWW... but they did not hold to us as a more or less evangelical body as did for instance those old northwest lumberjacks who even in their old age are still packing the red card.

Part of this is statistical: Out of 1600 members one wouldn't have as many persistent and enduring recruits as out of the half million or so who 'went through' the IWW out west. And there is the lack of what might be called 'critical mass'-- one is more likely to stay in the more there are around those with whom to maintain that bond of fellowship. 6

Cleveland's 440 organizing committee stated it in a different way, but with the same essential thrust as Thompson's analysis: To place a Wobbly union card in a man's pocket was an easier task than to inculcate IWW ideals in his heart. 7 Yet despite the lack of total permeation the fact remains that 440 operated for 16 years; that it received support from the ideologically non-committed as well as from the committed; and that its chief attractions were the practical gains and the sustaining power which coalesced into a formidable power base in Cleveland's labor community.

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Given this background of 440 in Cleveland, its functions, appeals, and development can best be understood through an examination of its activities. As stated earlier, the first tangible inroad in

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6 Ibid.

7 Organization Committee, IU 440, Shop Bulletin (September 1935), 5, Labadie Collection.
Depression-hit Cleveland came with the organization of Ohio Foundry Company's enameling division in April 1934. An embryonic 440 shop committee presented management with requests for a 25 per cent wage increase, abolition of the piece-work system, and recognition of the IWW shop committee. On April 5, 1934, when management refused to consider the proposals, 175 workers, organized by Cedervall and his colleagues, struck. Management, attempting compromise, offered 440 a 10 per cent increase which the Wobblies refused. In the meantime, AFL agents working with the support of management distributed letters to strikers stating that 440 "wants and will provoke continuous warfare between us and the company, as is declared in the preamble of the I. W. W. . . ."\(^8\) The AFL called a meeting on April 13 which attracted only six employees.\(^9\) Ohio Foundry employees joined with 440; the union bastioned its picket lines into four-hour shifts,\(^10\) and by April 16 management, worn down by sustained picketing, granted recognition of the 440 enameling division shop committee, abolished the piece-work system, and increased hourly wages 7 1/2 to 20 cents.

With complete control of the enameling division 440 extended itself in August 1935 by obtaining a 5 cent per hour wage increase for sprayers,

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\(^8\) *Industrial Worker*, April 24, 1934.

\(^9\) "440 Cleveland Report."

\(^10\) *Industrial Worker*, April 17, 1934.
and an additional 2 1/2 cent increase in October. 11 IU 440 also concerned itself with the protection of seniority rights, job security, and representation for maintenance and production employees in another plant of the company. 12 Although the AFL Molders' Union and the CIO vied for representation of these workers, the National Labor Relations Board, on September 21, 1937 certified that 440 "has been designated and elected by a majority of the production and maintenance employees . . . as their exclusive representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining in wages, hours, and other working conditions." 13

Several days after the initial strike against Ohio Foundry, 440, on April 26, 1934, called a strike at the Accurate Parts Manufacturing Company, which laid off night shift employees who voted for IWW representation. A settlement was made on April 27, when management saw its employees honor the IWW strike call by not reporting to work. The 440 shop committee was recognized, those laid off were reinstated, a wage increase of 7 per cent was granted, and all gains made

11"440 Cleveland Report"; Industrial Worker, July 13, 1935.

12Industrial Worker, August 31, 1935.

13Industrial Worker, October 2, 1937. Records of the Cleveland Regional Labor Board are not available for the Depression era. Letter from Vivian Brazier, Records Management Officer, National Labor Relations Board, July 9, 1970 and October 21, 1970, to RTW.
through the strike were to be posted by management as verification of settlement. On May 12, 1934 union members celebrated their victories at Ohio Foundry and Accurate Parts with a ball at the Fabian Hall on Buckeye Road. 14

A year later, when Accurate Parts white collar employees struck for a 40-hour week, time and a half overtime, and an increase of $2.00 a week for workers earning under $20 weekly, the IWW struck in sympathy. IU 440's sympathy strike shut down the plant, 15 a gesture of solidarity with the clerical employees.

A third victory and the broadening of the IWW base occurred on May 2, 1934 when employees of the Draper Manufacturing Company, the world's largest producers of steel barrels, voted in 440 over a company union. Victory did not come easily; when 440 received a majority of votes management threatened to fire the Wobbly union members. In retaliation employees declared a strike on May 3, calling for recognition of the IWW shop committee and for the cessation of company union propaganda. After one day of picketing the company gave in, 16 and the IWW came to public light when John Love, correspondent for the Cleveland Plain Dealer, observed: "In Cleveland still

14 440 Cleveland Report; Industrial Worker, May 8, 1934.

15 Industrial Worker, June 15, 1935.

16 Ibid., May 15, 1934; "440 Cleveland Report."
Figure 7. --Draper Manufacturing Company employees, members of IU 440, IWW, on strike. Source: Feczko Collection.
Figure 8. --IU 440 pickets, probably at the Draper strike.
Source: Feczko Collection.
another independent butts in an oar. The Industrial workers of the
World, who have not been heard from in years, as despite a somewhat
horrendous name, gained from its parentage in the Western Federation
of Miners... can make structural claims with logic in them. 17 De-
spite the initial victory, management persisted in pushing a company
union; to combat this move 440 demanded a closed shop and a 20 per-
cent wage increase. When Draper refused, the union, on June 7, 1934
voted to strike again. 18 Three weeks later the strike was still in pro-
gress, as management refused to come to terms with the strikers who
gave strong resistance. The IWW boasted that "the stubbornness of the
strikers exceeds even that of hard-headed old man Draper and they
swear that grass will crop up through the floors of the plant before they
will abandon their demands." 19 Wobbly insistence on maintaining the
strike was based on tactics: without workers, Draper could not pro-
duce barrels and, lacking its product, would lose orders. 20 In the
strike's fifth week 440 organizers reported excellent morale. 21 As

17 John Love, Cleveland Plain Dealer, cited in "440 Cleveland
Report."

18 Industrial Worker, June 19, 1934: "440 Cleveland Report."

19 Industrial Worker, July 3, 1934.

20 Ibid., July 10, 1934.

21 Ibid., July 17, 1934.
the strike entered the second month twelve carloads of 440 pickets moved to Niles, Ohio where the Stevens Metal Products Company handled orders for Draper. After Frank Cedervall addressed the Stevens employees, members of the AFL, management agreed not to accept Draper orders. Strike life for the 440 members assumed a well-ordered air as picket duty and daily IWW roll call became matters of daily fact. After two months of deadlock the Regional Labor Board requested a meeting between the IWW and management. The Board's proposed compromise settlement was rejected by the IWW. In retaliation the AFL, which had replaced the company union, and management took out two-column paid advertisements in Polish and Bohemian newspapers denouncing the IWW and the strike and lauding the AFL's position which urged a return to work.

The issue of an open versus closed shop was the bone of contention between the IWW and the AFL. IU 440 rejected the Regional Labor Board's compromise because of the open shop provision. Given

22Ibid., July 24, 1934; Thompson, The I. W. W.: Its First Fifty Years, p. 170.

23Industrial Worker, August 3, 1934.

24The compromise agreement called for an immediate end to the strike; a 10 per cent wage increase; an election supervised by the Regional Labor Board, allowing employees to choose between the AFL and the IWW; an open shop; and impartial recognition by management of both union and non-union men. Industrial Worker, September 4, 1934.
this deadlock the Board, on September 6, 1934 set forth a new agreement which included a closed shop provision. The IWW, commenting on the Board's decision, saw a significant breakthrough in New Deal policies; the National Recovery Administration, for the first time in its history, allowed a Regional Labor Board to condone a "100% union agreement." An NLRB-sponsored election resulted in a vote of 93 to 75 for the IWW to represent Draper employees. The federal government, which 15 years earlier had prosecuted the IWW, now compelled seventy-five Draper workers who voted for the AFL either to become IWW union members or lose their jobs.

For the IWW the victory was significant. A small group of Wobblies kept the plant owned by the president of the National Steel Barrel Manufacturers' Association closed for 14 weeks. IU 440 interpreted the Regional Labor Board's decision for a closed shop as

25 The new provisions, negotiated by Ralph Lind of the Cleveland Regional Labor Board, included an immediate end to the strike, with all employees returning to work without prejudice; a supervised election to determine whether employees desired the IWW or the AFL; the presence of IWW and AFL observers at the elections; and, most important for 440, a guarantee that Draper would agree to negotiate with the elected union on matters of wages, hours, and grievances with the understanding that if such discussion did not prove fruitful, management and the union would seek mediation from the Regional Labor Board. Industrial Worker, September 15, 1934.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid., September 22, 1934.
"discrimination in reverse." For Cleveland's IWW the closed shop decision was "helpful in knocking the idea out of the heads of the workers that they stand better chances of obtaining agreements with the employers if they join a 'respectable' union like the AFL. . . ." 28

After the closed shop decision 440 negotiated a 10 per cent increase in wages, time and a half overtime, and an additional 5 cents per hour to welders, painters, and scarfers. Since the strike was so protracted Draper tried to make up for lost time by operating six days a week; 440 members benefited with overtime payments which came as a result of their initial protest. 29 IWW members at Draper remained stable in union organization and operated well into the World War II era when the company was absorbed by Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation.

At another steel barrel plant, Perfection Metal Container Company, 440 secured complete employee participation; the IWW shop committee secured recognition on May 10, 1934, without resorting to a strike. 30 The action was quickly followed up by 440's organization of a fifth plant, the Permold Company. Management acquiesced to the shop committee's demands for improved sanitation and installed a new

28Ibid.

29Ibid., October 6, 1934.

30Ibid., May 22, 1934; "440 Cleveland Report."
ventilating system, but refused to accede to the demand of a 10 per cent wage increase. On May 19, 1934 Permold employees, most of whom were under 30 years of age, struck. After 10 days management granted the raise of 10 per cent for employees on day work, and a 5 per cent increase for men on piece-work. 31

The sixth incursion, implemented by the rank and file against the advice of 440 organizers, took place at the Cleveland Wire and Spring Company. At the beginning of Wobbly organization, 440 organizers spoke to the employees at the plant during lunch hour. 32 The drive was successful, resulting in recognition of the shop committee on September 27, 1934 after threat of a strike. With this recognition as a backbone, 440 secured approximately one-half of the company's employees as members. A month later the company rejected 440's demands for a closed shop and a 20 per cent wage increase. A strike ensued on October 23, 1934 without official sanction from union leaders, but once under way the IWW gave the strikers full support. In this strike, as in other episodes in Cleveland, the IWW faced the Associated Industries, proponent of the American Plan of the twenties

31 "440 Cleveland Report"; Industrial Worker, June 5, 1934.

32 A stenographer took notes of the remarks of 440's noontime organizers, leading the IWW to comment with sarcasm: "By now the bosses of the Cleveland Wire and Spring Company can boast, no doubt, of the widest social education of any of the local members of the employing class." Industrial Worker, September 29, 1934.
and, by the Association's own admission, a labor intelligence organi-
ization. The Association obtained armed guards for strikebreakers at Cleveland Wire and Spring Company and was instrumental in getting the courts to issue an injunction against 440, which was ordered to allow strikebreakers, transported by AFL truckdrivers, through the picket lines. In this sixth strike 440 members capitulated after 90 days on the picket lines. Frank Cedervall, in retrospect, observed that the strike was ill-advised in a situation which enamored 440 members with cockiness because of too many past victories. The opposition was strong, he stated, and contained "the bitterness borne of determina-
tion" to defeat the IWW regardless of cost. In the case of Cleveland Wire and Spring it might have been more judicious "to string along with the company union and defeat it with diplomacy rather than with force." IU 440 met its first defeat.

Republic Brass Company was next in line for organization and was struck on September 25, 1934 when management refused to negoti-
tiate with the IWW shop committee. Three days later the company agreed to negotiations, and the men returned to work. IU 440's shop committee was recognized, lay-off guarantees and seniority

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33Ibid., June 5, 1934; "440 Cleveland Report."

34LaFollette Committee Hearings, Part II, Chapter V.

35"440 Cleveland Report."
observances were negotiated, and the plant assumed normal operations with 98 per cent of its 150 workers maintaining membership in the IWW. By April 1941, IU 440 had a stable membership at Republic Brass. The union, which expanded into 250 shop branch members at the plant, received additional wage increases. IU 440 bargained for its members and obtained tangible gains at the company until the end of the Second World War. As in the other plants, pragmatic gains came first; immediate needs of the membership took precedence over the ideology inherent in the IWW mystique.

As 440 broadened its base it made contact with workers at the American Stove Company, producers of "Magic Chef" ranges. Inroads were made at the New Process Division of the company when the IWW called a strike in support of two 440 members, tool and diemakers, who were fired for wearing their Wobbly membership buttons. After a one-day strike the two Wobblies, members of a small nucleus designed to give a "bombardment of I. W. W. principles" to other plant employees, were reinstated.

At American Stove's Dangler Oil Burner Division workers voted a strike should management not recognize the 440 shop

36Industrial Worker, October 6, 1934; "440 Cleveland Report."

37Industrial Worker, March 22, April 5, 1941.

38Ibid., June 26, 1934.
committee. Twelve hundred workers supporting 440 were too formidable an opponent; Dangler capitulated with wage increases and recognition of the union. A major victory followed in late September 1934 when the 1200 employees of American Stove struck to protest a forewoman who had slapped a worker. The situation was serious enough for Arthur Stockstrom of the company's main office in St. Louis to fly to Cleveland for negotiations with the IWW. IU 440 and Stockstrom reached a compromise in which the forewoman was laid off without pay for two weeks, with the understanding that additional complaints against her would result in termination of employment. Management wanted a guarantee that employees would give a 15-day notice before striking, and that they not ask for a wage increase within the next six months. When strikers voted down these proposals, the IWW saw reason to boast of victory over a $4,000,000 concern with branches in four cities: "Again, the I. W. W. has proven to the workers that in sticking together they can win any fight that comes up, and win against any odds."

By 1937, 440 was solidly accepted by rank and file and management. Competing against the CIO, 440 won a collective bargaining agreement which granted it sole bargaining rights for employees at all Cleveland divisions of the American Stove Company. This was

39Telegram from Cleveland 440 to Industrial Worker, July 3, 1934.

