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THE DEFENSE OF CANADA UNDER LOUIS XIV, 1643-1701

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

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The Ohio State University 1970

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I: The Defense of Canada under the Company of New France, 1643-1663</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Defense</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial Defense</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II: The Royal Intervention, 1663-1667</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III: The Pax Gallica and Its Decay, 1667-1684</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter IV: The Great Iroquois-English War on Canada, 1684-1701</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter V: Conclusion</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRH</td>
<td>Bulletin de Recherches Historique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMNF</td>
<td>Collection des Manuscrits contenant Lettres, Memoires, et autres Documents historiques relatifs a la Nouvelle-France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHNY</td>
<td>Documentary History of the State of New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edits et Ord</td>
<td>Edits, Ordonnances royaux, declarations et arrêts du Conseil d'Etat du Roi concernant le Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JR</td>
<td>Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYCD</td>
<td>Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Public Archives of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAPQ</td>
<td>Rapport d'archiviste de la province de Quebec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure</td>
<td>Illustration Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Champlain's Map of 1632.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Indian Tribes in Canada in 1600.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Settlements and Trade Routes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Indian Tribes in Canada after 1660.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Ruins of Ste. Marie-on-the-Wye.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Iroquoia and the Richelieu Forts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>The Great Lakes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>La Barre's Camp at La Famine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Troyes' Expedition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Early Map of Iroquoia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Denonville's Expedition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>The Defenses of Quebec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>The Siege of Quebec.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Two items should be dealt with at the outset. One concerns the geographical limits of Canada. Writers of the seventeenth century frequently used the terms Canada and New France interchangeably when referring to French possessions on the mainland of North America. By the close of the century this confusion of terminology was near an end and the word, Canada, had acquired a rather definite meaning. It meant the lands of the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes water basin, thus distinguishing Canada from its sister colonies of Acadia, Hudson's Bay, and later, Louisiana. It is in this way that the word will be used throughout the dissertation.

Another item concerns the main thrust of the dissertation. What follows is not intended to be a military history of Canada. Discussions of affairs purely military will be kept to a minimum. It is intended to be a study of defensive strategy and how that strategy was put into operation to protect Canada from its enemies, which were, for most of the seventeenth century, the five Indian tribes of the Iroquois Confederacy. The study is also intended to show why some defensive proposals were
accepted and others rejected. The findings of this study indicate that Canada during the seventeenth century suffered considerably from poor defensive planning. There was always the tendency on the part of the French government to accept expedients in the place of carefully thought-out programs, to content itself with half-measures rather than thoroughgoing solutions. There were few examples during this period of broadly-conceived plans for the defense of Canada, few examples of strategy on the grand scale, few over-arching designs contrived to throw the enemies of the colony into confusion. The conclusion is that France, where Canada was concerned, lacked the determination to place the colony beyond the threat of injury.

There were a number of reasons for this. It is important, first of all, to remember that the empire of France in America was a commercial, not a military empire. Canada for most of the seventeenth century was not looked upon as a bastion of French power across the Atlantic, but as a counter upon which to trade for beaver pelts. Canadian beaver pelts were to France what Mexican silver was to Spain. The fur-trade, given the mercantilistic assumptions of the age, was the most important feature of the Canadian enterprise in the minds of French governing officials, and everything else, with the possible exception of the Catholic missionary effort, was in one way or
another an appendage of that most important feature. As a result, the feeling tended to prevail at court that so long as the machinery of Canadian trade operated smoothly and continued to supply France with beaver pelts, then the relationship between parent and offspring was a good one and little else in the way of assistance to Canada was necessary.

A second reason for Canada's predicament was the preoccupation of French officialdom with European problems. The seventeenth century was a turbulent period in the history of Europe, and particularly of France. Louis XIV came to the throne in 1643 as a child of five when his kingdom was heavily engaged in the Thirty Years' War against the Hapsburgs of Germany and Spain. For the first twenty years of the reign, France was far too involved with the European war and with war-related domestic strife to give much thought to Canada. Later, wars and preparations for war with the United Provinces, England, and other European states kept France embroiled on the continent and diverted the attention and resources of the government away from distant possessions like Canada. The colony was consequently bereft of material and cerebral aid from France during its formative years, and resembled nothing so much as an orphan abandoned to its own devices. As orphans somehow do, Canada managed to
survive in the wilderness of North America by relying on its own very limited resources, but the colony was hardly better for having done so.

A third reason for the neglected condition of Canada was its geographic remoteness from France. The colony was thousands of miles from France across the seasonally storm-raked North Atlantic and up the treacherous St. Lawrence River that for six months of the year was frozen and impenetrable to traffic. From the end of October until April no ship could enter or leave Quebec, and it was by ship that Canada received most of its supplies and all of its directives from the home government.

This remoteness produced special problems of commerce and communication with the mother country. Canada was never as self-sufficient in the necessities of life as the European colonies to the south. It produced little beyond wheat and pork for its own consumption. If the annual supply ships, through war or mishap at sea, failed to arrive in the colony on time, Canadians could quickly be driven to the edge of disaster in matters of food, clothing, munitions, and tools, almost all of which had to be imported.

What was true of supplies was also true of communications between Paris and Quebec. A round-trip ocean voyage between France and the colony might extend close to ten months, making it quite difficult, when one adds a
few delays common in the seventeenth century, for officials in either capitol to communicate with one another in the span of less than a year. Dispatches written by Canadian officials to the home government in the fall could, if the officials in France were prompt, receive reply the following spring; but it was not uncommon for Canadian officials to wait more than a year for directives from the court. Unfortunately for the colony, events in North America never seemed to conform to this schedule. The special problems of communication and supply meant that Canada was continually being thrown back upon its often limited wits and resources to cope with problems of defense that would not wait for a royal solution, assuming one were available for the asking. How the colony coped with its problems of defense is the subject of this dissertation.

Before embarking upon the subject, it will be instructive to investigate briefly the early history of the fur trade and show how that trade awakened the hostility of the Iroquois toward the French. The trade in beaver pelts developed rapidly in the sixteenth century from its small beginnings as a subsidiary of the
Fig. 1.—Part of the 1632 map of New France by Champlain (Trudel. *Atlas Historique*, p. 32).
French fishing industry. The Green Banks off Cape Breton Island early attracted French fishermen to the teeming schools of fish in the area, and these seamen quickly learned that for a few trinkets they could obtain valuable furs from the aborigines around the Gulf of St. Lawrence. The furs went to supply a new fashion-oriented demand which dictated that every well-dressed European gentleman should wear a beaver-felt hat. As the fashion spread and French seamen learned that the St. Lawrence region produced pelts far superior to those anywhere else along the coast, trading activity around the Gulf became more intense.

By the end of the sixteenth century the fur industry had become nearly independent of the fishing industry, and the demand for pelts was yearly increasing. The way was therefore opened for a concerted extension of the fur trade up the St. Lawrence River to tap the rich sources of beaver in the interior of the continent. The commercial partners of the French in this enterprise were the Indians living to the north of the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes system

of waters who yearly came in canoes with their furs from as far away as Lake Superior to trade with the French at Tadoussac and, later, Quebec.

The Indians who took the most active part in the fur trade in the opening years of the seventeenth century were members of three great confederations of tribes known to the French as the Montaignais, Algonquins, and Hurons. The Montaignais and Algonquins belonged to the Algonquian family of aborigines, as did the Ottawas who later in the century were to become the primary supplier of furs to the French. Members of this family of Indians all had certain similarities of language and life style in common.²

Of fundamental importance was this family's reliance on hunting as a means of livelihood. Being hunters, the Montaignais and Algonquins, as well as the Ottawas, did not develop the high level of social organization that more sedentary habits require. Their highest effective form of government was the band, although their mobile habits of living made even this form less important than the family group, which called no specific locale home, but wandered instead from place to place in search of game, carrying

Fig. 2.--Indian tribes in and around Canada in 1600.
with them as they went everything they owned.

The primitive social organization of these tribes made them unreliable partners in the French commercial enterprise. Initially more promising in this regard were the Hurons. The Hurons, in actuality a confederation of six tribes, were members of the Iroquoian family of aborigines and lived in half a dozen relatively permanent villages clustered near Georgian Bay. Not only did the Hurons live in the center of one of the most prolific beaver areas in North America, their higher form of social organization made them more dependable commercial partners. Consequently, the French early fastened their hopes for commercial gain on the Hurons.

The Iroquoian family of Indians were at a stage of social development somewhere between the nomadic life of the hunter and the settled life of the farmer. They made their living from both agriculture and the chase. Some tribes of this family, like the "Tobacco Hurons," known to the French as the Petuns, even diversified their crops to

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4 The Iroquoian family of aborigines should be distinguished from the Iroquois Confederacy. The terms Iroquoian and Iroquois are not synonymous.
the extent of raising luxury items, although the common crop was maize. In historic times, the Hurons had almost completely forsaken the life of the hunter as well as that of the farmer to become traders. From their villages near Georgian Bay they annually set out on trading expeditions far to the north, east, and west. In the remotest parts of the interior they traded foodstuffs and other merchandise for fur which they delivered down the Sagunay or Ottawa River to the French on the St. Lawrence. The Hurons, by virtue of their higher level of social development, in the second decade of the seventeenth century took from the Montaignais and Algonquins the role of principal fur supplier to the French. The combined population of the three commercial partners was in the neighborhood of 100,000 persons.5

As French fur traders and explorers made their way among the tribes to the north of the St. Lawrence-Lake Erie axis, they found to exist a state of perpetual hostility between these aborigines and those to the south. Those to the south were members of the Iroquois Confederacy. The Iroquois Confederacy inhabited the territory south of Lake Ontario and the upper reaches of the

St. Lawrence in what is today New York state. Composed of five tribes—six after the inclusion of the Tuscarora in 1712—the Confederacy counted the Mohawks, Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas, and Senecas as members. All of the members of these tribes lived in the famous longhouses, each dwelling the home of an entire matrilineal joint-family.

The Mohawks, their name deriving from an Algonquian word meaning "man-eaters," indicating the way in which they disposed of their war prisoners, were the easternmost tribe of the Confederacy, the "door" of the longhouse as they thought of themselves. Their villages, like all Indian villages, were moved at least once every dozen years or so for reasons of sanitation and to secure a fresh supply of firewood, but generally occupied from three to seven sites on both sides of, but never far from, the Mohawk River. The Oneida, the next tribe to the west, had only one village which was to be found somewhere

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between the headwaters of the Oneida Creek and Oneida Lake. The Onondaga, the "heart" of the longhouse, seldom possessed more than one town, which nevertheless acted as the capitol of the Confederacy and was to be found in the vicinity of Cazenovia Lake. The next tribe was the Cayuga, living for the most part in about three villages on sites between Lake Owasco and Cayuga. The Seneca, the most western tribe of the Confederacy, inhabited a number of towns, mostly clustered above the western Finger Lakes.

As to the population of the Confederacy, no indisputable figures are available, although the estimate of the Jesuit, Jerome Lalemant, writing in 1660, is probable as accurate as can be found. He estimated that the Mohawk tribe could field 500 warriors, the Oneida fewer than 100, the Onondaga and Cayuga 300 each, and the Seneca no more than 1,000. That would make the total strength of the Confederacy about 2,200 men. These figures not only reflect the relative size of the five tribes, but calculations based on average family size allow us to suppose that the total population of the Confederacy must have been about 15,000 at the middle of the seventeenth century.


9The Mohawks earlier had a larger population of warriors, perhaps 700, but wars with the Mohegans, Andastes, Algonquins, and the French told on their strength.
The Iroquois were members of the Iroquoian family of aborigines, and so had attained a relatively high level of social organization. The Iroquois Confederacy apparently came into being in the latter part of the sixteenth century for the purpose of peace—that is, peace among the member tribes. The government of the Confederacy was by council in which each tribe was represented. The council met regularly at Onondaga, although an extraordinary meeting might be called by any of the tribes at any time to consider some question of moment. At the council each tribe through its permanent sachems was allowed to speak and cast a single vote for or against the course under consideration. The functions of the council were primarily twofold. In the realm of internal affairs it reconciled differences between member tribes and invested the sachems with office. In the realm of foreign affairs: "It declared war and made peace, sent and received embassies, entered into treaties of alliance, regulated the affairs of subjugated nations, received new members into the League, extended its protection over feeble tribes, in a word, took all needful measures to promote their

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prosperity, and enlarge their domain." The decisions of the council were expected to be enforced by the member tribes on an individual basis.

The council of the Confederacy was not the only, or even the principal, governing agency of the League, however. Initiatives taken by the individual tribes were not outlawed by the Confederacy, indeed each tribe remained perfectly free to regulate its own affairs, make war and peace, negotiate treaties, and handle its own domestic relations, without interference from the council. In fact, until 1690 when the Confederacy began to act as an entity in commerce, peace, and war, it is easier to demonstrate the lack of coordination among the various tribes than to show their cooperation. Only rarely did two of the tribes combine for an attack, and then only when their self-interests for a time coincided. Few instances exist prior to 1690 when the tribes were not at odds diplomatically. The real nature of the Confederacy, therefore, was a kind of structured truce among the member tribes, leaving each tribe free to pursue its own goals and formulate its own policy without fear of being set upon by its nearest neighbors.

Insofar as the Iroquois had a single purpose at the beginning of the seventeenth century when Frenchmen first

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encountered them, it was to destroy the commercial partners of the French. The exact origins of the quarrel between the Iroquois and the Canadian Indians are lost behind the veil of pre-history, but the somewhat confused oral traditions of each party indicate that at least part of the hostility stemmed from French trading activity around the Gulf of St. Lawrence a half century or more before white men settled Canada. ¹²

The Hurons, Montagnais, and Algonquins had, since the middle of the last century, been receiving steel knives and arrowheads from the French in trade. With these weapons, which were far more lethal than the stone implements used by the Iroquois, the Canadian Indians terrorized the southern tribes. The Iroquois tribes, seeking to put an end to this trade which provided their neighbors with weapons superior to their own, or perhaps trying to gain a share in it, formed the alliance among themselves and launched an offensive against the Canadian Indians. The Canadian Indians counter-attacked, and with their steel weapons utterly routed the Iroquois, causing them to abandon their former lands and retreat to the southwest where they were found at the beginning of the historical

The Iroquois, therefore, had a predisposition toward the French long before they had met any of the white men. But whatever the exact causes of the strife, when Champlain began the first permanent French settlement of Canada in 1609 at Quebec, he found a situation in which the hostility of the Iroquois Confederacy toward the Canadian Indians was already traditional.

Champlain was little interested in the ongoing strife between the aborigines in the area except insofar as it adversely affected the fur trade, his business in Canada. Like a merchant who desires tranquility in the marketplace rather than fighting among his customers, Champlain repeatedly sought to pacify both parties in the quarrel so the traffic in furs could proceed more profitably. Time and again he pleaded with the Canadian Indians to set aside their old hostilities and get on with the business of searching out beaver skins. He was active also among the Iroquois to the same end, going so far as to establish the post of St. Croix where the Confederacy warriors could trade rather than fight.

Champlain’s efforts proved fruitless, however, and gradually the French were forced to take sides in the war.

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The side taken was that of the Canadian Indians. There were a number of reasons for this. The Iroquois Confederacy at first appeared militarily weaker than the Canadian tribes. At Tadoussac in 1603 Champlain found the Etchemins, Montagnais, and Algonquins jubilant about a recent victory over the Iroquois, and later that same summer, another war-party returned victoriously from the enemy country. From then until the 1630's the French found the Canadian Indians to be more than a match for the Iroquois. Wisdom and discretion, therefore, in view of the scarcity of white faces along the St. Lawrence at the time, decreed that the French ally themselves with the stronger.

Another reason for choosing the side of the Canadian Indians was inspired by economic considerations. Champlain stated the matter bluntly in 1616. He had just finished describing the material advantages of exploiting the country to the north of the St. Lawrence. Then he wrote: "As for the country south of this great river, it is very thinly populated, much more so than the north side...but, on the other hand, there is not so much profit and gain in the south from the trade in furs." The Algonquians

16 Quoted in Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada, p. 3.
and Hurons, stronger militarily to begin with, had the additional advantage of occupying territories where beaver were found in great number. These territories, moreover, were adjacent to still more remote regions where thick, prime northern pelts could be taken in abundance. The Canadian Indians, then, could serve as beaver hunters in their own territories as well as middlemen for furs taken by more distant tribes.

The tribes living on the north side could also claim a better network of lakes and rivers by which furs could be transported to the markets at Quebec or Tadoussac. Five main routes led from the fabulously wealthy beaver country just north and west of the Great Lakes. One was a far-northern route which passed via a chain of waters from Georgian Bay, through Lakes Timiskaming and St. Jean, and then down the Saguenai to Tadoussac. This route, extremely long and arduous, was little used except in the earliest days of the trade.

