HARBER, Charles Combs, 1936-
REFORMS IN TUNISIA 1855-1878.
The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1970
History, modern

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

© Copyright by
Charles Combs Harber
1971
REFORMS IN TUNISIA 1855-1878

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Charles Combs Harber, B.A., A.M.

* * * * * * *

The Ohio State University
1970

Approved by

Sydney A. Fisher
Adviser
Department of History
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank the following Professors for their help in defining this topic: Dwight L. Ling, DePauw University; Allan B. Cunningham, Simon Fraser University; L. Carl Brown, Princeton University; Albert H. Hourani, Oxford University; and André Raymond, French Institute of Arab Studies in Damascus. Thanks should certainly go to Mrs. Jean Schoen and the library services of William McIntyre Library, Wisconsin State University, Eau Claire, Wisconsin. My deepest gratitude goes to Professor Sydney N. Fisher. He consistently encouraged me in my studies and throughout the researching and writing of this work. His help and guidance have been invaluable in this effort.
VITA

February 5, 1936 . . . Born - Lexington, Kentucky

1963 . . . . . . . . B.A., University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky

1963-1964 . . . . Graduate School, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky

1964-1966 . . . . Frontier Interns, United Presbyterian Church, USA in Tunis, Tunisia.

1966-1967 . . . . University of Munich, Munich, Germany

1967 . . . . . . . . M.A., University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky

1967-1968 . . . . Graduate School, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1968-1970 . . . . Instructor in History, Wisconsin State University, Eau Claire, Wisconsin

FIELD OF STUDY

History of the Modern Middle East. Professor Sydney N. Fisher

History of Nineteenth Century Europe. Professor Carol Rogel
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</th>
<th>ii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. POLICIES AND PROGRAMS IN AND ABOUT TUNISIA</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II. INITIAL PERIOD OF REFORMS 1855-1864</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. DECLINE OF REFORMS 1864-1873</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. KHAYR AL-DIN AND LIBERAL GOVERNMENT 1873-1877</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| CONCLUSIONS                              | 111   |
| SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY                      | 117   |
INTRODUCTION

Reform in countries of the Middle East has long been the subject of scholars. Those reforms undertaken in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt have received the greatest amount of attention. This study concerns the North African state of Tunisia and the reforms attempted and effected during the period 1855 and 1878. Heretofore, interest in Tunisia has largely focused on the period of the French protectorate (1881-1956) or the contemporary era of national independence.

The reforms in Tunisia during the period under consideration offer the opportunity to realize the great difference of outlook which existed between the two worlds of the West and Islam. Reform itself was an attempt by the Muslims to become more like the West in certain ways. Basically the reason for reform was realization of Western superiority in arms; therefore, the initial reforms always stressed the military. As the years passed, other features of life in the West were incorporated in Islamic reform movements so as to include even the demands for reform of the religion itself. By virtue of hindsight, a contemporary observer may now judge the era of reforms to have been successful in their general goals. However, in specific
situations, such as Tunisia, that generality would not necessarily hold true. The reforms considered herein might be considered as substantiating the adage, an exception to the rule.

The reforms of the independent Tunisian government after the mid-nineteenth century were largely devoted to the political realm. In 1857, there was a guarantee of rights to all citizens, the Ahd al-Aman. This was followed by the first constitution issued by any Muslim state, promulgated by the Bey in 1861. These advances were allowed to stagnate and were even suspended because of internal disorders in 1864. The consequences of that upheaval were bankruptcy and economic reform, imposed by European powers in 1869. Nevertheless, there persisted an internal element desirous of reform which came to power in 1873. This group was led by Khayr al-Din and for almost four years he held office and tried to modernize the government and society of Tunisia. Because of many factors, this strong leader, who advocated good government, was dismissed and within two years, there was a return to the familiar pattern of venal and capricious government.

The Regency of Tunisia was, in mid-nineteenth century, a state titularly ruled by the sovereign but actually the business of government was concentrated into the hands of the Vizir. From 1837 until 1873, Mustapha Khaznadar held those reigns of power. A mamluk
of Greek origins, he married the daughter of Ahmad Bey who raised him to the viziral post. Mustapha exercised power, as did other vizirs, through the traditional *mamluk* hierarchy.¹ These slaves were brought to Tunis to be sold or put into the service of the royal family or other leading families of the state. They were exposed to the intricacies of the court and government or were trained for the military. Upon the death of the owner, usually the *mamluk* became free but almost always continued to pursue the career he had entered upon.² Traditional reliance upon this group for leadership meant they occupied almost every high position in the army and government with the exception of those in the *Shariah*.³ They normally rose up through the ranks by degrees in accordance with their talents and experience; whereas, sometimes a favorite of the Bey would experience a meteoric rise. There were weaknesses in the system, specifically three: (1) they were always subject to the Bey's whims; (2) they were always foreign, even though married to the ruling family or others of prominence; and (3) they always had the temptation to use their government position to acquire material means equal to their rank.⁴

---

²Ibid., p. 247. ³Ibid., pp. 256-260.
⁴Ibid., pp. 248, 260-264.
The realm was divided into twenty-four administrative districts each governed by a qaid. They were named annually by the Bey and came from either the tribes of that region or from the mamluks in Tunis. Also, they paid to the Bey a sum for the right of investiture, varying in amount according to the importance of the district. There existed no representative councils in the districts as were found in the Ottoman Empire. Each area was ruled as a feudal territory.

The government operated on the income derived from several sources. One major flow of income was from direct taxes. This included the ashar, a Koranic tax on grain; ganun on olive and date trees; marajas on fruits and vegetables; khadar, a special land tax on the Island of Djerba dating from 1845; and the majba, a head tax levied on all mature male citizens in 1856, except those born in the exempted cities of Tunis, Kairouan, Sousse, Sfax and Monastir. Twice a year, the Bey dispatched a force to collect the taxes (a mahalla), in early spring and at the end of the summer. The leader of the mahalla was the

---

5 Charles Cubisol, Notices abrégées sur la Régence de Tunis (Bone: Dagand, 1867), pp. 15-16.


Bey-de-camp or heir apparent, and he cooperated with the qaid in each district. The returns on the effort varied in direct proportion to the strength of the force and the distance from Tunis. Hence in those years when the mahalla was large, the taxes were paid in full close to Tunis, whereas only partially collected in the Sahara regions of the south.  

Sometimes the right to collect taxes was farmed out to the highest bidder. In either case, the burden fell heavily upon the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes in the countryside.

The other major source of income was the indirect taxes on goods and services, borne primarily by the cities. Imported goods could be taxed at no more than 3% because of the capitulatory regulations, with the exemption of wines and spirits, which entered at 10%. Exports generally paid 8% ad valorem.

The religious leaders (ulama) acted as a restraining force in the Regency. They filled the posts in the Shariah courts and the Zituna Mosque and became the leading kadis and muftis. In addition to the orthodox religious caste, there were numerous Sufi orders, or marabouts, in the Regency. Many of the Sufi leaders had been trained at the Zituna in Tunis and assumed part of

---


9 Ibid., pp. 103-104.
the traditional leadership of the society. "They helped mitigate the traditional opposition between city and country." Hence, Tunisia may be considered as a typical example of a traditional Muslim society before the beginning of the reforms under consideration.

---

CHAPTER I  POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

IN AND ABOUT TUNISIA

The pattern of reforms in Tunisia differed somewhat from the Ottoman Empire. For the Regency, the first significant ones were effected during the reign of Ahmad Bey (1837-1855). In part, Ahmad was trying to bolster the strength of his state so as to prevent foreign intervention. The precedents of France invading Algiers in 1830, and the Sublime Porte reasserting its control of Libya, by force, in 1835, gave the Bey reasons to be concerned about the independence of Tunisia.

The position of the Bey of Tunis dated from 1705, when Husayn ben Ali took control of the city and the surrounding territory. At that time the term "Regent" came into usage, in that Husayn ruled as Bey in the name of the Porte.\(^1\) The \textit{khutba} (Friday prayer) was said in the name of the Sultan and coins bore his name. The family of Husayn retained the title of Bey until 1957, when the monarchy was

\(^1\)Metcalf, p. 33.
replaced by a constitutional republican government. Until the time of the French protectorate, the Bey ruled with absolute power, with the exception of the few years his powers were legally restricted by the Ahd al-Aman and the constitution. After the Protectorate was established the Bey became merely a figurehead.

The major reforms of Ahmad apparently were begun after he visited France in 1846. In them, the army received the greatest attention, which took the form of an increase in its numbers as well as the establishment of an École Polytechnique, to train officers and other government officials. Also, more naval vessels were purchased, taxes revised, slavery abolished, a palace reminiscent of Versailles begun, and some restrictive laws abolished. Upon the death of Ahmad in May, 1855, the oldest living male in the family was Muhammad and according to tradition, ascended to the throne.

Muhammad Bey ruled until September, 1859, when he passed away and Muhammad al-Sadiq took the throne. History


5Fitoussi and Benazet, I, 59.
was to accord him the honor of being the last independent sovereign of Tunisia.

The position of Tunisia was one of complete independence during this period. The European powers dealt with the Bey as a fully sovereign monarch, with the exception of Queen Victoria's government. All the powers negotiated directly with the Bey. The allegiance paid to the Sublime Porte was nominal and reflected the religious ties and not the political ones.  

The July Monarchy had strongly advocated a policy of denying any thought of Turkish sovereignty over Tunisia. France desired to see the Bey as a weak and completely independent monarch who would be favorably disposed toward her. This policy brought out a French squadron from Toulon every time a squadron left Istanbul for Tunisia.

The Second Empire continued the same policy toward the Regency, with active desires to intervene in its internal affairs. Although other projects always seemed to take precedence in the plans of Napoleon III, there remained a lively interest. It appears that the French

---


7 François Guizot, Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de mon temps (Paris: Michel Lévy, 1858-1867), VI, 267-268.

encouraged Ahmad to support the Porte in 1854 but to ally himself to France as well. The Bey sent troops, canons, and horses, and after the death of Ahmad, Muhammad sent more support.9

On 1 July, 1855, Léon Roches arrived in Tunis as the new French Consul. He was an experienced hand, a former convert to Islam, and the man chosen by the Quai d'Orsay to press forward the French policy.10 Immediately upon having an audience with the Bey, the monarch and consul dropped formalities and conversed in Arabic, using the familiar form of address.11 Roches was off to an excellent beginning.

The representatives of the foreign powers were an outside force in the Regency. They brought pressure to bear upon the Vizir and his government and played a decisive role in the reforms. In 1864, there were at least eleven men representing fifteen different countries as consuls or commercial agents.12 Among them, however, the

10 Roches formerly lived in Algerià, spoke excellent Arabic, had converted to Islam, married the daughter of Abd al-Qadir and then betrayed his rebel chief father-in-law to French officials. See his autobiography, Trente-deux ans à travers l'Islam (1832-1864) 2 vols. (Paris: Didot, 1884-85).
11 Ganiage, 21.
12 Perry, 549-553.
French and English consuls wielded the greatest amount of respect and power. These two played a major role in the reforms and their influence exceeded the normal bounds of the posts.

The French Consul traditionally exerted much influence at the Bey's court in the palace at Bardo. Roches intended to continue that situation and capitalize upon it. British representatives had slowly been increasing in influence but it remained for Richard Wood, who arrived in April, 1855, to build his influence to a level superior to that of the French Consul.

British interest in Tunisia had developed somewhat late. It resulted from the Mediterranean policy of Lord Palmerston, which called for the continued integrity of the Ottoman Empire. This policy had emerged largely as a result of Russian threats to Ottoman sovereignty. The British government believed it could not tolerate any extensive gains by Russia at the expense of the Sublime Porte. Consequently, Palmerston's policy was to counteract any Russian advances against Turkish territory. This same policy found its logical extension in North Africa. As the eastern Mediterranean became more important to the British, the French control of Algeria began to take on a somewhat different cast. British communications were

---

relatively secure because of the possession of Gibraltar and Malta, but French activity in North Africa came to be repugnant to the Palmerston policy.

The French were implanted in Algeria, but that gave them no rights, in the British conception of things, in Tunisia. Just the contrary was true for English policy makers; once they undertook the active support of the Turks, that demarche placed them in a position opposite to the French and that opposition was carried into the Tunisian arena.

The British policy envisaged Tunisia as a province of the Ottoman Empire. This conception of reality was played out in London as well as in Tunis itself, and Queen Victoria, in 1846, would not receive the Bey except in the presence of the Ottoman ambassador. In the Regency, Wood pursued a policy of reaffirming the suzerainty of the Sultan. This was manifested in the attempts to convince the Bey to apply to the Sultan for a firman of investiture of authority or a reaffirmation of the legal relationship between the Regency and the Sublime Porte. Wood continually advocated the strengthening of

---

14 See Halford L. Hoskins, *British Routes to India* (London: Longmans, Green, 1928), for an extended discussion of this point.


16 U.S. National Archives, Department of State, *Consular Dispatches*, Tunis, Nicholson to Cass, 7 July 1860; cited hereafter as USNA.
ties between Tunisia and the Ottoman Empire through his tenure, which lasted until 1879.

The Italian Consul was the third major force among the foreign community in Tunisia. Before 1860, there were representatives of various Italian states but with unification in that year, most of the consuls were merged into one office. Still there remained problems at home which took precedence to such questions as expansion abroad. Since the major interest seemed to be completion of the Italian unity, the Italian consuls, consequently, continued to work on matters of commerce and did not attempt to expand Italian influence. By 1864, events began to shift after complaints from the Italian community in Tunisia were given credence at home and the Consul Carlo Gambarotta was criticized by the home government. The following spring Luigi Pinna was appointed to the post in Tunis.\(^{17}\) He and his successors vigorously asserted an Italian role in Tunisia, so much so that the balance of power was nearly upset at the Bey's court.

The other consuls in Tunisia represented Spain, The United States, Sweden, Norway, and other lesser states. These men usually confined their activities to the commercial realm and played no important role in the reforms.\(^{18}\)

\(^{17}\) Ganiage, pp. 273-274.

CHAPTER XI  INITIAL PERIOD

OF REFORMS  1855-1864

The position held by the different consuls at the court of the Bey played a major part in the reforms instituted from 1855 to 1864. Sometimes the representatives of the foreign powers worked together for the same goal, but often they were in competition one with the others. Generally, when they cooperated they were successful; however, this did not happen often. When it was every man for himself, there came a division of influence usually headed by the French on one side and the British on the other. The Italian representative often supported the British consul in the attempt to diminish French influence, all for the purpose of advancing his own position.

The first two years Wood was in Tunis, there were no significant events. Apparently, he was more concerned about other matters. In 1857, he submitted a memorandum to London regarding the appointment of consular officers, in which he was pleading for greater opportunity of advancement
for the personnel of consular posts.¹

The French Consul, Roches, had a difficult time trying to further the French cause in Tunisia. It seems that he was very interested in riding and going off on excursions into the desert.² Until late 1863, when he was replaced, the hegemony of France was continually being eroded away and Wood was the major factor.

