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THE FUNCTION OF GOAL-PROJECTION IN CURRICULUM

THEORY: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University

By

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* * * * * *

The Ohio State University
1970

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INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Talk about aims, goals, objectives is a characteristic feature of educational theorizing. Traditionally, most discussion about education started by raising this inquiry either because the belief that education is normative was enacted in catalogs and classifications of rules and goals, or because in the attempt to provide efficiency and order, it was necessary to isolate the specifications of a finished project.

In contemporary times, the tempo of exposition and discussion has increased with the realization that much of this effect was wasted. As catalogs flowered into taxonomies, it became evident that the vagueness and comprehensiveness of the lists could be used to "justify" almost any curriculum decision one wanted to take. Nor was there any real difference in practice for whatever formulation of educational goals was asserted. In the minds of many, discussion of goals became the infinitely more sensible task of reducing curriculum to objectives of stated courses. The model drawn from learning-theory stressed analysis of a complex into distinguishable elements and as general goals were singularly opaque to this kind of treatment, they were subject to replacement by objectives.¹

Despite the development of this theme, there yet remains in

¹Robert Gagne, "Educational Objectives and Human Performance" in Learning and the Educational Process, ed. by J. Klemholtz (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965), Ch. I.
contemporary educational literature a strong emphasis on goals. Perhaps this is because the language of education mirrors a primitive feeling that education as a process is not as easily articulated as suggested above. The gnawing doubt of contemporary educators that there is more to curriculum than the collection of specific courses and the inability of research to provide a pattern of crucial variables which explain education suggest that the approach may be inadequate.

For instance, Goodlad, writing on curriculum, deplores the "lack of a comprehensive and reasonably consistent set of objectives" to guide in curriculum building; yet, he equally complains of the "global" character of the goals unanimously accepted. His solution is to call for a political consensus with a vague conceptual systematization substituted for theory and an appeal to Bloom's taxonomy as the criterion of balance and scope. However, even a political consensus has an ethical legal base and a taxonomy provides no relief from the pressure of vested interests or evaluative basis for selection.¹

Along with the pressure of a technological society to reopen inquiry into educational matters, there has come a reawakened philosophical curiosity. If the curiosity of the philosopher towards education shares some of the motivation of technology, it also springs from intrinsically philosophical interests. Interest in ethical analysis has been broadened with value inquiry into political, economic and religious areas of life. Theory of meaning and of knowledge have tried to take

¹John Goodlad: *School Curriculum and the Individual* (Walthan: Blaisdell Publishing, 1966), Ch. V.
account of new methodology, differentiating private, common sense and technical languages and making patterns of justification and truth more precise. New data of psychology and sociology have provided fresh stimulus for philosophizing on human action, emotion and motivation.

The incursion of these inquiries into educational thought has brought about a rethinking of many educational problems. The area explored here is the function of goals in educational theorizing. The traditional concept of education as normative has been reopened, and the implications of this for curriculum theory have been explored. Goals are necessarily formulated as criterial-rules, not as ideal utopian ends. Rules will have a differential of application by taking into account both level and circumstance. Perhaps the complaint of a contemporary philosophy of education sets the standard objection which this thesis tries to obviate.

To be concerned about the improvement of school practice is not to ignore the importance of educational aims. Those aims have always been, among educators and laymen, an arena of serious debate. But one reason (although not the only one) those debates have not been settled is that aims are sometimes cast in terms so general as not clearly to indicate any differences in school practices. But practices differ widely anyway, and the differences are often the results of inability to see their connection to aims and consequences, and of failure to examine critically the beliefs that are presupposed by those practices.¹

The curriculum problem of aims and goals poses the philosophical question of normative language. This quotation from Arnstine does not attempt to pose the question of goals in philosophical terms; rather, he assumes that the concern of educators with practical matters is the

legitimate way in which concern for education should be manifest and that the best way to resolve the impasse of goals is to seek concrete and practical results.

This maneuver has a familiar ring to it. The artistry and even the anti-theoretical character of the teacher's task has often been argued. Of course, there is much to be said for this maneuver. In fact, this study does not attempt to side with the intellectualist. However, merely calling for a practical orientation is not a virtue because the term can be used to refer to innumerable and conflicting stances. The argument basic to this study attempts to diagnose the weakness of educational goals-projection in order to specify in just what sense it can be said that education (and especially curriculum-formation) is a practical operation.

It is unsettling to the critical reader of Arnestine's book to discover that in several ways Arnestine belies his own intention. The term "practical" masks some of his own flights into theory, for instance, when he argues for the practical thesis of "learning to learn." "Learning to learn" is a highly generalized kind of disposition and is also limited by Arnestine to the formal learning of the schools, so that in both cases the practicality of the situation surreptitiously masks theoretical and value positions. In a later chapter on curriculum, Arnestine himself draws implications from this restriction of learning to schooling by reading in a second criterion of desirable social climate to govern this assumed social organization of the classroom. He also

1Ibid., p. 43.
identifies the values implicit in "learning to learn" with the values of a democratic society. However, Arnstine's appeal to the practical orientation of education is not merely bedeviled by such ambiguities and confusions; it seems to be traumatically hung in a noose of its own fashioning. His complaint against the traditional educational use of goals was that goals seem to make no difference for practice. In his case, the orientation towards practice seems to make little difference with the traditional school approach for the goals he selects. But perhaps most damaging is his own admission that all practical choices are implicitly value choices. If practical choices are made for the values which they implement, it would not seem wise to argue that practice can substitute for the setting of goal-values.

The argument of this study can not depend on any such "ad hominem" demonstration against a counter-thesis. The issue has been dramatically posed, but the resolution of the complex of debate which it raises will take more careful effort. To clarify the debate and to propose a tentative solution can not be done by direct or simple argumentation. The strategy of argument in this study will first provide a more detailed description of normative problems arising out of three large-scale curriculum theories of the contemporary education scene. (Ch. I) These normative problems will then be exposed to the critical philosophical analysis of two important theories of value argued in educational contexts. (Ch. II and III) A third section of the study will correlate the value and curriculum theory analysis attempting to construct a more

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 355. \(^2\)Ibid., p. 351. \(^3\)Ibid., p. 352.
flexible and adequate philosophical tool for curriculum theory. A tentative and sketchy proposal for curriculum reconstruction will also be drawn up.
CHAPTER I

GOAL - PROJECTION AS A PROBLEM
OF CURRICULUM THEORIZING

Theorizing about the function of goals in curriculum has not substantially changed during the period of considerable growth and change of American education. As we shall argue later, this may be a sign of the basic and important rightness of the quest understood as an uncritical and common-sense human orientation. However, the elementary human importance of the quest need not blind us to the further call for clarity and consistency in improving and theoretically grounding what is "prima facie" acceptable.

The common-sense viewing of curriculum theory as initially the formulation of goals is well captured in the simple schema of Tyler. Objectives are formulated by screening the needs of society, learners, and disciplines philosophically and through learning theory.\(^1\) The rationale which governs this schema is argued by Herrick. Objectives define educational direction and scope, select learning experiences, and specify emphasis and mode of evaluation.\(^2\)

\(^1\)Ralph Tyler, Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947).

With a good measure of common sense, Herrick recognizes that general objectives will not function directly in specific or detailed application; their use is more contextual or directive. However, the uses which he lists seem to require that goals be used in a fairly specific, regulatory way. Goals function to define scope; i.e., "all of the significant and essential elements of a good education," and by elements, Herrick means the learning experiences which contribute the education.

It is just this tension between theoretical disclaimers and practical contradiction of these disclaimers which requires examination in contemporary curriculum theory. Herrick can not avoid this by entering a caveat that there are other criteria besides goals that must be considered. For the confusion only deepens with the further need of distinguishing an appeal to sources (or at the other end of the schema, to empirical conditions of actual classroom situations) from the components theoretically necessary for proper goal formulation.¹ We need to separate sources from goal-theorizing to prevent setting the goals formulated out of a given source in antagonism to another source, not construed as a goal. That is, we recognize that at the level of general goals we formulate all of the interests (sources) that are needed for a well-rounded ideal rather than formulate a few goals (political or ethical), than juxtapose these to cognitive or individual interests which we refuse to formulate in any goal-relevant pattern by calling it a source.

Likewise, we note that at the other end of the schema, Herrick legitimately introduces empirical considerations into the decision of selecting learning experiences without, however, inquiring whether empirical considerations are balanced directly or subordinately to goal consideration. To talk of balance and focus at a particular time is not the same kind of a problem as talking of balance and focus for a whole curriculum (K-12) or for the weighing of general goals at some higher level of organization.¹ Herrick recognizes the problem but does little to protect himself from the ambiguities that are hidden in his common-sense formulation.

Herrick is neither the last nor chief example of the abuse of common-sense insight by refusing to separate out its general contribution from its hidden ambiguities. Reading closely in contemporary curriculum theory literature will show many examples. It is surprising to find this even among those who display considerably more philosophical acuity and training. For instance, in a recent issue of Educational Theory, Broudy recognizes the philosophical complexity of relating goals to empirical tasks for all the considerations entailed at any given level of application or for the duty of separating out logical, normative or empirical aspects of the operation. Yet, when he comes to write about the contribution of goals to education, he argues that general goals are not applicable but interpretive of the educational enterprise. Broudy has in mind the same kind of problem that Herrick tried to solve common-sense-wise. In Broudy's case, he uses the term "interpretation"

¹Ibid., p. 269.
because he wants to allow a metaphysical solution. All goals are value facts and non-verifiable; but rather than take the alternative of formulating goals out of cultural traditions or conventions, Broudy holds this as the only way to rational education.¹

It will remain for the rest of the study to show another alternative, i.e., the analysis of goal talk as a normative language. The illumination Broudy gives to the question is to show that goals are inescapably a philosophical problem. Even though he seems to have constructed a philosophical monstrosity of value facts that is not joined to the actual decisions of education and life, he does see that these value facts are not reducible to any analysis less than a concern for life-style. The bridge between class objectives and interpretive goals, between instructional strategies and life-styles, has not been built any better than that of Herrick, while both call for the bridge to be built.

It is in the context of this tension between philosophy and common-sense that we turn to examine at length the explicit constructions of curriculum theorists. None of these will escape the horizons set by the ambiguities of philosophy and education-in-general. It will be helpful to see the problem of actual curriculum construction in order to get beyond the philosophical issue and to build into curriculum theorizing.

Taba's Analysis of Goals in Curriculum Theory

We turn to Hilda Taba's curriculum proposals offered in her book, Curriculum Development, as a clear example of the problematic relationship of goals to curriculum decisions. Not that this is the latest word or perhaps even the best formulation of curriculum proposals; it is rather that the book stands as an influential typical position argued with considerable level-headedness and classroom relevance. It is also a comprehensive account in contrast to the many more limited or specialized attempts of recent theorists. The use of Taba here is purely illustrative; there is no need to assume that her answer to the problem is decisive or particularly representative of present curriculum positions.

The problem of goals in most traditional theories is set in terms of the Herrick-Tyler development schema. Taba has accepted this, formulating a more detailed procedure for curriculum development, reiterating the common-sense rationale:

Formulation of clear and comprehensive objectives provides an essential platform for the curriculum. In large part the objectives determine what content is important and how it should be organized.\(^1\)

It is in the strategy for using these educational aims and objectives that Taba wants to make her contribution. Educational analysis has been too clumsy and inflexible. In the first instance we must distinguish the levels at which aims and objectives operate in curriculum development. General aims are derived from an examination of the cultural

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sources of education and from insight into the unique quality of human life and of knowledge. Specific objectives are defined in reference to the purposes of a given course of study; they are consistent with general aims but are neither expressive of a complete value perspective nor directly derivable from general aims.

The chief function of the more specific platform of objectives is to guide the making of curriculum decisions on what to cover, what to emphasize, what content to stress, and which learning experiences to stress. This level, in other words, contains the heart of the educational objectives in their usual sense, and clarification of the functions of objectives on this level is essential to arriving at a serviceable guide to curriculum development.¹

There seem to be two major claims embraced in this statement: 1) the best level at which to handle objectives is that of specific course construction, and 2) the relationship between general aims and specific objectives is like that of whole to part or the subordination of lower to higher. The second claim calling for consideration of the logic of norms will be deferred until later. On the surface there seems to be a puzzle in maintaining that general aims form an overarching integration for specific objectives and yet assert that general aims are insufficient to establish curriculum procedure.²

Before handling this major philosophical question, we would do well to reconstruct some of the argument on which Taba builds. Why does she maintain that specific course unit construction is the best place in which to attack the question of objectives? A list of criteria is expounded to develop the argument. Though these principles are stated positively in application to specific course formulation, they are

¹Ibid., p. 197. ²Ibid.
negatively oriented against the appeal to general aims as the essential focus of curriculum development.

1. A statement of objectives should describe both the kind of behavior expected and the context to which behavior applies.

2. Complex objectives need to be stated analytically and specifically enough so there is no doubt as to the kind of behavior expected.

3. Objectives should be so formulated that there are clear distinctions among learning experiences required to attain different behaviors.

4. Objectives are developmental, representing roads to travel rather than terminal points.

5. Objectives should be realistic and should include what can be translated into curriculum and classroom experience.

6. The scope of objectives should be broad enough to encompass all types of outcomes for which the school is responsible.

The disfunction of general aims is apparent in this list. The objectives are to serve as a platform for curriculum; they must specifically show how the selection of content, skills, and attitudes will be carried out. The major emphasis of the criteria is behavioral. The reason given is the common-sense one that we have to know and specify purposes in detail in order to gain concerted effort or efficiency. A more specific and technical argument can be conjoined, giving attention to the logic of behavior and especially to the work of John Dewey, who has set the philosophical context in which much of this demand for behavioral criteria is explicated. (See Ch. II)

For illustrative purposes here, it is necessary only to mark the difficulties which this point of view generates for the discussion of aims-objectives. As these criteria are read, the alert reader must be

\[\text{Ibid.}, \text{ pp. 200-205.}\]
aware of the tension of contrasting requirements. One set of criteria (1, 2, 3, 5) develops the concern for specificity of aims-objectives; the others (4 and 6) stress the indeterminateness and comprehensiveness of objectives. Then, too, the demand (3) that objectives of learning experiences be clearly differentiated, if there are behavioral differences, assumes an atomistic theory of action, motives and behavior. No consideration is allowed for learning experiences to incorporate a variety of differing behavioral patterns. In fact, the relationship between behavior and contrived experiences seems more complex than Taba allows. Perhaps the assumption most difficult to justify in this list of behavioral criteria is that all objectives and aims of the school can be behaviorally specified. No context makes this more obvious than in the following chapter where a behavioral prescription of knowledge is formulated tritely and tautologically.

... the simplest behavioral definition of this area of objectives is that of remembering, of recalling facts, ideas or phenomena in the form in which they were experienced or learned.¹

What this chapter succeeds in doing is to enumerate a number of areas which ought to be given behavioral specification, leaving unanswered the major question whether or how this is possible. The criticism which Taba levels against those who use taxonomies normatively might well be leveled against her position in this case. That is, we can agree with Taba that if a behavioral analysis is to be given, it should cover all the items listed descriptively in a taxology like Bloom's. However, merely noting the differences and even classifying these differences is

¹Ibid., p. 74.
not fulfilling the explanatory task of accounting for the differences.¹

If it is difficult to know how to fulfill the behavioral requirement for objectives, it is equally difficult to agree with the second argument which Taba employs. General aims are too vague; therefore, we ought to turn to a specific task of curriculum development and settle the question of specific objectives for that given area. It is obvious to all that we can not appeal to philosophy, for there is no philosophical consensus on educational aims, nor, in fact, on the way in which one would justify such a claim.

It is to Taba's credit that she does not pose the question of unit-construction as if none of the theoretical problems of goals, etc., had to be solved. Thus she writes:

It is evident, then, that the development of a unit raises all the theoretical issues and brings into play most of the criteria of curriculum development.²

Her point is that these theoretical issues can best be handled in the pressure of concrete decisions of a particular course. Objectives needed for the course can be formulated in terms of the needs of the course; whereas the integration of objectives from a number of courses and the balancing of objectives in general and abstractly for the total task of education is the philosopher's job. The reasons Taba gives are again essentially common-sense; one of them, however, masks a

¹There are many arguments formulated at this level against treating general aims behaviorally. cf. Elliot Eisner, "Educational Objectives, Help or Hindrance?" School Review, LXXV (Autumn, 1967), pp. 251-260.

²Taba, Curriculum Development, p. 347.
theoretical consideration basic to all the social sciences. Taba argues that generalized problems, insoluble because of abstractness or complexity, may become manageable when seen in the focus of a concrete setting.¹

This has the ring of a controversy within sociology. Whether and how values are operative in the social sciences, whether the social sciences are value-free or, as Popper proposes, whether the experimental context of the social scientist is always a concrete reform by which we both learn and live at the same time, are questions of contemporary debate. For Taba, the particular focus of a given concrete situation will enable one to cleave the abstract tangles yet unsolved by theoreticians. But it seems obvious that in solving specific curriculum problems, one is not merely solving some of these problems about objectives, but that one is really introducing a value perspective or uncritically assuming specific objectives without giving attention to the proper kind of justification that they require.

A second qualification is needed, however. Such solutions, although adequate for a specific problem on either the class or school level, are not solutions that take into account all other problems of the school. Thus, the quest for a theoretical explanation of the whole, or an attempt to balance out the goals incorporated in the various special problems for the perspective of the whole, yet remains a problem. Beyond the specific problems of curriculum unit theory are two major issues: 1) the balance of the curriculum and 2) the integration of the curriculum.

¹Ibid., p. 345.
Taba often writes as if these two criteria are not part of the problem of objectives, but are essentially curriculum theory problems. As we scrutinize her argument, it becomes obvious that here again Taba is smuggling in objectives under the cloak of alleged theoretical demands. Balance is conceived of as coordinating equally the scope and sequence of skills, i.e., with coverage and depth of understanding. But these are matters clearly determined in reference to objectives. Further, integration similarly conceived in terms of basic ideas and skills requires a horizontal articulation of the disciplines. Such a unity or synthesis of curriculum requires a unity of knowledge or experience which is philosophically debatable either for its possibility or desirability. The question of objectives is still present, though the associated connotations of the terms "balance" and "integration" would mask that reference. Perhaps the essential problem lies in the assumption of Taba early in the book that the purposes (general objectives) derived from each of these sources are not—nor should they be—mutually exclusive. The caveat "nor should they be" that Taba employs suggests a value context already, and the assumption that objectives are not mutually exclusive is, of course, a theoretical assumption intimately bound up with the logic of goals and objectives. These are issues which the work of Dewey and Peters will help us expose; at the moment, it is sufficient to note the way the issue of objectives confronts Taba in her use of curriculum theory criteria.

It would be a mistake to conclude that value-questions are raised only by asking "What are the objectives?" even if one recognizes

1Ibid., p. 428.  
2Ibid., p. 195.
the differing level of a given course or of a curriculum design. As we reflect on Taba's proposal for development of a teaching/learning unit, it becomes apparent that the division of the task into a series of elements masks a significant question of other kinds of objectives than either class objectives or general educational goals. Organizing content, organizing learning experiences, evaluation, organizing of the school and its facilities require attention to the implicit norms built into whatever framework is used to structure that aspect as well as requiring shaping towards the so-called educational objectives. Taba recognizes that school organization often shapes the curriculum, but she argues that this is not desirable nor proper. Part of her objection stems from the central place she legitimately delegates to the "teaching-learning experiences of youth"; perhaps part of her objection arises out of her failure to recognize the clash of norms and objectives between the school organizing activity and formal learning. In addition, we ought to keep in mind the previous criticism leveled at the whole enterprise of integrating the curriculum. As she writes:

It has already been pointed out that a fully integrated curriculum remains an impossibility as long as evaluation and accounting of the program for college entrance is in terms of separate subject areas, as long as teachers are trained along specific subject-matter lines, and as long as the patterns of team teaching are ineffectively developed.\(^2\)

No doubt, she has a point if one will agree with her that integration is possible for more intrinsic reasons, i.e., as a matter of objectives, and if it is only a matter of changing these organizational factors

\(^1\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 195.}\) \(^2\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 425.}\)
which stand in the way of realizing the integration. However, both of
these assumptions need criticism, and especially calling attention to
the second, illustrates the necessity for considering the harmonizing of
educational course-objectives with social organizational objectives or
norms.

This same criticism can be leveled at Taba’s use of the disci-
plines of knowledge. There she urges that the major problem of curricu-
lum content can be solved by emphasizing basic ideas and skills. She
fails to take account of the purposes by which the disciplines are dis-
tinguished or of the social organization of the discipline in its impact
on the school curriculum or organization. That is, she recognizes these
factors but treats them all as if they were merely factual data to be
woven into the educator’s fabric, ignoring the normative aspects of
these enterprises in their own right and influence. For this reason, we
turn to other contemporary curriculum theorists to set the discussion.
The attempts of many curriculum theorists to see curriculum theory as a
social process of decision making, stressing the provisional and situ-
aitional aspects of curriculum, arise out of concern for the pluralistic
and compromise nature of public school curriculum. This, joined with
the concern of many for individualized instruction, forms a rationale
for curriculum theory which is quite impressive. Writers such as
Macdonald set the dimension within which this point of view will be
argued later.
King-Brownell Theory of Curriculum

The two major issues which were exposed in examining Taba's strategy appear in the context of theories quite different from hers. Her strategy called for an explicit general reference to goals providing the rationale for education in general and an appeal to objectives directly derived from the construction of a specific course. The philosophical issues arose out of the perplexity concerning the logic of goal-objectives and of the feasibility of directing one's strategy to specific formulations, assuming that the solution of theoretical problems of concrete issue will in fact provide the solution of the general theoretical issues likewise. These issues also lie at the base of the proposals of King-Brownell and Phenix.

In either case, the curriculum proposal is argued philosophically and the strategy is given a different orientation than that of education. Nevertheless, the problems in each case are quite similar. The confusion about value-theory is masked differently, in these cases philosophically and in differently formulated criteria of curriculum adequacy. One reason for carrying out a critical analysis of these is to realize that the philosophical difficulties have not been overcome even if a curriculum is given a philosophical justification. There are, of course, good and poor philosophical justifications. A second reason why analysis is extended to these illustrations is to show the irrelevance of other criterial schema. Like the schema of Taba, these criteria of adequate curriculum theory are unrecognized value judgments. The connection between goal-objectives and curriculum criteria is more indirect
and less obvious than the relationships specified in any of these proposals.

The proposal of King-Brownell is unreservedly intellectualist. Curriculum must be focused on intellectual activity of the disciplines of knowledge. Reasons for this are the traditional ones: 1) the ideal learner is the rational intellect; 2) the curriculum most applicable is the curriculum most theoretically general; 3) the disciplines are identified with content learned most easily and accessibly; 4) the rational control of life is the best guide to the ideal life.¹ Other living interests are, of course, not excluded, but they are secondary and subject to the control and scrutiny of the disciplines.

There are two serious qualifications which King-Brownell want to introduce at this point. Though the curriculum is defined by intellectual activity, this activity must also include intellectual passions. That is, intellectual activity includes not only formal inference and cognitive judgment but commitment to all symbolic activity of man. The equivalent of their commitment is roughly an updated humanism with aesthetic, ethical and religious dimensions. Furthermore, inasmuch as it is impossible to establish a systematic unity of the sciences, King and Brownell argue for a pluralism of autonomous disciplines, bound together by a unity of commitment to truth and meaning, adhering to discovery, penetrating inquiry, and critical scrutiny. "It is to be found in a human focus for knowledge--the unity of persons as ends not means."²


²Ibid., p. 62.
The second qualification takes note of the methodological limitation of defining "discipline of knowledge." Curiously enough, King-Brownell join forces with curriculum theorists who emphasize the sociological process of curriculum decision by defining "disciplines of knowledge" as a sociological "community of discourse." As a community, a discipline bears social characteristics such as group membership, group boundaries, traditions, norms and purposes. As a community of discourse, it bears characteristic features of rational-symbolic endeavor such as syntactical structure, conceptual theory, specialized language and instructional patterns.\(^1\)

The theory of curriculum is a projection based directly on this ideal model sketched above. Every characteristic of the ideal will generate some corresponding demand on curriculum theory. In addition, this ideal sets the criterion of adequacy in the curriculum, that of consonance.\(^2\) The central issue of any curriculum design is the inclusion/omission of disciplines of knowledge; the teacher is the exemplar and transmitter of the discipline, the student is the initiate.\(^3\) Lest this statement be turned into the typical caricature of the traditional humanist's program, we ought to recognize that King-Brownell allow for many instructional concerns, even as they explicitly rule out others.

