ARAB EDITORIAL OPINION TOWARD
THE PALESTINE QUESTION, 1947-1958

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INTRODUCTION

Several points should be brought to the attention of the reader before beginning this study. In the transliteration of Arabic into Latin script, the Library of Congress system has been used. However, Arabic words and places that have a commonly accepted and familiar spelling in English have been retained. Thus Palestine is used instead of Falastīn, Cairo in place of al-Qāhirah, Lebanon rather than Lubnān, and so forth. A further exception to the use of the Library of Congress system of transliteration has been in the spelling of the names of Arab editorialists who write for the French-language press in Bayrūt. Since these men have their own way of transliterating their names from Arabic, their own transliteration seems more appropriate.

The time period chosen in this study, from November, 1947, through December, 1958, was done purposefully. The beginning of the study corresponds to the month in which the United Nations adopted its Partition Resolution for Palestine; while the last date corresponds to the year...
of the unification of Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic. With this unification came almost total control of the press in those two countries. As a result, quite a few Syrian newspapers contracted fatal diseases, and the editorial opinion found in those papers that survived was quite sterile. Rather than terminate the study in early 1958, when the merger occurred, the study ends with the presidential order banning a large number of Syrian papers in December, 1958. The terminal date of this study also marks the year of the Lebanese "Civil War" during which time the Lebanese press was much less interested in the Palestine problem and Israel. Thus, the period of the adoption of the partition resolution seemed an appropriate period to begin while the events of 1958 also appeared to mark a propitious time to end the study.

A look at the bibliography will reveal that approximately sixty newspapers have been used. However, not all of them have been read throughout the eleven years covered. The reason that all have not been read over a sustained period is because they are unavailable or are no longer extant. Copies of several papers that were used in this study only exist for a month in one year, a week in another, and sometimes not at all over a period of years. Another reason for not reading some of the
papers for a sustained period was that many of the newspapers, almost exclusively in Syria, appeared and disappeared with surprising rapidness. Therefore, many of the newspapers simply were not published. However, it should be added that al-Difa' and FalastIn of Palestine and Jordan, al-Ahrām of Egypt, and L'orient and al-Ḥayāh of Lebanon were all read for the entire period of this study, except for very short periods, often one issue, when a paper was missing from a collection.

Since this dissertation is only concerned with opinion, for the most part news articles in newspapers were not read. Usually only editorials, or news articles containing editorial opinion, were examined. In addition to these limitations, it is well to emphasize that this study as a whole is limited and that it is not intended to be a definitive study of Arab opinion towards Palestine and Israel. The time period is a limitation but even more important, only one segment of opinion, albeit important, was studied. A sampling of political leaders or people in all walks of life would have reflected general opinion more accurately. But that was never the purpose of this study. The purpose of this study is to survey editorial opinion—opinion which molds and reflects Arab views.

More Lebanese, Syrian, and Egyptian newspapers have
been read than Jordanian journals. This was not a deliberate attempt to bias the monograph but in fact reflects the wide number of papers published in Bayrūt, Damascus, and Cairo and their dearth in Jordan.¹

The newspapers studied come exclusively from Egypt, Jordan (or Transjordan), Lebanon, and Syria. These four countries have played the central political role, in the Arab world, in the conflict with Israel. Also, all four countries have had boundaries contiguous with Palestine and Israel and therefore have had more to "lose" at the expense of the Zionists. These two factors, leadership and proximity, seemed a valid reason for excluding the other Arab nations from this study.

A small portion of editorial quotes was not taken directly from the newspapers in which they originally appeared. Some were quoted in other newspapers or in professional translating services. These quotes have been noted. Such secondary quotes have been kept to a minimum and have only been used when the newspaper of origin was not available.

¹For a comparison of the number of newspapers published in the countries under study, see John C. Merrill, The Foreign Press, pp. 169-170.
CHAPTER I

THE ARAB PRESS,
A BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

An analysis of editorial opinion in the press of any country should reveal the attitudes of that nation's press toward any problem or situation. In the Arab world and, in particular, in those states having borders with Israel and Palestine, newspaper editorials in those four countries, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, show how the press felt toward the idea of Israel. It also revealed how the editorialists felt toward each other with reference to Israel.

One might well ask why study the Arab press? The Arab word for "press" is ِشَهَفَةٌ and its root implies something evil. The root, ِساَحَافَةٌ, means "he misrepresented." And there is little doubt that the Arab press is thought of, especially in the West, as not being responsible. One commentator has said that some Arab newspapers are "dangerously irresponsible."¹ A Western observer has

noted, "The Arab press, in general, had no historical heritage of freedom, desire for objectivity, nor more than a casual acquaintanceship with the western ideal of factual reporting....Most of the newspapers were venal; either they were organs of parties and special interests, or their editors lived off blackmail."² Undoubtedly what these two have said is to some extent true. There is a sector of the press in Arab countries which is bad.

But there is also a good press in Arab countries. What has been most often criticized in Arab newspapers are excessive nationalism which hampers objectivity and the sources of money used to support the papers. A study of the newspapers discloses a nationalistic appeal to fight the Zionists in Palestine. But it certainly was no worse than the jingoism appearing in Western papers prior to and during the two world wars. As for the acceptance of money by publishers or editors, one should recall the well-established procedure of bribery of newspapers that European governments practiced in the nineteenth century, or one might argue that this practice is similar to accepting money for advertising. Few would consider that the fear of the loss of advertising by a Western newspaper

does not limit that paper's freedom of opinion. At any rate, these are academic arguments. What can not be disputed is that in spite of obvious limitations of a segment of the Arab press, there is a large segment that is responsible. This segment has lived with the Palestinian problem. It has studied the Palestinian problem. And it has offered solutions for the Palestinian problem. One can think immediately of Rene Aggiouri of L'Orient, Michel Chiha of Le Jour, Fu'ād Šarrūf of al-Ahrām, and Kāmil Murūwah of al-Ḥayāh as well known men who have editorialized widely on Palestine.

Even though the critics may have a point that the Arab press is not wholly responsible, such an assumption does not make any less valid a study of Arab newspapers. The press of the Middle East is a significant factor in the development of the intellectual and emotional attitudes toward current political trends and thus it is important to discover its weaknesses and strengths. It becomes worthwhile to determine why the Arab press wrote as it did and, of course, simply to become acquainted with what an important segment of Arab opinion had to say about a problem that has deeply affected the Middle East and the world.

In order that the context of the opinions expressed in the editorials of the Arab press might be better
understood, a brief note has been included for each of the newspapers considered. The short paragraphs have been drawn from readings and from a few articles available on specific newspapers, supplemented by histories written in Arabic, most notably Adīb Murūwah's al-Ṣiḥāfah al-ʿArabīyah.

In the Arab papers under study there are independent newspapers, most notably perhaps al-Ahram until the mid-1950's and al-Ḥayāh. But even the independent newspapers have favorite topics or ideas which they regularly pursue. An independent newspaper does not imply that it was always above suspicion. Those that are not independent are usually attached to a party, a faction, or even a foreign country. Thus, it was felt that a brief history of the newspapers would be useful especially since it does not seem to have been done in English. The biographies, however, are only valid for the period covered in this study.

The Egyptian Press

al-Ahram (The Pyramids). This paper was founded in

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3See Tom J. McFadden, *Daily Journalism in the Arab States*, for a discussion of foreign subsidies in the Arab press.

4Unless otherwise noted, all the following papers are printed in Arabic.
Cairo in 1876 by two brothers, Salīm and Bishārah Taqlā. The Taqlā brothers were Roman Catholics who had immigrated from Lebanon. Al-Āhrām remained in the same family until it was sold to the Egyptian Government in 1957. The Taqlā family was financially independent and this apparently allowed the paper to be independent in Egyptian politics, although the paper was nationalistic. Besides being the oldest extant newspaper in the Middle East, it also had the largest circulation during the period under study—estimated at about 100,000. The paper's fame came from its independence and from its emphasis on news coverage not opinion.5

Al-Ākhbār (The News). This paper was founded in Cairo in 1920. The owner-editors were Muṣṭafā and ʿAlī Amīn, twins, who also edited the weekly Akhbār al-Yawm (Today's News) which was perhaps more influential than the daily. The paper was independent and nationalistic. It was usually anti-Wafdist. Muṣṭafā was American-educated and al-Ākhbār was sometimes criticized for its pro-American attitudes. The twins were both members of the Chamber of Deputies prior to the revolt of the Revolutionary Command

Council (RCC).

Ākhīr Sā'ah (The Last Hour). A weekly political and satirical review founded in Cairo in 1934 by Muḥammad al-Ṭābi‘Ī, Ākhīr Sā'ah was sold to the Amīn Twins in 1947. Muḥammad al-Ṭābi‘Ī continued on the editorial staff even after he sold the paper.

al-Balāgh (The Report). This was a Wafdist-controlled afternoon paper. Founded in 1923 by ʿAbd al-Qādir Ḥamzah, al-Balāgh was published in Cairo.

al-Jumḥūriyyah (The Republic). The paper was founded in 1953 to act as the organ of the RCC and was therefore strongly pro-RCC and pro-ʿAbd al-Nāṣir. The managing editor of al-Jumḥūriyyah was Col. Anwar al-Sādāt, a prominent member of the RCC and close friend of President ʿAbd al-Nāṣir. Editors of al-Jumḥūriyyah have included some of Egypt's better journalists including Ḥusayn Fahmī and Jallāl al-Dīn al-Ḥamāmī.

al-Masāʾ (The Evening). The paper was an RCC-government owned publication begun in Cairo in October, 1956. It was published by Khālid Muḥyī al-Dīn who was the cousin of Zakriyā Muḥyī al-Dīn, a prominent member of the RCC and one-time Minister of Interior. The faction of the RCC which Khālid and al-Masāʾ represented was apparently the
radical left wing. The paper was closed in 1958 for attacking, along with the Egyptian communists, the union of Egypt and Syria. This was, however, not the first time that Khālid Muḥīṣ al-Dīn had been involved in controversy. He had fled to Egypt in 1954 during the Najīb crisis.

al- Miṣrī (The Egyptian). al- Miṣrī was founded in Cairo in 1944 by Maḥmūd Abū al-Faṭaḥ, a former reporter for al- Aḥrām. It grew to be a rival, in popularity, of al- Aḥrām. The paper was the first spokesman of the Wafd Party and its largest. Maḥmūd was followed by Āḥmad and Ḥusayn Abū al-Faṭaḥ as publishers and owners. With the success of the RCC, the fortunes of al- Miṣrī began to decline until its license to publish was withdrawn by the government in May, 1954. Āḥmad and Ḥusayn were tried by the RCC for attempting to destroy the revolutionary government and Āḥmad was given a ten year jail sentence, in absentia. When he did not return to Egypt, Āḥmad was deprived of his Egyptian citizenship in April, 1958.

al- Qāhirah (Cairo). This was an evening newspaper begun in 1953 in Cairo. Its editors were Asʿād Dāghir and Ibrāhīm al- Shantī. Politically, the paper was pan-Arab but its circulation remained small. It passed from sight a few years after its birth.
Sa'at al-Ummah (The Voice of the Nation). The paper was Wafdist controlled and edited by Hanafi al-Sharif. Sa'at al-Ummah was founded in 1946 and was published in Cairo. Although supported by the Wafdists, it was never strong or popular and died a natural death in 1952, before the RCC could kill it.

al-Sha'ab (The People). Founded in June, 1956, the newspaper was published by Salah Salim. Major Salim was a leading member of the RCC and the paper, government owned, reflected a pro-RCC line. The paper was printed on the old al-Miṣr presses until it was incorporated into al-Jumhuriyah in 1959 at which time the "Dancing Major" replaced Anwar al-Sadat as managing editor of al-Jumhuriyah.

al-Siyasah (The Policy). al-Siyasah first appeared in Cairo in 1922. It was the organ of the Liberal Constitutionalists Party (Hizb al-Dustūriyin al-Ahrār). The Party was moderately conservative, being supported by the wealthy and some intellectuals. al-Siyasah reflected this bias under the editorship of Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal.

al-Zaman (The Times). Established in 1947 in Cairo, al-Zaman reflected a pro-Palace policy until the downfall of King Faruq. The owner-editor of the newspaper was Idghar Jallād, a naturalised Egyptian of Lebanese
birth. Jallād also owned the French daily, Le Journal d'Egypt. al-Zamān stopped publishing in 1953 when it was bought by the RCC.

**The Jordanian Press**

al-Difā' (The Defense). This newspaper was founded in 1934 with the avowed purposes of opposing the growth of Zionism and opposition to the British mandate over Palestine. It was published in Yāfā from its establishment until the fall of Yāfā to the Zionists in April, 1948. The founder and editor, Ibrāhīm al-Shanṭī, then had the paper published in Cairo and flown to Palestine and Transjordan. This practice did not continue long until in 1949, al-Difā' began publishing in the old city of Jerusalem. The paper was independent but was pro-West during the period under study. It supported the views of Muftī al-Ḥusaynī’s Arab Higher Committee during the Palestine war of 1948. After 1948 the paper slowly changed its views until by 1954 it opposed al-Ḥusaynī. It was Palestine's and Jordan's largest selling newspaper. The paper was Muslim owned.

Falastīn (Palestine). A Christian owned daily, Falastīn was published in Yāfā from 1911 until 1948 and the fall
of that city. This oldest of Arab newspapers in Palestine was founded by ʻĪsā al-ʻĪsā and ownership remained in the family. Prior to the war of 1948, the paper supported the Muftī of Jerusalem but was also known to be opportunistic in the causes it supported except for Palestine. After the Arab failures in 1948, the paper became strongly anti-al-Ḥusaynī and pro-ʻAbd Allāh. The paper, like al-Difā', was founded on an anti-Zionist belief. But it was more emotional than al-Difā'. Perhaps it was too euphoric in its content thus misleading its readers.

With the fall of Yāfā, Falastīn moved to ʻAmmān for a short period but began publishing in 1950 in the old city of Jerusalem. Recent owners-publishers have included Dāwud and Rijā al-ʻĪsā.

The Lebanese Press

al-ʻAhrār (The Liberal). al-ʻAhrār was begun in 1924 by a Christian, Jibrān al-Tawaynī. The paper has had a varied career but during the period under study, it was

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6 The allegation by J. C. Hurewitz, that Falastīn was opposed to the Muftī in 1947, may be wrong. Certainly, Falastīn supported al-Ḥusaynī in November and December, 1947. The Struggle for Palestine, p. 385.

7 For a Palestinian complaint about the quality of Falastīn see a letter to the editor of L'Orient (Lebanon), 24 October 1949.
pro-West. From 1947 to 1958, the owner was Kamīl Yūsuf Shamʿūn who was president of the Lebanese Syndicate of Journalists.

al-ʿAmal (In the Service [of Lebanon]). al-ʿAmal, the organ of the Lebanese Phalangist Party (Ḥizb al-Katāʾib al-Lubnānīyah), represented the extreme right of Lebanese thought. Representing this sector, the paper was therefore anti-pan-Arab and extremely pro-Lebanese nationalism. The paper was founded in 1938, the same year as the Phalangist Party, and to discuss al-ʿAmal is also to discuss the Party. The chief of the Phalangists was Biyar al-Jumayyil⁸ who also owned al-ʿAmal. The Party was pro-French as well as being strongly attached to the West as the protectors of Lebanon.⁹ The Party was almost totally composed of Maronites. Interestingly, the Phalangists had managed to keep clear of Christian elements in Lebanon that would like to make peace with Israel. But the Party and al-ʿAmal felt that if it were to be a choice between Lebanon and Palestine, Lebanon would come

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⁸Usually transliterated into Latin letters as Pierre Gemayel.

⁹For example see al-ʿAmal of 16 July 1958, which headlined the arrival of American Marines during the Lebanese "Civil War", "Citizens Rush to the Beach to Welcome the Troops."
first.

al-Anbā’ (The News). Founded in 1951, al-Anbā’ was a weekly. The publisher of the newspaper was Kamāl Junblāṭ, a leading Druze, who was the head of the Socialist Progressive Party (Ḥizb al-Tagāddumī al-Ishtirākī). During the period 1947-1958, Junblāṭ and al-Anbā’ may be described as being usually anti-Western and strong supporters of al-Nāsir and his socialist revolution.

al-Bayraq (The Banner). al-Bayraq was a Maronite daily founded in 1911. The owner was Yūsuf ‘Aql. The paper aligned itself with the West and was generally felt to be the spokesman of George ‘Aql, a Maronite member of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies (Majlas al-Nawwāb).

Bayrūt (Bayrūt). Founded in 1936, Bayrūt was owned by Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Nuṣūlī who was Lebanon's Finance Minister in 1954. As a result of al-Nuṣūlī's participation in the cabinet, the paper was often embarrassingly pro-government and pro-West while remaining pan-Arab. The paper also supported ex-Premier ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd Karāmī who had his power base in Tripoli. The paper was sold in 1960 and became an English publication which soon folded.

Bayrūt al-Masā’ (The Evening Bayrūt). Founded in 1946, the paper was owned and edited by ‘Abd Allāh al-Mashnūq. The
paper was usually anti-Western in attitude as well as being generally regarded as the greatest supporter in Lebanon of the policy of Lebanon's union with the United Arab Republic (UAR). The owner editor was a Sunnī Muslim and Bayrūt al-Masā' often reflected the ideas of the Najjadist Party (Hizb al-Najjadah), the strongly pro-Muslim party generally regarded as the antithesis of the Phalangist Party.

**The Daily Star.** Published in English, The Daily Star was the sister paper of al-Ḥayāh. The owner of the paper was Kāmil Murūwah and its editor in chief was Sāmī 'Atīyah. The editorial policy of The Daily Star was tied closely to that of al-Ḥayāh. The paper was founded in 1952 in Bayrūt.

al-Diyār (The Country). al-Diyār was founded in 1941 by Ḥannā Ghusun, a Greek Orthodox, and Taqī al-Dīn al-Sulh, a Sunnī, although Ghusun soon became the sole owner. The paper was often pro-Western. It was also pan-Arab while maintaining that Lebanon as a country could not be historically justified. At the same time, despite its

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On 18 November 1957, Bayrūt al-Masā' turned from a small tabloid into a regular sized newspaper. The first issue, in its new form, published a large photograph of 'Abd al-Nāṣir and dedicated the issue to him as "the prime mover of Arab independence and renaissance."

See for example al-Diyār, 14 April 1948.
Christian owner, the paper did not appear to show pro-Christian leanings and was in fact staffed largely by Sunnī Muslims. After 1955, with the departure of al-Diyār's "Political Director", Filīb Taqīlā, the paper became a strong supporter of al-Nāṣir and was often anti-Western in editorial opinion.

**al-Hadaf (The Goal).** This paper was founded in 1942 as the organ of the Najjadist Party by Jamīl Makāwī. The owner sold it the same year to a Shī'ah, Zuhayr 'Usayrān, who was its publisher and chief editor. al-Hadaf was semi-independent but espoused pan-Arabism. The paper was widely regarded as the organ of a Shī'ah deputy in the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, 'Adil 'Usayrān.

**al-Hayāh (The Life).** Founded in 1946, al-Hayāh soon grew to be the largest paper outside of Egypt. The owner-publisher was Kāmil Murūwah, a Shī'ah Muslim. Editorially, al-Hayāh was generally pro-Western, anti-sectarian, and pro-Arab nationalism. The paper supported the idea of Fertile Crescent unity and therefore the idea of the union of Syria and Iraq. However, its apparent independence gave al-Hayāh the success it quickly acquired. It was the sister paper of The Daily Star.

**al-Jarīdah (The Newspaper).** al-Jarīdah was founded in
1953 by Jūrj Naqqāsh and Naṣrī al-Maʿlūf, a Maronite and a Greek Catholic, respectively. The paper was edited by Rashdī al-Maʿlūf who has been Minister of Finance, Economy, and Social Affairs. al-Jarīdah was very pro-French and friendly to the West at the same time disdaining to support al-Нāṣīr. al-Jarīdah was the sister paper of L'Orient and probably less influential than the French-language daily.

Le Jour. Founded in 1934, this French language daily was published by Khalīl al-Jumayyil, a Maronite of the Lebanese Phalangist Party. The paper was strongly pro-West. The chief editorial writer until his death late in 1954 was Michel Chiha, a brother-in-law of former Lebanese president Bīshārah al-Khūrī.

al-Nahār (The Daytime). Founded in 1933, al-Nahār was an anti-sectarian and usually pro-Western newspaper. The owner-editor was Jibrān al-Tawaynī, the former owner of al-Aḥrār. In 1950 the ownership passed to Jibrān's son, Ghassān al-Tawaynī, a deputy in the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies. Ghassān had been a member of al-Ḥizb al-Sūrī al-Qawmtī (PPS) and his paper continued to reflect the

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12 al-Ḥizb al-Sūrī al-Qawmtī was founded by Antūn Saʿā dah who was executed in 1948 for his unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the Lebanese government. al-Ḥizb
anti-sectarian beliefs of the PPS and to a lesser extent the desire to unite "geographic Syria" into a Greater Syria.

L'Orient. Founded in 1924, L'Orient was owned and edited by Jūrj Naqqāsh, a long-time member of the Phalangist Party. Like its sister paper, al-Jarīdah, the newspaper showed strong Maronite tendencies in its pro-Western beliefs. L'Orient was as strongly anti-Arab as it was anti-Zionist and pro-Lebanese. Interestingly, the pro-Zionist historian and journalist, Jon Kimche, was L'Orient's special correspondent in London in 1947 and 1948.

Ṣadā Lubnān (The Echo of Lebanon). Ṣadā Lubnān was the organ of the PPS which was banned in Lebanon after the party's unsuccessful coups in 1948. Its publisher was Muḥammad al-Baʻalbakī and he had been one of those accused of complicity in the revolt. However, strong support for the PPS, even after the execution of Saʻādah, allowed Ṣadā Lubnān to publish.

al-Sūrī al-Qawmī translates into English as the Syrian Nationalist Party. When its name was translated into French, al-Qawmī was incorrectly translated as Populaire thus giving Partie Populaire Syrienne. The initials of the incorrect French translation are still, however, the Party's common appellation. The PPS advocates non-sectarianism and the unification of "geographic Syria."
al-Sharg (The East). Founded in 1926 by 'Abd al-Ghani 'Awni al-Ka'akI, a Sunni, al-Sharg was more opportunistic in its editorial policy than anything else. Never a strong paper, al-Sharg rarely sold 500 copies of any issue. The son of 'Abd al-Ghani, Khayri al-Ka'akI, was the owner during the period covered in this study and was usually a supporter of al-Nasir. This policy placed him among the opposition in Lebanese politics and as a result of strong words against President Kamil Sham'un, Khayri al-Ka'akI was arrested in July, 1957, for "vilifying the President of the Republic." During the time period surrounding the Palestine war of 1948, the paper was also a supporter of the Mufti of Jerusalem and was anti-Hashemite.

al-Siyasah (The Policy). Begun in December, 1955, it was founded by a former Lebanese Prime Minister, 'Abd Allah al-Yafi. Dr. Yafi established the paper as a forum for his views as a leader of the opposition. al-Siyasah was unusually anti-Western in its editorial policy and called on Lebanon to turn more toward the Arab nations.

al-Tilighraf (The Telegraph). al-Tilighraf was founded in 1930 by Tufiq and Nasib al-Matni as Tilighraf Bayrut. The

13 al-Tilighraf, 23 July 1957.
name of the newspaper was changed during World War II. Although Maronite owned, the paper was usually anti-Western. An oddity in Bayrūt, the paper was the only real "yellow" journal depending on sensational exposes. Nasīb al-Matnī, like Khayrī al-Ka‘akī, was arrested in 1957 for villifying President Sham‘ūn. al-Matnī’s continued opposition to Sham‘ūn and the President’s desire for re-election were apparent causes for the assassination of al-Matnī in May, 1958.

al-Zaman (The Times). Established in 1947 by Ḳūbir Abīla, al-Zaman was a Maronite owned newspaper with pro-British tendencies. The paper was never very influential and not widely circulated.

The Syrian Press

al-Akhbār (The News). Published in Damascus, al-Akhbār had a circulation of about 300 in 1948. Founded by Basīm Marrād, the paper’s editorial policy was uncertain.

Alif Bā’ (A.B.[C.]). Founded in 1920, Alif Bā’ was published in Damascus by Yūsuf al-‘Īsā, a Greek Orthodox and brother of ‘Īsā al-‘Īsā, the founder of Falastīn. The paper remained with its founder until it was sold in the early 1950's and disappeared from circulation with the
press reform of August, 1952. Then in the middle of 1956, it was revived when Ḥasan al-ʿAtrash, a leader of the Syrian Druzes, had his chief aid and secretary, Salmān Ḥamzīḥ, buy the paper which published as a Druze organ until January, 1957. Alif Bā’ was revived once again in June, 1957 by "free Jordanians" opposed to King Ḥusayn. Its publisher was Riyāḍ al-Bandaq, a Christian and a socialist. The editor was Yūsuf al-Bandaq, a former member of Jordan's parliament. The license of Alif Bā’ was cancelled in October, 1957, by the Syrian Ministry of Press and Propaganda because al-Bandaq's continued attacks on King Ḥusayn were threatening Syro-Jordanian relations. The paper's license revocation was apparently only temporary since the paper was issued again in November, 1957, and continued to publish until it went out of business following the unification of Syria and Egypt in 1958.

al-ʿAnbā’ (The News). Published in Damascus, this paper was born of the merger of Alif Bā’ and al-Niḍāl in the press reform of August, 1952. The editorial policy of al-ʿAnbā’ followed that of al-Niḍāl.

al-ʿAyyām (The Days). Founded in 1931, al-ʿAyyām was the organ of the National Bloc (al-Kutlah al-Waṭanīyah) of Hāshim al-ʿAtasī and Jamīl Mardam. The paper was sold to
Nasūḥ Bābīl in 1932, while continuing to be published in Damascus. Bābīl early joined the pro-King ʿAbd Allāh faction in Syria that favored the formation of a Greater Syria under the sceptre of al-Hāshimīyah. However, during the period under study, al-Ayyām turned from its policy of support for Greater Syria and became more independent and nationalistic. It thus supported the National Party. In 1952, al-Ayyām and al-Inshā' merged to form al-Yawm. In the second reform of the press, in January, 1954, al-Ayyām re-appeared while al-Yawm disappeared.

al-Baʿāth (The Renaissance). Founded in 1947 and published in Damascus, this paper was the organ of the Baʿāth Party. Its editors were Mīshāl ʿAflaq and Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Bīṭār.

al-Balad (The Country). Founded in 1945 by Ilyās al-Shāghūrī and Saʿīd al-Tallāwī, al-Balad was pro-National Bloc. In 1950, al-Tallāwī left al-Balad to start al-Fayḥā'. Issued in Damascus, the paper continued until 1953 when it was closed by al-Shīshaklī. al-Shāghūrī then moved to Bayrūt where he continued to write occasionally.

Baradā (Baradā River). Munṭr al-Rayyis founded Baradā in December, 1945. Prior to this, however, al-Rayyis had fought against British and Free French attempts to take Lebanon and Syria from Vichy France. When he failed in
1941, al-Rayyis spent the remainder of World War II in Berlin. From its founding, Barada served as the organ of Fawzi al-Qawuqji and others of the Rashid 'Ali revolt in Iraq. The paper was usually anti-British. It was suspended for six months in 1950-51 because of opposition to the proposed union of Syria and Iraq. Published in Damascus, the newspaper went out of business at the end of 1958 after the merger of Syria and Egypt.

al-Bina' (The Edification). Formed by the merger in 1952 of al-Haqarah and al-Jil al-Jadid, al-Bina' during the period under study was the organ of the PPS. As such, the paper favored the formation of a nation comprising Greater Syria which would be non-sectarian. The paper was published in Damascus. It stopped being published for approximately one month in January, 1954, but quickly resumed publication, still as the organ of the PPS, with Isam al-Muhayir as publisher and editor-in-chief. When Colonel Adnan al-Malik was assassinated in April, 1955, by a PPS member, crowds attacked the presses of al-Bina' which were destroyed. This, however, did not force the paper to stop publishing.

al-Fayrah (Fragrant, Vast, Verdant—epithet for Damascus).

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Founded in 1950, *al-Fayḥā* was owned and edited by Saʾīd al-Tallāwī of Homs although it was published in Damascus. The paper was pan-Islamic in outlook and received support from the Muslim Brotherhood. In a by-election in Homs in 1957, al-Tallāwī was defeated for a parliament seat. In his bid, al-Tallāwī was backed by the Muslim Brotherhood. His victorious opponent was Kamāl Kalālīb who had the support of the Baʿath Party. Apparently as a result of al-Tallāwī's loss at the polls, *al-Fayḥā* stopped publishing for a short period in 1957. It reappeared as a supporter of the union of Egypt and Syria.

*al-Haḍārah* (The Civilization). Published in Damascus, the editorial policy of *al-Haḍārah* was known to have connections with the PPS. The paper went out of business in August, 1952, when it merged with *al-Jīl al-Jadīd*, another PPS-supported publication, to form *al-Bīnā*'. It reappeared later during the period under study only to cease publication in 1958.

al-Jabal (The Mountain). Founded in 1941 by Najīb Ḥarb, the paper was published at al-Suwaydā', the capital of Jabal al-Durūz. The paper served as the spokesman of Druze opinion until it ceased publication in 1954.

al-Jīl al-Jadīd (The New Era). Published in Damascus, al-Jīl al-Jadīd was the organ of the PPS. It went out of business in August, 1952, when it joined with al-Haḍārah to form al-Bīnā'.

al-Kifah (The Struggle). Edited by Amīn Sa'ād, al-Kifah's editorial policy can best be described as opportunistic. In the past, Sa'ād had supported Vichy rule and was pro-Axis until in 1941 he suddenly became pro-British. The paper was pro-'Abd Allāh and pro-Greater Syria and had also supported the unification of Geographic Syria. The paper was published in Damascus.

al-Manār (The Lighthouse). Founded in 1946 by Bashīr al-'Ūf, al-Manār was published in Damascus as the spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood. Its editor was Muṣṭafā Sibā'ī. Association with the Brotherhood meant that al-Manār's editorials usually concerned themselves with maintaining religious purity in politics and favoring those candidates and policies that emphasized their Islamic qualities. This desire to return to an idyllic
past even caused al-Manār, at one time, to launch an editorial campaign to get Syria and other Arab countries to return to the Hijrah calendar.\textsuperscript{15} Delving into politics caused al-‘Uf to be brought to trial in October, 1954, for publishing anti-Egyptian articles apparently in retaliation for the Egyptian anti-Muslim Brotherhood campaign. He was acquitted. The paper stopped publication in December, 1958, with the merger of Syria and Egypt.

al-Nās (The People). The publisher of al-Nās was Ḥusnī al-Barāzī who founded his newspaper in 1951 to fight communism. al-Barāzī also called for Fertile Crescent unity and cooperation with Iraq's Nūrī al-Sa'īd. The advocacy of this policy caused the paper's downfall in 1953 after the coming to power of Adīb al-Shīshaklī. The publication of the paper resumed in Damascus in 1955 with the election of Shukrī al-Quwatlī as president of Syria.

al-Nāṣr (The Victory). Founded in 1943 by Wādīlūdīdāwī to fight against French rule, al-Nāṣr remained a strongly nationalist paper which was published in Damascus. Christian owned, the paper was also independent in its policies and displayed anti-Western and anti-Hashemite sentiments.

