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ENGLISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE
PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION, 1674-1678

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

William T. Partin, Jr., B.A., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1971

Approved by

Clayton Roberts
Adviser
Department of History
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W.T.P.
Columbus, Ohio

June 1, 1971
VITA

June 5, 1945. ......... Born - Williamston, North Carolina

1967. ............... B.A., Guilford College, Greensboro, North Carolina

1967-70 ............ National Defense Fellowship, Department of History, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1969. .............. M.A., The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1970-71 ............ Teaching Associate, Department of History, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: History

Studies in Tudor and Stuart England, Professor Clayton Roberts

Studies in Early Modern European History, Professor John C. Rule

Studies in Renaissance and Reformation History, Professor Harold J. Grimm

Studies in Medieval History, Professor Franklin J. Pegues
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ABBREVIATIONS

Manuscript

B.M. Add. MSS. British Museum, Additional Manuscripts.

B.M. Stowe MSS. British Museum, Stowe Manuscripts.

B.M. Egerton MSS. British Museum, Egerton Manuscripts.

P.R.O. Public Record Office, Baschet Transcripts.

S.P. State Papers, Foreign, Public Record Office.


Printed

Barbour, Arlington. Violet Barbour, Henry Bennett, Earl Of Arlington: Secretary of State to Charles II.

Browning, Danby. Andrew Browning, Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby. Three Volumes.

Bryant, King Charles II. Sir Arthur Bryant, King Charles II. Revised Edition.


C.J. Journals of the House of Commons.

Campana de Cavelli. Marquise Campana de Cavelli, Les Derniers Stuarts a Saint-Germain en Laye.

C.S.P. Dom. Calendar of State Papers, Domestic.

C.S.P. Ven. Calendar of State Papers, Venetian.

NOTE ON DATES

The dates of all letters written by the Venetian, French, and Dutch ambassadors in England, as well as those written by English residents in foreign countries, are given in both Old and New Style. All dates for events occurring in England, such as the meeting of Parliament, or letters in England by Englishmen, are given in Old Style. The correct New Style date in these cases can be obtained by adding ten days to the given date.
The England of Charles II (1660-1685) was a land blessed for the most part with economic prosperity and popular contentment. The monarch was a pleasure-loving man who pursued pleasure, yet showed a real concern for the welfare of his subjects. Most Englishmen after the Restoration were content to live quietly under the "Merry Monarch," free from the hardships and restrictions imposed by the Puritan Commonwealth. Their descendants in the early nineteenth century often looked back romantically to the happy years when England attempted to heal the wounds of civil war under a king whose greatest desire was to enjoy himself and thereby make up for years of misery spent in exile from his kingdom.

However, despite economic prosperity, great popularity, and a lively Court, Charles II came into direct conflict with Parliament over many constitutional issues: the maintenance of religious orthodoxy, the responsibility of the royal ministers for their actions, the king's finances, the regulation of the succession, and the conduct of foreign policy. These conflicts gave him no end of trouble. As his reign progressed, Parliament sought to increase its powers at the expense of the monarchy which it had once dethroned and had then restored. As the son of a king who had died in defense of divine right monarchy and the royal prerogative, Charles resisted the claims of Parliament
stubbornly and made only slight concessions when forced to. Yet in one matter of the royal prerogative, Parliament's demand for a role in the conduct of foreign affairs, the English king was forced in the 1670's to capitulate.

In the 1660's and 1670's Charles engaged in two wars with Holland, wars that gained nothing for England. He also maintained close ties with France, a nation regarded by many Englishmen as a natural enemy. As a result, Parliament often criticized his foreign policy. However, it was not until 1673, after the Third Dutch War had begun, that Parliament moved from criticism of the king's foreign policy to tactics of opposition and obstruction, thereby hoping to exert influence upon the shaping of foreign policy. Before 1673, and even before the reign of Charles II, the influence of Parliament in questions of foreign affairs was negligible. The making of war and peace and the conduct of foreign relations was largely accepted by Parliament and the people as being an indisputable part of the royal prerogative. These powers were jealously and successfully guarded by the monarchs against all attacks. Yet from 1673 to 1678 Parliament, throwing off the shackles of precedent and custom, successfully demanded and asserted an ever-growing role in the shaping of foreign policy. There was a basic change of attitudes and policies in these five years in relation to the monarch's control of foreign affairs and the claims of Parliament for a share of that control.

It is the purpose of this dissertation to ascertain the extent to which Parliament's role in the making of foreign policy changed between 1673 and 1678 and to examine the reasons why such a change occurred.
The basic questions to be answered are: How did Parliament assert a greater role in the conduct of foreign policy after 1673, and why did it seek such a role in defiance of precedent and the supposedly sanctified royal prerogative?
INTRODUCTION

When Parliament began its attacks on Charles II's foreign policy in October of 1673, few Englishmen would have questioned the fact that the conduct of foreign relations was a part of the royal prerogative. For over four hundred years the primary functions of Parliament had been to appropriate money and make laws for the kingdom. Foreign policy was made by the monarchs. This is not to say, however, that Parliament had not involved itself in matters of foreign policy on previous occasions; it could and often did exert a great influence upon foreign policy by the use of various weapons. By 1673 Parliament had acquired the means to influence foreign policy by refusing to vote taxes for the support of wars, by debating foreign policy, and by petitioning the King on matters of foreign affairs. These tactics had often caused conflict between Crown and Parliament, but they also led to the establishment of precedents to which Parliament could point when it began to attack the government's foreign policy in 1673.

As early as 1523 Parliament had exercised the power of the purse to influence foreign policy. A large grant of taxes was refused to Henry VIII for the support of his second war with France. Because Englishmen believed the war to be expensive and a cause for the neglect of other problems, they refused to vote Henry the money necessary to finance his war against France and eventually he had to abandon the
effort.\textsuperscript{1} Parliament's exercise of the power of the purse in 1566, when it sought to make the grant of a subsidy conditional on the Queen's marrying as soon as possible, provoked the wrath of Elizabeth.\textsuperscript{2} James I was confronted by this parliamentary tactic in 1624 when he asked for money to finance a war with Spain. The subsidy was granted only after provisions guaranteeing that the money would be spent for war were written into the Subsidy bill. The bill also established regulations for the collection and expenditure of the money.\textsuperscript{3}

In the reign of Charles I, Parliament asserted a right to discuss and criticize the financial administration of wars for which it had voted supplies. The King and the Duke of Buckingham were attacked in 1626 and 1627 for the mismanagement of wars with France and Spain. The issue at hand, however, was the financial management of these wars; Parliament did not criticize the government's policy of waging war. As J.T. Tanner has so accurately written:

\begin{quote}
The Commons was as yet scarcely competent to intervene in the higher politics or to criticize Buckingham's diplomatic dealings with the powers of Europe, but they were excellent critics of business deficiencies, ...
\end{quote}

This tactic of criticizing and investigating badly managed wars was

\begin{flushright}


\end{flushright}
carried over to the reign of Charles II. The Second Dutch War of 1665-1667 gained very little for England and discredited the government. Parliament began to debate the financial administration of the war in 1666 and called for the accounts of the navy and ordnance to be inspected. A year later Charles was forced to accept Parliament's assertion of its right to audit the accounts and investigate the war expenditures. Charles realized that he could get no more money for war from such a body of critics, so he made peace in July of 1667. Thus, by 1673, Parliament had acquired an effective means of influencing foreign policy through the power of the purse. In 1674 Parliament would make good use of this power by refusing Charles II's request for money to carry on the Third Dutch War and thereby compelling him to make peace.

The right of Parliament to discuss and debate matters of foreign policy was not conceded by the Crown until the reign of James I. While her Parliaments might claim that kings in the past had often advised with their Parliaments concerning foreign policy, Elizabeth looked unfavorably upon any attempt by Parliament to discuss foreign policy. She regarded the conduct of foreign policy as the prerogative of the monarch. In the early years of her reign Parliament did attempt to discuss prospects for her marriage; the Queen informed it that such matters did not concern it. In March of 1587, when the House of Commons began to discuss the question of English aid to the Dutch

5Ogg, Charles II, p. 317.
6Joseph M. Levine, Elizabeth I, pp. 132-134.
rebels, the Queen summoned the Speaker to Greenwich and expressed to him her outrage that such discussions were allowed.7

Although the last Tudor sovereign refused to allow Parliament to discuss foreign policy, James I was forced to yield in this matter. In 1621 Parliament met amid growing alarm over the disasters which had befallen the Protestants in the Thirty Years War. It was only natural that English Protestants should be sympathetic to the cause of the Protestant leader, the Elector Palatine, who was James I's son-in-law. However, when Parliament began to discuss a possible war with Spain, it came into conflict with James, who favored diplomacy and a possible Spanish marriage alliance as a means of helping his daughter's husband. The result was a petition from Parliament urging the King to end negotiations with Spain and to wage war in defense of the Palatinate. James' reply was a staunch defense of the royal prerogative and a peremptory denial of Parliament's right to discuss such matters:

... we have heard by diverse reports
... that our distance from the Houses of Parliament caused by our indisposition of health has emboldened some fiery and popular spirits of some of the House of Commons to argue and debate publicly of matters far above their reach and capacity, tending to our high dishonor and breach of prerogative royal. These are therefore to command you to make known in our name unto the House, that none therein shall presume henceforth to meddle with anything concerning our Government or deep matters of

When Parliament persisted in its discussions, James declared that they had no experience in such affairs:

> These are unfit things to be handled in Parliament except your King should require it of you; for who can have wisdom to judge of things of that nature but such as are daily acquainted with the particulars of treaties and of the variable and fixed connections of affairs of state, . . .

Despite these rebukes, Parliament did win an important victory in 1624 when James heeded their discussions and petitions for war against Spain. After seeking its advice on the Spanish treaties, the King asked Parliament for the money with which to wage war and promised to make no peace treaty without their consultation.

Foreign policy was not discussed by Parliament under Charles I, except in those cases when Parliament criticized the financial administration of the wars with France and Spain. Nor was it to be an issue under the Commonwealth and Protectorate because Cromwell's policy was both patriotic and effective. His advocacy of a war with Catholic Spain, still regarded by many as the natural enemy, brought England rewards in both the New World and on the European continent.

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9 Ibid.


When Charles II was restored in 1660, nothing was said concerning Parliament's right to discuss foreign policy. However, as early as 1661, Charles expressed his displeasure over Parliament's discussion of his marriage. His marriage to a Catholic Princess, the sale of Dunkirk to France, and the mismanagement of the Second Dutch War were all subjects taken up by Parliament. By 1673 Parliament had a clearly asserted right to discuss and debate issues of foreign affairs. After that date the King's pro-French foreign policy and the growing power of France were the subjects of great debate and discussion in Parliament.

The right of Parliament to petition the King on matters of foreign policy was a right that Parliament used extensively after 1673. In the reign of Mary Tudor, Parliament had involved itself in foreign affairs by using its right of petition to ask the Queen not to marry Philip II of Spain. A similar right had been exercised in the reign of Elizabeth, when Parliament petitioned the Queen in 1559, 1563, and 1566 to marry and secure a Protestant succession. Elizabeth's replies revealed that she was no more willing to recognize Parliament's right to discuss the succession than she was to allow it to discuss foreign policy. It was in the reign of James I that Parliament first made an important use of the right of petition. In 1621 Parliament petitioned the King to declare war on Spain and, despite James' reprimands, Parliament petitioned him to

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12 Ogg, Charles II, p. 166.
recognize its freedom to discuss such matters. In the Parliament of 1624 there were a number of petitions for an end to negotiations with Spain and a declaration of war. When the projected marriage alliance was not concluded and the prospects of receiving a supply from Parliament became bleak, James heeded the petitions and allowed Parliament to make the necessary preparations for war. In the early 1640's Parliament twice petitioned Charles I to make alliances with Protestant States. But with the coming of the Civil War Parliament ceased petitioning, for it undertook the conduct of foreign policy itself. During the Commonwealth it gained valuable experience in such matters. The right to petition the King on matters of foreign policy was not used again until 1673 when it proved to be an effective means of influencing the King's policy. Parliament would petition Charles II several times to declare against France and ally England with the enemies of Louis XIV.

If members of Parliament in October of 1673 needed precedents to support their claims for a role in the conduct of foreign affairs, they could find many. Parliament had influenced foreign policy in the past by refusing to vote taxes for unpopular wars, by debating the government's policy, and by petitioning the monarch to pursue policies it favored. After 1673 Parliament was to use all of these weapons in its attempts to obtain a larger role in the conduct of foreign policy.

15 The House of Commons' petitions of March 8 and 22, 1624 can be found in J.R. Tanner, Constitutional Documents of the Reign of James I, 1603-1625, pp. 296-301.

CHAPTER I

THE ATTACK BEGINS, OCTOBER 1673

Parliament's attacks on the foreign policy of Charles II began in October of 1673 when it was summoned by the King to grant money for the continued financing of the Third Dutch War. The attack launched in 1673 was the first step in the acquisition by Parliament of a larger role in the shaping of foreign policy. During the next five years it was to demand and achieve a measure of control over the foreign affairs of the nation. While few members of Parliament before 1673 would have seriously challenged the King's control over foreign policy, a dramatic reversal in attitudes occurred after that date.

Even before Parliament met in October, an anonymous pamphlet had challenged the assertions of that body as to its role in the shaping of foreign policy. The King's prerogative in foreign affairs was staunchly defended in terms which supporters of the Crown would use after 1673 to discredit the claims of Parliament:

This sovereign power of the King's making alliances and leagues was never questioned but by some mercenary Antimonarchial scribblers in the late commotions: And indeed reason shows that this power must be lodged in the King, for Parliaments are not always in being, and upon every league that the King

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makes with any prince, if he should be forced to summon a Parliament, . . . so it would make the legal authority precarious, and lessen his Majesty's reputation with foreign states.

And indeed our laws do declare that peace and war, and the determination of them are such inseparable flowers of the Crown, that none but they that wear the latter, are to meddle with the former.

In short, the making of leagues, war, peace so peculiarly belong to the Crown, that they cannot be taken away by Act of Parliament.

The author further pointed out that there were numerous historical precedents for the royal control of foreign affairs and he asserted that meddling with the Crown's power in foreign affairs could cause both delay and a lack of secrecy. Such arguments appealed to many supporters of Charles II, but Parliament was spurred on in its attacks by events and circumstances which seemed to justify a need for change. The pamphlet attack on the claims of Parliament had been written just prior to its meeting in October of 1673 amidst a considerable amount of discontent over foreign affairs. This popular unrest and the events which inspired it prompted Parliament to begin its attacks on the King's foreign policy.

Public discontent over foreign affairs was a result of the progress of the Third Dutch War which had begun in March of 1672. England was fighting Holland as the ally of Louis XIV, King of France, but the war soon became a general European conflict. While the only enemy of

\[2 \text{Ibid.}, \text{ pp. 260-261, 264, 265.}\]
England were the Dutch, France found herself fighting the Emperor and Spain as well as Holland. The Dutch were the great commercial rivals of England on the high seas; thus the English goal in the war was to reduce the rival and to share in Holland's rich empire in the East Indies. The war was popular with the general public at first because of the old hostility for the Dutch. However, the bad handling of the war and a growing apprehension over the consequences of both a general war and an alliance with Catholic France soon turned most Englishmen against the conflict. Many members of Parliament recognized this disillusionment and began to question the nature and the handling of the war.

Many Englishmen turned against the war because of the lack of progress which had been made before October of 1673. While there had been definite agreement between England and France over the naval campaigns against Holland, there was in fact very little co-operation between the two countries. Several battles proved to be inconclusive, and the public was made aware of French failure in the summer of 1673 to aid the English in a key battle. When Parliament met in October one member alleged that France had lost only two men in the war while England had lost many. The old public fear of a standing army was revived when martial law and billeting soldiers were proclaimed in order to take care of a large army awaiting transport to France. For

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4 Grey, Debates, II, 212.
those Englishmen who were anxious for victory over an old enemy, indecisive battles and a poor ally were signs that perhaps the war could not be won and thus should be ended.

While some Englishmen opposed the war on the grounds of its poor management, others feared that to continue the war would either involve England in a general conflict or else ruin its trade. There had been negotiations for a separate peace between England and Holland, but the English terms were unacceptable to the Dutch. Sweden had assumed the role of mediator at a peace congress at Cologne in June of 1673; the English representatives were Sir Leoline Jenkins and Sir Joseph Williamson. The war was suddenly escalated, however, when Spain and the Emperor agreed to help the Dutch against France in August. Since France was at war with Spain, many merchants feared that a continuation of the war might cause England to lose the valuable Spanish trade. After Parliament began to attack the war in October of 1673, the threat posed to English trade by the war was a theme constantly sounded by members of the Opposition.

Sir Eliab Harvey: ... Wool—You are

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5Ogg, Charles II, p. 377; Dumont, VII, 242. One clause of the treaty of alliance between Spain and Holland that Spain should serve as a mediator between England and Holland rather than declaring war on England. Very few Englishmen, of course, were aware of this.

6Alberti to the Doge, October 10/20, 1673, C.S.P. Ven., 1673-5, pp. 143-144; "There is a general dissatisfaction among the merchants and the coffee-houses, daily venting malicious censures of the actions of this present war, their fears of breaking with Spain driving them beyond reason." (Henry Ball to Williamson, July 4, 1673, Letters To Williamson, I, 88).

7Grey, Debates, II, 202, 205.
letting the King of France be the merchant of the whole world. By falling out with Spain, we spoil the best trade we have. . . .

Mr. Garroway: Ruin of trade, loss of religion, no grievance!

_______: War is a subtle thing; lose a correspondence in trade, and you know not how to get it again. The making bays, a great trade, you have lost by this war. If France can supply Spain with commodities, as they left you in the war so they will do in trade. . . .

Supporters of the war protested that the King's policy was actually causing the destruction of Dutch trade and removing a serious commercial rival. Yet Charles II may have realized that the end of English involvement in the war would be beneficial to English trade. In a conversation with the French ambassador in 1677, the King asserted that the making of peace with Holland had enabled England to capitalize upon the general dislocation of trade in Europe. Indeed, English trade did begin to increase after peace was made in 1674, a gain which was reflected in the increased yields of Customs duties.

The greatest reason for popular discontent over the Third Dutch War was undoubtedly a growing fear of France and a hatred for the

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10 An appreciation of what Danby did for the royal finances can be gained by examining the figures presented in Browning, Danby, III, 10-32.
French alliance. This fear of France was closely related to domestic politics and the chronic English fear of "Popery." France came to be identified with the stigma of Popery, and Charles II's close friendship with Louis XIV gave Englishmen reason to worry about their religion. Charles had twice tried to suspend the penal laws against Catholics, he was married to a Catholic Queen, and his own brother, the Duke of York, was known to favor the Catholic religion. While these circumstances caused grave apprehension among Englishmen, the English alliance with Catholic France in a war against Protestant Holland created even greater fear and hatred for France and Popery. The French alliance became the focal point of popular opposition to the war and the center of Parliament's attacks on the King's foreign policy. Both Dutch and Spanish agents were actively stirring up the people and members of Parliament against the French alliance, but the appearance of a new pamphlet in the Spring of 1673 had the greatest influence on the minds of Englishmen. England's Appeal was written by a Dutchman named Peter du Moulin who once had served in the English government and now was writing for the Prince of Orange. The author's purpose was to demonstrate how closely linked were the foreign and domestic policies of England. The purpose of the

11One of the most recent works on the growth of the fear of France in such areas as military power, trade, and religion is Hugh E. Boyer, "The Growth Of The Fear Of France In The Reign Of Charles II." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1969. Many of the conclusions of this writer were reached by his reading of this work.

12The complete title of the pamphlet was "England's Appeal from the Private Cabal at Whitehall to the Great Council of the Nation, The Lords and Commons in Parliament Assembled."
French alliance was to secure the subjugation of England to both the Catholic religion and autocratic government. Such a warning could hardly fail to strike fear into the hearts of men who were always concerned about the maintenance of their religion and liberties. Nor could such a warning fail to turn people completely against the war:

It was this famous pamphlet which did more than anything else to identify the French alliance in foreign affairs with the danger of Popery at home, and consequently to lead public opinion and the Country Party in Parliament to turn against the war.\(^{13}\)

Until March of 1673 the war against Holland was approved by most people because it was waged against a great commercial rival. Now Englishmen began to think seriously about the consequences of a war which produced no English victories, but instead enhanced the growing power of France in Europe. They also began to fear even more the prospects of Popery and arbitrary government at home. In November of 1673 the French ambassador reported to his King that Parliament did not oppose France out of jealousy or friendship with Holland. The great fear of Parliament was the ruin of the Protestant religion and the establishment in England of the Catholic religion and arbitrary government.\(^{14}\) Both the suspicions and fears of the people were in-


\(^{14}\)Colbert to Louis XIV, November 10/20, 1673, P.R.O. 31/3, 129, fos. 66-68.
creased when it was made known that the King's brother, James, Duke of York, would marry a Catholic Princess who had been recommended by France. One poet used the discontent over the marriage to write a poem which reflects the great degree of hatred for Popery through a savage attack on the Duke of York. Parliament’s attacks on the war and the French alliance would begin with a protest against the proposed marriage. By October of 1673 the climate of public opinion was such that many men foresaw the commotions which would occur when Parliament met. Although the Venetian ambassador could not understand how the English people could hate France so much, both Charles II's servants and friends knew that trouble was brewing.

As the government of Charles II anticipated the coming meeting of Parliament, there were new ministers with new policies to supplant the old system. For nearly six years after the fall of the Earl of Clarendon in 1667, Charles was advised by a group of men known as the Cabal: Thomas Clifford, the Earl of Arlington, the Duke of Buckingham, the Earl of Shaftesbury, and the Duke of Lauderdale. It was Arlington and Clifford who first consulted with Charles about an al-

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16 Alberti to the Doge, Oct. 31/November 10, 1673, C.S.P. Ven., 1673-5, p. 170; "Everyone dreads the meeting of the Parliament, and fear our enmity to the French may breed ill blood among them, for all people will have it that we must break off our league with them, or suffer ourselves to be ruined, but I dare not write half what is spoken in public in every coffee-house." (Henry Ball to Williamson, August 29, 1673, Letters To Williamson, I, 194). See also Letters To Williamson, II, 36 and B.M. Add. MSS. 25122, f. 144.
liance with France against Holland, and eventually all the members of the Cabal came to accept that new policy. The alliance with France meant abandoning the popular Triple Alliance of 1668 through which England had acted as a check to French expansion on the continent. This was a policy lauded by Parliament and generously supported with money and ships. The Treaty of Dover had now led England into an unpopular war as the ally of a nation feared and detested by the majority of Englishmen. The Cabal was identified by public opinion with the French alliance, and England's Appeal blamed those ministers for attempting to introduce Popery and autocratic government into England. The growing fear of Catholics and suspicions of Parliament over the designs of the Cabal were reflected in the passage of the Test Act in March of 1673. The act was aimed at removing all Catholics from public office by requiring all servants of the state to accept the sacraments of the Anglican Church. While Clifford spoke out against the bill because of his Catholic beliefs, Shaftesbury supported the bill and guided it to passage. This was the first step in the dissolution of the Cabal, according to Maurice Lee, since Shaftesbury now was aware of the secret clauses of the Treaty of Dover and was considering ways in which to remove himself from the consequences of the unpopular war. The passage of the Test Act prompted the resignation of Clifford as Lord Treasurer and the Duke of York as Lord High Admiral. It would require more time before the Cabal would completely dissolve, but the state of

\[17\text{Maurice Lee, Jr., The Cabal. (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1965), pp. 222-223.}\]
public opinion was causing the ministers some anxiety. The Duke of Lauderdale began to concern himself more with Scottish affairs, but Arlington began to think about ending the war in order to prevent a break with Spain. Shaftesbury and Buckingham began to consider going into opposition in order to further their own goals of securing liberty for all Protestants and to settle old grievances with enemies such as Arlington. The Cabal was ready to collapse by October of 1673, and the pressure of Parliament for an end to the war was the final blow.

Although the Cabal was slowly breaking up, Charles II was not left alone to face the coming wrath of Parliament and to deal with the divisions in his government. When Clifford resigned in June of 1673, the position of Treasurer was given to a rapidly rising protege of Buckingham, Sir Thomas Osborne. The Earl of Danby was a shrewd minister with a great ability in financial matters; in this area he had many problems caused both by war and the extravagance of the King. While he performed a valuable service as Treasurer in repairing the King's finances, Danby also had some influence on the conduct of foreign affairs. He was aware of the great public hostility to the war and to the French alliance, and he himself was too good a Protestant to support a policy linked with Catholic France. Indeed, Danby's foreign policy was calculated to win the support of the people and so

18 Ibid., pp. 228-232.
19 Sir Thomas Osborne's first titles were Baron Osborne of Kiveton and Viscount Latimer of Danby. In 1674 he was made Earl of Danby. All references to Sir Thomas Osborne in this dissertation will use the latter title.
to relax the suspicions of Parliament as to make it more amenable to a grant of money. In memorandums of October and December, 1673, Danby expressed the goals of a policy which he thought Charles should adopt:

In all things to promote the Protestant interest both at home and abroad.

To keep firm to the Triple Alliance, and to endeavour to bring all Protestant princes into it.

... they must be gratified by executing the laws against popery and nonconformity, and withdrawing apparently from the French interest.

And as to money, it is probably to be feared that neither the one nor the other will give anything proportionable to the wants of the Crown till satisfied in their fears as to France.

This was Danby's policy—support of Protestantism both in England and on the continent, withdrawal from the French alliance, maintenance of the Triple Alliance—a policy aimed at calming the fears of Parliament and thereby securing enough money to support the government.

When Parliament met in October, 1673, Danby's influence was not yet supreme, since the Cabal was still in existence. Charles needed money to support his war and to maintain his government, and thus Parliament had to be called. The King was assured by his ministers, Arlington in particular, that enough members of Parliament could be won over to the cause of the Court through bribes and by satisfying

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20 B.M. Add. MSS. 26042, fos. 15-17.
them in matters of religion and property. Although there was apprehension over the mood of Parliament, Arlington, in a letter written to the English representatives at Cologne, appeared to discount any rumors of a challenge by Parliament to the war:

We are preparing here to see the Parliament assembled at the day appointed, wherein we do not despair of seeing his Majesty enabled to prosecute the war notwithstanding the great aversion and dissatisfaction in the generality of the people against the alliance with France. But the point of treaties, alliances with foreign princes, the making of war and peace, being so indisputable in the Crown, I cannot persuade myself, that a Parliament so well complexioned as this towards monarchy, and so particularly addicted to his Majesty's person, will abandon him and his honor in such an exigent, . . .

The houses of Parliament came together on October 20, 1673.

Although Parliament had been called to meet on October 20, Charles II had determined to prorogue them for a week in order to prevent any opposition forming to the marriage of the Duke of York. The marriage had already been performed by proxy, but the arrival of this news in London caused widespread resentment. The members of Parliament began to organize in hopes of preventing the full completion of the marriage; however, Charles was aware of this and decided upon a one week proro-
gation to insure the conclusion of the marriage. The task of proroguing the two Houses was entrusted to Lord Chancellor Shaftesbury, but he delayed his task on October 20 long enough to allow the House of Commons to voice its opposition to the marriage. The lower House held the Speaker in his chair and voted a petition to Charles requesting that the marriage not be consummated and that James marry only a Protestant. Parliament was then prorogued to October 27 but the damage was done. The House of Commons had expressed its opposition to the Catholic marriage and through that to the French alliance and the danger of Popery.

It is difficult to determine the strength of the "Opposition" in the House of Commons; nor can one make a strong argument for the existence of clearly defined parties. Those who supported the King were referred to as the "Court" party, while those who opposed the government were grouped as the "Country" party. In truth, many members of Parliament were loyal not to a party but to a man such as Arlington, Buckingham, Shaftesbury, or Danby. In the House of Commons men such as Sir William Coventry and William Russell rallied supporters to the cause of attacking the crown. Before and after the session of Parliament in the fall of 1673 there were numerous instances of members coming together in assorted groups to plot a strategy. Sir William Temple has provided

24 Haley, Shaftesbury, p. 36; Burnet, My Own Time, II, 36.

25 C.J., IX, 281; Grey, Debates, II, 182.

the historian with a rough analysis of the composition of the House of Commons in October of 1673. In a letter to the Earl of Essex on October 25, 1673, Temple identified four groups or parties:

...; but there seem to be already four parties formed in the House of Commons one would run up to the height and fall upon the ministers, especially Buckingham, Arlington, and Lauderdale, and their carriage, particularly in the business of the war, ... and of these Sir William Coventry's brother is the head, and is thought will be very busy this session; but his in the last and extreme ambition, ... has lost him a good deal of credit in the House of Commons, and so Halifax too, ... and so they say will Garraway be, and Thomas, and Sacheverell, Lord Cavendish, and Will Russell. Another party is more moderate, would only secure the business of religion, break the war with Holland, ... and of this Strangeways and Powle seem the heads, but strong in the numbers of the House. Another, upon pretence of not exasperating the King, are for voting money, but with pretence of not perfecting it unless peace be made, ... and of this Sir John Holland is the head. The last party is made chiefly to carry on the business of the divorce, and this is headed wholly by Shaftesbury and Sir. R. Howard, ...27

Many of the names mentioned above, as well as others, were to be in the forefront of Parliament's attacks on the King's foreign policy in 1673 and subsequent years. The party favoring the divorce of Charles II and remarriage for the sake of producing an heir was interested primarily in removing the Duke of York from the line of

27Sir William Temple to the Earl of Essex, October 25, 1673, Essex Papers, I, 131-132. There are capsule biographies of the men mentioned by Temple, as well as other members of the Opposition, in the Appendix of this dissertation.
succession, but Shaftesbury's activities in this regard were of little avail. The members of Parliament were pressured by both the Crown and the ambassadors of France, Holland, and Spain, who used money to win votes. When Parliament reassembled on October 27, however, the "Country" party began an attack on the war and the French alliance which was the first step in Parliament's campaign to gain a larger role in the making of foreign policy.