While the course is an analytically and systematically planned series of encounters, it is expressly incomplete without the teacher and the student, without their active involvement in the dialogue and discovery which characterizes all of the practitioners of the discipline wherever they may be.\(^4\)

\(^{1}\)Ibid., p. 95.  
\(^{2}\)Ibid., p. 63.  
\(^{3}\)Ibid., p. 121.  
\(^{4}\)Ibid., p. 123.
Nevertheless, adequate curriculum proposals are so controlled by the disciplines that: 1) students are to be freed from "personal desire and caprice"; 2) the traditional patterns of the disciplines grouped in some mysterious way "by families" will provide the comprehensive unity or mirror of life; 3) the criterion of the longest-continuous attention of the scholars will generate the most important, useful and creative kind of learning,\(^1\) and, perhaps, most questionably of all; 4) we are urged "to have some faith that in the plurality of knowledge, freedom will lead to order."\(^2\) Unlike Taba, King-Brownell are quite explicit in deriving curriculum criteria directly out of the rational ideal which they sponsor as the goal of education. Like Taba, however, they must exploit the vagueness of the formulation of goals or add considerations not implied by the goals. Hence, they identify and confuse the issues of rationality and freedom, or in employing the notion of discipline, heavily weighted and problematically defined as it is, they inadvertently add further constraints such as "families of discipline" without indicating how these are to be construed. The selection of disciplines for actual construction of a curriculum turns on this. Because it is impossible to include all the disciplines at every stage of the curriculum process, we "can be assured of comprehensiveness and of balance by picking the most disciplined from each family of disciplines."\(^3\) Additional specific criticism of the curriculum proposal of King-Brownell is not our purpose here. It is sufficient to note that the relationship of goals to curriculum construction in this instance suffers the same

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 141-142.  \(^2\)Ibid., p. 128.  \(^3\)Ibid., p. 142.
dislocation as Taba's more practice-oriented proposal. In each case, there is the traditional appeal to goals as the direct implementation of the normative requirement of education and in each case, the criteria employed call for further value-commitments than those stated.

Philip Phenix

The proposal of Philip Phenix argues curriculum construction more comprehensively and with a greater degree of integration than either of the other two illustrations. His concern is for general education; nevertheless, general education supplies the framework in which special education functions, and the philosophical perspective elaborated, for the one certainly includes the other. As Phenix comments on his own intentions, he is not providing "an exhaustive guide to the fulfillment of human existence through education"; nevertheless, he is offering a "broad framework within which specific curriculum decisions can be made by taking account of many other factors relating to particular personal and cultural situations." That is, the broad framework he provides can be supplemented but not set aside.

The rubric with which Phenix chooses to explain his curriculum theory is that of "meaningfulness." Education as "the means of perpetuating human culture" must "center on the idea of 'meaning' as the key to distinctively human experience."¹ Phenix is aware, of course, of the range of application such a term has, and, in fact, has deliberately employed the term for that reason. He is not aware, however, that the

range of "shared ways of understanding" which he proposes is less than an accurate determination of all the usage of the term, even less than all of his usage. Thus, "meaning" may refer to theoretical disciplines, popular culture and individual significance. It may include patterns of thought, of behavior, of emotion, whether deliberate or unconscious.\(^1\)

Viewed over this extended range, "meaning" can no longer be characterized as reflective, rule-directed, or selectively symbolical.\(^2\) Nor can Phenix derive the nine classes of meaning, called disciplines, from an analysis of the logical aspects by which these characteristics can be divided. What is particularly disturbing about this classification, however, is the assumption that governs its use. Phenix assumes that this classification gives him guaranteed coverage of all that should be included in an education, or at times, coverage even of human reality for all its possibilities.\(^3\) This assumption also raises interesting questions about the role of philosophy in interpreting human experience.

Certainly the issue is not beyond debate whether philosophy can or should produce a synthesis and system of knowledge. One alternative would be to reduce the area of philosophy to the activity of criticism of what is carried on in each of the other areas. Or the problem of integration could be assigned to one of the areas of science, ethics, religion or esthetics depending upon one's intuition of significant clues to the unity of life. Here again, the question of the nature of goals and the manner in which they are formulated and justified has been raised as in our analysis of Taba and King-Brownell with very unsettling

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 13-14. \(^2\)Ibid., pp. 32, 203. \(^3\)Ibid., p. 26.
results. None of the maneuvers taken so far seems to help. Either they capitalize on the unsettledness of philosophical theory and hence ignore the problem of justification or they settle arbitrarily on a limited philosophical view of values and tailor education to its narrow demands. In the rest of this study some of these issues shall be explored, searching for another alternative which allows a philosophically-open theory of values, but which nevertheless seeks to build value considerations into curriculum theory without stymieing the enterprise nor ignoring the value problems implicit in goal-projection.

The third aspect of Phenix's proposal for a curriculum takes into account the criterion of adequacy for a curriculum. Here, Phenix displays an indeterminateness which belies his claim to propose a theory. For instance, although he divides criterion of adequacy into three topics of emphasis: 1) scope, 2) sequence and 3) selections; it is clear on analysis that selection is inclusive of themes developed in both scope and sequence. In fact, it becomes obvious on inspection that some of the rubrics employed by Taba, for instance, are really at the root of Phenix's consideration. Thus, the topics of focus, balance and relevance listed by Taba are really in consideration of Phenix's discussion would benefit by recognition of these. A further general observation of Phenix's account re-emphasizes a major demonstration of our thesis, that the justification of the criteria of any given curriculum proposal very often lies outside of the appeal to alleged goals and in any case the justification itself is extremely tenuous. Phenix is no exception to this rule. These criticisms can be readily observed
in tracing out Phenix's exposition.

The criterion of scope has already been commented upon in that Phenix has argued that any curriculum inclusive of the six areas of meaning will "provide foundations for all the meanings that enter into human experience." Presumably these areas also indicate the basic competencies that should be developed in every person in order to become a mature person. In the continuing discussion, Phenix makes explicit these assumptions by arguing that the six general areas be continually and equally represented in the curriculum and that there is no conflict between these areas functionally integrated. It is just these assumptions which provide the difficulties of forming the curriculum. To make sure of equal coverage, Phenix marshalls an argument of selection based first on the distinction of general special education, and secondly, by valuing the formal properties of knowledge, such as:

1) Whatever is taught ... be drawn from the scholarly disciplines.

2) Content should be chosen so as to exemplify the representative ideas of the discipline.

3) Materials should be selected so as to exemplify the methods of inquiry in the disciplines.

Both of these arguments lack any clear-headed justification. The alleged distinction between general special education turns on the difference between mastery and general minimal competence on the one hand, and on the distinction between belonging to a community of discourse and belonging to humanity, on the other hand. But these are

\[1\] Ibid., pp. 264, 267. \[2\] Ibid., p. 8. \[3\] Ibid., p. 270.
difficult distinctions to sustain. Phenix cannot make up his mind whether he is willing to allow general competence of general education to be on a minimal level and he has trouble showing that the abstractness embodied in general education is not itself a kind of specialization. In a way, he acknowledges this, concluding his discussion by disclaiming any attempt to discuss special education.¹

The second argument is itself a begging of the question. The appeal to the disciplines is only one of the considerations to be taken into account in forming the curriculum. The interest and ability of the student, the needs of the community, the most effective pattern of teaching, are all to be included in deciding the best curriculum. Phenix, by restricting himself to a question of formal content, is satisfied with only part of the answer. This is especially frustrating when we notice that he had incorporated interest, ability, and human needs into the distinction between general and special education, and that the traditional way in which the question of balance between general and special education was obtained was by student election. Phenix does allow, finally, that there is no clear line from statements of goals to implementation of the curriculum, in that the criteria derived from goals are themselves only general guides.

No one curriculum is the best for all people and for every culture and situation. The course actually chosen in a particular school will depend upon the circumstances of the case, including the character, traditions and history of the community and the predispositions of the student.²

The difficulty here is really deeper than what has been exposed

¹Ibid., p. 333.  
²Ibid., p. 274.
so far. In checking through the other problem of curriculum planning, namely sequence, it is patent that the same considerations disturb the whole discussion. Sequence considers logical and psychological problems or ordering the curriculum. The formal properties of disciplines are not enough; an order of discovery must supplement the order of analysis or of proof. But Phenix does seem to assume that the order of discovery for the student will be similar to the order of discovery of the knowledge claim even while affirming that the teacher must "humanize the content" and that the student's learning be graded for his ability and shaped to avoid the pitfalls of error of the original discovery.¹ Further tensions could be exploited out of his discussion. These would all confirm the point that has been made here, that the discussion of Phenix really only states the tensions embodied in a curriculum without either recognizing these items as tensions or offering a way to mitigate the tensions. The tensions here are major.

What is in question is the fundamental relationship between discipline oriented curriculum and an instructionally oriented one. For instance, Phenix argues that the ultimate purpose of the curriculum is to see the general orientation of all knowledge; nevertheless, he cannot make up his mind whether this is done by viewing the individual trees in sum or by seeing the whole woods. Notice that the ultimate ideal of grasping the whole is maintained throughout, but the means for doing this is unclear. To put the point in another context, Phenix emphasizes the use of representative ideas, methods of inquiry, and use of disciplines

¹Ibid., pp. 276-278.
to show the ordering of the curriculum. Nonetheless, he immediately disqualifies this by stating that these only exemplify and guide what is to be taught—what is actually taught depends on other principles of organization of instruction.

Scientific materials can be ordered esthetically, the content of language instruction can be organized around the problems of personal understanding and materials from such diverse fields as music and morals can be organized along historical or philosophical lines.\(^1\)

If it is true that there is no one logical pattern of organization, why argue that the disciplines as ordered materials be used in teaching? The balance to be obtained includes the difficult decision of weighing student knowledge versus student learning, curriculum content versus instruction, scope versus sequence. In a sense we can name Phenix as a romanticizer of intellectualism in which the mystery of deep questionings of philosophy, morals, psychology, history and religion are the ideal by which all educating is to be evaluated. In the act of imagining a new vision in depth, we have concretized the meaningfulness of life and the education of universal realization.\(^2\)

We have looked at three alternate proposals for a curriculum and notice in each the same nest of problems countered in the use of goal projection for each. Here, then, is the problem to be investigated in this research. How does one construe the relationship of goals to curriculum adequacy? Do goals, formulated directly, provide a screen for curriculum adequacy or is this a matter of indirect relationship? If so, what is the utility of goal-projection? What other

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 316, 341. \(^2\)Ibid., pp. 338, 348.
factors must be introduced to gauge the adequacy of a curriculum proposal? How does one establish the criteria of a good curriculum?

A second question seems to counter these, based as it is on the normative nature of the criteria listed in the above cases. If criteria are norms, what justifies the norm? What theory of norms best accounts for the joint requirements of justification and applicability of the norms? These questions will be addressed by two major philosophical theories of norms, attempting to provide a tenable rationale for goal-projection in curriculum theory.
CHAPTER II

JOHN DEWEY: VALUE AS MEANS ANALYSIS

The work of John Dewey has been singled out as an influential example of philosophical analysis of objectives/goals in curriculum building. Dewey stands without question as the most important figure in educational philosophy since the turn of the century, whose primary concern was the disjunction of knowledge and value in the contemporary world. Since this is not a historical thesis, there is no need to show the explicit dependence of the curriculum builders listed in the first chapter on Dewey's formulation; nevertheless, the construction Dewey argues stands as a prototype for most of the curriculum proposals of the recent past and gives opportunity to see a philosophically argued case applicable to curriculum building. To examine Dewey's work also opens the way to contemporary philosophical insight critical of Dewey and advocating other philosophical alternatives.

There is no more intriguing commentary on Dewey than that written by W. K. Frankena in his volume, Three Historical Philosophies of Education. He poses for us in sharp focus the frustration with which either Dewey or his interpreters have had to cope in resolving the means/end relationship central to Dewey's philosophizing. Frankena states Dewey's problem—that education has an end or standard, though not a "preconceived or fixed one"; he then comments:

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It is true that Dewey is often so concerned to criticize others who distinguish means and ends, extrinsic and intrinsic values, that he misleads both friend and foe—and even himself—into forgetting this passage, but there it is—and it is central to his whole philosophy of education. It is the main basis for his belief that the child's school years must be made good in themselves and not taken as a mere means to later years or to another life.¹

The passage Frankena has in mind is taken from *Democracy and Education*. There Dewey argues that instrumental goods must be justified by appeal to any end which is good in itself. Frankena in appealing to this passage is assuming that the passage is representative and not later rejected. This assumption will be questioned later as part of the study's argument. Frankena, of course, sees Dewey's position as precariously ambiguous; nevertheless, he read it positively, claiming two ends of education, i.e., individual growth and the common good. His summary description is helpful to limn the general context of Dewey's discussion. Education enables a man to face three major problems:

1) that of controlling the occurrence of consummatory experiences
2) that of enriching such experience by clarifying and deepening their content or perceived meaning
3) that of increasing the number of those who enjoy such experiences.²

For Frankena, then Dewey's major problem is the resolution of individual and community interests. It would be unwise to deny that this is a


²Ibid., p. 165.
problem for Dewey, but it is necessary to indicate that Dewey's treatment of the means/end relationship is methodologically equally crucial.

This issue will be sharpened by first demonstrating the cruciality of the means/end problem for Dewey's educational thinking. In the argument, it will be clear that there is a developmental thesis to be proposed also. For although the means/end relationship is always problematic for Dewey, it undergoes considerable reformulation in his thinking, even accounting for the ambiguity which Frankena has passed by. There seem to be several educational and philosophical positions taken early in Dewey's career which inhibit the further development of his position. Morton White, in tracing the shift from Hegelian to Pragmatist positions in Dewey's thought, concludes that Dewey's rejection of Hegelian formalism remains as a prejudice toward all dualistic and formal conceptualization.\(^1\) Equally important for the purposes of this study is the claim of White that Dewey criticizes Spencer's materialism for eliminating the conscious characteristic of: 1) activity toward an end, and 2) activity from choice.\(^2\) This motif is strongly supported by Dewey's educational doctrine of child development and child-centeredness.\(^3\) Dewey, of course, did not accept everything that

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\(^2\)Ibid., Ch. II.

was claimed in the name of these topics and, in fact, our exploration shall start with Dewey's last significant work on education, Experience and Education, in which he criticizes more radical formulations of this doctrine. In addition, an analysis of this work will give to the reader a proper perspective on the means/end doctrine. Nevertheless, it seems that Dewey was not able ever to conciliate or justify these motifs as will be seen in his attempt to define philosophy.

These motifs form a tension unresolved in all of Dewey's writings. Dewey, in reply to his critics in the Schilpp volume, singles out this tension as the "deepest problem of any philosophy" and the major concern of all of his effort.

The problem of restoring integration and cooperation between man's belief about the world in which he lives and his beliefs about values and purposes that should direct his conduct is the deepest problem of any philosophy that is not isolated from life.¹

The proposal of this study argues that the particular means/end formulation used by Dewey to resolve this tension never does the job. This tension also stimulates the major points of criticism elaborated both by contemporary philosophers² and educators.³


Experience and Education

Dewey writes with a dual concern in this book. He criticizes traditional philosophy of education for its failure to pay attention to the student, and for its excessive respect for subject matter as good-in-itself or inherently educative.¹ Likewise, the progressive educator has sentimentally exaggerated the importance of student interest, failing to take account of the continuity necessary for either intellectual progress or social well-being.² Thus, educational theory from either rationale has ignored the criteria of continuity and interaction derived from a theoretical grasp of experience. Traditional philosophers have tolerated illegitimate restrictions in the theoretical foundation of their position established by a priori appeal. In the progressive educational rationale the sound starting point focusing on the individual has been vitiated by short-sighted immediacy and the persuasion of slogans.

The alternative proposal elaborated by Dewey repudiates both the dualism of the traditional position and the anti-theoretical response of the radical educator. Dewey calls for a coherent theory of experience, affording positive "direction to the selection and organization of educational methods and materials." He notes the inconsistencies and confusions apt to appear in education founded on life-experience.

²Ibid., p. 86
rience unless the attempt is guided by some conception of "what experience is and what marks off educative experience from non-educative and mis-educative experience." This metaphorical way of sketching his theoretical intentions and maneuvers need not be explored at this point. As we shall see, the vague reference to something like a theory may be deliberately adopted to cover Dewey's indecision. At any rate, there certainly is no formal deduction to follow; rather a theory of education is controlled by the criterion of worthwhile experience.

Experience and education cannot be directly equated to each other. For some experience is miseducative. Any experience is miseducative that has the effect of arresting or distorting the growth of further experience.\(^1\)

Dewey is consciously alluding to the earlier formulation of *Democracy and Education* in which he argued that education is growth and can therefore be justified by no other appeal than growth for its own sake.\(^2\) This formulation was severely criticized by many;\(^3\) Dewey in this context is restating the argument--now clearly reaffirming growth in an explicit value context:

Every experience is a moving force. Its value can be judged only on the ground of what it moves toward and into.\(^4\)

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Growth in general does not seem to be the only end; only growth particularly informed with specific intellectual or social equality is worthwhile.

Dewey is intent in this context to emphasize both of these aspects. "Growth in general" means for him growth over a long-term measure in which the well-being of the organism is preserved and the quality of life deepened. Furthermore, it is growth implemented by certain habits and attitudes which in themselves are more conducive to the further growth of whatever other special interest may be cultivated.

Dewey is enigmatical in this use of the term "growth in general," stating that it is an ongoing process,\(^1\) and an integration of successive experience.\(^2\) In this he still stands within the earlier context of Democracy and Education in which he denied that growth may be construed as "movement toward a fixed goal" or "having an end." Growth is "being an end." Whatever we make of this claim, it is important for our purposes here to record that Dewey not only says education like growth is its own end,\(^3\) but that "education is all one with growing."\(^4\) Beyond the strangeness of the formula, "growth for its own sake," Dewey makes the further identification of education with growth as mere persistence in life. Dewey, himself, recognizes a second sense for "growing" which is normative when argued that life is not to be identified with every superficial act and interest, "... that living has its own intrinsic quality and that the business of education is with that quality."\(^5\)

\(^{1}\text{Ibid.}, p. 50.\)
\(^{2}\text{Ibid.}, p. 44.\)
\(^{3}\text{Ibid.}, p. 50.\)
\(^{4}\text{Ibid.}, p. 53.\)
\(^{5}\text{Ibid.}, p. 51.\)
In this identification of "living" with "living well" or "educated living," it seems Dewey is far removed from his formula of Experience and Education where education is explicitly restricted to experience that grows in a special way. The typical objection to this formula of Democracy and Education, he allows when he argues that "growth is not enough, we must also specify the direction in which growth takes place, the end toward which it tends" at least to the extent of recognizing educative and mis-educative growth.

. . . there is some kind of continuity in any case since every experience affects for better or worse the attitudes which help decide the quality of further experiences, by setting up certain preference and aversion and making it easier or harder to act for this or that end. Moreover, every experience influences in some degree the objective conditions under which further experiences are had.1

Dewey here resists the identification of growth and education to the extent of recognizing that education is a special kind of experience. He enunciates this in the generalized educational principle, calling for "the shaping of actual experience by environing conditions" and in the explicit educational principle:

. . . they (educators) should know how to utilize the surrounding, physical and social, that exist so as to extract from them all that they have to contribute to building up experiences that are worthwhile.2

Having resisted the too easy identification of growth and education, Dewey introduces another characteristic formula: "... while the principle of continuity applies in every case, the quality of the present experience influences the way in which the principle applies."3

1Ibid., p. 37. 2Ibid., p. 40; cf. p. 38. 3Ibid., p. 39.
That is, Dewey is arguing that a special form of continuity is what he has in mind for educational application. "Continuity" as the causal pattern of experience in general takes on the educational significance of purposefully organizing the present conditions to effect desirable future consequences. Educational continuity is the organization of objective conditions with an eye to judging which student attitudes and habitual tendencies are actually conducive to continued growth, actively manipulating these conditions for their causal determination of the present situation in which the individual learner stands.

This formulation is puzzling at first glance. One might think that Dewey was merely repealing his criticism of the rationalism of traditional education as preparation for the future. The puzzle is enhanced because Dewey both affirms\(^1\) and denies\(^2\) that there is any rational (philosophical?) organization to the traditional curriculum. What he had in mind is clear, however. The non-empirical organization of traditional education is repudiated; in addition the contemporary irrelevance and non-appeal of traditional education is scored, but especially Dewey wishes to deny the traditional pattern of means/final ends. Preparation in Dewey's scheme is read off quite differently:

1) . . . it means that a person . . . gets out of his present experience all that there is in it for him at the time in which he has it.

2) . . . that attentive care must be devoted to the conditions which give each present experience a worthwhile meaning (i.e.,

\(^1\text{Ibid.},\ p.\ 18\)
\(^2\text{Ibid.},\ p.\ 28.\)
not merely "enjoyment" but "desirabilities")

3) . . .the relation of the present and the future is not an Either/Or affair. The present affects the future anyway. (Hence) Education as growth or maturity should be an ever-present process.¹

I have articulated this argument fully in order to see how the future reference of experience becomes translated into a concern for present experience. Beside underlining the active instrumental role of intelligence, Dewey is informally marking out a view he has long held: the distinction between "ends-in-themselves" and "ends-in-view."
The actual formulations used in Dewey's writings will be analyzed later. At the moment it is helpful to capitalize on the informality of this context in an educational setting to raise questions of general logical strategy.

The context in which Dewey always raises the questions of ends-in-view is the denial that means are controlled by ends. The objections he raises to the traditional position are several: 1) the potentialities of the present are sacrificed to a hypothetical future; 2) the ideal of using the present simply for the future contradicts itself; 3) extracting at each present time its full meaning prepares us to do this for the future. The general formula raised by all of these is the question whether the only consideration proper to questions of means is its relationship to the future. Obviously, the question should be denied, for there are more questions to be raised about means,

¹Ibid., p. 50 Cf. Dewey, "Experience, Knowledge and Value", p. 521, where he distinguishes "intelligence" from "knowledge,"
than its justification by an end. Thus, there are questions of deployment of means which differ from the justification of whatever means deployed. But these questions are not competitive, but different and even the question of justification admits plural ends or plural means. A given means may serve several ends or there may be several means to one end. Furthermore, the rule of thumb, "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush," cannot always be followed, for it is obvious that at times we risk the one for the two, or if we are only content with the one will we ever become skilled in risking for two? Dewey's contradiction really is a denial, then, that there are worthy situations of deliberate risk. There is agreement with him that it is contradictory to talk about preparation unless the present is used as a condition to attain the future; but the measure in which this use of means is justified is the question that Dewey wants to suppress. He refuses to admit that ends justify means.

The second argument raises what we have called the question of the deployment of means, in which case it is evident that how the means is used will affect the attaining of the future. But if the present/future relationship is not either/or for Dewey; it is strange that he only raises the question from the perspective of means. Either the idea of preparation indicates that the future should in some cases affect the present or it is vacuous to talk of developing "all the potentialities of the present." It seems that Dewey has confused the questions of whether all means/end relations are equally important or good with the question of deployment of means. Or, perhaps, the ques-
tion of whether any means/ends relations are the ultimate justification of all others is confused with the question of whether there yet are better and less worthy means/end relations.

The other criterion of educative experience is interaction. In striking fashion, Dewey isolates the subjective conditions of the learner from the objective situation and defines interaction as the interplay between these. Individuals live in situations.

An experience is always what it is because of a transaction taking place between an individual and what, at the time, constitutes his environment, whether the latter consists of persons with whom he is talking or . . . (other conditions.) Even when a person builds a castle in the air, he is interacting with objects which he constructs in fancy.  

Interaction focuses the objective conditions upon the particular individual at the particular time. "Experience is always the actual life-experience of some individual." There is no such thing as educational value in the abstract. Interaction, then, provides the leverage whereby the traditional claim that there are intrinsically educational subject-matters is criticized; it emphasizes the need to evoke a "certain quality of response in the individual" which takes into account his "powers and purposes."  

It would be a mistake to readily identify the individual's subjectivity with what Dewey calls the "ideal of self-control," or to the ideal of freedom resident in the educational task. Nevertheless, Dewey does insist that the quality of experience had is constituted by "the immediate aspect of agreeableness, and its influences upon later expe-

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1Ibid., p. 44.  
2Ibid., p. 89.  
3Ibid., p. 45.
rience." The immediate aspect is easy to judge; it sets the problem for the educator, i.e., "to engage the students' activities" but does not define the problem of "having desirable future experiences." In the case of the delinquent student, however, the teacher has to regard him as an individual and handle the case individually, ferreting out "as best he can the causes for the recalcitrant attitude." Interpreted positively, the individual in education must be allowed the "free play of individual thinking or for contributions due to distinctive individual experience." It is to be noted here that Dewey is a trifle uneasy with this notion of individual. The characterization "agreeableness" can hardly bear all the import needed to clarify the notion of "initiative" or "creativity." It is this notion of individualism that Ernest Nagel exploits as a criticism to reject Dewey's metaphysical support of democracy while, perhaps, agreeing with Dewey's naturalism. Here, again, a thesis of chronological development in Dewey may help us understand him better.

For this purpose as well as for the purpose of evaluating the argument offered for this position we shall have to look to the more technical works offered by Dewey.

With these two criteria in mind, Dewey attacks some of the educational problems cast up by both traditional and progressive education. Inasmuch as there are two criteria which have to be taken into

1Ibid., p. 27.
2Ibid., p. 58, cf. p. 56.
account and Dewey has nowhere given us a theoretical correlation of the two, it is necessary to examine the educational problems he selects in order to assess his proposed criteria. The two problems selected are the organization of subject matter in the curriculum and the discipline of the school.

Social Control

Dewey has changed his proposed solution of this problem between the writing of Democracy and Education and this context in Experience and Education. Part of the difference may be accounted for in that in this context he has the teacher primarily in mind. Yet it seems that Dewey has learned in the interval to make more of the social context. "Mutual accommodation and adaptation" seems more important than interest (i.e., "one is identified with the objects which define the activity and which furnish the means and obstacles of its realization") and discipline (i.e., development of power of continuous attention").¹ There is also reference to social implications in the earlier context, Democracy and Education, but the emphasis is on the correlation of the individual knower and the solution of the problem he faces. Even in Experience and Education, Dewey, of course, does not ignore the factor of purposive action and its root in freedom of activity and self-control; yet "the essential point is that the purposes grow and take shape through the process of social intelligence."²

¹ Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 137. cf. Experience and Education, p. 60.

² Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 72.
What the difference amounts to when these likenesses are taken into account is the difference between mere impulse and what Dewey calls prizing. The major distinction in *Democracy and Education*, and indeed in his ethical writing up to *Theory of Valuation*, is that between value-prizing and valuation appraising.

The formation of proper standards in any subject depends upon a realization of the contribution which it makes to the immediate significance of experience, upon a direct appreciation. —Contribution to immediate intrinsic values in all their variety in experience is the only criterion for determining the worth of instrumental and derived values in studies.¹

It is apparent from the context in *Democracy and Education* that the act of evaluation is regarded by Dewey as instrumental to reach a full realization of immediate experience (prizing). It is also Dewey's intent here to indicate that he rejects curriculum projection as a compromise of conflicting interests and values, for this would assume the "isolation of social groups and classes" and "segregated values." Were one to question Dewey whether or not the ethical situation is best defined as a conflict of immediate intrinsic value, Dewey would reply that "certain traits of character . . . are moral because they are so intimately connected with thousands of other attitudes which we do not explicitly recognize." Further, "morals concern nothing less than the whole character, and the whole character is identical with a man in all his concrete make-up and manifestations." Finally, "the something for which a man must be good is capacity to live as a social member so

¹Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, p. 249.
that what he gets from living with others balances with what he contributes." This balance, of course, is a synonym for "a widening and deepening of conscious life—a more intense, disciplined and expanding realization of meanings" (growth for growth's sake).\(^1\) Either Dewey assumes that there is no fundamental conflict of intrinsic goods or that there is some moral pattern which provides the balance. In either case, it does not seem that we find in Dewey a congruence with his basic claim of growth for growth's sake.

It is this unsatisfactory resolution of his problem that stirs Dewey to a fresh statement in *Experience and Education*. What we find changed in the analysis is the earlier appeal to intrinsic value (prizings). The argument will be developed in *Theory of Valuation*; it is mirrored here in *Experience and Education*. Discipline in education is a product of social control "the primary source of which resides in the very nature of the work done as a social enterprise in which all individuals have an opportunity to contribute and to which all feel a responsibility."\(^2\) It is obvious that Dewey has allowed a traditional separation of task and moral principle. It is important, however, to recognize that he repudiates any attempt to define morality by appeal to principles or social rules,\(^3\) or that he will allow the task to be relegated to unpurposive activity. Thus, the model for both is purposive activity which combines impulse, desire and planning into a uni-

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\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 350-360.

\(^2\)Dewey, *Experience and Education*, p. 56.

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 59.
fied, free, human act. Here we see the intertwining of interaction and continuity. "A genuine purpose always starts with impulse." But impulse is only negative freedom, not an end-in-itself, because "it tends to be destructive of shared cooperative activities" and at best, is only a means to self-control, the power to frame purposes. This "negative freedom of movement" is constructive to the measure that it militates against inhibition, passivity of learning. Free activity is a means of maintaining normal physical and mental health. On the other hand, positive freedom is the power to form ends-in-view, i.e., "foresight of consequences which will result from acting upon impulse" or "the power to select and order means to carry chosen ends into operation."¹ We would do well here not to question Dewey's formulation of ends-in-view, rather we should ask whether ends-in-view really satisfy the requirements of Dewey's argument or is the ends-in-view formula merely assuming what he is seeking to solve. Dewey tells us that ends-in-view are more than merely foresight of consequences contingent upon some assumed end-goal. Ends-in-view require: 1) observation of objective conditions; 2) knowledge of what has happened in similar cases in the past (these two factors operate to inhibit impulse, turning it into a desire); 3) judgment which puts together what is observed and what is recalled to see what they signify.²

It is this significance ("what they signify") which creates an aura of mystery around Dewey's formulation. The whole succeeding context does not again mention this factor; instead Dewey is content with

¹Ibid., pp. 61-64. ²Ibid., p. 69.
describing the factors of impulse and of foresight. Only one sentence in the rest of the chapter illuminates the reference to significance.

The intensity of desire measures the strength of the efforts that will be put forth. But the wishes are empty castles in the air unless they are translated into the means by which they may be realized. The question of how soon or of means takes the place of projected imaginative end, and since means are objective, they have to be studied and understood if a genuine purpose is to be formed.1

Two observations should be made of this crucial passage. The identification of wish and projected imaginative end is curious. For most of us, wish not only is imaginative, but lacks any commitment. On the other hand, imaginative projected ends may or may not be attainable. The quality of involvement certainly implied in "projected end" can scarcely be discussed as a wish. Consideration of the kind of behavior characterized by that term raises the interesting possibility that Dewey has limited normative behavior to instrumental activity and has failed to take into account purposive action less specific and more fallible but humanly important. "Projective" also spells out a quite different human stance toward the future than the reading of "actualized prediction" which Dewey gives to the term "purpose." Desire and impulse may indeed by the occasion for planning, especially in unsatisfactory circumstance; these may also be the occasion for enjoyment, regulation, or emotional exploration. Self-control may be predictive or regulative.

1Ibid., p. 70.
Subject Matter

"Subject matter" includes all objective conditions of the situation amenable to manipulation. The stuff of the course of study may include even material of imagination. The educational criteria both operate in this area also. Interaction requires that all subject matter be derived from materials which at the onset fall within the scope of ordinary life-experience. The criteria of continuity provides for the "orderly development toward expansion and organization through growth of experience." The difficulty of the task increases as the student matures. It becomes more difficult to assess the place where the student starts and the further organization toward which he moves the older he grows. Such learning will be modeled on the work of the historical interpreter and will allow for variegated patterns. The importance of these claims cannot be underestimated; for our purposes, however, it is more important to pay attention to Dewey's conclusions:

1) ... students should be introduced to scientific subject matter ... through acquaintance with everyday social applications.

2) ... it is impossible to obtain an understanding of present social forces apart from an education ... which constitutes the sciences.

3) The methods of science also point the way to the measures and policies by means of which a better social order can be brought into existence.¹

Here is Dewey's vision of curriculum raised to a solution of human problems. The possibility that human beings can direct their

¹Ibid., p. 81.
common life intelligently corresponds to the exposition of education as "the intelligently directed development of the possibilities inherent in ordinary experience."\(^1\) Intelligent method must become habitual and intense emotional allegiance to this method must be developed. One would almost be tempted by the rhetoric to think Dewey is championing rationality as an end-in-itself. Dewey immediately disqualifies any such inference. Progressive organization of knowledge is only an ideal in the negative sense that "Educators cannot start with knowledge already organized and proceed to ladle it out in doses." It is a bit more difficult for Dewey to state what he means by the positive evaluation of progressively organized knowledge. Here are three statements which appear in sequence in as many paragraphs of Dewey's exposition:

But as an ideal the active process of organizing facts and ideas is an ever present educational process.

In the case of education, modulation means movement from a social and human center toward a more objective intellectual scheme of organization, always bearing in mind, however, that the intellectual organization is not an end in itself but is the means by which social relations, distinctively human ties and bonds, may be understood and more intelligently ordered.

Nevertheless, (organized knowledge) represents the goal toward which education should continuously move.\(^2\)

Of the three statements, the second one is the clearest and most carefully elaborated. It seems consistent with what Dewey has often argued in many places. The other two statements seem to be lapses, or perhaps, clues to a major tension in Dewey's position. The tension is intense between rationality viewed as a means to human adjustment

\(^{1}\)Ibid., p. 89.  \(^{2}\)Ibid., pp. 81-83.
and Dewey's attempt to interpret the means/end relation itself on the model of a rational purpose. Notice, for instance, the further exposition of rationality after having put it down as means only. The argument next distinguishes between a primitive common-sense means/consequence causal relationship, and a means/end-in-view, (or means/means relationship). In more complex intellectual effort the relationship changes from the first to the second relationship making explicit the primitive perception of cause and effect. This empirical, internal method of organization attaches great importance to ideas viewed as hypotheses, not fixed final truths. These ideas are tested by the consequences they produce when they are acted upon, not enjoyed; and the method of intelligence discriminates and records the significant features of developing experience. Dewey, of course, disclaims any narrowly experimental method; he is using "experimental" here in an unusual sense of means/consequence. But for all of his appeal to organized knowledge, Dewey finally argues that knowledge must be organized at the level of individual degrees of maturity. We might understand this as merely an educational problem in which case Dewey is merely saying that each individual assimilates as much of the working pattern of the experimental method as he can. But such interpretation is again snubbed into line when we read:

Consequently, whatever the level of experience, we have no choice but either to operate in accord with the pattern it provides, or else to neglect the place of intelligence in the development and control of a living and moving experience.¹

¹Ibid., pp. 86-88.
This context provides us with an allegory of Dewey's development. On the one hand, value theory if analyzed progressively as purposive "ends/means" of common sense becoming means/means of the knowledge. This is purposive in the sense that on the strength of theoretical claims, one can predict (and in the measure in which the prediction is warranted), commit himself to what will take place. An interpreter of Dewey could well predict that theory would be more and more formalized; this, along with the attempt to view value as rationally evaluated would tempt him to think rationality as end or ideal. Ironically, the very attempt of Dewey to interpret method generally would lead him to ignore possible differences between cognitive and life-tasks such that the purposes for which cognitive enterprise are used in life become confused with the cognitive purpose by which the enterprise operates. Equally ironical is the further analysis of ends as if they were only means in order to escape the threat of rational certainty by confusing it with rule-directed or projective behavior, a quite different sense of purposive activity than explicitly cognitive inquiry.

The analysis of *Experience and Education* has been carried through to the extent that we can see its tensions in perspective. Although we have provided some interpretative explanation of what seems to be awry, it is incumbent upon the interpreter to offer a more detailed criticism of Dewey's argument in a context in which Dewey is explicitly addressing himself to the crucial problems. This we shall do in an analysis of *Theory of Valuation*. The interpretation given here is based upon judgments made about Dewey's historical development.
This will need more justification than the mere posing of the ideas given in the previous discussion of *Experience and Education*. To perform this adequately, would commit one to writing an intellectual biography of Dewey. Tracing Dewey's concept of the philosophical task will provide some measure of the change, if it be allowed that this does not tell the whole tale.

To summarize, this analysis of *Experience and Education* has demonstrated that the means/end relationship is basic to all of Dewey's proposals. The criteria of continuity/interaction have been interpreted to demonstrate this. Notwithstanding, Dewey's further analysis of the specific curriculum problems of discipline and subject matter have suggested the problem of balance between these two criteria.

Social control is the answer Dewey formulates for the discipline problem. As we have seen, social control is constituted partially by common tasks, partially by rational self-control which sees its personal aspects are reducible to the common interest in a given task. On the other hand, "significance" cannot be accounted for as some specialized activity of abstracted ideals that monstrously objectifies the giant dualisms controlling traditional society. The balance between continuity and interaction has not been struck.

Again, the problem of subject matter also remains unresolved. Dewey advocates a curriculum plan of progressive organization. He does not resolve the major issue of what he means by organization. Subject matter organized in logical or methodological patterns gives to learning economy, efficiency and predictive power. Nevertheless, Dewey
talks of a different kind of organization when he emphasizes the individual learner. The leading principle then becomes individual interest, or perhaps the psychological unity of association.

Within the aspect of continuity, Dewey introduces a motif which sounds very much like the classical notion of historical agency. Thus, the individual lives for the future by focusing the past from his present problematic orientation in such a way to affect the future. Whether or not this really agrees with the ideal of "humanitas" in the western world, it is evident that the model he works with here gives a large place to purposive deliberation identified with rational planning. Mere purposeful projecting lacks this scientific rationality; such informal activity, however, does give the ideal of active adjustment, the sole end of all living. Even the ideal of active and continuous growing masks the question of whether rationality provides the directional goal or only functions as a means. That is, continuity and interaction are introduced as criteria-means; in Dewey's final formulation they function implicitly as goals.

Theory of Valuation

A careful scrutiny of Dewey's Theory of Valuation will enable us to expose some of the argumentation which produced such an uneasy synthesis as Experience and Education, written in the same period of Dewey's life. The brochure, written for International Encyclopedia of Unified Science seems to have suffered an eclipse among interpreters of Dewey. For the purpose of directly examining Dewey's arguments on means/end relationship, there is nothing better.
In the seventh section of his monograph, Dewey summarizes his argument for a theory of valuation. His thesis is simple: "value-propositions of the distinctive sort exist whenever things are appraised as to their suitability and serviceability as means." Value-propositions are predictions of what will take place through the intervention of some personal act; "they inherently involve the means-end relationship. Ends-in-view are anticipated results interacting with a given desire; as such they are ideational, "directive means or plans"; a "forecast or anticipation which is warranted in the degree in which it is based upon propositions that are the conclusions of adequate observational activities." Desires, interests and environing conditions are conceived in terms of energies which are capable of reduction to homogenous and comparable terms. Desires, interests and environing conditions are to be conceived of as ends in the measure that they are attained results or ends, for they are the coordination or organization of energies. A valuation-proposition, then, is the statement of a comparison of ends-in-view with actual results produced.

The required appraisal of desires and ends-in-view, as means of the activities by which actual results are produced, is dependent upon observation of consequences attained when they are compared and contrasted with the content of ends-in-view.²

The distinctive features of Dewey's value theory are all included in the quotations, edited above. The primary means/end

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²Ibid., pp. 52-53.
relationship cannot readily be divided into simple and easily distinguishable elements. Desires, interests and external conditions of a given act can function as material means or, marking the carrying through of the action, function as an actual end. Ends in this sense are to be distinguished from ends-in-view, i.e., the intention, plan or purpose by which the result is anticipated and patterned. Ends-in-view are conceptual, focusing desire upon an object methodologically; they are, however, only one element of desire. Desires are themselves causal conditions of results and as such have affectional and motor activity as well.

There are several controversial questions arising out of this construction. Dewey is concerned, on the one hand, to orient himself against empirical Interest theory currently argued. To see their bearing on a theory of valuation, the nature of desires and interest has to be analyzed and a method established for determining the constituents of desires and interests in their concrete particular occurrence.\(^1\)

A second major question for Dewey follows from this. As he already told us, distinctive evaluations are comparisons between ends-in-view and particular concrete results. How this evaluation is justified or integrated with other cognitive claims are formidable questions. Dewey's rejection of ends-in-themselves and his formulation of the means/end relationship pose the crux of this second analysis. Question number three appears before the reader more as a massive tangle than as a workable analysis. Having repudiated the traditional con-

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 19.
ceptual relationship of means/end, Dewey realizes that he must also reconstruct the formal characteristics of traditional principles to meet the demands of the new appraisal relationship he proposes. Just what logical form an appraisal takes as the comparison of ends-in-view with actual end-result is a question for which Dewey is not ready or even, perhaps, temperamentally disposed to handle. Historically, such a question marks the difference between the contemporary analytical philosopher and the pragmatist. Dewey puts to use the clumsy tools at his disposal, comparing appraisals to predictions, qualifying such comparison in the face of obvious misinterpretations and misapplications, finally declaring that he has no "complete theory of valuation."\(^1\)

What we have divided into three questions, Dewey treats as two. The relation of behavioral attitudes to liking-disliking which forms the specifiable and testable relation between possible situations and the certain activities as means for accomplishing it, are the two major questions as Dewey articulates them.\(^2\) The third question is stated as a hope and program of Dewey.

**Question of Means**

The distinction that Dewey made above between "material" and "directive" means was drawn first in *Logic: A Theory of Inquiry*. The elements of practical judgment are more clearly expounded there than in

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 53. \(^2\)Ibid., p. 13.
the *Theory of Valuation*; what the *Theory* brochure adds is a more detailed analysis of emotional and motivational factors and an extended criticism of the notion of end-in-itself. A restatement quoted from the *Logic* helps the reader to keep the interrelations in mind.

The facts may be undoubted; I certainly have enjoyed this object in the past; I will get immediate enjoyment from it now. Certain general principles may be accepted as standards. But neither the facts nor the standarized rules as they present themselves are necessarily decisive in the material and procedural means. Their relevancy and weight in the present situation is to be determined by inquiry before an evaluative appraisal can be grounded.¹

Material means include all causal conditions which enter into the process of evaluation. The material means that Dewey has especially in mind refer to the specifically human act. Dewey argues that impulses, desires and interests are the important material factor of valuation. The reasons Dewey has for this claim are complex. Exploring several recurrent motifs of his discussion will capture the main thrust of his position.

1) Desires arise out of needs and cannot be construed as enjoyment

2) Desires are not evaluations in the distinctive sense; they are the starting-point and factual data for appraisal itself.

In 1), Dewey shares with Interest Theory the concern that value theory be handled empirically. He criticizes Interest Theory for interpreting interest passively.

The word "interest" suggests in a forcible way the active connection between personal activity and the conditions that must be taken into account in the theory of valuation.\(^1\)

The difference is marked in Dewey's rejection of passive enjoyment as a primary sense of interest-prizing. Being "a condition of receiving gratification from something already in existence" is neither behaviorally specific nor separable from personal subjectivity. The active sense of "taking delight in an effort . . . to perpetuate the existence of conditions from which gratification is received," calls to our attention "the necessity to bring something into existence which is lacking or to conserve in existence something which is menaced by outside conditions." This active sense does not rule out the passive gratification, but rather places more emphasis upon the need for evaluation and especially for motor activity and purposeful manipulation of external conditions.\(^2\)

There is something odd about this attempt of Dewey to provide an empirical base for value. Dewey argues that "enjoyment" cannot be given any behavioral analysis, even as a factor in the analysis of human needs, it is inconsequential. Several motives are operative in this argument. Having shown in all of his writings that cognitive activity is instrumental, Dewey is anxious to preserve the link between activity and rationality. This leads him to blur any differences between purposeful and rational activity and between these and general


teleological activity ("event occurring for the sake of an end").¹

Notice how Dewey conflates "value" and "valuation" by ignoring the quality of satisfaction in the following quotation:

Yet the enjoyment that is the consequence of fulfillment of a desire and realization of an interest is what it is because of satisfaction or making good of a need or lack—a satisfaction conditioned by effort directed by the idea of something as end-in-view. In this sense "enjoyment" involves inherent connection with lack of possession; while, in the other sense, the "enjoyment" is that of sheer possession.²

"Enjoyment" in this passage can only be anticipatory; Dewey is both ignoring the quality of satisfaction as concomitant with needs satisfied and the fact that enjoyment in itself may not be defined as a lack.³ Dewey has already defined need as filling a lack or conserving something. His illustrations in this same context, told to make this point, unwittingly show the narrowness and absurdity of his definition of need. A man, finding a sum of money on the street, inasmuch as the act of finding has nothing to do with its valuation makes no valuation "until he considers how he shall prize or care for the money." A child finding a bright, smooth stone is gratified in his sense of touch and sight, but "there is no valuation because no desire and no end-in-view, until the question arises of what shall be done


²Dewey, Theory of Valuation, p. 38.

with it." This is an extraordinary passage because it fails to take notice of latent needs, not triggered by the express action or deliberate purpose of the agent. Further, though one might assign to valuation such a strict sense that he would refuse to say of these agents that they value the object; no one can plausibly deny a valuing-prizing separable from both valuation and deliberate purposeful action.

Another instance of conflation appears in Dewey's easy disjunction of wish/desire. All fantasy and ideals lacking energy expended to realize them or having no possible way of being energized are to be excluded from value-prizing.¹ Though Dewey's remarks are plausible if he means that wishes are not to be taken seriously, in this context they are not plausible because he has narrowed the sense of "effort" to that actually and overtly exercised. Here is a context, also, in which we can see Dewey's change of doctrine. For instance, in the Reconstruction, Dewey argues that ideas/ideals speculations are profitable as a range of "possibilities in which to view the world for possible application or organization. Such ideals need translation, so to speak, into workable means; nevertheless, ideals must be projected and the ideal as a dream has its value."² This passage introduces a human dimension which Dewey progressively expunges from his thinking. Interestingly enough, even in the Theory of Valuation, Dewey

¹Dewey, Theory of Valuation, p. 15.
finds himself with some vestigial remains of this early position, but clearly incompatible with his account. He talks of "native organic tendencies," and yet he does not construe ideals as habitual, even as dispositions. In another context, Dewey shows signs of widening his notion of active desire when he itemizes the components of desire as including "foreseen consequences along with ideas in the form of signs of the measures (involving expenditure of energy) required to bring the ends into existence."\(^1\) An "idea in the form of signs of the measure" of expenditure is an odd piece of furniture to be found in a Deweyan world. It is, however, not a hidden clue to Dewey's difficulty; it is a special kind of item which does not fit the dichotomous classification Dewey uses.

The second criticism Dewey raises against Interest theory is equally a criticism of Dewey's earlier work. Dewey denies that a "value is an object of any interest."

If "valuation" is defined in terms of desire as something initial and complete in itself, there is nothing by which to discriminate one desire from another and hence no way to measure the worth of different valuations in comparison with one another.\(^2\)

In the first criticism Dewey stressed motivational aspect of desire; in this criticism he points out the factor of ends-in-view, "of objects as foreseen consequences."

Ends-in-view will be discussed as a separate topic below; what we have before us now is the relationship between ends-in-view and desire. As Dewey comments at the end of this monograph, he has placed

\(^1\)Dewey, Theory of Valuation, p. 18.  \(^2\)Ibid., p. 16.
emphasis upon the importance of valued ideas in formation of desires
because current theories of interest have construed desire as emotional
and in isolation from the ideational. What these theories have argued
has led directly to subjectivism in which "every desire is just as good
as any other in respect to the value it institutes." Further, the em­
pirical control which motivated the construction of these theories has
been completely eroded in the claim that all desires are immediate
values.

If desire were of this original nature, if it were independent
of the structure and requirements of some concrete empirical sit­
uation and hence had no function to perform with reference to an
existential situation, then insistence upon the necessity of an
ideational or intellectual factor in every desire and the conse­
quent necessity for fulfillment of the empirical conditions of its
critics have said it is.2

Dewey has in mind his own earlier writings also. Both in
Democracy and Education and in Experience and Nature, Dewey argued that
the immediate quality of desire is its prizing-value. Only in evalu­
ation, the reconstruction of values into more compatible and fruitful
form, does rationality enter as a factor. In contrast Dewey argues in
this context against such earlier arguments codified authoratively in
the last chapter of Experience and Nature.3

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1Ibid., p. 65. cf. S. Cavell and A. Sesonske, "Logical Empir­
icism and Pragmatism in Ethics," Journal of Philosophy, XLV (January,
1951), p. 5-17.

2Ibid., pp. 55-56.

To attempt to gain an end directly is to put into operation the very conditions that are the source of the experienced trouble, thereby strengthening them and at most changing the out-ward form in which they manifest themselves.¹

The desirable as distinct from the desired does not then designate something at large or apriori. It points to the difference between the operation and consequences of unexamined impulses and those of desires and interests which are the product of investigation of conditions and consequences.²

These quotations are typical of the contrast which Dewey sustains throughout the monograph; a contrast between desire as quality and desire as causal condition. The contrast is not, of course, a denial of immediate quality. Immediate quality sets the problem as one of the conditions in a field of condition.³ To reconstruct desires as conditions, however, enables Dewey to strengthen his empiricism by insisting that all the conditions (environmental and personal) bearing on desires be considered. This move also supports the construction of value as active by interpreting desire as need and setting the actual consequence as the end. In addition, the well-worked formula for viewing cognitive activity as instrumental can be fitted neatly into this construction. Ends-in-view as the hypothetical solutions of the state of need or conflict can then be tested and reformulated in the light of their ability to actually resolve the problem.⁴

We can see why Dewey has turned away from construing desire as immediate quality; he has increased the internal coherence of his

position and he has replied to his critics by supplying an alternative to the traditional conception of good-in-itself, even when argued in moderate fashion as desire. It would be a mistake to think that Dewey's position is either plausible or without internal difficulty. Perhaps the major difficulty appears in the conception of intrinsic good which Dewey flatly caricatures as a claim that intrinsic good is absolutely and unconditionally in no relationship whatsoever. We shall return to this claim when we examine Dewey's notion of end.

However, there are more directly related issues which expose some of the inadequacy of desire as a condition. In the first place, it is noteworthy that Dewey's use of "condition" leads directly to a reduction of the intentional aspect of desire. Desire is human activity toward an object. In discussing the immediate quality of desire, Dewey reverses the relationship:

Any quality or property that actually belongs to any object or event is properly said to be immediate, inherent or intrinsic. Desire as a condition of a given action seems now to have no more intrinsic relationship to the situation of action than any of the other innumerable environmental conditions have. But this is to ignore desire as a primary constituent of the act. Dewey, of course, wants to enhance the rational deliberation of valuing whereby some conditions

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are inhibited and others are enhanced for a given resolution of a problematic solution. In so doing, he places the direction or normative aspect of the action squarely on the deliberation. Whether his conception of ends-in-view can bear so much weight remains to be seen, but that valuing, either as prizing or evaluation is this kind of judgment is questionable. Dewey suppresses such weighing of the special quality of desiring when he argues, "lack of desire and interest are proved by neglect of and indifference to, required means." No one would contend with this as stated; but, the context in which Dewey uses the statement would lead one to think this was the only way in which lack of desire is proved. Surely, the behavioral evidence for desire is more than that evidences by groping around for means. Again, in this same context, Dewey talks about the "loving care he devotes to obtaining and using means."¹ Here, likewise, no one would contend this as stated. It seems implausible, however, to specify "loving care" merely in terms of the means by which the agent seeks to carry out his desire, as we have also argued that the initial evidencing of desire cannot be resolved into the concern for means to implement the desire. The immediate quality of the desire functions as a condition to determine the outcome of the act in a way quite different from or in greater degree than other environmental conditions.

