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TOWARD A COMPARATIVE MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY POWER:

A CONCEPTUALIZATION AND EMPIRICAL APPLICATION

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

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* * * * * * *

The Ohio State University
1970

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. THE NEED</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Four Eras of Community Power Research: From Microcosm to Comparison</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. THE MODEL: COMMUNITY STRUCTURAL VARIABLES AND THE CHARACTERISTICS</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF THE LEADERSHIP POOL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Structural Variables</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics of the Leadership Pool</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. THE MODEL: COMMUNITY PROBLEM DIMENSIONS AND PATTERNS OF COMMUNITY</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Problem Dimensions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patterns of Community Action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. THE METHODS</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Original Research Problem</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Selection of the Cities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Continual Development of the Model</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Development of a Technique to Identify the Power Actors in the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Pool</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Field Work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. THE EMPIRICAL APPLICATION</td>
<td>235a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Structural Variables</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics of the Leadership Pool</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Relationship of Community Structural Variables to the Characteristics of the Leadership Pool</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Problem Dimensions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Relationship of the Characteristics of the Leadership Pool to the Community Problem Dimensions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patterns of Community Action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Relationship of the Community Problem Dimensions to the Patterns of Community Action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. THE SUMMARY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND REFINEMENT</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suggestions for Future Research and Refinement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Final Observation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Sampled Cities</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Number of Conducted Interviews</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Population Size and Rate of Growth in the Four Communities</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Demographic Heterogeneity in the Four Communities</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The Degree of Economic Autonomy in the Four Communities</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The Degree of Governmental-Political Autonomy in the Four Communities</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The Level of Organizational Density in the Four Communities</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Top Five Employment Categories in the Four Communities</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. The Degree of Economic Diversity in the Four Communities</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Community Social Class Rank for the Four Communities</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Rank Ordering of the Communities on the Structural Variables</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Size of the Leadership Pool in the Four Communities</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Institutional Representation in the Leadership Pool in the Four Communities</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. The Degree of Institutional Dominance in the Four Leadership Pools</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Social Class Composition and Rank of the Four Leadership Pools</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Degree of Legitimacy in the Four Leadership Pools</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Degree of Visibility in the Four Leadership Pools</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Degree of Scope in the Four Leadership Pools</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Degree of Cohesiveness in the Four Leadership Pools</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Level of Entrenchment in the Four Leadership Pools</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Levels of Local and Non-Local Interests in the Four Leadership Pools</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Degree of Cosmopolitanism in the Four Leadership Pools</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Spearman Rank Order Correlation Coefficients Between the Characteristics of the Leadership Pool and the Structural Variables in the Four Communities</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Rank Ordering of the Communities on the Characteristics of the Leadership Pool</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Spearman Rank Order Correlation Coefficients Between the Community Structural Variables and the Characteristics of the Leadership Pool</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. The Number of Different Perceived Problems and the Number of Different Perceived Problems per Power Actor in the Four Communities</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. The Rank Ordering of the Six Most Salient Problems in Each of the Four Communities</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. The Defined Degree of Severity Inherent in Ten Selected Problems for the Four Communities</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. The Degree of Consensus Evidenced by Each Leadership Pool Concerning the Severity of Ten Selected Problems in the Four Communities</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. The Degree of Institutional Specificity Inherent in the Problem Definitions of the Four Leadership Pools</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. The Degree of Local Solution Inherent in the Problem Definitions of the Four Leadership Pools</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. The Degree of Uniqueness Inherent in the Problem Definitions of the Four Leadership Pools</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. The Degree of Clarity Inherent in the Problem Definitions of the Four Leadership Pools</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Spearman Rank Order Correlation Coefficients Between the Community Problem Dimensions</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Rank Ordering of the Communities on the Community Problem Dimensions</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. Spearman Rank Order Correlation Coefficients Between the Characteristics of the Leadership Pool and the Community Problem Dimensions</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. The Perceived Degree of Urgency Inherent in the Action Sets in the Four Communities</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. The Perceived Degree of Institutional Coordination Inherent in the Action Sets in the Four Communities</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. The Percentage of &quot;Public&quot; Responsibility Inherent in the Action Sets in the Four Communities</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. The Degree of Perceived Organizational Relevance Inherent in the Action Sets in the Four Communities</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. The Degree of Proposed External, Non-Local Involvement Inherent in the Action Sets in the Four Communities</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. The Degree of Perceived &quot;Blockage&quot; Inherent in the Action Sets in the Four Communities</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43. The Level of Inactivity Inherent in the Action Sets in the Four Communities</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. Spearman Rank Order Correlation Coefficients Between the Patterns of Community Action</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. Rank Ordering of the Communities on the Patterns of Community Action</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46. Spearman Rank Order Correlation Coefficients Between the Community Problem Dimensions and the Patterns of Community Action</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. A Processual Model for Comparative Analysis</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Relationship of Economic and Political Autonomy to the Structure of the Leadership Pool</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Relationship of Community Structural Variables to the Characteristics of the Leadership Pool</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The Relationship of the Characteristics of the Leadership Pool to the Community Problem Dimensions</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The Relationship of the Community Problem Dimensions to the Patterns of Community Action</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

The Need

The central concern of this study is the presentation of a model for the comparative examination of community structure, leadership, problems, and action. The model is based upon the premise that the structure of leadership in any given community is strongly contingent upon the existent community structure in which this leadership is embedded. It is proposed that basic community structural variables and configurations may be viewed as crucial antecedent determinants of the structure of leadership, or power, in a community. In addition, variations in the structure of this "leadership pool", taken as the unit of analysis, will effect the perception, saliency, and definition of "local community problems." Finally, proposals, strategies, and tactics for ameliorative action concerning these problems will be affected by their saliency and definitional properties as assigned by the "leadership pool."

Our model, therefore, is processual. Interrelating certain elements of community structure with the structure of leadership in a setting, and relating this configuration of leadership to problem definition and community action proposals offers a model for comparative analysis. In this discussion the model will be empirically applied to four communities, selected on the basis of certain demographic, organizational, and ecological factors. A combination of the reputational, positional, and issue
techniques for locating community leaders will be utilized in these communities.

This study is organized into the following chapters. In Chapter I we will briefly review the literature in the area of community power. We will note that the field has progressed through four eras, and that currently there is a need for the type of comparative model presented in this study. Chapters II and III present the model. In Chapter II the first two structural components of the model, i.e. community structural variables and the characteristics of the leadership pool, will be discussed. Chapter III will present the final two dimensions of the model, i.e. the community problem dimensions and the patterns of community action. In Chapter IV we will describe the methodology utilized in applying this model to four communities. Also included in this chapter will be brief descriptions of each of these cities. The results of the application of the model will be presented in Chapter V. Finally, Chapter VI will offer a review and summary of this first step in the development of a comparative model for community power research.

This study is deeply embedded in the power tradition. Let us turn to a review of this literature.

The Four Eras of Community Power Research: From Microcosm to Comparison

Few areas of investigation in the social sciences possess a history and tradition as structured, animated, and rich as that of the analysis of community power and decision making. A sojourn through the literature is like a twilight walk in a city park. One often observes the same people doing the same thing in the same place every evening. The walk
can be exhilarating, amusing, exciting, frustrating, bewildering, and revealing. Of course, it may also be frightening. For the park is often the battle ground for the local gangs. Usually, they are involved in "doing their own thing" in their own territory. On occasion, however, they meet in the park to confront and bury their antagonist and rid the neighborhood of its "thing". One must not get caught in the rumble.

Analogies may be enjoyable and enlightening. However, to fully understand the place of this study and its comparative model in the development of the area, let us briefly examine the tradition of power research.

The field appears to have progressed through four stages or eras: (1) the Detailed Microcosm, (2) the Reputational Revolution, (3) the Pluralistic Rebellion, and (4) the emerging Comparative Era. As we shall see, this categorization is not clean; there is overlap among all the eras. Furthermore, though these are presented in a rough chronological sequence, this sequence may be more apparent than real. For example, detailed, microcosmic case studies are still being undertaken, and some comparative work was already underway in the late forties and early fifties. The classification, however, does structure the field according to the general emphasis of a given period.

I. The Detailed Microcosm

Let us first note the era of the detailed case study approach. The prototype of this form of investigation was the analysis of Muncie, Indiana, undertaken by Robert and Helen Lynd in the late twenties and thirties. In these classic studies, the Lynds described a power elite as the focus of control in Muncie. Although there were apparently some
pluralistic elements in the community power structure, the Lynds emphasized the notion of a business-elite conspiracy. Another study of note was the Yankee City series of W. Lloyd Warner. Warner, blending positivism with detailed ethnographic analysis, presented a refined analysis of the stratification system of one industrial New England community in the thirties. Though his emphasis was on the differential distribution of prestige, his analysis of the political structure and its "Biggie Muldoon" lent the series a place in the tradition of power studies.

This mode of research, employing participant observation, historical analysis, etc., attempted a gestalt analysis of community structure and decision making. In focusing on a single community, however, comparability and generality were sacrificed for depth. Furthermore, the technique was costly in terms of the time and effort involved in field work; from the standpoint of power analysis, it came to be viewed as inefficient. Its contributions, however, to community studies were substantial. In certain respects, it may have blossomed most brilliantly in the Vidich and Bensman study of Springdale. Here, many of the themes that would dominate power and community research in the sixties, i.e. loss of local autonomy, ineffective local government functioning, elite rule, etc., were explored in a vivid case study. As a research strategy, however, the approach was to be supplanted by the "assembly line" method of power studies, invented by the field's own Henry Ford -- Floyd Hunter and the reputational technique.
2. The Reputational Revolution

We will bend to tradition and consider the publication of *Community Power Structure* by Hunter in 1953 as the beginning of the "Reputational Revolution." Hunter utilized the technique of quering community knowledgeables about those members of the community who were "reputed" to be leaders. A list of community leaders was developed in this manner.

In his analysis of Atlanta, Hunter described a hierarchically-stratified, business-dominated, pyramid-shaped power elite. His technique and interpretations were not met with complete academic acclaim. In fact, many social scientists seemed to claim that "my town can't be like that!" This Marxian notion of an economic elite operating behind the scenes ran counter to the dominant pluralistic, democratic value system in America. Since the bitter debate which ensued is so tightly related to the research technique, we will postpone a discussion of this debate until Chapter IV.

The development of the reputational technique itself, however, was Hunter's greatest contribution. This technique provided the field of community power with a methodological device that was inexpensive, elegant, able of "mass production," and apparently a panacea to the problem of "getting behind the scenes." The fifties were dominated by the reputational method. The technique was applied to individual cities across the nation. The research was embedded in the study of social stratification within sociology, and was "sociological" in the truest sense. It combined elements of stratification theory with W. I. Thomas's thesis that "if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences."
The plethora of power studies launched by this technique share many characteristics. They placed emphasis on positivism, were concerned about the efficacy of various reputational techniques, and generally illustrated an inclination to expose the hidden, behind-the-scenes, economic elite in certain cities. In fact, in many minds, the reputational technique became synonymous with an "elitist" model of power. A great deal of effort was expended in simply identifying who the "leaders" were -- in a purely individual manner -- and describing their status, occupational, and affiliational characteristics. Little effort was shown in examining the truly structural aspects of this leadership. Finally, while the reputational technique was utilized in comparative studies, many of these works focused upon only a single community.

3. The Pluralistic Rebellion

As Presthus notes, the reputational technique may have been directly responsible for bringing political scientists into the field of community power research.\textsuperscript{14} The political scientists were vehement in their attack upon the reputational approach and what was perceived as its attendant "elite" model of power. In opposition to this thesis, there was launched a series of studies utilizing the method of "issue analysis."\textsuperscript{15} In these studies a "pluralistic" distribution of power was often posed as existent within the community system. Power was seen as being shared by various actors, positions, and institutions in the community. As opposed to the "elite" thesis, power was viewed as basically being more evenly distributed in the system. Furthermore, it was "issue-specific" in nature, i.e., the power of actors was generally
limited to specific institutional or issue areas, such as education, business, etc. As opposed to a business dominated elite working covertly to influence decisions, these observers saw a shifting, fluid distribution and exercise of power that fluctuated according to the specific issue involved. It was proposed that coalitions formed to "pool their resources" on one specific issue. However entirely different coalitions or actors may be "power wielders" on another issue. On any issue, however, the political and governmental sector was seen as important due to its legal, constitutional basis. If the fifties were the period of the "Reputational Revolution," the sixties may be called the age of the "Pluralistic Rebellion."

While the technique of issue analysis was used in the fifties, the birth of the "Pluralist Rebellion" is often attributed to Robert Dahl's publication of *Who Governs: Democracy and Power in an American City.* This study was a classic in utilizing the technique of issue analysis. In examining the distribution of power in New Haven from 1784 to the late fifties, Dahl found a "pluralistic" structure. Historically, power had changed from an oligarchic to a pluralistic system dominated by several elites. Dahl examined three issues -- urban renewal, school issues, and political nominations -- in an ex post facto design to determine who actually made key decisions, not who was reputed to be powerful. He found that the mayor had been powerful on all the issues. Overall, however, power was decentralized and the public had considerable direct influence, particularly through the ballot box.

Thus we have the other side of the coin. Dahl's analysis illustrated the effect of the democratic value system upon the distribution of power
in the local community. It served as a rebuttal and challenge to the reputational method and elitist model of Hunter. As noted, this masterful, in-depth case study served as a "rallying point" for political scientists and other social scientists who tended to favor the pluralistic model.

The pluralist perspective was presented in numerous studies by political scientists. While we will forgo a discussion of the debate between the elitists and the pluralists until Chapter IV, it should be noted that the argument was, and continues to be, caustic and polemic. Often lost in the rhetoric, however, was an issue of central importance to the field. Most of these studies were involved with analyzing the distribution of power within individual communities. It soon became evident that comparative analysis was essential if meaningful generalizations and substantive conclusions were to be advanced. We are now entering the "Comparative Era" of community power studies. One may rightfully state, "It's about time!"

4. The Comparative Era: Past Comparative Research and the Current Need

It would be highly inaccurate to propose that comparative power research has not been undertaken in the past. There have been numerous comparative examinations since Paul Miller's study in 1952. One of the first to offer a comparative approach to community studies was Albert Reiss, Jr. Although he was concerned with community studies in general, his remarks are pertinent to power research. Reiss believed that community studies were usually case studies without variables common to more than one study. When the study covered more than one community, it examined only the most elementary community variables. Reiss proposed
that comparative research in which relevant community variables were specified was needed.

Except for a longitudinal examination of leadership organizational involvement by Olmsted,23 little comparative, empirical research was undertaken until 1957. The most noteworthy effort of this period was presented by Delbert C. Miller.24 He examined a large city in the Pacific Northwest and a comparable city in southwestern England. In focusing on clique formation within the power structure, Miller proposed that a "cone model" be utilized to explain the finding that cliques formed around key influentials and varied according to the issue. It was concluded that there was no single solitary elite structure, and no hierarchical dominance based on one institutional sector. The "cone model" was most appropriate for the English city, where many more institutional spheres were represented in the power structure and the elected government officials had more power than in the Pacific City.

In addition to this cross-cultural, comparative study, some comparative conceptual and empirical work was being done within the United States. At the conceptual level, Rossi proposed that research on decision making should be extensive rather than intensive and comparative rather than the case-study technique.25 He offered three levels for comparisons; decision makers of different types, operating within different community and institutional settings should be compared as they come to the settlement of a range of issues. Empirically, two comparative studies may be noted. Charles Adrian examined the role of city managers and city councils in two middle-sized Michigan cities.26 The inactive role of city councilmen in leadership activities was noted.
Robert Agger and Daniel Goldrich studied the power structure of two small far-west communities. In comparing these Republican towns, Agger and Goldrich noted that when economic dominants do not control the power structure, (as they did not in the larger city) opportunities exist for Democrats to move directly into top leader positions without long apprenticeships in the Republican-dominated social structure. They viewed the efficacy of party organizations as being dependent upon the party complexion of the community power structure, which in turn depends upon the relationships among the local power, economic, and social structures. This study offered, therefore, one of the first attempts to relate the distribution of power to more general community structural variables.

Concern with comparative power research increased after 1960, and an increased interest was shown in relating the distribution of power to community structural variables. Rossi, based upon his prior work, attempted to conceptually link these phenomena. His general thesis posed that the pattern taken by the power structure of a community is a function of the kind of political life existent in that community. The specific hypothesis presented was, "in communities with partisan electoral procedures, whose officials are full-time functionaries, where party lines tend to coincide with class and status lines and where the party favored by the lower class and status groups has some good chance of getting elected to office, community power structures tend to be polythetic rather than monolithic."

Soon comparative studies appeared that further explored the relationship between community structure and power. Ernest Barth analyzed
six community case studies and revealed the functional relationship between the demographic and economic base of the community and the structure of the influence system. Among the associations noted were, (1) rapid population growth with a diffuse distribution of influence, (2) absentee-owned and operated businesses with an absense of an integrated influence system, and (3) rapid expansion of the community's economic base with the development of competing power elites. Bonjean and Carter undertook a comparative, structural analysis of leadership in four North Carolina cities. This analysis yielded three generalizations: (1) the greater the population influx experienced by the community, the less visible its leadership structure; (2) the greater the community poverty, the less visible its leadership structure; and (3) the less complex the political and economic structure of the community, the less visible its leadership structure. Another study of note, particularly for its conceptual and methodological contributions, was a comparative examination by Amos Hawley. Conceptually viewing the community as an "energy system," Hawley empirically studied the association between the concentration of power in the community, and urban renewal success for 1234 cities in the United States. He concluded that there was a positive association between these two variables. His ingenious use of aggregate data in the analysis of power and decision-making effectiveness was a major contribution to the methodological repertoire. Unfortunately, no one has utilized this technique -- a technique ideally suited to comparative analysis -- in the subsequent years.

Possibly the most extensive comparative power studies have been undertaken by scholars from Michigan State and Notre Dame Universities.
In these investigations from two to eleven cities were compared. Juarez, Mexico was included in the sample of cities and offered interesting cross-cultural comparisons, especially with El Paso, Texas. While the reputational technique was utilized in these investigations, it was supplemented by the examination of certain specific issues. The major comparative focus of these studies was on contrasting the class and occupational characteristics of the community leaders in cities of various size and cultural settings. For example, the predominant influence of business, government, and the independent professions in American cities was noted. By way of contrast, the Mexican cities, in which local government was highly viable, had the highest representation of the government sector in the power complex. In contrast to the cultural dimension, however, size appeared to be unrelated to business representation in the power structure. These studies did not provide theoretical or methodological innovations. No overall model for the comparative analyses of community power was proposed, and little attempt was made to analyse the "power structure" in truly "structural" terms. They did contribute, however, to the growing number of comparative studies; a contribution that must not be minimized.

Since 1965 comparative power research has exhibited three concerns. First, there has been a continuation of empirical field research. For example, William Gamson examined the exercise and distribution of power and analyzed instances of rancorous community conflict in eighteen New England towns. These studies presented two major contributions to power research. At the theoretical level, Gamson utilized certain elements of Smelser's theory of collective behavior ("structural
conduciveness," as measured by participative political structure and the existence of clearly defined solidary groups) in examining the relationship between community structural variables and the incidence of rancorous conflict. Although these measures of conduciveness to rancorous conflict did not differentiate the nine communities which had experienced conflict from the quiescent cities, the application of elements of collective behavior theory to the comparative study of social power and conflict was a major contribution. Furthermore, with regard to empirical findings, Gamson clarified issues relevant to the exercise of power by community actors. He showed, for example, that when reputational leaders were both active and united, they were on the winning side three-fourths of the time. This victorious record was not merely a function of their participation on the more active side. Furthermore, the side supporting change won only 30 percent of the time without the united support of the leaders, but 67 percent of the time with it.

Second, there has been the emergence of comparative power research utilizing extensive analysis of the literature. This work has often sought to determine (1) if there is an association between community structural variables and the distribution of power and/or (2) if the discipline or method of the researcher predetermines the findings regarding the distribution of power, i.e. sociologists utilizing the reputational approach are prone to describe "elitist" models of power. The answer to the first question has been a very definite "yes," and to the second, a tentative "no." With regard to the first question, Walton found that such structural variables as absentee ownership, economic resources, type
of city, party competition, and change in power structure were signifi-
cantly associated with the type (pyramidal, factional, or coalitional)
of power structure in fifty-five communities. He notes that each of
these variables reflects the interdependence of the community and extra-
community centers of power, or increased emphasis on the "vertical
axis." Gilbert similarly noted that such variables as regional loca-
tion, city type, governmental structure, and size were associated with
the structure of power in one hundred and sixty-six cities. Concern-
ing the second issue, Walton analyzed the relationship between three
variables: disciplinary background of the investigator, research method
employed, and type of power structure identified. This study revealed
a developmental sequence in which discipline tended to determine the
research method adapted. The research method, in turn, was related to
the type of power structure identified. With regard to findings such
as these, however, Clark et al. concluded on the basis of a study of
one hundred and sixty-six cities that method and discipline did not
correlate with the type or shape of power structure found. Community
structural characteristics were enormously more important than disci-
pline or method in predicting the type of power structure. These struc-
tural characteristics were posited as being fundamental in predisposing
communities toward different types of power structures. These studies
have made significant contributions to the comparative analysis of
community power and decision making. Specifically, they have been a major
catalyst in the development of comparative models, such as the one to be
presented in this study.
Third, there has been recently an attempt to develop conceptual models for comparative analysis. The development of such models is of paramount importance for the continued growth of the field. Many of the previous studies we have reviewed have been case studies. These investigations, while offering some excellent, in-depth analyses of individual communities, have a number of weaknesses for comparative research. Obviously it is difficult to generalize these findings when they are based on a sample of one case. The type of power structure described in these studies may not be representative of communities with differing ecological, demographic, political, organizational and economic structures. For example, in a southern, regional metropolis of 350,000 which serves as a financial, commercial, and political center, Hunter described a business-dominated, elite power structure. The extent to which similar structures are present in other communities (i.e. northern, smaller cities with different industrial, demographic and political profiles) is not clear or easily interpolated from the case study. Also, case studies present problems of reliability. Replication is exceedingly rare, and as we have seen, the research technique may affect the description of the power structure.

We also have noted, however, a number of comparative studies. While these studies were valuable in that their findings allowed greater generality, they still exhibited a tendency toward the idiosyncratic and a proclivity to simply ask "Who governs?" Little effort was made to isolate patterns among the various power structures described, or to search for conditions under which different configurations of power arose. Only recently, particularly since 1965, have studies been concerned with
analyzing the structure of power and its relationship to community structure and the exercise of decision making. As Clark states, these studies no longer seek simply to determine "who governs?" They are concerned with answering, "who governs, where, when, and with what effects?"49

They no longer seek simply to describe the structure of decision-making processes, but attempt to specify as precisely as possible the types of community structures, under varying conditions, which give rise to different patterns of decision making, and how these patterns in turn influence the actual outcomes of community decisions in one direction or another. 50

What is needed are models that allow for comparison of significantly contrasting patterns. These models are essential to the formulation of meaningful generalizations.

Clark has presented such a model.51 This work provides a most significant conceptualization of the relationship between the distribution of power and the social context in which it is embedded. Clark's conceptual model includes ten variables: (1) inputs to the community, (2) characteristics of the national society, (3) demographic characteristics of the community, (4) the adaptation (economic) functions of the community, (5) the goal-attainment (political structural characteristics) functions of the community, (6) the integration (political parties and voluntary organizations) functions of the community, (7) the functions of latent pattern maintenance and tension management (cultural activities) (8) intra-community variations of the characteristics of community leaders, (9) the decision-making structure of the community, and (10) community outputs. The first seven are viewed as input variables to the processual model. The eighth and ninth are intervening variables, while
the tenth is obviously the output variable. Clark operationalizes these concepts and explicitly posits their relationships in seven general formulations and thirty-eight propositions. The result is a model for comparative analyses that offers meaningful, conceptual hypotheses for empirical examination.

In the next chapter a similar model for comparative research will be presented. Although initially developed independently of the work of Clark, the conceptualization has greatly benefited from and been influenced by Clark's model. As the model is presented, the influence of Clark will be noted, and specific deviations from Clark's formulation will be explicitly cited.

Summary

We have completed our review of the literature. This highly structured review of the power literature has been solely to set the stage for the following study. We have seen the field move through various "eras," from a concern with case studies to a new interest in comparative research. It is within this new research focus that this study is embedded. The field needs conceptual models for comparative research. Such a model will be presented in Chapters II and III.
1. Placing the chapter on methods after the presentation of the model may be unorthodox. In this study, however, it is logical. The model was developed prior to any field work. The methods chapter serves as a bridge from the development of the model to its empirical application.

2. Scholarly concern with the nature of power has rather ancient roots. For example, Plato and Aristotle were concerned with human virtue and its attainment as a manifestation of power. Writers such as Ibn Khaldoun, Machiavelli, Pareto, Smith, Marx, Rousseau, etc. were deeply involved in relating power, its nature and exercise, to the structure of society. We, however, will focus on a much shorter chronological period and a more delineated unit of analysis, i.e. American community power and decision-making studies.


10. Actually, some other studies were already utilizing a modified reputational approach. See in particular Frank A. Stewart, "A Sociometric Study of Influence in Southtown," Sociometry, 10 (June 1947), pp. 11-31.

11. This method will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV.
12. Although this description of the elite of Atlanta is normally attributed to Hunter because of the emphasis that he placed upon it, it should be noted that he "doubted seriously" if power formed a single pyramid with any nicety in a community the size of Atlanta.


15. The technique basically involves a detailed analysis of one or more specific issues in a community in an attempt to determine who the actual participants and decision makers were in each issue, and how the decisions were made.

16. As one may note, the pluralistic thesis is much more compatible with the democratic value system of America than the elitist model.

17. Once again, it must be noted that the reputational approach continued to be utilized in the sixties. Many studies employed the reputational technique, however not all of them posited an elitist model. For example see Baha Abu-Laban, "Social Origins and Occupational Career Patterns of Community Leaders," Sociological Inquiry, 35 (Spring 1963), pp. 131-140; Thomas Hood and Joel Smith, "The Delineation of Community Power Structures by a Reputational Approach," Sociological Inquiry, 36 (Winter 1956), pp. 3-14; M. Kent Jennings, Community Influentials: The Elites of Atlanta (Glencoe, Illinois:
20. For an example of one early study utilizing this approach see Marion Pearsall and Solon Kimball, "Event Analysis as an Approach to Community Study," Social Forces, 34 (October 1965), pp. 58-63.


29. Ibid., p. 400.


34. Concentration of power was measured by the "MPO ratio," i.e., the ratio of managers, proprietors, and officials to the employed labor force. The lower the "MPO ratio," the greater the concentration of power.

35. Some may argue that Hawley's approach is of limited value because of the lack of "fit" between the concept of power concentration and the operational indicator, i.e., the "MPO ratio." This criticism, however, masks the essential value of utilizing demographic and aggregate data for the analysis of social power.

37. For example, four issues were analyzed in El Paso; the establishment of a United Fund, a private hospital, municipal elections, and a general public hospital.


39. The cross-cultural comparison of leadership characteristics may be viewed as the major contribution of these investigations.


45. For a criticism of these studies see Nelson W. Polsby, "Pluralism in the Study of Community Power, or Erklaerung Before Verklarung in Wissenssoziologic," The American Sociologist (May 1969), pp. 118-123.


50. Ibid.

51. Terry Clark, _op. cit._, pp. 15-126. As far as this author knows, the Clark model is the only comparative model in existence other than the one to be presented in this study.
CHAPTER II

The Model:
Community Structural Variables
and the Characteristics of the Leadership Pool

The exercise of social power does not occur in a vacuum. When examining social power in any system, one must consider the relationship of this phenomenon to other system properties and to factors that impinge upon the system from its environment. The assumption that the nature, distribution, structure, and exercise of power in a system is related to intra-and inter-systemic variables is the central foundation of this study. These proposed relationships, however, are more than pure speculation. As we noted in Chapter I, they have empirical support from recent studies. Furthermore, they will be examined empirically in this investigation.

At the community level of analysis, various dimensions of the "power structure" would appear to be effected by community structural variables. For example, the structure of a community may influence such factors as who in the community has power; what institutional and organizational units are represented in the "power structure;" the interrelationship among the power actors; how power is exercised; what conditions existent in the community are perceived and defined by the power actors as problems; and what structure of action the power actors employ to ameliorate these defined problems. While we will not be utilizing these
same terms, we will be considering similar questions in the following pages.

In Chapter I we noted the need for and interest in comparative community power research. Many previous studies have been case studies of single communities. They attempted no comparative analysis, and the generality of their findings was limited. What is even more problematic, however, is that these case studies and the majority of the comparative studies did not attempt to relate their findings concerning the nature, distribution, and exercise of power to the structure of the community they were studying. Instead, we often received lurid tales of "behind-the-scene" manipulation by businessmen, examples of covert and overt utilization of threats, coercion, and force to effect decisions, interesting stories of political bossism and the functioning of political machines, etc. While these stories may have made interesting reading, the question "Could it be that the type of community I have here is affecting who has power in it?" was seldom posed. Without asking this crucial question, any power study becomes less meaningful, for the conditions which determine the structure of power, and all this structure implies for the exercise of power, remain unknown. What we have, therefore, are two interrelated problems. First, a failure to conceptualize and examine the relationship of community power to other structural components of the community system, and second, a lack of comparative research. These problems are mutually reinforcing. Lacking an interest in the first relationship, the need for comparative research is minimal; without comparative research, there seems to be little demand for
examining the association between community structural variables and the configuration of community power.

The model we will present attempts to ameliorate these conditions. It is concerned with the relationships between four general sets of variables, or "dimension-sets": (1) community structural variables, (2) characteristics of the "leadership pool" of the community, (3) variables related to the "leadership pool's" perception and definition of community problems, and (4) variables related to the types of community action that are proposed by the "leadership pool" to assuage these problems. This model is processual. It posits, as shown in Figure I, that community structural variables will affect the characteristics of the "leadership pool" (A). Furthermore, the characteristics of the "leadership pool" will influence what, how, and why certain conditions existent in the community are perceived and defined as problems (B). Finally, the nature of these community problem definitions will effect the types of action proposed by the "leadership pool" to correct these problems (C). The model is also concerned with perception. What is

A PROCESUAL MODEL FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Figure 1.
the nature of the perception and definition of problems, how do various problem definitions differ, what do they share in common, does the "leadership pool" perceive problems that are objectively present in the community, etc.? Therefore, in this study we will not be concerned with questions relevant to the exercise of power per se. While questions such as, "how does the 'leadership pool' influence decisions?" are interesting and legitimate, at this time we will be concerned solely with the "leadership pool's" definition of problems and its proposals for action. Future analysis of the exercise of power is planned. Such an analysis will be included in a book-length study that is proposed in the future.

In this chapter we will present the first two dimension-sets in the model. We will be concerned specifically with the structural dimensions, i.e., the community structural variables and the characteristics of the leadership pool. These dimensions will be defined and the specific variables included in each set will be examined and operationally defined. Furthermore, justification for the inclusion of the variables on empirical and/or theoretical grounds will be given. Finally, illustrative propositions interrelating these two sets of variables will be posed. The final two dimension-sets of the model will be presented in Chapter III.

Before turning to the model, however, we must first consider the concept of social power. Since this study is concerned with the perception and definition of problems by men in power, it is crucial that we specify what is meant by social power, and note certain of its characteristics.
Social Power

A. Definition

We shall define social power as the ability of a system component to actualize its interests (attain goals, prevent interference, command respect, etc.), whether consciously or unconsciously, within the context of asymmetrical relationships within the system and thereby affect the processes in the system.

Let us look more closely at this definition. It reflects the influence of various writers, including Loomis, French, Clark, Dahl, Parsons, and Weber. Its weaknesses, however, are those of the author. To begin, we state that social power is an ability of a system component. In defining social power as an ability we are stating that the actual exercise of power is relatively unimportant for our concerns. What does interest us are those system components, i.e., individuals, groups, and organizations, that have the ability to exercise power, whether they do so or not. Obviously, the past exercise of power affects the perceived power of any social component. For example, past "victories" in instances of community conflict may increase the perceived social power of an individual. While it is practically untenable, this increased base of social power may never be exercised again. The important point, however, is that it could be!

It should be noted that this definition has a "systemic" orientation. This orientation is valuable for two reasons. First, if our definition is to have general value, it must be applicable to social power in any social setting, not just the community. Social power is
evidenced in the dyad, families, friendship groups, organizations, institutional spheres, and even broader social units. By viewing social power as a concept relating to an empirical phenomenon in any social system, our definition becomes more flexible. Second, since we are concerned with the perception and definition of problems, we prefer to define the community as a problem-solving system. Therefore, while our definition discusses social power in any system, we will focus upon the community as so defined.

The next section of the definition states that the system component is able to actualize its interests (attain goals, prevent interference, command respect, etc.) This phrase presents the purpose for the exercise of social power by an individual or collectivity. Some may object that this section posits a "rational man" approach to human behavior. It has the value, however, of adding the idea of "vested interests" to the definition and highlighting the point made by Loomis that the exercise of power is an attempt to control others. Furthermore, the next phrase tends to limit any undue stress that might be placed upon the element of rationality.

This phrase states, whether consciously or unconsciously. The point being emphasized in this section is that an individual or collectivity possessing a great amount of social power may actualize its interests or effect the processes of the system either consciously (intentionally, rationally, or if you will, purposefully) or unconsciously. For example, a decision made by a top corporation executive may be consciously aimed at increasing profits in the competitive market. While the proposal may succeed in enlarging the corporation's treasury, it may also effect
the lives of every individual in the community through such measures as increased prices and personnel layoffs. The increase in profits may be conscious, while the decrease in the standard of living may not.

Obviously, another example of the unconscious exercise of social power is deference. When an individual or collectivity is viewed as being "powerful" by others in the system, the more subordinate units may act with deference toward the more powerful. For example, the subordinate may, by taking the role of the other, adapt and orient his behavior to what he believes the superordinate desires it to be. The "homespun" advice to "polish the old man's apple if you want to keep your job" is only one example. Performing a task, whether willingly or not, before being requested is another. While these rather trite examples all concern the interpersonal level of interaction, deference also occurs between organizations, polities, etc. What is obvious is that the exercise of social power need not be conscious or planned, but as in the case of deference, may be quite unconscious and actually unknown to the power actor.

The next section states WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ASYMMETRICAL RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE SYSTEM. The basic emphasis of this phrase is that the exercise of power takes place in interaction between system components. For example, actor 'A' may attempt to affect the behavior of actor 'B.' Due to any one of a number of bases of social power soon to be discussed, 'A' has more social power than 'B.' The relationship could be viewed as 'A' affecting 'B' or A→B. This is a traditional description of a basic superordinate-subordinate, one-way relationship. What is meant by "asymmetrical relationships," however, is that 'B' also affects, or
influences, 'A,' but not in as great an amount or to as great an extent as 'A's' effect on B; A \rightarrow B. If the two actors were equal in power, then the relationship is symmetrical, or A \leftrightarrow B. This concept has been described in other discussions of power. Furthermore, Weber's famous statement that power is the probability that an actor can carry out his own will despite resistance can be subsumed under this concept. 'B' may resist the effort of 'A' to exercise power, but since the relationship is asymmetrical, 'B's' power over 'A' is less than 'A's' over 'B,' and 'A' will prevail. What this section emphasizes most of all, however, is that power is exercised in interactional settings, and that certain system components -- due to differing bases of social power -- are more "powerful" than others.

Finally, the definition concludes with the general statement, AND THEREBY AFFECT THE PROCESSES IN THE SYSTEM. This general statement exactly pinpoints our interest in this study. We are interested in locating which system units have the ability to affect the functioning of the community social system, and can thereby aid or hinder social change within that system. It is proposed that their perception and definition of community problems will effect the processes of change in the system.

B. Authority and Influence

Our concept of social power can be further divided into an authoritative component called authority, and a non-authoritative component termed influence. Authority is formalized and institutionalized power. Its basis is the office or position. Following Weber,
we will view authority as residing in the office or status-role, not in the individual. The right to exercise power in an authoritative relationship is determined by members of the social system. It is normatively based and therefore legitimate. Authority is non-transferable.

Influence is the non-authoritative component of power. Simply, it can be considered as any power not based upon an office or position. Influence may have various bases ranging from control of finances, skill in manipulating people, social credits accumulated through the mechanism of exchange, expertise, wealth, reputation, prestige, to outstanding individual qualities. It may be viewed as power which is not built into the authority component of the status role, but results (1) from the willingness of the subordinate to become involved with the superordinate or (2) from an unwilling response or compliance by a subordinate resulting from some type of coercion. The capacity to influence may reside in the individual actor and his facilities, but it does not reside in the office or position.

Authority and influence interact. Both components of power may be present in the same power actor. A mayor, for example, has the authority of the office and often a considerable amount of influence due to various individual skills and qualities (i.e., ability to manipulate or control the political machine, wealth, prestige, etc.). While it is theoretically possible to have social power entirely composed of either authority or influence, usually they are found in some combination. What is crucial to the observer, however, in determining whether or not power is based upon authority or influence, is to examine the situation
in which power is exercised. In one case, the exercise of power by an actor may be authoritatively based, and in another instance be based upon influence.

C. The Bases of Social Power

It is obvious from the above that authority and influence differ as to their bases. Throughout the literature it has been shown that the effective exercise of social power requires facilities and various resources. Whether it be the governorship or a fistful of mortgages, all social power is based upon certain resources. What are these bases of social power?

There are many different answers to the above question. Lasswell and Kaplan see power as being built upon the following bases: respect, affection, well-being, rectitude, wealth, skill, enlightenment, or favorable value position.\(^7\)

For Parsons social power is a result of three sets of factors: (1) valuation of the unit (power actor) according to qualitative and quantitative judgments based upon cultural value standards, (2) the degree to which an actor or actors in the system is permitted by other system actors to deviate from those standards in performance, and (3) the control of possessions which is a source of differential advantage in bringing a desired result.\(^8\)

Rossi makes a most crucial point that has bearing on the following section. In discussing various types of power structures, he posits a causal association between the bases of power and the inequality of power among actors in the system. Rossi proposes five key attributes to
the successful exercise of power: (1) control over wealth and resources, (2) control over mass media, (3) control over solidary groups, (4) control over values, and (5) control over prestigeful interaction. What is required in the utilization of these resources is their conversion into control of institutions which can be used as sanctions.

Even though we have barely scratched the surface, it is obvious that we have a great variety of lists of important bases of power. As Clark notes, this problem is the social analogy of potential energy in physics. Having scanned the above lists, and several others, we have decided to accept the list of bases developed by Clark for our study. This list includes the main variables encountered above. For our purposes, therefore, the bases of social power are (1) money and credit, (2) control over jobs, (3) control of mass media, (4) high social status, (5) knowledge and specialized skills, (6) popularity and esteemed personal characteristics, (7) legality, (8) subsystem solidarity, (9) the right to vote, (10) social access to community leaders, (11) commitments of followers, (2) manpower and control of organizations, and (13) control over the interpretation of values. It should not be assumed that each of these resources is equally "valuable." These resources vary according to their generality. As Clark states, "Resources that are highly specific to a particular situation, or valuable to only a narrow range of persons, or which may be exchanged only in restricted markets, are less valuable for many purposes than more general resources." For example, after examining such factors as the generality, prestige, exchange value, expendability, durability, etc., of these resources, Clark concludes that three resources -- money and
credit, knowledge, and control of mass media — are extremely valuable because of their high exchange values and their general applicability. Certain other resources, however, such as the right to vote, are not nearly as valuable. While our concern in this study is not with the exercise of power, it should be noted that this inequality in the value of resources is extremely important. The extent to which these resources vary along these various dimensions has important implications for their utilization in specific instances and for the exercise of social power in general. In various instances of conflict and in certain issues that arise, no actor in the community may have power to independently effect a decision. This situation may be due to the actor's power being based upon specific resources. Various strategies are available to community actors in situations such as this. Actors may chose to form coalitions and/or exchange resources to develop adequate power bases. While these are interesting phenomena deserving of study, we will resist the temptation to pursue them at this time.

D. The Stratification of Power

There is a final issue relevant to our definition of social power, however, that must be considered before we turn to the explication of the comparative model. As we shall note in Chapter IV, this issue also is directly related to the research methodology utilized in this study.

The issue centers about the criticism that some might offer of our definition, wherein it implies that every individual, group, or organization has social power. If this inference is correct, how are we able to select certain individuals or collectivities from the community system and claim that they are the most powerful actors?
Let us first examine the inference. Our definition does allow that all system units have some degree of social power. In specific situations any actor may be able to actualize its interests and effect the processes of the system, be it a new born baby crying at 2:00 a.m., or the President moving troops into a foreign nation. Our definition allows for such a range of behavior. While the inference is correct, we feel justified in locating and selecting certain power actors as leaders. Power is not equal in the system.

The issue basically concerns the stratification of social power. We have noted that social power is based upon various resources. Since social power is dependent upon these bases, let us examine whether or not the bases of power are stratified. If they are, one may be able to assume that social power is also stratified.

Of our thirteen bases of power, the majority appear to be stratified. It would appear that in most American communities (the unit of analysis in this study) (1) money and credit are unquestionably stratified. In addition, to a large degree so are (2) control over jobs, (3) control of mass media, (4) high social status, (5) knowledge and specialized skills, (6) popularity and esteemed personal characteristics, (7) legality, (10) social access to community leaders, (11) commitments to followers, (12) manpower and control of organizations, and (13) control over the interpretation of values. The eighth base, subgroup solidarity, varies according to the degree of subgroup heterogeneity in a given community. The degree to which it is stratified is an empirical question not answerable in the general case. Finally, the right to vote, with the possible exception of certain areas such as the American South,
and for certain age groups, is primarily unstratified in modern democracies.

Thus, eleven of the thirteen bases are definitely stratified to some degree, while two may not be in certain cases. We have previously noted the lack of a general direct relationship between the bases of social power and its exercise; a relationship complicated by such dimensions as the generality, applicability, durability, expendability, etc. of these resources. Realizing this problem, we do feel justified in viewing social power as stratified. While all system components have social power to some extent, certain actors — due to the stratified nature of the bases of power and the actor's differential access to these power resources — are more "powerful" than others.

Community Structural Variables

Having defined social power and examined some of its characteristics, we are now prepared to explicate our comparative model. The first set of dimensions in the model are those relevant to the structure of the community. The relationship between the structure of a community and the processes and patterns of behavior to be found in it has been an issue of theoretical and empirical concern for many years. Within the discipline of sociology, urban scholars in general and human ecologists in particular have pursued the analysis of these relationships. For example, Burgess noted associations between certain ecological and structural elements of urban areas and the forms of behavior existent in these zonal areas. Wirth and Simmel pessimistically proposed that increasing urbanization led to depersonalization, anomie, weakened
kinship bonds, disappearance of the neighborhood, etc., within the city population. A considerable effort has been exerted in attempting to develop classifications of communities based upon such variables as the dominant function, economic base, and/or demographic characteristics of the community. This effort at classification was an outgrowth of an early concern in defining the rural-urban continuum. Most recently, advances in the areas of social area analysis and factoral ecology have attempted to inductively isolate clusters of structural variables that effect the processes of the system.

The number of structural variables that could be included in the model is manifold. We will consider only those structural elements of the community that would appear to effect the distribution, structure, and exercise of social power in the community. The selection of these elements is deductively based upon previous theoretical or empirical works. In addition, a certain amount of "face validity" is evident in the selection.

The variables included in our model are population size, demographic heterogeneity, community autonomy, governmental structure, organizational density, economic heterogeneity (economic base), and social class. It should first be noted that these variables are only relevant to comparative studies within the United States; there are no cross-cultural variables included in the model. With the increasing scale of society, the national cultural components are somewhat controlled. If the model was applied to communities in different cultural settings, these variables would have to be included. Also, if communities in different regional areas of the United States were to be compared, the regional
variables should also be considered. For example, Gilbert examined the impact of regional location on the distribution of power in the local community and concluded that communities in the West tended to be more pluralistic than those in the South or East. Region is not included in our model, however, because all of the sampled cities are located in a single state in the United States.

Let us now turn to a brief discussion of each of these variables. We will attempt to more explicitly define these concepts, offer justification for their inclusion in the model, and propose possible operational indicators for each of them.

A. Population Size and Rate of Growth

The relationship between the size of the population in any system and other properties of the system has long been an issue of theoretical and empirical concern. Generally, it is assumed that an increase in the number of inhabitants in a system, in this case the community, leads to increasing structural differentiation. Many examples of the relationship of size to other elements of the community could be offered. With increasing size the system is faced with providing additional and expanded services to the community. Additional strain is placed upon those elements of the community concerned with such functions as social control, socialization, mutual support, and general system integration. With increasing numbers of inhabitants, the provision of general services, such as streets, sewers, parks, sanitation, utilities, etc., becomes problematic. Local government is faced with the problem of increasing these services, as well as being confronted with other
issues such as an increasing need for zoning, larger police and fire departments, traffic congestion and transportation flow, etc. Other elements of the community, such as the school system, production-distribution-consumption subsystem, the financial, health, and religious institutions, etc. also face problems regarding the distribution of services and increased functional requisites. In sum, the resultant structural differentiation associated with increasing size affects all the elements of the community system.

It would appear that the population size of a community would also affect the distribution and structure of power in the system. The structure of power in a small, rural, mid-western service town is obviously different than that in New York City. With increasing size, structural elaboration and differentiation, it would appear that the power structure would be more pluralistic. Furthermore, the government and political institutions would apparently play major roles in the local power complex due to an increase in the demands for governmental services, increased size of the governmental bureaucracy, and more numerous full-time political roles.

What support is there in the power literature for viewing size as a crucial independent variable? A number of writers have directly or indirectly noted its importance. The demographic variable, however, has been emphasized most strongly in the work of Gilbert and Clark. Gilbert found that population size has some relationship to the type of power structure found in the city. Among the findings were that very large cities were more frequently pluralistic than smaller ones. In all cities, pyramidal structures were most often headed by elected
officials, but the tendency was greatest in cities of large population. In cities of more than 100,000 any combination of officials and non-officials was rare, whereas combinations occur about one-fourth the time in smaller cities. Also, nonofficials were found in greater numbers as heads of pyramidal and multipyramidal structures in cities of fewer than 100,000. Finally, factions in large cities tended to be headed by officials and in smaller cities by a combination of officials and others.\textsuperscript{25}

Clark proposed, and later empirically substantiated in a study of fifty-one communities, that the larger the number of inhabitants in a community, the greater the structural differentiation, the greater the differentiation between potential elites, the more decentralized the decision-making structure. . . .\textsuperscript{26} The empirical findings in this case are most impressive. We are positing basically the same proposition.

While size can be posed as a crucial structural variable, we must make one qualification. Gilbert did find a gross association between population size and the structure of power, however he concluded that growth rates correlated with political attributes more often and more strongly than simple size. It appears to us that growth rates may actually be a more sensitive, precise indicator than size of increasing structural differentiation. For the size variable to be meaningful, large differences in community size must be examined; a difference in community size of one to five thousand, for example, may not entail large differences in structural differentiation among comparative communities. Communities of basically the same size may, however, have very different growth rates. These differences in the growth rates could have serious implications for the distribution and structure of power. A city with
a growth rate of 40 percent faces different types of problems and stresses than one with a rate of 4 percent, even though they are of similar size! In the former, massive strain is placed upon local institutions to provide services to the proportionately larger population. The demands on local government become particularly pressing as such "mundane" concerns as the extension of sewer and water lines, street improvements, zoning, etc., suddenly become major issues. Furthermore, with a large rate of growth, other areas, particularly business and industry, may expand. The increased rate of growth and structural differentiation may lead to fracturing of the old normative order as new life styles and values are intruded upon the community. A community in such a state of increasing scale would appear to foster a pluralistic power structure, in which power would tend to be confined to specific institutional areas and the exercise of power would take place through exchange and coalition formation. It would appear, therefore, that controlling for size, the greater the rate of population growth, the more pluralistic the power structure.

In the next section we will relate each of these structural variables to specific characteristics of the leadership pool. At this time, let us simply note that, by definition, current population figures and percentage population change since 1950 are useful indicators of size and rate of growth.

B. **Demographic Heterogeneity**

Demographic heterogeneity refers to the degree to which the population of a community is divided along ethnic, and particularly in the
latter twentieth century, racial lines. The greater the number of racial and ethnic groups, the greater the demographic heterogeneity. The distribution, structure, and exercise of power in a community would appear to be influenced by the degree of heterogeneity in the population. We previously noted that one of the bases of social power was subsystem solidarity. When the population of a community is heterogenous, this base may become a valuable resource for potential power actors. Particularly in communities where subcultures and subgroups are socially visible and organized, they and their spokesmen may become important actors in the leadership pool. The rise of certain ethnic groups to positions of leadership in the political and economic institutions in American cities during the late 19th and early 20th centuries is an obvious example. Currently, the "Black Movement" is attempting to alter the distribution and structure of power not only in the local community, but in the larger society as well. Of course, cleavages in the community associated with demographic heterogeneity facilitate the development of conflict, as groups attempt to realize their vested interests in the system. Due, therefore, to the expansion of the resource of subsystem solidarity, we would propose that the greater the demographic heterogeneity in the community, the more pluralistic or decentralized the decision-making structure.

There is limited support in the literature for the inclusion of this variable in our model. Gilbert found that cities with medium and high rates of nonwhite population increase tended to be pluralistic. While population size may be a contaminating variable in this finding relative to an increase, not the simple magnitude, of the nonwhite ratio,
it would appear that the variable is justified for inclusion due to its logical relationship to the distribution of power. The proportion of the population which is nonwhite combined with the percentage of the population which is foreign-born, may serve as a useful operational indicator.

C. Community Autonomy

There is an increasing concern in sociology with the relationship of community autonomy to other elements of the community system. Two related notions are implied in these discussions. First, there is the proposition that with the increasing scale of our society, the spread of vast organizational networks throughout the land, increased federal and state financing of local community projects, development of regional and national markets, etc., local people have become unable to determine the goals, policies, and operations of local community units. The local community is now dependent upon external sources, such as state governments and central offices which make key decisions effecting the life of the community. The growing number of ties between the local community and non-local units and networks is viewed as having weakened local community integration. As the community is drawn into the larger society, the local unit ceases to be a viable, decision-making entity.

There is, however, a second, related use of the concept of autonomy. The term may be applied to the degree of functional autonomy at the local level. The question in this case is the extent to which local community institutions perform requisite functions having locality relevance. The issue concerns, if you will, the viability of the local
institutions. A local governmental institution could be viewed as autonomous if it provided essential services and performed crucial functions for the community system at the local level. A nonautonomous, or dependent, nonviable governmental institution, however, would be one which provided fewer services and functions. As a result, the local community residents would have to go elsewhere for these services. Obviously, if a local government does not provide parks, child-welfare services, hospital services, police and fire protection, etc., it is a less viable, autonomous institution than one that does. The autonomy of the economic institution can be similarly examined by measuring the extent to which it performs vital functions for the relevant locality, such functions as providing jobs for the local population.

Local autonomy, therefore, involves the ability of local individuals, groups, and organizations to determine the goals, policies, and operations of the community, and the existence of viable, functionally-autonomous, locally based institutions. As a structural variable, the degree of local autonomy would apparently affect the distribution, structure, and exercise of power in the community. Increasing non-local involvement and lessening functional-autonomy would alter many of the bases of social power, such as control over wealth, the media, jobs, knowledge and specialized skills, manpower and control of organizations, and control over the interpretation of values. Furthermore, new resources and sanctions are introduced with increasing vertical ties to the larger society. These provide new and enlarged bases of social power.
The literature provides justification for the inclusion of the autonomy variable. Many writers have directly or indirectly considered its relationship to local configurations of power. In 1958 and 1959 Robert Schulze and later Norton Long each published articles of relevance to the question of the relationship of autonomy to the distribution of power. Schulze examined the changing role of economic dominants in the power structure of Cibola, as the community moved from a self-contained unit to a satellite community. After 1930 Cibola had come under the economic dominance of a nearby metropolitan center. A growing number of large absentee-owned branch plants were located in the community. Financial ties among the local dominants dissolved. The corporations, however, being concerned with good community relations, did not become involved in local affairs. Long specifically examined the role of absentee-owned corporation executives in local community issues. He also states that even though the branch plant is not locally owned, the corporation is public relations conscious. He noted, however, that the local manager above all attempts to avoid trouble and controversy. He finds himself involved with ritual and "do-goodism" in community affairs, and, except at rare times when corporation profits are directly concerned, he has little reason for participating.

Further evidence for this "absentee-owned executive-withdrawal" syndrome was provided by Form and Clelland. They compared the community power positions of economic dominants in a satellite and an independent city over a period of a century. In both communities they withdrew from elective and political office as business became integrated into national markets. Partial withdrawal from office in civic
associations came later. Economic dominants in the independent city were more often cited as public leaders or top influentials, and were involved more frequently in local issues and projects than those in the satellite city.

Absentee-ownership has often been used as an indicator of autonomy. Clark has proposed that the degree of absentee-ownership is directly related to the distribution of power. He notes the withdrawal from community affairs by the executives of these corporations, and proposed that the greater the number of absentee-owned enterprises in the community, the more decentralized the decision-making structure.\(^{36}\)

In many communities -- particularly the smaller, functionally unspecialized ones -- if a single sector dominates community decision making, it tends to be the economic sector. Within the economic sector, it is the owners or managers of the largest locally owned and managed enterprises who tend to dominate. Consequently, factors leading to a decrease in the (instrumental) community-wide activities of executives of local enterprises tend to lead to a more decentralized decision-making structure. Absentee-ownership is one important factor in the noninvolvement of executives from large enterprises, which in turn influences the community decision-making structure.\(^{37}\)

Recently conceptual and empirical studies have directly considered the relationship of autonomy to the distribution of power. Warren has posed a negative relationship between local autonomy and a broad distribution of community decision-making power.\(^{38}\) He notes that autonomy denotes local control over maximally localized institutions. "In operation, it would take the form of the least possible absentee-ownership and in general the fewest possible organizational ties, both in the economy and in other sectors, to more inclusive organizations outside the community."\(^{39}\) The less autonomous the community, the broader the distribution of local power.
Walton empirically found the same relationship in a study of fifty-five communities. He found that the presence of absentee-owned corporations, competitive party politics, adequate economic resources and satellite status are positively related with the presence of competitive power structures. Walton proposed that each of these variables reflects the interdependence of the community and extracommunity centers of power, i.e., they are indicators of autonomy. Therefore, he offers the proposition that "to the extent that the local community becomes increasingly interdependent with respect to extra-community institutions . . . the structure of local leadership becomes more competitive."

Thus, there is substantial justification in the literature for including the autonomy variable in our model. The crucial issue, however, is to isolate what elements of the concept have the greatest utility for our model. The concept of autonomy encompasses many variables; it is an "open" concept. It would appear, however, that limiting the concept to the economic and governmental-political institutions would be valuable. The structures of these two institutional areas are crucial determinates of the distribution and structure of power in the community. Both of these institutions are directly relevant to many of the bases of power. As we have noted, many writers have examined economic autonomy by utilizing such indicators as absentee-ownership. It has been offered that decreased economic autonomy results in a broader distribution of community power for various reasons. When the executives of absentee-owned corporations withdraw from local affairs, they also withdraw important resources from the available supply of power bases; a "leveling effect" tends to result. However, when they are active in local issues,
they also tend to widen the distribution of power by intruding new tactics, life styles, values, resources (e.g. taxes) etc., into the local system -- not to mention simply increasing the number of competing actors who potentially have the resources to be influential. Furthermore, when the locus for such important economic decisions having community-wide implications as personnel lay-offs or the relocation of plants lies outside the community, the viability of the local decision-making structure is weakened.

The degree of political and governmental autonomy is also relevant to the distribution of power. If a large percentage of local government revenue and services comes from outside sources, the autonomy and resource base of the local government institution may be weakened. For instance, the decision to allocate certain funds to the local community from state sources obviously entails a decision whose locus is outside the community, and whose resolution is only indirectly influenced by the local citizens.

Economic and political autonomy may vary independently of each other. The possible configurations are presented in Figure II. From the literature we have noted that where both institutions are autonomous, there is a tendency for an elitist structure of power to be existent in the community. Where they are both dependent, the tendency is toward pluralism. With political-dependence and economic-autonomy, one would expect a more pluralistic system than type I, but with strong economic influence. Political autonomy and economic dependence would be still more pluralistic, but with strong governmental and political influence.
THE RELATIONSHIP OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL AUTONOMY TO THE STRUCTURE OF THE LEADERSHIP POOL

**Political**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autonomy</th>
<th>Dependence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elitist</td>
<td>Moderately Elitist with Strong Economic Influence</td>
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<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately Pluralistic with Strong Government Influence</td>
<td>Pluralistic</td>
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Figure 2.

Operational indicators for a variable as inclusive and "open" as autonomy always are inadequate to some degree. The degree of economic and political autonomy along the decision-making dimension might be measured, however, by the percentage of local industry that is absentee-owned, and the proportion of local governmental revenue that comes from state and federal sources. Possible indicators of the functional-autonomy dimension include: the percentage of those employed persons who live in the community, but work outside the county; the number of services performed by the local government; the per capita expenditures by the local government; and/or the size of the local governmental institution as measured by the number of residents per full-time governmental employee. We will utilize these indicators to measure economic and political autonomy.

