CRISIS IDEOLOGY IN AMERICAN SOCIAL
THOUGHT: ITS IMPLICATIONS AND
IMPACT UPON EDUCATION

DISSERTATION

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By

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PREFACE

It is the theme of this essay that the sociology of thought and the scientific organization of bureaucracy, as well as the bureaucratization of science have created a new ideology in American society. This ideology increasingly controls and influences: (1) the socialization of Americans, (2) their conceptions about themselves and their social world, (3) the development of their values and belief systems, (4) the operations (both means and ends) of their scientific activities, and, (5) the functioning of American education. This new ideology that has developed is the ideology of crisis, or if one prefers, the crisis ideology.

The creation of crises and the organized social bureaucracy to ameliorate (not necessarily to resolve) those crises have increasingly become both the sole source of social issues in America and at the same time the exclusive means of resolving those issues. Furthermore, it is argued in the essay that the patterns of access to these bureaucracies are managed both in a sense
of recruitment to and guidance through them. Notwithstanding illusions of openness of process or democratic participation the bureaucratic activities are, of course, also managed and planned.

Thus, one of the themes that emerges in this essay is that the crisis ideology in America can be seen both as a function of structure and also as the ideological generator of changed social structure. Which vantage point offers the richest collection of social findings depends upon the institutions involved and the locus of the crisis in society. To search for a definitive beginning or end point in terms of sequence, however, would be both elusive and inconsequential because we are concerned with not pattern but with resulting process.

Another theme mentioned in the essay contends that the crisis ideology results from what historically was a combination of the scientific method and the bureaucratic structure of the modern corporate state. When these two social processes combined, they did not remain separate status isolated social entities. Rather, both the method on the one hand, and the system of organization on the other, had mutual influences on each other. Both were changed as a result of this
gradual social collision. These changed social processes had both social effect and ideological import. A new ideological focus was born.

Thus, the crisis ideology is more than a statement about the problem solving methodology of science. It is the social and political representation of the problem solving methodology of science in bureaucratic-institutional settings. In a mass society institutions define and legitimate the aspirations of men. They also validate the enterprise of individuals engaged in intellectual activity, and as institutions define for the citizens the content and limits of social pluralism in the society.

The method employed in the essay is essentially the historical method of empirical sociology that has in the past been so excellently represented by the works of men such as the late C. Wright Mills. History and historical trends in social thought and social action are developed in order to show patterns from which one may seek meanings for our era. Our behavior, our institutions, and our intellectual processes must be linked in meaning both in sociological prospective and historical depth.
By way of summary perhaps a few words about the form this essay takes would now be relevant. The first chapter traces the patterns of thought historically that are seen as the intellectual foundations of the crisis ideology. No claim is made for total, complete coverage. It could be argued that many more ideas, some older in terms of history, have played equally important roles in the formation of the crisis ideology. I concede that this claim may be true. One can, when viewing the affairs of men begin one's "leap of faith" at any hour in social time and at any position in the social milieu. What is suggested however, is that the major ideas, the controlling philosophical and sociological insights leading to the modern era, are included in the historical overview.

Chapter II discusses the immediate postwar era in American intellectual-scientific thought. The various social institutions that affected these thought processes are discussed. The conditions for the eventual evolution of the crisis ideology are seen initially as the value neutral position in social thought, followed by the end of ideology as a social view of the world, and culminating in the mood of moral indignation among
social critics. These three themes are discussed in sequential and developmental terms each related to the formation of the other.

Chapter III shows an aspect of the crisis ideology as that ideology is used to create both the illusion of social pluralism and as it actually is used to destroy the possibility of that social pluralism. The counterculture is seen as an illusion of the former, and the use of law against the Black community in America an example of the latter.

Chapter IV reveals the crisis ideology in terms of legal process and educational structure. In this chapter the history of the legal process as it applies in educational institutions, academic issues, and school policies is shown. The law is seen as a means by which the school can define both the institutional goals and create intellectual trends. Moral issues are seen as being transferred into legal problems, or questions involving policy considerations and the use of bureaucratic expertise.

The next chapter shows a case study of the operation of the crisis ideology in America. The example under discussion and review is the drug crisis in our society.
The development of the problem, the use of ideology, and the selectivity of approach are shown against a background where the real social significance of these processes is revealed. Drugs, it will be urged, should not be viewed so much as a problem (a crisis) but rather as an indication of a larger social process that results from a specific ideological focus.

Chapter VI examines the crisis ideology within the field of education. The example selected for analysis is the academic area known as special education. The techniques of behavior modification, encounter group therapy, and the use of drugs are discussed both as a means of social control mitigating against social pluralism in the school, and also as a social process. This process it is suggested makes the distinctions that children must make between honest and contrived behavior, illusion and reality increasingly difficult.

The essay then continues with a discussion of ideology and the area of ethics. This chapter shows how the pluralism that once existed in human affairs over competing moral standards (politics) has been reduced by the crisis ideology. This chapter reveals concerns with illusory ethical issues, for example, questions
involving the personal conduct of the scholar-scientist
and comments on the heart of the matter: that all ethics
and morals are becoming functions of the scientific-
bureaucratic process. The chapter concludes that moral
and ethical questions arise and are asked (intellectually
or socially) only when there is personal ideational
difference (often conflict) and its sociological counter-
part, social pluralism.

In the last chapter, Chapter VIII, some concluding
remarks are offered for the reader. Some of these
statements may seem to be bold. To those who are shocked
by the boldness I reply that they should examine carefully
the sociological aspects of their own surprise. This
self examination might best be the beginning for any
critical assessment of the conclusions. For those
however, who think my remarks meek and not projective
enough, I can only say that while I anticipate that my
insights will grow, I am also conscious to paraphrase
Che, of the nature of the beast. I feel that at this
eyearly stage of a move toward meaning in intellectual
life that some measure of skilled privacy is often
the best and loudest answer for the concerned man.
I agree with Sylvia Plath the poet when she says that
"Perfection is terrible, it cannot have children. Cold as snow breath, it tamps the womb."\(^1\)

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I wish to acknowledge my teacher, Professor Bernard Mehl, who I met as an unfulfilled person and a confused student and through whom I became a man, and hopefully, a teacher of men. I owe him essentially everything. He was responsible for teaching, directing, and guiding me over so gently, and with a rare quality of beauty few men possess. His wife Mickey added no small amount of support, counsel, and advice. She, upon occasion, gave me much needed moral insights as to both the nature of my own conduct and my social perceptions.

Professor Mehl's four sons, Eric, Marc, Kurt, and Aaron each in their own unique ways so enriched my life during my period of study with their father that any simple statement of thanks is both hopelessly inadequate and perhaps even improper. My love for each of them continues to grow with each passing year, and my joy at seeing each of them recalls not only past memories but brings to my mind a genuine shared pleasure in their present activities.
To acknowledge a family is perhaps not unique. To acknowledge one that is not one's own may well be. Certainly the Mehl's were and continue to be for me in ways perhaps best left private a uniquely meaningful and moving people. To the extent that I am conscious of my future obligations as a teacher I must gratefully thank all of them.

Finally, to such a wonderful group of individuals all I can say is that I owe you more than I should put in words here. I will have to find some other way. Perhaps my wife Elizabeth and I have begun to do so with the birth of our lovely daughter Rachel.
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CHAPTER I

THE ROOTS OF CRISIS IDEOLOGY: AN HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF IDEAS LEADING TO PATTERNS OF CRISIS THOUGHT

The French Revolution of 1789, more than any other single fact in the modern history of man, generated specifically new awareness in the course of human history and social thought because it singled the beginning of ideological thought for western man. As a revolution, the events of 1789 were essentially a middle class movement. The middle class as an economic group had risen to a position of financial, professional and technological importance in French society without either equal gains in social prestige or political importance. Personal irritation soon gave way to social discontent. The transformation of social grievances into a revolutionary force occurred when the desires of the industrial commercial, and financial leaders for social equilibrium changed and became a determination to act.
The social action of the revolution, the attack on the old order, ignited the minds of most intellectuals of the day. Among those men who enthusiastically followed the progressive swell of political ideas and social action programs were former aristocrats such as Saint-Simon. These philosophers were correctly convinced that the Ancien Regime could not last. They quickly found a new social purpose in the role of enlightened nobles, and some measure of restored personal prestige as enterprising social philosophers.

Many of these men, Saint-Simon included were themselves willing to admit the deficiencies of their own (past) politics and their shortcomings as would-be politicians. They preferred to have politics, all politics purified. The competing classes and factions should be purged and replaced with principles and doctrines. Secretly, they had a fear of genuine democracy. In their aristocratic eyes such a social system would lead to disorder and chaos.

As Felix Markham in his introduction to the collected works of Saint-Simon says:

Saint-Simon, like de Tocqueville, was an aristocrat, who realized that the day of his class was over, and foresaw the coming of the age of the masses; but whereas de Tocqueville was repelled
by the prospect, and thought mainly in terms of safeguards against 'democratic despotism', Saint-Simon wished to take hold of the new age and mould it into a harmonious and constructive form. He did not see the elements of the new age as separate or conflicting, but rather as parts of an organic whole.1 (Italics mine.)

Saint-Simon basically was dominated by the seventeenth and eighteenth century assumptions that the only true knowledge was mathematical. Along these lines he sought for a universal concept:

... (He) is primarily concerned with a philosophical and scientific problem, the search for the unity of knowledge ... which he regarded as the purest and most successful example of scientific thinking.2

In Saint-Simon's mind these topics are not unrelated to each other. They are aspects of the same problem. In his synthesis of these questions the originality of his work exists. It is true that his synthesis breaks down, but the fact remains that no other political and social thinker of the nineteenth century surpasses him in originality of approach to these


2Ibid., p. xx.
problems, or for that matter, in boldness of view. Saint-Simon's argument, when summarized, could be outlined as follows:

In medieval civilization, a universally accepted religion ensured the stability of society; but the growth of scientific thought, the emergence of a commercial middle class, the Protestant Reformation, and the skeptical criticism of the eighteenth-century rationalists have undermined the Catholic Church, and the international authority of the Papacy. The metaphysicians and the lawyers, with their negative principles of 'natural rights' and 'equality' have completed the disintegration of the old society, but are totally unable to organize a new one. These destructive forces have culminated in the upheaval of the French Revolution. The task of the nineteenth century must therefore be to rebuild an organic society on the basis of the new ideas and the new forces.3

(Italics mine.)

For Saint-Simon, a new organic society cannot come into being until unity and coherence have been restored to the realm of thought. Human thinking of him has passed successively through the stages of polytheism to monotheism, to metaphysics, and then to positive science. Mathematics and physics have been the first to become scientific and positive. Biology, physiology, and the science of human behavior, which Saint-Simon called social

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3 Ibid., pp. xx, xxi.
physiology, must also become scientific and positive.

The results of this process were clear to Saint-Simon. Thus,

... an encyclopedia of scientific knowledge will become possible, to replace the medieval Summa Theologica: the certainties of science will replace the dogmas of the medieval church; the scientists and captains of industry will replace the priests and the feudal lords as the natural leaders of society.4 (Italics mine.).

Saint-Simon, in one passage of his work made reference to this social process as a New Christianity. Finally, he says,

... New Christianity is called upon to pronounce anathema upon theology, and to condemn as unholy any doctrine trying to teach men that there is any other way of obtaining eternal life, except that of working with all their might for the improvement of the conditions of life of their fellow men.5 (Italics mine.).

Saint-Simon thus placed his positivism in religious terms. A specific claim to exclusivity was made by him in the strongest of terms--anything else was to be declared unholy, and man's relationship to his fellow man and his own environment was construed in purely functional pathological terms. The new orientation that Saint-Simon foresaw carried with it another feature that furthered

4 Ibid., p. xxi.  
5 Ibid., p. 105.
the similarity with Christianity: it was to be messianic. Thus,

... The New Christians should have the same character and follow the same course as the Christians of the early church; they should use nothing but their intelligence to spread their doctrine.6 (Italics mine.).

Saint-Simon died in 1825, too soon to see much progress in his New Christianity of positivist thought. He did leave, however, an able heir in the person of his former student, Auguste Comte, and it was Comte who developed the rough ideas of Saint-Simon into a more specific, detailed statement of what positivism was, and what the position of the intellectual in the positivistic society was to be.

For Comte, positivism was defined as the application of scientific method to every aspect of nature and human experience. Comte defines the positive stage in human development as that period in which,

The human spirit, recognizing the impossibility of obtaining absolute conceptions, abandons the search for the origin and goal of the universe and the inner causes of things, to set itself the task of merely discovering, by reason and experience combined effective laws of phenomena, that is to

6 Ibid., p. 110.
say their invariable relations of succession and of similarity.\textsuperscript{7} (Italics mine.).

For the discoverer of these laws, the social scientist, Comte envisioned nothing short of the position of philosopher-king, and dismissed fears of a despotism founded on science as a ridiculous and absurd fantasy. For Comte, the allegiance of the people to their new scientific leaders would be of quite a different character from the unreasoning obedience to priests in the "theological phase". Reason would prevail, and would ensure man's freedom.\textsuperscript{8} Man would be free because, for Comte, there was no philosophy of history in positivism; only a generalizing sociology encompassing and classifying contemporary life-act phenomena.

The advent of what could be called the positivist mood fully revealed this problematic view of the world. The positivist movement killed the universalistic spirit of the liberal era (all men are created equal, for example),


\textsuperscript{8}J. S. Mill, \textit{Autobiography} (London: Hamish, 1873), p. 9. In his autobiography Mill described the Comtian religion as "the most complete system of spiritual and temporal despotism that ever issued from the brain of any human being--except, perhaps, Ignatius Loyola."
destroyed all metaphysical presuppositions, and in the end, moved far beyond Comte's position. Positivism made it impossible to arrive at any kind of theoretical decision about human affairs or the conduct of society. No absolutes, not even the absolutes of Saint-Simon's "New Christainity, were able to withstand the challenge. 9

This later positivism reached its maturity in the 1870's, and its exponents glorified the industrious gathering of empirical data, and succeeded in flooding man with masses of unassimilated "knowledge". Economics, history, and social science avoided making generalizations until more "knowledge", in the form of social statistics,

9 In France the exponents of reason and science initially celebrated individual liberty and human dignity. In less than 25 years, however, their opposites, the "scientific organization of communal life and social usefulness" became the focus for them. Floyd Matson summarized in succinct terms when he said:

"The comprehensive attempt to apply scientific method to the rationalization of human conduct—what might be termed the first systematic program of behavioral engineering—turned out to be, not a dispassionate and positive science of behavior, but a wholly passionate and negative campaign to make men behave. . . . In the hands of its most devoted missionaries, the natural scientists of behavior, this faith in social and political physics has produced with impressive regularity the vision of a techno-scientific future."

could be accumulated. Positivism thus produced three clear things: (1) a **scientific objectification of the world** of man and of man himself, (2) an **intellectual value vacuum**, where conclusions, interpretations, and extrapolations about data were avoided, and (3) an **abandonment of the search for absolutes and timeless values**, since all was seen as historically determined and alterable. The doors of relativism and pessimism were opening, and Nietzsche was walking through the doorway onto the stage of human thought.

Nietzsche believed that man's concern for knowledge and truth was **social, not scientific**. He employed the social contract doctrine to explain its origin. For Nietzsche, man needed a belief in truth, and in turn, **truth became a social need of man**. The "truth" for Nietzsche begins with language, which introduces into the development of human culture an immediate and erroneous view of the world because man's conceptual world, as revealed in language, is distorted by the power relationships existing in that society at any given moment in time. Truth emerges as the falsification of reality because the only real truth is a process without
end—the will to power.¹⁰ Our values correspond to our life conditions, and when these change our values also change. Modern decadence began for Nietzsche in the Christian values that had come to dominate man's moral and intellectual thoughts.

In Nietzsche's theory of ideology, all products of the mind lose their autonomy. He states that all moral systems, religious, legal, political, are universally a propaganda device(s) of men. All men follow the will-to-power, either by wielding power or by striving for it. In his eyes the human mind is a citadel of trickery and cunning that allows man to self-rightously control his fellow man.

Friedrich Nietzsche was thus the first philosopher who essentially tried to live with the notion that truth was dead.¹¹ His philosophy, rather than avoid this notion or disguise its importance, transferred the existence of falsehoods into a kind of a truth: he saw lies as a life necessity for man. Nietzsche thus saw the intellectual condition of man as one where errors

¹¹Ibid., p. 184.
(lies) were justified into truths by the functioning of the sociological conditions prevailing in society: ultimately, the will-to-power in man.

For Marx more than the functioning of the sociological conditions were important. Marx saw the concept of ideology as total. All ideas (Nietzsche's included) merely reflect the thinker's position in the process of production or his class position. The entire mind is ideological. Marx saw the relationship between ideological analysis and political argument as being closely related phenomena. Thus, in his political arguments, Marx would not only have to be correct (using his ideology) but would also have to destroy and demolish the basis of his opponents' (exposing their ideology) social and intellectual existence.

Political debate and social reasoning moved from weighing the theoretical relevance of an argument to demolishing the existential foundation of an opponents thinking. The entire life-situation, as well as the entire thought situation of an opponent, was called into question. For Marx, the ideological analysis was in the main only a strategic tool; one used in the class struggle, and aimed at the middle class or bourgeoisie. Marx's ideological
analysis was a weapon used on behalf of the working class: it was not a method of general social analysis. Thus, while ideological thinking had been exposed, it was not universalized.\textsuperscript{12}

At this stage in the development of intellectual concepts that bear on the crisis ideology we turn to Freud, for in Freud we see the advance of the scientific ideology in human affairs to an examination and categorization of mental phenomena. In essence, Freud elaborated a theory of essentially biological determination of knowledge. For Freud there was no question, no issue, no moral argument involved in the examination of man. He accepted completely the devaluation of reason that began with Saint-Simon and Comte and continued with Nietzsche and Marx. Indeed, Freud constructed his psychology upon this devaluation of reason.\textsuperscript{13}

He stated that the mental life was divided into three parts: the conscious, the preconscious, and, the


unconscious. For Freud, the most important and also the largest of the three categories was the unconscious. Freud thus departed with those who felt consciousness was completely mental—for him it was only a small portion of man's mental process. Man's mind, moreover, was more than the simple interaction of conscious mind and social structure. Thus, in a manner of speaking, the doubts voiced by Saint-Simon concerning Christianity, its spiritual elements and its organization which were hopefully rectified by the social scientific postulates of the New Christianity, were extended in both subject and form by Freud. In essence Freud said that all elements of the non-material superstructure, religion, morality, social organization, law, and philosophy were determined by an instinctive internal substructure inside man. Ideology was based upon instinct, or upon the social distortion of that instinct.  

It followed, that for Freud the control and understanding of this substructure constituted the proper undertaking of mankind.

Karl Mannheim pictured the thought of every group not as distortion of human instincts but rather as arising

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out of that group's life conditions. For Mannheim the task of the sociological-historian of thought was to analyze all of the factors in the existing social situation which influenced thought. Mannheim saw the thought of all groups as ideological and as a result became concerned with the trends and movements of positivism, extreme historicism, and relativism in the area of human thought, which he saw developing in terms of the social situation of man. Mannheim states that:

New forms of knowledge, in the last analysis, grow out of the conditions of collective life and do not depend for their emergence upon the prior demonstration by a theory of knowledge that they are possible; they do not therefore need to be first legitimized by an epistemology. The relationship is actually quite the reverse: the development of theories of scientific knowledge takes place in the preoccupation with those of the later. (Italics mine.).

For Mannheim there is no question that this approach has justification. True, there are areas of political and social historical knowledge where, no doubt, a pattern or a regularity can be formulated independently.


16 Ibid., p. 289.
of one's political position, but

By constantly taking account of all the various types of knowledge, ranging from earlier intuitive impressions to controlled observation, the sociology of knowledge seeks to obtain systematic comprehension of the relationship between social existence and thought. The whole life of an historical-social group presents itself as an interdependent configuration; thought is only its expression and the interaction between these two aspects of life is the essential element in the configuration, the detailed interconnections of which must be traced if it is to be understood.17 (Italics mine.).

For us the question is not whether we are unhappy because we are frustrated (Freud), or whether we are frustrated because we are unhappy (Mannheim), because it is the spirit of modern science, e.g., the process, that is a reflection of the one vital aspect of the nature of man that we must now consider.

It has been repeatedly declared by scientists, intellectuals, and theologians alike, that the world which science presents is void of meaning and that science does not show man what ends he ought to make by his use of scientific means.18 Even the terror that his knowledge

17 Ibid., p. 309.

presents to him, in terms of scientific artifacts, the bomb for example, does not seem to deter man. If man is the only animal capable of boredom, then it appears that if he has to be busy at something, it is going to be science, or some social aspect of the scientific process. For the historical roots of this process, we turn to the sociology of Max Weber.