Dewey's reduction of desire to conditional status does not take this into account. The obtuseness of Dewey's argument can be measured

In a single statement that he makes.

In case an end-in-view exists and is valued or exists in relation to a desire or an interest, the motor activity engaged in is tautologically mediated by the anticipation of the consequences which as aforeseen end enter into the makeup of the desire.¹

Dewey's argument is obtuse in the fact that he carefully lists two major considerations, that of foreseen end and of desiring-anticipating. He allows only foreseen end as an effective component in the analysis of the action and in fact he equates desire-anticipation with motor activity.

This discussion raises the question of means/end in a way in which Dewey is unprepared to think constructively. If ends are to be resolved into controlled means, each of these means itself is open to similar analysis. Thus, any discussion of means/ends would seem to demand an awareness of integrated levels of analysis as Dewey readily argues. No end is isolated from the continuum of cause and effect whereby this end becomes a means to some other end. So also no means is simply a mean, but is itself the end result of other means.² This identification of cause/effect with means/ends has already been examined in terms of the distinction of condition/quality. What is unusual about this analysis is that Dewey forgets means/end relation is more than merely a cause-effect sequence. There is a direction and order superimposed upon the cause/effect relation. "For the sake of" is not to be identified or reduced to the cause/effect order. Consideration must be given to

¹Ibid., p. 35. ²Ibid., p. 43.
both continuity and direction. Not all ends become means to another end simply because of a causal relationship important as that is for the analysis of continuity. The relationship of means to end is also not merely causal; for example, in cases where there are several equally effective means to an end, and in any case, where the purpose of the action is more than merely imitative of the way things happened. To gain this identification of "means" and "cause" Dewey blurs an all important distinction between "actual consequence and attained end." He argues:

An end as an actual consequence, as an existing outcome, is like any other occurrence which is scientifically analyzed, nothing but the interaction of the conditions that bring it to pass. Every condition that has to be brought into existence in order to serve as a means is, in that connection, an object of desire and an end-in-view.¹

We shall wait till we examine Peter's argument to see what is the connection between caused objects and objects of desire, but until it seems implausible to confuse "actual end" taken as an object of empirical description with "attained end" taken as an object of desire. To attain an object of desire may well include the effecting of causal sequences; nevertheless, to attain an object of desire is a situation where very special human sequences characterize the activity, to say the least.

Furthermore, there may be differences of mean/end relationship for differing situations. Using his own illustration, take notice that Dewey has made theoretically profitable distinctions in one case without realizing that he has need of such for all his work.

¹Ibid., p. 29, cf. with p. 43.
No human activity operates in a vacuum; it acts in a world and has materials upon which and through which it produces results. On the other hand, no material—air, water, metal, wood—is a means save as it is employed in some human activity to accomplish something.\(^1\)

From this quotation, it is clear that human conditions are more essential in defining the means/end relationship than material conditions. It is not clear whether material human conditions such as desires function for the whole on the level of environmental conditions or whether their human character places them in that special referential category mentioned above. Perhaps Dewey feels that the classification of material-directive means is all that is necessary to preserve this special human character of the means/end formula. This would mean that end-in-view, the directive means, is the bearer of the human decision. But if this is the case, Dewey still has not shown how the material condition of desire is taken into account by the act of forming ends-in-view, and perhaps ends-in-view function is too intellectual a way to account for the volitional side of the human action. We shall turn to this formulation of ends-in-view directly. Inasmuch as Dewey classifies ends-in-view as directional or methodological means, there yet remains the task of showing that the notion of end-in-itself is cancelled out by Dewey's means/end formula.

An alternative to Dewey in analysis of desire as material condition may be found in the contemporary classification of value as intrinsic, instrumental, inherent and contributive.\(^2\) Intrinsic value and

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 50.

its derivative, inherent value are, of course, denied by Dewey and the arguments remain for our examination below. The distinction between instrumental and contributive turns on the kind of relationship sustained between these values and intrinsic value. Instrumental value is that which has utility in bringing about another given value. Taylor distinguishes between a mean, something which has utility to bring about an end, which itself is non- valuable and instrumental value, that which brings about a valuable end. Here is the distinction that Dewey has just made between mere conditions and condition as a means (for a human purpose). In addition, we have here the relationship of means/end used as means to produce another end. Contributive value is not a relationship of causal connection; it is that of part to whole. Something has contributive value if it is part of a whole which has intrinsic, inherent or instrumental value. If we were to allow desire as more than a material means in Dewey's sense, we would want to separate such a relationship as part of the whole human act, from a mere causal condition. The point of Taylor's classification is to remind us that means covers several relationships and that these can be compounded in a variety of ways.\(^1\)

**Ends-In-View**

We have explored the limitation of Dewey's formulation of material means; we turn now to directional or methodological means.

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 31-32
Ends-in-view as methodological means function both negatively and positively.

Ends-in-view framed with a negative reference (i.e., to some trouble or problem) are means which inhibit the operation of conditions producing the obnoxious result; they enable positive conditions to operate as resources, and thereby to effect a result . . . positive in content.¹

This interpretation of ends-in-view as the coordinating factor of all the other sub-factors must be balanced with that which speaks of ends-in-view as merely hypothetical. Interpreters of Dewey's value theory have often misconstrued his position by failing to observe the full range of claims he makes for ends-in-view.

One notable example is the criticism of Morton White who interprets Dewey's ends-in-view as a descriptive hypothesis in which the normative factor is analogous to a perceptual norm. In constructing the analogy, White neglects the fact that hypotheses function in Dewey's value theory to "stamp in desires", as well as, to descriptively organized desires. Several critics of White's article have called this aspect of ends-in-view to our attention. Both Ladd and Hook point out that Dewey thinks of desire as an intrinsic component of ends-in-view.² Dewey, himself, expresses this, if at times somewhat obliquely:

. . . the difference between simply having an end-in-view for which any desire suffices and looking, examining, to make


sure that the consequences that will actually result as such will be actually 'prized and valued' when they occur.\(^1\)

It is for this reason that Dewey talks of ends as active, final ("the conclusion of a process of analytical appraisals of conditions operating in a concrete case"), and as the "specifically unified organization of activities." Ends-in-view are properly regarded perhaps as provisional ends. It is necessary, nonetheless, to separate ends-in-view from attained ends in order to prevent the circularity of regarding ends-in-view as both ends and means for any given stage of analysis. The separation is also necessary because the attained end is more than "a reinstatement of a unified on-going action"; "it is also an enactment of a new state of affairs."\(^2\)

This conception of ends-in-view appears highly ambiguous. As in this quotation, it is not always clear whether Dewey regards ends-in-view as independent of desires and almost reducible to the level of a calculus of possible alternatives, or whether he construes ends-in-view as planning already infused with preferences. At least when he criticizes Absolute Ends, he slips into a contrast of ends-in-view/Absolute End which conflates desire and planning into aim.\(^3\) He also roundly rejects the identification of ends-in-view with cognitively descriptive statements. In the light of White's criticism, here is his own statement:

Nevertheless, propositions which lay down rules for procedures as being fit and good, as distinct from those

\(^1\)Dewey, Theory of Valuation, p. 33.
\(^2\)Ibid., p. 44. 
\(^3\)Ibid., p. 35.
that are inept or bad, are different in form from the scientific propositions upon which they rest. For they are rules to use, in and by human activity, of scientific generalizations as means for accomplishing certain desires and intended ends.\(^1\)

The explicit factor of evaluation in Dewey's mind, then is the comparison instituted between ends-in-view and attained ends, "such that the comparison throws light upon the actual fitness of the things employed as means." Other statements indicate that the comparison is to be judged by application of rules; the appraisal is a valuation of things with respect to their serviceability or needfulness. The more generalized form of the rule speaks of appraising the "completeness of the situation," "a unified state of affairs," or "integrated state of affairs."\(^2\) Proposed ends-in-view in the measure that they fulfill the standards of evaluation become attained ends. These standards or norms are simply "conditions to be conformed to in definite forms of future action." Here also is the grounds for distinguishing the sense of "desired" from "desireableness."

It is apparent from the above analysis that Dewey has not cast off all appeal to ends. In fact, it appears that Dewey is willing to grant that the means/end relation is construed properly in the measure that means contribute to an end/close. But Dewey cannot readily equate end as merely the closing of an activity with end as that for which the means function.

1) A value is final in the sense that it represents the conclusion of a process of analytic appraisals of conditions operating in a concrete case . . .

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 23.  \(^2\)Ibid., pp. 46, 35.
2) Any conclusion reached by an inquiry that is taken to warrant the conclusion is "final" in that case.

3) The quality or propriety of value that is correlated with the last desire formed in the process of valuation, is tautologically ultimate for that particular situation.¹

Here are three different senses of "closure" whereas Dewey recognizes only two, that of "final property" and of the "quality of finality." A warranted conclusion (2) is surely more akin to the second and has logical force of concluding the argument. "Value correlated with the last desire" (3) is an instance of the first and with that identification we can recognize how far short such a conception falls from either ends-in-view or attained end. The "conclusion of a process of analytic appraisals of conditions" (1) is a value closure but refers only to means. On the previous page, Dewey comments on another kind of finality which he excludes from analysis altogether.

It is not necessarily a sign of insanity to isolate some event projected as an end out of the context of a world of moving changes in which it will in fact take place.²

The reason he ignores this relationship is that he wants to avoid the suggestion of events coming to a complete stop or of viewing the end as itself not a means to further means/end relationships. To treat these alleged arrests as a model for the means/end relationship, he argues, is to "substitute a manipulation of ideas abstracted from the contexts in which they arise and function, for the conclusions of concrete facts." The confusion is easily pointed out. The proper function of end to bring closure in its relation to its means is surely quite

¹ Ibid., p. 45. ² Ibid., p. 44.
different from the function of a closure as a means toward another end. Nor will it help the confusion to cry "wolf" as if there had been ab-stractly introduced an artificial arrest for the flow of concrete events. If the means/ends relationship can be wrongfully isolated from the sequence of further concrete relations, nevertheless that does not minimize the analysis of that given means-end relation as itself the ordering of conditions exercised for the sake of an end-result. Dewey provides his own illustration in the course of denying the above distinction.

The value of different ends that suggest themselves is estimated or measured by the capacity they exhibit to guide action in making good, satisfying, in its literal sense, existing lacks.\(^1\)

The point of Dewey's argument is that evaluation is directly governed by rules formulated in instrumental and consequential measures. What makes something worth doing is in the final analysis a question of how satisfactorily or efficiently one can do it. It would be easy to allow Dewey to blur the difference between ends-in-view and attained ends, as if ends-in-view were merely hypothetical and attained ends were the actual instance of value judgment, a distinction between proposed and actually carried out judgment. Such is not the contrast which Dewey draws. He is concerned with distinguishing between hypotheses. Attained ends need not refer to actual implementation; attained ends are more on the order of validated hypotheses. An attained end is a matter of agreeing on the results of existing, specific evaluations,

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 17.
i.e., of validated evaluations.¹

As Stevenson reminds us in an article defending Dewey, at least on this issue, Dewey does not claim value as direct judgment of a specific case in every instance. The "supremacy of the individual case" structures scientific claims. Dewey is not suggesting in either case that we banish all generalization, but only that we make our scientific generalizations fit the facts, progressively revising them to ensure this.² That is, the anticipated end-in-view becomes an attained-end when the satisfaction or completeness accruing to the action meets the requirements of the generalized rule of the satisfactory, the efficient, the complete or the unified. Where Stevenson errs, however, is in the claim that in the main, Dewey evaluates the goodness of the activity in terms of the consequence or outcome. He argues, interpreting Dewey, that it is not the uniqueness of ends nor their desirability that counts, for there are ends in abundance. It is consideration of the consequences and conditions of the action which sort out the ends.³

This is a precision which is only slightly warranted in Dewey. For the most part, Dewey talks of consequences only in the broad sense of the completed situation, the satisfactoriness of the relation between logical choices and preferred choices. It is this standard of

¹Ibid., p. 60.


³Ibid., p. 107.
satisfactoriness which rules regulate. Clearly, the judgment is not rendered in terms of the actual choice, for its particular material consequences; it is the actual choice seen for its valued consequence. Dewey argues very often that value is judged by application of a rule.

This construction of Dewey's theory of valuation comes close to re-affirming a traditional position. In his own eyes, Dewey interprets himself as completely restructuring the problem. For instance, Dewey speaks directly against our interpretation of his position, when he writes in the same context and page that "no abstract theory can be put side by side, so to speak, with existing valuations as the standard for judging them." The quotation is perplexing, to say the least. It indicates a general point of weakness in Dewey's work as well as a specific dislocation here. How shall we explain it?

We do less than justice to Dewey if we ignore this, either by refusing to face the problem that it masks or by reading into his position a solution which is foreign to it, such as Stevenson's. Perhaps the work of Ernest Nagel stands as the best guide in this case, both to point up a specific weakness in the way Dewey carries out his proposal and to suggest a more clear-headed line of interpretation. Notice first Nagel's general observation concerning the reading of Dewey.

He has unquestionably been successful in formulating the common structure of operations that are identifiably similar . . . Nevertheless, his general formulas sometimes cover structurally distinct operations, which can be identified as similar only on the basis of hopelessly vague analogy. A theory which is so general that it takes no note of commonly recognized distinctions is always in danger of lapsing into tautology.¹

Secondly, it is instructive to hear Nagel's analysis of Dewey's theory of science. Nagel criticizes the failure of Dewey to account for the role of theory and formal argumentation in the sciences. In contrast to Dewey, he argues that even "pure cases and ideal concepts have significant use for intellectual economy and comprehensive generality." Without entering at all into Dewey's account of science, it would seem to be the case that something like this criticism is applicable to Dewey's theory of value. We have already called to notice the seeming contradiction between rule-governed appraisal and the explicit denial of any theory governing the appraisal of individual cases. What seems to be the case is that Dewey is uncomfortable in the face of any generalized ideals or ends. In another context he shows this directly:

... these general ideas are used as intellectual instrumentalities in judgment of particular cases...; they are, in effect, tools that direct and facilitate examination of things in the concrete while they are also developed and tested by the results of their application in these cases.

What may be the intent of Dewey's caveat disclaiming any abstract standard for evaluation of existing valuations, is the admission that rules do not operate directly to establish the values of given particular ends. These rules are necessary only in the sense of classifying "the respective conditions and consequences of various modes of behavior." Dewey supplements this explanation in other cases.

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1Ibid., p. 115. He scores Dewey for his antipathy to rigorous formal techniques and for his failure to reduce generalities to more "circumspect and precise formulation of the distinctions required by his theory."


3Ibid., p. 58, cf. Stevenson, Facts and Value, p. 100.
Generalized ends do exist as more than habit in that similar cases are grouped for likeness in some rough way without prejudging the uniqueness of the individual case and without making the generalization independent of all empirically existent cases.

This admission hardly illuminates the way in which rules are formulated or what is singular about this kind of rule formulation. It is noteworthy that Dewey senses a dimension to the problem beyond the ordinary; it is equally obvious that he is unprepared to explain or elaborate what a rule would be like which governs other rule-classifications ("kinds of conditions") rather than classify conditions. That is to say, there is more complexity than what his distinction of material/procedural mean would allow. There are both differing kinds of procedure and differing levels of procedural mean for any given valuing process.

This admission of Dewey, however, should not be allowed to blur the primary question before him. In admitting that there are generalized ends, it is incumbent upon him to explain why specialized consideration of these should not be taken into account as well as consideration of means. For the force of his denial of abstract theory is really the affirmation that theorizing can be carried out only in terms of "conditions and consequences." The plausibility of Dewey's claim hinges on his negative criticism of the traditional notion of end-in-itself and on the ambiguity of the standard which the rule implements.

The arguments against the concept of end-in-itself are not altogether cogent. In some cases the lack of cogency is a result of
Dewey's caricature of the notion; in other cases, the point made is not altogether relevant and sufficiently conclusive. As an instance of the first kind of argument, notice how Dewey criticizes the notion of end-in-itself as a contradictory, rigidly absolutistic and independent of all further experience. If end-in-itself is a relational concept, it of necessity will have to be relational to means in order to be defined, but surely, admitting that relation is compatible with denying that any necessary relationship be sustained with other features of experience.¹ Likewise, Dewey defined intrinsic value as the claim "that intrinsic value cannot depend on any relation whatsoever and certainly not upon human beings."² This is specious because we are talking of human values and as Dewey recognizes values themselves are defined as humanly intentional. The remaining criticism may well be pertinent, for the traditional sense of end-in-itself seems to rigid and self-justifying. But many contemporaries share this criticism of absolutism without thereby rendering the concept of end-in-itself as useless. That is, it is clear that there are ends--some unconsequential, some of great importance--which for the relationship that they govern are ends-in-themselves. Thus, Garner and Rosen argue well that unless Dewey allows activity or growth itself as an intrinsic value, there is no way in which the activity in which all else is a mean in sequence can be purposefully initiated. Further, to argue an end-in-itself is not to argue it as absolute or incomparable worth:

If someone claims that happiness is intrinsically valuable (but

¹Ibid., pp. 42, 50. ²Ibid., p. 28.
agrees that there are conditions under which it is less valuable than something else, and does not hold a teleological theory of obligation), he does not seem to be arguing for fixed and stable ends in just the way Dewey supposed . . .1

The more important arguments of Dewey come in the process of breaking down the identification of ends with prizing, and of means with evaluation. Here Dewey lists a number of arguments against this alleged implausible separation.

1) Are desires and interests which directly affect an institution of ends-value independent of the appraisal of things as means?

2) If an immense amount of effort is required to procure means to an end (even the sacrifice of other ends), does that fact modify the original end?

3) Is there any control of the operation of foreseeing consequences save in terms of conditions that operate as causal conditions?

4) Common sense discriminates between end-values with regard to their fruitfulness as means toward other ends, refusing them to treat ends as immediate and exclusively final.2

5) Means employed produce a number of consequent-ends. To use any given end to justify means is to arbitrarily rule out other ends and artificially select the consequences one wants to find.3

Some of these arguments can be given short-shift. For instance, Dewey's negative answer to question #1 succeeds only in showing that there may be need of two kinds of analysis (analysis of means and analysis of ends) and that these are not independent of each other. It is clear that in this case, Dewey would not want to deny that consideration of means influences the setting of ends. His argument, however, seems to demand more than this. He wants to show more than a merely

1Garner and Rosen, Moral Philosophy, p. 135.

2Dewey, Theory of Valuation, p. 25. 3Ibid., p. 42.
necessary relationship but a necessary and sufficient determination of ends by consideration of means. In this vein, the reader might well question argument #5. The focal point of the means/end relationship is the end. This may be gained by several means, and there may be considerable incidental effects found in the exercise of means to a given end. Nevertheless, what seems essential is the relation "for the sake of" and this makes primary some kind of consideration about the "ends." There is no relationship "for the sake of," but rather only a causal or perhaps at best, predictive relationship if one starts the analysis in terms of means. There surely are questions of means but these are not either a substitute for or more important than questions of ends, if the question is one of purpose or human intention.

In answering Dewey's second argument, we notice the same non sequitur as the first question. One can well grant that means modify ends without granting that analysis of means is more important than analysis of ends or is the only way in which an analysis of ends can be carried out. This question poses the further confusion, however, of considering all conflict of ends in any given relationship as merely a matter of means/end relationship. In part, Dewey falls into this trap by identifying the means/end relation with biological adjustment (Lack/satisfaction=solution).

Not all deficiencies in a situation can be characterized as something to be desired or acquired. Moral judgment, at least, is more often a question of resolving a conflict between two equally desirous ends. In one case, he regards the sacrifice of other ends to a given
enjoyed end as a matter of cost without ever questioning whether the
cost of ends is to be calculated in all respects as merely an expend-
iture of effort or a matter of efficiency (means).\(^1\) Hear Dewey's
incidental support of this distinction which he himself does not take
into account.

Quite independently of any "moral" issues, people continually ask
themselves whether a given enjoyment is worthwhile or whether the
conditions involved in its production are such as to make it a
costly indulgence.\(^2\)

In another case, as in question \#4, he distinguishes between short and
far sightedness of value discrimination only on the basis of whether
value will be a fruitful means to other values.\(^3\) "Fruitfulness" in
this sense is quite different from either the "unified whole" which
Dewey seeks or from questions of permanence or of the importance of
this end in competition with other ends. Basic to all of this is
Dewey's sleight-of-hand identification of "there is something the
matter" with "there is something lacking/wanting" and the oversimpli-
fied interpretation of desire as acquisitive which we criticized above.
Dewey has rejected any analysis that talks of end-in-itself; it seems
equally implausible that his claim for the exclusiveness and ultimacy
of the "means" notion can be allowed to stand. As we have seen, Dewey
rightfully protests any easy either/or solution to philosophical prob-
lems in \textit{Experience and Education}. In this case, his effort has not
survived his own criticism. The notion of cost yet needs expansion to
make clear the difference of costs of end, means or criteria.

\(^1\)\textit{Ibid.}, p. 35. \(^2\)\textit{Ibid.}, p. 41. \(^3\)\textit{Ibid.}, p. 39.
Question #3 can be answered directly as Dewey intends. That is, if we allow with Dewey that ends-in-view are primarily a hypothetical prediction of the alternative consequences of a given act then the question of "conditions" is in order. Dewey, in spite of himself, though, insists that such alternate consequences need further consideration in terms of desire and that the predictive question is not the only question to be raised. In previous contexts we have criticized the notion of desire as a condition. We note here that Dewey makes no move to provide us with an analysis of a problem which he himself has called to our attention because he is not aware of the ambiguity of his concept "ends-in-view." To put it another way, Dewey makes no attempt to show relationship of attained-ends to means, as he has means to ends-in-view or ends-in-view as means to attained end.

Ends-in-view is not the only place where Dewey's discussion becomes impressionistic. The discussion above also shows that the criterial rules by which ends-in-view are compared with attained-ends are equally indeterminate. On the one hand, Dewey instructs us to compare ends-in-view as means to end-attained for the actual "fitness of the thing employed as means." His elaboration is generally clear and acceptable.

The generalized ideal and standard of economy-efficiency which operates in every advanced art and technology is equivalent, upon analysis, to the conception of means that are constituents of ends attained and of ends that are usable as means to further ends.¹ On the other hand, it is not so obvious that the requirements of the

¹Ibid., pp. 26, 50.
other criteria, such as "things with respect to their needfulness," "the completeness of the situation," "a unified state of affairs," "an integrated state of affairs," can be equally well-served. That means can be evaluated for their efficiency and economy no one doubts; that we evaluate means for the criteria of completeness, unity and integration seems to raise a different question to say the least. These are criteria of ends or perhaps of the means/end relation seen as a whole, or better said, as criteria of the weighing of several ends for the sacrifice of one to another.

To expand this remark in the light of Stevenson's defense of Dewey's criticism of end-in-itself is instructive. Stevenson allows the distinction of end-partially-in-itself to have some merit in contrast to the notion of end-wholly-in-itself. He, then, argues that Dewey still does not use the notion of end because ends in this sense are innumerable and the relationship so temporary and commonplace as to be ignored. Stevenson then argues: 1) like Garner and Rosen that "the degree to which we desire something for its own sake is not at all a measure of the degree to which we desire it all things considered;" and 2) "for no matter what we select (temporarily prize for its own sake and limit means to attain it), it will be likely to have its cost of maintenance, so to speak, and also its purchase cost; and for all we know these costs, when examined, will impress us as too high."

Stevenson gives this as the reason that Dewey emphasizes the causal milieu as revealing many other things that really matter beyond the

1Stevenson, Facts and Value, p. 107.
limited relation of end/means.

Ignoring the way Stevenson blurs the relationship of cause-effect and consequence incorporated in the original prizing of end and the fact that prizing is the end result which, even on his construction of dramatic rehearsal, yet allows for the question of whether "we really want to privilege" the situations which are causally expedient, it is instructive to assess what Stevenson calls the purchase and maintenance cost. Further, we have the distinction made between things desired partly for their own sake and a thing desired "all things considered."

As we have already observed in Dewey's argument, the notion of cost is ambiguous—we may profitably estimate cost in terms of means for both purchase and maintenance, but this is not the only kind of cost. To select ends, even temporarily and immediately as Stevenson allows, is done only in the face of other possible alternatives, and the question raised is "which do I prefer?" as well as "which can I reasonably expect to get?" Further, the question of preference will bear on the cost of maintenance as well as purchase in distinction from the question of means when the intensity and comparative value of the preference with other preferences is taken into account. If as Stevenson argues, at any given time there are a number of preferences which consideration of means will help to sort out, still, for that given occasion there are infinitely more things ruled out by not being preferred. Surely, preferences are repeatable as patterns and in some cases are defensible and generalized for good reasons.
Dewey questions this with the formula of a causal continuum. If all causes are in turn effects, so also all ends are in turn means to other ends.\(^1\) We have already argued that ends need not be absolutized in the sense of an irrevocable and focal life choice in order to be regarded as intrinsic ends. We have also argued that we need both consideration of means and ends. A third consideration needs to be carried to argue that ends are also means is sophistry unless we allow that we are now analyzing a different situation, itself and end/means relation. No one denies that given intrinsic ends can function in other contexts as means to another end. What is specious about Dewey's argument here is that he criticizes the generalized formula means/end in mechanical fashion. End/means relations are of varying degrees of concreteness, of comparative value and utility, of infinite interrelated complexity and require for a given complexity quite differing patterns of justification.