D. Governmental Structure

The structure of local government in the United States basically varies along three dimensions: the locus of executive authority, the
method of electing representatives, and the type of ballot used. At one extreme is what may be called a traditional, political structure. In this form executive authority resides in the office of a mayor; representatives are elected by ward or district; and a partisan ballot is utilized. The other basic form of government is often labelled a "reform" or "good government" structure. In this case, executive authority resides in the position of the city manager; representation is on an at-large basis; and a non-partisan ballot is used. These three dimensions, however, need not -- and do not -- vary together. They are independent dimensions and can appear in any combination. Also, a combination of at-large and district representation is often included with the other two variables. There is a tendency, though, for them to appear in the above configurations. Finally, these forms vary by geographical region. Mayor forms of government occur 65 percent of the time in the Northeast, 55 percent in the Midwest, 38 percent in the border states, and only 15 percent in the West. The city manager structure, however, is strong in the West (81 percent), South (59 percent), and border states (56 percent), but weaker in the Midwest (37 percent) and Northeast (18 percent).

The governmental structure of the local community would appear to affect the distribution and structure of social power in the total community system. Obviously government has the legal basis of power in the local system. The structure of this legal, authoritatively-based power would appear to be relevant to the configuration of other elements of social power in the community. For example, it is generally assumed
that administrative authority reaches its highest degree of centralization and articulation in the city manager, as opposed to the mayor, form of government. If this is the case, in cities with city manager governments, with less direct political control and involvement with the executive office, one might expect greater governmental influence in the leadership pool. Also, we must remember that the "good government" structure was proposed as a "reform" of the traditional structure. This reform was aimed at eliminating corruption, "bossism," and political "in-fighting" from local government, and increasing citizen participation in the political process. If citizen participation does in fact increase, power becomes more dispersed and the structure more pluralistic.

The consequences, however, of these contrasting structures are not clear. It may also be that certain elements of the traditional structure -- particularly ward or district representation -- may also increase citizen participation and result in increased pluralism. With district representation the councilman or alderman is directly responsible to a constituency which shares common problems and expectations due to ecological, racial, and/or class similarities. Where these groups have some control over their representative through the ballot box, they may have more direct influence in the structure of power. Of course, a crucial assumption of either position that may not be tenable is that the local government is a viable, important element in the local power structure.

This variable has been included in many previous studies. Like the above argument, however, the relationship posed and the findings reported often have been contradictory. Rossi proposed that in communities
with partisan electoral procedures, whose officials are full-time
funcionaries, where party lines tend to coincide with class and status
lines and where the party favored by the lower class and status groups
has some good chance of getting elected to office, community power
structures tend to be polythic rather than monolithic. This propo-
sition was based upon the assumption that the pattern taken by the power
structure of a community is a function of the kind of political life to
be found in it. He sees the political institution of a community as the
ultimate locus of the decisions that are binding on the total community.

Hawley posed that those communities with strong centralized,
executive control (city manager governments) would be most successful in
achieving the execution stage of urban renewal programs. They were.
Similarly, Crain and Rosenthal found that the structure of local govern-
ment was a crucial determinate of the outcome of flouridation issues.
Flouridation has the best chance of being accepted where there is a city
manager form of government, the existence of mechanisms to insulate the
executive from "irregular pressures" relevant to this issue, and a low
level of direct citizen participation.

Other writers have directly examined the relationship between
governmental structure and the distribution and structure of community
power. The results, however, are not consistent. Walton found no
association between the type of local government and the structure of
power. Gilbert, however, found that towns with non-partisan electoral
procedures were somewhat more pluralistic. Furthermore, cities with
ward systems and city managers were more pluralistic than those with
at-large systems and other forms besides city managers. Clark,
however, notes that non-partisan electoral procedures tend to favor the better organized and wealthier segments of the community. This bias results from the fact that (1) the voter turnout in non-partisan elections is low due to a lack of clear party identification, however the middle and upper class votes tend to be proportionately higher in low-turnout elections, (2) candidates for office under non-partisan elections are more likely to turn to business organizations and wealthy individuals for campaign funds, and (3) with no party identification, pre-election information about the candidates assumes an important role, this tends to discriminate against the lower class. Clark, therefore, posits that the larger the number of governmental statuses in the community filled according to non-partisan procedures, the more monolithic the power structure.

We thus have precedent for including this variable in our model. The direction of the proposed association, however, is not clear; the findings are simply contradictory. In our model, we will relate this variable to a number of dimensions of the leadership pool; not just the monolithic-pluralistic variable. An index of governmental structure can be developed by giving a government one point for each of the three components in a city manager, non-partisan, at-large structure. A city with a mayor, non-partisan, at-large structure, would total one point. Half of a point would be given for a combination of at-large and ward elections. The structure of local government, described in this manner, can then be examined in relationship to the structure of power in the community.
E. Organizational Density

The concept of organizational density refers to the number of voluntary organizations in the community relative to the size of the community's population. Certain communities suffer from "organizational poverty." They have few organizations relative to the number of citizens. Since voluntary organizations are major "linking mechanisms" within the community, a community with few organizations may face problems with system integration. At the other extreme are those communities that are epitomized by "organizational saturation." The number of voluntary organizations is extremely high in relationship to the size of the population. One person in such a community once claimed to the author that the town was "clubbed to death."

This structural variable would appear to influence the distribution and structure of power. A voluntary organization represents (1) a potential basis of response in any community issue, (2) a resource whose control may serve as an important base of power, and (3) a potential power actor in its own right. A community with a high density of organizations simply has more voices that could potentially be heard in any issue, and more organized groups with relevant resources who can enter controversies than one in the situation of "organizational poverty." Such a situation would logically tend to distribute power more widely within the system, and thus influence the power structure toward the direction of pluralism.

Findings from the literature offer further justification for including this variable. Coleman has analyzed the role of organizations in the process of community conflict. He posits that organizations
both inflame and subdue a conflict. They provide bases for response to the issue and are often forced to take sides thus potentially enlarging the conflict. They do keep the controversy within bounds however by (1) integrating the community by increasing local loyalty through the attachments of their members and through the mechanism of cross-cutting status-sets, and (2) exhibiting a tendency toward moderate response due to the cross-cutting alliances of their members.

Clark has noted that a crucial variable for the maintenance of a pluralistic system is some type of structural support for competing elites. High organizational density may provide such support, therefore Clark proposes that "the greater the density of voluntary organizations in the community, the more decentralized the decision-making structure."\textsuperscript{54}

An obvious operational indicator of this variable is a comparison of the number of voluntary organizations to the size of the population in the community. Such a ratio would provide at least a crude index, although such additional indicators as total organizational membership and the percentage of the community population that are members of local organizations could also be used.

\textbf{F. Economic Base}

The type of economic structure existent in the community should logically affect the distribution, structure, and exercise of power. Many of the resources that can be utilized as bases of power are defined, controlled, and distributed by the economic structure. More specifically, two elements of the economic structure appear to be of
crucial relevance. First, the major economic function performed in the community is a particularly powerful factor influencing other structural elements and system characteristics. A number of studies have examined such differences between manufacturing, retail trade, agricultural, resort, financial, governmental, educational, and diversified cities. Actors representing the dominant economic activity in the community would obviously be included in the power structure due to the resources they control. Also, the overall structure of leadership would appear to be related to the dominant function. For example, the leadership pool of an industrial city would probably include actors from management and labor; in a retail trade city, one could expect to find businessmen; in an educational center, maybe professors and administrators.

Second, the diversification of the economic base would also appear relevant. Where there is little diversification in the economic base, the dominant economic institution has a greater proportion of the relevant resources; a proportion that can become a monopoly. In a one-industry town, the centralization of such resources as money and wealth and control over jobs facilitates the formation of an elite power structure. Diversification of the economic base, however, tends to widen the distribution of resources. There are fewer actors with great quantities of resources, but many actors with some power. In such a situation actors can exchange resources that are issue relevant, form coalitions to increase their power base, or only attempt to exercise power in those areas where their resources are most applicable. Therefore, the greater the diversification of the economic base, the more pluralistic the structure of power.
Many writers have utilized the economic base of the community as an independent variable in analyses. One of the first was Mills and Ulmer who compared small business cities with big business cities. They concluded that (1) small business cities provided residents with a more balanced economic life, (2) the general level of civic welfare was higher in small business cities, and (3) differences among the cities studied were largely due to the prevalence or absence of big business domination of the industrial sector. Fowler reexamined these associations in thirty New York cities and found the opposite relationship. Cities with heavy concentrated industry tended to be those with high welfare levels. Furthermore, economic pluralism did not result in political pluralism. Finally, local pluralistic power structures were found to be negatively associated with high welfare scores.

Recently, Walton found that economic diversity was not related to the type of power structure. Also, Gilbert found no support for the predicted association between economic diversification and a pluralistic power structure. He did find, however, other relevant associations. Economically diversified cities did tend to be led by politicians and governmental officials. Furthermore, cities dominated by one or a few industries tended less than other cities to have politicians as the most important figures in community decision making.

Finally, Clark has posited the economic base as a crucial community structural variable. Two of his propositions are relevant to the question of functional dominance and economic diversity. First, Clark proposes that "the more important any single function in a community, the more community members from the sector performing that particular..."
function will be active in community decision making, and the more community decisions will be oriented toward the values and interests of that sector of the community. Also, he offers that "the more diverse the economic structure within the community, the more decentralized the decision-making structure." These propositions are in accord with our previous discussion of the relationship between the economic base and the distribution and structure of power.

There are a number of possible indicators of this variable. The Nelson technique for classifying economic services based upon deviations from the national norm could be utilized. The dominance of any economic function can also be measured by the proportion of the working force employed in the largest service classification. Finally, a measure of diversification can be developed by determining the proportion of the labor force that is employed in the five largest areas. The higher the proportion, the lower the economic diversification of the community. For example, a community in which only 21 percent of the labor force is employed in the five largest service classifications would have a more diverse economic base than in which 82 percent of the workers were so employed.

G. Social Class

Sociologists have utilized social class as an independent variable in investigating such diverse phenomena as political attitudes and behavior, the etiology of mental illness, fertility and family size, pre-marital sexual behavior, and preference for social change. It would appear that the social class dimension of the community would
affect the distribution and structure of local power. Two aspects of social class appear to be relevant: (1) the amount of hierarchical differentiation and the horizontal shape of the local stratification system, and (2) the median class level of the community.

Concerning the initial class dimension, the relationship of the shape of the local stratification system to the distribution of power is not conceptually clear, nor has it been empirically investigated. One might argue that in a community characterized by class homogeneity, with little vertical spread and differentiation in the class structure, power would tend to be widely distributed due to the wide distribution of power relevant resources. Where there is a great spread between the highest and lowest classes, however, and a large degree of differentiation with little social mobility, one might expect a more elitist structure of power due to the centralization and control of resources by the upper classes. Other factors, however, such as social access to the community leaders may contaminate such a relationship. Also, the shape of the local stratification system is so highly interrelated with many of the other structural variables that its effect may be difficult to isolate.

The overall class level of the community must also be considered. It might be proposed that the higher the median class level of the community (measured by such variables as median income and median education) the more widely distributed the decision-making structure. We have already noted that political participation increases with social class position. Furthermore, such power resources as money and wealth, knowledge and specialized skills, control over jobs and mass media, etc.,
are class relevant variables. The inclusion of social class in the model, therefore, appears to be justified.

The literature provides few clues as to the nature of this relationship. Lane has proposed that political participation increases with (1) the proportion of commercial as opposed to industrial occupations in the community, (2) the proportion of occupations, such as civil service positions, with high political relevance, and (3) the smallness of the proportion of lower-lower class members in the community.64

Gilbert examined two variables -- income and education -- that are common indicators of social class. He found that conflict is greater in cities with a large proportion of the population earning under $2,000 in 1950 and under $3,000 a year in 1960.65 There was no association, however, between the educational level and any measures of the power structure.66 Clark, on the other hand, disagrees. He posits that in nations where general democratic values are inculcated in students through the educational system, the internalization of the pluralistic value system will tend to be positively associated with the level of education of the community members. Therefore, the higher the educational level of community residents, the more pluralistic the decision-making structure.67

In this study we will be limited to examining only the association between the social class level of the community and the configuration of local power. We will be unable to examine the relationship of the shape of the stratification system to the same dependent variables. The latter association requires measuring and describing the class system; our data do not allow such an analysis. We will use median income and
median education, however, as an index of the class level of the community.

In summary, in the above section we have presented the structural variables that are included in our model. We have attempted to justify their inclusion on the basis of previous work in the field, and on the basis of their logical, theoretical relationship to the structure of power. We have not posited hypotheses systematically associating them with characteristics of the leadership pool. The explication of such propositions will follow the next section in which the latter characteristics will be presented.

Before turning to that section, we must note the issue of covariance. It is obvious from even a cursory examination of these variables that they are not independent. For example, factors such as social class, demographic heterogeneity, size, rate of population growth, and autonomy are interrelated. These interrelationships create problems for analysis that must not be minimized. These variables have been selected because of their apparent association with the distribution, structure, and exercise of power. This deductive technique has been utilized not only because of theoretical relevance, but for pragmatic considerations as well. An inductive technique, utilizing scores of variables and attempting to isolate clusters or factors could be used where the data is available. This technique has proven valuable in certain previous community studies. The limitation of this technique for our model, however, results from varying definitions of the unit measures (counties, townships, corporation limits, etc.), a lack of reliable, comparable data for varying size cities (particularly very small
communities), and a lack of theoretical linkage with the power literature. Data for analyzing the variables in our model, on the other hand, is available in all communities. In utilizing the variables in our model, however, it is obvious that control by means of sampling or statistical manipulation (which requires a large number of sampled cities to be meaningful) must be undertaken if the effect of any one structural variable -- independent of the effects of the other variables -- is to be determined. With our sample of four cities selected on the basis of criteria independent of this model, we will be unable to perform such controls. At best our application of the model in this study is heuristic. As we shall see, certain variables, such as population size, were intentionally controlled; others were found to be controlled during the analysis. However, the application of this model to our cities should be viewed as a "test case" of the model. It is offered, however, that the model does represent an important contribution to the power literature; its explication is in itself justification for this study. Its application in this instance illustrates its empirical feasibility.

Characteristics of the Leadership Pool

The second set of dimensions in our model are those variables which are relevant to a description of the distribution and structure of social power. These dimensions include: (1) size of the leadership pool, (2) institutional dominance, (3) social class composition of the leadership pool, (4) legitimacy, (5) visibility, (6) scope of influence, (7) cohesiveness, (8) entrenchment, and (9) cosmopolitan-localite
orientation. These variables have been selected because they present a fairly complete picture of the distribution and structure of power. Furthermore, variation in the structure of leadership along these dimensions would appear to affect the leadership pool's perception and definition of community problems. The reader will note that the traditional "elitist-pluralist" or "monomorphic-polymorphic" dimensions are not included in the model. Actually, these dimensions are included, but are broken into four separate indicators: legitimacy, visibility, scope of influence, and cohesiveness. For example, a traditional economic elite, such as Hunter found in Atlanta, would be characterized by low legitimacy, low visibility, a broad scope of influence, and high cohesiveness. These dimensions may, however, vary independently. Therefore, examining them separately is more advantageous than lumping them together and utilizing the more gross concepts of "elitist-pluralist" or "monomorphic-polymorphic."

Before we turn to an explication of each of these variables, and subsequently relate them to the previously mentioned community structural variables, let us define more precisely what we mean by a leadership pool.

A. Definition

We shall define as the leadership pool THOSE COMPONENTS OF ANY SOCIAL SYSTEM, BE THEY INDIVIDUALS, GROUPS, OR ORGANIZATIONS, THAT ARE IDENTIFIED AS POSSESSING SUPERORDINATE SOCIAL POWER AND THE ABILITY TO AFFECT THE PROCESSES IN THE SYSTEM.
Before we attempt to dissect this definition, perhaps a few comments about our choice of the term "leadership pool" to describe the group of power actors in the community is necessary. The obvious question is "why not use 'power structure' or 'power elite' like everybody else?" While we will not enter into a full discussion of our preference for "leadership pool" as opposed to these other concepts, let us only note a few basic reasons. The term "power structure" seems to imply a highly structured, rather static, elitist model of the group of community power actors. As Delbert Miller states, research and methodology in this area have been greatly impeded by the term, elite.69 If any segment of our conceptual or methodological apparatus should have a decent burial, it is this misleading term. The term implies a high solidarity and a consensus on goals and values among a community's power actors. This solidarity and consensus must be questions for empirical research, not a priori assumptions. The term "pool" implies no such consensus or "smoked-filled room" imagery.

Furthermore, the term "power structure" has become a part of everyday language; it has also become a value-laden term, connoting all that is sinister, corrupt, amoral, and decadent within our society. Being synonymous with "the establishment," it has become a meaningless term for scientific analysis. Its emotional value as a rhetorical device may be great; its conceptual merit, however, is minimal.

It must be noted, however, that the concept, structure, does have a value that must not be overlooked. Structure implies the existence of some form of patterned relationships among the power actors. It highlights the point that a network of influence is often brought to
hear upon many decisions in the community. This interaction among
power actors often is necessitated because each actor has power resting
upon various bases and resources. Some of these resources may be more
relevant for one issue as opposed to another. By interacting and bar-
gaining with other actors, by utilizing the tactics of exchange, coop-
tation, and coalition, a network of power may form.

Of course, the nature of the relationships among power actors and
even the existence of such relationships also must be empirically
proven, not assumed. Again, the term "pool" -- while not disregarding
these relationships -- does not infer these unwarranted assumptions.

Let us now turn to the definition. Perhaps we should call this
group of leaders a potential leadership pool. In so doing we would
be consistent with our definition of social power and our methodology.
It will be remembered that in defining social power we stated that it
was an ability that certain system components hold to actualize their
interests and affect the processes of the system. Therefore, we are
isolating potential community leaders, i.e., those individuals who have
the ability to affect the processes of the system -- whether they do so
or not. In addition, we stated that the exercise of power takes place
in asymmetrical relationships. A reciprocal relationship is required
for the utilization of power. It would appear, therefore, than an actor
who attempts to exercise social power will be more successful if he is
defined by others in the system as being powerful than if he is not.
If a list of power actors is constructed by the reputational method, we
have located at least one half of the reciprocal relationship necessary
for the existence and exercise of social power. The nominated power
actors have, therefore, at least the potential for exercising their power.

Our definition states that this pool of power actors includes those components of any social system, be they individuals, groups, or organizations. . . . In this phrase we are attempting to emphasize two points. First, we are interested in the existence of social power in any social system. Although we will focus upon the community, the definition is general enough to include other systems as well. Second, we are stating that system components other than individuals may be classified as power actors. Much of the previous work in community power has been concerned solely with the power arrangements of individuals in the community. While such a concern is obviously justified, one must not forget that social collectivities and institutions also possess power. As we shall note shortly, one component of the dimension of institutional dominance is the influence of various institutions (schools, churches, government, business, etc.) in the overall affairs of the community. Finally, we state that these components are identified as possessing superordinate social power and the ability to affect the processes in the system. Here we simply are reiterating that these identified components are potential power actors. These components are the "pressure points" of the system. If one is attempting to institute social change within the system, they are primary targets.

Let us now turn to an explication of the dimensions of the leadership pool. The method we will utilize is similar to that we followed in presenting the community structural variables. In addition, we will
offer a few illustrative propositions relating these first two components of our model.

B. Size of the Leadership Pool

The number of actors in the leadership pool is an obvious, but important dimension. Size may be a good indicator of the centralization of decision making. Where the leadership pool is small (relative to the size of the community population) we might assume that a more centralized leadership structure exists in which superordinate power is held by a few individuals. Of course, where the number of power actors is large, power is more decentralized. Furthermore, the scope of power in the latter situation would appear to be rather narrow. Cohesiveness among the power actors would tend to be rather weak as the possible networks of exchange and coalition formation increase geometrically with an arithmetic increase in the number of actors. With a large number of power actors, conflicts over goals, values, tactics, priorities, etc. may be numerous. The vested interests of each actor have a catalytic effect upon the structure and exercise of power.

Any community structural variable that increases or decreases the quantity of the power-relevant resources in the system; distributes these resources throughout the system; and/or generally affects citizen participation in the decision-making structure would appear to be a determinant of the size of the leadership pool. Therefore, a number of propositions may be offered. These propositions are illustrative. Some have empirical support; others are logically deduced from the model. They should be viewed as irreversible, stochastic, coextensive,
sufficient, and substitutable propositions. This list, and all of the other illustrative lists, is not inclusive. A matrix of proposed relationships will be presented at the end of this section.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the population size of the community, the larger the size of the leadership pool.

The greater the rate of population growth in the community, the larger the size of the leadership pool.

The greater the demographic heterogeneity in the community, the larger the size of the leadership pool.

The greater the economic and government dependence (the less the autonomy) of the community, the larger the size of the leadership pool.

The greater the economic diversification in the community, the larger the size of the leadership pool.

The greater the organizational density in the community, the larger the size of the leadership pool.

The higher the social class level of the community, the larger the size of the leadership pool.

We have included the size of the leadership pool in our model also because this variable would appear to be related to the perception and definition of local community problems. The larger the number of power actors, the larger the number of perceived problems, the greater the difficulty in reaching consensus concerning priority, and the more difficult the coordination of ameliorative action.
One final comment is in order concerning this dimension. The size of the leadership pool is also a result of the methodology employed in locating the power actors. With the reputational technique, the "cut-off level of nominations" is arbitrary. What is required, therefore, with this and any other technique, is that the criteria for inclusion in the leadership pool must be consistent across communities. If the methodology is not consistently applied, the size dimension lacks validity.73

C. Institutional Dominance

This variable refers to the extent to which a single institution dominates the leadership pool in the community.74 There are two elements to this dimension. First, the extent of perceived power residing in the institution, as an institution, e.g. the "power" of the educational, religious, economic, political, etc. institutions. Second, the extent to which actors from the institution are represented in the leadership pool.75 At one logical end of the continuum are those communities in which perceived power and representation reside in a single institution. At the other extreme are those communities in which power is equally distributed across institutional areas. More likely, however, are those cases where power is decentralized and shared by a few institutions. Due to their inordinate share of power-relevant resources, the political and economic institutions are often found in some sort of uneasy, symbiotic relationship. For the researcher, therefore, the crucial question is "Is there institutional dominance?" If the answer is yes, then "By whom?"
We again find that those structural variables which affect the quantity and distribution of the bases of social power also will influence the extent and nature of institutional dominance in the leadership pool. Where the structure of the community is such that these resources are widely distributed across the institutions, there is less likelihood of any single institution dominating the leadership pool. Where the resources are centralized in one institution, however, the probability is that the favored institution may dominate the system.

Illustrative Propositions:

- The larger the population size of the community, the less likely is the dominance of one institution in the leadership pool.
- The greater the demographic heterogeneity in the community, the less likely is the dominance of one institution in the leadership pool.
- The greater the economic and governmental dependence (i.e., the less the autonomy) of the community on external sources, the less likely is the dominance of one institution in the leadership pool.
- The greater the economic dependence and governmental autonomy of the community, the more likely is the political institution to be dominant.
- The greater the economic autonomy and governmental dependence of the community, the more likely is the economic institution to be dominant.
- The greater the organizational density in the community, the less likely is the dominance of one institution in the leadership pool.
- The higher the social class level of the community, the less likely is the dominance of one institution in the leadership pool.
These propositions require a few comments. It should be noted that empirical support for these propositions generally is lacking. It may be that the relationships are not linear. For example, we have noted that with increasing population size and/or rapid population growth, the governmental institution may become more important. Also, in very small, non-autonomous communities, the government may be powerful because it has no competitors! Therefore, the relationship may be curvilinear, with government being dominant at the extreme ends of the population continuum. These propositions, however, are presented heuristically; they are deductively drawn. In analysis, however, the possibility of non-linear associations must not be forgotten. Finally, there is no logical empirical or theoretical justification for positing the existence or nature of an association between such independent structural variables as reform government and our dependent variable of institutional dominance. With the reform government variable, for example, one might argue that the more reformist the character of the governmental institution, the less likely is the dominance by a single institution because of increased citizen participation associated with the reformist form of government. However, it may also be that the governmental institution itself becomes dominant for exactly the same reason! While there is no a prior justification for proposing the direction of these associations, they will be included in the matrix presentation of propositions that follows this section and can be empirically investigated.

It is obvious that the variable of institutional dominance may affect the definition and perception of community problems. If power, for example, does reside in the economic institution, one may find that
the perceived problems of the leadership pool are economic in nature, or at least may affect the economic institution of the community. Other problems may be viewed and attacked by the strategy of "benign neglect." If power resides in two different institutions, however, such as the economic and the religious, one may find that the defined problems center around these institutions but that there is little agreement as to the priority of the problems on the part of the power actors. It is believed, therefore, that institutional dominance will affect the number of problems defined and perceived as existent in the community, the priority of the perceived and defined problems, the agreement among the power actors as to the priority of community problems, etc.

Operational indicators of this concept can be developed along both the power and representation dimensions. Influentials in the community can be asked to rank order the influence of the various institutional areas in community affairs. Also, the institutional affiliations of the power actors in the leadership pool can be analyzed as a measure of institutional representation in the leadership pool. If an institution has the highest rank on dominance, and a high proportion (possible 40 percent as an arbitrary percentage) of the power actors are associated with it, it might be labeled dominant.

D. Social Class Composition of the Leadership Pool

Probably no other dimension of the distribution of power in the community has received more attention than the class level of the leaders. It is basically because of this emphasis that we have included this variable in our model. The literature exhibits remarkable agreement
concerning the class level of the leadership pool. Let us briefly look
at some of these studies.

Baha Abu-Laban found that similar individuals were power actors in
a Pacific community. The power actors were older males characterized
by high educational training, high organizational participation, long
community residence and non-manual occupational career patterns reflect­
ing upward social mobility, stability, and success.

Of Hunter's forty influentials in Atlanta, thirty-seven were
college graduates. Hunter distinguished between an upper and under
power structure; the decision makers and executors respectfully. Those
in the upper structure came from older, established families with in­
herited wealth and ascribed status. The under structure included many
professional "organization men."

Form and Sauer established that the Lansing community influentials
were composed primarily of businessmen who quite early achieved posi­
tions of prominence in their particular local organizations, and be­
came civic leaders as well. In terms of their background, they repre­
sent a rather privileged group. Most had attended college, and the
average age was about 60.

How do the social characteristics of the power actors compare to
those of the other community residents? Bohlen compared the personal
and social attributes of the power actors with those of a random sample
in the same community. The six personal and social characteristics
that differed significantly in comparing the two groups were occupation,
mean gross family income, education, political orientation, age, and
home ownership. The power actors were found to have significantly higher status occupations, higher incomes, more formal education, a different political orientation, higher age, and greater home ownership than the random sample. The two groups were found not to differ in the number of people living in the household and the length of residence in the community. 79

We could continue to review studies, but the findings are all similar. The power actors are a privileged lot. The "typical power actor" is probably fairly old (at least over 40), college educated, financially well-off, and a business and professional man who has lived a fairly long time in the community. This finding is practically tautological! High social status is based upon those resources that are also power-relevant. Occupation, education, and income define fairly well six of our eleven stratified bases of power. We can expect the leadership pool, therefore, to be composed of power actors with relatively high, homogenous class levels; levels that are probably higher than the class level of the community due to the selectivity of "resource rich" actors into the leadership pool.

The question becomes one of simply "how high?"

This association of our community structural variables to the dependent variable of social class composition of the leadership pool is the most confused, "messy" relationship in the first section of the model. Any structural variable that (1) increases the median class level of the community and (2) increases the participation of high status actors in the leadership pool would increase the class level of the leadership pool. Any variable, however, which functions to widen
the distribution of power relevant resources, or to strengthen a power resource which is not class defined (such as subsystem solidarity) might act to lower the class level of the leadership pool. For some of the variables -- size, rate of population growth, autonomy, and economic diversity -- the author cannot predict the direction of the relationship prior to the empirical study. Perhaps our best clue is that more pluralistic systems in which power is widely distributed would tend to be lower in class level than more centralized, elitist systems.

Illustrative Propositions:

The more reformist the character of local government, the lower the social class level of the leadership pool. (Due to an increase in general citizen participation in local affairs; the professionalization of the governmental institution, etc.)

The greater the demographic heterogeneity in the community, the lower the social class level of the leadership pool.

The greater the organizational density, the higher the social class level of the leadership pool.

The higher the social class level of the community, the higher the social class level of the leadership.

We will discuss the relationship of the social class composition of the leadership pool to the perception and definition of community problems in the next section. Let us note that we will utilize education and occupation as our indicator of the social class composition of the leadership pool.
E. Legitimacy

The next four variables in this dimension-set were first presented by Thomas J. Anton. These four variables -- legitimacy, visibility, scope of influence, and cohesiveness -- are extremely important in describing the structure of power in the community. Furthermore, these variables are the major components of the "elitist-pluralist" dimensions.

Legitimacy is the first of these variables. One of the major points of contention between the elitists and pluralists (and between sociologists and political scientists) is the relative importance of the authority component versus the influence component of power in local affairs. The concept of legitimacy taps this dimension. Where leaders hold public or associational office, the leadership pool is an authoritative one. Where the majority of power actors do not hold official office, the pool can be viewed as non-authoritative. The former pool would be classified as "legitimate;" the latter as "non-legitimate." This dimension should be viewed as a continuum, with some leadership pools being more "legitimate" than others.

Many studies have examined this dimension. Among these investigations Stewart found that 38 percent of fifty-five top influentials held no office. Hunter, Mills, and Schermerhorn concluded that men of influence played a more dominant role in the community decision-making process than did men of authority. Finally, White concluded that the researcher might expect to find many community influentials without a significant amount of authority.

The extent to which a leadership pool is "legitimate" has many ramifications for both the distribution and exercise of power in the
community. For example, when legitimacy is high, the citizenry of the community has a more direct channel of pressure and influence (e.g. the ballot box) on the power actors. Increased legitimacy would tend to facilitate increased pluralism. Taken to its logical extreme, one finds a Jeffersonian democracy in which power is widely distributed, but is legitimately embedded in the office. In a community with a "non-legitimate" leadership pool, however, in which economic actors dominate, the power actors are more isolated from citizen pressure and sanction. They are more free to exercise power without concern for a constituency. In such a situation, their "vested interests" may be pursued with reckless abandon -- only thwarted by the effects of the other power actors. The vast bulk of the citizenry has little opportunity to directly influence these power actors. As we shall see, they may not even know who they are.

We propose that the degree of legitimacy in the leadership pool is strongly influenced by the structure of the community. Those structural variables that function to increase the concentration of power-relevant resources in the governmental institution relative to the other institutions would appear to foster increased legitimacy. Furthermore, in communities where there is a great need for governmental services, such as those which exhibit great or rapidly increasing structural differentiation, the degree of legitimacy may increase. With these assumptions of structural differentiation, high governmental influence relative to other areas, and the implicit notion of citizen participation, we present the following propositions.
Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the population size of the community, the more legitimate the leadership pool.

The greater the rate of population growth in the community, the more legitimate the leadership pool.

The greater the demographic heterogeneity in the community, the more legitimate the leadership pool.

The greater the economic and governmental dependence (i.e., the less the autonomy) of the community on external sources, the more legitimate the leadership pool.

The greater the economic dependence and governmental autonomy of the community, the more legitimate the leadership pool.

The greater the economic autonomy and governmental dependence of the community, the less legitimate the leadership pool.

The more reformist the character of the local government in the community, the more legitimate the leadership pool.

The greater the organizational density in the community, the more legitimate the leadership pool.

The higher the social class level of the community, the more legitimate the leadership pool.

The greater the economic diversity in the community, the more legitimate the leadership pool.

With one of the core concerns of this model being the relationship between the structure of the leadership pool and the leadership pool's perception and definition of community problems, the degree of legitimacy appears to be a crucial independent variable also. Where the
leadership pool is legitimate, we might expect (1) a large number of
different problems to be defined (due to the channels which various
citizens have to reach those with legitimate power); (2) problems to
represent either governmental or "the total community's" concerns;
(3) the government to be viewed as responsible for a large proportion
of the problems; (4) a higher level of agreement concerning the urgency
and priority of these problems, etc. By comparison, a community with a
relatively non-legitimate leadership pool might have fewer perceived
and defined problems. Furthermore, these problems might represent "issue
specific" (i.e., business, industry, education, etc.) concerns over which
there is little agreement.

In operational terms this concept can be measured by the propor­
tion of the leadership pool who hold elected or appointed office in the
governmental or other key institutional executive and legislative levels.

F. Visibility

Anton's second variable is visibility. The concept refers to the
extent to which the power actors are covert, "behind-the-scenes" manipu­
lators. (It must be remembered that a central issue in the "elitist-
pluralist" debate was the degree to which the power actors were covert.
This variable makes the question an empirical, not a rhetorical one.)
This dimension may vary independently from legitimacy. Leaders who do
not hold positions of authority may or may not be covert. Thus legiti­
macy tells us nothing about "visibility," unless all leaders are public
or organizational officers. Therefore, it would be possible to classify
a leadership pool as "legitimate-invisible," "nonlegitimate-invisible,"
etc. This dimension must also be viewed as falling on a continuum.
The extent to which a leadership pool is visible is associated with the distribution and exercise of power. Where the pool is "invisible," few constraints are placed upon the hidden power actors. These actors are relatively free to pursue their own interests. Furthermore, there are fewer avenues for redress open to the general citizenry than where the pool is "visible." Obviously, this variable is related to the degree of citizen participation in the leadership pool and to the general distribution of power. If the pool is "invisible," power is probably confined to a small number of actors, working covertly; i.e. an elite. Therefore, factors which would tend to hinder the development of an elite in a community would also tend to increase the visibility of the leadership pool.

The literature, however, provides few clues as to what structural components of the community do function to increase visibility. Bonjean and Carter examined the visibility of the leadership pools in four North Carolina cities. The study revealed three tentative generalizations that may explain some of the divergent findings set forth by previous investigators. First, the greater the population influx experienced by the community, the less visible its leadership structure. Second, the greater the community poverty, the less visible its leadership structure. Third, the less complex the political and economic structure of the community, the less visible its leadership structure. Therefore, on the basis of these findings, and the logical relationships presented in the model linking social complexity and differentiation with the structure of the leadership pool, we offer the following tentative generalizations.
Illustrative Propositions:

The greater the economic and government dependence (i.e., the less the autonomy) of the community on external sources, the less visible the leadership pool.

The greater the rate of population growth in the community, the less visible the leadership pool.

The more reformist the character of the local government in the community, the more visible the leadership pool.

The greater the organizational density in the community, the more visible the leadership pool.

The greater the economic diversity in the community, the more visible the leadership pool.

The higher the social class level of the community, the more visible the leadership pool.\[88\]

We will be examining the relationship between the degree of visibility of the leadership pool and the pool's perception and definition of community problems. The degree of visibility would appear to affect the number of perceived problems, the degree of agreement among the power actors concerning the urgency of these problems, and the extent to which problems related to only one institutional area dominate the perception of the leadership pool. These issues will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

Finally, we must consider the problem of operationalizing this concept. The literature provides two possibilities. First, Bonjean developed a technique for locating visible leaders.\[89\] In a study of Burlington, North Carolina, he found three types of leaders: concealed,
symbolic, and visible. This technique offers two assumptions: (1) that the reputational technique is effective and valid, and (2) that the more visible the leader, the more accurate the assessment of the influence of other community power actors. Concealed leaders were those power actors who received higher rank positions from top ranking than from lower ranking leaders. Symbolic leaders received higher rank positions from lower ranking than from higher ranking leaders. Finally, visible leaders were those power actors whose level of influence was agreed upon by both top ranking and lower ranking leaders. Bonjean posited that the true source of power in the community resides in the visible leaders.

The second technique was developed by Ehrlich and Bauer. They examined the relationship between reputation for community leadership and frequency of citation in local and metropolitan newspapers. Reputed community leaders in this survey appeared with considerable frequency in the metropolitan and local press. Furthermore, reputation for leadership, holding political office, and newspaper appearance were closely interrelated. This technique, while crude and not offering complete "fit" with the theoretical concept, does appear to be a valid indicator. The higher the mean number of newspaper citations for those power actors in the leadership pool, the more visible the pool.

We will utilize the second indicator. While the Bonjean technique may be more sophisticated, it appears to actually be a measure of perceived influence by the power actors themselves. It is a measure based upon factors internal to the leadership pool; the extent to which the power actors are visible to those outside of the leadership pool is not
tapped. The Ehrlich and Bauer technique, however, utilized a criterion -- newspaper citation -- that is at least partially external to the pool.

G. Scope of Influence

This dimension taps what is possibly the key issue in the debate between the "elitists" and the "pluralists." This dimension recognizes that one leader or a set of leaders may participate in decision making in a wide range of community issues, or different leaders or sets of leaders may be active in different areas. In one community the leadership pool may have "general overall influence" in various areas, such as the economic, political, educational, religious, and cultural institutions. In this case the scope of influence would be very broad, and a single pyramid might adequately describe the distribution of power.

In another community, however, a division of labor may occur in which certain actors are influential in specific areas only. In this case, the pool has a narrow scope of influence. This latter situation exists due to differing bases of social power and access to power resources by the power actors, and is present where resources are decentralized and broadly distributed throughout the community.

The scope of influence of the leadership pool has obvious implications for the exercise of social power. Where the scope of influence is narrow, and the leadership pool is fractured with a number of "institutional-specific" influence pyramids, any problem or issue that cuts across institutional areas will have to be attacked by means of exchange and the formation of coalitions among the power actors. Coordinated action and efficient output from such a leadership pool may
become problematic. Of course, such a situation also is a strong indicator of a decentralized, pluralistic decision-making structure, and may therefore be viewed as being more responsive to overall community problems, not as motivated by strong vested interests, and more "controllable" by the general citizenry than a pool with broad scope.

Few topics in the literature have received as much attention as the issue of scope. The majority of writers agree that power actors tend to be specialized influentials, and therefore that leadership would tend to have a narrow scope of influence. For example, Fanelli examined "Bakersville," a small Mississippi community, and found that only one person out of the twenty-three community leaders ranked near the top in the three issue areas studied. He proposed that variation in the occupational roles among the influentials contributed to this specialization. Delbert C. Miller noted that leadership tended to be specialized and that an institutional cone model best described the local community distribution of power. Presthus examined five issues in each of two communities, and found that approximately one third of the decision makers in both communities participated in two or more of the issues, while about two thirds participated in only one area. Spinard, in another study, rejected the "business elite theses" and concluded that community power was relatively pluralistic, and depended on the specific issues involved. Many other writers have reached similar conclusions.

Two generalizations emerge from the above. First, it is highly unlikely that a leadership pool will be composed completely of general influence leaders. For such a situation to exist, every power actor
would have to possess influence in every institutional area; with the
distribution of power relevant resources in the community, this is not
likely. No leadership pool exhibits the broadest possible scope of
influence. Second, however, there are both specialized and general
power actors in any leadership pool. Therefore, the question becomes
one of degree; how broad is the scope of influence of one leadership
pool in comparison to that of others.

From the literature and the model, it appears that those commu­

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the population size of the community, the more narrow the scope of the leadership pool.

The greater the rate of population growth in the community, the more narrow the scope of the leadership pool.

The greater the demographic heterogeneity in the community, the more narrow the scope of the leadership pool.
The greater the economic and government dependence (i.e., the less the autonomy) of the community on external sources, the more narrow the scope of the leadership pool.

The greater the organizational density in the community, the more narrow the scope of the leadership pool.

The greater the economic diversity in the community, the more narrow the scope of the leadership pool.

The higher the social class level of the community, the more narrow the scope of the leadership pool.

The more reformist the character of the local government in the community, the more narrow the scope of the leadership pool.

We will relate this concept to the leadership pool's perception and definition of problems in the next section. We must, however, mention a possible indicator of this concept. A valid indicator of the scope of influence of the leadership pool can be derived by having the power actors rank the influence of every other member of the pool in various institutional areas. The actors can be ranked on a scale from one to five (extremely influential to no influence) in the areas of education, local government, business and industry, religion, local voluntary organizations, and general overall influence. The scores can be combined and a rank ordering of the actors for each area can be derived. The extent of overlapping influence can be found by computing the multiple correlation coefficient across the areas using the Kendall Coefficient of Concordance for ordinal level data. Where all of the actors have the same degree of influence across all of the areas, the Kendall value is 1.00. Where there is no overlap, the value is .000.
The higher the value, the broader the scope of influence. The basic assumption of this technique is that the power actors are accurate judges of the extent of influence possessed by the other actors in the various institutional areas. The value of this technique is that it is applicable for analyzing scope in any system, not just the community.

H. Cohesiveness

Cohesiveness is the fourth dimension mentioned by Anton. The concept refers to the degree and nature of interaction among the power actors in the leadership pool. The actors may exhibit a high level of interaction, or they may be relatively isolated from each other. They may form one group, or be divided into cliques or factions. The more cohesive the leadership pool, the smaller the number of clique and factional patterns, and the higher the level of interaction among the power actors.

Many studies in the literature have examined the interaction patterns of the leadership pool. All have found some interaction among the power actors, but the degree to which the leadership pool has been clique ridden has varied. For example, Hunter found that within the power structure, the members interacted at a high level. The power actors were also better known to each other than to those outside of the group. Miller found evidence of group patterns within the power structures of a large city in the Pacific Northwest and a comparable city in southwestern England. While no rigid clique structure with specific clique leaders was uncovered, on certain issues a high degree of clique solidarity was evidenced. Finally, Thometz discovered that
each key leader in Dallas "knew well" or "knew socially" every other key leader. They had a greater acquaintance among themselves than with the leaders in lower levels of power.\textsuperscript{99}

One would expect at least some interaction among the power actors. The exercise of power in general, and the process of handling issues and problems that cut across institutional areas in particular, necessitate it. If the power actors are to pool their resources, exchange vital resources, form coalitions to affect key decisions, etc., they must interact. What is crucial for the exercise of power, however, is the extent of cohesiveness within the leadership pool. Where there is high cohesion, coordinated activity is facilitated, the degree of consensus concerning emerging community issues and problems among the power actors is likely to be heightened, and the general output of the decision-making structure may be increased. On the other hand, where there is low cohesion, coordinated activity is problematic, consensus among the power actors may be low as each is involved in its own domain, and the level of outputs is likely to be relatively low.

Certain community structural variables would appear to affect the degree of cohesion within the leadership pool. Cohesion would tend to be lessened if the structure of the community isolates the power actors from one another, hinders their interaction, increases their number, and generally fragments the structure of the leadership pool. Structural variables that facilitate differentiation and cleavage within the local system would appear to be particularly relevant.
Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the population size of the community, the less cohesive the leadership pool.

The greater the rate of population growth in the community, the less cohesive the leadership pool.

The greater the demographic heterogeneity in the community, the less cohesive the leadership pool.

The greater the economic and government dependence (i.e., the less the autonomy) of the community on external sources, the less cohesive the leadership pool.

The more reformist the character of the local government in the local community, the less cohesive the leadership pool.

The greater the organizational density in the community, the less cohesive the leadership pool.

The greater the economic diversity in the community, the less cohesive the leadership pool.

The higher the social class level of the community, the less cohesive the leadership pool.

The dimension of cohesiveness has great relevance for the leadership pool's perception and definition of community problems. March and Simon examined the effect of subgroups within intraorganizational decision making. They offered two propositions that are pertinent to this relationship. First, they proposed that the interaction within the group increases as group cohesiveness increases. Second, increases in the uniformity of group opinion result in increases in group
cohesiveness. We propose, therefore, that the degree of consensus among the power actors concerning the number, nature, priority, and urgency of community problems is influenced by the degree of cohesion within the leadership pool. Where there is high cohesion, one may expect high consensus.

In seeking to measure the extent of "cohesiveness" within the leadership pool, various sociometric indices will be built into the research instrument. These indices will examine friendship, visitation, and discussion patterns among the power actors. Furthermore, data on overlapping organizational membership provides an additional check on the validity of the sociometric measures. By examining these patterns the degree of "cohesiveness" can be determined.

I. Entrenchment

The concept of entrenchment refers to the relative period of time that the power actors in the leadership pool have spent in the local community. The average number of years spent in the community is only a part of this concept. What is more crucial is the average proportion of the power actor's life that has been spent in the community. Such a proportion includes both the time spent within and outside the local area. For example, in one community the average power actor may have spent only 20 percent of his lifetime in the local community. On the other hand, in another community the power actors may have spent an average 90 percent of their life in the local place. This latter leadership pool is more "entrenched" in the local system than the former one.
The degree of entrenchment in the leadership pool has implications for the distribution, structure, and exercise of power in the system. In a community in which the leadership is highly entrenched and the power actors have spent a great deal of their life in the local town, the structure of decision making would tend to be stable. New actors with different values, goals, life styles, and resources would not be available to "shake up" the leadership pool. Certain of the bases of social power, particularly status, prestige, popularity, and social access to community leaders, might become more valuable and useful. There would probably be a higher level of cohesiveness and consensus on the part of the power actors, and the leadership pool's knowledge of, concern for, and personal identification with the community might be greater than in a low entrenched, highly mobile pool.

The literature provides no clues as to the nature of the association between the structural variables in the community and the degree of entrenchment in the leadership pool. The concept has not been presented previously in the power literature. It would appear, however, that any structural variable that would affect the level of in-migration, alter the local normative order, and generally influence the ability of new residents to enter the leadership pool would affect the degree of entrenchment. For example, where such variables as the rate of growth, local dependence, absentee-ownership, and dispersion of power relevant resources are high, the leadership pool may be less entrenched, and the power actors more mobile.
Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the population size of the community, the less entrenched the leadership pool.

The greater the rate of population growth in the community, the less entrenched the leadership pool.

The greater the demographic heterogeneity in the community, the less entrenched the leadership pool.

The greater the economic and government dependence (i.e., the less the autonomy) of the community on external sources, the less entrenched the leadership pool.

The more reformist the character of the local government in the community, the less entrenched the leadership pool.

The greater the organizational density in the community, the less entrenched the leadership pool.

The greater the economic diversity in the community, the less entrenched the leadership pool.

The higher the social class level of the community, the less entrenched the leadership pool.

The dimension of entrenchment has also been included in the model because of its apparent relationship to the leadership pool's perception and definition of community problems. In communities with entrenched leadership pools one might expect greater consensus on both the perception and definition of problems, greater agreement concerning the urgency of the problems, a greater tendency to view the problems as unique, local concerns rather than manifestations of larger societal issues, a greater proclivity for defining the local community as the
responsible agent for amelioration without outside help, etc. These associations will be explicated in the next section.

The concept can be measured by an "Index of Entrenchity." By subtracting the mean number of years spent in the local community by the leadership pool from the mean age of the pool one can determine the average number of years any power actor has spent outside of the community. This is a worthwhile measure, however a more adequate indicator is provided by dividing the mean number of years spent in the community by the mean age of the leadership pool. This quotient represents the mean percentage of the power actor's life that has been spent in the local community. The value can range from 0.00 to 100.00 percent. This index can be applied across communities, and can be utilized in systems other than communities.

1. Cosmopolitanism-Localism

This final characteristic of the leadership pool has been selected mainly in order to investigate its effect upon community problem perception and definition. The distinction between cosmopolitanism and localism has often been utilized in social research. Merton has described a person who has a "localite" orientation as "parochial." His interests are confined to the local community. He is preoccupied with local problems to the virtual exclusion of the national and international scene. A "cosmopolitan," on the other hand, may live in the local community, but he identifies and relates himself to issues, events, and social organization in the broader national and international milieu.
A few studies in the literature have been concerned with this dimension. Stewart found that the top leadership in Southtown was cosmopolitan. Agger and Ostrom noted a similar relationship when they examined the political roles in a small community. They established that those who performed the roles of "active advisors" and "talker" were the more cosmopolitan residents. They proposed that these individuals served to relate the local system to the outside world. Dye located the locals and cosmopolitans among the political leaders and residents in sixteen suburban communities. Localistic attitudes were found to be inversely related to status. Political leaders at the municipal level appeared to be more localistic in outlook than their constituents. Also, local-cosmopolitan attitudes were found to be related to varying opinions in three current problem areas: transportation, municipal jointure, and zoning.

The most extensive examination of this concept in relation to the distribution of power, however, was undertaken by Merton. Merton used a form of the reputational technique to locate the leaders in Rovere. He then classified the leaders by their local and cosmopolitan orientation. The orientation did not refer to the arena in which the influentials were effective, but rather how each viewed the problems of the local community. Locals wished to establish frequent contacts with a great many people as a means to further their career while cosmopolitans desired quality. The locals belonged to voluntary organizations in order to make contacts and the cosmopolitans to organizations requiring special skills or knowledge. The locals held political posts while the cosmopolitans were more often on professional boards. The path to
success for the localite was an elaborate network of personal relationships while the cosmopolitan was equipped with skills that furthered his upward mobility. Cosmopolitans were outsiders. The cosmopolitan was followed because he knew; the localite because he understood.

From the above studies we can infer that the degree of cosmopolitanism or localism in the leadership pool will be influenced by those structural variables which affect the autonomy, social class level, structural differentiation, and degree of political dominance in the community. Those communities that are economically and politically dependent upon the larger society, enjoy a relatively high social class level, have diversity within their demographic and economic bases, and have a reformist type of government with emphasis upon professionalism in the performance of political roles, are most likely to have cosmopolitan leadership pools. It must be noted, however, that the leadership pool of any community will not be completely cosmopolitan. The power actors obviously are concerned with the condition within the local system. This system is the locus of power for these actors.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the population size of the community, the more cosmopolitan the leadership pool.

The greater the rate of population growth in the community, the more cosmopolitan the leadership pool.

The greater the demographic heterogeneity in the community, the more cosmopolitan the leadership pool.
The greater the economic and government dependence (i.e., the less the autonomy) of the community on external sources, the more cosmopolitan the leadership pool.

The more reformist the character of the local government in the community, the more cosmopolitan the leadership pool.

The greater the organizational density in the community, the less cosmopolitan the leadership pool.

The greater the economic diversity in the community, the more cosmopolitan the leadership pool.

The higher the social class level of the community, the more cosmopolitan the leadership pool.

As we noted, this variable has been specifically included in the model in order to examine its association with the leadership pool's perception and definition of problems. Such factors as the number of problems, their degree of uniqueness, the extent to which they are defined as solvable at the local level, and the degree of consensus regarding their urgency and importance may be influenced by the orientation of the leadership pool along the cosmopolitan-localite continuum.

In order to measure this concept, two attitude scales will be included in the interview schedule. The first scale included five items and was used in the study by Dye. The second is a ranking of local, county, state, national, and international interests, and was utilized in a study by Kreps and Wenger.

In this section we have presented our definition of the leadership pool and presented nine dimensions for classifying leadership pools. These pools can be classified by size, institutional dominance, social
class level, legitimacy, visibility, scope of influence, cohesiveness, entrenchment, and cosmopolitan-local orientation. It is offered that classification along such variables is a needed refinement to the usual "elitist-pluralist" or "monolithic-polylithic" distinctions. Thus, we might have a small, economic, high social class, non-legitimate, invisible, general influence, cohesive, highly entrenched, localite pool in one community, as opposed to a large, economic-political, middle class, legitimate, visible, issue-specific, factional, non-entrenched, cosmopolitan leadership pool in another.

We also offered illustrative propositions relating the structure of the community to these characteristics of the leadership pool. Figure 3 presents in matrix form these propositions. The tentative nature of these propositions must be emphasized. They have been deductively drawn from the literature and the model. They await empirical validation.

Finally, we have briefly noted the relevancy of these characteristics of the leadership pool for an analysis of the pool's perception and definition of community problems. Possible operational indicators were presented for each concept. We will utilize these indicators in our heuristic application of the model.

Let us now turn to the third main dimension-set in our model -- community problem dimensions. In Chapter III we will present this dimension and relate its variables to the characteristics of the leadership pool. The final component of the model, i.e., patterns of community action, will be similarly treated in the next chapter.
## Figure 3

**THE RELATIONSHIP OF COMMUNITY STRUCTURAL VARIABLES TO THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LEADERSHIP POOL**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
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<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>(Rate of Growth)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Demographic Heterogeneity</td>
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<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
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<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dependence (Autonomy)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Dep.</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>(Econ Dom.)</td>
<td>*</td>
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<td>(Polit)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Dep.</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>(Polit Dom.)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(Econ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reform Govt.</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organizational Density</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>Diversity of the Economic Base</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>Social Class Level</td>
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+ = Positive Association; - = Negative Association; * = Direction of Relationship Not Known Prior to Empirical Examination.
1. Other relationships can also be posed. For example, community structural variables may directly affect the definition of community problems. The characteristics of the leadership pool may influence proposals for community action. Also, the type of community action undertaken may affect the structure of the community. While these relationships are legitimate concerns and can be examined, we have chosen to examine the simple, causal chain in this study. Its utility in community action analysis is its primary advantage. This chain traces any problem from the structure of the community through to proposals for action. This study was initially and specifically concerned with water problems; the advantage of the chain analysis for this specific problem was great.

2. Additional analysis of the exercise of power is planned for a future date.


5. Loomis, op. cit., p. 20.

6. For example, see Clark, op. cit., pp. 272-273; Dahl, op. cit., p. 8; and French, op. cit., p. 183.


11. It should be noted that these first nine bases are those developed by Dahl. See Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* *op. cit.*, pp. 79 ff.

12. Nuttall, Scheuch, and Gordon have developed a classification of influence positions based upon actual and perceived access to relevant resources. This article is an excellent analysis of the relevancy, applicability, and utility of resources in the exercise of social power. See Ronald Nuttall, Erwin Scheuch, and Chad Gordon, "On the Structure of Influence," in Terry Clark, ed., *Community Structure and Decision Making: Comparative Analyses* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 349-380.


15. Ibid., p. 64.

16. Other scholars have also examined this question. For example, Clark looked at the extent to which Dahl's nine bases of social power are stratified. He concluded that seven of the nine bases were definitely stratified to some degree. See Clark, "The Concept of Power: Some Overemphasized and Underrecognized Dimensions," *op. cit.*, pp. 283-284. Also, as we previously noted, Rossi proposed that the bases of power account for the inequality of power among citizens. See Rossi, *op. cit.*, pp. 415-443.


22. For example, in 1956 Robert Daland examined leadership in a rapidly growing Alabama city of 50,000. He found that three trends were associated with increasing size: non-natives won public office more frequently; there was a slight rise in the formal education of the winners; and fewer people could afford to hold public office because the burden of serving and campaign costs had risen. Robert Daland, Dixie City: A Portrait of Political Leadership (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1956). Peter Rossi posed that city size was a crucial antecedent determinant of how and why decisions are made. Peter Rossi, "Theory, Research and Practice in Community Organization," in Social Science and Community Action (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1960), pp. 9-24. Charles Mulford compared two rural and one urban communities and concluded that "concealed" leaders only existed in the urban community. Charles Mulford, "Comment on the Identification of Leaders," Social Forces, 44 (December 1965), pp. 251-258.


27. This proposed generalization may not be valid for "bedroom, residential communities."

28. Often this rise in power was facilitated by the "machine politics" of the era and its emphasis upon patronage.


36. Barth examined six community case studies and on the basis of their findings proposed a similar generalization. He offered that absentee-owned and operated businesses were associated with a diffuse distribution of influence. Ernest A. T. Barth, "Community Influence Systems: Structure and Change," Social Forces, 40 (October 1961), pp. 58-63.

37. Clark, op. cit., p. 103.

39. Ibid., p. 12.


41. Ibid., p. 363.

42. The commission form of government is another variant in local government structure. This form exhibits regional variation, representing 19 percent and 17 percent of the governments in cities in the South and Northeast respectively. It represents only 12 percent, however, of all local governments in the United States, as compared to 41 percent for the mayor and 47 percent for the city manager forms. Because of its uniqueness in occurrence, and its similarity to the mayor form with respect to the centralization of power, we have chosen not to include it. If regional variations are being considered, however, or comparative studies are being undertaken in the south or northeast, this variable should be included. For a discussion of the distribution of various governmental structures, see Raymond Wolfinger and John Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Governments," in Clark, ed., Community Structure and Decision Making: Comparative Analyses (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 159-195. The percentages cited above are from page 178 of this article.

43. Ibid., p. 184.

44. Ibid., p. 178.


51. Of course other elements of the community also serve as integrative forces. The family, schools, government, churches, etc. may serve to integrate the community in addition to their other functions. Where the number of voluntary organizations is small, these elements may "take up the slack" in the integration of the system.


54. Ibid.

55. For example, see Matt and Reiss, loc. cit., Harris, loc. cit., Nelson, loc. cit., and Reiss, loc. cit.


60. Ibid., p. 153.

61. Clark, op. cit., p. 94.


66. Ibid., p. 154.

67. Clark, Community Structure and Decision Making: Comparative Analyses, op. cit., p. 119. In his later empirical study, he found that the relationship was ambiguous. See Clark, "Community Structure, Decision Making, Budget Expenditures, and Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities," op. cit., p. 587. Crain and Rosenthal, however, found that the higher the socioeconomic status of the population of
In a community, the greater the level of citizen participation in day-to-day community decision making. Robert L. Crain and Donald B. Rosenthal, "Community Status as a Dimension of Local Decision Making," American Sociological Review, 32 (December 1967), pp. 970-984.


70. This term was used by Smith and Hood who viewed it as being more truly descriptive of those leaders identified by the reputational technique. Joel Smith and Thomas Hood, "The Delineation of Community Power Structures by a Reputational Approach," Sociological Inquiry, 36 (Winter 1966), pp. 3-14.

71. As such, we would expect it to be negatively associated with the scope of influence variable, our sixth dimension.


73. For comparative purposes the relative size of the leadership pool can be determined by dividing the total population of the community by the number of power actors in the leadership pool. The lower the "citizen-power actor ratio," the smaller the relative size of the leadership pool.