\textsuperscript{15}See for example al-Manār of 25 August 1955.
At the time of the Syrian press reform of August, 1952, **al-Naşr** was merged with **al-Akhbār** to form **al-Naşr al-Jadīd**. The union lasted only temporarily and **al-Naşr** reappeared. It was then wildly pro-'Abd al-Naşir and strongly supported the union of Egypt and Syria.

**al-Nīqāl** (The Struggle). Nationalistic in its beliefs, **al-Nīqāl** was founded in 1948 by Dr. Sāmī Kabbārah. Dr. Kabbārah was a member of the Syrian parliament but was an independent and as such was pro- or anti-government depending on the issue. This type of honesty meant the paper's frequent suspension. In August, 1952, **al-Nīqāl** joined with **Alīf Bā'** to produce **al-ANbā'.**

**al-Qabas** (The Flash). Independent and nationalistic, **al-Qabas** was owned and edited by Najīb al-Rayyis, the brother of Munīr al-Rayyis of **Baradā**. The paper was sometimes associated with the National Party especially in the paper's opposition to any Greater Syria scheme. **al-Qabas** emerged from the press reform of 1952 as **al-Zamān**. It reappeared in the mid-1950's but stopped publication in December, 1958. The paper was published in Damascus. Perhaps the al-Rayyis identification with the Axis accounted for the anti-Semitic tone of some of the editorials of **al-Qabas**.
al-Ra'y al-'Amm (Public Opinion). Begun in 1954 by Ahmad 'Assah and Nazih al-Hakim, al-Ra'y al-'Amm was a socialist newspaper and was anti-Western. In particular, the paper appeared to have been founded to fight the Baghdad Pact and the adherence to it of any Arab country. The paper supported Egyptian President Najib and the Muslim Brotherhood against 'Abd al-Nasir. It stopped publication with the presidential decree of December, 1958.

al-Sha'ab (The People). Begun in 1947 in Damascus, al-Sha'ab was that city's organ of Fayd al-Atas and the People's Party. Therefore, the paper was generally conservative and pro-West. The editor was Adib al-Safadi. al-Sha'ab was stopped in 1953 by Adib al-Shishakli but reappeared with the fall of al-Shishakli.

al-Sham (Damascus). A spokesman for the PPS, al-Sham had a short one-month career when it appeared in January, 1954, as a replacement for al-Bina'. It reappeared again in 1958 only to be stopped in December of that year.

al-Yawm (Today). Semi-independent while associated with the National Bloc, al-Yawm published from August, 1952, until January, 1954, as the replacement for al-Ayyam and al-Inshā'. al-Yawm's editorial policy was closely aligned with that of its predecessors.
al-Zaman (The Times). An independent paper founded in the press reform of 1952 and published in Damascus, al-Zaman was edited by Ḥabīb Kaḥālah.
CHAPTER II

ARAB EDITORIAL OPINION TO THE END OF THE MANDATE

The beginning of this study reveals, at least prior to the adoption of the partition resolution of the United Nations in November, 1947, that Arab opinion in newspaper editorials and articles did not differ widely from what is believed to have been the general Arab view concerning Palestine. In Arab newspapers generally, discussion prior to November, 1947, centered around intellectual arguments, essentially non-military, concerning the rights of both the Arabs and the Jews.

Such editorial opinion as did appear prior to November, 1947, wondered about the defensibility of the Jewish position. It refused to accept the right of the Jews in Europe to come to Palestine. And it argued that the coming to Palestine of a large Jewish population would severely upset Arab life.

One of the least defendable Jewish political positions is searching for a second nationality, even though all of the countries where they live
offer them one. Is not being English, French, American, Dutch, Swiss, or Danish sufficient? And sufficiently honorable....?

How is it possible that Jews from eastern Europe can be transported to Palestine, by the thousands and hundreds of thousands without upsetting the Arabs of Palestine and their neighbors?...and how can peace result from such an audacious adventure, so full of perils?¹

The last sentence of this editorial, however, shows, even in 1945, that there was an awareness on the part of some Arabs that a military conflict of some sort might develop out of the influx of Jews and the results "may become the most bloody and terrible."²

Faced then, in 1947 and before, with obvious facts before them, the Arabs more and more, in their editorial opinion, began to formulate opinion which can be divided along several main lines. Firstly, the Arabs felt that outside pressure, acting in the United Nations, had forced upon the world partition in Palestine. Secondly, with this realization and the placing of the blame, there was an affirmation, on the part of the Arabs, of their own unity. And thirdly, there was

¹Michel Chiha in Le Jour (Lebanon), 19 April 1945.

²Michel Chiha in Le Jour (Lebanon), 26 September 1945.
almost unanimous agreement to refuse partition of Palestine because it was unjust.

Since the Arab press recognized the unity of Palestine and its Arab character, the discussions and resolutions being worked out in the United Nations were viewed with considerable suspicion. Of those delegations involved with Palestine, the United States delegation came under the heaviest fire. The American delegation was, throughout the Arab countries, viewed as having Jewish pressure put upon it. The approaches which editorialists took, however, toward this pressure were sometimes pity for, and other times castigation of, the American supported resolution. Other editorialists wondered if the emergence of the United States as a world power in the twentieth century was not a debit for other nations. Another point, galling to the Arab journalists, besides the role of the United States, was the fact that it was largely western hemisphere nations and western European nations that had voted against the interests of an Oriental nation.

How could the United States stick to a resolution that was adopted under pressure and bribery, where countries like Paraguay

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and Uruguay were the deciding factors, while countries like Pakistan, India and Turkey refused the resolution, in addition to all of the Arab people, who are about seventy million living in the east on the coast of the Mediterranean.  

We have seen that all of the Oriental states voted against partition or abstained while the Occidental states—with the exception of a few noble nations—have supported Zionism. So the partition of Palestine is an indication that right and justice are composed of different things in the East and in the West. And Rudyard Kipling was right when he said, 'East is East and West is West and never the twain shall meet.'

Clearly Arab writers were dismayed by what they felt were to be transgressions committed against Palestine. This feeling, however, is doubly interesting when it is placed in juxtaposition to what was felt in the west at the same period. Often the westerner did not see the question as being whether it was right or not to give Palestine to the immigrating Jews but felt the question was over how the game of politics was played in the United Nations. For some western writers and diplomats what had happened in the United Nations during the partition

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4 Najīb al-Rayyis in al-Qabas (Syria), 3 December 1947.  
5 Kāmil Murūwah in al-Ḥayāh (Lebanon), 3 December 1947.
vote was what gnawed at their consciences. But, for
the Arab writer, the western dilemma over the moral
question of coercing nations to vote favorably or un­
favorably in the United Nations was largely irrelevant.
To reduce the morality of partition in Palestine to a
vote in the United Nations was incomprehensible for
him. His view was smaller and more parochial and he
saw Palestine, no farther away than twenty or thirty
miles, being torn asunder. It was here that morality
came into play. The question was not what the great
nations might decide to do. The question was how to
keep the Arab country of Palestine intact, and to prevent
it from being turned into a Jewish nation.

The attitude of the Arab states toward
Palestine leaves no room for equivocating.
Directly or indirectly, Palestine will be
defended against Zionism. By every means,
the Jewish state will be fought. The Arabs
consider themselves to be in a state of
legitimate defense and no informed and just
person will say that they are not right. No
one will consent to admit that, with the
Jews having for thirty years settled themselves
in so great a number on the land of Palestine,
the hospitable welcome of Palestine may

6The most famous example illustrating this is James
V. Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, p. 363, in which
he says "the methods that had been used...to bring
coercion and duress on other nations in the general
assembly bordered closely unto scandal."
paradoxically end up in the exercise of Jewish sovereignty over the soil.  

Thus having rejected the moral right of the United Nations to vote on partition, Arab editorialists were practically unanimous in rejecting partition. One can think immediately of the now famous statement alleged to have been made by an Arab diplomat calling the partition plan, which divided Palestine into seven definite districts, "death by a thousand strokes." The editorialists, with excellent foresight, warned that any attempt to apply the partition resolution would result in a general conflagration in Palestine, would spread to the Arab countries, and perhaps eventually to the rest of the world. Further, there was a belief that the introduction of a Jewish state in Palestine would eventually threaten the existence of the Arab countries--Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan which would have contiguous borders with the new state.

Having dismissed the partition resolution as an

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7Michel Chiha in Le Jour (Lebanon), 18 December 1947.

8See for example Muby al-Din al-Nuṣūlī in Bayrūt (Lebanon), 15 November 1947; al-Ḥayāh (Lebanon), 28 November 1947; and al-Manār (Syria), 4 September 1947.

9al-Difā' (Palestine-Jordan), 30 November 1947.
act perpetrated by the morally bankrupt, and having almost unanimously agreed to reject this resolution, the Arab editorialists began to turn to a third aspect, the affirmation of Arab unity in the face of a hostile world and the determination to oppose partition by whatever means necessary, including the use of force. It is well to note that Arab opinion, at this stage in the Palestine problem, that is to say in November and December, 1947, showed surprising unity, at least a unity of editorial opinion. Much has been said of the differences which aided the disastrous results for the Arabs in 1948; but these differences were not manifest in the editorial opinion at the beginning of the period under study. In fact, when one compares the most ardent pro-Palestinian paper, FalastIn, with the most conservative paper, L'Orient, one discovers that editorial opinion was very similar. L'Orient said that, "our fierce attachment to the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon has never prevented us and will never prevent us from practicing, in the future, the most fruitful collaboration with our neighbors, and to accept, when need be, the defense of their interests." 10

10 Kesrouan Labaki in L'Orient (Lebanon), 2 December 1947.
Many observers have wondered about this rare display of Arab editorial unity at the end of 1947; unity which will begin to crumble as May, 1948, draws closer. Unity of this type should not be a surprise except in the case of elements in the Arab press which represented Lebanese Christian opinion. Even L'Orient, a representative of Christian Lebanese opinion, was markedly pro-Palestinian. For various reasons, often valid, it has been thought that the Christian population of Lebanon was more amenable to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, probably because some Christians felt that the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine would protect and aid the Christians of Lebanon.

Undoubtedly, there have been many Arab Christians who have felt threatened by the sea of Muslims that surrounded them. But with one exception, this segment of Christian Arab belief was not manifested in the newspapers covered in the study. This one exception was the publication in Lebanese newspapers of a statement by the Maronite Archbishop of Bayrút, Ighnātiyūs Mubārak. Archbishop Mubārak said, "major reasons—social, humane, and religious—demand that there be created... a Christian home in Lebanon as there has always been; a Jewish home in Palestine....The Lebanon demands liberty
for the Jews in Palestine just as she desires her own liberty and independence."11 However, this exception did not give rise to favorable editorial comment in the Christian Arab newspapers. Within editorial ranks, unity was maintained and the determination to prosecute a war in Palestine, with the ending of the British mandate, was maintained.

For all purposes, then, being united in their opposition to Zionism, the Arab editorialists began to demand firstly the neutrality of the world, especially Britain, in Palestine. They also wanted the Arab nations to unite, and finally they called upon the Arabs to resist forcefully the Zionists in Palestine. While later attacks against foreigners would be aimed particularly at the United States, at this stage Britain, as the mandatory country in Palestine, was singled out for what was believed to be, by the Arabs, a lack of neutrality in taking arms away from the Arabs while not taking arms away from the Zionists.12 If the great powers would

11 For the full text of Mubarak's statement see al-Diyar (Lebanon), 27 September 1947. As a result of this statement issued to the press about his feelings toward the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, Archbishop Mubarak was restricted, by Rome and the Maronite Patriarch, to a monastery and was exiled from his diocese until his death.

leave the Middle East alone, there was little doubt in the newspapers about who would win since the Arabs were "more systematic, more devoted, and stronger than their enemies." Left to their own devices, the only problem that possibly could prevent a victory, in which the Arabs were to engage the Zionists in a war without mercy, "on land, sea, and in the air," would be not a lack of heroism on the part of those who are fighting, but in the lack of unity on the political front.

Often when a westerner conjures up images of the Arabs, one image almost certainly in the forefront is that of lack of unity, even violent disagreement, among Arabs. And this conception of the Arabs was also a self-conception for the Arabs. The Arabs were felt to be far superior as long as their politicians at home filled their roles correctly. But there was a sense of uneasiness within Arab editorials as 1947 drew to a close. Some newspapers tried to make propaganda out of feared fissures within the Arab front by claiming that stories of internal differences were largely fabricated and exaggerated. They characterized the rumor, that there was a lack of unity on the Arab political front, as

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being "political bankruptcy to which the desperate resort." 15

Despite this attempt to whitewash supposed Arab leadership differences, many of the Arab newspapers felt that these differences were more than just fabrications. There was a feeling pervading a good number of the newspapers that the Arab politicians were just playing for headlines and pictures and that they did not realize that what was being enacted in Palestine was, in fact, a matter of life and death. There was also frustration at the slowness with which the politicians were acting 16 and

While the Arabs of Palestine are being burned by Jewish bombs and their houses destroyed, we look and see here in Damascus nothing but speeches, demonstrations, and figures about volunteers. At the same time we see in Cairo, where Arab foreign ministers are meeting, nothing but photographs of parties, feasts, and speeches threatening the Zionists and the countries which supported them. All this does not help the Arabs of Palestine.... 17

Nevertheless, the impression left by the Arab newspapers under study, was that in spite of possible shortcomings, especially from the political segment, the Arab

16 See for instance Muhyi al-Din al-Nusulî in Bayrut (Lebanon), 9 and 12 December 1947.
17 al-Qabas (Syria), 16 December 1947.
nation as a whole might expect and reasonably hope for a victory against the Zionists in Palestine. This hope was based upon the large numerical advantage which the Arabs had and was predicated also on the belief that if only the world would maintain its neutrality, the Arabs would be the victors in any military engagement. Although there were signs to show that among some segments of the Arab peoples there was a belief that war would not come, this belief came from optimism on the part of the Arabs that the Jews in Palestine, faced with overwhelming Arab superiority, would capitulate to the Arabs before fighting. The opinion expressed in the newspapers called, therefore, for military action in Palestine and perhaps in the back of some editorialist's minds, although never expressed in the papers, was the belief that as 15 May, 1948, approached, the Jews would capitulate and military action on the part of the Arab armies would be unnecessary.  

With the coming of the new year, Arab writers began to look at what they thought were the reasons for the impending crisis of 15 May, 1948. Not surprisingly, at this point, they viewed the causes for the Palestinian

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18George Kirk, *The Middle East 1945-1950*, p. 270. Mr. Kirk is of the belief that there were some Arabs, including the Secretary General of the Arab League, Ḥabūb al-Raḥmān Aṭṭām, who felt the Arab states would not fight in Palestine.
problem as being almost exclusively non-Arab. The year 1948 was also an American presidential election year and this fact did not escape Arab editorialists. Many felt that President Truman, in a bid to become re-elected, had sacrificed morality and principles of humanity in Palestine. The belief was that for Jewish American money and votes, President Truman was willing to give Zionists a country in Palestine. Still other editorial comment placed the blame on the United Nations or upon the Security Council for voting partition in Palestine. And others repeated a belief that will re-occur throughout the study. This was the belief that

If it were only a question of a war between Arabs and Jews, it would mean the Arabs would only defend themselves and their patrimony. But a localized war over a small, restricted space has been transformed into a Crusader War against the Arabs...led by the Christian states.

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19 One can argue about whose fault the Palestine problem was. Undoubtedly, however, the vast majority of Arabs felt it was not of their own making. Were the Arabs guilty of shifting the blame for their own failure? George Kirk believes that inability to accept blame and the ability to place blame elsewhere is a characteristic of the Arabs. Contemporary Arab Politics, p. 26.

20 See for example Falasṭīn (Palestine-Jordan) 11 February 1948; al-Naṣr (Syria), 14 March 1948; and Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Nuṣūlī in Bayrūt (Lebanon), 27 May 1948.


22 al-Qabas (Syria), 13 May 1948.
The general feeling, then, of the editorialists was that Zionism was being aided by western nations (or sometimes vice versa) and was attempting to establish a type of colonial state in Palestine. This belief, quite naturally, gave rise to comparing the twentieth century Haganah to the tenth century Crusader knights. Once again the Arab east was to be invaded by the west and there was little doubt that the result would be the same as it had been some ten centuries previously.23

The result of this belief, that Zionism was a subversive element within the Middle East and the belief also that Zionism and Judaism were the same things, was the appearance of a degree of anti-Semitism in the press. Usually this feeling manifested itself in editorials which claimed that Jews in the Diaspora held loyalties to other Jews and therefore, whether Zionists or not, were happy to see the establishment of a Zionist state in Palestine.24 Jews were also given characteristics which included meanness and barbarianism for their methods in killing Arabs in Palestine.25

23 See for example Michel Chiha in Le Jour (Lebanon), 15 January 1948 and 3 March 1948.
24 Michel Chiha in Le Jour (Lebanon), 11 May 1948.
anti-Semitic feeling affected editorial opinion about Jewish Arabs. There was, although not wide-spread, a feeling that no matter how the Jewish Arabs voiced their support for anti-Zionism, this was not a true expression of their feelings.

When some papers published telegrams supporting Arab Palestine from some Syrian Jews or their societies or their spiritual leaders, people wonder whether the government or the papers trust the signers of these telegrams. Would it not be stupid to believe any Jew in the world dislikes the establishment of a Jewish state or feels sorry for the cruel and barbarian acts which the Jews are committing in Palestine?26

Arab feeling toward the Jews, however, was not entirely negative. A Lebanese editorialist was not only able to make a differentiation between Zionism and Judaism, but he was also able to project a purely Lebanese belief in writing that Lebanon was a home for minority groups. Kesrouan Labaki felt that if Jews were not allowed their freedom in Lebanon then the raison d'être of Lebanon would be lost. Therefore, he pleaded, "Leave the Jews of Bayrūt in peace."27 An Egyptian


27 L'Orient (Lebanon), 13 January 1948. Also see his editorial in L'Orient of 18 May 1948 which says of the Jewish Lebanese "...they have done more for Palestine than the Christians and Muslims combined."
writer, however, approached the problem not from an exclusive nationalistic point of view but from a pan-Arab viewpoint.

We do not have to ascertain that the Arabs, whether they are Palestinians or not, hold no prejudice against the Jews. The Arab east has always been known for its hospitality and generosity and the Jews, being a small minority, lived among their Muslim and Christian brothers in peace and unity. And they were not persecuted as they were in Europe.28

The topics involved in the immediately preceding paragraphs were only a portion of editorial opinion. By far the greatest percentage of editorial opinion, devoted to the Palestine question, centered around the future of Palestine and the patriotic call to defense of Arab Palestine. The future of Palestine and the demands of the Arab editorialists in this regard may be neatly summarized as follows: "abandonment of partition; expulsion of terrorists; stopping of Jewish immigration; dissolution of the Haganah; end of the British mandate; immediate proclamation of the independence of Palestine;

28 al-Ahram (Egypt), 25 April 1948. Although the study has covered several months, up to this point, Egyptian newspapers, and especially al-Ahram, were largely void of any type of editorial comment on Palestine from November, 1947, to the beginning of March, 1948. This may have been due to censorship. Another factor involved was the Egyptian preoccupation with the British at the expense of the events occurring in Palestine.
the creation, in Palestine, of a Judeo-Arab state in which all the inhabitants would enjoy the same rights and would have the same obligations." To achieve their plan for Palestine, the Arabs were exhorted to defend Palestine and defeat Zionism.

As the date for the termination of the British mandate grew closer, Arab editorialists were unanimous in their call for a military solution. The headline in *al-Qabas* of 16-May, 1948, which said "writing and speaking have ended and courage and blood have begun", accurately reflected Arab editorial opinion.

Here, perhaps, it might be well to look at how each of the four countries viewed the impending struggle in Palestine. Syrian editorialists, generally, were more emotional in their appeal to their readers. For the Syrians, recalling the glories of Salah al-Din was part of the attempt to get the Syrian people prepared for war. They were anxious to begin the battle and seemed reluctant to await the final withdrawal of British troops scheduled for the middle of May. In fact several of the Syrian newspapers advocated "cutting off the viper's head

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29 Kesrouan Labaki in *L'Orient* (Lebanon), 23 March 1948.

30 *al-Qabas* (Syria), 20 May 1948.
before it grows larger." This attitude was reinforced by the belief that "force has been, and does not cease to be, for all eternity, the only practical argument which asserts its rights in this world." Thus the Syrian reader was urged by the editorials in his country to fight the Zionists in Palestine and to recognize, in this world, Might conquers Right. If he and his friends did not do so, in the future they would "cry like women over a homeland you were not able to save like men." Along with this exhortation was a warning that the road ahead might be difficult since the enemy was powerful, disciplined, and supported by important external forces.

For the Lebanese, there was a realization that they were militarily the weakest of the four nations touching the borders of Palestine. Thus, their editorials, while no less patriotic in their call to liberate Palestine from the Zionists, were aware of the implications for a vulnerable Lebanon if a strong, militant Israel was established on her southern border:

31 _al-‘Alam_ (Syria), 26 March 1948.
32 _Baradā_ (Syria), 11 March 1948.
33 _al-Qabas_ (Syria), 9 May 1948.
34 _al-Fayha‘_ (Syria), 22 April 1948.
Israel at our gates obliges us to consider every aspect and every consequence of its closeness. It is no game when a small country tries to guess the weight, on its frontier, of such a peril....The hymn of David, which the Hebrews chant, resounds throughout the Orient. And the weight of Israel, weight which is numerous and powerful, appears heavy and full of dangers for those nations who have, in all fields, but limited resources.35

In contrast to the narrow, even parochial, attitude of the Lebanese press, Egyptian editorials were more worldly in their outlook. They viewed what was going on in Palestine as not reflecting so much a limited battle between a group of Arabs and a group of Zionists, but as a battle on a larger scale which involved the Arab nation and its renaissance against the western world and the remnants of colonialism. This attitude may have come in part from the relatively great distance between Cairo and Tel-Aviv when compared with the distance of 'Ammān, Damascus, and Bayrūt from Tel-Aviv. But a more likely reason for Egypt's distant and somewhat more objective approach to the problem may have been Egypt's preoccupation with British occupation of her territory.

A natural result of this would be the blending together of the causes of her occupation with the causes of the emergence of Zionism in Palestine. There was a

35Michel Chiha in Le Jour (Lebanon), 28 May 1948.
call in the Egyptian press to fight the Zionists in Palestine, but it was mild and tended to see the Palestinian problem in the light of the British occupation of Egypt. From this hypothesis, the Egyptian press then drew a parallel between Palestine and Egypt and felt that any fight that might result in Palestine, although certainly important, was nothing more than a prelude to a much greater test, that of fighting colonialism everywhere. "The fighting going on in Palestine is the smaller struggle and may the Arab nation return from the field stronger and more capable of the greater struggle."  

The Palestinian press was not offered the luxury of distance from the battle ground. The writers for al-Difāʿ and Falastīn were well aware of the action that had been surrounding them in Palestine. And so they exhorted their readers to defend those portions of Palestine held or promised to the Zionists.

We are convinced that this struggle we are involved in is for the protection of our country's unity and for the attainment of our rights and liberties.

We are convinced that our enemies are

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36 Fuʿad Ṣarrūf in al-Ahrām (Egypt), 18 May 1948. A corroborating argument, that Egypt was a reluctant battler, is made by Jon and David Kimche in Both Sides of the Hill, pp. 48-49.
fighting a losing battle and that the odds are not on their side.

We are also convinced that the solution will be here not in New York or London.

At the same time we know that we will face difficult situations and we will suffer sacrifices and losses. And the state of affairs will ebb and flow for some time.

Even though our destiny is assured, we avoid being over-optimistic and always call for preparation and alertness, for more organization and putting time to better value.37

It has often been repeated that one cause for Arab flight from Palestine, in late 1947 and in 1948, was the Arab newspapers call to the population to leave Palestine. This myth, in so far as it is concerned with Arab editorial opinions, may be quietly laid to rest. As the above paragraphs have shown, rather than urging the Arab people to flee Palestine, the newspapers were urging Palestinians and the other Arab peoples to join in the fight for Palestine. Of particular interest, where this question is concerned, is the reaction of the Palestinian papers, themselves, to the impending war in Palestine. There is undoubtedly an overwhelming amount of evidence to show al-Difā‘ and Falastīn never urged their readers to abandon their homes. To the contrary, Palestinian editorials felt

37al-Difā‘ (Palestine-Jordan), 1 February 1948.
...the Palestinians have to make the greatest sacrifice and be an example for others. Who will sacrifice for us if we do not sacrifice for ourselves first?\textsuperscript{38}

Although the Arab editorialists attempted, undoubtedly sometimes too hard, to instill within the Arab peoples a feeling of unity before the Zionists, these editorialists were not blind to what they saw of a negative nature in the handling of the war for Palestine.

Before the entrance of the regular Arab armies into Palestine in May, 1948, the newspaper writers brought to the attention of their readers many faults being perpetrated. There was editorial criticism of the training of the Arab armies, use of volunteers, lack of coordination among the Arab states, the tendency of Arab politicians to talk instead of work, the absence of Palestinians defending their home country, and the greed of the Arabs in wanting to pursue national self-interest above Arab self-interest. Although the news during April and May, 1948, left the impression that the Arab volunteers were winning a great victory in Palestine, editorial opinion

\textsuperscript{38}FalastIn (Palestine-Jordan), 19 November 1947. No evidence has been found of any official or unofficial call for the Arabs to leave Palestine published in any Arab newspaper.
did not reflect the optimism found in the news stories. The net impression left by the lack of editorial support for the news stories was that the news was an attempt to increase circulation and raise morale, but even the editorialists took them with a grain of salt.

The two largest volunteer Arab groups fighting in Palestine prior to 15 May were those headed by 'Abd al-Qādir al-Ḥusaynī and Fawżī al-Qāwuqjī. al-Ḥusaynī took his orders from the Arab Higher Committee (al-Ḥay'ah al-ʻArabīyah al-ʻUlyā) which was headed by the Muftī of Palestine, the cousin of 'Abd al-Qādir al-Ḥusaynī, al-Ḥāj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī. al-Qāwuqjī, on the other hand, owed his position to the Arab League operating out of Cairo. Of the two Armies of Liberation (Jaysh al-Ingād), as they were commonly known, the forces of al-Ḥusaynī were, because of their leader's ability, the more effective group.\(^{39}\) Unfortunately for the Arabs, 'Abd al-Qādir al-Ḥusaynī was killed in Palestine in the first week of April, 1948. It is debatable whether the Palestinian liberation armies could have influenced the outcome of

\(^{39}\) Actually neither of the two groups was very effective. However, al-Qāwuqjī "did his side great harm. He aroused extravagant hopes by his boasting amongst the Palestinian Arab villagers, whose morale was undermined by disappointment when the supreme test came of resisting the advance of the Jewish forces." Sir Alec Kirkbride, A Crackle of Thorns, pp. 158-159.
the 1948 war even if al-Ḥusaynī had not been killed in action. The Jaysh al-Inqādūdū were hastily put together, they were not well trained, and with the prospect of a quick and easy victory appearing before many Arabs, politicians in great numbers rushed to join the volunteer forces.40 "Against an adversary who has been armed and organized for a long time, the first Arab group contained only ill-matched elements, hastily introduced, insufficiently trained, and lacking any heavy armaments."41

Added to this realization, on the part of some editorialists, of the paltriness of the volunteer forces which entered Palestine, was a recognition of the lack of armed Palestinians able to defend their own country. The complaint against the Palestinians, while limited, was centered largely in Syria. Several newspapers noted, and perhaps with sarcasm, the movement of the Arab Higher Committee from Jerusalem to Damascus at the beginning of 1948. Many of the editorial writers may well have wondered why the committee had moved to Damascus instead of remaining in Jerusalem. The Syrian papers reiterated their determination to fight to free the Palestinians, but were


41 L'Orient (Lebanon), 26 April 1948.
angered by the lack of effort on the part of the Palestinian leaders to help themselves. One editorial chastised Palestine's leaders for "surveying" the military operations and "conducting the battles" from luxurious drawing rooms, from comfortable arm chairs, and for using binoculars, because they were too far away from the battles to use their naked eyes.  

The amount of criticism of the Palestinians and of the volunteer armies was minimal, both in space given to berating them and in the newspapers that broached the two topics. Perhaps this lack of editorial treatment by the newspapers accurately reflected the lack of importance of these two factors in the overall picture. The role of the regular armies and the role of the Arab politicians was more important for the final disposition of Palestine. It is not strange to discover, then, that more editorial opinion was paid to the Arab politicians and to the problems involved with the approaching intervention on the part of the regular Arab armies.

More will be said in the following chapter about the role of the regular armies in the war of the spring of 1948. Here it is sufficient to say that the editorials dealing with the role of the Arab armies gave the

\[42\text{al-Qabas (Syria), 22 April 1948.}\]
impression that troops were sufficiently strong to deal with the Zionists in Palestine. There was no doubt about the strength or the will of these armies. Where questions did arise over the regular forces, it was over the coordination between the armies of the Arab countries involved. And here, also, the general impression was that the details of collaboration for the liberation of Palestine were completed and the governments were in full agreement. But even in this, there were negative notes made in some of the newspapers. One newspaper put the matter quite succinctly:

Within forty-eight hours the Palestinian bill must be paid and the Lebanese are held in almost total ignorance of Arab preparations....