Three other routes passed through Lake Ontario on their way down the St. Lawrence to Quebec. The most direct, but not necessarily the best, lay directly through Lakes Huron, Erie, and Ontario to the great river. This route was broken by some of the worst rapids and falls on the continent, however, and was, therefore, unsuitable unless the Indians were carrying a great many heavy burdens. In this case it was a good route because each of
the portages was a short one. Another route, to become quite important later in the century, led from Georgian Bay, through a system of lakes and rivers on the Ontario peninsula, to an outlet named Cataraqui at the eastern end of Lake Ontario, and then down the St. Lawrence. Yet another, the fastest route, led from Georgian Bay, down a twenty-mile portage to the site of modern Toronto on Lake Ontario, and then on to Quebec. These routes using Lake Ontario had the distinct disadvantage of passing dangerously close to Iroquoia. They consequently were also little used by the Canadian Indians.

The best all-around route from the upper Great Lakes to Quebec was down the Ottawa River. The Indians followed a path that led from Georgian Bay through Lake Nipissing to the Ottawa. From there they could go down the river and arrive on the St. Lawrence just above Montréal Island. This route was long and tortuous, and filled with numerous nuisance portages; but it was early recognized to be the most practical passage between the country where the furs were secured and where they were marketed.

The final reason why the French came to back the Canadian Indians in their war with the Iroquois stemmed from religious motives. The prospect of proselytizing the natives, a constant goal of Champlain and his immediate successors, showed a better chance of success among the Hurons, who lived in villages where relatively permanent
Fig. 3.--The major settlements of Canada and the trade routes.
missions could be established, or among the Algonquians, who might be induced to settle near the white "habitations, than among the Iroquois, who remained as hostile to Christianity as they did to the Canadian Indians.

The commercial alliance between the French and the Canadian Indians became a military alliance in 1609 when Champlain tried to frighten the Iroquois into discontinuing their sporadic raids north of the great river. Champlain and two associates, accompanied by a mixed force of sixty Canadian Indians, invaded Iroquoia. The allied party left Quebec and journeyed up the River of the Iroquois (the Richelieu) to a lake which Champlain named for himself. There, on the evening of July 29, the allied flotilla of twenty-four canoes came upon the beached canoes of about one hundred Iroquois and immediately put ashore. The next morning at daybreak the two groups closed for battle. When the two were within arrowshot of each other, the allied force opened ranks, and there in their midst stood the white men holding strange weapons, the first muskets to appear in Iroquoia. Champlain took twenty deliberate steps toward the enemy, paused to raise his weapon, and fired. Three Iroquois fell to the ground from the four balls he had loaded into his musket. When

an associate brought down a fourth upon the discharge of his weapon, the remaining Iroquois fled. This first French battle with the confederated tribes was over, the Iroquois having only arrows with which to answer the muskets.

Again the next year and in 1615 Champlain committed French arms with similar results on the side of the Canadian Indians against the Iroquois, and by these encounters the alliance was forged.  

The struggle of the French and their allies against the Iroquois remained until the 1630's the one-sided affair that the early encounters had been. Champlain, who remained disturbed over the damage done to the trade by war parties raiding back and forth across the St. Lawrence, could as late as 1633 write to Richelieu that if the Cardinal would send only 120 lightly-armed men to Canada, they, together with two or three thousand allied warriors which he, Champlain, would recruit, could "in the span of a year make themselves absolute master of all the Iroquois by carrying there the required order; and that will augment the worship of religion and the trade in furs in an unbelievable way." But while Champlain was writing

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19 Champlain to Richelieu, Quebec, 15 August 1633, printed in Champlain, Works, Vol. VI, pp. 375-77. See also Champlain to Richelieu, Quebec, 8 August 1634, printed in Champlain, Works, Vol. VI, p. 379.
these lines, the balance of power among the contestants was already beginning to shift, and within a generation ten times the number of soldiers he requested would be insufficient to accomplish his goal.

The reason for this was that in the 1630's the Iroquois, especially the Mohawks, began arming themselves with weapons of European origin. About 1630 the Mohawks, having defeated and driven away the Mohicans from the upper Hudson Valley, came in contact with Dutch traders, who since 1614 had operated a trading post at Fort Orange (Albany). Each had what the other wanted, and soon the Dutch began to trade firearms for Mohawk beaver pelts at the rate of one musket for ten pelts. The trade continued almost without interruption, despite a number of attempts to stop it by some New Netherland officials, until the English took it over in 1666. The number of muskets in the hands of the Iroquois was not great when Louis XIV came to the throne--about 300 was the estimate of Father Jogues in 1642--and these were subject to malfunctions irreparable by the Indians; but they were of great weight in the balance of power, for Champlain and his successor as governor, Montmagny, consistently

20 The Dutch unquestionably led the other European colonies in the Indian arms trade. Trelease, Indian Affairs in Colonial New York, p. 95.

refused to barter firearms to the Canadians' allies.  

During the same decade another development was taking place which was going to bear on the Canadian situation. The beaver in Iroquoia became virtually extinct. The number of beaver in the area must never have been large owing to the relative scarcity of suitable water areas for breeding. This, coupled with the non-migratory character of the animal, meant that the beaver of Iroquoia were quickly killed off as the demand for pelts increased in the 1630's. By 1640 the supply had reached the point of exhaustion. The Iroquois were not placed in a bad predicament. Without beaver pelts they would be deprived of Dutch firearms, and without firearms they could not successfully defend themselves against the French and Canadian Indians. They would also be unable to obtain all of the other merchandise upon which they had grown dependent--steel knives and hatchets, woolen blankets, and copper kettles.

The Iroquois knew where there was a seemingly inexhaustible supply of beaver pelts. It was in the far north and west, around the Great Lakes and beyond--and only their

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22 See below, page 23

enemies, the French and the Canadian Indians, stood between them and this fortune. Around 1640, impelled by motives of greed, vengeance, and self-preservation, the Iroquois launched one of the greatest military offensives in recorded Indian history. Their purpose was to destroy the French and their allies and take control of the fur traffic. With themselves in control, they would be in a position to gain all of the firearms and other items they wished from the Dutch and become the preeminent Indian power on the continent.  

The great offensive began around 1640. The Mohawks and Oneidas struck at the French and their allies along the lower St. Lawrence while the western tribes of the Confederacy struck at the Hurons. The feeble French settlements were easy targets. From April through October, when snow did not force a temporary halt in the war, Quebec, Tadoussac, and the newly-established

24 The problem of Indian motivation is always difficult for the historian to determine. One reason is that the Indians left no written records. Another reason is the cultural difference between the Indians and the historians who write about them. From what we know of the Indian temperament, however, parts of which we share in common, it is perhaps safe to say that greed, vengeance, and self-preservation had a place in what happened after 1640. For a thesis which stresses the economic motivation to the practical exclusion of all others, see Hunt, The Wars of the Iroquois. For a more balanced account which admits the difficulty of the problem, see Trelease, Indian Affairs in Colonial New York. Indian motivation is also discussed in Snyderman, "Behind the Tree of Peace."
settlements of Three Rivers and Montreal were subjected to continual assault. Farmers were cut down in the fields, children were captured at play, women dared not step out of the house alone. This style of warfare, so different from the European, was all the more terrifying to the French because it was in reality a manhunt directed against the unwary. Unwilling to kill their enemies immediately unless driven to it, the Iroquois preferred to capture their victims alive and subject them to long periods of torture before killing and eating them. Most often the Iroquois attacked singly or in small bands, waiting sometimes for days out of sight to pounce without warning on an unwise individual who had separated himself from his companions. The best description of this type of warfare was written by an anonymous Jesuit:

...in their method of warfare the Iroquois are so stealthy in their approach, so swift in their retreat, that one commonly learns of their departure before gaining any knowledge of their arrival. They come like foxes through the woods, which afford concealment and serve them as an impregnable fortress. They attack like lions, and, as their surprises are made when they are least expected, they meet with no resistance. They take flight like birds, disappearing before they have really appeared.  

25 The fragmentation of the Iroquois attack force may have been occasioned by the superior firepower of the French. The Iroquois, before the arrival of the French, seem to have fought in mass formations a la europeene.

Frenchmen lived in terror of this kind of attack for the next twenty-six years.

Most of the Iroquois' fury, however, was directed against the Hurons. Led by the Seneca, the warriors of the Confederacy seasonally invested the Ottawa River, attacking the Hurons who used it as a trade route, killing the tradesmen and capturing their furs. In 1644 Father Vimont reported that only one Huron trading fleet out of four escaped destruction. Father Vimont also reported the effects of the intensified Iroquois raids against Huron villages:

> Where, eight years ago, one would see a hundred wigwams, now one sees scarcely five or six. A chief who once had eight hundred warriors has now but thirty or forty; and in place of fleets of three or four hundred canoes, we see less than a tenth that number.28

But the worst was yet to come. Beginning in 1649 with a swiftness and resolution uncommon in any aborigines, the Iroquois launched massive attacks to the north and west. The conquest began at dawn on March 16, 1649 when a party of 1000 Mohawk and Seneca warriors attacked the Jesuit mission station of St. Ignace, killing all but three in the village. The next day the same war party

27 JR, Vol. XXVI, p. 3.

accomplished the destruction of nearby St. Louis. These two blows, although the main stronghold of Ste. Marie had not been touched, precipitated a panic among the Hurons which led in the succeeding months to wholesale starvation among the bewildered tribesmen and the total evacuation of Huronia by the pitiful survivors of the catastrophe. An historian of early Montreal reported the plight of some of the survivors escaping eastward: "During the whole of this year [1649-50] nothing was seen but the coming of Hurons fleeing from the savagery of the Iroquois and seeking refuge with us. On each occasion they reported new disasters, new forts lost, villages pillaged once more, the occurrence of fresh butcheries." In 1650 the Iroquois turned on the Neutrals, with whom they had formerly lived in peace, and defeated and dispersed them, and four years later did the same to the Erie. With these massive attacks to the north and west, the Hurons were destroyed and tribes which might have raised a hatchet in their defense were destroyed along with them.

The Iroquois were then in a position to insert themselves into the place abandoned by the Hurons and divert the northern fur trade to Fort Orange with themselves acting as middlemen and gaining a middleman's profit—except for one thing. The remnant of the Hurons, together with several other tribes of the Michigan-Ontario area who had also fled the fury of the Iroquois, relocated farther toward the northwest, around the area of the upper-Michigan peninsula. These dispersed peoples met tribes who were native to the area, the Ottawas being the most important. The newcomers introduced French trade goods to the latter and awakened in them a desire to become part of the French trading empire.

Within a short time the Ottawas, more enterprising than the dispirited Hurons and willing to run the gauntlet of the Ottawa River to carry furs to the French, displaced the Huron remnant as the principal partners of the colony in the western trade. The effect of the Iroquois offensive against the Hurons was, therefore, quite different than the Confederacy had intended. The dispersal of the Hurons served to expand the French fur trade rather than contract it and to place it as far beyond their reach as it had been prior to the 1640's.32

Fig. 4.—Indian tribes in and around Canada after 1660.
Unwilling to accept this initial failure as a final defeat of their plans, the Iroquois pursued a course of action in the decades following the mid-1650's which was calculated to bring about the same goal for which they earlier fought—namely, control of the fur traffic. Their tactics were largely the same as before. Toward the French, they showed unremitting hostility in the form of bloody attacks which grew in intensity and effectiveness with every passing year. These attacks were calculated to force the people of Canada, through discouragement or defeat, to abandon the colony and its commercial empire. Toward the allies of the colony, the Iroquois practiced both war diplomacy in an effort to detach the tribes, especially the Ottawas, from the French alliance. Their diplomats were active among the northern tribes to induce those Indians to desert the French and begin trading with the Dutch, using themselves, the Iroquois, as intermediaries. Their warriors were active along the Ottawa River trade route, to close it, and among the allied Indian villages, to gain through terror what might be denied them through diplomacy.

The tactics of the powerful and aggressive Iroquois Confederacy presented a grave challenge to Canada, especially since the mother country was too preoccupied in Europe to provide the colony with much help. It was necessary for the Canadian people and their government to
shoulder most of the responsibility for defending the colony and keeping its commercial empire intact. To meet the challenge, the government over the years developed a number of policies that were followed with varying degrees of success and imagination until the Iroquois threat was finally overcome in 1701. The policies can be grouped into four categories.

The first category involved the defense of the central colony, the area of white settlement between Montreal and Quebec. Here the aim was first to stop enemy infiltration, which used the Lake Champlain-Richelieu River valley as a means of easy access to the colony. When this early proved to be impossible owing to the stealth of the Iroquois and the weakness of the French, the policy next became the consolidation of the French population into a few fortified villages where they could more easily be protected against roving bands of Iroquois warriors. The organization of a colonial militia, the most numerous and effective fighting force in Canada, was also accomplished to deal with the Iroquois problem.

The second category involved the defense of the western colony, the area around the upper Great Lakes which France nominally controlled and where lived the Indian allies. Before 1649-50 the defense of this area entailed instructing the Indians in the technique of building fortified villages to protect against Iroquois
attacks. After the destruction of the Hurons and the evacuation of the Ontario peninsula, French activity was confined primarily to the region of Michilimackinac and Sault Ste. Marie in the upcountry, where French missionaries and army officers organized the defensive and offensive operations of the allies against the Iroquois and did all in their power to counter the diplomacy of the Iroquois among the northern tribes. Steps were also taken to insure that the Iroquois blockade of the Ottawa River would not succeed. When the upper Mississippi River valley was opened to French influence in the 1680's, activity of a similar kind centered at Fort St. Louis (near Peoria, Illinois) in the country of the Illinois Indian allies, and along the trade routes leading from there to the central colony.

The third category comprises policies relating to Lake Ontario. By 1670 the Iroquois were achieving some success in their plan to detach the northern tribes from the French alliance. A few of these tribes had started using the trade routes leading through Lake Ontario in order to arrive at Iroquoia with their furs; and conversely, the Iroquois were using the same trade routes to journey northward and secure Canadian pelts. To combat this trade, the French tried to close Lake Ontario to Indian commercial traffic by building Forts Frontenac and
Niagara and maintaining a small fleet of boats on the lake.

The fourth category involved projects directed against the Iroquois and their European partners, the Dutch and English. Canadian officials quite early recognized that the only permanent solution to the Iroquois problem would be either the complete subjugation of the five tribes, or French control of the Hudson River by which the Iroquois obtained arms and munitions. Canada tried the first alternative several times and failed on each occasion, largely because Louis XIV refused to provide an army big enough for the task. As for the second alternative, Canadian leaders repeatedly entreated the King to gain control of the Hudson River by whatever means necessary; but their appeals went unheeded. All of Canada's difficulties in regard to defense stemmed from Louis XIV's failure to act on these two points, for all of the other measures were like beating at the branches of the problem rather than striking at the root.

It is now time to turn to a detailed investigation of the challenge presented by the enemies of Canada and how the colony tried to meet that challenge.
CHAPTER I

THE DEFENSE OF CANADA UNDER THE COMPANY OF NEW FRANCE
1643-1663

Canada led a precarious existence during the first twenty years of Louis XIV's reign. The colony's meager population of merchants, pioneers and priests faced all of the problems attendant upon implanting a new culture in a foreign land. The most pressing of the colony's problems was the inveterate hostility of the Iroquois. The Iroquois subjected the colony and its Indian allies to a protracted war of attrition, a war the Iroquois were close to winning by 1663.

Canada was hard pressed in this war owing to the low level of financial and military support from France. Abandoned to its own quite limited devices, Canada desperately assumed a strictly defensive posture in the war. In each of the principal villages in the central colony and in the western region, local leaders used locally improvised measures of defense to preserve their particular part of the colony. Coordinated, colony-wide measures of defense were almost completely lacking because of the difficulty of inter-colonial communications and the weakness of the defenders.

There were two imminently practical reasons why Canada was bereft of substantial support from abroad during
these critical years. One reason pertained to the political conditions in France and in Europe at the time. Louis XIV was five years old when he succeeded his father to the throne of France. The regency government, headed by Anne of Austria, the Queen Mother, was far more concerned with events in Europe than in the wilderness of North America.\(^1\)

France had just become directly involved in the Thirty Years' War and was heavily committed on the side of the northern German states against the Austrian and Spanish Hapsburgs. France itself was rife with intrigue related to the war and to the crown's attempt to suppress the liberty of the nobles. Within a decade civil war would be added to the list of the political ills of the kingdom. Until the strife at home was settled, Louis XIV and his government could take no serious thought of Canada.