Both Roches and Wood believed that reforms should be instituted in the Regency. But, the program of each did not necessarily coincide with that of the other. The reforms Roches would implement were often not the same ones Wood might have set forth. Roches was in the position of dominating the scene at first. He inherited a post where French influence had been virtually unchallenged. The program of Roches was basically to continue asserting French dominance at the palace in Bardo, thus maintaining the continued possibility of French acquisition of Tunisia. He did advocate reform along the lines of the Tanzimat and Hatt-i Humayun.³


²Ganiage, pp. 21-23.

Wood of course had British interests uppermost in his projected plans for Tunisia. Even though British prestige at the court did not equal that of France, Wood was able to bring it on a par and at times even impose his ideas upon the Bey against the wishes of the French representative. Wood came to the post in Tunis as well prepared as Roches, in some respects even better. Where Roches had indulged in duplicity by revealing secrets of his father-in-law, Wood had continually operated along constant lines, working for the same goals and trying to implement the same policy. He had spent thirty years in the Ottoman Empire, most of them as a dragoman, and was fluent in Turkish and Arabic as well as in European languages.

There was a brief period of agreement between these consuls from England and France. It came about, in part, because both felt threatened by the events of June, 1857. Briefly, there occurred an altercation in the streets of Tunis in which a Jew, named Batto Sfez, openly cursed the Bey, the government, and even Islam. He was taken before the Shariah for judgment. There exist two Muslim rites in Tunisia, Malikite and Hanafite. Sfez was taken before the Malikite court, which is the more conservative, and there the death penalty was pronounced. Muhammad Bey was not

\[4\] Cunningham, pp. 4-5.
disposed to mercy in this case because not long before a Tunisian soldier had been condemned to death and executed on the charge of killing a Jew. The Sfez incident helped serve as an emphasis to his subjects that the Bey ruled supreme and judged impartially. Further, Muhammad's decision not to interfere with the course of judgment appears to have been influenced by other considerations. First, there was widespread fear of a large outbreak of hostility against foreigners in Tunis at that particular time. This unrest apparently was linked with the Tangimmat and the proposal to institute the Hatt-i Humayun in Tunisia. Also, secondly, the court sensed this mood of prejudice and provocation and did not desire to introduce any reforms along the line of the Hatt which might possible undermine its own authority. Consequently, the court pressed for the full punishment allowed by the law.

The mob sentiment openly displayed shot a bolt of fear through the foreign community in Tunis. If the popular will was not to be curbed and was allowed to stampede the authorities into taking the life of one man, what was to be the assurance that the life and property of all non-Arabs were safe from violence. The execution of Sfez seemed to be a


barbarous act and something that could not have happened in the Regency since the reforms of Ahmad Bey. Thus the incident forced to the forefront, in a most dramatic manner, the legal rights of non-Muslims in Tunisia.

Roches and Wood, prior to June, 1857, had proposed reforms in the same vein as the Hatt-i Sharif and Hatt-i Hamayun, proclaimed by Sultans in 1836 and 1856, respectively. The charged atmosphere of the Sfez affair gave an excellent opportunity to bring pressure to bear upon the Bey. Paris and London instructed their consuls to protest the execution and try to obtain the establishment of mixed courts wherein non-Muslims could receive justice. Wood desired the Bey to put into force the two Hatts just as in the Empire, consequently strengthening the open ties with Istanbul. Roches wanted reforms which would accomplish the same goals as the Hatts. The two men vigorously agreed in a further point; that was to insist upon an end to monopolizing local products by the government and to take steps for the granting of commercial liberty to the subjects.

Late in June, Roches wrote about mollifying the rigidity of the Muslim law and apparently was working to

---

8FO 102/53 Clarendon to Wood, 7 August 1857.
9Raymond, "Problème," p. 149.
improve the position of foreigners. Five days later, on 30 June, Wood wrote: "We do not wish to mix up questions of interest with that of humanity," and went on to deplore the commercial difficulties experienced by foreigners daily in the Regency. On 29 June, Roches suggested to his government a joint intervention with Great Britain, so as "to lead the Bey to endow his people with a sort of Tanzimat." Then on 6 July, Wood sent to London a program of action, obviously drawn up in collaboration with Roches, which called upon the Bey to grant concessions already made by the Sultan, to organize an administration with established institutions which guaranteed the life and property of his subjects, to strictly adhere to all treaties, and to abolish commercial monopolies.

The French government, however, was not seeking the same ends as that of the British, and the Quai d'Orsay communicated to Roches that their goal was not an adoption of the Hatt-i Humayan in Tunisia, but rather they desired only a limited reform of the judicial structure in the Regency. This would amount to the adoption of mixed courts on the model of those established by the Porte to judge

---

10 FO 102/53 Wood to Clarendon, 6 July 1857.
12 FO 102/53 Wood to Clarendon, 6 July 1857.
criminal and commercial cases in which a non-Muslim was involved. The British Foreign Office proposed to the French government a cooperative effort so as to induce the Bey to make such reforms that would develop the resources, give security to foreigners, and observe the treaties with foreign powers. The response was to suggest that the Foreign Office instruct Wood in a manner similar to those sent to Roches and the Quai d'Orsay included a copy of their instructions to the French consul. Thus the desire of Wood and Roches for joint action was dashed on the more rigid structures at a higher level. The French did not want an extension of the Tanzimat to Tunisia nor a joint action with Great Britain. There seemed to be no hope of achieving any goal.

The Bey denied any responsibility in the Sfez affair and placed all blame on the ignorance and fanaticism of the masses and also on the rigid religious court, the Shariah. On 9 August, Muhammad indicated in a letter that progressive reforms would be instituted in accordance with the needs of the country and customs of the people. Thus, it seemed, the excitement generated by the Sfez affair had dissipated without any accomplishments on the part of Wood

14 Ibid., pp. 151-152.
15 FO 102/53 Wood to Clarendon, 18 August 1857.
or Roches. The competition between the home governments foiled the attempt to cooperate and force upon the Bey certain reforms. But, a new turn of events offered a second chance.

On 9 August, there erupted fighting between Jews and Muslims in the area of the French sector of Tunis. Soon the scene shifted to the Jewish quarter (hara) and became a mass pillaging. Wood and Roches immediately renewed their pressure on the sovereign. Two days later, Roches submitted a four-point plan calling for (1) laws applying justice to all Tunisians; (2) a council or Divan made up of Muslims and non-Muslims to deal with crimes and misdemeanors; (3) drawing up a commercial code and creating a commercial council made up of representatives of all the nations, whose citizens found themselves in the Regency; and (4) granting the right to foreigners to own real property in Tunisia. The Bey was only interested in inaugurating the criminal and commercial councils and then they were to be composed of Muslims alone. On 12 August, he accepted the idea of setting up separate courts for criminal and commercial cases, but these new courts would not be mixed.16 This move indicated that Muhammad was not going to encroach

upon the traditional prerogatives of the Shariah, nor did he wish to circumscribe, in any way, his own sovereign powers. Roches demanded the Bey guarantee these concessions with the issuance of a qanun, but it was refused.17

Muhammad had thus avoided any firm commitment to reform, even the limited ones of the French. He made the best of the division of the consuls and evaded having to deal with the reality of the internal situation of his realm. He maintained his attitude toward and support of the unreformed Ottoman system as it operated in Tunisia. Among his own advisors were individuals who urged the Bey to pronounce reforms and adopt part, if not all, of those concepts embodied in the Hatt-i Sharif and Hatt-i Humayun. Most notable were the Vizir, Mustapha Khaznadar, and the Minister of Marine, Khayr al-Din.18

At the time when it looked as if the Bey had won, one last link in the chain of events was being forged in Paris. A communication had gone out on 20 August, to prepare a squadron to sail to Tunis. On the 26th, Admiral Tréhouart was ordered to take that force from Djaccio to Tunis, where he arrived off La Goulette five days later.

17Diyaf, VII, 235-236.
Needless to say, the appearance of French ships of the line caused a sensation in Tunis.\textsuperscript{19} The necessary counterbalance to conservatism and tradition was now present and reform proceeded apace.

Roches wanted to wield this new force and extract the necessary reforms, or guarantees or reform. The absence of any immediate communication from Paris allowed him great latitude of action. Tréhouart sailed with only vague orders to support the consul "with Prudence."\textsuperscript{20} Likewise, Wood had not received any specific instructions regarding either the French squadron nor reforms. Consequently, the men on the scene in Tunis, devoid of any dictated plan of action from their respective governments, and removed by some days from communications with their governments, were left to their own resources as to how best to utilize the overwhelming surprise and show of force.

Wood, on 2 September, went to the palace and convinced the Bey that the naval force was only the first act of a joint program of France and Great Britain, which was designed to bring about reforms in Tunisia. If certain reforms were not instituted, then his country would break off diplomatic relations with Tunisia and even go so far as to blockade the ports of the Regency. The consul also

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{19} Ganiage, p. 73.
\end{itemize}
clarified that the two great powers were ready to demand that the Sultan impose reforms upon the Bey by a pre emptory firman. Then he set forth the demands of the two powers: mixed courts, fulfillment of all commercial treaties, right of foreigners to hold real property, and the Bey's guarantee to his subjects of their life and property. 21 Roches supported Wood and congratulated him on his vigorous language, adding that he had certainly prepared the way for a complete victory. 22

With an overwhelming force arranged against him and internal pressures rising, Muhammad Bey relented and the following day promised to Roches a list of reforms including the seating of Jews in the criminal courts, equal rights for all Tunisians, commercial liberty and extension of rights to foreigners regarding their commercial activity and holding of property. 23 The French case was reemphasized on 5 September, when Admiral Tréhouart called on the Bey. The Admiral stated that he had not been ordered to Tunis to menace the Bey, but rather to support Roches and give to the Bey moral support so that he could accomplish the good things he wished to do for his people. Then he ended on the note that he would be happy to announce to his

21 PO 102/53 Wood to Clarendon, 2 September 1857.
22 Ibid.
Emperor, the accomplishment of reforms contemplated by his highness. 24

Ahmad Ibn Abi al-Diyaf, an advocate of reform, phrased it more strongly; he reported that Tréhouart said he had come to help the Bey against those forces which opposed giving liberties and guarantees to his subjects concerning such things as life, property, honor, and religion. The Admiral said the Bey knew the Sultan was doing exactly that sort of thing and he demanded a prompt response. 25

The Bey directed Roches and Wood to agree and submit their demands to him. This perhaps was an attempt on the part of Muhammad to forestall reforms in that he probably believed the two men could not formulate a single list which would be mutually agreeable. Nevertheless, on 7 September, the two consuls each submitted almost identical memoranda to the Bey. 26 The points included were drawn mainly from the Hatts and were the same ones that had been discussed and presented for more than a year.


26FO 102/53 Wood to Clarendon, 10 September 1957.
The final step had been taken and Muhammad Bey was convinced of the necessity of reform. He called a meeting of his counselors and admitted the impossibility of resisting the combined force of Roches and Wood supported by the presence of French ships of the line off La Goulette. He then designated Diyaf to draw up the document proclaiming reforms.\footnote{Diyaf, VII, 242.}

The 
\textit{Ahd al-Aman} was proclaimed to the notables gathered at Bardo, including representatives of the foreign community, and published on 10 September, 1857.\footnote{d'Estournelles, p. 26.} Ibn Abi Diyaf had merely integrated the different demands, grouped those of a general nature first, and written a preamble that placed the document in the context of reforms already enacted by Muhammed Bey as well as those of the Sultan. The last concept included in the preamble was a reference to the previously announced intention to establish mixed courts for criminal and commercial cases and judicial reform. Eleven articles set forth the new order. The first five guaranteed "complete security" to all subjects and inhabitants of the Regency, exceptions to be made only through the law courts; regular taxation; freedom and equality of justice and religion; and limitations on military service according to a military code. The last six articles
consisted of special guarantees: they assured the presence of Jewish members on a court when the accused was a Jewish subject; they established mixed commercial courts; and they guaranteed freedom of commerce, elimination of government monopolies, and the opening of the doors to foreigners to purchase property and engage in any industry in the realm after treaties were made with their respective governments.  

At one fell stroke, the Regency had been jerked through three or four decades of reformism in the Ottoman Empire. Ahmad Bey, reformer that he was, had not gone so far as to implement those concepts included in the Hatt-i Sharif. A less willing reformer, Muhammad, not only published those basic reforms, but included some of a similar nature to the more recent Hatt-i Humayun, such as the right of foreigners to own property and experiencing no disabilities in commercial enterprises. Wood had insisted upon the two latter points and he proved to be the first to capitalize upon them.

The major cause of these reforms was undoubtedly the overwhelming force brought to bear upon the Bey. Roches and Wood had participated in campaigns by their

---

It is clear that governments which imposed western ideas and programs. Despite the delay in communications, they were well equipped to pursue the policy and strive for the general, if not specific goal. Tunisia was not a major factor at that time in the policy of Great Britain nor France, so that the general goal was satisfactory. Later, French officials were unhappy with Roches' accomplishments, but that was only after French policy abandoned the idea of reform in Tunisia and substituted in its place an active opposition to the British program in the Regency.  

The *Ahd al-Aman* was unquestionably the result of the joint efforts of Roches, Wood and the liberal-minded members of the Bey's Council. Roches reportedly had on many occasions been called upon to lend his support to those seeking liberal reforms. The group was headed by the Vizir with Khyar al-Din, Ibn Abi Diyaf, Muhammad Bayram, Muhammad Qabadu and others in the circle. Later, this group split apart, Khaznadar proving himself not to be a true reformer, but rather interested solely in his own welfare and power.

Wood played his role in the most audacious manner and consequently should perhaps receive the greatest credit for the proclamation of September, 1857. He not only colorfully phrased the situation to the Bey, after the arrival of the French squadron, but also even exceeded his

\[30\] d'Estournelles, p. 34.
own instructions and powers. He threatened the Bey, on 5 September, with the English force at Malta. Reportedly, he informed Muhammad that they only awaited his message and, if the French squadron remained off Tunis, then his government would send their ships from Malta and a Turkish group would not be far behind.³¹ Whereas the fact of the matter was that the Foreign Office did not mention sending a squadron until after the Ahd al-Aman was published.³²

There were many parties interested in reform, but had it not been for the French show of force and combined efforts of their consul with that of Great Britain, the Tunisians striving for reforms would have been long waiting. All indications point to the final conclusion that the Ahd al-Aman was the result of western pressure. Even though the different articles enumerated were mirror-images of earlier Ottoman reforms, they suited the programs and policy envisioned by the two leading consuls and their home governments.

The reforms of Muhammad Bey were not limited to those articles in the Ahd al-Aman. The sovereign had consented to establish a municipal council for Tunis, decreed on 30 August, 1858, which was to undertake the maintenance of public buildings and look after the

³¹Diyaf, VII, 239.
³²FO 102/53 Clarendon to Wood, 14 September 1857.
maintenance of public thoroughfares and also was charged with the regulation of traffic in the streets. In October, the next stages of the reform movement began to develop when the Bey eliminated the monopoly of olive oil presses. This was followed by the authorization of the coasting trade between Tunisian ports for foreigners. The situation of the Jewish subjects was ameliorated as they were granted the right to purchase real property and also were freed from the requirement of having to wear distinctive clothing in public, specifically the red hat. Further, by November, the Bey had appointed a commission, chaired by Mustapha Khaznadar, to study the new legal codes of the Ottomans and begin work on a constitution for the Regency.