74. Miller has proposed that this variable is in dire need of investigation. Delbert C. Miller, "Power, Complimentarity, and the Cutting Edge of Research," op. cit., p. 4.

75. The number of studies that have examined this second component simply is too numerous to mention. Practically every case study of community power has included information on the institutional affiliation of the power actors. For two excellent comparative studies, however, see Delbert C. Miller, "Industry and Community Power Structure: A Comparative Study of an American and an English City," loc. cit., and William Form, William D'Antonio, Charles Loomis, and Eugene Erickson, "Institutional and Occupational Representations in Eleven Community Influence Systems," American Sociological Review, 26 (1961), pp. 440-460.

77. Hunter, loc. cit.

78. William Form and Warren Sauer, Community Influentials in a Middle-Sized City (East Lansing: Michigan State University, The Institute for Community Development and Services, 1960).


81. No value judgment should be inferred from these labels.

82. Stewart, loc. cit.

83. Hunter, loc. cit.

84. Mills, loc. cit.


88. Once again the predicted relationship between certain of the structural variables and the degree of visibility is not patently obvious. Specifically, the relationship between visibility and the population size of the community is a case in point. It may be that the relationship is curvilinear, with high visibility being found with extremely small and large populations. The question requires empirical examination.

There are, of course, some studies that have found generalized leaders with broad scope. Hunter is often credited with describing such a power structure in Atlanta. It must be remembered, however, that he did state that there were pyramids of power in Atlanta, and doubted that power formed a single pyramid with any nicety in any community the size of Regional City. Hunter, op. cit., p. 62. Empirical support for a broad scope of influence, however, was offered by Kimball and Pearsall. In studying Talladega, Alabama (13,000) in the early fifties, they noted that the community dynamics were like a whirlpool with the same old gang in the inner circle running things. Solon T. Kimball and Marlon Pearsall, "Event Analysis as an Approach to Community Study," Social Forces, 34 (October 1955), pp. 58-63. Finally, limited support for a broad scope of power was found by Form and Sauer. They noted that half of the power actors in Lansing viewed a small group as being responsible for making a majority of the major community decisions. On the other hand, one half perceived the decision makers as changing by issue area. William Form and Warren Sauer, Community Influentials in a Middle-Size City, loc. cit.


Hunter, loc. cit.

Miller, op. cit., p. 299.

100. James G. March and Herbert S. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958). We are indebted to Bohlen, *ibid.*, for first utilizing these propositions in the analysis of social power.

101. It must be emphasized that entrenchment is not synonymous with "power actor turnover" in the leadership pool. It is possible, for example, to have a community in which the leadership pool is entrenched, but the rate of turnover is high as localites circulate into and out of the leadership pool. To examine the rate of turnover within the leadership pool requires longitudinal study. This is a legitimate concern, however Olmsted is the only person who has systematically examined the concept of turnover. He found that only nine of the thirty selected leaders delineated in 1943 were among the thirty-nine elected in 1949. Donald W. Olmsted, "Organizational Leadership and Social Structure in a Small City," *American Sociological Review*, 19 (1954), pp. 273-281.


CHAPTER III

The Model:
Community Problem Dimensions and Patterns of Community Action

In Chapter II we explicated the concept of social power and presented the first two dimension sets of this model. Each of the variables included under the general dimensions of community structure and characteristics of the leadership pool was initially defined. The inclusion of each of the variables was justified on empirical and/or theoretical grounds. Previous work from the literature was cited when it was appropriate to such justification. The association of the variables in these two dimension sets was explicated. Propositions illustrating the relationship of the structure of the community to the characteristics of leadership in the community were posed and deductively derived from the model. In addition, the utility of each of the characteristics of the leadership pool as independent variables influencing the pool's perception and definition of local problems was examined. Finally, possible operational indicators of each variable were offered.

In this chapter we will consider the final two dimension sets in the model: i.e. community problem dimensions and patterns of community action. As the reader may note, the first two sets of variables basically were structural in nature. They were concerned with the patterns of association between selected elements of the community and certain
analytical dimensions of the community's pool of leadership. The dimensions in this chapter are more perceptual and social-psychological. We will be concerned with the power actors perception of problems, the analytical nature of their definition of problems, and the patterns inherent in the proposals they offer to ameliorate these problems.

Let us turn to the third dimension of our model.

Community Problem Dimensions

We are now about to enter virgin territory. In this section we will present a definition of community problems, offer seven analytical dimensions for classifying these problems based upon their perception and definition by the leadership pool, and relate these dimensions to the characteristics of the leadership pool. One of the working hypotheses of this model is that the structure and characteristics of the leadership pool will affect the pool's perception and definition of local problems. Such dimensions as the number of perceived problems, the degree of consensus shown by the power actors in defining the seriousness of the problems, the clarity of the definitions, and the extent to which the perceived problems are institutionally specific will be affected by the scope, cohesiveness, class level, legitimacy, visibility, etc., of the leadership pool. Furthermore, it is proposed that the manner in which problems are perceived and defined will affect the types of action that are proposed for ameliorating them.

No one previously has attempted such an analysis. The relationship between the structure of leadership and the perception and definition of problems has not been examined. To the author's knowledge, no previous
study has attempted to classify problems along analytical dimensions. For our purposes, the only aid provided in the literature was a study published in 1959 by Ernest A. T. Barth and S. D. Johnson. In opting for an issue-analysis approach to community power research, they presented an empirical typology of issues based upon the following dimensions: unique-recurrent, salient-nonsalient to the leadership, salient-nonsalient to the community public, effective action possible-effective action impossible, and local-cosmopolitan nature. These dimensions provided us with an initial perspective from which to develop our problem dimensions. We subsequently included two of the Barth and Johnson dimensions in our model.

It was decided that the major criterion for the inclusion of a dimension was that it exhibit an apparent relationship with types of action that might be proposed to ameliorate the perceived problem. In other words, the attempt was made to include dimensions whose configurations would affect the nature of the action proposed by the leadership pool to solve the problem. Concern was evidenced in selecting dimensions that might affect such variables as the degree of urgency of the proposed action, the degree of coordination within the community required for implementing the proposal, and the degree of external aid needed in carrying out the proposed action. In addition, however, dimensions were sought which might be influenced by the characteristics of the leadership pool. To be included in the model, therefore, a dimension had to be able to serve a dual function. It had to be logically possible to view it as both a dependent (to the characteristics of the leadership pool) and an independent (to the proposed ameliorative action) variable.
These are stringent criteria. Certain dimensions were considered and not included because of a lack of fit with the other elements in the model. The attempt was made to select dimensions that could be applied to any perceived problem, and were not dependent upon the nature of any specific problem. For example, dimensions were chosen that could be applied to community problems as varied as juvenile delinquency, zoning, school finances, industrial development, sex education, local government taxation, slum clearance, apathy, and water pollution. The task of selecting and justifying these dimensions would have been much easier if previous studies had analyzed the problem. As it is, the task is similar to attempting to construct a full score for an improvisational work by Bruin. One has an idea what types of elements to select to produce a coherent, logical, whole -- but there are no guidelines, classical conventions, or precedents to guide the endeavor. Mistakes may have been made. Therefore, this formulation must be viewed as tentative. It is hoped that even the heuristic application that this study represents will aid in refining the model.

The dimensions selected are (1) the number of perceived problems, (2) the perceived seriousness of the problems, (3) the degree of consensus concerning the seriousness of the problems in the community, (4) the extent of institutional specificity versus community generality inherent in the perceived problems, (5) the extent to which the perceived problems are viewed as solvable by the local community, (6) the degree of uniqueness of the problems, and (7) the degree of clarity in the definitions of the problems. These concepts will be defined and their place
in the model explicated shortly. First, however, let us examine what we mean by community problems.

A. Definition

We shall define as community problems those CURRENT OR FUTURE CONDITIONS PERCEIVED TO BE PRESENT OR LIKELY TO OCCUR WITHIN THE COMMUNITY SOCIAL SYSTEM THAT ARE DEFINED BY POWER ACTORS IN THE LEADERSHIP POOL AS BEING DYSFUNCTIONAL AND REQUIRING AMELIORATION, WHETHER OR NOT THE CONDITION CAN BE AMELIORATED.

We begin our definition by stating that community problems are CURRENT OR FUTURE CONDITIONS PERCEIVED TO BE PRESENT OR LIKELY TO OCCUR IN THE COMMUNITY SOCIAL SYSTEM. The key word is perceived. The conditions we are labelling as community problems are those that are perceived by the power actors as being currently present in the community or as having a high probability of future occurrence. Whether or not the condition is present objectively is of little importance. What is crucial is that the power actors perceived that it is, or soon may be. It is possible that the power actors may be chasing shadows and "looking for men under the bed." What they consider as being problems within the community may only exist in their perceptual set, influenced by what they view as their vested interests. (The fear expressed by a banker in a small midwestern town over a radical leftist takeover of the community by poisoning the citizens with flouride in the water system may be such a "problem.") On the other hand, what the actors perceive as problems may be crucial needs, inconsistencies, contradictions, or deficiencies objectively present within the local community. Of course what is
"objectively present" is always contingent upon one's criteria for selection, frame of reference, and location in the system; it may be impossible to determine the objective presence of all community problems with any degree of validity. There may be as many different problems as there are residents in the community! As we shall note below, what is important is that it is these perceived problems that will probably be attacked by the leadership pool. These are the conditions that will affect the nature of the pool's activity and the future of the system.

Perception, however, is not our only concern. We offer that these perceived conditions are those THAT ARE DEFINED BY POWER ACTORS IN THE LEADERSHIP POOL AS BEING DYSFUNCTIONAL AND REQUIRING AMELIORATION. To be considered a problem, therefore, a condition must meet two criteria. It must be defined by the power actors as being detrimental, pernicious, baneful, or deleterious to the community. In addition, however, it must be a condition that the actors define as requiring some measure of activity to solve. It is possible that a condition may be viewed as dysfunctional but the power actors do not see it as requiring amelioration. Perhaps the issue is "not that bad." Perchance it is something "we have lived with so long that we're used to it." Possibly it is a situation that "those people brought on themselves -- they love to live that way, let's not bother them." By our definition, these conditions are not problems. They are not defined as requiring amelioration. Of course, it is possible for a problem to be defined as needing a solution, but subsequently no action may be taken by the power actors. This inactivity may be caused by numerous factors. It, however, is also
Important. The decision not to attempt to solve the problem, or not to initiate an ameliorative program after the condition has been defined as dysfunctional and requiring a solution, represents action to undertake inaction. The subsequently proposed activity, as we shall note shortly, is influenced by the nature of the problem definition. Conditions which meet these criteria, therefore, qualify as problems in our model.

Finally, we state WHETHER OR NOT THE CONDITION CAN BE AMELIORATED. It is possible that certain conditions may not be solvable, at least at the local level. Problems such as inflation and voting rights extension may be true concerns perceived as existing in the local community by the power actors. Solutions to such problems, however, do not lie at the local level. What this phrase highlights is that it may not be presently possible to solve all of the conditions that we might label as community problems. What is important, however, is that the power actors perceive the conditions as dysfunctional, and define these problems in such a manner that ameliorative action is viewed as being required.

Let us now turn to the community problem dimensions. Our modus operandi will be similar to that used in presenting the characteristics of the leadership pool, except that we will be unable to cite the previous work in the area.

B. The Number of Perceived Problems

The most obvious dimension for classifying the problems of the leadership pool is simply the number of different problems that power actors perceive as existing in the community. This dimension is important in that it indicates the actors' perception of "the state of the
community," and may also serve as a measure of the perceived stress and strain in the local system. Obviously, one must be careful in using such a crude indicator in this manner. The actors (1) may not perceive many problems that are present (e.g., poverty in the hidden ghetto or pollution in the local stream), (2) may not acknowledge the existence of problems that are perceived by the general citizenry (e.g., a lack of effective community leadership), and/or (3) may perceive problems that are not actually existent in the community (e.g., a "Communist conspiracy"). What this dimension does tell us, however, is basically the number of different conditions present in the local community that the leadership pool views as being problematic. Where the number is large, one finds a leadership pool that is faced with such tasks as assigning priorities, allocating resources, coordinating action, and planning strategies to handle the volume of concerns; in this situation these tasks become problems in themselves. It may not be a question of "guns and butter," but the choice between "sewers and welfare" or "schools and low taxes" is just as difficult.

The number of perceived problems would appear to be affected by the characteristics of the leadership pool. Those characteristics of the leadership pool which affect such factors as the number of actors, the number of contacts and channels that those in the leadership pool have with others in the system, the rate and nature of the information exchange with the pool, the scope of the leadership pool, etc. would also appear to influence the number of perceived problems. Any leadership pool that is large, visible, narrow in scope, factional, and generally associated with a wide, issue-specific distribution of power
would tend to perceive a large number of different problems. Each power actor, relatively isolated from the other actors in the pool both with respect to the area of influence and the rate of interaction, would tend to perceive problems relevant to his institutional sphere. The larger the number of actors and the more widely distributed the decision-making structure, the larger the number of problems.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the size of the leadership pool, the larger the number of perceived problems.

The greater the dominance of one institution in the leadership pool, the smaller the number of perceived problems.

The higher the social class level of the leadership pool, the larger the number of perceived problems.

The more legitimate the leadership pool, the higher the number of perceived problems.

The more visible the leadership pool, the higher the number of perceived problems.

The broader the scope of the leadership pool, the smaller the number of perceived problems.

The more cohesive the leadership pool, the smaller the number of perceived problems.

The more entrenched the leadership pool, the larger the number of perceived problems.

We also consider this dimension as an independent variable which will affect the patterns of community action proposed by the leadership
pool. We have already noted the attendant problems presented to the leadership pool by a large number of perceived problems. These concerns should be manifested in the proposals and tactics offered to ameliorate the problems. Such variables as the urgency, degree of coordination, amount of external aid, perceived relevance of institutions and organizations, etc. required for the successful implementation of the proposals would appear to be influenced by the number of perceived problems. We will further explicate these relationships in the final section of this chapter.

If there is one problem this dimension does not present, it is that of operationalization and measurement. The power actors in the leadership pool can be asked to identify the current and/or recent community problems. The number of different problems noted is our dimension. Our unit of measurement, the problem, has already been defined.

C. The Perceived Seriousness of the Problems

While the number of perceived problems is a useful dimension, this second dimension may be even more determinant of the patterns of ameliorative activity. Whether the perceived number of problems is large or small, the degree to which the power actors perceive and define them as serious will have ramifications for what, how, and particularly when they attempt to solve them. These first two dimensions are similar in many respects. Both may be utilized as indicators of the leadership pool's view of the welfare of the community at a given moment in time. Both create dilemmas, when their values increase, for the leadership pool concerning the assignment of priorities, the distribution of
resources, etc. Also, both share the strengths and weaknesses that we have previously noted in being perceived by the leadership pool.

The two dimensions, however, are independent. It is possible to consider four types of communities based on the number and seriousness of the problems. The "deadly combination," of course, is a community in which the leadership pool perceives a high number of problems and defines them as seriousness. The task facing such a pool by their own definition is monumental. In such a situation conflicts over priorities, resources, strategies, etc. are likely as there are many problems worthy of amelioration. Due to factors such as this, one might predict a low output, or low level of successful ameliorative action, as the leadership pool attempts to decide simply where to start! The high-number-low seriousness and low number-high seriousness communities might prove to be interesting for future analysis. The former faces the same problems as the high number-high seriousness community -- without the sense of urgency. One might expect a leadership pool in such a condition to employ the tactic of "benign neglect." The latter, however, does not face the question of priority. It has few problems, but they are serious. They are visible. One might predict a fairly high output from such a leadership pool.

This dimension of seriousness was included in the model primarily for its utility as an independent variable. The perceived degree of seriousness, however, also would appear to be dependent upon the characteristics of the leadership pool. This dimension, though, is similar to the social class dimension in the previous section. The relationship between the characteristics of the leadership pool and the pool's
perception of the seriousness of the community problems is not self-evident. Furthermore, there are no previous studies that provide clues as to the direction of such an association. In examining the relationship, however, it would appear that a cosmopolitan leadership pool would tend to view the problems of the community as less serious than a localist one. The power actors in the former are simply not that concerned with local issues. Conversely, an entrenched leadership pool may view the problems in the community as being serious. Such a pool is composed of power actors who have spent a large proportion of their lives in the community, and have probably acquired a rather high degree of identification with the community. These high levels of familiarity and concern might result in seriously perceived problems. Furthermore, a narrow scoped, factional pool might also tend to perceive a high degree of severity inherent in the local problems. In such a pool, the power actors are isolated and hold and exercise influence in only one or a few institutional areas. Problems within these areas are salient to these actors. Issues within their spheres of influence are likely to be important to their vested interests. Therefore, such problems may be viewed as serious. Concomitantly, the perceived degree of severity inherent in the local problem definitions may be high.

These propositions are extremely tenuous and their explication may be considered as heuristic. They are offered at this time, however, in order that they may be empirically examined.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the size of the leadership pool, the less serious the perceived problems.
The greater the dominance of one institution in the leadership pool, the less serious the perceived problems.

The more visible the leadership pool, the more serious the perceived problems.

The more broad the scope of the leadership pool, the less serious the perceived problems.

The more cohesive the leadership pool, the less serious the perceived problems.

The more entrenched the leadership pool, the more serious the perceived problems.

The more cosmopolitan the leadership pool, the less serious the perceived problems.

This dimension would appear to be an antecedent determinant of the patterns of ameliorative action proposed by the leadership pool to solve the defined problems. The proposed immediacy of the action is one rather obvious dimension. Where problems are defined as serious, there is likely to be an associated sense of urgency about their solutions. Other characteristics of the proposed action, however, may also be affected by this dimension. The degree of required, institutional coordination within the community, the perceived relevance of various organizations, the possibility of one actor or a group of actors blocking the action, and the extent of external aid needed to solve the problem are a few examples. These relationships will be more fully discussed in the next section.

The dimension of seriousness can be measured by having the power actors define whether problems within various institutions are very
serious, fairly serious, or not serious. Communities can then be ranked and compared along this dimension.

D. The Degree of Consensus Concerning the Perceived Problems in the Community

A crucial variable is the degree of consensus shown by the power actors concerning the existence and seriousness of the community problems. In some communities the power actors may exhibit a high degree of consensus about what constitute the problems in the community. In other communities, however, conflict and disagreement may be found. In the latter situation effective ameliorative action is problematic. There is little agreement among the actors as to the nature of seriousness of the community's problems. Coordinated action within the leadership pool is difficult to achieve as the actors are faced with the tasks of assigning priorities, allocating resources, and planning strategies to solve the problems. Where the leadership pool evidences consensus regarding the problematic condition of the community, however, efforts at successful solution and change are enhanced. Consensus basically serves to short-cut the process from perception to implementation. Where there is consensus within the leadership pool concerning the seriousness of the community's problems, the pool can more easily institute the types of action they perceive as necessary to ameliorate the situation. Some of the most violent, rancorous conflicts local communities experience are centered about this dimension of consensus. Schools or low taxes, which shall it be? Questions such as this must be answered before the leadership can have either choice.
The degree of consensus would appear to be influenced strongly by the characteristics of the leadership pool. If the leadership pool is large, factional, visible, not dominated by a single institution, and cosmopolitan in orientation, the degree of consensus will probably be low. In such a pool the power actors are isolated individually or in groups. There is little interaction between them; little opportunity to converse and reach consensus. Where they are visible, the pool receives many varied inputs about community problems. Selecting those which are valid, urgent concerns and having the power actors agree with such a selection may be difficult. A cosmopolitan leadership pool may not reach consensus because of the relatively lower degree of identification with and interest in the local community. Finally, a pool with a narrow scope of influence would probably have a low degree of consensus. The power actors have influence within limited institutional areas. They will tend to perceive problems as serious within their areas. In such a situation, based upon the vested interests of each actor in a particular segment of the community, consensus regarding the seriousness of the overall problems in the community will be low.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the size of the leadership pool, the lower the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems.

The greater the dominance of one institution in the leadership pool, the higher the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems.

The more legitimate the leadership pool, the lower the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems.
The more visible the leadership pool, the lower the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems.

The broader the scope of the leadership pool, the higher the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems.

The more cohesive the leadership pool, the higher the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems.

The more entrenched the leadership pool, the higher the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems.

The more cosmopolitan the leadership pool, the lower the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems.

We have already noted the effect upon coordinated action that this dimension may exhibit. Other characteristics of the ameliorative proposals may also be affected. The perceived urgency of instituting action aimed at changing the situation, the perceived possibility of various interest groups blocking the action, and the perceived relevance of various organizations for a successful implementation of the program are other dependent characteristics. Basically, a lack of consensus about the problems in the community may produce a lack of agreement about what is to be done to correct these conditions. Such a situation may lead to a high degree of ambiguity and inaction. Other questions may also be influenced by the level of consensus. Should action be the responsibility of the government or private interests? Should external aid be sought by the local community to solve the problems? Who should initiate the action? We will explicate these relationships in greater detail in the next section.
The degree of consensus concerning the seriousness of the problem can be determined by developing an "index of opinion dispersion." This index can be applied to the power actor's rating of the degree of severity in the problems in the various institutional areas. The power actors can rate the problems as very serious, fairly serious, or not serious. If there is complete agreement among the power actors, each problem should have all of the ratings in the same category. Where there is no consensus, the ratings would be evenly distributed across the three categories. By computing the maximum possible dispersion for each problem \((D_{\text{max}} = N - N/3\) where \(N\) is the number of power actors\) one can determine the proportion of the maximum possible dispersion that the leadership pool exhibits. The formula representing this index is \(I_{\text{C}} = 1 - \frac{\sum D_I}{N_p D_{\text{max}}}\) where \(I_{\text{C}} = \text{Index of Consensus}, D_I = \text{the dispersion or dissensus within each problem and is computed by} D_I = N - M_o\) where \(M_o\) is the number of the model category and \(N_p\) is the total number of problems. This index has a value from .000 to 1.000, and can be interpreted to represent what proportion of the total possible consensus is illustrated by the leadership pool. Thus in a pool with high consensus the value may be .864. In a pool with little consensus, the value might range as low as .153. The index can be applied to other ratings other than problem analysis, and would appear to be a useful comparative tool.

E. Institutional Specificity versus Community Generality

This community problem dimension may be the most important in our model. Some power actors may be myopic when perceiving community problems. These actors tend only to perceive and define problems that are
related to their own institutional spheres. In such leadership pools, one finds governmental officials citing only governmentally related problems; public school administrators only perceiving educational issues; and the industrial leaders viewing as problematical only those conditions which affect the industrial sector of the community. The leadership pool in such a community may be labelled as "institutionally specific" in its perception of local problems. Other power actors may have a panoramic view of the community. The conditions they perceive as being problematic may be in institutional areas other than their own sphere, and may have community wide implications. The city auditor may view school financing as an urgent problem; the school superintendent may be concerned with urban renewal; the industrialist may perceive that there is a great need for increased hospital facilities in the community. If the leadership pool is composed of actors with such a perspective, it may be labelled as exhibiting "community generality" in its perception. Community leadership pools can be placed on a continuum based upon this dimension, with polar extremes being "specificity" and "generality."

The importance of this dimension lies in its relationship with the other community problem dimensions. Such dimensions as consensus, the number of problems, the degree of seriousness, and the possibility of local solution may be influenced by this dimension. For example, where the perceived problems exhibit institutional specificity, the level of consensus will probably be low. Each actor sees problems only related to his sphere of activity. As the overall perception of problems becomes fragmented, the level of agreement becomes low. Such interrelationships
between the community problem dimensions, however, must be empirically examined.

Whether or not the perceived problems are institutionally specific or of general community orientation would appear to be strongly influenced by the characteristics of the leadership pool. No set of perceived problems would ever be completely specific or general in orientation. Some specificity is to be expected due to the vested interests of power actors who do not possess a broad scope of influence. Also, a degree of generality is likely to occur because of the visibility of certain issues, and the existence of actors with higher levels of general influence in the community. It would appear, however, that leadership pools characterized by large size, institutional dominance, high legitimacy, high visibility, narrow scope of influence, low cohesiveness, low entrenchment, and a cosmopolitan orientation would tend to perceive and define problems that were specific to various institutions. This institutional specificity would likely occur from the fractionated, pluralistic, polythic nature of such a leadership pool. Where the power actors exercise influence in a specific institutional sphere, and the leadership pool is clique-ridden and factional, the actors have less opportunity to become aware of and knowledgeable about problems in other areas. Furthermore, the actor's interests are so deeply embedded in a specific institutional sphere that it is not surprising that it should serve as the locus of the problems they perceive as being urgent. Basically, any characteristic of the leadership pool which would tend to focus and limit the power actors' influence and activity to a specific institutional area, would also tend to increase the institutional
specificity of the perceived problems. In such a leadership pool, "myopia" may be a common condition.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the size of the leadership pool, the greater the degree of institutional specificity in the perceived problems.

The greater the dominance of one institution in the leadership pool, the greater the degree of institutional specificity in the perceived problems.

The higher the social class level of the leadership pool, the lesser the degree of institutional specificity in the perceived problems.

The more legitimate the leadership pool, the greater the degree of institutional specificity in the perceived problems.

The more visible the leadership pool, the greater the degree of institutional specificity in the perceived problems.

The broader the scope of influence of the leadership pool, the lesser the degree of institutional specificity in the perceived problems.

The more cohesive the leadership pool, the lesser the degree of institutional specificity in the perceived problems.

The more entrenched the leadership pool, the lesser the degree of institutional specificity in the perceived problems.

The more cosmopolitan the leadership pool, the greater the degree of institutional specificity in the perceived problems.

This dimension also has particular relevance as an independent variable. The degree of institutional specificity would appear to influence various patterns of the proposed ameliorative activity. Where
the perceived problems are located within specific institutional spheres, the level of consensus within the leadership pool probably will be lessened. Furthermore, the tasks of establishing priorities, allocating resources, and instituting ameliorative action will become more difficult. In such a situation, conflict is likely. Reconciliation is difficult, and inactivity may result. Also, such variables as the level of required coordination among the various institutions to successfully implement the proposals would appear to be affected. As a general proposition one might offer that the more institutionally specific the perceived problems, the greater the difficulty in successfully implementing the proposed action.

To measure this dimension, a content analysis can be performed upon those problems perceived and defined by the leadership pool. The institutional representation of each actor can be determined. These institutional affiliations can then be compared with the perceived problems. The higher the proportion of all problems that are related to the affiliated institution, the higher the measure of institutional specificity.

F. The Possibility of Local Solution

Certain problems may be defined by the leadership pool as being solvable at the local level -- by the local community. The power actors believe that these types of problems are the responsibility of the local community; not non-local state, regional, or national agencies. Furthermore, it is perceived that the local community possesses the necessary material resources, skills, and knowledge to undertake a solution. Such
problems as downtown traffic congestion, zoning, school curriculum reform, integration of public facilities, and the extension of sewer and water lines are examples of types of problems for which there may be purely local solutions. On the other hand, a local solution may be defined as impossible. Certain problems, although existent within the community, may not be considered as the community's responsibility. Furthermore, the nature of other problems may be such that the leadership pool does not believe that the local community, by itself, has the ability to solve them. The community is defined as lacking the requisite authority, resources, skills, or knowledge. The solution to such problems lies either totally outside the local community, or within the local community, but requires extensive external aid. Examples of such problems might include inflation, urban renewal, school construction, long-range planning, industrial development, hospital construction, and poverty and unemployment. In effect, this variable provides an indicator of the perceived "problem solving" ability of the local community.

The degree to which problems are defined as being solvable at the local level would appear to be related to certain characteristics of the leadership pool. Those characteristics which would tend to limit the power actor's knowledge about the total resources available in the community and/or increase his knowledge about the possible external sources of aid available to the community apparently would have particular relevance. Both of these conditions should increase external aid. Such characteristics, therefore, as the degree of cosmopolitanism, the level of cohesiveness, the extent of entrenchment, and the scope of influence within the leadership pool should become manifest as important antecedent
Determinants. The relationship, however, of other characteristics, such as the degree of visibility and institutional dominance, is not clear. The existence and direction of such associations cannot be determined prior to the empirical application of the model. Once again, the following propositions must be considered as illustrative and highly tentative.

Illustrative Propositions:

The higher the social class level of the leadership pool, the lower the proportion of locally solvable problems.

The broader the scope of influence in the leadership pool, the higher the proportion of locally solvable problems.

The more cohesive the leadership pool, the higher the proportion of locally solvable problems.

The more entrenched the leadership pool, the higher the proportion of locally solvable problems.

The more cosmopolitan the leadership pool, the lower the proportion of locally solvable problems.

Various characteristics of the proposed ameliorative action would appear to be influenced by this dimension. In fact, this dimension may be the most crucial antecedent determinant. Obviously, the level of inactivity will be affected. The extent to which the leadership pool defines and proposes "no action" as possible, should be influenced by this definitional dimension. Where the local community is not defined as the viable locus for solution, the degree of inactivity will likely increase. Other action patterns, however, would also appear to be
affected. The association with the proposed degree of external aid considered essential to solve the problem is practically tautological. The perceived relevance of local organizations and the possibility of blockage by local individuals and groups also would appear to be negatively associated with the degree of local solution. Also, the perceived extent of governmental as opposed to private responsibility would appear to be influenced by this dimension. We will further explicate the associations in the next section.

This dimension can be measured by having the power actors define whether the problems can be solved at the local level, by the local community. The percentage of the total problems that can be solved at the local level can then be determined. For comparative analysis, the communities can be ranked on the basis of this percentage.

G. The Degree of Uniqueness in the Problem Definitions

Leadership pools may vary in the extent to which they define local community problems as being unique to their community, as opposed to neighboring or similar communities. Some pools may define their problems as unique. Others may view them as similar to those faced by other, salient communities. Certain conditions, such as a lack of industrial development, needed zoning reform, or the need for the construction of a flood wall may be truly idiosyncratic to the community. Other issues, such as crime and delinquency, adequate governmental financing, and school construction are likely to be present in other communities. The important variable, however, is the extent to which the leadership pool perceives the problems as being unique -- whether or
not they actually are. In communities with a high degree of uniquely defined problems, one can expect the leadership pool to look within the community both for causal factors and for ameliorative action. If there is something "uniquely wrong" within the community, less reliance might be placed upon the aid, experience, and knowledge of external sources.

The structure of leadership in the community would appear to influence the defined degree of uniqueness in the community problems. The social class level and degree of cosmopolitanism are characteristics of the leadership pool that should influence the extent of uniqueness. Educational level is an important indicator of social class level. This variable, and cosmopolitanism, might serve to broaden the interests and knowledge of the leadership pool. A leadership pool characterized by high social class and a cosmopolitan orientation, therefore, might tend to define proportionately fewer problems as being unique to the local community. Entrenchment apparently represents another crucial determinant. Where the power actors in a leadership pool have spent a large proportion of their life within the local community, they may be less knowledgeable about the conditions in other areas. If they exhibit a strong personal identification with the local area, they might be expected to define its problems as being unique. The relationships between uniqueness and the other characteristics of the leadership pool lack face validity. The only clue to the association might be found in the possible interrelatedness of certain of the characteristics. If entrenchment, broad scope of influence, and high cohesiveness are positively associated, then these latter characteristics also may increase the degree of uniqueness. This statement represents, however, pure
speculation. These associations and interrelationships have never before been conceptually posed or empirically examined. Often, the author feels as though he is attempting to piece together a jigsaw puzzle -- while blindfolded!

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the size of the leadership pool, the less unique the perceived problems.

The broader the scope of the leadership pool, the more unique the perceived problems.

The more cohesive the leadership pool, the more unique the perceived problems.

The more entrenched the leadership pool, the more unique the perceived problems.

The higher the social class level of the leadership pool, the less unique the perceived problems.

The more cosmopolitan the leadership pool, the less unique the perceived problems.

As an independent variable, this dimension would appear to have utility for explaining certain characteristics of the proposed ameliorative action. We might assume that the most crucial dependent characteristic would be the locus of action. If the community problems are defined as unique, there may be a greater tendency to attempt to solve them within the local community, without reliance on outside sources of aid. The perceived relevance of local organizations, the degree of urgency in implementing an action program, and the level of inactivity are other examples of possible dependent characteristics.
The power actors can be asked if the problems they have perceived and defined are unique to their own community, or if other nearby, similar communities share such problems. The proportion that are defined as unique is a useful indicator of this concept.

II. The Clarity of the Problem Definitions

The set of problems perceived by the leadership pool may vary in the degree of clarity exhibited in their definitions. By clarity, we are referring to the extent to which they are viewed in specific cause and effect terms. Certain problems may be defined as having single or multiple specific "causes." The "cause" of water pollution in the local river may be the dumping of waste materials into the stream by the local rendering plant. The "cause" of an inadequate sewage system may be the refusal of the city council to appropriate the needed funds. The "causes" of local racial discontent may be "the segregated municipal swimming pool and the discriminatory hiring practices in the local plants." In defining these problems, the power actors in the leadership pool offer concrete, specific factors as being the causes of the problems. In their definitions, they exhibit a belief in specifically what conditions are bringing about the problems. Furthermore, in so doing they specify what conditions in the community must be altered to ameliorate the problems. Other problems, however, may be defined as having "no cause," or causal relationships may be proposed in highly amorphous, abstract, and general terminology. In these definitions the power actors are not able to pinpoint "causes," or attribute cause to such general conditions as "apathy," "growth," or "the sexual revolution." In the former instance, there exists a fairly direct association within the
power actor's definition between the specific cause and the problematic effect. In the latter situation, the association is much less direct; several intervening factors and relationships seem to be missing. An example of such a general, causal imputation would be positing "basic human nature" as the cause of urban blight.

The degree of clarity in the leadership pool's definitions would appear to be influenced by various characteristics of the pool. Once again, we find that those characteristics which indicate greater knowledge of, interest in, and identification with the community are particularly important. The social class level, degree of cosmopolitanism, and level of entrenchment are such characteristics. A leadership pool with high social status and a high level of entrenchment might be expected to offer a higher proportion of clearly defined problems. If the pool is extremely cosmopolitan, however, and has little interest in the local community (a rather unlikely occurrence) the proportion might be lower. In addition, the characteristic of visibility would appear to be positively associated with the proportion of clearly defined problems. A visible leadership pool is a target. Individuals and groups with problematic concerns or "beefs" can identify whom to contact to "have something done." Because of these sources of information, a visible pool may be more knowledgeable about the conditions in the local system than a covert one. Increased knowledge may be manifested in clearer definitions. Likewise, a high level of cohesiveness facilitates the exchange of information and opinion among the power actors. Serving as another source of information, it may also be positively associated with our dependent dimension. Due to a lack of previous conceptualization or
empirical study within this area, we must, however, emphasize the tentative nature of the following illustrative propositions.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the size of the leadership pool, the lower the proportion of clearly defined problems.

The higher the social class level of the leadership pool, the higher the proportion of clearly defined problems.

The more visible the leadership pool, the higher the proportion of clearly defined problems.

The broader the scope of the leadership pool, the higher the proportion of clearly defined problems.

The more cohesive the leadership pool, the higher the proportion of clearly defined problems.

The more entrenched the leadership pool, the higher the proportion of clearly defined problems.

The more cosmopolitan the leadership pool, the higher the proportion of clearly defined problems.

This dimension would appear to affect the likelihood of any action being proposed to ameliorate the defined problem. If the leadership pool is unable to impute a causal association, or where the causal association offered is abstract and amorphous, the level of inactivity might be expected to be high. If the leadership pool defines a specific cause to a problem, it seems probable that they would be more likely to propose such a causal association. In the former situation, the leadership pool, by their own definitions, has isolated contributory factors
to the problematic condition. Offering proposals for ameliorative action would appear to be facilitated by the existence of visible, specific targets for change. Other patterns of proposed action, such as the relevance of local organizations for successful implementation and the perceived threat of blockage, might also be influenced by the degree of clarity within the definitions.

This dimension can be measured by performing a content analysis upon the responses to open-end questions relating to the cause of the pool's perceived problems. The responses can be coded as "no cause," "single or multiple specific causes," or "single or multiple general causes." We can operationalize the concept by determining the percentage of the total problems that are defined in specific cause and effect terms. Such an indicator requires that a consistent criteria for classification be utilized, and that the degree of inter-coder reliability be high.

In this section we have presented seven community problem dimensions. These dimensions include: (1) the number of perceived problems, (2) the perceived seriousness of the problems, (3) the degree of consensus concerning the perceived problems, (4) the degree of institutional specificity versus community generality evidenced in the perception of the problem, (5) the defined possibility of local solution, (6) the degree of uniqueness in the problem definitions, and (7) the clarity of the problem definitions. These dimensions were defined, explicated, related as dependent variables to the characteristics of the leadership pool, justified for inclusion as independent variables of the patterns of ameliorative action, and operationalized. The perceived problems of
any leadership pool can be classified along these dimensions. Thus a "problem set" may be classified as large, not serious, of low consensus, institutionally specific, not solvable at the local level, not unique, and not clearly defined -- or any other combination of the above dimensions. These dimensions are tentatively proposed. Empirical application will determine their utility. Perhaps mistakes have been made. This explication is a halting, first step toward the development of a meaningful model; refinement is contemplated.

Figure 4 represents a matrix presentation of the proposed relationships between the characteristics of the leadership and the community problem dimensions. These propositions are highly tentative and heuristic. They await empirical validation.

Finally, we must note the possibility of covariance between these community problem dimensions. All of our "dimension sets" may covary. The level of covariance is an empirical issue. In this heuristic application of the model to only four communities, we will be able to determine and measure this important variable only in gross terms.

Patterns of Community Action

The last section of our model relates to the action proposed by the leadership pool to ameliorate their perceived problems. This final set of variables is very important. It truly indicates "where the action is!" We will offer seven variable patterns or characteristics for classifying this action. This set has theoretical importance. It is the final element in our processual model. The characteristics of the proposed action would appear to be strongly influenced by the
Figure 4

THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LEADERSHIP POOL TO THE COMMUNITY PROBLEM DIMENSIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community Problem Dimensions</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Seriousness</th>
<th>Consensus</th>
<th>Institutional Specificity</th>
<th>Local Solvability</th>
<th>Uniqueness</th>
<th>Clarity of Def.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institut'l Dominance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class Level</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visibility</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohesiveness</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrenchment</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmopolitanism</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ = Positive Association; - = Negative Association; * = Direction of Relationship Not Known Prior to Empirical Examination.
perception and definition of community problems by the leadership pool. Furthermore, one can surmise that the patterns taken by this action will affect the structure of the community. For example, let us suppose that the leadership pool proposes that a large amount of non-local, external aid in the form of resources, skill and knowledge, or authorization is required to ameliorate the local problems. The degree of local community autonomy may be lowered if such a proposal is undertaken. These patterns of action, therefore, are intimately related to change within the system. They are offered to alter conditions within the system.

These characteristics also have practical importance. If an actor wants to institute ameliorative action or social change within the system, the classification of proposals and explication of their associations with the leadership pool's perception and definition of problems should prove to be relevant and valuable. A better understanding of certain key dimensions of community action proposals should aid the actor in instituting purposeful social change.

In selecting these patterns, we faced the same problems that were noted in the selection of the community problem dimensions. Practically no previous conceptual or empirical studies have attempted to develop action patterns, let alone examine their relationships to the perception and definition of local problems. There have been a number of efforts at conceptualizing the phases or stages inherent in the process of instituting community action. These classifications represent legitimate concerns, however they do not characterize the nature of the action. They simply describe its process. For our purposes, however, the most
relevant work in the literature is an article by Kaufman. While proposing that community behavior should be studied from the standpoint of an "interactional field," he offered a set of dimensions for differentiating community actions. These dimensions included: (1) the degree of comprehensiveness of interests pursued and needs met, (2) the degree to which the action is identified with the locality, (3) relative number, status, and degree of involvement of local residents, (4) relative number and significance of local associations involved, (5) degree to which the action maintains or changes the local society, and (6) extent of organization of the action. Although these dimensions are important, certain of the variables, such as the first dimension, appear not to have great relevance for our model. Also, important action characteristics, such as the urgency of the proposal, the level of inactivity, and the possibility of blockage, are not included. The reader will note, however, that certain of our patterns are similar to, and inspired by, these dimensions. Except for this indebtedness to Kaufman, however, we basically have had to "go it alone" in selecting our patterns.

In selecting the action patterns we first sought variables that would tap crucial elements of any proposed action. Crucial elements were defined as those which appeared relevant to the involvement of local units in the proposed activity. Such dimensions as the extent of required coordination among local institutions, the relevance of local organizations, the perceived possibility of one or a few actors "blocking" or defeating the proposals, etc. fulfilled this requirement. Second, we attempted to include variables that would be as encompassing of as many aspects of community action as possible. Finally, the
variables had to be at a level of generality and abstractness that they could be applied to any proposed ameliorative action. Our patterns of community action can be applied to such varied proposals and projects as the "bussing" of students to achieve racial balance in the schools, the development of an industrial park, the floating of a school bond issue, the recruitment of public servants, the restructuring of the local government, the construction of a floodwall, the renovation of the downtown business district, the building of single family rental units, or the assassination of the mayor.

The seven patterns of community action include: (1) the urgency or immediacy of instituting the proposals, (2) the degree of institutional coordination required to successfully implement the program, (3) the degree of public versus private responsibility for action, (4) the perceived relevance of local organizations, (5) the proposed degree of external, non-local involvement in the ameliorative action, (6) the perceived possibility of "blockage" by one or a few actors, and (7) the level of inactivity. In this section we will define these variables, explicate their relevance to the model, relate them to the perception and definition of local problems, and suggest possible operational indicators for their measurement.

Before considering these specific patterns, however, let us define and briefly explicate the nature of our general concept, i.e. community action.

A. Definition

We shall define community action as those ACTIVITIES OR INACTIVITIES THAT ARE PROPOSED BY THE LEADERSHIP POOL, REQUIRE LOCAL COMMUNITY
INVolvement, AND ARE OFFered TO AMELIORATE PERCEIVED COMMUNITY PROBLEMS AND THEREBY AFFECT THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESSES IN THE SYSTEM.

Our definition begins by labelling as community action those activities or inactivities that are proposed by the leadership pool. An obvious, logical question is "why include inactivity in a discussion of community action?" There may be occasions when power actors in the leadership pool propose a "do nothing" policy to "solve" certain problems. There are numerous situations in which the power actors may propose "inactivity" as the most appropriate action. A power actor may perceive and define a problem as existing within the community, but it is not yet a public issue. If public disclosure and subsequent ameliorative action are defined by the power actor as being opposed to his "best interests," inactivity may be an attractive proposal. Political graft and corruption on the part of local political officials, discriminatory hiring practices by local unions, price fixing and collusion by local businessmen, and the pollution of the local waterways by the community's industries are a few examples of such types of problems. Often the power actors seem to be saying, "let's do nothing, maybe nobody will notice, and eventually the problem will 'solve' itself. Above all, let's not get hurt!" Such proposals have implications for the future structure and processes in the community, and thereby qualify as action in our model.

Other situations may also lead, however, to the proposal of inactivity. Certain issues may be defined by the power actors as problems, but they are too "hot," too controversial. Local segregation practices, fluoridation of the water system, and the institution of a city income
tax may represent such issues. The power actors do define these conditions as local problems. Due to a number of factors, however (not the least of which may be their vested interests in the community system) they propose inactivity to "solve" them. Such comments as "The time is not right, maybe in a year or so we will be ready to tackle that one," or "Yes, it's a bad situation, but there is no use in creating a bloody fight within this town, besides it will probably iron itself out," are often presented to justify the proposed inactivity. Of course, the power actors may believe that a condition is problematic, but that "benign neglect" is the best policy. Placing their faith in the "benevolence of evolution," these actors basically propose that "time will heal all wounds."

Proposals of inactivity occur at all levels, within all systems. They appear most likely to occur when other forms of action are defined by the power actors as detrimental to their vested interests. Whether it be a "suggestion" offered by a presidential advisor, or a "stalling tactic" by the president of the local chemical company, inactivity is a proposal that can influence the system. We will consider such a proposal as a form of community action.

To be considered as community action, however, a proposed ameliorative program must REQUIRE LOCAL COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT. Certain proposals may require action exclusively within and by the local community and its institutions. The institution of a one-way street system to relieve downtown congestion may be such a problem. Other community action may be sanctioned, funded, developed, and accomplished predominately by external, non-local agents. In certain instances an entire program from
conception to conclusion may be controlled by non-local units. The locating and building of an interstate highway on the periphery of the community may be such an act. To be considered as community action, however, the activity must (1) have its ultimate locus of change within the community system, and (2) require at least some involvement by the local community actors. For example let us return to our illustration of the interstate highway. It is possible that the local leadership pool defined "geographic isolation" and inadequate long-distance highways as a community problem. As at least a partial solution, they may have proposed the building of a modern highway. Due to the cost of construction, a lack of knowledge, experience, and local authority, etc., this ameliorative action could not obviously be undertaken alone by the local community. As a solution, therefore, the power actors may have lobbied and attempted to influence the outside agencies to locate the highway near the community and provide an interchange for local use. Such activity would be classified as community action, because it included local involvement. On the other hand, the local actors may have suddenly found out that an interstate highway was going to be constructed near their community. The local actors may have taken no action to influence this construction. Furthermore, they may never have perceived any reaction or involvement as necessary. In this instance, this construction would not be classified as community action.

Finally, we note that these community actions ARE OFFERED TO AMELIORATE PERCEIVED COMMUNITY PROBLEMS AND THEREBY AFFECT THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESSES IN THE SYSTEM. Briefly, there are two points to emphasize in these phrases. First, what we are defining as community actions are
those proposed activities that are related to the power actors' perceived and defined problems. For the purposes of our model, these are the relevant activities. They are "problem-linked." Second, we are asserting that these ameliorative actions are intimately related to the process of social change within the community. These actions are aimed at altering the existing conditions in the community; they are agents of social change.

Let us now turn to our seven patterns of action. These dimensions will be defined, explicated, and related to the community problem dimensions.

B. The Urgency or Immediacy of Instituting the Ameliorative Action

Among the possible patterns of variation among action proposals is the perceived urgency or immediacy of implementing them. Certain problems may require immediate action. Conditions posing extreme stress on the local community in general, and those that exhibit a rapid onset and are diffuse throughout the community in particular, are these types of problems. The most urgent action is required to contend with conditions that are defined by the power actors as "disastrous." A natural disaster or civil disturbance obviously requires urgent, immediate ameliorative activity. Other conditions, however, though less dramatic, may be equally in need of an urgent solution. It would appear that those conditions which are perceived to (1) manifestly threaten life, property, and/or community values and mores, or (2) greatly disturb the normal conditions in the local system, or (3) directly threaten the vested interests of the power actors, would be urgently attacked. The
emergency passage of a bond issue to "keep the schools open," the securing of a restraining order to halt a wildcat strike, the enactment of emergency resolutions to repair a weakened water system, a special recall election to remove corrupt officials, and the effort to attract new industry to ease a crucial problem of unemployment caused by the loss of the community's major industrial plant, may be examples of urgent action. Other types of action, however, may not have to be immediately undertaken. Certain conditions may be perceived and defined by the power actors as problems, however they do not meet the above criteria and therefore a solution is not proposed as being urgently needed. Efforts to promote "culture" within the community, the construction of a neighborhood park, or the development of a master plan are a few examples.

The degree of urgency inherent in the ameliorative action is a crucial variable. Where the need for action is immediate, stress is placed upon those actors and organizations defined as relevant and responsible for the activity. With a demand to "do something -- now!" such relevant units must develop plans and tactics, procure requisite resources, coordinate activity, and perform other needed tasks under duress. The possibility of successful implementation obviously is influenced by this dimension.

Some might propose that the nature of the problematic condition determines the degree of urgency in the ameliorative action. It would appear, however, that the degree of urgency is influenced by the perception and definition of the problems by the leadership pool -- not anything inherent in the problem itself. The same condition may be
proposed as requiring immediate action in one community, while in another it is not defined as urgent. What is crucial is how the problem is defined. The degree of seriousness perceived in the problem is an obvious determinant of the degree of urgency in the solution. The more serious the perceived set of problems, the more urgent the proposed solutions. Other community problem dimensions, however, would also appear to be associated with the degree of urgency. If a large number of different problems are perceived, the degree of overall urgency might be expected to be low. In such communities, there are few "overriding," paramount problems. The degree of institutional specificity might be assumed to be positively associated with the degree of urgency. Issues centered within the power actor's sphere of influence are likely to be seen as urgent. Problems, however, which are clearly defined and unique may be positively associated with the proposed immediacy of the ameliorative action. Where the problems are not defined in specific cause and effect terms, the implementation of immediate action is difficult. Furthermore, the more unique the problems, the more urgent the action. Routine problematic conditions, those found in most communities, may be handled through time by institutional means. It is the condition that is defined as unique that may require immediate attention.

We must note that the above discussion of proposed associations is based upon studied thought and the general deductive scheme inherent in the model. The discussion assumes a degree of covariance among the community problem dimensions. There is a dearth of theoretical or empirical studies to guide the exposition of such associations. In certain instances, the existence and direction of the assumed association can
not be predicted prior to empirical examination. Therefore, the following list of propositions may be viewed as heuristic. They are offered to stimulate thought and to allow for empirical examination.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the number of perceived problems, the less urgent the proposed ameliorative action.

The more serious the perceived problems, the more urgent the proposed ameliorative action.

The greater the institutional specificity in the perceived problems, the more urgent the proposed ameliorative action.

The more unique the perceived problems, the more urgent the proposed ameliorative action.

The higher the proportion of clearly defined problems, the more urgent the proposed ameliorative action.

The concept can be measured by asking the power actors to note the degree of urgency in their proposals for action. Action can be classified as urgent, fairly urgent, or not urgent according to the length of time perceived by the leadership pool that may transpire until action must be initiated. Classification based upon six months or one year might be used.

C. The Degree of Institutional Coordination Required to Successfully Implement the Proposed Ameliorative Action

An important characteristic of action proposals is the degree to which they require coordination among the various institutions in the community. Certain problems may be solved by action located within only a single institution. Other sub-units in the community system may not
be defined as being relevant or responsible actors. These proposals, while offered by the power actors to ameliorate conditions they have perceived and defined as "community" problems, are actually "business," "industry," "government," or "school" concerns. Other proposals, however, may require the involvement and coordinated activity of two, three, or more institutional areas. Certain patterns of community action may come close to involving the total community. For example, in one community the action proposed to rebuild the downtown area required the involvement of over six different institutional spheres. Business, Industry, government, mass media, and the financial sectors, as one might expect, were involved. In addition, the local school system and college were also participants. Such an action program requires a great deal of coordination among the community sub-units. Its implementation presents different problems to those attempting institute change than a program that is the responsibility of "business," or "the schools."

This characteristic has utility for action analysis because it represents a crucial determinant of successful implementation. To a certain extent, this characteristic is an indicator of the complexity of the issue. When the local government can develop and initiate the action, secure the necessary human and material resources for its implementation, and perform all the requisite tasks from the point of problem recognition to the stage of problem solution, the action can be viewed as less complex than when other institutional areas in the community must also participate. As different institutional areas become involved, coordination among these actors becomes more problematic. The "horizontal" network within the community is "put to the test." The true, functional
viability of the local community comes under examination. As more elements of the horizontal network become active participants in the action, the tasks of securing cooperation among the actors, developing consensus regarding priorities, establishing tactics and strategies, allocating tasks and roles to the participants, procuring and distributing resources, implementing and coordinating the activity, and dividing the rewards and sanctions (i.e. "who gets the credit, and/or who gets blamed?") become more difficult. One might propose, therefore, that the degree of institutional coordination is negatively associated with the probability of successful implementation.

The degree of institutional coordination inherent in any instance of community action proposed by the power actors would appear to be strongly influenced by their perception and definition of community problems. Such community problem dimensions as the perceived seriousness of the problems, the degree of consensus concerning the nature and severity of the problems, the perceived possibility of local solution, the degree of uniqueness, and the clarity of the definitions might be positively associated with the degree of institutional coordination in the proposed ameliorative action. Although severe problems may be ameliorated by the action of a single institution, where the percentage of problems perceived as severe is high, coordinated activity is likely to be proposed. Similarly, where there is a high degree of consensus on the severity of the problem set, coordinated activity is probable, as representatives of the different institutional areas in the leadership pool illustrate a margin of agreement about what problems should be attacked. If the problems are clearly defined, viewed as unique, but
perceived as solvable by the local community, the power actors may propose a more massive program to solve them. Such a program may require greater institutional coordination. Obviously, however, the degree of institutional specificity inherent in the problem definitions would appear to be negatively associated with this action characteristic.

Illustrative Propositions:

The more serious the perceived problems, the greater the degree of institutional coordination inherent in the proposed ameliorative action.

The higher the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems, the greater the degree of institutional coordination inherent in the proposed ameliorative action.

The greater the institutional specificity in the perceived problems, the lesser the degree of institutional coordination inherent in the proposed ameliorative action.

The higher the proportion of locally solvable problems, the greater the degree of institutional coordination inherent in the proposed ameliorative action.

The more unique the perceived problems, the greater the degree of institutional coordination inherent in the proposed ameliorative action.

The higher the proportion of clearly defined problems, the greater the degree of institutional coordination inherent in the proposed ameliorative action.

The degree of institutional coordination defined as requisite by the power actors can be indicated by determining which institutions they perceived as being relevant and responsible for solving their
problems. Any action requiring the participation of three or more institutions can be classified as "coordinative." The relative degree of institutional coordination within the action set can be determined by percentage. There are epistemological weaknesses in this indicator. For example, the number of institutions involved does not necessarily indicate the degree of coordination inherent in the action. The institutions may act relatively independently. Furthermore, establishing an arbitrary number of active institutions, such as three, and using it to classify the action may not be as valid as comparing the total number of institutions involved in each action. One must remember, however, that we are concerned with comparing different communities on their proposed degree of institutional coordination. This technique does allow for comparison; it may be consistently applied to all communities. An alternative to this indicator would be to perform an in-depth issue-analysis of the proposed ameliorative action. Such an analysis requires longitudinal study and is costly in time and money. If it is feasible to attempt such an analysis, it should be undertaken. We are not able to do such a study in this investigation. We shall accept, therefore, this rather crude indicator of institutional coordination.

D. The Degree of Public versus Private Responsibility for Action

Proposals for ameliorative community action may differ with respect to the degree to which the power actors define them as "public" (i.e., governmentally as opposed to "private" concerns.) The solution to certain problems may be defined as purely a governmental concern. Other problems, however, may be considered by the power actors as conditions
requiring action by "private" citizens. The extent of defined "public," governmental responsibility for community action would appear to be an important characteristic of any community's action set.  

This characteristic of the community's horizontal pattern is especially relevant to our model. This model is offered to be utilized in the comparative examination of community power. One of the central issues of debate within the area of community power is the relative influence and decision-making ability of the local governmental and political institutions as opposed to the economic, industrial, and financial sphere. This characteristic was included in the model primarily because of its relevance to this issue. It offers an action-based indicator within a reputational framework of the defined responsibility of these two spheres. Furthermore, this characteristic is directly relevant to the analysis of the possibility of successful implementation of the proposed ameliorative action. In empirically applying this model, the researcher is able to determine the relative power of these spheres in the local community. Such characteristics of the leadership pool as institutional dominance, legitimacy, visibility, and scope offer direct indicators of this power differential. In attempting to predict the outcome of proposed ameliorative action, these dimensions, in association with the relative degree of public versus private responsibility, provide extremely useful guidelines. For example, in one community the leadership pool may be dominated by the business and industrial institutions, with little representation by the governmental officials. The leadership pool in this community may also be non-legitimate, invisible, and characterized by a broad scope of influence. The "public" sector
in such a community would be subordinate in power to the "private" sphere. Ameliorative action defined by the power actors as being the sole responsibility of the "government" in such a community, would not be as likely to succeed as that which is perceived as a "private" concern. This characteristic, therefore, is a crucial dimension for action analysis.

The nature of the problematic conditions in the community, however, is not the crucial determinant of the degree of "public" versus "private" responsibility. The solution to the same problem (e.g. water pollution) may be defined as a "public" matter in one community, and as a "private" concern in another. What would appear to be a crucial antecedent determinant of this characteristic, however, is the manner in which the leadership pool perceived and defined the local community problems. Unfortunately, there has been no prior study of the association between these dimensions. As a dependent variable, this characteristic offers the most difficult problems for analyzing its relationship to the determinant dimensions. The nature and direction of the associations between this characteristic and such community problem dimensions as consensus, local solution, uniqueness, and clarity, can not be predicted prior to empirical examination. These associations, however, due to the deductive nature of the model, can be empirically examined. The direction of other associations, however, can be tentatively proposed on the basis of extrapolations from general sociological findings in the community power literature. For example, as we have noted, many studies have emphasized the dominance of power and decision-making ability held by the economic institution within the local community. It is this sector that often
has been defined as possessing the greatest ability to "get things done -- especially those things that it defines as important and desirous." Therefore, we might propose that the greater the perceived seriousness of the local problems, the smaller the degree of defined "public" responsibility for action. Other community problem dimensions, such as the number of problems and the degree of institutional specificity inherent in the definitions, may also be negatively associated with this dimension. The following propositions, however, are tentative.

Illustrative Propositions:

The greater the number of perceived problems, the smaller the degree of defined "public" responsibility for ameliorative action.

The more serious the perceived problems, the smaller the degree of defined "public" responsibility for ameliorative action.

The greater the institutional specificity in the perceived problems, the smaller the degree of defined "public" responsibility for ameliorative action.

