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SOME GRAMMATICAL CORRELATES OF FELICITY
CONDITIONS AND PRESUPPOSITIONS

DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is an attempt to show that there is a systematic relationship between what a speaker of a language does in uttering sentences of that language and the syntactic form of those utterances. That is to say, through an examination of some of the acts performed by a speaker in producing an utterance we will be able to find an account for the grammar of the utterances used to perform those acts.

Of necessity such an attempt must draw heavily from the work of Austin (1962) and Searle (1969), who both concern themselves with speech acts. In chapter two, we review some of Austin's concepts and Searle's development of them, and in particular, the concepts of illocutionary act and felicity condition.

It has recently been shown that by reference to certain felicity conditions on illocutionary acts, it is possible to explain a certain type of expression of those acts (Gordon and Lakoff, 1971), called conversational implications by Gordon and Lakoff and indirect illocutionary acts here. In chapter three, we examine this process, especially the subset of felicity conditions on which such indirect illocutionary acts may be based, which subset we here define as the subset of intrinsic conditions. It is shown that several of these
intrinsic conditions are not conditions on particular illocutionary acts, but rather general conditions on all illocutionary acts, and that therefore a variety of illocutionary acts may be indirectly performed by use of one such general intrinsic condition. We attempt an explicit account of the process by which such indirect performance can take place.

Intrinsic conditions on illocutionary acts do not only serve as the basis for indirect illocutionary acts; they also are significant in a process called here illocutionary act qualification. In chapter four, we delimit a class of if clauses which do not behave in utterances like the antecedents of true conditionals. It is shown that such if clauses, named qualifying if clauses, can be explicated only by reference to the illocutionary acts performed by the utterances which contain them. When such reference is made, it turns out that a qualifying if clause serves to call into question whether an intrinsic condition on the illocutionary act performed by the utterance holds. Further, the syntactic form of the if clause is directly related to the intrinsic condition which it calls into question. We find that only a subclass of intrinsic conditions on illocutionary acts may be the basis for illocutionary act qualification and argue that this subclass is a semantically natural class.

All of the above work concerns itself with illocutionary acts. Speakers uttering sentences also perform propositional acts, i.e., acts of reference and predication (Searle, 1969). Chapter five discusses the relationship between propositional acts and the fact that some presuppositions may be the basis for qualification of
propositional acts through the syntactic medium of *if* clauses which have almost the same properties as *if* clauses used to qualify illocutionary acts. It also turns out not only that some presuppositions may constitute the basis for propositional act qualification, but also that truth conditions on propositional acts may constitute the basis for such qualification. Truth conditions are logically necessary conditions for a propositional act to be true, while presuppositions are necessary conditions for a proposition to have a truth value or to be meaningful.

In chapter six, we find that parallel to indirect illocutionary acts based on intrinsic conditions, there are indirect propositional acts based on truth conditions. Such indirect propositional acts are shown to be identical to what Geis and Zwicky (1971) have called invited inferences. The exact process by which invited inferences are generated is discussed and several examples of its application are illustrated. We also attempt an explanation for why presuppositions may not be the basis for invited inferences.

In short, this dissertation discusses two processes in which conditions on speech acts figure, the process of performing an indirect act and the process of qualifying an act. These processes are discussed with respect to the performance of illocutionary acts and the performance of propositional acts. It is shown that in all cases, it is possible to explain syntactic features of utterances used to perform speech acts by reference to semantic conditions on those acts.

In this dissertation, we consider application of the ideas presented to the study of English syntax only. Because of the elusiveness of the acceptability judgments involved in testing such
application, it would seem necessary to employ native speaker
intuitions about a language to extend the analysis presented here
to that language. However we would be surprised if it were impossible
to extend the analysis to all human languages, since the abstractness
and generality of the notions involved make them candidates for
semantic universals. This is not to say that all English utterances
presented here should be literally translatable into any other
language with no change in acceptability judgments, or that all
languages have the same syntactic mechanisms for the qualification
of acts or the expression of indirect acts. Rather the claim would
be that all languages have some process for expressing illocutionary
and propositional acts indirectly and some process for qualifying
illocutionary and propositional acts, and that these processes would
depend on intrinsic conditions on illocutionary acts and presuppositions
of and truth conditions on propositional acts in a manner similar to
the corresponding processes in English.

By the same token, it is expected that there will be dialectal
(or idiolectal) variation in the reaction to the English sentences
used as examples here. However, if our hypotheses about the general
relationship between speech acts performed with an utterance and the
syntax of that utterance are correct, all such variation is to be
explained as dialectal idiosyncracies in the use of lexical items
and in the application of syntactic rules. This does not render our
hypotheses unfalsifiable and therefore empty, since there are types
of variation which would count as counterevidence against them, namely,
variation that is general and not specific to a particular lexical
item or purely syntactic rule.
CHAPTER II

ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS AND FELICITY CONDITIONS

We owe to Austin (1962) the notion of the illocutionary force of an utterance. This is, essentially, the act that one performs in producing a linguistic utterance under the appropriate circumstances. Some examples are:

(2.1) I advise you not to eat that popcorn.
(2.2) I order you to leave the premises.
(2.3) I promise to wash half the dishes.

In appropriate circumstances, if a speaker of English utters (2.1), (2.2), or (2.3), he has in fact performed the act of advising, ordering, or promising, respectively, and (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3) under such circumstances have the illocutionary force of a piece of advice, an order, and a promise, respectively.

In the case of (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3), the main verb of the sentence gives explicit expression to the illocutionary force of the utterance. Such verbs are called explicit performative verbs by Austin. Austin notes that an explicit performative verb must be the main verb of the sentence and must generally be in the 1st person present tense, i.e., must be used performatively, if the sentence is to have the illocutionary force indicated by the verb. Further, hereby may modify only explicit performative verbs and these
only when they are used performatively.

In other cases of performing acts by uttering words, however, there need not be an explicit performative verb present. Thus, (2.4), (2.5), and (2.6) are just as much acts of advising, ordering, and promising when uttered under the appropriate circumstances as (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3) would be.

(2.4) You shouldn't eat that popcorn.
(2.5) Leave the premises.
(2.6) I shall wash half the dishes.

In fact it can be maintained (and will be maintained in this work) that all normal utterances made by speakers of a language have illocutionary force (Searle, 1969) in that all normal utterances perform acts of asserting, apologizing, criticizing, welcoming, etc. (although Austin would distinguish some of these as locutionary rather than illocutionary acts).

Many utterances may also have the effect of performing what Austin calls perlocutionary acts, as well as illocutionary acts. Thus by uttering (2.1) or (2.4) the speaker may alarm his hearer. The speaker then, by performing the act of advising, has secondarily performed the perlocutionary act of alarming.

One difference between illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts is that while the former are directly involved in the act of producing an utterance, the latter are less central to the act (Austin, 1962). This is evidenced by the fact that, while a given utterance under normal circumstances must be the performance of one and only one illocutionary act, the same utterance may under normal
circumstances be the performance of several perlocutionary acts or perhaps none. If the addressee to whom (2.7) is directed takes it as an informational question while the speaker intended it as a request for action, the addressee has misunderstood.

(2.7) Do you want to open the door?

However, the utterance of (2.7) may inspire, persuade, frighten, etc., the addressee or may have several of these effects on him without it being said that he misunderstands (2.7), independent of whether the speaker intended to produce any of these effects in the hearer.

The question immediately arises whether the illocutionary force of an utterance is a well-defined notion, that is whether for a given utterance there is any way of determining other than by vague intuition what illocutionary act(s) may be performed by the speaker using it and distinguishing such illocutionary acts from the possible perlocutionary acts associated with the utterance. It should be obvious that this question cannot be answered positively without reference to the circumstances surrounding the utterance. One cannot discover, by intuition or any other means, whether (2.8) is a simple statement of fact, a promise, a threat, or a question without knowing something about the speaker's intentions, beliefs, and desires.

(2.8) You are going to leave.

However, given for example that the speaker believes he does not know whether or not the hearer is going to leave, that the speaker believes that the hearer is able to tell him whether he is leaving or not, and that the speaker wants to know whether or not the hearer
is leaving, it is necessarily the case that (2.8) was uttered as a question. This may be tested in the case by noticing that under these circumstances the utterance of (2.8) has the same illocutionary force as the utterance of (2.9), which contains an explicit performative verb, that is, they both count as requests for information.

(2.9) I hereby ask you whether you are going to leave.

It turns out that for every illocutionary act there is a relatively small set of necessary conditions on the intentions, beliefs, desires, and external circumstances of the speaker and addressee who are performing the illocutionary act, that is a set of conditions on the speaker's and addressee's set and setting.¹ These conditions are called felicity conditions. In the case of illocutionary acts in the legal sphere, such as pronouncing a couple man and wife or contracting to form a partnership, the conditions are partly legal in nature and therefore conventional, as noted by Austin (1962). As Searle (1969) would have it, all felicity conditions are conventional, but this appears to be false (David Stamps, personal communication). For example, it seems strange to say that the condition that the speaker requesting something to be done must intend for that thing to be done is conventionalistic rather than naturalistic. If the condition were merely a convention, one would expect to find in some language utterances having illocutionary force almost like that of requesting but lacking the condition on the speaker that he intends to be done

¹These terms are to be construed only as convenient labels, without psychologistic connotations.
what he 'requests' to be done. However, we will not pursue this matter further here, since our results here do not depend crucially on the conventionality or naturalness of felicity conditions.

Felicity conditions do not only have the function of allowing us to distinguish between the different possible illocutionary forces of an utterance. Their main function is to characterize felicitous illocutionary acts and thereby indicate the various ways that illocutionary acts can go wrong. The necessity for this derives from the fact that the illocutionary force of an utterance is not strictly speaking true or false, unlike the proposition expressed by an utterance. Thus suppose the speaker uttering (2.10) does not own a car.

(2.10) I hereby bequeath you my car.

There is something wrong with his uttering (2.10) then, but it cannot be said that (2.10) as an illocutionary act is false (or true for that matter). (2.10) is odd or misleading under the circumstances, i.e., 'infelicitous'. By distinguishing between the proposition expressed by an utterance and the illocutionary act performed by an utterance, we can account both for the possibility that (2.11) (or the proposition expressed by (2.11)) is false and for the possibility that (2.11) (or the illocutionary act performed by asserting (2.11) is odd if, e.g., the speaker believes that the hearer already knows that his wife is faithful.

(2.11) Your wife is faithful.

Austin distinguished various types of felicity conditions, according to the following taxonomy (from Austin, 1962, pp. 14-16):
(a.1) There must exist an accepted conventional
procedure having a certain conventional
effect, that procedure to include the uttering
of certain words by certain persons in
certain circumstances, and further,
(a.2) the particular persons and circumstances in
a given case must be appropriate for the
invocation of the particular procedure
invoked.
(b.1) The procedure must be executed by all parti­
cipants both correctly and
(b.2) completely.
(y.1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed
for use by persons having certain thoughts
or feelings, or for the inauguration of
certain consequential conduct on the part
of any participants, then a person partici­
pating in and so invoking the procedure must
in fact have those thoughts or feelings,
and the participants must intend so to
conduct themselves, and further,
(y.2) must actually so conduct themselves
subsequently.

Austin calls violations of the (a) or (b) conditions misfires
while violation of the (γ) conditions are termed abuses by him. In
the former case, the illocutionary act involved is said to be void
while in the latter it is said to be hollow. Violations of the (a)
conditions are called misinvocation (act disallowed) with violations
of (a.1) being termed non-plays, and (a.2), misapplications.
Violations of the (b) conditions are called miscarriages (act
vitiated) with (b.1) violations being called flaws or misexecutions
and (b.2) violations being called hitches or non-executions. Among
the violations of the (γ) conditions, violations of the (γ.1) type
are called insincerities or dissimulations, while those of (γ.2) are
called non-fulfillments, disloyalties, infractions, indisciplines,
or breaches.

In what follows, we will consider only the (γ.1) type of
felicity condition, those involving beliefs, knowledge, intentions, and desires, i.e., the set of the participants in an illocutionary act, the reason being that these are the ones which have the most interesting syntactic consequences. Before proceeding, however, we must modify Austin's terminology for violations of (γ.1). First of all, the distinctions between (α) and (β) conditions on the one hand and (γ) conditions on the other was made by Austin because it seemed to him that the last type, unlike the first two, could be violated without utterly voiding the illocutionary act, that is, that all felicity conditions involving participant set are not central to the illocutionary act and may be violated without totally vitiating the act. However, there are cases of felicity conditions on the speaker's and addressee's beliefs which are central to the act being performed, in the sense that they cannot be violated without voiding the illocutionary act being performed. For example, in order for a speaker to perform the act of promising, his addressee must prefer the speaker's doing what he is promising to do to his not doing it, and the speaker must believe that the hearer would so prefer. In order to perform the act of threatening, on the other hand, the addressee must believe that he would prefer that the speaker would not do what he is threatening to do, and the speaker must believe that the hearer would so prefer (Searle, 1969). In all other respects, promises and threats seem to have identical felicity conditions. If the felicity conditions made explicit above for promises were both violated, one would not say the speaker has made an insincere promise; one would say he has failed to promise and has
instead threatened something, if he has done anything at all. If only one of the conditions is violated, again, one would not say that an insincere promise had been made, but that no promise had been made. Thus (γ.1) type of felicity conditions may be central

Alternatively it might be said that promises in general have no felicity conditions involving hearer preferences and that threats are a special subclass of promises set apart from the rest by felicity conditions involving negative hearer preferences. Even if this were so, the illocutionary act of threatening would still have criterial felicity conditions involving speaker and hearer beliefs. A threat to do something the speaker believes the hearer wants him to do is not a hollow threat; it is simply not a threat.

to the performance of the illocutionary act, and may cause misfiring, or voiding of the act, if they are violated.

A second objection is to Austin's labeling of failure of (γ.1) conditions as insincerities or dissimulations. This terminology leads Austin, Searle (1969), Gordon and Lakoff (1971), and others to call (γ.1) conditions sincerity conditions. However not all failures of felicity conditions on participant set lead to utterances which could be called simply insincere. The case given above, where a (γ.1) condition failure causes voiding of the illocutionary act, is one example. Although it might be argued that in the example given the act was void because the promise or threat was insincere, the act was not performed, and thus could not be called an insincere act.

There are also cases where a (γ.1) type violation causes only abuse and not misfiring of an illocutionary act (i.e., the act is
still performed) but where the abuse results from impoliteness rather than insincerity. Thus, if you request a person to do something that you believe he would object to doing, you are simply not being polite. You can be accused of being insincere in this instance only if you use polite phrasing deceptively, but this insincerity is secondary to a violation of what might be called a politeness condition on requests, that the speaker believes his addressee would not object to doing what he is being asked to do.

Sincerity and politeness are in fact parallel modes of behavior, in that, just as there are cases where one is not expected to be polite, such as when speaking to close friends or when angry, there are cases when one is not expected to be sincere, such as when pretending or when engaging in diplomacy. In these cases, sincerity or politeness conditions on illocutionary acts may be violated without causing infelicity. Thus, if a diplomat utters (2.12), his fellow diplomats spend little time questioning his sincerity in uttering (2.12) but consider rather the possible perlocutionary acts performed by such an utterance—e.g. convincing them of the truth of
(2.12), frightening them by suggesting that (2.12) is false, or lulling them into feeling secure—and why the diplomat would want to perform such acts.

(2.12) We have no intention of widening the war in Southeast Asia.

Other examples of felicitous insincere illocutionary acts are rife among the pronouncements of politicians, e.g., (2.13).

(2.13) I am not now, never have been, and never will be a candidate for that office.

