FREY, Linda Sue, 1947-
ANGLO-PRUSSIAN RELATIONS, 1703-1708: THOMAS
WENTWORTH, BARON RABY'S MISSION TO BERLIN.

The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1971
History, modern

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ANGLO-PRUSSIAN RELATIONS, 1703-1708:

THOMAS WENTWORTH, BARON RABY'S MISSION TO BERLIN

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

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* * * *

The Ohio State University
1971

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank Dr. John C. Rule for his constant encouragement, perceptive criticism, and invaluable assistance in preparing this manuscript. The gracious assistance of the staffs of the Ohio State University Library, the British Museum, the London Public Record Office, the Oesterreichische Staatsarchiv, the Hannover Stadtarchiv, and the Algemeene Rijksarchief greatly facilitated my research. I also want to thank my twin sister, Marsha, and my mother for their unflagging moral support.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation will seek to examine England's decisive influence on the foreign policy of Frederick I, King in Prussia (Frederick III, elector of Brandenburg), from 1703 to 1711. England sought to mediate the dissensions of an incohesive alliance, to persuade Frederick to fulfill his obligations as an ally, and to prevent Prussian interference in the Northern War. The influence of Thomas Wentworth, Baron Raby, the English representative to Berlin from 1703 to 1711, was very important in binding Frederick more firmly to England's interests.

1. Historiographical Background

A selective analysis of historians dealing with Frederick I reveals how the legend surrounding Frederick has been created. The legend of Frederick I really began with Frederick the Great's criticism of his grandfather, which was published posthumously in 1789. Frederick's criticism of his grandfather as a mercenary king, who sacrificed the interests of the state to his prodigality by binding the state to the allied cause, has decisively influenced later interpretations of Frederick's foreign policy. Frederick the Great, the embodiment of enlightened absolutism, criticized Frederick for possessing the vices of
courtly absolutism. For example, Frederick II regarded Frederick's foreign policy as an extension of the king's own weakness and vanity. Frederick II believed that Frederick's inordinate fondness for pomp and splendour induced him to sacrifice the blood of his subjects and the strategic interests of his state in order to obtain subsidies and to pave the way for the recognition of his royalty. Frederick's infatuation with the external representation of his power contrasted markedly with his own debilities. Fettered by his indecision, his power was largely an illusion.

The legend of Frederick I was further developed in the nineteenth century by Carl von Noorden in an article published in 1867 in which he discussed Prussian politics during the War of the Spanish Succession as a fatal mistake that Frederick made by tying his goals and ambitions to the good will of the Allies. By becoming dependent on the Allies, Frederick lost his freedom of action and was unable to exploit Prussia's pivotal position between the East and the West. By avoiding involvement in the Northern War, Frederick failed to follow Prussia's true interests in the East. In Noorden's Europäische Geschichte (1870, 1874, and 1882), he reiterates his criticism that Frederick's failure to intervene in the Northern War after the 1702 battle of Clissow, in which Charles defeated the Poles, was a strategic error.

The historical interpretation of Frederick was decisively
influenced by Johann Gustav Droysen in his *Geschichte der preussischen Politik* (1872). He contends in this incisive and authoritative study that Frederick followed "im Westen Krieg ohne Politik, im Osten Politik ohne Krieg." Bernhard Erdmannsdörffer’s *Deutsche Geschichte* (1893) and Ernst Berner’s *Geschichte des preussischen Staates* (1896) essentially followed Droysen’s interpretation. Erdmannsdörffer asserted that Frederick’s involvement in the War of the Spanish Succession stifled Prussia’s natural expansion to the Northeast. Frederick, who became more and more tightly bound to the interests of the Maritime Powers and of the emperor, did not have the strength or determination to extricate Prussia from its increasingly precarious and little honored position in the Grand Alliance. Berner contends that Frederick felt morally bound to defend the empire and to aid his sovereign, the emperor. According to Berner, Frederick was not an elastic Realpolitiker and could not reconcile the demands of his Christian and German conscience with the necessities of Machtpolitik. Frederick’s commitment to the West consequently smothered Prussia’s natural impetus to intervene in the North. Ernst Berner’s article on Frederick’s foreign policy (1900) continues the theme that Prussian politics was deflected from its course of intervention in the Northern War by the Allies in the War of the Spanish Succession.

In contrast to this interpretation, Albert Waddington, a French historian, in his *Histoire de Prusse* (1911) portrays Frederick
as an intelligent but weak man, who was guided by political goals in his policies, but who was trapped by his own vacillation and by adverse circumstances. Max Braubach in his article, "Die Bedeutung der Subsidien" (1923) contends that Frederick's efforts to maintain an independent position in the Grand Alliance and to follow an independent policy were undermined from the beginning by the subsidies which kept Frederick tied to the Allies' interests. His position gradually degenerated until the Allies regarded him as a mere vassal tied to their interests. Braubach in a general study on the rise of Prussia (1933) differs with Droysen in his contention that Frederick had genuine political reasons for participating in the War of the Spanish Succession. Frederick deliberately avoided commitment in the Northern War until he could be certain that his intervention would be militarily decisive. Braubach believes that Frederick's maintenance of his neutrality in the Northern War was a sound policy as long as Charles was the victor in Poland and Saxony. After the Swedish defeat at Poltava in July 1709, however, Frederick should have interfered in the Northern War. His failure to do so meant that Prussia gained nothing from Sweden's defeat. Braubach criticized Frederick for following a policy of missed opportunities, of unexploited chances because he failed to intervene in the Northern War at the decisive moment.

Other historians have helped to create Frederick's image in
history. Walter Koch's work (1926) on Frederick's court and government furnishes valuable insights into the factionalism which dominated the court and the king. Arnold Berney's study (1927) of the relations between Frederick I and the Habsburgs reveals the bitter dissensions which wracked the alliance. It is pivotal in understanding Frederick's increasing disillusionment and dissatisfaction with the Allies in the War of the Spanish Succession. He convincingly argues that Droysen's thesis is not applicable to Frederick's politics until after the battle of Poltava in 1709. Erich Hassinger's article on "Preussen und Frankreich im Spanischen Erbfolgekrieg" (1943) is essentially a study of the abortive Franco-Prussian negotiations of 1705. His incisive analysis of the Franco-Prussian negotiations from 1700 to 1709 is important in revealing Frederick's ambitions and Frederick's increasing embitterment with the Allies. He also studied the role of various ministers, especially Ilgen in carrying out these negotiations. In Brandenburg-Preussen, Schweden und Russland 1700-1713 (1953), Erich Hassinger analyzes Frederick's vacillation between Sweden and Russia and the decisive importance of the Northern War in Prussian politics. He discusses Frederick's territorial ambitions and strategic concerns and Frederick's attempts to maintain Prussian neutrality in the Northern War. The negotiations between Prussia, Sweden, and Russia are traced. He analyzes Frederick's role as an opponent of Russian and Swedish expansion. The most recent
discussion of Frederick is in Carl Hinrich's *Preussen als historisches Problem* (1964). His discussion analyzes Frederick the Great's reactions to his grandfather and Frederick I's role as a baroque figure. Hinrichs contends that Frederick the Great, as a classical representative of enlightened absolutism judged Frederick I as a representative of courtly absolutism. Frederick II even interpreted Frederick's attempts to procure the kingship as a manifestation of his personal weakness and vanity. Frederick was a baroque figure in his infatuation with power and in his seeking after the external representation of it in pomp and magnificence.

In contrast to Prussia's policy, England's policy during the War of the Spanish Succession has not been extensively studied. William Coxe's work on Marlborough (1818) is important because of his extensive use of manuscript materials. He vividly depicts Marlborough's role as an astute diplomat and as a brilliant commander during the War of the Spanish Succession. His examination of English foreign policy and of Marlborough's influence on the formation of that policy is especially helpful. Sir Richard Lodge (1923) has discussed Great Britain and Prussia in the eighteenth century but his discussion starts in 1714 with the accession of the house of Hanover to the British throne. His analysis of England's commercial and Prussia's strategic interests in the North is very useful. George Macaulay Trevelyan's *England Under Queen Anne* (1934) is a good general history of England's policy during the War of the Spanish Succession. Although frequently biased in favor of his fore-
bearer, Winston Churchill's study of Marlborough (1947) is valuable because of the many unpublished documents that he quotes and because of his intensive study of Marlborough's role in the war. David B. Horn in a 1961 study of the British Diplomatic Service, 1689-1789, examines diplomatic practice during the War of the Spanish Succession. In particular he discusses the education, the training, the recruitment, and the selection of the diplomats. He traces the growth of the British diplomatic service, the systematization of diplomatic practice, and the development of a professional diplomatic corps. In David B. Horn's study of Great Britain and Europe in the Eighteenth Century (1967), he he discusses Great Britain and Prussia. However, his discussion begins with the accession of George I. The failure of George I as king and as elector in the North are examined.

Studies of the Northern War, which was so important in both English and Prussian foreign policy, have not focused on English interests in the North during the reign of Anne. James Frederick Chance's work on George I and the Northern War (1909) is important for his analysis of the Neutrality Convention of 1710 and of the conflicting aims of the Northern belligerents. His study focuses mainly, however, on the period after 1714. John J. Murray's study of George I, the Baltic and the Whig Split of 1717: A Study in Diplomacy and Propaganda (1969) though also emphasizing the period after 1714, discusses England's
commitment in the Baltic and the importance of the Swedish depredations on British commerce. Murray clearly depicts George I's skillful use of the British press, money, and fleet for the benefit of Hanover. His study is valuable for his discussion of the interests and roles of Hanover and Prussia in the Baltic and for his analysis of the policies of Anne's government in the North. Ragnhild Hatton's recent biography (1968) of Charles XII examines the role of Charles XII and of Sweden in the Northern War. She vividly depicts the conflicting aims of the belligerents and the ensuing struggle. Prussia's strategic interests in the North and Frederick's ambitions are discussed. The manifold and tangled negotiations that Frederick carried on with Charles, Augustus, and Peter and the precarious neutrality which Frederick attempted to maintain are sketched.¹

¹Frédéric II, Oeuvres, 4 vols. (Berlin, 1789); Carl von Noorden, "Die preussische Politik im spanischen Erbfolgekriege", Historische Zeitschrift, XVIII (1867), 197-358; Johann Gustav Droysen, Geschichte der preussischen Politik, IV, part I (Leipzig, 1872); Bernard Erdmannsdörffer, Deutsche Geschichte vom westfälischen Frieden bis zum Regierungseintritt Friedrichs des Grossen 1648-1740, III, part 8, part 2 of Allgemeine Geschichte in Einzeldarstellungen, edited by Wilhelm Oncke, 4 vols. (Berlin, 1893); Ernst Berner, "Die auswartige Politik der Kurfürsten Friedrich III von Brandenburg, König Friedrich im Preussen," Hohenzollern Jahrbuch, IV (1900), 60-109; Albert Waddington, Histoire de Prusse, 2 vols. (Paris, 1911); Max Braubach, "Die Bedeutung der Subsidieng für die Politik im spanischen Erbfolgekriege, "Bucherei der Kulture und Geschichte, XVIII (1923) hereafter cited as Braubach, "Die Bedeutung der Subsidieng,"; Max Braubach, Der Aufstieg Brandenburg-Preussen 1640 bis 1815 (Freiburg-im-Breisgau, 1933); Walter Koch, Hof- und Regierungsverfassung König Friedrich I von Preussen 1697-1710 (Breslau, 1925); Arnold Berney, König Friedrich I und das Haus Habsburg (Munich, 1927); Erich Hassinger, "Preussen und Frankreich
2. Thesis

There has thus been no extensive work which focuses directly on Anglo-Prussian relations during the War of the Spanish Succession. These works on Frederick I, on England's foreign policy, and on the Northern War do, however, furnish valuable insights into certain facets of this discussion. In this dissertation I intend to examine Anglo-Prussian relations during the War of the Spanish Succession. My discussion will center on England's influence on Prussian politics and Prussia's role as a pivotal state between the East and the West. England's role in fettering Frederick to the allied interests was decisive.

Succession illuminates the foreign policy of Frederick, who has been too harshly criticized by historians, such as Onno Klopp. I contend that Frederick vacillated between a Realpolitik policy, as exemplified in his acquisition of the Orange inheritance, and a genuine moral commitment to the alliance. I do not believe that Frederick was equal to the task of dexterous tacking between the adverse political winds of East and West. Whether his military intervention in the North would have brought him meaningful gains is questionable.

This study examines the period from 1703 to 1711, a period in which England sought to mediate the differences and assuage the dissensions between Prussian and the other Allies and a period in which they tried to persuade Frederick to fulfill his obligations as an ally and to prevent Prussian involvement in the Northern War and its consequent imperilling of the Grand Alliance. England's role as a mediator in the various disputes that arose between Frederick and the Allies was necessitated by the disparate goals and the conflicting interests of the Allies. Throughout the war England prevented Prussian defection and ensured that Frederick would fulfill his obligations as an ally. England's policy towards Prussia was important because Prussia was a pivotal state. By becoming embroiled in northern affairs, Prussia could plunge the empire into the Northern War. England did not feel threatened by Frederick's growing power as the other Allies did and
and England's territorial goals and commercial ambitions did not conflict with his. Prussia regarded England as the only friendly ally in an otherwise hostile coalition. In fact, it was through England's assistance that Frederick was able to obtain territorial concessions, such as Spanish Guelderland. The role of Thomas Wentworth, Baron Raby, the English representative to Berlin from 1703 to 1711 was decisive in cementing Anglo-Prussian relations. His close friendship with Frederick and his great influence at court helped to bind Prussia more tightly to the alliance. His mission reflects England's aims and diplomatic practice during the War of the Spanish Succession.

I contend that Anglo-Prussian relations can be divided into three distinct periods, 1703-1706, 1706-1708, and 1709-1711. In the first period from 1703 to 1706 Frederick was closely tied to the allied coalition and did not openly interfere in the Northern War. In spite of latent allied dissension and Frederick's bitter quarrels with the

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2See map in Appendix A.

3Albert Waddington, Histoire de Prusse, II, 173-213 divides Frederick's later foreign policy into three periods, 1701-1706, 1706-1709, and 1709-1711. His criterion is Frederick's rather tortuous relations between the East and the West. I have chosen my periods in order to reflect Frederick's increasing disillusionment with the Allies. This disillusionment is punctuated by certain crises in the Anglo-Prussian alliance.
States-General over the Orange Succession and with the emperor, which
resulted in the Prussian troops recall from the Upper Rhine, Frederick
remained faithful to and firmly tied to the alliance. Frederick was in
fact further bound to the alliance by the Italian treaty which
effectively stopped any potential Prussian interference in northern
affairs. Raby's promotion from envoy extraordinary to ambassador
extraordinary in 1705 indicated the importance of Prussia in the allied
war effort.

From 1706 to 1708 the threat of the dissolution of the Grand
Alliance, which was so patent in 1706 was gradually banished even
though Frederick was increasingly dissatisfied with the other Allies,
especially after the Italian defeat. The Swedish invasion of Saxony
in 1706 and the establishment of the pro-Swedish Stanislaus on the
Polish throne emphasized the threat that Sweden posed to Frederick.
This threat brought Frederick closer to the Allies, who were in fact
the only ones whom he could rely on to safeguard his territories
because of their desire to prevent the expansion of the Northern War.
The allied victories of Ramillies, Oudenarde, and Turin bound Frederick
more firmly to the alliance. Yet, Frederick's delay in sending his
troops and his projected alliance with Sweden and Hanover had threatened
the unity of the coalition. Frederick's increasing disillusion is
reflected in Raby's dissatisfaction. Raby's influence at the Berlin
court was undermined by the plot to recall him in 1706, by Major
General Palmes's mission to negotiate with the Berlin court in 1708, and by Marlborough's failure to consult with him on a planned augmentation of Prussian troops in 1708.

In the third period from 1709 to 1711, Frederick remained faithful to the coalition but became increasingly disillusioned and bitter. The May preliminaries of 1709 and the projected Barrier Treaty so alienated the king that only England's mediations kept Frederick in the coalition. The Swedish defeat at Poltava in June 1709 increased the possibility of Prussian interference on the side of the tsar and of Augustus. The revolution in the Berlin court that ousted the faction with whom Raby had been closely associated weakened Raby's position still further and increased his discontent.

3. Archival Sources

This dissertation is based in part on a study of the papers of Thomas Wentworth, Baron Raby, the English representative to Berlin from 1703 to 1711; George Stepney, the English representative to Vienna from 1701 to 1706; John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, the commander of the allied forces; Sidney, Earl of Godolphin, the English Lord Treasurer; and Alexander Stanhope, the English representative at The Hague 1700-1706, in the British Museum and the Public Record Office. The papers of Henry Davenant, the English representative at Frankfurt 1703-1711; and of Charles Whitworth, Stepney's assistant at
Vienna 1703-1705, and subsequently English representative to Russia, 1704-1712, in the British Museum were very helpful. The instructions to and the correspondence of Francis Palms, the English representative at Vienna, 1707-1711; and Charles Townshend, the English representative at The Hague from 1709 to 1711 in the Public Record Office proved extremely valuable. In the Algemeene Rijksarchief at The Hague the correspondence of Anthonie Heinsius, the Grand Pensionary of Holland; of Jan Jacob Hamel van Bruyninx, the Dutch representative at Vienna (1700-1707); of Mozes de Mortaigne, the Dutch representative to Berlin, 1701-1705; and of Christiaan Carel, Baron von Lintelo, the Dutch representative to Berlin from 1704 to 1716 were very useful. Of great help were the general and secret reports to the States-General. The Hannover Stadtarchiv contained the correspondence of Jean de Robethon, the secretary to the elector of Hanover, with Thomas Wentworth, Baron Raby. The reports of and the imperial instructions to Johann Wenzel, Count Gallas, Duke of Lucera, the imperial representative at London (1705-1711); Johann Wenzel, Count Wratislaw, the imperial representative to London (1701-1704); Johann Philip Hofmann, the imperial secretary at London (1693-1724); and Arnold von Heems, the imperial representative to Berlin, 1697-1709, in the Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv were very informative.
CHAPTER II
A CRUCIAL ALLIANCE

1. Frederick's Importance to the Allies

Frederick's membership in the Grand Alliance was important because of his leadership of the German Protestants and his growing prestige within the empire, because of his strong army, and because of his pivotal position in the Northern War. The Hohenzollerns were uncontestably acknowledged as the second dynasty in the Holy Roman Empire both in territory and prestige. The state's dominions were widely dispersed from the shores of the Baltic to the banks of the Rhine. The annexations negotiated by the Elector Frederick William provided the state with territories on the courses of the Rhine, the Weser, and the Elbe and on the shores of the Oder which would later lead to conflict with Sweden, which occupied the lower courses of the Weser, the Elbe and the Oder, and with Poland, the mistress of the Lower Vistula.

The distance of the East Prussian lands from the bulk of the Hohenzollerns' dominions meant that they could hardly be defended against either Poland or Russia. They gave, however, to the new kingdom an independence which would not have accrued to it if it had been attached to the older dominions for they lay outside of the empire and owed no obligations to the emperor or to any other authority. Initially the union of Prussia with Brandenburg was technically merely a personal

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1 Lodge, Great Britain and Prussia in the Eighteenth Century, p. 5.
2 See map in Appendix A.
ones. This is evidence clearly by Frederick William's signature on the treaty of Utrecht as "king in Prussia" while remaining at war with France for another year as a German prince and elector. This is also shown in the prohibition of commerce and correspondence with France and Spain which Frederick initially enforced only in regard to his electoral dominions. England pressed the king to extend this prohibition to Prussia because England felt that otherwise it would be "in a great measure ineffectual elsewhere." The king and his ministers were initially unwilling and claimed that Frederick was only engaged in the alliance as a prince of the empire and that he had prohibited all commerce and correspondence in his electoral dominions but that he was not obliged to do the same for Prussia. Raby argued, however, that Frederick had declared war against France as king in Prussia and by that title had entered the alliance. The king finally


agreed to extend the prohibition to cover Prussia.\textsuperscript{5}

Frederick's army of 43,000 men made Prussia's allegiance to the alliance vital.\textsuperscript{6} The troops were uniformly clothed and well equipped in spite of the high cost. It is estimated that it cost 5 Thaler, 12 Groschen and 8 Pfennige to equip one infantry man.\textsuperscript{7} The excellence of Frederick's troops was well known and Eugene wrote to


\textsuperscript{6}Saint-Simon remarked that "il se trouva le plus puissant des Electeurs, et celui que l'Empereur avoit le plus à ménager." Jean G.M. de Boislisle, ed., Mémoires de Saint-Simon, XXIII (Paris, 1928), 295. The army represented a considerable part of the population, which at Frederick's accession was approximately one and one-half million people. Nevertheless, the army consisted largely of Brandenburg-Prussian men and only in the officer corps does one find a great number of foreign men. Eugene Francis, Prince of Savoy, Feldzüge, I (Vienna, 1876), hereafter cited as Eugene, Feldzüge.

\textsuperscript{7}Eugene, Feldzüge, I, 484. For a general description of Frederick's army see Feldzüge, I, 481-486. According to Braubach, "Die Bedeutung der Subsidien," p. 125, 4 Reichsthaler equalled approximately one pound sterling.
Frederick that "sie nach ihrer angeartten Tapferkeit gleichfalls die gegenwärtige Compagne bey allen occasionen dassjenige thuen werden wodurch Sye Sich bey jedermann zu ihren unsterblichen gloire in gulten wahn vndt reputation gesetzt haben." 8 Despite the high quality of his army, Frederick was never able to use it as an effective arm of his foreign policy. His army was split into various contingents and became only units in the allied army. 9 As a member of the Upper Saxony Circle, Frederick's quota was 4,000 men. by his treaty of 1700 with the emperor, he was obliged to furnish 8,000 men.

Frederick was also an important ally because of his pivotal position between the War of the Spanish Succession and the Northern War. As Ernst Berner so vividly asserts, "Im Osten und Westen zogen zwei gewaltige Wetter heran, Brandenburg war von beiden bedroht." 10

8 Eugene to Frederick, 23 June 1709, Lille, quoted in Alfred Ritter von Arneth, Prinz Eugen von Savoyen, II (Gera,1888),469. Also see II,115. Eugene also highly praised the Prussian troops to Frederick in a letter of 16 August after the battle of Hochstadt, see F. Heller,ed., Militärische Korrespondenz des Prinzen Eugen von Savoyen, I (Vienna, 1848),201.

9 This contrasts with the elector of Bavaria's position in his alliance with France. See Dale Albert Gaeddert, "The Franco-Bavarian Alliance During the War of the Spanish Succession," Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1969.

10 Ernst Berner, Geschichte des preussischen Staates (Bonn, 1896),223.
It is clear that this "unholy dualism"\(^{11}\) gave Prussia a decisive position at this time. Nevertheless, Prussia was too weak to utilize her interests on both sides and this bring on the consequent merging of both wars.\(^{12}\)

The Great Northern War (1700-1721) began when a coalition of Denmark, Saxony, and Russia attacked Sweden in an attempt to oust her from the powerful position that she had attained during the Thirty Years' War under Gustavus Adolphus. With the naval assistance of the Maritime Powers, Charles landed on Zealand in August 1700 and forced Denmark to sign the peace of Travendal. The article of the treaty of Travendal which prohibited Frederick IV from ever aiding again the enemies of Sweden was guaranteed by the Maritime Powers.\(^{13}\) The battle of Narva (November 1700) drove Russia away from Sweden's trans-Baltic provinces and the Swedish crossing of the western Dvina and the invasion of Poland in 1701 scattered the troops of Frederick Augustus, the elector of Saxony and the king of Poland. The bitter northern conflict threatened

\(^{11}\) Hans Prutz, *Preussische Geschichte*, II (Stuttgart, 1900), 324. Prutz contends that Frederick did not fully exploit this position, for in the West, although he had nothing to lose, he also had hardly anything to gain; yet he had a war there without a political basis and in the East, where he had great prospects, he had politics without an army.

\(^{12}\) Otto Hintze, *Die Hohenzollern und ihr Werk* (Berlin, 1916), p. 275. contends that it was the immaturity of the European state system which prevented the two wars from merging into a general war.

\(^{13}\) See Chance, *George I and the Northern War* (London, 1909) for a discussion of the Northern War.
to detach some of the German states from the alliance against France. If Frederick recalled his troops it would bring about the recall of the Holsteins, the Danes and the Hanoverians. It was imperative to prevent the Northern War from entering the empire and thus imperilling the success of the Grand Alliance.

Johann Gustav Droysen's scathing criticism (1872) that Frederick followed "im Westen Krieg ohne Politik, im Osten Politik ohne Krieg"\(^{14}\) is true but too simplified. Frederick followed political goals in the Spanish Succession which were often influenced by his position as a subsidized auxiliary power. Historians such as Max Braubach and Otto Hintze argue that Frederick's true interest lay in the East where he could possibly have acquired West Prussia and Swedish Pomerania and gained a strong position on the Baltic.\(^ {15} \) In the North, however, Frederick sought to maintain his neutrality and was alternately menaced and cajoled by the combatants. Prussia's continuous negotiations with Sweden, Poland, and Russia were without result or meaning for Frederick had not the desire to commit his army.\(^ {16} \)

\(^{14}\) Droysen, Geschichte der preussischen Politik, IV, part I, 163.

\(^{15}\) Braubach, "Die Bedeutung der Subsidien,"; Otto Hintze, Die Hohenzollern und ihr Werk, p. 274.

\(^{16}\) Otto Hintze, Die Hohenzollern und ihr Werk, p. 274; Braubach "Die Bedeutung der Subsidien," p. 104.
Frederick was in the end forced "gleichsam der Diskretion des Zaaren untergeben." Marlborough concluded the treaties concerning the Italian contingents with Frederick in 1704 and 1705 in order to win more troops for the Italian theatre, who would otherwise have been available for the Northern War.

Whether his active military intervention in the Northern War would have brought him meaningful gains is questionable. Prussia's desire to acquire Swedish Pomerania brought Frederick into conflict with Sweden. Frederick's desire to gain West Prussia and Ermeland as a connection between the electoral area of Brandenburg and East Prussia brought Prussia into inevitable conflict with Poland and with Russia. In the first phase of the Northern War after the Russian defeat at Narva when the struggle continued between Augustus and Charles, a Prussian alliance with Sweden or with Poland with West Prussia as the price was impossible since the two opponents were both endeavouring to win over the nobility of Poland. An advance towards Prussia by either Charles or Augustus would have lost them the support of Poland. After Charles deposed Augustus in the Altranstädt treaty, he lost interest in a Prussian arms alliance. After the Swedish defeat at Poltava in 1709 the tsar felt strong enough to impose his will on Poland and the Baltic

17 Braubach, Der Aufstieg Brandenburg-Preussen 1640 bis 1815, p. 224 quotes a letter of Frederick of April 1712.
without ceding West Prussia and Courland in exchange for military aid.

Frederick's commitment to the West brought him real advantages. He strengthened his position in the West by territorial acquisitions, such as Spanish Guelderland, Neuchâtel, Moers and Lingen. In spite of Brandenburg-Prussia's increasingly precarious financial position, Frederick was able to maintain his army by allied subsidies. Frederick was also able to keep his lands almost entirely free from the devastation of war in spite of the middle position that Brandenburg-Prussia held between the Northern War and the War of the Spanish Succession. The tangled intrigues, that Frederick carried on simultaneously in the West and in the East in which he sought to have his kingship acknowledged, to fulfill his obligations to the emperor, to maintain good relations with the Maritime Powers, and to safeguard his neutrality in the East, reacted on each other, especially because of the vacillating nature of the king which Carl von Noorden has so vividly depicted.

2. Frederick's Membership in the Grand Alliance.

The sequence of treaties indicate Frederick's commitment to

18 Hinrichs, Preussen als historisches Problem, pp. 270-272.
20 Noorden, Europäische Geschichte, II, 44.
the Grand Alliance. The treaty of 16 November 1700 had renewed the secret defensive alliance between Leopold and Frederick and had stipulated Leopold's acceptance of Frederick's accession to the kingly title, the so-called "Krontraktat." 21 Frederick made the condition for the aid, which he as already obliged to give the emperor according to the 1686 treaty, the recognition of his kingship. George Stepney, the English representative to the emperor, expressed the commonly held view in asserting that the new kingship of Prussia which occasioned many new divisions in the empire would not have been granted "but upon the prospect of Assistance towards the Spanish Succession." 22 In 1700 Anthonie Heinsius, the Grand Pensionary of the Province of Holland, remarked to Count Peter Goes, the imperial representative at The Hague that "es ist nicht sicher ob der Kurfürst von Brandenburg sich bereits


22 B.M., Add. Mss. 28909, f. 166, Stepney to Ellis, Vienna, 20 August 1701.
Although Frederick's treaty of 1700 with the emperor made Frederick's recognition of Philip V morally indefensible, Frederick wanted recognition of his title by Louis XIV and by Philip V. He meant to follow the example of England and the United Netherlands in recognizing Philip. On report of this William III wrote to Heinsius that

"Il me semble souverainement ridicule que le roi de Prusse se soit en tête de vouloir reconnaître le roi d'Espagne attendu que c'est ouvertement en contradiction avec son traité avec l'Empereur."  

Johann Wenzel, Count Wratislaw, the Imperial representative at London, felt that "Allerding verfetzte der König; aber seit einigen Jahren gehen die Dinge am Hofe zu Berlin derartig, dass man demselben nicht trauen darf."  

The treaty of the Grand Alliance had been signed on 7 September 1701 by Great Britain, Austria, and the United Provinces.  

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23 Onno Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, IX (Vienna, 1888), quotes Heinsius to Goes on 23 November 1700.

24 Ibid., IX, 184, f. n. 1 quotes William's letter of 31 May 1701.

25 Ibid., IX, 185.

believed that only through an alliance with the Maritime Powers could he obtain the recognition of his kingship. As an independent ally, Brandenburg-Prussia had joined the alliance by signing on 30 December 1701 a treaty with the United Provinces and on 20 January 1702 a treaty with England, which stipulated that Prussia was to furnish five thousand men who were to be paid half by the United Provinces and half by England. The emperor had opposed Frederick's entering the alliance as an independent member and had contended that Frederick was already bound by the Kronvertrag of 1700. Bernhard Erdmannsdörffer argues that by entering the alliance Prussia was pulled from her natural political course and was set on a path which lead Frederick to become a mere vassal of the Maritime Powers and the emperor. Frederick was put in a difficult, precarious, and little honored position. He had neither the determination nor the strength to break through the net in which he saw himself ensnared. As late as August 1702 there were apprehensions in Ratisbon that Prussia might either form a third party in the empire with Sweden and Bavaria, or by a treaty force the emperor to

27 Printed in Lamberty, Mémoires, I, 710; Dumont, Corps Universel Diplomatique, VIII, 96-97; and Bittner, Chronologisches Verzeichnis, I, 119.

28 Noorden, Europäische Geschichte, I, 226.

On 16 December 1702 Frederick signed an alliance with the emperor which renewed the alliance of 1686 and of 1700. It stipulated that Frederick was to supply a corps of Prussian troops subsidized in part by the emperor, that Prussian claims on Spain were to be satisfied, and that Frederick would be granted the title of Prince of Orange.

Frederick's earlier relations with the Allies influenced his policy in the War of the Spanish Succession. Frederick had remarked to George Stepney, the English representative in Berlin, that the Ryswick peace was a lesson to him. He felt that he had received nothing from England for his efforts and declared that in the future he would delay proceeding and conclude an alliance only after solid stipulations had been made. Frederick felt that he had been treated by the other members as only an Auxiliarmacht. Frederick's representatives had been only grudgingly admitted to the peace congress at Ryswick and were not able to obtain anything substantial. Louis XIV had refused to give his ambassador power to negotiate with the representatives of Brandenburg-Prussia and had treated Frederick like the other princes of the empire although at one time Frederick had mobilized...
ized 40,000 men against France. Frederick resolved to gain a higher position in the alliance against France in the War of the Spanish Succession and to secure substantial gains.

3. Frederick's Objectives in the War of the Spanish Succession

Frederick's objectives in entering the Grand Alliance were to procure the recognition of his kingship, to obtain subsidies to maintain his army and if possible arrears from the previous wars, to fulfill his moral and patriotic ideals as a Protestant and as a prince of the empire, and to receive the Orange inheritance. Frederick secured for himself the title of king not of Brandenburg, where he continued to rule as elector, but in East Prussia which had been ruled since 1660 by the elector of Brandenburg as a sovereign duchy. The attainment of royal status with its attendant mystique was an important asset to the house of Hohenzollern, which was diminished only by the new royal status of the rulers of Saxony and of Hanover who became respectively kings of Poland and of England. According to David B. Horn, this elevation was a "tangible recognition of the advance made by Brandenburg in the second

half of the seventeenth century."\(^{35}\) Thomas Wentworth, Baron Raby, Earl of Strafford, the former English representative to Berlin, wrote in 1713 that the king in Prussia was "certainly after the Emperor the most considerable prince of the Empire."\(^{36}\)

It was as true in 1702 as it had been in 1680 that "with the Elector of Brandenburg there is nothing to be done without money."\(^{37}\) It was clear that Frederick needed money and that the army needed subsidies. The subsidies did help bring Frederick into the War of the Spanish Succession for the same subsidies could not be expected from Sweden, Russia, or Poland, the northern antagonists.\(^{38}\) Although the foreign subsidies were a considerable sum, they did not nearly cover the cost of the troops and the army devoured about half of the state income. The state paid yearly about 50 Reichsthaler for each man.\(^{39}\)


\(^{38}\)Hintze, Die Hohenzollern und ihr Werk, p. 272.

\(^{39}\)William Pierson, Preussische Geschichte, I (Berlin, 1903), 231.
Ernst Berner estimated that Brandenburg-Prussia raised about five-sixths of the cost of the army.\textsuperscript{40} The influence of subsidies on a king whose grandson subsequently labelled him a \textit{roi mercenaire} is not incon siderable. The expense of maintaining and augmenting the army could not be covered by other income. In the North, Frederick was faced with Swedish insolvency and only the prospect of greater costs if he became involved in that war. Frederick II, who has criticized Frederick I for even entering the alliance, contended that he took "des subsides, afin de soulanger la prodigalité de sa magnificence, et il crut que les secours qu'il fournissoit aux alliés lui frayeroient le chamin à la royauté... Il trafiquit du sang de ses peuples."\textsuperscript{41} Braubach believes that in spite of Frederick's efforts to remain in an independent position, the Maritime Powers began to regard Frederick more and more as a vassal. The subsidies which again appeased Frederick kept him in a subordinate position and in the interest of the Maritime Powers.\textsuperscript{42}

Frederick's Protestant zeal also induced him to join the

\textsuperscript{40}Berner, \textit{Geschichte des preussischen Staates}, p.100.
\textsuperscript{41}Frédéric II, \textit{Oeuvres}, I, 165-218.
\textsuperscript{42}Braubach, "Die Bedeutung der Subsidien," p.106.
alliance. The king, who was bound more firmly to England because of their common Protestantism, even attempted to introduce episcopacy and liturgy on the Anglican model into his dominions. The English liturgy was translanted into German and published and printed in Berlin. Frederick also thought of introducing a public service like that of the Church of England and hoped that it would be a step towards uniting the Lutherans and the Reformed. Undeniably, Frederick felt a tie with England because of their common Protestantism.

A tight alliance with the Maritime Powers appeared also to guarantee to Frederick the realization of his inheritance pretensions to the entailed property of the house of Orange. Frederick was the first cousin of William III and by the will of Frederick Henry the heir presumptive to the principality of Orange. By dangling hopes of the Orange inheritance and the survivorship of William's offices, the Maritime Powers had further induced Frederick to join the alliance. It is clear that William took care to foster Frederick's illusions concerning the inheritance. The Orange Succession, a widely dispersed complex of dominions, comprised lands in Germany, the Netherlands, and France. For example, Moers bordering on Cleves was in the

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44 An alleged promise of William had recognized Frederick's claim in 1688 when William needed Frederick's aid in his expedition to England. Also see Droysen, Geschichte der preussischen Politik, IV, pt.1,216-217 for the report of Paul von Fuchs, the foreign minister, of an interview with Bentinck when Bentinck's assurances on behalf of William seem to sustain the Prussian contention.
empire and the duchy of Neuchâtel was in Switzerland. Frederick's relations with William were good. No state had done more than Brandenburg-Prussia to facilitate William's expedition to England.

After the death of William in February 1702, it was announced on 16 May that William had made a will which bequeathed his private possession to his relative the young Prince John William Friso of Nassau-Dietz, still a minor, the son of Casimir of Nassau, the Stadtholder of Friseland. This was a blow to Frederick, who as the grandson of Prince Frederick Henry of Nassau, had believed himself to be the sole heir to the Orange inheritance. Indeed Frederick had authorized his ambassador at The Hague to take possession and to request the cooperation of the States-General and the States of Holland. In spite of resolute opposition, Frederick even attempted to secure the Stadtholdership. The fact that part of William's possessions, such as the Estates of Orange, lay within Louis's dominions augmented the allied fear that alienating Frederick would throw him into Louis's camp. This fear was increased by the hint which Frederick let fall that


46 For a discussion of this see Grew, William Bentinck and William III, pp.382-384.
he would conclude a treaty of neutrality with France. The States-
General, who administered the whole of William's legacy, including
the feudal estate, as executors of the wills of Prince Frederick
Henry of Orange and William III, offered their mediation in the
inheritance dispute. In spite of Frederick's disappointment in
1702 over William's testament and over the hostile position of the
States-General, he did not recall his troops from the allied service.
It was widely believed, however, that the king of Prussia exploited
his position as an important ally in order to obtain concessions from
the States-General. Frederick's relations with the States-General
so degenerated that Prussian troops took Moers by force on 8 November
1712 and forcibly expelled the Dutch garrison.

In the peace of Utrecht (1713), Frederick acquired some of
the Orange inheritance which he had annexed during the war, Moers and

47 An Englishman at Celle commented that "The news we have re-
ceived from Holland touching the will of the King of England surprises
people. It is considered that they have been rather precipitate about it,
and that it would have been better to take time, since the exercise
of tact with the king of Prussia is extremely necessary at present. For
He will be deeply offended at the exclusion. The Dutch are not now
popular in Berlin." Quoted in Grew, William Bentinck and William III,
p.394.

48 This is illustrated by Thomas Somerville, History of Great
Britain During the Reign of Queen Anne (London, 1798), p.436. He contends
that the "King of Prussia, absorbed entirely in his own interest, availed
himself of every emergency to raise the price of his services. He
took umbrage at the States because they declined interfering with the
provincial courts of justice in cases where his property was at stake,
and threatened to disband his army, if all his demands were not com-
plied with."
Lingen in 1702, Tecklenburg near Cleves in 1707, and Neuchâtel on the western border of Switzerland in 1707. He also acquired Upper Guelderland in the Spanish Netherlands in 1713, as compensation for parts of the Orange inheritance which had been given to France. The dispute over the Orange Succession was, however, not settled until 1732. 49

Frederick misled the Allies into thinking that he was seriously negotiating with France by exploiting his pretensions to the Orange possessions. It was not, however, in the French interest to have the principality of Orange under a foreign and especially a Protestant power. 50 William Ayerst, Raby's chaplain, voiced England's fear that "unless we have found some wonderfull Chaine to tie that Proteus, 'tis to be feared he will rather chuse to strike up a Peace wth them [France] and leave us in the lurch." 51 In spite of the Krontraktat, Louis XIV had hoped to neutralize Prussia by allowing Frederick to provide 8,000 men for the emperor. Frederick could then be neutral without violating his alliance with Leopold. Frederick, however, remained loyal to the alliance. 52 In the summer of 1702 when the French army was on the two

49 See map in Appendix A.
50 The principality of Orange was annexed to the royal domain in March 1703.
52 Hans von Zwiedineck-Südenhorst, Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitraum der Gründung des preussischen Königums, II (Stuttgart, 1894) 370-371, hereafter cited as Zwiedineck-Südenhorst, Deutsche Geschichte. Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, who is anti-Prussian in his interpretation believes that Prussia was ready each moment to break the alliance.
long stretches of the Rhine and the Meuse, Marshal Boufflers had negotiated with Frederick and had offered him Cologne and Liège if he would abandon the alliance and leave Holland open to invasion. Although Frederick remained true to the alliance, the French offers had greatly worried the Dutch. The May and June 1702 French seizure of Cleves provided a new opportunity to press Frederick to negotiate. By the feint of negotiating, Frederick attempted to deter the threat to his countries. It was clear that Frederick merely wished to obtain a neutrality for Cleves. The Allies did in fact fear that Frederick would defect to France because of the French occupation of part of his inheritance and because of the temptation to be recognized as king by Louis XIV. George Stepney urged Hedges not to be hasty in sending an ambassador because he felt that "When y Civility is past, you have no further hold of him."  


54 Waddington, Recueil des Instructions, Prusse XVI, 257-258.

55 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/19, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 26 August 1702.
CHAPTER III

KING AND COURT

1. The King

Because Prussia's accession to the Grand Alliance was crucial, Frederick played a decisive role in the War of the Spanish Succession. A clear understanding of Frederick's personality, of his indecision, capriciousness, fatalism, and religious zeal is necessary in order to understand Prussian policy throughout the war. Frederick III (1657-1713) elector of Brandenburg, literally crowned himself Frederick I, king in Prussia, on 18 January 1701 with the imperial sanction. He was the second son of the Great Elector Frederick William and his wife, Louise Henriette of Orange, and became heir to the state on the death of his brother, Charles Emil, in 1674. His early life was darkened by bitter quarrels with his stepmother, Dorothea of Holstein-Glücksburg, whom he feared would poison him. He became the elector of Brandenburg in 1688.

He was a child of delicate health. A fall from the arms of his nurse in infancy had injured his vertebral column and left him with a slight deformation in the form of a node on the back of his neck. He was diligent and studious and learned French, Polish, and Latin. Although Frederick inherited the features of Frederick William, his were smaller and more refined. Albert Waddington contends that "les yeux
ne sont pas énergiques, mais ils sont vifs; sur les lèvres erre un sourire railleur et dédaigneux, bref, tout était grand et un peu rude dans le Grand Electeur; tout est plus petit mais spiritualisé dans Frédéric Ier.1 Frederick the great unjustly and scornfully describes Frederick as "petit et contrefait; avec un air de fierté, il avait une physionomie commune." 2 La Rosière, a French agent at Berlin, depicted Frederick more impartially as "assez beau de visage, mais il est bossu et petit." 3 In 1708, William Ayerst, Raby's chaplain, described Frederick's wedding rather amusingly. "one cou'd see nothing of ye Little Man but a Cap of Feathers and a great many Diamonds on a short Spanish mantle wch made him look so much like a Puppet yt I wonder those about him cou'd hold their Countenances, but ye Queen taller by ye Head and shoulders." 4

1Albert Waddington, L'Acquisition de la Couronne Royale de Prusse par les Hohenzollerns (Paris, 1888), p. 28.
2Frédéric II, Oeuvres, I, 214.
3Quoted in Waddington, Histoire de Prusse, II, 8. Waddington p. 29 believes that most historians have exaggerated the deformity of Frederick. [Even Poellnitz asserted that "son caractère se ressentait de la complexion de son corps." ] He believes that the hump at the top of Frederick's spine was entirely hidden by his perruque.
Frederick's affability and friendliness earned for him the
general love of his people. Unfortunately his very goodness was often
exploited by those around him who sought to use him for their own
ends. As Lintelo, the Dutch representative to Berlin, wrote to
Heinsius that the king "a le Coeur bon, mais il est extrement prompt
et le malheur vent qu'aucun des Ministres se le contredire, et cela
parce qu'estant opposez les uns autres il crainrent qu'on le contre-
disant on s'en servira pour les nuire." Frederick's son remarked that
"Quand je lui demande le bout de l'ongle, il me donne tout le bras."  

Frederick was a zealous Protestant who was influenced by his
religious and ethical ideals. A pious man, he felt, for example, that
God had given an illness to his son "pour le bien de son Salut et a sa

5 Friedrich Förster, Friedrich Wilhelm I (Potsdam, 1834), I, 20.
6 For example, Christophe, Comte de Dohna, Mémoires Originaux
sur La Règne, et La Cour de Frédéric I, Roi de Prusse (Berlin, 1833), p. 341
hereafter cited as Dohna, Mémoires, remarks that he had "par un excès
de bonté d'âme laissé quelque fois prendre un peu trop d'ascendant sur
son esprit à de certaines gens qui en abusirent." La Rosière links his
goodness with his weakness, "Il est plein de bonté, mais il serait à
souhaite pour ses sujets qu'il en eut moins, car il manque de force pour

7 The Hague, Algemeene Rijksarchief, Archief Anthonie Heinsius,
1521, Lintelo to Heinsius, Berlin, 26 April 1710, hereafter cited as
Alg. Rijks., Archief Heinsius.

8 Quoted in Waddington, Histoire de Prusse, II, 9.
propre gloire," 9 He felt that it was his duty "vor die Religion alles aufsetzen." 10 He was deeply aware of the power of God and felt that "Ich win ein Wurm und kein Mensch." 11 He was also subject to frequent attacks of melancholy. He strongly felt that he could do nothing against fate and that he must accept what God sent him. 12 "Was kann ich machen, man muss alles im Gottes Hand annehmen, sie er es schicket." 13 He felt that he should let fate take its course and would do nothing when the Northern War began, "denn er solle stille setzen und zusehen." 14 His inclination to fatalism often let him avoid making difficult decisions.

9 Alg. Rijks,, Archief Heinsius, 1205, 17 September 1707.


12 Berner, Briefwechsel, p. 267, Frederick to Sophie, Berlin 26 January 1709.

13 Ibid., p.151, Frederick to Sophie, Berlin, February 1712.

14 Ibid., p.16, Frederick to Sophie, Berlin.
Frederick was also very irresolute, captious, and easily vexed. Charles Louis de Poellnitz, a memorialist of the reign, claimed that Frederick was inconstant, suspicious, and choleric. Marlborough often had occasion to regret Frederick's "fickle temper." The king read all the ministers dispatches and was often annoyed by trivial incidents in the reports. England often resolved to gratify Frederick in what seemed to be trivial demands. Brentano remarks with some acuteness that "Seine Menschenkenntnis war klein, und er war ein Mann, der im Gehause seines Ichs lebte; er hatte lebhafe Vorstellungen, Träume und Pläne im Kopf, aber schwache Augen." Frederick's vacillation and suspicions acerbated the personal rivalries in his court, so that Sophie of Hanover could write in 1701 that "Qui est favori un heur est mis le lendemain en prison." The Count Dohna, whom Frederick personally loved, called his court "une cour d'intrigues, de fourberies, de cabales."