Where are we?
And where will we be tomorrow?
Has agreement been reached between 'Ammān and Riyād?
Has King 'Abd Allāh received carte blanche to intervene in the Holy Land?
The Arab Legion currently stationed in Palestine, will it along operate against the Haganah?
Will the governmental and administrative authority be exercised, after 15 May, in the name of King 'Abd Allāh or the Arab League?
All of these questions which are pre-occupying the Lebanese to a great extent have not, up to now, received any response....
Will our soldiers enter into Palestine?

43al-Kifāh (Syria), 13 May 1948.
Will they be engaged in fighting the Hagenah? We are ignorant of all this.\footnote{Kesrouan Labaki in \textit{L'Orient} (Lebanon), 13 May 1948.}

If the military situation was not fully comprehended by Arab editorialists prior to May, 1948, the political situation and the private ambitions of the political leaders were better recognized. As subsequent chapters will show, political hindsight would be a major characteristic of the editorialists. But foresight was also evident, especially in the Syrian papers. It is hard to judge whether it was actually foresight or emotional hypothesizing which happened to be true. Of particular interest to the Syrian papers were the thinly veiled attempts by King 'Abd Allāh to annex the portions of Palestine which, according to United Nations resolutions, were to become the Arab Palestinian state. The Syrian papers felt that the announced intention of Jordan to annex Palestine was really annexation of Palestine by Britain and by John Glubb Pasha, the British commander of the Jordanian Arab legion.\footnote{Barada (Syria), 11 April 1948.} The fact that Jordan was tied both through treaty and by having her army officered and paid for by the British did not escape the Syrian
editorials. Another paper called the Jordanian plans an "occupation of slaves" because Jordan was so tied up with the British.46

The other major figure in Palestine, the Muftī of Palestine, al-Ḥāj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī, also came in for sharp attack. Already writers had frowned on his moving his organization from Jerusalem to Damascus. Still other editorials questioned his leadership abilities and the way he was spending the money allotted to him for his Palestinian campaign against the Zionists. One newspaper commented that the Muftī had been given two hundred and fifty thousand Egyptian pounds and he spent one hundred thousand pounds on "organization", another hundred thousand pounds on "propaganda", and only the remainder was spent on war materials.47

Criticism was not limited to ʿAbd Allāh and al-Ḥusaynī. With Arab reverses in Yāfā and Haifa and with the events that occurred in Dayr Yāsīn, Arab editorialists began to attack a larger circle of political leaders. One could

46 al-Manār (Syria), 9 April 1948.

47 Baradā (Syria), 12 May 1948. If there is a correlation between the number of soldiers the Palestinians themselves were able to put in the field and the amount of money spent for this purpose by the Muftī, then the allegations by Baradā appear to be true. ʿAqil H. H. Abidi in Jordan a Political Study, p. 42, puts the number of soldiers the Palestinians were able to muster at only a little over two thousand.
list literally hundreds of newspapers that wrote, "We have had enough words and communiques." The warning was quite clear. Responsibility for the future of Palestine would rest on the Arab politicians. If they were successful they could bask in glory and if they failed they would be held accountable. To save themselves, the Arab editorialists urged political leaders to take the initiative in the field of battle, to listen to public opinion which was angry over the postponement of invasion until 15 May, and to enter Palestine with their armed forces as quickly as possible.

However, with official military statements being issued announcing victories in the field, the few notes of warning published by editorialists appear to have gone largely unheeded. The reader was left with the overall impression that victory after 15 May would be complete and quick. But the warning was there and on the day of invasion of the Arab armies, Kesrouan Labaki summed it up concisely when he wrote, "The past died at midnight. It is

48 *al-Nidal* (Syria), quoted in *L'Orient* (Lebanon), 15 April 1948.

49 See for example Kamil Muruwah in *al-Hayah* (Lebanon), 17 April 1948 and *Barada* (Syria), 24 April 1948. For an opposing view that waiting until the end of the British mandate would not seriously hinder Arab efforts in fighting Zionism see *al-Ahram* (Egypt), 6 May 1948.
not necessary to revive it. Errors—grave errors—have been committed. Among the Arab leaders, some have failed in their mission...."^50

In reviewing Arab editorial opinion up to the end of the British mandate in Palestine, one can discover distinct patterns in the editorials written for the Arab newspapers.

Prior to 1947, the arguments in the newspapers displayed a rather distant and objective viewpoint. This distance allowed them to view the problem non-militarily. But as 1947 came to an end and May, 1948, approached, there seemed to be a correlation between the approach of the end of the mandate and the end of the objectivity which distance had provided in the past. The result, especially after the adoption by the United Nations of the partition resolution, was a change in editorial opinion. This change affected what the writers saw and what they predicted would be the consequences of what they had seen.

What they began to perceive was outside influence, particularly on the part of the British, of the Zionists in the United States, and of the United Nations. The consequences which they foresaw from these causes were

^50L'Orient (Lebanon), 15 May 1948.
possible violence in the Holy Land. Seeing a battle ahead, the editorialists did not shirk from it but instead believed that a war in Palestine might forever end the Zionists' dream and provide the Arabs with a way of preserving the Arab character in Palestine. Therefore, they encouraged military intervention, believing this was a way to gain their rights, and they felt that it would be successful.

The unity of opinion, however, that had been observed also carried with it two undercurrents of disunity. There continued to be calls for unity within editorials and there was still a pervading belief in victory, perhaps due largely to the optimism of the official reports coming from the unofficial war. Still, each nation began to look at the impending fight from a limited, nationalistic viewpoint. Syria felt she was making the greatest sacrifice and urged military action. She was especially hostile toward the Jordanians and the Palestinians for their inability to aid themselves and therefore urged more military action. The Lebanese were aware of their military weaknesses and seemed to fear war although supporting it. The Egyptians seemed more interested in the British and viewed the Palestine problem as part of the overall problem of the British presence in the Middle East. The Palestinian papers reflected their proximity to the fight
and the newspapers, founded to fight Zionism, urged a battle till death.

This fracturing of Arab unity also manifested itself on a level other than national. Thus, there was a growing belief that perhaps Arab volunteers, the regular armies, and the political leaders were not prepared for the events ahead. As the official war began there was a willingness on the part of the Arab writers to forgive and forget, possibly because of a belief that the Arab armies would be victorious. But there was a definite warning that if the Arabs were not successful in combat, the political leaders would be held responsible.
CHAPTER III
FROM THE PALESTINE WAR TO THE
ASSASSINATION OF KING ʿABD ALLAH

The role of editorial opinion was not a large one during the Palestinian war that began officially on 15 May 1948. Columns devoted to the events unfolding in Yāfā, Haifa, the Negev, and Jerusalem were many but they were just one part of any given newspaper and the papers were largely filled with the events of Palestine. Earlier, an editorial on Palestine might have been the greatest portion of the day's print devoted to Palestine. In April and May, 1948, this was not the case.

And yet the role of the editorialists should not be minimized. They exhorted their readers to defense, pleaded for more patriotism, provided their own ideas on how a successful fight might be waged, and warned of the consequences which might be forthcoming if the Arabs lost. To the statement that, "Palestine was the one subject on which the rulers and governments of the Arab states were more or less united in opinion,"¹ might be

¹John Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800-1953, p. 323.
added that editorial opinion was also united as the war began.

Censorship, however, limited the topics freely discussed and, in the case of the Lebanese and Syrian papers, made some articles difficult to comprehend. Still, with few exceptions, as for example the shock surrounding the fall of Haifa, the articles were optimistic, although often lacking originality in their content.

As events became more important than any comment upon them, the headlines of the daily press often reflected editorial opinion since they interpreted the content of the story that followed. The Appendix is composed of translations of the main headline from one paper from each of the four countries included in this study, beginning on 1 April and ending with 31 May 1948. If the headlines in the newspapers are compared, one generalization can be made. There is a striking correlation between what has been stated in the preceding chapter about national interests in Palestine and the headlines from each country.

FalastIn, as a Palestinian paper, devoted all of its main headlines to the events within the country. al-Qabas, as the Syrian representative and perhaps the most emotionally involved, had the second highest percentage of headlines devoted to Palestine. Lebanon's Le
Jour had what might be termed the most balanced, factual headlines while al-Ahrām of Egypt, when compared with the other papers, seemed almost detached from the Palestine problem. al-Ahrām's attitude appears extraordinary, especially in April when her lead headline for five days dealt with the Italian elections.

In spite of the general feeling of confidence and a belief that the Arabs had the upper hand during the fighting, the war which lasted from 15 May until 11 June, 1948, did not end in military victory for the Arabs. They were not defeated but neither did they win. Why had the quick victory become illusive? Editorials had several answers. A common Syrian reply was that the people, especially the wealthy, were not sacrificing enough. "We wonder where are our wealthy people and where is their generosity?"^2

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^2Najīb al-Rayyis in al-Qabas (Syria), 3 June 1948. See also al-Manār (Syria), 14 July 1948 for a similar call to sacrifice. Kesrouan Labaki, however, was one writer who felt his people had sacrificed sufficiently. "Lebanon has been the only one of the member-states of the Arab League to apply, without hesitation and without reservation, the boycott of Zionist industry. Lebanon has been, also, the only one to suffer from this boycott. The Jews, who had bought our fruits and skied in the Cedars, have renounced our cherries and stopped skiing. The Arab countries have not even offered us symbolic compensation. Egypt buys her apples from California, the Aghas of Iraq do not ski and the Pashas of Cairo take their vacations along the Côte d'Azur. L'Orient (Lebanon), 28 April 1948.
Another reason advanced to answer the general disappointment was that "...the firm solidarity between the Jews was stronger than the modest unity amongst the Arabs [remainder censored]." A third conjecture held that the military fighting was only part of the story which was unfolding. The Arab armies were handling themselves well but there was also a political battle to be fought. World sympathy for the justness of the Arab cause was felt to be necessary to insure the military victory because, "The time when things were done by orders of ministers and politicians is gone and we have entered an age where we cannot deny the power of public opinion and its influence on governments."  

Finally, Arab editorialists placed the blame for the Arab lack of success on the world's Great Powers, especially Russia and the United States. The United Nations, up to the first truce, escaped chastisement to a great extent and to a lesser extent so did Great Britain. What rankled the Arabs was the quickness of the recognition of the new State of Israel by Russia and the United States. And once again, the forthcoming

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3 Kamil Muruwah in al-Hayah (Lebanon), 8 July 1948.
4 al-Ahram (Egypt), 27 May 1948. See also the same paper of 1 June 1948.
presidential election in the United States was viewed as another reason for the action of President Truman.

...in precipitously recognizing the Jewish state, they have encouraged, in decisive fashion, the Israeli war. These great countries have thus sought war and not peace. Undoubtedly their reasons were not the same; but the brutal fact is there. And history will register against the United States that, for reasons of internal policy, for reasons of electoral subterfuge, even though she was six or seven thousand kilometers away, she, a country of Christian civilization, deliberately sacrificed the Holy Land.5

The comments offered by the Arab writers and their analysis of what was happening at this time in Palestine appear to be, in retrospect, rather shallow. Of course, the benefit of time provides a clearer idea of what occurred. Nonetheless, it is well to remark that some of the major causes for the poor Arab showing in the first Palestinian campaign were not commented upon in the newspapers and were probably unknown to the commentators. In particular, one such example was the lack of preparedness on the part of the Arab armies, with the exception of the British-officered Arab Legion and the Iraqi army. The Lebanese army's lack of offensive capability was so universally recognized as to require no

5Michel Chiha in Le Jour (Lebanon), 7 July 1948. See also the same writer in Le Jour of 11 June 1948.
comment. However, the Egyptian army's performance has been termed "humiliating," while the Syrian army's weaknesses were apparent within ten days of the Arab intervention in May.

There was also no mention, at least not in the newspapers at the time of the war, of the scandals which were being perpetrated. In particular there was the case of the Egyptians boarding a ship bound for Jordan carrying ammunition. The ship was unloaded by the Egyptians and the ammunition never reached the Jordanian army. There was also the case of Captain Fu'ād Mardam, the nephew of the Syrian Prime Minister, Jamīl Mardam, who was on an arms purchasing mission in Italy. After he had purchased the arms, his loaded ship was hijacked by the Israelis as it was heading for Syria. It is still not known whether the hijacking was perpetrated with or without the prior knowledge of Captain Mardam.

There was also no mention in May and June, 1948, of the secret meetings that had occurred between King 'Abd Allāh and certain Zionist leaders. These meetings, and subsequent ones, will come to the surface at a later period. The contacts between the nominal Arab military

6Sir Reader Bullard, The Middle East, p. 188.
leader and his enemies over the prospects of a secret peace appear now to be incongruous.

However, this lack of information in certain areas did not prevent the editorialists from passing judgment on the unfolding events. But their judgment was limited and biased by the incomplete facts which were available. Censorship in time of war was also another factor preventing a larger discussion of the events in the Middle East.

Count Folke Bernadotte, the United Nations' Mediator, was able to negotiate a four-week truce beginning on 11 June. The reasons for the Arab acceptance of the first truce are debated even today. And the reasons for accepting the truce were asked in 1948. Several commentators felt that the Arabs had accepted the truce in order to show their good will and their willingness to enter into negotiations.

The acceptance of the Arab countries to stop the fighting does not mean weakness but it means that the Arab countries are giving another chance to the Security Council and by this move the Arab countries give evidence of their sincere desire to cooperate with the United Nations to reach a solution.\(^8\)

Other writers believed that perhaps Western pressure

\(^8\) al-Ahrām (Egypt), 3 June 1948. See also Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Nuṣūlī in Bayrūt (Lebanon), 3 June 1948.
had been applied to the Arabs to make them accept the truce. And here the implication was that the British, having special relations with Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan, had applied pressure for acceptance. "It is because they could not do otherwise that the Arabs have accepted the truce."  

But practically unanimous was the condemnation of the first truce by the Arab writers. The general feeling, rightly or wrongly, was that the Arabs had been on the offensive and the acceptance of the truce threatened the momentum which was propelling the Arabs toward an eventual, if slower, victory. "Poor Arabs—what good hearts you have" was a commonly expressed belief among the editorialists.

Besides allowing the Arabs to lose their momentum, the truce also was felt to be a means by which the Israelis would be able to increase their provisions and to complete their military preparations; this, while the Arab armies were at the gates of Tel Aviv.

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9 Kesrouan Labaki in L'Orient (Lebanon), 11 June 1948.


11 Representative editorials may be found in al-Qabas (Syria), 17 June 1948; Kāmil Murūwah in al-Hayāh (Lebanon), 4 June 1948; and Fu'āḍ Sarrūf in al-Ahrām (Egypt), 6 June 1948.
Each day that passes, each hour that passes is a day and an hour gained by the Jews. The State of Israel will live, starting tomorrow, her first four weeks of peace. She will dress her wounds and get organized with a view toward the eventual resumption of hostilities. The same respite is given to the Arabs. But the Arabs had been, till today, on the offensive. It must be hoped that they can keep it for a month.\textsuperscript{12}

While the truce was progressing, the Arabs and the Israelis tended to their respective wounds and prepared for the coming battle when the truce would expire on 9 July. But the two adversaries were not the only ones busy at work in Palestine. Count Bernadotte was occupied travelling between the belligerents and eventually proposed a plan to settle the Palestine problem. His proposals included the merger of the Arab portion of the Palestinian partition with Transjordan. He also called for the inclusion of all of Jerusalem in this Arab state, which would presumably be under the sceptre of the Hashemites. Another of Bernadotte's proposals was unlimited Jewish immigration into the State of Israel for two years. Also the Arabs were to be given the Negev region in exchange for the Galilee.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12}Kesrouan Labaki in L'Orient (Lebanon), 11 June 1948.

\textsuperscript{13}The text of Count Bernadotte's proposal was published in the New York Times, 5 July 1948. A largely accurate version of the proposal appeared in al-Miṣrī (Egypt), 1 July 1948 which was three days prior to the official release of the document.
It is now known that King 'Abd Allāh was anxious to make peace with the Israelis. His reasons were many, including the realization that Transjordan was not a viable kingdom unless her territories were increased and she had access to the Mediterranean Sea. However, the other Arab states were reluctant to allow King 'Abd Allāh to increase the size of his country and the extent of his power in the Middle East. The Arab editorials outside Transjordan were almost one voice in rejecting the proposals of Count Bernadotte, although a fear of Transjordanian pre-eminence was not voiced. The main reason given for the rejection of the mediator's proposals was that in accepting them, the Arab states would be guilty of de facto recognition of a Jewish state that was established on Arab land. And there is no reason to doubt that along with a fear of Transjordanian expansion, another factor, and perhaps the major factor, was a fear of what the future would bring to the Middle East if a Zionist state was established there.

No government can approve the propositions of Count Bernadotte. How could it be otherwise as long as the Arabs know that the establishment of a Jewish state would be a fatal blow to their aspirations and would constitute a permanent danger to their national future?14

14Hanna Ghusun in al-Diyār (Lebanon), 4 July 1948.
As long as the Zionists were felt to be using the truce period to consolidate and strengthen the State of Israel, Arab editorials were against the prolongation of the truce. They called for the Arabs to fight the "Jewish Crusaders" because "the question is very simple, Palestine is an Arab land and must forever belong to its legitimate sons." The Arab editorials were outspoken in their call for a resumption of the hostilities. They warned the mediator and the Zionists that the Arabs would meet next in Tel Aviv. They therefore called upon the Arab armies to pursue the fight until victory was obtained.

The fighting resumed, with the end of the first truce, on 6 July, 1948. The results of the following ten-day war was the rout of the Arab forces. In the north, the Israeli troops captured western Galilee and crossed the Lebanese border where they occupied a dozen or more villages. In the central portion of Palestine, they captured, among other towns, Lydda and Ramle as well

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15Najib al-Rayyis in al-Qabis (Syria), 7 June 1948. See also Fu'ad Sarruf in al-Ahram (Egypt), 22 June 1948.

16Hanna Ghusun in al-Diyar (Lebanon), 12 June 1948. See also Muhyi al-Din al-Nasuli in Bayrut (Lebanon), 16 June 1948.

17See for example al-Balad (Syria), 7 July 1948; al-Kifah (Syria), 10 July 1948; and al-Ayyam (Syria), 14 July 1948.
as widening the corridor that led from the coast to the new city of Jerusalem. In the south, Israeli forces probed into the Negev.

Thus defeated, the Arab leaders were willing to agree to a second truce. The reaction to the second truce was mixed. As might be expected, the Syrian papers were in the forefront of those who denounced it. The word emanating from a good number of these papers was that the people wanted combat, not a truce. One Syrian paper, al-Ayyām, felt that the cease-fire ought not be adhered to and called the Security Council, which had been in the lead in calling for a truce, the "Injustice Council."  

Other papers were willing to accept the necessity of a cease-fire in Palestine and thus presented different views about the consequences of the truce. For the Egyptian papers, the second truce was just a step in the long struggle which lay ahead. In the end, the Arab people could rightfully expect to be victorious. On the other hand, the Lebanese papers were more pessimistic. "Our dreams vanished on the evening of 18 July....Beloved

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18 *al-Akhbār* (Syria), 24 July 1948. See also *al-Balad* (Syria), 20 July 1948.

19 18 July 1948.

20 *al-Ahram* (Egypt), 19 July 1948.
Palestine was nailed to the cross as if those who crucified Christ wanted also to crucify the land where He was born."\(^\text{21}\)

Despite the attempts at bravado by the official spokesmen for the various Arab governments, it was obvious, as the second truce began, that the victory that the Arab people had been promised was nowhere in sight. Twice within two months, the Arabs were disappointed to find the State of Israel still existed. This condition caused the Arab editorialists to reflect upon what had happened and why they were not victorious. Many reasons were put forward for the lack of victory. They included blaming the western nations for their aid of Israel. The Arab League came under fire. The role of Transjordan was questioned and Arab leaders found themselves chastised in the press.

Coming under special scrutiny, by the Arab press, was the role of the British. The English were damned since the Arabs felt they had been wronged in 1920 and 1921 when the English agreed with the French to split the Middle East into spheres of influence. And they felt that the British had wronged the Arabs again in

\(^{21}\)Hanna Ghusun in al-Diyār (Lebanon), 22 July 1948. See also Kāmil Murūwah in al-Ḥayāh (Lebanon), 19 June 1948.
1948 by helping the Zionists.\textsuperscript{22} Also along with the British, the role of the United States was questioned.

On this occasion, we would like to direct our speech to Britain and America. The Arabs believe that the Zionists alone cannot attain any of their ambitions. And if it were not for the support of the Great Powers and their assistance, they [the Israelis] could not have done what they did in Palestine.\textsuperscript{23}

However, criticism of foreign countries for their role in creating the Palestine problem was minimal. The feeling pervading the editorials was that it was well and good to assert that Israel had been established by foreign powers, but why were the Arabs not able to destroy a country that was so small, so young, and so weak?

The Arab League, as a focus for the Arab people, came under heavy fire. The fact that the League and its Secretary General, `Abd al-Raḥmān `Azzām, acted as lightning rods was due in part to the fact that for the previous three months, Arab League headquarters, in Cairo, had been acting as a paper mill. It distributed literally hundreds of memos and announcements which implied great Arab victories in the field. When the

\textsuperscript{22}\textit{al-Kifāh} (Syria), 21 August 1948.

\textsuperscript{23}\textit{al-\textit{Ahrām}} (Egypt), 22 November 1948.
victories failed to materialize, the wrath of the Arab writers fell on those who had been misleading them. 

al-Nahār, under the headline, "What have you done?" wrote:

[The Political Committee of the Arab League] has affirmed that our forces will remain in the Holy Land until "peace returns to the Land of Peace."

Does the Political Committee believe that those forces which will stay in Palestine will guarantee its [i.e., the Arab League's] rights if the truce negotiations fail? If this is so, why don't these forces continue the battle which was started and get these rights, since the Political Committee is convinced that force is the only solution and the truce is nothing but deceit...?

We ourselves believe that the only thing the Political Committee of the League will do is submit to the fait accompli while trying to save face. And if we have anything to say to it...it is that its policy has failed and fools no one.24

Other comment on the role of the Arab League and its Secretary-General was biting in its sarcasm:

Let us confess...that in the East, the ridiculous never kills.

If ridiculousness killed, Mr. ‘Abd al-Rahmān 'Azzām, Secretary-General of the League, would have already died 107 times.

Mr. ‘Abd al-Rahmān 'Azzām would have been a dead man every time that he, through his effusive verbage, annihilated Israel; every time he expressed his optimism regarding the developments of the Palestine

24al-Nahār (Lebanon), 20 July 1948.
affair at the United Nations; every time he announced to the world the secret resolutions and mysterious decisions of the Council of the League and of the Political Committee.

Mr. ‘Abd al-Rahmān ‘Azzām and the pontiffs of the Arab League have not visibly learned anything. They have not learned, in any case, that their victory in Palestine was not due solely to foreign factors but also—and to a large extent—to the incoherence of their foreign policy.25

The bitterness felt resulted in the call, in some newspapers, for the abolishment of the Arab League. Since it had practiced a policy which was not within its means, several papers felt that it should be buried so that future Arab generations would not know how weak the League had been.26

By far the largest amount of editorial criticism was directed not at the Arab League nor at foreign influence but at the responsibility of the Arab leaders for the disaster. The editorialists blamed the Arab leaders for having two major faults. The first was that the Arab leaders had disregarded the people and did not realise that war could no longer be won unless the people were informed of what was going on

25 Kesrouan Labaki in L'Orient (Lebanon), 1 December 1948. For a corroborating view see Fāyɛz Sayegh, Arab Unity: Hope and Fulfillment, p. 144.

on about them. The leaders had to solicit popular support in order to win and this had not been done. Secondly, the editorialists felt that the leaders were not organized and had limited objectives in mind in Palestine. They thus felt that their leaders were more interested in personal aggrandisement rather than having the welfare of the Palestinian Arabs or the welfare of all of the Arab peoples in mind.  

There is the implication in almost all of the editorials that if only there had been a real, unified military command, if only there had not been treachery on the part of some leaders, if only there had been no foreigners aiding Israel, if only the Arab League had functioned as it was designed to, then undoubtedly, the Arabs would have been successful.

This "only if" syndrome, while touching on valid points, does not really answer the question of why the

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27 For representative editorials see Kāmil Murūwah in al-Ḥayāh (Lebanon), 20 July 1948 or al-Manār (Syria), 29 July 1948. See also a poem written by Muḥammad al-Asmar in al-Ahrām (Egypt), 3 October 1948, which reads in part:

"I do not fault the Jews,
Our allies are to blame,
"They desired our friendship,
But their actions refuted their claim."

For a more detailed discussion of the role of the Arab leaders and their betrayal of the Palestine cause, see Musā al-‘Alamī, ‘Ibrat Falaṣṭīn, pp. 23-30.
Arabs were defeated. The Arab editorialists seemed to be afflicted with the same illusion that was rampant in China during the nineteenth century. The feeling in China then, and in the Arab Middle East in the twentieth century, was that there could be a merger of modern technology with eastern ethics. However, the Chinese soon learned that it does no good to have a modern machine in the hands of someone with no technological understanding.

There has to be modernization not only in technology but modernization of the minds that will run the machines, be they political or physical. Nowhere did an Arab editorialist write, "The reason for this [Israeli] victory is that the roots of Zionism are grounded in modern Western life while we for the most part are distant from this life and hostile to it."\(^{28}\)

And by missing this point, Arab editorialists overlooked what was perhaps the greatest reason for the defeat of the Arabs in 1948. They also overlooked an opportunity to help their people not only to understand the reasons for the disaster but to show how a second disaster could be avoided.

The passage of time did not always ameliorate the negative feelings of the Arab editorialists. Arab unity

\(^{28}\)Constantine K. Zurayk, *The Meaning of the Disaster*, p. 34.
was still as elusive as ever in 1950. "We are still shouting at each other."29 There was still the feeling that Arab leaders were doing nothing but "meeting, deciding, exchanging greetings, and filling the world with promises."30

But the role of the newspaper editorials did not continue in an exclusively negative vein. As time passed, the writers began to pick up what pieces remained and tried to lead public opinion once again.

The most immediate concern was with the fate of the 300,000 refugees who had fled Palestine. The editorialists called for those with wealth to aid their less fortunate brothers. Several editorials wondered whether the Arab refugees were going to form a new diaspora in place of the in-gathered Jews in Palestine.31 But with the possibility in late 1948 that negotiation might result in the repatriation of the refugees, editorialists did not spend a great deal of time on the refugee problem.


30 al-Difa' (Palestine-Jordan), 21 April 1950.

31 al-Ahram (Egypt), 10 August and 9 September 1948. See also al-Qabas (Syria), 19 October 1948.
If the refugee problem escaped close scrutiny, the actions of King ‘Abd Allāh did not. As early as October, 1948, there began to appear hostile criticism of his role in managing the Transjordanian sector of the war. In particular there was criticism of his demand, as early as 1947, that no government be formed in Palestine since the king had the idea of annexing Arab Palestine to Transjordan.

If there had been a government in Palestine in mid-May, the least that could be said is that the unhappiness of the refugees would have been less great and that other miseries would have been avoided. In refusing a government for Palestine at that moment, there was tragically, in the place of a country which could defend herself, a country occupied.... All this has happened because intentions were not innocent. Palestine was coveted, at least in part, by the very ones who claimed to save her.\(^2\)

The editorial campaign against ‘Abd Allāh, begun in the last quarter of 1948, was in fact a reflection

\(^2\)Michel Chiha in Le Jour (Lebanon), 27 October 1948. Although some of the Arab newspapers noted that ‘Abd Allāh's actions in the Palestine war were not exactly what was expected, there was no hint at this time of the king's meetings and agreements with, among other, Golda Meir and Moshe Shertok. These were made public only in late 1949 and early 1950. The details of the meetings may be found in volume one of ‘Abd Allāh al-Tall, Karithat Falastīn. A detailed analysis of the meetings may be seen in A. H. H. Abidi, Jordan A Political Study, pp. 25-38.
of the anger felt toward the annexation of the west
bank of the Jordan River to the Kingdom of Transjordan.
There had been, for a long time, suspicion on the part
of the other Arab countries directly involved in the
Palestinian problem that Abd Allah wished to unify
all of the Near East under the Hashemite crown. In
fact, in order to forestall Transjordanian expansion, the
Arab countries having contiguous borders with Trans­
jordan had begun encouraging the Palestinians in 1948
to form their own government with its capital in
Ghazzah. Egypt, as the principal opponent to
the Hashemites for Arab leadership, was in the forefront
of those supporting the All-Palestine Government. This
government was formed on 20 September, 1948 and had as
its Prime Minister Ahmad Hilmî [‘Abd al-Bâqî].33 The All-
Palestine Government's National Assembly, meeting in
Ghazzah, elected the Muftî of Jerusalem, al-Ḥâj Amîn
al-Ḥusainî, as its president. Clearly, the Egyptian
government was trying to prevent the announced intention
of Abd Allah to annex the portions of Palestine which
he controlled.

King ‘Abd Allah, however, did not wait long to

33 For a complete listing of the cabinet members in
the All-Palestine Government and their portfolios see
accept the challenge. On 1 December, 1948, two thousand Palestinians, loyal to the king, attended what is known as the Jericho Congress and called for the union of Palestine with Transjordan. What developed, then, was a power play on the part of ʿAbd Allāh against the other involved Arab states. Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and even Iraq quickly recognised the Palestinian government in Ghazzah and warned the Transjordanian leader not to attempt to annex Palestine. The governments' demands were strongly echoed in the press of the respective countries. Lebanon was the most restrained in her condemnation of the actions of ʿAbd Allāh. But Egyptian and Syrian editorials lashed out at the policies of the Hashemite king.

The Egyptian papers warned that the attempt to annex Palestine would cause a serious breach in the heretofore solid Arab front facing the Zionists in Palestine. To this extent, the Egyptian editorialists were correct in their assessment. Prior to the annexation of Palestine to Transjordan, the Arabs, at least on the surface, were united in their opposition to the Zionists. But with the aggrandizement of Transjordan, a new chapter was opened in the Palestinian question.

