THE ROLE OF NETWORK BROADCASTING
DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

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* * * * *

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PREFACE

Although commercial radio in this country was born and managed to gather up a full head of developmental steam in the 1920's, the mass radio medium did not reach full maturity until two decades later when American involvement in World War II pressured radio to achieve its "finest hour." Once limited to situation comedies and soap operas, network radio offered the human drama of death, devastation, and despair to a nation at war in the 1940's. Radio became a companion; a constant source of information and inspiration against which the print medium could not compete.

This study presents a detailed investigation of network radio's activities during the Second World War. The networks were each composed of a main station in New York City and a varying number of local or affiliated stations around the country. As a limiting factor, the contributions of such local stations, apart from their role as network disseminators, will not be discussed. During the war, the networks were primarily concerned with government support/cooperation,
news/information and regular/supplemental entertainment roles. More simply, radio served as a domestic supporter, informer, and entertainer during the period of foreign hostilities. These activities combined to form a potent social force found to be beneficial to the maintenance of an appropriate level of public morale. As a by-product of this intense and effective attention to public service and morale boosting, network broadcasting earned the right to continued operation free from the threat of federal control. Throughout the war itself, the networks had voluntarily functioned within a cooperative regulatory system perhaps best defined as responsible freedom. The success of this experiment and the specifics involved with each of the wartime radio roles will be discussed in this study.

While previous research has been done on radio and radio commentators during the Second World War, the vast majority of such was either written while the war was still in progress or written on only one aspect of the subject. The intent of this dissertation was to take a broader look at network broadcasting's wartime domestic participation in an effort to contribute an over-view analysis of the era and, in so doing, help strengthen an area of broadcasting history still in need of research.
I would like to acknowledge the valuable guidance and assistance provided by my adviser, Dr. Walter B. Emery, during the course of this study. Additional thanks go to Dr. Richard M. Mall and Dr. Robert W. Wagner for their time and probing questions, and also to Dr. James E. Lynch for his supervision of my doctoral course work and his help in obtaining the financial assistance necessary for the completion of this research. Finally, my deepest expression of gratitude must go to my parents, Dr. and Mrs. John A. Cathcart, whose continued concern and subtle encouragement have played such a vital role in making this dream a reality.
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INTRODUCTION

...radio is the number one arsenal of democracy in the ordnance of Ideas - the supply and transportation of words and thoughts that beget human action.

— Paul W. Kesten

In 1926, RCA created a subsidiary, the National Broadcasting Company, to operate the nation's first transcontinental radio network. In that same year, Adolph Hitler published the second volume of Mein Kampf and pushed his National Socialist movement closer to Berlin. Twelve years later the two forces would meet, as network coverage of the world conflict got under way in the Fuhrer's old stomping ground, Munich.

Briefly outlining first the principal events of the Second World War, Hitler, after having previously overthrown Austria, occupied the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia in October of 1938, following the agreement at Munich. In March, 1939, the Republic of Czechoslovakia was formally dissolved. After six more months of relative external inactivity, Germany invaded Poland, signaling the start of war on September 1, 1939. Two days later, France and Great Britain, among others, declared war on Germany. Once again, a period of calm followed
the German aggression. This lasted until April 9, 1940, when Hitler's forces invaded Norway and Denmark to finally begin the war in earnest. France collapsed and signed an armistice in late June. The Battle of Britain followed, with German bombing reaching its peak in the fall of 1940. Germany turned on its former ally when it attacked Russia in mid-1941. As European conditions worsened, President Roosevelt declared a state of unlimited national emergency on May 27, 1941, as our own involvement date drew near. The Japanese attack on December 7 brought the United States into the war on both fronts.

The Allied forces finally began to turn the tide, starting with the successful North African expedition in November, 1942. The year 1943 brought defeat to the Germans at Stalingrad and surrender to the Italians. D-Day, the long awaited Allied counter-invasion of Normandy, came on June 6, 1944. During the following spring, the Rhine River was crossed from the west and soon after Victory in Europe was declared on May 7, 1945. Our war in the Pacific continued until the formal Japanese surrender ceremonies aboard the U.S.S. Missouri on September 2, 1945 marked V-J Day. The peak strength of the U.S. Armed Forces had reached 12.3 million persons during the war, second only to the Soviet Union's
12.5 million. The United States' battle deaths totalled 292,000, as compared with 53,000 in World War I and 33,000 in Korea, with Viet Nam figures yet incomplete. The Soviet Union reported 7.5 million battle deaths, a statistic that certainly puts our losses into perspective.

A look next at the pre-war status of radio. American broadcasting had grown rather dramatically since its beginnings in 1920. As the war approached, four national networks stood ready to cover the events. Since 1926, the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) had maintained two networks, the Red and the Blue. The Blue Network was separated from NBC in 1942, following a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ruling, and became the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) in 1945. The Columbia Broadcasting System's (CBS) network of stations came into being in 1927 and the newest network, the Mutual Broadcasting System (MBS), began operations in 1934. So much for the major program transmitters. On the listening side of things, the United States could boast of having more radio receivers tuned to more stations airing more programs than any other nation in the world. In 1940, twenty-eight million families owned radios (85% of the total U.S. families) and over 83% of those families listened on a daily average of 5.1 hours. The nearly eight-hundred U.S. standard broad-
cast (AM) stations had a potential radio audience of over seventy million people. The 1939 AM sets-in-use figure of 45,300,000 compared rather impressively with the 60,000 sets and 30 stations in existence in 1922. Americans were certainly conscious of radio and the networks were being made equally conscious of the tremendous information/unification responsibility that lay ahead.

"In peace," wrote Charles Siepmann, "we listeners used radio mainly for our pleasure, as a toy. War forces us to recognize it as a tool, indispensable to the prosecution of the war and to preparation for the peace." There was general agreement at the time that radio was potentially the most effective medium or vehicle for promoting social awareness and action. Network radio would have to assume at least three basic roles or avenues of participation to help maintain the desired level of public awareness. Alfred J. McCosker, Mutual Broadcasting's Chairman of the Board, felt that these three basic public service obligations were: "to make our resources available to the fullest extent to the broadcasting of official government requirements; to present to the public as complete coverage of news as government regulations will permit, and to give special thought to national morale in our program.
planning." Governmental cooperation, war news information and morale-building "business-as-usual" entertainment formed the basic network plan for domestic participation.

The morale issue was an interesting one, in that radio could be used to break down that of the enemy while at the same time bolstering such on the home front. Morale in peacetime revolves largely around the issue of future security. The same condition only much more immediate and complex, exists in time of war.

A high national morale, especially in times of crisis, involves, among other things, a general belief that the government is in safe hands with intelligent men of integrity in charge. It involves measurable confidence in the essential economic and social stability of the country and in the adequacy of its resources — both human and material — to meet any instant demands. The constant assurance that such conditions did in fact exist in this country became a major wartime task facing network radio and the other mass media. Transmission of the human voice was a tremendous morale factor favoring the use of radio over print. President Franklin D. Roosevelt discovered the power of radio during the depressed early 1930's and employed the same direct-to-the-people technique to ward off the mental depression associated with America's re-involvement in a world war. Radio could provide a thorough information
service through news immediacy and mass dissemination. The power and appeal of the voice helped to supply the needed additional emotional service.

...radio is far more than word transmission; it is a sort of thought transmission, and has the capacity of carrying emotion and conviction from one point to another with a minimum of dilution.

Although bringing necessary comfort to the public, network radio still had the duty to express the realities of the wartime situation and to stimulate a unified active response. Pre-war isolationist influence was strong and continued so right up to the bombing of Pearl Harbor. "Radio's job during the war and immediately preceding it," wrote Deo F. Reynolds, Jr., "was to break down this false sense of security and arouse the people of the United States to accept war when and if it comes." Building up that sense of realistic security would lead hopefully to the needed high level of national wartime cooperation. Supplementary programing would be developed to involve the public in national efforts (e.g., war bond drives) as well as in local participation (e.g., civil defense), to serve both the cause of morale and the actual needs of national survival.

Network radio would thus find itself serving during World War II as supporter, informer and entertainer
within a framework of responsible freedom. The specifics of and the degree of success achieved in these various roles will be discussed in the succeeding chapters, beginning with a look at the federal government's relationships with radio, followed by network news coverage, supplementary war-theme entertainment programing, and radio's post-war status.
FOOTNOTES

Introduction

1 Paul W. Kesten, "Wars Aren't Won With Long Faces," Broadcasting, May 11, 1942, p. 27. At that time, Mr. Kesten was vice-president and general manager of CBS, Inc.


3 Charles A. Siepmann, Radio in Wartime (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 27.


6 "The Impact of War on Advertising," Advertising and Selling, April, 1944, p. 38.

CHAPTER I

BROADCASTING AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Everywhere in radio, the tendency is to service the government, follow its directions, and build programs that will please Uncle Sam.

-- Sherman H. Dryer

Network radio's crisis relationships with the government, beginning in some instances even before our entry into the war, concerned primarily censorship, information, manpower, and production.

Censorship

There are two basic, separate yet interconnected, government-sanctioned censorship systems. One is battlefield or at-the-source censorship, controlled by the military and inherent in every war. The other is home front or domestic censorship, handled by the government and instituted whenever deemed necessary. During World War II, for the second time in its military history, the United States operated under a system of official domestic censorship. Our first such censorship experience had been during World War I with the Committee of Public Information, more commonly
called the Creel Committee after its chairman and America's first official censor, George Creel. The Creel Committee had only limited success in halting the media dissemination of strategic information. One reason for its ineffectiveness and public mistrust was that the Committee not only handled the censorship chores but also functioned as the central government news and propaganda agency. The news, censorship, and propaganda roles tended to get mixed together, resulting in occasional military news "blackouts" and in exaggerated or false news about our progress abroad. The Creel Committee had neither a national agreement with the mass print media nor any censorship codes to serve as guideline references. Principal emphasis seemed to be on excluding radical publications and letters from the mails. Censorship during World War II was much more effective, due to voluntary media agreement and codes administered by the Office of Censorship, a federal agency created in December, 1941. Looking back on his Committee's apparent failure to hold the nation's media in line, George Creel concluded that effective censorship must be limited to military information, with accurate news of a non-essential nature available to the public. The Office of Censorship was able to limit itself to matters of military security by virtue of its
total separation from the government information agency.

The Creel Committee's procedures and records were abandoned promptly at the conclusion of the war, with public suspicion and pressure too great to keep such an organization functioning in peacetime. Two federal laws relating to the mass media did however survive, via hibernation, and were reactivated for use in the Second World War. The Espionage Act of 1917 concerned attempted interference with the success of military activities, instigation of disloyalty or mutiny, and dissemination of false military information. The most feared section of this act was the Sedition Act of 1918, termed "the most sweeping legislation passed in World War I to regulate freedom of expression..." Threatening legal prosecution for almost any written or spoken criticism of the government or the military, this law was now renewed, allowing much greater responsible freedom of speech and press during the 1940's. The second piece of hold-over legislation was the Trading-with-the Enemy Act of 1917. It lapsed after the war and was reincarnated as the First War Powers Act of 1941 granting, among other things, presidential power of censorship over international communications for the duration of the war. With regard to domestic broadcasting, the
government, via the Federal Communications Commission, was denied "the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station..." (Section 326) by virtue of the Communications Act of 1934, unless a war or other state of national emergency was in existence, at which time "the President may suspend or amend, for such time as he sees fit, the rules and regulations applicable to any or all stations within the jurisdiction of the United States..." (Section 606-C). Although this provision was invoked after Pearl Harbor, it caused little disruption.

Domestic broadcasting's relationship with the government during World War II was characterized by normal adherence to pre-war regulations and voluntary, code-outlined restraint.

Two years prior to the establishment of federal censorship, the broadcasters themselves began developing some of their own suggestions for the handling of war news. It should be emphasized here that government censorship during World War II was limited to news, weather, and matters of military security and did not generally concern itself with entertainment programming. So the system was both voluntary (the absence of legislation) and limited to matters of security (as opposed to blanket censorship and/or outright government con-
In September, 1939, "with the fear of government in their hearts, radio networks, after a week of fiddling, put a code of self-censorship of war news in writing, had it blessed by the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) and FCC's Chairman Fly." This first of several government and industry codes dealt with avoiding sensationalism, limiting news bulletin interruptions and suggesting that henceforth news commentators refrain from saying anything "in an effort to influence the action or opinion of others..." It would be naive to suggest that government pressure was not a major force behind the creation of such self-policing codes. Yet consideration must be given to the broadcasters' seemingly unanimous desire to cooperate with and give complete support to the requests and regulations of the federal government. True, what real choice did they have? But, mindful of the damaging morale effect of government take-over, the system of mutual admiration and cooperation allowed the general retention at home of the same democratic principles for which we were fighting abroad. The broadcaster, with the support of farsighted members of the administration, wanted to be "regulated but not run." Some of the governmental pressure for that first NAB-approved war news code might be traced directly
to earlier threats from the White House aimed specifically at broadcasting. Presidential Press Secretary Stephen T. Early's warning to the industry had implied that:

...in war the press is a seasoned veteran and radio an untried rookie, and that if radio proved itself a 'good child,' well-mannered, etc., it would be left to itself; but if it turned out to be a bad one, the government disposition would be to teach it some manners.6

This threat of punishment no doubt had direct reference to the President's wartime broadcast station take-over powers. Elmer Davis, at the time a staff news analyst for CBS, was vigorously opposed to such official talk of station control and resultant news censorship.

It would be a pity if after a hundred and fifty years of self-government the American people are still not old enough to be allowed to hear what there is to be heard.7

Davis felt that network news departments were capable of responsible, cooperative, private operation and that there was nothing to fear from the influx of foreign propaganda as long as the government and the news media limited their releases to the truth. Apparently network broadcasting eventually succeeded in impressing the White House with its self-grooming ability and sincerity, because a year after Stephen T. Early made his remarks, the Chief Executive himself spoke out on
the matter of governmental controls. President Roosevelt expressed the belief that democracy "would not tolerate any attempts at domination...of the free and open avenues of public information."

You (the broadcasting industry) have reached an amazing maturity for one so young. Your government has no wish to interfere or hinder the continued development of the American System of broadcasting. Radio was born and developed in the real American way and its future must continue on that basis.

Much of Roosevelt's seeming admiration for radio's performance to date could probably be attributed to network radio news' amazing job of war coverage, which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. FCC Chairman James Lawrence Fly quite likely vocalized the President's between-the-lines thoughts, however, when he continually reminded broadcasters that the responsibility for preserving the freedom of the airwaves rested with them. The government had no intention of stepping in as long as self-policing continued to be successful. As for the rumors of government operation and/or the shutting down of stations, persistent during the summer of 1940, Chairman Fly stated that such plans were untrue and had "existence only as hobgoblins in the minds of idle gossips." Even Wendell L. Willkie chose to echo the hands-off position taken by President Roosevelt, when he stated that "...a free radio, along with a free
press, constitutes the cornerstone of a system of free men."

Meanwhile, amidst the platitudes from Washington, mid-summer, 1940 had witnessed one of the first wartime regulatory actions, the banning of amateur radio communications with foreign stations by the FCC. This action proved to be a valid aid in patrolling the short-wave bands in search of fifth column espionage activity. American amateur activity was not seriously disrupted by the ban since the majority of "hams" had been observing a self-imposed neutrality code from the time war broke out in Europe. At the time of the ban, there was a rumor that government censors would soon be placed at the networks and in key stations around the country. This was never considered to be necessary and as such never came to pass. On September 24, 1940, one of the first wartime agencies affecting broadcasting, the Defense Communications Board (DCB), was formed. This body was to function as a planning/advisory agency responsible to the President, which would analyze the relationships of all communications in this country to the problem of national defense. FCC Chairman James Lawrence Fly was named to chair the five-member DCB. The sub-committee most closely associated with broadcasting was the Domestic Broadcasting Committee,
organized to "study the physical aspects of standard broadcasting and formulate recommendations of such precautions as it shall deem desirable under foreseeable military conditions." As an indication of the broadcast industry's willingness to cooperate in such investigation and planning, NAB President Neville Miller assumed the chairmanship of this important sub-committee. The DCB had no censorship or control powers and was restricted to planning. This Board would only pose a serious threat to privately-run broadcasting, by virtue of a Presidential decree, three days after Pearl Harbor. Fortunately, broadcasters were able to shift rapidly enough into wartime pace and cooperation so that the take-over potential of the DCB was never realized. The DCB became the Board of War Communications on June 15, 1942.

At the very beginning of that fateful war year, 1941, the networks had already taken on the responsibility of voluntary censorship. In addition to the NAB-endorsed code of late 1939, Columbia, Mutual, and the National networks each prepared a procedural memorandum concerning war news coverage. The bulk of the directions related to broadcasting only accurate, factual material and doing so in a calm manner, and avoiding the expression of personal opinion.
News analysts are at all times to be confined strictly to explaining and evaluating such fact, rumor, propaganda, and so on, as are available. No news analyst or news broadcaster of any kind is to be allowed to express personal editorial judgment or to select or omit news with the purpose of creating any given effect, and no news analyst or other news broadcaster is to be allowed to say anything in an effort to influence action or opinion of others one way or the other. Nothing in this is intended to forbid any news broadcaster from attempting to evaluate the news as it develops, provided he substantiates his evaluation with facts and attendant circumstances. His basis for evaluation should, of course, be impersonal, sincere, and honest.¹²

Sol Taishoff, broadcast publisher and spokesman, pledged radio's continued cooperation and encouraged the networks to seriously adhere to such war news limitations, believing that it was "better to miss a scoop than provoke a panic."¹³ With the foreign war situation becoming all the time more intense, the elimination of certain items from the news such as troop and ship movements, "isn't censorship - just good judgment."¹⁴

President Roosevelt proclaimed a state of war emergency for the country on May 27, 1941. This condition had no immediate effect on broadcasting although coming materials shortages, due to war priorities, would eventually hurt the supply of tubes and transmitter parts. The technical side of radio and the war is an entire story unto itself. In August, DCB Chairman Fly
announced that the present broadcasting structure was well suited to a nationwide link-up for air raid warnings and civil defense instructions. Just as would happen later with Korea, Americans actually feared the possibility of air attacks on the continental United States.

The air attacks came, but fortunately they did not reach the continent. In the early afternoon of December 7, 1941, newscasters H.V. Kaltenborn and John Daly interrupted the programs in progress on their respective networks (NBC and CBS) to announce that the Japanese had made a surprise attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Within 24 hours, the United States was officially involved in World War II. President Roosevelt's request for a declaration of war, addressed to a joint session of Congress, was carried to the nation by all four networks and to the world via shortwave and the BBC. New York Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia, serving as National Civilian Defense Director, later announced that in the event of an air raid the public should turn to their radios for CD instructions.

The blade of government censorship fell quickly. After the initial attack, the Navy Department (separate from the War Department) placed censorship on all
outgoing cables and radio messages from the U.S., invoking the Espionage Act of 1918 provisions against the conveyance of information of value to the enemy. Over 50,000 U.S. radio amateurs shut down their stations the night of December 7. The American Radio Relay League's key station in Hartford, Connecticut relayed the government order to cease operations. In an amazing display of patriotism and cooperation, the entire membership had received and complied with the order within twenty minutes! Only selected "ham" stations would continue to transmit as links in a defense emergency service network. In terms of broadcast censorship, no apparent initial attempt was made to hush up the seriousness of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Colonel William J. Donovan, head of the Office of Coordinator of Information, suggested that in reporting the attack story to Europe, U.S. shortwave stations should "make no attempt to gloss over the gravity of the first day's losses of the United States in the Pacific." The initial overseas information policy was thus one of telling the truth, attempting to establish a reputation for honesty that hopefully would take the thunder out of Axis propaganda. A good immediate example of the legitimate need for at least military censorship in wartime can be seen in the con-
tent of an eyewitness broadcast account of the Japanese bombing of the Philippines. Bert Silen, the manager of a Manila radio station, was relaying a description of a night air attack to NBC for rebroadcast here. His commentary contained, unintentionally of course, information of use to the enemy.

We are trying to locate the exact place of the tremendous fire that is raging and turning the sky absolutely crimson...Ladies and gentlemen, there is one thing we definitely found out at the present time: the Japanese came over here with the idea of hitting a definite target and they have hit that target...16

The following day, the Manila broadcasts relayed to NBC ceased. Silen's admission that the bombs had indeed found their targets would save the Japanese valuable guesswork and reconnaissance time. But surprisingly enough his detailed account was also helpful to the U.S. audience. Silen's description of bomber accuracy helped to erase the dangerous stereotype held here that the Japanese had an inferior air force which was not to be taken seriously. Between these Pearl Harbor and Manila accounts by radio, such notions became unrealistic.

On the day following the formal declaration of war, the President broadcast a reminder to the media of the need for responsibility and restraint.
To all newspapers and radio stations - all those who reach the eyes and ears of the American people - I say this: You have a most grave responsibility to the nation now and for the duration of this war. If you feel that our government is not disclosing enough of the truth, you have every right to say so. But - in the absence of all the facts, as revealed by official sources - you have no right in the ethics of patriotism to deal out unconfirmed reports in such a way as to make people believe they are gospel truth.17

As Sol Taishoff had previously stated, such official admonition probably fell more in the category of using judgment and common sense than of censorship.

On December 10, 1941, President Roosevelt invoked his wartime powers of broadcast station control (Sec. 606) and transferred them to the Defense Communications Board. The DCB eased broadcaster apprehensions by announcing no drastic changes in the organizational status quo. The DCB was merely given the power to make sure that any Navy, War, or other government agency's broadcast facility requirements were filled. Fortunately, the need never arose for the DCB to commandeer any network or standard broadcast stations. Yet there were immediate needs and Board Chairman Fly attended to one of them by ordering all stations along the Pacific Coast and as far east as Idaho to go off the air after dusk, in order to prevent the use of radio signals as direc-
tional aids by enemy aircraft. Some limited radio blackouts also were in effect, initially, along the East Coast. The Interceptor Commands of the U.S. Army, in cooperation with the DCB, announced plans for the suspension of broadcasting operations whenever continental enemy air raids were threatened. In the interest of avoiding public alarm, the War Department disseminated carefully worded announcements to be made should stations be temporarily silenced. In the meantime, the Office of Civil Defense requested that stations on both coasts broadcast air raid protection instructions at regular intervals. The intensity of the precautions and worries, like the 24-hour network war news coverage, would return to a more normal state of positive preparedness by the end of that first traumatic week.

Standing apprehensively between the shadow of the DCB and the administration's status quo assurances, broadcasters, out of duty and desire, pledged their willingness to give unlimited service and cooperation to the war effort. The War Department soon requested that stations limit the reading of casualty lists to only those names of significance to the local listening area. The NAB went a cooperative step further by advising stations to refrain entirely from the airing of casualty lists, leaving such to the local press.
In encouraging such a voluntary ban, Edward Kirby of the NAB said:

This is deeply appreciated, as the broadcasting of casualty lists would, in effect, set up obituary columns on the air when such time can be used to elevate morale rather than depress it.¹⁸

There was apparently no objection to the mention of numbers of casualties, however. Of course this information was most often initially regulated or censored militarily at the source. In conjunction with several other War Department news requests, the NAB issued a "Guide for Wartime Broadcasting" in late December.¹⁹

Included in the Guide was an admonition against broadcasting weather conditions, a ban ordered previously by the Chief of the U.S. Weather Bureau and applicable to all weather announcements except those released by local bureaus to prevent loss of life or damage to transportation and crops. Other suggested "do nots" dealt with news sensationalism, unjustifiable program interruptions, broadcasting unconfirmed reports and divulging ship and troop movements. Extreme caution was urged when engaging in man-in-the-street interviews or other ad-lib programs. The individual networks supplemented the NAB Guide with codes of their own. For example, CBS focused attention on newscasts by calling for reduced commercial length and inclusion of only those commercials.
that were clearly distinguishable from the news content. NBC banned the use of warning sounds, such as sirens and alarms, from all dramatic shows to avoid upsetting and confusing the public. The other networks adopted similar measures all designed to better equip them for wartime duty. At about the same time, representatives of the five existent broadcast trade associations stopped their feuding long enough to form the War Broadcasting Council (later changed to the Broadcasters' Victory Council) which hoped to function as the liaison between radio and those government agencies with broadcasting functions. Although this was certainly a legitimate cause, their ultimate concern was with the question of radio censorship.

Their question soon got an answer. On December 16, President Roosevelt appointed Byron Price to the post of War Director of Censorship, making him the second official censor in our history. Said the Chief Executive:

All Americans abhor censorship, just as they abhor war. But the experience of this and of all other nations has demonstrated that some degree of censorship is essential in wartime, and we are at war.20

Roosevelt hoped for a combination of mandatory censorship and voluntary action, meaning that the most rigid
censorship would be military and would be imposed at the source. He was content for the time being to stick with free radio and cooperation as his domestic policy. Three days after Price's appointment, the Office of Censorship, with the necessary operating funds, was a reality. The President had derived his censorship powers from the recently passed First War Powers Act of 1941, considered by some to contain the necessary provisions "to make censorship a specific, efficient instrument or a nightmare." The "nightmare" concern could well have been derived from the fact that the censor's powers were limited only by (1) the government's attitude, (2) what public opinion would stand for, and (3) the character and inclination of the Censor himself. As long as a Censor was deemed necessary, the broadcast industry was relatively content with the credentials and sympathies of Byron Price, a former executive news editor for the Associated Press (AP). Just as pleasing to them, if not more so under the circumstances, was Price's appointment of J. Harold Ryan as Assistant Director of Censorship or, more correctly, broadcast censor. Previously Ryan had been a vice president with the Fort Industry (now Storer) broadcasting chain and had been recommended to Price for the job by a sub-committee
of the War Broadcasting Council. Ryan's function would be to serve as the industry contact for clearance of questionable material. The Office of Censorship's overall duties concerned the monitoring of all outgoing communications, working with the War and Navy Departments in withholding security information, preventing publication of information valuable to the Axis and implementing a plan of voluntary domestic censorship by means of media codes and clarifications. While the President's power to create an Office of Censorship was derived from the First War Powers Act, Censor Price's powers of information regulation were drawn chiefly from the Espionage Act of 1917. The limitations on these powers were vague at best and depended largely on the attitude and intelligence of the Censor, with one very important exception. Unlike the Creel Committee of World War I, the current Censor had no legal authority to compose and disseminate news. The creation of a separate government news agency, working in cooperation with and abiding by the guidelines of the censorship office, was a significant move in the broadcaster's and the public's favor. By introducing such a system of checks and balances, the efficient functioning of voluntary media censorship and cooperation was given a much better chance for survival. Nevertheless, the
Censor did possess much power and did recommend adherence to the forthcoming wartime code, then in preparation. The broadcaster's best protection would be to get advance clearance and to avoid broadcasting undesirable material. In general, at that point, and for the duration of the war, "the safe, sane policy," according to Sol Taishoff, "is for radio to follow orders, avoid controversy, be on the alert, and use its head."23

In January, 1942, the army, through its Fourth Interceptor Command in Los Angeles, over extended its censorship powers a bit by banning the use of testimonials and requests for musical numbers on all west coast radio stations. The ban was an attempt to stop the use of these devices as sources of code for enemy agents. After investigation by the Office of Censorship and the War Department, the use of testimonials was again allowed, although the ban against telephone requests remained. Some coastal stations were still being silenced at night to prevent the use of their signals for navigation purposes. An air raid alarm network had been established, with a key broadcast station in each area designated as the dispatcher of silencing orders. At the same time, Attorney General Francis Biddle had ordered all "enemy aliens" (from
Germany, Italy, and Japan) in the U.S. to surrender all radio receivers and cameras to federal authorities for the duration of the war. Officials estimated that there were likely over one million shortwave receivers currently in the hands of "enemy aliens." In the midst of such military and federal actions, President Roosevelt managed to ease some anxious minds when he reaffirmed his policy by stating that "a free radio is just as essential as a free press" although, as a facet of this freedom, "radio has an increasing obligation to keep the public fully informed." Similar reassurances from the Defense Communications Board made it seem all the more likely that, despite military interference on the coast, the government was shifting its relationship efforts toward establishment of cooperative censorship guidelines and away from AM station or network takeover, the possibility of which had momentarily been very real under Section 606 on December 10, 1941.