16 B.M., Add. Mss. 9097, Marlborough to Godolphin, 1 November 1706.

17 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/5, Raby to Boyle, Berlin, 1 March 1710.

18 P.R.O., S.P. Holland, 84/226, Stanhope to Hedges, The Hague, 5 February 1704.


Many historians believe that the splendor of Frederick's court was an unconscious device of Frederick's to cover his own personal weaknesses through outward show. Frederick followed French fashion and modelled his court on that of Versailles. In imitation of the Pont Neuf at Paris with the famous statue of Henry IV, Frederick had erected on a bridge in Berlin an equestrian statue of his father, Frederick William. He even ordered Spanheim, his representative in Paris, to procure the form and dimensions of Louis XIV's perruque so he could have an exact copy made. Frederick sought to endow his newly established kingship with the magnificence and etiquette found in Paris and even used French as the language of his court. He became known in Europe as "a Louis XIV in Germany" or more unkindly as "le singe de Louis XIV." The fashion, the ceremonial and the smallest faction of life was modelled on the French. Spanheim's belief that Frederick was a "roi de théâtre qui dans la même comédie joue quelque

22 For example, Koch, Friedrich I, p.2.
23 Poellnitz, Mémoires, I, 10.
24 Waddington, Histoire de Prusse, II, 163.
25 Ibid., II, 10.
26 Gilbert Burnet, History of His Own Time, III (Oxford, 1823) recounts a story of Frederick speaking of the equality of kings. The French envoy replied that "all ships were ships but there was great difference in their strength and rate."
fois un personnage fort inférieur." 27 contrasts vividly and rather pathetically with Bolingbroke's assertion that if Louis XIV "was not the greatest king, he was the best actor of majesty at least that ever filled a throne." 28 Frederick often thought of his entire life as a play or a comedy, "was ist unser gantzes leben anders alss eine comedie." 29 Frederic, who had to be "humor'd in the Darling point of Ceremony, beyond Reason or Convenience," 30 made a fetish of ceremony and splendor. 31 Sophie Charlotte remarked with her usual asperity that "Leibnitz veut m'apprendre ce que c'est que les infiniments petits. A-t-il donc oublié que je suis la femme de Frederick Ier, ou s'imaginet-il que je ne connaisse pas mon mari?" 32 For example, the ostentatious display of the 1701 coronation had "une magnificence qui est encore allé

29 Berner, ed., Briefwechsel, p. 75, Frederick to Sophie, 12 September 1705, Charlottenburg.
30 B.M., Add. Mss. 37, 353, f. 64, Stepney to Hedges, Vienna, 27 September 1702.
31 Frederick the Great thought that Frederick was "impatient préoccupe de sa grandeur, réglant ses moindres actions sur l'exact compas du ceremonial, et sur les nuances des dignites." Oeuvres, I, 71.
32 Waddington, Histoire de Prusse, II, 182.
au dela de tout ce qu'on s'était imagine. 33 Ayerst describing the marriage of the king in 1708 wrote with his usual discernment and wit that "certain nothing finer cou'd possibly be seen in any Court w'tsoever no excepting y' great Monarch's at Versailles," but felt that "we shall loath and despise Pageantry and fine Coats ever after." 34 Raby wrote that the counsellors try to insinuate themselves with the king by making "him believe they seek nothing but his Grandeur." 35

As Frederick the Great pointed out it was Frederick's misfortune to be "place dans l'histoire entre un père et un fils dont les talens supérieurs le font eclipser." 36 He was eclipsed by the two Frederick Williams, his father and his son. He lacked their personal energy, vigor, and aggression, their strength of body and their force of mind. His weakness was accentuated by their strength. His silhouette appears even smaller in comparison with the stout robustness of his father and of his son. He lacked their strength and purpose, physically, mentally, personally, and administratively. They ruled, whereas he was ruled by his own weakness and indecision. "Son ame étoit

33B.M., Egerton Mss. 2428, f. 19, Plantamour to Blathwayt, Königsberg, 20 January 1701.


36Frédéric II, Oeuvres, I, 218.
His weaknesses were such that he went to extremes to illustrate his power. His
inordinate fondness for pomp, ceremony, and ostentation reflect his in-
fatuation with the outward trappings of power. His vanity was such that
his court was one "corrompue par la flatterie." Yet his power was
in fact a delusion for he was fettered by his own indecision, his own
debilities; "l'esprit de ce prince étoit flottant entre les cabales
des ses favoris, comme ine mer agitée des vents différents." He
appears as a rather sad pathetic figure whose mediocre and well-meaning
nature was exploited by self-seeking men. He was on the whole mediocre
in his virtues and in his vices. Albert Waddington contends that "il
avait le coeur froid et n'aime beaucoup personne." Though Frederick
the Great criticizes him too sharply, it was true that he was "grand
dans les petits choses, et petit dans les grandes."

Frederick was a Baroque figure as manifested in his infatuation.

37 Frédéric II, Oeuvres, I, 214.
38 Ibid., I, 174.
39 Ibid., I, 199.
40 Waddington, Histoire de Prusse, II, 149.
41 Frédéric II, Oeuvres, I, 218.
with power and his seeking after the external representation of it in pomp and magnificence. He was a man of the Baroque by Brentano's definition that it was style in which the ornament conquers the structure. He was a man of contradictions; he was tender and proud, mild yet intractable, weak, yet brave, abstemious yet ostentious and pleasure-seeking.

Frederick's second wife, Sophie Charlotte, who has been called "die schöne Königin" and "die philosophische Königin," is important because of her pro-Hanoverian influence at the court. Frederick's first wife, Elizabeth-Henriette of Hesse had died in 1683 and had left Frederick with a three year old daughter, Louise-Dorothee-Sophie. Sophie Charlotte was born in 1668, the daughter of

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42 Carl Hinrichs, *Preussen als historisches Problem*, pp. 253-271. See his discussion of Frederick as a Baroque figure.

43 Brentano, Sophie Charlotte, p. 106, defines the Baroque as a "schwülstige (prunksüchtige) Entartung der Renaissance."

44 Ibid., p. 163.


Ernest August and Sophie of Hanover, from whom she inherited "Genie und Character, Egoismus und Kraft, eine ungewöhnliche Leidenschaft des Geistes." She was married to Frederick in 1684 at Herenhausen near Hanover.

She was a young queen with black hair which she never powdered, blue eyes, regular features, a fair complexion, and a face which was charming and intellectual. She was not tall, but she carried herself well. Toland, a visiting Englishman, thought that she was "the most beautiful Princess of her Time," although "somewhat too plump." The Tsar Peter, after attending one of her soirées, told Frederick that the most admired thing in his lands was his wife. She was a very brilliant woman and was a close friend of Leibnitz, a trusted personal adviser of her mother, the electress, Sophie. She spoke many languages fluently. As evinced in her letters, she was witty and often sarcastic. Her death in 12 February 1705 was widely regretted and Dohna wrote that it was incontestable that "c’etoit une princesse d’un

50 Waddington, Histoire de Prusse, II, 141.
51 Raby wrote that "all her fault was that she had too much wit, and could not spare her friends." B.M., Add.Mss. 22,196, f.31, Raby to Cadogan, 24 February 1705.
Frederick the Great writes with his customary scorn when speaking of his grandfather, that Frederick consoled himself "par la cérémonie de ses obsèques, de la perte d'une espouse qu'il n'aurait jamais peu assez regretter." 53

She had a close circle of friends especially Fraulein von Poellnitz and Frau von Bülow, who enjoyed themselves in intellectual discussions, plays, etc. 54 Frederick seems to have had little to do with this group and Raby himself was there but infrequently. 55 Her lively spirit was often antipathetic to the more sedate, sober, and pious Frederick; "elle aime la joie et les plaisirs, ce que directement opposé à l'humeur sombre et retirée du prince." 56 The story of her taking tobacco at his coronation and his subsequent reprimand is probably untrue. It nevertheless indicates her spirit and her attitude

52 Dohna, Mémories, p.298. Charles Talbot, Earl of Shrewsbury, felt that her death was a "loss to the world, and so much more to be regretted since she was too young as well as too charming to dy so soon." B.M., Add.Mss. 7058, f.97, Shrewsbury, then English representative at Rome, to Stepney, 28 February 1705.

53 Frédéric II, Œuvres, I, 195.

54 Varnhagen von Ense, Biographische Denkmale, pp.335-338.


56 Waddington, ed. Recueil des Instructions, Prusse, XVI, xlvii quotes the Comte de Rebenac, the French representative who resided in Berlin from 1679 to 1688, and who was recalled to go to Madrid in 1688. He wrote a long mémoire on the court in that year for the enlightenment of his successor.
towards "la comédie du courronement." 57 The greatest source of contention between them was Sophie Charlotte's devotion to Hanover, a hostile rival of Frederick. 58

Although Prussian relations with the Hanoverian court were never good, Frederick kept up a close correspondence with the electress Sophie, his mother-in-law. Raby asserts that she was "very great" with the king and was often a mediator in the Hanoverian-Prussian disputes. 59 Frederick was kind to her and his letters to her are very candid. One of his last letters during his illness was written to Sophie. 60 While writing to Frederick letters full of flattery and sympathy, Sophie wrote to others mocking his dipsomania, his financial condition, and all else that she could to damage Brandenburg. 61

Indubitably Sophie Charlotte and Frederick were never very close. Sophie Charlotte disapproved of his politics and never shared

57 Waddington, Histoire de Prusse, II, 163.
58 Waddington, ed., Recueil des Instructions, Prusse, XVI, 250; Brentano, Sophie Charlotte, p.111.
60 His last letter to her was dated 11 February 1713. See Bodemann, ed., "Briefe des Königs Friedrich I. und seines Sohnes, Friedrich Wilhelm,"; George Schnath, ed., Briefwechsel der Kurfürstin Sophie von Hannover mit dem preussischen Königshause (Berlin, 1927).
61 See Brentano, Sophie Charlotte, pp.110-111.
the feelings, which he originally felt for her. Raby remarked that "tho his Queen is now in town" there is "no temptation to him to return for they are not very fond of one another." He also remarked that the setting up of a separate establishment for the queen's household is regarded as "a further mark of Separation considering some indifferences that were between their Matys before." Nevertheless, her letters which have survived the destruction, which Frederick ordered, indicate an affection for Frederick, her "cher electeur." In spite of their disagreement, Frederick remained attached to his "incomparable reine" and at her death was a "mighty Concerned widower and Crys often for the loss of his Queen." The queen's death in 1705 occasioned no alteration in court affairs for she had "meddled with the Government very

63 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia 90/2/175, Raby to Hedges, Berlin, 13 November 1703.
65 Waddington, Histoire de Prusse, II, 143.
66 Ibid.
littl" and because of the increasingly pronounced estrangement between the king and the queen. Brentano remarks that "Ihr Ungluck war, dass sie einen härteren Mann gebraucht hatte als Friedrich. Friedrich war zu wich für sie, zu gut, zu unbeständig, zu nachgiebig, und zuverliebt." 69

2. The Berlin Court

In the 1703-1711 period, Frederick governed from the chamber or Kabinett. After the fall of Danckelmann in 1697, Frederick no longer desired to give the direction of affairs to one man. During the time of Wartenberg's ascendancy, the privy council lost its former importance as the highest authority in affairs of state. All important issues were withdrawn from it and relegated to four councillors, Wartenberg, Barfuss, Fuchs, and Schmettau. This cabal of four men was officially called the Staatsconferenz. Frederick ruled through the Staatsconferenz, which met and deliberated apart from the king. Fred- also ceased presiding over the privy council. He used his private secretaries to communicate with the Staatsconferenz. The secretaries thus

68 Poellnitz, Mémoires, IV, 55; Sophie Charlotte wrote in 1703 that "Pour moi, je regarde celle comme le Jupiter de Lucien, et les laisse faire." Waddington, Histoire de Prusse, II, 163.

69 Brentano, Sophie Charlotte, p. 203.
became very influential. This is illustrated most clearly by Heinrich Rudiger v. Ilgen, who in Frederick William's reign was to become the minister of foreign affairs. The eclipse of the privy council, which was now divorced from the ascendant Staatsconferenz facilitated the dominance of Johann Casimir Kolbe, Count von Wartenberg. Wartenberg's influence became predominant because of his domination of the Staatsconferenz and because of his personal intimacy with the king for whom he made decisions. Wartenberg was actually made Prime Minister in 1701 after Frederick's coronation. He exploited Ilgen whose genius and technical ability were indispensable to him. By a regulation of 1 February 1702 Wartenberg and Ilgen took up the most important affairs directly with the king, thus bypassing the secretaries and tightening their hold over the government. 70

Because Frederick was so easily influenced, the ministers surrounding him played an important role in the formulation of Prussian policy. This is especially true of Ilgen, who was in charge of foreign affairs, and who was the principal impetus behind the Franco-Prussian negotiations throughout the war. "One of the most able Ministers that

70 Dorwart, The Administrative Reforms of Frederick William, p. 28. Raby's contention that "all affairs goes throw the hands of only one Minister so that information is harder to get here" illustrates the extent of Wartenberg's personal rule. P.R.O., S.P. Prussia 90/2/64, Berlin, 21 August 1703.
Germany ever produced" and the most important and influential minister of Frederick, Heinrich Rudiger v. Ilgen, was born of an obscure family in Minden, Westphalia. By hard and conscientious work, Ilgen had risen from a clerk to become a councillor and later a noble. According to a Poellnitz, he had "Gaiety and Solidity in his Temper, a lively fruitful Imagination, and a most pleasing aspect." Baron de Fuchs, who was in charge of foreign affairs, was so impressed with his genius that he recommended him to the king who gave him a seat in his council. The Count de Wartenberg, the Prime Minister, depended very heavily on him. Ilgen was given the main charge of foreign affairs, especially after Fuch's death.

Ilgen was a brilliant and indefatigable man. He wrote all his correspondence himself and only let his secretaries make copies. Poellnitz remarked that he worked like a "Day-labourer and makes the Ministry, as it were, a Handicraft." He was gifted with a rare intelligence, which is reflected in his writings. "He speaks well, but writes better; he affects double Entendres in his Answers, and artfully

71 Poellnitz, Mémoires, I, 45.
72 Ibid., p. 46.
73 Poellnitz, Memoires, I, 46.
has recourse, when he needs it, to an Ambiguous Expression." 74 For example, Raby relates that when his secret correspondence with the bishop of Warmia was discovered by the king of Poland, Jakob Heinrich, Count Flemming, the Saxon minister, accused Ilgen but "did not return very well Satisfied for all that Ilgen told him, that he thought he did not do well to open peoples letters but Ilgen had write with caution that they can fix nothing on him." 75 His shrewdness was often called duplicity and the Hanoverian resident in 1703 labelled him "dangereux et méchant." 76 Ilgen had neither confidants nor favorites and he never became a creature of any faction. He was a "Master of his Temper, his Countenance, his Tongue, and his Eyes, which he accomodates altogether to the Situation of his Affairs." 77 His shrewdness and craft 78 were accompanied by an unscrupulousness, so that it was said of him in speaking of oaths that "he takes them and breaks them with equal Indifference." 79

74Dohna, Memoires, I, 46; Leibniz said that he "est le seul qui expédie les choses. Il a un talent admirable pour mettre tout par écrit, en latin, français, allemand. Aussie ne lui corrige-t-on rien, et on ne lui dit pas même ce qu'il doit mettre; on lui dit simplement de faire une lettre ou réponse à un tel, de faire une instruction pour un ministre, sans lui dire autre chose." Waddington, Histoire de Prusse, II, 159-160.


76Quoted in Waddington, Histoire de Prusse, II, 159.

77Poellnitz, Mémoires, I, 46.

78See Noorden, Europäische Geschichte, II, 46-47.

79Poellnitz, Memoires, I, 46.
Johann Casimir Kolbe, Count von Wartenberg (1643-1712), whom Sophie Charlotte disparagingly called "le grand vizir" was never a member of the Privy Council, but governed through his personal intimacy with the king. Frederick the Great sums up the view of posterity on Wartenberg as man "qui n'avait de mérite qu'une connaissance parfaite de goûts de son maître ... il possédoit l'art de la cour, qui est celui dell'assiduité, de la flatterie, et un mot de la bassesse: il entra aveuglement dans les veues de son maître, persuadé que servie ses passions c'étoit affermir sa fortune particulière." He was a corrupt, greedy, self-seeking opportunist of an indolent and mediocre nature who governed by exploiting the brilliant talents of others, such as Heinrich Rudiger v. Ilgen. He directed policy from his office of High Chamberlain for thirteen years. He was made prime minister in 1701 after Frederick's coronation.

He was born in Metz, the son of an exiled Palatinate noble, and entered the servie of Brandenburg in 1688. According to La Rosière, a French agent at Berlin, he pleased Frederick "principalement par sa manière de monter à cheval." After the 1697 overthrow of Danckelman,

80 Waddington, Histoire de Prusse, II, 162.
81 Frédéric II, Oeuvres, I, 174.
82 Waddington, Histoire de Prusse, II, 59.
he became first minister. Wartenberg married the daughter of a waterman, who by her haughty and insulting manner, pride and avarice alienated the Berlin court and helped estrange many potential allies of her husband. 83 As Palmes acutely observed "it is difficult to say whether she is more feared or more hated" and whether the "Party ... or she herself will ruin the Great Chamberlain." 84 She was the mistress of the king, but only on titre. Poellnitz admits that she had beauty, "but was in every other Respect a coarse Lady." 85 She herself is reported to have declared that it would be easier to "number the Shells upon the Shore at Sheveling, than her Adventures of Gallantry." 86 There is not doubt that Raby intrigued with the Countess during his embassy. 87 In a letter to Leibniz, the electress Sophie, who was a close friend of Raby, says that "J'avoue aisement que Mylord Raby n'a pas le même politesse que Mylord duc de Marlborough; mais comme il est de mes amis, je luy passe bien des petits défauts qu'il a peutestre pris par la sympathie d'une qui par sa naissance n'en scauroit trop

83 Dohna, Mémoires, 306.
84 B.M., Add. Mss. 9101, f. 157, Palmes to Marlborough, Vienna, 23 April 1708.
85 Poellnitz, Memoires, III, 237.
86 Ibid.
87 Alexander Cunningham, The History of Great Britain from the Revolution to the Accession of George the First, II (London, 1787), 338 believes that Raby associated with her because of his "covetous disposition, because it was through her means, as was reported, that the king made him many rich presents."
avoir." She also says that "Mylord Raby est fort assidu auprès de la comtesse de Wartenberg. Je ne vois pas que son crédit soit assez grand pour nous rendre bons amis." 89

The Oberkriegspräsident, Hans Albrecht, Count von Barfuss, (1635-1704) was at the head of the new ministry which was constituted in 1697-1698. Barfuss, "un bon allemand sans finesse et sans grand habileté," 90 had served in the Brandenburg army since 1655, being successively promoted to colonel in 1673, lieutenant general in 1688, and general field marshal in 1698. He was close to Frederick and had hoped, although in vain, to become first minister. He had disliked and intrigued against Eberhard von Danckelmann. Barfuss is exemplary of the older noble ministers and councillors who resented the rise to power of a roturier like Danckelmann. 91

88 Onno Klopp, ed., Correspondance de Leibniz avec la Princesse Electrice Sophie de Brunswick-Lunebourg, III (London, 1874), 111, Sophie to Leibniz, Hanover, December 1704. Poellnitz is aware of the intrigue and tells an amusing and scandalous story about the Countess, who wanted to see if Frederick Augustus deserved his European reputation, being interrupted by Raby, whom the servants did not think to exclude. Poellnitz, Mémoires, III, 237n.


90 Des Alleurs to Louis XIV, Koenigsberg, 24 June 1698, as quoted in Waddington, L'Acquisition de la Couronne Royale, p. 89.

91 Reinhold Dorwart, The Administrative Reforms of Frederick William of Prussia (Cambridge, 1953), pp. 224-225. Eberhard von Danckelmann was one of seven brothers from the principality of Lingen who entered the service of Brandenburg and distinguished themselves as brilliant public servants. Eberhard von Danckelmann had been the tutor of Frederick and dominated the Berlin court from 1688 until his fall in 1697. One of the consequences of his dismissal was that it also brought down a number of professional public servants.
In the ministry of 1698, Paul von Fuchs (1640-1704), along with Ilgen, took charge of foreign affairs. His son-in-law, Wolfgang von Schmettau, was a privy councillor. Fuchs was a bourgeois lawyer born in Stettin in Pomerania. He was privy secretary to the Elector Frederick William in 1670 and privy councillor in 1682. Since 1685 he was instrumental in the conduct of foreign affairs, especially in creating the imperial alliance. He was made a baron of the empire in 1702. He was an excellent administrator and was in charge of the postal service, and church and university affairs. He helped found the University of Halle and the Berlin Academy of Sciences. In an effort to retain power, he deserted Danckelmann in 1698. However, he lost his honour without profit. Barfuss and Wartenberg were hostile to him because he, like Canckelmann, represented the professional civil servant. He was a close friend of Sophie Charlotte, who corresponded with him regularly and cried at his death.

Friedrich Wilhelm von Grumkow (1678-1739) gained his military knowledge and attained the rank of major general by service in the War of the League of Augsburg and in the War of the Spanish Succession. He attached himself to the crown prince and was a trusted adviser and


93 Waddington, Histoire, II, 159. For his life and career see Königliche Akademie der Wissenschaften, Historische Commission, Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, VIII (Leipzig, 1875-1912), 170-173.
close friend of Frederick William I. Frederick assigned Grumkow to Marlborough to safeguard the king's interests. Raby believed that he was very "hearty and Zealous for my Lord Dukes interest, so much so that he was very angry that the King sent some Tohai to my Lord Albermarles and none to the duke." According to Poellnitz, Wartenberg was so jealous of Grumkow's genius that he tried to keep him out of power by putting him in a military position instead of in the ministry. Poellnitz says that Grumkow was
good-natur'd, civil, and affable. He has the Manners and Sentiments of a Man of Quality, as he really is; he is generous, liberal, loves Splendour and Pleasures but is not so much addicted to them as to neglect the Affairs of the Ministry. He is laborious, has a clear and quick Apprehension; a pleasant, lively, and penetrating Fancy.

General William Cadogan thought that he was "as Silly as he is false" and told Raby that he had "as little Commerce with Grumkow as I have esteem for him." Cadogan said that he "is the last Person I know

95 Poellnitz, Memoires, I,48.
96 Ibid.
98 Ibid.,f.49, Cadogan to Raby, The Hague, 16 November 1706.
that I would either believe or trust, for he will outlye a Dutch Gazette and mis no more capable of keeping a secret than a Woman. However as a Whisperer he is the most dangerous creature breathing." 99

The Saxon envoy at Berlin in 1712 thought that the was a "bon harlequin," an "agréable debauché" who was a "vrai pot-pourri de vices." 100

Raby was bitterly jealous of Grumkow, whom he scornfully called that "half Minister" 101 who dabbles in cobweb intrigues," 102 because of his power and influence with Marlborough and with the king. The king had a great deal of affection for Grumkow, "whose relations he read with more pleasure than any others, and to give him his due they are write with more fire and a very diverting Stile, and by them he seems to be much better inform'd then by his conversation." 103

Raby believed that, although Grumkow and Ilgen spoke indifferently of one another, Grumkow was entirely Ilgen's creature. 104 Raby hated

100 Quoted in Wasdington, Histoire de Prusse, II, 162.
101 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia 90/5, Raby to St. John, 13 December 1710.
103 Ibid., f. 210, Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 30 March 1709.
Grumkow and advised Cadogan to "know the man and how to use him: for silly as he is it is better to have such a block head speak well of one then other ways," for he "loves to tattle and talk all he knows to make him self appear a great man here." 105

Raby's suspicions were not ill-founded for the Berlin court was rife with the rumour that "all affairs between the Queen and this King should be managed strait by Grumkow with your Grace [Marlborough] that Mons'r Spanheim and I need only be Cyphers." 106 Drummond thought that Marlborough had "affected to negotiate military matters both without him [Wartenberg] and Lord Raby and unkown to Monsieur Schmettau ... and made all such bargains with and through Monsieur Grumkow, a travelling military minister, indigent of money and common sense." 107

There were two principal mémoire writers at the Berlin court, Charles Louis de Poellnitz and Christophe, Count de Dohna. Charles's father, Gerard de Poellnitz was governor of Berlin under the Great Elector Frederick William. His two children remained in the Brandenburg service. His daughter was a woman of honor and a close confidante of Sophie Charlotte. His son, Charles Louis, born in 1692, was a colonel of cavalry and author of the Mémoires. 108 He became a gentleman of the

107 H.M.C., Portland Mss. IV, 651-652, Drummond to Harley, Amsterdam, 13 January 1711.
108 Poellnitz, Mémoires.
the chamber of Frederick in 1708, but left Berlin in 1710. Since he was only eighteen years of age when he left Berlin, his experience of the Berlin court was limited, but since he actually witnessed many events and knew the persons intimately his mémoires are revealing, though often inexact.

The two counts of Dohna, Alexander and Christophe, were brothers and stood in the confidence of Frederick and Sophie Charlotte. The older, Alexander, was a brilliant officer who had been a privy councillor since 1687 and had been on various diplomatic missions. He was the governor of the young prince, Frederick William, from 1695 to 1704, and as such had access to the queen. Christophe, the younger brother, the author of the Mémoires, was quicktempered and did not adapt well to court life. He was very close to the queen, who condescended to play with his children. He was a true friend of Frederick, who called him by the nickname, Peter. He was pricy councillor in 1695 and a lieutenant general in 1704. Christophe believed that the Grand Chamberlain and his wife were afraid that he and his brother would unite with the antagonistic party and find means to destroy the Wartenberg faction. 109 Although antipathetic to the favorites, he retained to the end of the reign a high position at Berlin.

At Berlin there were many influential foreign representatives.

In 1703 there was no minister from the United Provinces in Berlin, but only "a sort of Resident ... who was not over agreeable to the court," 110 Mozes de Mortaigne, who served there from 25 November 1701 to 16 February 1705. 111 In 1703 Frederick had resolved to recall his envoy from The Hague unless the States-General sent one to him immediately. 112 Christiaan Carel, Baron van Lintelo, who was appointed envoy extraordinary had his first audience on 3 July 1704 and served until 31 May 1716. Cadogan thought that Lintelo was an "insignificant Coxcomb" and that he followed "the play of several Dutch ministers, to give all the Ill Impressions they can of the English ones in the same courts or Places with them." 113 According to Raby, he never "saw" Lintelo and since Lintelo never acknowledged his presence by even bowing, Raby reciprocated. Raby condemned Lintelo's "foolish pride" and sent Mr. Tilson, his secretary, to Lintelo when there was something of vital importance to the alliance. 114 Raby.

111 Bittner and Gross, eds., Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter, p.351.
112 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia 90/2/109, Raby to Hedges, Berlin, 2 October 1703.
complained that Lintelo never communicated his orders to him. He wrote rather disparagingly that Lintelo "must do a great deal to give his Countrymen as well as others a good opinion of his understanding." 115

Raby personally detested that "coxcomb Lintelo who I have the pleasure daily to See mortified, and to contribute to it myself now and then as far as my Character will permit me." 116 Raby complained that at a conference with the chief ministers, Lintelo was "in his cups" and "rather did harm than good." 117 Raby also thought that Lintelo was too apt to name names which often hinder the publick Service." 118 Raby once asked Stepney

for god sake dont none of the States gen... ever speake to you about their Envoy... he is neither beloved by the King nor any of the court he makes a poor figure here and has brought such a wife that the devil cant match her... she is the publick jest of the court and he is not able to do the least service to the States here... the king tells me he is the only one at his court that appears all the time in old clóthes and realy where the others are so rich this Looks ten times as bad. 119


117 B.M., Add. Mss. 7061, f.197, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 10 February 1705.


The imperial resident, Arnold von Heens, was at Berlin from 28 July 1697 to 9 July 1709. Raby was on better terms with Heems than with Lintelo, even though he thought that Heems was "so mean a fellow that was he not resident I should not let him sit before me." Raby in fact rarely saw Heems. Raby wrote rather disparagingly that during Holy Week the imperial resident would not stir out and that the emperor 'should have ministers to pray and others to do business.'

Ezechiel, Baron von Spaneheim (1629-1710) was the Prussian envoy and subsequently ambassador to England. He served in England from 23 May 1701 until his death on 14 November 1710. He was accompanied by Louis Frederick Bonet, the Prussian resident and his nephew, who succeeded his brother, who had died in 1696. Bonet was a diligent and active representative as illustrated by St.John's assertion that "le donne beaucoup de mouvement, and I have the satisfaction of receiving a quire


121 B.M., Add. Mss. 7062, f.68, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 15 September 1705, wrote that "tho I don't see your Resident I now and then sent him some good advice."

122 Ibid., f.216, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 3 April 1706.

Spanheim was born on 7 December 1629 in Geneva, where he became a professor of eloquence. Bishop Burnet later said of him that he was "the greatest critic of the age in all ancient learning, and is with that a very able man in all affairs and a frank cheerful man." In 1656 he entered the service of the elector of the Palatinate and in 1671 he was appointed a counsellor of the Brandenburg court by Frederick William, the Elector of Brandenburg. He went on various diplomatic missions. In April 1680 he went to Paris until the War of the League of Augsburg broke out. He returned to Paris in 1698 and served there until 1701. He wrote a "Relation de la Cour de France in 1690". He also wrote an account of the English court in 1706. These two documents illustrate the acuity of his observation and his intelligence. He wrote astonishingly long reports to Berlin to Ilgen. He also continued his scholarly studies. He gained the trust of the English court to such a degree that in 1706 when his recall seemed imminent the queen herself wrote of her friendship for him.

125 Burnet, History of His Own Time, II, 389.
127 In his recreditation Anne called him an "ae gre licet verum tam egregium simul ac literati orbis ornamentum et regius nostris exire patiamur." Loewe, Ein Diplomat und Gelehrter, p. 154.
was buried in Westminster Abbey near his wife. 128 Victor Loewe contends that by appointing Spanheim as ambassador to London, Frederick wished to indicate to the world that the young kingdom had an equality of ceremonial rights. 129 Frederick's failure to follow an independent political course in the war is reflected in Spanheim's mission. Spanheim regularly dealt with the payment of subsidies, while Wolfgang von Schmettau, the Prussian representative at The Hague had the principal share in negotiations for the alliance treaties. 130

Wolfgang von Schmettau, whom Drummond calls "a man of true worth and honesty as ever was born," 131 was the Prussian envoy extraordinary to The Hague from 11 November 1701 until his death on 5 February 1711. He had formerly been the Prussian representative to the Ryswick peace. He had hoped to be ambassador to England in Spanheim's place. 132

128 For his life see Waddington, Recueil des Instructions Prusse, XVI, 222, f.n. 1; Doebner, eds., "Spanheim's Account of the English Court,"; Alg. Deut. Biog., XXXV, 50-59; Loewe, Ein Diplomat und Gelehrter.

129 Loewe, Ein Diplomat und Gelehrter, p. 148.

130 B. Van 'T Hoff, The Correspondence 1701-1711 of John Churchill, First Duke of Marlborough and Anthonie Heinsius, Grand Pensionary of Holland (The Hague, 1951), hereafter cited as Van 'T Hoff, Correspondence Marlborough to Heinsius, London, 20 December 1701, p. 2. Marlborough asks Heinsius to agree the "whole for Schmettau is more likely to adjust the difficulties in the treaty with the King of Prussia than Spanheim."; Loewe, Ein Diplomat und Gelehrter, p. 148.

131 H. M. C. Portland Mss. IV, 651, Drummond to Harley, Amsterdam, 13 January 1711.

After Schmettau was empowered to negotiate a treaty in The Hague, Raby procured full powers for Spanheim to negotiate the same treaty. Raby thought that Spanheim was easier to negotiate with than Schmettau, who "thinking himself a great politish is horribly false." Schmettau's ignorance of the Prussian treaty with Danzig in 1704 illustrated that he was often not informed of state policy.

Raby claimed that "there was not a more difficult court in Europe to manage than" Berlin. At the same time, Lintelo, the United Provinces' representative at Berlin, complained that "il n'y a pas de Cour de Europe ou il soit si difficile a negotier pour un Ministre etranger qu'a celleci." The court was rife with intrigues and party factions. According to Raby, no step could be taken at Berlin "but what is watch'd and observed by 20 spyes." The grand Chamberlain claimed that he did not write more often to Marlborough because


134. P.R.O., S.P. Holland 84/227, Stanhope to Harley, 7 October 1704.


137. B.M., Add. Mss. 31,132, f.170, Raby to Mr. Weih, Berlin, 10 May 1704. Ayerst called Berlin "this little tattling Town where like a country Parish y' least thing becomes y' discourse of every Gospiping and Rable and where they have not judgment enough to know when a man talks good sense, or will bare with a preacher y' that has any thing but whipt Cream Complement and flattery in his mouth." Doble, ed., "Ayerst Letters," IV,137, 10 December 1707.
he had "so many Spyes upon him." 138 The continual jealousy of the
ministers and their incessant attempts to insinuate themselves into the
king's favor were concomitant with a thwarting of each other's counsels.
"Revolutions happen daily in the council of our little court, for what
is advised one day and agreed on by one party of councillors is
obstructed and altered the next day by another party." 139 This
factionalism caused in part "the wether cock" 140 disposition of the
Berlin court, which Robert Spencer, Earl of Sunderland, thought "the
most humoursome and capricious one in the world." 141

138 B.M., Add. Mss. 9096, f.3, Raby to Marlborough, Berlin, 1
June 1706.

139 Raby to Stanhope, quoted in Stanhope, History of England, I,
142-143.

140 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia 90/4, Raby to Harley, 5 Juen 1706.

141 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/27, Sunderland to Harley, 1 December
1705.
CHAPTER IV

THE MISSION OF THOMAS WENTWORTH, BARON RABY

1. Raby's Life and Career

The man who was sent to Berlin to extend England's recognition to Fréderick and later to insure Prussian cooperation in the war effort was Thomas Wentworth, Baron Raby, later Earl of Strafford (1672-1739). He was said to be "surely more master of the intrigues of the court of Berlin than any foreign minister there," ¹ and was the second son and surviving heir of Sir William Wentworth, of Northgate Head, Wakefield. He was the grand nephew of Thomas Wentworth, the famous minister of Charles I, who was executed in May 1661. Raby was Page of Honor to the queen in 1687. After the 1688 Revolution, he became Groom of the Bedchamber from 16 May 1695 to 19 March 1702. He was a close friend of William III and upon hearing of William's accident in February 1702 rushed home to England to be at the dying king's bedside.

His military career began on 31 December 1688 when he was appointed by William as cornet in Lord Colchester's regiment of horse which was sent to Scotland and later to Flanders. In Flanders he participated in all the campaigns until 1697 and served with such

¹H.M.C., Portland Mss.V,110, John Drummond to Robert Harley, 25 November 1711 [1710?].
bravery that he was made aide-de-camp to the king in 1693. He was 
promoted to Major in January in January 1694 in the First Troop of 
Life Guards and served as Colonel of the Royal Regiment of Dragoons from 
1701 to 1715. He served under Marlborough in Flanders in 1702 and par-
ticipated in the action at Helchternen where his horse was shot under 
him. He was successively promoted to Brigadier General in January 1703, 
to Major General in 1704 and to Lieutenant General in 1707. In 1706 he was present at the seige of Menin and narrowly escaped being cap-
tured by the French while on a foray with General Cadogan, who was 
taken. 2 

Raby always contended that "I could serve her Majesty better in the army than in forein affairs for I have ben bread up in the for-
mer all my life and this Last is new to me." 3 He was initiated into 
diplomacy in 1698 when he accompanied Lord Portland, the English am-
bassador, to Paris. In 1701 William sent him to congratulate Frederick 
the Elector of Brandenburg on his coronation as king in Prussia. Raby 
was appointed envoy (1703) and later ambassador extraordinary 4 (1706) 

2 James J. Cartwright, ed., The Wentworth Papers, 1705-1739 

3 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia 90/3/133, Raby to Harley, Berlin, 10 
December 1704. 

4 Few diplomats reached the dignity of ambassador. David B. Horn states that there were only sixty-nine in one hundred years, excluding 
the anomalous Turkish embassy. The importance of the office of amba-
dador is seen in a letter from Marlborough to Godolphin when he says that "I know him [Raby] to be a very meddling, insignificant creature: but 
since he is the only one that has the title of ambassador, he should in 
justice be named." David B. Horn, British Diplomatic Service 1689-1789, 
p. 45; Sarah (Jennings) Churchill, Duchess of Marlborough, Private Cor-
respondence of the Duchess of Marlborough, II (London, 1838), 133.
to Berlin. In 1711 he was appointed envoy to The Hague, made a Privy Councillor, and created Earl of Strafford.

After Raby's impeachment for his participation in the negotiations leading to the Utrecht Treaty in April 1713, he retired and devoted himself to the care of his Yorkshire estates. Presumably at one time he was in correspondence with the titular King James III by whom he was in January 1722 created Duke of Strafford and nominated as Commander in Chief of His Majesty's forces north of the Humber. He died at Wentworth Castle on 26 November 1739 at the age of sixty-seven.

Lord Raby has been described by John Macky at the age of thirty as a "young Gentleman, de bon Naturel, handsome ... of low stature, well-shaped, with a good face, fair Complexioned." Swift,


6According to a minute of 1715 of the Privy Council, it was usual for ambassadors to be sworn of the Council on their return from abroad, H.M.C. Portland Mss., V, 503; Marlborough asserted that "being declared of the Council ... can hardly be refused to any ambassador that can desire it" before he goes on a new mission, H.M.C. Bath Mss. I, 94.

7Sir Leslie Stephen and Sir Sidney Lee, eds., The Dictionary of National Biography, XX (London, 1921-1922), 1199, hereafter cited as D.N.B.


remarking on Macky, contended that Raby was on the contrary very tall. He appears to have been a tall, well built, rather good looking man. The picture printed by Cartwright indicates that he was rather handsome with well delineated features in an ovular face with large eyes, a full mouth, and a cleft chin. Sophie Charlotte, the queen of Prussia, remarked that "Je le trouve lun air de santé, mais plus tout a fait celui de si bonne volonté, que par le passé cela donne des grandes inquietudes, et si il ne se contraignait pas, jaurais peur quel'on s'en prendrait à toutes les beautés ici."

Geoffrey Holmes contends recently that it would be hard and even irrelevant to attach a party tag to Thomas Wentworth. Abundant evidence for this view can be found in Raby's correspondence. For example, he wrote to Marlborough that "during the late Reign I had no particular obligation but to the King himself" and that though recently importuned "by great persons of different parties "he had "openly refused coming in to any of their measures." Writing to Cadogan, Raby

11 Cartwright, The Wentworth Papers, picture facing title page.
contended that "I am really of neither party called wig or Tory, but of that party w'ch is truly for the interest of my ty." Although these assertions may be seen as part of his attempts to ingratiate himself with the politicians in power, Wentworth in his family correspondence reveals the same distrust and even antipathy for the parties.

Raby has been characterized as "the most persistent and shameless go-getter of his day." This trait is clearly exemplified when upon hearing the news of his brother's death in 1692, he at once rode to Breda to request his brother's former position, but he was too late. Wentworth's correspondence with Marlborough is full of sollicitations for various appointments or favors, such as Privy Councillor, Ambassador, Plenipotentiary of the peace, the title of Strafford, etc. Marlborough wrote that "Lord Raby is so very desirous of having his name in the treaty of Peace that he will be contented to stay at Berlin and consequently have no Equipage Mony." Marlborough, in demanding Raby's recall from Berlin, complained that he was "always importuning for


16 Geoffrey Holmes, British Politics in the Age of Anne, p.386; Walter Sichel, Bolingbroke and His Times, I (London, 1901), 385 describes Wentworth as a "martinet who by plodding perserverance and a wealthy marriage, acquired and retained a large fortune, part of which he expended on building a magnificent mansion in Yorkshire."

some honour or promotion."  

As a soldier, Thomas Wentworth appears as a proud, courageous man who enjoyed the challenge of military battle. He continually asserted his preference for the military instead of the diplomatic life and deplored "being in inaction when all the world is in arms and seeking Hon."  

For example, Raby declared that the "army is where I woud be and for it I torment the Duke of Marlborough daily."  In a letter to Marlborough he stated that "I desired you so often to let me serve in the Army which is much more my inclination than continuing here."  His courage is illustrated by his military record and by his singly attacking a wild boar which nearly killed him.  It was said of Raby that he brought this spirit to his diplomacy; "ce seigneur propre

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a brusquer une entreprise comme un colonel de dragons. 23

He was a vain often suspicious man who sought to guide rather than to be guided. His letters from The Hague contain longer instructions to St. John than St. John sent to him. (Both Oxford and St. John were continually requesting him to shorten his letters.)

His dispatches and even his private letters are inordinately long and rambling. He was described in 1735 as a "loquacious, rich, illiterate, cold tedious, constant haranguer in the House, who spoke neither sense nor English . . . in short there was nothing so low as his dialect except his understanding, nor anything so tiresome as his public harangues except his private conversation." 24 In 1713, Strafford argued that as The Hague would remain the center of the affairs of Europe, he ought to receive copies of all dispatches sent to the foreign courts. 25 John Drummon, Robert Harley, Earl of Oxford's, confidential agent in Amsterdam, 26 dryly reported that Wentworth went home partly

23 Quoted in Marie René Roussel de Courcy, La Coalition de 1701 contre la France, I (Paris, 1886), 284.

24 Lord Hervey quoted in Cokayne, Peerage, XII, pt. 1, 331.

25 H.M.C., Portland Mss., V, 353.

"to instruct the Queen's ministers how to serve her Majesty to the best of his Judgment." "However," he added that "For my part I wish we had one of his courage and resolution here; he has served well and is really capable of serving well." 27 Raby complained that his advice was not considered because "it has been said I am a Prussian because of the liberty I have several times taken of giving my poor advice of what is to be done with regarded the Court and its neighbour-hood but . . . when they are considered it will be found they were the advice of a true Englishman." 28 Raby did in fact become a partisan of the Berlin court. He wrote to a fellow diplomat that "I must vindicate my little King as you call him, - tho' he thinks himself great enough." 29 Raby also wrote to the English representative at Denmark that "you and

27 H.M.C., Portland Mss., V, 354.

28 B.M., Add. Mss. 9108, ff.41-42, Raby to Marlborough, Berlin, 4 February 1710. He reiterates his complaint in his assertion that his advice "is interrupted by partiality for them for in England where they mind but to Superficially when a Minister has been any time at a Court they cry oh he is a prussian or an Austrian or a Swede." B.M., Add. Mss. 9108, f.198, Raby to Robinson, 10 March 1710. Robinson in his reply asserts that he himself has "long suffer'd under that reproach." B.M. Add. Mss. 22,198, f.204, Robinson to Raby, 12 March 1709, Hamburg. According to David B. Horn, British Diplomatic Service, pp. 202-203, this criticism was the one which was most frequently levelled against a diplomat.

I become Partizans for the Courts where we are, and tho you accuse mine of sinister designs and Intrigues with France; I can give you brave resolutions and open actions to convince you to the contrary."  

Raby's suspicious nature is best seen in St. John's letters to Drummond and in St. John's complain to Strafford that "you very frequently over think the point, imagine great secrets to lie latent where really there are none, and by consequence blame your friends for not communicating what they do not know... For God's sake, my Lord, lay aside these jealousies."

Wentworth, who has been described by Marlborough as "a very coxcomb," both "impertinent and insignificant" and by Abel Boyer as a bold towering Spirit, and enterprising Genius," appears as a controversial figure in the European scene. Both Frederick and Sophie

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31 For example, see Gilbert Parke, ed., Letters and Correspondence Public and Private of The Right Honourable Henry St. John, Lord Viscount Bolingbroke, I (London, 1798), 26, hereafter cited as Parke, ed., Bolingbroke Correspondence.

32 Ibid., I, 317.

33 B.M., Add.Mss. 9105,f.60, Marlborough to Godolphin, 31 May 1709; Duchess of Marlborough, Private Correspondence, I, 179, Marlborough to the Duchess, Gand, 13 June 1709.

34 Boyer, History of Queen Anne, II, 514.
Charlotte were charmed by him. Raby corresponded frequently with many illustrious people of his day such as Leibniz and Robethon. He was also a close and influential friend of Sophie of Hanover. Macky, who contends that he was a man "of fine Understanding, and with application, may prove a man of Business," is contradicted by Swift, who contends that he was a man "of very bad understanding and could not spell." Raby's reports to the Secretaries of State are, however, perspicacious. Raby was a shrewd man who knew and understood the political and personal maze of intrigues of the Berlin court. The various judgments of him by contemporaries such as, Marlborough and Swift, must be read in the light of reports distorted by personal bias or even animosity.

The diplomatic representative who preceded Raby at the Berlin court was Philip Plantamour, who was merely in charge of affairs from 1699 to 2 November 1703 and was "only left there upon the removall of 


36Raby's letter to Robethon are preserved in the Hannover Stadtarchiv. Robethon, who had come from a Huguenot family, had served William III and had been secretary to the Elector of Hanover. His wife had attended Sophie Charlotte at Berlin. See J.F. Chance, "John de Robethon and the Robethon Papers," English Historical Review, XIII (1898), 55-70.

37Macky, Memoirs, p.146. For the allegation that Macky's characters were written by Burnet, see William A. Shaw, ed., Calendar of Treasury Papers, Introduction to Vols. XI-XVIII (London,1904-1957), clxxxii, hereafter cited as Shaw, ed., Treasury Papers.