40Industrial Worker, October 20, 1934.
significant, for contracts between workers and the employer class were traditionally abjured by the IWW as capitulation to capitalism. In this case, however, 440 used its right as collective bargaining agent to ward off inroads by the AFL and the CIO. As the Industrial Worker put it, "Contract Protects Solidarity." After negotiation of this contract the CIO, fearing Wobbly competition, requested a formal NLRB-sponsored election under the provisions of the Wagner Act. Ralph Lind, Regional NLRB director, announced that the election results--339 for the CIO, 530 for the IWW, and five abstentions--gave formal recognition to the Wobblies. At other shop branches of American Stove the IWW shop committee got management to agree to limit foremen from excessive surveillance of plant workers, a policy which greatly irritated employees. By 1940 the IWW was pushing for a closed shop. IU 440 called a work stoppage on November 20 to pressure the company toward this policy. This time AFL teamsters respected 440's picket lines, and after an 11-day strike a compromise settlement was reached: a 3 cent increase for lowest paid workers, and union preferential lay-off and recall; but the closed shop was not

41Ibid., May 29, 1937.

42Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 22, 1937.

43"Hell! Everytime I'd go to answer the call of nature . . . who do you think would be standing right outside the door? That's right, the foreman." Industrial Worker, February 17, 1940.

44Ibid., November 23, December 7, 1940.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT made and concluded at Cleveland, Ohio, this 1st day of May, 1937, by and between the AMERICAN STOVE COMPANY, a corporation, hereinafter referred to as the Company, and the METAL AND MACHINERY WORKERS INDUSTRIAL UNION NO. 440 OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD, hereinafter referred to as the Union,

WITNESSETH

1. The Company agrees to deal with the Shop Committee of the Metal and Machinery Workers Industrial Union No. 440 of the Industrial Workers of the World as the sole collective bargaining agent for all of the employees of its Cleveland Divisions.

2. This Agreement covers collective bargaining and is not intended to interfere with certain other rights. Any employee who desires to bargain collectively will be represented by the Shop Committee upon request, whether or not he is a member of the Union.

3. Eight (8) hours shall constitute a day's work. Every (40) hours, Monday to Friday inclusive, shall constitute a weekly work. Time and one-half shall be paid for all overtime and Saturday work, double time shall be paid for all Sunday work.

4. In laying off employees or in rehiring former employee seniority shall govern.

5. All employees with two (2) years of continuous service with the Company prior to September 1, 1937, shall be entitled to one week's vacation with pay, subject to the conditions set forth in the Company's announcement respecting vacations.

6. The employees shall not be required to work on premises devoted for the use of any plant in which a strike is being conducted or to work on production of any description transferred to Cleveland Divisions of the Company from any plant in which a strike is being conducted.

7. Neither the Company nor any of its employees will go about, directly or indirectly, by means of force, threats or intimidation, to compel any of its employees to join or not to join, or to resign from, any labor organization.

8. There shall be no solicitation or propaganda for membership in any organization during working hours.

9. This Agreement shall be in force for one (1) year beginning May 1, 1937, and thereafter from year to year in the absence of thirty (30) days' written notice to the contrary by either party to the other prior to the expiration of any yearly term.

Figure 9. ---Collective bargaining agreement between IU 440, IWW and American Stove Company. Source: Feczko Collection.
granted. Despite this setback for 440 the union continued to represent the bulk of American Stove employees in Cleveland. IU 440, after its initial recognition by American Stove in 1934, also obtained membership and management recognition at the Dill Manufacturing Company in Cleveland. 45

Wobbly organization continued to claim shop after shop. Cochrane Brass Company was organized in January 1935 with management recognition of the union and gains in wages. By February 1940, with 440's focus on tangible achievements, Cochrane workers received a total of six wage increases and new blowers designed to make conditions safer in the polishing department. Concessions were granted through use of direct negotiations between union and management; the services of the NLRB were not needed at Cochrane. 46 The roster went on: Holland Trolley Company, organized in 1935, received two wage increases in one year. 47 At American Brass Company the IWW, to the distaste of Associated Industries, won shop recognition in January 1936 after negotiations were made by Frank Cedervall. IU 440's efforts were concentrated on the machine shop and the buffing and polishing divisions of the company. When management reneged on a

45 "440 Cleveland Report." 

46 Industrial Worker, January 20, February 17, October 26, November 9, 1940.

pay increase the plant was struck with complete IWW membership participation. 48

Sporadic skirmishes achieved additional ground for 440. Superior Carbon Products Company, with 50 per cent of work force in the IWW, granted wage increases of 2 to 10 cents per hour. 49 In the same month that Superior Carbon was organized, 440 obtained recognition from the Cleveland Container Plant, 50 followed by a victory at Globe Steel Barrel Company. In June 1937, when ten employees refused to join 440 at Globe, Wobblies struck. The Regional Labor Board called a conference between the IWW and management which resulted in a settlement granting 440 sole collective bargaining power, an eight-hour day, and a forty-hour week. 51 By July 1937 the union had organized the Independent Register Company, manufacturers of air conditioning equipment. Negotiations with management over "bread and butter" issues normally associated with the AFL rather than the IWW resulted in individual lockers for employees, sanitary drinking fountains, and improved washrooms. 52 By August the Wobblies

48 Ibid., January 25, July 18, 1936.
49 Ibid., March 20, 1937.
50 Ibid., May 8, 1937.
51 Ibid., May 22, July 17, 1937.
52 Ibid., September 11, 1937.
accepted a "temporary adjustment" of a 10 cent per hour increase, an eight-hour day, a 40-hour week, and negotiated improvements in sanitary conditions.

In January 1940, solidly established in the metal shops of Cleveland, 440 tried to expand by gaining recognition at the Ohio Crankshaft Company in Cuyahoga Heights. The firm, operating under a company union, resisted AFL and CIO unionization, a policy which applied to the IWW as well. IU 440 organizers handbilled the plant, encountered resistance, and were apparently rebuffed. Some consolation was to be had at Mitchell Industries in February 1940 when 60 out of 108 employees requested the IWW as a collective bargaining agent. IU 440 filed a petition with the NLRB for investigation and certification of the union.

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Excluding the defeat at Cleveland Wire and Spring, 440 advanced rapidly, gaining at least fourteen job branches by 1937 and additional plants by the beginning of World War II. These

53 Ibid., August 7, 1937.
54 Ibid., September 11, 1937.
55 Ibid., January 27, 1940.
56 Ibid., February 10, 1940.
57 Spencer Fullerton, "On the Labor Front," Cleveland Plain Dealer, August 8, 1937.
achievements, however, were hampered by three major setbacks: the charwomen's strike, the loss of the National Screw and Manufacturing Company strike, and the defeat of 440 at the Dangler Division in Lorain. IWW success in Cleveland was generally regarded as unparalleled in the organization's history; but the halcyon days of the Depression were marred by setbacks.

The charwomen's strike was based on the frustrations and low wages of eighty predominantly Slavic women who nightly cleaned the Terminal Tower skyscraper and the Midland and Medical Arts buildings, all belonging to the Van Sweringen realty complex. Early in December 1934 the management of the Terminal complex asked charwomen to vote on either a company or an outside union. The election resulted in a victory for a non-company union, Building Maintenance Industrial Union 655, IWW. Management, without notice and apparently in retaliation, fired some Wobbly charwomen. On December 11 a committee of IWW charwomen requested the reinstatement of the fired employees and recognition of the IWW. Management refused and fired additional IWW charwomen. On December 12, 1934 the charwomen declared a strike which included demands for the rehiring of fired employees, recognition of the IWW union committee, a six-hour work shift without reduction of the $2.50 daily wage, $2.75 for moppers whose work required additional physical stress, and seniority. 58

58 Statement of Charwomen, December 17, 1934, addressed to physicians of the Terminal Tower Complex, Feczko Collection.
Management insisted that the charwomen return to work without written assurances recognizing the IWW job committee. The women thought this unfair and appealed to physicians in the Terminal Tower complex to intercede:

As a doctor you are no doubt familiar with the fact that the drudgery . . . these women go through every night is of no particular benefit to them physically. This, coupled with trying to take care of their children during the day makes their lives little to be envied. All they ask is $15.00 for a 36-hour week. . . . The twelve precious hours that will be theirs if the strike is won will be spent with their children who are certainly entitled to a mother's care as well as the children of any other class of people.

Intercession was apparently lacking. With no settlement in sight the charwomen set up nightly picket lines. In the first month of the strike Tor and Frank Cedervall, assisting with the organization of the picketers, were assaulted and beaten with clubs and blackjacks.

Mass IWW picketing in support of the eighty charwomen was circumvented when management smuggled strikebreakers into the Terminal Tower via the post office entrance, federal property which could not be picketed. The charwomen complained to Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins of management's tactics, a charge taken to the Regional Labor Board by the IWW, which asserted that Terminal

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59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Cleveland Press, January 1, 1935.
Tower violated labor's rights to collective bargaining. Eight Wobbly affiants stated management interfered with the right of organization and discriminated against those who joined the outside union. 62

As the strike wore on, the AFL became involved when members of its Building Service Employees Union tried to cross IWW picket lines. AFL organizers Don A. Campbell and John E. McGee reportedly told Ralph H. Sharpe, vice president of Cleveland Terminal Building Company, that the Wobbly picket line would cease to exist if the company signed on the AFL union. 63 What tactic would have been used to end the IWW picket line remains a mystery known to the AFL organizers alone; McGee, however, told Lieutenant Kurt Gloeckner, head of the Police vandal squad, that AFL locals "were not in any fight with the I. W. W. or the Terminal people." 64

From February through April 1935 sporadic arrests occurred in conflicts between the charwomen and their protagonist, Captain Savage of the Cleveland Police Department. Jack Raper, columnist for the Cleveland Press who scoffed at Savage as "the hero of the round-up of the peanut vendors" in 1934, stated that the anti-Wobbly police officer reportedly told the charwomen that the IWW was almost as dangerous as

62 Industrial Worker, January 5, 1935.
63 Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 24, 1935.
64 Ibid., January 24, 1935.
Rabbi Barnett R. Brickner, a liberal Cleveland clergyman. On April 10, 1935 on orders from Savage the entire charwomen's picket line, including organizers Bill Feczkó and Tor Cedervall, were arrested when they verbally protested the use of strikebreaking charwomen. In jail the charwomen sang the IWW version of Isle of Capri:
"Twas on the mass picket line that I met her..."
The felicitous mood ended when police, asserting they had received a tip about dynamite bombs set for use in the Terminal Tower and the National Screw strikes, raided and searched IWW headquarters for explosives, which they did not find. Mike Lindway, a master mechanic and 440 member, was taken into police custody for alleged possession of explosives.

On April 22 charwomen charged with shouting "scab" at strikebreakers came before Municipal Judge Frank Lausche. Morris H Wolf, former attorney for the Locomotive Engineers and for Eugene Debs, represented the Wobbly charwomen. Wolf interrogated the operating manager of the Terminal complex, making him conscientiously

65 Clipping, Feczkó Collection. Robert Barnett Brickner was rabbi of the Euclid Avenue Temple in Cleveland since 1925, identified himself with liberal causes, and was a labor arbitrator for bakery and railroad employees during the Depression era. He was also a member of the Freemasons and the Rotary Club, organizations hardly considered "radical." Biographical information on Brickner is available in John Simons, ed., Who's Who in American Jewry, III (New York, 1938).

66 Industrial Worker, April 20, 1935.

67 Ibid.
imitate the way strikers shouted "scab." By forcing him to mimic the pitch and tone of the way in which the term was bantered about, Wolf forced a euphonious courtroom demonstration which, while not totally subject to Judge Lausche's approval, won the case. Lausche dropped the charges against the charwomen. "Punishing persons for such action in this particular type of situation," he said, "would be destroying every right of free speech and right of protecting one's interests. . . ."68 This minor victory for the Wobblies was followed up by an attempt to raise funds by holding the Cleveland IWW Charwomens' Ball at the Grdna Hall on St. Clair Avenue. Not without humor the IWW remarked that this was the first time outside the comics that a charwomens' ball was held. 69 Yet within this humor there was pathos. A public rally held at the Engineers' Auditorium also attempted to secure publicity and raise money. Columnist Jack Raper and a minister, John A. Sommerville, defended the charwomen. Rallies might have aided the IWW cause, but management was strong and held firm during the strike. After 170 days of picketing the charwomens' strike was called off. Defeated, the charwomen now had to face the possibility of a blacklist. 70

68 Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 23, 1935.
69 Industrial Worker, May 4, 1935.
70 Ibid., June 8, 1935.
Cleveland's IWW was also defeated in the National Screw and Manufacturing Company strike which lasted from February 8 to April 28, 1936. As in other cases, this strike was the result of a demand for higher wages. When the company refused, 1300 employees stopped work.\(^\text{71}\) The confrontation between the company, a member of the Associated Industries, and 440 gave rise to violence. Wobblies charged that hirelings of Associated Industries threw bolts, tear gas, and boiling water at picket lines. When arrests were made, however, the Cedervalls and other Wobblies were taken into custody "for investigation."\(^\text{72}\) Strikebreakers received the protection of armed guards hired by management\(^\text{73}\) while management charged that 440 assessed National Screw members 25 cents each to raise funds to import Chicago gangsters.\(^\text{74}\) IU 440 denied these charges, arguing that at 25 cents per head, only a paltry $325 could be raised--hardly enough for proficient strongarm men.\(^\text{75}\) Accusations were hurled back and forth, but the fact remained that violence took place. Many pickets were hurt, allegedly by hired toughs of the Associated Industries.

\(^{71}\)"440 Cleveland Report;" \textit{Industrial Worker}, February 16, 1935.

\(^{72}\)\textit{Industrial Worker}, March 9, 1935.

\(^{73}\)\textit{Industrial Worker}, March 16, 1935.

\(^{74}\)\textit{Cleveland Press}, February 26, 1935.

\(^{75}\)Frank Cedervall, in oral history interview with Cedervall, Halonen, and Kaciban, October 31, 1967.
Roger Baldwin and Arthur Garfield Hays of the American Civil Liberties Union urged Cleveland Mayor Harry Davis to protect the rights of striking union men, and Norman Thomas contributed funds to 440 for defense expenses. 76

Since most of National Screw's employees were Hungarian, one of Cleveland's largest ethnic groups, the IWW sought liaison with Hungarian community leaders to win public opinion for strikers. In an attempt to rally the Hungarian population against management a mass meeting was held at 116th Street and Buckeye Road at which the audience was addressed by speakers from the Hungarian Young Peoples' Society, Andrew Weiner of the Bermunkas staff, and ministers from the Hungarian Reformed Church, and the Hungarian Presbyterian Church. 77 Members of the Hungarian community who crossed 440's picket line had their names publicly advertised in Bermunkas, which surrounded the list of strikebreakers with a heavy black border. 78

As the strike continued, so did violence, which was not confined solely to 440-management confrontations. On the larger level vandalism, the protection racket, and strikebreaking was part of Cleveland's milieu during the hectic days of labor organizing in the

76 Industrial Worker, March 30, 1935.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., April 13, 1935.
thirties. But public opinion through the newspapers focused in, at least temporarily, on 440 when Frank Cedervall was arrested in April 1935 on charges of blackmail and threats of personal injury made, allegedly, to Miss Margaret Guman, secretary of National Screw's company union. Lieutenant Gloeckner of the vandal squad alleged that on February 11, Cedervall approached Miss Guman in a restaurant with the threats. Cedervall, arraigned before Judge Lausche, was freed on $1000 bond. Guman's sister, a witness for the prosecution, first reported that she did not see Cedervall in the restaurant in which the alleged threats were made; later she changed her testimony, stating that she did indeed witness Cedervall threatening her sister. 79

In early June, Cedervall came to trial and denied that he threatened Miss Guman or her home with injury. The jury, after deliberating an hour and a half, acquitted him. Cedervall then shook hands with all the jurors. 80 The acquittal was small consolation for the ultimate outcome of the controversy. On April 29, after 10 weeks of picketing, 440 members voted to end the strike. The combined strength of National Screw and Associated Industries which employed strikebreakers was too much for the union. Associated Industries was

79 Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 11, 1935.