34_al-Ahram_ (Egypt), 9, 10, and 12 December 1948.
This was the question of inter-Arab rivalries for supremacy within the Near East. Henceforth, where there had been restraint on the part of the editorial writers, perhaps enforced by their respective governments, in attacking leaders of the various Arab nations, there was no such restraint following the announced intentions of King ʿAbd Allāh. If one may judge from the amount of editorial opinion devoted to both, the role of the Arab leaders in the Palestine war did not upset the writers as much as ʿAbd Allāh's actions in annexation. One might then draw the conclusion that for Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon, the loss of Palestine to Israel was less bitter than the loss of Palestine to ʿAbd Allāh.

Jordan's action initiated a period of strong denunciations by the papers of one nation against the leaders of other nations. The Syrian journal, al-Manār, summed it up well when it wrote that ʿAbd Allāh's annexation of Palestine to Transjordan had sown discord in the Arab League and in the Arab cause for the sole benefit of individuals, not peoples.35

At practically the same time as friction was developing over the formation of an All-Palestinian

359 December 1948. See also Alif Baʿ (Syria), 29 September 1948 and al-Balad (Syria), 9 October 1948.
Government, there was issued the second report of Count Folke Bernadotte. The Count submitted his report to the United Nations on 16 September. He was assassinated on 17 September and his report was published on 20 September, 1948. The second report, in Arab eyes, was basically the same as the first report. For this reason, it was almost totally rejected by Arab editorialists. The newspapers were still unwilling to accept partition. "The mediator brings nothing new. And it is undeniably true, the rights of the Arabs in Palestine cannot be the object of haggling."36

Although the Arabs rejected the proposals of Count Bernadotte, they were forceful in condemning his assassination. They even rationalised his death, saying that it was for such terroristic activities, perpetrated by the Zionists, that the States of the Arab League had

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36 *al-Fayhā'*(Syria), 16 September 1948, quoted from *Bulletin de la Presse Syrienne*, 15-17 September 1948. See also *al-Ahrām* (Egypt), 22 and 23 September 1948. These editorials cast some doubt on the accuracy of A. H. H. Abidi's statement that "Bernadotte's posthumous report, on the whole, was well received by the Arabs." *Jordan A Political Study*, p. 49. The Arab writers were, however, wrong in saying that Bernadotte's second proposal brought "nothing new". The Port of Haifa and the airport at Lydda were taken from Israel and declared "free."
invaded Palestine on 15 May.\textsuperscript{37}

As the events of the first half of 1948 drew more distant in time, the Arab writers began to formulate ideas about the results of the fighting. There began to develop in Arab editorials a premonition of the long and difficult struggle ahead.

On the eve of 15 May, the Arab declarations permitted the belief that our armies in Palestine would carry out a military pleasure-trip.

Today there is no question of a pleasure-trip.\textsuperscript{38}

This long battle against the forces of Zionism could be speeded toward a successful conclusion if only the Arabs would unite. "The first lesson we learned from Palestine, and one we should always remember, is that our unity gives us strength."\textsuperscript{39}

Others, however, saw in any prolonged struggle, whether or not the Arabs were united, the victory of the Zionists. The belief was that every second Israel lived was a period of time in which she would consolidate

\textsuperscript{37}L'Orient (Lebanon), 18 September 1948; al-Kifāh (Syria), 18 September 1948; and al-Qabas (Syria) 2 November 1948.

\textsuperscript{38}Kesrouan Labaki in L'Orient (Lebanon), 8 September 1948.

\textsuperscript{39}al-Ahrām (Egypt), 25 July 1948.
herself and increase both her numbers and her arms. The call from these editorialists was for a resumption of combat immediately.\textsuperscript{40}

For two Christian Lebanese editorialists, the danger to the Arabs lay in the international character of Zionism. The fact that Jews from throughout the world were supporting Israel rankled these writers. And being Christians, they focused on the city of Jerusalem.

Kesrouan Labaki wrote that for Zionists, "...the Jewish state without Jerusalem would be a body with no soul." But he pleaded that Jerusalem no longer belonged exclusively to the Jews but also belonged to Muslims and Christians.\textsuperscript{41} Echoing this belief, Michel Chiha wrote, "There is no Zionism without Zion and there is no State of Israel which will indefinitely do without Jerusalem."\textsuperscript{42}

Editorial opinion continued in a pessimistic tone when fighting erupted in the Negev region during

\textsuperscript{40}al-Balad (Syria), 30 October 1948. See also al-Ahram (Egypt), 26 October 1948. The latter editorial recognized the danger, for the Arabs, of Israel's ability to strengthen herself. The editorial said that a quick solution would be the best. But then it did not say what it would like to see in any quick solution.

\textsuperscript{41}L'Orient (Lebanon), 21 September 1948.

\textsuperscript{42}Le Jour (Lebanon), 4 September 1948.
the last quarter of 1948. Egypt was defeated by the Israelis. Perhaps as a result of her inability to continue the war, Egypt accepted the invitation of the acting U. N. Mediator, Ralph Bunche, and went to the island of Rhodes to negotiate the first armistice. The Egyptian delegation arrived in January, 1949, and this demarche caused an editorialist to remark that with the journey of the Egyptians to Rhodes, the game was over for the other Arab states. They would all fall in line and "play dead, just as they always have, and accept disgrace and the fait accompli."43

Transjordan followed Egypt to Rhodes in February, 1949. Lebanon began negotiations in March while Syria and the Israelis signed a truce agreement in July, 1949.

Egyptian editorials attempted to be understanding of the causes which had brought the Arabs to the negotiating table:

The truce in Palestine is considered an important stage because it opens the way for a permanent solution of the Palestine problem.... As for Egypt...she can review her situation with pride since she has done her duty and did what she promised and was faithful to the Arab cause.44

43Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Nūṣūlī in Bāyrūt (Lebanon), 17 January 1949.

44al-Ahrām (Egypt), 25 February 1949.
The Syrian press was uniformly opposed to the Egyptian action in going to Rhodes although adverse Syrian comment was not permitted when the delegation from Syria went to Rhodes.\(^{45}\)

The editorial comment on the proposals of Count Bernadotte, the fate of Jerusalem, and the events at Rhodes seem less important when compared with the continuing drama between Transjordan, on the one hand, and the other Arab states, led by Egypt, on the other hand. The muffled protests and lack of outraged commentary concerning the former events were not characteristics of the writings on the topic of the fate of 'Abd Allāh-held Palestine.

The announced annexation scheme of Transjordan, as portrayed above, may be conveniently designated as the point at which inter-Arab friction came into the open. One may hypothesize that there was genuine worry on the part of the Arab countries that Transjordan was subordinating the interests of the Palestinians to

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\(^{45}\)See for example al-Fayhā', 9 February 1949; Baradā, 19 February 1949; and al-Manār, 21 February 1949. The editorial comment in the last newspaper is especially bitter toward the Egyptian government. This may be explained, in part, by the fact that al-Manār was the spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood's leader, Hasan al-Banna was assassinated on 12 February 1949 and al-Manār held the Egyptian Government responsible.
dynastic considerations. A more accurate analysis is that there was an Arab fear of Transjordanian growth, especially on the part of Egypt which viewed herself as the leader of the Arab world.46

It is in the light of Transjordanian-Arab (Egyptian) rivalry that the questions of Palestine must be seen. The feelings of the Arab writers toward the Palestinian refugees was in part humanitarian but they provided also an opportunity to advance political ideas. Consequently, when the negotiations over the return of the refugees failed, attention returned to their plight. And for reasons largely attached to politics, Transjordan and the other Arab countries, respectively, came up with two diverging opinions over how the refugee question could be solved.

Egypt, in opposing the union of Arab-held Palestine with Transjordan, naturally opposed any plan for the refugees which would help to finalize that union. She therefore opposed the settlement of the refugees

46This fear of King ʿAbd Allāh's ambitions was present in Iraq. The Regent, ʿAbd al-Ilāh, had agreed to the recognition of the All-Palestine government for this reason. The Saudis were afraid of a too-strong Hashemite ruler who might decide to try and recapture his family's old hegemony in the Arabian peninsula. Syria feared ʿAbd Allāh might try to take Damascus as his brother had as part of a Greater Syria plan.
in Transjordan. But in Egyptian editorials, fear of Transjordanian aggrandizement was not voiced. Rather, in demanding that the refugees return to that portion of Palestine which had originally been assigned by the United Nations to the Zionists, Egypt said she was only being just. In this manner, she refused to further Transjordanian aims by declining to cooperate with the U. N. in its attempts to provide an economic settlement of the problem of the refugees.

This attitude first appeared in the autumn of 1949 when the United Nations dispatched an economic commission to study the possibility of providing jobs for the refugees. Egypt viewed this as a step toward an economic settlement of a problem which she saw as being military and political.

It is obvious from the [United Nations'] Committee's assignment that it is trying to make a connection between the refugees' destiny and the economic plans which help their settlement, as if it is already decided that the [Arab] countries of the Middle East should settle the refugees. But it is known that the Arab countries adhere to the principle that the refugees must go back to the country from which they were evicted and any other solution is unjust.47

The Transjordanians, however, viewed the problem

47al-Ahrām (Egypt), 14 September 1949.
differently. King 'Abd Allāh was, in 1949 and 1950, still anxious to find a common ground on which to base a settlement with the Israelis and was more prone, therefore, to accept a settlement which did not require the return of the refugees to their former homes. Falastīn, which had become after 1948 the outspoken leader of the pro-'Abd Allāh newspapers, felt that "the inevitable, practical solution is that the refugees settle in Jordan alone, as Jordan can make available for them work and shelter." Thus Falastīn asked for the United Nations to provide for a just economic settlement by beginning development projects in Jordan so that the refugees might begin once again to depend on themselves to earn a living, thus regaining their lost dignity.49

Where the refugees were to be settled was often only a topic on which the growing Arab-Transjordan dispute could focus. This was also true of the friction that resulted over Transjordan's annexation plans. When on 27 December, 1949, King 'Abd Allāh announced that the Transjordanian parliament had been dissolved and that new elections were to be held in April on both sides of the Jordan River, it was obvious that 'Abd Allāh was finally

48 Falastīn (Palestine-Jordan), 12 January 1950.
going to finish what had begun in 1948 with the call for
the unification of the two banks of the Jordan River.

The pro-'Abd Allāh papers in Transjordan busied
themselves with editorials describing the reasons for
the necessity of the annexation of Arab-held Palestine.
They stated that the Arab countries, other than Trans­
jordan, had sold out the Palestinians and that the only
country capable of preserving a measure of dignity for
the Palestinians was His Hashemite Majesty's. Not only
were the other Arab countries not capable of regaining
the rights of the Palestinian Arabs, they had washed
their hands of the Palestine question and "followed
the motto that the annihilation of the Arabs of
Palestine is a solution for the Palestine question."^50

On the other side, the anti-'Abd Allāh forces
viewed the impending annexation of Arab Palestine as a
betrayal of the Arab cause. Some newspapers called
Israel and Transjordan "allies" because the two had
split the Holy Land between themselves like old friends.
They declared that as a result of this insidious be­
havior, "Palestine has disappeared."^51

^50Falastīn (Palestine-Jordan), 15 January 1950. Also
see the same paper on 11 January 1950.

^51al-Sūrī al-Jadīd (Syria), 21 December 1949. See the
same newspaper of 25 December 1949 as well as al-Nāṣr
(Syria), 21 October 1949.
The anti-'Abd Allāh campaign increased in tempo until it reached its zenith on 4 March, 1950, with the publication in the Egyptian newspaper, Akhbār al-Yawm, of an expose of the alleged secret meetings between 'Abd Allāh and the Zionists. This attack was continued two weeks later when on 18 March, 1950, Akhbār al-Yawm produced photocopies of letters said to have been written by 'Abd Allāh. The letters graphically pointed out the attempts by the king to make peace with the Israelis. One letter was singled out for special scorn because it addressed Moshe Shertok as "My Dear".

This Egyptian campaign against the Transjordanian monarch had wide repercussions throughout the Arab world. Many newspapers reprinted the damning evidence against 'Abd Allāh and broadened the charges. Interviews were given by those opposed to the king thus furthering anti-'Abd Allāh feeling. Newspaper readers were reminded that British circles, three years earlier, had stated they would not oppose absorption of parts of Palestine.

52 That the meetings between 'Abd Allāh and the Zionists are really more than an "allegation" has since been confirmed by Walter Eytan, The First Ten Years, pp. 42-43; John Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, pp. 258, 340-341; James G. McDonald, My Mission in Israel, p. 194; and 'Abd Allāh al-Tall, Kārīthat Falāṣīn, Vol. I.
to Transjordan. Some papers even assured their subscribers that a peace treaty had already been concluded between Transjordan and Israel and would be announced at an opportune time.

There resulted a call to drive Transjordan from the Arab League for having "betrayed Islām, Arab unity, and the Arab cause."

فلسطين was not long in responding. An editorial of 9 May, 1950, accused a former Egyptian Foreign Minister, Ḥāmid Lūṭfī al-Sayyid, of calling for peace between Arabs and Zionists. The pro-'Abd Allāh press also stated in no uncertain terms that the other Arab countries had forfeited their right to speak for the Palestinian Arabs as a result of the pitiful showing in the recent

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53 al-Aḥrām (Egypt), 9 May 1950. This editorial is undoubtedly based on a statement by British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. See Parliamentary Debates House of Commons, Vol. 451, columns 999-1000, 4 June 1948.

54 al-Ḥaramā (Syria), 11 May 1950. See also al-Aḥrām (Egypt), 11 May 1950.

55 al-Miṣrī (Egypt), 19 March 1950. The next sentence in the editorial, often quoted, reads, "The time has come to sever this decayed member from the body of the Arab world and to bury it and heap dung on it."

56 That there may be truth in the accusation that the first overt call for peace with Israel came from the Egyptians, see Benjamin Shwadran, Jordan A State of Tension, p. 272.
war. It was now up to the Palestinians to speak for themselves and they said they desired union with Transjordan.

If the Arab League does not want to understand that the Palestinian Arabs themselves asked for unity with their brothers, the Jordanians, it is because the League has bad intentions against this portion of the Arab world and it wants to make it a prey for Israel.57

The Egyptian-led campaign against Transjordan was unsuccessful. A parliament composed of Palestinians and Transjordanians met in 'Ammān in April, 1950, and there ratified the unification of the two banks of the Jordan River. The name of the unified state had earlier become the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Despite periodic threats, Jordan was not expelled from the Arab League and her new borders were de facto accepted by the Arab states.

No sooner had the Jordanian affair quieted down when a new Arab irritant entered the Middle East. And this was the proclamation of the French, British, and American Tripartite Declaration on 25 May, 1950. This declaration is best remembered for its guaranteeing the integrity of the borders of all countries in the

57 פלסטין (Palestine-Jordan), 17 May 1950. See also the same newspaper of 3 June 1950.
Jordanian editorial opinion was not outspoken on the respective merits or demerits of the Tripartite Declaration. One can assume that ‘Abd Allah was not adverse to having international guarantees for his newly enlarged nation. One may also assume there was anti-Tripartite feeling but this was not permitted to become manifest in the Jordanian newspapers. The Lebanese journals left the impression, at least when the declaration first appeared, that they were not adverse to having their southern border guaranteed against believed Israeli designs against south Lebanon. This Lebanese support was reinforced by the government's issuance of a statement which supported the Tripartite Declaration.\footnote{59}

What can be assumed as Lebanese and Jordanian passive acceptance of the Declaration was not reflected in the newspapers of Syria and Egypt. Each of these countries opposed the ideas incorporated in the Three Power statement. Their editorials reflected three reasons for opposing it. First and most important, they felt the

\footnote{58}The Tripartite Declaration is published in the \textit{Department of State Bulletin}, Vol. 52, no. 570, p. 886.

\footnote{59}Published in \textit{L'Orient} (Lebanon), 27 May 1950.
Declaration protected the State of Israel and guaranteed her borders, thus finalizing the status quo. Second, they viewed the Great Power declaration as a means of intervening in the affairs of the Middle East. Finally, they saw it as a means for the three nations to reaffirm old influence in the Arab countries under the guise of providing peace and stability. Although the latter two points were sometimes hazy in their exposition, the general feeling in the Arab papers of Egypt and Syria was that the Tripartite Declaration was nothing more than another species of the Balfour Declaration. It would provide for the definitive establishment of Israel's borders and thus was an attempt to liquidate, through subterfuge, the Palestinian affair.60

Frustration and bitterness toward the Western Powers and their policies in the Middle East were also reflected in the Arab attitude toward the Korean conflict. There was a feeling that the United States and her western allies were menacing, through the exportation of colonialist and imperialist ideas, the peace of the

60 Representative opinion may be seen in Alif Baʾ (Syria), 9 June 1950; al-Ahram (Egypt), 30 May 1950; and al-Insāʾ (Syria), 11 May 1951.
world. 61

Other opinion was equally biting in its comment although it found different reasons for the lack of United Nations' aid in the Middle East—this while the same organization, under United States' leadership, was aiding the south Koreans against their enemies. The blame for lack of Middle Eastern action on the part of the world organization was placed on President Truman and his government.

...One can speak of the weakness of the United Nations in Palestine. For Korea, this language cannot be used. But in order to be just, one bitter remark must be made: in Korea, Interest and Justice were on the same side; while in Palestine, Interest played against Justice. These things must be said because the truth must be told. 62

If the Jordanian newspapers were silent on the United Nations' intervention in Korea, they were not as silent in discussing the role of the United Nations

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61 al-Sūrī al-Jadīd (Syria), 14 July 1950. With the early setback of the United Nations' forces in Korea, there was a certain amount of elation in the Arab newspapers. One editorial said that Divine Providence acting in Korea was getting revenge, for the Arabs, against those who had supported the Zionists. al-Nadhīr (Syria), 1 August 1950.

62 Michel Chiha in Le Jour (Lebanon), 27 December 1950. See also al-Qabas (Syria), 27 May 1951.
in settling the plight of the refugees. Whereas in early 1950, the pro-'Abd Allāh paper, Falastīn, had supported the settlement of the refugees in Jordan, by the end of 1950 this position had changed. Now Falastīn and al-Difā', perhaps out of anti-'Abd Allāh pressure, out of the desire of 'Abd Allāh to placate his Egyptian-aroused opponents, or out of a desire to delay a new U. N. resolution on the refugees, had begun to call for the unqualified return of the refugees to their old homes.

The call for the settlement of the refugees in Jordan was now substituted with, "The refugee accepts nothing less than return to his home. His return should not be the subject of discussion and bargaining."63 And to facilitate this return, the Palestinian-Jordanian newspapers called for positive action on the part of the United Nations and its Relief and Works Administration.

The discussion in the Jordanian papers around the refugee problem corresponded in time to a debate going on at the U. N. over a revision of the U. N. resolution

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63 Falastīn (Palestine-Jordan), 19 November 1950.
of December, 1948,\textsuperscript{64} for a return of the refugees to their homes. An Israeli offensive in the United Nations in late 1950 culminated in a new resolution which affirmed that the refugees could either return home or be compensated. However, this second resolution placed emphasis on compensation rather than return.\textsuperscript{65} The Israeli position, as voiced by U. N. Delegate Abba Eban, was that Israel was not to blame for the flight of the refugees. To this argument came the editorial reply:

> It may seem to the reader that the Arab situation with respect to the refugees is sound and just but Mr. Eban, the Jewish delegate to the United Nations, has a different opinion. He spoke before the [U. N.] Political Committee and pretended that his government was innocent in the refugee crisis. He tried to make the entrance of the Arab armies into Palestine the scapegoat.

> We wonder whether Eban believed what he said yesterday. He has overlooked what happened in Palestine and that is the refugee problem reached its climax before the end of the Mandate and before the entrance of the Arab armies into Palestine. Did he forget that about half a million Arabs were forced to evacuate their homes by force of arms? Do we have to remind him of Dayr Yāsīn which was the main reason for the entrance of the Arab armies into Palestine? Eban knows these facts but

\textsuperscript{64}U.N. Resolution No. 194 (III) of 11 December 1948.

\textsuperscript{65}U.N. Resolution No. 394 (V) of 14 December 1950.
ignored them....

The refugees' tragedy is a result of the devilish and deadly plan devised by world Zionism to uproot the Palestinian Arabs and settle foreigners in their place.66

This type of editorial did not alter the adoption of the resolution calling for either repatriation or compensation. The Palestinian press in Jordan was unanimous in condemning this alteration of a previous resolution. By making the return of refugees less positive, it was felt that Israel would only have to say return was impossible and the refugees would be forced to take compensation.67 The impression given by editorials was that once again the U.N. had been forced to bow before Zionist pressure. As a result the prestige of the already damaged United Nations sank even lower. The world body was once again seeking the easy way out of a dilemma without giving full recompense to the injuries done to the Palestinians.

The scope of this chapter, from the entrance of the Arab armies into Palestine to the assassination of King 'Abd Allāh in July, 1951, has dealt largely with topical problems. The Arab press, as a generalization, can be said to have played a reacting role rather than a

66al-Difā' (Palestine-Jordan), 10 November 1950. Also see the same paper of 12 November 1950.
67Falastīn (Palestine-Jordan), 8 and 9 December 1950 and 25 January 1951.
leading role in the events that surrounded the Palestine question. This may be true of the world's newspapers. Editorialists tend to see problems already manifest and then react to them, proposing suggestions to ameliorate them. Rare is the editorial which foresees problems and wishes to inform its readers of possible dangers and the methods to be taken to avoid these potentialities.

However, the Arab press was not completely a backward looking press. There was a perceptible segment of editorial opinion which commented not only upon what Israel had done or was doing but upon what Israel might do. This segment of the press tried to draw a larger picture of the implications, for the Arabs, of Israel on their borders. There was, then, a segment of the press which not only looked back but looked forward to discover the meaning of Israel for the Middle East. This type of editorial treatment was usually confined to a limited number of negative observations. There was a feeling that the State of Israel was racist and confessional in nature while the nations of the world were moving toward separation of Church and State and were condemning racially established nations. Arab editorial opinion felt that Israel was a new colonial adventure when, in contrast, the world was moving
away from colonial states. The writers also agreed that perhaps because of the tragedies which had befallen the Jews in Europe under Hitler, Israel was now receiving favored treatment from other countries. And finally, there was a universal Arab editorial belief that Israel in the future meant expansion. This last point was most ominous since the only place the Arabs could see Israeli expansion was into the lands of the Arabs.

To support their claims that Israel was a racist-confessional state, editorials dealing with this felt the Arab refugees had been expelled from Palestine for religious reasons. It was felt to be a step backward in the development of modern nation-states since the nations of the world had declared themselves for tolerance, protection of minorities, and civil equality. Israel was felt to be against all of these rights. The question was then asked, if Israel was permitted to practice racial and confessional discrimination, why was she being encouraged by others? The implied answer was that because Jews had been forced to suffer so greatly, the western nations were trying to salve their consciences by permitting the Israelis to do as they pleased.68

68See for example Michel Chiha in Le Jour (Lebanon), 25 October 1948; al-Difa (Palestine-Jordan), 17 April 1950; and al-Ahrām (Egypt), 3 October 1950.
A corollary to this belief was the idea that Israel was a colony of the west. But here the classic interpretation of the establishment of Israel by Britain was not given. Not iterated were the commonly held western beliefs that Britain had helped to establish Israel in order to maintain a strong power, friendly to the west, on the Suez Canal; that Israel would keep the life-line to India open; and Israel would be a means of keeping in check the influence of the French.

Rather, the Arab editorialists felt that Israel's colonial status came as the result of Jewish pressure, largely in Britain and the United States, to form a Jewish-western state in the Arab east. Jewish money and votes in the United States were particularly suspect. The general feeling was that the Jewish American votes in the New York elections and in the presidential election were enough to cause politicians to do everything in their power to gain this believed bloc of votes. The wealth of the Jewish community in the United States was also identified and it was implied that this community could secure favors as a result of its wealth.  

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69 Representative editorials may be seen in Michel Chiha in Le Jour (Lebanon), 6 January 1949; al-Ahrām (Egypt) 13 June 1949; al-Difa’ (Palestine-Jordan), 30 August 1950; and al-Qābas (Syria), 9 April 1951.
To expound upon how the Arabs felt the Israelis were being favored would be to re-read what has come before and what follows in this dissertation. Throughout is the Arab belief that Justice was on the side of the Arabs and for many reasons—economic, political, as well as those reasons engendered by the second world war—Justice was not important except in Arab eyes. This frustration over believed favoritism was often more implicit than explicit.

Two instances where this feeling became explicit were the diplomatic recognition of Israel and her admittance to the United Nations. There were genuine feelings of editorial shock over the rapidity with which Israel was recognized by the United States and Russia.70

The second incident was the seeming haste with which Israel was admitted to the world body:

Before the fate of Jerusalem and Nazareth is decided, and before the question, for example of Italy and Spain [being admitted into membership], the Security Council, almost unanimously, is recommending the admission of Israel into the United Nations Organization. The country of Dante and that of Charles V can languish in waiting; but

70 See footnote 5, this chapter, page 68, above.
Israel cannot wait; and nations are seen seized with a feverish zeal as soon as it is a question of Israel.71

Finally, there was the fear of Israeli expansion and its implications for the Arabs in the future. There are many editorials on this topic in almost all of the Arab journals. They voiced a fear of believed Zionist intentions to expand. However, the greatest number of editorials on this particular subject, and often the best handled, came from the pen of Michel Chiha. Chiha's editorials must be read with caution, however, since he was often unable or unwilling to make a differentiation between Zionism and Judaism. This is a fault not unknown to other Arab editorialists.

The feeling that Israel was and would be an expansionist state grew out of the thesis, adhered to by the editorialists, that with the establishment of Israel, world-wide Jewry had in one stroke discovered a home for themselves. Comment was made of the fact that henceforth Israelis could gain benefits not normally accruing to others by their ability to hold two passports. But more important than this was the establishment in a small area of a country which claimed a potential population of

71 Michel Chiha in Le Jour (Lebanon), 6 March 1949. See also al-Ahram (Egypt), 13 May 1949.
fifteen or sixteen million people dispersed throughout the world.\textsuperscript{72}

These scattered millions possessed, it was realized, greater wealth and knowledge than the Arabs. It was felt, then, that the first steps, prior to physical expansion, would be economic expansion followed by political and military expansion.

\ldots The Jewish state, conceived according to the partition plan of the United Nations is, we have written it ten times, a bridgehead, a departure point, a commencement. It is the means of arriving at the possession of Palestine entirely, of vast territories on the other side of the Jordan [River], of other [territories] in Syria, which belonged to the Twelve Tribes, and later, when circumstances will permit it, of [territories] which were of old the Kingdom of Israel, and, yet further, that which was the patrimony of Abraham.\textsuperscript{73}

\ldots It is not the business of Israel to produce cereals and sugar-beets...Israel is made for power, for the management of money and what goes with it, for the final revolution which will establish its prevalence.\textsuperscript{74}

For Israel, all the universe could perish provided the Kingdom of David would emerge triumphant. That, for Israel, is a congenital concept of all policy and a fearful concept.

\textsuperscript{72}Michel Chiha in \textit{Le Jour} (Lebanon), 12 June 1948 and 25 March 1949.

\textsuperscript{73}Michel Chiha in \textit{Le Jour} (Lebanon), 4 September 1948.

\textsuperscript{74}Michel Chiha in \textit{Le Jour} (Lebanon), 25 March 1949.
The good men who think that Israel can represent, through this, a power for security and order have given themselves over to illusions.\(^7^5\)

Editorialists felt that tragically the Arabs would replace the Jews in a new diaspora. Thus once again, as at the time prior to May, 1948, the Arab editorialists were militant in their call for arms to settle their grievances.\(^7^6\) This call was not heeded, to any large degree, by the Arab governments. This was probably due to a recognition on the part of the Arab leaders that military victory was not possible at that time. It may also have been unheeded because of a hope that peace might come through arrangements between the Arabs, led by King ʿAbd Allāh, and the Israelis.

The slim chance for peace ended with the assassination of King ʿAbd Allāh as he was entering the Mosque of al-ʿAqṣā in July, 1951. It has been widely speculated that one of the causes for the assassination was the resentment felt toward ʿAbd Allāh as a result of the press campaign against the king. Particularly damaging

\(^7^5\)Michel Chiha in Le Jour (Lebanon), 29 July 1950. See also al-Ahrām (Egypt), 25 March 1949.

\(^7^6\)Representative editorials may be seen in al-Ayyām (Syria), 22 July 1948; Michel Chiha in Le Jour (Lebanon), 6 August 1949; and al-Difāʿ (Palestine-Jordan), 17 September 1950.
to him were the disclosures in *Akhbār al-Yawm* which, as have been mentioned, were widely reported and expanded. Not surprisingly, Arab editorials outside of Jordan spent a minimum amount of time extolling the virtues of the late Hashemite ruler.\(^7\) Clearly the militant press still identified King ʿAbd Allāh with peace with the Zionists and the annexation of Palestine.

Editorial opinion expressed in the Arab world from the beginning of the Palestine war was markedly different from the opinion written at the time of the assassination of King ʿAbd Allāh. Early in 1948, although there was a hint of future strife, editorials were united before the Zionists. This was probably not unusual for any press and may be termed national unity in the face of an enemy. What differences occurred between the papers were the fervor of devotion and the amount of space devoted to the events in Palestine. It is not surprising to discover that those papers most closely associated, geographically and emotionally, with Palestine spent the largest amount of editorial and other space on that

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\(^7\) For an example of damning with faint praise, see *al-Ahrams* (Egypt), 22 July 1951. "Undoubtedly the situation in Jordan will change after his assassination for many reasons, particularly since Ṭalāl is inclined to follow an effective Arab policy...."
country's tribulations.

With the first truce, the Arab newspapers were generally one voice in condemning it. And after the second truce, there began to appear sustained dissent in the editorials. This dissent centered around the reasons for the lack of Arab victories. Since differing reasons were given for the defeat, there developed a movement away from the unified optimism, prior to the war, to fractured pessimism, after the war—pessimism often not so much over Arab defeats but over how these defeats occurred. As a result the Arab League became a prime target for adverse opinion. The West, too, was blamed for the ability of the Israelis to withstand the Arabs. More than this, the Arab leaders would be called upon to answer for their role in the disaster of Palestine.