When the Houses of Parliament came together again on October 27, Charles II greeted it with a speech in which he blamed Dutch obstinacy for the continuation of the war and asked for a new supply to carry on the war. The House of Commons, however, was so influenced by the speeches of such members of the Opposition as William Garraway and Sir Thomas Clarges that the custom of voting the thanks of the House for the King's speech was abandoned. After some harsh words concerning the new Speaker of the House, Sir Edward Seymour, who was a friend of Danby and supporter of the King, the House was adjourned until October 30. It was on that day that Charles rejected the petition against the Duke of York's marriage on the grounds that Parliament had not opposed on religious grounds Catholic marriages in the past.

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28 Haley, Shaftesbury, p. 337; Alberti to the Doge, November 14/24 and December 12/22, 1673, C.S.P. Ven., 1672-5, pp. 177, 189.

29 Colbert to Louis XIV, November 3/13, 1673, P.R.O. 31/3, 129, f. 63. A new French ambassador, the Marquis of Ruvigny, was sent to England with money and instructions to win Parliament over to the French alliance. His instructions from Louis XIV can be found in Jusserand, Recueil, Angleterre, pp. 131-147.

30 C.J., IX, 282.

31 Grey, Debates, II, 183-185.
including the King's own marriage and a proposed marriage for James to an Austrian princess. The House of Commons was not satisfied with this reply and by a vote of 184 to 88 voted to prepare another address to the King asking that the marriage be prevented. It is significant to note that many members of the committee appointed to draw up the new address were men who had spoken out against the marriage and would be great critics of the war and the French alliance. Such names as John Powle, Sir William Coventry, William Sacheverell, Strangeways, Sir Thomas Meres, William Garraway, John Birch, Sir Thomas Clarges—these were men who were always in the forefront of the attacks on the King's foreign policy. On October 31 the House began to consider Charles II's request for money to continue the war. It was at this point that the Opposition began its great attack on the war by speaking out against supply:

Mr. Russell: ... let us consider what we give this money for, and consider that what we give is destructive to the nation (by maintaining this war) and the Protestant religion. . . .

Lord Cavendish: Here is money asked of us to carry on a war we were never advised about, . . .

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32 Grey, Debates, II, 189-196; C.J., IX, 284.

33 C.J., IX, 284. There were other important members of the Opposition, such as William Russell, Lord Cavendish, Sir Samuel Barnadiston, and Sir Thomas Clarges, who had an active part in committees on grievances, Popery, a standing army, etc. An examination of the Journals of the House of Commons will reveal the many activities of men such as these.

34 Grey, Debates, II, 198-213.
Sir Thomas Meres: ... In such great wars as this, and in most wars, the Kings of England have advised with their Parliaments; ... we owned not the war in the last tax—The King may make war, but the House of Commons may or may not give money. ... 

Sir William Coventry: Is as unwilling to give money for the maintenance of this alliance as any man, it being destructive both to trade and to religion. ... 

Sir Henry Capel: Would know how we came into this war, before we give money to it. ... 

The tactics of the Opposition were clear: attack the French alliance, the bad effects of the war, and the failure to consult Parliament. The House of Commons was thus influenced to deny the King a further supply until the most recent grant had expired in September of 1674. 35 Charles could hope for little from Parliament now, but the session continued until November 4. The Opposition launched attacks on the grievance of a standing army and was proceeding to the question of evil counselors when the prorogation to January 7, 1674 was announced. Parliament had refused to grant money for the war, thereby setting the stage for efforts in the next session which would force England to break the French alliance and make a separate peace with Holland.

The Opposition's first attack on Charles II's foreign policy had been a success. The Court party had failed to prevent the passage of the address against the Duke of York's marriage and the vote against granting more money. Although Danby had mustered some support in the 

House of Commons and could depend on men such as Henry Coventry, Edward Seymour, Sir Richard Temple, and Sir Robert Howard. Sir William Temple felt that the Court party was suffering from poor leadership:

> The Court's business in the House seems to be much wanting in point of men to manage it of credit and ability, for besides Mr. Secretary Coventry and Mr. Attorney, . . . there is none of much talk that undertake it but Sir Robert Carr and Sir Richard Temple, who are the worst heard that can be in the House, . . . My Lord Treasurer seems to be discovering the coasts, and not resolved what course to steer, . . .

In addition, the old dissensions between members of the Cabal flared up again, as Buckingham and Arlington and Shaftesbury and Lauderdale intrigued against one another. Shaftesbury was dismissed as Lord Chancellor on November 9 by the King upon the advice of Lauderdale and the Duke of York. Charles now had to consider the course to follow before Parliament met again—whether or not to dissolve Parliament, whether to take new subsidies from Louis XIV, and above all, what to do about the war. There was no unity among his ministers nor

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37 Sir William Temple to the Earl of Essex, October 25, 1673, Essex Papers, I, 132-133.

38 Haley, Shaftesbury, pp. 337-342. It is clear that Shaftesbury had been considering resigning from office for some time, especially since he was anxious to disassociate himself from the war and the French alliance.
any constructive suggestions as to policy, and Shaftesbury, soon to be followed by Buckingham, was moving into opposition. Danby was the minister most capable of winning the confidence of the King; however, to accomplish that he had to persuade Parliament to grant money in the next session. That was a dim prospect as the people became more anti-French and more distrustful of the government. The outlook for the Court was not bright as the next session of Parliament approached.

\footnote{Alberti to the Doge, December 5/15 and 12/22, 1673, \textit{C.S.P. Ven.}, 1673-5, pp. 184, 187.}

\footnote{Sir Gilbert Talbot to Williamson, November 13, 1673, Colonel Roger Whitley to Williamson, November 17, 1673, and Sir Robert Wiseman to Williamson, November 17, 1673; \textit{Letters To Williamson}, II, 71, 76, 77-78.}
CHAPTER II

THE FIRST VICTORY, JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1674

Although Parliament had been prorogued only until January 7, 1674, there was some suspicion among the people that it might never meet again. Indeed, Charles II was considering another prorogation, or even a dissolution of Parliament, for fear that the hostility of the Opposition had not been tempered. The counsels of his ministers were divided on this issue. Arlington urged the King to prorogue Parliament again, the Duke of York was for the punishment of all troublemakers, and Buckingham and Danby felt that Parliament might be persuaded to grant money for the war. The King was also subjected to French pressure for a prorogation since Louis XIV feared the consequences of another attack on the French alliance. The Duke of York had approached the French ambassador about a large subsidy from his master, which would enable Charles to dispense with Parliament. However, there was no real agreement on the subsidy and Charles soon informed the ambassador that Parliament would meet at the scheduled

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1 Ruvigny to Louis XIV, November 7/17, 1673, P.R.O. 31/3, 129, f. 74; Alberti to the Doge, November 14/24, 1673, C.S.P. Ven., 1673-5, p. 176.

2 C.S.P. Ven., 1673-5, p. 187. Buckingham even proposed a plan to the French ambassador for winning votes through large scale bribery, but it was not taken seriously (see the ambassador’s instructions in Jusserand, Recueil, Angleterre, pp. 131-147).
While these negotiations were going on, the French were also attempting to bribe Shaftesbury into support of the war and the French alliance. Acting upon the advice of Arlington, Ruvigny visited Shaftesbury and offered him a bribe of 10,000 pounds in return for his support of the French interest. Shaftesbury refused the offer and confirmed his stand against the policy of the King.

Charles II's decision to meet Parliament at the appointed time reflected his growing confidence in the opinions of Danby. The Lord Treasurer was slowly gaining an ascendancy over Buckingham and Arlington by working with friends (such as Sir Heneage Finch and Sir Edward Seymour) to persuade Charles to abandon the French alliance. Danby's memorandum of December 1673 emphasized his belief that Parliament would grant money in return for the securing of religion and the breaking of the French alliance. Any arguments concerning the use of force to subdue Parliament he rejected as too risky.

Charles II accepted Danby's arguments and decided to meet Parliament; a proclamation was issued on December 12 ordering all members to be present on January 7. The victory of Danby was virtually complete, as many observers recognized his fi

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5B.M. Add. MSS. 28042, f. 17.
cial abilities and his prestige at court. Now that the decision had been made to meet Parliament, the Court undertook several new policies aimed at winning the support of the people and lessening the power of the Opposition. All Catholics were forbidden the Court and the laws against Non-Conformists were enforced strictly. In addition, preparations were made to disband what was left of the newly raised army. William Lockhart was sent to France to negotiate a treaty of commerce, for trade disputes were "a main ingredient of the dissatisfaction they (the people) pretend to have towards our strict alliance with that crown." Efforts were also made by the Court to win votes in the House of Commons, since Charles was still apprehensive of what might result from the January session. Danby, Seymour, Coventry and others were instructed to use all available means to secure votes for the King. These measures of Charles may have had some success in calming the

6 Browning, Danby, I, 121; Lord Conway to the Earl of Essex, December 6, 1673 and Sir William Temple to the Earl of Essex, December 25, 1673, Essex Papers, I, 150, 155.

7 Bryant, King Charles II, p. 234; Browning, Danby, I, 121; Henry Coventry to Sir William Curties, November 21, 1673, B.M. Add. MSS. 25122, f. 176; John Richards to Williamson, November 25, 1673, Letters To Williamson, II, 85 ("... and 'tis hoped will allay the impetuous hates that have lately appeared in the Parliament. . .").

8 William Lockhart's instructions can be found in S.P. 104, 17, fos. 32-33.

9 "King is infinitely disturbed in his thoughts upon the approaching Parliament." Lord Conway to the Earl of Essex, December 9, 1673, B.M. Stowe MSS. 203, f. 243. On December 13 Conway reported to Essex that the King wished the Earl to persuade his brother, Sir Henry Capel, to vote with the Court party (Conway to Essex, December 13, 1673, Essex Papers, I, 152).
fears of the people, but in one important area Charles had not changed his policy to please his subjects or Parliament. The French alliance was intact and as long as it remained in force, the Opposition had something upon which to base their attacks on the King's foreign policy.

Of the four grievances aired by Parliament in October, "Religion, Army, French-Allyance, and Councillors," Charles II had given some measure of redress in every area except the French alliance. The King was not yet firmly convinced that the ties with France had to be cut, although Arlington had told the French ambassador that a separate peace with Holland might be a necessity. In his letter of November 10/20, 1673, Colbert informed Louis XIV of the Court's despair at the hostility of Parliament to France. The King had no money to continue the war and feared rebellion if he did not yield to public opinion. Thus, wrote Colbert, it seemed that Charles would be forced by the next Parliament to make peace. The dire financial straits of the King prompted the Duke of York to bring up the question of a French subsidy; however, Charles demanded 1,500,000 livres and this seemed too high a price to Colbert. In the middle of December England began to receive peace feelers from the Dutch by way of the Spanish ambassador in England, the

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10Letters To Williamson, II, 76.

11Colbert to Louis XIV, November 10/20, 1673, P.R.O. 31/3, 129, fos. 66-69.

12Colbert to Louis XIV, December 1/11, 1673, P.R.O. 31/3, 129, f. 92.
Marquis del Fresno. The Dutch offered to recognize England's claims in regard to saluting the flag and to pay an indemnity of 187,000 pounds. Coupled to this offer of peace was a Spanish threat of war if Charles did not accept the terms. Charles may have been willing to accept these terms but still was reluctant to break his ties with France for fear that French subsidies might stop. It appeared to Sir William Temple that the King was willing to take a chance on obtaining good results in the next Parliament.

And those who reckoned about a week ago upon our being content with our own separate from France, are for the present at an end of their accounts, ... The Parliament will certainly meet, and a trial be made upon them for money with all compliance they can desire in any point besides that of going on with the war and the French alliance, but I do not yet discern any appearance of their being satisfied without those two forbidden points.

... The short of our present story seems to be that the Court will upon no terms fall out with the French alliance, and the Nation will upon no terms fall in with it; ... that which makes this obstinacy in the Court is not only the violence of Duke, but the dread of having all that has passed between them and France published if they anger France, ...
Temple was correct in observing that the Court feared the consequences of any revelation of the secret terms of the Treaty of Dover, a revelation France might make in order to revenge England for making a separate peace. As a means of satisfying public opinion about the nature of the French alliance, it was decided to reveal to Parliament the terms of the so-called traité simulé of December 21, 1670. This bogus treaty of alliance had been drawn up and signed in order to conceal from Buckingham, Shaftesbury, and Lauderdale the secret clauses of the Treaty of Dover concerning the conversion of England to Catholicism. It was proposed in December 1673 to show this treaty to Parliament in hopes of allaying its suspicions about the French alliance. According to the French ambassador, Charles II made this decision with the advice of Danby and Buckingham and it was resolved to offer Parliament this opportunity in the King's opening speech. The hope was that Parliament would believe that there was no secret alliance with France providing for the introduction of Catholicism and arbitrary government into England. Shaftesbury could hardly reveal the truth to Parliament, since he had been associated with the Cabal and, having never divulged the truth before, he was in a precarious position.

As the time appointed for the meeting of Parliament drew near, both the Court and Country parties were making final preparations. The King was so apprehensive of the activities of Shaftesbury that the

16 Ruvigny to Louis XIV, December 22/January 1 and January 5/15, 1673/4, P.R.O. 31/3, 130, fos. 1-2, 29.
Earl was twice ordered to leave the city. As early as December 17, 1673, no one could fail to notice that many members of Parliament were already present in London and that the members "daily discourse of no longer continuance of the war." Sir Joseph Williamson at Cologne was told that "there are so many cabals of the malicious ..." and that the activities of all the various factions were too numerous to be described. The ambassadors of both Spain and Holland were busily attempting to stir up opposition to the war. Soon after Parliament was prorogued on November 4, there appeared in London, by way of Holland, a pamphlet which contained the addresses and votes of the recent session of Parliament. Thus the people were made aware of what had happened regarding the war and the French alliance. The Spanish were no less active in encouraging the Opposition; also, it was thought by some people that the peace terms were offered in hopes that Charles II would refuse them and thereby discredit his policy even more. In

17 Letters To Williamson, II, 92 ("... the late Lord Chancellor, whose interest they report is good as ever, and the side whereof he is, they report to be much stronger than the other and more prevalent."); Essex Papers, I, 142.

18 Henry Ball to Williamson, December 17 and 18, 1673, Letters To Williamson, II, 99, 103.

19 Ibid., II, 87, 105.

20 Ibid., II, 82. The Dutch also sent copies of the King's rejection of the peace terms to several members of Parliament. B.M. Add. MSS. 25122 f. 189; B.M. Stowe MSS. 203, f. 325.

21 Alberti to the Doge, December 19/29, 1673, C.S.P. Ven., 1673-5, pp. 190-191; Colbert to Louis, December 15/25, 1673, P.R.O. 31/3, 129, f. 110.
light of all these activities and planning, it is not surprising that many Englishmen foresaw an unhappy time ahead. Despite all of Charles II's new policies, the French alliance had not been broken. Secretary of State Henry Coventry wrote to Sir Leoline Jenkins at Cologne that "our King seems resolved not to quit France, though I fear the Parliament will be in no better humour than when you left them." Eleven days before Parliament was to meet, Coventry expressed his apprehensions to the Earl of Essex:

Our great crisis now draweth on, and if all agree well at home, we have little in my poor opinion to fear abroad; . . . But if a disagreement should happen between his Majesty and Parliament, which God forbid, though there want not men of very different opinions in other matters, that promote it, we must expect confusion beyond what we have soon, . . .

Coventry was right to speak of those "men of very different opinions," because there would be no peace in the new session of Parliament. If the "Country" party had won a small battle in October, 1673 by refusing money for the war, a greater victory could be realized in January of 1674.

When Parliament reassembled on January 7, 1674, Charles II greeted both houses with a speech in which he asked for money to continue the war against Holland. At the end of the speech the King made his proposal

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22 Coventry to Jenkins, December 17, 1673, B.M. Add. MSS. 25122, f. 183.
23 Coventry to the Earl of Essex, December 27, 1673, B.M. Add. MSS. 25122, fos. 188–189.
concerning the revelation of his treaties with France:

... I know you have heard much of my alliance with France, and I believe, it has been very strangely represented to you, as if there were certain secret articles of dangerous consequence; but I will make no difficulty of letting the treaties, and all the articles of them, without any the least reserve to be seen by a small committee of both Houses, who may report to you the true scope of them: And I assure you, there is no other treaty with France, either before or since, not already printed, which shall not be made known.  

It was reported by one observer that Charles fumbled at these words in his speech, but no one stepped forward at that time to challenge him. Charles II's speech was followed by one in which the Lord Chancellor blamed Dutch obstinacy for the continuation of the war and asked Parliament for money to fit out the Fleet for the coming campaign. Once again the House of Commons delayed a vote of thanks for the King's speech and adjourned until January 12. It was difficult to ascertain the temperament of the House of Commons after only one day; however, the Earl of Essex was informed that the House seemed to be in an angry mood. In the interval the ambassadors of Holland were actively trying to stir up opposition to the war in hopes of forcing England to make a separate peace. There also appeared another propaganda piece from Holland in the form of a pamphlet which related the Dutch side of the negotiations

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24 Conway to Essex, January 10, 1673/4, Essex Papers, I, 161.
26 C.J., IX, 291.
27 Lord Ranelagh to Essex, January 10, 1673/4, B.M. Stowe MSS. 204, f. 25.
with England and attacked the French alliance. The House of Lords was meeting during this interval and Shaftesbury used this period to launch his career as a leader of the opposition. He did so with speeches about the danger of Popery. Although the Earl had many friends in the House of Commons, his latest biographer has asserted that Shaftesbury's joining the opposition did not mean that he could control it. Men such as Sir William Coventry and Lord Cavendish preferred to act on their own and acknowledge no real leader. Nevertheless, Shaftesbury's activities against Popery in the House of Lords could not fail to influence the lower House in its attacks on France, for much hatred for France grew out of fear for the Protestant religion.

When the House of Commons, four hundred strong, met again on January 12, the King's opening speech was the first matter to be considered. In the debate that ensued on the issue of a vote of thanks, the Opposition attacked the war, the alliance with France, Popery, evil counsellors, and a standing army:

Mr. Russell: ... but when God has blessed us with so good a King, and yet property, religion, and all invaded, we ought to find out the authors of our misfortunes, the ill ministers about the King, ...

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29 Haley, Shaftesbury, pp. 343-353. Haley argues that Shaftesbury could not command a large following in the House of Commons at first because he was still too closely associated with the Cabal and the war. Many members still remembered his famous "Delenda est Carthago" speech of February 1673.

30 Grey, Debates, II, 225-236.
Colonel Birch: Doubts not but the King will at last find, that they who advise him to follow the Parliament's counsel are his best subjects . . . How we entered into this war he remembers, . . . The greatest Princes have called Parliaments to advise in peace and war; . . .

Mr. Garraway: Nothing, but we must carry on a war we know not how long; let those good counsellors that advised it look after it . . . Cleanse the house at home; know those that have intrigued you; . . .

Sir Thomas Clarges: . . . but as those evil counsellors about the King persuaded him then, they do still exasperate him, that our best counsels are prevented; this is the Great Grievance. . . . No example that ever any war of this nature began without Parliament. . . . The best thing to rivet the King and his people, is mutual confidence. . . . Submits to all gentlemen's opinions here, the universal hatred against this French alliance. . . .

Mr. Sacheverell: . . . Articles of war were complained of in the last session, to set up martial law. . . . Soldiers sent beyond sea, which should stay here, for our safety. . . .

The debate on whether to return thanks for the King's speech ended in a vote of 191-139 in favor of a vote of thanks, but the atmosphere for the entire session of Parliament was set by these speeches. The war and the French alliance were the great grievances, along with Popery and a standing army. However, the House of Commons sought first to redress these grievances by an attack on men whom it believed responsible for the state of the nation: the King's "evil counsellors,"

[C J ., IX, 292.]
Lauderdale, Buckingham, and Arlington. On January 13 the attack on the ministers was launched with the voting of an address for the removal of the Duke of Lauderdale from the royal presence. He was attacked for having raised a large army in Scotland, but the extent of Parliament's discontent over the war was more truly reflected in the proceedings involving Buckingham and Arlington. These two ministers, always bitter enemies, both went before the House of Commons to defend themselves and to answer questions on their conduct. Some of the questions asked reflected the Opposition's desire to find out who was responsible for the war:

5. by whose counsel and ministry the Triple League was made.

6. And the first treaty with France, whereby it was broken, and the Articles thereof:

9. And the Smyra fleet fallen upon, before war was declared:

10. And the second treaty with the French King at Utrecht, and the Articles thereof:

11. And by whose counsel the war was made, without advice of Parliament; and the Parliament thereupon prorogued.

An address for the removal of Buckingham from his post was passed on January 14, largely because of the poor showing he made before the House and his great unpopularity among its members. Arlington, however, defended himself admirably before the House, with the result that on January 20 the address against him was voted down by a vote

32 C.J., IX, 292.

33 Grey, Debates, II, 262-263.
Undoubtedly Buckingham and especially Arlington had supporters in the House of Commons. These ministers were not attacked so much for the way in which they carried out the King's policy as for the principles of that policy. It was thought that Buckingham and Arlington had advised the King in favor of the war and the French alliance, and Parliament was determined to fix the responsibility for those policies. Henry Coventry defended the counsellors' position on the grounds of their oath of secrecy, but Sir Thomas Meres replied sharply that the House of Commons was competent to question the counsellors. A perusal of the debates in the House over the two Ministers shows that many members of the Opposition joined together to attack both men: Colonel Strangeways, William Sacheverell, John Birch, William Garraway, William Russell, and Sir Thomas Meres. That Arlington was saved from a fate like that of Buckingham was probably due to the impressive way in which he handled himself before the House and the support of men such as Sir Henry Capel and William Harbord. Both men left their posts in government after the session had ended, Buckingham giving up the position of Master of the Horse and Arlington selling his post as Secretary of State to Sir Joseph Williamson. By its attacks on the King's evil counsellors the Opposition endeavoured to remove the men it thought responsible for the war, the French alliance, and the failure to consult Parliament. To

34 C.J., IX, 293, 296.

35 Essex Papers, I, 163. In a letter of February 5, 1673/4 to the Earl of Essex, Arlington acknowledged the valuable support of these men (B.M. Stowe MSS. 204, fos. 156-157).
one observer, the attacks on Buckingham and Arlington represented a great victory for Parliament:

So that when the parliament sat, they were all brought to account for their advice to the King, and by that gave advertisement to all succeeding generations, that none should presume afterward to advise their kings to war, and matters greatly concerning the nations, without advice of his states of parliament. 36

The first phase of the Opposition's attack on Charles II's foreign policy was now complete. It was largely an attack carried on by members of the House of Commons, although the French ambassador was told that Shaftesbury and his group may have been guiding matters in the lower house. 37 At any rate, the House of Commons could now proceed to matters such as Popery and a standing army which, to many men, were related to the great grievance of the war and alliance with France.

The attack on the ministers ended on January 20 with the failure of the address against Arlington. On January 22 the Opposition moved once again to the attack on foreign policy; Henry Powle moved that the House consider "the business of the foreign war, that hangs over our heads, like a comet, threatening destruction..." After a seconding speech by Sir Thomas Meres, who referred to the war as "the bottom of

36 Robert Law, Memorialls; or, the Memorable Things that fell out Within this island of Britain from 1638 to 1684, ed. by C.K. Sharpe (Edinburgh: 1818), pp. 60-61.

37 Ruvigny to Pomponne, January 22/February 1, 1673/4, cited in Haley, Shaftesbury, p. 357. The French ambassador was told by the Duke of York that Shaftesbury was meeting regularly with Lords Carlisle, Holles, Salisbury, and Faucomberg to plan strategy. See also Essex Papers, I, 168 and Letters To Williamson, II, 156-157.
all our grievances," the House of Commons resolved to consider "the state and condition of the nation, and the grievances occasioned by reason of the war." The Court may have been hoping that the House would consider the question of supply after the attack on the ministers; however, the hostility of Parliament to the war and the French alliance was still strong. The French ambassador reported that it appeared as if Charles II might still be forced to make peace with Holland. The Dutch had been stirring up the House of Commons throughout the session and once again had offered England terms of peace through the Spanish ambassador. In a letter of January 14/24 an offer of a larger indemnity was made to Charles II, as well as colonial concessions in the East Indies. The English King was now in a difficult position, for another rejection of the terms would certainly be revealed by the Dutch to the Opposition and acceptance of the terms would mean a desertion of France. Confronted with the anti-French feelings in Parliament, Charles decided to reveal the Dutch proposals to the two Houses and solicit their opinion. This was a bold decision, made in the hope either of causing disagreements among the various factions over the terms (and thereby gaining some advantage) or of winning financial backing in an attempt to get better terms. Sir Arthur Bryant has described the King's decision as "waving prerogative to the wind," and

38 Grey, Debates, II, 334-335.

39 Ruvigny to Pomponne, January 22/February 1, 1673/4, cited in Haley, William Of Orange And The English Opposition, 1672-4, p. 177.

40 Haley, Ibid. p. 175.

41 Bryant, King Charles II, p. 188.
undoubtedly it was a novel step for Charles to take. The royal prerogative suffered diminution the moment the King decided to ask Parliament for its opinions on whether to accept or reject peace proposals. It was a surrender on the part of Charles II, but it was also a shrewd move which put Parliament in the unpopular position of deciding for peace or war and gave the King a justifiable reason to desert France if the choice were peace. The decision to refer the proposals to Parliament was made on January 23, the day before the House of Commons was to consider grievances and the state of the nation.¹⁴²

The two Houses of Parliament were summoned by Charles II on the morning of January 24 and heard this speech:¹⁴³

At the beginning of the session I told you, as I thought I had reason to do, that the States General had not yet made me any proposals which could be imagined with intent to conclude, but only to amuse.

... they have now sent me a letter by the Spanish ambassador, offering me some terms of peace, upon conditions formerly drawn up, and in a more decent style than before.

It is upon this that I desire your speedy advice: for, if you shall find the terms such as may be embraced, your advice will have great weight with me: And if you find them defective, I hope you will give me your advice and assistance, how to get better terms.

¹⁴² There is confusion in the sources as to who advised Charles to take this step. "This bone was cast before Parliament by advice of Treasurer, but I think Arlington broke the French alliance." (Conway to Essex, January 27, 1673/4, Essex Papers, I, 168). The Venetian ambassador wrote on Jan. 30/Feb. 9 that the Duke of Ormonde and Arlington suggested this course (C.S.P. Ven., 1673-5, p. 211). Finally, Andrew Browning argues that Danby was responsible for the decision (Browning, Danby, I, 127).

¹⁴³C.J., IX, 298.
The first reaction of the House of Commons was one of confusion and puzzlement. Rather than considering the King's speech immediately, both Houses resolved to adjourn until Monday, January 26. Clearly the leaders were in a dilemma because they recognized the King's attempt to divert the debate on the war and grievances. The Country Party was probably pleased at having such an opportunity, which involved a surrender of the royal prerogative; however, it was thought that the offer might be a trick to win more money for the war if the Dutch terms did not provide ample satisfaction. Since some members of Parliament were not even certain that the proposals were genuine, some of its leaders talked to Dutch agents on January 25. That there was confusion in the ranks of the Opposition may be seen in the debates on Charles II's speech which took place on January 26 and 27. Some members, such as Sir William Coventry, Clarges, Birch, and Powle, were eager to accept the proposed terms. Another group, including Sacheverell, Cavendish, and Littleton, were confused about whether the peace was to be a separate one or a joint effort involving France. Finally, there was a group, headed by Garraway, which insisted that Charles should get out of the war which he had waged without the advice of Parliament:

44 Haley, William Of Orange And The English Opposition, 1672-4, p. 179.

45 Grey, Debates, II, 341-357. Those who favored a separate peace did so in a desire to emphasize the English break with France. It was reported that some members regarded the King's speech as a trick to get money and wanted him to end the war without their advice (B.M. Stowe MSS. 204, f. 114).
Mr. Sacheverell: It is not clearly before the House to give advice whether to make peace with the Dutch, or no; not clear, whether the King craves advice in a joint, or separate peace, . . .

Colonel Birch: Cannot believe that any line in this paper tends to anything but a separate peace . . . but if this league has been so destructive to us, is it not better to answer it here, than to put the King to answer it?

Mr. Boscowen: So little fruit of the war, and you must pay the reckoning! You were not advised with for war, and if you advise peace, all will be laid upon you. We had no hand in the war, . . .

Mr. Powle: The only way for our trade is to get peace, and secure the discontents at home . . . Sees no danger in not advising a war, and the articles are a sufficient ground for an honourable peace.

Sir William Coventry: France is not likely to have peace—It is in our interest to have peace before our neighbors, if we can. It becomes us better to offer our opinion on these conditions.