Other reforms came in the economic area and it was there that Wood was the most active. In 1856, he had obtained from the Bey the necessary authorization to establish a British-Tunisian bank. It would be financed by English capital, was to encourage agriculture, loan funds to the government, and carry regular accounts. Another concession was for a British company to grow cotton.

33 FO 102/55 Wood to Malmesbury, 17 July and 3 September 1858, cited in Ganiage, p. 75.
34 Ganiage, p. 75.
During the exertion of pressure for the reforms, Wood had told the Bey that if he were going to become a member of the family of Europe then he would have to introduce European capital and companies into the Regency. After the Ahd al-Aman was proclaimed, Wood's plan moved ahead and the bank and the cotton company were to operated by the Anglo-Tunisian Association, chartered in March, 1858.

No sooner had the charter been issued, then the French government vigorously protested its exclusive powers and status. The protests of Roches went unheeded; however, he also was able to find concessions for French capital. The aqueduct of Carthage was to be renovated by a French company and late the following year, a monopoly on the telegraph services was granted to another French company.

In his desire to attract more capital to the Regency, Wood continued to press for implementation of the reforms. In March, 1859, he sent a memorandum to Muhammad explaining the necessity for judicial reforms and suggesting the creation of a national legislative body. The French

---

also complained about the delay in implementing the reforms embodied in the Ahd al-Aman.  

On 30 July, 1859, Wood sent a long memorandum to Lord John Russell on the affairs of Egypt and Tunis. He drew out the French involvement in Egypt and Tunisia, pointing out the reasons for and directions of their policy. He raised the issue of France extending the telegraph from Algeria to Tunisia, "either at her expense or at that of the Tunisian gov't.\[sic\]." Also, he gave Russell a picture of France portraying her desire to expand her power in the Mediterranean by annexation of Egypt and Tunis, only twenty-four hours sailing from Malta. Then she would push deeper into Africa. The consul was encouraging about the situation in Tunis by the fact he had made the Tunisian government aware of France's design on her territory. Also, he said, "The British agents will struggle and struggle in vain to maintain any personal influence they may have acquired." And struggle on he did.  

The entire question of reforms was changed in September, 1859, when Muhammad Bey died on the twenty-second. His younger brother succeeded to the throne, being the

---

40 AE, TD, 18, Walewski to Roches, 6 April 1859, cited by Ganiage, p. 75.

41 St. Antony's College, Private Papers Collection, Richard Wood, MS dated 30 July 1859.
oldest male in the royal family. Muhammad al-Sadiq Bey took the oath of office, which included swearing allegiance to the Ahd al-Aman. He then addressed the dignitaries of state and representatives of the foreign powers stating his intentions to continue the work begun by his predecessor. Soon thereafter, al-Sadiq began a series of reforms which culminated with a constitution.

The new regime started with no changes in personnel other than the Bey himself. This portended good things for the reformers, because now the sovereign was well-disposed toward reform and should need no dramatic affair such as that of Sfez to renew the vigor of reformism. The first step was to reorganize the Bey's council. Al-Sadiq redefined the area of responsibility for each of the ministers and other high ranking officials on the council, and then tried to fix precisely the duties of the lesser officials and bureaucrats. 42 These changes were completed by 10 April, 1860. In addition, there had been a new law set forth on military recruitment in March. 43 These acts proved to be in anticipation of the constitution and moved the administration towards responsible government in Tunisia.

42 Fitoussi and Benazet, I, 65-66.
43 Ganiage, p. 76.
These initial reforms of the new Bey were modeled on European lines and actually began a modern bureaucratic government in the Regency. The next step helped further the bureaucracy by creating a publication, *Journal Officiel Tunisien*, which would publish all laws, decrees, and regulations and report all the major acts and movements of the government. This was to be distributed to all the governmental offices throughout the country. A third major step was to instruct the commission on civil and criminal law, appointed by Muhammad, to resume its work. 44 This occurred shortly after Wood had urged the new Bey to revise the codes and create a national representative body. 45

By spring, the Bey had produced a glorious scheme by which he would receive the greatest amount of praise for the culmination of his reforms: the constitution. This plan was to visit the Emperor Napoleon III when he embarked on his announced voyage to Algeria. Muhammad al-Sadiq met with Napoleon at Algiers on 17 September, 1860. The Emperor had previously been given a copy of the draft; the result of months of committee work and consul pressures. He was enthusiastic and approved of the proposals contained therein. It remained only for the new law to be put into effect: it was proclaimed in January, 1861, and became the

44 Fitoussi and Benazet, I, 66-67.
45 FO 102/60 Wood to Russell, 17 February 1860, cited by Ganiage, p. 75.
basic law of the land on 26 April. The Emperor decorated al-Sadiq with the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor.  

By this means, Tunisia became the first state in the Arab-Middle East to adopt a constitution. Muhammad al-Sadiq, for varying reasons, had instituted the first constitutional government for his subjects. A brief analysis of the provisions of that document shows it to be potentially a revolutionary force. Fully implemented, the constitution would have placed the Tunisian government on a par with any Western European state and more advanced politically than most of those in Eastern Europe. However, full implementation never occurred and even the period in which the provisions of the law operated at all was quite short; it was suspended in 1864.

The constitution made Tunisia into a constitutional monarchy by providing for a legislative body to share the task of governing with the monarch. The body created was the Grand Council and was composed of 60 members. The form of government took on a very modern look in that there was a separation of powers with executive, legislative, and judiciary branches.

The constitution made specific provisions for such things as the successor of the Bey, formalizing the tradition of succession passing to the oldest male member

---

46 Ganiage, pp. 76-80.
of the royal family, stating there would be no regent, rather the post devolved upon the next eligible man. The Bey was the head of the family, controlling all affairs of the entire family, both public and private. The Bey was required to take an oath, at the time of his installation in office, swearing that he would not contravene the principles of the Ahd al-Aman nor any of the laws which stemmed therefrom. He was accorded the usual powers given over to the head of a state: commander of all military and naval forces, the power to declare war and make treaties, and the right to initiate legislation. The ministers were attached to the executive section of the government. They were to serve at the pleasure of the Bey and advise him in all matters of state.\textsuperscript{47}

The Grand Council was made up of twenty prominent government officials, both civilian and military, whereas the other forty members were leading ordinary citizens of the realm. They were to be appointed so that each year one-fifth of the members changed. The non-government members were appointed for five years. The Council itself prepared a list of forty names from which the Bey would choose the eight new members each year. These men served without pay and were unimpeachable in their position as Councilors of State.

\textsuperscript{47}The text of the constitution may be found in Fitoussi and Benazet, I, Annex No. 2.
The Constitution made further provisions dealing with the attributes of power of the different sectors of the government and also made specific guarantees to the citizens of the country. The equality of non-Muslims, first set forth in Tunisia by the Ahd al-Aman, was incorporated into the Constitution. This concept was taken over from the Hatt-i Humayun and guaranteed "complete security to their person, good and honor." Each and every individual was guaranteed equality before the law. Also, all citizens were charged with the obligation to serve in the military, specifying that there would be a fixed term of service. All subjects were guaranteed the right to own property, engage in commerce and manufacturing, restricted only by whatever local regulations may be in force. Other aspects of the force of the Constitution came in such areas as establishing uniform weights and measurements, and regulating naval traffic in the ports of the Regency. The Constitution explicitly stated that the government surrendered no "natural rights" except that of the taxes on grains and olives, which were specifically dealt with in the document.

Insofar as foreigners were concerned, the Constitution made certain provisions for them. They were guaranteed complete freedom of worship and were extended the same

---

48 Article 86.
guarantees of their person and goods as those given to the citizens of the state. They would not be subjected to military service nor forced labor: both not unusual circumstances in the early part of the century. Foreigners were to be on equal footing with citizens relative to industry, commerce, and owning real property. Also, foreigners would be judged by mixed courts, incorporating judges of their own choosing.

The effect of the Constitution was to reinforce and extend the provisions of the And al-Aman, further infringe upon the complete authority of the Bey, and set up a body competent to initiate and debate legislation. Finally, the administration of justice was completely removed from the executive and established in its own department of the government.

The intention of al-Sadiq had been seriously compromised by his action before the promulgation of the Constitution. By going to visit Napoleon III in Algiers in September, 1860, and giving him a draft of the law, it appeared that the entire matter was rooted more in prestige and a power play than stemming from a basis of reforming for the betterment of the government and improvement of the conditions of life for his subjects and foreigners. It has been pointed out that "There is nothing fundamentally wrong with the Constitution as a blueprint for representative
What was wrong was that neither the Bey nor his Vizir was seriously interested in effecting such far reaching reforms as those incorporated in the Constitution. Mustapha Khaznadar was not willing to relinquish the bulk of his power to the Council, as specified by the Constitution. The Bey was not interested, if he were capable, in working with the governmental powers in order to implement fully the provisions of the Constitution.

The Grand Council was not designed to represent the different political factions of the country. There was no attempt to insure representation from all parts of the realm nor to institute a liberal legislative body. Rather, it appears the Constitution was "drawn up more to curry favor and suppress criticism from abroad than to regularize the actual balance of political forces within Tunisia." In fact, the Constitution did bring praise from abroad and lessened the pressure upon the Bey, but it also served as a smoke screen, giving the Regency a facade of westernization whereas the reality of the situation was a continuing state of decline: morally, politically, financially and socially.

---


50 Ibid., p. 29.
The first Grand Council was filled with the friends and followers of Khaznadar. There were many Councilors of State who owed not just their position, but their career to him, and apparently no one was willing to oppose him. D'Estournelles de Constant presents the argument that it was Khaznadar who exercised the real executive power while Muhammad al-Sadiq was just a figurehead. There is good evidence to support such an argument, but it is too simplistic to account for all the facts. Khaznadar did exercise an enormous amount of power in the Regency, but that does not necessarily mean al-Sadiq was a mere figurehead. The Vizir was a clever man, but when the Bey was convinced of wrong doing on his part and decided to dismiss him, there was no way for Khaznadar to prevent it. Unfortunately, such royal action did not come until 1873, and up to that time Khaznadar was a strong force against any possibility of a constitutional government taking root in the country. The next move for reform was left up to the consuls. The Tunisian government was undergoing a thorough restructuring and being praised for it, so this left the initiative up to the consuls. Wood was the first who acted.

Her Majesty's representative at the court of the Bey had, from the outset, played the game very shrewdly.

\[51\] d'Estournelles, pp. 32-33.
Soon after he had arrived in Tunis, he rented a house in the section of the city where Mustapha Khaznadar lived. This enabled Wood to visit the Vizir after working hours, a practice of which he often took advantage. In addition, Wood built up a network of men who held different positions in the Tunisian government, all of whom informed the consul as to what activities and plans were under consideration. The entire efforts of Wood were aimed at obtaining as much accurate information as possible and using that information and the informants to effect British policy. That policy included foiling French plans and attaching Tunisia more strongly to the Sublime Porte. Further, it is clear that Wood hoped for a large influx of British capital into the Regency. Certainly, he was active in promoting such a goal and was partially successful. In the long run, however, his plan and his portion of the British policy failed.

The proclamation of the Ahd al-Aman can certainly be viewed partially as a result of Wood's plan. That document contained many of those concepts first presented by the Tanzimat. Therefore, the adoption of those ideas could only serve to help make for closer ties with the Sublime Porte.

In July, 1858, Wood sketched out his ideas about the relations with the Porte. In a dispatch to London, he

\[52\] Ganiage, pp. 28-30.
proposed the Bey formally recognize the suzerainty of the Porte, with assurances in return of continued autonomy. Then the Sultan could render a firman stating explicitly what the relationship was to be. Such a firman could be used not merely as the basic agreement between the two powers, but could also serve to foil French interests in the Regency. That would make any encroachment upon the Bey's territory an encroachment upon Ottoman territory or at least repugnant to the Porte and to the friends of the Porte. 53

The death of Muhammad Bey in 1859 ended the possibility of bringing Wood's plan to completion, so he devised a new approach. This concerned the accession of the monarch. Wood proposed the strengthened ties be expressed in the firman of investiture, issued by the Porte. 54 Such a firman was customary and was given largely because of the tradition. There were no legal or binding obligations involved.

Once again, Wood's goal was thwarted. The Tunisian envoy to Istanbul, charged with obtaining the firman, was Mustapha Bash Agha, the Minister of War. He did not initiate any negotiations concerning a reassertion

\footnote{53}{FO 102/55 Wood to Malmesbury, 31 July 1858, cited by Ganiage, p. 32.}
\footnote{54}{FO 102/58 Wood to Bulwer, 14 November 1958, cited by Ganiage, p. 32.}
of Ottoman influence over Tunisia and returned only with.
the traditional good words and presents.\textsuperscript{55} The Bey also
was not greatly desirous of any reassertion of Ottoman
authority; partly as a mark of independence, but more for
the pomp, al-Sadiq had a throne installed at the Bardo
palace in February, 1860.\textsuperscript{56}

The enactment of the Constitution must have been
encouraging for Wood. It reaffirmed certain items of the
Ahd al-Aman which had not been implemented but in which he
held great interest. This was especially true of the
provision that foreigners could own real property. The
right was first broached in Article X of the Ahd al-Aman
and then reiterated in Article 113 of the Constitution.
On each occasion there was the requirement of negotiations
with the specific government and the rendering of a treaty
before such rights could be exercised. It is a tribute to
Wood's skill, his understanding of the inner workings of
the court, and undoubtedly his own influence with the
Vizir that he was able to negotiate the necessary treaty.
This convention, signed on 10 October, 1863, spelled out
the provisions concerning immovable property, taxes,
litigation arising therefrom, inheritance, and all the legal

\textsuperscript{55} Ganiage, pp. 32-33.
\textsuperscript{56} FO 102/60 Wood to Russell, 11 February 1860,
cited by Ganiage, p. 33.
involvements of owning property in the Regency.\textsuperscript{57}

Once the doors had been opened, the other powers slowly followed suit and obtained the same rights for their nationals residing in the Regency. Austria was the second power to take advantage of the right, in 1866; Italy in 1868; France not until 1871; and Belgium in 1880.\textsuperscript{58}

Wood had more than one iron in the fire. Before the convention on property had been signed, an English Jew, Joseph Levy, was authorized to form a company which was to raise cotton.\textsuperscript{59} Shortly after the convention was signed in January, 1864, Levy started operating a steam-driven mill to produce olive oil, thus becoming the first foreigner to set up any type of factory in the realm. Wood had also been at work to obtain the contract for constructing a railroad from the city of Tunis to its port, La Goulette. Those talks began in 1863 and by February, 1864, had reached an agreement favorable to Wood. At about this same time, Wood had convinced the Tunisian government to commission a study of its forests and mineral resources, to


\textsuperscript{58}State Papers, 63, 1072; 63, 1280-1290; 65, 1320-1321; 71, 532-536.

\textsuperscript{59}USNA, Perry to Seward, 21 February 1863.
be carried out by a British engineer, of course. Before all these projects were launched, a revolt broke out which threatened to overthrow the government.

The revolt which swept across Tunisia in 1864 was the result of poor administration and bad crops. Its lasting effects did little to solve either of the two major causes. The effect most important for this study was the suspension of the Constitution and other reforms. After the outbreak of violence in the early spring of 1864, an interlude of almost ten years followed before any further, serious, internal reforms took place.