It is this which Stevenson recognizes in arguing that nothing is desired wholly for its own sake, but only partially. Hence, we must pay attention to the shaping of "our emerging unified preference" by considering our given preference in the light of all things. We have already pressed the point that this is not merely a causal consideration, for the emerging unity is a unity of preference, not effects. What remains is the question of the kind of evaluation needed to assess the emerging unity. The unity is demanded in the face of conflicting ends and the compromise or subordination of one preference (end) to

that of another. Here is another aspect of the cost of purchase and maintenance and an aspect that can scarcely be handled in terms of immediate and specific interests.

It is for this reason that Dewey emphasizes the rational character of ends-in-view and minimizes the prizing activity as secondary to or identical with the activity of appraisal. To guard against any misconstruction of this interpretation of Dewey, it should be recognized that there is at least one context in which Dewey asserts the unity of prizing and appraisal. I have argued that this assertion is to be set in the context of qualifying his previous argument for the intrinsic and immediate value of desire rather than construing appraisal as a different kind of question than that of means or cause. Thus, Dewey also argues that appraisals as distinctive valuation propositions are possible only to the extent that evaluation of things as means is empirically warranted and in the measure that the empirical question of means enters into the formation of the valuation of ends.¹

Dewey, as a point of fact, has not said that valuation of ends is identical with valuation of means. It is to Dewey's credit that in facing honestly the issue before him, he has admitted that he can find no suitable solution on those terms, and more so when the tentative solutions he does offer seem to be incongruent with this claim. We have traced Dewey's formula to the central issue of ends-in-view. Ends-in-view are themselves evaluated by criteria which rule on the effectiveness and satisfaction of ends-in-view compared with ends-as-attained.

¹Ibid., p. 30.
How shall we construe this kind of rational operation?

In one unusual passage, Dewey indicates some consideration of this question when he tried to distinguish his position from Stevenson's. The difference between these two is easily demonstrated when we compare Stevenson's notion of ends-in-view with Dewey's. Stevenson, in effect, identifies consideration of ends with consideration of means. (He identifies consequence with means not recognizing that even a discussion of intrinsic ends takes consequences into account).\(^1\) He further argues that the generalization of a specific interest to an end-in-itself can be effective only indirectly (we can use patterns of value established by habit as a basis of classification in which similarities of condition suggest similarities of solution); but a generalized end-in-view cannot be used to rule directly on the judgment of an individual case.\(^2\) Dewey has denied that consequences are identical with ends and although he is hesitant and undecided, he does not want to contend that "there is a specifiable and testable relationship between the latter (a prospective possible situation) as an end and certain activities as means for accomplishing it."\(^3\)

In the context of Theory of Valuation mentioned above, this difference is focused in Stevenson's claim that the ideal of rationality is itself as arbitrary, as much dependent upon the needs of a finite organization as any other ideal. Dewey takes issue with a high

\(^1\)Stevenson, Facts and Value, p. 96; cf. with p. 103.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 102.

\(^3\)Dewey, Theory of Valuation, p. 13.
degree of righteous indignation. He exposes the "astounding preconceptions" built into this claim: 1) "that an ideal ought to be independent of existence, that is a priori; and 2) that there ought to be ends or ideals that are not also means . . ."\(^1\)

It is not difficult to recognize in the first of these assumptions criticized by Dewey the root of the criticism which Nagel leveled against Dewey. Without documenting the claim, it would appear that Stevenson's denial of rationality of values stems from the same concern as Nagel's, to argue the formal and a priori (logically independent of empirical evidence) aspect of the structure of at least the archetypal forms of rationality. Dewey seems caught in the confusion of arguing that valuation is carried on by rule-formation--it is itself an instance of comparing hypothetical anticipations with implemented hypothesis in such a way that rules indicate satisfactory and non-satisfactory fit--and arguing that solved concrete cases are all that really count, along with the claim that generalizations rule only in offering suggestive comparisons or classifications. The passages Dewey writes here are remarkable for the vagueness and logical ambiguity allowed. Notice two statements set against Stevenson's alleged assumptions.

A) . . . it would be supposed that an ideal is arbitrary in the degree in which it is not connected with things which exist and is not related to concrete existential requirements.

B) If rationality as an ideal or generalized end-in-view serves to direct conduct so that things experienced in consequence of conduct so directed are more reasonable in the concrete, nothing more can be asked of it.\(^2\)

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 39-40.  \(^2\)Idem.
It is clear that "connection," "relation" do yeoman work for Dewey in just the ambiguous way that Nagel protests. Without exploring this complaint, it should be equally obvious that Dewey "related" ends-in-view to concrete existential requirements in B, in the indirect way that A rules as arbitrary. In B, rationality directs "things experienced in consequence" which is hardly a connection with something that exists. If we are to use Dewey's formula, we must be prepared to call the ideal of rationality arbitrary, i.e., not directly "connected" with things which exist, though, of course, the other connotations of the word "arbitrary" upon which Dewey plays here without stating them would be agreed to by both Nagel and Stevenson.

This argument appears to be flogging a dead horse, and it is for the embarrassment of this appearance that I have merely appealed to Nagel and Stevenson by way of illustration than by way of demonstrated proof. Such an appeal is helpful in that it illuminates the second complaint of Dewey that ends are always also means. What this principle of Dewey's states all the way through his philosophical career is that the unity and reality of human experience lies in human action, not human thought. We have seen this stated explicitly in the earlier works, in Experience and Education; it is also stated here, where we have another affirmation of Dewey's instrumentalism.

Its (previous discussion) only and complete import is the need for their (emotive and intellectual) integration in behavior—behavior in which, according to common speech, the head and the heart work together, in which to use more technical language, prizing and appraising unite in direction of action.1

1Ibid., p. 65.
There is no final reason or better justification for life than the fact that one is living, growing, actively adjusting to his environment. Not even the philosophical ideal of rationality, i.e., contemplation, is allowed to be nought but a means to this end.

Not withstanding, there is in this monograph and in the other contemporaneous literature of Dewey, another theme. It is the claim that the most important form of activity is the rational. In this monograph it is stated strongly.

In this integration (knowledge and emotional traits), not only is science itself a value (since it is the expression and fulfillment of a special human desire and interest), but it is the supreme means of the valid determination of all valuations in all aspects of human and social life.\(^1\)

This provides a puzzle, for if science is the determiner of all valuation, and prizing and appraisal are unified in the rational projection of ends-in-view, then science is its own evaluator and, in fact, science has become the end by which all other ends are justified.

It is clear that Dewey never admits such a sequence of inference or the conclusion drawn above. From beginning to end, his writing advocated the instrumentality of knowledge. This fundamental perspective of his position becomes increasingly beleaguered in the measure that Dewey argues the identity of prizing and evaluation and to the degree that the worth of life is not recognized as immediate and direct.

Marvin Fox, in an interesting article commenting on the earlier work Experience and Nature, finds a "crack in the armor of Dewey's pre-

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 66.
sumed methodological unity" in that Dewey does not resolve value-prizing into experimentally warranted judgments of conditions and consequence. He interprets Dewey as insisting that the qualitative immediacy of value experience remains, as beyond question and discussion, the primary and ultimate quality of life.¹ Barring all question concerning Fox's analysis of qualitative immediacy construed as a primitive value-intuition,² it is more important for our purposes to recognize that Dewey's argument against immediate experience in this monograph destroys the way in which he preserved the doctrine of instrumentalism previously. If we might raise some questions against Fox, whether in earlier writings Dewey held to the unity of science in the radical form of equating life with the life of a knower, in the Theory of Valuation, there is all the more reason for suggesting such a tension within Dewey. Here Dewey seems critical of the doctrine of immediate value for just the reason that it destroys the rationality of all prizing-evaluating. There are several reasons for this emphasis upon rationality. In The Logic, Dewey both recognizes the need of stronger requirements for formal knowledge³ and incorporated ethical


³Dewey, Logic, p. 256 ff. where he allows for necessity of universal relations as distinct from generic distinctions for empirical classification. In early works, generalization is usually handled only in terms of the second; cf. Reconstruction in Philosophy, Chp. VI.
discussion within the framework of a logic of social sciences.\(^1\) In the summation of his purpose in the *Theory of Valuation*, he again identifies ethics as the attempt at systematic theoretical control of valuation which must be constructed out of "a grounded theory of the phenomenon of human behavior" provided by biology, psychology, and anthropology.

Here is the irony of Dewey's argument. He has complained that Stevenson's appeal to consequences and to desire construed as emotion is preserving unconsciously the separation of ends from means in that the reduction of desire to emotion provides a degenerate notion of end.

The sole way of arriving at the conclusion that a generalized end-in-view or ideal is arbitrary because of existential or empirical origin is by first laying down as an ultimate criterion that an end should not also be a means.\(^2\)

It is apparent that the irony of the criticism is that Dewey conceives of ends-in-view as means—not, of course, means as data nor generalization of prior empirical disciplines—but as a means which rules on the comparison of anticipated desires with realized desires. In this way, he seeks to retain valuation as a science not of the non-human or descriptive-predictive kind. He is hopeful that the science of valuation will "lay down a norm" of something that "shall or should happen," not something that "merely will happen."\(^3\) Nevertheless, it is

\(^1\) *Ibid.*, p. 492. All social problems are reducible to the same kind of practical judgment and the moralism of traditional social issues is repudiated.


just this sense of rule which he immediately transposes into an empirical rule of condition, such as Stevenson employs in his reference to consequences. Notice the vagueness and duality of the statement:

Thus, the proposition may be said to lay down a norm, but "norm" must be understood simply in the sense of condition to be conformed to in definite forms of future actions.¹

Most intriguing of all the phrases in this statement is the juxtaposition of the word "condition" with "to be conformed to." A condition "to be conformed to" is quite different from a condition to be taken into account, and to equate "rules as to the best way to accomplish the ends in view" with "rules used as criteria or norms for judging the value or proposed modes of behavior" seems implausible. Nor will it help to tactly admit the difference by blurring the difference at the same time one is making the distinction.

In another context, Dewey argues that every activity of the arts and professions develops rules as the best way to accomplish the ends in view.

Such rules are used as criteria or "norms" for judging the value of proposed modes of behavior. The problem concerns not their existence as general propositions (since every rule of action is general) but whether they express only custom, convention, tradition or are capable of stating relations between things as means and other things as consequences, which relations are grounded in empirically ascertained and tested existential relations such as are usually termed those of cause and effect.²

Dewey continues by noting that custom cannot be ruled out because the empirical base is not well established. He makes it clear, however, that if the empirical base were developed, custom would be excluded. More important, however, is his explanation of what he means

¹Ibid., p. 21. ²Idem.
by "empirical base." Like a doctor, the value theorist appeals to as-
certained principles of the empirical sciences, but can Dewey argue
that the doctor's diagnosis and prescription is itself constituted by
such an empirical base? Dewey replies negatively, but then what is the
difference between a medicine man and a doctor? There is no answer!

We have tried to show by use of Dewey's own analysis that the
crucial concepts of Dewey's Theory of Valuation are in fact the most
vague and unformed. Dewey calls for norms of behavior, but then writes
as if norms were either merely general classifications which do not
enter constitutively into the value-judgment or that because they are
also means in some other context, that this fact minimizes the func-
tion of the norm to rule over the means for which it is an end. We
have also argued that the reason Dewey fails at this point is an in-
stance of his general failure to realize the importance of formal and
abstract conceptualization in the quest for knowledge. Dewey never re-
linquished his Instrumentalism, that knowledge is but a means to the
growth and openness of living; nevertheless, Dewey also marks out
rationality as the pattern by which growth is best carried out. In
this essay, he comes close to saying that "open growth" is itself ra-
tional and a final end, whereas all of his overt analyses tend to ig-
nore the problems of giving a unified or integrated theory of ends, or
of properly characterizing the function of rules in making a value-
judgment, or even more lamentably, fail at the point of explaining the
function of end in a means/end relationship.

Perhaps a more clear way of stating the issues is to point out
that the general relationship of means/end must be structured quite differently from the variety of means/end relationships. We have pointed out earlier in this chapter that means as a material condition needs to be distinguished from means as method. It is equally the case that to regard an end as a means to another end is, at least in some cases such as conflicts of end, also a quite different operation, perhaps better formulated as resolving a conflict of ends. The further case of the contribution of a methodological inquiry to evaluating the whole of life can be spoken of as a means to life but surely not easily justified nor articulated in any rational means/end relation. To argue as Dewey has done when he declares that each value judgment must ultimately be decided in terms of its specific characteristics and as a non-generalized judgment is to confuse the problem of assessing a whole life with: 1) the question of harmonizing conflicting ends, or with
2) the further question of justifying a given means by elaborating the purpose for which it is done. However, if, like Dewey, one minimizes the considerations of end in a given means/end relation, and reduces the consideration of rules to the level of rules of thumb, then, of course, one is in no position to recognize that generalized patterns of life can themselves be evaluated, though, of course, not in an easy or specific way.

Kai Nielsen has argued this against Toulmin's ethical theory in an article entitled "Can A Way of Life Be Justified?" Unlike Dewey, Toulmin allows that prima facie rules be generalized beyond the individual and that utilitarian rules resolve the conflicts of rule-formu-
lated ends into an "equitable harmony of as many independent actions of the community as possible." At this point Toulmin stops the argument—no cross-cultural comparison directed toward the ideal life is possible. Decision about a way of life is personal and intimate for many reasons. 1) We do not know what specific alternatives to offer to a criticized custom or what consequences would follow from the adoption of the alternative. 2) To compare a given institution within a culture with that of another culture is to forget that institutions function for the cultural, not in abstract. Toulmin's conclusion that decisions about a way of life are personal and intimate and hence allow no generalized comparison is repudiated by Nielson. A way of life is quite literally an expression of a moral attitude. One question which focuses this concern beyond the individual decision is the educational question, "How ought we to bring up our children?" Questions are also meaningful and objectifiable on the level of cultural conflict or international conflict. Inasmuch as Toulmin has allowed value generalization for individuals and within a culture, it seems there are no good theoretical grounds for dismissing similar considerations raised about different ways of life.¹

Paul Taylor, in his book *Normative Discourse*, does more than merely argue the possibility of such a level of generalization. He claims there are separable phases of value inquiry distinguishable for their purpose and hence distinguishable for the method of justification

by which those purposes are established. On the lowest level of means/end, the means are justified (verified or evaluated) by determining whether or not that means fulfills the standard. Taylor, with Baier, calls this "verification," for given a clear standard, the process of checking is empirical. The second level of validation concerns the justification of standard or ends as appropriate to the given task.

The point of confusion for Dewey is that he cannot decide whether the standards are rule-formulated or if rule-formulated whether they rule decisively in a given decision. The process of validation must be carried out for Taylor on several issues: 1) the standard must be relevant; 2) the standard controls the exceptions of circumstances allowable; 3) the standard is consistent with other value standards or precedence is established. The validation consists in appeal to higher standards because: 1) they are more general; 2) they rule on the consequences of fulfilling the lower standard; or 3) they order the relative precedence of conflicting standards and exceptions to a given rule.

A further level of argumentation concerns the vindication of value systems. A value system is vindicated by appeal to rules of relevance, and by rules of valid inference and by the free commitment to ends which mark the fulfillment of the system. For differing value-systems, however, there is still one point of view: that is, there is

\[1\text{Taylor, Normative Discourse, p. 77.}
\[2\text{Ibid., p. 85.}
\[3\text{Ibid., pp. 123, 135.}\]
a distinction to be made between ethical, aesthetic, political and non-normative points of view. To take a point of view is to make a rational choice which adopts certain canons of reasoning as the framework within which value judgments of a certain kind are to be justified. The method of justification for a point of view can be done on two levels: 1) it may mean explicating the canons defining a point of view or 2) it might mean to justify the decision to take a point of view. If specifying the canons of reasoning are difficult, justification of the decision to take these means in any case is a matter of deciding to be rational or deciding whether the canons are rationally efficient to expedite the commitment.1

The difference between Taylor and Dewey at this level is that Taylor has made clear the formal requirements of the problem and is either arguing for rationality as an end-in-itself or is ready to show how rational canons are the best instrument for sustaining life values directly prized apart from the formulation of the canons, as such.

It would not do to argue that Dewey was wrong because Taylor is assumed right. The use to which this sketch of Taylor's is being put is to suggest a way in which distinctions can be made to clarify many of the ambiguities already pointed out in Dewey's analysis. As Taylor's analysis indicates, the formula means/end defaults for the reason that the express kind of relationship of end to mean is not clarified. Although Dewey struggles to make his means/end formula count, he continually elaborates a further sense of the problem than

1Ibid., p. 122.
what his analysis can hold. So in this case, Dewey argues to resolve ends into means, but manages to convey a sense of the function of end in control without ever providing a theoretical account of that function. We shall turn to an exposition of Peters to argue another position on the matter of ends/means in education.

The Theory of Valuation has provided an explanatory context for much of the educational proposal of *Experience and Education*. It might appear that the demand for a philosophy of education made in this book is to be fulfilled by the discussion of *The Theory of Valuation*. Interestingly enough, the allusions to philosophy in the *Theory of Valuation* are scanty—Dewey talks mostly in terms of science. Furthermore, in the context of *Experience and Education* we noticed that the derivation of educational criteria from a theory of experience was carried but only metaphorically. Nor does there seem to be any counterpart in the *Theory* for the radical notion of spontaneous and inventive individuality which forms an element of the criterion of interaction. At best, Dewey equates "newness" with "the consequences of present and new valuation." For these reasons, it will be germane to the argument to explore Dewey's conception of philosophy. There seems to be a reasonable doubt whether the discussion of the *Theory of Valuation* is to be construed as philosophical or scientific.

Dewey has often argued a difference between philosophy and science. Philosophy concerns itself primarily with value and the relation between value and knowledge. There is a difference, in degree at least, between earlier and later formulations which has a bearing on
the interpretation of **Theory of Valuation**. In the earlier writings through to the year 1931, Dewey writes of philosophy as the critical concern with human meaning. Philosophy is heir to the methodology of science for the purpose of establishing the sciences of human meaning.¹ By 1938, with the writing of the **Logic** and the **Theory of Valuation**, Dewey is ready to dissociate philosophy from the human sciences. In the **Logic** he repudiates the attempt to view all social problems exclusively or primarily from an ethical perspective. In the **Theory of Valuation** it seems he means literally what he has said; he is seeking to implement a program of the science of valuation which has at least the features we have articulated in the body of the text. What of philosophy?

There are several important articles written about the time of **Logic** and **Theory of Valuation** (1938), which rediscuss the relation between science, philosophy, value and culture. For the 37th yearbook of the **National Society for the Study of Education**, he writes chapter 38, "The Determination of Ultimate Values or Aims Through Antecedent or A Priori Speculation or Through Pragmatic or Empirical Inquiry." Writing against a philosophy of Ultimate Reality, Dewey advocates a philosophy of actual experience.

Its business is criticism of experience as it exists at a given time and constructive projection of values, which, when acted upon, will render experience more unified, stable and progressive. Defects and conflicts in experience as it exists demand thoroughgoing

criticism of its contents and procedures . . . Criticism does not end with mere intellectual discrimination. It provides the basis for projection of values as yet unrealized, values that are to be translated into ends that move men into action.¹

The important emphasis of this quotation is amplified by the rest of the essay. The two notions of criticism and projection are stated explicitly. Criticism here is "concern . . . rather with values and ends that known facts and principles should subserve, than either any kind of superior reality or knowledge" or even the most exact and inclusive knowledge of conditions and means necessary to execute the ends purposed. Thus, the target of philosophical criticism is not knowledge, but social conditions and institutions which form the routine of human life.² In addition, Dewey draws the contrast between knowledge and projection or action. Like education, philosophy is concerned with the formation of attitudes and dispositions to be transmitted to the individual from an inherited culture and with the task of creating attitudes productive of a better culture. This is a rational projection, and in a sense there is no line to be drawn between hypothesis about conditions and means, and hypothesis about ends save that hypotheses that are projected "outrun the possibility of scientific confirmation." Another difference between projective ideas and scientific hypotheses is that the constructive ideas of philosophy have "authority


²Ibid., p. 475.
over activity to impel it to bring possible values into existence, not, as in the case of science, that they have authoritative claim to acknowledge..."

Philosophy of education—as one phase of philosophy, but the most important single phase—is just the critical and constructive exploration of the potentialities of existing experience as that experience is brought under the fuller control of intelligence represented by the scientific method.¹

Here lies the solution to one of the problems of Theory of Valuation. Science is the fundamental form of all intellectual response in all subjects; it is to be taught as a method and not as content in the schools. More importantly, this scientific method will be valued not as an end-in-itself, but as an alternative life pattern to that of convention, prejudice and custom. Most important, however, is the concept of social institution and social change which is enforced by this distinction of ideas as projected ends and as knowable relationships. To talk of ideas as projective is to point to the "importance of a philosophy that recognizes the inherent place and function in experience of practical constructive intelligence, the union of knowledge with action, and the permeation of experience with social values." "It is to recognize how intimately relations with other human beings enter into the very constitution of experience."²

It is important to get a sight on the bearing of this for the Theory of Valuation. Dewey has contrasted knowledge and projective valuing. In the Theory of Valuation, he is discussing the science of evaluation by which the projective valuing of philosophy becomes trans-

¹Ibid., p. 479. ²Ibid., p. 484.
lated into the working evaluation of planned change. The function of ends is accounted for as a philosophical exercise, but the necessity of means to constitute and secure those possibilities is also argued and is a scientific activity. In addition, the connection between projected possibilities and the "interaction" theme of *Experience and Education* is spelled out. The activated and embodied criticism projected against dominant and living institutions calls for a kind of critical activity which is not merely cognitive nor impersonal. Hence, Dewey argues that experience as personal and social is capable of developing values of the most precious sort, and the kinship of philosophy with education is established in the unity of creating and cultivation of inner-directed behavior.

In other essays written in this period, Dewey elaborated further implications of this theme. In his article, "Philosophy," in the *Encyclopedia of Social Science*, he emphasizes the speculative and even the ignorant or erroneous claim of some philosophical hypotheses which nevertheless "aid in freeing the imagination and permitting the generation of ideas that give new direction to attention and interest."¹ Philosophic hypotheses are propadeutic tools to either physical or human sciences. Philosophy also provides an emotional satisfaction for the imaginative play-synthesis of ideas, giving a focus of unity and clarity to the ideas at work in a given period. There is, of course, no question of verification, or of conceptual systematization.

In an article written for *Commentary*, Dewey calls for philos-

ophy to cultivate that "climate of belief" in which the creation of human sciences takes place. The cultivation of working attitudes of the everyday world, the campaigns of persuasion and education to gain "willingness to hear and absorb" are part of the philosophical task. To charge knowledge with that emotive faith in its value which impels action is the task of philosophy. Thus Dewey writes: "Generous imagination and wide and liberal sympathies are needed to carry on the required activities."¹ Dewey does not want to deny that such activity is intellectual; it is also of great human importance as having power to move to activity. Neither is Dewey satisfied with a rigid use of this distinction between philosophy and science. In the translation from common-sense language of life to objective claims of knowledge, we have to recognize that it is a matter of degree whether one is posing a purely imaginative hypothesis (though even Dewey admits it must have some relevance to the facts at hand), or whether one has in mind a specific question within an accepted frame of reference. What is puzzling is that Dewey refuses to recognize the similarity of conditions and bearing that these speculative hypotheses have with the more traditional patterns of ethical principles. It would seem that Dewey preferred to leave the whole operation of speculative hypothesis unexamined rather than admit that there are formal characteristics which can be specified for either logical or evaluational operations. It is

also this area of speculative hypothesis that escapes Dewey's own formulation of theory of knowledge because it masks the search for unity and certainty even as limited, non-absolute cognitive ideals, and ignores the regulative use of moral and intellectual ideals even when they cannot be formulated or justified for the degree of rigor required in other cognitive operations. This contrast between the speculative model of inquiry and the cooperative, experimental model of knowledge remains as an unresolved tension in the work of Dewey.

The discrepancy that Frankena called to our attention at the start of this essay can now be recognized in its right perspective. Dewey talks the language of ends when he refers to the subjective, spontaneous, creative activity of the individual thinker-agent. When referring to objective, cooperative activity, Dewey talks with the language of means. It is not so much that he uses these concepts loosely as it is that he has not worked out the interrelationship completely, or fully explored the tensions in his own point-of-view. In addition, there must be allowance for Dewey's intellectual growth and constructive change of mind in dealing with recurrent issues.

If this provides difficulty for interpreting Dewey, it is obvious that the educators who work within this point-of-view to attack specific curriculum problems will have more difficulty. The inability to formulate goals for curriculum as a whole will be the direct consequence of conceptualizing goals instrumentally. The frustration of the educator with the irrelevance of goals for the specific issues of curriculum building is generated out of the misconception of the function of
ideal-ends to means.

The disillusionment of the educator who finds that the solution of a curriculum problem on the working level has only exacerbated the problem of the unity, balance, or integration of the curriculum, arises out of the failure to recognize the dimensions and focus of the context in which the problem is set. This is not to affirm that there are no problems remaining. It is rather a call for the sorting out of issues and the more careful analysis of an issue.