Sir Thomas Littleton: By this separate peace you secure all those fears; and should all these armies of France be at leisure, we should be in more apprehensions than ever.

Colonel Strangeways: . . . You were angry, at first, that you were not advised with, and now that you are advised with—The French alliance was of no advantage to us . . . It seems that the sense of the House is for a separate peace . . . Would know upon what terms; not what we imagine or suspect, but certainly to know whether upon a separate peace, . . .

To some observers it seemed that the Opposition was not so much confused as angry over being diverted from the debates on grievances.

Thus Arlington wrote to the ambassadors at Cologne: "one thing was
very remarkable in the debates of each House, that no man opposed the coming to a speedy peace, but those that had most professedly railed at the war before, and now saw His Majesty in a fair way, by this expedient, of breaking through those snares they had laid for him."\textsuperscript{46} The Earl of Essex was told that "those who thought the French alliance a grievance, do now think a peace, nay, a separate peace, to be the greater grievance, so that one may see they designed only to fetter the King and take their advantages, ..."\textsuperscript{47}

The disagreement among members of the Opposition was not so serious that the chance for peace was allowed to escape. On January 27 the House of Commons resolved to advise the King to accept the terms and make "a speedy peace." The House of Lords followed suit on January 28 and on February 3 both Houses concurred in the sending of an address to the King concerning the proposals.\textsuperscript{48} Now that the decision was made, Charles II resolved to act quickly; he asked Sir William Temple to go to The Hague to negotiate a treaty of peace. The Dutch, however, once again acted through the Spanish ambassador. They gave him full powers to negotiate a treaty in the name of the States General. England accepted the offers made by the Dutch concerning the lowering of the flag, the indemnity, and the various colonial disputes. The formal

\textsuperscript{46}Arlington to Jenkins and Williamson, January 30, 1673/4, S.P. 81/71, f. 169.
\textsuperscript{47}Lord Conway to the Earl of Essex, January 27, 1673/4, Essex Papers, I, 168.
\textsuperscript{48}C.J., IX, 299, 302; L.J., XII, 622-623, 625.
treaty of peace was signed at Westminster on February 9/19, 1673/4 with Danby, Arlington, the Duke of Ormonde, Secretary Coventry, and Lord Chancellor Finch signing for England. On February 11 the King told Parliament that peace had been concluded with the Dutch.

The signing of the Treaty of Westminster represented a great victory for Parliament in its challenge to the royal prerogative. Charles II yielded to its pressures on a major policy in foreign affairs, because he found himself forced to withdraw from an unpopular war and a hated alliance. At the beginning of the session of 1674 he had begun this process of capitulation by offering to show his treaties with France to Parliament. This was not a novel step, for James I had promised to reveal his alliances to Parliament in 1624. The Triple Alliance of 1668 was shown to Parliament in order to solicit a grant of supply. What was significant about Charles II's offer, however, was that he made it in the hopes of dampening Parliament's hostility to France. When this failed, he yielded to Parliament's pressures for peace with Holland and a break with France. Although Charles wanted to continue both the war and his alliance with France, he could not do so without the financial support of Parliament. By refusing to grant a supply, Parliament was able to exercise a considerable influence on foreign affairs and to claim some role in the making of foreign policy.

Now that peace had been made, the Court still hoped to secure a supply from Parliament before the session ended. After advising the

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49 Dumont, VII, 255; P.R.O. 31/3, 130, f. 67; Ogg, Charles II, p. 387. The indemnity to be paid by Holland was about 200,000 pounds.

50 Grey, Debates, II, 413.
King to accept the Dutch proposals, the House of Commons had resumed its concern with grievances such as Popery and the standing army. On February 5 a bill against Catholic recusants was read for the first time and on the next day the Commons received a bill to prevent the illegal exacting of money from the subject. Then, on February 7, the issue of the standing army was brought up in a Grand Committee as a grievance and the Opposition connected this question to the matter of the war:

Sir Henry Capel: . . . . What use have we of these forces at home? None, but in case of invasion; and in that case we should trust our safety to such as we know.

Sir Thomas Lee: . . . . In the militia of England lies your strength and safety. . . . The army, by rules of war, are bound to obey their superior officers; if commanded to break your law they must do it . . . .

Lord St. John: . . . . The counsellors now look to set themselves up by this army and this guards; the money spent upon them might have made us masters of the sea.

The fears which brought about this debate were occasioned by the presence in England of 8,000 troops, many of whom were Irish Catholics, awaiting transport to the Continent. The activities of these troops had necessitated the enactment of martial law and billeting and the people of England greatly resented such practices. The opposition to this "standing army" was such that the House of Commons voted to ad-

51 C.J., IX, 303-304.
52 Grey, Debates, II, 390-399.
dress the King for the disbanding of all armed forces raised since 1663. Charles had not been able to secure money for the war; now he was threatened with the loss of his troops. It was indeed an appropriate time for peace, but the announcement of peace with the Dutch did little to change the temperament of Parliament. The House of Commons continued to debate grievances, including Irish affairs, while the House of Lords was following Shaftesbury in attacks on Popery. Charles II finally grew weary of the attacks of Parliament and on February 24 announced a prorogation until November 10, 1674.

The King made the decision to prorogue Parliament without consulting the Privy Council and the Opposition was certainly caught off guard:

... that all our great men have taken occasion to profess publicly they knew nothing of it. I never saw such a consternation as was among the members of both Houses; every man amazed and reproaching one another that they had sat so long upon eggs and could hatch nothing.

Apparently Charles II realized that there would be no money obtained in this session of Parliament and decided upon a prorogation to prevent any further attacks on the prerogative. There was certainly no fear on

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53 C.J., IX, 305. Charles II's reply to this address was given in his speech on February 11 announcing the peace with Holland. The King promised to disband his army but asked for more money for the Fleet.

54 Haley, Shaftesbury, p. 360.

55 Grey, Debates, II, 454.

56 Conway to Essex, February 24, 1673/4, Essex Papers, I, 179-180. On March 3 the Duke of Ormonde told Essex that on one knew about or even counselled a prorogation (B.M. Stowe MSS. 204, f. 273).
his part of losing the good will of France because of the Treaty of Westminster, since Louis XIV made a special point of assuring Charles of his continued friendship.\textsuperscript{57} Perhaps the English King was content to rely upon the economies of Lord Treasurer Danby as a means of living within his income; also, there was reason to hope for French subsidies as a price of neutrality. The ranks of the Opposition were certainly thrown into confusion by the decision. Some members feared an attempt to dispense with Parliament and establish an arbitrary government:

This sudden prorogation caused many of the guilty Commons (Lord St. John, Sir Thomas Lee, Sir Robert Thomas, Sir Nicholas Carew, Sir Eliab Harvey, Sacheverell, and many others) who had bespoken a large dinner for that day at the Swan Tavern in King Street, to leave their provisions to Mr. Dod and his wife, and to haste away (some by coach, some by water) into the city, suspecting themselves . . . unsecure in the suburbs.\textsuperscript{58}

These fears were unfounded for the most part, although the Earl of Essex was informed that "Osborne has proposed a way or method not to want Parliament any more . . ."\textsuperscript{59} Charles II had simply wearied of the constant attacks on his government and was ready to allow Danby an opportunity to relieve the Crown's financial problems. While the Oppo-

\textsuperscript{57}B.M. Stowe MSS. 204, f. 199. As will be seen in Chapter III, Charles had good reasons to hope for the continued friendship of France after the Treaty of Westminster.

\textsuperscript{58}Sir Gilbert Talbot to Williamson, February 28, 1673/4, Letters To Williamson, II, 157. It was also reported that some members were burning their important papers (Haley, William Of Orange And The English Opposition, 1672-4, p. 191). There were also rumors, stirred up by Dutch and Spanish agents, that French influence was responsible for the prorogation (P.R.O. 31/3, 130, fos. 102-103).

\textsuperscript{59}William Harbord to Essex, February 25, 1673/4, B.M. Stowe MSS. 204, f. 237. See also the opinions of the Venetian ambassador in C.S.P. Ven., 1673-5, p. 232.
sition might be unhappy over the lost opportunities of this session, it could still look forward to the next session in November.

Indeed, there was cause for the Opposition to be pleased with its efforts. The King's ministers had been attacked for favoring the war and the French alliance. The Duke of Buckingham and the Earl of Arlington would soon leave their posts in government. More important still, Parliament had, by exercising its powers of debate and control of the purse, forced the King to withdraw from an unpopular war and alliance. Charles II could not wage war without money nor could he long resist the clamor of his subjects against his foreign policy. By forcing the King to make peace with Holland and break the French alliance, the Opposition had won the first important victory in the struggle between the Crown and Parliament over the control of foreign affairs. The results of the session of January-February 1674 marked the first step of a process by which Parliament would in the next four years assert for itself a larger role in the shaping of foreign policy.
CHAPTER III
PARLIAMENT AND OTHER CONCERNS, MARCH 1674-NOVEMBER 1675

After the prorogation of Parliament to November 1674, the government of Charles II was faced with several new situations which required an adjustment in policy. Parliament had given the King no money, so there were financial problems to be surmounted. England was now at peace and the King had to decide what new foreign policy would be best for England. The Cabal had completely broken up and there was a reshuffling of government positions. Finally, preparations had to be made for the coming session of Parliament.

Parliament had passed addresses for the removal of both Buckingham and Lauderdale and had nearly done the same for Arlington. Thus Charles II was faced with the problem of either keeping his old ministers or making some changes. The King had become angry at Buckingham for his conduct before the House of Commons and the Duke was subsequently relieved of his posts as Master of the Horse and Chancellor of Cambridge. Buckingham now began to throw in his lot with Opposition Lords such as Shaftesbury and Denzil Holles. In the case of Lauderdale, Charles II ignored the address of Parliament and even gave his viceroy in Scotland

1Hester W. Chapman, Great Villiers: A Study of George Villiers, Second Duke of Buckingham, 1628-1687. (London: Secker & Warburg, 1949), pp. 213-214. Buckingham was also pressured to abandon his mistress by the House of Lords because of his scandalous conduct with her.
Shaftesbury, of course, had been out of the King's favor for a long time, but it was not until May that his name was struck from the Privy Council. The Earl of Arlington had not been the subject of a Parliamentary address; however, his own position in power was slowly being weakened by the growing strength of Danby and the hostility of the Duke of York. The Earl of Essex was informed that "Treasurer is esteemed the great support of the Crown, Arlington makes his interest among the discontented members of the House of Commons, and Duke and Lauderdale are his mortal enemies." By September of 1674 Arlington had resigned his post as Secretary of State and was currying the friendship of the Duke of Monmouth and those members of Parliament who were anxious to insure a Protestant succession.

With Buckingham and Arlington out of power and Lauderdale in Scotland, there was but one minister to whom Charles II could entrust the tasks of government. The Earl of Danby now became the most important figure in the King's government, a position which he held for five years, and his ascendancy was completed at a time when his talents were most needed. Parliament had not voted any money to the Crown, so Charles II's troubled and strained finances desperately required the skillful management of

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2 Essex Papers, I, 234. Lauderdale's English title was Earl of Guilford.
3 B.M. Stowe MSS. 205, f. 151.
4 Conway to Essex, May 19, 1674, Essex Papers, I, 228.
5 Barbour, Arlington, p. 242; Essex Papers, I, 261. It was quite clear to Arlington's enemies and the French ambassador that he was encouraging the "rebels" in Parliament (See Ruvigny's dispatch of August 3/13, 1674, cited in Barbour, p. 243). Sir Joseph Williamson replaced Arlington as Secretary of State.
Danby.

When peace between Holland and England had been made in February, 1674, the government of Charles II had already exceeded by nearly 400,000 pounds the supplies voted by Parliament. In addition, the government was burdened with other heavy debts as a result of the Stop of the Exchequer in 1672 and the extravagant policies of the King. Danby's solution for these financial problems was a combination of controlled spending, cuts in all unnecessary areas of expenditure, exploitation of all sources of revenue, and capitalizing on the increased prosperity caused by the end of the war. Charles II was naturally delighted with a minister who could increase the royal revenues and pay off old debts, for a sounder financial status for the Crown might enable the King to live without Parliament. Indeed, the financial status of the Crown had so improved in a few short months that Charles decided not to meet Parliament in November. On September 23 the Privy Council issued a proclamation proroguing Parliament from November 10 to April 13, 1675. Danby did not agree with this decision since he was anxious to win more money for Parliament. The announcement was certainly not received well among the people:

This prorogation produces other domestic results which agitate the whole country; the

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6 The success of Danby in the management of the royal finances has been made clear in Browning, Danby, I, 128-132 and III, 10-32. See also Bryant, King Charles II, pp. 190-191. Danby's cuts in spending angered many people at the Court (Essex Papers, I, 199).

7 C.S.P. Dom., 1673-5, p. 365. Both Danby and Secretary of State Coventry opposed the decision (Essex Papers, I, 259-260).
members resent being sent back to their homes when they flattered themselves that they were coming to cut a figure in London. They complain that the King assembles them only when he wants money. Being thus exasperated it seems likely that they will be more troublesome than ever next spring. 

There were rumors that French influence was responsible for the prorogation, but there were no new French subsidies for Charles II. The decision further to prorogue Parliament was made after an appraisal of the improved financial status of the Crown. Danby's financial policies were very successful; and he now began to take an interest in an area in which the King was considering what policy to follow. Now that the war was over and the French alliance broken, Charles II needed to evaluate his foreign policy and make any adjustments he deemed necessary.

Now that England was at peace and officially neutral in the European war, Charles II was in the position of being able to choose what foreign policy to follow from a number of alternative. First of all, he could by secret negotiations, maintain close ties with France, thereby inviting the distrust of a public that had come to fear the growing power of France. Then, too, the King could win the confidence of the people by following a policy which was pro-Protestant and anti-French. Fear of France was a very real thing among the people, and

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9 Certainly the French ambassador talked with the King about a prorogation (P.R.O. 3/3, 131, fos. 86-89). See also Essex Papers, I, 260.
there were a few members of Parliament who were already anxious for England to re-enter the war against France. This was not a widely held opinion at this time since most Englishmen preferred to enjoy the peace and the economic prosperity which accompanied it. The last alternative for Charles II was to exploit his neutrality by playing the role of mediator between France and the Confederates. This was the policy which Charles II adopted after the Treaty of Westminster. On the day the treaty was signed the King offered the French ambassador his services as mediator in the war and promised to instruct his ambassadors at Cologne to support the interests of France. This offer was made by Charles as a means of preserving the friendship of France and demonstrating to his subjects some degree of interest in the cause of the Confederates. The new foreign policy of Charles II was to be continued friendship with France expressed by means of a benevolent neutrality in public and a covert partiality in private.

Charles II's decision to offer his mediation came at a time when the peace conference at Cologne was near the point of dissolution. Since the beginning of its meetings in June 1673, there had been few substantive agreements and many open disagreements. The month of February 1674 saw two incidents between France and the Emperor, which

10 Sir William Coventry and one such member who felt this way, and he was especially eager for England to act as a counterpoise to the growth of French power in Europe, as she had done with the Triple Alliance. See his speech in the debates on the war October 31, 1673 (Grey, Debates, II, 213).

11 Ruvigny to Louis XIV, February 9/19, 1673/4, P.R.O. 31/3, 130, fos. 67-69.
prompted both France and England to recall their ambassadors, thereby bringing the conference to an end. Louis XIV quickly accepted England's offer of mediation, which was also extended to Spain, Holland, and the Emperor, but it was not until the beginning of 1675 that all the warring parties accepted the new mediator. There was much debate over what site should be chosen for the new peace congress and after many proposals all the countries involved accepted the town of Nimeguen. Undoubtedly France was pleased to have her former ally act as mediator, but the Confederates were suspicious of the English King. Sir William Temple's letters from The Hague related the doubts Holland and her allies had of the sincerity of the English mediation, since England was so partial to France. Spain was, however, anxious to bring England into the war against France:

I suspect their design is to endeavour the gaining his Majesty into some league with them or the Hollanders on their behalf and afterwards to accept his mediation, and this on pretense of renewing the Triple Alliance or the like . . . it is incredible to what a pitch they raise their hopes of prevailing over France, and reducing that crown to

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13 B.M. Add. MSS. 25123, f. 64; B.M. Add. MSS. 17677 CC, fos. 29, 136; S.P. 104, 152, fos. 8, 15; S.P. 94, 63, fos. 68, 111. The Emperor refused the English offer at first because he feared the English partiality to France (P.R.O. 31/3, 131, f. 74).

14 S.P. 104, 66, f. 46; S.P. 104, 56, pp. 25, 32.

15 B.M. Egerton MSS. 3325, f. 5; Temple, Works, IV, 53-54. For the Spanish attitude see C.S.P. Ven., 1673-5, pp. 248, 251, 256, 260.
render up all its conquests over this
since the Treaty of the Pyreneans: 16

There was little chance of England's entering the war, for Charles II preferred the friendship of France, desired to remain neutral, wished to enjoy the profits of the dislocated trade in Europe. The King's desire for the continued friendship of France was also reflected in his decision to allow English troops to remain in the service of France. Ruvigny was told soon after the peace that those troops would not be recalled and that France could continue to recruit troops in Scotland and Ireland. There were protests from the Dutch and proclamations against the levying of troops, but France continued to use and recruit English troops. 17 This would prove to be a very sore subject between Crown and Parliament in 1675.

Charles II's new foreign policy was still based on friendship with France, but he did not cut off his contacts with Holland and with his nephew, William of Orange. Although the English and Dutch still had unsettled colonial disputes and were at odds over the question of English troops serving France, there were some men in the government who advocated an alliance with the Stadtholder against France. Danby gradually became interested in foreign affairs and soon became a strong supporter of an anti-French policy. He favored allying with Protestants

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16 Sir William Godolphin to Arlington, March 31/April 10, 1674, S.P. 94, 63, f. 68. For the activities of the Dutch and Spanish ambassadors in London after the Treaty of Westminster, see P.R.O. 31/3, 131, fos. 45, 49 and C.S.P. Ven., 1673-5, p. 262, 276.

17 P.R.O. 31/3, 130, f. 69; B.M. Add. MSS. 25123, f. 63; B.M. Stowe MSS. 206, f. 91; C.S.P. Dom., 1673-5, pp. 230-309, 378.
abroad. The Earl of Arlington was the first, after peace was made, to advocate a Dutch alliance, and upon his urging Sir William Temple was sent to The Hague with instructions to seek a closer tie with the Dutch. In the fall of 1674 Arlington persuaded Charles to send him on a secret mission to the Prince of Orange for the purpose of discussing peace proposals. The Earl was also empowered to discuss a possible marriage between the Prince and his cousin, Princess Mary, the oldest daughter of the Duke of York, a project which was dear to Arlington's heart. At this point Danby came into the picture in order to check the influence of his rival. The Treasurer began to correspond with the Prince of Orange and Sir William Temple, and he also managed to have his son included in the group which accompanied Arlington to Holland in November. The embassy was not successful, because of the personal hostility of the Prince of Orange to Arlington. The peace terms which were found to be acceptable to Charles II, and his nephew rejected any plan for a marriage to the

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19. A good account of Arlington's mission to The Hague can be found in Barbour, Arlington, pp. 244-249. There had been rumors of this marriage as early as February of 1674, but the Duke of York was opposed to the idea and thus was a bitter enemy of Arlington (P.R.O. 31/3, 130, f. 55 and 131, fos. 19, 109).

20. Danby's first letter to the Prince was in April 1674, but after that date he maintained a regular correspondence. There are also many letters between Danby and Temple on the subject of Arlington's embassy. The Treasurer's son acted as an observer for his father. See Browning, Danby, I, 141-145, II, 382-384, 451-456 and Temple, Works, IV, 57-58.
Princess Mary. Thus, when Arlington returned to England in January of 1675, his stock at the Court fell even lower, while the ascendancy of Danby was confirmed. The Lord Treasurer had experienced his first contact with foreign affairs and was now the most important minister of the King. Danby gradually was coming to favor a policy of alliance with the Prince of Orange, but it would be over two years before his advice was adopted. That such a policy was being urged upon the King from other quarters is apparent in a memorandum submitted by Sir Leoline Jenkins after the failure of the Cologne Conference:

It seems to my humble apprehension to be safest; for so we shall make a counterpoise against France, whose puissance does every day threaten to turn the balance, . . . France will not offer to invade us at any time, if we are strictly united with Spain and Holland, . . .

Whereas if we continue in the interest of France, our reward can only be part of its conquests abroad, or maintenance of our peace and quiet at home. . . As for the maintenance of peace at home, after the present disrelishes and jealousies, it is a thing that the people will never fancy or expect from a friendship with France; Nay, if his Majesty should enter into a stricter amity with France, it may be expected, that the Parliament will again take upon them to enquire into and judge of that treaty.

Barbour, Arlington, 246-249. The terms of peace which William proposed can be found in a letter from Arlington to Charles II on November 24, 1674 (B.M. Add. MSS. 32094, fos. 329-331). Because of the intelligence he was able to receive on Arlington's failures, Danby was able to discredit his rival with the King.

This was a foreign policy which Charles II might have been wise to adopt, for his benevolent neutrality towards France and his failure to break completely with his old ally caused Parliament to attack his prerogative in foreign affairs more vigorously.

While Charles II was considering the alternatives in foreign policy, the Opposition was also busy formulating plans for the coming session. The sudden prorogation of February 1674 and the extending of that prorogation to April 1675 had caused a great deal of discontent among some members of Parliament. There was talk of declaring it illegal to terminate a session before all business had been completed. Precedents were found to support this position, a position which was to be urged in the 1675 session. 23 Members of Parliament who were regarded as Republicans visited the Dutch ambassador and there were reports of "illegal" meetings of Parliament men in the counties. 24 In addition, there were certain members of Parliament, "the Presbyterians, the Independents and other Non-conformists," whose policy it was to offer the King a large sum of money in return for a dissolution of Parliament. In the hope that a new Parliament would ease the penal laws against Dissenters, the King was promised that Parliament would vote him a large supply in return for a dissolution. Even the Duke of

23 B.M. Add. MSS. 17677 QQQ (the Dutch ambassador's dispatch of April 16/26); C.S.P. Ven., 1673-5, p. 393; Grey, Debates, III, 19-22.

24 P.R.O. 31/3, 131, f. 49; C.S.P. Dom., 1673-5, p. 604. See also C.S.P. Ven., 1673-5, p. 348.
York was promised an end to the attacks on him and freedom for Catholics if he could influence his brother to dissolve Parliament. The Earl of Shaftesbury also engaged in some sort of activities in both London and his home in Dorset. After his name was struck from the Privy Council, he was ordered to leave the city; however, before his departure the Earl had a conversation with the King in a vain attempt at reconciliation. While at his country home in December he received a visit from Lord Mordaunt which aroused suspicion in many quarters. Some observers believed Shaftesbury would soon be reconciled to the Court, while others believed he was planning the strategy to be followed when Parliament met. By the time Parliament met in April 1675, the Opposition had made its preparations and was prepared to take up the business which had been postponed. Foreign policy was not to be a focal point of its attacks at this time.

The government of Charles II had also made some preparations for the coming session of Parliament. In an attempt to halt the meetings of Parliament-men and to prevent public debates about government policy, the King issued a proclamation on May 2, 1674 which prohibited the publishing of false reports or news and malicious speeches about the gov-

25C.S.P. Ven., 1673-5, pp. 243, 253, 279. The Duke of York was also promised consideration for his interests if he abandoned the French interests at the Court (Ruvigny to Pomponne, February 1/11, 1674/5, cited in Campana de Cavelli, I, p. 148).

26Haley, Shaftesbury, p. 364; C.S.P. Ven., 1673-5, p. 253.

27Haley, Ibid., pp. 368-369. For the various conflicting opinions on the mission of Mordaunt, see Essex Papers, I, 286, 289, and C.S.P. Ven., 1673-5, pp. 348-349.
ernment or affairs of state. There were also efforts to discover the names of members of Parliament who were taking bribes from or consorting with the Dutch ambassador, but very little was accomplished. In January of 1675 the French ambassador offered Charles II 100,000 livres either to dissolve Parliament or to prorogue it for a year, but Danby persuaded the King that more money could be obtained from Parliament. The French ambassador then turned to a policy of bribing members of Parliament, while Charles II and Danby used the same methods to build up the Court party in the House of Commons. The Treasurer believed that the King could win the favor of Parliament through a policy of strict enforcement of the laws against Catholics and Dissenters. Since the House of Commons was largely devoted to the Anglican Church, such a policy might win its support; accordingly, there were new proclamations against Catholics and Dissenters as well as an order for the stricter enforcement of the penal laws. Danby and the other ministers also began a vigorous campaign to win support for the Court through other means. Numerous letters were written to members of both Houses asking that they either attend the forthcoming session or allow

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28 C.S.P. Ven., 1673-5, p. 257. The proclamation can be found in C.S.P. Dom., 1673-5, p. 238.


30 Ruvigny to Louis XIV, January 17/27, 1674/5, P.R.O. 31/3, 132, fos. 9-10; Ruvigny to Louis XIV, Jan. 28/February 7 and February 8/18, 1674/5, cited in Mignet, Succession D'Espagne, IV, 332.

31 C.S.P. Ven., 1673-5, pp. 354, 357; C.S.P. Dom., 1673-5, pp. 548-551; Browning, Danby, I, 146-149.
the Court to use their proxy. The Treasurer also sought support for the government by using his control of finances as a means of buying votes and insuring loyalty. While the French, Dutch, and Spanish ambassadors distributed bribes widely, Danby sought to build up a small nucleus of Court supporters upon whom he could count. Both the Court and the Opposition had made their preparations for the forthcoming session, so Secretary Coventry could truthfully write to the Earl of Essex that "the critical time is now coming to show us what the complexion of our affairs is." Danby and the Court could hope for the best, since the nation was at peace and the King had shown his sincerity in securing the Protestant religion. But there would be problems, once again, with those "forward and unhappy" men who were dissatisfied with the King and his government and were prepared to launch new attacks on the prerogative.

The session of Parliament which began in April of 1675 proved to be one in which domestic issues dominated. Charles II opened the session with a speech in which he first assured the Houses of his zeal for

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32 Such letters of both Danby and Secretary Coventry can be found in Browning, Danby, II, 56 and B.M. Add. MSS. 25124, fos. 25-29. See also H.M.C., Hastings, II, 169 and Portland, II, 150.

33 Good accounts of Danby's organization can be found in Andrew Browning, "Parties And Party Organizations In The Reign Of Charles II," Transactions Of The Royal Historical Society, XXX (1948), 21-36 and E.S. de Beer, "Members Of The Court Party In The House Of Commons," Bulletin Of The Institute of Historical Research, XI (1933-1934), 1-23. Lists of the Excise Pensioners and members of Parliament on Danby's payroll can be found in Browning, Danby, III, 44-151.

34 Coventry to Essex, February 15, 1674/5, Essex Papers, I, 302; Williamson to Sir William Temple, April 16, 1675, S.P. 104, 66, f. 60.
maintaining the Protestant religion and then asked for money for the fleet. The Opposition responded with another address for the removal of the Duke of Lauderdale and on April 27 brought in articles of impeachment against Danby. Once again the tactic of attacking the King's ministers was being employed by the Opposition, but Charles refused to heed the address on Lauderdale and the impeachment of Danby did not succeed. The Treasurer had many supporters in the House of Commons and all the articles for his impeachment were rejected by May 3. The fact that Arlington had lent his support to the effort displeased Charles II and eventually caused the Earl to fall into disgrace. There were vigorous debates in the House of Commons on such issues as the Habeas Corpus Act, a bill to prevent placemen from sitting in Parliament, and the non-resisting act proposed by Danby. By this measure the Treasurer hoped to remove many members of the Opposition from Parliament by requiring an oath of loyalty to the King and the Anglican Church. This bill met with the greatest opposition in the House of Lords, where Shaftesbury and Buckingham led the fight to prevent its passage. Parliament became so involved

35 The address against Lauderdale was passed on April 14 and presented to the King on April 26 (C.J., IX, 360). William Russell proposed the impeachment of Danby and members of the Opposition such as Henry Powle, Sir Thomas Littleton, and Sir Thomas Meres supported it. (Essex Papers, I, 319)

36 Browning, Danby, I, 155-160. The articles of impeachment charged that Danby had overstepped his authority as Treasurer and had interfered too much with Irish affairs (Grey, Debates, III, 49-50). For Arlington's role in this affair see Barbour, Arlington, pp. 250-251 and Essex Papers, I, 319.

37 Haley, Shaftesbury, pp. 374-380. The bill never left the House of Lords before Parliament was prorogued again.
in such domestic issues that there was no discussion of money for the 38
King or the Fleet, but as late as June 1, Danby was still hopeful of
some good results from the session.

The only question of foreign policy which the Opposition raised
in this session was the issue of English troops in the service of
France. Although the King had issued proclamations against the levy-
ing of troops for foreign powers, he continued to allow the King of
France to recruit troops in Scotland and Ireland, and he did not re-
call the English troops he had committed to French service during the
war. There had been numerous complaints about this practice before
Parliament met and Sir Thomas Littleton had brought up the question
in the House of Commons on April 19. Although many members of the
Opposition advocated only the recall of the troops serving France,
members such as Lord Cavendish, began to argue that the King should
give up the interests of France and declare himself against that
country:

Sir Thomas Littleton: Moves in the behalf of
kingdom, and the whole Christian world,
France excepted, for recalling the English

38 Danby to the Earl of Essex, June 1, 1675, B.M. Stowe MSS. 208,
f. 5.

39 In regard to the French levies in Ireland see Essex Papers, I,
304, 313, 323. This is a series of letters between the Earl of Essex
and Lord Ranelagh concerning the recruiting of troops for service in
France. The King was concerned to keep the matter secret, but the news
leaked out and there were many complaints from both Parliament men and
the Confederate ambassadors.