38Scott, ed., Swift's Works, XII, 237.
Mr Stepney. 39 James Cresset had been sent to Berlin as an extra-
dinary envoy in 1700 but he was only there one month. 40 Thomas Went-
worth had been sent to Berlin in 1701 by William III to congratulate
the elector of Brandenburon his assumption of the royal title. He
was at Berlin from 14 May to 22 June 1701 41 and was very successful
in his mission, so much so that Hedges later wrote that he was "glad to
find you are parting with that Court, with so much mutual Satisfaction." 42
In a similar vein, Plantamour wrote Raby that the Grand Chamberlian
"m'a charge de vous témoigner l'estime toute particulière qu'il fait de
votre amitie luy est chere ... il a grand envie de cultiver votre
correspondence." 43 Plantamour wrote Hedges that "Je dois vous dire
en Amy qu'Elle ne scauroit donner cet Employ a une Personne qui soit
plus agreable au Roy mon Maitre que My Lord Raby et je vous Conseille
demander cela a votre Cour." 44 According to Plantamour, Spanheim, the

39 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 104/204/79, Hedges to Raby, Whitehall,
22 June 1703.

40 Bittner and Gross, eds., Repertorium der diplomatischen
Vertreter, I, 181.

41 David B. Horn, British Diplomatic Representatives 1689-1789,

42 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 104/200, Hedges to Raby, 14 June 1701.

43 B.M., Add.Mss. 22,193,f.17, Plantamour to Raby, Potsdam, 18
October 1701. See also B.M., Add.Mss. 22,193,f.108, Plantamour to Raby,
Berlin, 27 February 1703.

44 Ibid., f.24, Plantamour to Hedges, Berlin, 1 November 1701.
Prussian representative in London, had orders to press the appointment of Raby. "Asseurement on vou souhaitez passionement icy comme Ambassadeur et le Roy luy me'me ne peut pas s'empécher de le dire souvent."

There had been some speculation that Cresset might be appointed. As late as 26 December 1702 Sophie Charlotte, the queen of Prussia, had made the rather odd remark that "Je suis curieuse si Milord Rabi le tirera del'emploi qu'il devait avoir. Ici certaine personne s'en flatte, mais comme il est whic, je ne sais si la reine le voudra employer." The king himself seems to have personally pressed for Raby's appointment and to have told Plantamour that "vous ne luy marquerir pas quand vous partirier pour vous rendre icy et qu'il vous attendoit avec grande impatience." Marlborough told the Count of Wartenberg, the Grand Chamberlain, that the queen had resolved to "t'emoigner l'étroite liaison et la bonne correspondance qu'Elle souhaite toujours d'entretenir et de cultiver de plus en plus avec son Majesté,"

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d'avoir en envoûé extraordinaire à la cour de Berlin" and that he would recommend Raby "qui serait le plus agréable a sa Majesté Prussienne." Before Raby was issued credentials as Envoy Extraordinary on 11 March 1703 and instructions on 11 March 1703 and 24 April 1703, he was assured by Marlborough that he could retain his "post and pretensions in the army." He did not arrive in Berlin until 20 June 1703.

The appointment was plainly gratifying to the king who wrote Raby that he was greatly pleased that the queen had chosen him to be


49 Ibid. Plantamour wrote Hedges that "ce Prince fut de la meilleure humeur du monde en apprenant que My Lord Raby doit venir icy quoyque ce ne soit qu'en qualité d'Envoye Extraordinaire. Il me dit que c'étoit une marque que la Reyne voulait vivre en bonne amitié et intelligence avec luy puisqu'Elle luy envoyoit une personne qui luy étoit si agréable et que Sa Majesté pouvoit etre persuadé qu'il feroit toujours un grand plaisir d'oblier en tout cas ce qu'il pourroit." P. R.O., S. P. Germany, 90/1, Plantamour to Hedges, Potsdam, 27 January 1703.

50 B.M., Add. Mss. 22, 196, f. 24, Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 2 November 1704. Also see Add. mss. 22, 196, f. 181, Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 16 February 1709. Raby later bitterly wrote that he had "been sent with show of friendship to this scribbling trade." Cartwright, Wentworth Papers, Raby to the Duke of Argyll, Berlin, 21 February 1711. For Raby's instructions see P. R. O., S. P. Germany, 104/204/146-151.

51 Horn, British Diplomatic Representatives, p. 103.
her envoy at the court of Berlin and who signed the letter "Votre
très affectionné, Frederick R." Raby's appointment was indicative
of the desire of the English ministry throughout the war to humor
and gratify the Prussian king; to "maintain and cultivate a good and
firme Friendship and Allyance with that Court." 53

2. Raby at Berlin

During Raby's mission to Berlin, letters were forwarded from
England by packet boats which left on Mondays and Fridays for the Low
Countries, Germany, Sweden, and Denmark. If the wind continued
easterly, however, there were often no letters received from England.
Raby complained that representatives in France and Holland had a
greater annual extraordinary allowance even though their "Postage doe
not cost halfe as ours doe heer for I pay more for the sending of my
letters from hence then they doe for the receit of theirs." He estimated

52 B.M., Add.Mss.22,210,f.1, Frederick to Raby, 28 February
1703.

53 P.R.O., S.P. Germany 104/203/147, Instructions to Raby dated
11 March 1703.

54 Horn, British Diplomatic Service, p.231.

that his postage bills "came to very nigh the whole Quarters allowance."\footnote{56}

In order to insure that the letters were received, duplicates were sent by another post.\footnote{57} Not infrequently the posts were interrupted, especially during a war. Charles Whitworth, the English envoy to Russia, complained to Secretary of State Boyle that

the posts are still so very ill regulated that nothing can be relied on . . . But to live here six months without receiving any letter . . . to know several I have writ from hence are lost, to be uncertain as to the rest, and yet to have such a heavy tax imposed,- is intolerable.\footnote{58}

The high incidence of post interruption necessitated the use of a cipher. Whitworth in fact complained that he cannot write to Raby "as freely as I would on this Subject for want of Cypher."\footnote{59}

One of the drawbacks of using a cipher was that there were many different ciphers in use at the same time and one cipher was often used only with one person. Stanhope enclosed a letter to Hedges which Robinson had sent him under flying seal "believing our Cyphers might be the

\footnote{57}Charles Whitworth, "Dispatches," \textit{Russkoe Istoricheskoe Obshchestvo Sbornik,} L, (1886), 137, Whitworth to Boyle, Moscow, 28 January 1709, hereafter cited as Whitworth, "Dispatches," \textit{Sbornik.}

I want to thank Professor Charles Morley, Ohio State University, for pointing out this useful series to me.

\footnote{58}Ibid., L, 22-23, Whitworth to Boyle, Moscow, 18 July 1708.

\footnote{59}B.M., Add. Mss. 31, 128, f.15, Whitworth to Raby, Grodno, 7 October 1705.
same, but I could make nothing of that part of it." 60 One of the
difficulties of communications as far as Raby's mission was concerned
was Raby's handwriting for the Secretary of State would misread and con-
sequently misinterpret his "scrawling hand." 61

The sums allotted to diplomatic representatives were not in-
tended as remuneration for services rendered to the crown, but rather as
an expense allowance to defray the costs necessarily incurred in rep-
resenting the Crown abroad. 62 For example, Raby was paid £1,000 in
order to defray the cost of his mission to compliment Frederick on
his crowning as king in Prussia. 63 As Envoy Extraordinary to Berlin
from 1703 to 1705, he was to receive a payment of £455 as a quarter's
advance for his ordinary of £5 a day, which was thereafter to be paid
quarterly. 64 In addition to these ordinaries, Raby was to receive a
regular extraordinary allowance which was £75 a quarter and an allowance

60 P.R.O., S.P. Holland, 84/226, Stanhope to Hedges, 21 December
1703.

61 See for example, B.M., Add. Mss. 28, 916, f. 36, Raby to Ellis,
24 May 1704.

62 Horn, British Diplomatic Service, p. 61.


64 Ibid., XVIII, 9, 114, 115, and 406.
of £ 500 for equipage money. 65 The equipage allowance corresponded to the allowance for "outfit" still paid under the Regulations for His Majesty's Foreign Service. 66 As Ambassador Extraordinary from 1705 to 1711, Raby received £ 10 a day as ordinary, £ 1,000 as equipage money, and £ 300 as an extraordinary allowance. 67 In addition to the fixed extraordinary allowance, excess expenditure could be authorized by the Treasurer. Raby complains in a letter to Marlborough that although the Lord Treasurer had ordered the payment of the greatest part of his extraordinary, he had "laid aside all my extra Extraordinary tho they were all most all by speatial Order." 68

In addition to these cash allowances, there were other perquisites of considerable value. Ambassadors were entitled to a large quantity of white and gilt plate which was estimated to be worth £ 2,500. 69 When Raby went to Berlin as Ambassador Extraordinary, he

65 B.M., Add. Mss. 37, 353, f. 3, "Regulations of Extraordinary allowance to Envoys or Residents."

66 Horn, British Diplomatic Service, p. 52.


68 Horn, British Diplomatic Service, p. 49. Among the items on Raby's extraordinary list are the postage of letters, secret correspondence and mourning. At one time he was allotted £ 1,600 for four quarters. Shaw, ed., Treasury Books, XXIII, part II, 337.

69 B.M., Add. Mss. 9103, f. 91, Raby to Marlborough, 16 October 1708.
received 945 ounces 10 pennyweight of gilt plate and 6,064 ounces of white plate which he was later discharged "from liability to return." 70 Ambassadors also received a cloth of State of crimson damask with gold and silver fringe, a chair, two stools, a footstool, and a foot carpet, "as hath been used on such like occasions" as well as a large bible, prayerbooks, etc., for the embassy chapel estimated at £350. 71 The importance of the plate and furniture is seen when Raby used them as an argument for his appointment as Ambassador and Plenipotentiary at the peace. He wrote that "when they Consider the plate I have and the Ambassador's furniture that is a good article in my favour: since to any one else they must give these things over again." 72

What he was supposed to receive, however, was very different from what he actually received. 73 Raby, who was notorious for complaining about the treasury's failure to pay his arrears, was finally assured that the money would be paid. He soon found, however, that the payment was to be in tin which comes in so slowly that before that is

71 Ibid., XX, part II, 376.
73 For example, Raby to Lord Paulet, 28 April 1711, B.M., Add. Mss. 22, 222, f. 184. See Shaw, Treasury Books, XVI, XVIII, XIX, XX, part II and III, XXI, part II and III, XXIII, part II, XXIV, part II, and XXV, part II.
pay'd me; w ch I can't take up at any discount; there is as much again in arrears, so that I am continually soliciting for what is my due."74

As he later wrote, "I am weary of living at great expense and receiving no mony at all w ch is at present the misfortune of all our foreign Ministers." 75 Raby claimed that he had an honorable post "yet it is one w ch obliges me to spend more than I get by it." 76 At one time he estimated that he was in arrears for more than £ 5,500. 77 Raby did, however admit that Berlin was the only court that returned part of the subsidies that it received in presents to the foreign ministers. 78

Raby with his love of show was well suited to the Berlin court. The expenses which he incurred are indicated by the size of his en­tourage. According to a memo written in 1705, his staff was composed of


75 B.M., Add.Mss. 22,198,f.325, Raby to Robinson, Berlin, 17 March 1710; Robinson told Raby that a fellow diplomat "is driving a bargain with Mr Stratford, to whom he offers to make over his allowance both OrdV and ExV in consideration of a yearly Summ certain, whereby the other is to have a profit equal to the supposed Hazard." B.M., Add.Mss.22,198,f. 82, Robinson to Raby, Hamburg, 29 September 1708.


77 B.M., Add.Mss.9097,f.70, Raby to Marlborough, Hanover, 10 October 1706.

sixty-nine persons, among which were listed twenty footmen, three running footmen, three porters, six pages and a "sick runner upon Chantry." 79

As representative at Berlin, part of Raby's duties was to correspond regularly with the Secretary of State and with the other diplomats. His correspondence indicates that he fulfilled his duties only too conscientiously. Raby, however, complained that the letters which he received from his fellow diplomats were written in a "mystereious and double stile." He further claimed that many of his fellow ministers "either thro negligence or other self-regarding politicks kept me in the dark from what was necessary for me to know." This neglect made him so indifferent that he felt "rather glad when they dont communicate to me, than when they do." 80

David B. Horn contends that one of the worst weaknesses of eighteenth-century diplomacy was the failure of the Secretaries of State to keep the diplomats well informed. 81 Raby often speaks of having "stomachd some neglects I have had from home" and complains that "the great difficulties which are made are done without my being informed.

81 Horn, British Diplomatic Service, p. 186.
the least of them from home and knowing but from this Court first." 82

One of the clearest examples of this neglect is the incident regarding
the letter in favor of the Protestants in the empire. Raby was
instructed to persuade the court not to send the letter. Hedges did
not acquaint him, however, when the queen changed her mind and decided
to send the letter. Raby complained that the secretaries did not care
"how much Envoyes are put out of Countenance, tho if one knew nothing
more then w't one hears from their office one should be continuously
put to the blush to excuse ones ignorance." 83

The Secretaries of State were often by-passed by Marlborough,
who sent imperative instructions to Berlin. Because the Berlin mis-
sion was as much military as diplomatic in character, Marlborough was
very influential. For example, in requesting instructions from Marl-
borough, Raby assured him that he would not divulge to the Secretary of
State what had been communicated to Marlborough about the Franco-Prussian
negotiations. 84 Marlborough did not hesitate to write private letters
which were in effect additional instructions. For example, Marlborough

82 B.M., Add.Mss.9106 f.42, Raby to Marlborough, Berlin, 4 Febru-
ary 1710.

83 B.M., Add.Mss.7061 f.137, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 20 Octo-
ber 1703.

84 B.M., Add.Mss.9095 f.4, Raby to Marlborough, Berlin, 2 Janu-
ary 1706.
wrote to Raby that the queen "would have signified her directions to you in this manner by the secretary of state, but that it is thought what comes from me may be better taken." 85

The increasing estrangement and the consequent lack of confidence between Marlborough and Raby undermined Raby's position at Berlin. In 1707 Raby wrote Cadogan that although he knew that Marlborough was sounding the court on augmenting the Italian contingent, Marlborough had not taken "the least notice of it to me, wherefore I took no notice of it either." 86 In 1709 Raby complained that in the six years he was at Berlin, he had not signed one treaty. Even the treaty, which was signed after the battle of Ramillies, was signed by Lintelo, the Dutch representative to Prussia, who was only an envoy, whereas Raby was an ambassador. Raby in fact did not hear of the treaty "till all was over." 87 Indeed Marlborough often instructed Raby to insist on certain conditions which he later yielded to Grumkow,

85 Murray, ed., Dispatches, II, 415, Marlborough to Raby, St. James, 5 February 1706.


87 Ibid., ff. 190-191, Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 9 March 1709.
the Prussian representative to the army. This aggravated the difficulties already inherent in Raby's position and gave credence to the rumour that entrusting Raby with anything would be a "sure way to make it miscarry with" Marlborough and that all affairs should "be managed strait by Grumkow with" Marlborough, while Raby and Spanheim "need only be ciphers." Raby was not unjustified in his assertion that "I have deserved more consideration and really the world will be apt to judge, that I have deserved to be used like others in my post or else that her Matys mony has ven very wrong employed in keeping a useless Minister here so long." 

Raby, punctilious in most things, was well-suited to the court of Berlin where "Ceremony was the breath of his [the king's] life" and where the "jungle of diplomatic ceremonial" was especially difficult. The ceremonial tangle became so acute in 1705 that the king ordered the Privy Councillors to avoid visiting or receiving visits from the foreign diplomats in order to avoid disputes about ceremony.

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91 Horn, British Diplomatic Service, p.205.
One of the reasons for Raby's rather prolonged journey to Berlin was that Marlborough had instructed him not to hurry to Berlin so that he could write and receive an answer from the Secretary of State about the ceremony to be observed with the Royal Prince. To avoid disputes the Secretary of State instructed Raby to adhere closely to precedent and to "observe the same Ceremony as the Envoy Extraordinary of the King of Denmark has done." Characteristically, Raby questioned his instructions and asked Stepney if he should "give the Hand to all ambassadors in their Houses . . . [even though] all Envoyes from other princes refuse to do it." The importance of ceremonial in reflecting the current relations between two powers is lucidly illustrated by the behavior of the Swedish ambassador at Berlin. When the Swedish ambassador who hitherto had been inflexible concerning the ceremony of his reception, began to "make amends by an easy condescénsion to what they desire of him. . . the Conjecturers imagine that a great intimacy may follow between the two Courts of Sweden and Prussia." Raby later wryly

94 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia 90/2/5, Raby to Hedges, Cologne, 19 May 1703.

95 B.M., Add. Mss. 28, 947, Instructions to Raby of 13 May 1703.


reported that the Swedish ambassador "was a little too hot at first and yielded to all they desired till he found they would put too much upon him." 98 The prestige-seeking Frederick used all the means of ceremonial and outward show to elevate his status. For example, although a certain diplomat was no longer accredited to his ruler, the Berlin court "put him upon the foot of an ambassador because they affect to have as many with that character as they can." 99 The elevation of Raby from envoy extraordinary to ambassador extraordinary in 1705 was a compliment to the king and indicates the importance attached to Berlin at this time. There was an English tradition of keeping ambassadorial appointments to a minimum and only the English diplomatic representative at the French court in the 1689 to 1789 period was regularly accredited with the ambassadorial rank. 100

A speaking facility in a foreign language, especially French was necessary for the diplomatic service. Raby wrote and spoke French although the Prussian Queen Sophie Charlotte wrote that "il parle mal


100 Horn, *British Diplomatic Service*, p. 45.
In 1703 Raby neither spoke nor read German. In 1705 he wrote to Robert Harley that "tho they will have it here that God Spoke to Adam in High Dutch [German] yet it is now a Language known but amongst themselves and few will strain their throats to Learn it." The languages used at court are illustrated by Raby's proposal that at his ambassadorial reception he should speak English to the king for his formal speech, French to the Royal Prince, and German to the king's brothers. When the king tenaciously insisted that his brothers be

101 Doebner, ed., "Briefe," p.45, Sophie Charlotte to Hans Caspar von Bothmer, 15 March 1705. The difficulties which Raby encountered especially in French are illustrated by an incident when he tried in French to make a pun on the name of Ludwig Freicherr von Printze, Schlosshauptmann. The consequences are amusingly related by Sophie Charlotte in the above cited letter.

102 In fact, few English diplomats had any knowledge of German. See Horn, British Diplomatic Service, p.139. Raby wrote in 1704 that since I find from home I am like to stay here some time longer, I design to set my self about learning High Dutch [German] of wch I have picked up a little since I have been here." B.M., Add.Mss.31,132,f.190, Raby to Wich, May or June 1704.

103 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia 90/3/239, Raby to Harley, 18 July 1705. Ayerst, Raby's chaplain recommended to two gentlemen coming to Berlin that they learn to speak French since "otherwise they'll find themselves very much embarrassed with ye Latin wch we pronounce so very different from other Nations yw we can neither make our selves understood nor understand others wth out a great deal of Difficulty." Doble, ed., "Ayerst Letters," IV,132, Ayerst to Dr. A. Charlett, Berlin, 2 April 1707.

called Hoheit Raby wrote a long letter discussing the prestige associated with and the meanings attached to various German titles and suggested that Hoheit did not mean Royal Highness and that the term Altesse should be used as an equivalent. He concluded that if this was unsatisfactory, "we must find a way to give them their Hochheit and let them interpret it as they please." The expedient later found was that Raby used Hoheit, although the rest of the speech was in French.  

105 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia 90/4, Raby to Boyle, 8 December 1708.
The appointment of Thomas Wentworth, Baron Raby is indicative of England's efforts to bind Frederick firmly to the alliance. Thomas Wentworth had been appointed because of his friendship with Frederick I and because of his influence at the Berlin court. It was imperative for the Grand Alliance that England have a decisive influence on Prussian politics because of Frederick's importance in the empire and because of his pivotal position between the East and the West. England regarded Prussian adherence to the Grand Alliance as crucial.

When Raby arrived in Berlin in 1703, he was instructed to prevent Prussia from getting embroiled with either the emperor, the States-General, the elector of Hanover, or the king of Sweden. This entailed acting as a mediator in the various disputes which arose. Prussian estrangement from the emperor, the States-General, or the elector might entail Prussian withdrawal from the alliance and possibly even her defection to France. Prussian involvement in the Northern War would necessitate the recall not only of her troops,
but also the troops of many neighbouring princes, such as Denmark and Hanover, estimated at between 30,000 to 40,000 men. An examination of the dissensions which were prevalent in the alliance and of the threat which the Northern War posed to the allied war effort reveals the problems which England would face throughout the War of the Spanish Succession in her efforts to keep Frederick in the alliance.

The year 1703 would see the loss of the fortified cities of Augsburg, Ratisbon, and Landau to the French, the allied defeat in the fields of Hochstadt and Spirbach, and the tightened French hold on the Upper Rhine and Moselle. It was thus imperative that the Allies retain Prussia as a close ally. In 1703 Frederick had two corps of troops in the allied service. The Prussian corps on the Rhine participated in the seizure of Bonn and Guelder. The Prussian corps in Bavaria was present at the imperial defeat at Hochstadt in September. Raby urged the king to send his quota and to induce the other princes to send theirs. ¹ Marlborough believed that "they never could come more seasonably than at this time." ² By the end of 1703, Raby was "almost weary of


²Murray, ed., Dispatches I, 120, Marlborough to Raby, Camp at Hanover, 22 June 1703. The number of Prussian troops on the lower Rhine in 1703 was 11,983 of which 8,890 were infantry, P.R.O., S.P. 105/68/429.
preaching to them their own good." 3 He believed that England must "manage the King and not drive him" 4 for Anne did not have the same hold over the king as William had whose heir Frederick had hoped to be. Frederick had a great respect for the queen whom he thought more obliging than William had ever been 5 but "not enough to part with any thing they think they can keep for all they expect from her is her Good offices's to get his title ownd in other Courts ... as a Mediator she may doe something but no other way." 6 England's territorial goals and territorial ambitions did not conflict with Frederick's and she did not feel threatened by his aggrandizement as the other allies did.

1. Allied Dissensions

To insure a united war effort, the internal disruptive tendencies


5 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia 90/2/49, Raby to Hedges, Berlin, 11 August 1703.

of an imperfectly cohesive alliance whose members had disparate goals, conflicting interests, and latent dissensions, had to be contained. Frederick's conflicts with the emperor over the persecution of the Protestants, the conduct of imperial affairs, the treatment of his troops, and the payment of subsidies, threatened to disrupt the alliance. Raby felt that the princes of the empire "have much reason to find fault with the Emperor's ill management and he with theirs and we with both." The relations between Brandenburg-Prussia and the emperor were embittered by their religious differences especially because of Frederick's a fervent espousal of the Protestant cause.

This is illustrated clearly by the letter from the Queen, the States-General, and the King of Prussia to the Emperor concerning the persecution of the Protestants in the empire. Spanheim, the Prussian ambassador to England, had given Queen Anne a copy of the letter which the king asked her to send in favor of the Protestants. The queen, considering it inopportune to send such a letter at this time, persuaded the Berlin court not to continue with it. The queen, however, changed her mind and wrote the letter without informing Raby.

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7 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia 90/2/204, Raby to Hedges, Berlin, 11 December 1703.
8 Hinrichs, Preussen als Historisches Problem, pp.259-263.
Meanwhile the king of Prussia thought that there were some expressions in the letter which would only incense the emperor and asked Raby to write to Stepney, the English representative at Vienna, to stop the delivery of the letter. Raby felt that Prussia's objection to sending the letter was partly generated by jealousy over "who shall have the Cheife Honour of Espousing the Protestant interest for England thinks themselves the Cheife Protector of the Protestants, and indeed is the ablest, but our King here would be counted the Prince who espouses most wearmly their Interest and to whom they ought most to apply themselves." The Prussian ministers' fervent Protestantism lead them to believe that the Emperor was greatly influenced by the Jesuits and that he would not regret Ratisbon's falling into enemy Catholic hands.  

Another cause of Austro-Prussian dissension was the imperial treatment of Prussian troops. Frederick was very bitter about the high losses incurred by his troops at Styrum's defeat by the elector of Bavaria. He also resented the emperor's refusal to exchange the

10 B.M., Add.Mss. 7061,ff.36-38,Raby to Stepney Berlin 20 October 1703.

11 Ratisbon was the seat of the Imperial Diet. The emperor wished to remove the Diet to some place in his hereditary dominions while Prussia wished it to be held at Frankfurt or some other free Imperial town.

12 P.R.O.S.P.Germany 80/21,Stepney to Hedges Vienna 30 October 1703.
Prussian prisoners. There were rumours in Berlin that the king was going to recall his troops at the end of October if the emperor did not grant them favorable winter quarters on the Danube.\textsuperscript{13} Raby feared that if the troops did not receive winter quarters on the Danube and were obliged to march home the emperor would have great difficulty in convincing the king to send the troops next year because the emperor owed the king three years subsidy, which he could not pay, and for which he refused to give any country as guarantee for his debt, as Prussia desired.\textsuperscript{14} The chief dispute centered on who was to pay the 17,000 Reichsthaler for quarters on the Danube. The emperor believed that the king should pay it over and above the regular troops pay and the king believed it incumbent on the emperor to pay it. The dispute was resolved by the emperor’s paying for the use of the king’s forces and deducting this from the amount he owed him in subsidies.

Prussia’s increasingly strained relations with the emperor provided Frederick with an excuse to request that all his troops act


\textsuperscript{14}P.R.O.,S.P. Prussia 90/2/149, Raby to Hedges, Berlin, 27 October 1703.
together in a body on the Moselle commanded by either himself or one of his generals. He was willing to send 18,000 Prussians to join the Anglo-Dutch army on the Moselle provided they constituted a separate command.\textsuperscript{15} Frederick also wished to have many of the Prussian prisoners taken by the French released and he felt that with the troops in a separate body he could make a separate cartel with the French. Hedges thought that the making of a separate military unit was "of so dangerous consequence that you are to use all your endeavours to divert" the king from it.\textsuperscript{16} Frederick's attempt to transform his army from a mere unit in the allied army into an effective arm of his foreign policy seemed dangerous to the Allies, who did not trust Frederick. By December, Raby could report that he no longer apprehended the possible execution of the project because of the insurmountable opposition of the Dutch and because of the continuance of the largest part of the king's troops in their Danube quarters.\textsuperscript{17} By the end of 1703, Austro-Prussian relations had become so embittered that Raby wrote that the Berlin court would not

\textsuperscript{15}See Churchill, Marlborough, I, 718. Concerning the position of Frederick, which wavered between an ambitious \textit{Machtpolitik} and patriotic feeling, and the tenacious hesitating politics of the Vienna court against Prussia, see Berney, \textit{König Friedrich I und das Haus Habsburg}, chapters IV to VI.

\textsuperscript{16}P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 104/204/172, Hedges to Raby, Whitehall, 30 October 1703.

\textsuperscript{17}P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/2, Raby to Hedges, Berlin, 1 December 1703.
"be thought to have any dependance on that of Vienna, nor is the name of Mr. Stepney very agreeable to them." 18 He fervently wished that the emperor could as easily govern kings "as he could make and unmake them." 19

The year also foreshadowed the bitter dissensions between the king of Prussia and the United Provinces over Spanish Guelderland and William's inheritance, which threatened the unity of the alliance. The relations between Prussia and the United Provinces had never been amicable. In 1703 Raby believed that although Heinsius had desired him to encourage Frederick to have a good opinion of the States and of their support for him, the allied successes had made the States-General "talk bigger" and "seem to neglect those cautions they used formerly with the King of Prussia." 20 The king was dissatisfied with the States because they seemed to be obstructing his acquisition of William's legacy. For example, the Dutch garrisoned at Moers were reportedly hindering the citizens from paying the tenths of the harvest and other rights due to

18 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/2/61, Raby to Hedges, Berlin, 21 August 1703.

19 B.M., Add. Mss. 7061, f. 6, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 7 July 1703. For a discussion of Austro-Prussian relations see Berney, König Friedrich I und das Haus Habsburg and Berner, Geschichte des preussischen Staates, p. 61. Terzo Daniele Dolfin, the Venetian ambassador at Vienna, acutely remarked that "Wenn sie einig waren so wäre ihre Macht wahrhaft furchtbar. So aber schaden ihre Sonderabsichten dem gemeinsame Interesse, und jedes der beiden Häuser sieht nur mit eifersuchtnigen Auge die zunehmende Macht des anderen." Arneth, Prinz Eugen, II, 114.

the king. The States-General as executors of William's will refused to give him the title of Prince of Orange until the whole succession was legally resolved. The Princess of Nassau had requested the States-General to force the king to quit all that he held of William's until the will was legally executed. As Raby claimed, the United Provinces had "no very great sway here till they doe some thing to oblige us about the Late Kings Succession." The intense dissatisfaction of the king led him at one time to offer to attack the United Provinces.

Another source of friction between the king and the States-General was Spanish Guelderland, which was taken by Prussian troops in 1703. Frederick had always wanted the town, which he now held technically as security for the subsidy Spain owed Prussia for the last two wars, and was resolved never to part with it, even though the Dutch fiercely resented his possession.

In spite of their mutual alliance with England, their common obligations and gratitude to the emperor, and their common German


"patriotism", which manifested itself mainly in a fierce resentment of French expansion, there were strong and deep undercurrents of personal jealousy and hostility, which threatened to disrupt the alliance. Raby despaired of seeing a reconciliation between the two for "Like the Hydra's heads as we get over one difficulty, another arises." The conversion to Roman Catholicism of the elector of Saxony, who had hitherto been the head of German Protestantism, added to the existing rivalry between Hanover and Prussia the competition for the leadership of the corpus evangelicorum. Their geographical propinquity, common Protestant interests, and frequent intermarriage, bound Hanover and Brandenburg-Prussia in close association, but also exacerbated their quarrels by a personal bitterness. Their territorial claims and ambitions were often conflicting. For example, Hanover claimed East Friseland with its excellent harbor of Emden by virtue of a treaty of mutual inheritance which had been made by Ernest Augustus with the reigning duke in 1692. Brandenburg, however, claimed it by virtue of an imperial expectation granted by Leopold in 1695. Frederick wrote bitterly to William III that "Das Haus Braunschweig will uns vom Elbhandel ausschliessen, wohin wir sehen und gehen finden wir Hannover im Weg liegen, und sie kreuzen uns am kaiserlichen Hof und überall."}


26 Lodge, Great Britain and Prussia, p. 5.

27 Brentano, Sophie Charlotte, p. 110.
The relations between Brandenburg-Prussia and Hanover were so strained that Raby wrote that if he should stay at Hanover "Longer it would be taken ill where I am going [Berlin] for I find there is no good understanding between these two Courts and the Jealousies increase daily." One of Raby's first orders from Hedges, the Secretary of State, was to "Compose the misunderstandings... between the two Courts and prevent as much as possible may be the Increasing of their Jealousies which you are apprehensive of." Hedges continually asks Raby to "keep things quiet there" and to remove "all occasions of misunderstandings between the Princes in the North." Marlborough feared that Raby would have "a hard task to procure a good understanding between those two courts, considering their different interests." Raby in fact saw himself as a "sort of Mediator in the Jealousys w'ch I find Increase rather than diminish." His mediation had been proposed by the Hanoverian resident at Berlin and the Berlin ministers as the best expedient to settle

28 P.R.O.S.P.Prussia 90/2/7, Raby to Hedges, Hanover 29 May 1703.
29 P.R.O.S.P.Germany 104/204/272, Hedges to Raby Whitehall 15 June 1703.
30 P.R.O.S.P.Germany 104/204/86, Hedges to Raby Whitehall 3 July 1703.
31 Ibid., 104/204/85, Hedges to Raby Whitehall 29 June 1703.
32 Murray, Marlborough's Dispatches I,120, Marlborough to Raby Camp at Hanneff, 22 June 1703.
their quarrels. He felt that this mediation was necessary for he feared that if "Matters are not minded they may proceed further than may be for the good of the Comon cause wch at this time requires a mutuall agreement between all the Members of the Empire."\(^3^4\)

The extent of the Prussian-Hanoverian quarrels is illustrated by Hanover's seizure of Hildesheim and Prussia's retaliatory seizure of Northausen. Hanover became more and more uneasy as Prussia held Northausen because it was a key into the Luneburg country where there were extensive silver mines.\(^3^5\) In July Raby believed that the Luneburg troops would soon quit Hildesheim in order to get the king of Prussia out of Northausen because the Prussian occupation could not be tolerated by either the emperor or the elector.\(^3^6\) Although Frederick was extremely incensed against the elector, he did not actually desire them to quit Hildesheim for upon that pretense only could Prussia retain Northausen.

The States-General regarded the detention of Hildesheim by the elector of Hanover and that of Northausen by the king of Prussia

\(^3^4\)B.M.,Add.Mss. 7061,f.3,Raby to Stepney, Berlin 30 June 1703.

\(^3^5\)P.R.O.,S.P. Prussia, 90/2/17, Raby to Lord Nottingham, Berlin 19 June 1703.

\(^3^6\)Ibid., 90/2/23 and 29, Raby to Hedges, Berlin 3 July 1703.
as "sparks easy to be quenched if undertaken speedily, yet such as, if let alone, may grow up to a great flame" and asked the queen to interpose her mediation.\(^37\) Instructions were sent to Raby to endeavour to persuade the king to withdraw his troops from Northausen while instructions were simultaneously sent to Cresset at Hanover to persuade the elector to remove his troops from Hildesheim.\(^38\) Raby did not apprehend the danger that Cresset did in these occupations but felt that Hanover and Prussia would be glad if their quarrel induced the queen to pay their troops all winter. The emperor's alleged observation that when Prussia and Hanover argued they "vented their rage against each other in seasing his Imperial Citys, and had their quarrel gon further he was afraid they would have seased upon Countrys of his at least," \(^39\) is illustrative of the rapacity of the two courts. Raby was still hoping that things would continue only "Grumbling on" and not precipitate a rupture.\(^40\) After the elector of Hanover had evacuated Hildesheim, Prussia refused to withdraw her troops until the elector declared that he would not put any of his troops in there.

\(^{37}\) P.R.O., S.P. Holland, 84/224, Stanhope to Hedges, The Hague, 22 June 1703.

\(^{38}\) P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 104/204/85, Hedges to Raby, Whitehall 29 June 1703; B.M., Add.Mss.28,914,f.129, Instructions to Cresset, 29 June 1703.

\(^{39}\) P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/2/113, Raby to Hedges, Berlin, 2 October 1703.

\(^{40}\) B.M., Add.Mss.7061,f.10, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 21 July 1703.
While Hanover continued to press the Allies to interpose and oblige the king of Prussia to quit Northausen, the king of Prussia pressed them to oblige the elector of Hanover to promise that he would not occupy the town if he evacuated it.

Prussia was also endeavouring to fan the differences between Wolfenbüttel and Hanover for their union might make them too great a threat to Prussia because many of their lands lay between great parts of Brandenburg-Prussia's dominions. The Electress Sophie told Raby that Prussia had even sent one of the Danckelmanns to the Wolfenbüttel court to dissuade Anton Ulrick from signing a treaty with Hanover.41

The Prussian Hanoverian quarrels threatened the unity of the Grand Alliance. One result of their quarrels was that the king of Prussia, who coveted the directorship of the Circle, delayed sending his quota until a Diet was called. The elector of Hanover, who was an acknowledged friend of Sweden opposed the calling of a Diet. This issue was embroiled further because the king of Denmark joined with Prussia in opposing the king of Sweden, who had allied with Hanover. It was generally believed that the French had emissaries at Hanover and Berlin, "to blow the coals." 42

41P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/2/70, Raby to Hedges, Berlin, 1 September 1703. Raby believed that Frederick was justified in attempting to divide the house of Lüneburg, who were always encroaching on him. Ibid., 90/2/12, Raby to Hedges, 16 June 1703.

42Ibid., 90/2/18, Raby to Lord Nottingham, Berlin, 19 June 1703.
2. Prussia and the Northern War

It was imperative that the Maritime Powers should isolate or terminate the Northern War which they could only regard as a "monstrous irrelevancy" for the involvement of the northern princes would disrupt the alliance. In 1701 Charles had driven the Russians and the Saxons across the Dvina and had invaded Poland. He had called upon the Poles to dethrone Augustus and had taken Warsaw and Cracow in 1702. After the capture of Thorn, Charles had an army of 23,000 in the Polish Commonwealth while Augustus had only 4,000 left of his Saxon army of 13,000. The treaty, which Augustus signed on 10 October 1703 with the tsar, is indicative of his weakened status. Charles's successes were such that Stanhope felt that if this "rapid torrent" was not stopped, it would cause a new war in the empire and necessitate the withdrawal of many troops of the confederates to defend themselves at home. The Polish envoy at The Hague was pressing the Maritime Powers to act against Sweden as two years before they had acted against Denmark.

The king of Sweden was the prince most feared by Prussia because of the strength of his army, his geographical position, and his alliance with the house of Hohenzollern. The Swedish possessions in the

\[^{43}\text{Churchill, Marlborough, I,633.}\]

\[^{44}\text{P.R.O.,S.P. Holland,84/224, Stanhope to the Earl of Notting-}\]

\[^{5}\text{ham,The Hague, 12 June 1703.}\]
empire served economic and strategic purposes by their positions astride river mouths. Swedish Pomerania with Stettin and Stralsund, Wismar further west in the Baltic, and Bremen and Verden on the North Sea, commanded respectively the Oder, the Elbe, and the Weser. These German provinces were indeed "strategic bastions rather than economically or constitutionally integrated parts of the Empire."45

Through her provinces in the empire, Sweden had a voice in the Diet of the Empire, and was a powerful military force to be reckoned with in the Lower Saxony Circle and in European politics for it put her within striking distance of Austria, France, and the Netherlands. She could also exert pressure on Brandenburg, who was always jealous of Swedish Pomerania and apprehensive of Swedish intentions in Courland and Poland. Hanover was known as an ally and friend of Sweden. Hanover's relations with Sweden were so important because of Sweden's possessions of the duchies of Bremen and Verden, which divided the Brunswick-Luneburg dominions from the sea and commanded the Elbe and Weser estuaries. Frederick was particularly apprehensive about the king of Sweden's intentions in 1703 because of his military vulnerability in Prussia. At the end of 1703, Frederick's troops in

Prussia did not amount to 10,000 men, of which not even 8,000 were militarily effective. Frederick had neither the time, nor the money to raise an effective military force to oppose Charles.

The presence of the Swedish army at Thorn, the city on the Vistula which transported Polish trade to the sea, had accelerated Swedish negotiations with the Maritime Powers and with Brandenburg-Prussia. England and the United Provinces, pressed by Count Nils Lillicoot, the Swedish ambassador at The Hague, had repeated their guarantee of the Travendal settlement in a convention of 16 August 1703. Charles XII in return promised to enter into negotiation for Sweden's accession to the Grand alliance "as soon as possible," Professor Ragnhild Hatton emphasizes that this went beyond Charles's earlier commitment to furnish troops according to the treaty of 1700 when he had obtained peace. The Allies' argument that his noncommittal stand was encouraging Louis XIV may have induced Charles, who felt bound to his alliance and who had repeatedly given his word not to aid France, to express more strongly his moral commitment to the Allies in 1703. Charles's commitment

46 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia 90/2/208-209, Raby to Hedges, Berlin 18 December 1703. The Berlin court hoped to raise the number to 20,000 by withdrawing some of their troops from Guelder and using the local militia, estimated at 5,000 men.

47 For the strategic importance of Thorn and Charles's siege of if, see Hatton, Charles XII, pp. 109-105. By the middle of May, Thorn was encircled and it capitulated on 4 October 1703.

48 Ibid., p. 193.

49 Ibid., p. 194. Raby's contention that there is "too much reason to fear the Swedes touch French mony" illustrates the Allies' suspicions. P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/2/210, Raby to Hedges, Berlin, 15 January 1704.
reflects his need for a constraint on Frederick IV of Denmark-Norway and his concern over the English and Dutch attitude to Sweden. The English and Dutch governments were exasperated over Swedish delays in supplying the pitch and tar, which were so necessary for their fleets.\textsuperscript{50} England felt that Sweden was imposing on her an excessive rate for pitch and tar and was looking for other sources in Prussia and Russia which could supply the navy. The Maritime Powers were also apprehensive of the aggressive commercial intentions of Sweden. A Swedish expedition to Archangel in 1700-1701 was not successful but it had heightened the suspicion of the Maritime Powers and of Prussia that Charles intended to found a \textit{Dominum maris Baltici}. The English and Dutch merchants were apprehensive of Swedish designs not only on Courland\textsuperscript{51} but also on West Prussia.

On 29 July 1703 a treaty was signed with Prussia in which Sweden recognized Frederick as king of Prussia and in which Prussia

\textsuperscript{50}Hatton, \textit{Charles XII}, p. 194 claims that Swedish headquarters did all they could to hasten the supplies, but that the responsibility for the delays was the desire for higher profits in Stockholm.

\textsuperscript{51}The Swedish occupation of Courland lasted from 1701 to 1709, with temporary Russian control interrupting it from 1706 to 1707. See August Seraphim, "Preussen und die kurländische Frage," \textit{Altpreuß- ische Monatschrift}, LVIII (1921), 280-348 for a discussion of Prussian politics concerning Courland.
gave Sweden the desired promise of neutrality. The king acknowledged the treaty in September after the Maritime Powers had already concluded treaties with Sweden. The discussion about the treaty among the Allies is indicative of the importance of Sweden, especially as a disruptive force in the war. In August, the Grand Chamberlain had assured Raby that the treaty was only a renewal of a former treaty and only defensive. He denied that there was any thought of a partition with Sweden of Polish Prussia or any other country. Raby thought that the purpose of the treaty was only to allay Frederick's fear of the king of Sweden, whose dominions lay so close to his that he could march with an army from Stettin to the very gates of Berlin. Carl von Noorden feels that it was a Prussian move to counter Saxon cunning by


53 See for example, P.R.O., S.P. Holland, 84/224, Stanhope to Hedges, The Hague, 28 August 1703; B.M., Add. Mss. 7061, f. 23, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 1 September 1703.

54 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/2/59, Raby to Hedges, Berlin, 18 August 1703.

winning Sweden's protection, especially if not only the royal party in Poland, but also the entire Republic of Poland armed itself. Although the treaty was only defensive, it was widely felt that it would nevertheless hinder the conclusion of a peace in the North for it gave the king of Sweden a diplomatic advantage over and a greater chance of success against Augustus of Poland. The Swedish-Prussian treaty was bitterly resented by the king of Poland, who regarded Frederick as a close friend and ally and who had been the first to recognize Frederick's title. The king of Prussia had, however, refused to allow the insertion of an article that would oblige him to assist Sweden with his forces if Poland should declare war against Charles. Frederick did not wish to alienate Poland because he hoped to be acknowledged king by the Republic and to obtain a peace in the North which would free 14,000 men from Prussia for the allied cause. In March 1703 Frederick through Georg Johann, Freiherr von Kayserling, the Prussian representative to Russia, had proposed an alliance against Sweden in which Prussia would obtain Polish Prussia, Sweden would obtain Lithuania, the tsar would get the Ukraine and Augustus would return to Protestantism and keep

56 Noorden, Europäische Geschichte, II, 38.
57 Refer to Paul Haake, "Der erste Hohenzollernkönig und August der Starke vor und nach 1700," Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte, XLVI, (1934), 381-390.
58 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/2/77, Raby to Hedges, Berlin, 15 September 1703.
his throne.\textsuperscript{59} In September, Patkul,\textsuperscript{60} a Livonian nobleman who continually schemed against Sweden, had a secret and confidential conference with a Prussian minister who assured him that Frederick had a sincere friendship for the king of Poland and the tsar and intended nothing which would be detrimental to their interests. Patkul in a report to the tsar did not deny that the king had a secret agreement with Sweden but he wanted some one to be empowered to treat with Prussia.\textsuperscript{61}

Raby thought that the only direct effect of the continuance of the Northern War on the Maritime Powers would be the loss of 7,000 or 8,000 Saxons whom the Allies might have been able to hire. He thought that the treaty with Sweden was better for the Grand Alliance than too strict a one with Denmark, which would have involved the

\textsuperscript{59}See Waddington, \textit{Histoire de Prusse}, II, 186. For a similar proposal to Charles of Sweden, see Klopp, \textit{Der Fall des Hauses Stuart}, XI, 264.

\textsuperscript{60}Patkul was a Livonian nobleman and Swedish subject who had escaped abroad in 1694 when he was sentenced to death as a leader of a movement to resist the introduction of absolutism into Livonia. He wanted independence for Livonia and restoration of the power of the local nobility. He was instrumental in anti-Swedish negotiations until Augustus delivered him to the Swedes on 28 March 1707. He was executed by the Swedes in September 1707.

\textsuperscript{61}Johann Reihold von Patkul, \textit{Berichte aus das zaarische Cabinet in Moscau}, I (Berlin, 1792), 25, September 1703, hereafter cited as Patkul, \textit{Berichte}. Patkul thought that Charles had offered Frederick Elbing. He felt that the Prussian treaty was signed only to obtain security and that neither Augustus nor the tsar would have anything to fear from Frederick.
Prussian king in a war against Sweden. Hedges was relieved to find the treaty was as Raby had represented it, for if it had involved Frederick in the Northern War, the queen would have felt it necessary to obstruct it. The Maritime Powers could not condone the treaty if it encouraged Sweden to act against Danzig, an important Baltic trading center.

The fact that Spanheim only mentioned the Prussian treaty with Sweden and did not divulge the substance of it made Hedges suspect that there was something in it that they did not want known. Raby was endeavouring futilely to find out the substance of the treaty. It was only entrusted to Ilgen and Wartenberg and from them it was impossible to find out anything. The recent movement of Prussian troops into the bishopric of Warmia and the Prussian transactions about Elbing increased Raby's suspicions since it was obvious that England was to learn nothing about what was in the treaty. Stanhope at The Hague also found the treaty a "noli me tangere." The Prussian seizure of the country of

62 Raby felt that the treaty might also expedite the acceptance of the ninth electorate since Denmark would be more eager to sign a treaty with Hanover since Sweden had signed one with Prussia. Prussia, however, succeeded in breaking off the defensive treaty between Hanover and Denmark. P.R.O., S.P. Prussia 90/2/62-63 and 85, Raby to Hedges, Berlin, 21 August 1703 and 18 September 1703.

