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ALIENATION AND IDENTITY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF BLUE-COLLAR AND COUNTER-CULTURE VALUES

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

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The Ohio State University
1971

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The past few years have been witnesses to events and confrontations that have profoundly shaken the foundations of higher education and increasingly those of the public schools. They have also reverberated into the society at large and in part have forced certain segments of American society to gather together in actively defensive camps while others have sought solace in rhetorically defensive camps.

An unexpected aspect of the past eight years is that such disruption and polarization has been spurred on mainly from within America. In the past, the great crises that have beset the American public; the taming of a hostile environment, the labor unions' struggle for legitimacy, the waging and winning of World War I and World War II, and the early civil rights movement, were approached and interpreted as part of an ongoing progress that held for the majority the promise of at least a secular utopia. And so most, whether immigrant, worker, businessman, or educator, felt themselves involved in a common undertaking that involved all for the good of all. It is, therefore,
significant that at a time of apparent victory over the problems of abundance and the good life, for most, that in the face of the remaining battles (poverty, war, and pollution) the Great American Dream Machine has seemed to bog down.

What is now being questioned is the viability, flexibility, humanity, and perhaps the existence of certain of our basic institutions of education, government, and industry. This questioning is not new. But what is new is the vehemence, intensity, and magnitude of the questioning groups. That "push has led to shove" and rhetorical missiles to active attack, in many cases, is within the American tradition. However, in the past this kind of forcefulness has usually been directed against a hostile environment or a foreign threat (WWII). What is surprising is that now we, in part, are turning on ourselves. Such attacks do not seem to draw men together but tend to pit them against each other.

This study will examine the nature of the most obvious groups that are attacking or defending basic institutions and ways of life in America. Through a philosophical-logical mode of inquiry, it will analyze such questions as: How do these groups respond to the philosophical and psychological charges of alienation in modern American life? How can personal, or even group, identity emerge in the face of "dehumanizing technology and bureaucracy?"
This analysis will probe the values of the two most obvious sectors of American society that seem, in many ways, and usually not consciously, pitted against each other. These two groups are: (1) the blue-collar or Middle Americans; and (2) the counter-culture (usually composed of a majority of youth between the ages fifteen to twenty-five, but also of like-minded adults).

It is hypothesized that an examination of blue-collar and counter-culture values, will substantiate an emerging pattern that will help to more clearly define the basic value conflicts. A clearer delineation of these value conflicts will be crucial in answering such questions as: Are the local and national confrontations between those parts of American society that we have witnessed during the past years due to generational, class, or ideological differences? In effect, the end product of the investigation will be a conceptual structure to help us understand this kind of question and to project alternative courses of action.

The charges leveled against modern society by those from Marx to Fromm, Mills, Goodman, Marcuse, and Ellul are that it dehumanizes and alienates man from his source of satisfaction and meaning in his work and his total existence. These charges seem to have become the central theme of the young of the counter-culture in their cry of "irrelevance" as they assess
education and the oppressiveness of modern institutions. On the other hand it is the Middle Americans of blue-collar persuasion, who have been historically seen as the class that would be expected to address itself to this condition. And, out of this frustration, they might be the group that might be expected to bring about radical changes in society through their own direct experiences with productive labor and management manipulation.

In view of these expectations supported in part by history, it seems strange that the radical counter-culture in seeking a coalition with the oppressed the Third World, including the blue-collar sector of American society, out of supposed mutual frustrations would meet with so much derision and uncooperativeness. Why is this so? Is it related to the fact that alienation is more a spiritual notion that seems more attractive to the young idealists than to the working Middle Americans? Or, is it possible that one group can cope more effectively with alienation than another due to different frames of reference or life experiences? It is clear that the notion of identity must necessarily follow from the way both blue-collar and counter culture cope with the psychological and structural experience of alienation. Indeed, the development of identity can be seen as the "other side" of the alienation dilemma.

The basic issues that grow out of relations between society and education and society and work clearly take the form
of two, at times, competing views. It is in this arena that the sharpest rhetorical and actual confrontations take place. It is hypothesized for the purpose of this investigation that these two competing views may be the intellectual embodiment of the two groups under study.

If one examines American history, he will find that we have always had these two basic visions. For example, America has always had its struggling majority and its needed "idealistic" minority. But this aspect of our heritage, has now emerged as a growing confrontation of increasing proportions. In the past, the idealism, satire, or at times, cynicism of the prevailing romantic critics was usually "absorbed" by the majority without obvious disruptions. Contemporary conflict, then, is not a new phenomenon. What is new is the growing number of the verbal minority. To cite but one dimension of this problem, we have more students in colleges and universities than we have on all of the nation's farms. This fact is not important in itself. But, when it is related to the phenomenon explicated above, then there is a possibility that the basic institutions involved may be greatly affected in unpredictable ways.

It is asserted here that the issue of society and education appears to split itself between the overall goal-values of "will" and "work." On one side there has emerged the existential world of idealism, affluence, and the will. This belief system
holds that in a world of material affluence what is most needed by America to solve its basic problems is the "proper direction of the will." On the other side, the competing vision gives us a world view in which, for the first time, the epic struggle of the Protestant ethic has yielded, at least in America, the good life to some and an increasingly decent life to most with the possibility of good times ahead for all. However, in this belief system life is a battle that must be waged continuously because we have a way to go yet.

One vision stresses qualities such as: creativity, non-alienation, and humanity. The other seeks after less abstract qualities, concerning itself with security, job, home, and maybe college. This investigation will probe these two conflicting belief systems to identify their origins, their characteristics and the nature of their conflict.

Chapter II examines Karl Mnnheim's sociology of knowledge as drawn from his Ideology and Utopia. This classic approach considers the social, historical, and psychological factors necessary in a comparative study of the value systems of counter-culture and blue-collar. This chapter will also explicate the concept of alienation as drawn from Marx and Fromm to the Neo-Marxian thought of Goodman, Roszak, Reich, Marcuse, and Flacks. A second concept basic to the investigation, identity, will also be explicated. In effect, Chapter II presents the basic
conceptual tools which will be used in this investigation. They have been created from studies of the sociology of knowledge and are appropriate for the philosophical-logical mode of inquiry.

Chapter III analyzes prevailing blue-collar values from various perspectives. The works of Hoffer, Glazer, Blauner, and Shostak furnish the data for this analysis.

Chapter IV presents a parallel analysis of counterculture values by examining the influences that alienation exerts on counter-culture perspectives. An examination of the impact of a youthful search for identity in the modern world of leisure, affluence, and higher education will serve as an additional source of data. These data will come from the works and studies of Erikson, Kenniston, Roszak, and Reich.

Chapter V generalizes the findings from the comparative study of these two sets of values and presents a conceptual framework for the understanding of the major problem under investigation. Generalizations are then made in the light of this framework.
CHAPTER II

PROCEDURES OF THE STUDY:
A SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE APPR'

Inasmuch as this investigation probes the way men think and act as individuals and in groups, the procedures to be used must be suited to this kind of inquiry. The approach that has come to be known as the sociology of knowledge best fits the criteria of an appropriate research procedure. Karl Mannheim describes this approach in his Ideology and Utopia:

The principal thesis of the sociology of knowledge is that there are modes of thought which cannot be adequately understood as long as their social origins are obscured.\(^1\)

Mind, and finally, action exist not in a purely metaphysical realm but in a social, psychological, and at times less obvious historical setting. Only by examining these conditions can one then determine the rationale for specific thought-action or the lack of it. Thus as Mannheim points out:

The first point which we now have to emphasize is that the approach of the sociology of knowledge intentionally does not start with

the single individual and his thinking. Rather, the sociology of knowledge seeks to comprehend thought in the concrete setting of an historical-social situation out of which individually differentiated thought only very gradually emerges. Every individual is therefore in a two-fold sense predetermined by the fact of growing up in a society: on the one hand he finds a ready made situation and on the other he finds in that situation preformed patterns of thought and of conduct. 2

From this one can extrapolate in a warranted manner from the individual in a traditional social setting to the modern world of fluctuating and competing values. Thus it becomes clearer that the competition between the world of traditional and the world of new or sometimes only novel, determines to a great extent the individual's personal battleground from which emerges some sense of identity.

The forces that make up the combatants in this surge for meaning come out of the socio-historical setting, and as the two encounter each other they tend to generate, at least in the modern world, the personal crises that disrupt and alienate one from his meaning in life or to another extent pervert it. The manner in which one handles this personal alienation has much to do with the way each individual finds and defines himself in social settings.

2Ibid., p. 3.
Again, this study must deal with the question of how seemingly identical human thought processes concerned with the same world produce divergent conceptions of that world? Obviously one must examine the social-historical setting of that world and just as importantly one's psychological make-up. As Mannheim writes:

What seems to be so unbearable in life itself, namely, to continue to live with the unconscious uncovered, is the historical prerequisite of scientific critical self-awareness . . . . Man attains objectivity and acquires a self with reference to his conception of his world not by giving up his will to action and holding his evaluations in abeyance but in confronting and examining himself.3

And also with groups, it is possible to arrive at some point of critical awareness by following Mannheim's sociology of knowledge procedure.

This investigation by such a process of delineating both blue-collar and counter-culture values against such sociological, psychological, and political propositions as alienation, war, race, anxiety, work, security, ideals, and identity will explore the diverse weltanschauung of each group.

One conceptual tool that will serve in this exploration of the Weltanschauung is the concept of alienation. As one examines the writings of the romantic and radical critics of

3Ibid., p. 47.
industrial and post-industrial society, it becomes clear that alienation is the key concept that embodies in a general term the total frustrations of modern man. Except in the cases of such men as Nietzsche and Dostoyevsky, most critics have seen alienation as a structural problem of the modern world. That is, man’s essence (Marx-Fromm), \(^4\) or man’s nature (Goodman)\(^5\) is denied fulfillment by the unnatural pursuit of modern industrial-technological society. Man as an object of manipulation by powerful managerial forces is intellectually deceived and physically used in order to forward the production of goods and the objectification of himself. Alienation is seen as the ultimate condition of man in this kind of world.

Karl Marx, himself, felt and wrote about man’s alienated state in industrial society. In later years, sharing the mutual experiences of Frederick Engels among the English working classes, he threw over his youthful Hegelian influences and turned to the notion of exploitation and the struggle against it.\(^6\) However, most critics of modern society from the beginning of


the industrial revolution up to what is now called technological society, tended to see the remedies for man's alienation in structural changes or the humanizing of already existing structures. (That is, the worker should be involved as a craftsman and not as one cog of the assembly line). Starting with Charles Dickens (Hard Times, etc.), who suggested better and more humane of what was already there, to the more recent liberal critics who suggest basic remedies in Socialism (Michael Harrington)\(^7\) or decentralization and a return to craftsmanship (Paul Goodman),\(^8\) alienation has been considered a natural by-product of industrial-bureaucratic society.

The more politically conservative critics of modern society from Franz Kafka to Nietzsche and Dostoyevsky detected at the bottom of modern man's character a basic irremediable flaw that in all cases would prevent even the profoundest structural changes from relieving the individual of his innate unsettledness. But with only this philosophical notion of alienation, this investigation would take a different path that might not involve any consideration of social or historical analysis.

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Although there might be some psychological interpretations that come out of blue-collar perspectives involving a certain skepticism of various types of non-blue-collar people (politicians and the business world in general), this study will focus on the more traditional concept of alienation originated by Marx and carried on by Fromm, Harrington, Goodman and to some extent the Neo-Marxian thought of Marcuse, Roszak, Flacks, and Reich.

The original and traditional concept of alienation is one that sees modern man estraged from himself, passive, and manipulated. The process of production and the goods produced assume the primary importance in industrial society and as man is denied his essence as a human being and craftsman, he becomes further estranged from himself to the ultimate condition of objectified alienation. As Erich Fromm points out in his interpretation of writings of Marx:

Marx's central criticism of capitalism is not the injustice on the distribution of wealth; it is the perversion of labor into forced, alienated, meaningless labor, hence the transformation of man into a "crippled monstrosity."

Fromm goes on to point out that for the young Marx:

Labor is alienated because the work has ceased to be part of the worker's nature and "consequently, he does not fulfill himself in his work but denies himself, has a feeling of misery

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9Erich Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, p. 42.
rather than well-being, does not develop freely his mental and physical energies but is physically exhausted and mentally debased. The worker therefore feels himself at home only during his leisure time, whereas at work he feels homeless."\(^\text{10}\)

The logical conclusion of such human processing was to turn man's essence into an end for industrial society. In Marx's own words:

Thus alienated labor turns man's essential humanity into a non-human property. It estranges man from his own human body, and estranges man from nature and from his own spiritual essence--his human being.\(^\text{11}\)

As we shall discover later, the various traditional concepts of alienation seem to hold up in part for many members of the radical counter-culture who see themselves much like the worker of the blue-collar world processed and manipulated for ends not of their own choosing and in ways that they deem counter to their own human essence.

Here it seems useful to the study to add to the classical concept of alienation developed by Marx and extended by Erich Fromm, also the interpretations of three important Marxist scholars, Daniel Bell, Lewis Feuer, and to a lesser degree

\(^\text{10}\)Ibid., p. 47-8.

Victor C. Ferkiss. Marx, as Bell points out, placed a radical new emphasis on work. Man in his work and in his association with others involved in the world of work develops both an individual and social identity. Individually and in common men develop self (identity) and in so doing are able to transform nature as well. It is here with Marx that alienation finds its roots in the material world of work.

This interpretation is the ideal of "humanized labor." However, many critics of modern society have advocated either improvement or complete abolishment of industrial-technological society because this ideal has not been met. This passage from Bell is an example of such a view:

In labor, man is "under the domination, compulsion, and yoke of another man." Against this is the state of freedom where man would transform nature, and himself, by free, conscious spontaneous, creative work. But what stood in the way of achieving this freedom? The fact that in the alienation of work man lost control of the process of work, and, of the product of his labor . . . . And by becoming a commodity, he lost his sense of identity; he lost the sense of "himself." 13

One can assume that if Marx's and other critics' observations of the world of objectified work has even in part been true then the blue-collar or Middle American who is disproportionately represented in the world of work should have joined

13Ibid., p. 360.
with alienated youth in a natural coalition of the alienated and exploited of America. Instead, we see taking place a growing opposition. The radical young who have taken on the classic alienation from the Neo-Marxian writers of Marcuse, Goodman, and Reich, seem to have misjudged the views of the blue-collar world in seeking a union with them. Again the major theses reappears and certain assumptions must be posed again. Is it possible that alienation is so complete in the modern world of work that the worker is apathetic out of despair? It might also be possible that the blue-collar ethic strongly identifies itself with the goals of management, or the blue-collar has been deluded and must be converted to the new hope of a Consciousness III. These are all possibilities and must be considered in any treatment that tries to clarify the growing conflict of values between blue-collar and counter-culture.