The Office of Censorship issued its first "War-Time Code of Practices for Broadcasters" on January 16, 1942. Its purpose was to systematize voluntary broadcast cooperation under a series of news, ad-lib and foreign language program restriction requests. The Code's contents were neither a surprise nor a hardship
to broadcasters since, for the most part, it simply made official those provisions previously initiated by network and NAB codes. Included were bans on weather reports, troop, ship and plane movements, war-related production and experimentation, telephone request and certain ad-lib programs, and a requirement that transcripts be kept of all foreign language programs. Censorship's primary thrust was in the area of news, forums, and commentaries, with a minimum of interference in general programing and non-security related content. This January Code would be followed by four periodic revised editions, each closely reflecting our war situation as it changed from defensive to offensive action. For the duration, Assistant Censor Ryan reminded broadcasters that they were all serving as censors. In their continuing campaign of self-censorship, responsible media men could themselves make intelligent day-to-day decisions on questionable material by asking, "If I were the enemy, would this information be useful to me?" Questions beyond this test were to be referred to the official code and to Ryan's office.

In the months following the issuance of the first code, now that the Pearl Harbor attack tempo had settled down to a more reasonable wartime pace, some anticensorship sentiment was in evidence. There were
those who not only objected to voluntary or any censorship but also felt that broadcasting was being subjected to more government control than the other communications media. They were quick to point out that while the President could take control of broadcast facilities during wartime (Sec. 606), he did not have similar powers over press and motion pictures. While the question here does concern First Amendment freedoms, there is also the matter of public airwaves and federal license which must be considered in the case of broadcasting. With regard to military censorship, it was charged that armed services control over communications had been and continued to be too tight. Two months after Pearl Harbor, according to New York Times staffer Arthur Krock, the military still refused "to inform the public of the details and consequences of the Japanese attack." CBS foreign correspondent Cecil Brown, back in the U.S. for the first time in five years, expressed a dislike for censorship, feeling that all the truth possible within the limits of security should be told.

If you're asking people to die, and they have the courage to die, they have the right to know why they are dying. I have been in places where people were asked to die but were refused the right to know why.
Brown had been previously barred from the air in Rome and Singapore for his anti-government comments. He would later leave CBS News in a dispute over editorial policy. Dr. James R. Mock, of the National Archives Staff, expressed the belief that American citizens "have rights that no censorship should set aside," and because of this "they are entitled to know at all times what their government and their armed forces have done." Dr. Mock opposed the usefulness of our need for a system of voluntary domestic censorship (he did agree with the need for censorship at the source). He recalled the Creel Committee's attempt at a voluntary agreement with the press, where violations committed by only one percent of the participants succeeded in making a "farce" out of the agreement. Mock listed his requirements for a proper censorship system: legally enforceable censorship rather than voluntary, limited only to information of value to the enemy; censorship at the source; selection of only qualified personnel; no news or propaganda functions; and the existence of censorship only during the period of actual hostilities. Robert J. Landry echoed Mock's apparent philosophy on this issue when he commented: "We wish only as much censorship as winning the victory demands." Landry related that even
the British had grown weary of government-censored news reports ("Bore War").

Winning that victory did demand, in such an all-encompassing world conflict, that broadcasting of at least security-related material be censored, due largely of course to radio's two key advantages over print: mass dissemination and immediacy. It was precisely because of radio's superior efficiency that stiffer wartime regulation was in order. Its inherent relationship with the ether and public interest made such censorship and potential control regulations just that much easier to institute. Most sentiment against broadcast censorship seemed to come from outside the industry. "Wise radio men realize," said Robert Landry, "that, as a matter of conscience alone, wartime censorship is a workaday need of the broadcaster as it is an indispensable protection to the nation." With most responsible broadcasters (and very few were not during the war), the question of censorship was not one of existence but rather of extent. The National Association of Broadcasters expressed satisfaction with the Censor's avoidance of propaganda and information functions, and with his handling of the Code to date.
...the Office of Censorship is counting on voluntary cooperation, and it is to be noted that the Code is full of "requests" and suggestions that certain programs should "be carefully supervised," and the like, and there is an absence of prohibitions.32

As another example of censor-broadcaster harmony, the need had not yet arisen for establishing a large policing force or for placing a censor in each network and station. Soothing the apprehensions of those broadcasters who wondered how long this smooth-functioning yet fundamentally undesirable censorship might go on beyond the cessation of hostilities, Byron Price told those assembled for the 1942 NAB Convention that, "the more militantly you take up the torch, the sooner the war will be over, and the job of censorship ended..."33

But meanwhile, in mid-1942, censorship was still very much in existence. Attorney General Francis Biddle, apparently dissatisfied with the state of domestic censorship, attempted to bring back the Sedition Act by proposing a War Secrets Bill to Congress. Critics called it a "gag bill," charging that there was already too much secrecy regarding war matters. According to the Washington Post, "it might better be labeled 'a bill to halt criticism of any government agency that wishes to conceal its blunders
from the public. ³⁴ This bill was given little chance of passage in its present severe form. Such was fortunate for broadcasting which stood to be directly affected by this or any other "gag" measures.

The first revision of the "Code of Wartime Practices" was released June 24, 1942, effective immediately. Reminding broadcasters that the "industry's greatest contribution to victory will be the use of good common sense,"³⁵ this Price-Ryan Code again requested that broadcasters act as their own censors on questionable material. This edition went into more detail on specifics to be avoided during newscasts and request shows. The major crackdown affected foreign language broadcast stations, of which there were over two-hundred in the United States. The Censor requested that such stations require script submission and approval prior to all broadcasts, and that they also monitor all programming as a check against the approved scripts. In many cases this last request necessitated the hiring of a language specialist by the station management to handle the monitoring function.

Significantly reminiscent of James Fly's comment that "broadcasters are custodians of what is potentially the most powerful weapon in the world,"³⁶ the U.S. Government took over program control of the
nation's fourteen existing shortwave stations, on November 1, 1942, to form a unified government network or "voice." Once again cooperation was the key, with the station licensees continuing to handle the technical facilities, on a non-profit basis, while the government assumed the programming responsibility and the cost of operation. In effect, the government was leasing the air time from the operators. The programming would be handled by two agencies: the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs and the Office of War Information. These shortwave outlets were the only U.S. broadcast stations to fall under actual federal control during the war.

In February of 1943, the Censor issued a second Code revision. Under this document, the Office of Censorship was given the power to remove from the air persons engaged in foreign language broadcasts who "endanger the war effort...by their connections, direct or indirect, with the medium." The foreign language broadcasts had been a problem and, as such, were subject to tougher measures. In addition to censorship control, foreign language operations were subject to FBI checks on broadcast personnel and FCC supervision of station programming performance. In the fall of that year, improved defense and war con-
ditions allowed for the first loosening of censorship control. After an absence of almost two years, sta­tions were once more allowed to broadcast weather re­ports with certain restrictions. The reports had to be official and they could not yet include barometric pres­sure or wind direction, due to their use as naviga­tion aids. Weather reports, the most often accidental­ly violated section of the Code, were a source of $2,000,000 in annual revenue for the broadcast industry. The Office of Censorship had two basic methods for tracking down these and other code violations. They monitored network programs at the rate of 400 to 600 shows each month and they spot-checked station news scripts. In 1943, out of over 12,000 newscasts heard or read, there were only 177 recorded Code violations, meaning 98% compliance, and most of the mistakes were classified as accidental. This record of cooperation pleased the Censor. "The Office of Censorship," said that agency's broadcast news editor, Charter Heslep, "not only has no criticism of radio's handling of news but is proud of the record being made by the industry as a co-partner in the unprecedented experiment of voluntary, civilian censorship."^39

That same voluntary censorship was relaxed con­siderably by the December, 1943 Code revision, third
in the series. Partially reflecting our transition from defensive to offensive warfare, this edition allowed for the broadcasting of more news items, specifically, war production information, merchant marine operations, non-military negotiations and the previously cleared weather conditions. The amount of Code relaxation was in direct proportion to the improvement in the national security situation.

Troop movement information, however, had not yet been relaxed, as Byron Price was quick to remind broadcasters in a memorandum anticipating the fast-approaching Allied invasion of France. A "moratorium on backstairs gossip" was urged to avoid endangering the fortunes of the Eisenhower armies.

The coming invasion confronts voluntary censorship with its greatest responsibility, for there is no way to conceal from the enemy that an invasion is in prospect, or that the British Isles will be used as a base.

No American broadcaster will want the distinction of being first to disclose where, when or how our troops will strike.40

Price told the networks and stations that during the apprehensive months ahead they were especially urged to consult with the broadcast division of his office on questionable material rather than to take risks.

By February there would be a new man heading that
broadcast division. J. Harold Ryan resigned as radio censor to accept the presidency of the NAB. He succeeded the retiring Neville Miller, the first paid NAB head, who had served for six years. Ryan's replacement, John E. Fetzer, a Michigan station owner, also met with the approval of the industry.

Following the successful D-Day Invasion in June of '44, as battlefield progress became more definite, the question of Allied victory was no longer "if" but "when." By mid-May, 1945, with the conquest of Nazi Germany now complete, Censor Price issued a post-V-E Day Code revision which was to be the last. Nearly twenty previously restricted areas were deleted. Once again stations could: broadcast man-in-the-street interviews, talk about the President's travels after-the-fact, accept telephone requests, report lost pets, broadcast foreign language programs without prior script approval, and carry complete weather reports. The only remaining restrictions concerned matters of security related to the Pacific combat zones. Needless to say, American broadcasters were relieved and some felt that these mass deletions had put radio and newspapers "on equal footing for the first time" in the war.
Byron Price had repeatedly gone on record in support of the need for domestic censorship for the duration of the war only. Price stuck to his commitment and, at his suggestion, President Truman issued a directive in late August, 1945, dissolving the Office of Censorship and canceling all remaining Code restrictions. Military censorship was still necessarily in existence but was being relaxed where possible. Price gave thirty days notice to his staff and predicted that his office would be completely disbanded within three months. He expressed assurance that the nation would be fully returned to a freedom of the press and radio system. Price agreed that a free wartime radio must be, and indeed had been, a responsible radio.

It is a pertinent but often forgotten fact that in no other major country at war has completely voluntary censorship even been attempted. It discloses no secret to say that in the early days there were those in and out of government who felt sure no voluntary censorship could succeed here.42

During the long trying years since Pearl Harbor you have written a bright page in the history of free enterprise. No one will dare question hereafter that your patriotism and patient cooperation have contributed greatly to the glorious victory. My own gratitude, and that of my colleagues in the unpleasant task of administering censorship is beyond words or limit.43
The success of voluntary wartime censorship depended largely on responsibility — the responsibility of the administrator and of the media, both being charged with the task of preventing the spread of information valuable to the enemy, with minimum infringement on democratic freedoms. One of the best examples from World War II of voluntary censorship and broadcaster responsibility was the two-year suppression of the atom bomb secret. Network newsmen knew the story but kept it quiet, with only minor exceptions, at the request of Byron Price in 1943. In general, the media and the Censorship Office got along this well. Problems did arise, of course, but most concerned the extent of, rather than the acknowledged necessary existence of, censorship. Incidents of alleged unjustified military censorship occurred in the field (e.g., the Patton soldier slapping affair) but such were apparently the exception. "Whatever may be said of censorship in World War II," wrote Joseph J. Mathews, "it did not prevent the public from receiving on the whole a reasonably accurate picture of the war." Coupling this service with the effective protection of national security, World War II voluntary censorship would seem to have proven itself a success.
Information

"World War II, beyond doubt," according to Joseph Mathews, "was the most highly publicized military effort in history," and "radio in particular played a part in publicizing the war that is difficult to overestimate." Radio carried out its dual publicity role by presenting both military news coverage and wartime domestic information and appeals. The news role is described in the next chapter. The public information relationship with broadcasting was on a par with censorship in importance. Lack of adequate cooperation with either faction could have resulted in stiffer governmental controls.

The first wartime government news agency actually had its beginnings back in 1934. The U.S. Information Service was later reorganized as one of four divisions under the Office of Government Reports (OGR) in July, 1939. This division then continued its primary function as a clearing house for government activities information. One serious problem concerning government information and the media in the early war years was the lack of centralization. Although the U.S.I.S. continued to be the primary outlet, most agencies had their own information divisions and this often resulted in problems of accuracy and duplication of news releases. Another
major duplication problem, resulting from this lack of effective centralization, concerned agency requests for radio time. When war broke out in Europe, the American broadcasting industry pledged complete government support and cooperation for the duration. Under the heading of cooperation comes the providing of free network and station airtime for government war appeals and instructions. Broadcasters were hit from all sides by the press releases and facilities requests of the various information agencies. This embarrassing, inefficient confusion would continue for nearly a year after our entry into the war before a workable time allocation plan was finally formulated. In the absence of adequate federal assistance, the NAB distributed to its membership some suggested time-allotment priorities. Armed services enlistment, defense financing, morale building, and then other activities less closely tied to national defense was the order developed.

The Office of Facts and Figures (OFF) was the government's first wartime attempt at centralizing and ordering the agencies' release/request situation. A small division bearing that name had first emerged within the Office of Civilian Defense during the summer of 1941. Two months prior to the start of American military involvement, OFF was transferred to a position
within the Office for Emergency Management (OEM) with much closer and clearer organizational ties with the administration. OEM was the producer-coordinator for all government agency radio programs until mid-1942.

On the afternoon of December 7, 1941, closely following the first radio flashes of the Japanese attack, came the first official radio bulletin issued by the War Department in World War II, telephoned to all the networks.

The Secretary of War directs that all firms and manufacturing plants who have defense contracts or are working on defense orders will at once institute proper measures against sabotage.46

And with that, the information services were officially in the war. The agencies would use the coverage and immediacy of radio for two basic purposes: to explain what the government needed from the people and to interpret government actions in the war effort for the people. The once minor Office of Facts and Figures was catapulted into the spotlight and designated "as the coordinating agency and clearing house for all government radio time requests..."47 according to Presidential Secretary Stephen T. Early. OFF would thus coordinate, in theory, all government agency efforts toward explaining and interpreting the war and
its needs. Archibald MacLeish, Pulitzer Prize-winning poet and Librarian of Congress, was named OFF Director, a demanding position carrying no compensation. His office put into practice the policies developed and adopted by the behind-the-scenes Committee on War Information, an interdepartmental advisory group. The Committee's basic policy: "to give the people all the facts and figures possible, within the limits of national security." OFF cooperated with several other agencies, including the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI), the Office of Government Reports (OGR), and the newly created Office of Censorship, in attempting to implement the "facts and figures" policy. Although the information function was kept generally separate from censorship in this war, the two agencies recognized the necessity of working closely together. They did share at least one definite connection for several months, with OFF Director MacLeish serving also as a member of the Committee on Censorship, a policy group similar to the one on war information.

The OFF Radio Division, headed by former CBS vice president William B. Lewis, functioned chiefly as a "time-broker" for government agencies, aiding them in getting their messages or programs on the air. It
also advised broadcasters on policy and appeals priorities. Neither this division nor the parent OFF wrote or produced radio programs themselves. The biggest problem then facing broadcasters and the listening audience alike was that of too many wartime messages and morale shows from too many information sources.

Much as they would like cash for some of the thousands of hours of radio time devoted to government programs each week, the broadcasters would be willing to settle at present just for fewer programs and a more regular procedure in their placement.48

In an effort to solve this growing problem, the Radio Division devised a trial allocation plan under which each network nighttime program would devote time to only one government message a month and each daytime show would carry one such message every two weeks.

Certainly OFF does not aim to interfere with radio in its great function of providing entertainment to the public. On the contrary, it hopes by careful planning to prevent the kind of irritation that grows out of appeals and messages of great quantity and little quality.49

By means of its message placement plan and its "Radio War Guide" of message priorities by importance, the OFF Radio Division hoped to cut down the problems of repetition and duplication which had led to public over-saturation and resistance. Helping to keep track
of progress made in this area would be the OFF Intelligence Division, part of whose job it was to monitor public opinion and morale. The OFF's allocation procedures helped solve the problem of too many messages but did not seem to help the growing state of public confusion caused by too many sources of information. Although the OFF was designed as a central clearing house, the information origination function soon took a back seat to the more demanding pressures of media scheduling. This left three other major information-oriented agencies to compete for the public ear. After observing the current system on one of his brief visits to the U.S., Edward R. Murrow, Chief of CBS European News Operations, concluded that "the machinery for the dissemination of news and information is cumbersome, contradictory, and confusing."^51

Criticism of the system had reached a peak by the time the Office of War Information (OWI) was established by Executive Order on June 13, 1942. The OWI was formed, basically, by combining OFF, OGR, OEM's Information Division, and COI's Foreign Information Service, all previous competitors, into one truly centralized agency. This new information disseminator, under the direction of former CBS news analyst Elmer Davis, was given an experienced, prestigious staff to help it
function successfully. Serving with Davis on the War Information Board were Milton Eisenhower, long-time government administrator, Gardner Cowles, Jr., print and broadcast chain owner, Robert E. Sherwood, author and playwright, and Archibald MacLeish, director of OFF. The OWI was created by and was responsible only to the President. Davis felt his agency's task was "to tell the U.S. as much about the war as possible, as fast as possible, with as few contradictions as possible." He was determined to work on certain areas in need of better public understanding, such as: the issues of war, the sacrifices needed for victory, our allies-in-arms, the nature of the Axis, and the production war at home. To do this, a first year operating budget was estimated at $37 million, with $9.5 million earmarked for home information and the remainder going for information abroad. As a comparison, Propaganda Minister Goebbels' organization ran on approximately $500 million a year.

The Office of War Information became the coordinating agency that OFF was, and also the central issuing and policy agency that OFF was not. Individual departments and agencies retained their own information staffs but they were reduced in size and power. All news releases related heavily to the war were to be
cleared and issued by the OWI News Bureau. News of military action would be cleared by the War and/or Navy Department and only then disseminated by OWI.

All addresses by heads of departments or agencies, all bulletins or publications relating significantly to the war effort, all proposed radio programs sponsored by federal departments or agencies and all posters were to be cleared through the OWI.54

With its new information controls, the OWI, at least in theory, was able to present a clearer picture of the war effort as a whole. In practice, the picture may still have been a bit blurry, with the OWI issuing anywhere from 30 to 55 press releases per day, nearly burying reporters in the process. Nevertheless, Elmer Davis strove for ever-increasing news clarity and understanding in the interest of the public, as indicated by the pledge that hung on most OWI office walls.

This is a people's war, and to win it the people should know as much about it as they can. This office will do its best to tell the truth and nothing but the truth, both at home and abroad. Military information that will aid the enemy must be withheld; but within that limitation we shall try to give the people a clear, complete and accurate picture.

July 10, 1942 Elmer Davis, director55

Davis went to work on clarity and understanding by attempting to improve upon the OFF allocation plan and add genuine centralization to it. In October,
1942, he directed all government agencies to submit their program and message plans to the OWI Radio Bureau for compilation. Two months later, OWI informed radio that its new allocation and assignment plan, composed of four parts, was set to go. Each part was described as follows:

1. **The Network Allocation Plan** which systematically utilizes all network programs, both sustaining and commercial, for action messages (what to do) concerning all phases of the war effort.

2. **The Announcement Plan** for local stations, which is synchronized with the Network Allocation Plan to provide additional facilities on the community level for the same type of war information.

3. **The Transcription Plan** for local stations whereby the various transcription efforts of the several Government war agencies are pulled together in one strip package to provide greater audiences for understanding messages (what you should know) about all phases of the war effort.

4. **The Special Assignment Plan** whereby network programs, both sustaining and commercial, which volunteer to help the war information effort over and above the Allocation Plan are systematically assigned understanding (as against action) themes.

This new allocation system, like its predecessor, was non-compulsory but almost universally adopted by cooperating stations because of its organizational assistance. It was administered by the Radio Bureau,
under the direction of former OFF Radio Chief William B. Lewis who considered his new division to be like a "super traffic cop." The Radio Section also published a "Radio War Guide" to aid local stations in determining the current level of importance of various appeals. As an additional clarity innovation, Director Davis announced the creation of a radio news section as a part of the main OWI News Bureau. This new unit's function was to keep networks and radio press associations informed of stories as well as to service their requests for any additional information. As an aid to increased understanding, Davis also announced plans to initiate a regular OWI wire service to both press and radio containing Axis propaganda stories followed by the U.S. version of the story. The media were encouraged to let the public have both sides and decide the truth for itself - a procedure certainly not adhered to by Dr. Goebbels.

As happened to the Office of Censorship after a few trial months of operation, the OWI found itself becoming a target for criticism. Leaving the radio industry burdened with most of the program planning, writing, casting and directing, the OWI, felt Robert Landry, had served merely as "a funnel through which the whole of government has passed requests for help..."
Partially because so much war appeals control was left in the hands of the broadcasters, the OWI experienced weakening authority with regard to overall uniform information policy control. Part of the problem here was the lack of power needed to ensure that its "advice" would be carried out. Specific enforcement machinery was non-existent in this system of voluntary cooperation (excepting the rather general government control of FCC license renewal powers). Along the line of intra-government relations, a further problem resulted from inadequate power when some government agencies began to show resistance to (or perhaps resentment for) OWI information/coordination efforts. Jerome S. Bruner reviewed what was expected from the OWI by the public:

As far as the American public is concerned, OWI has two tasks: first, to formulate and carry out, through the use of press, radio, motion pictures, and other facilities, information programs which increase understanding of the war effort, and second, to coordinate the war-information activities of all Federal departments and agencies so as to insure the accurate and consistent flow of war information to the people and to the world at large. In short, OWI is to supply the people with the facts and to help them understand what the facts mean.58

In short, the facts were coming but sufficient understanding was not following, according to critics. Labeling the OWI as "the most power information agency this country has ever known," Michael Darrock and
Joseph Dorn expressed criticism of that agency because:

...on every other issue than military victory and national survival - including especially the precise points the OWI said it was determined to clarify (where the war came from, where it is going, its nature and what we hope to get out of victory) there is disagreement, ignorance, and doubt. 59

Darrock and Dorn admitted that much of the confusion was caused by public policy differences among the various government agencies. The OWI could not explain war policy until a definite policy was settled upon. "OWI is like the player who can kick the extra point, but must wait until someone else scores the touchdown." 60 Since the OWI was a reporting and not primarily a policy-making body, the solutions seemed to be either acting as a dispute mediator and/or helping to keep inter-agency squabbles out of the information mainstream. In the meantime, in support of critics' charges, public confusion continued at an alarmingly high level for a country with plentiful communications facilities like the United States. In response to the 1943 Princeton Polls' question, "Do you feel that you have a clear idea of what this war is all about - that is, what we are fighting for?" 35% of the respondents, as of December, 1942, answered, "No." This in a nation with a comparatively low illiteracy level and high
press-radio saturation. And, in that same poll, as of the same month, over 20% of the respondents felt the government was not giving the public as much information as it should about the war. This percentage was down from a 41% figure just two months before.

With a third of the nation unsure of the aims for which the war is being fought, we are, let no one doubt, faced with the danger of a confused public when the problems of peace come before us.

Not only will OWI have to attempt to build up new attitudes among the confused, it will also have to blast out many undesirable attitudes which have grown up in the soil of confusion.

Its efforts to date have been, at best, only partially successful. Jerome Bruner's last remark probably summed up the feelings of most contemporary OWI critics.

Yet another complaint involved the old problem of war program quantity and quality held over from OFF days. Too much repetition was a major cause of the advertising nemesis, "radio fatigue," which resulted in either listener indifference or resentment toward the product, or in this case, the war appeal. In mid-1942, eight government agencies had a total of eighteen regular programs a week on network radio. Add to this the speeches, special programs and agency messages, broadcast on the networks as well as the
local stations, and it is not difficult to see how quantity might get out of hand in relation to effectiveness. Critics and broadcasters favored reduced numbers and better use of the remaining time.

...relatively few listen to a radio talk unless the President makes it.

And the unfortunate part about sustaining programs is that they run in competition to Charlie McCarthy, Fred Allen and Eddie Cantor, and such commercial shows which have the bulk of the audiences.

What we need to do is work out some system...of utilizing the already established radio audience.63

The system that was worked out by OWI was to put more of the needed war "pitches" in the entertainment show scripts and also have the radio stars make brief appeals, out-of-character, at the close of the program. This method saved the need for government competition for the "commercial" audience and also allowed reduction of repetition in attempting to reach that audience. Davis' four-part allocation plan, once in full swing and acceptance, also helped control the numbers problem. Yet, although criticism of the OWI became less vocal after these and other corrective measures were initiated, the OWI still seemed to be evaluated as, in Bruner's words, "only partially successful." And to make the start of an unpleasant
spring, 1943, even less pleasant, Archibald MacLeish resigned (in February) from his position as OWI Assistant Director in order to devote full time to his Library of Congress duties. Davis and Milton Eisenhower absorbed many of his responsibilities.

Back in the fall of 1942, the Office of War Information had mentioned the possibility of Elmer Davis doing a once-a-week, fifteen minute radio news commentary program. The series format, network arrangements, and other matters were debated and settled over a four-month period. Finally Davis took to the air for his initial OWI newscast on March 12, 1943, broadcasting for the first time regularly since he had left CBS in June 1942. The program featured no spot news, no news not previously released, and a vow not to compete, as such, with the commercial commentators. He would serve solely as a spokesman for the OWI and would engage only in an explanation of the general war situation. The program was broadcast live on Friday evenings over NBC, CBS, and the Blue Network, and recorded for rebroadcast on Saturday by MBS. This was only the second time in broadcast history that all four networks had made time available for a regular program series. Unfortunately, what seemed like a good communications idea to the Democratic administration
seemed like a bad one to at least part of the Republican opposition. By Davis' second broadcast, the show had become a political issue. Leading the vocal dissent was Senator Robert A. Taft (R-Ohio). "By what authority or pressure," wondered Taft, is Mr. Davis able to command time on the four radio networks simultaneously and virtually say to the people that they must listen to him or turn off their radios?" Taft charged that Davis, in effect, was "commandeering" all the stations of the country for "propaganda broadcasts." Unfortunately, the program controversy only primed the Republican-majority pump and by mid-year the partisan political squabble had enveloped the parent OWI as well. During the months that followed, the House Appropriations Committee even reached the point of suggesting that OWI Domestic Branch funds be cut off. Although not exactly agreeing with the Davis program concept either, broadcasters did realize the value of the vast clerical and informational services performed by the OWI and did back the retention of this agency.

Under the program channeling and allocations plans devised by the (OWI) Radio Branch, a smooth-running operation has been effected. The Radio Bureau is clearing programs for 32 government agencies. Broadcasters have only one government source with which to deal. Before the plan was evolved stations were carrying an average of 44 government spots or programs a day; now it runs a dozen for network affiliates
and 16 for independents.

Repetition has been eliminated. A professional job is being done, insuring to the public good and in the best interests of government and industry alike. Elmer Davis countered with praise of his own for the generous way the broadcast industry was cooperating with him in the task of war information. As of March, 1943, radio had donated $86.9 million worth of time, talent, and facilities to the OWI cause. Davis was quick to remind Congress that without such broadcast donations, the cost of information services would have been countless times greater than the annual Domestic Branch budget of $9 million. Congressional pressures and criticism did, however, remain but, for the most part, with lessened intensity.

According to the New York Times program listings, the weekly Elmer Davis commentary continued for about four months with the last edition coming on July 9, 1943. The reason given for "temporarily" stopping the series was Davis' up-coming trip to Europe to observe the action first-hand. Davis indicated before his departure a desire to shift his program to Sunday nights. During his absence, an OWI Radio News and Policy Committee, consisting of representatives from broadcast management, was named to decide whether the Davis broadcasts should be resumed upon his return. With the
Republicans in Congress calling the Davis program a network monopolizer hosted by the "minister of propaganda," and with broadcasters very much opposed to giving Davis any of their highly valued Sunday evening time, the odds seemed to be rather dramatically stacked against the Davis program. It was not resumed.