We shall call felicity conditions on the participants' set for an illocutionary act (that is, Austin's (γ.1) type of felicity condition) intrinsic conditions on that illocutionary act, and all others, those involving the setting of an illocutionary act, extrinsic conditions. Those intrinsic conditions on an illocutionary act violations of which cause the act to be void will be called essential intrinsic conditions. We will still use the term sincerity condition, but reserve it for those intrinsic conditions which have to do with the sincerity of illocutionary acts, and similarly we will use the term politeness condition for those intrinsic conditions which have to do with politeness of illocutionary acts.
CHAPTER III

INDIRECT ILOCUTIONARY ACTS

We are now in a position to discuss a grammatical correlate of felicity conditions on illocutionary acts. A basic claim defended here is that by making reference to the class of felicity conditions we have just defined as intrinsic conditions, we can in theory account for all the possible grammatical expressions of a given illocutionary force, and moreover that without reference to intrinsic conditions, such an account would be impossible. We make this claim programmatically, in that we do not intend to discuss here all cases of grammatical expressions of illocutionary acts. We will present some confirming cases which substantiate a general claim about the relationship between intrinsic conditions and expressions of illocutionary acts, one which we know of no clear counterexamples to. Complete validation of the claim must wait, however, until there is a complete working out of the intrinsic conditions on illocutionary acts, a project beyond the scope of this work.

One class of possible alternative expressions of illocutionary force has been discussed by Gordon and Lakoff (1971), who attempt to show that "one can convey a request by (i) asserting a speaker-based sincerity condition [on that request] or (ii) questioning a
hearer-based sincerity condition [on that request]." This is based on the fact that all of the following are possible requests (the examples are Gordon and Lakoff's), and that there exist sincerity conditions on requesting expressable as follows: "if a sincerely requests of b that b do R, then a wants b to do R, a assumes that b can do R, a assumes b would be willing to do R, and a assumes that b will not do R in the absence of the request."

(3.1) a. I want you to take out the garbage.
   b. Can you take out the garbage?
   c. Would you be willing to take out the garbage?
   d. Will you take out the garbage?

On the other hand, sentences similar to (3.1) in form such as (examples Gordon and Lakoff's) (3.2) cannot possibly be used to convey requests because there are no sincerity conditions on requesting like those above by which such sentences as (3.2) could be related to requests.¹

(3.2.) a. I suppose you're going to take out the garbage.
   b. Must you take out the garbage?
   c. Are you likely to take out the garbage?
   d. Ought you to take out the garbage?

¹It should be pointed out that since it is not obvious that there should be any formal characterization of requests (although such a claim is defended in Gordon and Lakoff (1971) and here), it is not clear why anyone would expect sentences like (3.2) to convey requests any more than he would expect "Salt is NaCl." to (David Stampe, personal communication).

Gordon and Lakoff discuss under what circumstances sentences like (3.1) can convey requests. They state that (i) the utterance
must not have its literal meaning, (ii) elements of the conversa-
tional context and conversational postulates, in the sense of Grice
(1968), must entail the request. Conversational postulates are said
to be parallel to meaning postulates and to include among others
(3.3), where the capitalized words are intended to represent semantic
units.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(3.3)} & \quad a. \quad \text{SAY } (a,b, \text{ WANT } (a, Q)) \rightarrow \text{REQUEST } (a,b,Q) \\
& \quad b. \quad \text{ASK } (a,b, \text{ CAN } (b,Q)) \rightarrow \text{REQUEST } (a,b,Q)
\end{align*}
\]

In other words, sincerity conditions on requests can be the basis
for conversational postulates, which explains how some utterances
which can be literally taken as assertions or informational questions
can convey requests.

When we attempt to extend Gordon and Lakoff's analysis to other
illocutionary acts and to other felicity conditions on illocutionary
acts, we find that, while it appears to be essentially correct,
modifications must be made in the original formulation of the analysis.

First of all, it is fairly obvious that when Gordon and Lakoff
speak of sincerity conditions, they are in fact referring to what
we have called intrinsic conditions. This can be seen even with
one of the purported sincerity conditions on requests given above,
that the speaker wants the addressee to do R if he requests him to
do R. If A requests B to do R and at the same time A has no desire
for B to do R, it may be said that A is being insincere and even that
A has made an insincere request. However, as indicated in the last
chapter, this is not what is at issue in Austin's framework. At
issue is whether requests which are insincere in this manner still
count as real requests, the way the assertion of something one does not believe, that is, an insincere assertion, still counts as a real assertion. This issue can be settled by considering (3.4) and (3.5), which seem to indicate that, while requesting something one does not want can be grounds for saying the request was misexecuted and void, asserting something one does not believe cannot be grounds for saying that the assertion was misexecuted and void.

(3.4) He requested me to help him, but since it turned out that he didn't have any desire for me to help him, it wasn't a real request.

(3.5) He stated that Mary was his wife, but since it turned out that he didn't believe she was his wife, it wasn't a real statement.

Furthermore, while (3.6) conveys a request, it cannot be maintained that a condition on the sincerity of requests is that the speaker believe that the hearer would not object to doing what he is being requested to do.

(3.6) Would you mind taking out the garbage? This is obviously a condition on the politeness of requests which derives from a general condition on polite acts.

Thus it seems that Gordon and Lakoff's analysis is actually an analysis of the conveyance of illocutionary acts by the use of intrinsic conditions. Another objection to their analysis is that they make it appear that the intrinsic conditions on a given illocutionary act are unrelated to the intrinsic conditions on any other illocutionary act, or, if they are related, that the relationship is accidental. But this is not the case. For example, consider the intrinsic conditions at the right side of the arrows in (3.7).
(3.7)  
a. A requests B to do R $\rightarrow$ A believes B is able to do R  
b. A offers to do R for B $\rightarrow$ A believes A is able to do R  
c. A asserts P to B $\rightarrow$ A believes that B is able to come to believe (or to know) P  
d. A asks B P $\rightarrow$ A believes that B is able to tell A P (where P is an incompletely specified proposition or the disjunction of a proposition and its negation)

All of these intrinsic conditions may be used to convey illocutionary acts, as in (3.8).

(3.8)  
a. Can you answer the phone? (request)  
b. Can I help you with the dishes? (offer)  
c. Can you believe that Irv is a virgin? (assertion)  
d. Can you tell me what time it is? (question about the time)

In Gordon and Lakoff's system, the conversational postulates justifying the indirect illocutionary acts in (3.8) would probably come out something like those in (3.9).

(3.9)  
a. ASK (a,b, CAN (b,Q)) $\rightarrow$ REQUEST (a,b,Q)  
b. ASK (a,b, CAN(a,Q)) $\rightarrow$ OFFER (a,b,Q)  
or SAY (a,b, CAN (a,Q)) $\rightarrow$ OFFER (a,b,Q)  
c. ASK (a,b, CAN (COME ABOUT (KNOW (b,Q)))) $\rightarrow$ SAY (a,b,Q)  
d. ASK (a,b, CAN (b, SAY (b,a,Q))) $\rightarrow$ ASK (a,b,Q)

Instead of setting up four different intrinsic conditions and basing five different conversational postulates on them to account for the illocutionary acts conveyed with utterances like those in (3.8), an account which captures the underlying relatedness of the intrinsic conditions in (3.7) and illocutionary acts conveyed by them seems
necessary.

The most direct way to achieve such an account is to postulate one general intrinsic condition on illocutionary acts having to do with participant ability. A preliminary statement of this condition is given in (3.10).

(3.10) The performer of an illocutionary act K believes that the performers of the volitional acts involved in the carrying out of K are in fact able to perform those volitional acts.

The volitional acts referred to in (3.10) are those acts denoted by a subclass of the non-stative verbs and adjectives (Lakoff, 1966), namely the pro-agentive verbs discussed in Lee (1970) when they occur with agents. Thus, while (3.11a) is ambiguous between an agentive reading where John intentionally frightened the baby and a non-agentive reading where John frightened the baby, perhaps by accident, (3.11b) understood as a request does not show this ambiguity.

(3.11) a. John frightened the baby.
   b. Can you frighten the baby?

As an informational question about the addressee's abilities, however, (3.12) is ambiguous as to agentiveness.

(3.12) Can you frighten the baby by accident?

(3.12), unlike (3.11b), cannot be understood as a request but only as an informational question (unless one is talking about frightening the baby accidentally on purpose). The reason (3.12) cannot be understood as a request is that the phrase by accident forces a non-agentive interpretation on the sentence, thus making the act denoted by frighten non-volitional. Since the act is non-volitional, the
ability condition given in (3.10) cannot be used to perform an indirect illocutionary act.

Given an intrinsic condition such as that in (3.10), the next thing we need to know is how such a condition is used to perform illocutionary acts indirectly. Modifying Gordon and Lakoff's (1971) account somewhat, we shall say that:

(3.13) An illocutionary act K is performed indirectly by asserting that an intrinsic condition on K holds or by questioning whether an intrinsic condition on K holds.

Asserting an intrinsic condition to perform K is not interchangeable with questioning an intrinsic condition to perform K. Gordon and Lakoff (1971) would have it that assertion is used when the agent is first person and questioning is used when the agent is second person, but this is wrong, as shown by the possible indirect acts given in (a) and (b).

(a) Can I help you? (offer)
(b) You can take out the garbage. (command)

The distinction between assertion and questioning will be discussed further below.

For intrinsic conditions with more than one possible application to a given illocutionary act—such as that in (3.10), which refers to all volitional acts needed to carry out K—an illocutionary act is performed indirectly by asserting that a specific application of the intrinsic condition holds or by questioning whether a specific application holds. In the case of (3.10), this means asserting that a participant in the illocutionary act has the ability to perform one of the volitional acts necessary to the carrying out of the illocutionary act or questioning whether such is the case.
To illustrate these ideas, we need an analysis of illocutionary acts which makes explicit the volitional acts involved. A rough attempt at such an analysis is given in (3.1) for some illocutionary acts.

(3.1)  

a. **Assertions, Granting of Permission**  
\[
\text{SAY} (S,H,P) \\
\text{SAY} (S,H, (\text{ALLOW} (S, (\text{DO} (H,A))))))
\]

b. **Questions**  
\[
\text{IMPERE}^6 (S,H, (\text{SAY} (H,S,p)))
\]

c. **Promises, Offers**  
\[
\text{PROMOFF}^6 (S,H, (\text{DO} (S,A)))
\]

d. **Commands, Requests, Asking Permission**  
\[
\text{IMPERE} (S,H, (\text{DO} (H,A))) \\
\text{IMPERE} (S,H, (\text{ALLOW} (H, (\text{DO} (S,A))))))
\]

6IMPERE is a representation of the semantic content common to the explicit performative verbs command, order, request, ask (that), and others like them, as well as of the illocutionary force of many imperatives. The term is from Ross (1970), as is the analysis of questions. A similar representation of the semantic content common to offering and promising is labelled by PROMOFF.

The representations in (3.1) are intended to be semantic representations and the items in capital letters are to be taken as semantic primes. These representations are very schematic. It is highly probable that the posited semantic primes are actually semantically complex, but, we hope, not in ways which bear on the argument. S and H are labels for the speaker and addressee of the illocutionary
act. A is an arbitrary volitional act, and P is an arbitrary proposition.

Before continuing, it should be noted that embodied in the representations in (3.14) is the claim that promises and offers are not two different types of illocutionary acts, but rather two realizations of the same illocutionary act, and that commands and requests are similarly related. In fact, we wish to claim that requests and offers are just deferential commands and promises.

One piece of evidence for this claim is the fact that while there are explicit performative verbs for the illocutionary acts of commanding and promising, there are no explicit performatives for the illocutionary acts of requesting and offering (David Stampe, personal communication). This is shown by the fact that (3.15b) is unacceptable and that (3.15a) is not really a request, but is rather an order, as shown by the unacceptability of this utterance with following please.\(^7\)

(3.15) a. I (hereby) request you to leave the premises (*please).

b. *I (hereby) offer to help you fix your flat tire.

\(^7\)Sadock (1970) considers the acceptability of a following please to be a test for true imperatives. However, this constitutes a confusion of form and function, since imperatives used as commands cannot be followed by please, as in (a), and yet one would not want to claim that imperatives used as commands are not true imperatives.

(a) #Shoulder arms, please.

Gordon and Lakoff (1971) consider the acceptability of a following please to be a test for illocutionary requests, the view adopted here.
Of course, the lack of explicit performative verbs for requesting and offering does not in itself show anything, since there are other illocutionary acts, such as insulting someone, which do not have an associated explicit performative verb (Austin, 1962), as shown by (3.16).

(3.16) *I hereby insult you be calling you a rapscallion.

However, there is also the strongly felt semantic (or pragmatic) relationship between the acts of promising and offering and commanding and requesting. To capture this relationship, we need only say that they are basically the same acts, and that explicit performative verbs cannot be used in deferential situations. (This of course leaves the unacceptability of (3.16) a mystery.)

Another claim made in (3.14) is that utterances used to grant permission are a type of assertion rather than a type of promise, say, or a type of illocutionary act unrelated to the others we have given. The reason for making this claim is that later we shall come across cases of indirect illocutionary acts performed with utterances which are literally grants of permission and we shall then need this claim to arrive at an explanation of them. Since we have hypothesized that indirect illocutionary acts are performed by asserting or questioning that intrinsic conditions on those acts hold, we would expect only literal assertions or questions to be used to perform indirect illocutionary acts. If grants of permission are assertions, we can explain how these grants of permission can be used to perform indirect acts. If, on the other hand, such an analysis is wrong, then such illocutionary acts will remain unexplained.
Given the representations in (3.14) and our hypothesis about how the intrinsic condition on ability may be used to form indirect illocutionary acts, we would expect the following to be indirect illocutionary acts (with A and P instantiated):

(3.17) **Assertions, Granting of Permission**

a. Can I say that Harry is a fool?
   
   I can say that Harry is a fool.

b. I can allow you to leave.

c. You can leave.

**Questions**

d. Can I ask you what you plan to do?

e. Can you tell me what you plan to do?
   
   You can tell me what you plan to do.

**Promises, Offers**

f. Can I offer you my help?
   
   I can offer you my help.

g. Can I help you?
   
   I can help you.

**Commands, Requests, Asking for Permission**

h. Can I ask you to help me?
   
   I can ask you to help me.

i. Can you help me?
   
   You can help me.

j. Can I ask you to allow me to leave now?

k. Can you let me leave now?

l. Can I leave now?
However, there is a problem here, in that some of the utterances in (3.17) may be paraphrased using *may* for *can* and others using *be able to* for *can* as in (3.18):

(3.17) Assertions, Granting of Permission

a. May I say that Harry is a fool?
   *Am I able to say that Harry is a fool?
   ?I may say that Harry is a fool.
   I am able to say that Harry is a fool.

b. *I may allow you to leave.
   I am able to allow you to leave.

c. You may leave.
   You are able to leave.

Questions (about plans)

d. May I ask you what you plan to do?
   *Am I able to ask you what you plan to do?

e. *May you tell me what you plan to do?
   Are you able to tell me what you plan to do?
   You may tell me what you plan to do.
   *You are able to tell me what you plan to do.

Promises, Offers

f. May I offer you my help?
   *Am I able to offer you my help?

   *I may offer you my help.
   I am able to offer you my help.

g. May I help you?
   Am I able to help you?
g. (continued)

*I may help you.

I am able to help you.

Commands, Requests, Asking for Permission

h. May I ask you to help me?

*Am I able to ask you to help me?

I may ask you to help me.

I am able to ask you to help me.

i. *May you help me?

Are you able to help me?

You may help me.

You are able to help me.

j. May I ask you to allow me to leave now?

*Am I able to ask you to allow me to leave now?

k. *May you let me leave now?

Are you able to let me leave now?

l. May I leave now?

Am I able to leave now?