Victor C. Ferkiss adds to the discussion of alienation on modern society by balancing it with the loss of freedom, or man's self-direction. Here he examines the critical views of

14Goodman, Growing Up Absurd.


mass society which assume that loss of freedom and loss of identity are exactly parallel, and constitute the same phenomenon. Ferkiss judges that alienation has its roots in Romanticism. In this context it is explained as man's divorce from nature and denial of his basic nature.\textsuperscript{18} It is more in keeping with the views of early or young Marx (as the repression of instinct) and later Goodman (man as craftsman).

Finally, one must examine Lewis Feuer's interpretation which is more critical of the early Marx and the Romantic critics than he is of the historical Marx. In his essay, "What is Alienation? The Career of a Concept,"\textsuperscript{19} he deals rather harshly with the matter of alienation and those that it attracted. He writes of it in these words:

> Alienation moved a handful of poets and professors, who achieved their therapy with a few poems and treatises. The masses of men, on the other hand, were moved to action by exploitation.\textsuperscript{20}

Feuer continues in the same essay by concluding of the older wiser Marx:

> The Young Hegelians wallowed in the masochistic joy of their "alienation." Marx and Engels finally discarded the vocabulary of the school, and spoke in the direct language of social realities which needed no romantic

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., p. 71.
\textsuperscript{19}Feuer, Marx and the Intellectuals.
\textsuperscript{20}Ibid., p. 73.
metaphor. With their abandonment of the concept of alienation, Marx and Engels made central in their political philosophy the concept of struggle.\textsuperscript{21}

Feuer's interpretation probably holds some clues to today's split between "the masses of men" (blue-collar) and the "Young Hegelians, intellectuals, and poets" (counter-culture).

This historical and interpretive review of the concept of alienation, whether structural or romantic, has been carried on so that with the variations expressed the continuity of definition has carried over from industrial to post-industrial, or technological, society. Previously, alienation was applied to man's divorce from the fruits of his labor, to the denial of self-direction, to his total exploitation. Today, the charges of routinized work, denial of creativity, and dehumanized processing continue an historically comprehensible definition of this term. This explication of the term alienation has been undertaken in a sociology of knowledge context to demonstrate its adequacy as a conceptual tool for the investigation. We turn now to an explication of the meaning of a second conceptual tool--namely, identity.

Identity as it is employed in this study is a variation of the theme of alienation. Since the majority of men are still daily involved in the production of goods and services, this

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 82.
activity must play a part in the final definition of each individual. That man in the Marxian and Weberian sense defines himself in his work has, through the ages, formed the basis of a healthy craftsmanship and a strong sense of individual autonomy. Where identity has taken on the overtone of alienation is exactly at the place where work has been corrupted by insensitive or dehumanizing forces that deny man his true nature as creator-maker. This corruption has usually been seen as a by-product of mass, or industrial, society in which the worker is forced to deny his essence in order to conform to the demands placed upon him as worker or consumer. As Victor Ferkiss explains:

As an actor in these roles he goes through the motions but the "real" person is not involved. He is forced to wear a mask to conceal his true self. Sometimes the strain becomes too great and results either in individual psychological breakdown or in social conflict or, more likely, simply in the pseudo identity replacing the real one, the mask becoming the face.\(^{22}\)

If in the case of the worker, healthy identity has been denied him because of impersonal mass society or dehumanized manipulation, then for youth an analogous situation might prevail. The lack of positive\(^{23}\) or manly\(^{24}\) work not required by

\(^{22}\)Ferkiss, *Technological Man*, p. 71.


\(^{24}\)Goodman, *Growing Up Absurd*. 
technologically advanced society may deny to youth the equivalent freedom for self-direction and personal fulfillment that a depersonalized work structure has denied the worker. As Erik Erikson has pointed out in his discussions on adolescence and emerging identity, the developing physiological and psychological entity of youth in order to foster healthy growth and personal competence requires loyal and positive examples and teachers—be they individuals or institutions. However, if the Neo-Marxian and other critics have valid charges, the denial of positive, or autonomous, fulfillment is becoming increasingly more difficult in the face of a depersonalized and powerful managerial class. Here again, one would expect unity between mutually oppressed workers and denied counter-culture, but this is not so.

Using then, a sociology of knowledge approach and the two conceptual tools derived from such a context—alienation and identity—Chapter III, which follows, will analyze the world of the blue-collar worker.

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CHAPTER III

ANALYSIS OF BLUE-COLLAR WORK:
ALIENATION AND IDENTITY

In factory jobs the workman is likely to be ignorant of what goes on, since he performs a small operation on a big machine that he does not understand. Even so, there is evidence that he has the same disbelief in the enterprise as a whole, with a resulting attitude of profound indifference . . . . It is found that a thumping majority of the men don't care about the job or the firm; they couldn't care less and you can't make them care more . . . . The conclusions must be that workmen are indifferent to the job because of its intrinsic nature: it does not enlist worthwhile capacities, it is not "interesting"; it is not his, he is not "in" on it; the product is not really useful.¹

Look again at a "fascist"—tight-lipped, tense, crew cut, correctly dressed, church-going, an American flag on his car window, a hostile eye for comunists, youth, and blacks. He has had very little of love, or poetry, or music, or nature, or joy. He has been dominated by fear. He has been condemned to narrow-minded prejudice, to a self-defeating materialism, to a lonely suspicion of his fellow men. He is angry, envious, bitter, self-hating. He ravages his own environment. He has fled all his life from consciousness and responsibility. He is turned against his own nature; in his

agony he has recoiled upon himself. He is what the machine left after it had its way. 2

There are many of us who have been workingmen all our lives and, whether we know it or not, will remain workingmen until we die. Whether there be a God in Heaven or not; whether we be free or regimented; whether our standard of living be high or low--I and my like will go on doing more or less what we are doing now.

This sober realization need not be unduly depressing to people who have acquired the habit of work and who, like the American workingman, have the ingredients of a fairly enjoyable life within their reach. Still, the awareness of being an eternal workingman colors one’s attitudes, . . . . 3

Here are two basically divergent views of the same condition. Paul Goodman, in the first quote, has through most of his writings attempted to uncover the meaninglessness of most work and education in modern American society. He has done this by emphasizing a return to the world of craftsmanship in work and a town meeting or decentralized, community-controlled world of social relationships and educational pursuits.

In his early works, he seemed to capture the basic feelings of the more critical of the youth counter-culture and


also seemed to be on top of a growing dissatisfaction among American workers. What has happened to his estimation of a growing unsettledness that was supposedly arising out of an "absurd" social culture and a junk producing industrial complex? Has his prophecy been totally denied, or has he misjudged the degree of frustration and alienation among the blue-collar workers?

The second quote from Charles Reich seems to condemn, in a patronizing fashion, the narrow world of the working and other Middle Americans. Reich does this in the hope that Consciousness I and Consciousness II may be transcended and the transformation of such bigotry and misunderstanding forthcoming. Is such an estimation of the world of work and those that make it up sufficient? Has Reich's ability to recognize such obvious human weaknesses denied him the insight to apply them to other groups? Has he failed to account for the anxiety that comes out of work, social insecurity, and the pressures exerted by the social and technological flux that continually challenges the more traditional models of the blue-collar world?

To a great extent, most critics, such as Goodman and Reich have tended to blame the narrowness, bigotry, and profit seeking of the status-quo for the social failures (poverty, segregation, war) of recent years. This, in a way, is to ascribe
innate defects to one segment of society. In another way, it leads to a limited analysis of the reality, anxiety, and pressures that most people must face in their own experiences.

In contrast to these views, there is yet another assessment of the world of the working man. Eric Hoffer's statement defining the reality of the world that the worker must face is not a normative avoidance of a better world, but a confrontation of a world not yet perfect but with hopes of one day becoming so. And here probably rests the basic difference between the analysis and indictment of modern industrial-technological society as opposed to one that has assessed and agreed to take on the reality of existence.

Drawing mainly from the works of Eric Hoffer, Arthur Shostak, Robert Blauner, John C. Leggett, and Nathan Glazer, this study will now analyze blue-collar values, specifically here, the world or work and the influence of alienation as it applies. That is, what factors have been and are important in determining the blue-collar world to its members. The noticeable differences among the quotes at the beginning of this chapter must be accounted for in varying analyses, experiences, and aspirations of the groups considered.

It is hypothesized that this analysis will show that blue-collarites, or Middle Americans, are forced to come to grips, and therefore, to terms with the realities of existence much
sooner than those of the counter-culture. They, therefore, must be influenced in their interpretations of the classic charges leveled against the world in which they find themselves.

It is first important to examine the nature (industrial-technological work) of the trend of modern American society. If we are as automated and as affluent as is now charged, then our social and physical problems are due to an innate narrowness of those who control or identify with those in control. Has the world of work become a ukase of the past? Technology has, of course, partly changed the nature of work. Craftsmanship as a total style, while personally satisfying, has not proved sufficient to handle the material and service demands of mass society in its appetite for increased goods and services. Also increased automation and technological change put constant pressure on the world of blue-collar work, but in the end most people will find themselves defined by the traditional world of work.

What has happened instead has not been the total freeing of most from the world of work but a transferring of workers from the assembly line in some cases, due to automation, to distribution. As Victor Ferkiss points out:

Blue-collar workers increased from 49 to 50 per cent of the total male work force during the decade 1950-1960. Actually, it is a good guess that automation, first affecting unskilled labor, will relatively affect white-collar workers even more.
Most men still work in the traditional sense. Indeed, it should be noted how meaningless are such statements as "not involved in production." Salesmen, truck drivers and gas-station attendants may be "involved" in distribution rather than production, but they are the creatures of industrial production and most may work with their hands and get dirty.4

Ferkiss goes on to question the notion of continuous automation equally distributed to all segments of the economy. This is possible only in industries that can afford such expensive hardware and have the markets to sustain its costs. Thus at the same time automation might release many from jobs, mechanization also opens up work in the distribution of goods. He goes on to reinforce his position concerning automation, unemployment, and affluence by adhering to the fact that semi-skilled and unskilled labor will continue to play an important part in the American economy.5 This denies, in part, the assumption that continuous automation will eliminate semi- and unskilled labor and only skilled labor will predominate in the work force.

In view of these facts, it is clear that the working world of the blue-collar man is a continuous one and still a rugged one, much to the surprise of those that make up the leisure class (many in the counter-culture). The world of

5 Ibid., p. 115.
automation and mass automatic leisure has been realized only in small part even with improved working conditions for most. So at this point it becomes clearer that many in the counter-culture have unwittingly imposed a "leisure world" perspective on the majority and have to the same extent misunderstood the still important influence that the condition of work exerts on most.

If, as Charles Reich, Jacques Ellul, and others contend, the world of work and craftsmanship has become subservient to the Machine, the objectified blue-collarites and the routinized white collarites should have out of mutual frustrations joined forces with the alienated of the counter-culture against the profit seeking managerial class. It is significant that this has not taken place and is due to many factors, one of which is the expectation of personal fulfillment that should come out of work.

Other factors to be examined are those that are part of the classic charge of alienation. They are: Blue-collar life-style, blue-collar political-social consciousness, blue-collar expectations from work and management, and blue-collar attitudes towards industrial-technological society.

Selig Perlman, a labor economist of the 1920's, was one of the first to notice the gap between Marx's development prediction and the reality of the American worker's consciousness.  

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He went on to point out that industrial-technological development had not led to an increasing frustration among crafts minded workers, but to a reappraisal of the machine and the world of work. Thus what was evident was that a "job consciousness" and not a "class consciousness" had developed among modern workers who still saw themselves as part of a cultural class but not a revolutionary one. Thus any appeal to the working class had to be in economic terms and not in radical cultural ones.

The traditional orientation of the workers was partly due to choice and partly due to the unpredictability of total job security and the social pressures of status achievement. As Eric Hoffer has pointed out earlier the ease of individual social and cultural mobility is not part of the ongoing life style of the blue-collar world. As Leggett discusses:

Workmen came to view extremist attitudes as antithetical to working-class interests. . . . Workers reasoned that if revolutionary action were to fail, the defeat would result in the destruction of all the material gains made by them. . . . In short, given the strategic pragmatism and limited goals of unions, plus their success in collective bargaining, these unions could not imbue their members with revolutionary zeal; . . . . Strikes would focus on particular issues, while the pecuniary struggle would lead to greater equity within the capitalist system.7

7Ibid., p. 22.
It seems to hold true that even with the most unpleasant of modern working conditions, most blue-collarites continue, in spite of individual cases of company injustice, to hold the capitalist system as essentially tolerable if not improvable. They continue their optimism of the system and still hope for a decent world for themselves and possibly a more pleasurable place in the world of employment for their children, although this is not substantiated by the evidence.\(^8\)

This optimism of the blue-collar world is what is now being put to the test of Marcuse's one-dimensionality and Marx's belief of growing working class frustration. How has it managed to handle alienation and social meaninglessness? Why has it remained so pervasive and ingrained? In part, it is a continuing segment of the American Dream and in part of material affluence. The 1940's in America saw a glorification of the worker or the "common man" as one who had suffered through the Depression and sacrificed himself in time of need (WWII).\(^9\) The movies saw such stars as Bogart, Gable, and Garfield portray the worker as "down to earth," loyal, and


finally as an unsung hero. 10

Most of these facts lead to the conclusion that America has offered a "status haven" and economic sanctuary to the blue-collarite, at least up until the 1960's. Thus, to the typical blue-collarite, industrial change has brought the promise of less backbreaking work and the hope of higher wages and more pleasant working conditions. In most instances this has been the case. Consequently, it is easy to understand the blue-collarite's continued loyalty to a general system of production that has visibly altered his material surroundings. His fear of the machine has been minimal to the extent that it eases his work load, but disrupting to the extent that it makes him unemployed.

Reich and Ellul have talked of the dialectic of the machine age, and have seen such development as the root of modern malaise. But on the other hand, the blue-collarite has seemed to adapt his perspective to this change and even taken a vested interest in it. As Eric Hoffer so philosophically expounds:

Contrary to the doctrine propounded by some in the heyday of the Industrial Revolution, mechanization has not taught docility to the "refractory hand of labor." At least here on the docks we know that

we shall manage to get our share no
matter what happens. And it is a dull
workingman who does not see in the
machine the only key to the true millen­
nium. For only mechanization can mit­
igate—if not cure—"the disease of
work," . . . . 11

To add to this we may go on to Ely Chinoy's classic
study of American automobile workers (the automobile industry
is considered as probably the most frustrating work in most of
U.S. industry), 12 where he examines the attitudes of workers
concerning the American Dream. Among those workers there is
a need to maintain and reinforce the belief that America is a
land of promise, with an added optimism in technological change.