A word about the OWI Overseas Branch. This division operated under the direction of Robert E. Sherwood with a budget three times that of the Domestic Branch. In November, 1942, as has been previously mentioned, the government "leased" the total air time of the fourteen existing privately licensed shortwave stations. These stations had not been generally profitable to operate and served more as institutional advertising for the companies that owned them. Thus, temporary federal control caused no great financial loss to the broadcasters involved. Previous to federalization, the American shortwave stations had produced varying transmitting powers and differing news accounts which resulted in confusion and lack of credibility overseas. With programming controlled by OWI and the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (directed by Nelson Rockefeller), the government was for the first time able to project a uniform "voice of America." As of June, 1944, two of the stations were equipped with effectively high-powered
50,000 watt transmitters: WRUL, Boston, and WCBN, New York (replaced CBS' 10-kw WCDA). Broadcasting on 20-hour-a-day schedules, the OWI Overseas Branch shortwave fleet was aimed at five listening groups: enemy areas, Axis-occupied areas, neutral countries, the United Nations, and Allied-occupied areas. Despite Axis-imposed penalties for listening, the American network had quite an audience and morale effect overseas.68

Returning to the domestic scene, Radio's cooperation with the OWI continued to be impressive right up to, and through, the conclusion of the war. In 1944 alone, the broadcast industry donated over $66 million (20% above 1943) in time, talent, and facilities, enabling OWI to make an average of 640,000,000 "listener impressions"69 per week through the use of its various message allocation plans. The tables that follow provide a good look at OWI campaigns and time allocations. In May, 1945, during the 7th War Loan drive, a composite seven-day week showed a listener impression total of 1,003,608,000, bettering the one-billion mark for the first time and representing a 50% increase over the same week in 1944. Not only did commercial radio provide quantity, it generally delivered war information quality as well. The OWI Radio Bureau monitoring service rated excellent or good, with only 5% falling into the poor category.70
## TABLE 1

Radio Participation in War Information Campaigns - 1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OWI FACILITIES</th>
<th>No. of Programs</th>
<th>No. of War Messages</th>
<th>Est. &quot;Listener-Impressions&quot; Per Week</th>
<th>Est. Annual Value of Time &amp; Talent (Net)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Network Allocation Plan</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>10,920</td>
<td>460,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsored</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustaining</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Special Assignment Plan</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2,575</td>
<td>95,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. National Spot &amp; Regional Network Allocation Plan</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>1,617*</td>
<td>84,048</td>
<td>24,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Station Announcement Plan: (Stations)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Affiliates</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>26,082</td>
<td>1,356,264</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>17,136</td>
<td>891,072</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>43,218</td>
<td>2,247,336</td>
<td>63,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Special Events</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Women's Radio War Program Guide</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>45,095</td>
<td>2,344,879</td>
<td>642,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Represents number of station-broadcasts per week.
†Figures represent commercial value of time and talent of programs carrying OWI assigned messages.

## TABLE 2

Typical OWI Radio Campaigns in 1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaigns</th>
<th>Weeks</th>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Station Announcements</th>
<th>Est. Listener Impressions</th>
<th>Est. Value of Time and Talent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WAC Recruiting.</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>112,144</td>
<td>1,318,256,000</td>
<td>$2,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare for Winter.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>43,218</td>
<td>583,725,000</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victory Gardens.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>36,330</td>
<td>1,095,480,000</td>
<td>805,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Cross War Fund.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>93,765</td>
<td>1,166,205,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth War Loan.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>87,994</td>
<td>1,390,543,000</td>
<td>2,574,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Production Comes First.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>519,798,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadet Nurse Corps.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>25,515</td>
<td>625,695,000</td>
<td>1,250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Tax Regulations.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>10,248</td>
<td>686,345,000</td>
<td>1,314,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth War Loan.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>25,012</td>
<td>1,675,297,000</td>
<td>2,812,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National War Fund.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>41,514</td>
<td>787,616,000</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Office of War Information's tenure outlasted that of the Censorship Office which had begun dissolu­tion procedures in August, 1945. In December, Elmer Davis, who had stayed at the helm of the OWI through its entire period of existence, returned to commercial radio, this time signing with the new American network (ABC) to do three news analysis programs per week. The OWI had taken over, from the relatively unpowerful and inef­f ective OFF, the task of coordinating, clearing, and disseminating the information output of about 30 separate government agencies. "The Office of War Information is a war agency," wrote Elmer Davis, "which owes its existence solely to the war, and was established to serve as one of the instruments by which the war will be won." By assuming the role of govern­ment radio commentator on a four-network feed, Davis had hoped to aid civilian understanding of the wartime situation. The failure here was probably due more to the way it was carried out than to lack of a sound idea. Apparently the success of such a legitimate venture is largely dependent upon the ability to remain clear of the political arena. Apart from this incident, the government-industry information relationship was a relatively smooth one. Radio appreciated the schedul­ing and news services performed by the OWI while the Davis
organization expressed gratification over broadcasting's
time and talent generosity. The voluntary cooperative
effort, wrote OWI Radio Bureau Chief George P. Ludlam,
"has brought to the radio war information program a
success comparable only to the great success of commer­
cial radio itself."^72

Manpower and Production

Early in 1941, Sol Taishoff, editor of Broadcasting
magazine, made a prediction:

Broadcasting is pegged as a national
defense enterprise. As such, it will not
be stripped of key personnel. And it
will not be deprived of essential mater­
ials, such as transmitters, tower steel,
and other physical needs.73

He was only partially correct. Although broadcasting
was designated as an important defense industry, mili­
tary service depleted personnel rosters at all levels
and military production put an effective armlock on
the supply of needed technical materials.

While newspapers and magazines were experiencing
the initial stages of a wartime paper shortage, broad­
casters began to feel the pinch of a parts shortage,
caused by the diversion of men and materials to war
production. In February, 1942, at the suggestion of
the War Production Board and the Defense Communications
Board, the FCC announced a "freeze" on new station construction permits for the duration of the emergency. Permits outstanding would be honored on a materials priority and geographic location basis. The freeze would, among other things, limit the number of stations drawing on a limited supply of replacement parts and on a decreasing available manpower pool. "Censorship restrictions have been taken in their stride," wrote Business Week magazine. "This freezing order comes as the greatest single wartime blow dealt the broadcasting industry." Probably the greatest blow was to those who did not make it under the wire, since the war proved to be financially profitable for most already-established broadcasters.

Over 13 million radio receivers had been purchased in the United States in 1941. By War Production Board order, production of receivers for civilians would cease by April 22, 1942. In November, 1942, broadcasters were assured of their wartime importance and relative protection by War Manpower Commission Director Paul V. McNutt.

The War Manpower Commission recognizes the vital role that radio broadcasting is playing in the welfare and defense of our country. Radio communications have been classified as an essential war activity. Despite such classification, the draft hit broadcasting
at both top and bottom. The first radio official to be "drafted" into the government defense system was CBS Washington counsel Paul A. Porter who was assigned to an executive position with the National Defense Commission. Porter, incidentally, would later become an FCC commissioner and its youngest chairman to that date (1944). RCA head David Sarnoff served as a colonel with the Army Signal Corps while CBS Chairman William Paley was assigned to the Army's Psychological Warfare Branch with the same rank. Often retaining their civilian jobs in uniform, commercial radio's representatives in the service formed the backbone of the highly successful Armed Forces Radio Service Network, composed of over 170 stations. It was estimated at the beginning of 1944 that over 23% of radio's personnel (5,800 persons) was in the armed services. This figure did not include the hundreds of broadcast executives who were serving in civilian branches like the OWI, WPA, and other agencies. CBS alone had 715 employees, in addition to William Paley, in the service at this time. Regardless of its "essential" category, the broadcasting industry still felt keenly the effects of draft-depleted staffs. Yet despite necessary hindrances like the draft, and the freeze, and the ban on man-in-the-street interviews, broadcasting managed to carry on. For all intents and purposes, it was "business as usual."
Summary

Broadcasting's relationship with the Federal Government during the war consisted primarily of matters of information, censorship, industry manpower, and production. Radio functioned effectively as an obedient servant, from Roosevelt's declaration of an unlimited national emergency on May 27, 1941, until Truman's proclamation formally ending wartime status for the United States on December 31, 1945.

Even before our entry into the war, government program and announcement numbers had grown to the point of burden for broadcaster and listener alike. MacLeish's OFF attempted to bring order to the agency requests but failed, giving way to the Office of War Information's plans for lowering quantity and raising quality. The OWI was alternately criticized for having either too much, or too little, power. Director Elmer Davis attempted a four-network government news summary series in 1943 which, due to criticism and a congressional controversy, lasted only a few months. The public, or at least many of its elected representatives, was not yet ready for the "Minister of Information" image that the Davis program presented. The idea was sound and the spokesman was certainly well qualified. With more favorable "press" and by limiting the series to one
or two networks to insure listener alternatives, the OWI series might well have caught on and provided a valuable supplementary information service. Playwright Norman Corwin resented those who carelessly criticized this and other information attempts.

...the kind of criticism that is neither intelligent nor constructive is the sort that doesn't realize that we are at war - the sort that treats Elmer Davis and Archibald MacLeish and the Office of War Information and the Office of Facts and Figures as the enemy. The enemy, dear reader, is the Axis and the Fascists at home...?6

Despite the almost constant fault-finding and the persistent problems with Congressional funding, OWI did manage to bring order to agency time requests and did provide finally a centralized information source for radio.

In wartime, the problem always exists, in a democratic nation, of achieving a balance between military security and the need for public information. Helping OWI and broadcasters to determine just what could be disseminated safely was the Office of Censorship which, for the first time, functioned separately from the information service. World War II censorship at home consisted of restraints on international communications and security codes applied to domestic print and air media. Defined very simply, the Censorship Office was
"the government agency authorized by the President to request that certain news be not published or broad- cast."

Media responsibility was the key to voluntary censorship's success. With the general exception of accidental mention of banned weather information and the need for special restraints on foreign language stations (a major censorship problem), government-industry cooperation worked, and to mutual advantage: the maintenance of freedom. There was, of course, criticism of the degree of censorship imposed. Former CBS newsman Fletcher Pratt felt that World War II "was very nearly the worst reported" war in our history, with the result that "most Americans...remained profoundly ignorant" of what really happened. The reason given for this ignorance: the government censors.

The official censors have pretty well succeeded in putting over the legend that the war was won without a single mistake, by a command consisting exclusively of geniuses.

Contrary to Pratt's opinion, there was general agreement that the Censorship Office had functioned conscientiously and that the five Code editions had not significantly hampered news broadcasting or credibility. Perhaps most responsible for maintaining a healthy public image for the Office was Chief Censor Byron Price, known as "an ardent devotee of the principle of giving
both press and radio the maximum freedom consistent with national security..."79 Considering the alternative to a voluntary form of censorship, the Price Office functioned effectively despite probable excessive restraint on occasion.

Broadcasting had worked closely with the DCB, OFF, OWI, Censorship, WPB, Manpower, and, of course, the FCC. The Defense Communications Board had been granted great power over the networks and stations (enough to be labeled a "super FCC"), but the DCB ceased to be a dominant concern to broadcasters once the likelihood of government take-over had become fairly remote. Information and censorship received programming's prime attention while manpower and production had quite an effect on the technical side. An OWI spokesman described radio's participation as providing probably the "greatest and fastest exchange of intelligence the world has ever known."80 The Office of Censorship had praise for broadcasting's adherence to security restrictions. This had been radio's first experience with official censorship. Responsible censorship and efficient dissemination of information, through a voluntary cooperative effort, helped to win the war and to eliminate the need for government control of broadcasting.
Chapter I

1Sherman H. Dryer, Radio in Wartime (New York: Greenberg, 1942), p. 8. Mr. Dryer was then director of radio productions for the University of Chicago.


3The text of Sections 326 and 606-C of the Communications Act of 1934 appears in the appendix.

4"Broadcasters Adopt Self-Censorship Code as War Begins," Time, September 25, 1939, p. 50.

5Dryer, Radio in Wartime, p. 51.

6"Jitters," Time, September 18, 1939, p. 44.


10"Radio Must Remain Free, Says President," p. 15.


"Scoop or Panic," Broadcasting, March 3, 1941, p. 34.


The complete text of the "NAB Guide for Wartime Broadcasting" may be found in the appendix.


"Official Censor," Time, December 29, 1941, p. 60.


The complete text of the "War-Time Code of Practices for Broadcasters" may be found in the appendix.


Ibid., p. 3.


Ibid., p. 507.


The fourteen existing shortwave stations in 1942, including location and licensee, were: WRCA and WNBI (NBC, New York); WCRC, WCBX and WCDA (CBS, New York); WLWO (Crosley, Cincinnati); WGE0 and WGEA (General Electric, Schenectady); KGEI (General Electric, San Francisco); WBOS (Westinghouse, Boston); WRUL, WRUS and WRUW (World Wide Broadcasting Foundation, Boston); and KWID (Wesley I. Dumm Company, San Francisco).


"Price Charts Pre-Invasion Censorship," *Broadcasting*, January 24, 1944, p. 70.


Ibid., p. 218.


55 Ibid., p. 241.


59 Darrock and Dorn, "Davis and Goliath," p. 226.

60 Ibid., p. 235.


62 Ibid., p. 131.


64 The first four-network hook-up arranged for a regular series carried "This Is War!", Norman Corwin's 13-week dramatic series which began on February 14, 1942.
Senator Taft spoke in apparent error here with his use of the word "simultaneously." As previously stated in the text, although all four networks carried the Davis program, only three did so simultaneously. The main MBS station, WOR in New York, rebroadcast the Friday evening commentary on Saturday afternoon at 4:00 pm. The fact that WOR had boxing scheduled during the Friday night Davis slot can be verified by checking the appropriate New York Times radio listings.


"OWI - With or Without," Broadcasting, June 28, 1943, p. 32.

According to Elmer Davis (War Information and Censorship, p. 19), "...shortwave broadcasting has its limitations, due largely to the fact that in enemy countries, and countries occupied by the enemy, people risk their lives if they listen to it. Nevertheless there is evidence that they do listen to it...a good deal in Germany and Italy and still more in the occupied countries..." Powerful station WRUL in Boston received an average of 100 letters a day, smuggled out of Europe, from listeners who typically wrote, "Your messages keep our courage up." (Webb Waldron, "Democracy on the Short Waves," Readers' Digest, September, 1941, p. 40). Again Elmer Davis: "...there are plenty of people who listen to us in Germany and some of them evidently believe what they hear - enough of them for Dr. Goebbels to think it is worthwhile to talk back." (p. 21).

A "listener impression" is registered each time one listener hears one message or program.


Dryer, Radio in Wartime, p. 308.

"Revised Codes," Broadcasting, December 13, 1943, p. 11.


I have an idea that radio's job is more than that of a mere translator. If it is to be effective it must transport the listener to the country from which the broadcast is originating and say to him: "Look, Joe, if you were here this is what you would see and hear and smell and taste."

—Edward R. Murrow

The story of World War II network news coverage concerns complex radio organizations. Perhaps more importantly it concerns individuals - the war correspondents who constantly risked their lives to provide the American audience with on-the-scene accounts of action as it happened. For radio, war news coverage was more than a patriotic commitment. It was a much needed opportunity for electronic journalism to prove itself equal to or even above the abilities of its newsprint counterpart. Network radio news had been born and raised in peacetime. World War II stood ready to confer upon it both baptism and adulthood in one, long, devastating ceremony.
Network News Beginnings

The radio news correspondent movement began with very little fanfare back in 1930. It was in that year that William Hard of NBC and Frederick William Wile of CBS were sent to London for the express purpose of covering the Five-Power Naval Disarmament Conference then in progress. Soon after the conclusion of the conference, both networks decided that the coverage experience had been worthwhile and each assigned a network representative to cover London and Europe on a full-time basis. NBC chose Fred Bate, an artist and a personal friend of the Prince of Wales, to establish its office there. Cesar Saerchinger, a writer-historian, was selected in 1930 as CBS' first European director, with headquarters in London (Edward R. Murrow succeeded him in 1937). During those first few years, these two network foreign correspondents were given the primary task of lining up radio talks by European "celebrities."

During the 1920's and early 1930's, the newspapers had generally regarded radio as a toy and not as a serious news competitor. For a time, the press had given radio free column space in which to advertise upcoming broadcast events. But with the placement of newsmen overseas, the increased use of press
wire services and the stiffening of advertising competition, radio became serious about news and newspapers became serious about radio. Table 3 shows the rapid growth in radio's overall advertising revenue during the late twenties and early thirties compared with the general newspaper decline. Radio was certainly making its presence felt.

**TABLE 3**

**ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES IN RADIO AND NEWSPAPERS,**

1927 to 1936
(in millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Radio</th>
<th>Newspapers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>620</td>
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<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
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<td>1933</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>450</td>
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<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


"Radio news coverage, which had dealt a death blow to the afternoon 'extra,'" according to Llewellyn White, "was utilizing the press association reports - the very
raw material of newspapers - to beat the publishers at their own game, and with a decided advantage in timing." Newspaper publishers began to pressure the press-oriented news services (United Press, Associated Press, and International News Service) to stop supplying releases to the networks, and by early 1933 the wire services complied. This move forced radio, previously only a news-relayer, to become a news-gatherer as well. It is ironic that over the next decade, the press would often take a back seat to radio in the performance of a role it had forced broadcasters to adopt.

In October, 1933, Paul White, a former UP editor and at that time CBS news director, began to form his own news staff. His counterpart at NBC, A.A. Schechter, also started to build. Reacting sharply to such actions, the newspapers withdrew the vital radio program listings from print. Panic was apparently quick to set in among broadcasters, for in December, the two networks agreed to meet with the publishers' association and the press services to work out a settlement. As was anticipated, broadcasters took their lumps, ending up with the right to carry only two five-minute news summaries per day and only extremely important news bulletins. The newscasts were to be unsponsored and CBS was instructed to cut back the size of its already successful
and growing news staff. The publishers set up a special wire service, the Press Radio Bureau, to supply the networks with the material for their summaries. This system functioned with reluctant network support for about three years until the Press Radio Bureau folded. At least part of the reason for its demise was the start of Trans-Radio Press, a new independent wire service which sold news directly to advertisers for radio sponsorship. Trans-Radio broke open the press service boycott and soon after, to meet the competition, the other news services were once again selling to the networks. The lure of increased revenues effectively ended what had come to be called the "press-radio war" by 1940.

The year 1938 served as network radio's dress rehearsal for war. In a January poll, news broadcasts ranked third on a list of favorite programs and President Roosevelt fell between Charlie McCarthy and Gracie Allen in a rating of favorite radio personalities. In 1936, NBC, as a part of the network's tenth anniversary, had demonstrated radio transmission from airplanes to land and also had presented a two-way conversation between David Sarnoff in New York and Guglielmo Marconi in Genoa, Italy. NBC's two-way use of radio was considered a stunt in 1936. Two years later, CBS put the technique
to practical news application. During March, 1938, CBS news pioneered the use of multiple foreign pick-ups within the same program when it initiated its "European Roundup" series. This program's first assignment was the on-the-spot description of the Austrian "Anschluss" and its effects, via shortwave from various European capitals. The timing and technical arrangements demanded by such endeavors were extremely complex, yet this type of news program became standard fare during the war to follow. William L. Shirer (CBS) and Max Jordan (NBC) quickly became famous for their eyewitness reporting as they roved around a Europe in transition. Shirer broadcast his uncensored account of the "Anschluss" from London only one day after being forced to flee Vienna in the face of the Nazi take-over. Young Edward R. Murrow, still in the process of hiring "reporters, not announcers" for the CBS European staff, made his first international broadcast on American radio, from Vienna in March, 1938, when he covered Hitler's arrival after the German conquest.4

The second major crisis to emerge that year came in September, lasted for twenty days, and took place in Munich, Germany. It was a political problem regarding the future of Czechoslovakia and radio was there to bring home the details. In the past, radio
newsmen had not always been particularly well qualified or effective as journalists.

...at Munich, a serious, capable, hard-working and resourceful type of radio reporter put in his appearance. Actually, he had been on the job for several years, but it took an event of this caliber to bring him to public attention.

William L. Shirer, Max Jordan, Ed Murrow and Fred Bate are men whose work is comparable to the best correspondents newspapers have to offer.

Looking at CBS, four newsmen handled the bulk of that network's Munich coverage under the general direction of Paul White in New York. European Chief Edward R. Murrow reported from London, senior European reporter William L. Shirer covered Munich and Berlin, Russian expert Maurice Hindus broadcast the Czech reactions from Prague, and H.V. Kaltenborn served as the untiring anchor man in New York. During the crisis period, from September 10 to September 30, 1938, Kaltenborn made over one-hundred news broadcasts of varying lengths. Said Kaltenborn, "Never before had so many listened so long to so much." He ate and slept in the studio during the entire twenty-day period, ready to go on the air at a moment's notice. His knowledge of the German language allowed him to translate a Hitler speech in progress, followed by his own instant capsule analysis. Prior to Munich, Kaltenborn's most
famous broadcasts had been done in the midst of the Spanish Civil War (1936) with the use of a portable back transmitter. These efforts provided some of the first actual sounds of battle heard over radio. Kaltenborn's knowledgeable and understandable running commentary on the crisis catapulted him into national prominence.

...this tall, dignified master-linguist, and ad lib artist was seizing in his two big hands a priceless moment.

When the twenty days were finished and the peace of Munich had descended upon a still half-trusting world, Kaltenborn's name was a household word throughout America. 7

Kaltenborn enjoyed top prestige and audience ratings for about a year before falling back into the growing ranks of commentators. After a generally unfruitful fact-gathering trip to Europe in 1939, he returned to find several other news analysts sharing both his audience and his popularity.

The two primary networks had dedicated a previously unheard of amount of time to the coverage of Munich. NBC carried 117 foreign pick-ups and a total of over 58 hours of news during the crisis. CBS broadcast over 54 hours of news during the same period, including more than 470 originations from overseas. "It is quite possible," felt James Rorty, "that the dissemination and interpretation of news will now be recognized as
the most important function of the industry." Although it was generally agreed that CBS had out-covered NBC's Red and Blue Networks, NBC had managed to out-scoop the competition badly on at least two occasions. The first "coup" was obtaining an interview with Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain when he returned from the conference in Munich. The second occurred when Max Jordan, NBC's European chief, managed to get an advance copy of the final Munich terms and beat Shirer of CBS to the microphone by three-quarters of an hour. Not only did Jordan scoop CBS, but also officials in London, Paris, and even Berlin! Shirer established an excellent coverage record with CBS. Munich was one of the very few times he was beaten to the punch.

The networks, NBC, CBS, and the emerging MBS, gambled vast sums of money on the extended news coverage, not realizing that public interest was being awakened to a great enough extent to allow for commercial sponsorship. A.A. Schechter of NBC estimated the cost of a Europe-to-America broadcast to be about $15 a minute. Technical costs alone for the four networks figured out to around $90,000, with correspondents' salaries, travel, refunds to sponsors, etc., more than doubling that figure, just for those twenty days. But the effort had paid off, both in the public's
recognition of radio news and in the solidification of
the network news departments.

The necessity of the moment had
molded into a finely organized and
super-sensitive sounding board various
processes which had been building over
eighteen experimental years.9

Even though the news pace slowed considerably and ex­
pectedly after Munich, the networks took the crisis
rather as a cue to increase their news capacities,
especially in the area of foreign correspondents. Net­
work radio news was well prepared for the outbreak of
war, possibly even more so than some government agencies.
As a hectic 1938 drew to a close, Mutual's Fulton Lewis,
Jr., initiated and won a move to allow radio corres­
pondents to be seated in the Congressional press gal­
leries and at the administration's regular press con­
ferences. These concessions helped to break down out­
dated precedents established by newspapers in Washington
and they served as "a final recognition of the birth of
the Fifth Estate."10

Coverage of the European War: 1939 - 1941

The increased depth and extent of radio news,
"the transmission of current reality,"11 was adding
greatly to the general level of public awareness. The
annual Fortune magazine survey found that in 1931 al­
most 70% of Americans relied primarily on the radio for news and that 58% considered it to be more accurate than newspapers. Twice as many people as not indicated they would believe a radio news bulletin over a conflicting version in print. And to support their belief, they did buy radios. "The American listener," wrote NAB Research Director Paul F. Peter, "has convincingly attested his high regard for radio by this staggering investment in the gadget which brings the world into his home." In 1939 alone, consumers purchased 9 million sets and paid a total price of $630 million (cost of the sets, electricity and batteries, replacement parts and servicing) for the use of radio.

In September of 1939, the Second World War erupted in Europe, twenty years after the conclusion of the "war to end all wars." But this time radio was on the scene and, to both the amazement and horror of people around the world, those listening could for the first time actually hear a war begin. Hitler's army invaded Poland on September 1. Two days later, England and France declared war on Germany, too late however to save the blitzkrieged Poles. "That Sunday," recalled CBS news analyst Elmer Davis, "September 3rd, with bulletins coming in from somewhere every minute and put on the air as fast as they came in, was just about as hot a day as radio reporting ever knew - hotter even
than the night of the Lindbergh kidnapping, or the Hindenburg explosion, or of a national election." In addition to Prime Minister Chamberlain's war declaration against Germany, the American networks carried the sounds of London's first air raid, King George VI's war message, French Premier Daladier's declaration of war, Canadian Premier MacKenzie King's pledge of support, President Roosevelt's reaffirmation of U.S. neutrality, and innumerable on-the-scene reports from correspondents. Network news went around the clock for those first few event-packed days. Paul White led the CBS team of Murrow, Shirer, Kaltenborn and Elmer Davis. Over at NBC, A.A. "Abe" Schechter directed the efforts of ace correspondent Max Jordan along with Dorothy Thompson and General Hugh Johnson in New York. Fledgling MBS, operating with definite budget restrictions, had only John Steele abroad and intelligent, respected Raymond Gram Swing holding down the fort at home. All the networks had quickly retained active military officers to help analyze the battlefield situation. Very soon, however, the War Department decided it did not like the idea of public analysis and comment by active servicemen, and ordered such participation to cease. General Johnson had already quit over a disagreement with Miss Thompson before the order was issued.
CBS pulled another in a series of wartime coups here by hiring retired Major George Fielding Eliot as a commentator on movements and tactics, thus circumventing the Army ban. One major coup that CBS had and lost by fate alone concerned correspondent Eric Sevareid on September 3, 1939, as related by Mitchell V. Charnley.

Sevareid experienced heartbreaks on the first day of World War II. Great Britain had gone to war at 11 a.m. Sevareid had a broadcast from Paris scheduled at noon. Just before airtime he learned that France would officially be "in" at 3 p.m. Though other reporters had the story, censors had refused to clear it; Sevareid's script, however, was passed by a censor without comment. It would be a world-wide scoop. Just as the minute hand approached 12, the studio engineer stuck his head out of his booth and announced that New York had decided to cancel the broadcast.14

Radio had had two previews during which to iron out coverage procedures prior to the start of war: the "Anschluss" and the Munich crisis, both in 1938. World War II provided a different situation due to its anticipated length and due to the initiation of stringent censorship controls. The Austrian, Czechoslovakian and now Polish crises had all pushed radio news to a 24-hour and constant bulletin basis. After the first few days of the war, the continual program interruptions and voices of excited commentators soon became an emotional drain on both the audience
and the broadcasters. "Radio did not clarify; it confused," charged Sherman Dryer. "It did not inform; it alarmed." During the days surrounding the war's outbreak, radio had so often outcovered the press or beaten it back home with the story that newspapers were often forced to credit news items to radio sources. Because of this supreme insult, many newspapers engaged in a generally unsuccessful campaign to reduce radio's credibility with the public by questioning the tremendous quantity and thus the accuracy of radio news. Press animosity triggered by radio's wartime success would continue until the entrance of the United States into the hostilities. But the press and other critics had been right about the eventual public disenchantment with the increased volume of radio news, and so the networks, feeling the pressures of public opinion and terrific costs, decided to limit foreign pick-ups, limit interruptions and return generally to their regular program schedules during the third week of war.

The newscaster was destined to become the symbol or voice of radio during the Second World War. These were the men who relayed and interpreted the information which affected the day-to-day existence of millions of people. "Eighteen years ago," wrote H.V. Kaltenborn, "when I broadcast my first talk...,
radio's 'coverage' of the news was non-existent. Today the news department...is a vast machine...whose work takes place in cities all over the globe..." Obviously, the newscaster was in a position of great importance. What were to be his restrictions? How was his job defined? During the early days of war there had been complaints of overly-excited commentators and adjacent commercials done in bad taste (e.g., "Here is a late, important news bulletin - use Smith Brothers cough drops..."). More tightly organized news operations, news reforms and codes had helped the move away from the Walter Winchell "dots and dashes and lots of flashes" style of reporting. Radio commentators had a tendency to move away from the factual to the emotional. Suggestions were made that rigid standards of competence should be enforced so as to limit the quantity and elevate the quality of commentators for the sake of radio's rapidly developing credibility position. The suggestion was also made that commentators be unsponsored. This did not come to pass, although the networks did adopt certain restrictions on commercial length and treatment during news shows.