What appears to be the case here is that, even though illocutionary acts are themselves volitional acts, one cannot question one's ability to perform such acts as an indirect way of performing those acts, as shown by (3.18 a, b, d, h, j). Put another way, one cannot question one's ability to perform an illocutionary act and at the same time perform that act. One can however assert one's ability to perform the act and at the same time perform it, as shown by (3.18 a, d, h). This may be accounted for by modifying (3.13), the formulation
of how indirect illocutionary acts are performed, as in (3.19).

(3.19) An illocutionary act K is performed by
asserting that an intrinsic condition on K
holds or by questioning whether an intrinsic
condition on K which is a matter of belief
only (not knowledge) holds.

Since when you perform an illocutionary act you know that you are
performing it, you must also know that you have the ability to
perform it. Thus it is not a matter of belief only that you have
the ability to perform the act and you cannot question this ability
to perform an indirect illocutionary act.

To account for the illocutionary force of the utterances in
(3.17) where may is possible (grouped together in (3.20) below), we
need to appeal to another intrinsic condition.

(3.20) **Assertions, Granting of Permission**

a. May I say that Harry is a fool?

b. You may leave.

**Questions**

c. May I ask you what you plan to do?

d. You may tell me what you plan to do.

**Offers**

e. May I offer you my help?

f. May I help you?

**Commands, Requests, Asking Permission**

g. May I ask you to help me?

h. You may help me.

i. May I ask you to allow me to leave?

j. May I leave now?
Without becoming involved in a detailed analysis of *may*, we can at least note that all of the utterances in (3.20) have paraphrases with *be allowed to* for *may* and in fact that they all are literally cases of asking and giving permission. This suggests that we need an intrinsic condition or conditions having to do with permission on which to base illocutionary acts. A candidate for such an intrinsic condition is given in (3.21).

(3.21) In settings where he is being deferential to the addressee, the performer of an illocutionary act K believes that he has permission of the addressee to perform the volitional acts involved in the carrying out of K, i.e., that the addressee will allow him to carry out these acts.  

\[8\] It is probably the case that the politeness condition discussed in chapter two, that the speaker believes that the addressee would not mind performing the volitional acts involved in the illocutionary act, is actually a deference condition related to this one.

Now questioning whether this intrinsic condition holds, i.e., questioning whether one is allowed to carry out some volitional act involved in the illocutionary act, amounts to the same thing as asking permission to carry out that volitional act, by our analysis of asking permission in (3.14). Thus we can explain how a request for permission is used to perform indirect illocutionary acts without modifying our account of how illocutionary acts are performed. One modification is needed, however, to account for the fact that the assertions in (3.22) cannot be used to perform the illocutionary acts that their question counterparts can.
(3.22) a. I may say that Harry is a fool.
   b. I may ask what you plan to do.
   c. I may offer you my help.
   d. I may ask you to help me.

A superficial explanation would be that may in the permission sense takes 1st person subjects only in questions and takes 2nd person subjects only in assertions. However, this explanation is inadequate since we are not dealing with a fact about the morpheme may here but with a fact about permission in general. Thus (3.23) is exactly parallel to (3.22).

(3.23) a. You will allow me to say that Harry is a fool.
   b. You will allow me to ask you what you plan to do.
   c. You will allow me to offer you my help.
   d. You will allow me to ask you to help me.

A deeper explanation for the facts in (3.22) and (3.23) is based on the fact that there seems to be a contradiction between a speaker's being deferential to an addressee and his asserting that he has the addressee's permission to perform a volitional act. This contradiction makes it impossible for an indirect illocutionary act based upon an assertion of the intrinsic condition in (3.21) to go through.

The illocutionary acts in (3.20) which are expressed with assertions may be accounted for by (3.24).

(3.24) The performer of an illocutionary act K believes (and, in fact, knows) that the addressee has his permission to perform the volitional acts involved in K, i.e., that he will allow the addressee to carry out those acts.
This intrinsic condition, unlike (3.20), does not involve deference, but does involve knowledge. As we saw before, in the discussion of (3.19), this disallows indirect illocutionary acts by questioning. When the intrinsic condition is asserted, i.e., when the speaker asserts that he allows the addressee to perform some volitional act involved in $K$, this amounts to the same thing as granting permission to the addressee to perform the volitional act, thus accounting for the literal interpretation of utterances like (3.25) as granting of permission.

(3.25) You may tell me what you plan to do.

Since the intrinsic condition in (3.24) does not involve deference, the antideferential character of indirect illocutionary acts performed by utterances like (3.25) still needs to be accounted for. This is easily explained by considering that (3.25), taken as a question, amounts to the assertion of a logically necessary truth, since it is logically impossible to ask a question of someone without being willing to allow him to answer. It is part of the meaning of the notion illocutionary act that in performing it, permission is granted to the addressee to perform his parts of it, which is to say that (3.24) is an essential condition on illocutionary acts (of which more will be said in chapter four).

It is instructive to compare this case of the assertion of a logically necessary truth with another case, given in (3.26) (Searle, 1969, p. 124), discussed in Gordon and Lakoff (1971).

(3.26) Either John is a communist or he isn't.

By asserting (3.26), the speaker commits himself to the belief that
either member of the disjunction may be true and thus implies that it is possible that John is a communist. Since (3.26) is on the surface tautological and thus empty, the implication is all that is meaningfully conveyed by the sentence.

Utterances like (3.25) (repeated below) seem to be similar to (3.26) not only in their logical necessity but also in the fact that they imply the possibility that they could have been false. That is, with (3.25) taken as a question, it implies that the speaker might not have given the addressee permission to answer the question, and further that the speaker is in a position to deny permission for the addressee to answer the question.

(3.25) You may tell me what you plan to do.

Similarly with (3.27), taken as an order, there is an implication that the speaker is in a position to grant permission for the addressee to carry out the speaker's desires.

(3.27) You may help me.

In such cases, the speaker's permission is the hearer's command.

We have so far discussed cases of indirect illocutionary acts based on the assertion or questioning of intrinsic conditions involving belief and knowledge. There also appear to be cases of indirect illocutionary acts on intrinsic conditions concerning speaker intentions.

Some examples of such intrinsic conditions are as follows:

When the speaker (S) asserts a proposition (P) to an addressee (H), it is S's intention to cause H to believe P. When S asks H P, it is S's intention to cause H to tell S P. When S promises or offers
to do a volitional act (A), it is S's intention to do A. When S commands or requests H to do A, it must be his intention to cause H to do A. These conditions on speaker intention appear at the right side of the arrows below.

\[
\begin{align*}
(3.28) & \quad \text{a. } \text{SAY} (S,H,P) \rightarrow \text{INTEND} (S, \text{CAUSE} (S, \text{BELIEVE} (H,P))) \\
& \quad \text{b. } \text{ASK} (S,H,P) \rightarrow \text{INTEND} (S, \text{CAUSE} (H, \text{SAY} (H,S,P))) \\
& \quad \text{c. } \text{PROMOFF} (S,H, \text{DO} (S,A)) \rightarrow \text{INTEND} (S, \text{DO} (S,A)) \\
& \quad \text{d. } \text{IMPERE} (S,H, \text{DO} (H,A)) \rightarrow \text{INTEND} (S, \text{CAUSE} (S, \text{DO} (H,A)))
\end{align*}
\]

These conditions cannot be used by themselves to perform indirect illocutionary acts. This is shown, for example, by the fact that the utterances in (3.29) cannot be used as commands or requests (although (3.29b) may have the perlocutionary effect of getting the addressee to take out the garbage).

\[
\begin{align*}
(3.29) & \quad \text{a. } \text{Will I } \{\text{cause} \} \text{ you to take out the garbage?} \\
& \quad \text{b. } \text{I will } \{\text{cause} \} \text{ you to take out the garbage.}
\end{align*}
\]

However, the utterances in (3.30) can be taken as indirect illocutionary acts.

\[
\begin{align*}
(3.30) & \quad \text{Assertions} \\
& \quad \text{a. } \text{Can I get you to believe that I wouldn't hurt a fly?} \\
& \quad \text{b. } \text{Can you believe that Irv is bald?}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Question} \\
& \quad \text{c. } \text{Can I get you to tell me what time it is?}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Request} \\
& \quad \text{d. } \text{Can I get you to help me?}
\end{align*}
\]
Apparently these illocutionary acts are examples of the ability intrinsic condition applied to the intentional intrinsic conditions on the acts in question. For example, the speaker in (3.30b) by questioning the addressee's ability to believe a proposition P conveys indirectly his intention to cause the addressee to believe P, and by conveying this intention conveys P at second remove. It seems that this method of performing indirect illocutionary acts is possible only when the ability condition is applied to the intention conditions by questioning, since, for example, the assertions corresponding to the questions in (3.30) cannot be used to perform the respective indirect illocutionary acts. We have no explanation for this restriction. Doubly indirect illocutionary acts like the ones we have been discussing need more research.

We have so far discussed indirect illocutionary acts based on general intrinsic conditions concerning ability and permission. There are other general intrinsic conditions which can be used to convey a variety of indirect illocutionary acts. Some of these are as follows:

(3.31) The performer of an illocutionary act K believes that no acts involved in the performance of K are already performed.

(3.32) The performer of K believes that all acts involved in the performance of K (save for K itself) will occur in the future. (In the case of acts involved in the performance of K which are acts performed by the performer of K, this intrinsic condition is a matter of desire rather than of belief. cf. (3.33))

(3.33) The performer of K desires that all acts involved in the performance of K should take place.
(3.34) In settings where he is being deferential to the addressee, the performer of K believes that the addressee is willing for all acts involved in the performance of K to take place, i.e., that the addressee does not object to any of the acts involved in K occurring.

(3.35) In less formal settings where he is being deferential to the addressee, the performer of K believes that the addressee desires that all acts involved in the performance of K take place.

The sorts of illocutionary acts that may be performed using these intrinsic conditions are illustrated by the following sentences:

The sentences in (3.36) are based on the condition that the speaker believes that no part of the illocutionary act is already performed.

(3.36) **Assertions, Granting Permission**

a. Have(n't) I (already) said that John is coming tomorrow?

b. Did(n't) I say that John is coming tomorrow?

c. Did(n't) you know that John is coming tomorrow?

d. Do(n't) you (already) know that John is coming tomorrow?

e. Have(n't) I (already) told you you may go?

f. I haven't said yet that John is coming tomorrow.

g. You don't know yet that John is coming tomorrow.

h. I haven't yet told you you may go.

**Questions**

i. Have(n't) I (already) asked you when you'll be done?

j. Did(n't) I ask you when you'll be done?

k. Have(n't) you (already) told me when you'll be done?
1. Did(n't) you tell me when you'll be done?

m. Have(n't) you (already) let me know when you'll be done?

n. Did(n't) you let me know when you'll be done?

o. Do(n't) I (already) know when you'll be done?

p. Have I (already) gotten you to tell me when you'll be done?

q. I haven't yet asked you when you'll be done.

r. You haven't yet told me when you'll be done.

s. You haven't yet let me know when you'll be done.

t. I don't know yet when you'll be done.

u. I haven't yet gotten you to tell me when you'll be done.

Promises, Offers

v. Did(n't) I offer to help you?

w. Has(n't) anybody helped you?

x. I haven't yet offered to help you.

y. Nobody has yet helped you.

Commands, Requests

z. Have(n't) I (already) asked you to close the door?

aa. Have(n't) you (already) closed the door?

bb. I have(n't) yet asked to close the door.

cc. You haven't yet closed the door.

The sentences in (3.37) are based on the condition that the speaker believes that all acts involved in the illocutionary act (save for the illocutionary act itself) will occur in the future.
(3.37) **Assertions, Granting Permission**

a. Will you believe that my dog has fleas?

b. I will allow you to close the door.

**Questions**

c. Will (Won't) you tell me how you knew that?

d. Will (Won't) you let me know what your name is?

e. You will tell me how you knew that.

f. You will let me know what your name is.

g. I will know how you knew that.

**Promises, Offers**

h. I will help you.

i. I will climb that mountain.

**Commands, Requests, Asking Permission**

j. Will (Won't) you fix that leak?

k. Will (Won't) you allow me to see her?

l. You will fix that leak.

The sentences in (3.38) are based on the condition that the speaker desires that all acts involved in the performance of the illocutionary act should take place.

(3.38) **Assertions**

a. I want to say that this is a proud moment for me.

b. I want to tell you that you're the greatest.

c. I want you to know that it wasn't personal.

**Questions**

d. I want to ask you why you did it.

e. I want you to tell me where the stash is.
f. I want to know what you think of me.

Promises, Offers

g. I want to offer to help pay for that.

h. I want to help you with the dishes.

i. I want to promise it will never happen again.

Requests, Asking Permission

j. I want to ask you to close the door.

k. I want you to close the door.

l. I want to ask you to let me leave now.

m. I want you to let me leave now.

n. I want to leave now.

The sentences in (3.39) are based on the deference condition that the speaker believes that the addressee is willing for all parts of the illocutionary act to be performed.

(3.39) Assertions

a. Would you mind if I said that the meat's overdone?

b. Is it alright with you if I say that the meat's overdone?

c. Do you mind knowing that John is unfaithful?

d. Do you mind my letting you know that John is unfaithful?

Questions

e. Do you mind my asking how many more children you're going to have?

f. Would you (be so kind as to) tell me where she is?

g. Will you (be kind enough to) let me know who you think you are?
h. Do you mind my knowing what you're going to do?

Offers

i. Would it be alright if I offered to help you?

j. Would you mind my helping you?

Requests, Asking Permission

k. Would you object to helping me?

l. Would it be alright if I got you to help me?

m. Do you mind my asking you to help me?

n. Would you (be kind enough to) let me leave?

o. Is it OK if I leave you?

The sentences in (3.40) are based on the informal deferential condition that the speaker believes that the addressee desires that all parts of the illocutionary act be performed.

(3.40) Assertions

a. Do you want me to tell you what I think? You're nuts.

b. Do you want to know what I think? The butler did it.

Questions

c. Do you want to tell me what you did with the body?

d. Do you want to let me know what you did with the body?

Requests, Asking for Permission

e. Do you want to close the door?

f. Do you want to give me permission to leave?

Several points should be noted about the intrinsic conditions in (3.31)-(3.35), and how they may be used to perform illocutionary
acts. First of all the formulations given are only intended as an attempt at representing the intrinsic conditions and are not to be construed as the last word. One inadequacy is that (3.31) and (3.32) obviously do not contain two independent intrinsic conditions, but should probably be analyzed as two aspects of the same condition. This is made difficult, however, by the fact that part of the intrinsic condition in (3.32) is a matter of desire, while (3.31) is totally a matter of belief. This is evidenced by the impossibility of conveying an indirect act by questioning (3.32) when the performer is the speaker, and by the possibility of doing so by questioning (3.31). (3.41) illustrates this.

(3.41) a. Do I already know what this is?
    b. I don't yet know what this is.
    c. I will know what this is.
    d. Will I know what this is?

All the utterances in (3.41) may be taken as questions about the identity of something, except for (3.41d). This is explained if knowing the answer in the future is not a matter of belief, given our formulation of how to perform indirect illocutionary acts with intrinsic conditions (cf. (3.19)). It is called a matter of desire here on the basis of the relationship between (3.32) and (3.33).

Another similar inadequacy in the formulations given is that (3.34) and (3.35) should not be considered two different intrinsic conditions. There are only two differences between (3.34) and (3.35). The first is that (3.35) is used in less formal settings than (3.34) to perform indirect illocutionary acts and the second is that (3.34)
involves a speaker belief about what his addressee would not object to, i.e., would not not desire, while (3.35) involves a speaker belief about what his addressee would desire. In short, the speaker belief in (3.34) is simply a weakened version of the speaker belief in (3.35). This fact cries out to be related to the formality difference between (3.34) and (3.35). It might be said, for example, that in a more formal setting, the speaker is more distant from his addressee and, because of this, makes fewer and weaker assumptions about the addressee’s beliefs. However, not enough is known about what constitutes formality to allow more than speculation.

