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LOCKE'S DOCTRINE OF REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION

DISSERTATION

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CHAPTER I

DATA CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERCEPTION AND IDEAS

a. The Limits of Our Present Concern.

This discussion of Locke will primarily concern his account of perception of the external world, and some of the assumptions of that account. Locke is chosen because of his ability to express apparently common sense answers to some of the questions about the nature of perception. It is often suggested that Locke's views are widely, if naively, held today. For example, while he is never very clear about what might be called the nature of physical objects, Locke clearly believes that there are things which exist apart from and independently of our perceptions and experiences. This appears to be a rather widespread belief, but one the grounds of which are often questioned by philosophers. Time and again Locke uses such phrases as "the object affects our senses" (IV.ii.14), "the notice we have by our senses of

\[1\] I don't think this incompatible with the spirit of Ryle's remark, "...there is no unkindest or unfairer testimonial to his philosophical writings than to say...that in them the common-sense views of ordinary man find their best expression." Gilbert Ryle, "John Locke on the Human Understanding," in Tercentenary Addresses on John Locke, ed. by J.L. Stocks.

\[2\] I shall hereafter refer to Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by E.A. Fraser (2 vols.), by noting Book, chapter, and article, e.g., (IV.ii.14).
the existing of things without us" (II.xi.3), and "simple ideas...are the natural and regular productions of things without us..." (IV.iv.4). In this respect Locke's whole philosophy is not subject to the intuitive revulsion which Idealism seems so often to inspire. And while it may be claimed that Locke's philosophy, and in particular his account of perception, inspires scepticism, it is certainly not his purpose, or consistent with it, to raise doubts about the existence of physical objects which exist independently of minds.

In Book IV Locke discusses the problem of scepticism, but in a manner which would appear to reflect not so much philosophical concern as impatience with the sceptic. He at first confesses that knowledge of the external world is less secure than knowledge of self, God, and demonstration, and then proceeds to speak of the sceptic in the following way:

And if our dreamer pleases to try whether the glowing heat of a glass furnace be barely a wandering imagination in a drowsy man's fancy, by putting his hand into it, he may perhaps be wakened into a certainty greater than he could wish, that it is something more than bare imagination. (IV.xi.8)

A predilection against scepticism is implied in the stated aims of the Essay. Locke sets himself apart from previous philosophies and philosophers by his use of the "historical plain method" by which he endeavors to explain the "grounds of those persuasions which are to be found amongst men," (Introduction 2) and to show the foundations and origin of
all knowledge to be experience.

While this indicates a decided anti-scepticism in Locke's assumptions, he never seems to question the tenet of earlier philosophers which leads to scepticism, e.g., the claim that what we directly perceive are ideas. While Locke does not think that his account of perception should encourage the sceptic, the impatience he betrays in his anti-sceptical arguments of Book IV, chapter xi, are his indirect recognition that it does. It is no less a thinker than Reid who says of a crucial postulate of Locke's theory of perception that it is the germ of modern philosophical scepticism:

All the arguments urged by Berkeley and Hume, against the existence of a material world, are grounded upon this principle—that we do not perceive external objects themselves, but certain images or ideas in our minds. 

Reid makes it clear that it is not Locke's system alone which contains the seeds of disaster, and also that Locke was not fully aware, at least of the magnitude, of the problem:

But to come to the system of Des Carte, concerning the human understanding. It was built as we have observed, upon consciousness as its sole foundation, and with ideas as its materials; and all his followers have built upon the same foundation and with the same materials... The natural issue of this system is scepticism with regard to everything except the existence of our ideas, and of their necessary relations, which appear upon comparing them, is evident; for ideas being the only objects of thought, and having no

---

Thomas Reid, *Philosophical Works*, I, 446.
existence but when we are conscious of them, it neces-
ecessarily follows that there is no object of our 
thought which can have a continued and permanent ex-
istence......Neither Descartes nor Locke perceived 
this consequence of their system concerning ideas. 4

Reid is a perceptive thinker, but not everything he 
says here is to be readily accepted. It may not, for exam-
ple, always be consistent with the other things Locke says 
to say that ideas are the only objects of thought or percep-
tion. Whether or not there is a way of interpreting Locke's 
account which acknowledges and explains its common appeal, 
and does not obviously inspire scepticism (supposing that 
that is ever an inspired position) is the question we shall 
attempt to answer. I hope to show that Locke had answers to 
these philosophical problems of perception which are consist-
ent with common sense beliefs. Locke would find little to 
disagree with in Reid's contention that

...philosophy...has no other root than the princi-
ples of Common Sense; it grows out of them and draws 
its nourishment from them. Severed from this root its 
honours wither, its sap is dried up, it dies and 
rots.5

I disagree with Reid's contention that Locke is one of 
those philosophers who has "waged open war on Common Sense

4Ibid., 207.

5Ibid., 101. Locke's agreement with this and the fol-
lowing quotation from Reid is indicated by his response to 
the sceptics. That response indicates that his concern is 
with whether we have certainty as great as our frame is ca-
pable of attaining, and sufficient for the practical 
affairs of life. Beyond that, doubt is "(I will not say 
reason, but) pretense of doubting." (IV.xi.especially 1-10).
and hopes to make a complete conquest of it by the subtleties of philosophy—an attempt no less audacious and vain than that of the giants to dethrone almighty Jove." The explanation of Locke's belief in the compatibility of that "crucial postulate of Locke's theory of perception that is the germ of modern philosophical scepticism," with the Common Sense which he is accused of violating, is centered in the attempt to explain how Locke thought the claim "we perceive ideas in our own minds" was compatible with "we perceive external objects." The establishment of this as one of Locke's beliefs is the central task in this discussion of Locke.

This task requires that we consider only select portions of Locke's discussion of knowledge, for his discussion is divided in the following way:

...we may add to the two former sorts of knowledge this also, of the existence of particular external objects, by that perception and consciousness we have of the actual entrance of ideas from them, and allow these three degrees of knowledge, viz. intuitive, demonstrative, and sensitive: in each of which there are different degrees and ways of certainty. (IV.iii.14)

Intuitive knowledge is that knowledge resulting from the immediate comparison of two ideas when that comparison ends in, e.g., the realization that the one is not the other. Demonstrative (or rational) knowledge is the kind involved when we know the relation of two ideas via intervening ideas, as in a proof or demonstration. Sensitive knowledge is know-

---

6 Ibid.
ledge of the existence of things actually present to our senses, that is, the kind of knowledge we have of anything other than ourselves and God.

We shall be concerned primarily with sensitive knowledge, but since it is a species of knowledge, many of the true things one says about it will be true of all knowledge. The way sensitive knowledge is arrived at, the certainty of it, and the adequacy of Locke's arguments will be the subject matter of this dissertation.

b. Ideas, and Objects of Perception

The account of perception which leads Reid to say the things he does is known as the doctrine of Representative Perception. In a general way such an account attempts to bring together the immediately known content of an act of perception and the mind-independent reality which is known by means of that act and its content. The immediately known content is sometimes called "ideas," while the reality may be called "objects," "objects of perception," "qualities," "qualities of objects," "reality," or "physical reality." What Reid has suggested in the preceding pages is that an account according to which ideas are objects of perception is incompatible with one in which "objects" or "qualities of objects" are perceived or are objects of perception. What

7Locke's hesitations and final decision that sensitive knowledge is really knowledge can be found in I,ii.14.
we are now about to do is examine Locke's use of some of these terms to see whether he agrees with Reid or whether Locke thinks he can offer an account according to which ideas are not the only things that are perceived. The use of these terms is the data from which various interpretations of Locke's account of perception draw their support.

According to Locke all knowledge, by definition, is "the perception of the agreement of disagreement of our ideas." (IV.iii.1) This definition is later modified somewhat to include sensitive knowledge as knowledge. In any event the source or origin of all these ideas is the external world, i.e., there are no innate ideas. It is the case that the notions of 'idea' and 'perception' are of crucial importance in Locke's account of perception. As we shall see these notions are intertwined, and the task of getting straight about them is really the task of discovering the relationship of perceptions to ideas. This is complicated by the fact that the term 'perception' seems to be used ambiguously throughout the text. For example, here are some passages which are frequently noted:

Whatsoever...is the immediate object of perception...that I call idea (II.viii.8);

...the extension, figure, number, and motion of bodies of an observable bigness, may be perceived at a distance by the sight...(II.viii.12)

From yet another source we find further evidence of ambiguity:

...I think nobody can imagine that any articulate
sounds of mine, or anybody else, can make known to another what his ideas, that is, what his perceptions are, better than what he himself knows and perceives them to be:... 8

The evidence of these passages indicates that we "perceive" both ideas and objects of the external world.

It may be thought that the first of these passages suggests that "ideas" are immediately perceived, while the second indicates that "qualities of bodies" are just "perceived" or "immediately perceived." This kind of data, however, is available to all who comment upon Locke. Yet it is not only Reid's belief, but general knowledge that Locke is a representationalist for whom there is little or no hope of his being able to say that he "perceives" mind-independent external objects. 9 It is thought that the claim that the objects of perception are ideas takes precedence over, and falsifies, the claim that he perceives tables and chairs, meaning what we all mean by that claim. What I want to investigate, primarily, in this dissertation is whether there is not good reason, given the ambiguity of the use of the term 'perception,' for thinking that an alternative account can be given of Locke's theory of perception. I

8 The Works of John Locke, X, 248.

9 George Berkeley in The Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous; Maurice Mandelbaum in Philosophy, Science and Sense Perception; and H.P. Grice in "The Causal Theory of Perception," Supplementary Volume of the Aristotelian Society, XXXV (1961) are but a few of the widely differing philosophers who have recognized this to be true.
hope to show by my examination of his account that either "nothing but ideas are perceived" is not a justified inference from what Locke says, or, at least, that it is not the only justified understanding of his account of perception.

'Perception' is sometimes used to indicate an act, and sometimes an object. When 'perception' is used to indicate an act sometimes the objects of that act are ideas, and sometimes they are mind-independent entities. In addition, it is sometimes used as a generic term, sometimes as a species term. In its role as indicator of an object, 'perception' seems to function as a replacement for 'idea'. In both cases we want to determine the role of the external object in "perception," and the extent to which Locke thinks it is "perceived." Looking ahead, I think that it is a good bet that the distinction between mediate and immediate perception, one with which Locke was familiar, but about which he was not always precise, will be of help in unraveling these rather knotty problems. He uses these terms but infrequently and apparently in such a way that commentators still think it unlikely that anything external is perceived. Thus these terms are introduced primarily by commentators in order to interpret the passages we are about to cite, and the proper use of these terms to explicate the Lockian text in accordance with our goals has not always been obvious to commentators. As will be quickly seen the problem is not one of having no evidence, but of having far too much
that is ambiguous.

Let us turn first to the notion of 'idea'. The term 'idea' is probably more often used than any other in the Essay, and it is difficult to determine the relationship between "ideas" and other things. 'Idea' is the term which Locke says he uses to "stand for whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks,...or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking." (Introduction 8) He also says such things as:

...our knowledge is founded on and employed about our ideas only...(IV.ii.15)

...our knowledge consisting in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, its clearness or obscurity consists in the clearness or obscurity of that perception, and not in the clearness or obscurity of the ideas themselves...(IV.ii.15)

and perhaps most importantly for our purposes:

Perception, which we make the act of the understanding, is of three sorts:--1. The perception of ideas in our minds...(II.xxi.5)

and

Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call idea. (II.viii.8)

It is taken for granted

...that there are such ideas in men's minds: everyone is conscious of them in himself; and men's words and actions will satisfy him that they are in others. (Introduction 8)

Later we hear again that:

Every man being conscious to himself that he thinks; and that which the mind is applied about whilst thinking being the ideas that are there, it is past doubt that men have in their minds several ideas,...
such as those expressed by the words whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness, and others... (II.1.2)

What, however, is one to make of such claims as the one that ideas are "what the mind can be employed about in thinking"? Certainly it is one of the disquieting features of the claim that it is genuinely ambiguous. My mind is currently "employed about" this paragraph, and though this paragraph may be the result of my having certain ideas, it does not seem to be an idea. It might be thought that instead of any ambiguity we have the implication that my mind cannot be employed about the paragraph or the other things we ordinarily think we have knowledge of.

It may be suggested that 'employed' be replaced with 'immediately employed'. There might then be little doubt that Locke thinks the claim true. First of all, however, it is not clear that the term 'immediately' is called for. So far we have seen it used only once (in II.viii.8), and there it was used in conjunction with 'objects' in the phrase "immediate objects of perception." Secondly, even if it is plugged into the account we must be alert to the fact that for philosophers such as Reid and Berkeley, Locke's use of the term 'immediate' does not allow for the truth of the claim that there are mind-independent objects of perception. Thus the term 'immediate' is superfluous, for there are no objects of perception other than immediate objects.
While it may be that Locke's account does imply this conclusion, it is not his intention that it should. Time and again in the Essay Locke betrays his conviction that we perceive and know these external entities:

...the extension, figure, number, and motion of bodies of an observable bigness, may be perceived at a distance by the sight... (II.xiii.12)

or:

The notice we have by our senses of the existing of things without us...is an assurance that deserves the name of knowledge. (IV.xi.3)

Thus the problem of what constitutes the object of these mental acts is not peculiar to the act of thinking. Perceiving is closely connected with thinking when 'thought' or 'thinking' is used in the broad sense (as it often is by Locke) of being a generic term standing for any sort of conscious state:

...the actions of choosing and perceiving are produced which are but several modes of thinking. (II.xxii.17)

The ambiguity in "what the mind is employed about in thinking" is present in just as great a degree in talk about "the object of perception" as in talk about "the objects of thought." Just as I am thinking about this paragraph I am also now perceiving it. Even if we suppose that certain ideas are involved in each of those phenomena, we need not suppose that that which I am thinking about, and which I perceive, is an idea.

I said earlier that Locke was concerned to attend to common sense. Given the connection between "perception" and
"ideas" that has just been discussed, however, it is not clear that the account accords with common sense at all. Let us examine a few of the claims about that relationship in order to clarify the matter. Some of the following claims are apparently antithetical to the common sense claim that the objects of perception are usually mind-independent objects.

A1. Whatever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call idea. (II.vii.8)

A2. Perception which we make the act of understanding, is of three sorts:—1. The perception of the idea in our minds. 2. The perception of the signification of signs. 3. The perception of the agreement or disagreement that there is between any of our ideas (II.xxi.5)

A3. As the bodies that surround us do diversely affect our organs, the mind is forced to receive impressions; and cannot avoid the perception of those ideas that are annexed to them. (II.xi.25)

A4. ...there is nobody who doth not perceive the difference in himself between contemplating the sun...and actually looking upon it. (IV.xi.5)

Each of the first three statements suggests that we perceive ideas, not the things we have ideas of, including shoes and ships. In A1, an idea is an immediate object of perception. I emphasize the word 'immediate. It will play an important role in both Locke's account of perception and the account of perception which Berkeley attacks. At the same time, in terms of the distinction I outlined on page 9., perception is an act and its object is an idea. In A2, part of the claim in A1 is repeated, but there are two further claims.
Not only are ideas the objects of perception, but so are the relationships between them. Furthermore, no consistent thesis about whether the understanding is active or passive in "perception" emerges. In A2, "perception" is an act of the understanding. Yet in A3, it is suggested that the mind is passive in perception. Of the significance of this claim, I will say more later.

Also in A3, Locke introduces the word 'impressions' and it is impressions to which are annexed the ideas we perceive. The importance of this passage for our discussion is simply that of supporting the claim that the objects of perception are, for Locke, unlike common sense, mind dependent. The last of the above passages is interesting because it shows clearly a blur in terminology which can lead to serious misunderstandings. Locke suggests that we can "perceive" the difference between contemplating (imagining? dreaming of? having an illusion of?) the sun and looking at (perceiving? seeing?) it. We cannot tell whether Locke is here offering a suggestion to counter the claims of those who say that the perception of ideas leads to the scepticism about tables and chairs. The distinction between "looking upon it" and "perceiving" should alert us to the possibility that, even if all that we perceive are ideas, Locke may be able to claim compatibility with common sense on the grounds that 'perceive' is used as a technical term in his account whose place in the common sense account is filled by his
The attempt to indicate some of the uses of 'idea' and 'perception' has so far been met by little success where that is measured by the clarification of Locke's account that is achieved. For example, Locke has made neither the disastrous but clear claim that we perceive only ideas, nor the far happier claim that we perceive external physical objects. That is, neither the view that what is "really perceived" is ideas, nor the view that what is "really perceived" is mind-independent objects seems to find conclusive and unique support. And the terms 'mediate' and 'immediate' have not been used in any helpful way. One is left with no alternative but to examine more passages in which those terms are used in the hope that an account will emerge. If none does, a new account will have to be constructed on the basis of what is found out about the use of those terms and supported on the basis of other textual considerations.

Here are a few more passages which may help to shed light on Locke's use of the terms 'perception' and 'idea'. In these the term 'perception' is the more common of the two.

B1. ...our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them. And thus we come by those ideas we have of yellow...heat...soft...bitter...and all of those which we call sensible qualities. (II.i.3)

B2. ...wherever there is sense or perception, there some idea is actually produced, and present in the understanding. (II.ix.4)
To discover the nature of our ideas the better...it will be convenient to distinguish them as they are ideas or perceptions in our minds; and as they are modifications of matter in the bodies that cause such perceptions in us. (II.viii.7)

Perception being the first step and degree towards knowledge, and the inlet of all materials of it... (II.ix.15)

These passages suggest a close, though again unclear, relationship between perceptions of at least some kind or other and ideas, whatever they might be.

The lack of clarity in the B group of statements is different from that in the A group. While the passages in the A group were unclear because we could not determine whether ideas were the only objects of perception, it was tolerably clear that they were the intentional objects of at least some "perceptions." In the B group, however, the lack of clarity results from an apparent confusion over whether "ideas" and "perceptions" are causally connected, or are in fact taken to be identical, i.e., the claim that a "perception" is an object of an act of mind in substantially the same way that other ideas are.

In view of this continued unclerarness we cannot yet provide a definition of the terms 'perception' and 'idea' with any confidence that it will fit with Locke's use of these terms. Consequently, in our use of the terms there will be ambiguity to the extent that Locke's usage is ambiguous, and it will be only after Locke provides a clear account of the use of the terms, or after we give some interpretation of his unclear use of them such that it fits with
other Lockian doctrines, that we will be able to know what we are talking about when we talk about perception.

In the passages in the B group, for example, B1. is neutral with respect to the issue, but B2. suggests a causal relationship, and B3. suggests that perceptions and some ideas are identical. B4. again suggests that perception is an act. Here again what perceptions are and how they are related to ideas remains unclear.

Consider yet another passage:

Concerning the simple ideas of sensation, it is to be considered that whatsoever is so constituted in nature as to be able, by affecting our senses, to cause any perception in the mind, doth thereby produce in the understanding a simple idea. (II.viii.1)

Here again at least two ways of reading the passage appear. It seems clear that in the case of simple ideas of sensation the ultimate causes are external objects in nature. In virtue of their constitution these objects cause ideas and perceptions, but whether they cause perceptions of ideas or perceptions which are ideas is still unclear.

We have, so far, given evidence (in the A group of quotations) that perception is an act of mind, the object of which is an idea. We were not happy to accept this as indicative of Locke's understanding of 'perception' because of the other uses of that term which occur in the text and because of what some have thought was an obvious difficulty in reconciling that claim with the claim that we have knowledge by perception of the external world. We could divide
the uses of the term into various "senses," but it is not yet clear that Locke was prepared to admit that he used the term in more than one way.

Passages in the B group were not especially helpful in determining the meaning of 'perception' but B3., at least, implied that perception is identical with an idea of a certain kind. There are also other reasons for thinking that Locke does, at times, identify perceiving with having ideas and "perceptions" with "ideas," thereby suggesting that "perceptions" are mental objects. For example, he says:

C1. To ask at what time a man has first any ideas, is to ask when he begins to perceive; having ideas, and perception, being the same thing. (II.1.9)

Of course, that he says this here is not to be taken as proof that such a use of the term occurs significantly often in the text. That is, one should not try to make a case for "the meaning" of 'perception' on this kind of evidence. It is, however, sufficient to require that I try to make this use of the term compatible with the others. Furthermore, it is of consequence because if having certain kinds of ideas and having perceptions are the same thing, then it is quite likely that our "perceptions" are of whatever kinds of things our ideas are of. This would be a significant point in making a case for rejecting Reid's interpretation of Locke's account of perception, for if one can imagine a mind-independent external object, it should be
theoretically possible to perceive one. It thereby lends some support to the thesis that Locke thinks the primary qualities of objects existing without the mind are perceivable.

In addition to C1, and those passages in B and elsewhere in the text which tend to support the claim that, at times, Locke thinks perception is of something other than ideas, we have:

C2. For, since there appear not to be any ideas in the mind before the senses have conveyed any in, I conceive that ideas in the understanding are coeval with sensation; which is an impression or motion made in some part of the body, as (produces some perception) in the understanding. It is about these impressions made on our senses by outward objects that the mind seems first to employ itself, in such operations as we call perception, remembering, consideration, reasoning, etc. (II.i.23)

This passage seems to suggest that perceptions and ideas, if not identical, at least sometimes play the same role—namely that of objects of the understanding. So far, however, we do seem to have too much evidence to determine the relationship between the term 'perception' and the term 'idea' in Locke's account. What sort of account should we hope for out of this untidy mass of claims?

Looking ahead to a reconciliation of the various claims, we think that ultimately it would be more defensible...
for Locke to claim that, at least in some cases (or for some uses of 'perception'), perceiving the table and having an idea (of a certain kind) of the table are identical states or synonymous expressions. And we would, in the interest of the consistency of Locke, as well as the accommodation of the various passages in the text, like to show that "perceiving an idea" can be understood as talk about immediate perception (ideas are the sole objects of immediate perception, and all perceived ideas are perceived immediately) and can be rephrased so as to make it clear that "perceiving an idea" is synonymous with "having an idea." Such having of ideas is necessary to but not sufficient for perception. It might then be shown that sometimes when we have an idea of the table we perceive the idea immediately, and the table mediately. It could then be seen that (1) this account is different from and closer to common-sense than the one Reid attributes to Locke, and (2) this results from the fact that the account is helpful in explaining our perception of external mind-independent objects.

In order to facilitate this attempt it might be worth spelling out the alternatives as they now appear. First, we must decide whether the term 'perception' is used equivocally or unequivocally. If the latter we must then decide whether Locke thinks "perception" is identical with having an idea of a certain kind, or whether "perception" is an act of mind which necessarily has a object of some kind. If "perception"
is an act of mind which has an object, we must decide whether the object is an idea of a certain kind or whether it is something mind-independent. Perhaps we can make that determination by considering the structure of the two kinds of account. Let us make a kind of "structural analysis" of Locke's account of perception—a kind of map to which we can refer when we talk about ideas, objects, perceptions, primary qualities, etc.

So far we have evidence for at least two accounts of the relationship between minds and physical objects. The claim that in Locke there is evidence for two accounts is an indictment, for, as will become clear, the accounts are mutually exclusive. The first account makes "perceptions" the passive objects of the understanding or mind and identical with ideas of some kinds, and the second account makes "perceptions" acts of mind or the understanding with ideas as the objects of those acts. The two accounts, if in fact they are two and incompatible, have quite different ramifications. We shall briefly examine both of them.

Let us consider the former account first. Imagine three realms from left to right. Let us call the first the realm of the understanding or mind, the second the realm of ideas some of which are perceptions, and the third the realm of physical objects. A map might look like this:
Mind is the kind of thing that is supposed to know things about physical objects. And it knows these things via (in some sense) perception or ideas. Perceptions and (certain) ideas are said to be the same thing according to this account—that is, they play the same role with respect to the understanding. They are its objects. A moment's consideration, however, will elicit the admission that some ideas are really quite different from perceptions. For example, what kinds of ideas are not perceptions? Well, ideas of our own making, ideas from God, ideas of illusion, hallucination, dreams, and in short any ideas which do not arrive via the senses after a normal causal process has resulted in the stimulation of the sense organs. In other words, once the distinction has been made between perceptions and other ideas, we can say that wherever there is a perception there exists for it (as its object) a physical object. Of course, other ideas do not guarantee the existence of external objects. Perceptions are, on this account, objects of mind and not acts of mind. A perception is an idea and ideas are always objects, for it is essential to their existence—that they be noticed.
By reason, furthermore, of the distinction between perceptions and other kinds of ideas, the connection between perceptions and physical objects is not merely contingent. If there are no objects, we may have ideas but, by definition, no perceptions. This account is the one implicit in such statements as:

...it will be convenient to distinguish them as they are ideas or perceptions in our minds;... (II.viii.7)

and

Our senses convey into the mind several distinct perceptions...

The way that one accounts for error in such a scheme as the one I have just suggested is by admitting that we cannot, or do not, always tell the difference between perceptions and other ideas—not by saying that in some cases of perception there are no physical objects. In short, while perceptions and other ideas may serve some of the same purposes (in that they are both objects of mind or understanding), perceptions can do something that other kinds of ideas cannot. They can give us a certainty about physical objects. Furthermore, Locke feels that we can distinguish between perceptions and at least some other ideas.

...there is a manifest difference between the ideas laid up in my memory...and those which force themselves upon me, and I cannot avoid having. And therefore it must needs be some exterior cause, and the brisk acting of some objects without me, whose efficacy I cannot resist, that produces those ideas in my mind whether I will or no. (IV.xi.5)
If one is seriously concerned about the problem of how we tell perceptions from any other ideas and is not satisfied by Locke's answer, he could opt for the alternative that all the ideas have corresponding objects. Any scepticism about the existence of objects other than minds and ideas, it is claimed, is thereby defeated. All ideas have corresponding objects in reality; it is just that some of them subsist and some of them exist. This scheme and our map will now be recognized as one basically appropriate to the Meinongian-Bergmannian realists and, in its underdeveloped form, to all realists. Thus, when Locke writes that perceptions are the same as ideas, he possibly means that they stand in the same relationship to mind that all other ideas do, not that in every respect we know no more by having a perception than by having another kind of idea.

There is, however, evidence for another account in the text.

We now change the story slightly, to the second of the two accounts. The term we heretofore used to separate one kind of idea from all others is no longer used for that purpose. 'Perception' which named the unique kind of idea via which minds know something about physical objects now has a new use. It is used to describe a particular kind of activity of the mind or understanding. The components of our account are now an understanding which (among other acts) perceives ideas and, presumably, physical objects. The map might look like this:
Perception in this account is something quite different from before, with perhaps quite different implications for what we know. 'Perception' according to this account could better be replaced by 'perceiving' to indicate that it is an act and not an object which is being discussed. In this use 'perception' seems to be a generic term sometimes used as a synonym for 'thinking' in the Cartesian sense. In the former account it designated a species of object.

Perhaps because of the nature of mind or understanding, the things perceived are only ideas. The idea can be any idea, no matter whether it is simple or complex, imaginary, representative, or whatever. While the existence of an understanding which is perceiving guarantees the existence of an idea which is its object, ideas do not guarantee the existence of physical objects.

That Locke also held this account is demonstrated by the statements:

Perception, which we make an act of the understanding...  
(II.xxi.5)

and

...the actions of choosing and perceiving are produced which are but several modes of thinking.  
(II.xxi.7)
as well as

The two great and principle actions of the mind, which are most frequently considered, and which are so frequent that everyone that pleases may take notice of them in himself, are these two:-- Perception, or Thinking; and Volition or Willing. (III.iv.1)

It has generally been thought that this type of account succumbs to the criticism that if only ideas are perceived, then we have no way of knowing of the existence of mind-independent physical objects. We are not warranted in any inferences we might draw about the external world from the perception of ideas.

There are ways of attempting to save such an account from this attack. It may be suggested that the understanding in perceiving or in the act of perception, as distinct from the acts of hallucinating, imagining, remembering, dreaming, etc., guarantees the existence of a physical object just as the passive perception did in the former account. In fact, it would be possible to offer an account in which it did just that, but Locke does not seem concerned to do so. A look at the list of terms he uses in this context shows him to be inconsistent about the contrasting acts or states of the understanding. Suggestions he makes include 'thought', 'understanding', and others. In order for the account which I suggested to be a satisfactory alternative to the first account, however, it would be necessary for perception as an act to contrast with hallucinating, dreaming, misperceiving, and so on. The "perceiving understanding," or
'perception', as Locke uses it in these passages to name a state or act of the understanding, is not sufficient to provide evidence of the nature of the real world. It is only ideas that are perceived, and those ideas are indistinguishable from one another with respect to their relationships to anything beyond ideas. As it stands, i.e., without defense, this way of using the term 'perception' leads much more easily to phenomenalism or idealism than does the former kind of account.

It should by now be clear that we will not find a single and unproblematic use of the term 'perception' in the Essay. We may be able, however, as we have now begun to do, to distinguish which use of the term is being employed in various passages in the text. If we can do this we have a far better chance of substituting another term or phrase for one of the uses of 'perception' and thereby to show that unambiguous sense can be made of what Locke is doing.

Our suggestions along these lines so far (pp. 14-15) have been that perhaps we could use 'looking upon' in one case and 'perceive' in another. The same attempt, while truer to Locke's own terminology, could perhaps be made by employing the terms 'immediate' and 'mediate' to qualify 'perception'. For example, in the first of the two accounts above, the objects of "perception" are physical objects, while in the second account they are ideas. Now Locke uses the term 'immediately' in connection with the perception of
ideas. When the term 'perception' is used to name an act, therefore, it should be possible to insert the term 'immediately' before 'perceive' in talking about ideas as the objects of perception, and the term 'mediately' before 'perceive' in talking about mind-independent things as the objects of perception. When 'perception' is used as an object it can be broken down into 'immediate object' and 'mediate object' depending upon whether Locke is talking about ideas or qualities of mind-independent objects.

Both Berkeley and Reid realize that Locke makes use of this distinction between mediate and immediate perception, and yet neither thinks that Locke's problems are solved by the use of these terms. Both think that knowledge got by means of perception is either knowledge of ideas or knowledge of mind-independent objects, and both think that in Locke's case it is the former.

What we want to know is whether, if Locke were forced to choose between either ideas or mind-independent entities as the objects of perceptual knowledge and, consequently, of perception, he would choose the former or the latter.

In this section we have seen that Locke thinks the origin of our ideas is the external world, that he seems to think that we perceive both ideas and qualities at a distance. We have also seen that 'perception' is sometimes used as a success term such that the having of perceptions guarantees the existence of external objects, and at other
times it names an act the object of which may be "just" an idea. This ambiguity in the face of Reid's and Berkeley's suggestion that we have perceptual knowledge of either ideas or physical objects but not both, leaves us with no clear account to attribute to Locke. The question we have been asking and to which we have not yet received an answer is, what, for Locke, is the basic sense of 'perception' or 'perceive'?

Locke intends to give an account according to which we perceive external physical objects. This is obvious from the material on pages 12 and 19 and those immediately following 19. But it is unclear whether perception is an act, or an object of an act. It is unclear whether 'perception' is a generic term or a species term. And it is clear that there is no single account which is unproblematically derived from the passages we have quoted. As I have demonstrated by the multitude of passages in which the terms 'idea' and 'perception' are used, there is no obvious solution to the question of just what to do with the term 'perception'. Neither can one, simply by examining the use of the terms 'mediate' and 'immediate', arrive at any conclusions. Their employment in the text is too infrequent.

It should by now be clear that the method of our investigation must change. The failure to obtain decisive data from an examination of Locke's use of these terms inevitably leads to attempts to support or reject possible interpretations on the basis of their compatibility with other
doctrines of the *Essay*. For example, the most likely candidates for perceived but mind-independent entities are the qualities of mind-independent objects. Those are the things that Locke has mentioned as perceived or "looked upon" in addition to "ideas." But are such qualities mind-independent? To answer this an inquiry into the nature and location of primary and secondary qualities, and an inquiry into whether they are perceived, are necessary. If these qualities are mind-dependent and really perceived then there is no real perception of external physical objects, for it would then be clear that Locke claims no perceptual knowledge of the external objects, i.e. in terms of our structural accounts above, Locke accepts the second. But if qualities are really perceived and without the mind, then Locke accepts the first account.

Here it can be seen quite clearly that our claims as to the basic sense of "perception" will depend heavily upon what kinds of entities Locke claims to have perceptual knowledge of. Should it turn out that he claims to have perceptual knowledge of mind-independent qualities, we would try to reconcile that with the claim that there is perceptual knowledge of ideas by showing that when ideas are "immediately perceived" they are "had" (our substitute term), that this is a reasonable part of a causal account, and that the real objects of (objects of real) perception are external. Knowledge of external objects on this account might
not be inferential, for there are people who know that, e.g., "this is a hand," but do not have knowledge of the causal account necessary to such an inference. That is, they do not know that they are having handlike ideas or brain states x,y,z, etc. In this examination of the status of primary and secondary qualities we will discuss Reginald Jackson's article, "Locke's Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Qualities."\(^1\)

But I am anticipating. I shall turn to that examination shortly, but while we are still explicitly on the topic of ideas, I must establish as much as I can about the distinction between the realm of ideas and that of external objects. To do that I shall, in the next chapter, examine what Locke says about the relationship between them. Only after that will I attempt to show the place of qualities in the schema.

\(^{11}\) Mind, XXXVIII (1929),
a. The Relationship Between Ideas and External Objects is Causal

In the three sections of this chapter I will be presenting some general and non-controversial claims about Locke's account of perception. These consist primarily of statements by Locke, and by me about Locke, which are intended as foundation stones upon which any interpretation of Locke's account of perception must rest. The primary task of these sections is to show that according to Locke there are in the universe at least two kinds of things—minds and ideas—and that they are related in various ways.

In this section in particular it is shown that Locke is an interactionist, i.e. that there are minds and bodies which are causally related through intermediaries called "ideas." I then show that Locke offers no good arguments for the claim that ideas are caused by objects "from without," and finally that he has no explanation of the mechanism by means of which mind could act upon body or vice versa.

There is a general outline of Locke's account of the relationship between ideas and external objects which is
quite well agreed upon. This general outline is compatible with a number of different specific accounts. It is to some of these general and agreed upon points that I want to turn first.