Thus Chinoy points out:

This belief gains particular support
from the obvious and unceasingly re­
ported progress of science and tech­
nology. For example, a machine
operator with three young children
commented: "There's better opportuni­
ties now than when I started. There
are more things being created, like
diesel engine work, things that
weren't thought of when we were child­
ren. Science is growing greater
everyday." 13

11 Eric Hoffer, The Ordeal of Change, p. 81-82.


In all of this, the worker is not a deluded man. Materially conditions have, in general, improved all around. Mechanization has removed some of the backbreaking effort required at one time, although of course leading to more, in some cases, routinization. But now the mind must deal with boredom where before working muscles had to deal with physical exhaustion. Most workers have seen to it that their brownstone apartments were remodeled or have in fact moved to a working class suburb. With this gradual improvement over the past twenty years, the worker's faith in the American Dream has persisted not because of his own heightened expectations, because his expectations were mild and conservative compared to a call for a spiritual utopia\textsuperscript{14} or a cultural revolution\textsuperscript{15} that would transform men's dreams into soulful realities. The blue-collarite's progress has been slow and steady and has, in part, paid off for many. Or, it is now beginning to pay off for most. This state according to the blue-collar world must be preserved and cherished and only by those that see a personal stake in technological development. So for the blue-collarite, suburbia is not a place to "sell out" to the God of Mamon, but a secular utopia where one can finally enjoy the "good life." He knows

\textsuperscript{14} Charles Reich, \textit{The Greening of America}.

his culture and continues to choose a certain style of life. He has not, in most cases, turned into an organization man. Rather, he has held firm to traditional values of work, neighborhood, family, and culture.

The world of work and not the world of leisure, or idealism, is the probable world of the blue-collarites. Although increasingly more sons and daughters of blue-collar families have access to higher education, the figures are continuous and demonstrate that higher education continues to remain the domain of the more wealthy of American society. These realities must certainly color the perspectives of blue-collar men to the extent of what one expects out of work and from society. The fact that security is not automatic and the fact of lowered educational expectations have influenced workers to expect less and thus appreciate what finally does come their way. As Blauner has discovered in considering creative leisure as a solution for alienation in automation:

The problem with the leisure solution is that it underestimates the fact that work remains the single most important life activity for most people, in terms of time and energy, and ignores the subtle ways in which the quality of one's

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16 Herman P. Miller, Rich Man, Poor Man, p. 189.

worklife affects the quality of one's leisure, family relations, and basic self-feelings.\(^{18}\)

For the blue-collar man, work is considered part of existence and the only way to finally provide security for himself and his family. Thus he has a natural anxiety and perplexity against those that propose radical social and economic changes. He is disrupted enough as it is by technological changes that effect job changes without being bombarded by continually changing styles of life and culture that paint him as primitive and narrow. Consequently, the charge that routinized work stifles creativity is not a basic issue to the blue-collarite.

The lack of opportunities to develop self potential to express idiosyncratic abilities, and to assume responsibility and decision making functions, may not be a source of serious discontent to most workers today. For this reason, the studies tend to bear out the fact that most workers are satisfied with their work and their jobs even though individually there may be complaining and turnover.\(^{19}\)

At this point, it might be interesting and pertinent to note that basic job satisfaction and a firm belief in the worth of the goods produced show a solid vested interest in the


\(^{19}\) Blauner, \textit{Alienation . . . .}, p. 202 (Table 2).
industrial world of work. Paul Goodman's charge that modern American industry continually turns out socially worthless items, or junk, does not seem to be a real issue among the blue-collar. Modern industrial production is not seen by the blue-collarites as a mass waste of human creativity. In fact, along with the finding that 73 per cent of the average factory workers saw their company as good a place to work as any,80 89 per cent of all factory workers saw their jobs as essential to the company and society.21 This evidence does not square with the charges of meaningless production leveled against modern U.S. industry.

As will be discussed later, more money, goods and better living conditions are gratefully sought after and considered stepping stones to the "good life." Consequently, to sweepingly condemn the whole of American industry as irrelevant to the modern world of affluence is to underestimate the importance of blue-collar work as a necessary ingredient of life for most and underestimate the development of affluence as an accepted way of life for most blue-collarites.

The average worker seeks some control over conditions of employment and control over his immediate work process but seems to be less concerned over the more general issues of alienation and powerlessness. As a worker with more limited

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20 Ibid., p. 202 (Table 2).
21 Ibid., p. 203, (Table 3)
social and economic mobility, the blue-collarite realizes and struggles with his existence and only demands fair treatment by management, not control of the means of production. Blauner gathers this same sense of expectation by contending:

Unlike the absence of control over the immediate work process, "ownership powerlessness" is a constant in modern industry, and employees, therefore, normally do not develop expectations for influence in this area. Today the average worker no more desires to own his own machines than modern soldiers their howitzers or government clerks their file cabinets . . . . Manual workers have required only steady jobs, reasonable wages, and employee benefits to put down at least moderate stakes in society and industry.22

Blauner goes on to point out that:

The average worker does not want the responsibility for such decisions as what, for whom, and how much to produce; how to design the product; what machinery to buy; how to distribute jobs; or how to organize the flow of work.23

With the vested interest that the blue-collarite has in the world of work and its industrial-technological base, it is obvious that he is upset not with those that manage and effect job changes from the top, but with those that threaten to do away with the whole base of what he has come to see as the

22 Blauner, Alienation and Freedom, p. 17.
23 Ibid., p. 18.
only possible source of his security. The charges of alienated work and dehumanizing technique are not real issues for the blue-collarite. For better or worse, he is stuck in the world of work and does not really demand that it be fulfilling in itself at all times. The boredom and monotony of some jobs are filled in by the social companionship of fellow workers or by life secured by a stable neighborhood or secure family setting. He realizes that work even at its freest or most non-alienated may be difficult to bear. Because as Blauner points out about the nature of work:

Even in the most unalienated conditions, work is never totally pleasurable; in fact, the freest work, that of the writer or artist, usually involves long periods of virtual self-torture. Such non-alienated work is never completely an end in itself; it is never totally without the element of necessity.24

Work as part of the world of necessity must be accounted for in the blue-collar perspective and not merely explained as an alienating force in industrial society. To imply that all work is alienating in a total sense is to misplace the judgment of the world of leisure and affluence onto the majority who can only realize such hopes in their dreams. It is thus a misguided view that takes as a given the affluence and leisure that most will never fully know. To deny the necessity of, at

24 Ibid., p. 31.
times, hard, monotonous, and non-fulfilling work is to turn

time back to an idyllic past that in no way could deal with the
demands of a mass society. The worker who knows from the
beginning that he is not and probably never will be part of the
leisure class of the upper-middle and rich also knows that his
hope of a decent life will come not from a redistribution of
wealth, or from a transformation of alienating work into pleasurable
self-fulfillment, but from improved wages and conditions of em-
ployment. As a worker, consumer, and taxpayer he does not
condemn those who employ and pay him but those who degrade
him by labeling him narrow, racist, and uptight.

The classic charges of alienation and the nature of in-
dustrial society have spotted the excesses of the industrial
state. Those that sought to curb these excesses by humanizing
various industrial and bureaucratic institutions seemed to have
come closer to a more valid appraisal of modern mass society.
They have, like Marx and Harrington, sought to reform the
abuses and thus not disregarded the only possibility for most to
partake in the best that America had to offer those that took up
the challenge. Those that seek transformation have to some
extent naively misjudged the effort expended in sustaining and
maintaining mass society. So necessarily their dream is small
scale and only for a few. This is why the blue-collar world
sees itself pressed in, accused, and forgotten. As Peter Schrag so clearly points out:

Is there an urban ethic to replace the values of the small town? Is there a coherent public philosophy, a consistent set of beliefs to replace family, home, and hard work? What happens when the hang-ups of upper-middle-class kids are in fashion and those of blue-collar kids are not? What happens when "do your own thing" becomes not the slogan of the solitary deviant but the norm?25

With all of these pressures and seemingly no media or social power, the blue-collarites do complain, are angry, and frustrated, but they still go to work the next day. Alienation in this sense has sought to direct needed inquiries into the machine-age but seems not to have attracted those closest to it to effect radical change. It does not seem to fully explain the relationship between work and happiness. Even the most alienated of modern work conditions (especially automobile assembly line) is not totally rejected. The most oppressive jobs are rarely only means to exist but often become ends in themselves in some regard (a way to provide for family and home). Thus as Blauner considers alienation as a concept:

With all its social-psychological subtilties, it does not fully comprehend the complexities and ambiguities of the inner meaning of work to the individual. As a polemic, it therefore condemns too much, and as a vision, promises too much.  

Even in such a materially prosperous world the fear of joblessness and continuing insecurity seem to strike closer to the core of blue-collar concerns than do alienation and self-estrangement. So the estranged young of the counter-culture have misread the fears and anxieties of the blue-collar world and have attributed them to the machine and alienated work. This analysis thus supports the assertion that what has really happened is that the counter-culture has not totally understood the fortuitousness of its own place in society and the effort that is required to sustain it.

Abbie Hoffman calls himself a "cultural revolutionary" and urges people from all sectors of American society to walk away from their oppressive labor and follow him to continual Woodstocks.  

Charles Reich urges workers and businessmen alike to forget the worlds of Con I and Con II and romp in the grass with the liberated young. Richard Flacks in a more political dialectical vein urges a coalition of alienated labor

26 Blauner, Alienation and Freedom, p. 31.

27 Abbie Hoffman, Woodstock Nation.
with the increasingly aware youth and student movements now taking shape as agents of change within the university. His analysis of the modern condition is this:

There is a deep, far-reaching crisis in advanced capitalism. The root of this crisis lies in the contradiction between the technological capacities and social organization of society. The technology frees increasing numbers from direct dependence on material insecurity. But it cannot provide either the social institutions of cultural meanings for such a post-industrial situation . . . . Continuing imperatives of profit, economic growth, and individual consumption perpetuate and endlessly ramifying network of irrationalities and barbarities.²

This style of political dialectic again supposes that work is totally a thing of the past. What we seem to lack is the will to overcome profit seeking and human manipulation. Our salvation will come with a radical restructuring of our social culture. An easier, freer, and more humane life-style can be had by all if most would hitch their political-social wagon to the rising star of liberated youth. On the surface, this may appear to be a supportable position, but is one that seems to overlook the world of the majority. In fact, the blue-collar man would tend to see such prospects of radical social change as an imposition of leisure class issues onto their already difficult world.

Peter Schrag seems to have captured the emotion of the blue-collar frustration as the product of both a political and cultural attack on basic blue-collar values. He thus writes about the "Forgotten American":

He cannot imagine any major change for the better; but he can imagine change for the worse. And yet for a decade he is the one who has been asked to carry the burden of social reform, to integrate his schools and his neighborhood, has been asked by comfortable people to pay the social debts due to the poor and the black . . . .

The ambiguities and changes in American life that occupy discussions in university seminars and policy debates in Washington, and that form the backbone of contemporary popular sociology, became increasingly the conditions of trauma and frustration in the Middle . . . .

The frustrated middle. The liberal wisdom about welfare, ghettos, student revolt, and Vietnam has only a marginal place, if any for the values and life of the working man. It flies in the face of most of what he was taught to cherish and respect: hard work, order, authority, self-reliance. 29

Labor has had its confrontations with management. Through its unions and collective bodies it remains wary of its bosses and alert to its own interests. But the real challenge to blue-collar life comes from the radical political preachings of the New Left and the cultural charges of the counter-culture. Here the cry of new turns to a fear of the stable and recognizable

29 Peter Schrag, Out of Place . . . . , p. 22-23.
being pulled away. The world of the radical and the new is not one that, even in America, automatically attracts the blue-collarite. As Peter Schrag points out:

The affront comes from the middle class people--and their children--who had been cast in the role of social exemplars (and from those cast as unfortunates worthy of public charity) who offend all the things on which working class identity is built: "hippies said a San Francisco longshoreman who fart around the streets and don't work"; welfare recipients who strike and march for better treatment; "all those said a California labor official who challenge the precepts that these people live on."30

The radical political-cultural appeal that the counterculture holds out to the blue-collarite usually repels and perplexes. Blue-collarites have a sense of stability that teaches them to be wary of overnight utopias. Given the fact that most workers in the 40's have experienced the Depression, WWII, and the slowed down 1950's, it would seem acceptable that they continue to behave politically much the way they do in their jobs. They have tended in these areas to hold on to more traditional and for them more successful models. That is, to support industrial society by asking only for increased wages and improved working conditions and not control of the company. Also in politics the same trend can be uncovered. Their politics reflects personal economic interests to the detriment of the more

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general or abstract issues of civil rights, the Vietnam War, or aid to education. Thus as Shostak tells us:

The AFL-CIO in short appears today to speak politically—and with some accuracy—for a rank and file that is progressive on impersonal public issues, conservative on personal and quasi-private issues, and fainthearted and self-centered on issues of once removed, if class linked, mutual aid items.31

Improved living conditions have not substantially changed blue-collar political voting habits. They have primarily stayed within the "system." On economic issues they have remained liberal (Democrat) but in certain social issues have been put to the test of their Jacksonian-Rooseveltian heritage. As Peter Schrag writes:

His anger, if he is angry, is not that of wage earner resenting management—and certainly not that of the socialist ideologue asking for redistribution of wealth—but that of the consumer, the tax-payer, and the family man. (Inflation and taxes wiping out most of the wage gains made in labor contracts signed during the past three years.) Thus he will vote for a Louise Day Hicks in Boston who promises to hold the color line in schools or for a Charles Stenvig calling for law enforcement in Minneapolis but reject a George Wallace who seems to threaten his pocketbook.32


32 Schrag, Out of Place . . . ., p. 28.
Bennett Berger has found a continuous voting pattern that holds true for blue-collarites even when they become homeowners in the suburbs. Their politics as their job expectations tend to remain stable within the more egalitarian tradition of the Democratic Party. At this point the Radical Left, SDS, New Student-Worker Coalition, all of whom picture themselves as real alternatives to a rigid and outdated New Dealism again miss the point of blue-collar political loyalties. The blue-collar pattern is logical and sensible. The Democratic Party has traditionally been the party of the working class and in general has represented their interests, thus blue-collar loyalty remains constant even in the face of some "ultra-liberal" social positions. The past presidential election was a case in point. Less than half of George Wallace's voters were blue-collarites and most of them were among the younger workers. The older workers of the blue-collar are generally more settled and have greater responsibilities in the face of decreasing mobility and thus know their own and their company's interests.