A second point concerning the intrinsic conditions given in (3.31) – (3.35) as well as the ones discussed earlier is that when they are questioned to perform an indirect illocutionary act, the question may be either positive or negative, as shown by (3.42) and some of the sentences in (3.36) – (3.40).

(3.42) a. Can you help me? (request)
    b. Can't you help me? (request)
    c. Do you want me to help you? (offer)
    d. Don't you want me to help you? (offer)

This is the case even with the intrinsic condition in (3.31), which itself is negative, as (3.43) shows.

(3.43) a. Have I already told you that John eats brown rice?
    b. Haven't I already told you that John eats brown rice?
    c. ?Haven't I not already told you that John eats brown rice?
It appears that whether or not the intrinsic condition is itself negative, the possible realizations of its use as an indirect illocutionary act remain the same. This is not true for cases of assertion of intrinsic conditions, as shown in (3.44).

(3.44) a. You can help me. (request)
    b. You can't help me. (not a request for help)
    c. I have already told you John eats brown rice. (not an assertion of tell's complement)
    d. I haven't yet told you John eats brown rice. (assertion of tell's complement)

The difference between the relationship between positive and negative questions and the relationship between positive and negative assertions can probably be used to explain this. (See Schachter, et al., 1968, for a discussion of positive and negative questions.)

The final point concerning the intrinsic conditions above concerns those intrinsic conditions which are used in deferential situations. As with (3.21), (3.34) and (3.35) cannot be asserted to perform indirect illocutionary acts, but can only be questioned, as we find in (3.45).

(3.45) a. Do you mind stopping the car? (request)
    b. You don't mind stopping the car. (not a request)
    c. Do you want me to wash the dishes? (offer)
    d. You want me to wash the dishes. (not an offer)

As was the case with (3.21), we can explain this by appealing to the contradiction that exists between being deferential to an addressee and at the same time asserting that the addressee does not mind or
actively desires that a part of the illocutionary act be performed.

This leads to the following generalization:

(3.46) An illocutionary act \( K \) is performed in a deferential situation by questioning (not by asserting) that an intrinsic condition on \( K \) involving deference holds.

This generalization is explained by the following;

(3.47) One cannot perform an illocutionary act by asserting an utterance the assertion of which contradicts any aspect of the illocutionary act in question.

From examination of the examples of indirect illocutionary acts we have given, it appears that performing such acts with a question is in general more deferential than performing them with an assertion. This may be because questions somehow make the act seem more conditional and thus subject to veto by the addressee. This conditionality may be emphasized by the use of the subjunctive for indicative modal verbs as in (3.48), in which case the deferentiality of the act is also increased.

(3.48) a. Could I ask you when you are leaving?
     b. Would you take out the garbage?
     c. Might I help you?

Such use of the subjunctive for indicative modals is not found in assertions used to perform indirect illocutionary acts.\(^9\)

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\(^9\)The use of subjunctive for indicative in indirect illocutionary acts is treated in Sadock (1970) as the use of past tense modals for present tense modals. While there are sentences in English which seem to contain past tense modals, such as (a) and (b), the sentences which we have been discussing and those which Sadock discussed do not seem to be of this type.
(a) It used to be that John could leap tall buildings in a single bound.
(b) When I was young, my mother would tuck me into bed.

It may be instructive at this point to compare the account given here of indirect illocutionary acts with the account provided for some of them by Sadock (1970). Sadock discusses a class of utterances which have the form of questions but which are used imperatively and to some extent behave syntactically like true imperatives. These utterances he calls whimperatives. Some of

10 In another paper (Sadock, 1971), Sadock also discusses a class of superficial questions which are taken as assertions, which he calls queclaratives. Examples are given in (a) and (b), with the assertions conveyed by them given in (a') and (b') respectively.

(a) Who gives a damn about Turing machines?
(a') Nobody gives a damn about Turing machines.
(b) Is being a middle executive type easy?
(b') Being a middle executive type isn't easy.

We have no way to account for queclaratives, in our framework, since we presently have no idea what intrinsic condition on assertions could be said to be questioned with sentences like (a) and (b). The wh-question type is especially problematic for us, since it is difficult to relate to the questioning of whether an intrinsic condition holds or not. (The same goes for Sadock's (1970) whimperatives which are wh-questions, such as "What do you have to drink?" as a request for a drink.) However we expect that further research will show some relationship between queclaratives and indirect illocutionary acts in our sense.

Sadock's examples are given in (3.49).

(3.49) a. Won't you give me a drink?
b. Do you have anything to drink?
c. May I have a drink?
d. Would you give me a drink?

These examples and the other (yes-no question) examples given by Sadock are examples of what we have been calling indirect commands and requests performed by questioning whether an intrinsic condition holds (although we have not postulated the intrinsic conditions necessary to account for all of them).

Sadock gives three tests for what he calls true imperatives and one test for what he calls true questions and shows that whimperatives pass the former tests and fail the latter. The three tests for true imperatives are: 1) please may follow true imperatives, 2) the indefinite vocative someone may follow true imperatives, 3) true imperatives, but not true questions, may be conjoined with true imperatives. The test for true questions is that they may be preceded by tell me. In our terms, the please test is a test for illocutionary requests, the someone test is a test for commands and requests with unspecified addressee, the conjunction test is explained by noticing that utterances performing two different types of IMPERing cannot be conjoined, and finally, the tell me test is a test for requests for information, i.e., informational questions.11

11 There is another test mentioned in Sadock (1970, from Jerry Morgan and Georgia Green, personal communication), for distinguishing between formal imperatives and whimperatives, which is that formal imperatives (as well as other types of utterances) may be followed by the 'tag' I tell you, while whimperatives may not. Apparently this tag has a more superficial environment which allows its appearance than the tests just mentioned, since it seems to appear with superficial assertions and imperatives and not with superficial questions and exclamations, no matter what illocutionary force is involved. Thus we have:
(a) John is a doctor, I tell you. (assertion)
(b) You may leave, I tell you. (granting permission)
(c) I want to know what time it is, I tell you.
   (question)
(d) I can help you with the dishes, I tell you. (offer)
(e) You will take out the garbage, I tell you. (command)
(f) I want you to help me with the dishes, I tell you.
   (request)

These all seem to be cases of repetition of an illocutionary act
but the form of the tag is a mystery.

On the basis of the tests given and some other considerations,
Sadock opts for representing whimperatives semantically as a
**conjunction** of an imperative and an interrogative hypersentence,
i.e., as a conjunction of a sentence of imperative illocutionary
force with a sentence which has the illocutionary force of an informa-
tional question. The two conjoined sentences are said to be partially
identical. This solution is more or less *ad hoc* and does not provide
an account of which questions can convey requests and commands and
which can't.

In our framework, on the other hand, whimperatives (like other
indirect illocutionary acts) are represented at the remote structure
level as explicit commands or requests, possibly by the use of the
appropriate higher performative predicate. These representations
are then mapped onto structures which have a performative predicate
associated with either assertion or questioning. The mappings which
can take place are based only on felicity conditions on commands or
requests and thus explain how at some later (but relatively early)
stage in their derivation commands and requests become questions.

By this account, all tests for distinguishing between whimperatives
and true questions must be tests involving relatively deep semantic facts, and, as we have seen, this appears to be the case.

In fact, we hypothesize that the mapping of illocutionary acts onto illocutionary assertions and questions takes place in the derivation before any syntactic transformations apply, i.e., that assertions and questions used to perform indirect illocutionary acts are syntactically indistinguishable from literal assertions and questions (taking cooccurrence restrictions to be semantic).

\[\text{T} \quad \text{9}\]

This hypothesis seems to be borne out by such facts as that both (a) and (b) may be indirect assertions of (c), thus showing that negative hopping must apply after the mapping of the structure underlying (c) onto the structure underlying (a).

(a) I believe John isn't insane.
(b) I don't believe John is insane.
(c) John isn't insane.

(The felicity condition justifying this mapping is given below). However, Sadock (personal communication) has shown that a queclarative such as (d) can either be understood as either the assertion of (e) or the assertion of (f).

(d) Does Nixon believe that Rusk knows the meaning of chutzpah?
(e) Nixon does not believe that Rusk knows the meaning of chutzpah.
(f) Nixon believes that Rusk does not know the meaning of chutzpah.

If queclaratives are to be handled in our framework, we are forced by this fact either to claim that the mapping in this case occurs after negative hopping, or to claim that the mapping involved maps two different structures onto the structure of (d), thus duplicating the work of negative hopping in the mapping. Both alternatives are unattractive. A third alternative would be to say that queclaratives are not illocutionary questions and thus fall outside our framework. The choice between these alternatives must await further research.

Another instructive comparison is between Gordon and Lakoff's
(1971) mechanism for relating questions and assertions to the indirect illocutionary acts performed by them and our own mechanism, the mapping indicated above. Gordon and Lakoff's mechanism is a transderivational constraint (see (Lakoff, 1970a) for a discussion of this notion). This works as follows: given derivations $D^a$ and $D^b$ as in (3.50), where $S$ is a surface structure and $L$ is remote structure, there will be cases where $L^a$ conversationally entails $L^b$, which is to be understood as a transderivational relationship between $D^a$ and $D^b$.

(3.50) $D^a: S^a, \ldots, L^a$

$D^b: S^b, \ldots, L^b$

The transderivational relationship of conversational implication is always to be explained on the basis of a sincerity condition on $L^b$, $L^a$ being the literal illocutionary act and $L^b$ being the illocutionary act conveyed. The transderivational rule relating $L^a$ and $L^b$ is to be understood as an interpretive rule operating on remote structures.

In our framework, there would be only one derivation involved, that given in (3.51) (using the notation given above).

(3.51) $D^a: S^a, \ldots, L^a, L^b$

There would be a generative rule mapping $L^b$ onto $L^a$, where $L^b$ is the indirect illocutionary act and $L^b$ the literal illocutionary act which conveys it. Thus the difference between Gordon and Lakoff's approach and the one adopted here is essentially between the use of an interpretive rule or a generative rule to account for the indirect illocutionary act conveyed by a question or assertion. There seem to be no conclusive arguments for favoring one of the approaches over the
other. However, there are two considerations which seem to tip the scales towards the approach adopted here. First, in Gordon and Lakoff's framework, every intrinsic condition involved in a trans-derivational rule must be turned backwards to yield that rule, while the mappings posited here correspond directly to the intrinsic conditions involved. This is more than a mere notational difference since several different illocutionary acts can have essentially the same intrinsic condition on them, thus forcing Gordon and Lakoff to have several transderivational rules all with the same left-hand side but each with a different right-hand side.

Second, if our hypothesis about the mapping occurring before all syntactic rules is correct, there is no case in which the derivation of $L^b$, the indirect act, is relevant to the derivation of $L^a$, the literal act. Only the remote structure, i.e., the semantics of $L^b$, is relevant. This means that the use of a transderivational rule to account for the facts would be much too powerful a move.

We conclude this chapter by pointing out that, while many intrinsic conditions which heretofore have been considered conditions on particular illocutionary acts can be more profitably viewed as general intrinsic conditions on all illocutionary acts, there are intrinsic conditions which must be viewed as particular to specific illocutionary acts. Two are given in (3.52).

(3.52)  
(a) SAY $(S,H,P) \rightarrow$ KNOW $(S,\text{BELIEVE}(S,P))$

(b) IMPERE $(S,H,SAY(H,S,P) \rightarrow \text{BELIEVE}(S,\text{KNOW}(H,P))$

(3.52a) is the condition that a speaker who performs the act of asserting $P$ must know that he believes $P$. This is a condition on
sincere assertions only. Searle (1969, p. 66) would have this condition be simply that the asserter believes what he is asserting, but if this were the case, we would not be able to explain the indirect assertion conveyed by (3.53a) and (3.53b) and the impossibility of (3.53c) being an indirect assertion.

(3.53) a. I believe that John left.
    b. John left, I believe.
    c. Do(n't) I believe that John left?

In all our previous examples it was the content of the speaker's belief that was asserted or questioned to perform an indirect illocutionary act, not that he believed it. Thus the examples in (3.54) do not seem to constitute indirect requests, offers, or questions, but only indirect assertions of believe's complement.

(3.54) a. I believe you can help me.
    b. I believe I can help you.
    c. I believe you can tell me what time it is.

Further, it would seem impossible to believe a proposition without knowing that one believed it, or vice versa, if "knowing" is used in its ordinary sense. For some philosophers, "I know that p" primarily means "p, and no amount of further information would have made any difference to my saying so." Among these philosophers is Hintikka (1962), who shows convincingly that if one is using "know" in this sense, one can indeed believe p without "knowing" that one believes p.

The analysis of the intrinsic condition in (3.52a) is thus in some sense equivalent to Searle's
analysis, and at the same time allows us to explain by our account the form of (3.53a) and the impossibility of indirectly asserting with (3.53c), the latter following from the fact that the intrinsic condition is not a matter of belief only.

The condition in (3.52b) says that a performer of the act of questioning his addressee must believe that his addressee knows the answer to the question. This intrinsic condition accounts for the use of (3.55a) and (3.55b) as indirect questions about who John is with.

(3.55)  a. Do you know who John is with?
   b. Don't you know who John is with?
   c. You know who John is with.

The fact that (3.55c) cannot be so employed would seem to indicate that (3.52b) is a condition which holds only when the speaker is being deferential to the addressee, and thus that it is possible to ask an addressee for information one knows he doesn't have, if one is not being deferential to him. This seems to be correct.

This chapter has only scratched the surface of the topic of indirect illocutionary acts; it needs to be gone into much deeper. We have at least shown one way in which intrinsic felicity conditions are important to any consideration of the syntax of illocutionary acts.
Besides their significance for the performance of indirect illocutionary acts, intrinsic conditions are also syntactically relevant in that certain of them may be used to qualify illocutionary acts. The sort of process we are going to consider is illustrated in (4.1).

(4.1) a. You'll never be a politician, if you don't mind my saying so. (assertion)

b. If I can ask, what do you mean by that? (question)

c. You're a wonderful cook, Martha, if I haven't already told you so. (assertion)

d. I'll help you with the dishes, if it's alright with you. (offer)

e. Perhaps I've already asked you to, but could you take out the garbage? (request)

The if clauses in (4.1a) - (4.1d) differ from the if clauses of conditional sentences in several ways. First of all, there is no causal connection between the proposition in the if clause and the proposition of the main clause as there is between the antecedent and consequent of the normal conditional sentence. Thus while (4.2a) and (4.2c) are acceptable, (4.2b) and (4.2d) are not:

(4.2) a. If John comes, Mary will leave because of his coming.
b. *If I can say something, that's a stupid idea because of my being able to say something.

c. If John were dead, how would Mary feel because he was?

d. *If I could ask, when are you leaving because I can?

Second, while the normal conditional expresses a contingent proposition, there is nothing contingent about (4.1a) - (4.1d). that is, the truth of the illocutionary force of the main clause in these sentences is not contingent on the truth of the if clause.

Third, the if clause of normal conditionals may occur in a variety of tenses and moods, while qualifying if clauses can only be present indicative or subjunctive, or in the case of sentences like (4.1c), only in the past indicative. This is illustrated in (4.3).

(4.3)

a. If I had studied, I would have passed.

b. If I were to study, I would pass.

c. If I study, I (will) pass.

d. If I studied, I passed.

e. If I were to have been able to say so, John would have been a doctor.

f. If I were to be able to say so, John would be a doctor.

g. If I could say so, John would be a doctor.

h. If I can say so, John is a doctor.

i. If I was able to say so, John was a doctor.

j. If I could say so, John is a doctor.