80 Ibid., June 6, 1935; oral history interview with Frank Cedervall, January 2, 1968.
so active that the LaFollette Civil Liberties Committee devoted an entire chapter of its report to its activities in Cleveland. IU 440 money had to be channeled into other plants; National Screw could not sap all of the union’s resources. When Isadore Lubin, Commissioner of Labor Statistics queried 440 about the strike, Wobblies responded that a study of the National Screw strike would provide a "rich field" for the investigation of stikebreaking. 81 It was a telling commentary about the nature of 440’s opponent. IU 440 admitted defeat, but while the National Screw strike was in progress the union was organizing in other plants. On the date of the 440 defeat Wobblies obtained shop recognition, a 5 to 10 per cent wage increase, and improved safety conditions for the loss of National Screw. 82

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AFL, CIO, and IWW organization attempts in Cleveland met resistance from management and from Associated Industries. 83 The IWW, as a result of the Terminal Tower and National Screw strikes, was drawn into the larger pattern of conflict, this shadowy area called "labor violence." IU 440, in the public eye, at any rate, was linked with the attempted dynamiting of Terminal Tower despite union

81*Industrial Worker*, May 11, 1935.

82Ibid.

83See, for example, the *LaFollette Committee Hearings*, Part II, Chapter V.
officials' emphatic belief in non-violence. Police, tipped off by an anonymous informer, discovered dynamite and a 25-foot fuse in the skyscraper. Frank Cedervall asserted that the IWW was opposed to terrorism and believed that the dynamite was a "plant" made by provocateurs. 84

Acts of paint-splashing, truck bombings and stench bombings were rampant in Cleveland; much of this violence was connected with activities not involving the IWW. Nevertheless, the old image of a violence-prone IWW reappeared. Lieutenant Gloeckner asserted that every IWW strike was followed by violence,85 a statement which placed the onus of guilt on the union but not on management or professional strikebreakers which so concerned the LaFollette Committee.

After vandals bombed a bar and a barber shop in late March 1935, police held the Cedervall brothers and another IWW organizer, John Anderson, "for investigation"; they were released after 24 hours, as the police were unable to link them to the bombings. Attorney Wolf denied that the IWW was in any way involved in violence and charged that provocateurs who were "sympathizers of Associated Industries" were responsible for terrorism designed to discredit the IWW char-womens' and National Screw strikes. 86

84 Oral History interview with Frank Cedervall, January 2, 1968.
85 Cleveland Press, February 26, 1935.
86 Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 29, 1935.
Ralph Chaplin, a Leavenworth veteran of the IWW trials of World War I and editor of the Industrial Worker also believed that provocateurs were involved. "Somehow people are led to think that an I. W. W. comes to town with bombs in one pocket and guns in another and dynamite under his coat. But if you want to find out who uses them and where they're stored . . . go over to the Associated Industries."87 Numerous strikers, claimed the IWW, were arbitrarily arrested "for investigation" and some beaten for activities which the union attributed to Associated Industries.88 A number of strikers who did in fact carry weapons for protection against company-hired gun thugs were arrested on concealed weapons charges.89

In March 1935 a city council investigation publicized in Cleveland's major newspapers and in the Industrial Worker revealed that the Chamber of Commerce had organized a "Secret Seven," an intelligence group designed to spy on liberal and radical employees to obtain evidence to get them fired. Two armed paramilitary groups were reportedly ready to act against "subversive elements,"90 and,

87 Ibid., March 26, 1935.
88 IWW, "The Associated Industries of Cleveland, Ohio vs. the Union of their Slaves," microfilm number P34898, WHS.
89 Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 25, 1935; Industrial Worker, April 6, 1935.
90 Industrial Worker, March 9, 1935.
according to Safety Director Eliot Ness, the Cleveland Police Department had placed two undercover agents in every trade union for intelligence gathering purposes. The IWW interpreted the latter as a move to aid the open shop movement. 91

In this milieu of labor espionage, vandalism and bombings, an IWW member, Mike J. Lindway, was arrested for possession of explosives, an offense which carried a 1- to 20-year sentence. Lindway, a former coal miner, was a master mechanic with National Screw and an active 440 member. 92 He had a record of previous arrests and convictions in Michigan and Ohio. 93 Lieutenant Gloeckner and two plainclothes officers, Ray Heisley and Thomas Casey, 94 acting on an informer's tip, went to the Lindway home on the afternoon of March 27, 1935. Mike Lindway was not at home. The police claimed they told Mrs. Lindway about their suspicions of explosives on the premises. Mrs. Lindway denied their suspicions, according to the police version, but allowed the officers to enter the home to search the premises. Mrs. Lindway's testimony differed significantly from that of the police.

91 Ibid., January 11, 1935.

92 IWW, General Defense Committee, "Mike Lindway's Fight is Your Fight," Feczko Collection.

93 Ohio, Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation, File number 357-780/FBI number 432629.

She claimed that one of the officers flashed a badge, uttered "From headquarters," and then entered the house despite her protests. 95 Regardless of whose version was correct, the police conceded, and the court recognized, "that the officers had no warrant, but proceeded to make a search notwithstanding." 96 The search revealed a rifle, three pistols, and a shotgun. In the basement of the home police found reloading components; 97 Lindway was an avid hunter. The firearms were not at issue, except that they gave, by innuendo, more fuel for unfavorable publicity. What implicated Lindway were two pipe bombs, each containing a 23 percent nitroglycerin content. Police claimed they found the bombs which presumably were made by Lindway in the basement of his home. The IWW General Defense Committee, on the other hand, argued that the bombs were planted by police in order to injure Wobbly organization at National Screw. 98 At the same time that police apprehended Lindway they also detained the Cedervall brothers and John Anderson, 440's secretary-treasurer. After being held "for


96State v. Lindway, 131 O. S. 166.

97Ibid.

investigation" police stated that there was no connection between the union officials and the explosives. 99

Lindway, arraigned before Judge Frank J. Merrick, was held on $25,000 bond. 100 On the basis of a 50-hour detention period without questioning, the use of the third degree, and the abuse of the arrest process, Attorney Wolf petitioned for a restraining order. The request was denied. 101 Judge Lausche, who bound Lindway over to the grand jury, defended the amount required for bond on grounds that "extraordinary circumstances require extraordinary things." 102

By April 27 a jury of nine women and three men was chosen for trial set in Judge George P. Baer's Court of Common Pleas. Wolf requested suppression of evidence on grounds that it was taken illegally, without warrant; Baer overruled the defense motion and proceeded with the trial. 103 Lindway, who pleaded not guilty, was found guilty on April 29 and sentenced to 1 to 20 years at the Ohio Penitentiary. Wolf offered neither testimony nor evidence on his client's behalf, but stated that a motion would be made for a new trial. 104 The

99 Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 28, 1935.
100 Ibid., March 29, 1935.
101 Industrial Worker, April 6, 1935.
102 Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 11, 1935.
103 Ibid., April 27, 1935; Cleveland Press, April 29, 1935.
104 Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 20, 1935.
next day the Cleveland Plain Dealer, commending the jury for "quick and satisfactory work," made its own judgment: "The fact that Lindway was a striker and that such weapons were found in his house led to an assumption . . . that he was guilty." Cleveland, continued the editorial, "is a little safer now that Lindway is locked up." Despite Lindway's incarceration the wave of bombings continued. Lindway's wife reported threats and harassment from neighbors and police.  

Wolf appealed the verdict. In October 1935 the Ohio Court of Appeals, by a vote of two to one, reversed the lower court's decision "for error in overruling motion to suppress, as the evidence was obtained by unlawful search." The case was remanded for further hearing, and Lindway was allowed to leave the penitentiary. While out of prison he volunteered to make speeches in Slovakian for the IWW. IU 440 members at the Draper and Dill companies assessed themselves one dollar each to raise funds for Lindway's defense. A homecoming

105 Ibid., April 30, 1935.

106 Industrial Worker, September 28, 1935.

107 State v. Lindway, 131 O. S. 166; Industrial Worker, October 26, 1935.

108 Industrial Worker, November 2, 1935. The paper used the term "Slovakian," but Lindway was probably of Slovenian extraction.
Figure 10. --Defense rally for Mike Lindway held at Slovenski Delavski Dom (Slovenian Workers' Home), ca 1936. Source: Feczko Collection.
ball was held on November 15, 1935 to raise additional defense funds. 109

In December 1935 the Ohio Supreme Court agreed to hear the prosecution's appeal from the appellate court. Arguing that although the evidence was seized without a formal search warrant, Lindway's home lost its residential status because of the existence of a machine workshop in the basement. 110 On May 27, 1936 the State Supreme Court, with the concurrence of all judges, reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and upheld the original verdict emanating from the Court of Common Pleas. The Ohio Supreme Court decision, delivered by Justice Zimmerman, allowed that evidence seized in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the constitution was admissible in court on grounds that the threat by the "gangster, gunman, racketeer and kidnapper" was more dangerous than protection of the rights of criminals. Zimmerman qualified his statement by observing that

... if the state of Ohio should ever deem it expedient as a matter of public policy to declare that evidence wrongfully seized can not be used against a defendant in a criminal case on the basis that its admission encourages the lawless acts of overzealous officers of the law in their methods of obtaining evidence, that would be an entirely different matter which is not our concern here. 111

109 Ibid., November 16, 1935.

110 Cleveland Plain Dealer, December 12, 1935.

111 State v Lindway, 131 O. S. 166.
Lindway was taken from Cleveland by Deputy Sheriff Mike Belsmack for delivery to the state penitentiary at Columbus.\textsuperscript{112} Wolf planned to appeal the Ohio Supreme Court decision to the United States Supreme Court,\textsuperscript{113} but to no avail. On October 12, 1936 the appeal was dismissed without comment.\textsuperscript{114} Wolf then appealed to United States District Judge M. F. Underwood in Columbus on grounds that Lindway, had he taken the stand, would have been subject to bodily harm from Gloeckner and other police officers. Lindway was intimidated to the extent that he was afraid to tell counsel of Gloeckner's alleged threats, and thus the decision not to testify at the Court of Common Pleas.\textsuperscript{115} Underwood stated that he could not pass judgment on the petition because all legal remedies in the Ohio judicial system were exhausted.\textsuperscript{116}

Wolf and the IWW General Defense Committee then requested a writ of habeas corpus from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, sixth district, on grounds that Judge Underwood denied the right of appeal. The Circuit Court struck down the appeal from Wolf,\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{112}Criminal Court, County of Cuyahoga, \textit{State v. Lindway}, case number 44663, microfilm at County Court.

\textsuperscript{113}\textit{Industrial Worker}, June 27, July 6, July 11, August 1, 1936.

\textsuperscript{114}\textit{Ibid.}, October 24, 1936.

\textsuperscript{115}\textit{Industrial Worker}, December 12, 1936.

\textsuperscript{116}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{117}\textit{Ibid.}, November 13, 1937
who then petitioned the Ohio Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus issued to the warden of the penitentiary. The court dismissed the motion on grounds that "habeas corpus is not the proper mode of redress where the petitioner has been convicted of a criminal offense and where all aspects and irregularities of the case were reviewed."\textsuperscript{118}

All possible channels of redress were now exhausted. Lindway, prisoner number 70-893 in the Ohio Penitentiary, worked on the prison's plumbing and hammered out copper pennies into little tea kettles to be sold as watch charms at $10 each, with profits to go to the General Defense Fund. Additional money was raised by 440's sale of "Free Lindway" stamps and buttons. But General Defense Committee efforts were to no avail, and Lindway had to serve out his sentence. On April 15, 1940 Lindway was transferred to the London Prison Farm, parole-released on May 29, 1945 and granted final release on July 8, 1946.\textsuperscript{119} He died shortly after his release. To the end Lindway and the IWW asserted that he was framed, and from the IWW vantage point Lindway, a "class war prisoner," joined Mooney and Billings.\textsuperscript{120}

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\textsuperscript{118}Ex Parte Lindway, 132 O. S. 473.

\textsuperscript{119}Ohio, Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation, File of Mike J. Lindway, number 70-893.

\textsuperscript{120}Industrial Worker, April 20, 1935.
Despite the setbacks, Cleveland's 440 made progress and attempted to branch out to Lorain in hopes of establishing IWW job branches at the Dangler Oil Burner Division of American Stove Company and the Steel Stamping Company of Lorain. Inroads with Dangler began in 1935. When the Dangler Division moved to Lorain it instituted the speed-up system and paid its employees 10 to 15 cents per hour less than Cleveland branches of American Stove. IU 440 set out to open a Lorain branch. The union's reputation with American Stove in Cleveland was well established, giving impetus to requests for the IWW to organize in the Lorain plant.

Organizational efforts in Lorain were hampered when six 440 organizers were arrested on February 11, 1936 and held for questioning for 41 hours. Lorain's mayor asserted himself when he stated that Dangler employees had to be protected from the IWW; the AFL, on the other hand, was a union with which he had no quarrel. Morris Wolf countered the arrests by filing suit against the mayor, safety director, chief of police, and T. M. Sourbeck, general manager of Dangler. Wolf stated that the suit's purpose was "to challenge in courts

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121 Ibid., April 20, 1935.