It is sometimes, but not often, claimed that on certain readings Locke has not got a representationalist account of perception. In those cases it is usually argued that the reading of Locke must be mistaken, for whatever else he is, he is certainly a representationalist. The representationalism which is attributed to him is a view which, in its most general form, maintains that there is a real world which exists independently of minds, ideas, and perceptions. It also maintains that knowledge of this world is achieved only with the help of intermediaries between that world and the knowing mind. Certain more specific versions of that doctrine will be examined, at least in part, in the course of our discussion. The examination will involve specific claims about the entities of that world, the nature of the intermediaries, their raison d'être, and the relations of the entities of the real world and the intermediaries, to minds or perceivers.

That Locke held some version of this general representationalist account, and that he thought it was "ideas"

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1For example, Reginald Jackson in "Locke's Version of the Doctrine of Representative Perception," *Mind*, XXXIX (1930), implies that if Berkeley has understood Locke correctly then Locke is not a representationalist; hence, Berkeley has not understood Locke correctly. We shall discuss Jackson's account at length later.
that "represent" things is clear from his classic statement of representationalism:

It is evident that the mind knows not things immediately but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things. But what shall be here the criterion? How shall the mind when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree with things themselves? (IV.iv.3)

We see here, at once, a statement of Locke's representationalism, and his recognition of its major difficulty. I am not yet interested in how he handles that difficulty, but in exploring what he thinks the relationship is between the ideas and "things" mentioned in this statement.

It is again generally agreed that representationalists and, in particular, Locke think that ideas are caused by external objects or "things." Within certain limits we can bring together Locke's view on that causal relationship. The limits are, specifically, tied to his disavowals of interest in the explanation of some kinds of connection between mind and body, e.g.:

I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind; or trouble myself to examine wherein its essence consists; or by what motions of our spirits or alterations of our bodies we come to have any sensation by our organs, or any ideas in our understandings; and whether those ideas do in their formation, any or all of them, depend on matter or not. (Introduction 2)

But he does, nevertheless, give this much of the causal account:

The next thing to be considered is how bodies produce ideas in us; and that is manifestly by im-
pulse, the only way which we can conceive bodies to operate in. (II.viii.11)

and

...it must needs be some exterior cause, and the brisk acting of some object without me, whose efficacy I cannot resist, that produces those ideas in my mind whether I will or no. (IV.xi.5)

as well as

...I have by the paper affecting my eyes, that idea produced in my mind...which I call white, by which I know that that quality or accident (i.e. whose appearance before my eyes always causes that idea) doth really exist, and hath a being without me. (IV.ix.2)

As all of this amounts to no more than the claim that there is the causal relationship in question, we might attempt to further our understanding of the doctrine by inquiring into the nature of the causes of the ideas which are immediately perceived. But almost immediately this attempt would be thwarted by Locke's claim that worry about the causes of ideas

...is an inquiry not belonging to the idea, as it is in the understanding, but to the nature of things existing without us....These are two very different things...it being one thing to perceive and know the idea of white or black, and quite another to examine what kind of particles they must be to make any object appear white or black. (II.viii.3)

Locke notes in many places that inquiries which belong to the nature of things existing without us are not his proper task.

Assuming that there are such external objects of one nature or another Locke does go on to give a kind of physical-physiological account of how they affect us. It is an
account that appeals to physical and physiological facts, would be compatible with a number of philosophical accounts, and implies, and is implied by, none of them. An example of such an account in the case of privitive causes is:

...all sensation being produced in us only by different degrees...of motion in our animal spirits, and variously agitated by external objects, the abatement of any former motion must as necessarily produce a new sensation as the variation of increase of it; and so introduce a new idea, which depends only upon a different motion in the animal spirits of that organ. (II.viii.4)

Again, this is not a general account of how external objects produce ideas, but rather an account of how privitive causes may produce ideas. A privitive cause is one which while producing some effect is apparently non-existent, and thus incapable of producing any effects. For example, while it is easy to understand the explanation of how light, refracted in a particular way, is motion which causes the sensation of red, which sensation is itself a certain kind of motion in us, it is much more difficult to understand how the absence of refracted light, hence of motion, can be the cause of any sensation at all, even the sensation of black.

A look at the above account should convince us that what we have is not a significant difference between the causal account in the case of privitive causes, and the case of causes which are not privitive, but a coherent way of explaining how the two kinds of causes operate to produce effects in the same way. Thus for privitive causes Locke has provided the same type of explanation as the following which
he provides in the case of causes which consist of increased motion:

...some motion must thence be continued by our nerves, or animal spirits, to the brains...there to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of them.... And since...the bodies...may be perceived at a distance...some singly imperceptible bodies must come from them to the eyes, and thereby convey to the brain some motion which produces these ideas we have of them in us.

After the same manner that the ideas of these original qualities are produced in us we may conceive that the ideas of secondary qualities are also produced. (II.viii.12-13)

While what has been shown so far constitutes evidence of Locke's belief that there is a causal relationship between minds and bodies, or between powers in objects and the ideas they produce in minds, it does little in the way of giving (1) reasons for thinking that such relationships do in fact exist, or (2) an explanation of how the relationship in question can be causal.

First, what are the reasons for thinking that such relationships exist, i.e. for thinking that there are external objects of the kind he describes? Put another way, when Locke says, "It is...the actual receiving of ideas from without that gives us notice of the existence of other things..." (IV.xi.2), how can he be sure that there is any "actual receiving"? The problem is one he recognizes quite nicely:

there is no necessary connection of real existence with any idea a man hath in his memory....For, the having the idea of anything in our mind, no more proves the existence of that thing, than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world, or the visions of a dream make thereby a true history. (IV.xi.1)
There is something of a puzzle surrounding this passage for the last sentence quoted is contiguous with:

...no particular man can know the existence of another being, but only when, by actual operating upon him, it makes itself perceived by him.

Locke thus suggests that "perceiving" is distinguishable from other cases of having the idea of a thing in our minds, e.g., remembering, in a manner such that perception allows us to know of existence while having an idea in the mind does not.

Campbell Fraser dissolves the problem by understanding "in our mind" as "in our memory" or "in our fancy"—"as distinguished from 'ideas actually coming into our minds by our senses,' and which we cannot help regarding as appearances presented by what is real."²

In his first attempt to defend the claim that we can know that such relationships between objects and ideas exist, Locke appeals to a difference between ideas. With respect to this particular difference he takes a very forceful stance:

We as plainly find the difference there is between any idea revived in our minds by our own memory, and actually coming into our minds by our senses, as we do between any two distinct ideas. (IV.II.14)

While the difference between ideas of memory and those of perception may be clear enough, what about the difference between those of dreams, illusions, and hallucinations, and

those of perception? This difference may be much more troublesome. Locke's defense against the possibility that all is but a dream consists of three general kinds of arguments against scepticism, the first of which might be called a "practical" one:

But yet if he be resolved to appear so sceptical as to maintain, that what I call being actually in the fire is nothing but a dream...I answer, That we certainly finding that pleasure or pain follows upon the application of certain objects to us, whose existence we perceive, or dream that we perceive, by our senses; this certainty is as great as our happiness or misery, beyond which we have no concernment to know or to be. (IV.ii.14)

The second general kind of argument is an appeal to the fact that we cannot doubt the existence of external objects when we perceive ideas from without:

...when our senses do actually convey into our understanding any idea, we cannot but be satisfied that there doth something at that time really exist without us, which doth affect our senses...(IV.xi.9)

and also

It is plain that those perceptions are produced in us by exterior causes affecting our senses, because ....sometimes I find that I cannot avoid the having those ideas produced in my mind. (IV.xi.4-5)

The argument in both of these cases would seem to be that, if doubts vanish like phantoms of the night on the appearance of the dawn, they cannot be legitimate doubts.

The third general kind of argument relies on facts about the senses. For example:

It is plain that those perceptions are produced in us by exterior causes affecting our senses, because those that want the organs of any sense, never can
have the ideas belonging to that sense produced in their minds. (IV.xi.4)

And it is clear, Locke claims, that these perceptions do not originate in the sense organs, for then

...the eyes of a man in the dark would produce colors, and his nose smell roses in the winter. (IV.xi.4)

All of these arguments are clearly unsatisfactory answers to the question of how we know that we receive ideas from without. The first argument depends upon an appeal to the felt difference between the objects of memory and those of other states of mind, particularly perception. But it is the distinction between ideas of perception and those of illusion, hallucination, and dreams that are the most troublesome, for they, unlike ideas of memory, are involuntary as are the ideas of perception. That is, Locke appeals to the kinds of ideas (those of memory) which are least likely confused with the ideas of perception or the ideas of things from without. He ignores the whole problem of error which allows the kind of doubt under discussion even to begin.

As to the second kind of argument, we need only point out that doubts which arise only in the sceptic's closet are not for that reason illegitimate.

The third kind of argument depends upon a supposition about the nature of the sense organs themselves which someone like Berkeley, for instance, would deny—namely the supposition that they are the very kind of external objects the existence of which is in question. Along with the as-
sumption of this nature goes the additional supposition, which also might be denied, that they are properly stimu-
lated only by other objects of the same kind.

It can now be seen that none of these arguments, nor their conjunction, is sufficient to provide even any proba-
bility that the ideas in question are received from without, or that any qualities or accidents "bath a being without." It may not be that Locke fails in that task, but these are not the arguments, if there are any; by means of which he is successful. I doubt that he is successful, but I also doubt that this failure would make him more vulnerable to Berkeley's attack.

We have now seen that there is no reason to think that a causal relationship between powers in objects and ideas exists (at least no reason in Locke) because there is no reason to think that there is more than one term of the alleged relationship.

I also said earlier (p. 37) that there was a second problem, namely that of explaining how the relationship in question could be causal. What I meant by that, and I still have found no solution to the difficulty, is that some ex-
planation is needed of how one thing can be the cause of another when the one is significantly unlike the other. In this case the cause is physical and the effect is mental. The former is a body in space and time, the latter a char-
acteristic of minds which are in time but not in space.
Surely the mind-body relationship is in need of some additional comment. Thus Locke has not provided the reader with an explanation of this relationship any more than he provided the reader with reasons for the belief in the duality of the universe.

What I have done is to call attention to those passages in which Locke comes closest to explicitly answering the questions which were raised concerning the claim that ideas originate from without. Perhaps, at a later point, some conclusions may be drawn from the things he has said in these passages. For now I shall turn to the question of how well various types of ideas may be supposed to represent their archetypes.

b. Ideas and Archetypes—The Relationships Between Them

In the last section we saw that Locke is a representationalist and that he thinks that the relationship between ideas and external objects is causal. I did not, because I could not, show his reasons for thinking that, first because I could not find convincing reasons for thinking that there are external objects, and secondly, supposing that there are external objects, I could not show that he solves the problems of relating minds or ideas to them. Nevertheless, Locke goes on to claim that there are certain specific relationships which exist between ideas and the objects they repre-
sent. These relationships are the topic of the present section, and, once again, any account of perception which we attribute to Locke must be compatible with these alleged relationships.

The first and most important of the claims about the relationship of ideas and objects is that in "representing" their causes ideas sometimes also "resemble" them:

the ideas of primary qualities are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves, but the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all. (II.viii.15)

In using the terms 'resemble' and 'represent' I want to call attention to the contrast, for which Locke has no consistent terminology, between the relationship of primary qualities to the ideas they produce, ideas which are "patterns" or ideas of characteristics which are the same whether in idea or existence, in the mind or in the manna, and the relationship of secondary qualities to the ideas they produce. In this latter case there is a "causal" relationship or a relationship of "constant effects." The reason for making the distinction in this way will be more easily understood in later sections when it becomes clear that there is really only one kind of quality in objects. Prior to the question of whether an idea represents or resembles an archetype there are several other relationships

\[\text{Loce, Essay (II.xxx.2).}\]
\[\text{Ibid. (II.viii.18).}\]
\[\text{Ibid. (II.xxx.2).}\]
which may exist. Let us look at them.

Excluding the relationship of representation there are three ways in which ideas may be judged in relation to their archetypes: they are either real or fantastical; they are either adequate or inadequate; and they are either true or false.

Real ideas "have a foundation in nature" or "have conformity with the real being and existence of things." This is not to say that all real ideas are images or resemblances of things or qualities that exist, but rather that something exists which is the cause of, or constantly conjoined with, that idea, e.g., a power of a body.

...simple ideas are all real and true, because they answer and agree to those powers of things which produce them in our minds; that being all that is requisite to make them real...For in simple ideas... the mind is wholly confined to the operation of things upon it, and can make itself no simple idea, more than what it has received. (II.xxx.2)

Thus it is that if whiteness, coldness, pain, etc. are simple ideas then regardless of whether they are "exact resemblances" or only "constant effects" they are real.

While simple ideas have their source completely in the external world, this is not the case with some complex ideas. The case of mixed modes and relations need not be discussed at any length, for in these the idea is not referred to archetypes outside the mind itself:

...All of our complex ideas, except those of substances, being archetypes of the mind's own making, not intended to be copies of anything, nor referred
to the existence of anything, as to their originals, cannot want of any conformity necessary to real knowledge. (IV.iv.5)

In these cases while the knowledge is "real" in the same sense as before, it is only trivially "knowledge."

In the case of complex ideas of substances, however, those are real which are combinations of simple ideas representing combinations of qualities and powers existing in nature. Therefore, ideas of such things as mermaids and centaurs are fantastical and ideas involving contradictory qualities or powers are even more fantastical or imaginary, for in the case of the mermaid there is at least the possibility that something will be discovered which the idea can be said to conform to as representation, while in the latter case nothing could be discovered which the idea would conform to.

Leaving aside the fantastical or imaginary ideas, and considering only the real ones, it can be said that some are adequate and some are inadequate. Adequate ideas perfectly represent the archetypes the mind supposes them to stand for, while inadequate ideas do not perfectly represent their archetypes. For example, simple ideas are adequate for they stand for, or represent, powers (a power) in a thing to produce a sensation. If that sensation or idea is produced it is adequate. But adequacy is a function not only of the relationship between objects and ideas, but also of what we think an idea represents. If we think the idea of whiteness represents a power of the paper to produce the idea of
whiteness in us, then that idea is adequate. But if we think that idea of whiteness represents the paper, the archetype has changed (to a substance) and the idea is then inadequate. It represents the paper only partially and imperfectly. Thus all ideas of substances are inadequate, for they do not attain perfection in their attempt to represent things as they really do exist. Take the case of gold:

In some, this complex idea contains a greater, and in others a smaller number of qualities; and is apparently such as the mind makes it. The yellow shining color makes gold to children; others add weight, malleability, and fusibility...And therefore different men, leaving out or putting in several simple ideas which others do not, according to their various examination, skill, or observation of that subject, have different essences of gold, which must therefore be of their own and not of nature's making. (III.vi.31)

The essence we would have to know in order that our complex ideas of substances be adequate is the essence of nature's making. To know this we would have to know all the active and passive capacities of the substance, which would be to know all the changes caused in it or by it when it interacts with all the other substances. This, however, we cannot know for the powers of a thing are infinite:

The simple ideas whereof we make our complex ones of substances are all of them...powers; which being relations to other substances, we can never be sure that we know all the powers that are in any

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6G.J. Warnock, "Hume on Causation," in David Hume: A Symposium, ed. by David Pears, 56-57, says that this is because we cannot know the minute inner (atomic) structure, from which we could, if we knew, predict the reaction of an object to all contingencies. But as we shall see shortly (below) this knowledge would not end our difficulties.
one body, till we have tried what changes it is fitted to give or to receive from other substances in their several ways of application: which being impossible to be tried upon any one body, much less upon all, it is impossible that we should have adequate ideas of any substance made up of a collection of all its properties. (II.xxxi.8)

But even this is not the only problem. Even if we could know all the powers of an object we still could not have an adequate idea of a substance. So the problem is not that we may have an adequate idea of substance and not know it, but that we cannot even have an adequate idea.

...if we would have, and actually had, in our complex idea, an exact collection of all the secondary qualities or powers of any substance, we should not yet thereby have an idea of the essence of that thing. For, since the powers or qualities that are observable by us are not the real essence of that substance, but depend upon it, and flow from it, any collection whatsoever of these qualities cannot be the real essence of that thing. Whereby it is plain that our ideas of substances are not adequate; are not what the mind intends them to be. Besides, a man has no idea of substance, in general, nor knows what substance is in itself. (II.xxxi.13)

It is not even clear that we can distinguish properly between different substances or kinds of things:

Nor indeed can we rank and sort things, and consequently...denominate them, by their real essences; because we know them not. Our faculties carry us no further towards the knowledge and distinction of substances, than a collection of those sensible ideas which we observe in them; which, however made with the greatest diligence and exactness we are capable of, yet is more remote from the true internal constitution from which those qualities flow, than, as I said, a countryman's ideas is from the inward contrivance of that famous clock at Strasburg, whereof he sees only the outward figure and motions. (III.vi.9)
In nature there are precise distinctions between substances, that is, between species, and in order to know them we would have to know the following things:

First, to be assured that nature, in the production of things, always designs them to partake of certain regulated established essences... (III.vi.15)

Secondly, it would be necessary to know whether nature always attains that essence it designs in the production of things...(III.vi.16)

Thirdly, it ought to be determined whether those we call monsters be really a distinct species...(III.vi.17)

Fourthly, The real essences of those things which we distinguish into species, and as so distinguished, we name, ought to be known...(III.vi.18)

Given ignorance on these points, which Locke is convinced we do not know, there is only one other way which might be supposed to provide the knowledge necessary for distinguishing substances into species:

Fifthly, The only imaginable help in this case would be, that, having framed perfect complex ideas of the properties of things flowing from their different real essences, we should thereby distinguish them into species. (III.vi.19)

This, however, cannot provide the necessary knowledge, for without knowledge of the real essence we cannot know which of the properties of the thing flow from that essence:

We can never know what is the precise number of properties depending on the real essence of gold, any one of which failing, the real essence of gold, and consequently gold, would not be there, unless we knew the real essence of gold itself, and by that determined the species. (III.vi.19)

And knowing neither the essence nor the properties of the thing, we can have no reason to suppose that any of our
Ideas of a thing is an adequate representative of an archetype—no reason to suppose that the ideas are representatives at all.

It might be suggested that a way out of the difficulty lies in the appeal to nominal essences—those characteristics that we suppose belong to the substances for the sake of, and in the course of, conversation. But these essences of men's own and not nature's making vary from person to person, and to appeal to them obliterates the distinction between substances and mixed modes and so prevents us from distinguishing between reality and fancy. It is of mixed modes, but not of substances, Locke can say:

His own choice having made that combination, it had all in it he intended it should, and so could not but be perfect, could not but be adequate; it being referred to no other archetype which it was supposed to represent. (III.vi.45)

But if nominal essences were real essences in the case of substances, we could make the same claim we make of mixed modes—that the archetypes are internal.

Further, the appeal to knowledge of the properties which (for God) flow demonstratively from the essences will be to no avail. Apparently Locke thinks there is no possibility that we could know these:

Which properties, because they are endless, it is plain that the idea made after this fashion, by this archetype, will always be inadequate. (III.vi.47)

Thus we are left with the certainty that none of our ideas of substances is adequate, and the assurance that even if
any were we could not know it to be.

This concludes this discussion of the difference between complex ideas of modes and complex ideas of substances so far as their adequacy to archetypes is concerned. And now, to the third way in which ideas may be judged in relation to their archetypes—truth and falsity.

It can readily be made apparent that truth or falsity need not concern us in our investigation, for truth lies not in the representation of an archetype by an idea, but is an attribute of a judgment that the mind makes.

For truth or falsehood, being never without some affirmation or negation... is not to be found but where signs are joined or separated... The signs we chiefly use are either ideas or words... Truth lies in so joining or separating these representations, as the things they stand for do in themselves agree or disagree...(II.xxxi.19)

Or alternatively, the falsehood is:

First, when the mind having any idea, it judges and concludes it the same that is in other men's minds... when indeed it is not. (II.xxxi.21)

(2) When it having a complex idea made up of such a collection of simple ones as nature never puts together, it judges it to agree to a species of creatures really existing. (II.xxxi.22)

(3) When in its complex idea it has united a certain number of simple ideas... but has also left out others... inseparable, it judges this to be a perfect complete idea of a sort of things which really it is not. (II.xxxi.23)

(4) ... when I judge that this complex idea contains in it the real essence of any body existing...

Ideas, according to Locke, are more properly said to be right or wrong in so far as they agree or disagree with
the patterns to which they are referred:

...I think that our ideas... may very fitly be called right or wrong ideas, according as they agree or disagree to those patterns to which they are referred. But if anyone had rather call them true or false, it is fit he use a liberty, which everyone has, to call things by those names he thinks best; though in propriety of speech, truth or falsehood will, I think, scarce agree to them... (II.xxxii.26)

Ideas, simply considered, cannot be wrong unless they contain inconsistent parts. In referring them to something such as a supposed pattern or archetype, however, the ideas are capable of being wrong so far as they disagree with those archetypes. And in this case the judgment that they agree is false so far as the ideas and archetypes do not agree.

The ways to falsehood are as varied as the supposed archetypes to which the ideas may conform, viz. ideas in other men's minds, real existence, and real constitution and essence.

This concludes our inquiry into the kinds of ideas that have external sources, and the relationships between those sources and the ideas. Real, adequate ideas come the closest of any to giving us knowledge of external objects. But even these are not sufficient to inform us of the properties a thing manifests at the present time. While no ideas adequately represent a thing, some ideas do nevertheless resemble primary qualities, and others represent the other sensible qualities. Of this I shall say more in the chapter on primary and secondary qualities.
Of the tasks briefly outlined at the beginning of section a. in this chapter, it yet remains for me to make a few remarks about the unexplained nature of the mechanism by means of which minds and bodies interact.

c. The Relationship Between Ideas and External Objects: That the Causal Mechanism is not Explained

In section a. we showed that Locke thinks the relationship between ideas and external objects is causal, and that while he cannot (or does not) prove it, he thinks that the causes of those ideas are mind-independent. In section b. of this chapter we saw him enlarge upon the previous claims to the point of asserting that some ideas "resemble," while others only "represent" those mind-independent causes. These relationships seemed to depend upon ideas being real and adequate, and these notions were also discussed in b. The difference between "resembling" and "representing" that we noted in section b. does, however, leave some puzzles that we think Locke should attend to.

The first puzzle is:

How do we explain the production of effects which are (at least apparently) unlike their causes?

And the second puzzle, arising from the difference between ideas and physical objects, is:

How do we explain the interaction, it that is what it is, of the mental with the physical realm?
With respect to the special case of question (1) in which we are particularly interested, namely the production of mental effects from physical causes, Locke says:

We are so far from knowing what figure, size, or motion of parts produce a yellow color, a sweet taste, or a sharp sound that we can by no means conceive how any size, figure or motion of any particles, can possibly produce in us any color, taste, or sound whatsoever: there is no conceivable connection between one and the other. (IV.iii.13)

But Locke has an answer to neither of the questions above, and his confession of failure on both counts can be seen in the following passage:

As the Ideas of secondary qualities which we have in our minds, can by us be no way deduced from bodily causes, nor any correspondence or connection be found between them and those primary qualities which experience shows us produce them in us; so, in the other side, the operation of our minds upon our bodies is as inconceivable. How any thought should produce a motion in body is as remote from the nature of our ideas, as how any body should produce any thought in the mind. (IV.iii.28)

While it is clear that Locke thinks we cannot understand the relationship between the powers of primary qualities in bodies and the produced ideas of secondary qualities in mind, the latter part of the passage displays the common inability to bridge the mind-body gap in whatever form it appears. At that point the problem is not one of getting color out of motion, but of getting the idea of motion out of motion. We might add that this difficulty may not be thought by Locke to arise from the different natures of mind and body, for neither can he explain the communication of motion from one body to another:
Another idea we have of body is, the power of communi-
cation of motion by impulse. . . . If here again we inquire
how this is done, we are equally in the dark. . . . For in
the communication of motion by impulse, . . . we can have
no other conception, but of the passing of motion out
of one body into another; which I think, is as ob-
scure and inconceivable as how our minds move or stop
our bodies by thought... (II.xxiii.28)

While Locke offers no adequate explanation of the causal
mechanism, and hence allows us no answer to the questions
posed at the beginning of this section, two things are by
now becoming clear. The first is that ideas of primary
qualities "resemble" their causes, while the effects which
are unlike their causes are the secondary qualities, the
causes of which are powers. And with this the second thing
becomes clear— that the time for the aforementioned discus-
sion of primary and secondary qualities is now at hand. As
a means of facilitating that discussion we shall consider at
length two articles by Reginald Jackson.

In the first chapter I have, then offered for con-
sideration and interpretation those passages in the Essay
in which Locke talks about "ideas," "perceptions," and
related terms, and made it clear that there is no clear
account of perception obviously and uniquely embodied in
those passages.

Warnock, "Hume on Causation," 57, thinks that Locke
thinks there is no explanatory mechanism: "It just is the
case, as a matter of bare, brute fact, that certain sensa-
tions are the effects of certain physical stimuli...there
is no intelligible, non-arbitrary connection between two
such diverse items.
In spite of the failure to discover Locke's account of perception in chapter I, we were able in chapter II to provide evidence that Locke is a representationalist, for whom bodies and minds causally interact, and that Locke thinks that ideas "represent" or "resemble" items in the mind-independent external world. The items these ideas represent or resemble are primary and secondary qualities, and it is to an examination of the nature of these that we shall now turn.
CHAPTER III

REGINALD JACKSON ON PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES

a. Of Primary and Secondary Qualities, and Primarily the Former

Primary and secondary qualities are entities crucially involved in Locke's account of perception. An examination of the nature of these qualities, their location, and their role in perception will no doubt help to clarify the account of perception which Locke offers. I shall be seeking an account of perception which unites what Locke says about these qualities both with the claims he makes concerning the relationships between ideas and their causes, and with as many of the passages containing the terms 'perception' and 'idea' as possible.

Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities is notoriously unclear. For example, some commentators think that primary qualities are the only qualities of bodies, and that the so-called secondary qualities are really ideas or sensations. Other commentators think that there are both primary and secondary qualities in bodies, but that both, whatever their differences, are really "powers" of bodies to do one thing or another. Some think that both primary and secondary qualities are perceivable while...
still others think that primary qualities are not sensible or perceivable. There is evidence in the text for all of these claims about the nature and location of qualities. I want to push one particular interpretation, because it is different (with respect to secondary qualities) from the one Berkeley seems to hold, and because that difference appears to make a difference in Locke's vulnerability to Berkeley's attacks. At the same time I think that the things Berkeley says about primary qualities correspond quite closely with Locke's account of them.

Here are two passages in which Locke seems to hint that, among other things, secondary qualities are not really just ideas or sensations by contrast to the primary ones which are really in bodies:

If then external objects be not united to our minds when they produce ideas therein; and yet we perceive these original qualities in such of them as singly fail under our senses, it is evident that some motion must be thence continued by our nerves, or animal spirits...to the brains or seat of sensation, there to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of them. And...the extension, figure, number, and motion of bodies...may be perceived at a distance by the sight...some imperceptible bodies must come from them to the eyes, and thereby convey some motion; which produces these ideas we have of them in us. (II.viii.12) (Italics mine.)

This is followed by:

After the same manner that the ideas of these original qualities are produced in us, we may conceive that the ideas of secondary qualities are also produced...(II.viii.13) (Italics mine.)

Yet another passage in which the hint becomes more insistent that secondary qualities are in the objects is the
following:

...the ideas of primary qualities are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves, but the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all. (II.viii. )

As I shall show, the view that secondary qualities are in the objects, and are not mere ideas or sensations, is not often attributed to Locke. This should be something of a surprise coming on the heels of the passages we have just quoted. What could motivate commentators to find another interpretation of the distinction than the one implicit in those passages?

Reid, in explaining that interpretation, cites an ancient hypothesis:

...the mind, like a mirror, receives the images of things from without, by means of the senses; so that their use must be to convey the images into the mind.¹

He then notes the consequence of this hypothesis:

...the necessary and allowed consequence of this hypothesis is, that no material thing, nor any quality of material things, can be conceived by us, or made an object of thought, until its image is conveyed to the mind by means of the senses.²

Spelled out more thoroughly, the consequences of this hypothesis are that:

...to every quality and attribute of a body we know, there should be a sensation corresponding, which is the image and resemblance of that quality; and that the sensations which have no similitude or resemblance to a body, or to any of its qualities, should

¹ Thomas Reid, Philosophical Works, I, 140.

² Ibid.
give us no conception of a material world, or of anything belonging to it.\(^3\)

Now we know from the passages I quoted from Locke that Locke found that secondary qualities do not resemble anything in a body, and thus it can be seen that if Locke held both the ancient hypothesis and this belief about secondary qualities, he, or at least the commentators, would have felt compelled to deny that secondary qualities are real qualities of a body. The argument again goes like this: if ideas of heat and color and sound are ideas of real qualities of body, the sensations by which we perceive heat, cold, sound must be resemblances (or images) of those qualities; but the sensations are not resemblances; therefore these are not real qualities of bodies.

Reid realizes that Locke was at least not consistent in his acceptance of the ancient hypothesis and his beliefs about secondary qualities:

It is difficult to assign a reason why, after this, he should call them secondary qualities... Surely he did not mean that they were secondary qualities finding that they were no real qualities of body he at all.\(^4\)  

Reid clearly recognizes that what must be given up in this conflict is the "ancient hypothesis." He realizes that the conclusion that color, sound, and heat are not qualities of bodies completes a reductio of that hypothesis, but at

\(^3\)Ibid.

\(^4\)Ibid., 141.
the same time, he appears convinced that Locke, Berkeley, and Hume accept its truth:

What Locke has proved with regard to the sensations we have by smell, taste and hearing, Bishop Berkeley proved no less unanswerably with regard to all other sensations....This opinion surely looks with a very malign aspect upon the old hypothesis; yet that hypothesis hath still been retained, and conjoined with it. And what a brood of monsters hath this produced!

The first-borne of this union, and, perhaps the most harmless, was, that the secondary qualities of bodies were mere sensations of the mind....The next was Berkeley's system...

The progeny that followed, is still more frightful; so that it is surprising, that one could be found who had the courage to act the midwife, to rear it up, and to usher it into the world.5

Whether or not Reid thought that Locke meant that secondary qualities are not real qualities of bodies is open to question.6 He certainly did, however, think that there were forces acting upon (perhaps many) philosophers which would lead them to claim that secondary qualities either were not real or were qualities of mind. This difficulty is reflected, possibly for the reasons Reid suggests, in modern accounts of Locke. For example, Richard Aaron, though ultimately recognizing much the same account of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities which I shall attribute to Locke, says the following:

5 Ibid., 142.

6 Passages to see are on pages 131, 207-9, 274-5, 286-7, 315-8, and 446. For example, he says on page 131: "Des Cartes, Malebranche, and Locke revived the distinction between primary and secondary qualities; but they made the secondary qualities mere sensations, and the primary ones resemblances of our sensations."
Actually the table is not brown, though I see brown when I look at it....to talk about ideas of secondary qualities is thus slightly misleading, for there are no secondary qualities in the sense in which there are primary qualities of things.7

D.J. O'Connor, in his recent book, seems also to suggest that secondary qualities are not really qualities of the external objects:

If we observe an orange, for example, we normally say that it has the properties of being roughly spherical, yellow, acid tasting, having a certain characteristic texture and so on. But according to Locke, the only one of these properties which is a property of the orange is the primary quality of shape of which the idea in our minds is a counterpart of the quality in the body.8

Similarly, C.R. Morris says that for Locke, "An object appears to have shape, and it really has shape; it also appears to have colour, but in reality it has no color."9

It can be seen that in contrast to Locke's avowed way of making the distinction, if O'Connor and Morris are correct, then if color is a secondary quality, as Locke says it is, secondary qualities are not in external objects, which Locke says they are. Apparently these interpreters are at a loss for a better place to put secondary qualities than in the mind. Other commentators of similar view are Fraser,10

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9Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, 34-36.
10In *John Locke*, Encyclopedia Britannica and in his edition of Locke's Essay, Fraser identifies secondary qualities with ideas of secondary qualities. He also take primary qualities to be perceptible.
All of these commentators have been cited by Reginald Jackson as holding views against which he is objecting.

The importance of this move to place secondary qualities in the mind, for our considerations, is that it may make Locke more vulnerable to a Berkelian attack. We all know that Berkeley can show that primary qualities are in the same place that secondary qualities are, but it may be that secondary qualities are in the objects, as Locke seems to think. At least if Locke is not understood to be saying, "secondary qualities are in the mind," the burden of showing that falls upon the (would be) Idealist. In fact, no less a figure than Berkeley himself seems to assume:

They who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of the primary or original qualities do exist without the mind...acknowledge that...secondary qualities do not--which they tell us are sensations existing in the mind alone, that depend on and are occasioned by the different size, texture, and motion of the minute particles of matter. (Principle X)

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11 James Gibson, Locke's Theory of Knowledge and its Historical Relations, 60.
12 The Concept of Nature, 27.
13 The Development of Berkeley's Philosophy, 40-41.
14 A History of Modern Philosophy, I, 183 and 384.
15 Appearance and Reality
16 Space, Time and Deity, II, 555-6, 138.
17 Mind and Its Place in Nature, 206.
18 The Principles of Human Knowledge, ed. by Turbayne.
In fact if Berkeley did hold this view it is much easier to explain why so many commentators held the view. There is a tendency to concede that Berkeley is an expert on Locke and to give credence to his interpretation of the Lockian text.\(^1^9\)

Among the first cogently to expound the view that both primary and secondary qualities are qualities of bodies, and that we have ideas of those qualities was Reginald Jackson. This he did in two articles in *Mind*, "Locke's Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Qualities," and "Locke's Version of the Doctrine of Representative Perception," in 1929 and 1930 respectively. These have been cited by many modern commentators and have now been anthologized as representative of the arguments for which philosophers may be led to a similar interpretation of Locke.\(^1^6\) Because of the relative uniqueness of Jackson's view and its appeal for the purposes of providing an interpretation other than Berkeley's, as well as for a foil against which to offer yet a third view, I propose to spend a good deal of time expounding Jackson's view and commenting upon it.

In "Locke's Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Qualities," it is Jackson's purpose to offer an account of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities

\(^{1^9}\)For example, see W. H. F. Barnes, "Did Berkeley Misunderstand Locke?" *Mind*, XLIX (1940), anthologized in *Locke and Berkeley*, ed. by C. B. Martin and D. M. Armstrong, 79-95.