Our fundamental interest is in determining the relative degree to which the proposed action is solely the concern of the "public" as opposed to the "private" sector. This characteristic can be measured by having the power actors define the ameliorative action as the responsibility of "government," or "private" citizens. Obviously, certain actions may be defined as the responsibility of both of these sectors. By computing the percentage of the problems that are defined solely as "public" concerns, however, an estimate of the relative degree of "public" versus "private" responsibility for the action set can be determined.
E. The Perceived Relevance of Local Community Organizations

Our model contains a third pattern of action that is relevant to the horizontal network of the community. This characteristic refers to the degree to which the power actors define local community organizations as being relevant for the successful implementation of the proposed action. This dimension is interrelated with the preceding two patterns, but it taps different elements of the action. All three of these dimensions are partial indicators of the degree of intra-community, or horizontal involvement. With this third characteristic, however, organizational relevance, as opposed to institutional involvement or "sector" responsibility, is specifically indicated.

For certain action proposals, the perceived relevance of various local community organizations may be low. The involvement of only one or a few organizations may be defined as essential by the power actors for a successful solution. On the other hand, a proposal for ameliorative action may be defined as requiring the active involvement and support of numerous local organizations. Whether the action set is characterized by low or high local organizational relevance would appear to influence such other patterns as the degree of requisite coordination and the possibility of successful implementation. Along these dimensions, this characteristic is very similar to the preceding two variables.

This characteristic, however, has utilitarian value along another dimension. It offers an index of the leadership pool's perception of the viability and influence of various local organizations. If the
leadership pool of a community perceived that the local organizations are strong, viable entities which can provide support or opposition to any proposed action, the perceived level of organizational relevance will probably be high. This pattern especially may be pronounced where local organizations have been active participants in prior issues and programs. In effect they have proven their ability to "muster the forces" to aid or hinder action proposals. Therefore, because of its utility as an indicator of perceived local organizational viability, and its relevance for predicting the outcome of action proposals, we have included this characteristic in our model.

The perception and definition of local problems by the leadership pool would appear to be a determinant of the perceived relevance of local community organizations. Most of our community problem dimensions, with the exception of institutional specificity, would appear to be positively associated with this characteristic. Local community organizations possess human and material resources that may be relevant to the successful implementation of any ameliorative proposal. Where problems are perceived as serious, and especially where they are defined as solvable by the local community, a large number of local organizations are likely to be perceived as relevant to their solution. Furthermore, where the leadership pool illustrates a high degree of consensus and a clear understanding of the specific causal factors involved in the problems, the number of perceived, relevant organizations may be high. Problems perceived and defined in this manner are "ready to be attacked."

The utility of the organizations' resources for ameliorating the specific problematical conditions may result in their being more salient to
the leadership pool. Where there is little agreement or understanding about the nature of the problems, however, fewer organizations may be viewed as relevant. Finally, if institutionally specific problems are perceived, the degree to which general community organizations will be viewed as relevant will probably be low.

Illustrative Propositions:

The more serious the perceived problems, the greater the perceived relevance of local community organizations.

The higher the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems, the greater the perceived relevance of local community organizations.

The greater the institutional specificity in the perceived problems, the lesser the perceived relevance of local community organizations.

The higher the proportion of locally solvable problems, the greater the perceived relevance of local community organizations.

The more unique the perceived problems, the greater the perceived relevance of local community organizations.

The more clearly defined the perceived problems, the greater the perceived relevance of local community organizations.

A rating scale can be used to measure this characteristic. A list of various community organizations can be compiled. On the basis of this list, the power actors can be asked to rate each organization's relevance to proposed ameliorative actions as (1) essential, (2) important, but not essential, or (3) not important. For purposes of comparison, communities can be ranked on the degree of perceived relevance inherent in such a rating.
F. The Proposed Degree of External, Non-Local Involvement in the Ameliorative Action

In our preceding discussion of community action we noted that such action had its ultimate locus of change within the local community. Furthermore, the participation and involvement of local community units was defined as requisite for such action. Community action, however, may differ in the extent to which the leadership pool defines external, non-local assistance as necessary for its successful implementation. Certain proposals may be defined as requiring no external involvement. The power actors in such situations apparently perceive that the local community possesses the necessary resources, skills, knowledge, and authority to successfully undertake the proposed action. At the other extreme are those problematic conditions that are perceived to be existent within the community, but whose solutions are defined as being outside the local community's boundaries or control. Inflation may be such a problem. The ameliorative action proposed to solve such problems may be defined by the leadership pool as being totally the responsibility of external units. Of course, a great deal of community action will fall somewhere between these two extremes. The proposal may be defined as the responsibility of the local community with the assistance of outside units, or vice versa.

This dimension has been included in the model because of its importance as an indicator of local autonomy and its utility for the analysis of community action proposals. Unlike the preceding three characteristics which were related to the horizontal network, this dimension is relevant to the vertical axis of the community. It can be utilized to
measure the strength of this vertical axis within the community. As such, it indicates the relative degree of local autonomy. For example, the action set, as defined by the leadership pool, may exhibit a high degree of external, non-local involvement in the solution of local community problems. One may propose that the present structure of such a community is dependent upon non-local agencies, i.e., it is non-autonomous. Furthermore, one may infer that the future structure of the community will be at least as dependent as it is currently, and possibly more so due to the projected non-local involvement in the proposed ameliorative action. The characteristic also is valuable in predicting the outcome of the action proposals. For example, suppose that the leadership pool perceived a high level of severity in the problem set, however, they do not define non-local involvement as being required to solve them. A potential bountiful supply of resources, knowledge, and skill thus is defined by the local power actors as being "not needed" to solve their problems. In so doing, one may predict that they lessen their chance for successful amelioration. This characteristic, therefore, taps two vital elements of any community action. It offers an indication of the likelihood of success, and presents a picture of ideal viability, i.e., it offers at least a partial answer to the question, "Can the community solve the problem itself?"

Whether or not non-local assistance is defined as necessary would appear to be influenced by the power actor's perception and definition of local problems. The most crucial antecedent determinant of this dependent characteristic would obviously be the defined local solvability of the problems. In fact, at first glance such an association may
appear to be tautological. It is not. Problems may be defined as solvable by the local community. Such a definition, however, does not prevent the ameliorative action proposal from including a great amount of external, non-local assistance. One would expect to find, however, a strong, negative association between these variables. The perceived level of severity within the problem set, as noted above, would appear to be positively associated with this characteristic. Also the number of perceived problems and their degree of institutional specificity would appear to be positively associated with the level of non-local involvement in the action proposals. As the number of perceived problems increases, it would appear likely that the degree to which the local community is defined as being able to solve them by itself will decrease. Where problems are defined in an institutionally specific manner, the relevance of the horizontal network within the community may not be salient to the leadership pool. In such a situation, they may turn to the vertical axis, particularly to those ties with non-local units existent within their institutional spheres. Other associations also may be deductively drawn from the model, e.g., a negative association between the degree of perceived uniqueness in the problems and the level of non-local involvement in their solutions. These propositions are, however, heuristic. They are proposed to stimulate comparative empirical study within this area. The strength they contain comes from their place in the deductive model; they share in the validation of every other proposition.
Illustrative Propositions:

The greater the number of perceived problems, the higher the level of non-local involvement in the ameliorative action.

The more serious the perceived problems, the higher the level of non-local involvement in the ameliorative action.

The greater the institutional specificity in the perceived problems, the higher the level of non-local involvement in the ameliorative action.

The higher the proportion of locally solvable problems, the lower the level of non-local involvement in the ameliorative action.

The more unique the perceived problems, the lower the level of non-local involvement in the ameliorative action.

The power actors' own proposals for ameliorative action offer the best opportunity to operationalize this variable. Two techniques can be utilized: (1) directly querying the members of the leadership pool about the extent of external, non-local involvement in their action proposals, and (2) performing a content analysis upon their proposals. Each action proposal can be classified as (1) local, (2) local with non-local assistance, (3) both, (4) non-local with local assistance, and (5) non-local. Communities can then be ranked and compared based upon the degree of non-local involvement exhibited within their action set.

6. The Perceived Possibility of "Blockage"

These last two patterns are included in the model because of their relevance for understanding and predicting the possibility of
successfully implementing the action program. This sixth pattern also is important for its relationship to the distribution of power within the community. Basically at issue is the presence of "veto power" within the community. By "blockage" we are referring to the act of opposing, stalling, and successfully defeating any proposal for ameliorative action.

Communities differ in the extent to which their action sets are "blockage-prone." In one community, the power actors may perceive the possibility of one actor, a coalition of actors, or a more formalized group opposing and defeating any action. A system in such a state has an inordinate amount of power-relevant resources in the possession of a few actors. Also, the probability that they may utilize the resources to "block" any proposal may be predicted by the leadership pool based upon the pool's definition of local problems in combination with its knowledge of the vested interests of the opposition. In another community, the amelioration of only certain perceived problems may be defined as facing possible "blockage." In such instances, no power actor is powerful enough to defeat any and all proposals. Furthermore, in such communities the power actors may be uninterested in blocking action proposals that do not directly affect their interests. Such "selective blockage" is likely to occur where power is institutionally-specific or polylithic. Finally, the leadership pool may simply perceive that no one actor or coalition of actors possesses enough power or interest to block action proposals. This variable, therefore, does tap a crucial element of the distribution of power.
For the researcher interested in predicting the outcome of community action, this characteristic has obvious merit. Any action proposal that is defined by the leadership pool as possibly being opposed and defeated by certain power actors in the community has a smaller probability of success than one which does not face such perceived obstacles.

While the structure of power in the community is obviously a determinant of the perceived possibility of "blockage," so too are the power actors' perception and definition of local problems. For example, such community problem dimensions as the degree of perceived severity inherent in the problems and the level of the power actors' consensus concerning the nature of the problems would appear to be negatively associated with this dependent pattern. If the problem set is perceived by the leadership pool as being very serious, one can assume that the premium on ameliorative action will be high. In such a situation it may be more difficult for an actor to defeat or "veto" the ameliorative proposal. Furthermore, to do so may entail the loss of potentially valuable resource bases for the future exercise of power. Likewise, if the leadership pool basically is in agreement about the nature and severity of the problem set, the probability that one of them would "buck the tide" and attempt to defeat the proposed action is low. In such cases the existence of consensus on the part of the power actors is itself potentially an extremely powerful resource. Consensus fosters the formation of coalitions and aids the exchange of relevant resources. To attempt to oppose a proposal offered by a consensually based leadership pool may be a folly. On the other hand, such dimensions as the
number of problems and the degree of institutional specificity would appear to be positively associated with the perceived probability of "blockage." The larger the number of problems, the greater the probability that some action proposal may be defined as salient to some power actor's vested interests. Furthermore, if the problems are defined in an institutionally specific manner, the likelihood of blockage within a specific institutional area increases.

The above associations and the following propositions are illustrative.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the number of perceived problems, the greater the perceived possibility of "blockage."

The more serious the perceived problems, the lesser the perceived possibility of "blockage."

The higher the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems, the lesser the perceived possibility of "blockage."

The greater the institutional specificity in the perceived problems, the greater the perceived possibility of "blockage."

The more unique the perceived problems, the lesser the perceived possibility of "blockage."

The higher the proportion of clearly defined problems, the lesser the perceived possibility of "blockage."

This characteristic can be measured by asking the power actors if there are any individuals or groups whose opposition would be impossible or extremely difficult to overcome in the implementation of their
proposals for community action. For comparing communities, the higher the proportion of the proposals in the action set that are perceived as potentially being blocked, the higher the community ranking on this variable.

II. The Level of Inactivity

The last characteristic in our set of action patterns, and also the last variable in our model, is the level of inactivity within the set of proposed community actions. This characteristic refers to the proportion of perceived problems for which no action either has been initiated or proposed. It is a dimension of the set of community actions, not of any single action proposal.

This dimension has been included in our model because of its obvious relevance to the probability of successful implementation of community action. It may be considered an indicator of the likelihood of success. Those perceived problems for which (1) no ameliorative action has been undertaken, and (2) the leadership pool offers no ameliorative proposals, are unlikely to be solved in the immediate future. Furthermore, this variable serves as an indicator of the "problem-solving ability" of the leadership pool. If the action set of a community exhibits a high level of inactivity, the community's leadership pool may possibly lack "problem-solving ability."

While other variables may be determinants of the level of inactivity, the leadership pool's perception and definition of problems also would appear to be contributory factors. Throughout the discussion we have noted the association between numerous characteristics and the
likelihood of successful implementation of the ameliorative action. We will not review these points at this time, however they do serve as the basis for the following propositions. Certain community problem dimensions, however, would appear to be crucial determinants of the level of inactivity. Such dimensions as the perceived degree of severity, the level of consensus, and the clarity of the problem definitions might be negatively associated with this variable. These dimensions all are indicators of the necessity, urgency, and feasibility of instituting ameliorative action. When the values of these dimensions are high, there is a resultant increased demand for action. Local solvability and uniqueness would also appear to be negatively associated with this dimension. We previously noted that if the community is defined as being functionally autonomous and able to solve the problems by itself at the local level, the degree of inactivity would decrease. This negative association may result from the lack of complication involved in not having to secure external aid. Furthermore, if problems are defined as being unique, they are likely to be seen as locally solvable. On the other hand, institutional specificity and the number of problems would appear to be positively associated with the level of inactivity.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the number of perceived problems, the higher the level of inactivity.

The more serious the perceived problems, the lower the level of inactivity.

The higher the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems, the lower the level of inactivity.
The greater the institutional specificity in the perceived problems, the higher the level of inactivity.

The greater the proportion of locally solvable problems, the lower the level of inactivity.

The more unique the perceived problems, the lower the level of inactivity.

The higher the proportion of clearly defined problems, the lower the level of inactivity.

As previously noted, this characteristic is a dimension of the action set, not of any single action proposal. It can be measured by determining if any ameliorative action has been undertaken to solve the perceived problems. If none has been initiated, the power actors can be asked to explicate their action proposals. The level of inactivity inherent in the action set is the proportion of the problems for which no activity has been undertaken or proposed. For purposes of comparison, communities can then be rank ordered on this dimension.

In this section we have presented the final component of our model. We have defined our unit of analysis, i.e. community action, and presented seven patterns or characteristics of that unit. Each of the characteristics in the action set was defined, justified, and operationalized. Community action can be classified along these dimensions. A proposal, for example, may be urgent, require little institutional coordination, be viewed as the responsibility of the local government, not require the involvement of many local organizations, require a great deal of external, non-local assistance, and have a high probability of being "blocked." Action sets similarly may be classified.
In addition, possible associations between these characteristics and the independent community problem dimensions were proposed. These propositions are presented in matrix form in Figure 5. These associations are offered for empirical examination. They are tentative and may be viewed as heuristic. The development of these propositions could have been greatly facilitated by the existence of previous literature in the field. There is none. In fact, the farther we have moved from our first set of propositions (i.e. the relationship between community structural variables and the characteristics of the leadership pool) the more tenuous have been the proposed associations. These propositions have been developed on the basis of careful analysis utilizing the logical deductive framework of the model.

Finally, although we have not posited these patterns of community action as independent variables, they obviously are associated with the crucial dependent variable of the likelihood of successful implementation. Given that action within the community system may alter the structure and processes of the system, these patterns may be viewed as related to the future structure of the community. We have completed the circle.

Summary

To reiterate, the model includes four sets of variables: (1) community structural variables, (2) characteristics of the leadership pool, (3) community problem dimensions, and (4) patterns of community action. The general theoretical assumption of this model is that community structural variables influence the characteristics of the community leadership pool. Furthermore, the characteristics of the leadership pool affects
Figure 5

THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE COMMUNITY PROBLEM DIMENSIONS TO THE PATTERNS OF COMMUNITY ACTION

Patterns of Community Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community Problem Dimensions</th>
<th>Urgency</th>
<th>Institut'1 Coordinat'1n</th>
<th>Public Respons'1y</th>
<th>Organizat'1l Relevance</th>
<th>External Involvement</th>
<th>Blockage</th>
<th>Inactivity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seriousness</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Specificity</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Solvability</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniqueness</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarity of Def.</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ = Positive Association; - = Negative Association; * = Direction of Relationship
Not Known Prior to Empirical Examination
the manner in which the local power actors perceive and define community problems. Finally, the nature of these community problem definitions will influence the structure of action proposed by the leadership pool to ameliorate these problems. In the previous two chapters a total of thirty-three variables have been presented under these general sets. Each of these variables has been defined, explicated, justified, operationalized, and placed in the model as an independent and/or dependent variable. These variables are not logically exhaustive. They have been selected for their apparent utility as meaningful dimensions for examining the interrelationships posed in this model. They are variables which are important for the analysis of the distribution of power, the nature of problem definitions, and the structure of community action. Furthermore, it is assumed that these variables covary. The extent of these interrelationships, however, must be determined by future empirical examination. Conceptually, the model requires refinement. This is a first step in its development. For example, some of the proposed associations, particularly those in the first set of propositions, have at least some empirical support. We have noted this support when it has been available. For many of the associations, however, no support is available. These have been deductively drawn based upon the general theoretical assumptions of the model. They also await empirical examination. Finally, as a practical tool the model is crucial for determining the "problem-solving ability and methods" of the community leadership pool. Such knowledge may be of paramount importance to anyone who wishes to institute ameliorative action or social change within the local community.
We now have a model for the comparative analysis of community power, problems, and action. The major task of this study is completed. In the remaining chapters we will apply this model to four communities. This application must be considered as heuristic. This model is very complex. It cannot be empirically validated with such a small number of communities. It will, for instance, be impossible to control certain variables to examine the independent effects of other dimensions. Furthermore, these sampled cities, as we shall note, were selected on the basis of more specific criteria (i.e. the presence or absence of water-related problems) than to serve as a valid test of this model. For example, our comparative model can best be examined by utilizing a large number of communities that vary greatly on our structural variables. As we shall note, the sampled cities in our study are very similar in structure, therefore associations predicted by the model may not be manifest in the findings.14 This heuristic application, however, is valuable. It illustrates the feasibility of the model. It will be shown that these variables can be operationalized; data to indicate these dimensions can be obtained for all communities; and the proposed associations can be empirically examined. Furthermore, though we may not validate or empirically "prove" the associations proposed in the model by this application to four similar cities, any application will aid in the further development and refinement of the model. No empirical examination of these associations has been previously attempted. Even such a "halting first step" as this application represents should aid in future refinement. The next chapter explicates the methodology employed in this investigation.

2. The actual, dominant problem and the rank priority of the problems were such dimensions. These dimensions are important and worthy of empirical investigation. They are, however, descriptive and do not fit well with the other elements in the model. The author plans to include them in an expanded version of this study. This book will include a great deal more "qualitative" data than this present study.

3. It might be argued that the characteristics of the leadership pool do not affect the number of perceived problems, that this number is a function of the conditions present in the local community. One must remember, however, that what problems are or are not actually present in the community is of little importance. Every community has numerous conditions which could be defined as problems. Some are and some are not. It is not the existent conditions which determine the number of perceived problems, it is the media through which they are perceived. In this case, these are the characteristics of the leadership pool.

4. It may be argued that due to the systematic nature of the community, all problems eventually are relevant for all institutions. This may be true, however what interests us is the extent to which they are not so defined, and are in fact perceived as isolated problems by the power actors. Also, some may argue that although an issue may appear to lie outside the actor's institutional sphere, it may actually be indirectly relevant. For instance, the industrial leader in our example may be concerned with community health facilities because he is unable to attract a quality administrative and managerial staff to his company, and believes that poor health facilities in the community are scaring them away. This problem is a methodological one. In performing a content analysis on the perceived problems, one must be careful to isolate the true problem, i.e., health care or labor force. Finally, some problems may be directly related to two or more institutional areas. Zoning is such a problem. Both the business and industrial institution and the governmental institution may view it as their concern. We have chosen to consider problems such as this as being institutionally specific. When the power actors define such issues they tend to do so in isolation of other institutions and to view it as a "business" or "political" issue.

5. For example, see E. A. T. Barth and S. D. Johnson, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33; James Green and Selz Mayo, "A Framework for Research in the


7. Ibid.

8. The author's conception of social change within the community system is presented elsewhere. We will not explicate it at this time. See Gary Kreps and Dennis Wenger, "The Nature and Relationship of Social Conflict and Social Change: Organizational Change Within a Community Conflict Environment," a paper presented at the September 1970 meetings of the American Sociological Association in Washington, D.C., 29 pp. (mimeo).

9. The distinction made by power actors is usually between "government and elected officials" and "private citizens." Often in their designations educational administratives are viewed as "public" officials. On the basis of empirical study, these terms appear to be meaningful to the power actors. We will use them in this manner in this investigation.

10. Obviously, these categories are not mutually exclusive. Proposed community action may be defined as the responsibility of both the public and private spheres. Such a definition may be another indicator of the degree of institutional coordination inherent in the proposed action. As such, one might expect its rate of incidence to be positively associated with those community problem dimensions that were posited as being positively related to the degree of institutional coordination; e.g., the perceived severity of the problem-set. Designating action as the responsibility of both public and private interests, however, is an incomplete indicator of institutional coordination. Other institutions may also be involved.

11. Like the preceding characteristic, this dimension would appear to be very valuable to the student interested in predicting the outcome of any action proposal. While the general level of perceived organizational relevance may be important, what is probably more crucial is the specific identification of which organizations are defined as relevant. Organizations differ in their degree of influence in local community affairs. If the more influential organizations are defined as being relevant for a specific action proposal, its likelihood of success is increased. If these organizations are not perceived as being relevant participants, or if other less powerful organizations are designated as relevant, success is less likely. Finally, of course, it must be noted that those organizations which can count the power actors as members are more likely to be perceived as relevant. If the members of the leadership pool are deeply involved in a few organizations, these organizations potentially possess great power and may be defined as relevant.
12. One need not list examples of blocking of community action proposals; they can be found in most studies of community power and in any daily newspaper.

13. In the analysis of one particular action proposal, the categories of "perceived blockage possible" and "perceived blockage impossible" are mutually exclusive and logically exhaustive. Action sets, however, may differ in their degree of perceived "blockage." At one extreme, no single proposal may be viewed as "blockable." At the other extreme, the leadership pool may perceive that all the issues may be blocked.

14. It should be noted, however, that the similarity in structure is an asset to the specific empirical problem originally posed, i.e. an examination of the saliency of water-related problems to the community leadership pool.
CHAPTER IV

The Methods

In this chapter we will review the methodology utilized in this study. Included in such a review will be discussions of such topics as the original research question; the selection of sampled cities; the development of a technique for identifying power actors; the development and refinement of the research instrument, including the specification of operational indicators for our numerous variables; the actual collection of the data in the field; and the process of coding and statistical manipulation. The primary goal of this chapter will be a descriptive presentation of the methods employed in the research. In addition to simply noting "what was done," however, we will attempt to explicate and analyze the methodological problems that were encountered. It is hoped that this descriptive and analytical account may serve two purposes. First, future comparative power studies may benefit from our experience. Second, such an explication of our methods may aid in clarifying, explaining, and increasing the meaningfulness of our findings.

Before we begin, it must be emphasized that the scope of this study increased from the time of its inception until the research entered the stage of data collection. What began as an examination of the saliency of water-related problems to local community leaders, evolved into the comparative model presented in Chapters II and III. The specific,
initial research study was the primary purpose of the empirical examination. It has been completed. The comparative model was developed, however, to increase the contribution of this specific study to the general community power literature. The comparative model also served as an extremely useful framework for the analysis of the specific, initial research question.

Let us now turn to a discussion of the original research problem. It was from this initial concern that the subsequent methodology evolved.

The Original Research Problem

In 1968 the Disaster Research Center undertook a study of community reactions to long term collective stress situations. Utilizing a sociological framework, the Center has defined collective stress as a large, unfavorable change in the inputs of a social system. For a number of years the center had been engaged in the study of collective stress conditions caused by the rapid impact of stress-inducing agents. Until that time scores of studies of disasters and civil disturbances were conducted within the continental United States and in several foreign countries. This study was to be the first examination of long term collective stress situations.

The specific long term stress-inducing agents selected for study were the water-related problems of pollution, depletion, and flooding. These types of problems were ideal for the analysis. Their nature is one of gradual onset and extended duration. As opposed to sudden impact agents, such as natural disasters, they allow the opportunity for
planning and action to cope with their stress-induced situations. On the other hand, they are more difficult to perceive by community members. Obviously, the perception of stress is a necessary condition for planning and action. The initial study, therefore, was oriented toward exploring community reactions to a specific form of a long-range stress-inducing agent, i.e., water-related problems.

There were three objectives of the original study. First, to determine various definitions of the salience of types of collective stress for particular communities. Second, to determine various forms of adaptation on the part of particular communities to types of collective stress. Third, to determine various social factors related to differential community perception and adaptation.

Regarding the first objective, it was offered as a working hypothesis that the collective awareness of the seriousness and relevance of a particular situation can be seen as a necessary precondition for the mobilization of any type of community action. Therefore, one of the goals of the research was to assess the perception of the relative seriousness of particular problems as seen by the leadership pools in particular communities. Of special interest would be the pool's assessment of the importance of water resource problems that were existent within their communities. This assessment of the salience of water resource problems would have to be placed within the wider context of other problems, or long-term stress conditions, facing the community. For example, a basic question of interest was "if community members were asked to specify and rank the seriousness of community problems, would issues of water pollution and depletion (which were know to exist in
their community) be important?" It was assumed that those problems which were salient to the leadership pool and defined by them as serious, would be the ones against which ameliorative community action would be instituted.

The second objective, an analysis of various forms of community adaptation to collective stress, was related to the ongoing research effort of the Center. It was basically an examination of the range and form of adaptations, with particular emphasis upon the development and institutionalization of "disaster cultures." The concept of disaster culture refers to the actual or potential adjustments, be they social, psychological or physical, which are used by the residents of such areas in their effort to cope with disasters which have struck or which tradition indicates may strike in the future. The concept has normative and technological elements. Such adjustments range from the building of physical safeguards such as levees to the belief that certain areas are immune to particular kinds of danger and to the cultivation of certain types of attitudes of "defiance of nature" and "community self-sufficiency" in the face of such stress. Disaster, in certain communities, may be expected, and its response institutionalized within the community system. Some communities have even been known to "love" their disasters, viewing such events as floods as simply nuisances, or possibly even looking forward to the flood period as a time of "carnival."

This existence of a disaster culture in a community would appear to affect its perception and reaction to such long-term stress agents as flooding. Such attitudes may militate against more rational planning
For flood control and may minimize the community's awareness of the need for concern and planning for other problems.

The development of a disaster culture, however, is unique and seemingly occurs only in situations with recurrent and obvious collective stress. One community may be unaware of objective indications of serious problems such as depletion and pollution. Another may be involved in active planning by a "few concerned" citizens. Another may be involved in planning which has the interest and support of a broad segment of the population of the community. Finally, another may have developed a disaster culture. The effect of such a culture upon the community leadership pools' perception and definition of local problems and proposals for ameliorative action was the prime concern of the study. Analysis of this data is underway, and will be presented shortly by the Center.

The third objective entailed an attempt to explore various "explanations" of the different forms of community perception and adaptation to collective stress. The comparative model presented in the previous chapter is the result of this attempt. Its application to four cities will be presented in Chapter V.

The Selection of the Cities

The first task to be undertaken in initiating the above research was to select the communities for study. The initial research design called for the selection of five different communities. Three initial criteria were used in selecting the communities for inclusion in the sample -- size, community autonomy, and administrative importance.
Each of the communities was to be within the 10,000 to 25,000 population range. Each community was to be relatively autonomous, i.e. not closely linked to a neighboring metropolitan area. Finally, each community was to be a county seat.\(^4\) As opposed to these controlled dimensions, however, the communities were to vary in terms of the presence or absence of several different forms of collective stress. The five communities, therefore, were to have exhibited the following characteristics: (1) one community subject to recurrent flooding which has developed a "disaster culture" over time, (2) one community subject to recurrent flooding which has not developed a "disaster culture," (3) one community faced with objective evidence of serious problems of water pollution, (4) one community faced with objective evidence of water depletion, and (5) one community with little objective evidence of stress from flooding, depletion, and/or pollution.

First, a list of all of the cities in the state with populations ranging from 10,000 to 25,000 was compiled. From this list were selected those cities which were county seats. The resultant, shortened list was then examined, and those communities that (1) were located within the same county as other cities of over 25,000 population, or (2) were known to be residential suburbs for nearby metropolitan areas, were eliminated. These communities were then examined for the existence of the specified water resource problems. This search to locate our five types of communities was undertaken with the assistance of the water resource center located at the largest university in the state, the state department of natural resources, and the state water control board. Eventually, four cities were chosen to be studied. Within the limitations of our sample
criteria, no community with a water depletion problem could be located. Two communities, Gilford and Union, were proposed to us as possible "depletion communities." They were subsequently excluded from the sample, however, after exploratory interviews within the communities could not substantiate the existence of a depletion problem. One community with a glaring depletion problem was located, however, its population was only 700. The following communities were chosen. (Table 1).

**TABLE 1**

**THE SAMPLED CITIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Size (1960)</th>
<th>Problem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>16,847</td>
<td>Flooding (Disaster Culture)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toeyston</td>
<td>11,059</td>
<td>Flooding (Without Disaster Culture) Also Pollution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>10,585</td>
<td>Pollution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>12,388</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Let us turn and briefly describe these communities. We shall withhold any detailed explication of their structure until the next chapter.

**Demain**

The city of Demain is most noted for three qualities: its physical beauty, historical heritage, and floods. The visitor to Demain is
immediately struck by its beauty. The city is located at the juncture of two major, wide rivers. At the point of confluence rises the downtown business district, highlighted by the majestic de Chaumpneuf Hotel and the clocktower of the archaic county courthouse. Stretching along the banks of the two rivers and away from the downtown district runs Front Street. All of the streets in Demain are extremely wide, tree-lined, and picturesque. North Front Street, however, is the city's showpiece. Four lanes wide, lined with gracious elms, the street is bordered on the "river-side" by a public park. Along the east side, however, and stretching for a distance of three blocks, is a row of colonial mansions. These homes, with stately columns and expansive lawns, were once the residences of riverboat captains and local entrepreneurs. Now, the descendants of the community's "elite" reside in them; though a few have become tourist homes and museums. While "Demainians" will eagerly show the visitor North Front Street, they will tend to bypass a tour of South Front. This area, which borders the docks and levees on the giant river, represents the community's slum. Actually, the area is in a state of transition. Warehousing, absentee-owned stores, a block of taverns, and a large section of low-income, substandard housing are found here. Above this area, however, sitting on a series of steep hills is Demain College. This small, liberal-arts school peers down on the mansions of North Front Street and the slums of South Front. While the former is the residence of certain key members of its board of trustees, the latter is of more interest to it. The college must expand. South Front Street is an inviting target.
While its residents call it "the most beautiful city on the river," the town also possesses a rather unique historical heritage. The city was originally surveyed by George Washington. Washington, while headquartered at Valley Forge and during a low point in the Revolutionary War, gathered his officers together and decided that if they were defeated they might retire west of the mountains. Demain was to be the point of refuge. The city was founded in 1788 by 48 Revolutionary War officers under the direction of General Rufus Putnam. It was located across the river from an United States Army outpost that had been built three years earlier. Demain was the first city in a very large geographical area that presently includes the north central region of the United States. It proudly boasts the first civil government, the first permanent settlement, county, retail store, tavern, and civil court in the area. The city achieved early prominence as a river port, and during the 19th century it was one of the "jewels of the river." This historical heritage has permeated the life-style of the city. Museums are numerous. Pride in the "New England atmosphere found here" is evident. Most of all, however, there is a great emphasis placed upon lineage. Being a descendant of the "Original 48" is still honored in the community. "Style" and "taste" are matters of importance.

Finally, Demain is noted for its floods. The business district is located on the flood plain of the two rivers. The city experiences flooding almost annually, and is hit by serious floods about every four years. Particularly devastating floods occurred in 1913, 1936, 1937, 1943, 1959, 1964, and 1969. The entire business district has often been
underwater, with depths of eleven feet being recorded in the dining room of the de Champneuf Hotel, which is two blocks from the river.

What is extremely interesting, however, is the manner in which Demain handles its floods. "We love them," is an often heard comment. This city has developed a "disaster culture" that is practically an "ideal-type." Flooding and flood response have become accepted elements of community life in Demain. Technologically, the organizations in the community have developed complex plans and procedures for responding to floods. For example, businesses have developed elaborate plans for moving their stock "up the hill" and storing it, along with the other citizens' possessions, in the college. Certain banks have flood doors in their basements and vaults. Clean water is pumped into these areas prior to the flood to equalize pressure and lessen the problems of "cleaning" caused by dirty, flood water. The local utilities have instituted procedures for cutting-off service to flooded areas. Local emergency relevant organizations, such as the police and fire departments, Civil Defense, Red Cross, Salvation Army, and the Corps of Engineers have large supplies of flood-relevant resources, shelter supplies, and equipment. An overall flood plan exists for the community. Furthermore, there is a great emphasis on "teaching newcomers how to survive floods." This process of socialization is furthered by holding periodic "flood seminars," the publication of a list of bench marks for the city which can be obtained in most stores, and the efforts of neighbors to inform the new residents. Attitudinally, the floods are viewed as nuisances at worst, and as "carnivals" at best. As one respondent noted, "If we haven't had a flood, it's been a boring year. We love them."
Everybody pitches in. The college kids all get off school and help evacuate the people. Everybody goes up on the hill and gets drunk. It's great!" Finally, the folk-lore of the community is replete with legends about past floods, and certain local individuals, such as Pop Darby, a retired riverboat captain who predicts the crest of the river, have become famous because of their flood-related activities. As we have noted, the presence of this "disaster culture" was one of the primary factors in the selection of Demain. It was posed that the existence of this "disaster culture" would influence the leadership pool's perception and definition of water resource problems.

We will discuss the structure of the community in greater detail in Chapter V when we apply our comparative model. At this point, let us note only that the community is the most geographically isolated city in our sample. It is about two hours driving time by a new interstate highway to the nearest metropolitan area. The city is basically a commercial area, although recently a few branch plants have moved into the community. Overall, however, the industrial growth and development of the community has been hindered by flooding. Because of its national reputation as a "flood town," it has been difficult to lure outside industry into the city. Also, many community residents have not desired to have industry locate in the community for fear of "changing the lovely, New England quality of the town." Politically, the town is conservative. The Republicans have a two to one margin over the Democrats among the registered voters. Nixon received 3,724 votes to Humphrey's 2,157 in the last general election. Wallace, however, only received 325 votes. Finally, it may be noted that this community offered the
most enjoyable location for field work of any city in the study. The cooperation of the power actors was most sincere, and all of the organizations in the community were very cordial and helpful in providing us with data.

Teayston

Journeying from the same metropolitan area that is two hours from Demain, one must only travel about thirty miles to be in Teayston. Not possessing the physical beauty of Demain, this community is located on a fertile plain near the Big Foot River. Two smaller creeks cut through the community, separating the original downtown area from rapidly developing residential allotments. The downtown business district symbolizes the traditional rural-service function of the community. Two and three story buildings run along the two perpendicular main streets for about three blocks. The downtown area shows evidence of decay, as business has gradually been lost to modern shopping centers which are but a half-hour from the city. On the west end of town is an industrial park, which houses the branch plants of a number of national corporations. Immediately east of the downtown area, along the banks of the Elk Creek, one finds an area of substandard housing. Surrounding these areas are the new subdivisions. In the last few years, the community has been inundated with medium-priced homes to house the great influx of working class and middle class immigrants who have moved to Teayston from Capital City in an attempt to find "suburbia."

Teayston was founded in 1838. Blessed with an abundant water supply from the mammoth, underground Teays river, the community soon developed
into an important service and trade center for the surrounding rural area. The community continues to perform this function today. The major event in the community is the annual "Cucumber Carnival." This week long agricultural festival usually draws over 250,000 visitors to the community, and annually serves to "pump some new life into our local businesses."

The days of rather static rural existence and "Cucumber Carnivals," however, may be numbered. Teayston is rapidly becoming dependent upon Capital City. It is now within the SMSA of this metropolis. Though smaller than Demain (16,847 - 11,059), it is growing rapidly. From 1950 to 1960 it had a growth rate of 26.8 percent. This increase in population has placed great strain on the local government to provide adequate public services. The local school system has constantly struggled to keep pace with the increasing student enrollment. The community is undergoing various structural alterations as its function changes from "service town" to "bedroom community."

Like Demain, Teayston experiences recurrent flooding. Unlike Demain, however, it has not developed a "disaster culture." Flooding in Teayston is mainly of a "flash flood" variety and comes from the overflow of Elk and Duck Creeks. Only rarely has the Big Foot River flooded the community. Floods occur almost annually, and are likely in the spring. Heavy rain and spring-thaw are contributory factors. The most devastating floods were in 1913, 1936, 1938, 1958, 1964, and 1969. Unlike Demain, however, the central business district rarely has been inundated. The residential areas bordering the streams -- particularly the low-income, substandard section by Elk Creek -- are the most seriously affected parts of the city.
Teayston has few plans or resources for responding to their floods. No overall community flood plans exist. In fact, five different local officials each claimed to be "the man in charge of handling floods for the town!" Because of the nature of "flash floods," little warning is available to the community. No warning system, however, has been devised by the community, and no organization claimed responsibility for warning. The disaster-relevant organizations in the community are poorly staffed and equipped. Only one respondent even knew the names of the local civil defense director! The citizens, according to one respondent, "Don't know the first thing about how to handle a flood." No benchmarks are available. No systematic plans or procedures for evacuation are in existence. Floods appear to be viewed as disasters. As one respondent noted, "We just go from one flood to another. Pretty soon we have to get ourselves organized to handle them!"

Finally, we may note that this community is more industrial than Demain. As its "character" has been changing, so has its voting record. Teayston was once a strong, Democratic community. Now it is more mixed, and is turning toward a more conservative orientation. Nixon defeated Humphrey in 1968 by a count of 2,302 to 1,418. Furthermore, Wallace received 742 votes, or 16.6 percent of the total. Teayston, our "flood town - without 'disaster culture,!'" offers an excellent opportunity to examine a community in the process of social change.

Lowell

Located in the midst of rolling hills in the western part of the state is the small city of Lowell (10,585). Built upon the location of
an 18th century United States Army fort and the scene of an important treaty signing between the federal government and the local Indian tribes, the community was founded in 1838, the same year as Teayston. Throughout the more than 160 years, the city has served as a "retail-sales" and "rural service" center for the surrounding rural, agricultural area. The community is relatively isolated, though not nearly as isolated as Demain. The nearest metropolitan center is an hour drive from Lowell over macadam roads. The community is located about 160 miles from Capital City.

The visitor to Lowell first may note that it is an extremely attractive community. As one drives past the county fair grounds with its manicured half-mile track, he soon realizes that this is "harness horse country." Traveling further down the main state route into the center of town, one notices a "strip" of new, modern commercial establishments. These soon become significant as one makes the "S-turn" and enters the Main Street business district. The downtown area is old. The two story buildings are often in need of repair. The local theater is closed for the summer. A few vacant buildings are noticed, but basically the storefronts are occupied by typical retail outlets one might expect to find in a "Middle America" service town.

Main Street is narrow; traffic is congested at most hours of the day. After passing the archaic, decrepit county courthouse, one approaches the new "Civic Center" at the end of Main Street. A modern Municipal Building, Post Office, and Fire Station rim the circular park. Passing farther to the west, one notices a large, well-kept, extraordinarily equipped municipal park. If he remains in town, he will soon learn
that the park was a gift from the National Construction Company, the
town's largest industry. If he looks closely, he may even see the main
office of this locally-owned nationally-oriented company nestled among
the trees in the municipal park. Heading out of town, our visitor will
pass an area of fine residential homes, and soon come upon the Lo­
well Museum. The museum houses the personal collections of Lowell's
two most famous citizens: a "crack-shot" artist who once performed
with Buffalo Bill's Wild West Show, and a nationally famous radio news
commentator. Eventually one passes the modern high school. Built with­
in the last five years, and based upon the "Campus Plan," the high
school is one of the prides of the community. Leaving the community,
one again enters the rich, rolling farm land of the surrounding hinter­
land.

The community possess other characteristics of "the typical small,
midwestern town" in addition to its physical setting. The community is
relatively "balanced" economically. There is approximately equal em­
ployment in manufacturing, retail trade, and finance, insurance and
services. It is predominantly a white, middle class city, with only 48
non-white residents. Politically, it is a balanced community with 3,563
registered Democrats and 3,112 registered Republicans. Recently, how­
ever, there has been a turn toward the Republican Party. Nixon defeated
Humphrey by a 3 to 2 majority.7 Furthermore, Republican candidates have
won every recent senatorial, govenatorial, house, state election since
1966. The respondents claim, however, that in local elections, people
vote the "man," not the "party."
Lowell was selected as our "pollution city." Lowell Creek runs through the west end of the community. At the time of the field work, the city of Lowell was being sued for polluting the stream. The suit was brought by the owner of a grist-mill—who lived downstream from Lowell. The sewage system of the city is inadequate. The case was being litigated in the courts at the time of this writing. What interests us, of course, is not the outcome of the suit, but the extent to which an objective water pollution problem is salient to the power actors of Lowell.

Before leaving Lowell, we must note that the cooperation of the power actors in this city was excellent. No outward antagonism toward the researchers was shown, and no one refused to be interviewed.

Jefferson

Shortly after the Revolutionary War, the federal government was in financial difficulty. It was unable to pay the wages of many of the recently released soldiers. As opposed to money, the government gave land grants to these men. One major section, the Virginia Military Lands, was allotted to Virginia soldiers. The first settlement in this region was made by a regiment of Revolutionary War Veterans who fought under the command of Colonel Alexander Brown. Brown sent an aide, Thomas Hinton, to layout the city. The first log cabin was built in 1807, however the town of Jefferson was not laid out until sometime between December 1810 and February 26, 1811. The latter date is the recorded date of settlement on the town plat.
Today, Jefferson is about 60 miles from any city with a population larger than its own 12,000 plus. It is located in a major agricultural area specializing in livestock. Travelling to the community, one passes this rich grazing land. The apparent prosperity of the surrounding hinterland contrasts sharply with the appearance of the city. Jefferson gives the impression of being "poor," "shabby," and "stagnant." The downtown area surrounds the city square. It shows obvious signs of decay. A number of store-fronts are unoccupied, most of the others are in need of repair. One soon learns that the two new shopping centers located on the east and west ends of town have severely crippled the prosperity of the downtown commercial establishments. The county courthouse, located in the center of the city square, is drastically in need of repair. The city hall is an old, one-story structure located off the main street. Except for a small, new allotment on the east side of town, the homes in the community are below average in appearance. Few homes have been constructed in recent years. The "typical" house in Jefferson is old, in need of paint, and generally gives the impression of being a remnant of the past century. As one outside research firm has noted, the homes, businesses and neighborhoods need a "paint-up, fix-up, clean-up campaign."

Throughout its history Jefferson has been a "rural-service" center. Until the earlier 1960's, there were very few industries in the city. Since that time, however, three branch plants have located in the community that employ a total of 983 workers. This industrial expansion has created some jobs for the local labor force, and, according to the respondents, was instrumental in the building of the two new shopping
The population, however, has continued to be static. Prior to 1965 the rate of population growth never exceeded 1.6 percent for any ten year period. The projection for the 1970 census shows a growth rate of only 1.2 percent.

The pace of life in Jefferson is apparently slower than in any of our other sampled cities. While downtown traffic is sometimes heavy because of the confluence of four state highways at the center of the city, true congestion problems only occur on Friday night when the farmers from the surrounding area come to town. Politically, the community is very conservative. A strong chapter of the John Birch Society is located in the community, and some of its members hold important, influential positions in the city. Republicans outnumber Democrats by about a 2 to 1 margin. In 1968 Nixon defeated Humphrey by 1,130 votes (2,769 - 1,639.) Furthermore, Wallace received 820 votes, or 19.2 percent of the total votes cast. The city has consistently defeated any proposal for a city income tax, and has turned down three of the last four school bond issues. Finally, recently the citizens overwhelmingly defeated a proposal to fluoridate the city's water system by a five to one margin.

We may note briefly, however, that opposed to its "pace of life," the level of conflict in Jefferson is very high. According to the respondents, for the past twenty years there has been open antagonism and conflict between the city of Jefferson and the surrounding hinterland. This controversy has centered around the separate school systems. It has resulted in broken friendships, the boycotting of the Jefferson business establishments by the rural residents, and court cases that
have been appealed as far as the Supreme Court. The original specific issue involved the proposed consolidation of the two independent school systems into one, centralized system. This proposal was favored by the city, but vehemently opposed by the rural residents who feared a "loss of control of our schools." As with many instances of community conflict, the specific issue has been eventually ignored and, to some extent, forgotten. The conflict has become generalized into a "city-county" battle that supersedes any specific issue. At the time of this writing, the controversy shows no signs of being resolved.

Jefferson was selected as our "control city." The community has no objective evidence of any water resource problems. Two streams crisscross the community. The streams, however, present no flooding or pollution problems. Furthermore, there is no objective evidence of a depletion problem.

It should be noted, however, that field work in this city was difficult. One of the power actors -- the president of the local John Birch Society -- refused to be interviewed. Two other members of the leadership pool only agreed to answer part of the questions in the interview, and were generally very apprehensive and defensive. Although it would be "ego defensive" to blame this antagonism to a "general conservative, anti-research ideology," such an "explanation" is purely speculative. This community was the first to be studied. Perhaps the antagonism, in part, was the result of a novice field team.
The Continual Development of the Model

Shortly after selecting the cities, the comparative model was initially developed. The model already has been explicated in great detail in Chapter II. At this time, let us only note that its development and refinement occurred prior to the selection of a technique for locating the power actors and the development of the research instrument. Many modifications were made in the model from the time of its inception until the beginning of the phase of data collection. Variables were added or discarded on the basis of newly found work in the literature. In addition, the author presented the model to his fellow research associates and to the directors of the Disaster Research Center. Their criticisms, evaluations, and substantive suggestions were very valuable in refining the model. Of course, throughout this period the instrument also was being developed. Every effort was made to provide a "tight fit" between the model and the research instrument. Thus, modifications in the model usually necessitated corresponding alterations in the research instrument. We shall discuss the research instrument in greater detail shortly.

The Development of a Technique to Identify the Power Actors in the Leadership Pool

The next step in the research was to develop a technique to locate the power actors within these communities. A number of different techniques have previously been used in power research. Our first step was
to review these techniques and either (1) simply select an existing technique, or (2) select elements of these techniques and develop a hybrid approach. As we shall note shortly, we finally decided upon the second alternative.

It was determined that whatever technique we selected had to meet two criteria. First, it had to meet the practical considerations of the research project. In other words, within our limitations on time, resources, and personnel the technique had to be appropriate. Any approach that required field work, expense, or staff in excess of our project resources had to be rejected. Second, the technique had to be appropriate for our comparative model. The degree of logical fit between our concept of social power and our technique for locating those in the community who hold superordinate power had to be tight. The nature of our definition is basically interactive. Furthermore, it stresses the ability of those actors who hold social power to affect the processes in the system. The selected technique, therefore, had to tap these two dimensions of social power.

Many different approaches to locating power actors have been utilized. Students have undertaken such varied approaches as examining newspaper stories, utilizing participant observation, analyzing social registers, and developing sociograms to locate exactly "who influences whom." The three most widely used techniques, however, are the positional, the reputational, and the event-analysis or decision-making approaches.

The oldest technique is the **positional approach**. This approach is based upon an authoritative approach to social power. Using this
technique, the researcher is only able to identify those power actors whose positions are authoritatively based. When utilizing this approach, the researcher selects various key positions, or roles, in the community as being the true locus of social power within the system. Individuals or groups are not considered, simply social positions. The power actors in the leadership pool identified by this approach are solely the formal leaders or office holders in the community. With this approach, great care must be taken to develop and specify criteria for selecting which authoritative positions are relevant to the community decision-making process. The identified power actors usually include governmental officials, political functionaries, school administrators, organizational officials, leaders of religious groups, etc.

The positional approach has a few advantages. It is easy to apply, and inexpensive in both time and money. In addition, it appears to be reliable through time. By ignoring the non-authoritative component of social power, however, it has serious drawbacks. This technique fails completely in identifying those power actors who are not in official positions, but who work behind the scenes to affect the processes in the system. Furthermore, this technique, by focusing generally upon administrative officials, ignores the lower-ranking members of bureaucratic organizations who serve as "gatekeepers" of the information-flow within the organization. These individuals and positions may be very powerful. Another problem with this technique, noted by Clark, is that after selecting the positions and compiling a list of the occupants, the researcher is faced with the major problem of inferring the amount of influence actually wielded in the community by the specific power
actors. Due to the fact that each person occupies a number of statuses, i.e., a "status-set," it is naive to predict the behavior in one status, for example, school board member, through the assumption of direct congruence with another status, for instance occupation, assumed to be dominant. Finally, this approach does not fit well with our concept of social power. It is a non-interactive approach. It ignores the non-authoritative component of social power. While it may be adviseable to select certain power actors for inclusion in the leadership pool solely on the basis of position, for example, the mayor, as the major technique, this approach is wanting.

The most widely used technique for identifying community power actors is the reputational approach. As we noted in Chapter I, the introduction of this technique by Hunter in 1954 served to revolutionize the field. It provided a ready-made, "assembly-line" method of studying community power. Of course, it has also been one of the most maligned and criticized techniques in the research arsenal of the social sciences. We will discuss these critiques, and the subsequently proposed defenses, shortly. First, let us explicate in more detail the nature of this technique.

Like the positional approach, the reputational method first requires the researcher to select a set of positions within the community to be interviewed. Unlike the former approach, however, the reputational method selects these positions not on the bases of assumed power, but on the criterion of knowledgeability about the community. The primary task is to isolate positions whose incumbents are located at key points in the system. These positions afford the incumbents an opportunity to
observe the structure of decision-making and patterns of action in the community. Often this list of positions is labelled a "panel of knowledgeable." These panels often include such positions as newspaper editors, heads of chambers of commerce, key religious leaders, community officials, news editors, etc.

The researcher first interviews this panel about the power actors in the community. Various questions have been utilized in the literature, from "Who in town is influential in local affairs?" or "Who runs things around here?" to posing questions on influence in specific institutional or issue areas of the community. Then the researcher compiles a list of those actors "reputed" to have power by people who should be knowledgeable about the community. Since this list often may be quite lengthy, the researcher may establish a minimal number of mentions as a criterion for inclusion in the leadership pool. With the reputational method, therefore, although the researcher does select the initial panel of knowledgeable and does establish the level of mentions for inclusion in the sample, the leadership pool actually is selected on the basis of the reputation of certain individuals in the opinion of the knowledgeable. It is these individuals, not the researcher, who actually determine the composition of the leadership pool.

There are many variations on this basic methodology. Some of these complexities include "two-step panel design," "snowball sampling," etc. These are, however, simply variations, not alterations of the basic theme. Since the strengths and weaknesses of this method are all found in its basic form, we will forego a discussion of these variants at this time.
This technique has a number of strengths. First, its design is simple, and its method is easy to apply. It is not exhorbitant in either cost or effort. Second, it inherently neglects neither the authoritative nor the non-authoritative component of power. Thus, it does delineate informal as well as authoritative power actors. Third, the approach is intimately related to the general theory of social stratification and serves as a link to this body of knowledge. Fourth, as Clark notes, the approach is conceptually parsimonious. The method isolates the power aspect of a community, and thereby allows the researcher to analyze this aspect without becoming involved in often rich but frequently irrelevant details of local community life. Fifth, the technique is fairly reliable through time. It has high reproducible. Its operations are such that several researchers can investigate different communities with a high probability that the basic technical operations will be duplicated in each. Sixth, and most important for our purposes, the method assumes that power is exercised through the process of social interaction. We will discuss this interactive element in more detail shortly.

We noted, however, that this approach has been severely criticized. One key criticism involves the use of the panel of knowledgeable. These knowledgeable must be extremely informed about the structure of power and the patterns of action in the community. In effect, the validity of the method is completely based upon their ability to identify and isolate the actual power actors. The very first step undertaken by the researcher, therefore, is critical. Many investigations have shown that if the knowledgeable are clustered in one institutional area of the
community, for example, the business or industrial sector, the pool of nominated individuals will be biased in the direction of that area. The researcher must explicitly select knowledgeable from a variety of institutions that represent the cross section of the community. In effect, the research design must increase the probability that the "perceived power actors," as identified by the knowledgeable, are the actual members of the community's leadership pool.

Clark has presented a highly detailed discussion of the proposed weaknesses of the reputational model.18 He finds six basic objections. First, the researchers who utilize this technique bias their results from the initial stage of the study by assuming a pyramidal decision-making structure. Second, there is no intrinsic method for arriving at an appropriate cut off point for inclusion in the sample. Third, the separation, often attempted, between "top leaders" and "second stringers" is based on an arbitrary decision by the researcher. Fourth, the empirical referent of both the researcher and the knowledgeable is not clear. "Who" or "What," for example, is a "general influential." Fifth, even if the concept of "influential" is clear to the investigator, many community knowledgeable are likely to confuse influentials with social notables or widely publicized persons who may not wield any actual influence in community decisions. Sixth, it is claimed that this technique only gives a "reputation" for power or potential influence which, even if the actor actually does have available to him, he may not choose to exert, or only exert infrequently in a narrow range of issues.19 Basically, therefore, the criticisms center around the validity of the technique, the ability of the knowledgeable to accurately
identify the power actors, the arbitrary nature of certain of its operations, and the inability of the technique to tell the research anything about the actual exercise of power; it relies solely upon reputation.

In examining this technique, it would appear to have great utility for our study. Its practicality and ease of application are an advantage. Furthermore, as we shall note briefly, it is very compatible with our concept of social power. Finally, the possible limitations inherent in the validity of the method can be overcome both utilizing and issue-specific reputational method in which the reputation for influence is obtained in all the institutional areas of the community and combining this method with the decisional method or the event-analysis technique.

The *event-analysis or decision-making approach* has been proposed by political scientists as an alternative to the sociologically based reputational technique. Robert Dahl has presented the most complete explication of the technique and the most exacting application of the method to a single community. In utilizing this method, the researcher undertakes a detailed investigation of one or more current or past community issues. Having selected one or more issues for analysis, the researcher attempts to trace or reconstruct the history of the issues. Emphasis is placed upon delineating the phases inherent in the process of decision-making and identifying the power actors who actually participate in this process. Analysis of the issue begins at the stage of conceptualization and initiation and proceeds until the stage of completion is obtained. Within each of the delineated stages, the researcher attempts to identify the actors and the roles they perform.
Therefore, the approach particularly is valuable for investigating the exercise of power and analyzing the various roles of the power actors. The degree to which the same actors actively are involved at each stage in the decision-making process, and the extent to which their roles overlap can be determined. As an approach for examining the structure and process of community-decision making, this method may have no peer.

Clark notes four basic advantages of this technique. First, unlike the positional method, no questionable inferences need to be drawn between position-holders and actual decision-makers; this problem is empirically examined. Second, as opposed to the "reputational method," the actual roles and process of decision-making is analyzed, not simply the reputation for power. Third, the degree of overlap of an actor's influence from one decision area to other areas can also be empirically determined. Fourth, the degree of overlap between social and economic notables and influential decision-makers can likewise be established empirically.

The approach, however, does have some serious limitations. The investigation of these issues must either occur simultaneously with their enactment or in an ex post facto manner. Therefore, the approach is extremely costly in time, expense, and personnel. Furthermore, it is impossible, due to the costly nature of this approach, to study more than a few specific issues. The researcher must generalize from a small sample, usually not randomly selected, of issues. Charges of "misplaced concreteness" can be leveled at many studies utilizing this technique. The selection of issues is extremely important. Since only a
few issues are selected, the results may be predetermined by the selection. For example, if one selects only "public-regarding" issues, such as the institution of a city tax or the nomination of public officials, one will certainly find that political and governmental officials have power. In addition, the issue-analysis method does not cope adequately with indirect influence. Furthermore, it is incapable of handling nondecisions. The approach seems to imply that if there are no issues, there is no structure of decision-making power -- this is nonsense.

This method would appear to have limitations for comparative research. We have already noted its expense in time and money. Also, it is difficult to select issues that are (1) comparable across communities, and (2) equally embedded in all the institutional areas of the community.

As one easily can see, none of these approaches is perfect. All have merits, and all have weaknesses. Some emphasize the authoritative component of power, while others lay more stress upon the non-authoritative component. Some rely upon members of the community to designate power actors, while others leave this chore for the researcher. The validity of all of the techniques can be questioned. Although the reliability of certain of the methods, such as the positional approach which selects only the formal office holders in the community as power actors, appears to be fairly high, the reliability of other methods is apparently problematic.