123 Industrial Worker, February 22, 1936.

124 Ibid., February 22, 1936.
the right of civil authorities to proceed in this high-handed manner against citizens who are not charged with violating any laws. "125 Despite harassment the IWW managed to sign up sixty employees but management countered by asking its employees to sign a "yellow dog" agreement in which workers promised not to strike or join 440. 126 Evicted from temporary headquarters in Lorain--Wobblies charged that Republic Steel was responsible for the dislocation--IU 440 organizers continued their efforts by visiting Dangler workers at their homes. Two of the organizers, John Marinsic and John Clark, were beaten by thugs allegedly hired by open shop advocates in Lorain. Additional harassment came from the city prosecutor, who threatened proceedings against Marinsic for distributing IWW leaflets to Dangler employees without a mayor's permit. Marinsic's prosecution was halted when Municipal Judge John Duffy stated that the dissemination of leaflets was permissible by law. 127

In May 1936 the 440 shop committee met with Sourbeck, requesting union recognition and a pay increase. Sourbeck refused recognition, contending that the employees could work through the company union. Two days after the meeting with 440, management

125Ibid., February 29, 1936.
126Ibid., March 7, 1936.
127Ibid., February 29, March 7, March 14, 1936.
suddenly announced a 3 to 6 cent per hour pay increase, \textsuperscript{128} a move probably designed to stave off discontent and to appease the Wobblies. Meanwhile, 440 efforts were additionally constructed by the passage of a new Lorain ordinance which forbade leafleting without special police permission. \textsuperscript{129} By January 1937 approximately 100 Dangler workers had taken out IWW cards, \textsuperscript{130} and the situation seemingly remained static until 1939 when rivalry between the CIO affiliated Steel Workers Organizing Committee and the IWW came to a head. W. F. Donovan, field director for SWOC, attempted to win Dangler workers to his union by labelling 440 leaders as destructive agitators. \textsuperscript{131} As tensions between the two unions mounted, IWW organizer Tor Cedervall wired the Department of Labor for intervention to settle a jurisdictional dispute between 440 and SWOC: "Strike voted by IWW members at Lorain . . . to take place at the discretion of the shop committee. We regret we are forced to this action. Perhaps if you would be so kind as to assign one of your representatives to investigate this situation, much costly class warfare could be avoided." \textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{128}Ibid., May 20, 1936.

\textsuperscript{129}Ibid., May 20, 1936.

\textsuperscript{130}Ibid., January 16, 1937.

\textsuperscript{131}Lorain Journal, April 21, 1939.

\textsuperscript{132}Tor Cedervall, telegram June 8, 1939, to Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, copy in Feczko Collection; Lorain Journal, June 8, 1939.
On the same day the telegram was sent, Dangler fired a Wobbly. The next day 440 used its discretionary power of the strike to force the issue and to publicize the jurisdictional dispute between the IWW and SWOC. With 250 of the 450 employees on strike, Cedervall requested a meeting with a Labor Department conciliator. SWOC's Donovan lashed out at what he called an "outlaw strike," stated that Dangler's management was justified in disciplining strikers, and urged SWOC workers to report to work.

Three days later a field representative from the NLRB scheduled a meeting between committees from the rival unions. On June 26, 1939 an NLRB-sponsored election was held. Employees could vote for the IWW, SWOC, or "no union." Of 451 Dangler workers, 222 voted for SWOC, 215 for the IWW, 13 for no union, and one ballot voided. SWOC had a plurality of seven, a slim victory. After the election Donovan stated that "The I. W. W. agreed before the election that if SWOC is victorious, its members will join up with us. We feel they will be as good as their word." For the moment the IWW was

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133 Lorain Journal, June 9, 1939.

134 Ibid., June 10, 1939.

135 Ibid., June 27, 1939. The IWW observed that SWOC leaders, with the cooperation of a priest and a minister, used red-baiting techniques at an anti-440 rally.

out of the picture. A forthcoming run-off election sponsored by the NLRB was scheduled for employees to vote for SWOC or "no union." 137

Tor Cedervall contested the agreement made with SWOC on grounds that the latter union had to show a clear majority. Since such majority was not shown, Cedervall argued that the IWW was entitled to equal representation and urged employees to vote "no union" in the run-offs. 138 Election results were close: 234 for SWOC, 214 for "no union." 139 Ralph Geiger, an SWOC representative in Lorain, urged the 200 Wobblies to forget factionalism and unite behind SWOC. 140 The CIO affiliate now had exclusive jurisdiction over employees at Dangler. For three years 440 organizers had worked to gain support in Lorain. Their defeat by a narrow margin indicated that almost one-half of the rank and file had faith in the union's bargaining abilities.

Five months later 440 was again organizing in Lorain, this time at the Steel Stamping Company. On December 23, 1939 two 440 members were laid off during a slack period of production. When production increased management refused to rehire the men, who were the most active 440 organizers in the plant. Moreover, the plant's general

137Ibid.
138Ibid., June 28, 1939.
139Ibid., July 1, 1939.
140Ibid.
manager, Harry Bregman, refused to recognize the right of the laid-off men to represent men employed by the company. The IWW complained to the NLRB, which upheld 440. The NLRB decision, which was confirmed by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, stated, in part, that management must "cease and desist . . . from in any manner interfering in, restraining or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights to self-organization. . . ."\(^{142}\)

At an NLRB-sponsored election the IWW was selected by the employees with a majority of more than two to one. NLRB certified that six employees of Steel Stamping Company, duly elected as business union agents, had to be recognized as bona fide representatives of job branch number 17, IWW. Bregman, forced to deal with the IWW, granted recognition to the shop committee.\(^{144}\) Shortly after this settlement employees were presented with a contract of "jumbled words and no material benefits" which they unanimously refused.\(^{145}\) Sitdown strikes and work stoppages on February 18 and 20 forced

\(^{141}\)Industrial Worker, January 27, 1940.

\(^{142}\)Decision of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, cited in Industrial Worker, June 27, 1940.

\(^{143}\)NLRB certification, cited in Industrial Worker, February 3, 1940.

\(^{144}\)Industrial Worker, February 3, 1940

\(^{145}\)Ibid., February 24, 1940.
management to reinstate the two Wobblies fired earlier, and when management fired another IWW for arguing with a foreman, the union again voted to strike. In addition to reinstating the Wobbly, 440 took advantage of the situation to set forth demands for higher wages, paid vacations, time and a half for over 40 hours, improved working conditions, and seniority rights. A picket line was established around the plant on March 6, monitored by the "IWW flying squad" which maintained discipline by insuring that strikers in freezing winter weather kept their spirits strong with nothing stronger than hot coffee. Added to the regular picket line was an automobile IWW caravan picket which toured Lorain with placards mounted on vehicles. Some evidence of community support was seen when local merchants and residents furnished striking 440 members with coal, wood, and coffee.

Tor Cedervall filed charges with the NLRB against the company, alleging that blacklists were used to discriminate against Wobblies. William Faulkner, a conciliator with the NLRB, was unable to reconcile the conflicting parties. In the meantime, the

146 Ibid., March 2, 1940.
147 Ibid., March 16, 1940.
148 Ibid., March 23, 1940.
149 Ibid., March 30, 1940.
150 Ibid.
striking Wobblies petitioned the Ohio Bureau of Unemployment Compensation for relief, a request which the state denied. IU 440 furnished strikers' families with a relief fund of $5.00 weekly. Pledges of financial assistance from other IWWs totaled between $400 and $500 a week, with extra donations coming from Finnish Wobblies.

A combination of staying power, disciplined picket lines, modest yet adequate donations and, significantly, a small independent steel fabricator lacking the bedrock strength to resist endemic with larger firms, all contributed toward an IWW victory. After 63 days on the picket line, 440 proclaimed a victory. A vote by union members resulted in the acceptance of a compromise settlement which included the rehiring of the fired IWW member, observance of seniority in layoffs and rehirings, company agreement to meet with the union shop committee within three days of a demand for a conference, and four hours' pay for employees who reported for work but who were turned away for the day due to lack of production. Another skirmish was won.

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151 Lorain Journal, March 21, 1940.
152 Industrial Worker, May 4, 1940.
153 Ibid., March 30, 1940.
154 Ibid.
In sum, the IWW acquired control of numerous Cleveland metal and machinery shops and, by 1937, had closed shops in four plants. Cleveland Wobblies organized workers along the lines required for successful union survival: tangible gains amounting to the esteem of union recognition, inducements of higher wages, shorter hours, and better working conditions. Initial approach to a potential union member was made along practical and ideological lines, but the former took precedence over the latter. Once within 440's confines, it was hoped that exposure to, and practice of, IWW doctrines and philosophy would permeate to the point of changing a member's outlook at least toward general IWW lines. Although 440 had educational programs and IWW concepts in various shop bulletins, the union had sufficient insight to play down ideology. Organizers for Cleveland 440 perceptively saw the problem in 1934 at the outset of the organizing drive. "Idealism is a wonderful thing, but job control is a far more practical factor in holding a dues paying membership in good standing."

Practicality and the ripe environment made for resurgence. The IWW, dormant in Ohio since the Rossford strike of 1919, rose up from the ashes, not quite a phoenix, but definitely transfigured into a new form. Programs of achievement were stressed to gain support against small to middle range management. Doubtless the organizing abilities of the Cedervalls and other IWWs in Cleveland had a great deal to do with 440's success and many victories, which overshadowed
Figure 11. — Wobbly basketball team which participated in Cleveland's Industrial League, 1940. Source: Fecsko Collection.
the union's defeats. These victories, stabilized over a continuum of 16 years, proved to be the pride of the IWW. The gains instilled a new image, a new pride, an expanded membership—all of which were outgrowths of Depression and dedicated organizing zeal in the face of hostile odds. But credit cannot end with the IWW alone; 440's victories would have been impossible without that one factor which imbued a new faith in the nation: the domestic policies of the New Deal which both preserved capitalism and strengthened institutionalized labor. Ironically, from the standpoint of "national" IWW principles and philosophy, the very success of Cleveland's 440 represented failure in the sense of accommodation with capitalism.
CHAPTER VII

CONTRACT ISSUES, THE SECOND WORLD
WAR ERA, AND AFTERMATH

The Second World War's industrial boom provided impetus for an expanded IWW membership,¹ but the cold war years decimated the organization in general and forced an irreparable rift between Cleveland 440 and its parent body. From 1941-1950 pragmatic job unionism continued in Cleveland but the issues of contract-signing and compliance with Taft-Hartley non-Communist affidavits caused a split which destroyed 440 as an IWW union.

The background of the contract issue reached back to the late thirties. Even as Cleveland 440 was making headway in unionization, its advances gave rise to a split between bread-and-butter unionists and IWW "visionaries" within the organization, each of whom had different priorities. In 1938, a year after 440 members signed a collective bargaining agreement with the American Stove Company, Walter H. Westman, general secretary-treasurer of the IWW, observed that

¹"Report by W. H. Westman, General Secretary-Treasurer of the I. W. W.," Minutes of the Twenty-fifth Convention of the IWW (1946), Labadie Collection.
the contract issue had polarized the IWW. Nationally, the organization adhered to its historic principle that making contracts was a concession with capitalism, while Cleveland 440 felt contracts were necessary for effective union strength.

Wobblies, at their 1938 convention, were confronted with a major question: should the organization maintain its "revolutionary teaching and remain a non-time contract signing" IWW, or should it bend its principles with changing times and become a practical business union? Members of Cleveland 440 urged the IWW to shift its tactics to appeal to contract-minded workers or to those not interested in revolutionary objectives. Defenders of contracts believed it was more advantageous to sign agreements than to lose a plant or a city; such were the feelings of numerous IWW members who wanted agreements with the American Stove Company.

Hungarian-speaking members of the IWW, mainly from Cleveland, backed the contracts through an appeal to history and past mistakes as a rationale for pragmatism. Lawrence, Massachusetts and the Mesabi iron range in Minnesota were IWW victories which came to nought because the IWW constitution forbade time agreements and thus forced a loss in membership. The same was true for the 1927-1928

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2Minutes of the Twenty-third Convention of the IWW (1938), Labadie Collection.

3Ibid.
Columbine coal strike in Colorado, when the IWW lost members to the UMW because of the contract issue. Given this background and the fact that IWW membership in Cleveland was expanding, 440 signed contracts "which the rank and file not only allowed but demanded." If job control is to be maintained, contracts must be signed, asserted the Hungarian branch. While theoretically opposed to contracts, the Hungarian-language branch did not abjure them; to oppose contracts meant opposing success.  

Cleveland 440 met resistance at the convention when Wobblies from Tacoma, Washington proposed that all 440 members and officials who signed contracts be expelled. In 1939 the General Executive Board moved that 440 members at the American Stove Company be expelled should they renew their contracts. The motion passed, but the convention stated that the IWW constitution did not force the GEB to take immediate action. On principle the GEB was not a "police force," a concept alien to IWW libertarian tradition. Perhaps, as Carl Keller stated in 1938, 440 was kept in the IWW because it was "nothing worse than an experiment." Contracts, he stated, were not permanent. Or

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 "Report of Carl Keller, Chairman of the GEB," Minutes of the Twenty-fourth Convention of the IWW (1939), Labadie Collection.

7 "Report of Carl Keller . . .," Minutes of the Twenty-third Convention of the IWW (1938), Labadie Collection.
possibly the per capita dues tax from Cleveland 440 to the parent body was too valuable to give up. In any event, despite the controversy of the late thirties, Cleveland 440 stayed within the confines of the IWW. Fred Thompson, who assisted 440 organization in 1943, perceived the essence of contracts as keeping 440 alive by preventing other unions from raiding Cleveland's membership.  

The issue of contracts, brought to a head in the thirties, remained a touchy and delicate problem until 1950 when Cleveland 440 disaffiliated with its parent body. In this environment 440 continued to function through the Second World War.

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The first case involving Cleveland's 440 during World War II was between the union and Republic Brass Company, which was under 100 per cent war production work. According to R. A. Blywise, the firm's president, IU 440's shop committee demanded salary increases because of increased costs. Management replied that loss of business volume made a wage increase impossible and that the company already paid wages equal to, or higher than, firms of the same size as Republic Brass. Blywise told the 440 shop committee that since January 1, 1941 wages had risen 15 per cent. 9 The 440 shop committee, according

8 Fred Thompson, May 27, 1968, to RTW.

to management, did not fully understand their rights. IU 440 requested
the aid of the United States Conciliation Service which in March 1943
sent conciliator Robert Stuart to attend a union-management meeting in
hopes of reaching a settlement. 10 The upshot of this case is unknown,
but the IWW, which had organized the plant in 1935, remained there
until 1947 when Republic Brass was purchased by the Briggs Manu-
factoring Company. The CIO, which represented Briggs employees,
asserted that they now had jurisdiction over workers at Republic Brass.
The IWW felt betrayed by the raid because Wobblies had donated funds
to the CIO emergency strike fund in the winter of 1945-1946. 11 An
NLRB-sponsored election resulted in a vote for the CIO at Republic
Brass. Wobblies claimed they lost because of the CIO's promise of
large wage increases. 12

In 1944 further War Labor Board negotiations resulted from
requests for conciliation over the issue of vacations for IU 440 mem-
bers at American Stove. 13 The firm's wartime manufacturing was
primarily geared toward subcontract production of engine cowls for

10 Ibid. Material on Republic Brass labor-management prob-
lems are non-extant beyond the above citation.

11 Industrial Worker, June 21, 1947.

12 Ibid., July 5, 1947.

13 American Stove Company case file 111-9053-HO (6/24/44),
RG 280, in custody of U.S. Department of Labor. Hereafter cited as
American Stove Case File.
P-47 Thunderbolt aircraft made by Republic Aviation Company. IU 440 members at American Stove were also involved in the manufacture of firing pins, fuse bobbin plungers, and heavy duty gas burning equipment for government work. The case, assigned to F. C. Wetzel, hearing officer, War Labor Board, fifth region, was negotiated at the Holleden Hotel, Cleveland, on September 9, 1944. Wetzel observed that since 1943 union and management had been involved in a continuous dispute over vacations. IU 440 argued that 93 per cent of American Stove's women workers and a majority of male workers would be denied vacations, as company policy provided vacation plans only for employees who had worked for the firm for two or more years. The union's case for vacations, according to the hearing officer, was based on grounds that those denied vacations worked 10 to 12 hours a day, six and sometimes seven days a week. The plant, located at 1825 East 40th Street, was built in 1880 and allegedly had poor ventilation. IU 440 contended that vacations for those who worked less than two years was in accord with "sound social policy" and would conserve employee

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14 W. C. Lehman, Personnel Manager, American Stove Company, July 21, 1944, to National War Labor Board, Region 5, in response to queries from William J. Petro, Assignment Officer, NWLB, who directed IU 440 and management to submit briefs on the nature and type of industry at the plant, and the background of labor relations. American Stove Company Case File.