The factors contributing to the revolt are to be found in the activities of Mustapha Khaznadar. The Vizir had served under three Beys with practically no restraint upon his power. With the creation of the Grand Council by the Constitution, Khaznadar gained even greater influence by the fact that all the members were totally or partially obligated to him for their positions. This effectually gave him most of the political power which should have belonged to the Bey. The Council was empowered to enact legislation and was controlled by the Vizir. If Mustapha had been a conscientious, responsible officer of the government, all would have been fine. Instead, he had become corrupted by power and used it to achieve his own

---

60 Raymond, "Tentatives," pp. 55-56.
ends. He freely indulged himself with state funds and
gave no attention to the plight of the peasantry in the
country; they were the ones from whom the monies had been
extracted by force, under the pretext of taxation.

The disbursement of state funds was also regulated
by Khaznadar in his capacity as Treasurer of the government.
These offices he received during the reign of Ahmad Bey,
to whom Mustapha was a brother-in-law. In the role of
Treasurer, he ceased paying debts in standard currency,
substituting in its place a note, called *teskeres*, which
actually was a promissory note issued by the administration.
The *teskeres* were backed up by the value of future taxes
from the harvests. The *teskeres* were issued for three
years and were rendered in payment not only to merchants,
but also for compensation of government functionaries.
These people were consequently forced to remain on the job,
because if they left, they risked forfeiting all their back
pay. 61

The monies actually received by the government were
deposited to its account. Those records and funds were
handled by the leader of the Jewish community in Tunis,
Nissim Samama, who served the Bey as banker and Director of
Finances. 62 Samama desired to enrich himself and cooperated

61 Ganiage, pp. 192-193.
with Khaznadar in every way possible.

As each year passed and Mustapha Khaznadar remained in power, that power increased. Never was it so strongly increased as by the changes introduced by reforms, especially the Constitution. The new organization, started in 1861, gave Mustapha the role of helping the Bey name the Councilors. Since the Council was filled with men of his choice, the Vizir found no great problems in getting it to do his bidding.

The Vizir was not controlled by a strong monarch nor the Council; unchecked and unscrupulous, he pursued an irresponsible, self-aggrandizing policy. His actions as Treasurer had for some time proved to be rather profitable for himself and his friends, if somewhat unorthodox. When Muhammad al-Sadiq took power, Khaznadar and Samama sent the treasury to the new Bey, after they took some 3,000,000 piasters for themselves, over half of the total funds.63

The general financial situation of the realm was good. There was a regular income from the taxes on crops and people, as well as the custom duties and monopolies of the government. Immediately, the new Bey had new

---

expenditures: first came the envoy sent to Istanbul to obtain the traditional firman of investiture. This gesture was always accompanied with presents from the Bey, costing in this instance about 3,000,000 piasters. Secondly, al-Sadiq wanted the neglected army restored to a place of prestige with new weapons. A deal was made with a Belgian firm, but when the rifles were delivered, they proved to be obsolete pieces and had to be replaced. A second deal brought 10,000 of the latest French-made small arms. 64

Partly in view of the arms, but undoubtedly more because of Napoleon's decoration, the Bey ordered that a new structure at a cost of 680,000 francs, be built for the French consulate. This new building was placed just outside the main gate of the city and has continued to serve as the seat of French representatives in Tunisia. Muhammad al-Sadiq could not stop at just one special consideration but had to extend the same gesture to the British consul; thus, a sea side villa was constructed in La Marsa for the representative of Her Britannic Majesty. The total bill was increased to about 2,000,000 francs. 65

---

64 Archives de la Résidence Générale à Tunis, Politique, vol. 32, Roches to Walewski, 16 December, 1859, cited by Ganiage, p. 190.

65 ARGT, Consulats, Note on financial and political situation, cited by Ganiage, p. 190.
Before the year 1860, there had been no budget drawn up. Even its advent did not curtail the spending nor relieve the growing financial disorder. In that year public works began to eat up funds. The first paved road in the Regency was opened from Tunis to Bardo, a distance of almost three miles. Also, the project of restoring the aqueduct from Zaghouan, the major source of fresh water for the city, was begun. This job was to cost 7,000,000 francs, but expenses ran up to 12,000,000 francs before it was finished two years later.  

Khaznadar was responsible for paying such charges as the public works projects and keeping the accounts of the government, but this duty was not performed in a responsible manner. There being no restraints placed upon him, he was accountable to no one for expenditures; there followed in succeeding years a continual process of embezzlement by Mustapha and his entourage. When projects were contracted, always a "kickback" had to be made to the Vizir. Then the expenses of the project were met with a mixture of sound currency and "Mustapha's gold" or teskeres. A contract would be paid partly in francs or paisters, and the balance in teskeres. They were worthless outside the country, and practically so within the realm. Such notes in theory could be redeemed at the state

treasury. The usual response one heard upon attempting to redeem teskeres was that the treasury was empty. The advice would follow as to who might buy them. Khaznadar's lackey, Samama, would be the agent who would purchase the worthless paper -- usually at 30%, or greater, discount -- and return the teskeres to the treasurer. Then Mustapha would remove the discounted amount from the treasury for himself or friends and start the teskeres off on another round of circulation. 67

In addition to the teskeres, the government issued coinage minted from copper. The denomination of any of such copper pieces was nowhere near the intrinsic value of the metal itself; consequently, the merchants of the realm would accept the coins only at discounted values. This caused the government to readjust their value from time to time. 68

These practices, coupled with the issuing of the notes to be paid, carrying 12 to 25% interest, contributed to fiscal problems. In 1861, the government owed about 19,000,000 piasters (11,000,000 francs). Because none of the forms of currency circulated at face value nor were any notes paid off -- rather, they were renewed often at higher interest

68Ganiage, pp. 192-194.
rates -- the debt increased in 1862 to about 28,000,000 francs. This caused a small crisis and much criticism, so that Khaznadar offered his resignation. It was refused by the Bey. 69

Bankers in both London and Paris were aware of the situation in Tunisia. The money market in London had become relatively expensive by 1862, and the interest rates were high. Paris was benefitting, and from 1860 to 1865 the Parisian bankers made loans not just in neighboring countries, such as Italy and Spain, but also abroad in North America and South America. Further, there were loans in the Middle East to the Ottomans and Egypt. When an English banking house offered to finance Tunisian public works in March, 1862, Roches presented a counter offer from a French firm and did everything in his power to forestall any British loans. He was aided in the cause by Eugenio Fasciotti, the Italian consul. 70

Khaznadar has just about convinced the Bey to accept the British offer when the Jewish leader and government banker and receiver general, Nissim Samama, offered to make a loan of 10,000,000 piasters at 12% sans amortissement. This won the support of Khayr al-Din and General Hussein,

69 Fitoussi and Benazet, I, 91-92.

each of whom wanted to prevent the introduction of foreign capital and to preserve the complete sovereignty of the Bey, arguing that it was better to pay a little more for the use of the money than to sell freedom for material advantages. This broke off the loan negotiations and Samama was given the contract in May, 1862.\(^71\) This loan carried a 12\% rate and helped increase the government debt, which rose to 28,026,983 francs in 1862.

The differences of opinion over obtaining the loan seem to have caused some changes in the Cabinet. For example, "In December, 1862, a small palace revolution in which the Prime Minister got rid of his rivals" occurred.\(^72\) Mustapha Bash Agha, an opponent of foreign loans, retired. Khayr al-Din resigned his ministerial post of the Navy as well as the presidency of the Grand Council. It started a nine-year period of self-exile for him. With Khayr al-Din out of power and his fellow supporters of reform covered, the major restraint upon Khaznadar was gone, and he proceeded to drive the government to the verge of bankruptcy.\(^73\)

\(^71\)Ibid.
\(^72\)Ganiage, p. 203.
General Muhammad Roustam, another son-in-law of Khaznadar, as was Khayr al-Din, clearly became the second major force in the Cabinet by taking over the Ministry of Interior while remaining General of the Palace Guard. Also, Khaznadar advanced Aziz bar Attour to director of finances and placed General Muhammed Fahrat and General Ahmad Zarrouk on the council. These three men were lackeys of the Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{74}

Mustapha Bash Agha was the leader of the opposition to Khaznadar. The Minister of War had married into the royal family just as the Vizir had done; consequently he marshalled some power independent of Khaznadar. Also, Bash Agha was of like mind with the ulama, the religious leaders. Thus the group for which he spoke was as large as the following of the Vizir. The retirement of Bash Agha signalled a further strengthening of Mustapha's position.

The Vizir ruled the government and early in 1863, he was once more seeking a loan abroad. The loan with Samama had not proved to be adequate for his needs, so he was going to push for a foreign loan this time. It seems the business arrangements with the Jewish banker somewhat estranged him from Khaznadar because the Vizir used a different agent in the negotiations in Paris, a Syrian

\textsuperscript{74}Ganiage, pp. 203-204.
named Rashid Dahdah.  

Mustapha had no difficulty obtaining approval from the Council to float a new loan. Once the Council had approved it, he sent Dahdah off to Paris to work on the transaction. There were brief talks with two firms in London and three in Paris, but soon all were eliminated except the house of Emile Erlanger. He was a German Jewish banker recently established in Paris and that Erlanger was the chosen firm was a surprise to the financial world and most of the Tunisians. Dahdah had been primarily responsible for the choice, apparently because he could strike the best deal with Erlanger, whereas other firms, such as the Crédit Mobilier and the house of Rothschild were not willing to make any sort of payoff.

The American Consul in Tunis at that time was Amos Perry and he learned about the proposed loan early in 1863. On 10 April, he wrote to Washington that he had protested to the Tunisian government the thought of dealing with the Erlanger firm due to the fact they "exhibited as proof of their ability to accommodate the government of Tunis, a certificate that they had loaned the Confederate

---


76 FO 102/68, Wood to Russell, 11 May 1863; Archives Tunisienne, Dossier 334, Carton 113, cited by Ganiage, p. 206.

States of America a large sum of money. The Sultan also protested any loan to Tunisia. He informed the French government that any loan to Tunisia without his approval would not be valid for the province nor the successors of the Vali.

Despite the opposition of Perry, Wood, the Sultan and others, the loan was signed on 10 May. Soon afterwards, there appeared a new entry on the Paris bourse - Tunis. The value of the loan itself was nominally for 35,000,000 francs, but the terms called for the repayment of 4,200,000 francs each year for fifteen and one-half years, amounting to 65,000,000 francs. The French consul congratulated himself, arguing that the terms with Erlanger were less severe than those of local financiers. Those who felt the best, benefitted most; Khaznadar took 1,500,000 francs for himself, the agent for Erlanger, Enrico Cernuschi, took 1,000,000, while Dahdah got 500,000 francs and lesser amounts went to others involved in the transaction. After Khaznadar had taken his money and paid his friends, there was only 5,640,914 francs left to

78 USNA, Perry to Seward, 10 April 1863.
79 Hariciye Vekaleti Arzivi, Ali Pasha to Cemil Pasha and Musurus Bey Cambus, 2 June 1863, cited by Çayci.
be deposited to the government account. 81

In October, 1863, the Vizir completed the takeover by setting up a small committee to handle the problems of the Grand Council. This small group functioned similarly to an executive committee, taking action while the Grand Council was not in session, arranging an agenda for the sessions of the Council, and presenting material to the Council as a fait accompli rather than a problem to be debated before any action was taken. Khaznadar dominated this committee as if he were the executive and chose the members of it. 82

The result of the Vizir's action was the completion of the process of dominating the government by Khaznadar and the other mamluks. The traditional sources of power in the countryside did not like this new situation which was developing as a result of the reforms. Mustapha Khaznadar had overwhelmed his opposition at court, but in the process created an ever-growing opposition in the rest of the country. The result became a general revolt which lasted for some months in 1864.

The traditional exercise of power in the provinces lay with the qaids, the leaders of the various tribes. Their usual functions in the judicial realm had been

81 d'Estournelles, p. 36.

82 FO 102/68 Wood to Russell, 8 October 1863.
stripped away by the reforms. This caused some consterna-
tion on the part of the tribal members; however, the gaids were more disconcerted by their very apparent loss of power to the mamluks at Bardo. The installation of a Constitution had not affected the life of the beduins, whereas the requirements of going to a city and staying there while the new courts slowly ground out a decision in a manner far beyond the comprehension of the individual struck the beduins as being contrary to the natural order they had known. They were baffled, not understanding the new system nor why it had been installed. Most certainly they resented it, if not detested it. They saw justice overturned and injustices perpetuated, a situation which led to resentment and discontent.83

Other grievances were magnified by the unrest, such as the recently installed telegraph system. The nomadic tribes quickly learned that the telegraph lines were able to bring a swift response from the Bey's forces, must faster than before. Most especially, the tribes in the country did not like the increase of the mejba tax. They felt it was an excessive burden.

Increasing the mejba was the idea of Mustapha Khaznadar. This was his proposal in September, 1863, to solve the financial difficulties of the Regency.84 The

84 ARGT, 5, Beauval to Drouyn de Lhuys, 11 December 1863, cited by Ganiage, p. 223.
state was on the verge of bankruptcy largely because of the loan from Erlanger in 1863. Most of that money had been siphoned off before it reached the treasury, by Khaznadar for himself, his friends, and other well-situated individuals. The debt retirement schedule placed an added burden upon the already overworked financial apparatus of the state. There were the normal expenses, plus the payments due Samama on the domestic loan of 1862. All in all, the debt rose to about 28,000,000 francs at the end of 1863. 85 The Prime Minister proposed that the people finance the difference needed by the government. The mejba had been fixed at 36 piastres, about $4.32. 86 On 11 December, 1863, Muhammad al-Sadiq decreed the mejba be increased to 72 piastres, or $7.64. 87

Normally, spring was the time for collecting taxes, and by early March trouble began to appear. The French consular agent in Sfax, Jean Mattei, reported on 10 March that the nomadic tribes in his area were not paying the mejba and that there seemed to be widespread agitation the Bey. 88 By the end of March the leader of the Majur

85 Fitoussi and Benazet, I, 94.
86 Perry, Carthage, Appendix H, 539, gives piaster as equal to 12¢.
87 d'Estournelles, 38.
tribe in the western mountains, Ali ben Ghadahem, was proclaimed "Bey of the People." The first week in April brought with it the disruption of telegraphic service throughout the country as different groups cut the wires in every area. Service was rapidly restored but continued to remain vulnerable to attacks.  

At the court the Bey, all his government, and the representatives of foreign powers became more worried with each passing day. Rumors passed about the court indiscriminately concerning the revolt and sides began to become discernible. The French consul visited the court and demanded the dismissal of the Vizir and all who were supporters of the rapprochement with the Ottoman Turks. Further, he demanded that the privileges granted to British subjects by the Convention of 1863 be renounced and declared null and void. He insisted that the Regency was under French protection not British. On 14 April the Vizir in turn defied de Beauval and displayed his own power by successfully demanding that Lieutenant Colonel Campenon leave the country, his services being no longer required as head of the Military School at Bardo. To this demand the French consul had no alternative but to comply;


90Broadley, I, 124, erroneously includes Khayr al-Din in de Beauval's demands, but he had already broken with Khaznadar and had resigned 7 months earlier.
however, Campenon's departure was delayed until 20 July.\textsuperscript{91}

Early in April all the consuls informed their respective governments of the situation in Tunisia. The first positive response was an English corvette \textit{Firefly}, which arrived 14 April.\textsuperscript{92} Within two weeks there were squadrons of French, Italian and English ships of the line in Tunisian waters. These forces were not to participate in the hostilities but rather were solely for the purpose of rendering aid to the European community and protecting the Europeans from any threats to their safety. In other words it was a display of force by the great powers directly involved in Tunisia.