It was decided that a hybrid approach, utilizing both the reputational and, to a lesser extent, the decision-making methods would be
best suited to our needs. There were three main reasons for selecting the reputational approach. First, it met the practical requirements of our research problem. Its economy of design and limitation on resources, expenses, and personnel were important advantages. Second, this approach inherently neglects neither the authoritative nor the non-authoritative components of power. Both of these components are explicitly elements in our concept of social power. Both official, formal office holders and positional incumbents and behind the scene power actors may be identified by this technique. Third, we have defined social power as being exercised within the context of "asymmetrical relationships." Since the idea of reciprocal relationships is implied in the above concept, if a system component (individual, group, or organization) is viewed as possessing superordinate social power, we already have identified at least one-half of the relationship. In other words, if 'B' views 'A' as having power, a basis for the exercise of power by 'A' already has been established. Of course, 'B' may be in error and 'A' actually may have only a small degree of power. It is also possible that 'B' is correct, but 'A' may have never, or at least rarely ever, exercised power. The crucial point, however, is that the potential for exercising social power is present and has been identified by those in the system. The reputational approach allows the researcher to identify at least one-half of this relationship in a manner not possible with any other method.²²

Of course, any researcher utilizing the reputational technique must be aware of the possibility of "invalid nomination," "knowledgeable obfuscation," or more simply the "Big Lie" on the part of the
There are additional advantages, however, for also including the decision-making approach in our research. First, by gaining knowledge about the process of past community issues, the researcher is able to obtain a more complete picture of the history of the community and its issues, a better understanding of the method by which social power is exercised in the community system, and perhaps some information about the structural properties of the leadership pool. Which particular power actors are involved in specific stages of community issues and the process of community decision-making can both be determined. Second, we have previously stated that social power is built upon various power-relevant resources. Furthermore, the power actors in the community have differential access to these various bases of social power. Some may control finances, others the mass media, certain individuals may be incumbent in formal offices, and others may be respected for various qualities such as expertness. Therefore, it would appear that different community issues may call into play different power actors with differing bases of social power. Certain resources may be more crucial in one issue than in another. Of
course, this proposition should be empirically verified. The decision-making approach allows such an examination.23

In sum, therefore, the following technique for identifying the power actors was established. A panel of three community knowledgeable was initially chosen. There were three criteria upon which this selection was based. First, positions were sought whose incumbents, because of their location within the local community system, would be able to identify the power actors in the community. Second, these knowledgeable preferably would be in positions in which they would regularly interact with these power actors, and, optimally, would attempt to influence them to institute certain changes within the community. Finally, positions were selected whose incumbents would have some knowledge of water resource problems in the community. The panel of knowledgeable included the county extension agent, the president of the chamber of commerce, and the newspaper editor in each of the four communities chosen for the study. These knowledgeable would be asked first to identify individuals in the community who are influential in "general community affairs." Furthermore, in an attempt to achieve broad community representation from this limited number of knowledgeable, the respondents were to be queried as to who was influential in specific institutional areas, such as business and industry, schools, religion, local government, health and welfare, local organizations and associations, etc. In addition, in attempt to gain information on past community issues and a measure of the validity of the nominations, these knowledgeable were to be questioned about previous issues in the local community. The focus of this information was upon (1) who in the
community was involved in the issues, (2) what action was taken, and (3) at what stages in the process of decision-making were various power actors involved. Finally a brief history of past community issues and action with a special emphasis upon water related problems such as depletion, pollution, and flood control was to be obtained.

From this data the composition of the local leadership pools was determined. The actual procedure entailed compiling a list of all those individuals nominated as power actors, and selecting those who were mentioned by at least two of the three knowledgeable for inclusion in the leadership pool. The level of two nominations was chosen to eliminate idiosyncratic nominations. In addition, in an attempt not to overlook any power actors in the community, the study was designed so that the reputed power actors were also asked to name anyone in the community who was influential in general community affairs or in specific institutional areas and was not included in the original list. It was determined that if certain names were repeatably mentioned, these actors would also be included in the leadership pool.

Development and Pretesting of the Identifying Instrument

After developing the above method to identify the power actors in the communities, the technique was pretested in a city very similar in size and structure to those which would eventually be studied. The first task was to develop an interview schedule for use with the panel of knowledgeable. (See Appendix A) This first schedule, designated by the code WR-DRC 07-68 CI, was developed to gain data on four specific areas for each community: a history of past problems in the community, the list of power actors in the leadership pool, a summary of the
current problems facing the community, and an explication of any water resource problems currently existent in the community. The goal of this schedule, therefore, was to identify the leadership pools in the communities and gather background data on local problems. It was to be utilized only preliminary to the interviewing of the actual power actors.24

The schedule was divided into four sections: History, Leader Nomination, Current Community Problems, Perceived Water-Related Problems. Under the historical section, the knowledgeable were asked to simply list what they considered to be the major community problems in their local city. Then, they were asked to select the one they considered to be the most important problem from the past and discuss how the issue arose, what action was taken, who in the community was active in the issue, and how the issue was solved.25 The section on Leader Nomination was, of course, the most important in this brief interview schedule. The knowledgeable were asked, "Who do you consider the most influential persons in the community?"26 After asking the knowledgeable about those persons with general influence, the interviewer next asked if there were people who were influential in the following institutional areas: (1) education and schools, (2) economic life, (3) health and welfare, (4) religion and churches, (5) local clubs and organizations, (6) local government, (7) state government, and (8) national government. Finally, the knowledgeable were asked if there were any individuals who were influential in local affairs, but resided outside of the community. The names, occupation, and position of each of the nominees was obtained. The third section, Current Community Problems, asked the
knowledgeable to designate the most important problem currently facing the community. In addition, regarding a possible solution to this problem, he was asked which individuals he would go to in order to do the following things: (1) make people aware of the problem, (2) decide what should be done, (3) get public support for the decision, and (4) put the decision into operation. In the fourth section the knowledgeable was asked if the local community had any water-related problems. If it did, the extent to which the community considered these pressing or urgent problems was determined. Finally, the knowledgeable were asked to identify those individuals within the community who they would attempt to get involved in any attempt to solve the water resource problems.

After this interview schedule was developed, it was pretested in the town of Madeira. Madeira is a city of 16,470 located in the southeastern corner of the state. Like our other sampled cities, it is a county seat and like Demain and Teayston, does experience recurrent flooding. A field team composed of three, trained research associates from the Disaster Research Center was dispatched to Madeira to pre-test the knowledgeable interview schedule. In addition to interviewing the county extension agent, the editor of the local daily newspaper, and the executive secretary of the local chamber of commerce, the field team contacted the general office of the chamber of commerce, the board of elections, the city auditor's office, and the office of the mayor. The attempt was made to determine what information was available from these local sources relevant to the structure of the community. Demographic, economic, political, organizational, and social class statistics were sought.
The pre-test was very successful. First, regarding the interview schedule, the three community knowledgeable were contacted and all agreed to be interviewed. All three of the individuals were very cordial, helpful, and candid. The interview schedule was utilitarian. All of the questions, with the exception of those in part three, were very clear and appeared to be easy to answer. The interviews were tape recorded and subsequently transcribed. When the data were analyzed, it was obvious that the technique would work. A pool of 26 power actors was obtained. These actors came from a cross-section of the community, with major representation being from the economic, educational, and governmental institutions. The first task had been completed.

The field team also achieved limited success in securing data on the structure of the community. Such information as government expenditures, community voting records, governmental structure, number and type of industries, employment records, demographic statistics, the number of local organization and their estimated membership, and general historical sketches were available within the community. After this pre-test, it was determined that this information, augmented by data from the United States Census, would allow us to adequately operationalize the structural variables in the comparative model.

Development of the Leadership Pool Interview Schedule

During this period the researchers continually were involved in developing the basic research instrument of this comparative study. The construction of this interview schedule was integrated very closely with
the development of the comparative model presented in Chapter II. There were many alterations in the instrument. These were made in an attempt to increase (1) the validity of the schedule, (2) the degree of fit between the schedule and the comparative model, (3) the specific relevancy of the schedule to water resource problems, and (4) the pace of flow of the interview. Originally, the schedule was very similar to the Knowledgeable Interview Schedule. It contained open-ended questions and was more of an "interview-guide" than an interview schedule. As the development of the comparative model progressed, however, the structure of the research instrument also was altered. As concepts were included in the model, specific questions were placed in the interview schedule to measure them. As the model became more "concrete" and "explicit," the research instrument became more "structured." Attitudinal, rating, and ranking scales were included. The questions became more specific. The data became more "quantitative." The development of the interview schedule took place over a period of approximately five months.

To increase the parsimony of presentation we will not discuss each of the items in the schedule separately. We will, however, relate each of the concepts in the model to its source of datum in the schedule. Before commencing with that task, however, let us briefly describe the general structure and format of the research instrument.

The interview schedule is composed of four parts. The first part was produced as a separate section. Its format was that of a "paper and pencil" questionnaire. At the beginning of the interview this section was self-administered by the power actor. It began with a five
item cosmopolitan-localite attitude scale. The second page included basic census type data about the respondent's occupation, age, education, religious and political affiliations. In addition, data on the reading material of the respondent also was obtained. The third page included a checklist of political activity, a matrix of organizational membership and office-holding, and another cosmopolitan-localite scale. The final item in the first part asked the respondent to rank order the influence on local affairs of six local groups representing five different institutions. This first part took about ten minutes to complete.

The second part of the instrument was an actual interview schedule. It contained twenty-seven items. A tape recorder was used to record this section. The first section was concerned with the respondent's perception of past and present community problems. In addition, information on the respondent's involvement in the attempts to solve these problems and data on two prior past issues was obtained. Finally, the respondent was given a card with a list of ten general types of community problems, including water resource problems. He was asked to rate the perceived degree of severity of each problem within his community. This rating scale was included to (1) provide a comparative measure of the perceived severity of certain common local problems for our four communities and (2) assess the perceived severity of water resource problems relative to other community concerns.

Next the respondent was asked to identify what he believed was the most important problem currently facing his community. A total of ten questions attempted to secure data relevant to the community problem.
dimensions and the patterns of community action in our model. Such variables as uniqueness, clarity of definition, level of inaction, urgency, degree of requisite coordination, degree of public responsibility, perceived possibility of blockage, and the perceived relevance of local organizations were tapped. Included in this section was a list of twenty-one local organizations. The respondent was asked whether the support of each group was essential, important, but not essential, or not important.31

The last section of part two specifically was concerned with water resource problems. The power actor was asked if his community had any water-related problems, such as pollution, depletion, or flooding. If he answered affirmatively, the identical ten questions from the previous section again were asked. This technique allowed for the comparison of water-related and general community problems and solutions along the dimensions presented in our model.

Part three was specifically concerned with the distribution of power within the community. The respondent was asked to rank the influence of each of the other power actors in six issue-specific areas and in over-all community influence. These areas included: (1) education, (2) business and industry, (3) local government and politics, (4) state and national government and politics, (5) churches, (6) organizations and clubs, and (7) overall community influence. This technique served as an indicator of the scope of influence in the leadership pool.32 It was self-administered by the power actors.

The final section of the instrument was an attempt to determine the structure and nature of interaction within the leadership pool.
The power actors were asked to check the names of those members of the leadership pool with whom (1) they shared lunch, (2) they exchanged visits in their homes, (3) they considered to be close friends, and (4) they discussed local affairs. This data was useful as an indicator of cohesiveness.

In Chapters II and III we presented the operational indicators of each of the variables in our comparative model. At this time let us present the sources of data that we will use in constructing these indicators.

A. Community Structural Variables

**Population Size and Rate of Growth:** Population statistics and rates of growth from Table 8 in the United States Census.

**Demographic Heterogeneity:** The proportion of the population that is non-white and the proportion of the population that is foreign-born from Tables 8 and 32 in the United States Census.

**Community Autonomy:** Sources of data on economic autonomy include (1) the percentage of local industry that is absentee-owned; figures are available from the local Chambers of Commerce, and (2) the percentage of the employed persons who work outside of the county; figures are available from Table 52 of the United States Census. Regarding political autonomy, sources include (1) the proportion of local government revenue that comes from state and federal sources; data is available from Table 22 of the 1967 Census of Governments, (2) the number of services performed by the local government, (3) the per capita expenditures by the local government; data for both of the latter two indicators is available in Table 22 of the 1967 Census of Governments, and (4) the number of residents per full-time government employee; data available from Table 284 of the 1969 Statistical Abstract of Ohio.

**Governmental Structure:** Data is available from the local governmental units.

**Organizational Density:** Data is available in the form of total listings of community organizations, and can be secured from the local Chambers of Commerce.
Economic Base: The proportion of the labor force that is employed in the five largest employment areas can be calculated from Table 75 of the United States Census.

Social Class: Data on median income and median education for the communities can be obtained from Tables 71 and 47 of the United States Census.

B. Characteristics of the Leadership Pool

Size: Results from the analysis of data secured by the Knowledgeable Interview Schedule.

Institutional Dominance: Data for determining the degree of institutional dominance within any leadership pool may be secured from questions 1 and 11 in Part I of the Leadership Pool Interview Schedule.

Legitimacy: Data for determining the degree of legitimacy of the leadership pool is available from items 1 and 8 (which relate to occupation and political and governmental involvement) in Part I of the Leadership Pool Interview Schedule.

Visibility: One year subscriptions to each of the local daily newspapers were secured. The level of visibility of the leadership pool can be indicated by the number of newspaper citations per member of the pool.

Scope of Influence: Data for determining the scope of influence of the leadership pool is available from Part III (item 28) of the Leadership Pool Interview Schedule. (See Chapter II, page 58 for the method of operationalization.)

Cohesiveness: Cohesiveness can be measured by a sociometric analysis of the data secured in Part IV (item 29) of the Leadership Pool Interview Schedule. In addition, item 9 in Part I of the same schedule presents data on overlapping organizational memberships.

Entrenchment: The "Index of Entrenchment" can be computed from data secured from item 2 and 3 in Part I of the Leadership Pool Interview Schedule.

Cosmopolitanism-Localism: This variable can be measured by the two attitude scales, items A1 and 10, in Part I of the Leadership Pool Interview Schedule.
G. Community Problem Dimensions

Number of Perceived Problems: Data to measure this variable is available from items, 1, 2, and 3 of Part II of the Leadership Pool Interview Schedule.

Perceived Seriousness: Item 4 of Part II of the Leadership Pool Interview Schedule presents data relevant to this dimension.

Degree of Consensus: The "Index of Opinion Dispersion," (see Chapter III, page 82) can be computed from data secured from item 4 in Part II of the Leadership Pool Interview Schedule.

Institutional Specificity: This dimension can be measured by comparing the occupational data with the perception of problems found in item 1 in Part I and item 2 in Part II of the Leadership Pool Interview Schedule.

Possibility of Local Solution: Item 10 in Part II of the Leadership Pool Interview Schedule presents data directly relevant to this dimension.

Degree of Uniqueness: The degree of uniqueness in the problem definitions is directly measured by item 6 in Part II of the Leadership Pool Interview Schedule.

Clarity of the Problem Definitions: Data for assessing the degree of clarity inherent in the leadership pool's definitions of problems can be secured from item 7 in Part II of the Leadership Pool Interview Schedule.

D. Patterns of Community Action

Degree of Urgency: Item 9 in Part II of the Leadership Pool Interview Schedule provides data that is directly relevant to this pattern of community action.

Institutional Coordination: The degree of institutional coordination perceived to be requisite to successfully implement the proposed community action can be measured by data secured from item 11 in Part II of the Leadership Pool Interview Schedule.

Degree of Public versus Private Responsibility: Data obtained from item 12 in Part II of the Leadership Pool Interview Schedule is a direct measure of this dimension.

Perceived Relevance of Local Community Organizations: Measurement of the magnitude of this pattern can be computed from data obtained by item 15 in Part II of the Leadership Pool Interview Schedule.
Degree of External, Non-Local Envolvement: Item 10 in Part II of the Leadership Pool Interview Schedule provides data to measure the magnitude of this variable.

Blockage: Data for measuring the perceived possibility of "blockage" of community action can be obtained from item 13 in Part II of the Leadership Pool Interview Schedule. This item provides data on the possible blockage both by individuals and by groups.

Level of Inactivity: Item 8 in Part II of the Leadership Pool Interview Schedule provides data directly relevant to the measurement of the pattern of community action.

In sum, this completes our discussion of the development of the research instrument. The instrument proved to be useful. It was easy to administer. On the average it required one and a half hours to complete the schedule. In addition, we must note that the many "open-end" questions in the schedule provided valuable qualitative data in the form of vivid, rich discussions of the distribution of power, the process of decision-making, and the resolution of past community issues. This material, however, is not being analyzed in this study. Future, planned analyses of these communities will utilize this valuable cache of information.

The Field Work

All preliminary stages of the research project were completed. The cities had been selected; the comparative model had been developed, at least tentatively; the two interview schedules had been constructed; and a pre-test had been undertaken in Madeira. This entire phase of the study, from the initial review of the literature to the completion of the Leadership Pool Interview Schedule had taken about one year. The field work was ready to begin in the late spring and continue throughout the summer.
First, a field team had to be selected and trained. A team of four core interviewers was selected. Two of these researchers were M.A. sociologists who currently were serving as research associates on the staff of the Disaster Research Center. These men had previous experience in conducting semi-structured interviews. Another member of the team was a graduate student in sociology who was hired for the summer field work. The final interviewer was a female special student with some training in sociology. The latter two team members had no previous interviewing experience. The field team was instructed in general field research methods and interview techniques. Factors such as identification, entre, rapport, and the use of the in-depth probe were discussed. Copies of the interview schedule were examined, discussed, and related to the theoretical model so that each interviewer "knew exactly what information was sought." Instruction in the use of the tape recorder was given. Finally, credentials and letters of entre were provided each team member. University identification, as opposed to that of the Disaster Research Center, was used.

The general modus operandi for the field work required that the interviewing within each community be completed within a two week period. The initial contact in each community was made with the county extension agent, who was a member of the panel of knowledgeable. Entre into the community was established with this position due to its incumbent's association with the university. An appointment was scheduled with the county agent. A two-man field team was then dispatched to the community for a period of two days. This team interviewed the extension agent and the other two members of the panel of knowledgeable, i.e. the
executive-secretary of the Chamber of Commerce and the editor of the
daily newspaper. The Knowledgeable Interview Schedule (WR-DRC 07-68 CI)
was utilized. In addition, the team members began the task of secur­
ing statistical information from various local sources. A local tele­
phone directory and a subscription to the local newspaper were also
obtained.

On returning to the university, the data was analyzed and the list
of power actors was compiled. This list included all the power actors
who had received two or more nominations by the panel. The names of
these power actors were placed into the matrices in Parts III and IV
of the Leadership Pool Interview Schedule. Finally, an "Interview
list" was compiled which included the name, occupation, address, and
telephone number of each power actor. Each interviewer received a list
of those individuals he was to interview.

The four-man field team then was sent to each community. Jeffer­
son being our control city, was the first community to be studied.
Lowell, Teayston, and Demain followed in order. Except in Demain, most
of the interviewing was completed within one week. In Demain many of
the power actors were not in the community during the initial field
trip. Follow-up trips occurring over a period of one month secured a
100 percent return. While in the community, in addition to conducting
the interviews and securing the statistical, historical, and structural
data, the field team attempted to "catch the flavor" of the city. Con­
versations with local residents about local affairs were actively sought.
At no time, however, did the field team disclose any information they
had received from the interviews, and the team members never discussed
the local leadership pool or mentioned any of the power actors to the local residents. Also, time was spent in the local parks, restaurants, hotels, and on the streets in an effort to gain some degree of understanding of the style and pace of life in the community.

The field work was very successful. Table 2 presents a compilation of the number of interviews that were conducted for the total sample and for each city. The power actors were very cooperative. Of the 76 identified power actors, 97.4 percent were interviewed.

TABLE 2

THE NUMBER OF CONDUCTED INTERVIEWS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Total Number of Interviews</th>
<th>Total Number of Power Actors</th>
<th>Number of Interviewed Power Actors</th>
<th>Percent of Leadership Pool Interviewed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demain*</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teayston*</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>94.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>95.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>97.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The total number of interviews in Demain and Teayston includes several that were conducted specifically for the "Disaster Culture" portion of the original study.

One individual in Teayston was out of the country and could not be contacted. One power actor in Jefferson refused to be interviewed. In addition to achieving success with the field interviewing, the field team was able to secure all of the required statistical, historical, and structural data.
Having completed the field work, the recorded interviews were given to the Disaster Research Center's typing pool for transcription. Transcribing tape recorded interviews is a slow process. It required approximately nine months to complete the transcription of these one hundred interviews. During this period, the size of the research team was decreased to one full-time researcher and a part-time undergraduate assistant. Upon returning from the field, two tasks were begun. First, a daily analysis of each local newspaper was undertaken. This analysis included the collection and cross-filing of all newspaper citations referring to the members of the leadership pool, a content analysis of each editorial, and the construction of a chronology of daily events. Second, work was begun on developing a code book to be used in coding and analyzing the interview data. The code book was finished in time to begin coding the first transcribed interview.

A copy of the code book can be secured from the Disaster Research Center. It was developed by the author in association with the directors of the Center and an undergraduate assistant. Since the coding of the interviews was to be done by the author and the undergraduate, it was decided that the code book should be as concise and simple as possible. Criteria and guidelines for coding each item were discussed by the coders. This small number of coders was very advantageous. Any problems that arose during the process of coding the interviews easily could be discussed. If a decision could not be reached, one of the directors of the Center served as an "unbiased, third-party, arbitrator." In addition, after the first two interviews were transcribed, two
additional coders were obtained solely for the purpose of assessing the degree of "inter-coder reliability" that could be expected from the analysis. Each of the four coders analyzed both of the interviews. The coding decisions of these four individuals exhibited a 98.9 percent level of agreement.\textsuperscript{36} As each interview was transcribed, it was coded. The final transcribed interview was obtained and coded approximately ten months after the code book was developed.

The stage of data analysis was begun. The findings relevant to the application of our model are presented in Chapter V. Before turning to that application, however, we must note the matter of statistical analysis. The statistics utilized in this application basically are descriptive. Our sample is very small, and the cities were not randomly selected. Neither, of course, were the power actors.\textsuperscript{37} The parameters of the universe are unknown. The application of inferential statistics and tests of significance to such data is not appropriate.

We are faced, however, with the problem of obtaining some indication of the fruitfullness and predictability of our model. The data from this study allow the cities to be ranked on each dimension. In many instances, however, this rank ordering must be crude. For example, with certain dimensions, such as the cohesiveness and scope of influence of the leadership pool, it is possible only to state that the leadership pool of Community A is more so, or less so, than the pool of Community B, etc. The analysis, therefore, will be of nonparametric data. It would be ideal if the techniques of factor analysis, analysis of variance, analysis of covariance, or path analysis could be utilized.
They can not. Furthermore, other multivariate techniques, such as the Hyman and Coleman models, are inappropriate with our small sample. To provide some indication of the utility of our model, therefore, we will compute Spearman rank correlation coefficients for the associations between each of our dimensions. This approach is far from ideal. The probability of committing errors of Type I is immense. With a sample of four, the shifting of one-step rank order by two cities results in the value of the statistic being altered by .200. At this stage in the development of the model, however, the statistical application of this measure can provide us with some information regarding the degree of fit between the theoretically predicted and the empirically observed direction of the relationships. Siegle presents a table of significant values for Spearman rank order correlation coefficients with an N of from four to thirty. This table presents results for a one-tailed (directional) test. Only a perfect association (1.000) between two variables with a sample of four cases is significant at the .05 level. Of course, no statements of statistical significance justifiably may be offered from this statistical analysis, due to the small, non-random nature of our sample. Future analysis of this data is planned, at which time additional, qualitative data will be used to augment, clarify, and refine these original statistical findings.

Summary

This chapter has reviewed the methods utilized in this study. We began by explicating the original research problem, and noting that the scope of the study increased through time. The method and criteria for
selecting the cities to be studied was described. It was noted that the attempt was made to control the size, autonomy, and administrative importance of each of these cities. As a result, our sampled cities are fairly homogenous in structure. This situation is beneficial to the original water resource focus of the study, but it is detrimental to the application of the comparative model. After briefly describing each of the cities, the development of this model was noted. A large section of this chapter was devoted to the important matter of selecting a technique to identify the power actors in the leadership pool. After reviewing the common approaches, a hybrid approach, utilizing portions of the reputational and decision-making methods, was developed. The successful development and pre-testing of this identifying instrument with a panel of community knowledgeable in Medellin was discussed. The development of the Leadership Pool Interview Schedule was then explicated. The general structure of our major research instrument was described, and the sources of data for each of the dimensions in our model were noted. A brief description was offered of the training of the field team and the method of operation within the field. Finally, the process of coding was explicated, and the problems associated with the application of inferential statistics to our data were noted.

In the following chapter we will present the heuristic application of our model to the four cities.
FOOTNOTES: Chapter V


2. For discussions of "disaster culture," see Dynes, *op. cit.*, p. 92; Dennis Wenger and Arnold Parr, *Community Functions Under Disaster Conditions* (Columbus: Disaster Research Center Report No. 4, 1969), pp. 1-17; and Harry E. Moore, *... and the winds blew* (Austin, Texas: Hogg Foundation for Mental Health, University of Texas Press, 1964), pp. 195-213. Moore was the first to develop this concept.

3. These variables were utilized for purposes of controlling certain structural dimensions that were assumed to be relevant to the structure of the leadership pool in various communities, and to the pool's perception and definition of community problems. The importance of size and autonomy as crucial antecedent determinants of these dependent variables already has been noted in Chapter II. Furthermore, the level of administrative importance in the community is relevant to the distribution of power. It serves to indicate the quantity of power-relevant resources available to the governmental institution. In other words, the attempt was made to select cities that were very similar in structure. They were to vary only on the presence or absence of (1) certain water resource problems, and (2) a disaster culture. These controls, therefore, increased the validity of the initial study. They proved to be disasterous, however, to the application of our comparative model. Certain of the specific structural variables we might wish to contrast, i.e., size and autonomy, were controlled. The communities were similar in many structural patterns; they did not present an extremely meaningful test for our comparative model which was developed after the selection of the cities, but prior to the collection of the data.

4. Only partial success was achieved, however, in controlling these dimensions. For example, while the cities were relatively the same size, they were found to differ in the rate of population growth. Furthermore, during the stage of analysis certain differences in the degree of political and economic autonomy were noted. (These will be discussed in Chapter IV.) All of the cities were, however, county seats.

5. These names, and the names of all of the communities and individuals mentioned in this study are fictitious. The respondents in our study were assured anonymity. Only pseudonyms have been used.

6. As a number of respondents noted, this is a rather poor location for the central business district. They offer, however, that it
is "too late to move it!" A local legend is told that the Indians in the area told the original settlers not to build the community on the flood plain, but that the Revolutionary War officers did not believe it "proper" to take the advice of some "savages."

7. George Wallace received 418 votes in Lowell in 1968. This total was 416 more than the number of votes cast for Dick Gregory.

8. This estimate is based upon the vote in the 1969 primary election. At that election 1,610 Republicans and 835 Democrats voted. The total registration figures for the city are not available. In Jefferson, with its slow-paced existence and static population, you do not need to register to vote!

9. These techniques, and several others, are all reviewed and examined by Bell, Hill, and Wright. This discussion of alternative techniques is heavily drawn from their analysis. See Wendell Bell, Richard Hill, and Charles Wright, Public Leadership (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1961), pp. 5-33.

10. Two additional approaches have been utilized often, but not nearly to the extent of the above three. First, there is the personal influence approach. This technique, as opposed to the positional approach, neglects the authoritative component of power. Emphasis is placed upon the non-authoritative element. The researcher attempts to identify which community actors are successful in influencing the outcome of decisions and the formation of opinion. Mere identification, however, is not the ultimate. Identification of the channels through which this influence is exercised is also sought. This approach attempts to go beyond simply identifying "who is behind the throne," for it strives to describe the patterns of influence across the various institutional areas and social classes of the community. With this approach, the researcher often finds himself drawing very intricate, quasi-aesthetic sociograms.

As an approach to analyzing opinion formation, this technique has value. Furthermore, it is not limited in its perspective to only the authoritative component of power. There are, however, several practical and conceptual difficulties with the approach. It is extremely time consuming, expensive, and difficult to analyze. Furthermore, where does power lie? Do those who actually make decisions have no power? This approach has great limitations for our study.

Second, many researchers have utilized the social participation approach. Basically, this technique is an in-depth analysis of the organizational network in the community, with a major emphasis on organizational membership, office holding, participation, and the multiple memberships of the actors in the community. One examines the extent to which various actors participate in such groups as the Chamber of Commerce, Kiwanis, Rotary, and Little League
Baseball. Indices based upon the level of participation are then developed. The power actors with the highest participation indices are designated as the leadership pool.

This technique is an excellent device for examining certain aspects of the community's organizational network. It has questionable validity as a technique for identifying the leadership pool. Power actors need not participate in voluntary organizations. The bases of power are not organizationally controlled. With this technique the only valid conclusion that can be drawn is that the researcher has isolated those community actors who are active in voluntary organizations -- not that he has identified the leadership pool.


12. See Hunter, op cit., especially "Appendix: Methods of Study."

13. This level often is chosen by chance, or practicality. The rationale for selecting the specific level may be a closely guarded secret.


15. Clark, op. cit., p. 76.

16. Ibid.

233


18. Clark, op. cit., pp. 75-76.

19. As we shall note shortly, this sixth "weakness" does not apply in our study because our concept of social power includes the dimension of potential influence.


22. Due to the above contingencies, perhaps we should consider these reputed power actors as "potential leaders."

23. As we have noted previously, in this current study we will not be analyzing the exercise of power. We have purposefully, however, designed this study so that such an analysis can be undertaken. Further investigation of this phenomenon is planned for a later date.

24. This interview schedule should not be confused with the Leadership Pool Interview Schedule that was used in securing information from the power actors. The latter schedule was much more extensive, and at the time of this pre-test was being developed simultaneously with the comparative model.

25. Data obtained from this section of the interview proved to be very valuable in (1) providing the researchers with general background information and overall knowledge of the community, and (2) constructing the subsequent Leadership Pool Interview Schedule.

26. A great deal of effort was expended in constructing this key question. Optimally, the question should (1) be worded in such a manner that the knowledgesables actually understand that power actors, and not "popular people," or "famous citizens," or "wealthy citizens," or "high status people," are the actual target, i.e., the respondent must understand that we are interested in learning who hold superordinate social power in the system, and (2) not antagonize or threaten the respondent. With regard to the latter requirement, discussing intimate community affairs -- such as "who is running the town" -- if anyone is -- may be very threatening to
27. Actually this data was a preliminary source of information on the exercise and structure of power and decision-making in the community. As such, it was most helpful in preparing the Leadership Pool Interview Schedule and in training the field workers prior to the stage of data collection. This information gave the interviewers a clue as to what to expect to find "out there." There were, however, problems with this section. The respondents generally were not able to discuss problems and subsequent proposals for action within the "task" or "stage" distinctions we offered them. Normally, they would identify which individuals in the community they felt would have to be involved to successfully solve the problem, but they were often unable to specify role or task assignments for these individuals.

28. A large state university is located in Madeira. Three of the university administrators were nominated by the panel of knowledgeables.

29. This scale had been previously developed and used in a study by Thomas Dye. See Thomas Dye, "The Local-Cosmopolitan Dimension and the Study of Urban Politics," Social Forces, 41 (March 1963), pp. 239-246.

30. In addition to water resource problems, the list included such conditions as industrial and economic development, housing and building, race and ethnic relations, public improvement, services and utilities, health, culture, education, social improvement and welfare, and recruitment of capable public servants; These problems were selected because (1) they represented a cross-section of community issues and (2) they were all problems that were likely to occur in these communities.

31. Organizations were selected for this list which had a high probability of being found in any community. Furthermore, they were organizations which were likely to be involved in community action programs. By presenting the same list of organizations in all of the communities, the comparability of the data was enhanced.

32. This technique can also be used to measure visibility. The procedure, however, is very complicated and time consuming. In this current application of the model we are using newspaper citations as our indicator of visibility. In future research, the

33. In the latter stages of the field work additional interviews were used. These researchers were advanced graduate students in the Department of Sociology who were serving as Research Associates at the Disaster Research Center. They were well versed in the techniques of field research and interviewing.

34. The female member of the research team was included after the Madeira pre-test. At that time a research team from an eastern university was also engaged in field work in Madeira. It was noted that this other team experienced great success in gaining entry and cooperation by using mini-skirted interviewers. Our female team member also worked part-time as a professional model. We attempted to benefit from having observed the eastern team.

35. In each community one or two power actors could not be contacted during the initial field trip. Additional follow-up trips did succeed in interviewing these actors.

36. Of the total of 2,688 coding decisions required to analyze these two interviews from Jefferson, complete agreement was exhibited in 2,659 of them.

37. In the future, analysis is planned of the internal patterns of each leadership pool. When describing the characteristics of each leadership pool, except for purposes of clarification, one may argue that due to the nature of our definition of the leadership pool contains the universe of power actors for that community.

CHAPTER V

The Empirical Application

In this chapter we will present the results of an application of this comparative model to the four cities. It may be remembered that in the first chapter we noted the growing interest in the comparative analysis of community power. Concomitantly, there is a need for a comparative model to guide such research. In the following two chapters such a model was presented. This model has been constructed upon the assumption that the structure of a community is a determinate of the nature, distribution, and structure of power existent within that community. Furthermore, a working hypothesis of the model is that the characteristics of the structure and distribution of power among the power actors in a community, i.e. the leadership pool, will influence the nature of the community leadership's perception and definition of local problems, and subsequently, the nature of this leadership pool's proposals for ameliorative community action. It was noted that the formulation of the model in those chapters was tentative; its explication constituted a first step in its ultimate refinement and development. With this chapter we begin the task of assessing its validity and utility.

This first step toward refinement by means of empirical application, however, is tentative. The primary goal of this application is to assess the feasibility of empirically examining the model. One often
encounters the complaint that many theories or theoretical models in the social sciences, especially those labelled "grand theory," can not be operationalized and empirically examined. This model is more in the "middle range." We have already proposed indicators for our concepts and specified sources of data that may be used to analyze the model. As we shall illustrate shortly, the model can be empirically examined.

There are also, however, a number of secondary objectives of this application. We will attempt, for example, to obtain some indication about the validity of the model. At best, due to the size of our sample, and the method of selecting the cities, we may obtain a few "empirical clues" regarding the validity of the specific, proposed associations and the theoretical "pay-off" of the model in general. We may observe that sections of the model are supported. If so, we must temper our enthusiasm and remember the limitations of this application. Other sections, however, may not be supported by the empirical findings. In this case we likewise must withhold final judgment. This inability to finalize the model, however, does not imply that this application can not lead to refining the model. In fact, it is an objective of this study that the following empirical examination will lead to further refinement, be it along theoretical, conceptual, operational, or empirical lines.

It is obvious from the above discussion that the answer to the question, "Does this empirical examination constitute a valid test of the model?" is an unequivocal "No!" Possibly we should have labelled this examination an "heuristic application." The cities we are
examining were selected for our sample on the basis of criteria independent of this model. To ideally examine this model, communities of differing size, autonomy, and other structural patterns should be studied. As noted, these controls increased the validity of the initial water resource study; they were detrimental to the application of this model. Furthermore, we are examining only four cities. To attempt empirical generalization and inference from such a sample is fatuous. Statistical analysis is severely handicapped by such a sample size. Therefore, no additional claims are made for this heuristic application other than that it represents a logical first step in the further development of this model.

In this chapter we will utilize the following format. Each of our four clusters of variables will be considered independently. The communities will be described and rank ordered on each of the dimensions. Any patterns evidenced in these dimensions will be noted. In addition, the associations proposed from the model will be empirically examined. Finally, the overall model will be critically evaluated and possible points of refinement will be explicated.

Let us turn, therefore, to our first set of dimensions, the community structural variables.

Community Structural Variables

A. Population Size and Rate of Growth

The 1960 population figures for each of the communities is presented in Table 3. All of the communities are of similar size. It may be recalled that population size was included in our model because of
TABLE 3

POPULATION SIZE AND RATE OF GROWTH
IN THE FOUR COMMUNITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population Size</th>
<th>Rate of Growth</th>
<th>Growth Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teayston</td>
<td>11,059</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>10,585</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>12,388</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>16,847</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

its relationship to structural differentiation and elaboration and the decentralization of decision making. It is doubtful if differences in population size of this small magnitude would indicate great variation in structural differentiation or elaboration. Previously we noted that in such cases the rate of population growth may be a more sensitive indicator of increasing structural differentiation. As Table 3 indicates, these communities do differ in their growth rates, and can be rank ordered on this dimension. Teayston is a rather rapidly growing city, having increased its population by over 25 percent from 1950 to 1960. At the other extreme, Demain has been rather stagnant, having added an average of only 84 persons a year to its population over the same period of time. Lowell and Jefferson show relatively moderate rates of growth. We have previously explicated the relevance of this dimension to the analysis of the distribution of power. In the empirical application of the model, we will utilize rate of population growth, due to its variation among our cities, instead of the absolute size of the population.
Our communities exhibit little difference in the heterogeneity of their populations. These are basically white, native American communities. As Table 4 illustrates, the percentage of non-white and foreign born residents in these communities is very low.\(^3\) For example, the

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Demographic Heterogeneity in the Four Communities}
\begin{tabular}{lcccc}
\hline
City & Percent Non-white & Percent Foreign-Born & Total & Heter-Rank \\
\hline
Jefferson & 3.9 & .5 & 4.4 & 1 \\
Teayston & 2.9 & .6 & 3.5 & 2 \\
Demain & 1.3 & .9 & 2.2 & 3 \\
Lowell & .3 & 1.2 & 1.5 & 4 \\
Mean & 2.1 & .8 & 2.9 & - \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

total state averages are 8.2 percent non-white and 4.1 percent foreign born. None of our communities even approaches these averages. Because of the lack of variation and the high degree of homogeneity, for practical purposes, this dimension has been controlled. We have noted the importance of this dimension as an independent variable due to its association with subsystem solidarity, an important power relevant resource. Therefore, we will rank order the communities and compare their ordering on this variable with their ordering on our dependent characteristics of the leadership. The results, however, should be interpreted only in light of the feasibility of the model.
In Chapter II we discussed the complex concept of autonomy. It was noted that the concept, as currently used in the literature, refers to two interrelated notions: (1) the ability of local individuals, groups, and organizations of the community to determine the goals, policies, and operations in the community, and (2) the existence of viable, functionally autonomous, locally based institutions. In addition, in an attempt to limit the scope of the concept, we proposed to focus upon the degree of autonomy in the economic and governmental-political institutions. These institutions were selected because their structures would appear to be crucial determinates of the distribution and structure of power in the community. Tables 5 and 6 present the indices of economic and governmental-political autonomy respectively. The findings empirically illustrate the complexity of this issue.

First, utilizing the indicators of the percent of the local industry which is absentee-owned to tap the first notion and the percent of the labor force which works outside the community to measure the second meaning of economic autonomy, we note that Jefferson is fairly autonomous. In comparison to our other communities, it has a low rate of absentee-ownership and a moderate proportion of commuting residents. Teayston, on the other hand, has higher percentages on both dimensions. Lowell falls between these two extremes. Demain, on the other hand, is anomalous. It has a high percentage of absentee-ownership, but is a very viable, local economic system, employing all but 6.7 percent of its resident workers. Therefore, it is economically dependent along the decision-making dimension, but extremely autonomous as a viable,
TABLE 5
THE DEGREE OF ECONOMIC AUTONOMY
IN THE FOUR COMMUNITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Percent of Local Industry that is Absentee-Owned</th>
<th>Percent of Labor Force Working Outside City</th>
<th>Economic Autonomy Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demain*</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell*</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaysston</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The tied ranks results from summing the individual ranks on the two dimensions.

For purposes of analysis, we have summed the ranks on the two dimensions as an indicator of economic autonomy. It must be emphasized, however, that this ranking is relative only to these four communities. Differences in the percentage of absentee-ownership and commuting residents are not exceptionally great.

The issue becomes more complex, however, when we consider governmental-political autonomy. As Table 6 illustrates, the communities do vary in their degree of dependence upon non-local sources. Furthermore, they reverse the order of ranking that was associated with economic autonomy. Teaysston has a very autonomous local governmental unit. It has the highest level of per capita expenditures, performs the most functions, has the largest staff of full-time local government officials (both in absolute and relative terms) and finances all but 11.6 percent of its budget locally. Jefferson, on the other hand, exhibits a dependent governmental unit. Performing fewer functions, spending less
TABLE 6
THE DEGREE OF GOVERNMENTAL-POLITICAL AUTONOMY
IN THE FOUR COMMUNITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Per Capita Government Expenditure</th>
<th>Number of Government Functions</th>
<th>Percent of Budget From State-Federal</th>
<th>Residents/Full-Time Gov. Emp.</th>
<th>Gov-Pol Autonomy Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teayston</td>
<td>103.82</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>96.17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>130.7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>63.27</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>160.5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>48.19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>302.1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

money, having fewer full-time employees, it receives over one fourth of its revenue from outside sources. Lowell and Demain fall between these two extremes, with Demain having the more dependent governmental unit.

The relationship between these two dimensions is very interesting. The Spearman rank order correlation coefficient between economic and governmental-political autonomy for our four communities is -.900. In general terms, there are two communities, Teayston and Lowell, which are economically dependent-governmentally autonomous relative to the other cities. Demain and Jefferson, however, are economically autonomous-governmentally-dependent. Two questions immediately may be posed. First, why? A full explanation to such a question requires analysis beyond the scope of this paper. One possible explanatory factor, however, may be the differing rates of population growth in these communities. It may be recalled that in discussing rate of growth in Chapter II we noted that increasing size and rate of growth place additional
strain upon those elements of the community that provide local services. With increasing numbers of inhabitants, the provision of general services, such as streets, sewers, parks, sanitation, and utilities becomes problematic. The local government is faced with the problem of increasing these services, as well as being confronted with other issues, such as an increasing need for zoning, larger police and fire departments, traffic congestion and transportation flow, etc. Teayston and Lowell are communities which have been experiencing rather rapid rates of growth. They also are the two cities which have the most active, viable local governmental units. Perhaps the strain accompanying rapid population growth that has been placed upon the local governments to provide essential services has resulted in local units which are large, financially self-supportive, and active. On the other hand, the population growth of Demain and Jefferson has been rather stagnant. Recently, in fact, they have been experiencing population loss. Where there is not a great demand for governmental services, one may expect to find a rather inactive, "caretaker" government. A decreasing population would appear to lessen the demand for local governmental services. Demain and Jefferson have less active, viable governments. Therefore, in answer to the first question, we tentatively offer that the rate of population growth may be a determinant of the degree of governmental autonomy in these four communities.

Second, one may ask "what effect may such patterns of autonomy have upon the characteristics of the leadership pool?" In Chapter II we noted that leadership pools would probably be more pluralistic when either of these dimensions exhibited dependence, than if the community
was extremely autonomous. Further, we noted that with political
dependence and economic autonomy one might expect a fairly pluralistic
pool, but with strong economic influence. The leadership pool in a
community which is politically autonomous and economically dependent,
however, may be still more pluralistic, but with strong governmental
and political influence. If such be the case, the scopes of influence
of the leadership pool in Teayston and Lowell should be more narrow than
in Demain and Jefferson. We will empirically examine this association
shortly.

Finally, in order to empirically examine the model, we might
wish to rank these communities on an overall index of autonomy. The
above discussion should at least caution us that any such ranking will
be inadequate; the concept of autonomy is not as simplistic as it
might at first appear. If we examine such factors as Tables 6 and 7
and other census and ecological factors we might offer the following
heuristic ranking on community dependence: (1) Teayston, (2) Lowell,
(3) Demain, and (4) Jefferson. Teayston is part of the Capital City
SMSA. It would appear to have a number of ties with Capital City.
Lowell and Jefferson are located in what the census considers "peri­
pheral metropolitan places," though Jefferson is more isolated than
Lowell. Demain, however, is located in an "isolated rural area." Due
to its rather large proportion of absentee-owned industries, however,
it may be considered as more dependent than Jefferson.

D. Governmental Structure

For purposes of empirical analysis, this dimension, applied to
these four communities, is inadequate. Three of the communities --
Teaysoton, Lowell, and Demain -- have exactly the same structure of local government. All three of these cities are "strong-mayor" communities, with partisan election both on a ward and at-large basis. Jefferson is the only community with a different governmental structure. It has a pure reformist government. The city has a "city manager-council" form of government, in which elections are non-partisan and councilmen are elected on an at-large basis. Due to the great similarity in governmental structure, this dimension will not be able to be validly examined.

**E. Organizational Density**

The level of organizational density for each of our communities is presented in Table 7. Unlike governmental structure, our four communities do differ in the relative number of voluntary organizations and associations existent within their boundaries. Relative to the other three communities, Demain suffers from "organizational poverty." There is only one organization for every 185 residents in the city. On the
other hand, Teayston is rather "saturated" with voluntary organizations. There are only seventy residents per organization in the community. For example, there are nine different garden clubs in this small city. Lowell also exhibits a rather dense organizational network. Jefferson has slightly fewer organizations relative to its population, but does not approach the degree of "organizational poverty" that is illustrated by Demnin. Finally, it should be noted that as a category, the communities exhibit a fairly dense organizational structure. On the average, there are 104 residents per organization in these communities.

F. Economic Base

The economic bases of these communities are very similar. Table 8 presents the top five employment categories for each community and the percent of the labor force that is employed in each occupational group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 8</th>
<th>TOP FIVE EMPLOYMENT CATEGORIES IN THE FOUR COMMUNITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>Teayston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manuf'g</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constr'n</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ret'l Td.</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pub. Adm.</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educat'n</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>62.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Furthermore, the percent of the total labor force which is employed in these five largest employment categories is also presented. First, we may note that manufacturing is the largest employment category in each of these cities. The range of manufacturing employment is from 37.7 percent in Lowell to 28.6 percent in Jefferson and 24.8 percent in Demain. In addition, retail trade is the second highest employment category in Lowell, Demain, and Jefferson. There is only a 1 percent difference in the proportion of the labor force employed in retail trade activities in these communities. Also, retail trade is the third largest employment category in Teayston, ranking behind construction. As a further indication of the similarity in economic bases, construction is ranked second, third, fourth, and fourth in employment in these cities, while education is third in two cities and fifth in another. Finally, we may note that there is only a 5 percent difference from the most economically concentrated city (Lowell, 63.3 percent) to the most economically diverse community (Jefferson, 58.5 percent).

There is, however, some variation in the economic base and degree of economic diversification of these communities. While all have a large proportion of their residents engaged in manufacturing, Lowell has a much higher concentration in this category than the other cities, e.g. in Lowell about four of every ten laborers work in manufacturing, while in Demain only one in four does. We may note that Teayston has a relatively large construction industry, and that education is an important employment category in Demain. For purposes of classifying these four communities, we note that Lowell is a concentrated manufacturing-retail sales community. Teayston is a less concentrated manufacturing-
construction-retail sales city. Demain shows more diversification and may be considered a manufacturing-retail sales-educational center. Jefferson is the most diversified city, being primarily a manufacturing-retail sales community.

Utilizing an indicator of percentage employment in major employment categories, Table 9 presents the rank ordering of these communities on the dimension of economic diversity. The relativity of this ranking must be emphasized. It is offered in order to heuristically apply the comparative model. The similarities in the economic structures of these communities would appear to outweigh the differences.

### Table 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Percentage of Labor Force in Top Two</th>
<th>In Top Three</th>
<th>In Top Four</th>
<th>Diversity Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teayston</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

G. Social Class

The median social class levels for these communities are presented in Table 10. It should be noted that the differences among the cities in educational level is not great. Demain, due to the presence of Demain College, has the highest median level of education. This level, however, does not exceed the lowest median city (Teayston) by even one year.
### TABLE 10

COMMUNITY SOCIAL CLASS RANK
FOR THE FOUR COMMUNITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Median Education</th>
<th>Median Income</th>
<th>Class Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>5,592</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teayston</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>5,499</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>5,151</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>5,067</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>6,531</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is, however, a range of over 500 dollars in the median income category. On the basis of these two indicators, therefore, Lowell would appear to have the highest social class level of our four communities. Jefferson apparently is the lowest ranking city. On the basis of the 349 dollar advantage over Demain in median income, we have chosen to rank Teayston second. Once more it must be emphasized that this ranking is relative to these four communities and only is offered in order to empirically examine the feasibility of the model. The class differences between these communities are not great. The communities, as a group, have a median educational level that is slightly above the state average, however the average median income in these communities is approximately 1,200 dollars below the state average, and the deficits range from Lowell's 939 dollars to Jefferson's 1,464 dollars. Therefore, the class level of our communities, in comparison to the median level within the state, is slightly below average.
The initial step in applying the model to our four cities is almost completed. We have classified these communities in relationship to each of the structural variables of the model. It was found that the communities exhibit practically no variation in their population size, demographic heterogeneity, or local governmental structure. Some variation in economic diversity and social class level was noted, however these differences are not great. The communities do appear to vary in their rates of population growth, levels of economic and political autonomy, and degrees of organizational density. The association of these latter variables with the characteristics of the leadership pool should provide the most informative data concerning the validity of the model.

Before turning to the characteristics of the leadership pool and subsequently examining these associations, we should note the degree of covariance in the structural variables of these communities. It may have occurred to the reader that certain patterns were emerging in the rank ordering of the communities on these dimensions. If each variable was dichotomized relative to these four communities into "high" and "low" halves, Teayston and Lowell appear to vary together, as do Demain and Jefferson. Table 11 presents the rank ordering of the communities on those structural variables which exhibit some variation. The reader will note that for purposes of statistical analysis, two of the dimensions have been reversed. We have labelled "economic autonomy" as "economic dependence" and changed "economic diversity" to "economic concentration." We may observe that the pattern does hold together. A value of .771 illustrates a highly consistent pattern of ranking on
these variables. The level of significance presented in the table is purely for illustrative purposes. For these four communities, therefore, population growth, economic dependence, political autonomy, organizational density, economic concentration, and social class level appear to be positively associated.

**TABLE II**

**RANK ORDERING OF THE COMMUNITIES ON THE STRUCTURAL VARIABLES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Rate Of Growth</th>
<th>Economic Dependence</th>
<th>Political Autonomy</th>
<th>Organizational Density</th>
<th>Economic Concentration</th>
<th>Social Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teayston</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ W = .771 \quad p < .01 \quad r_{sav} = .725 \]

Let us conclude this section of this chapter by describing the structure of each of the communities along the dimensions proposed in the model.

1. The Structure of the Communities

**Teayston**—A small, demographically homogenous city, with a high rate of population growth, a relatively low degree of economic autonomy, a high degree of political autonomy, a "strong-mayor" form of local government, a high level of organizational density, a "manufacturing-construction" economic base, a moderately low level of economic diversity, and a middle social class level.
Lowell -- A small, demographically homogenous city, with a moderately high rate of population growth, a moderately low degree of economic autonomy, a moderately high degree of political autonomy, a "strong-mayor" form of local government, a moderately high level of organizational density, a "manufacturing-retail trade" economic base, a low level of economic diversity, and a middle social class level.

Demain -- A small, demographically homogenous city, with a low rate of population growth, a moderately high degree of economic autonomy, a moderately low degree of political autonomy, a "strong-mayor" form of local government, a low level of organizational density, a "manufacturing-retail trade-educational" economic base, a moderately high level of economic diversity, and a middle social class level.

Jefferson -- A small, demographically homogenous city, with a low rate of population growth, a moderately high degree of economic autonomy, a low degree of political autonomy, a "manager-council" form of local government, a moderately low level of organizational density, a "manufacturing-retail trade" economic base, a moderately high level of economic diversity, and a low social class level.

Characteristics of the Leadership Pool

A. Size of the Leadership Pool

The size of the leadership pool in each of the communities is presented in Table 12. The pools basically are the same size, with there being only a difference of four power actors between the largest pool in Demain and the smallest in Teayston. It may be noted that this rank ordering is identical to the ranking of the communities on
TABLE 12
SIZE OF THE LEADERSHIP POOL
IN THE FOUR COMMUNITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Number of Power Actors</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teays ton</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The basis of population size. Such an association is consistent with the proposal from the literature that "the larger the community, the larger the size of the leadership pool." The differences, however, in both population and leadership pool size are not great.

B. Institutional Dominance

In an attempt to measure the degree of institutional dominance in the leadership pools, let us first examine the institutional composition of each pool. Table 13 presents the institutional profiles for each of the leadership pools. First, we must note the overall similarity in the composition of these pools. Basically, they are composed of power actors from the business, industrial, and governmental institutions. On the average, power actors from these institutions constitute 70.8 percent of the leadership pool. Education, the media, and the professions are represented in each community, though they never constitute more than 11.8 percent of the leadership pool. Power actors from the local
TABLE 13

INSTITUTIONAL REPRESENTATION IN THE LEADERSHIP POOL IN THE FOUR COMMUNITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>City</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Teayston</td>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bus. &amp; Ind.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Financial institution make up 10.5 percent of the leadership pool in Jefferson and 4.8 percent in Demain. There are, however, no representatives from this institution in the leadership pools of Teayston and Lowell. Religion is represented only in Lowell.

While government officials constitute 26.7 percent of the total sample and business and industrial leaders make up 44 percent of the power actors, the communities do differ in the degree of representation by these two groups. In Jefferson, business and industrial leaders dominate the leadership pool. Demain and Lowell illustrate more of a balance in the representation of these two institutions, however, the proportion of business and industrial representation is still relatively high. In Teayston, however, government officials constitute a larger proportion of the leadership pool than business and industrial leaders.
representatives. While we will relate these characteristics of the leadership pools to the structural variables of the communities shortly, we must note that such a pattern of representation was predicted by the model. Jefferson is an "economically autonomous-governmentally dependent" community. We proposed that such a community would contain a leadership pool in which the economic interests in the community would be at least strongly represented, and might possibly dominate the pool. Such is the case. Furthermore, Teayston is the most "economically dependent-governmentally autonomous" city in the sample. From the model, one may deductively predict that the leadership pool in such a community would have strong representation by local government officials. Teayston has the largest proportion of government representation in the sample.

In attempting to determine the relative degree of institutional dominance in these four leadership pools, we have considered the percentage of the leadership pool which is represented by the dominate institution. Furthermore, as an indicator of dominance, one can compute the actual difference between the percentage of representation in this institution and the percent in the next two largest categories combined. The higher the positive difference, the greater the degree of institutional dominance. Table 14 presents the rank ordering of the communities on the degree of institutional dominance. As can be noted, Jefferson has the highest degree of institutional dominance. There are 30.0 percent more power actors from the business and industrial institution than from the next two largest categories combined. At the other extreme, we may note that Teayston has a much lower degree of dominance by a
single institution. Although 41.2 percent of the leadership are representatives of the governmental institution, this figure is 5.9 percent fewer than the combined business, industrial, and media representation. The institutional representation in the leadership pool of Teays ton, therefore, is more evenly distributed than in Jefferson. Lowell and Demain are very similar in their levels of institutional dominance. Both of these cities contain leadership pools with much lower levels of institutional dominance than found in Jefferson.

TABLE 14
THE DEGREE OF INSTITUTIONAL DOMINANCE IN THE FOUR LEADERSHIP POOLS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Dominant Institution</th>
<th>Percent in Dominant Institution</th>
<th>Percent Difference*</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>Bus. &amp; Ind.</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>+30.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>Bus. &amp; Ind.</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>+5.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>Bus. &amp; Ind.</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>+4.8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teays ton</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>-5.9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percent Difference is computed by summing the combined percentage totals of the second and third most represented institutions and then subtracting this total from the percent in the dominant institution.

In the next section we will relate this characteristic of the leadership pools to the structure of the communities. At this time let us simply observe that the above pattern of institutional dominance is generally supportive of the propositions derived from the model. As the model predicted, there appears to be a negative association between the community structural variables of rate of growth, dependence,
organizational density and social class and the degree of institutional dominance within the leadership pool.

C. Social Class Composition of the Leadership Pool

In Chapter II we noted that previous studies consistently have found that the power actors are from the higher social class levels of the community. They have been found to be well educated and located in high prestige occupations and positions. As Table 15 indicates, the power actors in these cities possess similar characteristics. Using occupation and education as indicators of social class, we may observe that these power actors constitute a rather privileged group. The median occupational scores for these cities is consistently high. The leadership pools indicate little variation in the prestige scores of their power actors' occupations. In addition, the power actors are highly educated. Of the total sample of power actors 83.9 percent have at least attended

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Median North-Hatt Score</th>
<th>Mean Years of Education</th>
<th>Social Class Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teayston</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample Average</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
college and 63.4 percent have college degrees. The mean number of years of schooling completed by these actors is 16.1, or the equivalent of four years of college. While all of the leadership pools possess a high level of education, there are differences in the educational levels.

In Lowell, the mean years of education is 16.9; the median is 18 years; and the modal category is graduate school. Sixty-seven percent of the power actors in Lowell are college graduates and 55.5 percent have graduate school training. In Teayston, the mean is 16.8 years; the median is 16 years; and the modal category is college graduate. Forty-three percent of the leadership pool have graduate training. In Demain the mean number of years of schooling is 15.7; the median is 16; and the modal category is graduate school. Sixty-one percent of the leadership pool have college degrees, but only 33.3 percent have graduate training. Finally, in Jefferson the mean is 15.1 years; the median is 16; and the modal category is college graduate. In this community, however, "only" 52.5 percent of the leadership pool are college graduates, and "only" 21 percent of the power actors have graduate school training.

For purposes of analysis we have rank ordered the leadership pools on the basis of social class level. Due to its highest rank on both occupation and education, we have ranked Lowell first. Conversely, Jefferson has the lowest prestige and educational levels and has been ranked fourth. Teayston was ranked above Demain due to the small difference in occupational scores compared to the larger difference in educational levels. We may note in passing that, as the model predicts, the community structural variables of organizational density and social
class level appear to be positively associated with this characteristic of the leadership pool. Such associations, however, will be considered in greater detail shortly.

D. Legitimacy

In Chapter II we noted that previous studies have found that leadership pools differ in the degree to which they are "legitimate." A "legitimate" leadership pool is one in which the power of the actors is at least partially based upon the dimension of authority. In such a pool, a high proportion of the power actors hold elected or appointed office in local government or other key institutional executive and legislative levels.