15 Inter-office memo. War Labor Board, Region 5, from WJP (William J. Petro, Assignment Officer), July 20, 1944, to F. C. Wetzel, American Stove Case File.
health without disturbing war production. Management admitted that its employees worked arduously and performed good work, but stated that ventilation was adequate and argued that many workers came from non-industrial walks of life "where perhaps no vacations were received at all."16

In response to the company's position, Wetzel noted that poor ventilation, even if technically non-defective, might be harmful to employees. He further observed that "because many . . . employees are unfortunately forced to live in quarters which have poorer ventilation and light than the plant" did not justify the company's argument.17 To compensate for these conditions Wetzel proposed one week's vacation with pay for one or more year of service, and two weeks of vacation with pay for five or more years of work, all based on a 40- to 48-hour work week.18 Wetzel denied the union's request for a three-day vacation after six months of employment,19 but ruled that employees on the company payroll for at least nine months could qualify for vacations and that workers, upon termination of employment, would be entitled to accrued vacation pay.20 By unanimous vote the hearing board approved

16 Hearing Officer Report and Recommendations, September 22, 1944, American Stove Case File.

17 Ibid.

18 Directive Order, American Stove Case File.

19 Hearing Officer Report, American Stove Case File.

20 Directive Order, American Stove Case File.
Wetzel's recommendations and defeated the 440 proposal for a three-day vacation after six months of work.

A directive order reporting the settlement was sent to both union and management with the stipulation that each party had two weeks in which to appeal. If a petition was not made within this period, the directive order would become binding.²¹ Both parties were apparently satisfied. When American Stove converted to peacetime production, 440 won a temporary agreement stipulating a 20 per cent increase over 1941 rates, bringing the average hourly rate to $1.36 per hour.²²

The World War II era also witnessed the signing of a collective bargaining agreement between 440 members and Federal Aircraft Company, a situation which exacerbated the touchy relationship between the Cleveland local and its parent body.²³ At Draper Manufacturing Company, organized since 1934, members of 440 struck in 1944 over the dismissal of a foreman who had 31 years of service. The strike was brief in duration and resulted in the rehiring of the foreman.²⁴

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²¹ Sanford E. Bennett, Assistant Director, Disputes, Regional War Labor Board, November 2, 1944, to George Dobrich (IU 440) and Henry J. Meecker (Manager, American Stove Company), American Stove Case File.

²² Industrial Worker, May 18, 1946.


²⁴ Industrial Worker, May 18, 1946.
Screw and Manufacturing Company was again lost, this time to the CIO in 1945 NLRB-Sponsored elections. The CIO also won over 440 at Lawson and Sessions Company, but 440 made gains at the Draper plant, purchased by Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation, when management granted wage increases to employees after the union went on a seven-week strike. A month after this victory 440 attempted to start unionization at Cleveland Electronics, but management retaliated by firing IWW workers as "inefficient." Management claimed it had no objections to unions, but the IWW was too extreme for the company. The IWW complained to the NLRB, which sponsored elections on the issue of voting for the IWW or "no union." Employees voted no union, but the IWW claimed that they were threatened by foremen with firing if they cast votes for the Wobblies. NLRB recognition of these complaints led to the scheduling of another election which apparently did not result in an IWW victory.

The situation was different at the Schirmer-Dornbirer Company, manufacturers of gasoline and oil tank pumps. Management, fearing IWW organization, offered employees a company union and a

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25 Ibid., May 6, 1944.
26 Ibid.
27 Industrial Worker, April 20, 1946.
28 Ibid., June 15, 1946.
minimum hourly wage of $1.00. Despite insistence on a company union, management, on July 12, 1946, consented to an NLRB election in which 440 was certified. This did not placate the IWW organizing committee, which declared a strike in September, protesting the company's offer of 80 cents an hour for new employees with less than six months' service, and 90 cents hourly for the second half-year. 29 IU 440 demanded time and a half overtime for over eight hours daily, monthly increases of 5 cents, and recognition of the union. The 440-organized strike hurt production. Management filed a $25,000 damage suit against the union in the United States District Court, Northern District, Ohio on grounds that 440, by not following procedural channels required by the War Labor Disputes Act, caused an estimated loss of $25,000 to the company. 30

With the strike in progress the company lost business and was pressured into settlement on October 5, 1946. Terms included a $1.25 hourly minimum for machine operators who previously received 80 cents; a $1.15 hourly wage for assembly line workers whose old wage was 80 cents; 95 cents an hour for janitors and laborers who earlier had made 80 cents. When management dropped the $25,000

29Ibid., July 13, September 7, 1946.

30Complaint of Schirmer-Dornbirer Company filed against IWW in United States District Court, Northern District, Ohio, cited in Industrial Worker, September 21, 1946.
suit against the union and granted the negotiated settlement, 440 claimed victory. 31

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For several years after the war 440 retained its strength and potential for growth. In late 1949 and early 1950 IU 440 made inroads at the Coleman-Patterson Corporation and negotiated a 25 cent hourly increase. The union's American Stove branch won improved pensions, hospitalization, and insurance equivalent to an 8 cent hourly increase.2 At this point 440's activities were suspended. The union became enmeshed in a web of circumstances which compounded the difficulties over contracts and which led to the dissolution of Cleveland 440 as an IWW component.

The first difficulty for 440 and for the rest of the IWW involved Executive Order 9835, which governed procedures for the 1947 Federal Employee Loyalty Program. Part of the program entailed the designation of organizations which the government considered subversive. The IWW was placed on the list. The cold war and Republican Party and House Committee on Un-American Activities allegations of Communist infiltration of the New Deal put the Truman administration

31 Ibid., October 5, 1946.

on the defensive. Executive Order 9835, issued in the wake of public concern over Communism, took "loyalty" out of the realm of espionage and sabotage and into the shadowy area of political belief and "potential disloyalty." To counter Republican charges and assuage public fears the Truman administration adopted loyalty and security programs. The rationale for placing the IWW on the list apparently came under the rubric that the Wobblies sought "to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means." Additional specifics are unavailable, since officials of the Department of Justice state that they are "unauthorized to disseminate outside the executive branch of the Government confidential information from our files, if any is available."

Fred Thompson, who visited Cleveland after the subversive listing was made, stated that many IWW members were frightened, believing that membership in an organization deemed subversive would affect their children and grandchildren. Older 440 members calmed the men, but the situation was uncomfortable for many. The IWW


34Robert C. Mardian, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, United States Department of Justice, per Wallace B. Henley, Special Assistant, February 19, 1971, to RTW.

35Fred Thompson, Report to Membership of I. W. W. on Situation in Cleveland, Tussey Collection.
protested categorization as a subversive organization, but to no avail.

Ironically, in 1946, one year before the Federal Employee Loyalty Program and four years before Senator Joseph McCarthy's speech at Wheeling, West Virginia, the IWW tried to remind its readers that "There are 1500 per cent more victims of outrage, oppression, and cruelty in the jails and slave camps in Russia of 1945 than there were in 1905." In terms of comparative butchery the IWW contended "more anarchists; more socialists; more union men are murdered every year by the Bolo government than were murdered in any five year period under the Czar." 35

The IWW's persistent anti-Communism came into play in 1950 when members of Cleveland 440 charged that elements of Bermunkas, the Hungarian IWW newspaper, showed sympathy with, and approval of, the Stalinist-dominated "Peoples' Democracy" of Hungary. Bermunkas was expelled after an investigation led by 440 officials, and was no longer granted the right to publish under the IWW logo. One anti-Soviet Wobbly tersely stated that the IWW does not want "Commy rot under the IWW emblem." 36

35Industrial Worker, January 12, 1946.

Disagreement between Cleveland 440 and national IWW over the signing of Taft-Hartley non-Communist affidavits was the chief, and last difficulty. The fissure from contract issues developed into a major rift over Taft-Hartley in 1949 and 1950, a divisive factor which forced Cleveland 440 to end its affiliation with the IWW.

NLRB-sponsored elections, in which the IWW participated in the past, now carried a prerequisite of union leadership compliance with the Taft-Hartley non-Communist affidavit before access would be granted to the NLRB ballot. At Electro Motors, recently purchased by General Motors, refusal of the IWW national officers on the General Executive Board not to sign the affidavits, kept IU 440 from competing with the CIO and AFL for membership. At Jones and Laughlin, a 440-controlled plant, the IWW feared CIO inroads. Fred Thompson visited Cleveland and witnessed the CIO raid 440 membership at Jones and Laughlin; he feared that the CIO and AFL would deplete 440's ranks unless GEB members signed the affidavits. Cleveland membership, he observed, did not renounce the IWW, but difficulties existed between local and national over Taft-Hartley. To expedite matters Thompson hoped that IWW membership would urge the IWW GEB "to sign the

37440 Cleveland Report, 1950.
damnéd things so we can build the union necessary to make this a de-
cent world.

Additional pressure for complying with the affidavits came
from 440's secretary, Richard D. Tussey. Pennsylvania-born, Tussey
came from old American stock after whom a mountain was named in the
Keystone state; and in his youth Tussey belonged to a society for de-
cendants of Union Civil War veterans. "I had all the hang-ups," he
recalled, referring to his youthful views of minority groups and the
"IWW bummery." His conversion came when his Latin teacher, who
recognized him as an avid reader, gave him issues of New Republic
and Nation, journals which he considered "radical." As dialogue be-
tween teacher and student developed, Tussey's values and perceptions
shifted. He read and debated with his friends, and subsequently joined
the De Leonite Socialist Labor Party. By 1947, Tussey, a former
print shop worker and newsboy for the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, was
working as an industrial production and efficiency expert. One of the
older Wobblies in Cleveland asked him to teach a class in labor history
to members of 440. The Cleveland IWW branch then asked him to work
for their union on a 30-day trial basis; from 1947 to 1950 Tussey was
involved with IWW union organizing. Tussey represented Cleveland

38 Thompson, Report to Membership of I. W. W. on Situation in
Cleveland, Tussey Collection.

39 Oral history interview with Richard D. Tussey, January 2,
1968.
Figure 12. --Non-Communist Affidavit signed by official of Cleveland IU 440, IWW. Source: Tussey Collection.
440 in the conflict between pragmatists and visionaries, between those who wanted to sign contracts and Taft-Hartley versus those who refused to compromise. The NLRB refused to recognize Cleveland 440 unless its parent body officers signed the affidavits. Despite this provision, Tussey and other 440 officials sent signed non-Communist affidavits to the NLRB. The affidavits were returned by Affidavit Compliance Officer Claude B. Calkin, who stated that they were invalid without the concurrence of GEB officers from the parent body. Tussey replied that 440 was autonomous in collective bargaining power and in organizational activities, and that the IWW general headquarters had neither right nor power to start or stop a strike or negotiations "of any Industrial Union or its components." Calkin countered by stating that IWW unions did not have the same autonomous status as AFL or CIO unions and reasserted NLRB's position that GEB officers would have to sign the affidavits before 440 could use NLRB services.

"We are now stymied," Tussey wrote, unless IWW GEB officers sign the affidavits. Some members of the IWW "may philosophically ignore the state and its machinations [but] the state will not ignore us." Fearing 440's loss of power to the AFL and CIO, Tussey

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40 Claude B. Calkin, Affidavit Compliance Officer, NLRB, February 14, 1950, to Walter Westman, IWW secretary-treasurer; and Calkin to Westman, February 17, 1950, Tussey Collection.

41 Tussey, April 6, 1950, to Calkin, Tussey Collection.
asked the IWW GEB officers to sign. "Is the I. W. W. going to function . . . or is the I. W. W. going to be a union in name only?"42 Another 440 member believed compliance with the affidavits was necessary on grounds that recognition from the NLRB would make the IWW, in the government's eyes, a bona fide union which would then be allowed tax exemptions. 43

IU 440 showed its opposition to the GEB's refusal to sign by voting to withhold Cleveland per capita dues tax from the parent body. Among those voting for withholding the tax were many older Wobblies who were with 440 from 1934. 44 Union members at the Coleman-Patterson Company backed their officials with a resolution affirming the necessity of signing the affidavits. Other unions, stated the resolution, complied with the affidavits while 440, because of GEB reluctance to sign, was out of the running. Compliance with NLRB requirements would allow 440 to overcome organizing difficulties and would destroy the "vicious lies" that the IWW was under Communist domination and influence.45

42Tussey, April 26, 1950, to General Executive Board of the IWW, Tussey Collection.

43Letter from IU 440 officer, April 26, 1950 to General Executive Board, Tussey Collection.

44Tussey, May 12, 1950, to Chairman, General Executive Board, Tussey Collection.

45Coleman-Patterson Shop Branch, IU 440, Resolution on the General Executive Board of the I. W. W. Complying with the Taft-Hartley Affidavits, Approved May 20, 1950, Tussey Collection.
The GEB, as was the case with all IWW members, was bitterly anti-Communist. W. H. Westman of the GEB wrote Cleveland 440: "You members may say, and rightly so, 'we are not Communists and the IWW is opposed to the Communist Party and refuses to have dealings with it.' Therefore, why not sign the affidavits? Westman replied by stating the IWW was against such affidavits in principle; that signing them would not take the IWW off the subversive list; and that Taft-Hartley was anti-labor. Westman saw the principle of non-Communist oaths as a dangerous precedent: "Today it is the signing of the Taft-Hartley non-Communist oath. Tomorrow, if we are a menace to the employers' profits, it will be the signing of a non-IWW oath, and then a non-Socialist oath and so on until they have one political party and all unions hog tied and controlled by it, just as we have seen in Germany, Italy, and Russia." 