40 Grey, Debates, III, 3-9.
forces in that King's service; that the French may be no farther encouraged to
ruin us, and the rest of their neighbors. . . . In the Palatinate business Spain then
stood in the room of France, . . . ready to swallow up the world. Addresses were
denied, till he, . . . saw his error, and redressed it. . . .

Lord Cavendish: The danger of Flanders falling into the French hands, is what he most apprehends. . . . 'Tis our interest to support the Protestant interest, which France totally destroys. . . .

Sir Thomas Meres: . . . This address to the King for recalling these men out of France concerns the very being of England, . . . 'Tis the King's glory to defend the Protestant religion, must not support the French interest, . . . 'Twas always the opinion of our ancestors to keep the balance equal betwixt France and Spain. . . .

Colonel Strangeways: . . . The scale is now turned from former times. France is grown more powerful than Spain. If the French should take Antwerp, and be masters of the Scheldt, they will be formidable. . . .

The number of the English troops in the service of France was estimated at about 8,000 men by Sir Thomas Littleton, a number which the supporters of the Court termed too high. The Opposition won the day when it was resolved to address the King to recall all of his subjects in the service of France. On May 8 Charles II replied to the address by saying that he would not recall any English troops sent to France before the signing of the Treaty of Westminster. He did promise to renew his proclamation.

\[^{41}C.J., IX, 319, 321. The address was presented to the King by a delegation of two hundred members on April 21.\]
against any new levies. The answer of the King provoked a furious
debate in the House of Commons on May 10 and 11, during which the
Opposition once again attacked the King's partiality to the interests
of France and claimed some role in the shaping of foreign policy.

Sir Thomas Littleton: ... The number of
English forces there is now great; 8000
men at least. ... Great numbers going into
France is no breach of the treaty; but into
Holland, is a breach. ... 

Mr. Garraway: ... If we open the matter of
fact, see how we contribute to France's
greatness. The King's honor, crown, and
dignity are concerned in it. If the Low
Countries and Flanders should be conquered,
knows not what our condition will be. ... 

Colonel Birch: ... He agrees that war and
peace are in the King's hand; but he thinks
that in this business of the peace with
Holland, the King asked the advice of this
House. ... 

Sir Thomas Meres: To answer the objection of
law—in the case of the Palatinate you will
find a message of this nature, and lately
in the Duke's marriage with Modena, a sec­
dond address. He thinks we have a right to
petition pro bono publico. ... 

Mr. Sacheverell: ... 'Tis not for the
interest of the people to aggrandize
France, but to pull her down. ... 

Mr. Powle: ... 'Tis now clearly seen
whither France drives and tends. ...

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42 Grey, Debates, III, 115-116. To the King it was a question of
avoiding "derogation to his honor and dignity."

43 Grey, Debates, III, 116-139. It is interesting to note that
Sir William Coventry made only one short speech in these debates while
William Russell said nothing on the subject.
The case is clearly this: whether we shall give assistance to France, or no. He thinks the case rather runs to resistance. France preponderates, and therefore 'tis not our interest to add any more grains to the scales.

These debates aroused so much passion on both sides that the deadlock of a vote on whether to present another address to the King caused angry scenes in which insults were passed and swords were drawn. Another vote on whether to omit the word "all," as it applied to the English troops, produced a narrow victory of 173 for omission and 172 against. This was a small victory for the Court, but the issue had aroused bitter passions which some feared would endanger the session. The Opposition had once again attacked the King's foreign policy; some of its members had even called upon England to prevent the growth of French power on the Continent. There was no widespread sentiment for war with France at this time, however, and Parliament now turned away from foreign affairs to an issue which would soon wreck its deliberations.

The great dispute with which Parliament became involved concerned the appeal to the House of Lords of a case in which a member of the House of Commons was the defendant. Both Houses soon became embroiled in the defense of their privileges and the assertions of their jurisdiction. The matter was first taken up on May 5 and during the next

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44C.J., IX, 333-335; Essex Papers (1675-1677), pp. 9, 11; Margo- liouth, Poems And Letters Of Marvell, 150. The issue was not completely dead, because a new address for the recall of English troops serving France was read on May 21, with the Speaker casting the decisive vote (C.J., IX, 343; Grey, Debates, III, 184).
month little in the way of business was accomplished. It was suspected by many, including the King, that Shaftesbury and his followers were responsible for building up the passions of Parliament in this matter in the hopes of wrecking the session, preventing a grant of money, and perhaps compelling the King to a dissolution. By June it was apparent to Charles II and Danby that no money would be obtained in such an atmosphere and on June 9 the King prorogued the Houses until October 13, 1675. In his speech dismissing Parliament, Charles complained of the "ill designs of our enemies." 

The summer of 1675 was marked by preparations for the next session of Parliament. The Court, the Opposition, the French ambassador, and the Dutch and Spanish ministers were all active. Danby, who was anxious for Parliament to meet again, told the King that failure to meet it would result in the loss of 250,000 pounds, and he spent the summer organizing his party of excise pensioners. There were also attempts

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45 This case is known to constitutional historians as Shirley v. Fagg and is well explained in Ogg, Charles II, 470-471. For the role of Shaftesbury in this dispute see Essex Papers (1675-1677), p. 27; C.S.P. Ven., 1673-5, p. 416; Haley, Shaftesbury, 382-384; and Burnet, My Own Time, II, 85.


47 Essex Papers (1675-1677), p. 33; Browning, Danby, I, 163-171. By the time Parliament met in October Danby had created a payroll of over thirty members of Parliament. There were also more letter-writing campaigns aimed at assuring the attendance of Court supporters or, if they were peers, at securing their proxy (C.S.P. Dom., 1675-6, pp. 341, 343, 346).
to win the favor of the Opposition by such acts as a new proclamation against English troops serving foreign countries, and it was thought that Shaftesbury would soon come back into favor at the Court. However, in June after Shaftesbury's attempts to reconcile the Duke of York with the Opposition failed, the King ordered the Earl to stay away from the Court. Shaftesbury then retired for the summer to his country estate and corresponded with colleagues in London. Besides various meetings during the summer, some members of the Opposition also engaged in conversations with the Duke of York and the French ambassador. Their aim was to reach some sort of accommodation with the Court, an accommodation which would involve a grant of money in return for the securing of religion and property. In early October several members of "the Presbyterian party" offered, through Ruvigny, a grant of one million pounds in return for the abandonment of Danby's Anglican policy and the granting of toleration to the Dissenters. Charles II insisted on having the money first and the negotiations broke down. The French ambassador hoped to win the support of some discontented

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48 C.S.P. Dom., 1675-6, p. 126; H.M.C., Laing, I, 403. The new proclamation recalled all the English troops who had gone over since the treaty of Westminster.

49 Essex Papers (1675-1677), p. 32; B.M. Add. MSS. 17677, QQQ; H.M.C., Laing, I, 403-404. For a discussion of Shaftesbury's dealings with the Duke of York and his activities in the summer, see Haley, Shaftesbury, 385-390.

50 B.M. Egerton MSS. 3330 (unfoliated); Ruvigny to Louis XIV, October 14/24 and 21/31, 1675, cited in Mignet, Succession D'Espagne, IV, 371; P.R.O. 31/3, 132, f. 39.
Parliament men for a dissolution, but he was also ready to offer Charles II a large subsidy in return for a dissolution or long prorogation. In August Ruvigny was approached by the Duke of York concerning a subsidy of 300,000 livres in return for a prorogation until April of 1676. The ambassador finally persuaded Charles II to accept 100,000 pounds a year in return for a dissolution, if Parliament proved hostile to France in the autumn. The Dutch and Spanish ambassadors were also busy in the summer of 1675, as they attempted to build up a party of Opposition members committed to bringing England into the war against France. The proceedings of Parliament were now a great matter of concern to the enemies of France, who believed that England could turn the scales in the war on the continent. The Confederate ministers often spent so much time with Parliament men that Secretary Coventry was moved to comment that "it seems the Spanish Ambassador is to come to wait on the Parliament, not the King." Ruvigny was often matched in his bribery of members by the Spanish and Dutch ambassadors, who also kept Parliament informed of the progress of the war. Throughout the spring session and the summer of 1675, both men were conferring with members of Parliament, bestowing bribes, and stirring up hostility to France.

51 Ruvigny to Louis XIV, August 9/19, 1675, P.R.O. 31/3, 132, f. 41.
52 Secretary Coventry to Secretary Williamson, March 17, 1675, C.S.P. Dom., 1675-6, p. 25. The Dutch were represented by Conrad van Beunningen and the Spanish by Don Pedro de Ronquillo.
53 C.S.P. Ven., 1673-5, pp. 385, 410, 427; S.P. 94, 63, fos. 156-158, 178. Public hostility to France was evidenced by disorders in London caused by the harassing of French weavers (Thompson, Hatton Correspondence, I, 120).
When the two Houses of Parliament reassembled on October 13, they were greeted by another speech from Charles II, in which he requested money to settle his debts and to build new ships for the Fleet and in which he promised to secure the Protestant religion. A most unusual part of his speech concerned an admission of failure to husband his resources and a promise to change that policy in the future. The House of Commons adjourned its debate on the King's speech to October 18, when it was decided to consider separately the requests for a supply and the settlement of religion. When the House considered Charles II's request for money to remove the anticipations of the revenue, members attacked the government for having caused those debts by waging a war that Parliament was not advised about:

Sir Thomas Meres: . . . At Christmas 1671, such desperate councils followed giving money, . . . and a war without advice of Parliament, and the Triple League broken, and a league with France made; and if you give no more money, you will have no more desperate councils; . . .

Colonel Birch: . . . Could never have believed to have heard that these anticipations have risen from a war, which this House had no opinion of. Not only without the consent of the House begun at first, . . . We are now not only out of the Triple League, but out of all league. In one session, thanks

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54 C.J., IX, 357-358. David Ogg believes this was an "extraordinary admission" on the part of Charles II (Ogg, Charles II, p. 534).

55 Grey, Debates, III, 301-311. According to Andrew Browning (Danby, I, 174), the government was living ahead of its revenues by about 1,000,000 pounds.
were given to the King for this league; and, in another, we were to give money for the breaking it. . . .

On October 19 the House of Commons voted 172-165 against the granting of an aid to remove the anticipations on the revenue, and then began to consider other matters. Once again domestic concerns dominated the proceedings of both Houses. On October 18 and 21 the House considered a bill to appropriate the Customs revenue for three years to the Navy, and the government found it hard to convince the House that there was a need for new ships. Then on October 21 the Court defeated by only eleven votes a bill which would have lodged any supply that was granted in the Chamber of London, rather than in the Exchequer. Despite the attempts of the Opposition to supervise the expenditure of money for the Navy, a resolution was finally approved on November 4 to grant 300,000 pounds for the building and equipping of twenty new ships. Danby had hoped for a larger grant, but the House defeated all his efforts to raise the amount granted. Eventually he got nothing. 57

The only issue of foreign policy to be considered in this session of Parliament involved the issue which had been attacked so vigorously in May: the English troops in the service of France. Despite his last

56Ibid., p. 311. This vote was taken while the House was in Grand Committee. Danby's efforts to secure a larger grant met with resistance and on November 11 the House of Commons voted 151-124 to annex the money bill to the bill appropriating the Customs for the Navy. The Court could hardly accept this and so the subsidy was lost (Grey, Debates, III, 459; Browning, Danby, I, 180).

57C.J., IX, 359, 361, 364-365; Grey, Debates, III, 411. The question of whether to put any money granted in the Chamber of London was defeated by a vote of 171-160.
proclamation on the subject in May, Charles II had not changed his policy of allowing France to recruit troops in both Scotland and Ireland. On October 23 the question was brought up in the House of Commons and the Opposition once again attacked the practice and spoke of the growing power of France:

Mr. Powle: . . . When he has over run Holland and Germany, he may recoil back and over run us. . . . We made an Address to the King the last session, and had a gracious answer, and a proclamation, but not the effect answered. Many are gone since into the French service, . . .

Sir Thomas Clarges: Letters from all parts beyond sea tell us that the King of France sends for levies into all the King's dominions, . . . Nothing visibly can sooner destroy us. They have a printed prophecy that the King of France shall be King of England. . . . It goes current, that England promotes these French counsels, . . .

Sir William Coventry: . . . 'Tis the worst employment the King's subjects can have, that next to rebellion against their own Prince; to be put to spend their lives in the French service. . . .

Sir John Hanmer: If you withdraw these forces from France, you give the French encourage ment to make peace. Having these men there, you keep up the balance.

Very few of the Court party spoke up in opposition to these attacks. Accordingly, it was resolved "that all the forces that are, or shall be, in the service of the French King, contrary to his Majesty's late Proclamation, shall be taken to be contemners of his Majesty's Royal

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Authority, and opposers of the interest of their Country." In addition, a bill was prepared and committed on November 17 which imposed heavy penalties on those who continued in the French King's service. The Opposition had once again attacked the King's foreign policy; however, the debates over the English troops did not lead to further consideration of foreign affairs. Members of the House had expressed fears of the growing power of France, but as yet there was no general demand that England join the Confederates against France. Even though the old issue of Shirley v. Fagg was brought up again, the House of Lords was the scene of attacks on the government's foreign policy. Before Shirley v. Fagg developed into a major quarrel, the Earl of Shaftesbury made a speech on October 20 attacking the growth of French power:

... We owe the peace of these last two years, and the disengagements from the French interest, to the two Houses differing from the sense and opinion of Whitehall. So, at this time, the thing in the world this nation has most reason to apprehend is a general peace, which cannot now happen without very advantageous terms to French, and disadvantages to the House of Austria.

We are the King's great counsellors; and if so, have a right to differ, and give contrary counsels to those few that are nearest about him... I heartily wish nothing from you may

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59 Ibid., p. 336; C.J., IX, 378. The House of Commons also petitioned the King on November 10 to renew his proclamation (C.J., IX, 372).

60 Printed in W.D. Christie, A Life of Anthony Ashley Cooper, First Earl of Shaftesbury, II (London: 1871), Appendix VI. The speech was actually made on a motion concerning the case of Shirley v. Fagg.
add weight and reputation to those counsels that would assist the French. No money or ships, nor preparations you can make, nor personal assurances our prince can have, can secure us from the French if they are at leisure.

After this speech the House of Lords became so involved with the Commons in a dispute over Shirley v. Fagg that Shaftesbury and his friends began to press for a dissolution to prevent further deadlocks. This was the beginning of a long campaign for dissolution, by men who were both weary of frequent prorogations and believed that a new Parliament might be more free of Court influence. On November 20 the Lords debated all day on a motion to petition the King for a dissolution, but Danby eventually rallied enough support to defeat the motion by a vote of 50-48. This pressure for a dissolution prompted Charles II to decide on another prorogation. The Commons had given him no money and many of the Lords had begun to oppose the government, so he thought it best to end the session and rely on the French subsidies. On November 22 Charles II prorogued Parliament to February 15, 1677.

The two sessions of 1675 witnessed another step in the process by which Parliament asserted its role in the shaping of foreign policy. The House of Commons twice addressed the King concerning the English troops in the service of France. Charles II was forced to yield in part to these addresses; he recalled all those troops that had gone into French service.

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61 Haley, Shaftesbury, pp. 398-402.

62 C.J., IX, 382.
since the Treaty of Westminster. Although he continued to allow French
levies in Scotland and Ireland, some of the units in France began to
return. The pressure of Parliament was responsible for this change
in policy. It had exercised both its power of petition and its control
of the purse to effect that change. Charles II had been forced by Par-
liament to give up the French alliance in 1674 and now his continued
friendship with France was attacked. The Opposition had not yet begun
to press the King for a declaration of war against France, but the
foundations had been laid for such a move. The members of Parliament
would greatly resent the fifteen months prorogation, but this long
interval between sessions would play a large role in changing the Op-
position’s opinion about foreign affairs. In those months the progress
of the war would make dramatically clear to Englishmen the growing power
of France, and that growth would result in a drastic shift of opinion
towards war with France.

63 For notices concerning the return of troops in compliance with
the proclamation, see C.S.P. Dom., 1675-6, pp. 433, 479.
CHAPTER IV

THE FIFTEEN MONTHS PROROGATION, NOVEMBER 1675- FEBRUARY 1677

Charles II’s announcement of such a long prorogation shocked Englishmen and caused many to fear that this was only a preliminary step before a proclamation of dissolution. There was such great unhappiness and resentment at this action that libellous pamphlets were placed on the statue of Charles I at Charing Cross and a savage poem attacking the King was circulated in the coffee-houses. Indeed, the first few months after the prorogation witnessed such an outpouring of scandalous pamphlets and poems and public agitation that the King feared for his safety and took a guard with him on his walks in the parks. There was so much malicious gossiping and discussion of new pamphlets in the coffee-houses that Charles II decided to close down these institutions. On December 29, 1675 a royal proclamation ordered the suppression, by January 10, of all public coffee-houses. They were to be closed because they occasioned "the spreading of false reports to the defamation of the Government and the disturbance of peace of the realm." Although Parliament had been prorogued for such a

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1 H.M.C., Kenyon, p. 101; H.M.C., Hastings, II, 169. The poetical attack on the King, which was entitled "The Royal Buss," blamed the long prorogation on the influence of Charles II’s French mistress, the Duchess of Portsmouth (George deF. Lord, Poems on Affairs of State, I, 263-265).

long period, many members of Parliament remained in London and regularly met together to discuss politics. Many members of the House of Commons were meeting with the Earl of Shaftesbury, so the King decided, if he could, to put an end to their talks. On February 15, 1675 Secretary Williamson warned Shaftesbury to leave the city. The Earl refused to heed this warning and denied any meetings with discontented elements, but on the very next day such Opposition men as Sir Thomas Littleton and Sir Samuel Barnardiston visited him.\(^3\) Danby urged the King to send Shaftesbury to the Tower, but Charles demurred for fear of antagonizing public opinion. The Earl remained in London for most of 1675 and soon purchased a house on Aldersgate Street, a house which became a popular meeting place for opponents of the government. The Duke of Buckingham had already moved into the area, so a center of political activity was beginning to appear in the City.\(^4\)

In addition to facing intrigue and malicious gossip the government had to face another pressing problem. Parliament had granted no money in 1675, and the Customs revenue began to decline, so Danby had to consider once again policies of retrenchment and reduction of expenditures. Charles II, however, was anxious to secure money from another source: the King of France. In early 1676 it appeared that Louis XIV might withhold his promised subsidy of 100,000 pounds because Charles

\(^3\) Ven. Trans. (Unc.), 1676-1678, Sarotti to the Doge, Dec. 31/January 10, 1675/6; C.S.P. Dom., 1675-6, 559-563; Haley, Shaftesbury, 404-405.

\(^4\) B.M. Add. MSS. 29555, f. 309.
had only prorogued Parliament and not dissolved it. As early as December of 1675 the French ambassador was approached about the payment of the subsidy, but he was unwilling to pay the price of a dissolution for a prorogation. Soon, however, he became aware of the attempts of Danby to persuade Charles to do without French money. At once he advised Louis XIV to pay the entire amount on January 9, 1676. At the same time he informed Louis that Charles II wanted to sign another treaty with France providing for reciprocal assurances that neither monarch would assist the enemies of the other. In seeking such a personal "gentlemen's agreement," Charles was opposed by Danby and Lauderdale; eventually he had to write and sign the treaty by himself. The treaty was given to Ruvigny on February 16 for delivery to the King of France. Both Kings bound themselves to give no aid to the enemies or rebels of the other, and to make no treaties without the other's participation. It would appear that by this step Charles II was committing himself once again to a policy of close friendship with France. Despite his proclamation against English troops serving France and despite the protests of the Spanish and Dutch ambassadors against this practice, the French were still allowed to levy

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5 Ruvigny to Louis XIV, December 30/January 9, 1675/6, P.R.O. 31/3, 132, fos. 49-50. The subsidy was paid to Charles II in quarterly installments throughout the year.

6 P.R.O. 31/3, 132, f. 54; Browning, Danby, I, 190-191. The complete text of the treaty can be found in Mignet, Succession D'Espagne, IV, 382-384.
troops in Scotland and Ireland. Charles II was undoubtedly concerned to insure himself of continued French subsidies and thus signed the new treaty to secure the friendship of France. Danby repeatedly argued that the King could only get money from Parliament by following a Protestant foreign policy, but Charles preferred to rely upon France as a more certain quantity. He certainly had no intention of re-entering the war on the side of France; however, the signing of such a treaty was hardly in keeping with his declared role as an impartial mediator.

1676 was a year in which no substantial negotiations for peace took place. Although Nimègue had been agreed upon as a site for the peace congress, and the fall of 1675 set for its beginning, there were considerable delays in beginning the talks. In December the English representatives to the congress were named: Lord Berkeley, Sir Leoline Jenkins, and Sir William Temple. Jenkins and Berkeley received their instructions and left for Nimègue on December 20, but Temple's duties as English ambassador in the Hague detained him there until the summer. There were problems to be resolved about the granting of passports and the establishment of a neutral zone around Nimègue. Sweden did not announce its formal acceptance of English mediation until early in 1676, and the ambassadors for Spain and the Emperor did not arrive until late in the year. Temple had joined his colleagues and the French and Dutch

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8 For the French expectations regarding the mediation of England, see the letter of the Venetian ambassador in Paris, Ascanio Giustinian, on January 12/22, 1675/6, Ven. Trans. (Unc.), 1676-1678.
9 S.P. 104, 66, fos. 85-87; B.M. Add. MSS. 28953, f. 16; Temple, Works, I, 245, 258.
ministers in July of 1676, but with all the delays and with all the attention said to protocol, it was not until March of 1677 that serious discussions began to take place. Thus there were no real hopes for peace in 1676. In a letter of September 22/October 2, 1676, Sir William Temple informed the Earl of Essex of the delays in meeting caused by the Emperor and gave him his assessment of the prospects for peace:

France seems extremely to desire the peace but does not think themselves in condition to buy it dear by any considerable cessions of what they have conquered.

The Estates are extremely earnest for it, and find nothing in their way but the honor of their treaties and interest of having a good frontier left in Flanders.

Sweden is more passionate for it than both as finding no appearance of being restored to any of their late losses but by Treaty.

Spain thinks it their interest to continue the war unless the County of Burgundy and five or six towns may be restored them in France, . . .

The Emperor, Denmark, Brandenburg, and three Dukes of Luneburg are all violent at bottom for continuing the war till the Swedes be wholly beaten out of Germany, and the French out of Lorraine, Alsace, and the three bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun.

France and Sweden will, if a general peace cannot be composed, urge all arts to gain a

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10 S.P. 104, 179, fos. 1-2; S.P. 104, 52, f. 15; Temple, Ibid., I, 244-253; Louis André, Louis XIV Et L'Europe, p. 180.

Thus the chief English mediator saw little hope for a general peace until the campaign of 1677 had been waged. Spain and the Emperor were anxious to carry on the fight rather than to make major concessions or a separate peace. 1676 was a year of continued war in Europe, as would be 1677, and it was to the progress of this war Englishmen now turned their attention.

After its early successes in the Dutch War, the French Army had largely been kept in check. In 1676, however, the French were in the field early; by May 1 they had already captured the fortresses of Condé and Bouchain in the Spanish Netherlands and had relieved Maestricht. In the Mediterranean a French fleet had defeated the Dutch admiral de Ruyter off the coast of Sicily, a defeat which enabled France to occupy the town of Messina. These were ominous developments in the eyes of Englishmen, who were coming to believe that France meant to dominate Europe and subjugate England. Members of Parliament had consistently expressed fear of the growing power of France and had urged Charles II to prevent French domination of Europe. In October of 1673 Sir William Coventry expressed the opinion that "the interest of the King of England is to keep France from being too great on the Continent, . . ."\(^{12}\) This opinion was also shared by such members of the Opposition as William Garraway and Sir Thomas Littleton, who spoke out against French expansion in 1675.\(^{13}\)

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\(^{12}\) Grey, Debates, II, 213.

\(^{13}\) Ibid., III, 117, 124.
Coventry spoke out again in that year, saying that the basic principle of English policy should be "that no predominant power be a terror to the rest, . . .".¹⁴ Now, in 1676, with Flanders on the verge of collapse and Sicily in French hands, it appeared that French expansion might not be stopped by the Confederates. Englishmen were alarmed at this prospect.¹⁵ In the minds of most Englishmen, French control of Flanders and Sicily meant a disaster for English trade, and this was one motive which led the Opposition to speak out against France. In April of 1675 Sir Thomas Meres spoke of the danger to trade should France be allowed to take Flanders; he was supported by Colonel Giles Strangeways. It was also feared that France, once having conquered Europe, would turn on England. In June of 1676 there were rumors along the English coast that French agents were burning all the chief seaports or cities of the nation.¹⁷

French victories in 1676 and the apprehensions they aroused, contributed to the growing hatred and fear of France in England. Trade rivalries played an important role in these fears for England had an unfavorable balance of trade with France and many English ships, carrying

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¹⁴Ibid., III, 125.

¹⁵The Earl of Anglesey to the Earl of Essex, December 9, 1676, Essex Papers (1675-1677), p. 84 ("The French proceed with unexpected success in Sicily which alarms England much, . . .").

¹⁶Grey, Debates, III, 5, 7.

¹⁷C.S.P. Dom., 1676-7, pp. 142-143, 185.
contraband to Holland, were seized by France. There was much agita-
tion against the French trading community in London and a growing demand
for a commercial treaty with France. The English dread of "Popery"
was commonly associated with France, and members of Parliament often
referred to France as the champion of Popery. The Court's partiality
for France and leanings toward the Catholic Church had always been
suspected. Many Englishmen believed that the purpose of the French
alliance was to introduce the Catholic religion into England. The
influence of France in securing the marriage of the Duke of York was
greatly resented, and English partiality to France was equated with
supporting the "Popish" interests. England's Appeal had, as one of
arguments, the assertion that England was fighting against the interests
of Protestantism in allying with France. Sir Thomas Meres argued that
"whoever will support the Protestant religion must not support the French
interest, ..." The Duke of York, because he was a secret Catholic,
was regarded as the great supporter of France and of Catholics at Court.
In 1676 James publicly announced his conversion to Catholicism and said
"he would never more come under the roof of Whitehall Chapel, ...".

18 Ogg, Charles II, 538-539; Ven. Trans. (Unc.), 1676-1678, Saroti
to the Doge, July 28/August 7, 1676; C.S.P. Dom., 1676-7, pp. 18-19.
Good accounts of the relationship of trade disputes and public hostility
to France can be found in D.G.E. Hall, "Anglo-French Trade Relations
Under Charles II," History, VII (April, 1922), 17-30 and Margaret
Priestly, "London Merchants And Opposition Politics In Charles II's
Reign," Bulletin Of The Institute of Historical Research, XXIX (November,
1956), 205-219.

19 Grey, Debates, III, 5.

20 H.M.C., Seventh Report, Appendix, p. 467.
Public hostility to the King's brother increased as people were confronted with the prospect of the eventual succession of a pro-French Catholic King.

All of these factors combined in 1676 to produce a gradual shift of opinion in regard to foreign affairs. Before 1676 the Opposition had been hostile to France and there were men who believed England should join the Confederates against France. Public hostility to France was based on trade rivalries and a fear of "Popery," but there were no demands for war with France. The progress of the French army in Flanders during 1676 was the catalyst which aroused the fears of Englishmen and produced a shift of opinion towards war with France. The Opposition had attacked Charles II's foreign policy before 1676, because it failed to pursue the true interests of England. Yet it was not until 1677 that most men came to believe that the true interest of England lay in an alliance with the Confederates, for the preservation of Flanders. In early 1677 an anonymous pamphlet was published which bore the title "A Representation of the present affairs and interests of the most considerable parts of Europe, more especially of those of the Netherlands, as they now stand in the beginning of the year 1677, laid open in a letter from Holland by a lover of truth and peace." This pamphlet declared that only the King of England could check the expansion of France and save the Netherlands. That this was the opinion of most Englishmen can be seen in the fact that the question of Flanders occupied

the chief part of Parliament's attention during the 1677 session. Sir William Temple saw clearly how Parliament had proceeded from the breaking of the French alliance to the consideration of the growth of French power:

The Parliament in England, though much pleased with the last peace of Holland, yet were not so with his Majesty's desires of a general one. They thought the power of France too great since their last conquests in Flanders: and their ambition too declared, of achieving it by one means, and at one time or other. They were suspicious of the Court's favoring too much the French designs, by pursuing a peace that would break so mighty a confederacy as was now united against France. . . .

Thus the seeds of discontents, that had been sown in the Parliament under the counsels of the cabal, began to spring fast, and root deep, after their power and influence was wholly at an end; . . . But whatever began or increased them, it is certain these agitations in England had great effect upon those of the war and peace abroad: for the confederates were so confident, that the humour of the Parliament and people would at last engage the King in their quarrel, which they knew would force France to such a peace as they desired: and Spain was so presuming that England would not suffer the loss of Flanders, that they grew careless of its defense. . . .