The degree of legitimacy in these four leadership pools is presented in Table 16.\(^\text{15}\) It may first be noted that none of the pools are either totally "legitimate" or "non-legitimate." Thirty of the seventy-six power actors, or 39.5 percent, were classified as "legitimate." The

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Number of Legitimate Power Actors</th>
<th>Percent of Legitimacy in Pool</th>
<th>Legitimacy Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teayston</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
degree of legitimacy within each pool, however, does vary. At one extreme, 51.9 percent of the leadership pool in Teayston is "legitimate." This high percentage of "legitimate" power actors in the leadership pool should not be surprising considering that 41.2 percent of the pool is composed of local government representatives. At the other extreme, only 31.5 percent of the leadership pool in Jefferson was classified as "legitimate." Demain and Lowell possess legitimacy percentages of 42.8 and 33.3 respectively.

Before turning to a consideration of the "visibility" dimension, let us briefly observe that the above pattern of legitimacy appears to be consistent with the deductive propositions of the model. Such community structural variables as rate of growth, community dependence, economic dependence, organizational density, and social class level appear to be positively associated with the degree of legitimacy in the leadership pools. Such associations apparently are most pronounced at the extremes of the rank orderings. Teayston and Jefferson are rather consistently at the extremes of the rankings, while Demain and Lowell exhibit some variation in the second and third positions.

K. Visibility

As an indicator of the degree of "visibility" in the leadership pools we examined the level of newspaper citations for each pool of power actors. One hundred and fifty-five editions of each local newspaper were examined. These papers covered a time span from April 22, 1969 to November 11, 1960. The total number of citations for each leadership pool and the mean number of citations for each power actor were computed. It was proposed that the higher the total number of
citations and the higher the mean average, the more visible the leadership pool. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 17.

TABLE 17

DEGREE OF VISIBILITY
IN THE FOUR LEADERSHIP POOLS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Total Number of Citations</th>
<th>Mean Per Power Actor</th>
<th>Visibility Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teayston</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The highest level of visibility -- at least as measured by exposure in the local press -- is found in Demain. During the period of analysis, each power actor averaged 15.1 citations, or about one citation in every ten issues. In Jefferson, there were on the average 11.6 citations per actor, or approximately one citation in every thirteen issues. The leadership pools in Teayston and Lowell, however, had much less exposure. In the former the mean per power actor was 6.4 citations, while in the latter it was only 4.5. The rates per issue were one in 25.9 and one in 34.4 respectively.

We previously noted that the degree of legitimacy and visibility might be independent dimensions. With these four cities there is some support for this proposal. In Demain, we find a leadership pool that is "legitimate-visible." In Teayston, the pool may be classified as
"legitimate-invisible." Jefferson possesses a "non-legitimate-visible" pool, while Lowell contains a "non-legitimate-invisible" leadership pool. The model does allow for such a pattern, and we will examine this pattern of visibility in relation to the structure of the communities shortly.

Before turning to the key dimension of "scope," however, let us note that this indicator is not completely satisfactory. The results of this analysis may be contaminated by the quality and extent of coverage of local news by the local papers. As a measure of visibility, this indicator only is valid if each leadership pool has an equal chance of having its power actors cited in the local press; i.e. that the level of local coverage in these papers is similar. Having examined these papers, however, it appears as though they do vary in their extent of local coverage. In Demain, the newspaper includes extensive local coverage. The staff of this paper is the largest in our sample. In Lowell, local news is relatively ignored, and a large amount of space in the paper appears to be devoted to national wire stories. A systematic content analysis of these papers is currently being conducted. Until the results of this study are obtained, however, we must note that this indicator of visibility is crude and may suffer from bias.

F. Scope

This dimension of the leadership pool may be the most important in this set. Its importance lies in its centrality to the "elitist-pluralist" debate. Scope refers to the extent to which the leadership pool's influence in local affairs is broad ranging across many institutions or
issues, or is narrow and institutionally specific. While the concept can be applied to describe the range of power of an individual actor, we are utilizing the term to describe a structural dimension of the leadership pool. The more narrow the scope of the pool, the more "issue-specific" the distribution of power within the pool. Therefore, the more narrow the scope, the more pluralistic the leadership pool. 17

In measuring this dimension, we actually will be examining the power actors' perception of the degree of scope within the leadership pool. The power actors were asked to rate the influence of every other member of the leadership pool in various institutional areas such as education, local government and politics, religion, organizations and clubs, business and industry, and health and the professions. Furthermore, each actor was rated on his overall community influence by his peers. The degree of scope in the leadership pool can then be determined by computing the multiple correlation coefficient for these rank orderings by using the Kendall Coefficient of Concordance. The higher the computed value of W, the broader the scope of influence within the pool. In addition, the average rank order association of influence between institutional areas can be determined by the formula $r_{sab} = \frac{kw - 1}{k - 1}$. 18

Table 18 presents the results of this analysis of the degree of scope in the leadership pools. 19 We may note from the table that Jefferson possesses a leadership pool with a rather broad scope of influence. The overall correlation of influence among the various institutional areas is .560 and the average association between any two institutional areas is +.487. At the other extreme is Teayston. The
TABLE 18
DEGREE OF SCOPE
IN THE FOUR LEADERSHIP POOLS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Kendall Coefficient</th>
<th>Rsav</th>
<th>Scope Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>.560</td>
<td>+.487</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>.359</td>
<td>+.253</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>.311</td>
<td>+.196</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaysan</td>
<td>.237</td>
<td>-.070</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reputed scope of influence in this pool is rather narrow, and apparently the pool is the most pluralistic of these four leadership pools. The multiple correlation of influence across the various institutional areas is a rather low .237. Furthermore, the average association between any two institutions is low and negative in nature, i.e. -.070. The leadership pool in Lowell has the second lowest degree of scope, while Demain's pool possesses a broad range of influence. The latter pool's degree of scope, however, does not approach the magnitude of that in Jefferson.

The association between various community structural variables and the above pattern of scope will be empirically examined shortly. At this time let us simply note that the above pattern appears to be consistent with the propositions presented in the model. This characteristic of the leadership pool appears to be negatively associated with such structural variables of the community as rate of growth, community dependence, economic dependence, organizational density, and social class level. Due to the importance of this dimension, such apparent
support for the propositions of the model is heartening. We must reiterate, however, that the size of our sample is so small that any inference about the validity of the model must be made hesitantly.

G. Cohesiveness

A sociometric analysis of the structure of interaction within each leadership pool was undertaken to determine the degree of cohesiveness of each pool. The power actors were asked to identify the other members of the leadership pool with whom they (1) discussed local affairs, (2) shared lunch, (3) exchanged home visits, and (4) shared close friendships. Sociograms visually describing each interaction pattern were constructed. The average percent of the total leadership pool cited by each power actor for each pattern was determined. In addition, total weighted sociometric scores were computed. Finally, the average percent of the leadership pool identified as interacting on each of these patterns and the average total weighted score for each leadership pool were then calculated. It was posed that the larger the average figures for these dimensions, the more cohesive the leadership pool.

Table 19 presents the results of this sociometric analysis. In this table are presented the average percentages of the other members of the leadership pool identified by each power actor as being lunch, friendship or visitation partners. Also the mean total weighted score for each leadership pool is presented. Based upon these indicators, it would appear that the leadership pool in Lowell has the highest degree of cohesion relative to the other four pools. The
average power actor in Lowell claims to join approximately 25 percent of all the other power actors for lunch frequently. Furthermore, about 30 percent, on the average, are considered to be close friends, and visits are exchanged with about one power actor in every five.

**TABLE 19**

**DEGREE OF COHESIVENESS IN THE FOUR LEADERSHIP POOLS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Average Lunch Percent</th>
<th>Average Friendship Percent</th>
<th>Average Visit Percent</th>
<th>Total Percent</th>
<th>Average Weighted Score</th>
<th>Cohesive Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domain</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teayston</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>22.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>28.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>61.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>29.2</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jefferson also illustrates a relatively high level of cohesiveness, however visits are only exchanged with 7.6 percent of the other power actors and the total percentages and average weighted score are lower for this leadership pool than for Lowell's. There appears to be a gap between the degrees of cohesiveness in the two most cohesive leadership pools and the degrees of cohesiveness in Domain and Teayston. These latter two leadership pools exhibit much less cohesiveness than the former. There is a difference of approximately 20 percent between these two sets of leadership pools. While we have apparently located two relatively cohesive pools and two relatively non-cohesive pools, we have ranked the leadership pools on this dimension in order to empirically apply the comparative model.
Although we will systematically examine the association of this dimension with the structural variables of the communities, we may note in passing that the associations, though in the predicted direction, would appear to be weak.

II. Entrenchment

We previously noted that the leadership pools may differ in the degree to which they have been "entrenched" within the community. By "entrenchment" we are referring to the proportion of one's life that has been spent within the local community. Within certain communities the power actors may have spent a large proportion of their lives within the local system. In other cities the members of the leadership pool may be relative "outsiders," having recently moved to the community and therefore having spent a small proportion of their lives in the city.

The level of entrenchment for any leadership pool can be indicated by computing the Index of Entrenchment, i.e. \( I_E = \frac{M_a}{M_Y} \) where \( I_E \) = the Index of Entrenchment; \( M_a \) = the mean age of the leadership pool; and \( M_Y \) = the mean number of years spent in the community by the leadership pool. The levels of entrenchment for each of the leadership pools is presented in Table 20.

Before examining the differences between the leadership pools, let us note that the "average" power actor in these communities is almost fifty years old. He has resided about thirty years in the local community, therefore 60 percent of his life has been spent in the local system. As previously noted, similar patterns have been found in the literature.
The differences between these leadership pools, however, are most interesting. The youngest leadership pool is found in Teayston. This pool, however, has the second highest mean level of local residency and the highest index of entrenchment. The leadership pool in Teayston appears to be composed of relatively young power actors who have spent 70 percent of their lives in the community. At the other extreme are Lowell and Jefferson. In Lowell the average power actor is slightly over three years older than his counterpart in Teayston. However, he has spent an average of 6.4 fewer years in the community. In Lowell, the average power actor has spent 51.9 percent of his life in the community. Jefferson exhibits a similar pattern. It contains the oldest leadership pool in the sample. This leadership pool, however, has the second shortest period of residence in the local community. The difference between the mean age of the pool and its mean years of residence in the city is the largest of the four cities, i.e. 25.1 years. The
leadership pool of Demain is more entrenched than are those in the latter two communities, though it is slightly less entrenched than the pool in Teayston. In gross terms, there appear to be two leadership pools with a relatively low level of entrenchment and two that are relatively firmly entrenched in their local communities. Although there is a modicum of difference in the levels of entrenchment in Lowell and Jefferson, we have ranked Lowell fourth on the basis of the Index of Entrenchment.

Before turning to a discussion of the last characteristic of the leadership pools, we briefly must observe that the above pattern of entrenchment generally would not have been predicted from the model. For example, the city with the most rapid rate of growth contains the most entrenched leadership pool, and the community with the third highest rate of growth is the third most entrenched city. Other apparently positive associations between such community structural variables as community dependence and economic dependence and this characteristic of the leadership pool were also unexpected and not predicted. We will postpone a discussion of these associations until after we have empirically examined the propositions. Let us simply note that the indicator of entrenchment appears to be valid. Of course, the size of our sample is particularly conducive to inconsistent patterns. One community which exhibits an idiosyncratic distribution on any one dimension can cause significant differences in the rank ordering of the four cities.
1. Cosmopolitanism - Localism

Two separate scales were utilized in attempting to measure the degree of cosmopolitanism in the leadership pools. With one scale, the power actors were asked to rank from 1 to 5 the following concerns in terms of their personal interest: (1) state issues, (2) national issues, (3) local issues, (4) county issues, and (5) international issues. It was proposed that an "ideal type" localite would rank them in the following order: (1) local, (2) county, (3) state, (4) national, and (5) international. The "ideal" cosmopolitan would reverse the order. The results of this ranking are shown in Table 21.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>County</th>
<th>International</th>
<th>Cosmo Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dena</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenston</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first and most obvious conclusion that can be drawn from Table 21 is that these leadership pools are strongly localite in their orientation. Local issues were of primary concern to the power actors in each of the leadership pools. Furthermore, the least interest
consistently was shown in international issues. The leadership pool in Jefferson exhibits an "ideal localite" pattern. Teayston was only slightly less localite in that county and state issues were tied for the second most salient level. In Demain there is an additional slight trend toward cosmopolitanism in that state issues were ranked second and national issues were tied with county concerns for the next position. Finally, on the basis of this ranking, Lowell contains the most cosmopolitan leadership pool. State and national issues were tied for second position. County issues were ranked fourth.26

In addition to this ranking scale, the power actors were requested to respond to a five item attitude scale constructed on a Likert format.27 This "local-cosmopolitan" scale previously had been developed by Dye and used in a study of urban politics.28 The results of this scale are presented in Table 22.

TABLE 22

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CITY</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>PERCENT COSMOPOLITAN</th>
<th>COSMO RANK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teayston</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reader may note that the rank ordering of the communities on the basis of this attitude scale is exactly the same as the ordering
based upon the previous ranking scale. In this case, the higher the mean response, the more cosmopolitan the leadership pool. Lowell again is observed to contain the most cosmopolitan leadership pool, while the pool in Jefferson is the most localite. More striking than these differences, however, is the dominance of the localite orientation in these pools. Of the seventy-four power actors interviewed in these cities, fifty-two or 74.6 percent exhibit a localite orientation. Furthermore, even in the most cosmopolitan leadership pool, 66.7 percent of the power actors are localites. The relativity of these rankings, therefore, must be emphasized.

Before considering the degree of association among these characteristics of the leadership pool, let us simply note that the proposed positive associations between the degree of cosmopolitanism and the structural variables of community dependence, economic dependence, and social class level appear to be supported.

In an attempt to determine the degree to which these characteristics of the leadership pool covary among the four cities, Spearman rank order correlation coefficients between the dimensions were computed. The correlations are presented in Table 23. It must be emphasized that this statistic is very unstable when computed for an "N" of four. For example, if two communities exchange adjoining rank positions, the value of the coefficient is altered by .20. Furthermore, while there are twenty-four possible rank orderings with a sample of four, except for those associations involving tied ranks, there are only eleven possible coefficient values: +1.00, +.80, +.60, +.40, +.20, .00, -.20, -.40, -.60, -.80, and -1.00. Finally, with this sample size only the values
TABLE 23

SPEARMAN RANK ORDER CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LEADERSHIP POOL AND THE STRUCTURAL VARIABLES IN THE FOUR COMMUNITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Institu'l Dominance</th>
<th>Social Class</th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
<th>Visibility</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Cohesiv's</th>
<th>Entrenchm't</th>
<th>Cosmop'n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institu'l Dominance</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class</td>
<td>- .60</td>
<td>- .40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>- .40</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visibility</td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>- .80</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope</td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td>- .80</td>
<td>- .80</td>
<td>+.60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohesiv's</td>
<td>+.20</td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td>+.20</td>
<td>- .80</td>
<td>- .40</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrenchm't</td>
<td>- .20</td>
<td>- .80</td>
<td>- .20</td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>- .40</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmop'n</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>- .20</td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td>+.20</td>
<td>- .40</td>
<td>- .40</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>- .40</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of +1.00 and -1.00 are significant at the .05 level of probability. Obviously, however, with the limitations of our sample we will offer no inferences concerning statistical significance. On the other hand, as with any correlation analysis the strength and direction of the associations may at least provide preliminary evidence concerning the issue of covariance. Final conclusions on this issue, however, must be withheld until more extensive research is undertaken.

In examining Table 23 we may note that thirteen of the associations are quite strong, being .80 or greater. Size is positively associated with visibility and scope. As might be logically assumed, institutional dominance exhibits a positive association with both scope and cohesiveness and a strong negative association with legitimacy. It is also negatively associated with entrenchment. Social class exhibits negative associations with visibility and scope and is positively related with cosmopolitanism. Legitimacy appears to be negatively associated with scope and cohesiveness and positively related to entrenchment. Scope and visibility show a moderate, positive association, while cohesiveness and entrenchment exhibit a strong negative association. The other associations are weaker. Little association is evidenced between (1) size and cohesiveness and entrenchment, (2) class and cohesiveness and entrenchment, (3) institutional dominance and cosmopolitanism, and (4) visibility and cosmopolitanism. Finally, there is evidence that size and cosmopolitanism, institutional dominance and visibility, and legitimacy and visibility are independent dimensions.

From the above table, therefore, we may observe certain patterns among these dimensions. In these four communities it appears that the
dimensions of the leadership pools tend to have the following pattern of interrelationship: large size, high institutional dominance, low social class, low legitimacy, high visibility, high scope, high cohesiveness, low entrenchment, and low cosmopolitanism. In an attempt to measure the overall level of association in this pattern, the communities were rank ordered on these characteristics. Table 24 presents this ordering. It should be noted that the ordering on the social class,

**TABLE 24**

RANK ORDERING OF THE COMMUNITIES ON THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LEADERSHIP POOL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of the Leadership Pool</th>
<th>Insti'l Size</th>
<th>Social Domin'ce</th>
<th>Legit' Class</th>
<th>Visib'- imacy</th>
<th>Cohes'- ility</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Entrench- ment</th>
<th>Cosmo-pol'ism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duma</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teayston</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ W = .436 \quad p. = .01 \quad r_{sav} = .366 \]

legitimacy, entrenchment, and cosmopolitanism dimensions was reversed in order to measure the multiple rank correlation by means of the Kendall Coefficient of Concordance. The direction of the association previously was examined in Table 23. At this time we are interested only in the magnitude of the overall associations. There is a moderate multiple rank association between these dimensions, however the overall coefficient \( W = .436 \) and the average rank order coefficient \( r_{sav} = +.366 \) are much lower than the interrelationships exhibited by the community structural
variable ($W = 0.771$, $r_{gav} = +0.725$). Therefore, while there is a moderate degree of covariance among the characteristics of the leadership pool, they are more independent than the structural variables of the communities.

Before turning to an empirical examination of the proposed associations between the structural variables of the community and the characteristics of the leadership pool, let us describe the leadership pool in each of the communities along the dimensions proposed by the model.

2. The Characteristics of the Four Community Leadership Pools

**Teayston** — A relatively small pool, with low institutional dominance and high political and governmental representation, high social class composition, high legitimacy, low visibility, narrow scope, low cohesiveness, high entrenchment, and relatively low cosmopolitanism.

**Lowell** — A relatively small pool with a relatively high level of institutional dominance and high business and industrial representation, high social class composition, relatively low legitimacy, low visibility, relative narrow scope, high cohesiveness, low entrenchment, and high cosmopolitanism.

**Demain** — A relatively large pool with relatively low institutional dominance and high business and industrial representation, relatively low social class composition, relatively high legitimacy, high visibility, relatively broad scope, relatively low cohesiveness, relatively high entrenchment, and relatively high cosmopolitanism.

**Jefferson** — A relatively large pool with high institutional dominance and high business and industrial representation, low social class
composition, low legitimacy, relatively high visibility, broad scope, relatively high cohesiveness, relatively low entrenchment, and low cosmopolitanism.

The Relationship of Community Structural Variables to the Characteristics of the Leadership Pool

We are about to empirically examine the propositions posed in the model relating the structure of the community to the characteristics of the leadership pool. Such an examination represents a crucial step toward refining the model. It is, however, only a first step. All of the qualifications we previously have cited concerning the size of our sample, the relative lack of variation exhibited by the communities on the dimensions of the model, and the instability of the Spearman rank order coefficient with small samples apply to this examination. This examination, however, does illustrate the feasibility of empirically testing the model, and provides information pertinent to the future refinement of the model. Our basic interest will be in comparing the empirically observed direction of the associations with the direction proposed in the model. Strength of association, of course, will also be a relevant contingency.

Table 25 presents the Spearman rank order correlation coefficients for the seventy-two empirically testable propositions. The theoretically proposed direction of each association is presented above the empirically observed coefficient. The reader will note that this nine by nine matrix offers only seventy-two empirical associations due to the lack of variation between these communities on the variable of governmental structure.
### TABLE 25

**SPEARMAN RANK ORDER CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY STRUCTURAL VARIABLES AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LEADERSHIP POOL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community Structural Variables</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Institutional Dominance</th>
<th>Social Class</th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
<th>Visibility</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Cohesiveness</th>
<th>Entrenchment</th>
<th>Cosmopolitanism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size (Rate of Growth)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>+.60</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>-.80</td>
<td>-.80</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>+.20</td>
<td>+.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic**</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneity</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>+.20</td>
<td>-.80</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependence (Autonomy)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.80</td>
<td>-.80</td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>-.60</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>+.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political (Dependence)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td>-.80</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>+.60</td>
<td>+1.00</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>-.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic (Dependence)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.75</td>
<td>-.85</td>
<td>+.65</td>
<td>+.95</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>-.85</td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>+.65</td>
<td>+.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform***</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Density</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>+.60</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>-.80</td>
<td>-.80</td>
<td>-.80</td>
<td>+.20</td>
<td>+.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic**</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity</td>
<td>+.60</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>+.20</td>
<td>-.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.60</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>+1.00</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>-.80</td>
<td>-.80</td>
<td>+.20</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>+.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Communities exhibit extremely little variation in structural variable.**

***Communities exhibit practically no variation in structural variable, i.e. variable is controlled.**

278
In examining the total table we note that of the sixty-six propositions for which directionality was proposed, thirty-nine or 59.1 percent were supported. Furthermore, many of the coefficients are of a high magnitude. Twenty-eight or 38.9 percent of the seventy-two empirically observed associations have values of .80 or higher. Two of our structural variables, i.e. demographic heterogeneity and economic diversity, showed little variation across the communities. The communities were ranked on a modicum of difference in order to examine the feasibility of the model. There were eight directional propositions offered in the model for each of these variables. Of the eight, only two of those involving demographic heterogeneity and three of the economic diversity propositions were supported. These observed associations must be cautiously considered; they may be spurious. Due to the nature of our correlation coefficient which is not sensitive to the degree of difference between the ranked units, and to the homogeneity evidenced by our communities on these two dimensions, we will consider these variables as being basically controlled, and their application as illustrative. If these two dimensions are discarded from the total matrix, and we consider only those associations involving independent structural variables that exhibit variation across the communities, thirty-three or 68.5 percent of the fifty directional propositions are supported. The chance probability of observing this degree of support for fifty propositions is \( p = .03, x^2 = 5.12, \text{d.f.} = 1 \).

A. Supported Propositions

Let us first examine the structural variables. The following figures represent the number and percentage of supported propositions.
for each structural variable: size and rate of growth = five of eight or 62.8 percent; community dependence = six of eight or 75.0 percent; political dependence = five of eight or 62.5 percent; economic dependence = six of eight or 75.0 percent; organizational density = five of nine or 55.5 percent; and social class = six of nine or 66.7 percent.

There is evidence of empirical support for the theoretically proposed negative associations between rate of growth and institutional dominance (-.40), visibility (-.80), scope (-.80), and cohesiveness (-.20). Also, the proposed positive association between rate of growth and legitimacy is supported, though the strength of the association is moderate (+.40). The proposed negative associations between organizational density and institutional dominance (-.40), scope (-.80) and cohesiveness (-.80) were supported. The positive associations between this independent variable and social class and legitimacy were also given moderate support (+.60 and +.40). Regarding social class, the proposed negative associations with institutional dominance and entrenchment were weakly supported, while the negative association with scope was strongly supported (-.80). The proposed positive associations between social class and visibility (+.40), cosmopolitanism (+.80), and the social class composition of the leadership pool (+1.00) were given strong empirical support.

It appears, however, as though the strongest support both in terms of direction and magnitude lies with the three "dependence" variables. Of the twenty-four directional propositions, seventeen or 71.8 percent were supported. There is support for the proposals that as community and economic dependence increases, institutional dominance decreases
(-.80 and -.85), legitimacy increases (+.40 and +.95), visibility decreases (-.60 and -.25), scope narrows (-1.00 and -.80), cohesiveness decreases (-.40 and -.55) and cosmopolitanism increases (+.40 and +.35).

With increasing political dependence, size increases (+.80), institutional dominance increases (+.80), legitimacy decreases (-.40), scope broadens (+1.00) and entrenchment decreases (-.40). Furthermore, the strength of the dependence propositions can be noted if one considers the characteristic of institutional dominance. Not only is there strong agreement between the proposed and observed associations, but there is a tendency for those communities, i.e. Jefferson and Demain, with the highest levels of political dependence to have the lowest levels of political and governmental representation and the highest levels of economic dominance. As expected, Teayston, the most politically autonomous-economically dependent community, has the largest representation by government officials, the lowest representation by economic leaders, and the lowest degree of institutional dominance. Therefore, there is strong support for the proposal that the greater the overall dependence of the community on external, non-local sources, the lower the probability of institutional dominance. If, however, we focus on political and economic dependence, we may note that the combination of political dependence and economic autonomy (Jefferson and Demain) is associated with the under-representation of local governmental and political officials, the over-representation of local economic leaders, and an increased probability of dominance by the economic institution. On the other hand, with political autonomy and economic dependence (Teayston and Lowell) there is larger representation by governmental and political officials,
proportionately smaller representation by economic leaders, and a
decreased probability of institutional dominance, except by the govern-
mental institution.

If the above observations are combined with the empirical associa-
tions evidenced between the dependence variables and the scope of the
leadership pool, we may note a most important pattern. These empirical
observations support the proposal offered in Chapter II relating econom-
ic autonomy and political dependence with a moderately elitist pool with
strong economic influence, and economic dependence and political
autonomy with a moderately pluralistic pool with strong governmental
influence. Very strong empirical support is offered for the propositions
involving scope and community dependence (-1.00), political dependence
(+1.00), and economic dependence (-.85). The leadership pools which
have the most narrow scope, i.e. are the most pluralistic, are found in
Teayston and Lowell, the most economically dependent-politically auto-
omous cities. Conversely, these pools with the broadest scope, i.e.
are the least pluralistic, are found in Jefferson and Demain, the most
economically autonomous-politically dependent cities. Therefore, there
is support for the theoretical notion of "absentee-ownership withdrawal."
As an institution within the community becomes more dependent upon non-
local sources and is drawn into the larger society, power actors from
that institution become relatively under-represented in the local leader-
ship pool. Finally, with increasing overall community dependence, the
scope of the leadership pool becomes narrow, and the pool becomes more
pluralistic. (+1.00).
Turning to the dependent characteristics of the leadership pool, we note that -- excluding the independent variables of demographic heterogeneity and economic diversity which were basically controlled -- strong empirical support is evidenced for the propositions involving institutional dominance (six of six or 100.0 percent), legitimacy (six of six or 100.0 percent), scope (six of six or 100.0 percent), social class (two of two or 100.0 percent), and cohesiveness (four of six or 66.7 percent). Visibility (three of six or 50.0 percent) and cosmopolitanism (three of six or 50.0 percent) received moderate support. Little empirical support was shown for the propositions which included size (one of six or 16.7 percent) or entrenchment (two of six or 33.3 percent) as dependent variables.

We will discuss these latter "problem areas" shortly, at this time let us only note that the two social class directional propositions involving organizational density (+.60) and social class (+1.00) as independent variables were supported. All of the legitimacy variables were supported, although the strengths of the associations -- with the exception of economic dependence (+.95), were moderate or low. There is evidence, however, that in these communities legitimacy increases with rate of growth, community and economic dependence, organizational density, and social class level. Also as predicted by the model, legitimacy is inversely related to political dependence. All of the propositions including institutional dominance as a dependent variable, were also supported with the same degree of strength -- except for the set of dependence variables which were strongly supported: dependence = -.80, political dependence = +.80, and economic dependence = -.85.
Of all the dependent variables, however, scope received the strongest support. All of the directional propositions were supported, and the strength of the association was never less than .80. Therefore, in these communities there is strong support for the propositions that as scope narrows, i.e. pluralism increases, with increasing rate of growth, community dependence, economic dependence, organizational density, and social class, and decreasing political dependence. Finally, moderate support was given for the expected negative associations between cohesiveness and rate of growth, community dependence, economic dependence, and organizational density (-.80).

Before we turn to those propositions which were not supported, we must note that the expected negative associations between visibility and rate of growth (-.80), community dependence (-.60), and economic dependence (-.25) were found. Also, the expected positive associations between cosmopolitanism and community dependence (+.40), economic dependence (+.35) and social class level (+.80) were also evidenced.

B. Propositions Lacking Support

The propositions which were not supported are not randomly distributed throughout the matrix. They are centered in two independent and two dependent variables: demographic heterogeneity and economic diversity on the one hand, and size and entrenchment on the other. In fact, to illustrate the non-random nature of the unsupported propositions, if these four dimensions are removed from the matrix, thirty-two of the remaining forty directional propositions are supported. The chance probability of supporting 80 percent of forty propositions is p. ≤ .001, $X^2 = 14.2$, d.f. = 1.
We have already noted the problematic nature of the former two
variables. Only five of the sixteen directional propositions involv­
ing these two variables as independent dimensions were supported. The
indicators of the concepts appear to be adequate. The problem seems
to lie in the fact that the communities simply exhibit little variation
on these two dimensions. Therefore, the empirically observed associa­
tions may be insignificant. Any decision concerning refining or alter­
ing the propositions involving these dimensions, therefore, must await
further empirical investigation. Cities which vary on these dimensions
must be examined.

Turning to the dependent characteristics of the leadership pool,
the only supported propositions involving size were those with political
dependence (+.80) and economic diversity (+.60). None of the other six
propositions were supported, and two, i.e. rate of growth and organiza­
tional density, exhibited directions completely opposite from that pro­
posed in the model (-1.00). Upon the basis of previous findings in the
literature and the logic of the model, it seems highly likely that the
strong negative associations between rate of growth and organizational
density and the size of the leadership pool are spurious. Furthermore,
the negative associations between size of the leadership pool and the
community social class level and degree of community and economic
dependence are contradictory of the previous findings in the field.
Once again we must note that the communities' leadership pools are
basically the same size. The largest includes twenty-one power actors;
the smallest contains sixteen. This modicum of difference, coupled
with a small sample and a statistical test that is insensitive to
magnitude, necessitates caution in the interpretation of these empirical associations. Perhaps these findings are valid and the model is in error regarding the nature of these associations. These propositions, however, were developed on the basis of verified, empirical studies from the literature. This previous work utilized cities of greatly varying size. Size in this study was controlled. Furthermore, two other dimensions which are indicative of structural complexity, i.e., demographic heterogeneity and economic diversity, exhibited little variation. Therefore, due to the similarity evidenced by the communities on these structural variables which are very relevant to the dependent variable in question, the similarity in size should be expected. Condemnation of the model must be withheld until further study is undertaken. It is paramount that future research examine contrasting communities in order to validly test the model.

Interpreting the negative findings relevant to the entrenchment variables, however, is more confusing. There was no previous work to guide the development of these propositions. They were based upon the logic inherent in the model. Furthermore, the "Index of Entrenchment" appears to be adequate and valid. In addition, the communities do vary in the degree to which their leadership pools were "entrenched." Therefore in contradiction to the model, in these communities the level of entrenchment in the leadership pool increases with increasing rate of population growth, demographic heterogeneity, community dependence, economic dependence, organizational density, and economic diversity. While these associations may be valid, they are not logical. An increase in these structural variables would appear to increase the level
of in-migration, alter the local normative order and generally increase the ability of new residents to enter the leadership pool. Under such conditions, logic dictates that the level of entrenchment within the leadership pool should decrease. A possible exception may involve the community dependence and economic dependence variables. With increasing dependence along these two dimensions, the "absentee-owner withdrawal" syndrome may be operative, and the "same old gang" continues to "run things" in the local system. If such is the case, then the observed positive associations between these dependence variables and the degree of entrenchment might be expected. Furthermore, these two associations are among the strongest (+.40 and +.65) observed in the set relating to entrenchment. Except for this possible reinterpretation, however, no definite conclusions can be reached regarding these negative findings at this time. The size of the sample is very small. These findings may be idiosyncratic to these four communities. Furthermore, except for the association with economic dependence, the strengths of association are very weak. Half of the relationships exhibit only a .20 magnitude of association, and none exceeds .65. Future research, involving a larger number of cities, is required.

Other unexpected observed associations included the negative relationships between organizational density and community social class level and visibility, the positive relationship between political dependence and visibility, the positive relationships between political dependence and community social class level and cohesiveness, and the lack of association between rate of growth and organizational density and cosmopolitanism. Concerning the visibility associations, we have
previously noted the general inadequacy of our indicator of visibility. Future research should combine our indicator of newspaper citations with the Bonjean technique for measuring visibility. The degree of fit between the concept of visibility and our operational indicator of that concept is poor. Perhaps the most valid interpretation of these associations would involve substituting the term "newspaper citations" for the concept visibility, and not attempting to bridge the chasm between the indicator and the concept. If, however, one is willing to accept our indicator as meaningful, then the strong negative associations with organizational density and community social class level must be reinterpreted. Possibly these two variables serve to isolate the leadership pool from the citizenry. This proposal, however, seems unlikely. It and the empirical observations from this application contradict the previous verified findings relevant to these associations. Therefore, due to the size of our sample, the inadequacy of our indicator, and the previous findings in the literature, we will not alter the proposed associations in the model at this time. Future research may necessitate such a reinterpretation.

The unexpected positive associations between cohesiveness and political dependence and community social class are weak; they may be spurious. It is also possible, however, that reinterpretation may be necessary. We previously noted that political dependence is associated with the over-representation of economic influentials in the leadership pool and the dominance of the economic institution. The level of interaction among the economic leaders in the community who constitute a large proportion of the leadership pool may result in the degree of
cohesiveness being associated with political dependence. The social class association may be a function of the sample. Lowell contains the leadership pool with the highest degree of cohesiveness. It is also the city with the highest social class level. With a sample of four, this pattern in one community can account for the weak (+.20) positive association.

Finally, rate of growth and organizational density vary together in these communities (+1.00). Their effect, however, on the degree of cosmopolitanism in the leadership pool would appear to be contradictory. The former would appear to increase the degree of cosmopolitanism, while the latter might decrease this level. The lack of association between these variables and the level of cosmopolitanism (.00), therefore, may be a result of these contradictory forces. Again, further research involving a larger number of cities is needed if appropriate "controls" are to be applied to the data.

In sum, this first empirical examination generally appears to support the first set of proposals from the model. Particularly strong support was evidenced for those propositions involving the dependence variables as independent agents and institutional dominance, social class, legitimacy, scope, and cohesiveness as dependent variables. Moderate support was given to the independent variables of rate of growth, organizational density, and social class, and to the dependent variables of visibility and cosmopolitanism. Little support was evidenced for the propositions involving the independent variables of demographic heterogeneity and economic diversity, and the dependent dimensions of size and entrenchment. Regarding the latter negative
observations, we have proposed possible alternative interpretations
to those offered in the model, discussed possible methodological
problems contributing to these negative findings, and offered concep­
tual and methodological refinements for future analysis. Throughout
this discussion the tentative nature of the findings -- due to the
limitations of the empirical application -- have been emphasized. As
a first step toward the ultimate refinement of the model, however,
this examination has been encouraging, helpful, and most of all,
essential.

Let us now turn to the third set of variables in the model, i.e.,
the community problem dimensions.

Community Problem Dimensions

A. The Number of Different Perceived Problems

The first dimension in this set concerns the number of different
problems perceived by the leadership pool. Each power actor first was
asked to identify what he considered to be the two most important,
recent community problems. Next, they were asked to identify the most
important current problem in the community. Thus, each power actor
was asked to identify three problems. Our concern centers about the
number of different problems perceived to be existent or recently
present in the community. The number of different perceived problems
and the number of different perceived problems per power actor are
presented in Table 2b.37

The basic similarity evidenced by these four communities on this
dimension must be noted. In three of the cities, the leadership pool
TABLE 26

THE NUMBER OF DIFFERENT PERCEIVED PROBLEMS AND
THE NUMBER OF DIFFERENT PERCEIVED PROBLEMS PER POWER ACTOR
IN THE FOUR COMMUNITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Number of Different Problems</th>
<th>Number of Different Problems Per Power Actor</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teayston</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.750</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>.667</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.667</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.632</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Average</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>.667</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

perceived exactly the same number of different problems. Only in Demain, the largest city, was any variation evidenced. Furthermore, there is great similarity across the communities in the nature of the perceived problems. Table 27 presents the rank ordering of the six most salient problems in each of the four communities. Problems centering around local schools, public improvements and services, and local finances are among the six most salient problems in each community. Furthermore, schools and public improvements are not ranked lower than third in any city. Except in Teayston, industrial and economic development is a salient problem. Urban renewal is a perceived problem in Demain and Jefferson, while the recruitment of public servants is a salient issue in Teayston and Lowell. Finally, another indicator of the degree of similarity in the perceived problems in these sampled cities is the fact that these seventy-four power actors collectively perceived only nineteen different problems across the four communities. Due to the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Teavston Problem</th>
<th>Lowell Number of Problem Times Cited</th>
<th>Demain Number of Problem Times Cited</th>
<th>Jefferson Number of Problem Times Cited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pub. Impro't and Services 12</td>
<td>Industry and Econ. Develop't 13</td>
<td>Urban Renewal 15</td>
<td>Education 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Education 9</td>
<td>Education 12</td>
<td>Pub. Impro't and Services 11</td>
<td>Pub. Improv't and Services 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Finances 7</td>
<td>Pub. Impro't and Services 6</td>
<td>Education 9</td>
<td>Finances 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Recruitm't of Public Servants 6</td>
<td>Social Welfare 6</td>
<td>Finances 8</td>
<td>Industry and Econ. Develop't 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Planning 4</td>
<td>Finances 5</td>
<td>Industry and Econ. Develop't 4</td>
<td>Housing and Building 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Airport 2</td>
<td>Recruitm't of Pub. Servants 3</td>
<td>Community Apathy 3</td>
<td>Urban Renewal 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
basic similarities evidenced in the structure of these communities and the characteristics of their leadership pools, this lack of variation should be expected.

There are differences, however, between these cities. None of the problems ranked first are the same. The foremost problem in Teayston is the upgrading of public improvements and services. In a community experiencing rapid population growth, such a problem should be a predicted concern. The leadership pool in Lowell, however, is concerned about industrial and economic development. Education problems, however, are almost as salient. The primary problem cited by the leaders of Demain is the renewal of the downtown business district and the removal of the slum area on South Front Street. In Jefferson, the predominant problems are educational. Furthermore, in examining the entire list of problems, certain idiosyncratic issues appear in each community. For example, in Teayston there is a unique concern with planning and altering the tax structure. Absentee-ownership is cited as a problem only in Lowell. The leaders of Demain, curiously enough, show evidence of concern over rapid growth. Finally, ultraconservatism is a salient problem in Jefferson. Also it may be noted that the types of problems mentioned in each community vary, and this variation is consistent with certain aspects of the model. For example, the leadership pool of Teayston has strong governmental representation. In this city such governmental concerns as public improvements and services, government financing, and the recruitment of public servants are three of the four most salient problems. Conversely, the leadership pool in Jefferson is the most economically dominated. In this community
such business concerns as industrial and economic development, housing and building, and the rejuvenation of the downtown business district are salient. Also, social welfare is one of the six most salient problems only in Lowell, where the leadership pool evidences the highest educational, social class, and cosmopolitan levels.

Returning to the question of the number of different problems, we have rank ordered the communities on the basis of the number of different defined problems per power actor. In so doing, we basically have controlled for the size of the leadership pool in order to secure a better indicator of the relative number of different problems defined in each community. Therefore, while the leadership pool in Demain did perceive the largest number of different problems, it is also the largest pool. Teayston has five fewer interviewed power actors, but only two fewer defined problems. Thus, Teayston, in which there are three different problems cited by every four power actors, has been ranked first, as opposed to Demain and Lowell where the ratio is only two to three. In order to empirically examine the model, we will utilize this rank ordering. We must emphasize, however, that the communities do evidence a great deal of similarity on this dimension.

B. The Perceived Seriousness of the Problems

The reader may recall that in Chapter III we noted that the degree to which the power actors define local problems as serious may have ramifications for what, how, and particularly when they attempt to solve them. Furthermore, this dimension, like the first, may be
utilized as an indicator of the leadership pool's perception of the welfare of the community at a given moment in time. This dimension, therefore, would appear to be a crucial antecedent determinant of the patterns of ameliorative action proposed by the leadership pool to solve the perceived problems.

In order to determine the comparative degree of seriousness for these communities, a list of ten common problems was developed. The list included the following problems: (1) industrial and economic development, (2) housing, building, and urban renewal, (3) race and ethnic relations, (4) educational concerns, (5) health, (6) culture, (7) public improvements and services, (8) social welfare, crime, and delinquency, (9) water problems, and (10) recruitment of public servants. These problems were selected because they were general, likely or known to be present in the communities, and represented a range of issues of concern to various institutions within the communities.

Each power actor was asked to define whether the specific problems were (1) very serious, (2) fairly serious, or (3) not serious in his community. Each problem was rated individually. The results of this rating are shown in Table 28.

As can be observed, the communities do vary in the extent to which they define these ten problems as serious. In Teayston, 24.3 percent of the problems were defined as serious and 62.4 percent were defined as at least fairly serious. At the other extreme, the leadership pool in Lowell only defined 11.1 percent of the problems as serious and 47.3 percent as at least fairly serious. The degree of seriousness in De main and Jefferson fall between these two extremes. For the entire
TABLE 28

THE DEFINED DEGREE OF SEVERITY INHERENT IN TEN SELECTED PROBLEMS FOR THE FOUR COMMUNITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Percent Very Serious</th>
<th>Percent Fairly Serious</th>
<th>Percent Not Serious</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teayston</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

sample, 52.9 percent of the problems were defined as being at least fairly serious. Thus, with respect to these ten problems, the defined "state of the local community" in these cities varies from moderately good in Lowell to fairly poor in Teayston.

We will systematically consider the relationship of this dependent problem dimension to each of the characteristics of the leadership pool shortly. At this time let us only note that the above pattern appears to support the propositions offered in the model. There is apparently a strong positive association between the degree of severity inherent in the perceived problems and the degrees of legitimacy and entrenchment in the leadership pool. Furthermore, this dimension appears to be negatively associated with institutional dominance, scope, cohesiveness, and cosmopolitanism. For example, the least institutionally dominated, most legitimate, most narrow scoped, least cohesive, and most
entrenched leadership pool evidenced the highest degree of severity in their problem definitions.

C. The Degree of Consensus Concerning the Severity of the Community Problems

We have just noted the degree of severity inherent in ten problems as defined by each leadership pool. As noted in Chapter III, an equally important dimension is the level of agreement or consensus illustrated in these definitions. In some communities the degree of consensus may be high. In others, conflict and disagreement over the severity of problems may be evidenced. In the latter situation effective ameliorative action is problematic. In the former case, consensus may serve to short-cut the process from perception to implementation as conflicts over priorities, resources, and strategies are likely to be lessened.

To measure this dimension the "Index of Consensus" was developed. This index was applied to the power actors' ratings of the degree of severity inherent in the ten problems in their community. It is basically a measure of dispersion, and has a value from .000 to 1.000. If each problem was rated identically by every power actor, there would be complete agreement or consensus regarding the problem set, and the value of the index would be 1.000. If the ratings were equally divided between the categories of very serious, fairly serious, and not serious, there would be complete disagreement, and the value taken by the index would be .000. Any value between these extremes can be interpreted as the percent of the maximum possible consensus observed. Thus, a value
of .430 represents 43 percent of the maximum possible consensus. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 29.

TABLE 29
THE DEGREE OF CONSENSUS EVIDENCED BY EACH LEADERSHIP POOL CONCERNING THE SEVERITY OF TEN SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE FOUR COMMUNITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Index of Consensus</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>.450</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>.392</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>.367</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teayston</td>
<td>.270</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>.380</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It may be noted that the highest level of consensus is found in Demain, where 45 percent of the maximum possible consensus is observed. Relatively moderate levels of consensus are exhibited by the leadership pools in Jefferson and Lowell, while there apparently is relatively high disagreement about the severity of the problems in Teayston. In this last city only 27 percent of the maximum possible consensus is evidenced. Possibly more indicative, this figure represents 83 percent of the maximum possible dissensus. Finally, for the entire sample, the average index of consensus is .380.

If the above pattern is combined with that exhibited in Table 28, four interesting combinations are produced. In Teayston, the leadership pool defines the problems as serious, but there is little agreement among the power actors about this severity. Demain, on the other
hand, also illustrated a relatively high degree of severity, but in this case there is also a high degree of consensus. In Lowell the problems were generally defined as being not serious, but there is little consensus concerning this rating. Finally, in Jefferson the problems were also defined as being not serious, but the level of consensus is relatively high. Thus we have four types of problem sets classified on the basis of severity and consensus. These configurations would appear to be determinant of certain patterns of ameliorative action, particularly the level of inactivity. For example, the level of inactivity in Teayston and Jefferson might be expected to be high. In the former community, the leadership pool defines the local problems as being serious, but they exhibit a great deal of disagreement about which specific problems are serious. Such a combination may be "deadly" for effective, ameliorative action. In the latter community, however, the power actors consider the problems to be not serious. Furthermore, they exhibit a relatively high degree of consensus about this definition. In such a situation, inactivity may result. Conversely, the level of inactivity in Demain may be expected to be lower. The power actors in this community are generally in agreement that the local problems are severe. Furthermore, there is general agreement about which specific problems are most serious. Consensus, in this instance, may foster action. We will empirically examine these proposals shortly.

Before considering the next community problem dimension, let us briefly note that as predicted by the comparative model, the degree of consensus appears to be positively associated with level of institutional dominance, range of scope, and degree of cohesiveness inherent in the leadership pool.
II. The Degree of Institutional Specificity
Inherent in the Problem Definitions

It was previously noted that this dimension is important both because of its relationship with the other community problem dimensions in the model and its utility as an apparent antecedent determinant of the patterns of community action. As the reader may recall, "institutional specificity" refers to the extent to which the power actors perceive and define problems that are related to their own institutional areas. In effect, it is an indicator of the degree of myopia exhibited by the leadership pool in perceiving local problems. Its antithesis is "community generality." In a leadership pool characterized by the latter dimension, the power actors perceive as problems conditions existent in institutional areas other than their own sphere that may have community wide implications. Community leadership pools can be placed on a continuum based upon this dimension.

In order to measure this dimension each power actor was asked to identify the two most important recent problems and the most important current problem in the community. A content analysis was then performed to determine if the perceived problems were located within the power actor's institutional area. Each problem was classified as (1) institutionally specific, (2) semi-institutionally specific, or (3) not institutionally specific. In analyzing the data, the institutionally specific problems were given a value of 1.00. A value of .50 was assigned to the semi-institutionally specific problems. The degree of institutional specificity was then determined by the percent of the total perceived problems that were institutionally specific. The results are presented in Table 30.
TABLE 30
THE DEGREE OF INSTITUTIONAL SPECIFICITY
INHERENT IN THE PROBLEM DEFINITIONS
OF THE FOUR LEADERSHIP POOLS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Percent of Problems That Are Institutionally Specific</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teayston</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The communities exhibit little variation on this dimension. All of the leadership pools evidence what might be considered as moderate levels of institutional specificity. There are slight differences, however, with the power actors in Teayston perceiving 64.8 percent of the local problems in an institutionally specific manner. At the other "extreme," only 54.6 percent of the problems in Lowell were so defined. For the entire sample, 60.5 percent of the problems were defined in an institutionally specific manner, with the greatest variation being evidenced by Lowell which is about 6 percent below this average figure.

Though there is a modicum of difference, the above pattern appears generally to be consistent with and supportive of the comparative model. For example, as predicted, this dimension is apparently negatively associated with the following characteristics of the leadership pool: social class level, scope, and cohesiveness. The association with the last variable would appear to be particularly strong as the
least cohesive community has the highest degree of institutional specificity, and vice versa. Furthermore, the expected positive associations with legitimacy and visibility are apparent. The relationships with the other characteristics, however, are not clear. We will systematically analyze these associations shortly.

E. The Defined Possibility of Local Solution

Although certain existent community conditions may be defined by the leadership pool as "local" problems, they all may not have "local" solutions. The power actors may perceive that the local community, by itself, does not have the requisite authority, resources, skills, knowledge, or responsibility to bring about an effective solution to certain problems. On the other hand, the local system may be defined as being able to solve other problems by itself, at the local level. This dimension, in effect, measures the perceived "problem-solving ability" of the community.

In order to measure this dimension, the power actors were asked to identify what they considered to be the most important current problem in their community. A series of specific questions concerning such factors as the cause, nature, and solution of the problem were then posed. One of the questions asked the power actors was if their perceived problem could be solved by the local community, or would outside assistance be required. A content analysis of the answers to this semi-structured question was performed, and each response was classified into one of five categories: (1) local solution, (2) local solution with outside assistance, (3) equal local and outside responsibility, (4) outside
solution with local assistance, and (5) outside solution. The proportion of the problems which were classified in the first category is our indicator of this dimension. The results are presented in Table 31.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Percent of Problems That Are Perceived To Be Locally Solvable</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenyston</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variation is evidenced within the problem sets with respect to this dimension. In Lowell, the leadership pool perceives that 83.4 percent of the most important current problems can be solved by the local community. Obviously, the community is defined as a viable, problem-solving entity by the leadership pool. At the other extreme, only 33.3 percent of the problems perceived to be existent in Demain are defined as being solvable at the local level, by the local community. Jefferson and Tenyston exhibit intermediate degrees of perceived local solvability. For our sample of four communities, however, approximately 55 percent of the problems are defined as being able to be solved by the local community -- at the local level. One may interpret this...
average figure to represent a moderate degree of support for the local community as a problem-solving entity.

We will systematically examine the relationship of this dependent dimension of the independent characteristics of the leadership pool shortly. At this time let us simply note that the above rank ordering is complex, slightly confusing, and offers inconsistent support for the propositions presented in the model. For example, the leadership pool in Lowell is the most cosmopolitan in the sample, yet it perceived the highest degree of local solvability. In addition, it is the least entrenched pool, existent in one of the more dependent communities. On the basis of the comparative model, one would expect a lower level of perceived local solvability to be evidenced in this particular problem set. On the other hand, Jefferson is the most localite leadership pool, and is a community which is more autonomous than Lowell. As expected, the leadership pool in this latter city does consider the local community as being able to solve local problems. While we shall postpone an analysis of these relationships until we have empirically analyzed them, let us simply note at this time that our indicator of this dimension appears to be adequate.

F. The Degree of Uniqueness in the Problem Definitions

In order to measure this dimension, each power actor was asked to identify what he considered to be the most important current problem in the community. He was then asked if this problem was unique to his city, or if other nearby communities or cities of comparable size had similar problems. The higher the percentage of the total problems which
were defined as being unique, the greater the degree of uniqueness in the problem definitions. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 32.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Percent of Problems Perceived to be Unique</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teayston</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The problem sets in these communities show little variation on this dimension. The range is only 4.7 percent. The degree of uniqueness is consistently low. The power actors in these communities overwhelmingly perceived their local problems as being similar to those found in other neighboring communities or cities of the same size.

It is possible, however, to rank order these communities on this modicum of difference. This rank ordering appears to be consistent with certain of the propositions from the model. For example, the degree of uniqueness, as predicted, apparently is negatively associated with the levels of social class and cosmopolitanism and positively associated with the degrees of scope and entrenchment in the leadership pools. The most cosmopolitan, least entrenched leadership pool with
the highest social class level perceived the smallest degree of uniqueness. Conversely, the most localite pool with the lowest social class level perceived the highest degree of uniqueness. We must, however, even at the expense of being repetitious, again emphasize the basic similarity in the problem sets along this dimension. While the rank ordering may be consistent with the model, the absolute differences between the cities may not be as great as would have been expected on the basis of the propositions inherent in the model.

6. The Degree of Clarity Inherent in the Problem Definitions

The reader may recall that in Chapter III we noted that by clarity of definition, we were referring to the extent to which the power actors viewed local problems in specific cause and effect terms. We further noted that this dimension would appear to affect the likelihood of any action being proposed to ameliorate the defined problems. If the leadership pool is unable to impute a causal association, or where the causal association offered is abstract and amorphous, the level of inactivity might be expected to be high.

In attempting to measure this dimension, we again focused upon the conditions that were defined by the power actors as being the most important, current, community problems. The power actors were queried about the possible cause or causes of these problems. A content analysis was performed upon their answers to this questioning. Each answer was classified into one of five categories: (1) no cause offered, (2) single specific cause offered, (3) multiple single cause offered, (4) single general cause offered, and (5) multiple general cause offered.
As an indicator of this concept, the percentage of the total problems for which no cause was offered was subtracted from the percentage of the problems for which cause was imputed in specific cause and effect terms.\textsuperscript{46} The results of this analysis are presented in Table 33.

**TABLE 33**

THE DEGREE OF CLARITY INHERENT IN THE PROBLEM DEFINITIONS OF THE FOUR LEADERSHIP POOLS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Percent of Problems For Which No Cause Was Imputed</th>
<th>Percent of Problems For Which Specific Cause Was Imputed</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teayston</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These findings are most interesting. It first may be noted that three of the communities exhibit rather similar levels of clarity in their problem sets. In Jefferson, Demain, and Teayston about three out of every ten problems were defined in specific cause and effect terms. In Lowell, however, six out of every ten problems were so defined. The power actors in Lowell, on the other hand, were more likely not to impute any cause to a problem than were the power actors in the other three communities. There is a moderate positive association ($r_s = +.40$), therefore, between imputing no cause and defining the problem in specific cause and effect terms. In other words, where causes are readily offered, there is a moderate tendency for them to be offered in general terms.
The above pattern appears to be consistent with certain of the propositions presented in the model. For example, the proposed positive associations between this dependent dimension and the independent characteristics of institutional dominance, social class, scope, and cohesiveness appear to be supported. The proposed associations with size, visibility, entrenchment, and cosmopolitanism, however, do not appear to be supported. We will statistically examine these relationships shortly.

Before systematically examining the relationship of these dependent problem dimensions to the independent characteristics of the leadership pool, we must briefly note the issue of covariance. Spearman rank order correlation coefficients between the dimensions were computed in order to determine the degree to which these dimensions covary. The results are presented in Table 34.

As may be observed in Table 34, there is a high degree (+.80 or above) of intercorrelation between four of the dimensions: the perceived degrees of seriousness, institutional specificity, local solution, and the clarity of the definitions. The degree of seriousness is positively associated with the level of institutional specificity (+1.00) and negatively associated with the degree of local solvability (-.80) and the clarity of the definitions (-1.00). The level of institutional specificity is negatively associated with both the degree of local solvability (-.80) and the clarity of the definitions (-1.00). Finally, the degree of local solvability and the clarity of the definitions are positively associated (+.80). As may logically be expected, in these problem sets, the more serious the perceived the problems, the greater
The level of institutional specificity, the lower the degree of local solvability, and the less clear the definitions. Of the remaining fifteen associations, nine are moderate. Among these are five of the associations involving the number of problems. While the magnitude of these relationships is moderate (0.55 - 0.65), the direction of the associations is logically consistent. Thus, the greater the number of problems, the greater the perceived level of severity, the lower the level of consensus, the greater the degree of institutional specificity, the lower the proportion that can be locally solved, the less unique, and the less clearly defined the problems. The other associations are weak, with consensus and uniqueness exhibiting the greatest independence.
With the exception of the negative association between the degree of local solvability and the degree of uniqueness, these associations appear to be logical. Therefore, in these four communities it appears that the community problem dimensions tend to exhibit the following pattern: large number, high severity, low consensus, high institutional specificity, low local solvability, low uniqueness, and high clarity of definition.

In order to measure the overall level of association in this pattern, the communities were rank ordered on the problem dimensions. The ordering on the dimensions of number, perceived seriousness, and institutional specificity was reversed in order to compute the Kendall Coefficient of Concordance. The results are presented in Table 35.

**TABLE 35**

RANK ORDERING OF THE COMMUNITIES ON THE COMMUNITY PROBLEM DIMENSIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Seriousness</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Consensus</th>
<th>Institutional Specificity</th>
<th>Local Solvability</th>
<th>Uniqueness</th>
<th>Clarity of Def.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaysston</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ W = .526 \quad p < .01 \quad r_{sav} = +.467 \]

There is a moderate multiple rank association between these dimensions. The overall coefficient \((W = .526)\) and the average rank order coefficient \((r_{sav} = +.467)\) are much lower than the interrelationships exhibited by the community structural variables \((W = .771, r_{sav} = +.725)\)
and slightly higher than the interrelationships among the characteristics of the leadership pool ($W = .436$, $r_{g g} = +.366$). Thus, like the characteristics of the leadership pool, there is a moderate degree of covariance among these dimensions. They are, however, more independent than the structural variables of the communities. Due to the nature of our statistical test, and the size of our sample, we must consider these findings as indicative, not conclusive.

At this time let us briefly describe the problem sets in each of the communities along the dimensions presented in the model.

3. The Dimensions of the Four Community Problem Sets

**Teaysston** — A relatively large number of problems, with a relatively high degree of severity, a low degree of consensus, a high level of institutional specificity, a moderately low level of local solvability, a low degree of uniqueness, and low degree of definitional clarity.

**Lowell** — A relatively moderate number of problems, with a low degree of severity, a relatively low degree of consensus, a relatively low level of institutional specificity, a high level of local solvability, a low degree of uniqueness, and a high degree of definitional clarity.

**Demain** — A relatively moderate number of problems, with a relatively moderate degree of severity, a relatively high degree of consensus, a relatively high level of institutional specificity, a low level of local solvability, a low degree of uniqueness, and a relatively moderate degree of definitional clarity.

**Jefferson** — A relatively small number of problems, with a low degree of severity, a moderately high degree of consensus, a relatively
moderate level of institutional specificity, a moderately high level of local solvability, a low degree of uniqueness, and a relatively moderate degree of definitional clarity.