The outbreak of revolt in Tunisia strained to the breaking point the relations between the English and the French consuls. In the crisis of 1857, they had worked together. Now Roches was gone, and not only was there a new man in his place but the entire atmosphere had changed. The French began to realize that Wood had clearly gained the advantage. He was not only successful in gaining economic and legal concessions but was more importantly a close confidant of Mustapha Khaznadar. This personal friendship gave Wood a degree of influence upon the executive

\textsuperscript{91}ARGT, Khaznadar to de Beauval, 14 April 1864, cited by Ganiage, 229; Broadley, I, 123-124.

\textsuperscript{92}FO, 102/71, Wood to Russell, 21 April 1864, cited by Ganiage, p. 231.
decisions of the government unparalleled by the French representative. This relative importance of the British Consul had been a major reason Roches had been recalled in July, 1863. Also, the Quai d'Orsay was quite surprised when he began to denounce the very men who had received his accolade two years before. 93

The new French consul, de Beauval, embarked upon a program to tear down the accomplishments of Wood and once again assert the primacy of France in the Regency. This naturally placed him in opposition to Wood, Khaznadar, al-Sadiq and the government program. De Beauval initiated an intensive campaign to unseat the Vizir and assault the dominant position of Wood. The Italian consul, Carlo Gambarotta, observed that de Beauval had made the dispute with Khaznadar a personal affair. 94

On 18 April, de Beauval visited the court and asked the Bey to abolish the Constitution. Three days later he was once more before the Bey denouncing the Convention with Great Britain and demanding the dismissal of the Vizir and other ministers. 95

93 AE, TD, 21, Roches to Thouvenal, 17 May 1862, cited by Ganiage, p. 222.
94 Ganiage, p. 231.
95 FO 102/71, Wood to Russell, 21 April 1864, cited by Ganiage, p. 231.
De Beauval reported on 21 April that the entire country except the city of Tunis was in revolt and that an Arab tribesman had been named as Bey. Also, he reported that an English ship of line had arrived in Tunisian waters and that Wood had requested more help from Malta. The French consul demanded that the foreign office send help and that it be a large force if the English landed. This call for aid brought a quick response from Paris, but it was of a dual nature. First, Drouyn de Lhuys informed his representative in Tunis that a naval force was on its way but that it was only for the purpose of protecting nationals and must not interfere in the internal conflict. Secondly, the Foreign Minister simply stated, "Avoid all appearances of direct antagonism with Mr. Wood." 

On the 27th of the month, Drouyn de Lhuys was again stressing to de Beauval that the squadron was dispatched primarily to protect French citizens. If it became necessary to take action, by all means there should be an avoidance of appearing to intervene in the conflict of the Bey with his subjects. Then the Foreign Minister continued with the counsel he had previously offered; not to antagonize Wood. He explained at length that the government

---

96 Pierre Grandchamp, Documents relatifs à la révolution de 1864 en Tunisie (Tunis: Alocio, 1935), I, 24 de Beauval to Drouyn de Lhuys, 21 April 1864.

97 Grandchamp, I, 34.
was in communication with the British and Italian governments and that the display of force was an action in concert with the other two powers. He informed de Beauval that the Cabinet in London had been informed of the instructions given to the French admiral and that Wood had been instructed by his government to act only in concert with his counterpart from France. Finally, the French consul was advised to consult with the Italian consul in that the Cabinet in Turin desired an understanding and joint action with the Emperor.  

The same day on which the Foreign Office was clarifying the international situation, de Beauval sent word that the Méteore, first of the French ships, had arrived.  

The French and Italian consuls were agreed that the insurrection offered to them the opportunity to reverse the influence of the British consul. They worked in cooperation while still under the restrictions from their home governments to cooperate. In this tense atmosphere, de Beauval attempted a decisive move: that of landing troops. De Beauval hoped to forestall any possible effect of the Ottoman fleet known to be on its way to Tunis.  

---

98 Grandchamp, I, 49-50; Drouyn de Lhuys to de Beauval, 27 April 1864, cited in Ganiage, pp. 237-238.
99 Grandchamp, I, 50.
100 Ibid., I, 74, Drouyn de Lhuys to de Beauval, 4 May 1864.
He had some freedom of action, in that telegraph wires had been cut and he was thus unable to receive directions as to how to act. Thus, he convinced Admiral Herbinghem to authorize the landing of troops. The specific argument used has not been recorded. The entrance to the port of La Goulette was barred with a chain and the Tunisian officer in charge refused to remove it, frustrating the marines. 101

Upon learning of the attempted unilateral action, Wood, Gambarotta and others condemned de Beauval. 102 The French consul had followed his own plan of action, attempting to undermine Wood's position and that of the Vizir as well, all by direct assault. He had demanded the renunciation of the October (1863) Convention with the English and dismissal of those responsible for negotiating it. All of these were so because they represented Wood's superior position in the Regency. De Beauval had worked ceaselessly to reassert France's primacy, but all it brought him was abuse, opposition, advice from Paris to cooperate and finally complete discredit at the Bey's court after the attempted landing of troops. At that juncture, de Beauval saw only two possibilities remaining open to him: first, to relax his goals and accept his place as one of many factors in the Regency. Secondly,

101 Ganiage, 246, Perry to Seward, 14 May 1864.
102 FO 102/71, Wood to Russell, May 1864.
there was the possibility of pursuing his goal of re-establishing French power in Tunisia at any cost. Of course, he chose the latter. Nevertheless, de Beauval strove to maintain appearances, for he sent Perry a note disclaiming any French designs on Tunisian independence. Later, the United States consul inquired of Khaznadar what the relations of Tunisians were with the French and was told, "We claim to be politically independent. . . ." During the first few months of the revolt, Wood played the major role of influence upon the government. He had steadily pursued the policy of strengthening ties between the Bey and the Sublime Porte. This entailed a strong British presence in the Regency and a government well disposed to Her Majesty's Government. Toward these goals, Wood had been successfully driving.

The first clear sign that Wood was succeeding came with the signing of the Convention in October, 1863. Early in 1864, he was negotiating for further concessions, for example, the railroad from Tunis to La Goulette, which negotiations were disrupted because of the revolts. Therefore, it was not difficult for a new consul in Tunis to learn quickly that Wood was the most influential representative

103 USNA, Perry to Seward, 24 May 1864.
104 USNA, Perry to Seward, 26 November 1864.
of a foreign government. De Beauval attempted to reverse that situation immediately.

Wood had been the first to characterize the revolt and as a result on 14 April the Firefly arrived in Tunisian waters. Lord Russell informed his ambassadors in Paris and Turin of this action and later was responsible for making the naval presence into a joint action. The British policy was one of non-intervention. This had prevailed since the days of Palmerston when it had been forged in an attempt to stop Russian encroachments on Turkish territory. The policy became maintenance of the status quo in so far as the Ottoman Empire was concerned, no territorial concessions or boundary adjustments. This remained the basic posture of the British down until 1878. Wood had been very faithful to that policy in his work. He stressed the traditional ties of the Bey with the Sublime Porte, encouraged a strengthening of those ties, and attempted to facilitate the Bey's action by asserting British influence in the Regency to the detriment of that of France.

In the context of the revolt, Wood urged Mustapha Khaznadar to make concessions to the populace so as to end the threat to the Bey's authority. Such a time of upheaval invited outside intervention from either the French or the Porte, neither of which would further the designs of Great Britain. Therefore, a course of action consistent with British desires called for the presence of
a British force in the Regency, just to forestall any real outside threat to al-Sadiq. Also, this would explain why Russell desired the show of force by the powers to be considered a joint action. Wood realized that France would not allow Turkish intervention, so there must be no intervention. Further, Wood was in an excellent position to exert, personally, influence while officially remaining uninvolved.

On 11 May a Turkish squadron put in at La Goulette, bringing a commissioner from the Sultan, Haydar Efendi. His mission was to inform the Porte as to the causes and course of the revolt and act as his envoy, awaiting further instructions. The Porte consulted the British government before dispatching an envoy to Tunisia. This was definitely further evidence of the British policy.

Haydar readily formed a triumvirate with Wood and Khaznadar. The three of them met often to discuss the events of the day. Wood and Haydar became friends, and after the departure of the Turkish envoy, Haydar wrote to Wood of his arrival in Istanbul. He reported on the reception of Khayr al-Din, asked to be remembered to the

---

105 FO 102/71 Wood to Russell, 11 May 1864.
106 HA 44/12 Musurus Bey to Ali Pasha, 30 April 1864, cited by Çayci.
Bey, Khazandar, and all his other friends in Tunisia.  

The arrival of the Turkish force scared the Italians and caused Gambarotta to overreact. He represented one of the powers and was the head of the largest colony of foreigners in the Regency, but despite all of this the Vizir had no use for him and almost ignored him. To add to the difficulties there was no agreement among the Italians; they may have achieved unification at home but there remained separate and distinct groups within the Italian populace of Tunisia.

Gambarotta himself disliked both Wood and Khaznadar. He understood the revolt to be a result of bad administration, unscrupulous leaders in the mamluks, and, also to some extent, of the innovation of the Constitution. Secretly, the Italians welcomed the revolt. Perhaps not at the precise moment, but the Italians had designs on Tunisia. They desired to annex the Regency so as to start rebuilding the Roman Empire. It seemed a logical step, once a political unity again became a reality in the Italian peninsula. One thing was certain, and that was that Gambarotta did not want any reassertion of Ottoman power or influence at the court in Bardo. The Italian consul was ready to take drastic action after the Turkish

107Wood Papers, Haydar to Wood, 12 October 1864.
squadron dropped anchor. The Foreign Minister in Turin had instructed him on 9 May that the Italian government wanted assurances of protection for the people in Tunisia, even if it meant landing troops. After the Turks appeared in Tunis, the Italian government changed to support allied intervention. Nevertheless, the government in Turin had not abandoned all hope of gaining Tunisia as its first conquest.

While the consul in Tunis followed the lead of de Beauval the Ministry of War, headed by General Della Rovere, set into motion the preparatory steps necessary to dispatch an expeditionary force to Tunis. Wood repeated on 25 May that 10,000 men had been massed on Sicily. Four officers were sent to reconnoiter Tunis so as to prepare maps and determine landing sites, access routes, and strategic points in and around the city. Apparently two factors were decisive in stopping the secret invasion. One was the lack of encouragement from French friends and the other factor was the questioning of the Prime Minister Visconti-Venosta in the Parliament about the planned invasion of Tunisia. On June 13, the Prime Minister denied any such plans existed and assured the representatives of

---

the people that the government only desired the protection of nationals in Tunisia and the continued independence of the country. This declaration then prompted Gambarotta officially to offer the services of the Italian troops to the Vizir in order to help put down the revolt. 110

Wood's domination was characteristic of the entire revolt. He counseled Mustapha Khaznadar before its onslaught and after the arrival of Haydar Effendi. The three of them held conferences in various places. Also, Wood received the emissary from the Porte in private at his home. This, of course, caused further antagonism in the French and Italian consuls. They charged Wood had helped initiate the rebellion so as to allow for Turkish intervention and once again place Tunisia in the power of the Porte. De Beauval suggested the inflammation of the Sahel and the raising of the Ottoman flag occurred only after Wood had visited that area at the end of April. 111

The situation of the Bey grew worse as each week passed, and the revolt did not fade away. The treasury was emptied with little prospect of replenishing it. Wood suggested to the home office that the Sultan could show a return on Tunisian help in the Crimean War and extend a

110 Ganiage, pp. 253-256.
111 Grandchamp, I, 75-76, de Beauval to Drouyn de Lhuys, 5 May 1864.
loan of 100,000 pounds. Further, in response to offers from both France and Italy, to place their troops at the disposal of the Bey, Wood suggested that the Porte send Egyptian recruits as aid. This would avoid any charge of intervention and could be supported on grounds of a religious bond.  

All during the time Wood was trying to make suitable arrangements with the Vizir and the Ottoman Commissioner, de Beauval had embarked upon another course of action. Restrained by directives from the Quai d'Orsay, the consul undertook a personal policy, which he well knew was supported in some circles, to manipulate the downfall of the government.  

Sometime during the month of May, de Beauval began writing to Ali ben Ghadam, the most widely recognized leader of the rebellion.  

In the letter of 1 June, the French consul stated, in summary fashion, what he was trying to do and why. He portrayed all of his actions as support of the people's Bey and the revolt. He argued that the dispatch of French ships was for the purpose of forcing Muhammad al-Sadiq to accede to the demands of the revolt. He then proceeded to give Ghadam another

---

112. FO 102/71, Wood to Russell, secret and confidential, 20 June 1864.  

113. Three of these letters were later given to the Bey and published by Broadley, I, 128-135.
reason for revolting by recounting the evils arising from
the British Convention of October, 1863. First was the
loss of their land to Englishmen because they had more
money with which to purchase land and work it. Secondly,
they wanted to build railroads and keep them, thus taking
possession of the country. Thirdly, they wished to open a
bank in Tunis to lend money to the people, thereby
becoming their lord. And fourthly, all mineral deposits
would belong to the English and be worked as they saw fit.
After this, de Beauval vented his anger toward the Vizir
and summed up his objectives: "These nefarious transactions
. . . have aroused the anger of my government, and its
object in sending the fleet is to obtain dismissal of the
Minister and the abrogation of the Organic Laws, upon
which the aforesaid treaty is founded." He added that
revoking the Constitution would cause the fall of the Vizir
in addition to cancelling the treating. As to the abroga-
tion of the Constitution it would carry with it the
annulment of the aforesaid treaty, as well as the fall of
the Minister.\(^{114}\) Then he warned Ali that the Bey was
sending an operation against him.

\(^{114}\)Ibid., I, 130.
CHAPTER III DECLINE OF
REFORMS 1864-1873

Once the Bey had suspended the Abd al-Aman and the Constitution, reformism was also suspended. The indigenous reformers were not in favor and, because of the revolt, there appeared little hope of further westernizing the Regency. By July, the revolt in the Regency had not diminished in seriousness. The nomadic tribes were still up in arms, while most of the cities and towns along the coast also experienced evidence of or had fallen victim to the rebellion. Through it all, the Bey's government persisted. The Bey and his ministers continued to try to divide the opposition and to whittle away at the insurgents. On 30 May the coastal city of Sfax was engulfed in the rebellion, and the Europeans fled the city to board the English corvette stationed there. The rebels demanded that the Bey raise the green flag of the Prophet and they swore their allegiance to the Sultan. The following day, Sousse witnessed a repeat of the same events. By 3 June all

1ARGT, Espina to de Beauval, 3 June 1864, cited by Ganiage, 235.
of the coast had been thrown into chaos by the rebels. The latent antagonism harbored by the Arabs against the Bey was fanned into open flame by the success of the tribesmen and perhaps more especially by the presence of European gun boats along the coast. The outbreak of hostilities along the coast caused even greater concern for the court at Bardo.