\(^{2^0}\)C. B. Martin and D. M. Armstrong, *Locke and Berkeley*, 53-77 and 125-154 respectively.
which fits nicely with Locke's definitions of the terms and with Locke's distinction between Qualities and Ideas. It is Jackson's contention that Berkeley (and Reid) incorrectly interpreted Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and that their writings form the basis of the description of that distinction as found in many recent commentaries. Jackson also thinks that the discrepancy between their way of making the distinction and Locke's way goes unnoticed.

The distinction which Berkeley thinks Locke has drawn between primary and secondary qualities is between perceptible qualities of bodies (the primary qualities), and ideas, sensations, or sensibilia which are the effects of the action of bodies upon minds (the secondary qualities) which do not exist independently of the perception of them. In addition to Principle X, which I cited earlier (p.), he also says:

...the sensible qualities are color, figure, motion, smell, taste, etc., i.e. the ideas are perceived by sense. (Principle VII)

This is followed by:

Some there are who make a distinction betwixt primary and secondary qualities. By the former they mean extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity, impenetrability, and number; by the latter they denote

\[21\] In addition to the evidence presented above, and just below, for Berkeley's understanding of Locke, I shall present a more detailed consideration of some of the arguments of Three Dialogues in later pages of the thesis when we are dealing more explicitly with Berkeley.
all other sensible qualities, as colors, sounds, tastes, and so forth. (Principle XI)\textsuperscript{22}

Thus in this passage he says that secondary qualities are sensible, while he has just defined sensible qualities as "the ideas perceived by sense."

This way of making the distinction, Jackson asserts, aligns Locke much more closely with the Cartesians and ultimately with Democritus than he actually should be and, supposing that primary qualities are in the bodies, makes the primary-secondary quality distinction into the same distinction as that between qualities and ideas. According to modern writers, making the distinction between primary and secondary qualities along the lines of the qualities-ideas distinction is another way of stating the Representative Theory of Perception. That is, they presume that the only things directly perceived, or perceived at all, are ideas.

Another possible reading of the distinction which Jackson thinks incorrect is the identification of secondary qualities with "the primary qualities of the insensible parts" of bodies. Jackson's one concession to those who wish to make the distinction in either of these ways is his announcement that the "source of both confusions is to be

\textsuperscript{22}All citations of Berkeley's Principles are from Colin M. Turbayne, ed. Berkeley: Principles of Human Knowledge -- Text and Critical Essays.
found in Locke himself..."

Jackson's alternative to the readings described above is that:

...Locke means by "primary qualities of bodies" simply qualities of bodies, that he calls them "primary" to distinguish them, not from other qualities as a kind of qualities, but from what are on his view only wrongly thought to be qualities, and that just because primary qualities are qualities they are, in accordance with the Representative Theory of Perception, necessarily imperceptible; and that by "secondary qualities" he means, neither qualities nor ideas, but a third set of entities, which he calls "powers of bodies to produce ideas by means of (primary) qualities." (Locke and Berkeley, 55)

Jackson thinks he can support this understanding of the distinction by an appeal to the purpose it serves in Locke's view of our knowledge of the external world. But he also thinks that the source of the confusion mentioned above lies in the confusion of the primary-secondary quality relationship with a number of other distinctions. Among the others are the distinctions between determinate and indeterminate qualities, between microscopic and macroscopic qualities, and between qualities and ideas. An additional problem is that of the meanings of the terms 'individual' and 'particular', and, as a consequence, of distinguishing between two views of our knowledge of the external world. Rather than trying to explicate all of Jackson's views about the interrelationships among these various distinctions, which in-

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23 Jackson, Op. Cit., in Martin and Armstrong, Locke and Berkeley. I shall hereafter refer to Jackson's articles by noting the anthology (Locke and Berkeley) in which they appear, and the page number, in the text of the paper.
volves a criticism of other commentators, I shall try to unravel the relatively new account which Jackson offers.

The first question in this unraveling is what role the distinction between qualities and powers mentioned in the quotation above plays in Locke's theory of the nature of the external world.

Both Descartes and Locke recognize two kinds of substance, one for minds and one for bodies. While both agree that there are a number of conscious substances, Locke, unlike Descartes, also thinks that there are a multitude of material substances. Another way of putting the matter is, "...Locke...holds not only that the external world exists in itself, and can be known through itself, but also that its parts exist in themselves and can be known through themselves." (Locke and Berkeley, 58) Locke does not seem to be claiming that bodies are not related to one another and to minds, but is rather claiming that these relations are not necessary to the body's being what it is, or to our knowledge of these bodies. This would seem to imply that Locke thinks knowledge of a body through itself (as an atomistic individual) and knowledge of a body through its relations are different, and therefore that the qualities of a body are different from the relations in which it stands. Knowledge of relations may provide a clue to what body is in itself, but real knowledge of what the body is is knowledge of its qualities. This is indicated by the fact that
the relations in which a body stands can change without any consequent change in the body itself:

The nature of relation consists in the referring or comparing two things to one another; from which comparison one or both comes to be denominated. And if either of those things be removed, or cease to be, the relation ceases, and the denomination consequent to it, though the other receive in itself no alteration at all... (II.xxxv.5)

Jackson, making the same point, claims Locke understands a relation to be something (the table's being in the room) a change in which would not logically involve a change in the table. (Locke and Berkeley, 59) But a change in a quality, e.g., a change in shape would be eo ipso a change in the table.

Because of this distinction Locke thinks it important to note the qualities as distinct from the relations of a thing. It would be a mistake to think that the power of a body to produce new qualities, or an idea in a percipient is a quality of that body. This mistake results from our ignorance of the quality in virtue of which the body has that power—for it is only by having qualities that bodies have powers, and a listing of those qualities would be sufficient to a comprehensive knowledge of the body. On the other hand, knowledge of the powers, but not the qualities on which they are dependent is not sufficient to a knowledge of those bodies. (Locke and Berkeley, 59) A list of what the body is (the qualities) can be supplemented, not replaced, by a list of what it does (the powers). Such a sup-
plemented list acknowledges an ignorance which, according to Jackson, Locke hopes may be made good by the progress of Physical Science. 24

Jackson thinks that the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is a special case of the distinction between qualities and powers—special because secondary qualities and what he calls powers proper are species of powers. 25 If the important parts of what Jackson has claimed so far are true, then primary qualities are not a kind of quality but all qualities. And secondary qualities are powers which are "wrongly supposed to be qualities."

There are some problems which may mediate against Locke's account and in favor of Jackson's interpretation. These are difficulties which, at least subconsciously, drive Locke towards abandoning these definitions. In this sense they work in favor of Jackson's interpretation, for they explain how Locke was led to say some of the confusing and apparently inconsistent things he says about qualities. It is these problems with which much of the rest of Jackson's article deals. I shall now attend to his discussion of them, for this attention should help to clarify the notion of 'quality', and hence of at least one kind of thing that is "perceived."

24 This does not seem consistent with other things Locke says about the kind and extent of the knowledge we can have.

25 The distinction between secondary qualities, powers, and powers proper is spelled out on page below.
Because qualities of a body can cease to qualify it, and others can take their place, and because this process may be happening at every moment, and because knowledge of a body is constituted by knowledge of its qualities, it looks as though knowledge of a body is not knowledge of something that persists through time or various states. It might be thought that the perishing states but not the persistent body can be known. If one desires to maintain that we do have knowledge of bodies that persist through time, the alternatives seem to be (a) that of saying that knowledge of a body is not constituted by knowledge of its qualities, or (b) that of denying that the primary qualities of a body can change.

Jackson thinks it may be pressure from this kind of attack that leads Locke to try to identify primary qualities as determinable qualities which qualify an individual throughout its differing states:

It is probably because he feels uneasy about this danger that Locke tries to meet it by defining primary qualities in such a way as to enable them to qualify an individual body throughout its differing states. (Locke and Berkeley, 61)

This is done at the cost of eliminating primary qualities as those aspects of bodies which distinguish one from another. If the primary qualities are size, shape, and so

Note in this paragraph and the quotations within and immediately preceding it the failure to recognize the role of substance. In Aristotle and for many philosophers after him, substance plays the role of individuator allowing for the numerical distinctness of qualitatively identical things. It
on then all bodies have the same qualities:

The determinations, which, if taken as always qualifying the individual, are fatal to its persistence, are indispensable to its distinguishability from other individuals. (Locke and Berkeley, 61)

That Locke does treat primary qualities as Jackson suggests he does is evidenced by his definition of them:

Primary qualities are such as are utterly inseparable from the body, in what state soever it be; and such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers, all the force can be used upon it, it constantly keeps; and such as sense constantly finds in every particle of matter which has bulk enough to be perceived; and the mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter, though less than to make itself singly be perceived by our senses...(II.viii.9)

While Jackson thinks that Locke was aware of the dangers of abstracting in this way, he also thinks that Locke lost sight of the need to have primary qualities which qualify an individual body throughout its different states. This he intends to show by an inquiry into the consequences of the definition of primary qualities and a discussion of the central Lockian doctrines incompatible with it.

The terms 'individual' and 'particular', used interchangeably by Locke, can be used to distinguish two theses between which Locke did not choose. An individual retains its identity through change because not every quality is essential to it. A particular is dependent upon its qual-
ties in such a way that a new quality logically implies a new particular. Jackson says this gives Locke the following choice:

Either he may try to show that the world consists of a number of individual substances, each existing in itself and knowable through itself; or he may, giving up the view that individual substances are knowable through themselves, contend that they are knowable through their particular perishing states. (Locke and Berkeley, 63)

In the case of the second alternative it is correct to say that the perishing states, but not the individual substances, are known.

But Locke often opts for the first alternative—he seems to think that there are persistent individual material substances, and that we know this to be the case. That he opts for persistence is not strange, for his definition requires that the qualities of an object be invariable (p. ). And yet this definition excludes the possibility of individual substances because the qualities he lists do not distinguish one body from another (a role which, as I noted, Locke might think is borne by his notion of substance).

Jackson further notes that Locke's account of self-identity appeals to time and place, and thus Locke's account of an individual substance appeals to a relation, not to qualities.

More often, however, Locke appeals to the second alternative of asserting that substances are knowable through their particular perishing states. In this discussion Jackson appeals to the distinction between determinate and
indeterminate qualities, reckoning among determinate qualities "all qualities not common to all bodies." Armed in this way he thinks he can show that there are central Lockian doctrines which are incompatible with Locke's definition of primary qualities given above. For this he has the following four arguments:

(1) Both the secondary qualities and the powers proper of a body depend on the primary qualities of the sensible parts. But the secondary qualities and powers proper of a given body are peculiar to it. Therefore the primary qualities on which they depend must also be peculiar to it. These are, therefore, not common to all bodies and are determinate qualities.

(2) ...we are ignorant of the primary qualities of the insensible parts of bodies...we have recourse to its secondary qualities and powers proper...we are acquainted with the primary qualities of its sensible parts. The primary qualities of the sensible parts are, therefore, different from those of the insensible parts and must be determinate qualities.

(3) ...it is possible "to alter...the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of a body." This is possible only if the qualities are determinate.

(4) ...abstract ideas are formed by "leaving out" of complex ideas "what is peculiar to each." Now ideas of primary qualities are one of two kinds of original ideas of sensation. They are, therefore, not abstract ideas. But they are like the qualities of which they are ideas, and these qualities must accordingly be determinate.

These four arguments, and there are others which can be added, show that Locke does not regard determinateness as excluded by his definition of primary qualities. Jackson concludes that Locke holds that there are determinate primary qualities.

27Martin and Armstrong, Locke and Berkeley, 64. I have preserved the order and context carefully.
qualities and does not consider their fluctuating character to be an impediment. "Though variable, their variations, unlike those of relations, are eo ipso variations of what they qualify." Thus whatever secondary qualities are, and I shall turn to them now, they are to be contrasted with determinate qualities of objects of mind-independent reality.

In this section we have seen that Jackson thinks Berkeley's interpretation of Locke's primary-secondary quality distinction is mistaken because it makes it difficult to account for the distinction between qualities and ideas. If Berkeley is correct there is only one distinction and not two, though Locke seems to think there are two. By Jackson's account, which seems plausible, the primary-secondary quality distinction is a difficult one to explicate because it becomes entangled with other distinctions between determinate and indeterminate qualities, microscopic and macroscopic qualities, and qualities and ideas.

It was finally concluded that primary qualities are determinate qualities, and that problems of their fluctuating character are problems with Locke's account. As I shall show Jackson can make sense of the distinction between macroscopic and microscopic qualities. The relationship between qualities and powers will also become clear.

The evaluation of Jackson's claims about primary qualities in particular will indicate that I accept his conclusion that primary qualities are the qualities of mind-
independent bodies, but reject his conclusion that they are imperceptible. That claim does not follow from the more sophisticated version of the doctrine of Representative Perception which I shall offer below. It is obvious that Jackson and I differ about the nature of some of the objects of perception, and those differences will become clearer as this account progresses.

b. Jackson on Secondary Qualities

I said earlier that the strength of Berkeley's attack on Locke might depend in part upon whether Locke admits, or Berkeley assumes, that secondary qualities are in the mind. Primary qualities may be shown to be where the secondary ones are, but if that is not "in the mind" then neither Idealism nor Phenomenalism is established. What I would like to show in this section are Jackson's reasons for thinking that secondary qualities are indeed not in the mind but rather in the mind-independent physical objects.

In order that we might understand Jackson's account of secondary qualities it will be necessary to examine several of Jackson's claims and the terminology used in stating them. Let us start with with following claims: (1) There are "powers to produce various sensations in us" and "powers to alter the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of another
(2) Only the former are called "secondary qualities" while only the latter are called "powers." These claims would seem to indicate that Jackson is suggesting that the power to produce sensations be referred to as a "quality," while 'power' is properly used to refer to the ability of a body to alter the bulk, figure, and motion of a second body. Jackson appears to have prescribed the use of these two terms. Unfortunately the matter is not that simple. Ambiguity enters the account because Locke's use of the term 'power' is not as rigid as Jackson might hope. As Jackson notes, Locke holds "secondary qualities are powers in the non-technical meaning of the word, and not qualities."30

Locke uses the term 'power' more loosely than Jackson might wish to. Locke uses the term 'secondary quality' only in order "to comply with the common way of speaking" and not because they are a kind of qualities.31 Locke therefore does not wish to use the term 'quality' to refer to secondary qualities. Since the word 'quality' does no real work in this connection, Locke is left with only the word 'power' to refer to both the ability of the body to produce changes.

28 Jackson in Locke and Berkeley, 65, and Locke, An Essay (II.viii.10.23.24), (II.xxiii.7.8).
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Locke, An Essay (II.viii.10).
in bulk, texture, etc., as well as the ability to produce various sensations in us. In other words he has too many jobs to do, or distinctions to make with just one term. Jackson solves the problem by introducing the terms 'powers proper' and 'powers in the loose sense'. 'Powers proper' are powers of the object to alter the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of another body, while 'powers in the loose sense' are secondary qualities.

A third claim which he adds to these first two is the claim that secondary qualities and powers depend only upon the primary qualities of the insensible parts. Jackson calls these primary qualities of the insensible parts microscopic qualities. They contrast with the primary qualities of the sensible parts which he calls macroscopic qualities. This third claim, along with the first two and the terms they embody, provide us with the material necessary to understand how Jackson thinks the distinctions between primary qualities, secondary qualities, and powers are made by Locke. So far I have described his use of the terms 'power' and 'secondary quality'. We now need to see how these correlate with "microscopic" and "macroscopic" qualities mentioned in

\[32\] Ibid. (II.viii.10.23) and Jackson in Locke and Berkeley, 66.

\[33\] Jackson in Locke and Berkeley, 66-67. The use of the terms 'macroscopic qualities' and 'microscopic qualities' is misleading. Anything microscopic might be expected to be visible with the aid of a microscope. Jackson does not think that microscopic qualities are even theoretically visible.
the previous section as a distinction to be accounted for.

Microscopic qualities, qualities of the microscopic parts, underlie both secondary qualities (powers in the loose sense) and powers proper. The product of powers proper is change in bulk, texture, figure, etc., while that of powers in the loose sense (secondary qualities) is Ideas. Thus in some sense or other microscopic qualities underlie both changes in objects and ideas. But there are also macroscopic qualities of objects. The qualities of the macroscopic parts of objects also underlie powers, but these powers are not discussed in any detail. They are powers to produce ideas of primary qualities. If I have read Jackson correctly the situation could be diagrammed like this:

Microscopic qualities in objects (primary qualities of the insensible parts).  

1. Powers, changes in bulk, texture, figure, etc.  
2. Powers (in the loose sense -- Ideas (sensations)

Macroscopic qualities in objects.  

Powers (unclassified) Ideas in the objects.

The '---' is to be read as "are causally responsible for."

All powers to produce ideas or changes depend upon primary qualities—primary qualities of either the microscopic parts or the macroscopic parts. The power to produce ideas of

---Ibid. Jackson says, but does not explain, that secondary qualities and powers proper "depend on" microscopic qualities.
secondary qualities depend upon the microscopic qualities (or primary qualities of the insensible parts). But the power to produce ideas of primary qualities depends upon the primary qualities of the sensible parts.

The distinction between ideas of primary and secondary qualities on Jackson's interpretation turns out to be directly related to the distinction between microscopic and macroscopic qualities. Secondary qualities are powers (to produce ideas) which depend upon microscopic qualities, while primary qualities are powers (to produce ideas) which depend upon macroscopic qualities. As tests of this way of making the distinction Jackson suggests that we see how it fits with the doctrine that primary qualities are like the ideas they produce and secondary qualities are unlike the ones they produce, and with the terminology according to which ideas produced by primary qualities are ideas of primary qualities while those produced by secondary qualities are ideas of secondary qualities.

Before putting his own view to the test Jackson quickly rejects a view worthy of some detailed consideration:

On the view that primary qualities are themselves perceived, or that secondary qualities are mind dependent ideas, it is hard to see what could be made of either the doctrine or the terminology. (Locke and Berkeley, 67)

It is difficult to understand the reason for Jackson's rejection of this view. It seems worthy of more consideration because the view is, as Jackson himself seems to suggest,
rather widely held by philosophers such as Berkeley. In any event Jackson proceeds to consider his own view. To consider the first test first, what of the notion that some ideas resemble their archetypes and some do not? Jackson says:

...we have seen that Locke uses the term "secondary quality" only of powers dependent on what he calls "the primary qualities of the insensible parts." The ideas of the secondary qualities are, therefore, probably held to be produced by microscopic qualities, while the ideas of the primary qualities are probably held to be produced by macroscopic qualities. Locke's doctrine will then be that macroscopic qualities produce resembling ideas, while microscopic qualities produce non-resembling ideas.

This seems to adequately state the view, but no real understanding of it has yet been provided. Just what is it that the ideas produced by these qualities resemble, or fail to resemble? Is it first or second group of the items on our diagram above?

Locke asserts that ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble the secondary qualities. But Jackson has his own interpretation of that claim. Jackson thinks it is the microscopic qualities, not the secondary qualities which the ideas of secondary qualities fail to resemble. To support this Jackson appeals to the claim that it makes no sense to say that an idea resembles (or fails to resemble) the power to produce it (which is what the secondary quality is), and

35 I shall attempt to show the first part of the view, that primary qualities are themselves perceived, is as easily reconciled with the doctrine of resemblance and representation as is Jackson's view. But I do agree with him that secondary qualities are not mind-dependent ideas.
to the Lockian text to show that Locke varies the statement that secondary qualities produce ideas that do not resemble them with the apparently synonymous claim that there is nothing like our ideas existing in bodies themselves.\(^{36}\) In addition Locke says:

\[\ldots\text{what is sweet, blue, or warm in idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, and motion of the insensible parts, in the bodies themselves. (II.viii.15)}\]

Jackson claims in addition that on the representative theory of perception there is nothing to be gained by supposing that microscopic qualities resemble ideas.

Granted that microscopic qualities do not resemble ideas,\(^{37}\) how can the macroscopic qualities resemble the ideas they produce? To this Jackson has no ready answer. Locke, furthermore, explicitly claims that no ideas are qualities and Jackson suggests that this is because he thinks all ideas are unlike any qualities. But the explanatory power of that suggestion is difficult to see. "All ideas are unlike any qualities" does imply that no ideas are qualities. But, though Locke makes the second claim, he denies the first. For some reason Jackson thinks that the

\[^{36}\text{Jackson in Locke and Berkeley, 68, and Locke, An Essay (II.viii.15).}

\[^{37}\text{If Jackson is correct in his claim that secondary qualities are the powers resulting from the primary qualities of the insensible parts, we should wonder how Locke ever arrived at the claim that ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble their archetypes. Remember, on Jackson's account of Locke the primary qualities or archetypes are not perceivable. Thus there are no grounds for distinguishing between primary and secondary qualities on the basis of archetypes, for there are no perceivable archetypes.}\]
first claim is established. The result is that Jackson gives up on the attempt to show that this way of making the primary secondary quality distinction is compatible with the claim that primary qualities are like the ideas they produce in us:

There would be more to be said for the statement that the perceived shape resembles the shape of the surface that produces it, to the extent to which a figure resembles its projection of a surface that distorts it....But if nothing short of complete resemblance is claimed, and that between the original idea of sensation and the quality that produces it, this can be allowed only if the quality is taken to be indeterminate, and the idea...to be an abstract idea. (Locke and Berkeley, 68-69)

Jackson apparently convinces himself that his interpretation of the primary secondary quality distinction is satisfactory in spite of apparently having failed one of his self-imposed tests. He does this by supposing that Locke could not have meant what he said about resemblance in the case of primary qualities.\textsuperscript{38}

The other test of Jackson's interpretation was that of whether sense could be made of the terminology according to which ideas produced by primary qualities are ideas of primary qualities while those produced by secondary qualities are ideas of secondary qualities. Jackson wants to know "what is meant by calling these two sets of ideas, ideas of primary and secondary qualities respectively?" (Italics mine) This question becomes especially significant

\textsuperscript{38}Jackson in Locke and Berkeley, 67.
when one realizes that Jackson's account has apparently de­stroyed at least one proffered relationship between ideas and qualities— that of resemblance.

One way of understanding "idea of" is to suppose that it means "apprehension of." But Jackson rules out this interpretation by the following appeal:

But Locke does not think that either primary or sec­ondary qualities (or the microscopic qualities on which the qualities depend) are perceived, and per­ception is the only kind of apprehension that is here in question. (Locke and Berkeley, 69)

Furthermore, Jackson notes, the idea must be an object if the statement that it is like or unlike an object is to be significant.

Another possibility is that:

..."idea of" might mean "idea, namely," the phrase being parallel to such phrases as "city of Troy;" and this is one possible interpretation of such phrases as "idea of Blue," if "blue" is supposed to be a sensible and not either a group of micro­scopic qualities or a secondary quality. (Locke and Berkeley, 69)

But this, too, is rejected. It supposes that Locke confuses the idea with that which it is said to be "of." But there is yet another possibility:

Possibly "of" is equivalent to "representing" or "doing duty for." The idea of a primary quality (or rather a macroscopic quality) represents the quality in our complex idea of the body. (Locke and Berkeley, 69)

It is this view which Jackson settles on and he seems to think it fits with most of the passages in the text. (This is not surprising since the suggestion is Locke's very own):
My "idea of a horse" is used to mean an object which I apprehend and which represents and resembles, more or less according to my knowledge, a horse... (Locke and Berkeley, 70)39

As Jackson says, the accurate statement of Locke's doctrine would seem to be:

Ideas which are produced by microscopic qualities are unlike those qualities, but they represent them in our naive complex ideas of bodies. (Locke and Berkeley, 70)

This concludes my statement of Jackson's position, and the discussion of the arguments for it. There remains the task of identifying a few common errors that Jackson thinks are made in reading Locke. Against the background of Jackson's account, and at the same time I discuss these "errors," I hope to be able to mention one crucial disagreement I have with Jackson's account.

There are two errors of interpretation for which Jackson thinks Locke primarily responsible. These are errors in the identification of secondary qualities. One is the identification of the secondary qualities with the qualities on which they depend, that is the identification of Powers with microscopic qualities. Two kinds of things Locke says result in this erroneous identification. One is that there are ideas of secondary qualities, and that secondary quali-

39 Note that Jackson reinserts the notion of 'resemblance', which he has apparently just got rid of. Thus in spite of the fact that he uses the notion of "doing duty for" to replace "represent" in the previous quotation, there remains a question of just what 'represent' does mean.
ties are unlike the ideas they produce in us. This implies only a two part distinction between ideas and their objects, whereas there are three things to be distinguished. In the cause itself we should distinguish between microscopic qualities and powers, and then the ideas are the third part. The same can be said of Locke's statements such as "what is sweet, blue, or warm in idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, and motion of the insensible parts in the bodies themselves." Here again the insensible parts of microscopic qualities seem to have been collapsed with the power or secondary quality which causes the idea.

The second, and more frequent, error is the identification of secondary qualities with the sensations produced. Locke initiates this confusion by, for example, distinguishing between secondary qualities mediately perceivable and secondary qualities immediately perceivable:

The former of these, I think, may be called secondary qualities immediately perceivable; the latter, secondary qualities, mediately perceivable. (II.viii.26)

He also says:

Take away the sensation of them; let not the eyes see light or colors, nor the ears hear sounds; let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell, and all colors, tastes, odours, and sounds, as they are such particular ideas, vanish and cease, and are reduced to their causes, i.e. bulk, figure, and motion of parts. (II.viii.17)

Jackson says "as they are such particular ideas" (which Locke seems to want to emphasize) should read "or rather the ideas which these powers produce." Locke provides ad-
ditional fuel for the confusion when he uses the term "sensible qualities" as equivalent to "secondary qualities," which, Jackson asserts, leads to some of the confusion in Berkeley's account. A great deal of the difficulty may be due, Jackson suggests, to the fact that we have only one word to indicate both the secondary qualities, i.e. the powers, and the ideas of them.

According to Jackson there is one last, though important, source of the confusion. There are many passages in which Locke says or implies that qualities are perceptible. As Jackson notes, the terms "sensible" and "insensible part" have this implication, and there are explicit claims in such passages as:

We perceive these original qualities...(II. viii. 12)

and

Primary qualities of bodies are really in them, whether anyone's senses perceive them or no. (II. viii. 17)

Jackson again, significantly enough, though he notes it, dismisses such evidence for a different interpretation of what is perceived in the following way:

Such irregularities have encouraged the supposition that the primary qualities themselves become ideas by being perceived, which is inconsistent with the whole doctrine of Representative Perception, as embodied in Locke's distinction between Qualities and Ideas. (Locke and Berkeley, 71)

Whether they become ideas by being perceived is another question, but that such (primary) qualities are perceived is exactly what Berkeley thinks Locke is saying. I, too, think
the view has some merit and is at least worthy of further consideration. Jackson's dismissal of the view seems to hinge upon his understanding of the doctrine of representative perception. As we shall see in the next chapter Jackson seems to think that only those things immediately perceivable are perceivable at all, but this, I think, is not what Locke thought, nor is it what Berkeley thought Locke thought. Jackson proposes to look briefly at Berkeley's "erroneous interpretation of Locke's distinction..." (Locke and Berkeley, 71)

In the Principles of Human Knowledge as well as Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, Berkeley makes it clear that he thinks Locke means by primary and secondary qualities perceptible qualities and mind-dependent ideas, rather than Jackson's imperceptible qualities and powers and perceptible ideas. I agree with Jackson that secondary qualities are not mind-dependent ideas, but are, rather, powers. But I think that Berkeley's view that primary qualities are perceptible finds support in the Lockian text. Some of that support was just quoted.

Berkeley's view, which Jackson proceeds to criticise, seems to be that primary qualities exist without the mind while secondary qualities exist in the mind alone and depend upon, and are occasioned by, the different size, texture, and motion of the minute particles of matter. (Principles X)\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{40} As we shall see in the last part of this thesis there
Berkeley argues that the primary qualities are thought to be extension, etc., while the secondary qualities are "all other sensible qualities." (Principle IX) As Jackson notes, 'all other' implies that primary qualities are sensible. But Jackson also notes that Berkeley has by this time in the text already defined sensible qualities as "the ideas perceived by sense." (Principle VII) I think that this is not only a mistake on Berkeley's part, but a rather blatant one since the identification of sensible qualities with ideas is incompatible with the assertions that primary qualities are sensible and that they do exist without the mind.\(^a\)

Jackson, however, pays no attention to this mistake in Berkeley's account but rather seems to agree. Jackson then proceeds on the supposition that the resulting absurdity shows it a mistake to assume that qualities are perceived:

The awkwardness of this interpretation appears in the argument that what has been proved of "certain sensible qualities", namely, that they "have no existence in matter, or without the mind" "may likewise be proved of all other sensible qualities whatsoever". (Locke and Berkeley, 72)

Thus it is this assumption that the only sensible qualities are ideas that results in the collapse of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and the consequent

\(^a\) This is an example of the "ancient hypothesis" and its consequences, spelled out by Reid. See pp. 58-60 above.
Jackson thinks the collapse of this distinction is an awkwardness which...

...arises from the fact that Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities is grounded on the representative theory of perception, which Berkeley's version of the distinction ignores and precludes. (Locke and Berkeley, 72)

And with this claim I do not wish to quarrel. Perhaps Berkeley's version, at least his final version, does ignore and preclude the Representative Theory of Perception. But it is far from clear that it does this because it asserts that primary and secondary qualities are perceivable. Prima Facie there is nothing incompatible in the claims that the Representative Theory of Perception is true and that we perceive qualities which are not ideas.

In any event, Jackson thinks that Berkeley argues that the variability of our ideas is incompatible with the view that primary qualities resemble qualities of bodies (which is what Locke thought in the case of secondary qualities), and that Berkeley therefore understands "the existence without the mind of sensible qualities" to mean "their resemblance to qualities of matter." That is, Berkeley does not understand Locke to be asserting that primary qualities are qualities of matter, but ones which resemble qualities of matter, whereas secondary qualities do not. Of this Jackson says:
In fact the distinction between qualities and ideas of qualities, on which Locke's whole doctrine of our knowledge of the external is based, becomes meaningless when qualities are taken to be themselves ideas, some mind-dependent and some independent. (Locke and Berkeley, 72)

However, it is not yet the time to argue Berkeley's interpretation of Locke.

This concludes Jackson's discussion of primary and secondary qualities in Locke. Jackson has been shown to have made no sense of the notion of 'resemblance', and it is therefore questionable just what the ground for the distinction between "ideas of primary" as opposed to "ideas of secondary" qualities is. If the difference cannot lie in the relationship of the ideas to the qualities it certainly cannot lie in the qualities either, for by Jackson's own account all qualities are primary qualities.

Jackson does, however, seem to have done a good job of sorting out the various relevant distinctions in the Lockian text. Furthermore he has shown that an account of secondary qualities as qualities of mind-independent bodies is both plausible and consistent with other Lockian doctrines. There is, nevertheless, one particularly puzzling feature of Jackson's account.

In the course of discussing the account we have seen that Jackson claims, and I have questioned the claim, that other leading interpretations of Locke's distinction fail to accord with the doctrine of Representative Perception.
Unfortunately this was not argued as the account proceeded, and thus the status of Jackson's interpretation is in question. I certainly do want to give an interpretation of the distinction that accords with the doctrine of Representative Perception. On the other hand, I do not want to be guided in making that distinction by a faulty understanding of the requirements of that doctrine. Jackson's central point has, throughout the discussion, been that perceivability of qualities is incompatible with the doctrine of Representative Perception. How is that the case?

Fortunately Jackson felt the need to clarify himself on this matter and consequently presented us with an account of Locke's version of the doctrine of Representative Perception in an article by that title. Before presenting my view of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities in Locke, in which I do in fact hold that for Locke primary qualities are perceivable, I must, by examining this article, assess the truth of Jackson's claims about the incompatibility of that claim with the doctrine of Representative Perception.

a. Jackson on Representative Perception

In the first part of this chapter I would like to present Jackson's understanding of the doctrine of Representative Perception and then in the second part contrast certain claims of that account with the claims of a more traditional, and perhaps Berkelian, account. These different claims imply different things about the nature and location of qualities, which in turn suggest differing accounts of perception. These implications will be drawn out more clearly as the chapter progresses. The second part of the chapter will also be an evaluation of Jackson's version of the doctrine of Representative Perception.

In "Locke's Version of the Doctrine of Representative Perception" Jackson sets out to defend the view that Locke's distinction between qualities and ideas is an embodiment of the doctrine of Representative Perception, and hence that any explication of the other of Locke's views, such as the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, must be compatible with that doctrine. The earlier article in which he explained that distinction claimed:

92.
Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities, if interpreted in accordance with the Berkelian tradition, is awkwardly related to the distinction between Qualities and Ideas, not only being rendered redundant, as a distinction between physical reality and sensible appearance, by the distinction between Qualities and Ideas, but also, in view of the different standpoint from which the distinction between physical reality and sensible appearance is drawn, being incompatible with the distinction between Qualities and Ideas. This claim assumed that Locke's distinction between Qualities and Ideas was an embodiment of the doctrine of Representative Perception. (Locke and Berkeley, 127)

There have been some commentators who have claimed that Locke did not hold a Representative Theory of Perception, but it is not only against these that Jackson must argue. For many others, while professing that Locke did hold that doctrine, failed to announce, or possibly perceive, that Berkeley's interpretation of Locke was incompatible with that doctrine. Among these have been such distinguished commentators as Dr. Alexander, Professor Gibson, Reid, and William Hamilton. For example, Reid, who certainly thinks Locke a representationalist, goes so far as to say, "Berkeley's system follows from Mr. Locke's, by very obvious consequence." It is therefore incumbent upon Jackson to show not only that Locke was indeed a representationalist, but also that Berkeley's interpretation of the distinction

1Locke, in the series "Philosophies, Ancient and Modern," Locke's Theory of Knowledge, Philosophical Works of Reid, and Hamilton's commentary in Reid's Philosophical Works, all cited in Jackson, "Locke's Version..." in Martin and Armstrong, Locke and Berkeley, 128.

2Philosophical Works, I, 263a.
between primary and secondary qualities is incompatible with Locke's version of representationalism. Now, then, let us turn to the argument.