CBS preferred the term news analyst over commentator because of the obligation to stick to the facts and to maintain objectivity. The 1939 NAB code contained the recommendation, "News broadcasts shall not
be editorial." The networks adopted this policy.

NBC's Abe Schechter explained:

The NBC news policy called for this war coverage...to deal strictly with facts. Unbiased, unvarnished, responsible facts. Facts shorn of personal feelings, personal thoughts and personal opinions.

It was our feeling that Hitler may not have known what he intended to do up until the very moment he sent his troops into Poland. For that reason, it was decided to stay away from opinion and from tea leaves.17

CBS echoed the heart of these restrictions. "On the whole," stated Paul White, "we are satisfied with a good workaday American brand of English and set no especial store on polished diction. The one thing we have insisted on above all else is as complete an objectivity as can be mastered."18 Network policy on this matter was no doubt strongly influenced by the FCC's 1940 "Mayflower" decision which ruled that the broadcaster, unlike the press, could not editorialize or otherwise function as an "advocate" with regard to controversial issues. The war in Europe and our relation to it, certainly qualified as controversial issues.

Elmer Davis saw his news function as one of understanding - helping the listener to judge but not doing the judging for him. The newscaster had an obligation to maintain neutrality whether the information was good
or bad. One of the best descriptions of the radio news analyst's role came from the man who explained Munich to Americans, H.V. Kaltenborn.

The radio news analyst, as I see it, has two jobs. His first is to give background information on news bulletins as they occur. His second is to coordinate events into some kind of pattern so that listeners get a better idea of what is going on. He is a map-maker, an encyclopedist, a fact-elucidator and an antipropagandist. His job is not to edit, but to write footnotes to history in the making.19

Thus the wartime policy agreed upon by the network news corps was factual objectivity sans editorial comment. This decision stood generally unchallenged with the exception of a minor skirmish from within the ranks which will be discussed later.

In September of 1938, William L. Shirer reported that the only radio correspondents in Europe were American. No other country was getting a regular look at both sides of the growing conflict. This overall view was provided by the daily radio reports from European capitals, a new technique.

Through radio's peculiar magic, men three thousand miles away on the scene of action could penetrate into American homes and relate, simply and sincerely, the first-hand story of Europe plunging inexorably toward war.20

Following Munich, Murrow and Shirer concluded that CBS needed an enlarged foreign correspondent staff of its
own. Previously they had been getting some radio reports from hired newspaper correspondents and from part-time "stringers" located around Europe. Murrow predicted the newspapers would ban their men from broadcasting once the war broke out and he was correct. In July, 1939, Paul White met with his "entire European staff" consisting of Murrow, Shirer, and Thomas B. Grandin, then in charge of the Paris office, to plan CBS' war coverage. By December, White had assembled fourteen full-time correspondents and assigned them to a variety of foreign capitals. During the twenties, a newscaster could go just as far away from his station as a telephone line would reach. Now through a combination of land lines and telephonic shortwave (radio telegraphy), four-way (London-Paris-New York-Washington) transatlantic radio conversations had become almost commonplace, not to mention the relative ease of receiving regular one-way shortwave reports from other capitals. Table 4 provides an example of the composition and precise timing of a typical 30-minute network, multi-capital, overseas news "round-up." If the correspondents were out in the field, they could be connected to a powerful state-run shortwave transmitter either by land-line or by means of a portable transmitter. The connections for news transmission to
TABLE 4
FORMAT EXAMPLE FROM THE CBS "EUROPE TONIGHT" PROGRAM
Sunday, September 1, 1940
7:00 - 7:30 p.m.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eastern Daylight Time</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7:00:00 - 7:00:30</td>
<td>New York opening and introducing Elmer Davis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:00:30 - 7:01:00</td>
<td>Elmer Davis calls in London.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:01:00 - 7:09:00</td>
<td>Two-way conversation between Davis in New York and Edward R. Murrow in London.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:09:00 - 7:09:10</td>
<td>New York introduces Berlin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:14:45 - 7:15:00</td>
<td>New York introduces Rome.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:15:00 - 7:18:30</td>
<td>Rome and Cecil Brown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:18:30 - 7:18:40</td>
<td>New York introduces Bucharest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:18:40 - 7:24:00</td>
<td>Bucharest and Spencer Williams.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:24:00 - 7:24:10</td>
<td>New York introduces Washington.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


America were often complicated and involved much prior arranging. William Shirer recalled that his on-the-scene report of Russian fighting in Finland went first by telephone from Helsinki to Stockholm, then to a
European shortwave station 800 miles away, and finally from that station to New York where it was converted and "rebroadcast" on a standard band (AM) frequency. To help him coordinate such far-reaching CBS war coverage, News Director White had an electronic device, referred to as his "piano," installed on his desk which enabled him to contact most of his foreign staff at the flip of a switch. Daily news roundup planning was accomplished in this manner via private point-to-point radio-telephone cue channels. Such foreign originations for news programs were costing both NBC and CBS about $10,000 per week.

The fall of 1939, militarily, has been termed the "phoney war" simply because very little occurred during those few months following the conquest of Poland. What did occur were three notable on-the-scene news broadcasts. The first major naval battle of the war occurred on December 14, 1939, between the German battleship "Graf Spee" and three British cruisers that had engaged the Nazi vessel by surprise off the Montevideo coast in Uruguay. Via cable, NBC had hired an M-G-M film salesman then in the area named James Bowen to cover the battle since the network had no newsmen nearby. The "Graf Spee" was mortally wounded in the ensuing battle and limped into the Montevideo
harbor. Uruguay was then a neutral nation. To dock there would have meant detainment for the war's duration according to International Law; to make a run for the open sea would have resulted in almost certain annihilation at the hands of the British. On December 17, Bowen happened to be talking to New York by telephone when suddenly he shouted, "Give me the air! The ship has exploded!"22 NBC cleared the wires and what followed has been described as the most dramatic broadcast of 1939, as James Bowen gave a vivid eyewitness account of the scuttling and subsequent sinking of the famed battleship, carried out quite likely on direct orders from Hitler. Yet another dynamic NBC broadcast featured Max Jordan on Christmas Eve transmitting live and direct from a German bunker along the Siegfried Line. Jordan described the fortifications and talked with some of the soldiers in a broadcast approved by the Germans and done with the aid of their equipment and personnel. CBS also featured a Christmas Eve program with reports on the troops from various locations. Leseur was with the Royal Air Force, Sevareid spoke from the Maginot Line, White reported from Finnish headquarters, and Shirer broadcast from a German fueling ship in the Baltic Sea. Murrow rounded out the program by describing the peaceful pre-Christmas
scene in London. This was to be one of London's last peaceful evenings for some time to come.

With the arrival of 1940, estimates revealed the presence of over 28 million radio-homes and 6.8 million radio-equipped automobiles in the United States. The start of a new decade also brought a stop to the "phony war." On April 8, 1940, the German Army marched into Denmark to initiate the Scandinavian campaign. The networks again went to a 24-hour emergency schedule but with a newscast technique differing from earlier crisis coverage.

The ease and efficiency with which the networks moved into emergency status to bring to the American public up-to-the-minute reports of Germany's unexpected drive into Scandinavia...was...accomplished with scarcely any disturbance to normal program schedules.23

Bulletins were aired during the between-program breaks, causing fewer interruptions than before in the usual entertainment format. General procedure was to receive news items from London, Paris, and Berlin where transmission arrangements had long been established. Anchoring the commentator desks in New York were:

NBC Red - H.V. Kaltenborn (just recently switched from Columbia), NBC Blue - John Gunther, CBS - Elmer Davis and Major Eliot, and MBS - Raymond Gram Swing. Network radio news again went all night a month later in May when the Germans invaded Holland and Belgium. "The
first broadcast from Holland after the start of the invasion," according to Bruce Robertson, "was made on NBC-Blue at midnight on Sunday, May 12, by Louise Wight, who gave an eyewitness account of conditions in Amsterdam..." Once again adhering to the "minimum of interference" concept, the networks limited all but the most vital bulletins to station breaks and time periods normally devoted to non-entertainment, sustaining programs. Press-radio relations seemed greatly improved, with newspapers glad to receive radio's short-wave news due to crowded cables and radio relying heavily on the press services for bulletins. By mid-year, UP and INS had raised their rates for such service to both press and radio due to increased costs of war coverage.

Italy entered the war on June 10, 1940. On that date, the networks carried the greatest number of international speeches broadcast together since England and France entered the war, September 3, 1939. Relayed live via the networks was Mussolini's declaration of war, French Premier Paul Reynaud's (the last government broadcast from Paris) and British Minister of Information Alfred Duff-Cooper's replies, and an early evening speech by President Roosevelt. June was also the month in which radio recorded one of its finer wartime moments.
Francis Chase had described William L. Shirer as "a man of hunches, of long shots and terrific gambles." This CBS news ace had indeed played his cards right on June 22, 1940. On that day, the French surrendered to the Germans. Shirer and NBC's William C. Kerker were the only newsmen to witness the armistice signing in an old "wagon-lit" in the Compiègne Forest, the same railway car in the same position used for the German surrender after World War I. They signalled New York:

William C. Kerker and William L. Shirer calling NBC and CBS from the forest of Compiègne in France, The armistice has been signed.

The two alert radio newsmen broadcast the historic re-enactment, beating everyone else (most other reporters had gone to Berlin) including the Germans who did not release the news until two hours after the Shirer-Kerker broadcast.

Foreign censorship of broadcasts made by U.S. correspondents had by this time become quite definite, although censors seemed content to tell them "what not to say" rather than "what to say." As might be expected, the London censors or "scrutineers" were readily accessible and generally pleasant to deal with. In Paris, censorship was handled by the military and the information ministry, full advance scripts were required, and the censors were located some distance
from the broadcast facilities. German censorship procedures were the toughest. Advance written scripts needed the approval of the propaganda office, the foreign office and the military censor before being cleared for broadcast. The Russians refused to allow any American to broadcast from Moscow so their censorship was rather complete. Newscasters attempted to get around foreign censorship by altered delivery style, by the use of American slang and by ad-libbing whenever possible. The networks generally offered a more practical solution to censorship with their pick-ups from several European capitals attempting to arrive at all sides of a story.

As the Battle of Britain broke out in August, 1940, Edward R. Murrow's nightly "London After Dark" program helped describe the situation for Americans. His broadcasts were live, often done during actual air raids, and sometimes contained spot reports by other commentators from around the city. Whatever the content, the result was always "actuality."

U.S. listeners actually heard the people going by the Church of St. Martin's-in-the-Fields on their way to shelters before a raid because Murrow laid his mike down on the sidewalk to pick up their unhurried footsteps.27

Murrow frequently spoke from a rooftop describing the air action and London's reaction.
Ed Murrow manned his post simply because he felt that the American public, to whom he was speaking, had a right to know what it was like, on the spot, in London that fall of 1940. He was the man who had the individual and the technical resources to tell them.28

Murrow received many well-deserved awards for his early-war and Britain air-war coverage. Radio coverage of a significant United States event took place in Washington in October of that year. The major networks carried the proceedings of the selective service lottery, or drawing, of 8,500 numbers. This ceremony represented a part of the first U.S. peacetime draft.

At the start of 1941, there were almost 30 million radio homes in the United States which was twice the German figure. An Elmo Roper survey, commissioned by the networks, found that "listening to the radio is the favorite recreation of the average American citizen, who spends 3 hours and 8 minutes daily at his receiving set and who prefers radio to newspapers as a source of information..."29 To meet this need for news information, the networks and stations increased the number of regularly scheduled news programs as the war tempo picked up. In New York City alone, radio stations were carrying three times as many of these programs in 1940 as they had in 1938.
By mid-1941, European war clouds had begun to drift closer to the U.S. On May 27, for the first time in our history, an unlimited national emergency was proclaimed via radio, with President Roosevelt addressing the largest national audience to date. In July, the networks struck a blow at the stigma connected with the use of recordings by broadcasting, via transcription at night, the President's request that Congress extend the duty of the National Guard and Army Reserve to reach a larger audience. Although the war and radio news were already in full swing, the networks got an opportunity to catch up on some "basic training" by covering the largest peacetime maneuvers in history, involving 500,000 troops, scheduled for Louisiana in September. The types of programs coming out of this exercise were expected to closely resemble those resorted to in the event of our war involvement.

In November, all U.S. radio news correspondents in Berlin were ordered to cease broadcasting. The Germans had been fairly cooperative until they became heavily involved on the Russian front. With this increased activity came harsher censorship and when correspondents complained to their home offices, the Germans retaliated by shutting down their operations completely. Both NBC and CBS had stopped broadcasting
from Rome back in July due to increased censorship pressures.

In early December, Edward R. Murrow returned home on leave for the first time in three years. He was honored at a huge testimonial dinner where, among other tributes, a telegram from the President acknowledged Murrow's commitment to "telling the truth" when he told the news. In his comments later, Murrow spoke about the need for wartime censorship.

I cannot claim any undue personal popularity with British censors - observed none of them weeping when I departed - but I should be unwilling to broadcast from a nation at war without any censorship at all. The responsibility for human lives would be too great.30

In less than a month after Murrow made his remarks, press and radio in this country would be operating under a system of official military and government censorship.

Previous to December, the U.S. had consistently maintained its non-committal war status when probed by the media. But now news was beginning to leak out. There were reports of U.S. destroyers searching for German U-boats near Iceland. Finally, W. Averell Harriman, U.S. Lend-Lease Coordinator, confirmed what Americans were beginning to suspect, via a British radio broadcast, when he stated: "Our Navy is shoot-
ing Germans - German submarines and aircraft at sea.31 Yet these were not destined to be the type of activities that would finally and completely pull the United States into the Second World War.

Pearl Harbor to V-J Day

The first news of the attack came from the White House. President Roosevelt informed his press secretary, Stephen T. Early, who then called the three press services. The wire story broke at 2:25 p.m. (EST). Mutual scored first when at 2:26 p.m. on Sunday, December 7, 1941, station WOR, New York, interrupted its coverage of the Dodger-Giant professional football game to broadcast the UP bulletin regarding a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. At NBC, the program "Swing and Sway," featuring Sammy Kaye's band, was interrupted by H.V. Kaltenborn who announced:

President Roosevelt said in a statement today that the Japanese have attacked Pearl Harbor, Hawaii from the air. I'll repeat that - President Roosevelt says that the Japanese have attacked Pearl Harbor in Hawaii from the air. This comes to you from the NBC newsroom in New York.32

Taking morale and national calm into consideration, rather restrained language now tended to replace the excited "flashes" and "bulletins" of old. CBS, on the air with its regularly scheduled "World News Today"
program at 2:30, was perhaps in the best position to get immediate reports from foreign capitals regarding the attack and reaction to it. Although all the networks were quick to rally, after three years of training, NBC managed to win the day with a live on-the-scene description by a rooftop observer who reported: "It is a real war; it is no joke." Later, at 4:46 p.m. after some line difficulties, this same man gave a six-minute full report on what had happened that Sunday at Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The highlight of Mutual's coverage had been a report filed by MBC correspondent Royal Arch Gunnison from Manila describing the arrival of Japanese paratroopers over the Philippines. As a tribute to radio's restraint and, of course, to the state of America's mental preparedness for war by this time, a national hysteria did not follow the news of attack.

Nowhere did the straight radio reports of terrific bombing at Honolulu - of Jap pilots diving over the beautiful mountains to fire at U.S. ships and kill U.S. men - create anything resembling the panic created three years ago by Orson Welles' famed faking of a Martian invasion.

In fact, somewhat reminiscent of the often alleged national apathy of more recent years, several of WOR's listeners that Sunday were apparently considerably more interested in the football game than in the Japanese,
since they called the station to complain about the news interruptions! Needless to say, the networks stayed on all night, as they did for the remainder of the week, generally limiting news bulletins to the station breaks and increasing the frequency of regular newscasts. C.E. Hooper reported that radio listening on Pearl Harbor evening had increased 50% over a comparable evening in November, indicating certainly more concern than apathy. Time magazine noted a certain irony in the savage Japanese attack which came almost "as a great relief, like a reverse earthquake, that in one terrible jerk shook everything disjointed, distorted, askew back into place." Prior to the attack, national unity had been a problem for America. It was a problem no longer.

Congress, at President Roosevelt's request, declared war on Japan at 4:10 p.m., Monday, December 8, 1941. Over 65% of set owners heard the President's war speech before Congress, creating the largest daytime audience ever for a speech. An estimated 90 million people (83% of set owners) listened to their President as he addressed them personally, by network radio, on Tuesday evening, December 9.

We are now in this war. We are all in it - all the way. Every single man, woman and child is a partner in the most tremendous undertaking of
our American history. We must share together the bad news and the good news...So far the news has all been bad...

(Yet) we are going to win the war and we are going to win the peace that follows.56

Networks and stations placed armed guards at transmitters and in control rooms. Identification cards bearing fingerprints and pictures were issued to broadcast personnel. Live studio audiences were discontinued for many programs.

Three on-the-scene descriptions stood out during broadcasting's first week after Pearl Harbor. In addition to the December 7 account of the Hawaiian attack, there were vivid reports of the Japanese bombing of Manila in the Philippines, broadcast by station KZRH General Manager Bert Silen. Some of his transmissions were later censored due to unintentional comments of probable aid to the enemy. Silen remained through the fall of Manila, was captured by the Japanese and spent several months in a prison camp before being liberated. The third outstanding eyewitness account was delivered by CBS correspondent Cecil Brown who was aboard the British battleship, HMS Repulse, off the coast of Malaya when it was sunk by the Japanese on December 8. Brown later detailed the battle, his leap into the South China Sea, and his subsequent rescue by an Allied
destroyer. After sufficiently recovering from the ordeal, Brown, a veteran of Rome, The Balkans, the Middle East and Singapore, sent the following cable to his wife:

Health reasonably satisfactory. In October the Air Force crashed me. November an army truck plunged over a hill with me. In December, the Navy tried to sink me. Since no additional branches of the force remain, don't worry about the indestructible Mr. Brown. 37

Despite his touch of humor, Cecil Brown's description of the Repulse sinking was considered to be one of the best radio reports in history, earning him a Peabody and at least three other prestigious press awards by the following spring. Another CBS newsman, William J. Dunn, just barely escaped from the Philippines, catching the last boat from a small seaport town, and managed to reach Australia. Meanwhile, some newsmen in Germany had not been as fortunate. John Paul Dickson, Mutual's correspondent in Berlin, and fourteen other news personnel were being held indefinitely according to a German report received by MBS in late December. This was the first word they had had on Dickson's whereabouts since Mutual stopped its broadcasts from Berlin on November 13.

Although network radio was the electronic medium for news and public service during World War II, its offspring, television, had indeed begun to operate and
contribute to the war effort on a local and sometimes regional network basis. RCA had publically demonstrated an electronic television system as far back as November of 1929. The next decade saw much experimentation and improvement made on radio's "eyes." In 1939, RCA re­placed the exceedingly "hot" iconoscope television tube with a more sensitive image-orthicon that required much less light. RCA-NBC, then operating experimental sta­tion W2XBS, televised the New York World's Fair opening featuring President Roosevelt and also the first col­lege football game, both in 1939. Away from the studio or remote televising of events such as these was made possible by using mobile facilities, another first for RCA. CBS had been concentrating on the development of color television, transmitting its first such experimental broadcast in mid-1940. By the following July, with 10,000 television sets in operation (mostly in New York City), the FCC had given heretofore exper­imental operations the commercial go-ahead. NBC's WNBT became New York's pioneer commercial television station. During the months that followed WNBT adjusted its 15-hour per week program schedule to meet the de­sires of the audience, reflecting a 33% preference for news, special events, and sports.

When the news of Pearl Harbor broke, New York's two television stations were ready to offer coverage.
WNBT featured newscaster Sam Cuff interpreting the events with the aid of maps and photographs. When Cuff was not on the air that first night, WNBT focused a camera on an AP news teletype machine, a practice engaged in today by many CATV operators. NBC radio commentators appeared in nightly television round-table news discussions and, when available, pertinent films were shown. WNBT continued its previous active participation in defense training, featuring series on fire control and first aid. These programs undoubtedly were a part of the grass roots of present-day instructional television.

Although only in existence for five months, the CBS station, WCBW, appeared to out-program its older, more experienced rival (an assertion frequently made regarding the radio competition) on Pearl Harbor night. WCBW went on the air with the story for nine continuous hours, providing what was probably "the first television spectacular - an extended special coverage of a major news event." Major George Fielding Eliot, Fletcher Pratt, Linton Wells, and Richard Hubbell handled the on-air news and analysis with the aid of maps, charts, diagrams, and symbols. CBS TV Program Director Gilbert Seldes coordinated this and other regularly scheduled news programs. On Monday, December 8, WCBW carried the
audio of President Roosevelt's war speech while transmitting video of a waving American flag. Some entertainment programs were replaced by increased news and defense offerings.

"Television is in much the same position as the radiophone in the first World War," stated RCA Board Chairman, Major General James G. Harbord. "Then wireless was beginning to find its tongue; radio for the past few years has been opening its electronic eyes." The full "value of television has yet to be revealed." The primary technical drawbacks of television in 1941 were: limited broadcast range and impracticality of network interconnection due to exceedingly high cable costs. Picture transmission in another form was concurrently being perfected by RCA. By means of radio waves, pictures could be transmitted from distant parts of the world. In just 13 minutes a completed photograph could be flashed from Russia to New York City, a distance of over 4,000 miles.

With the start of 1942, radio - referred to as "our second great national air power" by Sherman Dryer - was fully mobilized overseas and settling back into practically normal schedules again at home.

The event was over; the war was on. Radio soon understood that it was to suppress for the duration its congenital eagerness to convert all important
public occasions into a blow-by-blow description.

Many Americans fought the Battle of France and the Battle of London with their stomachs, endangering their digestion without helping either France or the RAF. When war broke out in 1939, CBS probably had the best news correspondent/news analyst team then in operation. It was only after Kaltenborn had gone over to NBC Red, Elmer Davis had been appointed to OWI, and Murrow, Shirer and others had come home from Europe that NBC could and did form better competition for CBS. Mutual, which was never really able to compete with the giants, lost its home front standard bearer in July, 1942, when Raymond Gram Swing signed with NBC Blue. By late 1942, Mutual had six foreign correspondents, NBC and Blue had 23 and CBS had 32. One of the newer, young correspondent voices heard over CBS was that of Charles Collingwood. Collingwood was a Rhodes scholar who started out with UP in London before making the switch to CBS. He was the first to broadcast a report from Algiers on the Allied invasion of North Africa in November, 1942. Collingwood would become a distinguished war correspondent for CBS.

After one year of commercial operation for WNBT and after six months of wartime news for both stations, the FCC, on July 1, 1942, reduced the authorized weekly
television broadcast time from 15 hours to 4 hours, effectively curtailing most further news activity. "Television offers a combination of features which no other medium has so far provided," wrote S.H. Giellerup. "It gives you sight, sound, motion and immediacy." Regardless of these qualities, radio was the established service, television the apprentice. In the face of increasing restrictions on personnel and material, television programming became a war casualty of sorts, although technological experimentation continued.

NBC lost its respected news director in August when Abe Schechter resigned to accept a post in the Domestic Branch of the Office of War Information. During that same month, Edward R. Murrow expressed concern over the general lack of understanding of America's war involvement, citing the need to accept our position of dominant leadership rather than the popular pre-war "spectator" stance. With over 900 AM stations, 60 million receivers, and over 14,000 war-related program units in 1942 on CBS alone, network radio was the obvious dominant medium over which to conduct such leadership and other morale or opinion-building campaigns.

During its rather brief existence following our entrance into the war, the Office of Facts and Figures
did manage to conduct a study titled "American Attitudes Toward War News," the conclusion of which was quite favorable to network news. It stated, in part:

A majority of Americans have come to rely upon the radio, rather than upon newspapers, as the primary source of their news about the war; they express greater confidence in broadcasting than in printed news on the grounds that it is swifter, more condensed, more accurate, and gives a greater sense of personal contact with personalities and events.\(^44\)

This study has increased significance since it was conducted through a government agency and not commissioned by a network or the NAB. Approaching 1943, a Gallup Poll reported that over 57% of all students questioned obtained most of their news from radio. None of these positive findings came as a real surprise to RCA's David Sarnoff who for years had been praising radio's service to the nation, a service that allowed the people to "hear history before it is written."\(^45\)

The invasion of Sicily on July 10, 1943, marked the first entry of American troops onto the European continent and radio was there to cover the event. Nine days later MBS correspondent Raymond Clapper flew in the nose of a B-17 bomber in one of the lead squadrons and became the first to later broadcast an eyewitness account of the bombing of Rome. A former CBS executive, Captain Harry C. Butcher, serving in Malta, accepted
the surrender of the Italian Navy there in September.

Easily ranking with the dangerous encounter experienced by Cecil Brown in the South China sea was CBS correspondent Eric Severeid's unexpected visit to Burma in August, 1943. Severeid was en route from New Delhi to Chungking when the transport plane in which he was flying became disabled, forcing him and seventeen others to bail out over a northern Burma jungle area. All but one of the passengers survived the parachute fall although several were injured. Stranded over one-hundred miles from the nearest Allied base, it was several weeks before they were led safely out of the area. Severeid's account of the ordeal, transmitted for rebroadcast from Burma, made exciting radio.

On the subject of Cecil Brown, his name was again in the news, this time over a policy dispute with CBS in the fall of 1943. As an experienced correspondent and news analyst, Brown maintained he had the right to express his own opinions over the air. In one particular August broadcast, he had declared that "any reasonably accurate observer of the American scene at this moment knows that a good deal of the enthusiasm for this war is evaporating into thin air," and that "the need for
sacrifice in America is becoming less acceptable to the people." Regardless of the accuracy of the statements, CBS News Director Paul White fired off a memo to Brown terming the broadcast a blatant editorial. "In my judgment," wrote White, "you are indulging in defeatist talk that would be of immense pleasure to Dr. Goebbels and his boys." Brown, who had been banned from the air by the Italian and British governments for violating censorship restrictions, found he could no longer function within the CBS "no-editorial" restrictions and resigned. This dispute was joined principally by Kaltenborn and by Walter Winchell who engaged CBS in combat via his newspaper column. Kaltenborn, speaking for the Association of Radio News Analysts, said that "no news analyst worth his salt could or would be completely neutral or objective." Non-partisan yes, but impartiality was too much to expect of a professional. It all boiled down to the fact that the analysts wanted more freedom and the networks were too nervous to give it to them, in the face of wartime and regulatory pressures (1940 Mayflower). White reiterated the fact that CBS encouraged the discussion of controversial topics but that, in doing so, balance must be maintained. The CBS analyst was to function as an informer and not as an advocate or persuader. "Ideally, in the case of
controversial issues," stated White, "the audience should be left with no impression as to which side the analyst himself actually favors." White made it clear that CBS not only had the right but the duty to edit or censor the materials of the analysts just as it did those of the regular newscasters. The analysts' case began to fade once veterans like Shirer started commenting that CBS policy was not new and that it had never hampered them. This had been one of the few open challenges made against the "no editorial" policy from within since its wartime establishment.

While television's news efforts had been curtailed considerably in 1942, they had not been abandoned. Lever Brothers made its television debut by sponsoring a weekly news program, "The Face of War," over W2XWV, the DuMont experimental station in New York City. Four months later, in April, 1944, WNBT began airing a new war film series, "See the War As It Happens." These were news films taken by military cameramen in the war zones and carried in cooperation with the War Department. Military cooperation was also in evidence with the formation of the U.S. Army Radio Service, one of whose primary responsibilities would be the transcribing of interviews with hometown personnel for use by local stations. This function formed
a valuable human interest-morale supplement to the networks' usual hardline war news.