This assessment of Parliament's opinion of foreign affairs was written by Temple at the beginning of 1676. News of French victories throughout the year must have exacerbated the situation.

To speak of a gradual shift in opinion among the English people presupposes that they were receiving a great amount of news about the war in Europe. While it is impossible to determine all the sources of information,

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22 Temple, Works, I, 229-231.
available to the people of England, there were several important ways by which news of the war reached England. The London Gazette was available to everyone, though according to William Garraway, there was not much news contained in its pages. In May of 1675, in the debate over English troops in French service, Garraway complained that "all we have told us is but a pennyworth of news in the Gazette every week." He went on to say, however, that "sometimes we know things that they do not tell us." This is an interesting comment because it reveals that members of the Opposition may have had some secret sources of information. The Spanish and Dutch ambassadors certainly kept Parliament informed of the progress of the war, and there were always informants within the government who would talk for a price. The coffee-houses, before their suppression, were also useful sources of information; though news received there may often have been fabricated.

Parliament was not in session in 1676, but the Opposition was still well informed of what was happening in Europe. There may have been several sources of information available in this year. Aside from the contacts many members had with the Confederate ministers, there was always information to be had from merchants and sailors who had returned from Europe. The few English troops returning from the service of France could certainly give first-hand reports of the war. English ambassadors such as Sir William Temple and Sir William Godolphin often wrote people outside the government, such as the Earl of Essex and

23 Grey, Debates, III, 122.
the Earl of Arlington. One of the greatest leaders of the Opposition, the Earl of Shaftesbury, could learn about news in France from his friend John Locke.  

No doubt the foreign intelligence received by the government was substantial for it could rely upon ambassadors, spies, special agents, and other officials for news. Secretary of State Sir Joseph Williamson always received a constant flow of news-letters from everywhere in Europe, news letters which dealt with such subjects as the movement of armies, politics, and public opinion. In addition, the ambassadors in each country were asked by Williamson for information on the economy, religion, society, and constitution of the countries in which they were serving. The ambassadors themselves had expense accounts to provide for their own spies and for other sources of information. All of this information was undoubtedly valuable to the government of Charles II, but it is possible that much of it also passed through the hands of the Opposition. If the French ambassador can be believed, the two Secretaries of State, Coventry and Williamson, were enemies of France, so they certainly could give out information. Then, too, Secretary Coventry was the brother of the Opposition leader Sir William Coventry, and Secretary Williamson was still very close to

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24 Haley, Shaftesbury, p. 408.

25 Several volumes of news-letters from areas such as France, Holland, Flanders, and Spain can be found in S.P. 104, 4-6, 19, 33-35, 57-61, 91-92. The Secretary's requests of information from the ambassadors can be found in S.P. 104, 184-185. The ambassadors' expense accounts are in S.P. 104, 237.

26 Courtin to Louis XIV, September 21/October 1, 1676, P.R.O. 31/3, 134, f. 4.
his predecessor the Earl of Arlington. How much members of Parliament and the public truly knew about foreign affairs cannot be ascertained. However, Charles II once told the Spanish ambassador, Don Bernardo de Salinas, that public opinion would never allow him to sacrifice Flanders to France, and Secretary Coventry told the French ambassador that the state of public opinion demanded the conclusion of a trade treaty with France. The government certainly was aware of the growing hostility of the people towards France, and even the new French ambassador was instructed to be aware at all times of public opinion. Because of the growing hostility to France, the ambassador was also instructed to seek to persuade Charles to put off the next session of Parliament.

The King of France was not alone in wishing to prevent the present Parliament from meeting again. There was a growing sentiment in 1676 for a dissolution and new elections, and many members of the Opposition were involved in efforts to force a dissolution. Such sentiment dated back to the fall of 1675 when the deadlocks and arguments over Shirley v. Fagg made many men think a new Parliament would work better. The Earl of Shaftesbury firmly believed in the need for a new Parliament and published two pamphlets in late 1675 which expressed his feelings.  

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27 P.R.O. 31/3, 133, f. 41; Courtin to Louis XIV, September 4/14, 1676, P.R.O. 31/3, 133, f. 83.

28 Ruvigny was replaced in the spring of 1676 by Honore Courtin, whose instructions can be found in Jusserand, Recueil, Angleterre, pp. 169-197.

29 These pamphlets can be found in Parliamentary History, IV, Appendices VI and VII.
In June of 1676 the statements made by one Francis Jenks at the Guildhall in London caused much commotion. Jenks made a sensational speech at an election for sheriffs in which he denounced France and called for a new Parliament to deal with the growing power of France. He gave as his reason for demanding a new Parliament and the fact that statutes passed in the fourth and 36th years of Edward III's reign declared Parliament should be held every year. Since the present Parliament had been prorogued for fifteen months, it was ipso facto dissolved and should be replaced. Jenks was eventually called before the Privy Council to answer for his actions and to reveal who had prompted his speech. Although one contemporary observer believed that both Shaftesbury and Buckingham were behind the speech, Charles II blamed "Alderman George" (Buckingham) for the encouragement of Jenks. The movement for a new Parliament caught fire with the speech of Jenks, and Shaftesbury used this sentiment to plan a move in the next Parliament calling for a dissolution. Although many men saw a new Parliament as the best security for religion and property and as the best means to be free of Court corruption, they also sought a new Parliament because it could turn England's foreign policy towards hostility to France and an alliance with the Confederates. That this was in the minds of some who pressed

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30 Haley, Shaftesbury, p. 409, P.R.O. 31/3, 133, f. 11.

31 Thompson, Hatton Correspondence, I, 132 ("This business has been long contriving by the Duke of Buckingham and Lord Shaftesbury, . . ."); P.R.O. 31/3, 133, f. 32.
for a new Parliament can be seen in an anonymous pamphlet of 1676.

After summarizing all the precedents which supported the argument for a dissolution, the author included a story from the reign of Richard II concerning the demands of Parliament for a war with France. 32

The French ambassador made several offers of money to Charles II on condition that he dissolve or prorogue Parliament. But the King, upon Danby's promises of securing a supply in the next session, refused to accept another French subsidy and prepared to meet Parliament. Danby had told Charles that more than one hundred and fifty members of Parliament had been won to the royal cause during the prorogation, and the King believed that he could therefore obtain money in the next session. 33

In December the French ambassador found it necessary to request funds for dispersal among members of Parliament, in order to lessen their hostility to France. He reported that cabals were already beginning to form among Parliament men. 34 Members of Parliament did begin to return to London over a month before Parliament was to meet, in order to plot strategy, and there was talk of demanding a declaration against France. 35

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32 Printed in Grey, Debates, IV, 55-62.
33 Courtin to Louis XIV, June 12/22, 1676 and July 17/27, 1676, P.R.O. 31/3, 132, f. 124 and 133, f. 37. For Danby's efforts to win more support for the King see Browning, Danby, I, 191-193.
34 P.R.O. 31/3, 134, November 23/December 3, 1676, f. 64. Courtin had already been in contact with Denzil Holles (P.R.O. 31/3, 132, fos. 120-121 and 134, f. 57), but he regarded both Holles and Shaftesbury as the leaders of a group discontented with the government and hostile to France (P.R.O. 31/3, 134, f. 43).
was returning to London to meet in an atmosphere of suspicion, discontent, and fear. There was fear of the growth of French power in Europe, and there was fear of French plots at home. Both fears created an uneasy atmosphere. The demand for a new Parliament was matched with the growing protests against the Court's partiality of France. The stage was set for a great conflict between Crown and Parliament over the course of foreign affairs, and the result of this conflict was to be a parliamentary invasion of the royal prerogative. In 1674 Parliament had forced Charles II out of an unpopular war. Now in 1677 public opinion and parliamentary pressure were to advocate war, not against Holland, but against France, the hated champion of Popery and a threat to English security.

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36 For the fears of French plots to burn English cities, see C.S.P. Dom., 1676-7, pp. 173-174, 183-184, 186-187, 192. "I never saw the people in such fears as they are in; they keep guards in all places as in time of war." (Earl of Orrery to Essex, July 18, 1676, Essex Papers (1675-1677), p. 65).
CHAPTER V

RENEWED ATTACKS ON CROWN FOREIGN POLICY: 1677

Charles II greeted the reassembled Parliament on February 15, 1677 with a speech which urged the members to put aside their differences and to concern themselves with the securing of religion and property and the granting of a supply for the Fleet. The King took special pains to remind the Houses that the Excise grant was due to expire and should be renewed. The House of Commons adjourned without discussing the King's speech, but the House of Lords became the scene of a most unusual occurrence. After the King's speech had been heard, the Duke of Buckingham arose to move that the Parliament was not legally sitting and should be dissolved. This speech was part of Buckingham's and Shaftesbury's plan to secure a dissolution of Parliament, a plan that had been developing for months before February of 1677. Danby had known of this plan for a long time and was resolved to use it as a means of discrediting the Opposition to the Court. As soon as Buckingham sat down, the supporters of the Court moved to the attack and proposed that the Duke be called before the bar to answer for his statements. Shaftesbury and Salisbury

1C.J., IX, 382-383. The approaching expiration of the Excise was one factor which prompted the King to meet Parliament rather than accept the French subsidy.
and Wharton rose to the defense of Buckingham, but on the next day (February 16) it was decided to commit all four Lords to the Tower for failing to ask pardon of the House.\(^2\) It was a great victory for the Court to secure the removal of Shaftesbury and Buckingham from the House in which they were the heart of the Opposition. In the House of Commons Lord Cavendish and William Sacheverell brought up the question of a dissolution on February 15, but there was little support for such a proposal and no motion was made. The House of Commons then turned to other business.\(^3\) The effect of the quarrels over the legality of the Parliament was to reduce the strength of the Opposition for a short time, for many members were not in favor of a dissolution, not wishing to lose their seats. Charles II now had Shaftesbury and Buckingham in the Tower where they would be politically impotent, and there was no one else in the House of Lords really capable of leading the Opposition. The Court could now manage the House of Lords. It also seemed, with the Opposition in a temporary decline, that the lower House might be managed. Danby therefore set to work to secure a grant of money from the Commons.

On February 20 the House of Commons began to discuss the King's request for money to repair the Fleet. After amounts of both 600,000

\(^2\)Buckingham's speech can be found in *Parliamentary History*, IV, 815-823. For the story of Danby's response to the plans of Shaftesbury, see Browning, *Danby*, I, 214-217 and Maley, *Shaftesbury*, 417-419.

\(^3\)Grey, *Debates*, IV, 64-72. Such members of the Opposition as Meres and Powle refused to question the legality of this Parliament.
and 800,000 pounds were suggested as an ample grant, the House went into a Grand Committee to debate the measure. The members were truly concerned for the bad condition of the Fleet and the growing strength of the French navy, so Danby's only problem was to secure the greatest supply possible. Samuel Pepys was a strong supporter of the Court in these debates, which eventually resulted, on February 21, in the granting of the sum of 600,000 pounds for the building of thirty ships. That a growing fear of France prompted Parliament to be anxious about the condition of the Fleet is clear in the debates of February 20-21:\(^5\)

Sir Henry Capel: France's building these great number of ships is not for trade, but conquest. Would go therefore on, . . .

Sir George Downing: . . . This great fleet of France can intend no other neighbor than we. Now for him to build ships in the great occasion he has for land-armies, this must be against us. . . .

The debates on the proposed supply also gave members of the Opposition a chance to attack the King's foreign policy as being a cause of the increased power of France:

Mr. Powle: . . . Looking to alliances abroad is worth a hundred ships. 'Twas said formerly, "We could not look the Dutch in the face, without help of the French." He fears now, we cannot look France in the face without

\(^4\) Grey, Debates, IV, 130. The vote on the question of supply was 199-165.

\(^5\) Ibid., IV, 124-125.

\(^6\) Ibid., IV, 127-128.
help of the Dutch; and yet we assist
the French with our levies. . . .

Sir Thomas Littleton: . . . As for foreign
affairs, they are the great grievance,
and perhaps the greatest. . . . This alliance
with France carries the Pope in the belly
of it; and there is great jealousy that
this money to be raised is in aid of the
King of France. . . . There have been great
jealousies of the rise and aggrandizing of the
King of France, lately. It increases our jeal­
ousies, that, at least, by connivance, so many
men are going over to his service. . . .

There were attempts in the House of Commons to tack the bill of supply
to a bill appropriating the Customs revenue for the Navy; however, it
was defeated by 51 votes and the bill of supply went from the House of
Commons to the House of Lords on April 10.7 Charles II and Danby were
elated to receive a supply, after three years during which Parliament
voted no money, and it was a reflection upon Danby’s party organization
that there were no serious problems in acquiring the supply. Indeed,
the success of Danby in obtaining money prompted one observer to write
that "the Court party prevails in Parliament; . . ."8 But the Court
was hampered by a lack of skillful speakers or leaders in the House of
Commons, despite the presence of Secretaries Coventry and Williamson.9

The government was successful in winning a supply for the Fleet, but
the Opposition was anxious to strengthen the Navy in view of the threat

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7C.J., IX, 392, 417; L.J., XIII, 107. On March 5 the House of
Commons also voted 189-156 to continue the Excise for three years (Grey,
Debates, IV, 237).

8E. Mockliffe, ed., The Diary of The Rev. Ralph Josselin, 1616-

9Burnet, My Own Time, pp. 79, 125-126. See also Browning, Danby,
I, 221.
from France. When the war in Europe came to command Englishmen's attention after March 1677, the Opposition once again moved to attack the King's foreign policy and challenged the royal prerogative.

The two chief issues of foreign policy that arose in 1677 were the Anglo-French commercial dispute and the question of English troops in the service of France. Throughout 1676 Charles II had received numerous petitions and complaints from English merchants concerning the depredations of French privateers. The situation grew so serious that the French ambassador, acting on reports of a possible English break with France, recommended to Louis XIV the conclusion of a commercial treaty. Both Charles and Louis regarded the problem as serious, so on February 14/24, 1677 a commercial treaty between England and France was concluded. English merchants were to be allowed to trade with the enemies of France in any line of goods, except contraband, and French privateers were to be restrained. It was a very favorable treaty for England, and it did serve to alleviate one source of public hostility to France.

The question of English troops serving France was still a controversial matter when Parliament reassembled in February. Recruiting of troops for French service had been carried on throughout 1676 in

10 Courtin to Louis XIV, September 4/14, 1676, P.R.O. 31/3, 133, fos. 78-86 and Courtin to Louis XIV, December 21/31, 1676, P.R.O. 31/3, 134, f. 94.

11 The complete text of the treaty can be found in S.P. 103, 14, f. 485.
England, Scotland, and Ireland, and public opinion was especially aroused by the way in which some recruits had practically been kidnapped. In January of 1677 the Spanish ambassador complained to the King about the landing at Calais of 300 Scots intended for service with France. Charles II replied with a proclamation against the levying of troops for service in France, but the damage was done. Parliament was aware of what had happened when it met; therefore, the issue of English subjects in French service became the target of the Opposition's attack on the King's foreign policy. On February 19 a bill for recalling Englishmen in the service of France was read for the first time. It was not, however, a simple order for Englishmen to return; it also proclaimed that all those who remained in the service of France to be felons, incapable of being pardoned except by act of Parliament. The debate on the bill was delayed until the second reading on February 22. However, the supporters of the Court were unable to resist the Opposition on that day. Men such as Sir William Coventry were impatient with the way Parliament had been ignored in the past on this matter:

Sir William Coventry: ... No man can say, but that the King of France is already too strong, and no Englishman would have him stronger. He cannot but believe that the King of France will let them come back, and not break with England. ... One or two

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12 C.S.P. Dom., 1676-7, pp. 58, 60-61, 64, 69; C.S.P. Dom., 1677-8, pp. 12-17, 24, 57; Essex Papers (1675-1677), pp. 41-42.
14 Grey, Debates, IV, 98.
15 Ibid., IV, 133.
sessions we have had great debate about this, and when we gave the last money, we were sorry that France was so great. The next session we gave no money for that very purpose, but since we went home, what we did was so far from recalling them, that more were sent over. . . Nothing can be proposed less a doubt, than that France is too big, and shall we make her bigger?

After this debate the bill was ordered to be committed for consideration at a later date and the House of Commons returned to consideration of money matters. In two weeks, however, news of the war in Europe prompted the House to consider foreign affairs once more, and the Opposition moved to the attack more vigorously than it had ever done before.

The French Army was once again on the move in Flanders. Valenciennes fell on March 4, to be followed by the capture of Cambrai and St. Omer and the defeat of the Prince of Orange at the battle of Cassel in early April. Such news could hardly fail to alarm the majority of Englishmen, who had grown so apprehensive of French power in Europe. On March 6 the House of Commons, sitting in a Grand Committee on Grievances, took up the question of French expansion and the danger to England. Many members of the Opposition expressed their opinions:16

Sir William Coventry: . . . Consider the posture we are in, in relation to France, the greatest grievance that can be to the nation. . . The end and purpose of France's conquests is not for trade. The whole bent of France (a stirring people) is to consider what thing he'll undertake if he get rest

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16 Ibid., IV, 188-204. According to K.H.D. Haley, the news of the capture of Valenciennes reached London by March 6 and prompted this first debate (Haley, Shaftesbury, p. 424).
again. Having almost swallowed Flanders, will he not begin again? . . . If once France gets peace, nothing is so feasible and practicable as England; . . .

Mr. Vaughan: We are told of "conquering Flanders with French hands." Pray God it be not us with English hands! He would not have the King entrench upon any league he has made, but would have France know, that the King of England understands when he is safe and when he is not safe.

Sir Thomas Littleton: . . . He would have the House moved to nominate a Committee to draw up an address to represent to the King the growing greatness of the French King, and not to promote any treaty but what may tend to the restitution of the Spanish Netherlands. . . .

Mr. Powle: The best way for men to get into the right way when they have lost it, is to go back from whence they began. In 1669 the Triple Alliance was made, and in 1670 there was a Supply given to support that alliance, and when that Parliament was up, there was a journey to Dover, and he fears we may date our misfortunes from thence; . . . the root and ground of all our discontents; and this House can never forsake the King in such alliances as they apprehend for the safety of the nation. . . .

Colonel Birch: Can any man but think that while France is on the other side of the water, and can land with 80,000 men, we, though in no war, yet must prepare? . . . But should France make a sudden peace, what will become of us? But will not such an address make the poor Confederates take heart when they shall see the King and Parliament both of a mind? . . .

Court supporters such as Secretary Coventry tried to turn the debate away from foreign policy. They denied that Parliament had the power to advise the King in such matters. However, the Opposition pointed
to many cases in the past when foreign affairs had been discussed. Henry Powle said that "war and peace were debated here, in King James' time, in the business of the Palatinate, and therefore it may be now." William Sacheverell added a more recent precedent: Charles II's consulting Parliament in 1674 about peace with Holland. The Opposition carried the day when it was resolved to appoint a committee "to prepare an address to represent to his Majesty the danger of the power of France, and to desire his Majesty, by such alliances as his Majesty shall think fit, to secure his kingdoms, and quiet the fears of his people, and for the preservation and securing of the Spanish Netherlands." The address was presented by the committee to the House of Commons on March 10 and adopted the same day, but problems arose when it was submitted to the House of Lords for its concurrence. The upper House asked that the address be amended to include Sicily as a concern for the King and that it include a promise of financial assistance to the King if he should become involved in a war. The House of Commons, however, was not agreeable to either amendment, especially the one concerning the granting of money, which it thought to be an interference by the Lords in matters of supply. William Sacheverell answered the request of the Lords for a guarantee of money to the King in this fashion:

17Grey, Debates, IV, 127-128, 199.
18C.J., IX, 393.
19Grey, Debates, IV, 246.
He is amazed that the Lords should question that, when the House of Commons "advise" his Majesty, they should fail to "assist" him how to do it. They have always "assisted" in cases they like not, much more in this that they address for. . . you should show the Lords that it is not regular, nor parliamentary; and when that is done, likewise to let the Lords know "that no Parliament ever failed of assisting those methods they advised, when taken."

Two conferences with the Lords resulted in the Lords receding from their amendments, on March 16 the two Houses presented their address to the King. This address was the first in a series in which the House of Commons, over the next two months, urged Charles II to make the proper alliances for the preservation of Flanders and the halting of French expansion in Europe. Later the question of not granting money until the address was honored would cause much controversy; for the moment it was sufficient that the House of Commons had exercised its power of petition concerning foreign affairs. Parliament had petitioned James I in 1621 and 1624 to declare war on Spain; now it addressed Charles to abandon his old ally and join the Confederates. Parliament could point to precedents supporting their addresses, but Charles II regarded their advice as an invasion of his prerogative.

The King's reply to the address of March 16 came the next day and was not very reassuring to the Opposition:

I am of the opinion of my two Houses of Parliament that the conservation of Flanders is of great importance to England; and therefore, I assure you, I will use all means for

20 C.J., IX, 401; L.J., XIII, 76.
the preservation of Flanders, that can possibly consist with the peace and safety of the Kingdom.²¹

Some members were disappointed that the King had made no promises about following the advice of Parliament, but already the House of Commons was involved in a controversy which would lead to another address. In early February a Spanish privateer had captured a ship with 500 Scotsmen bound for France and had taken it into Ostend.²² Two of the men were released to the Spanish embassy in London, which passed them on to members of the Opposition in the House of Commons. On March 16 the House resumed its debates on English troops in the service of France and eventually resolved that those who were involved in the levying of troops should be known as "enemies to the peace and safety of the King and Kingdom." But before this resolution was approved, the two captured Scotsmen appeared before the House to relate their experiences. Only by persuading the House not to act further on the case was the Court able to avert a bad incident.²³ Nonetheless, the passions of the Opposition were aroused by this incident, and they now moved once more to place the consideration of foreign affairs before the House of Commons.

The conduct of the Spanish embassy was deeply resented by the Court and the government soon made the most of an opportunity for

²¹Grey, Debates, IV, 268.

²²H.M.C., Seventh Report, Appendix, p. 468; Ven. Trans. (Unc.), 1676-1678, Sarotti to the Doge, February 23/March 5, 1676/7.

²³Grey, Debates, IV, 259-283. Shaftesbury was probably visited in the Tower by the men who coached the two Scotsmen in what they should tell (Haley, Shaftesbury, 424-426).
revenge. On March 17/27 a meeting of the Committee of Foreign Affairs was held to examine statements purported to have been made by the Spanish ambassador. The Duke of Monmouth reported that the ambassador, Don Bernardo de Salinas, had repeated to Lord Cavendish a statement by the King to the effect that "they who had voted for the address were a company of rogues and knaves." Cavendish was called in to affirm this testimony. The result was an order by the King commanding Salinas and the Spanish Consul Fonseca to leave England. Although the Dutch had presented memorials of their own asking for English intervention in the war, the Court had grown weary of the intrigues of the Confederate ministers with members of Parliament. It was thought that the expulsion of Salinas and Fonseca would remove a great support from the activities of the Opposition, but Charles II soon found himself the recipient of more addresses on foreign policy.

According to Andrew Browning, the Earl of Danby was in complete agreement with all the addresses of the House of Commons to the King concerning the war in Europe. The Lord Treasurer had long contended that a policy of alliance with the Confederates against France would be popular with the people and with Parliament, and he sought eagerly

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24 The complete account of this incident can be found in C.S.P. Dom., 1677-8, p. 58; S.P. 94, 64, f. 47; S.P. 104, 56, p. 243; S.P. 104, 179, f. 113.

25 Proposals by both Spain and Holland for an alliance against France can be found in S.P. 94, 64, fos. 20-21 and S.P. 104, 66, f. 123. For the attitude of the Court towards the Confederate intrigues with Parliament, see P.R.O. 31/3, 135, fos. 55-56; S.P. 104, 56, p. 242.
to secure the passage of all the addresses. Danby did realize, however, that Charles II would never honor the advice of Parliament and risk a war with France unless he was assured of money. When the first address of the Commons was sent to the House of Lords, he proposed the amendment concerning the assurances of money. When this failed, he called upon his supporters in the lower House to seek another address which would give a definite promise of financial support. This was indeed a matter of great concern to both sides. Charles II was unwilling, without a definite supply, to commit himself to a foreign policy that might lead to war. The House of Commons, on the other hand, was reluctant to grant money before the proper alliances were made, for fear that the King would use the money for causes other than war. To many members the example of Henry VII was a convincing argument against such an act. In the debates over the first address William Harbord expressed this argument well:

... 'Tis said the King is not in a condition to go through this great matter. But he hopes we shall be very cautious in giving money for this present war. Henry VII received an aid from Parliament for the war in Brittany, which he received and made no war, but kept it for other purposes. . . .

In a letter to the Earl of Essex in March of 1677 Sir Robert Southwell also used this argument to explain the conduct of the House of Commons:

... 'tis true that the Commons were very shy in the address voted by them to speak

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26 Browning, Danby, I, 222.
27 Grey, Debates, IV, 198.
of aiding, assisting, or supplying his Majesty though by some they were sufficiently advertised that their counsel tended to war, and that the address would not look hearty if they did not speak plain. But so much the argument of distrust prevailed, and that example of Harry the 7th who got aids for the war and presently struck up a peace and remained with all those materials at his arbitrement, that for fear of a pickpocket war they would not name assistance; ... 28

Danby now concentrated his efforts to secure the promise of a definite sum of money. He instigated a motion in the House of Commons on March 20 for drawing up another address concerning the war. 29 Debate on this motion was postponed until March 26, when the Opposition once again led the attacks on Charles II's pro-French policy and spoke of the dangers for England of French power: 30

Colonel Birch: ... Whatever the King's thoughts were on the first address we made, he sees not how his thoughts can alter on a second. ... Till the King and people understand one another, all we do is to no purpose. And there is nothing so like to unite us, as this of securing the Netherlands. But he would not pay for anything, nor offer for it, till it were done. ... Perhaps we have provoked the Allies by suffering men to go over to the French, and who can we expect help from, if the French make peace, and fall upon us? ...  

Mr. Powle: ... He conceives that the King's answer is not so full as you can wish. ...

29 C.J., IX, 402. The motion for a new address was made by the father of Danby's son-in-law (B.M. Add. MSS. 28091, f. 59), but it was seconded by Opposition men such as Powle and Meres.
30 Grey, Debates, IV, 304-315.
Our meaning, by our address, was the reduction of French power to an equality with their neighbors, and to that you have no answer. . . But it sticks with him that the King does not understand the desires of the nation, and that we have contributed to the French greatness more than any other nation; . . . He likes not a state of neutrality which has always been fatal, and made such at last a prey to the Conqueror. France is too great to be defended from that power. . . .

Mr. Sacheverell: . . . He thinks you safe when the sum of money is in your own hands, and not in those that tell you, you can neither make such alliances, nor a war, and yet send ammunition to the French. Declare downright war, and he will go along with them.

Despite the objections of Secretary Williamson that the King could not adequately prepare for a war, it was resolved to appoint a committee to draw up another address. When the measure was brought up for consideration on March 29, there ensued another debate on whether to recommit the address and by a vote of 131-122 it was approved. When it was presented in its final form to Charles II on March 30, the address contained, in addition to its requests for alliances against France, an especially significant passage:

And in case it shall happen, that, in pursuance of such alliances, Your Majesty shall be engaged in a war with the French King, we hold ourselves obliged, and do . . . assure Your Majesty, that your most loyal subjects shall always be ready . . . to assist Your Majesty with such aids and

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31 C. J., IX, 406. Such members of the Opposition as Sir William Coventry, Powle, Meres, and Sir Thomas Littleton were named to the committee.

32 Grey, Debates, IV, 332-334.
supplies, as . . . may enable Your Majesty to prosecute the same with success. 33

Parliament had once again exercised its power of petition, but once again there was no promise of a definite sum of money or actual grant unless the King became involved in a war. The growing opposition to France had now been twice expressed in the House of Commons, and Charles II was faced with another choice of war or peace.

Before the King responded to this second address of the House of Commons, Danby engaged in a campaign of persuasion, aimed at drawing Charles II away from the interests of France. In late March the Lord Treasurer had received a letter from the English ambassador in Paris, Ralph Montagu, concerning Louis XIV's apprehensions over the current mood of Parliament. It was Montagu's opinion that the French King was very anxious to have Parliament's meetings discontinued and would be willing to pay a great sum for continued English neutrality. 34 Such opinions were hardly acceptable to Danby, who was anxious to move England away from France, so he suppressed the letter and prepared a memorandum of his own views on foreign policy for the King. For Danby the dangers of remaining in the French interest were as clear as the benefits to be expected from a policy favoring the Confederates: 35

That when men's fears are grown both so general and so great as now they are by the successes of France, neither his Majesty nor

33 C.J., IX, 408.

34 Montagu to Danby, March 25/April 4, 1677, B.M. Add. MSS. 39757, f. 42. Montagu mentioned a sum of nine million livres.

35 B.M. Add. MSS. 28042, f. 9. The memorandum was dated April 4, 1677.
any of his Ministers shall have any longer credit if acts do not speedily appear some way or other to their satisfaction.

1st. In being the redeemer of all Christendom from a universal calamity if not thralldom.

2. In being the restorer of so many kings and princes to their just rights.

3. In making yourself not only safe at home but great, and having by it an opportunity of selling yourself for the future both in the hearts of your people and in those establishments of revenues which nothing but such an opportunity could ever make us hope for.