For Jackson's purpose it is assumed that there are two alternatives open to an interpreter of Locke's account of our knowledge of the external world. The two alternatives are both "successive steps in a departure from Naif Realism," a view which claims that "when our ideas are employed about any object," the "simple ideas of sensation" that are presented are all qualities of bodies. (Locke and Berkeley, 129)

It is not asserted that Locke, or anyone else, holds this view, for there are obvious reasons why some "simple ideas of sensation" cannot be identified with any qualities of bodies. But if one thinks some ideas of sensation can be so identified, then he holds what Jackson calls the Mixed View.

While the original position (Naif Realism) does not distinguish between appearance and reality, the Mixed View does. Some simple ideas of sensation "are appearances and some are reality." This distinction, it should be noted, is between kinds of ideas for both groups are still "simple ideas of sensation."

It might, however, be noticed that the attack which leads to calling some ideas "appearance" works equally well on the others, and in response to this kind of attack one
might claim that all such "simple ideas of sensation" are to be distinguished from qualities of bodies. Thus the distinction between appearance and reality is one between "ideas of sensation" and qualities of bodies, rather than between two sets of "simple ideas of sensation." This resultant view Jackson declares to be the doctrine of Representative Perception is attributed to him by Reid, Hamilton, Alexander, and Gibson. But this is where the difficulties begin:

On the assumption that these alternatives are exhaustive, it will appear that, so far from needing no vindication, the thesis that Locke held the doctrine of Representative Perception is probably incapable of being conclusively proved, and must in any case be stated in carefully guarded terms. The difficulty is occasioned in part by the character of Locke's writings and in part by the peculiar relationship between the two views that have been attributed to him. (Locke and Berkeley, 130)

What is the "peculiar relation between the two views that have been attributed to him"? The two views are the Mixed View and the doctrine of Representative Perception. Jackson thinks he can show that the former is not the correct view to attribute to Locke, but that the latter is, and this in spite of the fact that:

there is no doubt that Locke not only occasionally, but even habitually, uses the language of Naive Realism, and this admission might be supposed, if coupled with the claim that Locke sometimes uses the language of the doctrine of Representative Perception, to be tantamount to the recognition of the rival interpretation. [I.e. the Mixed View] (Locke and Berkeley, 130-131)

Given that Jackson thinks it best to limit his thesis to the contentions (1) that there are some passages in which
the doctrine of representative perception is certainly em-
bodyed, (2) that strong influences encouraged him to use 
the language of Naif Realism on all occasions, but (3) that 
he intended the Mixed View the writing of those passages 
embodying the doctrine of Representative Perception would 
be inexplicable.

Even the first of these claims has its attendant dif-
ficulties for 

those very passages, which according to this claim 
can only be an expression of that doctrine of Repre-
sentative Perception, have been regarded by Campbell 
Fraser as an expression of the Mixed View, and have 
been admitted by Hamilton to be unhappily worded. (Locke 
and Berkeley, 134)

An example of such a passage in Locke Is:

(A) the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are re-
semblances of them, and their patterns do really 
exist in the bodies themselves. (II.viii.15)

of which Fraser says:

This implies that what we are directly percipient 
of, i.e. the idea, belongs, in the case of the real 
or primary qualities of sensible things, to the 
things themselves, being body itself manifested, so 
far as a percept can present what is extended.3

Fraser here suggests that some ideas belong to bodies, that 
is that Locke holds the Mixed View. He does not seem to 
see that in (A) Locke clearly distinguishes between ideas 
and qualities. Jackson thinks that the implication which 
Fraser draws (i.e. that ideas and qualities are in some 
cases identical) simply does not hold.

3Fraser in Locke, An Essay, 173.
Jackson and C.D. Broad both think that both views wish to assert the physical reality of sizes and shapes, while denying the physical quality of colors, temperatures, noises, etc. In spite of this similarity Jackson thinks that the representationalist's view is superior to the Mixed View as an interpretation of Locke:

...While the crude view (i.e., the Mixed View) maintains that the physically real qualities are sensible and that the surfaces to which they belong are sensible, the more developed view denies that any physically real qualities are sensible and holds that the physically real qualities can be determined only by inference from physically unreal qualities, to which they are causally related and some of which resemble them. (Locke and Berkeley, 136)

The Mixed View is internally inconsistent because it by implication both affirms and denies that what we sense are surfaces of bodies, by affirming that sensible shape is physically real and yet by denying that color is physically real. (Locke and Berkeley, 136)

Thus Jackson thinks there is no reason that he (Jackson), or anyone else, should want to attribute the Mixed View to Locke.

But it hardly needs to be pointed out that the claims that sensible shape is physically real, and that color is not physically real are not obviously inconsistent. If Jackson has given an argument it should seem to go in the following way:

1. Sensible shape is physically real
2. Sensible color is not physically real
Therefore, it is the case that what we sense

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are surfaces of bodies, and it is not the case that what we sense are surfaces of bodies.

But premises (1) and (2) do not seem, by themselves, to yield the contradictory conclusion, and Jackson gives no further argument to support the claim. Also I have not been able to find a plausible additional premise to make his case. Thus the additional premise or premises that he has in mind remain a mystery.

Jackson also thinks that the Mixed View is inconsistent with the facts. It is inconsistent with the facts because the arguments used to prove the physical unreality of some sensible qualities apply against all sensible qualities.

To be preferred, presumably because it is "more developed," is the doctrine of Representative Perception. This Jackson finally characterizes, and he does so in terms of a negative and positive tenet. The negative tenet is:

No physical reality is sensible.

and the positive tenet is:

There is a physical reality and it is represented by sensible appearances such as color. *(Locke and Berkeley, 137)*

This positive tenet means that sensible appearances, rather than the apprehension of physical reality, are relied upon by the perciptent to guide him in the practical affairs.

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5 Jackson allows that by a slight modification, primarily in connection with the terms 'physical reality' one can understand the doctrine of Berkeley as a version of the doctrine of Representative Perception. If so then Reid may have been closer to the truth than Jackson gives him credit for. (p. 93 above).
of life. Such a role could be played by the primary qualities by means of which color is produced in a body, if we were able to sense them. For we could then associate the primary qualities with powers other than those to produce ideas in a perciplent. But although we cannot do that we can nevertheless see that sensible qualities serve the same purpose even though they do not "resemble" physical qualities. Thus it is suggested that 'represent' in "sensible qualities represent physical qualities" means that attention to sensible qualities will afford us the ability to nourish ourselves, just as if we apprehended the physical qualities of things.

But Jackson notes that the negative tenet of the doctrine of representative perception is the one which is in question for the purposes of his discussion, and he is surely right. It is the negative tenet which distinguishes this doctrine from the Mixed View. And it is this tenet which raises a particularly difficult problem—in fact a problem which may lead some to hold a version of what Jackson calls the Mixed View. This is the problem of how, when physical reality is numerically distinct from sensible appearance, and no physical reality is sensed, we can know anything of that physical reality. It is because of this difficulty that many are tempted to say that physical reality is sensed. But Jackson tries to show how sensible appearance is evidence for the existence of a physical reality.
of the kind the doctrine of Representative Perception describes, and that appearance is the source of "acquaintance" with the qualities asserted to belong to that physical reality when in fact we cannot sense that physical reality.

This involves the following difficulties. On the one hand the doctrine that physical reality and sensible appearance are numerically distinct might be expressed by saying that no attribute of one can also be an attribute of the other. At the same time we are required to describe physical reality in terms appropriate to sensible appearance, for it is only the latter with which we are acquainted. Sensible appearance must be shown to be the source of acquaintance with the qualities that are asserted on the evidence to belong to physical reality.

On the other hand, Jackson thinks that to accommodate ourselves to this requirement we have to say that physical reality and sensible appearance have certain attributes in common. Of course, because of the numerical distinctness of physical reality from sensible appearance Jackson must claim that they might be said to share an attribute in the sense of universal. Thus the problem is generated by two different uses of the term 'attribute' and solved by their recognition. One use is 'attribute' to mean 'particular' or 'instance', the other to mean 'universal'.

It seems to me that Jackson's suggestion that "physical reality" and "appearance" or "sensible reality" share
attributes implies the existence of such things as square ideas, spatial ideas, colored ideas, and the like. How else is one to understand the claim that tables and ideas partake of the same universals? Since Jackson is not defending the doctrine of Representative Perception he does not attempt to solve this difficulty. He simply notes its existence for the Representative Perception theorist. This may not, however, mediate against the interpreter who ascribes the doctrine of Representative Perception to Locke, for the problem may be even more severe for the proponent of the Mixed View.

Jackson thinks that the proponent would have to hold that the particular shape of the physical appearance is the particular shape of the physical reality. This, however, implies the identity of sensible appearance with physical reality and hence demonstrates an alleged internal inconsistency of the view.\(^6\) (That physical reality is and is not distinct from sensible appearance?) Furthermore, he thinks that anyone holding that characteristics are themselves particulars either could not answer to the difficulties of getting knowledge of physical reality through sensible appearance, or he would have to identify the two in order to get that knowledge (so that knowledge of a character of sensible appearance)

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\(^6\)This would seem to be significant only if the mixed view theorist holds that in perceiving physical reality we make it into an idea only—that is, that we perceive only ideas. Jackson, unlike Berkeley, never considers the possibility seriously that Locke, as he suggests in numerous passages, thinks that qualities are perceived while only ideas are perceived immediately.
appearance would give knowledge of a character of physical reality); thus he would have to be holding Naïf Realism, the Mixed View, or some other unsatisfactory view.

Locke has a special difficulty. He seems to have held that characteristics are particular:

...general and particular belong not to the real existence of things; but are inventions and creations of the understanding...when...we quit particulars the generals that rest are only creatures of our own making; their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into, by the understanding, of signifying and representing many particulars. (III.iii.11)

Thus Locke would have to say of two similar things that a quality of one resembles a quality of the other, and not that they share a universal. He cannot legitimately accept Jackson's solution to the problem of knowledge of physical reality, which involves knowledge of a universal shared by physical reality and sensible appearance. He must claim either that we have no knowledge of physical reality, or else that at some points physical reality and sensible appearance coincide. That is, he is pushed toward the Mixed View as it is suggested above that anyone holding this view of characters would be. It will be seen that the positive tenet of representationalism is challenged in so far as doubt is cast upon the ability of sensible appearance to provide knowledge of physical reality. Locke is thereby pushed in the direction of modification of the negative tenet. If knowledge of physical reality cannot come through
knowledge of sensible appearance, then perhaps he must say
that some of physical reality is sensible. If we see Locke
as one who held that both ideas of sensation and qualities
of bodies are particulars, then we may view his distinction
between Qualities and Ideas and his claim that Ideas resemble
Qualities as complementary requisites in the attempt to rec­
nocile the two tenets of the doctrine of Representative Per­
ception with the truth of the claim that we have knowledge
of physical reality.

The distinction between Qualities and Ideas is drawn
to preserve the negative tenet. Qualities are qualities of
physical reality, and what Jackson would call sensible ap­
pearances are Ideas. How then is this distinction to be
reconciled with the implication of the positive tenet, name­
ly that physical reality can be described in terms of sensi­
ble appearance? Well, not only does Locke claim that certain
common qualities (not universals) are possessed by physical
reality and sensible appearance, but also that certain
qualities of sensible appearance "resemble" certain qualities
of physical reality. In saying this Jackson is pointing out
that had Locke held that qualities and relations were uni­
versals, then he could have held that we: have knowledge of
physical reality without jeopardizing either the doctrine of
Representative Perception or knowledge of physical reality.
But he did not hold that qualities and relations are univer­
sals; so the claim that sensible appearance and physical
reality have characteristics in common is fatal to their numerical distinctness. Thus we can see that it is Locke's view about characters that pushes him to say that some qualities are ideas, for only then can we know anything of qualities. But he is not consistent in that urge, and Jackson implies that, given the choice, Locke would say that qualities and ideas are distinct. Locke is quite explicit about that:

...the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves, but the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all. (II.vii.15)

And Jackson takes this to imply that the negative tenet is secured. On the Mixed View it would make no sense to say that ideas of Primary Qualities resemble Qualities because on that view the ideas of primary qualities and the qualities must be identified with one another.

Jackson then launches into a discussion of Fraser's interpretation which involves the following kind of claims with respect to some passages in Locke:

Locke, less subtle than Berkeley, probably means, in his vague way, that the primary qualities are virtually the ideas we have of them, while of the other qualities there is nothing in the things that can be identified with what we feel. The alleged 'resemblance' in the former case is Locke's way of asserting the objective existence of the presented appearance or idea.  

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7Fraser in Locke, An Essay, I, 173.
We will not follow Jackson in his criticism of Fraser with the one exception of pointing out that his major criticism of this way of understanding Locke is that it is incompatible with the distinction between Qualities and Ideas which has just been previously drawn.

We have now shown how Jackson arrives at the conclusion that, understood in the Berkelian tradition, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is either "redundant" with respect to the distinction between Qualities and Ideas, or "incompatible" with it. We have also seen how Jackson's interpretation, although raising other difficulties for Locke, eliminates that conflict. And we have seen that such an interpretation not only allows Locke to hold the doctrine of Representative Perception, but also that the consequences of his holding that doctrine are quite far-reaching with respect to the correctness of his other interpreters. Therefore, it will be worth our while, before presenting further discussion of the primary-secondary quality distinction, to examine very briefly the reasons that other commentators do not notice the alleged incompatibility of their way of making the primary-secondary distinction with the doctrine of Representative Perception. To facilitate this I will present the essentials of a more traditional account.
b. An Evaluation of Jackson's Doctrine of Representative Perception

As we have seen in preceding pages, Jackson thinks that Locke holds the doctrine of Representative Perception as it is developed in "Locke's Version of the Doctrine of Representative Perception." But as it is developed there the doctrine is a strange one. It is so strange that Jackson argues that Berkeley does not understand Locke, and he does so on the grounds that a number of things Berkeley says about Locke are incompatible with a representative account of perception. This is strange because a great number of philosophers have thought Locke a Representationalist, and have thought that Berkeley, too, recognized this.

Given the apparent oddity of his claims Jackson should perhaps have questioned whether the doctrine of Representational Perception is indeed the doctrine he thinks it is, for the peculiar version of that doctrine which Jackson holds has ramifications for the rest of his interpretation of Locke. The problem here can perhaps be clarified by a better statement of what Jackson should have done but did not do: he should have claimed that Locke is a Representationalist and then proceeded to show how only his (Jackson's) own version of that doctrine was applicable to Locke. Then, if successful, and if Berkeley's comments preclude the attribution of that doctrine to Locke, then Jackson would stand on solid ground in rejecting the claims of the Berkelian tradi-
tion to have successfully understood Locke.

Some idea of Jackson's audacity in his attack upon the tradition can perhaps be conveyed by the following considerations. It was noted above (p. 92) that Reid claimed that "Berkeley's system follows from Mr. Locke's, by very obvious consequence." In noting this Jackson also notes that Reid correctly thought Locke a representationalist. But given his belief that Berkeley misunderstood Locke, Jackson is forced to the conclusion that Reid is wrong in his claim about Berkeley's system, and indeed that Reid is wrong to think that Berkeley even understood Locke. According to Jackson:

...Berkeley did not recognize the full extent of the admission which Locke has made, but supposed that the view of Locke had first to be modified by proving that Locke's view of "certain sensible qualities," namely that they "have no existence in matter or without the mind," is true "of all other sensible qualities whatsoever," before it could be made to agree with the doctrine of Representative Perception. (Locke and Berkeley, 128)

What Jackson is claiming here is that Locke thinks that the sensible qualities exist "without the mind" and that this is not only compatible with, but an essential part of, the doctrine of Representative Perception. Jackson's arguments to the effect that Berkeley's suppositions about Locke are inaccurate are regrettably difficult to discover. They are apparently connected to the passage quoted just above and to Jackson's understanding of what Reid calls the common assumption made by philosophers from Plato to Hume:
...That we do not perceive external objects immediately, and that the immediate object of perception must be some image present to the mind... (Locke and Berkeley, 128)

This passage is one statement of the doctrine of Representative Perception, and it is a different one from that which Jackson gives.

Since I believe Jackson's rejection of Berkeley's interpretation of Locke is a consequence of Jackson's peculiar understanding of the doctrine of Representative Perception we should inquire into (1) the development of that doctrine, (2) its exact statement and the consequences of so stating it, and (3) the correctness, as an interpretation of Locke, of so stating the doctrine. The discussion of these points will provide the evidence necessary to judge the accuracy of the claims that Locke is a representationalist, and that if Locke is a representationalist then Berkeley's interpretation of him is incorrect. These latter claims are, then, the most general objects of investigation while the modus operandi will be the investigation of (1), (2), and (3).

The development of the doctrine of Representative Perception might be said to begin with the failures of a view called Naïf Realism. Jackson thinks Naïf Realism a first step in a series of steps culminating in the doctrine of Representative Perception. As we noted before (p. 94) Naïf Realism ("expressed in Locke's terminology")
would be expressed by saying that all "simple ideas of sensation," that are presented "when our senses are actually employed about any object," are qualities of bodies. (Locke and Berkeley, 129)

For the time being let us take this statement of the view at face value (whatever that might be) and agree with Jackson that this view is not to be attributed to Locke. Aside from the textual evidence in Jackson's favor, I want to assume with both Jackson and Reid that Locke is a representationalist while investigating Jackson's understanding of the development of that position. As it seems that no understanding of the doctrine of Representative Perception is compatible with the claim that all simple ideas of sensation are qualities of bodies, the rejection of this view as Locke's creates no particular difficulties.

The Mixed View which Jackson does think a contender with respect to interpretations of Locke, claims that some simple ideas of sensation are qualities of bodies and that some are not. This is the second of three steps on the path to the doctrine of Representative Perception. It is this Mixed View which, according to Jackson, Berkeley attributes to Locke. It is therefore worth noting just what the Mixed View is and how it developed.

The Mixed View results when one realizes that some "simple ideas of sensation" cannot be identified with any of the qualities of a body. Thus we have a distinction between "physical reality" and "sensible appearance"—a distinction
which was not available to us on the assumptions of Naif Realism. The same arguments used to force the distinction between appearance and reality in the first place, however, apply against the identity of any body with any simple idea. This leads to, for example, Jackson's rejection of the Mixed View. It is significant, however, that Jackson ascribed to the Mixed View a distinction between appearance and reality—sensible appearance and physical reality. It is this view which, Jackson claims, Berkeley ascribes to Locke.

The development of representationalism should by now be quite clear. It is necessary to affirm only that:

(1) NO SIMPLE IDEAS ARE EVER QUALITIES OF BODIES.

and

(2) ALL SIMPLE IDEAS OF SENSATION "REPRESENT" QUALITIES OF BODIES.

One would suppose that here we have the view which Jackson attributes to Locke, and which Berkeley fails to see there. But in fact things are far more complicated. Instead of formulating the doctrine of Representative Perception by completing the trend developed in the move from Naif Realism to the Mixed View as he promises, Jackson, unwittingly perhaps, formulates the doctrine in quite other terms.

Instead of having as a first tenet the suggested "no simple ideas of sensation are ever qualities of bodies" he has:

(1') NO PHYSICAL REALITY IS SENSIBLE.
The other tenet is similar to the suggested "simple ideas of sensation 'represent' qualities of bodies." It is:

(2')...THERE IS A PHYSICAL REALITY AND...IT IS REPRESENTED BY SENSIBLE APPEARANCE.

It is our contention that this deviation from the expected development of the doctrine of Representative Perception is of consequence in Jackson's rejection of Berkeley's interpretation of Locke, and further, that Jackson's unwillingness to attribute a mixed view to Locke is a result of a peculiar understanding of that position (the Mixed View).

We shall now do what we can to support those contentions, beginning by noting some discrepancies between what Jackson calls the Mixed View, and the position which I think Locke sometimes takes, i.e. the one Berkeley attributes to him. That is, I shall show that it is not the Mixed View which Berkeley attributes to Locke.

I said a moment ago that the distinction in the Mixed View between sensible appearance and physical reality was significant. Now I can begin to explain what was intended by that remark.

First, the "common assumption" made by philosophers from Plato to Hume (pp. 107-108), that we do not perceive external objects immediately, is taken by most philosophers to be one tenet of Representative Realism. Its explanation involves the claim that these external objects are "mediate-ly" perceived while the immediate objects of perception are
ideas, images, or the like which are presented to the mind. This would, in fact, seem to be an essential part of Representative Realism.

Sometimes there are still other tenets which assert the relationships between the two worlds, but these are, for our purposes, unimportant. What should be noted is the contrast between this traditional characterization and Jackson's characterization of the "two worlds," between this tenet and Jackson's tenet.

Jackson says, among other things, "there is a physical reality....it is represented by sensible appearance" (Italics mine). He thus substitutes 'sensible appearance' or 'sensible qualities' or sometimes just 'appearance' for the phrase 'immediate objects of perception'. The term 'physical reality' is substituted for 'external objects which are immediately perceived'. Thus Jackson seems to imply that all we see is sensible appearance which, we have seen, is substituted for 'simple ideas of sensation'. The traditionalist, on the other hand, claims that we perceive some objects directly and others (those of the physical world) indirectly.

This is of enormous consequence. The traditionalists' view at least appears to, and I think it does, allow us to say that external objects are perceived, as are the objects of immediate perception, albeit the account is different in the two cases. On the other hand, implications of Jackson's terminology are that we discover that we perceive what
is sensible (namely appearance) and cannot, on pain of giving up what he calls the doctrine of Representative Perception, assert that we perceive physical reality. That is to say, the terms 'sensible appearance', 'appearance', 'sensible quality' refer to mind-dependent entities only. Thus the distinction between sensible appearance and physical reality, far from expediting matters, is inadequate if meant as a replacement for the traditional mediately-immediately perceived distinction.

The traditional distinction offered by Reid and quoted by Jackson (as a model?) is between mediately perceived physical reality and immediately perceived images. Locke does not claim, as a representationalist by Jackson's definition would have to, that physical reality or objects are not perceived. He does not say, at least in any passages we have seen, that only ideas are perceived. And I take it as evidence against Jackson's definition that Berkeley thinks Locke is a representationalist and also thinks that Locke claims to perceive the primary qualities of objects.

According to Jackson's definition, Representative Realism is absolutely foreign to Berkeley. It is in fact Berkeley's belief that Locke perceives physical reality which convinces Jackson that Berkeley fails to understand Locke to be a representationalist. Yet it is exactly the universal (traditional) model of representationalism which Berkeley takes Locke to instance. And this belief is
explicit in Berkeley's claim that according to Locke some qualities belong to bodies and are perceivable—namely the primary qualities.

For Jackson there is nothing which is mediately perceived. There are only things perceived and things represented but unperceived. For the traditionalist ideas may represent, but they represent things which are perceived. And why should things which are perceived need representation? For the simple reason that perception is not an act, process, or event by which minds come into contact with physical reality. And the only mechanism of causal influence of which Locke is aware is one which requires contact—either direct contact or contact of intermediary particles (or ideas).

It should be asked what the difference between the two positions is. As I see it the primary difference is that Jackson's position looks like one which a man might arrive at if he were asked to clarify the meaning of the traditionalists' claim that some things are immediately perceived while others are mediately perceived. That is, if pushed to clarify the distinction between 'mediately' and 'immediately' one might give up the claim that things mediately perceived are perceived at all, and claim that they are known inferentially. This is only one possibility, however. One might just as well give up the claim that things "immediately" perceived are perceived, and claim instead that they are
"had" and are necessary components of "perceiving" tables and chairs. We think Jackson opts for the first alternative, and that Locke and perhaps other traditionalists opt for the other.

Jackson's deviation from the traditional understanding of the doctrine of Representative Perception is somewhat disguised by his use of the verb 'to sense' instead of 'see' or 'perceive' in certain situations:

The negative tenet is that no physical reality is sensible. In current terminology this may be expressed by saying that no sensa are parts of bodies. (Locke and Berkeley, 137)

Similarly, there is the further explanation:

...all that is meant by saying that sensible appearance represents physical reality is that the apprehension of sensible appearance serves the percipient instead of the apprehension of physical reality. Thus the sensing of color may lead the percipient to select appropriate food. (Locke and Berkeley, 137)

It might be supposed that I have made some mistake in my attempt to understand Jackson, for I have been discussing what is seen, or perceived, and here Jackson talks about what is sensed or apprehended. Might it not be the case that he is simply talking about different acts or processes which are necessary to, but not sufficient for, seeing or perceiving? Alternatively, might the difference not be a verbal one alone? To answer the second first, no. Differences in the conclusions of the two accounts will show how different they in fact are.
Concerning the first question it need only be pointed out that Jackson's discussions of both Naif Realism and the Mixed View were clearly discussions of the essential elements of the perception of non-mental entities by a conscious being. We have every reason to believe that the doctrine of Representative Perception should concern the act of perceiving the same kinds of things that are perceived on other accounts—namely the objects and characteristics of physical reality. This is the reality which is perceived via the representations—not an unperceived reality.

Furthermore, at least a prima facia case can be made for the claim that neither:

1. No simple ideas of sensation are ever qualities of bodies.

nor

2. Simple ideas of sensation represent qualities of bodies.

nor their conjunction legislates against the claim that we see tables, chairs and kings. All either of these claims or their conjunction appears to mean is that there are some kinds of things which do, and some which do not, directly interact with e.g., minds—but not that there is no interaction at all between minds and bodies. Claims of this sort are notably present in current and perhaps non-philosopher

8'Interaction' in this context refers to the relationships between my hand and its shape or my ideas and my mind, which however dissimilar, are more similar than that between my pen and my mind even in the act of perception. To relationships of the latter kind I append the adjective 'indirect', to the former, 'direct'. 
sophical accounts of perception. Consider the possible claim:

Brain stimulation resulting in discernable and repeatable behavior patterns is effected by electro-chemical changes in...or in any part of the...up to and including area...of the brain.

Presumably there is some such statement which is true concerning vision, and additionally a way of understanding such statements which would make it true that there is no "seeing" without the occurrence of the process in question, and seeing is not seeing the process, i.e. we do see tables.

For example, in a manner parallel to what I called "the development of representationalism" (p. 110), it might be claimed that:

a. No electro-chemical changes are identical with the shapes and colors for the perceiving of which such changes are essential.

and

b. Some such electro-chemical changes represent various changes in the shapes and colors of external objects.

This is in accordance with the claim and explanation on page 114 that objects of perception need representation. Furthermore, this claim, although only a caricature of a scientific law, seems, given current scientific knowledge, to be true. At the same time while it is not clear that it is a version of the philosophical account of perception known as the doctrine of Representative Perception it shares certain obvious, at least relational, features with that doctrine.
One of these features is the distortion we feel must have taken place when the claim is taken to support, or to be equivalent to, a very different kind of claim such as:

No shapes or colors are sensible; they are, rather, represented by electro-chemical states of the nervous system.

It is exactly this kind of distortion of the prima facia true claims (1) and (2) by his new claims (1') and (2') of which I am accusing Jackson. The claims again were:

(1) No simple ideas are ever qualities of bodies.

(2) All simple ideas of sensation "represent" qualities of bodies.

(1') No physical reality is sensible.

(2') ...There is a physical reality and...it is represented by sensible appearance.

While (1) and (2) are compatible with the claim which I said was an essential part of representative realism, that external objects are mediately perceived, (1') and (2') seem to rule out that possibility.

Jackson has taken a doctrine which was apparently neutral with respect to what is "seen" or "perceived" (at least it does not utterly deny any foundation for the common sense claims that we see tables), and so understood it that only something internal (if anything at all) is seen or perceived.

I have suggested that Jackson's terminology might be responsible for some of his difficulties. One further passage to consider is:
...the negative tenet requires that physical reality should be numerically distinct from sensible appearance, that no physical reality should be any sensible appearance; but the positive tenet requires that the physical reality should be known though not sensed, and this claim can be justified only by showing that sensible appearance can be the source of knowledge of physical reality. (Locke and Berkeley, 139-140)

This conspicuously displays both Jackson's adherence to a terminology distinct from that of either Locke or Berkeley and also his recognition of the fact that the negative tenet as he has characterized it is the source of difficulties in an account of knowledge of the external world. Locke, after all, says such things as:

Primary qualities of bodies are really in them—whether anyone's senses perceive them or no. (II.viii. 12)

and

We perceive these original qualities. (II.viii.12)

By the same token Berkeley thinks he is accurately capturing Locke's view when he says:

Is it your opinion that the very figure and extension which you perceive by sense exist in the outward object or material substance? (Three Dialogues, 28)

and also when he distinguishes between mediate and immediate perception. (Three Dialogues, 12-13) But this distinction involves the perception of exactly those things which Jackson claims cannot be seen at all—the objects of physical reality. Thus the negative tenet as formulated by Jackson:

(1') No physical reality is sensible.
Unlike that of the form:

(1) No simple ideas of sensation are ever qualities of bodies.

seems to be at the heart of the destruction of the distinction between mediately and immediately perceived. Berkeley would affirm (1) and reject (1'), for it is certainly the case that Locke and Berkeley think that physical reality is at least mediately perceived. Let us, for the sake of a name, call this "Berkeley's view."

I want now to try to explain how it is that Jackson slips into thinking that only "internals" are perceived. First, although it was only noted in passing (p. 107), Jackson begins his account by talking of "sensible qualities." It was also noted that Jackson thinks that sensible qualities have, for Locke, no existence in matter or without the mind. I mention this again because it indicates Jackson's loaded use of the terms "sensible quality" throughout the discussion. With this firmly in mind we can now attend to Jackson's next concern—the development of the Mixed View from Naïf Realism.

I noted in discussing Naïf Realism (pp. 108-109) that that view holds:

All simple ideas of sensation (presented when our senses are actually employed about any object) are qualities of bodies.

This characterization was not challenged at first, but I now ask the reader to notice that what is claimed here is far
from clear. This statement of Naif Realism might be understood as asserting on behalf of that view that what we thought were qualities are really ideas, and hence that all entities are mental. On the other hand, it might be the claim that ideas and qualities are really the same kind of thing, namely mind-independent entities, and thus that there are really no ideas. If the claim does not mean that in perception there is only one kind of thing perceived, then it certainly is misleading. Given what we know of views and their labels independently of what Jackson says, however, there is reason to think that indeed the statement is somewhat misleading. It could be, and I think this likely, an unfortunate way of expressing the belief:

OBJECTS HAVE ALL OF THE QUALITIES THEY APPEAR TO HAVE.

Jackson thinks his way of expressing the claim is simply a way of expressing it in "Locke's terminology." But to do that using 'sensible quality' as he has defined it has the smell of begging the question. Furthermore, stating the view in Locke's terminology is unnecessary when the view in question is one which everyone would have agreed Locke did not hold, and when, as is often the case in such delicate matters, the risk of confusion is great. Since this view is not important for its own sake we can continue on the assumption that my suggested rephrasing comes closer to what Jackson intended to say than did his proposed characterization.
There are some reasons (Jackson does not mention what they are) for "refusing to identify certain simple ideas of sensation with any qualities of bodies." That is, to be sure, an understatement. Unless one is committed to some sort of monistic view such as Idealism or Materialism before one begins an account of perception, there is not some, but every reason to resist the collapse of the distinction between ideas and qualities. The view which emerges from Naïf Realism by this recognition that certain simple ideas of sensation are not identical with any qualities of bodies can perhaps be formulated so as to sound at least reasonable. It might be stated in these terms:

(B) Objects have some but not all of the qualities they appear to have.

Jackson, however, persists in his use of the original terms of the distinction, and characterizes the Mixed View by two claims:

(B₁) Some simple ideas of sensation are not identical with any qualities of bodies.

and

(B₂) Some simple ideas of sensation are identical with some qualities of bodies.

Jackson seems to be correct in asserting that as he states it the Mixed View draws a distinction between appearance and reality, and, as he makes the distinction, it falls between two groups of simple ideas of sensation. He notes, and I certainly agree with him, that the view suffers from
the inconsistency of assigning a different ontological status to each of the two groups of "simple ideas of sensation." The remedy for this inconsistency may, however, lie not with rejecting a Mixed View (in one sense of that name) but with offering a new "Mixed View" - the one which we earlier called "Berkeley's view."

According to the characterization of Berkeley's view which I offered, it also distinguishes between appearance and reality. It is composed of at least the following claims:

(a) No simple ideas of sensation are ever qualities of bodies.

(b) Physical reality is immediately perceived, and hence it is false that no physical reality is sensible.

and

(c) Ideas, images, etc., are immediately perceived.

It is crucial to notice that this is neither the doctrine of Representative Perception (because of b.), nor the Mixed View (because of a.), as Jackson describes those views. One might, however, tend to identify it with the "Mixed View" because Jackson calls all theories according to which primary qualities are perceived "Mixed Views."

This view which I am offering under the name of "Berkeley's view" has other similarities with the "Mixed View." For example, there is a distinction between appearance and reality. That which is immediately perceived is appearance, while reality is mediately perceived. Usually appearance is
a helpful guide in the normal affairs of life, but sometimes it is misleading. What I am not about to claim, and what "Berkeley's view" does not claim, and what Jackson seems to insist upon in his statement of the Mixed View, is that when appearance is a satisfactory guide to the affairs of the moment we identify that appearance with reality. According to Berkeley's view never the twain shall meet, but sometimes the former is an accurate guide to the latter. So described, of course, this view is not really a "Mixed View" but a familiar version of the doctrine of Representative Perception. That is, it is familiar to seemingly everyone but Jackson.

It is only Jackson's insistence on identifying appearance with reality in those cases in which qualities of bodies are those which appearance suggests they are, that leads to the ontological inconsistency. This new "Mixed View" or "Berkeley's view" (the view that we perceive primary qualities) need not, in spite of Jackson's assertions to the contrary, be troubled by (this) ontological inconsistency. The inconsistency arises from Jackson's statement of the view. According to my statement of the view (Berkeley's view) ideas are always and only ideas, while qualities of bodies are always and only qualities of bodies. Certainly the two are never identical.

Because the Mixed View as Jackson states it is untenable, and because that untenability is traceable to the
inconsistency with respect to the ontological status of the simple ideas of sensation, Jackson thinks one must eventually move toward what he calls the doctrine of Representative Perception, i.e. the view that physical reality is insensible. This involves making a distinction between all simple ideas of sensation and all qualities of bodies. The former are to be taken as appearance, and the latter as reality. This distinction is not in question, for it is the very one I suggested in my statement of "Berkeley's view." But here the similarity with Jackson's claim ends.

Jackson thinks that the distinction between appearance and reality, as it is now made, corresponds to a distinction between what is perceived or seen and what is neither perceived nor seen. Physical reality is neither perceived nor seen. I denied this by distinguishing between what is mediately perceived and what is immediately perceived.