The year 1944 was to be decisive in the Allied campaign. By spring, both sides knew that the counter-invasion of France was coming but only a minute few knew where or when. The media began to make coverage arrangements for one of the biggest news stories of the war. Of the over 400 international correspondents accredited by the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) staff in London, at least 50 carried credentials from an American network or large independent station. The coverage of D-Day would be characterized by network sharing rather than by the "scoop." Through an extensive pooling system to conserve facilities, the four major U.S. networks would have available to them reports from all of their correspondents as well as those of the BBC and the CBC. This marked the first time that such an extensive combination had been made. As technical arrangements were being worked out, those radio correspondents selected to follow the invasion forces engaged in physical training with the troops under field conditions in England. Magnetic wire sound recorders, first introduced as a military device, would be made available for capturing beachhead landing actualities. Wire recorders,
in military use about a year, were about the size of a portable typewriter and were the first pieces of recording equipment not too bulky for front line use. They offered great potential for use by war correspondents since live broadcasting from a battle zone ran the risk of enemy interception. Wire recordings, like transcriptions, helped to chip away at network barriers against the use of recorded speech. Military cooperation went much further than wire recorders, however. Colonel Edward M. Kirby, Radio Branch Public Relations Chief for the War Department, coordinated military-radio invasion coverage, with Colonel David Sarnoff in charge of all traffic arrangements. Kirby increased the number of transatlantic circuits for network use, expedited censorship procedures, arranged for a consolidated pool study and had the Signal Corps standing by to provide additional facilities if the need arose. The networks' London bureau chiefs (NBC - Stanley Richardson, Blue - George Hicks, CBS - Edward R. Murrow, MBS - John Steele) prepared the invasion assignments that would carry Collingwood, Leseur, Grandin, Mueller, Hottelet, Meier, and others onto, or over, the beaches with the fighting men. Likewise, at home, the networks readied their staffs for the impending coverage. In a memorandum probably quite similar to those issued by
the three other networks, Paul White reminded his news- men of the need for unexcited, informative and objec- tive microphone manner to maintain listener confidence. Above all, he wanted them to remember that "winning the war is a lot more important than reporting it." As a sign of the importance of the invasion and of the entire year for that matter, more regular network radio news and commentary programs were scheduled during 1944 than in any other single war year. 

The first indication that the Normandy invasion was finally underway came at 12:37 a.m. (Eastern War Time) on June 6, when an AP bulletin reported that a German broadcast had made mention of an invasion. Official confirmation did not come until 3:32 a.m. when SHAEF issued its first invasion communique from London. As most of America slept and before newspapers could be printed, "the great, pulse-beating job of telling the U.S. people of the greatest military undertaking in history belonged to the U.S. radio." NBC's Wright Bryan gave the first eyewitness account from London after having flown over the invasion coast with Allied paratroopers. CBS' Robert Trout became the D-Day "Iron Man" by virtue of his ten continuous hours of roaming among the teletype machines reading the latest dispatches. The importance of the situation
caused a U.S. President to lead the nation in prayer over the combined networks for the first time. "Some 90 million Americans prayed with the President for victory. Radio was the pulpit." New York television stations WNET and WABD (the DuMont station on the air since October, 1943) cancelled regular programing to present invasion discussion and analysis.

One of the most famous on-the-scene reports to come out of the D-Day invasion, and in fact to come out of the entire war, was done by the Blue Network's London bureau chief himself, George Hicks. Hicks, in the early morning of June 7, positioned himself on the deck of an Allied warship approaching the French coast in convoy and made a film recording of the action on a film recorder supplied by the U.S. Navy. He captured the actuality of a German bomber attack and the fleet's anti-aircraft gun response. Hicks' sound film recording was picked up and returned to London by speedboat for processing and security clearance. From there it was shortwaved to New York and rebroadcast over all four networks simultaneously that same night at 11:15 p.m. Within 48 hours of invasion confirmation, network radio was able to bring the sounds and voices of that battle into American living rooms. Said Hicks when interviewed later: "There were about thirty other
broadcasters, but I was lucky. My recorder worked!" Other recordings were made during the invasion, but none enjoyed anywhere near the demand of the one made by George Hicks, which was considered by some to be "the first great documentary of the war." In a 24-hour D-Day period, CBS alone had 113 news broadcasts, totalling almost 16 hours, which included nearly 30 overseas originations. The networks returned to their regular schedules on the following day. Broadcasters like Murrow in London anxiously awaited the first news reports to be sent from a land transmitter in Normandy because "it will mean the microphone has moved closer to the war, and our job is to bring this war just as close to the American people as we can." Transmissions soon came from the invasion site and by June 14, Bill Downs of CBS was finally able to make the first direct broadcast to the U.S. from "somewhere in Normandy," via Army Signal Corps facilities. This transmission was carried over the four-network pool which was still in operation. All prior reports from France had been sent first to London and then on to New York. These had been handled through the Press Wireless Company's mobile transmitter near the front. This fully-equipped unit operated on a 24-hour schedule to accommodate 450 war correspondents.
The Press Wireless and other private mobile transmitters, functioning under Army supervision, supplied invaluable service to the media and were certainly one of the factors that helped make "the American public better informed on war goings-on than any other national audience." 57

In July, some highly regarded wire and disc recordings of battle action on Saipan, collected by marines at the scene, were presented on the CBS program "We, the People." Also in July, George Hicks returned home to begin a new assignment: his own two-night-a-week news program over the Blue Network. In the process, he received well-deserved praise and award recognition for his invasion coverage.

Following the D-Day attack, the tempo of the war seemed to quicken in both theaters, as on-the-scene reporting swung into high gear. Eric Sevareid rode in on a landing craft during the Allied invasion of southern France. William J. Dunn of CBS, after having escaped the islands in 1941, returned to cover MacArthur's invasion of the Philippines and make the first broadcast describing such from Leyte via an Army Signal Corps radio ship off shore. In a later Japanese bombing attack on Leyte, Blue correspondent Clete Roberts was wounded by shrapnel and an AP cor-
respondent with him was killed. Mutual carried recordings made by marine combat correspondent Sgt. Alvin Flanagan during the fight for Peleliu in the Pacific. Flanagan used a portable FM transmitter on his back to describe the beach landing and battle. This was quite dangerous since the transmitter had to remain upright to work effectively and the whip antenna served to draw additional attention. At one point, Flanagan put his microphone down just long enough to shoot a Japanese soldier who was taking aim at him! His descriptions were sent to a ship off shore for recording and later network use. CBS' Jim Leimert was the only radio correspondent to fly with the American B-29's in their Thanksgiving Day bombing raid over Japan. He broadcast his account of the action from Guam on the following day over all four networks. Back in Europe, Morris Pierce, a radio engineer on leave from WGAR, Cleveland, was instrumental in arranging the Allied capture of Radio Luxembourg intact. Gaining control of this powerful transmitter was a real military/radio coup since it was to become an important link in European operations. Pierce had made at least one other strategic wartime contribution. He was the engineer who had rigged up the make-shift transmitter which signaled the Italian
Navy to surrender at Malta. By the close of 1944, the German army, however, was not in the mood to surrender. Richard C. Hottelet broadcast to the U.S. the first news of Germany's massive counter-offensive. The Battle of the Bulge had begun.

The Pacific offensives continued as the marines stormed Iwo Jima in February, 1945. Bud Foster of NBC was the first correspondent to spend a night ashore with the invasion force and transmit his report to the U.S. via a radio ship off Guam. Foster risked his life to gather the account as did many unnamed army and marine radio men who were usually closer to heavy action than the network men. "We try to augment the network coverage of battle action, not compete with it," said Marine Lieutenant James Hurlbut who made some of the Iwo Jima recordings. "As no independent stations have representatives in the Pacific, these transcriptions are designed to fill their needs." After the successful cooperative coverage of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, more ships were equipped with transmission gear, and the major Pacific relay station was moved up to Guam from Pearl Harbor. In a real display of intensive war coverage, over 300 broadcasts were transmitted from the battle zone in the twenty days following the Iwo Jima invasion.

The western Allies had managed to halt the German counterattack and had resumed their drive to Berlin
with the Russians engaged in a similar move from the east. In March, planning ahead, the Army decided that one radio correspondent would be allowed to parachute into the German capital following Allied occupation to make the first American broadcast from the captured city. The networks drew lots in Paris and Bill Downs of CBS won the honors. He would either broadcast from an intact German transmitter or from the Signal Corps' 17-truck mobile unit advancing with the troops. Both the soldiers in the field and the American audience via England would hear his report of impending victory. Unfortunately, Downs never got to make his jump since it was the Russians who finally took Berlin and the resulting uncertainties prevented such an undertaking.

The networks were, however, able to cover the first American troops crossing the Rhine River into Germany on March 23, 1945. Herbert Clark (Blue) broadcast the first news from Europe of an all-out Allied move across the Rhine. CBS had nine reporters covering the crossing. Murrow rode in a glider-towing British bomber while Bill Downs rode observer in an American fighter plane that flew up and down the entire Rhine front. Reminiscent of Sevareid's earlier experience, Richard C. Hottelet was forced to bail out west of the Rhine when the Flying Fortress in which he was a passenger burst into flames. Like Sevareid and
Brown before him, Hottelet got to a transmitter as soon as he could and broadcast his story over CBS. Using a Signal Corps mobile transmitter like the one first used to transmit from the Normandy coast, John MacVane of NBC made the first broadcast from the east side of the Rhine River just three days after the start of the crossing. The Allies mounted their final drive to Berlin.

A tragic note to the final victorious weeks of war in Europe was the death of President Franklin D. Roosevelt on April 12, 1945, from a sudden brain hemorrhage, at his estate in Warm Springs Georgia. Two networks were on the air with the tragic news moments after word had reached the White House. John Daly, who broke the news of Pearl Harbor over CBS, found himself now called upon to announce the President's death for his network. Within three hours, shortwave reactions from around the world had reached New York. "The greatest voice in the 25-year history of American broadcasting is stilled," wrote Sol Taishoff of Broadcasting magazine. Roosevelt, the first radio president, had made nearly 300 broadcasts to the American audience during his lifetime. Carleton D. Smith of NBC, who had introduced Roosevelt on the air more than any other announcer, wrote of the President:
It was Roosevelt, the Man, who brought to radio much of the importance and dignity it has today.

Around that fireside he gathered the greatest listening audience in the world. They listened and they listened well — but never to just a voice.

Radio covered the funeral and later carried President Truman's policy speech to the nation which, in addition, was distributed around the world by Armed Forces Radio Service and the Signal Corps. Observers praised network radio's handling of the tragic occasion.

...broadcasting's stature as a medium of communication had been heightened by the resourcefulness and appropriateness of this coverage and by the sense of immediacy it was able to establish.

The New York Times called the coverage "the greatest radio ever gave to a news story," and Congressman A.S. "Mike" Monroney (D-Okla.) read into the Congressional record: "If any occasion were needed to demonstrate that the radio had come of age, this certainly marked the occasion."

Just two weeks after the death of President Roosevelt, East met West in Germany. Richard C. Hottelet scooped his fellow correspondents with an eyewitness account of the joining of the American First Army with the Russian troops on April 27. His report was probably sent from the Signal Corps' 60,000-watt
mobile station, the largest such unit then in existence. In operation since January, the station could transmit directly to the U.S., took 24 hours to set up or strike, and occupied 17 army trucks. Especially since D-Day, the Signal Corps had cooperated fully with the American networks on coverage and facilities, and the networks were quick to praise the Army for its assistance. Stymied by the Russian capture of Berlin, Bill Downs instead became the first American radio correspondent to broadcast from Hamburg following that city's capture by the Western Allies. Downs described over CBS the negotiations and surrender of all German troops in Holland, Denmark and northwestern Germany during the first week in May. On the morning of May 7, 1945, the networks were finally able to announce the signing of the unconditional total German surrender and the end of the war in Europe. As might be expected, the four networks turned their attention to victory programming and foreign pick-ups at a total V-E Day cost of $720,000. Radio had two basic tasks on this day and those that followed. One was to broadcast the speeches of Truman and other national and international leaders. The other, perhaps more important, task was to help convince the nation to save its all-out celebrating for a while.
longer so as not to seriously disrupt production for the Japanese war effort. With Italy and Germany defeated, only the enemy in the Pacific remained. The "mission," according to Major General A.D. Surles, was to "Get the Jap and get it over." "Let the mighty voice of American radio sound the final battle cry."63

By mid-summer, several broadcasts were originating from battleships within sight of the Japanese coast. Ironically, it was also mid-summer before the Russians would allow Allied correspondents to enter Berlin, an unhealthy sign of things to come. CBS, first again as it had been so often during the war years, flashed word of the Japanese acceptance of surrender terms at 7:42 a.m. on Friday, August 10, 1945, based on a Radio Tokyo broadcast to that effect. The official announcement was made by President Truman at a news conference on August 14. V-J Day was formally celebrated on September 2, 1945, the date of the armistice signing, four months after the cessation of European hostilities. The victory was meaningful to all Americans but perhaps more so to men like Royal Arch Gunnison, Bert Covit, Don Bell, and Bert Silen, all radio news correspondents who had been held prisoner by the Japanese. Silen's voice had been one of the first heard after Pearl Harbor, describing the invasion of Manila until his
capture. Following liberation by MacArthur's forces in 1945, Silen returned to the air with: "As I was saying when I was so rudely interrupted over three years and a month ago..." With the Pacific war finished, radio was dubbed "the sound behind the fury that licked Japan." The names Germany and Italy could easily be substituted without significantly altering the validity of that statement.

Summary

Network radio news played a major role in publicizing World War II and its needs at home, with support from supplementary entertainment/information programming and OWI allocation plans. Network radio used a four-part system of coverage: foreign correspondents, straight newscasts, news analyses, and foreign nation shortwave. Both NBC and CBS maintained round-the-clock shortwave listening centers on Long Island to monitor and translate foreign broadcasts. Excerpts were used in regular news programs, as background for analysts, and were sent by teletype to the press services under a reciprocal news agreement. World War II had greatly enlarged the scope of previous warfare coverage.

Between mid-1940 and the end of World War II there were more people who wore the label of war correspondent, more square miles designated as being
within theaters of war, and more information disseminated about the actions of armies, navies, and air forces than during the whole of the nineteenth century.66

Network radio news coverage was paced by a series of phenomenal eyewitness, live or recorded, action accounts, from the grass-roots days of 1938 until victory in the Pacific in 1945. Radio scooped the press at Munich, was first with the German war declaration speech, the Graf Spee sinking, the French surrender, and the MacArthur invasion of the Philippines, to mention a few. Radio (and to a limited extent television) was the sole source of information for the public in the first hours following Pearl Harbor and the D-Day invasion. These timely and graphic accounts won the audience for radio news more than straight newscasts and wire service reports. They were exciting, fast, and accurate in an era when such qualities counted most. The network correspondents proved to be "a very gallant band of radio reporters whose courage and ability added so much to the annals of journalism."67 And gallant they were, reporting their stories from the thick of the action at great risk. George Hicks stationed in a warship gun turret, Bill Downs set to parachute into captured Berlin, Tim Leimert on a bombing run over Japan, Edward R. Murrow on a mission over
Germany, and Hottelet, Sevareid, and Brown who were forced to bail out of their respective crafts to save their lives. In view of the risks, the network casualty lists were surprisingly short. Mutual reported two newsmen killed and two injured, American (Blue) had only two injured, CBS also had two injured, and NBC counted one killed and five injured. The quality of radio news reporting could be partially reflected in the number of prestigious awards received. Brown, Collingwood, Murrow, and Swing were given wartime Peabody awards in addition to other citations, while Downs, Hicks, White, Kaltenborn, and Lewis were the recipients of various press club awards, to name but a few of the total war news recognitions.

Radio news did encounter at least two areas of resistance during its wartime tenure. Although an active exchange of news stories did continue, radio was constantly working in the shadow of the press, in both the eyes of the publishers and sections of the government. Agencies tended to take radio for granted, gobbling up all the free air time available, too seldom acknowledging the gift, and then turning around and paying for advertising in the press. Radio was happy to provide the public service time but would have appreciated sharing the paid advertising wealth a bit more evenly. The press' antagonistic attitude came to
a head after Roosevelt's death, when the Truman-appointed Press Secretary, J. Leonard Reinsch, was forced by publisher pressure to resign because he was a broadcaster and not a newspaper man. "It behooves the nation's press," wrote an incensed Broadcasting editor, "to recognize radio not as an interloper or an upstart, but as a full-grown news contemporary." Despite phenomenal amounts of time donated to government agencies and the run-away top coverage of the war, radio was still thought of as inferior or illegitimate in some corners.

Censorship in the United States, as was previously discussed, was divided into two administrative areas. Domestic or government censorship was kept separate from the considerations of military or at-the-source screening which required accredited correspondents to submit all copy for pre-broadcast approval. The military was generally quite good about letting news out and briefing correspondents, much more so than during World War I. "I haven't found any mood in the (armed) services to hold back bad news because it was bad news," wrote Hillier Kriegebaum of OWI. Yet apparently there was military censorship of certain incidents which might have fallen more in the category of mistake or embarrassment than in that of classified military security.
In the American forces perhaps three stand out above all others: the General Patton soldier-slapping affair in Italy, the loss of twenty-odd transport planes and over four-hundred American soldiers to American guns at Bari, and the so-called news blackout during the Battle of the Bulge. 70

As in the case of the Patton incident, what is termed censorship may in reality be press-radio cooperation with the military or "voluntary journalistic silence." Outstanding communications cooperation was achieved between the networks and the military through the Army Signal Corps, the Army Bureau of Public Relations, and the Armed Forces Radio Service. These branches were responsible for superior D-Day news arrangements, for most battle action transcriptions, and for other coverage aid. The common goal was fast, accurate information for the soldiers in the field and the waiting audience at home.

Despite wartime FCC time limitations, television in New York City and elsewhere had continued to program and to develop. WCBW (CBS) reported that in 1945, news, special events, and discussion programs occupied 53 percent of its television schedule. Documentary efforts filled 5 percent of WCBW's air time. This particular program form would grow to an increasingly more important position within network television news structures in the years to come. Near the end of the
war, the first multiple-relay television network in the world, running between Washington and Philadelphia, had been dedicated. This hook-up was considered to be the forerunner of nationwide television networks. "Radio became established as the most potent force in reviving our democracy," remarked FCC chairman Paul Porter, speaking at the dedication ceremony. "Now we look forward to a great new force in our democracy - television." 71

If the expression "baptism by fire" could ever be used to accurately describe something it might well be applied to the relationship of network radio news to a first smoldering, then blazing, European war inferno. Radio assimilated its war role by means of general judgment, skill, and planning, since no war precedent existed for comparison. Hitler had staged only two dress rehearsals, Austria and Munich/Sudetenland, before the real drama began.

Network news spanned the globe to better inform the nation. Radio receivers were plentiful and audiences large. By 1944, NBC had 142 local affiliate stations throughout the country, Blue had 195, CBS totaled 142, and Mutual affiliates numbered 223. In all, over 75% of the nation's stations were directly connected with world-wide network news resources.
Listeners heard increased regular newscasts, on-the-scene actualities from foreign capitals and battlefields, and a wide variety of news commentators, some of whom were termed "the $1,000 a week tea-leaf readers" by Robert Landry.\textsuperscript{72} The audience was also provided with a constant effort at speed, accuracy, objectivity, and truth in all network news broadcasts. This on-air sense of responsibility was felt and practiced by most highly qualified news analysts like H.V. Kaltenborn who realized that "microphone manner is just as important as microphone matter."\textsuperscript{73} Such radio news goals have over the years become enshrined as radio news traditions. Although news had been heard over the air waves several years prior to the Austrian "Anschluss," the real birth and development of network broadcast journalism as we know it today must be credited to the Second World War.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter II


7 Chase, Sound and Fury, p. 157.


10 Ibid., p. 131.

11 Ibid., p. 138.


15 Dryer, Radio in Wartime, p. 46.

16 H.V. Kaltenborn, "Covering the Crisis," Current History, October, 1939, p. 35.


21 Among the December, 1939 CBS war correspondents, with their assignments, were: Edward R. Murrow (London), William Shirer (Berlin), Thomas Grandin (Bucharest), William White (Helsinki), Mary Breckinridge (Rotterdam), Betty Wason (Stockholm), Bill Henry and Larry Leseur (assigned to the Allied Forces in France), Erland Echlin (London), Eric Sevareid (Paris), Cecil Brown (Rome) and Russell Hill (Berlin).


23 Bruce Robertson, "War News Flare," Broadcasting, April 15, 1940, p. 17.

25 Chase, Sound and Fury, p. 165.


27 "From Brick Dust to Bouquets," Time, December 15, 1941, p. 50.

28 Gordon and Falk, On-The-Spot Reporting, p. 28.

29 "Radio Listening," Broadcasting, August 11, 1941, p. 16.


31 "War and Peace," Time, December 1, 1941, p. 13.

32 Gordon and Falk, On-The-Spot Reporting, p. 128.


34 Ibid.


Following an FCC chain broadcasting ruling handed down on May 2, 1941, NBC, which had maintained two networks for years, spun off one of them in forming the independently operated Blue Network Company. This move brought the national radio network count to four separate systems. When the Supreme Court ruled against NBC's appeals on May 10, 1943, the National Broadcasting Company was finally forced to divest itself completely of the Blue Network. Soon after, the Blue was sold and was later re-named ABC as the network of the American Broadcasting Company.

A complete list of the four networks' 1942 foreign correspondents and their locations may be found in the appendix.

S.H. Giellerup, "Is TV a War Casualty?," Advertising and Selling, March, 1942, p. 42.


"Networks Plan Coverage of the Invasion," Broadcasting, March 6, 1944, p. 52.

Thirty-five news programs were scheduled during the evening hours and eleven during the daytime. A complete breakdown of network, newscaster, time and sponsor for all of the war years and beyond may be found in Harrison B. Summers, A Thirty-Year History of Programs Carried on National Radio Networks, 1926-1956 (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1958).

"This Is It," Time, June 12, 1944, p. 20.

"Invasion by Airwave," Broadcasting, June 12, 1944, p. 38.

Gordon and Falk, On-The-Spot Reporting, p. 137.

"Invasion by Airwave," p. 38.


Herbert Corey, "Our War Communications from Combat Areas," Public Utilities Fortnightly, April 12, 1945, p. 486.


64 "Broadcasting Role in Pacific Is Big One," Broadcasting, August 13, 1945, p. 16.

65 Ibid.


70 Mathews, Reporting the Wars, p. 215.


72 Landry, "Radio: Key to National Unity," p. 504.

73 Kaltenborn, "Covering the Crisis," p. 38.
CHAPTER III
NETWORK SUPPLEMENTARY PROGRAMING

It is not what broadcasting transmits but what it delivers that counts...—Niles Trammell

"By turning the dial, you can be entertained, informed, or irritated," remarked Edward R. Murrow about American radio. The irritation Murrow referred to, then as now, generally centered on the commercials. Supplementing the information service provided by radio news, were the entertainment/information programs, some of which were created during the war, and most of which were in existence before the war. These initially took the form of talks, discussions, dramatic series, and an incredibly large number of public service messages coordinated by the Office of Facts and Figures and later the Office of War Information. For the most part, the time and talent for morale programing and messages was provided free of charge to the government agencies involved. Even before Pearl Harbor, the government was making use of over $3 million worth of radio time a month. Among other groups, the Hollywood radio gag
writers donated their talents to help formulate government messages for radio use. Most agreed that straight morale and virtues-of-democracy programs were necessary but the danger of listener resentment and immunity from too many of these types convinced broadcasters and observers of the need for balance and the continuation of regular entertainment series. "It is imperative," felt Robert Landry, "that people be able to laugh at the little everyday bumps and annoyances that war brings." Accepting this premise, programmers combined appeals and war themes with new or existent entertainment formats, making the candy-coated pill formula an integral part of wartime program structure.

Supplementary entertainment programming, which often included or featured war-need themes, fell into three general categories: dramatic shows or series, variety/comedy series, and special appeals programs. Television also contributed in these areas, concentrating primarily on information and instruction, however.

Drama

Prior to the formation of OWI, the Office of Emergency Management (OEM) had been the primary producer/coordinator of radio dramatic presentations
for the various government agencies and departments. These programs began appearing in quantity in 1939, as the international situation caused the emergence of an "Americanism" trend or theme in this country. "What Price America?" was a 13-week series on conserving our natural resources, sponsored by the Department of the Interior. Weekly classes in American folk music were added to the curriculum of the "American School of the Air." The Department of Labor ran a series on NBC Red called "America Unlimited" which featured interviews with leaders from labor and industry. "Gallant American Women," a feature of NBC Blue under the auspices of the Office of Education, was designed to:

...dramatize the roles American women pioneers have played in the struggle for freedom of worship, assembly, speech, and other civil liberties and to show how their work is being carried on today.4

The Education Office, with CBS, also produced the series "Democracy in Action and "Foundations of Democracy," both of which dealt with the operation and effectiveness of our form of government. These and other similar programs were very reflective of the pride-in-America and isolationist mood prevalent at the time.

With regard to this isolationism, charges were made that radio had done a disservice to the nation by ig-
noring or playing down the severity of the situation in Europe. Network radio had indeed frowned on things like the portrayal of fascists as villains, or the use of saboteurs in fiction, etc., so as not to appear to take sides. Playwrights Norman Corwin and Arch Oboler expressed the feelings of those who resented government and media suppression of the real state of world affairs.

The issues in the past five years...have been kept from the people, whether willfully, accidentally, or out of a strange, almost emasculated, sense of neutrality. 'We shall not discuss Fascism. We shall not put on a program which offends any group.' Imagine the crude laughter of the board of strategy of Axis propaganda at such a policy.

To which Oboler added:

...surely a medium as admittedly potent as radio in the evaluation and determination of values could have been as effective pre-war as during the war, could have aroused national indignation and strengthened weak Congressional backbones so that we would have faced our enemy, not at the time of our enemy's choosing, but at the time of our choice, with an armament and a mobilized man-power that would have either prevented the catastrophe or at least have shortened the duration.

Broadcasting's self-imposed neutrality, along with that of the nation, exploded with the bombs at Pearl Harbor. Once war became a reality for the United States, net-
work radio and the government embarked on an extensive war information campaign that made up partially for the pre-war foot-dragging. Nevertheless, Oboler's point was valid in that fuller American awareness of the European situation might have significantly altered the conduct or extent of the war. Historical study has since revealed that a serious challenge to Hitler's string of military bluffs might well have stopped him early in the game. Unfortunately his initial moves of conquest went largely unchecked.

Radio drama proved to be an effective vehicle for the dissemination of morale and home-front activities themes. Bernard C. Schoenfeld, OEM Broadcast Chief, considered the dramatic form to be one of the best for presentation and clarification of war problems affecting the public. In addition, drama, with its emotional appeals, "holds the richest promise of eliciting concerted action" from the audience, felt Sherman Dryer. The American foreign affairs attitude needed a major overhauling and with the Japanese attack came an increase in the number of radio drama hours devoted "to educating a partially unwilling audience to the stern realities of war." Just one week after Pearl Harbor, a Norman Corwin radio dramatization called "We Hold These Truths" was presented over a
four-network national hook-up. The program, molded around the Bill of Rights, evoked a genuine response from a listening audience still somewhat stunned by the events of December 7. "Actually Norman Corwin and his 'documentary' type of program had both long been familiar phenomena of the American radio scene," wrote Robert Landry, "but it was on this night of December 15, 1941, that millions of Americans and myriads of government functionaries first really discovered the man and his talents." 9

Americans got another taste of the Corwin art two months later. The Office of Facts and Figures and two additional information agencies co-produced with the networks a precedent-breaking 13-week patriotic series which threw any remaining wartime politeness and caution to the wind. The series was called "This Is War!," with all of the segments directed and most of them written by CBS' Norman Corwin, the man Life magazine called "radio's top dramatic genius." The first program of the series premiered on Saturday evening, February 14, 1942. From the opening lines, it was evident that Corwin and the series indeed meant business.

What we say tonight has to do with blood and with bone and with anger, and also with a big job in
the making. Laughter can wait. Soft music can have the evening off. No one is invited to sit down and take it easy...

And forcefulness continued all the way through to the closing address to the people of the United Nations (Allies):

Take heart! Resist much! Fight how you can! We are building for you, we are on the move...  

For both the people at home and for the Allies via re-broadcast, this program and the ones to follow offered unusually strong and needed patriotic medicine. The "Gallant American Women" series of 1939, and others of that pre-war mold, had little in common with the timely reality of the Corwin productions. In accordance with its importance, the series was provided with a four-network hook-up, included in which were 700 of the 924 existing AM stations, resulting in the largest potential coverage afforded a radio series to that date. This blanket coverage had an adverse effect on some observers who saw the limitation of listening choices as a step toward a state-controlled radio system. However, operating within a framework of cooperation, radio remained free and the coverage precedent produced no undesirable repercussions (four-network coverage was again granted to a series when Elmer Davis initiated his OWI newscasts in 1943). In general, "This Is War!"
was well received by the American public. Variety's review of the first program noted that the show had been:

...written, acted and directed with angry intensity. 'This Is War!' is not for those charming people who consider it bad form to speak too harshly of the Nazis...