The loss of Palestine thus resulted in a verbal war waged amongst the newspapers of the Arab countries over who was at fault in Palestine. This war came to pit on the one side the supporters of 'Abd Allah and on the other the supporters of the various Arab rulers. The feeling of anger towards the role of Transjordan in the Palestine war was heightened by the annexation of the west bank to Transjordan in 1950. As a consequence,
any proposed solution to the Palestine problem was inevi-
tably opposed by one of the two feuding sides. The
formation of the All-Palestine Government in Ghazzah, under
the leadership of the Muftī of Jerusalem, was denounced
by those papers supporting the King of Transjordan. On
the other side, the attempts to find a peaceful solution,
as advanced twice by Count Bernadotte, and an economic
solution, as put forward by the United Nations, was in-
vvariably condemned by the other Arab states, with Egypt
in the forefront.

Each side accused the other side of betrayal. To
a certain extent, both sides were correct. Anti-Egyptian
editorials pointed out that it was Egypt that first went
to the conference table with Israel. Anti-'Abd Allāh
editorials declared that it was 'Abd Allāh who had hoped,
from the very beginning, to arrange a mutually acceptable
settlement with the Zionists. One of the results of
these editorial campaigns may well have been the assas-
sination of 'Abd Allāh in 1951.

Despite this bulk of editorial condemnation on
both sides, there was a different leitmotif observable
throughout the period under study. This theme was the
fear that the establishment of the State of Israel would
be a disaster for the Arab states. The editorialists who
wrote on this subject felt that a Zionist state, by its nature, would have to be expansionist since it claimed a citizenship of at least fifteen million and the space she was given could hold only a fraction of that number. From this fear developed a belief that the Arabs might form a new Diaspora. To prevent this from occurring, the Arab writers called for a return to arms. This editorial appeal was not heeded by the Arab governments probably because of a lack of Arab ability to wage a successful war and perhaps a hope that the U. N. could arrange a settlement. There was also another reason for not resorting to arms. This was the possibility that permanent peace might be made between the Arabs and Israel, with Jordan in the lead. This marginal hope was ended with the death of the Hashemite ruler.
Certainly the death of King 'Abd Allāh was a major event in the history of the Palestine question. It marked the end of a period where a peaceful settlement, commonly arranged and commonly acceptable, could have been made between the Arabs and the Israelis. King 'Abd Allāh, for all of his faults and his desire to settle with Israel at the expense of the Palestinians, was a strong man, who, had he been able to conclude peace, might have been able to make the peace succeed. This was undoubtedly not the case with his successor and son, King Ṭalāl, nor with his grandson, King Ḥusayn, who was only seventeen years of age when he ascended the throne. If one searches the Arab world at that period, it is plain that no other ruler was capable of doing what 'Abd Allāh had desired to do.

The Arab world after 'Abd Allāh turned to other areas to find a solution to the problem of Palestine.
Editorial opinion reflected this change.

One possible solution, briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, was settlement through the permanent maintenance of the status quo, guaranteed by the Tripartite Declaration. Arab editorial opinion, as already noted, did not put a great amount of faith in the Declaration and what support did accrue to it had been passive in nature, emanating from Jordan and Lebanon. The passive attitude of the Lebanese writers did become more positive in 1953 or after. Such a stance arose out of the growing fear that Israel had intentions toward south Lebanon and especially that portion of the Litân River which flows westward toward the Mediterranean. Newspapers called for the Powers who had issued the declaration of May 1950 to "not forget that it is not only in their interest, but their primary duty and obligation, to take seriously their responsibilities to execute and enforce the commitments they have assumed."¹

For the Jordanians, the problem was more acute because of Israeli pressure, most notably around Jerusalem. So her papers, too, called for Western intervention to guarantee the borders. Jordan's government was even

¹Hāsil Daggāq paraphrased in the Daily Star (Lebanon), 9 September 1954; see also the same author in al-Hayāh, 17 March 1954; Naṣr al-Mal'ūf in al-Jarīdah, 30 September 1953; and L'Orient, 1 May 1954.
asked by her editorial writers to invoke the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of March, 1948, which provided for mutual military assistance in the event one or the other nation was attacked. 

The two nations which had earlier opposed the Tripartite Declaration, that is Egypt and Syria, did not change their attitude toward the Declaration. They felt that any Western intervention in Palestine, under the pretext of attempting to preserve the existing borders, would continue to be a conspiracy directed against the Arabs for reasons already mentioned. In spite of the pleas of the Lebanese and Jordanians for a firm stand on the part of those who had offered guarantees, by 1954, only four years after its inception, the Declaration for all practical purposes had become a dead letter. Other factors were pushing it into the background, including a fear of Western intervention. Moreover, Arab editorial hostility to the declaration, certainly justified from the Arab point of view, had aided in putting an end to the Tripartite Declaration.

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2al-Difā' (Palestine-Jordan), 15 December 1953.

3See for example al-Yawm (Syria), 5 June 1953; see also pages 99-100, above.
If the Tripartite Declaration was pushed quickly aside, an older problem, that of the refugees, did not disappear with the passage of time. The same forcefulness which characterized Arab editorials in the summer of 1948 was visible throughout this later period. With surprising unanimity, the Arab papers viewed the problem, above all, as being political. When the Jordanian papers ceased calling for the refugees to be resettled in Jordan, all of the Arab countries were unanimous in their desire for return of the refugees to their former homes. The papers felt that if the Zionists could return after two thousand years certainly the claim of the refugees was just as valid.\(^4\)

Besides the obvious desire to have an exclusively Jewish state, the writers felt the refugees were not permitted to return because the Israelis felt repatriation would end a source of tension in the Arab states which was preventing Arab modernization and self-strengthening.\(^5\)

The Arab writers were generally just as intransigent as the Israelis on the problem of the refugees. To this end, writers refused to accept any solution other

\(^4\) *Daily Star* (Lebanon), 8 June 1952 and Rene Aggiouri in *L'Orient* (Lebanon), 15 October 1954.

\(^5\) *Falastìn* (Palestine-Jordan), 19 December 1952.
than repatriation since they felt that if another solution was agreed upon, for instance compensation and resettlement, the whole question of Palestine and its disposition would disappear. As long as the refugees existed, the Arab peoples would have world public opinion on their side and a future resettlement could be hoped for.  

The hostility felt towards an economic solution to the refugee problem was magnified, in the editorials, by the attitude of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). This agency was created in December, 1949, to aid the Palestinians who had fled their homes. In the attempt

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6 See for example al-Jumhūrīyah (Egypt), 26 January 1954. Editorial opinion may appear to be lacking in feeling for the conditions under which the refugees were living. Yet there is ample evidence to support the belief that the refugees themselves refused resettlement and demanded return to their homes. See, as an illustration, the resolution adopted by a convention of Palestine refugees which said in part, "Nothing can change our desire to return." The full text may be seen in al-Jīl al-Jadīd (Syria), 2 October 1951. See also the statements made by the first two UNRWA directors, Howard Kennedy and John Blandford, Jr.: U. N. Document A/1451/Rev. 1, General Assembly, Fifth Session Supplement No. 19; and U.N. Document A/1905, General Assembly, Sixth Session Supplement No. 16. One segment of Arab opinion, the nationalist Christian Lebanese, did not voice the usual reasons for refusing resettlement. This segment, with al-ʿAmal as the leading spokesman, refused resettlement out of a fear that some of the refugees would be resettled in Lebanon. With the vast majority of the refugees professing Islām, their becoming Lebanese citizens was considered to be a threat to Christian predominance.
to aid, the directors had encouraged refugee resettlement and training to make the refugees self-sufficient. The reasons for these plans were largely economic—the refugees would be less of a financial burden on the world if they could support themselves. However, Arab editorialists, practically to a writer, rejected UNRWA's scheme of resettlement and employment of the refugees, using American Point IV aid and other monies, as nothing but a means of making firm the status quo for Israel's benefit. The thought was widely published that UNRWA was nothing more than an organization serving Israeli interests because UNRWA's plan was no more than the Israelis had asked. Israelis wanted the Palestinians dispersed amongst the Arab countries and the plan for small communities and resettlement in the various Arab states would do this. The Israelis wanted the Palestinians to be engaged only in agricultural work. It seemed that what was being advocated by UNRWA would insure that the majority of the refugees would be toiling the land.  

7\textit{al-Difā'ī} (Palestine-Jordan), 2 July 1952. See also \textit{Bayrūt al-Masā'ī} (Lebanon), 28 June 1952 and \textit{al-Fayhāʾ} (Syria), 22 October 1953. The wariness of the Arab editorialists was not lessened by the speech of the American Secretary of State, John F. Dulles, upon his return from the Middle East in 1953. "Some of these refugees could be settled in the area presently controlled by Israel. Most, however, could be more readily integrated into the
Opposition to the plans of UNRWA to alleviate the condition of the refugees by temporarily resettling them and training them with money provided by the West had cumulative results. In retrospect it is fairly easy to see the snowballing effect that opposition to resettlement had on relations between the Arabs and those who were proposing any solution other than repatriation.

If resettlement and training projects gave the Arab writers the feeling that the refugees and their grievances were being pushed aside and liquidated, then anything which aided the fulfillment of these hated ideas was also hated. A case to illustrate this feeling was editorial opinion toward American Point IV aid to underdeveloped nations.

Since UNRWA's ideas were condemnable, so was Point IV which was thought in part to be used for implementing UNRWA's projects. The western nations said they wanted to aid the Arabs but only gave them a very small portion of the total amount of funds allocated, while giving Israel huge sums. Further, although the avowed purpose of the aid was to help the refugees, how could the lives of the neighboring Arab countries. This, however, awaits irrigation projects which will permit more soil to be cultivated." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 28, p. 835.
diversion of the Lîtânî River to the south, for example, help the refugees? The only people who would benefit from such enterprises would be the Israelis. 8

The Israelis, with aid received from America, were to build armaments and factories while the same aid to the Arabs was to provide for the dispersion of the refugees and their employment in agricultural production which would continually make them economically subservient to the more advanced Israelis.

Behind these financial contributions—contributions which from dollars are translated at a later date into shells, guns, and military equipment—lies the real cause of this prevalent state of unrest throughout the Arab world. And naively, America feeds the Jews with dollars and wonders why its Middle Eastern policy has failed to meet with success. Very candidly, they wonder why their every move finds no response and why the Arabs consider them responsible for the present state of affairs. 9

The attacks on Point IV were widened not only to question the motivation behind the giving of the aid, but to include the idea that there were more sinister reasons behind it. A number of editorials intimated that Point IV had Jewish Americans working for it and

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8 al-Fayḥā' (Syria), 15 May 1951.

9 Kamīl Murūwah in al-Ḥayāh (Lebanon), 17 April 1954. See also Falastīn (Palestine-Jordan), 13 December 1951.
why should a Jew be involved in studying the Litān River unless the motivation of Point IV was not honorable? The result was a cry that Point IV had as its true mission espionage and obtaining military secrets.¹⁰

The lack of confidence in Point IV, in UNRWA, and in similar projects emanating from the world-at-large, forced many editorial writers to wonder about the ability or lack of ability of the United Nations. In this respect there was a significant change in the attitudes of the Arab editorialists toward the question of the U.N. and its resolutions. Earlier, before the death of King ʿAbd Allāh, the papers of Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon had opposed the U. N. resolution concerning the partition of Palestine, Jordan, although not overtly accepting the resolution, was known to have accepted it in principle.

However, these attitudes changed with the passage of time. The transition was slow in Egypt, Syria, and

¹⁰See for example al-Hadaf (Lebanon) and al-Sharg (Lebanon), both of 8 December 1953 and al-Difāʿ (Palestine-Jordan), 10 March 1954. The attacks on Point IV caused a minor government crisis in Lebanon in 1953. The government was accused, in accepting Point IV, of being in the service of Zionism. The Bayrūt newspapers of early December, 1953, are replete with descriptions of the crisis. Debate on Point IV was not without its lighter moments for instance when it was revealed that some of the Lebanese deputies had accepted bulls as gifts, while criticizing the aid.
Lebanon. The reversal of Jordanian opinion was more pronounced because of the relative freedom of opinion which was permitted after 'Abd Allāh's death. At any rate, the Jordanian papers, after the summer of 1951, called for a rejection of partition.\textsuperscript{11}

On the other hand, the newspapers of the other Arab countries, especially those of Lebanon, had accepted in principle the existence of Israel if she would implement the three resolutions involving repatriation of refugees, internationalization of Jerusalem, and the partition of Palestine. Some newspapers called for the sending of United Nations' troops to the Middle East to enforce its resolutions while others said that since the U. N. would not enforce its resolutions, the Arab countries should withdraw from the world organization.\textsuperscript{12}

Hostile criticism of the United Nations and its inactivity was not limited to what has been described in the preceding paragraphs. Criticism of the U. N. also included condemnation of that organization for lack of

\textsuperscript{11}Representative editorials may be found in \textit{Falastīn}, 29 November 1951 and \textit{al-Difāa'}, 8 July 1952.

\textsuperscript{12}For various negative expressions, see for example Rene Aggiouri in \textit{L'Orient} (Lebanon), 28 November 1952; \textit{Le Jour} (Lebanon), 15 November 1955; and \textit{al-Manār} (Syria), 17 November 1955.
action in handling the fate of Jerusalem. When the fighting had stopped in 1948, the city of Jerusalem had been in effect partitioned between the two belligerents. The Old City was in Jordanian hands while the New City of Jerusalem, composing at least seventy-five percent of the total city, was in Israeli hands. Arab consternation centered around the belief that Israel would at some future date attempt to conquer the Old City. This fear of Israeli intentions was heightened in 1952 when word began to appear in Arab papers that Israel was moving her Foreign Office to the New City from Tel Aviv. There was also a fear in April, 1953, when sporadic fighting between the two sides erupted.

But Arab concern did not limit itself to expressions that Israel was going to make Jerusalem the capital of her nation. The fear was expressed that the Jews of Israel had, in fact, a special desire for the area on which al-Aqṣā Mosque was standing. The Israelis were accused of wanting to destroy the mosque and desiring to rebuild Solomon's Temple on its original site.\(^{13}\)

Once again, however, as was the case with partition,\(^{13}\)

\(^{13}\)al-Ahrām (Egypt), 25 July 1952; Bāsīl Daqqāq in al-Hayāḥ (Lebanon), 14 November 1954; and Michel Chiha in Le Jour (Lebanon), 15 December 1954.
the Arab states were divided with Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon facing Jordan. The Jordanians had opposed the internationalization of Jerusalem. As a result there were no editorials in the Jordanian papers which called for internationalization. To the contrary, the newspapers of Jordan reported and asked for the conquering of the New City. They also said the Israeli plan to move her seat of government to Jerusalem should be countered by a Jordanian move of the same nature.\(^{14}\)

Editorial opinion, excluding Jordanian, found itself in the unenviable position of attacking the Israelis and the Jordanian Hashemites. Thus, Michel Chiha, for one, was forced to write in editorials approximately one year apart that the Israelis and the Jordanians were both at fault in their attitudes.

\(^{14}\)See for example al-Difa’ (Palestine-Jordan), 3 December 1953 and Falasteen (Palestine-Jordan), 14 November 1954. The Jordanian and Hashemite desire for Jerusalem was no great secret. "The demand for the internationalization of Jerusalem was the strangest and most unbalanced of the [Arab] national aims. It was one that disregarded the Arab rights and interests by handing the Holy Places over to international control and wrenching Jerusalem from the possession of the Arabs. It was my duty to stand resolutely and firmly in the defense of the Arab character of the Holy City and resist internationalization in all its aspects." King Abdallah of Jordan, My Memoirs Completed, p. 13.
For Israel, the hill of Zion is the justification for Zionism (with the obsession for Jerusalem); but for Christianity and for all of Islām, Jerusalem is a Holy Place which cannot be permitted to be placed, no matter what the promises under the political authority of Israel.¹⁵

Israel is the master of three-fourths of the Holy City; and what she wants, first of all, is the other fourth, that is above all, the site of the Temple....

In order to possess a fragment of Jerusalem, Jordan exposes the entire city and all of the neighboring area. In the Palestinian affair, Jordan, since the beginning, carries heavy responsibilities....

Feeble Jordan opposes that which could make her secure. It is to her own safety that she is opposed....

The Jordanian pretension does not honor the Hashemites, does not make them greater in the Arab world; it shows them to be subordinate to a vain and false glory....¹⁶

The problem was how to reconcile Jordanian desires and Zionist plans. The practically unanimous answer from those opposed to both Jordan and Israel was the internationalization of Jerusalem. Once again a past United Nations resolution was recalled and the editorial writers pleaded with the world organization to implement that which she had agreed upon.¹⁷

¹⁵*Le Jour* (Lebanon), 30 December 1953.

¹⁶*Le Jour* (Lebanon), 15 December 1954.

¹⁷Representative editorials may be seen in *Barada* (Syria), 16 May 1952 and *L'Orient* (Lebanon), 5 May 1954.
It is sometimes difficult to describe the exact feeling which permeated the minds of the various editorial writers. To think of the refugees in the camps, the division of a country which they believed could have been whole, and the Israeli push to occupy what remained of Arab Jerusalem appeared to be a nightmare being enacted before their eyes. Their natural tendency was to look about them and attempt to discover the causes of the dilemmas which they faced. The attempts at finding fault and the editorial remedies have been mentioned previously. But a newer reason for apprehension that began developing in the 1950's has not been mentioned. This was a fear of Jewish immigration. Perhaps it would be best to say that this was a re-emerging fright. Before the time under study there had been consternation of Jewish immigration and what it would do to the Arab population. The most famous of these alarms was expressed by George Antonius in his Arab Awakening. But during the period 1948 to 1951, criticism of the events in Palestine did not include a significant amount of comment on Jewish immigration. Nor did the writers spend a great deal of space discussing the ramifications of continued

18 "The logic is inexorable. It shows that no room can be made in Palestine for a second nation except by dislodging or exterminating the nation in possession," p. 142.
immigration, largely because the writers were more concerned with other events surrounding them.

However, as opinion turned to the attempts at settling the refugees and to the drama unfolding in Jerusalem, there arose a small cry against continued Jewish immigration into Israel. The Arab writers felt that the problems the second world war had created for world Jewry had ended. In 1951 and after, one could not speak of Jewish refugees. Therefore, the writers felt that the incessant calls of the Israelis for more and more immigrants were not humanitarian. Rather, they felt that the desire for more immigrants was just a means of denying the Arabs their right to return and a way to gain manpower so as to be able to "expand her area into the Arab countries such as taking south Lebanon, part of Syria, the Sinai peninsula, and northern Saudi Arabia."

The coming into being of the State of Israel, the resulting manifestations which her existence caused the Arabs, Israel's claim to being the home of the Jews of the whole world, and the favoritism shown to Jewish immigrants over Arab refugees could not but influence editorial

19al-Ahrām (Egypt), 19 May 1952. See also Falastīn (Palestine-Jordan), 18 March 1952 and Daily Star (Lebanon), 15 July 1952.
opinion toward Jewish Arabs. Signs of anti-Semitism in the Arab press, described in a previous chapter became much more prevalent in the 1950's, although still not widespread. This is not the place to discuss the treatment of Jewish Arabs by Muslim and Christian Arabs, nor for that matter of Arab Israelis by Jewish Israelis. It is sufficient to say that many newspapers, particularly those of Syria, were willing to draw a connection between what was occurring and what had occurred in Palestine and their own populations.

There was a Syrian campaign, perhaps not forceful, which aimed at those countries which were attempting to be judicious in the care of their Jewish citizens. In particular, several Syrian newspapers wondered about Lebanese treatment of her Jews. The American University of Beirut was mentioned since it had several Jewish faculty members. More important than this was the Syrian disclosure that there were Jewish officers in the Lebanese army. Editorialists asked how Lebanon could claim to be an Arab nation when she had within her officer corps those who were hostile to Arab aims? Lebanon was

\[20\] al-Fayyā' (Syria), 28 October 1951.
accused of being a weak point in the Arab organization.\footnote{al-Naṣr (Syria), 20 April 1952. See also Barādā (Syria), 30 March 1952 and al-Fayḥā (Syria), 21 April 1952.}

Unfortunately, there were seemingly no voices raised in support of the Jewish Arabs. This was in sharp contrast to what has been discussed earlier. In fact, Lebanese comment, when it did appear, was sympathetic to Syrian demands that the Lebanese army be purged.\footnote{Bayrūt al-Masā (Lebanon), 6 June 1952.}

Even General Muḥammad Najīb, the popular frontman of the Egyptian RCC, did not escape chastisement. When he made courtesy calls on the Shaykh of al-Azhar, the Coptic Patriarch, and the Chief Rabbi of Egypt comment was hostile. "We know the good intentions of General Najīb. But we wish him and every other Arab to realize that a Jew has no specific country and has no loyalty except to Judaism."\footnote{al-Difā (Palestine-Jordan), quoted in the Daily Star (Lebanon), 7 October 1952.}

Up to this point in this chapter events which had antecedents in preceding chapters have been considered. Jerusalem, the Refugees, the U. N., its resolutions and its organs, the Tripartite Declaration, and anti-Semitism were all discussed in previous chapters and were mentioned again since they reappeared during the period covered in
this chapter.

For the remainder of the chapter, however, events which began in the time period covered in this chapter will be discussed.

The first of these was the controversy over the diversion of the Jordan River south of Lake Ḥūlah and the Johnston Plan for regional exploitation of water resources in the Jordan Valley.

It was quite natural that once Israel had established herself as a nation, she sought to improve the use of the natural resources near her. One of the first attempts was a water-diversion canal from the Jordan River south of Lake Ḥūlah near the Bridge of Jacob's Daughters. The main purposes of this diversion scheme were hydro-electric and to use the fresh water of the Jordan for irrigation purposes.

Problems arose from this scheme because the land on both sides of the Jordan River south of the lake was in dispute. This area had originally been awarded to the Jewish state in the 1947 partition resolution. However, during the fighting in 1948, the area was occupied by the Syrians. In the armistice agreement between Israel and Syria, in order to break the deadlock over who had the rights to the land, it was decided to make the area a demilitarized zone. Article 12 of the
armistice agreement stated that neither side would do anything within the zone which would upset the strategic balance between the two countries.

The Israelis, in defending their project, maintained there was no question of ownership of the land since it had been given to the Jewish state at partition. They also argued that their work in the zone was not upsetting the strategic balance.

The Arab view of the problem was quite different. The Syrians, and their allies, felt that by diverting the waters of the Jordan, several debits would befall Syria. Firstly, there was a fear that if the Jordan was diverted, a natural boundary separating the belligerents would be erased. Editorial opinion also expressed a fear that the water level of the Jordan would fall thus causing a hardship to many farmers who used the Jordan for irrigation. There was also the belief that with the water going to irrigate previously arid regions, the Israelis would be able to accommodate more Jewish immigrants who would eventually threaten the Arabs. The new Israeli project thus constituted a threat to the safety of Syria and the other Arab countries because it gave Israel strategic and economic advantages
which were not allowed her.  

Syrian editorial opinion was split over what action its government should take in the face of Israeli attempts to divert the Jordan River. Several newspapers felt the best action Syria could take would be to act with Lebanon to divert the two streams, the Ḥasbānī and the Bānyās, which join to form the Jordan. Other Syrian papers were pessimistic in their feelings toward what could be done in the face of Israeli intransigence. These papers felt that Syria would not fight for her rights. Once again the Arabs would be confronted with the fait accompli while they themselves were engaged in a never ending campaign of speeches and declarations.

The Syrian papers were wrong in their estimation of what might happen. The Syrians and Lebanese did not divert the sources of the Jordan nor did the Israelis, at this time, put their canal to use. The United States, on 20 October, 1953, stopped giving Israel economic aid. When, as a result, of this pressure, the

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²⁴ See for example al-Migri (Egypt), 28 and 29 September 1953.
²⁵ See for example al-Fayha (Syria), 26 September 1953.
²⁶ al-Zaman (Syria), 27 September 1953. See also al-Yawm (Syria), 14 October 1953.
Israelis agreed to forego diversion, American aid was resumed to the Israelis on 29 October, 1953.

The problem involved in the Jordan River diversion plan and what was to be done with the development of the other waters, including the previously mentioned Litānī River, were finally brought to a climax with the project commonly known as the Johnston Plan. This far-reaching development plan for the water resources in and around the Jordan Valley was named after Eric Johnston, the special representative of President Eisenhower. The development project was introduced to the Arabs in the autumn of 1953. Full details of this plan need not be included here, but there were certain key provisions which should be mentioned in order that a better understanding of editorial opinion may be had.

Firstly, the Johnston Plan was a proposal for the systematic exploitation of the water resources of the Jordan Valley. This meant the development of the Bānyās, Ḥāṣbānī, Yarmūk, Dān, Litānī, and Jordan Rivers. Secondly, Johnston alleged that one of the purposes of the project was to aid the Palestinian refugees. And finally, the project did not take into consideration political boundaries, since the plan was regional.

A worse political time could not have been chosen
to gain Arab support for the Johnston Plan. One only has to recall that it was in early September, 1953, that the diversion of the Jordan River between Lakes Ḫūlah and Tiberias had been started by the Israelis. This had caused considerable consternation in the Arab camp. One must also remember that Ben Gurion, never an Arab friend, was at this time not only Prime Minister but Minister of Defense. This was an ominous sign which resulted in the Israeli attack on Qūbīyah (14 October) in which tens of civilians were killed. Following immediately upon Qūbīyah was the announcement of the Eric Johnston Mission (16 October) while the Arabs were in a condition of extreme stress.

The Johnston Plan, rightly or wrongly, was identified with the Israeli attempt to divert the Jordan River, with Ben Gurion being in power, and with the killings at Qūbīyah. The Arab writers felt that Johnston appeared as the agent of Israel and would gain concessions from the Arabs because of their stress and their knowledge that they were no military match for the Israelis. The implication was that the Arabs could reject the plan only at their own risk. The plan was brought forward to provide an equitable solution to the existing problems and if the Arabs rejected the plan, then they would have only
themselves to blame for whatever Israel might do.

"Johnston's mission, if looked at objectively, appears to be one which aims at making peace between Arab states and Israel through economic projects."\(^{27}\) The Johnston Plan was good in that it sought to bring some development projects to an area badly in need of such plans. But in doing so, and this exception was widely voiced in Arab editorials, political boundaries had been disregarded and thus the political aspects of any cooperation between the belligerents were not taken into account. This only served to reinforce the feeling that first and foremost, the problems surrounding Palestine were largely political. Any solution which did not take into account political considerations was doomed to failure.

The Arab-Israeli problem is firstly a political problem. It is a political problem above all. If there has even been a political problem, this is it. To say that economics alone can solve such a problem is to make a great error.\(^{28}\)

Other Arab editorialists took an opposite stand to reach the same conclusion. There were those who felt

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\(^{27}\) _al-Akhbār_ (Egypt), quoted in the _Daily Star_ (Lebanon), 30 October 1953.

\(^{28}\) Michel Chiha in _Le Jour_ (Lebanon), 21 October 1953.
that, indeed, the problem of the refugees was political but that the refugee problem could be solved economically. The belief among these writers was that by starting projects which would employ refugee workers and by irrigating land in the Jordan Valley where Palestinians could then be settled, the political aspects of the Palestine problem would disappear with the disappearance of the refugee camps. "Johnston, as well as any other man who knows the true basis of the conflict between the Arabs and Israel, knows that if the conflict between the Arabs and Israel should ever be wiped out, it would be on the basis of economics." 29

The one conclusion of these two diverging opinions was that the Johnston Plan should be turned down because a political settlement to the problems of the area was preferable to an economic settlement—an economic solution whose greatest beneficiary would be Israel.

We warn our American friends that we do not hate progress or construction, but we are simply trying to imitate them when they preferred destruction to construction and spent their money and energy turning cities into deserts. We have to compare our negative

attitude toward the development of schemes beneficial to Israel to America's positive attitude when it sent its huge bombers to enemy cities and towns to destroy their factories and hinder their industrial production.

Do Americans think that their fight against the Nazis and their allies was more justified than our struggle against the Zionists and their allies? The reasons which the Americans had for destroying the countries of their enemies are the same reasons which we have for refusing to develop the country of our enemies.30

Mr. Johnston's tour throughout the Arab countries did not result in acceptance of the project bearing his name. However, a small segment of Lebanese opinion was in favor of adopting the plan. This opinion argued that if some sort of plan was not adopted for the joint development of water resources, then Israel, using her superior military force, would unilaterally use the waters around her as she had shown she could at Lake Hūlah. The Arabs would thus lose whatever water rights they might have gained by adopting the American Plan.31 This feeling was apparently reflected in Arab governmental circles since the Johnston Plan was not completely rejected.


31The leading proponent of the Johnston Plan was Bāsīl Daggāq. See his editorials in al-Raqāh (Lebanon), of 23 June 1954 and 11 January 1955. See also al-Jarīdah (Lebanon), 4 September 1955.
The Arabs, as well as the Israelis, offered counter-proposals. Slowly, however, the question of what was to be done with the waters receded into the background. Then in early 1955, Johnston announced his imminent return to the Middle East with a compromise proposal, combining the best of all three plans. This was in February, 1955. He warned the Arabs that they should act upon the proposals to be set forth or else they risked losing American aid as well as their own natural resources. This attack by Johnston corresponded to the return to power of Ben Gurion as Minister of Defense. To one editorial writer, the events unfolding before him in early 1955 recalled the events of the Autumn of 1953. He wrote that in the Autumn of 1953, while Ben Gurion was in power, the water diversion project south of Lake Hûlah was begun. Arab political circles were upset by this and their fear increased with the Israeli attack on the village of Qûbîyah. It was at this precise moment, when "the fifty-four bodies of Qûbîyah were still warm," that Johnston had produced, as if by magic, his plan. And now, said the writer, Ben Gurion has returned to power and Johnston has announced his approaching return to the Middle East. One could almost expect another Qûbîyah: There was no question in one writer's mind that there was a plot to take advantage of Arab military
weakness to force them to agree to the Johnston Plan and
forever put an end to the political problems by resolving
them in an economic settlement. 32

That the Arabs were weak and unable to resist the
incursions was usually not argued in editorials. But
with the opening of a new economic offensive by the
Israelis, symbolized by the Johnston Plan, many Arab
writers thought that this thrust could be handled by the
Arabs through diplomatic channels. But even this battle
was in danger of being lost because full attention was
not being paid to the problem. There was editorial ques­
tioning who was and who was not sharing the burden im­
posed by Israel. Needless to say, the writers of each
country usually felt that their nation was doing the
utmost. However, editorial opinion, in attacking one
possible cause of Arab failure, felt that the Egyptian
regime which had overthrown King Fārūq had not fulfilled
its Arab responsibilities. That the RCC and General
Muḥammad Najīb were extremely popular at home was no
surprise. What may be surprising was that the RCC was

32 Rene Aggiouri in L'Orient (Lebanon), 22 February
1955. The Israelis attacked Ghazzah on 28 February,
killing forty Egyptian soldiers. Guy Wint, Middle
East Crisis has called this attack, for reasons which
will be discussed later in this chapter, "one of the
most fateful" in Middle East history, pp. 57-8.
not welcomed as enthusiastically throughout the remainder of the Arab world. One of the reasons for the lack of acceptance was the gentle policy which Egypt adopted toward Israel after 23 July 1952.