Walter Bendle, chairman of the GEB, visited Cleveland and found that with the single exception of the Jones and Laughlin shop branch, all IWW members wanted the GEB to comply with Taft-Hartley requirements.

When the GEB refused to fight an Internal Revenue Service ruling that it had to pay taxes because it no longer held official labor union status, the gap between Cleveland 440 and its parent body widened.

46Westman, May 23, 1950, to IU 440 Membership, Cleveland Branch, Tussey Collection.

47440 Cleveland Report, 1950, Tussey Collection.
even more. The Cleveland union refused to pay taxes on grounds that it was a functioning labor union duly representing members in negotiations and collective bargaining. IU 440 believed that if the GEB had contested the IRS ruling, the reasons for the subversive listing would have been discovered in litigation. But the GEB acquiesced to the IRS ruling, and by 1950 it was too late to fight it. IU 440 summed up the issue: "do we want to function as a union or not?" 48 The answer was in the affirmative. On November 5, 1950 members of 440 voted to withdraw from the IWW until the parent body acceded to the affidavits. 49 Disaffiliation with the IWW gave 440 independent status; the union, now called "Metal and Machinery Workers Industrial Union 440 of Cleveland, Ohio" complied with all Taft-Hartley affidavits three days after the break. 50 The union's name was later changed to "Metal and Machinery Workers of North America"; it became a member of the National Congress of Independent Unions founded in 1954, later affiliated with the Mechanics Educational Society of America, and was ultimately incorporated into the AFL-CIO. 51

48 Ibid.
49 Tussey, November 6, 1950, to Westman, Tussey Collection.
50 Tussey, November 6, 1950, to Walter H. Westman; oral history interview with Tussey, January 2, 1968.
51 Oral history interview with Tussey, January 2, 1968.
Smoldering hostility over contracts in the thirties erupted into a clean break between the Cleveland Wobblies and the "visionaries" of the IWW. Frank Cedervall, active in 440 organization in the thirties, felt that the IWW should have signed the Taft-Hartley non-Communist affidavits "because unless you have complete job control such as John L. Lewis had, you will be raided by other unions. This is cold, practical, sound tactics." From Cedervall's viewpoint, the IWW was willing "to cut the throats of the very organization which common decency should have bound them to protect." From 440's viewpoint pragmatism and survival dictated tactics over principle. IU 440's voyage with the IWW was over.

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As a final touch of irony, IU 440, the IWW's last vestige of viable unionism, rejected its own roots. It was, perhaps, an understandable ending in view of the nature of the IWW which had outlived its time.

Up to the era of the First World War Wobbly activity in Ohio was marked by sporadic, hit-and-miss incidents such as the coal strike in eastern Ohio. Rapid, short-lived spurts of unionization achieved public limelight but were usually accompanied by defeat. The rubber strike at Akron in 1913, which involved massive participation, established a

52Frank Cedervall, in oral history interview with Cedervall, Halonen, and Kaciban, October 31, 1967.
pattern to be repeated in the future: a strong industrial opponent, in cooperation with local officials, and an AFL union formed a bloc which the IWW could not overcome. Actions such as the rubber strike sometimes elicited a public response which, although not sympathetic to the IWW, at least directed attention to the plight of the worker. The IWW in Ohio in the pre-World War I era, if it accomplished nothing else, gave impetus to reform impulses through the medium of publicity.

Lacking the strength to fight a prolonged battle against management in the Progressive era, the IWW's rhetoric coupled with the tactic of confrontation revealed social problems which might otherwise have been ignored. As an example, the Green Committee, which investigated the 1913 strike noted that the rubber industry, by refusing to allow AFL organization in 1906, created, in part, the conditions and climate upon which the IWW thrived. Reforms in the rubber industry were neither rapid nor extensive, but constructive changes were eventually achieved. After the strike the Akron Beacon Journal observed: "Labor strife is today centering on the I. W. W. ideal of expropriation instead of the A. F. of L. ideal of shorter hour[s] and higher wages. To check the first we must serve the second."

The Akron Beacon Journal's admonition was borne out in the two decades between 1913 and 1933. The trade union movement fitted social forces at work in American society better than did the IWW. In the years preceding the IWW's resurgence in Cleveland (1934), trade
unionism emphasized first and foremost material gains for its members. The trade union movement met intense opposition but was spurred on by the Depression and New Deal. In counterbalancing corporate power organized labor displayed tactical flexibility and political acumen.

According to the IWW preamble, conflict between labor and capital "must go on until the workers of the world organize as a class, take possession of the earth and the machinery of production, and abolish the wage system." Such revolutionary and utopian rhetoric revealing the divergence of means and ends largely explains the IWW's decline. On the one hand the IWW, as borne out by its Ohio experience, filled the void in situations where strong labor organization was lacking. Tactics assumed short-run objectives such as increased pay, shorter hours, and abolition of the piece-work system. On the other hand, the IWW's road to its long-term goal of abolition of the wage system and industrial control by workers received lip service but was never spelled out except for an occasional reference to the general strike. Without specific proposals for attaining its professed goal, the IWW nevertheless insisted on maintaining the principle of refusing to compromise with capitalism. This gave rise to short-term victories in strikes but in the long run ideological inflexibility and dogmatism

53 Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, p. 480.
forced the IWW out of the picture and compelled its one stable union, Cleveland 440, to withdraw from the organization. The relationship between the IWW visionaries and the rank and file assumed a symbiotic tone in which workers used the IWW to attain short-term goals while the ideologists thought they could imbue the membership with aspirations of revolutionary industrial unionism. Wobblies won short-run objectives, but as the entire Ohio experience from the Akron strike of 1913 to the disaffiliation controversy of 1950 illustrates, the IWW was unable and unwilling to adapt to the American political and economic environment. Wobblies could mock the "conservative" working man whose poverty-ridden life would be assuaged by the hope of heaven, that "pie in the sky when you die." Yet the IWW had its own "pie" in the form of a secular, chimerical heavenly city. IWW aspirations were rejected by the very people the organization tried to redeem. Wobblies talked of "the historic mission of the working class to do away with capitalism," but the attempt was rejected by the working force whose institutionalized unions eventually received recognition from management and government, and whose political power was courted.

With the exception of IU 440 in Cleveland, the IWW did not perceive the essentially pragmatic and non-ideological milieu of the American character. The tables were turned on the Wobblies. Organized labor sought wage consciousness within capitalism rather than
class consciousness and the abolition of capitalism.

In an industrialized society in which job function assumed a major part in the daily life process, the proponents of the "Wisconsin School" of labor history are probably correct in their assessment that class consciousness in American society had to give way to self-interest along functional and wage consciousness. Moreover, the IWW had no way of successfully combatting achieved social mobility, a factor which has increased since the New Deal.

The experience of Cleveland 440 from 1934 to 1950 mirrored the strains epitomized by the IWW. The first strain, that of revolutionary industrial unionism, was subordinated to practical gains and shop control. Over a 16-year period 440's emphasis on realistic achievements and job stability placed the union in a position of desiring to compete with rivals. When the issue of contracts became inflexible principle, and when Taft-Hartley compromise was interpreted as total capitulation, 440 left the fold of the IWW and entered the ranks of pragmatic unionism. It was apparently impossible to balance 440 means with IWW ends; ultimately, the former became a part of organized labor while the latter became a part of the past.
APPENDIX A

Preamble of the IWW, 1905
The working class and the employing class have nothing in common. There can be no peace so long as hunger and want are found among millions of working people and the few, who make up the employing class, have all the good things of life.

Between these two classes a struggle must go on until the workers of the world organize as a class, take possession of the earth and the machinery of production, and abolish the wage system.

We find that the centering of the management of industries into fewer and fewer hands makes the trade unions unable to cope with the ever growing power of the employing class. The trade unions foster a state of affairs which allows one set of workers to be pitted against another set of workers in the same industry, thereby helping defeat one another in wage wars. Moreover, the trade unions aid the employing class to mislead the workers into the belief that the working class have interests in common with their employers.

These conditions can be changed and the interest of the working class upheld only by an organization formed in such a way that all its members in any one industry, or in all industries if necessary, cease work whenever a strike or lockout is on in any department thereof, thus making an injury to one an injury to all.

Instead of the conservative motto, "A fair day's wage for a fair day's work," we must inscribe on our banner the revolutionary watchword, "Abolition of the wage system."

It is the historic mission of the working class to do away with capitalism. The army of production must be organized, not only for the every-day struggle with capitalists, but also to carry on production when capitalism shall have been overthrown. By organizing industrially we are forming the structure of the new society within the shell of the old.
APPENDIX B

Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Law, 1919


In 1969 the United States Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 declared Ohio's criminal syndicalism law unconstitutional. Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan official, was sentenced to one to ten years and fined $1000 for violating the state criminal syndicalism law. The appellant's attorney contested the sentence, but to no avail: the intermediate Ohio appellate court, without written opinion, affirmed the sentence. The Ohio Supreme Court, without filing an opinion, dismissed Brandenburg's appeal "for the reason that no substantial constitutional question exists. . . ." On appeal the United States Supreme Court reversed the Ohio courts and asserted that the law gave a "bald definition" of advocacy without distinguishing from "incitement to imminent lawless action." Justice Douglas commented that "One's beliefs have long been thought to be sanctuaries which government could not invade" and asserted that "all matters of belief are beyond the reach of subpoenas or the probings of investigators." Fifty years after the law was passed to curb the IWW it was declared unconstitutional on a test case emanating, ironically, from the KKK, an organization antithetical of Wobbly ideals.

214
AN ACT

Defining the Crime of Criminal Syndicalism and Prescribing Punishment Therefor.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio:

SECTION 1. That criminal syndicalism is the doctrine which advocates crime, sabotage, which is defined as the malicious injury or destruction of the property of another, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform. The advocacy of such doctrine, whether by word of mouth or writing is a felony, punishable as is in this act provided.

SECTION 2. Any person who by word of mouth or writing, advocates or teaches the duty, necessity or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform; or prints, publishes, edits, issues or knowingly circulates, sells, distributes or publicly displays, any book, paper, document, or written matter in any form, containing or advocating, advising or teaching the doctrine that industrial or political reform should be brought about by crime, sabotage, violence or unlawful methods of terrorism; or openly, wilfully, and deliberately justifies, by word of mouth or writing, the commission or the attempt to commit crime, sabotage, violence or unlawful methods of terrorism with intent to exemplify, spread or advocate the propriety of the doctrines of criminal syndicalism; or organizes or helps to organize or become a member of, or voluntarily assembles with any society, group or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism; is guilty of a felony and punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not more than ten years, or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, or both.

SECTION 3. Whenever two or more persons assemble for the purpose of advocating or teaching the doctrines of criminal syndicalism as defined in this act, such an assemblage is unlawful, and every person voluntarily participating therein by his presence, aid or instigation is guilty of a felony and punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for
not more than ten years, or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, or both.

SECTION 4. The owner, agent, superintendent, janitor, caretaker, or occupant of any place, building or room, who wilfully and knowingly permits therein any assemblage of persons prohibited by the provisions of section 3 of this act, or who, after notification that the premises are so used, knowingly permits such use to be continued, is guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, or both.

SECTION 5. This act is hereby declared to be an emergency act necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace and safety. The emergency necessitating the enactment of this act arises out of the fact that there are persons in, and also persons threatening to enter, the state for the purpose of teaching the doctrine of criminal syndicalism as defined in this act, and advocating such doctrine and the commission of the other acts and practices declared by this act to be unlawful, the tendency of which will be to destroy our institutions and government, and put the people into a condition of unrest and terror.
APPENDIX C

The IWW Indictment of Soviet Communism, 1945

IWW, "Chicago Replies to Moscow!" Pamphlet reprint of an editorial in the Industrial Worker, January 27, 1945, Labor History Collection of Richard B. Tussey, AFL-CIO.

Toward the end of the Second World War the Director of the Library of Social Sciences of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR requested back issues of the Industrial Worker. The IWW refused the request and replied with the following indictment.
Do you, Mr. Ivanov, remember the days when the shipyard workers of the Kronstadt pulled a strike for one of the noblest and most unselfish causes in the history of the labor movement? Do you remember how these workers, comparatively well-fed themselves, noticed that Communist bigshots were living on the fat of the land while women and kids in Leningrad and Moscow were dying of starvation—even those who were eating out of the garbage cans outside of Communist party headquarters?

It was a time, you remember when all people (even us poor suckers) believed in the professed aims of the Revolution. Believed that at long last, Liberty, EQUALITY and Fraternity had become the bedrock of the new era. These workers pulled the pin in order to draw the attention of the Commissars to their stand on social science and to the misery of women and kids of their class.

And— you can read your Lenin on this—two vile rats named Djugashvilli and Bronstein took to the Kronstadt a large army of gunmen and two lying tongues. They induced the strikers to "arbitrate the issues" and when the strikers, believing in their honor, were willing to arbitrate, the gunmen put them up against the wall and machine-gunned them.

Do you remember a period when the name of Thiers caused nausea among decent people of all kinds because he did these things in Paris after the fall of the Paris Commune? Do you know that the infamy of Thiers is buried in the minds of decent people beneath the much greater infamy of the two men who were YOUR governors at the time?

These rats are known to the world under aliases. Stalin and Trotsky they called themselves. But in our social science, rats are still rats, no matter what they call themselves.

We will trade you whole files of the Industrial Worker for the lives of the men your govt. murdered in the Kronstadt. Many of them were our boys; they had Wobbly cards and Wobbly buttons on them when they died. . .

Do You, Mr. Ivanov, remember the Kuzbas Colonies? Do you know that hundreds of our boys went to Russia in the hope of helping build a "Workers Fatherland?" . . . Your govt. welcomed them, it offered them 50% of the product of
their labor; it lauded them for their sacrifice and solidarity. And then--it cheated them of food and wages; it lied about them--and finally--murdered them in cold blood!


We will trade you many a volume of the *Industrial Worker* for the diaries of William D. Haywood which your govt. burned, lest the wage workers of the U.S. learn something of the truth of the tyranny then in birth, but now in full maturity in your Communist heaven. Would YOU dare send it out to us, knowing that willingly, we would print it?

Do you remember that the workers of Vienna put up a brave struggle against the clerical fascism of Dollfuss and the Germanic national socialism of Prince von Starhemberg? You know of course, that your govt. offered these workers a haven in your country. And you know that every last one of them were murdered by your govt., lest their independence have beneficial effect on the slavish servility of the mujiki of Moscow. You know of course, that your govt. added the last final insult by calling them "Trotskites." Some of these were our boys, men who learned the social science of unionism in the ranks of the I.W.W. Not even the dirtiest rats of Commercial America ever defamed these boys with the last insult of "Trotskyism."