Max Weber found in Calvinism one explanation of the gospel of work in modern society. Calvin held that it is God's will that man should work in the building of His kingdom. Thus, the work of man became his duty, dignified as a calling, and regarded as proof of one's standing, economically and spiritually. Whether, without Calvinism, modern Capitalism would have failed to come into existence, is not the question. The important item to note for our analysis is that a rational, functional, economic view of man entered another area of human life, and was elevated to an ideological level, that of religion. Saint-Simon's New Christianity had found a home in the sociology of Max Weber.

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19As Marcuse shows work can encompass all "forms" of creativity and art. See H. Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon, 1969).
It does not concern us if this stage of intellectual thought provided the underpinnings and justifications for the factory system, the concept of wage labor, or what is generally known as mass production, or was a reaction to those changed social conditions. What is important is that the functionalist view of man combined harmoniously with a religious doctrine, thus avoiding the necessary political and economic revolution envisioned by Marx. This social process, this harmonious combination, paved the way for the development of modern corporate capitalism and the sociological aspects of the modern corporate state: the modern bureaucracy. The reason for this was that, unlike Marxist social thought, the focus of social criticism in the United States was not directed at the deep structural phenomena and institutional changes within society, but rather upon the individual and his position, rank, authority, identity, and the legitimating functions of status and esteem within the social system. If social science had gone astray, it is to C. Wright Mills that we

20The political and economic revolution that Marx envisioned still did not remove the combination of work with ideology and the subsequent proliferation of bureaucracy. Work, "quotas" became in the U.S.S.R. synonymous with "correct" Marxist principles. See H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization (Boston: Beacon, 1954).
must turn to find what the ingredients of the social imagination should be.

In *The Sociological Imagination* Mills raises vexing questions as to what the proper subject of analysis is for the social scientist, and what his task(s) should be. Mills points out that the study of modern bureaucracy, and the management, administration, and operation of large organizations and institutions has been the central thrust of much of American social science. This he correctly assesses as a conservative mood in American intellectual thinking, of which the intellectual himself may not be aware. Mills says:

> Increasingly, research is used, and social scientists are used, for bureaucratic and ideological purposes. This being so, as individuals and as professionals, students of man and society face such questions as; whether they are aware of the uses and values of their work, whether these may be subject to their own control, whether they want to seek to control them.\(^{21}\) (Italics mine.).

For Mills how the social scientist answers these questions is the key issue. As he says:

> How they answer these questions, or fail to answer them, and how they use or fail to use

the answers in their work and in their professional lives determine their answer to the final question: Whether in their work as social scientists they are: (a) morally autonomous, (b) subject to the morality of other men, (c) morally adrift. 22 (Italics mine.).

Nor does Mills leave the student of society in the air as to what he thinks the obligations of the social scientist should be. Mills believes that:

... What he ought to do for the individual is to turn personal troubles and concerns into social issues and problems open to reason--his aim is to help the individual become a self-educating man, who only then would be reasonable and free. What he ought to do for society is to combat all those forces which are destroying genuine publics and creating a mass society--or put as a positive goal, his aim is to help build and strengthen self-cultivating publics. Only then might society be reasonable and free. 23 (Italics mine.).

These are large goals, and they encompass great skills, the proper values, and no small degree of imagination. Mills is fully aware of this, and he also recognizes that men make their own histories, but they do not make it under conditions of their own choice. For Mills what is required by the society in which the social scientist is to successfully, as Mills has so defined it, pursue his craft are:

... parties and movements and publics have two

22 Ibid., p. 178. 23 Ibid., p. 186.
characteristics: (1) within them ideas and alternatives of social life are truly debated, and, (2) they have a chance really to influence decisions of structural consequence . . . Such a situation . . . I should consider one major requirement for any fully democratic society.24 (Italics mine.).

In order to examine the probabilities of Mills' conditions for the social scientist actually existing, or coming into existence, in modern bureaucratic society, the work of Herbert Marcuse is most instructive.

Marcuse, in his work, One Dimensional Man, slams the door on Mills' conditions of society necessary for the social scientist to pursue his craft, and shows little hope for man. For Marcuse, unlike Mills, it is not the chance to influence that is important but, rather, what choices in fact are made. In short, it is what is done that counts. All else is unimportant.

The range of choice open to the individual is not the decisive factor in determining the degree of human freedom, but what can be chosen and what is chosen by the individual . . . Free election of masters does not abolish the masters or the slaves. Free choice among a wide variety of goods and services does not signify freedom if these goods and services sustain social controls over a life of toil and fear--that is, if they sustain alienation.25 (Italics mine.).

24Ibid., p. 190.
Thus the products of society, its abundances (not its scarcities as formally thought), emerge as a repressive measures employed against man. This occurs when these goods and services in fact, by their consumption, increase the social control over man, and add to the increasing social cohesion of society. For example, working at an occupation to purchase an automobile, a television set, and an array of "labor saving" appliances which are manufactured (technologically produced), and subsequently using these items is unfreedom because man is the servant of the social order, in this case certain highly integrated systems of production and manufacturing.

Stated simplistically: Man "toils" to "freely" consume institutionally created products, the very consumption of which ensures the ever increasing social cohesion brought about by institutional combination and growth. This mitigates against his freedom in that genuine options (real choices) are being foreclosed. Marcuse does not see this process limited to consumer items but as covering all facets of social life. He states that there

... emerges a pattern of one-dimensional thought and behavior in which ideas, aspirations, and

\(^{26}\text{Ibid.}, p. 12.\)
objectives that by their content, transcend the established universe of discourse and action are either repelled or reduced to terms of this universe. They are redefined by the rationality of the given system and of its quantitative extension. . . . 27 (Italics mine.)

Marcuse suggests that this process of either reduction or destruction of transcending ideas is a trend that . . . may be related to a development in scientific method: operationalism in the physical, behaviorism in the social sciences. The common feature is total empiricism in the treatment of concepts; their meaning is restricted to the representation of particular operations and behavior. 28 (Italics mine.)

Man thus becomes his function, and he is this function in an ahistorical society, a society without philosophy, but, as Ellul will show us, a society with technique. 29

27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Marcuse continues at page 32:

". . . in reality, neither the utilization of administrative rather than physical controls ... compensate for the fact that the decisions over life and death, over personal and national security are made at places over which the individuals have no control. The slaves of developed industrial civilization are sublimated slaves, but they are slaves, for slavery is determined neither by obedience nor by hardness of labor but by the status of being a mere instrument, and the reduction of man to the state of a thing.

See also, Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem. (New York: Viking Press, 1963). Eichmann's defense was that he was just a "cog" in the machinery, and Arendt states that the function of the trial, in that view, is to turn a "cog"
In Ellul's eyes technique begins with:

The growth of technology, the interference in all domains by the new 'class' of technicians, the processes of propaganda, the attempts to establish a systematic sociological structure, the desire to create democratic processes by 'conditioning'—all this has now turned the debate toward the heart and mind of individual man, his personal relationship with the groups to which he belongs. (Italics mine.).

Thus, the process of creating an illusion of democracy in the modern era is not a question of social philosophy, or a problem requiring political action, but rather a new kind of concern for man: the development of technique. For Norman Mailer this technique embodies essentially, as we can see by his descriptions of the N.A.S.A. technicians, the notions of Saint-Simon's New Christianity. Mailer writes that:

. . . Everybody at N.A.S.A. was courteous, helpful, generous of information, saintly at repeating the same information a hundred times, and subtly proud of their ability to serve interchangeable for one another, as if the real secret of their discipline and their strength and their sense of morale was that they had depersonalized themselves to the point where they were true Christians, gentle, helpful, replaceable, and serving on a messianic mission. The only flaw was that the

back into a "man" and to have him stand the tests of moral judgement of his fellow men.

conversation could only voyage through pre-determined patterns. They would do their best to answer any technical question in the world, and voluminous mimeographings of N.A.S.A. literature, often valuable enough to be classified, were available to all the Press. It was just that there was no way to suggest any philosophical meandering.  

Thus, both Mailer and Ellul ask that we learn about the new Church in our midst. In Ellul's manner of approach there are three facts that determine the world we live in. He says that these facts are:

The prodigious increase in our means of action makes it impossible for us to claim any control whatever over those means. Rather they control us.

The intensity of these means of action and their immediate and constant presence in our lives provoke without our wanting it or even being conscious of it a definitive primacy of action over thought, mediation, choice, judgment.

The means determine the ends, by assigning us ends that can be attained and eliminating those considered unrealistic because our means do not correspond to them. At the same time the means corrupt the ends.

Finally, any quest for true democracy demands that we question all our cliches, all social evidence at present admitted without discussion; all collective sociological presuppositions that permit us to be in

agreement at the most superficial level with our fellow citizens.\textsuperscript{32}

These statements clearly have parallel in the course of human history. In earlier times each one could have been applied to the Church. For example, the first statement concerning the prodigious increase in means of action could be likened to the universalistic nature of the medieval church which promoted, rather than a concern with theological pluralism, an infatuation with cannon law and a form of intellectual debate during what is now known as the scholastic era which saw moral issues transformed into semantic differences.

The second statement, that means determine the ends, could be analogized to institutional history of the church. The absence of democratic means in the church was reflected in a clearly evolving religious bureaucratic structure. It was the operation of this structure that determined the ends toward which the church, as an institution responded.

Finally, by admonishing us to examine ourselves and the nature of our positions in the social universe, Ellul is actually calling for man to be the Martin Luther's of

\textsuperscript{32}Jacques, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 238-239.
the technological era. The implications are clear, it seems to me, that if man asks and weighs questions, as Ellul urges, then his acts may portent a coming reformation in social affairs, and in the structure and pattern of how those affairs are called to the attention of man.

Ellul remains pessimistic about the possibilities of a reformation for two reasons. The first lies in the repressive uses of information in the process of political action, and the second involves a realization of the real nature of democracy. As he states:

I believed that genuine information is an asset in political activity. But the opposite turned out to be true. Information is needed to confirm that a chosen political course is right.33 (Italics mine.).

and that for him,

Democracy cannot be defended: it is not a capital city, a fortress, or a magic formula, (as a constitution is). Democracy becomes possible only through every citizen's will: it remakes itself every day, through every citizen.34 (Italics mine.).

Thus, the ideological existence and uses of all information and the absence of real democracy from all institutional processes make chances of reformation slim.

For Ellul, these patterns of illusion develop and have

\[33\text{Ibid., p. 126.}\]  \[34\text{Ibid., p. 230.}\]
more power than social reality itself. They determine the problems, issues, and crises of our time.

With Ellul we have come full circle in terms of the historical development of the ideas that underlie the crisis ideology in American society. No linear sequence between Saint-Simon, Comte, Nietzsche, Marx, Freud, Mannheim, Weber, Mills, Marcuse, and Ellul is claimed. Rather common interlocking, overlapping, and complementary themes are established. In developmental terms, these ideas make specific contributions to human knowledge about the fragmentation of thought, the prevalence of suspicion (distrust), and the use of illusions in our lives. Retaining the historical overview of these ideas as a perspective, let us now turn our analysis to an examination of the issues of value neutrality in science, the end of ideology school of social thought, and the appearance of moral indignation as an intellectual mood. These social phenomena both intellectually influenced and socially contributed to the development of the crisis ideology in America from the conclusion of World War II until the early 1960's.
CHAPTER II

CRISIS VALUES IN AMERICA: THE POSTWAR PATTERNS OF VALUE NEUTRALITY IN SCIENCE, THE END OF IDEOLOGY IN SOCIAL THOUGHT, AND THE MOOD OF MORAL INDIGNATION IN INTELLECTUAL CRITICISM

Immediately after World War II, the process of moral confusion in the American mind was accelerated by a subtle sequence in American thought—perhaps the result of having fought a long, bitter, and ideological war—the realization that the mind was bound by idols, dogmas, and superstitions. The result of this subtle perception was a systematic attempt in the social sciences to avoid these contaminating pitfalls of "ideological thinking", in both academic work and professional activity. Yet, ironically, this realization, and the alleged avoidance of ideology answered no questions and solved no human problems. Rather, the process of value neutrality in the social sciences accelerated the drift of modern man because the
middle class intellectual had divorced himself from the politics of his craft.

The exhaustion of the ethical stance in education went hand in hand with the disappearance of the intellectual attitude and the presence of increased research and empirical verification techniques. Bernard Berelson, in an article, captures the drift when he says:

Twenty years ago the study of Public Opinion was part of scholarship. Today it is part of science.¹

Quantifiability, statistical correlation, and sophisticated measurement scales are increasingly represented as the characteristics of genuine knowledge. These empirical techniques began during the 1950's to underlie our intellectual values and form the content of our academic disciplines. Louis Kampf, in his article, "The Scandal of Literary Scholarship", comments on both the quality and the numbing effects of the language. In part he writes:

There is no apparent limit to the academy's capacity for institutionalising, not merely

innovations, but the most intemperate onsloughs against the Establishment. By now someone must surely be teaching a graduate seminar on Ken Kesey, perhaps in the form of a psychedelic be-in. Lest some backward English department falter in absorbing the latest cultural events, the MLA will lend both material and moral support by organizing the appropriate discussion sections, by publishing official journals and newsletters, and by assuring us of the national, even transcendent, importance of the task.2

( Italics mine. ).

For Kampf our language has become essentially a make do language, a language debased by statistics, empiricism and an inventory of facts all used as merely a convenient and crude way of pointing. Intellectual language is shallow, bleached, and not expressive in itself. It is no longer a part of experience or an indication of the intellectual's own reality.

During this period of intellectual history, personal history, time measure, and quality of content have begun to disappear from language. The intellectual, in his bureaucratic position and his involvement with empirical data, increasingly necessary to "cope" with the coming technological society or, perhaps, to master illiteracy

in a historical context, became the prime generator of a new phenomenon: the specializing language.

It is true, that only by developing specializing terminology we were able to increase our articulate abstractions about the world. The data obtained not only "increased" our knowledge of the world, but more importantly it caused the passion for information to grow. The growth in information was further reflected by an increase in the specializing language. Which specific elements in the pattern occurred first is not as important as noting that, rather than moving towards a holistic meaning these languages fractionated the universe of man.

Literally, the process of language is, in one degree or another, a movement toward meaning. Meanings have effects on people, some expected and predictable, others unexpected and unpredictable. In a mass society, where as a central condition of definition, more people receive opinions than generate them; a situation of misunderstanding and unpredictability would be intolerable. Meaning in language threatens the social cohesion of a mass society. For a mass society to exist, language must become "non-meaning" or at least a neutral vessel in which "data" can be transmitted. It is not that the doublethink
situation of Orwell's 1984 has arrived, but, rather, that the center of gravity as to who, or what, legitimates and enfuses meaning in language has passed from man to his institutions. For example, "democracy" is not how man lives, but a system of institutional arrangements, "education" is not knowledge, but an achievement of structural positions of importance, and vocabulary words--"professional", "freedom", "individual", are defined by something other than man.

Meanings in language in the mass society come from institutionally approved sources and in institutionally approved ways. Thus, the Scranton Commission Report, the Grand Jury findings on the killing of the students at Kent State University, cannot be differentiated from I. F. Stone's brilliant account of the tragedy; but both stand in distinction to the poet. It is perhaps the poet, who holds the magic of revolutionary hope, meaning, against the world of specializing language and value neutrality.

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He nourishes us, comforts us, and gently tells us about ourselves--radical acts in world of the mass society with a scientific culture.\(^4\)

As our history demonstrates, once the scientific subculture has taken hold, the rush to emulate it, because of a failure of nerve, or simply to avoid the stigma of inferiority (bureaucratic position, psychic and monetary rewards, and personal esteem), becomes overwhelming. In an article in the *American Journal of Sociology*, George A. Lundberg says:

\[\ldots\] I have always preferred to characterize my own viewpoint as that of natural science rather than to identify it with any of the conventional schools of traditional philosophy.\(^5\) Dodd and I, in common, I believe, with all other natural scientists, do indeed proceed on the postulate that the data of empirical science consist of symbolized reactions through the media of the human senses.\(^5\) (Italics mine.)

For Lundberg and others of his viewpoint the position was clearly established that sociology had

\(^4\)It is, after all, our minds and imagination, that in the end will redeem us from our technological redeemers. Our experiences must be earned from and learning from experiences used imaginatively.

moved from social philosophy, a speculative art, to a
natural science motif with empirical investigation and
classification techniques, from value to fact, or, more
precisely, value neutrality.

Adhering to a position of value neutrality had
clear liabilities for the intellectuals and the educational
process. Moral indecision was called open-mindedness, no
one wanted to be inflexible; the absence of intellectual
criteria, was called tolerance, no one wished to be a
dogmatist; and the political irrelevance of standards,
was referred to as a broad compass, no one desired to be
known as a stickler for details. There was, in short, a
loss of intellectual certainty, which was compounded
and accelerated by the increasing data and the political
situation in world politics.

The gathering of empirical data and the movement
of scientific processes of inquiry into educational
fields presented basic obstacles, not advances, to the
growth of knowledge within the fields of what could be
called the pure and applied social science fields. For,
as we continued to know more and more about modern
society and modern man, that is, as our data accumulated,
we discovered that the centers of political initiative
were less and less accessible to intellectual influence, and frequently, less observable. We also began to note the emergence of a new academic man, some would argue to fill this void, some would say created by it. These men rested for the most part on academic power which was, in reality, bureaucratic power (or position). The ability to obtain a grant, marketing research, and obtaining institutional support for a project became important features of academic life, not intellectual acumin. These men were salesmen, corporate executives of the mind. In the words of C. Wright Mills these men are well described.

For them the memorandum is reposing the book. They could set up a research project or even a school, but I would be surprised if, now after twenty years of research and teaching and observing and thinking, they could produce a book that told you what they thought was going on in the world, what they thought were the major problems for men in this historical epoch . . . and in the meantime we should not expect much substantive knowledge; first there must be methodological inquiries into methods and inquiry.6

Thus, Mills was alarmed that the social scientist would become so infatuated with his data and data gathering methods that he would have serious difficulty in ascertaining what the real problems demanding social concern were. For Mills and others the connection between data and the data gathering process was noted and placed in the structural setting of an emerging scientific bureaucracy.

Scientific data, by the admissions of its exponents, is silent on the questions of life style (institutional demands in a total sense) and ultimately quiet on what moral and ethical selections and applications of that data man should make. Friedrichs, in his book shows us how environment and intellectual judgment are related. Friedrichs cites a study concerning the results of the new famous article in the Harvard Educational Review by Arthur Jensen. Jensen, it will be

7The subject of initial investigation is of course deeply influenced by the process.


remembered contended that genetic factors are more likely than environmental factors to be responsible for the fact that the I.Q. scores of Blacks are generally lower than those of Whites. Friedrichs noted that the age and place of residence, social and demographic factors that should have no impact on "value free" scientific judgements, were relevant. Significantly more of the psychologists living in Alabama and Mississippi agreed with Jensen than did those living elsewhere. Friedrichs stated that:

Though the heredity of racial grouping may or may not be related to 'intellectual activity', it is quite clear that environment is most assuredly prognostic of intellectual--and even scientific judgment. ¹⁰

Those men who follow in the steps of George Lundberg, disagree with the implications of Friedrichs' study and insist that the social process of the scientific method in the social sciences cannot prescribe ends--an ideology. What these men fail to realize is that the scientific empiricism does not end ideology in the social sciences but rather that their "value free" processes have become an ideology, and, further, that this ideology has

reshaped our social institutions, personality structures, and, in some cases, the belief systems of our souls.

Ultimately, the end of ideology is based upon a disillusionment with any real commitment to democracy or the democratic process in education. This disillusionment, this failure of nerve, is the only ideology that has ended for those who believe in the end of ideology, not all ideology. One of the expressions of the failure of social nerve in America during the 1950's that bears on the "value neutral" positions intellectually was the social emergence of anti-Communism as an ideology. In brief, Communism was seen as an ideology, and our anti-Communistic position as a socially scientific, realistic, non-ideological, response to the exigencies of the real political struggles of the world. Man could live in freedom with science and capitalism, or in ideological enslavement with Communism. We are not concerned specifically at this stage with the connections between politics and intellectual process, but it is important to note that the two are not isolated events.¹¹

¹¹C. Wright Mills in his The Power Elite, and Fred Cook, in his The Warfare State notes the relationships between the political structure of the universe and the universe of the intellectual.
The political realities of impersonal and highly structural changes in society have not eliminated either the problems or the issues. The absence of public issues in the intellectual arena is not due to any absence of problems. Rather, their absence from intellectual discussions is an ideological condition: a condition that is controlled both by the structural position of the intellectuals in society (overwhelmingly university based--institutionally attached), and how, and in what manner, they, as intellectual men, view their tasks.¹²

The end-of-ideology view, as we have stated, is itself an ideology. Some might wish to argue that what exists is not so much an ideology but a mood of academic sensibility. I would strongly disagree and note that the end-of-ideology really is a specific thought process about the conclusions of specific patterns or processes of thought: the ending of political reflection and sociological imagination themselves as social facts. This is something more than a mood or an atmosphere. It is an organized body of thought that accompanies a specific social process, scientific empiricism.