Arab papers, excluding Egypt, carried news stories and editorials alleging that Egypt was going to make peace with Israel. General Najib was quoted in one paper, when asked if Egypt was going to attack Israel, as saying that Egypt sought to establish amicable relations with all nations.\textsuperscript{33}

Evidently Egypt realized she would not be able to conclude peace with Israel but felt that she could not fight her, either. Egyptian editorials emphasized that Egypt could only engage one enemy at a time. The British were still controlling the Suez Canal and RCC policy gave priority to forcing the British to leave and then worrying about Palestine. This Egyptian policy was presented by Major Šalāh Sālim, prominent RCC member and Egyptian Minister of National Guidance, when he spoke before the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies in July, 1954. In that speech, the "Dancing Major" said that the Suez

\textsuperscript{33}al-\texttt{Anbā'} (Syria), 28 August 1952. See also \texttt{al-Nagr} (Syria), 2 October 1952.
question was the foremost Arab problem because with the
British in Egypt over half the Arab world was paralyzed. 34

But prior to this statement, the Arab countries
who were having to face the Israeli danger as they saw it
wondered whether Egypt's preoccupation with the Suez
Canal was not detrimental to Arab interests in general.

....Is the central problem of the Arab world
that of the [Suez] Canal or that of Israel?
By getting bogged down in the Canal, surely
a mistake has been committed; and however
fraternal may be our sentiments for Egypt,
we must tell her this.
The Israeli affair has a character dis­tinctly permanent and crucial. She menaces
the Arab world differently than a [British]
presence on the Canal, which for whatever
irritant it may appear to be, is at least
in the end for Egypt herself, a guarantee in
the face of more grave dangers....
Cannot Cairo be shown that the time is
short, that Israel is growing roots and that
her chances increase? 35

Egyptian editorial opinion supported the priorities
established by the Revolutionary Command Council. 36
However, the feeling expressed toward Egypt by the
Lebanese editorialist continued to be the general Arab
view toward Suez as negotiations with the British continued.

34al-Jarīdah (Lebanon), 2 July 1954, among others.
35Michel Chiha in Le Jour (Lebanon), 28 May 1953.
36See for example al-Ahram (Egypt), 3 July 1953.
In fact, other opinion toward Egypt was not nearly as kind as Chiha's in its choice of words. Several editorials felt that the Egyptians, in advocating a Suez first policy, were myopic in their vision and really did not care about the Palestinian people. Attempts were made, editorially, to link the negotiations over Suez with Palestine and concluded that Egypt might make a settlement over the Canal to the detriment of Palestine.\textsuperscript{37}

The adverse comment against the RCC, and eventually against Jamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣir, culminated in a report which stated that the Egyptian opposition was closing its ranks against ʿAbd al-Nāṣir and there would result a second Egyptian revolution. One Syrian paper went so far as to intimate that ʿAbd al-Nāṣir was so depressed over his imminent fall that he would soon commit suicide.\textsuperscript{38}

It is noteworthy that one of the accusations leveled against Egypt and ʿAbd al-Nāṣir was similar in tone to that which had appeared in various newspapers attacking King ʿAbd Allāh. The intimation that one of the Arab countries was soon to make peace with Israel was a powerful weapon during the 1950's which one Arab faction

\textsuperscript{37} al-Nahār (Lebanon), 2 July 1954; al-Bīnaʾ (Syria), 4 July 1954; \textit{L'Orient} (Lebanon), 12 October 1954.

\textsuperscript{38} al-Manār (Syria), 11 October 1954.
could use against another. In this campaign of innuendo, the leading exponent was the Syrian journal, *al-Manār*, the spokesman for the RCC-repressed Muslim Brotherhood.  

Despite the recourse, on the part of some newspapers, to resort to name-calling, the events of 1951 brought to the foreground the fact that Israel was in the Middle East to stay for sometime. "Israel is here, beyond all question." Once having recognized this fact, however bitter, the question was what was to be done about her existence. For the first time there began a serious discussion, in Arab newspapers, of the prospects of peace with Israel. Speculation about the reasons for this desire, however small, for peace is intriguing. Certainly

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39 See for example *al-Manār* (Syria), 18 May 1954 and 21 June 1955. The charges of collusion with the enemy were not without lighter moments. The Lebanonese paper, *al-Hadaf*, is quoted in *al-Zaman* (Syria), 30 August, 1953, as saying that a feudal lord of south Lebanon, Ahmad al-As'ad, proposed that a buffer state between Israel and Lebanon be created. Al-As'ad, of course, suggested himself as the prince of the new nation. *al-Hadaf*'s report may be viewed with some scepticism since its publisher belonged to the 'Usayrān family, a Shi'ah family from south Lebanon and traditional rival of the al-As'ad family. However, the plan may not be as far-fetched as it would first appear since it is widely believed that Ahmad al-As'ad had sought a *modus vivendi* with the Israelis and had sold them extensive amounts of land in the Hūlah region of southeast Lebanon.  

40 *Daily Star* (Lebanon), 1 November 1952.
the pressures being placed upon Jordan's frontiers, world pressure on all the Arabs, the absence of Egypt from the battlefield while she was engaged with England, and Arab military weakness all contributed to the discussion.

The first comments about a cessation of hostilities stated that the Israelis would like nothing better than a peace which they would impose as the victors of 1948. The feeling was that the Israelis would wish to make permanent the fait accompli consisting of the following facts:

--that half of Palestine has become a Jewish state, organized, armed, and supported by the Great Powers;

--that this State which receives close to 15,000 immigrants per month, gathered from every corner of the earth, no longer has any place for the 970,000 refugees chased from their homes;

--that Jerusalem, the Holy City of the three greatest religions of humanity, is split between Israel and Jordan.

There is the fait, the fait juif accompli in front of which the United Nations, with its Charter and its Universal Declaration of Human Rights bows; and in front of which the Arab states are invited to become realists....

To counter the believed Israeli desire to make peace on the basis of the borders after 1948 and the non-

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41 Rene Aggiouri in L'Orient (Lebanon), 18 September 1951.
repatriation of the refugees, the Arab writers offered positive alternatives. Although they rejected the Israeli conditions, they did not reject peace. "We take the existence of Israel as a fact and there is no question of pushing the Israelis into the sea. We have said for a long time that the question of Israel is less a question of presence than a question of power."\(^{42}\) The conditions almost universally accepted by those writers who were willing to write of peace were three: the internationalization of Jerusalem, the repatriation of those refugees who wished to go home, and a return to the partition as envisioned by the United Nations resolution of November, 1947.\(^{43}\)

This willingness on the part of Arab writers to recognize the existence of the Zionist state may not seem to be a great step forward. But if one compares the Arab attitude prior to 15 May, 1948, when only a few Christian Arabs were willing to accept a Jewish state, the writing of the 1950's was quite revolutionary. One might say, however, and rightfully so, that the basic

\(^{42}\)Michel Chiha in *Le Jour* (Lebanon), 10 December 1952.

\(^{43}\)Representative opinion may be seen in *al-Ahram* (Egypt), of 12 September 1951 and 27 November 1952; *al-Sha'ab* (Syria), 28 September 1951; *al-Bina*\(^{2}\) (Syria), 2 December 1952; and Rene Aggiouri in *L'Orient* (Lebanon), 22 May 1955.
reason for even invoking the U. N. resolutions was the Arab defeat in 1948.

Of course there was also the thought that even with the Arab concession to abide by the resolutions, peace was not possible. This type of editorial felt that Israel no longer recognized the validity of the resolutions, especially the one which called for repatriation.44

There is no question that Arab and Israeli positions seemed irreconcilable. The Israelis accepted partition prior to May, 1948, and rejected it after the Palestine war. The Arab position was exactly opposite. In this respect, it seems as though the Israeli position was one war ahead while the Arabs were always one war behind.

Closely connected with the idea of accepting peace negotiations was the topic of direct negotiations with Israel. The Arab feeling, generally, was that although they might be interested in a peace with Israel based upon U. N. resolutions, they were not interested in direct negotiations which might lead to a normalization of relations between the two countries. At this period, perhaps, direct negotiations did not have the implication

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44 Rene Aggiouri in L'Orient (Lebanon), 15 September 1951; Michel Chiha in Le Jour (Lebanon), 30 May 1953; and al-Jumhūrīyah (Egypt), 8 June 1955.
of recognition which they do today. However, the feeling
then was that direct negotiations were capitulation.
One sees continuously the statement that the United
Nations had already passed resolutions upon which an
honorable peace could be established. If this was the
case, how, went the argument, could negotiation be
necessary? There was nothing to negotiate since a
blue-print for peace had already been drawn. The Arab
feeling was that if the U. N. resolutions were negotiated,
the only losers would be the Arabs.^[45

In the complete rejection of the idea of direct
negotiation, perhaps the real feelings of Arab editor­
ialists toward Israel were exposed. Many of the news­
papers called for peace. And yet the writers were un­
willing to enter into direct negotiations. This seemed
to be a mild contradiction. It revealed in fact a
belief, sometimes below the surface, that peace was the
only viable alternative open to the Arabs. The feeling
that emerged from the editorials of both those who ac­
cpted and rejected peace was that the Arabs were slowly
being trapped by the Middle East problem. Those who
rejected warfare did so reluctantly, not out of any great

[^45: See for example al-Ahram (Egypt), 25 July 1952;
al-Yawm (Syria), 2 December 1952; and Daily Star (Lebanon),
13 December 1952.]
pacifism. Nowhere did a peace advocate plea strongly to the Arab governments for peace. Rather, the plea appeared to be the cry of a man who had been forced into a corner and saw no alternative which was less fearful. Had an alternative which they could accept been presented to those who called for peace, it would most surely have been adopted quickly. One alternative did present itself in the form of Jamal 'Abd al-Naqir and several newspapers looked to him as the savior of the Middle East.

A more likely ally for the Arabs, other than the emergence of a strong Arab leader, was the Soviet Union. In 1948 it was virtually unthinkable that the Soviet Union would be able to strengthen here influence in the Arab East, since Russia had quickly recognised the State of Israel and had been one of her strong supporters. There were other good reasons for believing that communism would be minimal in the Middle East. Primary among them was Arab antipathy to the atheistic doctrine which Marxism advocated. A common reference to this was "Communism does not fit our country.""46

However, the desperate situation into which the Arab

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46 al-Migrat (Egypt), 10 December 1953.
countries had been forced caused their writers to look for new alternatives. Here the attitude of the West was certainly to blame, as far as editorial opinion was concerned. The West was more preoccupied with communism, for instance in Korea and in the McCarthy hearings. As a result the West, but especially the United States, tended to see everything in a communist or anti-communist light. The Arab countries and their newspapers continually criticized the West for failing to realize "the desperate position into which we have been forced by them [i.e., the West. And therefore,] we find it imperative to take steps we have never considered before."\(^{47}\)

There were Arab editorials which voiced the opinion that there was a special relationship between Israel and the United States resulting from the large number of Jewish citizens in America. Many of the editorials felt that, as a result, Israel had become a client-state of the Americans and a just policy for the Middle East was no longer possible. When this belief was added to the attempts, on the part of the United States and the United Nations, to involve the Arabs in direct talks with Israel,

\(^{47}\)Al-\(\text{Qahira}\)h (Egypt), 30 December 1953. "The Arab-Israeli conflict is just as dangerous for the Arabs as a world-wide conflict [with communism], something still not comprehended in Washington." Michel Chiha in \(\text{Le Jour}\) (Lebanon), 14 May 1953.
one can better understand the dilemma faced by Arab writers as they tried to evaluate the forces moving around them. The constant rumors that aid was to be cut off to the refugees and that the Arabs would not receive help in the face of Israeli expansion did not assuage their confusion. This is not to intimate that there were not those who realized that Russia was only following a policy of *realpolitik*. There were many editorials explaining that Russia, in becoming the ally of the Arabs, was only following her own self-interest and was, perhaps, only filling the vacuum left when the West moved to Israel.  

There were papers which cared neither for Western aid nor for Eastern friendship. These papers, although few, called for a plague on both houses since neither side was interested in the Arabs as people and their lost rights. But an increasing number of papers began to endorse openly a policy of friendship with the East.

Still, the advance of Russia to the Middle East was slow until 1955. One can point to the rise of the Ba'ath Party in Syria to argue that the march to the left was

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48See for example Bāstīl Daqqāq in al-Ḥayāh (Lebanon), 13 February 1953 who called the Russian move a "master stroke."

49See for example Falastīn (Palestine-Jordan), 13 January 1952 and al-Tilīghrāf (Lebanon), 17 May 1954.
speedy. However, there was no great feeling of affection between the Ba’ath and the communists. In fact, one of the reasons for the union of Egypt and Syria in 1958 was the Ba’ath fear of a communist take-over in Syria. It is more realistic to say that at best Russian influence in the Middle East was marginal until late 1954 or early 1955. At that time, it was well established that the Arab countries were not to be armed by the West to the same extent Israel was to be armed. Arab weakness was vividly shown on 28 February, 1955. Immediately after the Israeli attack on Ghazzah the pro-Western papers, centered largely in Bayrūt, began to cry loudly that the West was committing suicide by supporting Israel.⁵⁰

The counter-move to the Israeli attack on Ghazzah followed some six months later when ‘Abd al-Nāṣir announced his arms agreement with the Soviet Bloc. Even those papers which had in the past decried Russian influence in the Middle East were forced to give grudging admiration to ‘Abd al-Nāṣir’s political coup. Almost every paper wrote that the West did not realize that for the Arabs there were other enemies than communism.

⁵⁰See for example the following Lebanese journals: Bayrūt, 10 June 1955; Kāmil Murūwah in al-Ḥayāh, 1 October 1955; Rene Aggiouri in L'Orient, 28 February 1956; and Ṣadā Lubnān, 5 April 1956.
We are not unaware of the objectives behind the Russian generosity in arming us. We are also aware of the objectives that lie behind the refusal of the Anglo-Saxons to arm us. But we cannot forget that we have interests which must be safeguarded.51

There can be little doubt that with the announcement of the Soviet arms deal the influence of the communists increased within editorials. Many newspapers were jubilant with what they called Soviet Point IV,52 and urged the Arabs to negotiate with Moscow and prepare for war.53

The three Great Powers; America, Britain, and France have no preoccupation and no object but to try to avenge themselves of Egypt and to avenge themselves of Jamāl ʿAbd al-Ḥāfiz.6

The Great Power that respects our revolution and does not impede the popular gains in our country is the Soviet Union! So far the Soviet Union has not stood in our way; it has not attacked Egypt in its press and radio and it has not accused Jamāl ʿAbd

51Kāmil Murūwah in al-Ḥayāh (Lebanon), 29 September 1955. Major ŠalamŠalim said that in fact the Czechoslovakian arms shipments had begun as early as July, 1955. See his interview in Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria, pp. 235-236. It seems that ʿAbd al-Nāṣir may have decided to postpone the announcement of the arms agreement until an advantageous moment. ‘Abd al-Nāṣir had abolished the religious courts of Egypt on 22 September, 1955, and this was known to have generated considerable opposition. The announcement of the arms deal shortly thereafter may have been designed to rally support to his regime.

52al-Tiğhrāf (Lebanon), 12 October 1955.

53al-Raʿy al-ʿĀmm (Syria), 13 February 1956.
al-Nāṣir of being a dictator. 54

The Soviet arms agreement was not the only event occurring which tended to polarize East-West feelings in the Middle East. Some mention should be made of English and American attempts to implement a defense pact against Russia. Commonly known as the Baghdad Pact, the defense alliance was originally a defense alliance between Turkey and Iraq. However, many Arab newspapers, when the pact was announced in January, 1955, felt that this was still another attempt to make a peace settlement with Israel. The feeling was that Turkey was no more than an agent of the West and had in fact established diplomatic relations with Israel. Because of a realization in America and Western Europe that the Arab countries would not ally with the West because of Israel, the West was trying to forge an alliance between Muslim countries with the same purpose—peace with Israel. 55

54 Anwar al-Śādāt in al-Jumhūrīyah (Egypt), 9 April 1956. Compare this with the New York Times, 23 July, 1956, which wrote: "To make himself mighty he has mortgaged Egypt's economic future to get, not bread for his people, but arms in the hope of becoming the leader of a pan-Arab empire that would stretch from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf and would wipe out Israel." al-Ḥayāh (Lebanon), which was usually pro-Western, replied to the New York Times that the Egyptian action was most worthy of Arab praise. 25 July 1956.

55 See for example al-Jumhūrīyah (Egypt), 18 January and 2 February 1955; Falastīn (Palestine-Jordan), 20 January 1955; and L'Orient (Lebanon), 13 February 1955.
The attack on the Baghdad Pact, or Turko-Iraqi Pact, was led by Egypt. Many newspapers felt that the purpose of the Baghdad Pact was not related to Palestine but that for purposes of Arab leadership, Egypt and Iraq were using it to focus on Palestine to champion their separate causes. Editorials said that Palestine was being used by both countries. At any rate, Egypt was in the leadership of those nations fighting the Baghdad Pact and intimated that if other Arab states joined the pact, Palestine would be lost since one of the alliance's purposes was to bring peace between Arab and Israeli. The Egyptian newspaper, al-Jumhūrīyah, even intimated that the Ghazzah attack of February, 1955, resulted from the Baghdad Pact.\(^{56}\)

The Baghdad Alliance and the Czech arms agreement, as sensational as they were, were only preludes to other events. Apparently angered by Egyptian opposition to the Baghdad Pact, the buying of arms from the Soviet Bloc, and the recognition by Egypt of mainland China, the U.S. Secretary of State on 19 July, 1956, withdrew the American offer to support financially the building of the High Dam at Aswān. The British withdrew their offer the following day. This was an unmistakable slap in the face of Egypt

\(^{56}\)2 March 1955.
which was felt, editorially, to be an attempt to embarrass 'Abd al-Nāṣir. In retaliation one week later, the Egyptian president nationalized the Egyptian Canal company. If 'Abd al-Nāṣir had taken on extra-human characteristics with his Soviet arms agreement, he now became almost god-like with his nationalization of the canal. There were no voices raised in the newspapers against the action of nationalization.57

While events were marching forward in Egypt, one Arab commentator sounded an ominous note to an otherwise inconspicuous event. The same author, Rene Aggiouri, who had anticipated the Israeli raid on Ghazzah, noted another change of personnel in the Israeli cabinet. To this editorialist, writing prior to the American cancellation of the Aswān Dam aid and the nationalization of the

57 Arab feeling about American action in the Middle East was neatly summed up by Richard Nolte and William Polk, "Toward a Policy for the Middle East", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36, 1957-58, p. 656: "The inference drawn by the Arabs from these episodes was that an American promise about arms or a dam was not necessarily a promise when it was made to an Arab; that failure to secure arms from the United States did not give Arabs a right to try elsewhere; that in American eyes the only people who counted in the Middle East (apart from the Israelis) were the Russians; that the United States had no genuine interest in Arab economic development as such....In short the Arabs concluded that Americans did not look on them as being on the same level as other peoples or nations. By contrast, the actions of the Soviet Union seemed to shine with a pure white light."
Suez Canal, the Czech arms agreement and the British departure from Suez were dangerous for the Arabs when mixed with the cabinet change in Israel.

If one had the slightest doubt about the meaning of Mr. Sharett's leaving Ben Gurion's cabinet, the first declarations of Mrs. Myerson [Meir], who succeeds him as [Minister of] Foreign Affairs, and the commentary of Radio Israel, cited by A.F.P. [Agence France Presse], proves the necessity of getting rid [of any doubts about the meaning of the change.]

Mrs. Myerson says that her first objective is the Suez blockade. She will apply herself to making the Great Powers understand "the necessity for Israel to defend herself and to have free access."

"The necessity to defend herself", is the necessity to procure arms for herself. And "free access" is the Suez again which Mr. Hammarskjoeld has not succeeded in unblocking.

The commentary of Radio Israel again is very precise:

"Mr Sharett," it said, "represents a policy which seeks to resolve all problems by negotiation." And adds: "Our country needs a less supple policy.....It is not in accepting concessions that one gains an audience with the Great Powers."

This is what the American "experts" in the State Department call "contrast between the moderate views of Mr. Sharett and the more positive ones of Mr. Ben Gurion."

Everyone knows now what the "positive views" of Mr. Ben Gurion signify: placing the world before faits accompli; provoking frontier incidents; gaining the intervention of the Powers; driving the Arabs into negotiation.58

58L'Orient (Lebanon), 21 June 1956.
The nationalization of the Suez by the Egyptians could only serve to add to the unquiet in Tel Aviv. And, unfortunately, Mr. Aggiouri proved once again to be an accurate prognosticator.\(^5^9\)

During this period between the assassination of King 'Abd Allāh and the nationalization of Suez, Arab editorials reflected the gradual and then accelerated deterioration of Western influence in the Middle East. They disclosed the mood of the Arab writers as they viewed Western attempts to solve the problems of a Zionist state in the Arab world.

Each attempt by the West to find a solution to the "Zionist cancer" only served to make the Arab patient more ill. In editorial eyes, the Zionist danger had to be eradicated finally but this expunction was something the West was unwilling to do. Instead, the West attempted to placate the Arabs with aid such as UNRWA and Point IV. However, these palliative measures only served to increase editorial anger since they were thought to be only measures to prolong Israel's existence in the hope that the Arabs would become insensible to the Zionists.

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\(^5^9\) Rene Aggiouri was not the only clairvoyant. See Le Jour (Lebanon), 11 July 1956. This paper, however, felt that besides wanting to start a war, Israel was willing to begin a world war. Israel, the paper wrote, was also rumored to have the atomic bomb.
Editorials were particularly bitter at these international moves, in the form of aid, when the United Nations had passed three resolutions on which peace could be established. This turnabout, on the part of the Arabs, in accepting the U.N. resolutions, especially the partition, was one of the major editorial changes during the period covered in this chapter. However, the act of accepting the resolutions of the world body was not without its contradictions since Jordan, along with Israel, refused to accept the resolution which called for the internationalization of Jerusalem. Thus, the journalists of Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria found themselves criticizing Israel as well as Jordan for their position on Jerusalem.

The question of Jerusalem, however, was a minor one when compared with the implications of the Johnston Plan. This project, introduced by Washington, confirmed the worst fears of the Arab writers. Here was a plan which in its inception did not even take into consideration political boundaries, as though giving recognition to the Arab fear that Israel's boundaries were not yet extensive enough. The writers felt that the Arabs were being blackmailed. They could either accept regional exploitation of the area's natural resources or face the Israeli consequences. Not only this, but the Johnston Plan implied
that the refugees would not be repatriated but would be put to work as agriculturalists in newly irrigated Arab lands. Once again, the American had failed to understand the desires of the Arab peoples. Or worse still, they understood but did not care.

In the battle to stave off an economic settlement, many writers felt that Egypt was not doing her share for the Arab cause since she was preoccupied with the British in Suez. Thus, abandoned by the strongest Arab state, and for other pressing considerations, many Arab editorialists began to talk for the first time of peace. Once having recognized the validity of the three U.N. resolutions, the next step to peace might not be a difficult one to take. But once again the Arab writers called for a peace based on justice not on victory in battle. And for the most part, the writers rejected a peace based on face-to-face negotiations with the Israelis. In this respect, the writers seemed less married to the idea of peace than to a recognition of the apparent hopelessness of their cause. The net impression was that had the writers found a way out of making peace with Israel, they would have accepted it, however reluctantly.

Events moved quickly in 1955 and after. There was, first of all, the Israeli attack on Ghazzah followed by
the Czech arms agreement, the withdrawal of the British from Suez, withdrawal of the High Dam offer, and the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. Each step seemed somehow to be connected with the next until Western influence had been greatly eroded. Arab editorialists were saddened by the blunders which they felt the West was committing. Certainly most of the editorialists in the Arab world up to 1956 were pro-West. But they felt the West did not understand the problems of the Arabs and that the Arabs would willingly ally with anyone who would help them gain their desired goals.
In retrospect, it appears that the Czech arms agreement, the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt, and the nationalization of the Suez Canal were more than Britain, France, and Israel were willing to accept in the period of one year. For this reason, and many others which do not fall within the framework of this study, the worst Arab fears were to be fulfilled.

Even before the nationalization of the Suez Canal, Israel had been pressing for the recognition of free passage for her ships through that waterway (and the Strait of Tiran). Israel apparently felt that with the withdrawal of the British, her rights had to be established immediately. She therefore began an offensive in the United Nations and elsewhere to have her right of passage firmly established. This was something which the Egyptian Government did not favor and it may be here that the most immediate reasons for the invasion should
be sought. In attempting to discover the reasons for Britain and France joining this military adventure, undoubtedly it should not be overlooked that Britain wished to maintain a friendly force on the Suez. Oil shipped through the Canal supplied over half of Europe's needs. The British were also upset by the nationalization of the Universal Suez Canal Company and the loss of its revenue. The Algerian Revolution against the French and the moral and substantive aid which Cairo was giving the rebels were sufficient stimuli for the French participation. There was also the hope that faced with a military defeat at the hands of the allies, the regime of President ʿAbd al-Nāṣir would fall and one more amenable to the desires of the three would be forthcoming.

The Israeli, British, and French design against Egypt and the Suez Canal was not unknown to the Arabs. One can see frequently in their newspapers references to a planned invasion of Egypt. One Lebanese newspaper mentioned that it had from a "usually reliable source" that the originator of the invasion plan was Israel. The plan had been submitted to and supported by the French

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1See for example al-Shaʿab (Egypt), 1 October 1956. For the official Egyptian statement concerning the reasons behind the Israeli invasion, see al-Aḥrām (Egypt), 30 October 1956.
and was, at the date of publication of the newspaper, being studied by the English.²

Climaxing what was often seen as an inevitability was the invasion of the Sinai peninsula by Israel on 29 October, 1956. The invasion took place at two points north of the Gulf of 'Aqabah. The Arab press, especially the Lebanese, was not fooled into believing the invasion would continue unilaterally. Many editorials felt that in spite of Israel's apparent solitary action, she "cannot proceed without foreign intervention."³

To the Arab editorialists, it was only a matter of time until the West found an excuse to aid Israel. There was some writing which said that perhaps the excuse used to legitimate intervention would be the Tripartite Declaration of 1950.⁴ And when Britain and France threatened to occupy the Canal if the two belligerents did not withdraw from that waterway, this was immediately viewed by the editorialists as confirmation of their belief that the West would invade as Israel's ally. There was no possibility of believing the French and British assertion that they were entering as disinterested parties

²*al-Diyār* (Lebanon), 13 September 1956.
³Rene Aggiouri in *L'Orient* (Lebanon), 30 October 1956.
⁴See for example *al-Nagr* (Syria), 30 October 1956 and *al-Jarīdah* (Lebanon), 31 October 1956.
and their only aim was to restore peace to the area.  

The comment on the role of Israel, Britain, and France, prior to and during their action against Egypt in Sinai and Port Sa‘īd, viewed the aims of the three nations as being both short-termed and long-termed. The short-term aims, as the editorialists viewed them, were largely Israel's. As the short-termed benefactor, Israel was felt to gain from the West, for her role, maximally an imposed peace between Arabs and Israelis and minimally modern British and French weapons.

The long-term benefactors of the war with Egypt would be primarily Britain and France, but not completely excluding Israel. The object of the Western invasion of Egypt was not simply to overthrow ‘Abd al-Nāṣir but to restore Western influence throughout the Arab world which the Egyptian revolution had eroded.

It is not a limited war against the person of ‘Abd al-Nāṣir.... It is a colonial war against the whole Arab nation.

The formation of this unholy alliance between Britain, France, and Israel affirms the fact that this expedition is against the whole Arab nation.

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5 See the two-day commentary by Kāmil Murūwah in al-Ḥayāh (Lebanon), 30 and 31 October 1956.

6 Bayrūt (Lebanon), 30 October 1956.

7 Kāmil Murūwah in al-Ḥayāh (Lebanon), 1 November 1956.
No matter the political shade of the newspaper, the
editorialist felt that the attack was nothing more than
a colonial, imperialistic attack. The Great Powers saw
their former influence dwindling away in the Arab East
and in North Africa. The writers felt that what was
being enacted was the last desperate effort of the
protagonists of a dying ideology to preserve their former
positions.8

One of the immediate results of the 1956 war was
the rise in stature of the Soviet Union and the United
States in Arab editorials. The papers of early Novem­
ber, 1956, are full of praise of the Soviet Union for
her role in the war against Egypt. It was Russia
which had proposed a joint Soviet-American force to
restore peace to the area. The Russians had severed
relations with Israel. And it was generally believed
that the Soviets' firm stance led to the cease-fire

8Representative editorials may be seen in al-Ayyām
(Syria), 31 October 1956; Rene Aggiouri in L'Orient
(Lebanon), 2 November 1956; and Bayrūt al-Masā'ī (Lebanon),
5 November 1956. Anti-English feeling was so strong in
Jordan that an end to the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948
was demanded. See for example Falastīn (Palestine-Jordan),
28 November 1956. Lebanon, continually trying
to walk a path acceptable to both the Arabs and the
West, was criticized by some Arab writers for not breaking
diplomatic relations with France and England. These
Arab writers, usually non-Lebanese, wondered when
Lebanon was going to be even passively in harmony with
Arab policy. See for example al-Ra'y al-Āmm (Syria),
7 November 1956.
resolution adopted by the United Nations on 2 November.