4. In having what reasonable advantages both of trade and treaties could be desired both from Spain and Holland, . . .

Danby’s assurances that Parliament would support him with money in the event of war did not convince Charles II, who feared that, once in war, he might be deserted by Parliament, and the prerogative thereby weakened. As early as 1675 he had expressed such fears to Sir William Temple:

That he doubted much, while the war lasted abroad, it would give occasion or pretense for these heats that had of late appeared in the Parliament, and make him very uneasy in his revenue, which so much needed their assistance: that some of the warm leaders in both houses had a mind to engage him in a war with France, . . . if they did, they would leave him in it, and make use of it to ruin his ministers, and make him depend upon them more than he intended, or any King would desire. . . .

Thus Charles II was unwilling to commit himself to a new and risky foreign policy without positive assurances of support from Parliament,
and his reply on April 11 to the House of Commons' second address reflected this view. Charles declared to the House that he could not undertake the alliances it proposed without some guarantee of money in the event of war, and he suggested that the House adjourn until after Easter in order to consider his request. Such an answer could not fail to disappoint many members of the Commons, who were growing more and more anxious about the growth of French power. The news of the great French victory at Cassel had arrived in London; thus the apprehensions of Parliament certainly had reasons to increase. The reaction of the Commons was predictable: many members opposed the idea of an adjournment and proposed another address to the King. Sir William Coventry, however, proposed a compromise which might induce the King to make the proper alliances:

The matter is, the King seems to think that affairs are so altered abroad, that it is necessary we should be stricter in the matter we desired of him. He seems to intimate, that he is not in a condition to do what we desire of him, . . . Now the question is, how far should we go forwarder? . . . You are in danger of being lost before October. If it concur with the rules of the House, he would make so scruple to move, that the King may have power to make use of some part of that money, with our promise to reimburse it again. . . .

37 C.J., IX, 418.

38 Courtin to Louis XIV, April 9/19, 1677, P.R.O. 31/3, f. 92. The French ambassador's letter reports the arrival of the news in London and the unhappy reactions of the people. News of the battle is also given in the debates of April 16 (Grey, Debates, IV, 345).
A little money may go a great way. But he will not go farther than 200,000 1. 39

Coventry proposed that Charles II be allowed to borrow on the excise to make the necessary preparations for honoring the address; on April 12 the House resolved again to address the King, assuring him of their support if he would make new alliances. On April 13, this third address was presented to the King, along with the proposal that, in order to finance his preparations, he borrow 200,000 pounds at seven percent on the security of the Excise. 40 Charles II was once again forced to choose between peace and war and the decision was not an easy one, for the House of Commons had now offered money to the King. If he refused it, the House might be confirmed in its long-held suspicions that the English Court was too closely tied to the interests of France to honor its addresses.

The Opposition lent its support to this offer of money to the King. At a conference on April 11 some of its members had decided to support the offer of 200,000 pounds but they would oppose any higher amount, fearing the King really had no intention of going to war with France. 41 Their suspicions seemed justified on April 16 when the King's reply to the third address insisted that 200,000 pounds was not sufficient to pay for the desired preparations. Danby, who drew up this reply, asked for 600,000 pounds of new money in order to make the necessary alliances.

40 C.J., IX, 419-420.
41 Danby had complete knowledge of this meeting. See B.M. Add. MSS. 28053, f. 118.
42 Grey, Debates, IV, 353-354.
Once again it seemed as if the King was stalling because of his benevolent neutrality towards France. The reply of the House of Commons was a fourth address which went further than its predecessors had in its intrusion on the royal prerogative. The first three addresses had asked the King to make alliances for the preservation of the Spanish Netherlands and had promised him financial support for such a policy. The new address not only asked the King to make new alliances but asked that they be shown to the House of Commons before any money was granted:

... by which time we hope your Majesty may have so formed your affairs, and fixed your alliances, in pursuance of our former addresses, that your Majesty may be graciously pleased to impart them to us in Parliament.

This request was coupled with a statement that the House would adjourn until after Easter in order to give the King time to make his preparations. The Court was now in a dilemma. Danby had not planned on this reaction from Parliament and the King was not enthusiastic about deserting France. He had already assured the French ambassador of his continued loyalty to France, but he was anxious to have Parliament sit after Easter, in order to eliminate the impression that he only met it to get money. There was truly no way for the government to honor the addresses of Parliament at this time, because the money for the Fleet had not yet been collected, nor was there enough money for

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43 C.J., IX, 423.
44 Courtin to Louis XIV, April 12/22, 1677, P.R.O. 31/3, 135, f. 97.
raising an army. The King was not prepared for war. Charles II was still firmly in the interests of France, despite the pleas of Danby and the Confederate ministers, and all the proposals of Parliament and the Confederates could not move him. The Spanish and Dutch ambassadors prepared for the next meeting of Parliament by gathering together 250,000 livres to be distributed to members of the House of Commons.

When the Houses reassembled on May 21, the Court attempted to revive the question of more money for the King, pleading that only then could he honor the recent addresses. The Opposition quickly brushed aside this tactic and turned the discussion to foreign policy:

Mr. Sacheverell: He would know, what alliances we have made since we last met, and whether the money be laid out according to your intention.

As to France's growing greatness, it being greater than is consistent with the interest of England, he would know how he came by that power, that, as he has it, he may be reduced back again. 'Tis the interest of Holland to be ready to join with us, and we with them; and so we may preserve the Netherlands.

Sir Thomas Meres: Upon your Journal, 'tis eight weeks since you debated first this matter.

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45 Browning, Danby, I, 230. One government supporter said in Parliament: "The King has neither stores, nor money, nor ships. Twenty or thirty privateers may easily burn all our ships and master the Channel." (Grey, Debates, IV, 345).

46 P.R.O. 31/3, 135, f. 115.

47 Grey, Debates, IV, 355-361.
If we had had other ministers, alliances would have been propounded, or accepted, in all this time. You must either be the French King's province, or creatures, or fortify yourselves against his power.

Although supporters of the Court claimed that alliances and leagues were not a thing to be discussed in the open, the House of Commons persisted in discussing foreign policy. On May 23 the King again informed the House of Commons that he could not make alliances or prepare for war unless he were given more money and once again there was a vigorous debate:

Mr. Sacheverell: You have reasons given you, why alliances should be entered into...
Give 600,000 l. to be in the hands of that Council, which broke the Triple League, and greatened France! What instance can be given that those gentlemen have changed their principles... Let them own alliances, and we are for them. If not, he would not give them a penny.

Lord Cavendish: ... The Parliament has said, they will support alliances. And since we met, nothing has been done in pursuance of our address, for stopping the growing greatness of France... He moves now, that we make alliances with Holland and Spain.

Colonel Birch: ... He thinks that nothing under heaven can hinder raising the money, if these alliances were entered into, and what can hinder the alliances? In short, there is no money to be had without alliances; and, till then, we have no security of our lives or religion... and would appoint a Committee to draw up reasons for an alliance with Holland and Spain.

Mr. Sawyer: . . . War and peace are in the King's breast; but he never found it successful but when with the concurrence of the Parliament. . . .

The House of Commons had now arrived at a point where they were suggesting what alliances should be made and with whom they should be made, but no precedents were cited in support of this claim. Despite the opposition of the Court, it was resolved on May 23 to draw up another address to the King on foreign policy and on May 25 it was voted in favor of by a vote of 182-142. There was considerable debate on the clause which urged the King to "enter into a League, offensive and defensive, with the States General of the United Provinces. . . ." Court supporters naturally claimed that "there was never such a precedent, as to tell the King terms of leagues, offensive and defensive," and that such a step encroached on the royal prerogative. The Opposition replied that the addresses to James I concerning the Palatinate were a precedent, as was the recent advice of Parliament concerning the peace with Holland. William Sacheverell stated the case for Parliament well:

It is said, "That this is a breach of the King's prerogative." We move him to a league with Holland, and it is no breach at all of his prerogative, it seems, in

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49 Only one historical precedent was mentioned in the debate and that was in reference to James I's refusal to hear the addresses about the Palatinate (Ibid., IV, 370).

50 C.J., IX, 424. The complete text of the address can also be found in Grey, Ibid., IV, 374-377.

51 Both Secretaries Williamson and Coventry expressed these opinions (Ibid., IV, 377, 379). See also Williamson's impassioned speech in defense of the prerogative in Ibid., IV, 379-380.
the Council, to move him to a war. Our whole security depends upon a league with Holland against France, ...\(^{52}\)

Henry Powle also pointed out that in the reigns of Edward III, Richard II, and Henry V the Parliament advised the King to make a league with the Emperor.\(^{53}\)

The response of Charles II to this fifth address on foreign policy came on May 28 in a scathing attack on Parliament's encroachment on his prerogative. The King had grown weary of the repeated debates and addresses on foreign policy, so he resolved to dismiss Parliament and did so in his speech of May 28. After denouncing the efforts of the House of Commons to tell him what leagues to make and with whom they should be made, the King told the House that to allow such an intrusion into the prerogative would be tantamount to denying the sovereignty of the Crown:

Should I suffer this fundamental power of making peace and war to be so far invaded. ... as to have the manner and circumstances of leagues prescribed to me by Parliament, it is plain, that no Prince, or State, would any longer believe, that the sovereignty of England resides in the Crown; nor could I think myself to signify any more to foreign Princes than the empty sound of a King. ...\(^{54}\)

The House of Commons was then, amidst scenes of confusion and attempts to hold the Speaker in his chair, ordered to adjourn until July 16.\(^{55}\)

\(^{52}\)Ibid., IV, 384.

\(^{53}\)Ibid., IV, 386.

\(^{54}\)C.J., IX, 426.

\(^{55}\)Margolicouth, Poems And Letters Of Marvell, p. 198; Essex Papers (1675-1677), pp. 142-143.
Charles II now turned to the King of France for money and continued his policy of benevolent neutrality. The members of Parliament went home not knowing when they would meet again, for the King had promised repeated adjournments after July 16.

Although the next meeting of Parliament was uncertain, the Opposition had accomplished much in the session just ended. The Court had received money for the Navy, but its foreign policy was subjected to the strongest attacks since 1674. Parliament had now come to favor war with France for the preservation of Flanders, and to this end endeavoured to press the Court to adopt such a policy. The result was five successive Parliamentary addresses for the making of alliances to halt the growth of French power. Charles II had been urged by Danby to adopt such a policy, but he was reluctant to undertake such a course without a definite grant of money. He was also still tied to the interests of France. The growing apprehension of the House of Commons over the French threat to Flanders caused it to press even harder for a new foreign policy, with the result that Crown and Parliament fell to quarreling over the royal prerogative in foreign affairs. Parliament could find precedents in the reign of James I and in medieval times to justify its attempts to prescribe what foreign policy the Crown should follow. James had been advised to make war with Spain and medieval Kings had been advised to make alliances. But even if there had been no precedents to support its claims, Parliament felt compelled by the course of the war in Europe to express its views and demand a new foreign policy. The growing power of France was considered a new and dangerous threat to England and, as Henry Powle said in de-
bate, "new dangers create new precedents, and a new way."\textsuperscript{56} This fear of France, which compelled Parliament to intrude on the royal prerogative, continued to grow throughout 1677.

\textsuperscript{56} Grey, Debates, IV, 386.
The summer of 1677 was marked by several important events, both in England and on the Continent, which caused Charles II to re-evaluate his policies and make some significant changes. In July and August the four Lords in the Tower, Shaftesbury, Buckingham, Salisbury, and Wharton, petitioned for their release from confinement. The House of Lords had played a minor role in the session of Parliament just ended, because the great leaders of the Opposition were imprisoned. The petitions of Buckingham, Salisbury, and Wharton were accepted and they were released; but the King refused to free Shaftesbury. The Earl was still too strongly distrusted by Danby and the King to secure his freedom, so he remained in the Tower until February of 1678. Buckingham, however, used his freedom to seek a reconciliation with Charles II; this alarmed Danby, who feared the resurgence of his old rival.

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1 S.P. 104, 179, fos. 141, 144, 146, 148.

2 For a good account of Shaftesbury's activities in the Tower, see Haley, Shaftesbury, pp. 422-440. Much of his time was spent in the compilation of political information. In this regard, see K.M.D. Haley, "Shaftesbury's Lists of the Lay Peers and Members of the Commons, 1677-8," Bulletin Of The Institute Of Historical Research, XLIII (May, 1970), 86-105.

In addition to dealing with the Lords in the Tower, Charles II also had to make a decision in regard to the meeting of Parliament scheduled for July 16. He was resolved to keep that body adjourned as long as he could to avoid its attacks on the government, so on the appointed day of meeting Parliament was adjourned until December 3. The Opposition attempted to begin a debate about the way in which Parliament was being treated, but both Houses adjourned peacefully. The decision not to meet Parliament in the summer or fall had been made easier by new offers of money from the King of France.

Danby had always endeavoured to take England out of the alliance with France and into the interests of the Confederates; to this end he suppressed Ralph Montagu's letter of April regarding the availability of French money. Montagu, however, took it upon himself in June of 1677 to write directly to the King concerning a subsidy from France. On June 11/21, 1677 Montagu informed Charles that he could obtain from France one million livres a year while the war continued, and four millions six months after peace had been made, as the price of English neutrality. The King, acting through Danby, instructed Montagu to implement his proposal and seek such a sum; if it could not be obtained, the government would accept a subsidy of 200,000 pounds a year while the war lasted. Meanwhile the French ambassador

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4C.J., IX, 426; Margoliouth, Poems And Letters Of Marvell, p. 198, 327-328.

5B.M. Add. MSS. 28054, f. 66.

6B.M. Add. MSS. 28054, f. 70.
had been offering Charles II 200,000 pounds for a prorogation of Parliament to April of 1678 and eventually got Charles to agree to a sum of 175,000 pounds. There now followed a dispute between Danby, Charles, and the ambassador over the amount of the subsidy; this resulted from a misunderstanding of the relative values of pounds, livres, and écus. The result was that the King received none of the new subsidy. Danby played an important part in the disputes over the subsidy, seeking to use the dispute to discredit France with the King. The Lord Treasurer had been bitterly disappointed with the breakup of the last session of Parliament, for he had hoped by persuading the King to adopt an anti-French foreign policy, to win its support for the King. In this he had failed, but he had succeeded, in the summer of 1677, in breaking up the new subsidy negotiations with France. An opportunity now presented itself again to offer the King an alternative foreign policy to the alliance with France. Holland was growing weary of the war and William of Orange had decided personally to seek either his uncle's military aid or aid in negotiating a peace.

The summer of 1677 had witnessed a continuation of French military victories in the war on the Continent. The Prince of Orange's attempted

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7 Courtin to Louis XIV, July 9/19, 1677 and Courtin to Pomponne, August 6/16, 1677, P.R.O. 31/3, 136, fos. 70, 103.

8 For the complicated details of this dispute, see the French ambassador's letters in the period August-December in P.R.O. 31/3, 136 and 137. The matter was a continual source of argument between France and England in these months. A fuller explanation of the dispute can be found in Clyde L. Grose, "Louis XIV's Financial Relations With Charles II And The English Parliament," The Journal Of Modern History, I (June, 1929), 177-204.
The siege of Charleroi was a failure and a few months later the French were able to capture the city of Freiburg. The Confederates were unable to present a united defense because of jealousy of the Prince of Orange and dissension among the various commanders. A peace party now began to form in Holland and exerted pressure on the Prince of Orange to make peace before all of Flanders was lost. The peace congress at Nimègue had only begun to hold substantive negotiations in March of 1677 and even in the summer matters of ceremonial and protocol caused delays in the talks. France's objective at Nimègue was to secure a separate peace with Holland if possible, but the Prince of Orange opposed such a plan and still hoped for English intervention in the war. With this goal in mind he began to make approaches to Sir William Temple about a possible visit to England at the end of the 1677 campaign. In April of 1676 he had mentioned to Temple his continued interest in a marriage with Princess Mary, daughter of the Duke of York; he also wrote to Charles II for permission to visit England at the end of that campaign. There was no favorable response to this request, however, and the matter was not brought up again until 1677. After having talked to Temple in January of that year regarding his desires for peace, William sent his close friend, William Bentinck, to England in order to seek the permission of Charles II for a visit to England.

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in the Fall.\footnote{Ibid., I, 290-291; Browning, \textit{Danby}, I, 233.} Danby immediately seized upon this opportunity to urge the King to honor this request of his nephew. He presented another memorandum expressing his views about foreign policy:

\begin{quote}
As to foreign affairs, I cannot as a Counsellor but consider them in the first place as they stand with the interest of England, and then I am for concerting the peace with the Prince of Orange to his satisfaction, and making the alliance strict with him, by which many advantages may accrue to us. . . . Whereas I know none from France. . . .
\end{quote}

Danby's arguments persuaded Charles II to give his assent to the proposed visit of the Prince of Orange, but the King was not yet won over to an anti-French policy. Charles was concerned to effect a general peace as soon as possible, since he knew that the continuance of the war would further arouse the hatreds of his subjects and create problems for the next meeting of Parliament. As soon as Bentinck returned to Holland, the King informed the French ambassador of his belief in the need for peace and proposed terms which he thought would be acceptable to all the belligerents. Maestricht was to be returned to Holland, and the towns of Charleroi, Aeth, Oudenarde, Courtrai, Tournai, and Conde were to be returned to Spain; France would be allowed to keep her other conquests in Flanders and would receive the Franche-Comte and the city of Philipsburg. The ambassador was also assured that the King would endeavour to persuade William of Orange
to accept these terms when he came to England in the Fall. Preparations were now made for that visit, and Danby looked forward to the visit as an opportunity to persuade Charles II to change his foreign policy.

The Prince of Orange left Holland in September and arrived in England on October 9, 1677. The Court was then at Newmarket and the news of the Prince's visit was discussed by everyone. The French ambassador realized that the Prince's real object was to be married to Princess Mary; however, both Charles and his brother assured the ambassador that the marriage would not be detrimental to the friendship between England and France. The Confederate ministers feared that the Prince's visit meant a determination on his part to make a separate peace. Both Charles II and the Duke of York hoped to discuss peace terms with their nephew before talking about the marriage, but William was resolved to discuss the marriage first. Danby now stepped in, in order to persuade the King to agree to the match; on October 22 the decision to allow the marriage was made. The King persuaded his brother to agree to this policy and informed the French

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13 Courtin to Louis XIV, June 11/21, 1677, P.R.O. 31/3, 136, fos. 27-32

14 A good account of the reconciliation between England and Holland which began with the visit of the Prince can be found in K.H.D. Maley, "The Anglo-Dutch Rapprochement of 1677," The English Historical Review, LXXIII (October, 1958), 614-648.

15 Barrillon to Louis XIV, September 13/23 and 17/27, 1677, P.R.O. 31/3, 137, fos. 21-22, 26-27. The new French ambassador was Paul de Barrillon, who arrived in England in September 1677. His instructions are in Jusserand, Recueil, Angleterre, pp. 226-250.

16 Ven. Trans. (Unc.), 1676-1678, Sarotti to the Doge, September 27/ October 7, 1677.
ambassador that the marriage would ease his subjects' fear of Popery and France. The marriage was concluded on November 4, 1677, much to the pleasure of Danby, who now sought to bind the King to an alliance with Holland.

The great object of Charles II in agreeing to this marriage was to dampen the anti-French and anti-Popery feelings of the English people, for William of Orange was a stern Dutch Calvinist, the leader of the alliance against Louis XIV, and a very popular figure in England. The reaction of the people, however, was not completely enthusiastic. Many Englishmen suspected that the marriage was "a thing of the French King's making." The announcement of the marriage in London had resulted in "ringing of bells and bonfires, and the greatest expressions of joy," but there were many who believed the Prince was a secret Papist. Their suspicions of the government's intentions were increased when Charles II announced in the midst of the wedding preparations that Parliament would be adjourned from December 3 to April 4. Even before the marriage was completed some members of the Opposition were asking the

17 P.R.O. 31/3, 137, f. 65. It seems that James agreed to the match because his own wife was pregnant, so that there might be no reason to fear William as a threat to the succession if James were presented with a son. According to David Ogg, the marriage was a way in which Charles II could revenge himself upon a brother whom he disliked (Ogg, Charles II, p. 547).

18 H.M.C., Ormonde, N.S., IV, 376; Thompson, Hatton Correspondence, p. 151; B.M. Add. MSS. 29556, f. 243. See also E. Hockliffe, ed., The Diary of The Rev. Ralph Josselin, 1616-1683, p. 172 ("was the marriage a pillow to lull us asleep?").
French ambassador to assist them in preventing it. Danby was aware of the public hostility to the marriage, so he resolved to bring Charles II and the Prince of Orange together in an alliance which would satisfy public opinion.

After the wedding, William and his uncles met several times to discuss the prospects for peace in Europe. Charles II hoped to mediate between Louis XIV and William in a way that would be most favorable to France, but his nephew was determined to strike a hard bargain. Before William returned to Holland with his new bride in mid-November, Charles had agreed to offer the following terms to Louis XIV: France was to keep the Franche-Comté, Aire, St. Omer, and Cambrai and return Maestricht to Holland and Charleroi, Aeth, Tournai, Oudenarde, Courtrai, Valenciennes and Condé to Spain. The Prince of Orange left England after these terms were agreed upon and Charles then moved to persuade Louis XIV to accept them. Lord Feversham was sent to Paris to insist on either unconditional acceptance or rejection of the terms within two days; however, he did not return to England until December 1, at which time he brought news of Louis XIV's complete rejection of these proposals. This rejection was a great blow to Charles II's hopes for peace, for he had believed that he could mediate effectively between Louis XIV and William. Indeed, the King was hoping to secure a peace in Europe which would please everyone and perhaps relieve him of

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20 Browning, Danby, I, 255; P.R.O. 31/3, 137, f. 91.

21 B.M. Add. MSS. 25119, fos. 6-12; B.M. Add. MSS. 28040, f. 41.
parliamentary pressure for a war with France. Although Parliament had been further adjourned from December to April, Charles knew that he had to meet it then in order to have the Excise duty on wines renewed. If there were no peace in Europe by then, he could expect a renewal of Parliament's demands for alliances against France. This was something he wished to avoid, so he had given his full attention to working out peace terms which would be acceptable to everyone. He knew that the terms carried by Lord Feversham were more advantageous to the Confederates than the military situation warranted, but he was hopeful of inducing France to make a compromise. The return of Feversham without the acceptance of Louis XIV dashed these hopes and forced the King to consider a new tactic.

Danby immediately urged Charles to consider joining with Holland in an alliance that would enforce acceptance of these terms on France. The King accepted the idea as a means of bringing pressure to bear on Louis XIV. Ralph Montagu, who had just returned to England for a short visit, was sent back to France to demand again Louis XIV's acceptance of the terms; also, Lawrence Hyde was instructed to begin negotiations with the Prince of Orange for an alliance to force acceptance by all sides of the peace proposals. Danby also urged that Parliament be called before April 4, in order, by taking advantage of its anti-French mood, to secure money to finance preparations for war.

22 P.R.O. 31/3, 137, f. 121. The instructions given to Feversham mentioned the fears of renewed parliamentary pressure if no peace was made (B.M. Add. MSS. 25119, f. 8).

On December 3 the reassembled Parliament was told, much to its surprise, that it would only be adjourned until January 15. The government now began to make earnest preparations for war; it began to raise troops, build up the Navy, and recall the English troops in French service. Finally, on December 31, 1677, England and Holland concluded a treaty of alliance which bound both nations to enforce peace upon France and Spain by diplomacy or, if necessary, military power. Danby now had the policy he had so long advocated, and he believed that Parliament would fully support the King. In a conversation with the French ambassador in October, the Treasurer had expressed the opinion that Parliament would give Charles II all the money he needed if he declared against France. Now Danby could hope to win that support because the King had committed himself to forcing French acceptance of the peace terms. From a policy of alliance with France to one of opposition to his old paymaster was a considerable change for Charles II.

The King of England had made this change of policy because he felt compelled to effect a peace in Europe in order to avoid the pressures of his people for a war with France. As will be seen, Charles II still had hopes of bringing about a peace without active military intervention. The preparations for war and alliance with Holland were moves

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26 S.P. 180, 314, fos. 305-315; B.M. Add. MSS. 28092, f. 214.

27 Barrillon to Louis XIV, October 15/25, 1677, P.R.O. 31/3, 137, fos. 49-50.
which, it was thought, would force Louis XIV to accept the peace proposals or face a wider war. The King wanted to avoid war at all costs, as he told the French ambassador, but Parliament would force him into it in January if there were no peace by then. If no settlement were negotiated, both Danby and Charles hoped that the measures taken towards war would satisfy public opinion and induce Parliament to fully support the Crown. The change of policy which began with the marriage of William and Mary and ended with an Anglo-Dutch alliance was aimed at winning the support and confidence of the people. In December of 1677, however, neither Charles II nor Danby could foresee the problems that lay ahead. They could not know that, instead of supporting war with France, Parliament would soon reverse its opinions about foreign affairs; and that, instead of voting money to support a war, it would vote money only to disband an army which it feared was intended, not for war, but for the introduction of arbitrary government into England. Parliament's great reversal was about to occur.

28 Barrillon to Louis XIV, December 6/16 and 13/23, 1677, P.R.O. 31/3, 137, fos. 140-141, 148.
CHAPTER VII
THE GREAT REVERSAL, JANUARY-AUGUST, 1678

Before Parliament met in January of 1678, Charles II and Danby had to face many problems. While proclamations had been issued for the recruiting of an army, the attempt to recall the English troops in French service met with opposition from Louis XIV. The French King insisted that he was entitled to keep the English troops in his service until thirty days after a declaration of war between France and England. Thus he endeavoured to postpone their departure from France as long as possible.\(^1\) The government's lack of money and a failure to secure a base of operations in Flanders also hampered the raising of an army. Charles II wanted to use Ostend as a port from which his forces could move into Flanders; however, Spain was reluctant to grant this request for fear of a permanent English occupation of that port. The Spanish government demanded an immediate declaration of war by England as the price for the cession of Ostend. Although Charles had requested the use of that base in early December, it was not until February that the first English forces received permission to land there. The King had promised to send 12,000 troops

\(^1\) Browning, Danby, I, 256.
to Ostend, but all the delays reduced the number of the first English contingent to 1600 men. The attitude of the Spanish government irritated the King no end and gave him cause to wonder about the wisdom of undertaking this war.

The attitude of Louis XIV towards England's preparations for war and the alliance with Holland also influenced Charles II's thinking. He truly believed that he could persuade France to accept some sort of peace settlement. He was, therefore, bewildered by Louis XIV's refusal to accept the terms proposed in December. Immediately after the return of Lord Feversham from France, Charles sent Ralph Montagu to Paris to urge Louis to accept the peace proposals. The King instructed the ambassador to inform Louis how zealous the English were for war with France. If Louis did not accept the offered terms, Charles II had no choice but to prepare for war; otherwise Parliament would push him into it. Montagu's mission was not successful, for France proposed to negotiate a truce rather than a peace. Louis XIV offered a two months truce and declared that he "would make war a hundred years" rather than part with some of the towns he had captured.

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2 B.M. Add. MSS. 28093, f. 215; H.M.C., Egmont, II, 70.

3 For Charles II's reaction to the Spanish policy, see Danby's letters to William of Orange of January 8, 9, 23, and February 8, 1677/8 in S.P. Dom. 8, I, pt. 1, nos. 9, 10, 11, 12.

4 B.M. Add. MSS. 25119, fos. 13-20. Montagu was especially instructed to make the French King aware of the public and parliamentary pressure on Charles II for a war against France.

also pledged to use all his resources, "even to the engaging of his jewels," to persuade Charles II not to meet Parliament. France promised to send a large subsidy to England hidden in bales of silk; Danby received an offer of a fortune "in diamonds and pearls in return for his support of the interests of France." The French ambassador in England also attempted to bribe Charles into postponing the meeting of Parliament until a general truce had been negotiated. The offer of money tempted a King who had always accepted French subsidies in the past and who was not enthusiastic about the prospects of a war with his old ally. Danby's influence was a powerful factor in keeping Charles II committed to his new foreign policy, for he argued that Parliament would grant large amounts of money in return for a declaration of war against France. Strangely enough, the Duke of York was also a staunch supporter of the new policy. The King's brother had always supported England's close ties with France in the past, but now he opposed any retreat from the newly declared policy. He now hoped, by championing a popular war, to make a good impression on the people of England and to relieve their anxieties about his "Popish" leanings. It was clear to one observer of the Court that, although the King was uncertain about the risks of war,

yet the Duke is settled and resolved in the necessity of a war, and 'tis not doubted


7 Barrillon to Louis XIV, December 20/30, 1677 and December 24/January 3, 1677/8, P.R.O. 31/3, 137, f. 153, and 138, fos. 4-5.

but that he thinks of commanding all, and hopes that the Parliament will believe him firm to what he once declares, and qualify things which now lie too much in the way of his serving the public.  

The Duke of York's influence with his brother, as well as the promises of Danby, proved strong enough to persuade Charles to turn down the French proposals. On January 10 the King informed the ambassador that Parliament would meet at the appointed time.  

Although Parliament had been adjourned until January 15, Charles II now found it convenient to order another adjournment until January 28. The King's reason for this decision was the incomplete state of his preparations and alliances. Spain had not yet given England permission to use Ostend as a base. The alliance with Holland was not satisfactory to either party, so it underwent a series of time-consuming alterations. England and Holland disagreed over the contributions each nation was to make to the war effort, and they did not agree on a proposed defensive alliance. It was not until January 11/21 that Charles II finally approved all the changes that had been made; however, there were still some problems to be worked out. The absence of an

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9 H.M.C., Ormonde, N.S. IV, 396. These sentiments were expressed in a letter from Sir Robert Southwell to the Duke of Ormonde on January 12, 1677/8.  