A second reason for Canada's orphaned condition during these years stemmed from the fact that the maintenance of the colony had been given into the hands of a commercial company. In 1627 Richelieu, the powerful councilor of Louis XIII, had organized the Company of New France with the thought that Canada and the other American possessions of France could be developed without cost to

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the crown. Active in his capacity of Grand Master in charge of Navigation and Commerce, Richelieu had encouraged some one hundred wealthy merchants and magistrates to subscribe a total of 300,000 livres toward the strengthening of the colony. In return, he had ceded to them in perpetuity the entire North American possession of the king of France, from the coasts of Florida to the Arctic.² Richelieu reserved for the king only the right to the loyalty and homage of his Canadian subjects and the right to make or confirm the appointment of colonial officers. The company on the other hand had the right to distribute the lands of its new possession and administer justice after the fashion of Parisian courts. To the associates was also granted the important fur-trade monopoly in perpetuity, along with the monopoly of all other trade, excepting only cod and whale fishing, for a period of fifteen years. For their part, the associates agreed to undertake the settlement of four thousand French Catholics in Canada within fifteen years and the settlement of three ecclesiastics in each habitation. The company was to maintain and supply the

²"Compagnie de Canada, establie sous le titre de Nouvelle France, par les articles des vingt neuf avril et sept may, mil six cens vingt sept." Collection de Manuscrits contenant Lettres, Memoires, et autres Documents historiques relatifs à la Nouvelle-France (hereafter cited as CMNF), Vol. 1, Mis en ordre et edités sous auspices de la legislature de Quebec (4 vols., Quebec: Coté et Cie, 1883), pp. 62-71.
secular colonists with foodstuffs for their first three years in the new land and support the ecclesiastics for the entire fifteen. What was just as important, the company agreed to shoulder the whole administrative and military expense of the colony for as long as the company enjoyed its privileges in Canada. It was a business arrangement between the crown and a commercial company typical of seventeenth-century Europe, and prospects appeared good for its success.

Circumstances soon conspired to wreck Richelieu's plan for Canadian development, however, and leave Canada bereft of support from either the company or the crown. The reason for the defeat of Richelieu's plan was a series of financial disasters suffered by the company, making it impossible for the associates to meet their obligations. An Anglo-French War was in progress at the time of the company's formation, and colonial supply across the Atlantic was a risky undertaking. On the company's first colonizing attempt in 1628 four ships and four hundred colonists were captured by the English as they entered the Gulf of Saint Lawrence. This represented a loss to the associates of 164,000 livres, more than half of their operating capital.³

Then, the next year the associates suffered an even greater loss when Canada itself fell to the same group of English freebooters, led by Jarvis Kirke, who had despoiled them of their fleet. The loss of Canada for three years, until the Treaty of Saint Germain-en-Laye restored the colony to France in 1632, meant the loss of additional possessions and the loss of valuable revenue that could have been derived from the fur monopoly. These were setbacks from which the company never fully recovered.

When the company re-entered Canadian affairs in 1632 it was already in a weakened condition, and the years of its active life were numbered. The revenue brought in by the fur-trade monopoly initially provided some relief from the straitened financial condition of the company, but in the end debts accumulated faster than profits. There was the indemnity of 180,000 livres demanded by de Caen for abandoning his earlier claim to Canada and the peculation of two company directors, Jean Verdier and Martin Tabouret. This, on top of the ongoing expense for maintaining and administering the colony, caused the associates in 1645 to report that by then they had expended 1,200,000 livres on Canada without adequate compensation. ⁴ Because of its financial burdens the Company of New France in that year

gladly turned over to a newly formed commercial company, the Community of Habitants, its fur-trade monopoly. The stipulation was that the new company would assume the entire cost of colonial administration and defense; would transport annually to Canada twenty persons of either sex, together with provisions necessary to their maintenance; and would pay the associates one thousand prime beaver pelts annually as seigniorage. The right of the associates to the ownership of Canada, as well as their right to appoint Canadian officials, was left undisturbed.

The Community of Habitants, conceived in the hope that it could succeed where the other had failed and composed of Canadian residents, became responsible for the security and well-being of Canada, but financial difficulties soon began to plague them as well. It was the misfortune of the community to assume control of the colony on the eve of the great Iroquois offensive against Canada and its fur-trade empire. The supposedly lucrative fur-trade monopoly came to mean less and less as the Iroquois attacks along the Ottawa-Saint Lawrence trade route became more frequent and intense. By 1653 the Iroquois had so choked off the supply of pelts moving to market in Quebec that the fur-storage warehouses in the capitol were empty;

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all of those people who depended on the trade for a livelihood were in poverty; and there was no means "to defray a part of even the most necessary expenses of the country." The necessity of operating the colony on a shoestring and without the help of the king had persisted since the capture of the fleet in 1628 and was to persist until the intervention of Louis XIV in 1663.

What all of this meant in terms of colonial defense during the period of company control was that Canada was starved for financial support and what that support could buy: troops to defend the colony, or an augmented population capable of securing its own defense. Both of the companies responsible for the safety of Canada, the Company of New France and the Community of Habitants, had been wrecked at the outset of their existence and were forced to reduce to a minimum the expenses entailed in administering and colonizing the colony, maintaining only the pretense of fulfilling their obligations under the charters. The whole population of New France counted scarcely three hundred persons of both sexes in 1643, and of these a good portion were men engaged in the fur trade who did not call Canada home. After twenty years the stable population,

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6 JR, Vol. XL, p. 211.

true habitants of the colony, still amounted to fewer than 3,000,\(^8\) and these, it must be borne in mind, were not consolidated in one location; they were grouped in three principal settlements, the communications between which were tenuous in any season of the year. The troops sent to protect them were likewise few in number, although no firm statistics exist in this regard.\(^9\) Those who came were soldiers of fortune, recruited by agents of the companies in the various port cities of France and eager to return to France when their terms of enlistment expired.

Without adequate manpower or financial resources, and with a population spread along one hundred and fifty miles of wilderness between Quebec and Montreal, nor any means of close co-ordination between the three principal centers of population, the early defense of Canada had a local, extemporaneous character about it. Only measures which insured the day-to-day survival of the colony could be attempted.

\(^8\)Canada, Census of, Vol. IV, pp. 173-74.

Local Defense

Quebec was the easiest settlement in Canada to defend.\(^{10}\) Just to the southwest of the village the great promontory of Cape Diamond, rising two hundred feet above the St. Lawrence, effectively prevented attack from that quarter; on the south and east the St. Charles River, a small tributary of the St. Lawrence, acted as a moat protecting the village from that quarter; and the St. Lawrence itself, almost a mile wide at that point, prevented surprise from the south. Only to the north and west could Indians approach the habitation with ease, but not without detection.

The village of Quebec was divided into an Upper and Lower Town. The Lower Town, stretching back from the river about three hundred yards, became the commercial center of the village with its wharfs and storehouses for incoming and outgoing merchandise and its shops and homes of the merchants.\(^{11}\) The Upper Town was a place admirably situated for strong defenses. Located behind Lower Town, it was built on top of a sheer-faced rock cliff that rose


\(^{11}\) Journal of Asseline de Ronual in Canada, 1622, found in Report of the Public Archives of Canada, 1928, pp. 29.
abruptly from the river bank to a height of one hundred feet and then leveled off to form part of the hilly terrain to the north of the village. In Upper Town there grew up a number of houses, several churches (one of which was the cathedral), and Ft. Saint Louis, the principal stronghold of the colony.\footnote{Ronual, \textit{Journal}, p. 29.}

Ft. Saint Louis was situated on the edge of the cliff overlooking Lower Town, and its guns could command all of the land and water within range in every direction. Champlain had chosen the site of the fortress and had built a rather imposing wooden and earth structure there by the time of the English conquest in 1629.\footnote{T. G. Sagard, \textit{Histoire du Canada}, edited by E. Tross (4 vols., Paris: Librairie Tross, 1866), Vol. I, p. 38.} The fort was destroyed by the English when they evacuated the country in 1632, but Champlain quickly reconstructed Ft. Saint Louis on the site using the same general plan and materials as formerly.\footnote{\textit{JR}, Vol. VII, p. 229.} It was not until the time of his successor, Montmagny, that the bastions and walls of the fort were constructed of stone.\footnote{\textit{JR}, Vol. IX, p. 137.} Montmagny entered upon his duties by transforming the fort into a proper citadel and by repairing the redoubt which had been constructed in Lower...
Town to command the length of the quay. At the same time he increased the number of cannons which faced the river and strengthened the platform on which they were mounted. It seems evident that these measures were directed more against a renewed threat by the English than against the hostility of the Indians, toward whom harquebuses were of more value than cannons; so it is not surprising to find that as the English threat diminished in the following decades and the financial situation of the colony became more desperate, Ft. Saint Louis was allowed to fall into disrepair. A document of 1660 reveals vividly, though in bad French, the extent of the decay which had taken place in the preceding twenty-five years: "The gate is ruined and beyond service. The walls surrounding the fort are not finished and in such condition that the parapets are completely ruined." Once funds were made available to the colony after 1663, the records of Quebec become filled with references to the repairing of Ft. Saint Louis.

Whether the strong defensive position of Quebec was sufficient to frighten the Iroquois away, or whether the


Iroquois were concentrating their strength against the western portion of the colony, it is difficult to determine; but whatever the reason, there is no evidence to suggest that Quebec was ever seriously menaced by the Iroquois during the period of company control. It is true that alarm followed alarm after 1641, and particularly after the dispersal of the Hurons in 1649-50, when the full fury of the Iroquois fell upon the colony; but Iroquois raiding parties never came closer to Quebec than its outlying districts. As Marie de l'Incarnation indicated to her son in France, "I do not know why you show so much fear of the Iroquois on our account. If they came as far as Quebec, it would indicate that the whole country was lost."

This feeling of relative security against Indian attack may account for the fact that, as shown by the disrepair of Ft. Saint Louis, the defenses of Quebec seem not to have been kept in readiness. The attitude of the people

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of Quebec underwent a change, however, as the war became more vicious in the 1650's and early 1660's. In 1653 an ordinance was issued by Governor Lauzon which admitted the defenseless condition of the village. The Jesuit headquarters at Quebec, the building capable of receiving the largest number of people, was ordered fortified with small cannons, and loopholes were ordered cut in the walls to provide places through which muskets could be fired.

The farmers in the area around Quebec were likewise unmindful of their own safety. The Relation of 1659-60 complained:

> What gives the enemy this advantage over us is, that all the rural settlements outside of Quebec are without defense, and are distant from one another as much as eight or ten leagues on the banks of the great River. In each house there are only two, three, or four men, and often only one, alone with his wife and a number of children, who may all be killed or carried off without any one's knowing aught about it in the nearest house.

Seeking to remedy this condition, Governor d'Argenson in 1660 required all families in the Quebec district to form closed villages by building their houses, eight or nine together, so that each could support the others in time of

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attack. The requirement to relocate and rebuild was apparently too taxing on the habitants of the region, however; so about 1662 the policy of the government was changed. Small forts were ordered built in each parish and walls were ordered constructed around each church and each house of a seigneur so nearby residents could take refuge when the alarm sounded. Thus began an effort on the part of the government to rationalize the settlement and defense of rural Canada, an effort that continued without notable success until the end of the reign.

The men who manned the fort and the other defensive positions in Quebec and elsewhere in the colony were company troops from France and militiamen drawn from the local population. The distinction between company troops and militiamen during the early years was not striking. Every adult male in the colony, unless disabled, was subject to military service in time of danger or guard duty in time of quiet. The first indication that a garrison

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of soldiers, probably company troops, was stationed permanently at Quebec appears in the *Relation* of 1636:

We have...a number of fine-looking and resolute soldiers. It is a pleasure to see them engage in their warlike exercises during the calmness of peace, to hear the noise of muskets and of cannon....The Diane [the drumbeat which is sounded at daybreak] wakens us every morning; we see the sentinels resting upon their arms. The guardhouse is always well supplied; each squad has its days of sentry duty. In a word, our fortress at Kebec is guarded in time of peace as is an important place in the midst of war.26

In addition to guard duty at Quebec, soldiers were sometimes sent along to protect missionaries who were traveling to their mission stations,27 and frequently found employment in various non-military positions, skilled and unskilled, such as carpentry and farmers' helpers.28 The company soldier was, therefore, more of a member of the community than a member of a separate class of individuals.

It may well be that the Canadian militia had its beginnings at Quebec, but the earliest indication of the militia being organized on a regular basis was when Governor d'Ailleboust in 1651 ordered the entire male population of Three Rivers divided into three or four squads, each to

stand a night's guard duty in turn. Two years later Governor Lauzon issued an ordinance designed to fix age limits for service in the militia at Three Rivers, requiring that all of those between the ages of sixteen and sixty were obligated to stand guard. It was not until 1658 that an organized militia force at Quebec made its appearance in the records, but certainly some kind of home guard must have existed there from the earliest times.

At Three Rivers, the next major settlement upriver from Quebec, except for the information about the militia, there are few facts concerning local defense during the period of company control. Prior to 1634 the merchant companies had established no fixed habitation on the site of Three Rivers, having there only some warehouses for the fur trade. On July 4th of that year, however, M. de la Violette oversaw the construction of a fort and other

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defensive works on the location of a former Algonquian village. Within two years there had also been constructed a platform mounted with cannons which could command the St. Lawrence at that point. Located as it was at the juncture of the St. Lawrence and St. Maurice Rivers, the new French habitation soon became a major fur-trade post, mission station, and important look-out point for Iroquois moving toward Quebec.

There seems early to have been an attempt to get the local Indians to settle next to the French at Three Rivers. This was probably inspired by religious motives, to settle the nomadic Algonquians in a convenient location where conversion could take place more easily, but it also had the practical effect of augmenting the meager French population and thereby providing for greater collective security. In 1637 a conference was held between the French and the local Indians at which reference was made to a promise earlier made by Champlain to help the Montaignais clear the land and settle near Three Rivers in a fortified village. Governor Montmagny, Champlain's successor, agreed to continue the offer provided the Montagnais give

34 JR, Vol. IX, p. 137.
some of their children to the French to be taught—and serve as hostages. The project was on the point of being carried out when the lack of French workmen, money, and food caused an indefinite postponement. "It is a pitiable thing, I cannot repeat it too often," wrote Father Le Jeune about the project, "that the spiritual welfare of these poor barbarians should be retarded by the lack of temporal resources." 36

The inhabitants of Three Rivers seem to have been as careless about their safety as the people of Quebec, especially after Montreal was founded in 1643 and became the main object of the fury of the Iroquois. In 1649 a Jesuit missionary at Three Rivers complained to his superior that houses in the village were built of bark or thatch and that there were no town walls or defensive works except of wood, all of which could easily catch fire in case of attack. 37 The town walls had either not been completed or had been allowed to fall into disrepair in several places by 1652, leaving the village guarded in those quarters only by large trees behind which Indians could lurk and strike without warning. 38

The sight of such poor defenses must have attracted the Iroquois to Three Rivers because, in the summer of 1652 the Iroquois lifted their siege of Montreal and slipped downriver to attack the village. On August 1 they killed two men and took two others captive; and when the local Governor and forty Frenchmen gave chase to the marauders, the pursuers were ambushed and fifteen were killed, including the Governor. The next spring and summer Three Rivers was completely blockaded by a force of six hundred Iroquois.

Under these circumstances the inhabitants of Three Rivers were induced, though not without grumbling, to strengthen the fortifications of the town. After the first attack of 1652, what little money was available was spent on defenses. During the fall and winter of 1652-53 the Jesuit, Le Mercier, directed the work of fortification:

The reverend Father superior of the missions... labored energetically to secure the fortifications of that settlement of Three Rivers. This

40 JR, Vol. XL, pp. 34-35; Casson, Montreal, p. 167; François Vachon de Belmont, Histoire du Canada (Quebec: Société littéraire et historique de Quebec, 1840), pp. 6-7.
41 Casson, Montreal, p. 179.
42 JR, Vol. XL, p. 211.
was contrary to the opinion of the inhabitants of the place themselves—who, devoted to their own personal affairs, had no inclination to quit these in order to labor on the fortress. Notwithstanding the hindrances encountered by the Father in his undertaking, the fortifications were completed.\footnote{JR, Vol. XL, p. 257.}

The work was finished just in time to fend off the great attack of 1653. Even with this narrow escape, Governor Lauzon the following year had to issue two edicts to get the people of the village to act responsibly in their own defense: one edict required the townspeople to clear the trees away from the approaches to the settlement so as to give a better field of fire;\footnote{RAPQ, 1924-25, p. 390, Ordonnance du Gouverneur de Lauzon, 14 Nov 1654.} the other edict required the inhabitants to carry enough ammunition with them at all times to fire at least six shots.\footnote{RAPQ, 1924-25, p. 390, Ordonnance du Gouverneur de Lauzon, 14 Nov 1654.}

The reason why Frenchmen at Three Rivers and Quebec could be as neglectful as they were of their own safety was that Montreal, from the time of its founding, was the real focal point for Iroquois hostility. The geographical position of Montreal caused it to be thus. Located on an island in the great river, some thirty miles long and ten miles wide, the largest of a group of islands situated at
the confluence of the Ottawa River, Montreal was easily reached from Iroquoia by way of the Lake Champlain-Richelieu River valley. Montreal was also situated at the terminus of the Ottawa River trade route down which the allies brought their cargo of pelts to market at Three Rivers or Quebec.

Montreal thus became the natural rest-stop and refuge for the western Indians and soon became a market place to rival and eventually surpass the other French habitations. So, too, did Montreal become the base for French trading activity in the far west. For these reasons, and because it was the first French settlement encountered by the Iroquois on their way down the St. Lawrence, Montreal became the western bastion of the colony, "ce petit jardin du Mars" as Casson called it. If Montreal were to fall to the Iroquois, the rest of the colony could be rolled up like an old rug.