The myth of the melting pot of the suburbs is uncovered by Berger. He notes that homeownership in the suburbs by blue-collarites does not usually transform them into Republicans. It does contribute towards an increased interest in

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politics but not Republican politics--politics in general. In fact, from 1948 to 1956, the percentage of those that voted Democratic increased from 50 per cent to 64 per cent.\textsuperscript{34} Thus the appeal of the political counter-culture for radical social change to a group that for the past forty years has struggled to legitimate its unions and secure its jobs seems, at times, almost a hoax or at least a game played by the young on the politics of the old.

At this point, it is useful to examine the charge of political and social racism attributed to the blue-collar. The past few years have witnessed, at least, a rhetorical if not actual coalition among the rich, counter-culture, poor, and Blacks.\textsuperscript{35} When the sweep of civil rights and integration hit the nation the lower-middle-classes were the first asked to open up their unions, schools, and neighborhoods. Of course, the reaction was strongly negative and thus grew the charge of racism. This was partly true, but it was also based on a partial illusion.

The illusion was one discussed in Chapter I. It held that technology had brought with it total affluence and what we lacked to solve our social problems was only the will to do so. This vision flew in the face of blue-collar experience and met

\textsuperscript{34} Bennett Berger, \textit{Working-Class Suburbs}, p. 110.

\textsuperscript{35} Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, \textit{Beyond the Melting Pot}, p. xxxv.
only recalcitrance. To the blue-collarite who was struggling to escape social problems, the demand for integration, and job equality seemed almost a plot on the part of the rich, their children, and consenting black militants to deprive them of their only recently won gains. As Glazer and Monyhan point out:

Just as one illusion of racial politics in the 1960's in New York was that all blacks were poor and militant, another illusion was that all whites were affluent. Most of the Irish had taken three generations to work themselves out of poverty, the Italians two, the Jews had moved somewhat faster. But all these groups knew they had worked their way out of poverty at a time when government aid to the poor was nonexistent or more moderate, when mass public education was more restricted, when manpower development programs did not exist, and they found it difficult to understand the demand of "high income and high position now."36

Anxiety rather than racism is perhaps closer to the truth. To the blue-collar worker who is aware of the security granted him by his trade or craft union, the threat of integrated unions especially in hard times is more than one of color. The job equality demand becomes a threat that questions the blue-collarite's sense of economic self as his family's provider. To the blue-collarite who continues to pay on a home in one of the

36 Glazer, Beyond the Melting . . . ., p. iv.
less affluent suburbs, the demand for social integration shakes his sense of family and life-style. He is afraid of the pressures generated from all sides and above. As Arthur Shostak tells us:

Certain blue-collarites fear that "lower-class" Negroes are catching up with them. Others resent the stress now placed on attaining a college education, allure that tempts a growing number of their sons to draw away from them. And still others, displaced by new methods and machinery, find it hard to keep their self-regard from waver-ing.37

Brought up to believe in authority, responsibility, and hard work, he is now told that these past virtues are present day vices. He is told that these are qualities of rigidity and racism and no longer suffice for a liberated age. In this way he does come to see a plot directed against him by the rich and the poor. In New York, all of this has led to definite split between the rich and prestigious Jews who have championed the plight of the poor and the black and the lower-middle-class Jews who are still struggling to enter into the status-quo and feel somewhat betrayed by their wealthy brethren. Thus, in the case of racism and poverty the lower-middle-class blue-collar-ite has had the responsibility laid squarely on his shoulders. As Glazer and Monyhan tell us so pointedly:

37 Shostak, Blue-Collar Life, p. 221-2.
It was responsive to the enlightened self-interest of the Jews, and any other group on the city, to see the black newcomers grow prosperous and successful, as had their predecessors in one degree or another. But it also served to ascribe, or impute, a good deal of wrong doing to working-class Catholics who weren't especially conscious of wrong doing at all. Moreover, it set up situations of conflict between black and white working-class interests which no matter who won the battle, ended with the white workers losing the war. No matter what happened, they ended up as "racists" and "bigots." And at no cost to upper-middle-class players. It was demanded that trade unions be opened up to the newcomers, with all the primitive fears that would arouse. But it was rarely argued that blacks must be admitted to brokerage firms or law offices.38

The blue-collarite, who knows that he will never win the battle of higher education and increased social status quickly, who has only now achieved the possibility of the good life and some job security, is now blamed for our total failure to solve the pressing social problems of poverty and discrimination.

At this point the political and cultural split between blue-collar and counter-culture becomes more clearly defined. The visions, hopes, and expectations diverge greatly and point out the great difficulty of any meaningful or long lasting coalition. Where earlier Richard Flacks, founder of the SDS, assessed the state of labor and industry as due for radical change, let us now examine the open feelings of an average Middle

38 Glazer, Beyond the Melting . . . , p. ixv.
American reported by Robert Coles. He interviewed and recorded the words of a policeman who was probably somewhat more articulate than most. The following quotes could also be found in more philosophical terms in the writings of Eric Hoffer, and probably represent the basic attitudes of most lower-middle-class blue-collarites. Coles records of the policeman:

I'll tell you who the police are. They're men from plain, ordinary families. They don't have rich, fast-talking parents. They don't have parents who make all kinds of money by climbing over other people until they get on top, then start feeling sorry for the poor Negro, or the poor Puerto Rican, or whoever it is. They're not full of a lot of big talk about how they want to change the world, and help everyone out, and bring us freedom and peace and all the rest. But I'll tell you something, they're good men. . . . They go to church. They try to bring up their kids to respect older people and obey the law. 39

These words indirectly do paint a fairly accurate profile of the blue-collarite. The world of simple virtue and basic stability seem quite important to him.

When it comes to a direct approval of the radical counter-culture that are viewed and read about in the media or confronted on the streets, Coles records these impressions:

They march up and down advertising to the world how right they are and wrong

everyone else is and how much love they feel for humanity and how bad the cops are and most of the world, it seems. But do they ever really go and prove their good intentions?

You'll say I'm prejudiced, but I honestly believe a lot of those long-haired radical students are spoiled brats from rich families who won't lift a finger for anyone who's not part of their own group. It's talk, talk, talk, with them and dirty filthy talk, to be exact. The same goes for the civil rights people, a lot of them. They're for the Negro they say; but the police are helping Negroes every hour, day and night.

I wish the big, smart college people would get that through their heads, that someone has to be there on the firing line, protecting the whole of American society from what it's done wrong in the past.  

In the past few years, movies such as "Easy Rider," "Joe," and now on television, "All in the Family" have attempted to point out the blue-collarite as prejudiced and bigoted. From Coles' interview, it would seem that he is angry, but not to the point of rebellion. This anger might be more correctly interpreted not as an inherent flaw but as part of the anxiety and fear that the blue-collarite suffers in a world that is seemingly passing him by. In the end, his anger seems reasonable and nothing to fear, but a personal pain that should be listened to.

Since blue-collar employment and politics seem to compliment each other, we could expect the same from his family

\[40\text{Ibid.}, p. 74-5.\]
concerns and overall life style. Where the blue-collarite welcomed improvements in his work that eased the physical strain required to complete it, and where he welcomed the political success of his labor unions as a way to protect him by helping him secure his job, he also views his move out of the inner city as a way to escape his poor or more troubled neighbors. And this has all come about without great transformations of culture and life style. All of such improvements help to reinforce his basic belief in the American Dream, thus when he sees so many of the radical counter-culture critical of modern suburban life and modern institutions he again is perplexed.

Arthur Shostak has pointed out that for the blue-collar man suburbia is a place to relax rather than a school to acquire new social graces. Bennett M. Berger has also shown that the change from city to suburb is more one of house style rather than life style. Consequently, the charges of suburban stagnation, loveless homes, and souls dedicated to the worship of materialism instead of the celebration of the spirit of joy ring hollow and in fact challenge the basic foundations of blue-collar values. The good life is finally within view, but the children of the rich and those of the radical counter-culture seem

\[41\] Arthur Shostak, *Blue Collar Life*.

\[42\] Bennett M. Berger, *Working-Class Suburbs*. 
to be telling them that what they really seek is forbidden fruit that only holds eventual corruption of soul. Thus the blue-collarite who has spent his whole life in pursuit of the good life is now told by the radical young and others that his model is out of date. The new model now becomes the liberation of the soul. Hence the pose of disdain for middle-class material goods by the radical counter-culture becomes the new mode and places the blame for the evils of our time on those whose childhood dreams of the 1930's and 1940's are about to be realized.

The emphasis on stability and security by the blue-collarite leads the more experimental and deviant groups, many found in the counter-culture, to dominate the media. To most of us, continuity is not nearly as exciting as the different or experimental, except when the diverse becomes the norm. But, for better or worse, traditional family, politics, and life-style mark the blue-collar way of life. The emphasis on such stability, steady change, and social order come out of almost a civics book notion of society. It is part of a faith in fair play and a basic belief in the optimism of steady change. Thus demands for immediate eradications of social injustice or material poverty are seen by the blue-collarite, who is himself only now emerging from such conditions, as unrealistic and misdirected. He has seen in his own experience improvement only through steady change and is, therefore, suspicious of visions or
demands that promise too much too soon. Again, the blue-collar perspective may be held as overly cautious or not daring enough, but it is the style that marks its members. As Peter Schrag writes:

Stability is what counts, stability in job and home and neighborhood, stability in the church and in friends. At night you watch television and sometimes on a weekend you go to a nice place—maybe a downtown hotel—for dinner with another couple. . . . The wife has the necessary appliances, often still being paid off, and the money you save goes for your daughter's orthodontist, and later for her wedding. The smoked Irishmen—the colored (no one says black; few even say Negro)—represent change and instability, kids who cause trouble in school, who get treatment that your kids never got, that you never got. . . . Law and order is the stability and predictability of established ways. Law and order is equal treatment—in schools, in jobs, in the courts—even if you're cheating a little yourself. The Forgotten Man is Jackson's man. He is the vestigial American democrat of 1840: "They all know that their success depends upon their own industry and economy and that they must not expect to become suddenly rich by the fruits of their toil."43

It has been too easy, and in a way too shallow, to associate such a basic view of the world to the demagogue politics of a George Wallace, because, in fact, most blue-collarites voted Democrat (Humphrey) in the last national election. To label the blue-collar as purely racist is glib and misses the point.

43Schray, Out of Place . . . ., p. 19-20.
This analysis supports the assertion that what we have is a group of people who have taken one or two or three generations to come upon the possibility of the good life. Their entrance into the suburbs and the universities is only recent. The upper-middle-class arrived sooner, and their children have gathered the advantages gained by their parents. The blue-collarite has known and accepted this as part of the rules of the game, but only asks the same opportunity and a set of stable rules. So his reactions to differing life styles and socially liberal politics are rooted in a continuous and deeply ingrained tradition and culture. That is, with all the talk of open educational opportunities only one in four blue-collar high school graduates go on to college while three out of four white-collar high school graduates go on to college.\(^{44}\) Also it is significant to note that half of the brightest students who are in the lowest socio-economic status level do not attend college while only five per cent of the highest socio-economic level do not.\(^{45}\) This shows that the prospects of fulfilling the American Dream will continue to come from improvements within the blue-collar world and not by a status move up. And here is part of the missed vision of the counter-culture. As products of the middle-and

\(^{44}\) Miller, Rich Man, Poor Man, p. 194.

\(^{45}\) Miller, Rich Man . . . . (p. 193, Table X-15 and p. 1943, Table X-16)
upper-middle-class suburban and professional life, they have assumed the affluence of all those white.

The blue-collarite accepts the reality of his class base, but also takes refuge within it and its surrounding life style. Status pressure during the past thirty years has depreciated the glorification of the worker. He may now seek his identity in home and ethnic group. As Glazer and Monyhan point out:

"Today, it may be better to be an Italian than a worker. Twenty years ago, it was the other way around." 46 Especially with the more traditional family oriented Italians of New York, even better jobs and higher income have not led to an automatic move out of the old neighborhoods. For them the old neighborhoods were citadels of security and community and worthy of maintaining. As Glazer tells us about the Italian neighborhoods:

Though weakened in some cases and strengthened in others, are still in large measure where they were.

Nor are these old Italian neighborhoods only shells of their former selves, inhabited exclusively by the older people. Many of the married sons and daughters have stayed close to their parents. Even the trek to the suburbs, when it does occur among Italians, is very often a trek of families of two generations, rather than simply of the young. And it is striking how the old neighborhoods have been artfully adapted to a higher standard of living rather than simply deserted, as they would have been by other groups, in more American style. 47

46 Glazer, Beyond . . . . , p. xxxiv.
47 Glazer, Beyond . . . . , p. 187.
This is also true of more mobile blue-collarites who even though they have made the move out of the inner city still retain the same sense of neighborhood and family. A pleasant home with manageable children can be a haven against job and other wider social pressures. So to the blue-collarite the neighborhood and the friendships that it holds is not to be violated. It is a place where vital separate traditions can be maintained against a world in flux.

Arthur Shostak gives us a profile of a stable city neighborhood that aids in understanding the need of the blue-collarite for continuity. He writes:

A dense and vibrant street life combines with a wide network of personal affiliations to weave the whole together. Too much change and too much ambition too rapidly realized are avoided—the powerless can concentrate instead on the various distractions (friends, family, possessions) that make life tenable and help pass time.48

So a vote for Louise Day Hicks of Boston who offers to hold the color line is not innate "white-backlash" but something much deeper and more meaningful for our times—it is a way of expressing a defense of the familiar, secure, and comfortable ways of the cherished neighborhood. Thus the call for the integrity of neighborhood schools is only an out-post of resistance that

48 Shostak, Blue-Collar Life, p. 106.
seeks to preserve the sanctity of the inner citadel—the neighborhood. This probably seems somewhat strange to many of the radical counter-culture who at the same time seem to be increasingly disavowing the "stale" suburbs. Thus when lifestyle and neighborhood have been so closely woven together, the real estate agent or the fact of low cost public housing become and remain the real threats to the blue-collar style of life. He senses a note of insensitivity, or at best, misunderstanding among those who seek a political coalition with the poor and black, but have never experienced social or economic integration with them. His hope is to attain affluence, therefore, he does not understand its rejection by many of those of the counter-culture.

As the boredom or monotony of some blue-collar labor is compensated for by social companionship at the place of work, or by secure family or neighborhood ties, we might expect blue-collarites to hold out only traditional hopes for education. Where workers do not demand control or creativity in work, they probably do not expect intellectual liberation from education. This should not be surprising, but what should seem surprising is the continued faith that the blue-collar world holds in the educational institutions. Even though writers

like Sexton, Shostak, and Miller have pointed out what the working-class are generally excluded from full participation in higher education because of income, family background, previous public school performance, or even, as is the case with the New York Italians, personal choice, the hope is still strong that perhaps one of their children will go on to a profession and bring pride to the whole family.