About the terms 'mediately' and 'immediately' I have been extremely vague. This is primarily because the Lockian text gives us little help in determining their meaning. I think, however, that the following suggestion captures the spirit of Locke's use of the terms—that is, he might have given a similar explanation if the terminology had been available to him.

The distinction can be explicated by an analogy to the statements on page 117 above about the relationship between the claim that there are electro-chemical states of the
brain involved in perception, and the claim that we perceive colors or shapes. In the Lockian account the claim "'ideas' or 'images' are 'immediately perceived'" is like the claim of the modern causal account that "electro-chemical changes in the brain are necessary to our perceiving changes in colors and shapes."

Similarly, "perception of physical reality is mediate" is analogous to the claim that some such electro-chemical changes "represent" various changes in shapes and colors of external objects. In both cases we ought to become indignant if someone suggests that our account makes it impossible to perceive physical reality, for what is being offered is a causal condition for the perception of that reality. To say that something is 'immediately perceived' is, on this account, to suggest that it is "had" or "undergone" by the peripient, and the suggestion that this idea, image, or electro-chemical state is all that is perceived (because it is said to be "immediately perceived") is like suggesting that the necessity of having a retinal image for seeing meant that nothing but the retinal image could be seen.

Thus the view I suggest, and the one Jackson suggests, while both agreeing that the simple ideas of sensation are distinct from all qualities of bodies, and that the former correspond to appearance and the latter to reality, are really quite different--different in that my statement, but not Jackson's, allows for the perception of reality.
What Jackson has done is confuse the claim made by Berkeley that one can perceive reality as well as simple ideas of sensation with the claim that they are identical. Jackson then thinks that they are identical, i.e. when one perceives reality, the view is naively realistic because there is no representative. Physical reality and the simple idea of sensation have collapsed into one. On the other hand, he thinks that if one perceives just the simple idea of sensation the view is representationistic. Physical reality, in some sense, stands behind the simple ideas of sensation. Thus Jackson thinks (mistakenly) that Berkeley's truly representational account is a Mixed View in the true sense, i.e. in the sense that some ideas are qualities. The alternative ways of noting the "true sense" are to say either that sometimes there is one thing, and sometimes two in the ontological account of perception, or, in Jackson's terminology, sometimes the account is naively realistic, sometimes representationalist.

It has been shown that there is some chance that what Berkeley says can be construed in a way such that it does not collapse the distinction between ideas and reality, and that is does not attribute to Locke a hesitation in favor of Naif Realism as Jackson describes that view. Furthermore, I see no reason to deny that reality is indirectly or meditately perceived, and to that extent no reason to deny the accuracy of the Berkelian tradition. I am forced to
conclude that Jackson's elaborate discussion of the doctrine of Representative Perception is based upon a mistaken understanding of Naïf Realism, the Mixed View, and perhaps ultimately, of Berkeley's claims. It is these misunderstandings which lead to his strange notion of the doctrine of Representative Perception.

Therefore, while Jackson claimed that what he needed to show was that Locke accepted the doctrine of Representative Perception with no reservations in favor of Naïf Realism, what he should have shown was that Berkeley's view attributes to Locke reservations in favor of Naïf Realism as stated by Jackson, and that Jackson's understanding of the doctrine of Representative Perception is a reasonable one. I think that the distinction between ideas and reality is a reasonable one, and that it does not necessitate the denial that we perceive physical reality. It is this purported implication that I have just been at some pains to refute.

c. Some Conclusions about the Distinction and the Doctrine

What is the relationship between primary-secondary quality distinction and Locke's doctrine of Representative Perception? In this chapter Jackson's account of the doctrine of Representative Perception was spelled out. According to that account no physical reality is sensible. It was
there shown that there is a more traditional account (I called it the Berkelian account) than Jackson's, according to which "no simple ideas of sensation are qualities of bodies," and features of physical reality are mediately perceived. Jackson would have us believe that the relationship between this doctrine in one form or the other and the primary-secondary distinction is a rather intimate one, and one such that a proper understanding of the distinction requires careful attention to the doctrine of Representative Perception. In fact the collapse of representationalism into Idealism:

...arises from the fact that Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities is grounded on the Representative Theory of Perception, which Berkeley's version of the distinction ignores and precludes. (Locke and Berkeley, 72)

Jackson argues that the way Berkeley's version of the distinction precludes the doctrine of Representative Perception is by assuming, or at least asserting, that primary qualities are perceived. As I have made tolerably clear, Jackson's argument goes something like the following:

1. We perceive what is sensible.
2. Only sensible appearance is sensible.
3. Sensible appearance and physical reality are distinct.
4. Primary qualities are qualities of reality, not of appearance.
5. We have (perceive) ideas of primary qualities, not primary qualities.
6. (5) captures the essence of the doctrine of Representative Perception, and therefore that doctrine is incompatible with the claim that we perceive primary qualities.
7. Therefore, if Locke holds the doctrine of Representative Perception, and he does, Berkeley must be wrong in claiming that we perceive primary qualities.

Jackson also notes additional difficulties with Berkeley's way of making the distinction:

Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities, if interpreted in accordance with the Berkelian tradition, is awkwardly related to the distinction between Qualities and Ideas, not only being rendered redundant, as a distinction between physical reality and sensible appearance, by the distinction between Qualities and Ideas, but also, in view of the different standpoint from which the distinction between physical reality and sensible appearance is drawn, being incompatible with the distinction between Qualities and Ideas. This claim assumed that Locke's distinction between Qualities and Ideas was an embodiment of the doctrine of Representative Perception. (Locke and Berkeley, 127)

Jackson, it will be remembered, in addition to thinking that no primary qualities are perceivable, also thinks that secondary qualities are powers and not mind-dependent ideas. Berkeley, on the other hand, seems to think that secondary qualities are mind-dependent ideas. Thus when Jackson claims that Berkeley's way of making the primary-secondary quality distinction makes that distinction relate awkwardly to the distinction between Qualities and Ideas, I agree. That awkwardness, however, should be eliminated by a reexamination of the notion of secondary qualities, not by denying that primary qualities can be perceived, or by assuming that their perceivability makes them ideas.

Jackson's belief that the claim that primary qualities are sensible and the claim that the doctrine of Representa-
tive Perception is true are incompatible, is a false belief. And it is false because, as I have shown above, at least one version of the doctrine of Representative Perception does not imply that primary qualities are not perceived.

While it was seen that Jackson denied that Berkeley attributed a doctrine of Representative Perception to Locke, it was shown that he does so because his definition of that doctrine is strangely incompatible with the traditional statement of the doctrine. This was accounted for by the explanation that Jackson erred in describing the development of the doctrine of Representative Perception from Naive Realism by substituting "No physical reality is sensible," for "No simple ideas of sensation are ever qualities of bodies." This error is the result of precluding the possibility that there is any "perception" involved in "mediate perception," a term for which Jackson has no use, and which he ignores in the traditional account.

In this chapter I have also given a sense to the terms 'immediate perception' in accordance with which both that and 'mediate perception' become helpful in the explication of Locke, and in accordance with which Berkeley is correct in saying of Locke's account that it is one according to which qualities of mind-independent bodies are perceived.

In summary, my conclusions are these. I agree with Jackson that Locke holds a doctrine of Representative Perception, and that secondary qualities are powers of an
object. But I agree with Berkeley that Locke thinks primary qualities are perceivable, and that they are not mind-dependent. I think that both Locke and Berkeley thought there was something of importance in the distinction between immediately and mediately perceived, which something I tried to show (pp. 106-128) was sufficient to allow (at least some sense to be made of) the claim that these primary qualities of reality are perceived. Jackson did not attend to this last distinction, and his suggestion that the doctrine and the distinction, as Berkeley holds it, are incompatible, arise from this failure.

Using Jackson's account of what qualities are and their relationship to powers, and Berkeley's account of what Locke thinks is perceived, I shall now go on to try to deal with some of the problems which were not satisfactorily dealt with on Jackson's account.
a. Powers, Qualities, and Knowledge

The problems which were not satisfactorily dealt with on Jackson's account of Locke's theory of perception are primarily two. The first is that of giving some account of the difference in meaning of the terms 'resemble' and 'represent'. The second is that of accounting for the terminology according to which there are ideas of both primary and secondary qualities. This latter is a problem because according to Jackson all qualities are primary qualities, and therefore some other ground for the distinction than the qualities themselves must be found for these ideas.

In this chapter I will attempt to provide some answers to both of these problems. In doing so I will accept, and attempt to explain, Jackson's account of the relationship between powers, qualities, and knowledge according to which qualities, both primary and secondary, are in objects, while ideas of them are in the mind. The role of "powers" in this account is the object of special attention.

In the second part of the chapter I combine these Jacksonian-Lockian doctrines with the Berkelian belief that
we perceive the primary qualities of objects and attempt to show how Locke, in holding these positions, does offer an account of the difference between resemblance and representation. This account of the difference also grounds the distinction between ideas of primary and ideas of secondary qualities.

The resulting account of perception is one which accommodates more of the various Lockian doctrines than Jackson's accommodated, while at the same time providing a means of accounting for the widespread feeling that Locke's views accord with Common Sense. This latter objective is achieved by showing that he can be seen as claiming that we perceive features of the mind-independent world. Now, then, let us turn to the role of "powers" in Locke's account.

All the materials of reason and knowledge come from either perception concerning external sensible objects or the internal operations of our minds. We are concerned with the former in which

...our senses conversant about particular objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them. And thus we come by those ideas we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities... (II.1.3)

I gather from this that there are things which are yellow, hot, bitter, etc., and that we also have ideas of these. It

1What the analysis of this claim is, and how the yellow that the daffodil has compares to our idea of yellow is, of course, open to dispute.
is unclear from the context whether things on this list are considered "sensible qualities" or whether "all those things which we call sensible qualities" are different from the ones on this list. In any event, the causal account of ideas of primary qualities will not differ significantly from this account of yellow, heat, and sweet. In both cases there is something in the object which is responsible for the production of our ideas. So, external objects furnish the mind with ideas of sensible qualities, and these ideas are not the same things as sensible qualities. Thus, any reading which treat qualities as mind-dependent in the way that (presumably only) ideas are, would have to explain its apparent conflict with this passage. But for those with lingering doubts about the distinctness of qualities and ideas further evidence can be provided:

> Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the object of immediate perception...I call idea; and the power to produce an idea in our mind I call quality of the subject wherein that power is. (II. vii.8)

Here two points must be made. The first is about powers. The notion of a power is one of the more unclear notions in Locke, and a notion with which I do not propose to deal at length. As some comment is in order, however, I would like to suggest that the term be construed as a non-technical one whenever possible. For example, I do not think it unreasonable to claim that there is a sense of 'power' in which it is true to say, "A affects B" implies
(in some strong sense) that "A has the power to affect B." Perhaps the implication is a logical one.

In this perhaps somewhat loose sense, it may be said that all features of an object are powers—powers to affect things in various ways. For example, there is the power to affect another physical object \textit{qua physical object}, the power to affect another physical object \textit{qua perceiver}, and the power of the object to affect changes in itself. Among these powers there are further distinctions to be made. For example, the power to affect a physical object \textit{qua perceiver} may be further divided into the power to produce ideas which resemble the qualities of the original object, and the power to produce ideas which do not resemble the qualities of the original object. Furthermore, it may be discovered that some powers affect an object \textit{qua perceiver only}, while other powers affect objects \textit{qua perceivers} and \textit{qua physical objects}. In all cases the objects are said to have the "power" to effect changes, for to claim that, remember, is only to claim that they \textit{do} effect these changes: No object without a power to effect these or other changes can do so.

Such an understanding of the use of the term 'power' does not necessitate my claiming that ideas are \textit{of} powers, for they are non-entities—those dispositions and capacities which hide in the opacity of an object. This understanding also does justice to the ordinary, that is, undistinguished, use of the term in contexts of cause and effect discussions.
It is just there that Locke thinks such "power-talk" help­ful. He clearly thinks that the task of discovering what the powers of an object are is a scientific, not a philo­sophical, one which enlarges the extent of human knowledge.

The criticism heard in some quarters that talk of "powers" and "dispositions" is a hang-over from Aristotelian Teleology which is currently philosophically unsatisfactory provides no reason for not attributing it to Locke. Nor do I condemn him when I say he did not concern himself with the task of "explicating the notion of a power." He need not attempt to solve all the philosophical problems in order to attempt some of them.

The second point that must be attended to in the quo­tation is its generality. Any power to produce an idea is a quality, and any simple idea of sensation is the result of some quality or power. These qualities can be divided into primary and secondary qualities. There are some qualities, and only some, Locke thinks, which are "inseparable from a body no matter what its condition." The evidence for this is that every particle of matter large enough to be perceived has them, and the mind finds those qualities inseparable from even the unperceivable particles:

Take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts; each part still has solidity, figure, extension, and mobili­ty; divide it again, and it still retains the same qualities; and so divide it on, till the parts become insensible; they must retain each of them all those qualities....These I call original or primary quali­
ties of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz. solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number. (II.viii.9)

While these primary qualities are inseparable from an object no matter what the conditions, there are, by implication, other qualities which the object loses under certain conditions. They are the ones which are "nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce sensations in us by their primary qualities." (II.viii.10) These are the secondary qualities. These are the qualities which I referred to a moment ago as the powers to affect another physical object qua perceiver only. Such secondary qualities of bodies are known by the sensations of color, sounds, tastes, and so on. (II.viii.10) It is obvious that an object which is not perceivable has no color. And here I do not want to be misunderstood. I do not mean that one which is not perceived has no color. Just as I do not mean that an object moving so rapidly that it is imperceptible, e.g., a bullet fired from a gun, has no color. The bullet can be perceived, although at the time it is fired it is not perceived. Hence, on this interpretation, it does not follow that the beetle in the box is not brown, but it may follow that an electron has no color. Thus, while some qualities or powers of an object are retained as it is subdivided, others are lost.

What does it mean to say that they are "lost"? Look at some of these other puzzling things Locke says on the subject:
...light, heat, whiteness, or coldness are no more really in them than sickness or pain is in manna.

Take away the sensation of them; let not the eyes see light or colors, nor the ears hear sounds; let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell, and all colors, tastes, odours, and sounds, as they are such particular ideas, vanish and cease, and are reduced to their causes, i.e. bulk, figure, and motion of parts. (II.viii.17)

At issue here is the apparent removal of secondary qualities from physical objects. What is the relationship between secondary qualities, physical objects and perceivers? Are secondary qualities, unlike primary qualities, mind-dependent? Locke sometimes seems to be suggesting this. But such a claim would be inconsistent with other claims Locke has made. He has already told us that we have ideas of secondary qualities as well as of primary qualities, and that he thinks the causes of both kinds of ideas reside in the objects of the physical world. So he cannot be denying that there is something in the objects, which something we can call a secondary quality and which causes ideas of secondary qualities. At the same time we know that neither sickness nor pain is in the manna.

Locke is surely correct in claiming that if we deprive the senses of stimulation, sensations of various kinds will vanish. But notice that he does not say that the secondary qualities will vanish, but rather that, instead of sensations and their causes, only their causes will remain, i.e. the primary qualities of certain parts of the object. Let
us contrast this with the case of primary qualities.

The effects of primary qualities are somewhat different than those of secondary qualities. Primary qualities cause changes in physical objects qua physical objects, as well as in perceivers qua perceivers. Thus if we remove the perception of primary qualities there may still be, in addition to the causes of perception, some effects. The primary qualities may continue to influence other objects.

Consider further what happens if we should remove not only the perception, but also any other effects of primary qualities. In this case, as in the case of secondary qualities, we would have only (what once were) causes. There would be no sense in which there is some thing more than there is in the case of secondary qualities. But there is a difference. While the causes of the ideas of both primary and secondary qualities are the same entities in the things (bulk, figure, motion, etc.), some effects presumably resemble these causal entities more than others. The causes of the effects of primary qualities are, it is claimed, like the effects, whether those effects be ideas or changes in physical objects qua physical objects. In the case of the secondary qualities the effects which are ideas are unlike the causes which are the primary qualities of certain parts. We know that at least some effects are unlike the causes because we have ideas of both primary qualities and secondary qualities, and, while we know that those ideas are different,
we know that their causes in terms of the entities which produce or compose the things are the same.

I think we can now conclude that such phrases as 'unreal', 'really not in the things', 'reduced to their causes', etc., when used in characterizing secondary qualities as opposed to primary qualities, really mean just two things. First, they mean that the effects of secondary qualities are more limited than those of primary qualities—limited to perceivers qua perceivers, and when there are no perceivers there are no effects. And second, they mean that the entities involved in the causal explanation of the effects of secondary qualities are the same as the entities involved in the causal explanation of the effects of primary qualities (though the explanation may be different). And we say that the primary qualities are more "real" because the effects are more like the causes in this case than in the other. How we know this, or how Locke thinks he knows it, will be discussed shortly.

This does not conclude the discussion of powers, for there is another kind:

To these might be added a third sort, which are allowed to be barely powers; though they are as much real qualities in the subject as those which I...call...secondary qualities. For the power in fire to produce a new color...in wax or clay,—by its primary qualities, is as much a quality in fire, as the power it has to produce in me a new...sensation...which I felt not before,—by the same primary qualities, viz. the bulk, texture, and motion of its insensible parts. (II.viii.10)

"As much real qualities...as those which I...call...second-
ary qualities." Locke does not say that this third sort of power is the same as any of the others, simply that it is a power, or, alternatively, that one body may affect another in a manner not hitherto mentioned. This is in fact a rather interesting power or quality. It may be seen as the counterpart of the secondary quality to the second aspect of the primary quality—the ability to affect physical objects in addition to perceivers. It is the ability to produce or to alter a secondary quality in another object. It appears that this type of power is, like secondary qualities, one which the object has in virtue of its insensible parts.

If we attend to the distinction made on pages 136-137, we find that in addition to the distinction made there between two kinds of powers or qualities to affect physical objects qua perceivers, we can now also distinguish between two kinds of powers to affect physical objects qua physical objects. The first of these powers is the power of one object to affect the solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number of the sensible parts of another by the action of the qualities of the sensible parts of the causal agent. The new division provides for the changes wrought in other parts of the affected body—the primary qualities or powers of the insensible parts.

One thing that should be clear by now is that Locke is concerned to distinguish between powers, not in terms of
their "ground" within the object, but in terms of the various effects of these powers. This becomes clear in the following way. Locke has the primary qualities of the parts of objects play all the causal roles of the object. They are responsible for affecting perceivers and the sensible and insensible parts of non-perceiving physical objects. Since the ground of all of these activities is the same, the distinction can only be made in terms of the effects.

We have now, and this seems to agree substantially with Jackson's account in chapter III above, the following kinds of powers:

1. The power of a physical object to affect the primary qualities of another physical object by means of the primary qualities of the sensible parts of the first.
2. The power of a physical object (by means of the primary qualities of its insensible parts) to affect the primary qualities of the insensible parts of another physical object.
3. The power of a physical object by means of the primary qualities of its sensible parts to cause ideas in a perceiver, which ideas resemble the primary qualities of the sensible parts of the physical object.
4. The power of a physical object by means of the primary qualities of its insensible parts to produce ideas in a perceiver, which ideas do not resemble any quality of the causal object.

Since we are concerned with the problems of knowledge and perception, only powers 3. and 4. are of particular interest to us. These powers are the ones usually referred to as primary and secondary qualities respectively (though, strictly speaking, powers are not qualities).
With these preliminaries out of the way I shall now turn to an examination of how it is that Locke thinks bodies produce ideas in us. In addition to shedding light on his representationalist account of perception, this examination should further clarify the distinction between primary qualities and secondary qualities, or at least some of Locke's reasons for making the distinction in the way that he does.

b. Production and Communication: The Basis of the Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction

In chapter II it was discovered that the relationship between external objects and perceiving minds is a causal one. In this section I will reaffirm that claim, and in doing so try to shed additional light on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. The reader may remember that Locke says:

...bodies produce ideas in us...by impulse, the only way we can conceive bodies to operate in.
If...external objects be not united to our minds; and yet we perceive these...qualities in such of them as singly fall under our senses, it is evident that some motion must be thence continued to our nerves, or animal spirits, by some parts of our bodies, to the brains...there to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have....And since the extension, figure, number, and motion of bodies...may be perceived at a distance by the sight...some singly imperceptible bodies must come from them to the eyes, and thereby convey to the brain some motion; which produces these ideas we have of them in us. (II, viii. 11-12)

This account is a general one intended to explain how our
ideas of both primary and secondary qualities arise:

After the same manner that the ideas of these original qualities are produced in us, we may conceive that the ideas of secondary qualities are also produced, viz. by the operation of insensible particles on our senses. (II.viii.13)

While this claims that motion is the cause of these ideas, it does not explain how that can be the case. How does motion cause an idea? How does one bridge the mind-body gap? This does not seem to be a problem of immediate concern to Locke, though he is concerned with clarifying what he seems to think is a purely physical account:

...let us suppose at present that the different motions and figures, bulk, and number of such particles, affecting the several organs of the senses, produce in us those different sensations that we have from the colors and smells of bodies; e.g. that a violet, by the impulse of such insensible particles of matter, of peculiar figures and bulks, and in different degrees and modifications of their motions, causes the idea of the blue color, and sweet scent of that flower to be produced in our minds. (II.viii.13)

Locke seems to feel that there is some question of the acceptability of the claim that motion can account for such a varied range of ideas, some of which are quite unlike motion itself. He immediately adds:

It being no more impossible to conceive that God should annex such ideas as that of blue color, sweet scent to such motions, with which they have no similitude, than that he should annex the idea of pain to the motion of a piece of steel dividing our flesh, with which that idea hath no resemblance. (II.viii.13)

In what Locke has said here he is not primarily concerned with the role of God but rather with two other important
claims. The first is that the ideas of blue, sweet, and pain are caused. The second is that there need be nothing in the cause motion which is like the blue, sweet, or pain, just as there is nothing in the atmospheric conditions which is like the thunder caused by these conditions. This is, at least on the surface, somewhat different from the case of the baseball which has met the bat. It does seem in that case that there is something in the bat, namely motion, which is transferred as a quality to the ball.

Locke seems to think that this general question of the similarity of causes to effects can shed light on the claim that ideas of primary qualities resemble their causes while ideas of secondary qualities do not. Perhaps so, for all effects, including the ideas of secondary qualities, are effects of the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of the parts of an object. He discusses this question under the heading of "how bodies produce ideas in us." (II.viii.11) But just what the relationship is between the secondary qualities and these primary qualities is unclear. At first Locke suggests that the secondary qualities are powers which "depend" on the primary qualities:

...colors and smells...tastes and sounds, and other the like sensible qualities...are...nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us; and depend on those primary qualities, viz. bulk, figure, texture, and motion of parts... (II.viii.14) (Italics mine)

He later indicates, however, that the relationship might
be somewhat different:

...what is sweet, blue, or warm in idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, and motion of the insensible parts, in the bodies themselves, which we call so. (II.viii.15)

This embodies an apparent physicalism which, even in the face of Locke's refusal to worry about mind-body gap problems, I think can be safely ignored. Given the earlier passages in which he talks about these ideas annexing to motion, etc., as well as those in which he says that motion causes the idea of the blue color, I think it best to ignore the ambiguity of this last quotation which seems strangely at odds with much that we have cited.2

What Locke does conclude from either the preceding discussion, or as a parallel and amplificatory claim, is something about the nature of the relationship between ideas and causes:

...the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves, but the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all. (II.viii.15)

While we have been prepared in various ways for such a claim, and it, therefore, does not sound strange to us, it must be admitted that this account differs from the common sense one.

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2I think that instead of "...what is...blue...in idea, is but...bulk...in bodies..." Locke should have said "what is blue in idea is caused by bulk, etc. in bodies."
The common sense account would surely claim that the relationship between brown and our idea of brown, and square and our idea of square is the same when we perceive a brown square. The differences between primary and secondary qualities do not appear to be intuitive or prephilosophical ones. On the common sense account there is, then, little difference between the so-called primary and secondary qualities. Of such qualities as cold, white, and sweet, Locke would say that they are:

...commonly thought to be the same in those bodies that those ideas are in us, the one a perfect resemblance of the other, as they are in a mirror, and it would by most men be judged very extravagant if one should say otherwise. (II.viii.16)

This "common thought," it should be noticed, is a reflection of what Reid calls the "ancient hypothesis" (see p. 58 above) which, as I suggested earlier, Locke rejects. This rejection, until now only implicit, becomes quite explicit in subsequent passages. Furthermore, if the denial of the ancient hypothesis is "extravagant" there must be some overwhelming considerations which led Locke to make the distinction between primary and secondary qualities in terms of resemblance and non-resemblance in the first place. In this context he offers the following as his reasons:

...he that will consider that the same fire that, at one distance produces in us the sensation of warmth, does, at nearer approach, produce in us the far different sensation of pain, ought to rethink himself what reason he has to say—that this idea of warmth, which was produced in him by the fire, is actually in the fire....Why are whiteness and coldness in the
This argument appeals to the fact that while pain is a sensation produced in us by the fire, we do not say that pain is in the fire. And, if not, why should we say that the other sensations produced in us by the fire are in the fire?

Further considerations which might favor the distinction as Locke makes it are also available. In connection with another example he asks:

Can anyone think any real alterations are made in the porphyry by the presence or absence of light; and that those ideas of whiteness and redness are really in the porphyry in the light when it is plain it has no color in the dark? (II.viii.19)

This argument, like the former one, appeals to the fact that at one time we have one sensation (of color); at another time, another; and at a third, none, to show that there is no color which is the color of (or in) the porphyry. Set out in premise-conclusion form the argument must be something like the following:

1. Sometimes porphyry produces ideas of red (in the light).
2. Sometimes porphyry produces no idea of red (in the dark).
3. The porphyry itself remains unchanged.

... the redness is not in the porphyry.

Thus it is presumed that neither the porphyry nor the fire change qualities or lose them, and, apparently, that if they have qualities we do sense them. What this argument really
seems to show is that the existence of the porphyry in the light is not a sufficient condition of the idea of red. But this argument and its assumptions, coupled with the all important fact that we have no reason to say that warmth is, but pain is not, in the fire, leads Locke to suggest that neither the fire nor the porphyry has all the qualities we attribute to it.

The fact that we have no reason to say that warmth is, but pain is not, in the fire, which seems to have the following premises and conclusion:

1. Fire produces sensations (ideas) of both warmth and pain.
2. We do not think the fact that the fire produces a sensation of pain in us is a sufficient reason to suggest that pain is in the fire, so
3. The fact that the fire produces a sensation of warmth is not a sufficient reason to say that warmth is in the fire.

also gives us no reason for denying that the warmth is in the fire.

The reader will no doubt have noticed that a number of passages quoted from Locke seem to embody a confusion connected with Locke's claim that the ideas of whiteness and redness are not really in the porphyry, and the sensations of warmth and pain are not in the fire. And neither is the sensation of motion which varies depending upon our distance from the fire. But this confusion is only apparent.

It might appear that Locke is not taking enough care with the language he uses in his discussion of qualities and
ideas. But he does recognize that and, at least once, cautions us that when he is discussing these external bodies, the appropriate term is 'qualities' not 'ideas'.

There is a reason, however, why Locke has difficulties on this point. He cannot say that the qualities are in the porphyry or the fire, for then it would seem that there is no difference between the accounts of primary and secondary qualities. To say that the quality is in the porphyry seems to affirm that they are in us "as they are in a mirror." Any such implication must be avoided. That is, he wants to say that the qualities are in the porphyry or the fire, but to avoid the implication that what we think is in the fire or porphyry, is there, i.e. the implication that the "ancient hypothesis" is true.

If we not set these worries aside, and again turn our attention to the distinction as drawn in these last few paragraphs, we notice that a number of arguments used to show that secondary qualities are not really in the objects seem to apply against the primary qualities also. For example, whatever reasons Locke has for saying that the porphyry has no color in the dark (I said that he thinks "it is plain it has no color in the dark" in part because no color is perceived) would seem to be no better than those for saying that the porphyry in a glass case in the dark (so it cannot be sensed at all) has no motion, texture, or figure. For example, an argument similar to the one given above for
redness or warmth can be given for figure:

1. Sometimes the porphyry produces ideas of figure (in the light).
2. Sometimes the porphyry produces no ideas of figure (in the dark).
3. The porphyry itself remains unchanged.

... the figure is not in the porphyry.

Or, we can argue, if we do not say that pain is in the object, why say that motion is?

It seems that the basis for the primary-secondary distinction is disintegrating. It would seem strange that these problems were not immediately apparent to Locke. But let us suppose for a moment that he was aware of these difficulties. What then could he have thought was the real basis of the primary-secondary quality distinction?

It might be suggested that secondary qualities are those which can be discovered by one sense only, while the primary qualities can be known to the perceiver by more than one sense. This is interesting, but it is mentioned only once by Locke. (II.v) It is, therefore, unlikely that it is his basis for the distinction in question. He captures the primary-secondary quality distinction in different ways, such as using the term 'real' in this passage already quoted:

The particular bulk, number, figure, and motion of the parts of fire or snow are really in them,—whether anyone's senses perceive them or no: and therefore they may be called real qualities, because they really exist in those bodies. But light, heat, whiteness, or coldness are no more really in them.
than sickness or pain is in manna. Take away the sen-
sation of them; let not the eyes see the light nor
the ears hear sounds; let the palate not taste, nor
the nose smell, and all colors, tastes, odors, and
sounds, as they are such particular ideas, vanish
and cease, and are reduced to their causes, i.e.
bulk, figure, and motion of their parts. (II.viii.17)

This passage, however, does little to clarify the
grounds of the distinction which must be other than any we
have yet discovered. They must be other than any we have
discovered because none we have yet discovered supports
what Locke himself recognizes as an extremely unusual claim.
That recognition shows again when Locke notes that, while men
agree that the primary qualities are in the objects, and
sickness and pain are not, and while men agree that the
ideas of sickness and pain are not in the manna, they "can
hardly be brought to think that sweetness and whiteness are
not really in manna...are but the effects of manna on the
palate." (II.viii.18)

The "arguments" (considerations) cited so far for mak-
ing the primary-secondary quality distinction along the lines
of resemblance and non-resemblance seem to be only the
following:

1. Fire produces sensations of both warmth and pain
   (in the same way).
2. We do not think the fact that fire produces a sen-
sation of pain in us is a sufficient reason to
   suggest that pain is in the fire, so
3. The fact that fire produces a sensation of warmth
   is not sufficient reason to say that warmth is in
   the fire.

and
1. The sensation of whiteness or redness or colorlessness (color of porphyry) changes depending upon the amount and source of light.
2. The amount and source of light makes no real change in the porphyry, so
3. The whiteness, redness, or colorlessness are not in the porphyry.

But neither of these is sufficient to make us think that ideas of secondary qualities do not (but ideas of primary qualities do) resemble the qualities of bodies. The first "argument" is not successful in convincing us that warmth is not really in the fire because it is not successful in leading us to accept fire as analogous to pain. To do that we would have to assume that (1) both pain and warmth are sensations; (2) both pain and warmth are produced in the same way; and (3) that both pain and warmth are produced by the same set of necessary conditions. Pain, but not warmth, however, is a paradigm of a feature dependent upon mind for its existence. Preanalytically I think most of us could agree that there could be warmth even if there were no minds, while we could also agree that there would be no pains if there were no minds. Assumption (3), therefore, begs the question.

The second "argument" fails to show that the sensations of color of porphyry depend upon the porphyry alone. It seems consistent with the "premises" of this argument to conclude that porphyry is white, and that the color of porphyry does not stand in a one to one relationship with our sensations or simple ideas. That is, while it may be that
everytime we have an idea of white, there exists the same set of primary qualities of the insensible parts, it need not be that whenever the latter exists we have the idea.

The failure of the arguments or reasons considered so far to provide us with satisfactory evidence for making the distinction as Locke thinks it should be made, leaves two alternatives: I can claim that Locke has no good grounds for the distinction as it stands; or I can try to discover an alternative to the arguments I have so far discovered. The acceptance of this second alternative as that determining the nature of the task confronting me also involves the assumption that the claims Locke has made so far are not primarily convictions induced by philosophical argument. Certainly the "reasons" I have cited so far are not really arguments, or if they are, they are such bad ones that I do not want to attribute them to Locke.

Instead, perhaps a good number of these claims can be seen as the working out of the consequences of a conviction of common sense, and a principle of physics. The first is that there is an independently existing physical world with which we in some way interact. The second is that motion, or at least contact, is necessary to explain the interaction of some bodies with others.

This latest claim can, of course, be expanded to cover as many cases as possible if the natural philosopher bears
in mind the principle of Occam's Razor. Perhaps the motion of minute particles and our "animal spirits" can explain all sensations. Just listen to this explanation of how water can "be" warm and cold at the same time:

If the sensation of heat and cold be nothing but the increase or diminution of the motion of the minute parts of our bodies, caused by the corpuscles of any other body, it is easy to be understood that, if the motion be greater in the one hand than in the other; if a body be applied to the two hands, which has in its minute particles a greater motion than in those of one of the hands, and a less than in those of the other, it will increase the motion of the one hand and lessen it in the other; and so cause different sensations of heat and cold that depend thereon. (II.viii.21)

But even here it is clear that Locke already "assumes" the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Here he is simply explaining how the primary qualities produce the sensation, and while this little excursion into natural philosophy is interesting for its own sake, the reader is still entitled to ask for the ground of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.

We have now presented a number of accounts that failed, of the ground of the primary-secondary quality distinction. It is not that the accounts are unusual ones, for they are often cited as the ones Locke offers. Against the background of these traditional accounts which we have been examining, however, I think I can do Locke a greater justice by offering another account— one that he seems only to hint at in the Essay. But there are definite hints of the
distinction I am about to offer, and while it may be unsatisfactory in its own right, it goes a long way in tying together some of the things Locke says. Here then is a new understanding of Locke's view of the ground of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.