Broadcasting was impressed with the series opener, terming that type of hard-driving, no-nonsense production as "radio at its potent peak" with content "designed to arouse the highest patriotic instincts in time of crisis." "This Is War!" left its dramatic mark. Dr. Donald W. Riley considered the series to have been "a milestone in the history of radio drama." Such distinction is deserved not so much because of new production techniques employed, but because Corwin's series was so instrumental in tearing down what remained of the barrier that had too long separated the American people from the realities of the enemy and of the war. Corwin, very simply, told it like it was.

The War Production Board's "This Is Our Enemy" and OEM's "You Can't Do Business with Hitler" were other plain-talking series that received wide distribution, the latter having been heard over 700 stations at one point. The quantity of war programs grew. A four-network weekly average showed a total of: 202 newscasts, 173 war commentaries, 54 war sermon-type
programs, 29 army camp pick-ups, 15 government programs, and 120 war-planted, advertising sponsored entertainment programs. For the year 1942, CBS had broadcast 320 sustaining special war programs consuming 85 hours of air time.

To aid broadcast script writers handle war theme material, the OWI distributed instructional content and style pamphlets. The booklet "When Radio Writes for War" contained advice on composition, while the three-a-month series, "Radio Background Material," provided up-dated facts on appeals currently being emphasized by the government. These and other publications helped to keep the lines of communication open between program planners and federal agencies via OWI. The dramatic form spread. The CBS series "The Man Behind the Gun," was widely acclaimed for its portrayal of combat conditions for the concerned American audience. Special adventure series sprang up, like "Alias John Freedom," in which the hero managed to out-fox the Nazis each and every week.

During the term of U.S. involvement, over thirty new network daytime serials or "soap operas" were added to the list of dramatic presentations. Yet what made the "soaps" distinctive was the fact that the majority did not become totally enveloped by the war effort, choosing rather a concerned, yet "business-as-usual,"
story-line approach. "The majority of daytime series," concluded George A. Willey, "looked upon their response to the war as one of interior decoration rather than basic change in architectural plan." This flexible format approach allowed the serial producers to add war theme references to scripts only when they could be worked into the plot naturally or comfortably. Willey described this procedure as adding the appropriate "khaki tint" to the story line. Some observers saw this lack of total involvement as an abdication of wartime responsibility. But, as previously mentioned, too much patriotic, instructional war programing could have as adverse an effect on attitude and morale as too little. An entertainment/information balance was needed for maximum acceptance and effectiveness, and the soap operas generally directed their efforts toward satisfying the first category. Some of the newly created serials that managed to get too deeply involved in war topics failed to attract sufficient audiences and were taken off the air, proving in effect less beneficial to the cause than the popular fantasy "soaps" that flirted only briefly with war reality.

In evaluating the relationship of soap operas to the war the conclusion must be that daytime radio drama fell far short of its potential to inform, inspire or motivate. At the same time it becomes apparent
that audiences which listened to the most popular serials were provided with a considerable amount of information which was accurate and important.17

The serials did serve the listeners, even if at times only in providing programing balance. The casts of several of the leading serials offered additional public service by donating their time to perform in special dramas apart from their soap opera roles. Two such series, "Victory Volunteers" (NBC) and "Victory Front" (CBS) were launched in the fall of 1942 with the help and encouragement of OWI. The specific war themes to be dramatized usually were connected with the nation-wide information campaigns in progress at the time. Such use of well known radio performers, considered by listeners "as welcome members of their own family,"18 certainly made the necessary war appeals more palatable. The absence of time and talent costs made such efforts more palatable for the government as well. American radio donated over $200 million worth of those items for war-related programing in 1943 alone, as the itemized breakdown in Table 5 indicates. CBS dedicated one-third of its total 1944 broadcast hours to the presentation of war programs and messages.
TABLE 5
RADIO TIME AND TALENT CONTRIBUTION TO THE WAR EFFORT IN 1943

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Spot and Special Assignment</th>
<th>Station Contribution</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treasury Department</td>
<td>$26,323,900</td>
<td>$23,374,500</td>
<td>$49,698,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Agriculture - WFA</td>
<td>12,281,200</td>
<td>9,905,900</td>
<td>22,187,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Production Board</td>
<td>8,429,100</td>
<td>1,147,700</td>
<td>9,576,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Department</td>
<td>8,385,400</td>
<td>4,733,900</td>
<td>13,119,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Manpower Commission</td>
<td>6,282,200</td>
<td>5,737,000</td>
<td>12,019,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Price Administration</td>
<td>4,501,000</td>
<td>6,099,300</td>
<td>10,600,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Department</td>
<td>4,466,700</td>
<td>3,332,400</td>
<td>7,799,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Economic Stabilization</td>
<td>4,371,400</td>
<td>2,179,400</td>
<td>6,550,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Security Agency</td>
<td>3,216,600</td>
<td>4,288,200</td>
<td>7,504,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Red Cross</td>
<td>3,181,200</td>
<td>5,721,200</td>
<td>8,902,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Defense Transportation</td>
<td>2,748,000</td>
<td>3,907,900</td>
<td>6,655,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National War Fund</td>
<td>2,102,300</td>
<td>4,620,600</td>
<td>6,722,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum Administration for War</td>
<td>1,910,200</td>
<td>633,400</td>
<td>2,543,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber Administration</td>
<td>819,300</td>
<td>53,500</td>
<td>872,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Service Organizations (Books)</td>
<td>546,800</td>
<td>801,400</td>
<td>1,348,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Security Board</td>
<td>417,000</td>
<td>1,209,500</td>
<td>1,626,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Shipping Administration</td>
<td>389,700</td>
<td>2,044,600</td>
<td>2,434,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Civilian Defense</td>
<td>202,400</td>
<td>1,033,100</td>
<td>1,235,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
<td>75,300</td>
<td>78,400</td>
<td>153,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Lend-Lease Administration</td>
<td>37,400</td>
<td>37,400</td>
<td>74,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Miscellaneous Campaigns</td>
<td>14,957,400</td>
<td>15,604,100</td>
<td>30,561,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total                    | $105,644,500                | $96,506,000          | $202,150,500 |

*Campaigns not emanating from any particular government agency.

Variety

Most programs in this category had become radio favorites long before our war involvement. The emphasis on entertainment, via music and humor, remained intact although wartime references were now worked into serious and humorous sketches (we must be able to laugh "at the little everyday bumps and annoyances that war brings" - Landry), and also placed in detached segments at the program close.

Within the first week Jack Benny was cautioning Rochester to check the Maxwell automobile carefully with an eye toward conserving gasoline, oil and rubber.19

Bing Crosby added a new verse to Irving Berlin's "Any Bonds Today?" song, on his NBC "Kraft Music Hall" program in late December, 1941. It went:

Bonds for the planes and bonds for the tanks
And bonds for the ships meaning here come the Yanks;
Bonds for the guns, the shot and the shell,
And bonds to avenge all the heroes who fell.
They died in the night with no chance to fight,
But wait til the final text:
We'll wipe Mr. Jap from the face of the map,
And Germany's gonna be next.20

Older established variety shows toured the military bases, bringing live entertainment to the soldiers and providing on-location military flavor for anxious rela-
tives listening at home. New, military-oriented variety programs emerged during the war. The most popular show of its type was "The Army Hour," carried on NBC beginning in April, 1942. The program was a composite of actual soldier-in-the-field interviews, dramatic sketches and variety acts, which played to audiences here, in the Allied nations and among our widely scattered military personnel. The Army provided the cast, the interviews and the military arrangements. NBC paid the cost of broadcast personnel and facilities at a rate of $3,500 each week. "'The Army Hour' is not a radio program," commented Secretary of War Henry Stimson, "but a military operation of the United States heard and felt over the world."21 This 60-minute weekly military-civilian "experience" commanded an average of 38% of the listening audience at its peak, giving it the highest rating of any regularly scheduled Sunday daytime program, commercial or otherwise. "The Army Hour" was the sole entrant in the military-variety field for most of the war. In July, 1945, just prior to V-J Day, "The Navy Hour" commenced programing with music, sketches, official messages for the home audience, and transcribed reports from the Pacific fleet. At the conclusion of the war, the name "Army Hour" was
changed to "The National Hour" to reflect a gradual de-emphasis of the war theme.

An almost standard conclusion to many variety and dramatic shows was a war message often delivered by the "star" out of character. A new series, "Women of America," reserved the opening commercial position for statements by war heroes or by women working for the war effort at home. CBS used war slogans, such as "If it's a secret, keep it; if it's a rumor, kill it," to sign off all of its sustaining programs. Like the soap operas, most network variety programs served the cause by maintaining the flow of entertainment while giving significant yet secondary attention to war messages. Major wartime emphasis was left largely to government agency-coordinated discussions, special theme programs, sustaining dramatic series, and continual brief messages or public service announcements.

Special Appeals

Perhaps network radio's "second finest hour" (behind its war news coverage) was its role in helping the Treasury Department realize enormous success with the continuing sale of War Bonds. Even before the U.S. entered the hostilities, Treasury-sponsored series had been carried by the networks. Best known was "The
Treasury Hour" on CBS which adhered to a variety-type format. Other shows designed to entertain and sell Defense Bonds were two, more serious, patriotic offerings, "America Preferred" (MBS) and "For America We Sing" (NBC). In August, 1941, a new CBS-Treasury series, "Millions for Defense," was initiated. Paid for in total by Texaco and featuring the Irving Berlin theme song "Any Bonds Today?," this entertainment program soon became one of the most popular network programs going.

As war struck home, the intensity of Treasury and War Department promotion increased to the point where "scarcely a program gets over the air without some mention of bonds or recruiting."22 This dependence on network and local radio for information dissemination was explained by Treasury Secretary Henry Morganthau:

We at the Treasury decided that we could succeed with our financing only if the people themselves were aroused to the realities of the war and to the deadliness of the peril in which they stood. Accordingly, we enlisted the giant resources of radio.22

Radio responded with the donation of ample time and talent to the eight formal war bond drives in addition to continual messages between each. The series of bond drives began in 1943, with the first one occurring
during February. Among network efforts here was "Bond Night on the Blue," a seven-hour program which was credited with $19 million in bond sales. The "Second War Loan" drive began in April, 1943, with a three-week goal of $13 billion in pledges. Treasury officials expected an over-subscription in this drive, with radio's help, in view of the recent news that the Japanese had executed several flyers captured after the daring Doolittle bombing raid over the enemy's home island.

The "Third War Loan" drive commenced in September with a goal of $15 billion in sales in twenty-two days. Perhaps the most significant day of this campaign was September 21, 1943, which had been designated as CBS' war bond day. The star of what became a 18-hour radio marathon was Kate Smith, one of that network's most popular vocalists (the average audience for her weekly evening program was 21,000,000 listeners). Kate Smith had led two previous CBS all-day programs in conjunction with the first two bond drives and her efforts were credited with $3 million in pledges. This, her third attempt, would prove to be considerably more successful. So impressive, in fact, were sales that Robert K. Merton devoted his entire book, Mass Persuasion: The Social Psychology of a War Bond Drive, to a study of the
Smith technique and resultant listener response. Kate Smith spoke to the nation intermittently from 8:00 a.m. until 2:00 a.m. the following morning. Repetition of her appeal proved to be a key factor in the success of this radio campaign. Approximately every 15 minutes during that period, Kate Smith repeated the slogan-like question, "Will you buy a bond?"

On sixty-five distinct occasions in the course of the day, she begged, cajoled, demanded that her listeners buy war bonds. Within the narrow borders of her brief messages, Smith managed to touch upon a variety of themes enshrined in American culture. She invoked themes of love and hate, of large hopes and desperate fears, of honor and shame. This was presented as a personal message, iterated and reiterated in a voice often broken, it seemed, by deep emotion. And people did more than listen.24

They did do more than listen. They listened to the tune of $39 million in pledges, resulting in an average of over $2 million for every hour broadcast. Despite such success, there were those who resented this type of sales approach.

It's a sad commentary that the American people have to be entertained to make them buy something as important as war bonds.25

Although the statement did perhaps contain idealistic validity, the fact remained that the majority of Americans,
functioning in a reality situation and disliking a constant, non-diluted, barrage of war information, preferred to have their war appeals delivered in an entertainment package. Since this procedure seemed to get the best response, in terms of action and morale, the networks and government agencies tended to rely heavily on the entertainment-with-war-information formula as the dominant public appeals vehicle.

During the fourth bond drive, the OWI estimated that radio delivered almost 1.4 billion listener impressions for the Treasury's cause. On February 1, 1944, CBS held another "Kate Smith Day" during the course of which "the singing star made 57 separate appeals throughout the day and was credited with a grand total of $112,000,000 in war bond sales," almost tripling her previous phenomenal mark. The fifth, sixth and seventh war loans grew progressively in goals and broadcast participation, with the facilities donated for the seventh valued at more than twice the combined figure for the preceding two campaigns. Table 6 gives a per drive breakdown of radio's time and talent donations (network and local). The combined media advertising donation in support of the entire war finance program, between May 1, 1941 and December 31, 1945, totalled $400,000,000. Of that total, broadcasting's contribution
TABLE 6
RADIO'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE EIGHT BOND DRIVES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War Loan</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Estimated Worth of Time-Talent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>February, 1943</td>
<td>$3,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>April, 1943</td>
<td>$7,095,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>September, 1943</td>
<td>$12,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>January, 1944</td>
<td>$12,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth</td>
<td>June, 1944</td>
<td>$11,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth</td>
<td>November, 1944</td>
<td>$11,250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh</td>
<td>May, 1945</td>
<td>$23,513,742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victory</td>
<td>October, 1945</td>
<td>$14,124,853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$95,283,595</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


was over $219 million (55%), with the remainder split among newspapers, business papers, general magazines, farm magazines, and outdoor advertising. In the war loan drives alone, broadcasting's support value was almost double that of the newspapers. With the assistance of the combined media, the Treasury Department was able to sell a total of $185 billion worth of bonds to 85 million people. Quite a tribute to the unselfish support and cooperation of the media, and to the effectiveness of the network special appeal program form.
Local Television

In the same way that television attempted to emulate big brother radio's news programming, so also did the video medium actively pitch in when the time came to sell bonds. CBS Television helped sell over $100,000 worth of bonds through the use of three programs "which gave the viewing audience an opportunity to telephone orders to the studio and to watch and hear the calls being received." Most television stations produced and aired commercials urging the purchase of bonds. The DuMont station, WABD, televised a series of seven half-hour "star-appeal" programs to help kick off the Sixth War Loan in November, 1944. In addition to entertainment, the films-for-television included instructions for the bond drive workers.

It was in this last mentioned area of "instructional" television that the medium made its most valuable wartime contribution. Television concentrated on informing wardens, police, and the general public in the cities involved of procedures to be employed in the event of bomber attack, etc. On January 5, 1942, WNBT in New York premiered "Fighting the Fire Bomb," the first official training film to receive Civilian Defense Office approval. NBC also ran an air raid
warden instruction series in cooperation with the New York City Police Department. Television sets were installed in each precinct station, providing time-saving central instruction for 54,000 wardens by March. The six weekly shows covered the warden's duties, bomb and fire fighting, blackouts and gas warfare, with much of the instruction being handled by policemen who had themselves received training in London. Instructional/informational uses of television were also being worked with in cities other than New York. The Don Lee Television Studios in Los Angeles dramatized a story about the American Red Cross, emphasizing the importance of plasma as a life-saver in the war zones.

Production for the presentation included the building of a miniature village, the use of miniature Red Cross lorries and ambulances, and a complete replica of a Red Cross transfusion layout. Action was provided by 'bomb' blasts on the miniature set. 29

In Chicago, experimental station W9XBE presented a 45-minute instructional defense program in January, 1942, consisting of first aid demonstrations, a talk by the city fire chief, a short lecture on nutrition, and a film showing civil defense in action during an air raid in England.

The FCC limiting order on television air time in mid-1942 effectively trimmed programing output to the
bare essentials. WCBW henceforth televised only on Thursday and Friday evenings from 8:00 to 10:00, with news, discussions, and Red Cross instruction as regular features. WNBT was allowed to retain slightly more on-air hours pending completion of its highly successful air warden training series. In late 1944, WCBW added the series "Government Directives" to its reduced schedule. Formally a magazine feature only, this program was directed toward recruiting women needed for essential industries. Perhaps one of television's finer morale services was in combining with radio to originate programs from U.S. military bases showing bits of camp life and the soldiers involved. Such "visits" were very well received by the anxious families of servicemen.

Where possible, television is being brought in to augment this process and, as a result, parents and friends actually see for themselves the life of the camp, and often they catch sight of their own boys passing before the camera. Television's supplementary war programming, limited in distribution by war restrictions and state of development, served well the publics it reached. Speaking at the dedication of the Washington to Philadelphia video network hook-up, John Ballantyne, the president of Philco, made an amazingly accurate prophecy. Said
Ballantyne: "When peace comes, we can expect television to become a major factor in our lives, far more important in entertainment, education, and service to the public than even radio has been in the past."  

Summary

War-theme entertainment programing proved to be a far-reaching and widely accepted supplementary radio service. So important was this form that some might rather choose to call news coverage the supplement. Considered to be the most effective entertainment technique, the radio dramatization was generally acclaimed for its beneficial appeal to patriotic emotions and action. And the growing national networks stood ready and able to give thorough dissemination to these appeals.

Through radio's war information machine, the government has, in effect, a direct wire into practically every American home. It can bring war messages and appeals right into the family circle, presenting them through the voices of radio personalities who enjoy the affection of the listener, or in the form of dramatizations which not only make the messages interesting and easy to understand, but which illustrate and greatly point up their urgency.  

Supplementary education of children as well as adults fell increasingly to radio as polls began to indicate that this medium was the prime source of news for students around the country. OWI designated the CBS
series, "School of the Air of the Americas," as a primary channel through which to convey war information and instructions to children, teachers, and parents. Network "specials" helped to supplement agency drives and appeals. Manpower, production, and monetary needs were perhaps the three most important issues facing this nation at war. Network radio allocated time and talent to these causes for the duration of the conflict. The most significant special appeals efforts centered around the sale of war bonds, led by Kate Smith who, during just one of her radio marathons, was credited with obtaining over $100 million in pledges. A Treasury Department official praised network radio's bond drive role:

Radio's proudest accomplishment has been its contribution to the war finance program. You have not only sold bonds - cold instruments of finance - but you have sold habits and ideas and hopes that are beyond price...It is a job of selling that will not be fully appreciated until viewed by historians of the future. It is a job of selling that without radio would not have been possible.33

Local stations, as well as the giant networks, conducted numerous special appeals via the air waves. One station offered a $25 bond to the child collecting the most scrap metal for the war effort. By the time the contest had finished, that station had amassed
enough scrap to build almost sixty tanks! The television stations, although not yet in formal network form, also managed to supply valuable local service by means of mass air-raid warden instruction and civil defense programs for the general public.

Entertainment programming, the mainstay of early radio, continued to dominate the medium during the war years. "I believe the public will want to be entertained no matter what burdens of defense, and even war, they have to shoulder," wrote C. Lawton Campbell. The three entertainment program categories, drama, variety, and specials, filled leisure hours and provided necessary relaxation for Americans here at home. Functioning as "a flame at which popular imagination catches fire," network radio's entertainment offerings also proved to be an ideal and effective vehicle through which to maintain a healthy national morale level. Dispensing pep-pills and tonics on a daily basis, entertainment programming attended to both the physical and the mental needs of a nation at war.
Chapter III

1 "Network Heads Discuss Policies for 1942," New York Times, December 28, 1941, p. 12. At that time, Mr. Trammell was president of NBC.


7 Ibid., p. 205


10 "This Is War!," Time, February 23, 1942, p. 60.

12."This Is War!," Broadcasting, February 23, 1942, p. 34.


15.Descriptions of several of the CBS special war program series may be found in the appendix.


17.Ibid., p. 352.


27"Radio Bond Aid Tops Combined Media," Broadcasting, January 21, 1946, p. 84.


CHAPTER IV

POST-WAR STATUS

...American radio has estab­lished itself as a great and competent mass medium with ex­tremely high credibility. — Paul W. White

As the peacetime year 1946 got underway, the United States standard broadcast radio system was com­posed of four national networks, 940 licensed stations, and nearly 60 million receivers in homes and automobiles. Radio sets-in-use had numbered less than 10,000 during the industry's second year, back in 1921. "In less than three decades 90.7% of our families have acquired radio receivers," wrote K.G. Bartlett. "This means 33,998,000 'radio homes' or about 130,000,000 potential listeners." A popular saying of the day was that Americans were spending more time listening to the radio than they were doing anything else, except sleeping and working. Figures did show that more families owned radios than owned autom­obiles, telephones, and even, as the cliche went, bath­tubs. In a 1945 public opinion poll, the Minneapolis
Sunday Tribune asked Minnesota residents: "If you had to do without either a telephone or a radio in your home, which would you rather give up?" Only 27% indicated a desire to give up their radios while 63% would have removed the phone, indicating a better than two-to-one preference for radio.³

Radio Prosperity

While not always the case with the print media, the radio industry had very definitely prospered during the Second World War. As the following table indicates, although newspapers did receive greater advertising volume, their percentage of wartime increase was only about 50% while radio posted a 175% revenue gain over the same period. Radio had considerably fewer mouths to feed (912 stations vs. 11,946 total U.S. newspapers, at the end of 1942) and maintained a steady revenue climb, while the newspapers faced setbacks in both 1943 and 1944.⁴ The four national networks' revenues, while increasing less percentage-wise than the industry as a whole, did manage to double during the war years.
### TABLE 7

**ADVERTISING REVENUES FOR RADIO AND NEWSPAPERS, 1939 to 1945**

(in millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Radio</th>
<th>Newspapers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>770</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE 8

**NATIONAL NETWORK RADIO NET TIME SALES REVENUES, 1938 to 1948**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Revenues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>$56,612,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>$62,621,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>$71,919,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>$79,621,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>$81,744,396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>$99,389,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>$121,757,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>$125,671,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>$126,737,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>$127,713,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>$133,723,098</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the war, nearly 75% of this network radio advertising was concentrated in four industry groups: food and beverages, drugs, soaps and cleansers, and tobacco.

Basic reasons existed for this continued radio prosperity. Increased wartime production made funds available for both industry advertising and resultant consumer spending. The Treasury Department allowed tax deductions for reasonable good will advertising to keep out-of-production or scarce brand names alive for the post-war era. When the newsprint supply became limited, publications had to reduce the space available for advertising. As a result, radio gained increased business and new customers, such as department stores and theaters. With the overall increased demand for radio time, the networks and stations felt it necessary or just advantageous to increase their rates, thus contributing to gains. The extent of wartime broadcast prosperity might best be illustrated by the fact that in 1944 only 41 (or 4½%) out of 875 licensed, revenue-producing, commercial stations failed to report a profit.5

Despite the great quantity of war information and messages dispensed by radio during the conflict, surveys repeatedly indicated that the majority of listeners were not annoyed by the numbers. But numbers did become
a concern to many following the war. This time it was
the number of radio commercials. As wartime tensions
had eased, so apparently had concern for commercial and
program quality. New York Herald Tribune correspondent
Lewis Gannett, back in the U.S. to recover from war
injuries, noted that American radio was the "aspect of
homefront life" that he was least pleased with on his
return.

The first evening I sat by the
radio at home, I heard one long parade
of headaches, coughs, aching muscles,
stained teeth, unpleasant full feeling,
and gastric hyperacidity...Our radio
evenings are a sick parade of sickness,
and if they haven't yet made us a sick
nation, I wonder why.®

Although one must discount the press prejudice in
Gannett's remarks, he was not alone in calling attention
to radio's excesses. FCC Chairman Paul A. Porter, an
exponent of free radio, suggested that broadcasters
should begin putting their own house in order before
federal legislation did it for them. Over-commercial-
ization would have to be stopped and programing stand-
ards raised or broadcasting might invite the regulatory
fate of the railroads, the stock exchanges, and other
areas of commerce caught up in the web of excess. As
a step in this direction, the FCC published a report,
Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees,
commonly referred to as the "Blue Book," in March, 1946.
Henceforth the FCC would be paying special attention to the four programing problems considered, by critics as well, to be in need of improvement: poor quality and excessive advertising, lack of sufficient sustaining public service programing, lack of adequate shows featuring local, live talent, and too few programs aimed at education and culture. Unfortunately, this federal move toward program review lacked adequate enforcement, resulting in more controversy than correction. Thus, the post-war release following wartime containment continued.

"Some day," wrote journalist Max Knepper, "when foreign tensions have eased a bit, when taxes and the cost of living are down, and when the public attains a sense of security against the atomic bomb, American broadcasting will become an issue." American broadcasting was an issue before, during, and after the war and in its televised form, is still an issue today. The perhaps unfortunate irony in all this criticism of post-war commercial radio was that the general public - that mass of listeners and consumers who really counted - was, by in large, content.

An exhaustive poll of the radio audience proved beyond all doubt that the public did not begin to feel about commercialized radio the way it was supposed to feel. Listeners did not resent the soap operas. They were not excessively bothered by the commercials. They were pretty well satisfied with the status quo.
In the absence of a federal cheerleader, such as Vice President Spiro Agnew, current broadcast audiences remain just as satisfied.

**Network News**

In his V-E Day statement, House Commerce Committee Chairman Clarence F. Lea praised radio's contribution to the "unity, understanding and cooperation" of the American people in the war effort.

> For three years and five months while we have been in the great conflict, radio has given us the most complete and satisfactory reporting service any part of the world has ever known in any war.

With the subsequent September surrender of the Japanese, total peace had finally returned. The hectic news pace in existence since Munich was allowed to seek a more comfortable level. Following the cessation of hostilities in the Pacific, Elmer Davis, formerly of OWI and CBS, signed with the new American Broadcasting Company as a news analyst. Colonel A.A. Schechter, former NBC news chief, also switched networks, joining MBS as news and special events director. Edward R. Murrow remained with CBS and was promoted to the position of Vice President and Director of Public Affairs upon his return from London. After V-E Day, the Army withdrew food and transportation privileges from those
correspondents serving in the European theater. "If anyone can use 400 slightly used war correspondents we can be had cheap," wrote Quentin Reynolds, interjecting a bit of humor into the post-war military cutback. "You can have us in singles or in carlots. All we want is three meals a day, an expense account, and a little spending money."10

To say that radio news programing had expanded during the war years would certainly be an understatement. More precisely, it had exploded. In 1937, NBC assigned only 2.8% of its total program hours to news. By 1944, news occupied 20.4% of the total schedule. During that same span of years, CBS went from 2,045 news broadcasts per year to 7,973, an increase of almost 300%.11 CBS also reported that 40% of its total air time since Pearl Harbor had been devoted to war news and other related programs. News audiences had been large during the war but now, with the arrival of peace, listenership began to suffer. The networks cut back some in their staff sizes and total time devoted to news in line with this reaction to the relative easing of international tensions. CBS News Director Paul White remarked: "They'll listen again, and if they don't, God knows the war was fought for nothing."12
TABLE 9

TOTAL WAR PROGRAMS BROADCAST OVER THE CBS NETWORK,

December 7, 1941 to September 2, 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Category</th>
<th>Total Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War News Programs</td>
<td>22,850 or 4,051 hrs. 38 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programs with War Items Included</td>
<td>35,753 or 6,534 hrs. 40 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total War Programs</td>
<td>58,603 or 10,586 hrs. 18 minutes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


After an initial period of decline, radio news audiences did indeed return. Both listeners and sponsors had retained their war-instituted attraction to newscasts. Several surveys were made during the months following V-J Day to determine the public feeling toward radio news. Over 60% of those questioned in a National Opinion Research Center poll reported that radio news was their primary source of information (up from 25% in a 1939 Roper study). To the question of "most unbiased news source," twice as many respondents cited radio as mentioned newspapers. Ninety percent of the people polled in another study indicated that they listened to radio news twice or more daily and 65% listened three times or more per day. However, as
usual, the listening public did have some complaints. They reacted negatively to the continual repetition of news stories, to the lack of details, and to the placement and type of commercial interruptions in the news shows (nothing against news sponsorship per se, however). Listeners also began showing a preference for straight newscasts over those given by commentators, now that the need for personal reassurance in time of crisis was gone. The number of commentators and their programs dropped after the war as the audience for this type of presentation declined. Nevertheless, the general news audience had regained its numerical strength and so had radio. Three of the four networks had more foreign correspondents on assignment than they had had during the war, and all the networks had made decisions on the composition of their home office newscaster staffs. "By the end of the winter of 1946," stated Elmo C. Wilson, "it was evident to anyone having access to the measurements of radio program popularity that news broadcasts were here to stay." World War II had made radio news a habit.

