AUSTRIA'S ROLE AS AN ALLY OF THE MARITIME POWERS DURING THE EARLY YEARS OF THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION, 1701-1706

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By
Marsha Lee Frey, B.A., B.S. in Ed., M. A.

* * * *

The Ohio State University
1971

Approved by

[Signature]
Adviser
Department of History
PLEASE NOTE:

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February 21, 1947 • • • Born – Toledo, Ohio

1967 . . . . . . . . B. A., summa cum laude, B. S. in Ed., summa cum laude, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1968 . . . . . . . . M. A., The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio


1970-1971 . . . . Teaching Associate, Department of History
The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

Fields of Study

Major Field: Early Modern Europe. Professor John C. Rule

Minor Fields: Medieval Europe. Professor Franklin Pegues
Tudor Stuart England. Professor Clayton Roberts
Modern Britain. Professor Philip Poirier
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. Thesis

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine Austria's relations with the Maritime Powers, primarily England, in the early years of the War of the Spanish Succession. Throughout this study, I have focused my attention on the Habsburgs as hereditary rulers of Austria, not as emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. This topic has been chosen because there has not been any notable work done on Austria's role as an ally in the early years of the War of the Spanish Succession.

The Grand Alliance of September 1702, I contend, was never a strong one because of the clash of economic, cultural, and religious views between Austria and the Maritime Powers. The Protestant, republican preconceptions of the United Provinces and England clashed with Austria's Catholic imperial ones. At the very outset, the Grand Alliance was based solely on political expediency. As the war progressed, the basically irreconcilable goals and strategies of the Allies became increasingly apparent.

England entered the War of the Spanish Succession not primarily to uphold Habsburg claims to the Spanish inheritance, nor to
support an abstract conception of the balance of power, but to protect the Protestant Succession, national security, and commercial interests in Europe and overseas. The United Provinces entered the war primarily to secure a "barrier" of fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands against France and to protect their commercial interests in the Spanish Empire. Austria, however, entered the war to procure the Spanish inheritance for Emperor Leopold's son, Archduke Charles. Throughout the war, the Habsburgs strongly opposed the partition of the Spanish monarchy, while the Maritime Powers wanted to barter away Spanish possessions in order to gain more allies. The Maritime Powers' policy in this regard is illustrated by the Allies' Treaty with Portugal (1703) which Austria tenaciously opposed. Another source of irritation was the Emperor's desire to center the war effort, not in the Spanish Netherlands, Spain, or on the Rhine, but in Italy. The dispute over sending the English fleet to Naples in the early part of the war (1701-1703) marks the wide divergence between Austria and the Maritime Powers on Italian policy. Throughout the war, the Habsburgs were financially and militarily dependent on the Maritime Powers. Because of this dependence, the Maritime Powers were able to force Austria to assent to many policies, which conflicted with her strategic interests.

During the War of the Spanish Succession there was a steady erosion of confidence in the Grand Alliance of September 1702. The
dispute over sending the fleet to Naples (1701-1703), the entry of Bavaria on the French side (August 1703), the protracted negotiations with Portugal (1703), and the allied intercession in the Hungarian rebellion (1703-1706) were significant steps in the gradual deterioration of the alliance during the war which resulted eventually in the expulsion of the Johann Wenzel, Count Gallas, from Queen Anne's court (autumn 1711) and the conclusion of separate peace treaties by England and the United Provinces (Utrecht-11 April 1711) and Austria (Rastadt- 7 March 1714 and Baden 7 September 1714).  

2. Background to the Grand Alliance of 1702

Austria's relations with the Maritime Powers before the War of the Spanish Succession were strained, if not hostile. The strong sympathy of certain English "republicans" for the rebels under Count Emeric Tekely (1673) greatly annoyed the Habsburgs and proved to be merely a prelude to subsequent allied intervention in Hungarian affairs (1703-1706). The Maritime Powers were extremely chagrined over Austrian military mismanagement during the War of the League of Augsburg (1689-1697). Many Englishmen regarded Austria's totally inadequate military performance as "no small grievance to the Nation."  

1 All dates will be given in New Style unless otherwise indicated.

Because of Austria's disgracefully inadequate military effort, William III felt perfectly justified in forcing Austria to accept the Peace of Ryswick (1697). The Maritime Powers felt that the Habsburg's struggle with the Turks in the East greatly weakened the imperial war effort in the West against France. Both England and the United Provinces had pressed Leopold to abandon his strategic interests in the East in order to concentrate his military effort against Louis XIV. The Habsburgs, however, had greatly resented allied pressure throughout the war to make peace with the Turks. Leopold felt that the Maritime Powers had abandoned Austria and had ignored many of Austria's strategic interests, such as Strassburg, in concluding peace with France at Ryswick. The Maritime Powers' ratification of the detested Partition Treaties of 1698 and 1700 further embittered their relations with Austria. The Maritime Powers were willing to partition the empire of Carlos II in order to prevent a general European war. Leopold, however, was completely convinced of his inalienable right to the entire Spanish inheritance and tenaciously refused to consider the idea of a partition. Leopold was particularly enraged with the Maritime Powers' subsequent recognition of Philip V in 1701 and their abandonment of his claim to the Spanish inheritance. This mutual resentment presaged the subsequent allied dissensions during the War of the Spanish Succession which were to wrack
the Grand Alliance of September 1702.  

Neither Englishmen nor Dutchmen made a distinction between Germans and Austrians and typically regarded Austrians as beggarly, obstinate, intolerant, cruel, tyrannical, and avaricious. During the War of the Spanish Succession many English and Dutch writers deplored the conduct of their Allies, particularly Austria. On 19 December 1704 the Secretary of State, James Vernon, musingly asked Charles Talbot, Duke of Shrewsburg, the English representative at Rome, "who could not but pity a ministry which had to contend with the folly of Portugal, the Obstinacy of the Emperor, the Selfishness of the Dutch, and the madness of Scotland, all superadded to the power of France?"  

John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, remarked somewhat caustically that "it is a melancholy prospect to see that not only the Court of Vienna, but all the rest of the Allyes thinkes the whole burden of the Warr ought


to be bore by England and Holland." 6 Even the moderate Treasurer, Sidney Godolphin, castigated the emperor's conduct and claimed that "Vienna has not one thought that is not directly opposite to the interest of the Allies." 7 In The Conduct of the Allies (1711) Jonathan Swift complained that during the War of the Spanish Succession, no nation ever was "treated with so much Insolence, Injustice, and Ingratitude by its foreign Friends," as England was. The Tories in particular deplored the conduct of Austria, who, according to Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, "expects everything and does nothing." 9 Bolingbroke in fact regarded Austria as the "evil genius of Britain" and said that he never thought of Austria without "recollecting the image


of a man braiding a rope of hay while his ass bites off the other end." 10 The Maritime Powers' disparaging opinion of Austria persisted throughout the War of the Spanish Succession and greatly damaged allied unity. As the war progressed, the irreconcilable goals and strategies of the Allies threatened to disrupt the Grand Alliance of 1702.

3. Archival Sources

This study is based in part on a close reading of the George Stepney papers in the British Museum and the London Public Record Office. Stepney was envoy extraordinary to Vienna from 1701 to 1705 and subsequently envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary from 1705 to 1706. Stepney, who was an experienced career diplomat, particularly well versed in German affairs, is a central figure in the alliance because of his key role at Vienna in the negotiations, not only with Austria, but also with the Hungarian rebels, Portugal, Savoy, Bavaria, and Venice. I have also found useful the papers of John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, commander of the allied forces, Sidney Godolphin, Earl of Godolphin, English Lord Treasurer, Charles Spencer, Earl of Sunderland, English envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary to

10 Bolingbroke, Works, VI, 36-37. Also see A Few Words Upon the Examiner's Scandalous Peace (London, 1711); Francis Hare, The Management of the War in a Letter to a Tory Member (London, 1711), pp. 1-2, hereafter cited as Hare, Management of the War; Francis Hare, The Works of the Right Reverend and Learned Dr. Francis Hare, IV (London, 1746), 183-281, hereafter cited as Hare, Works.
Vienna (1705), Charles Whitworth, English representative at Ratisbon (1702), and subsequently Stepney's assistant at Vienna (1703–1705), Alexander Stanhope, English envoy extraordinary at The Hague (1700–1706), Johann Wenzel, Count Gallas, Duke of Lucera, imperial representative at London (1705–1711), Count Francis Ludwig Zinzendorf, Viennese Chancellor and Johann Wenzel, Count Wratislaw, imperial representative at London (1705–1711) in the British Museum and the Public Record Office. Of great help also were the papers of Anthonie Heinsius, Grand Pensionary of Holland, Jan Jacob Hamel van Bruyninx, Dutch representative at Vienna (1700–1707), Count Rechteren, Baron D'Almelo, Dutch special representative to Vienna (1705) and the general and secret reports to the States-General in the Algemeene Rijksarchief. In the Oesterreichische Staatsarchiv, the reports of and the imperial representative at London (1705–1711), Johann Wenzel, Count Wratislaw, imperial representative at London (1701–1704), Johann Wenzel, Count Gallas, Duke of Lucera, imperial representative at London (1705–1711), Johann Philip Hoffman, imperial Secretary in London (1693–1724), and Count Peter Goes, imperial representative to the United Provinces proved invaluable. Lastly, the papers of Thomas Wentworth, Baron Raby, English envoy (1903–1705) and later ambassador (1705–1711) to Berlin and Jean de Robethon, secretary to the elector of Hanover, in the Hannover Stadtarchiv were very informative.
In 1701 George Stepney was appointed envoy extraordinary to Emperor Leopold at Vienna. As envoy extraordinary (1701-1705) and subsequently envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary (1705-1706) at Vienna, Stepney played a crucial role in Austria's relations with the Maritime Powers. Stepney (1661-1707), who had spent more than one third of his life abroad in the foreign service, excelled as a diplomat. He had a grasp of German affairs that none of his contemporaries could equal. Stepney was a graduate of Trinity College, Cambridge (B.A. in 1687 and M.A. in 1689) a respected poet, and a good friend and a witty correspondent of Charles Montague, later Earl of Halifax, William Blathwayt, Princess Sophie of Hanover, Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibnitz, and Joseph Addison. As a member of the Royal Society (1697), and as a commissioner on the Board of Trade (1697), Stepney was highly respected by his countrymen. Politically Stepney was a Whig and a member of the Kit-Cat Club one of the most fashionable of the Whig clubs. Stepney even contributed to the pamphlet warfare which erupted later in 1700 over Philip of Anjou's succession to the Spanish throne (16 November 1700). In his "Essay Upon the Present Interest of England" (1701) Stepney contends forcibly
that England must reduce the "overgrown power" of France & must not allow Louis XIV to delude England into a false sense of security. The "necessary consequences" of a peace were, for Stepney, the "utter ruin and destruction of our trade, liberty, and religion." 1

Such was the man whom William III appointed as English representative to Vienna in early 1701. Stepney was instructed to find out about the dispositions of the various German princes in the empire, such as the Elector Palatine and the Elector of Cologne, towards the question of the Spanish Succession, to proceed on to Vienna to discover the diplomatic and military position of the emperor, and finally to inform the imperial court of the queen's concern about the religious persecution in the empire. He was also instructed to act in concert with the ministers of the Statam General "pursuant to such instructions." 2

When George Stepney arrived in Vienna on 4 May 1701, he encountered an irresolute emperor and a faction ridden court. Although Leopold I (1640-1705) often displayed indecisiveness while at the


2 For Stepney's instructions refer to P.R.O., S.O. (Germany), 105/62/1-3, for Stepney's credentials refer to P.R.O., S.P. (Germany), 105/62/4-5, 10, 18. For information about Stepney's pay and appear consult Shaw, Treasury Books, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, and XXII.
same time tenaciously adhering to what he regarded as the Habsburgs' inalienable right to the Spanish inheritance. With an Austrian Habsburg for a father (Ferdinand III) and a Spanish Habsburg for a mother (Infanta Maria Anna of Spain), Leopold had all the Habsburg physical attributes; a long, narrow face, blond hair, large light blue eyes, hollow cheeks, a prominent nose, a long pointed chin, and the "Habsburg" protruding lower lip. He was short in stature, thin, pale, and walked with a tottering gait. Although in appearance Leopold was not imposing, he had a strong sense of the imperial dignity, and of his duty toward God, family, and empire. Leopold in fact had an unshakeable conviction that God was on the side of the House of Habsburg.³ He was particularly disgruntled over William III's recognition of Philip of Anjou as King of Spain and complained vehemently to Stepney that instead of being assisted by her Allies in the Grand Alliance, Austria was being abandoned.⁴

In contrast to his father, Joseph, King of the Romans, (1678-1711), and later emperor, was said to be uncommonly pleasing in appearance, manner, and address. Like his father he was very conscious of the exalted dignity of his position and of his duty toward God and the

³For detailed discussion of Leopold I refer to Appendix B.

empire. Basically Joseph was generous, just and intelligent emperor, who was energetic, resolute, and keenly interested in military affairs. However, Joseph possessed a very violent temper, a passion for women and hunting, and a love of physical exercise and music. Joseph, with his younger brother Charles, urged Leopold to fight Louis XIV for the Spanish inheritance.  

At the court of Vienna, Count Johann Wenzel Wratislaw, ambassador to England, Count Leopold Wilhelm Auersberg, former ambassador to England, Prince Adam Lichtenstein, Archduke Charles' tutor, and Prince Eugene of Savoy, subsequently president of War, also advised Leopold to fight for the Spanish inheritance. Ferdinand Bonaventura, Count Harrach, First Minister, Prince Louis, Margrave of Baden, imperial commander on the Rhine, Count Julius Frederick Buccellini, Chancellor of Austria, Count Henry Mansfeld, Prince of Fundi, Marshal of the Court, and Count Henry Salaberg, president of the Chamber, advocated peace.

The War of the Spanish Succession failed to unite the already faction ridden court. The most influential factions at court were the old ministerial party, composed of Counts Harrach, Wallenstein, Buccellini, Ottingen, and Mansfeld and the reform party, which consisted

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5 For information about Joseph I refer to Appendix B.
6 For discussion of the ministers and the various factions in Vienna refer to Appendix B.
primarily of Prince Eugene, Count Stahremberg, and Count Wratislaw. The enmity of Kaunitz towards Harrach and Mansfeld played a key role in the increasing fractionalization of the court. By avoiding involvement in court politics, Stepney was able to maintain good relations with the chief ministers until the Anglo-Dutch mediation (1703) in the Hungarian rebellion.

Although Stepney was a Whig, he was also a career diplomat, who served both Whig and Tory governments. Upon the accession of Queen Anne in 1702, the Earl of Marlborough, as Captain General of the forces, and the Earl of Godolphin, as Lord Treasurer, ruled England with a predominantly Tory ministry. This ministry was succeeded in 1704 by a triumvirate of the Duke of Marlborough, the Earl of Godolphin, and Robert Harley.7

At the very outset of his mission Stepney stated that in spite of all the drinking and negotiating with German princes, which "might make as dolefull a Chapter as that wherein St. Paul enumerates

his Labours and Sufferings...8, he would not "quit this Post for any in Europe, all persons being extremly oblidging to me..."9 Stepney's attitude in 1701 contrasts markedly with that of Philip Meadows, envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Vienna after Stepney, in December 1707, who said that he would rather "live the rest of [his] days upon bread and water"10 than stay at the court of Vienna, where in time he felt that England would "find an Austrian allie as prejudicial as a Bourbon Enemy..."11 and reflects the gradual metamorphósis which occurred in Anglo-Austrian relations during the War of the Spanish Succession.

The year 1701 was an ominous prelude for Austria's relations with the Maritime Powers during the War of the Spanish Succession, for it revealed the divided allegiance of the empire, the financial, administrative, and military chaos of Austria, and the basically irreconciliable strategy and goals of the Allies. The year 1701 in particular revealed the Allies' disparate views on the Spanish problem.

The whole question of the Spanish Succession was brought

8 P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 105/65, Stepney to Godolphin, Vienna, 10 May 1702.
10 P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 80/29, Meadows Report of 20 December 1707.
11 Ibid.
dramatically to the fore by the death of King Carlos II, the "last pallid relic of a faded dynasty" on 1 November 1700. The problem of the Spanish Succession had been the predominant diplomatic concern of late seventeenth century Europe. The question of the legitimate heir was indeed a tangled and difficult one. In the Spanish empire, Castilian law clearly stipulated that in default of male heirs to the throne, females should inherit in order of primogeniture. Furthermore, ever since 1559 when Charles V had divided his kingdom between the two branches of the house of Habsburg there had been a series of mutual family agreements that if one branch should die out, the other would succeed it.

To ensure a Habsburg succession the Austrian heir married the eldest Spanish Infanta. If, however, the eldest Infanta married into another house she renounced her claim to the Spanish throne and the Austrian heir married her next eldest sister, thereby ensuring the succession. In the seventeenth century, two Infantas married into the house of Bourbon: Anne of Austria, daughter of Philip III and Maria Theresa, daughter of Philip IV. Anne of Austria married Louis XIII in 1615 and Maria Theresa married Louis XIV in 1659. Both Infantas renounced their

claims to the throne and their younger sisters married Austrian Habsburgs. Maria, the daughter of Philip III, married the Emperor Ferdinand III (1631) and Margaret, the daughter of Philip IV, married the Emperor Leopold I (1666).  

The problem of the succession was complicated because Maria Theresa's renunciation of the throne was conditional on the full payment of her dowry and because Margaret, Emperor Leopold's wife, had left only a daughter, Maria Antonia, who married the elector of Bavaria (1685) and had a son, the Electoral Prince Joseph Ferdinand. Leopold had extracted a private, personal renunciation of the Spanish throne from Maria Antonia, but this was considered invalid.

There were then three claimants for the Spanish throne. The Electoral Prince Joseph Ferdinand, son of Maria Antonia, rightly claimed that his mother's renunciation was invalid, while the Dauphin, son of Maria Theresa, maintained that his mother's renunciation was not binding because of the incomplete payment of her dowry at the time of her marriage to Louis XIV. The Emperor Leopold, however, alleged that he was the legitimate heir because both Maria Theresa and Maria Antonia had renounced their rights and that therefore his mother Maria, wife of Emperor Ferdinand III, passed her right on to him. Leopold would in turn pass his

\[13\] See chart in Appendix C.
right on to Archduke Charles, his second son.

In order to prevent a general European war from developing out of these rival claims, the partition Treaties of 1698 and 1700 were agreed to by England, France, and the United Provinces. However, neither Spain, nor Austria would have anything to do with either treaty. The Emperor Leopold had obstinately resolved to "sink or swim with ye Spaniards who are extreamly against ye division of their monarchy." 14

The first Partition Treaty gave Spain, the Netherlands, and the colonies to Joseph Ferdinand, the Milanese to Archduke Charles, and the Two Sicilies to the Dauphin. Carlos II in an attempt to avoid partition of his empire, made a will leaving all his empire to Joseph Ferdinand. The death of the Electoral Prince in 1699, however, rendered both these settlements abortive. In a vain effort to reach a peaceful settlement, William III negotiated a second Partition Treaty. By this treaty, Spain, the Netherlands, and the colonies would go to the Archduke Charles, while the Milanese and the Two Sicilies would go the Dauphin. Both Spain and Austria scornfully rejected any suggestion of what Claude Louis Hector, Duc de Villars, French ambassador extraordinary at Vienna, referred to as "un juste partage." 15

14 B.M., Add. MSS. 9736, f. 71, Sutton to Blathwayt, 17 August 1700.

In one last desperate counter move, Carlos II, in order to detach the Bourbons from the policy of partition, made a will leaving his entire empire to Philip of Anjou, provided that the crowns of Spain and France should never be united. Louis XIV repudiated the Partitions and recognized his grandson Philip of Anjou as King of Spain on 15 November 1700.\(^\text{16}\) Later England and the United Provinces also recognized Philip as King of Spain.\(^\text{17}\) Austria, floating "between hopes and despondency"\(^\text{18}\) and both exasperated and disappointed with Carlos II's will.


\(^\text{17}\) William III was really forced to recognize Philip as King of Spain by pressure from Parliament and the United provinces. Wratislaw the imperial representative in London reported that the States-General had told William that their delays in recognizing Philip "estotent sujets a des interpretations maligne come si tout leur but n'avait este que de gagner du temps, pour se mettre en etat de faire la guerre..."Oesterreichische Staatsarchiv, Haus-Hof- und Staatsarchiv, England, Karton 33, Bericht Wratislaw 1 March 1701, ff.1–3, hereafter cited as Oest.Staatsarchiv.

\(^\text{18}\) B.M., Add.MSS.9736, f.117, Sutton to Blathwayt, Vienna, 2 December 1700.
immediately went to war in Italy.\textsuperscript{19}

The emperor was convinced of his inalienable right to the Spanish throne and firmly believed that God would aid him in his "just" cause.\textsuperscript{20} In hopes of winning the Spanish inheritance for the Habsburgs, Leopold tried to secure help from the Maritime Powers and the various German princes. Many of the German princes, however, were being lured by the astute diplomacy of Louis XIV, who was hoping to secure the neutrality of the Holy Roman Empire. Through his many skilled diplomats, such as Charles François de la Bonde d'Iberville (1653-1725) at Metz and Triers and Louis Rousseau de Chamoy at Ratisbon, he repeatedly


\textsuperscript{20}Hugo Hantsch, Die Entwicklung Oesterreichs-Ungarns zur Grossmacht (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1933), 80, hereafter cited as Hantsch, Oesterreich-Ungarn; and Hugo Hantsch, Die Geschichte Oesterreichs, II (Vienna, 1947), 94.
emphasized that the Spanish Succession was only a dynastic question and that the empire should remain neutral. According to Louis, the Spanish Succession was a private quarrel which concerned only the Bourbons and the Habsburgs, not the empire. Leopold, on the other hand, stressed that the growing power of France was a threat to every German prince, and that it was the duty of the whole empire to come to the emperor's aid, especially after France's illegal seizure of the imperial fiefs in Italy.  

Constitutionally the empire was divided into ten circles and each circle had the right to decide in its own diet whether to remain neutral or to enter the war.  

Pierre Puchot, Comte de Chinchamp, Marquis des Alleurs (1643-1725), Louis's representative to Cologne, told Baron le Wiser, the chief minister to the Elector Palatine, that Louis regarded the circles as "le véritable pied de la Neutralité de l'Empire."  

Stepney believed that Emperor Leopold had been very negligent of his true interests in failing to secure the good will and trust of

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23 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/62/34, Baron le Wiser to Stepney, Dusseldorf, 18 May 1701.
the several German princes. He found that the circles of Electoral Rhine, Upper Rhine, Swabia, Franconia, and Bavaria were engaged in a compact of armed neutrality by the Heilbronn Covenant of 31 August 1701 and that Cologne, Bavaria, Brunswick-Wolfenbuttel, and Saxe-Gotha were tied directly to France by the Neutrality League of February 1702.\(^{24}\) Louis's treaty of Neutrality, Stepney feared, would indeed have a "parnicious consequence" \(^{25}\) in the already divided empire. The circles of Swabia and Franconia, the "bastions of the empire" in particular were annoyed with the emperor's desertion in the last war to win territory in Hungary and the emperor's efforts at the peace of Ryswick (1697) to secure Brisach and Philipsburgh rather than Strasbourg, which they regarded as a very necessary bulwark against France.\(^{26}\)

By the end of 1701, self interest, fear of French hegemony, hope of Maritime Power's subsidies, and the imperial loyalty of such men as Lothar Franz Schonborn (1695-1729), Elector of Mainz and Archchancellor of the empire, and Christian Ernest of Bayreuth, imperial


\(^{25}\) P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/62/20, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 18 April 1702.

Field Marshal, had gained most of the empire for Leopold I. In the empire, the most prominent supporters of the Habsburgs were Frederick, King in Prussia, George, Elector of Hanover, and the Elector Palatine. Duke Anton Ulrich, head of the elder Guelph dynasty, Joseph Clement, elector and archbishop of Cologne, and his elder brother, Max Emmanuel, elector of Bavaria, of the Wittelsbach dynasty allied with Louis XIV. Celle and Hanover, quickly overpowered Anton Ulrich of Brunswick-Wolfenbuttel who had refused to ally with the emperor and was forced to flee while his brother Rudolph Augustus concluded an accord which allowed Brunswick-Wolfenbuttel troops to be taken into the emperor's service. By the end of 1701, Stepney, even though he thought that the elector of


29Kemble, State Papers, p. 256.
Bavaria's demands were exorbitant, still had hopes of bringing the elector into the Grand Alliance. He firmly believed that the elector wanted to "keep open a back door" for further negotiations.

While Stepney was in the empire discovering the intentions of the various German princes, Marlborough was at The Hague negotiating the Grand Alliance. Throughout 1701 Austria had insisted on the Habsburgs' right to the Spanish throne and wanted the world to think, according to Stepney, that "the present war is grounded upon the Emperor's right..." Although the emperor signed the Treaty of the Grand Alliance, he continued to insist on his right to inherit the whole Spanish empire. By the treaty of the Grand Alliance of 7 September 1701, Austria, England, and the United Provinces accepted the rule of Philip V over Spain and the Spanish Indies on condition that the crowns of Spain and France should never be united. The also agreed to obtain

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31 B.M., Add. MSS. 9721, ff. 121, Stepney to Blathwayt, Vienna, 14 December 1701; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/64/314, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 14 December 1701.

"une satisfaction juste et raisonable" for the house of Habsburg in the form of Milan, Naples, Sicily, the Spanish Mediterranean islands, and the Netherlands. The United Provinces were to acquire "a Dyke, Rampart, and Barrier to separate France and the United Provinces" in the Spanish Netherlands. Article eight stipulated that England and the United Provinces must enjoy the same trading privileges in Philip's dominions as they enjoyed under Carlos II and that France must not possess or trade with the Spanish Indies. Later it was agreed that the emperor should bring 82,000 men into the field against France, the United Provinces should bring 100,000 and England 40,000.

At the outset of the War of the Spanish Succession, Austria was not prepared financially, administratively, or militarily to enter the war. The imperial Chamber of Finance was in a state of incredible disorder and confusion. Corruption in the central government and administration was rampant, tax yields, especially from the land tax were fluctuating, tax estimates were incorrect, trade was declining, and bankruptcy was imminent. The financial state of the empire was such that Daniel

33 For text of Grand Alliance refer to Lamberty, Mémoires, I, 620-628; Trevely, Documents, pp. 5-9; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/64/27-30.
Dolfin, the Venetian envoy at Vienna, reported that "the officials live without salary, the troops without bread, the workmen without pay." 36

To alleviate his difficulties, Leopold depended mainly on bankers, such as Samuel Oppenheimer, and on wealthy nobles, such as Count Gundaker Thomas Stahremberg. 37 Robert Sutton, The English representative at Vienna before Stepney bemoaned the sad condition of the emperor's troops. In 1700 he reported that the regiments were only half full and that only half the cavalry had horses. 38 The death of Marshal Stahremberg, the president of the Council of War on 4 June 1701 further debilitated the emperor's military effectiveness. 39 His successor, Count Mansfeld, was not appointed until 20 July 1701. Although the Allies continually pressed the emperor to send a "considerable force" quickly to the Rhine, 40 as of June 1701, the emperor had only 10,000

36 Noorden, Europäische Geschichte, I, 280.
37 Max Grunwald, Samuel Oppenheimer und sein Kreis, ein Kapitel aus der Finanzgeschichte Oesterreichs (Vienna, 1913), pp. 36-139.
38 B.M., Add.Mss. 9736, f. 82, Sutton to Blathwayt, Vienna, 11 September 1700.
40 B.M., Add.Mss. 28, 908, f. 244, Ellis to Stepney, Whitehall, 23 May 1701.
troops in the field and as of November he had only 14,000. The Allies were becoming more and more exasperated with the emperor's slowness, irresolution, and indifference concerning his military preparedness.

The year 1701 was also an inauspicious beginning for the Grand Alliance because it revealed the Allies' basically irreconcilable views on strategy. England and the United Provinces wanted the emperor to concentrate his main force on the Rhine. William III strongly opposed Prince Eugene of Savoy's desire to send 8,000 Danes to Italy and told Leopold that it was absolutely necessary for him to have the 8,000 men on the Rhine. Both William III and Heinsius, the Grand Pensionary, opposed the emperor's desire to center the main war effort on Italy. Leopold, along with his advisers, thought that once Italy was conquered, all the rest of the Spanish dominions would follow quickly and easily. Italy was strategically very important for Leopold because of its

41 For the condition of the imperial army refer to Wines, "The Imperial Circles", p.28; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/62/109, Stepney to Paget, Vienna, 14 June 1701; S.P. Germany, 105/62/56, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 9 November 1701; B.M., Add. Mss. 9720, ff.12-13, Stepney to Blathwayt, Vienna, 18 June 1701.


proximity to the hereditary countries. Leopold also regarded Italy as essential in order to maintain the imperial fiefs in Italy, to keep the Italian princes, especially Venice, in the imperial interest and to have the superior direction of affairs at the papal court.\footnote{Alg. Rijks., Arch. Heinsius, 842, Bruyninx to Heinsius, 28 April 1703.}

In May 1701 the emperor took the initiative and sent Prince Eugene of Savoy into Italy to overrun the Franco-Spanish positions there. Eugene assembled his army in Tyrol and began his march on 27 March 1701 through Vicenze, in neutral Venetian territory, thereby surprising Marshal Catatin and forcing him to retreat to the Oglio. Eugene's violation of Venetian territory startled the French and greatly angered the Venetians. Venice was particularly important because by her central geographic position she could close her passes and thereby make entry into Italy very difficult for Austria.\footnote{P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/64/270-271, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 26 November 1701. For Italy during the war consult, H.M. Vernon, Italy from 1494 to 1790 (Cambridge, 1909). pp. 317-340. For French policy regarding Venice see Duparc, Recueil, Venise, XXVI, 127-128, 115, VIII. Louis XIV's aim throughout the war was to keep Venice neutral. He believed, however, that Venice's pretendue neutralité cachait une partialité en faveur de l'Empereur. "Venice however wanted to remain on good terms with France in order to avoid a possible "revanche" of the Turks who wanted to retake the Morea which Venice had held since 1687.}

The emperor was particularly concerned about securing Naples, whose population was very pro-Habsburg. Even Prince Eugene of Savoy thought that the kingdom of Naples was "of greater consequence" to the imperial family than all the rest of the Spanish dominions put
together. The emperor repeatedly requested William III to send the English fleet to aid him, but William refused. Stepney frequently expressed his only too well founded fear that the emperor's cherished Naples expedition would "miscarry for want of a fleet." When the Naples expedition did fail, because of the lack of naval assistance, the emperor was furious.

Anglo-Austrian relations were further damaged by England's failure to secure special trading privileges in the empire. Stepney had contemplated increasing England's trade in quicksilver and Hungarian wine, but was particularly concerned about improving the position of English serges in the empire. William III feared that the emperor's edict of 13 October 1700 prohibiting the importation of serges and establishing a factory at Linz, which was designed to utilize imperial manpower and to keep Austrian money at home, might have disastrous effects.

46 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/67, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 7 February 1703. Also see in S.P. Germany, 80/20.

47 Oest. Staatsarchiv., England, Karton 34, ff. 5-10, Instructions of Lamberg of 29 July 1701.

48 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 106/64/61, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 5 October 1701. Also refer to f. 62, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 5 October 1701.

49 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/64, 236, Stepney to Godolphin, Vienna, 1701.

50 B.M., Add. MSS. 9720, f. 77, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 27 July 1701.
on English serges. The emperor's refusal to annul the edict or to allow the importation of English serges boded ill for the future of Anglo-Austrian relations.

CHAPTER III
1702: AN INAUSPICIOUS INCEPTION

The year 1702 was one of further allied disillusionment because it highlighted the military unpreparedness of Austria, the factiousness of the imperial court, the myopia of Leopold concerning Italy, the financial nadir of Austrian finances, and the divisiveness of the empire, as seen in the defection of Bavaria to France. In 1702 Austria's chagrin over England's refusal to send the fleet to Naples increased and English anger over the failure of the emperor to attach Bavaria to the allied cause erupted.

In 1702 the English government was particularly exasperated with Austria's poor military effort. In December 1701, the president of War, Count Mansfeld promised Stepney that there would be 27 regiments on the Rhine in 1702, that is about 40,900 men. The Margrave of Baden complained bitterly that he had not even half that number and that the men which he did have were very poorly supplied. Besides the failure of the emperor to supply his quota or to adequately equip the troops which

1 B.M., Add.MSS.9721,f.64, List of imperial regiments of 24 December 1701 (also given in P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 104/201, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 24 December 1701); B.M., Add.MSS.28,945,f.288; and P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/64,376-377.
he had, the war effort was further obstructed by a lively dispute be-
tween the Margrave of Baden and Count Mansfeld, the president of War. 
The dispute was occassioned by what Stepney termed a "German nicety," 
that is, the Margrave of Baden refused to address Mansfeld by the title 
of Liebten or Dilection because they were both princes of the empire. 
Mansfeld, however, refused to answer any of Baden's correspondence. Even 
though Stepney admitted that the Prince of Baden had been "miserably 
neglected" ever since Mansfeld's appointment as president of War, he did 
not believe that Mansfeld would "fail in his duty out of a malitious 
principle" because Mansfeld was devoted to the Habsburgs and the empire. 
Baden in fact often complained through his agent at court, Baron Greiff, 
of the poor condition of his army. The margrave's successful effort to 
obtain full powers to act offensively whenever he saw fit (April 1702) 
further augmented Mansfeld's enmity because Mansfeld regarded it as an 
invasion of the prerogatives of his office. This mutual hostility in-
creased to such an extent that it greatly hindered the war effort. Prince 
Louis even alleged that Mansfeld had failed to send greatly needed men 
and supplies to him after they had been promised. The Prince of Baden

2P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/18, Stepney to Vernon, Vienna, 18 March 1702.

3Ibid., Stepney to Albemarle, Vienna, 8 March 1702

4Ibid., Stepney to Vernon, Vienna, 29 March 1702 and 8 April 1702.
was so exasperated with Mansfeld that he openly accused him "not only of Negligence, but of Treachery." Prince Eugene was equally annoyed with Mansfeld's failure to provide him with the necessary reinforcements and provisions, but unlike Prince Louis, he was soon reconciled with and on good terms with Mansfeld.

Prince Louis William of Baden (1655-1707) was one of Leopold's most illustrious generals. He had served under General Montecucculi in Alsace and had helped to defend Vienna from the Turks. The Duke of Villars highly esteemed the margrave as "un vrai homme de guerre, il en amie le metier et y met toute son application; il a beaucoup de courage... il est actif, vigilant, laborieux." Prince Louis of Baden was particularly esteemed by the circles of Swabia and Franconia. At the very outset of the War of the Spanish Succession Prince Louis counselled

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5P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/18, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 1 July 1702. Also refer to B.M., Add. MSS. 23, 911, f. 270, Stepney to Ellis, Vienna, 8 July 1702.