In Book II, chapter viii of the *Essay* Locke discusses the relationship between qualities and powers of bodies, or specifically, between secondary qualities and bare powers. Above (pp. 142-143) I introduced Locke's distinction between secondary qualities and bare powers, where the latter were the abilities of a second body to induce changes in a third. Talk of these powers pertains only to independently existing bodies and their interactions with one another, but from this relationship we may learn a great deal. As Locke used the terms this "third" sort of quality (bare power) is supposed not to be found in the action of a body upon us. Of course, as we have seen, ultimately there are two sorts of qualities (p. 143), each with two kinds of effects, and not three sorts as Locke sometimes seems to indicate by his terminology. I am interested in the second power listed in one catalogue of the powers of an object (p. 143). It is:

(2) The power of a physical object (by means of the primary qualities of the insensible parts) to affect the primary qualities of the insensible parts of another physical object.
Locke lists as examples of such powers the power of the sun to make wax white, and the power of the fire to make lead fluid. (II.viii.23) In this and similar cases we forwardly enough conclude that the production of a sensible quality in any subject to be an effect of a bare power, and not the communication of any quality which was really in the efficient, when we find no such sensible quality in the thing that produced it. (II.viii.25)

Notice that this says that in any case in which a property is caused to appear in B by A, and that property is not in A, then it is the effect, not of a primary quality, but of a bare power, and therefore that the quality in B is a bare power also. (We know the quality in B to be a bare power also, for Locke has just defined, in II.viii.23, what are normally called secondary qualities as "sensible qualities" and has equated them for our purposes with bare powers.) The important point for us is the difference between the qualities we find in B and those in A.

We may contrast this case of the products of "bare powers" with the case of the production of ideas in us:

The idea of heat or light, which we receive by our eyes, or touch from the sun, are commonly thought real qualities existing in the sun, and something more than mere powers in it. (II.viii.24)

In the former case Locke describes the event as the production of a quality of the wax or lead, while in the latter case the event is usually thought of as the communication of a quality from the fire or the sun (or whatever the efficient cause may be). The terms of this distinction are
of crucial importance in Locke's understanding of the primary-secondary quality distinction.

What is meant by 'production', and what by 'communication'? Consider several instances of external objects acting upon one another:

1. My hand moves my pen.
2. The wind blows my tomatoes from the vine.
3. My ring impresses its print upon the wax.
4. My hand hits the wax which falls off the table.
5. The sun ripens my tomatoes.
6. The sun turns the wax white.
7. The sun turns my hand red.
8. The fire makes the lead fluid.

In all of these examples some change takes place which might be described as a new quality appearing in a body which is acted upon by another. Notice, however, that in some of the examples the quality brought into being in the body acted upon is the same as the quality of the body which is said to be the cause of the change. In these cases the motion in one thing causes motion in another, or a shape of one body reproduces itself in another body, etc. In other cases the quality brought into being is not shared by both parties to the change. The sun is not ripe, nor red, nor white, and certainly not red and white, nor is the fire fluid. Yet these are the qualities brought into existence in other bodies by the sun and the fire.

The former kind of change, the change in shape or motion, Locke calls communication. That is, a quality is "passed on" from one object to another. The latter kind of
change, in which a new quality comes into being is called *production*. It is "production" in that the fluidity found in the lead is a quality not found in the fire, yet one which is the result of the fire, and so one which is produced by it. On the other hand, the motion of the wax after I hit it, or its design after I impress my ring upon it, are qualities of the wax as well as of my hand or the ring. These qualities are *communicated* to the wax rather than produced in it, i.e. there is something in common between the cause and its effect. In the case of motion, for example, motion in one body is caused, in all of Locke's accounts, by motion in another, but it is not the case that all redness in one body is caused by redness in another. The effect is like the cause in the case of communication of qualities. To paraphrase Locke:

"...we forwardly enough conclude the communication of a quality to any subject to be an effect of primary qualities, and to be the communication of a quality which was really in the efficient, and not the production of a quality which was not really in the efficient, i.e. a bare power, when we find such a quality in the thing that produced it.

This principle, that in communication the effect is like the cause, and that in production it is not, plays the crucial role in the distinction we are trying to understand, for the distinction we are trying to understand is that between "real qualities" in objects and "mere powers" of objects, that is, between primary qualities and every other kind. And it is just in discussing the difference between
secondary qualities and bare powers and primary qualities, and in trying to tell us why we often want to align the former with primary qualities and class the latter (bare powers) separately, that Locke gives the basis for the distinction between primary qualities and both of the other kinds: 3

...the powers to produce several ideas in us...are looked upon as real qualities in the things affecting us: but the third sort are called and esteemed barely powers. e.g. The idea of heat, or light, which we receive by our eyes, or touch, from the sun are commonly thought real qualities existing in the sun, and something more than mere powers in it. But when we consider the sun in reference to wax, we look on whiteness and softness produced in the wax, not as qualities in the sun, but effects produced by powers in it. (II.viii.24)

But what is the point of the appeal to the sun and the wax? We must recognize that Locke's appeal is to a second body acting upon a third one, e.g. the sun on the wax. Look, he says, and you will see that the effect (whiteness) is not to be found as a quality of the cause. And we may look likewise to the changes in color wrought by the fire.

By parity of reasoning we should suppose that the idea of yellow got from looking at the sun bears no resemblance to any quality in the sun. But in fact there are reasons to say that the sun is yellow, and that the yellow in the sun is the cause of the idea of yellow in us. To find out

3 These arguments for assimilating secondary qualities and mere powers would be unintelligible unless the primary-secondary quality distinction is the one I suggest it is—namely that primary qualities are communicated qualities while the others are produced.
why Locke is unwilling to accept the claim that there is a resemblance between the yellow in the sun and the idea in us, we must try to understand the force of Locke's insistence upon discussing, in the context of ascertaining the relationships between objects and ideas, the relationships between external bodies.

Our knowledge of the relationship between qualities in one body and their effects as ideas cannot come, Locke is insisting, through attending to our ideas and the causes of them, but only by watching two totally different bodies act upon one another. This is a strange move and an intriguing one. Let us rehearse it in Locke's own words:

"... though receiving the idea of heat and light from the sun, we are apt to think it is a perception and resemblance of such a quality in the sun; yet when we see wax, or a fair face, receive change of color from the sun, we cannot imagine that to be a reception of anything in the sun, because we do not find those different colors in the sun itself. (II. viii. 25)"

This is not an argument about contradictory properties but primarily an appeal to independent objects in a case which should be taken as analogous to the case of perception. It is analogous in the following way. If we consider two objects such as the sun and the wax, the former of which acts upon the latter in some respect such as changing its color, we say that the color the wax takes on is not really in the sun. Locke would say that the perceiver is not relevantly different from the wax, so that any color effected in
us (perceived by us) should not be taken to be in the sun. We are, as perceivers, not peculiar.

Probably perceivers are not peculiar because the causal relationship between objects and perceivers is the same as that between objects and objects. For example, the sun

is able . . . so to alter the bulk, figure, texture, or motion of some of the insensible parts of my eyes or hands, as thereby to produce in me the idea of light or heat. (II.viii.24)

This is the same account that is given in the case of one physical object acting upon another. The difference is, we have an advantage, no matter what the metaphysical status of a physical object is, in our observation of one physical object acting upon another, that we do not have in a "first-person" case. Because the difference or similarity of the secondary qualities in two different external objects interacting with one another can be observed, we talk about the production rather than the communication of the quality (i.e. bare powers). That is to say, remembering the original distinction between communication and production, the qualities under discussion seem to come into existence in the body acted upon but are nowhere to be found in the other party to the change.

Our "privileged position" in the case of watching one physical object act upon another will become clear from consideration of the following example. Suppose there is a
limited universe of just the sun and me. The sun acts upon me and causes the appropriate changes in the bulk, texture, figure, etc. of some of the insensible parts of my eyes, thereby producing in me the idea of yellow. Since the universe is limited I have no knowledge of whether that idea results from my eyes taking on a quality similar to a quality in the sun, "resembling" a quality in the sun, or from my eyes taking on a quality different from any in the sun.

If I am alone in the world with the sun and the wax, and I suppose my eyes to be physical objects as is the wax, however, I do have evidence of how closely my ideas resemble reality. I can see the sun act on the wax, and note that some of the qualities produced in the wax are unlike any in the sun. I may not, of course, know what the ones in the sun or the wax are really like. But I can see whether they are the same or different. If they are different I can be quite sure that those produced in me are quite different from those in the sun, just as the ones in the wax are different from those in the sun; and if they are the same I can infer that there is a good chance that the ones produced in my eyes are like those in the sun. In time one learns that certain qualities always, or almost always, resemble those in the causal agent, and are therefore said to represent "powers" of the agent.

In more Lockian terms, the following happens when the secondary qualities of a body act upon us. What we see is,
say, the yellow sun. But we suppose that only because our senses not being able to discover any unlikeness between the idea produced in us, and the quality of the object producing it, we are apt to imagine that our ideas are resemblances of something in the objects, and not the effects of certain powers placed in the modification of their primary qualities. (II.viii.25)

But why, it may be asked, do we assume that if it is not the case? Again, in Locke's own words:

The reason why the one are ordinarily taken for real qualities, and the other only for bare powers, seems to be, because the ideas we have of distinct sounds, colors, etc., containing nothing at all in them of bulk, figure, or motion, we are not apt to think them the effects of these primary qualities; which appear not, to our senses, to operate in their production, and with which they have not any apparent congruity or conceivable connection... But, in the other case, in operations of bodies changing the qualities one of another, we plainly discover that the quality produced hath commonly no resemblance with anything in the thing producing it; wherefore we look on it as a bare effect of power. (II. viii.25)

The truth of the matter is that secondary qualities as well as mere powers, powers to affect the primary qualities of the insensible parts of physical objects qua physical objects, are all of a kind:

Whereas, if rightly considered, these qualities of light and warmth, which are perceptions in me when I am warmed or enlightened by the sun, are no otherwise in the sun, than the changes made in the wax, when it is blanched or melted, are in the sun. They are all of them equally powers in the sun, depending on its primary qualities; whereby it is able, in the one case, so to alter the bulk, figure, texture, or motion of some of the insensible parts of my eyes or hands, as thereby to produce in me the idea of light or heat; and in the other, it is able to so alter the bulk, figure, texture, or motion, of the insensible parts of the wax, as to make them fit to produce in me the distinct ideas of white and fluid. (II.viii.24)
This thesis that we have been offering so far is a strong one: that we are like physical objects (C), so if we know another physical object (A) acts upon a third (B) and produces a resembling quality in B, then we know that when A acts upon us in the same manner it produces a resembling quality in us (namely an idea).

There is, however, a weaker thesis that I think is more tenable than this strong one, and since it is based upon the same kind of considerations and the same passages in Locke, it is now easily stated and understood. This thesis does not involve, if the strong one does, the claim that anything is communicated to the mind, or that shapes are in the mind, or that ideas "resemble" something in the world. Instead, the words 'resemble' and 'represent' are defined terms and in this context do not have their usual meanings.

The thesis is that "resembling" versus "representing" ideas are not at all, but ideas which are of qualities which are "communicated" and "produced" respectively. That is, if q is known to be produced in B by A (and we can know this whether our ideas are true to the world or not), then our idea of q is a representing one. If q is seen to be communicated, then our idea of q is a resembling one.

On this interpretation 'representing' and 'resembling' refer not to the relationship between qualities in causally
interacting external objects. To say that q is a secondary quality (or mere power) is to say that it is different from any quality in either its cause or its effect (at least sometimes) in the causal chain. Further, to say that our idea of q only represents q is to pick out q as different in behavior in the causal chain from what we call "primary qualities," that is, to say that it is an idea of a secondary quality.

This ends our exposition of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities in Locke. Some summary, and perhaps comparison of this account with Jackson's, is in order. According to Jackson's account, and I agreed with him, all qualities are ultimately dependent upon primary qualities. Some are reducible to the primary qualities of the macroscopic parts and some to the primary qualities of the microscopic parts. Locke, too, says that secondary qualities are so-called simply to accord with the common way of speaking. According to Jackson, in Locke's technical terminology, all qualities are powers. Secondary qualities are the powers, dependent upon the microscopic parts of an object, to produce ideas in a perceiver. Primary qualities so-called in Locke are the powers, dependent upon the qualities of the macroscopic parts of the object, to produce ideas in a perceiver. And, in addition, there are other powers such as the power of an object in virtue of the qualities of its microscopic parts, to produce changes
in the bulk, texture, and figure of another body.

Locke says, and I think, for reasons that will become apparent very shortly it is a claim crucial to his account, that ideas of the primary qualities resemble the primary qualities, while ideas of secondary qualities only represent the secondary qualities. Jackson thinks that an account of Locke should be able to give some understanding of this claim, and also to make sense of the terminology (strange when there are really only primary qualities) according to which there are ideas of primary and ideas of secondary qualities.

The reason the claim that ideas of primary qualities resemble, while ideas of secondary qualities only represent their qualities, is important, is that given Jackson's claim that there are really only primary qualities, and the failure to make sense of the notions of resemblance and representation, then it looks as though no sense could be given to the terminology according to which there are said to be ideas of primary and ideas of secondary qualities. There would be no difference in the qualities, and no explicable difference in the relationship between our ideas and the qualities, and thus no basis at all for the primary-secondary quality distinction.

How does Jackson cope with the difficulty? First, he says it makes no sense to say that, for example, the secondary
qualities fail to resemble the **powers** to produce ideas, but that if any sense is to be given to the claim it must be construed as the claim that ideas resemble the microscopic (or, in the case of primary qualities, macroscopic) qualities. This move is acceptable to me, but unfortunately Jackson can still make no sense of the claim that ideas of primary qualities resemble the primary qualities. He cannot do that because he has already determined that primary qualities are determinate, and hence for an idea to resemble it, it would have to have not only a shape or size, but the same shape or size as the object which has the primary quality:

There would be more to be said for the statement that the perceived shape resembles the shape of the surface that produces it, to the extent to which a figure resembles its projection on a surface that distorts it... But if nothing short of complete resemblance is claimed, and that between the original idea of sensation and the quality that produces it, this can be allowed only if the quality is taken to be indeterminate, and the idea... an abstract idea. *(Locke and Berkeley, 68-69)*

But we know that according to Locke the quality is determinate.

Jackson makes no further attempts to explicate the notion of resemblance or representation. Failing at this task it apparently becomes impossible for him to explain the terminology according to which there are ideas of primary qualities and ideas of secondary qualities. There is now a single kind of quality and a single kind or relationship in
which ideas can stand to it. As we saw (p. 84) Jackson can say almost nothing about "ideas of" without resorting to the unexplained terms 'represent' and 'resemble'.

The account which we offered over the preceding pages does not explain how there can be complete resemblance between the original idea of sensation, and the quality that produces it, but it does offer a sense for the terms 'resemble' and 'represent' which seem to fit with the text and succeeds in making sense of the language according to which there are ideas of primary and ideas of secondary qualities.

An idea which resembles a quality is an idea of a quality which is communicated from one object to another, and an idea which resembles is an idea of a quality which is produced in one object by another. Secondary qualities are those qualities which are produced, and primary qualities are those which are communicated. Ideas of secondary qualities are ideas of those which are produced, and ideas of primary qualities are ideas of those which are communicated. I think that this way of making the distinction is preferable to Jackson's non-way when it appears that the primary-secondary distinction hinges upon making the notion workable in some way or another. Locke seems to offer no other ground for the distinction.

This concludes section b. in which I have presented Locke's ground for the distinction between ideas which
"resemble" and those which "represent" qualities. That ground lies in the difference between production and communication. This difference also makes sense of the terminology according to which there are ideas of primary and ideas of secondary qualities in spite of the fact that we accept Jackson's claim that all qualities are ultimately primary qualities.

It is certainly true that the senses given to 'represent' and 'resemble' are unusual, and not what one would expect from hearing Locke claim that ideas of primary qualities "resemble" their archetypes. The relation of "resemblance," if indeed there is any resemblance at all (that is, if "resemblance" means anything more than "communication"), holds between interacting external objects, and not between features of objects and ideas.

In spite of the uniqueness of this interpretation I think the distinction is helpful. By using it, it is possible to accept Jackson's account of powers and qualities, Berkeley's understanding of what is "perceived," and to give an account of otherwise inexplicable Lockian doctrines. One question now remains, and that is how well this account of resemblance and representation will withstand criticism. For a brief look at that I have included section c.
c. Apparent Counterexamples to the Suggested Meaning of 'Resemble' and 'Represent'

As I suggested the question still may be asked, as it could have been on Jackson's view of the primary-secondary quality distinction and Locke's representationalism, of whether we can know that our ideas tell us what physical objects are really like. Although the proposed way of making the distinction gives a sense to the claim that some ideas "resemble" and some "represent" their causes, this is different from the claim that ideas have the same qualities as external objects. There is bound to be scepticism which in its naive form goes something like, "yes, but do our ideas resemble what's really out there?"

As I understand it such a question indicates either a worry about perception qua perception—can perception provide real knowledge, or a worry about the acknowledged difference between the wax and anything in us, or in any way involved in the act or process of perception from the perceiver side. That is, a worry about the absolute difference between the wax and the perceiver, a difference so great that the conditions for knowledge might not be present in any case of "perception."

As to the first kind of question I wish to suggest that the problem is not peculiar to Locke, nor to any particular account of perception, but is one shared by all Realist accounts of perception. Sometimes it is really
based on, as it more clearly is in the second formulation, nothing more than the recognition that knowledge is claimed of something other than ideas. Sometimes, of course, this kind of question is a suggestion that in the metaphysical account of perception physical objects should have the status of mind-dependent entities.

All the talk about second and third objects does not guarantee that these objects are mind-independent. It may even be that there are no mind-independent objects of perception. That is, there may well be a theory according to which all appearances can be accounted for, and according to which there are no such external objects, but so far there is no reason to defend against so extravagant a claim. No real reasons for doubt have been articulated, and there may be some reason to think that some Berkelian attacks will not be successful if the primary-secondary quality distinction is made in the way I have suggested.

In addition to providing a sense for "resemble" as well as "represent" in talking about the relation of ideas to physical objects, which Jackson could not do (p. 82), our explanation accounts for two somewhat mysterious elements in Locke's text. They are Locke's discussion of and continued reference to external bodies interacting, and his discussion of secondary qualities versus bare powers. These are legitimate topics of philosophical inquiry, but their presence in an essay on human understanding must be accounted for.
I have done that by showing the importance of both the interaction of bodies, as well as the assimilation of secondary qualities and powers, to an account of human knowledge of the physical world. I have, furthermore, more solidly grounded the discussion between primary and secondary qualities than do arguments appealing to the "reality of the perceiver," for those arguments were shown in section b. to be bad ones. Yet I have not done it in such a way that the distinction between qualities and ideas is rendered redundant. In addition to all this I have made sense of both Locke's explanation of why people think secondary qualities are real, and provided his explanation of how he knows this view is mistaken (the assimilation of secondary qualities and bare powers, and the observation of physical objects interacting).

Because of these features I contend that the foregoing interpretation gives both the primary-secondary quality distinction and Locke's other views a coherence and compatibility that they have not had on other interpretations.

We have now seen that this way of making the primary-secondary quality distinction satisfies the usual tests of an adequate account. It may be, however, that there is an obvious test which is not so easily satisfied. That is the test of whether all the qualities Locke lists as secondary qualities and the ones he lists as primary qualities correspond to what we would list if we took the distinction
seriously. Would colors, light, heat, smells, tastes, etc. turn out to be the effect of "powers" while motion, figure, texture, bulk, etc. be picked out by the criteria as primary qualities?

It must certainly be conceded, even by critics of this way of making the distinction, that there are clear cut cases which seem to support it. The shape of the wax, the motion of the billiard ball, and the texture of the surface of the bronze casting are all results of shapes (of the ring), motions (of other billiard balls), and textures (of the molds). And further, the red of the tomato, the fluidity of the lead, and the heat of the match do not seem to be caused by redness, fluidity, or heat in the causal objects.

On the other hand, the heat in the meat does seem to be caused by the heat in the fire, the fluidity of the gruel does seem to be caused by the fluidity of the water which makes it up, the size of my hand does not seem to be caused by the size of the bumblebee which stung it, nor does my motion toward the cigarettes seem to be caused either by the motion of the cigarettes or the motion of my desire for them. One may, furthermore, ask whence comes the figure of the tree or the man if these are said to be communicated from one object to another. Are they communicated at all?

In the first place Locke's doctrine holds only for qualities that are caused in one object by another. The
fact that an object B has a characteristic c, which characteristic is not in object A, is not sufficient to show that c is not a primary quality. It must also be the case that A is the cause of c. That this is the case in all of the above examples is not clear. Such a claim, of course, would be a scientific one. So some of these questions, though perhaps not all, can be handled satisfactorily if we accept a certain amount of Locke's science.

Furthermore, we can leave the candidates for teleological explanation out of the picture. Thereby we dismiss, as a counterexample, my movements directed toward objects at a distance or as the result of desire or intention. Any movement is then, by Locke's scientific account, the result of forces applied to the object in question.\(^4\)

All of this fits satisfactorily with Locke's claims. The kind of "motion" that takes place in growth, if indeed it even fits the preceding conditions, can be accounted for by the piling on of additional matter, and this would come under the discussion of bulk. The same would be true whether of the growth of my tomato plant or the swelling of my hand when it is stung. In the latter case the size is not caused by the bee, but by the accumulation of blood, pus, and so on in my hand. Presumably the causal agents in this

\(^4\)Strangely enough, all effects of one body upon another are, according to Locke, the result of contact by at least small particles. Influences of such forces as gravity seem forgotten.
case of taking on bulk or size, if this kind of "causal talk" is even appropriate to such a case, are the parts which contribute to that bulk, and it is the bulk of those parts which constitute the bulk of the composite.

Texture might be explicable in much the same way in the case of living organisms, and, of course, is even more easily explained in the case of inorganic objects. In the latter case the texture of the objects is transferred from other objects which act directly on them (by contact). I maintain that Locke could reasonably have thought, and in fact did think, that there was an adequate physical account of the "taking on" of each of the primary qualities, which account is the basis of the claim that whenever a particular bulk, texture, figure, or motion comes to be in an object we will find in the cause the same bulk, texture, figure, or motion.

If the explanation to this point seems ad hoc perhaps that illusion will be dispelled by the following consideration. Secondary qualities differ from the primary qualities in just this way: it is not always the case that when an object "takes on" a certain secondary quality we will be able to find in our causal agent the same quality. The fact that we sometimes find it should not mislead us. While it may be thought to be the case that the heat in the meat is a result of the heat in the fire, there is no reason to think that the heat in the fire is "real," for there was no heat to
be found in the causal components of the flame of the match, and hence no communication of heat from those causal agents to the match, and hence heat is a secondary quality. If this were not sufficient it would still be the case that heat is a secondary quality because of its occasional production from two "cold" chemical components of a reaction. Primary qualities by contrast are those which are in the cause whenever they appear in a second object as effects.

This concludes our examination of Locke's theory of perception. The main outlines, if not always the supporting data, should by now be clear. There are two points, however, which will be of special interest to us in our forthcoming examination of a few of Berkeley's arguments. Those points are that our account has shown that it is possible to understand Locke as claiming that secondary qualities are qualities of objects, and as such are in mind-independent external objects. The second point is that the primary (and secondary) qualities of objects, which are in external objects, are perceived qualities. To that extent physical reality is perceived. Motion, figure, size, texture, and color are all qualities of objects and are all in the same place, to wit, in the objects.

The objects which have these qualities, or which these qualities comprise (I will not discuss that issue), are indirectly or mediately perceived, while ideas of them are had
or immediately perceived as necessary parts of, but not sufficient to, the causal process of perception. With these points in mind let us now turn to a brief examination of a couple of Berkelian attacks which are supposedly directed at Locke.
CHAPTER VI

BERKELEY'S ATTACK

a, Introduction

In this chapter on Berkeley it is my aim to show that some of the Berkelian arguments often thought to be directed at Locke, if so construed, actually miss their mark. The technique I employ in showing this is that of considering two versions of "materialism" characterized and attacked by Berkeley, among which is usually thought to be Locke's view. Using the various distinctions which were drawn in earlier chapters I separate those versions into materialism$_1$ and materialism$_2$, each of which differs in a crucial respect from Locke's view. I then try to show that it is not immediately apparent that Berkeley's arguments work equally well against materialism$_3$ (Locke's view), for the assumptions of materialism$_1$ and materialism$_2$ are in part incompatible with the assumptions of materialism$_3$.

Turbayne says in his introduction to one edition of Berkeley's Dialogues that Berkeley has two tasks.\footnote{Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, ed. by Colin M. Turbayne. References to the Dialogues in the body of the paper are to this edition.} These tasks are central to both The Principles of Human Knowledge and...
and *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous*. The first is to refute materialism, or what we shall show to be the same thing, to prove that no mind-independent external objects exist. The second is to show that the resulting philosophical views do not violate the canons of common sense. That Berkeley does in fact attempt to do these things is not in question. We have Berkeley's word that that is what he is trying to do, and I shall examine a couple of his arguments for at least the first claim in this section.

The two goals or tasks, diverse to the brink of incompatibility, require varied arguments and explanations for their accomplishment. For example, the goal of refuting materialism itself involves arguments which appeal to incredibly opaque "obvious truths" such as the obvious truth that nothing can be like an idea but an idea, or the obvious truth that the being of anything consists in its being perceived or known (Principle 6), as well as a quite different sort of argument which attacks earlier distinctions between primary and secondary qualities.

The second task, on the other hand, is of a quite different sort, one of synthesis rather than analysis, and one in the solution of which Berkeley appeals to our desire to clarify and unite truths recognized by the vulgar and by the philosophers. Those truths are:
1. Those things immediately perceived are the real things.

which is the common sense claim, and

2. Things immediately perceived are ideas (existing only in minds).

which is the truth recognized by the philosopher.

With these diverse ends, and the even more diverse means confronting the reader of Berkeley, I want to be especially careful to eliminate as many of the often associated but unessential aspects of Berkeley's thought and argument as possible. I do not want to defend dualism, or Locke's theory of perception either. Nor do I want to show that claims about the ultimate truth or tenability of Idealism are mistaken. I wish to show only that a limited number of arguments Berkeley uses against Locke's theory of perception either do not meet Locke's assumptions, or are, for other reasons, ineffective against Locke. Thus I am interested first in Berkeley's understanding of Locke's theory of perception, with whatever that theory entails, and secondly in whether some specific arguments Berkeley offers allegedly to challenge that theory of perception work.

As the reader is certainly aware by now, what I consider crucial challenges to Locke's theory of perception connect very closely with Berkeley's understanding of, and attack upon, the primary-secondary quality distinction. Certainly very closely related is "truth" 2. just above, and it might even be that the bulk of this section on
Berkeley can be seen as an, perhaps circuitous, examination of the truth or falsity of this claim about what is perceived and how it is perceived. To begin the examination let us look at what is involved in the refutation of materialism.

b. The Meaning(s) of 'Materialism'

Ordinarily the term 'materialism' might be taken as shorthand for any number of views which share the feature of denying the existence of mind or mental substance. The notion that this is what Berkeley is attacking is quickly put to rest, and replaced by the recognition that for his purposes 'materialism' is used to characterize those philosophical positions which assert the existence, or possibility of, material substance:

Hence, it is plain that the very notion of what is called Matter or corporeal substance involves a contradiction in it. (Principle 9)

Philonous. That there is no such thing as what philosophers call "material substance," I am seriously persuaded... (Dialogues, 10)

From this it might be concluded that Berkeley is attacking all metaphysical positions other than idealism or mental monism. Belief in the existence of matter, he appears to think, leads to scepticism. Whether it is true that Berkeley is attacking all forms of materialism or not may be questioned, for Berkeley does not seem to have addressed himself
to views other than dualistic ones with their attendant problems. And, as we shall see, some of those do not suffer his attention.

Some arguments in fact play specifically upon the dualism rather than upon the fact that there is a material substance:

...though we give the materialists their external bodies, they by their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced; since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner body can act upon spirit. (Principle 19)

It may or may not be that a material substance monism fares better in the face of Berkeley's objections than does a dualism. Since Locke is our protagonist, however, and he is universally conceded to be a dualist, material substance monism is one Pandora's Box we shall not open.

There is a question that should be raised, however, and that is the question of whether and how closely Locke's account of perception is tied to his belief that material substance exists. I suggest that the proof that there is no material substance would not necessarily affect the account of perception. In the characterization of Locke's account of perception I was deliberately vague, and Locke was also unclear, about the nature of the objects which exist in the mind-independent world.

I am suggesting that we test Locke's theory of perception against some of Berkeley's arguments, not that we test his views concerning the composition of physical objects.
In order to do this it will be necessary to attend only to the limited number of Berkelian arguments which attack Locke, and not to a number of other, and perhaps stronger, ones. The following use of the term 'materialism' is in accordance with these limited ambitions.

The arguments against materialism seem to be directed against more than one version of dualism. The versions may be distinguished by their characterizations of the role of primary and secondary qualities in the account of perception. The first version, let us call it materialism, seems to hold that we can directly perceive the primary qualities of bodies, while the so-called secondary qualities are ideas of sensations which exist in the mind only:

...sensible qualities are by philosophers divided into "primary" and "secondary." The former are extension, figure, solidity, gravity, motion and rest. And these they hold exist really in bodies. The latter are... all sensible qualities besides the primary, which they assert are only so many sensations or ideas existing nowhere but in the mind. Dialogues, 28)

or again:

They who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of the primary or original qualities do exist without the mind in unthinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that colors, sounds, heat, cold, and suchlike secondary qualities do not—which they tell us are sensations existing in the mind alone, that depend on and are occasioned by the different size, texture, and motion of the minute particles of matter. (Principle 10)

When Locke is not being careful, or when his warnings are not heeded about his sometimes sloppy use of terms, it sounds as though he might be espousing just such a view.
Remember, however, that this is not the view which I attributed to Locke. My understanding of "directly" or "immediately" perceived implies that ideas are the only things that are perceived in this way (see p. 126 above). Neither, of course, do I attribute to Locke the view that the secondary qualities are sensations or ideas. For Locke secondary qualities are powers of the object to cause ideas in a perceiver, but no qualities are ideas. Notice particularly that with respect to primary qualities this account has it that mind and body share the same thing. Primary qualities are in the bodies and they are in the mind, which is to say no more and no less than that they are both "in the objects" and "directly perceived." This seems to have some of the features of Jackson's so-called Mixed View. This account does provide us with an apparent distinction between primary and secondary qualities even though the distinction, so drawn, may not be Locke's.

As Berkeley is quick to show, however, there is no basis for the alleged difference. Briefly the technique Berkeley uses against this version of materialism is not that of showing that the same qualities cannot be shared by two radically different substances^2 (the explanation of which would presumably drive one to a second version of

^2Note that an obvious reason for having to say that motion is in the mind "by way of idea" as distinct from the way it is in an independent object is the radical difference between the types of substance. This may be a reflection, not a cause, of the division of attributes into very different types.
dualism according to which minds do not share qualities with bodies), but is rather the technique of arguing that there is no reason to think secondary qualities in the mind only and primary qualities in both places.

Two kinds of argument are used for this purpose. These two kinds of argument might be called arguments from the perceiver relativity of all sensible qualities, and arguments from the impossibility of conceptually separating some qualities from others. In the next section I shall discuss, at least briefly, both kinds of argument.

A second version of dualism, materialism, which Berkeley seems to consider, and which is closer to the one Locke embraces, claims that the qualities as perceived by us are not in the objects themselves:

Hyl. Properly and immediately nothing can be perceived but ideas. All material things, therefore, are in themselves insensible and to be perceived only by their ideas. (Dialogues, 48)

A similar view also seems to occur in the Principles:

But it is evident from what we have already shewn, that extension, figure, and motion are only ideas existing in the mind, and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea, and that consequently neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving substance. (Principle 9)

The qualities "as perceived by us" are perceived "by way of idea." That is, unlike the former view, in this one there is nothing shared by both minds and external objects, although there may be an interaction of various sorts between them. This view, unlike the former, involves a true repre-
sentationalism in which ideas are representative (again, they may or may not be resemblances) of qualities, and it is quickly, if not naturally, taken to mean that neither primary nor secondary qualities are perceivable. In the former case, remember, ideas were not necessary as representatives of primary qualities, for, on that view, we could directly perceive primary qualities.

It is often thought that the arguments against materialism, will not work against this second version of materialism because those arguments, unlike those against materialism, presuppose that qualities are perceivable. So, Berkeley attacks this version of dualism by coming down hard on the relationship between the alleged representation and the represented, or alternatively, on the notion of 'represent' and 'resemblance'. The upshot of this attack can be seen in the second premise of the Berkelian argument:

No ideas exist without the mind. (Dialogues, 49)
All things like ideas are ideas. (Dialogues, 48)

Therefore, no things like ideas exist without the mind.

The representationalist must claim that in some sense of 'like' ideas are "like" primary qualities, or at least like something which is represented by ideas. Otherwise any notion of representation is lost and the representationalists' claims become unintelligible.

In his introduction, in which he distinguishes between what I have called materialism, and materialism, Turbayne
attributes materialism\textsubscript{2} to Locke (as does Jackson before him):

Both these versions of the materialist doctrine are found in the philosophy of Locke. The second is avowedly his official position, but he often writes as though he subscribes to the first.\textsuperscript{3}

It has emerged from the discussion of Locke that his materialism is different from that of either materialism\textsubscript{1} or materialism\textsubscript{2}. We shall now call Locke's brand of materialism, materialism\textsubscript{3}.

There are significantly many similarities between materialism\textsubscript{2} and materialism\textsubscript{3}. For example, both views maintain that secondary qualities are powers which depend upon the primary qualities of external objects; both agree that secondary qualities cause ideas of colors, tastes, etc; both agree that ideas of primary qualities, but not ideas of secondary qualities, resemble the qualities they represent; and both agree that in some sense we "perceive" ideas of the qualities. But materialism\textsubscript{2} and materialism\textsubscript{3} disagree about whether or not we perceive primary and secondary qualities. Materialism\textsubscript{3}, which I have maintained is Locke's view, asserts that we do perceive primary and secondary qualities of objects. It asserts, that is, contrary to the usual Berkelian claim that nothing is immediately perceived but ideas (see the previous page), that some things other than

\textsuperscript{3}Colin M. Turbayne, "Introduction" to Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, xiii.
Ideas are sensible. Materialism challenges the legitimacy of the inference from "nothing is immediately perceived but ideas" to "therefore, material things (for Jackson, 'physical reality') are insensible."

It is my contention that materialism is Locke's position, and that if it is, then some of Berkeley's attacks are not successful against Locke. To ascertain the truth of this claim we shall have to examine the primary-secondary quality distinction as it is embodied in Berkeley's various arguments. I must also reiterate the meaning of 'immediately' versus 'mediately' perceived in Locke's philosophy, as well as elucidate the meaning of that phrase in Berkeley's philosophy.