**Television**

In December, 1945, David Sarnoff spoke about broadcasting's progress.
The miracle of radar and the advent of postwar television make 1945 a year to be remembered as beginning the third cycle in the evolution of radio: First there was wireless telegraphy; second, broadcasting of the human voice and music; and now, the world enters the third cycle— the era of radio sight...

War had slowed the progress of television programming but technological research and development was allowed to continue in the laboratory. Even in 1943, researchers were looking ahead to peacetime and the long-awaited launching of television on a nationwide basis. Camera sensitivity had been improved and studio heat diminished, receiver cost to the public was steadily being reduced, the first multiple-relay network was in operation before V-E Day, and color television techniques continued to be refined. The FCC had given commercial television "a steady green light." Convinced of video's future, NBC President Niles Trammell remarked: "If a radio or advertising executive chooses to remain ignorant about television, the chances are, in a few more years, he is not going to be a radio or advertising executive anymore." 16

Television licensees faced lean years during the war, with program and research expenditures far outdistancing revenues. Set production had been curtailed with only about 10,000 units in existence during 1941,
most of which were located in New York City. And losses would continue during the post-war years pending definite FCC channel assignments, receiver refinement, and sufficient numbers of set owners. The initial cost of constructing a full-service television station was estimated at $258,500, with a minimum of five years before profits could be expected. Since subsequent yearly operations costs would be in the neighborhood of $175,000, veteran television personnel, like Leonard F. Cramer of DuMont Laboratories, were quick to remind potential licensees that station ownership was "no penny-ante game." Television would have been hard pressed to exist during the early and mid-1940's without the financial backing received from its successful parent AM and equipment manufacturing licensees. To help hasten the development of widespread television activity following the war, the Television Broadcasters Association was formed in January, 1944. Television pioneer Allen B. DuMont was elected to serve as the first president of the organization. Among the first orders of business: initiation of a definitive study of the problems and potentials of post-war commercial television.

Heading into 1946, there were nine commercial television stations (Table 10) operating in the United
States (all but the 1943 DuMont station were in existence throughout the war period), twenty-six authorized experimental stations, and over one-hundred applications for new stations on file with the FCC. In New York City, the average home audience for television programming was almost six persons while public places registered an average of 37 viewers, according to a Ross Federal Research Corporation survey in 1945. One of the first post-war television highlights was the pick-up of President Truman's State of the Nation address to Congress in mid-January, 1946. The three New York stations covered the event from Washington, sending signals back to New York over a newly laid stretch of A.T. & T. coaxial cable connecting the two cities. With network interconnection and fuller program schedules in future view, television began to move forward. Wrote Francis Chase: "Visual broadcasting, in conjunction with sound transmission, could become their (the public's) principal source of education, entertainment and enlightenment, linking them together in mind and spirit." With over 13 million television sets produced in 1948, Chase's prediction was well on the road to reality.
TABLE 10

FCC-AUTHORIZED U.S. COMMERCIAL TELEVISION STATIONS
(as of January 15, 1946)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Call Letters</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Licensee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WNBT</td>
<td>New York City</td>
<td>National Broadcasting Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCBW</td>
<td>New York City</td>
<td>Columbia Broadcasting System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WABD</td>
<td>New York City</td>
<td>Allen B. DuMont Laboratories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRGB</td>
<td>Schenectady</td>
<td>General Electric Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPTZ</td>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>Philco Radio and Television Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBKB</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>Balaban and Katz Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTZR*</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>Zenith Radio Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMJT*</td>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
<td>The Journal Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KTS L</td>
<td>Hollywood</td>
<td>Don Lee Broadcasting System</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Construction permit status


Summary

By 1947, network radio's evening programming hours were divided among: variety (25%), drama (25%), news and commentary (15%), audience participation (15%), popular music (10%), and education, children's shows, and others (10%). Despite the criticism of over-
commercilization and program quality following three years and five months of restraint, the general public remembered radio's great wartime service and tended to overlook present weaknesses. In an "exhaustive study of listener attitudes toward radio," conducted by the National Opinion Research Center, respondents were asked to indicate which medium had done "the best job of serving the public during the war." Of those polled, 67% chose radio. Newspapers finished a distant second with 17%, followed by movies (4%), magazines (3%), and those who had no opinion (9%). Radio's popularity and listener habits helped pull the medium through times of criticism and readjustment.

At the 1945 dedication of a new Senate radio news gallery (a facility unheard of before the war), President Truman spoke of network radio's vast powers of dissemination.

Radio has made the United States one great auditorium. In no other way can men instantly talk to all of this nation's millions.

The extent of this radio coverage was directly dependent upon the number of stations in operation and radio sets-in-use. Table 11 shows the rate of AM station growth during and after the war years.
Financial problems and/or the unavailability of replacement parts were the most probable reasons for the decline in 1943 and 1944, with the "freeze" preventing any new stations from taking up the slack. Notice should be taken of the phenomenal increase in numbers during the first two peacetime years, 1946 to 1948. Growth in that period was almost triple that of the preceding eight years. Radio set ownership also made remarkable gains following the war (Table 12) as equipment manufacturers reconverted their product lines to meet the backlogged consumer demand.
TABLE 12
TOTAL RADIO SETS-IN-USE IN THE UNITED STATES,
1938 to 1948

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sets-in-use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>40,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>45,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>51,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>56,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>59,340,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>57,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>55,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>56,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>60,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>66,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>74,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The wartime peak was reached in 1942, the year that saw radio sets virtually disappear from the market by mid-summer. The lack of replacement parts was again the cause of the decline in numbers between 1942 and 1945. Sets-in-use jumped by 10 million in the two years following the war, as automobile radios and multiple-radio homes became more common. Frequency modulation or FM broadcasting also began to move after 1945. Referred to as "one of the most interesting and revolutionary changes in radio," and forced into a state of near dormancy by the demands of the war, FM grew from 21
experimental stations in 1940 to 48 licensed commercial operations in 1946. FCC Chairman James Lawrence Fly and the Broadcasting Magazine editorial staff, among others, felt that FM had "come of age" and felt secure in predicting its success.  

Domestically, despite the sizeable increase in stations and receivers, much of the U.S. was still beyond the daytime primary range of AM outlets at the close of the war. On the international scene, government leaders such as Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius were calling for increased radio participation in maintaining the peace, such as by helping to make the "homes of the world...into one great, common living room for the family of nations." The government-run Voice of America operation soon took this task of foreign broadcasting out of the hands of the networks and the others. The remaining areas without adequate radio service declined as more local stations, many bringing network affiliations, came into being.

Frequency modulation, facsimile, and television broadcasting will do for radio what the invention of the steam engine did for industry - bring about such revolutionary changes that the effects will be strongly felt outside the broadcasting industry and in our everyday social and economic life.
After clearly establishing its right and need to exist, by virtue of officially and popularly lauded war service, radio broadcasting and its derivatives settled back down to the business of growth, of profitability, and of affecting and reflecting social change.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter IV


4 In fairness to print, it should be mentioned that 1946 brought nearly a $200 million gain to the newspapers while the radio pace slowed to a revenue increase of only $20 million.


23This matter of predicting the post-war success of FM led Broadcasting to make an incorrect prophesy, when it compared FM's chances with those of television. Said the editors: "FM is a technical reality. So is television. FM, requiring less drastic changes in techniques and economics, is more susceptible to introduction and acceptance on a broad national base when wartime restrictions on construction and fabrication of receivers are lifted." (Broadcasting, January 31, 1944, p. 12). Unfortunately, FM did not prove to be susceptible to national acceptance until almost twenty years later in the 1960's. Television proved to be the "hot property" of the post-war years and beyond. Caught between a surging national television and a sagging national AM, FM broadcasting almost experienced economic strangulation during the 1950's.


25Chase, Sound and Fury, p. 289. *Facsimile refers to the transmission of print or pictures via radio waves. This process was in use experimentally during World War II.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Radio has become indispensable to the preservation of democracy.

—James Lawrence Fly

Sherman Dryer has described radio as "an industry which grew up in peacetime." Certainly radio did grow during the nearly two decades of relative international calm, blossoming from a mere handful of stations in the early twenties to over 700 by 1939 and from no national networks to four powerful ones over the same period of years. But real industry maturity and public dedication was to come as the result of a world war. Radio grew more in status and service during the seven war years than it had during the previous seventeen. Broadcasting's maturation process evolved as the result of a generally total and successful assumption of the wartime roles of supporter, informer and entertainer.

United States involvement in World War II had several immediate and sustaining effects on radio. Shortage of help and materials, increased schedules,
demands for free time, and coordination of government appeals were some of the new pressures which faced broadcasters. Perhaps the dominant government agencies related to these pressures were the War Production Board, the Manpower Commission, the Office of War Information and the Censor. In terms of day-to-day program operation, the latter two agencies became vitally important to network and local radio.

Byron Price believed that government censorship of radio and press was "one of the many restrictions that must be imposed on people fighting for the right to throw off those restrictions when peace returns." Acting under the provisions of the newly passed First War Powers Act, President Roosevelt authorized Director Price to censor all forms of communications leaving and entering the country. This included mail, cables, film, radio and even carrier pigeons which were actually being used to transport messages between enemy agents. The Office of Censorship's relationship with media was one of voluntary cooperation. Price expected the broadcasters and editors of this country to be their own censors as much as possible. Both sides believed that information restraint was often more a case of good judgment than of actual censorship.
For broadcasters, a major distinction existed between cooperative government regulation and potentially rigid government control. The President was opposed to government domination of the media but placed the responsibility for preserving the existing radio freedom squarely on the shoulders of the broadcasters. Self-regulating industry codes were developed to supplement government provisions and to act as a buffer between federal restrictions and the broadcasters. There was some expected opposition to the seemingly more stringent censorship rules for radio as compared with the press. But radio's distinct advantages - immediacy and dissemination - also became prime reasons for tighter censor control. Broadcasters generally did agree with the need for censorship as a means of preserving national security. Edward R. Murrow had stated early in the war that he would not care to work in a nation without some censorship provisions because of the tremendous responsibility for human lives involved. In general, the censorship argument was one of degree and not of necessity. Broadcasting achieved a fine record of adherence to censorship restrictions, leading the Price Office to express gratitude for the extent of wartime cooperation.
In contrast to the arrangement in effect during World War II, the information function was separated from that of censorship during the conflict of the forties, resulting in a greater level of public credibility for both the federal government and the broadcaster. The first attempt at a federal clearing house for radio requests and information, the Office of Facts and Figures, lacked the necessary inter-agency control and was replaced by the Office of War Information in June, 1942. OWI became, at the very least, a truly centralized coordination/dissemination agency, headed by Elmer Davis who continually encouraged his people to strive for clarity, understanding and truth in the distribution of information. Davis assured the government, the media and the public that OWI would be using...

...every means that may be useful to tell the story we have to tell to friends, enemies, and neutrals alike - that we are coming, that we are going to win, and that in the long run everybody will be better off because we won.

As with censorship, complaints were leveled at OWI. Evidence seemed to indicate that while the quantity of facts released had increased, the subsequent level of public understanding had not. Criticism of the number and repetition of war-related radio announcements was also voiced. Elmer Davis was subjected to personal attack from Congress regarding his experimental
weekly news program and, at one point, the entire OWI Domestic Branch was even in danger of losing its Congressional funding. In general, OWI appears to have taken a more intense verbal beating than did Mr. Price and his censors.

The actual effectiveness of the Price and Davis agencies is apparently debatable, in view of available comments on both sides, and is not a primary concern of this study. What is important, however, is that the radio networks, and the local independent stations on a smaller scale, did cooperate fully with these and other agencies and were clearly instrumental in bringing about the degree(s) of success which they did manage to attain. This assertion has been attested to by government statements presented in previous chapters. The Davis Office estimated that the Germans were spending somewhere between $200 and $500 per year for their foreign and domestic information services. In support of radio, Davis was quick to point out that free air time and production assistance was allowing the United States information efforts to function on a considerably smaller budget. Radio's assistance had indeed kept government expenditures in this area down while rendering essential service to the public. American broadcasting's total war effort contribution, in time and
talent, had reached $543,902,500 by August, 1945, which must certainly be recognized as a significant donation to our drive toward victory. Reflecting on broadcasting's wartime involvement, Colonel Edward M. Kirby of the War Department's public relations branch spoke glowing words of praise.

When the history of these critical times is finally written, I believe that one of the brightest pages in the story of America's mobilization for total war will be the account of how the entire radio industry threw all of its vast resources into the fight, without reservation, with complete unselfishness, and with a determination characteristic of true Americans.

Radio had indeed made a contribution. And what is perhaps most significant is that such had been made by a national radio system in the absence of actual federal government control.

It was said at that time that "the war has brought radio closer than ever to the public consciousness." Much, if not most, of the credit for this increased public awareness belonged to network radio news. In support of this contention, Edward R. Murrow, following the D-Day invasion, repeated his conviction that the networks' job was to bring the war as close to the American people as possible. The network news teams had faithfully pursued this objective since the early days of Munich and Kaltenborn. After initial periods
of too many program interruptions and, in fact, almost too much news, network radio settled down to a system of regularly scheduled newscasts with extended foreign coverage as the need arose. Via wire recordings, transcriptions, portable transmitters, land lines and shortwave, network newsmen provided on-the-scene battle reports for an anxious audience at home. Such actuality coverage helped to increase listener confidence in radio and to make the general public more totally aware of the extent of our Atlantic and Pacific involvement.

As Archibald MacLeish once told Edward R. Murrow, pertaining as well to all overseas radio correspondents, "you have destroyed...the superstition that what is done beyond 3,000 miles of water is not really done at all."³ Radio news brought the magnitude, the suffering and the demands of a foreign war home.

Network radio's coverage of the conflict made the public, on the whole, more news-conscious. An increasingly more aware public came to depend on the speed, accuracy and actuality of broadcast news. Radio had helped spread this new awareness to all segments of the public spectrum. Social researcher Paul Lazarsfeld concluded:

It is certainly fair to say that radio has contributed greatly to developing this new interest among women and less educated people and
thus has done a great service to democracy's need for an informed people.\textsuperscript{9}

Polls revealed that during the course of the war, radio had become the public's dominant and most credible spot news medium. When peace returned in late 1945, news listening dropped precipitously as the four year cloud of tension began to clear. Fortunately for the now sophisticated and conflict-hardened network news machines, the listener and sponsor withdrawal proved to be only a temporary one. As the networks regeread to a peacetime pace, regular news programing became a permanent schedule feature. It can rather accurately be concluded that the networks' high calibre performance during the Second World War made radio news a listener habit in this country.

The creation of the broadcast news analyst and/or commentator was due largely to the tensions and intricacies of World War II. A growing news awareness increased the need for listener reassurance and understanding. After twenty days of catering to these very needs in the fall of 1938, the name Kaltenborn had become a household word. The general radio news objective was to present pertinent information quickly, accurately and unemotionally. In short, factual objectivity sans editorialization was the network rule, although par-
tially challenged at times from within. Speaking for most commentators, H.V. Kaltenborn defined the standard strived for when he declared that radio "must give the news fully, fairly, freely..." A long list of names followed Mr. Kaltenborn to the analyst's microphone. Some were competent, responsible radio journalists and some were not. But most did attempt, perhaps in their own way, to bridge the gap between the straight newscast and the average listener, between uncertainty and understanding.

World War II also gave birth to the fast, versatile type of broadcast journalism that we have come to value and expect today, consisting of international actuality and accuracy. CBS News first pioneered multiple-city foreign hook-ups in 1938. The technological limits of on-the-scene reporting underwent continual refinement during the war period, progressing a long way from those first relatively simple network pick-ups from London in 1930. Yet despite the level of wartime technical and journalistic competence achieved, radio's news efforts and potential were still considered somehow inferior to the status of the American press. Coverage of Congressional and executive branch sessions was for a long time limited to print representatives and only grudgingly was space made available for kid-brother
radio. Much of the trouble can logically be traced to the competitive resentment of the press, formed during a pre-war decade that saw advertising revenues shrink at an alarming rate. Although ad volume did decrease, post-war recovery was swift and sizeable. And although the number of newspapers had decreased slightly, total circulation had actually increased by the time the war began. Radio's spot coverage of events as they happened complemented rather than competed with the in-depth, more permanent accounts supplied by the press. Yet despite the wire report and transcription exchanges carried on between the two media during the world war, the formerly overt press-radio war persisted on a more covert basis for the duration. In the absence of proper official recognition, broadcast journalists could, however, derive a measure of satisfaction from the ample number of compliments directed toward radio news during and after the war. The most valued of these must have been those received from the print community itself, as for example when Time magazine commented that "...the best news programs have probably surpassed the best newspapers since the war started." Other statements of praise have reflected a still more positive conviction.
From the standpoint of thoughtful service and showmanship, it was radio's finest hour. A great country was in need of the best and fastest international news service ever devised—and radio came through.

As has been previously discussed, the war served as a test of free broadcasting. World War II also served as a test for infant broadcast journalism in competition against a sage and aged press. Yet, as with the first test, broadcasting passed again with high scores. While the press may have won some battles, radio news carried the war.

In addition to network radio's wartime jobs of news gathering/reporting and information/censorship assistance, broadcasting found its pre-war entertainment fare now being looked upon as a necessary relaxation factor and morale-builder by the public and the government alike. In early 1942, radio's chief domestic task was considered by most to be one of selling the war to the American people, since isolationism had fragmented public opinion virtually until the bombs fell at Pearl Harbor. Network radio helped to "sell" the war and labored to maintain a high morale level, initially by means of regular and supplementary entertainment programming, and subsequently by combining same with the increasingly more positive news reports. Radio's pre-war patriotic series had been plentiful but had also
been isolationist in tone. Critics charged the networks with playing down the magnitude of the European situation and thus not properly or fairly preparing the nation to accept its eventual burden of war. Once war became inevitable, however, radio's tone and task shifted immediately to that of salesman. In the supplementary area, dramatic series, variety and special appeals programs were the chief formats employed to change and then maintain the course of national thought and action. The Norman Corwin dramatic series, "This Is War!," formally kicked off radio's new look and left little doubt in the minds of listeners about the medium's forceful activism. Military-oriented series like "The Army Hour," featuring camp originations and name entertainment, were found to be doubly popular and effective. Such radio programs from military bases helped to boost the morale of families at home, while the entertainment brought to the bases raised the morale of the soldiers. Most regular entertainment series devoted plot time or even a separate block of time to war-theme needs on a continuing basis. The soap operas were accused of not being fully involved in the conflict, but in actuality their restraint was probably a valuable preventive against war-theme saturation.
The broadcast medium was used heavily by government leaders, as well as by the network news personnel, to report and explain national policy and actions. "Radio," said Sherman Dryer, "is the perfect medium to introduce the leaders of the country to its people." President Roosevelt was good to, and for, radio, using it to "chat" with the people on numerous occasions. Network radio's extensive coverage of the President's funeral served as a fitting tribute to a departed friend.

Perhaps one of wartime network radio's greatest entertainment and morale triumphs was its series of war bond drive specials. Kate Smith's marathon pledge totals are impressive by today's standards, let alone in the midst of a world war over twenty-five years ago. Including the Smith-athons, the radio industry donated a total of $95 million in time and talent to the eight war loan drives. Using the power of radio and of the human voice, Miss Smith managed to better that cumulative figure in the course of just one around-the-clock appeal. Supplementary and regular entertainment programming adopted the candy-coated approach to war appeals dissemination. It was believed that entertainment-with-a-message encountered better receptivity and listener response than a constant barrage of purely
informational war-theme programs. The dramatic format was considered to be the most effective in this category due to the power of the human voice appealing to human emotions. Through the use of the OWI-coordinated entertainment forms discussed, network broadcasting was able to have an intense and, at least in the case of war bonds, measurable effect on national wartime morale.

Television, perhaps more so than radio, felt the full effect of the wartime broadcast freeze on materials and expansion. Although technological research and development was allowed to continue in the laboratories, television programming was limited in time and place, with a total of nine commercial stations serving six local markets for the duration. However, the television medium would soon escape the confines of limited, local transmission, as land-line technology and cost continued to move closer to the level of network feasibility. Already, in 1945, dedication ceremonies had been held for the first multiple-relay television network. With regional transmission then a reality, national network systems would be just a matter of time. In addition to the refinement of consumer products, wartime research in television and radio electronics contributed improved radar, sonar and portable FM transmitters to the military effort.
The Second World War brought general prosperity to the networks and to most individual stations as well. Critics charged broadcasting with commercial excesses both during and especially following the war. Socialist Norman Thomas expressed concern over the extent of broadcasting's prosperity during a time of struggle and personal sacrifice.

The chief indictment of the present American system is its steadily increasing commercialization. Radio is operating for profit with a capital P.\textsuperscript{14}

Even disregarding his political bias, Thomas did not stand alone in his charge of broadcaster greed. In view of the financial situation, many wondered whether radio's true potential for service to the nation had been reached or whether it had been seriously sidetracked by the lure of revenue. Norman Corwin had spoken earlier in the war of radio's vast power, "a power far exceeding that of the press."\textsuperscript{15} Yet Edward R. Murrow had stated that a person could not only be informed and entertained but also irritated at a twist of the radio dial, referring specifically to the commercials. Radio was running the spectrum, offering repetitious, often offensive advertisements at one end and the finest war news coverage available at the other. Weaknesses in the broadcast structure
caused Charles Siepmann to write:

War is a testing time. Radio's future, like our own, depends upon whether it learns the lessons of self-discipline imposed by war, and whether it, and we, read rightly the demands upon us of our future destiny. 16

Radio did successfully pass the test of operational freedom and press competition. Radio also did contribute great amounts of public service to the war effort. But so did most segments of government, industry and the general public. The point being made here is simply that despite radio's valuable and varied assistance, broadcasters were not perfect, discrepancies did exist, and some of the criticism leveled at the industry was undoubtedly deserved. How network broadcasting evolved in the decade following the war, amidst increased commercialization and lessened "self-discipline," and whether it ever reached its peacetime potential, if such could be determined, are subjects for further study.

Network broadcasting assumed three major, interrelated roles during the Second World War. Radio was a supporter of the federal government, adhering to the policies of censorship, information and other agencies, and donating time, talent and facilities for domestic education campaigns. Network radio also adopted the role of informer, disseminating government information,
interpreting war policies and events, and providing international, on-the-scene news coverage. Finally, radio was an entertainer, generally maintaining its pre-war programming schedule in addition to supplementation with war-theme and special appeal campaigns whenever needed. These three roles, support, information and entertainment, all represented examples of successful government/broadcaster cooperation in a time of crisis. More importantly, these roles combined to have a profound effect on national morale by virtue of radio's total involvement and the public's growing respect for the medium. The people learned to trust radio and to believe what was broadcast regarding domestic security and eventual military victory overseas.

Although perhaps difficult to document precisely, it would appear to be a reasonable conclusion that network radio's cooperation and credibility played a significant part in maintaining the sufficiently high level of public morale needed to insure a first mental, then actual, world war victory.

Due to the extent and consistency of radio's three-role cooperation, it can also be concluded that network broadcasting served as a major domestic ally of the United States Government throughout the war period. There were, of course, disagreements and
exceptions, as with any democratic organization or system. But on the whole, radio proved to be a solid supporter of government policies and needs—in short, a valuable and aggressive ally.

As already mentioned, World War II brought about network radio news maturity and, in at least the case of spot news, superiority over the press. In a more general sense, the war demonstrated to the nation the power and potential of the electronic mass media, including television, in the area of entertainment/persuasion as well as in that of information. The radio receiver, both in the home and in the automobile, proved itself to be a dependable, reassuring companion during a prolonged period of crisis. Some observers recognized all too well the tremendous power of radio and expressed fear of its use in the wrong hands. Propaganda Minister Goebbels' use of the German radio system served as a timely case in point. In addition, Orson Welles' "War of the Worlds" production in 1938 was remembered as a negative example of the power of radio in this country. Fortunately, network radio's wartime speed, dissemination ability and service gave this nation a convincing look at broadcasting's positive potential.

A final conclusion might well be that the system of voluntary radio government wartime cooperation did
prove to be a successful experiment. A privately-owned national radio set-up, operating with a system of relative freedom, had previously been unheard of in a nation at war. Network radio's sense of public responsibility and fear-induced blanket cooperation allowed for the retention in this situation of the same democratic principles of freedom for which this nation was fighting overseas. Responsible, voluntary cooperation on the part of broadcasters insured governmental restraint.

Network broadcasting, although a mere twelve years of age at Munich, passed quickly into adulthood via efficient, demanding and invaluable national service, and emerged as a crisis-hardened veteran by V-J Day. Radio's indispensable wartime assistance helped to win the war and to preserve national freedom at home as well as beyond the oceans. Network radio's supportive, informational and supplementary entertainment contributions, dictated by a voluntary cooperative commitment, served also to ensure that American broadcasting would be free of undue governmental restraint for the duration of the war and on into the peace that followed. The Second World War put network broadcasting in this country to the survival test. Radio successfully met the challenge and, in so doing, established the signifi-
cant precedent of responsible freedom as the framework for broadcast operation during periods of future crises. Network broadcasting had served its country well during the war years. Continued freedom was radio's just reward.

On the matter of further study in this area, more work needs yet to be done with the surviving World War II newsmen, producers, engineers, etc., so as to determine more precisely what the war was really like for broadcasters at home and, more importantly, overseas. How did our state of the broadcast art compare with foreign systems? What where the obstacles, other than censorship, that prevented or hindered coverage. What financial arrangements were made regarding use of foreign transmission facilities for American broadcasts? A closer look at wartime local television, (e.g., focusing on New York City), would help to strengthen a weak area in the recorded developmental history of the medium. An example of network radio's persuasive effectiveness was certainly Kate Smith's war bond specials. How did the local and local/independent radio stations contribute separately to the war effort and what were some examples of radio's persuasiveness on that level? Radio was the dominant electronic medium during the Second World War. Since the mid-1950's, television
has taken over that position. It has been previously concluded that network radio functioned as a strong ally of the federal government during World War II. To what extent have the television networks carried on the precedential wartime roles of supporter, informer and entertainer during the Korean War and more recently in Viet Nam? Has television served as a government protagonist or as a partial antagonist? What effects has the addition of video to the informational role had? Has there been supplemental war-theme entertainment programing? It is hoped that this study of network broadcasting's roles and contributions during the Second World War will not only result in the further researching of this era but also, and more particularly, will encourage investigation and comparison of the roles and attitudes of the electronic media during the periods of military conflict that have followed.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter V


4Ibid., p. 20.

5"Broadcasting Role in Pacific Is Big One," Broadcasting, August 13, 1945, p. 16.


7"The Impact of War on Advertising," Advertising and Selling, April, 1944, p. 40.

8"From Brick Dust to Bouquets," Time, December 15, 1941, p. 50.


Dryer, Radio in Wartime, p. 113.


APPENDIX

THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934

Section 326. (Censorship) "Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio communication."