6P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/18, Stepney to Vernon, Vienna, 18 March 1702; S.P. Germany, 105/66, Stepney to Halifax, Vienna, 21 October 1702; S.P. Germany, 80/19, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 12 July 1702; S.P. Germany, 100/10, Conference of 6 August 1702 at Vienna with Wratislaw.

the emperor to stay at peace with France because of the poor financial and military state of the empire. He was a very imperious commander and a bitter enemy of Count Wratislaw and of Prince Eugene.8

In order to strengthen the imperial war effort, especially on the Rhine, Stepney was instructed in early 1702 to request that the eldest son of the emperor, Joseph, King of the Romans, should command the army on the Rhine in person. Both William III and Heinsius hoped that the King of Romans' presence on that front would ensure the military preparedness of the emperor on the Rhine and would prevent the emperor from concentrating all his forces in Italy. Stepney felt that the King of the Romans, who was known to be of a very "warm temper" and to "apply very earnestly to what he undertakes" would force Count Mansfeld to "more than ordinary measures".9 Both Hamel Bruyninx, the representative of the States-General at Vienna, and Stepney argued that the emperor should allow the King of the Romans to command the Rhine army in order to promote Austrian interests and to encourage the Allies.10


9 P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 80/18, Stepney to Vernon, Vienna, 22 March 1702.

10 Ibid., Stepney to Hedges, 4 January 1702 and S.P.Germany, 104/201/14-17, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 4 January 1702.
Stepney had the support of the King of the Romans, the empress, the Prince of Salm and Count Kaunitz. Mansfeld, however, strongly opposed the plan.\(^\text{11}\)

On 7 March 1702 when the emperor resolved to allow the King of the Romans to go on campaign, England and the United Provinces were delighted. Stepney predicted that the King of the Romans would give "great heart to the States of Suabia and Franconia",\(^\text{12}\) the mainstays of the imperial army and ensure that "nothing shall be wanting on the Rhine."\(^\text{13}\) Stepney saw the King of the Romans as a "powerfull Solicitor ... who will take care that what is promised shall be performed."\(^\text{14}\) The allies were confident that the Prince of Baden would make an "early and powerful diversion on the Rhine."\(^\text{15}\) The King of the Romans in fact immediately inquired into the Margrave of Baden's

\(^{11}\) B.M., Add.Mss.9721, f.85, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 19 November 1701 and f.90, Stepney to Blathwayt, Vienna, 23 November 1701. Also refer to P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/18, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 7 January 1702.

\(^{12}\) P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/18, Stepney to Vernon, Vienna, 11 February 1702.

\(^{13}\) B.M., Add.Mss.28,910, f.318, Stepney to Ellis, Vienna, 8 March 1702.

\(^{14}\) P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/19, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 16 December 1702. Also refer to S.P. Germany, 90/18, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 23 March 1702 and Stepney to Vernon, Vienna, 8 March 1702.

\(^{15}\) P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/18, Stepney to Albemarle, Vienna, 8 March 1702.
complaints and "drained all troops to the Rhine." Both England and the United Provinces knew that the emperor would have difficulty in procuring a large force on the Rhine and at the same time hold his position in Italy and safeguard his hereditary countries, but they wanted to ensure that the Rhine was adequately protected.

In 1702 the Maritime Powers were gravely concerned about Leopold's preoccupation with Italy. Bruyninx candidly told Heinsius that the emperor was more concerned about his conquest of Milan, Naples, and Sicily than about all the rest of the Spanish dominions. Stepney in a similar way reported that in early 1702 the chief aim of the emperor was to make conquests in Italy and that the emperor's chief military effort would probably be made in Italy, not the Rhine. Marlborough and Heinsius knew very well that the emperor would not even consider a peace which did not provide for the cession of Milan, Naples, and Sicily. The emperor regarded Milan as a barrier in upper Italy against France and thought that the French possession of Naples and Sicily would provide a bridgehead for a French attack on his hereditary countries.

16 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/66, Nottingham to Stepney, 2 October 1702. Also refer to S.P. Germany, 80/18, Stepney to Vernon, 18 March 1702.


18 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/18, Stepney to Vernon, Vienna, 8 February 1702. Also refer to Marlborough to Heinsius, The Hague, 19 May 1702.

19 Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, XII, 220.
desirability of the projected Naples expedition. Count Kaunitz believed that the emperor should forestall the expedition and use the troops to defend the empire, while Count Mansfeld and the Prince of Lichtenstein, tutor to Archduke Charles, insisted that the emperor should immediately assist the Neapolitans and thereby secure his interest in Italy. When the emperor decided to postpone the Naples expedition it was a grave disappointment to Mansfeld and his supporters who believed that the success of the whole war effort depended upon the emperor's success in Italy.

The emperor, along with his advisers, still deemed Italy "the Substance and Spain it self the Shadow, or a mere Carcass scarce worth having." Spain in Mansfeld's view was the Tagg-end of God's creation." In 1702 the emperor pressed England to send the naval expedition to Italy because he was obliged "en Conscience et en honneur."

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20 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/18, Stepney to Vernon, Vienna, 8 February 1702; Alg. Rijks., Arch. Heinsius 764, Bruyninx to Heinsius, Vienna, 15 February 1702 and 18 April 1702.

21 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/65, Stepney to Ormond, Vienna, 27 April 1702.

22 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/68/405-406, Stepney to Buckingham, Vienna, 23 June 1703.

to assist the Neapolitans and because he wanted to assert and maintain his "just pretensions" in Italy. Wratislaw argued that if England would help the emperor in Naples, the emperor would then be better able to assist the Allies.24 England, however, flatly refused to send the fleet that year because of the lack of imperial troops to support the fleet and because it was a bad season for the fleet to arrive and return, especially when England had no ports which the fleet could enter in case of emergency.25 Wratislaw was greatly exasperated with the queen's answer and angrily told Secretary Vernon that if the fleet could not go to Naples this year there could be no expectation that it would go hereafter.26

Leopold I would not acquiesce in England's flat refusal, but

24 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/65, Wratislaw's Proposals of 26 April 1702. Also given in S.P. Germany, 104/202/183-185.


26 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/65, Vernon to Stanhope, Whitehall, 2 May 1702.
was determined to make new applications. The emperor regarded Italy as the "Apple of his eye... and as a land of promise" and would not give it up; he felt honor bound to aid the Neapolitans. He also wanted the fleet sent because he feared that the pope would recognize Philip's right to Naples, especially after Philip landed in Italy in 1702 on the advice of Louis XIV. Although Clement XI had recognized Philip's claim to Spain and Milan, he strove to remain neutral in the war. Leopold's quarrel with the pope over the Marquis del Vasto, a prominent Neapolitan nobleman and supporter of the Habsburgs, increased Leopold's desire to have a strong force in Italy. The Marquis was accused of distributing some defamatory papers against Cardinal Janson-Forbin and the Spanish ambassador. The dispute became so embittered that the emperor refused the papal nuncio audience and ordered his ambassador at Rome, Count Leopold Joseph Lamberg (1654–1706) not to appear before the pope. The destruction of the English ship, the Robert Bonadventura, by the French

27P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/18, Stepney to Secretary of State, Vienna, 31 May 1702, Stepney to Vernon, Vienna, 9 May 1702 and Memorial of Stepney and Bruyninx of 29 May 1702. Also refer to Alg.Rijks., Arch.Staten Generaal 6585, Bruyninx Report of 29 June 1702.

28P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/65, Stepney to Vernon, Vienna, 20 May 1702.

29Hanoteau, Recueil, Rome, XVII, 286-287

30P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/18, Stepney to Vernon, Vienna, 11 March 1702 and 22 April 1702; B.M., Add.MSS. 28, 910, f. 377, Whitworth to Ellis, Vienna, 24 March 1702 and f. 332, Stepney to Ellis, Vienna, 11 March 1702.
in the neutral port of Malamocco in Venetian waters gave the emperor yet another reason to request that the fleet be sent to Italy in order to prevent another such incident, to protect trade, and to assist him in the reduction of Italy.  

The emperor's insistence on England's aid in Italy led Stepney in September 1702 to write to Hedges that "It were almost to be wished that Country were under water, at least while this Court has any hopes of recovering it, they will neglect everything else, and it will be impossible for me to direct their thoughts towards Spain." In 1702 Wratislaw even secured the appointment of a board of commissioners to reconsider sending the fleet to Italy. This board, composed of Lord High Admiral Pembroke, the Earls of Rochester and Marlborough, the Earl of Manchester, and James Vernon, also reported that the Naples plan was not feasible mainly because of the late season and the lack of imperial military preparations. Hamel Bruyninx candidly told Heinsius that

31 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/65, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 19 August 1702.

32 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/66, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 2 September 1702.

he thought that it was the obligation of the Maritime Powers to send
the fleet to Italy because the emperor would be unable to carry on the
war in Italy without it. Stepney also told Secretary Vernon that if
the emperor was not successful in Italy, the influence of Spain and
France would take root there, the army would be dispirited, the Pope
might invest Philip with Naples, and the Venetians and the Duke of
Savoy would be "secured" in the French interest. He also reminded
Vernon that the Grand Alliance would never have been made if Emperor
Leopold had not been allowed to keep his cherished Italian designs.
George Stepney fully realized the effect of England's refusal to
send the fleet and reported that Austria "could not have been wounded
in a more sensible part . . . " and that he feared in future that Leopold
would "be less willing to concert operations with us or not observe so
exactly as we cou'd wish w' shall be concluded." 36

In 1702 the Naples expedition was abandoned in favor of an
expedition to Cadiz. William III had not wanted to send the fleet to


35P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/65, Stepney to Vernon, Vienna, 20 May 1702.

36P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/18, Stepney to Vernon, Vienna, 4 March 1702.
Naples because of the determined opposition of the admiralty, which was primarily based on the bad season and the lack of ports, and because he did not want Leopold to strengthen his army in Italy at the expense of his army on the Rhine. William III used the Prince of Hesse's proposed expedition to Cadiz (February 1702) to divert the emperor from the desired Naples expedition. Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt was an imperial Field Marshal and Knight of the Golden Fleece. Formerly Viceroy of Catalonia, he was very influential at court. He was related to the empress, befriended by the King of the Romans, and highly esteemed by Emperor Leopold. He was, however, not friendly with either Count Harrach or Count Mansfeld. His cousins included the Count Palatine and the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel and his brothers-in-law included the emperor, the King of the Romans, the King of Spain and the Duke of Parma. Prince George had a commission from the emperor to make a military diversion in Spain which both he and William III knew was to be secondary to the Naples expedition. Leopold intended that this port would be taken in route to Naples. Ironically enough, William gave the emperor's planned secondary expedition precedence over the emperor's cherished Naples plan. The obvious choice for the expedition was Cadiz, a good port

37 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/18, Stepney to Vernon, Vienna, 4 March 1702.
which would open the way to the Mediterranean, show Portugal the allied strength, and give England a base for her trade with the New World. The emperor was greatly disappointed over England's plan to send the fleet to Cadiz, but soon realized that there was no hope of the fleet going to Naples that year. He then requested that Prince George be allowed to embark with the English fleet and obtained William's assent. Prince George's later hostile report of the English barbarities, sacrileges, and incompetence and the ignominious failure of the fleet did nothing to alleviate the growing Anglo-Austrian hostility.

In 1702 England intervened on behalf of the Protestants of the empire. At first George Stepney was reluctant to meddle in Protestant affairs because of his fear that Wratislaw would do the same for the Catholics in England and Ireland. Diplomatic pressure, however, from the Protestant states of the United Provinces, Sweden, and Prussia made England agree to present a memorial to the emperor in early September 1702 in the name of all the Protestant powers

38 Ost. Staatsarchiv, England, Kart.35, f.43, Bericht Wratislaw of 12 May 1702 and f.73, Bericht Wratislaw of 23 May 1702; Francis, "Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt."

39 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/18, Stepney to Vernon, 24 March 1702 and S.P. 105/65, Vernon to Stepney, Whitehall, 31 March 1702.

40 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/20, Memorial of 10 September 1702.
represented at Vienna, concerning what the Dutch termed the "grandes et notoires griefs des Sujets de la Religion Protestants." 41 The United Provinces and Prussia in particular were vehement in denouncing the emperor's prosecution of the Protestants and in demanding "un prompt Remede." 42 This initial interference on behalf of the Protestants in the empire was but a prelude to England's later intervention on behalf of the Hungarian rebels which had such a pernicious effect on Anglo-Austrian harmony.

In the early eighteenth century Austria was in a quicksand of financial insolvency. The administrative decentralization and "red tape" and the widespread official corruption and negligence made the idea of Austrian economic recovery almost chimerical. 43 In 1701 Leopold had borrowed from Samuel Oppenheimer, his most prominent banker, more than three million florins. In 1702 despite the contribution of more than

41 B.M., Add.Mss.37,156,ff.83-84, Memorial of 20 December 1701.
42 B.M., Add.Mss.37,156,f.129, Memorial of 22 November 1702. Also refer to Add.Mss.7058, f.159, Hedges to Stepney, Whitehall, 15 December 1701 and Hedges to Stepney, 2 January 1703.

400,000 florins by the hereditary countries for the war effort. Leopold was forced to borrow five million florins more from Oppenheimer. Austria was financially unable to supply the requisites of war. The imperial troops as a consequence were "mal équipées . . . incapables de rendre des services appreciables; bien plus, mal nourries et mal payées, elles se livraient a des devastations et a des pillages et rendaient ainsi odieuse la cause des allies." Both Eugene of Savoy and Prince Louis of Baden complained frequently of the lack of supplies and soldiers. Because of his inability to borrow any more money at home, Leopold was forced to turn to the Maritime Powers for financial aid. Leopold borrowed much more money from England than he did from the United Provinces because of the Dutch insistence on certain security before they would lend money. The United Provinces were highly exasperated with the emperor because of his ignominious war effort and wanted to stop

44 B.M., Add.Mss.28,911,f.209, Stepney to Ellis, Vienna, 24 June 1702. For example, Lower Austria gave 50,000 Florins Hungary gave 20,000 Florins Silesia gave 100,000 Florins Moravia gave 50,000 Florins

45 Grunwald, Samuel Oppenheimer, p.141.

subsidies to Leopold entirely. England, however, felt that in abandoning the emperor they were only harming themselves.\textsuperscript{47} As Max Braubach points out so clearly, the unmistakeable financial and military superiority of England during the War of the Spanish Succession gave her a decisive position in the alliance. Austria was "degradingly" forced to depend on England for financial assistance.\textsuperscript{48} As early as May 1702 England gave the emperor 200,000 crowns for the war effort.\textsuperscript{49} In autumn 1702 Wratislaw again requested "une Somme modique" of 200,000 crowns to carry on the war effort in Italy,\textsuperscript{50} a proposal which Stepney considered both exorbitant and importunate.\textsuperscript{51}

In 1702 England was trying to procure a declaration of war and prohibition of all commerce with France and Spain from the empire.\textsuperscript{52} Austria had already declared war on France and her allies on 9 September

\textsuperscript{47}Van Den Haute, \textit{Les Relations Anglo-Hollandaises}, p. 354.


\textsuperscript{49}Van Den Haute, \textit{Les Relations Anglo-Hollandaises}, p. 139.


\textsuperscript{51}P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/66/36, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 9 September 1702.

\textsuperscript{52}B.M., Add. MSS. 28,911, f. 219, Ellis to Stepney, Whitehall, 26 June 1702 and Add. MSS. 7058, f. 115, Hedges to Stepney, Whitehall, 20 June 1702.
1702. At the request of George Stepney, Charles, later Baron, Whitworth (1675-1725) was sent (28 February 1702) to the imperial Diet at Ratisbon to secure these objectives. Stepney thought very highly of Whitworth whom he said "promises the fairest of any we have abroad." Stepney thought that Whitworth was "fittly qualified" for the post at Ratisbon because of his earlier diplomatic experience in Vienna and different parts of the empire. Both Secretaries of State James Ellis and Charles Hedges regarded Whitworth as "an Ingenious Young man fit to be encouraged." Whitworth was educated at Westminster school and was elected to Trinity College Cambridge in 1694 where he received his B.A. in 1699. He served his diplomatic apprenticeship under George Stepney at Vienna. He was appointed envoy extraordinary to Russia

George Stepney was originally going to the Diet. For Whitworth's appointment refer to B.M., Add.MSS.37,348,ff.29-30, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 22 July 1702, f.124, Whitworth to ?, Ratisbon, 31 July 1702, Add.MSS. 7058,f.115, Hedges to Stepney, Whitehall, 20 June 1702, Add.MSS. 37,353,ff.31-32, Whitworth to Hedges, Ratisbon, 31 August 1702,f.45, Hedges to Whitworth, Whitehall, 4 August 1702 and Hedges to Stepney, Whitehall, 10 June 1702; P.R.O.,S.P. Miscellaneous, 104/200/233, Hedges to Stepney, Whitehall, 26 June 1702.

B.M., Add.MSS. 7062,f.14, Stepney to Cardonnel, Vienna, 8 August 1706.

Ibid., Add.MSS. 9721,f.87, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 19 November 1701.

Ibid., Add.MSS.7058,f.149, Hedges to Stepney, 17 November 1702 and f.115, 20 June 1702; Add.MSS.28,911,f.219, Ellis to Stepney, 26 June 1702.
on 2 September 1704 where he stayed for six years. After Stepney, Whitworth was said to understand the affairs of Germany better than any other Englishman.  

This "dull Diet" "impuissante, ridiculisée par ses propres compatriotes" was treated by France as a sovereign power. France wanted a federal Germany divided into independent states. At the Diet Whitworth had to deal with an empire divided against itself where questions of ceremony reigned supreme. The ceremony at Ratisbon was, according to Whitworth, "the most irregular and extravagant of any Court or Congress in Europe." Whitworth complained frequently in his reports about those members of the Diet, like the Elector of Brandenburg, who must be humored in what Stepney termed the "darling point of Ceremony beyond Reason or Convenience." Austria also resented Whitworth's presence because of her desire to exclude all foreign powers from the affairs of the empire and to "reduce the several

58 Great Britain, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Manuscripts of the Marquis of Bath, III (London, 1908), 57, Prior to Villiers, The Hague, 20 July 1695, hereafter cited as HMC, Bath MSS.
59 Auerbach, Recueil, Diète Germanique, XVIII.
60 B.M., Add. MSS. 37,348,f.124, Whitworth to ?, Ratisbon, 31 July 1702.
61 B.M., Add. MSS. 37,353,f.64, Stepney to Hedges, 27 September 1702.
members to a greater degree of dependence on the Court of Vienna." 62

Besides the usual division and jealousies in the empire over religion and politics, the proceedings of the Diet were obstructed by the Elector of Bavaria and the Elector of Brandenburg. 63 The Elector of Bavaria's representative, Baron Kaspar Marquand von Zündt, deliberately delayed the Diet's proceeding in order to avoid a declaration of war that summer by the whole empire. The Elector of Brandenburg was also obstructing the Diet's progress in order to extract more favorable terms from an unwilling emperor. 64 Despite all the obstructions and difficulties, however, the Diet declared war on France and Spain on 30 September 1702 and resolved by 23 October to raise between 100,000 to 120,000 men. 65

62 B.M., Add. MSS. 7064, f. 81-82, Whitworth to Hedges, Ratisbon, 15 August 1702. Also refer to Add. MSS. 37, 353, f. 38, Whitworth to Hedges, Ratisbon, 10 August 1702.

63 B.M., Add. MSS. 37, 348, f. 72, Whitworth to Hedges, Ratisbon, 3 July 1702, Add. MSS. 37, 353, f. 55, Whitworth to Hedges, Ratisbon, 10 September 1702, f. 274, Whitworth to Tucker, 27 October 1702, f. 272, Whitworth to Hedges, Ratisbon, 6 October 1702. Disgusted, Whitworth had written that the political divisiveness of the Diet "was in the beginning, is now, & ever shall be . . . " B.M., Add. MSS. 34, 727, f. 188, Whitworth to Davenant, 24 November 1703.


65 B.M., Add. MSS. 37, 353, f. 99, Whitworth to Hedges, Ratisbon, 20 November 1702 and f. 364, Whitworth to Hedges, 23 October 1702. Also refer to Add. MSS. 37, 156, ff. 315-316, Forces in the empire.
By September 1702 the imperial Diet was also seriously considering prohibiting all commerce and correspondence with France and Spain only on condition, however, that England and the United Provinces should do likewise. By December 1702 many of the imperial towns, such as Ulm, Nuremburg, Augsburg, and Landau, were disgruntled over both England's and the United Provinces' failure to prohibit commerce with Spain and France and requested the emperor that the empire should also continue their "innocent and advantageous commerce" with France and Spain. The efforts of the Dutch to secure liberty of trade in Switzerland and Geneva with the Spanish subjects in America and Italy caused what Stepney termed an "uneasy jealousy" in the empire that the Dutch might have "too early a Bent towards Peace."

66 B.M., Add.MSS.37,348, f.273, Whitworth to Hedges, Ratisbon, 2 October 1702. Also refer to Kamen, Spain, p.126, Spain prohibited commerce with England, the Empire, and the United Provinces as early as June 1702.

67 B.M., Add.MSS.37,353, f.109, Whitworth to Hedges, Ratisbon, 11 December 1702; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/65, Hedges to Stepney, Whitehall, 22 May 1702; S.P. Germany 104/204/14, Hedges to Whitworth, 19 December 1702, S.P., Germany 105/66, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 6 December 1702, S.P.Germany 80/19, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 19 November 1702 and 6 December 1702 and letter of Imperial Cities to emperor of 28 November 1702; B.M., Add.MSS. 7064, ff.86-88, Whitworth to Hedges, 17 August 1702. Also refer to Oest. Staatsarchiv, England, Kart. 36, f.10, Hoffman's Bericht of 9 June 1702.

68 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/66/1-11, Memorial of Stepney of September 1702 and Memorial of October 1702.

69 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/65, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 21 June 1702.
The prohibition of commerce, however, had some notable supporters in the empire, such as Mons Vander Halten, first minister of Austria and Mons Horneck, minister of Passau, who believed that the empire would have an "infinite advantage" in such a prohibition. There were great difficulties in executing this, however, because of the great inverse balance of trade which the Germans had with the French.\textsuperscript{70}

Another cause of Anglo-Austrian dissension in 1702 was the elector of Bavaria's defection to France. England was greatly angered over what she regarded as Leopold's totally inadequate attempts to win over the elector of Bavaria. The emperor was equally exasperated with England's interference in the Negotiations. On 9 March 1701, Maximilian Emmanuel II, Elector of Bavaria, had concluded a secret treaty with Louis XIV for the maintenance of 15,000 Bavarian troops, but the elector did not conclude an offensive alliance with France until 7 June 1702 and did not ratify it until the fall of 1702.\textsuperscript{71}

\textsuperscript{70}B.M., Add.MSS.37,353,f.39, Whitworth to Hedges, Ratisbon, 17 August 1702. Also refer to Heinrich Ritter Von Srbik, Der Staatliche Exporthandel Oesterreichs von Leopold I bis Maria Theresa (Vienna, 1907), p.xxv.

In 1701 William III had "high hopes" that Max Emmanuel would enter the Grand Alliance. In July 1701 William sent his agent Prince Montmollin to negotiate with the elector. In sum, Montmollin promised Max Emmanuel the life-time governorship of the Spanish Netherlands, a military command next to William's, a military subsidy of £30,000 and a personal pension. The elector, however, told William that this was not enough and that the emperor must guarantee him either the Milanese or the Netherlands.72

The decision concerning the elector's accession to the Grand Alliance rested with Leopold. The emperor had to agree to grant Max Emmanuel the kingship and certain territorial concessions. Basically the elector wanted the elevation of Bavaria to a kingdom, the possible exchange of Bavaria for Naples and Sicily, the cession of Burgau and Austrian Tyrol, the subsidization of 20,000 Bavarian troops and the marriage of one of Joseph's daughters to the Electoral Prince Charles Albert. Throughout 1702 the Austro-Bavarian negotiations continued, but the emperor would only agree to give the elector a military subsidy. He would not agree to raise Bavaria to the rank of a kingdom or to grant Max Emmanuel large territorial concessions because this would greatly reduce imperial authority. Bavaria continued nego-

tations with Austria until autumn 1704. 73

In February 1702 Jean Baptiste Colbert, Marquis de Torcy, approached the very pro-French Bavarian ambassador, Monasterol to formulate an offensive alliance with the elector of Bavaria. These Franco-Bavarian negotiations continued smoothly through 1702. In April 1702 Bavaria's war aims were very clear. The elector wanted to add the Rhine Palatinate and the Palatinate of Neuburg to his lands, or, if Bavaria were lost, to gain the Spanish Netherlands. He also wanted to acquire the imperial cities of Augsburg, Nurnburg, Regensburg, and Ulm, the Duchies of Geislingen and Tyrol and Rottenberg, Kufstein, Kitzbühel, Burgau and Neuburg on the Inn. On 17 June 1702 a Franco-Bavarian offensive alliance was concluded which was ratified in August 1702. In substance the alliance provided for the subsidization of an additional 10,000 troops, the support of France in Bavaria's acquisition of the Palatinate areas by which he would obtain the title of king, the Bavarian acquisition of the hereditary governorship of the Spanish Netherlands, full sovereignty of Limburg and Spanish Guelderland and if the elector did not gain the Palatinate, full sovereignty over the Spanish Netherlands, if Bavaria were lost, and lastly French support of the Bavarian conquests in southern Germany.

73 Gaedert, "The Franco-Bavarian Alliance," pp. 24-52 and refer to B.M., Add.MSS. 9720, f.55, Conditions offered by Count Schlick (the imperial representative) to the elector of Bavaria, on 16 July 1701.
On 7 November 1702 Bavaria signed another treaty with France by which the elector acquired full sovereignty over the Spanish Netherlands except for some frontiers fortresses and French support of his acquisitions of Palatinate territory. Throughout 1702 Bavaria continued negotiations with Austria. Austria, however, refused to grant anything but military subsidies. Leopold's procrastination and refusal to treat Bavaria as no more than a client prince lost for the Allies the strongest military power in the empire, with an excellent army of 29,000. England was incensed with Austria for losing so valuable an ally and for failing to keep England informed about the Bavarian negotiations. During 1702 Stepney had corresponded with Prince Montmollin, but in 1702 Stepney was not kept properly informed by Vienna of the progress of the Bavarian negotiations and was continually "put off" with the lame excuse that


time was not "as yet ripe" for a further discussion about Bavaria. The elector's seizure of Ulm (8 September 1702) and his subsequent capture of Memmingen (10 October 1702), the two major fortified cities in the Swabian circle, convinced Stepney that it was too late to win the elector over by "fair means."
CHAPTER IV
1703: THE TURNING POINT

The year 1703 marks the turning point downward spiralling in the deterioration of Austria's relations with the Maritime Powers. England and the United Provinces were exasperated with Austria's military inadequacy, the emperor's timidity, the imperial court's factiousness, and Austria's financial and administrative chaos. Leopold's preoccupation with Italy, opposition to the Portugal treaty, negligence concerning the Duke of Savoy, intransigence over the elector of Bavaria, and violation of the civil and religious liberties of both Protestants and Hungarians further eroded Austro-allied amity. Austria on her part was deeply chagrined over England's refusal to send the promised fleet to Naples, indiscretion about the treaty with Savoy, failure to give the emperor monetary aid, and insistence on the Portugal treaty with its provisions for the further partition of the Spanish empire and the sending of the cherished Archduke Charles to Spain. The emperor was particularly annoyed about England's persistence in demanding a treaty settlement with the elector of Bavaria, whom the imperial court regarded as little better than a rebel. The Maritime Powers' demand that the emperor grant the Hungarians civil and religious liberties marked the great turning point in Austria's relations with the Maritime Powers and threatened to disrupt the alliance.
In 1703 Leopold did not know how to cope with the unbelievable administrative and military confusion. The court of Vienna was afflicted by what Prince Eugene termed the "Austrian malady." "To talk with Ministers is to waste one's breath, If I grumble, they grumble with me, I explain at great lengths to them the country will perish and they agree. But if I say that something must be done, they have no answer. The atmosphere here at court is one of incredible laziness or ignorance (perhaps both)." Prince Eugene even complained to Stepney that "there was no pleasure, Honour, nor Profit to be had in this service and that he would not again be exposed to the difficulties He has layn under these 22 months last past tho the Emperor should offer him a recompense of two Millions." Stepney also lamented his fate at being in Vienna

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2. P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 105/68/156, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 5 May 1703. Also refer to Gustav Otruba, Prinz Eugen und Marlborough (Vienna, 1961), p. 36 for Eugene's letter to Stahremberg where he complains to Stahremberg that "In Kriegsrat weiss niemand Bescheid, die Kammer redet nichts als Lügen, Das Kammissariat is womoglich; noch schlechter als sie beide. . . ."

3. P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 80/20, Stepney to Hedges, 28 February 1703.
in such a "fatal conjunction when all I have said & done has proved to little or no purpose." He was convinced in fact that nothing but allied aid would prevent this "unwieldy body from falling to pieces."

In Vienna there was a very powerful reform faction composed of men, such as Baron Wiser, the Elector Palatine, Count Traun, representative of the nobles of lower Austria, and Prince Eugene. There was also a strong faction working against Chancellor Buccellini, Count Gothard Henry Salaberg, and especially Count Mansfeld, president of War. Count Mansfeld, although a loyal and conscientious servant of the emperor, was not suitable for his position as president of War. The difficulty, however was to find someone suitable to replace him. The Elector Palatine was especially exasperated with Mansfeld's ineffectual war effort and wrote that he "wishes him hang'd and offers to pay for the rope." The emperor, fully realizing the need to reform the financial and military administration appointed Count Mansfeld his grand Chamberlain, Prince

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4. P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/20, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 14 April 1703.

5. P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/68, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 9 May 1703.


Eugene of Savoy, president of War, and Count Gundaker Thomas von Stahremberg (1663-1743), president of the Chamber on 30 June 1703. These appointments raised new hopes in England and the United Provinces that Austria would become a true ally rather than an allied dependent.

Count Gundaker Thomas von Stahremberg was a very capable, reserved, talented and honest man. Stahremberg had a tremendous job ahead of him in reforming the chaotic, unorganized treasury and in salvaging the emperor's credit. After the death of Leopold's chief banker, Samuel Oppenheimer on May 1703, the emperor faced almost certain financial disaster. The death of Oppenheimer and the subsequent revelation of his indebtedness almost dealt, what Mensi terms, the "Todestoss," the death blow to the emperor's credit. Oppenheimer's creditors were in reality the emperor's because the emperor owed Oppenheimer so much money. Oppenheimer's death also created an "unbeschreibliche Panique" among both bankers and merchants and further debilitated Austria's trade. At this time Leopold established a new bank

8P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/68/466, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 30 June 1703, S.P. Germany, 80/21, Stepney to Hedges, 27 June 1703, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 7 July 1703.

9For information about Stahremberg refer to ADB, XXXV, 480-482; Alfred Ritter von Arneth, Prinz Eugen von Savoyen, I (Gera, 1838), 349 and Franz Mensi, Die Finanzen Oesterreichs von 1701 bis 1740 (Vienna, 1890) pp. 91, 153-154.

10Mensi, Die Finanzen Oesterreichs, p. 91.

11Prince Eugene Francis of Savoy, Feldzüge, V (Vienna, 1876-1892), 78. Also refer to Grunwald, Oppenheimer, pp. 131-143; Otruba, Prinz Eugen, p. 230; Viktor Bibl, Prinz Eugen, Ein Heldenleben (Vienna, 1941), p. 111 and Braubach, "Die Bedeutung der Subsidien," p. 36.
at Vienna under the direction of Prince Adam Lichtenstein, Leopold's richest subject. 12

The year 1703 vividly revealed the financial disorder and insolvency of Austria. The emperor did not have enough money to keep large armies in the field and was forced to request aid from the Maritime Powers. In early 1703 Wratislaw requested Anne for a sum of money to help supply the imperial troops in Italy. 13 Wratislaw later reiterated this request and told the queen that it was "absolument necessaire" for Austria to have £ 100,000 from England and the United Provinces in order to maintain the war effort in Bavaria, Italy, and Hungary. 14 The queen later agreed to grant the emperor £ 50,000 as a gift to reinforce his army in Italy, provided that the United Provinces should grant the remainder and "provided that the sum be strictly applied to the uses of the army aforesaid and to Noe other." 15

12 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/68/314, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 6 June 1703; S.P. Germany, 105/68/435-441, Project of Bank, S.P. Germany, 80/21, Stepney to Hedges, 8 August 1703.

13 Oest. Staatsarchiv, England, Kart. 35, ff.5-7, Bericht Wratislaw of 2 January 1703.


In March Wratislaw again requested the queen to loan the emperor money to carry on the war against the elector of Bavaria. "La nécessité du Secours estant devenue bien plus pressante depuis que ledit Electeur osa entrer dans une Guerre ouverte." The queen told Wratislaw that she would have to confer with the States-General before granting Austria more financial aid.

The United Provinces complained frequently of the "negligence disorder, & inimical danger of the Empire" and entreated the emperor to take "more just and effectual measures for the common preservation before it was too late." The Dutch were particularly annoyed with the emperor at this time because of his protests over the Dutch administration of the Low Countries. The emperor portested vehemently and frequently about the oath of fealty which the inhabitants of Venloo and Ruremond had been obliged to take to the States-General. Count Kaunitz told both Hamel Bruyninx and Charles Whitworth that the real means to have the empire fulfill its military obligations was for the

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emperor to have "sufficient funds" to maintain his own army. As it was now, his cavalry was "without horses and his Foot without Shoes and Stockings" and additional recruits were a "new Grievance to the Circles and a Burden to the Army, and only served to strengthen the Enemy by shoals of Deserters." 19

In 1703 England was still urging the emperor to prohibit all trade and correspondence with France and Spain because England believed that it was "indispensably necessary to the putting a Good and Speedy issue to this warr." 20 In early 1703 the Imperial Diet agreed to prohibit all trade with France and Spain provided that England and the United Provinces would do likewise. The Hansa towns in the empire, however, in particular pressed the emperor to allow them free commerce with the enemy. England, however, regarded this as very prejudicial to the allied war effort and and refused to condone it. England in fact believed that commerce with the enemy was "contrary to the Nature of Warr" because this commerce would "enrich France

19 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/22, Whitworth to Hedges, 12 December 1703 and in B.M., Add.MSS. 37,351,ff.176-177. Also refer to Grunwald, Oppenheimer, pp. 138-139, and Otruba, Prinz Eugen, pp. 196-197.