Summary

We have covered a sizable portion of Dewey's work trying to clarify the later portion of his value theory and educational theory. Examination of Experience and Education shows Dewey arguing for a normative theory of education in which the norm "growth for growth's sake" is applied to educational theory under two criteria: continuity and interaction. Dewey illustrates his position by examining two major problems of schooling: discipline and subject matter. In each of these areas, it is the balancing off of continuity and interaction that gives the proper context. Thus, discipline is the balancing off of group and individual interest in terms of the sequence of tasks to be performed. In subject materials, the balancing of the structural sequence of subject matter with the individual interest and learning needs calls for a historically-oriented curriculum in which the past is used to illuminate and deepen the present interest of the student. The two criteria of continuity and interaction spell out Dewey's model of purposive action. All action must be the marshalling of immediate
capacity and interest for the promotion of a rationally specifiable and justifiable future project.

This model of purposive action was, then, examined in the context of Dewey's monograph on the Theory of Value. Dewey rejected the traditional absolute ends-in-itself and intrinsic good as instances of unwarranted abstraction and immoral control of life-experience. Dividing the notion of mean into two functions, material (psychological and physical conditions) and methodological means (ends-in-view), he argued that purposive action is the correlation of these in the production of consequent ends.

We have argued that this formulation is both inadequate and incomplete. Dewey does not make sufficient distinctions to bear the solution even as he has specified it. Even to allow a variety of senses for "mean," however, does not overcome the major problem of conceiving of purposive action apart from a full-fledged concept of end. Granted that Dewey's rejection of absolute ends is warranted, there is no further warrant to reduce ends to mere consequences. The problem at the level of philosophical analysis and at the level of educational analysis is essentially the same. Dewey's aversion to formal analysis precludes making the necessary distinctions and developing the logical interrelationships that build a sound explanation. On the other hand, Dewey's proposal illuminates a major tension of his philosophical point-of-view, in which the instrumental function of knowledge is challenged by exclusive evaluative function of reasoning. Viewed from the standpoint of curriculum, it is clear that Dewey's formulation gives no
answer to how one balances continuity and interaction. The tension maintained between knowledge as instrumental and evaluative leaves Dewey's discussion of the role of goals in curriculum confused. Growth for growth's sake is hardly plausible, nor is its educational equivalent of learning in its immediate context of interest and capacity. Rational and moral ideas must be specified as norms of education (and, in this sense, education is also preparatory), but then these ideals need not be completely specified in the means (curriculum and methods), nor is the justification which they provide for the means the only relevant question to be raised about means. We are arguing, of course, that the question of goals is of major importance for educational curriculum theory. However, the importance cannot be spelled out directly in terms of objectives, subject-matter and class behavior.
CHAPTER III

RICHARD PETERS: VALUE AS INTRINSIC WORTH

The work of R. S. Peters provides a contemporary critique of John Dewey in an attempt to establish a theoretical context for educational analysis. One of the earliest formulations of his position takes its start from Dewey's chapter in Democracy and Education entitled the "Aims of Education."

The number of misreadings of this essay of Peters is surprising. The interpreters see clearly that his answer to the question posed by the title of the article: "Must an Educator Have an Aim?" is negative, but the interpretations they give for this answer are conflicting. Soltis reads Peters as a Deweyan objector to ultimate aims in the strength of the claim that all questions of aims are really questions of procedure; hence, he reads the intention of Peters as like that of Dewey, pressing all questions of ends into analysis of means.¹ Macmillan and McClellan likewise interpret some questions of aims as procedural but then argue that statements of aims also function as non-conclusive justification for procedures.² That is, aims-end can be used


to justify means but not singly nor by ignoring all other lines of action-consequence. Neither Soltis' particularizing of all action to individuals who act purposefully nor the Macmillan-McClellan defense of aims as inconclusive justification capture the significance of Peters' use of "principles of procedure." Peters denies Dewey's means/end reasoning equally emphatically as he denies ultimate aims. He also denies that objectives construed as means or ends-in-view are the only way in which values are argued in education. His point is stated sharply: "Values are involved in education not so much as goals or end-products, but as principles of procedure." The emphasis is on principles, not on procedure, for principles structure valuations of content as well as of procedure. His point stated positively is that assuming education implies some commendable state of mind and some experience deliberately posed to lead to or contribute to that state of mind, then the relation between states of mind and such experiences can not be construed as end/means of either instrumental or productive relationship, nor indeed can states of mind be delimited by positive description or experimental manipulation. States of mind are negatively delimited by criteria; they are caught, emulated, initiated. The rejection of aims is two-fold: 1) aims falsely cultivate an instrumental conception of education rather than as a quality of life, and 2) aims conceived as utopian descriptions are both idiotic and illusory. Perhaps, just because they are so vague and ambiguous, they are appealed to for justification of any means,

2Ibid., p. 50.
3Ibid., p. 49.
however demonic. At any rate, aims traditionally employed give no direction, and hence cannot be used as norms. Further, the norms implicit in a goal description are externalized and reduced to illegitimate behavioral dimensions by construing the relation of value to procedure as a relation of ends to means. Education as a matter of procedure is then subject to the need for justification by ends external to it.¹

The extent of the misinterpretation of Peters is to have missed his major point. In the case of Soltis, the major point is the rejection of Dewey's formula for ends-in-view; in the case of Macmillan and McClellan the major point contends that general norms must be formulated as criterial rules for there is no other profitable or proper way to organize value commitments in educational situations. The point has been made; it yet remains to evaluate it. For this we shall turn to Peters' more elaborate and detailed essays.

Analysis of Aims

At the end of a later reprint of his article, "Must Educators Have an Aim?" Peters directs us to another formulation of the problem of educational use of "aim-goal" language. We turn to this article: "Aims of Education: A Conceptual Inquiry"² for a more illuminating essay to criticize, and to the appended critical responses of John Woods and William Dray as a starting-block of criticism.

¹Ibid., p. 51.

The point of this article is confusing. Professor Dray in his comments on Peters' analysis reprimands him for accepting as a proper way of talk what he himself criticizes as improper. Peters calls irregular the common usage of statements of the form, "The aim of education is . . ." but then suggests that these function in some contexts as tautologies to call to our attention an oversight or neglect of a given criterion of education. Dray properly objects that the tautology is ill-formed and that to identify with "nature, part, aspect" (or even criterion) as the tautology does is to talk nonsense. The reply of Peters is irrelevant. He protests that Dray is prohibiting any use of "aim" talk in reference to education, and he completely ignores the subject of tautology to which Dray has directed his objections specifically.

If this exchange highlights the inconsistency of Peters' argument, it serves to raise serious question about his analysis of "aim." For in the previously examined article (and also "Education as Initiative" written about the same time), Peters is explicitly negative toward use of "aim" in reference to education. "The so-called 'aims' in part pick out the different valuations which are built into different procedures . . ." In the later article, Peters has explicated what he considers to be an important meaning of "aim" which allows him to apply

1Ibid., pp. 20, 21.  
2Ibid., p. 25.  
3Peters, "Must An Educator Have An Aim?" p. 94. See the reprint of this article in Concepts of Teaching, ed. by Macmillan and Nelson, Ch. VIII. The text is unedited and shows greater differences than the text in Frankena's edition.
it to general aims and principles, albeit not substantively. "Aims" as a normative term is used in group contexts to suggest the concentration of attention on something which is the focus of activity. Hence, to ask about "aims" is not to ask for an explanation (purpose, motive) of a group activity; it is rather to ask for a more precise specification of what an action or activity is.¹ In addition, Peters lists the requirement that the aim-objective be distant and that the risk of failure be present. Peters' own illustration shows both the alleged naturalness of the use of aim in education and its problem.

A quick answer might be that education is a highly diffuse and difficult activity in which many earnest people engage with great seriousness without being altogether clear what they are trying to do. The demand for the aims of education is therefore a salutary request for teachers to survey what they are doing, get their priorities straight, concentrate their attention on the task and discard irrelevancies. The main respect in which it is not quite right is that education is not an activity. We do not say, "Go along, go and get on with your educating" as we would say, "Go along, go and get on with your teaching."²

There are several comments to be made on these claims of Peters. 1) If there are logical incongruities in the use of "the aims of education are," one should also expect to find the same incongruities in the question "what are your aims?". This is signaled very clearly in this context of Peters' discussion where the question is raised concerning the "aims of education" but answered in terms of the activities of the teachers. Peters is lead by his talk of "aims" to say "education is a highly diffuse and difficult activity" only to withdraw the assertion immediately by denying the appropriateness of "Go along, go and get on on with your teaching."²

¹Peters, Aims of Education, p. 3. ²Ibid., p. 4.
with your educating." Though the question, "What are your aims?" sounds natural in terms of the teacher's activity, it seems highly suspect if what we had in mind by the question was something like, "Tell me, what is education all about?" Peters, in all written contexts, has never denied the use of "aim" in talking of immediate and specifiable objectives or procedures like teaching; what he is trying to argue is that "aim" language is proper and useful in some fashion for general aims. He himself does not seem to keep the two questions distinct.

2) In examining the social context which, for Peters, shows the root-meanings of "aim," it is instructive to watch the way in which the natural context is displaced. In another context Peters gives three uses of "aim": a) literal concentration of attention within such an activity on some object which must be hit; b) figurative concentration of attention on something which is the focus of activity; c) figurative, to ask for an aim is to ask for a more precise specification of what an action is. The first two are contexts of concentration, the last is a context of specification. The shift comes in an unwarranted assumption of Peters that the only context for "what are your aims?" is that context where the actor(s) is confused. However, the question is equally pertinent where the questioner is uncertain because he can see nothing achieved (hence, "aimless"). That is, if the question arises out of the observer's confusion and not out of the operation of aiming, then surely the idea of redefining the target, especially by the one taking aim,

seems superfluous. A more natural social context is the phrase "the aims of the group"; in fact, Peters' exposition centers on this kind of instance. These aims, of course, need never be formulated by the group; aims are the conscious or unconscious concentration of the efforts of the group on some object. In this case, neither the idea of reformulating nor of formulating is pertinent. Thus Peters is implausible on two counts: a) construing "aims" even in a figurative sense as necessarily a specific concentration of effort, not of articulation, which is a matter of objectives. In addition, in the measure that the end result (goal, objective) remains unactualized, in that measure the use of the term "aim" is unfitting or metaphorical.

It is surprising that Peters missed this in his reading of Dewey's chapter on aims. Dewey calls for aims rather than ideals because aims are controllable as well as fallible. If at first Dewey speaks of aims in the strong rational terms ("acting with an aim is all one with acting intelligently"), he later introduces a caveat of tentativeness and experimentation. In no case, however, is he willing to allow the use of the term "aim" apart from the agent's ability to specify the specific procedures (methods and means) to realize the ends-in-view. ¹ This seems far more plausible than the claim of Peters that aims are never "close at hand or palpable." "Aim," then, must be used figuratively in order to become indefinite or distant. How poetic or how easily confused with "principle" the usage becomes will be a function of the actuality of the object referred.

¹Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 108.
These comments illuminate a more facile connection between aim used directly in a given individual activity and aim used indirectly of a group. In each case it signifies a concentration of effort on a given object. The extent of its application to human situations seems to depend on whether the situation can be conceived as an activity or, to say it another way, whether there is a specification of the situation concrete enough to direct and concentrate the energy expended. That there is a possibility of missing is implied in the notion of trying; like all human projects, there is many a slip twixt cup and lip. Contrary to Peters, it is not the possibility of formulating the act, save as the attempt itself may be a theoretical one. It is the possibility of carrying out the projected effort, of bringing off the risked expenditure that counts.

Peters' use of Dewey's quotation in which aims are formulations of needs only has already been criticized in Chapter II as an overly restricted explanation of desire/interest. Aims are formulated out of desires and even fantasies which cannot be behaviorally identified with conscious needs. Likewise, his attempt to defend the third characteristic of aim as distance and unpalpableness seems to have misconstrued what is at stake. He states: the term "aims" can not be applied to activities like cooking or fishing because these have a determinate and palpable point to them.¹ This seems ridiculous, because these activities seem to be prime examples of the proper use of "aim"; and, in fact, if as observers we do not see the aim realized, we raise a question of

aim to find out what other purpose these activities, i.e., practicing casting, performing a chemistry experiment in the kitchen, can be put to than the common one.

We have argued, then, that Peters' search for a viable use of "aims," meaning general aim, has contradicted his illuminating perception of education as ideal-oriented and, in fact, confuses the constituent activities and procedures which can be construed as aims with the overall pursuit of the Good. Peters shows this confusion in setting forth the usefulness of a typical statement, "The aim of education is to initiate men into a worthwhile form of life." He lists two items:
1) "it would be (merely) a way of drawing attention to what it means to educate or reform someone," and 2) "the function of talk about aims in education is usually to clarify the minds of educators about their priorities." Of the first advantage, it is enough to remark that the oddness of the statement "education is the initiation of men into a worthwhile form of life" is redundant enough to call attention to what is claimed without appending the further clumsiness of "the aim of . . . " The second alleged advantage seems to illustrate the confusion either because it calls for a definiteness which the phrase does not supply (Dray has already asked for an explication of "initiation")

Peters makes a further distinction in the use of "aims of,"

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1Ibid., p. 9.

2Ibid., p. 22.
marking out procedural issues from the question of worthwhileness. "Aims" when spoken in reference to procedures, i.e., "aim of education is self-realization," do not seem to be clearly tautologous, though such talk assumes that aims be concerned with worthwhile things. These aims mark out the structuring of activity in a certain direction, selecting procedures which have rules implicit in them.1 The procedures can refer to rules of social behavior or rules of cognitive behavior. However interesting this elaboration is for education, it seems to only compound the improper use of "aims of." What Peters calls aims seems to be more fittingly called norms; and the sociological distinction of aims and norms in reference to group activity seems viable enough to preserve the important difference between action focused, described or intended, and action prescribed, explained or justified. "Aims of" cannot be used to profitably mark out procedure because procedure is best specified in the form of rules and "aim" calls to mind an object of attention or effort (aim-goal) and is not aptly used of social norms and rules.

In the latest rewriting of his argument in the essay entitled "What is an Educational Process?" Peters makes explicit what was not so clear before. "Aims" language is used as a means of indicating which procedures have in fact been selected out in the process of education. There is no one answer to the question of education as a process. There are criteria establishing a family of specific processes, but there are alternate elements and multiple patterns for organizing the elements. To talk of aims is to "point out specific achievements and states of

1Ibid., p. 14.
mind which give content to the formal notion of 'the educated man' which is a shorthand for summarizing our notion of a form of life which is worthwhile enough to deserve being handed on from generation to generation . . . "\(^1\)

It has been the case that many educators have extrapolated from their choice of educational processes to press one aspect as the paradigm for all. This, of course, is not permissible as it blurs the fact of choice which is required. It also raises the question whether education is better spoken of as criterial rather than as a process, inasmuch as no one process is required and the fact of requirement, not that of process, is central. However, the use of aim seems fitting in application to a given specific procedure. It is worthwhile to notice that the aptness of the term "aim" turns on the fact that the choice can be specified, not as the "aim of education" but as specific means of fulfilling the criteria. Such an illustration fits well the usage of "aim" explicited above in criticism of Peters.

There is another interesting feature of this argument which similarly spells out some of the difference between the earlier and later articles on aims. In the context mentioned above of the later article on "Aims of Education," Peters suggests that the rules implicit in procedural criteria of education can also be construed as rules to be learned, hence, as content and worthwhile things.\(^2\) It would be unjust to Peters to say that on his construction the rule feature of procedural

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aims is lost in being translated into worthwhile content. Perhaps it is necessary, however, to recognize that worthwhile things are not all direct qualities and that the relation of rule and worthwhileness still needs explication.

The analysis of "aims" promoted here is critical of Peters from several angles. "Aim" seems a much more vague and action-oriented term than Peters allows. Rather than try like Peters to precise it unfairly, we would do well to use it only in a general common-sense fashion, substituting other terms such as "criteria," "norms," "rules," "ideals" when the context can demand a more applicable term. To speak of aims in education is legitimate if the end-in-view is determinable and the means realizable. To use "aim" to help specify the normative aspects of education seems neither desirable nor necessary, except as one construes the educational process as a human act in some vaguely purposeful way.

Taylor, in his book, The Explanation of Behavior, has an illuminating and perceptive defense of this point. He argues that there is a fairly explicit sense of aim/goal when we classify human action by "the goal-result which it was the agent's purpose or intention to bring about" to which must be added a "special extended sense in which any action can be said to have a goal." As he points out, there are directed activities that have "no end-condition, but simply the emitting of behavior of the required type." The end in these cases referred to vaguely as a goal, is "simply the action's having a certain form or fulfilling a certain description."

In these cases it would be less misleading to speak of a "criterion" being fulfilled rather than a "goal" being aimed at in the action, but it will simplify matters if we can adopt one term to apply to all cases of directed behavior . . . Thus, our ordinary action concepts generally pick out behavior as goal-directed in this extended sense.1

Analysis of "Education"

The analysis of "education" carried out by Peters is perceptive and provocative. Where it seems implausible is in the unwarranted tightening up of the rather general criteria into an overly-restricted usage. As a result, the term appears in contrast with terms like "training" for the wrong reasons and the criteria selected by the analysis, though important, do not convey the exact import of the term.

Peters has elaborated his proposal on the usage of "education" in several different essays. We shall work directly with the latest formulation titled, "What Is an Educational Process?" There are some questions of thematic development for some of the details change between the writing of essays. The main outlines are firmly held throughout.

"Education" makes reference to criteria to which a family of processes (or procedures) must conform.2 It can be used in both a task and achievement sense, but unlike many other achievement words, "education" calls for moral evaluation, i.e., commending as intrinsically worthwhile.3 "Education" also refers to cognitive criteria. Achievement must be knowledge, gained by use of principle, of more than one sphere of reference, with proper appreciation and concern.4

1Ibid., p. 28.
3Ibid., p. 4.
4Ibid., pp. 7, 8.
As a point of comparison and the starting place for criticism, it is instructive to note the differences between this list and Peters' earlier formulation in "Education as Initiation." Although it is evident that the earlier composition anticipates much of the nucleus of the later one, nevertheless, there seem to be differences in the emphasis taken in each case. The social and public features of education are emphasized, especially the social process of "transmitting or initiating" in this first work.

1) Education essentially involves processes which intentionally transmit what is valuable in an intelligible and voluntary manner and which create in the learner a desire to achieve it.

2) Initiation is always into some body of knowledge and made of conduct which it takes time and determination to master.

3) His (the teacher's) task is to try to get others on the inside of a public form of life that he shares and considers to be worthwhile.

4) . . . the notion of initiation is a peculiarly apt description of this essential feature of education which consists in experienced persons turning the eye of others outwards to what is essentially independent of persons.¹

There are several questions raised by this comparison: In what way is "education" to be considered an achievement word? Does the achievement sense or the task sense of "education" seem more central or prime? This second question may seem to be an unprofitable question and perhaps even unanswerable; but its importance stems from the tendency in Peters' analysis to equate achievement with learning and process with teaching. Notice, for instance, that he summarizes his analysis of

"education" in the achievement sense by talking of the educated man, i.e., what the student achieved. The process/task sense refers to both the activity of the teacher and the student in interaction. What is confusing about his position is that we seldom use "educate" as we would use other achievement words. "He wins," "he discovers," "he knows," "he cheats," have no counterpart with "he educates," if we are thinking of the student. The best we can do is "he educates himself" or "he is being educated." These verbs are active and episodic, as Ryle points out, "educate" is episodic as something that takes place, but not as something actively done, if we are referring to the student. Such activity belongs to the act of teaching, unless that is, we use "educate" to mean the selecting and commending of standards to the student. Even though it might be pertinent to notice that process words like "learning" and activity words like "teaching" do have an achievement sense, these do not stand in for "educate." "He educates every child," though it is like "he wins every game," does not have the same force as "he teaches every child," for the second can be true without the first and the first true without admitting the second. "Educate" seems to fit contexts more like "making a law" or "marrying a couple." To assert achievement is to assert that a state of affairs obtains over and above the performance or activity, but in this case the achieving is not to


carry through an action to a given state; it is to institute a relationship as the given state of affairs. Peters has spoken of "educate" as establishing criteria for learning and secondarily for teaching. He does not perceive, however, the logical gap in his argument when he switches from "learning" to "initiating learning" all in one breath.

So the achievement must be that of the learner in the end. The teacher's success, in other words, can only be defined in terms of that of the learner. This presumably is the logical truth dormant in the saying that all education is self-education. This is what makes the notion of "initiation" an appropriate one to characterize an educational situation, for a learner is "initiated" by another . . . "Education" picks out processes by means of which people get started on the road to such achievements.1

"Initiated" may mean only "starting to learn or to teach"; but it may also mean "instituting a relation" in which "selecting," "comending," "sanctioning" suggest quite different contexts than that of direct agency. Peters wants to construe processes of education (teaching and learning, et al.s.) as tasks relative to achievements because he wants to show that achievement is in accordance with standards intrinsic to the processes. We have argued here that the achievement criteria do not fit the sense of achievement used.

"Just as 'finding' is the achievement relative to 'looking,' so 'being educated' is the achievement relative to a family of tasks that we call the processes of education."2 This argument leads Peters to a rather confining sense of "educate" because the normative senses of "learning" and "teaching" are directly invoked to provide the standards

1Peters, "What Is an Educational Process?", p. 3.

2Ibid., p. 2.
intrinsic to the achievement. Thus, although "being educated" is merely achieving the standards implicit in the processes of learning/teaching, nevertheless, those standards are more than of ordinary performances. For Peters they are moral achievements.

For if something is to count as "education," what is learnt must be regarded as worthwhile just as the manner in which it is learnt must be regarded as morally unobjectionable, for not all learning is "educational" in relation to the content of what is learnt.¹

There are two points being carried in this argument. One is the rather simple point that education as a purposive human activity has a purpose; the educator has a reason or finds a value in what is transmitted to the learner. We can agree with Peters when he argues that the educator will not say the learner is educated unless he has achieved something the educator values. The way he states the tautology suggests another claim, however. That education because of its standard of desirability is somehow also self-justifying, if not by particular standards, then at least in a general way, education is always commending an intrinsically worthwhile experience.

There are several criticisms to be made of this argument. Peters, on the one hand, finds it difficult to decide between a bad education (what people are working at is not worthwhile) and non-education. Presumably there is a continuum of worthwhileness upon which all educations are judged and the difficulty in judging the lower limit is in knowing how much bad to allow before one cuts out its educational value. Presumably one would reply, it becomes no education when the agent initiating sees no value in the activity of initiating. But this sense of

¹Ibid., p. 4.
"educate" is for Peters only a derivative sense.

It seems that Peters is willing to allow "education" to be applied in a derivate sense to content if it is only relatively worthwhile, but that he holds a hard line in talking of procedure as educational. "Education" can not be used interchangeably with "indoctrination" or "training" because these procedures are to him altogether immoral. However, as Peters has already argued in "Aims of Education," procedural rules themselves become content taught, and in any case it is difficult to see the contradiction in saying "that kind of education holds thievery as a way of honor" or that we are then using the term in a derivative sense.

The category of worthwhileness with which the educator works need not be a category of moral obligation or of intrinsic moral goodness; there may be many levels of worthwhileness and, of course, there are many varieties of non-moral value. Neither educational procedure nor content need be bound by any restricted use of worthwhile. To affirm this is not to deny that a given educational process may have a moral standard or that we might talk of the "ideal education" as, for instance, Aristotle talks of the "ideal citizen." This second reference is a derivative usage; the first is typical. If there are educators who are bound to any enterprise of initiating students into a given set of accepted values, then we have a typical use of "educate."

The question Peters has raised here is the question of "worthwhile" in education. I have argued that the issue is not focused at the student or teacher level; it is a cultural phenomenon. This does not
rule out ethical consideration; such consideration incorporates ethical
decision perhaps, but only as a cultural decision. The very difficulty
of providing ethical justification spells out the impossibility of
assigning a root ethical sense to the word "educate." On the other
hand, it does seem that there is a valuing/commending aspect incorpora-
ted primitively in the term "educate." As Peters argues:

The natural way of asking for an extrinsic end is to ask what a
man's purpose is in doing something or what his motive for it may
be. These are strange questions to ask about education itself, for
as "education" implies the transmission of what is of ultimate
value, it would be like asking about the purpose of a good life, but
they are reasonable questions to ask about the activities that fall
under education.¹

What can Peters mean by the statement, "education implies the
transmission of what is of ultimate value"? There are other formulae
used, for instance, "summarizing our notion of the form of life which is
worthwhile enough to deserve being handed on from generation to genera-
tion,"² or "education is of the whole man."³ These alternate formulat-
ions wash out any sense of moral ultimacy, or of the attempt to provide
justification for such a sense of "educate." What looks more plausible
is the contention that to educate a person one has to effect a change of
his life-style, for the term "education" commends at this level and
calls for response at this level. You are educated if you have adopted
a life-style. The question of what is the most desirable life-style is
a question of value, but life-styles are transmitted, adopted and lived

¹Peters, Ethics and Education, p. 7.
³Peters, Ethics and Education, p. 9.
apart from the justification. The question of whether we can talk plausibly of the "ideal education" is open; the question of what "educate" means is not to be confused nor identified with it. Inconsistently in further exposition, Peters dismisses out of hand the question whether "education is of the whole man" is a conceptual truth which rules out one-sided development or is an expression of our moral valuations about what is worthwhile. Part of his reason for rejecting the issue is that he resolves some of the commitment aspect into cognitive value which for him is incontestably educational and part of it is the question whether education has to do with the selection of commitment to a life-style or the justification of a life-style.