There were writers, however, who warned the Arab people not to be carried away with euphoria by the Soviet stand.

...Beyond the questions of personal prestige and of national pride, permanent interests and centuries-old bonds must be safeguarded. One should not build a policy upon friendships accepted in a moment of despair.9

An extension of this warning, that Russia was a friend today and might in the future be an enemy, and vice versa for the Western nations, was an admonition for the Arabs not to become too involved with the problem of the role of the West. This argument said that the position of the East and the West was peripheral to the real problem. For these writers, the true enemy was Israel, and she would serve whoever agreed with her views.

In the last year, Israel was used by the English and French colonialists to hurt us and thus it was ascertained that Israel is at the disposal of any enemy that wants to hurt us. Time may change and enemies may change but Israel will remain a weapon against us....10

9L'Orient (Lebanon), 9 November 1956.

10Kāmil Murūwah in al-Ḥayāh (Lebanon), 15 May 1957.
The role of the United States was widely praised in the Arab states immediately after the invasion of Sinai. Encouraged by President Eisenhower's statement that there were not two "codes of international conduct" by which the world was ruled, one for allies and one for enemies,\textsuperscript{11} Arab editorials commented positively on America's role. The writers felt that the strong position of the United States in condemning France, Britain, and Israel might be the basis on which a new American policy could be established in the Middle East. There were comparisons of the pro-Zionist policy of President Truman with the more moderate views emanating from the Republican-controlled White House. For a short period, the papers were willing to forget the Aswān Dam debacle and be forgiving toward the United States.

Some editorials reviewed American foreign policy and saw it as having been originally positive. The United States was praised for having fought two world wars without territorial ambitions. The editorials would then continue by saying that the Americans had made at least two mistakes after World War II in the Middle East. One was supporting the State of Israel and the second was the withdrawal of the Aswān Dam offer. But the papers said that the recent

action of the United States, in response to the aggression aimed at Egypt, had redeemed some of the injustice the American government had caused the Arab people.  

The Arab honeymoon with the United States did not continue for an extended period of time. The Arab hopes for a new American policy in the Middle East were largely unfounded. The statement that the United States did not support territorial aggrandisement, whether by friend or foe, did not change America's basic support for the right of the State of Israel to exist. It did not take a protracted time for America's support of Israel to reassert itself. And this reassertion resulted in a return to negative comment on the United States in Arab editorials. The reemergence of this attitude toward the United States was aided by events occurring that were related to the recently completed Sinai campaign.

The British and French, within a matter of weeks had withdrawn from Egyptian territory. However, Israel refused to withdraw from the Ghazzah strip and Sharm al-Shaykh, an area controlling the entrance to the Gulf of 'Aqabah at

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12 Representative editorials may be seen in al-Ayyām (Syria), 3 December 1956; Bayrūt (Lebanon), 7 December 1956; and al-Siyāsah (Lebanon), 17 December 1956. The Arab press was not completely panegyrical toward America. At least one newspaper warned editorially that the American policy of support for Israel had not changed. Le Jour (Lebanon), 10 December 1956.
the Strait of Tīrān.

Britain and France accepted the United Nations resolution and withdrew from Egypt in a few days. Although the withdrawal of the Israeli forces would not take more than a day, we see Israel delaying withdrawal and trying to impose some conditions which do not exist in the United Nations' resolution.13

The withdrawal of France and Britain and the apparent isolation of Israel, diplomatically, allowed the Arab editorialists to become more belligerent in their stand toward Israel.

Had the matter been limited to Arab states and Israel, the Arabs would have taught this trifling state a lesson which it never would have forgotten. But Arab states, led by Egypt, have pledged themselves to respect the United Nations Charter.14

We will wait until the United Nations proves it is unable to carry out its resolutions, and then we will destroy the wrong conclusion that Israel can get what she likes through aggression.15

Israel continued to maintain herself on Egyptian territory as the year 1957 began. However, it was clear that the earlier editorial opinion on the reasons for Israeli participation in the attack on Egypt were incorrect.

13Kamil Murūwah in al-Ḥayāh (Lebanon), 27 December 1956.
14al-Āhrām (Egypt), 8 January 1957.
15al-Jumhūrīyah (Egypt), 16 January 1957, quoted in The Arab World, 17 January 1957. See also the same newspaper of 21 January 1957.
There seemed to be no diplomatic offensive to impose a peace between Arabs and Israelis. And Israel had not obtained an untoward amount of military equipment from the West. Clearly there were other reasons for Israel's actions. The most obvious was territorial aggrandizement. Far more likely, however, and a situation which did not escape editorial perusal was the maintenance of Israeli forces in the south of Sinai. The changing view now held that the Israelis were holding Ghazzah either to increase her territory or as a bargaining point to gain the right of free passage into and out of the Gulf of 'Aqabah.

It was widely believed that Israel was suffering economically from her isolation at the hands of the Arab boycott. An extension of this belief led to editorials that said Israel entered the Sinai campaign with the purpose of gaining egress to the Gulf of 'Aqabah in order to find new markets in East Asia.¹⁶

To counter this attempt of Israel to move out of the boycott imposed by the Arabs, several writers suggested that the Arab states tighten their boycott. A plea was made to stop the clearance of the Suez Canal, which had

¹⁶See for example Kāmil Murūwah in al-Ḥayāḥ (Lebanon), 5 January and 16 February 1957 and al-Āḥrām (Egypt), 14 February 1957.
been blocked during the war. This was felt to be a way to hurt the West economically. Also the flow of Arab oil to the West should be stopped and a boycott of the products emanating from countries which supported Israel should be introduced.¹⁷

It soon became apparent that the good will of Russia was not enough to force Israel from the territory she occupied. Britain and France stood behind their recent ally. The only power left was the United States. Despite the earlier flamboyant articles in the Arab press, there was no real question of Egypt forcing Israel from the Sinai peninsula. So the United States became the butt of Arab frustration because Israel refused to withdraw from the areas she had conquered.

Not Egypt alone, or the Arab states alone, or the Middle East alone but millions throughout the world have their eyes set on the United States president to see if he will force the snake back into its pit. Today, President Eisenhower stands face to face with Zionism.... Will he be able to defeat it and thus prove to the world that he is a man of principle and that he is a believer in the principles of the United Nations?¹⁸

¹⁷Representative editorials may be seen in al-Ra' y al-‘Amm (Syria), 3 January 1957 and al-Difā' (Palestine-Jordan), 28 January 1957.

¹⁸al-Ahrām (Egypt), 12 February 1957.
The implication was clear. Either Israel would withdraw under the prodding of the United States or she would remain with American blessing. As January, 1957, passed and so too the first few weeks of February, with no sign of an Israeli withdrawal, editorial comment condemned the United States for not forcing her ally to withdraw.\(^1^9\)

The United Nations on 19 February reiterated their call for Israel to get out of Sinai and Ghazzah within five days. When this period passed without results, vituperative comments against the United States increased. Clearly, all of the advantages that had accrued to the United States in the Arab press, as a result of her stand on the Sinai invasion, had disappeared by February, 1957. And when the Israelis finally announced their willingness to withdraw in March, 1957, the comment was not generally favorable toward the United States. "America forced Israel to withdraw from Ghazzah but she did not win the confidence of the Middle Eastern countries."\(^2^0\)

The Arab editorials were angry with the United States

\(^1^9\)See, among others, *al-Jumhūrīyah* (Egypt), 6 February 1957; *al-Siyāsah* (Lebanon), 10 February 1957; and *al-Naqṣ* (Syria), 12 February 1957.

\(^2^0\)al-*Jarīdah* (Lebanon), 3 March 1957. Not all commentary was unfavorable. *al-Ayyām* (Syria), 5 March 1957, said the U.S. had acted well in securing Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory.
because she was attempting to fulfill their worst fears. One problem was that in forcing Israel to withdraw from Ghazzah and Sharm al-Shaykh, the United States wanted to substitute one foreign power for another. That is to say substituting a United Nations Emergency Force for the Israeli Army.

The latest U.N. debates have shown that the majority of members of the Organization, with the U.S. at the head, want to maintain some international forces at Ghazzah and Sharm al-Shaykh in order to stop a repeat of the hostilities on the Negev front and to assure the freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqabah. But to accept that would be for Egypt the recognition that the aggression of 29 October was not a total failure for the aggressor. ‘Abd al-Nasir is not ready to accord the enemy such an advantage. It is on this point that he intends to put American friendship to the test.  

The point, as the editorialists saw it, was that the Israelis were attempting to reap some benefit from their aggression of October, 1956. They were to gain the right of passage through the Strait of Tiran into the Gulf of Aqabah. The Strait was considered by the Arabs to be Arab territorial water and the rights of belligerency should allow them to close the waterway to their enemy, as they had done prior to October, 1956. Any

21Rene Aggouri in L'Orient (Lebanon), 24 January 1957.
...modification of the status quo ante would signify a result for Israel, this is to say a success, however precarious it might be, of the operation of 29 October. And it is a question for the Arabs of imposing on Israel the proof of the principle: Aggression does not pay.\textsuperscript{22}

The Arabs were unable to prove to the Israelis that aggression did not pay. Israel gained access to and exit from the Gulf of 'Aqabah. This right was viewed by the editorialists as being gained largely by the position of the United States which held that the Strait of Tīrān was an international waterway. This American position was condemned editorially. And anti-American feeling increased when the first ship to test the new freedom through Tīrān was an American oil tanker.\textsuperscript{23}

At least one Arab writer did not fault America as much as he blamed the Arabs for Israeli gains:

> It would probably be impolite on our part to ask the Arab states to give an opinion on this subject since the Palestine case is good for bellowing and for popular consumption only. And no one has the courage to face Arab opinion with the bitter truths which have afflicted the Palestine case since the aggression at the Canal....

> So Arab quarters are now quiet about something as grave as the opening of the 'Aqabah

\textsuperscript{22}Rene Aggiouri in L'Orient (Lebanon), 3 February 1957.

\textsuperscript{23}See for example al-Tilīghrāf (Lebanon), 8 April 1957 and al-Jumhūrīyah (Egypt), 16 May 1957.
It was in the middle of the crisis over Suez and the Sinai, on 5 January, 1957, that President Eisenhower announced his Doctrine for the Middle East. Apparently motivated by a fear that there was imminent danger from the Soviet Union, as a result of the vacuum caused by the French and British fiasco, the American president sought to step into the breach. But the Doctrine only served to antagonize a majority of the Arab writers. Editorial felt it was ludicrous that, at a time when the West was aggressing against the Arabs, one of the Western nations should propose a defense pact aimed at communism.

The "pure white light" of the Soviet Union had only increased in brilliance during the Suez crisis. How could one speak of a fear of Soviet aggression when anger over Ghazzah, Port Sa'id, and Sharm al-Shaykh was still fresh in Arab minds?

The American plan talked dramatically about the future and the dangers lying ahead and kept a perplexing silence regarding the current problems.25

24al-Ḥayāh (Lebanon), 22 May 1957.
25al-Jumhūriyyah (Egypt), 8 January 1957, quoted in The Arab World, 9 January 1957.
With one eye open, the United States saw the far away threat which endangers the Arab world, namely the communist danger. But with the closed eye, the United States...wants the Arabs not to think about the Anglo-French attack on Port Said and to forget Palestine.26

It appeared to the Arab writers that the United States simply could not understand the Arabs. The Americans were bogged down in their own conception of the world and could not comprehend that for the Arabs communism was not as great an enemy as the Israelis. Once again, similar to the cold reception which was given to the Johnston Plan, Arab editorials were not warm in their reception of the Eisenhower Doctrine. They viewed it as another attempt to avoid the real problem of the Middle East. Some papers felt that had the U.S. President tried to make the Israelis respect the resolutions adopted by the international organization, he could have served his cause better.27

26Falastîn (Palestine-Jordan), 16 January 1957.
Western scholars have agreed that the Eisenhower Doctrine was an answer to American fears not an attempt to fulfill Arab needs. "...fear of Soviet aggression...was fundamentally a Western fear." J.C. Hurewitz, Middle East Dilemmas, p. 251, among others.

27al-Fayha' (Syria), 16 January 1957. Compare the Arab orientation with The New York Times, 6 August 1957: "The [Eisenhower] Doctrine has aligned most of the Middle Eastern states on the side of the West and has thereby checked President Nasser's Soviet-backed Arabic and ultimately pan-Islamic empire...."
Those governments which did accept the Eisenhower Doctrine, notably Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, were subjected to villification in the press of Egypt, Syria, and the Opposition papers in Lebanon. In this attack, the focus was often on the refugees. It was alleged, by those who were opposed to the Doctrine, that those who had accepted it had done so with the understanding that the Palestine refugees would be resettled. The opinion voiced was that the United States was behind these attempts and one billion dollars had already been set aside for this purpose. The United States, with her allies, was meeting secretly with the Israelis, another adherent to the Eisenhower Doctrine, with the intent of liquidating the refugee problem.28

The campaign against those allied with the West reached a low when a Syrian paper openly villified King Ḫusayn calling him "ʿAbd Allāh the Little." This editorial said that his crimes against the Arab nation were unsurpassed since he had agreed to make peace with Israel.29

28Representative editorials may be seen in al-Ahrām (Egypt), 12 August, 14 August, and 18 November 1957; ʿAbd Allāh al-Yāfī in al-Siyāsah (Lebanon), 18 July 1957; and al-Raʾy al-ʿĀmm (Syria), 17 July and 4 November 1957. See also al-Shaʿab (Egypt), 3 November 1957, which published a news story which alleged that a meeting on the ministerial level had been held in Nabulus between the Jordanians and the Israelis. Peace between the two nations was the topic of the meeting.

29Alif Bāʾ, 12 November 1957. The same writer called the Jordanian monarch, Ḫusayn Ibn Zayn. This was a great insult—calling an Arab by his mother's name.
The counter-attack against the campaign led by Egypt was confined to those newspapers sympathetic to the West or supporting those governments aligned with the West. Many such papers refuted the Egyptian-led campaign of vilification of King Ḫusayn. Falastîn commented favorably on the expressions of loyalty coming from the refugees and others in Jordan for their king. The paper was happy to report demonstrations throughout Jordan in support of the Hashemites.30

30Falastîn (Palestine-Jordan), 11 November and 13 November 1957. One of the strongest attacks against the Egyptians was broadcast on ‘Ammān Radio by an official Jordanian spokesman on 4 November 1957:

"Arab public opinion knows that those who fabricate and disseminate such lies and fabrications are the first to be accused of them, and are more deserving of shame and disgrace and to be called traitors and plotters because of the Arab rights and interest which they lost. They are the ones responsible for all the setbacks which the Palestine question, the foremost problem of the Arabs, [has] suffered at their criminal hands. They are the ones who handed over the Ghazzah sector, first to the military occupation of the Jews and then the UNEF. They are the ones responsible for opening the Suez Canal to Israeli ships, which are now sailing through its waters before their very eyes. They are the ones who agreed to the occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, Sharm al-Shaykh, and the Egyptian coastline along the Gulf of 'Aqabah by the UNEF in order that this force could insure the passage of Israeli and foreign convoys and ships to the Israeli harbor of Elath...

"In view of this condition prevailing in their territories and their peaceful attitude toward Israel as we have mentioned, responsible Egyptian officials and the hired Egyptian press, as well as the government of the Egyptian dictator, should be the last to accuse the noble patriots among responsible Jordanian officials of seeking pacification with Israel and paving the way for peace and
As the year 1958 approached the Arab world became polarized into two camps; one camp which looked to 'Abd al-Nāsir as its leader and one comprised of those who followed Iraq, the Hashemites, and the West. What resulted was that those editorials dealing with the Palestine question were, unfortunately, used by one contending side to attack the other. However, Palestine was only a excuse to attack. This disintegration in the Palestine question resulted in a rise in emotional invective fired from side to side.

Egypt and Syria were merged into the United Arab Republic (UAR) on 1 February, 1958. A union of Iraq and Jordan was announced on 14 February, 1958, as the Arab Federated State (AFS). The papers of the UAR attacked those of the AFS, and vice versa. The Lebanese journals took sides according to whether they supported the Opposition or the Government in that presidential election year.

The Egyptian-led bloc attacked the Hashemite monarchies in an attempt to rally support to their cause. In doing so they used Palestine as a point on which to pin failure on their opponents.

the settlement of the Palestine question. They should be the last because of the secret contacts, plots, and treason which Egyptian rulers committed, proof of which can be found in a large number of documents and information which we possess. We have been reluctant until now to publish these documents and information in order to preserve the reputation of these rulers and hired men."
...it is time the Arab nation rid herself of the Hashemite Kingdom...

It was because of the Hashemites' participation in the Palestine War of 1948 that we lost that war. It was they who handed over to the Jews the lands on which Israel emerged; these lands which the Arabs of Palestine had put as a trust in their hands.  

The Jordanian rulers were also accused of selling lands to Israel and of not taking adequate care of Jerusalem. Worse still, the AFS was indicted for being in alliance with Israel, since both had joined in supporting the Eisenhower Doctrine. One paper alleged that there was an agreement whereby Israel would attack the UAR and while this was occurring, the Arab Federated State would invade and conquer the Syrian region. And there was the repeated accusation that the Hashemites had concluded or were on the verge of concluding peace with Israel.

The newspapers favorable to the West and to the AFS were not reluctant to strike back at Abd al-Nasir, although in general their attacks were not as strong. Usually they did not accuse the UAR president of laxity in the past. But when strife erupted in Lebanon, his opponents accused Abd al-Nasir of agreeing to settle with

31 al-Nagr (Syria), 14 March 1958.
32 al-Ra'y al-'Amm (Syria), 2 April 1958.
33 See, among others, al-Nagr (Syria), 15 April 1958 and Al-Ahram (Egypt), 17 June 1958.
Israel in return for a free hand in Lebanon. "He sold Palestine to purchase Lebanon, and absolute leadership in the Arab East..."\(^34\)

Palestine was no longer an important problem but an object to be hurled by contending sides in the battle for Arab supremacy. One can attempt to recreate the picture. There was the polarization of political fortunes in the Middle East with the Egyptians leading one contingent and the Iraqis and Hashemites leading the other. In this setting the Palestine question often became only a weapon to be discharged at one's enemy. The deterioration of the Arab press was perceptible when it became the primary soldier in this battle. Its role of questioning, probing, and attempting to solve the Palestine problem came to an end.

There were other factors which ended its semi-independent commenting on Palestine. The unification of Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic hurt the newspapers of the new nation in two respects. First, political parties were disbanded early in 1958, shortly after the birth of the UAR. This disbanding of parties and political organizations meant the end of monetary

\(^34\)al-'Amal (Lebanon), 20 May 1958. See also al-Bayraq (Lebanon), 16 June 1958 and al-Bina' (Syria), 29 June 1958.
subsidies to the newspapers.

The press's honorable struggle in various political battles...is not denied by anyone... But the great union between Egypt and Syria meant prosperity for all citizens save news­men.... With the dissolution of political parties and organizations in our country, many sources of press income ceased to exist.35

Second, the regime of 'Abd al-Nāṣir had become increasingly hostile to a free press in Egypt or later in the UAR. This hostility was manifested in Egypt by the ending of the publication of many newspapers. The greatest signal of the termination of a free press was the government's purchase of al-Ahrām in 1957. The emergence of government-owned papers, such as al-Jumhūrīyah and al-Sha'ab, should also be noted. This policy of a controlled press also exerted itself in the Syrian region of the UAR. Although the papers were badly injured by the ban on political parties, the coups de grace was administered on 10 December, 1958, when a presidential decree reformed the press forcing more than half a dozen prominent papers to cease publication.36

35 al-Shām (Syria), 2 April 1958, quoted in The Arab World, 3 April 1958.

36 Included were Alif Bā', Baradā, al-Hadārah, al-Manār, al-Qabas, al-Ra'jī al-'Amm, and al-Shām.
In Jordan, the assassination of King Faysal of Iraq and his uncle, 'Abd al-Ilāh, in the middle of July, 1958, signified the beginning of greater press controls by the Jordanian monarch who feared for his throne. The result in Syria, Egypt, and Jordan was the cessation of varied comments on the problem of Palestine. Now the papers of each government did no more than follow the respective government line.

In Lebanon, although censorship was not instituted for editorial opinion on Palestine, the outbreak of hostilities amongst the Lebanese meant that editorials were not greatly concerned with Palestine. The survival or non-survival of the nation occupied all minds.

What has been discussed in this chapter has been the Palestine question after the Czech arms deal and the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. What the newspapers saw was often not pleasant, especially when viewed by a Westerner. It is not pleasant to speak of imperialism and colonialism but this is what the Arab editorialists were writing about. Undoubtedly, there was more than a small amount of truth in what they saw and wrote.

They wrote that the French, British, and Israeli action against Egypt was unlawful and motivated by base aims of territorial aggrandizement, forced recognition
of Israel, economic benefit, or worse, colonial superiority of one people over another. In their denunciations, the Lebanese press corps, often French educated and French bred, were the least vociferous in their condemnation, reflecting a governmental reluctance to break all ties with the West.

Out of the Sinai War of 1956, the United States and Russia emerged unscathed in their positions with the Arabs. One may even say that the American position was enhanced by her condemnation of the invasion of Egypt. But this advantage was lost under the deluge of subsequent events. The souring of Arab-American relations has been mentioned in the previous chapter. The Sinai campaign tended to put this Arab hostility below the surface. But it did not end it.

There was editorial suspicion that even though the United States did not overtly support the three allies, there was still no doubt of overall American friendship for the nations involved, especially Israel.

Arab editorial suspicion was confirmed when Israel refused to withdraw from the territories which it had conquered. Rightly or wrongly, they identified this Israeli attitude as being backed by the United States. Both were partners in desiring some benefit from the action of October and November, 1956. How else could
the writers explain the American ship which subsequently sailed through the Strait of Tīrān?

It is in the light of the gradual reemergence of anti-American sentiment, while Israeli troops still occupied Sharm al-Shaykh and Gazzah, that each writer's reaction to the Eisenhower Doctr'ne must be seen. There could be no question of its rejection by the Egyptians. They could not possibly ally with a Western nation while her client occupied Egyptian territory. The same was true of Egypt's allies as was demonstrated in Syria and in certain Lebanese political and journalistic circles.

More accurately, however, the anti-American sentiment, the Eisenhower Doctrine, and even the question of Palestine must be viewed within the context of the fight in 1958 for supremacy within the Arab world; the battle between the progressive socialism and positive neutrality of 'Abd al-Nāṣir and the more traditional, Western-oriented philosophy represented by the Hashemites.

Plans, developments, accusations, and countercharges might take the form of a debate on Palestine or the merits of one alliance or another, but underlying all was the question of which way the Arabs would move and who would lead them.

The effect on Arab newspapers was marked. As the governments were polarized, so too were the papers. As
governments adopted dogmatic positions or accused their enemies of deviating from stands amenable to Arab goals, so too did the newspapers. The precarious freedom that many of the newspapers had enjoyed came to a halt, as they became mere spokesmen for their respective governments. When the political situation became more and more accelerated (union of Syria and Egypt, union of Jordan and Iraq, civil war in Lebanon, overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy) and the governments more harsh toward any dissent, the role of editorial opinion diminished because it was hindered. Several papers ceased publication and some censorship was imposed. Palestine, as a question which could be probed and constructively criticized, vanished from Arab editorials.
CHAPTER SIX

The question of Palestine and Israel, as discussed in the Arab newspapers, appears to have two broad divisions. Firstly, there is the question of Palestine and Israel and their relationship with the remainder of the Middle East, especially the Arab Middle East. Secondly, there was the role of Palestine and Israel in the world.

In its smaller context, that is as an Arab problem, Palestine and Israel had many diverging ramifications which were manifest in the Arab newspapers. It can be said unequivocably that the disposition of Palestine and the threat of Israel were not the great unifiers of the Arab world which they were hoped to be and which are still believed to be. The first chapter of this study showed that before the Arab intervention of May, 1948, the Arabs were unified editorially before the Zionists. But this unity may have been more illusory than real. The Arabs' unity had not been tested in battle and, with a victory unquestionably before them, the editorials may have been only mouthed unity without a real understanding of the
divergent currents in the area. On the other hand, there may be some validity to the argument that the Arabs were united prior to their defeat in 1948, but this defeat caused dissension. This argument, however, upon closer scrutiny is not very convincing. The Arabs, in their contemporary history, have not been noted for their unanimity. It seems more likely that the failure of 1948 served only as a catalyst to increase the Arab fissures.

This is not to imply that the Arab writers were not agreed upon a majority of points in Palestine. Arab writers emphasized, repeatedly, that Palestine was Arab and, by implication, that the State of Israel was not. They wrote that Israel was a colonial, expansionist state with designs of expanding till she reached from the Euphrates to the Nile. But even these pronouncements did not improve inter-Arab harmony. It would appear that the writing dealing with those factors upon which all Arabs agreed were largely ignored. What was noticed by one writer, one paper, or one country was the hostile comment which emanated from contending newspapers.

The Egyptians were criticized by the papers of Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon for their role in the prosecution of the 1948 war. The Egyptians were felt to have been less occupied with Palestinian considerations than with domestic problems. Even with the overthrow of Faruq, the Arab
editorials chastized the Egyptians for being more interested with the Suez Canal and the British than with the problems facing the other Arabs. The Egyptians, themselves, were willing to concede that the problem of being rid of the British was their paramount concern.

Lebanon was editorially attacked for her position vis-a-vis Israel and the Arabs. She was accused of sacrificing Arab desires to nationalistic interests. Undoubtedly underlying these editorial attacks was some suspicion of the role of a Christian Arab nation in the midst of a Muslim Arab world. Lebanon was felt to be more interested in trade, in avoiding fighting, and in protecting her Jewish population than in redeeming the land lost in Palestine.

Jordan was attacked the most consistently and the most violently. Perhaps the greatest focus for Arab dissension was the Jordanian annexation of the west bank of the Jordan River. The Jordanian agreement with Britain not to invade that portion of Palestine which was assigned to the Jewish state was viewed with disfavor. The disclosure of the meetings between Jordanian and Israeli leaders was also heavily emphasized in the press. The special Hashemite relationship of Jordan and Iraq with the British was noted as another debit in the Palestinian question.
In the deluge of criticism that followed the defeats of 1948, only Syria escaped relatively unscathed.

The editorial comments of the writers of one country attacking a second country were not always unfounded. The allegation that Lebanon was more interested in a sound economy than righting wrongs committed in Palestine has some verity. The same may be said of all the Arab nations involved in this study. The reason for this may be in the fact that each country, which surrounded Palestine, viewed the problem less often from an Arab viewpoint than from a more narrow national aspect. The Arab leaders were thus criticized for pursuing limited national interests. This same condemnation may be applied to the Arab editorialist who defended his country's policies.

Undoubtedly, Lebanon had unique interests in the Middle East. It was a nation possessing a population approximately one-half Christian. And there was no denial that a certain portion of that number feared Muslim rule. This apprehension was shown in a limited number of Lebanese newspapers. But more importantly, this fear often influenced general Lebanese editorial opinion. The writers, almost unanimously, wanted to preserve the Lebanese entity and so often viewed the Palestine problem from the angle of their own security. Survival included
the protection of all minority groups as well as the 
protection of Lebanese borders. The editorials of 
Lebanon said that the people were willing to aid the 
other Arabs, but on Lebanese terms. For this reason, 
nationalistic Lebanese editorial opinion was never an 
outsPOken critic of the lack of Arab unity. In the back 
of these nationalists' minds was the fear that if the 
Arab armies did unite, Christian Lebanon would not sur-
vive. "For Palestine and not for the King of Prussia."1

Although the Syrians were not widely criticized, 
they did not escape the temptation to view Palestine 
from a nationalistic aspect. Certainly the uproar over 
the diversion of the Jordan River south of Lake Hulah 
and the draining of the marshes of the area evoked more 
editorial reaction within Syria than within any other 
Arab country. This parochial view was also manifest in 
the anti-Hashemite feeling of the Syrian writers. They 
remembered the desire of the Hashemites to center their 
kingdom in Damascus. The writers often viewed with equal 
alarm the activities of the Israelis and the Hashemites. 
There were numerous editorials which said that the 
Jordanians and Israelis were in allegiance against Syria. 
There was also a nationalistic tendency to believe that 
Syria was the main target of expansionist Israel.

1 Kasrouan Labaki in L'Orient (Lebanon), 8 September 
1948.
This fear of Israeli expansion, however, was not exclusively Syrian. The papers of each of the Arab countries tended to see their homeland as the next Zionist target.

Palestine and Jordan were also afflicted with narrow interests in their approach to Palestine and Israel. The monarchical designs of the Hashemites had to be considered. The pro-Western stance of 'Abd Allāh and his successors was also a factor in editorial opinion. If a paper wanted to continue to publish, it had to take into consideration the wishes of the regime.

Equally important was the policy of Jordan and her sister monarchy in Iraq. The possibility of leadership of the Arab world was important in molding editorial opinion in Jordan.

The Egyptian aloofness, in the early portions of this study, perhaps does not need amplification. However, it does show that the leading nation in the Arab world did not always take a leading position in the struggle against Israel. Editorially, the Egyptian press was removed from the problem of Palestine. It was more concerned with the British and the Suez Canal. al-Ahram, which quickly supported the RCC, reflected the official view that for the Egyptians, Britain was the major problem. This feeling was reflected by a significant number of
Egyptian journals.

The Arab newspapers, in the intertwining of national and regional interests with the Palestine question, seemed to have failed in two respects. Firstly, the newspapers reflected growing nationalism in the Middle East. One may call this regional interests or religious interests, but the indisputable fact is that those who lived in Syria were beginning to think of themselves as Syrians, in Egypt as Egyptians, and so forth. And each was more worried about his own land. The editorial writers thus viewed the problems of Palestine from a very narrow base. Instead of being concerned with the broad implications for the Arab world of Israel, they were often only interested in what would be the immediate consequences for them of Israel.