White-collar salaries average from a third to a half greater than blue-collar. Also, 69 per cent of those families earning $10,000 or more come from white-collar groups of professional, managerial, and sales, although many blue-collar family incomes in the past few years are on the rise (teamsters, carpenters, and plumbers). Blue-collarites also suffer from much greater rates of unemployment. This is not new evidence. The blue-collarites have known and accepted


51 Shostak, _Blue-Collar Life_.

52 Miller, _Rich Man, Poor Man_.

53 Shostak, _Blue-Collar Life_, p. 69, Table 4.

54 _Ibid._, p. 69, Table 5.

55 _Ibid._, p. 76, Table 7.
this. But these factors reflect a job insecurity and a work life unpredictability. All of this goes on in the face of personal responsibilities that probably are basic in their reinforcement of a stable style of life and work that can be tempered with only at great cost. Thus the brazenness and the disdain for conventional work by many of the counter-culture leave the blue-collar culture wavering in misunderstanding. This leads him to believe that what he would so much desire for his children, higher education, is treated so matter-of-factly and at other time with scorn by those that can have it. The hoped for and the given again come face to face here.

In the past, the blue-collar ethic has held its members accountable for any shortcomings of wage, education, or job. Most of those involved in the world of work must then shoulder the burden of any lack of advancement in their own lives. They have not sought to blame the schools, government, or management. As Chinoy tells us with his interviews of automobile workers:

Occasionally some of the men interviewed did give evidence of self-depreciation, guilt, and lowered self regard. "I guess I'm not smart enough," said a thirty-eight year-old machine-operator who had never worked at anything except a factory job, laughing gently at himself as if to ease this self-evaluation. 56

56 Chinoy, Automobile Workers . . . , p. 124.
Chinoy goes on to relate similar experiences of workers blaming themselves of narrow interest in money or of getting married early as the reasons for not being more than what they were. This attitude of self-blame follows a basically lowered expectation out of life and also allows the blue-collarite, with his commitment to the American Dream, to hope for more from the future of his children.

The hope that the blue-collarite holds out for the future is not always one that visualizes his children as white-collarared professionals. Understanding the reality of blue-collar existence, craft workers encourage their sons to follow them in the profession, which with its good intentions leads many critics to label this as closed-union exclusivity. But many times this is all that a worker can pass on to his son.

For example, from the New York Times, a union member wrote:

Some men leave their sons money, some large investments, some business connections, and some a profession. I have only one worthwhile thing to give: my trade. I hope to follow a centuries-old tradition and sponsor my sons for an apprenticeship. For this simple father's will it is said that I discriminate against Negroes. Don't all of us discriminate? Which of us . . . will not choose a son over all others?57

This hope is within the blue-collar world, but there rests in most workers a general rather hazy notion of the way up

57 Peter Schrag, Out of Place in . . . , p. 24.
through education.

To most blue-collarites, the schools should reflect the neighborhood ethic of obedience and responsibility and thus in mixed neighborhoods (blue-collar and white-collar) the blue-collarite tends to be the most traditional in his educational outlook. He is more likely to resent experimental or liberal curriculum in favor of a more task-oriented approach.

With this vision, most failures on the part of the school are taken into, the ethic of self-blame and may, like the father before, be transmuted into hope for the next son. This is a truly amazing aspect of blue-collar life, that personal, school, and social shortcomings allow the blue-collarite to maintain his belief in the prospects of a more hopeful future. That the blue-collarite is able to view himself as a "provider for family" allows him to handle his work and status. It, also, in the light of the present changing scene, the advance of science, and the general improvements of working and living conditions, allows him to hope for more. Thus Chinoy tells us about working fathers with sons:

Among the fathers there was an almost universally expressed desire that their sons not go into the factory, that they "do better than that" . . . .

Since most workers felt that they could not and should not dictate their children's occupational choices, their positive aspirations usually focussed upon education rather than upon specific
occupations or professions, although a few did have definite occupational hopes—doctor, musician, artist, engineer.  

The trouble here is that the seeking of a profession through higher education is becoming more and more an excursion to a different planet. Blue-collar sons and daughters on campus are the most easily intimidated by labels of "fascist engineers or teachers." Even though more blue-collar children turn up on the nation's campuses, these very campuses have become increasingly coopted by the style of the more radical of the counter-culture. So even on the college campus the split remains.

Some groups of blue-collarites have in the past characteristically stayed away from education as a matter of choice or culture. To the Italian immigrants of New York who came from small villages, education was for a personal style of life and culture that simple peasants could never aspire to. In the face of such cultural conservatism, there was no ideology of change. Intellectual curiousity or personal originality were ridiculed or suppressed as attempts to usurp the authority of the father and family. One improved himself through hard work or a good job, not in school by women teachers who "didn't even beat the children." So a born blue-collarite, the Italian

58 Chinoy, Auto... , p. 124.
immigrant is only now finding the value of higher education.

As Glazer and Monyhan tell us:

> The background of South Italians does not incline them toward the more intellectual and speculative college curricula; education is seen, when its importance is finally understood, almost exclusively as a means of preparing for a profession--teaching for the girls, engineering or the free professions for the boys.\(^{59}\)

Given the economic, social, and educational history of the blue-collar world, we can see that they are only now, because of higher wages, revived expectations or altered cultural perspectives being exposed to the overall general opportunities for higher education so long enjoyed by the white-collar world.

But what has happened has seemed in part to "change the rules of the game" to the extent that the good professors for the blue-collarites are those who hold to institutional continuity. The blue-collarites do expect the universities to fulfill and to train their sons and daughters for the professions. But they do not expect a cultural transformation to take place that brings back to home ideological confrontation at each school holiday. As Peter Schrag writes:

> We have never been unequivocal about the symbolic patricide of Americanization and upward mobility, but if at one

time mobility meant rejection of older (European) styles it, was, at least, done in the name of America. Now the labels are blurred and the objectives indistinct. Just at the moment when a tradition-bound Italian father is persuaded that he should send his sons to college--that education is the only future--the college blows up. At the moment when a parsimonious taxpayer begins to shell out for what he considers an extravagant state university system the students go on strike. Marijuana, sexual liberation, doress style, draft-resistance, even the rhetoric of change become monsters and demons in a world that appears to turn old virtues upside down. 60

The study turns now in Chapter IV to an analysis of the counter-culture in terms of the concepts of alienation and identity used to explicate the values and the value conflicts of the blue-collar worker in this chapter.

60 Schrag, Out of Place in America, p. 31.
CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF COUNTER-CULTURE:
ALIENATION AND IDENTITY

The difficulty in any examination of counter-culture values is one that ties up ideological-political issues to a quest for identity. Those that write and interpret the thoughts and the actions of the counter-culture, many times, are caught up in this difficulty. It confuses the adherence to political causes or cultural styles by the counter-culture as an incorruptible source of critical insight into the workings of modern society.

In effect, what one finds in the examination of many writings dealing with the counter-culture is the use, by the interpreter, of those in the process of finding self in order to reinforce some political, ideological, or cultural grievance. When such interpretations deprecate basic styles and historical perspectives in any way antecedent to the interpretation, there often is an aura of purity and infallibility of the new that is unfair to those that are, in fact, the representative embodiment of that new. In short, to deify the young counter-culture is to dehumanize them. Even with their idealism and energy, they
are susceptible to the same temptations and shortcomings as the rest of society.

In fact, the political and cultural split between the blue-collar and the counter-culture may grow out of this confusion of interpretation. To assume that all alienation, lack of choice, and perceived repression is due to political differences is to deny the importance of psychological insights. This rather widespread interpretation has also led to a confused perception of blue-collar motives and goals (Chapter III) and an overestimation of counter-culture potential.

With the failure of the working-class to overthrow an "oppressive" managerial society and restructure it in the name of the people, Socialism as a totally accepted governmental system was to wane in America.¹ Capitalism had blundered blindly into the possibility of creating comforts to satisfy a mass society but still would not choose the more humanitarian guidance of a Socialist system.² Both of these failures have led to the delusion of the Orthodox Left in America because they tended to overestimate the frustration point of the American working class. However, the Neo-Marxian and other Romantic critics of the present century have picked up the criticisms of

alienation and denial of self-fulfillment and placed them upon
the shoulders of modern technological society.

The new critics from Marcuse, Ellul, Roszak Reich,
Flacks and Goodman to Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin, while
to a great extent misunderstanding blue-collar values, have had
great appeal to the alienated and the radical of the counter-
culture. Where for the working class the issues have always
been those of wages, working conditions, and job security,
the counter-culture complains about the lack of opportunity for
creativity, the lack of authentic alternative life-styles, and the
determinism of traditional societal molds. These rigid systems
(Con I and Con II) may have been acceptable in their day, but
they are responsible in the eyes of these critics for the present
evils that beset the world.

These new critics talk and write about the radical
change inherent in the new alternatives now facing a world that
is inflexible and past-oriented. The approaches generated out
of the writings and values of the Neo-Romantic critics or gen-
erated by the changes taking place within many of the counter-
culture are somewhat varied but they continue to support cer-
tain common perspectives. The approaches vary from new
political strategies emerging from educated workers (intellegent-
sia) at the universities\textsuperscript{3} to cultural and forceful defenses of

\textsuperscript{3}Richard Flacks, "Strategies for Radical Social Change."
new and alternative options, to the inherent persuasiveness and non-violent force of Consciousness III.\textsuperscript{4} It is important to add here that these approaches to change and criticisms of modern conditions have alienation as the common theme.

Alienation to many of the counter-culture is the processing and the pre-determination characteristic of modern technological society that seeks to turn out the "happy robot" while at the same time it, consciously or unconsciously, estranges man from his natural self. Modern technological society, as the charges go, seeking its own interests outside of man debases and denaturalizes him in the process.

If these charges are true, the only path to sanity and human kindness in such a world is transcendence or the return to a more natural past. If they are partially true, then there is hope in reform or competent adaptation. The ideals that must come out of such critical observances of basic social flaws are the opposite of work, production, and "manipulation." These would be joy, creativity, and brotherhood. And it is in the examination of counter-culture values that such terms are encountered.

The most important aspect of counter-culture style is not political-ideological. The crucial factor is the influence

\textsuperscript{4}Charles Reich, \textit{Greening of America}. 
exerted, in one way or another, on the society around it. For what we have seen during the past few years can be interpreted in one of three ways. First, and most optimistically, we have the Roszakian or Reichian view that poses it as the inevitable and emerging alternative to a rigid and insensitive past. Its music, art, companionship, cooperation, and sensitivity is reflected in its cultural style of speech, dress, and behavior. All this is infectious and inevitable and in its unique non-violent way will bring about profound and lasting changes.

Secondly, it may be interpreted as only part of a larger and ongoing process and not as an originator or director of future change but only a captive and manifestation of it. This view is discussed by those like Alvin Toffler who sense the impact of constant social and technical change upon the whole of society.\(^5\)

Thirdly, and more appropriately, the counter-culture phenomenon may be interpreted more classically as part of a developmental search for identity among those not afforded acceptance into the larger society of more competitive identities but pressured into choice in a world where both traditional and new compete for loyalties. Erik Erikson comes closest to explicating this position\(^6\) with Kenneth Keniston adding a more


specialized treatment of the counter-culture.  

What we have then in reviewing the various aspects of interpretation of counter-culture values are two basic visions. One views the counter-culture lifestyle as the real alternative to an alienated technological world. The other does not go that far. It holds a more orthodox explanation in that it states that all young suffer the pangs of development, the balancing of youthful and historical personality against the demands and new offerings of the larger society. The first view in its way is more political and ideological and may be confused with the political and ideological views and criticisms of those that write of it and speak in its name. The second more classical view allows for the process of forming an ego-identity as natural to men at all times and in all societies. It also considers in more general terms the political, cultural, and ideological ramifications as only a part of the strain of identity formation and not as the causal aspect of such formation. This latter treatment seems more appropriate to the investigation of counter-culture values, however, the former view is important in explaining the conflict between the blue-collar and counter-culture visions and assessments of modern technological society.

Alienation in the classical Marxian sense never really lived up to the challenge it posed to a dehumanized industrial

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American workers may gripe and strike but they have come to terms with a working class existence and have remained immune to calls of radical social change in modern times. They have accepted new technological developments not as alienating but only as a threat to jobs (Chapter III). The blue-collarite thus forms identity out of alienation as workers, family provider, and consumer. These qualities are sought for and important to the blue-collar ethic. On the other hand, alienation among counter-culture may be part of acquiring productive roles and social and individual identity. The period between the security of childhood and the competency of adulthood, adolescence, poses the greatest challenge and threat to young identity formation. When this naturally difficult period is added to a condition of delayed adulthood, then the struggle for ego-identity becomes compounded. Alienation is an apt definition for this period characterized by lack of or incomplete identity formation.

Where the blue-collarite is forced by social and economic circumstances into identity choices out of social and economic necessity during adolescence, the young of the counter-culture have these choices delayed and magnified. The early confrontation of social reality influences blue-collar expectations and brings him more readily to follow the identity pattern.

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imposed by the world of work. Whereas, for the young of the counter-culture social and adult identities are delayed and prolonged due to educational requirements and a deferred style of life. He is therefore denied access to the social mainstream and is burdened by the demands of maturation and the need to find a competent self. That he chooses and at the same time is chosen for him. Consequently, for the counter-culture, the need to be needed and the need to be accepted as a contributor and producer is delayed allowing the young in their development to experiment with identity choices, to be confused by identity expectations of the larger society, or to be showered with excessive numbers of choices that come from a society of technological abundance.9

This investigator asserts that the charge of alienation that comes out of the counter-culture is due not to the advent of the machine age but to the deferring of adult identity and the identity confusion that comes with overwhelming change and choice. These hypotheses will be examined in the light of alienation and identity and the impact of affluence and rapid change on the formation of ego-identity among the young of the counter-culture.

Alienation is a common theme running through the maze of writings of those that speak for and about the counter-culture.

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9 Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock*. 

Does it hold the same sociological and psychological meaning for both counter-culture and blue-collar? Does it refer to non-fulfilling and self-estranging work? Or does it touch the deeper cord of personal meaning in technological society? The comparison is many times made that the alienation of both blue-collar and counter-culture are identical. However, as we have seen (Chapter III), both the issues of work and technology are handled by the blue-collarites. They, as of today, have not "turned off" or "dropped out." But the comparison is continual, which demonstrates that both affluence and change color counter-culture perspectives to the point (seeking political-cultural unity) where they finally break down. In short, the lack of a well formed and confident ego-identity places stress on the bearer and those that deal with him.