That the end-of-ideology carries with it the tone of cultural default, often under the guise of snobbish insight, is not what is crucial. Social reasoning collapses: reason becomes reasonableness (feasibility), social imagination is reified as mathematical images, and political courage is transformed into bureaucratic patterns of accommodation. The whole academic process becomes academic politesse. The emotions generated by a work, either appeal or they don't. No man's feelings have more authority than another's. While one can socially and intellectually quarrel with judgement (scientific results), one cannot take issue with feelings (ideological leanings). Thus, the democratization of genius is a social fact, because every man is entitled to his opinion, but the values underlying those opinions are never discussed, because feelings are irrelevant in the social process of social science. In the words of Karl Menninger:

... The scientist is seeking amelioration of an unhappy situation. This can be secured only if the scientific laws controlling the situation

13 Feelings are contradistinguished from power resulting from bureaucratic positions. That power is repressive, so also is the notion of equality of feelings which is bureaucratically sanctioned.
can be discovered and complied with, and not by talking of justice, not by debating philosophical concepts of equity based upon primitive theology. (Italics mine.)

The above remark, while it presents perhaps a too simplistic faith that research will be beneficial in areas beyond and not related to science, gets symbolic and actual support in American society. This support is deeply imbedded in American notions of progress and change, persistent now as an operating belief in the technostructure of America. For example, the remarks of N.A.S.A. officials as to the civilian "spinoffs" from the space program reflect not only an optimism about the total social value of the particular program, but also reveal the value of progress through scientific knowledge. It goes without saying that the opportunities for "personal progress" i.e. social mobility, are connected to this value in the reality that opportunities for that social mobility are through the corridors of the scientific bureaucracy.

That progress professionally in these bureaucracies often means something other than process through the

confrontation of ideas is not important here. What must be noted is, that for all his "freedoms" and "rewards", man is dependent on the continued good will of the organization.\footnote{William H. Whyte, Jr., The Organization Man (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956).} A quiet mood, where the protection of career chances becomes the dominant social function of the intellectual process, is reinforced by the social organization of the bureaucracy.\footnote{The thesis is that the intellectual process engaged in and the intellectual end product will, at least initially, be supportive to career chances. See Winston White, Beyond Conformity (New York: The Free Press, 1961).} The later, of course, was allegedly rationally stratified more by achievement than by either accident or power because the bureaucratic structure reflects a world in which men do things, not particularly because they have a great desire to do so (ideology) but rather because they know how (scientific functionalism).

Intellectual fashions often stand in the way of a release of imagination, and the scientific functionalism and institutional connections of the intellectual in America presented during the 1950's a weak picture of intellectual leadership. While it is important to note that leadership is meaningless unless citizens are
prepared to be lead, to follow that leadership, and while institutionalization gives leadership the appearance of a personal expression of intellectual pessimism, the lack of leadership is a behavioral sign of a breakdown of one symbolic universe for the intellectual and the formation of another. For intellectuals the lack of leadership was translated philosophically as existentialism, and its experiential equivalents in our society were juvenile delinquency and mental illness.

If in science, one can see an institutionalized classificatory act(s), then the individual, human counterpart to this social process during the 1950's was existentialism. Jean-Paul Sartre, in an article in *Life* magazine commented as follows upon his refusal of the Nobel prize.

> I don't align myself with anybody else's description of me. People can think of me as a genius, a pronographer, a communist, a

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17 As one symbolic universe dissolves it is not replaced immediately with another "system" though this may in fact be occurring. Rather the philosophical and intellectual "ideology" is one that enures to and stresses the highly anti-systemic and individualist qualities of man. In this sense existentialism of the 1950's preceded the social action of the 1960's, and the techno-systems of the 1970's.

18 See Chapters IV and V.
bourgeois, however they like. Myself, I think of other things.\textsuperscript{19}

To be delimited by a category (social or natural) external to the self, is seen by Sartre to be a depravation of a basic and highly personal freedom. He continues:

\textquote{... I am not, as has been said, a pessimist; I am a person who tried to make people more lucid vis a vis themselves, and it is for this that I am disliked. I frighten people. I would say that the majority of people have always been afraid to think. Stendahal, in his time, wrote, 'all good reasoning is offensive'--that is still very much true.\textsuperscript{20}}

Thus, for Sartre, man is a person only when he is the subject doing the categorizing. As an object of categorization, no matter what the ends are, man becomes a thing, a consumer, a viewer, or, perhaps even a manipulator. The intolerable contradiction between liberal education (man as master of his world) and the vocational realities of the society (man as institutionalized functions) generated toward the end of the decade, a new intellectual tone in the social sciences; the expression of moral indignation.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{19}Jean-Paul Sartre, "Existentialism," \textit{Life}, November 6, 1964, p. 88.

\textsuperscript{20}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{21}I use tone as reflective of an intellectual mood. This predates anything that could be called either a movement or a school of ideas. Peter Schrag in an article in
Whether the onset of moral indignation was the result of: (1) years of neglect and abdication on important social issues leading to a dialectical situation where intellectual concerns naturally evolved into external matters, (2) the resumption of intellectual will, (3) a rewarding intellectual position socially in the educational bureaucracies because of political changes, (4) reflections of emerging economic relationships—the demand for readable intellectual material, and/or (5) artistic insight about the future applications of where man's passions and energies should be concentrated, does not matter. We are not so much searching for the cause of a social phenomenon, but rather are trying to comment on a broad pattern of social events and critical thinking.

The critical body of thought that I refer to as the moral indignation, essentially made movements to: (1) express social issues intellectually, (2) express intellectual concerns in a social context, and, (3) to do both with a statement about the moral implications in the Saturday Review "named" these men, education's "New Romantics". See Peter Schrag, "Education's New Romantic Critics," Saturday Review, Vol. 50, February 18, 1967.
concerning the past exclusion of these questions and their future inclusion into the critical milieu. These men, who Peter Schrag referred to as education's new romantics, fell into several identifiable categories.22

Initially, there are those intellectuals who discuss the devastating effects of the technological culture on man, and higher education in particular. Ellul, through his works, The Technological Society, and The Political Illusion is an example of the first, while Paul Goodman, with his many books on man and education and the school would be an example of the later. Both of these men raise a series of questions, anchored in moral terms about man and the effects his culture has upon him. As Goodman has recently said:

Humanly speaking, the special sciences and their positivist language have been deeply ambiguous. At their best--it is a splendid best--they have gotten (and deserved) the payoff of the theological virtues of faith, selflessness, and singleminded devotion, and of the moral virtues of honesty, daring, and accuracy. At their worst, however--and it is a very frequent worst--specialist science and its value-neutral language are an avoidance of experience, a narrow limitation of the

22 Ibid., p. 80.
Thus, for these critics, the past is ambiguous, and frequently a limiting factor constricting the growth of the human spirit.

Another group of authors state that the culture itself should be the central focus of a reformed intellectual viewpoint. Herbert Marcuse and R. D. Laing adequately represent persons of this viewpoint. Marcuse, in his book, One Dimensional Man, discusses the totality of the culture and the psychological nature of man together, not as separate entities. He says:

... Personal withdrawal of mental and physical energy from socially required activities and attitudes is today possible only for a few ... Here, expansion has, in all forms of teamwork, community life, and fun, invaded the inner space of privacy and practically eliminated the possibility of that isolation in which the individual, thrown back on himself alone, can think and question and find. This sort of privacy--the sole condition that, on the basis of satisfied vital needs, can give meaning to freedom and independence of thought--has long since become the most expensive commodity, available only to the very rich (who don't use it). In this respect, too, 'culture' reveals its feudal origins and limitations.  

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Laing, however, assumes a different position on the same issue. His work, *The Politics of Experience*, suggests that the individual should create and develop both new patterns of thinking and new realms of personal meaning that would become a sort of buffer against culture.

Marshall McLuhan urged still a third position. His moral indignation was that man did not realize that the culture was the education itself, and the scientific and technological innovations should be openly embraced by man. He reluctantly stated that:

> . . . Now that we are in the post-industrial time and moving into a world of programmed environments we are certain to become obsessed with the economic organizations that lie immediately behind us.25

For McLuhan, the historical dimension was not a reference point or a baseline from which meaning could be built, but rather an impediment to the final liberation of man.

A fourth position, encompassed by the moral indignation spirit concerns those individuals who believe that the focus of moral concern lies with the academic community. Many of these scholars believe that the academic community is in much the same position

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that the business community was in the thirties, i.e.,
that it has developed abuses, often through only
custom and usage, which it cannot or has not remedied.
Some urge reorganization plans, and others call for
restructuring intellectual disciplines. Both of these
positions recognize clearly that higher education is
an instrument of power. This is true, if for no other
reason, than both essentially see the task as the
administration of power within the educational
structure.26

26 For example, the intellectual and structural events
effecting education since the conclusion of World War II
could be listed (summarized) as follows:

I. Results in Terms of Intellectual Enterprise
   A. Power expansion in scientific disciplines;
      spreading of the discipline and power
      of science.
   B. Progress toward universal interdependence
      in terms of science is made by science.
   C. Increased professionalism in science,
      moves against social pluralism and toward
      institutional man. Science as Psychology.

II. Results in Terms of Values
   A. Rational scientific values, though often
      novel, are realistic.
   B. The dialogue between science and society
      is culturally determined and science
      being the culture in ascendancy determines
      the rules, subject and process of the
dialogue. Science as Philosophy.
   C. Essential operating policies relating to
      science must be decided and controlled
The voice of adolescent protest is the fifth, and last position of the moral indignation writers. Writers in this vein variously catalogue youth as either a problem, functionally useless in society, or as a moral force, and a representation of social pluralism.

On the one hand the young are seen from birth, as objects to guide, things to manage, the recipients of an adult problematic view of the world that helps the young through the problems of bedwetting, braces, exams, grades, drink, dope and V.D. The child, in his parents

by scientists. Science as Law.

III. Results in Terms of Structure
A. Increasingly positive reward patterns become indispensable requirements in attracting (1) the most able men to train as scientists, and, (2) scientists to work in a scientific bureaucracy.
B. Movements toward international pools of "creative scientific" knowledge and intelligence.
C. Man is constructively adaptive socially, and science can assist in his adaptation. Science as Sociology.

IV. Results in Terms of Culture
A. Science can substitute for traditional conservatism in adequate safeguarding culture in times of transition. Science as History.
B. Science can be responsible for orderly social change based on scientific knowledge of the creative process. Science as Art.
eyes consists of a social dimension. It is this social dimension—basically rock music and radical politics—that receives comment and interpretation in terms of both youth's anger and alienation.

On the other hand, youth are seen as prophets of the future. The strictures of a child centered society, and the sociological products of boredom are seen in idealistic terms. To writers in this vein, youth represent a counterculture to the prevailing trends in American life. It is to an examination of that phenomenon, the counterculture, and its relationship to the crisis ideology that we now turn our discussion.
CHAPTER III

THE CRISIS IDEOLOGY AS ILLUSION OF SOCIAL
PLURALISM: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
COUNTERCULTURE IN AMERICA

Theodore Roszak, in his book, *The Making of a Counterculture* writes as follows:

It strikes me as obvious beyond dispute that the interests of our college age and adolescent young in psychedelic drugs, and communitarian experience comprise a cultural constellation that radically diverges from values and assumptions that have been in the mainstream of our society at least since the scientific revolution.¹

It is not my purpose in this chapter to review either the work of Roszak or other countercultural exponents. Rather, I will use Roszak's concept of the counterculture, place it in a meaningful perspective in terms of youth, law, and the crisis ideology in America. This chapter will show that the false sense of social pluralism called the counterculture is a result of the operation of the crisis ideology as that ideology is applied in patterns

of intellectual thought, law and legal sanctions, and forms of social organization against a real counterculture, Black America.

During the last decade, we in American education have witnessed social phenomena that have, quite simply, taxed the imagination of educators and scholars for explanation. This list is both familiar and monotonous: Civil rights and consumer rights, student rebellion and academic revolution, women's liberation and gay liberation, non-violence and social resignation and violence and political assignation, communes and condominiums, and lastly, perhaps the seeming polarity of spaced in (the Apollo program) and spaced out (psychadellic drugs) technologies. As was suggested at the conclusion of the last chapter, the 1960's has given us two dominant portraits of American youth: (1) youth as victims, and, (2) youth as visionaries. Basically, when commenting on American youth, authors, social critics, film writers, and members of the cultural intelligencia can be grouped into one of those two broad categories.

The figure of youth, the prophetic victim, is well anchored in American literary history. Religious imagery notwithstanding, Billy Budd, for example, represents
youth as victim, both of social circumstances and the adult world. This is the dominant image of the young in America at the conclusion of the 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's. In the movies during this period one had James Dean's portrayal of the anguished honesty of an unfairly victimized young man in Rebel Without a Cause, and Marlin Brando's great performance of a picked and put upon young man, basically good but misunderstood, in The Wild One. Both of these men represented characters who understood and had deep loyalties and friendships, and whose violence was taken out (acted out) in delinquent acts upon those symbolic adults--school, police, businessmen--who initially snub and in some manner dehumanize them. Their rebellion is personal, their situation ultimately pathetic.\(^2\)

In literature, the most important and significant character in this context was Holden Caulfield in J. D. Sallinger's Novel, The Catcher in the Rye.\(^3\) Caulfield was a sensitive complex youth who was adrift in a world that

\(^2\)Easy Rider, a movie by Peter Fonda achieves a much different view of youth and should not be confused with the above two sketches. In Fonda's movie, the hero, Captain America was very much in command of the social forces guiding his destiny, not in a state of passive terror against the adult world.

did not understand him. The world failed to relate to him in terms of a moral purpose. He was brutalized (victimized) by a range of events from trivial acts and meaningless language, to real affronts from the adult world—his school experiences and his teachers. He was passive, alone, and aloof.

The view of the young as victimized by society receives, in terms of readable social commentary, perhaps its most intense expression in the writings of Edgar Z. Friedenberg (*The Vanishing Adolescent*) and in the early writings of Paul Goodman (*Growing Up Absurd*). Both of these authors revealed the myths of being young, endeavored to reach through common misapprehensions about youth, and tried to discover the realities of a meaningful existence for our youth. Both writers saw youth as something essentially decent, unspoiled, and pure, victimized by the surrounding adult society. Each author abhorred unnecessary rules, petty regulations, and, the nonsensical demands of dehumanized organized society that placed the young person in problematic or crisis terms. In his

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conclusion in *Growing Up Absurd*, Goodman says:

> What I have tried to show, rather, is this: that such problems, by their form and content, test and criticize the society in which they occur. The burden of proof, as to who is 'wrong', does not rest with the young but always with the system of society. Some societies bear it easily; our society is not outrageously bad, but it is far from adequate, and it stands the test poorly.\(^5\) (Italics mine.).

Thus, for Goodman, the focus was inappropriately placed on the actions, activities, and conduct of youth. Rather, the proper focus, and his later works attest to his belief, should lie with the social institutions in America that, in varying degrees, are involved with the socialization of the young.

By the mid 1960's however, youth was beginning to change. Society was being tested not by personal rebellion but by social action. The young victim was beginning to transcend his victimization. American youth were overcoming their passivity, and in so doing were achieving both a new social reality and a new set of illusions. The passive stoic hero of the 1950's was gradually replaced with a more active, dynamic youngster. Caulfield grew up, went to college, and became Mario Savio. Freedom riders, sit-iners, and cause marchers were the sociological

\(^5\)Ibid., pp. 237-238.
phenomenon of the middle years of the decade. The rebel began to search for, or actually have, a cause.

Literature saw names such as Tom Wolfe, author of *The Kandy-Kolored Tangerine-Flake Streamline Baby*, and Kurt Vonnegut, author of *Cat's Cradle*, become popular. Wolfe, a social journalist wrote short stories that captured a new activistic heroic youth type, jet setter, hip, mod or hot rodder. Vonnegut told youth that, in a search for a transcendent reality, the man who misses the most is not the man who makes foolish guesses, but the man who refrains from guessing at all.

In another vein, Bob Dylan represented for youth the search for a transcendent reality, and the enigma of whether or not the meaning comes with the search or, in the end, proves to be elusive. On the one hand, Dylan spoke to youth about a meaning of being in his songs

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about the boredom of the suburbs, the folly of war and the absurdities of our social life;

Businessmen they drink my wine
Plowmen dig my earth
None of them along the line
Know what any of it is worth

and yet in a series of juxtapositions, sometimes playful, sometimes dramatic, showed a self-awareness that transcended the meaning of his own folk songs. Richard Goldstein writes:

Bob Dylan writes shields around himself. His imagery, his voice, even his album jackets keep us intrigued but distant. Stop to think about his songs and they grab you by the neck—strangling, slashing, putting you on. The put-on has become such a virile form of self-defense that we prefer it to pursuing meaning. We love to watch a great poser like Dylan making magic charades. It's so easy to experience a joke when the victim is a square other . . . Dylan's major theme is human vulnerability. His images repeat the same inner message over and over like a rock mantra: 'I need, I have needed, I will need.'

The themes of oppression, rebellious heroism, and social prophecy were not limited to the music of Bob Dylan. They have become, in a sequence similar to the one suggested above, the dominant social considerations

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of the last portion of the 1960's. The metaphor of victimization became politicized totally. Youth, Blacks, Women, Homosexuals, Athletes, Prisoners, Hard Hats, and even the Silent Majority—all claimed to have been victimized by some social process in American society.

What is important to note at this juncture, is not that the social process of victimization was increasingly used as a means of both political organization and social protest by groups and categories of persons who had social grievances, though this is important, but rather that the social aspects of the victimization of youth, their radicalization some would say, set the stage for those who interpreted their actions idealistically—and saw them as social visionaries.

An example that presents American youth essentially in the context of social visionaries can be found in Kenneth Keniston's work, The Young Radicals, a well known work on the activist youth of the 1960's. Briefly, Keniston's view of radical American youth could be condensed to the following statements. The radical young are drawn from families in the managerial and professional classes.

Far from being rebellious toward or alienated from the values of their parents, they in fact share and desire to implement them. They are intelligent, cosmopolitan in their views, and successful in scholastic matters. Their personal histories are marked, in fact, by success, but at some point along the way they begin to question conventional definitions of success, and become preoccupied with the discrepancy between the stated ideals that they have learned and internalized, and the various moral failures, that their social positions as students, have enabled them to see in American society. Thus, they find themselves committed to narrowing this disparity, closing the discrepancy. This commitment brings further commitment not in intellectual terms but in the realm of social action, and social action, in Keniston's eyes ultimately radicalizes the young. Basically, youth, is seen as agreeing on the ends of American society; departing from the elders only in so far as the means are concerned.

Radical youth saw clearly the isolation of politics from ethics. Suburban boredom, smug indifference to social injustice, and the all too quiet horror of a face-war were seen as moral issues and not technical questions
to be resolved by experts. In this context, youth reacted against attempts at the conversion of moral issues into policy decisions, but they were fundamentally not opposed to all policy decisions. Departure from the means of their elders in implementing, correcting, and, modifying social injustice was the one distinguishing characteristic of the youth on the late 1960's in Keniston's view. His view of the radical motivation places the emphasis on external events. Radical rage is, for example, largely reactive to the moral disarray existing in the world. It is a passive quality in a true sense, and not active or innovative, because it reacts to a predetermined set of moral issues and ethical questions. For this reason alone, the rage of Keniston's young protesters does not generate either new alternatives or raise the threshold of social inquiry.

For Roszak and Reich, the activities of the young Americans do assume a changed social perspective and a modified position of social inquiry. Initialy, the

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focus moves from what in Keniston's work could be called essentially a political-sociological line of inquiry to a cultural sociological focus. In a manner of speaking, by acknowledging the activities of youth in countercultural terms, both writers signaled, at least intellectually, that in their view the radical youth scene had passed into social history and the youth had become something else, perhaps the exemplars of a new kind of consciousness, as represented by their personal tastes, life styles, and rhetoric.