10 Barrillon to Louis XIV, January 10/20, 1677/8, P.R.O. 31/3, 138, f. 23. The ambassador attributed Charles II's decision to the influence of Danby and the Duke of York.  

alliance with Holland and the incomplete state of his preparations for war prompted the King to decide on another adjournment. Accordingly, on January 15 Secretary Coventry announced the King's order for the adjournment to January 28, with the explanation that "matters are not yet so ripe, as within a few days they will be." Charles II may have believed that it was necessary to complete all his preparations before meeting Parliament, but he did not expect the reaction to the new adjournment which followed.

The House of Commons received the announcement of the adjournment in a very ugly mood. Three times now, since May of 1677, the King had prevented their sitting; many members called such actions into question on January 15. Indeed, one observer noted that many believed this new adjournment to be the result of French influence: "This suspension occasions idle rumours, as if we had received money from France to sit still, and I know not what." In the minds of many members of the Opposition, the King's order was further proof of what they had believed for a long time: Charles II and Danby were not serious about

12 C.J., IX, 427.
13 "I believe he intends to respite the sitting of the Parliament till the treaty is returned, because he thinks it would be rather of ill consequence than good that they should enter upon business before he can assure them of an alliance perfected betwixt England and Holland." Danby to William of Orange, January 9/19, 1677/8, S.P. Dom. 8, I, pt. 1, no. 10.
14 Margoliouth, Poems And Letters Of Marvell, 202. In a letter to the Hull Corporation on January 15, Marvell wrote of the great displeasure over the new postponement.
a war with France. On January 17 Danby informed Montagu in Paris that "the effect of the adjournment has been that nobody will now believe other than that the peace is concluded by concert betwixt us and France." There was a widespread feeling that peace was imminent in Europe and that the King's eventual purpose in meeting Parliament was to obtain money under the false pretense of a war with France. It is not difficult to understand why Englishmen might distrust their King and his preparations for war. In the past Charles II had failed to make any effort at preventing French expansion, for he had not heeded the parliamentary addresses of 1677 regarding the preservation of Flanders. Englishmen could easily believe that Charles II's partiality for France was still strong and that his ties with France were too strong to undertake a war against his old ally. The question that all suspicious minds asked was: Why did the King change his mind about the danger of French power? Both the Venetian and French ambassadors reported that the new policy of the government seemed to most people to be a trick to obtain money from Parliament. Many men believed that the King's purpose in preparing for war was to raise an army with which to subdue Parliament and suppress civil liberties.

This suspicion about the reasons for raising an army reflected a

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16 B.M. Add. MSS. 28054, f. 134.

17 "The report in town is that we are like to have a peace, notwithstanding our great preparations for war." Earl of Arran to the Duke of Ormonde, January 19, 1677/8, H.M.C., Ormonde, N.S., IV, 90.

very real fear among Englishmen of the dangers of a standing army. Danby recognized this fear when he wrote to William of Orange about the consequences of Spain's procrastination concerning Ostend:

This has not only broke our measures as to Flanders, but to the Parliament, who will not at first believe it possible that they have refused to let us put auxiliaries into Ostend and Nieuport, and will think we have some other design for those men and ships which were designed to have carried 3,500 men and ships to those places, . . . 19

The French ambassador was also aware of the English dread of standing armies and spoke often to certain members of the Opposition about the threat to popular liberties posed by a large army.20 Some members of Parliament began to talk about safeguarding their liberties against the newly raised army by demanding the right to nominate its officers. There was also talk of establishing some sort of supervisory commission to make sure that any money granted for war would actually be used for that purpose.21 Such popular suspicions about a standing army and the King's sincerity regarding a war with France proved to be important influences on the decisions made by Parliament in the future. Although Charles II had made many preparations for war and was anxious to win the support of Parliament, there was much suspicion of his motives and good faith. This suspicion would be a crucial factor in the great reversal which Parliament was about to make.

19Danby to William of Orange, January 23, 1677/8, S.P. Dom. 8, I, pt. 1, no. 11.
20Barrillon to Louis XIV, January 17/27, 1677/8, P.R.O. 31/3, 138, f. 44.
21P.R.O. 31/3, 138, f. 36; H.M.C., Ormonde, N.S., IV, 395; H.M.C., Finch, II, 36.
Many members of the Opposition gathered together before January 28 in order to discuss what strategy to follow in the forthcoming session. It was at this time that many members, in order to obtain first-hand information, began to consort with the French ambassador. Such meetings had begun at the time of the marriage of William and Mary in November of 1677. On November 3 Barrillon spoke with some members of the Opposition about a way to prevent the marriage; they expressed to him their anxieties about the King's new policy. In January Barrillon talked with Lord Berkshire, who was a friend of Buckingham and Shaftesbury, about preventing Charles II from acquiring too much money. The Opposition believed that French influence might prevent the raising of a large army and might cause the fall of Danby. The ambassador regarded these contacts with members of Parliament as a means of preventing England's entry into the war against France. Thus the result was an unusual alliance, whose purpose was to prevent a declaration of war, between men who had once demanded war with France and the ambassador of that country. France's contacts with the discontented elements of Parliament increased with the arrival in England of the son of the Marquis de Ruvigny. The younger Ruvigny was a Huguenot and a relative of Lord Russell, one of the leading members of the Opposition in the House of Commons. Ruvigny's mission was to win support

23 Barrillon to Louis XIV, January 7/17 and 14/24, 1677/8, P.R.O. 31/3, 138, fos. 19, 37.
from the Opposition for the attempt to prevent Charles II from acquiring either money or men for a war. When he arrived in London on January 15, his first contacts were with Opposition leaders such as Buckingham, Lord Russell, and Denzil Holles. The French ambassador and his new allies now planned the tactics to be followed when Parliament met. To one observer it was clear that the coming session would be a trying one for the government:

... And though a war with France is greatly desired by everybody, yet now 'tis likely to come upon us, some malcontents are endeavouring to raise jealousy in the people, as if it would not be a war in earnest, that 'twas a trick only to get money; ... 

Many artifices are used to discompose the Parliament and 'tis said they will fall upon the Speaker for adjourning the House these two or three last times sine question, and this is looked upon as a thing to irritate the House and put them out of humor. But though almost all talk of their willingness to give any money towards this war, yet they add a kind of condition, provided they might be sure it should be faithfully applied to it, and I hear that Buckingham and Shaftesbury have sent Sir Ellis Leighton into France to evil purposes of disturbing the government. ... 

Danby and Charles II hoped to meet a Parliament which would enthusiastically support the measures taken towards war with France. What they did meet was a Parliament suspicious of the King's sincerity and uncertain

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24 Jusserand, Recueil, Angleterre, p. 259.

25 Daniel Finch to John Finch, January 14, 1677/8, H.M.C., Finch, II, 36.
what course to follow. The government sought financial support, but
what it received were new attacks on the prerogative. 26

Charles II opened the session of Parliament on January 28 with a
speech in which he informed both Houses of the marriage of William and
Mary and of the alliances recently made with Holland. The King requested
enough financial support to fit out ninety ships and raise an army of
30,000 men; also, he announced that the Houses could supervise the ex­
pediture of any money granted for war. 27 At the end of his speech
Charles made a special appeal to popular sentiment for a war with
France:

Having done all this, I expect from you
a plentiful supply suitable to such great
occasions; whereon depends not only the
honor, but for aught I know, the being of
an English nation: which will not be saved
by finding fault afterwards; but may be pre­
vented by avoiding the chief fault of doing
weakly and by halves what can only be hoped
from a vigorous and thorough prosecution of
what we undertake. 28

Several members of the Court party in the House of Commons spoke out
in favor of immediate consideration of the King's speech, but the Op­
position succeeded in winning a delay of one day. The irregular and
frequent adjournments of the past were the first targets of attack
for the opponents of the Court. However, on January 29 foreign affairs

26 On January 24 Secretary Coventry informed Lawrence Hyde that
"all things hitherto speak war, and I hope the Parliament will not
change the note they have sung so long." B.M. Add. MSS. 25125, f. 46.
27 L.J., XIII, 130.
28 Ibid.
became the chief issue as the House resolved to include in its votes of thanks to the King an address concerning the situation in Europe. Charles was asked now to admit of no treaty of peace, but such a one as leaves the French King in no better state and condition to offend his neighbors, than he is left in by the Pyrenean Treaty...; and that neither ourselves, nor any other of the allies, shall hold any commerce of trade with the French King, or his subjects, during the war.29

To make such a request of the King was absurd, because none of the Confederates, least of all Charles II, were willing or able to fight for the long period that such a task would require. In the words of the King, the reduction of France to its borders of 1659 was "a determination fitting only for God Almighty;" to demand that none of the allies trade with France was "a great and public provocation to the whole world."30 Why the House of Commons made such a request can only be explained as the attempts by some of the Opposition to make war impossible for the King. These men hoped that Charles, faced by such demands and at heart insincere about the war, would not declare war against France. According to Andrew Browning, this address was an example of the Opposition's attempt, by creating dissension and confusing issues, to weaken the Court's resolution for war.31

29 C.J., IX, 428.
30 Ibid., IX, 431-432.
31 Browning, Danby, I, 262.
Many important members of the Opposition were members of the House committee which drew up this address to the King: Sir William Coventry, Sir Thomas Littleton, Sir Thomas Meres, Henry Powle, and Lord Cavendish. It is not certain how many of these men and others of the Opposition were consulting with the French ambassador. However, on January 30 Barrillon reported to Louis XIV that his contacts in Parliament intended to appear ardent for war, while actually imposing impossible and ridiculous conditions on the King. Charles II received the address of the House of Commons on January 31 and on February 4 Secretary Coventry read the King's stinging reply. The request of the House to be shown the alliances with Holland did not please Charles, who scolded the House for its absurd demands regarding the war. If a war was desired, the King required a large supply as soon as possible. In the debate that ensued on the King's reply, the Opposition moved to inquire into the preparations made for war and the nature of the alliances with Holland:

Sir Thomas Clarges: . . . I am not satisfied that the alliances mentioned are made according to our former addresses. . . In all former alliances there was a quota expressed for Lorraine, Spain, Holland, . . .

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32 C.J., IX, 428.

33 Barrillon to Louis XIV, January 30/February 9, 1677/8, P.R.O. 31/3, 138, f. 67. The ambassador did not identify his contacts. The Venetian ambassador reported that the Court believed the bribes of Spain and Holland to be responsible for the address (Ven. Trans. (Unc.), 1676-1678, Sarotti to the Doge, February 1/11, 1677/8).

34 C.J., IX, 431-432.

35 Parliamentary History, IV, 918-924.
This 40,000 men and 90 ships, in the King's speech, is a doubt to me, what quota Holland must come up to. Formerly we saw all before us.

Mr. Powle: If I could be satisfied that we are wholly departed from French counsels, I would not be backward to go into a grand committee, to consider his majesty's message. But these four years, addresses have been made to prevent the growing greatness of the French, and the ministers declare against him, and yet France grows great under these conditions. I fear some inclination is still amongst the ministers to France, and they have brought us to the brink of ruin. Now we are told, "that here is a league offensive and defensive made with Holland, for preservation of Flanders." And money is called for to maintain the treaty, and we know not one word of it. When an aid was desired in parliament for supporting the Triple Alliance, Mr. Secretary Morris opened every particular of it to the House.

Sir Thomas Meres: If this treaty, that the King's ministers tell us of, be so good and desired by the confederates, and we may not see it, it may be good for them and not for us. However, if we must be urged, upon our words, to stand by his Majesty in these alliances, pray let it be upon our own terms, for we never promised the supporting them, but upon our own terms.

Mr. Sacheverell: I know not what answer to give, but I know what mind the country are of. They will not be pleased if we thrust a sum of money blindly into those hands that have so ill managed affairs. What end can our ministers now have in not showing us these articles, but their being conscious to themselves who made the French alliance, that they are faulty?

In this debate the Opposition revealed the weapons it was to use in its campaign against the war: cast doubts on the worth of the alliances with Holland, express fear of granting money too quickly, and refer to
the Court's past friendship with France. The Opposition pointed to many precedents in support of its demands to see the alliances that were made. Henry Powle spoke of the revelation of the Triple Alliance and the treaty with France, and William Sacheverell referred to English ministers in the pay of France in the time of Edward IV and Henry VII. Despite the attempts to discredit the Court, however, the House of Commons resolved on February 4 by a vote of 193-151 to consider a supply for the King. The Court had won its first victory in this session, but many observers, including the Duke of York, realized how the mood of the lower House had changed. In letters to William of Orange, James wrote that the opponents of the government "attack the prerogative, and would impose upon his Majesty, such things as cannot subsist with monarchy, and was never before pretended to by a House of Commons." The Duke also reported that "those who seemed to be most zealous for a war with France last session, are those who obstruct most the giving of a supply."38

There were members of the House of Commons who were genuinely concerned about preventing French expansion and were willing to believe the Court sincere in its desire for war. These men, led by Secretaries Coventry and Williamson, believed a war with France to be imminent and thus sought to speed the granting of a supply. On the opening day of

36 Ibid., IV, 920, 923.
37 C.J., IX, 432.
Parliament, Coventry had attacked the Opposition for wishing to delay consideration of a supply. He believed that such a delay would risk the total conquest of Flanders by the French armies:

... and the French King's advantages are so great in this conjuncture, that if we should be left alone, we are no equal match for him. He is now upon his campaign, and if the Confederates hearts fail, by our delay, and the King of France takes two or three more important places, he may quickly end his campaign, ... 39

Indeed, many members believed that war with France was necessary at the earliest possible moment for they feared that France, victorious in Flanders, would turn on England. It was better for England to fight France now with the aid of allies rather than to face the French colossus alone in the future.

All men conclude there must be a war with France, for if we do not step in now while others are engaged in the quarrel, we may have the whole of it fall to our shares alone, while others, quite harassed out, are taking their rest, and will afford us no more succour than we (in the midst of our plenty) have afforded unto them. 40

Because some members possessed sentiments such as these, the Court was able to win some important votes after February 4. On the 6th the Opposition's attempt to provide for the building of fifty ships from the Customs Revenue failed by a vote of 178-146; on the 7th the Court defeated by a vote of 107-85 an attempt to reduce the number of land

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39 Parliamentary History, IV, 900.

40 Sir Robert Southwell to Sir Philip Perceval, January 24, 1677/8, H.M.C., Egmont, II, 70.
forces from the 30,000 requested by the King. Then, on February 18 the House went into a grand committee of Supply. In the debates that ensued some members of the Opposition used the opportunity to express their suspicions of the Court's true intentions:

Mr. Powle: I wonder not at the silence of the committee, if every man is in the dark as well as I. I am so much in the dark, that I see not whether we shall have war or peace. The complexion of affairs seems rather inclined to peace; . . . If that matter be not clear, I know not what to give . . .

Mr. Garraway: . . . We have made the French King an idol, and we must worship him, and he must scourge us. If 250,000 l. be too little if we have war, if it be peace it is every penny too much.

Sir Henry Capel: I would not give such a sum as may make a peace, and pin the basket there. Till we have a war, let us give in some proportion to the noise abroad. . . .

Colonel Birch: . . . I believe the money will be for a war, or kept for some other use. It is too great a thing to be jested with, . . .

In spite of the Opposition's attempts to limit the amount of supply to 800,000 pounds, the House of Commons resolved by a vote of 186-166 on February 18 to raise 1,000,000 pounds for "an actual war against the French King." The suspicions that were voiced whether the Court really intended a war failed to prevent the grant of money. Many

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141 C.J., IX, 433-435; Margoliouth, Poems And Letters Of Marvell, 206-207.
142 Parliamentary History, IV, 940-943.
143 C.J., IX, 441; Margoliouth, Poems And Letters Of Marvell, 209.
members were willing to accept the premise of Secretary Coventry that "we are not a hair's breadth towards a peace with France, and the king has not consented to a cessation of arms, nor anything."

In these important votes on the raising of an army and the voting money, the Court had enjoyed a fairly steady majority, but the tactics of the Opposition were disconcerting. One observer credited the opponents of the government with "having a greater number of able and contentious speakers, though they are outdone in votes." Their object was to create "many difficulties and mistrusts of the King," and they were successful in irritating Charles II. As the King grew more disenchanted with the prospects of a war, he had endeavoured to negotiate a settlement between Holland and France. One of the chief points of contention was the French refusal to give up the town of Tournai, but Charles now proposed that it be exchanged for Charlemont. The younger Ruvigny returned to Paris in early February with this offer and a promise from Charles that he would not declare war at that time if France halted its advances in Flanders. Louis XIV, however, had no intention of giving his enemies any respite. On February 12/22 he began the siege of Ghent and in five days captured the city. Ypres was the next city to be invested by the French armies; on March 5/15

\[^{44}\text{Parliamentary History, IV, 941.}\]

\[^{45}\text{Sir Robert Southwell to the Duke of Ormonde, February 9, 1677/8, H.M.C., Ormonde, N.S., IV, 399; Andrew Browning, ed., Memoirs of Sir John Reresby (Glasgow: 1936), 132.}\]

\[^{46}\text{Browning, Danby, I, 264-265; P.R.O. 31/3, 138, f. 83.}\]
it too fell. These French victories substantially changed the military situation in Europe and wrecked the hopes of Charles II for a peace settlement. Parliament once again began to sound the alarm about the growing power of France, and the Opposition moved to push the King once and for all into war.

The news of the fall of Ghent, accompanied by a false report about the capture of Bruges and the besieging of Ostend, arrived in London on February 27. The King's first reply was to send to Ostend his small force of 1600 men under the Duke of Monmouth. Although the House of Commons was alarmed by this news, it became too involved in matters relating to the raising of money to begin a full scale debate on foreign affairs. The resolution to grant a supply of 1,000,000 pounds passed on February 18, but the lower House now found itself in disagreement over the methods of raising the money. It was not until March 8 that a final decision was made to raise the money by a poll tax and a levy on new buildings erected in London. The question of the French victories in Flanders did not become the topic of debate until March 14, when the House of Commons began to discuss the state of the nation. Although the Opposition still distrusted the motives of Charles II, several of its members now urged the King to declare war immediately and attacked his "evil counsellors." Lord

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49 Parliamentary History, IV, 951-954.
Russell wished the House to go into committee "to consider the sad and deplorable condition we are in, and the apprehensions we are under of Popery, and a Standing army."\textsuperscript{50} The result of these debates was a resolution to draw up an address to the King asking for a declaration of war against France. On March 16 this address was approved and sent to the Lords for their concurrence.\textsuperscript{51} This address of the House of Commons differed in many ways from the addresses of 1677, and it was a greater encroachment on the royal prerogative. In that year the House of Commons had asked the King to make alliances for the preservation of Flanders; there was no mention of a declaration of war. Now, however, the House of Commons demanded not only a declaration of war but also the expelling of the French ambassador and the recall of the English representatives from Paris and Nimeguen. The Opposition thus put the burden of war or peace squarely on the King. Charles II had received a vote of supply, so it was believed that this address would force him to show his sincerity for war. This address was a great challenge to the royal prerogative for it contained a specific demand for a complete break with France. The debate on the war, however, now passed to the House of Lords.

Until March the House of Lords had not played a major role, but now it became the scene of a great attack on the Crown's foreign policy.

\textsuperscript{50}Ibid., IV, 953.

\textsuperscript{51}C.J., IX, 454-455.
This was due largely to the activities of the Earl of Shaftesbury. Although Buckingham, Salisbury, and Wharton were now free and had resumed their seats in the House of Lords, Shaftesbury remained a prisoner in the Tower of London. In February of 1678 he presented numerous apologies and petitions for his release which Charles II and Danby ignored. However, the pressures of some of his friends in the Lords finally brought about his release on February 26. 52

And when the House of Commons' address came up for consideration on March 16, the Earl spoke out in favor of an immediate declaration of war. He was supported in this demand by Lords Halifax, Essex, Buckingham, and Holles, but Danby was able to secure the passage of two amendments to the address. The demand for the recall of ambassadors and the word "immediately," as it applied to a declaration of war, were the targets of Danby's amendments. 53 The House of Commons, however, opposed these changes and a subsequent conference with the Lords on March 22 produced a deadlock. Both Houses thus found themselves divided on the issue of peace or war, so on March 26 the House of Commons petitioned the King for a short recess. Accordingly, on March 27 Parliament adjourned until April 11. 54

The first two months of the session in 1678 had produced some victories for the Court. Charles II had been voted a supply of 1,000,000

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52 For the complete details of Shaftesbury's attempts to secure his release, see Haley, **Shaftesbury**, pp. 438-440.


54 C.J., IX, 463.
pounds and an army of 30,000 men to fulfill his alliance with Holland. Parliament had not yet taken steps towards raising that money and levying the troops and it seemed to some observers that the Opposition was deliberately delaying the preparations for war. On March 19 the Duke of York informed his nephew that "truly the temper of the house seems not to be good, and looks as if some of them minded more, how to get the power from the King, than anything else." 55 The House of Commons, which had once been so zealous for war with France, now had come to doubt the King's sincerity and suspect his motives. It wanted a declaration of war before raising any money, but the King refused to involve himself in a war until he had enough men and money to carry out such a policy. The result was suspicion and distrust on both sides and both Crown and the Opposition now sought to undermine each other's position. The Opposition had once again challenged the royal prerogative with the address of March 14, but it felt compelled to seek the help of France in finding out the true motives of the King. Charles II also turned to France to seek the financial support denied him by Parliament and to disengage himself from a policy which he found increasingly distasteful.

The suspicions of some members of the Opposition were so strong in March of 1678 that they believed it necessary to consult with the French ambassador. Thus on March 14/24 Barrillon reported to Louis XIV

55 James to William of Orange, March 19, 1678, S.P. Dom. 8, 3, pt. 1, no. 27.
that he had talked with several members of Parliament, including Lord Russell and Denzil Holles. These men, wrote the ambassador, believe that Charles II merely pretended to be anxious for war, in the hope thereby of securing a large subsidy and an army from Parliament. The King, it was feared, would use this army to establish arbitrary government and the Catholic religion in England.

Russell and Holles sought the help of the ambassador and the French King in compelling the King to dissolve Parliament and dismiss his evil ministers. In return, the Opposition would endeavour to keep the King out of war by putting insurmountable obstacles in his path. Barrillon's offers of money for bribes did not appeal to either man.

It is difficult to reconcile the fact that men who once were so ardent for war with France now consulted with the ambassador of the hated enemy. However, the motives of these men were truly sincere, for they were now suspicious of the King and wished to prevent him from acquiring the means to subvert Parliament. Many men simply were unable to believe that Charles II really intended war with France, and even the sending of men to Ostend did not convince them. It was a common belief that all Charles wanted was money and an army to use at home. His refusal to declare war, although he was levying troops, convinced many that "there seemed to be no use of such forces at home, unless

56 Barrillon to Louis XIV, March 14/24, 1677/8, P.R.O. 31/3, 138, f. 32. This letter can also be found in Sir John Dalrymple, Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland, II, 135-136. Russell and Holles also promised to inform Shaftesbury of their activities.
to make their parade in the place we sat."\(^57\) Popular distrust of the
government certainly increased with the appearance in February 1678
of a pamphlet entitled "An Account Of The Growth Of Popery And Arbitrary
Government In England."\(^58\) Written by Andrew Marvell, this pamphlet
expressed the fear that the government intended, with the aid of an ar-
my, to overthrow the Protestant religion and subvert the constitution.
The government immediately took steps to prevent its continued publi-
cation and distribution.\(^59\) Many people, however, read Marvell's pam-
phlet and their fears increased. Some members of the Opposition had
such fears, and their lack of confidence in the King led them to an
alliance with the French ambassador. Their demands for war lessened
as they pondered the consequences of putting the King into a condition
of arms.

Charles II had certainly encouraged the Opposition's fears by his
refusal to declare war and his hesitation at breaking with France. The
negotiations with the younger Ruvigny were a cause for some suspicion,
for many men believed that England was endeavouring to negotiate a
peace favorable to France. Charles II was not enthusiastic about a
war with France, and he was also determined not to enter the war with-
out a definite grant of money and men. As the Opposition continued to

\(^{57}\) Sir Robert Southwell to the Duke of Ormonde, March 23, 1678,
H.M.C., Ormonde, M.S., IV, 419. For reports on the public suspicions of
the King, see P.R.O. 31/3, 138, fos. 40, 126 and the Venetian ambassa-

\(^{58}\) Printed in Edward Thompson, ed., The Works Of Andrew Marvell

\(^{59}\) C.S.P. Dom., 1677-8, p. 659.
obstruct the raising of money and levying of troops, the King's resolution for war steadily weakened. There is no evidence to prove, however, that he intended to raise an army with which to subdue Parliament. Charles had often remarked, in reference to his exile, that he never wished to go on his travels again. To raise an army for the purpose of suppressing Parliament was an act which could produce another civil war and send the King into exile; Charles II could hardly have seriously considered such a policy. On the other hand, Danby saw the obvious advantages of preparing for war. In his memorandum of April 1677 he had pointed out to the King the benefits to be derived from heeding the public demands for war with France:

... And because I would suppose the worst, you will be put into such a condition of arms both by sea and land as might encourage you to speak boldly if they should deny you, and at last, if the nation saw that to disband that force you desired nothing but to be left free from your debts and in a condition to subsist with a fitting maintenance for the future, the people would help you destroy that Parliament which should refuse it.60 (my emphasis)

When Parliament began to delay the raising of money and soldiers in the session of 1678, Danby also saw that the troops already voted might be a valuable asset to the King. In a letter to the Prince of Orange he hinted that fears concerning the King's desire for war might be valid:

... Besides the Parliament has now voted 26,000 foot, and 4,000 horse and dragoons, and 90 sail of men of war, and I am confident will not stop there in case his Majesty will

60 B.M. Add. MSS. 28042, f. 9.
There was a good reason why Danby asserted that suspicions that there would be no war were "not without cause." Charles II had turned once again to France for the money which Parliament denied him.

His resolve to wage war already weak, the King was compelled to seek French money in March of 1678, for fear that Parliament would leave him high and dry. The first approach to Barrillon came in early February, when Charles offered to negotiate a speedy peace and dispense with Parliament in return for 600,000 pounds. The ambassador, however, replied with an offer of the smaller sum of six millions of livres. On March 25, Danby, acting on the King's orders, wrote to Montagu, instructing him to offer new peace terms and ask for a new subsidy of six millions of livres a year for three years. The new offer of peace, which had been approved by Holland, involved the French surrender of the towns of Charleroi, Aeth, Oudenarde, Condé, Ghent, Ypres, and Coutrai to Spain. France, however, refused to accept these terms, especially the cession of Ypres and Conde, so Charles II found himself without a subsidy. Then, in hopes of securing money from Parliament and forcing a peace settlement, he turned again to a policy of preparing

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62 Barrillon to Louis XIV, February 7/17 and March 3/13, 1677/8, P.R.O. 31/3, 138, fos. 84, 113. Six millions of livres amounted to about 500,000 pounds.
63 Danby to Montagu, March 25, 1678, B.M. Add. MSS. 28054, f. 168.
64 C.S.P. Dom., 1678, p. 67.
for war. Once again the same problem would result in failure for the
King. Parliament simply could not bring itself to trust Charles II
or believe in his sincerity for war.

Although Charles had already raised an army of 15,000 men and had
concluded a defensive alliance with Holland, he now felt it necessary
to make more alliances. Negotiations began with the ambassadors of
all the Confederates in the hopes of forming a quadruple alliance of
England, Holland, Spain, and the Emperor against France. Charles II
failed to reach any kind of agreement with the Confederates, largely
because they doubted the King's sincerity and now had French proposals
of peace to consider. Louis XIV had made his offer of peace at Nimègue
after the capture of Ghent, and a strong peace party had developed in
Holland. The Confederates had wearied of the long war, so they were
reluctant to conclude any binding pacts with England. The negotiations
for a quadruple alliance bogged down and Charles decided to adjourn Par­
liament once again so as to complete his preparations. The Court was
angered by the hesitation of the Confederates, especially Holland;
however, by April 11 there had been no success in the negotiations.
Accordingly when Parliament met on that day, the King asked for another
adjournment. On April 15 Parliament adjourned for two weeks.

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65 P.R.O. 31/3, 139, f. 150; B.M. Add. MSS. 28093, fos. 217-221.
66 Louis André, Louis XIV Et L'Europe, p. 182.
67 C.J., IX, 463-464. The reason given for the adjournment was
"that the Dutch ambassador had not at present full instructions; and
that the affairs concerning the alliances were not yet so ripe, or
fit to be imparted to both houses. . ."
This adjournment only served to confirm the Opposition's suspicions of the King and make its members more distrustful of the government. In the debate over the proposed adjournment these suspicions and fears revealed themselves:

Mr. Powle: I will only tell you what amazes me extremely. On the 28th of January the king told you, "He had made leagues with Holland, etc." And Williamson tells you, "Things are as bad as bad can be." I would know how that comes about?

Sir John Coventry: These kinds of adjournments are very strange things, and this proceeds from your counsels to raise men against Magna Charta, and set up Popery. No man can bear this... .