I shall now begin the examination of the arguments which are presumably directed against materialism, while evaluating their effectiveness against materialism (i.e. against Locke).

c. Materialism and Some Features Common to Direct Realism

Materialism begins with the assumption that minds and bodies share primary qualities, that is that primary qualities are in external bodies, and also that we directly perceive them. According to Turbayne it also assumes that secondary qualities are in the mind, are ideas or sensations:
According to the first version (Dialogues, 28, also Principles 10), the primary qualities such as extension, figure, and motion, inhere in external bodies, but we are able to perceive these qualities directly. The secondary qualities, such as colors, tastes and sounds, are asserted to be ideas or sensations which exist only in our minds.  

However, he seems quickly to retract the claim that "secondary qualities are ideas" is an assumption:

The argument from the relativity of all sensible qualities begins by showing that since secondary qualities vary in relation to the perceiver they cannot be in external objects.  

And he goes on to indicate on the next page that this is indeed an argument against the first version of materialism.

Whether or not the claim "secondary qualities are ideas" is an assumption, is an important factor in determining the relationship between Locke's philosophy and Berkeley's. If, for example, Berkeley merely assumes that secondary qualities are ideas, then this attack on Locke would seem to be extremely weak, for Locke does not make that assumption. Similarly, if his attempted proof that secondary qualities are ideas is unsuccessful, then any challenge to Locke based on arguments of this type would seem to fail. Of these there are many, for Berkeley "proceeds to show that similar considerations apply to the primary qualities." Thus, whether there is an argument to show that secondary

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4 Turbayne, "Introduction" to Three Dialogues, xiii.
5 Ibid.
qualities are ideas or sensations, and whether it is successful will be factors of primary concern in our discussion of materialism.

Materialism, at least in Berkeley's statement of it, also implies that the things we immediately perceive are the only sensible things. Locke, we saw, thinks that only ideas are immediately perceived, but that some things are perceived or sensible which are not immediately perceived. Since Berkeley's claims are at odds with Locke's account, I must seek the origin of those claims. Through either argument or assumption Berkeley arms himself with the "truths" that secondary qualities are ideas and that things immediately perceived are the only sensible things, and then attempts to prove that there is no reason to think that secondary qualities are only in the mind while primary qualities are in both places. We shall now turn to the text.

First, there is argument which seems designed to show that secondary qualities are in the mind. An example of this kind of argument, which takes place on pages 18-28 of Three Dialogues, is:

Phil. Those bodies...upon whose application to our own we perceive a moderate degree of heat must be concluded to have a moderate degree of heat or warmth in them; and those upon whose applications we feel a like degree of cold must be thought to have cold in them.

Hyl. They must...

Phil. Is it not an absurdity to think the same thing should be at the same time both cold and warm?
Hyl. It is.

Phil. Suppose now one of your hands hot, the other cold, and that they are both put at once into the same vessel of water, in an intermediate state, will not the water seem warm to one hand and cold to the other?

Hyl. It will.

Phil. Ought we not, therefore, by your principles, to conclude it is really both cold and warm at the same time, that is according to your own confession to believe an absurdity?

Hyl. I confess it seems so.

I picked this argument not because it is the first argument in Three Dialogues, but rather because the conclusion seems relevant to the question of how Berkeley knows that secondary qualities are in the mind. This argument questions the claim that they are in objects. I shall call this argument, Argument 1.

Argument 1 ends with the conclusion that it is absurd to hold principles which result in saying that the same thing is both warm and cold at the same time. One of those principles is that if we perceived a certain degree of heat in a body, that body ought to be said to have that degree of heat in it. Berkeley takes the conclusion to mean that we ought not to say that bodies have certain degrees of heat in them. In a summary form the position, though not the argument, appears in Principles 11:

Again, great and small, swift and slow, are allowed to exist nowhere without the mind, being entirely relative, and changing as the frame or position of the organs of sense varies.
Given its crucial importance for the attack upon Locke we must consider the argument of the Dialogues for a moment. If the water is not both cold and warm at the same time, then the perceptions of warmth and coldness must be perceptions of something besides the temperature of the water. Let us see what that means.

Philonous says in his first statement in the argument that the object in which the heat resides is the water. It is this claim which is to be reduced to absurdity. How is it done? Marc-Wogau thinks that the premises of this argument (he says they are presupposed) can be summed up in the following four propositions:

1. One and the same thing cannot simultaneously have two incompatible qualities;
2. the qualities cold and warm are incompatible;
3. a perceived quality is real or exists, i.e. is really a quality of the thing perceived; and
4. the water which seems cold to the one hand and warm to the other, is (identically) one and the same object.

If these premises are conjoined with the statement that the water does in fact seem warm to the one hand and cold to the other, an absurdity (contradiction) results. At least one of the claims must be given up, and, since it would not seem to be the statement of fact about how the water feels to each hand, it would have to be one of the premises.

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6 Konrad Marc-Wogau, "That Argument from Illusion and Berkeley's Idealism," Theoria, XXIV (1958),
Which of the premises is most likely to be false? Where these perceived qualities are may yet be in question, that is (3) may be false or hopelessly ambiguous. Perhaps the perceived qualities are in the hands, or perhaps, as Berkeley seems to think, this implies that secondary qualities have no existence outside the mind. I think that the two perceptions of the temperature and of the water tell us that it is "intermediate in temperature." Part of the way we know the temperature is by the differing sensations of heat and cold.

Certainly we can admit that in one sense of 'perceive' we perceive these sensations. What that means is that we have them. These sensations or ideas are not, however, the secondary qualities, but merely ideas of representatives of the secondary qualities.

It is well worth noting how Locke handles exactly this case:

If the sensation of heat and cold be nothing but the increase or diminution of the motion of the minute parts of our bodies, caused by the corpuscles of any other body, it is easy to be understood, that if the motion be greater in one hand than in the other; if a body be applied to the two hands, which has in its minute particles a greater motion than in those of one of the hands, and a less than in those of the other, it will increase the motion of the one hand and lessen it in the other; and so cause the different sensations of heat and cold that depend thereon. (II.viii.21)

Thus Locke's answer to the dilemma Berkeley points out is to raise the issue, perhaps indirectly, of what the "perceived
quality" is. It might be the motion of the particles of the water, the motion of the particles of the hand, or the sensation(s) which results from the interaction of the hand and the water. Certainly the sensations are qualities of mind, and they are two different sensations. But secondary qualities (in this case the motion of the minute particles of the water) are still, though Berkeley's argument may eventually prove otherwise, the causes of the sensations, which causes exist in the external objects. The perceived quality of heat, in so far as it is in the external object, is one and the same quality (namely the motion of the particles) which manifests itself in two different sensations—different sensations because the conditions are different, not because the secondary qualities are two and different. Locke's answer to Berkeley's dilemma, which Berkeley does not recognize in Argument 1., is to suggest that we do not perceive heat every time we have a sensation of it. Locke's example is designed to show how one degree of heat in an object can, under properly different conditions, cause two different sensations. To put the point in terms Berkeley uses in Argument 1., it is not the case that every time the water seems warm a moderate degree of heat is perceived.

Hylas reflected this position, although poorly, by saying at the outset "whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense, we may be sure that the same exists in the object which occasions it." (Dialogues, 14) Thus, if none is per-
ceived none exists, and if much is perceived much exists—
that makes heat mind-dependent! He reflected the position
"poorly" because of the ambiguity of the phrase 'whatever
degree of heat is perceived by sense'. For Berkeley the
perception of heat is an immediate perception, an act for
which the only necessary condition is the consciousness of
the perceiver. But Locke is quite clear in his rejection of
this account. A sensation is sometimes not a sufficient con-
dition for the ascription of warmth to the water, and hence
never a sufficient condition. At a minimum another condi-
tion is the absence of other sensations of, for example,
cold.

For Locke 'perception' in the phrase "the perception
of..." is a stronger notion than that of 'sensation' with
which Berkeley equates it. According to Locke's account
the perception of a single characteristic might involve
several sensations. And Locke would be quick to agree that
these sensations are not in the water, and as quick to
counter the suggestion that warmth is not—certainly quicker
than Hylas. For Berkeley "whatever degree of heat is per-
ceived by sense" means 'whatever degree as determined by one
sensation' while for Locke the perception of a certain de-
gree of heat involves both at least one sensation and a rec-
ognition of the relevant causal conditions.

Two sensations do not necessarily imply the percep-
tions of two degrees of heat, nor does the sensation or
idea, an identification which Berkeley makes quite suddenly (see Argument 3, below), of heat imply the existence of the secondary quality of heat any more than the idea of a unicorn implies the existence of one. Neither, of course, do the two sensations imply the existence of two distinct objects of feeling. For Locke the sensations are certain kinds of tinglings (motions) which are often associated with a particular degree of heat, but which are only among the necessary conditions of perception, which does imply the existence of an object.

The account that Berkeley has given here so far, no matter how different it is from Locke's, is not yet alleged by Philonous to show that heat is not in the water. Hylas is still unconvinced, so Philonous tempts him with the pin case. I shall call the pin case Argument 2. It occurs on page 18 of our edition of the Three Dialogues. The argument goes as follows: (1) The pin, in pricking the finger, and the coal in burning it, rend the flesh; (2) we do not judge the sensation occasioned by the pin to be in the pin; therefore, (3) why judge that occasioned by the fire to be in it? Note, here, the appeal to the equivalence of heat and pain to sensations, secondary qualities, and to each other.

This equivalence was just what was at issue. Locke and Berkeley both agree that sensations are mind-dependent, but for Locke heat is not a sensation, but a quality of a physical object. It is, of course, true that he talks about
the sensation of heat. But that does not mean that heat is a sensation of that sensation is the same thing as perception. The sensation of heat is for Locke the motion of certain particles of or in us, which motion usually, though not always, occurs when we are in the presence of a hot object. Conversely, we are not always in the presence of a hot object when the motion (sensation) occurs.

Berkeley's argument should not be construed as depending upon an agreement between Hylas and Philonous that there is a case in which what we feel when we feel heat is indeed a sensation, viz. pain, and that, then, if one case of what we feel when we feel heat is a sensation, all cases are. For, if Hylas is speaking for Locke, what is felt is always heat, and the means by which it is felt is the sensation. And, of course, a given sensation is not always an accurate guide to the state of affairs in the world. That is, sensations are not perceptions.

Unfortunately for Locke's view, however, Hylas has, in an earlier argument, already consented to the claim that heat, cold, sweetness, softness and so forth are particular sorts or degrees of pleasures and pains. Locke would, of course, agree that pleasures and pains are sensations. But why does Hylas admit that heat is a sensation? In the passage I quoted from Locke it is quite clear that neither heat nor cold need be present when the sensations of heat and cold are, and therefore that heat cannot be equated with the
sensation.

Strangely enough Hylas made the identification because he could not distinguish two sensations when he got burned. But even giving this as a reason is tantamount to the assertion that heat is a sensation and hence that if it is a secondary quality, then secondary qualities are sensations. Locke himself was perfectly clear that two sensations were compatible with one degree of heat. That is the point of the explanation I cited. Similarly I think it is clear that the same kind of explanation can account for our having only one sensation when there are two degrees of heat in external objects.

Here is the argument where Hylas cannot distinguish two sensations where he gets burned:

(1) Hyl. Pain is something distinct from heat; and it is the consequence or effect of it.
(2) Phil. Upon putting your hand near the fire do you perceive one simple sensation or two distinct sensations?
(3) Hyl. One simple sensation.
(4) Phil. Is not the heat immediately perceived?
(5) Hyl. It is.
(6) Phil. And the pain?
(7) Hyl. True.
(8) Phil. Then if both are immediately perceived, and the fire affects you with one simple or uncompounded idea, it follows that this same simple idea is both the intense heat immediately perceived and the pain; and consequently that the intense heat immediately perceived is nothing distinct from a particular sort of pain. (Dialogues, 15)
At this point it certainly appears that Locke's claim that pain is something distinct from heat has been challenged. But Hylas and Philonous continue the argument:

(9) Phil. Can you conceive a vehement sensation to be without pleasure or pain?
(10) Hyl. No.
(11) Phil. Can you imagine sensible pain abstracted from every particular idea of heat, taste, smells, etc?
(12) Hyl. No.
(13) Therefore it follows that sensible pain is nothing distinct from those sensations or ideas in an intense degree.

First, it seems clear that at least some refined form of (1) is representative of Locke's beliefs about the relationship between heat and pain. I have already said that it appears that (8) challenges those beliefs. I said 'appears' because there is some question about whether Locke would deny that the intense heat immediately perceived and the pain are the same. It is Hylas' agreement to Philonous' suggestion in (4) which sets Hylas apart from Locke. Heat, intense or otherwise, is a quality of an external object. Pain, however, is a sensation and it is immediately perceived. "intense heat immediately perceived" is nothing unless it is a contradiction. The question is only that of what Berkeley could mean by that phrase. It is equally unclear whether or not Locke would disavow (13). But it is spectacularly clear that he would deny the effectiveness of the argument against his position.
There has never been any question that both Locke and Berkeley accept the truth of:

ONLY IDEAS OR SENSATIONS ARE IMMEDIATELY PERCEIVED.

Neither has it been questioned that both of them accept the claim that pain is immediately perceived. But what is at issue is whether heat is a sensation, i.e. whether it is immediately perceived. It was this apparent assumption of the two arguments I previously considered that I was attempting to support by my appeal to this argument. That attempt seems to have failed.

The results of this rather complex string of arguments on pages 15, 18-28 can be distilled into the following claims:

(A) Whatever degree of heat (or other secondary quality) we perceive by sense exists in the cause.

(B) Pain is not in the pin but only in minds (it is a sensation caused by the pin).

(C) Heat (and other secondary qualities) are various sorts or degrees of pleasures and pains. (In other words, heat is immediately perceived.)

From B and C we can get D:

(D) Heat (secondary qualities) have no existence outside of minds.

and from D we get:

(E) Heat is not in the fire or water, and (A) has been shown false.

Thus a violent and painful heat cannot exist without the mind. (Dialogues, 15-16)
Looking at this structure for a moment with our knowledge of Locke in the foreground we see that premises A and C are obviously suspect. A is suspect if we understand by 'heat' something which is mind-dependent. We do not want Berkeley to slip that in, for we know from our study of Locke that secondary qualities are powers in the objects, not ideas. Nevertheless, A sounds like something Locke would agree to. It is just that understanding which we want to guard against, however, which becomes explicit in C. C asserts that heat (and other secondary qualities) are mind-dependent. From where does this assertion come? C is supposedly established in the argument from the Dialogues that we just quoted. In fact I got it from number 8 of Argument 3.

Given that: (1) heat is immediately perceived, or is a sensation; (2) all sensations are felt; (3) only one sensation is felt by one who burns his hand; and (4) both heat and pain are present in that case, it is a simple matter to conclude that heat and pain are, therefore (5), nothing distinct. The trick is to get the first claim. As should be clear by now that claim has neither been established by proof nor legitimately taken as an assumption. I think by the following rather lengthy digression, however, I can provide some insight into the effects of assuming, as well as pinpoint the origin of the assumption, that qualities are immediately perceived. First, the effects, and then the
origin.

A moment ago I hinted that Hylas wanted to announce a causal relationship between heat and pain, at least in the case of those degrees of heat which are not identical with pain (should there be such degrees). Suppose for the moment he denied the identity of heat and pain and proceeded to claim:

...those qualities as perceived by us are pleasures or pains, but not as existing in the external objects. We must not therefore conclude absolutely that there is no heat in the fire or sweetness in the sugar, but only that heat or sweetness, as perceived by us, are not in the fire or sugar. (Dialogues, 19)

In order for this to be an accurate portrayal of Locke's position, the last two lines of this should read, "...only that heat or sweetness, as perceived by us, i.e. the sensations of heat or sweetness, are not in the fire or sugar."

Philonous' response to this is a very strange one:

I say it is nothing to the purpose. Our discourse proceeded altogether concerning sensible things, which you defined to be "the things we immediately perceive by our senses." (Dialogues, 19)

It is a strange response because it rules out of consideration what we would ordinarily take to be the proper distinction to make in order to save us from paradox—the distinction between ideas caused or occasioned by external objects, and those objects themselves. It rules out that response because it has already been agreed that "the things we immediately perceive by our senses" are things that "cannot
exist but in a mind perceiving them." (Dialogues, 16) But, how that response can legitimately be ruled out, that is, how sensible things come to be only "the things we immediately perceive by our senses" bears investigation, for Locke would not have agreed to that. We would ordinarily think that things mediately perceived were also sensible.

We must not overlook the fact that while this response is made with respect to a claim about secondary qualities, its effect is far more reaching than we might suspect at first. If Berkeley can establish this claim he will have shown an important premise of Locke to be mistaken. The premise is that there are sensible things which are not immediately perceived, but which are mediately or indirectly perceived (qualities of objects). On the other hand, if Berkeley fails to establish his claim then any argument which depends upon it (and as we shall we there are many) will have no effect on Locke's thesis.

What is the origin of the claim that sensible things are only "the things we immediately perceive by our senses"? On pages 12 and 13 Hylas and Philonous talk about sensible things, immediate perception, and mediately perception in the attempt to show "sensible things therefore are nothing else but so many sensible qualities or combinations of sensible qualities." The argument there (the first part of it, which I will extract very carefully from the text) goes like this:
1. 'Sensible things' means 'those things which are perceived by the senses'.

2. Letters in a book are truly sensible things, that is they are perceived by sense; and they are immediately perceived. God, truth, and virtue are not sensible things, they are not perceived by sense and they are mediately perceived.

3. It supposedly follows from (2) and perhaps (1), that if I see one part of the sky red, and another part blue, and conclude that there must be a cause of that diversity of colors, that the cause cannot be said to be a sensible thing or perceived by a sense of seeing.

Let us look at 1.-3. closely in the attempt to expose the assumptions and to compare them, if possible, to some of those of the representationalist.

(1) seems reasonable enough, though perhaps too equivocal, to pass without comment. (2), however, does not seem nearly so innocent if it is meant as a comment upon, or an example of, the representationalists' use of 'immediately' or 'mediately perceived'. For example, we know that the conclusion of the argument will contain the claim that only sensible things are qualities. Yet (2) claims as a paradigm of things immediately perceived the letters on the page before us. Are they only qualities? Qualities are supposedly the only sensible things. How do they differ in analysis from the pen in my hand? Looking ahead we know that Berkeley holds that we do immediately perceive the pen, that it is a sensible thing. Is Hylas suggesting that the letters on the page, or the pen, are examples of objects immediately perceived, and that the perception of truth and virtue are
paradigms of mediate perception? Is he caricaturing the representationalists' position and setting up a straw man?

For the representationalist-dualist is it not the case that the letters on the page, or the pen, are indirectly perceived, and that they are not identical with either the sensible qualities or the ideas, as the case may be? God, truth, and virtue are not indirectly or mediately perceived according to the representationalist—they are not perceived at all! Hence what Berkeley seems to be offering as a paradigm of the immediate-mediate distinction looks like it is not even an example of that distinction as made by Locke.

To say that these claims do not seem to be Locke's is not to say that they make no sense at all. Rather, there are two points which, if made, may allow us to make sense of Berkeley's claim in (2) as well as the claim that (3) follows from (2). The first point is that Berkeley is arguing against only that version of materialism which I called the first version (materialism₁)—the one in which it is claimed that we directly perceive both primary and secondary qualities of objects and which does not try to establish, as I suggested, that secondary qualities are ideas of sensations. The second point to consider is that there is a long tradition of philosophers who operated within the framework of objects, essences, and occurrent or accidental properties.

According to this tradition one sees just the occurrent properties, never the essences or the objects which
have them, and the essences are causes of the occurrent properties. Those factors such as barometric pressure, moisture in the air, cloud formations and so on, that we might consider causes of the different colors in the sky are thought of by these philosophers as "conditions" not causes of the different properties.

If Berkeley's claim is looked at in this way, it does seem that some philosophers have held a view similar to the one offered in (2), one wherein both material objects and causes, like God, truth, and virtue are invisible. It is important to note, however, that for Locke it is not causes in the sense of essences that are the paradigms of what is mediately perceived; it is rather objects and their qualities. Essences are not perceived at all.

Berkeley's arguments can here, then, best be understood as an argument against a kind of direct realist—one who claims that there are essences which are causes, and that we perceive occurrent properties. This kind of direct realist has not yet seriously struggled with the problems of error and illusion or the two substance problem, both of which lead later philosophers to interpose ideas between minds and objects. This man's representationalism has a different root, and we should not fail to notice the difference in the resulting theory.

It can now be seen that the confusing thing about this argument Berkeley offers, the use of the terms 'mediate' and
'immediate' in describing the perceptual relationship between the perceiver and the object, is confusing because that terminology is presently linked to a kind of representationalism incompatible with the philosophical position Berkeley is characterizing here.

On this interpretation of the claim that Berkeley is arguing, sense can be made of the claim that (3) follows from (2) when (3) claims "the cause cannot be said to be a sensible thing" follows from the claim "God, truth, and virtue are not sensible things." After all, an essence is similar to God, truth, and virtue in ways that it is different from what we normally consider to be objects of perception. On the other hand, the point cannot be made emphatically enough that while on these relatively hidden assumptions, and with these paradigms of immediately and mediately perceived objects it may well be that sensible things are only those which are immediately perceived by sense, it does not follow that Locke would or could agree.

The second part of the argument which we began to state on pages 205-206 above may be completed in the following way:

4. Alleged summary: "...By 'sensible things' I mean those only which are perceived by sense, and that in truth the senses perceive nothing which they do not perceive immediately, for they make no inferences. The deducing therefore of causes or occasions from effects or appearances, which alone are perceived by sense, entirely relates to reason."
5. Conclusion: Sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense.
6. We perceive only qualities.
7. Therefore, if you take away all sensible qualities, there remains nothing sensible.

With respect to these concluding claims some points should be made. First, I want to note the implication in (4) that mediate perception involves inference. By way of introducing this discussion I want to grant that the senses make no inferences, and note as well that Locke does not challenge that claim. I wish to resist, however, on Locke's behalf as well as my own, the rather strong implication that the senses perceive—immediately or otherwise.

In spite of sometimes confusing terminology, Locke thinks that people, not their eyes, perceive. Normally formed retinal pictures may be necessary to, but they are not sufficient for, seeing or perceiving. Anything more, such as the deducing of causes, occasions, or anything else of course relates to reason.

It is furthermore questionable whether, as Berkeley means it, we should grant that effects or appearances are perceived by sense. What we have in (4) is, naturally enough, a continuation of the discussion in which God, truth, virtue, essences, causes, and physical objects (where that means nothing more than qualities) are the objects of mediate perception. I grant that if these are the objects of mediate perception, then perception involves inference, while
the operation of the senses alone does not.

The suggestion "the senses perceive" can perhaps be understood in this context, as the suggestion that there is a difference between perceiving a tree, table, chair, or pen and perceiving (if that term is appropriate at all in this context) these ephemeral entities. Maybe the claim that the senses perceive can be understood as the claim that trees are perceived by means of the senses whereas the latter entities are not. But neither are they perceived by means of reason or any other means.

The bastardization of the word 'perceive' completely distorts anything that Locke would have meant by it, if indeed, the argument is directed against Locke.

I suggested above (pp. 215-16) that tables, chairs and kings are all perceivable according to Locke, and that they are, for him, mediate perceivable. The only things immediately perceivable are the attributes of mental substance, call them ideas or whatever, and it is a distortion to say that my perception of the cup on the table before me is an inference. It is not the case that something else is seen, on the basis of which one infers that there is a cup. The cup is the only kind of thing that is seen. Locke would agree with Berkeley that knowledge of God, virtue, truth, substance, essence and so on must involve inference, but disagree that these are the things which are immediately
perceived. The inference in this case is from the observation that we do make to the conclusion that something else exists which we do not (cannot) observe. Thus, for Locke mediate perception need not involve inference while for Berkeley it must. This is because the kinds of items perceived in the two cases are different.

Returning now to our original concerns of this section, I think we can see the reason for Turbayne's confusion. The argument from the relativity of all sensible qualities looks like an argument to prove that secondary qualities are in the mind (cannot be in external objects), but in fact it does not do that. It assumes the truth of that claim by the somewhat devious route of assuming that heat is immediately perceived.

The root of this difficulty lies in the fact that Berkeley thinks that only the things immediately perceived are sensible while Locke thinks there are sensible things which are mediate ly perceived. This mistake combined with the representationalists' claim that heat is sensible, leads Berkeley quite naturally, but mistakenly, to suppose that heat is immediately perceived. He is not at all entitled to that conclusion.

Not only is this series of arguments a bad one if it is intended to prove that secondary qualities are ideas or sensations, but the assumption that heat is a sensation or what is the same thing, the assumption that heat is immedi-
ately perceived, and hence that secondary qualities are sensations, is incompatible with the representationalists', i.e. Locke's, position.

Neither does Berkeley demonstrate that secondary qualities are sensations or ideas in the Principles. Prior to the point at which that equation is just made there are no arguments even designed to show that secondary qualities are mind-dependent. Berkeley's arguments, however, depend upon establishing that secondary qualities are in the mind to the extent that he thinks that parallel arguments show primary qualities to be there also, and to the extent he argues that where one set of qualities is the other is also, to wit, in the mind.

There are several other arguments of what I would call the same type as the water case which appear in the pages immediately following that argument. I call them arguments of the same type because the appeal to some sort of relativism or other. For example, while the water case appeals to different sensations at the same time by one perceiver, others appeal to different perceivers in the same situation.

Immediately following his attack upon the mind independence of secondary qualities Berkeley does finally turn his attention to primary qualities:

Phil. Is it your opinion that the very figure and extension which you perceive by sense exist in the outward object or material substance?

Hyl. It is. (Dialogues, 28)
and then:

Phil. Again, have you not acknowledged that no real inherent property of an object can be changed without some change in the thing itself?

Hyl. I have.

Phil. But, as we approach to, or recede from an object, the visible extension varies, being at one distance ten or a hundred times greater than at another. Does it not therefore follow from hence likewise that it is not really inherent in the object?

Hyl. I own I am at a loss what to think.

Phil. Your judgment will soon be determined if you venture to think as freely concerning this quality as you have done concerning the rest. Was it not admitted as a good argument that neither heat nor cold was in the water because it seemed warm to one hand and cold to the other?

Hyl. It was.

Phil. Is it not the very same reasoning to conclude there is no extension of figure in an object because to one eye it shall seem little, smooth and round, when at the same time it appears to the other great, uneven, and angular?

Hyl. The very same...

The formula for generating such arguments can easily be seen from this and the preceding examples. But I have no more reason to think that argument successful in this case than in the case of secondary qualities. According to Locke's account there was no reason to admit that neither the heat nor the cold was in the water. It was only on the supposition that heat is a sensation, or what is the same thing, that it is immediately perceived, that that argument was successful. And that supposition is not consistent with our interpretation of Locke's doctrine of perception. We have every right to suppose that if pushed, as he was in the case
of secondary qualities, Philonous would respond in such a way as to make clear the dependence upon a premise such as:

PRIMAR Y QUALITIES ARE IMMEDIATELY PERCEIVED.

To this I have all of the same objections we outlined in the preceding pages.

I noted earlier that there was another kind of argument against materialism. We can now look very briefly at that second kind of argument. It is an argument to show that primary and secondary qualities cannot be separated from each other. I shall quote enough of the argument so that it is, for my purposes, self-explanatory. From the Dialogues we get the following:

Phil. But how does it follow that, because I can pronounce the word "motion" by itself, I can form the idea of it in my mind exclusive of body? Or because theorems may be made of extension and figures, without any mention of great or small or any other sensible mode or quality, that therefore it is possible such an abstract idea of extension, without any particular size or figure or sensible quality, should be distinctively formed and apprehended by the mind?

Hyl. But what do you say of pure intellect? May not abstracted ideas be framed by that faculty?

Phil. Since I cannot frame abstracted ideas at all, it is plain that I cannot frame them by the help of pure intellect....try if you can frame the idea of any figure abstracted from all particulars of size or even from other sensible qualities.

Hyl. Let me think a little--I do not find that I can.

Phil. And can you think it possible that should really exist in nature which implies a repugnancy in its conception?

Hyl. By no means.

Phil. Since therefore it is impossible even for the mind to disunite the ideas of extension and motion from all other sensible qualities, does it not follow
that where one exist there necessarily the other exist likewise?

Hyl. It should seem so. (Dialogues, 34-35)

In the Principles we get the following similar statement:

In short, extension, figure, and motion abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere else. (Principle 10)

Now it is clear, explicitly stated in the Principles and implied by the Dialogues that these arguments work to show primary qualities are sensations or ideas only if one is firmly committed to the claim that secondary qualities are sensations or ideas. Thus whatever the validity of these arguments, and the usefulness of them against materialism, they do not work against Locke and materialism, unless Berkeley proves that secondary qualities are in the mind. In at least the arguments I have considered here Berkeley is not successful at providing that proof.

I began this section by noting the difficulties of determining just what version of materialism Berkeley is attacking by the preceding arguments. We learned that it is unclear whether Berkeley means to assume, or to try to prove, that secondary qualities are ideas or sensations, and we learned that proof of that claim is essential to a refutation of Locke's version of Representative Perception. During the course of this section we discovered that Turbayne was correct in his initial belief that Berkeley assumes the truth of that claim, at least in the passages in ques-
tion, and that these apparent attempts at a proof were just that. The value of Berkeley's arguments would be most apparent when these arguments were understood as directed against some version of materialism other than materialism. Whether there are other Berkellian arguments which are more successful in the attack upon Locke's doctrine of perception than those which I considered I shall leave an open question. Certain other doctrines such as that of substance are vulnerable to Berkellian attacks.

Even the question of how the advocate of materialism arrives at his premises is something of a problem. If Berkeley's arguments to show that secondary qualities are mind-dependent are any example of the ones that the proponent of materialism gives, he seems to be in trouble. The reasoning alleged to show that secondary qualities are in the mind was found to be faulty (pp. 190ff), mainly because this type of argument seems to beg the question. But the difficulty is also Berkeley's. The arguments to put primary qualities in the mind which appeal to parallels with secondary qualities will not work. In brief, if we are to construe these Berkellian arguments as successful, we must construe them as hypothetical in form: if secondary qualities are in the mind, then primary qualities are too. The trouble is we have not found the proof of the truth of the antecedent statement.
It has also been shown that Berkeley appeals to a very different kind of argument to show that all qualities are in the mind. That argument attempts to obliterate the distinction between ideas and their external causes by restricting the discussion to things immediately perceived by the senses. This argument, however, supposedly rests upon the fact that all sensible things, or qualities of bodies, are immediately perceived—a fact that is not a fact at all. We found that the support for this blunder comes from assuming that such things as letters in a book are paradigms of immediately perceived, and hence mind-dependent, entities. Locke would never have agreed to this assumption and Berkeley never argues for it.

Thus for quite different reasons two lines of argument to show that primary qualities are mind-dependent fail. On the other hand, the support that seems to remain for the claim that there are mind-independent qualities and bodies would seem to be the support of perception. We have, as yet, no reason to think that the objects of perception are mind-dependent. Now let us look at materialism_2.

d. Materialism_2

Materialism_1, it was said, is the view that primary qualities of external objects are directly perceived, while the secondary qualities are ideas or sensations which exist
in the mind alone. Materialism, by contrast, claims that nothing is "properly and immediately" or directly perceived but ideas which do not exist in external objects. Examples of this view occur in such Berkelian claims as:

1. Our discourse must proceed altogether concerning sensible things, which you defined to be "the things we immediately perceive by our senses." Whatever other qualities, therefore, you speak of, as distinct from these, I know nothing of them, neither do they at all belong to the point in dispute. (Dialogues, 19)

2. You must distinguish, Philonous, between sound as it is perceived by us, and as it is in itself; or (which is the same thing) between the sound we immediately perceive and that which exists without us. (Dialogues, 21)

and

3. Properly and immediately nothing can be perceived but ideas. All material things, therefore, are in themselves insensible and to be perceived only by their ideas. (Dialogues, 48)

As I suggested earlier (P. 188) it looks as if what is being presented here, before Berkeley's attack, is a tolerable and common form of representationalism in which the idea is the representative of the external archetype. This view, however, quickly leads, as Turbayne also notes, to the claim that neither primary nor secondary qualities are perceivable. This is, strictly speaking, a mistake. (The mistake is that of assuming that on the view under discussion, the primary and secondary qualities are qualities of external

Turbayne, "Introduction" to Three Dialogues, xiii.
objects. As characterized, the view gives that up. We shall see the cause of that mistake a bit later.

In some ways this view is, and in some ways it is not, like Locke's theory of Representative Perception. We know, for example, that Locke agrees that nothing is properly and immediately perceived but ideas. We directly and immediately perceive ideas of both primary and secondary qualities. In the case of the former the qualities, which are "resembled" by the ideas, are in the external objects, and, in the case of the latter, there are in the objects at least the powers to cause the directly perceived but non-resembling ideas. Here, however, the agreement seems to end.

The agreement that ideas are immediately perceived is not sufficient to insure that materialism and Locke's position are the same. For Berkeley, and the advocate of materialism, but not for Locke, the claim "Properly and immediately nothing can be perceived but ideas" implies "All material things...are in themselves insensible and to be perceived only by their ideas." In other words, for Locke, mind independent physical objects are perceived by sense.

Thus, whether Locke accepts materialism is extremely questionable for he accepts it in part and rejects it in part. According to Locke the qualities of the objects themselves are perceived, though by way of ideas which are in the mind. The ideas represent, in some sense or other, the qualities of the object, and through these representing
Materialism is presented, discussed, and rejected on pages 45-49 of the *Dialogues*, and I think I should offer that discussion in some detail. For the sake of brevity I will try to condense the dialogue and present only the essentials of what is said in the order in which the points appear. First of all let me establish Hylas' view:

(1) Hyl. ...I think there are two kinds of objects: the one perceived immediately, which are likewise called "Ideas"; the other real things or external objects, perceived by the mediation of ideas which are their images or representations.

(2) Phil. Are those external objects perceived by sense or by some other faculty?

(3) Hyl. They are perceived by sense.

(4) Phil. How! Is there anything perceived by sense which is not perceived immediately?