In theory, Montreal was not part of the company-owned colony of New France. On December 17, 1640, the Company of New France granted the greater part of the Island of Montreal to a group of men known under the title of

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47 Casson, Montreal, p. 1.
"Messieurs les associes pour la conversion des Sauages de la Nouvelle-France en l'Ile de Montreal." These men proposed to establish a small colony on the island for the expressed purpose of converting the aborigines of the area. They chose as leader of the enterprise, because of his military background and ability, Paul de Chomedey, Sieur de Maisonneuve, and styled him Governor of Montreal. He, together with other organizers of the colony, visited La Rochelle in 1641 and engaged in the search everywhere for men suitable for the proper maintenance of Montreal. To that end they chose only fit men, for which there was the more reason since they knew that this place would be a warm one and not easy to defend by the few soldiers they would be able to supply.

Maisonneuve and about fifty-four others who had been selected set sail for Canada that same year, and the next spring, on May 17, 1642, they took formal possession of the land granted by the company. Since Montreal was not originally part of Canada, and since communications between

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50 Casson, Montreal, p. 69.
51 Casson, Montreal, p. 75. La Rochelle during the course of the century became the chief port for supplying the American colonies and was officially designated as such by the French government.
it and the other settlements were tedious in any season of the year, Montreal was always self-reliant where matters of administration and defense were concerned. This was true until 1663 when Louis XIV took possession of Montreal in the name of the crown.

The day after landing on the island and celebrating the foundation of Montreal, or Villemarie as it was known until about 1670, Maisonneuve ordered built a crude palisade wall surrounding the encampment. This kind of work was made easier because Champlain, who had visited the site in 1611, had cleared a great many trees from the area to serve as firewood and as protection against ambush. The original wall lasted only one season, being replaced by a proper fortress of five bastions, even in size, "so strong that the like have not yet been seen in Canada." This second fort was built under the direction of an engineer from Champagne, Louis d'Ailleboust, who had arrived with a re-enforcement of forty men the previous September and who became Maisonneuve's trusted second-in-command at Montreal, and still later, Governor of Canada.

It was in June, 1643, that "the first fruits of the blood poured out by Montreal for the common defense of the

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52 Casson, Montreal, p. 99.

53 Casson, Montreal, p. 118.

54 Lanctot, A History of Canada, p. 178; Casson, Montreal, p. 111.
country" was shed when six carpenters and woodcutters were lost in an Iroquois attack.\textsuperscript{55} From then until the end of the war in 1666, the Iroquois invested Montreal almost constantly, except during the dead of winter when snow made the trek from Iroquoia too difficult. Dollier de Casson, the earliest historian of Montreal, warned that there had been so many separate attacks against the village from the time of its founding until the year of his writing, about 1673, that "it would be vain to search and run through all the times and seasons, since I should infallibly forget many things worthy of remembrance."\textsuperscript{56}

Isolated, beleaguered, and with a population of scarcely one hundred persons during the first decade, the people of Montreal were forced into close cooperation for their mutual defense. One of the earliest and best means of defense, though certainly one of the most unorthodox, was to use dogs to warn of the enemy's presence. Each morning the people of Montreal would allow their dogs, led by the excitable Pilotte, to make the circle of the palisade wall to sniff out danger. If danger were present, the dogs would "begin to bark and howl as loudly as possible towards that side on which they scented the enemy....It


\textsuperscript{56} Casson, \textit{Montreal}, p. 95.
would have been impossible to protect ourselves against

The Iroquois had not God furnished these friendly
howlings."\(^{57}\)

The people of Montreal seem to have constructed at
various points around the island several redoubts to serve
in time of danger, when one man or group of men would be
captured in the open and unable to escape back to the main
enclosure in time. The redoubts may have been intended
to serve the primary function of protecting farmers in the
fields. Everyone went to and returned from the fields in
a single party, at fixed times, by the sound of a bell.\(^{58}\)

While in the fields a guard of one or more men was posted
to secure against surprise while the others tended the
crops.\(^{59}\)

The plight of Montreal was serious enough during the
decade of the 1640's, but with the dispersal of the Hurons
in 1649-50 the situation became desperate.

The Iroquois, with no more cruelties to carry
on above us, since there were no more Hurons
left to destroy...turned their faced towards
the Island of Montreal, which they looked on
as the first object of attack in descending
the river. Therefore, when the winter of
1650-51\(^{7}\) was over, they began to attack us in

\(^{57}\) JR, XXXII, p. 27.

\(^{58}\) Casson, Montreal, p. 131.

\(^{59}\) Casson, Montreal, pp. 131, 187, 237.
good earnest, and with such obstinacy that they scarce left us a day without an alarm. We had them on our hands incessantly, not a month of this summer passed without our roll of slain being marked in red at the hands of the Iroquois.  

The Jesuit Ragueneau, writing in the same year, spoke of Montreal and how the Iroquois "who make their appearance almost continually...nearly render the place uninhabitable."  

With the dramatic upsurge in enemy activity and with few replacements for those killed, the first steps toward abandoning the post were taken in 1651. All of the outlying buildings, including the homes of the habitants, were abandoned and their inmates crowded into the fort. All appeared lost until Mlle. Jeanne Mance, director of the hospital at Montreal, conceived of a way to save the settlement. She donated 22,000 livres to the colony out of the money given to her to found a regular Hotel-Dieu in Montreal. The money she gave to Maisonneuvre with the instruction to use it to raise a levy in France for the defense of the village. In exchange she requested and received one hundred arpents of land on the island, representing one-half of the farm-holdings of the Montreal

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60 Casson, Montreal, p. 155.
62 Casson, Montreal, p. 159.
society. Maisonneuvre took the money, and leaving
M. des Musseaux in charge, sailed for France that fall.
Before he left Montreal, he informed Mlle. Mance that he
would try to recruit two hundred men for the defense of
the place; "if, however, I cannot get at least 100, I shall
not return and the whole enterprise must be abandoned, for
certainly the place will be untenable." 63

Two years of agony passed before Maisonneuvre was able
to return to Montreal, but when he did he was able to come
with 113 recruits from Anjou, Maine, Poitou, and
Brittany. 64 When Maisonneuvre and his men landed at Quebec,
the people there were experiencing such disquiet over the
increased enemy activity in their own district that they
did not want to let the recruits leave for Montreal.
Maisonneuvre had to remind the people of Quebec that the
recruits were hired with the society's, not the community's,
money. 65 Arriving at Montreal, Maisonneuvre and his troops
were greeted with excitement and joy. Thus augmented, the
little colony again was able to hold its own against attack;

63 Casson, Montreal, pp. 167-68.
64 Casson, Montreal, p. 193.
65 E. M. Faillon, Histoire de la Colonie Francaise en
Canada (4 vols., Villemarie: Bibliotheque Paroissiale,
1868), pp. 531-61. Sulte, Histoire desCanadiens-Francais,
de 1642 a 1667," Memoires de la Societe royale du Canada,
but as terms of enrollment expired and as the number of slain steadily mounted during the next decade, Montreal, for all its improvised measures of defense, once more took on the appearance of a town in desperation.

A severe blow was dealt to Montreal in 1660 when seventeen men from the village were killed at the Long Sault, just above the town on the Ottawa River. Exactly what prompted the seventeen to be in that dangerous location is a subject of conjecture.\(^{66}\) Apparently Dollard, an impetuous young man recently come from France and unaccustomed to Indian warfare, enticed sixteen companions to go with him to the Long Sault, which was a spot ideally located for an ambush, and there lie in wait for small Iroquois war parties who would portage at that point on their way to Montreal. Dollard received permission from Maisonneuve to

lead his men out of the village and on May 21, 1660 they left for their destination.

At the Long Sault they were joined by four Algonquins and forty Hurons who had received word of the undertaking and rushed to join them. This small band was lurking in the woods near the Sault when to their amazement there appeared, not a small Iroquois raiding party, but a fleet of canoes carrying two hundred Onondaga warriors who had massed for an all-out assault on Montreal. The little band was discovered and prevented from fleeing while Onondaga runners were dispatched to alert an even larger Iroquois army which was then poised at the mouth of the Richelieu. The two armies combined to attack Dollard's men, and after a fierce struggle in which most of the allies deserted to the enemy, Dollard and his men were defeated and killed. Only one individual, a Huron, survived to repeat what had happened at the Long Sault.

Although the fight at the Long Sault has become a glorious legend of Canadian history, it is difficult to assess the motives of Dollard and his men, or the effects of their battle. It was not uncommon for Frenchmen to go on expeditions like this in the company of a few allied Indians. The *Relation* of 1658, for example, speaks of a foray against the Iroquois made by d'Argenson at the head of one hundred and fifty Frenchmen and one hundred
allies; but Dollard's expedition was a local affair and under the leadership of a private person, and his objective seems to have extended no further than simply to kill Iroquois.

As for the effects of the battle, it seems clear from all contemporary accounts that Dollard unintentionally saved Canada from a massive attack by eight hundred confederacy warriors: after the battle the Iroquois, who had been severely bloodied by the fierce resistance of the Frenchmen, withdrew to their homes and left Canada alone for the rest of the year. Even so, the cost to Montreal was staggering. When Asseline de Ronual visited the town two years later he found it sparsely settled, with nothing to be seen but a few houses and a chapel in which two Jesuit Fathers said Mass every day. "One's life in that district," he remarked, "is in greater danger than that of a bird on a branch."

The winter after de Ronual visited Montreal the people of the village received intelligence that the Iroquois were going to expend every effort the next spring toward destroying the village and its inhabitants.

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Maisonneuve decided to take extraordinary measures to meet the anticipated challenge. First, he proposed that the inhabitants form a militia organization structured along new lines. (One had been in existence earlier but its specific organization is unknown.) He suggested, in order to defend the island "which belongs to the Virgin Mary," that a religio-military group be formed under the name, La Milice de la Sainte-Famille de Jesus, Marie et Joseph. Immediately one hundred and thirty-nine eligible men offered themselves for service. Maisonneuve's suggestion was embodied in an order dated February 1, 1663. The men were divided into twenty squads, each with seven men, and each commanded by a corporal chosen by the men themselves. They took communion each time before reporting for sentry duty.

Maisonneuve also judged it necessary to maintain sentries on watch constantly at the various redoubts around

70 Faillon, Histoire de la Colonie Française, Vol. III, p. 15.

71 BRH, Vol. XXXVI, pp. 405-418, Édouard Massicotte, "La Milice de 1663," This is largely a reprint of information contained in Faillon, Histoire de la Colonie Française, Vol. III, pp. 15 ff.

around the island. With this in mind he gave the property on which these redoubts stood to men of known courage who would take up their residence there. 73

The anticipated attack did not materialize in the spring. The Iroquois had heard that "thousands" of French soldiers were coming to take their villages away from them and had decided to be discreet toward the French until more was learned. 74 Montreal remained alert, however, and in 1663 was able to welcome the royal intervention with a local defense force probably better than any other in Canada.

Still farther west from Montreal, in the villages of the Huron allies of the French, Jesuit missionaries were in charge of local measures of defense. The primary aim of the Jesuits in Canada was the conversion of the heathen, and to this end the fathers bent all of their efforts; but the Jesuits never forgot the physical well-being of their charges, for while the spiritual body of the Indian was being nourished, the temporal body must not be lost to Iroquois warriors.

When the Jesuits arrived in Huronia in the 1530's they found Indian villages fortified according to a plan that


74 JR, Vol. XLVIII, p. 81.
was common to all Iroquoian peoples. A site for a village was chosen that afforded some natural defense—a sharp bend in a stream or river, the crown of a difficult hill, or on the edge of a marshy stretch of ground. A ditch, several feet wide and deep, was dug around the site, and the earth thrown up on the inside to form a breastwork. Trees were then felled and trimmed and placed in a row in the ditch, inclined inward in such a way that their tops intersected with a consecutive row of trees placed farther from the ditch and inclined toward the first. The tops were tied, and the whole circumference to the height of a man was lined with heavy bark. At the top, where the palisades crossed, a gallery was constructed where defenders could stand and direct streams of water down on fires which might be kindled by an enemy. Piles of stones and several primitive ladders for mounting the structure completed the provisions for defense.

The Jesuits, by virtue of their European experience, could and did offer suggestions about how to improve the Huron village defense. By 1636 initial steps had been taken. Le Jeune reported in that year:

The Hurons have remained very friendly to us, on account of the promptitude we showed

in assisting them. We have told them also that henceforth they should make their forts square, and arrange their stakes in straight lines; and that by means of four little towers at the four corners, four Frenchmen / probably referring to several donnes, or seculars, who, accompanied the priests on mission/ might easily with their arquebuses or muskets defend a whole village. They are greatly delighted with this device, and have already begun to practice it at la Rochelle.76

The Jesuits also practiced combining two or more smaller villages into a single one, perhaps to administer to the spiritual needs of the inhabitants in a more efficient way, but perhaps to provide for their greater collective security. In 1640 the two stations of Saint Joseph, at Teanausteiyie, and La Conception, at Ossossane, were combined so as to avoid "many inconveniences." The new village became Ste. Marie and was dominated by a rather elaborate fort built in the European style. It was erected on the east bank of the Wye River where it flows from Mud Lake. The fort had four bastions, and two of its four walls were made of stone and a concrete which the Jesuits mixed themselves from local materials. The other two walls, those facing the lake and river, were of palisades. The whole enclosure formed a parallelogram of about 175 x 90 feet.77


77 A description and map of this fort appears in JR, Vol. XIX, pp. 269-70.
Fig. 5.--Sketch of the outlines of the ruins of Ste. Marie-on-the-Wye, an Indian fort designed by the Jesuits (JR, Vol. XIX, p. 270).
Forts like this were sometimes heavily fortified, but sometimes were enclosures which simply took the place of the weaker fortifications formerly used by the Indians.\textsuperscript{78}

These and other forts constructed in Huronia under the supervision of the Jesuits did not, of course, prevent the catastrophe of 1649-50, although they may have in some measure mitigated the blow. Three years after the Huron defeat the Jesuit Bressani declared that the fortress which the Jesuits had built at St. Ignace was so strong that it would never have fallen had the Iroquois not used a ruse to capture it.\textsuperscript{79}

From Quebec to Georgian Bay, Frenchmen used locally improvised measures of defense to guard their particular corner of the French empire in North America. Frenchmen also used colony-wide programs for defense. These were conceived and executed on a grander scale than the other measures and called for the cooperation of everyone in the colony.

\textbf{Colonial Defense}

The officer responsible for colonial defense was the governor. During the period of company control the governor was always chosen by the associates, although the

\textsuperscript{78} JR, Vol. XXXIX, p. 125.

\textsuperscript{79} JR, Vol. XXXIX, p. 125.
king under the charter had the right to confirm the choice. It was taken for granted that the governor would serve in his position only so long as the king took pleasure in him; but the term of service stipulated in the commission was three years, although this could be extended at the discretion of the company. The duties of the governor in Canada were vast and his authority complete. In the civil sphere, he had total charge of the administration of the colony and its police force; in the judicial, he exercised the right of judgment in the first and last resort; and in the military, he was granted jurisdiction general and specific. It was in the military sphere that the governor found his duties the most demanding, the Iroquois threat being what it was. In view of this, men were always chosen for the office in consideration of their military background and ability, with the single exception of Lauzon, 1651-1656, who was by trade a businessman. The commissions accorded to the various governors of Canada


82 Lanctot, L'Administration de la Nouvelle-France, p. 17.
during this period stressed the military nature of their function. Montmagny's of 1645 is typical:

We have commissioned Montmagny governor and our lieutenant-general, representing our person at Quebec...and places which are dependent on New France, to command all soldiers who are in the country, both to guard these places and to maintain and preserve the trade...with power to establish under you such lieutenants...as will seem good to you; moreover, by this provision and until sovereign judges are established in these places for the administration of justice, we give you power...to judge sovereignly and in the last resort... soldiers and other inhabitants of the country; to be responsible for the laws and ordinances of the council, made to regulate affairs between the inhabitants and the company; and to enjoy for three years...all honors which are owed to you.83

The first royal commission under the regime of the Company of New France was awarded to Charles Huault de Montmagny in 1636, Champlain having been designated simply as Richelieu's "lieutenant."84 When the Indian allies heard the name of the new Governor and asked what it meant, they were told it meant "great mountain." The Indians translated this into their own language and derived the name "Ononthio," which they ever afterward used to address


to address the governors of Canada. Montmagny was to serve as Governor from 1636 until his recall in 1648.

When Montmagny, Knight of Malta and fifty-three years old, stepped ashore at Quebec on June 11, 1636 with a small group of company soldiers, he found a situation to test his abilities. The white population numbered less than 300, divided between Quebec and the newly-established post at Three Rivers. The Europeans were surrounded by aborigines with whom they had had little experience and who were either of uncertain loyalty or outrightly hostile. Their lifeblood, the fur trade, was carried along a water highway a thousand miles long, the control of every foot of which was soon to be contested by the Iroquois. Under these circumstances, Montmagny's responsibilities narrowed to the essentials. He must first protect the two habitations of the colony and perhaps find a way to block the Iroquois from using the Richelieu River invasion route by which they descended to the St. Lawrence valley, and he must somehow guarantee that the convoys of canoes bearing their cargo of pelts would reach Quebec in safety.