20 B.M., Add.MSS. 28,913, f.151, Undated Letter, Ellis to ?. Also refer to Add.MSS. 7058,f.163, Hedges to Stepney, Whitehall, 15 December 1702, f.189, Hedges to Stepney, 12 February 1703 and Add.MSS. 28,913,f.128, Ellis to Whitworth, 12 February 1703.
... and enable her to carry on the war longer...

In the United Provinces there arose a strong outcry against this prohibition of commerce and statesmen, such as George Stepney, who promoted it.

The States-General finally agreed to prohibit all commerce with the enemy, but still persisted in demanding freedom of commerce for all goods except war materials, with the neutrals, such as Switzerland and Italy through the empire.

On 10 September 1703, the emperor agreed to allow the United Provinces free commerce through the empire into neutral countries for all non-contraband goods.

In spite of the obstruction of some Dutch merchants and some of the imperial cities, the emperor resolved to prohibit all commerce with France and Spain commencing 1 June 1703.

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21 B.M., Add.MSS. 28, 913, f. 157-158, Hedges to Whitworth, 9 February 1703 and 12 February 1703; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/66/3, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 4 April 1703. Also see B.M., Lansdowne MSS. 849, ff. 194-195, Conference of 16 April 1703 of the Lord High Commissioner.


23 B.M., Add.MSS. 37, 348, f. 234, Hedges to Whitworth, Whitehall, 23 February 1703; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/69, States-General to emperor, 30 May 1703; Alg. Rijks., Archief Staten Generaal, 6586, Bruyninx memoir of 27 August 1703; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/66/3, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 4 April 1703.

24 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/21, Emperor to States-General, 10 September 1703 and in P.R.O., Germany, 105/70.

Stepney and Whitworth also attempted to obtain a repeal of the edict forbidding the importation of serges. Despite the emperor’s dependence on England, however, he refused to "ruine the only Manufacture which had found a beginning in these Countrys." The emperor and his advisors saw very clearly the necessity of encouraging such a manufacture in order to enrich the imperial domains, and hindering the "exportation of ready Money." 26 Although England realized the emperor’s dire need of money and the poor condition of Austrian trade, she resented Leopold’s failure to reward an ally who had done so much for him.

Besides Marlborough’s seizure of Limburg (23 September 1703) and Bonn (15 May 1703), the year 1703 was a very unproductive one for the Allies. The many military disasters of 1703, such as Bavaria’s success at Hochstädt (20 September 1703), Bavaria’s seizure of Kurdfstein, Rottenburg, Hall, Augsburg (fall 1703) and Ratisbon (fall 1703), Tallard’s taking of Landau (12 November 1703) and seizure of Old Breisach (6 September 1703) exposed the dilatory and strikingly inadequate military preparations of the "lazy and sleepy empire." 27

26 B.M., Add.MSS. 37,351,ff.211-212 and Add.MSS.37,353,f.312, Whitworth to Hedges, 19 December 1703. Also refer to P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/21, Memorial of Stepney to 3 September 1703, S.P. Germany, 80/20, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 2 June 1703 and Srbik, Der staatliche Exporthandel Oesterreichs,p.280.

England and the United Provinces were extremely dissatisfied with the dilatoriness of the Germans and thought that it was "high time the Emperor should exert himself both there [in Italy] and on the Rhine." The Maritime Powers were particularly concerned about the Habsburgs' inability to stop the French and Bavarian thrust along the Danube. Marlborough feared that the failure of the empire to defend itself would prove "fateful" to England and the United Provinces and he condemned both the empire's and Austria's totally inadequate military forces. The emperor was obliged to provide 90,000 men and the empire 120,000. Marlborough, however, estimated that since 15 Battalions had marched last February not 10,000 more men had marched. As of April 1703 there was a total of only 32,000 imperial troops in the empire. In Italy the emperor had only 5670 infantry and 1800 cavalry. Both the English


and the Dutch believed that the "German princes will not stir till they are forced to for selfe preservation." 30 The United Provinces in fact demanded that the emperor adequately defend his frontiers and promptly fulfill his quota in troops and supplies "without excuse, delay, or diminution." 31 England in particular was afraid of a Franco-Bavarian military junction which would force the emperor out of the war.

The Allies were also extremely annoyed with the Margrave of Baden's conduct in the war. The quarrel of the Margrave with Lieutenant General von Goor, a prominent Dutch commander, disrupted the war effort. Goor had long been critical of what he regarded as the long, futile marches of the margrave. On 13 November 1703 when Baden ordered Goor to supply a small contingent of troops for a garrison, Goor refused because, according to his instructions from the States-General, he was not supposed to split up his troops into small contingents. Baden accordingly placed Goor under arrest. Baden, however, released Goor before Goor could receive orders from the States-General not to respect his arrest. The Dutch became so exasperated with the Prince of Baden's conduct that they suggested that the prince should send Goor and his


31 B.M., Add. MSS. 37, 353, f. 278, Whitworth to Hedges, Vienna, 14 November 1703.
twelve battalions back to the United Provinces and wrote an angry letter to the emperor complaining about the "hard usage" of their commanders.\(^{32}\)

The Allies were greatly dissatisfied with Baden's ineffectual marches and his failure to accomplish anything. Indeed many people really believed that the prince's conduct was "unaccountable."\(^ {33}\) Both Whitworth and Stepney believed that the margrave's military miscarriages were the result of "Passion and obstinacy [rather] than designe ... " and that the main defect of the imperial army was the "want of money, the primum mobile."\(^ {34}\) Bruyninx told Heinsius quite candidly that the margrave in fact "manque du tout, il n'a ni Troupes, ni argent, ni Vivres, ni Artilleurs. ... "\(^ {35}\) The year 1703 saw the increasing exasperation of England because of Austria's

\(^{32}\) Churchill, Marlborough, I, 712-713; B.M., Add.MSS.37,351,f.280, Whitworth to Hedges, 26 December 1703 and ff.287-289, Letter of States-General to the emperor, 27 November 1703; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/22/125, Whitworth to Hedges, 26 December 1703; B.M., Add.MSS.37,353,ff.322-324, Whitworth to Hedges, 22 December 1703.

\(^{33}\) B.M., Egerton MSS.929, f.52, Gwyn to Halifax, Hanover, 20 December 1703.

\(^{34}\) B.M., Add.MSS.37,351,f.354, Whitworth to Hedges, 3 January 1703. Also refer to Alg. Rijks., Arch. Staten Generaal, 6586, Bruyninx report of 28 March 1703.

\(^{35}\) Alg. Rijks., Arch. Heinsius, 842, Bruyninx to Heinsius, Vienna, 14 March 1703.
egregious war effort. Both the empire and Austria had ignominiously failed to fulfill their military obligations in both Italy and on the Rhine. Their leading general, Margrave Louis of Baden had glaringly failed to accomplish anything. At the end of 1703, the empire was threatened by a Franco-Bavarian military invasion, which Leopold was unable to prevent because of his complete military inadequacy.

In 1703 Emperor Leopold reitered his request to Anne for a fleet and monetary help to aid the imperial troops in Italy. Wratislaw vehemently insisted that the most important theatre of war was Italy because through Italy the Allies could "hurt France most sensibly." England, cognizant of the emperor's "infatuation" for Italy, and his disgruntlement over England's earlier refusal to send the fleet, promised to aid the emperor on the Italian front provided that Eugene of Savoy's forces would be augmented to at least 50,000 men so that Eugene could act offensively and that a detachment of troops would be sent to Naples to aid the fleet. On these conditions England promised to seriously consider sending the fleet to the Mediterranean and gave the emperor a moiety of £100,000, that is £50,000 (the remainder to be given by the Dutch to carry on the war in Italy.)

36 Oest. Staatsarchiv, England, Kart.35, ff.5-7, Wratislaw to Anne, 22 December 1703 in Bericht Wratislaw, 22 December 1703.

what Stanhope regarded as a "Mania for Naples." Stepney frequently told Hedges that he felt that "no arguments or conditions in the World will be able to bring these people to part with Naples." In 1703 England also saw the advantage of sending the fleet to the Mediterranean, not only to satisfy the emperor, but also to help persuade the Duke of Savoy to declare for the Habsburgs. By April 1703, however, Stepney was completely disgusted with the whole imperial war effort in Italy and told Secretary Hedges that it would be "to little or no purpose to send a fleet to the Mediterranean, for I cannot assure you that we shall be ready for it." The emperor had promised to send more than 80,000 troops to Italy in 1703, but by December there were only 21,000 troops in Italy. Due to the admiralty's fears about the return of the fleet, and the obviously inadequate imperial preparations

38 B.M., Stowe MSS. 244, f. 166, Stanhope to Hedges, 11 April 1703.
40 John Owen, War at Sea under Queen Anne (Cambridge, 1938), p. 43, hereafter cited as Owen, War at Sea.
41 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/68, Stepney to Ellis, Vienna, 11 April 1703.
42 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/67/235-240, Troops destined for Italy in 1703 and in S.P. Germany, 80/21, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, December 1703.
in Italy, the Naples design was again postponed, although the fleet did go to the Mediterranean under Sir Cloudesley Shovel. Stepney was convinced that sending the fleet to Naples would have been a "vain effort" which would have sacrificed the "best blood" in England and would have effectually terminated all future endeavors. Many of the imperialists, such as the Duke of Noles, the Marquis del Vasto, Count Mansfeld, Count Wratislaw, and Prince Adam Florian Lichtenstein were convinced that "all things were ripe" and suffered a "grievous disappointment" when England failed to send the fleet to Naples.

The year 1703 was very auspicious in that it saw the joining of Victor Amadeus, Duke of Savoy, later King of Sicily (1714) and then King of Sardinia (1722) (1666-1732) to the Grand Alliance. Savoy was strategically important because it was the guardian of the Alpine passes and because it could be used as "either a bulwark in Italy against the French penetration of the Lombard plain of a French bridgehead for the subjection of northern Italy." The emperor saw the alliance with Savoy as a way of attaining his hopes in Italy, while England saw Savoy as important in establishing a continental balance of power and in

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43 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/21, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 24 October 1703.

promoting English maritime interests. George Stepney regarded the Duke of Savoy as a "Proteus" and a "Knave" who has "no matter of bowels or other principles and cares for nothing on God's earth but his own dear self." Stepney confessed that he had "no high opinion of the duke's honesty." The French were also very suspicious of the duke and realized that he was "un prince toujours occupé de son aggrandizement" and that he was very "dissimule" (double dealing).

In the early part of the war Victor Amadeus had been allied with France, but by 1702 had begun negotiations with the imperialists. By the treaty of 6 April 1701, the duke had promised France 10,500

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46 B.M., Add. MSS. 37, 529, f. 12, Stepney to Hill, Vienna, 1 September 1702.
47 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/69 and in B.M., Add. MSS. 37, 529, Stepney to Hill, Vienna, 8 September 1703.
49 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/69 and in B.M., Add. MSS. 37, 529, f. 148, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 8 September 1703. For character also see S.P. Germany, 105/68/212-213, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 16 May 1703 and S.P. Germany, 105/69, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 15 August 1703.
soldiers in exchange for a subsidy of 150,000 livres per month and the marriage of the Duke's daughter, Louise-Gabrielle, to Louis' grandson. Victor Amadeus, however, also wanted to aggrandize himself with territory in Montferrat, Lombardy, and Milan, which Louis refused to grant because of Milan's strategic access into Lombardy and Dauphiny.  

England was very angry over Austria's failure to keep the English government informed about the course of the negotiations and over the emperor's negligence and procrastination in the negotiations. The imperialists did not even tell England that they were negotiating with Savoy in 1702. Stepney found out about the negotiations with Savoy in October 1702, but did not let the court at Vienna know that he had "the least knowledge" of the transaction. By June 1703 the projected treaty with Savoy was the public talk of Vienna and Stepney was working with Austria to win Savoy over to the Allies. Count Auersberg was sent by Leopold to negotiate with the Duke at Turin. England also negotiated with the Duke through Richard Hill, envoy extraordinary at Turin, and through the English fleet, which was in the Mediterranean in 1703, and assured the duke a subsidy of 80,000 crowns a month.
At the court of Turin there were two factions, one pro-Habsburg, the other pro-Bourbon. The negotiations with the imperialists were extremely dangerous for the duke because of the presence of a strong French army under Louis-Joseph, duc de Vendôme in Savoy. Five thousand of the Duke's men were in the French service. The French army was intermingled with the Savoyards and held many strategic points. In late 1702 early 1703 the French were becoming very suspicious of the Duke of Savoy. Louis XIV in fact had never really trusted the duke and had relied on Raymond Balthazar, Phélypeaux du Verger, maréchal du camp, his diplomatic representative at Turin and Vendôme to watch this well known "Proteus" closely. In July 1703 Louis empowered Vendôme to disarm the Piedmontese army and to take possession of the important fortresses whenever he thought necessary.55

England was continually pressing the emperor to "strike while the iron is hot"56 and conclude with the Duke of Savoy. The Duke of Savoy was becoming more and more annoyed with the Bourbon refusal to grant him Mantua, Montferrat, and Milan, and the "patronizing arrogance

55.Noorden, Europäische Geschichte, I, 411-412; Legrelle, La Diplomatique Francaise, V, 54-78; B.M., Add. MSS. 7058, f. 275, Hedges to Stepney, Bath, 3 September 1703.

of France. . . "57 and reputedly said that it was better to sacrifice them [his two daughters] than himself and his two sons, who will be forever at the mercy of France if a Bourbon holds the present possession of Milan."58 By August 1703 Stepney was convinced that in spite of the great credulity and indiscretion of the imperial court, the "ouvertures are such as cannot well miscarry."59 In August Stepney received instructions and full powers to act and sign jointly with the emperor and the United Provinces the treaty with the Duke of Savoy.60

The Allies agreed to advance 100,000 crowns to the Duke of Savoy and pay him 80,000 crowns per month. If the Dutch would not bear half of the subsidies, Stepney was instructed to agree that England would pay up to two-thirds of the subsidies provided that the Dutch would pay the remaining one-third. Stepney, believed that although the negotiations

57 Churchill, Marlborough, I, 641.

58 P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 105/68/303-304, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 2 June 1703.

59 P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 105/68/303-304, Stepney to Aglionby, Vienna, 8 August 1703. Also refer to S.P.Germany, 80/21, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 8 August 1703 and S.P.Germany, 105/69, Stepney to Hill, Vienna, 8 September 1703.

60 P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 105/69, Instructions of 10 September 1703, the Earl of Nottingham to Stepney, Whitehall, 7 September 1703 and in S.P.Germany, 104/204/135-137.
"have turned and shifted as variously as the weather cock" 61 and that the duke had been amusing himself and the Allies under "frivolous pretences" 62 with "vain and treacherous overtures" 63, the duke would join the alliance because the Allies had more to offer him than Louis XIV did. Stepney firmly believed that the duke was "playing double" 64 and that there was "no practice so foul but that Prince is capable of it." 65 Stepney was also greatly annoyed over Victor Amadeus' "infamous usage" 66 of Count Leopold Auersberg, the imperial minister at Turin.

In August 1703 the Duke of Savoy was virtually forced to stop his "double dealing" because Richard Hill, the English representative at Turin inadvisedly took into his confidence the Count de la Tour,

61 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/21, Stepney to Hedges, 2 October 1703.
62 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/21, Stepney to Hedges, 2 October 1703.
63 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/21, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 11 September 1703.
64 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/21, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 22 September 1703.
65 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/21, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 8 September 1703.
66 B.M., Add. MSS. 37, 519, Stepney to Hill, Vienna, 8 September 1703. Also refer to Blackley, Richard Hill I, 260-261, Hill to Stepney, The Hague, 8 September 1703.
a prominent Savoyard noble. The Count de la Tour was unfortunately "plus François que Savoyard". The consequences of Hill's egregious indiscretion about the allied negotiations with Savoy were serious. In September 1703 Vendôme disarmed the Savoyard troops under him, arrested a number of the Duke of Savoy's generals and demanded the surrender of several fortresses. Victor Amadeus in retaliation imprisoned the French ambassador, the Marquis de Phélypeaux, and issued a declaration of war against France on 3 October 1703. As Stepney so aptly phrased it, the Duke of Savoy had indeed "cut his fingers by paring his apple too finely." Stepney castigated thoroughly the carelessness and indiscretion which had characterized the negotiations from the very beginning.

Stepney, who came to The Hague in 1703 in order to discuss the treaty with Savoy with Heinsius, was very annoyed with the United Provinces' obvious reluctance to participate in the negotiations. He


68 Beaucaire, Recueil, Savoie-Sardaigne, et Mantoue, XIV, 210, 256.

69 B.M., Add.MSS. 9090, f. 147, Stepney to Shrewsbury, Vienna, 13 October 1703. Also refer to P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 80/21, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 10 October 1703 and Warner, Epistolary Curiosities, pp. 101-103, Shrewsbury to Stepney, 3 November 1703.

70 P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 105/70, Stepney to Cardonnel, Vienna, 3 November 1703.
commented with some asperity to Alexander Stanhope, the English envoy extraordinary at The Hague, about the "Pentionary's thrifty way of bargaining" which lead him to question the Dutch sincerity about promoting the alliance. Both Stepney and Alexander Stanhope surmised that the Dutch did not trust the Duke of Savoy and that they were reluctant to undertake any new financial obligations.

On 8 November 1703, the treaty was concluded which brought Savoy over to the Allies. Basically the emperor promised to "use his best endeavours" to send aid to the Duke, and the Maritime Powers agreed to pay the Duke 100,000 crowns immediately and 30,000 crowns per month thereafter for the duration of the war. Victor Amadeus was to receive the supreme command in upper Italy and "eine kunstige Barriere" against France in the form of Montferrat, and the provinces of Alexandrie, Valence, and Le Val de Sisia in Lombardy. If the Allies succeeded in penetrating France, the Duke was to receive territory in Provence and

71 P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 80/21, Stepney to Stanhope, Vienna, 8 September 1703. Also consult B.M., Add.MSS.37,529, f.21, Stepney to Hill, Vienna, 19 September 1703; Blackley, Richard Hill, I, 34-35, Stepney to Hill 19 September 1703 and I, 273, Hill to Stepney, The Hague, 30 October 1703.

72 Coombs, The Conduct of the Dutch, pp.59-60; P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 80/21, Stepney to Hedges, 10 November 1703.
Aside from winning the allegiance of the Duke of Savoy, Emperor Leopold had little diplomatic success in the rest of Italy in 1703. The emperor had trouble with the pope and with the Venetians, much to England's chagrin. In 1703 Austria was greatly annoyed with the pope over the del Vasto affair and the nuncio's conspicuous absence from the ceremony proclaiming Charles King of Spain. The pope was also greatly annoyed with the emperor's subsequent refusal to admit the nuncio and threatened in fact to recall his nuncio.

The emperor's relations with Venice were also strained in the year 1703. Stepney attempted to win the Venetians over to the Allies only to learn just how much Venice mistrusted and disliked Austria. The Venetians were very disgruntled over the emperor's ratification of the

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74 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/23, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 20 October 1703.
peace of Carlowitz (1699) without consulting them and his subsequent seizure of a Venetian castle in Morlachia. The Venetians were also annoyed over the emperor's failure to recall his Venetian ambassador, Count Francis Anthony Berka, a violent, irascible, disagreeable man and the invasion of their neutral territory by the imperial army. The Venetians refused even to consider an alliance, because, as they told Stepney, they had no desire to enlarge their territory nor to outfit the thirty ships needed to protect their trade and their islands in a war. The general rule of Venetian policy, as Pierre Duparc points out, was to maintain "una balance égale" between France and the empire. This balance would be offset if Venice allied herself with either side. Lastly the Venetians were dissuaded from concluding an alliance by the miserable state of the imperial troops and by the fear that the French might help to incite the porte against them to attack the Morea where they were unable to defend themselves.

In 1703 England was particularly annoyed with the emperor's procrastination over an alliance with Portugal. The emperor did not want an alliance with Portugal because he did not want to further partition the Spanish monarchy. Leopold only desired the neutrality of Portugal. The imperialists did not believe that the assistance of Portugal

75 Duparc, Recueil, Portugal, XXVI, 127.

76 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/24, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 27 October 1703 and S.P. Germany, 105/69, Stepney to Hedges, 8 August 1703.
was necessary to put the Archduke Charles on the throne of Spain. If the reports about the Habsburg dispositions of the Spanish people were not true, then the Portuguese alliance would be of no help. The emperor did not want to "mangle and alienate" any more of the Spanish monarchy by giving parts of Spain, such as Extremadura and Galicia, to Portugal and he did not want Portuguese troops to enter Spain for fear that they would not easily leave. The alliance with Portugal in the emperor's eyes had no utility at all.

The Maritime Powers on the contrary thought that an alliance with Portugal would be of "grand utilité". England believed that an allied Portugal was much better than a neutral one. England wanted to launch another diversionary front against the Bourbons, harm French commerce, increase their own trade, and use the Portuguese ports for their own fleet. During 1701 and 1702 Leopold pursued delaying tactics over the projected Portugal treaty. Though England knew that Austria was


unalterably opposed to the alliance, the English government continued negotiating with Portugal. England was particularly concerned to prevent any possible "miscarriage" with Portugal as had earlier occurred with Bavaria. Stepney was very chagrined over the imperial court's "dilatory way of proceeding"\(^8\) and Austria's ability to "continually spoile and obstruct its own business."\(^9\) Stepney had to solicit the imperial court for months before he received any answer about the projected Portugese treaty.\(^10\) The Dutch were very annoyed over the emperor's dilatoriness and complained frequently and vehemently to London about it.\(^11\)

The widely diverging aims of England and Austria concerning Portugal were reflected in the very strained relations of John Methuen the English representative at Lisbon and Count Karl Ernst Waldstein, the imperial representative. Count Waldstein, the former envoy at Piedmont, was a Privy Councillor of considerable wit and charm. His father was the imperial Grand Chamberlain and his uncle was Count Harrach. He was

\(^8\) P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/20, Stepney to Hedges, 22 April 1703.

\(^9\) Ibid.

\(^10\) P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/19, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 19 November 1702. Also refer to P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/19, Memorial of 27 October 1702, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 29 November 1702 Memorial of 2 December 1702 and Stepney to Hedges, 23 December 1702; B.M., Add. Mss. 28,914, f.157, Stepney to Ellis, Vienna, 27 June 1703.

\(^11\) Van T. Hoff, Correspondence of Marlborough and Heinsius, pp.40-41, Heinsius to Marlborough, 15 December 1702.
esteemed by the emperor and by the King of the Romans and was very friendly with most of the imperial ministers. Waldstein was a very vivacious, headstrong, haughty, obstructive, yet charming minister. Waldstein quarreled bitterly with Methuen over the dismemberment of Spain, Portuguese neutrality, and later over Methuen's failure to keep him informed about the progress of the negotiations. Both Waldstein and Francis Schonemberg, the Dutch representative at Lisbon, disagreed with Methuen on fundamental points of the alliance. The imperial ministers in fact strongly supported Waldstein in his dispute with Methuen and were, according to Stepney, determined to "sustain Count Waldstein right or wrong." Waldstein, along with most of the imperial ministers, believed that Methuen was "entirely in the king of Portugal's interest." The imperialists even tried to get Paul Methuen, John's


85 B.M., Add.MSS. 7058, f.133, Hedges to Stepney, Bath, 24 September 1702, f.135, 8 October 1702; Add.MSS. 29,588, f.187, Warre to Nottingham, Whitehall, 20 September 1702.

86 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/20, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 1 March 1703.

87 Ibid.
son and successor at Lisbon, dismissed because of the widespread allegation that he was "thought to lye with the French consuls wife at Lisbon & that she worm'd him of the Secret [Treaty] when they were at the close Hugg." The emperor later authorized Don Juan Tomas de Cabrera, Duque de Rioseco, Conde de Melgar, the Admiral of Castile, to assist Waldstein in the formation of the Portuguese alliance. England was very annoyed over the appointment because she wanted the emperor to entrust the whole negotiation to her.

John Methuen (1650-1706), the son of a famous clothier, was a former barrister, Master of the chancery, and member of Parliament before becoming ambassador to Portugal. He managed to establish personal relations with the temperamental King Pedro through the Dowager Queen, Katherine of Braganza. Methuen has been described as "a profligate without morals" and as a man "of great parts, much improved by study, travel, and conversation." Methuen was a firm advocate of an alliance with Portugal. Many Englishmen thought, along

88 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/72/136, Stepney to Stanhope, Vienna, 24 May 1704.


91 Jonathan Swift in Francis, The Methuens, p. 325.

92 Abel Boyer in Horn, British Diplomatic Service, p. 203.
with the Austrians, however, that Methuen's policy was a mistaken one. Halifax in fact said that he thought that "Methuen was the ruine of our affairs in Spain,[and that] he was truly the minister of Portugal and not of England." 93

One of Louis XIV's aims in the War of the Spanish Succession was to keep Portugal neutral. The treaty signed at Lisbon on 18 June 1701 between France, Spain, and Portugal was basically a neutrality treaty in which Dom Pedro recognized Philip of Anjou as King of Spain. 94 As late as April 1703, Pierre Rouillé de Marbeuf, the French representative to Portugal, mistakenly reported to Louis that there was no reason to doubt that the king of Portugal would remain neutral. Louis then was led wrongly to believe that the Allies had no hope of making a treaty with Portugal. This egregious error on Rouillé's part led to his recall and replacement by Charles de Aubespine, the Marquis de Châteauneuf in a futile effort to keep Portugal out of the war. 95

Most of Pedro's advisers, such as Nuno Alvares Pereira de Melo, Duke of Cadaval, advocated that Portugal stay out of the war because of her poor economic condition and her total military unpreparedness. 96

93 Lord Halifax in Horn, British Diplomatic Service, p. 203.
94 Saint-Aymour, Recueil, Portugal, XL, 211-227.
95 Legrelle, La Diplomatie Francaise, V, 60-62; Saint Aymour, Recueil, Portugal, XL, 211-239
96 Francis, The Methuens, p. 121.
On 16 May 1703 Portugal joined the Grand Alliance and on 3 July 1703 the emperor finally signed the treaty. The Portuguese Treaty is significant because it greatly expanded the war aims of the Allies in providing that no peace should be made until Archduke Charles was in possession of the whole monarchy of Spain. The Maritime Powers had in fact renounced their old theory of partition and the emperor ironically enough received an allied guarantee of Charles' receiving the whole Spanish monarchy in a treaty which he had violently opposed from the very beginning. The treaty also provided that Portugal should furnish 23,000 foot and 5,000 horse, of which 11,000 foot and 2,000 horse would be paid and equipped by the Allies. The Allies would also advance 500,000 pattacosons for army preparations and would pay Pedro one million pattacosons for the 13,000 soldiers. The Allies were also obliged to furnish soldiers (10,000 of which were foot) for the war in Spain and to send a fleet to defend the Portuguese coast, protect Portuguese shipping, and attack the Spanish coast. Portugal was bound by the treaty only to make an offensive war in Spain, in return for which she would receive parts of Extremadura and Galicia. Lastly King Pedro was not obliged to make war until the Archduke Charles arrived in Portugal with the troops and the supplies. The emperor, the United Provinces, and England were to

97 P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 105/69, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 4 July 1703; S.P.Germany, 108/133, Emperor's ratification of the Defensive and Offensive Alliance with Portugal of 3 July 1703.
to share the allied expenses equally. Many Englishmen agreed with George Stepney's opinion that the Portuguese treaty was "a very good bargain." 

On 27 December 1703 Methuen also concluded a commercial treaty with Portugal which provided that Portugal would allow the importation of English woolens, while England in return would levy a duty on Portuguese wines one-third less than that levied on French wines. This treaty was designed to injure French trade and at the same time promote English and Portuguese trade.

The Portugal treaty aroused a great deal of dissension among the Allies because the emperor was unable to pay his third and because he was unwilling to send his adored Archduke Charles to Spain. Marlborough

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99 P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 80/20, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 22 April 1703.

100 Francis, The Methuens, pp. 184-218.

101 P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 105/69, Stepney to Hedges, 11 August 1703.

along with Heinsius hoped "that the Emperor would or could furnish his quota for Portugal"\(^\text{103}\), but realized very well that even if the emperor wanted to contribute his share "it is not in his power."\(^\text{104}\) The emperor's share fell to England and Charles promised faithfully to reimburse England for his share.\(^\text{105}\)

The greatest difficulty in the Portugal Treaty was the stipulation that the Archduke Charles must go to Portugal. The Archduke, "the darling son and hope of the family,"\(^\text{106}\) was the emperor's favorite and the direct heir to the throne after Joseph who had no male heirs. Stepney was ordered to press the emperor to send the Archduke as the treaty would not go into effect until the Archduke was in Portugal because Portugal wanted Leopold "engaged beyond possibility of retreating."\(^\text{107}\) Concerning Spain Stepney had great difficulty in bringing the ministers to any resolution because the court's main concern was Italy. Any effort

\(^{103}\) Hoff, Correspondence of Marlborough and Heinsius, pp. 84-85, Marlborough to Heinsius, 2 August 1703.

\(^{104}\) Ibid., pp. 82-83, Marlborough to Heinsius, Vorselaer, 21 July 1703 and in Alg. Rijks., Arch. Heinsius 2380, f. 51e.

\(^{105}\) P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/69, Emperor's Act of Reimbursing Allies of 9 September 1703.

\(^{106}\) P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/73/99, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 16 August 1704.

\(^{107}\) Ibid., S.P. Germany, 105/68, Hedges to Stepney, Whitehall, 30 March 1703. Also see B.M., Add. MSS. 28, 913, f. 355, Ellis to Stanhope, 30 March 1703.
in Spain they regarded as "scarcely worth [their] while." The imperial ministers in fact regarded Spain "as a mere Carcass scarce worth having unless accompanied with the dominions in Italy which are supposed to be the Flesh & Vitalls." Vienna, was according to Stepney, "wholly bent towards Italy" and "cares not what becomes of Spain." Stepney thought that it would be very hard, if not impossible, to bring the emperor to consent to let the Archduke go to Spain. The Dutch seconded England through Hamel Bruyninx at Vienna and demanded that the emperor send Charles immediately.

By summer 1703 the emperor had resolved to let the Archduke go to the peninsula. Throughout the summer of summer 1703, the emperor's ministers debated on which way the archduke should go. Counts Harrach,

108 P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 80/19, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 19 July 1702.

109 Ibid., Stepney to Vernon, 26 April 1702.

110 Ibid., S.P.Germany, 80/20, Stepney to Vernon, 28 April 1702.


112 Van T'Hoff, Marlborough and Heinsius, pp.72-73, Marlborough to Heinsius, 2 June 1703; P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 80/20, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 11 November 1702 and 7 March 1703, S.P.Germany, 105/66/21, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 22 September 1702 and S.P.Germany, 105/66, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 11 November 1702.

Mansfeld, Buccellini, and the Prince of Lichtenstein wanted the Archduke to go by way of Italy, but Counts Ottingen, Jörger, Würben, Kaunitz, Baron Seilern, and the Prince of Salm and Prince Eugene opposed Charles' passage through Italy as did England primarily because of the "expence of time and money." The emperor also had great difficulty in raising money for the expedition. As Stepney told Hedges, "it is not to be conceived what distress we are in & if ever it be the Archduke's fate to sett his foot in Spain, he wil arrive there almost as naked as he came into the world." The queen later agreed to pay the Archduke's expenses and arranged for Stepney to escort Charles to the United Provinces. On 12 September 1703, Emperor Leopold and Joseph, King of the Romans, gave up their rights to the Spanish Succession to Charles

114 P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 105/69, Hedges to Stepney, Whitehall, 15 June 1703; Stepney's Memorial of 14 July 1703 and Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 20 July 1703.

115 P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 80/21, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 4 August 1703.

116 B.M., Add.MSS.37,353,f.262, Hedges, to Whitworth, Whitehall, 10 August 1703. Also refer to Add.MSS. 28,915,f.209, Stepney to Ellis, Lutzelbough, 23 February 1703; Stowe MSS.245,f.82, Stanhope to Hedges, 12 February 1704; P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 105/67/499-500, Stepney to Tucker, Vienna, 23 March 1703, Stepney was allowed to return to England at this time and did not return to Vienna until Sprin 1704. During his absence Charles Whitworth took over his duties.
and the emperor proclaimed Charles King of Spain.\textsuperscript{117}

In 1703 England still hoped to win the Elector of Bavaria over to the Allies and pressed the emperor to grant the elector extensive territorial and prestigious concessions in the empire. The emperor, however, was determined to beat the elector by force of arms, not by diplomatic concessions. In January and later again in March 1703, Wratislaw requested Anne to advance subsidies to defeat the elector of Bavaria.\textsuperscript{118} Anne, admitting that the elector's conduct was inexcusable, was very annoyed with the dilatory way that the emperor was negotiating with Bavaria and with the emperor's failure to keep England informed about the progress of the negotiations.\textsuperscript{119} England regarded Bavaria's defection as a "fatal mischief"\textsuperscript{120} and instructed Stepney to press the emperor to win over the elector "almost at any rate" even

\textsuperscript{117}P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 80/21, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 12 September 1703, Leopold to Anne, Vienna, 13 September 1703, S.P.Germany, 105/70/270-272, Anne's Reply to Emperor, September 1703, S.P.Germany, 103/19, Pactum Mutuae Successiones of 12 September 1703.


\textsuperscript{119}Ibid., ff. 91-93, Wratislaw's Bericht of 30 January 1703. Also consult B.M., Add.MSS. 28, 946, ff. 401-402, Add.MSS. 37, 156, ff. 186-187 and P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 100/10, Draught answer of Anne to Wratislaw of 27 January 1703.

\textsuperscript{120}B.M., Add.MSS. 37, 407, f. 36, Hedges to Stepney, Whitehall, 2 April 1703.
if it meant the cession of Naples, "without loss of time." By March 1703 the elector had 32,500 troops.

Austria's negotiations with the elector in 1703 were characterized by invincible delays, irresolution, and inconsistencies. Stepney in fact regarded the negotiations as "little better than Amusements & Illusions," and regarded any attempt on England's part to press the emperor to conclude with the elector as "lost labour." Stepney felt that the emperor must "destroy the Elector Root and Branch . . . or be forced to a disadvantageous and dishonourable Peace." England also complained frequently that the emperor kept England in the dark about the negotiations. Stepney in fact

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123 Ibid., S.P.Germany, 105/67/2626, List of Elector of Bavaria's Troops of March 1703.
124 Ibid., 105/67/219, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 14 February 1703, S.P.Germany, 80/20, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 3 January 1703.
125 Ibid., S.P.Germany, 105/67/166, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 7 February 1703. Also consult S.P.Germany, 80/20, Stepney to Hedges, 7 February 1703, Summary of Conditions offered Elector by Schlick.
126 Ibid., S.P.Germany, 105/67/167, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 7 February 1703.
127 Ibid.
128 B.M., Add.MSS.37,350,f.33, Hedges to Whitworth, 16 March 1702.
told Hedges that he acted at Vienna "as if I had been a Spy here, rather than a Minister." The emperor was unwilling to tell the English anything about the course of the Bavarian negotiations because in fact the emperor was unwilling to concede anything at all to the elector and was only following a policy of temporizing to keep England appeased and to forestall Bavaria's military aggression. Leopold also suspected that England would favor Bavaria to the prejudice of Austria as they had earlier done in the detested Partition Treaties. The elector's seizure of Ratisbon, the seat of the imperial diet, in spring 1703 further enraged the emperor, who later agreed, however, to accept Ratisbon's neutrality.