It is true that a surface glance will reveal what appears to be a separation between the youth and adults over the disjunctions dividing knowledge and values in our society. However, on closer inspection, this divorce between knowledge and values is symbolized not by opposition but by the underlying agreement between the technologist and the hippie. The technologist states clearly that values are subjective feelings, and the hippie loudly proclaims some social equivalent of, "Look baby, I'm doin' my own thing." The result, in the end,

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12 Hippie is an admittedly general and vague term. I use it as a sensitizing device and oppose it to an equally vague and ill defined term, the technologist, for purposes of social description.
signifies that values are no longer shareable as knowledge, and, hence, one is left with only their functional equivalents: feeling, emotional rushes, and great spectacles, the unreality of Woodstock and the tedium of a lunar landing.

Fundamentally, both the technologist and the hippie recognize that they are hip, mod, cool, and really plugged into "what's happening"--the future. Both groups obtain the same subtle satisfactions from the same theme of liberation existing in modern mass society. Only the subject of the liberation theme differs between them. The hippie seeks to be relieved from the social constraints of his existence, dull schooling, repetative work tasks, and a confining life style. The technologist on the other hand, searches for the removal of the social impediments blocking his uninterrupted and undisturbed technological inquiries. In the end, however, neither the hippie nor the technologist are liberated. Both are prisoners of a new order because gone from each, though for different reasons, is the man confident of his own ability to make a place for himself where what he did would make a difference in shaping his life. The hippie retreats from the social situation in search of a new inner self, while the
technocrat overlooks his inner self and acknowledges only the search for a new social self.

The technologist and the hippie reveal additional similarities. Both have an obsession with technique, style and motion. In addition, the technologist and the hippie also share a common fascination for electronic marvels and for the movement that modern communications and transportation allow. They enjoy essentially the same pleasures; but the hippie makes his pleasures public quickly, while the technologist keeps his either private, or judiciously displayed in good taste. Each is repelled by essentially the same things: pigs, honkies, intellectuals, and other pre-technological peoples—namely Blacks. In our technological society, the subversive impulses of the hippie and the legitimate impulses of the technocrat are the same: they are both illusions mitigating against the realities of our existence.

To be known as a yippie, a flower child, a head, or a wearer of bells, has importance in the placement of individuals in the social structure, renders a sanitary "purpose" to social change, and creates a socially safe "dynamic dimension" to controlled social movement. Ideology is superimposed on items of style and choice
but only when these items are in fact style and choice. For example, radical dress in terms of wild colors and unusual clothing combinations, is treated as ideology, a countercultural opposition, only when, in fact, no possibility of ideological significance in fact exists.

At this stage we should note an important fact about the illusion of the counterculture. We, in White America may need the illusion of a counterculture, existing among our youth, for if we admit that there is none, then we are faced with either the unhappy realization that the counterculture lies somewhere else in our social life, thus depriving us from viewing our children as real agents of social change; or that there is a creeping cultural monotheism in existence in America, that uses every social means possible to suffocate any hope of a real counterculture surviving in our midst. Both of these alternative are true, but it is to the use of law and the counterculture that we now turn our analysis.

The law can be viewed in terms of being essentially contra a culture, mitigating against social pluralism in American life in that it operates in two distinct aspects: (1) first, there is an absence of regulatory law and a presence of permissive laws in the fields of technology and
advanced research, on our universities and industrial complexes: This is White America; and (2) Secondly, there is a presence of regulatory rules and an absence of permissive legislation, that protects and would further social pluralism in the area where the possibilities for a true counterculture exist: That is Black America.

Let me begin by citing some obvious difference between the White technocratic culture and the Black counterculture that will show how the law reflects a clear crisis ideology in its definition of the Black culture in problematic pathological terms. We are all familiar with the distinctions between the criminal and the civil aspects of the law. What is interesting to us here, however, is that upon examination, we see well defined criminal sanctions related both to specific and anticipated forms of conduct when we examine the relationship of the law to the area of a Black counterculture. Obviously more than the commands and charges of current civil rights legislation is involved. A well defined and long established normative code exists on our law books, administrative processes, and court decisions; and is used in structural manner to prevent further inroads of Black counterculture into our dominant culture. In one geographic
area this process may be revealed in the use of civil legal procedures to prevent the establishment of local control of school districts for Blacks, in another area the legal process may be a series of administrative rulings to stop collective bargaining in what is an essentially Black union, and, in yet a third aspect, the law may be evidenced in the application of antiquated criminal-civil responsibility statutes to prevent both the dissemination of information and the social gathering of individuals concerning any social activity of Black culture that has not been unequivocally relegated to a harmless position of style and/or rhetoric. For those who would defend the just use of law as a means of social change for Black

13The overwhelming fact of the late 1960's and early portion of the 1970's is that both the possibility of revolution has been removed, and the revolutionary references to social phenomena has increased. It seems that once the "risks" of unplanned and uncontrolled change is removed (by whatever social means necessary) one can attribute both revolutionary rhetoric and style to groups of people, youth, or in some cases Blacks for example, where in fact no such threat exists. This gives a "realistic dimension" to the group so labeled and creates the illusion that change is pluralistic, e.g., can eminate from many areas in society. It is democracy's repressive use of the concept, revolutionary, as a means of social control. In dictatorships, the more secure the social control, the more the hunt for revolutionaries becomes. In Hitler's Germany, for example, anti-semitic attitudes were highest at the war's end when virtually no Jews existed in Germany.
America, an awareness of the one dimensionality of the changes would seem to be called for in accessing both strategy and in measuring the pluralism protected in fact by the legal process.

White culture, in terms of regulating itself is backward looking, that is, the regulations occur after the fact; while in terms of regulating the Black counterculture it is anticipatory. For example, the concerns of men like Ralph Nader can be viewed in terms of making a once vibrant industrial culture live up to the standards it allegedly sets for itself. Thus, Nader will insure that Detroit will build safe automobiles, as the automobile manufactures should indeed do; but his activities are not countercultural because when we look behind the facts of Detroit constructing safe automobiles we see that they can now make a profit from safety. Fins and chrome have been replaced by seat harnesses and air bags as money makers for the automobile manufacturers. What remains, rhetoric notwithstanding (you've changed, we've changed), is the same sociological relationship. Nader and his raiders do not offer us a sociological pluralism in our commercial and manufacturing relationships any more than the pleasant White social worker holds out hope of personal
freedom and individual choice--and the possibility of a
differential family structure to her welfare cases.

At this juncture, it is more than a little interesting to note the intellectual response in terms of the law and the Black counterculture. The overwhelming number of works written about Blacks, often by Blacks themselves, place the Black in terms of social crisis, a social pathological view of life, and not in positive cultural of a dynamic social pluralism.¹⁴ This reveals yet again that the culture of the Black American is not viewed as a counterculture but rather as a problematic social entity, threatening, in various ways, depending upon time, geography and politics, the dominant culture of White America.

Both the literature and the legal process clearly show the distinctions between White culture and Black counterculture when abortions are discussed. ¹⁵ Until very


recently, it was a morally unpleasant experience to discuss abortions in public, let alone contemplate changes in the laws governing social conduct in this area. Often school teachers were admonished to avoid such topics in school health classes. Law, White law, had defined the fetus as life, and established legal sanctions to preserve its ethical position. However, for one desirous of an abortion, and willing to risk both criminal prosecution and civil liability, there was an alternative, the essentially Black underground hospital, or abortion clinic. At this moment in the history of this issue, the law of society could be seen as: (1) upholding a specific level of moral conduct, (2) exercising a normative restraint on those who deviated from that norm, (3) reflecting the social and medical "risks" involved in such conduct, and, (4) promoting an ideological view of familial structure and individual parental responsibility regarding the sacredness of life and the seriousness of child rearing.

At the present time however, things have changed dramatically. By again examining the abortion laws, we can see how these changes reflect the continued differences between the White culture and the Black counterculture. There have been significant changes in the abortion laws
of the several states in recent years. Laws in this area have either been changed, permitting open and legal abortions (New York, Hawaii, and Colorado) or a permissive, though "limited" abortion program (for example, New Mexico, consent of parents or a concerned adult; Illinois, agreement between medical representatives in the performing hospital; and Florida, where the procedure is available only if the health, physical or psychic, of the mother is endangered). The new legal attitude of the White culture with regard to abortion reveals a broader area where the values of the White culture have shifted: Life has been redefined. Values concerning conception, the beginning of life, and the importance of motherhood once held private and sacred have been (are being) moved into the domain of public policy and thus becoming the concerns of professional scrutiny and the uses of expertise. Family planning and population control are becoming social problems--crises--to which, of course, the skills of the White culture will increasingly respond.

What we see reflected in the changed abortion laws is in reality an excellent example of the crisis ideology in operation: (1) The impetus for the enactment of the new abortion laws, historically will become the first stage
of population management and control, is the creation of a population crisis; (2) Links between the population crisis and the welfare crisis are established as both political realities and patterns of academic thought. The latter is deemed, in varying degrees of course, to be the result of the former; (3) The enactment of permissive legislation is seen as a vehicle by which the child producing areas of society (Black and Poor America) will voluntarily curtail their child bearing activities; (4) White culture does not desire the burden of children. Mass society is represented by the ahistorical playboy culture—a culture where everyone is treated like a child, and yet there is no place for children; and (5) Lastly, these new abortion laws reflect the fact that any degree of loyalty, strength, love, and the bonds of an extended family structure, such as the Black family represents in America are counter to the establishment of mass man. *Newsweek*, in an article entitled, "The New Crisis: The Negro Family," states that:

The Negro family problem was scarcely news to social scientists. But its very intimacy has excluded it from the public dialogue of civil rights; it reaches too deep into white prejudices and Negro sensitivities.16 (Italics mine.).

For *Newsweek*, the Black family is a problem that, as we have previously mentioned, is placed into perspective in the social structure by referring to it in crisis terms. Liberal sociologist Herbert Gans, in urging caution in concentrating upon the Black family as a problematic entity, points up the process of socialization that we have urged is repressive to social pluralism and a healthy Black counterculture. Gans cautions that:

There is a danger, however, that it (emphasis on family structure) may result in a wave of social work and psychiatric solutions intended to change the Negro female-based family to a middle class type. Such solutions could deflect attention away from the economic causes of the Negro problem.17 (Italics mine.)

Allow me to shift focus for a moment from abortions, population crisis, and Black family structure to the question of the definition of life functions in other areas.18 We see White culture moving into new research and development areas unchecked by either law or clear cut ethical standards that are enforceable. At the present time, we seem to have


18Historically, of course, societies have always engaged in this process. The same act depending on the social circumstances, i.e., the normative sanctions involved could be an act of murder and moral cowardice, or an act of heroism and great bravery.
no clear codification of what will and what will not be permitted in the areas of: (1) organ transplantation, (2) lazer technology, (3) synthetic manufacturing of deoxyribonucleic acid, and, (4) genetic clonning of animal species. Thus, White culture, as represented by technology, science, and bureaucratic institutions flourishes, unchecked and unabated by either law or custom, while Black culture, perhaps, as we have suggested, a counterculture fights for survival and positive identity.

By way of conclusion to this chapter, it should be noted that the view of the "youthful opposition to technology" in countercultural terms, pays handsome dividends for the white intellectual. It is, first of all, a safe position socially. Its psychic rewards are obvious—the White intellectual can perceive cultural change (differentiation) essentially in terms of White youth. More importantly, however, the position enables the intellectual to energize himself professionally for the task of dealing with the problem and crisis presented by Black Americans. Thus, notwithstanding the illusions of social analysis and the claims of honesty, these men of good will become upholders of the crisis ideology and the pathological view of man.
In the end, to be honest and forthright means several things for intellectuals in the context of the counterculture. It may mean that we have to own up to our own racism—not as a crude political outlook—but, as the combination of our philosophies, our intellectual thoughts, and our social processes. Honesty may also mean that we will have to let the Black counterculture, or the possibilities of such a counterculture, enter us, to become a significant part of our intellectual lives, to influence everything from subjects of inquiry to styles of teaching. Lastly, perhaps by being honest, we will see in ourselves a new quality of human worth that will make our own human enterprise more worthwhile and fulfilling. To that end, our discussion of the crisis ideology and law continues in the following chapter.
CHAPTER IV

THE CRISIS IDEOLOGY AS LEGAL PROCESS:
A CONSIDERATION OF EDUCATIONAL
ACTIVITIES AND LEGAL
DECISIONS

Historically, free schooling in America was defined as an obligation that the state owed its citizens. For example, the New Hampshire Supreme Court said in 1980 that:

Free schooling furnished by the State is not so much a right granted to pupils as a duty imposed upon them for the public good.¹

By the 1920's, legally, no question remained about the constitutional power of a state to compel school attendance for its youthful citizens. In 1925 a modification of the doctrine occurred when it was declared that parents had the legal right to send their children to a non-public school for schooling, if they so desired.² Schooling, of

¹Fogg v Board of Education of Littleton, 76, N.H. 296, 82 A 173 (1860).
²The leading case is: Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, Oregon (1925).
some nature was still, depending on the varieties of local law, compelled. Thus, a legal doctrine had been fashioned which on the surface appeared to be limited only to attendance matters and school policy relating to students in this area: The state had a duty, and the parents had a right. In reality, however, as we shall develop in this chapter, the concept of the state having a duty, and the parents, and later, the students being enfranchised with a right has legal significance beyond the scope of school attendance matters. In education this doctrine provided the legal basis for the sociological process whereby institutional duties and individual rights would be pointed against each other in an increasing constellation of social situations that historically could be linked directly to the institutional (bureaucratic) expansion of education. Thus, as the educational institutions expanded, their duties also increased. It is not important whether the law granting

3 The children, or more properly students, were not considered as having a legal interest in the matter before the courts. It has been only recently that their interests as far as rights, privileges, and immunities in the school have been considered as "possible" legal matters.

4 Some might wish to argue that the duties changed as opposed to an actual expansion. This seems to be a rather arcane sociological argument with little connection to the real world. For even if this point is granted, it
to (reserving) the state the political concept of duty came first, or whether the sociological phenomenon of institutional growth, augmented by external conditions in society began the process. In the historical dimension each became interwoven with the other as an ongoing sociological process. Thus, for example, driver education class was initially an educational experience that began as an addition to the school's curriculum as an elective. In some cases it joined an increasing list of subjects and activities that were offered without credit for the student. At the present time however, many states, excluding Ohio, have made driver education part of the required curriculum of high school education, while others, such as Ohio, have established clear incentives for students (earlier driving privileges) and parents (lower insurance rates) so as to make the "elective" all but "required". To argue or search for causality in it still does not explain the sociological process. Rather, it justifies it, and we are still left searching for both meaning and consequences within the socio-historical context.

Private schools limited solely to teaching driver education courses show the economic aspects of the process, as well as extensions of the sociological process of "schooling" as a means of socializing individuals in society. See also Marshall McLuhan, *War and Peace in the Global Village*, especially "Education as War," p. 150.
terms of this developmental process is to place unnecessary emphasis upon the individual separate items or events, and often fails to note the importance of the process itself as an event.

During the same period, the concept of parental rights were being defined politically. The most important legal case in this area, without question, was the now famous Brown v Board of Education of Topeka. In that case, the court saw the right of the parents not solely as a personal and present right, but as a right that inexorably had social aspects to its "free" exercise and use. As one writer has suggested:

The language of the Brown ruling buttresses the view that societal interest in education overrides and transcends the interests of the parents as well as those of the child. (Italics mine.).

Thus the Supreme Court found that a national interest existed in education, and that this national (societal) interest existed as an important public function which

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overrode the interests, rights, and concerns of the parents.  

When legally recognized, the public aspects of education became functions of the bureaucracies of several states. In a long line of decisions, the courts have expressly held that the promotion and control of public education are essential attributes of that state's exercise of its sovereign power. The local state administrative units owed their existence to permissive state laws and took their authority most often from specific state statutory authorization. Though this granting of powers often appeared to be express and specific, the range of activities permitted (both by express mandates and inference) was actually very broad, because most of these laws were deliberately drafted to allow for considerable bureaucratic discretion. Matters of discipline of students were given only the barest of legal outline in the state statutes. For example, section 1102-C of the general code of Kansas provides in part that:

... the discipline, control, and regulation of

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students attending public schools in this state shall be governed by the rules and regulations established by the Boards of Education in the several local districts in the state. Said rules shall apply and have effect only upon the schools within said local school district.9

Historically, this local discretion was deemed as being necessary for local flexibility and administration of school policy. The legal pluralism evidenced by making these rules matters of local concern was supposed to be democratic in that the rule making authority was established in the area where the rules would be applied. This was, of course, often cited as but another aspect of social pluralism in America, and education's commitment to that social ideal.10

In actuality however, both the process and the ideology were illusions. The discretion threatened both the institutional legitimacy of the school as an agent of the democratic process, mitigated against social pluralism in education, and provided for the managerial authority and the classlessness inherent in bureaucracy

10Barzun, op. cit.
of mass society. The bureaucratic discretion actually operated not as the rule of law, but as a kind of modern feudalism, in such a fashion so as to give men unchecked dominion over each other. As Thomas Szasz has observed:

The real enemy of the Rule of Law is therefore not lawlessness or anarchy, but rather the demand for benevolent discretion on the part of the authorities.\(^\text{11}\) (Italics mine.).

Within the discretionary mosaic of powers possessed by local school authorities in addition to the powers of discipline, regulation and control and as a result of the exercise of those powers, there gradually emerged the power of the local authorities to ascertain who and under what conditions could attend school.\(^\text{12}\) Thus, the Supreme Court of the State of Connecticut stated that the right to attend school:

... Is not an absolute right, but one which will at all times be subject to such reasonable conditions as the State may impose.\(^\text{13}\) (Italics mine.).


\(^\text{13}\)Ibid., pp. 919-921.
While historically it is true that the majority of "reasonable conditions" imposed by the state (through the local districts) involve questions of student discipline, it is important to note that in a long series of decisions, the courts of the land have repeatedly stated that it is not their (the court's) function to rule on the wisdom of a local school board's ruling (the philosophy or ideology) in making a specific decision, but only to legally access the reasonableness (fairness) of that decision. Thus, the ideology of the social process is not a matter of legal review, only the operational aspects of that ideology. Allegedly, in this instance the law is unconcerned with ends; and only involved with the means of educational-social policy. In a manner of speaking, a kind of value neutrality and legal "end of ideology" doctrine was legally established for education in this

14Frequently the legal concern is stated as being one where the interest is solely with the operational aspects, the procedures and at most, the practicalities of the action taken. Sadly, as the record discloses even the A.A.U.P. is still reluctant to openly admit to the political aspects of using the "rules of fair play" as a means of political repression in educational institutions. See the excellent article by C. Wright Mills, "The Structure of Power in American Society," Power, Politics, and People, Irving Louis Horowitz, ed. (New York: Ballantine Books).
area that was to have vast social and political significance. For example, the doctrine of "reasonableness of conditions" referred not to social conditions in some sort of a political vacuum, but politically meant the "reasonableness of decision" by someone in bureaucratic authority about a given set of social conditions in the school.

At this juncture we must expand our focus from the social conditions in the school, and those conditions as the legal reference point in establishing the reasonableness of the bureaucratic decisions. The relationship of the social conditions in the school, the bureaucratic decisions (and the bureaucratic decision making process) and what those social processes effect, impinge upon, and define as the rights of the students in the educational institution must now be examined.

For example, freedom of speech (often also symbolic behavior) a constitutional right guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in

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15 An excellent article that discusses matters in this area but never specifically mentions the legal aspects of avoiding the ideological area can be found in Theodore Roszak's piece "On Academic Delinquency," The Dissenting Academy, op. cit., pp. 3-43.
the institutional setting of the school is by no means an absolute right. Whether the speech issue involves either students or teachers does not matter because its "right" occupies a secondary position to the maintenance of school discipline. The Iowa Supreme Court said that:

School officials must be given a wide discretion and if, under the circumstances, a disturbance in school discipline is reasonably to be anticipated, actions which are reasonably calculated to prevent such a disruption must be upheld by the court.¹⁶

The rights of the individual thus assume a position of secondary importance in the bureaucratic setting. What becomes the overriding consideration is the maintenance of institutional patterns and administrative stability, and these social processes are protected by the resort to legal (para-legal or law like) axioms inherent in maintaining school discipline.¹⁷


¹⁷ I do not think that the recent court decisions permitting the students to wear black arm bands on a specific day to protest the Viet Nam War contradicts these remarks. The case was decided by the United States' Supreme Court at a time when the war was becoming unpopular politically and socially and was decided on the ground that the suspension of the students in question was unreasonable because the arm bands would not cause disruption in the school. The first amendment question was avoided.
Under the guise of maintaining school discipline
a doctrine of prior restraints on speech and conduct
thus emerged. Action calculated to cause disruption
was prohibited by local administrative personnel and
their prohibitions would be legally enforced or
sanctioned as the case called for. The expertise of the
school official (superintendent, administrator, or
teacher) was used to make a moral judgment as to what
would or would not be permissible activity in the school.
Thus we are again presented with the moral dilemma
where expertise and technique, under the guise of
pursuing only questions of fact, actually replace
(dispose of) moral issues.18 Thus, the preoccupation
with fact finding, legal regulations and rule application
hides the real issue—the sociological process by which
the law is used to change moral questions into legal
issues: technical questions of fact.