Montmagny's most pressing need, as with all the governors who succeeded him, was greater manpower to carry out his programs for the defense of the colony. As yet the French had not come under direct attack from Iroquois, but their Indian allies were beginning to feel the presence
of Dutch-supplied arms in the hands of their old enemies. The one hundred and twenty men requested by Champlain two years earlier had not been sent, and the only men available for service were the colonists themselves and a few company troops, in all about one hundred men, seventy of which were stationed at Three Rivers.

The easiest way to accomplish a swift augmentation of the number of fighting men would have been to arm the natives who were friendly to the French; but Champlain had forbidden the sale, gift, or barter of firearms to the Indians out of concern for their loyalty and dependability. Montmagny was of the same mind during the initial years of his governorship, but by 1640 his opinion had changed. Acting as godfather to a Huron neophyte at a baptismal ceremony, Montmagny presented the new Christian with a fine harquebus, "which astonished this good Neophyte, for these arms are wholly new to them." The governor went on to tell the Huron to spread the word among his people that all those who accepted the faith would receive guns and protection from the French.

85See above p.23.
88JR, Vol. XX, p. 221. Italics mine.
The Jesuits were quite pleased with the change in policy, one of them remarking that granting harquebuses to the Hurons was a powerful attraction to win them to Christianity, and he added, "it seems that our Lord intends to use this means in order to render Christianity acceptable in these regions." Soon afterward Montmagny dropped even his restriction against arming the non-Christian Indians, and harquebuses, power, and lead started being traded to all of those tribes in alliance with the French.

This behavior, reminiscent of what the Dutch were doing at the same time, was not to last long, however. Considerations of the Indians' vast numerical superiority and their supposed unreliability caused Montmagny to reverse himself on this point. On July 9, 1644 the governor issued an order forbidding entirely the sale, gift, barter, or exchange of arms to the Indians, whether Christian or non-Christian; and in the same year he again was found offering axes and iron arrowheads as presents to the allies rather than guns and ammunition.

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89 JR, Vol. XXV, p. 27.
With this reversal in policy Montmagny deprived the colony of what under the circumstances would have been its most effective defense against the Iroquois: small bands of allied Indians raiding Iroquoia the same way that Mohawks were raiding Canada. Moreover, he placed the allies at an enormous disadvantage, for although they were more numerous than the confederacy tribes and just as brave, without firearms they were infinitely weaker. Had Montmagny shown more trust for the allies, the massive Indian army envisioned by Champlain could have made a rapid end to the Iroquois war; but lack of trust made this impossible.

Another consideration which may have caused Montmagny to change his mind again was the formulation of a plan to end the Iroquois menace by striking at the Dutch in America who were supplying the enemy with weapons. New Netherland by this time was regarded as the perpetuator of all the trouble with the Iroquois because of the traffic in munitions; so in the fall of 1641 Montmagny and Father Vimont, the Jesuit Superior, dispatched Father Le Jeune to France to propose an attack against the Dutch and request men, money, and material to carry it out.92

There is evidence that Le Jeune never presented his proposal to the authorities in France because of a change

92 JR, Vol. XX, p. 119.
of heart by the Canadian authorities; for that winter, Father Lalemont, who was also in Paris on colonial business, wrote that the whole scheme had been at least temporarily abandoned. The strength of the Dutch was unknown, he said; and even if it were known, a considerable sum of money would be needed to pay for the men and ships needed in the venture. Furthermore, there would still be no guarantee of victory, and the great outlays made by the king in equipping the expedition might go for nothing, "which would result in our not being listened to when we might need some lesser help." A failure would worsen the situation in America in that the Dutch would be enticed into open opposition of Canada and would be led to furnish more arms than ever to the Iroquois. A victory, on the other hand, would raise the problem of military occupation of the territory, for there would not be enough Frenchmen in America to guard against a certain counterattack by the Dutch forces. Finally, "what certainty have we that a victory will oblige the Iroquois to make peace with our savages? and yet it is upon the assurance of such peace


that the whole project is founded."\textsuperscript{95}

With the persons who sent him uncertain about the course to follow, Le Jeune turned to Queen Anne, who donated ten thousand \textit{ecus} to the colony, and then to the Duchesse d'Aiguillon, a niece of Richelieu, who had earlier befriended the colony in a similar way. The Duchess persuaded her uncle to use the money to help defray the cost of sending a contingent of soldiers to Canada the following spring.\textsuperscript{96} A bargain was struck and in June or July of 1642 about thirty or forty soldiers, the cost of which was jointly borne by the company, Richelieu, and Queen Anne, set foot in Canada.\textsuperscript{97} This welcome support from home at a time when the colony was just beginning to feel the first effects of the Iroquois offensive allowed the Governor to adopt an alternative to the New Netherland project for stopping the encursions of the Iroquois.

Montmagny immediately enlisted the troops in a program to close the Richelieu River warpath by which the Mohawks were descending upon the colony. In August he loaded onto river craft a force of about one hundred men,

\textsuperscript{95} JR, Vol. XXI, p. 271.
\textsuperscript{96} JR, Vol. XXII, pp. 33, 247.
composed of the new arrivals, part of the Quebec garrison, and a number of armed laborers. With these he sailed up the St. Lawrence to the Richelieu.\textsuperscript{98} There, on the eastern bank of the Richelieu where it flowed into the great river, he set his men to work on a fort which was to be named after the Cardinal who had made it all possible. After fighting off an attack by some three hundred Mohawks on the 20th, the fort was brought rapidly to completion, the cannons mounted, and a garrison of soldiers chosen to remain at the post. Montmagny and the others sailed back to Quebec confident that their time had been well spent and that the colony would now be safer with a lock on its western door.

The effectiveness of Fort Richelieu proved to be less than intended, however. The spring of 1643 opened with a Mohawk attack on Montreal, and although the Jesuits believed the fort did in some measure ease the pressure on Huronia, it became apparent to everyone in the colony that the fort had not entirely served its purpose.\textsuperscript{99} The allied Indians reported that the Iroquois could still reach the St. Lawrence either by using the Richelieu until just above the fort and then portaging to the great river, or by using one of a number of smaller streams in the area.\textsuperscript{100}

\textsuperscript{98} JR, Vol. XXII, pp. 89-91, 247, 277.
\textsuperscript{100} JR, Vol. XXIV, p. 295.
Montmagny, when he set out to investigate this claim, found a well-beaten path bypassing the fort just out of gun-shot range.  

Montmagny, like the other Governors who served Louis XIV, thought of defense in terms of their European military backgrounds. This often meant the construction of forts at strategic points outside the main habitations of Canada to act as barriers against enemy movement, Fort Richelieu being one example. Whatever soundness this tactic may have had in Europe, where armies hesitated to leave a fortified position in their rear, in America it was almost useless. The Iroquois, who grew up knowing how to bypass natural obstacles, found little difficulty in bypassing man-made ones, nor were they concerned that a fortified position might be between themselves and their home country. A fort in the wilderness could control only the land its guns commanded, and any patrol sent from its gates to widen the area under control was sure to be destroyed by an enemy with all the advantages of surprise and numbers on its side. Such forts were little better than prisons for their defenders; but it took the French a long time to learn the lesson.

The lesson began under Montmagny. In the spring of 1645 Fort Richelieu, its brief existence a disappointment to the Governor, had its garrison reduced to only eight or ten men, and in the fall its garrison withdrawn completely.\textsuperscript{102} During the winter of that year the fort was pillaged and burned by the Iroquois, and the next spring the French were able to salvage only its cannons--but they had been spiked by the raiders.\textsuperscript{103}

Montmagny's disappointment at not being able to stop the infiltration of the Iroquois was somewhat lifted in the summer of 1644 by the arrival of another contingent of soldiers from France, the last for some years to come. The Queen Regent had undertaken the sponsorship of this contingent by donating a sum of money to the Baron de Renty, one of the associates of the company and director of the Montreal enterprise. When the troops arrived in Canada Montmagny lost no time in distributing them among the habitations of the colony, not excepting Montreal out of consideration for de Renty.

This contingent allowed Montmagny the men he needed to inaugurate a program which long proved of great benefit


to Canada, the sending of soldiers into the west to act as guards for the Indian trade convoys bound for the colony.

In August Montmagny took a group of the newly-arrived soldiers to Three Rivers to meet the Indians who had come there from the up-country to trade. Montmagny had heard stories of the Indians' growing reluctance to trade with the French due to the increasing pressure from the Iroquois along the Ottawa River route. When the Indians were ready to return to their country, the Governor dispatched twenty-two soldiers to travel with them, winter in Huronia, and escort the trading fleet back to the colony the following autumn. In order to increase the soldiers' enthusiasm for their duty, Montmagny left them free to trade on their own account during the winter. When the twenty-two returned the next fall they were richer by some 40,000 livres worth of pelts. From then on it was not at all difficult to recruit Frenchmen to make such trips.

The great success of this first attempt to keep the Ottawa River open to trade was not always repeated in later years. In the reorganization of Canadian trade and government that took place in 1645 the Community of Habitants was left free to send "volunteers" to the Indian country to act

as escorts for missionaries and the trading fleets.\textsuperscript{106}

As an inducement, these volunteers were placed at liberty to trade for furs in the up-country, provided they sold their pelts to the community upon return. The arrangement worked well for a time; but as the Iroquois arsenal of weapons became still more formidable in the late 1640's, it became increasingly difficult to induce the western Indians to make the journey to the colony, no matter what rewards awaited them and no matter how numerous were the French guards. Then, in 1649-50, the whole fur-trade empire went into temporary collapse with the Huron dispersal, and for four years no furs at all came down from the up-country. It was only due to the extraordinary determination of the French volunteers that the Indians resumed their convoys in 1654. But even so, only four fleets, those of 1654, 1656, 1660, and 1662 escaped capture before Louis XIV took control of the situation in 1663.

We are fortunate in having an account of one of these successful expeditions written by one of Canada's most renown adventurers, Pierre d'Esprit Radisson. His account, written either during the 1654-56 or 1658-60, bears witness to the valuable service rendered the colony by the

\textsuperscript{106}\textit{PAC, F3, Vol. III, fol. 235-38, Arrêt, 5 March 1648.}
volunteers. Radisson and his companions aided the cause of France in America by exhorting the Indians to be of good courage, organizing the defense of over-night camp sites, sending scouts ahead to investigate the safety of portage paths, keeping the allies together when they come under attack, and leading assaults on enemy positions. It was only by virtue of expeditions such as the one recounted by Radisson that the fur-trade empire was preserved from complete collapse after 1650, and with it, the undoubted collapse of the colony itself.

The fact that in the years following 1645 there were few new programs initiated for the defense of the colony is accounted for by the low level of trade and the consequent paucity of financial resources available to the colony. On March 2, 1648, Louis d'Ailleboust was appointed Governor of the colony, the king having noted Montmagny's lack of vigorous leadership during the previous twelve years. Ailleboust, whose first term of service lasted until 1651, continued the former practice of sending volunteers to escort the fur-trade convoys and in addition made a new attempt to close the Richelieu River.


108 Belmont, Histoire du Canada, p. 5.
Avoiding the mistake of his predecessor in constructing a permanent fortification on the bank of the Richelieu, d'Ailleboust put into operation a mobile defense force which he hoped would better accomplish the objective. In the spring of 1649 he placed forty men, drawn from the garrisons of Montreal, Three Rivers, and Quebec, under the command of his nephew, Charles d'Ailleboust des Musseaux, and charged them with the responsibility for stopping the infiltration along the Richelieu River. This camp volant operated in boats during the months when navigation was free and patrolled the St. Lawrence between Montreal and Three Rivers to catch the Iroquois trying to cross to the northern shore. This project, although better conceived than the one of Fort Richelieu, was no more successful than its predecessor, as witnessed by destruction of the Hurons that very summer. The problem again was one of hindering the movement of an elusive enemy. As Casson remarked, the sound of arrows upon the river was warning enough for the Iroquois, who could hide until the camp volant had passed and then resume their infiltration. The primary benefit derived from the patrol during the summer of 1649, after which it was discontinued, was to encourage the people of Montreal as it passed the village.

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110 Casson, Montreal, p. 147.
Frustrated in his first attempt to end Iroquois infiltration, and stimulated to drastic action by the beginning of the all-out enemy offensive during the spring and summer of 1649, d'Ailleboust hit upon a bold plan to rid the colony of its nemesis. He dispatched Father Druillets, who had for years served as missionary to the Abenaki Indians of Maine, on an embassy to New England in the autumn of 1650. Druillets' purpose was to open the subject of an alliance with New England for the purpose of exterminating the Iroquois. The appearance of a Jesuit in a role distinctly political was nothing new for the order in Canada. In 1641 Montmagny had requested Le Jeune to go to France and seek aid for the colony; in 1646 Father Jogues had gone to the Mohawks to attempt a peace settlement with that tribe, only to lose his life in the effort; and in 1653 Father Le Moyne began a series of embassies to Onondaga and other Iroquois tribes, ending also in his death.

The subject of an alliance, a commercial one, had first been broached by Massachusetts in 1647, but the


French request that the terms be broadened into a military alliance against the Iroquois threw cold water on the scheme and nothing more was said about it for three years. Then in 1650 word came to Quebec that New England was again interested in a commercial agreement with the French colony, and d'Ailleboust sent Father Druillets to pursue the matter, still with the idea that Canada might gain an ally against the Iroquois.

Druillets left in September and journeyed first to Boston and then to Plymouth and Salem with the message that trading privileges in Canada would be granted on condition of military aid against the Iroquois. But since the New Englanders would hardly provoke so dangerous an enemy as the Iroquois just to receive privileges of questionable value from Quebec, Druillets urged the alliance as a point of duty. The Abenaki, whom Father Druillets was also representing, had suffered from Mohawk inroads; and Druillets, who for the occasion assumed that the Abenaki were under English jurisdiction, urged the New Englanders to protect them. The New Englanders gave noncommittal answers and suggested that Druillets return the next year for a formal reply.

Druillets returned the next summer to New Haven where the commissioners of the four English colonies received

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him. He was carrying with him a formal letter from the Council of Quebec dated June 20 in which were set forth the terms of agreement.\textsuperscript{114} The commissioners treated him with kindness, but considerations of duty nor commerce would induce them to attack the Iroquois with whom they had until now lived in peace; so the Jesuit ambassador had to retrace his steps to Quebec after learning that New England would neither declare war nor permit volunteers to be raised in New England.

When Druillets returned to Quebec in the late summer of 1651 changes were already under way in the colony which were to affect its defensive posture for the next several years. A new Governor, a merchant named Jean de Lauzon, had arrived to take charge of the colony. Lauzon, unlike the vigorous Governors of the past, proved himself at once timid and avaricious, intent on enriching himself and his family in the briefest possible time regardless of the long-term consequences for the colony.

Lauzon was sent to preside over the Council of Quebec, created by the king in 1647 to bring some order out of the chaos into which the fur trade had sunk in the two years since the Community of Habitants had taken control of

The Council was composed of the Governor, the Superior of the Jesuits, and the Governor of Montreal, and was intended to regulate the fur trade and look after the general "bien du pays." The Governor was left with all of his powers intact, but Lauzon's personal predilection caused him to turn over to the Council much of his policy-making prerogative.

Here the Jesuit influence on the Council became important. The Jesuits, although they frequently called for the destruction of the Iroquois, were above all concerned with peace, for peace alone insured the success of their evangelization work. What happened during Lauzon's term as Governor, 1651-1656, by virtue of the clerical influence on the Council and the Governor's disposition to leave the affairs of government to others, was an aimless and compromising policy toward the defense of the colony. Add to this the desperate condition of finances during the 1650's and Canada, it may be said, became quite indifferently guarded against attack.

It was to the great good fortune of Canada that at this time the Iroquois were in no position to prosecute their advantage. In 1653 the Iroquois fell out with the Dutch; the Eries menaced them in the west; and the Andastes

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(Susquehannas) pressed them from the south. Moreover, in that same year, the largest Iroquois war party ever to invade the lakes region was utterly destroyed by the Chippewa and Illinois Indians as it pursued a Huron remnant near Green Bay. For these reasons, the Iroquois thought this would be a good time to mend fences with the French; so ambassadors from the Onondaga appeared at Quebec on June 26 for that purpose. By November 9 a peace had been concluded with the four eastern tribes which was to last, with minor violations, until Lauzon left office.