By summer 1702 Stepney saw "little likelihood of an Accommodation with the elector by fair means." As early as February 1703,


130 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/27, 87, Bavarian Declaration of neutrality to Ratisbon, 5 November 1703 and ff. 131-134, Emperor accepts Neutrality; B.M., Add. MSS. 37, 350, f. 87, Whitworth to Hedges, 2 April 1703, ff. 116-117, Whitworth to Hedges, Ratisbon, 9 April 1703, f. 141, Whitworth to Stepney, 13 April 1703 and f. 162, Whitworth to Hedges, Ratisbon, 23 April 1703.

131 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/21, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 18 July 1703.
Leopold had told Stepney that he was resolved to "beat the Elector without Compassion." The emperor's and the King of Romans' exasperation by September 1703 with the elector had increased to such a degree that Stepney candidly told Hedges that the elector would be able to expect no more mercy than a Teckely or a Rakoczy.

Throughout 1703 England interfered in the emperor's domestic concerns by remonstrating, along with the other Protestant powers, over the alleged persecution of the Protestants in the empire. The King of Prussia in particular was vehement about the necessity of redressing Protestant grievances. Because of the "evangelical alliance" between England and the Protestants, Queen Anne wrote a letter to the Elector Palatine concerning the "more than usuaall hardhips" of these Protestants. The same concern for the Protestants motivated the queen to write a

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132 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/20, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 7 February 1703 and see Alg.Rijks., Arch. Heinsius 84,2, Bruyninx to Heinsius, Vienna, 7 February 1703.

133 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/21, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 1 September 1703 and in S.P. Germany, 105/69.

134 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 104/204, 146, Hedges to Stepney, Bath, 27 September 1703; B.M., Add.MSS. 28,914, f.104, Ellis to Stepney, 11 June 1703; Add.MSS.37,351, f175, Whitworth to Hedges, Vienna, 12 December 1703.


136 B.M. Add.MSS. 28,946, ff.244-245, Queen Anne to Elector Palatine, 2 March 1703.
personal letter to the emperor to request liberty of conscience for the rebels in Hungary were Protestant and their grievance were religious.\textsuperscript{137} Stepney was, however, instructed later not to deliver the letter because the majority of the rebels were Catholic and the cause of the rebellion was primarily the violation of civil, not religious liberties.\textsuperscript{138} Bruyninx regarded the whole issue of Protestant persecution in the empire as "une veritable fatalite".\textsuperscript{139}

England's intervention over the Protestant greatly embittered relations and achieved no visible result. Whenever England brought up the question of Protestant grievances in the empire, the emperor or Wratislaw raised the analogous question of Catholic grievances in England and Ireland.

"L'incarnation du patriotisme\textsuperscript{140}, "fort honnete, droit, vrai, extremente brave, beaucoup de simplicité\textsuperscript{141}
and "un impositeur. . ."

\textsuperscript{137}B.M., Add.MSS.37,351,ff.167-169, Anne to Leopold, 3 November 1703 and in Add.MSS.37,156,f.184.

\textsuperscript{138}P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 104/204/159-160, Hedges to Stepney, Whitehall, 23 October 1703, ff.176-177, Hedges to Stepney, Whitehall, 13 November 1703; Oest.Staats.England Kart. 37, Bericht Wratislaw, ff.12-13, Bericht 9 January 1703.

\textsuperscript{139}B.M., Add.MSS.37,352,f.416, Bruyninx to Whitworth, 18 October 1704.

\textsuperscript{140}Emile Horn, Francois Rakoczi II, Prince de Transylvanie 1671-1735 (Paris, 1906), p.VIII, hereafter cited as Horn, Rakoczy.

\textsuperscript{141}Jean George Michel de Boislisle, ed., Memoires de Saint-Simon, V (Paris, 1928), 260.
promoter immoral de convulsions anarchique" was described. Francis II Rakoczy (1676-1735) was a member of a very illustrious Hungarian family. After the death of his father in 1679 and the forced separation from his mother, Helena Zrínyi (1687), Francis Rakoczy was brought up by an Austrian prince and married to a German princess, Charlotte Amalie of Hesse Rheinfelds (1694). After his marriage Rakoczy returned to his Hungarian estates and contracted a lifelong friendship with Count Nicholas Bercsenyi (1655-1725), the emperor's supremem commissar in north eastern Hungary. Bercsenyi was an ardent patriot, a brilliant orator, a military and administrative genius, and the very embodiment of Hungarian nationalism. He was haughty, proud, arrogant and sarcastic. It was Bercsenyi who convinced Rakoczy that Hungary was ripe for rebellion and only needed a leader. Many felt in fact that Bercsenyi was the real leader of the rebellion. After the betrayal of Rakoczy's plans to obtain French aid in the upcoming


rebellion, Rakoczy was imprisoned (spring 1701) and later escaped (fall 1701) to join Bercsenyi in Poland. In June 1703 Rakoczy returned to Hungary to join a small band of insurgents to fight "Für Gott, Vaterland und Freiheit."144 "Jamais soulevement ne fut plus futile dans ses griefs, plus destructifs dans son cours et plus sterile dans ses résultats,"145 according to Lefaivre.

In the seventeenth century Hungary had been a strife-ridden land fought over by the emperor and the Turks. By the Treaty of Carlomont (1699) most of Hungary was "liberated from the Turks, only to be places under imperial domination and subdued by what has been termed "une soldatesque brutale . . . et une administration tracassière."146 Hungary was treated not as a liberated land, but as a conquered foe. Imperial troops were quartered on the country, new taxes were levied, old taxes were increased, Protestants were persecuted, and land was confiscated. Hungarians particularly resented the abrogation of their constitution, the levying of taxes on nobles, abolishing the right of resistance, and fixing the succession to the Hungarian crown in the male Habsburg line. The imperial policy of denationalization, by confiscating


145 Lefaivre, Les Magyars, II, 398; also see 274.

land, placing Austrians in high offices, and persecuting the Protestants greatly exasperated the Hungarians. Essentially the emperor wanted to crush Hungarian separatism and extend his central authority. 147

In 1703 what taxes were raised and more men conscripted into the imperial army, Hungary, with Leopold engaged in a war with Louis XIV and with Rakoczy as leader started a national struggle to recover their cherished liberties. 148 Louis XIV saw an opportunity in the Hungarian rebellion for a powerful diversion in the empire and supplied Rakoczy with money (about 30,000 livres a month for the first two years and later raised it to 50,000) and officers, but not troops. Louis also tried to dissuade Rakoczy from coming to terms with the emperor, but never himself concluded a treaty with Rakoczy. 149 Rakoczy


149 Braubach, "Die Bedeutung der Subsidien," pp. 189-190; Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, X, 291; Andre, Louis XIV, 321; Legrelle, La Diplomatite Francaise, V, 120-129; Torcy, Memoires, I, 221-222.
depended on Louis XIV for monetary aid and ignored Wratislaw's warning about Louis' faithlessness to his allies, "Prince, lui dit'il vous avec confiance dans les promesses de la France: la France est l'hôpital des princes qu'elle ne tient pas; vous en augmentez le nombre et vous finirez le votre Carrière." 150

English sympathy for the rebels because of the violation of their religious and civil liberties, anxiety that the emperor would withdraw the imperial troops from the war effort to suppress the rebels, and fear that the Turks would come to the aid of the Hungarians contributed to England's decision to intervene on behalf of the rebels. 151

Robert Sutton, the English ambassador in Constantinople, wrote that the Porte "had all the temptation in the world to break with the Emperor" and that if the Hungarian flame were not extinguished quickly the Porte might attempt to seek a "Share in the Spoil." 152 Sutton was particularly concerned about the French intrigues to involve the Turks in the Hungarian conflagration and told Whitworth that Leopold must "suppress them [the rebels] without delay if he will not give too fair a handle to

150 Horn, Rakoczy, p. 274.
151 B.M., Add. MSS. 7075, f. 125, Sutton to Stepney, Pera of Constantinople, 27 November 1703 and Add. MSS. 37,352, Sutton to ?, Pera of Constantinople, 27 November 1703.
152 B.M., Add. MSS. 37,352 and in P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/21, Sutton to Whitworth, Pera of Constantinople, 7 November 1703.
their Enemies." 152 Sutton believed that there was "no relying upon the fair words of these people [for] while they make very fine promises, they may very probably give the Rebell assistance underhand or even send them succours of Troops." 154 By December 1703, England, worried over the increasing strength of the rebels, the French intrigues in Constantinople, and the possible Turkish embroilment with the rebels, pressed the emperor to come to terms with the rebels since the emperor did not have enough troops to carry on the war in Italy and the Rhine and to suppress the rebels. 155 England's insistence that the emperor come to terms with the rebels in late 1703 was but a prelude to her subsequent mediation with the rebels. The emperor resented England's meddling in the Hungarian rebellion and regarded it as an "unwarrantable interference in the internal affairs of his dominions." 156

Most of the emperor's ministers favored an "energetic repression" 157 of the Hungarian rebellion. Prince Eugene in particular wanted

153 B.M., Add. MSS. 37, 352, Sutton to Whitworth, Pera of Constantinople, 7 November 1703, and in P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 30/21.

154 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/22, Sutton to Whitworth, Pera of Constantinople, 27 October 1703. Also refer to B.M., Add. MSS. 28, 914, f. 237, Stepney to Ellis, 24 July 1703 and 4 August 1703; Add. MSS. 37, 351, f. 92, Whitworth to Hedges, 25 November 1703.


to suppress the rebels by force and regarded Rakoczy's attitude as tantamount to treason." In June 1703 Rakoczy had issued a manifesto strongly castigating the establishment of hereditary monarchy in Hungary, the abrogation of the right of resistance, the appointment of foreigners to important offices, the increase in taxes, especially salt, the alienation of crown lands, and the religious persecution. By the end of 1703, Rakoczy's force had grown to more than 30,000 and was increasing daily. The emperor sent Count Schlick to Hungary and later, after Schlick's disastrous military defeat in Altsohl, Hungary, Prince Eugene to Pozsony to assess the situation. The outlook, however, was bleak. The emperor wanted to crush the rebellion, but he had neither the money nor the troops to do it. The rebels meanwhile were increasing daily in both strength and number.

Many Englishmen believed, along with Lord Bolingbroke, that a "spirit of bigotry, tyranny, and of avarice" was the cause of the troubles in Hungary. The cruelty of Leopold I and Vienna's barbaric persecution of the Protestants were typical and widespread English

159 For Rakoczy's Manifesto refer to P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/71/365-370 and 371/372. Also refer to S.P.Germany, 105/71/393-398,399-400.
160 Redlich, Oesterreich, pp. 162-165.
161 Bolingbroke, Works, II, 459.
beliefs. Jonathan Swift publicly indicted Leopold in The Conduct of the Allies for choosing "to sacrifice the whole alliance to his private passion, by entirely subduing and enslaving a Miserable People who had too much Provocation to take up Arms to free themselves from the Oppression under which they were growing." 163

One further cause of English annoyance with the emperor was the emperor's refusal to grant Queen Anne the title of Majesty. Stepney did not really feel that the emperor's address to the queen as Serenity was a point of honour. He thought that it was really better "to leave that string untoucht" 164 because it would greatly exacerbate Anglo-Austrian relations to no purpose. On points of etiquette, the Austrians were "tenacious almost to superstition." 165 The Imperial Chancery would not grant the title of Majesty to anyone, not even the King of Spain, and Stepney saw very little hope of the emperor


163 Swift, Conduct of the Allies, p. 21.

164 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/21, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 25 August 1703.

165 Ibid., and see S.R., Germany, 80/26, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 13 June 1703.
ever doing so for Queen Anne. The whole question of Anne's title continued to acerbate diplomatic relations throughout the war and greatly annoyed the English who regarded the imperial refusal as "very impertinent." 166
CHAPTER V

1704: ALLIED DISILLUSIONMENT

By 1704 the English government and the States-General were thoroughly disillusioned with Austria's blatant failure to aid militarily, diplomatically, or economically either herself or her Allies. They were particularly incensed over the imperial withdrawal of troops from the Rhine to Hungary. The emperor on his part greatly resented England's interference in the Bavarian negotiations, and more particularly, the Maritime Powers' noxious meddling in the Hungarian rebellion.

In 1704 the emperor was in an even more precarious financial position than he had ever been earlier in the war, in part because of the Hungarian rebellion. The rebellion in Hungary cost the emperor more than four million florins a year, while the devastation wrought by the rebels in parts of Tyrol, Upper Austria, Lower Austria, Bohemia, Silesia, and Moravia further reduced the emperor's already low tax yields and ruined trade. Leopold also had to meet the new expense of maintaining an army to suppress the rebels and of keeping Archduke Charles and his

court in a foreign country. The deplorable condition of the imperial troops was a well known fact. The imperial troops in fact "have neither money, nor Subsistence." According to George Stepney, this frequently happened. The emperor also had to cope with an inefficient, corrupt, central administration. In 1704, however, financial and military reforms, especially in the system of recruitment, promotion, and accounting, were started by Prince Eugene and Count Stahremberg. The emperor was resolved, despite the determined opposition of Count Kinsky, the Chancellor of Bohemia, Count Buccellini, Chancellor of the court, Count Stahremberg, president of the Chamber, and many others, to set up a new bank, a "Banco del Giro" to re-establish his credit. The director of this bank was Prince Adam Lichtenstein, the emperor's richest subject. The establishment of this bank further divided the already factious court into two more factions between the Chamber and the Bank and further debilitated the emperor's almost nonexistent credit.

Gallas tried without success to raise a loan in England, while Goes in the United Provinces succeeded in negotiating a loan of

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2 B.M., Add. MSS. 37, 352, Whitworth to Hedges, Vienna, 6 February 1704; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/23, Whitworth to Hedges, Vienna, 24 September 1704.

3 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/24, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 30 August 1704.


5 B.M., Add. MSS. 37, 352, Whitworth to Hedges, 24 September 1704.
250,000 Kronen, offering as security the Emperor Leopold's already heavily mortgaged silver and copper mines. When unexpected difficulties arose over the Dutch loan, a conference was held at Frankfurt on 30 January 1704 among the Elector of Metz, the Elector Palatine, the Prince of Baden, Baron D'Amelo, and Count Palatine to discuss the Dutch loan, and to find further expedients to raise money. Several projects, such as using part of the Church silver and melting down half of the plate of private families, were discussed in the imperial council, but the emperor's weakness and irresolution, the ministerial despair, and the imperial court's divisiveness made all these projects ineffectual.

Whitworth in fact regarded all the emperor's attempts to raise more money with gloom and said that "any Extravagant Method of raising Money can not be relied on, since none can be found which are not someways burdensome to the subject & will therefore meet with Clamor and opposition."

The Maritime Powers, particularly the United Provinces, were

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8 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/22/186-188, Whitworth to Hedges, 16 January 1704. Also see 80/22/203-209, Whitworth to Hedges, 6 February 1704.

9 B.M., Add.MSS. 37,352, ff. 49, Whitworth to Hedges, Vienna, 6 February 1704.
also very annoyed over the emperor's failure to prevent the importation of French good into Austria.\textsuperscript{10} England was more concerned about the emperor's "very prejudicial" exportation to France. This trade in fact supplied the French cavalry with their mounts.\textsuperscript{11} Despite the emperor's strict prohibition of this trade, the French were still able to bribe the imperial border guards and obtain horses through the Swiss cantons and through Liège and Cologne, "the Great inlets of all unlawful Trade between France and the Empire."\textsuperscript{12} Although the imperial ministers frankly admitted that they were "at a loss how to make their orders prove more effectual",\textsuperscript{13} the emperor, under pressure from the Allies, issued another decree expressly forbidding the export of horses to the enemy.\textsuperscript{14}

England was also greatly perturbed over the emperor's persistent refusal to allow the importation of English woollens, Harley frequently reminded Stepney that the cities in western England, such as

\textsuperscript{10} B.M., Add.MSS. 37,351,f.394, Whitworht to Hedges, Vienna, 23 January 1704,f.401, Whitworth's Memorial to the emperor of 21 January 1704.

\textsuperscript{11} P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/22/388, Whitworth to Harley, 29 October 1704,f.391, Memorial of 5 November 1704; B.M., Add.MSS.37,352,f.386, Hedges to Whitworth, 26 September 1704.

\textsuperscript{12} B.M., Add.MSS. 37,352,f.432, Whitworth to Hedges, 29 October 1704 and in P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/24.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{14} B.M., Add.MSS.37,353,f.412, Whitworth to Hedges, Vienna, 8 November 1704.
Exeter, Ashburton, Tiverton, and Trenton, who had petitioned the queen to request the revocation of the edict prohibiting the importation of English woolens, were very influential in the House of Commons, especially in the granting of money.15

Baron Raby, the English representative at Berlin, echoed the general allied opinion when he told Stepney that he thought that the "poor Empire . . . looks ripe for destruction, the head or members being either corrupt or benum'd."16 In 1704 the German empire was literally "trottering."17 The empire was exposed to a possible Franco-Bavarian-Hungarian invasion. England and the United Provinces pressed the emperor to hasten his military preparations in "ye most effectual manner."18 The Allies also continually complained about the Margrave of Baden's inactivity.19 The Allies soon, however, realized the

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15 B.M., Add. MSS. 7059, f. 45, Harley to Stepney, Whitehall, 10 November 1704; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 104/39/21, Order of Council of 9 November 1704; HMC, Lords VI, 237-238, 322-323, Memorial of Stepney of 30 December 1704.

16 B.M., Add. MSS. 31, 132, f. 120, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 29 March 1704.

17 Carleton, Memoires, p. 74. Also consult Prince Eugene, Feldzüge VI, 311-336.


deplorable state of the imperial army and the general impoverishment of Austria. As Whitworth reported to Marlborough in 13 February 1704, The "Emp's Armys are wholly destitute of Ingeneers and Ammunition." 20 The armies in Italy, Bavaria, and the Rhine all needed recruits and supplies. 21 The Margrave of Baden in fact was so disheartened that he was "resolved to throw up his command." 22 During the past year the Margrave had not received more than 80,000 florins for the maintenance of his whole army. The margrave was thoroughly disheartened with his lack of men, arms and ammunition and demanded a year's subsistence before he again took the field. 23 Prince Eugene was also depressed and wrote to the emperor that he did not have enough troops and that those he did have "dye for want and misery." 24

20 B.M., Add. MSS, 37, 352, f. 69, Whitworth to Marlborough, Vienna, 13 February 1704.


22 B.M., Add. MSS, 37, 351, Whitworth to Hedges, Vienna, 30 January 1704.

23 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/22/206, Whitworth to Hedges, 6 February 1704; B.M., Add. MSS, 37, 351, f. 330, Whitworth to Hedges, Vienna, 5 January 1704.

24 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/22/188, Whitworth to Hedges, Vienna, 5 January 1704.
Both Wratislaw and Prince Eugene insisted that if the queen did not aid Leopold, the empire would fall. Marlborough, convinced that without the assistance of the Maritime Powers, "the whole Empire must be undone", 25 frankly told Heinsius that "if the Emperor was obliged to make an ill peace, England and Holland must pay for it." 26 Hamel Bruyninx in a similar vein reported in January 1704 that "Die Sachen stehen hier seh desperat und es scheint dies Haus mahe an seinem Ende zu sein mit einem allgemeinen Umsturtz des ganzen kriegs-system, wenn nicht ein wunderbare Hilfe von Gott eintritt ..." 27

The Elector of Bavaria's seizure of Passau, the "Key to the Emperor's Hereditary Countrys" on 11 January 1704 marked an inauspicious inception for the military campaign of 1704. The surrender caused an uproar in both the imperial court and in London because of Passau's strategic importance and because it surrendered without even a struggle. With only 1900 men Passau had been unable to resist the elector's 10,000 troops. Most of the troops in Passau had been sent to lower Austria to stop the rebel incursions there. The surrender

25 Van T'Hoff, Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, p. 101
Marlborough to Heinsius, Landau, 18 March 1704.

26 Ibid., p. 106, Marlborough to Heinsius, Coblenz, 25 May 1704.

27 Redlich, Oesterreich, p. 40.
of Passau highlighted the emperor's military ineffectiveness and seemed to prove the Allies' contention that the emperor could not maintain the war effort in the empire, Italy, and suppress the Hungarian rebels simultaneously. Whitworth gloomily told Hedges that in view of the emperor's poor military condition, the elector of Bavaria would "meet with little opposition or diversion." 28

In view of the great danger to the empire, Wratislaw formally requested England's assistance in a memorial of 2 April 1704. Queen Anne replied on 4 April 1704 that she had given Marlborough instructions to concur with the United Provinces in order to find the "moyens les plus efficaces pour donner profitement de l'Assistance" to the Emperor and to make "tous les efforts possibles pour tacher de garantir l'Allemagne du Danger extreme qui la menace ..." in this pressing necessity. 30

On 20 May 1704 Marlborough wrote to Stepney to tell the emperor in the greatest secrecy that his troops were bound for the

28 B.M., Add. MSS. 37, 351, f. 369, Whitworth to Hedges, Vienna, 16 January 1704.

29 Lamberty, Mémoires, III, 64-65.

30 Ibid., p. 66; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 104/223/223, Answer to Wratislaw of 4 April 1704 and in B.M., Add. MSS. 28, 947, f. 258.
Danube. In a brilliant strategic maneuver, Marlborough transferred a whole body of troops from the Low Countries to Bavaria and defeated the 60,000 troops under the elector of Bavaria, Marshal Tallard, and Marshal Marsin near Hochstädt, Bavaria. The resultant victory at Blenheim (13 August) prevented Austria from leaving the war, made the French retreat beyond the Rhine, forced Bavaria out of the war, punctured the image of French military invincibility, and raised the morale of the German princes. Even after the Blenheim victory, described as "perhaps the greatest and compleatest victory that has been gained this aiges," Marlborough was fully aware of the Maritime Powers' inability to influence the emperor and told Heinsius that he was "very sensible that what ever I shal say they will doe as they please."

The emperor's military and diplomatic failures in Italy in 1704 greatly weakened an already eroded alliance. After the conclusion

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31 For the genesis of the Blenheim campaign refer to Wyon, Queen Anne, I, 244; Atkinson, Marlborough, pp. 193-194, 246; Churchill, Marlborough, I, 721-722; Redlich, Oesterreich, p. 42; Frank Taylor, The Wars of Marlborough, I (Oxford, 1921), 152; Trevelyan, Queen Anne, I, 323-335.


34 Van T'Hoff, Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, p. 118, Marlborough to Heinsius, Aachen, 30 July 1704.
of the treaty with Savoy, England continually pressed the emperor to send succours to Italy rather than draw his forces back to Hungary because they wanted the duke of Savoy to be able to act offensively against the French.\textsuperscript{35} By May 1704, the imperialists had sent neither "men, nor money, nor anything else to carry on the war in Italy." \textsuperscript{36} According to Richard Hill, English envoy at Turin, the emperor was able to "neither recruit nor Subsist his own troops ..." in fact the emperor "does not so much as find Bread for his own troops ... and ye perish." \textsuperscript{37} Even the imperial troops under Prince Eugene were in such poor condition that by January 1704, "those with him dye of want & misery." \textsuperscript{38} Financially and militarily, Leopold was able to give Victor Amadeus nothing "but wax and parchment." \textsuperscript{39} Although Marlborough was "persuaded that it is of the last consequence" to send aid to Victor Amadeus, he realized, as did Heinsius, that the emperor would be able to

\textsuperscript{35} P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 104/37, Harley to Stepney, 15 July 1704 and 104/37/10, 29 July 1704; Kemble, State Papers, p. 380, Harley to Stepney, Whitehall, 16 September 1704; B.M., Add.MSS. 28,916, f.7, Ellis to Stepney, 2 May 1704; Prince Eugene, Feldzug.VI, 209-310.

\textsuperscript{36} Blackley, Richard Hill, pp. 365-366, Hill to Stepney, Turin, 27 May 1704.

\textsuperscript{37} B.M., Add.MSS. 28,056, f.62, Hill to Godolphin, 27 May 1704.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., Add.MSS. 37,351, f.375, Whitworth to Hedges, Vienna, 16 January 1704.

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., and see B.M., Add.MSS. 7059, Harley to Stepney, Whitehall, 13 June 1704.
do very little."  

In 1704 England also feared an Austrian break with the Papacy. At this time Leopold was quarrelling with Rome over the pope's sending Cardinal Berberini to compliment the duke of Anjou at Naples, over the pope's prosecution of the Marquis del Vasto, and over the papal nuncio's absence from the ceremony in which Charles was declared King of Spain on 12 September 1703.  

England also wanted the emperor to try to persuade Venice to enter the Grand Alliance. The Venetians, however, were determined "not to deviate one Step from their neutrality."  

Stepney had little

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41 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/23/413-414, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 19 July 1704.

42 Ibid., 80/23/103, Harley to Stepney, Whitehall, 20 October 1704.

43 Ibid., S.P. Germany, 80/24, Stepney to Hedges, 19 November 1704, Stepney to Harley, 26 October 1704.
hope of Venice joining the Grand Alliance because of the emperor's negligence concerning the duke of Savoy and the continued presence of the imperial troops in Brescia, neutral Venetian territory.\textsuperscript{44} The Venetians were completely exasperated with the continued presence of the imperial troops and their devastation of Brescia. They complained bitterly that the imperial troops treated Brescia "as if it were an Enemy's Country."\textsuperscript{45} and told the emperor frankly that they would "no longer suffer these indignities." By December 1704, under heavy diplomatic pressure from Venice, the emperor sent positive orders for the military to march out of Venetian territory.\textsuperscript{47}

Even after the elector of Bavaria's seizure of Passau on 11 January 1704, England was still putting pressure on the emperor to negotiate with the elector. Austria, however, wanted to use military

\textsuperscript{44}P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/74/23, Stepney to Harley, 3 October 1704.

\textsuperscript{45}P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/24, Stepney to Hedges, 29 November 1704.

\textsuperscript{46}Ibid. Also consult P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/24, Stepney to Hedges, 22 November 1704 and 26 November 1704.

\textsuperscript{47}P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/24, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 17 December 1704.
force and was not disposed to grant concessions to the elector. In March 1704, Queen Anne empowered Stepney to "use any means \( y \) are practicable" \(^{48}\) to win the elector over and even agreed to pay two-thirds of the subsidies provided that the elector would "quitt all engagements with France and \ldots{} come into the interests of the allies." \(^{49}\) England, however, aware of Austria's jealousy towards Bavaria, instructed Stepney not to take one step without the consent of the emperor. The emperor had tenaciously resolved not to grant the elector either the kingship or territorial concessions in Milan or Tyrol. \(^{50}\)

The negotiations of Montmollin and later of Schlick at Munich, the futile efforts of Count Lamberg, the subsequent attempts of the duke of Savoy, Baron Stadiari, representative of the elector of the Palatine, and the elector of Metz, and the failure of Stepney's and the king of Prussia's overtures finally convinced England that she must use military force to get the elector out of the war. The elector would not give up his demands for the kingship and for extensive territorial concessions in the empire.

\(^{48}\) B.M., Add.MSS.28,947,ff.256–257, Additional Instructions of 4 April 1704. Also given in P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 104/203, and 105/72/62–63. Also refer to P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/72/60, Hedges to Stepney, Whitehall, 4 April 1704 and 105/72/60–61, Credentials of 3 April 1704.


\(^{50}\) P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/71/445, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 26 March 1704.
which Leopold refused to grant. 51

The emperor was in fact determined to punish the elector's "treacherous defection" to France and destroy him "root and branch." 52 In July 1704 Marlborough and Wratislaw made one last attempt to convince the elector to join the Allies. The emperor promised complete forgiveness, restoration of all his lands, cession of Pfalz-Neuburg and Burgau, employment of the Bavarian troops in Italy, and payment of 200,000 crowns for the damage done to his lands. The emperor, however, refused to grant him kingship and insisted that Max Emmanuel refuse the French troops permission to depart freely. 53 The elector decided that it would be more advantageous for him to maintain his alliance with Louis XIV.

On 13 August 1704 Marlborough and Prince Eugene freed the empire from the danger of a Franco-Bavarian invasion and forced Bavaria out of the war by the decisive victory at Blenheim, where the Franco-Bavarians lost about 40,000 men killed, wounded, and taken prisoner. 54 After Blenheim, Max Emmanuel reopened negotiations with the Allies.

51P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/23, Stepney to Marlborough, Berlin, 26 February 1704; G. Preuss, Die preussische Mediation zwischen Bayern und Oesterreich, 1704 (Munich, 1897).

52P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/73/41, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 16 July 1704 and refer to Stepney to Marlborough, 25 July 1704.


These negotiations however came to nothing because Max Emmanuel refused to relinquish his territorial conquests since 1702 and his various prestigious and territorial demands in the empire. Many Englishmen in fact harshly condemned Leopold's refusal to accede to some of the elector's demands. On 7 November 1704 France signed another treaty with the elector which committed France to retake Bavaria, to enlarge the electorate with Swabian territory, and to procure the kingship for Max Emmanuel.

On 28 August 1704 the elector relinquished all his power in Bavaria to his wife who accepted a cease fire and subsequently agreed to the Treaty of Ilbersheim of 7 November 1704 wherein the Wittelsbachs retained control of Munich, the rest of Bavaria being put under Austrian military occupation. Joseph, King of the Romans, made Bavaria contribute heavily to the war effort in both men and money. His harsh retributive policy was the cause subsequently of several uprisings in Bavaria against the Austrian regime.


In addition to interfering in the Bavarian negotiations, England openly intervened in the Hungarian rebellion. Although England realized that it would be very "difficult to meddle" in the Hungarian rebellion because it was "properly a Domestick Affair between the Emperor and his subjects" and that their intervention would be "often liable to misinterpretation" both England and the United Provinces repeatedly pressed the emperor to make peace with the rebels. In January 1704 England and the United Provinces offered their "best offices" to the emperor to settle the Hungarian rebellion and sent full powers and instructions to February to Stepney and Bruyninx to use their "best endeavours to put an End to the troubles in Hungary." Throughout the ill-fated negotiations England and the United Provinces acted in concert.

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58. P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/72, Instructions of Stepney of 19 February 1704. Instructions also in S.P. Germany, 104/203/208-210 and in B.M., Add. MSS. 28, 947, ff. 211-212. Also refer to B.M., Add. MSS. 7058, f. 327, Hedges to Stepney, Whitehall, 19 February 1704.


61. B.M., Add. MSS. 37, 352, ff. 194-195, Stepney's full powers to treat of 19 February 1704; ff. 67-68, for Bruyninx full powers to treat in Whitworth to Hedges, Vienna, 13 February 1704. Also refer to P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 104/203/204-207, for Commission on Hungary.
Between Bruyninx and Stepney there was always, what Bruyninx termed "la même bonne harmonie." Stepney respected Bruyninx as an "able and honest man . . . " Bruyninx reciprocated Stepney's esteem and told Heinsius that it was "ene groote consolatie" to him that Stepney had arrived in Vienna to help him with the Hungarian negotiations. Bruyninx had tremendous faith that Stepney's great persuasive powers would be able to end this "hoogste crise."^  

On 11 February 1704 Kaunitz told Whitworth and Bruyninx that it was the emperor's pleasure that England and the United Provinces should use their "good offices" with the Hungarians "without any further delay." Both England and the United Provinces realized that the Hungarian rebellion was, in Bruyninx's words an "affaire assez delicate" but felt impelled to intervene because of the possibility of Turkish intervention, the imperial withdrawal of troops from Italy and the Rhine to Hungary, the violation of the Hungarians' civil and religious liberties, the possibility of a Franco-Bavarian-Hungarian

^ Alg. Rijks., Arch. Heinsius 998, Bruyninx to Heinsius, 12 August 1705. 


^ B.M., Add.MSS.37,352,ff.64-65, Whitworth to Hedges, Vienna, 13 February 1704. Also refer to Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, XI,51-52. 

military junction, and the financial loss and danger to an already debilitated empire. Onno Klopp castigates the Anglo-Dutch intervention as an unbelievable folly (unglaubliche Thörheit) which weakened the alliance irreparably and aided Louis XIV by creating dissension among the Allies.

Rakoczy in fact wanted the mediation of Sweden, Poland, and Prussia, or Venice. Much to Leopold's annoyance, both Poland and Sweden had rather inopportunistically pressed the emperor to accept their mediation. England also did not want any other powers involved in the mediation.70 Ironically neither Rakoczy nor Bercsenyi wanted the Maritime Powers' mediation because they regarded England and the United Provinces as "too good friends" of the Habsburgs to mediate fairly. Several of the imperial ministers, however, thought that the Maritime Powers were too partial to the rebels. Leopold was really forced to accept the Maritime

67 Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, XI, 57, also refer to pp. 58–62.

68 Hengelmuller, Hungary, p. 171; Klopp Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, XI, 167; B.M., Add.MSS.37,352,ff.4-5, Whitworth to Hedges, Vienna, 2 February 1704; Redlich, Oesterreich, p. 167.

69 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/22/261, Whitworth to Hedges, Vienna, 27 February 1704 and in B.M., Add.MSS.37,353. Also refer to P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/23/190, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 24 April 1704.

70 B.M., Add.MSS.7058,f.345, Whitehall, Hedges to Stepney, 13 May 1704 and in P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 104/204/263; B.M., Add.MSS. 28,916,f.7, Ellis to Stepney, 13 May 1704.
Powers' mediation because of his financial and military dependence on them especially on England and because the mediation of other powers, such as Poland or Sweden was even less palatable. 71

The emperor wanted, not the Maritime Powers' mediation, but their military forces and their financial aid to terminate what Klopp has termed Rakoczy's reign of terror (Schreckenherrschaft). 72 Leopold was more inclined to negotiate with the rebels, but Joseph, King of the Romans, and Prince Eugene were determined to quell the rebels by force and strongly resented Anglo-Dutch interference. 73 Count Peter Goes, the imperial representative at The Hague, expressed the opinion of many of the imperial ministers when he told Alexander Stanhope, English representative at The Hague, that the rebels were only "canaille" and that the "interposition of any Protestant power would be likely to do more hurt than good" by making the rebels more obdurate than ever. 74 Stanhope fully realized that the imperial court would rather settle the rebellion "without our interposition", but felt that it would take a miracle to end the rebellion and thought personally that "it matters not

71 Braubach, "Die Bedeutung der Subsidien,"

72 Arneth, Prinz Eugen, I, 298-299; Braubach, Prinz Eugen, II, 90.

73 Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, XI, 215.