Marxian symbols permeate Neo-Marxian thoughts and criticisms, but they are applied to a world of varying realities. Let us examine some such thoughts. As Theodore Roszak writes:

Just as the dark satanic mills of early industrialism concentrated labor and helped create the class-consciousness of the proletariat, so university campus, where up to thirty thousand students may be gathered, has served to crystallize the group identity of the young--with the important effect of mingling freshmen of seventeen and eighteen with graduate students well away in their twenties.10

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He goes on in the same manner:

These non-technicians know that the society cannot do without its universities, that it cannot shut them down or brutalize the students without limit. The universities produce the brains the technocracy needs; therefore, making trouble on the campus is making trouble in one of the economy's vital sectors.  

The emphasis on political unity and a structural power base ringing with Marxian terminology but is now applied to members of the "oppressed" counter-culture and not to the working class. It is important to notice that a "crystallized group identity" has now taken over the term "working class consciousness." This has taken place with the assumption that youth and class have the same potential as defined agents of social change. This is an important misjudgment of youth for class.

Abbie Hoffman, elder spokesman for the radical counter-culture, writes about a growing political consciousness among the young. He tells us in his own colorful manner:

Our conspiracy has grown more militant. Flower children have lost their innocence and grown their thorns. We have recognized that our culture in order to survive must be defended. Furthermore, we have realized that the revolution is more than digging rock or turning on. The revolution is about coming together in a struggle for change. It is about the destruction of a system based on bosses and competition and the building of a new community based

\[11\] Ibid., p. 29.
on people and cooperation. That old system is dying all around us and we joyously come out in the streets to dance on its grave. With our free stores, liberated buildings, communes, people's parks, dope, free bodies and our music, we'll build a society in the vacant lots of the old and we'll do it by any means necessary. Right On!  

Richard Flacks writes about the new political vision of a united youth counter-culture ("intelligentsia" or "educated labor") in more Marxian tones. This is what it is predisposed to bring about:

It is a vision of a society in which the *primary vocational activities* would be focused on the production and distribution of knowledge and art, on the provision of a vast array of human services, and on collective efforts to create maximally beneficial communal and natural environments. It is a vision of a society in which *technological development and economic investment* are guided not by imperatives of profit, economic growth, and empire, but rather by drives to eliminate "alienated" labor and to promote public happiness and personal self-actualization. It is a culture that values cooperation and love over competition and dominance, self-expression over self-denial, and equality over materially based status differentiation. It is a quest for a *political order* in which the nation-state is replaced by self-governing communities.

Flacks, as Hoffman and Reich, has taken the stage of developing youth as a political alternative to the rigid values of the controlling system. His Marxian analysis has also been applied

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to the radical counter-culture and not as an explanation for an emerging ego-identity of the young but as the path away from doom.

One more examination of similar thought finds Charles Reich explaining young identities in transition as real alternatives to ongoing and prevailing social molds. He writes:

\textit{This is the revolution of the new generation. Their protest and rebellion, their culture, clothes, music, drugs, ways of thought, and liberated life-style are not a passing fad or a form of dissent and refusal nor are they in any sense irrational. The whole emerging pattern, from ideals to campus demonstrations to beads and bell-bottoms to the Woodstock Festival, makes sense and is part of a consistent philosophy. It is both necessary and inevitable, and in time it will include not only youth, but all people in America.}^{14}

The real problem with this kind of analysis is that it takes youth with incomplete identities as the agent of a profound social change which in the past not even the whole of the working class could bring about. It also takes changing and developing life styles as part of a constant culture and makes no allowances for the influence of maturation and added experiences.

The transition between childhood and adulthood has always been a difficult period, even in the best of times. The

\footnote{Charles Reich, \textit{Greening} . . . . , p. 2.}
less confusing and less modern tribal societies have been able to routinize and institutionalize such youthful "rites of passage," and have thus avoided the social shock generated by a free floating adolescence. However, in modern times conditions of affluence among the higher classes in society and conditions of constant social change have added in prolonging this pre-adult period of identity formation among the young until early adulthood. With nowhere to go and no one to become until one reaches his twenties, and with many changing choices or models to follow modern societies must expect to suffer more and more the "crisis of adolescence."

Social and psychological identity strength tend to be generated out of the development of skills that foster self-assurance, wholeness of personality, and the satisfaction of the desire to be needed. Such satisfaction invariably comes from acceptance into the social mainstream. For the working class this comes about more quickly due to social and economic necessity. However, for increasing numbers of the young this process and development becomes more and more delayed and at times is laden with unexpected consequences. The need to do and to be is a natural part of childhood and adolescent development and must be satisfactorily encouraged. As Erikson tells us:

While children at times need to be left alone in solitary play . . . . they all, sooner or later, become dissatisfied and disgruntled without a sense of being able to make things and make them well and even perfectly: it is this that I have called the sense of industry. Without this, even the best entertained child soon acts exploited. It is as if he knows and his society knows that now that he is psychologically already a rudimentary parent, he must begin to be something of a worker and potential provider before becoming a biological parent . . . . He now learns to win recognition by producing things. He develops perserverance and adjusts himself to the inorganic laws of the tool world and can become an eager and absorbed unit of a productive situation. 16

The period of psychosocial moratorium, 17 or adolescence, consists of identity formation and personality choices. It is a time where what one can do (his own uniqueness) and what can be done (needs of the larger society) must in some way compliment and reinforce each other in order to bring about a healthy development of both individual and society. This "flowing of generations" and mutual reinforcement is not always smooth or personal and in this case identity search can easily turn into identity doubt or psychosocial alienation. In the face of high technological expectations and at times excessive choices, the choice one makes may be none at all ("dropping out") or a negative one that flies in the face of parental and


social expectations. The impact of such drastic change and choice pressure is delineated here by Erikson:

In general it is the inability to settle on an occupational identity which most disturbs young people. To keep themselves together they temporarily over-identify with the heroes of cliques and crowds to the point of an apparently complete loss of individuality (as in "I am of the Woodstock Generation") On the other hand, clarification can also be sought by destructive means It is important to understand in principle (which does not mean to condone in all of its manifestations) that such intolerance may be, for awhile, a necessary defense against a sense of identity loss. This is unavoidable at a time of life when the body changes its proportions radically and when the immediate future confronts one with too many conflicting possibilities and choices. Adolescents not only help one another temporarily through such discomfort by forming cliques and stereotyping themselves, their ideals, and their enemies; they also insistently test each other's capacity for sustaining loyalties in the midst of inevitable conflicts of values.

Alienation as lack of a whole identity is natural and understandable, but it does not hold up when applied to the harsher world of the blue-collarite, who is a participant and knows that the world of work will not go away and leave behind a utopia. Where alienation is important in the counter-culture is the tendency of an incomleted identity to overcommit itself

18Erik Erikson, Identity, Youth . . . . , p. 132-3.
to a leader or ideology as a way to make up for a sense of completedness. This is also understandable and expected.

Among many of the counter-culture who have only known an affluent world where the ideal of totally satisfied desires is the norm, the reality of a world less than that with which one is personally acquainted may lead to identity confusion, social disillusionment, cynicism, or negative identity choice. Affluence seems here to be an important factor in generating divergent world views on the part of those who partake in it (counter-culture) and those who aspire to it (blue-collar). President Edward H. Levi of the University of Chicago has recognized this influential condition and in what was written about his views it was recorded:

He finds that the high expectations of modern students leads to easy disillusionment. "One can ask," he says, "why any generation can feel that it was born into a perfect world--and then feel deceived when it found out it wasn't."¹⁹

Easy idealism in the face of real social problems may lead to cynicism and lack of involvement or commitment and it needs a strong ego to grapple with and overcome such a crisis. What at times is taken to be a "relaxed," "free-flowing," or "spontaneous" life style on the part of the counter-culture may actually be a time of non-choice or non-commitment. The

pressures and demands may be so great as to really try undeveloped skills and thus cast doubt on one's ego competence. The psychosocial moratorium does not guarantee intelligent experimenting among youth nor does the freedom granted by affluence generate selfless social concern in many cases. As Roszak surprisingly points out:

To be sure, such an infantization of the middle-class young has a corrupting effect. It ill prepares them for the real world and its unrelenting if ever more subtle disciplines. It allows them to nurse childish fantasies until too late in life; until there comes the inevitable crunch. For as life in the university wears on for these pampered youngsters, the technocratic reality principle begins grimly to demand its concessions. 20

The sense of conspiracy is another important aspect of counter-culture alienation. It is bound up with a background of high idealism and affluence. "It is," as Kenniston says, "drawn from a background of upper-middle-class, politically liberal, secular families and life-styles, excellent educations and attendance at the more prestigious universities. It is the kind of background that makes the stage of youth most possible." 21 Where social and personal goals are high and have been continually reinforced by an environment of affluence, the

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20 Roszak, The Making of . . . . , p. 32.

21 Kenneth Kenniston, Young Radicals, p. 274.
need to do and to succeed also runs high. These needs are placed in a more indulgent surrounding of greater choice. But with identity formation comes at times self-doubt as to personal competence. Thus there may be the need to justify one's lack of confidence or fear of an impending manipulation of one's autonomy or uniqueness by the development of a theory of conspiracy.

Kenniston, in discussing the uncommitted youth of the counter-culture, talks about the decline of Utopia in American society. It asks men to live without high ideals but with "realistic" and "practical" approaches to "empirical goals." This may be and may have always been the case, but idealism has been present in other individuals outside of youth. Stephen Spender seems to grasp more clearly the fear of failure and at times the need to pull away from political or social action on the part of the young rebels. He writes:

Students look to writers like Marcuse to analyse and explain—to "justify"—their sense of frustration which they feel in a world in which they are a privileged minority, and where they enjoy a great deal of freedom, they want it explained to them that the whole democracy, with its governing class, big business, mass media, is a vast conspiracy of powers that makes their freedoms illusory.23


To feel "conspired against" is also to feel out of place among, or alienated from, those from whom one seeks approval. This is characteristic among many of the psychosocial immigrants of society—the adolescent young. The need to be accepted as unique and the freedom to do so may in an uncertain world lead one to justify non-action through a personal cynicism that attributes corruption to the possibilities offered in modern society. Thus as Erikson states:

The necessity of finding, at least temporarily, a total stamp of standard at this time is so great that youth sometimes prefers to be nothing, and that totally, rather than remain a contradictory bundle of identity fragments. ²⁴

Those that "turn off," "drop out," or "mellow out," take on the guise of wisdom that has seen it all. Or, the sense of non-involvement may reflect a more relaxed approach that disdains mindless competition. Whatever, it is probably somewhat misleading to look at such a transitory state as one upon which real social alternatives may be founded.

Conspiracy is the other side of trust. It also reflects a belief that free choices are not really that but manipulations of social authorities and in that way a strategy to deny one a freely chosen identity of his own. With a conspiratorial attitude there is doubt that one has any right to self-determination, but,

²⁴Erikson, Identity, Youth and Crisis, p. 88.
as the worker, is processed for the good of an outside agent. The lack of trust in elders or social institutions may lead to the formation of a conspiritorial attitude that attributes the basest motives to all social life. For this reason, youth often belittle authorities or parents as conspiritorial agents in order to search for individual mystics, charismatic leaders, or collective ideologies that claim the power to reverse the irreversible or by predicting the future being able to control it. Thus only be feeling victim of a conspiracy may some of the young justify unmade choices and incomplete identities.

This attitude may also explain the propensity on the part of many of the counter-culture to flaunt the negative social identities of public sex, drugs, and disdain for any responsibility to provide or partake in the face of those not trusted or those by whose judgment one is accepted into the ongoing society. As Erikson puts it:

The adolescent now looks for an opportunity to decide with free assent on one of the available or unavoidable avenues of duty and service, and at the same time is mortally afraid of being forced into activities in which he would feel exposed to ridicule or self-doubt. This, too, can lead to a paradox, namely, that he would rather act shamelessly in the eyes of his elders, out of free choice, than be forced into activities which would be shameful in his own eyes or in those of his peers. 25

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Among the indulged and the self-indulgent of the counter-culture prosperity has become automatic. Also with the attainment of material and social success among their parents the most fortunate of the counter-culture are usually exposed to a youthful environment that is economically secure and socially freer from the struggle for status. Such an environment encourages prolonged transition into the adult mainstream with greater emphasis on non-material more idealistic goals and self-expressive identities. Such a world, during the best of times, and in the face of a less encouraging society may lead to social and personal disillusionment and a belief that the larger society has conspired against one's given freedoms. And it is here that many of the radical counter-culture see themselves physically pampered and cared for by the material abundance of a technological society, while at the same time mentally coerced by a manipulative one. Thus it is ironic that both a sense of conspiracy and the freedom to experiment with identity roles are both luxuries found only in affluence.

The problem with attempting to appeal to a common sense of "alienation" and "exploitation" among both blue-collar and counter-culture is that social demands temper these points of possible rebellion among the blue-collar, where affluence isolates and insulates the young radical against any

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26Kenniston, Young Radicals, p. 245.
need to adapt himself to these same demands. The analysis that follows this condition finds the young radical outraged by the "reality" of the larger society while upset by the delusion and "fascism" of the blue-collarite. To the young radical any restriction on freedom of choice and freedom of self-expression is seen as an attempt by the technological society to manipulate human beings to some interest outside of the individual. It is here that the young visualize themselves to be as "processed" by their social institutions as the worker is "processed and exploited" by factory and management.

Emphasis on the values of self-actualization, independence, sensitivity to feelings, concern for others, free expression of emotion, openness, and spontaneity are characteristic of the liberal and affluent young. But given the stage of youth of those of the counter-culture and its concomitant social and economic security, how do these values hold up in the larger society in the presence of overpowering social problems? It is here where those such as Reich and Roszak have expected too much from those still in the process of becoming. Adolescence in its search for identity does uncover social flaws and offer unique approaches to new problems. Its energy can and does rejuvenate those around it by its need to know and learn from those that are wise and willing to teach. However, as an

27 Kenniston, Young Radicals, p. 245.
ideology in and of itself it understandably falters before overwhelming social problems and, therefore, must be viewed in a more developmental light.

The attempt to blame the machine and the processing of a technological society for the human shortcomings of self-estrangement and alienation seem somewhat shortsighted. The problems that exist in a technological society are the problems of change and adjustment to the new technology. The call to break up the machines and return to a communal setting in nature is a fantasy that in its way tries to handle the confusing and changing world of adult identities and social possibilities. The identity crisis that arises is a real and prolonged one for many of the young who share a sense of self-doubt and therefore a lack of trust in significant others. The special problem here is that while most make the transition from childhood to adulthood with minimal disruption, a minority is given the psychosocial luxury of coming to terms with an existence not universally reinforced throughout the society. As Erikson puts it:

The immediate contribution of the school age to a sense of identity can be expressed in the words "I am what I can learn to make work." It is immediately obvious that for the vast majority of men, in all times, this has been not only the beginning, but also the limitation of their identity; or better: the majority of men have always consolidated their identity needs around their technological
occupational capacities, leaving it to special groups (special by birth, by choice or election, and by giftedness) to establish and preserve those "higher" institutions without which man's daily work has always seemed an inadequate self-expression.  