In this situation of despair, Wood's proposals of a stronger attachment to the Sublime Porte began to appear more reasonable. No doubt Mustapha Khaznadar was first won over to it in the many sessions he had with Wood and Haydar. Once convinced, the Vizir easily brought the Bey around to accepting the same attitude. Wood drew out the problem in the context of French domination versus Ottoman domination. A continued independent stance or anything less than closer ties to Istanbul would mean becoming another French conquest, the same as Algeria. Further, Wood clarified that the Porte must not try to reduce Tunisia to the same status as Egypt.

The willingness of the Bey to strengthen relations with Istanbul brought immediate returns. In the middle of August, the Sultan sent a gift of 50,000 pounds, so

---

2 Ibid., 3 June 1864, cited by Ganiage, 235.
3 To 102/70, Wood to Russell, 15 July 1864.
that he would put down the revolt. This money proved very useful in hiring more troops and did materially contribute to the cessation of hostilities. No doubt in part because it displayed the fact that the Sultan supported the Bey and would not accept anyone else in his place. Already, late in July, the rebellion in the interior had been overcome. The Vizir's policy of dividing the rebels so as to prevent unification or coordinated attacks proved successful. Actually, there was no conspiracy against the Bey, rather a multitude of rivalries, all expressing their discontent with the taxes and other things—all at the same time. The government attempted to reduce the friction when the Bey renounced the increase in the mejba and suspended the Constitution, both on 21 April. This step brought no response from the rebels, so the revolt continued.

When Ali ben Ghadam accepted the Bey's offer of amnesty on 26 July, it signaled the end of the popular revolt. That left the coastal uprisings to be dealt with. However, the attempt to send the army against the rebel strongholds brought on a riot in Tunis. Thus, the gift of

\[4^\text{FO 102/72, Wood to Russell, 20 August 1864; Broadley, I, 137.}\]

\[5^\text{Perry to Seward, 23 April 1864; ARGT, Khaznadar to de Beauval, 14 April 1864, cited in Ganiage, p. 229.}\]

\[6^\text{FO 102/72, Wood to Russell, 29 July 1864.}\]
the Sultan came at a most opportune time and allowed the Bey to recruit fresh troops, who were in turn sent southward to pacify the coastal region. This task was finally accomplished by early October.7

Overcoming the revolt left the problem of the presence of the foreign naval units in Tunisian waters. So long as the Turkish force remained, so would the French and Italian squadrons.8 A week was spent discussing how the withdrawal would take place, and finally a program was agreed upon. On 23 September, the Turkish squadron sailed first, followed by the French and Italians.9 Two British vessels remained at anchor, then a week later the flagship of Rear-Admiral Yelverton, the Revenge, sailed for Malta.10

The final episode of the revolt arose from the conviction of the Vizir and the Bey to strengthen ties with the Porte. In November, Khayr al-Din was chosen to convey to Abd al-Aziz, the Bey's gratitude for the help rendered during the rebellion. This official reason for the mission

7FO 102/72, Wood to Russell, 8 October 1864.
8FO 102/72, Wood to Yelverton, 25 August 1864.
9Broadley, I, 124-135.
10FO 102/72, Wood to Yelverton, 25 August 1864, cited by Ganiage, p. 266.
was at best their guise for the actual purpose, to implement the government's desire to strengthen relations and draw closer to the Porte. Khayr al-Din was set to sail on 17 November. However, when de Beauval learned of the true object of the envoy, he demanded an audience with His Highness on 12 November.

The French consul demanded the mission be cancelled and threatened to stop it by force, if necessary. The Vizir convened the cabinet, and it was decided the envoy should depart as soon as possible. Khayr al-Din boarded ship and after two attempts at delay by the French, sailed away to Istanbul. De Beauval wrote Paris that Khayr al-Din was on a mission secretly to place the Regency under the superiority of the Sublime Porte. Nevertheless, the consul had badly blundered in trying to stop the departure of the mission, and this finally caused his recall on 3 January, 1865.

After de Bauval's precipitous action, Wood assured the Tunisian government of British support and, if need arose, protection. This same protection was extended to Khaznadar in the event he was forced to resign. In

---

11 Broadley, I, 138-139; FO 102/72, Wood to Russell, 26 November 1864.

12 ARGT, de Beauval to Drouyn de Lhuys, 12 November 1864, cited by Ganiage, p. 271.

13 FO 102/70, Wood to Russell, secret, 10 December 1864; FO 102/75, Russell to Wood, 10 January 1865.
December, 1864, Wood had requested Russell to authorize him to assure the Vizir of political asylum in England. Wood stated that in the strained atmosphere, Mustapha would not be assured of his personal safety were he to remain in the Regency if he had to resign.\textsuperscript{14}

The mission of Khayr al-Din in Istanbul did not go according to plan. The Tunisian mamluk was well received at the Palace. But during the remainder of November and the first part of December, the French Foreign Office brought to bear on the Porte all the pressure of opposition they could muster. The French Ambassador in Istanbul, the Marquis de Moustier, told Ali Pasha, the Foreign Minister, that Franco did not want the Porte as a neighbor. Further, Drouyn de Lhuys telegraphed that the Sultan must preserve without any change the status quo at Tunis as an absolute condition of maintaining the good relations with the Porte.\textsuperscript{15} The French government enlisted the aid of the Italians once again.\textsuperscript{16}

It is interesting to note that November was the very month in which the Vizir, Fuad Pasha and Midhat Pasha

\textsuperscript{14}Wood Papers, MS, dated 10 December 1864.

\textsuperscript{15}AE, Turkey, Brouyn de Lhuys to de Moustier, quoted in Ganiage, p. 275; HA 44/12, Camil Pasha to Ali Pasha, 23 December 1864, cited by Gayci, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{16}AE, Turkey, Drouyn de Lhuys to de Moustier, quoted in Ganiage, pp. 277-278.
wrote a new law reforming the provincial administration of the empire. It was promulgated shortly before the arrival of Khayr al-Din.\textsuperscript{17} (There is no evidence to link the Porte's consideration of Tunisia with the work being done on administrative reform in the provinces.)

The British Ambassador presented a proposal drawn up by Wood,\textsuperscript{18} which enlarged the submission of the Bey to the Porte. This caused a letter to be drawn up by Fuad, stating the traditional relationship between the two. As the new year opened and pressures against any firman regarding the Bey increased, Khayr al-Din returned to Tunis with only the Vizirial letter of 20 December, 1864, as a reward for his mission.\textsuperscript{19} It stated that the public prayers and coinage were to be continued in the name of the Sultan; the flag should remain; and all relations with the Sublime Porte should continue. All internal functions were to be exercised by the Bey as were relations with other powers and finally, "the inheriting Prince shall send and solicit the Imperial Firman (of investiture) \textsuperscript{[sic]} which shall be granted to him according to custom."\textsuperscript{20} Thus the failure to get a firman was taken to be a French check of the British policy.

\textsuperscript{17}Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 146.
\textsuperscript{18}FO 102/72. Wood to Russell, 26 November 1864.
\textsuperscript{19}Full text may be found in Broadley, I, 354-357, Appendix K.
\textsuperscript{20}\textit{Ibid.}, I, 356.
Wood had successfully prevented French intervention into Tunisian affairs at a time when the Bey would have been unable to resist. Had it not been for British support, it is not unreasonable to assume that Tunisia would have been annexed to Algeria. However, because of excessive terms of the British demands for a firman, the initiative was blunted and French policy was not completely defeated. The French certainly exercised some influence upon the Sultan. The Porte was not willing to alienate France; therefore, the Ottoman Ambassador in Paris was instructed to obtain French approval for issuing a firman on Tunisia, but in an absolutely confidential manner.21

Once the revolt had been overcome and no firman was forthcoming regarding the relations of the Porte to the Regency, other problems began to command attention—primarily finances. For almost five years the financial troubles had dominated the court and its actions.

The internal systems of the Regency had suffered a tremendous shock because of the revolt. The natural and human resources declined drastically in the next few years after the insurrection of 1864. There were crop failures, drought, famine, epidemics and especially of cholera, all within a five year span of time. The coastal plane, the

\footnote{HA 45/3, Ali Pasha to Suffet Pasha, 30 August and 8 October 1865, cited in Çayci, p. 12.}
Sahel, which was the most heavily populated region, "returned to a primitive state"; 22 it was "the worst famine known in a century." 23 The American consul said that cholera diminished the population, depressed business and this, coupled with crop failures, famine and typhus, cast a gloom over the land. 24 The numbers of livestock decreased, and the average individual had difficulty just meeting the bare necessities of life, especially outside the larger cities. During the winter of 1867-68, "more than a hundred people died each day in Tunis from hunger and exposure." 25

The total impact of those five years meant the population was reduced approximately one-fifth, the livestock two-thirds, cultivated land about one-half, and dwellings outside the cities one-half. 26

The terrible social conditions which afflicted the Regency after 1864 only served to exacerbate the financial difficulties. Once the insurrection had been overcome, the Bey found there was no money remaining in the treasury.


23d'Estournelles, p. 44.

24Perry, p. 208.

25Diyaf, quoted by Poncet, p. 325.

26Ibid., 327-328.
Already, revenues were depressed because of the many months of upheaval and turmoil. Nevertheless, Tunisia was thought to be a sound risk in certain financial circles in Paris, most specifically in the office of Erlanger and Company. On 1 November, a contract was signed at Bardo committing the Bey to a loan of 15,000,000 francs at 7% with the customs revenues pledged to pay it off.27

Apparently, the profits were so attractive that a friend of Erlanger, Hermann Oppenheim, offered to the Vizir in December yet another loan, this one for 10,000,000 francs. The guarantee was to be the qanun or tax on the olive trees. On 9 February, 1865, an agreement was signed by representatives of the banking houses and the Tunisian government, dividing the total 25,000,000 francs equally between the two bankers, with the same guarantees: customs and qanun. The French Minister of Finance, Achille Fould, supported by Drouyn de Lhuys, approved the loan.28 The bonds were placed on sale and the weekly financial newspaper Semaine financière commented, "The Bey of Tunis now is under the moral protection of France."29

27 AE, Tunis, 12, quoted by Ganiage, p. 288.

28 Archives Nationale, F 30.240. Drouyn de Lhuys to Fould. 27 February and 11 March 1865; Fould to de Lhuys, 18 March 1865; quoted by Ganiage, p. 289.

29 Quoted by Ganiage, p. 290.
The loan of 1865 proved to be another windfall for the bankers, their agents, and Mustapha Khaznadar, just as that of 1863 had been. The bankers took for brokerage fees, commission and other expenses, almost 4,500,000 francs. Then Erlanger deposited in Khaznadar's private account 2,000,000 francs.\(^{30}\)

The Bey was to receive 100 new rifled cannons in lieu of 1,000,000 francs from Erlanger. Those delivered were old pieces of scrap which cost no more than 200,000 francs.\(^{31}\) Also, Erlanger purchased 20,000 rifles, uniforms, and thousands of barrels of powder for the Bey.\(^{32}\)

In addition to these items for the army, other arrangements were made to increase the navy. Erlanger agreed to supply the Bey with a dispatch boat, invoiced at 750,000 francs, and a frigate, estimated to be worth 2,410,000 francs. The frigate turned out to be only a corvette and was actually valued at 1,000,000.\(^{33}\) Also, two unarmed vessels, in a state of disrepair, were delivered

\(^{30}\)AE, TD, 12, Report by Villet, 19 May 1872, cited by Ganiage, pp. 292-293.

\(^{31}\)Ibid., cited in Ganiage, p. 294.

\(^{32}\)A Tunis, Doss 284 carton 110, Schmidt and Plock to Khaznadar, 22 March 1865, cited by Ganiage, p. 295.

\(^{33}\)AE, TD, 12, Report by Villet, cited by Ganiage, p. 295.
and left to rot off La Goulette, at a price of 500,000 francs. This represented approximately 1,600,000 francs more profit for Erlanger. The last portion of the loan was given over as an issue of new coinage for the Regency. Erlanger had struck and shipped to Tunis new copper money. There were two shipments totaling 956 barrels and invoiced at almost 1,500,000 francs.

Tunisia found that the loan did give them some new playthings but did not help the financial conditions, which were actually worsened by the new loan. It is said, "Three months after the conclusion of the loan, the Tunisian government was already reduced to makeshift means." Reduced income and increased interest payments all added up to another crisis. This was staved off by three small loans from the Comptoir d'Escompte of 5,500,000 francs at 6% semi-annually, plus 1% commission for Erlanger. This tactic worked until January, 1867. By this means the note due on the loan of 1863 was met on time.

34 Ganiage, p. 294.
35 A Tunis, Doss. 284 carton 110, 5-20 December 1864 and 20 March-22 May 1865, cited in Ganiage, p. 295.
36 Ganiage, p. 298.
37 ARGТ, Moulin to Drouyn de Lhuys, Tunis, 10 July 1865.
The Vizir, in 1866, began selling large quantities of olive and grain at very low prices. This deprived the treasury of income that otherwise would have accumulated if those items had been sold at fair market prices. Of course, the action brought a loud protest from the French consul, Gustave Duchesse de Bellecourt. In January of that same year Khaznadar had tried to get 115,000,000 francs in Paris, enough to pay the loans and have 20,000,000 francs left to apply to current expenses. But none of those houses approached were interested; apparently, Tunisia had become a bad risk.

At home the administration could borrow no money from local sources. By the summer of 1866, the government had stopped paying on the internal debt and was in arrears with its bills. This caused the local merchants to complain because many were citizens of or protected by a foreign power. The European consuls began to register the complaints at the Bardo court. In July and August the payment on local debts was entirely suspended. It was into this atmosphere that Khaznadar chose to throw the new copper


40 Ibid., 24 June 1866 and 10 August 1866, cited in Ganiage, p. 303.
money, obtained from Erlanger. The merchants refused to accept it at anything more than 25% of its face value. 41

In addition to all the other troubles, 1866 was a year of drought. This caused further dislocations in the treasury. Italy threatened to break off diplomatic relations because the government would not pay the debts accumulated by members of the royal family. The disagreement was finally settled when the Bey paid only about 30% of the total sum. 42

The countryside was ravaged by drought and disease. Typhus and cholera epidemics took a great toll of lives in the years 1867 and 1868. Livestock died from exposure and neglect. 43

During those very troubled times, further difficulties were created by another attempted revolt. In September, 1867, some mountain tribes raised the standard of revolt, hoping it would bring them some relief from the terrible conditions which existed in the country. The younger brother of the Bey, al-Adil, placed himself at the head of the rebel forces, wanting to unseat al-Sadiq. It was widely believed that there was a large plot to assassinate the Bey and other members of the government.

41 Ganiage, p. 304.
42 Broadley, I, 143.
43 Diyaf, VII, cited by Ganiage, p. 311.
Early in October, two of the Bey's advisers were garroted. A force was sent against the rebels and returned victorious. Al-Adil was brought back to Tunis as a prisoner and died a month later in the dungeon at Bardo. 44

By the end of 1867, the French consul, François de Botmiliau, saw only one solution for the troubles of the Regency: a French occupation. This, he believed, would end the corruption present in high office, stabilize the social and financial disorder and allow the country once again to return to normal. 45 The French cabinet declined to intervene, preferring to work for a return on French investments in the Regency.