While the peace was in effect colony-wide defense was neglected as unnecessary, but the peace was more corrosive to the overall military position of the colony than that. Canada for the first time in its brief history stood in danger of losing the essential support of its western allies. A cardinal point of French policy was never to make a peace settlement which did not include the allies, for only in this way could a united front be maintained in the face of Canada's enemies. In addition with the Iroquois


118 Casson, Montreal, p. 205.
still intent on making economic partners of the western 
tribes, any peace which did not include the allies would 
only play into the hands of the Iroquois. Every one of 
Louis XIV's governors, except Lauzon, recognized the urgent 
need to follow this policy.119

Lauzon, believing perhaps that peace with four of the 
tribes was better than war with all five, and evidently 
swayed by the Jesuits who urged a pacific policy toward the 
Iroquois, agreed to a peace which did not include the 
Senecas. Since the Senecas, because of their geographical 
position, were the Iroquois most likely to make war on the 
allies and least likely to bother the colony, the peace 
had the effect of buying the safety of Canada at the 
expense of the western allies. After 1653 the Senecas 
continued to attack the western allies, and Lauzon refused 
to offer the Ottawas and Hurons any effective help.120
Then, in 1656, an event occurred which seemed to indicate 
that Lauzon would look the other way even if the Mohawks 
became party to the attacks against the allies. On May 18 
a band of Mohawks, bribing some Frenchmen not to sound the 
alarm, attacked a Huron settlement on the Isle of Orleans 
in the St. Lawrence just below Quebec.121

119 See for example JR, Vol. XXXVIII, pp. 41-46 for an account of Montmagny's refusal.
120 JR, Vol. XLII, p. 33.
Some Quebec inhabitants rushed to Lauzon and begged permission to aid the beleaguered Hurons, but Lauzon, desiring to do nothing that would endanger the French part of the peace, refused. Two-thirds of the Hurons living on the island were killed in the first assault and the remainder were forced to return with the Mohawks and be adopted into the tribe. The incident was a humiliation for Canada, which had encouraged the Huron remnant to inhabit the island and had promised to defend it against the Iroquois, as it was a defeat for the loyal allies of the French. Clearly, if attacks such as this continued, Canada would find itself without a friend in North America.

At this critical juncture of affairs, Lauzon was succeeded by a new governor, Pierre de Voyer, Viscount d'Argenson; but because the ship bearing d'Argenson to the colony was battered by a storm and had to return to France for repairs, the temporary management of the colony was handed back to d'Ailleboust, who was still in Canada.

D'Ailleboust took control on August 26, 1657 and immediately adopted a policy of decided resistance to the Iroquois raids against the allies. On October 21 he called an assembly of the habitants, who apparently shared his attitude regarding recent events in the colony, and they determined to allow no infraction of the treaty to go unpunished on pretext of respecting the peace.\textsuperscript{122} To this

\textsuperscript{122}Journal of the Jesuits in JR, Vol. XLIII, p. 61.
meeting not a single Jesuit was invited. D'Ailleboust
and the habitants made their decision just in time, be-
cause the good fortune that had accompanied Canada for the
last few years ran out four days later. On October 25 some
Iroquois, who were then experiencing a lull in their war in
the west and south, attacked some men on the Island of
Montreal, and the struggle between the colony and the con-
federacy tribes resumed again in earnest.

With the landing of d'Argenson in the colony the next
summer, on July 11, an entirely new era of Canadian
defense was opened. The emphasis before had been on
programs which the colony could carry out with its own re-
sources or with a minimum of assistance from abroad. Now,
with military resources of the colony near exhaustion
(d'Argenson reported in 1660 that he could muster not above
one hundred troops) and with the Iroquois showing no
sign of diminished energy, the emphasis shifted toward
appealing to Louis XIV for massive aid to crush the enemy.

The time was propitious for these appeals because
France was nearing the end of its long preoccupation with
war in Europe. In 1659 France and Spain signed the Peace
of the Pyrenees ending the western phase of the Thirty

124 Casson, Montreal, p. 133.
Years' War, and the government of France was ready to give some attention to the Laurentian colony.

It was a good thing, for the Iroquois war that broke out in the fall of 1657 was the most vicious of any to date. All five tribes united to exterminate the French and their allies. Montreal was again besieged, and Iroquois war parties ranged far to the east. In 1660 affairs had become so bad that the crops planted in the spring could not be gathered for fear of massacre, and a special ship had to be dispatched to France for flour in order to avert starvation during the winter. The next year the Iroquois did more damage and killing than in any previous year: more than one hundred habitants were killed or captured, an appalling loss out of a population fewer than three thousand. The shadow of collapse grew darker.

Appeals from Canadians to officials in France were not new in 1658; they merely became more insistent after that time. Jamet, a Jesuit missionary in Canada, had written in 1615 that although the Iroquois were terrible, a little blood and money spent quickly to subdue them would be well

126Ronual, Journal, p. 28.


worth the cost. In 1534 Father Le Jeune outlined three measures for speeding up the rate of conversion. Two of them concerned the Hurons: they should be induced to take up agriculture from the example of French farmers who would settle among them; and they should be encouraged to attend Jesuit-sponsored schools where they could learn the elements of French civilization. But the most important measure was listed first by Le Jeune: the French had to stop the incursions of the Iroquois and strike fear in their hearts or the progress of evangelization would never proceed at a quickened pace.

The cry for aid was taken up by Charles Lalemant in 1640, when the Iroquois war first began to spread into the St. Lawrence valley. In a letter to Richelieu, dated March 28, 1640, Lalemant remarked that one of the most formidable difficulties confronting the colony in its relations with the Iroquois was the proximity of the English and Dutch, "who line the seacoasts on our side of the Atlantic, and who excite and strongly fortify the courage of the enemies of the tribes allied to us." He then went on to add: "I regard it as certain, that not for a

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129 Kennedy, Jesuit and Savage, p. 74.
hundred years hence, and perhaps never, shall we see ourselves rid of these...enemies of God and the State, if Your Eminence do not put your hand to this work."

Lalemant's request went unheeded, and the next year Le Jeune was prevailed upon by everyone in the colony to embark for France and request aid for the project against New Netherland. Le Jeune was able to gain ten thousand ecus from the Queen Regent which allowed the dispatching of the 1642 reinforcement of colonial troops; but the original aim of the mission went unfulfilled. After that date no direct appeals were made for a time as both France and the colony settled down to their separate wars. But when ships from France arrived in the summer of 1659 bearing the first Bishop of New France, Mgr. de Laval, together with news of the Spanish capitulation, a mood of eager anticipation arose in the colony that France would finally fulfill its obligations toward the colony. The people of the colony must have nearly burst with joy when the king sent word that same summer that he intended to send powerful support to the hard-pressed Canadians.

The next summer d'Argenson and Laval sent Le Jeune, whose influence at court was strong, to France again to

133 JR, Vol. XLVI, pp. 201-203.
learn more details of the expected help and perhaps hasten the arrival of whatever in the way of aid the king wished to send. Laval had so much confidence in the favorable outcome of Le Jeune's mission that he wrote that same summer to the pope, "We are awaiting from France, next year, a powerful reinforcement of soldiers against the Iroquois."\textsuperscript{134} The \textit{Relation} of that year, too, was full of confidence.

Jerome Lalemant put into words one of the most poignant appeals to date for succor from France:

\begin{quote}
It is a kind of miracle that the Iroquois, although able to destroy us so easily, have not yet done so; or, rather, it is a providence of God, who hitherto...foiled the plans which they have formed....But God has not bound himself to continue over us this almost miraculous providence, which has not only equaled our desires but has exceeded our hopes; and he seems to have had no other design than to assure our subsistence up to this present time, when, peace being happily established in France, it will be possible to send us aid against an enemy that had finally resolved either to destroy us, or to perish in the attempt. Our destruction would involve that of a countless number of souls; the destruction of the enemy would give new life to this whole country and cause here a reign of peace, the sweets of which France is now tasting, and can share with us if she will. Let her only say, "I will"; and with the word she opens Heaven to a host of Savages, gives life to this colony, preserves her new France, and acquires a glory worthy of a most Christian Kingdom, which bears elder Sons of the Church and heirs of the great Saint Louis--
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{134} Abbé Auguste Gosselin, \textit{Vie de Mgr de Laval} (Quebec, 1890), Vol. I, p. 314.
heirs are these not only of his piety, but also
of his conquests.... Once more, let France deter-
mine to destroy the Iroquois, and he will be
destroyed. For what is this Iroquois who
causes himself to be talked about so much? Two
Regiments of brave Soldiers would very soon over-
throw him.135

The combination of Le Jeune's pleading and Lalemant's
writing must have stirred the court, though not to the
extent desired by everyone in the colony. On the last day
of August, 1661, a new governor, DuBois d'Avaugour,
arrived to take control of the government. He brought with
him one hundred company troops.136 It was the largest
single re-enforcement in the colony's history. "Prudent
and courageous, skilled and experienced," d'Avaugour was an
extremely vigorous leader.137 The day after his arrival
he left on a trip up the St. Lawrence to visit Three Rivers
and Montreal so as to study the military preparedness of
the country. Before he left on his inspection trip he
confided to d'Argenson that he was amazed that the colony
had held together as long as it had with so little military
backing. He told d'Argenson to inform the king that he
would return to France without awaiting his recall unless
massive assistance was provided the next year.138

About the time d'Argensons sailed carrying these dire pronouncements, Le Jeune sent to France a Relation, every syllable of which was an appeal for assistance. A special address to the king preceded the first chapter.

Sire, Behold your New France at Your Majesty's feet. She has, as this little Book will show you, been reduced to extremities by a band of Barbarians. Hear, Sire, if you please, her languid voice and her last words. "Save me," she cries; "I am about to lose the Catholic Religion; the Lilies are to be snatched away from me. I shall cease to be French...I shall fall into the foreigner's hands, when the Iroquois shall have drained the last drop of my blood, which has almost ceased to flow. I shall soon end my life in their fires; and the Evil One is on the point of carrying away many Nations which were looking to your Piety, your Might, and your Generosity for their salvation."139

The Relation itself dealt extensively with the misery of the colony and with the benefits to be expected when the Iroquois were finally vanquished with royal assistance.

D'Avangour remained extremely active for the next few weeks after his rapid inspection trip up the river. The trip had taught him that the answer to the Iroquois problem was not more fortification of the central colony, although some improvement here could take place; what was necessary was a large-scale invasion of Iroquoia to crush the enemy. He took up the project first advanced by Champlain in 1634 to attack the confederacy. This he did

139 Jr., Vol. XLVI, pp. 197-199.
in a letter to Prince Condé, dated October 13, 1661.140

After informing Condé of the fertility of the land and size of the colony, d'Avaugour reminded him that the country was groaning under attacks of five or six companies of "vagabonds" who had kept the advantages of the land from being realized. Three thousand men, he said, were needed to "scatter that rabble" who had received aid from the Dutch. On the other hand, twelve hundred men and three hundred soldiers could check them if flour for one year were provided for the former, and full subsistence for the latter for three years. If the king were unwilling to do either, he went on, let him grant the habitants full authority to do what is required and the whole question could be settled in a short time.

As for ad interim measures, d'Avaugour bemoaned the fact that of all the settlements Quebec alone was in a position of strong defense, and the people of the colony were scattered between Quebec and Montreal "in a still more unsocial fashion than are the savages themselves."

D'Avaugour wished that all of Canada's three thousand persons could be consolidated at Quebec, which he assured Condé could easily support a population of one hundred thousand if full use were made of the district's agricultural

resources. Moreover, Quebec, with its natural defenses, could be made "the finest, strongest, and greatest port in the world" if it were guarded by two additional forts, one at the head of the Isle of Orleans and the other opposite it on the bank of the river. The strategic grasp of the situation implied in this and succeeding memoranda on the subject of Canadian defense gives d'Avaugour a solid place in the history on this topic.

At the same time, d'Avaugour was investigating other avenues in his program to awaken French officialdom to the urgent need for military assistance to the colony. He persuaded Pierre Boucher, Governor of Three Rivers and well acquainted from long experience with colonial affairs, to go to France and seek aid from Louis XIV, who, they may have heard, had that year assumed control of the government after the death of Mazarin. Boucher left for France on the last ship to sail that year from Quebec, October 22, 1661.141

Once in France, Boucher obtained admittance to the king's presence, where he was very favorably received.142 Boucher spoke of the riches of the soil, of the several iron mines in the country, of the wholesome climate, and went

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on to request troops of the king in order that Canada might not pass from the crown of France. Louis, after questioning Boucher at length about the problem of the colony, agreed to provide the help requested.\textsuperscript{143}

D'Avaugour received word the next summer that his efforts on behalf of the colony had been rewarded and that the king intended to make a "firm establishment" in Canada.\textsuperscript{144} As yet, however, there was no indication that this meant the renunciation of the charter of the Company of New France. Boucher arrived in the late fall of 1662 to tell of his audience with the king and of the firm promise to send troops the coming year. He brought with him in two ships provided by the king two hundred colonists and thirty soldiers, a token of the help that was to follow. Dumont, the commandant of the soldiers, had left France with one hundred troops; but the ocean voyage lasted twice as long as planned and forty men died in transit, and the commander had left thirty soldiers in Newfoundland.\textsuperscript{145}


\textsuperscript{144} JR, Vol. XLVII, pp. 131, 291-93.

Much encouraged by the report that Boucher brought back with him, d'Avaugour during the winter of 1662-63 began work on a series of ambitious plans for guaranteeing the security of the colony. The first extant plan was of magnificent scope. In a long and detailed memoir, dated at Gaspé on August 4, 1663, the Governor set forth a comprehensive program for guarding Canada from its enemies, whether red or white. First of all, Placentia, Gaspé, and Cape Breton should be evacuated because they are of no consideration, being arid regions incapable of sustaining themselves and of no value to the enemy. The energies of France and Canada ought to be focused on Quebec.

Quebec, d'Avaugour continued, should be solidly fortified by erecting two additional forts, one on its right, on the opposite side of the river, the other on its left, across the St. Charles. To effect this, two things would be necessary. There would be necessary 100,000 ecus for the fortifications and 100,000 francs for munitions and provisions. There would also be necessary 3,000 soldiers, selected for their ability to work on fortifications as well as to fight. These should plan to spend at least three years in the colony. Seed grain should be provided for the first year, which, with proper planting and management of

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crops, would insure that the king would be out no expense for their maintenance during the second and third years. With these men and provisions the other posts in the colony could also be put into a state of defense.

D'Avaugour envisioned an empire in North America made up of ten provinces stretching three hundred leagues along the St. Lawrence with Quebec as their "keystone." With the establishment of these ten provinces the king could consider himself the master of America; but the Governor cautioned against being diverted from the initial goal of concentrating French power at Quebec. Quebec once secure from approach by land or sea, "no power on earth" could drive the French from Canada. When Quebec was secure other subsidiary matters could be dealt with: the driving of Dutch and Swedish heretics from America, and the destruction of the Iroquois.

The first step to be taken in destroying the Iroquois and thwarting the progress of the heretics would be to send the 3,000 men in a strike to the south. Using the Richelieu-Champlain route, this force could not only disperse the Iroquois rabble and drive the Dutch from "a miserable wooden Redoubt...which they call Fort Orange," but would build three forts along the route which in turn would open communications between Quebec and the warm-water port of Manhattan.
D'Avaugour soon followed this memoire with another of like breadth and vision. Again emphasizing the importance of concentrating French power at Quebec, the Governor proceeded to inform the king of ways to prevent an enemy from attacking the colony from the west. He proposed a whole chain of forts placed at strategic locations along the St. Lawrence between Lake St. Pierre and Quebec. The principal fort in the chain would be Ft. Richelieu, reconstructed on the same site as Montmagny's structure and heavily fortified with cannons. Each of these forts would be more elaborate than the one of 1642, however. They would each be soldier-farmer communities with their surrounding lands cleared and planted and their houses sheltering the officers and men.

Concerning offensive operations against the Iroquois, d'Avaugour was less sanguine about the success of a strike to the south than he had been earlier. The distance between Quebec and Iroquois precluded the movement of a large army between the two points; so two alternatives were suggested. The first alternative involved getting permission from the Dutch to land a French force at Manhattan and then using the Hudson River, which offered a shorter approach, to gain access to the enemy country.

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The other alternative involved the co-operation of the men of Boston. D'Avaugour said that he had received word that a certain Major Guebin of that city had offered to raise an army for the conquest of the Iroquois if the French would pay him 20,000 francs for the service. The Governor suggested that the king might want to further investigate the offer, for "were the King to give the English a much larger sum than that to destroy the Iroquois he would still be assuredly a great gainer."

A few weeks later, on September 2, yet another memoire on Canadian defense issued from the pen of d'Avaugour, this one much shorter and concerning the defeat of the Dutch.148 If the king could only place d'Avaugour in command of ten large warships and 4,000 men, he would capture the cities of Boston and Manhattan between May and July of the next year and return to Canada by way of Ft. Orange and capture that, too. Within a matter of months the king could be made the master of "the most beautiful part of America."

The imperial vision contained in the writings of d'Avaugour was far in advance of his time. The general military position of Canada was not yet clearly understood, and the government of Louis XIV had not decided what

it wanted to make on France's possession in North America beyond having it serve as a fur factory and mission station for the mother country. The time would come, however, when many of d'Avaugour's views would be adopted, first by those who succeeded him as governor, and finally by those in France responsible for colonial planning. His views started being implemented the year after his death when the Carignan-Salières regiment arrived in Canada to enact part of his project against the Iroquois. From then until 1689, when the last great project against New York was conceived, his program was piece by piece adopted by colonial planners, although not with the regularity and determination necessary to make it successful.