Does your social science encompass the knowledge that when the Jehovah-screaming Browder of Kansas, the inef-fable Cant of London, and the cowardly Tom Mann of igno-minious memory were living in luxury in the foreign city of Shanghai, uplifting the downpressed and up trodden masses of China, (whom they knew as thirteen lackies they hired in their mansion) the Marine Transport Workers of the I.W.W. were doing a magnificent job for democracy on the waterfront stretching from Stettin in Germany, through Hamburg, Antwerp and on to LaHavre?

Do you know that many of these 510 boys were murdered and slug ged on the direct orders of your gang? A guy named Kreb, alias Jan Valtin has admitted some of his part in these murders. Don't tell us that he is a liar--we know that if he wasn't your govt. would not have hired him. Don't tell us
that he is a "no-good." How could he be otherwise after mixing so long with your kind of people?

Do you know that the local Nazis regarded the red-card men of Hamburg and Stettin as their most courageous and competent enemies. And do you know that members of YOUR communist party put the finger on these red-card men so that Hitler's mob could finish off the murders your mob had begun?

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Does your library have the facts on the Revolt of the Generals in Spain in 1936? Can you read there, that after the Socialist Party of France had conceived the idea of International Brigades of wage workers to help our Spanish fellow-workers, your govt. demanded full control under threat of refusal to sell arms to the legal govt. of the country?

Can you read in your library of the deliberate campaign of lies and treachery the members of your International waged against the union men of Spain? Do you know that your mobsters insisted that the industries and transport system being operated so efficiently by the C. N. T. be turned over to "public" control--the public being the kind of political lice who would accept the bribes so freely offered in the name of Holy Russia?

Do you know that this campaign culminated in a deliberate murder by govt. troops of the wage workers of Barcelona on--of all days--MAY DAY of 1937? Your chief of military espionage, General Krevitsky, says that they only wanted to murder POUMISTS. But do you know that there were more decent union men murdered than the cretins of your bastard child of POUM?

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The I. W. W. lost many good members because of your control of the International Brigades. We lost many members and thousands of good friends to the murder lust of your LISTER--the rat whose sadism would entitle him to high rank in your ogpooeys.

Can you trade back any of these lives?
Your armies invaded Hungary and Poland. They have shown themselves to be just as intolerant of thinking among workers as were the German armies. Do you know that your mob have murdered as many members of the I. W. W. in these countries as have the American Capitalist class in the U. S.? Men who learned something of SCIENTIFIC unionism here is the U. S. and who returned as missionaries to spread the light among the more benighted people of Europe?

Sure—we'll send you the Industrial Worker for your files—IF. Will you see that your murder gang allows us to send our paper BERMUNKAS to the Hungarian workers? Can you guarantee the right to read a working class paper to those workers who are now being amgotted by Stalin's armies in Hungary?

You want some of our publications? Do you know that we have a daily newspaper published in the Finnish language? We'd like to get it in the hands of the workers in Finland. Will your govt. agree that the Finnish workers have the right—the freedom to read—INDUSTRIALISTI if we honor you by sending the Industrial Worker into your despicable Academy?

... ... ...

There was a time when we could collaborate with socialists and with other union-forms for specific causes and on specific issues. Not respecting their intelligence, but trusting to their integrity.

Do you know that this trust among workers and among working class organizations has been murdered and betrayed by the stooges of the govt. which hires you? Do you know that the faith in our fellow man has been replaced by suspicion and mistrust—due directly to the habit of forming United Fronts contracted by comrades on direct orders from your govt.?  

... ... ...

We know of at least 5 million dollars which you have spent on the Communist Party of America for the purpose of dividing and splitting the forces of labor. We are almost certain your govt. has spent more—but we will stick to what we know.
Are you willing to induce your govt. to spend 5 thousand for the purpose of UNIFYING the American labor movement? One grand for every million you have spent to divide!

Too much? How about the half million dollars which the Russian govt. gave the rats and renegades of the I. W. W. WRECKING CREW which used to operate on the Pacific Coast? We'll trade you whole volumes of the Industrial Worker for your secret files on this matter!

Or--will you give us the inside story of the Marine Workers Industrial Union which you formed to smash the Marine Transport Workers Industrial Union 510 of the I. W. W. Your stooges deliberately formed this--not as a union--but as a union busting agency.

The millions of dollars you have spent in all countries from America to Afganistan to smash the working class movement were millions taken from the hide and sweat of the Russian mujiki. May be we wouldn't want that kind of money--even if you offered it to us. We have refused it on the numerous occasions your rats in the U. S. have offered it to us, and we see no reason to change our attitude.

You may not know it, but there still exists in this land of Jefferson far more freedom of speech and far more liberty and equality than exists in your country. And that freedom and liberty exists because the I. W. W. have bought and paid for it!

We have paid for it with thousands of years in jail. We have bought it with hundreds of lives of good and gallant men. Men whose dust you were not worthy to swallow! And we who are alive and out of jail want that which our brothers have bought so dearly.

We are sending you this through the U. S. mails. We know that censors will look over every line of it--and that if they know anything of your history and ours, they will echo every word we say.
We are sending our reply to you to every city in the U. S. and to wage workers all over the world—that they may know some social science which your mobsters have deliberately tried to bury.

IF we thought you had a real Academy of social science, we would applaud your taste in wanting the authentic voice of labor unionism in your liberty. But we have seen some of the crap which you send out under the guise of "science" and we can get better in the gutter press of the U. S. In papers, which no matter how low and degraded, have still more spark than your Iskra and still more truth than your Pravda.

... ...

Some of the Russian workers were in the "underground" long before the underground became the plaything of govts. and the pet of propaganda pimps of Hollywood. There were Russian seamen who believed that if the Industrial Worker was good enough for your library, it surely must be good enough for the wage workers who were your serfs. They used to pick up many copies in many ports of the world and smuggle them in to your Fatherland.

Where are those boys today? In Siberia? In the Lubianka prison murdered by the OGPOOEYS?

Tell us that and heed our final offer. We will send you back copies of the Industrial Worker if you can send us the names of 500 union men in Russia who can read English.

Pretty tough proposition, eh? If you know the name of ONE UNION man in Russia you would have him shot! If you dared believe that there were five hundred UNION men, your govt. would declare martial law in Russia which it now exercises in Poland, in Finland and in the Balkans.

... ...

So, Dear Mr. Ivanov, the answer to your request for the Industrial Worker is distinctly in the negative. We have failed to teach any of the social sciences to your stooges and agents in this country, where despite their antics, they still have a little freedom. Why then should we hope to educate the poor suckers who live in your country?
APPENDIX D

Cleveland IU 440, IWW Disagrees With its "Parent," 1950


Disagreements over signing the Taft-Hartley non-Communist affidavits ended the relationship between Cleveland's 440 and the rest of the IWW. Both factions were militantly anti-Communist, but the "national" IWW refused on principle to support Taft-Hartley while Cleveland's 440 agreed to the non-Communist affidavit on the practical grounds of gaining an expanded membership.
There are some problems of importance that this Convention should consider and, if possible, find a solution. But before mentioning them we would like to briefly review Cleveland's activities for the past year and one-half.

ORGANIZING

In March of 1949 we put on a drive at the Electric-Motors Corporation, a plant then recently taken over by General Motors. The UAW-CIO and the AF of L were also competing in trying to organize the plant. To the best of our limited resources, especially manpower, we covered the plant, distributing many leaflets, some of them later published in the Industrial Worker. This was our first experience at trying to organize workers on a program that called for their voting NO UNION if they wanted us as their union. We were forced to use this approach because we were unable to use the NLRB since we had not complied with the Taft-Hartley Law by signing the non-Communist affidavit.

Threats against the secretary were made by people calling in on the telephone and for a while during April we had someone staying constantly in the hall, twenty-four hours a day, to guard against any attempted raids or rough stuff on our office.

The election was pushed ahead by 30 days and in the voting the UAW-CIO won out by a narrow margin over the AF of L. There were 11% who voted NO UNION but whether these votes, or any part of them, were for us we had no way of determining.

One lesson we did draw from this was that it is almost impossible to try and organize a large plant without having access to the NLRB ballot so that we could compete on a more equal basis with the other so-called unions.

In October we established some worthwhile contacts in the then UE-CIO. This was during the time that the right wing and the left wing were then battling it out for control of the union. It was our opinion then--and still is yet--that we missed a valuable opportunity to build up a middle force between the two extremes. This observation is based on countless numbers of talks and informal meetings with rank and file members who were interested only in building a good union.
We published a leaflet setting forth our viewpoint and urging the rank and file to forget the battle of the wings and begin to build a real union by organizing into the I. W. W. These leaflets were not only distributed in Cleveland but through our contacts were distributed in other parts of the country. As the intra-union struggle in UE developed we found ourselves again squeezed out because even where it seemed that we stood a good chance of getting a shop there was nothing we could do since we could not challenge UE or IUE to an NLRB election.

In September of last year our General Organization Committee drafted a resolution setting forth the need and the circumstances under which the I. W. W. and particularly IU 440 should comply with the NLRB. This resolution was later approved by the G. E. B.

In the latter part of last year and the early part of this year we were successful in organizing a wire fabricating plant, the Coleman-Patterson Corp. In organizing this plant we did no handbilling after we established our inside contacts. We were not going to give any other union the chance to disrupt us by their using NLRB. After about six weeks of careful work we were able to line-up 62% of the employees. They had not only signed authorization cards but were carrying a paid up union card. In February the Union and the Company held their own election and 75% of the employees voted for us. This convinced the Company that we had the shop and we signed an Agreement on February 22, retroactive to February 15.

There are shops in the same industry located in this area and it was our intention to try and organize all of them, if possible. However, the AF of L became active at some and rather than waste our time and money we withheld starting a drive until we received NLRB compliance which we were then expecting. It should be mentioned here that the shops are still not organized and our chances are still good.

While the AF of L was giving us trouble at the unorganized shops, the CIO and one scissorbill was giving us trouble at Coleman-Patterson. The scissorbill just pointedly refused to join the union while the CIO character tried to have the CIO
raid us. We had a strike over these two people and after some difficulties such as NLRB filing an unfair labor practice charge against us, both fellows quit. NLRB informed us last month that they had dropped their charges too.

Anticipating that we would receive NLRB compliance we continued our agitation and making contacts. However, when our G. E. B. refused to comply we were literally left high and dry, and as a result some of our contacts lost their jobs, and to others we were placed in the embarrassing position of telling them we are a union but we can't organize you. A peculiar position to say the least.

Taft-Hartley Difficulties

Under the section on organizing we have made several references to the NLRB and indicated that our, i.e. the I. W. W. in general, refusal to comply with the Taft-Hartley Law has hampered our organizing efforts.

... ...

In May of this year Cleveland withheld its per capita tax from Headquarters when the General Executive Board refused not only to comply with NLRB but even declined to issue a national referendum on the question.

... ...

The Shop Branches, with the exception of J & L, went on record favoring that our G. E. B. comply with the T-H requirements and sign the non-Communist affidavit.

After a meeting in Chicago last month, and considering that the G. E. B. had in effect stymied us from consummating our organizing efforts, it was recommended to the July Central Branch meeting that we remit our per capita tax and attend the General Convention.

Our G. O. C. requested that the delegates to the General Convention be sent uninstructed on this question of T-H compliance; however, according to the minutes of the California Central Conference they are sending their delegates instructed to vote against complying.
And so the question of complying or not complying remains with us and is one of the problems this convention should consider and take some definite action on.

Internal Organization in Cleveland

At present work in our shops is picking up and we can expect an increase in membership.

The American Stove Shop Branch recently concluded negotiations which resulted in their improving their pension, hospitalization and insurance plan the equivalent of an eight-cents (.08) an hour increase.

Our J & L Shop Branch accepted the steel pattern on pension and health insurance plan this year.

Coleman-Patterson Shop Branch has, under the wage reopening clause in their agreement, reopened negotiations for a twenty-five cent (.25) across the board increase. One meeting has been with the Company, and another is scheduled soon.

Future Prospects and Problems

The question of our being the first and as yet only union to be placed on the so-called subversive list is one matter that we must take action on in order to counteract its far reaching effects in the future. We have already felt some effects from the listing in that the Internal Revenue Department has now taken the position that we should pay income taxes. Under the law unions are exempt from paying income taxes, but the Internal Revenue Department, basing its ruling on the ruling of the Attorney General of the United States, has now taken the position that the I. W. W. is not a union; and consequently must pay income tax. Our G. E. B. ruled that the various industrial unions should pay the tax. However, Cleveland has not paid any tax because we contend that we are a union since we hold agreements with employers and represent workers in collective bargaining, and in other respects function as a union.
It might be well to consider that when the G. E. B. decided that the I. W. W. should pay income taxes they in effect said that the I. W. W. was not a union. This question should have been fought out when it was first raised, and Cleveland even went so far as to make inquiry as to the approximate cost of such a case. I believe that the price quoted was $3500 but the Board decided not to fight the ruling. In fighting the ruling of the Internal Revenue Department we might have at the same time been able to get to the bottom of the subversive ruling.

As said before, the convention should decide something on this question.

While we have undoubtedly lost some ground because of our being denied use of NLRB by our organization there is still the possibility that we can organize workers under our banner. The question is: do we want to function as a union or not?

At this convention we recommend that in considering proposals we view them with an eye to the future. The G. E. B. coined the slogan of 2,000 new members in 1950. Unless we straighten ourselves out organizationally this slogan will mean less than the paper it is written on.


On labor theory and ideology Selig Perlman, *A Theory of the Labor Movement* (New York: Macmillan, 1928), follows the Wisconsin school, contending that American community attitudes toward private property, the lack of class consciousness among wage-earners, the weakness of political labor parties, and the negative role of abstract

1963) deals tangentially with labor as part of the larger quest for civil rights and liberties in America. The author writes in an optimistic vein of the Kennedy era.

climate. Gerald Pomper, "Labor and Congress: The Repeal of Taft-Hartley," Labor History, II (Fall, 1961), 323-343 argues that labor's failure to unify in a solid bloc and its inability to compromise led to a failure to repeal the Act in 1949.