The Relationship of the Characteristics of the Leadership Pool To the Community Problem Dimensions

The Spearman rank order correlation coefficients for the sixty-three empirically testable propositions are presented in Table 36. As was the case in Table 25, the theoretically proposed direction of each association is presented above the empirically observed coefficient. Before we turn to a discussion of the findings, we must reiterate that the qualifications we previously have cited concerning the size of the sample, the relative lack of variation exhibited by the communities, and the instability of the Spearman rank order coefficient with small samples continue to apply. As previously noted, conclusions about the substantive and statistical significance of the propositions can not justifiably be offered; indications, however, can be observed. Our basic interest will be again in comparing the empirically observed direction of the associations with the direction proposed in the model.

In examining Table 36 we observe that thirty-four or 63.7 percent of the fifty-four propositions for which directionality was proposed were supported. The chance probability of observing this degree of support for the direction of fifty-four propositions is $p < .06$, $X^2 = 3.62$, $d.f. = 1$. In addition, many of the associations are of a high magnitude. Twenty-five or 39.7 percent of the sixty-three empirically observed associations have values of .80 or higher. As was the case
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of the Leadership Pool</th>
<th>Community Problem Dimensions</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Seriousness</th>
<th>Consensus</th>
<th>Specificity</th>
<th>Local Solution</th>
<th>Uniqueness</th>
<th>Clarity of Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>+.60</td>
<td>+.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Dominance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.85</td>
<td>-.80</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>-.80</td>
<td>+.60</td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>+.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+.65</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>-.60</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>+.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+.95</td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td>-.60</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>-.80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visibility</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>-.60</td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.85</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>+.00</td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohesiveness</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>+.20</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>+1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrenchment</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+.65</td>
<td>+.100</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>+.100</td>
<td>-.80</td>
<td>+.20</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmopolitanism</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+.35</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>+.20</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ = Positive Association; - = Negative Association; * = Direction of Relationship Not Known Prior to Empirical Examination.
with the associations between the community structural variables and the characteristics of the leadership pool, the distribution of supported propositions is not random throughout the matrix. The directionality of those propositions involving institutional dominance, social class, legitimacy, scope, and cohesiveness as independent variables was strongly supported. Of the twenty-eight directional propositions involving these dimensions, twenty-four or 85.7 percent were supported.48 Of the four remaining independent variables, i.e. size, visibility, entrenchment, and cosmopolitanism, only ten of twenty-six directional propositions, or 38.5 percent were supported.49 It may be recalled that the size of the leadership pools in these communities was very similar. In addition, we have noted the inadequacy of our operational indicator of visibility. These factors may be partially responsible for the unexpected direction of the propositions involving size and visibility as independent variables. We will systematically consider these latter, non-supported propositions shortly.

A. Supported Propositions

Let us first discuss the characteristics of the leadership pool, our independent variables. The following figures represent the number and percentage of directionally supported propositions for each of the characteristics of the leadership pool: size = three of seven or 42.9 percent; institutional dominance = four of five or 80.0 percent; social class = four of five or 80.0 percent; legitimacy = four of four or 100.0 percent; visibility = two of five or 40.0 percent; scope = six of seven or 85.7 percent; cohesiveness = six of seven or 85.7 percent; entrenchment = three of seven or 42.9 percent; and cosmopolitanism = two of
seven or 28.6 percent. There is strong support for the proposed positive association between the size of the leadership pool and the number of different perceived problems (+.80) and for the negative association between the size of the leadership pool and the degree of consensus concerning the severity of the problems (+1.00). Moderate empirical support is evidenced for the proposed negative association between the size of the leadership pool and the degree of local solvability (-.40). The proposed positive associations between visibility and the perceived degrees of seriousness and institutional specificity were moderately supported (+.40). As proposed, entrenchment was found to be positively associated with the number of problems (+.65), the degree of severity (+1.00), and the degree of uniqueness inherent in the problems (+.20). Moderate support was given to the proposed negative associations between cosmopolitanism and severity and uniqueness (-.40).

Turning to institutional dominance, we may note that as predicted, as institutional dominance increases in the leadership pool, the number of perceived problems decreases (-.85), the perceived degree of severity decreases (-.80), the level of consensus increases (+.40), and the clarity of the problem definitions increases (+.80). Furthermore, although directionality was not predicted in the model, positive associations are evidenced between institutional dominance and the degree of local solvability (+.60) and the degree of perceived uniqueness (+.80) in the problem definitions. For example, the most institutionally dominated leadership pool in the sample was found in Jefferson. As predicted, this pool perceived a relatively low number of problems,
with a low level of severity, a high degree of consensus, a high degree of local solvability, a high degree of uniqueness, and a high level of clarity.

The proposed negative associations between the social class level of the leadership pool and the degrees of institutional specificity and local solvability were only moderately supported (-.20 and -.40). However, strong empirical support was offered for the negative association between this independent variable and the degree of uniqueness in the problem set (-1.00). The positive association between social class level and the number of different problems was moderately supported (+.65), but only weak support was evidenced for the positive association with the level of clarity inherent in the problem definitions (+.20).50

The set of propositions involving legitimacy as the independent variable received the strongest support in the model. The proposed positive associations between legitimacy and number (+.95), seriousness (+.80), and institutional specificity (+.80) were empirically observed. In addition, the proposed negative association between legitimacy and consensus was moderately supported (-.40). Furthermore, negative associations were observed between legitimacy and the degree of local solvability (-.60), the degree of uniqueness (-.40), and the level of definitional clarity (-.80). All of the directional propositions involving this independent variable were supported.

The "scope propositions" were also generally supported, although the magnitude of the associations was not as great as that evidenced in the relationships involving legitimacy. Thus, the expected negative associations between the scope of the leadership pool and the number of
different problems (-.85), the degree of severity inherent in the problems (-.40), and the degree of institutional specificity exhibited in the problems (-.40) were empirically observed. Likewise, proposed positive associations with consensus (+.80), uniqueness (+.80), and definitional clarity (+.40) were evidenced. For example, the leadership with the most narrow scope, perceived the greatest number of problems, with the highest degree of severity, the lowest level of consensus, a low level of local solvability, a low degree of uniqueness, and the lowest level of definitional clarity.

Finally, strong empirical support was evidenced for the proposed negative associations between the degree of cohesiveness in the leadership pool and the number of different perceived problems (-.55), the perceived degree of severity inherent in the problems (-1.00), and the degree of institutional specificity inherent in the problem definitions (-1.00). The proposed positive associations between cohesiveness and consensus (+.20), local solvability (+.80), and definitional clarity (+1.00) were also observed.

Turning to the dependent community problem dimensions, we may observe that strong empirical support is evidenced for the propositions involving the perceived degree of severity inherent in the problems (eight of eight or 100.0 percent), the number of different problems (seven of nine or 77.7 percent), and the perceived degree of uniqueness in the problems (four of six or 66.7 percent). Moderate support was evidenced for the following dimensions: degree of consensus (four of eight or 50.0 percent), institutional specificity (five of nine or 55.5 percent), and definitional clarity (four of eight or 50.0 percent).
Propositions involving the degree of local solvability received little support (two of six or 33.3 percent).

Fifteen of the seventeen directional propositions involving the number of different perceived problems and their degree of severity as dependent variables were empirically supported (88.2 percent). Furthermore, eight of the fifteen supported propositions were of a magnitude of .80 or higher. Only one of the propositions, that being between the size of the leadership pool and the degree of perceived severity, was weakly supported (-.20). Thus, the number of different perceived problems tends to increase with the size, social class level, legitimacy, and level of entrenchment in the leadership pool, and to decrease with increases in the level of institutional dominance, scope, and cohesiveness. We must note, however, that the problem sets exhibit little variation on this dimension. The absolute differences between the communities on this dimension may not be as great as the model predicted. The consistency and level of support, however, are impressive. In addition, all of the directional propositions that included the degree of severity as a dependent variable were supported. The associations involving institutional dominance (-.80), legitimacy (+.80), cohesiveness (-1.00), and entrenchment (+1.00) were very strong. Finally, as predicted, the degree of uniqueness inherent in the problem set was found to be negatively associated with social class (-1.00) and cosmopolitanism (-.40) and positively associated with scope (+.80) and entrenchment (+.20).

As proposed in the model, the degree of institutional specificity inherent in the problem set exhibited strong negative associations with
both entrenchment and legitimacy, and a strong positive relationship with cohesiveness. The relationships with social class, visibility, and scope were moderately supported. Consensus was observed to be positively associated with institutional dominance, scope, and cohesiveness, and negatively associated with legitimacy. The association with cohesiveness, however, was weak (+.20). Regarding the dependent dimension of uniqueness, the expected positive associations with scope and entrenchment, and the negative relationships with social class and cosmopolitanism were observed.

Finally, before turning to those propositions which were not supported, we must observe that, as predicted, local solvability was negatively associated with the size of the leadership pool, and positively related to the degree of cohesiveness in the pool.

B. Propositions Lacking Support

As we previously observed, the non-supported propositions are not randomly distributed throughout the matrix. Sixteen of the twenty propositions which lack support are located within four of the independent characteristics of the leadership pool. These characteristics include size, visibility, entrenchment, and cosmopolitanism.

Let us first consider the size of the leadership pool. The proposed negative associations between this variable and the problem dimensions of consensus, uniqueness, and definitional clarity were not observed. In addition, an unexpected, weak, negative association (-.20) with the degree of institutional specificity was evidenced. The only strong association in this set involved the size of the leadership pool.
pool and the degree of consensus inherent in the problem set (+1.00). Logically, one would not expect size and consensus to be positively associated. The degree of positive covariance (+.80) between size and scope may partially account for this illogical empirical observation. A possible factor contributing to all of these unexpected findings may be the lack of variation evidenced by the leadership pools on the independent variable. It may be recalled that the largest leadership pool contained only five more power actors than the smallest.

In practical terms, as an independent variable, the size dimension was controlled. Our statistical test, however, is not sensitive to this modicum of difference. Therefore, the significance of these specific relationships — and also those that involved size as an independent variable and were supported — is questionable. If the associations are valid, however, the model will have to be reinterpreted. Due to the size of the sample, the nature of our statistical test, and the lack of variation on the independent variable, we will postpone any possible reinterpretation until further research utilizing an increased, heterogenous sample is undertaken.

Three of the five propositions that included visibility as an independent variable were not supported. Neither the expected positive associations with the number of perceived problems and the clarity of the problem definitions, nor the proposed negative association with consensus were empirically observed. The former associations exhibited moderate strength (-.25 and -.40), while the latter relationship was strong (+.80). Based upon the deductive logic inherent in the model, these associations are very surprising. Our indicator of visibility
and the nature of the four cities may be possible contributory factors. These leadership pools exhibit a strong positive association between the characteristics of scope and visibility. We previously noted that such an association may be the result of (1) inadequacies inherent in utilizing newspaper citation as an indicator of visibility when the quality of local news coverage varies greatly between the communities, and (2) the small size of these cities, which may result in leaders with broad scope being visible. Therefore, two possible interpretations may be offered. First, our indicator is inadequate. There is poor fit between the concept of visibility and the indicator of newspaper citations. Therefore, all of the propositions including this concept must be cautiously considered. Second, these findings may be valid, and result from the size of the cities. It is generally assumed in the literature that scope and visibility are negatively associated. However, in these four, small cities they are positively associated. Such association results in the unexpected findings involving visibility. The basic problem inherent in selecting the second explanation is that our indicator of visibility is still inadequate. Therefore, before attempting to reinterpret the model on the basis of these findings, future research utilizing a refined indicator must be undertaken.  

It was proposed that entrenchment would be positively associated with consensus (-.20), local solvability (-.80), and definitional clarity (-1.00), and negatively related to institutional specificity (+1.00). Not only are these propositions not supported, but the strength of the association is generally strong. As we noted in the discussion of the first set of propositions, the indicator of entrenchment does appear to
be adequate and valid. In addition, the communities do vary in the level of entrenchment inherent in their leadership pools. Thus, in contradiction to the proposals in the model, in these communities as the level of entrenchment in the leadership pool increases, the degree of consensus, the perceived level of local solvability, and the clarity of the problem definitions decrease, and the level of institutional specificity increases. In analyzing these negative observations we are faced with two possibilities: (1) the model needs reinterpretation and alteration or (2) these findings are idiosyncratic to our four communities.

Let us consider the first possibility. To achieve parsimony between the model and the empirical observations, we would have to propose that the longer the period of time spent in the community by the power actors, the less they agree about what constitute local problems, the less clear are their definitions of local problems, the less likely are they to define the local community as a viable problem-solving entity, and the less likely are they to perceive overall community problems. We have previously noted the strong covariance between the number, perceived severity, level of institutional specificity, degree of local solvability, and definitional clarity of the problems. (The larger the number of problems, the greater their perceived degree of severity, the greater their level of institutional specificity, the lower their perceived local solvability, and the less clear their definitions.) The predicted positive associations between entrenchment and the number and perceived severity of the problems was strongly supported. Due to the covariance in the problem dimensions, the unexpected
associations were concomitantly observed. Perhaps as power actors become more entrenched in the community and subsequently develop spheres of influence and idiosyncratic concerns, they do tend to perceive a greater number of serious, institutionally specific problems. Due to these dimensions, they exhibit little agreement about the severity of the problems, are not able to offer specific causes for such a large, varied number of issues, and do not believe that the local community can solve the problems by themselves, either because of their severity or because of past experience. This reinterpretation is offered only as a plausible alternative. Until further research is undertaken in order to determine if the second alternative is valid, i.e. that these four communities are idiosyncratic, we must hold this reinterpretation in abeyance.

Only two of the cosmopolitan propositions were supported. Neither the theoretically predicted negative associations between cosmopolitanism and the problem dimensions of number, consensus, local solvability, and definitional clarity, nor the proposed positive association with institutional specificity were observed. All of these associations were weak. None of the relationships involving cosmopolitanism exceeded .40. This lack of association and the unexpected direction of the observations may be due to numerous factors, including the basic, dominant localite orientation in each of the leadership pools. Little variation was shown on this dimension; all of the pools are localite. Therefore, the direction and weakness of the associations are not surprising; they are consistent with the predicted associations for localite leadership pools.
Some variation, however, was noted, and this variation is not consistent with the model. The high degree of positive covariance between cosmopolitanism and social class inherent in these four leadership pools may be a possible contributory factor in the observed positive associations with number and definitional clarity. The observed positive associations with consensus and local solvability, however, are not logical due to the nature of cosmopolitanism. Finally, the negative association with institutional specificity may call for re-interpretation. Perhaps when cosmopolitans do observe local problematic conditions, those which are community wide in nature may attract their attention.

The above discussion, however, represents speculation. While our indicator of cosmopolitanism does appear to be valid, the unexpected findings may result from the lack of variation on the independent variable, the covariance between the variables, the nature of our statistical technique and sample size, the idiosyncratic nature of the four leadership pools, and/or logical errors in the comparative model. Due to these factors, therefore, this dimension has not been adequately examined and reinterpretation of the model will be withheld at this time. Although the propositions offered in the model do appear logical, they will be altered if future research, utilizing a larger number of heterogenous cities and proper controls, shows that these empirical observations are valid.

Finally, let us observe that four other propositions involving different independent variables were not supported. The unexpected associations included: institutional dominance and institutional
specificity (-.80), social class and local solvability (+.40), scope and local solvability (.00), and cohesiveness and uniqueness (-.20). The latter two relationships are very weak and may indicate independence between the variables. The positive association between social class level and local solvability may be due to the idiosyncratic pattern in Lowell, in which both of these dimensions exhibit high values. Finally, the negative association between institutional specificity and institutional dominance may be due to the size of the cities and may indicate a possible area for reinterpretation. It may be that in small cities with relatively small, institutionally dominated leadership pools, the level of institutional specificity is low because the power actors must be concerned with areas other than their own institution. In other words, scope may be a crucial intervening variable in this association. One might predict that small, institutionally dominated pools with broad scope will exhibit low levels of institutional specificity. Only if the scope of such pools is narrow will the power actors perceive problems in an institutionally specific manner. The empirical observations from this application do support such a proposal.

In sum, this empirical application generally supports the second set of propositions presented in the model. Thirty-four of the fifty-four directional propositions were supported. Particularly strong support was evidenced for those propositions involving the independent variables of institutional dominance, social class, legitimacy, scope and cohesiveness. Twenty-four of the twenty-eight propositions involving these variables were supported. The dependent variables of number,
severity, and uniqueness also received strong support. Moderate support was shown for the independent dimensions of size and visibility, and for the dependent variables of institutional specificity, definitional clarity, and consensus. Little support was evidenced for the propositions involving the independent variables of entrenchment and cosmopolitanism, and the dependent variable of local solvability. With regard to the latter unexpected observations, we have proposed possible alternative interpretations to those offered in the model, discussed possible methodological problems contributing to these negative findings, noted the issue of covariance, and offered conceptual and methodological refinements for future analysis.

Let us now turn to the last set of variables in the model, i.e. the patterns of community action.

Patterns of Community Action

A. The Urgency or Immediacy of Instituting the Ameliorative Action

The first dimension in the action set involves the degree of urgency perceived by the power actors to be inherent in any ameliorative action proposal. In Chapter III we noted that those conditions which are perceived by the power actors to (1) manifestly threaten life, property, and/or community values and mores, or (2) greatly disturb the normal conditions in the local system, or (3) directly threaten their vested interests would have a high probability of being urgently attacked. We also observed that with increasing urgency the relevant problem-solving units in the community must develop plans and tactics, procure requisite resources, coordinate activity, and perform
other needed tasks under duress. Therefore, the possibility of successful implementation of any action program is influenced by this dimension.

In order to measure this dimension, each power actor was asked to identify what he considered to be the most important current problem in the community. Subsequently he was asked, "How urgent is a solution to this problem?" The responses to this question were classified into one of the following three categories: urgent, semi-urgent, or not urgent. If a solution was viewed as essential within a six-months period, the action was classified as urgent. Any action proposed to take place over a period of two years was classified as not urgent. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 37.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Percent Urgent</th>
<th>Percent Semi-Urgent</th>
<th>Percent Not Urgent</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teayston</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It first may be observed that the action sets in these communities do vary on this dimension.54 The most urgent need for problem solutions was perceived by the power actors in Teayston. Of the sixteen perceived
problems, fourteen or 87.6 percent were defined as needing urgent solutions. The degrees of urgency in Jefferson and Demain are about equal, and may be defined as moderate. The leadership pool in Lowell, however, perceives a much lower degree of urgency than that found in the other communities. While about nine of every ten problems in Teays-ton is defined as needing immediate, urgent solutions, only about four of every ten problems in Lowell are so defined. For our sample of four communities, six of every ten problems was defined as needing urgent ameliorative action, and 16.1 percent were defined as being not urgent concerns. It is interesting to note that while the four leadership pools only defined 16.7 percent of the problems as being very serious, they proposed that 60.3 percent of them require urgent attention.

We will systematically examine the relationship of this variable to all of the community problem dimensions shortly. At this time let us briefly note that the above pattern appears to be generally consistent with the propositions offered in the model. For example, the degree of urgency apparently is positively associated with severity, institutional specificity, and uniqueness. Teays-ton, for instance, is ranked first on each of these dimensions, while Lowell consistently is ranked fourth.

B. The Degree of Institutional Coordination Required to Successfully Implement the Proposed Ameliorative Action

This characteristic is important because it represents a crucial determinant of successful implementation. It concerns the degree to which the action proposals require coordination among the various
institutions in the community. To ideally measure this variable requires an in-depth analysis of the proposed ameliorative action. Such an issue analysis was not able to be undertaken in this study. Therefore, in order to measure the degree of institutional coordination inherent in the proposals, each power actor was asked to discuss what action he would propose to solve the community's major problem. Specifically, he was asked to identify which local institution(s) should be involved in the action, and to designate which institution(s) were responsible for finding a solution. The leadership pool's proposals were classified as either (1) requiring coordination or (2) not requiring coordination. If a proposal required the involvement of three of more institutions, it was classified as "requiring coordination." The results of this analysis are presented in Table 38.

TABLE 38
THE PERCEPTED DEGREE OF INSTITUTIONAL COORDINATION INHERENT IN THE ACTION SETS IN THE FOUR COMMUNITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Percent Requiring Coordination</th>
<th>Percent Not Requiring Coordination</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teayston</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In no community does the majority of the action proposals require the involvement of three or more institutional areas. Variation on
this dimension, however, is evidenced. The action proposed by the power actors in Lowell necessitates the highest degree of coordination. Of the eighteen proposals offered by this leadership pool, ten or 44.4 percent require the involvement of at least three different institutions. At the other extreme, 87.5 percent of the proposals presented by the leadership pool in Teayston are perceived as requiring the involvement of only one, or at the most two, institutions. As with the previous dimension, the action proposals in Demain and Jefferson require about the same level of coordination and are intermediate between Lowell and Teayston. For the entire sample, three of every ten proposals require the involvement of at least three different institutions. It is extremely interesting to note that these two first variables in the action set are negatively related (-1.00). One might propose that if a solution to local problems is defined as being urgent, the power actors offer proposals that do not require a great deal of systematic involvement and coordinated activity. Where the problems are not seen as requiring immediate attention, however, the power actors may propose ameliorative action that is detailed, comprehensive, and inclusive of local resources.

Let us briefly observe that the above pattern does appear to support the propositions offered in the model. For example, the degree of institutional coordination appears to be positively associated with the problem dimensions of consensus, local solvability, and definitional clarity, and negatively associated with institutional specificity. For example, the problem set in Lowell exhibited the highest level of local solvability, while the level of local solvability in Teayston was low. Therefore there is evidence that if the local community is defined as
being able to solve local problems, the action proposals will require the involvement of various local institutions.

C. The Degree of Public Responsibility for Action

As the reader may recall, our model includes three patterns of action that are relevant to the horizontal network of the community. The degree of institutional coordination is the first of these dimensions. The perceived relevance of local organizations is another. The dimension under analysis at this time is the third horizontal variable. This dimension refers to the degree to which the action proposed by the leadership pool is defined as solely the concern of the "public," or governmental, as opposed to the "private" sector of the community.

To measure this dimension the power actors were asked if their proposed solutions to the major problems in the community were "public" or "private" concerns. Their responses were classified as (1) solely "private," (2) solely "public," or (3) a combination of "private" and "public" responsibility. The percentage of the total problems which were defined as solely "public" concerns is presented in Table 39.

Almost one half of the action proposals offered by the leadership pool in Demain were defined as purely public, governmental concerns. In Teayston, about three out of every ten proposals were seen as the responsibility of public agencies. The lowest percentage of public action was proposed in Lowell. For the sample, twenty-three or 31.1 percent of the seventy-four proposals were offered as public concerns. Based upon the characteristics of the leadership pools, this pattern is not surprising. The most legitimate leadership pools with the largest
TABLE 39
THE PERCENTAGE OF "PUBLIC" RESPONSIBILITY INHERENT IN THE ACTION SETS IN THE FOUR COMMUNITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Percent of Problems Defined As &quot;Public&quot; Concerns</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teayston</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

governmental representation are found in Teayston and Demain. The other two pools have lower levels of legitimacy, smaller representation by governmental officials, and greater economic dominance.

The relationships between this dependent action pattern and the independent community problem dimensions, however, are neither as consistent nor as supportive as the above associations. As a dependent variable, the degree of public responsibility presents a difficult problem. Only three directional propositions linking this variable with the problem dimensions were previously offered. These do not appear to have been supported. We will, however, systematically examine these associations shortly.

D. The Degree of Perceived Relevance of Local Organizations

This dimension refers to the degree to which the power actors define local community organizations as being relevant for the successful
implementation of their proposals for ameliorative action. As such, it is relevant to the horizontal network of the community. Its importance lies in its covariance with the degree of requisite coordination and the possibility of successful implementation, and its utility as an indicator of the leadership pool's perception of the viability and influence of various local organizations.

In order to measure this dimension, the power actors were given a list of twenty local organizations and officials. To increase comparability, the same list was presented to each power actor. They were asked to rate each organization's relevance to their ameliorative action proposals as (1) essential, (2) important, but not essential, or (3) not important. Table 40 presents the rank ordering of the communities on the degree of perceived relevance inherent in their local organizations.

**TABLE 40**

THE DEGREE OF PERCEIVED ORGANIZATIONAL RELEVANCE
INHERENT IN THE ACTION SETS
IN THE FOUR COMMUNITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Percent Essential</th>
<th>Percent Important</th>
<th>Percent Not Important</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tcayston</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>45.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>27.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>27.8</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Little variation is evidenced on this dimension. There is only a difference of 13.8 percent between the community with the highest degree
of organizational relevance and the city with the smallest degree. Furthermore, a high degree of consistency was evidenced in the rating of the organizations across the communities ($W = .797, p.< .001$).

It is possible, however, to rank order the communities on this dimension. Only in Demain are more than one half of the organizations viewed as being relevant and essential. In addition, only 20.0 percent of the organizations were defined as having absolutely no relevance. On the other hand, the support of only 39.6 percent of the organizations in Teayston was defined as being essential, while the involvement of 34.0 percent was seen as not being important. There are relatively moderate, equal degrees of organizational relevance in Jefferson and Lowell. For the sample of four cities, an average of 45.1 percent of the twenty organizations were defined as essential, while the support of 27.8 percent was viewed as being not important.

It may be observed that there is a strong negative association between community dependence and organizational relevance. The two most dependent communities have the lowest degrees of organizational relevance, while the autonomous communities, i.e. Demain and Jefferson, have the highest degrees. In addition, as might be expected, there apparently exists a positive association between institutional coordination and organizational involvement. Finally, the above pattern does appear to support certain of the propositions presented in the model. For example, the degree of organizational relevance apparently is positively associated with the degree of consensus, urgency, and definitional clarity inherent in the problem set, and is negatively associated
with the level of institutional specificity. The expected positive associations with number, severity, and local solvability, however, are not evidenced.

E. The Degree of Proposed External, Non-Local Involvement in the Ameliorative Action

Unlike the preceding three characteristics which were related to the horizontal network, this dimension is relevant to the vertical axis of the community. This dimension has been included in the model because of its importance as an indicator of local autonomy and its utility in the analysis of community action proposals. In discussing their proposals for solving the major community problems, the power actors were asked if outside, non-local assistance would be needed. Each action proposal was classified as (1) local, (2) local with non-local assistance, (3) both, (4) non-local with local assistance, and (5) non-local. No purely non-local solutions were offered. A Likert-type weighting was utilized, with those proposals defined as local concerns being rated one, and non-local solutions being assigned a weight of five. This weighting was based upon the assumption that the degree of external involvement increases with a decrease in local involvement. The results are presented in Table 41.

The greatest degree of non-local involvement was defined as being requisite in Demain. Of the total of twenty-one separate action proposals, eleven or 52.3 percent were defined as being either the combined concerns of both local and non-local units or the primary responsibility of non-local agents. At the other extreme, all of the proposals in Lowell were defined as being primarily local concerns.
TABLE 41

THE DEGREE OF PROPOSED EXTERNAL, NON-LOCAL INVOLVEMENT
INHERENT IN THE ACTION SETS
IN THE FOUR COMMUNITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Local With Non-Local Assistance</th>
<th>Combined Local And Non-Local Assistance</th>
<th>Non-Local With Local Assistance</th>
<th>Mean Weighted Score</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domain</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teayston</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only 16.6 percent of them were even seen as requiring non-local assistance. In Jefferson 21.0 percent of the proposals are not defined as being local concerns, while the corresponding percentage in Teayston is only 12.4 percent. Teayston, however, actually has a greater degree of non-local involvement because of the large number of proposals that are defined as local concerns, but which require outside assistance. For the total sample, 44.0 percent of the proposals require some degree of non-local involvement.

The above pattern does appear to support many of the propositions presented in the model. For example, the degree of non-local, external involvement appears to be positively associated with the community problem dimensions of severity, consensus, and institutional specificity. Furthermore, it is apparently negatively associated with the degree of local solvability. We will systematically examine these
associations, and the remaining relationships proposed in the comparative model, shortly.

F. The Perceived Possibility of "Blockage"

The reader may recall that by "blockage" we are referring to the act of opposing, stalling, and successfully defeating any proposal for ameliorative action. Basically at issue, therefore, is the presence of "veto power" within the community. In addition to tapping this crucial element of the distribution of power, the concept has utility for predicting the outcome of community proposals.

The power actors were asked if there were any individuals or groups whose opposition would be impossible or extremely difficult to overcome in the implementation of their proposals to solve the major community problems. In Table 42 are presented the percentage of projected "blocking" by individuals and groups, and the average possibility of blocking by either individuals or groups.

**TABLE 42**

**THE DEGREE OF PERCEIVED "BLOCKAGE" INHERENT IN THE ACTION SETS IN THE FOUR COMMUNITIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Percent Blockage By Individuals</th>
<th>Percent Blockage By Groups</th>
<th>Average Percent By Either</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teays-ton</td>
<td><strong>12.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>50.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>31.3</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td><strong>31.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>59.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>45.4</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above pattern is very interesting. Except for Teayston, in which the level of "blockage" is relatively low, the communities exhibit little variation in their average levels of "blockage." In each of these three cities about one half of the proposed solutions may be blocked by individual or group action. In addition, the perceived possibility of group "blockage" is even higher. Almost three out of every four proposals offered by the power actors in Jefferson were seen as possibly being blocked or defeated by certain groups in the community. In Lowell, two thirds of the proposals may be blocked, while in both Demain and Teayston the level is about 50.0 percent. For the sample, 59.5 percent of the seventy-four proposals were seen as facing possible group opposition and defeat. The perceived level of individual "blockage," however, is much lower. Except in Demain where the probability of individual and group "blockage" is identical, group opposition is two to four times as likely as individual opposition. Therefore, within these communities "veto power" is more likely to reside with coalitions and organizations than with individual power actors. Considering the total sample, any action proposal offered by the leadership pools in these communities faces a rather high probability of "blockage."

The above rank ordering is logically consistent with the characteristics of the leadership pool. For example, there is a strong, positive association (+.80) between the degree of "blockage" and the levels of scope and institutional dominance within the leadership pool. In the city with the highest level of "blockage," i.e. Jefferson, is found the most economically dominated, broad-scoped, elitist leadership pool.
Conversely, the leadership pool in Teayston, which is the most pluralistic in the sample, perceived the lowest level of possible "blockage."

This rank ordering, however, does not appear to consistently support the model's propositions relating this dependent variable to the independent problem dimensions. The expected positive associations with local solvability and uniqueness, and the negative association with severity apparently are evidenced. The other expected associations apparently are not. We will consider these associations shortly.

G. The Level of Inactivity

This characteristic refers to the proportion of perceived problems for which no action either has been initiated or proposed. It is a dimension of the set of action proposals, not of any single action proposal. Not only is this dimension an indicator of the likelihood of successful implementation, but it may also indicate the "problem-solving ability" of the community. To measure this dimension, the power actors were asked if any ameliorative action had been undertaken to solve what they considered to be the major problems in the community. If none had been initiated, the power actors were asked to explicate their personal action proposals. The level of inactivity inherent in the action set was defined as the proportion of problems for which no activity has been undertaken or proposed. The power actors were always able to offer some proposal to solve the problems, therefore, the level of inactivity was based solely upon the proportion of problems for which no ameliorative action has been undertaken. Table 43 presents the results.
TABLE 43
THE LEVEL OF INACTIVITY
INHERENT IN THE ACTION SETS
IN THE FOUR COMMUNITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Percent of Problems for Which No Ameliorative Activity Has Been Undertaken</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teayston</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demain</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Generally, the level of inactivity is low in these communities. Some form of action already has been undertaken to ameliorate about 85 percent of the major community problems. The level in Lowell is exceptionally low (5.5 percent), however only in Teayston is the level of inactivity above 30 percent.

One element of the above rank ordering is very interesting. The above pattern tends to support the previous findings in the literature that the successful implementation of community action proposals is facilitated by the concentration of power in the community. For example, the leadership pool in Teayston is the most pluralistic. As previously noted, this community also contains the highest level of inactivity. Although the size of our sample places severe limitations upon the generality of our findings, this association is strengthened by its consistency with previous work.
Finally, the above pattern also appears to support many of the propositions presented in the model. As expected, the level of inactivity is apparently associated with the community problem dimensions of number, and institutional specificity, and negatively associated with consensus, local solvability, and definitional clarity. The predicted negative associations with the dimensions of severity and uniqueness, however, do not appear to be evidenced.

Before turning to a systematic examination of the relationship of these dependent patterns of community action to the independent community problem dimensions, let us briefly note the issue of covariance. Once again we have computed Spearman rank order correlation coefficients between the patterns of community action in order to determine the degree to which these patterns covary. The results are presented in Table 44.

It may first be observed that the propositions are generally of a moderate magnitude. Of the twenty-one correlation coefficients, fifteen or 71.4 percent exhibit a value of .40, and two other associations have values of .60. Only four associations are strong (1.00). On the other hand, none of the associations are weaker than .40.

There is a high degree (1.00) of intercorrelation between three of the patterns: the perceived degree of urgency, the projected degree of institutional coordination, and the level of inactivity. The degree of urgency is negatively associated with the degree of institutional coordination, and positively associated with the level of inactivity. Also, there is a negative association between the degree of institutional coordination and the level of inactivity. Apparently, therefore,
TABLE 44

SPEARMAN RANK ORDER CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
BETWEEN THE PATTERNS OF COMMUNITY ACTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urgency</th>
<th>Institu'l Coordina'n</th>
<th>Public Respons'y</th>
<th>Organiza'l Relevance</th>
<th>Non-Local Involvem't</th>
<th>Blockage</th>
<th>Inactivity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institu'l Coordina'n</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Respons'y</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organiza'l Relevance</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Local Involvem't</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>+1.00</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blockage</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>-.60</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>-.60</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inactivity</td>
<td>+1.00</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>-.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In these communities when ameliorative action is defined by the leadership pool as being urgently needed, the proposals offered by the power actors do not require extensive institutional coordination, but the level of activity is low. Conversely, where solutions are not defined as being urgent, detailed proposals requiring extensive institutional coordination are offered by the leadership pool, and the level of activity is high.

With the exception of the strong, positive association between non-local involvement and public responsibility, the remaining intercorrelations are moderate in strength. With the exceptions, however, of the positive association between non-local involvement and organizational relevance, and the negative associations between blockage and
public responsibility and blockage and inactivity; the intercorrelations are logically consistent with the model. Among these moderate intercorrelations, we may note that urgency is positively associated with public responsibility and non-local involvement, and negatively associated with blockage and organizational relevance. Institutional coordination exhibits logical positive associations with organizational relevance and blockage, and negative associations with public responsibility and non-local involvement. Organizational relevance is positively associated with blockage and negatively related to the level of inactivity, and non-local involvement is positively associated with the level of inactivity and negatively associated with the perceived possibility of blockage. Therefore, in these communities there is a moderate tendency for those solutions which are defined as being urgently needed to have low degrees of institutional coordination, moderately high levels of public responsibility, moderately low degrees of organizational relevance, moderately high non-local involvement, moderately low probabilities of blockage, and high levels of inactivity.

In order to measure the overall level of association in this pattern, the communities were rank ordered on the patterns of community action. The ordering on the patterns of institutional coordination, organizational relevance, and blockage were reversed in order to compute the Kendall Coefficient of Concordance. The results are presented in Table 45.

A moderate rank order correlation is evidenced between these patterns. The overall coefficient ($W = .534$) and the average rank order coefficient ($r_{sav} = .456$) are much lower than the interrelationships
exhibited by the community structural variables, and very similar to
that evidenced by both the characteristics of the leadership pool and
the community problem dimensions. As noted above, however, few of the
associations are strong. Once again we must note that due to the
nature of our statistical test and the size of our sample, these find­
ings are indicative, not conclusive.

Before systematically considering the relationship between the
patterns of community action and the community problem dimensions, let
us briefly describe the action sets in each of the communities along
the patterns presented in the model.

4. Patterns of the Action Sets for the Four Communities

Teays ton -- Urgent ameliorative proposals, with a low degree of
institutional coordination, a relatively high degree of public respon­
sibility, a low degree of organizational relevance, a relatively high
degree of non-local involvement, a low level of blockage, and a high
level of inactivity.
Lowell -- Non-urgent ameliorative proposals, with a high degree of institutional coordination, a low degree of public responsibility, a relatively low degree of organizational relevance, a low degree of non-local involvement, a relatively high level of blockage, and a low level of inactivity.

Demain -- Semi-urgent ameliorative proposals, with a relatively moderate degree of institutional coordination, a high degree of public responsibility, a high degree of organizational relevance, a high degree of non-local involvement, a relatively high level of blockage, and a low level of inactivity.

Jefferson -- Semi-urgent ameliorative proposals, with a relatively moderate degree of institutional coordination, a moderately low degree of public responsibility, a moderate degree of organizational relevance, a moderate degree of non-local involvement, a high level of blockage, and a relatively high level of inactivity.

The Relationship of the Community Problem Dimensions To the Patterns of Community Action

Table 46 presents the Spearman rank order correlation coefficients for the forty-nine empirically testable propositions which link the problem and action sets. Once again, the theoretically proposed direction of each association is presented above the empirically observed coefficient. The previously observed difficulties concerning the size of the sample and the instability of the Spearman rank order coefficient with small samples are still manifest in this examination. Furthermore, little variation was evidenced by the communities on the problem
TABLE 46

SPEARMAN RANK ORDER CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY PROBLEM DIMENSIONS AND THE PATTERNS OF COMMUNITY ACTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community Problem Dimensions</th>
<th>Patterns of Community Action</th>
<th>Institutional Coordination</th>
<th>Public Responsib'y</th>
<th>Organiz'1 Relevance</th>
<th>Non-Local Involvem't</th>
<th>Blockage</th>
<th>Inactivity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+.35</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>+.35</td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seriousness</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td>-.80</td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td>-.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>+1.00</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>+.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Specificty</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td>-.80</td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td>-.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Solution</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>+.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniqueness</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>+.60</td>
<td>+.40</td>
<td>+.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarity of Definition</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.80</td>
<td>+.80</td>
<td>-.80</td>
<td>+.20</td>
<td>-.80</td>
<td>+.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ = Positive Association; - = Negative Association; * = Direction of Relationship Not Known Prior to Empirical Examination.
dimensions of number, institutional specificity, uniqueness, and definitional clarity. In fact, the number of problems was basically controlled. Therefore, the analysis and interpretation of the propositions that include these dimensions as independent variables must be cautiously undertaken. Verification based upon this application is not justified. Indications about the validity of the model, however, may be ascertained. As with the previous sets of propositions, analysis will center upon the comparison of the empirically observed direction of the association with the direction proposed in the model.

It may be observed from Table 46 that of the forty-one propositions for which directionality was proposed, twenty-three, 56.1 percent, were supported. For the number of propositions involved, this represents the lowest degree of support for any set of propositions in the model. Many of the associations, however, are of a high magnitude. Twenty-one of the forty-nine directional propositions, or 42.9 percent, have values of .80 or higher. While the overall level of support is weak, as with the previous two sets of propositions, the distribution of supported propositions is not random throughout the matrix. The directionality of those propositions involving consensus, institutional specificity, local solvability, and definitional clarity as independent variables was strongly supported. Of the twenty-two directional propositions involving these dimensions, sixteen or 72.7 percent were supported. Of the three remaining independent variables, i.e. number, severity, and uniqueness, only seven of the nineteen directional propositions, or 36.8 percent were supported. In addition, none of the propositions involving the dependent dimension of public responsibility were
supported. We will systematically consider these non-supported propositions shortly. First, let us turn to an examination of those areas that do support the model.

A. Supported Propositions

Let us first consider our independent variables. The following figures represent the number and percentage of directionally supported propositions for each of the community problem dimensions: number = one of six or 16.6 percent; severity = three of seven or 42.9 percent; consensus = four of five or 80.0 percent; institutional specificity = five of seven or 70.1 percent; local solvability = four of five or 80.0 percent; uniqueness = three of six or 50.0 percent; and definitional clarity = three of five or 60.0 percent. As noted above, only one of the propositions involving the number of different perceived problems was supported. The predicted positive association between this independent variable and the level of inactivity was moderately supported (+.30). The three supported propositions involving the degree of severity as an independent variable, however, evidenced a strong association (.80). Therefore, as predicted, the greater the degree of severity inherent in the problem set, the greater the urgency for instituting ameliorative action, the greater the involvement of non-local units in the activity, and the lower the perceived possibility of blockage. Moderate support was evidenced for the proposed positive associations between uniqueness and urgency (+.40), organizational relevance (+.60), and blockage (+.40).
Four of the five directional propositions involving the degree of consensus as an independent variable were supported, though overall there was only moderate strength to the associations. As proposed, the degree of consensus evidenced by the problem set is positively associated with the levels of institutional coordination (+.40), organizational relevance (+1.00), and non-local involvement (+.40), and negatively associated with the level of inactivity (-.40). In addition, moderate associations were observed between consensus and urgency (-.40) and political responsibility (+.40).

The independent variable receiving the strongest support was institutional specificity. Not only were five of the seven directional propositions supported, but generally the strength of the associations was quite high (.80). The expected positive associations between the degree of institutional specificity and urgency (+.80), non-local involvement (+.80), and inactivity (+.80) were observed. Likewise, the proposed negative associations with institutional coordination (-.80), and organizational relevance (-.20) are evidenced. As proposed in the model, therefore, the greater the institutional specificity inherent in the problem definitions, the greater the urgency in initiating ameliorative action, the lower the level of institutional coordination inherent in such action, the lower the relevance of local organizations, the higher the level of non-local involvement in the action, and the higher the level of inactivity.

As proposed, the degree of local solvability was found to be positively associated with institutional coordination (+.40) and blockage (+.60), and negatively related to non-local involvement (-1.00).
and inactivity (-.40). Therefore, problems which are defined as being solvable by the local community require a higher level of institutional coordination and a lower level of non-local involvement than those problems which are not so defined. In addition, locally solvable problems, while they face a high probability of being blocked by local actors and groups, are likely to be attacked by some type of ameliorative action.

Finally, as proposed, high definitional clarity leads to high institutional coordination (+.80), high organizational relevance (+.20), and low levels of inactivity (-.80). Apparently where the leadership pool is able to specify cause for the local problems, coordinated activity is likely to occur. As with all of these supported associations, however, we must view these findings as tentative, but encouraging. Our sample size and statistical test allow no stronger inferences than the above to be drawn.

In examining the dependent patterns of community action, we may observe that strong empirical support is evidenced for the propositions involving the degree of urgency (three of five or 60.0 percent), the level of institutional coordination (four of six or 66.6 percent), the level of organizational relevance (four of seven or 57.1 percent), the level of non-local involvement (four of six or 66.6 percent), and the level of inactivity (five of seven or 70.1 percent). Moderate support was given to those propositions which included the degree of blockage as the dependent variable (three of seven or 42.9 percent were supported). Finally, none of the propositions involving the dependent variable of public responsibility were supported.
As proposed, the degree of urgency inherent in the action set is positively associated with the degrees of severity, institutional specificity, and uniqueness in the problem set. Furthermore, though a direction was not previously proposed between the dependent variable of urgency and the independent variables of consensus and local solvability, the observed relationships are negative, but moderate (-.40). The degree of institutional coordination, however, exhibits the opposite association with these problem dimensions. It is positively associated with consensus, local solvability, and definitional clarity, and negatively associated with number, severity, institutional specificity, and uniqueness. Two of these seven associations were not expected, i.e. severity and uniqueness. Apparently, however, there is evidence that in these communities ameliorative action that is urgently needed cannot afford the luxury of extensive institutional coordination.

Of the thirteen directional propositions involving the important dependent variables of organizational relevance and non-local involvement, eight or 51.5 percent were supported. As proposed, organizational relevance is positively associated with consensus, uniqueness, and definitional clarity, and negatively associated with institutional specificity. Non-local involvement evidenced the expected positive associations with severity, consensus, and institutional specificity, and the negative association with local solvability. Therefore, non-local involvement in local ameliorative action is likely to increase with increases in the perceived severity, consensus and institutional specificity of the problem set, and decreases in its degree of local solvability and definitional clarity.
The strong support evidenced for the propositions involving the level of inactivity is most encouraging. This dimension is very important. In certain respects, it is the dependent variable for the entire model. One of the prime concerns of the model is in determining if any action will be undertaken to solve the perceived problems. As predicted by the model, the level of activity will increase with increasing consensus, local solvability and definitional clarity, and decreasing number and institutional specificity. In addition to this support, the relationship of the level of inactivity to the degrees of severity and consensus is most interesting. We previously noted that a "deadly combination" for a community would be for the leadership pool to define local problems as serious, but to exhibit little consensus regarding this severity. In other words, where there is a high degree of severity and a low level of consensus, one might expect to find a high level of inactivity. There is evidence in these empirical observations that such is the case. The problem set in Teayston has the highest degree of severity and the lowest level of consensus. The action set in this community has the highest level of inactivity. High severity and high consensus, however, appears to lead to low levels of inactivity. Empirically, this pattern may be observed in Demain. High level of activity also may be associated with low severity combined with low consensus, however this pattern, as observed in Lowell, is not logically consistent with the model. Finally, as proposed, high levels of inactivity appear to be associated with low levels of severity and consensus. Such a pattern is illustrated in Jefferson. Due to the
limitations of our empirical examination, however, these relationships must be cautiously interpreted. These proposed associations are tentative.

Finally, only three directional propositions involving the dependent variable of public responsibility were offered in the model. None of these was supported. Regarding the four other associations, however, we may observe that the level of public responsibility is positively associated with consensus (+.40) and uniqueness (+.40), and negatively related to local solvability (-1.00) and definitional clarity (-.80).66

II. Propositions Lacking Support

The propositions lacking support are not randomly distributed throughout the matrix. Nine of the eighteen, or 50.0 percent, propositions which lack support are centered in the first two problem dimensions, i.e. number and severity. The remaining nine unsupported propositions are spread across the other five independent variables in the following manner: consensus = one, institutional specificity = two, local solvability = one, uniqueness = three, and definitional clarity = two.

Let us first consider the number of different perceived problems. Only one of six directional propositions was supported. Neither the expected positive associations with organizational relevance, non-local involvement, and blockage, nor the negative associations with urgency and political responsibility were observed. With the exception of the strong, negative association with blockage (-.85), the associations are weak or moderate. A possible factor contributing to these unexpected associations and to the general lack of strength in the relationships
may be the lack of variation evidenced by the leadership pools on the independent variable. Only in Demain was any variation evidenced in the actual number of perceived problems. The leadership pool in Demain perceived fourteen different problems, while the other three leadership pools each perceived twelve. In effect, as an independent variable, this dimension is controlled. Our statistical test, however, is not sensitive to this modicum of difference. Therefore the significance of these relationships is questionable. If the empirically observed associations are valid, however, reinterpretation is required. Concerning this reinterpretation, it may be that as the number of perceived problems increases, the degree of urgency inherent in the action set also increases. The sheer quantity of problems may necessitate urgent action. Also, the number of perceived problems is positively associated with the degrees of severity and institutional specificity in these communities. Therefore, due to these intercorrelations, the positive association with urgency is logical. Where a large number of severe problems are defined in an institutionally specific manner, the degree of urgency in the action set is likely to be high. The unexpected negative association with blockage may be due to the same covariance. The other proposed associations appear to be logical, although they are not evidenced in these four communities. In sum, therefore, due to the lack of variation on the independent variable, the size of the sample, and the nature of our statistical test, we will postpone any possible reinterpretation until further research utilizing an increased, heterogeneous sample is undertaken.
Four of the propositions involving the degree of severity as the independent variable were not supported. These associations included the expected positive associations with institutional coordination (-.80) and organizational relevance (-.20), and the proposed negative associations with public responsibility (+.80) and inactivity (+.80). Our indicator of severity appears to be adequate. These unexpected associations may be due to (1) the effect of institutional specificity as an intervening variable, or (2) logical inadequacies in the model. Concerning the first possibility, the degree of severity and the level of institutional specificity were strongly interrelated (+1.00). This strong covariance may elicit the unexpected associations. In this case, the second possibility must also be considered. Particularly with regard to the associations involving institutional coordination and inactivity, the model may have to be altered. We have observed the urgency and institutional coordination dimensions are negatively related (-1.00). As expected the degree of severity and the degree of urgency are positively associated (+.80). Therefore, the positive association between severity and institutional coordination is axiomatic. In other words, where the problems are defined as serious, the ameliorative activity tends to be defined as being urgently needed, and the level of institutional coordination is low, i.e., problems are attacked within institutional areas where the problems of inter-institutional coordination are lessened. The positive association between the degree of severity and the level of inactivity may also -- as previously observed -- be a result of the degree of consensus inherent in the problem dimensions concerning the severity of the problems. Where the degree of severity
is high, and the level of consensus is low, inactivity may result. Furthermore, there is a negative association between severity and definitional clarity (-1.00). As noted, the expected negative association between definitional clarity and inactivity is observed (-.80). This covariance may also influence the unexpected association between severity and inactivity. In sum, we have offered explanations based upon the covariance in the independent variables and reinterpretations based upon the empirical observations. Which of these possible interpretations is correct must await further research utilizing a larger number of cities in order that appropriate controls may be applied to the data.

The only unexpected association involving the degree of consensus as the independent variable was the moderate, positive relationship (+.40) with the perceived possibility of blockage. This observed association is not logically consistent with the model. Where the power actors are in agreement about the nature and severity of local problems, the level of blockage would appear to be lower than in a situation marked by dissensus. This unexpected association is moderate, and the idiosyncratic pattern of low consensus and low blockage evidenced in Teayston may be responsible. With a sample of four cities, one strong, idiosyncratic community can alter the association. Before reinterpretation is attempted, future research is required.

Two of the propositions involving institutional specificity were not supported. Neither the positive association with blockage, nor the expected negative association with public responsibility were evidenced. Both of these associations are strong (-.80), however the original propositions do appear to be logical. Based upon the strong
economic and industrial representation in these leadership pools, the positive association with public responsibility is very surprising. However, the communities with the highest levels of institutional specificity, i.e. Teayston and Demain, are also the communities with the largest representation by governmental and political officials. Institutional specificity in these communities results in a high degree of public responsibility. The communities with the lowest levels of institutional specificity, i.e. Lowell and Jefferson, also have the lowest levels of public responsibility and the lowest levels of governmental representation. Therefore, due to the nature of the leadership pools, this association is logically consistent with the model. The negative association with blockage, however, may be due to the intervening effects of severity and definitional clarity. If reinterpretation is required in the future, we may offer that when problems are defined in an institutionally specific manner, the level of blockage is lowered due to the non-involvement of actors from various institutional areas.

The only proposition involving local solvability that was not supported was the proposed positive association with organizational relevance (-.40). This unexpected moderate association results from the idiosyncratic pattern evidenced in Demain. The problem set in this community has the lowest level of local solvability, but the action set has the highest level of organizational relevance. The proposed proposition is logically consistent with the model, i.e. the higher the proportion of local problems that are defined as being solvable by the local community, the higher the degree of local organizational
relevance. We will withhold reinterpretation at this time, due to the size of our sample and the idiosyncratic pattern in Demain.

The proposed negative associations between the degree of uniqueness and the levels of non-local involvement (-.40) and inactivity (-.40), and the expected positive relationship between uniqueness and institutional coordination were not observed. These unexpected moderate associations may be a result of a lack of variation on the independent variable. The problem set with the highest degree of uniqueness, 15.8 percent, was only 4.7 percent more unique than the set with the lowest degree. Basically, therefore, in all of these communities the degree of uniqueness is low, and the independent variable is basically controlled. In addition, consensus may be an intervening variable due to its covariance with uniqueness (+.60). The propositions originally proposed in the model appear to be logical. Until future research validates these empirical observations, we will postpone altering the model.

Finally, two of the propositions involving definitional clarity as the independent variable were not supported. Neither the expected positive association with urgency, nor the predicted negative association with blockage was observed. The strength of these associations is strong (.80). Reinterpretation due to the observed covariance between the independent variable and severity and institutional specificity (-1.00) may be required. In these communities, problems which are defined as being severe are (1) perceived in an institutionally specific manner, and (2) not clearly defined in cause and effect terms. The less severe the problem set, therefore, the greater the definitional clarity, and the lower the degree of urgency inherent in the action set. In
addition to these factors, controlling for the other problem dimensions, definitional clarity and blockage may be positively associated. Where problems are clearly defined in specific cause and effect terms, the power actors exhibit a rather clear understanding of the nature of the issue and the steps needed to solve it. The clear understanding may also include the ability to perceive at what points in the action program the activity may and can be blocked by local actors.

In sum, this empirical application generally supports the third set of propositions presented in the model. The level of support, however, is the weakest in the model. Twenty-three of the forty-one directional propositions were supported. A basic problem in this application has been the general lack of variation evidenced by the communities on the independent variables. Two of the variables were basically controlled, i.e. number and uniqueness. Of the remaining twenty-nine directional propositions, nineteen or 65.5 percent were supported. This general lack of variation, however, necessitates caution in the interpretation of these findings. On the basis of this empirical application, however, there is evidence of strong support for the independent dimensions of consensus, institutional specificity, and local solvability. Also encouraging was the strong support evidenced for the propositions involving the dependent variable of inactivity. Institutional coordination, organizational relevance, and non-local involvement also were strongly supported. Moderate support was evidenced for the independent variables of severity, uniqueness, and definitional clarity, and the dependent dimension of blockage. Finally, little support was found for the independent variable of number, or for the dependent dimension of
public responsibility. Where propositions have not been supported, we have offered possible alternative interpretations to those proposed in the model, discussed the issue of covariance, noted possible methodological problems that may have contributed to these findings, and offered conceptual and methodological refinements for future analysis. Once again, we must emphasize the tentative nature of these findings.

Summary

In this chapter we have empirically examined the comparative model. Generally, in this application to four communities, the model was supported. Of the one hundred and forty-three directional propositions offered in the model, ninety-two or 64.3 percent were supported. The chance probability of observing this level of support for the direction of one hundred and forty-three propositions is $p < 0.01$, $X^2 = 10.74$, d.f. = 1. Within the first set of propositions, particularly strong support was evidenced for those propositions involving the independent dimensions of community, political, and economic dependence, and the dependent variables of institutional dominance, social class, legitimacy, scope, and cohesiveness. Strong support within the second set was evidenced for the independent variables of institutional dominance, social class, legitimacy, scope and cohesiveness, and the dependent dimensions of number, severity, and uniqueness. Finally, within the third set of propositions, the independent variables of consensus, institutional specificity, and local solvability, and the dependent dimensions of inactivity, institutional coordination, organizational relevance, and non-local involvement were strongly supported. As
may have been expected, the propositions for which there was the weakest empirical support were those based upon a lacunae in the literature. Therefore, the first set of propositions received the strongest support.

In our analysis of the data we have emphasized the issue of covariance among the variables, noted the inadequacy of our sample and statistical test, proposed methodological and conceptual refinements, and offered reinterpretations and alterations to the basic model. As a first step toward the ultimate development of the model, this application has been very useful and encouraging. It is upon this base that future research and theoretical development will be undertaken.
1. Preliminary figures from the 1970 census are available for these communities. They show that these four cities have become even more similar in population size since 1960. The preliminary reports list the following population figures: Demain, 16,439; Teayston, 13,091; Jefferson, 12,368; and Lowell, 12,277. The range of the population differences has decreased by approximately 30 percent from 6,262 to 4,162. Therefore, at the time of the field work, these communities actually were more similar in population size than even Table 3 would indicate. It would be advantageous to use the 1970 figures, however, we will not do so for two reasons. First, these are preliminary, not official statistics. They are likely to be modified. Second, the only figure available for these communities from the 1970 census is the total population. Other data has not been released. Our other dimensions either are based upon data only available from 1960 or are constructed from per capita indicators. Therefore, to increase comparability, we will only use the 1960 figures.

2. Rates of growth based upon the preliminary 1970 census figures are even more revealing. From 1960 to 1970 these communities had the following growth rates: Teayston, 18.5; Lowell, 15.1; Jefferson, -0.1; and Demain, -2.4. The reader may note that the rank order of these communities has not changed, however, they have split into two distinct groupings. At the time of the field work, Teayston and Lowell were experiencing moderately high rates of growth. Jefferson and Demain, however, actually were losing population. Therefore, the trend evidenced in population growth rate noted in Table 3 has continued, only it has been bifurcated.

3. It may be noted in Table 3 that the two components of our index of Demographic Heterogeneity are negatively associated. This inverse relationship between the percent non-white and the percent foreign-born may be idiosyncratic to the size and historical development of these cities. Apparently, this pattern would not hold for larger cities. An explanation of this pattern for these communities requires additional investigation that is outside of the scope of this study. What should be noted, however, is that due to the extremely small proportion of the population that is foreign-born in each of these cities, a city's rank position on our index of Demographic Heterogeneity is determined by the proportion of non-whites in its population.

4. One possible factor influencing the high proportion of local employment in Demain may be geographical isolation of the community.

5. One may infer from the data in Table 6 that the increase in Teayston and Lowell's populations in resulting from the immigration of
commuters who reside in the community but live elsewhere. Both cities have a large percentage of the residents who work elsewhere. These communities may be experiencing a "suburban boom."

6. The statement on population loss is based upon the preliminary figures from the 1970 census. See footnote 2.

7. Information on the total number of organizations in each community was obtained from the local Chambers of Commerce. This data was collected in 1969. The population figures on which Table 7 is based, however, are from the 1960 census. To correct for bias, the author also computed the level of organizational density for each community using the preliminary 1970 census figures. The rank ordering, and relative magnitude, were the same.

8. Approximately one of every ten employed persons in Demain works in some activity related to the educational institution. The presence of Demain College in the community obviously is the factor leading to this proportionately large educational labor force.