At least part of d'Avaugour's programs were conceived after his removal from office and with the idea of ingratiating himself with the king. Louis XIV, awakened by the alarm sounded by d'Argenson, by the pathetic supplications from Father Le Jeune, and by the tremendous vision of d'Avaugour's program, decided to assume complete control of Canada in 1663. The king informed the company of his decision, and the thirty-six remaining associates, encumbered with debts and problems of every sort, quickly drew up a deed dated February 24, 1663 upon a promise of royal

150 D'Avaugour was killed in 1664 while in the service of Austria. Note in NYCD, Vol. IX, p. 17.
compensation for their losses. The king accepted the deed the next month, noting that "instead of learning that the country was populated as it ought to have been, in view of the duration of the possession, we have learned with regret that not only is the number of inhabitants very small, but even that they are always in danger of being driven out by the Iroquois." The statement of acceptance concluded with an announcement that the king now brought New France directly under his authority and that all rights and privileges ceded to the company under the edict of 1628 were revoked.

D'Avaugour learned of this important transaction on July 5, together with word of his removal from office. The Governor had become embroiled in a dispute with Bishop Laval over the sale of brandy to the allied Indians, and the previous fall the Bishop had carried the story to France to seek satisfaction from the home government. The king agreed that d'Avaugour's effectiveness as Governor had been damaged in the affair, but in view of his energetic leadership in the past, it was decided to recall him.


without blame. The king called attention to d'Avaugour's "undeniable" gifts, but added that in light of the "strange and somewhat impractical nature" of the Governor it was thought best to replace him. Confronted with this announcement, the Governor impulsively departed from Quebec before his successor arrived.

For thirty-five years Canada had been indifferently governed by the Company of New France. The early hopes of the associates had been dashed in 1629-30 by the capture of their ships and the loss of the colony. After that they became interested only in cutting their losses as much as possible. Colonial expenses, which meant revenue for defending the colony, were reduced to a minimum, and the defense of Canada, after the return of the colony to the company in 1632, was carried out as well as possible with the limited resources available. But beginning in 1659 with the news of peace in Europe the corner was turned in Canadian affairs; for then, although still without help, the colonists were not without hope. The one governor who could have capitalized on this mood and who showed promise as a visionary leader, d'Avaugour, became the

first casualty of the irascible Bishop Laval. Nevertheless, the hope remained, and when Louis XIV announced in 1663 that henceforward he would be personally responsible for Canada, it appeared that a new dawn was breaking in the wilderness.
CHAPTER II

THE ROYAL INTERVENTION, 1663-1667

The edict restoring Canada to the crown in 1663 recognized two immediate and overriding needs for the colony: an increased population and a cessation of the Iroquois war. The two needs were related. It was the Iroquois war, together with the severe Canadian winters and the general economic stagnation of the colony which had combined to discourage Frenchmen from risking an ocean voyage to settle in an unknown land. Fewer than three thousand persons had migrated to Canada prior to 1663; and those who came, after experiencing what the colony had to offer in the way of danger and poverty, were only too eager to embark on the first ship for France, often without waiting for permission from the governor to leave.\(^1\)

The meager population, shut up behind its fortifications, could not hope to put an end to the Iroquois war. The best it could do was exist in the desperate hope that material assistance from France would arrive before the colony was overrun, that the promises of aid from the king

\(^1\)BRH, Vol. VIII, p. 334, Argenson to Mazarin, 5 Sept 1658.
would become more than promises. A large-scale offensive against the enemy was out of the question. Not only were Canadians too few in number to risk an invasion of Iroquoia, their families would be left unprotected in their absence and their crops would spoil in the field. In 1658, when d'Argenson learned of an imminent attack against Three Rivers and hastened there with one hundred men from Quebec to meet the onslaught, he could only remain on guard in the village a few days, "because of the many laborers whom /He7 had with /Him7."2

The overriding needs of the colony were going to be met, however. Louis XIV was going to keep his promises of aid, and for four years the colony was going to bask in the warmth of the royal attention.

One of the first steps taken by Louis XIV for the defense of the colony was the rapid augmentation of the colonial population. Pierre Boucher had already led 300 people to Canada the previous fall, and the king followed this by dispatching at his own expense one hundred families (500 persons in all) together with one year's provisions in 1663.3 The next year 800 indentured laborers were sent,


and in 1665, thirty-six. In 1666, 286 came. Many of those who came were specially selected young women, the so-called filles du Roy, some destined to marry the ordinary habitants, others of higher social standing to make good wives for the gentlemen of the colony, and all of them expected to be fecund so as to make their own contributions toward peopling the colony.

A second and equally important step was taken by deciding upon a form of government. The decision was made within days of the formal demission of the Company of New France when the king created the Sovereign Council of New France with its seat at Quebec. The Sovereign Council had no direct responsibility for the defense of the colony, although its voice, by virtue of the stature of the men who composed it, must have carried weight in matters of military importance. The Council was instituted to serve purposes

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5 RAPQ (1930-31), p. 103, Observations faites par Talon, 1669, Quebec.


that were judicial and political.\(^8\)

In its judicial capacity it acted as a court of appeals for cases originating in the colony; in its political capacity, as an overseer for public expenditures and as regulator for public affairs, such as the fur trade. By the terms of the edict, the Sovereign Council was composed of the Governor, the Bishop (or the senior ecclesiastic in the colony if the Bishop were absent), five councillors, an attorney-general, and a secretary. In 1665 another member took his seat on the Council, a colonial official named the Intendant. The Governor and the Bishop were to act jointly in the appointment of the others on the council.

A second component of the new government was created soon afterward when Louis XIV named the Sieur Saffroy de Mesy as Governor, thereby giving evidence that this office would be continued under the new regime. Mesy's commission, signed May 1, 1663, afforded Canada an official whose powers were more circumscribed than the governors under company rule, however.\(^9\) The civil and judicial powers of the governor were sharply curtailed, being in large measure invested in the Sovereign Council and in the office


Only in the two areas of military affairs and foreign relations with the Indians and other European colonies in America did the royal governor exercise the same power as his predecessors, and for the same practical reason. Military matters often could not wait upon the consensus of a council nor upon specific directives from the home authorities. The hand of the royal governor in matters pertaining to defense of the colony was therefore unchecked by any in the colony and was guided only in general terms from France.¹⁰

According to their commissions, the jurisdiction of the Canadian governors extended, depending on the time and fortunes of war, over Canada, Acadia, Newfoundland, Louisiana, Isle Royale, Isle Saint-Jean, and other French lands in North America.¹¹ In practice, the authority of the Canadian governor was limited solely to Canadian territory except in the beginning when the commandants in Acadia were ordered to recognize the superiority of the governor at Quebec. By 1684 even this limited authority

¹⁰ An excellent discussion of the military responsibilities of the governor is found in Gustave Lanctot, L'Administration de la Nouvelle-France, pp. 24-33.

¹¹ Compare the commissions of the various Canadian governors in P. G. Roy, Ordonnances, commissions, etc.
over other colonies was removed when Louis wrote to Governor de la Barre telling him to send no further orders to Acadia, it "being difficult and even impossible for you to know its needs from afar."\textsuperscript{12} Especially after that date, the authority of the Canadian governor was confined to the territory known and explored, from Labrador to the frontiers of the Illinois country and from New Brunswick to the foothills of the Rocky Mountains. The commissions of the royal governors specified no length for their term of office. They were expected to serve as long as the king took pleasure in their service.

The primary function of the governor was to represent the person of the king and to preserve the country under the royal obedience and domination.\textsuperscript{13} This being the case, the governor was the most important single individual in the colony and one whose responsibilities were distinctly military. His responsibilities encompassed three categories: troops, militia, and fortifications. In regard to the troops, whether Marines (\textit{Troupes de la Marine}) or Regulars (\textit{Troupes de Terre}),\textsuperscript{14} he had supreme command in

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{12}PAC, C11A, Vol. VI, p. 406, King to la Barre, 10 April 1684.
  \item \textsuperscript{13}Edits et Ord, Vol. III, pp. 21-22, "Commission du 1er mai, 1663."
  \item \textsuperscript{14}See below p.
\end{itemize}
time of war and peace.

In time of war he issued general and specific orders for the defense of the colony. In time of peace his first duty was to give attention to the disciplining of the troops so they would be ready to serve on the first occasion. In addition, he was responsible for executing all of the many details involved in stationing full-time soldiers in the colony. These included providing them with suitable winter quarters; protecting the civil population from insults at the hands of the soldiers, and conversely, protecting the soldiers from insults at the hands of their civilian or military superiors; and providing the troops with regular meals and pay. \(^{15}\)

As far as the militia of the colony was concerned—and this included all male habitants between the ages of sixteen and sixty capable of bearing arms—the governor here also exercised supreme command. He was able to summon them to active duty in time of peace to perform military corvées if need be. His primary duty, however, was to keep them in readiness in case of war. To accomplish this he was authorized to hold frequent reviews and training exercises on the condition that the men not be detained too

\(^{15}\)PAC, B, Vol. Cl, p. 56, Mémoire du Roy pour servir d'Instruction aux sieurs de Vaudreuil de Cavagnal et Bigot, 22 March 1755; p. 72, Mémoire du Roy pour servir d'Instruction au sieur Vaudrevil de Cavagnal, 22 March 1755.
long from their crops.\textsuperscript{16} He was also authorized to distribute, at the king's expense, firearms and ammunition to be used in these training exercises.\textsuperscript{17}

Regarding the officers of the militia, the governor was often able to obtain from the king blank commissions to be granted to the governor's favorites in the colony;\textsuperscript{18} on other occasions he could propose to the king that certain gentlemen of the colony receive commissions;\textsuperscript{19} so he was able to control to an extent the composition of the militia officer corps. The officers of the militia, when not on active duty in time of war, were employed by the governor on various duties relating to military matters: as ambassadors to Indian tribes and as commandants of the western fur-trade posts. Thus, the governor's military authority, even over the civilian population, was all-pervasive.

\textsuperscript{16} PAC, B, Vol. XCV, pp. 74-75, Mémoire du Roy pour servir d'Instruction au Marquis Duquesne, 15 May 1752.

\textsuperscript{17} PAC, F3, Vol. CXLIII, fol. 195, Mémoire sur les fonctions de gouverneur et d'intendant en Canada.

\textsuperscript{18} PAC, B, Vol. LXXXIII, p. 135, Mémoire du Roy pour servir d'Instruction au sieur de la Jonquiere, 1 April 1746; Vol. CVII, pp. 122-23, A. M. le Marquis de Vandrevil, 10 Feb 1758.

\textsuperscript{19} PAC, C11A, Vol. CI, p. 170, Liste des officiers que j'ai l'honneur de proposer à Monseigneur le Garde des Sceaux pour remplacer ceux qui sont morts, 8 Nov 1756.
In the domain of fortifications, the governor's discretionary powers were not as broad. Ordinarily, military necessity and availability of funds had to form a favorable conjunction before work could begin on any fortification. Once the minister had approved of the proposed site and the estimated cost, the governor was free to determine the particulars of construction, the size, shape, materials, and so forth, used in the building. The garrison of soldiers who would guard the finished structure were, of course, under his control.

In time of war, the powers of the governor increased appreciably. Automatically, he became the general-in-chief of the country, having absolute direction of all operations likely to make the colony more secure in the face of attack. The line separating his military authority from the civil authority exercised by others was likely to fade in the threat of the moment. He was at perfect liberty to regulate the affairs of the colony without recourse to advice of any kind, nor was he obligated to consult his officers in the field about tactical questions. He became, in short, an autocrat in the defense of the colony.

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Apart from what may be called his domestic military obligations, the governor was charged with duties involving foreign relations. Not only was he the only one in the colony authorized to communicate in an official way with other European colonies in America about affairs of mutual interest, he alone was given the task of dealing with the Indian allies of the French.

There were two groups of these allies. One group lived within the colony itself, the domiciles as they were called, inhabiting six small villages by about 1700: that of the Hurons, at Lorette, near Quebec; those of the Abenaki, at Becancourt and Saint-Francois-du-Lac, near Three Rivers; those of the Iroquois, at Sault Saint-Louis, in the neighborhood of Montreal, and at Presentation, on the St. Lawrence between Montreal and Ontario; and that of the Iroquois, Algonquins, and Nipissings near the Lake of the Two Mountains. Over these Indians, by virtue of their proximity to the French, the governor of Canada held complete and unquestioned authority.

The second group of allies were those who lived in the outskirts of the colony, those who settled around the western posts, like Michilimackinac in northern Lake Huron, or those who continued their nomadic lives in various parts of the country. This group constituted the largest and most important part of the French allies, but also the part that was most difficult to govern in the
best interests of the colony. The first interest of the
governor in their regard was to maintain the French domi­
ation in their territories. This he could do effectively
only by diplomatic means, the power of the French, like
the power of light, decreasing inversely to the square
of its distance from the source, in this case, Quebec.

The second interest of the governor was allied to the
first. He had to preserve the Indian fur trade carried
on at the western posts to the exclusion of other European
colonials—namely, the New Englanders. Here again his
only effective weapon was diplomacy. It was a problem
which successive governors wrestled with, never with out­
standing success. As a last resort, the governor could
undertake war against these Indians to hold them under the
French dominion and assure the continuance of the trade;
but then they would no longer be allies, and French
interests in the area would suffer severely. 22

The third component of the new Canadian government
created in 1663 was the office of Intendant. The man who
held this post took his place beside the governor as the
second most important administrative officer in the
colony. The first person appointed to the new Canadian
position, Louis Robert, Sieur de Fortel, never came to

22 PAC, B, Vol. CI, p. 77, Mémoire du Roy pour servir
d'Instruction au sieur Vandrevil de Cavagnal, 22 March
1755.
the colony because Louis XIV cancelled his commission soon after its issuance in March, preferring to entrust the functions of the intendant to the Sovereign Council for the time being.  

The first man to actually serve as Intendant in Canada was Jean Talon, who arrived at Quebec in the fall of 1665.

The intendant was expected to serve as the head civil officer in the colony. His commission, like that of the governor, specified no length for his term of service. The geographical limits of his jurisdiction, likewise, were limited out of practical considerations to the area under French domination in the interior of North America. His formal title, Intendant de Justice, Police et Finance en Canada, gives a good indication of his responsibilities.

He was responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the colony, and for seeing that the habitants obtained swift justice in the colonial courts. To aid him in this task he not only took the role of chief law-enforcement officer, issuing over his signature police regulations, he also served as the highest judge in the land, acting sometimes in conjunction with the Sovereign Council (where he served as president after 1665) and sometimes on his own authority. Further, he was the head

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bursar of the colony. Through his hands all monies and requests for monies were channeled, and he was in large measure responsible for the economic progress of the colony.  

Although the intendant was primarily a civil official, some of his duties extended into the realm of military affairs. Talon seems to have been the only intendant authorized to participate in the councils of war in the colony. Ordinarily, the intendant's activity in defensive planning was linked to his job of dispersing the king's money. He was responsible for paying, feeding, and clothing the troops, providing them with arms and ammunition, and arranging for their hospitalization when necessary. In the event the troops were in the field, the intendant had to arrange for the king's supplies to reach them.

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On the subject of fortifications, the intendant had to allocate money, materials, and labor. This he had to do while taking into account the governor's possible desire to build massively and the king's desire to hold down expenses. As for the militia, the intendant had no authority over them; but he might use the officers, as did the governor, to execute police regulations. Toward the western posts the intendant had no responsibility except for keeping the garrison supplied with food, clothing, pay, and trading goods, and enforcing law and order. Over the western tribes he had a very vague authority which hinged on his duty to allocate money to buy them presents and firearms.

Thus, within weeks after the management of Canadian affairs fell into his hands, Louis XIV took a large stride toward planning for an adequate defense of Canada by deciding on the form of its new government.

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The next logical step, a program to end the Iroquois war, was not long delayed. In the fall of 1664 Louis XIV named the Sieur Prouville de Tracy, sixty-four years of age and full of honors, as Lieutenant-General of North and South America and ordered him to take command of four companies of troops bound for the colonies. Tracy's commission, dated November 19, 1663, directed him to proceed to Canada by way of the Caribbean Islands of Cayenne, Martinique, and Guadeloupe, where he was to re-establish French control and settle certain administrative matters. After completing his mission in the Caribbean, an assignment of almost a year, he landed with his troops at Quebec on June 19, 1665 amid shouts of joy from the habitants. Since Tracy was the king's Lieutenant-General in the Americas, he outranked all of the other colonial officials during his stay. He had come to put an end to the Iroquois war.

Tracy found a curious calm existing in French-Iroquois relations when he landed. In August of 1663 a "solemn embassy" of Onondagas, led by their chief Garakontie, had arrived at Montreal, and in the name of all the Confederacy tribes except the Oneidas had asked for peace. They were

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cautiously received by Maisonneuvre and urged to go to Quebec the following year to speak of these matters with the new Governor, Mésy, who was to replace the already departed d'Avaugour. The next fall, on September 18, envoys from the Cayugas arrived at the capitol, and speaking for all of the tribes, again except for the Oneidas, arranged a treaty with the French. Except for a few incidents involving "pine-tree" upstarts, this was the peace in effect when Tracy landed.