74 P.R.O., S.P. Holland, 80/226, Stanhope to Hedges, The Hague, 1 January 1704.
much whether it be by a Popish or a Protestant Saint . . . " The
Elector Palatine considered it "dishonourable for the Emperor to con­
descend so Low " as to treat with the rebels. He further told Stepney
quite frankly that once the Bavarian danger was over, the emperor had
the right to withdraw from 15,000 to 20,000 troops from the war in order
to quell the rebellion. 76

On 5 February 1704 Bruyninx told the States-General that he
thought that they should not "negliger une si belle occasion pour
procurer la reestablishissement de leur [Protestant] droits et priveleges." 77
Many Englishmen agreed with Bruyninx and thought that never again would
the rebels be able to "gain such good conditions and [be able to] in­
terest Princes to secure their performance." 78 English public opinion
on the whole regarded the Hungarian rebellion as a troublesome diversion
and greatly sympathized with the rebels. 79 Alexander Stanhope, the
English representative at The Hague, expressed a similar view when he
said that he thought the "poor Hungarians" would be "very good subjects

75 B.M., Add.MSS. 7069, f. 134, Stanhope to Stepney, The Hague, 4
March 1704.
76 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/23/348 and in S.P. Germany, 105/
77 Alg. Rijks., Arch. Staten Generaal, 6587, Bruyninx report of
5 February 1704 and refer to B.M., Add.MSS. 37, 361, ff. 402-405,
Bruyninx's observation about Anglo-Dutch mediation.
78 Warner, Epistolary Curiosities, pp. 113-114, Shrewsbury to
Stepney, Rome, 26 April 1704.
79 Ibid., p. 127, Shrewsbury to Stepney, Rome, 29 November 1704.
if treated like men." 80 Baron Raby, the English representative at Berlin, expressed the general public opinion that the "poor Rebells" were being "press'd and inslaved in the violentest manner in the world to protect their Religion and Liberty." 81

The Maritime Powers were particularly annoyed about the emperor's withdrawal of troops from Italy and from the Rhine in order to suppress the rebels. The circles of Swabia and Franconia complained vehemently that the imperial withdrawal of troops left them unable to defend themselves from the French and protested vociferously about the imperial request to send their troops to Hungary. 82 The ease with which the elector of Bavaria seized Passau (January 1704) because of the emperor's withdrawal of troops to quell the Hungarian rebellion seemed to substantiate the Maritime Powers' allegation that the emperor could not carry on a war in Italy, the Rhine, and Hungary simultaneously. The Maritime Powers were particularly concerned that a combined Franco-Bavarian-Hungarian junction might force the emperor out of the war.


81 B.M., Add. MSS. 31, 132, f. 164, Raby to Hill, Berlin, 10 May 1704. Also refer to Prince Eugene, Feldzüge, VI, 16-17; Taylor, Marlborough's Wars, I, 640; Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, XI, 49, for the Maritime Powers views on the Hungarian rebellion. For Prussian views on Hungary see B.M., Add. MSS. 21, 551, ff. 36-38, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 10 January 1705.

The Maritime Powers were particularly concerned about the danger of Turkish intervention in the Hungarian rebellion. Although Ibrahim Effendi, the Turkish representative at Vienna, assured the emperor that the sultan wanted to keep peace, the Turks did aid the rebels surreptitiously with men, arms and ammunitions. The Hungarians and the French were "intriguing" at Constantinople for Turkish intervention. Although Robert Sutton, English ambassador at Constantinople, saw little likelihood in the summer of 1704 of the Turks openly aiding the Hungarians, he feared that the sympathy of the people for the rebels, the desire of the military to intervene, and the continued success of the rebels might "force the present Ministry, tho otherwise not disposed there­to to lay hold of the opportunity." Sutton quite candidly told Stepney that "it certainly behoves the emperor to put a speedy conclu­sion to the Troubles of Hungary, unless he would force the turks to enter into the Game . . . ." 86

83 B.M., Add. MSS. 37, 156, ff. 2170224, Reflexions Sur les Affaires d'Hongrie of 5 October 1704; Alg. Rijks., Arch. Staten Generaal, 6587, Bruyninx to States-General, 30 August 1704.

84 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/23/200, Sutton to Stepney, Pera of Constantinople, 2 March 1704; B.M., Add. Mss. 21, 551, f. 23, Sutton to Stepney, Pera of Constantinople, 26 March 1704.

85 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/23/429, Sutton to Stepney, Pera of Constantinople, 21 June 1704; S.P. Germany, 80/23/388, Sutton to Stepney, Pera of Constantinople, 2 June 1704.

86 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/24, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 30 August 1704.
In early 1704 Prince Eugene and subsequently Archbishop Paul Széchenyi of Colocza were sent to Presburg to discuss terms with the rebels.\(^{87}\) Basically the rebels wanted the guarantee of Poland, Sweden, Prussia, or Venice to the agreement and the return of the various abbeys and benefices which the Jesuits had illegally taken.\(^{88}\) On 27 February 1704 the Dutch requested the emperor to make an accommodation with the rebels with "alle mogelijke spoed."\(^{89}\) In a similar vein England instructed Stepney on his return to Vienna to treat the Hungarian rebellion as "the first matter"\(^{90}\) "taking care to manage it so that the Emp" may not be displeased at it,"\(^{91}\) a virtually impossible task. With Stepney's return in spring 1704, Whitworth confidently told Secretary of State James Ellis that there was "some hope of quenching the [Hungarian] flame."\(^{92}\)


\(^{88}\) B.M., Add. MSS. 37,352, ff. 4-5, Whitworth to Hedges, Vienna, 2 February 1704; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 30/22/194-195, Whitworth to Hedges, Vienna, 2 February 1704.


\(^{90}\) B.M., Add. MSS. 28,915, f. 237, Ellis to Stepney, 18 March 1704.

\(^{91}\) B.M., Add. MSS. 28,915, f. 307, Ellis to Stepney, 11 April 1704.

\(^{92}\) B.M., Add. MSS. 28,915, f. 241, Whitworth to Ellis, Vienna, 8 March 1704.
In March 1704, under pressure from the Maritime Powers, the emperor offered the rebels an amnesty and sent Hamel Bruyninx to discuss the rebels' grievances and obtain a provisional armistice. Bercsenyi and Rakoczy told Bruyninx that they wanted an international guarantee of the agreement, elective kingship in Hungary, and the right of resistance guaranteed. Although Bruyninx thought that there was "a good disposition in Hungary for peace," he found the Hungarians "much exasperated, & the business not so ripe as he could have wished."

Stepney felt that many of the ministers wanted "rather to widen than heal the breach " and from Vienna warned England not to expect

93 B.M., Add. MSS. 28, 915, f. 364, Ellis to Stepney, 29 April 1704; Add. MSS. 7058, f. 339, Hedges to Stepney, 30 April 1704; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/72/104, Hedges to Stepney, Whitehall, 25 April 1704; S.P. Germany, 104/204/258-260, Hedges to Stepney, Whitehall, April 1704; S.P. Germany, 80/23/221-222, States-General to emperor, 1 April 1704.


97 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/72/17, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 9 April 1704.
to hear of any peacef ul accomodation while the imperial troops "met with these lucky hits" against the rebels. Many of the imperial ministers in fact regarded the rebels as mere "canaille" and thought that the rebels were only negotiating in order to gain time. Stepney questioned many of the imperial ministers' sincerity to accomodate the rebels because of the way they "act only be starts and are eager while they lye under panick fear ... " such as when the rebels ravaged the villages near Vienna. Stepney also thought that the ambiguous wording of a proposed armistice justified the rebels' fear of imperial chicanery.

In May 1702 Stepney encountered many more "Rubbs" in the Hungarian negotiations. He was harrassed by "false imputations" that he and Bruyninx were too favorable to the malcontents and by the obstructionism of men such as General Heister, the head of the

98 P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 105/72/17, Stepney to Solescope, 9 April 1704.


101 P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 80/23/127-128, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 2 April 1704.

102 P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 80/23/173-177, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 23 April 1704.
imperial army in Hungary, and Count Wratislaw, who were "of a humour to embroil rather than to accommodate." He was also disturbed by the insincerity of the imperial ministers, who "move heavily as if they had little mind to come to a fair agreement . . . " Stepney was particularly annoyed by Wratislaw's "base and disingenuous insinuations" about his alleged partiality for the Hungarians because of Stepney's supposed passion for Rakoczy's sister. Wratislaw, Stepney observed, somewhat bitterly to Harley, was "keeping to his old imper- tinent way of judging wrong & censuring my proceedings . . . " Stepney's quarrel with Wratislaw in spring 1704 was but a prelude to a subsequent, more rancorous dispute.

In June the queen reiterated her desire to Leopold for a peaceful termination of the Hungarian rebellion. England felt that because of her special exertion of sending Marlborough into the empire,

103 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/23/304, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 11 June 1704.
104 Ibid., 80/23/233, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 14 May 1704.
105 Ibid., S.P. Germany, 105/72/135, Stepney to Stanhope, 24 May 1704.
107 Ibid., 105/72/93.
the emperor ought to listen to her and make peace with the rebels.\textsuperscript{108} Robert Harley was very annoyed that "neither Danger nor Kindness have force enough to prevail with [the Austrians] to exert themselves for their own safety, or at least not to be a weight & burden upon those who would deliver them . . ." \textsuperscript{109}

Wratislaw, however, told Marlborough in late June that both the emperor and the imperial court wanted a peaceful settlement with the Hungarians, but felt that the rebels' demands were exorbitant.\textsuperscript{110} The emperor's ministers in particular objected to the Hungarian demands that Hungary again become an elective kingship and that all foreign troops leave Hungary. They were particularly adamant about refusing to grant the latter because they thought that they could not govern such an unruly land as Hungary without troops and because they did not believe that the Hungarians would be able to defend Hungary alone from the Turks. All the men and money which the emperor had poured into Hungary would be irreparably lost if the Turks were able to seize it. A Turkish power in Hungary would also threaten, not only

\textsuperscript{108} B.M., Add. MSS. 7059, f.3, Harley to Stepney, Whitehall, 13 June 1704, f.7, Harley to Stepney, Whitehall, 10 June 1703, f.9, Harley to Stepney, 1 July 1704.

\textsuperscript{109} P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/73/76, Harley to Stepney, 10 June 1704. Also refer to S.P. Germany, 104/39/5, Harley to Stepney, Whitehall, 1 July 1704.

\textsuperscript{110} P.R.O., S.P. Military Expeditions, 87/2, Marlborough to ?, Giengen, 29 June 1704.
Austria, but also the Holy Roman Empire.\textsuperscript{111}

In summer 1704 Stepney candidly told Harley that the imperial court greatly resented English meddling in the rebellion and that they were determined to "shuffle us out of a share in the Mediation if they could."\textsuperscript{112} Stepney also realized that opposing the emperor's military suppression of the rebellion would entail "being misrepresented as disaffected to the Emperor's interest & too partial to the Malcontents."\textsuperscript{113}

At the same time Marlborough was pressing Count Wratislaw, Prince Eugene of Savoy, and the King of the Romans to conclude with the rebels and thus remove this "thorn in our sides."\textsuperscript{114} Wratislaw again assured Marlborough that the emperor wanted to eliminate this "chronic ulcer"\textsuperscript{115} but that the rebels' demands were, in imperial eyes, unreasonable. Rakoczy's demand that the emperor recognize his recent election as Prince of Transylvania was seen to be particularly exorbitant because it

\textsuperscript{111}P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/23/320, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 14 June 1704.

\textsuperscript{112}P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/23/361-362, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 2 July 1704.

\textsuperscript{113}P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/72/196, Stepney to ?, Vienna, June 1704.

\textsuperscript{114}Murray, Marlborough's Dispatches, I, 436, Marlborough to Stepney, Sefelingen, 27 August 1704.

\textsuperscript{115}Taylor, Marlborough's Wars, I, 252.
threatened Leopold's sovereignty in Hungary. 116

By July 1704 Stepney was thoroughly exasperated with the frivolous pretences, unaccountable delays, negligence, and indolent way of transacting of the emperor and the Hungarians and candidly told Harley that he saw as "little appearance of an accommodation now as we had six months ago." 117 In August 1704 both Stepney and Bruyninx reiterated to the imperial court that England and the United Provinces had ordered them to exert themselves "to the utmost" to end the Hungarian rebellion. 118 The States-General were especially concerned about the emperor's withdrawal of troops from the Rhine to Hungary. 119 Although on 20 August 1704 the emperor had appointed a commission of Count Kaunitz, Count Nicholas Palfy, and Baron Seilern to mediate with the rebels, by 27 August 1704 Stepney still had little hope of a peaceful settlement because Prince Eugene, along with several of the imperial ministers, had absolutely rejected the idea of a pro-

116 Murray, Marlborough's Dispatches, I, 328; Marlborough to Harley, Giengen, 28 June 1704, and Marlborough to Hedges, 29 June 1704, Hengelmüller, Hungary, pp. 200-201; Redlich, Oesterreich, p. 170.

117 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/23/436, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 30 July 1704.


119 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/24, Stepney to Harley, 30 August 1704.
visional armistice, alleging that the emperor should not consent to such terms. 120

Marlborough, who found "little satisfaction in the [Hungarian] business", thought that even if the allies succeeded in routing the Elector of Bavaria, the Hungarian rebellions would "still be a thorn in our sides ..." 121 Unfortunately Marlborough proved to be correct. The battle of Blenheim (13 August 1704) which effectually ended Rakoczy's hopes of military junction with the Bavarians, worsened rather than improved Anglo-Austrian relations. The imperialists, relieved of the imminent danger of a Franco-Bavarian military junction, were more concerned about suppressing the rebellion by force than by negotiation. England was greatly exasperated over the imperial withdrawal of troops to Hungary and thought that the least that the emperor could do was conclude peacefully with the rebels. Harley was very disgruntled that the only visible effect of the victory at Blenheim was the imperial court's regression into their "former insensibility." 122 At The Hague, Alexander Stanhope found the backward state of Hungarian affairs very understandable and advised Stepney to be more philosophical about the state's affairs, which "cannot but trouble our head ..."
"[but] aught never to come near the heart."  

In September an armistice with the rebels was further obstructed by the looting and burning carried on by Heister's troops and by the insulting language which Heister used in a manifesto against the rebels, issued on 27 August in Ersenstadt. The Hungarians were very angry about Heister's "exasperating language" and "opprobrious terms." His reference to their "perfidia crimine" and their "perfidice et detestabile obstinate" and his allusion to them as "nefaria Rebelliones" particularly incensed the Hungarians. Count Siegbert Heister received his command in Hungary in early 1704 and often quarreled with Prince Eugene, who later demanded his dismissal. As Ladislas Hengelmuller points out, a worse selection than Heister could hardly have been made for the command in Hungary. Although Heister was brave and energetic, he was also obstinate, cruel, and unable to cooperate with either his subordinates or his fellow commanders. Heister in fact had no military


124 B.M., Add. MSS. 37,352, ff. 271-272, Heister's Manifesto of 27 August 1704. Also refer to ff. 261-262, Whitworth to Harley, Vienna, 13 September 1704; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/22/294, Imperial deputies letter to Stepney and Bruyninx, 3 September 1704, 80/22/296-297, Archbishop Colocza to Joseph King of the Romans, 4 September 1704, 80/22/298-299, Manifesto of Heister of 27 August 1704.

125 B.M., Add. MSS. 37,352, f. 6, Whitworth to Hedges, Vienna, 2 February 1704; Add. MSS. 28,915, ff. 165-166, Whitworth to Ellis, Vienna, 30 June 1704, Braubach, Prinz Eugen, II, 88.
or diplomatic ability and proved to be "as great a scourge" to his own troops as he was to the rebels. With his 10,000 men, Heister followed a policy of "Schwelt, Strang und Feur" (Sword, Rope, and Fire.) Heister's various atrocities, such as the razing of the neutral city of Viszpreim in May 1704, further inflamed the Hungarian rebels, increased the rebels' following, and greatly reduced the possibility of a peaceful settlement.

In mid-September 1704, the emperor and the rebels had agreed to a provisional armistice until the end of the month when negotiations were to begin. In late September, early October Stepney was discussing the Hungarian situation with Marlborough at Cron Weissembourg. Leopold empowered Baron Seilern to treat with the rebels because Vienna never had any confidence in either Paul Szechenyi, Archbishop of Colocza, or in Baron Szirmai. Szechenyi had been negotiating with the rebels ever since June 1704. Szechenyi, who sympathized with the Hungarians, was suspected, by the imperial ministers, of being too partial to the rebels. Baron Szirmai, a clever and prominent Hungarian

129 B.M., Add. MSS. 37, 352, Whitworth to Marlborough, Vienna, 14 September 1704.
130 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/23/328, Stepney to Harley, 18 June 1704.
who "had a share in every Rebellion that has happened in his age," was sent to discuss terms with Bercsenyi in early September, but had no success. The truce was later extended to October 15th. This truce was especially advantageous for the emperor because it gave him the opportunity to supply his beleaguered garrisons and to gather more troops.

In mid-October a conference of Archbishop Szechenyi, Baron Seilern, Count Cohary, and Count Sigismund Lamberg as the imperial representatives, Bercsenyi as the chief Hungarian delegate, and Stepney and Bruyninx as mediators met at Schemnitz to decide the conditions for a three months armistice. The selection of Baron Seilern was the chief imperial delegate was a crucial one because he was very authoritative and repressive and went to Hungary "with a Spirit to receive criminals to grace [rather] than to treat with a body of men who still think they have some just claim to Freedom and good usage."

131 P.R.O., S.P. Holland, 104/73, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 10 September 1704. Also see S.P. Germany, 80/24, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 6 September 1704 and 10 September 1704; B.M., Add. MSS. 37,352,f.334, Whitworth to Harley, Vienna, 29 September 1704; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/22/349-350, Seilern's Full Powers of 26 September 1704.

132 B.M., Add. MSS. 37,353, ff.337-338, Bruyninx and Whitworth to Szirmai, September 1704; Add. MSS. 37,351, f.429, Whitworth to Hedges, 30 January 1704.

133 B.M., Add. MSS. 37,353, f.455, Whitworth to Harley, Vienna, 4 October 1704 and in Add. MSS. 37,352, f.280. Also refer to P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/22/360, Whitworth to Hedges, Vienna, 4 October 1704; S.P. Germany, 80/22/358, Projected Passport for Baron Seilern of October 1704.
at the very outset, the negotiations were obstructed by "cavills" over Rakoczy's title of prince and the wording of the various passports and full powers.\textsuperscript{134} The title Prince of Transylvania was especially crucial because it implied Rakoczy's virtual sovereignty and because it threatened Leopold's hold over Hungary. The main difficulty, however, arose over the demarcation of the armistice. Selern demanded, without authorization from Vienna, the surrender of more than one hundred square miles of Hungarian territory. The rebels would not even consider this demand and the conference broke up on October 30th and the truce expired on the 31st.\textsuperscript{135}

The Maritime Powers blamed both sides for the breaking off of the negotiations.\textsuperscript{136} Stepney in particular blamed the emperor for his appointment of Selern and for the extravagant demands and the "ensnaring conditions" of the proposed treaty. He believed that the imperialists had done "all they could before my arrival to ruin their own business

\textsuperscript{134} B.M., Add.MSS.37,353,f.455, Whitworth to Harley, Vienna, 4 October 1704, f.450, Whitworth to Harley, Vienna, 1 October 1704; Add. MSS.37,352,f.390, Rakoczy's passport; P.R.O., S.F. Germany, 80/22/368-369, Whitworth to hedges, Vienna, 11 October 1704.

\textsuperscript{135} Hengelmuller, Hungary, pp. 208-220; Alg. Rijks., Arch. Staten Generaal, 6587, Points of Armistice of 27 October 1704.

\textsuperscript{136} B.M., Add.MSS.7069,f.186, Stanhope to Stepney, The Hague, 28 November 1704; Add.MSS.37,353,f.466, Whitworth to Cardonnel, Vienna, 29 October 1704; P.R.O., S.F. Germany, 80/24, Stepney to Harley, Vienna 3 November 1704; S.P. Germany, 105/74/100, Stepney to Stanhope, Vienna, 15 November 1704; S.P. Germany, 105/74/163, Stepney to Marlborough, Vienna, 10 December 1704; B.M., Add.MSS.37,353,ff.473-474, Stepney to Stanhope, Vienna, 15 November 1704.
as if their intention were to widen rather than to heal the breach." Stepney felt that the main reason for the failure of the negotiations was the appointment of Baron Seilern as head of the commission. Seilern was a man of "a waspish and violent humour full of his own Notions and impatient of reproof." Seilern was particularly odious to the Protestants because of his recent conversion to Catholicism and his subsequent religious intolerance. Both Stepney and Stanhope castigated what they termed Seilern's "capricious obstinacy." Stepney also blamed the rebels for their intractability. Stepney and Whitworth attributed Rakoczy's obstinacy to the imperial diffidence about the negotiations and to the Hungarians' "engagement" with Bavaria and France, "broken reeds" which "would only pierce the hand of those who lean on them." Stepney felt that all they did was "run around in a Circle and might have done so till dooms day." He did believe, however, as did Stanhope,

137 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/24, Stepney to Harley, Schemnitz, 3 November 1704 and also in S.P. Germany, 105/74.

138 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/24, Stepney to Harley, Schemnitz, 3 November 1704 and in S.P. Germany, 105/74.

139 B.M., Stowe MSS. 245, f. 253, Stanhope to Harley, The Hague, 2 December 1704. Also see P.R.O., S.P. Holland, 84/227, Stanhope to Harley, The Hague, 23 November 1704.

140 B.M., Add. MSS. 37, 352, f. 319, Whitworth to Harley, 24 September 1704. Also refer to P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/24, Stepney to Harley, Schemnitz, 3 November 1704 and in S.P. Germany, 105/74, HMC, Buccleuch MSS, II, part 2, 701, Stepney to Harley, 15 November 1704.

141 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/24, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 3 November 1704.
that matters may be "retrieved" "by fair honest fair dealing and proper application."

The Hungarians imputed the failure of the negotiations to the emperor's extravagant demands and his appointment of Seilern, whom they felt was sent to "criticize rather than conclude" and with whom it was impossible to negotiate. They believed that the imperial project was "insincere, unreasonable, and impracticable" and deplored the six weeks "idly spent in cavils and subtleties." The Hungarians in particular believed that the armistice was a snare because of the imperial demand for the cession of more than one hundred square miles of Hungarian territory. After seeing the imperial demands, they told Stepney that they had "nothing to relye on but their swords." The imperial court believed that the rebels had broken up the negotiations by their obstinate insistence on exorbitant demands and that the rebels

142 P.R.O., S.P. Holland, 48/227, Stanhope to Harley, The Hague, 28 November 1704 and refer to HMC, Buccleuch MSS, II, part 2, 701, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 15 November 1704.

143 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/24, Stepney to Harley, Schemnitz, 3 November 1704. Also refer to S.P. 80/24, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 12 November 1704.

144 HMC, Buccleuch MSS, II, part 2, 701, Stepney to Harley, 15 November 1704.

145 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/24, Stepney to Harley, Schemnitz, 3 November 1704.

146 Ibid.
were never sincere about their desire for peace. 147

For Stepney the peace conference at Schemnitz revealed many "disagreeable truths" 148 about the imperial court's attitude towards the rebels. The conference increased the distrust of the rebels and the Austrians. It accomplished nothing but "the exacerbation of relations between Vienna and the Sea Powers." 149 In December 1704, Stepney candidly told Stanhope that the Hungarian commission "lies like a millstone upon me." 150 He also reminded Stanhope that his prediction that "this Court would certainly be offended by such an overture, and tho they would not openly reject it, would endeavour to shuffle with us, and render all our attempts ineffectual ..." 151 had come true. Already he was experiencing the "obloqy of Wratislaw" and heartily hoped that he was "not to be eternally grinded here." 152 Stepney knew that once


148 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/24, Stepney to Harley, Schemnitz, 3 November 1704.

149 Henderson, Prince Eugene, p. 116.

150 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/74/185-186, Stepney to Stanhope, Vienna, 27 December 1704.

151 Ibid.

152 Ibid.
he pressed the emperor about the Hungarian negotiations, he could expect to "have a nest of wasps upon [him]." He had little hope that the Hungarian question would be solved except by "dint of Arms, without considering the Emp'r loses whoever wins." In December 1704 England and the United Provinces again pressed the emperor to resume negotiations with the rebels. England in particular was concerned about the possibility of Turkish intervention in the rebellion and instructed Stepney to warn Leopold of England's "weariness" of helping an ally who "wil do nothing towards their own deliverance but rather Embarass their own Affaires and weaken others."  

153 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/74/192, Stepney to Cardonnel, Vienna, 20 December 1704.

154 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/74/208, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 27 December 1704.


156 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 104/39/26, Harley to Stepney, 2 December 1704.
CHAPTER VI
1705: GROWING ESTRANGEMENT

The year 1706 highlighted the ever widening fissures of the Grand Alliance in Hungary, Italy, and on the Rhine. Stepney's quarrel with Wratislaw, Sunderland's mission to the emperor (26 August-24 November) and Marlborough's trip to Vienna (12-24 November) indicate the rapid deterioration of the tottering alliance. Even the accession of the new emperor Joseph (5 May 1705) did nothing substantially to mitigate the mutual and ever increasing Anglo-Austrian exasperation.

By 1705 Leopold was dependent on the Maritime Powers for military and financial aid. The emperor's government, despite Stahremberg's creditable efforts at the treasury, was still caught in a financial morass, with little money and less credit. The imperial court was sharply divided by a schism between the Bank and the Chamber over financial control. The emperor was struggling hard to support Charles in Spain, sustain the war effort in Italy and on the Rhine, and subdue the Hungarian rebellion and the Bavarian insurrection. The emperor was also struck very hard by the rebels' ravages in his hereditary countries.

1P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/25, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 8 April 1705; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/75, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 18 March 1705; Braubach, "Die Bedeutung der Subsidien," pp. 34-74.
and the poor state of imperial trade and adamantly refused to revoke the edict prohibiting the importation of serge despite the continual clamor of the Western merchants in Parliament. Bruyninx and Sunderland felt that it was absolutely imperative that the Maritime Powers lend the emperor money. Bruyninx in fact blamed the emperor's egregious war effort on "le sobre etat des finances et la quantité de debtes ou l'on s'est plongé pour commencer et soutenir cette guerre." 

In September 1705 Gallas requested England and the United Provinces to loan the emperor money to carry on the war in Italy. He told Queen Anne candidly that the emperor did not have the financial means to carry on the war in Italy and that if she did not agree to the loan the common cause would suffer "une perte irreparable". In her reply Anne censured the emperor's "unique attachment" to the Hungarian rebellions and Leopold's virtual abandonment of the war in Italy.

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2 HMC, House of Lords MSS, VII, 321, Harley to Stepney, Whitehall, 5 March 1705.


4 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/76, Memorial of Gallas of 4 September 1705. Also given in P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 104/39/76-80.

5 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/76, Anne's reply to Gallas of 9 September 1705. Also given in P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 104/39/81-182. Also refer to Oest. Staatsarchiv, England, Kart. 39, Bericht Gallas of 11 September 1705; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 104/39/75, Harley to Sunderland, 8 September 1705.
The imperial court was very annoyed over this reproach. Gallas assured Godolphin that the money would be used in Italy, not in Hungary. Godolphin told Gallas that the queen wanted to be absolutely certain that the money would be used exclusively for the war in Italy. In October 1705 Queen Anne agreed to pay two-thirds of the projected loan of 300,000 crowns, provided that the United Province would loan the emperor the remaining one-third. Despite the Dutch dilatoriness about the payment of their one-third, the queen advanced the first one-third in November and the other one-third in early 1706. By December 1705, the States-General had not advanced their one-third, in spite of the added security of the imperial silver mines in Idria, and Marlborough had little hope of them ever doing so.

6 Oest Staatsarchiv, England, Kart. 39, Gallas Bericht of 22 September 1705, Gallas to Godolphin, London, 22 September 1705; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/26, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 28 September 1705.

7 Oest. Staatsarchiv, England, Kart, 39, Gallas Bericht of 25 September 1705, Godolphin to Gallas, 23 September 1705.

The Maritime Powers were very disgruntled over the German dilatoriness in the military campaign in 1705, the military miscarriages in the empire, the emperor's failure to support the duke of Savoy, and the behavior of the German princes "who will not (tho they can) help themselves." Stepney candidly told Adam Cardonnel, Marlborough's trusted aide, that the direction of military affairs was worse now than it had ever been under Count Mansfeld. The English hope that the replacement of Mansfeld by Prince Eugene would improve military matters proved to be mistaken. The Maritime Powers were not the only ones disgusted by the imperial war effort. General Heister, the imperial commander in Hungary, complained so loudly that it was widely believed that he was going to resign.

The war situation became so desperate that Prince Eugene threatened to resign on 13 March 1705 "since it was impossible for him to serve with any advantage to the Emperor, or reputation to himself" and because he found it impossible to carry on a war "without money.


10P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/75, Stepney to Cardonnel, Vienna, 28 February 1705.

11P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/25, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 4 February 1705.
Management, and the like ... 

12 Even Prince's threat to resign "had not gained [him] one penny more." 13 When Prince Eugene left on 17 April 1705 for Tyrol, he went according to Stepney, "a bit more like an Apostle than a General," 14 with no additional supplies or money and no assurance of any.

England was greatly disheartened over the imperial negligence of the Italian front and castigated the emperor strongly for sending troops and supplies to Hungary rather than Italy. Harley felt strongly that the emperor had "thoughts for nothing but Hungary." 15 In Italy the duke of Savoy was seriously threatened by the French army under Vendôme who almost succeeded in conquering Piedmont. 16 At Turin Hill complained vehemently that the duke of Savoy had seen "nothing come

12 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/75, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 18 March 1705. Also given in S.P. Germany, 80/25.

13 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/25, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 1 April 1705. Also refer to S.P. 80/25, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 8 April 1705, 25 March 1705, 14 March 1705.

14 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/25, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 18 April 1705. Also refer to Alg. Rijks., Arch. Heinsius, 2382, f.44c, Marlborough to Heinsius, Meldert, 13 August 1705.

15 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 104/39, Harley to Stepney, Whitehall, 11 September 1705. Also see S.P. 104/39/74-75, Harley to Sunderland, Whitehall, 8 September 1705.

16 For the war in Italy refer to Prinz Eugen, Feldzüge, VII, 92-187; Braubach, Prinz Eugen, II, 142-144; Alg. Rijks., Arch. Heinsius, 78, Heinsius to Marlborough, 11 September 1705.
from Vienna these 18 months but promises & disappoiniments. . . .”17 Marlborough himself assured Hill that he could not "say more of ye supine negligence of ye Court of Vienna with reference to yr affairs then we are sensible of every where else . . . "18 Eugene reassured the duke of Savoy in March that he was doing all in his power "pour presser jour et nuit ce qui fallut de la secourir." 19 Even after the accession of Joseph, however, conditions in the imperial army in Italy were so bad that Prince Eugene wrote the emperor that "it has gone so far that the men are not ashamed of saying that they cannot live without bread & without money. Each one from the first to the last is desperate . . . [and reminded Joseph that the army] was the last pillar supporting the Crown, the sceptre and the monarchy." 20 The possibility that Prince Eugene who has "more merit and capacity, more virtue and honour, than most men . . ." might be sent out of Italy to

17 B.M.,Add.MSS.28,056, f.248, Hill to Godolphin, Turin, 4 March 1705.

18 B.M.,Add.MSS.37,529, f.69, Marlborough to Hill, Whitehall, 17 February 1705.

19 Prinz Eugen, Feldzüge VIII, 78079, Prince Eugene to the Duke of Savoy, 23 March 1705. For Eugene’s correspondence with the duke of Savoy, refer to Heller, Prinz Eugen, II. Also refer to P.R.O.,S.P. Germany, 80/25, Duke of Savoy to Eugene, 4 April 1705.

20 Frischauer, Prince Eugene, p. 229. Also refer to Indiana University Library, Stepney Papers, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 2 December 1705.
Hungary caused an uproar in both London and Turin. By October 1705 thanks to England's assent to the imperial loan of 200,000 crowns, Eugene was able to assure Count Vittorino Tarino, the envoy of the duke of Savoy at Vienna, that the imperial "assurance of succour" were good. and that the emperor would send 9,000 men to his aid.

The margrave of Baden was becoming more and more disgruntled with his command as the Allies were with him. Although the Maritime Powers pressed for an early campaign in 1705, the margrave refused to enter the field before May because of "want of Stores, of provisions, of forrage and powder." Marlborough had "a real dislike of the Margrave" and a sincere "repulsion from his military outlook" and strategy. Marlborough, however, wanted to ensure that the margrave had enough supplies and men so that "he may have no excuse ... to

21 Blackley, Hill's Correspondence, II, 614, Hill to Stepney, 2 September 1705.


23 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/25, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 11 March 1705. Also see P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/75, Stepney to Harley, 14 February 1705.

24 Churchill, Marlborough, I, 821, and refer to 776, 937-938.
spoyle any more Campagnes." In 1705 the margrave of Baden was ill with an inflamed foot, militarily jealous of Marlborough, and opposed to Marlborough's idea of a "connected campaign." The margrave's obstruction in fact proved fatal to Marlborough's cherished Moselle campaign, in which Marlborough planned to advance through Lorraine into France. Because of the delay in arrival of both men and horses at Trier, Marlborough complained bitterly that the Allies had lost "the finest opportunity in the world." Both England and the United Provinces complained about the margrave of Baden's lethargy, military delays, such as the siege of Hamburg, and general obstruction. St. John even told Marlborough that the most that the Allies could hope for was that the margrave of Baden would do "no hurt to the campaign." Adam Cardonnel even told Stepney that he thought that Prince Louis was "indifferent whether we or the French carry the day." The English


26 For the 1705 campaign, see Churchill, Marlborough, I, 920-942; Taylor, Marlborough's Wars, I, 269-339; Prinz Eugen, Feldzüge, VII, 411-472; B.M., Add. MSS. 7059, Harley to Stepney, Whitehall, 30 June 1705.


28 B.M., Add. MSS. 9094, f. 117, St. John to Marlborough, 16 July 1705. See also f. 211, Slingelandt to Marlborough, 21 November 1705; f. 233, Slingelandt to Marlborough, 25 December 1705.

became so exasperated with Baden's conduct that Harley instructed Sunderland to request Baden's removal.  

In 1705 England was also greatly annoyed over the emperor's treatment of Denmark and Prussia. The Danish government was continually requesting England to make the emperor pay the Danish subsidy arrears. England was even more perturbed over the emperor's failure to appease Frederick of Prussia. Prussia's exasperation with the emperor's failure to pay his subsidies and provide good winter quarters for his troops reached such a degree that Marlborough feared Prussian defection and went to Berlin in November 1705 to appease Frederick, assure him of England's support, and guarantee the imperial assent to the new treaty.