18Often, for example, moral issues are legally
reduced to items of procedure by assigning a bureaucratic
"parity" to all issues in the institutions. Thus, what
initially surfaces as an immediate moral question must
follow bureaucratic routine, often pleasantly referred to
as "channels" as does every other issue, moral or not,
in the institution. When confronted with the possi-
bilities that the particular issue in question is unique
and a special "exception" should be made in this particular
instance, the administrator often counters with what
Faced with what is a sophisticated rule-making, rule-following bureaucratic model as a legal frame of reference for educational institutions, the question of what rules, among this great diversity of regulations, are important in understanding the development and operation of the crisis ideology in American education is raised. In order to answer this question effectively one must not lodge an inquiry solely at the types of, or the nature of classification schemes into which the rules could be placed, but rather at the philosophical orientations or themes that lie behind the rules which bear on the crisis ideology in American education. It is Professor Bernard Mehl has referred to as, "the fundamentalism argument." This argument propounds that if the administrator has to make an exception in this particular instance, then he will have to do it in every instance where one in form and content exist. In the end, the administrator presents a hypothetical social situation that he colorfully though inaccurately calls anarchy or chaos. Furthermore, the specific request on the particular moral question is seen as leading to that future situation of social disorganization and, if the administrator is convincing, personal responsibility is attached to the individual posting the request. Suggestive hints, of "troublemaker", and "uncooperative" are often used to attach low esteem to the individual involved.

One thing that is vital to note is that the bureaucrat who previously had displayed an ability only to deal with facts, specific cases, and the instrumentalities of expertize, now becomes a social philosopher of sorts and thinks in terms of, to say the least, abstract sociological processes.
to a discussion of these themes that our discussion must now turn.

It is my thesis that there are two broad philosophical orientations that underlie the rules (laws) in American educational institutions that are important considerations in the operation and maintenance of the crisis ideology in education and in American society. These philosophical orientations are: (1) an infantile view of man, and (2) the scientific and rational nature of man's world as revealed through his institutions.

The first philosophical orientation, when translated in terms of social activity is revealed as an operational pathological view of the child. Youngsters are seen, and often kept (a means of creating a sociological phenomenon called the self-fulfilling prophesy) in situations where they are essentially helpless. A teacher, for example, may withhold a wide variety of privileges, rewards, activities and learning experiences from children, so as to actually induce and further this condition in a given social situation. The power

19 The pathological view of the child is the ideological reason given for this position. Who after all, can argue with a "rational" view of man?
relationships in a sociological situation of superordination-subordination, dominance-submission and knowledge-ignorance are known and accepted as both articles of faith and means of social control.\(^{20}\)

In the adult world, what is essentially the same process may be seen in both the differential acquisition of information and the social control of knowledge (secrets) in bureaucratic-institutional settings. Indeed, one of the strongest themes in Franz Kafka's novel, The Trial, is the almost childlike helplessness of Joseph K. K's identity, his fears, and his knowledge are completely controlled by his artificial environment. In the end he finds freedom only in total submission--death.\(^{21}\)

The social aspects of this orientation of helplessness result socially in the help-giving care

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\(^{20}\)Actually, it is more than interesting to note that the social relationship just described, one in which the power motif is strong is actually a conflict oriented crisis producing pattern of social interaction whether face-to-face or nation-to-nation. This conflict producing relationship is maintained and justified however, on terms of cooperation, balance, and social harmony; i.e., maintaining the status quo, or keeping order.

providing activities of the school. The helplessness of the child is reflected in a wide compass of school "aid" programs. It operates, for example, as we have seen in special education programs, and in sophisticated, guidance--career adjustment--programs in exclusive private college preparatory schools. No one escapes the social aspects of the infantile view of man, only the applications of the process vary. Thus, some individuals become the objects of care-oriented activities of society as school children, others as adolescents, others as drug users, and still others as senior citizens.

The second philosophical orientation, that of the scientific and rational nature of man's world as revealed through his institutions and their social processes bears directly on the operation of our educational institutions

22 An example would be the increased use of the encounter group, or college classes in sensitivity training.

23 One could expect that the categories to which the "caring" activities would be increased. This would be a function of bureaucratic administration and result in institutional growth. Note how, as the Defense Department "cares" for our security, it has grown in institutional size and social importance. The correlates to a national mental health program are obvious and frightening.

24 See Chapter V.
as those institutions become increasingly laboratories where the data, information, and knowledge about human behavior are applied. The school uses studies, research, and clinical investigations concerning the learning process and human behavior to stimulate specific forms of social behavior and to obtain certain forms of social control. This data and information comes from scientific bureaucracies. These institutions are often related in terms of education structure. Thus, for example, clinical investigations concerning the behavior of children in a specific social situation may transpire at a university (what is referred to as pure research); become ideologically organized in a college of education (referred to as theoretical development); and applied in the school systems by teachers (referred to as using the latest educational methods). Frequently, each of these processes transpire on the same university and often the

25I am not discussing the ideological uses of specific behavioral studies and scientific information at this juncture for several obvious reasons. Initially it is not relevant to the points being discussed in this Chapter. Which studies are selected and why, for use in the school obviously raise a series of moral and ethical issues. Some of these issues will be discussed in the next chapter. Here, however, our interest lies with examining the social process and not the ethical questions of the selectivity principles at work within that process.
relationship between the university and the local school
system is of such a nature that little difficulty in the
application of the "methods" is encountered in the school
system. Man, or more properly perhaps, the children of
man, become guinea pigs--the objects of the research and
application of constellations of scientific bureaucracies.

In terms of legal orientation (philosophy if one
prefers), the social combinations and the applications of
these disciplines is the same as the legal orientation,
mentioned in the last chapter, of technology and science.
Both are examples of a laissez-faire, highly developmental
social process protected by either: (1) an absence of
legal rules, or, (2) broad enabling legislation, or,
(3) punitive measures (civil and criminal) that "mold"
behavior in certain broad directions. Little in terms

26 Frequently, this social process presents the illu­
usion of having a system of checks and balances, in admin­
istrative ineptitude and the famous "lack of communication"
syndrome if no where else. Such is not the case in actual
fact however. The right hand of the King not knowing what
the left hand is doing, does not provide the serf with
freedom, but only a period of grace.

27 Margret Willis, We Were Guinea Pigs (Columbus,

28 For example, the unavailability of F.H.A. finan­
cing on older homes in urban areas and the readily
of specific legal sanctions, restrictive doctrines, exists. If they do they are statutory prohibitions regulating social relationships now no longer relevant in an ultimate political sense. For example, legislation, court decisions, and school codes now exist as to when and under what circumstances a teacher may strike a student (administer corporal punishment). No specific rules exist, however, defining as to when and under what circumstances a teacher may: (1) administer drugs to a child for purposes of social control, (2) employ sophisticated behavioral modification techniques in the classroom situation, (3) use an achievement test or measurement device as a means of placing a child in a specific social position for purposes of control or discipline, or, (4) use psychological tools to counsel and guide a

availability of such financing for new suburban homes encourages people to move to the culture of the suburbs and to leave the city. An income tax incentive for having only a few children and a tax deduction for college education will encourage small families with increased educational social contact. Sadly, examples that could be cited are not limited so much by policy considerations as by the imagination (tastes) and ideologies of those in power. Imagination is thus politicized.

By this I mean nothing other than the fact that the social issues so regulated no longer form the cutting edge of moral questions.
child on a specific path leading to a predetermined set of social conditions. Paddling regulations are to educational law and the legal process of the schools what the hot air balloon is to aerospace travel.

At this stage of our discussion it should be pointed out that the organization and combinations of scientific (natural and social) fields and their applications in the schools of America presents not so much a question of standards, as alluded to, in part, above. Rather the important point to grasp is that the intellectual practices and the results of those practices in a number of given fields are becoming the basis for social policy. This is a legal question of great importance in at least two vital aspects: (1) when, why and how do institutions (professions, colleagues) take legal action against the intellectual process? and (2) how does intellectual knowledge enter the legal process and for the basis for decisions in law? The former is a concern with the Frankenstein aspects of human intellect, while the later reveal the philosopher as king dimensions of the social role of the intellectual-scientist.

In an article entitled, "The Harvard Drug Controversy: A Case Study of Subject Manipulation and
Social Structure," authors Benson and Smith examine how institutions take legal and law like (rule invocation) action against the intellectual process. The authors examined the moral, ethical and legal questions surrounding the drug research of Dr. Timothy Leary and Dr. Richard Alpert at Harvard University. The authors postulated:

... That the practical limits to experimental subject manipulation lie in the interests of the social groups, organizations, and professions involved in or impinged upon by the research in question. (Italics mine.)

The results of their research showed this to be true. The authors found out that as the research of Drs. Leary and Alpert became better known and moved into the public eye, and as it became increasingly controversial, the decision of Harvard University to terminate the research and to dismiss the professors was based upon the desire of the institution to protect its image and its organizational interests. The questions of professional abuse or misuse of standards, and the health and safety


31Ibid.
of the student subjects were at best, minor considerations in reaching evidentiary conclusions and taking legal action.

The important thing to note is not that the intellectual practices in this area of research field would threaten or did in fact threaten institutional stability, but rather that the political aspects of the research were found objectionable and were terminated. Thus, the institution made it clear that it would be permitted (war research for example) as opposed to the individual researcher ultimately reaching this decision. As B. A. Maher stated in a paper read before the Massachusetts Psychological Association:

> In the long run, however, we have an even greater stake in the more serious questions that have been asked about the possibility of an erosion of the freedom of researchers to do research on topics and in a manner of their own choosing.\textsuperscript{32} (Italics mine.).

The important thing to remember at this point is that the delimitation of academic freedom or the placing of constraints upon the research process is not topical but

\textsuperscript{32}B. A. Mahar, "Drugs and Academic Freedom," Massachusetts Psychological Association Newsletter, October, 1963, p. 4.
rather behavioral: politically embarrassing, eccentric behavior will no longer be tolerated.\textsuperscript{33} Thus, we have the institution, in this case Harvard University, establishing both the limits of intellectual research and style of behavior in which research is to be corrected.

At this stage, our discussion must turn to the second legal question: How and under what circumstances intellectual knowledge enters the legal process and forms the basis for decision in the law? The case of \textit{Painter v Bannister} is instructive on this point.\textsuperscript{34}

In that case, one had a unique situation where the court relied on a specific intellectual discipline (child psychology) in reaching its legal conclusions. The court relied heavily on the research of Anna Freud concerning the growth and development of children.

The case involved a father who sought to regain possession (custody) of his child from the maternal

\textsuperscript{33}By implication one could fairly surmise that the research team, the faceless, highly organized, and humanly interchangeable form of intellectual organization would be favored.

grandparents in Iowa for almost three years after the
death of his mother. The court extensively quoted from
Freud's work in child psychology to the effect that it
shaped a legal doctrine based on findings that the need
of every child for an unbroken continuity of affectionate
and stimulating relationships was essential in good child
development. These relationships the studies stated,
should be uninterrupted, and the court so held in its
decision. Thus, intellectual studies supplied the court
with content to access the psychological well being of
the child. Stated differently, psychological findings
at a very sophisticated level, became issues of fact
(evidence) for the court to weigh and then determine. 35
Thus, the moral questions implicit in an issue such as the
psychological well being of a child, are translated first,
into behavioral data and scientific conclusions, and then
into technical questions of legal fact. This process
does not remove the moral issue from the process of
legal decision however; it only obscures it.

35 One could hypothesize a situation where both
plaintiff and defense place testimony in evidence that is
nothing other than methodological argument in the various
sciences. Perhaps, legally, in some areas a system of
expert-referees will be established to enable the court
to decide matters of specific policy.
Though the court denies making moral decisions, and says that:

It is not our perrogative to determine custody upon our choice of one of two ways of life within normal and proper limits, and we will not do so.\textsuperscript{36} (Italics mine.).

It later makes the following revealing remarks:

Mark has established a father-son relationship with (the grandfather), which he apparently has never had with his natural father. He is happy, well adjusted, and progressing nicely in his development. We do not believe it is for Mark's best interest to take him out of this stable atmosphere in the face of warnings of dire consequences from an eminent child psychologist and send him to an uncertain future in his father's home.\textsuperscript{37} (Italics mine.).

Further comment on the case, the court compares the two households in question, saying that:

The household of the grandparents was described as stable, dependable, conventional, middle-class, midwest and that of the father was unstable, unconventional, arty, bohemian, and probably intellectually stimulating.\textsuperscript{38} (Italics mine.).

Though the court persists in denying that it is selecting a life style for the boy the following things become clear as a result of the court's decision in the case:

\textsuperscript{36}\textit{Painter v Bannister, op. cit., p. 154.}

\textsuperscript{37}\textit{Ibid., p. 158.}

\textsuperscript{38}\textit{Ibid.}
First, a new legal doctrine, "in the child's best interest" was created. Secondly, a clear life style or pattern of social behavior for the child was favored by the court. Lastly, the previous two conclusions rested fundamentally upon scientific research done in an academic discipline—child psychology.

By far the most important issue in the case is the use of a professional body of knowledge to decide the eventual merits of the issue. The question is not whether psychology or psychoanalytic theory and research have a contribution to make to law, but that they are becoming in this example, both the substantive and procedural guides for that legal decision. Stated differently: the intellectual content is finding its own legal (moral) justification through its use in the legal process and conversely the law is becoming a compendium of scientific research results about human behavior.

True, an important feature of the case is the doctrine of the "best interests of the child". In its application, for example, this may raise questions of the parental functions in society moving increasing from natural considerations to social considerations when the doctrine so necessitates.
Thus, Chief Justice Burger is categorically wrong when he says that:

The law always lags behind the most advanced thinking in every area. It must wait until the theologians and the moral leaders and events have created some common ground, some consensus. Because he overlooks the processes mentioned above and also does not recognize the existence of the vast area bureaucratic and institutional situations where rule and law, like judgements, are made employing the latest scientific and behavioral techniques in their decision making processes. Not all law is open or public. The overwhelming majority of regulations, rules, and law in our society are institutional and private in nature. They are well insulated from public view.

At this point it should be noted that to move an issue (event) by social pressure or social action from the public sphere to a private (often institutional) setting is simply turning a moral issue (actual or potential) into a technical question. In reality, this process involves competing ideologies as well as the mechanical operation of the legal process. For example,

one manner in which the last decade of legal struggles in education can be viewed is, as competing attempts on the one hand to have matters that have been institutional private questions of expertise become public moral issues (politicized) and resistance to this process on the other. During the 1960's the students, employees, functionaries, occupied the former position, and the administrations of various institutions in society the other.

The other side of the struggle, as it is shown legally, is the process where the institution turns the moral questions being publicized back into either questions of expertise or into institutional procedural issues—perhaps even into precise legal issues. For example, during the 1960's educational institutions adopted a policy, when possible, of no comment regarding the attempts of radical students to publicize research and development, racial, admissions, and investment policies of their institutions. When forced to make public statements administrators tended to minimize the significance of the social process. Clark Kerr, the

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41 Refer to footnote 18, page 86 of this chapter.
former President of the University of California at Berkeley, said three years after the famous Berkeley riots that:

The so-called crisis of the university is a limited crisis—limited to areas comprising perhaps one-quarter or one-third of a typical university viewed in terms of numbers of students, but considerably less than that in terms of money spent.\(^4^2\)

and Dr. Robert F. Goheen, President of Princeton University actually took the offensive and stated that the university's institutional relationships were beneficial. He said:

\[\text{I see nothing to be ashamed of or afraid of in this involvement. The fundamental obligations of the university include not only the protection and exercise of academic freedom but also concern for the welfare and security of the society which permits academic freedom to flourish and flower.}\]

\(^4^3\) (Italics mine.).

\(^{4^2}\) Clark Kerr, "Toward the More Perfect University," The University in America, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1967, p. 11.

\(^{4^3}\) Newsweek, November 13, 1967, p. 66. Note how the university as an institution assumes new functions. Traditionally, freedom from absolute feudalism was the responsibility of free men in universities engaged in inquiry. Now this became an institutional responsibility. Historically, the university like the temples was occasionally sacked and destroyed as well as emasculated by the rule of a tyrant. Goheen's remarks seem to assure us that this will never occur again. Note also, how some administrators state that the university is being destroyed from within by radical student groups.
At the same time that these social processes were occurring frequently the institution (depending on politics and geography) endeavored to create a situation where the status of the radical students were questioned. If the issue raised could not be made a technical question then the status of the student would be defined legally. Thus, the issue was transferred neatly from one of moral substance to one involving the factual (legal) situation of the questioner.

For example, a university by delaying, avoiding and obscuring responses on specific questions raised from the recognizable constituency of students actually induces a set of social conditions that are calculated to create a future situation where the activities, language, and demands of the students become the issue rather than the institutional policies questioned by the students initially. Thus, the student becomes the problem, and was made increasingly vulnerable to institutional sanctions if he persisted in his efforts to translate large areas of institutional activity into moral issues, for to do so, his actions often
had to assume outrageous socially-dramatic acts. 44

It is important to note that the same essential institutional philosophies and patterns of organization was followed by the Nazi's regarding the social situation of the Jews. The Jews were seen initially as a moral issue not to mix with ayrans and as having social relations detrimental to the state. The next step was to declare the Jews to be a problem. This was done in such a wide variety of cruel and ingenious ways that they need not be recounted but only noted because the end of the process resulted in the Jew being made into a legal issue. The repressive laws passed at the Nazi party conference in 1935 and known as the Nuremberg Laws made the Jew a stateless, homeless, object. The Nazi tried to make the Jew a chattel. Joseph K was reality, not a novelistic nightmare.

Once objectified, the last stages and the final fate of the Jews became nothing other than technical problems for the Nazi bureaucracies. Men's lives were translated into paperwork problems, dare I say "problems

44 The Chicago conspiracy trial points out how outrageous some of the behavior of those persons was as well as how outrageous the institutional, in this case the legal, behavior was also.
in communication", and transportation schedules. The men of the Third Reich, in their rush to eliminate the Jew, the symbol of social pluralism, lost all meaning. Indeed as Eichman claimed, he became a cog in the bureaucratic process. He was supplanted by the functioning of highly organized bureaucracy in terms of meaning. Peter Drucker says that:

Fascism is the substitution of organization for creed and order; . . . the glorification of organization as an end in itself shows that eventually there will be a new order based upon a reformulation of the old fundamental values. (Italics mine.)

and Jacques Ellul in discussing the process of propaganda and the manufacturing of issues says that:

At the moment when propaganda sets in, political facts become political problems, which implies they must be solved even if in reality they are not even problems in order to give satisfaction, not to those directly interested, but to those aroused and disturbed by public

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46 Peter Drucker, The End of Economic Man (Vienna: Guild Books, 1939), pp. 32-33. Drucker also says at page 165 that:

Totalitarianism must reject the demand made upon every preceding social order--to justify itself and its authority. It must maintain that the mechanical, external organization of society constitutes its own justification and
opinion. It must respond to what the ordinary man considers to be a problem. For political reality exists there and nowhere else.47

Thus, whether real or imagined, the universities had to respond to the problem of the student and in some cases whether they had first to create the problem student and then respond to him did not matter. The importance is established in the social process and not the results for the institution. A moral question symbolized by the students, was turned into a problem, which subsequently became a legal issue, and finally and ultimately was disposed of as a technical problem of institutionalized bureaucracy.48

While it is true that the legal harassment of dissenters in society is as old as recorded history there

and that it is a social order by itself. Not only must the mere hull of the social fabric be supreme compared to all social substance: the empty mechanical form must also be the supreme social substance itself. Organization must serve for creed and order. (Italics mine.).

47Ellul, The Political Illusion, op. cit., p. 120.