63 P.R.O., S.P.Germany, 104/204/125-126, Hedges to Raby, Bath, 26 August 1703. For the Danzig issue see Hassinger, Brandenburg-Preussen, Schweden und Russland 1700-1713, pp.122,ff.

64 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 104/204/164, Hedges to Raby, Whitehall, 20 October 1703.

65 B.M., Add.Mss. 7061,ff.53-54, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 10 November 1703.
Elbing and their attempts to persuade the town to receive them as their protectors increased England's suspicions about the provisions of the treaty. Stanhope labelled the cooperation of Sweden and Prussia in the seizure of Elbing a "notorious collusion." Hedges refused to make a judgment upon whether it was a matter of collusion between Prussia and Sweden, but he warned Raby to observe Sweden's proceedings carefully especially in relation to Danzig. Prussia had earlier assured England that she would neither tolerate nor participate in any design against Danzig.

Danzig was located at the mouth of the Vistula on the Baltic sea. Its strategic position had made it in the late thirteenth century an important link in the line of Hanseatic towns which carried trade between eastern and western Europe. Danzig, a free city, wanted to remain neutral between Augustus and Charles and made difficulties about the transit of Swedish recruits and heavy seige

66 Raby reported the seizure of the country of Elbing by the Prussians on 13 October 1703. P.R.O., S.P. Prussia. 90/2/133, Raby to Hedges, Potsdam, 13 October 1703. The Prussians took possession of the country according to a Prussian treaty with Poland for money the Poles owed them.


68 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 104/204/213, Hedges to Raby, Whitehall, 21 December 1703.
artillery. These delays were important, for example, during the siege of Thorn because they caused a four months postponement of the actual bombardment. Danzig was apprehensive that Charles might seize it and had requested Queen Anne's protection. The queen, unwilling to take a step without the concurrence of the States-General, inquired through Stanhope what the United Provinces intended to do to protect Danzig and whether any provision had been made for its security in the treaty recently signed by the United Provinces with Sweden. In the project for the treaty, there was an article for the security of Danzig, Elbing, and Thorn, which was subsequently omitted. At the request of Danzig, however, the States-General asked Charles not to molest the city.

In December Raby reported that there were "Stormes Gathering in the North" for there were rumours that Sweden had designs on Danzig. He was apprehensive that Charles's actions might provoke Frederick to recall his troops. Charles had rushed a garrison into Elbing in order to prevent Frederick's seizure of the city and to allay Polish fears that he was "willing to sacrifice Polish territory for immediate diplomatic advantage. The detachment

69 Hatton, Charles XII, p.193.


71 B.M., Add.Mss. 4741, f.142, Raby to Davenant, Berlin, 10 December 1703.

72 Hatton, Charles XII, p.196. Frederick's desire for Elbing was obvious in his earlier suggestion of a partition of the Baltic coastline and in his plan to link Brandenburg and East Prussia. See Alg. Rijks., Archief Staten Generaal, Lias Duitsland, 6637, Domburgh to States General, Danzig, 14 November 1703.
arrived 1 December 1703 just before the Prussian force Frederick had
sent to strengthen his hold, for he had a small garrison there as
security for a loan. Charles had also ordered his troops to take
winter quarters in the bishopric of Warmia even though Frederick had
sent troops to take possession of that bishopric in order to protect
it from the Swedes. The Prussians, who had hitherto felt secure in
their new ally, found themselves duped. They felt that Charles had
only made the treaty to entice the Poles to act with him and against
Augustus and to frustrate the resolution of the Diet of Lublin. They
also began to fear that he had designs on Danzig.73 If the Swedes
took Danzig, all communications would be severed between Brandenburg
and the kingdom of Prussia. Frederick's anger at being circumvented
in his designs on Elbing and the Danes' desire to draw England and
the United Provinces in against Sweden made them both exaggerate the
Swedish threat to Danzig, which England could not ignore. The capture
of Danzig would deprive England of almost all the trade she had in the
Baltic. Prussia resolved to smother her resentment and to seem satis-
fied with a situation which she could not change. They would at least
make the world believe that there was a good understanding between
themselves and the king of Sweden for "their refined Politicks has made
all their neighbours mistrustfull of their desines, and have left them

73 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/2/210, Raby to Hedges, Berlin, 18 December 1703.
no ally in these parts that will trust them." 74

74 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/2/213, Raby to Hedges, Berlin, 22 December 1703.
CHAPTER VI

A FURTHER BINDING: 1704

Despite the dissensions which continued to plague the Grand Alliance, Frederick was bound more tightly to it in 1704 by the Italian treaty and further hindered from becoming involved in the Northern War. The disputes and disparate goals of the Allies did not disrupt the alliance. Relations with Hanover remained difficult throughout 1704 but not as dangerous or as acerbic as earlier. The difficulties of mediating the differences between the two courts were only suspended for until one court was manifestly superior to the other "their jealousies will keep them always imposing and complaining of one another." ¹ Ilgen complained to Raby of the ill impressions the Lüneburg ministers were giving of the Berlin court in Vienna, England, and the United Provinces. He thought that the magistrates andburgesses of Northausen, the city which Prussia had earlier seized, refused to send a deputation to meet with the king's privy councillor because of Hanoverian intrigues. ² The Allies feared that this dispute might lead to the recall of the Hanoverian and Prussian troops. Frederick also greatly resented the

¹B.M., Add. Mss. 31,132,f.9, Raby to Edmund Poley, the English Envoy Extraordinary at Hanover, Berlin, 5 January 1704.

²P.R.O., S.P. Prussia 90/2, Raby to Harley, Berlin, 1 July 1704.
refusal of the elector of Hanover to grant passage to the Prussian troops through his territories. That relations with Hanover were inextricably connected with the Northern War is illustrated by the desire of the Berlin court in the summer of 1704 to settle the Northhausen affair because they feared that the house of Lüneburg would attack them upon that pretence if ever Berlin would break with Sweden. The Berlin court was indeed fearful that Northern affairs would force them to break with Sweden.

England also sought to mediate the differences between Brandenburg-Prussia and the United Provinces. Heinsius felt that there must be "une entière confidence et harmonie" between Frederick and the States-General. The continuing disputes about Guelderland hindered the march of the Prussian troops and persistently disrupted the alliance. Raby asked Marlborough to persuade the Dutch to be more reasonable for he felt that the Dutch "chicans" were obstructing the settlement. He felt that the Dutch were at fault for keeping the Prussian troops in Guelder. If the Dutch would have allowed Frederick as much from the country of Guelder as they took from Roermond, Venloo, and Stephenswert, the troops would have marched sooner. The

3 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/2/54, Raby to Harley, Berlin, 7 October 1704.
4 AlgL.J.Rijks..Archief Heinsius, 698, Heinsius to Lintelo, The Hague, 8 July 1704.
5 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia , 90/2/322, Raby to Hedges, 12 April 1704.
continuing negotiations about William's inheritance was another point of contention. There was even talk in Berlin that the king intended to go to the United Provinces the following summer to press the States-General to expedite the decision concerning William's succession. By December the States-General had promised Frederick that the disputed succession would be settled in six months. Although the States-General's relations with Prussia improved in 1704, many embittered disputes between the two threatened to disrupt the alliance.

Despite the increasingly bitter relations between Frederick and the emperor, there was no direct rupture. The Prussian court dreaded nothing more than the "greatness of the Emperor" because they regarded Leopold's successor, Joseph, as hostile and despotic. Religion continued to be a source of contention. There were frequent complaints from Berlin about the treatment of Protestants in Silesia.

7 B.M., Add. Ms. 7061, f. 144, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 2 December 1704.
8 Ibid., f. 147, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 9 December 1704.
9 B.M., Add. Ms. 31, 132, f. 165, Raby to Hill, Berlin, 10 May 1704. Eugene had complained for example, in a letter to Zinzendorf of 18 July 1704 that the Prussian contingent was supposed to have 13,000 men and it did not even have 9,000. Braubach, Prinz Eugen, II, 62.
10 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/2/300, Raby to Hedges, Berlin, 29 March 1704.
and Transylvania. In spite of Leopold's assurances, Frederick also felt that the emperor would rather give up the Protestant towns than any part of hereditary dominions. Raby acutely observed that Prussia was striving to gain prestige and power by placing themselves at the head of the Protestant party in the empire. Illustrative of the dissensions between the king and the emperor is the "indecent" behavior of the Prussian ministers at the Diet. Count Metternich, the Brandenburg Plenipotentiary, gave shelter in his home to the minister of Bavaria and Mons' Henning, the Brandenburg representative in the College of Princes, expressed himself "with more violence and malice against the Emperor on this occasion than he could have done against the Elector of Bavaria for having seized Ulm." The Vienna court was scandalized by their behavior and complained vehemently to Frederick.

The Bavarian negotiations acerbated and brought to light the latent rivalries within the empire. The allied negotiations with Bavaria continued from the fall of 1702 until the fall of 1704 either in Regensburg or in Munich. The elector of Bavaria was a prince whom

12 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/24, Stepney to Harley, Vienna, 27 August 1704.
Marlborough felt could not be bought at "too dear a rate." 14 Frederick would have been glad to have reconciled the elector of Bavaria and the emperor because as a prince of the empire he did not like the precedent of the emperor deposeing electors. The Prussian court criticized the emperor's negotiation with the elector and alleged that the emperor did not care what "becomes of all the world and that rather then part with castles in the air . . . you would see the whole empire ruin'd and that it is your desire to weaken and destroy all the Princes that you may be the more absolute." 15

In January 1704 Frederick had offered to use his mediation to bring Bavaria into the alliance and Frederick through Raby proposed to the queen that England and the United Provinces should determine what offers he should make the elector. 16 Marlborough sent a copy of Raby's letter and the elector's proposal to Heinsius and asked him to give what orders he thought proper. 17 Stepney was also ordered to forward the business at Vienna. The emperor did not favor the Prussian mediation. He was apprehensive that the elector of Bavaria would convince Frederick

14P.R.O.,S.P. Military Expeditions 87/2, Marlborough to Harley, Freiberg, 29 July 1704.


to ally with France rather than that Frederick would convince the elector to ally with the emperor. Raby, however, thought that the imperial court acted "very strangely" and that Frederick would have acted fairly. Nevertheless, Raby resolved to have a "strict eye" on the compliments passing between the elector of Bavaria and Frederick for he believed that the elector was "too cunning a man not to know how to make his advantages of them." Raby wrote to Richard Hill, the envoy extraordinary to Savoy, that "tho you think the Emperor wrongs us to think us knaves yet you take us for fools and that we shall be Bubbled by the Elector of Bavaria." He admitted, however, that "I have not been a little afraid of this my self and have set it fairly before them."  

The Allies feared that since Max Emmanuel had obtained Swabia from the French victories, Prussia would think of obtaining Franconia with its fertile plains of Nuremburg Frederick had in fact told Louis that he wanted Nuremburg as his price to leave the alliance.


21. Churchill, Marlborough, I, 718. When Franconia was menaced by the approach of the Franco-Bavarian army towards Nördlingen and Nuremburg, Frederick offered an army of 15,000 men, nearly double his quota, to protect Franconia, provided they constituted a separate command. The emperor replied that 8,000 was enough. The circle of Franconia was indeed "shy of grasping the strong rescuing claw." Ibid.
The Allies were also apprehensive that Frederick would use his position in the Bavarian mediation to obtain the recognition of his kingship by Louis. While Prussia was negotiating with Bavaria, Louis was endeavouring to win over Frederick. The elector of Bavaria did try to win Frederick away from the Grand Alliance. The Prussian representative at Ratisbon, Count Metternich, wrote to Berlin that he had talked with the Bavarian minister there who showed him a paper signed by the elector in which he promised that he, his brother, the elector of Cologne, and the kings of France and Spain would acknowledge Frederick's title. The Bavarian minister urged Frederick to agree to an immediate cessation of arms before affairs changed. Ilgen told Raby that Metternich was sent a reprimand for entering so far into discourse with the Bavarian minister. The Bavarian offers seemed to be only a pretext for corresponding with Prussia in the hopes of winning Frederick to the French side or of stopping his troops. Although Raby believed that the Berlin court did not listen to any offers, he feared that Frederick might be duped by the "cunning of Bavaria!" Raby wanted the emperor to reply to the Bavarian demands immediately so that Frederick would know that the emperor was willing to negotiate and so that Frederick could test Bavaria's sincerity.

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22 See Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, XI, 151.
The Prussian-Bavarian negotiations in February 1704 were conducted by Frederick's envoy, Thomas Christian von Berlepsch. Max Emmanuel, the elector of Bavaria, demanded as the price of his leaving the French alliance, the Milanese, a defensible broad corridor under Bavarian jurisdiction through the Tyrol to Milan, and his conquests in Swabia and Pfaltz-Neuburg. The emperor would only make token concessions, however. The emperor agreed to let the elector of Bavaria retain part of Pfaltz-Neuburg and Burgau.\(^{24}\) By June, Schmettau, the Prussian representative at The Hague, reported to Ilgen that the elector had communicated to Louis all that had passed in the negotiations.\(^{25}\) Max Emmanuel had told Louis Gaspard de Ricious, the French extraordinary envoy to Bavaria, of the Bavarian-Prussian negotiations and Jean Baptiste Colbert, Marquis de Torcy, the French foreign minister, told Ferdinand Solar, Comte de Monasterol, of the French negotiations with Prussia.\(^{26}\) The increasingly high demands of the elector in June made the king believe that either the elector had only been amusing himself or that the elector was secretly negotiating a treaty with Prince Lewis of Baden and Marlborough.\(^{27}\) Raby hinted to Marlborough


\(^{25}\)B.M.,Add.Mss.7061,f.92, extract of Raby's letter to Marlborough, 3 June 1704.


\(^{27}\)P.R.O.,S.P. Prussia,90/2/415, Raby to Harley, Berlin,28 June 1704.
that he might gain one elector and lose another if he disobliged Berlin by concluding a treaty with the elector of Bavaria without informing Frederick. Marlborough, who had had a "mean opinion" of the negotiations hoped in June that when the elector of Bavaria became more pressed, the Prussian mediation would have a good effect. By 29 June Marlborough felt that there could be no thought of treating with the elector until his hitherto extravagant demands were more reasonable. Meanwhile Raby criticized Frederick's handling of the negotiations and fervently wished that the king would hold his tongue. He even condemned the king as a "mere blab" for giving out information which appeared in the public prints about the Bavarian negotiations. The carrying of the war into Bavaria by the Allies broke off these negotiations.

There were suspicions among the Allies throughout the war that Frederick was negotiating with France. This is illustrated by James Vernon's, the English envoy extraordinary to Denmark, accusation

28 B.M., Add. MSS. 22, 196, f. 21, Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 28 June 1704.

29 P.R.O., S.P. Military Expeditions, 87/2, Marlborough to Harley, Camp at Heppach, 1 June 1704.

30 Ibid., Marlborough to Harley, Gingen, 29 June 1704.

that Frederick had "sinister designs and Intreagues with France." 32

In 1703 Louis had, in fact, after diverse communications with Frederick sent Jean Victor de Besenval, Baron de Brunstatt (1671-1736) to Aix-la-Chapelle to meet with a representative of Frederick. Although Frederick's past conduct had thrown doubt on the sincerity of his propositions, Louis thought it so essential to detach Frederick from the alliance that he responded to his advances. Besenval arrived late, however, and the Prussian representative had already left. 33 In 1704 Raby felt that Frederick's dispatching of his troops to the Danube would prove his integrity to his allies. 34 Raby believed that the court was "extremely wrong'd" by the many rumours of their entering into a neutrality with France. He thought that the rumours originated with the French who sought to sow jealousies among the Allies. 35 Frederick's resentment against the temporizing treatment he was receiving in regard to William's succession would not push him to a neutrality. Raby had little regard


33 Besenbal's mémoire to Louis of 10 September 1703 is printed in Waddington, ed., Recueil des Instructions, Prusse, XVI, 257-268.


for the alleged negotiations being conducted at Copenhagen between Jean Baptiste Poussin, the French representative to Denmark, and Adam Otto von Vireck, the Prussian representative to Denmark.\footnote{P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/2/442, Raby to Harley, Berlin, 15 July 1704.} He earlier told Harley that if it was true that Frederick was seriously negotiating with France, Berlin was the last place one could find it out.\footnote{Ibid., f. 63, Raby to Harley, Berlin, 21 October 1704.} The rumours about serious Prusso-French negotiations at Copenhagen were also disbelieved by Heinsius who claimed that "comme sela vient de la part de la France cela pouroit bien aussi estre debite pour done de l'ombrage entres sa Ma\textsuperscript{te} le Roy de Prusse et ses allies."\footnote{Alg.Rijks., Heinsius Archief, 968, Heinsius to Lintelo, The Hague, 8 July 1704. Jean Baptiste Colbert, Marquis de Torcy, wrote to Poussin "combien le Roi croit inutiles tous les moyens que vous em­ployez pour entrer en quelque negociation avec l'envoy\textsuperscript{e} de Brandenburg." A. Legrelle, La Diplomatie Français et la Succession d'Espagne, IV (Paris, 1892), 335.}

The vigorous resolutions of the Berlin court soon proved that Frederick was still faithful to the alliance. Frederick resolved to place 15,000 men on the Danube for the next campaign, to arm and exercise Brandenburg's militia, and to increase his army in Prussia to about 5,000 men.\footnote{B.M., Add. Mss. 31, 132, f. 29, Raby's circular letter of 22 January 1704.} Raby was glad that the court was beginning to exert itself so that "we may make some figure in the world. He in
fact "trumpeted about the news."\textsuperscript{40} Frederick intended to put 7,000 additional men in the army so that he would have 14,000 or 15,000 men altogether on the Danube.\textsuperscript{41} Schmettau, the Prussian representative at The Hague proposed that the Maritime Powers let the king withdraw the 5,000 men he had in the Netherlands in their pay so that he would have a separate command of 20,000 men. By February it was clear that Frederick intended to have all the troops in a unit under a Prussian commander. With the 5,000 additional Prussian troops, the 5,000 in the Maritime Powers' pay, and the troops of the Circles of Franconia and Swabia, Frederick would have an army of between 30,000 and 40,000 men.\textsuperscript{42} The emperor made no immediate answer to the Prussian proposal. Raby deprecated the "fatal slowness" of the imperial court which "not only spoils their own affairs, but tires and disgusts those that would assist them."\textsuperscript{43} After receiving a satisfactory answer from the emperor, Frederick mobilized his troops in early


\textsuperscript{41}\textit{P.R.O.,S.P. Holland,84/226}, Stanhope to Hedges, The Hague, 19 January 1704.


March. Raby was becoming a partisan of the Berlin court and defended it in a letter to the English representative at Copenhagen when he claimed that

but our mountain can't bring forth an Elephant yet it will bring out something much nobler than the mouse you imagin for at worst we shall now certainly send 13,000 men to the Danube.  

Frederick's offer to increase his troops to 15,000 on the Danube was not universally welcomed. The archbishop-elector of Metz, the Margrave of Baden, and several states in Franconia were afraid that Frederick would enter their dominions and add them to his territories. The Count Palatine thought that the offer "was scarce to be accepted" and feared that if Frederick's troops once "take footing they will not easily be removed." If the king was well intentioned, he argued, the troops should be put on the Rhine. Charles Whitworth, the English representative at Vienna, tried to persuade the imperial court that "these suspicions were not well grounded or at least unseasonable, and


46 Ibid., f. 100, Raby to Hill, Berlin, 15 March 1704.

47 Ibid., f. 120, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 29 March 1704.
that it might cause inconvenience if the King of Prussia should perceive himself distrusted." Any refusal of Frederick's assistance would also infallibly arouse the jealousies of the Protestants. It was also feared that the king designed to take a footing on the Upper Palatinate and would not leave until the elector gave up the duchies of Jules and Berg, to which Frederick had old pretensions. Many of the states in Franconia "even dread the assistance of the Prussians" in spite of the imminent approach of the Franco-Bavarian army. Even Lothaire François de Schorriborn, the Archbishop-Elector of Metz, a friend of Frederick, opposed Frederick's project of aggrandizement in Franconia.

Raby was a little apprehensive of the Prussian troops augmentation. Raby thought that after, if not before, the king sends his troops to the Danube, he would expect a greater compliance from the Allies, especially in allowing his troops now in Brabant to march to the Danube and join the rest of his forces. Frederick would also be more insistent about his claims to William's inheritance and about the

49 B.M., Add.Mss.37,352,f.84, Whitworth to Hedges, February 1704.
50 Waddington, L'Acquisition de la Couronne Royale de Prusse, p.181.
payment of the subsidies.\textsuperscript{51} A large army would ensure that the Allies would have a greater respect for Frederick's demands. There were rumours that the king was going to keep only 4,000 men in his Prussian garrisons and send the rest into Germany. There were also rumours that Frederick would join with Denmark and Poland to threaten to recall his troops unless the Allies would join with them to force Sweden to a peace.

In March the court resolved to send 15,000 men to the Danube, which would really be 13,000 effective men and a good supply of artillery.\textsuperscript{52} The number was short of that projected because Frederick wanted to keep his guards in Berlin because of his fear that the Swedes might invade Saxony, which Frederick "could never suffer." Nevertheless, the king did not wish it to appear that he was arming himself or that he mistrusted the Swedes. Even though Frederick claimed that the troops were for the assistance of the empire, the greatest part of the 12,000 newly recruited men was destined for Prussia to protect Frederick from Charles XII of Sweden.\textsuperscript{53}

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\textsuperscript{51}P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/2/229, Raby to Hedges, Berlin, 5 February 1704. Spanheim pressed the queen to pay Frederick an arrear of 200,000 crowns so that he could better meet the expense of having 25,000 men in Franconia. Van 'T Hoff, ed., Correspondence of Marlborough and Heinsius, p. 104, Marlborough to Heinsius, 8 April 1704.

\textsuperscript{52}B.M, Add. Mss. 22, 196, ff. 13-14, Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 4 March 1704.

\textsuperscript{53}P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/2/295-296, Raby to Hedges, Berlin, 18 March 1704.
\end{flushright}
In March the king ordered his troops to march to the Danube to secure the Circles of Swabia and Franconia against the French and to hinder the French recruits from joining their army in Bavaria. Raby complained that he could not "make my Court Stir one jot farther. The french are in rediness for action and the Germans not recruited yet." The later delay of the troops march can be attributed to Frederick's resentment against the emperor and his feeling that if he was not too precipitate he might obtain greater advantages. He hoped to obtain the territory of Schwiebus in exchange for the arrears which the emperor owed him. Frederick's displeasure over the heavy losses which his troops had incurred at Hochstadt in 1703 and over the emperor's failure to pay the subsidies, induced him to threaten at the end of 1703 that the Prussian general would not follow imperial orders until the emperor paid part of the subsidy arrears. Because of the precarious situation of the war, the imperial Hofkammer in March 1704 sent 150,000 Gulden as an installment on the arrears to Berlin.


55 Prince Eugene, Feldzüge, VI, 95. Schwiebus bordered on Brandenburg and the emperor had received it from Frederick when he was an electoral prince in exchange for a sum of money. See map in Appendix A.
In spite of Frederick's delaying tactics, Raby defended the Berlin court to Hill, "as for your Suspition of my little monarch tho he does not do altogether as much as he promised [this refers to Frederick's sending 13,000 instead of 15,000] yet he does pretty nigh it, and more than I thought he would or than any other Prince in Germany dose." The king still promised to provide the 15,000 men, even if he had to use his guard of 2,5000 men. Frederick had made difficulties before any of his troops marched in order to get "as much as we cou'd, for since every body was naking their advantage by this warr we that were the most remote from danger and did the most for the common cause were glad to get something by it." 56 Although Ilgen and Wartenberg favored sending the guards to the Danube, Frederick hesitated to send them because of the Swedish threat to Danzig. By May, Raby was not without hopes of getting the guards to march because their equipage was ready and Frederick's apprehensions regarding Danzig were partially allayed by the Charles XII's moderate answer to Robinson's memorial about Danzig. 57 Frederick


57 Ibid., f.166, Raby to Cardonnel, Berlin, 10 May 1704.
was also angry because the imperial court had not settled a cartel
to exchange his prisoners and because the two circles of Swabia and
Franconia had not requested his troops to march. Frederick hoped
to make the Swedes have more regard for his messages in favor of
Danzig.\(^{58}\) Raby was, however, angry with the court for having broken
their promise to him about the march of the guards. He felt that
the Swedish threats to Danzig were only a lame excuse; "They talk
no more of sending their guards or artillery to the Danube upon
pretence of danger Danzig is in."\(^{59}\) Ilgen, who promised to intervene,
was unable to persuade the king to let them march.\(^{60}\) Lintelo, the
United Provinces' representative in Berlin, who at that time was in
great favor at the court because of some orders he had to "satisfie
or rather amuse" the court about settling William's will, thought
he had enough interest to get the guards to march. The king, how­
ever, rebuked him for advising him to send his guards when affairs
were so perilous in Prussia.\(^{61}\) Lintelo wrote Meinsius that the king

\(^{58}\) B.M., Add. Mss. 7061, f. 87, Raby to Stepney Berlin 24 May 1704.

\(^{59}\) B.M., Add. Mss. 31,132, f. 220, Raby to Stepney Berlin 10 June
1704.

\(^{60}\) B.M., Add. Mss. 22,194, f. 16, Raby to Ilgen Berlin 17 June
1704.

\(^{61}\) B.M., Add. Mss. 7061, f. 112, Raby to Stepney Berlin 5 July
1704.
was very occupied in the affairs of Poland and Sweden and that he was so "anime contre le Suede" that he would probably recall his troops rather than send others. 62

The Maritime Powers were apprehensive that Frederick intended to become involved in the Polish troubles especially after the movement and recruiting of his troops. Frederick's involvement would plunge the whole empire into the Northern War. Marlborough did not know that Frederick's plans for a partition of Polish and Swedish lands had in fact vanished because of Augustus' vacillations. The projected Italian treaty would hinder Frederick from becoming involved in Northern affairs, would bind him more firmly to the alliance, and would provide the necessary military aid for the Duke of Savoy, who was hard pressed by the French. Marlborough thus attempted to "laye the healousies in the North" for it was imperative that the Allies should obtain the Prussian contingent. 63

At no other time is the influence of the Maritime Powers on Prussian politics so distinct as in the 1704 Italian treaty. The sending of the Prussian contingent to Italy not only aided the Duke of Savoy and helped


63 P.R.O., S.P. Military Expeditions, 87/2, Marlborough to Harley, Hanover, 4 December 1704.
the Allies' Italian plans but also lessened the increasing danger that Frederick would intervene in the Northern War. The Italian treaty represents the success of the Maritime Powers' policy of keeping separate the two wars.

Marlborough had decided to apply to the king of Prussia for a subsidiary corps of 8,000 troops in person, for Frederick was in Marlborough's words, "the only prince of the Empire in any condition to send any men. . . . it being the only thing that in probability can save Savoy." The Prussian treaty was the only way to procure help for the Duke of Savoy because the Maritime Powers could not oblige the troops in their pay to march into Italy by the existing treaties. The various princes would not permit their troops to be sent into Italy. Furthermore, after an arduous campaign, none of the troops would be in condition for the long march. Marlborough and Heinsius foresaw, however, many difficulties in procuring Frederick's agreement. Marlborough proposed that these 8,000 troops would be part of the inactive force which the king had at home and that they would be paid

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64 See Marlborough's memoirs of 24 November 1704 to Frederick at Berlin, Alg. Rijks., Archief Heinsius 2381, ff. 6-8 and Frederick's answer, Ibid., 2381, ff. 1-5.

65 Coxe, Memoirs, I., 355, Marlborough to the Duchess, 27 November 1704.

66 P.R.O., S.P. Military Expeditions, 87/2, Marlborough to Harley, Hanover, 4 December 1704.
300,000 crowns a year. He hoped that with the emperor's contingent this Prussian corps would enable the duke of Savoy to act offensively. He also believed that the Maritime Powers' guarantee of Prussian neutrality would obviate the difficulties which the Northern War posed. He resolved to "spare no pains, but venture to take Berlin in my way home, provided there were good hopes of success." In October Marlborough's attitude is illustrated by the letter which he wrote to his wife. He feared that his journey to Berlin "may do no good, but if I should not go, the emperor and the States may think the eight thousand men might have been had, if I could have taken the pains of going, so that you see if they insist upon it I must undertake that trouble." Marlborough, having very little hope of success, confided to Godolphin on 10 November on his departure that "my heart aches at the thought of it." 69

67 B.M., Add. Mss. 9092, ff. 81-82, Marlborough to Heinsius, 26 September 1704.
68 Coxe, Memoirs, I, 352-352, Marlborough to the Duchess, 3 October 1704.
69 Ibid., I, 353, Marlborough to Godolphin, Weissenburg, 10 November 1704.
Raby wrote Harley that the court expected much better propositions from Marlborough than from him and hoped to procure a good security in the North and a good subsidy for their troops. Raby asked Harley to be very "circumspect" about divulging to Spanheim the contents of his letters for the news had reached Berlin that Raby had given Harley hopes of getting the Prussian troops at a reasonable rate. Spanheim had advised Frederick that by delaying he would obtain better terms because England and the United Provinces were resolved to have 25,000 more men for the next campaign. Raby subsequently alleged that if Frederick had been given assurances of his neutrality he would have let the Allies have a good share of his troops gratis and the rest on reasonable terms. Spanheim, however, assured the king that he could obtain both a good subsidy and the neutrality guarantee. The disclosure of Raby's information to Spanheim had weakened Raby's position and the ministers had refused to treat with him. Raby told Marlborough that if the Allies were to expect any more troops from Prussia, the main condition would be the queen's and the States-General's guarantee to protect Frederick against

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70 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/3/84-85, Raby to Harley, 1 November 1704.

Charles XII. Marlborough asked Harley "how far Her Majesty may be inclin'd to grant it, in case the Dutch should be willing to enter into the same treaty." 72

Marlborough reached Berlin on 22 November 1704. The Berlin ministers attempted to extract additional concessions from the Maritime Powers while he was at Berlin. Marlborough evaded commitment by answering their demands in general terms. The greatest obstacle to Prussian concurrence was Frederick's apprehensions concerning the disturbances in the North. Frederick feared that the conflict between Sweden and Poland would spread into his dominions when his troops were absent. Marlborough felt that Frederick's apprehensions were increased by the arrival of the Grand Treasurer of Poland, Prebendow, who was empowered to make offers to induce the king to join his troops with Augustus's and oblige Sweden to make peace. Marlborough thought it probable that his visit had precipitated Prebendow's mission. 73 Prebendow in fact attempted through Marlborough to press the Maritime Powers to mediate the differences between Poland and Sweden. Marlborough eluded his application by answering in general terms.74

72 P.R.O., S.P. Military Expeditions, 87/2, Marlborough to Harley, Camp at Weissenbourg, 13 October 1704.
73 ibid., Marlborough to Harley, 25 November 1704.
74 Churchill, Marlborough, I, 906-907, is incorrect when he states that the tsar's and the king of Poland's fear of Prussian domination had induced them to deliberately court defeat at the hands of Charles in order to bring Sweden and Prussia face to face.
Marlborough gained Frederick's assent to the Italian treaty by pledging the queen's and the United Provinces' guarantee of his Prussian territories during the absence of his troops and their endeavours to prevent the extension of the Northern War. Prebendow and Ptakul, who had hastened to Berlin at the news of Marlborough's visit, thus found themselves outmaneuvered. Raby could exult that the Northern politics of the court was snapped in the bud. Frederick wrote Augustus that Marlborough went so far as to hint that if Prussia stirred up new trouble in the North, Prussia "would be dealt with as Denmark had been in 1700" when England's fleet carried the Swedish army to the vicinity of Copenhagen. 75 The treaty signed on 28 November 1704 stipulated that a body of 8,000 Prussians was to be sent to Italy for which the queen would pay two-thirds of a subsidy of 300,000 crowns a year and the States-General the other third. 76 The queen paid well for the troops, which the duke of Marlborough was glad to get "at any rate," because the duke of Savoy would be lost without them. Raby felt that had he known what the queen was willing to offer, the negotiations would have been expedited.77

75 Churchill, Marlborough, I, 907.


He also felt that if Marlborough had not come to Berlin he could have obtained the troops at a cheaper rate. Initially Frederick's only condition had been a guarantee of his neutrality in the Northern War. After hearing that money was to be offered for his troops, Frederick abandoned his demand for the neutrality guarantee. In the treaty Frederick was able to procure both the subsidy and the guarantee.

The court was willing to part with the troops for a good subsidy and a security in the North because of the dispersion of the king of Poland's army and his defeat by the king of Sweden. Frederick now feared that Poland and Sweden might make a peace and attack him. Raby accurately expressed Frederick's position when he stated that

whilst he has these differences with the King of Poland, and Sees no hope of obtaining any Great advantage from the King and Republich of Poland he will proceed heartily in the treaty with the Duke of Marlborough and throw himself entirely in to the protection of the allys as his best Security in those Parts, for he knows neither the King of Sweden nor Poland are sure friends of his.

With the march of the 8,000 troops the danger of Frederick's becoming

78 Alg. Rijks., Archief Heinsius, 931, Lintelo to Heinsius, 6 September 1704.

involved in the North and thus disturbing the allied efforts against
France was lessened. Raby feared that Frederick would take his
troops from the imperial army in order to provide his Italian con-
tingent. 80 Frederick did in fact defer the marching of his troops
from Prussia chiefly because of a dispute with the emperor. Frederick
did send the contingent to the duke of Savoy but part of the corps
was withdrawn from Germany.

Nevertheless, Marlborough was pleased with the results of his
visit. He had left Berlin on 28 November 1704. Marlborough later wrote
his wife that the king "did me all the honour he cou'd, and indeed I
have met with more kindness, and respect every where than I cou'd have
imagind." 81 Marlborough with the prestige of the Blenheim victory
behind him was well liked by the court. He had written often to the
king and "pleases him extreamly." 82 For example, he wrote to Frederick
from the camp at Steinheim that the Allies were satisfied with "la
bonne conduite de son Altesse et de la bravour de toutes les troupes

80 B.M., Add. Mss. 7061, F.150, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 14
December 1704.

81 B.M., Add. Mss. 9118, f.6, Marlborough to the Duchess, 2
December 1704.

82 B.M., Add. Mss. 7061, f.121, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 9 August
1704.
de V.M. qui se sont particulièrement distinguées." He had also requested Frederick's opinion on the Moselle operation. Raby related that Frederick had been charmed with Marlborough's behavior and that Marlborough had been regaled in an "extraordinary manner." Sophie Charlotte commenting on Marlborough's success, remarked that "Je le trouve le plus poli Anglais que j'ai jamais vu et Milord Raby aurait grand besoin d'apprendre à vivre de lui." Marlborough was presented with rich gifts such as a hat with a diamond button and loop and a diamond hat band. Raby bragged that it was his letter to the Secretary of State that had brought Marlborough to Berlin and that he had predicted that the duke would succeed. He excused his vanity by claiming that "being a young envoy I must let my Brethren know when I hit right." He admonishingly wrote Stepney that the 8,000 Prussians will make you "suspect this court no longer of being cool in the party of the allies."

83 Murray, ed., *Dispatches*, I, 413, Marlborough to Frederick, 17 August 1704.


England's policy of separating the War of the Spanish Succession and the Northern War seemed threatened by the ostensibly near conclusion of an alliance between Prussia and Sweden's opponents. The surest means to hinder this imminent alliance was the Italian troop treaty which bound Frederick more firmly to the alliance and which would entail the withdrawal of troops from Prussia which Frederick could have used in the Northern War. It was imperative that England should isolate the northern quarrel for if Prussia became involved the consequent recall of her troops and those of her neighbours, especially Denmark and Hanover, would entail a serious loss of manpower and a diversion of German energy which could only aid Louis. Heinsius wrote to Lintelo that it was imperative that he should "prévenir tout sorte d'extremites." When at Berlin, Marlborough asked the king to help insure that the Northern troubles did not infest the empire. It was rightly apprehended that any plan which would force Charles XII out of Poland would mean the recall of many troops in the Allies' service, estimated at between thirty to forty thousand men. Patkul, an agent of the tsar, was resolved to unite the armies of Prussia and Russia. Frederick was to raise


89 Ibid., Archief Heinsius, 2381, no. 60, ff. 6-8, Memoire of Marlborough to the king of Prussia, Berlin 24 November 1704.
10,000 men on pretext of the war against France and Denmark was to draw her troops near. Frederick had in fact begun recruiting. Patkul was so convinced that Frederick would be drawn into the war that he promised 10,000 ducats yearly to Ilgen and Wartenberg as long as the war lasted. The tsar's resolution to act principally in the Baltic instead of in Poland might deter Frederick. Frederick also would not act as long as Augustus was on the defensive in Poland. It would seem folly to become involved in a war which was as yet indecisive without a strong army to support his interests. In March Patkul had come to Berlin and proposed a partition of Poland between Russia, Prussia, Saxony, and Denmark. Nothing had been concluded however. His second trip in June was also fruitless.90

At this time the Northern War threatened to embroil Prussia. On 2 July 1704 Charles succeeded in having Stanislaus elected as king of Poland. Although Stanislaus urged an invasion of Saxony so that as little fighting as possible would be done on Polish soil, Charles rejected this and adopted the alternative of "bottling up as many troops as possible inside Saxony while fighting Augustus and his Russian auxiliaries in Poland."91 He placed his army on the border so that

90Patkul, Berichte; Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, XI, 279-287.
91Hatton, Charles XII, p. 199.
it was impossible for the Saxon troops to re-enter the Polish Commonwealth until the Swedish army moved. He succeeded in 1704 in chasing the major part of Augustus's Saxon army back into the electorate. According to Professor Ragnhild Hatton, his success paved the way for the coronation Diet of July 1705, the coronation itself on 24 September and the Swedo-Polish treaty of 18 November. 92 His successes were, however, mitigated by the conquest of Warsaw by Augustus and by the capitulation of Narva and Dorpat (August 1704) to the Russians. There were fears at Berlin and at The Hague that Charles would not be dissuaded from marching on Saxony and that he intended to ruin that country and cut off all the resources of Augustus. It was widely believed that an invasion of Saxony would plunge the whole empire into the Northern War. Frederick was indeed "too much afraid to disoblige the Swedes." He feared that his countries were threatened not only by the Swedes, but also by the barbarous allies of Augustus. He had consequently resolved to send more troops into Prussia to strengthen his bargaining power with Sweden and with Augustus. The Allies feared that he intended to take the first opportunity to attach Sweden and thus entangle also Hanover and Denmark. 93

92 Hatton, Charles XII, p. 200.

93 B.M. Add. Mss. 7061, f. 74, Raby to Stepney, 18 March 1704; P.R. O., S.P. Holland 84/226, Stanhope to Hedges, 17 June 1704.
Raby felt that the king of Sweden had treated Frederick "very caverlierly"\(^{94}\) for during the 1703-1704 winter he had forced his way not only to Elbing through the middle of the Brandenburg troops but also to the bishopric of Warmia, which lay in the middle of the kingdom of Prussia. Charles obliged Frederic's troops quartered in Warmia to retire in order to make room for the Swedes. Raby felt that the Swedes had been too cunning for the Berlin court and that the ministers did not know beforehand of their designs on Elbing and Warmia.\(^{95}\) Frederick's troops were so dispersed in quarters about Prussia that Charles would have taken all of Prussia belonging to Frederick. By inostensibly shifting the quarters of his troops, Frederick had gathered them about Königsberg to protect it at least from the Swedes. The Prussians, who resented the presence of the Swedes in Prussia, especially after they seized Elbing, were relieved when the Swedes left Prussia to support their adherents in Poland.\(^ {96}\) Elbing was so important to Frederick because it gave him free communication with his kingdom of Prussia. By March 1704, if Frederick did get possession of the

\(^{94}\)P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/2/284, Raby to Harley, Berlin, 15 March 1704.

\(^{95}\)B.M., Add. Mss. 31, 132, f. 9, Raby to Poley, Berlin, 5 January 1704.

\(^{96}\)B.M., Add. Mss. 31, 134, f. 19, Raby to Mr. Attorney General of Ireland, 15 March 1704.
town the Swedes "will have Squeez'd the Orange and only Left the Rind." Deputies from the town came to Berlin to negotiate for its delivery to the king of Prussia on condition that Frederick advance them 100,000 crowns, which was part of the contribution demanded by the Swedes which the town could not pay. When the Swedes left and it Charles consented, the king would be ready to pay the money and take possession of the town.

Frederick was very disappointed when the tsar had concentrated his troops in the Baltic instead of in Poland. In the spring of 1704 in about three months time, the Prussians had raised 1200 new forces to protect themselves more against the Swedes than the French. Frederick did not, however, dare act against the Swedes who were between him and the 12,000 troops which he had in Prussia. There were many suspicions about the projects of Denmark and Denmark's attempts to draw Frederick into them. Because the Danish plans would indubitably involve acting against Charles, Raby felt that "our will at present, or at least our Courage here is likely to fail." In Berlin the Danish envoy was emphasizing the danger that Frederick was in and how

97 P.R.O., S.P. 90/2/284, Raby to Harley, 15 March 1704.
necessary it was for him to take measures for his preservation. Frederick therefore decided not to send either his guards or his artillery to the Danube. It was apparent now that the 1703 treaty between Sweden and Prussia did not include a partition. Charles "takes all he can get for himself and leaves us nothing but the chagrin to see we cannot hinder him and he has made us Dupes." 99

Danzig, who had requested the king to send 2,000 men to protect the city against the Swedes, found that Prussia did not have the courage to act because it might occasion a direct break with the Swedes. 100 Frederick was resolved not to let Charles become master of the town but did not know how to hinder him without occasioning an immediate break. The Berlin court was searching all the treaties between Danzig and Brandenburg to find a loophole which could be used a pretense to send the town the troops. 101 The Berlin court was as jealous and fearful as the Maritime Powers were of the possible Swedish seizure of Danzig for Danzig was vital to Frederick


100 B.M., Add.Mss. 28, 916, f.36, Raby to Ellis, Berlin, 24 May 1704.

for his communication with his kingdom of Prussia. Stanhope reported
that in regard to Danzig no one was "warmer" than Schmettau, "tho I
perceive his Master is terribly afraid, as he has most reason, being
most exposed to Swedish King's resentment." Frederick never
received the least encouragement from either the Maritime Powers or
Denmark, who were not eager to embroil themselves with Sweden. At
The Hague Stanhope did not see anyone willing to venture to help Dan-
zig except Denmark who talked "very warmly" but would do nothing with­
out the consent of the rest of the confederates.

Frederick's ministers were stressing how important it was for
the United Provinces and England to interpose their mediation more
forcefully in the Danzig affair. If the king of Sweden would not lis­
ten to the Maritime Power, they could not hinder him from taking Dan­
zig this summer because the entire allied force was being employed

102 B.M., Add. Mss. 31, 132, f. 31, Raby to Robinson, Berlin, 22 January 1704. Danzig had also applied to the queen and the States-General for protection. For the Danzig appeal to the States-General see Alg. Rijks., Archief Staten Generaal, Duitsland, 6638, 1704. See also their memorial of 5 June which refers to the failure of the States-General to answer their previous memorials of 5 and 26 May. The city asks for advice and counsel how Danzig "se puisser retirer du bout de precipice ou elle se trouve."

103 P.R.O., S.P. Holland, 81/226, Stanhope to Hedges, The Hague, 10 June 1704.

104 Ibid., Stanhope to Hedges, The Hague, 8 July 1704.
against France. Frederick assured Raby that he would not stir in the matter of Danzig without the approbation of the Maritime Powers. Berlin was resolved to "keep fair" with the Swedes as long as possible and would not lend Danzig the troops which the town desired but persuaded the magistrates to yield to Charles's demands "to save themselves from ruin, which none of their Allies can save them from now." Raby felt that there was no doubt that Sweden would take Danzig either to plunder or to keep. After a peace with France, the Maritime Powers would assist Danzig because it was the only free port they had in the Baltic. Raby feared that Charles's stubborness would shortly "set all this part of the Empire in a flame all we can hope for is that they may continue quiet till you have brought France lower."  

Queen Anne was resolved to intervene for Danzig's preservation with Charles. Stanhope was then instructed to join with the ministers of the United Provinces, of Denmark and of Prussia to secure Danzig. At The Hague these powers resolved to take Danzig and its

108 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 104/51, Harley to Raby, 3 June 1704.
territory into their protection. Prussia was resolved if encouraged by the Maritime Power, to "Speech a little plainer to the Swedes then they have done." Frederick would do nothing without the approbation of the Maritime Powers despite pressure from Poland and Denmark.

In July Frederick was increasingly uneasy about Danzig and wanted to know if the queen would assist him if he sent troops to the town and the Swedes attacked him. According to the treaty of 1690, which was renewed in 1702, England was obliged to assist Frederick with eight ships and 6,000 troops if he was attacked. Without the queen's assurances, the court was very unwilling to arouse Charles XII's wrath. Everyone was indeed "eager to get this chestnut out of the fire but would do it with a nothers paw least they should burn their own." England was very unwilling to break with Sweden for this would throw Charles toward the French interest and would probably occasion the recall of most of the northern princes' troops. The queen was ready to enter into measures with Prussia and Denmark for


Danzig's security but advised the king, as Raby so colorfully asserted, to send his force to fight against France who "may devour us all, and then we can crack those little vermin at our pleasure when we have less to do." 112

In August, however, Stanhope could get no more conference held about Danzig. Frederick became very uneasy for he felt that they had all gone too far if they intended to go no further. 113 Frederick was apprehensive that if entered openly into any engagement for the protection of Danzig that the Swedes would use that as a pretense to attack him. Brandenburg-Prussia did not enter into the first resolution taken at The Hague for the protection of Danzig and would not enter into any subsequent resolution until the Maritime Powers assured him that they would assist him according to their treaties even against Sweden if necessary. 114 The representative of the Hansa cities expressed the position when he claimed that "Gute Mittel helfen dort nicht, wo keine Zwangsmittel angewendet werden können." 115 By the fall Stanhope reported that the affair of Danzig still did not advance.


113 P.R.O., S.P. Holland, 84/227, Stanhope to Harley, 29 August 1704.

114 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/2/5, Raby to Harley, Berlin, 5 August 1705.