In order to have a smooth transition from childhood to adulthood, it is important to have a stable sense of self and also important to have an acquaintance of social possibilities. This usually occurs where a basic trust has been established in both the adolescent and those that will teach and guide him. Joined with his own sense of industry and need to be a part of the larger society, the young can most readily make the passage into the social mainstream. As Erikson writes, "Man must learn to will what can be, to renounce as not worth willing what cannot be, and to believe he willed what is inevitable." The knowledge of social possibilities must come chiefly from responsible elders, who need to teach, and institutions, which must reaffirm parental-social values on a more formal level. The disruption of this ego-identity development is minimal in more traditional societies, but is compounded in times of drastic social and technological change so that not only adolescence but also adults and institutions are forced to undergo continual self-assessments.

29 Erikson, Insight and Responsibility, p. 118.
The factor of continual change is upsetting to most but seems to have a telling effect on the young of the counter-culture. The young in this situation are those least prepared to cope with such change. High expectations of self and society coupled with a world of uncertain and fluctuating adult roles exact a high tribute from the counter-culture. The appeal to quick solutions for the resolution of personal and social problems and a misreading of the social possibilities many times leads to a cynicism of the young which sees only futility in any redeeming social action. Or it may be an extension, on the part of the affluent young, of a personal will that demands gratification upon presentation. This latter interpretation is the one held by those such as Bettelheim, Sidney Hook, Lewis Feuer, and Eric Hoffer.

Constant and drastic change tend to break down the "flow of generations" (Erikson). When this takes place, then wisdom is in the hands of whatever or at times whoever is new. The elders out of their own self-doubt no longer feel fit to teach and carry on. Institutions seek renewal in order to be up to date. And the young many times are catered to as being closer to the new and therefore closer to future wisdom. The ultimate result is a perpetual unrooting that breaks down continuity. What finally remains is fragmented and isolated. As Alvin Toffler tells us:
To be "between styles" or "between subcults" is a life crisis, and the people of the future spend more time in this condition, searching for styles, than do the people of the past or present. Altering his identity as he goes, super-industrial man traces a private trajectory through a world of colliding subcults. This is the social mobility of the future: not simple movement from one economic class to another, but from one tribal grouping to another. Restless movement from subcult to ephemeral subcult describes the arc of his life.30

Where earlier (Chapter III) Victor Ferkiss has pointed out that automation has not taken place equally across the whole of society, so we confront a similar situation where the condition of affluence is not equally distributed to all classes of society. Those who are raised in such a background are more subject to the innumerable choices offered by technological abundance and their own social positions within it, and because of their own "newness" (unsettledness) are also more influenced by the new. As Kenniston writes, "Material prosperity alone has made a difference in the development of this generation . . . . without material affluence the restlessness, mobility, and "wastefulness" of today's youth could hardly be understood."31 But change or at least changing life-styles have become such a part of counter-culture life, that its impact must be examined.

30 Alvin Toffler, Future Shock, p. 316.
31 Kenniston, Young Radicals, p. 240.
The segmenting and isolating process that is characteristic of such conditions has also added in keeping the young farther away from the world of real social possibilities. Toffler tells us about the "children of streamlined, nuclear families," isolated from the social mainstream and forced upon themselves:

They become more responsive to the influences of peers than ever before. Rather than idolizing an uncle, they worship Bob Dylan or Donovan or whoever else the peer group holds up for a lifestyle model. Thus we are beginning to form not only a college student ghetto, but even semi-ghettos of pre-teens and teenagers, each with its own peculiar tribal characteristics, its own fads, fashions, heroes and villains.32

When one has formed a stable identity based on a skill or job competence then the threat of choices or the new seems less threatening. And it indeed requires ego strength on the part of adults and larger institutions to feel that even in the face of the new they have both something substantial to offer the young and a vital tradition to maintain and replenish. Without adults in possession of such competence and integrity, young people in need of an identity can neither rebel or obey.

As we usually find it, healthy identity formation is in part tempered by older models and in part by the awareness of social possibilities. These two qualities are blurred and sometimes

missing in the world of open choice and thus leave the unformed adolescent identity to pull itself up by its own bootstraps.

Both affluence and drastic change contribute to the maximizing of role confusion among the counter-culture by offering open choice and social idealism but presenting only social reality. Eric Erikson writes pertinently here about identity by telling us, "The key problem of identity, then, is (as the term connotes) the capacity of the ego to sustain sameness and continuity in the face of changing fate . . . . Identity connotes resiliency of maintaining essential patterns in the process of change."

To the unformed identity pressured by the fear of incompetence in the face of superiors or the threat of excessive choices and no direction, the swing towards the identification with a movement, leader, or ideology that rearranges the future and answers the present is many times brought to completion. This involvement may be faddishly mod, religious, or political. Ragged clothes and uncleanness as an affront to anal middle-class order and hygiene may be one turn. Another taken from Hesse's *Sidhartha* may be an interest in Eastern mysticism as found in the Hare Krishnas. The original "flower children" were probably following this path also. The East in its teachings of

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the balance between man and nature is seen as an alternative to environmental exploitation and human processing that takes place in Western industrial society. The Eastern tradition allows man, it is said, time to come upon his essence in the tranquil state of nature and assures him a status in the common world of man. Such radical choice allows the person to transcend by avoiding the demands of the more competitive Western society. It also assures him an identity by his right as a human in a community of equal members. These choices are more characteristic of the "uncommitted," and are part of the process of segmentation that goes on in the face of continual turn over of values.

The more radical influenced by the same condition of change and affluence many times choose more political alternatives. The rhetoric is Marxian but now applied to the grievances of the counter-culture and in a way is not revolutionary at all. This is true if one interprets the cry for revolution as a cry for entrance into a society that has prolonged acceptance. The cry is really one that asks in but unsure of itself in the status quo has to justify that uncertainty by condemning those who finally make the decision as who and when one enters into the social mainstream.

In other times, the search for identity and the need to be needed was not so overt but was defined by many of the
same pressures that exert themselves today. Arthur Koestler tells us of his conversion to Communism during his very early adulthood:

I was ripe to be converted, as a result of my personal case-history; thousands of other members of the intelligentsia and middle-classes of my generation were ripe for it, by virtue of other personal case-histories; but, however much these differed from case to case, they had a common denominator: the rapid disintegration of moral values, of the pre-1914 pattern of life in postwar Europe, and the simultaneous lure of the new revelation which had come from the East.  

What one encounters in many of the young of the counter-culture is a fear of losing self to an insensitive whole before one is able to gain self. This fear then extends itself to a program of denying the necessity of any social institution or restriction. "Do your own thing" then becomes the password for a belief in individual goodness over the authority of social institutions. Society corrupts but individual acts redeem and liberate. And where ego-identity and its progressive acceptance into the social mainstream are held up, disrupted, or denied many young seek the path of the goodness of one as he faces his brother man directly and honestly. Individual spontaneity and free floating relationships are seen as more desirable than "plastic identity" or mutually profitable relationships. The self

is supreme in this case since all arguments or needs on the part of the larger society are not forthcoming. This is free floating alienation and with more passionate followers is also the ethic of anarchy or the goodness of individual acts that seek no social tribute from fellow members of community. As Irving Louis Horowitz writes:

Action may not guarantee the successful conclusion of a conflict, and long range prediction is out of the question for most anarchists; what is guaranteed is personal redemption (personal worth outside of social recognition) [italics mine]. Social equilibrium tends to be viewed with a certain suspicion and alarm not because of political factors so much as personal factors. Equilibrium resolves itself in terms of rationalized authority. The "rules" of society tend to become deified into the "rights" of society. The very perpetuation of formalistic rules thus comes to depend upon the willingness of men to become alienated with respect to work processes and anomic with respect to social interaction. The anarchist demand for action is at its source an insistence on the psychological values of spontaneity. ³⁵

Those displaced by disruption of development and others bothered by the prevailing scheme of things find it hard to come to terms with the status quo. Where one's development is forced in upon himself by social isolation or psychological moratorium a whole personality finds it hard to emerge. For true and stable identity as Erikson tells us, "does not connote

a closed inner system impervious to change, but rather a psychosocial process which preserves some essential features in the individual as well as his society.\(^{36}\)

The inability to know, and, therefore, to succeed in taking one's place in the larger society may manifest itself in preoccupation with self for fear of losing self. The realization that responsibility can only be fulfilled between individual and society is a way of coming to terms with the possible. This understanding which usually comes later in personality development must overcome the sense of self as the highest or only aim in order to profit from intergenerational associations. Andre Gide recognized the importance of this development in the young personality and is quoted as saying:

> I am particularly grateful to him for throwing light on a paradoxical truth which is of considerable psychological importance to me, namely, that the happiness of man does not consist in liberty but in the acceptance of a duty.\(^{37}\)

Gide in his play Oedipus, of 1931, shows the destruction that comes to an individual when he accepts nothing greater than himself and values unattached liberty above all else. It is written of Gide's Oedipus:

> Oedipus starts out with all the advantages which Gide thinks essential for the free

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individual, and he is proud and happy to be unencumbered by any attachment of family or tradition, for he can then be himself alone. Nevertheless, he is finally defeated because he tries to be entirely self-sufficient . . . . Oedipus, at the end, rejects God for man, and Gide looked towards Communism. He now thought that liberty was not sufficient in itself, that it destroys itself if it is not linked to some ideal beyond egoism and self-expression—to some duty even.38

There are those who do not react so kindly to the counter-culture phenomenon. They tend to interpret the easy idealism, the free floating disdain, or the militancy as an inevitable outcome of a pampered affluence and a security based self-indulgence. While the highest ideals aspired to by man usually come out of a condition freed from material want or social competition, in many cases, this appears not to be so. Affluence and freedom may breed high ideals or self-indulgence. Among the young of the counter-culture we have examined both. Kenneth Kenniston and Eric Erikson, to a lesser degree, promote the idealism and the social concern of the young as a necessity in a free wheeling technological society. But others see increasing signs of pathology and hypocrisy. For example, Dr. Bruno Bettelheim is examined by Donald McDonald:

It is very easy to say, "I want a just society," according to Dr. Bettelheim,

\[\text{Ibid}, \ p. \ 148-9.\]
"but that is not idealism. Adolescents make tremendously high moral demands on others . . . . Idealism is when you put your ideas into practice, at some expense and hardship to yourself." 39

Writers such as Dostoyevsky have also seen this side of the young students. His description of the university students in his book, The Idiot, is quite biting and penetrating. He writes of one and then the others of the young students visiting Prince Myshkin:

He was a young man poorly and slovenly dressed in a coat whose sleeves were shiny with grease, an equally greasy waistcoat buttoned to the top, with no trace of linen and an impossible filthy black silk scarf twisted into a rope around his neck . . . . He wore an expression, if one may so put it, of insolent innocence . . . . Not a sign of irony or introspection showed in his face; on the contrary, it expressed an absolutely blank enchantment with what he took for his rights and at the same time some sort of strange craving to be and feel constantly insulted . . . . The others were still with ceremony as they entered, and embarrassed; they looked as important as they could, however, and were plainly in fear of losing their dignity somehow, a concern plainly but of keeping with their reputation for denying useless social observances, prejudices, and almost everything else in the world except their own interests. 40


These condemning quotes by psychologist and novelist seek to uncover the self-interest and shallow idealism of some of the young radicals.

It has always been known that affluence and the overall personal gratification that is part of it, along with greater freedoms of choice and a longer period of personal development carry with them an inherent risk that instead of being idealistically carried out in the larger society will be exploited for purely personal satisfactions. In short, the young indulged pampered and kept away from the mainstream may have come away with only the ability to mutually reinforce peer life styles. It is clear that the strength gained in facing and overcoming problems is not automatically to be expected from a preferential group. Eric Hoffer, strongly opinionated spokesman for the blue-collar ethic, tells us regarding this theme:

The young have a genius for discovering imagined grievances. It goes without saying that imagined grievances cannot be cured but they enable the young to evade those aspects of reality which do not minister to their self-importance.

It is true that present-day young are idealistic. But theirs is the easy idealism that condemns abuses and pushes aside any thought that would reveal the difficulties and complexities inherent in righting wrongs. They are not willing to do the hard work by which alone the world can be improved. Hearing what they say and seeing what they do, one suspects
that one of the main functions of the young's idealism is finding good reasons for doing bad things. 41

Hoffer goes on in his discussion of youth values and idealism and the process of creativity by writing:

> It seems doubtful whether a generation that clamors for instant fulfillment and instant solutions is capable of creating anything of enduring value . . . .

> One also suspects that the young's exaggerated faith in spontaneity and inspiration is a characteristic of un-stretched minds. Creative people believe in hard work . . . . It needs great effort to make an achievement seem effortless. 42

Such views are worth considering since they open up for inspection a quality of personality that goes beyond purely political interpretations. Since affluence tends to isolate the counter-culture from an early involvement with the world of work and the demands of the social mainstream, it is possible that such conditions of development may generate their own reasons for being. That is, a conspiracy or sense of futility that holds that any movement out of the counter-culture in order to improve the society will be doomed to failure. The world of spontaneity, free-flowing life-styles, cooperation, and a "non-material set of values" may be a true alternative to the world of effort, discipline, and deferring. Or it may also hide the lack of real


42 Ibid., p. 106-7.
commitment to anything constant by not facing up to it. Thus a simpler, more satisfying, and more pleasant way to bring about the transformation of a Con I or Con II is by positing and living in the world of Consciousness III. All one must do to bring about the revolution is to "do his own thing" in the light of non-material values. This is easy, comfortable, and completely without risk, and by the same measure may be unrealistic.

To point out the social ruptures that need closing is necessary to any progressive society. But ultimately, in order to remedy social ills, one must face them and struggle with them. This may entail a departure from the comfortable world of Con III in order to put one's idealism and social concern on the line. In short, the process of social healing and the need for humanistic conversion of old vices will not be (nor has ever been) a pleasant or "free-floating" undertaking. To make it so depreciates the importance of the impending social problems, while at the same time unduly sanctifies the powers of the young counter-culture to the point where hope and emphasis will be totally abdicated to those that will finally bear the tragedy for failure. Michael Novak catches this flavor by writing:

> Whoever lives by impulse, instinct, and feeling necessarily "blows as the wind blows, yes and is mobile." Consciousness III describes as "authentic existence" fidelity to one's dominant emotion of the moment. It resists loyalty, long-term commitments, promises and obligations.