Financial interests in Paris proposed a conversion of all the Bey's indebtedness into one account. La Banque de Crédit International made this proposal which was to include a Tunisian National Bank. Erlanger and others who were profiting from the Tunisian government's mismanagement, raised a storm of protest, both in financial and diplomatic circles in Paris. They were able to forestall sharing any of their profits with others. 46

44 ARGT, 57, 12 November 1867, cited by Ganiage, p. 311; Brodley, I, 143-144.
45 ARGT, 63, Botmiliau to de Moustier, 2 December 1867, cited by Ganiage, p. 312.
46 Ganiage, pp. 320-325.
Bankruptcy appeared to be the only answer for the Tunisian government. Finally, after extended negotiations among the French, British, and Italian governments, an agreement was reached which would permit the establishment of a debt retirement commission. On 5 July, 1869, the Bey promulgated the decree giving over to the Finance Commission control of all Tunisian finances. The Commission was to be chaired by a Tunisian with a French Inspector of Finances and representatives of the governments of the Bey, France, Great Britain, and Italy as other members.

Khayr al-Din was brought back into administrative circles as the President while France named Villet as the Inspector of Finances. These two men were both dedicated to the goal of termination of the chaos and regularizing the financial affairs of the government. The first task was to go over all the accounts and launch a program of fiscal responsibility. This program of conversions and debt retirement was announced the following year and put into effect immediately.

---

47 State Papers, 65, 742; Ganiage, pp. 367-368.
48 Broadley, I, 146-147.
50 State Papers, 67, 500-506, 23 March 1870.
Once some internal order had been reestablished, the political area also became reactivated. Italy had threatened to break off relations with the Bey and there were rumors of an Italian invasion. This situation worked to the advantage of Wood. The British consul convinced Khaznadar and the Bey once again to take up the idea of soliciting a firman from the Sublime Porte and strengthening ties with the Ottoman Empire. In this manner, Wood argued, the French and Italian designs on the Regency would be frustrated. Therefore, in September, 1871, Khayr al-Din once again was sent to Istanbul on the mission of seeking a firman.

This time the Bey's envoy was successful. Khayr al-Din writes, "We reached an accord and a firman was promulgated on the basis of the viziral letter I had previously obtained." The firman was published on 23 October, 1871, and provided for the hereditary succession of the royal family, the obligation to send troops if the Porte were threatened, and forbade the making of any treaties which might alter the boundaries of the Empire.  

51 Mzali and Pignon, p. 200.  
52 State Papers, 61, 104-106; Broadley, I, Appendix K, pp. 254-257.
The administration of Mustapha Khaznadar had declined steadily since the inauguration of the Finance Commission. As the Inspector of Finances pursued his investigation into the difficulties of the Regency, he uncovered more and more damning evidence against the Vizir. Despite the mounting facts against Mustapha, the Bey still would not dismiss him. Finally, the situation changed because a new young man captured the fancy of al-Sadiq. Mustapha ben Ismail became the new protege of the Bey, and he convinced the sovereign to dismiss Khaznadar in October, 1873. Thus, under investigation and confined to his home, Khaznadar, after thirty-six years fell from power. Khayr al-Din was named to be the new Vizir.

The appointment of Khayr al-Din as Vizir provided Tunisia with almost four years of good government. The basic ideas of this Circassian mamluk were responsible government, limitation of the power of the monarch, and renewal of the classic spirit of religion while at the same time partaking of the modern ideas of government.

The new vizir had been in various positions in the government since shortly after 1840. He had served as
Minister, President of the Grand Council, and special envoy of the Bey — twice to Istanbul. In 1862, he resigned, apparently because of a difference with Khaznadar over seeking foreign loans.¹ For seven years Khayr al-Din remained outside the government, with the exception of the mission to Istanbul in 1864. During that time, he wrote *The Surest Path to Knowledge Concerning the Conditions of Countries* ² which set forth his ideas concerning government and the functions of the state.

Upon taking office in 1873, Khayr al-Din found himself in charge of a government shot through with corruption, heavily in debt, both foreign and domestic, and weighed down by thirty-six years of continued bad management and corrupt government. Kayr al-Din appointed an entirely new cabinet: all but one of his own choosing. His choices were all liberal, enlightened men, of like mind with himself. Minister of War Roustam, Minister of Public Instruction Hussein, and Minister of the Interior Muhammad

¹Brown, pp. 30-31; Hourani suggests the difference was whether the ministers should be responsible to the Bey or Grand Council, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 85.

²The Maqaddima or Introduction has been translated by L. Carl Brown, *The Surest Path: The Political Treatise of a Nineteenth Century Muslim Statesman* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967). This work also contains an extended exposition of the man and his times.
Khaznadar were experienced members of the government and had always been in the minority as far as their views were concerned. Muhammad ben Mustapha Bayram, the nephew of the leader of the religious community and from an outstanding old Tunisian family, was named Director of al-Zaytuna, the Grand Mosque. The one minister forced on the Vizir was Mustapha ben Ismail. The favorite of the Bey, he proved to be singularly inept in anything other than maintaining the support of al-Sadiq.

One of the first tasks the new regime turned to was to discredit the old one. An investigation into Mustapha Khaznadar's financial situation was begun and it proved to be very damning. Since the loan of 1863, he was charged with embezzling more than 21,000,000 francs. This with compounded interest for eight or ten years brought up his theft to the total of 53,000,000 francs.\(^3\) Mustapha then turned over to the state certain of his properties, jewels, advances from Erlanger, and cash amounting to 13,000,000 and was to pay 7,000,000 francs over the succeeding fourteen years.\(^4\)

\(^3\) AETD, 12, Inquiry of Villet, 16 December 1873, cited in Ganiage, p. 438.

\(^4\) AETD, Vallat to Decazer, Tunis, 24 January 1874 and annex; A Tunis carton 8; carton 6, Doss 72-77, cited by Ganiage, p. 439.
The new Vizir was an old hand at governmental affairs. He had served three successive beys: Ahmad, Muhammad, and al-Sadiq. Khayr al-Din had been purchased in Istanbul in 1840 as a mamluk for the court of Ahmad. He was of Circassian origin and next to nothing is known of his family, youth, or even exact birth date. In accordance with the customary practice he was probably about twelve to fifteen years old upon entering the service of the Tunisian Bey. In Tunisia Khayr al-Din was sent to the new École Polytechnique, where he learned French and was influenced by not just the French instructors but also Muhammad Qabadu, the Tunisian director of the École. Qabadu was a man of wide ranging talents and was credited with being the originator of a philosophy of Islamic revival and reform, which took hold among the intellectuals and even commanded respect from the leaders of the Grand Mosque, the religious community, and the Sharia.

Excelling as a student, Khayr al-Din rose quickly: aide-de-camp in 1849, four years in Paris as the representative of the Tunisian government in a case of extended litigation against a former Tunisian citizen, and in 1857

---

5 Brown, pp. 29-30.
7 For details of this Ben Ayad affair, see Ganiage, pp. 181-185.
he entered the cabinet as Minister of Marine. When the Grand Council was formed, he was selected president. In 1859, upon the ascension to the throne of al-Sadiq, Khayr al-Din was part of the mission sent to the Sublime Porte to solicit the firman of investiture. This was no doubt partly because he spoke Ottoman Turkish as well as the fact that he was a bright young star in the Tunisian government. He had married the daughter of the Vizir, Mustapha Khaznadar, and was thus assured a lifelong place for himself in government service, if he so chose. But he did not choose to remain in service when it threatened his ideals absorbed and forged out in his years of the École Polytechnique and in France. In 1862 he resigned his office over differences with Khaznadar concerning foreign loans. With the exception of his mission to the Porte in 1864, Khayr al-Din lived mostly abroad in self-imposed exile. In 1869, with the creation of the international debt commission, he returned to government service as the chief officer for the government. Upon the dismissal of Khaznadar, Khayr al-Din was named to replace him.

Shortly before his death in 1889, Khayr al-Din reflected upon his taking the reins of government in Tunisia (he also served as Grand Vizir to the Sultan in Istanbul for some months in 1878-1879 after his dismissal from the court at Bardo) stating, "The principal cause of all the troubles which overwhelmed the Regency was a
detestable administration which had as immediate effect the loss by the ruling authority of its prestige and the confidence of the people. . . .

The new administrative system was to be one filled with mamluks and motivated by a sense of noblesse oblige. The new Vizir lived and thought in an Islamic world, and although many of his ideas approached or resembled democracy, he did not advocate it. Good government was the keynote, and that meant reforming the corrupt practices which had existed before so as to operate the government in accordance with enlightened Islamic teachings. Also, he desired an honest responsible government, one responsive to the needs of the people governed. His program might be summed up in terms of honest efficient administration, reforms, just taxes, public security in the realm, emphasis upon religion, and education. By such means there would be restored to the people a sense of confidence in the government. When these reforms were effected, the government would become more efficient, win over support and the aid of the people, and all would benefit. Further, this would enable the Regency to maintain its freedom from foreign control.

Tunisia was faced with the problem of French and Ottoman designs, upon her territorial integrity. France began her Second Empire in Algeria in 1830 and looked to

---

8Brown, p. 32.
Tunisia as a state for future expansion. The Ottomans reasserted their force over Libya in 1835, thus placing Tunisia between two territories controlled from afar. Consequently, one constant problem of Tunisian policy was to maintain a balance among those wielding power at Bardo. Khayr al-Din had resigned in 1862 because of Khaznadar's desire to negotiate foreign loans. Apparently, that upset the system and endangered independence. He was willing to serve on the debt commission because it had authority, operated honestly and efficiently, and wanted to free his country of the financial burden they had been duped into assuming.

Khayr al-Din realized that Tunisia's place in the nineteenth century Mediterranean was quite a problem. One student of Khayr al-Din remarks that he did the following:

1) Followed his attitude in consideration of the Ottoman Empire in spite of the opposition to the European powers.  
2) Justify in their eyes the retieing of Tunisia to the Ottoman Empire. 3) Rigorously maintain equal balance among the powers. 4) Maintain good relations with each one.

Early in his career he had come to the conclusion that the Regency must take on some reforms similar to governmental functions in the West. More important to Khayr al-Din's

way of thinking was the revival of Islam in its best form.

In his own words:

I was the only man of influence who had energetically sustained the rights of Turkey over the Regency of Tunis and who had searched by every possible means for the existence and prosperity of the little state, in maintaining on the one side with the Ottoman Empire the broad ties imposed by religion and politics and on the other keeping up good relations with the European powers.10

The traditional balance of power had been to avoid French encroachments. The British policy had served this purpose well, especially when it was represented by a man such as Richard Wood. The general objectives of both were similar: to prevent French control of Tunisia and strengthen her ties with the Porte. However, this did not make close friends nor open allies of the two. Wood was older and had made his association with Mustapha Khaznadar. For Wood this was perhaps the better of the two in that Khaznadar could be cajoled and changed but Khayr al-Din remained steadfast in his ideas and goals. Nonetheless Wood played a major role in helping institute reforms and making it possible for Khayr al-Din to exist and come to power.

France had early supported reforms, from the time of Ahmad Bey until the Constitution of 1861, apparently because of the assumption that it would strengthen France's

10Mzali and Pignon, p. 212.
influence at Bardo and help prepare the way for French intervention. After that time Roches began to fall behind in the competition between English and French interests in Tunisia. Thereafter, for some years, French consuls were unable to compete with Wood on equal terms and re-establish the weight French influence once had in the Regency.

In place of an improvement of the international situation, which might have otherwise developed because of reduced French prestige, the new arrangement soon saw yet another state display its interest in taking control of the Regency: Italy. In the upheaval of 1864, the recently unified Kingdom of Italy displayed her great interest in Tunisia, even to the point of armed invasion. The end result was simply more troubles for Tunisian independence. Once again the star pupil of the École Polytechnique was dispatched to Istanbul. He stated it was because he was known as the most vigorous exponent of refastening the links between Tunis and Istanbul.  

For the succeeding five years there were continuous troubles in the Regency: social, meteorological, agricultural, financial, culminating in the International Finance Commission of which Khayr al-Din served as President. This assured France of continued influence in the Regency, even after the unglorious defeat in 1870. In

---

11Ibid., p. 188.
1871, Khayr al-Din was sent to the Porte for the second time to solicit a firman on the relationship of the two states and drawing Tunisia more firmly into the orbit of the Ottoman Empire. The envoy arrived shortly after Ali Pasha's death and after long discussions obtained the firman. But little change was effected and it was not even recognized by France other than to be opposed.

In 1873 Khayr al-Din was given the opportunity to implement his ideas on government. This he desired to make a success by providing the state with security, liberty, and justice. These would come through a system of governmental accountability, would give the people the guarantees they needed, and would seek to protect their life, property and honor. Further, he believed states advanced when ruled justly and declined otherwise. He stood firmly within the traditional bounds of Islam, although by training and experience he had been favorably exposed to Western thought, especially in the political-governmental realm.

Khayr al-Din had travelled widely and accepted the tanzimat, but his philosophy was worked out within the

---

12 Brown, p. 49.

13 Ibid., p. 59.
religious bounds of Islam. He adhered to the lines of classical Islamic thinkers and precedents, asking only that secular advancements from the West be introduced. In this manner, using what Western techniques were useful, Islam could reassert itself and once again take its place of primacy in the world.

The specific incidents of Khayr al-Din's term of office brought another conclusion to the story. Internal reform took up the tax question. The collection systems, relying on military expeditions or farming out the taxes, were stopped, and in each provincial district the qa'id or khalifa was given the responsibility of collecting taxes, and was allowed to keep one-tenth for himself. These measures helped to increase the revenues of state.

Khayr al-Din encouraged a revival of agriculture, which had never regained its pre-1864 levels. The Vizir estimated that in his years in office the amount of cultivated land almost doubled. The administration enabled more land to be planted in olive trees, giving over formerly unused public domain territory to be planted in olives. The harvests were good in 1873, 1874, and again in 1875. The increased revenues coming into the treasury

---


15 Mzali and Pignon, p. 196.

16 Bompard, Decrees, 18 December 1875, cited in Ganiage, p. 454.
through a more efficient collection system significantly increased the funds available to the government. These increases were in turn applied to the national debt. By 1875, the coupons on the debt had been paid, all arrears met, and still there were surplus funds. In a desire to free the government, the Vizir directed the monies to be used to pay off their bonds early; thus, 460 of them were repurchased. After two more good years, 2,350 had been paid, representing a substantial future savings to the government. 17

The city of Tunis received due attention. There were practically no public services operating in the capital. Khayr al-Din started crews to cleaning the streets, repairing buildings, installing sewers, paving streets, lighting some streets, and enlarging the police force. Also, the first Muslim hospital, Sadiqi, for the city was begun, although it did not open its doors until 1879. 18

The native sector of the city also benefitted.

Foreign goods had worked an extreme hardship on the trade

---

17 AET, 4 and 42, 12 August 1874 and 3 August 1875; FO 102/123 "Rapport sur l'exercice quinquennal 1870-1875 de la gestion des Revenues concédés," table 29, cited in Ganiage, pp. 452-453.