115 Quoted in Eugene, Feldzüge.VI,23-29.
He did not attribute this to the king of Prussia's request for security because it had been understood that Frederick would expect a collateral security from England, the United Provinces and Denmark. Spanheim had, however, demanded not only that the powers should engage to guarantee the security of Danzig but also that they should guarantee that Augustus and Charles would not carry the war into Polish Prussia, which would cut off the communication between Frederick's Prussian and his imperial territories. 116

A better understanding did develop about Danzig. It was proposed as an expedient that Danzig would be taken into protection without mentioning the number of battalions to be furnished by each protecting party. There was to be a mixed garrison in Danzig and English ships in the harbor. 117 The Pensionary had also proposed a neutrality for Polish Prussia. Raby complained that the States-General had offered a neutrality for Polish Prussia when the Berlin court would have been glad to have secured a neutrality for East Prussia. The latter might have been obtained without much difficulty but the former would not because while Sweden fought Poland, Charles would not grant a neutrality for Polish Prussia because his recruits from and correspondence with Sweden

117 Eugene, Feldzüge, VI, 28-29.
came through Polish Prussia. Stanhope rightly projected that if the quadruple protection was not soon concluded "'tis probable it will never be done at all." England feared that the whole empire would become embroiled. In spite of appearing to wish for peace, Frederick had not neglected his interests in the Northern quarrels. He concluded a treaty with Danzig which guaranteed its independence and pledged Frederick to provide 2,000 men in case of necessity. Stanhope was surprised and reported that many were scandalized when the news reached The Hague of the treaty signed between Prussia and Danzig. It had been signed while the conferences were being held for Danzig's protection and was concluded without the knowledge or participation of the other protecting parties. Suspicions about the king's motives in "clapping it up in such a hasty manner" were prevalent. Schmettau knew nothing of it and Stanhope felt that there is "certainly some mistery of iniquity, and consequently in all probability an end put to all we have been doing


120 Stanhope had heard of the treaty from Robinson. P.R.O., S.P. Holland, 84/227, Stanhope to Harley, The Hague, 7 October 1704; B.M., Stowe Mss 2b.5, f.24r, Stanhope to Harley, The Hague, 14 November 1704. The articles of the treaty signed on 26 August 1704 can be found in P. R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/3/66-67, Raby to Harley, 21 October 1704.
The king of Prussia had been treating jointly with three other powers for Danzig's protection and Danzig had underhandedly signed a treaty for Prussia's protection when it could have had the protection of the three other states also. It was questionable whether it was advisable for the town to admit so many Prussian troops upon any terms because the troops would become absolute masters of the town. Stanhope felt that this treaty necessitated the insertion of an explicit article that Danzig remain under the same allegiance to Poland. He condemned the attempts of the Danzig magistrates to explain it as endeavours to "plaster a very Scurvey business in a Slovenly manner." Even Raby admitted to Stepney that he could not "comend" the proceedings of Berlin in transacting the treaty with Danzig for it entirely put a stop to the quadruple treaty of protection for Danzig, which was being negotiated at The Hague. Raby somewhat futilely hoped that the ratification of the treaty could be put off and that some way would be found to destroy it at The Hague. The effect of the treaty was,

121 P.R.O.,S.P. Holland,84/227, Stanhope to Harley, 7 October 1704.

122 Ibid.,Stanhope to Harley, 28 October 1704; for Heinsius's suspicions see Heinsius to Lintelo, The Hague, 4 November 1704,Alg. Rijks., Archief Heinsius 968.

123 P.R.O.,S.P. Holland,84/227, Stanhope to Harley, The Hague, 14 October 1704.


as Stanhope had anticipated, the termination of the conferences because the States-General refused to proceed in the act of protection until the powers knew the substance of the treaty, which had been so industriously kept from them. 126 The town of Danzig refused to show the treaty to Robinson while the Berlin court entirely disowned it to Raby. 127 Schmettau would neither own nor disown it. The king of Prussia refused to divulge the treaty's contents and Danzig could not obtain his consent to show the treaty because Frederick felt that it was beneath his dignity to account for his actions. He felt that the other powers should take his word that there was nothing in the treaty which endangered the liberty of Danzig or which was inconsistent with the quadruple protection. Ilgen later told Raby that the court had refused to divulge the contents of the treaty because there were two or three articles which would shock and offend the Swedes. 128 Frederick assured the other conference parties that he had no intention of separating the town from its dependance on Poland. He claimed that he had only made the treaty because of


127 Ibid., Stanhope to Harley, The Hague, 28 October 1704.

Danzig's request for 2,000 men. He pressed the continuation of the conferences and claimed that his treaty had no force until the joint treaty was concluded.

Notwithstanding the private treaty, Stanhope was ordered to press the continuation of the conferences, rather than let Danzig be lost. Heinsius, however, retorted that the question which remained was to whom the city would fall. The United Provinces were indifferent whether one king or the other seized it. The conferences were at a standstill although Schmettau argued that if they did not join with Prussia, the king would undertake it by himself. If a war should break out over Danzig, Frederick would have to recall his troops. Heinsius, however, told Schmettau that the Berlin court had acted "as if they thought all ye rest of ye world blind, and believed nobody but themselves had common sense." The feeling in the United Provinces was so antipathetic that the States General delayed the allied subsidy payments. Marlborough, however, felt that the treaty which Prussia had concluded with Danzig might make the quadruple protection unnecessary by securing the town in another way. Stanhope wrote on 9 December 1704 that he believed that

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129 P.R.O., S.P. Holland, 84/227 The Hague, Stanhope to Harley 18 November 1704.

130 Ibid., Stanhope to Harley 12 October 1704.

131 Ibid.

132 Ibid., Stanhope to Harley 22 December 1704.
the act of protection would proceed because the Pentionary was "more humane and compliant than he had been." The reason for the sudden change was that Frederick had shown Marlborough the treaty and Marlborough had written Heinsius to assure him that there was nothing in it to hinder the carrying on of the treaty of protection. Ilgen had shown Raby the original separate treaty with Danzig in December. Raby felt that it was "in its self an ill treaty & the maner of making of it worse." He found that the articles were often contradictory and equivocal.

England's fear of possible Prussian involvement in the Northern War, as aptly reflected in the Danzig issue, had increased in 1704. From mid-September Charles tried to engage the Saxons in battle while the tsar was absorbed in his Baltic conquests. The treaty between Prussia and Saxony was near conclusion and 8,000 Prussians were ordered to march to the Vistula. Patkul exulted that the Prussian and Saxon armies would


be united before the Maritime Powers could hinder it. The massive Russian infiltration into Poland which Frederick was depending on, however, was deferred. After the defeat of Johann Mathias von der Schulenburg, a Saxon general at Punitz (October 28), he was unable to re-enter the Polish Commonwealth because Charles had quartered his army all along the Polish western border. In spite of the tsar's failure to send troops and the Saxon defeat at Punitz, Frederick had remained firm in his desire for a Saxon alliance. In the midst of Patkul's negotiations, Marlborough, who had heard of the Prussian march towards the Vistula, came to Berlin to enervate Frederick's inclination towards a Polish alliance.

Throughout 1704 the envoys of Denmark and Poland were urging Frederick to send his troops to Prussia and not to the Danube. But Frederick did send his troops against France in spite of their warnings that without more troops he was absolutely in the power of Sweden. In the spring of 1704, the king of Denmark was making preparations on land and sea but it was doubted whether he would begin another conflict.
with Sweden, "having so lately burnst his fingers in the last." 138 He was poor and could not venture such an affair without assistance from Frederick who wished "for peace at home and war a broad." 139 Although Frederick's ministers wished "heartily for a fair opportunity of shewing their resentment [against Sweden] without hazard to them­ selves," they resolved to dissemble with the Swedes for as long as they could. 140 The Berlin court was not prepared to engage against the Swedes until the Swedes were "So low" that they were no longer a threat to them. 141 In the fall Jakob Heinrich Flemming, a Saxon minister, offered Frederick in Augustus's name all of Polish Prussia in exchange for Frederick's support. The project was, however, abor­ tive. 142 The rejection of the subsequent offer of Patkul and Lt. General Schulenburg and their departure for Dresden in December 1704


139 Ibid.

140 P.R.O., S.O. Prussia, 90/2/373, Raby to Hedges, Berlin, 31 May 1704.


142 Ibid., 90/3/59, Raby to Harley, Berlin, 21 October 1704.
left no doubt that there was no hope of engaging Frederick to help Augustus at this time.\textsuperscript{143}

At the same time, Frederick was carrying on negotiations with Sweden, which had been initiated by Charles. Frederick raised his demands higher than in 1703. He hoped that the proximity of the tsar would make Charles more amenable to giving him a corridor between Brandenburg and East Prussia. The negotiations lapsed when it became apparent that Frederick would go no further than a benevolent neutrality and would not commit himself to recognizing Stanislaus.\textsuperscript{144} Raby acutely described Frederick's vacillating foreign policy when he wrote that

they would put themselves upon a great foot of having all their neighbours be afraid and stand in awe of their power; they would be acknowledges and courted by every party; they arm themselves at home, that their neighbours may court them for their Troops, wch they will not send and others be afraid of them tho, they dare never begin any thing, and are extremely afraid others should begin with them; in short they would put themselves upon a foot wch is impossible for them to support.\textsuperscript{145}

The Berlin court clearly intended to see what side would win

\textsuperscript{143}B.M.,Add.Mss.7061,f.145, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 6 December 1704.


out so that they could declare for the stronger in safety.¹⁴⁶

The king continued to negotiate with both sides and it became increasingly clear that in 1704 he was committed to neither side. Raby deprecated the irresolution of the court when he claimed that following their designs was "Like following a pack of Hounds which are not Staunch, for the minute a fresh Hare starts they Leave the former to follow that and immediately that for another; So that one has no hopes of Catching any thing."¹⁴⁷ Raby found it difficult to discover the intentions of the court for the court "it self changes it's resolutions as the face of affairs changes."¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁶B.M. Add Mss. 31,134,f.58, Raby to Rochfort, Berlin 21 October 1704.


¹⁴⁸Ibid., 90/3/77, Raby to Harley Berlin 21 October 1704; In July Raby asked Wich to observe two Prussian ministers and see whether they conversed with agents of the Danes or of the Swedes. B.M. Add Mss. 31,132,f 14, Raby to Wich, Berlin 8 July 1704.
CHAPTER VII
1705: ALLIED DISSENSION

During the year 1705 the alliance was wracked by internal dis-
sensions, epitomized in the Prussian troops withdrawal from the Upper
Rhine. Relations between Frederick and the other Allies became so
acerbic that Jean Baptiste Colbert, Marquis de Torcy, the French foreign
minister, wrote Jean Baptiste Poussin, the French representative at
Copenhagen, in July 1705 that "La manière dont les alliés traitent M.
I'Elector de Brandebourg devrait bien le dégoûter des engagements qu'il
a pris, et le faire songer aux moyens de profiter de la conjoncture
présente pour ses avantages particuliers." 1 It was imperative that
Prussia be kept in the alliance because of the need for Frederick's
troops. The active campaigning was from May to September because of the
appalling condition of the roads and the shortage of fodder in the win-
ter. The short campaign season meant that the troops must be in the
field promptly. In the spring of 1705, Marlborough in an attempt to
accelerate the march of the 12,000 man Prussian contingent, wrote Raby of
the "straits we are in for want of the Prussian troops" and asked him
to point out to Frederick the consequences of his failure to perform his
duty though "in the softest terms you can." 2 It was also mandatory

1 Quoted in Legrelle, La Diplomatie Française, IV, 336; see also
Erich Hassinger, "Preussen und Frankreich im spanischen Erbfolgekrieg,"
Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte, LIV, (1943)
43-68.
2 C.T. Atkinson, Marlborough and the Rise of the British Army
that the treaty for the 8,000 troops in Italy be renewed in order to prevent the collapse of the allied front. The disputes over the Lübbecke bishopric, the continuing dissension over the quadruple protection for Danzig, the threat of a Swedish invasion of Saxony, and the tangled intrigues in the North acerbated the affairs in the North, which again threatened to detach Frederick from the alliance.

Frederick's importance as an ally in 1705 is illustrated by the elevation of Raby from envoy extraordinary to ambassador extraordinary. Raby received his credentials as ambassador extraordinary on 22 May 1705. The appointment was obviously gratifying to Frederick. When Raby took leave as envoy extraordinary, Frederick gave Raby a hat studded with diamonds valued at 10,000 crowns. The alteration of Raby's character entailed an increase in his allowances which was so large that Harley told him that "both equipage mony and other were [higher than] there is any precedent for in this Province." 5

3 For the significance of Raby's appointment see Horn, British Diplomatic Service, p.45.

4 In the summer of 1704, Baron Spanheim had told Frederick that the queen was going to change Raby's character from envoy to ambassador, although it was supposed to be kept secret until the winter. P.R.O., S.P. Prussia 104/51, Harley to Raby, 29 July 1704; P.R.O., S.P. Prussia 90/2/439, Berlin, 12 July 1704; B.M., Add. Mss. 7062, f.28, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 11 August 1705; B.M., Add. Mss. 22,197, Raby's memorandum of 23 July 1705.

5 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 104/51, Harley to Raby, 18 September 1705.
The relations between Prussia and the United Provinces remained tense. Friedrich Wilhelm von Grumkow's complaint that the Prussian troops were starving and had not been paid "God knows when" made the king declare that if the States General did not give him security for better payments he would recall the States-General's share of the 5,000 men hired jointly with England and would not renew the Italian treaty. The recall of the Prussians from Italy would mean the consequent recall of the Danes, the Holsteiners, and the Hanoverians from the allied service. Another source of contention within the alliance was the king's plan to have his troops in a body on the Moselle. Frederick had hoped and believed that Marlborough's promised intervention with the queen and the States-General would procure their agreement. He was angry at the queen's failure to commit herself and at the States-General's adamant refusal to consent to his project.


The death of Sophie Charlotte boded ill for future Prussian-Hanoverian relations because the queen had remained an ardent Hanoverian and had sought to promote the interests of Hanover at Berlin. The death of Sophie Charlotte (February 1705) whom Raby felt to be the court's "chiefest ornament and diversion" was mourned by the king who "tho he did not shew over much Love for her whilst Living he Shews over much Greif now she is dead." The royal prince had underhandedly supported Hanoverian interests while his mother lived but Raby believed that he did not now have the power to support them "tho the King loves him extreemly." Hanover had become increasingly jealous of the power Prussia was acquiring especially when Prussia secured the inheritance of Culmbach, Bareuth, and Ansprach. The dispute about Northausen continued to simmer because Prussia did not wish to withdraw her troops and because Hanover did not wish to be bound by a promise never to put troops there. The elector of Hanover began to fear that although Frederick recognized the ninth electorate, he was working to bring Hanover's


10 B.M., Add.Mss.7061,f.192, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 7 February 1705.

enemies against it. Relations became so embittered that Raby believed that Sweden had shown Frederick some propositions which Hanover had made to Charles which were detrimental to Prussia.

The dispute with the emperor in 1705 took on a threatening aspect. The Berlin court had no wish to forward the ban on the electors of Bavaria and Cologne, which Frederick thought would inordinately increase the power and prestige of the emperor in relations to the electors. The court also opposed the emperor's policy of giving the Upper Palatinate to the already powerful Elector Palatine, who was too close a neighbor. The emperor also pressed Frederick to leave Northausen. The emperor had sent his declaration against the Prussian occupation to the town magistrates before he acquainted Frederick with it. The Berlin court was evidently resolved not to leave Northausen because they subsequently sent two more companies of foot into the town. The imperial court would have been better advised to have delayed their resolution concerning Northausen,

12 See B.M., Add. Mss. 7062, f. 76, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 26 September 1705.


which had only aggravated the king. The long standing dispute over the treatment of the Protestants in the empire also acerbated relations. The king, who determined to maintain Protestant rights and to obtain satisfaction for their grievances, resolved that unless the Protestants had speedy redress in the elector Palatine's dominions, he would undertake reprisals against Roman Catholics in his lands.

Raby hoped that the death of Leopold on 5 May 1705 and the succession of Joseph I would not be prejudicial to the alliance. Initially Raby thought that the death of the emperor would be an advantage to the Allies because the Berlin court had more respect for Joseph than they had for Leopold. The death of the old emperor and the succession of Joseph lead to many difficulties such as the disruptive quarrels over treaty renewals and an almost bitter hostility between Frederick and Joseph. The king complained to Marlborough that "the late emperor testi-

15 B.M., Add. Mss. 7061, f. 171, Raby to Stepney, 13 January 1705; Add. Mss. 7061, f. 181, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 24 January 1705, Raby remarked that there was "no understanding the Imperial politics who can only take Contrary measure to w' their friends wish, and they have Lately done all that can to put this Court out of Humour with them, at the very time they have kept the fairest." P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/3/164-165, Raby to Harley, Berlin, 20 January 1705.

16 B.M., Add. Mss. 7062, f. 8, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 14 July 1705.

17 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 104/51, Harley to Raby, 22 May 1705.

fied his gratitude to me on many occasions, yet I do not know since
his death if the court of Vienna continues in the same sentiments." 19
For example, Joseph avoided sending an envoy to Berlin to acknowledge
the succession of royalty to the king's brothers. The Berlin court
hoped to get the emperor's acknowledgement of Frederick's brothers
by inserting a clause in the Italian treaty for the 8,000 Prussian

There were also many quarrels over the Prussian contingent in
the imperial army. This is exemplified in the withdrawal of the
Prussian contingent on Frederick's orders on the eve of the attack on
Hagenau. Marlborough had suggested to Frederick through Raby the
transference of the then idle Prussian troops from the upper Rhine to
Flanders. The Margrave of Baden, however, considered this a betrayal.
His letter of 1 September to Marlborough relating his successful cap-
ture of Hagenau and his capture of the whole line of the Moder, re-
flects his anger. Marlborough in a letter of 3 September congratulates
the margrave and adds that he had, on the news of the Prussian march,
sent countermanding orders directly to the Prussian commander, Arnim.

19 Quoted in Coxe, Memoirs of Marlborough, I, 495-496, Frederick
to Marlborough, Berlin, 27 October 1705.

20 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia 90/3/299-300, Raby to Harley, Berlin, 2
June 1705. Bartholdy, the Prussian representative to Vienna, was also
instructed to get the imperial recognition of Frederick's pretensions
to Bareuth and Culmbach inserted in the treaty, P.R.O., S.P. Prussia,
His orders were not sent, however, until the day before the attack.21

In the fall of 1705 the king began to complain that Prince Lewis of Baden and the imperial court were neglecting his troops. The report of General Arnim's aide-de-camp, concerning the great hardships of the Prussian troops on the upper Rhine, incensed the court. The Prussian officers were extremely dissatisfied and complained bitterly about Prince Lewis. The Prussian commander, General Arnim, desired to be recalled and declared that he would not serve under Prince Lewis. The king was so angry at the neglect of his troops that he dispatched orders to recall the troops from the upper Rhine. Frederick was especially angry that Prince Lewis had allotted winter quarters for the rest of the troops, but not his.22 Frederick was also offended that Prince Lewis should order his troops to march to the siege of Homburg.

21 Prince Lewis wrote to Marlborough that "Ich fasse nicht, wie es möglich, dass die Briefe des Königs von Preussen andeuten; dies sei geschen auf das Ansuchen des englischen Botschafters, un Ihren Ansicht-en und bitten zu willfahren, während doch Ihre eigenen Briefe an mich und an den Grafen Firesen versichern, dass EW. Excellenz dieser Truppen nicht bedürften . . . Ich darf nicht verschweigen dass bei dem auch so errungenen Erfolge 10.000 Mann mehr seht nutzlich gewesen sein würden, die Sache heir zu einem guten Ende zu bringen." Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, XI, 539. Also see Murray, ed., Marlborough's Dispatches, II, 238. Klopp, XI, 539 also uses this incident as an illustration of Marlborough's insincerity while Churchill, Marlborough, I, 988 points out Marlborough's good faith.

22 The emperor's offer of 100,000 Reichsthaler instead of winter quarters was not considered enough because the court expected the allowance would follow the same rate that they had had in Bavaria last winter. B.M., Add.Mss.7062,f.95, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 27 October 1705; Österrechische Staatsarch., Haus- Hof- und Staatsarch., Preussen, Korrespondenz, Kart IV, I, Heems, 31 October 1705.
a city in the Palatinate north of Zweidrücken, which was regarded as very difficult and fatiguing without telling him. The Allies feared that Frederick was using his quarrel with the emperor as a pretext for withdrawing his troops to Prussia. The allied ministers complained to Marlborough. The hope that Marlborough could mediate the differences between the emperor and Frederick proved false. The hope that an expedient could be found to keep the Prussians on the Rhine was dispelled when Frederick ordered his troops to march home. Frederick also ordered the three battalions which were to cover the siege of Homburg to march home. The king was also dissatisfied with the imperial court because the emperor's subsidy payments were three years in arrears. Frederick declared that the emperor would never have another man of his.

It was clear that the only thing which would keep the troops in the allied service was an expedient in which the Prussians would serve Marlborough and not Prince Lewis, who would be given an equal number of troops. Vienna had indubitably given Berlin "but too fair

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a hande of complaints." Raby felt that "when German princes are vext you may talk as much as you please of their Contingent the'l send as many or as few as they please." Relations were so strained that the imperial resident was refused a conference at Berlin. Frederick wrote to Marlborough that although he wished to continue his assistance in Italy, if the emperor did not agree to his demands, he would find it impossible to do so. He complained that the imperial court had used him "with great harshness." Marlborough, speaking of Frederick recalling his troops from the upper Rhine "with some disgust", wished that the "usage they have met with there had not give so just a handle for it." Marlborough felt that nothing could have happened "more unluckily" because it was very unlikely that Homborg could be taken without the


27 Ibid., Raby thought that thr misunderstanding could be partially attributed to Friedrich Heinrich Bartholdi, Baron von Micrander, the Prussian representative to Vienna, who "has done no service to the Court of Vienna since he has been there", and now "carrys it with too much insolence and haughtiness at your court." Ibid.; Add.Mss.7062, f.93, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 24 October 1705.

28 Coxe, Memoirs of Marlborough, I,495-496, Frederick to Marlborough, Berlin, 27 October 1705. See also Van t' Hoff, ed., Correspondence, p.360, Marlborough to Heinsius, Vienna, 14 November 1705, concerning Frederick's dissatisfaction.

29 P.R.O., S.P.Military Correspondence, 87/2, Marlborough to Harley, 14 November 1705.
assistance of the Prussian troops. The failure to take Homburg, a city which was "absolutely necessary for the operation of the next campaign," disrupted the allied plans.

Frederick's dispute with the emperor also threatened to wreck the renewal of the Italian treaty. The imperial court tried to get more men for Italy from Berlin by pressing Frederick to send 4,000 of the 8,000 men which he owed the emperor by treaty. The difficulties arose because the treaty was ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. According to the treaty, the Prussian troops were not obliged to go beyond the sea nor into the kingdom of Naples, but they were supposed to serve in the empire and in the imperial fiefs. The imperial resident at Berlin emphasized that the last word obligated Frederick to send the troops to Italy. The Berlin ministers, however, denied it and continued to hedge. Raby partly blamed the court's failure to send these men to

30 Van t'Hoff, ed., Correspondence, 360, Marlborough to Heinsius, Vienna, 14 November 1705.


Italy on the imperial resident, who, he alleged, had not informed him soon enough that he had orders to urge the court to send 4,000 men to Italy.\textsuperscript{33}

Marlborough hoped that the queen would renew the Italian treaty one year longer if the States-General was willing and felt that the sooner the orders were given for the treaty renewal, the better.\textsuperscript{34} Marlborough hoped to encourage the Berlin court to make early preparations.\textsuperscript{35} In contrast, Heinsius hoped to defer the renewal for some time. Marlborough pressed Harley to instruct Stanhope, the English representative at The Hague, to urge the Dutch to join with the queen in immediately renewing the treaty or at least to declare through their minister at Berlin in conjunction with Raby that they intended to renew the treaty. Raby continued to press for the renewal of the treaty

\textsuperscript{33}B.M., Add. Mss. 7062, f. 54, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 4 September 1705. Other difficulties arose concerning sending troops to Italy when Schmettau declared that the king intended to recall all his troops from Italy unless the Allies agreed to pay all the recruits. The Grand Chamberlain, however, claimed that Schmettau did not have the orders to make that declaration. See B.M., Add. Mss. 22, 197, Raby's memorandum of 14 September 1705; Österreich. Staatsarch., Haus-Hof- und Staatsarch., Preussen Korrespondenz, Kart IV, I, Heems, 10 October 1705.

\textsuperscript{34}P.R.O., S.P. Military Correspondence, 87/2, Marlborough to Harley, Camp at Ramée, 27 August 1705, also printed in Murray, ed., Marlborough's Dispatches, II, 241; Van 't Hoff, ed., Correspondence of Marlborough and Heinsius, p. 207, Marlborough to Heinsius, 27 August 1705.

\textsuperscript{35}P.R.O., S.P. Military Correspondence, 87/2, Marlborough to Harley, Camp at Tirlemont, 31 August 1705.
although he rather resentfully felt that he had nothing to do with the treaty and Stanhope was empowered to renew it. Raby and Marlborough believed that the king would agree to renew the treaty at the same subsidy rate. Raby believed that although Frederick "is a Looser" by the treaty, it would be renewed. It was estimated that the king lost over 2,000 men in the Italian campaign.

Although the king intended to renew the treaty, he equivocated. It is clear that he hoped to gain new concessions from the emperor and the States-General. Raby cryptically remarked that the king would try to make the best bargain he could, "Since he sees his are the Chiepest the Em has to depend on in Italy and their bravery has of Late ben so much extol'd." Raby prophesied that the treaty would be renewed after a great struggle on both sides but perhaps, "if we seem

36 B.M., Add. Mss. 7062, f. 76, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 26 September 1705; P.R.O., S.P. Military Correspondence, 87/2, Marlborough to Harley, 24 September 1705.


38 Ibid., f. 83, Raby to Stepney, 10 October 1705. Raby related in another letter that the king had lost more than 1,000 men and more than 40 officers. P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/3/388, Raby to Harley, 29 August 1705.

39 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/3/403, Raby to Harley, Berlin, 29 September 1705; B.M., Add. Mss. 7062, f. 87, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 27 October 1705. For example, he hoped that the emperor would confirm his succession to Bareuth.
too fond of it it may cost us more." 40

It was imperative at this time to reinforce Eugene because there were rumours that the French were laying aside the siege of Turin in order to send all their troops into Lombardy. Marlborough felt that Eugene "never had more need of succours." 41 It was probable that if the Prussians retired, the imperialists would also be obliged to return. Even the threat of a Prussian troop recall could hinder preparations at Vienna to reinforce Eugene. 42 Frederick had written Johann George d'Anhalt, the Prussian commander stationed with Eugene, that when the treaty expired in three months, he intended to recall the Prussian troops. Eugene, who believed that "cette menace n'est que pour faire ces conditions meilleures" did not doubt that Marlborough could sway Frederick. 43 Marlborough told Raby to emphasize the fact that the queen felt that she had fully complied with the treaty. Raby was to assure Frederick that Marlborough would forward his pretensions at The Hague. He was also to hint that Marlborough regarded the

40 B.M., Add. Mss. 7062, f. 65, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 12 September 1705.

41 Murray, ed., Marlborough's Dispatches, II, 293, Marlborough to Raby, Herenthal, 5 October 1705.


treaty as a "particular mark of his Majesty's goodness and favor to me." Marlborough told Raby to "humour the court" but to emphasize that there was no time to be lost since the recall would be "of a most dangerous consequence to our affairs in Italy." Marlborough had in fact written Heinsius that Frederick was very dissatisfied and begged him to "do all you can to put that King in good humour." Raby did succeed in procuring Frederick's declaration that he would renew the treaty. This declaration was, however, to be kept a secret. Marlborough, who had been "in some pains about it," was relieved.

Marlborough wrote to Frederick "du plaisir que j'ai eu en apprenant de My Lord Raby la declaration qu'Elle avait eu la bonté de lui faire." Marlborough wrote to the prince of Savoy that he was delighted that Frederick had renewed the treaty and that Frederick would

44 Murray, ed., Marlborough's Dispatches, II, 293, Marlborough to Raby, Camp at Herenthals, 5 October 1705.

45 Van 'T Hoff, ed., Correspondence of Marlborough and Heinsius, p.352, Marlborough to Heinsius, Herenthal, 3 October 1705.

46 Murray, ed., Marlborough's Dispatches, II, 302, Marlborough to Raby, 13 October 1705. Frederick had assured Marlborough that it was for the queen and because of his friendship with Marlborough that he had made the declaration. See B.M., Add.Mss.28,056, Marlborough to Godolphin, The Hague, 14 October 1705.

replace the cavalry with three battalions of infantry. Marlborough did not dare reveal, however, the king's declaration at either The Hague or Vienna. Heinsius urged Marlborough to go to Berlin because the States-General's relations with Frederick were so strained. Frederick was angry because the United Provinces had not paid one penny of the subsidy which they owed him and because they did not forward his claims to William's inheritance.

It was widely believed that Marlborough's personal diplomacy would return Frederick to a better humour. For example, Alexander Stanhope wrote Harley that all his hopes of changing Frederick's ill humour "ly in ye Duke of Marlborough, who has ye Secrit to persuade him to whatever he pleases." More reservedly, Sunderland hoped that Marlborough could "make things Pretty easy with the Berlin court which he labelled "the most humoursome and capricious one in the world."  

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49 Frederick had a close friendship with Marlborough. See B.M., Add.Mss.22,194,f.63, Wartenberg to Raby, Charlottenburg, 27 April 1705.

50 P.R.O., S.P. Holland, 34/228, Stanhope to Harley, The Hague, 8 September 1705.

51 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 80/27, Sunderland to Harley, Berlin, 1 December 1705. See also Godolphin to Harley, April 1705, H.M.C., Portland Mss, IV, 175.
Marlborough asked Heinsius to give Frederick "good words" so that he would find him in a better humour when he came to Berlin. He hoped to "soften him and to remove all prejudices." He succeeded in renewing for an additional year the Italian treaty in which there was inserted a secret article which stipulated that the queen would assist Frederick if he was attacked. Marlborough had not, however, raised the issue of the Prussian regiments' recall from the Rhine. On Marlborough's departure on 3 December Frederick presented him with a sword set with diamonds. His visit represents the success of his personal diplomacy. Frederick later told Raby that he never knew "in his life so agreeable a man as you was and wished you could have stayed longer with him."

52 Van 'T Hoff, ed., Correspondence of Marlborough and Heinsius, p.360, Marlborough to Heinsius, Vienna, 14 November 1705.

53 P.R.O., S.P. Military Correspondence, 87/2, Marlborough to Harley, Berlin, 1 December 1705.

54 P.R.O., S.P. Treaty Papers, 103/59, Treaty of 3 December 1705. This treaty was in general a renewal of the 28 November 1704 Treaty. See Noorden, Europäische Geschichte, II, 527-528; Droysen, Geschichte der preußischen Politik, IV, part 1, 263; Eugene to Kaiser, 13 August 1705 and Eugene to Marlborough, 14 August 1705 in Feldzüge, VII, Suppl., 379 and 380.

Marlborough's visit to Berlin in 1705 marked a turning point in his relations with Raby, which later became so strained. Marlborough could still write in truth in 1705 to thank Raby for his "many obliging expressions and for kindesses you show'd me" and to express "a real friendship for you." Raby was, however, already suspicious that Marlborough was undermining his position at Berlin by negotiating with Grumkow in spite of Marlborough's assurances that he had not entrusted Grumkow with anything.

Differences over the ratification of the treaty and delays in the Prussian troops preparation hindered the march of the contingent. Although the duke of Savoy had initially objected to the allotment of winter quarters and to the assertion of Frederick's rights and title to Neuchatel, he did sign the Italian treaty. It was feared that the emperor's long delays over the acceptance of the treaty would hinder the march of the 8,000 men whom the duke of Savoy desperately needed.


57 Ibid., II, 264, Marlborough to Raby, Camp at Tirlemont, 14 September 1705.

58 B.M., Add.Mss.9094,f.8, Hill to Marlborough, 4 January 1705.

Hill, the English envoy extraordinary at Turin from 1703 to 1706, wrote Marlborough that the 8,000 Prussians could "only save us by their diligence and reputation. His R.H. will impute all the delays, which are made at Vienna, to the malice or impotency of that court, or to the ill will of Prince Eugene." The deficiencies of the treaty became only too apparent. When the treaty was renewed, it would be necessary to add a clause stipulating that the troops should be mustered and complete. At the end of January there were still eight regiments, which had not yet marched from Prussia. Prince Eugene discovered that contrary to the treaty and to the king's promises, that the Prince of Anhalt, the Prussian commander of the troops destined for Italy, did not intend to march until the latter end of March. Prince Anhalt contended that he delayed because the contingent needed arms and clothing. Raby, however, attributed the delay to Anhalt's reluctance to leave his favorable winter quarters in Bavaria.

60 B.M., Add. Mss. 9094, f. 12, Hill to Marlborough, Turin, 14 January 1705.
62 Ibid., f. 195, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 7 February 1705. The 8,000 men, who were to be provided for Italy, were principally drawn from Prussian troops in Bavaria. It was important that England should urge Frederick to replace those men. Johann Wenzel, Count Wratislaw, the former imperial representative to England, complained to Marlborough that it was "the practice of that court [Berlin] to draw Subsidies from all quarters and to confound the [?] in such a way that the number was never complete." B.M., Add. Mss. 9094, f. 19, Wratislaw to Marlborough, Vienna, 24 January 1705.
The Berlin court was hoping to obtain three months advance payment before the troops marched. The treaty, however, stipulated that payments should begin from the fifteenth of January on the condition that the troops were to be in Piedmont or at least in Italy by February. Raby wanted the march of the troops to regulate the commencement of the payments. 63 Raby urged the Berlin court to dispatch the troops quickly because if they did not march soon the duke of Savoy would be lost. 64 Raby felt that if Frederick fulfilled the treaty, Marlborough would receive the honor for it but if Frederick failed to keep his promises he would be blamed and thought negligent. He could not, however, make the Berlin ministers keep their promises for "courts will go their own way in spight of all the influences foreign Ministers can have over them." 65 The Prussian troops finally left their Bavarian quarters on the twentieth of March. 66 Frederick was angry that the troops had not marched sooner because he was afraid that if the duke of Savoy was


64 Ibid., f. 197, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 10 February 1705.


66 Ibid., ff. 220-221, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 24 March 1705.
ruined before his troops arrived in Italy, the Maritime Powers would not feel obliged to pay the money stipulated in the treaty. Raby resolved to say nothing of Prince Eugene's quarrel with the emperor because he feared that it would hinder the march of the Prussian contingent. Friedrich Heinrich Bartholdi's reports to the Berlin court about Eugene's potential assignment to Hungary instead of Italy worried the ministers who feared that the Italian contingent would be ruined without Eugene's leadership. 67

The contested succession of the Lübeck-Eutin bishopric between the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, supported by Sweden, and Frederick IV of Denmark, could disrupt the alliance because Denmark could use it as a pretence to disturb northern affairs. The consequence would be the embroilment of the northern princes, especially Frederick in the Northern War. There had been much uneasiness concerning Lübeck-Eutin at The Hague in 1704. Heinsius was cautious and avoided declaring himself for either side. He hoped to offend neither party and to keep the peace by mediation. 68 The king of Denmark was pressing the Berlin court to declare for his succession, but Ilgen thought that since Frederick was one of the guarantors of the Travendal treaty, he could not support Denmark.

68 P.R.O., S.P. Holland, 84/226, Stanhope to Hedges, 4 March 1704; Ibid., Stanhope to Harley, 8 July 1704.
It had been stipulated in the Travendal treaty that the bishopric would be settled in the Holstein family. Ilgen had deduced that the queen would not support Denmark from the memorial which she had presented to the States-General. 69 Johann Palmquist, the Swedish representative from 1703 to 1715 to the United Provinces, and Bothmar, the Hanoverian representative to The Hague, were endeavouring to get the Lübeck-Eutin dispute declared within the Travendal guarantee. Schmettau and Stanhope thought that the coadjutorship of Lübeck-Eutin was comprehended in the Travendal treaty but that it did not oblige the signatory powers to do anything if the settlement was threatened. Heinsius refused to answer directly and Count Peter Goess, the imperial representative to the States-General from 1698 to 1707, claimed that he was not instructed. 70 Goess and Schmettau admitted that the right was on Holstein-Gottorp's side. They did not wish, however, to disoblige the king of Denmark and felt that there was no need to declare for either side while the old bishop still lived. The elector of Hanover, an ally of Sweden, still felt that he was obliged to declare for the Holstein-Gottorp candidacy. 71


71 Ibid., Stanhope to Harley, The Hague, 18 July 1704. Sweden always supported the interests of the duke-administrator of Holstein-Gottorp because through Holstein-Gottorp, Sweden could checkmate Denmark on her southern frontier.
The death of the bishop in 1705 precipitated the dispute and gave "a handle to Emissarys of France to kindle a fire in the North." The duke of Holstein-Gottorp requested the Maritime Powers, as guarantors of the Travendal treaty, to interpose in order to prevent the recall of his troops and the subsequent recall of Denmark's troops. The duke of Holstein-Gottorp had the support of Palmquist, the Swedish representative, and Bothmar, the Hanoverian representative at The Hague. Heinsius and the other Dutch deputies were industriously avoiding the main issue of whether the dispute was within the compass of the treaty of Travendal, even though Stanhope believed that they really wished to support Holstein. The Berlin court had returned a "very cold" answer to the king of Denmark and claimed that the duke of Holstein-Gottorp had the right of succession. Marlborough convinced the emperor to act with the Maritime Powers in order to persuade the king of Denmark to acquiesce in the duke of Holstein-Gottorp's succession to the bishopric. Marlborough hoped that his diplomatic pressure would stop the king of Denmark. By the spring of 1706, Frederick IV of Denmark finally gave

72 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 104/51, Harley to Raby, 20 October 1705.
74 P.R.O., S.P. Holland, 84/228, Stanhope to Harley, The Hague, 15 December 1705.
76 P.R.O., S.P. Military Expeditions, 87/3, Marlborough to Harley, Vienna, 18 November 1705.
up his pretensions to the Lübeck-Eutin bishopric.\textsuperscript{77}

The quadruple protection for Danzig was an attempt by the Maritime Powers to prevent Prussian involvement in the Northern War. In 1705 the quadruple protection of Danzig was at a standstill. Stanhope expressed the prevalent prejudice when he said it was hard to judge "how far Prussia may be trusted ... for the juggling between Sweden and Prussia is so manifest in general, that we can not make it out in particular, that it seems as if that poor Town had as much to fear from one as other."\textsuperscript{78} Denmark and Prussia were the most eager to conclude the protection. Johann Heinrich von Stücken, the Danish envoy at The Hague, became very irritated when he could not get any more conferences on the protection. It was doubtful if he would enter anew into negotiations.\textsuperscript{79} Stanhope found that Heinsius and the Dutch députés grew "very cold" in the quadruple protection.\textsuperscript{80} Heinsius believed that the best way to secure the town was to postpone the quadruple treaty and to act on the secret article of the Berlin treaty. It was possible but not probable that Danzig could be secured or protected by representations made in virtue of the Berlin treaty. Stanhope believed that the

\textsuperscript{77}P.R.O., S.P. Holland, 84/223, Stanhope to Harley, 28 May 1706.

\textsuperscript{78}Ibid., Stanhope to Harley, 30 July 1705.

\textsuperscript{79}Ibid., Stanhope to Harley, 28 July 1705.

\textsuperscript{80}Ibid., Stanhope to Harley, 28 August 1705 and 30 July 1705.
quadruple convention would have effectually secured the town. If the protection was resumed on the basis of the Berlin treaty only the United Provinces and England would be involved. It was unlikely that the States-General would do more than use "their good offices" with Charles, which would signify nothing. It was clear that the United Provinces would not risk a war with Sweden or Prussia to save Danzig's liberty.

In 1705 it remained imperative that the Allies should prevent Prussia's involvement in the Northern War. Charles had stationed his army in such a way that it would be impossible for the Saxon troops to come back into the Polish Commonwealth until the Swedes moved. By bottling up the Saxons in the spring and summer of 1705, Charles effectively ruined the projected joint Russo-Saxon campaign for 1705. The victory of Count Adam Ludwig Lewenhaupt stopped the Russian movement over Lithuania towards Poland. On 24 September Stanislaus was crowned king of Poland. On 18 November 1705 the treaty of peace and alliance between Sweden and the Polish Republic was signed. The Allies feared that Charles would invade Saxony. This invasion would plunge the whole empire into the Northern War. Raby did not believe that Charles would invade Saxony in the spring of 1705 because

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81 P.R.O., S.P. Holland, 84/228, Stanhope to Harley, 31 March 1705.

82 Ibid., Stanhope to Harley, 28 July 1705.

he thought that if Charles would ever have invaded Saxony, he would have done it when the Saxons under Johann Mathias von der Schulenberg retreated from Poland. He felt that there was little reason for Charles to invade Saxony in 1705 because Charles had a stronger army than Augustus to oppose a Saxon entry into Poland. Raby did not understand Charles's position and therefore misinterpreted the real danger of a Saxon invasion. Marlborough had reputedly assured Lintelo that the Swedes would not invade Saxony. He felt that the clause of the protection of Saxony in the Berlin treaty really engaged the Maritime Powers to do nothing and would induce Augustus to give 4,000 additional men for his contingent. The Swedish concern for the reaction of England and the United Provinces shows Charles needed a constraint on Frederick IV of Denmark-Norway. He could not risk losing the Anglo-Dutch guarantee of Travendal. Charles respected the allied veto of the Saxon invasion until the autumn of 1706 when because of the allied victories against France, the Maritime Powers could not claim that Charles was knifing them in the back by the Saxon invasion. The Allies realized the inestimable value of Saxony to Augustus and feared that in spite of their veto, Charles might forget his obligations to them and invade Saxony. The Travendal guarantee meant more

84 B.M., Add.Mss.7062,f.231, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 7 April 1705.

85 Hatton, Charles XII,pp.157-194.
than the imperial decree, which declared that anyone attacking a member of the empire would become the enemy of the whole empire. Linteloo was absent from Berlin in the early spring of 1705 and the imperial resident did not believe that Charles would invade Saxony even if Augustus invited him. Raby wanted Frederick to ask the king of Sweden to promise not to invade Saxony. Charles could not give such a promise even though he had no immediate plans for invasion, because the Swedes must "keep that rod in their hand if it was only to shake it in case of accident." The king of Poland was afraid that Charles might invade Saxony and warned the king of Denmark. The invasion would have found the Danish court unprepared to send the troops promised in the defensive alliance or to put a squadron out to sea. It was generally believed that the fear of Charles's invading Saxony delayed the march of the Prussian troops. Prussia's fear of disturbances in the North was such that the sending of troops from Prussia to replace the troops in Bavaria which sent to Italy was kept a secret from the Poles and the Swedes and was not even mentioned in the council of war. It

86 B.M., Add. MSS. 7061, f. 213, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 7 March 1705.

87 H.M.C. Portland Mss., IX, 185, Vernon to Harley, Copenhagen, 28 March 1705.
was announced that the troops were only changing quarters. The plan of Ercole Turinetto, Marchese des Prés, the Savoyard minister, to send 8,000 more Prussians against France in exchange for the support of Frederick's pretensions to Neuchatel, was bound to fail. The Prussian apprehensions about affairs in the North would never let Frederick deplete his troops by sending 8,000 more troops against France. 

In spite of Frederick's fears of a Swedish invasion of Saxony, the "good intelligence" between Frederick and Charles increased so precipitately throughout 1705 that the king of Poland complained that all his friends had left him in the lurch. The Swedish ambassador's condescensions about the ceremony of his reception in contrast to his hitherto inflexibility was pointed out as an indication of the better relations between Prussia and Sweden which might lead to a peace in the North, a marriage alliance, or a treaty.

Frederick told Raby that he was negotiating a treaty with

89 Ibid., f.231, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 7 April 1705.
90 Ibid., f.224, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 28 March 1705. The apparent unity between Sweden and Prussia made Denmark more desirous of allying with Hanover to form a counterpoise. Denmark was "so perfectly satisfied with the King of Prussia that they are for throwing themselves headlong" into the Hanoverian alliance. H.M.C., Portland Mss., IX, Vernon to Harley, Copenhagen, 5 September 1705.
Charles. He claimed that the treaty would not prejudice his relations with the Allies. He asked Queen Anne to keep the treaty a secret.\footnote{P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/3/358, Raby to Harley, Berlin, 1 August 1705.}
The rumor of a partition treaty between Sweden and Prussia was believed widely. It was rumored that the projected treaty gave Courland to the Swedes and Polish Prussia with Danzig, Elbing, Thorn, and Marienburg to Prussia.\footnote{H.M.C., Portland Mss., IX, 192, Vernon to Harley, Yegersburg, 26 May 1705.} Raby believed that Charles was offering Frederick Polish Prussia and Warmia. Raby feared that part of the 8,000 men from the Rhine would move to the North, not to begin hostilities but to support Frederick's pretentions because the emperor had not paid the 100,000 florins which he owed Frederick, because the king's title was established, because the emperor was dead and the treaty was not renewed, and because Sweden was on closer terms with Berlin than ever before.\footnote{B.M., Add. Mss. 7062, f. 85, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 13 October 1705. The increasingly strained relations between Raby and Marlborough is evident in Wartenberg's promise to Raby to tell him of the treaty negotiations between Frederick and Charles before he told Marlborough. See B.M., Add. Mss. 22, 197, ff. 15-16, Raby's memorandum of 14 September 1705.} Marlborough, however, did not think that the treaty was as important as Raby did.\footnote{P.R.O., S.P. Military Expeditions, 87/2, Marlborough to Harley, Camp at Corbais, 24 August 1705.} The offers of the Swedes were tempting but the Berlin court did not wish to involve themselves
in a war. They hoped by their mediation between the tsar and Charles to secure a peace in the North, to see Stanislaus acknowledged by the Poles and to find an expedient to make Augustus renounce his pretensions in Poland.

Frederick was also drawn to the Swedes because he discovered at this time that Augustus had offered to join with Charles to drive him out of Prussia. Augustus had offered to give all of Prussia to Stanislaus as a hereditary kingdom on the condition that he remain king of Poland for the rest of his life only. When this proposal reached the Berlin court, it effectively stopped Flemming's proposal that Frederick should join with Augustus, seize Elbing, Culm, and Marienburg, in Polish Prussia and declare that if Charles did not make peace, Frederick would declare war against him.