48This is true whether the "results" were or resulting in a Brandeis type negotiation, or a Kent State killing. In both instances the students were technicalities—in the first instance of bureaucratic negotiation and in the second objects impeading the functions of the national guard.
are important distinctions to be noted between what was done and what is now attempted. Harsh prison sentences and civil penalties existed in both periods of time, but today, in its most sophisticated fashion legal harassment becomes not sanctions but actual use of bureaucratic-democratic due process. To be free is to be free of institutional process. Freedom becomes the freedom and avoidance of bureaucracy. Paradoxically, the schools both teach and show the students how to both use (manipulate) and become accommodated (manipulated) to the bureaucratic social structure. The central thrust of the institution then becomes one where a moral hunger on the part of individuals is always quelled often by the illusion of complete freedom. As Abbie Hoffman noted in his book Woodstock Nation:

It didn't take long to figure out where Antioch's head was at. There are lots of progressive nursery schools, but there the kiddies are so big. Most issues that are being fought for at other schools were won at Antioch ten years ago. Perhaps won is not the right word, they were liberally given. Like the big sheet of paper over the men's pissing stall for grafitti. But, well Antioch would be the dream school for most students given what they now have. No ROTC, close teacher-student community relations, people turn on and fuck everywhere, naked swim-ins in the gym pool, a black dorm, nice woods, co-ed dorms,
Sunday tourists who drive through to stare at the commie-hippies, and so much love and identity-searching. It was all 'Who am I' stuff. Everything was so beautiful, I was completely bored after three hours. The School lacked the energy that comes from struggle. When I was leaving the next day Eric remarked, 'You know surveys show that 55 per cent of us end up in large corporations.' What 'Hair' is to Broadway, Antioch is to the universities.\(^4^9\) (Italics mine.)

Thus, complete freedom, combines with an absence moral purpose, since the institution grants what is asked and becomes repressive. In reality the school is again seen as a care oriented-privilege granting institutions.\(^5^0\) The question of what struggles are real, and which are illusions, remains; as does the search for the moral and ethical implications of the issues of the crisis ideology, the central issue of our concern. It is to that question, the uses of the crisis ideology, that our query must now turn as we discuss an extended example--the drug problem in America.


\(^5^0\)I am not pursuaded that the infantilistic view of man is absent at Antioch, but only that it takes a different form. It makes the moral desires of the student instrumentalities of school policy that are granted, not withheld. Instead of a starved child we have the spoiled brat. Neither, it should be noted, is a man.
CHAPTER V

THE CRISIS IDEOLOGY AND THE DRUG PROBLEM:
A CASE STUDY OF CRISIS THOUGHT
IN OPERATIONS

Perhaps no aspect of the crisis ideology has gathered more attention in America than what is commonly referred to as the drug problem. Each day brings with it a new clustering of programs, proposals, and answers concerning this most vexing of crises. Virtually all individuals appear to be involved in some way with the drug problem. Religious, business, and labor leaders, politicians at all levels, and, of course, the intellectual and academic community are touched in some manner by the drug problem. This universality of appeal, this totality of involvement, is the single greatest strength of the drug problem. Newsweek says:

In one sense, the heroin crisis is real because so many persons have come to believe that it's real. A recent Gallup poll showed that just since March, drug addiction has risen
from seventh to third place on the public list of 'most important' national problems.¹

National priorities in problems notwithstanding, it is the thesis of this chapter that the drug crisis represents another feature (aspect if one prefers) of the crisis ideology in education, and that clear ideological approaches in the definition, control and management of the crisis can be shown to exist. The issue is not, as is often popularly thought, the proper or improper use of drugs, but rather, in an examination of the social situations and, more specifically, in who controls these social situations in terms of social organization where the drugs are used and/or administered.²

Initially, the problem of drugs during the 1960's occupied, in rough approximation, the same position that the spread of juvenile delinquency among white middle-class youths did during the 1950's. At first both phenomena taxed the intellectual scheme prevalent for cataloging deviant behavior. During the 1950's there were no neat

¹"The Heroin Plague: What Can be Done?," Newsweek July 5, 1971, p. 27 at p. 28.

²Note how the terms user-used and administer-administered reflect totally different social situations in the mind of the reader.
little pigeon holes in which to place the middle-class delinquent who had everything (social position, money, and background), nor is there a place today to neatly file the affluent, white addict. Categories of organization, the tools of social analysis, used by sociology were strained. Parenthetically, it is obvious that in both instances deviancy was not defined (no social indices existed) as a condition to include the white middle-class. As a result, initially, both phenomena were thought of in terms of individual pathology. No one responded, in either case, with a structural argument of any compass that these things were an indication of a certain radical failing in American life, and that ultimately this radical failure only could be dealt with politically.

The real problem of drug usage in society, and there is one, lies, not so much with the much maligned youth in our society, even in terms of the dreaded addiction to heroin, but rather with the use of

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3 Paul Goodman's work Growing Up Absurd did not appear until 1958 though it did discard the individual pathological focus.

4 See Chapters II and III.
pharmaceutical means to modify the behavior of children, initially in clinical-experimental situations, and later in school-learning settings. Indeed, Dr. E. Leong Wau pointed out at the National Heroin Symposium that:

Alcohol and barbiturate addiction are incomparably larger, costlier and uglier problems than smack, and heroin is considered the most serious drug of abuse only because society has willed it so.\(^5\) (Italics mine.).

Thus, because in Dr. Wau's words, "society has willed it," drugs, as examplified by heroin use, are the central focus of the problem. To place the focus on heroin, hallucinogens, marijuana, represents both the workings of ideology and a failure of social nerve in America. As we discovered that the counter-culture and the intellectual credence attached to it shadowed from public view that recognition of a possible real counter-culture with Black America, so concentration upon the above aspects of the drug problem obscures the real nexus of the issue and clouds the debate for educators.

Many educators point with pride at the drug education programs for parents, students, the general public, and young children that are proliferating in all communities.

\(^5\)Newsweek, op. cit., p. 32.
No community, inner city, suburban, rural, wants to be left out of the picture. To be excluded would be to suffer the charge of irrelevancy of program, or worse, be accused of faulty social perception. Neither are attractive courses for these vulnerable positions. Reasons for inclusion, aside from the above would be that (1) an honest drug crisis does exist in all communities, and/or, (2) there are powerful interests, police, school, and economic jobs to be obtained and retained by the recognition of the problem. A sizeable group of individuals exist who see the retention of the drug crisis as advantageous to their social and institutional positions. One of the methods of recognition is that:

Most of the big cities figure their addiction rate by the so called Baden formula (after Dr. Michael M. Baden, New York City's Deputy Chief Medical Examiner), multiplying the number of heroin deaths by 200 to get the total addict population. It was this formula that led the city of Washington to multiply its estimated number of addicts from 1200 in 1968 to

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In a similar vein Ralph Nader has a vested interest in the healthy continuation of American capitalism because the success of the latter ensures, with careful timing, the success of the former. Who cares if the Packard was a safe car?
16,800 now—a statistical crisis that has been duplicated in other cities from Boston to Los Angeles.\(^7\) (Italics mine.).

Statistical crisis notwithstanding, in an article entitled, "Drug Education Begins Before Kindergarten", Daniels makes the following revealing statements.\(^8\)

We believe that children entering Kindergarten have already had five years of drug education that began the day they were born into our drug oriented society . . . During the annual pre-Kindergarten parent orientation meeting we point out that the time to become concerned about the teenage drug problem is now, before their child even enters school.\(^9\)

The implication of Daniels' statement is that ideally there ought to be a way to educate the young child about drugs shortly after birth. The social drawback is a simple communication problem with the young infant. Ironically, no one has yet solved the social problem of communication by suggesting that the mother be given a drug or series of drugs that would induce certain anti-drug dispositions in the yet unborn fetus. This suggestion is not science fiction nor is it a serious

\(^7\)Newsweek, op. cit., p. 29.


\(^9\)Ibid., p. 243.
proposal, it does, I hope, shed light upon the soundness of the reasoning, quite prevalent in the area of drug crisis, that the way one stops a drug problem is with another, socially approved, drug: Methodone for heroin, Thorazine for LSD.

Daniels concludes that the young children who become involved in drug use usually do so for one of three reasons: (1) an unrealistic curiosity, (2) a need for acceptance, or, (3) a need to avoid facing an unpleasant situation.

She continues as follows:

Whatever the reason for becoming involved, these young people seem to exhibit one or more of the following: a poor self concept, a lack of respect for and understanding of the law, an inability to make responsible personal and social decision.

Consistent with our philosophy of teaching in anticipation of needs and concerns, the lower grade curriculum has been supplemented with preventive educational material aimed at helping children develop:

1. respect for the positive role of drugs in people's lives,
2. respect for and understanding of the law,
3. an improved self concept,
4. an understanding of the meaning of substance abuse in society and,
5. **attitudes encouraging responsible behavior.**

... The other aim, that of encouraging responsible behavior, is approached through the use of reality discussion material. Several realistic situations, which might take place in any child's daily living experience, have been prepared as short paragraphs to be read or dramatized in class, with follow-up discussion providing experience in problem solving techniques ... Another technique that has been experimented with, which we call Reality Conversation, is an adaptation of the encounter group. Fourth grade class members spend twenty minutes per day, often times in heated discussion, pointing out to someone in the group, behavior that has not met agreed upon standards of school conduct. This is done in an attempt to motivate the student to want to change to more acceptable behavior.\(^{10}\) (Italics mine.)

The implications of this passage are startling. For example clear ideological overtones run throughout the piece. That behavioral techniques are used as a supplementary means to induce changed orientations and/or behavior toward future, as yet, unrealized situations unobjectionable and passes without discussion of either moral, ethical, or philosophical implications.

The philosophy of teaching is said to be one of anticipation. Clearly, this can mean nothing more than pragmatic response to the ideologically formed and

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\(^{10}\) Ibid., pp. 244-245.
approved priorities of an existing situation. Thus, the educational ends are determined then the most successful means are used to achieve that end. In our context, this means that, as soon as possible, a monopoly on the information about drugs should be obtained by the school, or a related educational agency, and used as a source of socialization on the youth, both in terms of content and means.

Moreover, the program suggested and reported is ideological in that it seeks to teach respect for the positive role of drugs in society and in individuals' lives. Thus, the program is not anti-drug per se, but selective as to what are the positive and legitimate uses of drugs. The selectivity as to use, conditions, and drug type place the program in a political arena. To teach the positive role or the affirmative aspects of anything, clear value choices have to be made, and these values intermingled with the scientific (natural or social) efforts sought. To say that values determine the outcome is unnecessary; that they shape and

\[\text{11No doubt the list of drugs and their uses would change from time to time. One can envision movement toward entropy in this area like we witness in the definitions of obsenity.}\]
interpenetrate the scientific effort means we have to examine that effort in ideological terms and not scientific probity alone.

The positive or negative use of drugs, however, would not depend upon drug time, nor ultimately upon whether or not such administration was legal or illegal but rather on the social conditions in which said behavior transpired and upon the social ends toward which the behavior was directed.

For example, diet pills, usually a mild amphetamine, serve a positive use in diminishing or controlling appetites. The value upheld is that obesity is disfunctional in our society, cosmetically and, of course, healthful for the individual. To use the same diet pills, however, for their side effects, alterness, hyper-activity, and rapid passage of time (speeding), would be a negative or non-positive use of the drug. This would be true even if the pills were used primarily for their side effects by fat people. One must not only

12 How much illegal use of drugs occurs in clinics, hospitals, and foundations is unknown. The use transpires among the professional staff and in prescription and administration to human subjects. See Chapter VIII.
use the right drug, but one must use the drug for the right reasons.

The article continues, dwelling not so much on the positive use of drugs, but rather with the encouragement of responsible attitudes and behavior on the part of the children. Reality conversation is the vehicle by which someone in the classroom group is admonished about his behavior and not meeting agreed standards of school conduct. Stated differently, a sort of behavioral court is held each day.\(^\text{13}\) The prosecutors (rule followers) and the defendants (rule violators) often engage in heated discussion, which has as its purpose the motivation of the student to change to more acceptable behavior.

What is so insidious about this reality conversation is not that it brainwashes the children, not that it instructs them in para-legal techniques, not that it threatens the children, but that the encounter groups

\(^{13}\)Emily Post and the manners that became so associated with forms of social conduct in interaction leave an individual intact even if he fluffs on a rule. They remain external to him, whereas the reality conversations internalize a previously established code of behavior upon the child, and as a result the behavior assumes a kind of total reality for the child and not a code of conduct.
are blurring the distinction between authentic human relationships and the playacting that goes on in the typical encounter session. If this blurred state is true, then it is the academic community, in this aspect, that established the life as theatre concept, while the credit has been falsely given to yippies like Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman. At any rate, a genuine relationship is quite different from a relationship in which two people look at one another in a contrived atmosphere, no matter how sophisticated the contrivance or how deceptive the atmosphere. If Martin Buber is an example of the former, a sorority house encompasses the latter. American education is certainly not Jewish. In this context it is Greek.

That the atmosphere will continue to be deceptive and the social realities illusory can be seen if we establish a not too hypothetical relationship between the token system and reality conversation. Thus:

... Tokens were presented for correct responses. The children then used the tokens to select reinforces, such as snacks and access to a variety of play activities. ... Informal observations suggested that the token system had several unanticipated effects: the children's vocabulary and ability to understand instructions improved; a favorable attitude toward school developed; and

A kind of capitalism in the classroom could be envisioned. Those behaving in a way deemed to be acceptable, usually some variant of rule following behavior, could be given tokens. Each individual, the teacher would stress, is equal at the beginning, and each can acquire as many token as his abilities will allow. The hitch is that it is all managed, and unlike true capitalism, there is no place for the entrepreneur, for the reason that for every activity the entrepreneur contemplates and/or does, there is a rule "flexible" enough to encompass his behavior.

It is in the flexibility of these rules that the problem lies. It does not matter whether the flexibility exists so as to "treat the equities" of a situation or to "move toward meaning" for the involved (confronted) child. The end result of the process is that the individual liberty of the child, both a value and a social condition, we claim to hold in high esteen are seriously threatened.\footnote{Ironically, one could note that the initial K carried by Joseph in Franz Kafka's brilliant work, The Trial, could stand for Kindergarten.}
F. A. Hayek in his book, *The Road to Serfdom*, states:

Nothing distinguishes more clearly conditions in a free country from those in a country under arbitrary government than the observance in the former of the great principle known as the Rule of Law. Stripped of all technicalities, this means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.16 (Italics mine.).

I will not argue whether one can translate Hayek's remarks to educational encounter groups meaningfully. That argument seems to be one essentially involved with translating a moral right into a behavioral setting. It is that behavioral setting that stirs my mind and not process within that setting. Edgar Z. Friedenberg has observed:

The content of the curriculum is of little significance except insofar as what is done with it conveys to the student values, threats, and anxieties whose impact he is required to sustain. In schooling more than any other kind of communication the medium is surely the message.17 (Italics mine.).


One could add that if the medium of the school is indeed the message and that medium is a sophisticated means of total social control anchored in intrigue, distortion, unreality, and illusion, then the failure of American social nerve will have become total, and solutions to living (coping) institutionalized under the broad umbrella of the school.

The schools analyze, record, and transmit rich and detailed behavioral files on individuals in addition to documented judgements regarding the students personal qualities. A society with social nerve, in apologetic terms, less sophisticated, would be less concerned about the reality of social stratification and retaining the illusions of equality. Where social nerve exists, these matters are left to the private judgement of individuals.

It is true that individual private judgements still affect our lives in very important ways. Often private judgements, hunches, still affect recruitment and advancement, economically, socially, and politically. The point remains, however, that these private judgements carry increased prestige, meaning, and a force-legitimacy if they are supported by credentials granted by an official agency such as our educational institutions.
Friedenberg notes with alarm that:

The school grades students on citizenship and emotional adjustment, but this is less important than the fact that value judgements about the student's acceptability within the social structure permeate course grades as well, and at this level they cannot effectively be challenged as reflecting cultural bias. Similar judgements as to whether students should be admitted to a college preparatory program and hence whether they will ever obtain a college degree at all. 18 (Italics mine.).

Some communities, usually the more liberal ones, are very concerned with the question of individual acceptability within the social structure. 19 These communities go farther in their educational programs than drug information seminars and/or announcements. These communities use a socio-pathological view of man combined with a sophisticated (often emerging) bureaucratic structure and establish drug treatment centers, out-patient

18 Ibid., p. 16.

19 The liberal sees the social pathological "objective" or "rational" view of man as liberating him from the ideologies of the past, which as he defines his situation, were infused with religion, racism, and politics. In his view the liberal is correct but he fails to account for the ideological and social implications of his ideology. See W. H. Whyte, The Organization Man (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956), David Reisman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), and Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959).
drug prevention programs, and, most importantly, broader community health programs. In 1934 Kurt Gauger, a Nazi and a member of the SS said:

The connection between psychotherapy and politics may appear strange to many of you... Hitherto, psychotherapy was largely individualistically oriented, and precisely at the point where one spoke of the relationship of the individual to the community. To us, the concept of the individual is at the outset false... German psychotherapy is oriented toward the basic premise that man is a community-building being... Hence, the concept of illness is 'politically' determined, and this means politically in the sense of a definite decision about a world view.20 (Italics mine.).

Gauger's statements are more than specific historical comment. True, they allude to a repugnant and defunct ideology, but is the process, the means, that should alarm us with its familiarity, not the ideology. For example, in these communities, most often the suburbs,21 the most modern medical-pharmaceutical means available is combined with intense programs of encounter group therapy.

Nothing less than the restructuring of the personality of the individual is involved. Old needs (the drug


and junkie relationships) are replaced by new needs (new drugs and new social relationships surrounding the new drug). The important thing to note is not that the evidence is beginning to show that individuals in these programs cannot function without the social support that surrounds the cure, but the sociology of the cure-oriented relationships.

In terms of social organization the areas where drug education programs flourish are essentially cure-oriented communities. A cure-oriented community is one in which the mind, body, and soul of man are seen in crisis terms: unpredictable entities that have the potential to become infected or diseased and thereby disrupt the system of social organization in the community. The efforts of the community, both in terms of content and context of social organization are seen as seeking solutions to the unknowns of human behavior and

22 Newsweek, op. cit., p. 29.

23 Ken Kesey, One Flew Over the Cookoo's Next (New York: Bantam Books, 1964). In Kesey's work the relationship between big nurse and McMurphy are instructive as to the nature of cure-oriented communities if one agrees with Hannah Arendt that the essence of totalitarianism was revealed in the concentration camps.
systematically (with the aid of computers) applying the results of that knowledge to individuals whose behavior is either: (1) judged to be unacceptable, or (2) deviates from an established norm when compared with the normative system of the community.\textsuperscript{24}

On the surface, however, the cure-oriented community, with its crisis producing-problem solving instrumentalism, appeals to a basic need for an organic community, for historical continuity, and for the retention of morality. One just has to learn (discover) the laws that govern men and follow (obey) them. Thus, the cure-oriented community is seen as the legitimate continuation of both man's history and his moral purpose.\textsuperscript{25} This is ironic, not because this perception is an illusion, which it is, but because the

\textsuperscript{24}Both of these situations are normatively formed results of ideological views. The question of statistical variation or deviation from a norm has proved to be particularly vexing for the liberal. For example, an objective examination, given fairly (all subjects treated equally), was said to be value free device for measuring knowledge. Both the social process of testing and the ideological reasons for the test remained unexamined.

instrumentalism, which objectified everything encompassed in its view, in reality politicized everything it encountered. For example, the cure-oriented communities mentioned above, define "freedom" as the fulfillment of a socially approved task, "meaning" as successful group relations, and "morality" as affirmative responses to a hierarchal, ordered, bureaucracy. These definitions are seen not in terms of ideology, but merely as the results of the operation natural and social scientific principles. Any deviation, intentional or not, can (must) be viewed in ideological terms, thus becoming politicized. 

In view of the political totality of these cure-oriented communities it is vital to ask the following question: What occurs if the illness or disease, be it social or medical, is in fact cured? In other words, when the crisis disappears, what happens? Several possibilities exist.

26 If the stated axioms of the community are, value neutrality, objectivity, measurement, and ideological freedom, then anything else, any aspect of human activity or social intercourse that differs or questions these presuppositions is "ideological" and "politically motivated."
Sartre in his book, *Anti-Semite and Jew* suggests an answer. In juxtaposing the philosophical and political orientations of the liberal democrat and the anti-semite, Sartre reveals some startling differences between the two men and their positions. He states, in terms of their social attitudes, that the anti-semite wanted to kill the man and save the Jew, while the liberal democrat wanted to save the man but kill the Jew.  

The anti-semite is seen as "ideological man", a person who must passionately retain both his ideology and those symbolic features that give it meaning. Even after those symbols have been either removed or have ceased to have social meaning, they will still be retained and manipulated by the anti-semite.