Another place in which the point must be made is in reference to Peters' discussion of training. There are two issues here. Peters insists:

Firstly, there is no reason why vocational training should not also be educational . . . We do not naturally talk of educating men as rulers, soldiers, or economists; we talk of training them.1

The justification of these positions is again dual. Even the vocational arts can be called educational in the measure which these arts are valued for their own sakes, as intrinsic goods, having a reason for doing them built into them. Of course, it is also true, that these arts can be construed as instrumental or inherent goods. The interesting point, however, is that these are educational for Peters because intrinsically good, even if the intrinsic quality is at a fairly low level and conjoined with extrinsic ends. If this be an obviously sound

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1Ibid., p. 7.
value relationship on the level of content, it is difficult to see why educational worthwhileness in general cannot be treated in the same way. Education as such may be intrinsically good in itself or as containing other intrinsic goods; it may also be construed as inherently good, having the capacity to produce intrinsic goodness in the experience of anyone who responds to it (the learner). This is no bar to education being declared instrumentally good, also, in that it is effective as a means of bringing about a valuable end beyond its intrinsic worth. In this case, it can be argued education is a means to other intrinsic values while yet recognizing that education is an intrinsic or inherent good, also. Or perhaps it would be better to classify education as having intrinsic, inherent value, and also, having contributive value, namely, the contribution of intrinsically valuable experience to the good life as a whole. This variety of possible interrelations sketched out by Taylor is not raised by Peters in this context. Further, the argument employed against Dewey's dismissal of intrinsic value should be used here to prevent the kind of abuse Dewey foresaw. Dewey protested ultimate values, arguing that intrinsic good was neither a plausible construction in itself nor a strong candidate for ultimacy. The reply sketched out in Chapter II agrees with Dewey that intrinsic good is not to be read as ultimate value, because the question of overall value can not be answered in terms of intrinsic good. This does not dislodge the claim that there are intrinsic goods and these are worthwhile in themselves. The degree of worthwhileness may be scaled in relationship to other goods and the intrinsic goodness may itself be either instrumental
to other goods or contributory to overall good.\(^1\)

The question of overall value is reflected in the criterion discussed above. We distinguish education from extrinsic learnings by its significance for our life. As Peters has allowed, "when people speak of 'education,' it is essential to know what their standards of valuation are in order to ascertain the aspect under which some process or state of mind is being commended." It is suspect, however, to impute to "educate" any special level of commending or to imply that because there are value issues raised by this commending feature, it is therefore the task of education to provide the justification for their commendation. Education may select out worthwhile experiences which perhaps are good-in-themselves and yet be subject to the further question of whether these worthwhile experiences best fit the student to live a happy and fruitful life. In other words, the overall purpose of education may be instrumental to life-practice, while the experiences selected are also individually worthwhile; and the question of ultimate value, and its justification may be reasonably left open.

The interesting question of specifying "ideal" education is subject to several further inquiries: 1) how to justify such ultimate values as the measure of an ideal life, 2) what is the most effective way to transmit these values and to whom? Education, per se, requires neither of these criteria; it implies the questions of selection and transmission only at the level where an agreed-upon sense of life-worth is located.

The distinction between educate and training is questionable for the same considerations. Peters comments that "we normally use the word 'train' when we have a specifiable extrinsic objective in mind." Peters is right in suggesting that "training" refers primarily to skills and specific tasks. Moreover, the wide applicability of skills and hence their desirability in education renders suspect his statement that "training" is excluded from the achievement sense of "educate." For to educate in skills may be the one possible way in which the worthwhileness as an intrinsic feature will be realized, though at the same time, of course, the training may be quite specific. Not all skill development can be considered training, however. In this respect, Peters' contrast of "educate" and "train" may be allowed.

Peters also declares that "we talk of a person being trained as a philosopher, cook or scientist," but "education" can not be tied to special competence. Here again the criterion of intrinsic worthwhileness is tightened up in extraordinary fashion. His stricture may well apply to a "cook" where the general relationships to life are not usually explicated, but the case of philosophy seems quite different. The very generality of philosophy seems to exclude this, although admittedly there would not be any guarantee of an ideal education. Furthermore, if education is always a selection and focus, it seems unreasonable to rule out such statements as "educated as a philosopher." One is merely noting the focus of selection while agreeing that the selection meets the criteria of "educate" in the achievement sense. It would be tempting to claim that Peters, in this denial is implying some abstracted content or procedure that belongs to education, per se. If "education"
in the achievement sense calls for the fulfillment of criteria (moral, cognitive), and if as we have argued there are added criteria of socialization (transmission or commendation beyond moral or cognitive level), then we can think of philosophy or science as education, if the area selected is itself general enough to meet the other criteria of education, also.

We have treated the extension of "educate" in the achievement sense which Peters makes by comparing the earlier and later formulations of the criterion. A second criticism of Peters' formulation of criteria concerns the scope of this standard. Peters adds to the criterion of worthwhileness a composite cognitive requirement. I am not sure of the reason why he distinguishes these in "What Is an Educational Process?" as the moral requirement and the achievement requirement.1 Perhaps this underscores the first objection that the achievement sense is tied too closely to the learning performance. Whether that be so, it should be first noted that the cognitive requirements, like the moral requirements, seem to be restricted unduly.

The cognitive criterion of "educate" requires that a man possess knowledge and know-how to the level of grasping principles inherent in at least two spheres of knowledge, caring for the activity of each specific knowing, as well as, committing oneself to acting in accordance with the warranted claims of those areas of knowledge. It is obvious that the criticism of Peters' moral criterion has siphoned off some of the force of the cognitive demand which stipulates the range of

knowledge and the proper attitudes of the knower. It is important to pay attention to the heightening of the cognitive demand in general. For instance, Peters seems unduly harsh on the Spartans when he states: "We could not say that they had received a military or moral education; for they had never been encouraged to understand the principles underlying their code."¹ Suppose the Spartans have a well-developed religious mythology which along with rules gives consistent but not adequate rational support for their military life; would this be classified by Peters as non-educating? It does not seem plausible to allow Peters to claim, then, that the "education of Spartans" is a derivative and merely descriptive use.

If education includes a criterion of cognitive activity, either because cognitive activity is worthwhile or because cognitive activity is incontrovertibly an integral part of being a whole human being, then the range of cognitive skills included by the usage is considerable and to narrow the range to the more sophisticated levels of cognitive activity is unwarranted. If Peters in this context talks about the essentials of education, this will be allowable only if he uses fairly broad designations, as for example, Wayne Booth does in addressing a Liberal Arts Conference at the University of Chicago. The criteria which he formulates are:

1) I must speculate (make an effort to understand), and I must test my speculations so that they are not simply capricious, unchecked by other men's speculations . . .

2) . . . the man who has . . . learned how to make the great human achievements in the arts his own . . .

¹Peters, Ethics and Education, p. 8.
3) ... the man who has ... learned anything about how to understand his own intentions and to make them effective in the world ...

Comparison of Peters and Booth suggests a second criticism of Peters' cognitive requirement. Booth calls to our attention the aesthetic dimension of education as well as the notion of individual agency in a non-moral dimension. Peters, of course, has not denied an aesthetic dimension; he has included it under the moral criterion of worthwhileness, using ethics loosely to include both value theory in general and theory of morality. We have introduced Taylor above to call attention to different value points of view (moral, aesthetic, legal, economic, etc.), as well as to suggest that there are other considerations to raise about justifying values than the obvious formula of extrinsic/intrinsic. To group all value as intrinsic and to discuss intrinsic value in the context of moral intrinsic value is to foreshorten the range covered by the term "educate."

This is most clearly demonstrated in terms of the two criteria used by Peters to explicate "educate." If there are at least two criteria, there is the further question of how these two criteria are correlated. Peters seems to have emphasized the cognitive aspect unduly. His preoccupation with the question of justification of worthwhileness leads him to overstate the rationality of the educational enterprise, and to detract from his own insight into the procedural-decisional aspect of the institution.

In the chapter "Worthwhile Activities," Peters with admirable skill sorts out the arguments which have been marshalled to support the contention that "there are reasons for choosing some forms of activity rather than others as ends in themselves." It is also a question of which ends are of most worth, and Peters admits the instrumental character of this question while arguing the obvious intrinsic superiority of serious cognitive activities which explain, assess and illuminate the different facets of life.

The various theoretical inquiries are explorations of these different facets of his experience. To ask the question "Why do this rather than that?" seriously is, therefore, however embryonically, to be committed to those inquiries which are defined by their serious concern with those aspects of reality which give context to the question he is asking. In brief the justification of such activities is not purely instrumental because they are involved in asking the question "Why do this rather than that?" as well as in answering it.¹

For all the brilliance and insight of this argument, it seems to be begging the question. One can readily agree that serious cognitive activity of this kind is intrinsically worthwhile, that such activity is superior to other intrinsically valuable activities, that such activity is necessary if one seeks seriously to comprehend life. What is not shown is that education is intrinsically worthwhile, or that rational activity is incorporated into education entirely for intrinsic reasons. The tight knit Peters has woven for education as worthwhile and cognitive might be allowable as an ideal or preferred form. The "unexamined life may not be worth living," other things considered equal. But there are other considerations. Notice that Peters assumes that the only

¹Peters, Ethics and Education, p. 90.
serious way to be concerned or awed with the world is the rational way. Again, to have shown the justification of these activities to be not purely instrumental is not to have shown the intrinsic worth is more important for education than the instrumental value. Basically, to ask "why this or that?" is not to expect that the question can be given a clear or justifiable answer; the answer may be insufficient and impossible to interpret with any definiteness. Perhaps this is why Peters allows for the possibility of explanation to be at times only obscurely intimated in an undifferentiated way in the question of "why," but even this is presumptuous, for some answers are given in action, not talk.

The result of this close identification of rational explanation with education is that Peters assigns secondary significance to other characteristic features of education. One such characteristic is the educator's consideration of the interests of the children and what is in their interest and also what is in public interests. The question for Peters becomes primarily a matter of distribution as the question of worthwhileness has already taken care of the prizing side of the question.

"The normative notion of 'interests' combines judgments about what is worthwhile or desirable (judgments of content) with judgments about individual capacity and potentiality."¹ Consideration of interests has to do more with instrumental questions of schooling rather than the intrinsic worthwhileness embodied in education. In part, the doctrine of interest resolves into that of public interest, i.e., those

¹Ibid., p. 95.
basic rules of social intercourse and ethical principles of justice, respect, equality and freedom. Yet, the doctrine of interest is presupposed in all of these doctrines and in relation to education the cost of what is worthwhile must be cut according to the cloth of individual aptitude, which is often best assured by building in a principle of options into the curriculum.

At the early stages of education simpler forms of what is valuable are all that is possible for children. In brief, education is not simply for the intelligent. It is not a question of some being capable of it and others not. It is a matter, rather, of how far individuals can progress along the same avenues of exploration.¹

Peters here talks of a quality of life which is educational but surely not incorporated in his argument for criteria of cognition or worthwhileness. According to his strictures, this could be called education only in a derivative or process sense. The alternative, i.e., construing education in the sense of transmitting value, seems closer to our usage. In that way, interest of the individual according to his capacity becomes a major criterion of education, not merely as procedure but as achievement.

What has happened in Peters' argument is that the question of worthwhileness has been restricted to the question, "What is of most worthwhile quality?" Trying to answer this only by raising questions of intrinsic value blurs the needed "instrumental" reference to the quality of the life as a whole. Peters refers to this in terms of the categories of duty and necessity.² Thus, Peters is inclined to reduce the question of worthwhileness to the more esoteric qualities and to ignore

¹Ibid., p. 102. ²Ibid., p. 99.
the common factor of individual prizing which gives the more complex qualities their ground, though admittedly not their complete justification. Interest, as individual fulfillment, is a quality intrinsically worthwhile on its own level; and while its relation to other values considered for the whole of life may yet be an instrumental consideration, it is not therefore subordinate. Peters argues implausibly:

... no education can be indifferent to what children want. He cannot, as in the ordinary social situation say that what people want is their own affair, provided they do no damage to others. The justification of order falls under the promotion of what is good, with its subordinate principle of the consideration of what is in people's interest.¹

At a subordinate level it is instructive to see Peters arguing the non-rational aspect of political organization. He argues that the very notion of government itself, implying the placing of some man over another, is prima facie an affront to a rational man. But, if as he has also argued, justice, equality, respect, are primarily rational arbitrations that establish societal order, public interest and standards of worthwhileness; the affront should be resolved unless there is a factor of human interest which is both irreducible and intrinsic to the situation.

The argument, of course, should be generalized beyond the single individual interest. Israel Scheffler presenting "Reflections on Educational Revelation" argues social revelance, the practicability and applicability of knowledge to life as the criteria of educational revelance.

The ultimate fruit of the knowledge it seeks is its use in life. Schooling must thus be so organized as to bring knowledge to bear on

¹Ibid., p. 117.
life's problems and in so doing to train students in the proper application of what they may know or come to know. Education is thus made relevant by making its instrumental values dominant.¹

Scheffler, however, is not altogether happy with his conclusion. Life must be infused with respect for knowledge and criticism; schooling is not to be conceived of as an instrument for the implementation of designated social values, taken as ultimate. His final statement sounds like the complete reversal of his previous bid for educational relevance to life. His closing sentence states: "Its (education's) primary task is not to be relevant but to help form a society in which its ideals of free inquiry and rationality shall themselves have become chief touchstones of relevance."²

Like Peters, Scheffler has lapsed into a wistful intellectualism. If rationality as a tool forms also a pattern of life to which one can be committed, it would then be considered as an ideal education. That this way of life can be completely realized seems hard to swallow; that education as a process of forming life patterns can be restricted to this stance seems both radical and exclusive of the other elements of life which are necessary. Interest need not be taken as ultimate to be given a place of intrinsic worth alongside of rationality or worthwhileness taken at its highest degree. There might be several styles of life which beget characteristic educational ideals. The element of choice might then be irreducible as far as education is concerned.

²Ibid., p. 773.
Peters has discussed this topic explicitly in the essay "Education as Process." His essential contentions are that extrinsic aids such as physical properties of classroom, extrinsic interest-rewards and informal "picking things up" are not educational because they happen to people. Another list of processes are labeled as educational. These include training, instruction, theorizing, criticism and conversation. These are educational in that they all involve the intention of the learner for even training is not restricted to a specific skill. The distinction between processes and achievement turns largely on the fact that processes can be brought to a degree of excellence, while the processes are neither sufficient nor exhaustively specified to be identified as achievement.

A more interesting and fruitful analysis of process in education is developed in the context of Ethics and Education. While discussing the justification of the several constituents of his concept of education, Peters sketches a sequence of analyses which show the intricate measures to be considered in putting the criteria of education to work. He does not discuss processes in the traditional sense, then, but gives considerable attention to spelling out a schema of application and implementation into which processes can be introduced or by which they can be directed. Take, for instance, the question of justice. Peters views this as a second-order principle in both a positive and negative way.

The principle of justice prescribes the making of general rules for distinctive forms of action where there are relevant differences
and once rules are made, making no exceptions to them unless there are relevant differences in the situation to which they are presumeto apply.¹

Such a second-order principle requires other principles to determine the relevance of the criteria in the situation then judged as a matter of fairness. Further, as formal arrangements can be extended to minimize existing differences, there is always the question of the extent to which this can be carried out. That is, if wages be judged as unjustly unequal, to what extent shall the conditions (and the principles governing them) be shaped to balance the inequality? In the case of education, the lack of agreement about what is vital in education reflects differences as to criteria far beyond the mechanisms of equality and involve questions concerning the extent to which schooling should meet the external demands of the community.

A series of formal considerations are in order. If the question of equality is the ordering of values established for other reasons, then there will always be questions of reducing the conflict of whatever values presupposed. Equality presupposes for Peters a harmonizing of the presupposed criteria of worthwhileness and freedom.² Further, equality, like freedom, as a normative criterion commends an ideal which is indeterminate. It is commended contingent upon the finding of good reasons for limiting its application. Though Peters blurs the grounds for being just by casting the presumption as a matter of having good reasons for making change and thus failing to recognize the justification for being just, will not be entirely some set of reasons, but

¹Peters, Ethics and Education, p. 53. ²Ibid., p. 64.
perhaps a sense of fittedness or obligation; nevertheless, his recognition of the indeterminateness of this rule is noteworthy. The application of equality has to be balanced against a calculus of proportionate interest-claims, and careful consideration has to be given to how far the rule can be extended. The extent to which differences must be ignored or eradicated is a part of the task of exercising moral judgment. Another provision must be made for consideration of the actual situations in which these judgments are to be applied, bridging the discrepancy "between formal arrangements and what in fact happens."

The plea for "equality of opportunity" is more properly understood as either an attack on irrelevant aids to opportunity (e.g., wealth) or as a demand for replacing unreasonable by reasonable grounds for providing access to opportunities.¹

This, of course, is not a matter of philosophical argument again, but a practical judgment exercised in the light of a multitude of contingent circumstances and in the light of whatever technical expertise can be garnered.

These same considerations apply equally to the principle of freedom. In this case, the concern for fitting the formal pattern to the actual situation involved quite different empirical considerations than the first. In this case, we are concerned with the exercise of inner-directed attitudes rather than the control of external acts and the actualities include the students adopting the pattern for his own. Here, the actual necessities concern learning theory, and further, learning theory developed in the area of moral education. Using Piaget's findings on the learning of moral behavior, Peters sketches out

¹Ibid., p. 67.
a number of observations of human development and of teaching. This example should not be pressed too far in that the process of socialization in the schools calls for tolerance and empathy which is the equivalent move in reference to the doctrine of equality to that used of freedom. It is also the case, that freedom is introduced into the school at different levels, calling for response and exercise for a variety of role-contexts and stages of maturity. The freedom of the teacher centers in the active exercise of teaching, that of administrator in management and discipline, that of the Board in political control and responsibility. The paradox of freedom, i.e., too much freedom by reason of the anxiety and social vacuum created leads to too little freedom, emphasizes the necessity of a formal system of rules and sanctions which ensure that the individual will not in fact be interfered with in certain respects.

Freedom is explicated as the demand to be allowed to do what there are reasons for doing, or speaking in the case of freedom of speech and thought. There are, then, several kinds of indeterminateness built into the concept. Reasons for interfering with a reasonable action may be derived from other equally relevant and important principles. Freedom will always be construed in a specific context of constrained desires; where there is little possibility of interference or indifference to the interference, there is little point to freedom. Freedom is had only in the measure that it is exercised in the fulfilling of possible wants and the conditions of freedom extend to personal

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1Ibid., p. 120.  
2Ibid., p. 108.
limitations as well as social and physical.

In discussing freedom concretely, therefore, it is important to discover what types of constraint are thought to be oppressive in any given context. There is no one problem of freedom any more than there is one problem of equality.¹

Applying these considerations to the problem of freedom in the schools, Peters denies that the children should have freedom in any great measure. Compulsory education, need for order in the situation of group learning, the immaturity of the child, are empirical conditions which rightly constrain any exercise of the child's freedom. From Peters' point of view, questions of worthwhileness and the subordinate principle of public interest generate the primary justification for the student. He does not deny freedom as a matter of independent concern; he rather insists that intrinsic worthwhileness and order are more important to determine the priorities in actual situations than freedom. The assumption that rationality should be given precedence over self-determination has been questioned above, in terms of Scheffler's argument. In this context, however, it seems necessary to add that schooling in actuality should be directed toward the individual's development primarily. There will be a sliding scale of application: freedom is conditioned by maturity, so that the older the student, the more his education is self-directed. Nevertheless, to forbid freedom of thought is to presuppose infallibility and unless or until it is clear that one way of life is warrantedly superior to another, the schools must preserve the neutrality and plurality necessitated by indeterminate situations. Furthermore, we cannot overlook the way in which freedom is

¹Ibid., p. 109.
built into rationality, as the freedom to make mistakes and the necessity of learning by negatively ruling out possibilities. To tie compulsory education to maximum quality and rationality of life requires a standard far above that required by public concern for order or by the psychological conditions of maximum learning opportunity. Educators have too often forgotten that the ideal of an educated man (defined even in Peters' way) enter in the process of education for minimal, not maximal standards. The opportunity to develop as far as one has capacity and to the fullest capacity is offered only as an opportunity, not as a demand or compulsion. Unless one has Platonic expertise to determine fairly and wisely the exact level of individual life, it seems rash to set the compulsory standards of the school in light of ideas rather than in terms of bare minimum, leaving to the individual's freedom the matter of individual determination of limits. Peters seems to have selected out criteria of education which may be esoteric, no matter how ideally desirable. Well aware of the fact that to reach them may demand optimum effort, he then stresses the order and worthwhileness of the educational effort than the interest (what all have in common) and individuality of the task.

If we disagree with the conclusions to which Peters has argued, we observe the pertinence of the methodological considerations which he has suggested. The point so well taken by Peters here is that education is more than a matter of establishing normative criteria, but that the matter of procedure is itself so complex as to require highly sophisticated application to the specific demands of the parts of that educational situation. In this case of applying the criteria of freedom, it
has been suggested that Peters has not paid careful enough attention to the conflict with other criteria or given proper consideration to the specific dimensions of the application of freedom to the student. Unless we want to play God, the application of educational criteria must be at the level of actual student response and not at the level of rational justification.

Summary

Peters discusses other moral criteria implied in the task of education. Respect for others, fraternity, authority and public sanction are given exposition in a helpful, enlightening way. As has been seen, he does not give the schools a democratic cast. At best, any school in a democratic country must consider realistically what it can do to produce democratically-minded citizens. What we have stressed as the basis of education, Peters rejects.

But it is precisely because there is agreement about the procedural principles of fairness, tolerance, and the consideration of interests, which provide a framework for such issues to be discussed, that we can afford to differ about low-level matters where fundamental principles conflict. Such a consensus does not, of course, make these principles valid; that has not been argued. But it is necessary for making democracy more than a formal facade.²

He argues that the principles of rationality and worthwhileness are more important for the school than democratic principles. Also that schooling gains its justification only as it is rationally justified, so that no consensus is allowable. There is a democratic consensus to which the school gives support—the triad mentioned in the quotation.

¹Ibid., p. 212.
²Ibid., p. 215.
These are secondary in education; nevertheless, they do form a bridge between school life and democracy and the basis for the school to become the socializing agent of democracy.

Here, as I see it, is the dilemma of Peters. Having accepted an essentially aristocratic ideal of worthwhileness, based upon a process of rational justification, he cannot allow anything less than the highest ideals as criteria for education. But the solution he proposes has several major flaws. On the one hand, Peters seems oblivious to the fact that educational norms are less rigorous than this by the very nature of the situation in which they operate. Even in a community of rational beings, there would be a distinction to be made between the ideal of rationality fulfilled as an individual achievement and the way in which that rationality functions as the binding commitment of the group. Unless the entire society were composed of adults, there would be the need of education which employed the means of rational authority to bring the child into maturity, learning would yet be different from knowing, and one might conceivably imagine a rational being who has less than ardent commitment to the life of reason.\footnote{Ibid., cf. pp. 152, 161, 191.} If the notion of a rational society is at all human, it must incorporate criteria of procedure and initiation which seem similar to a concept of education we have argued. On the other hand, the matter of rational justification as Peters presents it, seems to ignore its own specifications. To justify in each case involves an interest plus good reasons for entertaining it. It would be improper to conclude that the justification consisted only
in the giving of reasons, for the most basic reason in each case would be the fact of the interest. Peters acknowledges this in arguing for intrinsic worth, but he is lead into confusing intrinsic worth with overall worth or comparative worth. In the case of the secondary educational criteria, he minimizes the essential positive sense of fittedness (equality, freedom, respect) which give the positive presumption and stresses instead the need of providing sufficient reason to negate the presumption.

In any case, his work is extremely valuable for its insight into the nature of value, and doubly so for the awareness of the difference between the formal principle and its necessary application to specific situations. Formal principles are necessary for the direction and criterial function they perform. To have stated criteria is not the only task even in value theory. Criteria to be applied have to take into account conditions and possibility of conflict of the criteria on the lower level of specific application. A given set of conditions may set criterial principles in conflict or at least introduce severe modification of the criteria. For this reason, Peters argues that the application of criteria is itself a practical judgment. There can be, then, consensus on the level of principle and disagreement on the level of application, inasmuch as the practical judgment must perform two tasks: 1) the traditional task of setting criteria, and 2) the task of fashioning a tool of initiation which fairly implements these criteria for their proper role and intent.
CHAPTER IV

A DIALOGUE ON NORMATIVE CURRICULUM DESIGNS

The purpose of this chapter is to bring together the descriptive analysis of the curriculum theorists in chapter one with the projection of ethical theory in chapters two and three. In effect, there are two major positions to be argued: 1) the expectations either negative or sycophantic toward philosophy's contribution have to be qualified, and 2) the distinctions and operations of the curriculum theorist have to be flexibly and individually infused with value consideration for the particular task at hand. It would be interesting, but extremely difficult to construct the second position in concrete detail. I propose a sketch of some of the detail by comparing another radically different curriculum theory with those of chapter one, in the light of the revised ethical theory taken in chapters two and three.