**Works on the IWW**

For the background to the IWW Louis Levine, "The Development of Syndicalism in America," Political Science Quarterly, XXVIII (September, 1913), 451-479, discusses the simultaneous appearance of syndicalism in both France and the United States, with emphasis on the American West. The decline of the Knights of Labor and the ascendancy of the AFL left a vacuum for unskilled laborers who were organized along industrial lines by the Western Federation of Miners and the Brewery Workers, two elements felt at the founding convention of the IWW. Vernon H. Jensen, Heritage of Conflict: Labor Relations in the Nonferrous Metals Industry (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1950) centers about mining in the Western states with emphasis on Wobblies antecedents in the Western Federation of Miners. The accounts of Levine and Jensen should be rounded out by Melvyn Dubofsky, "The
Origin of Western Working Class Radicalism, 1890-1905, "Labor History, VII (Spring, 1966), 131-154. Dubofsky argues that the environment of the American West produced radicalism but this was not unique to a geographical area alone, since radicalism was a by-product of the general capitalist process. The basic document on the IWW's formation is Proceedings of the First Convention of the Industrial Workers of the World (New York: Labor News Company, 1905), the stenographic account of the organization's creation at Chicago. General histories include John Graham Brooks, American Syndicalism: The I. W. W. (New York: Macmillan, 1913), an attempt at understanding the Wobblies from the viewpoint of a progressive writer who believed in the common welfare of all classes. The bedrock foundation for IWW history is Paul Brissenden's monumental study, The I. W. W.: A Study in American Syndicalism (Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Number 83, New York: Columbia University Press, 1919; reprinted New York: Russell and Russell, 1957), the pioneer study of IWW history up to the World War I era. Carleton H. Parker, The Casual Laborer and Other Essays (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Howe, 1920), a series of essays published posthumously, is a reformer's attempt to explain the IWW within the context of the First World War. Wobbly philosophy was basically "stomach philosophy" and the Wobblies, to Parker, were seen as part of a continuum of "revolt phenomena" which included the Grangers, the Knights of Labor, the Farmers' Alliance and the Progressive Party. John S. Gambs, The Decline of the I. W. W. (Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Number 361, New York: Columbia University Press, 1932) takes up where Brissenden leaves off and analyzes the demise of the Wobblies in terms of the impact of World War I and internal factionalism. Fred Thompson, The I. W. W.: Its First Fifty Years (Chicago: Industrial Workers of the World, 1955) is the "official" history, a compilation of IWW events from 1905 to the post World War II era. Joyce Kornbluh, ed., Rebel Voices: An I. W. W. Anthology (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1964), is a well-rounded collection of IWW writing and art. Significantly, and indicative of the social activist trends of the sixties, Kornbluh's book is dedicated to the memory of three slain civil rights workers. Philip Foner's The Industrial Workers of the World, 1905-1917 (New York: International Publishers, 1965), the fourth volume in his History of the Labor Movement in the United States cited earlier, is detailed but generally ignores IWW ideology or, when treating it, does so within a cast-iron framework. Two years after Foner's massive but doctrinaire study Patrick Renshaw published The Wobblies: The Story of Syndicalism in the United States (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967). Renshaw has been criticized for presenting a journalistic account containing numerous errors and overemphasizing
internal divisiveness, but the study gives a lively presentation of a number of IWW personalities and is written in a sprightly style. Melvyn Dubofsky, "The Radicalism of the Dispossessed: William D. Haywood and the IWW," in Alfred F. Young, ed., Dissent: Explorations in the History of American Radicalism (De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1968) is an incisive, sympathetic essay in which Dubofsky draws upon Oscar Lewis's concept of the "culture of poverty" to explain the early IWW. The sum total of Dubofsky's research is incorporated in We Shall Be All: A History of the Industrial Workers of the World (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969), a massive, heavily documented work fraught with commitment. Although the book takes Wobbly history up to 1924, its strong points reside in history up to 1918 and in the excellent presentation of IWW ideology. The treatment of the Akron strike, based on IWW newspapers and the International Socialist Review is unfortunately but understandably overshadowed by the Patterson strike. Dubofsky and Jensen, "The I. W. W. -- An Exchange of Views," Labor History, XI (Summer, 1970), 354-372, is an academic battle between a committed and a clinically objective historian. Jensen asserts that Dubofsky is guilty of excessive "emotional devotion" to the IWW and that voluminous documentation does not necessarily imply authentication. Jensen's quest for objectivity and Dubofsky's more committed approach must be taken in balance by the reader, for each historian, in his own way, contributes toward a better understanding of the IWW. Ironically, and despite Jensen's allegations of Dubofsky's excessive emotionalism for the IWW, Fred Thompson reviewed We Shall Be All with mixed feelings. Thompson's review headline in the Industrial Worker (November, 1969) reads somewhat pejoratively: "Another 'Labor Historian' Writes a Book About the Wobblies -- So What Else is New?"

Joseph R. Conlin, Bread and Roses Too: Studies of the Wobblies (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Corp., 1969) is a series of essays based principally on his "The Wobblies: A Study of the I. W. W. Before World War I" (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1966) and is of interest because the author refutes the contention that the IWW was syndicalist.

topic than McEnroe's study and serves as a good supplement to Brissenden and Dubofsky.

For individual Wobbles the earliest and most blatant distortion of William D. Haywood is J. Louis Engdahl's polemical hagiolatry, "William D. Haywood--'Undesirable Citizen'," The Communist: A Theoretical Magazine for the Discussion of Revolutionary Problems, VII (July, 1928), 434-441. William D. Haywood, Bill Haywood's Book (New York: International Publishers, 1929) sheds dubious light on the most prominent of Wobbles. The autobiography, allegedly written by Haywood in the Soviet Union, might have been edited by Communist functionaries who wanted to create in Haywood a "primitive" Bolshevik. Ralph Chaplin, Wobbly: The Rough-and-Tumble Story of an American Radical (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), and Benjamin Gitlow, I Confess: The Truth About American Communism (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1940), both suggest that the autobiography is a spurious document. Dubofsky, "The Radicalism of the Dispossessed," argues that Haywood allowed "Communist Party hacks to ghost-write his autobiography," and that its numerous inconsistencies lend no credence to authentic authorship. On the other hand, Conlin's Big Bill Haywood and the Radical Union Movement (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1969), a study based on some new sources, refutes Gitlow and Chaplin, maintaining that internal evidence points to Haywood's authorship. In any event, the point is moot. As Conlin admits, "Haywood's final years remain disappointingly obscure." A sad and telling commentary on Big Bill Haywood is poignantly summed up by Richard Brazier, the last surviving member of the IWW GEB from the World War I era. In "The Mass IWW Trial of 1918: A Retrospect," Labor History, VII (Spring, 1966), Brazier, speaking of Haywood, remarks: "Half his ashes remained in the Kremlin wall; but the best half--the Wobbly half--was brought home to Chicago." Warren Van Tine, "Ben H. Williams, Wobbly Editor" (M. A. thesis, Northern Illinois University, 1967), written under the direction of Dubofsky, is a study of an eclectic Wobbly philosopher. There are numerous accounts of Joe Hill, a christological figure in IWW lore. The most detailed and objective of these studies is Gibb Smith, Joe Hill (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1969). Richard Brazier, "The Story of the I. W. W.'s 'Little Red Songbook'," Labor History, IX (Winter, 1968), 91-105, is an account of the Wobbly hymnal.

For one of the IWW's earliest actions in Ohio, the Akron rubber strike, the best document is Ohio, Eightieth General Assembly, Senate, Journal (1913), CII, Appendix: "Majority and Minority Reports of the Senate Select Committee Appointed to Investigate Causes and Circumstances of the Akron Rubber Industries." Leslie H. Marcy, "800 Per Cent and the Akron Strike," International Socialist Review, XIII (April, 1913), 711-724, is an account sympathetic to the strikers. The India Rubber Journal, organ of the rubber industry, is useful in perceiving
attitudes of management. Company histories shed tangential light on
the strike: Harvey S. Firestone, Men and Rubber: The Story of Busi-
ness (Garden City: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1926); Hugh Allen, The
House of Goodyear: Fifty Years of Men and Rubber (Cleveland: Cor-
day and Gross, 1949); and Alfred Leif, The Firestone Story: A
History of the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company (New York:
Greed (New York: Covici, Friede, 1936), is a general history written
from an emotional and leftist bent of the Depression era. Harold S.
Roberts, The Rubber Workers: Collective Bargaining in the Rubber
Industry (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), although somewhat
dated when compared to IWW scholarship of the sixties, surpasses all
other accounts on the Akron rubber strike. Documents and works
germane to Akron rubber workers include Emery R. Hayhurst, A Sur-
voy of Industrial and Occupational Diseases in Ohio (Columbus: F. J.
Heer Printing Co., 1915); Rey Vincent Luce, "Aniline Poisoning in the
Rubber Industry of Akron, Ohio," and Alice Hamilton, "Industrial
Poisons Used in the Rubber Industry," both in U. S., Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Bulletin, Number 179 (October, 1915); Luce and Hamilton,
"Industrial Aniline Poisoning in the United States," U. S., Bureau of
for additional reforms in the rubber industry. For coal mining the
United Mine Workers' Journal is useful for UMW of A attitudes on the
eastern Ohio strike but not much is mentioned on the IWW. T. L.
Lewis's Coal Mining Review and Industrial Index, published in Colum-
bus, represents the "harmony of interests" philosophy of the National
Civic Federation but, like the UMW Journal, does not shed too much
information on the IWW. The era of the First World War is rich in
printed works. Ohio, Eighty-third General Assembly (1919), Laws of
Ohio, CVIII, Parts I and II, contain criminal syndicalism and deporta-
tion laws. Eldridge F. Dowell, A History of Criminal Syndicalism
Legislation in the United States (Johns Hopkins Studies in History and
Political Science, Series LVII, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1939) is the definitive work on the topic. Joseph Mereto, The
Red Conspiracy (New York: National Historical Society, 1920), and
Ole Hanson, Americanism versus Bolshevism (New York: Doubleday,
Page and Co., 1920) epitomize the anti-radical hysteria of the period.
A judicious approach to the thorny problem of liberty and order is
John Lord O'Brien, "Uncle Sam's Spy Policies: Safeguarding American
Liberty During the War," The Forum, LXI (April, 1919), 407-416.
O'Brien, Assistant Attorney General under Thomas Gregory and A.
Mitchell Palmer, recognized the limits of political surveillance and
regulation. Immediately after the period of Joseph McCarthy, O'Brien
published his philosophy of constitutional republicanism and civil liber-
tarianism in National Security and Individual Freedom (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1955). O’Brien is of the genre of upper-class liberalism and merits serious attention and further study as a policy maker. William Preston's *Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903-1933* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), the definitive study based on Department of Justice material in the National Archives, gives a great deal of insight into federal policy during the World War I period and suggests that such guidelines laid the foundation for later security policies after World War II. The American Protective League, quasi-official arm of the Department of Justice, is memorialized by Emerson Hough in the official history, *The Web* (Chicago: Reilly and Lee Company, 1919). Joan Jensen, *The Price of Vigilance* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968), is a scholarly, critical look at the League based largely on manuscript sources and should be read as an antidote to Hough’s court history.

**Manuscript Sources and Oral History Interviews**

The interconnection between federal activities and the IWW is made clear in a variety of material at the National Archives and Records Service. Records of the Department of Labor, RG 174, contain unpublished reports of the U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations and a plethora of material on the IWW. Papers of the President’s Mediation Commission, RG 1, ephemeral to the Ohio IWW, furnishes insights into general governmental policy. Records of the Department of Justice, RG 60, is useful for policy-making decisions and administrative internments of IWWs. All files in RG 60 are screened for Bureau of Investigation material before researchers are allowed to use them, but correspondence of the United States district attorneys aid in filling this void for the World War I era. Military investigative dossiers relative to individual members of the IWW in Ohio are still closed, and records of the American Protective League for Ohio were destroyed by archivists. *General Records Relating to Political Prisoners*, RG 204, supplements RG 60 material and in many cases gives individual biographies of convicted or administratively interned IWWs. For the era of World War II the material of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, RG 280, in custody of the United States Department of Labor, is invaluable for federal intervention in IU 440-management conflict with Republic Brass and American Stove Company. Unfortunately, materials of the National Labor Relations Board are unavailable for the thirties and forties. (Letter from Vivian G. Brazier, Records Management Officer, NLRB, July 9, 1970 and October 21, 1970, to RTW)

The Labadie Collection, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, is rich in IWW materials and extremely useful for its vertical files of
IWW leaflets and manuscripts. For a description of this unique collection, see Elanor H. Scanlan, "The Labadie Collection," Labor History, VI (Fall, 1965), 244-248. IWW material and unpublished U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations reports are archived at the Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, a repository rich in general labor history. The Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, Ohio, is excellent for a case study of a single city and the First World War. Papers of the Mayor's Advisory War Committee (Mayor Harry L. Davis) and the typewritten minutes of the Chamber of Commerce give insight into the totality of war and the fact that it reached into virtually every aspect of life in Cleveland. The Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, sheds light upon state World War I activities through the papers of the Ohio Branch, Council of National Defense, and materials in the A. M. Schlesinger Collection of World War materials. The correspondence of J. M. Roan of the Division of Mines, in State Letters, Division of Mines, State Archives, OHS, gives perceptive accounts of the coal mining situation in eastern Ohio. Ephemeral to the strike situation of eastern Ohio are the Papers of Governor Frank B. Willis: Governor's and Personal Papers (1915-1916). Additional manuscript material on the coal strike is apparently non-extant. An attempt to locate court material for this period did not bear fruit in Jefferson and Belmont counties. (Letter from Walter Kanoski, Clerk of Courts, Jefferson County, Ohio, April 29, 1970, to RTW.) For the rubber strike of 1913 the papers of Frank A. Seiberling (Goodyear Rubber Company), recently acquired by the Ohio Historical Society, are not yet processed. They will apparently not be opened until 1985. (Letter from J. Penfield Seiberling, November 4, 1970, to RTW.)

IWW materials in the possession of Mrs. Elizabeth Feczko were germane to IU 440 in the Depression era and were of tremendous help in the preparation of this study. The private labor history collection of Mr. Richard B. Tussey, A. M. C. B. W., N. A., AFL-CIO is a repository rich in IWW materials, both published and unpublished, and contains translated Hungarian accounts from the Bermunkas press committee, correspondence between IU 440 and the Taft-Hartley Affidavit Compliance Officer, and material on the disaffiliation controversy of 1950. A scrapbook in the possession of Mr. Toivo Halonen furnished many leads on IU 440 during the Depression.

To supplement printed, archival, and manuscript accounts of the IWW in Ohio I resorted to seven oral history interviews listed here in chronological order: Frank Cedervall, Toivo Halonen, and Mike Kaciban (joint interview), October 31, 1967; Fred Thompson, December 18, 1967; Andrew Wein..., December 18, 1967; Frank Cedervall, January 2, 1968; Richard B. Tussey, January 2, 1968;

Newspapers

The Akron Beacon Journal, Cleveland Citizen, Cleveland Leader, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Daily Independent (Bellaire, Ohio), Lorain Journal, New York Times, Ohio Socialist, Ohio State Journal, St. Clairsville Gazette, Steubenville Daily Gazette, and Toledo News Bee were consulted in the absence of manuscript and archival material. Solidarity and Industrial Worker were consulted as IWW sources.