(4.3a) - (4.3d) illustrate the pattern for normal conditionals. Of the sentences (4.3a) - (4.3j), (4.3e) and (4.3i) cannot be construed
as assertions of the noncontingent truth of the consequent qualified by the antecedent, (4.3j) cannot be construed as a true conditional, and (4.3f) - (4.3h) are ambiguous between a reading with causal connection and one without. In the last case, (4.3f) and (4.3g) must be read with heavy stress on would to count as noncontingent assertions that John is a doctor. Note that in normal conditionals, if the antecedent is subjunctive, the consequent must also be. This is not, however, the case with qualifying clauses and the associated main clauses. This is the reason why (4.3j) cannot be interpreted as a normal conditional, but only as an assertion that John is a doctor.

A fourth difference is found by comparing sentences like (4.4a) and (4.4b) with sentences like (4.4c) and (4.4d).

(4.4) a. If you don't mind my saying so, whales are mammals.

b. Perhaps you will mind my saying so, but whales are mammals.

c. If whales are viviparous, whales are mammals.

d. Perhaps whales are not viviparous, but whales are mammals.

While the former bear a paraphrase relationship to each other, the latter do not. All qualifying clauses have such paraphrases. Another type of paraphrase not shared with conditional if clauses is exemplified in (4.5).

(4.5) a. How's your wife, if I haven't already asked.

b. How's your wife, or have I already asked that?

c. Your house is a mess, if you don't mind my saying so.
d. Your house is a mess, or do you mind my saying so?

e. Take out the garbage, if I may ask you to.

f. Take out the garbage, or may I ask you to?

g. You may go, if you really want to.

h. You may go, or do you really want to?

To summarize, qualifying if clauses are if clauses which have the following properties: a) they do not bear a causal relation to their main clauses; b) they do not make the utterance hypothetical or contingent; c) they occur only in the present indicative or subjunctive, or in one case, the past indicative; d) they may occur with indicative main clauses when they themselves are subjunctive; e) they are paraphrasable by perhaps not x but y or y, or x?.

The reason that qualifying phrases are of interest to us is that, like indirect illocutionary acts, they appear to be based on intrinsic conditions, in fact, on a semantically natural subclass of intrinsic conditions. For example, all of the following if clauses are based on the intrinsic conditions on ability and permission discussed in the last chapter, and they may all qualify just those illocutionary acts one would expect them to qualify, given the precondition that the qualifying if clause must be an expression of an intrinsic condition on the illocutionary act it is qualifying:

(4.6) Assertions

a. Fred loves Jello, if I can say so.

b. Fred loves Jello, if you can believe it.

c. Fred loves Jello, if I can get you to believe it.
Questions

d. Where were you last night, if I can ask (you something)?

e. Where were you last night, if you can tell me?

f. Where were you last night, if you can let me know?

g. Where were you last night, if I can know?

Promises, Offers

h. I'll give you a lift, if I can offer to.

i. I'll give you a lift, if I can.

Commands, Requests, Asking Permission

j. Would you walk the dog, if I can ask you to?

k. Would you walk the dog, if you can?

l. I want to leave, if I can ask you to allow me.

m. I want to leave, if you can allow me to.

n. I want to leave, if I can.

Just as with indirect illocutionary acts, possible ambiguities arise. Thus, the if clauses of (4.61) and (4.6n) are identical, and (4.7) is ambiguous.

(4.7) I'll help you, if I can.

It may be used either to offer help or to request permission to help, which one determined by whether the hearer obviously wants the help or not. Of course, (4.7) may also be used as a straight conditional sentence, a contingent assertion of intention to help. Notice that this last possibility is not open in (4.8), while the first two possibilities still are.

(4.8) I'll help you, if I could.
The conditional reading is disallowed because of the fact noted before, that if the antecedent of a conditional is subjunctive, the consequent must also be.

It was said before that not all intrinsic conditions may be used to qualify illocutionary acts. Of the intrinsic conditions we have examined, the ones on intention, e.g. that the speaker intends to get the addressee to do what he orders or requests him to do, the one on desire, that the speaker wants what he intends, and the ones involving speaker knowledge cannot be used to qualify indirect illocutionary acts. All of the others can, as shown in (4.6) and below.

(4.9) **Assertions, Granting Permission**

a. John is here, if you didn't already know it.
b. John is here, if you don't mind knowing what I think.
c. *John is here, if I intend to tell you.
d. *John is here, if I want to tell you.
e. John is here, if you want to know.
f. *John is here, if I believe he is.
g. You may eat some cake, if you haven't already.
h. You may rescue the maiden, if you wouldn't mind.
i. *You may leave, if I want to let you.
j. You may leave, if you want to.
k. *You may leave, if I intend to let you.

**Questions**

l. When is the party, if you haven't already told me?
m. When is the party, if you don't mind me knowing?
n. *When is the party, if I intend to know?

o. *When is the party, if I want to know?

p. When is the party, if you want to tell me?

q. When is the party, if you know?

Promises, Offers

r. I promise to do it, if I haven't already done so.

s. I'll take care of the baby, if you wouldn't mind.

t. *I'll take care of the baby, if I intend to.

u. *I'll take care of the baby, if I want to.

v. I'll take care of the baby, if you want me to.

Commands, Requests, Asking Permission

w. Make your bed, if you haven't already.

x. Take out the trash, if you wouldn't mind.

y. *Take out the trash, if I intend for you to.

z. *Take out the trash, if I want you to.

aa. Take out the trash, if you want to.

bb. Can I go, if you haven't already said I could?

c. Can I go, if you don't mind?

d. *Can I go, if I intend to?

e. *Can I go, if I want to?

ff. Can I go, if you want to let me?

It must be understood that some of the starred sentences are acceptable on some readings; however, they cannot be uttered with the illocutionary force indicated.

What the intrinsic conditions which can be the basis for qualification have in common is that they are all conditions on the
beliefs of the speaker performing the illocutionary act. The condition on speaker intention, that he intends for example to do what he promises to do, the condition on speaker desire, that he wants to happen what he intends to happen, and conditions involving knowledge on the part of the speaker cannot be matters of mere belief for the speaker. In general, it appears that qualifying if clauses qualify those aspects of illocutionary acts which the speaker might reasonably have doubt about, namely the felicity conditions involving his own beliefs. It is the content of the belief which the speaker has doubt about which appears in the if clause. Thus, the following are unacceptable because of the otiose I believe:

\[(4.10)\]
\[a. \ast I \text{ like rhubarb, if I believe I can say so.}\]
\[b. \ast \text{Open the door, if I believe you want to.}\]
\[c. \ast \text{Where's Melvin, if I believe you know.}\]

In passing, we note that there is further support here for the formulation given in (3.52a) of the sincerity condition on assertions, repeated below:

\[(3.52)\]
\[a. \quad \text{SAY (S,H,P) } \rightarrow \text{ KNOW (S,BELIEVE (S,P))}\]

If this condition were merely that one believes what one asserts, we would expect to be able to base a qualifying if clause on this belief. This is impossible, however, as shown by an examination of (4.11).

\[(4.11)\]
\[a. \quad \text{Frank did the easy problems, if (he did) them.}\]
\[b. \quad \text{Did Frank do the easy problems, if (he did) them?}\]

While (4.11a) is acceptable with heavy stress on easy and them, it is not a simple case of the qualification of the speaker's belief
in the proposition he is asserting. For one thing, there is
involved in (4.11a) (and (4.11b)) the question of which problems
Frank was most likely to do, since (4.12) is only acceptable if
Frank is wont to do difficult problems in preference to easy ones.

(4.12) Frank did the difficult problems, if them.

Also, there is a parallelism between (4.11a) and (4.11b) which we
do not find with the qualifying if clauses we have been discussing,
for example:

(4.13) a. John is here, if you will believe it.

b. *Is John here, if you will believe it?

This is the case because the application of intrinsic conditions to
assertions and questions yields different results. If (4.11) were
examples of qualifying if clauses based on an intrinsic condition,
it would have to be an intrinsic condition on both assertions and
questions and further, one which yielded the same result when applied
to questions as when applied to assertions. The intrinsic condition
in (3.52a), however, is specific to assertions and has no application
to questions. We will discuss sentences like (4.11) further in the
next chapter, where we find that they are examples of qualification
of a presupposition rather than of an intrinsic condition.

So far, we have discovered one necessary condition on intrinsic
conditions which are the basis for qualification of illocutionary
acts: they must be conditions on the beliefs of the speaker. We
have argued that this is a natural restriction, assuming that the
qualification we are discussing is a calling into question of some-
thing. There is another condition which is equally natural given
this assumption. It is that the intrinsic condition involved must be a non-essential condition. The only essential intrinsic condition we have discussed so far was the one on threats, that the speaker believe that the hearer does not want the speaker to do what the speaker is proposing to do. If this condition does not hold, the speaker cannot be said to be threatening; he is either promising or offering.

Notice that the essentiality of this condition does not prevent its being used in performing an indirect illocutionary act. (4.14) can convey a threat or an offer, depending on the circumstances.

(4.14) Do you want me to hit you?

The fact that the negative force of the condition does not show up in the indirect act is paralleled by what happens to the negative of the intrinsic condition that part of the act already has been performed. In fact as (4.15) shows, unlike other indirect illocutionary acts, these perhaps cannot be conveyed by negative questions.

(4.15) a. Don't you want me to hit you?

b. Haven't I already asked you to help me?

It is difficult to construe (4.15a) as a threat and slightly difficult to construe (4.15b) as a request. This is perhaps an accidental gap in English usage of intrinsic conditions to perform indirect illocutionary acts.

Now consider (4.16):

(4.16) a. I'll hit you, if you want me to.

b. I'll hit you, if you don't want me to.

(4.16a) can only be a promise or offer and can't be a threat. (4.16b)
cannot be any of these. It is instead a plain conditional assertion, with causal connection between antecedent and consequent. We would expect (4.16b) to be the correct expression of the qualified threat, since negatives in intrinsic conditions do show up in qualifying if clauses, unlike the case with indirect assertions. Thus:

(4.17) a. John is here, if I haven't already told you.

b. Why purple, if you don't mind me asking?

Another case of an essential intrinsic condition, which is particular to the act of warning the addressee that X (as opposed to warning the addressee to X), where X is some event, is that the speaker must believe that the occurrence of X is not in the addressee's best interest (Searle, 1969, p. 67). If the speaker believes to the contrary or has no opinion on the matter, he is not warning; he is simply asserting X to the addressee. As expected, one can perform an indirect illocutionary act using this condition; e.g., (4.18), when not an informational question, constitutes a warning.

(4.18) Is it to your best interest that your car has no brakes?

And, bearing out our hypothesis, (4.17), if acceptable at all, is not illocutionarily a warning.

(4.19) I warn you that your car has no brakes, if it isn't in your best interest.

To summarize, we have determined that qualifying if clauses are based on a natural subclass of intrinsic felicity conditions, non-essential intrinsic conditions on the speaker's beliefs.

We next consider what happens when qualifying if clauses are
used with utterances which are expressions of indirect illocutionary acts. When we begin examining such cases, we notice first of all that the same intrinsic conditions cannot be both the basis for an indirect illocutionary act and qualified by an if clause. Thus the utterances in (4.20) and others like them are unacceptable except, perhaps, as conditional questions.

(4.20) a. *If I may say something, may I say that it has been wonderful?  
       b. *Did I ask you how you've been, if I haven't already asked you?  
       c. *Do you want me to help you, if you want me to help you?  
       d. *Do you mind taking out the garbage, if you don't mind?  
       e. *Do you know what time it is, if you know?  
       f. *If you may tell me, you may tell me what you're doing.  
       g. *If you will, you will not speak.

This restriction on qualification of indirect illocutionary acts is given in (4.21).

(4.21) One cannot perform an indirect illocutionary act by asserting that or questioning whether an intrinsic condition on K holds and at the same time call that same intrinsic condition into question by qualifying it.

However, we must be careful to be exact about what we mean by "same intrinsic condition." Actually it appears that problems don't arise if the indirect act and the qualification derive from different applications of the same intrinsic conditions, as the examples in (4.22) show.
(4.22) a. Can I say that it has been wonderful, if you can believe it?
   b. Do you want me to let you leave, if you want to leave?
   c. Do you mind taking out the garbage, if you don't mind my asking you to?
   d. Do you know where my wife is, if I can know?
   e. *Did you tell me where you're going, if I haven't already asked?

The only exception is (4.22e), and, as it turns out, this is explainable by the fact that indirect illocutionary acts based on the intrinsic condition that the speaker believes that no part of the act has already been performed cannot be qualified at all, as illustrated by the examples in (4.23).

(4.23) a. *Did you walk the dog, if you can?
   b. *Did I ask you how you like my hair, if you know?
   c. *Did I tell you that I'm pregnant, if you can believe it?
   d. *Did I offer to help you with the dishes, if you want me to?
   e. *Did you take out the garbage, if you don't mind?
   f. *You haven't told me yet where you are, if you want to.
   g. *You haven't yet closed the door, if you don't mind.

It would appear that qualifying an illocutionary act by calling any felicity condition on that act into question makes it impossible to convey that act by asserting that or questioning whether some part of that act has already been performed.
Other intrinsic conditions which act the same way are ones based on the intentional condition on assertions, that the speaker intends to cause the addressee to believe what he is asserting. Two such derived conditions are that the speaker believes that the addressee is able to believe what he is asserting and that the addressee will believe in the future what he is asserting. The impossibility of qualifying indirect illocutionary acts based on these conditions is shown in (4.24).

(4.24) a. *If I can tell you something, can (will) you believe that John has passed his exams?
   b. *Can (will) you believe that my wife is pregnant, if you didn't already know?
   c. *Can (will) you believe that George left, if I haven't already told you?
   d. *Can (will) you believe that my son is a dropout, if you want to know what I think?
   e. *Can (will) you believe that I saw Jesus last night, if you don't mind my saying so?

The unacceptability of the utterances in (4.24) is not to be explained by reference to the behavior of the ability and futurity intrinsic conditions, for, in general, indirect illocutionary acts based on them can be qualified. (4.25) gives some examples.

(4.25) a. Can I say, if I haven't told you already, that I'm sorry?
   b. Can I tell you something? If you don't already know it, your hair's on fire.
   c. If I haven't already asked, can you tell me when you're leaving?
   d. Can I say that your husband is the world's best cook, if you can believe it?
e. You can go in now, if you want to.

f. Can you clean the cat-box, if you don't mind?

g. I will allow you to close the door, if I haven't already told you so.

h. You will tell me how you knew that, if you don't mind my asking.

i. I will be a faithful husband, if I can.

j. Will you allow me to see her, if you can?

Nor can the unacceptability of sentences like those in (4.24) be explained by the fact that there is a mediating intentional condition involved, since intrinsic conditions based on a similar intentional condition on questions, that the speaker intends to cause the addressee to cause him to know what he is asking, can be used to perform indirect illocutionary acts which can be qualified, as in (4.26).

(4.26)  
a. If I can ask you something, do you (will you let me) know where the nearest telephone is?

b. If I haven't already asked, do you (will you let me) know why they put you in jail?

c. If you want to tell me, do you (will you let me) know what she ate for lunch?

d. If you don't mind me asking, do you (will you let me) know what has four wheels and flies?

Apparently, the inability to be qualified shown by assertions based on the intentional condition that the speaker intends the addressee to believe what he is asserting can only be explained as some idiosyncrasy in the behavior of this particular intrinsic condition. Perhaps further research will yield a more satisfactory explanation for the facts in (4.24).
With respect to qualifiability of indirect illocutionary acts based on them, the other intrinsic conditions we have discussed all act like the ability condition with two restrictions, the one given in (4.21) concerning not qualifying an indirect illocutionary act with the same application of the intrinsic condition which it is based on, and a second one, that the intrinsic condition that the speaker believes that the addressee wants what the speaker intends cannot be qualified in an indirect illocutionary act based on the intrinsic condition that the speaker believes that the addressee doesn't object to any part of the illocutionary act in question.

The reverse is also true. This is shown in (4.27).