First of all, what are issues arising out of curriculum theory as projected in chapter one? The skepticism of Taba concerning the fruitfulness of philosophy in projecting the goals of the school is juxtaposed to the uncritical use of philosophy in establishing the framework and context of curriculum in Phenix and King-Brownell. The instability of the relation of philosophy to curriculum stems in part from the indeterminateness of philosophical problems, but in these cases the value orientation of education is disguised by making curriculum
theory appear to be more substantial than what it is. In Taba, this appears as a naive espousal of curriculum criteria, such as balance, sequence, and scope, which really mask value positions. The root of the problem lies in her hope that the concrete learning and particular curricula aspect of the problem can be handled separately from the analysis of the general and vague philosophical ideals of educator. Thus, solving the empirical and specific problems of instruction, she hopes to accumulate units of curriculum into an overt total value commitment which will then have relevance and forestall the cynicism which arises out of observation of philosophy's irresolution and partisanship. This maneuver of Taba obviates the whole question of justification for a given value commitment. In fact, it blurs the interesting and more important philosophical question directly focused on educational problems, such as, 1) whether education is essentially normative or descriptive; 2) whether we need to resolve the value questions at this level of generality in order to educate.

It is at this point that Peters speaks most convincingly. Education is irreducibly normative and those norms, though general, are pervasive to the very detail of curriculum activity. Most important is his stipulation that the application of educational norms be flexible and that by the very nature of the case, norms as general rules require careful specification of conditions in application to differing situations. Also, at differing levels, rules require consideration of their interaction with both conditions and other normative principles. Dewey had striven for the same insight, but was prevented by his failure to isolate the operations which characterize a moral or value role.
Viewing general norms from this theoretical perspective enables us to entertain a more just expectation of the role of such goals. Introducing goals as criteria allows for a proper conception of generality functioning to exclude undesirable characteristics of a given classification. Nevertheless, this generality governs classifications, not specific end-goals. Furthermore, on Peters' analysis the criteria operate negatively, ruling out what is incompatible, not attempting to specify in any conclusive or exhaustive way, the necessary and sufficient characteristics of a given class. Peters has given us an open-ended method, even if we reject his application of it in arriving at a given construction of educational procedure.

Where this study took issue with Peters was on the question of the specific character of educational norms and on the identification of philosophical justification with educational justification. We have argued that educational norms are less intellectualistic, are staged at the level of social consensus, not philosophical justification, and, hence, require a justification built on intrinsic quality and considerations which support a way of life. Questions of intrinsic value are neither sufficient in themselves to provide answers to educational questions, nor is intrinsic quality to be taken as a mark of absolute value or as the key to the hierarchical relationships ordering educational values. For these reasons, it is necessary to distinguish the question of philosophical justification from educational justification.

Not only is it a fact that the issue of philosophical justification has not been resolved satisfactorily, but the educational concern
with the individual and his actual needs requires action now, even theoretically inadequate action, if this is all that is available. Educational theory is focused on what is available and in the case of philosophical indeterminateness, it is focused on a pluralism which does not disguise or arbitrarily solve the philosophical issues but does give a stability for practice. Peters' position is unwarrantedly restrictive from the point of view of philosophical conclusions. Practically, education must build in awareness of philosophically competitive ways of life while insisting that this plurality does not destroy the normative aspects of education, i.e., the acceptance of reasons for value commitments which are relevant to the educational situation. With this in mind, I have argued against intrinsicness as the major criterion of educational norms. Education is for life, but the assessment can not be made on any easy analysis of intrinsic reasons, or for that matter, of extrinsic reasons.

King-Brownell and Phenix introduce into the discussion considerations of the sociological dimension of knowledge (King-Brownell) and of the achievement of individual meaning (Phenix). In each case, they hold that curriculum is primarily a matter of a philosophical theory of knowledge; in each case the intellectualism of the curriculum activity has been mollified by an improper introduction of considerations for which they can give no good account. The use of the category, discipline, in King-Brownell marks their inability to provide a unified and rational perspective for all areas of human concern. They argue for a pluralism of knowledge organized into a curriculum primarily by discipline as if
the disciplines of life had fortuitously resolved the problems of the unity of knowledge.

In the case of Phenix the rubric of meaningfulness cannot be taken as purely cognitive even in the light of his own classification. Nevertheless, his curriculum theory assumes that these areas of meaning constitute a coverage of the whole of experience. Here again, the claim seems pretentious and the philosophical unity of meaning needs supplementation by Phenix's endorsement of a subjective position, i.e., to see experience as meaningful to me.

In both the argument of Phenix and King-Brownell, we have in essence a denial of the claim that education is normative. The inability of these writers to give a philosophically adequate account of experience allows them to entertain clandestine appeals to historical accident or subjective preference because the subordinate position of value in the theory lacks the necessary explanatory capacity.

These expositions are helpful to the extent that the appeal to historical disciplines and subjective preference (meaningfulness) bring before us further curriculum issues. As Peters has argued, it is not enough to acclaim education as value-directed and by rule. The issue of applying a given value to a situation in which other value-rules are operative, as well as the need for taking into account the empirical conditions of the situation, display further complexity which has to be dealt with. If there are moral values in the curriculum, there are also cognitive values which have to be taken into account. If moral values include social organization, they also include freedom of choice and
individual expression. The question of disciplines, the selection of cognitive paradigms, the pressure to evaluate a student for his cognitive achievement are all empirical situations directed and focused by a cognitive ideal of knowledge and truth. Phenix's appeal to individual choice and pacing set an obvious hurdle to the implementation of the traditional mass education. In addition, it is not merely a matter of whether curriculum criteria mask a conflict of values; there is the task, emphasized but not adequately treated by Taba, of rightly fitting the value rule to the specific situation within the curriculum. It is not enough to note differences of level between general goals and unit-course objectives. It is imperative that we see the value dimension in each level, admitting the logical priority of the general goal over the objective by virtue of the fact that the general rule indicates the way in which the specific case is classified while taking into account the specific conditions to be ruled on. In the case of King-Brownell, there is no way in which the cognitive ideal realized in a variety of disciplines carries beyond this to the level of the student learning save in the clumsy requirement that all the disciplines be represented at all times. In Phenix's use of meaningfulness the formal order of the curriculum is set in direct competition with the order of student learning and no resolution is offered.

A positive example can be given, using the work of Paul Hirst, who seems to be implementing the more general position taken by Peters. Like Peters, Hirst is eager to construct a program of Liberal Arts which will mediate educational values throughout the whole of the educational
process without necessarily excluding specialized and physical education or character training. He justifies the Liberal Arts, like Peters, arguing that education is based on what is true; as knowledge, education is the fulfillment of rationality and the determinant of the good life as a whole. We have criticized this identification of education with rationality (though admittedly the two are not mutually exclusive) above in the discussion of Peters' position. What is relevant to the point being made here is the thoughtful way in which Hirst applies this cognitive ideal to the problem of curriculum. He does not compose a full-fledged design; nevertheless, his suggestions are highly significant.

Hirst turns away from the hoary metaphysical appeals to Reality, and in direct fashion he rejects the alternative of the Harvard Report on General Education which tries to establish a curriculum in terms of skills and forms of knowledge. Liberal Arts as a form of education knows no limits other than those necessarily imposed by the nature of rational knowledge. Thus, the justification of curriculum is not the justification of mass education. The pattern of curriculum will be tailored to the following demands:

1) . . . existence of public criteria of truth and falsity which give objectivity to knowledge and Liberal Arts.

2) . . . the characteristic forms of knowledge are derived directly out of an analysis of the actual function of knowledge in life.
   a) . . . disciplines are formally prescribed by i) marking the elements of concept, system, experimental testability and skill; ii) by describing linguistic and decisional usage; iii) by the specific focus which separates it from other disciplines

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(i.e., history, physics)

b) ... fields of knowledge are formed out of several disciplines by attempting to solve or direct some actual task of civilization. These belong in Liberal Arts only as a matter of practical inquiry, not as fields of study for resolving the problem.

c) ... areas of moral inquiry can be isolated from either a) or b) for analysis of the special problems and methodology involved.

d) ... second-order inquiry in which knowledge is cultivated for its bearing as a tool or method in other inquiries.

3) Liberal Arts education will be concerned with the understanding of experience achieved in this variety of ways and of the interrelations and common characteristics exhibited.

4) Rules of selection can be specified directly: a) there must be sufficient emersion in a given form to know the distinctive focus of the area brought to bear on specific cases (paradigms); b) there must be sufficient generalization so that the student's experience begins to be widely structured in this manner; c) the major achievements of every area ought to be known at least in outline.

5) The logic of the disciplines demonstrates the meaningful way in which terms and criteria are employed in that discipline; how these patterns are best perceived by the student is a matter of empirical inquiry.

The important moves which Hirst makes to tie the cognitive ideal into the actual curriculum structure are in the way he defines the forms of knowledge, the separation of the logical and psychological aspects of the problem, and the emphasis upon actual knowledge rather than mere schematized abstractions. The ideals of knowledge are preserved even as they are fitted to the situation. However, the work has not been carried far enough. The relationship between instruction and curriculum has been worked out for cognitive values, but not for the conflict of other values implicit in the social interaction or the learning process.

1Ibid., p. 130.
Unless we are willing to exclude learning from the ideal of knowledge, then there may be a tension between optimum learning of science and educational learning of the individual. Nor is this a matter of empirical inquiry alone; we have to decide what it is best for the individual to know in relation to what he can know best. In this respect the caveat of Hirst that justification of curriculum is not the same as justification of mass education has an ominous import.

Another way of infusing specific learning with general values is to view education primarily as a matter of choice or of social constraint.

An Open-Ended Curriculum

As Macdonald looks at the problems of curriculum construction, he singles out the normative moral characteristics of education as the focal ones.

The dominant value proposed here is a moral value and the concept of a person is a moral concept. Education, and more particularly schooling, is thus a moral enterprise because we create a contrived environment called "curriculum and instruction," and we attempt to influence persons in this environment.¹

The reasons he gives for holding this position are worthy of notice and further qualification. He is concerned for the vitality of curriculum as a living experience when he argues that its beginning point is what is right, now, for the person; "the learning experience itself must have inherent worth for the person, not in terms of some

eventual behavior change, but in terms of its moral quality in the present.\(^1\) He is concerned with the unity of the curriculum when he argues that the order we give to values must depend upon commitment to some dominating belief; in this case, it is the respect for person and the freedom of human agency. He is concerned for the implementation of the curriculum as a tool for initiating conditions and encounters with the student as person, not as a finely-wrought cultural contrivance, nor as the definition of the student's learning. Hence, the curriculum in its narrowest sense must generate the most flexible and widest opportunity for cultural learning and especially the widest and most intense development of the skills and languages of the disciplines. These assumptions are sharply contrasted with his formulation of the traditional means-end, technological rationality of schemes built on a Tyler model. Orienting decision-making to expected behavioral outcomes assumes that the student's objective performance is indicative of his psychological knowledge and violates the integrity of the person by segmenting his behavior and manipulating him for an end beyond his immediate experiencing in the curriculum. The cultural content of the traditional curriculum standardized and reproduced forms the process by which the schools socialize the individual.

The contrast between Peters and Macdonald is obvious. Both are holding normative views of education; both call for a unity of curriculum invested in moral criteria. The criticism against Peters' intellectualism elaborated in chapter three indicates a certain affinity with

\(^{1}\text{Ibid.}, p. 41.\)
the position of Macdonald. Nevertheless, the reasoning with which Macdonald has supported his ideal of person, suffers from ambiguities worth assessing.

The concept of student-organized learning has implicit in it all the ambiguities explored in Dewey's theory of experience and of Phenix's concept of meaningful. To argue that curriculum be focused on the active, conscious interest of the student is not also to argue that manipulating a student "for an end beyond his immediate experiencing in the curriculum" is altogether wrong. While it is true that the educator's energies are to be concentrated on the learning at hand, and while it is true that education as a human function cannot wait until we are certain of its success, we cannot agree that all learning experience need be worthwhile in an immediate and direct way. Macdonald qualifies his statement in one place by talking of "the moral quality in the present." This can be interpreted in a stronger way than even Peters' insistence on the morality of educational procedure. The content as well as the procedure must be intrinsically worthwhile; but this neither excludes being of instrumental or contributive worth at the same time, nor does it require the intrinsic quality to be on any fixed or high level. The "moral quality in the present" may be any of these relationships which involve the student in an end beyond the immediate.

The second reason presents an equally limited moral situation. To gain unity in the curriculum, Macdonald advocates singling out one value of supreme worth and as the organizer of the hierarchy of values.

1Ibid., p. 41.
The "paradox of freedom" presented by Peters is the obvious rejoinder to Macdonald's claim that freedom is the key to the hierarchy of educational values. But perhaps the issue is not merely a controversy of which value is more central, i.e., rationality or freedom. The more important problem may be concerning the plurality of values. If, for instance, M. Scriver argues for justice/equality to be the central value (and the one most apt to gain easy consensus), Frankena, on the other hand, argues for a plurality of moral values, justice and benevolence.¹ In either case, however, there are non-moral values to be taken into account such as aesthetic, spiritual and intellectual values, and it remains an open-ended question how these are to be ordered for full-orbed life. When one considers the complexity of values to be ordered, and the variety of values classified into points of view (aesthetic, religious, economic, rational, etc.), it seems wisest to refuse to take a radically unified position. Rather, we allow for the philosophical work of classification and justification to proceed independently of the educational task, adopting a pluralistic value position. With Dewey, we would make education instrumental to the quality of life, but admit some procedures and value-aspects to be more central and worth while than others.

This is, in fact, what educators seem to have done with their formulations of goals of education. However, it takes little perspicuity to recognize that merely listing ideals is not enough. Without careful consideration of how the values are classifiable, of the

¹William Frankena, *Ethics* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), Ch. III.
relative importance of any of these for a way of life, of the relative
importance of any of these for the task of educating, of the methods of
justification by which some values are clearly subordinated to others--
without these considerations, such lists seem to be a waste of time. A
pluralism of values need not be held uncritically nor the list composed
without discrimination, even though, practically, there will be more
than one selection of values implemented in educational systems because
ultimately the question of philosophical justification is unsolved.

This raises the third of Macdonald's reasons for asserting a
person-value orientation for education. He has argued that the applica-
tion of moral criteria to the educational process directs an optimum
exercise of self-initiated learning and interpersonal relationships.
The curriculum must be dialogue, structured with promise, forgiveness,
service, beauty, vitality and justice in order to capture the moral
import that Macdonald seeks. Some of these items (dialogue, beauty,
justice) sound relevant; some of the items (forgiveness, promise) appear
incongruous with the life of the school for any of its major emphases;
and some items (service) are given an immoral twist. For instance, he
suggests service should be given to oneself. More important is the
overall rationale of Macdonald's thesis. He desires to construct a
"moral curriculum through procedures which reflect moral values." Thus,
although he emphasizes the inter-active procedural side of curriculum
development, he does not want to lose sight of the contrived environment
necessary for the facilitation of instruction. Unlike the emphasis of
Hirst, Macdonald views the curriculum as vital and pliable. With Hirst,
he points to language, form, content, locus and prescription (whether mandatory or elective) which indicate knowledge to be learned. Unlike Hirst, he suggests that we pay attention to open-ended goals, to formal and informal influence and involvement. These fall under moral restriction and, in fact, these items are the main vehicle of the moral import, which to Macdonald is sufficient justification for education.

The requirement of flexibility and positive personal growth is a welcome correction to Hirst's position. However, Macdonald has not made it clear in what respect the moral and the cognitive come into agreement, nor how the moral rightfully directs the cognitive aside from the fact that student rights should not be denied. It is puzzling to know how to separate instruction from curriculum in his design. It is also puzzling why the morality upon which the curriculum is based is construed largely for egoistic response. There seems no good reason for restricting morality to the creativity, meaning and progress of the individual; whereas socialization, order and common welfare seem equally pertinent to moral issues. Thus, for instance, Frederick Olafson, writing on the educational benefit of the humanities, insists on isolating the agency, communicative and evaluative aspect of the humanities as its essential contribution to education.

Through the study of a carefully selected group of such works, the student can be brought to an understanding of a gradually evolving tradition, or set of traditions—moral, religious, social and political—in which he himself stands; and the study of that tradition would be an exercise in historical understanding in the broadest sense (reflective and appraising) rather than in conceptual or logical analysis.1

This use of the humanities differs from Hirst's in that the analysis is directed to the human agency, dramatically portrayed in the fullness of a concrete situation. The analysis will issue in direct appraisal of the values structuring the situation and communicated through a nontechnical language which mediates the dualism of practical and cognitive activity. Macdonald has something like this in mind when he tries to contrast technical and aesthetic rationality and, in fact, identify these respectively with curriculum and instruction.\(^1\) What remains confusing is the identification of planning with technical rationality and of personal interaction with aesthetic rationality, when the question in point is how to bring the two together into a workable unity or fusion, and this on a social as well as individual level. Either he has failed to project an ample set of values or he has allowed the application of values to levels of curriculum theorizing to become stereotyped and insensitive to the dimensions of the situation. In respect of Macdonald's position, there is agreement that the normative moral aspect of education must be brought to bear directly on the student. This means that education cannot defer to unfinished philosophical business, nor can any narrower interpretation of education be given, than to say we are seeking to develop life commitments of the highest possible quality in the individual. For that reason, Macdonald's position has been scored along with Peters and Hirst for offering a value orientation for education that is more restrictive than it should be.

What can be said toward a constructive sketching in of possible alternatives.

Towards a Reconstructed View of Curriculum Norms

Pluralism has been enigmatically referred to as a better way of handling the normative problems of education. What do we mean by such a reference?

In the first place, it should be argued that there are no single values which can provide the unity desired for educational activity. There is no philosophically valid theory of values and surely educational norms are not justifiable on a political or social consensus alone. But, as a first step, recognizing that the individual's initiation into life-styles as he grows is imperative, even if there is no unified perspective, it is advisable to catalog whatever values seem prima-facie important. Thus, Frankena argues for an eclectic statement of educational values, in lieu of a well established philosophical justification, that will be philosophically eclectic. That is, he advocates a list of educational norms which will receive common philosophical consent, even though there may be differing and unresolved philosophical questions on the proper methodology of justification. What is important here, is that the list is formulated comprehensively and tentatively. He lists the cognitive dispositions necessary to empirical science, the logical dispositions of clarity, consistency and rigor, and the moral dispositions of personal integrity to which he adds
a required level of attained knowledge and moral and aesthetic character.¹

The point of this first step may not be immediately plausible and appear to be merely a holding maneuver for vested philosophical interests. What is at stake, however, is the widest possible analysis and employment of the greatest range of tools in order to forestall any arbitrary limitation of the concerns of education. There is, in addition, a philosophical stance taken here, in that we have argued that value concerns are central to education and values must be treated philosophically. The stance, however open to philosophical engagement, is nevertheless a practical one. Ecclesiastically out of cultural necessity, not with philosophic justification, a base is selected from which to start the process of education, leaving open the possibility of future philosophical confirmation.

In one respect, this seems to deny Frankena's schema of educational reasoning. He has argued that educational decisions are of two kinds: on the one hand there is the formulation of a list of excellences with bearing on the educational process; on the other hand, there is a pattern of argumentation deriving specific educational prescriptions from this list.² There does not appear to be any conclusive way of establishing the list of excellences; it is necessary to argue that the formulations should be open to whatever level of sophisticated


argument possible.

A second set of considerations is necessary beyond the eclectic formulation of a list of excellences. To do this would do little more than has been done in educational practice until now. There is, on the one hand, a consideration to be given of second-order justifications of the original list formulated. In addition, there must be further elaboration of the ways in which such a listing of excellences can effectively minimize the complexity of the educational task.

First, is there only one requirement for selection of a list of excellences, namely, that it be chosen on a philosophical consensus? Braithwaite, in a paper comparing inductive cognitive policies and moral policies, argues that if there is a question as to what moral commitment is the best, there surely is no controversy that a moral pattern of life is necessary for the highest level of social cooperation. Thus, he introduces a second-order principle requiring moral organization on the basis that in the face of indeterminacy, one should act to keep to a minimum the possibility of maximum loss.¹ This is only a partial justification; however, like Frankena, he also argues for a prima-facie, intrinsic worthwhileness as equally a requirement for selection. Like Dewey, he introduces a further requirement of means. In the face of inability to provide ultimate justification, it is expedient to recognize that "many non-ultimate ends have the . . . property of being necessary conditions for their successors in any ascending series of ends

which we can imagine."¹ Unlike Dewey, Braithwaite is not arguing that all questions of ends be reduced to questions of means. Beside the initial commitment to what seems a worthy quality of life, Braithwaite has introduced a policy of minimizing maximum losses which supports the line which Peters took. If moral commitments can be defined positively only in a very vague way, at least the negation of some practices seems quite obvious and these should be minimized either as a moral commitment, or, in this case, a moral commitment implementing an educational commitment. Secondly, though it is morally indefensible to argue questions of means only, there are some ends which, because of their pervasive instrumentality, can be given practical priority in either moral commitments or educational commitments based upon them. We can agree with Peters that rationality is an educational criteria, then, without having to argue its absolute moral superiority.

The other use of lists of excellences mentioned above, can be explicated with the help of an analysis from Scheffler. In an article entitled "Justifying Curriculum Decisions," Scheffler argues several distinctions to be kept in mind. One is the notion of relative justification. Within moral reasoning, for instance, as Taylor has pointed out,² there is a difference between justifying a specific decision by subsuming it under a moral rule (validation), and the justifying of moral principles (verification). Both cases are relative to justifying

¹Ibid., p. 68.
²Paul Taylor, Normative Discourse, Ch. XXXIII.
a point of view which is of higher order than either particular judgment of principle. Scheffler uses this concept in reference to more general life-situations.

Relative justification is often a highly complicated intellectually engaging business. To appreciate this fact, one need only recall that there is a whole profession (law) devoted to solving just such questions as the conformity of cases to rule. In education, such justification seems to be related not to specific laws, but to broad social practices and traditions, the formulation of which has to be abstracted from our history and is itself a difficult job.¹

In terms of this concept of relative justification, he then formulates rules which mediate between the general ideals and specific practice. Content should be economical of teaching effort and resources, of the learner's effort, of content transfer-value.

Transfer-value is given a further subdivision. Content can be judged for transfer by the empirical aid any specific learning gives to other learnings and by the logical function of the content as explanatory of other content.² A second relative justification is the maximizing of self-sufficiency of the learner. The self-sufficiency is to be judged for personal and moral aspects, for individual knowledge achievement and for cognitive skills and critical ability.³ This second relative justification provides a way in which to enlarge Macdonald's curriculum based on moral ideals. One might well argue all learning in the school is moral if it falls under the rubric of maximizing self-sufficiency. In any case, we have a good illustration of mediating rules implementing

²Ibid., p. 470.
³Ibid., p. 471.
general cognitive values. The first rule of economy covers a wider range of problems and introduces institutional and material considerations. In both cases, the empirical conditions enter in as a consideration in applying the moral rule, whatever it may be; in these cases the cognitive ideal is being mediated.

If we are working with a plurality which includes moral and aesthetic ideals, we might formulate the mediating rules differently. For instance, as Frankena has noted, religious ideals can be built into public school curriculum only in a limited way. So also, even moral ideals have to be mediated, as Peters has already illustrated. Equality of opportunity is limited by personal, group and institutional factors for which it is difficult to compensate. Freedom must be tailored to order, and in this case, public order. Perhaps the major weakness of our public schools is that we do very little to cultivate the social attitudes or implement the organization of the school with any of the instrumentalties which we recognize as necessary to justice and equality on a public level. To model a school after a scholarly society, family or prison, is to have paid little attention to what makes liberty and justice vibrant in the political and economic world.

It appears that the major problem of this thesis is not the question of goals or objectives as it has been phrased in the contemporary educational world. It is rather to work seriously at formulating goals in usable rule form and then properly applying the rule for the variety of given situations. The intriguing question of how to harmonize those ideals, the traditional concept of balance in the curriculum,
we have side-stepped because there is no philosophically viable way to implement it. Questions of sequence, of course, are tied into the mediating rules or other similar mediating rules. The question of scope is handled by the initial philosophical pluralism with no pretension being held that there is time, means or interest to educate one to all the ideal aspects of life. The most grave weakness of the traditional formulations of goals was, as Peters has pointed out, that it encouraged one to think of the goals as obtainable and definable. We have built this thesis on the assumptions that education can only inculcate ideals but not implement them in any complete or positive way. Furthermore, the day is past when educators can afford the luxury of thinking that they can prepare a student adequately for life. This is so for reasons quite different from Dewey's. It is that life has become too complex, as well as, that life is a matter of individual creativity.

This is by no means a perfected proposal. The question of general norms for education has been argued only indirectly. It would be feasible to argue that education should be reduced to technically effective items of training, leaving the value dimension of life to be inculcated by other institutions. One condition of such a position would be to drastically reduce the time consumed by education in the life of the student. In addition, we have only given a sketch illustrating the application of norms to curriculum practice, so that there remains considerable exposition of design to be done. Neither has there been any attention given to formulate all educational ideals as criterial-rules; we have only appealed to those ethical norms which offer ready-made
formulations, such as justice, freedom, etc. Finally, the curriculum design suggested, modeled on a philosophically-critical concept of historical agency, employs, of course, comparatively untrodden philosophical ground. Its advantage is to shift educational concern from a psychological to a sociological focus. This nicely supports many current educational concerns; it does not guarantee that the analysis will succeed. The philosophical concepts of action, motivation, agency, purpose, norm and disposition are receiving serious attention, but the results are not definitive. It is understandable, then, that differential treatment be given such philosophical analysis and that the application to curriculum problems will heighten the tentativeness of the proposal.
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