18 Ganiage, p. 454.
unions especially in Tunis. The new administration tried to inject new life into the unions by revising their work codes and hours of work, as well as the relations between masters and apprentices. The sale of their goods suffered from the marketing of imported merchandise from Europe and that called into question the Capitulations and rights of foreigners. Khayr al-Din wanted to increase the import duties on foreign goods so that the local products might better compete with them, but the European consuls presented a unified opposition to any hint of change. 19

Further obstacles were met when Khayr al-Din tried to carry to completion the project of mixed courts to judge cases which involved Tunisians and Europeans. The Ahd al-Aman had called for such courts in 1857, but still there was opposition to the creation of such benches in 1875.

Most of the European powers represented at Bardo had availed themselves of the constitutional provision in 1861 to receive the right to hold real property in the Regency: starting with Great Britain in 1863, thereafter Austria in 1866, France in 1871 and Belgium in 1880. 20

19 AT, carton 59 and 72, cited in Ganiage, p. 455.

There were, however, no other concessions made to Tunisian justice over foreign nationals. France did not want to establish a precedent which might jeopardize her interests in other Muslim countries. Finally, in April, 1874, all the consuls had given preliminary approval. Khayr al-Din decided to set up a pilot project while awaiting final approval by the home governments. In July, he named a Frenchman and Englishman to sit with a Tunisian president on a mixed tribunal to judge cases not exceeding 1,000 piasters.\(^{21}\) This seemingly was an affront to Italy, despite the fact that the mixed court functioned satisfactorily. Italy did not send her approval and likewise France helped kill this project by not sending her approval.\(^{22}\) It was filed away and never revived after Khayr al-Din was dismissed from office.

It was very much in character that Khayr al-Din approached this same problem of the rights of foreigners from another angle: the Islamic side. About the time the foreign powers frustrated the mixed courts, Khayr al-Din launched another project, this time based upon the reasoning that, due to differing legal traditions within Islam and the resulting differences in application of the laws, 

\(^{21}\) AET, 41, dispatch of de Billing, 18 July 1874, cited in Ganiage, p. 458.

\(^{22}\) F0 102/106 Derby to Wood, 22 August 1874; 102/101, Wood to Derby, 2 August 1875, cited in Ganiage, p. 458.
if a unified law code were in force, the European nations could be subjected to it. A large part of the origins of the Capitulations had been due to the different traditions of interpreting the law in Islamic countries. Tunisia recognized the two traditions, the Hanifi and Malaki rites; therefore, Khayr al-Din appointed a commission of religious scholars with representatives of both schools and of Muslim merchants to draw up a single code which all could accept and enforce. This then would be presented to the European powers in lieu of mixed courts. This project also failed apparently because the Hanifites and Malakites could not agree.23

The Vizir did have success with the religious community on other projects. One was the creation of a commission to administer the habous (waqf in eastern territories).24 The habous were those properties placed in religious trust, and their regulation had fallen on bad days. A member of the religious leadership and fellow reformer, Muhammad Bayram, was placed in charge of this commission.25 Also, Khayr al-Din encouraged the expansion of the Muslim schools, kuttab,26 and reformed the course of

26AET, 9, cited in Ganiage, p. 455.
instruction at the Zaytuna Mosque. The habous commission had as one of its early tasks the administration of property recently acquired by the government. This particular property was used to support an institution of learning, al-Sadiqi, created by decree on 13 January, 1875, to offer not only Koranic studies but also Western languages, mathematics, and sciences. It was an appropriate use of Mustapha Khaznadar's former holdings, especially in that the Sadiqi became the training ground for some of the leading "Young Tunisians" of the next generation. That same year saw the founding of the first public library in Tunis which incorporated Khaznadar's books and 1,000 donated by Khayr al-Din himself.

The position of Khayr al-Din regarding Tunisia's place in the Mediterranean may be analyzed in two parts: first, the relations with the consuls; and second, the relations with the Porte. A major guideline followed in

---

27 Bompard, Decrees, 26 December 1875 and 22 January 1876, cited in Ganiage, p. 456.
28 Ganiage, p. 456.
30 Mzali and Pignon, p. 193.
dealing with consuls was to be even-handed. In addition to
this the Vizir sought to pursue his goal of closer ties
with the Porte despite the opposition of some of the
consuls and even to justify such closer relations to the
opponents. Also, he had to maintain good relations with
each of the powers. Until the time he took office in
1873, Khayr al-Din's policies had coincided with those of
Great Britain and clashed with those of France and Italy.

The Vizir desired to utilize Western technical
knowledge and consequently granted certain economic
concessions. The gas works and the only railroad were
owned by Englishmen. There was an English bank, the light-
houses had been build by British firms, and Englishmen
held rights on certain mineral deposits. Wood had begun to
obtain economic concessions and bring capital into the
Regency. The French consul, Théodore Roustan, was working
for the same goal for France; however, only the telegraphic
service was backed by French capital. Italy had gained the
right to operate a shipping line along the coast from Tunis
to Sfax, linking it up with the service to Italy.32

31 Demeersman, "Indépendance," p. 236.
However, by 1875 the picture began to change: the gas company changed hands, the bank closed, and there was no work done on any further expansion of the rail system. After a good start, British capital decided not to invest in Tunisia and left Wood holding the bag. Khayr al-Din transferred the rail concession to a French company over the protests of Wood, in July, 1875. The Italian consul, Luigi Pinna, obtained concessions for lead mines and a fishery.

Khayr al-Din tried to balance the role of each of the three leading consuls but found it impossible to accomplish such a task. When the Russo-Turkish War began in April, 1877, he was no longer welcome at the French consulate. Roustan had not been satisfied with the

---

33 FO 102/100 Wilkinson to Wood, 22 October 1874; 27 and 31 October 1874 Wood to Derby; 102/102 Balfour to Bourke, 15 June 1875, cited in Ganiage, p. 464. Actually, with Wilkinson's decision not to go ahead with the railroad the die was cast and all future British investments in Tunisia killed. This may also be taken as the opening event of the episode culminating with the establishment of a French Protectorate over Tunisia. After the decision not to invest in the Regency, there followed the decision to stop advocating stronger links with the Porte, the retirement of Wood, and the throwing of Tunisia into the hands of the French at the Congress of Berlin, 1878.

34 d'Estournelles, p. 74.
concessions and actively denounced the Vizir to the Bey and everyone else. 35

The years 1875 and 1876 brought poor harvests and once more the government began to suffer from a shortage of funds. The friends and hirelings of Mustapha Khaznadar also worked against Khayr al-Din, 36 but the final straw seems to have been his reduction of the civil list of the Bey. The Vizir, loyal to the Porte, began to gather material support for the war. This required incurring unscheduled expenses and the budget of the royal palace was cut to strike a balance. By then al-Sadiq had already fixed upon a new favorite, Mustapha ben Ismail, and dismissed Khayr al-Din on 22 July, 1877. 37 Broadley reports that "A fortnight after Kheir-ed-Din's downfall a thousand mules and horses left Gouletta on their Turkish transports for the seat of war." 38

The tenure of Khayr al-Din, 1873-1877, was a period of outwardly traditional government. Almost all the men the Vizir chose to surround him were from the mamluk or ulama classes. Most essential were the beliefs

---

36 Ganiage, p. 471.
37 Ganiage, p. 475.
38 Broadley, I, 164.
that reform was possible within the confines of traditional Islamic thought. He did not desire to build a large bureaucracy, desiring rather an efficient responsible administration. When the government provided security, liberty, and justice then would follow the benefits of the modern world, among which he believed to be education, libraries, inventions, railroads, and the like.39

The means of obtaining security, liberty, and justice were by tanzimat. And the purpose was to improve the state and its subjects.40 There were obstacles to reform and Khayr al-Din well understood that the European countries would be one of the biggest. In discussing that very point, he realized that European countries would not readily permit their nationals to be judged by the laws of Muslim states.41 He continued his analysis by recognizing that foreign powers would not remain passive but rather would actively oppose tanzimat. His conclusion was that often such reforms would grant more liberty in the Islamic country than that which existed in the European country. Therefore, "we are forced to believe that they have no

40 Brown, p. 116.
41 See Brown, for a discussion of tanzimat, pp. 118-137.
motive except the aim of perpetrating confusion in the Islamic countries in order to thwart successful reform. In general, the policy of European states in our provinces is contradictory.⁴²

⁴²Brown, p. 122.
CONCLUSIONS

The spirit of Reformism in Tunisia and the reforms were spread over a long period and involved a number of personalities and situations. At the beginning of the period under consideration there was already established a legacy of reform. At the end of the period finances were controlled by an international Finance Committee and complete foreign control was not long in coming. Roches, Wood, Khaznadar, Khayr al-Din, and the Beys had all played their part. Khayr al-Din did have the opportunity to work for some time in Istanbul, but served only briefly.

The French consuls, especially Roches, played a role in bringing about the Ahd al-Aman and the Constitution, the first round of reforms. He was interested in seeing Western reform but preferred to see Tunisia under French control. Each of the French consuls asked for French control, but it remained Roustan's good fortune to be successful.

The Italians continually played their own game and were not interested in reform or anything else other than making Tunisia the first acquisition of the Italian Empire. This plan was frustrated by the French and British.
The British Consul was the most persistent supporter of reform. He had the longest resident of any foreigner who played a major role. His actions consistently pointed towards a stronger relationship between the Bey and the Porte. He worked well with the general policy of his government and with success, until the policy was changed. When the Cabinet decided to take Cyprus, Salisbury told the French at Berlin they could take Tunisia, as a *quid pro quo*. Then Wood had to be retired because he represented a bygone era.

In his work to reassert the Turkish role in Tunisia, Wood had many obstacles. The Bey usually was ill-disposed toward such an action, the French and Italian governments opposed it, many ranking Tunisian officials opposed it, and there is little evidence that the project received much attention at the Sublime Porte.

Wood truly desired reforms for Tunisia and believed they must come from the West. Initially, he succeeded in attracting British capital into the Regency, believing that physical changes would bring in their train economic, social, and political changes. Perhaps that plan would have met with success in Tunisia, but the initial investments were withdrawn and no further British funds were diverted to the Regency on a large scale. Wood himself had limited success in his own sphere, especially in preventing French annexation of the Regency, but decisions
were made outside his area of influence that altered the final outcome.

The long-time Vizir Mustapha Khaznadar proved to be the individual who least desired reform. His aim was to amass personal wealth and power, which he accomplished. By doing so, however, he created the financial disorder which brought the first real limitation on the sovereignty of the country.

The beys play a role typical of Islamic rulers. Poorly prepared for their office they could not strike out in new directions but were bound by tradition and crises. Muhammad proclaimed the Ahd al-Aman only because he was confronted with an overwhelming force. It was a situation similar to the abolition of slavery. Ahmad is remembered and praised for his humane act, all performed under the guns of a British squadron.

Muhammad al-Sadiq was more like Abd al-Hamid II in that he professed reform upon his ascension to power but did not prove to be a true reformer. Al-Sadiq was not a reactionary; however; he was rather a straw and moved with the wind. Usually, it came from Khaznadar, sometimes from Wood or Khayr al-Din, and sometimes from other sources.

In 1864, the Bey suspended the Ahd al-Aman and Constitution in the hopes such an action would pacify the rebellion. He had no commitment to either document and neither was re-introduced.
The last individual was Khayr al-Din. He more than any other person involved was able to transcend the normal bounds of his life and work and accept new and different ideas. He was a true reformer. He worked for what he understood to be the best interests of the country and the people. This was conceived within the Islamic framework and therefore was not just trying to make Tunisia into a western-type state. Khayr al-Din lived, thought, and worked within the traditional structures of his society and sought to expand them by reform. He brought honesty, devotion, and loyalty to his task and certainly left a large impression upon his age. He had success while in office but very soon after being dismissed, his reforms fell into disuse. In the long run, he has come to be considered one of the leading advocates of Islamic reform of the nineteenth century, based largely on his political treatise.

Khayr al-Din believed that the Islamic tradition could be reformed by borrowing secular ideas. His eclectic borrowings from the West should be acceptable to the ulama, he argued. He supported the religious tradition and tried to work in cooperation with it. For this man, it would have been alien to oppose his heritage; rather he sought to harness all the good aspects for the advancement of society. In this view he believed it good to seek stronger ties with the Porte because it represented the traditional center of political power. His downfall was that he was too
dedicated to liberal reforms while the monarch was not. The monarch still held complete power and could change his government upon a whim if he so chose.

The Sublime Porte was caught up in its own reform and problems. No doubt the Turks wished to reassert their authority over Tunisia but found no opportunity. There is no evidence of agitation for such a move, so that it appears the Porte dealt with Tunisia only when Tunisia asked for some consideration. Also, the Sultan was subject to pressure, especially from England and France, as shown by the viziral letter of 1864.

Reforms and Westernization do often conflict with established patterns. The revolt of 1864 must be viewed as an upheaval largely against undigested Western-imposed reforms. There was no such occurrence at the end of Khayr al-Din's administration. He worked within the normal patterns of life. Had he been supported in office, it is entirely possible that Tunisia's fate may have been altered. If her internal administration had been reformed along the lines advocated by Khayr al-Din and had another generation of reformers been planted in the system, she might have avoided her fate of colonialism.

The political modernization in Tunis was different from that in Istanbul or Cairo. There were not as lucrative rewards in Tunisia, but the pressures upon the government and course of events were quite similar.
In the final analysis, reform in Tunisia during the years 1855 to 1877 falls into two categories: first, European styled reform forced by a particular crisis; second, Islamic reform borrowing heavily from the West but carried out within the traditional Islamic structures. The former type is exemplified by the Ahd al-Aman and the Constitution. They were new forms superimposed on the old traditions. The latter category of reforms was the one which held the portent of success. It included maintaining the basic structures of the society, but injecting borrowed secular ideas which would be beneficial for the people as a whole. Khayr al-Din epitomized the latter.
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Government Documents

Great Britain. British and Foreign State Papers. LIII-LXXI.


Unpublished Sources


St. Antony's College. Private Papers Collection, Richard Wood.

Books


Hoskins, Halford L. British Routes to India. London: Longmans Green, 1928.


Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization. New York: 

Moore, Clement Henry. Tunisia Since Independence: The 
Dynamics of One-Party Government. Berkeley: University of 

Perry, Amos. Carthage and Tunis: Past and Present. 
Providence: Providence Press Company, 1869.

Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The 

Paris: Didot, 1884-1885.

Longmans, Green, 1936.


Articles

Demeerseman, André. "Au berceau des premières réformes 
démocratiques en Tunisie," Institute Belles Lettres Arab. 

_____. "Catégories sociales en Tunisie au XXème siècle 
d'après la chronique de A. Ibn Abi al-Diyaf," IBLA. 

_____. "Un grand témoin des premières idées modernisantes 

_____. "Indépendance de la Tunisie et politique extérieure 

Émerit, Marcel. "La crise de finances tunisiennes et les 
origines du protectorat," Revue Africaine. (1949) pp. 249- 
276.

Mzali, Muhammad S. and Jean Pignon. "Documents sur 
pp. 177-225 and 347-396.