(4.27) a. *Do you want to take out the garbage, if you don't mind (taking it out)?

b. *Do you mind my asking where your bathroom is, if you want to tell me?

c. Do you want to open the window, if you don't mind my asking?

This seems to provide further evidence that these two intrinsic conditions may actually be one (cf. the discussion of (3.31) - (3.35)), because if they were one, we could then account for the unacceptability of (4.27a) and (4.27b) as resulting from a violation of the restriction given in (4.21). This suggests itself strongly, since (4.27c) is acceptable, as would be expected if two different applications of the same intrinsic condition were involved.

If we attempt to use this type of argument to demonstrate that (3.31) is the same condition as (3.30), i.e., that the condition that the speaker believes that no parts of the illocutionary act have already occurred is the same condition as the one that the speaker
believes that all parts of the illocutionary act (save the act itself) will occur in the future, we find that the argument will not work. This is because sentences like (4.28a) are acceptable as requests and the unacceptability of sentences like (4.28b) as requests is explained by the unqualifiability of any indirect illocutionary acts based on the non-prior-performance intrinsic condition (cf. the discussion of (4.23)).

(4.28) a. Will you see what's wrong with Jane, if you haven't already?

b. *Have you already seen what's wrong with Jane, if you will?

This seems to be negative evidence that the conditions in (3.31) and (3.32) are in fact different intrinsic conditions.
In the last chapter, we discussed the phenomenon of illocutionary act qualification and showed how it could be explicated by reference to intrinsic felicity conditions. In this chapter, we will show that there is a considerable parallelism between presuppositions and intrinsic felicity conditions, in that there is a process of qualification of utterances having presuppositions, or in other terms, a process of qualification of the presuppositions of utterances which seems to be a process quite similar to illocutionary act qualification.

Before we can demonstrate this parallelism, however, we must be clear on what we mean by the term 'presupposition' and more precisely, who or what presupposes and what happens when the presupposition is violated. Garner (1971), in a comprehensive review of the notion of presupposition, points out that while most philosophers writing on presuppositions assume either that illocutionary acts presuppose or that the (abstract) speaker of an utterance presupposes, and presupposition failure leads to the non-performance of the illocutionary act involved, many linguists speak of the presuppositions of sentences and say that presupposition failure causes the statement made by the sentence to lack truth or
to be meaningless. Garner gives reasons why the linguists' view leads to difficulties. One is as follows: suppose one claims sentences of the type "A knows that P" presuppose the factuality of P. Then "it would seem that we would have to say that unless P were the case, nobody could either assert or deny (successfully) that P was known by anyone. This is, at the very least, highly problematic" (Garner, 1971, fn. 23). On the other hand, if we speak of the speaker of an illocutionary act presupposing P, we may restrict our attention to whether the speaker believes P to be true or not, and not get involved in the question of whether or not P is actually true.

Let us tentatively adopt the view that speakers performing illocutionary acts presuppose things, and further, that for a speaker to presuppose a proposition is for him to believe that the proposition is true. If it is in fact false that the speaker believes the presupposition to be true, then the illocutionary act is void or at least infelicitous.

The question then arises as to what the difference is between presuppositions and the sort of speaker beliefs we are calling intrinsic felicity conditions. An obvious answer is that while intrinsic conditions are either very general conditions on the performance of all illocutionary acts or are less general conditions on specific illocutionary acts (independent of what the form of the utterance is which is used to perform the act), presuppositions are associated with the use in utterances of specific lexical items (or specific complexes of semantic primes) and don't seem to vary from
one type of illocutionary act to another. In other words, intrinsic conditions on illocutionary acts in a sense follow by definition from a consideration of the meaning of those acts or what it means in general to perform an illocutionary act, while presuppositions are unrelated to the meaning of illocutionary acts. Thus, given the proposition P, "You point out that Q" (where Q is a proposition), no matter whether you assert P, question P, promise P, or command P, it must always be the case that you believe Q. Further, you can even deny the proposition P or use it as the antecedent of a counterfactual conditional and you would still be committed to the truth of Q.

Actually, matters are not as simple as the preceding account would have it. Not all presuppositions are as invariant as the belief in the complement of point out. Karttunen (1971) has shown that there are some verbs like manage and remember which apparently presuppose\(^1\) the truth of their complements in all assertions, but

\(^1\) When we speak of a word presupposing, it must be understood only as a convenient locution for the speaker of an utterance containing the given word presupposing.

presuppose the negative of their complements in denials and in questions conveys the question of their complement. This is exemplified in (5.1).

(5.1) a. John managed to stop eating anchovies. →
    John stopped eating anchovies.

b. John didn't manage to stop eating anchovies. →
    John didn't stop eating anchovies.
c. Did John manage to stop eating anchovies? → Did John stop eating anchovies?

The so-called presuppositions in (5.1) look suspiciously like what we have been calling indirect illocutionary acts, since rather than merely being presupposed, they are often *conveyed* by the utterances they are associated with. Further, *manage* shows up in utterances we already know to be indirect illocutionary acts, as in (5.2).

(5.2) a. Can you manage to tell me why you're wearing that mask?
   b. I can manage to say that we plan no wider war.
   c. Can I manage to help you somehow?
   d. Could you manage to shave before Mother comes?
   e. Did I manage to tell you that Sylvia got married?
   f. ?Did you already manage to tell me what her name is?
   g. Can you manage to believe that Harry proposed?

However, as (5.3) shows, *manage* may not be used by itself to convey an indirect illocutionary act.

(5.3) a. *I am managing to say that you're wrong.
   b. *Are you managing to tell me what you're doing here?
   c. *I manage to say that you're wrong.
   d. *Do you manage to tell me what you're doing here?

These facts can be accounted for, if we employ Searle's (1969) distinction between illocutionary acts and propositional acts. Acts of asserting, commanding, questioning, promising, etc., are
illocutionary acts, while acts of referring and predicating are
propositional acts. One propositional act can usually be used to
perform any of a number of illocutionary acts, but it is impossible
to perform a propositional act without at the same time performing
an illocutionary act. On the other hand, some illocutionary acts,
like utterances of "Huzzah" or "Ouch," do not have propositional
content, and may thus be performed without performing any
propositional act. Propositional acts must be distinguished from
utterance acts, i.e., the uttering of words, because the same
proposition may be expressed by different paraphrases and different
referring expressions.

Now let us modify what we said before about what presuppositions
are. We shall say that a speaker performing a propositional act
presupposes, and further, that for a speaker to presuppose something
is for him necessarily to believe that another proposition is true.
If there is presupposition failure, the propositional act is invalid,
and therefore any illocutionary act performed by performing the
propositional act is void.

In this view, presuppositions are nothing more or less than
felicity conditions (in fact intrinsic felicity conditions) on
propositional acts. As such they may be the basis for indirect
propositional acts, just as felicity conditions on illocutionary
acts may be the basis for indirect illocutionary acts. In the case
of verbs like manage, succeed (in), get (to), we notice that for
the speaker to perform the propositional act of predicating a
volitional act V of some agent A, it is necessary for the speaker to
believe that A manages to perform V, that A succeeds in performing V, and that A gets to perform V. These are conditions on the predication of a volitional act. Moreover, these conditions are not only necessary conditions on the predication of a volitional act, but also sufficient conditions for the predication of a volitional act (Karttunen, 1971, p. 350ff). Thus, it makes sense that one can predicate of an agent that he manages to, succeeds in, or gets to perform a volitional act as the performance of an indirect propositional act of predicking that the agent does perform the act. Since the conditions on which the indirect propositional act may be based are both necessary and sufficient conditions on the propositional act involved, the indirect propositional act cannot be avoided. We shall see in the next chapter that there are cases of indirect propositional acts which are not obligatory.

The unacceptability of the utterances in (5.3) shows that the distinction between propositional acts and illocutionary acts is not just philosophical hair-splitting, but has syntactic relevance. The utterances in (5.3) are unacceptable because a felicity condition on propositional acts has been used as the basis for an alternative expression of an explicit performative verb or illocutionary force marker. All we need to say is that explicit performative verbs do not predicate, in the normal sense of the term, when they are used performatively. When a presupposition is used as the basis for an indirect propositional act and applies to a verb which may be either taken as an explicit performative or a simple predicate, the former interpretation is disallowed, and thus
the utterance is disambiguated.

(5.4) a. I request (to have) 50 boxes a day. (ambiguous between performative and aorist interpretations)

b. I manage to request (to have) 50 boxes a day. (unambiguously aorist)

We shall have more to say about indirect propositional acts in the next chapter, when we examine invited inferences. Right now we will examine the qualification of presuppositions, a process parallel to the qualification of felicity conditions on illocutionary acts. (5.5) gives examples of what we are concerned with.

(5.5) a. The stash is in the air vent, if anywhere.

b. Only John has the strength to lift that, if he does.

c. (Only) five people came, if that many.

d. Few blue whales, if any, have survived.

e. John has stopped beating his wife, if he used to beat her.

Lakoff (1970b) has described this sort of thing as a process of presupposition cancelling. (It has also be discussed from an interpretive viewpoint by Wilson (1970)). For example, considering (5.5d) in detail, the proposition "Few blue whales have survived" presupposes the proposition that there exists at least one blue whale which has survived. The latter proposition must be true before the former proposition is meaningful. However, the presupposed proposition need not be true in the case of (5.5d). This is shown by the fact that (5.5d) can have a continuation which denies the presupposition in question, while the same sentence without the if clause cannot have such a continuation, as in (5.6).
(5.6)  a. Few blue whales, if any, have survived, but perhaps none have.

b. *Few blue whales have survived, but perhaps none have.

To call this process presupposition cancelling is to suggest that (5.5d) no longer has the presupposition in question. Lakoff himself argues against this, giving evidence that the presupposition is still there, but no longer required to be true. Thus, instead of using the term cancelling, we shall call this process presupposition qualification.

Before continuing the discussion of Lakoff's treatment of presupposition qualification, we shall demonstrate some of the resemblances between the if clauses used for the qualification of presuppositions and those used for the qualification of intrinsic conditions. (5.7) contains the utterances of (5.5) with their if clauses expanded.

(5.7)  a. The stash is in the air vent, if it is anywhere (around here).

b. Only John has the strength to lift that, if (even) he has the strength to lift that.

c. (Only) five people came, if (even) that many people came.

d. Few blue whales have survived, if any blue whales have survived.

e. John has stopped beating his wife, if he used to beat her.

The first point of similarity between the if clauses in (5.7) and the qualifying if clauses we have discussed is the lack of causal connection in both of them between the proposition expressed by the
if clause and the proposition expressed by the main clause.

Actually, normal conditionals, such as those in (5.8), also seem to lack causal connection at times.

(5.8) a. If the moon has a ring around it, it will rain.
    b. The moon's having a ring around it would cause it to rain.
    c. If John thinks he can get away with it, he's crazy.
    d. John's thinking he can get away with that would cause him to be crazy.

Thus, (5.8b) and (5.8d) are not paraphrases of (5.8a) and (5.8c).

However, it can be seen that there is in such conditionals a causal connection between the if clause proposition and the speaker's believing the proposition expressed by the main clause. Thus, (5.9a) and (5.9b) are paraphrases of (5.8a) and (5.8c), respectively.

(5.9) a. The moon's having a ring around it would cause me to think that it's going to rain.
    b. John's thinking he can get away with it would cause me to believe he's crazy.

However, as a comparison of (5.10) with (5.7) will show, neither type of causal connection exists with if clauses of the type illustrated in (5.7).

(5.10) a. *The stash's being anywhere around here would cause it to be in the air vent.
    a'. *The stash's being anywhere around here would cause me to think it's in the air vent.
    b. *(Even) John's having the strength to lift that would cause only John to have the strength to lift that.
b'. *(Even) John's having the strength to lift that would cause me to think that only John has the strength to lift that.

e tc.

The two types of if clauses are also similar in that they share the same types of paraphrases. Utterances containing either type may be paraphrased with utterances of the form Y, or X? or of the form Y, or perhaps not X. However, only utterances containing if clauses qualifying illocutionary acts may be paraphrased with utterances of the form Perhaps not X, but Y., perhaps because of some difference between the use of but as a conjunction of propositions and its use as a conjunction of illocutionary acts. These paraphrases are illustrated in (5.11) for the corresponding sentences of (5.7), the paraphrasability of utterances containing if clauses qualifying illocutionary acts already having been discussed in chapter four.

(5.11) a. The stash is in the air vent, or
{perhaps it's nowhere around here.}
{is it anywhere around here?}

b. Only John has the strength to lift that,
or {perhaps (even) he doesn't.}
does (even) he?

c. Five people came, or {perhaps not (even) that many.}
did (even) that many?

d. Few blue whales have survived, or {perhaps none.}
have any?

e. John has stopped beating his wife,
or {perhaps he never used to.}
did he use to?
The third similarity is that *if* clauses like those in (5.7) apparently may be indifferently subjunctive or indicative while the main clause remains indicative, although there is dialectal variation concerning this:

(5.12)  

a. The stash is in the air vent, if it would be anywhere around here.  

b. Only John has the strength, if even he would have.  

c. ?Five people came, if even that many would have.  

d. ?Few blue whales have survived, if any would have.  

e. John has stopped beating his wife, if he would use to beat her.  

(5.12c) and (5.12d) show that the subjunctive paraphrase must be restricted to the present tense cases, perhaps because of the usual counterfactual presupposition of the past subjunctive.

The fourth similarity is that the propositions expressed by the utterances in (5.7) are not contingent propositions. In fact, the *if* clause use increases the number of circumstances under which the proposition of the main clause may be true, while in normal conditionals, the proposition of the antecedent limits the circumstances under which the proposition of the consequent may be true.

There is a major dissimilarity between the *if* clauses qualifying illocutionary acts (intrinsic conditions) and those qualifying propositional acts (presuppositions), and that is that the latter may be past subjunctive or indicative if the main clause is past subjunctive, as in (5.13).
We see above the same indifferent use of past subjunctive and indicative that we noticed with the present, but this may perhaps be explained in this case by the dying out of the past subjunctive in English. The difference we have discovered may be explained by assuming, as Searle (1969) does, that the subjunctive mood is part of an illocutionary force indicator, i.e., that subjunctively asserting and questioning are illocutionary acts. Since the qualification of propositional acts has no connection with illocutionary acts performed by those propositional acts, we would expect to find real subjunctive qualifying if clauses on subjunctive propositional acts, while qualifications of illocutionary acts

\[ (5.13) \]

a. The stash would have been in the air vent, if it had been anywhere.  

b. Only John would have had the strength, if (even) he had had it.  

c. Five people would have come, if (even) that many had.  

d. Few blue whales would have survived, if any had.  

e. John would have stopped beating his wife, if he ever had beat her.
could never be subjunctive. In other words, while qualifications of presuppositions are inside the domains of the illocutionary acts in question, qualification of intrinsic conditions on illocutionary acts are outside the domain of these acts.

We have demonstrated enough similarity between the qualifying if clauses on intrinsic conditions of illocutionary acts and those on presuppositions to consider them to be manifestations of the same process, with the differences between them accounted for by the differences that exist between illocutionary and propositional acts.

We now turn to a consideration of the fact that not all presuppositions are qualifiable. Lakoff (1970b) claims that not only are some presuppositions inherently not qualifiable, e.g. the factivity of the complements of factive verbs, but also that those presuppositions that are qualifiable may in fact be qualified only if they occupy a certain position in the presuppositional structure of the sentence (in our terms proposition) in question, namely, that they are first order presuppositions.

Lakoff defines the order of presuppositions in terms of the concept "immediately presupposes": "Thus we will say that \( S_1 \) immediately presupposes \( S_2 \) if and only if \( S_1 \) presupposes \( S_2 \) and there is no \( S_3 \) such that \( S_1 \) presupposes \( S_3 \) and \( S_3 \) presupposes \( S_2 \)" (Lakoff, 1970b). First order presuppositions are those which the propositional act immediately presuppose, second order presuppositions are those which the first order presuppositions immediately presuppose, and so forth.