9. In order to utilize the Kendall Coefficient of Concordance as a measure of the multiple-rank agreement, the direction of the associations must be constant. Magnitude of association -- not direction -- is what concerns us.

10. In both of these communities, however, there are indirect links between the leadership pool and the financial institutions. Certain of the power actors, while being corporation executives or business officials, also serve on the boards of directors of the local banks. No bank officials or other financial executives, however, were included in the leadership pools of these communities.

11. In Lowell the power actors in the leadership pool are members of two churches. A total of 49.3 percent of the leadership pool are members of either the local Presbyterian or Episcopal churches. The ministers of these two congregations were identified as being power actors. As one of the community knowledgeable noted, "When you got them all in church on Sunday and working on all your church committees during the week, you are bound to have some influence with the 'big men.'"

12. Information on the income levels of the power actors was not gathered in this study. In future research, it would be advisable to secure such data to construct a more valid index of social class.

13. These prestige scores are based upon an interpolation of the North-Hatt Scale constructed by scholars at The Ohio State University. Christen Jonassen, Robert Bulock, Jerome Folkman, William Kenkel, Alfred Clarke and Russell Dynes extended the original North-Hatt scale to include the prestige scores for over 550 occupations. The occupation of each power actor was affixed a prestige score on the basis of the Ohio State scale.
14. Obviously, "highly educated" refers to the number of years of schooling completed, and not to any judgment concerning the degree of wisdom, intelligence, knowledge, etc., of the power actors.

15. Power actors who held the following positions were classified as "legitimate": local city government offices, whether appointed or elected; local county offices, whether appointed or elected; local administrative positions in the school system; executive positions in local clubs and organizations; elected representative positions to regional, state, and federal legislative bodies.

16. The subscription services of these papers vary in quality. For two of the communities, a number of the local papers were not received. In Lowell and Jefferson 155 issues of the paper were received. From Teayston we received 159 copies, and from Domain 174. We randomly discarded four issues from Teayston and nineteen from Domain in order to have comparability in our indicator of visibility.

17. "Narrow scope" and "pluralism," especially as the latter concept is normally defined by political scientists, are not completely synonymous. In our analysis we will be examining the degree of perceived institutional specificity within the leadership pool. While the concept, "pluralism," infers institutional specificity, it explicitly denotes the exercise of power within institutional areas, and not the reputation for such exercise.


19. In effect, our indicator of scope measures the horizontal dimension of the distribution of power. This indicator can be combined with two measures of the vertical dimension, i.e. the range of influence rankings and quartile distribution of each pool, to provide a description of the distribution of power in the community, or in any social system. For example, we note that the leadership pool in Teayston has a narrow range of scope, i.e. .237. Influence in such a pool is issue-specific and widely distributed among the power actors. In addition, the range of total influence rankings in Teayston is 62. This range is rather small, suggesting a pool with little vertical, but rather extensive horizontal differentiation. Finally, by examining the differences between ranks and identifying clusters of power actors with similar rank scores, one can infer that in Teayston there are three levels of influence in the leadership pool. Two power actors are included at the top level. These actors have influence in a broad range of issues and institutions. At the middle level are 12 power actors whose influence tends to be more issue-specific. Finally, three power actors cluster together at the lowest level. These actors are (1) not as powerful as those above them or (2) have extremely specialized areas of influence, e.g. health and welfare. For Jefferson, however, the scope is much more broad, i.e. .560. The range is 75. These figures indicate a
leadership pool with more vertical differentiation, but much less horizontal differentiation than in Teayston. In this pool there is a tendency toward generalized influence, with four discernible levels of influence. These levels contain two, eleven, two and one power actors respectively. The two actors at the highest level have influence that is strong and ranges across a broad spectrum of issues and institutions. The eleven actors at the second level also possess a relatively consistent degree of influence across institutional areas, however their influence is not as important as that of the two actors at the top level. The actors at the lower two levels also have a consistent level of influence across institutional areas, but the level of influence is relatively low.

The following values were computed for the other two communities: Demain -- scope = .359; range = 91, levels = four of four, eight, eight, and two actors; Lowell -- scope = .311, range = 80.5, levels = four of three, four, seven, and two actors.

20. In computing the sociometric scores it was decided to weight the totals for home visitation and friendship by a factor of two. These two dimensions indicate more intimate relationships among the power actors, i.e. they provide information relative to the degree of primary, as opposed to secondary, interaction with the leadership pool. The other two patterns of interaction, i.e. discussion of local affairs and sharing lunch, are not as primary in nature. It was reasoned that such a weighting would give a more valid indication of the actual level of cohesiveness in the leadership pools.

21. The discussion patterns were dropped from the analysis. The discussion levels were extremely high for all the cities. On the average each power actor claimed to discuss local affairs with 84.3 percent of the other members of the leadership pool. Little variation was shown across communities. It appears that in communities of this size, the power actors definitely (1) do know each other, and (2) interact frequently about local issues. In attempting to determine the relative variation between the pools, however, the discussion dimension was not fruitful.

22. In addition to the data presented in Table 19, other information was utilized in order to rank order the communities on this dimension. The sociograms were studied and it was noted that the number of mutual choices in Teayston was much lower than in Demain. Furthermore the choices in Teayston formed dyads of a limited number, while in Demain a greater percentage of the pool was included in each of the patterns as determined by mutual choices. In addition, in an attempt to assess the validity of the indicators presented in Table 19, the extent of overlap in the organizational memberships of each leadership pool was determined. Based upon the average number of power actor members per organization, the communities were arrayed in the following manner: Jefferson = 2.58, Lowell = 2.11, Demain = 1.91, and Teayston = 1.57.
23. We must note the relativity of these rankings and descriptions of the levels of entrenchment. The rankings are valid only for these four communities. Actually, all of the leadership pools are rather entrenched. In all of the pools the power actors have spent at least 50 percent of their lives in the local communities. Therefore when we note that Lowell is relatively non-entrenched, the statement is only valid in comparison to the other three communities in our sample.

24. The rationale for utilizing two different scales to measure the levels of cosmopolitanism centered around the issue of validity. It was offered that by attempting to measure this concept by two scales, their degree of association would provide some indication of the validity of the instruments. As we shall note, the rank ordering of the communities' degree of cosmopolitanism was exactly the same on both scales. Apparently these two scales were consistently measuring something in a similar manner. On the basis of "face validity" and these perfect associations, we may assume that the something was cosmopolitanism.

25. This finding should not be surprising. The respondents are power actors. The arena in which they exercise power is the local community. This arena obviously is important to the vested interests of these actors. It would be surprising if they showed little interest in the local community and were more concerned with national or international issues.

26. On the basis of this ranking scale, only nine, or 12 percent, of the 74 power actors interviewed were classified as cosmopolitan. Three, or 4.0 percent, were strongly cosmopolitan, however 47 or 63.5 percent were strongly localite.

27. The scale contained the following items: (1) The most rewarding organizations a person can belong to are local clubs and associations rather than large nation-wide organizations; (2) Despite all the newspaper and TV coverage, national and international happenings rarely seem as interesting as events that occur right in the local community in which one lives; (3) No doubt many newcomers to the community are capable people but when it comes to choosing a person for a responsible position in the community, I prefer a man whose family is well established in the community; (4) Big cities may have their place but the local community is the backbone of America; and (5) I have greater respect for a man who is well established in his local community than a man who is widely known in his field but who has no local roots. The choices offered to the power actors were (a) agree strongly, (b) agree somewhat, (c) agree slightly, (d) disagree slightly, (e) disagree somewhat, and (e) disagree strongly. A response of strongly agree was coded as 1, strongly disagree was coded as 6.
28. Thomas R. Dye, "The Local-Cosmopolitan Dimension and the Study of Urban Politics," Social Forces, 3 (March 1963), pp. 239-246. Dye makes no mention of any possible indicators of the validity of the scale other than "face validity." He does note, however, that the reliability of the items was tested by means of the Likert Discriminatory Power technique. Each item significantly discriminated between the respondents in the highest and lowest quartiles.

29. The moderate association (+.40) between scope and visibility should not be surprising. These four cities are small. If the leadership pool in such a city has a broad scope of power, they are likely to be "visible" and frequently cited in the local press. The negative association between cohesiveness and entrenchment, however, is surprising. Apparently in these cities there is a tendency for cohesiveness to decrease with increase in the proportion of time that the leadership pool has spent in the community. In examining four cities, the particular pattern of only one city may cause this association. For example, in Lowell five executive-relatives of the National Construction Company are members of the leadership pool. These individuals have spent a considerable proportion of their lives outside of the city. At this time they are "back home," and have been active in local affairs for a number of years. The sociometric patterns among these actors exhibit a high level of interaction. Therefore, even though Lowell is the least entrenched leadership pool, it has the highest degree of cohesiveness. Even more important, however, we noted that basically these pools (1) exhibit a rather high level of cohesiveness and (2) have relatively high levels of entrenchment. In examining the four cities together, therefore, these concepts appear to be positively associated. When fine distinctions are made, however, and the communities are rank ordered on these dimensions, a strong negative association results. A larger number of sampled cities is required before a conclusion on the nature of this relationship can be ascertained.

30. The reader may remember that the model allowed for such independent associations.

31. The chance probability of observing 59.1 percent supported propositions in a set of 66 is \( P = .147; \chi^2 = 2.2, \text{ df} = 1. \)

32. The Spearman rank order correlation coefficient assumes that the units ranked are the first \( n \) integers of an interval scale. It therefore is valid if the differences between ranks is fairly constant. The magnitude of difference, however, when the units are ranked is not measured. Therefore, spurious results may be obtained if the cities are basically homogenous. For example, let us suppose that four cities are ranked on variable \( X \). The values for these cities on \( X \) are 14.6, 14.3, 14.2, and 11.1. The cities are also ranked on \( Y \), and the values are 124, 84.2, 41.7, and 3.2. If these two variables are independent dimensions in propositions relating them to variable \( Z \), the Spearman rank order correlation coefficients may
be identical, but due to the homogeneity and small degree of variation on variable X, the results may be spurious.

33. In chapter II we were unable to specify the direction of a number of the propositions involving the social class level of the leadership pool as a dependent variable. Only three directional propositions were offered. All of these were strongly supported. In addition, the social class level of the leadership pool in these four communities appears to be positively associated with the rate of growth, degree of community and economic dependence, and negatively associated with political dependence and economic diversity.


35. Ibid.

36. A possible methodological refinement that may be used in future research involves the selection of a random sample of community residents. The extent to which the leadership pool -- selected on the basis of a panel of community knowledgeable -- is visible to the community residents could be empirically determined by querying these residents about "who is influential in the community." The degree of overlap between their nominations and the nominations of the panel of community knowledgeable may be a valid indicator of the degree of visibility in the leadership pool.

37. The specific problems cited by the power actors were classified into general categories, such as industrial and economic development, housing and building, educational problems, public improvements and services, finances, urban renewal, social welfare, etc. Certain problems were more unique and could not be classified in the above categories. Ultraconservatism, absentee-ownership, population growth, the need for a metropolitan government, and the need for a revision in the tax structure are such problems.

38. In addition to the eleven problems cited in Table 27, other problems included (1) water in Teayston, Lowell, and Demain; (2) health in Lowell, Demain, and Jefferson; (3) metropolitan government in Lowell, Demain, and Jefferson; (4) tax revision in Teayston; (5) absentee-ownership in Lowell; (6) population growth in Demain; (7) race and ethnic relations in Jefferson; and (8) ultraconservatism in Jefferson.

39. This concern over rapid population growth is an excellent example of the difference between actual and perceived problems. For the past ten years the city of Demain has been losing population!
40. This rank ordering will be utilized in examining the relationship of this dimension to all the characteristics of the leadership pool except the characteristic of size. Since we would be examining a relationship in which the independent variable is the denominator of the dependent variable, we must use a different indicator. Therefore, the absolute number of different defined problems will be utilized in examining this specific association.

41. \( X^2 = 15.9, \text{d.f.} = 6, p. < .02 \).

42. Another indicator of the degree of similarity in the problems perceived to be present in these communities is the moderately high Kendall Coefficient of Concordance (.629) evidenced in the multiple rank correlation. For each of these four cities, the problems were ranked in the following order: Teayston -- (1) public improvements and services, (2) health, (3) recruitment of public servants, (4) educational problems, (5) water problems, (6) housing and building, (7) social welfare, (8) culture, (9) industrial and economic development, and (10) race and ethnic relations; Lowell -- (1) industrial and economic development, (2) educational problems, (3) water problems, (4) social welfare, (5) public improvements and services, (6) recruitment of public servants, (7) health, (8) housing and building, (9) culture, and (10) race and ethnic relations; Demain -- (1) housing, building, and urban renewal, (2) water problems, (3) public improvements and services, (4) educational problems, (5) recruitment of public servants, (6) industrial and economic development, (7) social welfare, (8) health, (9) culture, and (10) race and ethnic relations; Jefferson -- (1) educational problems, (2) housing, building and urban renewal, (3) public improvements and services, (4) recruitment of public servants, (5) social welfare, (6) industrial and economic development, (7) water problems, (8) culture, (9) health, and (10) race and ethnic relations. For the total sample, the problems were ranked in the following order: (1) educational problems, (2) public improvements and services, (3) water problems, (4) housing, building, and urban renewal, (5) recruitment of public servants, (6) industrial and economic development, (7) social welfare, (8) health, (9) culture, and (10) race and ethnic relations.

43. The formula representing this index is \( I_C = 1 - \frac{N_p D_{\text{max}}}{D_T} \) where \( I_C \) = Index of Consensus, \( D_T \) = the dispersion or dissensus within each problem and is computed by \( D_T = N - M_0 \) where \( M_0 \) is the number in the modal category, \( N_p \) = the total number of rated problems, and \( D_{\text{max}} = N - N/3 \) where \( N \) is the number of power actors and 3 represents the number of different rating categories.

44. Certain problems were definitely institutionally specific. For example, institutionally specific problems included: Government = government financing, recruitment of capable public servants, public improvements and services, metropolitan government, political
apathy, urban renewal, community health programs, flood control, and government planning; Business and Industry = industrial and economic development, housing, building, and urban renewal, downtown revitalization, absentee-ownership, and commercial transportation; Education = school problems of financing, curriculum, teacher recruitment, construction, and public service; and Religion = social welfare. Other problems were indirectly relevant to certain institutions. For example, semi-institutionally specific problems included: Government = industrial and economic development and community apathy; Business = public improvements and services, tax revision, and rapid growth; Education = local finances and public improvements and services. Furthermore, because of its nature, all media problems were classified as semi-institutionally specific.

45. On the basis of the propositions presented in the model, one would expect to observe a low level of inactivity in Lowell due to this high degree of local solvability.

46. In coding these answers the basic criterion for classification concerned the number of intervening steps or degree of direct causal imputation inherent in the problem definitions. For example, causes were classified as "specific" if the power actors offered concrete factors as being the causes of the problems. In their definitions they specified exactly what conditions were bringing about the problem. In other words, there existed a fairly direct association between the specific cause and the problematic effect. In the case of "general" causes, however, the association was much less direct; several intervening factors, steps, and relationships appeared to be missing. The imputation of cause to such factors as "moral decline," "apathy," "greed," or "growth" are examples of such general causes. The difference between these two types of cause may be illustrated also in one of the cities where two power actors discussed racial conflict. One attributed the cause to "the segregated municipal swimming pool and the discriminatory hiring practices in the local plants." The other power actor defined the cause as "basic human nature." Two different members of the research staff coded each response. The level of agreement was 84.2 percent. Where disagreements occurred, discussion and compromise were used to reach a mutual decision.

47. The negative association between the degree of local solvability and the degree of uniqueness is surprising. One would expect that if problems were defined as being unique to the local community, there would be a greater tendency to define the local community as the problem solving agent. The association, however, is moderate. Furthermore, it may be spurious due to the intervening effects of the degrees of seriousness and institutional specificity. These latter two variables are strongly (-.80) associated with local solvability. They also exhibit a weak (+.20) positive association.
with uniqueness. Therefore, because of its positive association to the degrees of seriousness and institutional specificity -- which are negatively associated with the degree of local solvability -- uniqueness may exhibit the unexpected negative association with local solvability.

48. The chance probability of observing twenty-four directionally supported propositions in a set of twenty-eight is $p < .001$, $X^2 = 14.28$, d.f. = 1.

49. $p = .25$, $X^2 = 1.38$, d.f. = 1.

50. Logically, the positive association between the social class level of the leadership pool and the clarity of the problem definitions could have been expected to be stronger than +.20. Possible contaminating factors include the strong degree of covariance evidenced between the clarity of the definitions and the degrees of severity, institutional specificity, and local solvability, the idiosyncratic nature of our four cities, and the generally high educational levels evidenced in all of the leadership pools. Further research involving a larger number of cities is needed.

51. As previously noted, future research may benefit by utilizing the Bonjean technique for locating visible leaders in combination with newspaper citations. The former technique taps the internal visibility of the leadership pool, while the latter may be interpreted to measure the external dimension.

52. With a sample of four communities, this latter situation may well be the case. We previously noted the surprising negative association between entrenchment and cohesiveness that was caused by the unusual pattern in Lowell, i.e. the leadership pool in Lowell was the least entrenched and the most cohesive. This factor may be responsible for the lack of fit involved with the entrenchment variable. The original proposals offered in the model do appear to be logical. Before we alter the model, we must determine if these negative findings are a result of the unusual pattern evidenced in these four cities.

53. These associations are very weak and may not be significant.


55. The institutions included business, government, industry, education, churches, voluntary associations, financial institutions, mass media, public and farmers and ruralities.

56. $X^2 = 4.3$, $p = .23$, d.f. = 3.
57. Of the total of seventy-four action proposals, twenty-two or 30.3 percent were defined as being purely "private" matters. The modal category included those proposals that were defined as being both "public" and "private" concerns, and included 39.6 percent of the total proposals.

58. The list included the following organizations, ranked on the basis of relevance as defined by the power actors in the total sample: (1) chamber of commerce, (2) newspaper, (3) industry, (4) mayor, (5) merchants, (6) bankers, (7) city council, (8) business, (9) church leaders, (10) school board, (11) county commissioners, (12) school teachers and administrators, (13) Republican party, (14) neighborhood groups, (15) Democratic party, (16) bar association, (17) labor unions, (18) farm organizations, (19) the American Independent Party, and (20) racial and ethnic groups. These organizations were selected because they were likely to be present in each of the communities and control resources that are relevant to the solution of local problems. Furthermore, they represent a broad spectrum of the community.

59. In both Jefferson and Lowell the groups which were perceived to have the ability to block the proposals were composed predominately of business and industrial leaders.

60. The degree of public responsibility may be an intervening variable in the first of these illogical associations. Non-local involvement and public responsibility exhibit a perfect positive association. Due to the additional positive association between organizational relevance and public responsibility, the unexpected relationship may result. Furthermore, Demain has the highest values on each of these dimensions. This high intercorrelation in one city also may contribute to the positive association. The negative association between public responsibility and blockage is unexpected only in the sense that the literature stresses the superordinate power of the business and industrial sectors at the expense of the governmental sphere. Finally, the last association between blockage and inactivity is illogical. These latter two relationships may be caused by the strong intercorrelations between urgency, institutional coordination, and inactivity, and to the general lack of variation evidenced by the communities on the blockage dimension, i.e. all of the communities exhibited relatively high levels of blockage.

61. The chance probability of supporting the direction of twenty-three out of forty-one propositions is $p = .50$, $X^2 = .608$, d.f. = 1.

62. The chance probability of supporting the direction of sixteen of twenty-two propositions is $p = .03$, $X^2 = 4.54$, d.f. = 1.

63. $X^2 = 1.316$, $p = .25$, d.f. = 1.
64. Due to the lack of variation on this independent variable, however, this association must be cautiously interpreted.

65. The negative association between consensus and urgency may be a result of the effect of severity. Consensus and severity were negatively associated. Therefore, in these communities the leadership pools exhibit consensus when the severity of the problems is low. Concomittantly, the level of urgency inherent in the ameliorative action is negatively associated with the level of consensus inherent in the problem set.

66. This latter association is particularly interesting. Apparently in these four communities, those problems which are not clearly defined are viewed as public concerns. As one power actor remarked in an interview, "If you don't know what to do about a problem, throw it at the government to solve."

67. If these propositions are removed from the matrix, twenty-two of the remaining thirty-five directional propositions are supported. This represents 62.9 percent of the propositions. The probability of observing this level of support by chance is p. = 12, $X^2 = 2.42$, d.f. = 1.
CHAPTER VI

The Summary and Suggestions
For Future Research and Refinement

In this study we have taken steps toward the development and refinement of a comparative model for the analysis of community power. While not "a giant leap for mankind," this step does represent a sizeable stride for the area of community power research. The task is almost complete. In this chapter we will briefly summarize what we have attempted and accomplished in this study. In addition, suggestions concerning the direction of the future steps necessary for refining the model will be offered. Since it is upon the basis of this study, however, that additional research and refinement will be undertaken, let us briefly summarize this conceptual and empirical effort.

Summary

In Chapter I we briefly reviewed the literature relevant to the study of community power. It was noted that this field of study has a rich, structured, research tradition. Historically, the field has progressed through the following four stages or eras: (1) the Detailed Microcosim, (2) the Reputational Revolution, (3) the Pluralistic Rebellion, and (4) the emerging Comparative Era.\(^1\) It was emphasized that during the first three eras most of the studies were case studies of single communities. Often their main interest was in simply identifying
"who had power," and describing its exercise in the local system. When comparative research was undertaken, little effort was exerted in isolating key community structural variables and relating these to the distribution, structure, and exercise of power. With the coming of the comparative era, however, such research increasingly has been undertaken. With this increased comparative research interest, there has arisen a need for comparative theoretical models to guide the endeavor. The major goal of this study was directed toward this need.

Such a model was presented in Chapters II and III. This model is based upon the relationships between four general sets of variables or "dimension-sets": (1) community structural variables, (2) characteristics of the leadership pool of the community, (3) community problem dimensions relevant to the leadership pool's perception and definition of community problems, and (4) the patterns of community action that are proposed by the leadership pool to ameliorate these problems. The community structural variables include population size and rate of growth, demographic heterogeneity, community autonomy, governmental structure, organizational density, economic diversity, and social class level. In presenting these variables, among other contingencies, we noted the extremely complex nature of the concept of autonomy. In an attempt to secure a degree of conciseness to this concept, economic and political autonomy were also included in the model as independent variables. Basically, the model posits that these community structural variables will affect the structure, distribution, and exercise of community power, i.e. the characteristics of the leadership pool. A total of 81 propositions relating these dimension sets were presented. The
characteristics of the leadership pool were selected from the literature and included size, institutional dominance, social class, legitimacy, visibility, scope, cohesiveness, entrenchment, and cosmopolitanism. Not only were these characteristics chosen for their utility as dependent variables, but they also serve as independent dimensions. The model proposes that these characteristics of the leadership pool will influence what, how, and why certain conditions are perceived and defined as problems. A total of 63 propositions were presented in this relationship. In addition, this set of propositions served to bridge the structural variables in the first two dimension sets with the attitudinal and perceptual dimensions in the latter two sets.

The set of community problem dimensions included the following variables: (1) the number of different problems, (2) their degree of severity, (3) the level of consensus exhibited by the power actors concerning this severity, (4) the degree of institutional specificity inherent in the problem definitions, (5) the level of perceived local solvability, (6) the degree of uniqueness, and (7) the clarity of the problem definitions. The basic criteria for selecting these variables centered around their importance as determinants of the nature of the activity proposed by the power actors to ameliorate the problems. This action was conceptualized along the following seven patterns: (1) the degree of urgency, (2) the degree of requisite institutional coordination, (3) the degree of requisite local organizational relevance, (4) the extent of public versus private responsibility, (5) the requisite level of non-local involvement, (6) the perceived degree of blockage, and (7) the level of inactivity. A total of 49 propositions were
proposed on this last set. In sum, our model relates the structure of the community to the patterns of problem-solving activity existent within the community. This relationship is mediated through the characteristics of the community's leadership pool, and that pool's perception and definition of local problems.

As a first step towards refining the model, this study included an empirical application of the model to a sample of four small cities. The methodology utilized in this application was described in Chapter III. We noted that the cities were selected on the basis of organizational, demographic, and ecological factors which were independent of the model. Specifically, cities were selected that were similar in size and administrative importance, but varied with regard to their possession of water-related problems. Based upon these criteria, the selection of Demain, Teayston, Lowell, and Jefferson for empirical examination was beneficial to the original research interest in water problems, but it proved to be detrimental to an adequate application of the comparative model. Basically, the structure of these communities was very similar. As a result, little variation was evidenced on certain key independent variables, and therefore, these could not be adequately examined. A brief description of each community was offered.

Among the other topics discussed in Chapter IV were the development of the research instruments, the pre-testing of these instruments in Madeira, the composition and training of the field team, the actual field work, and the development of the code book. Also, operational indicators and data sources for each concept were listed. Finally, we noted certain statistical problems encountered in analyzing the data.
These problems center around the size of the sample, its non-random nature, our level of data, and our statistical tests. Ideally, we would want to have a large, random sample of heterogenous cities with data that would allow for the application of multiple and partial correlation and regression analysis and the utilization of such multivariate techniques as path analysis. In this first application, however, we were not able to utilize these techniques. Instead we rank ordered the communities on each variable and examined the relationships by means of the Spearman rank order correlation coefficient and the Kendall Coefficient of Concordance. We previously noted that these techniques are not sensitive to the magnitude of difference in the ranked units. Also, they do not allow for the application of more advanced multivariate techniques or the analysis of variance. These techniques, however, do give us a crude indication of the direction of each association. Our analysis centered on this directionality. Due to the size and nature of the sample, no statistical inference may be drawn. We make no claim for the results of this application other than that they are valid for these four communities.

The findings were presented in Chapter V. Basically, within the limitations of this application, the model received strong support. The strongest support was evidenced for the first set of propositions which linked the dependent characteristics of the leadership pool to the independent community structural variables. The theoretical and empirical bases of these propositions were the strongest in the model. Previous studies have examined some of these propositions. This application confirmed many of the previous findings. The basic limitations
of this section centered around the lack of variation on the structural variables of demographic heterogeneity, governmental structure, and economic diversity, and upon our inadequate indicator of visibility. Concerning the fifty propositions relevant to the structural variables that exhibited variation, the directionality of thirty-three or 66.7 percent was supported. Particularly strong support was evidenced for those propositions involving the independent autonomy variables and the dependent dimensions of institutional dominance, social class, legitimacy, scope, and cohesiveness. Therefore, in these communities the degree of local autonomy does appear to affect the distribution and structure of local power. The direction of those propositions involving entrenchment and cosmopolitanism generally were not supported. Alternative propositions, possible points for reinterpretation, and methodological and conceptual refinements were offered. In addition, the high level of intercorrelation between the structural variables and the moderate level between the characteristics of the leadership pool were noted. In sum, the working proposition that the structure of the community affects the characteristics of the leadership pool was not refuted.

The propositions in the remaining two sets were developed on a lacunae of literature. No previous theoretical or empirical studies have considered either the relationship between the characteristics of the leadership pool and the nature, perception, and definition of local problems offered by the pool, or the latter's effect upon the types of action proposed by the community leaders to ameliorate these problems. These propositions were not as strongly supported as the first set.
This first step, therefore, has been tentative. Let us at this time briefly offer some suggestions for future research and refinement.

Suggestions for Future Research and Refinement

A. Continued Refinement of the Concepts, Indicators, and Propositions in the Model

Obviously, future effort must be given to refining the model. Conceptually, refinement of the concept of social power and the concepts presented in the model may be undertaken. Additional refinement of the concept of autonomy may be needed. We have already attempted this refinement by examining political and economic autonomy as independent dimensions. The boundaries and implications of the concept of autonomy, however, in addition to its referrent, are not precise. The concepts of entrenchment and cosmopolitanism within the leadership pool need refinement. Based upon this application, the expected relationships of these dimensions to the other variables in the model were not observed.

Regarding the operational indicators, refinement is also required. We utilized six indicators to measure political and economic autonomy, but the measures of the decision-making dimension were less than adequate, i.e. absentee ownership and governmental revenue from non-local sources. Perhaps direct questioning of the local power actors concerning the viability of the local community as a decision-making entity could be used, or indices based upon such information as newspaper circulation, marketing areas, transportation routes, long-distance phone calls, vacation patterns, and chain outlets could be utilized. Nelsen's economic classification of cities might be used to measure economic
diversity if the data is available. With respect to the characteristics of the leadership pool, the dimension of social class can be refined by the inclusion of income data into the index. A refined indicator of legitimacy must be constructed based upon formal organizational office holding in combination with the indicators used in this study. We previously noted that our indicator of visibility was inadequate. In addition to newspaper citations, the Bonjean technique for identifying visible, concealed, and symbolic leaders could also be utilized. Possible refinement of the cohesiveness dimension should probably take place through more detailed analysis of the sociometric data that can be gathered. Our indicator did not tap clique patterns within the leadership pool. These patterns may have particular relevance in the analysis of the exercise of social power.

Most of the indicators of the concepts inherent in the community problem dimensions and the patterns of community action appear to be adequate. However, in-depth analysis of the qualitative responses to the questions related to institutional coordination, institutional specificity, and organizational relevance may increase the validity of the indicators.

Finally, we have previously noted which propositions were not directionally supported, and have offered explanations, alternative proposals, and refinements for these. We will not repeat these suggestions at this time. However it should also be noted that future efforts might place the model in an axiomatic framework. Certain of the propositions have already received strong support from the literature in
addition to being supported here. These may serve as axioms for the
deduction of the other propositions.

B. Additional Research Involving A Large Number of Heterogenous
Cities Utilizing Multivariate Techniques Must be Undertaken

We have previously alluded to this need for increasing the scope
of the research. To adequately examine this model, a large number of
cities with differing structural arrangements must be randomly sampled.
Such a study is feasible. Furthermore, it is essential. If we are to
make inferences to other cities, the sampled communities must be random­
ly selected within size categories. It is also of paramount importance
that the communities vary on the structural variables in the model.
For example, we have yet to examine the effects of such community struc­
tural variables as governmental structure, demographic heterogeneity,
and economic diversity. These variables were basically controlled in
our application due to a lack of variation. It is hoped that future
research will not only examine these variables, but cities will be
studied of greatly varying size and structural differentiation. The
four communities studied here were very similar and thus do not consti­
tute an adequate sample for testing the comparative model. Our findings
may be (1) idiosyncratic to these four communities, (2) representative
of communities of this size and structural elaboration, or (3) repre­
sentative of the distribution of power in all cities. The third alter­
native is highly unlikely, however future research in other types of
cities must be undertaken in order to assess the generalizeability of
these findings.
In addition, a large number of cities allows the researcher to apply appropriate controls to the analysis of the data. We have noted that the variables in the model do covary. The independent effect of each variable was not determined in this model. Future research utilizing multivariate statistical analysis must be undertaken.

Finally, future research with a large sample of heterogenous cities would allow for the inductive development of the community structural variables. These variables were deductively selected on the basis of the previous studies in the field. We noted that they were highly intercorrelated. In the future, many additional variables might be included. The technique of factor analysis could be applied to these variables in order to isolate key clusters of variables. It would be most interesting to compare the list of structural variables presented in the model in this study with a list derived on the basis of this inductive method.

In addition to these first two broad, general suggestions, let us briefly offer a few specific proposals for research.

C. The Analysis of the Exercise of Power in these Four Communities, and an Examination of the Relationship of the Exercise of Power to the Other Elements in the Model.

In this study we did not examine the exercise of power. It would appear that the exercise of power would be particularly affected by the characteristics of the leadership pool. The following are only a few of the interesting research questions that can be examined: What effect do such structural characteristics of the leadership pool as institutional dominance, legitimacy, visibility, scope, and cohesiveness
have upon the tactics and strategies utilized in the exercise of power?
Does the rate of exchange and coalition formation increase with a decrease in the scope of the leadership pool? What effect does high cohesiveness have upon the rate of exchange in the exercise of power?
Is the level of authoritatively exercised power affected by the social class level, size, visibility, legitimacy, or cosmopolitanism of the leadership pool? Is the nature of the sanctions utilized in the exercise of power affected by such characteristics as institutional dominance, legitimacy, visibility, entrenchment, scope, and social class level? Do any of the characteristics of the leadership pool influence the level of coercion inherent in the exercise of power?

D. Future Examination of the Other Possible Relationships Inherent in the Model

In Chapter II we noted that, in addition to the relationships examined in this study, one might examine the association between (1) the community structural variables and the community problem dimensions, (2) the relationship between the characteristics of the leadership pool and the patterns of community action, or (3) the association between the patterns of community action and the community structural variables. Regarding the first set of relationships, it would appear that certain community structural variables -- though mediated through the perceptions of the leadership pool -- would affect the dimensions of local problems. For example, the rate of population growth might be expected to influence the perceived severity of the problems because of its stress-inducing qualities. With regard to the second set of associations, one might wish to examine the effect of the characteristics of
the leadership pool upon the patterns of local action. For example, the level of legitimacy in the leadership pool would appear to influence the degree of public responsibility for action. Similarly, the levels of entrenchment and cosmopolitanism would appear to affect the level of non-local involvement in the local action. The dimensions of scope and cohesiveness might influence the levels of institutional coordination, organizational relevance, blockage, and inactivity. To adequately examine such associations, one must control for the intervening dimensions of leadership pool characteristics and community problem dimensions respectively. Such an analysis requires a sample larger than ours. The third possible set of associations is rather unique. Therefore, we will offer it as a part of the next suggestion.

E. Longitudinal Research into the Effect of the Patterns of Community Action Upon the Structure of the Community and the Elements of Change within the Dimension Sets of the Model.

To adequately examine the effect of the community action upon the structure of the community, one must study the community through time. A number of interesting research questions can be developed from the model. For example, what effect does a high level of non-local involvement in local problem solving have upon the degree of autonomy in the community? Do such patterns of community action as institutional coordination, organizational relevance, and blockage influence the organizational density or economic diversity in the community? Is the structure of local government influenced by the level of public responsibility for local action? Future research may explore the structure of the community in relationship to the patterns of action we have
observed. Finally, longitudinal research may focus upon changes within
the dimensions of the model. The model offers a convenient check-list
of variables for classifying each of the dimensions.

F. Development of Typologies of Community Structure,
Leadership Pools, Problem Sets, and Action Patterns.

Future research may lead to the development of typologies for
classifying any unit on these dimensions. Such a development appears
to be feasible due to the interrelatedness of the variables within
each dimension set. Even in this application there is evidence for
such typologies. For example, one type of community may be illustrated
by Teayston. In this city there is a high rate of population growth,
economic dependence, governmental autonomy, high organizational density,
and a relatively high social class level. The leadership pool in
Teayston was observed to have low institutional dominance, high legiti-
macy, low visibility, narrow scope, low cohesiveness, high entrenchment,
and relatively high cosmopolitanism. Jefferson, however, may indicate
another type of city. Its structure included a low rate of population
growth, high economic autonomy, high governmental dependence, low organi-
zational density, and a low social class level. Also in contrast to
Teayston, its leadership pool was characterized by high institutional
dominance, low legitimacy, high visibility, broad scope, high cohesiveness,
low entrenchment, and low cosmopolitanism. These communities
represent the polar extremes in our study. They may also indicate
possible bases for the development of typologies.
G. Examination of Specific Propositions with Appropriate Controls.

With this model, there are 193 testable propositions. Any one of these propositions may be examined independently of the other associations in the model. By controlling for the other variables through sampling, an extremely large number of cities do not have to be studied. For example, those propositions involving the autonomy dimensions would appear to be particularly fruitful for future analysis. Cities which vary only in their degrees of political, economic, and community autonomy could be selected for analysis. By controlling for the other structural variables, the independent influence of autonomy upon the structure, distribution, and exercise of power in the community could be determined. As a method for determining the validity of the entire model, such in-depth analysis is tedious and inefficient. Its value, however, lies in its ability to provide a detailed analysis of key variables.

H. Application of the Model to Large Numbers of Previous Case Studies.

As an alternative to future, costly, expanded field research, a secondary analysis of the existing case studies may aid in refining the model. The model can be applied to each case study. Over 150 different communities have been studied by others in the past. A sample of this magnitude would offer an excellent opportunity for in-depth analysis of the independent effects of each variable. It would have obvious advantages for any attempt at verification. Such studies have been undertaken in the past, however, never before has a deductive theoretical model been applied to the case studies. The studies of Gilbert and
Walton were inductive. This model provides us with an opportunity for systematically classifying and analyzing the dollop of literature in the field.

I. Examination of the Predictive Value of the Model.

Some may consider the predictive value of the model to be a "grandstand play." Prediction, of course, is not the sole criterion upon which the validity of any model should be judged. It is possible, for example, to be able to predict the occurrence of social phenomena without being able to explain this occurrence. Conversely, explanation may be possible, but one is unable to predict eventuation of the phenomena without being able to explain this occurrence.

The predictive utility of a model, however, is one important characteristic for evaluating its validity and practical "pay-off."

In order to evaluate the predictive ability of the model, the researcher can select certain cities for study. On the basis of the structure of these communities, one should be able to predict the characteristics of the distribution, structure, and exercise of power in each city. Having ascertained the degree of fit between the predicted association, one can evaluate the predictive ability of the model.

Similarly, the associations involving the characteristics of the leadership pool and the community problem dimensions, and the patterns of community action can be examined. The predictive ability of the model has obvious relevance for our next, and last, suggestion.
J. Application of the Model in Instances of Planned, Purposive Community Change.

This model would appear to have practical value for those in a local community who attempt to institute community action and change. To institute change within the community system, it is most advantageous to be able to identify those actors in the system who hold power and therefore have the ability to influence the processes in the system. Our model allows the change agent to identify such actors on the basis of the structure of the community and to predict the nature of the structure and exercise of their power. In addition, knowledge of the power actors' perception and definition of local problems and their propensities for ameliorative action can be very valuable to anyone attempting to institute local change. For example, if one is interested in instituting community action to solve a local water pollution problem, knowledge of the structure of local leadership is extremely important. Is the local leadership pool institutionally dominated? If so, by whom? What is the proportion of economic and industrial representation in the leadership pool? Are local government officials represented? Is the pool visible, legitimate, or cohesive? How broad is the scope of the pool? Are pollution problems defined as severe? Do the power actors believe the local community can solve pollution problems by itself? Are the power actors able to clearly define the nature of the pollution problem? Does the leadership pool perceive pollution as a unique problem for their city? Is pollution a salient problem to the leadership pool? Is there consensus within the leadership pool about the severity of the pollution problem? Does the
leadership pool perceive that a solution to local water pollution is urgently needed? What degree of institutional coordination is perceived as being requisite to solve the problem? Are the local organizations viewed as relevant to this issue? Is the solution of water pollution perceived to be a public or private concern? Is there high probability that local individuals and groups will be able to block any action to solve this problem? These questions are of crucial importance to the change agent. Our model offers a framework for securing the answers.

A Final Observation

We have noted many inadequacies in this study. Irrespective of these difficulties, however, it is hoped that this step toward a comparative model for the analysis of community power represents a significant contribution. We have presented a model for the comparative analysis of community power, problems, and action. We have shown that the model can be operationalized and empirically applied. Its strength lies in its utility as a framework for future research. Hopefully, those interested in this area of research will find it useful.
FOOTNOTES: Chapter VI

1. Clark basically noted a similar historical trend, however he only specifically labels the "pluralistic revolution" and the "comparative revolution." See Terry Clark, Community Structure and Decision-Making: A Comparative Analysis (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 3-5.


4. Claire W. Gilbert, "Community Power and Decision-Making: A Quantitative Examination of Previous Research," in Clark (ed.) Community Structure and Decision Making: A Comparative Analysis (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 139-155; and John Walton, "The Vertical Axis of Community Organization and Structure of Power," The Southwest Social Science Quarterly (December 1967), pp. 353-368. It is the author's understanding that the data from these two studies may be obtained from the authors.
I should first like to introduce myself. I am __________________, a staff member at The Ohio State University, The Disaster Research Center. The Center has been engaged in studying a wide variety of community problems. While much of the work of the Center has been on the social consequences of natural disaster, we are interested in a wide range of problems centering on problem solving in local communities. We are moving into a series of studies in small cities in Ohio, trying to understand the range of problems they face and the ways they have used to solve these problems.

In order to do this, we want to talk to persons in these communities who are influential in the decision-making process. You can be of help to us in identifying these persons.

In other words, we wish to identify the persons in the community who are instrumental in decision making and problem solving. We plan to talk to them. (Of course, anything you say is confidential. In addition, your name will not be used when we talk to these influentials. We plan to ask several people to help us identify them.)

What we want to do then is to talk about the various problems this community faces and the people that are involved in the solving of these problems. It should not take too much of your time. (If he balks, rearrange meeting.)

Could we record our discussion? We have found that this helps us remember more accurately and also it saves us a great deal of writing.
HISTORY

1. Every community has a wide variety of problems. What would you consider to be the major community problem in ________ in the past few years? (Try to get issues and dates on various problems.)

2. Now you have talked about several different problems, would you select one of these issues, the one you consider most important, and tell me:
   a. How the issue arose?
   b. What action was taken?
   c. Who in the community was active in this issue?
   d. What was the process whereby the decision was made -- the issue was solved?

LEADER NOMINATION

1. You have already indicated certain individuals as being influential in the decision-making process in the past. Who do you consider the most influential persons in the community?

   LET HIM GIVE NAMES. PROBE ONLY ONCE. Go back and pick up occupation and position of persons mentioned.

2. Now many people are influential and/or knowledgeable in a particular area of the community. In each of the following areas, would you tell me who you consider influential. (Can get occupation and position as you go along.)
   a. Education and schools
   b. Economic life
c. Health and welfare

d. Religion and churches

e. Local clubs and associations

f. Local government

g. State government

h. National government

3. Are there any individuals who are influential in local affairs who live outside the community?

**CURRENT COMMUNITY PROBLEMS**

1. What do you consider the most important problem facing the community at the present time? (If he mentions several, have him rank them.)

2. If you wanted these problems solved, what individuals would you go to in the community to do the following things? (Might summarize overall process and then go back.)

   a. Making people aware of the problem.

   b. Deciding what should be done.

   c. Getting public support for the decision.

   d. Putting the decision into operation.

**PERCEIVED WATER-RELATED PROBLEMS**

1. Do you think that __________ has any water-related problems such as depletion, pollution, flood control, etc.?

   a. If yes, do you think that the community considers these pressing or urgent problems?
2. If you were convinced that ________ did have a water problem, what individuals (get names) within the community would you try to get involved in solving it?

THANK YOU FOR THE TIME AND INFORMATION.

At some later stage of the study, we might want to talk to you again. If we do we will contact you. Thanks again.
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First, let me introduce myself. I am ________________________, a staff member from The Ohio State University Disaster Research Center. While most of the previous work of the Center has been on the social consequences of natural disasters, we are interested in a variety of community problems, not just disasters. In this current study, we are attempting to understand the range of problems faced by smaller cities and to understand how they attempt to solve them. In order to do this, we want to talk to persons in these communities who have been actively involved in problem solving and decision making. This is why we have come to you.

We would like to talk with you about what you see as being the more important problems this community faces and the people that are involved in solving these problems. It will only take about 45 minutes of your time.

We have found that a tape recorder helps us to remember more accurately and also it saves a lot of time from writing. Would you mind if we use the tape recorder?

It is understood, of course, that anything we say here will be confidential. During the course of the interview, we may use the names of specific persons. It should be made clear that we are not interested in names or personalities as such but only how particular kinds of persons are related to one another in the problem-solving process within the community. Since we plan to compare several communities, our focus is on differences between these communities, not among persons. In the final product, towns will be compared and no personal identifications will be used.

PART I

Since we do need different kinds of information about people, I wonder if you would fill out this information sheet while I am setting up the tape recorder.

(HAND RESPONDENT INFORMATION SHEET)
PART I

People have different feelings about their community. Below are a series of statements about the community on which people feel differently. There are, of course, no right answers. Please circle the answer which best reflects your feeling.

1. The most rewarding organizations a person can belong to are local clubs and associations rather than large nation-wide organizations.

   Agree Strongly  Agree Somewhat  Agree Slightly
   Disagree Slightly  Disagree Somewhat  Disagree Strongly

2. Despite all the newspaper and TV coverage, national and international happenings rarely seem as interesting as events that occur right in the local community in which one lives.

   Agree Strongly  Agree Somewhat  Agree Slightly
   Disagree Slightly  Disagree Somewhat  Disagree Strongly

3. No doubt many newcomers to the community are capable people but when it comes to choosing a person for a responsible position in the community, I prefer a man whose family is well established in the community.

   Agree Strongly  Agree Somewhat  Agree Slightly
   Disagree Slightly  Disagree Somewhat  Disagree Strongly

4. Big cities may have their place but the local community is the backbone of America.

   Agree Strongly  Agree Somewhat  Agree Slightly
   Disagree Slightly  Disagree Somewhat  Disagree Strongly

5. I have greater respect for a man who is well established in his local community than a man who is widely known in his field but who has no local roots.

   Agree Strongly  Agree Somewhat  Agree Slightly
   Disagree Slightly  Disagree Somewhat  Disagree Strongly
INFORMATION SHEET

Most of the information below can be supplied by making a check mark ( ) or by writing in a few words.

1. What is your present occupation? (Be specific. If more than one, write in your major occupation.)

2. How many years have you lived in this community? _______ years.

3. How old are you? ___ Under 30 ___ 30-40 ___ 40-50 ___ 50-60 ___ 60-70 ___ 70 and older

4. Circle the last year of formal schooling you completed.
   Grade School 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
   High School 1 2 3 4
   Technical or Trade 1 2 3 4
   College 1 2 3 4
   Graduate or Professional 1 2 3 4

5. What is your church affiliation? (Be specific, e.g., Broad Street Methodist, etc.)

   _____________________________________________. If none, check here ___.

6. People read many different things. Would you write in below the newspapers, magazines and professional journals you read regularly.

   NEWSPAPERS __________________________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________

   MAGAZINES __________________________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________

   PROFESSIONAL JOURNALS _____________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________
7. In your political activities and voting, do you consider yourself a Republican ___, a Democrat ___, or an Independent ___? (Check one.)

8. In the last three years, how have you been involved politically within the community? (Check as many as needed.)

- held local (city or county) political office
- run for local political office
- been involved in local party organization
- been involved in state and national party activities
- only been involved in voting and other citizenship obligations

9. Below would you list the local clubs, associations, service organizations to which you have belonged in the past three years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Club</th>
<th>Member</th>
<th>A Committee Officer</th>
<th>An Involved Member</th>
<th>Involved at State Levels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Example: Kiwanis,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civic Improvement Club, etc.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(Check below if YES)

(If others, please write on back of page.)
10. People have different kinds of interests. On the following issues, would you rank 1 to 5 the following concerns in terms of your personal interests. Use (1) to indicate the type of issues that interests you most and (5) to indicate that which interests you least. 
   Rank all five.
   ____ State Issues
   ____ National Issues
   ____ Local Issues
   ____ County Issues
   ____ International Issues

11. Groups within a community have different amounts of influence upon local affairs. Would you rank 1 to 6 the following groups within this community as to how influential they are in most community issues? Use (1) to indicate the group with the most influence and (6) for the group that has least influence. Rank all six.
   ____ Churches
   ____ Mayor and City Council
   ____ Industry
   ____ Retail Merchants
   ____ Schools
   ____ Local Organizations, Clubs, Councils
PART II

In trying to understand a community, it is necessary to know something about its past. In the next few minutes, we will be talking about the past.

1. Briefly, could you tell me what you consider to have been the major community problems in _________ in the past five years?

   (LIMIT THE RESPONDENT TO FIVE PROBLEMS BUT DO NOT INFORM HIM OF THIS LIMITATION. DO NOT SAY WHAT ARE THE FIVE MAJOR PROBLEMS. PROBE UNTIL YOU GET FIVE FROM HIM.)

2. How have you personally been involved in these issues? What role did you play in helping to solve these problems?

3. Taking what you consider to be the two major issues in the past --
   A. What action was taken to solve the problem(s)?
   B. Who was active in making decisions to solve these problems?
      (PROBE, OBTAIN SPECIFIC NAMES)

4. Here is a list of subjects which sometimes pose problems for communities in the United States. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 1.) Would you tell me which of these have been very serious problems in ________, which have been fairly serious problems in ________, and which have not been serious problems in ________?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Serious</th>
<th>Fairly Serious</th>
<th>Not Serious</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Industrial and economic development (new plants, electrification, employment, labor supply, etc.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Housing and building (slum clearance, blight and deterioration, zoning, etc.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Race and ethnic relations (school desegregation, housing segregation, racial violence, etc.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Public improvements, services, and utilities (transportation, roads, streets, sewage, etc.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(5) Health (public and private hospitals, sanitation, etc.) ................. 1 2 3

(6) Culture (libraries, clubs, theatres, etc.) ............................ 1 2 3

(7) Education (including school construction, curriculum problems, reorganizations, etc.) .............................. 1 2 3

(8) Social improvement and welfare (child welfare, crime, delinquency, poverty, care for the aged, handicapped, etc.) .............................. 1 2 3

(9) Water problems - flooding, pollution and depletion (contaminated water, lack of water for industry, homes, etc.) .............................. 1 2 3

(10) Recruitment of capable public servants .................................. 1 2 3

5. What do you consider to be the most important problem currently facing ________?

6. Do you believe that other nearby communities of approximately the same size have a similar problem?
   Yes, _____ No

7. What do you see as the cause(s) of the problem? (PROBE)

8. Has any action been undertaken to solve this problem?
   IF YES,
   A. What has been proposed?
   B. Who initiated the idea?
   C. What has been accomplished so far?
   IF NO,
   A. What action would you propose to solve this problem?
   B. How would you carry out your plan of action?

   (FOR BOTH PRESENT ACTION OR ANTICIPATED ACTION)

9. Do you feel a solution is urgently needed? (PROBE. IF YES, HOW URGENT?)

10. Do you see this problem as something the local community can solve or will it have to depend on outside help?
11. What segment of the community do you see as being primarily responsible for solving this problem? (i.e., businessmen, political leaders, churches, etc.)

12. Do you feel that this problem is primarily a governmental matter or a matter for private citizens to solve?

13. Is there any single person whose opposition would be almost impossible to overcome or whose support would be essential if one wanted to solve this problem?
   ___ Yes, ___ No

   IF YES,
   A. Who is that? ___________________________________________
   B. What is his position in the community? _________________

   IF NO,
   A. What person comes closest to this description? _________
   B. What is his position in the community? _________________

14. Is there any informal group whose opposition would be almost impossible to overcome or whose support would be essential if one wanted to solve this problem?
   ___ Yes, ___ No

   IF YES,
   A. Who is that? ___________________________________________
   B. What is its position in the community? _________________

   IF NO,
   A. What group comes closest to this description? _________
   B. What is its position in the community? _________________

15. Here is a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me for each whether their support is essential for the success of a solution to this problem, whether their support is important but not essential, or whether their support is not important? (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Support Essential</th>
<th>Support Important, Not Essential</th>
<th>Support Not Important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B. Republican Party

C. AIP Party (Wallace Party)

D. Chamber of Commerce

E. Church Leaders

F. School Board

G. School Teachers and Administrators

H. Newspapers

I. Bar Association

J. Labor Unions

K. Racial or Ethnic Groups
(If named as essential or important, ask: Which groups.)

L. Neighborhood Groups

M. Farm Organizations, such as Grange, etc.

N. Heads of Local Government Agencies

O. City and County Employees

P. Industrial Leaders

Q. Retail Merchants

R. Bankers and Executives of Financial Institutions

S. Other Businessmen

(If the respondent has mentioned a water-related problem earlier, refer back to it as a lead in.)

16. (Refer back to Card One) Do you think that _________ has any water-related problems, such as water pollution or depletion? If so, what are they?
17. Do you feel that these are particularly urgent or pressing problems? (PROBE. GET RESPONDENT TO COMPARE THEM WITH OTHER PROBLEMS PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED.)

18. Do you believe that other nearby communities of approximately the same size have similar water-related problems?
   _____ Yes, _____ No

19. What do you see as the cause(s) of these water problems? (PROBE)

20. Has any action been undertaken to solve these water problems?
   IF YES,
   A. What has been proposed?
   B. Who initiated the idea?
   C. What has been accomplished so far?
   IF NO,
   A. What action would you propose to solve this water problem?
   B. How could you carry out your plan of action?

21. Do you see this water problem as something the local community can solve or will it have to depend on outside help?

22. What segment of the community do you see as being primarily responsible for solving this water problem? (i.e., businessmen, political leaders, churches, etc.)

23. Do you feel that this water problem is primarily a governmental matter or a matter for private citizens to solve?

24. Is there any single person whose opposition would be almost impossible to overcome or whose support would be essential if one wanted to solve this water problem?
   _____ Yes, _____ No
   IF YES,
   A. Who is that?
   B. What is his position in the community?
IF NO,

A. What person comes closest to this description?

B. What is his position in the community?

25. Is there any informal group whose opposition would be almost impossible to overcome or whose support would be essential if one wanted to solve this water problem?

_____ Yes, _____ No

IF YES,

A. Who is that?

B. What is its position in the community?

IF NO,

A. What group comes closest to this description?

B. What is its position in the community?

26. If you were convinced that __________ had a water-related problem, who would you go to in the community to help solve this problem? (ASK FOR NAMES.)

A. Why would you seek the aid and support of these particular individuals?

27. You already have in your hands (CARD 2) a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me for each whether their support is essential for the success of a solution of water-related problems, whether their support is important but not essential, or whether their support is not important?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Support Essential</th>
<th>Support Important, Not Essential</th>
<th>Support Not Important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Democratic Party</td>
<td>1  2  3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Republican Party</td>
<td>1  2  3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. AIP Party (Wallace Party)</td>
<td>1  2  3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>1  2  3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Church Leaders</td>
<td>1  2  3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>F. School Board</td>
<td>1  2  3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Rating</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>G. School Teachers and Administrators</td>
<td>1-2-3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>H. Newspapers</td>
<td>1-2-3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>I. Bar Association</td>
<td>1-2-3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>J. Labor Unions</td>
<td>1-2-3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>K. Racial or Ethnic Groups (IF NAMED AS ESSENTIAL OR IMPORTANT, ASK: WHICH GROUPS?)</td>
<td>1-2-3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. Neighborhood Groups</td>
<td>1-2-3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>M. Farm Organizations, such as Grange, etc.</td>
<td>1-2-3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>N. Heads of Local Government Agencies</td>
<td>1-2-3</td>
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<tr>
<td>O. City and County Employees</td>
<td>1-2-3</td>
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<tr>
<td>P. Industrial Leaders</td>
<td>1-2-3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q. Retail Merchants</td>
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<tr>
<td>R. Bankers and Executives of Financial Institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>S. Other Businessmen</td>
<td>1-2-3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

28. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 3) In front of you, you have a list of various persons in the community. After each of their names, you have a number of categories of community activity and effort. In each of these areas, could you rate each of the individuals in terms of their influence. (1 - Extremely Influential, 2 - Quite Influential, 3 - Some Influence, 4 - Very Little Influence, 5 - No Influence.)

For example, a person might be extremely influential in Education, have some influence in Local Government, no influence in other areas but you consider him to have very little influence in the total community. He should be marked as the example on the sheet. While I'm checking back to see if we have overlooked anything, would you rate the persons on the list in each of these areas?

29. Now that you have finished this list, would you look over the list and write in the names of any persons that you feel should be on it?
In other words, individuals that you feel have important influence within the community?

A. Would you rank them as you did the others?

30. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 4.) In front of you there is the same list of persons. In all communities, there are different circles of people with whom one associates in different ways. Some we often each lunch with; others we visit in their homes; some we consider our close friends; others we discuss community problems with. Would you go through each name and check the column which indicates your relationship with the person mentioned?

(MAKE SURE THE NAMES OBTAINED FROM THE PREVIOUS QUESTION ARE ON THIS LIST.)

31. One final question. While all communities are somewhat alike, all of them are unique also. If you were talking to someone from outside the community, what features of the community would you tell him were unique about it?

(LEAVE THIS OPEN. IF PROBE IS NECESSARY, INDICATE IT ON THE INTERVIEW FORM. PERHAPS USE PROBE SUCH AS -- IS THERE ANYTHING ABOUT THE TONE, THE QUALITY, THE HISTORY, THE COMPOSITION OF THE COMMUNITY WHICH MAKES IT UNIQUE?)

Thank you very much for your time and effort. Let me reemphasize that this information is to be kept confidential. As I explained earlier, we are interested in different patterns of influence and problem solving among communities and no names will be associated with any specific opinion in the final product. Thanks again for your time.
PART III

Below are listed various persons from your community together with a number of categories of community activity and effort. In each of these areas, could you rank each of the individuals in terms of his influence (1 - extremely influential; 2 - quite influential; 3 - some influence; 4 - very little influence; and 5 - no influence.) For example, a person might be extremely influential in education, have some influence in local government, no influence in other areas, but you consider him to have very little influence in the total community. He should be marked as the example, Mr. Smith. Would you rate the persons on this list in each of these areas?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Business and Industry</th>
<th>Local Govt. and Politics</th>
<th>State and National Government and Politics</th>
<th>Churches</th>
<th>Organizations and Clubs</th>
<th>Overall Community Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. J.W. Smith</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>2.</td>
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PART IV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Check the names of the people you often join for lunch.</th>
<th>Check the names of people you often visit in their homes and they in yours.</th>
<th>Check the names of your close friends.</th>
<th>Check the names of the people with whom you discuss local community affairs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
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<td>2.</td>
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<td>10.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


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