Even after the elector of Bavaria had been defeated, Bavaria was still a focal point for allied dissensions because of Joseph's stringent policy towards the Wittelsbachs, which the Maritime Powers thought was very unjust. Bavaria provided a strong diversion for the emperor's manpower in 1705 because of the revolt ignited by Joseph's policy. The imperial refusal to allow the electrice of Bavaria to

30 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 104/39/64-65, Harley to Sunderland, Whitehall, 28 July 1705.

31 HMC, Portland MSS, IX, 177-178, James Vernon to Robert Harley Copenhagen, 31 January 1705 and 196-197, Vernon to Harley, Copenhagen, 12 September 1705.

32 Churchill, Marlborough, II, 51; Taylor, Marlborough's Wars, I, 349-350; Atkinson, Marlborough p.244; Berney, Friedrich I und das Haus Habsburg.
return from Venice, the seizure of the Electoral Prince Charles Albert in May, the occupation of Munich under General Gronsfeldt, and the increased imperial demands for more men and money culminated in a Bavarian revolt in autumn 1705. This revolt broke out after the Austrian announcement of the induction of 12,000 Bavarians into the imperial army in Italy and the widespread rumor that Max Emmanuel's remaining children were to be taken out of Bavaria.33

The Austrian war effort was further obstructed by the death of Count Kaunitz, Vice-Chancellor of the empire on 11 January 170534 and later by the death of Emperor Leopold on 5 May 1705. Leopold had five children by his wife Eleanor Magdalena, sister of the Elector Palatine, Joseph (b.1678), Charles (b.1685), Elizabeth (b.1680), Anna (b.1683) and Magdalena (b.1689). Joseph, King of the Romans, was young, vigorous, war-like and energetic. He was a handsome man of medium height, with blue eyes and blond hair.35 Bruyninx at Vienna depicted Joseph as "un


34For further information about Kaunitz's death refer to P.R.O., S.P. 80/25, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 14 January 1705.

35For more information about the demise of Leopold and the accession of Joseph see Redlich, Oesterreich, pp.48-57; Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, XI, 358-365; Wyon, England under Queen Anne, pp.358-359; Hofler, "Gallas," p.302, Salms to Gallas, 5 May 1705; Alg. Rijks., Arch. Heinsius 1053, Heinsius to Bruyninx, 15 May 1705.
Joseph aimed for a greater centralization of government, the extension of imperial authority, the increase of imperial revenues, and reform of the governmental administration. Joseph substantially followed his father's policies in trying to increase Austria's power and prestige, rather than that of the empire. Joseph, unlike his predecessor, however, adopted a more stringent attitude towards imperial reform, the Bavarian defection, and the Hungarian insurrection.  

The Maritime Powers had great hopes that Joseph would reform the government administration, increase imperial revenues, terminate the Hungarian rebellion, and greatly increase the German military effectiveness. Stepney rather hopefully expected that Joseph's changes would "in all appearance come near to a general revolution."  

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37 For more information about Joseph and his reign consult Herchenhahn, Kaiser Joseph.  
38 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/25, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 5 May 1705. Also consult S.P. Germany, 80/25, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 16 May 1705, Heinsius to Bruyninx, The Hague, 15 May 1705, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 27 May 1705; B.M., Add. MSS. 9092, ff. 8-11, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 16 May 1705; Warner, Epistolary Curiosities, pp. 139-140, Shrewsbury to Stepney, Augsburg, 20 July 1705.
By the end of 1705, Joseph's government had retrogressed into what Stanhope described as "the old torpid system of routine" and had proved how mistaken allied expectations were.

Upon his accession Joseph made very few changes. Although he did reduce the Privy Council from 160 members to 34, he continued most of his father's ministers in office. Under Joseph, the influence of the older ministers, such as Count Buccellini, declined and the power of the younger ministers, such as Wratislaw, Prince Eugene, and Baron Seilern increased. The most influential men under Joseph were the Prince of Salms, Count Wratislaw, Prince Eugene, Count Schönborn, Count Trautson, and Baron Seilern. The three newest additions to the imperial council were Schönborn, Trautson, and Seilern. Count Frederick Paul Schönborn was a very gifted, active, and sincere Vice Chancellor, who owed his appointment as successor to Kaunitz, primarily to his uncle Elector Lothar Franz of Mainz. Count Leopold Trautson was a very conscientious High Chamberlain and a very religious man. Baron Frederick von Seilern who replaced Count Mansfeld as Chamberlain, was also a very important minister. His main attributes were his excellent juridical knowledge, and his renowned integrity. The Prince of Salms became


Joseph's chief minister and "even flattered himself with the Thoughts of bringing them [the imperial ministers] together with a whip and an hallow. . . . " 41

Austria's relations with the Maritime Powers were further eroded in 1705 by Anglo-Dutch "obtrusive meddling" in the Hungarian rebellion. 42 England and the United Provinces strongly resented the imperial withdrawal of troops from Italy and the Rhine into Hungary and opposed the imperial plan to send the Danish troops to Hungary rather than Italy. 43 In 1705 England was fearful of Turkish intervention in the Hungarian rebellion because, according to Robert Sutton, English ambassador at Constantinople, "God know how far the Turks may be drawn in by degrees in processe of time . . . " 44 Sutton was particularly apprehensive that the French intrigues at Constantinople might precipitate Turkish "intermeddling" in the Hungarian disturbances. 45 After Joseph's accession to the throne, Sutton thought that there was much less chance

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41 B.M., Add.MSS.9094, f.75, Stepney to Marlborough, Vienna, 13 June 1705. Also refer to Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, XI, 365-369; Braubach, Prinz Eugen, II, 138-141; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/26, Stepney to Harley, 3 June 1705 and 6 June 1705.

42 Noorden, Europäische Geschichte, II, 138-146.


44 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/75. Sutton to Stepney, Pera of Constantinople, 9 February 1705. Also see Hoff, Marlborough and Heinsius Correspondence, Heinsius to Marlborough, The Hague, 3 March 1705.

45 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/25, Sutton to Stepney, Pera of Constantinople, 9 February 1705.
of Turkish intervention because of the respect which the Turks had for Joseph and his military valor, but warned Stepney that the Turks were still clandestinely aiding the rebels and that it was "unsafe to rely upon the good faith of these people." 46

In January 1705 Stepney complained that all his "honest endeavours have hitherto been undermined and defeated by Caballs and Intrigues" and that several of the imperial ministers, such as Baron Seilern, thought that "nothing but arms could decide the quarrel." 47 Bruyninx candidly told Heinsius that he feared that Stepney was going to be "sacrificed for his views" on the rebellion and that the negotiations for peace would fail because the emperor felt that a large army was necessary in order to govern it. 48 Prince Eugene had begun to complain about Stepney's partiality for the rebels as early as January 1705. 49 Harley regarded Eugene's chagrin as "a very ill Signe" 50 and was very sympathetic to Stepney whom he reassured of the queen's support and

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46 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/26, Sutton to Stepney, Pera of Constantinople, 14 June 1705. Also see S.P. 80/26, Sutton to Stepney, Pera of Constantinople, 21 June 1705; 13 July 1705; S.P. Germany, 80/27, Sutton to Stepney, Pera of Constantinople, 21 May 1705.

47 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/25, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 24 January 1705.


50 B.M., Add. MSS. 7059, f. 55, Harley to Stepney, Whitehall, 31 March 1705.
approbation. After continual pressure from the Maritime Powers to resume the negotiations, the emperor named Count Harrach, Count Mansfeld, Prince Eugene, Count Nicholas Palfy, and Baron Seilern, as new commissioners to treat with the Hungarians.51

On 26 February 1705 the House of Commons requested the queen to continue her efforts to end the Hungarian rebellion. In early March the States-General further pressed Queen Anne to send a special commissioner, along with theirs, to reinforce their mediation. The States-General had conceived the idea of sending a special commissioner as early as 1704, but were dissuaded them by the joint action of Marlborough and Goes.52 Lord Paget was at first selected to strengthen Stepney's position, but he was never sent. Charles Spencer, third Earl of Sunderland, Marlborough's son-in-law, was later sent instead.

In March 1705 the emperor insisted on the Habsburg's hereditary succession in Hungary, and the abolition of the right of resistance, but agreed to residence of the King of Romans in Hungary, triennial convocation of the Hungarian assembly, maintenance of certain Hungarian

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51 P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 80/25, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 24 January 1705.

institutions, such as the Chancellory, compensation for the damage done by the imperial troops, and reduction of the salt taxes. He also agreed to submit such questions as expulsion of the Jesuits, reduction of the taxes, and independence of the Hungarian treasury to the Hungarian Diet. Rakóczy's insistence on the imperial acceptance of a foreign guarantee, however, remained an insuperable obstacle to peace. Johann Philip Hoffman, the imperial secretary in London, thought that the rebels' demands were so high that no sovereign could consent to them. Even Marlborough saw "but little probability of success" in the negotiations in March 1705.

In April the emperor hoped to suppress the rebellion militarily. This hope was occasioned by the replacement of General Heister by General Herbeville, a clever, efficient, tractable, but not brilliant military leader. Ever since Heister's appointment, he had caused almost universal dissatisfaction. The council of War and Prince Eugene in particular were dissatisfied with his leadership and his way of

53 Hengelmüller, Hungary, pp. 241-244.
54 Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, XI, 348.
55 B.M., Add. MSS. 7058, f. 39, Marlborough to Stepney, 21 March 1705.
56 Redlich, Oesterreich, pp. 172-174; Hengelmüller, Hungary, p. 250.
proceeding "after his own fancy." Wratislaw, a close friend of Prince Eugene's, wrote rather disgustedly to Archduke Charles that Heister "mit lauter marche undt contramarche dies Cavalleries ruiniret, undt mit anderen ubellen dispositionen ein gutten theil den Infanterie verloren." 58

After Joseph became emperor in May 1705, the Maritime Powers optimistically hoped that the Hungarian rebellion would be quickly terminated. 59 Stepney was very much heartened by the emperor's desire to examine and redress the Hungarian grievance. Joseph's motto about Hungary was, as he told Stepney, "amore et timore." 60 He tried first of all to quell the rebellion by following "une politique de conciliation." 61 On 10 May 1705 he promised the rebels amnesty and gave them his word that he would be a good ruler and act according to the


60 B.M., Add.MSS.9092, ff.8-9, Stepney to Marlborough, Vienna, 16 May 1705. Also refer to P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/25, Stepney to Harley, 16 May 1705.

Hungarian constitution. The rebels, however, remained adamant in their demand for a foreign guarantee which they regarded as the very foundation of the negotiations. Their tenacity was rooted in part by their long standing distrust of the Austrians and in part by Rakoczy's desire for a defensive and offensive treaty with Louis XIV. After Leopold's death, Louis had in fact increased Rakoczy's subsidies to 50,000 livres per month. According to Klopp, Rakoczy's dependence on Louis XIV, led to Rakoczy's "unvermedliche Untergang." Joseph regarded the Hungarian demand for a foreign guarantee as insulting to his imperial dignity and as inimical to Austrian interests. Stepney perceived only too clearly that the foreign guarantee would "prove an invincible obstacle which this Court will hardly ever admit." Joseph, was, however, like his father, forced to accept the Maritime Powers' intervention in his domestic affairs because of his financial and military dependence on them and because

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62 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/26, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 27 June 1705. Also consult S.P. Germany, 80/25, Rakoczy to Stepney and Bruyninx, 28 April 1705.


64 Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, XI, 82. Also refer to pp. 412-416 and 376.

65 B.M., Add.MSS.9092,f.10, Stepney to Marlborough, Vienna, 16 May 1705.
of his desire to prevent the intervention of other powers, such as Poland, Prussia, or Sweden. Rakoczy likewise accepted the mediation of the Maritime Powers in July 1705.  

By the summer of 1705 Rakoczy had more than 75,000 men in the field. At this time Stepney pessimistically told Cardonnel that he "would not give 3 farthings for all that I or any man else can Negotiate here in ye business of Hungary" and that he regarded the whole negotiation as a "mere jest." Peace negotiations, however, continued throughout the summer and autumn of 1705.

On 14 June 1705 full powers were sent to the Earl of Sunderland and Stepney empowering them to "press the Emperor to the utmost to come to a Peace with the Hungarians ..." Sunderland was sent to assist Stepney in the Hungarian mediation largely because Stepney's quarrel with Wratislaw had grown to such dangerous proportions. Stepney's disagreement with Wratislaw is indicative of how the English intervention


67 Noorden, Europäische Geschichte, II, 138-140.

68 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/75, Stepney to Cardonnel, Vienna, 3 June 1705. Also refer to HM4, Bath MSS, I, 69-70, Godolphin to Harley, 3 June 1705. For the Austrian view of the negotiations of summer 1705 consult Höfler, "Correspondenz des Grafen Gallas", pp. 229-247.

69 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 104/39/48, Harley to Sunderland, Whitehall, 7 June 1705. Also refer to S.P. Germany, 104/203/72-73, Sunderland's credentials of 28 June 1705.
in the Hungarian rebellion eroded the Anglo-Austrian alliance. Wratislaw strongly deplored the English sympathy for the Hungarian rebels and had tried, with Prince Eugene's help, to have Stepney removed in January 1705. 70 Eugene had in fact procured a formal complaint from the emperor about Stepney's alleged partiality for the Hungarians. Marlborough however, had persuaded Eugene to withdraw this complaint and promised to have Stepney removed. 71 Marlborough had promised to recall Stepney as soon as another suitable post was available for him, but insisted that the court at Vienna treat Stepney well in the interim and that the Hungarian negotiations be continued. Marlborough sent Stepney a copy of his letter to Wratislaw which promised his recall and assured Stepney of the queen's just regard for him. He also assured Stepney that he would not be moved "until her Majesty has provided otherwise for you." 72 Stepney, very much embittered by Wratislaw's calumnies, complained to Count Harrach of Wratislaw's conduct. Wratislaw subsequently found out about Stepney's letter to Harrach and accused Marlborough of a breach of confidence. This incident further


71 Murray, Marlborough's Dispatches, I, 590, Marlborough to Stepney, St. James, 6 February 1705.

72 B.M., Add.MSS.7059, ff.72-73, Marlborough to Stepney, St. James, 16 January 1705. Also refer to Churchill, Marlborough, I, 924; Murray, Marlborough's Dispatches, I, 606-607, Marlborough to Stepney, St. James, 16 March 1705.
embitterd relations because Wratislaw refused hereafter to correspond personally with the Duke of Marlborough. 73

Stepney incurred all the blame for the English meddling in the Hungarian affair, but ironically enough Stepney had opposed the English mediation from the very beginning because of the umbrage which he knew it would give in Vienna. Secretary of State Hedges had originally conceived the idea of English mediation. 74 As early as May 1703 Stepney had told Ellis that he suspected that the imperial court "have a plott upon my Correspondence." He did not mention this to the Secretary of State because he did not want to become a "rowlingstone" and saw little prospect of "bettering his fortune by these complaints." 75 By autumn 1703 Stepney had changed his mind and desired to be replaced. Shrewsbury, the English representative at Rome, saw little hope of Stepney's being replaced. As he told Stepney, "it is always usefull to a Master that one should serve well, but very often inconvenient to oneself, as you will find in the present case, that you have made your stay at Vienna necessary." 76


74 Hengelmiller, Hungary, p. 229.

75 B.M., Add. MSS. 28, 914, ff. 51-53, Stepney to Ellis, 23 May 1703.

76 B.M., Add. MSS. 7058, ff. 93-94, Shrewsbury to Stepney, Rome, 6 October 1703.
Throughout 1704 Stepney's relations with Wratislaw steadily worsened. Hedges advised Stepney to ignore Wratislaw's calumnies and assured him that "whatsoever he [Wratislaw] may say will make no impression to your prejudice." 77 Shrewsbury commiserated with Stepney at being at Vienna where it seemed "no industry, success, or virtue can protect one from ill usage" and told Stepney candidly that he would advise "patience and perseverance, but that I am ashamed to preach what I was never able to practice..." 78 Harley subsequently advised Stepney in February and again in March to ignore Wratislaw's allegations which he told Stepney were "neither believed at Vienna nor at St. James." 79

Stepney was particularly disturbed about Wratislaw's "notorious calumnies" at The Hague and told Hedges that he thought that Wratislaw "would ruine me if it lay in his power." 80 Stepney later reiterated his anger about Wratislaw's "faux et scandaleuse" insinuations to Count

77 B.M., Add.MSS. 7058, f. 355, Hedges to Stepney, Whitehall, 30 May 1704. Also refer to f. 353, Hedges to Stepney, Whitehall, 19 May 1704; Add.MSS. 28, 916, f. 34, Ellis to Stepney, 19 May 1704 and f. 41, 30 May 1704; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 104/204/274, Hedges to Stepney, Whitehall, 30 May 1704.

78 Warner, Epistolary Curiosities, p. 131, Shrewsbury to Stepney, Rome, 3 January 1705.

79 B.M., Add.MSS. 7059, f. 49, Harley to Stepney, Whitehall, 17 February 1705. Also refer to f. 53, Harley to Stepney, Whitehall, 27 March 1705.

80 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/23, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 21 May 1704 and refer to B.M., Add.MSS. 47440, ff. 57-58, Stepney to Davenant, 21 February 1705.
By summer 1704 Stepney professed that he was "heartily weary" of his "laborious employment." Marlborough feared that Stepney was taking Wratislaw's insinuations "too much to heart" in spite of his assurances that Wratislaw's allegations would make no impression with him or with the ministers at home.

Although Stepney was assured of both Count Harrach's and Count Mansfeld's friendship, he was greatly perturbed by Wratislaw's reiterated allegations that he was partial to the rebels. On 4 March 1705 the emperor assured Stepney that he was very well satisfied with his conduct and that it would be very agreeable to the imperial court if Stepney should remain there until the general peace. Marlborough's solid support of Stepney had made all the "malicious endeavours to blast" Stepney ineffectual. However, by spring 1705 Stepney was "very

81 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/23/261-263, Stepney to Kaunitz, Vienna, 20 May 1704.
82 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/73/152, Stepney to Lewis, Vienna, 30 August 1704.
83 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, S.P. 105/73/190, Stepney to Halifax, Cron-Weissem, 26 September 1704.
84 Murray, Marlborough's Dispatches, I, 329, Marlborough to Hedges, Giengen, 29 June 1704. Also refer to I, 288, Marlborough to Stepney Cassell, 30 May 1704.
86 B.M., Add. MSS. 23, 916, f. 244, Stepney to Ellis, Vienna, 29 August 1705.
willing to quit this station now I can do it with reputation. . . and [felt] that the sooner this change can be brought about the more it will prove to my ease and satisfaction." 87 Stepney was heartily weary of drudg[ing] on in this laborious and ungrateful employment." 88

Wratislaw's quarrel with Stepney reached such a dangerous point that Marlborough warned Sunderland to "act with the greatest caution so that the court may not take any umbrage or believe that you intend to follow Mr. Stepney's measures. . . [for] they are so much piqued against him that the very belief of its coming from him will be enough to destroy the most reasonable project." 89

"An almost uncanny ability to do the wrong thing at just the right moment to occasion the greatest difficulty to his associates" 90 was one of the chief attributes of Charles Spencer, Earl of Sunderland (1643-1722) appointed envoy extraordinary on 17 June 1705 on the accession of Joseph I in order to help heal the empire's chronic ulcer, Hungary. Besides trying to end the Hungarian rebellion, Sunderland

87 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/75, Stepney to Halifax, Vienna, 22 April 1705.

88 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/75, Stepney to Blathwayt, 1 April 1705.

89 Murray, Marlborough's Dispatches, II, 225, Marlborough to Sunderland, Basse Wavre, 20 August 1705.

was also instructed to condole Joseph on the demise of his father, congratulate him on his accession to the throne, and suggest the removal of Prince Louis of Baden. Sunderland was a very rash, "odiously assertive" and strong-tempered Whig, who was "implacably odious to Mr. Harley" and towards whom the queen had an "unconquerable aversion." Taylor somewhat aptly described Sunderland as an "extreme Republican in theory and an acrimonious Whig in practice." Macky describes Sunderland more favorably as a gentleman of a "great deal of learning, Virtue, and Good Sense; very honest and zealous for the liberty of the People."

Sunderland's appointment is indicative of the increasing strength of the Whig party in England. Duchess Marlborough and the Treasurer Sidney Godolphin had supported Sunderland's appointment. Sunderland was also Marlborough's son-in-law and it was thought because

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91 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 104/203/43-52, Instructions of 28 June 1705. Also see S.P. Germany, 104/203/37-42, Sunderland's Credentials; HMC, Portland MSS., IV, 219, Harley to Sunderland, 10 August 1705.

92 DNB, XVIII, 755.


94 Morgan, English Political Parties, p. 129.

95 Taylor, Marlborough's Wars, I, 317.

96 Macky, Memoirs, p. 69.
of this relationship that he would have more influence at Vienna than another diplomat. The duke, realizing just how unsuitable his son-in-law was, and desiring to mitigate both Dutch and Austrian concern over the appointment, instructed Sunderland to confer with him before he proceeded on to Vienna.

Wratislaw candidly told Marlborough what a poor impression the appointment of Sunderland, a notorious Republican Whig, had created at Vienna and implored Marlborough to use his influence to moderate the "republican zeal" of his son-in-law. The Dutch were also concerned about Sunderland's appointment in an affair "fort delicate." Sunderland arrived at Marlborough's camp on the 29th of July and fortunately showed great deference to Marlborough's opinion. Marlborough was able to write Wratislaw that he did not doubt that Sunderland would be agreeable to the imperial court at Vienna. In spite of Sunderland's "republican ardor", Marlborough thought that he would be very flexible and would follow his advice.

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While Sunderland was at Marlborough's camp, the queen was still doing her utmost to "persuade and to press a Peace with the Malcontents as being of such vast advantage to the Emperor himself as well as to y"e Common Cuase." 100 James Vernon, England's envoy extraordinary at Copenhagen, was still rather futilely hoping that common sense would persuade the emperor to make peace with the Hungarians. 101 The main obstruction to a peace was the question of a foreign guarantee. The rebels tenaciously insisted on a foreign guarantee as a very necessary safeguard for their national liberties. 102 The emperor, however, regarded the question of a guarantee as a "point of honneur" and felt that it was politically pernicious to allow a foreign guarantee to a peace between the emperor and his subjects because it would invite foreign intervention. 103 Two other prominent obstacles to a peace were the Hungarians' insistence on the abolition of hereditary succession and

100 B.M., Add. MSS. 7059, f. 67, Harley to Stepney, 10 July 1705.

101 B.M., Add. MSS. 7068, f. 75, Vernon to Stepney, Copenhagen, 14 July 1705.


on the preservation of their traditional right of resistance.

Sunderland arrived in Vienna on 26 August 1705, twelve days after Count Rechteren, Baron D'Amelo, the United Provinces' special representative arrived. At Vienna Sunderland soon adopted Marlborough's view that the rebels were to blame for the prolongation of the rebellion. He also felt that he had "not much Prospect" of success in the mediation. Sunderland immediately perceived that the imperial victories in Hungary mitigated the chances of a peaceful accommodation.

In early September Sunderland thought that "we shall never come to a treaty" and that the fault was not "wholly on the side of the Court, tho' it is so in a great measure." He also felt that the rebels were "as averse to any treaty" as the Austrians were. By 9 September 1706 Sunderland saw so little hope of a peace that he requested orders to return home as D'Amelo had done earlier, alleging that both sides would rather "decide the quarrel by Arms, than be a Treaty ..." Stepney in fact thought that the emperor was merely spinning out the negotiations for an armistice until he saw how his forces did in

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105 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/26, Sunderland to Harley, The Hague, 10 July 1705.


Transylvania.  

Sunderland later reiterated his desire to be recalled to Godolphin and told him frankly that he would "rather be buried alive than be kept in this Place."  

By the end of September Sunderland was fully convinced that he and D'Amelo would "return as we came, without doing any good and castigated the Hungarians forcibly for obstinately insisting on the abolition of hereditary succession and the necessity for a foreign guarantee. Sunderland believed that hopes of peace were becoming more and more remote every day and that the rebels had never been sincere about coming to a peaceful settlement.

The Hungarian conference at Szecheny, held in the summer of 1705, which renounced Habsburg leadership, established the Hungarian confederacy, and elected Rakoczy its prince, "change entièrement la face de ces affaires" and considerable lessened the possibility of a peaceful settlement.

108 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/26, Stepney to Harley, 26 September 1705.

109 B.M. Add.MSS.28.056, f.322, Sunderland to Godolphin, Vienna, 12 September 1705. Also see ff.319-320, Sunderland to Godolphin, Vienna, 9 September 1705.

110 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/26, Sunderland to Harley, 23 September 1705 and S.P. Germany, 80/27, Sunderland to Harley, 4 November 1705 and 14 November 1705.

settlement.

Although the emperor and Rakoczy agreed to hold a conference at Tyrau on the 26th of October 1705, the chances of settlements were very remote. Joseph appointed Count Wratislaw and Archbishop Paul Szeczenyi of Colocza as the imperial commissioners and Rakoczy appointed Bercesenyi as his main commissioner. The Anglo-Dutch mediators, Stepney, Sunderland, Bruyninx, and Rechteren quickly discovered that Bercesenyi had no desire to make peace and that Austria was merely "biding her time" to discover how Herbeville fared in his campaign against the rebels. Quibbling over the location of the conference and the wording of the various terms and credentials did nothing but augment Austro-Hungarian distrust. Wratislaw regarded all delay in the negotiations as dangerous and opposed unalterably the idea of allowing the rebels' representatives more time to obtain fuller powers and more

complete instructions. Stepney who felt that the rebels were "much less inclined to peace than they were a year ago," labelled the negotiations as "pernicious proceedings" on which the Hungarian chiefs were "merely amusing the people and spinning out the negotiations until an opportunity offers of breaking it on some specious pretence, whereby the blame and miscarriage not be imputed to the Court."  

Toward the end of 1705 both Sunderland and Stepney were fully convinced that the chances of peaceful settlement were remote, because neither the imperialists nor the Hungarians would moderate their demands. Although Sunderland was more empathetic to the Austrians about their Hungarian ulcer and believed that the emperor had been more reasonable than the malcontents, he admired and eulogized Stepney. He hoped that Stepney would not be removed from Vienna until he was provided for.


114 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/27, Stepney to Harley, Pressburg, 4 November 1705.

115 Ibid.
"to his satisfaction." Sunderland had somewhat remarkably gotten along well with both Stepney and Wratislaw. After repeatedly requesting his own recall, Sunderland received his letter of congé in late October and took his audience of congé on 19 November 1705. Sunderland received the usual present of the imperial picture set in diamonds before his departure with Marlborough to Berlin.

While Sunderland was at Vienna, he had discussed the possibility of removing Prince Louis of Baden, who was very popular in the circles of Swabia and Franconia, but who was very unpopular with the Allies for his inaction and lethargy in leading the army of the Rhine. The emperor while candidly professing that he would like to remove Prince Louis from the command on the Rhine, confessed that he was really not able to do so because Louis held the post of Lieutenant General of the


Empire. The emperor could offer Baden the command in Hungary or Italy, but he could not relieve him of his command. The emperor felt moreover that Prince Louis' command in either Italy or Hungary might only aggravate matters in two crucial theatres. The emperor thought that the only remedy was the joint planning of the coming campaign by Marlborough, Prince Eugene, and Prince Louis and the deputation of someone to go with Prince Louis to ensure that the plans were carried out. The imperial court planned to use any means they could in order to "pique him so as to quitt." Both Joseph and Wratislaw thought that it was imperative that Marlborough come to Vienna to concert plans for the forthcoming campaign.

Marlborough went to Vienna in November 1705 to try to reinvigorate an imperilled alliance. In 1705 Marlborough was urged by the emperor to come to Vienna in order to discuss the next campaign. Although it was "a great and tedious voyage," Marlborough felt that


119 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/26, Sunderland to Harley, 27 September 1705; HMC, Portland MSS., IV, 257, Marlborough to Portland, 8 October 1705.

120 Van T' Hoff, Marlborough and Heinsius Correspondence, p.213, Marlborough to Heinsius, Turnhout, 21 September 1705.
it was mandatory for him to go in order to ensure that Prince Louis of Baden would not alter the plans for the upcoming campaign.\footnote{HMC, Portland MSS. IV, 249-250, Marlborough to Portland, 1 October 1705 and B.M., Add. MSS. 7064, f. 148, Cardonnel to Stepney, 8 October 1705.}

The Dutch also wanted Marlborough to go in order to thwart Prince Louis' military plans and repair damaged Austro-Dutch relations.\footnote{B.M., Add. MSS. 7058, f. 347, Marlborough to Godolphin, 14 October 1705.}

Marlborough arrived in Vienna on 12 November 1705 and stayed at Stepney's home in order to support Stepney's Hungarian efforts. Marlborough in fact told Stepney that he could not "on any terms admit of being elsewhere."\footnote{B.M., Add. MSS. 9094, f. 202, Count Wratislaw to Marlborough, 17 October 1705 and f. 205, Eugene to Marlborough, October 1705; and Otruba, "Die Bedeutung englischer Subsidien", p. 200.}

While in Vienna, Marlborough planned the next campaign, negotiated a new treaty with the United Provinces, and the king of Prussia, and pressed the emperor to make reasonable concessions to the rebels.

At Vienna Marlborough secured a loan of £100,000 for the emperor by pledging his personal fortune and promised a loan of £250,000
in the name of the Maritime Powers for Prince Eugene in Italy. 124 Marlborough clearly realized that unless the emperor received this loan he would be "necessitated to recall the remainder of his troops in Italie." 125 The queen later authorized this loan "on a Security of [the emperor's] lands, rents and Revenues in the province of Silesia at an interest of 8% per annum towards the more vigorous carrying on the Warr against the french King in Italy and for the effectual Reliefe of the Duke of Savoy." 126 The loan was subsequently went through a banking house in Frankfurt and then transmitted to Venice and given directly to Prince Eugene.

At Vienna Marlborough was invested with the principality of Mindelheim, an imperial fief south of the Danube near Augsburg. Marlborough had been created a prince of the empire on 28 August 1704. 127 This title was important because it enhanced Marlborough's prestige on the continent, especially in the empire, and gave him a vote in the Imperial Diet. After Marlborough advised Stepney in December 1704 that he


127 Lamberty, Memoires,III, 104-105; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/24, Emperor to Marlborough, 28 August 1704 also in P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/73/171.
would not accept Munderkingen, "a very inconsiderable ruinous town" above Ulm in Swabia, he was offered Mindelheim, a small principality formerly held by the elector of Bavaria, which gave him a net income of £1500 per annum. In March 1706, Marlborough entrusted Stepney to "take the business of Mindelheim entirely upon yourself." Stepney took final possession of Mindelheim for the duke on 24 and May 1706.

England was becoming more and more exasperated with Austrian myopia about Hungary and Austrian negligence of the Italian and German theaters of war. Heinsius in particular opposed Austria's plans to send the Danish troops to Hungary. Harley very clearly expressed England's exasperation with Austria when he told Stepney that "the imperial Court must have a very pleasant notion of England and Holland

128. P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/71/214, Stepney to Marlborough, Vienna, 31 December 1705. Also refer to S.P. Germany, 105/75, Marlborough to Stepney, St. James, 9 January 1705.


131. Van T'Hoff, Marlborough and Heinsius Correspondence, pp. 175-176, Heinsius to Marlborough, The Hague, 2 June 1705.
that they are to ruin themselves and to spend the last drop of their blood and Treasure to procure the house of Austria the possession of the Spanish monarchy while themselves Act as if they were indifferent towards it and did not think it worth their going a Step out of their Old Way to take it." 132

132 B.M., Add. MSS. 7068, ff. 172-173, Vernon to Stepney, Fredericksbourg, 13 June 1705.
CHAPTER VI
1706: AN IMPERILED ALLIANCE

In 1706 Austria's relations with her Allies, particularly the Maritime Powers were imperilled by Prince Louis' inaction on the Rhine, imperial neglect of the duke of Savoy, the abrupt termination of the Hungarian negotiations, and especially the imperial withdrawal of troops from the Rhine to Hungary. Stepney's recall in 1706 is indicative of the erosion of the Anglo-Austrian alliance. The year 1706 saw Marlborough's brilliant success at Ramillies (12 May) and Eugene's at Turin (9 September). The year 1706 also saw imperial inaction on the Rhine and allied failure in Spain.

In 1706 Englishmen complained more frequently than ever that the "Court of Vienna uses us insufferably" in both Hungary and on the Rhine and that "the Empire does nothing to help itself," that in fact the more the Allies did for the Austrians "the less return they make." England was particularly disgusted with Prince Louis of Baden's conduct and with the imperial withdrawal of troops from the Rhine. England was also concerned about the effect of the Austrian military failure on the

3 Ibid. and see f. 148, Godolphin to Marlborough, 30 July 1706.
Dutch peace party.

The Prince of Baden was a cautious and conservative general who was "not the sort to risk all to gain all" and who would not fight without great probability of success." Marlborough was especially critical of the margrave's defensive lines of Stollhofen, which stretched from the Black Forest to Fort Louis and which the margrave regarded as "inexpugnable." The Lines in fact were subsequently overrun by the French under Villars on 22 May 1707 without loss of life. Marlborough thought that the lines were exhaustive of both men and money and that they would not give the prince any advantage. Marlborough in fact became so annoyed with the Prince of Baden that he requested his recall in May 1706.

Many of the imperialists also deplored the Prince of Baden's conduct and realized that a change in command was absolutely necessary. The Austrians, however, could not remove Prince Eugene from Italy or Stahremberg from Hungary at that time. They confessed to Stepney

5 Ibid., p. 35.
7 B.M., Add.MSS.9095, Prince of Salms to Marlborough, 13 January 1706.
8 B.M., Add.MSS.9096, f.182, Marlborough to the emperor, 15 May 1706.
that there was a "want of generals" in the empire and that "y[e] choice of a person capable to command in chief will be found very difficult." Stepney frankly admitted that he could "see no remedy" for Prince Louis' "frequent accidents and Infirmities." which greatly obstructed the campaign and which often left the generalship of the imperial forces on the Rhine vacant.

The Hanoverian and the Prussians refused to serve under Prince Louis. The king of Prussia in particular was so disgusted with the prince's conduct that he refused to let his troops serve under Prince Louis. The Dutch were likewise completely exasperated with the Prince of Baden's poor preparations and the bad condition of his troops. The English were particularly resentful of Prince Louis' inaction after the French withdrawal of troops from the Rhine and Moselle to the Low Countries. Harley strongly advised Gallas to write to Vienna "dans les termes les plus fortes ... " in order to spur Prince Louis to

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9 B.M., Add. MSS. 9096, f. 176, Zinzendorf to Marlborough, 14 August 1706. Also consult Add. MSS. ff. 57-61, Zinzendorf to Marlborough, 10 March 1706.