The liberal democrat, however, is rational, not passionate, man. He is a man who construes the world in terms of the social pathology of problem resolution and crisis resolution. His concern is with

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28 Ibid., p. 57.
instrumentalities, both in process and object, and he will save the man, all men. To insure his perceptions of the world he will sacrifice (remove by education) the ideological concepts and social categories (in this instance the Jew) that prevent the triumph of rationality in the human community.

Both the anti-semite and the liberal democrat suggest that the manner in which communities react to the drug crisis can be viewed as being extensions of Sartre's contrasting pictures of these men, not as men alone, but as sociological phenomena.

The social extensions of anti-semitism would reveal a picture of a community where the drug crisis would be dealt with by "killing" the child (most probably by a prison term), and retaining the drug either physically (few efforts made to reduce the source of supply) or symbolically (by harsh, broad drug laws). Mythological stories and sensational accounts of, and concerning, drugs and drug users would enter the community and assume, with the passage of time, a sense of legitimacy. If the community resembles in social profile the world of the anti-semite the drug crisis or illness will never be cured, for no other reason than
because the passions concerning the issue refuse to release the rationality necessary to affect the cure.  

If the community is a cure-oriented community, the home of the liberal democrat, the emphasis is placed on saving (socializing) the child, and removing or solving the problem. The problem will either be solved by definition of removing all drug laws (historically, making the Jew become Christian) or in actual fact (for example, purchasing the opium crop in Turkey). Clinical reports and professional literature on drugs and drug users would begin to enter the social system of the community and to control perceptions on this crisis.

Both the perceptions of the crisis and the cure become unimportant in their specificity (drugs) but become endemic partners in an ongoing process of total socialization that protects the liberal democrat from his failure of social nerve and insulates him from an encounter with a Jew, the symbolic representation historically and socially of social pluralism.

29For example, in America the anti-semite is exemplified by George Wallace and President Nixon, and the liberal democrat by Ralph Nader and Betty Fredan.
Thus, those communities which either are or are becoming increasingly cure-oriented dispose of the disease, problem, or crisis at hand but retain the process of social organization employed initially in the crisis resolution as a means of continuing general socialization. Disease hunting (crisis generation) is an important aspect of the crisis ideology and is central to the cure-oriented community of the liberal democrat, as well as being an important social process in institutional educational activities. It is to an examination of crisis values in education and their social importance that our analysis now shifts as we leave the community perspective for the institutional setting of special education.
CHAPTER VI

THE CRISIS IDEOLOGY IN EDUCATION: AN
ANALYSIS OF SPECIAL EDUCATION
AND BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION

Leonard Carmichael in his introduction to
Virginia Axline's book, Dibs in Search of Self states:

There can be no doubt that one of the great problems of our crowded and technological age is the proper understanding of techniques by means of which lasting changes in personality and behaviours can be brought about.¹ (Italics mine.)

while Jane Brody in an article in the New York Times entitled, "Ethics Debate Set Off by Life Science Gains" comments as follows:

The growing ethical concern which amounts to a movement arises from such recent developments as heart transplants and new drugs to alter emotions and behaviour. It is also prompted by such future possibilities as the creation of test tube babies and the manipulation of genes to 'improve' the human race. 'Unless thought is given to such matters now,' said James Watson, the Nobel Prize winning geneticists, 'the possibility of our

having a free choice will one day suddenly be gone. 

These two quotations present both ends of an increasingly important issue involving the fields of medicine, education, and combinations of these fields. The issue is on the one hand, the understanding and control of human beings by science and education as opposed to moral and ethical limits as to what can and what cannot be done to and/or for human beings. Walter F. Mondale and seventeen co-sponsors in the United States Senate have proposed legislation that would establish a national advisory commission on health science and society. The commission would endeavor to explore the moral, social, and legal implications of the life sciences and their effects on our society.

In this chapter, I will discuss the relationships existing and emerging between medicine, law, and education. I will show how and in what manner these disciplines and others are merging with educational research and what the results of these social processes portend for education in America. It is my thesis that

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the crisis ideology, the problem solving instrumentalism of science, enters American education through its programs in special education, and that its applications in this specific treatment oriented field will be generalized, gradually to be sure, to all educational programs.

The decade of the 1960's has been a tremendous growth in educational programs for emotionally disturbed children. President Kennedy, discussing the mental health of all Americans said:

I propose a national mental health program to assist in the inauguration of a wholly new emphasis and approach to care for the mentally ill . . . Government at every level--Federal, state, local--private foundations and individual citizens must all face up to their responsibilities in this area.3

That President Kennedy concluded his remarks with a desire to bring mental health within the field of medicine and the scientific model does not now concern us. Rather, the tone of his remarks suggests how interest in the area has recently accelerated.

These programs have increased not only in number but in methodological sophistication and measureable productiveness. New models for both the treatment and the management of the classroom situation have evolved, some with a sense of urgency or impending disaster.

Jerome Bruner agrees and says that:

Education is in a state of crisis. It has failed to respond to changing social needs—lagging behind rather than leading. The functionalist in me says, first recognize the gravity of our present situation. But then treat it as an emergency and restate the priorities. 4 (Italics mine.)

Recently, for example, the number of alternative strategies available to educators who teach in the special education area have been increased by the introduction of the ecological management programs 5 and, the crisis teacher. 6

Among the divergent approaches and strategies which have been tried and identified, the behavioral


approach appears to be the most promising and has contributed the most to an attitude of optimism in the education and management of disturbed children. The initial and pioneering efforts of the Montgomery County Project and the Arlington Project to modify children's behavior by providing a consistent structure for educational and socio-emotional experiences have been refined and extended through application of operant methodology and educational technology.  

Operant methodology involves the continuous or frequent observation and recording of directly observable behavior in, what is termed, a functional analysis. The behavioral record is continued through several phases, including a phase in which the rate of a specified behavior is determined, a phase in which a procedure designed to modify the behavior is instituted, and a phase in which


8Ibid., p. 187.

the modification procedure is discontinued. The functional
analysis of behavioral change takes into consideration
what is called the "antecedent or stimulus events", the
movement or specified behavior which is to be changed,
subsequent or consequent events, and the arrangements or
"contingency system" which defines the relationship
between the occurrence of behavior and its consequences. 10
Though the measurement techniques may vary, depending
upon the specific type of operant methodology employed,
the objective is still to demonstrate the relationship
between a behavior and an antecedent or consequent event.
In short, a complete behavioral record is kept on the
student for the purpose of altering certain specific
portions of that behavior.

Until recently, it should be pointed out, most of
the investigations involving the management of disturbed

10 R. J. Whelan and N. G. Haring "Modification and
Maintenance of Behavior Through Systematic Application
of Consequences," Exceptional Children (1966), Vol. 32,
pp. 281-289.

See also R. J. Whelan, "The Relevance of Behavior
Modification Procedures for Teachers of Emotionally
Disturbed Children," Intervention Approaches in Educating
Emotionally Disturbed Children, ed. by P. Knoblock
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966), pp. 35-
78.
behavior by operant conditioning techniques have involved only single subjects. Modern educational technology, television and video tape facilities, do allow application of the desired behavior principles to problems involving groups of children, thus, overcoming the objections of specificity and classroom nonapplicability. A more serious objection lies, however, in that the real world is much different from a laboratory setting.

Bruner indicates his concern for this point when he says:

> My chief worry about behavior modifiers is that they often forget that in life the very melee for the control of behavior guarantees a curious kind of freedom. Human beings learn the consequences of their acts very quickly, and they can do comparison shopping among the consequences of different acts. So Godspeed to all who create paradigms for learning based on isolated pigeons in soundproof pecking boxes. But Godspeed to all who generate paradigms for learning based on isolated pigeons for re-entry to the real world as well. Let them not lament the general untidiness of real things.12 (Italics mine.).

While Bruner's objection is well taken, and I feel that there all too often does exist a "lament" about the general "untidiness of real things" among those natural

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12Hall, op. cit., p. 70.
and social scientists who conduct observations and engage in research in laboratory settings, I do not feel that it strikes the core issue. Let me cite an example from McLuhan's book, *War and Peace in the Global Village*. The author, in discussing the work of Pavlov, states that:

The work of Pavlov, in revealing the fact of conditioned reflexes, had a totally different meaning for the Russian and the European. Pavlov had been unable to condition his dogs in his experiments until he had completely conditioned the laboratory environments in which they lived. Until precise thermal and auditory controls were introduced into the laboratories the conditioning did not occur. The bell did not elicit salivation. To the European it was not the conditioning of the laboratories but the fact of automatic salivation that created the excitement... Living in a man-made environment, extremely specialized and fragmented, the Westerner was as oblivious of his environment as the Russian is oblivious of his tribal environment, which is neither mechanical nor man-made... Therefore, to the Russian, the exciting event in Pavlov's experiment was not the conditioning of the dogs but of the laboratories.13 (Italics mine.).

The danger lies not in a disparity between the "real world" and the laboratory but that both will be eventually the same, e.g., totally managed environments. Since one of the admitted "problems" is the transfer of

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technique from the laboratory to the school room the answer is not to adapt the technique to changed circumstances, but rather, I fear, to transform the school room into a laboratory, and the teacher into a technician.\(^{14}\)

Accordingly, the agent of socialization will not be the critical teacher, but the modern technocrat, not he who clarifies, but he who mystifies. Whereas, the teacher promotes a sense of personal responsibility in the search for truth, often at the cost of spiritual turmoil, the technocrat offers security and happiness instead of an authentic search for meaning and truth. If the goals of education are essentially aristocratic, competitive, and instrumental, the goals of laboratory socialization are just the opposite: democratic, non-competitive, and institutional.

The aim of the laboratory initially, of course, will be to discover, correct, and control behavior problems in only special instances where the "behavior problem" has been predetermined, i.e., determined to have

existed before observation begins. It goes without saying however, that the management of behavior problems is best achieved by discouraging idiosyncratic behavior and exploration and by encouraging conduct favoring group solidarity. The laboratory setting of the school will become increasingly generalized, if for no other reason than the reduction of choice and alternatives, so vital in behavior modification programs, is also essential to socialization (not critical education), especially in mass society.\textsuperscript{15} In the laboratory, control comes first, teaching follows.\textsuperscript{16}

Another feature of the behavioral approach to educating disturbed children that raises serious questions is its claimed universality within the field and to all involved with disturbed children. Although the technical aspects of a behavioral approach to educating disturbed children may require a sophisticated understanding of scientific research, the learning principles which underlie the approach and their

\textsuperscript{15}If what I suggest is that teaching and socialization are partly, at least, antagonistic processes, and I believe they are, then the technological society will opt for socialization.

\textsuperscript{16}Cantrell, op. cit., p. 218.
application to specific situations may, the argument goes, be understood by parents and teachers. Recent published investigations, as well as courses, parent-teacher workshops, in-service institutes, and school programs have provided both teachers and parents with instruction in behavior management techniques. As a result, teachers and parents are now able to communicate more precisely about children's behavior in objective, scientific, terms and rationally plan more effective control procedures. The child has thus become an object and has ceased to be a child, and the parent has become a benevolent caretaker. Listen to the words of an enlightened, liberal, public official, Senator Abraham Ribicoff concerning the behavior of children.

Week after week, our newspapers report senseless killings, rapes, and acts of sadism. For those who read beyond the headlines there emerges a repetitive chronicle of neglect and inaction by a society that turned its back of deeply troubled children until it was too late to save them or to protect the community.

... What is needed, it seems to me, is an all-out effort to make sure that potentially dangerous youngsters are identified early.

effectively brought into treatment, and continuously treated as long as necessary to assure decent lives for themselves and safety for society. 18 (Italics mine.).

The school-laboratory, thus not only is a means of socialization, ever increasing socialization, at the expense of teaching, but, in Senator Ribicoff's eyes, a diagnostic and treatment center for "potentially dangerous youngsters," and a guarantor of increased public safety in that idiosyncratic behavior of students will become rationalized on the grounds that it is a potential threat to society. Thus, the school-laboratory carries a political coloration of being a crisis prevention clinic, and as Jacques Barzun says:

The notion of helping the child has in the United States displaced that of teaching him. Anyone who tries to preserve the distinction is obviously unhelpful, and is at once known for a declared enemy of youth. 19 (Italics mine.).

and a declared enemy of society, according to Senator Ribicoff's remarks. Thus, the fact that the schools


are becoming day hospitals for youth may not, in the end, be the real vexing issue, rather the problem may lie in the fact that the intellectual critic is cast out, unheard, as the villain, the enemy, and, perhaps as an ultimate irony, as the troublemaker who himself is in need of "treatment."

The notion of "helping the child" is not exclusive to the area of special education or to the field of education in general. It is becoming a central theme in American society, and it illustrates the moral bias of the medical-scientific view of man that persons are acceptable only if healthy. If they are not healthy, they must either strive to recover, i.e., embrace in a positive fashion some form of "treatment" or socialization, or be penalized. The penalties, symbolic and real, are not exclusively given only to children, but may run to the parents.

In the case of Painter v Bannister the notion of "helping the child" was turned into a legal doctrine: the "child's best interest." One of the key factors

in deciding who was to obtain custody of the child, the maternal grandparents or the father was the nature of the social relationships provided by each party. The father was deemed to be unacceptable because his lifestyle was "unstable and bohemian" while the grandparents presented a "stable, dependable" existence for the child. What is at stake is more than the fact that what was a "notion" (helping the child) in education, has become legal doctrine. True this is important, and, as we may note, those that would criticize this legal precedent would be cast as misanthropes. The vital point is that the flexibility, vagueness, and fluid nature of the standards facilitate the movement of the rational problem creating, crisis solving methodology of science, into yet another area of our lives, and that only when there is no escape will standards gradually evolve to "protect" us.  

Recognition of this "flexibility" and extensions of the behavioral approach in education has carried within the field almost no discussion of the moral and ethical issues involved in research, investigation, and

21 See Chapter III.
program planning. Lloyd Dunn's now famous article, "Special Education for the Mildly Retarded--Is Much of It Justifiable?", while an excellent overview of essentially technical and logistical problems, skirts the moral issue. Instead of calling for a reduction in special education programs Dunn asks for expansion of the field. He asks that we rid ourselves of the need for disability labels.

In their stead we may need to substitute labels which describe the educational intervention needed. We would thus talk of pupils who need special instruction in language or cognitive development, in sensory training, in personality development, in vocational training, and in other areas. However, some labels may be needed for administrative reasons. If so, we need to find broad generic terms such as 'school learning disorders!' (Italics mine.)

Dunn asks that we shift the focus from the child to the scientific process needed. Thus, the child ceases, even in clinical terms of the special education classroom, to be a subject (MR for example) and becomes an object—the receiver of a specific scientific process.

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23 Ibid., p. 15.
It does not matter what this procedure will be called, the result for man is the same: he has been objectified again by science, this time even alienated from his own mental-learning disorders. Even man's sickness, perhaps, will not be "his" to suffer because surely this would become the responsibility of benevolent scientific teaching team using individuated curriculum.

In the end, though Dunn makes a subtle plea for the objectification of man, he still retains labels. True, he says they would be used for "administrative purposes" but this either misses the point or intentionally compounds the mystery. Dunn does not recognize that the scientific methods used to discover and the educational intervention needed are identical to the administrative purposes of the program. Further on, in the same passage, Dunn blends these three items together and "recognizes them" as being part and parcel of the same process. He says:

Let us be honest with ourselves. Our courses of study have tended to be watered down regular curriculum. If we are to move from the clinical stage to a science of instruction, we will need a rich array of validated prescriptive programs of instruction at our disposal. To assemble these programs will take time, talent, and money; teams of specialists including creative
teachers, curriculum specialists, programmers, and theoreticians will be needed to do the job.

What is proposed is a chain of Special Education Curriculum Development Centers across the nation.""} (Italics mine.).

That science, treatment, and administration come together with Dunn's blessing is not enough. He proposes a scientific-educational elite to generate and administer the program. In fact, he is quite bold and open about what is usually a key issue: financial support.

As never before, funds are now available from the U.S. Office of Education under Titles III and VI of PL 89-10 to embark upon at least one such venture in each state. In fact, Title III was designed to support innovation in education and 15 percent of the funds were earmarked for special education."" (Italics mine.).

It is surprising to see such candor in an article, but even more astonishing is what Dunn states the benefits of such a new program would be. Herein are the real reasons for his proposals. He says:

The virtue of these new roles for special education is that they are high status positions which should appeal to the best and

24 Ibid.

25 It is interesting to note that no hint of the problem that the law refers to as the separation of powers exists here.

26 Dunn, op. cit., p. 16.
therefore enhance the recruitment of master regular teachers who should be outstanding in these positions after having obtained specialized graduate training in behavior shaping, psychoeducational diagnostics, remedial education and so forth. (Italics mine.)

This establishes without any doubt that the raison d'être for Dunn's suggestions in terms of programs, research, and administration is to enhance institutional needs and professional concerns. The student, and the crisis producing-problem solving process of science, are, in the end, only vehicles for the accomplishment of this end. As could be expected, the impediments, such as there are, to Dunn's dream are not moral, legal, or ethical questions, but technical issues, often jurisdictional disputes between academic areas and professional jealousies.

One of the major difficulties in the evaluation of children with learning and/or behavior problems is often a lack of communication between representatives of the various disciplines . . . Establishing effective means of communication . . . would accomplish a major break-through in efforts to help these children.

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27 Ibid., p. 15.

Educational plans for the child with learning and/or behavioral problems involve more inter-disciplinary cooperation than most other fields of academic endeavor. Each discipline seems to be engaged in both: (1) the social process of searching for a cause, and, (2) the social process of treating (changing or altering) individual behavior. For example, the medical professions, especially neurologists, have been particularly involved in trying to relate learning and behavior problems with some type of cerebral dysfunction, while psychoanalytic thinking stresses the psychogenic disturbances. The field of sociology emphasizes such items as peer groups and family structure.\(^{29}\) If each discipline sees itself as having a definite contribution to make, then why does any problem exist? Why don't we see a smooth process of cooperation between disciplines and professionals?

The answer is that, increasingly, the differences between disciplines are political constructs (artificial and ideological) and not natural distinctions. Social

\(^{29}\)Included, among others, would be the pediatrician, psychologist, school nurse, speech therapist, guidance counselors, the principal or a specialist from the administration, and of course the parents.
science and natural science are using the same process, the same approaches to their problem resolution and often their lines of inquiry blur. I am not suggesting that there is not a difference between medicine and education; what I am saying is that these two fields approach the same phenomena by use of the same process, and that their respective "subject matter fields" become increasingly irrelevant. For example, medicine, genetics, and biology are sciences; sociology, psychology and education are commonly called social sciences. The distinction that the former group lodges inquiries about "natural phenomena", while the latter group of disciplines studies man no longer holds. Man has been so objectified, so fragmented that his total nature is particle. Thus, the separation between abstract knowledge (theoretical science) and practical application (engineering) becomes indistinct. The question eventually becomes sort of an unanswerable circular statement such as: How will a sociologically sophisticated medical inquiry affect man and how will a medically sophisticated sociology respond to man?

The fusion of the sciences, an emerging phenomena, is not recent in terms of recognized possibilities, but
only in terms of realized probabilities. Condorcet in 1783 stated in surprisingly modern language, the objective of the positivist social scientist.

... He would study human society as we study those of beavers and the bees.

and the obligation of the student of man was,

... to introduce into the moral sciences the philosophy and the method of the natural sciences. 30

How such mergers will continue, and what the final outcome will be for man and education remain at the immediate time unknown.

Perhaps a foretaste of what we may see in the future may be gleaned from an editorial in the New York Times entitled, "A New Deal for Children." The editorial states that:

The Comprehensive Child Development Act, which has been approved unanimously by a subcommittee of the House Committee of Education and Labor, could usher in a new era in American child care.

... The advantage of this measure over an Administration proposal to extend similar day care privileges to children of welfare families is that it does not limit the benefits

to early pre-school physical, educational and psychological development only to the deprived . . . middle class youngsters could . . . share in the natural extension of American education . . . a field that has already given rise to much promising experimentation outside the traditional system.31 (Italics mine.).

Allowing the possibilities that this enabling legislation suggests to remain the silent provence of the reader, let us now turn to an examination of the crisis ideology as an ethical problem in America.

CHAPTER VII

THE CRISIS IDEOLOGY AS AN ETHICAL CONCERN:

THE COMBINED IMPLICATIONS OF LEGAL,

RELIGIOUS AND SOCIOLOGICAL

MEANINGS OF CRISIS

THOUGHT

The history of social analysis in America has been legalistic, ethical, and theological. The Federal form of the American government put a premium on constitutional argumentation (legal analysis and judicial process) as the determinators of social institutions, political relationships, and individual rights.\(^1\)

Issues over social policy and individual responsibilities were argued in the language of conformity with or deviation from a body of premises which were presumed to be either: (1) legally stated, (2) ethically recorded, or, (3) theologically devined.