Patkul was also attempting in the tsar's name to win Frederick over to Augustus's side and to obtain an unhindered entry to Brandenburg's ports for the Russian fleet. These proposals were refused by Ilgen. When Patkul was not at Berlin, he continued the negotiations by corresponding with Wartenberg, Ilgen, and Printzen. Augustus hoped that Charles would attack the Habsburgs' hereditary countries. The emperor and consequently the Allies would become involved in the Northern War.

98 Patkul, Berichte, III, 90, Report of June 1705.
Raby cryptically remarked that Augustus was like a drowning parrot who cried for help and promised £10,000 to some one to risk drowning to save him "but when saved cryd give the knave a graaf." 99

Frederick hoped to protect his interests and secure substantial gains by becoming a mediator between Poland and Sweden. This hope induced him to keep some troops in Prussia which were destined to march towards the Moselle. 100 There were rumours at Moscow that there were negotiations for a separate peace being conducted at Berlin between Jan Jerzy Prezbendowski, the ambassador from Poland, and Johannes Baron Rosenhane, the Swedish ambassador. Augustus, however, assured the Russian representative in Saxony, that he would never forsake his Russian alliance or make a separate peace. 101 In December 1705 Augustus had arrested Patkul, the tsar’s agent. This act against the tsar caused the tsar to suspect Augustus of an about-face. Frederick’s efforts were generally met by failure because Charles could not and would not rely on Augustus’s sincerity. Augustus was an incalculable factor in the tangle of Northern intrigues. He was the most scheming double-dealer of his day. A contemporary aptly remarked that "on ne sait jamais

100 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia,90/3/203, Raby to Harley, Berlin, 3 March 1705.
101 B.M., Add.Mss.31,128,ff.8-9, Whitworth to Raby, Moscow, 1 April 1705.
"qu'il veut tromper." 102 In an attempt to avoid Frederick's mediation effort, Rosenhane, the Swedish ambassador, did not travel to Oranienburg when Prezbendowski, the Polish ambassador, was staying there. 103

The increasing numbers of the Muscovites and their proximity to Frederick's frontiers made Frederick very desirous to secure a peace. 104 Frederick did not intend to do anything which would enmesh him in the war and which would offend either side. He hoped to quench the fire rather than increase the flame. He dispatched his ministers to both sides to renew his mediation offers. Marquard Ludwig, Baron von Printzen was commissioned to secure a peace if possible between Sweden and Russia. 105 Frederick rightly apprehended that the tsar resented his neutrality and his treaty with Sweden. 106 Count Golowin, the Russian war commissioner, told Whitworth, the English representative at Moscow, that he believed that the king of Prussia might aid Charles and would not be sorry to see the king of Sweden march against the tsar.

102 Hassinger, Brandenburg-Preussen, Schweden und Russland, p. 49.


104 B.M., Add.Mss. 22, 197, Raby's memorandum of 21 September 1705 in which he discusses the Berlin court's fear of the Muscovites, Poles, and others, who are on their frontiers, and Frederick's fear that Prussia would become a theater of the war. Frederick thought that he needed 20,000 men to preserve his neutrality.


The tsar suspected that there were secret transactions between Sweden and Prussia but he did not refuse Frederick's mediation. Because of Frederick's actions in the winter of 1704, the Russians were still suspicious of him. They were also afraid that Charles and part of the Polish Republic which was for Stanislaus had offered Frederick the town of Elbing and other districts at a peace if he abandoned Augustus and sided with them. It was felt that Frederick by trying to procure gains from both sides, was playing a "sure game." The overtures of Georg Johann, Freiherr von Kayserlingk, the Prussian representative to Russia, to the tsar were seen as an attempt to persuade the tsar to evacuate Courland. Frederick wanted the tsar to place Courland in Prussia's protection for Frederick's nephew, the hereditary prince. The proposal could hardly be accepted and served only to increase the tsar's suspicions. 107

By October Printz had met with little success and had returned to Berlin. The tsar was willing to accept peace on his own conditions but those were unacceptable to Charles. 108 Frederick's offers of mediation were thought to be merely "a colour for some other transactions and pretensions," 108 because both sides were so far removed that reconciliation at that stage was impossible. Whitworth wrote Raby


that he did not expect anything from the negotiations until something more decisive occurred in the war.\footnote{109}

The maintenance of Frederick's precarious position in the North became more and more difficult. The projects and counterprojects were all useless. Frederick's refusals of various offers were not without peril. He dared not accept either Polish Prussia from the tsar or Elbing, the archbishopric or Ermeland, and the band of Polish lands between Prussia and Pomerania from Charles. The Poles' incursion into Warmia in the fall of 1705 threatened to violate Frederick's neutrality. Frederick feared that Charles would also bring his troops in and that East Prussia would become a war theater. When the king of Poland put the bishop of Warmia under arrest, his correspondence with Ilgen was uncovered. Ilgen had written with such caution that Jakob Heinrich, Count Flemming, the Saxon representative to Berlin, could not prove Ilgen's collusion with Stanislaus. Ilgen rather coolly told Flemming that it was not a good practice to open other people's letters.\footnote{110} Augustus became more suspicious of Frederick's plans. Prezbendowski was afraid that Frederick intended to send his troops


\footnote{110}{B.M., Add.Mss. 7062, ff.78-79, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 29 September 1705.}
into Prussia and had projects with the Swedes, one of which was the guarantee of the treaty between Sweden and Stanislaus. He asked Raby to intervene to keep Frederick neutral. 111 The recognition of Stanislaus was a thorny matter. Frederick avoided commitment in an attempt to offend neither side. Frederick was uneasy when the Cardinal Primate of Danzig published a paper declaring that Frederick had promised Charles to recognize Stanislaus. Frederick sent an order to his representative to disavow it openly but not to bring out a formal protestation in print lest it offend Charles. 112

CHAPTER VIII
THAT UNCERTAIN GAME: THE CRISIS OF 1706

In 1706 England was faced with the threat of Prussian defection from the alliance. The bitter dissensions between Frederick and the emperor caused Frederick to refuse to send his troops to the Upper Rhine. Frederick's refusal to send any more troops to the Allies' service was only changed by Marlborough's victory at Ramillies. The Swedish invasion of Saxony threatened to plunge Prussia into the Northern War. Raby, who was absent from June to October 1706, found his position at the Berlin court undermined at his return. The plot to procure his recall is indicative of the strength of the court faction which opposed Frederick's dependence on the Maritime Powers and sought to overthrow the Wartenberg faction. The withdrawal of the Prussians from Italy and from the Rhine would be fatal to the alliance.

In 1706 Villars had attacked the Margrave of Baden and chased him over the Rhine. The allied blockade of Fort Louis was abandoned. Hagenau and Durenberg were captured with their garrisons. The line of the Moder and the Lauter were lost to the French and Landau alone remained. The Prussian troops, which should have helped the Margrave on the Upper Rhine, had been withdrawn. These allied misfortunes in
the spring of 1706 illustrated "how prejudicial it is to the Publick
that the King of Prussia should continue obstinate in the march of his
Troops" towards the United Provinces instead of into Germany. Marl-
borough in the early months of 1706 feared Frederick's desertion of the
allied cause because Frederick had withdrawn his troops from the fighting
fronts. Churchill in fact contends that Frederick was advancing far on
the path of treachery. He feels that it is doubtful whether anything
but an overwhelming military victory could have kept him from a sep­
arate peace.

Frederick's relations with the United Provinces became so embittered
that he withdrew his troops. The poor condition of the troops in the
United Provinces' pay enraged the king. Marlborough had intervened with the
States-General in an effort to ameliorate matters. He wrote Frederick that he
was pressing an accomodation between the king and the princess of Nassau con­
cerning the succession of William, "je n'ai rien négligé pour cela." He
had even sent Jacob Hop, the Treasurer-General of the United Provinces,

1P.R.O., S.P. Military Correspondence, 87/2, Marlborough to
Harley, 9 May 1706.

2Churchill, Life of Marlborough, II, 72.

3P.R.O., S.P. Prussia 90/4, Tilson to Tucker, Berlin 20 Febru­
ary 1706; B.M., Add.M ss. 7062, f.172, Raby to Stepney, Berlin 20 Feb­
uary 1706.
a project to be communicated to the princess. Marlborough had also pressed the payment of Frederick's arrears and was assured that the province of Gelderland would work to find the money. Nevertheless, by the spring, relations had deteriorated so that Lintelo reported that Frederick "a esté fort mecontant contre moi" because of the disputes over the Orange Succession. Frederick was further dissatisfied because the States-General had refused to lend him money.

Frederick sent troops to Prussia because of his bitter dissensions with the emperor and because of his fear of disturbances in the North. Raby attempted futilely to hinder the march of more than 4,000 troops to Prussia. This march meant that the emperor would be lucky to have 8,000 instead of the supposed 12,000 troops on the Rhine. England was concerned that the troops, which were necessary to the allied cause and which should have been early in the field were sent so far. Marlborough felt that the queen's guarantee should have allayed any apprehensions the king had for Prussia. Raby wished that Marlborough


5 Alg. Rijks., Archief Heinsius, 1112, Lintelo to Heinsius, 29 May 1706. See also P.R.O., S.P. Holland, 84/228, Stanhope to Harley, The Hague, 10 August 1706.

had secured the troops for the Rhine when he had been at Berlin. He claimed that he had foreseen what would happen but that Marlborough would not believe it. Marlborough told Raby to induce the king to recall the troops, who could return from Prussia at their own pace, and to put at least 12,000 men on the Rhine out of those troops which remained in the king's territories in the empire. As Raby had predicted, it had been a mistake to let the 12,000 Prussian troops march home because the emperor did not want to grant them winter quarters. Raby could not understand why the emperor used Frederick "with such negligence" especially since Frederick could be of such assistance.

One source of contention was Marlborough's promise that the emperor would allow Frederick 200,000 florins for winter quarters. Marlborough had not been authorized to promise the payment of the florins but the imperial resident had, although he later denied it. Raby felt that the emperor does "neglect a Little too much the Court tho I own at the same time I think we in England on the other hand

8Murray, ed. Marlborough's Dispatches, II, 415-416, Marlborough to Raby, St. James, 5 February 1706.
spoil them with too much Compliance." The Berlin court felt that the emperor's demands were too high for the Prussian troops' excesses in Bavaria and the Upper Palatinate. The emperor wanted the 500,000 florins which he owed the king to go in liquidation of the excesses. The Berlin court complained bitterly of the impertinent demands of the imperial resident and threatened to stop the troops march to Italy or to the empire. Ilgen complained to Raby that it was "very hard the common cause should be preach'd up to them to the prejudice of their own particular interest." Ilgen went so far as to say that it was questionable whether the greatness of the house of Austria might be more prejudicial to Berlin than the house of Bourbon because Austria had lately shown such ill-will.

Frederick's threat to keep his 12,000 troops out of the imperial service and to recall his troops in Italy was designed to frighten the emperor into complying with his propositions. Ilgen had told Raby


12 Ibid.,ff.172-175, Raby to Stepney, 20 February 1706. See the discussion of this in B.M., Add.Mss.9095,ff.30-34,Raby to Marlborough, 20 February 1706. George Willem Vreeke, ed., Correspondance Diplomatique et Militaire du Duc de Marlborough, du Grand-Pensionnaire Heinsius et du Trésorier Général des Provinces-Unies, Jacques Hop 1706-1707 (Amsterdam, 1850), p.2 cites Heinsius's letter to Marlborough, The Hague, 29 January 1706 in which Heinsius discusses Frederick's complaint that the emperor was not fulfilling the treaty which Marlborough had drawn up in Berlin, Frederick kept the recruits for the 8,000 men in Bavaria until he was satisfied that the new treaty was adjusted.

that if the emperor would satisfy Frederick's demands he would promise that the king should send the same number of troops which he had last year. Frederick had demanded that the emperor pay him for the 1,500 recruits to the army in Italy for 1705, pay the 200,000 florins for the Prussians on the upper Rhine, and make no further mention of the disorders of the Prussian troops in the Palatinate and in Bavaria. Frederick had declared that if his demands were not met, he would not honor the treaty which had been renewed by Marlborough. The imperial court was angry at Frederick's declaration and inveighed against the grasping spirit manifested by the Berlin court.

Matters soon stalemated because the imperial resident at Berlin had assured Vienna that Berlin was willing to give up the 500,000 florins while Ilgen had told the king that he believed the emperor would give them the whole 500,000 florins. The result was that both sides only delayed the matter further. By March 1706 the emperor or still did not have the Prussian troops. The vacillation of


15 B.M.,Add.Mss.9095,f.9, Prince of Salm to Marlborough, Vienna, 6 January 1706. For the Berlin view see Wartenberg to Marlborough, Berlin, 6 February 1706, B.M.,Add.Mss.9095,f.28, Wartenberg told Marlborough of the embarrassments in which the Berlin court was involved because the Vienna court had not accepted the treaty which Marlborough had made. Vienna had refused to grant the stipulated recruit money and the sum of 200,000 florins which was in accordance with Heems's declaration. He complained of "the great and inconquerable difficulties we find at Vienna."
Frederick, the offers of France for a separate peace, and the disastrous consequences of Frederick's defection were especially obvious at this time. Raby, who was whery soliciting this matter," hoped that if the emperor "doe mean to comply in gods name Let him do it soon." The only answer he could get from the court was that they would be reasonable if the emperor was. Matters were complicated further by the continuing estrangement of Raby and the imperial minister at Berlin. The king after "a world of trouble and importunity" ordered the three regiments to march out of Prussia to Wesel to complete the 12,000 troops contingent.

The dispute had been further embittered by a diplomatic blunder at Vienna. The Vienna court had shown Bartholdy, the Prussian representative, a proud man who had recently been made a Privy Councilor, what their minister had written from Berlin. Bartholdy immediately wrote the king a letter in which he complained that he


17 Ibid. For example, Raby received word from Robinson that three battalions of the French troops were to be sent into Hungary and that they would get into Hungary if the emperor's ministers did not hinder them from marching through the King's territories. Raby wrote the resident that he had something important to communicate to him. The resident, however, would not see Raby and did not return Tilson's visit but sent word he could not come through a secretary. This enraged Raby who resolved to leave "the coxcomb his Master in ignorance and uneasiness." Raby sent Tilson once a day to see the resident, whom he never saw.

was less informed than the imperial resident in Berlin of the king's intentions. The king was put "in a great passion" because the imperial resident had written that he was sure that the king's troops would march to Italy and that the emperor would have the 12,000 men on the Rhine, which was directly opposite to what Bartholdy was told. The king was infuriated with Heems and swore that not one man would march. 19

Raby admitted that the court was wrong in not having prepared the troops for an early campaign but felt that the first fault lay with the Vienna court who had let the Prussian troops march home, when they knew the humor of the king. Raby blamed the imperial ministers for not giving the Prussian troops winter quarters and for haggling so long over the subsidies and the troops' excesses in Bavaria. 20 He feared that Frederick was seeking an occasion to break the treaty and that Vienna would unwittingly give him an excuse. Harley ordered Stepney to press Vienna to satisfy the king's demands. Although Frederick continued to complain about the emperor's attitude,


20 Ibid., f.203, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 20 March 1706; ff. 196-197, Raby to Stepney, Berlin 13 March 1706.
he finally came to an agreement with the imperial court about the
excesses committed by the Prussian troops in Bavaria.\footnote{21}

Further difficulties arose about the troops because they were
not ordered to march from Berlin until the twentieth of April, which
meant that they would not be in the field until the latter end of
May. Raby blamed the late march partly on the imperial resident, who
did not support him in his attempts to expedite the march.\footnote{22}
The Berlin court did fear that if they let the troops march the emperor
would not pay them the money which they needed so badly. The imperial
resident finally did request Frederick to order his troops to be
ready fourteen days earlier than the twentieth of April. It was
Raby, not the imperial resident, who had pressed Frederick to order
the troops to march. It appears that the Berlin court had no
hint from Vienna when or where the emperor intended the troops to
march. The Vienna court apparently thought that either England
would press Frederick to send the troops or that Marlborough had
already settled the details of the troops march when he was at Berlin.

\footnote{21} P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Harley, Berlin, 13 March
1706; Raby to Harley, 6 April 1706.

\footnote{22} B.M., Add. Mss. 7062, f.209, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 27
March 1706.
Marlborough had not, however, discussed this because he found the king extremely averse to the troops marching to the Upper Rhine. It was thus left in Raby's hands. Although spring was approaching, the Allies had not sent any directions to Frederick concerning the sending of his troops or the preparation of the magazines. No hint of the campaign was given to Frederick. By late March, the Allies began to press Frederick to send his troops immediately to camps on the Rhine and on the Moselle. Raby wanted to know why the Berlin court was not informed of the projected campaign earlier.\(^{23}\)

The king demanded that the Maritime Power should satisfy his pretensions before he would send his troops. Frederick wanted the States-General to recognize his claims to William's succession, his troops to act in a body with the 5,000 troops in the Maritime Powers' pay and not serve under Prince Lewis, and Guelders granted to him in perpetuity. There were loud complaints at Berlin of the bad treatment of the troops by Prince Lewis. Frederick resolved that the troops should not serve under Prince Lewis, but was willing to let them serve under Marlborough.\(^{24}\) Frederick refused to change the route and

\(^{23}\)B.M., Add.Mss.7062,f.213, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 30 March 1706. It was true that the king was not told of Marlborough's plans, which were only told to a very limited circle. See Churchill, Marlborough, II, 83.

insisted that the troops go to Wesel, instead of Mainz. The emperor did not like having the troops sent where Frederick pleased. Raby thought that the chief difficulty was Frederick's opinion that the Allies should "court him and that he only make war for their sakes and has his views towards Prussia." 25

Raby was uneasy because he felt that if Vienna had given the king more reason he would have been "glad of a fair pretence not to have sent his troops at all." 26 Frederick wanted his 12,000 men to serve in the Southern Netherlands joined with the 5,000 men in the pay of the Maritime Powers. Frederick wanted the troops in the Southern Netherlands to "support" his claims to William's inheritance against the claims of the prince of Friseland. The Vienna court clearly understood Frederick's intentions,
The imperial resident objected futilely that the service of the
Prussian contingent in the Netherlands violated the treaty of 1700 by
which those 12,000 men were to serve in the empire. According to
Stepney, the imperial court was surprised at Frederick's behavior.
They had hoped to bind Frederick to the alliance by recognizing his
kingship. They found, however, that Frederick "abates every year and is
some times Subject to starts w\textsuperscript{ch} are ill symptoms." The Vienna court
complained that the Prussian troops did not march when and where they
ought.^28 There were continuing disputes about the route. The imperial res-
ident wanted the troops sent by Mainz to the Upper Rhine. The Berlin court
intended the route to be in three columns through Zell, Hanover, Wolf-
enbuttel and towards the Lower Rhine. ^29 It was unlikely that Frederick
would let his troops march to the Upper Rhine where they would be under
the command of Prince Lewis. ^30 Marlborough had written Frederick
urging the march of the troops towards Mainz because of certain re-
ports that the enemy was detaching a considerable body of troops towards
Germany. ^31 The king, however, assured Marlborough that "plusiers

^28 P.R.O., S.P. Germany, 105/77, Stepney to Raby, Tyrnau, 4 May
1706.

^29 B.M., Add.Mss. 7062, f.223, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 24 April
1706; Österreich. Staatsarchiv, Haus-Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Preussen
Korrespondenz, Kart 4, Heems' report of 5 December 1705.


^31 Murray, ed., Marlborough's Dispatches, II, 471, Marlborough to
Frederick, 26 April 1706; ibid., II, 473, Marlborough to Raby, 27 April
1706.
grandes et fortes raisons m'empêchent de donner pour cette campagne mes trouper pour le Haut Rhin et que j'espère que l'on me voudra plus presser là-dessus, parce que c'est une chose à laquelle il m'est tout à fait impossible, de me pouvoir resoudre."

The emperor must finally agree because Frederick would send his troops where he pleased or keep them at home. Marlborough, deprecating "so humoursome a court", did not know what new terms Frederick would offer, but cautioned Raby that "if we give ear to all their projects, there will be no end." Godolphin felt that Spanheim ought to be spoken to "very roundly upon his proposals." Raby asked Harley to send the queen's answer to the propositions to Marlborough. Marlborough could then send her answer to him with his opinions at the same time.

The king was so dissatisfied with the conduct of the imperial generals and with their neglect of his troops that there was no alternative but for England to consent to Frederick's troops marching towards Brabant, not the Upper Rhine, and serving under Marlborough. Frederick was enfuriated when he heard the news from Italy of the

33 Ibid., II, 453, Marlborough to Raby, St. James, 19 March 1706.
34 B.M., Add. Mss. 9095, Godolphin to Marlborough, 22 April 1705.
allied losses at Calcinato. On 19 April 1706 Vendôme had beat the imperialists at Calcinato. Only Eugene's arrival had prevented their complete dispersion. Frederick attributed the loss of over 2,000 of his troops to Austrian incompetence. The Allies had lost over 10,000 men but proportionately the loss fell mainly on the Prussian battalions. Frederick was determined not to send any more men to Italy. He was deeply affected by the loss of so many of the troops from his brothers' battalions.

It was widely feared that Frederick was looking for a pretence to keep his troops in Prussia to execute the plans he had in the North.

The king had "built castles in the air of great acquisitions in Prussia." Marlborough, who had give the king some hopes of the queen's assistance, had later advised him to put aside all his northern projects. There was also a strong faction at the Berlin court, led by Patkul and Flemming, which was endeavoring to persuade Frederick that his true interest lay in the North towards Prussia. It was not improbable that Frederick hoped to use a sharp answer to his propositions as an excuse to send his troops to Prussia instead of to the allied front. The Allies feared that the prospects of great gains from Sweden were making Frederick indifferent whether his troops marched against France or not. Raby asked Stepney


to advise Vienna to phrase their answer in placatory terms until the troops were joined and in action. The situation was also complicated by the command of the Prussian contingent being given to the Prince of Hesse-Cassel, who was believed to be unfriendly to the States-General and to the Duke of Marlborough.

Frederick, who was thwarted in his ambitions in the North, threatened to let the Allies have only the troops already serving in Italy and in the low Countries. Frederick had in fact forbade anyone to speak to him on the march of his troops. The Grand Chamberlain was ordered not to meddle in the march. Lintelo pessimistically reported that "le temps passe et tous les projets avantageus tombent en reant." Marlborough suspected that Frederick was preparing to abandon the coalition and cautioned Raby to "penetrate what his designs may be." Marlborough had received a letter from Frederick written "in a very odd

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39 At this time there were 25,000 Prussians in the field against France, 5,000 in the pay of the Maritime Powers in Flanders, 8,000 in Italy, and 12,000 on the Lower Rhine which the king had recalled in 1705 from the imperial army.


Marlborough had reputedly shown the letter to Goes, the imperial representative at The Hague, and demanded if Michel Chamillart, the French war minister, could have written him a worse letter. He confided to Godolphin that "The little zeal that the king of Prussia . . . and almost all the other princes show give me So dismal thoughts that I almost despair of good success." Marlborough personally appealed to the king on the basis of their friendship. He told Wartenberg that he hoped that "cette mauvaise humeur, à S.M. se trouve ne durera pas" and that Frederick's letter "me tient au coeur." Frederick, however, stood firm. Marlborough urged Heinsius to lose no time in agreeing to what was reasonable and to word his answer kindly. By answering most of the articles with reference to the treaties, he would concede little.

Marlborough had again written the king, but the Grand Chamberlain had refused to give Frederick the letter claiming that it would

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42 Murray, ed., Marlborough's Dispatches, II, 481, Marlborough to Harley, April 1706.

43 Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, XII, 47, quotes the report of Goes of 30 April 1706. Also see B.M., Add. Mss. 9095, f. 165, Raby to Marlborough, 22 May 1706.

44 Quoted in Coxe, Memoirs of Marlborough, I, 402.


46 Ibid., II, F.N. 510, Frederick to Marlborough, Charlottenburg, 4 May 1706.

47 Vreede, ed., Correspondance, p. 21 and p. 23, Marlborough to Heinsius, 13 May 1706 and 20 May 1706.
do more harm than good. He begged Raby to give it to the king. Raby did deliver the letter, but it did not alter the king's resolution of sending his troops towards the United Provinces. Marlborough was indeed at a loss "what to say or do more than I have already" to such a "ticklish court." The king, who was in a very capricious mood, "takes fire at anything that displeases and crosses his expectation." Frederick was so restive that none of his ministers dared to speak to him.

An impasse was now reached. Frederick would not let his troops march until his propositions were complied with by the Allies. The king felt that the States-General and the emperor were only trying to keep him in the alliance and that after a peace they would not only neglect his interests but work directly against them. He felt that he must safeguard his own interests by these demands, which he felt he could justify by his treaties. Frederick felt that he was justified in recalling his troops from the Upper Rhine because of the imperial generals' neglect of his troops and because of the imperial denial of winter quarters for his troops. Frederick pointed out that if there


50 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Harley, Berlin, 14 May 1706.

was a breach of the treaty with the emperor, there was none with the queen's. The emperor, however, would not agree to some of Frederick's propositions. The propositions were so demanding that an answer could only be given in general terms. For example, the Allies could not give Spanish Guelderland in perpetuity. If King Charles wanted to, he could not promise to cede such an important territory because it would give too great an advantage to his enemies in Spain. Wartenberg thought that the king would be satisfied if the Allies promised to see the king kept possession until he was paid his arrears from Spain.

52 Österreich.Staatsarchiv, Haus-Hof- und Staatsarchiv, England Korrespondenz, Kart 4, Berichte 1706, Gallas presented a memorial to the queen on 30 May 1706 asking her to interpose her offices with Frederick to send his troops without more delay. Gallas said the conditions were surprising to the emperor and had been demanded in addition to the 200,000 florins. Harley's answer of 31 May 1706 was that the queen would use all her endeavours with the king. Ibid. Relations with Vienna became so embittered that Bartholdi wrote Frederick that there was a group in Vienna who were contending that Frederick should be treated as an enemy of the empire if he did not send his troops. This, however, seemed only to make Frederick more obstinate. Marlborough, who had failed to persuade Frederick to send his troops, felt that it is "in vain for me to use any further endeavours, but that the Emperor must exert himself on this occasion tho I fear it will be to little purpose." P.R.O., S.P. Military Expeditions, 37/3, Marlborough to Harley, Maestricht, 15 May 1706.


54 B.M., Add.Mss.9095, ff.120-121, Raby to Marlborough, 8 May 1706.
Raby told the ministers that many would believe that Frederick was acting in concert with France. Frederick's ministers continued to deny that Frederick had any agreement with France. Raby did not believe that Frederick had any agreement with France "tho this maner of acting dose not Look well but you know his temper and so wont wonder that when he has a thing in his head he is so positive." Raby wrongly thought that if Frederick would ally with France it would be done at the king of Sweden's instigation. Raby emphasized to Frederick the importance of the English alliance. England had a fleet which Frederick needed because he had sea ports and not one ship of war, while his rivals, Denmark and Sweden, had fleets. As Raby later remarked, Frederick's engagements with France "were not great if any at all but pevish temper and ill humour." It would indeed be a "very Miraculous Scheme which can recompense that Court for their breaking with England and Holland at the same time." Raby told Frederick that

Marlborough felt that if he was victorious against the French "no thanks to the king of Prussia" but if the Allies were defeated, "he knows no excuse the King can make to his allys."  

This referred to the absence of the Prussian infantry at the battle of Ramillies. Marlborough had noticed that Villeroy had brought his troops to the left bank of the Dyle between Wavre and Louvain. On 19 May the French had crossed the Dyle and marched within four miles of Tirlemont. Marlborough had called on the allied forces to join him quickly. The Prussians, however, had not hastened to the battle. Marlborough had sent Frederick's letter to England remarking that his further actions would be useless.

It was true as Raby states that although Frederick did not act "with the vigour I could wish, [he] is too powerfull to be neglected, or have occasion given him to grow Cooler in the interest of the allys." If Frederick was provoked too much it was feared that he might not send one more soldier to the allied service. Schmettau had in fact declared on 19 May that Frederick would leave his troops


61. Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, XII, 73.

in Italy only for the current year, but would then recall them. 63

Even Raby feared that Frederick might take worse measures "\[which\] I do not believe he is yet engaged in, tho his actions give occasion to doubt." 64 Apologetically Raby wrote Harley that the "wether cock disposition" of the court makes him tedious in explaining why things "dose not go Stedier here." 65

The king became more and more capricious and unaccountable. Marlborough had exerted moral pressure on Frederick by writing that "Je regrette fort que les troupes de V.M. n'ont pas eu part à cette glorieuse action [Ramillies], cependant, je ne veux pas désespérer de les voir encore dans l'armée." 66 Frederick was pleased with Marlborough's letter one minute and the next thought that it was written in reproach. By June Frederick had consented that his troops should march to join Marlborough 67 over the angry protests of the imperial resident who continued to contend that the troops should serve on the Upper Rhine.

63Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, XX, 78-79.
64P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Harley, 1 June 1706.
65Ibid., 90/4, Raby to Harley, 5 June 1706.
66Murray, ed., Marlborough's Dispatches, II, 521, Marlborough to Frederick, May 1706.
67On the part of Marlborough, Grumkow had pressed the king to send the troops towards Brabant. Alg. Rijks., Archief Heinsius, 1112, Lintelo to Heinsius, 8 June 1706.
The imperial resident feared that the Allies would never get the troops, who would be "a worse plague to the country than the French were", out of Brabant once they were there. Raby stopped Heems from declaring that if Frederick sent his troops to Brabant, the emperor would not think himself obliged to pay Frederick's subsidy arrears. The resident deferred the declaration until the troops were joined. It was obvious that the troops would not be ordered to the Upper Rhine. This declaration would only stop the troops again until Frederick had persuaded the Maritime Powers to intercede with the emperor. The emperor was extremely angry with Frederick. The imperial resident told Ilgen that the Berlin court could not have treated the least court in the empire "with more slight and disrespect" than they had done the imperial court. The crisis had upset the delicate equilibrium of court politics. It was rumored that the compliance of the Maritime Powers after the king's obstinacy would harm the Grand Chamberlain who had sought to dissuade Frederick from Halting the march of his troops. The Grand Chamberlain told Raby that the king no longer


consulted with him freely about the interest of the Allies since Marlborough's last visit.71

By the battle of Ramillies, Marlborough had destroyed the ambitious plans of France and the potential defection of Frederick. Marlborough, who knew of the Berlin negotiations with France, did nevertheless not want to renounce Frederick's help.72 Marlborough hoped that Frederick was ashamed of what he had done and that he would act more carefully in the future.73 Raby thought that it was now obvious that there was no engagement with France "at the Bottom of this obstinacy of the Kings." 74 After the Duke of Marlborough's success, the king was willing to use any pretence to send his troops to the allied fronts. On June 7 the king sent a courier to Marlborough to inform him that he had ordered his troops to join the allied army in Brabant. The Prussians joined Marlborough at the siege of Menin. The king's appointment of Wartenberg as hereditary governor of all his hereditary possessions in

72 Coxe, Memoirs of Marlborough, I,424.
73 B.M.,Add.Mss.9096,f.99, Marlborough to Godolphin, 8 July 1706. Also see Murray,ed., Marlborough's Dispatches,II,596, Marlborough to Frederick, 17 June 1706.
74 P.R.O.,S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Harley, 5 June 1706.
the Principality of Orange is indicative of Wartenberg's association with the Maritime Powers, especially England. Raby hoped that Frederick's future behavior may "make our delitary proceedings (not to give it a worse name) at the beginning of this Campaign forgot." 76

The king had ordered his troops to march before he received the queen's declaration on his propositions. The Allies, nevertheless, sought to conciliate Frederick. Marlborough had ordered Cadogan to treat the Prussian troops with "all manner of Douceur and Favour". Cadogan had followed Marlborough's orders by taking care that the sick were furnished with wagons and by doing "twenty little services in my way." 77 Cadogan had taken such care of the troops that Grumkow had bestowed on him in the name of Frederick the order of generosity. Marlborough advised the Prince of Salm to conciliate Frederick. He reluctantly agreed but couples his agreement with a tirade against the rapacious spirit of the Berlin court. 78

75 B.M., Add.Mss.7062, f.243, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 8 June 1706.

76 B.M., Add.Mss.7062, f.247, Raby to Stepney, Camp at Helchin, 22 June 1706.

77 B.M., Add.Mss.22,196, f.46. and ff.49-50, Cadogan to Raby, 12 November and 16 November 1706.

The Maritime Powers sent obliging letters to Frederick in an attempt to conciliate him and to weld him to their interests. Raby was annoyed that Harley had not sent the letter to Marlborough first because some concessions might have been avoided. 79 Lintelo did not consult Raby on the concessions which the United Provinces had made. 80 Raby felt, as Marlborough did, that the march could have been obtained on easier terms. 81 Lintelo granted the terms, which Marlborough had earlier deemed too costly to England and the United Provinces. Marlborough's proposal that the Prussian troops should have winter quarters between the Meuse and the Rhine 82 was mistakenly taken to be Frederick's proposal. Marlborough warned Heinsius not to persist in making difficulties about the winter quarters if he did not want the Allies to lose the 10,000 Prussian troops. 83 Frederick accepted Marlborough's provisions about the winter quarters, but he was angry at the United Provinces "who are to bear the blame in this matter." 84

80 "Österreich. Staatsarchiv, Haus-Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Preussen Korrespondenz, Kart 4, Berichte, 6 June 1706, copy of the declaration of the envoy of the States-General to the king of Prussia.
82 Ibid., III, 170, Marlborough to Goslinga, 14 October 1706.
83 Vreede, ed., Correspondance, p. 156, Marlborough to Heinsius, Cambron, 14 October 1706.
The treaty signed on 24 November 1706 by Marlborough and Schmettau was a renewal of the treaty for the 3,000 Prussians in Italy. In the treaty, the king was also remunerated for placing the 12,000 man contingent in the allied service. England and the United Provinces were to bear this new expenditure which according to the English estimate cost England alone £74,000 yearly. For 1706 the Prussians were given a supplementary grant of approximately £40,000 by Parliament. Raby later complained that Linteló did not consult him on the conditions in the treaty and that he did not sign the treaty. Linteló, who was only an envoy, signed the treaty, while Raby, then an ambassador was excluded. Raby later complained that he knew nothing of the treaty until after it was concluded. Raby's exclusion marks an important point in the deterioration of confidence between Marlborough and Raby.

85 B.M., Add. Mss. 37, 156, ff. 289-291. The treaty was agreed to by Queen Anne on 15 December 1706. The differences between the treaty concluded between Great Britain and Prussia on 3 December 1705 and 24 November 1706 was mainly a paragraph relating to the quarters of the troops and proportions in the contributions. This clause was similar to the ninth article of the 1704 treaty. See P.R.O., Treaties, etc., 108/406. See Hannover Stadtarchiv, 16693, Raby to Robethon, 16 November for Raby's comment that when the Italy treaty was concluded the king was content with England and with Marlborough.


87 B.M., Add. Mss. 22, 196, f.190, Raby to Cadogan, 9 March 1709.
Marlborough's suspicions that Frederick was negotiating with France were well founded. Relations between Berlin and Paris had never been entirely broken. Louis XIV hoped to induce Frederick to accept a neutrality by offering recognition of his kingship and excellent financial and territorial gains. 88 Jean Louis d'Usson, Marquis de Bonnac, the French minister at Danzig, thought that “Les dépenses, où il s'est engagé depuis le nouveau titre, qu'il a puis, le rendront encore plus facile à changer de parti; pour trouver de nouveaux moyens de les supporter par les subsides qu'on lui donnera.” 89 Frederick negotiated with Louis XIV through the Genevan agent, Daniel de Martine, at Paris and the Bavarian agent, Heydenfield, at Berlin. The main negotiations were carried on, however, in Danzig, Copenhagen and in Berlin. The French minister at Danzig cultivated an association with the court preacher, Jablonski, and through him with Frederick. The French resident at Copenhagen, Jean Baptiste Poussin, negotiated through Adam Otto von Viereck, the Prussian envoy. 90 Count Bielk, a Swede and a brigadier in the French service, had initially come to Berlin disguised as a merchant but later appeared publicly as an agent for the French.

88 Legrelle, La Diplomatie Franaais, IV,417-423; Waddington, ed., Recueil des Instructions, Prusse,XVI,25-263; Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, XII, 49-50.

89 Quoted in Legrelle, La Diplomatie Franaais, IV,267.

90 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia,90/4, Raby to Harley, 23 February 1706.
Raby knew of Frederick's negotiations with Bielk, Bonnac, and Poussin. He felt that if the court listened to any of the agents "in this unsteady climate" it would be Bonnac. He thought that Frederick, however, was "too far engaged with the allys to shrink back," unless Frederick used his dissatisfaction with Vienna as a pretense to retain his 12,000 man contingent at home. Frederick had never seriously intended to accept the French offers. He used the negotiations to extract from the Allies more advantageous terms. It was apparent that the French negotiations were not to be kept a secret because letters giving an account of Bielk's proposals to Frederick had been sent through the packets of regular mail. Raby, Heems, the imperial resident at Berlin, and Marlborough knew of the negotiations. The French offers had even reached Hanover. Bothmar had written Heinsius that France had offered Frederick a subsidy and the role of mediator at the peace in exchange for his neutrality.

91 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Harley, 27 February 1706.
95 Alg. Rijks., Archief Heinsius, 1077, Bothmar to Heinsius, 1 March 1706.
By December 1705 the ministers had assured Raby that there was nothing in the French negotiations to alarm the Allies and had promised Raby that they would assure Marlborough of the same thing. Wartenberg sent the French offers to Marlborough by post in cipher and asked Marlborough to keep them a secret among the queen, the Lord Treasurer, and himself. Raby assured Marlborough that he would not divulge to the Secretary of State what had been communicated to Marlborough concerning the offers. He felt that he must mention the negotiations in general so that he would not be thought negligent. The Grand Chamberlain wrote Marlborough that Bielk had a commission from the French court to offer Frederick extensive territorial acquisitions on the Rhine, the Meuse, and in Poland and considerable sums of money. Marlborough told Wartenberg that the offers of Bielk were designed to disrupt the alliance. He was sure that Frederick would discourage the propositions which would be of such a fatal consequence to the Allies.

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96 B.M., Add. Mss. 7062, f. 139, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 29 December 1705.


98 Ibid., f. 5 Wartenberg to Raby, Berlin, 2 January 1706. See also Murray, ed., Marlborough's Dispatches, II, 390, Marlborough to Raby, St. James, 11 January 1706.

99 Murray, ed., Marlborough's Dispatches, II, 392, Marlborough to Wartenberg, St. James, 26 January 1706.
The Berlin court assured Raby that they would only listen to the French offers and would not accept them. Frederick complained that the United Provinces had not communicated the French offers, which they received to him. Frederick was very desirous to see the French offers to the States-General, which he realized that Marlborough knew. The Dutch failure to inform Frederick of the French offers angered the king. Raby was given "a plain and naked account" of what the English ministry knew of the transactions in the United Provinces so that he could tell Frederick. Harley had not told Frederick earlier because the offers were regarded as a French artifice to divide the Allies and were known only to certain people in the United Provinces, where faction was rife. 100

In the spring of 1706, the critical time for the troops' march, when Frederick grew cool to the Allies, it was widely believed that there was more to the French negotiations than was known. 101 Frederick seemed very sincere in his fidelity to the Allies because he had ordered

100 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 104/51, Harley to Raby, Whitehall, 26 January 1706.

101 Ibid., 104/51, Harley to Raby, 23 April, O.S. 1706.
Wartenberg and Ilgen to inform Raby of the French offers. The Berlin court resolved to depend entirely on the Allies and hoped by the open disclosure of the French offers to procure assistance from the Allies if necessary.\textsuperscript{102} Frederick also used the French offers as a lever to obtain his demands from the Allies.

The Great Northern War again threatened to disrupt the allied war effort. The dispute over the succession to the Lübeck-Eutin bishopric remained a source of potential disruption. The Swedish minister at Berlin was pressing Frederick to fulfill his agreement as a guarantor of the Travendal treaty. Frederick continued to assure Raby that he would not and indeed could not with safety act in the Lübeck-Eutin affair except together with the Maritime Powers and with the rest of the guarantors.\textsuperscript{103} Prussia and the Maritime Powers suggested as an expedient that the administrator retain civil jurisdiction and not allow any troops in the bishopric until the dispute was resolved. If Denmark refused this proposal, Marlborough felt that the Maritime Powers must insist on the

\textsuperscript{102}B.M.,Add.Mss.9095,ff.11-13, Raby to Marlborough, 9 January 1706.

\textsuperscript{103}B.M.,Add.Mss.7062,f.145, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 5 January 1706; Hannover Stadtarchiv, Bücher,Nr. 16693, Goertz to Robethon, 15 March 1706.
Travendal treaty "comme le seul moyen qui reste pour prévenir les désordres qui nous menacent." 104 The king of Denmark, who, Raby thought, had played the fool, finally agreed to leave the settlement of the dispute to the decision of the guarantors. 105

Frederick, who had believed that Marlborough had sanctioned his Northern schemes, was very disappointed when Marlborough sent word that the queen entirely disapproved of his projects in the North. Marlborough intended to deter Frederick from involvement in the Northern War. He told Frederick that some of the neighbouring princes would recall their troops if Prussia accepted Sweden's offers. Frederick thought seriously of an alliance with Sweden and had seemed at one time resolved to recall all his troops from the Western theaters. Marlborough emphasized to Wartenberg that although the offers of the Northern belligerents appeared very advantageous for Prussia, the queen was convinced that Frederick's acceptance would endanger the common cause

104 Hannover Stadtarchiv, Bücher Nr.16693, Goertz to Robethon, 15 March 1706 encloses a letter of Marlborough to Prince of Salm, St. James, 23 February 1706.

"puisque cela produirait indubitablement de si fortes jalousies entre tous les Princes de l'Empire qu'ils se trouveraient obligés à rappeler leurs troupes employées contre l'ennemi commun." Marlborough emphasized that "il n'est pas de saison d'entrer à présent en tels engagements, et qu'Elle voudra bien les remettre jusqu'à une paix générale." 106 Raby, who had not been told of Frederick's Northern schemes, consequently was unable to explain Marlborough's objections. Raby felt that Marlborough did not intend him to know of Frederick's Northern ambitions. 107 Wartenberg felt that the Allies should recompense Frederick for giving up his Northern plans by granting his demands, especially concerning the Orange Succession. 108

The Swedes had crushed the Saxons at Fraustadt-on-the-Oder on February 1706. The Swedes had also pursued the Russians who retired by forced marches. Frederick had followed the war with increasing anxiety. He feared that his dominions would become theatres of the war in spite of the queen's guarantee of 3 December


1705 of the integrity of his possessions. Frederick was resolved to send more troops to Prussia to guarantee his neutrality which he felt was threatened by the imminent conflict near his borders. Frederick hoped to keep the Northern belligerents from going through his country.\textsuperscript{109}

The allied fear that Frederick would become involved in the Northern War was heightened. Marlborough urged Raby to press Frederick in Marlborough's and the queen's names to recall the troops marching to Prussia.\textsuperscript{110}

In the spring of 1706 the Swedes were trying to persuade the king to join with them. Frederick seemed to "have a great mind to bite the bate they have set for him."\textsuperscript{111} Charles Whitworth, the English representative in Russia, could hardly "believe that so good a confederate as the king of Prussia would engage so far in these northern broils without the knowledge and consent of her Majesty and the allies."\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{109} B.M., Add. MSS. 7062, f. 160, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 26 January 1706; Eugene, Feldzüge, VIII, 70.

\textsuperscript{110} Add. MSS. 7062, f. 182, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 2 March 1706.

\textsuperscript{111} P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Harley, Berlin, 1 May 1706.

\textsuperscript{112} Sbornik, XXXIX, 284-292, Whitworth to Boyle, Moscow, 14 July 1706. It is curious that Whitworth when discussing the possibility that the English interest might demand the exclusion of the Russian power from the Baltic, reflected that it would be most effectual and least invidious to encourage the king of Prussia to "appear more openly" because "the extent of his several coasts on the Baltic obliges him to take care that no formidable power encroaches on the sea." Sbornik, XXXIX, 223, Whitworth to Harley, Moscow, 3 February 1706.
sent General Schlippenbach to the Swedish camp to propose a triple alliance between Prussia, Hanover, and Sweden. Charles made no immediate response. Schlippenbach had, however, alerted the Berlin court that Sweden was preparing to attack Saxony.

Frederick also attempted to act as a mediator in the Northern War. While the tsar was campaigning in Ingria, Frederick had not been greatly troubled. Frederick endeavoured to remain on good terms with the tsar, who might prove a useful counterpoise to the Swedes. The tsar's march into Lithuania in the spring of 1705 worried the Berlin court because the war was now on their frontiers. Frederick sought to achieve a peace and to prevent the war from pervading his dominions. George Johann, Freiherr von Kayserlingk, the Prussian representative to the tsar, was dispatched to offer Frederick's mediation to the tsar. Marquard Ludwig, Baron von Printzen, was sent to Charles XII. The tsar warmly received Kayserlingk and asked him what conditions he thought were necessary for peace. Kayserlingk offered as his private opinion that Dorpat and Narva be returned to Sweden and an equivalent in land or money be given the Swedes for the province of Ingria and for Petersburg. The tsar refused to give up Narva saying that to demand Narva was to demand his head. It was plain from Kayserlingk's negotiations that no mediation in the North could succeed until some more decisive military battle occurred. The tsar's suspicions of Frederick were increased by the
march of Frederick's troops from the Upper Rhine to Prussia. Frederick's negotiations in favor of his nephew the young prince of Courland were used by the tsar and by Augustus as an opportunity to offer Frederick the duchy of Courland and advantages in Polish Prussia provided he could persuade Charles to leave the king of Poland in his dominions and the tsar in possession of his new conquests. If Charles refused, Frederick was to join them in the war effort. The excuses of the Prussian envoy had not made Frederick's refusal very agreeable.\(^{113}\)

In August 1706 the victories of Marlborough and Eugene had changed the military situation. Bavaria was lost and Louis was on the defensive in Flanders and on his eastern frontier. The Allies could no longer contend that a Swedish invasion of Saxony would tip the military balance against them. Charles felt that the invasion of Saxony was necessary because the elector hitherto had not accepted the Swedish victories of 1704 and 1705 as final because of the increasing strength of the Russians. The Saxon invasion would force Augustus to accept his defeat. Charles tried to avoid the invasion by offering to desist if

\(^{113}\)Sbornik, XXXIX, 215-219, Whitworth to Harley, Moscow, 3 February 1706. Whitworth thought that the tsar was sincere in his desire for a peace in the North.
the Maritime Powers could persuade Augustus to give up his claims to the Polish crown. Augustus offered to give Lithuania to Stanislaus and Courland to Sweden. Both offers failed. Charles crossed the Vistula and transversed Silesia. On 28 August the Swedish army was on the Saxon frontiers. On 24 September the Swedish army established its camp at Altranstädt outside of Leipzig.