(5) Hyl. Yes....in some sort there is. For example, when I look on a picture or statue of Julius Caesar, I may be said, after a manner, to perceive him (though not immediately) by my senses.

(6) Phil. It seems then that you will have our Ideas, which alone are immediately perceived, to be pictures of external things: and that these are perceived by sense in as much as they have a conformity or resemblance to our Ideas?

(7) Hyl. That is my meaning.

(8) Phil. And in the same way that Julius Caesar, in himself invisible, is nevertheless perceived by sight, real things in themselves imperceptible, are perceived by sense.

(9) Hyl. In the very same. (*Dialogues*, 45-49)

The analogy here is the following: the statue stands to Julius Caesar as Ideas stand to external objects. The argument then proceeds against this view. But the view offered here is a strange one indeed! One thing that is clear
before we begin to look at what the argument is is that in
(8) as I have taken it from the text, Hylas says that Julius
Caesar is invisible, and likewise that real things which are
IMPERCEPTIBLE are, nevertheless, PERCEIVED BY SENSE. And
invisible Caesar is likewise perceived by sight.

What we are to make of this it is difficult to tell. My objection is not that Caesar is visible or perceptible, for he is surely invisible having been dead these many years. Rather, the real trouble is in figuring out what we are to make of the claim that something perceived by sense is invisible.

I suggest that this apparent (or real) contradiction is the result of an incredibly bad example (at least for the purposes of characterizing Locke's views). Hylas must pick something that is immediately perceived, but that does not mean he should pick something that is invisible for the former. Why not, then, pick the pen in my hand which all representationalists in the Lockian tradition will claim is mediately perceived, and contrast that with my idea of the pen which all will admit to be a paradigm of something immediately perceived.

In the first place it is far from clear that this example of Hylas is consistent with any representationalist's claims which we are supposed to be examining, and furthermore it apparently concedes the claims of Berkeley himself that there is nothing perceived by sense which is not imme-
diately perceived. While for Locke the pen in my hand is perceived by sense, and mediately perceived, this Berke- lian example leaves nothing as a possible object of mediate perception except something invisible. This example, there­ fore, leads to the conclusion that the only things that could be perceived by sense would be things immediately perceivable.

I am not suggesting that there is anything wrong with the concession, that nothing is perceived by sense which is not immediately perceived, in and of itself, for we are ad­ mittedly examining materialism which I have already suggest­ ed is not Locke's view. The discovery that the view being attacked is not Locke's, however, is one in which we re­ ceive little or no help from Berkeley who would apparently have us think, as he perhaps thinks, that the attack, if successful, demolishes Locke's position.

A look at the claims made may enable us to separate those which are not compatible with Locke's position from those which are. For example, it seems that one could hold claims (1) and (3) and perhaps (6), and I think Locke does, without holding (5) and (8). Yet (5) and (8) are crucial to Berkeley's attack. Let us look at how he proceeds with that attack:

(a) Phil. ...when you behold the picture of Julius Caesar, do you see with your eyes any more than some colors and figures, with a certain symmetry and composition of the whole?
(b) Hyl. Nothing else.
(c) Phil. And would not a man who had never known anything of Julius Caesar see as much?
(d) Hyl. He would.
(e) Phil. Consequently has he sight and the use of it in as great degree as you?
(f) Hyl. I agree with you.
(g) Phil. Whence comes it that your thoughts are directed to the Roman emperor, and his are not? This cannot proceed from the sensations or ideas of sense by you then perceived, since you acknowledge that you have no advantage over him in that respect. It should seem therefore to proceed from reason and memory should it not?
(h) Hyl. It should.
(i) Phil. Consequently it will not follow from that instance that anything is perceived by sense which is not immediately perceived... (Dialogues, 45-46)

It might be thought at first that (a) through (i) is supposed to be a reductio of claim (1) on page 221 above. But it should be noted that (1) claims only that (1) has not been proved.

The question, however, should not be whether it follows from Hylas' incredibly poor example that there is something perceived by sense which is not immediately perceived, but whether the denial of that seems even reasonable on the basis of what has been said.

In the first place the example is a bad one from reasons other than that the mediately perceived object is invisible. It is also bad because both the representation and the represented have the properties of colors, figures, symmetry and composition of the whole. In this respect the
representation in question is quite unlike what the representationalists think it is like, or would agree to. It is only on the assumption that these qualities are "in the mind" that this would begin to be agreed upon. And at that point we would need to arrive at some agreement about the nature and qualities of the represented objects. Presumably the same qualities which are alleged by the representationalist to be "in the mind" are not also alleged to be "in the objects."

Even if we accept the example in question we need not accept the additional assumption that (as in g) neither reason nor memory are legitimate components or requirements of sense perception. There is another, and better, response, however, to this challenge to representationalism. That is to maintain that there is nothing strange about the view at all if we leave out, or change, the example that is used only slightly, and thereby try to make sense of it.

For example, suppose that the picture had been a self-portrait of Gainsborough, who was himself quite as visible as his self-portrait. Would that have made a difference? Well, the observer would have been looking at the colors, figures and so forth which according to our supposition is a self-portrait, and he would not have been looking at Gainsborough. It is difficult to tell how in doing this either Hylas or our observer would have been perceiving Gainsborough by sight. What this seems to show, as does
Hylas' example, is that if we are looking at an object in a certain spatial location, then in order to perceive another object by sense at the same time the second object must be in close spatial and temporal proximity to the first.

It might be thought that the picture example could be used to make a stronger point. But, as I see it, the picture either fails as an analogue to ideas (because, as in this case, the represented object is imperceptible), or it shows at most that the visual field is limited.

If one has Locke's doctrine in mind, it seems much more plausible (and yet compatible with 1, 3, and 6, as well as Locke's claims) to say that the self-portrait, a real object existing without the mind, is perceived by sight though indirectly. The same would be true of Gainsborough.

The point to the preceding exercise is that if we try to make the example of mediately and immediately perceived objects slightly plausible while following the model of Berkeley's example, it becomes clear that the kinds of things selected in this argument are not examples representative of that distinction. As made by Locke, the choice of an invisible object as a paradigm of the mediately perceived one was indeed most advantageous for Berkeley. Whether there are convincing examples which do not themselves assume the conclusion is another question. This limited search indicates that finding them may be difficult.
Suupose for the sake of following out the argument that the example is satisfactory, or that a satisfactory substitute has been found. We may then look at the argument (a) through (i) against the claims of (1) through (9). The following seems to be a comparatively bare structure of the discussion. I have included the sources of these summary claims:

(v) Everyone sees with his eyes only COLORS and FIGURES in a certain RELATION (call these things C). (from a and b of the argument above, pp. 223-224)

(w) These are immediately perceived. (from 6 above, p. 221, found on page 44 of the Dialogues, and earlier argument).

(x) These can be perceived by any man with good eyes. (from a, c, e, and f above, pp. 223-224).

(y) Hylas sees (claims to see?) X (Julius Caesar or Gainsborough) upon looking at C, but Jones sees only C. (from 5 above, p. 221, and g above, p. 224).

(z) Therefore, there is no reason to think that Hylas or anyone else perceives anything by sense except C.

Putting aside any questions of the truth of the "premises," if this is the structure of the argument the "conclusion" (z) does not seem to follow from the premises. At least one more premise or principle is needed, and that would seem to be:

If X is a candidate for an object perceived by sense (eyes), and Jones has good eyes (can see C) and yet doesn't see X (no matter who else does), then X is not perceived by sense.

I suggest, however, that this premise is included, though perhaps somewhat concealed in the first three premises, that is, in v, w, and x. In this light they look even more
suspect than they did at first glance. For example, suppose that certain factors (F), which include good eyes, are sufficient conditions for immediately perceiving C, and, of course, in addition suppose that perceiving ideas or sensations by means of the senses makes sense at all.

Now, then, why should we suppose that they (F) also constitute sufficient conditions for mediate perception of other things by means of the senses? That is, why should the sufficient conditions for immediate perception be sufficient for mediate perception? Or more particularly, why should we link "by means of the senses" to good eyes in such a way that if a man with good eyes cannot see something, then that something is not perceivable by means of the senses?

Now it might be objected to my formulation of the alternatives that it prejudices the case by ignoring the fact that Berkeley's example is intended to compare something which is perceivable (a portrait) with something which is not (long-dead Caesar), and hence that in the latter case good eyes are not involved in whatever "perception" takes place. Of course he continues to use the term 'perception' to describe this act of "thinking of" invisible Caesar. But this objection is mistaken for we agreed to work with a substitute example. The example was to be any one in which the object of immediate perception was an idea or sensation and
the object of mediate perception was, unlike Caesar, still visible. This is the only kind of example to which the representationalists (in spite of Hylas' blunder) would agree. It is in the context of this kind of example that I have posed my question of whether it is true of all things that are "unseen by one with good eyes" that they are "un-perceivable by means of the senses."

The answer is, of course, no, as Hylas immediately recognizes. But by that time he cannot extricate himself, for it is the example he selects which prejudices the case against the representationalist. But even given a proper example we cannot make the connection because good eyes are not sufficient for perceiving the perceivable, and that is the only criterion Berkeley uses in this example to determine what is perceivable. There is more to seeing than meets the eyeball.

Even if the argument is accepted as a good one on Berkeley's part the most that it shows, as Philonous is quick to point out, is that there is no reason to think there is anything perceived by sense which is not perceived immediately. Unfortunately the argument is not good and nothing seems to have been proved. Berkeley proceeds, however, as if what had been proved conclusively was that there is nothing perceived by sense which is not perceived immediately.
Some support for this, perhaps unorthodox, interpretation of these pages of the dialogue, at least as including the assumptions and arriving at the conclusions which, I have claimed, are incompatible with Locke's, is provided by three summary claims right at the end of the argument I have just considered. The first of the three claims is about mediate perception:

...we may, in one acceptation, be said to perceive sensible things meditately by sense—that is, when, from a frequently perceived connection, the immediate perception of ideas by one sense suggest to the mind others, perhaps belonging to another sense, which are wont to be connected with them. (Dialogues, 46)

This claim clearly shows that what Berkeley calls "mediate perception" is really inference, and need have nothing to do with anything visible.

Secondly, there is a claim about what is really experienced:

...when I hear a coach drive along the streets, immediately I perceive only the sound; but from the experience I have had that such a sound is connected with a coach, I am said to hear the coach. It is nevertheless evident that, in truth and strictness, nothing can be heard but sound; and the coach is not then properly perceived by sense, but suggested from experience. (Dialogues, 46)

And third, we are offered a criterion by which to select what has been perceived by sense:

In short, those things alone are actually and strictly perceived by any sense which would have been perceived in case that same sense had then been first conferred upon us. (Dialogues, 46)
Thus we would perhaps see a certain shape and certain colors, but not a coach, for "seeing a coach" involves tying things together in a way that involves inference, the basis of which lies in the repetition of such experiences. The representationalist objects that seeing the color and the shape involves seeing something external, and further that the business about the sense having been just conferred assumes that no learning is necessary to perception. He could argue that we do not perceive the same thing in a pristine state that we do after a variety of learning experiences, and that it is a mistake to think that we perceive colors and shapes, but not coaches in that pristine state.

All of the claims are, to say the least, questionable. They are questionable because the notions of what we perceive and how we perceive it are, on this account, questionable. And it is questionable because the three quotations above add up to a very puzzling account of the role of perception in knowledge.

In the first passage it turns out that what Berkeley is willing to call "mediate perception" is really the association of ideas. We are meditatively perceiving when, upon seeing whiteness we think of Socrates' robe, Socrates' voice, or Socrates himself. We apparently do not see Socrates' robe, or any robe, immediately, but rather colors and shapes—or to be true to Berkeley's claim about another
This comes out more clearly in the second passage where Berkeley says that we hear nothing but sound. We, strictly and truly, do not hear the coach or the bell, but sounds. The coach or the bee, for that matter Socrates' robe, are not properly perceived by sense but suggested from experience. To ascertain that this is the claim that Berkeley is making we need only examine the last of the three claims—that those things are actually and strictly perceived which would be perceived in the absence of any experience and without the benefit of any other senses. If we cannot see Socrates or his robe, then, while Berkeley does not seem to realize it, I think he is quite probably committed to the claim that all we see are sights—not robes, or colors, or figures, or any other determinates. There is not evidence to suggest that seeing a color is not an inferential process in much the same way that seeing Socrates is.

I said a moment ago that Berkeley's claims added up to a puzzling account of the role of perception in knowledge. Given these claims we have, possibly, two ways of understanding what he is saying. First, it may be that we do not directly perceive that the rumbling in the street, or the color that strikes our eye, is the rumbling or color of Smedley's coach. That it is the rumbling of Smedley's coach may be something we have to infer. A closer look at Berkeley's statement, however, will reveal that it is not
Smedley's coach which we fail to perceive immediately, but any coach at all. A coach is not perceived by sense—not heard, seen, touched, tasted, or smelled—no matter what we do.

What experience then, one may ask, could possibly ground our claim that we hear a coach? Perhaps it is the experience that such a sound is constantly conjoined with certain other sounds, sights, and so on. The coach may be thought of as an emergent property of this conglomerate of experiences of sights, sounds, etc. That is, no coach is ever properly perceived by sense.

But if no coach is ever properly perceived by sense, we may well ask what the experience to which we appeal (in saying, "I hear the coach") can be made of. I suggested certain sights, sounds, and so on. But presumably these sights and sounds are recognized as going together because they are sights and sounds of the coach. That is how we identify and describe them, how we set them apart from other sights and sounds. On Berkeley's account we perceive no connections of sights with sounds, sounds with other sounds, and certainly no coaches. Hence the claim that one hears the coach is a prediction for which there can never be any evidence.

We can, of course, say that certain other sights and sounds have followed sounds like that before. But what does
"sounds like that" mean? It cannot mean "sounds like those of a coach" for that is something discovered in perception. While we experience the sounds (perhaps) we never experience the coach and hence can never associate the two. We have no assurance (nor even any legitimate idea) that the sound before was like this one. They cannot be like in that they are sounds of the coach— that begs the question. Nor can they be sounds of a coach or a bell.

There is, at least in this undeveloped account of phenomenalism, no mechanism allowed us in immediate perception for the characterization, or categorization, of different sounds or sights.

e. Nothing is Like an Idea

Sections c. and d. indicated that some arguments commonly thought to show that Locke's representationalism led to phenomenalism do not show that at all. Rather those arguments are directed at versions of materialism other than the one Locke offers. Those versions of materialism hold that secondary qualities are either ideas or sensations, or are immediately perceived which, it turns out, means the same thing. Thus, neither version of materialism is Locke's, which asserts that secondary qualities are qualities of objects, mediately perceived, and not in the mind.
There is, however, another argument I want to consider. It is one which appears not to assume any particular version of materialism, but appears to attack a certain relationship between external objects and their representation.

I shall now turn to the final argument of the first dialogue. It is the one in which Berkeley says that ideas are unlike anything but ideas, and hence cannot be representative of independent archetypes. This is a different type of argument than any we have considered so far. It does not depend upon any particular notion of mediate or immediate perception, but instead attacks the claim that ideas represent external archetypes. In that sense it attacks both materialism₁ and materialism₂, which is why I have allotted a separate section for the discussion of this argument. It comes in two parts, or it may even be said that there are two arguments. The first one goes as follows:

Phil. ... if I understand you rightly, you say our ideas do not exist without the mind, but that they are copies, images, or representations of certain originals that do?

Hyl. You take me right.

Phil. They are then like external things?

Hyl. They are.

Phil. Have those things a stable and permanent nature, independent of our senses, or are they in perpetual change, upon our producing any motions in our bodies, suspending, exerting, or altering our faculties or organs of sense?

Hyl. Real things, it is plain, have a fixed and real nature, which remains the same notwithstanding any change in our senses... which indeed may affect the ideas in our minds, but it were absurd to think that
they had the same effect on things existing without the mind.

Phil. How then is it possible that things perpetually fleeting and variable as our ideas should be copies or images of anything fixed and constant? Or...since all sensible qualities...as continually changing upon every alternation in the distance, medium, or instruments of sensation—how can any determinate material objects be properly represented or parted forth by several distinct things each of which is so different from and unlike the rest? Or, if you say it resembles some one only of our ideas, how shall we be able to distinguish the true copy from all the false ones?

Hyl. I profess, Philonous, I am at all loss. I know not what to say to this. (Dialogues, 48)

The structure of this argument seems to be something like the following:

(1) There are external things (real things) with a stable and permanent nature.
(2) There are ideas all of which are perpetually fleeting and variable.
(3) Ideas cannot be copies or images of anything fixed or constant, or if we say that only one of the ideas is the copy or image it is not possible to tell the true copy from all the false ones. (Dialogues, 48)

Why the disjunctive conclusion? Because the claim that ideas cannot be copies of anything fixed or constant surely does not follow from premises (1) and (2). The more that is needed to get that conclusion is apparently:

(2a) Any thing which is a copy of something else must be a copy (be representative) in respect of the length of its existence.

Many real things exist for only short periods of time, and probably all last for only some finite period of time.

Ideas or images, on the other hand, exist for some period of
time, no matter how short. Hence, it must be that the point is one of the relative lengths of the existence of the two kinds of things.

Analogously, it might be argued that if a tracing is a copy of a roadmap it must co-exist at all times with the roadmap. If it does not co-exist at every moment it isn't a copy. I am not arguing that the relationship between ideas and archetypes is like that between roadmap and tracing in any respect except that of their possible lengths of endurance. But consideration of the roadmap is sufficient to show that 2a. is false and that no one should accept it as a premise. I am therefore led to conclude that the force of the argument, if any, lies with the second disjunct of the conclusion:

If one of the ideas is the copy or image it is not possible to tell the true copy from the false ones.

I think Berkeley's point here is obscured by his way of stating the conclusion. As it stands we might ask why he thinks there is more than one copy of most real or external things. Surely my idea of a cup is not a false idea of my pen. It may well be the case that each of our ideas of external things is a true copy, and that it is merely the case that there are some ideas which are not copies at all. Thus, while ideas may have contrary qualities, all that shows is that at most one of them is an idea of an external object. The other (perhaps both) fails to be an idea of an external object just as the idea of a unicorn fails to be
an idea of an external object. It could be, thus, that some ideas are copies and that there are no false copies.

This, however, raises the question which I think Berkeley was trying to get at by his way of stating the conclusion: How does one distinguish between those ideas which are copies and those which are not?

To this Hylas has no answer, but that is not to say there is none. The representationalist solution may range from "clarity and distinctness" to "liveliness" and include the notion of coherence. A full discussion of these criteria would involve me in a full discussion of the problem of error and the attempt to find a solution to the worries of scepticism--a task I do not intend to undertake. But it might be important to note that that notion of "copy" or "image" which Berkeley thinks is the relationship of some ideas to external objects, may not be one shared by Locke. I tried to argue that 'represent' and 'resemble' should be understood in a way such that 'copy' or 'image' are not at all synonymous with them. It suffices for the purposes of our discussion, however, to point out that Berkeley has, so far, offered no argument which defeats the representationalists' claims that I have discussed, including those using the notions of 'copy' or 'image'.

To this point, then, the argument has suggested that even if ideas are copies of external things, we cannot tell which ideas are the copies. But no criterion offered by
The second argument, or part of an argument, against the claim that ideas are representative of external things goes like this:

Phil. ...Which are material objects in themselves—perceptible or imperceptible.
Hyl. Properly and immediately nothing can be perceived but ideas. All material things, therefore, are in themselves insensible and to be perceived only by their ideas.
Phil. Ideas then are sensible, and their archetypes or originals insensible?
Hyl. Right.
Phil. But how can that which is sensible be like that which is insensible? Can a real thing, in itself invisible, be like a color, or a real thing which is not audible be like a sound? In a word can anything be like a sensation or idea, but another sensation or idea?
Hyl. I must own, I think not.

In its summary form this argument looks like this:

(1) Ideas are sensible.
(2) Their archetypes or originals are insensible.
(3) Nothing invisible can be like a color, nothing inaudible can be like a sound.
(4) .*. Nothing sensible can be like anything insensible.
(5) .*. Nothing can be like a sensation or idea but another sensation or idea.

We can recognize the conclusion of this part of the argument, unlike that of the first part above, as ruling out the possibility that ideas represent external real objects. Thus it is a much stronger conclusion than the first, and if...
true might mean that the representationalist accounts of perception are false. This, of course, is a much stronger sense of 'represent' than any I argued for in my interpretation. Even if Locke were to hold that ideas "represent" in this very strong sense, however, I still do not think this argument would be effective against him. Let us, therefore, examine this part of the argument with some care.

It would seem that the first and second premises of the argument are open to question. Above (p. 223) I asked how it was in Berkeley's account that sensible things came to be only the things we immediately perceive by our senses. At that time I suggested that that identification rested upon taking as paradigms of the objects which are mediately and immediately perceived certain sorts of things that the representationalist would not count as paradigm examples of that distinction at all.

I did, however, make sense of taking these as paradigms by distinguishing between materialism_1 and materialism_2 and then showing that while some of Berkeley's arguments might apply to materialism_1 they did not apply to materialism_2. When I did turn to that set of arguments which attacked materialism_2 I found that Berkeley, by the choice of his example (the Caesar example), and not through argument at all, arrived at the claim that there is nothing perceived by sense which is not immediately perceived.
Thus it turns out that the second premise:
ARCHETYPES OR ORIGINALS ARE INSENSIBLE.
is extremely questionable. We can neither accept it as granted by the representationalist, nor as proved by Berkeley. What Berkeley must do, even at this point, is to establish that the representationalists' claim that external real objects or their primary qualities are mediately perceived is false. That has not been done to our satisfaction, and without the above premise the argument in (1) through (5) (p. above) is no good.

Premises (3) and (4) go together, and should perhaps be considered as one. They are, again:

(3) Nothing invisible can be like a color; nothing inaudible can be like a sound.
(4) Nothing sensible can be like anything insensible.

Visible things and audible things are special kinds of sensible things. Everything visible (audible) is sensible, but not everything sensible is audible or visible. Thus from (3) and (4) and the assumption that colors and sounds are sensible, and that claim that only ideas are sensible, it follows that colors and sounds are ideas. This, it will be remembered was a claim shared by materialism\(^1\) and materialism\(^2\) but denied by Locke.

Thus if the argument does not fail because it assumes that archetypes are insensible it fails as a criticism of Locke's view because it assumes what he denies—namely that qualities are in the mind.
This last objection might be criticized on the grounds that Berkeley's examples are examples of secondary qualities (colors, sounds, etc) while Locke's claim was that primary qualities, not, strictly speaking, secondary qualities, exist in the external objects. It is these primary qualities which are perceived by way of idea. This objection has only initial force. Either

(a) the argument shows only that secondary qualities must fail to represent

or

(b) primary qualities are where the secondary qualities are, viz. in the mind, and none of them can be like (represent) things outside the mind.

Alternative (a) is obviously not strong enough to be Berkeley's claim—it might even be said that Locke agrees with (a). Remember that the notion of "represent" in the case of secondary qualities is loose indeed, or on my interpretation means something quite different. On the other hand, alternative (b), that all qualities are dependent upon mind, was discussed above and shown to rest upon assumptions from which it follows that there are no sensible things which are not immediately perceived—assumptions which Locke does not make, and assumptions which Berkeley has not proved in any of the arguments I have considered.

This concludes my examination of Berkeley's understanding of and attack upon Locke's account of perception. The examination is inconclusive in the sense that not all
of Berkeley's arguments were examined. There may be others which do indeed show Locke's account of perception to lead to phenomenalism, or to be otherwise untenable. I, however, do not know what they are. There are, I believe, some arguments which attack the notion of material substance quite effectively. But these can be successful without showing Locke's account of perception wrong, and these I have intentionally avoided.

I now believe that I have provided an interpretation of Locke's account of perception which is compatible with many related doctrines of the Essay, which is compatible with the assumptions of common sense and science, and which does not obviously succumb to the attacks by Berkeley. Even if only one of these ends has been approached I should think my labors rewarded.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

It is a commonplace for philosophers to claim that Locke's theory of perception has been shown by Berkeley to be untenable. We have seen ample evidence of such a claim in, for example, the passages I quoted from Reid. The belief seems to be that by accepting Locke's premises and using Berkeley's arguments one can arrive at, not some version of Realism or an affirmation of the existence of a world of mind-independent objects, but Idealism or Phenomenalism and the realization that we have no grounds for that affirmation. Locke himself clearly recognizes a problem which calls for comment:

But whether there can be more than barely that idea in our minds: whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of anything without us, which corresponds to that idea, is that whereof some men think there may be a question made; because men may have such ideas in their minds, when no such thing exists, no such object affects their senses. (IV.ii.14)

He attempts to put our doubts to rest. What are the reasons for error in the case where we say, for example, 'I smell a rose'? We may be imagining rather than perceiving; the poet may be correct when he tells us,

But to simply close my eyes
Is to smell those pewter skies.
We may also be remembering an experience of this morning, yesterday, or last year. Or perhaps we are dreaming. We talked earlier about perception as involving, among other things, certain electro-chemical states of the brain, or to use Locke's terms, certain ideas and images which "represent" to us the items and features of a mind-independent world. Could it not be the case that the neurophysiologist, who in implanting the electrode in our brain has made us "see" blue and have the sensation of lifting our hands, has been responsible for all the electrochemical states, or ideas, or images that we have had?

Locke treats the first two possibilities as one. He suggests that we can tell the difference between ideas which are the result of imagination (or revived by memory) and those coming into our minds via our senses as plainly as we can between any two distinct ideas. (IV.ii.14)

The possibility that life is but a labyrinth of dreams is treated somewhat differently. Whereas in the former cases his response depends upon our having some perceptions of real objects from among which we need only pick the veridical ones, i.e. he does not consider idealism, in the case of dreaming he treats the question of whether all these ideas may be produced in us without any external objects. But Locke's response here is a purely pragmatic one:

Where all is but a dream, reasoning and arguments are of no use, truth and knowledge nothing....If he be resolved to appear so sceptical as to maintain,
that what I call being actually in the fire is nothing but a dream; and that we cannot thereby certainly know, that any such thing as fire actually exists without us: I answer, that we certainly finding that pleasure or pain follows upon the application of certain objects to us, whose existence we perceive, or dream that we perceive, by our senses; this certainty is as great as our happiness or misery beyond which we have no concernment to know or to be. (II.ii.14)

The same general line of argument is continued in chapter ix of Book IV. Locke agrees that having an idea of a thing "no more proves the existence of that thing, than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world, or the visions of a dream thereby make a true history." It is rather the "actual receiving" of an idea as a result of things in the external world that makes us know that something outside us causes that idea in us. Nowhere does the true nature of Locke's defense against the sceptic show more clearly than when he says:

...I can no more doubt, whilst I write this, that I see white and black, and that something really exists that causes that sensation in me, than that I write or move my hand; which is certainty as great as any human nature is capable of...(IV.xi.3)

But all of this is surely unsatisfactory to the sceptic. It either begs the question by assuming that we sometimes "actually receive" ideas from without, or it refuses the sceptic an opportunity by declining to take the possibility of doubt seriously. There may be nothing wrong with this tactic; maybe the sceptic's questions are not demanding of an answer. But surely this must be argued, and Locke has not provided that argument.
Locke, I think, feels the unsatisfactoriness of his response and continues the attempt to save the day by resorting to an apparent tautology, presumably preferring the trivial but true to the interesting but possibly false:

...Nobody can...be so sceptical as to be uncertain of the existence of those things which he sees and feels. (II.xi.3)

But seeing and feeling are actions performed upon things in the external world. The question facing Locke is whether there is any seeing or feeling in this sense, or whether there are only ideas and images. Locke's appeal at this point seems to miss the point of the question, for he seems in the next few paragraphs to turn again to a pragmatic appeal, many parts of which we have already heard. I shall list them in order of their appearance:

1. No sceptic can have any controversy with Locke since he can't be sure Locke has said anything contrary to his opinion. (IV.xi.3)

2. By the application of things without I can cause pleasure or pain in myself. I can contrast this with, and find it different from, the mere idea of pleasure or pain. (IV.xi.3,6)

3. Perceptions must be externally caused because those without senses lack ideas correspondingly. Furthermore the senses themselves do not produce ideas witnessed in the fact that ideas of men in the dark do not produce colors. (II.xi.4)

4. Sometimes I cannot avoid having certain ideas. If they were productions of mine I would have control over them. (II.xi.5)

5. Our senses bear testimony to each other's reports. (II.xi.7)

Locke concludes the section in which he has attempted to provide arguments against scepticism with the practical
confutation:

...if anyone will be so sceptical as to distrust his senses, and to affirm that all we see, hear, feel, taste, think and do...is but the series of deluding appearances of a long dream whereof there is no reality...he may dream that I make him this answer, That the certainty of things existing in rerum natura when we have the testimony of the senses for it is not only as great as our frames can attain to, but as our condition needs...our faculties being suited...not to...the clear, comprehensive knowledge of things free from all doubt and scruple; but to the preservation of us in whom they are...they serve our purpose well enough...this evidence is as great as we can desire, being as certain to us as our pleasure or pain...beyond which we have no concernment either of knowing or being. (IV.xi.8)

We can see that this response will satisfy only men of a certain bent—those who have little concern beyond pleasure or pain and well-being. Neither do the arguments offered in capsule form in 1.-5. (p. 247 above) save Locke from the sceptic; for they seem to assume, rather than prove, that ideas are the appearances of real things.

Perhaps because Locke himself so clearly recognizes these problems, and fails to deal with them successfully, it is often assumed that one who writes on Locke's theory of perception or Representative Realism has set out to show that Locke's position is "really" immune to the sceptic's attacks. I, however, have not even dealt with the problems of scepticism, except peripherally and in a most limited way. What is the limited way?

Much earlier in the thesis (p. 58 ff) I described a progression beginning with the ancient hypothesis that:
...the mind like a mirror, receives the images of things from without, by means of the senses; so that their use must be to convey the images into the mind.

and mentioned the presumed consequences of that hypothesis

...no material thing, nor any quality of material things, can be conceived by us, or made an object of thought, until its image is conveyed to the mind by means of the senses.

and

...to every quality and attribute of a body we know, there should be a sensation corresponding, which is the image and resemblance of that quality; and that the sensations which have no similitude or resemblance to a body, or to any of its qualities, should give us no conception of a material world, or of anything belonging to it. (Reid, *Philosophical Works*, I, 140)

I then said that combined with the belief that our ideas of secondary qualities are no resemblances of anything, this hypothesis including its consequences proves that ideas of secondary qualities are not ideas of qualities of bodies at all. There is no reason to think there are any secondary qualities of bodies. These ideas give us no knowledge or "conception of a material world or anything belonging to it."

We then saw that Reid thinks that Locke is bound by this ancient hypothesis, its consequences, and the assumption that ideas of secondary qualities are not images of things from without. It was only when armed with these assumptions that Reid was able to assert the existence of a progression in the philosophies of Locke, Berkeley and Hume which began as the "root of common sense" and ended by at-
tempting to "make a complete conquest of it [Common Sense] by the subtilties of philosophy—an attempt no less audacious and vain than that of the giants to dethrone almighty Jove."  

It was the existence of this progression that I challenged, for I tried to show that the philosophy of Berkeley does not "follow from that of Mr. Locke by very obvious consequence."  

It does not, for though Berkeley may accept the ancient hypothesis and its consequences, which acceptance may lead him to think that for Locke, who admits that ideas of secondary qualities do not "resemble" or image their counterparts in the external world, secondary qualities are confined to the mind, Locke does not accept that ancient hypothesis and its consequences.

Locke's refusal to accept the ancient hypothesis, that is, his supposition that the mind is not like a mirror, implicit in his claims that knowledge of the external world can be had not only through those ideas which resemble, but also those that merely represent features and items of the external world, denies that progression alleged to exist by Reid. And if Berkeley's philosophy does not follow from Locke's, and needs instead another premise, then Berkeley's

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2 This conclusion with respect to Berkeley's philosophy is limited to the philosophy of *Three Dialogues* and the *Principles*. 
philosophy cannot constitute a *reductio ad absurdum* of Locke's philosophical principles.

So far, then, I am saying that the commentator who thinks that Berkeley's idealism is the logical result of Locke's premises must show that one of those premises is or implies that secondary qualities are in the mind. This is the claim that I have challenged. Such a commentator's task would be all the easier if viable alternatives were not discovered in the Lockian text. It was in pursuit of those alternatives that I spent the bulk of the pages in this thesis. It was necessary to test my belief that Locke thinks secondary qualities are in the objects against what Locke explicitly says on that subject, as well as against the other doctrines of Locke's Essay and rival interpretations. Those tests involved me in a consideration of 'ideas', 'perception', the relationship of ideas to external objects, the relationship of ideas to primary and secondary qualities, and a consideration of what is involved in Locke's doctrine of Representative Perception. In these tasks I found it helpful to examine the views of other commentators, especially those of Reginald Jackson. In the course of that examination I think I provided some helpful suggestions about the notions of mediate and immediate perception, resemblance and representation, and primary and secondary qualities in Locke's philosophy.
Hopefully those suggestions are helpful in two ways: first, in clarifying some of Locke's often ambiguous and apparently inconsistent claims; and secondly, in showing that not every doctrine necessary to Berkeley's attack in *Three Dialogues* is actually a Lockian doctrine. This second task involves us in an examination of some of the things Berkeley said in *Three Dialogues* and *The Principles*.

Briefly, my conclusions were that according to Locke both primary and secondary qualities are qualities of objects of the physical world; that ideas of primary qualities resemble those qualities while ideas of secondary qualities only represent those qualities; and it was decided that, although it may be ultimately indefensible, Locke can give some fairly clear understanding of the notions of resemblance and representation in terms of the notions of production and communication. It was further found that it is consistent with Locke's doctrine of Representative Perception to say that we "perceive" qualities.

I went on to show that Berkeley's attack upon Locke presupposes that Locke does not think that secondary qualities are in the objects and further does not provide accurate examples of items which are mediately and immediately perceived. This failure to argue the claim that secondary qualities are in the mind, and to represent accurately the distinction between items that are mediately and immediately
perceived makes it impossible for Berkeley to show that primary qualities are in the mind by the arguments I considered from the Three Dialogues. It is thus impossible for him to show by these arguments that Locke's principles lead to Idealism. As I said before I do not presume that this secures Locke against all sceptical attacks, but I hope it goes some way in securing him against some of Berkeley's attacks.
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