(p. 228) To an extent, this definition is a
form of self-defense temporarily necessary for many, in the most disciplined, hurried, and closely tracked generation in history; but one ought not to forget that it is also the definition of fickleness.

Consciousness III is being surpassed because it encounters realities for which it is not prepared.43

The real danger that the counter-culture faces in its special condition in society is that in being so isolated from the mainstream of society, its message will end up by being too esoteric or even more tragic, it will become an entity in and of itself and only for itself. We see more clearly every day that freedom and affluence are not guarantees to social and political insights or to the true establishment of social idealism. If denied direction or adult exemplars who are willing to teach and be involved with the development of the young, much of the idealism of the counter-culture may turn into purely ego indulgence. Eric Erikson recognizes this danger that is one of the risks of ego-identity formation in modern society and cautions us:

Yet the search of youth, I believe, is not for all-permissibility, but rather for new ways of directly facing up to what truly counts.

We will undoubtedly see a tragic re-evaluation of the first attempts of youth to ritualize life for themselves and by themselves and against us, and of the way in which, in the face of such provocation and

challenge, the elder generation abdicates too willingly and too quickly their vital role as sanctioners and critics. For without some leadership—and if need be, leadership that can be lustily resisted—the young humanists are in danger of becoming irrelevant and ending up, each individual and each clique, stewing in strictly episodical "consciousness expansion."  

CHAPTER V

GENERALIZATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There is a tendency that arises out of a lack of perspective or the inability to discern which allows its interpretations of the world to be magnified and imposed upon all worlds. This seems to be the case with alienation. Originally it was thought to serve as a conceptual tool that would expose the excesses and the deepest flaws of an insensitive burgeoning industrial society and its relationships to those that would serve it. It was thought to express the inevitable and tragic condition of man the artisan ripped out of a craft or yeoman farmer society into the dehumanized processing of a manipulative industrial society. Alienation in this sense saw only natural man and his unchanging crafts. As an analytical reaction to the industrial revolution, it was critical and utopian. But at the same time its perspective was not broad enough. It refused to accept man as a generator and extender of new technologies.

As Peter Drucker has pointed out, when an ethic or a movement finally runs its course, its terminology lives on and is taken in by the roving critics of society as a ready made and
popularized analysis of what they perceive as problematic of that society. Thus Marxism abandoned early in this century by the intellectual elite of Europe has been picked up by the Neo-Marxian romantics and lives on rhetorically as a quick analysis of what is fundamentally wrong with post-industrial society. To the extent that this has happened the critics have underestimated man's ability to come to terms with the new technologies and have overestimated the political and economic plight of the young students. It is significant to note that the workers of America have not abandoned their machines. On the other side it is just as significant to weigh the fact that the most radically conceived social and cultural movements on the part of the counter-culture have only found themselves one to two years ahead of Madison Avenue. The answer to this is to be found in the character of the movements and not in a Marcusian cooption.

The dominance of "job consciousness" over "class consciousness" and the determination of the blue-collarite to defend the primary institutions of the society manifest a practical idealism that sees steady jobs for all as a way out of degrading poverty and a subtle wisdom that understands the precariousness of psychosocial relationships. To those that have fought in the battle against want the utopian appeal of a world without struggle or work and the rhetorical leveling of institutions remains suspect. Even with increased automation and affluence, most still realize
that the proper maintenance and development of a society still requires vast human effort. Work is not automatic and even though backbreaking drudgery has been greatly reduced one's attention and effort are still required in daily labor. In this world, alienation as an economic or working class call to arms has had little appeal.

What the few free from total want or struggle have failed to notice about most people, especially those of the blue-collar, is that such freedom is only recent and in most cases still not a given or automatic security. Therefore, it should be understood that most who are only now just "making it" find little or no surplus to share with those who are still outside and if they do they tend to begrudge it. This should be expected and to hope for any more would be shortsighted and in a way insensitive to the role and limits of the blue-collar ethic and struggle.

The real tragedy of analysis that totally blames working-class narrowness, ethnicity, and traditionalism for the ills of the black and the poor is one that pits two groups, one just "making it" and the other hoping to, against each other in a world where each gain or loss is detracted from the opposing group. The solution to poverty, discrimination, and unemployment is not to let the two groups at the bottom fight it out in a world of scarcity. The solution is to expand the bottom. This will at first run into ecological criticisms. But the issue then becomes nature parks
for the leisure class or jobs for all. The ethic of work and struggle may be a dead issue for a few, but most know that this is the world they face everyday.

What we have seen in this investigation is that freedom and affluence seem to pose the greatest crises and burdens to those who take them as a given. And it is here also that our greatest liberal dreams and ideals seem to be challenged. Those who have sought to politicize youth as a growing class-consciousness movement intuitively more capable of insightful criticisms and solutions rather than the development of a person with skills and competence to offer his fellow men both for his and their benefit have misread and underestimated the youth of the counter-culture. They have placed a heavy burden upon the shoulders of the young and have at the same time justified the waning of effort, activity, and suggestions from the elders and institutions of our society. The dynamism and the vagaries of youth are not enough to solve our greatest social problems.

The liberal and progressive ideals of pluralism, tolerance, openness, freedom, and the lack of want have also been severely challenged during the past few years. The real shame of it is that these ideals, always worthy of being translated into a living environment, were tried on those least capable of transforming them into working realities. This we have learned: that freedom, affluence, tolerance etc. do not automatically
bring about the ideal world of kindness, cooperation, and constructiveness. This of course does not argue for a world of forced choice or authoritarian rule. However, we have learned that idealism and freedom cannot be maintained without a sense of proportion. Work and pleasure must balance with the practical and the ideal. The appeal by many of the romantics and the counter-culture to only moral issues can unbalance an individual or society causing incomplete development. In the same way, the appeal to only "what works" or "what is practical" may deaden and blunt the spirit of a people. The moral appeal would, if taken totally, give us a world of yogis or ascetics, while the appeal to total practicality would give us a world of unimaginative, dull, but steady working men and engineers.

With all the gains amassed by American society in its struggle against want, we sometimes attempt to isolate ourselves from the realization of the vast effort required to maintain this world of growing affluence. Life becomes more automatic. Labor turns increasingly to service. Social movement continues to go from depressed city to comfortable suburb. Madison Avenue shows us the ease with which social problems are solved. Beautiful people of all races and colors groove smoothly and easily. Style and culture take over from struggle and effort. In truth, most people still respond to their own social circle and personal experiences. They struggle to be among the affluent, while in
fact only a minority actually enjoy the total freedom from want or precarious struggle.

A certain amount of leisure is needed by all to fully develop and refine each self. But given our heritage and our nature, total freedom from want can lead to a "crisis of affluence." This would not be a problem in a world of total abundance. All could experiment, follow their wildest wishes, or contemplate the grass without any need to be concerned with wastefulness or utility. Except for a minority, this is not the world we presently live in. And the glibness with which many dismiss the ethic of struggle and effort show their detachment from what needs to be done. It is here that the energy and idealism of the young might be channeled.

Whether we choose to look at them or not, the depression of our cities and the poverty of parts of our countryside are still with us. These tasks are outside of the mainstream of social and economic affairs and to that extent are neglected by most who are preoccupied with their own struggles and goals. It is here and in related areas that the idealism of the young could be tested and their energy directed. The goals of making the cities and countryside habitable and the reclaiming of part of the landscape appeal to both youthful idealism and the need for action, belonging, and contributing.
These problem areas are outside the mainstream and are thus mostly free of overlapping vested interests. Neglected and unprofitable they can only draw upon themselves or the surplus of the larger society. And it is here where the young of the counter-culture, affluent and free but undirected, could most satisfy their idealistic yearnings and begin to develop competence through need. This would be an idle suggestion without the mention of the presence of significant elders and institutions. Government, business, labor, and educational institutions must play primary roles in choosing and directing what is to be done. To leave the young alone without examples to learn and draw from would be to find them where many are found today—wandering.

A work corps or youth corps that would draw from those just graduating from high school and just entering colleges would dovetail many of our present difficulties into opportunities for growth. Pay, jobs, and training would come from government, business, labor, and educational institutions. For many of the young their cultural center is the university. The university could also serve as a take off point where ideas would have the possibility of being translated into useful action. And in return action could be refreshed and redirected by a return to the university as a cultural and intellectual center. Again, this requires those who would be willing and eager to work with and serve as master or exemplar to those who need direction and instruction.
Obviously, the educational institutions in and of themselves do not have the power, capacity, or scope to handle all social problems. It must also go about its own business of training, educating, and civilizing the young to assume some of the basic duties requisite to the psychosocial fulfillment of all. But as a repository of many of the counter-culture, it may be especially equipped to offer the challenge demanded by youthful idealism and the concern required to take on neglected social problems. Without some guidance and call from the established society the freedom and affluence of the young counter-culture is doomed to reinforcing freaky self-indulgence or youthful stoicism and already neglected social problems will be perpetuated.

We have seen that the world of occupation, effort, and the drive for security are the lot of most of us. Only a few escape these concerns. And when we examine what is yet to be completed to make this a suitable world for human habitation, the search for an alternative to the Protestant ethic may be a bit too premature. Even if this were overcome by a proliferation of abundance, the dynamic tension and hustle characteristic of America is so deeply a part of us that it would need a few generations to turn the prospects of increasing leisure into a constructive pursuit.

At this moment we seem unable to effectively handle our successes. At the universities the major emphasis is on
production (research and publication) with less devoted to development (teaching). This also seems to be a pervasive ethic among many of the young counter-culture. To hustle for the degree satisfies the short term quality of productivity but cuts short the development of the knowing individual. Technique is applied and appealed to as a facile way to handle quantity and quality in many parts of the university and among many of the young. But what many times results is a quick processing or a novel packaging.

Thus both education and youth identity-formation suffer when neglected, pushed aside, or not recognized as important.

It is not enough to offer the young freedom and social welfare and then ask that they turn this condition into a creative pursuit. The existential prospects of such givens are not without their consequences and risks. To prolong and encourage youthful identity experimentation without a sense of psychosocial direction is to shirk the responsibility for the generational process and maybe advocate an abortive human identity. For only in the development of self can one go beyond self and in this sense be truly individual.

Finally, as many times the young are inspired by one individual, teacher or parent, who encourages and teaches by example while at the same time being rewarded by the reciprocal effort of his student, the nation is in need of one who holds the same appeal. The relative lethargy that has spread over the land
can be countered by one who inspires by his own example and inspiration. This nation will survive because of its daily dedication to building and maintaining itself. But the untapped or many time squandered energy of many of the young must be given direction and encouragement.
APPENDIX
Table 1: It's the Wealthy Who Go To College *

(Annual average of 14 large colleges)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1927-28</th>
<th>1939-40</th>
<th>1955-56</th>
<th>1970-71</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$267</td>
<td>$332</td>
<td>$712</td>
<td>$2,080</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Family Income | Percentages of students from families of various incomes who go on to college, based on 1966-67 figures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Range</th>
<th>25%</th>
<th>50%</th>
<th>75%</th>
<th>100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$0 - 3,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3,000 - 4,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4,000 - 6,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$6,000 - 7,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$7,500 - 10,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10,000 - 15,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,000 and over</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Proportion of Factor Workers Satisfied with Company, By Industry*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Own Company as Good</td>
<td>Other Places Are Better</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation equipment</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil refining</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sawmills and planing</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apparel</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stone, clay, and glass</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron and steel</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobiles</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-ferrous metals</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All factory workers</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Question: "For a person in your trade or occupation, do you think your company is about as good a place as there is to work, or do you think there are other places that are better?"

Table 3: Proportion of Factory Workers Who Feel Jobs Are Essential, By Industry*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sawmills and Planing</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil refining</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobiles</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-ferrous metals</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron and steel</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apparel</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation equipment</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stone, clay, and glass</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All factory workers</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1,965</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Question: "Is your job really essential to the success of the company, or not?"

Source: Blauner
Table 4: Voting Record (Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Record</th>
<th>1956 (respondents)</th>
<th>1952 (respondents)</th>
<th>1948 (respondents)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not vote</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not eligible</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't remember</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bennett Berger, p. 110
Table 5: Political Identification (Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Republican</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>Total per cent</th>
<th>Number in Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>By Type of Former Residence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeowners</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renters (pvt.)</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renters (gov.)*</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>By Age Groups</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 plus</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Sample</strong></td>
<td>81</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The 40 respondents listed as "Renters (gov.)" include two who lived in run-down Richmond hotels before the movement of the plant.

Source: Bennett Berger, p. 110
Table 6: Family Income and Characteristics of College Attended*:
October 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Income**</th>
<th>Under $3,000</th>
<th>$7,500 to $9,999</th>
<th>$15,000 and over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rank of college

Type of college

Type of control:

Public          | 58% | 66% | 46% |
Private         | 33  | 30  | 50  |
Not available   | 10  | 4   | 4   |

Enrollment:

Tuition and fees:

Under $250      | 37% | 28% | 19% |
$250 to $499    | 23  | 38  | 27  |
$500 to $999    | 18  | 13  | 15  |
$1,000 and over | 13  | 17  | 34  |
Not available   | 11  | 4   | 4   |

* By dependent family members 14 to 34 years old.
**During preceding 12 months.
***Includes colleges for which enrollment figures not available.

Table 7: Percentage of High School Graduates Entering College During the Five Years Following Graduation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ability quintile</th>
<th>Socioeconomic status*</th>
<th>Total Graduates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top fifth</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second fifth</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third fifth</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth fifth</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom fifth</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1 = highest status; 4 - lowest status.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blue-Collar Work: Objective Factors</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>$8,459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>7,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>6,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales Workers</td>
<td>7,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen (excluding foremen)</td>
<td>6,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiskilled Operatives</td>
<td>5,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Workers (excluding private household)</td>
<td>4,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled laborers (excluding farm and mine)</td>
<td>4,651</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Income of Families by Occupation of Head, Both Races, 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Under $3,000</th>
<th>$3,000-$4,999</th>
<th>$5,000-$9,999</th>
<th>$10,000 and over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional and Managerial</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>57.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and Sales</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operatives</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(including private household)</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers and Farm Managers</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Distribution of the Unemployed, Percent and Rate, by Occupation, Both Races, 1950-1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1955</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1965 Rate</th>
<th>1968 Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operatives</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (Farm; private household; no previous work experience)</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>2.1% (Farm only)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Source: Department of Labor, Manpower Report of the President 1966, Table A-16, p. 170.


Coles, Robert. "A Policeman Complains: 'Between gansters and hoodlums, the Negroes and drunks, the college crowd and the crazy ones, it's a miracle more of us don't get killed,'" New York Times Magazine, June 13, 1971.


Thompson, William Irwin. "'We Become What We Hate,'" New York Times, July 25, 1971.