The Swedish invasion of Saxony is indicative of Charles's power in the North and of the potentially disruptive effect of the Northern War on the allied war effort. The emperor was not able to hinder the Swedish invasion of Saxony because of his preoccupation with the Hungarian rebellion and because of the exposed position of Silesia and Bohemia. 114 The emperor had alienated Charles by helping Augustus. He had granted freedom of passage for the Saxons via Silesia, had entered into negotiations with the tsar, and had weakened the position of the Holstein-Gottorp family by supporting Frederick IV in the contested succession to the bishopric of Lübeck-Eutin. 115 The landgrave of Hesse-Cassel

114 B.M.,Add.Mss.9097,f.61, Raby to Marlborough, Hanover, 10 October 1706.

115 Hatton, Charles XII,p.213.
dared not act against Charles because his country adjoined Saxony and all his troops were in Italy. The Danish ministry was "extremely disgusted" at the conduct of the courts of Berlin and Hanover in the affair of Saxony. 116 It was plain that neither Hanover nor Berlin would act against Sweden. George Ludwig of Hanover, who had from the beginning stood on friendly terms with Charles, wrote Marlborough that Charles would indubitably not alarm the empire or harm the allied cause. He recommended that the Allies show no distrust of Charles because that would only drive Charles into an alliance with France. 117 Stepney, the English representative at Vienna, did not attempt to judge the king of Sweden's intentions but he accurately reflected that the courts of Berlin and Hanover seem satisfied with his eating up Saxony, if his appetite goe not further; But of that there is no other security than the good opinion they are pleased to entertain of him . . . the Emperor apprehends the worst, but is oblig'd to dissemble and hide those Jealousies, least he shou'd provoke and draw upon himself the Iyon, which is broke loose, and is at Liberty (as the Empire is now compos'd) to devour any part of it without Restraint; whereby the Allies may have reason to reflect That they have been too

116 H.M.C., Portland Mss., IX, 261, Vernon to Harley, Copenhagen, 12 September 1706.

indulgent by allowing Him to grow too big for them; and I cannot think the House of Hannover will have Interest enough to lead him home again quietly, unless King Augustus consents to abdicate, which proposal, you may imagine, will not be easily digested.\footnote{118}

The Diet and the rest of the empire would be influenced by the courts of Vienna, Berlin and Hanover. Charles was master of the northern area of the empire because no other power had troops in the neighborhood and none dare recall any. The only powers that could act were the Maritime Powers, who must consider how dangerous Charles was with an army of 25,000 men in the middle of the empire. The Maritime Powers sent representatives to Charles to ask him to leave the empire.\footnote{119}

Harley cautioned Raby to make use of "all soft and amicable ways" to end the northern troubles. Augustus rightly believed that the emperor and the Allies would sacrifice him to the Swedes rather than bring disorders into the empire.

The Berlin court had been extremely alarmed at the Swedish invasion of Saxony which put the Swedish army on their borders.


\footnote{119} P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 104/51, Harley to Raby, Whitehall, 5 November 1706.
The electorate of Brandenburg was at the mercy of the Swedes, who were almost at the gates of Berlin. Their initial alarm was mitigated by their calculations of how to make use of the invasion. Frederick still had hopes of obtaining some part of the Polish dominions. Frederick sent Printzen to Altrandstadt in September 1706 to assure Charles of his friendship and to emphasize the advantages of a triple alliance between the Protestant powers of Prussia, Sweden, and Hanover. Printzen's mission was a failure partly because he had inadequate powers and partly because Frederick sought to gain concessions which Charles would not grant. Charles wanted Frederick to recognize Stanislaus without compensation. Frederick, on the other hand, wanted Polish Prussia.

The Berlin court nevertheless dreaded the Swedes, who had threatened to make the electorate of Brandenburg a theater of the war if the Poles obtained passage through Frederick's lands.

120 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Harley, 19 October 1706.
121 Ibid., Raby to Harley, 10 October 1706.
Because the king's dominions in the electorate and in Prussia were exposed, Frederick resolved to prevent the Poles passage if necessary by joining with the Swedes.° Frederick asked the queen to intervene with the king of Poland to dissuade him from marching towards Pomerania through Frederick's lands. Augustus's badly disciplined and barbaric army could cause considerable damage to Frederick's lands. If Augustus was not stopped, Frederick felt that it was necessary to recall part of his troops. The Allies feared that the king of Poland would plunge the whole empire into the Northern War. Godolphin felt that Frederick "is naturally not very unapt to catch that infection." Frederick wanted to be freed from his fear of the two armies but he nevertheless hoped that a peace would not be concluded in the North without his obtaining some advantages. The invasion of Saxony resulted in Frederick's relying on the Maritime Powers, who alone "dare speak plainly" to Charles. Raby felt that Marlborough could do what he would with Frederick's troops.

122 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Harley, 23 October 1706.
123 P.R.O., S.P. Foreign Ministers in England, 100/44, Spanheim to Hedges, 23 October 1706. For Raby's opposition to Augustus's march into Pomerania see Hannover Stadtarchiv, Nr.16693, Raby to Robethon, 30 October 1706.
The treaty of Altranstädt, which temporarily deprived Augustus of the Polish throne, was made public on 5 November 1706 by Charles in an effort to stop Augustus' double-dealing. The peace was "une furieuse surprise" to the Berlin court. Raby reflected the court's opinion in his contention that "cette paix extraordinaire que le Roy Augusts conclure avec le roy de Suede La maniere est aussi extraordinaire que la chose meme." Frederick, however, endeavoured to dissemble the resentment which he felt at the treaty and at the proximity of the Swedish troops. Augustus had signed the treaty on 20 October 1706. The treaty stipulated that Augustus could keep the courtesy title of king of Poland, but had to accept his dethronement. Augustus was to recognize Stanislaus, to terminate his alliance with the tsar, and to deliver the Russian troops in Saxony to Charles. The Swedish army would stay in the electorate until the terms of the treaty were carried out and until Augustus obtained the guarantess of the

127 Hannover Stadtarchiv, Nr. 16693, Raby to Robethon, 16 November 1706.
Maritime Powers and of the emperor. The Maritime Powers never intended to accept the position of guarantors of the peace. Raby remarked that "il me semble que le bon politique veut qu'ils ne ses pressent trop dans une chose de la quelle ils ont eu sa peu de connoissance." England did recognize Stanislaus but the United Provinces did not. Prussia and Hanover guaranteed the treaty and recognized Stanislaus. Frederick recognized Stanislaus in January 1707 in exchange for Swedish admission of the Hohenzollern claim to Elbing, which was to be occupied by Sweden until Charles concluded a peace with the tsar. When Charles led his army out of Saxony in the autumn of 1707 his position in Poland and in North Germany seemed secure. He counted on the powers' guarantees. He did not reflect that they might be unable to carry out their guarantees.

In the fall of 1706 there were rumours at The Hague of a

129 Hannover Stadtarchiv, Nr. 16693, Raby to Robethon, Berlin, 21 November 1706.

130 Hatton, Charles XII, p. 214; Chance, George I and the Northern War, p. 10; B.M., Add. Mss. 9097, f. 523, Raby to Marlborough, Hanover, 10 October 1706.
triple alliance between the king of Sweden, the king of Prussia, and the elector of Hanover. The projected triple alliance would strengthen Charles in northern Germany in relation to the emperor. It was clear from the negotiations for the alliance that Frederick and George Ludwig of Hanover could not be depended on to act against Charles. The king of Prussia had spoken to Marlborough of the triple alliance and asked Marlborough if the queen would also enter the alliance. Marlborough was alarmed at the triple alliance and dissuaded the queen from it. The queen replied that such a treaty could not be kept secret from the States-General and that it would disturb the Catholic allies. Marlborough had written to the Berlin court that he did not think that it was a proper time for such a treaty. Pressure from the Maritime Powers made George Ludwig of Hanover refuse

131 P.R.O., S.P. Holland, 84/229, James Dayrolle to Harley, 26 October 1706.

132 Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, XII, 199.


134 Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, XII, 198.

135 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Harley, 4 December 1706.
to join the alliance. Nevertheless, Frederick sent Printzen to Saxony on 6 December. Frederick wanted as the price of his help the recognition of his royal title by the Republic of Poland, the restitution of Elbing and its territory, and the use of a belt of lands between Prussian and Pomerania. The Swedes deemed the king's demands excessive. Printzen left in January with nothing concluded. A dual confessional treaty was, however, finally signed in August 1707.

The Allies became increasingly worried about Frederick's threat to recall his troops, about Frederick's potential defection to France, and about his negotiations with Sweden because the position of Raby, the chief proponent of their interests, was threatened. The Wartenberg faction with whom Raby was closely associated appeared to be losing power. The issue is obfuscated because the chief reporters of the incident, Grumkow and Lintelo, were bitterly hostile to Raby and resented his influence with Frederick. In addition to the king's increasing dissatisfaction and disillusionment with the Allies, the intrigues of the Berlin court, the increasing unpopularity of the Countess of Wartenberg, and Raby's equivocal position with the Countess, tended to mitigate Raby's influence at court. Enemies of Wartenberg played on Frederick's jealousy of his authority and power by hinting that Raby governed the court by report to his mistress and that "cela estoit un scandale pour la Cour du Roi que Milord Raby mal-
traitoît le monde. Wartenberg's enemies also claimed that he sacrificed the king's troops and interests to the Allies. The threat to Raby's and to Wartenberg's positions was a source of worry to the Allies. The emperor, who wished to conserve the Grand Chamberlain's position at court, "se donnera beaucoup de mouvement."

In May Marlborough told Heinsius that Frederick was not "in a better humour" and that it was true that Raby "is not so well with the King as he was." As early as 9 May 1706, Godolphin had asked Marlborough his views on Raby's recall and on who should succeed Raby if he was recalled. Marlborough thought that Raby was "so far from being well with the king that he can forward nothing, but will spoil everything." He asked Godolphin not to remove him, however, until he received an exact account of how the court behaved after the allied

137 Ibid.
138 Van t'Hoff, ed., Correspondence, p. 2, Marlborough to Heinsius Borchloen, 20 May 1706. See also Alg. Rijks., Archief Heinsius. 80, Heinsius to Marlborough, 22 May 1706 for the opinion of the imperial minister at Berlin. Also see Vreede, ed., Correspondance, p. 25, Heinsius to Marlborough, 22 May 1706 for the citation that the Comte de Goes, the Austrian envoy at The Hague, showed Heinsius the letters of the imperial minister at Berlin and his feeling that the affair of Raby, "y alloit fort mal." Heinsius wrote Linteló that "L'affaire du Mylord Raby ne me plait aussi guère." Alg. Rijks., Archief Heinsius 1156, Heinsius to Linteló, 19 May 1706.
success at Ramillies. 139 Marlborough confided to his wife that if
the king "shall continue uneasy, it must end at last in recalling"
Raby. 140 On the request of Wartensleben and Ilgen, Lintelo asked
Heinius to intercede to procure Raby's recall. Lintelo felt that
Frederick, who was "fort foible et inconstant" did not have the
"vigour" to show his resentment towards Raby. 141

Marlborough, who corresponded with all the factions at
Berlin, wrote Raby that he wanted to speak with him. Marlborough
had heard that the Countess of Warrenberg was in disgrace and intended
to tell Raby "plainly how matters stand." 142 Harley told Raby to
explain to Marlborough the very strange appearances of that "whimsical
court." 143 On 2 July Raby came to Marlborough's camp at Rousselaer.

139 B.M., Add. Mss. 9096, f. 31, Marlborough to Godolphin, Arseele,
7 June 1706.
140 Marlborough, Sarah, Duchess of, Correspondence, I, 26,
Marlborough to the Duchess, Marlebeck, 31 May 1706.
141 Alg. Rijks., Archief Heinsius, 1112, Lintelo to Heinsius,
Berlin, 8 May 1706.
142 P.R.O., Military Expeditions, S.P. 87/2, Marlborough to Harley,
Camp at Rosselaer, 24 June 1706.
143 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 104/51, Harley to Raby, Whitehall, 15
June and 25 June 1706.
Grumkow, the Prussian military adviser assigned to Marlborough, had told Marlborough that Frederick wanted it known only to the queen that he intended to recall Spanheim so that she might recall Raby. He did not want Raby to go back to Berlin. Grumkow claimed that although Frederick had no personal objection to Raby, his "being so well" with the Grand Chamberlain's wife and Frederick's mistress en titre made Frederick appear ridiculous. Marlborough realizing that it was important for the queen to have power over Frederick, advised Godolphin to appoint carefully because every one is "not fit for such a court." Spanheim had received his letters of revocation. On 9 August 1706 he asked Harley to arrange his formal audience of leave.

On 19 August 1706 Raby's letters of revocation were issued. Harley wrote Raby that the changes at the Berlin court rendered it impossible for him to return. Raby was to send the letters of revocation


and the queen's letter to the king. Raby was surprised "at so sudden a resolution of recalling me upon so little warning." He thought that the situation at the Berlin court was not correctly depicted to the English ministry. Harley's letter was supposed to, but failed to reach Raby at The Hague before the king left The Hague so that Raby could have taken his leave there and not returned to Berlin. Raby thought, as Marlborough did, that it was impossible for Raby to do anything but take his leave at Berlin. It was unprecedented that an ambassador, who was leaving a court where he had been for years and which was to remain in alliance with England, should not pay the respect of taking leave and of paying his debts. Raby thought the letters of revocation were not proper and sent them back to England. This was clearly a move on his part to gain time to retrench his position at the Berlin court.

Harley felt that Raby could no longer be "serviceable" at Berlin. He proposed that Raby go to Vienna as English envoy as an expedient for Raby to continue in the queen's service. Marlborough

147 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 104/51, Harley to Raby, 17 August and 31 August 1706.
148 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Harley, 26 August 1706.
149 H.M.C., Bath MSS. I, 94, Marlborough to Harley, 26 August 1706.
agreed with Harley that "you will not find a better choice." 151

This meant a loss in station for Raby, who had been an ambassador at Berlin. Raby, who felt that he could gain no advantage by going to Vienna, requested to be made a member of the Privy Council and a plenipotentiary as well as envoy at Vienna. 152 He also requested the same pay as he had received at Berlin because Vienna was expensive. 153 Raby was issued credentials as envoy extraordinary on 18 October 1706. 154

The king had, however, sent Spanheim new credentials as ambassador. He had also written letters to Marlborough and to the queen expressing his desire that Raby stay at Berlin. Marlborough sent Frederick's letter to Godolphin and remarked on the "fickle"

151 H.M.C., Bath Mss, I, 94, Marlborough to Harley, 26 August 1706.

152 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Harley, 26 August 1706.

153 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Harley, 10 October 1706.

154 J. Pulteney asked Godolphin that his son Daniel be given Raby's post rather than Denmark because the air and the way of living was better at Berlin than at Copenhagen. H.M.C., Portland Mss., IV, 333, Pulteney to Godolphin, 28 September 1706. Raby did think that Pulteney had been issued credentials to Berlin. B.M., Add. Mss. 22, 196, f. 144, Raby to Craggs, 9 November 1706.
temper of the king. Frederick told Raby that he hoped that he would not leave his court. Raby told Cadogan that he was surprised to find when he went back to Berlin that Spanheim was ordered to remain in England. Frederick told Raby that he regretted his recall which he did not intend. In spite of Grunkow's efforts to procure Raby's recall, Frederick resolved to continue Raby at his court. The issuance of credentials for Spanheim meant that Raby was to continue at Berlin. The puzzled attitude of the English ministry is reflected in Godolphin's statement that "There is a new mystery about my Lord Raby, more impenetrable than the former."

Frederick authorized Spanheim to continue as ambassador to England as long as Raby retained the title of ambassador to Prussia. Spanheim delivered a memorial in which Frederick asked the queen to continue Raby at Berlin with the intention of continuing Spanheim at London. When Hedges appealed to Spanheim as an experienced minister

155 B.M., Add. Mss. 9097, f. 98, Marlborough to Godolphin, Gilluighen, 1 November 1706.

156 See Ayerst's account of 10 April 1706 on "how welcom" Raby was. Doble, ed., "Ayerst's Letters," English Historical Review, I (1888) 757-758.


158 H.M.C., Bath Mss., I, 94, Marlborough to Harley, 26 August 1706.

159 P.R.O., S.P. Foreign Ministers in England, 100/44, Spanheim to Hedges, 23 October 1706.
concerning this extraordinary proposal, Spanheim seemed "much out of countenance." Harley informed Raby in a letter dated 29 October that he was to continue at Berlin. Raby did not need new credentials because as Frederick requested, he had not taken his audience of leave. Raby told Harley that he had been easy in the matter because he knew that Harley was misinformed about the king's attitude. He denied pressing or having some one in his entourage press the king to continue him. Cadogan told Raby that Marlborough's letter to England was the cause of his staying at Berlin. The English ministry was not absolutely certain that the king of Prussia was earnest in his request for Raby's staying. Cadogan thought the doubts might have arisen from private hints given by the "husband of the lady" for Grumkow's words had conveyed that impression. He thought this allusion might be groundless because Grumkow was "as silly as he is false." Godolphin

160 H.M.C., Portland Mss., IV, 339, Hedges to Harley, 22 October 1706.


162 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Harley, 11 December 1706.

asked Marlborough to "unriddle this mystery" and to advise him how to act with a people "so wavering and uncertain." On 9 November Raby believed that in spite of the king's letter he would still go to Vienna. He later wrote that "realy had I ben as hasty to take that voyage as they in England seem to think I should be I should have been at Vienna before this." Sophie, the electress of Hanover, proved correct when she said that "Je crois que Milord Raby serait bien aise de rester à Berlin." The threat to Raby's position by a cabal headed by Ilgen and Grumkow was thwarted by Raby's friendship with Frederick. The crisis is indicative of the vacillation of Frederick and of the power of the court faction which opposed Frederick's entanglements in the West. Marlborough apparently acted in good faith according to what

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164 B.M., Add.Mss.9097,ff.99-100, Godolphin to Marlborough, 22 October 1706. Raby had in fact requested Marlborough's permission to go to England after he took his audience of leave at Berlin. If the queen wanted to avoid answering Frederick's letter Raby thought that this would be the best expedient. B.M., Add.Mss.22,196,f.41, Raby to Cadogan, November 1706.


166 B.M., Add.Mss.7062,f.258, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 30 November 1706. Also see Narcissus Luttrell, A Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs from September 1678 to April 1714 (Oxford, 1857),VI, 84, 96, 100 and 101.

he thought was Frederick's wish. Marlborough's role increased Raby's embitterment with his position and his distrust of Marlborough and helped lead to the consequent breakdown of confidence. The crisis of 1706 receded when Frederick did not carry through with his threat to recall his troops, when the king of Sweden refused an alliance with Prussia, and when Wartenberg and Raby retained their positions.
CHAPTER IX
A PORTENTOUS DISILLUSIONMENT: 1707-1708

In 1707 and 1708 in spite of further dissensions, which embittered Frederick's relations with the Allies and in spite of Frederick's continuing negotiations with France, he remained faithful to the alliance. Frederick was further bound to the alliance by the renewal of the Italian treaty and by the beginning negotiations for the augmentation of his troops. These years illustrate the important political fact that despite the threat of the Triple Alliance, Frederick was further tied to England by the Swedish threat. The years 1707 and 1708 also foreshadowed the bitter quarrels of 1709 and of 1710 between Frederick and the Allies which nearly disrupted the alliance.

In 1707 Frederick wanted to keep his troops in Flanders under Marlborough's command. Spanheim, the Prussian representative to England, had written Frederick that the queen was glad that Frederick had decided to keep the troops in Flanders rather than transfer them to the Upper Rhine.1

1P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Harley, 8 February and 5 February 1707; B.M., Add. Mss. 7062, f. 279, Raby to Stepney, 22 March 1707; B.M., Add. Mss. 9098, f. 61, and f. 121, Raby to Marlborough, 8 February and 26 March 1707.
Marlborough, who had asked Heinsius not to let his opinion be known, wanted Frederick's troops to serve in Brabant. He thought that it would be "the most extravagant thing imaginable" to weaken the army in Flanders in order to strengthen that on the Rhine.  

Frederick was offended when he heard that the emperor had offered the command of the army in Germany to the elector of Hanover without consulting him. Although Raby had feared that the king would not order his troops to march to the Rhine because of the elector's appointment, Frederick finally decided to send his troops. The quarrels with the elector of Hanover became so embittered that in 1708 all correspondence with Hanover was forbidden by the Berlin court.

Frederick continued to refuse to send his troops to the Upper Rhine because of the emperor's failure to provide his troops with winter quarters and to pay Frederick the subsidy arrears. It was clear to Berlin that the emperor was using all the pretexts at his command to delay paying the subsidies. For example, the emperor

\[\text{\textsuperscript{2}}\text{Alg. Rijks., Archief Heinsius, 2384, 2a, Marlborough to Heinsius, 17 January 1707; Archief Heinsius, 2384, 138, Marlborough to Heinsius, July 1707.}\]


\[\text{\textsuperscript{4}}\text{P.R.O., S.P. Raby to Harley, 18 June 1707; Raby to Harley, 28 June 1707.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{5}}\text{Doble, ed., "Ayerst Letters," English Historical Review, II (1889), 339, Ayerst to Dr. A. Charlett, Berlin, 22 September 1708.}\]
even claimed that Frederick owed him reimbursement for the straw which some of the Prussian troops took to make huts after they had lost their baggage and tents under Count Styrum. These disputes had also delayed the march to the recruits to Italy. The season was so far advanced that if Frederick delayed until the matters were settled with the emperor it would be too late for the troops to be effective. Raby assured the king that the queen would use her influence to see that Frederick had satisfaction for his demands.

By April the march of the Prussian troops to Italy was still delayed because the Prince of Anhalt-Dessau wanted the march to be through the Tyrol rather than through the Grisons country. He contended that the baggage would not be able to pass through the Grisons country. By mid-May the recruits had marched for Italy through Bavaria and the Tyrol. Acrimonious disputes continued, however, to plague the Italian campaign. The duke of Savoy and Prince Eugene were

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8 B.M., Add. Mss. 7062, f. 293, Raby to Stepney, 26 April 1707; B.M., Add. Mss. 22, 195, f. 109, Heems to Tilson, 10 May 1707; B.M., Add. Mss. 11, 197, Raby memoranda of 26 April 1707.

9 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Harley, Potsdam, 14 May 1707.
soon angry with the Prussian commander, the Prince of Anhalt-Dessau. Raby thought that Frederick's intransigence about renewing the Italian treaty stemmed from the Prince of Anhalt-Dessau's reports of the ruin of his troops and his desire to be removed from service in Italy. He was also insinuating that the duke of Savoy was negotiating a peace with France which would make Frederick's troops "run the greatest risk imaginable."

In the fall of 1707 Frederick wrote Marlborough that he doubted if he would be able to furnish recruits to supply the loss of troops from Italy. He wished to recall his troops from Italy and send them to the army on the Rhine next year. The Allies feared that Frederick intended to withdraw all his troops to the Rhine. Schmettau at The Hague was seriously pressing for the return of the troops on the grounds that the emperor had performed none of the conditions.

10 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Harley, 17 October and 26 November 1707.
11 Ibid., 90/4, Raby to Harley, 17 December 1707.
13 B.M.,Add.Mss.9100, f.219, Frederick to Marlborough, Potsdam, 19 October 1707.
14 P.R.O., S.P. Holland, 84/229, Dayrolle to Harley, The Hague, 6 December 1707. Also see P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 104/51, Harley to Raby, 13 December 1707.
promised to the king.\textsuperscript{15} The allied ministers at The Hague, who were uneasy, relied on Frederick's consideration for England to hinder this resolution. The king did consent to leave his troops in Italy for another year on certain conditions; these conditions, however, were so demanding that Heinsius felt that the States-General could not comply with them.\textsuperscript{16}

Frederick thought that his terms for renewing the Italian treaty for another year were reasonable because "the Emperor who promises much performs nothing; since the States are backward in their payments and the King has lost above double the number of men specified in the treaty to be allowed for recruits."\textsuperscript{17} The king wanted a larger allowance for recruits and a guarantee from the Maritime Powers of the emperor's payments. Because the cost of the troops in Italy exceeded the subsidies allotted, Frederick wanted the queen to pay 56,000 crowns in subsidy arrears. The king's propositions for the renewal of the treaty were given to Raby and Lintelo and were sent to Spanheim. Raby did not think that they were unreasonable "for really the Emperor and the States-General have not kept in any point their words with them."\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{P.R.O., S.P. Holland, 84/229, Dayrolle to Harley, The Hague, 6 December 1707.}

\textsuperscript{16}\textit{Ibid., 84/229, Dayrolle to Harley, The Hague, 20 December 1707.}

\textsuperscript{17}\textit{P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Harley, 10 December 1707.}

\textsuperscript{18}\textit{B.M., Add. Mss. 22, 196, f.114, Raby to Cadogan, 13 December 1707.}
According to Raby, the Prussian troops cost the queen less than any other auxiliaries. 19

Frederick, who was disgusted with the failure of the Maritime Powers to pay the subsidies, refused to renew the Italian treaty until his demands were met. Raby wanted Marlborough to assure Gromkow that if Frederick transferred his troops from Italy to the Rhine or to Brabant they would not receive the same high subsidies. 20 By 24 December the king had not decided whether the troops should stay in Italy. Although the queen had promised to secure the payment of the subsidies from the emperor and the States-General, every time the treaty had been renewed, she had repeatedly failed to do this. The king was easily angered. Raby reported that since his last illness, "a little thing puts him in a passion." Frederick regarded Italy as an "Abime that swallowed up his best troops." He claimed that he had lost more than 9,000 in three years. 21

19 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia 90/4, Raby to Harley, 10 December 1707.
21 B.M., Add. Mss. 9101, ff. 7-11, Raby to Marlborough, Berlin 17 January 1707. Danckelman had told Raby that "il ny a points d'esperance que le Roy enverrois plus de troupes sans ruiner son infanterie entièrement plus de 9,000 hommes dans ce troys ans de recrues." B.M., Add. Mss. 22,197, f.36, Raby's memorandum of 20 December 1707.
Raby felt that the king's order to the troops to be ready to march out of Italy was only to frighten the States-General into compliance with Frederick's demands. The disputes with the States-General were over the subsidy arrears and over the States-General's continued assertion of their right to keep a garrison in Meurs, which Frederick regarded as part of the empire and his by right of inheritance. 22 The United Provinces refused to yield to the king's demand to evacuate Moers, where they had kept a garrison for over one hundred years. Frederick was furious that the minister of the United Provinces at Ratisbon had delivered a memorial to the Diet on behalf of the prince of Nassau's rights to Moers and other lands in Germany of William's succession. 23 The States-General was, however, attempting to find the money for the subsidies. 24 Heinsius complained that every year some new article, such as the evacuation of Moers, was tacked on to the treaty renewal. Marlborough believed that the States-General would comply with Frederick's more reasonable demands. 25 Raby thought that the

Prince of Anhalt-Dessau was hindering the treaty renewal because he wanted the troops recalled out of Italy. He would be appointed commander of the troops if the contingents were stationed on the Rhine or in Brabant. 26

Frederick was easily offended and felt that England had shown partiality to the Duke of Savoy and the Landgrave of Hesse by granting the money. 27 He was also offended that the queen had not mentioned him in her last speech to Parliament. The Berlin court was endeavoring to obtain the 56,000 crowns in subsidy arrears. Harley wanted to know, however, whether there would be any further demands or pretenses to recall the troops. He feared that Frederick's intransigence was more than an effort to obtain money from the queen and his other demands from the States-General and the emperor. Raby was instructed to find out Frederick's plans and to discover if any French emissaries had been at work in Berlin. 28 The queen was willing to pay the 56,000 crowns on condition that the treaty be unconditionally renewed for one year. 29

27 Murray, ed., Marlborough's Dispatches, III, 666, Marlborough to Raby, St. James, 23 January 1708.
29 Ibid., 104/51, Harley to Raby, 7 February 1708.
Grumkow had written Frederick on Marlborough's request concerning the renewal of the treaty for the eight thousand men in Italy. Raby, however, had received no specific orders about it from England and neither Marlborough nor Cardonnel had mentioned it to him. Although he knew Marlborough wanted the treaty renewed, he initially did nothing in the matter. 30 Cadogan admitted to Raby that "steps have been made without your privity towards renewing of the Treaty for troops in Italy." He excused this by blaming Grumkow, who actually pestered Marlborough with projects and who offered to undertake everything. Cadogan felt that Grumkow's offers may have induced Marlborough to employ him. 31 Marlborough finally did write to Raby that Harley would instruct him on how to deal with Frederick's demands. Raby was to make the court "recede from these demands, which cannot readily be allowed." 32

The king ordered his ministers to renew the Italian treaty of 1704 on the best conditions they could. Characteristically, Raby attributed the king's decision to renew the Italian treaty to his own persuasive efforts. 33 Ilgen told Raby that he did not want

31 Ibid., ff. 119-120, Cadogan to Raby, 29 December 1707.
32 Murray, ed., Marlborough's Dispatches, III, 657, Marlborough to Raby, St. James, 30 December 1707.
33 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Harley, Berlin, 11 and 20 February 1708.
the king's intention to renew the treaty revealed to the emperor or to the States-General because he felt that if Frederick did not make difficulties with them he would obtain nothing. Raby felt that Marlborough could negotiate better with Spanheim than anyone else could with Schmettau, who "is most commonly more difficult than he needs be." Spanheim was sent full instructions and powers. Grumkow was at this time complaining to Raby of the difficulties which Schmettau had made at The Hague. Marlborough thought that the treaty should be renewed at The Hague and that Schmettau would do his best to obviate all difficulties. Harley told Raby that the renewal of the treaty was to be completed at The Hague. He sought to propitiate Raby by telling him that he would be freed from negotiating a very troublesome matter. Harley was at the same time pressing the Pensioner through Dayrolle to hasten the treaty renewal for the Prussian troops in Italy. No


35 B.M., Add.Mss. 9101, f.30, Raby to Marlborough, 10 February 1708.


time was to be lost because of the necessity of hastening the recruits. 38

Nothing further was demanded from the queen, who had given Frederick
assurance of the payment of the 56,000 crowns. Marlborough and Span-
heim had written that Raby had orders to satisfy Frederick concerning
the 56,000 crowns. Harley, however, had made no mention of it to Raby. 39
Raby did promise the king the prompt payment of the 56,000 crowns next
winter.

The States-General were willing to satisfy the king in his
demand that they pay the arrears of subsidy due by the treaty and
that they take care of the Prussian regiments, who had received no pay
for eight months. They refused, however, to evacuate Moers to which they
pretended a right although it was adjudged to the king in Prussia. Fred-
erick's demand that the States-General recall their troops from Moers
at a time when the Allies should act in concert for the common good
was condemned by a Dutch envoy who asserted that "quelques uns d'Eux ne
cherchens que de pescher dans L'eau trouble et de profiter de cette

38 P.R.O., S.P. Holland, 104/74, Harley to Dayrolle, 17 February
1708.

February 1708.

40 P.R.O., S.P. Holland, 84/225, Cadogan to Harley, The Hague,
7 February 1708.
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emperor desired because of the difficulties in transporting the carriages and the cannon. Orders were sent to Sir Philip Meadows, the English representative in Vienna, to attempt, in the queen's name, to procure passage for the Prussians through Tyrol. Bartholdi, the Prussian representative in Vienna, felt that the king should not dispatch the troops until the emperor had agreed to the troops advance through Tyrol. Other Prussian ministers proposed that the king should let the troops stay in Bavaria, where the emperor did not want them until his consent was obtained. By April the emperor had consented to the march through the Tyrol.

In the fall of 1708, Frederick again threatened to withdraw his troops from Italy. He wanted his troops to serve either on the Rhine or in Brabant. Robert Spencer, Earl of Sunderland, the Secretary of State, thought that Frederick was only trying to procure new concessions for the troops. Marlborough urged Raby to stifle any idea of a Prussian troops recall from Italy. The recall would frustrate the allied plans in Italy where the duke of Savoy's conquests had opened the way into France. The Prussian recall also would weaken the allegiance of the duke of Savoy. Major General Palmes was ordered to assure the duke of Savoy that the queen was taking

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45 B.M., Add. MSS. 9103, f. 83, Marlborough to Raby, 1 October 1708.
all necessary measures for renewing the treaty with the king. In
spite of Frederick's chicanery, the queen did not doubt that Frederick
would renew the treaty. Grumkow had hinted to Marlborough that
Frederick intended to propose the recall of his troops from Italy.
Marlborough wanted Sunderland to provide Raby with arguments against the
recall out of Grumkow's paper, which Marlborough did not want exposed
for the minister's sake. Marlborough intended to press for the re-
newal of the Italian treaty when he came to The Hague. Every fall
Raby had to persuade Frederick to ratify the Italian treaty on the
former conditions. This annual renewal gave the king the opportunity
to threaten to recall his troops unless the Allies granted him better
terms.

After the king consented to the emperor's request to send his
troops if necessary against the pope, it seemed less difficult to pre-
vail with him to leave the troops in Italy for another campaign. If
the troops were compelled to fight in winter, they would be too exhausted

46 P.R.O., S.P. Miscellaneous, 104/208/144, Sunderland to Palms, 2 November 1708.
47 P.R.O., S.P. Military Correspondence, 87/3, Marlborough to Sunderland, 1 October 1708.
48 Ibid., Marlborough to Sunderland, 4 October 1708.
50 P.R.O., S.P. Military Correspondence, 87/3, Marlborough to Sunderland, 24 October 1708; S.P. Prussia, 104/51, Boyle to Raby, Whitehall, 19 October 1708.
to march to either the Rhine or to Flanders in the spring. If Frederick refused to let his troops serve under the duke of Savoy in the next campaign, it would in effect mean they would serve nowhere. Raby did not doubt that England could keep the 8,000 Prussians in Italy although Frederick made new demands and resolved to have the troops serve either on the Rhine or in Brabant. The queen expected that after the payment of the 56,000 crowns the Italian treaty would be renewed upon the same terms as last year. No measures could be taken with the duke of Savoy until the Italian treaty was renewed. In writing to Frederick, Marlborough had mentioned the Italian treaty as if he had no doubts that the king would renew it on the same conditions. The king in his answer did not mention the treaty renewal, however. The treaty was renewed nevertheless in the spring of 1709 after prolonged negotiations.

51 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 104/51, Boyle to Raby, Whitehall, 19 October 1708.

52 Ibid., 104/51, Boyle to Raby, 30 November 1708.

53 P.R.O., S.P. Military Correspondence, 87/3, Marlborough to Raby, Camp at Marlebeck, 31 December 1708.

54 Ibid., 87/3, Marlborough to Boyle, 20 December 1708.

55 Ibid., 87/3, Marlborough to Boyle, Marlebeck, 30 December 1708 contains enclosure of Frederick's letter to Marlborough, 22 December 1708.
In 1708 the Maritime Powers planned to strengthen the army in the Netherlands. Marlborough remembered his promise to Frederick in 1704 to take his troops in preference to others. Frederick believed that Marlborough was his true friend and that he would employ his troops. Marlborough hoped that Frederick would offer the service of the two to three thousand troops to the Allies. Grumkow and Marlborough went to The Hague to negotiate the augmentation. Raby was angry that Lintelo had full powers to draw up an agreement concerning the troops augmentation when he did not.

Raby felt that it was mandatory that he know Marlborough's intentions concerning the projected augmentation. Raby defensively asserted that Marlborough could trust him with his intentions and could "be sure I shall not exceed his directions for the engagements I have to any foreign court can never make me act in the

56 B.M., Add. Mss. 22,196, f. 141, Raby to Cadogan, 14 February 1708.

57 Murray, ed., Marlborough's Dispatches, III, 657, Marlborough to Raby, St. James, 30 December 1708; Murray, III, 663, Marlborough to Raby, St. James, 16 January 1708.

least against my own Queen and country." Raby did not know whether Marlborough would take any more of the king's troops into the Allies' service or on what conditions he would have them. Raby should know about the augmentation because the two regiments of horse which were to make up that number were still in Prussia on the other side of the Vistula. Raby wanted Marlborough to fully instruct Palmes on the projected augmentation. Raby told Cadogan that he wanted Palmes to come to the Berlin court so that he could know what was expected of the court. Raby could not get Frederick to withdraw any more of his troops from Prussia until the Allies' plans were revealed. If the Allies did not employ the troops, the king would leave them in Prussia, where it was cheaper to maintain them.

In February 1708 Raby wondered why Palmes was not at Berlin. Cadogan told Raby that Palmes was not instructed to demand more troops at Berlin. Raby continued to try to persuade Frederick to send the two or three thousand men more into the Low Countries. The financial

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60 Ibid., f. 139, Raby to Cadogan, 11 February 1708.
61 Ibid., f. 143, Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 18 February 1708.
state of the Berlin court was so precarious that no troops could be obtained without the Maritime Powers' guarantee of bread, agio and forage. The king hoped that Marlborough would make good offers when he arrived.

By November Frederick was willing to let the Allies have more troops for additional subsidies. Satisfying Frederick was an important consideration in Marlborough's mind. The 8,000 unemployed troops, which the king had, would also be better troops than the Allies could obtain anywhere else. Raby emphasized that it was necessary that he know before the king's minister in England what resolutions were taken to augment the allied strength for the next year and from what princes the troops would be taken and on what conditions. On November 12 Boyle wrote that he knew of no arrangement for additional troops. However, on 30 November Boyle wrote that the queen would be willing to take more Prussians into her

65 P.R.O., S.P. Military Correspondence, 87/3, Marlborough to Boyle, contains enclosure of Marlborough to Frederick, 5 December 1708.
66 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Boyle, Berlin, 6 November 1708.
67 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 104/51, Boyle to Raby, 12 November 1708.
service on the same conditions as those troops now serving in the Low Countries in the pay of the Maritime Powers, that is, bread, agio, and forage. The queen refused to grant the king levy money. Marlborough hoped that the queen could pay the 56,000 crowns because it had been promised. He hoped to defer the payment, however, in order to induce Frederick to renew the Italian treaty and to provide an augmentation of troops. It was necessary to insure that the augmentation did not consist of troops already employed elsewhere. The queen would not take into her service any troops which were part of the contingent on the Rhine. The Berlin court resolved to let the Allies have 5,000 men but the court could send 3,000 men more. Raby rather futilely hoped that the king would let the Allies have 8,000 men. By the augmentation treaty signed on 12 April 1709, Frederick was to provide 6,205 more troops for service in the Low Countries.

68 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 104/51, Boyle to Raby, Whitehall, 12 November 1708; P.R.O., S.P. Military Correspondence, 87/3, Marlborough to Boyle, contains letter of Marlborough to Raby, 6 December 1708.

69 Murray, ed., Marlborough's Dispatches, IV, 336, Marlborough to Boyle, Camp at Berleghen, 3 December 1708.

70 P.R.O., S.P. Military Correspondence, 87/3, Marlborough to Raby, 31 December 1708.

71 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Boyle, 29 December 1708.
England's support of Frederick's pretensions to Neuchâtel was important in binding Frederick further to the allied interests. Neuchâtel was a small country strategically situated on the frontiers of France and of Switzerland, at equal distance from the Rhine and the Rhône, and at the center of the Jura mountains. It was the key to the province of the Franche-Comté. The area was important for a state which wished to menace France and to dominate Switzerland. Emile Bourgeois, writing in the late nineteenth century, believed that Frederick intended to enter the old duchy of Burgundy through this area. Since the sixteenth century, Neuchâtel was governed by French families, such as the Rohan, the Bourbon, and the Nemours. It passed in 1694 to Marie de Nemours. When she died in 1707 there was a contested succession.

Frederick's claim came through his mother, Louise von Nassau, the sister of Frederick Henry of Orange. The other major candidate was the prince of Conti whose title rested on the bequeath of the land

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to him by the Abbé d'Orléans, Madame de Nemours' immediate predecessor. Frederick was preferred to the prince of Conti because he was a Protestant like the majority of the inhabitants and because he lived too far away to dominate them. The prince of Conti's claim was quickly eliminated because the county had been declared inalienable in 1694. The French opposed Frederick's claim so vehemently because they feared an allied invasion of the Franche-Comté through Neuchâtel.

England instructed her representative to use their "utmost Endeavours to support and favour" the king of Prussia's pretensions to Neuchâtel.\(^{74}\) Abraham Stanyan, the envoy extraordinary to the Republic of Geneva from 1705 to 1714, and his secretary, Francis Manning, wrote regularly in 1707 about the advancement of the king's interests.\(^{75}\) Godolphin had feared that the death of the duchess of Nemours on 16 June 1707 might make Frederick take measures "inconvenient" to the alliance.\(^{76}\) Marlborough, who had assured the king that the English

\(^{74}\) B.M., Add.Mss.31,130,f.46, Stanyan to Raby, Berne, 1 June 1707; B.M., Add.Mss.31,130,f.58, Stanyan to Frederick, Berne, June 1707; B.M., Add.Mss.9099,f.76, Godolphin to Marlborough, 13 May 1707.

\(^{75}\) See B.M., Add.Mss.31,130.

ministers would support his pretensions, felt that Frederick was satisfied and would not do anything to disrupt the allied war effort.\footnote{B.M.,Add.Mss.9100,f.14, Marlborough to Godolphin, Meldert, 4 July 1707.}

At the request of the Prussian representative, Stanyan wrote a letter informing the inhabitants of Neuchâtel that if France meddled in the decision, the Allies would also do so.\footnote{B.M.,Add.Mss.31,130,f.72, Stanyan to Raby, Berne, 16 July 1707; Berner, ed., Briefwechsel, p. 132, Sophie to Frederick, 27 August 1707.} With English support, the sentence was finally pronounced in favor of the king of Prussia.\footnote{Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, XII,507.}

Frederick's acquisition of Neuchâtel led to more direct communications with France in 1708 and 1709. Frederick's desire to obtain a neutrality for Neuchâtel became a pretext for an exchange of Franco-Prussian views. Raby was consequently watching all the "Little french emissarys w. ch are going backwards and forwards throw this place." \footnote{P.R.O.,S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Harley, 17 September 1707. Also see Alg.Rijks., Archief Heinsius, 1205, Lintelto to Heinsius, Berlin, 13 December 1707 in which Lintelto discusses the difficulties of an agent at Berlin.}

England did not want Frederick to procure a neutrality for Neuchâtel. Harley hoped to draw the Protestant cantons into the war.
as belligerents by capitalizing on their support of Frederick. England wanted Frederick to station troops in Neuchâtel, which was a "very convenient Place for making a Sensible Impression upon France." 81 Frederick assured Raby that he would endeavor to engage the Swiss in a war against France. If Frederick failed, he would rely on the queen's assistance to gain him a neutrality. 82 Stanyan and Boyle agreed that matters were not at present disposed for a war in Switzerland. Boyle suspected that Frederick's negotiations with the cantons were only designed to force the French to an acceptable neutrality. 83

The vacillating and equivocal position of England obscured the issue. Spanheim had received little encouragement from the Lord Treasurer concerning Neuchâtel. Palmes, however, had attempted to induce Frederick to refuse the neutrality. Raby felt that it was now too late because Frederick was determined to ratify the neutrality. Because Palmes behaved so mysteriously and because he seemed to have

81 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 104/51, Harley to Raby, Whitehall, 10 January 1708.

82 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Harley, 4 February 1708.

83 P.R.O., S.P. Holland, 84/231, Dayrolle to Boyle, 16 March 1708.
some secret commission which he could not communicate to Raby, Raby had not inquired into his negotiations.\textsuperscript{24} Raby felt that the king was obliged to accept the neutrality which the Swiss had devised.\textsuperscript{85} The Neuchâtel acquisition was indeed, as Lintelo said, "un affaire dont je ne puis prévoir que l'on puisse maintenant tirer aucun avantage." \textsuperscript{86}

Charles XII, "that young Slovenly Gothick Hero", \textsuperscript{87} threatened to involve the empire in the Northern War. Raby believed that the Allies should hinder a peace between Russian and Sweden because it would free Charles to turn to the West.\textsuperscript{88} Because of this fear that the Swedes would not evacuate Saxony and would join with France, Johann Wenzel, Count Wratislaw, the imperial minister, proposed to Marlborough a joint league of the Maritime Powers, Denmark, the emperor, and the German princes to drive Charles out of Germany. The emperor would

\textsuperscript{84} P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Boyle, Potsdam, 28 April 1708.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{86} Alg.Rijks., Archief Heinsius, 1304, Lintelo to Heinsius, Berlin, 28 April 1708.
\textsuperscript{87} B.M., Add.Mss.22,196,f.65, Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 9 April 1707.
\textsuperscript{88} B.M., Add.Mss.37,355,f.373, Raby to Whitworth, Oranienburg, 21 July 1707.
detach some regiments of cavalry from Hungary and Italy. The league
was to be kept a secret so as not to endanger Prussia and Hanover. England did not want to alienate Charles, who could greatly help or hinder the Allies, or Augustus, who they hoped would supply additional troops.