Further, while writing from a narrow base, the editorialists accused each other of having narrow, nationalistic interests. While claiming that the danger from Israel was imminent for Jerusalem, the Jordanian writers would criticize the Lebanese for indifference. The Syrians would accuse the Egyptians for caring more for Suez than for the Jordan River. Everywhere unity was the clarion, but unity for limited nationalistic reasons. It seems that in calling for unity, while they were not themselves able to unify, the journalists were unrealistic.
The writers were incapable of seeing that complaining about Palestine and Israel from a limited aspect and criticizing other correspondents for doing the same thing was incompatible with unity. The Arab writers pursued doggedly the myth of Arab unity while adding to the disunity. In fact, the call for Arab unity against the Zionists was enough to anger one writer or another. Who was to unify and be the leader of this unity were occasions for argument. In relentlessly pursuing this myth, the editorialists left the realm of probability for that of the ephemeral and thus hindered the Palestine cause by tapping energies to argue the pros and cons of a myth when these energies were needed for Palestine. It would have been better had they stuck to the realm of the possible and encouraged their readers along those lines. Accentuate the positive, as it were.

If the editorialists are criticized for their flights of fancy in desiring Arab unity as a prerequisite to the successful defeat of Israel, they were less flighty in other areas dealing with inter-Arab alternatives in facing Israel. The Arab editorials were fairly militant in their calls for a solution to the Arab-Zionist question. In this respect, undoubtedly, they mobilized Arab public opinion and influenced their governments' and the masses' views. Prior to the fighting in 1948, the writers rejected
the United Nations resolution which called for partition of Palestine as being immoral. To a large degree, the West was held responsible for this immorality—from the Balfour Declaration to the partition resolution. But the West was not the only segment criticized. Perhaps the original sin rested with the Western European countries and the United States but the Arab leaders were also held responsible for any adverse results in Palestine. In their militant call, the Arab writers, while willing to concede that the West was responsible, felt that the Arab leaders should arouse the people to fight the West and its representative, Israel. It was this feeling that allowed the journalists, prior to May, 1948, to call for an armed solution to the Palestine question. When this satisfactory solution was not forthcoming, the Arab writers condemned, along with the West, the Arab League, King 'Abd Allāh, and any other Arab leader felt to be responsible for the debacle.

This militancy also led to the rejections of the first truce and, to a lesser extent, the second truce of 1948. The reasons for the rejections of the 1948 truces are overlapping. The editorialists were convinced of the justice of their cause. Often, they could not understand why others would not vouchsafe that justice was on their side. They were thus frustrated that right and
justice, in this world, were not enough. They recognized that for justice to succeed, might was necessary. Perhaps, this was a rationalization on their part for the use of force. Undoubtedly, every conqueror or would be conqueror, including the Israelis, has felt that right was on his side. Nonetheless, the Arab writers, out of a sense of frustration, urged the use of force to gain their rights. They felt that the Arabs were superior in force and thus rejected the first truce. They often commented that the truce was only accepted under pressure. But since they viewed the partition resolution as immoral, they concluded that to submit to it was immorality itself.

The defeat of the Arabs, following the end of the first truce, and the imposition of the second truce tempered the Arab writers' militancy. They were not so bound to justice as an abstract point that they could not see the realities around them. Starting towards the end of 1948, over a prolonged period, the Arab writers' militancy slowly cooled. By the beginning of the 1950's they were willing to accept peace. This same pattern was observable before and after the Suez War of 1956. Immediately prior to the war, Arab editorial opinion was forceful. When the war was lost, this militancy slowly died. One might expect that if this study had continued
after 1958, a rising number of peace editorials might have been observed. If these two periods at the time of the wars of 1956 and 1948 are examplary, it might also be expected that the 1970's would be an optimum period for the realization of a negotiated peace. This is assuming that there is a correlation between Arab editorial opinion and general Arab attitudes. The conclusion might also be drawn that peace, at least as it concerns the Middle East, is farthest removed from the realm of possibility immediately before and after a war. An extension of this observation might include the presumption that peace would be more difficult to negotiate without an effective ceasefire.

The realities which the editorialists accepted were that Israel was a strong power capable of defeating the Arab forces and that the Arabs had been defeated in war. These realities forced a startling reversal of opinion toward the acceptance of the United Nations' resolutions, especially the resolution dealing with the acceptance of Palestinian partition. But this acceptance was not wholehearted. Undoubtedly, the Arab writers hoped for better terms. Nonetheless, the armistice, negotiated in 1949, was accepted and editorial opinion supported the three U.N. resolutions dealing with Palestine. It should be emphasized, however, that these
resolutions were not accepted out of love but out of many fears. Justice was still the same but political realities had changed. There was a fear of further Israeli expansion, a fear of Jewish immigration into Palestine, and a fear that if the resolutions were not accepted a worse fate might befall the Arabs.

In being fearful and accepting of the resolutions, the editorialists felt that if only the Arabs could fight, editorial opinion would reject any peace with Israel. Conjecture may be made over the results had the Arab governments accepted the editorial advice and not negotiated a settlement. An argument may be made that had the Arabs and Israelis accepted a peace based upon the United Nations' resolutions, they might have refused to honor the peace settlement, once the Arabs became militarily stronger. This type of argument results in a *reductio ad absurdum*. War is better than peace in the Middle East. A better argument would be that had they accepted a negotiated peace and had their boundaries been internationally guaranteed, the Arabs would have respected their obligations.

One point should be noted concerning armistices of 1949. When the Arabs began to accept the U.N. resolutions, they viewed the separate ceasefire resolutions as a prelude
to peace. However, this differed sharply with the Israelis, and in some instances with Western opinion. The Arab editorialists viewed the ceasefire agreements as a stoppage in the fighting in order to implement previous United Nations' resolutions. The Israelis and their allies, however, viewed the ceasefires as preliminaries to a negotiated peace with negotiations over the U. N. resolutions. For the Arab editorialists, the resolutions were the minimum acceptable. For the Israelis, the resolutions were maximum concessions never really envisaged as a possibility. In Arab journalists' minds, these was no further reason to negotiate. The broad lines of a permanent peace had already been established. All that was needed was Israeli compliance. This attitude held true for 1956 as well as for 1948. As a concession for their defeat, in both wars, the Arabs were willing to accept U.N. resolutions. However, the Israelis, as a result of their victories, viewed the resolutions as being outdated and denying them the fruits of victory.

As far as Arab opinion towards Israel and her world context was concerned, she was viewed as a foreign invention established to harm the Arabs. This editorial view was reinforced by the belief that it was not the massacres of Hitler which had led to the final establishment
of Israel, but to Jewish pressure in the Diaspora on world governments. Editorialists felt that this Western, Jewish pressure was instrumental in the establishment of Israel and had sinister motivations. There developed an anti-Semitic feeling that the Jews wanted to use Palestine as the center for some future empire. They were also accused of being the agents of the West who were intent on keeping the Arabs from progressing, from founding strong nation-states, and from choosing friends as they liked in the world community. These beliefs resulted in rising anti-Semitism. This feeling, although never wide-spread, was perceptible and appeared to grow stronger from 1947 to 1958. Early in the period covered in this study, some Arab writers could defend the Jewish Arabs. This was no longer possible in the late 1950's.

The major belief about Israel in her world context, that she was designed to be a disturbing influence in the Arab world, must be understood in order to fathom Arab editorial opinion. Once it is comprehended that the Arabs viewed Israel as a Western appendage inserted into the Arab East, editorial intransigence toward the West is better understood. All programs, no matter their shape or goal, were seen in the context of Arabs versus the colonial agent of the West, Israel.

As a Western agent in an Eastern area, Israel was
always branded with the titles of imperialist and colonialist. Friendship with the Arab countries, wrote the editorialists, was incompatible with support for Israel. It was thus not surprising to discover the decline of editorial sympathy for the West.

It is in this light that American attempts at economic and defensive plans must be seen. The Tripartite Declaration was viewed by Arab writers either as a reaffirmation of old influence, an affirmation of the right to intervene in the affairs of the Arab states, or as a guarantee of Israel's borders when U. N. resolutions had established different borders.

The Johnston Plan for regional development of natural resources was also seen in the light of the Arab-Israeli conflict, with the West acting as the major supporter of Israel. The Johnston Plan came too close on the heels of the beginning of the diversion of the Jordan River and the massacre in the Jordanian village of Qūbīyah. It was announced while Ben Gurion held both the portfolio of Prime Minister and that of Defense Minister. This latter point was thought to be another Western attempt to scare the Arabs into accepting the Johnston Plan.

The Baghdaḍ Pact, besides antagonizing those Arab states opposed to Iraqi predominance, was viewed with
suspicion because it included Turkey. Slyly the West was going to have peace by allying Muslim countries, one of which recognized Israel.

The Eisenhower Doctrine was issued at a time when the Israelis were still occupying portions of the Sinai peninsula and the Ghazzah strip. No further editorial comment was necessary.

In each of the five instances mentioned above, the Arab writers felt the West, and here especially the United States, was attempting to force an Israeli peace upon the Arabs. The questions were repeatedly asked, why did the Tripartite Declaration guarantee Israel's borders when a just settlement of borders could be established within the framework of the United Nations? The answer which the writers announced was that Israel, being a client of the West, received privileged treatment. Why had the West taken such a disturbed time to announce the Johnston Plan? The answer for the Arab writers was that Israel and the West were attempting once again to find an economic solution to a political problem already solved by the United Nations. The Arab editorialists repeatedly pointed out the lack of recognition of international borders in the planning. How else could one explain a plan by a group of engineers who had never surveyed the area about which they wrote? The activities
of the Israelis and Prime Minister Ben Gurion were aimed at showing the Arabs that if they did not accept the Johnston Plan they might expect the worst, including the seizure of their rivers and subsequent exploitation without Arab benefits.

The Baghdad Pact was another link in the chain of Western and Israeli conspiracies. While the Arabs were worried about the danger of Israel, the West wanted an alliance against communism, an alliance which would include, interestingly enough, Israel. Whether what they wrote was true or not is irrelevant. That is written about and believed are not moot questions. Often what is believed is just as important as what is true. In this respect, the Eisenhower Doctrine was no different from the Baghdad Pact except that as blackmail, the Arab editorialists wrote, the United States would give no aid to Arab countries unless they subscribed to the Doctrine. A second difference between the Doctrine and the Baghdad Pact was the overt acceptance of Israel of the Eisenhower Plan.

The pattern is unmistakable. Every American and Western attempt to draw closer, to initiate dialogue, to aid, and to unite with the Arabs led to violent opposition in at least one segment of the Arab press—all this while the growth of Russian influence continued unabated.
Arab editorial opinion, at the beginning of this study, was strongly pro-Western. By 1958, the best that can be said is that editorial opinion was about equally divided in support of East and West.

The conclusions are quite clear. As far as it may be judged from editorial opinion, there was no great love for the Soviets. But American blunders in the Middle East led to the rise of Russian influence. This is what the writers felt. The West backed Israel and so the Russians backed the remainder of the Middle East. The West proposed an unpopular plan and so the Russians opposed it. America and Britain withdrew support for the High Dam and Russia agreed to build it. This analogy extends to other areas. The West committed mistakes of major proportions by tying the Tripartite Declaration, the Johnston Plan, the Baghdad Pact, and the Eisenhower Doctrine to Israel. In all of them there was a link that would somehow bring the two belligerents together. There were no major Western plans for the area that did not include Israel. What this was at best was neutrality; a Western neutrality toward Israel and the Arab states. But neutrality was a sin, as Secretary Dulles had said. The Arab writers felt it was a question of either the Arabs or Israel. When the West insisted upon including Israel in all of its plans, the Arab writers could only infer
that since the West was not with them, they must be against them. Perhaps the Arab editorialists may be chastized for caring more for their area than for the rest of the world. On the other hand, the West, as the editorialists pointed out, often cared more for itself than for justice in the Middle East.
Headlines in *al-Ahram* (Egypt)

1948

1 April - "Jews Blow Up The Cairo-Haifa Train"

2 April - "Italian Concern Over The Destiny Of Their Country"

4 April - "America Accepts The Russian Challenge In Berlin"

5 April - "Spain Between the Franco Regime And Democracy"

6 April - "Police Officers In Cairo And Alexandria--The Prime Minister Flies To Alexandria And Returns In The Evening"

8 April - "1500 Male Nurses Strike In Qasr al-'Ayn T"

9 April - "America Suggests The Fromation Of A Government For West Germany"

11 April - "New Appropriations To Help The Arab Freedom Fighters"

12 April - "The Arab Countries And The Fight Against Communism"

13 April - "The Political Committee Refuses Trusteeship In Palestine"

14 April - "The Arab Delegation Plan In The United Nations"

15 April - "Moscow Doubts Communist Victory [In The Italian Elections]"

16 April - "Great Victory For The Arabs In Palestine"
18 April - "The Position Of Russia And America After The Evacuation Of The English"

19 April - "DeGasperi Expects A Great Victory"

20 April - "The Christian-Democrats Win"

21 April - "Communists Do Not Take Part In The [Italian] Government"

22 April - "Contacts Between London And Cairo"

23 April - "Important Military Conference in 'Ammān"

25 April - "Important Military Discussions in 'Ammān"

26 April - "Explosion In Front Of The Residence Of al-Nāḥḥās"

27 April - "Transjordan Declares War On Zionism"

28 April - "The President Of Lebanon Invites The Kings And Presidents To Bayrūt"

29 April - "The Arabs Fight In The Streets Of Yāfā"

30 April - "The Arabs Decide On Their War Plans"

2 May - "Three Military Meetings In 'Ammān"

3 May - "King 'Abd Allāh Calls On The Palestinian Arabs To Hold On"

5 May - "King 'Abd Allāh's Memorandum To The United Nations"

6 May - "The Anniversary Of King Fārūq's Ascension To The Throne"

7 May - "Britain Refuses To Extend The Mandate In Palestine--King 'Abd Allāh Threatens The Jews Of Palestine"

8 May - "An Egyptian Commander For The Palestine Liberation Armies"

10 May - "The Final Plans To Enter Palestine"

11 May - "Fall Of Safad Into The Hands Of The Haganah"
12 May - "Faruq Will Not Accept A Zionist State"

13 May - "Exhortation Of Arab Kings And Presidents On The Day Of Attack--The Arabs Will Attack On Saturday"

14 May - "Bevin Promises Not To Declare The Jewish State"

16 May - "Egyptian Forces Occupy Ghazzah and Continue Their Attack"

17 May - "Egyptian Planes Destroy The Harbor Of Tel Aviv"

18 May - "Egyptian Planes Destroy Zionist Fortifications"

19 May - "Jordanian Army Occupies Jerusalem"

20 May - "Jordanian Army Chases The Remaining Jews West Of Jerusalem"

23 May - "Egyptian Forces Enter Bayt Lahm and al-Majdil"

24 May - "Egyptian Forces At The Gates Of Jerusalem"

25 May - "Egyptian Forces Destroy The Fortification of Dayr al-Snayd"

26 May - "Egyptian Bombers Attack Tel Aviv"

27 May - "Two Zionists Confess That They Had Orders To Poison The Water Used By Egyptian Army"

28 May - "Annihilation Of A Jewish Convoy In Latrun"

30 May - "The Two Arab Prongs Are Tightening In On Tel Aviv"

31 May - "Egyptian Forces Prevent An Attack On Asdud"
Headlines in FalastIn (Palestine-Jordan)

1948

1 April - "40 Martyred and 60 Injured in the Filthiest Crime Perpetrated Till Now by the Foreigners"

2 April - "Convocation of a Special Session of the United Nations on 16 April and a Call to the Arabs and Jews to Stop Temporarily the Killing"

3 April - "The Arab States and The Arab Higher Committee Refuse the Demand to Convoke a Truce in Palestine"

4 April - "The Arabs are Finally Ready for Anything in the Palestine Affair and Their Political Committee Will Meet on the Sixth of This Month"

6 April - "Meeting of the Security Council Yesterday and Hearing of the Details of the American Project for a Regency in Palestine"

7 April - "The District of the Raging Battles is Throughout an Extended Front from al-Qastil to Dayr Muhaysin"

8 April - "The Arab Flag Will Fly Above the Settlement of Mushmār HaʾImak After Its Final Violent Surrender"

9 April - "A Most Holy End to the Purest Life of the Martyred ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Ḥusaynī Leader of the Common Holy War"

10 April - "The Country, for Which ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Ḥusaynī Sacrificed Himself with His Own Blood, Marched Yesterday in His Funeral"

11 April - "Kings and Presidents Console His Eminence the Great Muftī on the Martyrdom of the Hero ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Ḥusaynī"
13 April - "The Barbarous Jewish Crime in the Village of Dayr Yāsīn Reverberates and Arab Circles are Concerned Over It"

14 April - "His Majesty King Fārūq says: 'The Arab Armies will Occupy Palestine and Then Hand It Over to Its Inhabitants'"

15 April - "A Great Jewish Demonstration in Jerusalem And the People Cry 'Stop Killing the Arabs Immediately'"

16 April - "Palestine [is a Topic] in Meeting of the United Nations Today--The Political Committee in Cairo Widens Its Role"

17 April - "Opening of the Special Session of the United Nations Organization In Order to Resume Looking at the Palestine Problem"

18 April - "Sudden Meeting of the Political Committee And It Discussed the Military Situation in Palestine and the Appointment of Șafūt Pasha"

20 April - "The Arab Kings, Presidents and Leaders Finally Announce an All Out War Against the Covetous Zionists"

21 April - "His Eminence, the Head of the Arab Higher Committee, and ʿAzzām Pasha Arrive in ʿAmmān to Meet with His Majesty King ʿAbd Allāh"

22 April - "The Arab Representatives in America Approve The Principle of a Trusteeship on Condition That Immigration is Stopped and Partition is Anulled"

24 April - "The English Have Sold Haifa With the Blood of the Arabs But the Arabs of Palestine Will Not Die Without All of Palestine"

[Falastīn stops publishing in Yāfā on this date.]
Headlines in *Le Jour* (Lebanon)

1948

1 April - "The Grand Mufti of Palestine Addresses a Note to the U.N. 'The Arabs Demand the Establishment of a Sovereign and Independent State'"

2 April - "The Security Council Adopts the American Resolutions"

3 April - "The Truce Proposition Will be Rejected by the Arabs"

4 and 5 April - "The Berlin Situation Poses Some Embarrassing Problems"

6 April - "Bloody Disorders in Egypt - Curfew Proclaimed in Alexandria"

7 April - "The Jewish Agency is Opposed to the Trusteeship Project"

8 April - "The Political Committee of the Arab League Will Meet Saturday in Cairo"

9 April - "General Robertson Sends a Last Warning to the Russians [Over Berlin]"

10 April - "Egypt Will Accept the Trusteeship Over Palestine"

11 and 12 April - "Communications Are Cut Between Jerusalem, Yāfā, and Tel-Aviv"

13 April - "Colombia Breaks Relations With the U.S.S.R."

14 April - "Mr. Marshall Accuses the Communists"

15 April - "The Security Council Examines the Aspects of Applying the Truce in Palestine"
16 April - "The Vote on the Truce Resolution Will be Held Today"

17 April - "The Extraordinary Assembly Has Begun Its Work, The Argentinian Delegate Is Elected President"

18 and 19 April - "The Security Council Pronounces In Favor Of The Truce"

20 April - "The Palestine Question Before the General Assembly of the U.N."

21 April - "The Victory of the Christian-Democrats Is Confirmed"

22 April - "Syria Declares Herself Favorable to the American Trusteeship Project"

23 April - "Civil War In Palestine—Fighting in Haifa"

24 April - "The Arab Countries Are Preparing Military Action In Palestine"

25 and 26 April - "Tripartite Commission Is Charged With Realizing A Truce In Palestine"

27 April - "Violent Fighting In Yāfā—The Haganah Attacks St. Jean d'Arc"

28 April - "The Arab Armies Have Crossed The Palestine Frontier"

29 April - "England Maintains Her Decision To Quit Palestine"

30 April - "The English Have Intervened in the Battle of Yāfā"

1 May - "The Truce Is Prolonged In Yāfā"

2 and 3 May - "The Truce Commission Declares: The Situation Is Rapidly Worsening"

4 May - "After The Arrival Of Reinforcements In Palestine, The Government of London Declares Her Policy Has Not Changed"
5 May - "English Troops Will Maintain Order Until 15 May"

6 May - "The Plenary Assembly of The U.N. Will Meet Today"

7 May - "A Neutral Municipal Commissioner Will Be Named In Jerusalem"

8 May - "The American Government Is Forced To Find A Peaceful Solution"

9 and 10 May - "The English Colonial Secretary Says, 'Palestine Is On Its Way To A Real Partition'"

11 May - "Arab Forces Have Evacuated Safad"

12 May - "Toward A Russo-American Accord"

13 May - "From 15 May, A State of Siege In Egypt"

14 May - "America's Final Step"

15 May - "The Arab Armies Have Entered Palestine"

16 May - "The Egyptian Troops Advance In The South Of Palestine"

17 May - "The Arab Armies Effect Their Junction At Lydda"

18 May - "Arab Troops Enter Palestine"

19 May - "The Battle For Jerusalem Enters Its Decisive Phase"

20 May - "The Arab Legion Storms Jerusalem"

21 May - "Hand to Hand Fighting In Jerusalem—The Jews Have Demanded Of the Arabs Their Conditions [For Surrender]"

22 May - "The Egyptian Army Occupies Hebron"

23 May - "The Last Phase of The Battle For Jerusalem—The Jews Have Proposed To Surrender"

24 May - "The Jewish Agency Gives The Order To Ceasefire"
25 May - "New Delay Of 36 Hours Has Been Asked By The Arab Countries"

26 May - "The Jews Must Renounce Partition"

27 May - "The Arabs Reject The Appeal Of The Security Council"

28 May - "Debate In The Security Council Over The Response Of The Arab Countries"

29 May - "Surrender Of The Old City Of Jerusalem"

30 May - "The Arab Armies Are 20 Kilometers From Tel-Aviv"

31 May - "The Push Of The Iraqi Army Toward The Sea"
Headlines In al-Qabas (Syria)

1948

1 April - "Austin Discusses In The Security Council The Peace Proposal And The Call For An Assembly"

2 April - "How Economic And Financial Unity Was Saved Between The Two Countries [Syria And Lebanon]"

4 April - "The International Palestine Commission Continues To Persist In Its Work"

6 April - "The Arab World Joins In The Commemoration Of The Loss To Greater Syria Of The Deceased Sa'ad Allāh al-Jābirī"

7 April - "The Forces Of The Leader al-Qāwūqjī Launch The First Large Attack Against The Jewish Colonists Supported By Tanks"

8 April - "Famine Threatens 1000,000 Blockaded Jews In Jerusalem--Truce Negotiations Between The Arabs And Jews"

9 April - "League, Security Council, and House of Lords Circles Are Discussing The Matter Of A New Truce In Palestine"

11 April - "The Political Committee Of The League Of Arab States Studies The Truce Question And Creation Of An Arab Military Alliance"

13 April - "Brutal Jewish Crime In Dayr Yāsīn--His Holiness The Pope Dismisses Archbishop Mubārak For His Support Of The Zionists"

14 April - "The Arrival Of 800 Jewish Immigrants--American Minister Ascertains That Russia Has The Atomic Bomb"

15 April - "Sufficient Preponderance Of Arab Power In Palestine And The Destruction Of The Largest Zionist Gang In A Great Battle"
16 April - "The People Cheer The Army In Its Parade And Demand The Saving Of Palestine And Her Liberty From the Imperialists"

19 April - "Renewed Election For President By Consensus In The House of Deputies"

20 April - "The Arab Freedom Fighters Occupy The District Of Tiberias And Capture A Great Number Of Men From Haganah"

21 April - "The Political Committee Of The United Nations Is Discussing The Palestine Problem—The Defeat Of The Communists In Italy"

22 April - "The Official Arab Armies Will Occupy Palestine On 16 May After The Departure Of The British"

23 April - "The Jewish Agency Announces Its Readiness To Accept Unconditionally The Truce If The Arabs Will Cease Fire"

25 April - "The Sound Reverberates In The Skies Of Damascus: We Want The Military Occupation Of Palestine And Her Freedom From The Zionists"

27 April - "The Regent Of The Iraqi Throne And al-Sulḥ Carry The Results Of The Cairo Deliberations Back To ‘Ammān This Evening"

28 April - "Did The Arab Armies Enter Palestine Today--The Saudi King Agrees To the Decisions To Invade"

29 April - "The Arab League Submits An Important Memorandum To The Secretariat Of The United Nations Organization Warning Of Their Withdrawal From It"

30 April - "The Arab Liberation Forces Liberate Yāfā And Destroy The Colony of Nitār And Heavy Artillery Fire Showers Tel-Aviv"

2 May - "Three Brigades Of The Syrian Army Cross The Borders Of Palestine After Midnight And Take Up Positions"
4 May - "The English Continue Their Conspiracy Against The Arabs, Save The Jews, And Prevent Their Defeat"

5 May - "The United States And Britain Search For A Quick And Final Solution To End The Complicated Problem In Palestine"

6 May - "Arab Political Activities Move To Damascus And The Leaders Continue To Meet In The Palace"

7 May - "The United States Intervenes In Palestine And Presents Conditions For A Truce And Prolongation Of The Mandate To 25 May"

9 May - "The Jews Complain To The Security Council About The Advance And The Council Refuses Their Complaints And Pretentions"

11 May - "The Forces Of The Freedom Fighters Occupy Safad And Destroy The Jewish Quarters And Kick Out The Haganah After Causing Them Thousands Of Casualties"

12 May - "Arab Chiefs Of Staff Hold A Meeting Today In Damascus In Preparation For Their Conference In 'Amman"

14 May - "The Arab Freedom Fighters Approach Jerusalem And Kill 400 Of The Hagenah Along With Their Leader"

16 May - "Planes Attack Tel-Aviv And Destroy Its Quarters And The Jewish Colonies Surrender To The Freedom Fighters"

18 May - "100,000 Jews In Jerusalem Surrender And Give Their Arms Unconditionally To The Arabs"

19 May - "A Chain Of Glorious Victories For The Arab Armies In Different Military Sectors Of Palestine Yesterday"

20 May - "Victories Of The Arab Armies Yesterday And Today In The North, Middle, And South And The Threatening Of Tel-Aviv"
21 May - "A Serious Meeting Of The Arab Leaders, Midday Today, To Study The Present Affairs And The Future Steps To Be Taken In Palestine"

23 May - "Sirens Ring In Alarm In Tel-Aviv Ten Times In One Day And Scare The Jews"

25 May - "The Desperate Jews Depend On The Security Council And Declare Their Desire To Lay Down Their Arms"

26 May - "The Arabs Refuse The Truce Unless The Jews Lay Down Their Arms, Drive Out Haganah, And Renounce Partition"

27 May - "An Abortive And Suicidal Attack By The Jews In Bāb al-Wād To Save The Jews Of Jerusalem From Annihilation"

28 May - "The Security Council Listens To the Answer Of The Arab League Who Refuse To Stop Fighting Because It Is In The Interest Of The Jews"

30 May - "The Arab Forces Move West Towards Tel-Aviv From Three Directions After The Battle Of Jerusalem"
I. Books

Arabic


Sa‘ādah, Anṭūn. Marāḥil al-Mas‘alah al-Falastīnīyah (The Stages of the Palestine Problem), Bayrūt: Matba‘at al-Jihād, 1957 (?).


English:


Abouchdid, Eugenie Elie. Thirty Years of Lebanon and Syria, Bayrūt: Sader-Rihani, 1948.


Fisher, Carol and Fred Krinsky. Middle East in Crisis, a Historical and Documentary Review, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1959.


McFadden, Tom J. Daily Journalism in the Arab States, Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1953.


Qubain, Fahim I. Crisis in Lebanon, Washington: Middle East Institute, 1961.


French:


II. Articles and Pamphlets

Arabic:


English:


French:

III. Unpublished Theses in English


IV. Periodicals Used as Chronology References

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Middle Eastern Affairs. New York. Monthly

French:

Italian:
Oriente Moderno. Rome. Monthly

V. Newspapers

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al-Ahrām (The Pyramids). Cairo.
al-'Abrār (The Liberal). Bayrūt.
al-Akhbār (The News). Cairo.
Ākhir Sāʻah (The Last Hour). Cairo.
Alif Bā' (A.B.). Damascus.
al-‘Amal (In the Service [of Lebanon]). Bayrūt.
al-Anbā’ (The News). Damascus.
al-Ayyām (The Days). Damascus.
al-Ba‘ath (The Renaissance). Damascus.
Baradā (The Baradā River). Damascus.
Bayrūt (Bayrūt). Bayrūt.
Bayrūt al-Masā’ (The Evening Bayrūt). Bayrūt.
al-Binā’ (The Edification). Damascus.
al-Difā’ (The Defense). Yāfā and Jerusalem.
Falastīn (Palestine). Yāfā and Jerusalem.
al-Fayḥā’ (Fragrant, Vast, Green—epithet of Damascus). Damascus.
al-ḥayāh (The Life). Bayrūt.
al-Inshā’ (The Erection). Damascus.
al-Jumhuriyyah (The Republic). Cairo.
al-Kifah (The Struggle). Damascus.
al-Manar (The Lighthouse). Damascus.
al-Masa' (The Evening). Cairo.
al-Misr (The Egyptian). Cairo.
al-Nahar (The Daytime). Bayrut.
al-Nas (The People). Damascus.
al-Nasr (The Victory). Damascus.
al-Nida (The Struggle). Damascus.
al-Qabas (The Flash). Damascus.
al-Qahirah (Cairo). Cairo.
Ra'y al-'Am (Public Opinion). Damascus.
Sadah Lubnan (The Echo of Lebanon). Bayrut.
Sawt al-Ummah (The Voice of the Nation). Cairo.
al-Shabab (The People). Cairo.
al-Shabab (The People). Damascus.
al-Sham (Damascus). Damascus.
al-Sharq (The East). Bayrut.
al-Shirah (The Sail). Bayrut.
al-Siyasah (The Policy). Cairo.
al-Tilighraf (The Telegraph). Bayrut.
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al-Zaman (The Times). Bayrut.
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VI. Newspaper Translations

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VII. Official Documents

Arabic:
English:


United States Congressional Record. 85th Congress, First Session, Vol. CIII, part 6, pp. 8159-8160. Statement by James P. Richards, former chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on his trip to the Middle East to explain to those countries the "Eisenhower Doctrine."