10 B.M., Add. MSS. 7059, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 7 August 1706.


13 Murray, Marlborough's Dispatches, II, 461-463.
Because of the sharply increased Allied criticism of Prince Louis' conduct, the emperor sent Count Leopold Joseph Schlick to investigate Baden's conduct in summer 1706. The report that Schlick returned was very unfavorable to the Prince and claimed Baden could have taken the offensive on the Moder if he had so desired. As Churchill points out so well, the emperor used the Prince as a scapegoat for Austrian financial and military deficiencies. The Allies also sent representatives to Prince Louis to spur him to action. General Dopf, a Dutch commander, Count Lecherain, minister to the elector Palatine, and William Cadogan, Marlborough's special assistant, were sent to Prince Louis. In August 1706 Marlborough sent Henry Davenant, the secretary at Frankfurt, to try to persuade the prince to act by confiding the allied resentment towards the prince to Baron Forstner, Prince Louis' closest adviser.

The Prince of Baden alleged that besides his indisposition with gout, he was militarily unable to take the offensive because of the weakness of his forces. Baden claimed that the Allies had "bin grossly

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15 Churchill, Marlborough, II, 190.

deceived by Mr de Schlick about the state of his army and that "ye Emperor's Ministers were so industrious to amuse ye world with false lights." The Prince of Baden died on 4 January 1707 of blood poisoning in his incomplete palace at Rastadt and was succeeded by Charles Ernest, Margrave of Bayreuth.

In 1706 the English government complained vigorously about the imperial neglect of the war in Italy. England, however, realizing the financial insolvency of the emperor, had, by 19 March 1706 completed a loan of £250,000 for Eugene of Savoy's army. This loan enabled Eugene to carry on the war in Italy and to accomplish subsequently his brilliant victory at Turin on 7 September 1707.

England continually pressed the emperor to send more aid to the duke of Savoy. Gallas was told repeatedly of the queen's resentment of

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18 Arneth, Prinz Eugen, I, 408-409; Churchill, Marlborough, II, 189-191, 240; Diersburg, Kriegsschriften.
Vienna's failure to adequately support the war in Italy.  

Harley in despair told Stepney that "unless that Court will grow more reasonable towards their allies, or in truth consult really their own Interest, it is in vain to labour to help them who will undo themselves."  

On the other hand, the imperial court felt that England was too partial to the duke of Savoy whom the imperialists blamed for his "equivocal conduct, ambition, and encroaching spirit."

Not only Savoy, but also Venice complained bitterly of the Austrians' conduct. Venice was particularly annoyed about the ravages of the imperial army in their provinces of Bressan, Veronnese, and Polosene. Daniel Dolfin, the Venetian ambassador to Vienna, in fact demanded the withdrawal of all imperial troops from Venetian territory and refused to allow the imperial troops to winter there or to allow provisions for the allied armies in Italy to pass through her territory.

The year 1706 also presaged the bitter dispute over the merits of a Toulon or Naples expedition. Joseph, like his father, considered

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21 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 104/73/59-60, Harley to Stepney, 21 December 1706.


23 B.M., Add. MSS. 9093, ff. 21-25, Salms to Marlborough, 12 January 1707 and refer to f. 147, Wratislaw to Marlborough, 2 April 1707.

24 Oest. Staatsarchiv., England, Kart. 40, Memorial of Gallas to Queen Anne of 6 May 1706; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/77, Stepney to Harley, Private, Vienna, 23 June 1706.
Naples to be the most important objective in the Italian campaign. England, however, opposed the Naples plan and insisted on the expedition to Toulon, the Mediterranean base for the French fleet. England hoped to use Toulon, a pivotal port in the Mediterranean, as a springboard to attack France. England, forgot, as Klopp so cogently points out, that Austria joined the Grand Alliance principally to fulfill her cherished Italian plans. England also blatantly ignored Austria's strategic interests of acquiring Italian land as a bulwark against French invasion of the hereditary countries.  

Harley complained bitterly to Sir Philip Meadows, Stepney's successor at Vienna that Austria paid "more regard to the groundless insinuations and importunity of a few Neapolitan noblemen, than the Remonstrances of the Queen and the States."  

Ironically enough, Raby's sarcastic comment to Jean de Robethon, the chief Hanoverian minister, that the house of Austria would rather have Italian lands than Spain was quite correct.  

Godolphin was thoroughly annoyed with Austria's "obstinate persisting upon the expedition to Naples" and their aversion

Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, XII, 221-22.

B.M., Stowe MSS. 222, Harley to Meadows, 13 May 1707, Also see Harley to Meadows, 3 June 1707.

Hannover Stadtharxiv 16693, Raby to Robethon, Berlin, 2 April 1707.
"to the design of entering France." 28 He further told Marlborough that in his opinion the Austrians should be "threatened if they will not desist from their enterprise of Naples at this time" 29 and that Marlborough should speak "very plain" to them. 30 England regarded the Naples expedition as a very selfish plan of the emperor's which would seriously obstruct the allied plans for Toulon. Austrians maintained that they could execute both the Naples and the Toulon expedition. 31 The subsequent ignominious failure of the Toulon expedition in August 1707 further increased Anglo-Austrian acrimony over Italy. 32 England blamed the emperor for the failure of the expedition, while the Austrians defended the emperor and claimed that he had considered the public interest above his own and that he and "exhausted himself to send [succours] to Italy." 33


29 Ibid., f.59, Godolphin to Marlborough, 20 May 1707.


31 B.M., Add.MSS.9099, ff.7-9, Salms to Churchill, Vienna, 4 May 1707; B.M., Add.MSS.9100, f.4, Wratislaw to Godolphin, 2 July 1707.

32 For details of this expedition see Churchill, Marlborough, II, 244-258; Taylor, Marlborough's Wars, II, 49-51; B.M., Add.MSS.9100, f.157, Chetwynd to Marlborough, 25 August 1707 and f.95, Eugene to Wratislaw, 4 August 1707.

33 B.M., Add.MSS.9098, f.23, Salms to Marlborough, 12 January 1707.
Anglo-Austrian relations were further eroded in March 1707 when the emperor concluded the secret Treaty of Milan with Louis XIV. In this treaty, the French troops in the Milanese, between 12,000 and 20,000 men were given free passage home. These troops were able then to increase Louis' forces in Spain, France and Flanders. By this treaty the emperor obtained the neutrality of Italy and in effect closed down the Italian front. Joseph was able to take immediate possession of his desired Italian territories. The emperor was able to conclude this treaty because of Eugene of Savoy's brilliant victory on 7 September 1706 at Turin, which virtually expelled the French from Italy. Churchill castigated this treaty strongly as illustrating the "wanton, reckless, self-seeking of the Emperor" and the "folly and ingratitude of the basest kind" of Austria.

In 1706 the Allies were defeated in Spain and Philip V returned to Madrid. This failure the English government attributed in part to Charles III and his advisers. England was also very annoyed by the Habsburgs' expectation that the Maritime Powers would bear the entire


35 Churchill, Marlborough, II, 163-175; and Trevelyan, England Under Queen Anne, II, 142-144.

36 Churchill, Marlborough, II, 220.
cost of the war in Spain. Charles III was very pleased with the "prudent and zealous conduct of Mr. Stanhope," the English envoy extraordinary to Charles and later leader of the allied forces in Spain. England was however far from satisfied with either Charles or his ministers, whom Charles Mordaunt, Earl of Peterborough, described as "the most wretched creatures of the earth." Peterborough vividly depicts the German ministers as proud, ignorant, covetous, ungrateful, and as a "dead-weight" which he thought "capable of ruining all our endeavours in Spain." Marlborough was even apprehensive that Charles' conduct would greatly "lengthen the war."

Besides refusing to accept the importation of English serges, the emperor also greatly angered the English by insisting that the Hansa towns be allowed to trade freely with the enemy. England was particularly chagrined with this request because the English government thought that trading with the enemy was prejudicial to the war effort and allied

37 Atkinson, Marlborough, p. 328.

38 F. L. Edwards, James, First Earl Stanhope (1673-1721) and British Foreign Policy (London, 1925), p. 1.

39 Ibid., p. 4.

40 B. M., Add. MSS. 39, 759, f. 131, Peterborough to Godolphin, Barcelona, 29 May 1706 and see f. 119, Peterborough to Godolphin, 11 January 1706; Add. MSS. 9118, f. 76, Earl of Peterborough to Duchess of Marlborough, 1706.

In 1706 England and the United Provinces were still very concerned with the possibility of Turkish intervention in the Hungarian rebellion. Sutton had little faith in the Turks, a people whom he believed to be "naturally ambitious, greedy, and daring."\textsuperscript{43} The incompetency of the imperial representative to the Turks, Christoph Ignaz, Baron von Quarient, further aggravated the situation. Never Sutton told Stepney had he seen such a weak, pusillanimous "Stick of Wood."\textsuperscript{44} England felt that she had to press the Turks to keep the peace of Carlowitz not so much for Austria's sake, who "does not deserve so much Care from England & the States", but for the common cause.\textsuperscript{45}

Under pressure from the Maritime Powers, the emperor resumed negotiations with the Hungarians in the spring of 1706. The imperialists concluded a fifteen-day truce beginning the 15th of April during which time a more permanent armistice was to be arranged. In late April

\textsuperscript{42}B.M., Add.MSS. 7058, Hedges to Stepney, Whitehall, 5 March 1706; Egerton MSS. 929, ff. 98-100, Memorial from the Merchants of 12 April 1706; P.R.O. S.P. Germany, 105/77, Hedges to Stepney, Whitehall, 26 March 1706 and Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 17 April 1706; S.P. Germany, 80/28, Stepney to Harley, 24 March 1706 and 17 April 1706.

\textsuperscript{43}P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/28, Sutton to Stepney, Pera, 13 January 1706.

\textsuperscript{44}B.M., Add.MSS. 7075, f. 136, Sutton to Stepney, Pera of Constantinople, 26 September 1706.

\textsuperscript{45}P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 104/73/59, Harley to Stepney, Whitehall, 21 December 1706.
Stepney, Wratislaw, Counts Lamberg, Volkra, and Esterhazy went to Pressburg to conclude a truce with the Hungarians until the end of June while General Guido Stahremberg (1657-1737), a brave, brilliant, and honorable imperial Field Marshal assumed command of the imperial army in Hungary. At Pressburg, Stepney, who found Rakoczy "immovable" about giving up Transylvania, became increasingly suspicious of Rakoczy's sincerity in negotiating. Wratislaw, who regarded the Hungarians' demands as "insupportable," was openly credulous of the rebels' sincerity in this "very difficult and critical matter." The Hungarians on their side were suspicious of the Austrians' sincerity and confessed openly their exasperation with Wratislaw's "disingenuous Proceedings."

After Marlborough's victory at Ramillies, Harley fervently (and as it turned out futilely) hoped that the Austrians would think it

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47 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/77, Stepney to Harley, Tyrnau, 11 June 1706 and Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 12 May 1706.


49 B.M. Add.MSS.9095, f.37, Wratislaw to Marlborough, Vienna, 12 May 1706.

50 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/28, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 12 May 1706.
"requisite to do something for themselves and not enervate the very endeavours of their allies." Marlborough's victory did not improve, however, but rather worsened Anglo-Austrian relations. The Austrians hoped that England would give them both financial and military assistance to suppress the rebels. The smallest prospect of allied help in suppressing the rebellion Stepney felt "would only render the Austrians most intractable and insufferable." Stepney told Cardonnel that he hoped that Marlborough's victories would never be "a means of enslaving a free people and of destroying the Reformed churches in Hungary. . . Stepney gloomily felt that Marlborough's victories would "defeat our negotiations at Tyrnau" just as his earlier successes had ended the conference at Schernitz. Shrewsbury somewhat sarcastically Stepney who could blame the Austrians for neglecting the war and concerning themselves solely with the rebels when their Allies seemed willing to carry on the war "at their own cost" and give the house of Austria "so little trouble about it."

In May 1706 the emperor sent Princess Rakoczy to Hungary to

B.M., Add.MSS.7059, f.101, Harley to Stepney, 4 June 1706.
52 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/77, Stepney to Cardonnel, Vienna, 28 June 1706.
53 Ibid.
54 B.M., Add.MSS.7059, Stepney to Harley, 20 July 1706.
55 Warner, Epistolary Curiosities, pp.136-137, Shrewsbury to Stepney, Venice, 13 June 1706.
visit her husband with the understanding that she be returned to Vienna whenever the emperor requested it. In the emperor's name the princess offered her husband the Marquisate of Burgau in compensation for Transylvania, but he refused to consider it. The princess' real purpose was not only to work for "une pai raisonneable", but to facilitate the negotiations by helping to circumvent the rigid questions of etiquette. Yet both Stepney and Bercsenyi regarded the Princess' coming as part of another imperial intrigue.

On 15 June the Hungarians presented their peace proposals. The Hungarians insisted upon the foreign guarantee not only of England and the United Provinces, but also of Sweden, Prussia, Poland, and Venice, the sanctioning of the right of resistance, the separation of Transylvania from Hungary, the withdrawal of all foreign troops, the exclusion of all foreign interference in the administration and the various offices in Hungary, the free exercise of the recognized religion, and triennial convocation of the Diet. They agreed to relegate the very important


58 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/23, Stepney to Harley, Pressburgh, 1 May 1706. Also refer to S.P. Germany, 80/20, Laws to Lewis, Vienna, 29 May 1706.
question of succession to the next Diet. Vienna considered these proposals exorbitant. On 28 June the Sustrians agreed to the re-establishment of the constitution, recognition of all Hungarian laws and privileges, triennial convocation of the diet, and the relegation of certain grievances to the next Diet. They emphatically refused to consider the separation of Transylvania. The Austrians refused even to include Transylvania in the peace because most of it had already been reconquered by General Rabutin.

Wratislaw made a personal visit to Bercsenyi to discuss the negotiations. Bercsenyi insisted, however, on the separation of Transylvania and the admission of Transylvania to the peace negotiations. Wratislaw could not agree to this demand because it would greatly debilitate imperial authority in Hungary because Transylvania was a dependency of Hungary. On 30 June and 1 July Wratislaw talked with Rakoczy and offered him the principality of Leuchtenberg on the Rhine, a seat and a vote in the imperial Diet, plus either the Marquisate of Brugau or the lordship of Podiebrad in Bohemia in return for Transylvania. Wratislaw candidly told Rakoczy that the emperor would never let him keep Transylvania. The failure of Wratislaw's mission really marked the end of the negotiations. Princess Rakoczy departed a few days later for

59 Lamberty, Mémoires, IV, 102-119; Redlich, Oesterreich, p. 179; Hengelmüller, Hungary, pp. 312-313.

60 Hengelmüller, Hungary, pp. 314-317.
Carlsbad. 61

The negotiations continued further into July, partly because of the desire of both sides to conciliate the mediators. The Austrians were very much aware that Godolphin's complaint that the "Imperial court will do nothing at our request in relation to Hungary and the Rhine . . ." 62 was shared by many of their Allies. The Tyrnau negotiations made little progress because of the "nicety and chicane" of both sides, the protests from the various commanders, such as Rabutin in Transylvania, that his army was being ruined, and the impending termination of the armistice. 64 The main difficulty arose over the imperialist refusal to allow the Transylvanians into the conference or to agree to separate Transylvania from the rest of the imperial lands. 65

In meetings held on the 11th and 16th of July, the Austrians agreed to prolong the armistice only if the Hungarians waived their

61 Hengelmuller, Hungary, pp. 319-323; Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, XI, 172; B.M., Add.MSS.7059,f.124, Stepney to Harley, 2 July 1706.
62 HMC, Bath MSS.I, 83, Godolphin to Harley, Windsor, 20 July 1706.
63 B.M., Add.MSS.7059,f.129, Stepney to Harley, Tyrnau, 6 July 1706.
64 Ibid.,f.134, Stepney to Harley, Tyrnau, 12 July 1706.
65 Hengelmuller, Hungary, pp. 323-324; B.M., Add.MSS.7075,f.30, Stepney to Stanhope, Vienna, 10 July 1706; Add.MSS.7077,f.81, Stepney to Sutton, Vienna, 28 July 1706.
Transylvanian demands. The emperor adamantly refused to alter his position on Transylvania. In one more final attempt the emperor sent Countess of Aspremont, Rakoczy’s sister to reason with Rakoczy. At the end of the armistice, the countess returned to Vienna and so did Count Kery, Bercsenyi’s son-in-law, who had also attempted to negotiate a peace.  

When the emperor refused to prolong the armistice, the Hungarian deputies drew up a protest alleging that it was the Austrians who were at fault for the failure of the negotiations. Rakoczy also wrote to Marlborough and Queen Anne and the States-General protesting the rupture of the negotiations and reiterated his earlier accusations that the imperialists had never been sincere about a peace.

The emperor refused to extend the armistice beyond the 24th of July because he thought that the Hungarians had "industriously Spunn


67. Lamberty Memoires, IV, 119, Emperor’s declaration of 21 July 1706.

68. Ibid., IV, 119-122, Protestation of Hungarian Deputies, 28 July 1706.

out the negotiations therby to ruin his army." 70 and that all further communication with the rebels was "fruitless." 71

The Maritime Powers were very annoyed over the "abrupt breaking off" of the negotiations with the Hungarians and protested vehemently to the emperor. 72 In a formal report to the emperor of 4 August 1706, Stepney and Rechteren imputed the blame to the imperial ministers, chiefly Wratislaw. 83 Heinsius was skeptical about the emperor's desire to make peace with the rebels. 74 Marlborough, although equally annoyed over the termination of the negotiations, fully realized that Joseph, like his father, "has the business of Hungary so much more at heart, then

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70 B.M. Add. MSS. 7059, f. 154, Stepney to Harley, August 1706. Also refer to Add. MSS. 7075, Stepney to Stanhope, Vienna, 1 September 1706.
71 B.M., Add. MSS. 7059, ff. 138-149, Schlick to Marlborough, 28 June 1706.
72 Murray, Marlborough's Dispatches, III, 91-92, Marlborough to Harley, 19 August 1706. Also see Redlich, Oesterreich, pp. 179-180 and Lamberty, Mémoires, IV, 126-127.
74 Vreede, Correspondence of Marlborough, Heinsius and Hop, pp. 95-96, Heinsius to Marlborough, The Hague, 21 August 1706.
any other part of the war, that I am afraid your just representations will not do much good." 75

In the obstinate quarrel between the emperor and the Hungarians, Stepney found that all his efforts were fruitless. 76 Stepney never really expected the Tyrnau negotiations to be successful because he thought that the Hungarians and the Austrians were "people of such different Notions and principles..." 77 Rakoczy, assured of Louis XIV's "L'estime et l'affection particulière," 78 was determined to continue fighting until a general peace where he hoped to obtain Transylvania. 79 The emperor would not give up his rights in Hungary and Transylvania. Joseph insisted tenaciously on his rights because of the contingency that there might be no male heirs to the Austrian throne. In that case the Hungarian throne would be considered vacant and a new election would be held with the possibility that the Habsburgs might

75Vreede, Correspondence of Marlborough, Heinius, and Hop, pp. 84-85, Marlborough to Heinius, Helchin, 10 August 1706. For the rebellion in 1706 refer to Hengelmüller, Hungary, pp. 304-334; P.R.O., S.P. 105/81, Papers relating to Hungary; Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, XI, 152-196.


77B.M., Add. MSS. 7077, f. 34, Stepney to Tilson, Vienna, 18 August 1706.

78Fiedler, "Rakoczy, 1706," p. 291, Louis to Rakoczy, Marly, 15 April 1706. Also refer to Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, XI, 156-162.

79Fiedler, "Rakoczy, 1706," p. 20.
not be re-elected to the throne. This possibility would be greatly increased if Joseph accepted Rakoczy's election as Prince of Transylvania because the Transylvanians also had a very good chance of receiving the Hungarian throne.  

After the termination of the negotiations the emperor withdrew four regiments from the Rhine to Hungary in order to suppress the rebels. The withdrawal of these troops aroused a storm of protest from the Allies. Wratislaw rather ingenuously told Marlborough that he felt that the Allies would not protest about the troops withdrawal because once the rebellion was suppressed, Joseph would be better able to "support and press vigorously the war against France."  

Not only England, but also Prussia and the United Provinces were irate about the termination of the Hungarian negotiations and the withdrawal of troops to Hungary. The United Provinces in particular were disgusted with the way that the Austrians had handled the rebellion. What really "nettled" the Dutch "to the last degree" was Wratislaw's insult to Count Lecherain, a Dutch deputy. Wratislaw, after being pressed by Lecherain about the rebellions, angrily told him that it was "no wonder he was for the Rebelles, since his Masters were no better,"


Lecherain subsequently sent Wratislaw a challenge. This rather unpleasant affair greatly augmented Austro-Dutch acrimony.

England was particularly irate about the withdrawal of the four regiments from the Rhine to Hungary in summer 1706. Harley indeed believed that the "folly and supine negligence that has been shown upon the Rhine was unaccountable." Harley was very angry about the withdrawal of the troops from the Rhine front, "which is too weak already" because it gave Prince Louis another "pretext for justifying his inactivity." and greatly weakened the German front. Both England and the United Provinces immediately protested to the emperor about the withdrawal. As Marlborough envisaged, the protest did no good at all. The withdrawal still took place. Prince Salms subsequently defended this withdrawal to Marlborough by saying that it would be favorable to the allied cause. Salms said that he thought that his withdrawal was


83 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 104/73/120, Harley to Stepney, Whitehall, 14 June 1707.

84 B.M., Add. MSS. 9096, f. 174–175, Harley to Marlborough, 13 August 1706.

85 Ibid.

86 B.M., Add. MSS. 7058, f. 58, Marlborough to Salms, Helchin, 26 July 1706; Hoff, Marlborough and Heinsius Correspondence, p. 254, Marlborough to Heinsius, Helchin, 3 August 1706; Murray, Marlborough's Dispatches, III, 91–92, Marlborough to Harley, Helchin, 19 August 1706.

87 B.M., Add. MSS. 9096, f. 184, Marlborough to ?, Helchin, 9 July 1706.
"perfectly justified" because he felt that the common cause would be served by the prompt termination of the war in Hungary. Since Salms believed that it was impossible to use force in order to stop the burning, robbing and murdering of the rebels.

The prime irritant in 1706 between Austria and her allies was the withdrawal of four Austrian regiments from the Rhine to Hungary. Stepney believed that the court "seems resolved to proceed after their own methods with out having the least regard to any Remonstrances which shall be made in favour of the Hungarians." Further reproaches, he felt, would "serve only to create ill blood, for the mischief is gone so far that I scarce think it will admitt of any Remedy." The Austrians felt fully justified in sending this detachment of troops to quell the rebels and strongly censured the mediators for deceiving themselves into thinking that the Hungarians were sincere about peace.

On the eve of his recall from Vienna in 1706, Stepney felt that

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88 B.M., Add.MSS.9096, ff.168-169, Salms to Marlborough, Vienna, 11 August 1706 and see Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, XI, 179.

89 B.M., Add.MSS.7059, ff.180-182, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 4 September 1706. Also see Add.MSS.9093, f.125, Marlborough to Wratislaw, Gramez, 22 September 1706; B.M., Add.MSS.7059, f.179, Stepney to Cardonnel, Vienna, 4 September 1706.

90 B.M., Add.MSS.9097, ff.17-18, Prince of Salms to Marlborough, Vienna, 8 September 1706.
he was "very lucky to have escap'd Vienna which is now the most disagreeable Station we have abroad and will become more so every day." 91 This attitude contrasts sharply with his attitude in 1701 and reflects the gradual deterioration of the Anglo-Austrian alliance. During 1703, 1704, 1705 and 1706 Stepney had persistently expressed a desire to be recalled. In January 1704 Marlborough promised Stepney to have him recalled from Vienna and sent to The Hague "as soon as Possible." 92

In September 1704 Stepney asked Halifax to speak to Godolphin about his recall from this "very perverse and Ungratefull court" 93 and his removal to The Hague. Stepney told Halifax that this recall would be "no less for her Majesty's service than for my private satisfaction." 94 and that Marlborough, who had been "as good as an angel to me," favored his employment at The Hague. He thought that a position at The Hague would bring him closer to home and would be "a comfort to him and

92 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/75, Marlborough to Stepney, Landau, 2 January 1704.
93 B.M., Add. MSS. 28, 916, Stepney to EllsmAntwerp, 18 March 1704.
a Credit in the eyes of the world." He rather mistakenly felt that The Hague could not "fail of being more agreeable to me in all respects than this has prov'd of late." By late 1706 he professed himself completely disgusted with an empire that "does nothing to help it self . . . " Stepney, realizing in August 1706 that the Hungarian negotiations were over and that there was little hope of their being renewed, requested Marlborough to have him recalled immediately.

In July 1706 Godolphin, concerned about the Treaty of Succession and the intrigues of the Dutch peace faction, urged Marlborough that "no time shold be lost in bringing Stepney to The Hague, if the affairs of Hungary would not suffer by his immediate recall." In mid August Marlborough told Godolphin of his pressing need for someone at Brussels and urged Stepney's immediate recall from Vienna. Harley sent Stepney his letters of revocation on 31 August 1706 and on 22 and 23 September

95 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/74, Stepney to Halifax, Vienna, 20 December 1704.
96 B.M., Add. MSS. 7059, f. 176, Stepney to Halifax, Vienna, 4 September 1706.
97 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/25, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 7 August 1706.
98 Murray, Marlborough's Dispatches, III, 84, Marlborough to Godolphin, Helchin, 15 August 1706.
1706 Stepney took his audience of congé from the emperor, the empress, dowager, and the empress consort. Stepney was appointed plenipotentiary to The Hague and Brussels. Stepney arrived at The Hague on 9 November 1706 replaced Alexander Stanhope, a "very capable man" but one who was heavily handicapped by recent illness. From September 1706 to June 1707 in fact England had no permanent representative in Vienna. By 1707 England and the other Allies had "little hopes left" of the Austrians reaching an agreement with the Hungarians and saw no use in further pressing the emperor about the rebels. By 1707 the rebels had forfeited a great deal of the sympathy which the Allies had originally had for them but their intransigent attitude. In 1706 the Grand Alliance was imperilled by the Maritime Powers' resentment of


102 B.M., Add. MSS. 9095, ff. 192-193, Marlborough to Godolphin, 9 May 1706.

103 B.M., Add. MSS. 9100, f. 76, Marlborough to Godolphin, Helchin, 29 July 1707.

104 B.M., Add. MSS. 9100, f. 76, Marlborough to Sunderland, Meldert, 7 July 1707; f. 16, Godolphin to Marlborough, Windsor, 5 July 1707; F. 61, Marlborough to ?, Meldert, 27 July 1707.
Austrian military inaction on the Rhine and in Italy and by Austrian anger over Anglo-Dutch "meddling" in the Hungarian rebellion. After Stepney's recall in 1706, this mutual allied resentment crescendoed until it destroyed the Grand Alliance of 1702.
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this dissertation has been to examine Austria's relations with the Maritime Powers in the early years of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1706) in order to understand why it was that the Grand Alliance of 1702 ultimately failed. In particular this study has examined George Stepney's mission as English envoy extraordinary (1701-1705) and subsequently as envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary (1705-1706) to Vienna. Stepney's mission is significant because it reveals the irreconcilable dissensions between Austria and the Maritime Powers that were to so embitter allied relations. The main reason for the erosion of the Grand Alliance was the conflicting preconceptions, goals, and strategies of the Allies. Because of her financial and military dependence on her Allies, Austria became an allied dependent and was forced to accept the unpalatable policies of her Allies.

England and the United Provinces consistently disregarded Austria's policies, and strategic interests throughout the early years of the War of the Spanish Succession. The Maritime Powers ignored the Habsburgs' desire and claim to inherit the entire Spanish empire and tried to barter away parts of the inheritance in Italy and in Spain to Bavaria, Savoy, and Portugal in order to gain more allies. They also
ignored Austria's strategic concerns in Italy and refused to send a fleet to aid the emperor in his Italian plans. More importantly they transgressed the Habsburgs' vital interests in the empire by meddling in the Hungarian rebellion and by trying to force the emperor to agree to Maximilian Emmanuel II, Elector of Bavaria's territorial and prestigious demands which would have greatly weakened the emperor's authority and the Habsburg power in the empire. Financially England, even though aware of the decay of trade in the empire, kept pressing the Habsburgs to allow the importation of serges in the empire, even if this would have ruined the small, but increasing cloth trade in the empire.

The Maritime Powers were annoyed over the financial, administrative and military inadequacy of the Habsburgs. Even the accession of Prince Eugene as president of War (June 1703) and Count Stahremberg as president of the Chamber (June 1703) and subsequently of Joseph as emperor (May 1705) did not strengthen Austria as the Allies had hopefully expected. As the war progressed, Austria's alliance with England and the United Provinces quickly eroded. The year 1703 marks the turning point in the alliance. It was in 1703 that the Maritime Powers, rather unpardonably, interfered in the Hungarian rebellion. By 1705 the Grand Alliance was tottering. Sunderland's mission to Vienna (26 August–23 November 1705), Marlborough's visit to the emperor (12–24 November 1705), and Stepney's quarrel with Wratislaw and subsequent recall reveal the rapid erosion of the Grand Alliance. The expulsion of
Count Gallas, Austria's envoy to England from Queen Anne's court (autumn 1711) and the conclusion of separate peace treaties by the Maritime Powers (Utrecht, 11 April 1711) and Austria (Rastadt, 7 March 1714 and Baden, 7 September 1714) epitomized the disintegration of the Grand Alliance.

During the early years of the War of the Spanish Succession, Austrian finance and administration were in a chaotic condition. When the Habsburgs were no longer able to borrow money at home, they borrowed from their Allies, particularly England. Between 1702 and 1706 Austria borrowed more than £700,000 from England. In Austria corruption was rampant, tax yields were fluctuating, and the imperial court was fractious and factious. Austria was also militarily dependent on her Allies. Although Austria had agreed to supply a quota of 82,000 men, she had never been able to fulfill it. Not only did Austria not fulfill her quota, but she also withdrew her troops from the war effort in order to suppress the Hungarian rebellion. The repeated failure of the Austrians at Ulm (September 1702), Rottenburg, Hall, and Ratisbon (autumn 1703) greatly exasperated the Allies. When the elector of Bavaria easily seized Passau (11 January 1704), the key to the emperor's hereditary countries, the allied contention that the emperor could not simultaneously maintain three war fronts, that is Italy, the Rhine, and Hungary seemed substantiated. The Allies also were annoyed over the imperial commander, the Margrave of Baden's procrastination, delays, and
ineffectual lines of Stollhofen. Allied disgust with Baden increased to such a degree that Sunderland requested Baden's dismissal in 1705. To a certain extent Baden was used as a scapegoat to camouflage Austria's military deficiencies. Both the imperial army in Italy and on the Rhine were poorly supplied and poorly reinforced. Matters became so critical in Italy that Prince Eugene threatened to resign (12 March 1705).

From its very inception the Grand Alliance of Vienna was wracked by dissension. In principle Leopold opposed the Grand Alliance idea of partitioning the Spanish empire. Emperor Leopold in fact thought of the treaty of the Grand Alliance of September 1702 as just another Partition Treaty. Even after he signed the Grand Alliance, Leopold continued to insist upon his right to inherit the whole Spanish empire. During the war Austria opposed England's desire to cede parts of the Spanish empire in order to gain more allies. Exemplary of the basic Anglo-Austrian conflict was the treaty with Portugal (1703). The emperor did not want the alliance of Portugal, he only wanted her neutrality because he did not want to cede parts of Spain, such as Galicia and Extremadura, to Portugal. Furthermore Leopold did not believe that the Portuguese alliance would be of any use to the Allies. If the Spanish people were pro-Habsburg, Archduke Charles would not need Portuguese aid, and if they were anti-Habsburg, Portuguese aid would be of no use either. The Maritime Powers, especially England thought that a Portuguese alliance would be very useful in establishing another diversionary front against the
Bourbons, harming French trade, increasing English trade, and providing ports for the English fleet. Even though England knew that Austria was unalterably opposed to the alliance, she persisted in her negotiations with Portugal. The allied conflict over the Portuguese Treaty is epitomized in the quarrel of Count Karl Ernst Waldstein, the imperial representative at Lisbon, and John Methuen, the English representative to Portugal. Ironically enough the emperor, who had opposed the treaty from the outset, was able to obtain an allied commitment to secure the entire Spanish inheritance for Archduke Charles.

At the outset of the war, the Allies had irreconciliable views on strategy. The emperor preferred to concentrate his forces in Italy while the Maritime Powers wanted to concentrate them on the Rhine. The Habsburgs regarded Italy as the most important theatre of war because of its proximity to the hereditary countries and to France. The Habsburgs also regarded Italy as essential in maintaining the imperial fiefs there and in securing the Italian princes, especially Venice and the papacy to the imperial interest. The Habsburgs, along with their advisers, thought that once Italy was conquered the rest of the Spanish empire would follow easily. The emperor was particularly concerned about helping the Neapolitans, who were very pro-Habsburg. After England repeatedly refused to send the fleet to aid the emperor in his conquest of Naples (1701-1703), relations between the two powers rapidly worsened.
England was also annoyed over the emperor's totally inadequate efforts to support the English fleet. In 1703 Leopold had promised England that there would be 80,000 men in Italy to support the fleet, but by December 1703 there were only 21,000. England felt perfectly justified in postponing the Naples expedition because of the emperor's insufficient preparations and because of the Admiralty's concern over the return of the fleet.

Before 1703 the Allies were complaining about the Habsburgs' myopia over Italy, but after 1703, they were criticizing the emperor's neglect of the Italian theater, and especially the emperor's failure to aid the duke of Savoy. In 1705 the Maritime Powers feared that, thanks to imperial negligence, Savoy would be overrun by the French under Vendôme. The dispute over the merits of a Toulon or Naples expedition in 1706-1707 epitomized the allied conflicts over Italy. The ignominious failure of the Toulon expedition and the conclusion of the Secret Treaty of Milan (March 1707) further debilitated the Grand Alliance.

Much to England's annoyance the emperor became diplomatically embroiled with Venice and with the pope in the early years of the war. England greatly feared that Austria would break off the relations with the pope because of the Del Vasto affair in Naples, the absence of the papal nuncio at the ceremony proclaiming Charles King of Spain, the papal compliment of the duke of Anjou at Naples, and the subsequent refusal of Leopold to admit the papal nuncio to court.

England also blamed Austria for the Venetians' refusal to enter
Grand Alliance. The Venetian distrust of the Austrians, their annoyance over the conduct of the Austrian representative, Count Franz Anthony Berka, the imperial invasion of their neutral territory, the miserable condition of the imperial army in Italy and their fear of French reprisal soon dispelled England's hopes for a Venetian alliance.