Section 606. (c) (Presidential War Emergency Powers) "Upon proclamation by the President that there exists war or a threat of war, or a state of public peril or disaster or other national emergency or in order to preserve the neutrality of the United States, the President, if he deems it necessary in the interest of national security or defense, may suspend or amend, for such time as he may see fit, the rules and regulations applicable to any or all stations or devices capable of emitting electromagnetic radiation within the jurisdiction of the United States as prescribed by the Commission, and may cause the closing of any station for radio communication or any device capable of emitting electromagnetic radiations between 10 kilocycles and 100,000 megacycles, which is suitable for use as a navigational aid beyond 5 miles, and the removal therefrom of its apparatus and equipment, or he may authorize the use or control of any such station or device and/or its apparatus and equipment, by any department of the Government under such regulations as he may prescribe upon just compensation to the owners. The authority granted to the President, under this subsection, to cause the closing of any station or device and the removal therefrom of its apparatus and equipment, or to authorize the use or control of any station or device and/or its apparatus and equipment, may be exercised in the Canal Zone."
EXECUTIVE ORDER #8964

Prescribing Regulations Governing the Use, Control and Closing of Radio Stations and the Preference or Priority of Communications (Transfer of Section 606 powers to the Defense Communications Board)

"WHEREAS The Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled have declared that a state of war exists between the United States and the Imperial Japanese Government;

AND WHEREAS Section 606 of the Communications Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 1104; U.S.C., title 47, sec. 606) authorizes the President under such circumstances to cause the closing of any radio station and the removal therefrom of its apparatus and equipment, and to authorize the use or control of any such station and/or its apparatus and equipment by any agency of the Government under such regulations as the President may prescribe upon just compensation to the owners, and further authorizes him to direct that communications essential to the national defense and security shall have preference or priority;

AND WHEREAS It is necessary to insure the national defense and the successful conduct of the war that the Government of the United States shall take over, operate, and have use or possession of certain radio stations or parts thereof within the jurisdiction of the United States, and shall inspect, supervise, control or close other radio stations or parts thereof within the jurisdiction of the United State, and that there should be priority with respect to the transmission of certain communications by wire or radio;

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of authority vested in me under the Constitution of the United States and under the aforementioned joint resolution of Congress dated December 8, 1941, and under the provisions of the aforementioned Section 606 of the Communications Act of 1934, I hereby prescribe that from and after this date the Defense Communications Board created by the Executive Order of September 24, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the Board) shall exercise the power and authority vested
in me by Section 606 of the Communications Act of 1934 pursuant to and under the following regulations:

1. The Board shall determine and prepare plans for the allocation of such portions of governmental and non-governmental radio facilities as may be required to meet the needs of the armed forces, due consideration being given to the needs of other governmental agencies, of industry, and of other civilian activities.

2. The Board shall, if the national security and defense and the successful conduct of the war so demand, designate specific radio stations and facilities or portions thereof for the use, control, supervision, inspection or closure by the Department of War, Department of Navy or other agency of the United States Government.

3. The Board shall, if the national security and defense and the successful conduct of the war so demand, prescribe classes and types of radio stations and facilities or portions thereof which shall be subject to use, control, supervision, inspection or closure, in accordance with such prescription, by the Department of War, Department of Navy or other agency of the United States Government designated by the Board.

4. Every department and independent agency of the government shall submit to the Defense Communications Board, at such time and in such manner as the Board may prescribe, full information with respect to all use made or proposed to be made of any radio station or facility and of any supervision, control, inspection or closure which has been or is proposed to be effected pursuant to paragraph 3 hereof.

5. No radio station or facility shall be taken over and operated in whole or in part or subjected to governmental supervision, control or closure unless such action is essential to national defense and security and the successful conduct of the war. So far as possible, action taken pursuant to this Order shall not interfere with the procurement needs of civilian governmental agencies, the normal functioning of industry or the maintenance of civilian morale.

6. Until and except so far as said Board shall otherwise provide, the owners, managers, boards of directors, receivers, officers and employees of the radio stations shall continue the operation thereof
in the usual and ordinary course of business, in the names of their respective companies, associations, organizations, owners or managers, as the case may be.

7. The head of any department or agency which uses or controls any radio station pursuant to the terms of this Order shall ascertain the just compensation for the use or control of such radio station and recommend such just compensation in each such case to the President for approval and action by him in accordance with the provisions of subsection (d) of Section 606 of the Communications Act of 1934 (U.S.C., title 47, sec. 606 (d)).

8. By subsequent order of the Board, the use, control, or supervision of any radio station or facility or class or type thereof assumed under the provisions of this Order may be relinquished in whole or in part to the owners thereof and any restrictions placed on any radio station or facility pursuant hereto may be removed in whole or in part.

9. The Board is hereby designated, in accordance with the provisions of Section 606 (a) of the Communications Act of 1934, to make such arrangements as may be necessary in order to insure that communications essential to the national defense and security shall have preference or priority with any carrier subject to the Communications Act of 1934. The Board may issue any regulations which may be necessary to accomplish this purpose.

10. All terms herein used shall have the meanings ascribed to such terms in Section 3, as amended, of the Communications Act of 1934.

11. All regulations of general applicability issued by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or any other governmental agency under these Presidential regulations shall be published in the FEDERAL REGISTER.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE,
December 10, 1941.
(No. 8964)

Source: The National Archives, Federal Register, Vol. 6, December 12, 1941, pp. 6367-68.
NAB GUIDE FOR WARTIME BROADCASTING

FORWARD

This is a different war. It affects all phases of the nation's activity and reaches into every home. This is total war and victory requires the combined efforts of all our people. While we have learned much from broadcasting war news since 1939, we now have new responsibilities and new opportunities. The relationship between broadcasting and Government and the manner in which it will perform its function as the chief source of news and information requires careful appraisal. Upon the judgments and policies now formulated will depend our effectiveness.

* * * * *

The broad outlines of the policies to be followed in dealing with news and radio were given by the President in his speech of December 9. The President said:

"This government will put its trust in the stamina of the American people and will give the facts to the public as soon as two conditions have been fulfilled; first, that the information has been definitely and officially confirmed; and second, that the release of the information at the time it is received will not prove valuable to the enemy directly or indirectly.

"To all newspapers and radio stations - all those who reach the eyes and ears of the American people - I say this: You have a most grave responsibility to the nation now and for the duration of this war.

"If you feel that our government is not disclosing enough of the truth, you have every right to say so. But - in the absence of all the facts, as revealed by official sources - you have no right to deal out unconfirmed reports in such a way as to make people believe they are gospel truth."

* * * * *

The National Association of Broadcasters, after careful consultation with the military branches of the Government as well as other agencies, has attempted to make more detailed and specific the broader principles as enunciated above by the President. With the objective of setting forth certain basic requirements, your Association offers to broadcasters this pamphlet of recommendations as a guide to wartime broadcasting.
IN GENERAL

Accept the fact that this is likely to be a long war - reverses and triumphs. Avoid broadcasting the news in a manner that is likely to cause exaggerated optimism. Likewise avoid creating an atmosphere of defeatism and despair. At all times practice moderation in the writing, delivering and scheduling of news broadcasts.

The writing should avoid sensationalism.
The delivery should be calm, accurate, factual.
There should be a minimum of production trappings surrounding news broadcasts. The news of America at war is sufficiently exciting; do not try to make it more so by presenting it with sound-effects. The tension needs to be lessened, not increased.

Newscasts should be scheduled at regular intervals, and in the absence of news of extreme importance, this regular schedule should be followed.

Artificial efforts to stimulate listening audience by promises of immediate interruption of regular programs for important news broadcasts should not be attempted. Let the events speak for themselves.

* * * * * *

Extreme care should be used in the handling and broadcasting of any communiques or radio reports from our enemies.

They should not be used unless coupled, by careful editing, with known facts or an official statement on the same subject by our government. If you don't have the facts or an official statement on the same subject, don't broadcast the enemy communique until you get them.

In this connection, broadcasters should remember that extraordinary care must be taken to insure that those who tune in late do not get a wrong impression.

Remember the Men From Mars!

Remember we are at war with other Axis countries as well as Japan. Their communiques should be considered in the same light as those of the Japs.

* * * * * *

The broadcasting industry has been given to understand that it can use news from recognized press services because responsibility for that news rests with the press services. News gathered from other sources must be thoroughly checked and verified before broadcasting.
DO NOT

DO NOT broadcast rumors, "hot tips" or "unconfirmed reports," no matter what their source. "Hot tips" and rumors may burn your fingers. If you have the slightest doubt on any story, check with your press association. It is better to have no news than to broadcast false or harmful news.

In this connection, a word of caution on news flashes. A good practice is to wait a few minutes after the first flash until you are perfectly satisfied from the following story that the flash is borne out.

Radio's speed of light is cause for caution.

DO NOT broadcast news which concerns war production figures unless such news is officially released by the government.

DO NOT broadcast the movement of Naval or any other vessels.

DO NOT broadcast news about the movement of troops or personnel either outside or within the continental limits, unless it has been released officially by the War or Navy Departments.

DO NOT broadcast the location of vessels, either under construction or about to be launched.

DO NOT broadcast figures of Selective Service enrollments and inductions.

DO NOT broadcast personal observations on weather conditions. Watch sports broadcasts for this. A late night or early morning comment that "it's a fine, clear night (or morning)" might be invaluable information to the enemy. Stick to official weather reports your station receives from your local weather bureau.

DO NOT broadcast such imperatives as "Attention all men! Report to your local Civilian Defense headquarters tonight at eight." (Announcements may be requested in that manner. They should be changed to qualify the source at the beginning, such as: "The local Civilian Defense Committee requests all men, etc."). Reserve such "attention compellers" for important war purposes.

DO NOT overestimate American power nor underestimate the enemy strength and thereby tend to create complacent confidence. Stick to the facts as presented in official releases.

DO NOT allow sponsors to use the news as a springboard for commercials. Such practices as starting commercials with "Now some good news, etc." should never be permitted. Also it is important that such news-phrases as "bulletin," "flash," "news" and the like be used only in their legitimate functions. Do not
DO NOT use any sound-effects on dramatic programs, commercial announcements or otherwise which might be confused by the listener as air raid alarms, alert signals, etc.

DO NOT try to second-guess or master-mind our military officials. Leave this for established military analysts and experts, who are experienced enough to await the facts before drawing conclusions.

DO NOT broadcast any long lists of casualties. This has been specifically forbidden.

DO NOT permit speakers, in discussions of controversial public issues, to say anything of aid to the enemy.

DO NOT broadcast location of the plants engaged in the manufacture of war materials unless approved by the Government. This applies to emergencies such as explosions, sabotage, etc., unless such reports have been approved by the Government or cleared at the source by press associations.

DO NOT take chances with ad lib broadcasts, on the street or in the studio. An open microphone accessible to the general public constitutes a very real hazard in times of war. Questions should be prepared and approved in advance and extreme care should be exercised to avoid the asking of questions which would draw out any information or answer which would disclose matters or information of value to the enemy.

Any questions regarding the war or war production might make trouble.

DO

Maintain constant vigil over the news machines. Be sure to designate a responsible staff member in charge of the news at all hours of your operation. That person should be the one to determine the advisability of breaking programs for news bulletins, flashes, etc., and should be responsible for all news during the period he is designated in charge of the news machines.

Look for further instructions on the press wires, from the National Association of Broadcasters, the War Department, the Navy, or other official sources.

See that every member of your staff knows and understands these guides. Let your entire news staff and announcers know your policy.

File a complete script of all your news broadcasts. Keep the file until the war ends. Prepare and present your news factually, authentically, calmly. This is repetition, but this caution cannot be repeated too much.
DO your job as best you can, knowing it is one of the significant jobs in this all-out war in which America is engaged. Do your job in a manner that will satisfy yourself, advance the cause of free radio and serve the best interests of your country.

Source: Broadcasting, December 22, 1941, p. 11.
WAR-TIME CODE OF PRACTICES FOR BROADCASTERS

Issued by: The Office of Censorship
January 16, 1942

In wartime it is the responsibility of every citizen to help prevent the enemy, insofar as possible, from obtaining war, navy, air or economic intelligence which might be of value to him and inimical to our national effort.

The broadcasting industry has enlisted with enthusiasm in the endeavor, and the following is intended to be helpful in systematizing cooperation on a voluntary basis during the period of the emergency.

Two possibilities exist:
(1) Enemy exploitation of stations heard only within our borders, to expedite the work of saboteurs, and
(2) Enemy exploitation of stations heard internationally (both short and long wave) to transmit vital information.

All American stations desire to prevent such exploitation. The statement herewith set forth is presented under three headings:
(1) News programs.
(2) Ad lib programs.
(3) Foreign language programs.

Radio management can do much in other ways to win the war. It can act, in the light of experience, as its own censor above and beyond the suggestions contained in this statement of conduct.

I. NEWS PROGRAMS

It must be remembered that all newspapers, magazines and periodicals are censored at our national borders. No such post-publication censorship is possible in radio. Scores of stations operating on all classifications of frequencies are heard clearly in areas outside the United States. These stations especially should exercise skill and caution in preparing news broadcasts.

Ninety-nine percent of the commercial stations operating in the United States are serviced by one or more news agencies. News teletyped to stations and networks by these agencies will be edited at the source, with a view to observing certain requests set down by the press section of the Office of Censorship. These precautions notwithstanding, the Office of Censorship
stresses the need for radio to process all news in the
light of its own specialized knowledge. Broadcasters
should ask themselves the question, "Would this mater­
ial be of value to me if I were the enemy?" Certain
material which may appear on the news service wires as
approved for newspapers may not be appropriate for
radio.

It is requested that news falling into any of the
following classifications be kept off the air, except
in cases when the release has been authorized by ap­
propriate authority.

(1) Weather reports. This category includes
temperature readings, barometric pressures, wind direc­
tions, forecasts and all other data relating to weather
conditions. Frequently weather reports for use on
radio will be authorized by the United States Weather
Bureau. Special care should be taken against inad­
vertent references to weather conditions during sports
broadcasts, special events and similar projects.

Information concerning road conditions, where such
information is essential to safeguarding human life,
may be broadcast when requested by a Federal, State or
municipal source.

(2) Troop movements. The general character and
movements of units of the United States Army, Navy and
Marine Corps, or their personnel, within or without the
continental limits of the United States; their location,
identity or exact composition, equipment or strength;
their destination, routes and schedules; their assembly
for embarkation or actual embarkation. Any such infor­
mation regarding the troops of friendly nations on
American soil. (The request as regards location and
general character does not apply to training camps in
the United States, not to units assigned to domestic
police duty.)

(3) Ships. The location, movements and identity
of naval and merchant vessels of the United States and
of other nations opposing the Axis powers and of per­
sonnel of such craft; the port and time of arrival of
any such vessels; the assembly, departure or arrival of
transports or convoys, the existence of mine fields or
other harbor defenses; secret orders or other secret
instructions regarding lights, buoys and other guides
to navigators; the number, size, character and loca­
tion of ships in construction, or advance information
as to the date of launchings or commissionings; the
physical setup of existing shipyards, and information
regarding construction of new ones.
(4) Planes. The disposition, movements and strength of army and navy units. The time and location of corps graduations or the equipment strength of any training school.

(5) Experiments. Any experiments with war equipment or materials, particularly those relating to new inventions. Any news of the whereabouts of camouflaged objects.

(6) Fortifications. Any information regarding existing or projected fortifications of this country, any information regarding coastal defense emplacements or bomb shelters; location, nature or numbers of anti-aircraft guns.

(7) Production. Specific information about war contracts, such as the exact type of production, production schedules, dates of delivery, or progress of production; estimated supplies of strategic and critical materials available; or nationwide "round-ups" of locally-published procurement data except when such composite information is officially approved for publication.

Specific information about the location of, or other information about, sites and factories already in existence, which would aid saboteurs in gaining access to them; information other than that readily gained through observation by the general public, disclosing the location of sites and factories yet to be established, or the nature of their production. Any information about new or secret military designs, or new factory designs for war production.

(8) Casualty lists. Total or round figures issued by the Government may be handled. If there is special news-worthiness in the use of an individual name, such as that attending the release concerning Capt. Colin Kelly, it is permissible material. Stations should use own judgment in using names of important personages from their own areas killed in action. The Government notifies nearest of kin BEFORE casualty's name is released to the press.

(9) Release of figures on selective service enrollments.

(10) Unconfirmed reports. Reports based on information from unidentified sources as to ship sinkings or land troops reverses or successes should not be used. In the event enemy claims have been neither confirmed or denied by established authority, the story ordinarily should be handled without inclusion of specific information; there should be no mention of ship's name - only its classification; there should be no mention of army unit designation - just its general description.
(tank, artillery, infantry, etc.). Commentators, through sensible analyses of reports from enemy origins, stressing the obvious fallacies, can do much to correct any false impressions which might be created.

(11) Communications. Information concerning the establishment of new international points of communication should be withheld until officially released by appropriate federal authority.

(12) General. Information disclosing the new location of national archives, art treasures, and so on, which have been moved for safekeeping; damage to military and naval objectives, including docks, railroads, or commercial airports, resulting from enemy action; transportation of munitions or other war materials, including oil tank cars and trains; movements of the President of the United States, or of official military or diplomatic missions of the United States or of any other nation opposing the Axis powers - routes, schedules, or destination, within or without the continental limits of the United States; movements of ranking army or naval officers and staff on official business; movements of other individuals or units under special orders of the army, navy or State Department.

Summation: It should be emphasized that there is no objection to any of these topics if officially released. These restraints are suggested:

(1) Full and prompt obedience to all lawful requests emanating from constituted authorities. If a broadcaster questions the wisdom of any request, he should take it up with the Office of Censorship.
(2) Exercise of common sense in editing news, meeting new problems with sensible solutions. Stations should feel free at all times to call on the Office of Censorship for clarification of individual problems.

II. AD LIB PROGRAMS

Certain program structures do not permit the exercise of complete discretion in pre-determining the form they will take on the air. These are the ad lib or informal types of programs. Generally they fall into four classifications:

(a) Request programs.
(b) Quiz programs.
(c) Forums and interviews (ad lib).
(d) Commentaries and descriptions (ad lib).

As experience dictates the need of changes, they will be made, and all stations notified. Stations
should make certain that their program departments are fully acquainted with these provisions.

(a) Request programs. Certain safeguards should be adopted by the broadcaster in planning request programs. It is requested that no telephoned or telegraphed requests for musical selections be accepted for the duration of the emergency. It is also requested that all mail bearing requests be held for an unspecified length of time before it is honored on the air. It is suggested that the broadcaster stagger replies to requests. Care should be exercised in guarding against honoring a given request at a specified time.

Special note is made here of "lost and found" announcements and broadcast material of a similar nature. Broadcasters are asked to refuse acceptance of such material when it is submitted via telephone or telegraph by a private individual. If the case involves a lost person, lost dog, lost property or similar matter, the broadcaster is advised to demand written notice. It is suggested that care be used by station continuity departments in re-writing all such personal advertising. On the other hand, emergency announcements asked by police or other authorized sources may be accepted. Announcements bearing official authorization seeking blood donors, lost persons, stolen cars, and similar material may be accepted by telephone, but confirmation of the source is suggested.

It is requested that announcements of mass meetings not be honored unless they come from an authorized representative of an accredited Governmental or civilian agency. Such requests should be accepted only when submitted in writing.

(b) Quiz programs. It is requested that all audience-participation type quiz programs originating from remote points, either by wire, transcription or short-wave, be discontinued, except as qualified hereafter.

Any program which permits the public accessibility to an open microphone is dangerous and should be carefully supervised. Because of the nature of quiz programs, in which the public is not only permitted access to the microphone but encouraged to speak into it, the danger of usurpation by the enemy is enhanced. The greatest danger here lies in the informal interview conducted in a small group - 10 to 25 people. In larger groups, where participants are selected from a theatre audience, for example, the danger is not so great.

Generally speaking, any quiz program originating remotely, wherein the group is small, and wherein no arrangement exists for investigating the background of
participants, should be discontinued. Included in this classification are all such productions as man-on-the-street interviews, airport interviews, train terminal interviews, and so forth.

In all studio-audience type quiz shows, where the audience from which interviewees are to be selected numbers less than 50 people, program conductors are asked to exercise special care. They should devise a method whereby no individual seeking participation can be GUARANTEED PARTICIPATION.

(c) Forums and interviews. This refers specifically to forums in which the general public is permitted ex tempore comment; to panel discussions in which more than two persons participate; and to interviews conducted by authorized employees of the broadcasting company. Although the likelihood of exploitation here is slight, there are certain forums during which comments are sought "from the floor," or audience, that demand cautious production.

(d) Commentaries and descriptions. (Ad lib). Special events reporters are advised to avoid specific reference to locations and structures in on-the-spot broadcasts following air raids or other enemy offensive action. Both such reporters and commentators should beware of using any descriptive material which might be employed by the enemy in plotting an area for attack.

THE BROADCASTER, IN SUMMARY, IS ASKED TO REMEMBER THAT THERE IS NEED FOR EXTRAORDINARY CARE, ESPECIALLY IN CASES WHERE HE OR HIS AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE IS NOT IN FULL CONTROL OF THE PROGRAM.

III. FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROGRAMS

It is requested that full transcripts, either written or recorded, be kept of all foreign language programs; it is suggested that broadcasters take all necessary precautions to prevent deviation from script by foreign language announcers and performers. ("Foreign language" is here taken to mean any language other than English.)

MISCELLANEOUS

From time to time, the Office of Censorship may find it necessary to issue further communications, which
will either interpret certain existing requests, amend or delete them, establish new ones or cover special emergency conditions.

These communications will be addressed to managers of radio stations and networks. They should have preferential handling and it is therefore advisable that certain alternate executives be appointed to execute them in the absence of the regularly constituted authority. All such communications will be coded in numerical order, i.e.: R-1; R-2; R-3; etc. Stations are advised to keep them in careful filing order.

The American broadcasting industry's greatest contribution to victory will be the use of good common sense. Too frequently radio in general instead of the individual offender is blamed for even the most minor dereliction. If material is doubtful, it should not be used; submit it to the Office of Censorship for review. Free speech will not suffer during this emergency period beyond the absolute precautions which are necessary to the protection of a culture which makes our radio the freest in the world.

Broadcasters are asked merely to exercise restraint in the Handling of news that might be damaging, for the Army behind the Army represents a great force in the war effort. Radio is advised to steer clear of dramatic programs which attempt to portray the horrors of combat; to avoid sound effects which might be mistaken for air raid alarms. Radio is one of the greatest liaison officers between the fighting front and the people. Its voice will speak the news first. It should speak wisely and calmly. In short, radio is endowed with a rich opportunity to keep America entertained and interested, and that opportunity should be pursued with vigor.

THE OFFICE OF CENSORSHIP,
BYRON PRICE, Director.

Source: Broadcasting, January 19, 1942, p. 11-12.
NETWORK FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS
AND LOCATIONS, NOVEMBER, 1942

MBS - Frank Guhel, Australia; Owen Cunningham, Honolulu; Leslie Nichols, Cairo; Jack Thompson, Oran (pending); Arthur Mann and John Steele, London.

NBC and BLUE - Sidney Albright, Australia; David Anderson, Sweden; Paul Archinard, Switzerland; Everett A. Bauman, Argentina; Bjorn Bjornson, Iceland; A.D. Bramstedt, Alaska; Peter Brennan, Panama; Mary Brock, Iran; William Chaplin, India; Hassoldt Davis, Africa; Alex Dreier, England; George T. Folstar, Australia; Reece Hatchitt, Chile; Harwood Hull, Jr., Puerto Rico; John MacVane, Africa; Robert Magidoff, Russia; Frances Muir, India; Grant Parr, Egypt; Stanley Richardson, England; Stanley Ross, Venezuela; M.K. Slosberg, New Zealand; Helen Townsley, Brazil; and Jim Wahl, Hawaii.

CBS - Edward R. Murrow, Robert Trout and Paul Manning, London; Charles Collingwood, Africa; Bill Downs and Walter Kerr, Moscow; Howard Smith, Berne; Winston Burdett and Larry Leseur (on way home), Cairo; Bernard Valery, Stockholm; Gunner Paulsson Reykjavik, Iceland; Harry Ziner, Jerusalem; James Stewart, Chungking; William J. Dunn, Jr., Sydney; Quentin Pope, Wellington, New Zealand; Webley Edwards, Honolulu; William Gillman, Juneau, Alaska; Robinson McLean, Toronto; Daniel Lundberg, Mexico City; Peter Muir, New Delhi; Jack Pendell, Panama; Alex Garcia, Havana; Herbert Clark, Buenos Aires; Sergia Perez, Guayaquil, Columbia; Jorge Mantillas, Quito, Columbia; Franklin Whait, Caracas, Venezuela; John Adams, Rio de Janeiro; Charles Griffin, Santiago, Chile; Claude Guiant, Lima, Peru; John Veber, Asuncia, Paraguay; Joel Nystrom, Montevideo, Uruguay; and Willie Gutierrez, LaPaz, Bolivia.

Source: Broadcasting, November 23, 1942, p. 22.
REPORT TO THE NATION "brought listeners each week a picture of the people and their Government in the war on fronts at home and abroad."

THEY LIVE FOREVER "offered a series of factual dramatizations in tribute to men in the armed services who gave their lives in the fight for freedom."

THE MAN BEHIND THE GUN "presented dramatic accounts of the tasks being carried out by the nation's fighting forces and their experiences in fulfilling them."

THE SPIRIT OF '43, "a series which began two years ago as 'The Spirit of '41', continued to bring vivid, on-the-scene descriptions of all phases of the war program."

HELLO FROM HAWAII "gave America's fighting men in the Pacific an opportunity to greet the folks at home directly from the Islands."

WOMANPOWER "took note of women's increased wartime activity - on the assembly line, in nursing, in various other types of volunteer work and in the Army, Navy and Marine Corps."

OUR SECRET WEAPON "trained its guns on the lies in Axis propaganda."

COMMANDOS "offered a series of dramatic episodes, highlighting the adventures of young Americans participating in the spectacular new type of military tactics for which the program is named.

THE TWENTY-SECOND LETTER "documented the resistance of liberty-loving people in countries which have been overrun by the Axis, and related the stories of how the underground movements, the guerrilla fighters, the refugee armies and the governments-in-exile are carrying on the fight against tyranny."

VISITING HOUR, "the first of a 20-week series of programs originating in government hospitals throughout the nation opened on April 29, 1944. By presenting a clear and vivid picture of the kind
and quality of treatment rendered in these hospitals, CBS gave needed reassurance to the thousands of anxious families of America's disabled veterans."

SERVICE TIME. "With the increase of casualties, the voluntary enlistment needs of the armed forces became acute. To support the government's recruiting campaigns for nurses, WAVES, WACS, SPARS, air cadets and merchant seamen, Columbia went to their boot camps and bases throughout the country and brought to its listeners a picture of the urgent and indispensable service performed by each of these groups."

ASSIGNMENT HOME. "The program illuminates one of America's most challenging problems: the readjustment of the returning veteran to civilian life - the man who comes home to a child he has never seen, to a wife who has changed while he was changing, to a job whose routine is pale beside the tensions and excitement of the front. What the civilian can do to help the veteran move smoothly from war to peace is sharply dramatized each week by this notable series."

TRANSATLANTIC CALL. "CBS and the British Broadcasting Corporation continued jointly to strengthen the bond between the two great English-speaking nations by weekly broadcasts, in both countries, of a series of exchange programs depicting the traditions, folkways and character of the American and British people. The broadcasts originate in America and England on alternate Sundays, and give both nations an account of each other's way of life and the many customs and beliefs common to both."

PROBLEMS OF THE PEACE. "Drawing on three years' intensive research by Columbia's Committee on Postwar Studies, Dr. Lyman Bryson, CBS Director of Postwar Studies and Educational Broadcasts, gave 41 weekly talks in 1945 on the complex problems of the peace."

WE DELIVER THE GOODS and IT'S MARITIME. "With the recruitment problem of the Merchant Marine equally as urgent following V-J Day as at anytime during the war, CBS continued to devote two special programs weekly to our merchant seaman. The first, 'We Deliver the Goods,' originating at the U.S. Maritime Base at Catalina Island, presented actors, musicians and singers, all from the Maritime Service."
The second, 'It's Maritime,' a dramatic presentation of heroism on the sea, was presented from CBS studios in New York in collaboration with the War Shipping Administration."

**YOUR MARINE CORPS.** "During the closing months of the Pacific War, CBS inaugurated a weekly series featuring dramatic interviews with distinguished Marine heroes and on-the-spot pickups from bases in the far reaches of the Pacific."

**TEN FROM TOKYO.** "With the intensification of the war against Japan during the first six months of 1945, CBS launched a limited series in July, entitled 'Ten from Tokyo' - dramatic documentaries which sought to bring to the attention of the American people the personal histories of the Japanese leaders."

**JOB FOR TOMORROW.** "The year 1945 marked the inauguration of a cycle of programs produced in collaboration with the leading organizations representing American labor. By agreement, the first 13 weeks of 1945 were devoted to 15-minute programs produced by CBS in collaboration with the Congress of Industrial Organizations. Entitled 'Job for Tomorrow,' these documentary programs reported the role played by CIO unions in the country's great industrial mobilization for victory. Activities of nearly every CIO union were documented and described."

**BUILDERS OF VICTORY.** "The second 13 weeks of the labor cycle consisted of a series entitled "Builders of Victory," produced by CBS in collaboration with the American Federation of Labor. 'Builders of Victory' recreated the dramatic exploits of the Seabees, the majority of whom had come into service from unions affiliated with the A.F. of L. This series was endorsed by the Navy Department, which played an active role in providing research and guidance."

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