An example of first and second order presuppositions (from
Lakoff, 1970b) is given in (5.14).

(5.14) a. Few men have stopped beating their wives.

   b. (first order presupposition) Some men have stopped beating their wives.

   c. (second order presupposition) Some men have beaten their wives.

Lakoff notes that (5.14a) presupposes both (5.14b) and (5.14c), but

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\[15\] Lakoff claims that the relationship of presupposing is not always transitive. However, all his counterexamples to the transitivity of presupposition either are based on a faulty presuppositional analysis of pretend (Karttunen, 1970a) or the nonfactivity of realize in conditional sentences (Karttunen, 1970b).

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that while the first order presupposition can be qualified, as in (5.15a), the second order presupposition apparently cannot be qualified, as shown by (5.15b).

(5.15) a. Few men have stopped beating their wives, if any have stopped.

   b. *Few men have stopped beating their wives, if any have ever beaten them at all.

However, it seems more likely that (5.15b) is unacceptable not because of qualification of a second order presupposition, but because one if clause is being used to qualify two presuppositions at the same time. If we separate the qualification of the presupposition associated with few from the qualification of the presupposition associated with stop, as in (5.16), we find that the 'second order' presupposition associated with the verb stop can in fact be qualified.
(5.16) a. Few men, if any, have stopped beating their wives, if they ever beat them at all.

b. Few men have stopped beating their wives, if they ever beat them at all.

Sentence (5.16b), for example, could be asserted by somebody who is taking a poll to determine, of those men who have beaten their wives, how many have stopped, and who finds that few men have in fact stopped and further that it is questionable that those men should count in the poll, since there is evidence that they lied in response to the initial question, whether they had ever beaten their wives.

It can be further shown that the notion of order of presupposition is somewhat problematic. Since in cases like (5.17), there is no way to determine which is the first order presupposition and which is the second, of \( P_{Ra} \) and \( P_{Rb} \), while admittedly \( P_{Rc} \) seems to be more distantly associated with the proposition expressed be the assertion.

(5.17) John has stopped beating his wife.

\( P_{Ra} \). Somebody has stopped beating his wife.

\( P_{Rb} \). John used to beat his wife.

\( P_{Rc} \). Somebody used to beat his wife.

The difficulty could be solved by calling both \( P_{Ra} \) and \( P_{Rb} \) first order presuppositions and \( P_{Rc} \) a second order presupposition.

However, it is not very explanatory to say that (5.18) (as an example of qualification, not as a conditional) is unacceptable because \( P_{Rc} \) is a second order presupposition, when really what is going on is that one cannot qualify two presuppositions at the same time.
Another condition on qualification of presuppositions is that the qualifying if clause must be in the same clause as the word connected with the presupposition being qualified, thus, in (5.19), the NP being qualified can only be the one immediately following the qualifying phrase.

(5.19) a. If anybody, Harry was sick.
    b. If anybody, John said that Harry was sick.
    c. If anybody, Milt regretted that John said that Harry was sick.

Putting heavy stress on Harry in (5.19b) or (5.19c) or Milt in (5.19c), thus marking them as the referring expression which has its presupposition qualified, causes these sentences to be unacceptable.

Returning to the subject of qualifiable versus nonqualifiable presuppositions, we recall that there were two possible reasons why a given intrinsic condition could not be qualified: 1) it is a condition on the speaker's intentions, desires, or knowledge rather than on the speaker's beliefs, or 2) it is an essential condition which must be fulfilled for the illocutionary act to take place.

Since all presuppositions seem to be conditions on the speaker's beliefs rather than on his knowledge, intentions, or desires, it appears that an explanation of why some presuppositions are not qualifiable similar to that given in 1) is not open to us. Nor can we expect to find an explanation similar to that given in 2), since by definition the presuppositions associated with a propositional act are necessarily believed to be true if the propositional
act is to have a truth value or be meaningful. There are no
cases of propositional acts which have a truth value but which are
odd or misleading because of a presupposition failure, parallel to
the cases of illocutionary acts which are infelicitous because of
the falsity of an intrinsic condition but which still constitute
illocutionary acts. In fact we have no explanation for why some
presuppositions are not qualifiable.

Continuing this discussion, we give some examples of qualifiable
and non-qualifiable presuppositions. Corresponding to the examples
of qualifying if clauses given in (5.7), we have the following
qualifiable presuppositions:

(5.20) a. if anything
   if anybody
   if anywhere
   etc.

   If the speaker predicates f of
   a referring expression r, he
   presupposes that there exists
   in the domain of discourse
   some object that f is true of.

b. if he does
   if that

   To say ONLY (a,f(a)) presupposes
   f(a).16

b'. if that many

   To say there exists only some
   number of x such that f(x)
   presupposes f(x) for that
   number of x.

c. if any

   To say FEW (a,f(a)) presupposes
   there exists an x such that
   f(x) is true.

d. if S used to

   To say of an argument that it
   stops at time t presupposes that
   there exists a time t₁ before
   t such that the argument
   occurs at t₁.

16We follow here Horn's (1969) presuppositional analysis of
only and his representation of only as a two place predicate taking
as first argument its scope and as second argument a predication
about its scope.
All of the presuppositions given in (5.20) are invariant under assertion, questioning, and subjunctive assertion. The first one however does not count as a presupposition under denial (the others do). This need not concern us much, since invariance under assertion, questioning, subjunctive assertion, and denial is not for us a defining characteristic of presuppositions.\textsuperscript{17} Presuppositions are those propositions which the speaker must believe to be true to bring off a propositional act. We argued before that propositional acts are embedded in illocutionary acts at least for the purposes of presupposition qualification, so it is not surprising to find some interaction between the illocutionary act and its associated propositional act. In fact, we can hypothesize that the interaction is all one-way, that is, we would be surprised to find that a felicity condition on an illocutionary act need not hold if the illocutionary act's associated propositional act was of a certain form.

One of the claims implicit in (5.20b) and (5.20b') is that whenever we find an utterance with a qualifying if clause of the form if that or if him or if and a clause with a stressed definite noun phrase, the noun phrase in the main clause which gave rise to the presupposition being cancelled must be an argument of the predicate only. There are obviously superficial counterexamples to this, e.g. those in (5.21).
(5.21) a. The fire is smoldering, if that.
   
b. Five people came, if that.
   
c. He likes her, if that.

(5.22) a. The fire is only smoldering, if it is doing that.
   
   b. Only five people came, if that many people came.
   
   c. He only likes her, if he feels that strongly about her.

However, not only are the sentences in (5.21) paraphrasable by the sentences in (5.22), but the same contrastive stress shows up on the noun phrases (perhaps underlying) in the examples of (5.21) that shows up on the noun phrases quantified by only in the corresponding examples of (5.22). As Wilson (1970) points out, it is difficult to begin discourses with sentences like those in (5.21). In fact, there are some like (5.23) which only seem possible in response to something like (5.24).

(5.23) George came, if he did.

(5.24) George, Harry, and Mike came.

In other words, sentences like those in (5.21) serve only to contradict either what someone else has just said or to contradict a shared assumption. This is a feature which utterances containing only have, since, following Horn (1969), the assertion of an utterance containing only amounts to the assertion that no argument in the domain of discourse other than the argument that is in the scope of only is characterizable by the predication of the assertion. That is:

(5.25) \( \text{SAY (ONLY } (x=a, f(x))) + \text{SAY (} \neg \exists y (y \neq a \& f(y)) \text{)} \)
Another reason for assuming that there is an underlying *only* in sentences like (5.21) is that the noun phrases in question show the same scale of strength behavior that Horn (1969) showed existed for the argument of *only*. Thus, just as (5.26a) is unacceptable, so is (5.26b).

(5.26) a. *He only loves her, he doesn't like her.

b. *He loves her, if that.

For these reasons, we can assume that utterances which have following *if that* clauses have at least an underlying *only* taking the qualified expression as its first argument and that this *only* is optionally deletable.

Examples of non-qualifiable presuppositions are actually quite difficult to come by. We have been able to find only two (although there may well be others): 1) that the speaker believes that what he is predicating a factive predicate of is true, and 2) that when the speaker predicates *even* \((x=a, f(x))\), he believes that \(\exists y(y\neq a, f(y))\) (using Horn's (1969) analysis).\(^{18}\)

\(^{18}\) In a future work it will be shown that the presupposition of *even* given here is more accurately that *f* is also true of more likely arguments in the domain of discourse for it to be true of than *a*, rather than simply that there exists another instantiation of *x* such that *f(x)* is true. This difference in analysis is not crucial to the discussion here.

It might at first glance appear that these presuppositions are actually qualifiable because of the existence of sentences like those in (5.27).
If John is upstairs, Harry realizes that he is.

If somebody else comes, even Irv will come.

However, as shown in (5.28), these sentences are actually normal conditionals with causal connection between antecedent and consequent, and, as (5.29) shows, they do not have the paraphrases we would expect for sentences containing qualifying if clauses.

John's being upstairs would cause Harry to realize that he is.

Somebody else's coming would cause me to believe that even Irv is coming.

*Harry realizes that John is upstairs, or is he?

*Even Irv is coming, or perhaps nobody else is.

It is particularly interesting to examine a class of utterances which have if clauses which are ambiguous between readings where they are antecedents of true conditionals and readings where they qualify a propositional act. An example of such an utterance is given in (5.30).

John left last night, if he was able to.

This utterance is ambiguous between the reading given in (5.31a) and the reading given in (5.31b).

John's having been able to leave last night would cause me to believe that he did leave.

John left last night, or was he able to?

To delimit this class of utterances and to account for the (5.31b) reading of (5.30), we must consider in detail Karttunen's (1971) analysis of what he calls implicative verbs. For Karttunen, an implicative verb is one which when used in assertions implies
that its complement is true, as factive verbs do (Kiparsky and Kiparsky, 1970), but which when negated implies that the negative of its complement is true and which in questions amounts to a question about whether its complement is true, unlike factive verbs. An example will clarify this: the assertion of (5.32a) amounts to the assertion of (5.32b), the assertion of (5.32c) amounts to the assertion of (5.32d), and the question (5.32e) amounts to the question (5.32f) (leaving aside cases with contrastive stress on the main verb).

(5.32)  
a. John happened to see Mary.  
b. John saw Mary.  
c. John didn't happen to see Mary.  
d. John didn't see Mary.  
e. Did John happen to see Mary?  
f. Did John see Mary?

Similarly, there are, according to Karttunen, negative implicative verbs, which, when used in positive assertions, imply that their complements are false, when used in negative assertions, imply their complements are true, and when used in questions, amount to a question about whether or not their complements are false. An example of a negative implicative verb is fail (to), whose behavior is demonstrated in (5.33).

(5.33)  
a. Fred failed to button his fly. =  
b. Fred didn't button his fly.  
c. Fred didn't fail to button his fly. =  
d. Fred buttoned his fly.
e. Did Fred fail to button his fly? =

f. Did Fred not button his fly?

Some of the verbs which are implicative are given in (5.34) and some which are negative implicative are given in (5.35)

(5.34) a. manage (to), get (to), succeed (in), happen (to)

b. remember (to), choose (to), be able (to), dare (to), see fit (to)

(5.35) a. fail (to), neglect (to), refrain (from)

b. forget (to), decline (to), refuse (to), be too lazy, stupid, smart, etc., (to)

Karttunen explains the behavior of the above verbs by reference to the fact that utterances containing the verbs in (5.34a) constitute necessary and sufficient conditions for believing that the complements of those verbs in such utterances are true, while utterances containing the verbs in (5.35a) constitute necessary and sufficient conditions for believing that the complements of those verbs are false. Thus, it is impossible under all circumstances for one to happen to do something and not do it or for one not to happen to do something and do it. Similarly, it is impossible to fail to do something and do it or not to fail to do something and not do it. Thus, the propositions expressed with the verbs in (5.34a) and (5.35a) are in some sense equivalent to the propositions which they convey, although there is, to be sure, a meaning difference between the explicit proposition and the conveyed proposition not relevant to the stated equivalence.

In the case of the verbs in (5.34b) and (5.35b), Karttunen
Some of the verbs which Karttunen would have included in the classes exemplified by our (5.34a) and (5.35a) we would reclassify as belonging to the classes exemplified by (5.34a) and (5.34b). Such verbs include remember, dare, forget, and decline. This is necessary because we find these verbs to act like those in (5.34b) and (5.35b) in our dialect. The fact that dialects can differ in such judgments is noted by Karttunen and will be discussed in the next chapter.

points out that they are ambiguously implicative or non-implicative and that strictly speaking utterances containing them constitute only necessary and not sufficient conditions for believing that their complements in such utterances are true in the case of verbs in (5.34b) or false in the case of verbs in (5.35b). Thus a sentence like (5.36a) is ambiguous between a reading where it is about John's ability and a reading where it is used to convey a statement about what John did and is only secondarily about John's ability.

(5.36) a. John was able to complete his collection.

b. John was able to complete his collection, but he didn't because he had lost interest in it.

The sentence (5.36b), however, can only be interpreted as a statement about John's ability because the continuation contradicts the indirect assertion. Comparing (5.36) with (5.37), (and ignoring the readings with heavy stress on able), we find that it is impossible to avoid the indirect reading of (5.37a), where it is a statement about what John didn't do as well as one about his abilities.

(5.37) a. John wasn't able to be present.

b. *John wasn't able to be present, but he was present.
This is explained by the fact that being able to perform a volitional act is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition on the actual performance of that act. However, as Karttunen argues, it is sometimes taken also as a sufficient condition on the performance of that act, in which case sentences like (5.36a) can be taken as statements about what the agent of the volitional act actually did.

A similar argument would show that forgetting to perform a volitional act, a sufficient condition on the non-performance of that act (or rather not forgetting to perform a volitional act, a necessary condition on the performance of that act), has the same behavior.

In the framework presented here, implicative verbs are simply verbs which denote logically necessary conditions on the truth of a predication of a volitional act of someone. Thus to perform the propositional act of predicating of an agent that he performs a volitional act \( V \), you must believe that that agent manages to, remembers to, doesn't fail to, doesn't decline to perform \( V \),
and so forth through the list of implicative verbs. When you predicate of an agent that he manages to, remembers to, doesn't fail to, or doesn't decline to perform V, you may indirectly perform the propositional act of predicating that the agent does V, of which more will be said when we discuss invited inferences in the next chapter.

We cannot analyze implicative verbs as verbs which denote predication which is presupposed by the predication of a volitional act because if they were so analyzed, we would be in effect claiming that before a predication of a volitional act V can be meaningful, it must be the case that one believes that the agent of V manages to, remembers to, etc., perform that act. But it would be nonsense to say the proposition that "John sucks eggs" is meaningless when John doesn't manage to suck eggs. The proposition is simply false, not meaningless.

What we have in implicative verbs is a denotation of truth conditions on the propositional act of predicating a volitional act, while presuppositions are meaningfulness conditions. Truth conditions and meaningfulness conditions are similar in that they may both be the basis for the qualification of propositional acts by if clauses. Consider the examples in (5.38).

(5.38) a. John played pool last night, if he
   \{ managed to.
   b. \} chose to.
   c. \} didn't neglect to.
   d. \} didn't refuse to.
e. John didn't play pool last night, if he didn't manage to.
f. didn't choose to.
g. neglected to.
h. refused to.

These sentences as well as all having a causal interpretation all have an interpretation where the if clause is qualifying a truth condition on the main clause, as shown by the paraphrases in (5.39) - (5.42).

(5.39) a. John played pool last night, or perhaps he didn't manage to.
    b. didn't choose to.
    c. neglected to.
    d. refused to.