Charles XII was determined not to leave Saxony until he received the Maritime Powers' guarantee of the Altranstädt treaty. Augustus had asked the queen to guarantee the treaty. Although every possible precaution must be taken before the queen would guarantee the treaty, it was imperative that England "leave no Stone unturn'd to Satisfy the King of Sweden." The Allies hoped that once the emperor and the Maritime Powers guaranteed the treaty, the king of


90 P.R.O., S.P. Military Expeditions, 87/2, Marlborough to Harley, Camp at Helchin, 22 September 1707.


93 Alg. Rijks., Archief Heinsius 2384, f. 9a, Marlborough to Heinsius, St. James, 14 February 1707; Alg. Rijks., Archief Heinsius, 2384, f. 69, Marlborough to Heinsius, St. James, 28 January 1707.
Sweden would evacuate Saxony.94

The visit of Marlborough to Altranstädt from 27 to 29 April O.S. 1707 is indicative of the importance of the Northern War to the alliance. Marlborough wanted to procure a moral commitment to the Allies from Charles. He also wanted to give Charles enough hope of the Maritime Powers' recognition of Stanislaus and guarantee of the Altranstädt treaty so that Charles would not delay his departure from the empire. Marlborough did promise the English recognition of Stanislaus and the guarantee of the Altranstädt treaty. Charles promised to cooperate with the Maritime Powers concerning the peace with France. This promise allayed the allied fear that Charles XII would act as an independent arbiter in the War of the Spanish Succession and impose a peace in the West. 95 James Jeffreys, an English diplomat, 96 was permitted to accompany the Swedish army as a volunteer on the Russian campaign. If Charles was successful against

94 Murray, ed., Marlborough's Dispatches, III, 302, Marlborough to Raby, St. James, 20 January 1707.

95 Hatton, Charles XII, pp. 224-225.

96 Ibid., p. 189.
the tsar, he was to invite Charles to join the Grand Alliance.

In 1707 the Maritime Powers feared an imminent conflict between Charles and the emperor. The Swedes greatly resented the emperor's receiving into his service the 1200 Russians in Saxony and his connivance in May 1707 at their escape from Austria into Poland. The emperor's delay in recognizing the Gottorp candidate to the Lübeck-Eutin bishopric engendered the suspicion that the position of Sweden's ally would be undermined once Sweden was out of the empire. Charles feared that the emperor's suppression of Protestant rights in his hereditary lands, where the general guarantee of religious freedom of 1648 did not apply, would spread to areas covered by the Peace of Westphalia. If the King of Sweden broke with the emperor, Bohemia, Silesia, Moravia, and Austria beyond the Danube would be lost or at least rendered incapable of supplying the immense expenses of the war. The Hungarian rebels would also be encouraged.97 The emperor "quitremble deja de peur que les Suedois prenent quelque pretext de rompre avec Iuy ", recognized Stanislaus. 98 If Charles crossed into the

97B.M. Add. Mss. 9100, ff.119-121, Salms to Marlborough, Vienna, 10 August 1707.

98 Hannover Stadtarchiv, 16693, Raby to Robethon, 26 February 1707. Also see B.M., Add. Mss. f.274, Raby to Stepney, Berlin, 8 March 1707.
emperor's hereditary domains, he would in effect be an ally of France. To lessen Swedo-Austrian tension, Wratislaw was sent to Altranstädt in July. To appease Charles, he offered him free transit for the Swedish army through Silesia when the Russian offensive began. In the convention of Altranstädt of 1 September 1707 Wratislaw in the emperor's name gave up the emperor's claim to a military contingent from Charles as a German prince, promised imperial approbation of the Gottorp candidate to the Lübeck-Eutin bishopric and guaranteed the reinstatement of the religious rights of 1648 to the Silesian Protestants.  

The Prussian fear of Charles was, as in 1709, the basis for Frederick's policy in the North. By the summer, Raby did not share the widespread belief that the Berlin court was closely tied to the Swedes. Frederick, who was increasingly worried about Charles, asked Marlborough whether he could withdraw his troops from Prussia and the provinces with safety. Frederick acknowledged Stanislaus (January 1707) partly because his territories bordered in three places on Poland.


100 See P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Harley, 9 July 1707.


102 B.M., Add. Mss. 9, 000, f. 219, Frederick to Marlborough, Fall 1707.
Commerce between Frederick's subjects and the Poles would be greatly hindered if this recognition was delayed. 103 Ilgen had assured Raby that when Frederick acknowledged Stanislaus he would not endanger the common cause. 104 Nevertheless Frederick's recognition made Lintelo uneasy. He did not feel as it was rumored, that there was a hidden clause in the treaty which might endanger the common cause, but "des accidens qui pourroit survenir au sujet de ce traître, l'on assure qu'il y a un article qui engage le Roi de Prusse à soutenir les intérêts du Roi Stanislaus." 105

Frederick, who remembered Augustus's offer to the tsar and to Charles, which had been at Prussia's expense, did not want the Allies to hire the 10,000 or 12,000 men which Augustus offered. Frederick thought that the Allies would be maintaining a force for Augustus with which he would make trouble. 106 Hanover and Prussia feared that Augustus would raise more men and would begin hostilities after the Swedes left if he had an opportunity. If the Maritime Powers only hired the foot, which

103 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Harley, 8 February 1707.
was not above 5,000 men, Augustus would be financially unable to maintain even the body of horse which would be left in his hands. With such a small body of men, he could not seriously hurt his neighbors. The suspicions in Berlin and Hanover that if Augustus was armed "it was impossible for him to be quiet", were grounded on his notorious double-dealing and on rumors of his continued correspondence in Poland and in Russia.109

Raby had gone into Saxony to see "how our fate is like to be determined by that Gothick, He who with a handful of men makes himself dreaded and courted by all the powers of Europe." Raby wrote a colorful description of the kings which gives some hint of how he viewed their roles in the Northern War. He described Charles as
tall and Handsome, but immoderately dirty and Slovenly; His behavior more rustick than you can imagine in so young a man. . . He is very whimsical and positive, which makes his Alliés afraid of Him; for he Risques himself and his Army, as easily as another would fight a Duel.

He describes Augustus as "very obliging in his person and behaviour;“

107 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Harley, Berlin, 8 February 1707.
109 Alg. Rijks., Archief Heinsius 1205, Lintelo to Heinsius, 8 March 1707.
liked by everyone; but now He pays for all his false unfaithfull Politicks." Stanislaus is depicted as "a tall Handsome young Man with a great pair of whiskers, in the Polish dress, but inclined to be fat and a little upon the Dirty as all the Poles are." 110 Raby felt that the more the Allies courted Charles, the more obstinate he would become because he would realize that he had nothing to apprehend from them even though he invaded "the chieffest of our allies." 111

By means of the Triple Alliance, Frederick still hoped to realize some of his territorial goals in Poland. The projected Triple Alliance between the elector of Hanover, the king of Sweden and the king of Prussia, was a threat to the Grand Alliance, because it weakened the emperor's position in Northern Germany and because it might involve the elector of Hanover and Frederick in the Northern War. 112 Sweden and Prussia were eager to conclude the alliance. Hanover, however, was hoping to prevent the alliance and avoided commitment. Robethon feared that France had used the projected treaty in order to embroil the Catholics with the Protestant Allies. Robethon thought that "nothing is

111 P.R.O.,S.P.,Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Harley, Berlin, 9 July 1707.
more mal apropos than this treaty." and urged Marlborough to order Raby
to dissuade the Berlin court from the treaty immediately. Robethon, who
did not want his opposition to the treaty known, hoped to delay the
treaty by using the pretence that Berlin and Hanover could not agree to
such a treaty without informing the Maritime Powers. It was apparent
that the elector of Hanover was clandestinely trying to obstruct the	treaty.\footnote{113} The elector of Hanover refused to enter the alliance because
the Protestant clause would alienate the Catholic allies and because
Charles still threatened the emperor's hereditary countries.\footnote{114} Marlbor-
ough assured Heinsius that the treaty would come to nothing because he
was sure that Hanover would not agree to it. Marlborough was willing,
however, to do anything which Heinsius wished in order to prevent a
treaty so "prejudicial" to the common cause.\footnote{115}

\footnote{113}\textit{Murray}, ed., \textit{Marlborough's Dispatches}, III, 476, Marlborough to
Wartenberg, Meldert, 18 July 1707; \textit{P.R.O., S.P. Prussia}, 90/4, Raby to
Harley, 30 July, 1707; \textit{Alg. Rijks.}, Archief Heinsius, 2384, Marlborough
to Heinsius, Meldert, 24 July 1707.

\footnote{114} \textit{P.R.O., S.P. Prussia}, 90/4, Raby to Harley, Berlin, 13
August and 13 August 1707; \textit{P.R.O., S.P. Prussia}, 104/51, Harley to Raby,
Whitehall, 16 September 1707.

\footnote{115} Van 't Hoff, ed., \textit{Correspondence}, p.325, Marlborough to
Heinsius, Meldert, 11 July 1707; \textit{Alg. Rijks.}, Archief Heinsius, 2384, 32a-
32 c, Marlborough to Heinsius, 11 July 1707.
If the elector of Hanover would not join the alliance, Frederick intended to make a separate alliance with Sweden. Raby futilely endeavoured to break off the Swedo-Prussian treaty. Printzen had been sent in May 1707 to negotiate with Charles. He demanded the acquisition of Elbing, and a strip of lands in Polish Prussia, the freeing of the Russian ambassador, Ismaílow, and the right of Colonel de Siltman to accompany the Swedish army on the next campaign against the tsar. He only obtained Charles's promise of continued negotiations. The perpetual alliance between Prussia and Sweden signed in August 1707 mitigated the Swedish threat. The treaty provided that Sweden and Prussia would mutually guarantee each other's possessions, would furnish 6,000 men if the other was attacked, and would protect the Protestants according to the Treaty of Westphalia. Charles did not offer Prussia enough territorial advantages to hold Frederick as a firm ally. Erich Hassinger also believes that the Swedish offers were not strong enough to lead to a lasting alliance. He contends, however, that this was not


a major blunder for Charles until 1713.\(^{119}\)

Throughout 1708 there were many attempts to persuade Frederick to turn his army towards the East instead of the West.\(^{120}\) The Swedish seizure of Courland threatened to involve Frederick again in the Northern War. Robinson felt that Frederick's intercession would be necessary in order to persuade Sweden to restore Courland.\(^{121}\) Frederick was very aware that Courland would be too great an addition to the Swedish strength in the Baltic.\(^{122}\) If Sweden were master of the two ports in Courland, Charles would be the arbitrary master of the Baltic. The Swedish minister assured Frederick that Charles would keep Courland only for his convenience during the war and that he would give it up once peace was made.\(^{123}\)

It was imperative that England should maintain good relations with Frederick. Marlborough cultivated Frederick's friendship partly by praising the Prussian troops as "lesquelles on t paru si belles et complètes dans leur marche, si adroits et habiles dans leur exercises,

\(^{119}\) Hassinger, Brandenburg-Preussen, Schweden und Russland 1700-1713 p.209.

\(^{120}\) P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Boyle, Berlin, 26 January 1708 and 2 February 1708.

\(^{121}\) B.M., Add. Mss. 22, 198, f. 91, Robinson to Marlborough, Hamburg, 16 October 1708.

\(^{122}\) B.M., Add. Mss. 22, 198, f. 100, Raby to Robinson, 30 October 1708.

\(^{123}\) P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/5, Raby to Boyle, Berlin, 29 December 1708.
Raby even attributed Grumkow's promotion to brigadier to Frederick's desire to please Marlborough. When Frederick sent Grumkow to Marlborough with an urgent letter requesting Marlborough to visit him, Marlborough proceeded directly to Charlottenburg. Marlborough assured Frederick that the queen would act according to the treaties with Prussia which obliged her at a general peace to promote the king's title, his claims to Neuchâtel and the Principality of Orange, and his continuing possession of Spanish Guelderland until the Spanish arrears were paid. Marlborough had also attempted to dissuade Frederick from carrying on negotiations for the triple alliance. Marlborough had not gone to Berlin and consequently did not see Raby.

Raby, who was bitter about his appointment to Vienna in 1706 because he did not want to accept the lower rank of envoy, wrote less frequently to Marlborough in 1707. Raby also blamed Grumkow for the

124 Murray, ed., Marlborough's Dispatches, III, 413, 452, Marlborough to Frederick, 16 June 1707 and 4 July 1707.


128 B.M., Add. 9098, f. 81, Raby to Marlborough, 22 February 1707.
part he had played in the intrigues and sought to discredit him at court. Grumkow, who had admitted that he was wrong, emphasized that he was under strict orders. He contended that he believed that Frederick was so hostile to Raby that he dared not hint to Raby of the plot to recall him. Grumkow told Raby that Lintelo was the originator of the intrigue. Ilgen even excused the part which he had played in it.

Raby was becoming more and more dissatisfied with his position at Berlin. He complained to Marlborough that the longer he stayed in Berlin the less he had to do. He also complained that he did not know of the queen's resolutions until the Berlin ministers told him. In August 1707 he had not received letters from Harley in ten or twelve posts. Marlborough's relations with Raby had so far deteriorated that Marlborough wrote to Berlin concerning the projected troop augmentation and did not mention it to Raby. Raby in turn did not mention it to Marlborough. Cadogan admitted to Raby that "steps have been made without

132 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 90/4, Raby to Harley, 16 April 1707.
133 Ibid., Raby to Harley, Berlin, 13 August 1707.
your privity towards renewing of the Treaty for the Troops in Italy and the Intended augmentation." 134 Raby became more and more resentful because he felt that Marlborough was negotiating with Frederick through Grumkow. Raby complained that Grumkow was giving himself "much inquietus and great airs with his letters from Marlborough." 135 Raby's complaint find a strange collaborator in Lintelö, who claimed that "il [Grumkow] ce vante beaucoup de la confidence de Milord Marlborough a ces Amis en particulier, et il y a quelque apparence qu'il L'estime, puis qu'il le la extremement recommandé a cette Cour." He advised Heinsius to inform Marlborough that "ce fut un esprit extremement dangereux ... il est assez fair pour ce servir du nom du Roi mesme lors qu'il ne'as aucun ordre de le faire, pour peu qu'il le juge de sa convenance mais comme il y vas de mes interets par rapport a mes affaires de me le conserver." 136 By 1708 Grumkow, however, had avowed his friendship for Raby, who procured an office for him at court. 137 Nevertheless, by his very interest with Marlborough, Grumkow tended to undermine Raby's position.

Throughout 1707 and 1708 there were intrigues designed to


undermine Raby's position and to procure his recall. In the spring of 1707, Lintelo describing the extraordinary situation at Berlin, believed that many ministers who hated Raby were working underhand for his recall. There were rumours at the end of 1707 that Frederick was again thinking of recalling Spanheim, whose mission to England was so costly. Raby would subsequently be recalled by the queen who would not keep an ambassador at Berlin if Frederick had only a minister of an inferior rank at London. Count Metternich, the Prussian representative at Berne, even asked Stanyan if he wanted to succeed Raby. Raby, who had asked Cadogan if it would be "any prejudice to me to ask leave" was absent from Berlin from 10 May 1708 to 20 September 1708 on a visit to England. He had stayed at Berlin until Frederick began his journey to Carlsbad. Raby, who "Overstep[s] all their little domestic intrigues" felt that the court was becoming more "mysterious." In January 1708, Raby found out that there was an intrigue to have him recalled, Raby did not "value much my Staying here, but I hate to be trick'd and if

141 Ibid.,f.168 and f.174, Cadogan to Raby, The Hague, 17 April 1708 and Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 5 May 1708.
142 Ibid.,f.141, Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 14 February 1708.
it were for that alone I would spoil their projects." 143 In spite of
these intrigues, Frederick thanked the queen for sending Raby back to
Berlin as an ambassador. 144 Nevertheless, by December Raby, who felt
that the people at Berlin are "more intrigue and more false then at
any Court in Christendome," 145 was involved with yet another intrigue.
He was told that Kniphausen should have informed Frederick that Raby had
written Stanhope a letter speaking very slightly of Frederick and
of his court. Stanhope's valet had reputedly shown Kniphausen the
letter, but would not give him a copy of it. 146

The mission of Palmes to Berlin is indicative of Marlborough's
belief that Raby's position was weakened at Berlin. It also reflects
the growing estrangement between Marlborough and Raby. Palmes, who
was known as "one of the favorites of my Lord Marlborough," 147 was
sent to Berlin in the spring of 1708 to impart to the court the details
of the next campaign. The birth of Frederick's grandson was the

144 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 102/46, Frederick to Queen Anne, Potsdam, 13 October 1708.
146 For a revealing account of this intrigue see B.M., Add. Mss. 22, 197, ff. 52-54, Raby's memoir of 5 December 1708.
147 H.M.C., Portland Mss., IV, 469, William Greg to Chamillart, 30 December 1707.
pretend pretext of his visit. Raby obviously resented the sending of "that great Minister Mr. Palmes who is to do great matters in all the Courts of Europe." He later wrote bitterly that unless Palmes was given more powers "than ever I had he'd do no great matters here." 149

Palmes arrived at The Hague by packet boat by 9 March. He was to go to Hanover, Berlin, and Vienna. He was to reside in Turin as envoy extraordinary and was to accompany the duke of Savoy on campaign. Grumkow gave Palmes "soe odd a picture of that Court and our Minister there "that Palmes was put on the defensive. Palmes arrived at Berlin on 7 April and left on 14 April. Raby felt that Palmes imminent visit had destroyed his plan to obtain more Prussian troops without subsidies. Frederick had received a letter from Grumkow alleging that Palmes would offer Frederick subsidies for more troops. Raby could not answer this because he was not acquainted with the reasons


151 B.M., Add.Mss.9101,f.66, Palmes to Marlborough, Hanover, 30 March 1708.
for Palmes's visit. Palmes would not divulge his orders about Prussian troops to Raby.

Palmes's account of his mission is illuminating because it underscores the estrangement between Raby and Marlborough. Raby, who felt that his position was undermined by Palmes's visit met Palmes "with much State and more coldness," Raby contended that it was unusual to send another minister to a court where there was an ambassador in residence. In spite of Palmes's protest that his mission was not meant as an insult to Raby, Raby was very defensive. He told Palmes that he could justify everything that he had done at Berlin. Raby felt that Palmes's credentials did not empower him to treat with the king. He refused to cooperate with Palmes on the pretext that he was not instructed to do so. Raby asked Palmes not to speak Lintelo because of Raby's estrangement from him. Palmes refused because he felt that the interest of the Maritime Powers were so intertwined that nothing should be kept a secret between them. Palmes wrote Marlborough that Raby was civil only "for fear of being represented at home and at the same time to sift what discourse I had with the King." 

153 B.M., Add. Mss. 22, 197, ff. 44-48, Raby's memoir in which he states that "il me fait beaucoup le misterieux."

154 B.M., Add. Mss. 9101, ff. 155-158, Palmes to Marlborough, Vienna, 28 April 1708. Palmes found it difficult to say whether the Countess of Wartenberg "is more feared or hated." He found Ilgen very "droit" but believed that he was not "much in our Interests." He believed that Ilgen was contributing to the Grand Chamberlain's ruin.
Meanwhile Raby wrote Cadogan a letter in which he complained that Palmes "made mightily the misterious" at Berlin. Cadogan lightly passed it off with the comment that "I would advise him to keep all that for the Court he is going to, where I am persuaded that it may be necessary... he began to practice, on the way, for heretofore yr Lidship knows he never could keep any secret but that of his age." In spite of Marlborough's suspicions, Raby's relations with the king were friendly at this time. Frederick wrote Sophie of Hanover that "er ein aufrechtiger freundt von mich ist." From 1707 to 1708 the threat of the dissolution of the coalition was manifested in the internal dissensions within the alliance, such as the quarrels over the elector of Hanover's appointment as commander and the disputes over the routes for the Italian contingents and the negotiations which Frederick carried on with France and with Sweden. Nevertheless, the Swedish threat as evinced in the coronation of Stanislaus and Charles XII's seizure of Courland brought Frederick closer to the Allies, who were the only ones he could depend on to safeguard his territories. Frederick was further bound to the alliance by England's support of his pretensions to Neuchâtel, by the renewal of the Italian treaty, and by the Prussian troops augmentation. The allied dissensions and the plots against Raby foreshadowed the quarrels of 1709 and of 1710 which nearly disrupted the alliance.
From 1709 to 1711 Frederick remained faithful to the alliance in spite of his growing dissatisfaction with the Allies because of the peace preliminaries and the Barrier Treaty. Frederick wanted the recovery of the Principality of Orange, the acquisition of the Burgundian lands of the Franche-Comté, agreement concerning the Orange Succession with the Prince of Nassau, the settlement of his claims on Spain by the cession of Spanish Guelderland, an area next to Cleves, the recognition of his right to and possession of Neuchâtel and Valengin, and the recognition of his title as king in Prussia included in the peace preliminaries. However, the Prussian ministers were refused admission to the peace conferences. In the preliminaries signed on 28 May 1709, Frederick only obtained the recognition of his kingship and the sanction of his acquisition of Neuchâtel and Valengin. After Frederick discovered that the peace preliminaries had allocated Spanish Guelderland to the United Provinces and had made no mention of his rights to the Orange Succession, he threatened to recall his troops from the allied fronts.

The threat of a Prussian troop recall was also prominent during the negotiations for the Barrier Treaty. Marlborough had hinted to Frederick as early as April 1709 that the Dutch were initiating negotiations concerning the barrier and had offered to support Frederick's
Marlborough advised Frederick to instruct his representative at The Hague on his claims to Spanish Guelderland and to send a representative to Barcelona to press his claims with Charles.

Nevertheless Article XII of the Barrier Treaty, which defined the frontiers of the Spanish Netherlands, had allocated Upper Guelders to the United Provinces. England had ratified the Barrier Treaty on 17 December 1709 in order to stop the United Provinces' separate negotiations with France. In an attempt to assure Frederick of England's support and to arouse his opposition to the treaty and in the hope of deflecting Frederick's indignation, Marlborough had revealed the Barrier Treaty to the king through Grumkow by a calculated indiscretion. By mid-December, Frederick knew on what day the treaty was signed and what was in the treaty. Indignant at the allocation of Upper Guelders to the United Provinces, Frederick again threatened to withdraw his troops from the allied armies. Raby thought that the Barrier Treaty was indefensible because England had failed to keep her promises to Frederick. Raby in fact found his mission increasingly difficult as the king became more and more dissatisfied and embittered. The States-General attempted to appease Frederick by insinuating that they would hire his troops after the peace to garrison their barrier. Marlborough again intervened and asked Frederick to rescind the recall orders. He told Frederick that the

1Murray, ed., Marlborough's Dispatches, IV, 490, Marlborough to Frederick, 26 April 1709.
"standstill order to your troops, if not revoked spells not only the
ruin of the coming campaign but also without doubt that of the Grand
Alliance." ² The Prussian recruits were given public orders to stop
in order to make the United Provinces more compliant to Frederick's
demands, but the recruits were given private orders to proceed to the
allied fronts. Reassured of England's support, Frederick did not
wish to renounce the gains which he hoped to procure from the alliance
by abandoning the allied coalition. His increasing monetary dependence
on the Maritime Powers further weakened his position.

Frederick, who felt at this time cheated of the fruits of
his sacrifices in the West, was hindered from realizing his Northern
goals. From 1709 to 1711 the Northern War again threatened to disrupt
the allied war effort. In spite of Marlborough's contention that it was
mandatory to terminate the war in the West first, Frederick intended to
recall some of his troops from Brabant. He felt that only an army would
be able to make his demands heard in the North. In April 1709 Jakob
Heinrich Flemming, Augustus's minister, came to Berlin. The Saxon
overtures were well received in spite of Ilgen's reserve because Fred-
erick optimistically hoped to acquire Polish Prussia. In the meantime,
Kayserlingk, the Prussian representative to Russia, thought that

²Churchill, Marlborough, II, 831, Marlborough to Frederick, 27
March 1710.
Augustus intended to reconquer Poland. He urged Frederick to utilize the occasion to obtain extensive territorial acquisitions such as Swedish Pomerania, Ermeland, and Danzig. Nevertheless, Frederick who was willing, in spite of his treaty with Charles XII, to ally with Augustus and Frederick IV, was deterred from the alliance by Ilgen.

In later June 1709 after the defeat of Charles XII of Sweden at Poltava, Marlborough feared that 40,000 troops from Denmark, Saxony, and Prussia and perhaps 20,000 troops from Holstein and Brunswick would be lost from the Netherlands front alone. He felt that it was imperative to prevent Charles's troops from breaking into either Poland or the empire. In spite of the potential threat of Prussian defection from the allied coalition, Raby complained that he was not fully instructed by either Marlborough or the Secretary of State about English policy in relation to the Northern War. For example, Raby did not know that the queen had not guaranteed the Altranstädt treaty.

After the Swedish defeat at Poltava (June 1709), the danger of Frederick's defection from the allied cause was increased. After Augustus repudiated his treaty with Charles and re-entered Poland, Frederick IV declared war on Sweden. Augustus and Frederick IV then renewed their league with Peter. When the news of Poltava reached Berlin, Frederick sent representatives to Augustus and to Peter. Nevertheless, it was soon clear that Frederick, who wanted to acquire Swedish Pomerania,

\[3^{3}\text{Coxe, Memoirs of Marlborough, I, 123.}\]

\[4^{B.M., Add. Mss. 22, 198, ff. 298-299, Raby to Robinson, Berlin, 10 July 1709.}\]
Ermeland, and Danzig, went to Saxony to meet Augustus. The Prussian alliance of 15 July with Augustus was, however, merely a neutrality treaty. It neither committed Prussia to active participation in the war, nor did it promise her territorial advantages. Although Frederick had also travelled to Marienwerder to confer with the tsar, an offensive alliance between Peter and Frederick was not concluded. Frederick's ambitious plans were ruined because the tsar would not consider evacuating Elbing. Frederick, on the other hand, would not break openly with the Swedes.

The precarious position in which Frederick now found himself is indicated by the proximity of the Swedish army under Ernst Detlow von Krassow. Krassow had retreated from the Russians and the Saxons towards Swedish Pomerania. Although Frederick had refused the army passage and had threatened to declare war if they crossed through his lands, on 16 October Krassow had crossed Frederick's frontier and transversed the New Marche. Because he had no troops in Prussia, Frederick was forced to accept this \textit{fait accompli}. Krassow's march had consequently weakened Frederick's position \textit{vis-a-vis} the Russians and the Swedes.

Frustrated in his ambitious projects in the North, Frederick hoped to hinder a new passage of the Swedish army through his lands without striking a blow by pressing the neutralization of the Swedish possessions in the empire. This neutralization meant that the Swedish provinces in the empire could not be invaded or used as a base for attack
by the Northern belligerents. Charles XII of Sweden opposed the scheme which masked under a neutrality an intervention profitable to his enemies, who were in effect protected on the side of the empire while prosecuting the war elsewhere. Nevertheless, the Swedish Senate had accepted the neutrality convention in spite of the Danish defeat at Helsingbourg. The allied belief that the convention had secured immunity for the empire was shattered when Charles, after escaping from Poltava to Bender in Bessarbia, repudiated the neutrality convention and demanded that the guarantors of the Travendal treaty act against Denmark. The Allies’ fear that Charles would appear in Poland at the head of an army of Turks and Tartars and that Krassow would take the offensive inclined them to assemble a body of troops to support the Neutrality Convention of The Hague of 31 March 1709.

The Neutrality Convention, which immobilized 2600 Prussians in August 1710, was, however, only a negative success because the body of troops assembled to support it played only a passive role. The allied distrust of Frederick is evinced in their reluctance to appoint Frederick as commander of the neutrality troops. The Allies feared that he would use the troops for his own ends because they did not know his Northern commitments. The ultimate failure of the Neutrality

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Convention indicates that the English policy in the North was one of "expedients and shifts." St. John, the Secretary of State, felt that it was "like living by the peace of Cordials; an artificial strength opposes the distemper for the present, which returns complicated upon us in a little time, and the effects of the polluting medicine form a new disease." It was dangerous to do anything and yet simultaneously impossible to do nothing. England did not want to become involved in the Northern War, but she could not let the Northern belligerents pull the empire into the war.

Frederick's prolonged negotiations for a Polish partition were also doomed to defeat. Frederick had proposed that Swedish Livonia, Samogitie, and Courland should go to Prussia and the rest of the Polish lands to the king of Poland as his hereditary kingdom. He offered to recall 5,000 men from the Low Countries if Peter would deliver Elbing and part of Pomerania to him and would provide the army with subsidies. Peter, however, insisted on Frederick's total rupture with Sweden. Frederick regarded all participation in the actual war as impossible and

6 P.R.O., S.P. Prussia, 104/52, St. John to Raby, 17 March 1711.

7 See Chance, George I and the Northern War, p.23 where he quotes St. John to Marlborough, 20 July 1711.
refused. Frederick's rather ingenuous belief that Peter and Augustus would cede him valuable territories without his active participation in the war is highlighted by Waddington's contention that "il y a là un curieux chapitre de psychologie à écrire, propre à faire saisir à la fois l'ambition passionnée, la timidité craintive, et l'incroyable capacité d'illusion qui le caractérisaient." 8

Frederick's vacillation proved a mistake. The tsar, menaced by the Turks and the Swedes, offered Frederick Polish Prussia and Ermland on condition that Frederick would provide 15,000 troops in the Northern War. Frederick rejected this offer because he did not want to expose himself to attack by the Swedes, the Turks, and the Tartars. In seeking to gain time, however, he lost the benefit of circumstances. When the tsar was saved by a lucky chance with the conclusion of a peace with the sultan in July 1711, he recovered his freedom of action. Peter was then not inclined to make further advances to Frederick, who had sought to obtain great gains at little risk.

Embittered by the treachery of the Allies and disappointed by the failure of his projects in the North, Frederick turned to France. From September 1709 to February 1710, Frederick negotiated with France. After the deeply disillusioning peace preliminaries, Torcy hoped that his offers would be successful. A crisis occurred in allied relations

8 Waddington, Histoire de Prusse, II, 203.
when Torcy offered Upper Guelders and subsidies to Frederick in order to entice him to a separate peace. These negotiations were, however, frustrated by Grumkow. In November 1709, an officer in the Flanders army, M. de la Sourdrière, was sent to Anvers to meet Grumkow. He did not find Grumkow there, however. His later meeting at Brussels with Grumkow also proved fruitless. Grumkow, who had no written power from the king and who did not appear to be adequately instructed, did not mention either Frederick's claims to Neuchâtel or to the Principality of Orange, or his desire for recognition of his royal title.9

Marlborough feared that Frederick, who was still negotiating with France, would secede from the alliance because of his resentment against the United Provinces. Grumkow, who was sent to The Hague in December 1709 at Marlborough's request, drew up a letter containing England's promises of future support to Frederick. This letter was sent to the Treasurer and a transcript in the queen's hand was remitted to Grumkow to deliver to Frederick. Nevertheless, the French negotiations continued throughout 1710. Eugene, remarking on Frederick's extraordinary conduct, felt that "s'il auroit autant de fermeté que d'ambition, il pourroit causer de grands embarras dans ces conjonctures."10

Leopold von Anhalt-Dessau, Grumkow, and the crown prince


10 Arneth, Prinz Eugen, II, 473.
Frederick William, urged Eugene to come to Berlin in order to break off the French negotiations and to bind Frederick more firmly to the alliance. During Eugene's stay at Berlin from 1 April to 12 April 1710, he succeeded in renewing the Italian treaty and in hindering Frederick from ordering Schmettau to attend the Gertruydenberg conferences. In exchange, Eugene promised Frederick 100,000 Thalers in additional subsidies. The emperor would pay 30,000 Thalers and England would pay two-thirds and the United Provinces one-third of the remaining 70,000 Thalers. Eugene also succeeded in breaking off the French negotiations. Frederick's increasing monetary dependence on the Maritime Powers and England's promises of future support, had, however, already made these negotiations ineffectual.

The Allies also feared that the diminished position of the Wartenberg faction at the Berlin court would endanger the common cause by weakening Frederick's allegiance to the Allies. The opposition of Bogislaw von Kameke and Frederick William was first successful in 1709-1710. The financial collapse of 1709 highlighted the maladministration of the Wartenberg faction. Wartenberg, whose position was

further undermined by the news of the Barrier Treaty, lost his offices at court in 1710. The guidance of foreign affairs was now entirely in Ilgen's hands. Frederick William's influence on foreign policy also increased. In spite of this ministerial shift, Prussia continued to participate actively in the War of the Spanish Succession. Frederick William and Ilgen felt that since the War of the Spanish Succession was nearly at an end, Prussia could not throw away the fruits of her sacrifices. After the peace, Prussia could turn to the Northern War.

The weakened position of Wartenberg and Frederick's disillusionment with the Allies threatened to undermine Raby's influence at court. Raby was ill and was absent from Berlin touring in Italy from July to November 1709. At this time there was a real danger that Frederick would defect from the alliance. Marlborough, who had heard from Raby in three months, deplored the fact that there was no English representative at Berlin. Raby was so dissatisfied with his mission that he again asked to be placed on active duty in the army, even if he had to serve in Portugal. By the spring of 1710, Raby was "weary of our British politick and my employ. I am told I ought not to demand point blank to be recall'd but that I may give them to understand it, wch I have done Sufficiently." 12

At this time Raby also wanted the appointment of plenipotentiary to the peace congress. He was angry with Marlborough because he felt that Marlborough had blocked his appointment. Marlborough felt that a person of Raby's temperament would hinder the negotiations. Marlborough insisted that the third person dominated must be a civilian. However, Boyle, the Secretary of State, had thought that Raby was to act as a plenipotentiary at the peace and had told Raby so.

Marlborough sincerely felt that Raby was damaging the allied cause by remaining at Berlin and urged the queen to recall him. Frederick William was urging Marlborough to have Raby recalled from Berlin. Grumkow was also endeavouring to undermine Raby's position with Frederick and with Marlborough. Lintelo felt that Grumkow as sent to England only to procure Raby's recall. Marlborough had also been informed at The Hague that Raby's presence at Berlin was only injuring the common cause. Marlborough revealingly wrote that the king's jealousy was a subject "that I have not nor do I know how to write to Lord Raby about it, he believes himself extremely well with the King." The


15 B.M., Add. Mss. 9109, ff. 84-85, Marlborough to Godolphin, 11 June 1710.
order for Raby to proceed to The Hague was the preface to his recall from Berlin. Raby probably sensing this, pleaded the excuse of a fever and did not go to The Hague.

Grumkow had written Frederick alleging that he had seen a letter from Raby to Marlborough in which Raby had disparaged Frederick’s policies and his court. Ilgen had sent the letter back to Grumkow before the king had seen it. Raby, however, had seen Grumkow’s letter and insisted that Ilgen present it to the king. Marlborough also wrote Frederick a letter denying that Raby had ever written anything against him. Grumkow had initially succeeded because his insinuations that Raby was an enemy of Marlborough’s and that Raby did not have the confidence of the English ministry had some basis in fact. He could illustrate this contention with a number of plausible instances in which Raby had been by-passed. For example, the Italian treaties had never been renewed by Raby. In 1710 it was renewed by Townshend, a relative stranger to the Italian treaties. Lintelo, a mere envoy, had signed the 1706 augmentation treaty. Marlborough had often offered more advantageous terms than Raby was empowered to offer concerning the augmentations. Marlborough’s private instructions to Palmes and to Prince Eugene had also weakened Raby’s position. The queen’s letter containing her assurances of England’s support after the ratification of the Barrier Treaty had been sent directly to Frederick by Grumkow. Nevertheless, by November the plot against Raby had failed.
Grumkow was caught in a tangle of lies and was discredited at the court. Even Lintelo, an avowed enemy of Raby's felt that "il semble presque impossible de pouvoir croire qu'un homme qui n'aie pas l'esprit trouble en soit capable."\textsuperscript{16}

The disgrace of Grumkow strengthened Raby's position at the court. In November the queen instructed Raby that he was to remain at Berlin. This countermanded an earlier order of October in which he was told to prepare for his recall. Raby's mission to The Hague as ambassador extraordinary was postponed when the news of the Turkish rupture with the tsar made his presence at Berlin necessary. Raby, who resented the change of ministry at Berlin,\textsuperscript{17} was, however, eager to leave Berlin. Upon his formal appointment as Townshend's successor at The Hague, he left Berlin on 25 March 1711. In spite of his sudden departure, it is clear that Frederick still held Raby in great affection.\textsuperscript{18} Frederick had presented Raby at his audience of leave with a sword set with diamonds and continued to correspond with Raby while he was at The Hague.

\textsuperscript{16} Alg. Rijks., Archief Heinsius 1521, Lintelo to Heinsius, Berlin, 4 November 1710.

\textsuperscript{17} B.M., Stowe Mss. 224, Hanover State Papers, 1692-1710, ff. 22-30, Raby to Sophie, 31 January 1711.

\textsuperscript{18} Berner, ed., Briefwechsel, pp. 248-249, Frederick to Sophie, 4 April 1711.
The decline of Frederick's position in the alliance is indicated by the fact that there was no regular English representative in Berlin in 1711. Charles Whitworth was in Berlin only from 16 May 1711 to 11 June 1711. The next English representative to Berlin was William Breton, who arrived in June 1712 and left in August 1714.
CONCLUSION

An analysis of England's relations with Prussia from 1703 to 1711 is vital in understanding Prussia's crucial role between the East and the West and in evaluating Frederick's foreign policy. This dissertation has examined England's decisive influence in tying Frederick to the allied interests. England had mediated the dissensions of an incohesive alliance, persuaded Frederick to fulfill his obligations as an ally, and prevented Prussian involvement in the Northern War. England had succeeded in tying that Proteus, Frederick, to her interests. The years 1703 and 1705 saw Frederick more firmly bound to the Grand Alliance by the Italian treaty in spite of bitter dissensions with the States-General concerning the Orange Succession and with the emperor, which resulted in the Prussian troops recall from the Rhine in 1705. From 1706 to 1708 although Frederick's delays in dispatching his troops to the allied fronts and the projected Triple Alliance had threatened to disrupt the war effort, Frederick was bound more firmly to the Allies by the Swedish threat, as manifested in the establishment of Stanislaus on the Polish throne, and by the allied victories against France. From 1709 to 1711 Frederick remained faithful to the coalition in spite of the neglect of his interests in the peace preliminaries and in the Barrier Treaty because of England's promises of future support. The
Swedish defeat at Poltava (June 1709) threatened again to draw Frederick into the Northern War. Frederick's negotiations with the Northern confederates and with France, however, proved abortive. England had tied Prussia to the alliance by subsidies and by promises of future rewards for his faithfulness. The revolution which ousted the Wartenberg faction and which weakened Raby's position did not lead to a Prussian withdrawal from the alliance. Crown prince Frederick William and Ilgen, who then became dominant, felt that Prussia could not renounce the gains which Frederick hoped to procure from his participation in the war. After the peace in the West, which seemed imminent, Prussia could turn to the Northern War.

Frederick fulfilled his military obligations as a member of the Grand Alliance, in spite of the increasing dissensions within the coalition. His relations with the States-General had so far deteriorated that in November 1712 Frederick's army expelled the Dutch garrison from Moers, a fortress town south of Spanish Guelderland, and took possession. His relations with the emperor had worsened ever since the 1705 troop recall from the Upper Rhine. His relations with England, however, remained friendly in spite of the change to a Tory ministry in 1710. The number of Frederick's men in the allied service is interesting to note for it reveals how far Frederick was tied to the alliance and how great his services were. Frederick provided four main contingents in the War of the Spanish Succession, those provided according to the 1701-1702 treaties with the Maritime Powers, the "alte Korps", the "neue
Korps" and the Italian corps. By the 1701-1702 treaties, Frederick had agreed to provide five battalions and four squadrons in the Low Countries, which amounted to 5,000 men. The so-called "alte Korps," which consisted since 1706 of nine battalions and twenty-one squadrons, amounted to 12,000 men. The so-called "neue Korps" which consisted of five battalions and fourteen squadrons and which had been in service since 1709, numbered about 6,200 men. Since 1704 in Italy there were eleven battalions which consisted of about 8,000 men. Altogether Frederick had thirty battalions and thirty-nine squadrons which amounted to 31,200 men in the allied service. In 1709 when his entire army consisted of 44,000 men, approximately three-fourths of the army was in the service of the Allies.¹

In reward for his services, Frederick acquired substantial gains. First, he obtained subsidies from the Maritime Powers throughout the war which enabled him to maintain his army but at the same time made him a dependent on the Allies. The subsidies which were to be paid for Frederick's troops reveal the financial dependency of Frederick on the Maritime Powers. Although the money was not paid regularly and the arrears were considerable at the end of the war,² the figures also give

¹Braubach, "Die Bedeutung der Subsidien," p.124; Prince Eugene, Feldzüge.
²See for example, the memorial of the Prussian minister at The Hague to the States-General of 18 December 1710 in Lamberty, Mémoires, VIII, 6. For the state of subsidy payments annually granted by Parliament, see B.M., Add. Mss. 22, 264, ff. 71-72.
some idea of the cost of Frederick's troops. The corps of 1702 was to receive pay of 180,000 Kronen from England and 180,000 Kronen from the States-General, at an entire cost of 360,000 Kronen. The "alte Korps" was to receive agio, bread and forage of 155,000 Kronen from England and 155,000 Kronen from the States-General at an entire cost of 310,000 Kronen. The "neue Korps" was to receive pay of 280,000 Kronen from England. The Italian corps was to receive subsidy and recruit money of 47,000 Kronen from England, 23,000 from the States-General, and 30,000 from the emperor at an entire cost of 100,000 Kronen. The total of 1,350,000 Kronen or £337,550 was due annually for the Prussian troops.3

Secondly, he obtained the recognition of his royal title

3 These figures are extracted from Braubach, "Die Bedeutung der Subsidien," p.125. According to Braubach, p.17,

one pound sterling = 4 Kronen or Reichsthaler
= 10 Dutch Gulden
= 12 Livres.

It is important to note that these subsidy payments did not include the payment due from the emperor on account of the Krontraktat because the emperor did not acknowledge that debt after the January 1705 departure of the Prussian troops from the Upper Rhine. The amount which the emperor paid for feeding, douceurs, and maintenance for the Italian corps is not available. An indication of this can, however, be surmised from the demand for 400,000 floren for lodging in 1711. Prince Eugene, Feldzüge, XIII, 34-85.
at the peace of Utrecht. In the peace treaty the Allies fulfilled their pledge to procure France's recognition of Frederick's title of king in Prussia. This recognition was a result of Frederick's commitment to the West. In 1700 Frederick had made the condition for his aid, which he was already obliged to give the emperor according to the 1686 treaty, the recognition of his kingship. The treaty of 16 November 1700, the so-called "Krontraktat" had stipulated Leopold's acceptance of Frederick's accession to the kingly title. Frederick, who believed that only through an alliance with the Maritime Powers would he obtain the recognition of his kingship, had joined the Grand Alliance in 1701-1702. Frederick secured for himself the title of king not of Brandenburg, but in East Prussia, which had been ruled since 1660 by the elector of Brandenburg as a sovereign duchy. The distance of the East Prussian lands from the bulk of the Hohenzollerns' dominions meant that they could hardly be defended against either Poland or Russia. They gave, however, to the new kingdom an independence which would not have accrued to it if it had been attached to the older dominions. The East Prussian lands lay outside of the empire and owed no obligations to the emperor or to any other authority. This attainment of royal status with its attendant
mystique was an important asset to the house of Hohenzollern, which was only diminished by the new royal status of the rulers of Saxony and of Hanover, how became respectively kings of Poland and of England.

Thirdly, he acquired certain lands. A tight alliance with the Maritime Powers had also appeared to guarantee to Frederick the realization of his inheritance pretensions to the entailed property of the house of Orange. Frederick was the first cousin of William III and by the will of Frederick Henry the heir presumptive to the principality of Orange. The king was dissatisfied with the States-General because they seemed to be obstructing his acquisition of William's legacy. For example, the Dutch garrison at Moers had been reportedly hindering the citizens from paying the tenths of the harvest and other rights due to the king. The States-General as executors of William's will had refused to give Frederick the title of Prince of Orange until the whole succession was legally resolved. England's support had helped Frederick to gain certain areas of the disputed Orange Succession, which was not, however, finally resolved until 1732. For example, England's aid had been crucial in Frederick's acquisition of Valengin and Neuchatel, areas strategically situated on the frontier of France and Switzerland. England had promised Frederick that he would acquire at the peace the Principality of Orange, the Burgundian lands in the Franche-Comté, and an indemnity for the loss of Guelderland. There had been considerable friction between Frederick and the States-General over the town of
Guelders, which Frederick's troops had taken in 1702 and which he had held technically as security for the subsidy which Spain and Brandenburg for the last two wars. Frederick received, however, just the opposite. The Principality of Orange and the Burgundian lands went to France. Upper Guelders was allocated to Prussia as compensation for the parts of the Orange inheritance which had been given to France. In spite of Erdmannsdörffer's allegation that Raby was bribed, it seems more likely that Raby, who felt that Frederick had been unjustly treated in the Barrier Treaty and who was a violent partisan of Prussia, pushed Frederick's claims to Spanish Guelders. This action would also be consonant with Raby's personality and with his inclination to guide the ministry if possible. By the peace of Utrecht (1713), Frederick also acquired some of the Orange inheritance which he had annexed during the war: Moers and Lingen (1702), Tecklenburg (1707) and Valengin and Neuchâtel (1707).

4 For the peace of Utrecht see Ottocar Weber, Der Friede von Utrecht (Gotha, 1891).

5 Erdmannsdörffer, Deutsche Geschichte, II, 291.

6 See appendix A.
Thus we see that Frederick's commitment to the West and to England had brought him real advantages. On the other hand, whether Frederick's military intervention in the Northern War would have brought him extensive gains is questionable. His desire for Swedish Pomerania brought him into conflict with Sweden. His attempt to gain West Prussia and Ermeland conflicted with the interests of Russia and Poland. Frederick's very temperament, which was characterized by vacillation, indecision, and temporizing, was unequal to the dexterous manipulation so vital in that uncertain game of the Northern War. In contrast, Frederick was able to achieve some of his goals in the West by using the threat of a troops recall to make the Allies more obliging. Frederick by his inherent weakness was never, however, able to make the army an effective arm of his foreign policy and in the end his role was that of an Auxiliar-macht, a power without political claims or rights at a peace, bound to the Allies by monetary ties, by the allied guarantee of his neutrality in the North, and by the allied promises of future gains. Frederick's baroque infatuation with his power only thinly veiled the fact that he was fettered by his own indecision and weakness. England's policy was so successful because Raby and Marlborough were able to exploit Frederick's weakness in order to secure English interests.
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