Once again some members of the Opposition consulted with the French ambassador about the intentions of Charles II. In early April Buckingham, Shaftesbury, Russell, and Holles had expressed to Barrillon their fears that the newly raised troops would be used against Parliament. The contacts of the younger Ruvigny with Lord Russell and many Protestants in Parliament were also valuable to the Opposition. Some men now came to believe that France would not assist Charles II in suppressing popular liberties. Thus they sought the help of France in securing the dissolution of Parliament and disbanding of the army.

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68 Parliamentary History, IV, 957-962.
69 Barrillon to Louis XIV, April 1/11, 1678, P.R.O. 31/3, 139, fos. 157-158.
70 Barrillon to Louis XIV, April 15/25 and 18/28, 1678, P.R.O. 31/3, 139, fos. 180, 188.
The government's attempts to negotiate a quadruple alliance continued to falter as the Dutch resisted English pressure for the cutting off of all trade with France. The irritation of Charles and Danby at the conduct of both Holland and Parliament was great. The Lord Treasurer thus informed the Prince of Orange of the state of affairs in England: 71

We are so surprised here at the obstructions given by the States to the general treaty of alliance betwixt us, the Emperor, Spain and them, that it has put things amongst us into greater uncertainties than ever. . . .

In short I can assure your Highness that the fault will not be on our part if the war against France be no pursued to the utmost, and there has nothing hindered it hitherto, nor can yet, as much as the suffering ourselves to be still deluded by France with daily expectations of a peace. . . .

. . . if our Parliament and your States would do what they ought for the preservation both of themselves and the rest of Christendom; whereas on the contrary I do verily believe they contribute more to the service of the French King, and to his successes, than the best army he has could do. . . .

The attempts to negotiate the alliance failed and on April 29 Charles II met Parliament with no more news than he had before. The Opposition would now endeavour to force either a declaration of war or a disbanding of the Army. 72 The House of Commons' last great attack on the foreign

71 Danby to the Prince of Orange, April 16, 1678, S.P. Dom. 8, I pt. 1, no. 16.

72 That this was the plan of the Opposition is confirmed by the Venetian ambassador (Sarotti to the Doge, April 26/May 6, 1678, Ven. Trans. (Unc.), 1676-1678).
policy of Charles II was about to begin.

The House of Commons began its session with an address from Lord Chancellor Finch which related the state of foreign affairs at that time. Finch reviewed the addresses of the House for alliances against France and spoke of the responses the King had made. It was difficult for the King to make such alliances, said Finch, because of the demands made by Parliament for a prohibition of trade and against separate peaces. The Chancellor concluded his speech by relaying the King's request for advice and assistance from the House of Commons. The reply of the House was a request that it be shown all alliances mentioned in the Chancellor's speech. There was a precedent for such a request: James I had communicated his negotiations in 1624 to the House of Commons. More recently, Charles had revealed to the House the terms of his treaty with France. So Charles now showed the two Houses the alliances mentioned in the Lord Chancellor's speech. After examining the alliances with Holland, the lower House declared by a vote of 166 to 150 that they were contrary to its addresses. On the same day, May 4, the House of Commons resolved to advise Charles II to enter into a quadruple alliance with Spain, Holland, and the Emperor "for the vigorous carrying on of the present war with the French King." The Opposition was now attempting to force

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73C.J., IX, 464-466. See also B.M. Stowe MSS. 361, fos. 107-108.
74Parliamentary History, IV, 964.
75C.J., IX, 475.
76Ibid.
the King to a decision of peace or war in hopes of securing the disbandment of the army. In doing so the old issue of "evil counsellors" appeared again. The House attacked the Duke of Lauderdale for his conduct in Scotland and resolved to address the King on May 7 for his removal from office. Danby was the target of a resolution on the same day asking for the removal of those counsellors who had advised the King to disregard the Commons' addresses of May 26, 1677 and January 31, 1677/8. Danby's attempts to prevent the final adoption of these addresses failed on May 10 by a vote of 169-166.

Charles II had not yet replied to the address of May 4 concerning the Quadruple Alliance, and the House of Commons grew more suspicious of his real intentions. There were already rumours that England and Holland had concluded a separate peace with France. Now Charles II played into the hands of the Opposition by his speech to the House of Commons on May 11. In his speech he declared that an immediate supply was mandatory. If no money were granted he would, in order to reduce his expenditures, have to lay up some of the ships and begin disbanding the army. The opponents of the Court immediately voiced their sus-

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77 Ibid., IX, 477, 478. The vote against Lauderdale was 137-93 and that against Danby was 154-139 (Margoliouth, Poems And Letters Of Marvell, 223).

78 C.J., IX, 479.

79 Andrew Browning, Memoirs of Sir John Reresby, p. 142; H.M.C., Ormonde, N.S., IV, 424.

80 Parliamentary History, IV, 972.

81 Ibid., IV, 972-977.
Mr. Boscowen: I wonder that money should be moved for before we have an answer from the King to our address. I would know of the honorable person that moved it, whether we are like to have peace or war; . . .

Sir John Hotham: . . . That you are very near slavery is common fame. If these pranks go on, we shall be "reduced to slavery."

Mr. Powle: . . . It will be time to take up this debate, when our grievances are redressed, and our address answered. And then, giving money, ought to be the last thing considered. Why was the Army so hastily raised? Which was no good sign of good intention to the public. . . .

Colonel Birch: This was a work of darkness, from the beginning. We gave money for what we see now not a word of it true: a bargain performed on the one side, and not on the other. . . .

Sir William Coventry: . . . But why should we proceed now we have no light to go by? Will any man be satisfied to give money for war, when we see nothing but a face of peace? 100,000 l. would disband this army. . . Till we have more light, we know not what to say, . . .

Mr. Garraway: Perhaps they will disband a few men troublesome of them, and leave the rest to be troublesome to us. . . .

After this debate the House adjourned without considering the King's request for money; Charles made an angry reply to their address that afternoon. The King then decided in a fit of anger to dismiss Parliament for a short time. On May 13 he prorogued it for ten days.

By now Charles II and Danby had virtually lost all hope of securing enough money to carry out a war. They now began to think about negotiating a peace. On May 17 Danby had informed the Prince of Orange of the state
of affairs in England:

I am commanded by his Majesty to let your Highness know that he finds his affairs at home in so ill a posture, and his Parliament in so very ill a humor, that he has not the least hopes of doing anything by his arms for the preservation of Flanders, . . .

The Prince also received a report that the goal of the House of Commons was to leave Charles "nothing but the empty name of a King, and no more power than a Duke of Venice." The Court had experienced enough of the suspicions and obstructive tactics in Parliament, so Charles moved quickly to secure his own position. The King resolved to support the peace terms proposed by France and sought a new subsidy. In early May he had informed the French ambassador of his need for money. After some disputes over the amount, the King signed a treaty with France on May 17/27 in which he agreed, in return for 500,000 pounds, to prorogue Parliament for four months, to recall the English troops in Flanders, and to disband his army. The negotiation of a peace went on apace, and on May 22 France and Holland concluded a six months truce.

The news of an imminent peace between Holland and France alarmed many members of the House of Commons. Some of the Opposition were intent upon securing the disbandment of an army they believed was a

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84 Barrillon to Louis XIV, May 2/12 and 18/28, 1678, P.R.O. 31/3, 139, fos. 205, 230.
threat to liberty. There were still those members, however, who were fearful of the growing power of France and were anxious for war. These men rallied to the battle when the Houses of Parliament reassembled on May 23. The King's speech on the opening day told of his plans for the future:

That there was great appearance of Peace abroad, but, notwithstanding that, he thought it reasonable to keep his land and maritime force on foot, till it was agreed whether it should be peace or no; but yet submitted that to them, whether they thought it best to continue or disband the army, ... 85

Two days later the House of Commons began to debate a motion for an address to the King, "to know whether we shall have peace or war": 86

Sir Thomas Littleton: ... The common news is, that Spain has made peace with the French; ... If it be a peace, and they comply with it, I look upon it as the most dismal thing that ever was to our nation. If the Confederacy be dissolved, there's an end of England, ...  

Colonel Birch: ... The fatalness of this peace is no new thing, but how it has been driven on by our ministers you know. But what shall we do when this peace is made, and the Confederacy at an end? ... But when this peace is made, let the Commons of England know what's next. ... 

Mr. Harbord: ... When I reflect upon what this House has done to prevent the greatness of the French King, and yet that he has almost over-run Flanders, and almost overcome Sicily, I admire how we can engage this Kingdom in a war with France. As for

85 Grey, Debates, VI, 1.  
86 Ibid., VI, 3-15.
the Army, I would use them like gentlemen, and use them honorably; you may soon enough have occasion to use them again against France.

Mr. Sacheverell: It is a sad thing to me to consider, that, after a Parliament has done all they can, and so often invited the King to support him in this war, all negotiations are contrary to it, but what sticks most with me is, that the King should pass a bill for money for an actual war, and yet treat for peace.

Despite the strong feelings for war in the House, the more suspicious members of the Opposition succeeded in having the debate adjourned until May 27. On that day after further debate on foreign policy, the Commons voted a resolution to Charles II stating that the House would assist him if he chose to prosecute a war against France. If he chose to stay out of war, the House would proceed to consider the disbandment of the army. Charles replied on May 28 with a request for money to maintain the army until peace was assured; the House of Commons now proceeded to concern itself exclusively with the question of disbanding the army. The King had indicated his resolution to remain at peace; thus the Opposition felt compelled to relieve him of a weapon which, although raised for war, might be used at home.

The debate on disbanding the army, which began on May 30, reflected the growing fears of many members about the danger of a standing army:

Mr. Mallet: ... This late army was raised, not by the authority, but connivance of this

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87 C.J., IX, 483.
88 Grey, Debates, VI, 29-33.
House. . . I would give no countenance to a standing army, and I would have all the forces disbanded, except the militia; . . .

Mr. Powle: I hope that this "still stand" of arms abroad, will not be a "still stand" of an army here. . . And I know of no end of keeping up the army any longer, than to habituate us to its standing forever. . . .

Sir Thomas Meres: . . . But for an army to be raised, to go into Flanders against the French King, and yet to stay in England, I would not countenance such an army for one day. . . .

Colonel Birch: I would as unwillingly part with this army, as any body. I had great hopes of some effects of our long desires of lessening the French King. But because we cannot employ them where we would, I would not employ them against ourselves. . . .

This debate ended with a resolution that all the troops raised since September 29, 1677 should be disbanded. The House of Commons then proceeded to debate the amount of money required to disband these forces and on June 4 voted 200,000 pounds for the disbandment of the troops by the end of June. Charles II now attempted to keep some of his troops by appealing to the House that some men were needed in Flanders until a peace was signed. Despite the resistance of the Opposition, the proposal to extend the date of disbandment to July 27 passed by a vote of 172-166.

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89 C.J., IX, 485.
90 Ibid., IX, 488, 491.
91 Grey, Debates, VI, 86.
The government's proposal to retain an army in Flanders until the signing of a peace once again aroused the fears of a standing army. There had been many complaints in the past about the behavior of the forces in England, but now the Opposition became suspicious of this odd request by the King:

Mr. Powle: I see not, either from the state of affairs at home or abroad, that a standing army is a convenient thing for us, especially at home. . . .

Mr. Garraway: . . . If the peace be a good peace, why do we not come into it? If bad, why do we not protest against it? It is a strange, intricate thing, that such and such a thing may happen, therefore we must keep up an army. If you recall them out of Flanders, they and these here may be disbanded. . . .

Colonel Birch: . . . Keep up the army for fear of the King of France, and keep it up forever. . . . If it be for our fears of France, that will never be at an end, and those fears will be hotter and hotter upon us, . . .

Sir John Hotham: . . . But these forces in Flanders may be a nest-egg, and since we have no war, and they have been raised by tricks and deceits upon you here, I would not have them kept up by tricks and conceits that we understand not.

The suspicions of the House of Commons about the King's intentions received another confirmation in late June, when Charles II suspended the disbanding of the army. He had done this in response to the French refusal to give up any towns in Flanders until Sweden was compensated.

92 H.M.C., Egmont, II, 71-72.
93 Grey, Debates, VI, 79-86.
The Commons received this news on June 19, the day after the King had made an amazing request for a permanent revenue of 300,000 pounds a year. The Opposition could hardly fail to be suspicious of a new request for money and new talk of war, when peace had seemed assured for so long. Perhaps the crisis was merely a device of the King to get money with which to perpetuate his army. Although Charles II dispatched Sir William Temple to Holland to draw up a new alliance, he could not obtain a supply from Parliament. Finally, on July 15, the King prorogued Parliament until August 1. The bill for disbanding the army died with the prorogation.

Peace between Holland and France became a reality with the signing of the Treaty of Nimyguen on July 31/August 10, 1678. Spain followed suit in September and the Emperor in the next year. Thus there was no longer any hope on the part of some Englishmen to bring England into a war against France. The session of 1678 had begun with great expectations of war, but as the King's resolution wavered and finally broke, the House of Commons grew more suspicious of the government. It first voted money and men to prosecute a war against a hated enemy. Then it became fearful of the use Charles II might make in England of his army, and eventually voted money to disband that army. In one sense the session of 1678 was a culmination of those attacks on the King's foreign

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94 C.J., IX, 502; P.R.O. 31/3, 139, fos. 264-268.
95 H.M.C., Ormonde, N.S., IV, 152; P.R.O. 31/3, 140, f. 271. For rumors about war, see Thompson, Hatton Correspondence, I, 166.
96 C.J., IX, 515. Parliament did not meet again until October 21 because of three more prorogations.
policy which had begun in October, 1673. Hostility to France had grown steadily in these years and had led the House of Commons to press Charles II for an end to his friendship with France. Yet when the King yielded to Parliament's wishes for war with France, the House of Commons experienced a revival of the old fears and distrust of the Crown and thus reversed itself on the question of war. The great reversal of 1678 was not Charles II's, however much he wavered. It was Parliament's. It was the decision of Parliament, more especially of the House of Commons, to turn from a policy of advocating war to one of endeavouring to prevent its subjugation by an army raised for war. After July 15 the attentions of all Englishmen came to be concentrated on domestic affairs rather than the growing power of France. Even the fears aroused by the Popish Plot, however, were caused in part by suspicions that French influence was responsible for the terrible design to introduce "Popery" into England.
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS

Not since the reign of James I had Parliament so vigorously attacked the King's foreign policy as it did in the period from 1674-1678. Charles II's foreign policy became the target of attacks by Parliament which challenged the royal prerogative. In 1674, the making of foreign policy resided in the Crown and many of the members of the House of Commons acknowledged this. Speaking on January 24, 1674, William Garraway, who was a leading figure in the Opposition, asserted that "we allow the power of Peace and War always in the King."¹ He spoke these words as Parliament began its attack on the Crown's foreign policy, an attack which ultimately forced the King to withdraw from an unpopular war and a hated alliance with France. For the next four years Parliament continually attacked Charles II's foreign policy and offered alternative policies which it felt to be in the best interests of England. The King resented these attacks as encroachments on the royal prerogative, but by 1678 Parliament had claimed for itself a role in the shaping of foreign policy. Through the exercise of the power of the purse, the right to debate foreign affairs, and the right to petition the King, Parliament gained a considerable amount of influence.

¹Grey, Debates, II, 339.
in the conduct of foreign affairs.

In 1674 Charles II found himself compelled to withdraw from the Third Dutch War by the refusal of Parliament to grant him the money needed for its prosecution. The power of the purse was also an important weapon when Parliament attempted to force the King into the war against France in 1677 and 1678. Although the result of these efforts was a stalemate, Parliament had strengthened its role in the making of foreign policy. Its constant debates on foreign affairs and its petitions to Charles II for alliances against France had some important results. The King became acutely aware of parliamentary pressure when he considered matters of foreign policy. This pressure forced him to issue proclamations against English troops serving in France and to negotiate a commercial treaty with France. The extent to which Charles II felt the pressures of Parliament is reflected in his attempts to dampen the fervor of the Opposition by following policies it recommended. The government's attempts to win the support of Parliament in 1678, through alliances and preparations for war, were initiated because Charles II and Danby recognized that Parliament would grant money only for war with France. The government's change of policy, although hindered by a lack of resolution on the part of the King, was a reflection of the extent to which parliamentary pressure could influence the conduct of foreign affairs.

One of the questions posed in the preface of this dissertation was: why did Parliament attack the Crown's foreign policy and attempt to assert a larger role in the shaping of foreign policy? From an
examination of all the evidence, one can deduce one overpowering motive for these attacks on Charles II's foreign policy—fear of France. It was fear of France that drove Parliament in 1674 to force Charles to withdraw from a war in which he was the ally of France. Fear of France was the motive behind the attempts to persuade the King in 1677 and 1678 to join the war on the side of the Confederates. This fear was so widespread that Colonel Birch could say in 1675 that "there are ninety in a hundred against France, all England over." 2 While some members of the House of Commons attacked the Crown's foreign policy in the hopes of merely weakening the royal prerogative, the majority of the Opposition spoke out on foreign policy out of a fear of the growing power of France.

Members of Parliament feared the growing power of France for different reasons. Some men, such as Sir William Coventry, believed that French domination of Europe would be a disaster for England. In a debate on May 10, 1675 he asserted that the guiding principle of English foreign policy should be "that no predominant power be a terror to the rest." As early as October of 1673 Coventry had declared that "the interest of the King of England is to keep France from being too great on the Continent." 3 Still others in Parliament believed that France meant to conquer England as well. Thus William Garraway,

2 Ibid., III, 127.
3 Ibid., III, 125 and II, 213.
In a debate on making peace with Holland, expressed his fears of making any peace that did not lessen the power of France:

... if France be at liberty, and not engaged, what good will the peace do? France has armies and ships, and no place to vent their malice upon but England. 4

In 1677 Garraway argued that "our main business is to keep France out of England." 5 The fear of French domination of Europe and a possible attack upon England were strong motives behind Parliament's attack on a foreign policy which seemed to strengthen the interests of France.

The Opposition also believed the growing power of France to be a threat to English trade and commercial prosperity. Throughout the period from 1674-1678 there was great discontent over the unfavorable balance of trade between England and France and the attacks of French privateers on English shipping. Many London merchants opposed the war with Holland because it enhanced the trade of France. Their protests against French trade found such a sympathetic ear in Parliament that the importation of all French commodities was prohibited in March of 1678. There was great apprehension in Parliament that the French conquest of Flanders would be a disaster for English trade. In a debate on April 19, 1675 Sir Thomas Meres and Colonel Giles Strangeways

4 Ibid., II, 345.
5 Ibid., IV, 190.

called attention to the French danger to English trade:

Meres: ... This is against your trade by the French correspondence you have lost the Spanish, the most advantageous trade we have. ... We are their neighbors, and it is extremely dangerous they should get Flanders, which would help them to the trade of the whole world. ... The King of France is setting up for the Western empire. ...

Strangeways: ... The scale now is turned from former times. France is grown more powerful than Spain. If the French should take Antwerp, and be masters of the Scheld, they will be formidable. ... Would have trade considered; for silk, wine, and linen, that we have out of France, outbalance all your trade together, with brandy, which carries away not only your money, but your senses with it.

While some members of the Opposition regarded the French conquest of Flanders as a danger to English security, others regarded it as a danger to the valuable English trade with that area and with the rest of Europe.

There was one final motive for fearing France which drove the Opposition to attack Charles II's pro-French foreign policy. Men such as Lord Cavendish and William Russell believed the growing power of France to be a threat to Protestantism, both on the continent and in England. According to Sir Thomas Meres, the King of France was "the great patron of the Popish interest." Cavendish asserted that "'tis our interest to support the Protestant interest, which France

7Grey, Debates, III, 5-7.
totaU destroys.” Parliament always suspected the Catholic leanings of the Court and men such as William Russell were greatly concerned over the close ties between England and France. He believed that there was a plan to introduce the Catholic religion into England with the help of France. France and Catholicism also signified arbitrary government to many members of Parliament. This fear of "Popery" and the methods of arbitrary government, especially a standing army, would eventually compel Parliament to reverse its position on foreign policy. In 1678 the Opposition turned from a policy that advocated war with France to one that sought to secure the kingdom from an army which it believed was intended for the subjugation of Parliament. The discovery of the Popish Plot in August of that year served to confirm many men in their suspicions of the Court's "Popish" leanings.

If one can make conclusions about the reasons Parliament attacked the Crown's foreign policy, there is also a need for similar conclusions about the soundness of the Opposition's attacks. Were they knowledgeable about foreign affairs? Could they make sound judgments about the war in Europe? Chapter IV of this dissertation has presented the sources of information which were available to Parliament. Undoubtedly it did not have the wealth of information possessed by the government, but there was always news about the war in London. The ministers of Spain, Holland, and the Emperor kept the Opposition informed, as did men within

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8 Ibid., III, 4-5.

9 Sir Thomas Meres once asserted that "they have destroyed their three estates, an ill example to us in government." Ibid., III, 6.
the government. The London Gazette never contained much news from abroad; however, foreign newspapers such as the Haarlem and Brussels gazettes were available in London.  

Thus one can surmise that the members of Parliament had good sources of information concerning foreign affairs. Yet there were some members of the Opposition who showed some ignorance in such matters. In a debate in March of 1678 Colonel John Birch spoke on the fall of Ghent: "I know not this Ghent, but 'tis said to be a great place." Historians such as Andrew Browning and David Ogg have criticized the Opposition for advocating unrealistic goals in foreign policy. They regard the address of the House of Commons for reducing France to the boundaries of the Treaty of the Pyrenees as absurd and indicative of the House's general ignorance in foreign affairs. It has been shown that some members of the Opposition supported this address in the hopes of imposing impossible conditions on the King. However, there were men, such as Sir Thomas Littleton, who firmly believed that the interests of Europe and England required such a reduction in the French frontiers. As early as May of 1675, he had expressed such a view:

... To continue France in all these acquisitions, and secured in all, or the greatest part—The Confederates wasted, and the French army maintained in the bowels of the Confederates country, scarce

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10 Shaftesbury was able to purchase these papers while he was in the Tower (Maley, Shafesbury, 434).

11 Quoted in Browning, Danby, III, 262.
reparable in this age—If the Confederacy be dissolved before the French be resolved to France again, the most ruinous thing in the world: 12

There were many well-informed members of Parliament who recognized the threat of France to the balance of power in Europe. While few men, the King included, knew anything about such a "balance," the events of later years proved how right the Opposition was to fear France.

The fact that the members of the Opposition feared France for different reasons is evidence that there was no strict organization or generally accepted platform among the opponents of the Court. The Opposition consisted of several groups or factions which acknowledged no single leader. While Sir William Coventry, Sir Thomas Littleton, William Garraway, Henry Powle, and Sir Thomas Meres spoke out consistently against the Court, none of these men commanded an overwhelming number of members. Historians today speak of the beginnings of the "Court" and "Country" parties in the reign of Charles II. The period from 1674-1678 was a time in which formal parties may have begun to evolve. It cannot be said, however, that the Opposition was a well-organized and tightly-knit party before 1678. The fact that there was disagreement in that year over whether Charles was truly sincere about a war with France demonstrates this fact. Some men, such as Russell, Sacheverell, and Cavendish, abandoned the efforts to force a declaration of war and concentrated on securing the disbandment of

12 Grey, Debates, III, 124.
the army. Others, however, remained fervent for war until the session ended. As late as June of 1678, Sir Thomas Littleton asserted that he was "still for a war with France."\textsuperscript{13} Nonetheless, the great degree of hostility to France did serve as a rallying point for many opponents of the Court. When the Popish Plot came to dominate everyone's attentions in the autumn of 1678, those who had opposed the King's foreign policy and now were ardent for prosecuting "conspirators" and excluding the Duke of York were, for the most part, on the same side. J.R. Jones has recently argued that the Popish Plot and the Exclusion Crisis were crucial factors in bringing about the emergence of the "Whig" Party.\textsuperscript{14} Even at this time, however, there still was a divergence of views, because some Opposition figures, such as Littleton, Coventry, and Cavendish, opposed Exclusion.

Parliament's attacks on the Crown's foreign policy failed to secure the goal everyone advocated: war against France. But these attacks may have had two significant results. First, the great apprehension over the growing power of France served to make Englishmen more aware of foreign affairs and perhaps prepared them for the great wars which they later undertook to check that power. Secondly, Parliament's challenge from 1674-1678 to the royal prerogative in the area of foreign affairs was the first step in a process by which Parliament

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., VI, 83.

came to control the conduct of foreign policy. The great revolution of 1688 marked the supremacy of Parliament over the Crown and thereafter its role in the shaping of foreign policy continued to grow. William III faced its criticisms of the Partition Treaties and the making of the Grand Alliance; the management of the War of the Spanish Succession was a target of its attacks. With the introduction of the cabinet system in the 18th century, Parliament came to exercise a great control over foreign policy because it controlled the men who made that policy. The earlier Stuarts had surrendered to Parliament the control of legislation and taxation. The period from 1674-1678 marked the beginning of a gradual surrender to Parliament of the Crown's control of foreign policy.
NOTES ON IMPORTANT MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITION

IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1674-1678

The following information was taken from several sources: D.T. Witcombe, Charles II And The Cavalier House Of Commons, 1663-1674; the respective volumes of the Dictionary Of National Biography; Burnet's History Of My Time (Vol. 2; ed. by O. Airy); Sir John Dalrymple, Memoirs Of Great Britain And Ireland (Vol. 2, pt. 1); and K.H.D. Haley, "Shaftesbury's Lists of the Ley Peers and Members of the Commons, 1677-8," Bulletin Of The Institute Of Historical Research, XLII (May, 1970), 86-105. The latter source is particularly valuable because the Earl of Shaftesbury, while a prisoner in the Tower of London, endeavoured to classify the members of the House of Commons according to their "worthiness" or "vileness." Hence he used the letter "w" to show the worthiness of a member and the letter "v" for vileness. Degrees of worthiness or vileness were illustrated by doubled or trebled "v's" and "w's." Some important members of the Opposition received only a single "w," while others regarded as more reliable received three "w's" and an "x" by their name to indicate that they were regarded as members of the "Country" Party. The small number in the latter category illustrates how little co-operation or understanding there was between the Commons and Lords. Shaftesbury's classification of each member listed in this appendix appears after that person's name. Burnet provides the historian with interesting descriptions of some members of the Opposition, while Dalrymple's Memoirs contain letters of Barrillon which list Opposition leaders who accepted French bribes after 1678.

BARNARDISTON, SIR SAMUEL


BIRCH, JOHN

1616-1691. Elected in 1661 for Penryn in Cornwall. Fought for Parliament in Civil War. Purged from Parliament in 1648 and joined Charles II before battle of Worcester, for which he was imprisoned. An Auditor for life in 1661. Very active speaker, which caused Burnet to say that he "spoke always with much life and heat." Attacked the French connections of the Court. w
BOSCOWEN, EDWARD


CAPEL, SIR HENRY


CAVENDISH, WILLIAM, LORD

1641-1707. Elected in 1661 for Derbyshire. Son of an active royalist in the Civil War. Son-in-law of the Duke of Ormonde. Emerged as an opponent of the Court after 1673. Burnet described him as "a libertine both in principle and practice" and "an ambitious and revengeful man." www x

CLARGES, SIR THOMAS


COVENTRY, SIR JOHN


COVENTRY, SIR WILLIAM


GARRAWAY, WILLIAM

HARBORD, WILLIAM
1632-1692. Elected in 1661 for Dartmouth in Devonshire. Strong opponent of Danby but opposed Exclusion. Barrillon listed him on his list of members bribed by France.

LEE, SIR THOMAS
1635-1691. Elected in 1661 for Aylesbury in Buckinghamshire. Baronet 1660. Very active speaker for the Opposition and a supporter of Exclusion. Burnet described him as "a man that valued himself upon artifice and cunning."

LITTLETON, SIR THOMAS
1620-1681. Elected in 1661 for Much Wenlock in Shropshire. Expelled from Parliament in 1644 for royalist sympathies. Commissioner of the Navy in 1668 but driven from office in 1671. An active opposition speaker after 1673. Opposed Exclusion. In Burnet's opinion he was "the ablest and vehementest arguer of them all." Barrillon reported in 1679 that he had taken a bribe of 500 guineas.

MALLETT, SIR JOHN

MERES, SIR THOMAS

POWLE, HENRY
1630-1692. Elected in 1671 for Cirencester in Gloucestershire. Lawyer. Promoted the Test Act. Leader of the attacks on the marriage of the Duke of York and on "evil counsellors," particularly Buckingham. Burnet wrote that he was "very learned in precedents and parliament journals" and "a clear and strong speaker." Barrillon listed him as a pensioner of France in 1679. An opponent of Exclusion.

RUSSELL, WILLIAM
alliance. Strong supporter of Exclusion. Burnet called him "a man of great candor" who was "universally beloved and trusted." Many dealings with Barrillon in 1678. www x

SACHEVERELL, WILLIAM

1638-1691. Elected in 1670 for Derbyshire. A strong and extremely violent leader of the Opposition. Active in demands for alliance with Holland but later supported attempts to disband the Army. Strong advocate of Exclusion. Accepted money from Barrillon. www

STRANGEWAYS, COLONEL GILES


SWINFEN, JOHN

1613-1694. Elected in 1661 for Tamworth in Staffordshire. Expelled from Parliament as a Presbyterian in 1648. Spoke often and violently against the Court. Supported Exclusion. www x
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