More than anything else, the Maritime Powers' interference in the "domestic" concerns of the empire eroded the Grand Alliance. Diplomatic pressure from the United Provinces, Prussia, and Sweden impelled England to remonstrate to the emperor about the prosecution of Protestants in the empire. The emperor whenever, told about the prosecution, reminded England, much to her annoyance, of analogous Catholic prosecution in England and Ireland. This intervention achieved nothing but the embitterment of relations between Austria and her Allies.

Austria also regarded the Maritime Powers' interference in the Bavarian and Hungarian negotiations as an unpardonable intrusion in her "domestic" affairs. The Habsburgs, who were extremely jealous of the elector of Bavaria remembered only too vividly England's partiality for the Wittelsbachs in the hated Paritition Treaty. England imputed the blame for the Franco-Bavarian alliance (autumn 1702) to Leopold. England resented the emperor's failure to negotiate with the elector or to grant some of the elector's prestigious and territorial demands in the Holy Roman Empire and in the Spanish Empire. The emperor adamantly refused to grant these demands, in spite of allied pressure, because they would have greatly damaged imperial authority and
Habsburg power in the empire. The Habsburgs' intransigence in fact lost the Allies an excellent army of 29,000.

Even after the elector's seizure of Passau (11 January 1704), the Maritime Powers were still willing to negotiate with the elector. After January 1704, however, the Habsburgs were determined to destroy the elector "root and branch." After the allied failure to negotiate with the elector, Marlborough and Prince Eugene forced the elector out of the war at the decisive battle of Blenheim (August 1704). After the Treaty of Ilbersheim (7 November 1704), which placed all of the elector's lands, except Munich, under Austrian military occupation, the Allies still wrangled over Bavaria. England particularly objected to Joseph's vindictive policy in Bavaria which forced the Bavarians to contribute heavily to the war effort in both men and money and which subsequently caused uprisings against the Austrian regime. These uprisings necessitated the recall of imperial troops and further angered the United Provinces and England.

The primary cause of the disintegration of the Grand Alliance was the Maritime Powers' intervention in the Hungarian rebellion. Despite Stepney's advice against English interference, England felt impelled to intervene because of her sympathy for the rebels, her fear that the emperor would withdraw troops from the Rhine to Hungary, and her anxiety that the Turks might openly intervene and aid the rebels. Austria, however, did not want English interference in the rebellion, she only wanted English military aid to suppress the rebellion after continual pressure from the Maritime Powers, Austria accepted their
mediation in the Hungarian rebellion on 11 February 1704. Both Leopold and Joseph were forced to accept this mediation because of their financial and military dependence on the Maritime Powers and because of their desire to avoid Swedish, Prussian or Venetian interference. The allied victories of Blenheim (August 1704) and Ramillies (spring 1706) did not mitigate but rather increased allied tensions because once the Habsburgs were relieved of imminent danger, they broke off their negotiations with the rebels as at Schemnitz (October 1704) and Tyrnau (October 1705–October 1706) and tried to suppress the rebels by force. The withdrawal of four regiments from the Rhine to Hungary in 1706 greatly angered the Maritime Powers. The Maritime Powers resented what they regarded as Austrian intransigence in the negotiations. By 1706, however, the rebels had lost a great deal of allied sympathy by their unreasonable demands. Stepney's quarrel with Wratishlaw throughout 1703, 1704, 1705 and 1706 and the special commission of Baron D'Amelo and the Earl of Sunderland in 1705 illustrate how erosive allied meddling in the Hungarian rebellion was. If anyone could have succeeded in uniting the Maritime Powers and Austria, it would have been George Stepney who had an unrivalled understanding of Austrian affairs. Stepney's failure and subsequent recall was an ominous portent for Austro-allied relations.
George Stepney (1661-1707), who has been aptly described as "the leading diplomatist of William's reign" was descended from the Stepneys of Prendergast in Pembrokeshire. His father, George, was groom of the chamber to Charles II and his grandfather, Sir Thomas, was knight and cupbearer to Charles I. He was born at Westminster in 1661 and was educated at Westminster school, where he formed his lifelong friendship with "Chamont" (Charles Montague, later Earl of Halifax) and where he grew up with "Jemmy" (James Montague) and "Matt" (Matthew Prior). At Whitsuntide 1682 he was elected a scholar of Trinity College, Cambridge, where he early acquired a reputation as a writer of Latin verse. He graduated B.A. in 1687, M.A. in 1689 and became a fellow of his college in 1687.3


3 B.M., Add.MSS.41804, Petition of George Stepney for a Fellowship to Trinity College, 1687.
In 1688 Stepney, along with Charles Montague, joined William's side in the "Glorious Revolution." With the help of Montague, Stepney entered upon a very successful diplomatic career by becoming secretary to Sir Peter Wych at Hamburg (1687) and later to James Johnson at Berlin (1691). He also received valuable experience in Flanders in 1696 as a secretarial assistant to William Blathwayt, William III's acting Secretary of State.  

Stepney was later in charge of affairs at Prussia (1692), secretary at Vienna (1693), and commissary and deputy to Saxony (1693-1694). He also served as minister to Hesse-Cassel (1694-1695) and Saxony (1695) and as envoy extraordinary to Cologne (1695-1696), Mainz (1695-1696), Hesse-Cassel (1695-1697), the Palatinate (1695-1697), Treves (1695-1697), Saxony (1698) and Vienna (1701-1705). As envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary Stepney served in Vienna (1705-1706), Hesse-Cassel (1706-1707) and the United Provinces (1706-1707). Stepney in fact had spent more than one-third of his life abroad and most of his service had been in the Holy Roman Empire.  


5 For details of Stepney's diplomatic career refer to DNB, XVIII, 1077-1078; Horn, British Diplomatic Representatives, pp. 7, 29-30, 54-56, 60-61, 84, 86, 102, 103, 140, 159; Elizabeth Halbeisin, "George Stepney, A Calendar, 1698-1707," Noted and Queries, CLIX (1930), 93-96, 114-117, hereafter cited as Halbeisin, "George Stepney."
Stepney has been eulogized as "probably the most active and successful native diplomatist of William's reign." It has also been said of Stepney that "no Englishman ever understood the affairs of Germany so well, and few Germans better." George Stepney's life as a career diplomat is significant because it illustrates what Margery Lane has described as the "gradual evolution of a body of capable and disciplined public servants." Although patronage was still very important, talent was beginning to play a more important role in advancement during William's reign (1688-1702). Although Montague's patronage undoubtedly helped Stepney greatly in his career, in large part Stepney was so successful because of his "zeal, success, parts, and application..." and his "exact and ingenious reports."

"One of the finest poets of his time," "one of the best poets now in England" so has Stepney been rather extravagantly praised

6 Horn, British Diplomatic Service, p. 112.
9 HMC, Buccleuch-Queensbury MSS, II, part 1, 96-97, Shrewsbury to Blathwayt, 20 July 1694.
10 Ibid., f. 66, Shrewsbury to Blathwayt, 21 May 1694.
12 Macky, Memoirs, p. 142.
for his verse. In reality, as Sir George Murray has said Stepney was "a very indifferent poet."\textsuperscript{13} Jonathan Swift rather derogatively described Stepney's poetry as "scarce of a third rate".\textsuperscript{14} Though by present standards Stepney's poetry has been overrated, many of Stepney's contemporaries thought highly of it. Several of Stepney's poems have been published. Illustrative of his poetry is this excerpt from "An Epistle to Charles Montague Esq. on His Majesties Voyage to Holland" (London, 1691).

Sir,

Since you oft invite me to renew
An art I've either lost or never knew
Pleas'd my past follies to commend,
And fondly lose the critic in the friend:
Though my warm youth untimely be decay'd,
From grave to dull insensibly betray'd,
I'll contradict the humour of the times,
Inclin'd to business and averse to rhymes,
And to obey the man I love in spite
Of the worlds' genius and my own, I'll write.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{13}George Murray, Marlborough's Dispatches, V, 643.

\textsuperscript{14}Scot, Swift's Works, XII, 236-237.

George Stepney also contributed to the pamphlet warfare, which erupted in late 1700 over Philip of Anjou's accession to the Spanish throne (16 November 1700). In his "Essay Upon the Present Interest of England" (1701), Stepney contends forcibly that England must reduce the "overgrown power" of France and must not allow Louis XIV to delude England into a false sense of security. The "necessary consequences" of a peace were for Stepney, the "utter ruin and destruction of our trade liberty and religion." Politically Stepney was a Whig and was a member of the Kit-Cat club, "the most fashionable of Whig clubs, devoted to politics, letters, wine and women."

In August 1707 Stepney was taken ill of the "bloody flux" at The Hague. He returned to England in the futile hope that either his native air or the physicians would cure him. He died unmarried in Paradise Row, Chelsea, on 15 September 1707 and was buried in great


state a week later in Westminster Abbey. In his will Stepney left £50 to Matthew Prior, in cancellation of a long standing debt, a golden cup and a hundred tomes of his library to the Earl of Halifax, the rest of his library to Mr. Lewis, and a silver basin and ewer to Mr. Cardonnel. The remainder of his estate went to his two sisters. The best part of his estate ironically was a treasury debt of over £7,000.

In the aisle of Westminster Abbey, a monument was later erected to his memory, containing his bust and eulogistic epitaph. After a brief summation of Stepney’s career, the epitaph reads

Georgius Stephys Armiger
Vir
Ob ingenij acumen,
Literarum scientam,
Morum suavitatem,
Rerum usum,
Virorum amplissimorum consuetudinem,
Linguae, Stylia, ac Vitae elegantiam,
Beneclera officia cum Britanniae tum Europas prasetita,
Sua cetate multum celebretus,
Apud prostuos semper celebrandus


21 Westminster Abbey, Stepney’s Monument.
Stepney's death was greatly deplored. Marlborough in particular wrote that he was deeply affected by Stepney's death for "no man can be so acceptable nor useful to the public in this country." 22 Charles Whitworth, who had served his diplomatic apprenticeship under Stepney at Vienna, and who believed that no one "had the honour to know him better ... 23 was particularly grieved and wrote to Stepney's sisters that he had lost "a most tender Father ... the best of Friends and Masters. ..." 24

George Stepney has been aptly described by John Macky as a Gentleman of admirable Natural parts very Learned, one of the best Poets now in England, and, perhaps equal to any that ever was; hath an admirable, clear Stile in his Letters; of very good, diverting Conversation; a thorough Statesman, speaks all the Modern Languages, as well as Antient, perfectly well. Is a short man in Stature, with a pleasant Countenance, towards forty Years old.

22 Murray, Marlborough's Dispatches, III, 54, Marlborough to Harley, Helchin, 12 September 1707. Also consult Murray III, 611, Marlborough to Harley, 3 October 1770; HMC, Portland MSS. IV, 455, Alais to E. Lewis, 7 October 1707.

23 B.M., Add. MSS. 37355, Whitworth to Stepney's sisters, 30 November 1707.

24 Ibid.

George Stepney was a good friend and witty correspondent of Charles Montague, William Blathwayt, Princess Sophie of Hanover, Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, Joseph Addison, and many others. He was also a member of the Royal Society (1697) and a commissioner of the Board of Trade (1697).

Witty correspondent, poet, diplomat, scholar, member of the Royal Society and Kit-Cat club, such was George Stepney. Undoubtedly Stepney, who had spent more than one third of his life abroad in the foreign service, excelled as a diplomat. He had a grasp of German affairs that none of his contemporaries could equal. Marlborough in fact often remarked that "Stepney is very capable of carrying anything on with discretion." Such was the man whom William III appointed as envoy extraordinary to Emperor Leopold at Vienna in early 1701.


Leopold I, one of the most successful and conscientious of the Habsburg emperors, had an unshakeable conviction that God was on the side of the House of Habsburg. Leopold I (1640-1705) was the second son of Ferdinand III and the Infanta Maria Anna of Spain. He was destined for the priesthood until the death of his elder brother Ferdinand of smallpox (1654) made him heir to the Austrian dominions. With an Austrian Habsburg for a father and a Spanish Habsburg for a mother, Leopold had all the Habsburg physical attributes; a long narrow face, blond hair, large light eyes, hollow cheeks, a prominent nose, a long pointed chin, and the "Habsburg" protruding lower lip. He was short in stature, thin, pale, and walked with a tottering gait. Many of his contemporaries described him as "repulsively" ugly. Leopold was a silent reserved type of man who had grace in neither manners nor address. ¹ Louis de Rouvroy, Duc de Saint-Simon, in his memoirs described him as a man with "une laideur

ignoble, une mine basse, une simplicité fort éloignée de la pompe imperiale."  

Although in appearance Leopold was not imposing, he had a strong sense of the imperial dignity and of his duty toward God, family, and country. Indicative of his strong sense of duty was his emulation of Philip II. When Leopold became emperor in 1658, the empire was war-ravaged, administratively chaotic, financially unstable, and threatened on the East by the Turks, and on the West by France. Leopold attributed all his success in raising the Turkish siege from Vienna (1683), reconquering Hungary, incorporating Transylvania, achieving recognition of the male Habsburg line in primogeniture as the Hungarian kings at the Diet of Pressburg (1687), and restoring the empire to its former vigor, to God. He did not doubt for one moment that God was working for the House of Habsburg. As Hugo Hantsch so aptly phrased it, Leopold had "eine grosse Zuversicht und ein unermesslich Gottvertrauen."  

The emperor

2Saint-Simon, Mémoires, XIII, 34-35.

3Hantsch, Geschichte Oesterreichs, p. 94. For Leopold's character also refer to Frischauer, Die Habsburger, pp. 197-199; Gaedeke, Die Politik Oesterreichs, p. 265; Srbik, Wien und Versailles, pp.26-27; Redlich, Oesterreich, pp. 48-52; Nana Eisenberg, "Studien zur Historiographie über Kaiser Leopolds I, Mitteilungen des österreichischen Instituts für Geschichtsforschung, LIX (1937), 359-413.
was a profoundly religious man and lead an exemplary life. Because of his great awareness of his duty to God, he was a very conscientious ruler.

Leopold has been labelled vacillating, short-sighted, lacking in purpose, initiative, and insight, and one of the weakest Habsburgs rulers. Charles Edward Vehse in particular condemns what he terms Leopold's "wretched system of timid procrastination."^ Leopold, who has been derided for his contemporaries for his "inveterate irresolution" was, like Philip II of Spain, wary of making hasty decisions. Once, however, he believed that a certain policy was the correct one, he adhered tenaciously to it, and, according to Saint-Simon, used any means to attain his end. Leopold has also been depicted as a man who let his advisers and the Jesuits rule for him. In reality Leopold ruled, not his advisers. Leopold's detractors do not recognize his great penetrating judgment which always enabled him to select the most talented men to

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^Saint-Simon, Mémoires, XIII, 356.
serve him, such as Prince Eugene of Savoy and General Raimondo, Count of Montecuccoli, and his great achievements in consolidating and increasing Habsburg power. 7

Leopold was interested in history and collected books and antiquities. He was also a talented musician and composer. Under his guidance the Jesuit universities of Innsbruck, Olmutz, and Breslau, were founded. Leopold married three times: first to his Spanish cousin, Margaret Theresa (1651-1673) in 1666, then to Claudia Felicitas of Habsburg-Tirol, an Austrian archduchess (1653-1676) in 1673, and later to Princess Eleanor of Palatine Neuburg (1655-1720) in 1676. His first wife bore him a daughter, Maria Antonia, who married Max Emmanuel, Elector of Bavaria (1685), one of the most powerful men in the empire, while his third wife Eleanor gave him two sons, the future emperors Joseph and Charles. Despite all Leopold's limitations as a ruler, his reign is distinguished by many great achievements. Leopold, who firmly believed that God was on the side of the House of Habsburg, tenaciously adhered to what he regarded as the Habsburgs' inalienable right to the Spanish throne.

"Un prince importé, violent d’esprit et de talents au-dessous du mediocre..." so had Joseph, King of the Romans (1678-1711), later Emperor (1705-1711) been described by Saint-Simon, a very partial observer. Jacob Jan Hamel Bruyninx, the Dutch envoy extraordinary at Vienna, saw Joseph as "un Prince d’un tres bon naturel, et qui a toutes les belles qualitez qu’il faut, pour en pouvoir esperer un gouvernement... bien car il promet de l’application, il a de la prudence avec de la vivacité, de la vigeure avec de la moderation, de la promptitude sans precipitation, et de la resolution; de sorte que si Dieu donne des bon conseillers..." Joseph, like his father was very conscious of the exalted dignity of his position and of his duty towards God and his empire. Physically, Joseph did not possess the characteristic Habsburg lower lip, and was said to be uncommonly pleasing in appearance, address, and manner, in contrast to his father. Basically Joseph was a very generous, just, and intelligent emperor, who was clever, energetic, resolute, and keenly interested in military affairs. Joseph possessed a very violent temper, a passion for women and for hunting, and a love

8 Saint-Simon, Mémoires, XXI, 132-133.

of physical exercise and music. Although Joseph has been stigmatized as a "prodigue et ami du plaisir", his abilities as a statesman far outweighed his defects. He, with his younger brother Charles, had urged Leopold to fight Louis XIV for the Spanish inheritance. Joseph married Wilhelmina Amalia of Brunswick-Luneburg (1699) who bore him two daughters but no sons.

Archduke Charles (1685-1740), later Charles VI, the Austrian Habsburg claimant to the Spanish Empire was "the darling son and hope of the family." Charles was a very attractive, well-educated prince, who knew music well and spoke several languages fluently. Leopold's hopes were centered on Charles because Joseph, his elder brother and heir to the throne, did not and it seemed was not going to have any male heirs, so that the throne would go to Charles after Joseph's death.

10 See B.M., Add.MSS.9267, ff.107-113; Frischauer, Die Habsburger, p.225, Wyon, Queen Anne; I, 359; Erdsmannsdorfer, Deutsche Geschichte, p.211; ADR, XIV, 534-542; P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 105/62/72, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 18 May 1701; Johann Herchenhahn, Geschichte der Regierung Kaiser Joseph des Ersten, I (Leipzig, 1786); Braubach, Prinz Eugen, pp.180-184; and Braubach Prinz Eugen, II, 130-134.

Ferdinand Bonaventura, Count of Harrach (1637-1706) was the emperor's Master of the Horse, Grand Master of the empire, first minister and man whom Leopold often referred to as "his only friend." Harrach grew up with and hunted with Leopold. Harrach was in fact Leopold's favorite and was one of the emperor's oldest servants. Basically Harrach was an honorable, incorruptible, active, self-confident minister and patron of the arts. He was a bitter opponent of Count Dominik Kaunitz, Vice-chancellor of the empire. Harrach had powerful friends in Count Francis Joseph Lamberg, governor of Upper Austria, his brother-in-law, and his friend Count Karl Ferdinand Wallenstein, the Grand Chamberlain. Count Wallenstein, who was next in favor with Leopold, formed, along with Harrach, Count Julius Frederick Buccellini, the Chancellor of Austria, Count Wolfgang Ottingen, President of the Council Aulique, and Count Henry Mansfeld, Marshal of the court, the core of the old ministerial party.

14 Frischauer, Prince Eugene, p. 211.

15 B.M., Add. MSS. 37, 156, f. 232, Conseil d'Etat de l'Empereur Leopold of 25 April 1705; HMC, Bath MSS., III, 14, Stepney to Trenchard, Vienna, 20 October 1693; Srbik, Wien und Versailles, p. 32; Arneth, Prinz Eugen, I, 201 B.M., Add. MSS. 9720, f. 106, Stepney to Blathwayt, Vienna, 17 August 1701; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/63/196-197, Stepney to Blathwayt, Vienna, 17 August 1701; Add. MSS. 9721, f. 16, Stepney to Blathwayt, Vienna, 12 October 1701; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/66, Stepney to Blathwayt, Vienna, 18 October 1702; S.P. Germany, 105/62/132, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 22 June 1701; S.P. Germany, 105/64/364, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 21 December 1701/

16 ADB, XIV, 537; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/65, Stepney to Vernon, Vienna, 9 April 1702, S.P. 80/26, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 3 June 1705.
Henry Francis, Count of Mansfeld, Prince of Fundi (1641-1715), Marshal of the court, president of the Council of War (20 July 1701) and later Grand Chamberlain to the emperor was a "haughty, sometimes implacable" man of "excellent parts, Courteous in his address, quick in his conception, lively in his imagination & eloquent in his expressions." The conscientious Mansfeld was jealous of his authority as president of the Council of War and would not let Kaunitz encroach on his power as Kaunitz had done with his predecessor, the late Count Stahremberg. The enmity between Mansfeld and Kaunitz developed to such an extent that Kaunitz would not even enter Mansfeld's house. Among Mansfeld's supporters at court were his nephew, Count Leopold William Auersberg, Count Johann Wenzel Wratislaw, and Count Gothard Henry Salaberg, president of the Chamber.

17 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/64, Stepney to Blathwayt, Vienna, 19 November 1701.
18 Ibid.
19 ADB, III, 176; Arneth, Prinz Eugen, I, 201; B.M., Add. MSS. 9721, f. 104; Stepney to Blathwayt, Vienna, 13 August 1701, f. 83, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 19 November 1701; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/64, Stepney to Blathwayt, Vienna, 19 November 1701.
Count Dominik Andreas Kaunitz (1655-1705), a bitter opponent of Mansfeld, had served as the first commissioner at the peace of Ryswick (1697) before being appointed Vice-Chancellor of the empire, an office which he held for life. Kaunitz was a very industrious minister of "great judgement and experience" and a "man of Honour and Capacity." In order to gain more credit in the eyes of the emperor, Kaunitz rose very early in the morning and worked hard all day long. Count Kaunitz, however, had many powerful enemies, such as Count Mansfeld, Count Harrach, and Count Salaberg, president of the Chamber. Joseph, King of the Romans, also often opposed his interests. Another detriment to his career was his well known partiality for the elector of Bavaria. Kaunitz had many powerful supporters in his brother-in-law, Count George Adam Martinitz, former ambassador to Rome, and in his cousin,

21 P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 80/25, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 1 January 1705.

22 P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 105/63/196, Stepney to Blathwayt, 17 August 1701.

23 For information about Kaunitz's character refer to ADB, XV, 485-486; P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 80/25, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 1 January 1705; B.M., Add.MSS. 9720, Stepney to Blathwayt, Vienna, 17 August 1701; Add.MSS. 9721, f.16, Stepney to Blathwayt, Vienna, 12 October 1701; P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 105/64/86, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 12 October 1701.

24 P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 105/63/196-196, Stepney to Blathwayt, Vienna, 17 August 1701; B.M., Add.MSS. 9720, f.106, Stepney to Blathwayt, Vienna, 17 August 1701; P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 105/64/252, Stepney to Blathwayt, Vienna, 19 November 1701.

25 P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 105/66, Stepney to Hedges, 18 October 1702.
Count Francis Ludwig Zinzendorf. 26

Count Francis Ludwig Zinzendorf (1661-1742) was a very influential minister under Leopold, Joseph, and Maria Theresa. He served as the emperor's envoy to France before the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession and subsequently as the emperor's envoy to Sweden (1703). Zinzendorf was later Chancellor at court in Vienna and member of the Council of Conference. 27 His cousin Count Kaunitz, Prince Salm, the Elector Palatine, and the Duke of Marlborough were his chief supporters. 28 Both Marlborough and Stepney thought highly of him as a minister and respected his zeal for the imperial interests. 29 Zinzendorf has been characterized as "vains, glorieux, meprisants, et foibles ..." 30 and as "ehrgeizige und raffgierige ..., schlecht, flasch, unredlich, rücksichtlos, undankbar ..." 31 Although Zinzendorf may

26P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 105/62, Stepney to Hedges, 22 June 1701.
27ADB, LV. 338-339; Arneth, Prinz Eugen, I, 348; B.M., Add. MSS. 28, 912, f. 74, Stepney to Ellis, Vienna, 27 September 1702; P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 80/19, Steoney to Hedges, Vienna, 23 December 1702; and B.M., Add. MSS. 9721, f. 12, Stepney to Hedges, 5 October 1701.
29B.M., Add. MSS. 7051, ff. 22-23, Marlborough to Stepney, Borchloe, 11 August 1703; P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 105/69, Stepney to Marlborough, Vienna, 29 August 1703; Warner, Epistolary Curiosities, pp. 52-53.
30Dargenson quoted in Saint-Simon, Mémoires, IX, 76.
31Braubach, Prinz Eugen, p. 192.
have been to a certain extent vain, unreliable, selfish and intriguing, his talents as a courtier far outweighed his faults. He was a cool, reserved, loyal and very penetrating statesman and courtier.  

Another very influential figure at the imperial court was Charles Otto Theodore, Prince of Salm, (1645-1710), Grand Master of the King of the Romans and minister of the Council of Conference, and tutor of Joseph, King of the Romans. He had earlier earned his reputation as a military man by taking part in the siege of Vienna, he was subsequently made Field Marshal. He was a man of great intellectual abilities and was completely devoted to both Leopold and Joseph. Salm was a cousin of Leopold and of the Empress Eleanor. He was a very capable man, but was plagued in his later years by recurring illness. Among Salm's supporters were Johann Friedrich von Seilern, Cardinal Vincent Grimani, former imperial representative to Rome, Count Philip Ludwig Zinzendorf, Friedrich Karl von Schönborn, the Vice Chancellor, Count Leopold Joseph Schlick, and the Marquis de Prie, representative of the Duke of Savoy at Vienna. He was opposed at court to Prince Eugene of Savoy, Count Stahremberg, and Count Wratislaw and to their policy of increasing

32 Braubach, Prinz Eugen, p. 192; Sorel, Recueil, Autriche, I, 230, 204, 164; ADE, XXXIV, 408; Redlich, Oesterreich, 40-44.

33 Braubach, Prinz Eugen, II, 135-136; B.M., Add. MSS. 37, 156, 2. 232; Arneth, Prinz Eugen, I, 203; HMC, Bath MSS., III, 13; Stepney to Trenchard, Vienna, 2 October 1693.
the power and glory of Austria rather than the power of the empire.\footnote{Noorden, \textit{Europäische Geschichte}, II, 129; Braubach, \textit{Prinz Eugen}, II, 136-137; Braubach, \textit{Prinz Eugen}, p. 185; B.M., Add. MSS. 9094, f. 60, Stepney to Marlborough, Vienna, 9 May 1706; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/75/185, Stepney to Cardonnel, Vienna, 1 April 1705; S.P. Germany, 105/75, Stepney to Sutton, Vienna, 25 May 1706.}

Leopold Matthias, Count Lamberg (1167-1711) was Grand Veneur to the King of the Romans and his chief favorite because of his quick, lively, gay disposition, and his fondness for the hunt. He was nephew to Cardinal Philip Lamberg, Bishop of Passau and a was a good friend of both Count Harrach and Count Kaunitz.\footnote{ABB, XIV, 537; Vehse, \textit{Austria}, II, 87; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/4/270, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 26 November 1701.} For a time he was not in favor at court because of his brother's elopement with the Princess of Lichtenstein.\footnote{B.M., Add. MSS. 28, 912, Stepney to Ellis, Vienna, 27 September 1702; 11 October 1702 and P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 30/19, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 27 September 1702.}

Johann Wenael, Count Wratislaw (1169-1712) was the imperial representative at London (1701-1704). Wratislaw was very influential under Leopold, but really gained ascendancy only after Joseph became emperor. He was also a favorite of Charles VI who frequently and fondly referred to him as "mein Dicker". Wratislaw was a nephew of the...
Chancellor of Bohemia, Count Ulric Kinsky and relative of Count Wallenstein and of Count Harrach. His most influential supporters were Count Mansfeld, the Duke of Moles, former ambassador to Charles II to Vienna and Prince Eugene of Savoy. Wraitlaw also received some support from Count Schlick, who married Wratislaw's sister. Schlick, however, was a very good friend of Prince Salm and heartily detested Prince Eugene of Savoy, who was Wratislaw's closest friend. Wratislaw had interceded with his patron Count Kinsky to procure for Eugene the command in Hungary and later in Italy. Later Prince Eugene did all that he could to advance Wratislaw's interests. The substantial support which Eugene gave Wratislaw occasioned, as Stepney reported a bon mot in Vienna that "formerly St. Stephen carried little Jesus, but now the picture is...

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37 Duke Francis Moles entered the emperor's service in 1700 and served as the Imperial representative to Archduke Charles in Spain. In general he is depicted as a cunning and intriguing man. Refer to Braubach, Prinz Eugen, 190; B.M., Add.MSS.7059,f.153, Stepney to Crowe, Vienna, 31 July 1705.

38 P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 105/69, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 22 August 1703, Stepney to Buckingham, Vienna, 29 August 1703; B.M., Add.MSS.9720, Stepney to Blathwayt, Vienna, 16 July 1701; P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 105/64/86, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 12 October 1701, S.P. 105/65, Stepney to Vernon, Vienna, 9 April 1702.

39 P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 105/75, Stepney to Cardonnel, Vienna, 1 April 1705; Braubach, Prinz Eugen, p.185; Noorden, Europaische Geschichte, II, 129; B.M., Add.MSS.28,910, Whitworth to Ellis, Vienna, 25 January 1702.
Wratislaw was a man of elephantine bulk, quick wit, and a strong sense of duty. He was also a genial clever courtier and very able statesman. He was, however, very impatient, quick-tempered, and self-willed and had what Oswald Redlich describes as an unheard of candor. Even Marlborough, one of Wratislaw's friends, warned Secretary of State Nottingham that Wratislaw was "very positive and not well pleased with such as differ with him." William III frequently complained of Wratislaw's "manières fatigantes." Both


41 Braubach, Prinz Eugen, II, 137-138; Prince Eugene, Feldzüge, I, 3-4.

42 Redlich, Oesterreich, pp. 40-41.

43 Murray, Marlborough's Dispatches, I, 26, Marlborough to Nottingham, Asch, 31 August 1703. Also refer to Murray, I, 121, Marlborough to Stepney, Hanaff, 22 June 1703; P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/75, Stepney to Dayrolle, Vienna, 18 March 1705.

44 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/65, Stepney to Vernon, Vienna, 2 April 1702.
Stepney and Thomas Wentworth, Lord Raby, heartily detested him. Stepney regarded him as "a wretch which hardly anybody can endure" and as an "Enemy to our Name and Nation" and Raby saw him as "prow'd concealed coxcombe." During Wratislaw's mission to London he made himself so obnoxious to the ministers in London that Stepney tried to get him recalled and Anthonie Heinsius, the Grand Pensioner, requested Count Peter Goes, the imperial minister at The Hague, to write to Kaunitz about Wratislaw's behavior. Later Wratislaw requested his own recall.

Prince Eugene of Savoy (1663-1736), often called the "first soldier of the Empire" was very influential with both Joseph and Leopold. He was born in Paris and was the grandson of Duke Charles Emmanuel of Savoy and son of Olympia Mancini, a niece of Cardinal Mazarin. Eugene was forced to enter the church and was dubbed by

45 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/75, Stepney to Dayrolle, Vienna, 18 March 1705.

46 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/75, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 13 June 1705.

47 B.M., Add. MSS. 7061, f. 209, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 28 February 1705.

48 For information about Wratislaw's recall consult P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/66, Tucker to Stepney, Whitehall, 31 October 1702; S.P. Germany, 105/67, Tucker to Stepney, Whitehall, 12 January 1704; S.P. Germany, 105/68/78, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 22 April 1703; S.P. Germany, 105/65, Stepney to Albemarle, Vienna, 19 April 1702; Stepney to Vernon, 2 April 1702.
Louis XIV, "le petit abbé." After the early death of his father in exile, Eugene left Paris to go to Vienna, where he soon achieved a notable military reputation at the battle of Zenta (1697) through his mastery of the art of movement, acute observation, and daring.\textsuperscript{49} Eugene fought well with and became close friends with Marlborough during the War of the Spanish Succession. Marlborough said of Eugene, "I not only esteem but really love that prince."\textsuperscript{50} Prince Eugene was also popular with the people of England. In London Wratislaw reported that the English people esteemed Eugene more than they did Caesar or Alexander.\textsuperscript{51} Eugene's cousins included Maximilian II Emmanuel of Bavaria and Prince Louis of Baden.

Prince Eugene's honor, strong sense of duty, and powerful belief in God underlay all his actions. Basically he was a generous, kind, honorable, loyal, persistent, and sometimes implacable man. Eugene was also a bountiful patron of the Enlightenment and patronized such architects as J.B. Fischer von Erlach and L. Von Hildebrandt and sculptors, such as Balthasar Permoser. As a statesman, Eugene opposed.

\textsuperscript{49}Churchill, Marlborough, I, 467-468; Ernest Lavisse, Histoire de France, VIII, part I (Paris, 1908), 89; Frischauer, Prince Eugene.

\textsuperscript{50}Churchill, Marlborough, II, 220 and refer to Otruba, Prinz Eugen und Marlborough, pp. 28-102.

\textsuperscript{51}Helmut Oehler, Prinz Eugen im Urteil Europas (Munich, 1944), p. 294.
the growing power of France and advocated consolidating and increasing the power of Habsburg lands as a basis of imperial power. Politically Eugene pressed for war, along with the king of the Roman and the Archduke Charles, and allied himself politically with Wratislaw against Prince Salm. 52

Another important figure in the imperial circles was Johann Wenzel, Count Gallas, Duke of Lucera (1669-1719), the imperial representative at London and Wratislaw's successor (1705-1711). Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Marquis de Torcy described him as a wise man and one of the most enlightened ministers of the imperial court abroad. 53 Count Gallas' patrons at court were Count Harrach and Count Mansfeld. 64 Gallas was well received in England because of his great abilities and his natural affability, but was later refused admission to Queen Anne's court in 1711 because of his strong opposition to the peace negotiations and his friendship with such notable Whigs as Thomas Wharton and Robert Spencer, Earl of Sunderland. Gallas further enraged the Tories by publishing the preliminaries of peace in the Daily Courant. He left England on 28 November 1711. 55

52 Braubach, Prinz Eugen, V, 342-343; Braubach, Prinz Eugen, pp. 15-16; Bibl, Prinz Eugen, pp. 310-315; Henderson, Prince Eugene.

53 Torcy, Mémoires, I, 178.

54 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/65, Stepney to Lewis, 25 March 1705.

55 ADB, VIII, 319-320; Noble, Biographical History, II, 411.
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<td>Margaret</td>
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<td>Leopold I</td>
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<td>Princess Eleanor of</td>
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<td>Pfalz-Neuburg</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joseph I</td>
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<tr>
<td>Charles VI</td>
<td>1678-1711</td>
<td>1685-1740</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elector of Bavaria-Maria Antonia</td>
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<td>(m.1685)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electoral Prince Joseph Ferdinand</td>
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<td>(1692-1699)</td>
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