(5.40) a. John didn't play pool last night, or perhaps he managed to.
    b. chose to.
    c. didn't neglect to.
    d. didn't refuse to.

(5.41) a. John played pool last night, or did(n't) he manage to?
    b. did(n't) he choose to?
    c. did(n't) he not neglect to?
    d. did(n't) he not refuse to?

(5.42) a. John didn't play pool last night, or did he manage to?
    b. choose to?
    c. not neglect to?
    d. not refuse to?
It is no accident that (5.39), (5.40), (5.41), and (5.42) seem to have interpretations as (5.43), (5.44), (5.45), and (5.46) respectively.

(5.43) John played pool last night, or perhaps he didn't.
(5.44) John didn't play pool last night, or perhaps he did.
(5.45) John played pool last night, or didn't he?
(5.46) John didn't play pool last night, or did he?

There are two possible explanations for this. One would be that the implicative verbs in the continuations are all simply used implicatively and thus we don't have qualification of truth conditions here, but only an indirect conveyance of (5.39) - (5.46) by means of the use of implicative verbs. The problem with this explanation is that the continuation of a sentence like (5.39b) for example can be interpreted as a statement about what John chose to do, where chose is a nonimplicative. Thus (5.47) is perfectly acceptable with what is presumably a nonimplicative use of choose, in which case John's choosing to play pool would not imply that he played pool and the correspondence we are discussing would be unexplained.

(5.47) John didn't play pool last night, or perhaps he chose to instead of choosing another pastime.

A more tenable explanation of the correspondence between (5.39) - (5.42) and (5.43) - (5.46) is that the qualification of propositional acts by reference to truth conditions amounts to bringing the truth of those propositions into question (while qualification by reference to presuppositions brings meaningfulness of propositions into question). Then the utterances in (5.39) - (5.42) and (5.43) - (5.46) are similar
to each other in that they all amount to the assertion of an utterance of qualified truth. However, (5.39) - (5.42) differ from (5.43) - (5.46) in that the former have indication of which truth condition causes the questionability of the truth of the proposition, while the latter do not.

It is tempting to draw a parallel between presuppositions of propositional acts and essential intrinsic conditions on illocutionary acts on the one hand and between truth conditions and non-essential intrinsic conditions on the other. It might be said, for example, that just as an illocutionary act will be void if an essential intrinsic condition is false, a propositional act will be void, that is meaningless or without truth value, if a presupposition is violated. Further, just as an assertion will count as an assertion and yet be insincere if an intrinsic condition on insincerity is violated, certain types of propositions (e.g. propositions predicating a volitional act) will count as propositions and yet be false if a truth condition is violated. However, this parallelism is not supported by our examination of qualification of illocutionary and propositional acts, since we have seen that illocutionary acts may only be qualified on the basis of non-essential intrinsic conditions, while propositional acts may be qualified on the basis of some presuppositions, as well as on the basis of truth conditions.
CHAPTER VI

INVITED INFERENCE

In this chapter, we attempt to show that invited inferences in the sense of Geis and Zwicky (1971) are indirect propositional acts. Our demonstration will consist of showing that most of the cases of invited inference discovered so far (by Geis and Zwicky (1971) and Horn (1971)) can be explained as arising from truth conditions on (i.e., logical inferences from) propositional acts, just as indirect illocutionary acts can be explained as arising from intrinsic conditions on those illocutionary acts.

The mechanism for generating a proposition P which invites the inference of another proposition Q, will be said to be as follows: Q is replaced with a logically necessary condition for the truth of Q, that is, a truth condition on Q. The resulting proposition P will then invite the inference Q.

The paradigm example of invited inferences discussed by Geis and Zwicky (1971), that of conditional perfection, is easily explained in the above terms. Conditional perfection is the process by which sentences like those given in (6.1) invite the inference of the propositions expressed by the corresponding sentences in (6.2). (Examples from Geis and Zwicky.)

(6.1) a. If you mow the lawn, I'll give you five dollars.
b. I'll flunk you if you don't start coming to class.

(6.2) a. If you don't mow the lawn, I won't give you five dollars.

b. I won't flunk you if you start coming to class.

The sentences in (6.2) are suggested by the sentences in (6.1). A general statement of the principle behind such invited inferences is (from Geis and Zwicky):

(6.3) A sentence of the form $X \rightarrow Y$ invites an inference of the form $\neg X \rightarrow \neg Y$.

Concerning this principle, it is pointed out that "it should be understood that [the] principle and any other like it, has force only when it is not contravened by other assertions or beliefs."

In other words, the principle of conditional perfection behaves in our terms like indirect illocutionary acts, which may only be performed if nothing in the situation makes it clear that the utterance used to perform the indirect act should be taken literally.

If we analyze the utterances of (6.1) as having the invited inferences given in (6.4) below rather than those given in (6.2), we will not do any violence to the notion of conditional perfection.

(6.4) a. If and only if you mow the lawn will I give you five dollars.

b. If and only if you don't come to class will I flunk you.

In fact, since we are speaking of the perfection of conditionals, it would seem better to formulate the principle of conditional perfection as in (6.5) rather than as in (6.3).
(6.5) A sentence of the form $X \supset Y$ invites an inference of the form $X=Y$.

There does not seem to be much difference between the formulations in (6.3) and (6.5) as far as their effect is concerned, since the only change is that in (6.5) the invited inference is a conjunction of the invited inference given in (6.3) and the proposition literally expressed by a sentence of the form $X \supset Y$. However, we can now explain conditional perfection as an example of the general process of substituting a logically necessary condition on the truth of a proposition for that proposition, since (6.6a) is a tautology.

(6.6) a. $(X=Y) \supset (X \supset Y)$
   b. $(X=Y) \supset (\sim X \supset \sim Y)$

Since (6.5b) is also a tautology, our account makes the claim that for example (6.7a) and (6.7b) both invite the same inference, that of (6.7a).

(6.7) a. If you come here, I'll show you something.
   b. If you don't come here, I won't show you something.
   c. If and only if you come here will I show you something.

In Geis and Zwicky's account, (6.7a) invites the inference of (6.7b) and vice versa. There seems to be no internal evidence which would allow one account to be preferred over the other. However, by using the approach taken here, we can provide a general account of some other cases of invited inference which must be viewed by Geis and Zwicky as processes different from conditional perfection.

Before continuing, however, it should be noted that not all cases of tautologies based on logical implication can be the basis
for invited inferences. For example, (6.8) is a well-known tautology, yet it cannot be said that asserting \( A \lor B \) invites the inference of \( A \) (example from Arnold Zwicky, personal communication).

\( (6.8) \ A \Rightarrow A \lor B \)

This shows that we must restrict our use of the term 'logic' so as not to encompass all of propositional calculus. We may do this by stipulating that by logic we mean natural logic in the sense of Lakoff (1979b). Thus we consider Lakoff's meaning postulates to be examples of truth conditions on propositional acts which can be the basis for invited inference. Two of Lakoff's meaning postulates are given in (6.9) and examples of their use to invite inferences are given in (6.10).

\( (6.9) \)

\begin{enumerate}
\item \text{CERTAIN(S)} \supset \text{POSSIBLE(S)}
\item \text{INTEND}(X,S) \supset \text{BELIEVE}(X,(\text{POSSIBLE(S)})
\end{enumerate}

\( (6.10) \)

\begin{enumerate}
\item I think it is possible that you are wrong. \( I \) think it is certain that you are wrong.
\item I believe it is possible for me to talk Fred out of jumping. \( I \) intend to talk Fred out of jumping.
\end{enumerate}

We hypothesize then that all and only postulates and theorems of natural logic involving implication may be the basis for invited inferences.

Another case of invited inference according to Geis and Zwicky is what they call inferred causation, in which sentences expressing a temporal sequence of events invite the inference that the event prior in time is a cause of the subsequent event. (Note that the word \textit{subsequent} itself has causal implications, although it is strictly speaking a predicate concerning temporal ordering.) Some
examples are:

(6.11)  

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a.] After finishing his dissertation, Fred was ready for the nuthouse.
  \item[b.] Having eaten a whole goose, Wolfe was in a pleasant mood.
  \item[c.] I looked at her and realized how small her ears were.
\end{itemize}

To relate this phenomenon to that of conditional perfection, we need only note that it is a necessary condition on the truth of a predication that event A causes event B that A precede B temporally. Thus again we have an example of the substitution of logically necessary conditions on propositions for those propositions.

A third case of invited inference is pointed out by Horn (1971), who observes that sentences containing optional implicative verbs (like remember \(\text{to}\), choose \(\text{to}\), and be intelligent enough \(\text{to}\)) actually may be said to invite the inference of their complements, rather than to optionally presuppose them, as Karttunen (1971) would have it. We have already seen in the last chapter that implicative verbs denote predicates which are logically necessary conditions on the truth of a predication of a volitional act. Thus, our general principle immediately accounts for the indirect propositions expressed by sentences like (6.12), and why these indirect propositions are not always conveyed.

(6.12)  

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a.] George remembered to shuffle.
  \item[b.] Mary chose to be anonymous.
  \item[c.] Max was intelligent enough to keep quiet.
\end{itemize}

To perform a volitional act, it is necessary to remember to perform
it, choose to perform it, and be intelligent enough to perform it. However, these conditions are not logically sufficient conditions on performing a volitional act. Therefore it is possible to

21By this account, those speakers of English who find the verb remember (to) to be obligatorily rather than optionally implicative in their dialect must have a different truth condition on volitional acts, one which has it that remembering to perform a volitional act is a logically necessary and logically sufficient condition in the performance of that volitional act. That is, such a speaker would not be able to imagine any situation in which one could remember to do something and yet not do it. This must ultimately be accounted for as a difference in meaning of the verb remember (to) since the logically necessary and sufficient conditions we have been discussing must follow from the meanings of the predicates involved. The same remarks apply to several other of Karttunen's (1971) obligatory implicative verbs which the writer finds to be optionally implicative in his dialect.

imagine situations where one remembered to do something, chose to do something, or was intelligent enough to do something and yet did not do it. It is in just such situations that sentences like (6.12) do not invite the usual inference.

We have been claiming that what we are concerned with here are indirect propositional acts so far with no justification, since we have only considered examples of assertions. However, as (6.13) shows, we may make the substitution we have been examining in other sorts of illocutionary acts without having any effect on the illocutionary force involved.

(6.13) a. Will you kiss me if I'm good? Will you kiss me if and only if I'm good?

b. Do you feel better after that? Do you feel better because of that?
While we can thus easily account for the behavior of optional implicative verbs in various illocutionary acts, we as yet have no way of explaining why optional implicative verbs may be, in fact must be, implicative in negative assertions as in (6.14).

(6.14)  
  a. John didn't remember to duck. → John didn't duck.
  b. Warren didn't choose to answer. → Warren didn't answer.
  c. Mary wasn't intelligent enough to cope with her problems. → Mary didn't cope with her problems.

If we recall the correspondence between necessary and sufficient conditions, that if A is a necessary condition for B, then ~A is a sufficient condition for ~B, we see that the sentences in (6.14) are examples of the substitution of a logically sufficient condition for the truth of a proposition for that proposition. Since the condition is a sufficient one, the inference is not merely invited; it can't be avoided. However, in spite of this, these sentences still seem to have an ambiguity in that either they may be construed as primarily about remembering, choosing, or intelligence, or they may be construed as being primarily about the non-performance of the act indicated in the complement. In the cases of conditional perfection and inferred causation, the same ambiguity seems to exist (given our analysis of conditional perfection). That this is a real ambiguity is shown by a comparison of (6.15a) and (6.15b).

(6.15)  
  a. *I helped Mary to be intelligent enough to be a genius.
  b. I helped Mary to be intelligent enough to cope with her own problems.
Verbs like help which normally require a pro-agentive complement with an agentive interpretation (Lee, 1971), i.e., require a complement denoting a volitional act, can take complements having be intelligent enough as the main predicate but only when the inference of the performance of the volitional act which is denoted by the complement of be intelligent enough is invited.

Criticize is another verb like help, and, as we see in (6.15a) and (6.16b), not be intelligent enough can act just like be intelligent enough does in (6.15).

(6.16)  
a. *I criticized Mary for not being intelligent enough to be a genius.

b. I criticized Mary for not being intelligent enough to cope with her problems.

c. *I helped Mary not to be intelligent enough to frighten Max.

d. I helped Mary not frighten Max.

However, as (6.16c) shows, there are some cases where it is not possible to substitute a sufficient condition on a proposition for it and still maintain acceptability. Since (6.16d) is acceptable, we would expect to find (6.16c) also acceptable, because we have substituted a complement which gives the inference of the proposition which is the complement of help in (6.16d). The most obvious explanation for why (6.16c) is unacceptable is that in this context the complement is being used with its literal rather than inferential reading. This means however that sentences like (6.14c) must be considered to be ambiguous as to a literal or inferential reading even though the inference is strictly speaking not invited but unavoidable.
A similar argument cannot show that obligatorily implicative verbs like manage (to) and happen to, which denote predicates which are conditions both logically necessary and logically sufficient for the truth of a predication of a volitional act, also are ambiguous between a literal and an inferential reading, because all of these verbs apparently denote volitional acts in the literal sense. However, sentences like (6.17) do seem to be ambiguous in the same way the sentences in (6.14) seem to be.

(6.17) John managed to arrive late.

That is, (6.17) can be construed as being about managing or about arriving late.

Because of the ambiguity of sentences with strict inferences, it appears necessary to abandon the term invited inference (as opposed to strict inference) and instead talk about the performance (or lack of performance) of an indirect propositional act. Such a performance would be carried out by substituting a logically necessary or a logically sufficient condition on the truth of a proposition for that proposition.

There is a problem, however, in admitting the performance of indirect propositional act with logically sufficient conditions in that the left hand sides of all natural implications which are truth conditions on propositional acts should then be able to be used to convey the right hand sides. Thus (6.18), which was the basis for conditional perfection, should also constitute the basis for an indirect propositional act like that in (6.19).

(6.18) \((X \Rightarrow Y) \supset (-X \supset -Y)\)
However (6.19) is obviously not a case of invited inference, so it cannot be said that we are generally able to perform propositional acts by using logically sufficient conditions on those acts. In fact the only cases we are aware of are those involving implicative verbs. We have no explanation for this.

We next notice that indirect propositional acts cannot be based on presuppositions. Thus neither (6.20b) or (6.20c) can be considered to be an indirect propositional act performed by (6.20a), and similarly for (6.20e) or (6.20f) from (6.20d). (6.20a) does seem to suggest (6.20b) in a way, but this can probably be explained by reference to Grice's (1968) maxim of conversational implicature that one makes one's contributions to a conversation as informative as necessary.

(6.20) a. John came.
   b. Only John came.
   c. Not only John came.
   d. John used to beat his wife.
   e. John has stopped beating his wife.
   f. John hasn't stopped beating his wife.

This surely is not simply a matter of a condition on the proposition expressed by (6.20a). Moreover, (6.21a) certainly cannot be construed as (6.21b) without contrastive stress on John.

(6.21) a. Did John come?
   b. Did only John come?
A simple explanation for why presuppositions cannot be the basis for indirect propositional acts suggests itself when we consider what would happen if such indirect acts were possible. Namely, it would often be impossible for a hearer to decide whether an act were being performed which was positive or negative. Thus, for example, one might not be able to decide whether (6.20b) or instead (6.20c) was the proposition conveyed by (6.20a). Thus we may hypothesize that indirect propositional acts cannot be based on presuppositions because presuppositions are presupposed by both a proposition and its negative and thus there would be a fatal falling together of indirect propositions and their negations if presuppositions were so used.

We have not examined all known cases of invited inference but perhaps enough to justify the treatment of them suggested here. Given our hypothesis that it is natural truth conditions on propositional acts which give rise to invited inferences, it should be possible to examine a number of such truth conditions and arrive at a much larger collection of invited inferences than now exists.
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