\(^1\)Note the fact that as a condition of statehood Utah had to assure the federal republic, by legal change, that its' Mormon population no longer practiced polygamy. Thus, the moral questions of religious practice were made a legal issue.
With this emphasis, social criticism in America was handicapped because the social processes were viewed in a shallow fragmented issue oriented manner. No holistic view of life was either initially presented or subsequently built upon. No school of thought developed that dealt with America in terms of uniting abstract social thought with the concrete realities of dynamic American social life. For example, historically, a radical in America, could discuss slavery, living conditions in the Chicago slums, factory sweat shops, and child labor conditions in the southern mill town; but not tie these events together in terms of abstract analysis that was meaningful to the public.

Radicals, it will be urged, did discuss explicitly the economic conditions that prevailed in society and some tried to link those conditions with the social issues of the day. This is true, but those who discussed exploitation did so in European terms.

Legal philosophy in the American tradition developed not from a tradition of moral rights as is sometimes supposed, but rather from the steady use of instrumentalities. Principle came from fact rather than facts being ordered according to principle, a view of social-legal life that still prevails.
not American perspectives. They did not make due allowances for the American social outlook toward money or the American social hero, the gambler. The hustler and the risk taker were not only admired and treated as cultural heros but the social climate of the country favored their development as a social type in terms of rewards and opportunities. Writers who railed against the huge monopolies and cartels and the obscene social lives of the owners failed to appreciate how the public admired size (thought of bigness as a sign of success), and secretly coveted the social splendor that accompanied the "big spender".

Historically, this duality of muckraking on the one hand and admiration on the other was ideally suited to a pulpiteering culture. The social discontents which were generated within the culture were dissipated over time by issue oriented theological crusades. As best a specific "injustice" or "inequity" would be resolved but no fundamental structural change occurred as a result of any particular democratic ground swell of opinion.\(^3\) The social focus was not upon the brutalities of

\(^3\)Even movements such as the grange movement and some of the populist political programs never really, in
a static class structure, but on the adventures and dangers of the frontier. Class consciousness (European) became interest group concerns (American) and rarely transcended the concerns of the particular group, trade, or association.

Thus, historically one has a social pattern develop where moral values (issues) were not the legitimate concern of everyone, but were and fell under the special competence of particular groups and individuals. Health, education and welfare values, for example, were matters not of organic national concern; but were individual questions or issues, perhaps programs, of special interest groups. For example, unions seeking the alteration of specific social conditions placed the amelioration of them in legal language in a contract or negotiated agreement, and did not generalize these terms of structural effect, went beyond issues. A movement is tied to issues, a revolution is linked to philosophy.

The same fact is true today as an examination of the labor unions, trade and professional associations and societies in America will establish. This is true notwithstanding the feeble attempts of the Democratic party to build a coalition, because the Democrats were interested in instrumentalities (as other parties were) not philosophy. Social philosophy and the men who practiced it were separate from politics. Emerson and Boss Tweed lived in different worlds.
questions beyond their own social interests. Today the same thing prevails. Issues in these areas and questions of technical implementation are seen as the concern of experts (competing or cooperating; agreeing or disputing; and having democratic or authoritarian sympathies) and not as a distinctly universal human affair.

Ethics is a distinctly universal human affair. It involves the principles of conduct governing individual as well as groups. Ethics is not solely a group (institutional) concern. For ethics to be meaningful there must be a social context of self-governing individuals, more or less free to exercise uncoerced selections or alternative choices. Ethical interests solely linked to group concerns notwithstanding the democratic nature of the group or its social position alienate man from his moral nature. Let us turn briefly to religion for an example of this process.

In religious terms the confession and penitence ritual of the Church placed the moral nature of man in terms of the religious instrumentalities of the Church such as lighting candles and reciting prayers. Man's

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transgressions, his moral conduct, was transformed into factual questions (a series of specific acts), which were subsequently changed into the bureaucratic rituals and technical questions (activities) of the Church. The moral transgressions of man against man were converted by the use of expertise, into items of bureaucratic ritual and technique while the sins against God remained the subject of attention because their retention while allegedly promoting social control by individual conduct actually perpetuated bureaucratic and organizational growth and influence. Social control was thus seen in terms of institutional operation and not in terms of individual conduct.

On the other hand, the Jew lived a moral creed that was community, not institutionally based, and in addition, also suffered a personal moral judgement concerning his conduct. At Yom Kipper the Jew is forgiven for his sins against God but not for his sins against his fellow man. Thus, for the Jew, his moral conduct is linked to his life style and his life relationships with his fellow men, which is then morally judged. No institutional instrumentalities provide a moral escape for the Jew because ethics and living
merge (an ideal state perhaps) or tend toward merger.

While the Protestant Church in America did not have the same instrumentalities, the rigid confession and elaborate rituals of the Catholic Church; it did have social equivalents. Situations frequently existed where individuals publically confessed their sinning ways, became involved in evangelical conversions, and lived a secular social life that saw each of them individually as doing God's will in their specific social tasks.⁶ The Protestant Churches perpetuated a social view that focused on the instrumentalities of the individuals life and overlooked the connection between the social view of mankind (the community) and his political (moral) condition. The question of Man received meaning only in the social acts of men and in their particular social issues.

Thus while the Jew could experience alienation from his God—he could shake his fist at him for plagues, pogroms, and concentration camps; he was never alienated either from himself as a Jew or from his fellow men. His life style and moral code commanded a continuing

⁶Martin Luther used the term "calling" to mean that a particular social activity was approved "blessed" in the eyes of God.
living dialogue. The Christian however, was never alienated from his God because his efforts to obtain forgiveness through the institutional processes of the Church, the only legitimate way, established a continuing bureaucratic social process. However, the Christian was alienated from both himself and his fellow man because his moral conduct was a function not of human relationships but of ecclesiastical (legal) decision. Furthermore, he competed against his fellow men (within his class) for social position in and from which he could obtain increased likelihood of receiving God's grace. His activities were in support of the institution not independent of it.

Perhaps these legal and religious observations explain why the sociology of Max Weber found such a fertile home in American social science, and why that of Karl Marx was shunned and avoided. Weber's thesis when stripped to bare essentials becomes a theory of society where institutions and legal processes are seen as influencing human conduct and ultimately as the determining factors in man's existence. Weber basically views institutions as having a beneficial effect upon man, mitigating injustice, and supplying social conditions
for and in which freedom can flourish because of the existence of legal-bureaucratic safeguards (due process procedures).

Weber, for example, attempted to explain the industrial revolution in terms of the Protestant Ethic. This explanation was basically nothing other than a statement that social action is the result of institutionalized thought. Thus, for Weber the ideology comes first and is then followed by behavior. Ideas precede acts.

Marx, on the other hand, made man the focus of his sociological inquiry. For Marx, institutions were the social creations of men bound together in a social form of organization. The ideas, the ethics of society were justifications for these social combinations. For Marx, the institutions be they corporations, factories, or religious, mitigated against the freedom of man and ultimately caused a state of personal alienation that later Marxists correctly identified as a social condition.

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7 No confusion should exist between Marx's view of man and the Christian position. The church viewed man in terms of the individualistic application (reception) of an ideology and not in terms where no ideology existed, i.e., materialism.
of the mass society. Marx attempted to explain the industrial revolution in naturalistic (material) terms and moralized about both the developmental process and the forms of the institutions in society.

Thus, Marx saw the world in holistic terms and not legal or institutional entities. For him, men's behavior produced their ideology or ideas. Acts came first, followed by ideas. Institutionalized thought was ideological and false and ultimately had a repressive effect on man. Keeping these two contrasting points of view in mind we now turn our analysis to modern man, his institutional processes, and his moral status and the ethical questions of his existence as revealed by the social activities of science and the scientific process.

Science may be regarded as the sum total of human effort to understand man and nature and thus gain a measure of control over them. The process of naming, or symbolic identification, is the basic building block of science. Classification, a refinement over naming, provides us with certain regularities, spares us from surprises and ultimately aids us in mastering increasing aspects of our world.
Thus, the aims of science, and the essence of its assertions, are prediction and control. Naming and classification merely assist in the attainment of that goal. It does not matter whether the objects of the goal involve human or natural processes because the social relationships of prediction and control will be the same. The social relationships of the scientist will, over time, effect both his scientific ideas and his view of things he brings within (incorporates) in his research process as both subject and object. If he, as researcher-investigator-creator is institutionally isolated from the public, then as with the Pope, he becomes the sole prophet not because of the inherent truth of his prophesy but because all other avenues leading to alternatives are foreclosed. Without raising the question as to whether and how the sociology of science is affected by both the history of science and changes in the social method of science, let us continue our discussion by commenting upon social conflict, ethical issues, and their subsequent social consequences for man.

Historically these questions could be stated as ethical positions that fell (developmentally) into five
The crux of the matter is that in America we maintain that ethics are necessary because conflict exists. The prevailing view is that no real ethics can be found until conflict is rooted out. How is it possible to conceive of moral action without struggle (individual) or conflict (social)? Thus, Americans identify conflict as neurosis (mental illness) in individuals, and with social disorganization (pluralism) in society. In both instances, it becomes impossible categories. Each category was essentially concerned with the same question: the relationship of the scientist, his social product, and their combined effect upon man.

These five positions could be listed as follows: (1) the traditional approach (the scientist as the judge of his own conduct); (2) the neutral approach (scientific activity as free of the taint of social values); (3) the professional approach (the problem lies not with science but rather with the manner in which the professions are organized and used); (4) the political approach (science is recognized as an activity that has political overtones perhaps also as political activity); and lastly, (5) the artistic approach (science is recognized as a creative artistic activity reflecting both upon and creating new meanings for man).

Each of these five positions it should be noted, could be discussed at great length and many examples could embellish the discussion in both highlighting the shortcomings of one point of view and establishing the shortcomings of another. Yet no matter how extended, now interesting, or how complete this discussion would ultimately prove to be we would still be dealing with illusions, because, we shall see, the ethical questions that concern us at the present time are of a totally different nature.
to discuss either ethics or politics because of the illusions of the social, religious, political, religious and educational processes.

Basically, however, notwithstanding these illusions, two alternative ways of approaching ethics through freedom emerge as a result of the quality of American scientific thought. The concept of freedom can be viewed from the standpoint that freedom is knowledge or wisdom. This notion contains the elitist assumption of a privileged understanding of what freedom is for. Or freedom can be viewed as individual will or volition, implying a belief that man realizes himself only through exerting himself. Man's freedom in this view must be obtained through his own efforts.

A scientific society, organized to avoid conflict, tension and insecurity (the realization of peace instead of freedom as the highest social virtue) must relinquish all the attachments that would tend to create these uncertainties. In America just the opposite is true. The American method of science is much like the American approach to waging war in Viet Nam. It involves vast expenditures but it is indiscriminate in its objectives; it provides many lucrative jobs and utilizes ingenious
technology; yet the operation is conducted out of touch with significant human reality in that individuals remain connected to each other only by virtue of their ties to institutions or artificial social groups. Platoons, research teams, and social reference groups such as women's liberation movement would be examples of this process.

The breakdown of the old loyalties, the formation of new political movements and the illusiveness of the real issues obsessed the concerned man. The old left is at an ethical impasse because the ideas of its past have served their use well and because the new issues in society contradict too much of what the left has always believed about power and social progress.

The radical right however, continued essentially in the same antidemocratic manner that always saw the interpretation of values and the continuity of human affairs in (as) unalterable social conditions. For the successful resolution of social issues to occur for the conservative, a static acceptance of social goals and human conformity had to occur. The world was viewed in clear polar terms that reflected a bygone historical epoch and not a present reality. As always, the
conservative view of man and his moral commitment lacked a social base. It could be summarized as the power of positive thinking. The definition of social action either saw process function in fragmented formalized individual terms, for example the company suggestion box, or as isolated moral crusades, both of which were inappropriate to grasp the realities of the moment in either cultural or political terms.

Ultimately then, we are left with the new left as a political alternative. Ultimately however, it proved itself to be more of a cultural force than a political movement. As a movement it has moved from politics and ethics to style and rhetoric. In no small measure this process was accomplished by turning art into politics (Andy Warhol) and politics into art (Jerry Rubin). The issue of the relationship of culture to tradition was blurred by body paint, red fisted T shirts, and clever bumper stickers. If the mass could live as artists, the new left seemed to be saying then the artist as a moral force was dead in American social life. For the artist, the creative dynamic of historical meaning was demonstrated in an Uncola ad, and the mass turned what had formerly been known as product loyalty
into metaphysical principles governing artistic taste in social life. In the end, for the new left, the great majority of issues proved to be nothing other than an odd assortment of disconnected, particularized institutional concerns. We were truly at the nadir of contemporary politics and ethical formulation and we were at this nadir with great personal suspicion and social distrust.

Ethically, the re-evaluation of what is important in our civic and educational lives, the social control of scientific technological bureaucracies are not matters of priorities democratically determined in bureaucratic settings. Moreover, they are not questions of selection regarding any specific cause. Rather the essence of the ethical issue seems to be what behaviors' we are engaged in that we shall first define as insipid, and subsequently disengage ourselves from performing. Ethics, as freedom, will then be defined as the widest possible range of choice for each individual at each moment of time. Without that quality of freedom (ethical orientation) our orderly society can be viewed as stagnant, unanimous, Byzantine, and, as an end in itself, insipid; the ideal conditions for social change. It is
to a summary of those possibilities that we must now turn our analysis.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Like any social philosophy, the crisis ideology can be understood and discussed: (1) as an articulation of ideals, which, at any level of generality, operates as a sort of moral agent, and thus sets some guidelines for the actions and judgements of men, movements and events; (2) as a theory, expressed or implied, of how our society may currently be understood to function, of its important elements and how they relate, of its conflicts, and how they are solved; (3) as a social phenomenon, as an ideology justifying certain institutions and social practices, while demanding and expecting others. Hopefully, in the course of this essay each of these facets will have received comment and analysis, because now the time for a summation has arrived.

At the present time, there is no doubt that we are relinquishing more and more human qualities of cognition
and emotion to both machines and our social institutions (the management of others). Our technology has both created the illusion of increased freedom and actually restricted the alternatives open to man. This social fact has not been caused by an incredible lust for leisure on the part of man or by man's strong aversions to performing the repellent tasks in his society. Moreover, the phenomenon cannot be understood in terms of individual attitudes. It is a sociological phenomenon (the relationship of ideology and process) ironically, a process in which man is playing an increasingly small portion. The phenomenon is the inexorable application and extension of the crisis ideology of social scientific bureaucracies into progressively more areas of human life.

Whatever the roots of this social process are in sequential terms, or may ultimately prove to be, the social process appears to grow best in politically quiescent periods such as the 1950's were, and as I suspect the 1970's will be.¹ For intellectuals, an

¹By politically quiescent I mean where the concerns of intellectuals are not politicized either by external sources or as the result of fractional disputes and internal ruptures within a field of concern.
atmosphere of political calm, whether generated out of fear or the illusion of comfort, creates a situation where talents of insight are turned inward. Thus, for example, social science becomes concerned with methodology (perhaps in one sense as a reaction against being unable to "predict" political and social events); writers become enamored with the technicalities of their craft (perhaps as a reaction against increased breadth of scope); and social critics become concerned with standards of taste (perhaps in an attempt to find meaning in continuity). All of these processes may, in the end, occur because the moral (political) questions have, on the one hand been refashioned into technical problems (the bane of the intellectual), or divided into sanitary administrative or supervisory units for resolution.

During the 1960's, however, great social events cried for intellectual interpretation. Academic perceptions of these events, in part generated by increased academic audiences, were increasingly in social demand. Social topicality and intellectual interpretation was what mattered intellectually; not whether those perceptions were in fact based upon good teaching, scholarly writing, and insightful observations. During the 1960's,
to be issue oriented meant a new kind of classlessness because the former value neutral positions were associated with established professional success and bureaucratic position. Symbolically, McLuhan replaced Fiedler.

That we are now moving slowly into a new era where intellectuals will maintain silence once again on issues of social responsibility is perhaps understandable. To cry out, after all, is a constant reminder of the tragedy and isolation of one's own existence, something few are capable of, but it is a new dimension of silence, one in which increased social awareness is used and becomes a repressive social tool. Even Huey Newton, the President of the Black Panthers falls prey to the illusion that social commentary builds community, when he says:

In this country black revolutionaries have to set an example. We have to work out new solutions to offset the power of the country's technology and communications: its ability to communicate very rapidly. . . . We do have solutions to these problems and will be put into effect. I wouldn't want to go into the ways and means of this, but we will educate through action. We have to engage in action to make the people want to read our literature.² (Italics mine.).

The concern of the intellectual with the technicalities of his craft on the one hand, and the planned social actions of the administrator or revolutionary both miss man's needs. The issue is that someone must define, provide for, and nurture unto man a self respect. The facts of man's predicament are openly known. They are kind of a bizarre unspoken social secret. The fact is, that nobody needs man. Years of socialization have created a man whose meaning was essentially determined by his social function. That man became his function is however, important only in a developmental sense. That both man and his function exist increasingly at the pleasure of a scientific bureaucracy is what is important. Man, the individual, psychologically, and his social function, sociologically, are both defined in relative and not absolute terms. At best, human social functions are only temporarily protected by social institutions, and what remains of ethics and morality that is independent of technological discoveries. Man, in reality is becoming an expendable transparency; and he knows it. Orwell's words are prophetic:

Progress and reaction have both turned out
to be swindles. Seemingly, there is nothing left but quietism. . . . Get inside the Whale . . . give yourself over to the world process, stop fighting against it or pretending that you control it; simply accept it, endure it, record it.

The past trends and future tendencies of this process could be enumerated in the following suggestive sequence:

1. Science was organized bureaucratically initially in America for essentially military purposes.

2. As a result of this organization, science and scientific research became an adjunct of both government and industry.

3. The value postulates of "value neutrality" in science and its applications sociologically evolved in bureaucratic structure as the "end of ideology" view of the social world.

4. The cold war as it continued stimulated the unabated growth of the scientific

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institutional relationships, while radical focus dwelled upon the military industrial complex.

5. Moral indignation at the uses and abuses of the intellectual disciplines, and as a reaction against the end of ideology positions began to evolve.

6. The crisis ideology emerges as a phenomenon of domestic politics. Social issues, are placed in the social context of "crisis", by moral alarmists and the anti-democratic counter trend the bureaucratic manuvers for resolution (technicalization) of these "crisis" occur.

7. Scientific principles of social organization in bureaucratic terms become increasingly available to an ever expanding range of human social activity as a result of increased use of the metaphor or crisis termonology.

8. As the scientific principles of social organization and the social aspects of
science are applied to social life, the instrumentality of science becomes increasingly apparent. The ends, or the specific crisis become important, not in themselves, but only as social events that contribute to the further rationalization and scientification of society.

9. Educational programs continue to increase the use of the crisis generating-problem solving ideology, both in subjects and process. Socialization becomes increasingly a scientific phenomenon.

10. Industry, manufacturing, and education become the adjuncts of scientific bureaucracy. Services and enterprises are increasingly generated as a result of scientific applications and extensions in the world.

11. Government becomes the agent of science and scientific processes itself as scientific bureaucracies and government
tend toward merger in terms of social purposes.

12. Economic activity becomes subservient to the purposes of global scientific and technological research. Scientific and technological colonialism begins on both institutions, governments for example, and geographical (mental and physical space) areas.

13. Socially, scientific and technological colonialism is evidenced by the successful management and actual reduction of the human population of the world. A global system of elites begin to emerge from the scientific fields and the bureaucratic structures.

14. The scientific elites combine with computer technologies while the illusions of a man versus machine debate serves to obscure the reality of that social process.

15. The ultimate triumph of science, the merger of life systems, and social structure with infinity, closes the
human era. Philosophy and history cease. The science of ideology and the ideology of science become one and the same.

16. The conflicts and battles for the social control of evolution assume new forms and proportions.

The sociological consequences of what we have been summarizing in this abbreviated listing, may well produce a new species. Man's vulnerability to any of the persuasive control techniques is obvious, and his scruples, I fear, will be institutionally anchored and capable of quick modification. What McLuhan failed to emphasize was that our culture now extends, or will shortly, to all aspects of man, not that man assumes new freedoms by extending his nervous system into the culture.

However difficult, it may be culturally to control man, the most difficult problem of control, in the end, may be the question of not to control but to acknowledge man's freedom, autonomy, and to respect his fundamental liberty. The intellectual (the teacher) to this end, must risk defining freedom in such a way that people
become conscious of and recognize it as something that is nowhere already in existence. To this end, hopefully, this essay was written.
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