Why had the Iroquois suddenly turned pacific? As early as the summer of 1664 the Iroquois had got wind of Louis XIV's intention to send soldiers into Iroquoia to burn villages and destroy crops. This the Iroquois had learned from French captives taken during the summer and from the Dutch at Fort Orange. Moreover, a severe famine was presently thinning the ranks of their warriors, and an epidemic of smallpox was adding to their misery. In addition, the Mohawks in the east and the Senecas in the west were being dangerously pressed by the redoubtable Mohicans and Andastes. In view of these events, the

32 Casson, Montreal, pp. 299-301.
33 JR, Vol. XLIX, p. 147.
34 JR, Vol. XLIX, p. 139.
35 JR, Vol. XLIX, p. 139.
Confederacy, minus the Oneidas, deemed it expedient again to repair the French alliance.

Regardless of this most recent peace, however, Louis XIV was determined to end the Iroquois threat to the colony as quickly as possible. When Tracy and his men stepped ashore in Quebec they learned that the king had already put into operation the second phase of his plan to quell the Iroquois. The first companies of an entire regiment of regular troops had landed at Quebec eleven days earlier, the regiment of Carignan-Salières. The king intended that Tracy use this regiment plus the men he brought with him to "exterminate entirely" the Indian enemies of the colony.

The king had dispatched one of France's finest regiments by sending the Carignan-Salières to Canada. The regiment, clad in grey and brown uniforms, had seen action almost constantly since its formation in 1641. It had fought Spanish troops until 1659 and then had been trans-

38 For details on this regiment see Régis Roy et Gérard Malchelosse, Le Régiment de Carignan, son organisation et son expédition au Canada (1665-1668), (Montreal: G. Ducharme, 1925) and Benjamin Sulte, "Le Régiment de Carignan," Mélanges Historiques, 8 Vols. (Montreal: G. Ducharme, 1922), Vol. VIII.
ferred to the east where it had recently completed a cam-
paign against the Turks in 1664. The regiment had received
special, modern equipment for its mission to Canada. Each
soldier carried a flint lock musket, two flasks for powder
and ball, and a new ring bayonette which need not be
removed for the musket to be discharged. The regiment then
was as well armed as any in France.

When the regiment received orders to depart for
Canada, a great deal of unhappiness resulted. One captain,
Delemongne, resigned his commission rather than depart for
that forbidding land, and many of his fellow officers would
have done the same had not the king refused to allow further
resignations. The same feeling must have persisted among
the enlisted men, for when the roll was called after the
regiment arrived at the ports of embarkation, many of the
companies were discovered to be far below their usual
strength of fifty men each. Vigorous recruitment and the
energetic work of the newly appointed Intendant Talon, who
was going to sail with the regiment to Canada, resulted in
a full regiment of one thousand men by sailing time, how-
ever, with some companies even reporting supernumeri-
aries. These, together with the soldiers under Tracy,


would mean a professional army of 1200 men, by far the largest Canada would see until the arrival of Dieskau and Montcalm in 1754.

The first companies of the regiment arrived in the colony on June 19, 1665. All of the rest of that summer and far into the fall, every ship arriving at Quebec brought soldiers to enact the great design of the king. Unfortunately, the crossing was generally a rough one. Some ships were battered by storms at sea for four months before reaching the capitol, and many of the soldiers were sick when they walked ashore. Eight members of the regiment died in transit. Even Tracy could hardly struggle through the welcome ceremony and the Te Deum sung for his safe arrival before taking to his bed.

On September 12 the Saint-Sebastien, a colonial transport, arrived bringing Talon, who had waited until the last before taking ship for Canada. Also arriving aboard the Saint-Sebastien was the new Governor, Daniel de Rémy, Sieur de Courcelles, who had been sent to replace Mésy, recently deceased. Courcelles arrived "breathing nothing but war" and immediately set out on an inspection trip up the

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St. Lawrence to acquaint himself with the country. Talon remained behind to take up his duties caring for the troops.

Talon's instructions indicated the tactics that would be employed to eliminate the Iroquois problem. That part of the instructions which dealt with tactical considerations began by saying that the king considered the Iroquois to be the perpetual and irreconcilable enemies of the colony. Their enmity against the French had been the primary reason of the colony's stagnation. The king, the instructions continued, was resolved to carry war to them and "exterminate them entirely, if possible." For this purpose he had sent the powerful reinforcement of troops and munitions to Canada. The king expected the colony to furnish 300 or 400 additional men for the campaign. Some new forts would be necessary to preserve newly occupied territory for France. Talon would be permitted to take part in all of the detailed military planning undertaken by Tracy and Courcelles, but his primary task would be that of supplying munitions and other necessities to the troops.

The instructions went on to say that the king was gravely concerned about the scattered nature of settlement in Canada. The king believed that another attempt should

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be made to consolidate around Quebec the dispersed settlements of the colony and clear new land there for the immigrants who henceforth would be arriving yearly. Connected with this program of settlement, the king enjoined Talon to spare no effort toward inducing the soldiers of the Carignan-Salières regiment to remain in Canada after the Iroquois campaign was over and become habitants. The double thrust of the king's program for defending the colony was then: 1) exterminate the Iroquois, and 2) consolidate and enlarge the population of the colony, especially around the more defensible district of Quebec.

Part of the king's program had started being put into effect as soon as troops began arriving at Quebec. On July 23 Tracy ordered four companies of the Carignan-Salières to the Richelieu River to select and occupy sites for the construction of forts along the path leading to Iroquoia.\footnote{Faillon, \textit{Histoire de la colonie française}, Vol. III, p. 124.} They were commanded by M. de Repentigny and were followed by a great number of allied Indians who served as scouts and suppliers of fresh game. The plan was to construct before the snows came three forts along the Richelieu between its mouth and Lake Champlain. These would serve as magazines for supplies and retreats for the sick or wounded in the campaign against the Iroquois.
The sites selected, Tracy sent four other companies from the regiment under the command of M. de Chambly to the location picked for the construction of the first fort. Chambly and his men began their trip to the Richelieu at the beginning of August. The place chosen for the first fort was seventeen leagues up the Richelieu, across from the principal rapids of the river. A major portage for the army would begin at this point, and the fort would offer protection while the portage was in progress. It would also serve as a major supply base for forts constructed higher up the river. The fort was begun during the week in August when the feast of St. Louis was celebrated; so the fort early carried the name of that saint. But since M. de Chambly had been the prime mover in the enterprise, the structure more often was called after its first commander.

When completed in the fall of 1665, Fort Chambly was a square stone and masonry structure of 144 feet on each side, with triangular bastions in the middle of three sides and a well-protected entrance on the fourth.

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46 JR, Vol. XLIX, p. 163, 175, 272; I, p. 141; RAPQ (1930-31), p. 50, Talon to Colbert, Quebec, 3 Nov 1666.

47 One league is equal to 2.4 nautical miles of 2.76 statute miles.

48 An outline of the first three forts constructed appears in the Relation of 1665. JR, Vol. XLIV, plate facing page 266.
Inside the fort a chapel was built, along with barracks for the permanent garrison and a house for the commander. The whole was surrounded by a pine-log palisade fifteen feet high.

While work was in progress on this fort, Tracy dispatched a third contingent of the regiment to the Richelieu on August 25. This contingent was commanded by M. de Sorel and was ordered to construct a fort on the site of old Ft. Richelieu. The site would provide a place where an important storehouse of supplies could be built, one which itself could easily be provisioned from either Quebec or Three Rivers. Work on the second fort was also completed in the fall of 1665. When finished the fort formed the rough outline of a square, the front of which had bastions on either side, with another bastion on the rear wall flanked by two demi-bastions. Inside the fort were several buildings, a chapel, barracks, and storehouses. The structure was first called Ft. Richelieu after its predecessor, but soon it took on the name of its chief builder and was commonly styled Ft. Sorel.

As soon as other members of the regiment arrived at Quebec, Tracy organized yet another contingent to fortify

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Fig. 6.—Jesuit map of Iroquoia and plans for the first three forts along the Richelieu River (JR, Vol. XLIX, pp. 266-67).
the Richelieu. This contingent was placed under the command of M. de Salières, the regimental commander, and was ordered to construct a third fort at the Ste. Therese rapids, three leagues above Ft. Chambly. This third fort was intended to guard the rapids as Ft. Chambly would do, and serve as an advanced post for the army during the winter. M. de Salières left for the Richelieu to build the fort on September 2 with seven companies of soldiers containing, he complained, "not a single workman or carpenter." By October 2 he and his 350 men had arrived at the rapids and had begun construction.

The building proceeded rapidly, perhaps spurred by the frosty air, and in less than two weeks the fort was completed and named after the saint on whose feast day the final log in the palisade was placed, Sainte Therese. According to the plan of the fort made by the Jesuits, Ft. Sainte-Therese was in the shape of a parallelogram, 144 by 96 feet, with walls fifteen feet high and bastions on each corner. The fort was surrounded by a double palisade. The engineer Franquet, when he visited the ruins of the fort in 1752, reported that although the fort had been constructed of pine logs, it had been built on a

50 JR, Vol. XLIX, p. 253; L, pp. 81-83; RAPQ (1930-31), p. 50, Talon to Colbert, Quebec, 3 Nov 1666; Mémoire de M. de Salières in Roy, Carignan, p. 48.
rather grand scale and had enclosed a house and a magazine, the outlines of which were still discernable.  

The finishing touches were put on these forts during the fall and winter, and a road was constructed between Forts Sainte-Therese and Chambly and one linking Chambly overland with Montreal. At the same time, a scouting party of eighteen or twenty men set out from Sainte-Therese to investigate the river up to Lake Champlain with an eye toward choosing sites for other forts to be constructed the next year. While these initiatives were being carried out on the Richelieu, the people of Quebec were busy building large flat-boats to be used in transporting war materials over the rapids between the capitol and Iroquoia. It is noteworthy that the forts along the Richelieu were not constructed, as Montmagny's had been, to stop infiltration into the colony; they were waystations for an invasion.

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52 Roy, Carignan, pp. 28-29; RAPQ (1930-31), p. 50, Talon to Colbert, Quebec, 3 Nov 1666.


During these months Talon was not idle. He was busy with the needs of the troops and with another aspect of the king's plan to fortify the colony. His instructions had ordered him to consolidate the population of the Quebec area nearer the capital and prepare thirty or forty additional homesteads annually for new immigrants from France. Not only would a compact settlement at Quebec be easier to defend and easier for priests to serve, it would make justice easier to administer and would help guarantee the agricultural supply of the capitol.

In the fall of 1665 Talon began looking for land near the capitol on which to focus his attention. He chose land across the St. Charles River in the seigneurie of Notre-Dame-des-Anges, conceded to the Jesuits in 1626. This land he expropriated in the name of the king. Talon's action enraged the Jesuits and set them against him in a long legal battle that was not finally settled until much later in the century. While the legal battle raged Talon went ahead with his plans, and within one year could report to the minister that he had formed three villages in

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55 PAC, B, Vol. 1, fol. 75, Mémoire du roi pour servir d'Instruction à Talon, 27 March 1665.

56 The details of Talon's settlement plans for the district of Quebec are found in Chapais, Talon, pp. 93 ff, 158 ff, 164 ff.
the territory across the river—Bour-Royal, Bourg-la-Reine, and Bourg-Talon—two prepared to receive immigrants from France and the third to receive soldiers from the Carignan-Salières regiment who would remain in Canada. The villages were square in form and designed by Talon to be completely self-supporting in all the necessities of life. The farms within each village were laid out in triangular shape, their boundaries radiating from a center like spokes of a wheel. These farms were very popular, and by the fall of 1667 the Relation of that year reported that fields of grain could be seen ripening in each of the three villages.

In the fall of 1665, after Courcelles had returned from his inspection trip upriver and the soldiers had been assigned their winter quarters, the Iroquois, manifesting an uneasiness over the preparations for war then going on along the Richelieu and at Quebec, sent a deputation to Tracy to learn his intentions. On December 2 Garakontié and an Oneida chief arrived at Quebec to reconfirm the peace, which had recently been worn thin by a number of isolated attacks against the French along the great river.


The two chiefs made their speeches and gave and received gifts in the presence of Tracy, but the old Lieutenant-General would give them no satisfaction in regard to a general peace treaty.  

After the Indians had left the capitol, Tracy authorized the impetuous Governor Courcelles to undertake what was to become the first of four expeditions directed against the Iroquois to carry out Louis XIV's desire to exterminate the Indian enemies of the colony. This first expedition was to be directed against the Mohawks because it was they who had been the most relentless enemies of the colony and had been involved in some of the recent violations of the peace. The Mohawks were also the most accessible tribe of the five.

On January 9, 1666, in bitter cold and over snow sometimes four feet deep, Courcelles set out with a force of 100 Canadian volunteers and 300 regular troops. It was thought that a winter expedition would catch the Mohawks unaware and that the extreme cold would aid the march by making the snow and lakes over which the men must pass hard-frozen. Equipped for the most part with snow shoes...
and each man, Courcelles included, carrying about thirty pounds of provisions on his back, the rest being loaded on large sleds drawn by dogs, the little army reached Ft. Chambly around January 29 where some of the men who were suffering frostbite were replaced by soldiers on garrison there. The next day, the force, now numbering between 500 and 600 men, set out toward what they thought was Iroquoia.

Courcelles had expected to meet several Algonquin guides at Chambly, but true to the Indians' sense of timing, they did not arrive, and the impatient Governor set off without them. For lack of guides, the army wandered slowly southwestward for more than two weeks, passing each night in the open snow and sure of only two things--that it was heading in the general direction of the Mohawk villages and that it would be a miracle if ever it saw Quebec again.

On February 15 Courcelles and his army blundered upon the little Dutch settlement of Corlear (Schenectady), about three day's march east of the Mohawk villages. There they surprised a Mohawk hunting-party which fled at the sight of the French. Some of Courcelles' men pursued, and when the Indians led them into an ambush, the Governor got his first taste of Indian-style warfare. One French officer

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spring of 1666; an English account printed in NYC, Vol. III, pp. 118-19, "A Relation of the Governor of Canada, his March with 600 volunteirs into ye territories of his Royall Highness the Duke of Yorke in America (1666)."
and ten men were killed and several others wounded, the Mohawks losing only three of their warriors.

When news of the French presence reached nearby Albany, a delegation from that town was sent to inquire of Courcelles why he had thus invaded the dominions of his Britannic Majesty. It was then that the Governor for the first time heard that New Netherland had fallen to an English expeditionary force the previous year and that Englishmen now governed the territories along the Hudson River. Courcelles, when he learned this startling news, remarked with unwitting prescience "that the King of England did grasp at all America." Neither Courcelles nor his conferees knew that their respective monarchs had been at war in Europe for nearly a month. The Dutch and English offered the French every kindness, but when it began to rain and there arose the fear that a thaw might weaken the ice along the path of the return march, Courcelles left seven seriously ill men to be cared for by the Albany authorities and broke camp on February 21 to begin the long trek home.

The march back to Canada was no more pleasant than the one coming had been. With food running low and with Mohawk war-parties dogging their every step, the Frenchmen straggled back to Ft. Chambly as best they could, the last few dragging themselves back as late as March 20.
More than sixty men had fallen along the way, some the victims of Mohawk bullets, most the victims of exposure and exhaustion. As an English official at Albany later remarked, "surely soe bould an hardy an attempt (circumstances considered) hath not happened in any age."

Talon and the Jesuits did not fail to glorify the results of the expedition, but their opinions were not shared by others. Salières, who accompanied the expedition, claimed that the army was poorly equipped to undertake a winter campaign. Not enough soldiers had snowshoes, he charged, and there were too few hatchets and shoes to last out the long march. Dollier de Casson, writing about six years later, said that Courcelles' campaign was another instance of the French failure to adapt their style of fighting to that of the enemy. Certainly it must be admitted that this first expedition against the Iroquois was more of a disaster for the French than for the enemy. When one judges the goals of the expedition by the standard of actual accomplishment—a handful of Confederacy warriors slain—the near total failure of Courcelles' campaign becomes clear.

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63 Mémorial de M. de Salières in Roy, Carignan, pp. 48 ff.
64 Casson, Montreal, p. 311.
With another expedition against the Iroquois clearly called for, work was begun in the spring of 1666 on a fourth fort along the Richelieu invasion route. The fort was located on the northern shore of an island at the foot of Lake Champlain, where soldiers could overlook and guard the egress from the lake into the Richelieu. Construction was probably begun in May under the direction of Captain La Motte of the Carignan-Salières regiment and completed around July 26. The name of the fort was Sainte-Anne, testifying to the devotion Canadians felt for the patron saint of the colony. The dimensions of the fort are not known with certainty, although judging from the comments of Dallier de Casson, who visited the fort that winter, they must have been considerable.

The position of Pt. Sainte-Anne, twenty-five leagues distant from Montreal and situated on an island which could not support its garrison with food, made the soldiers who lived there wretched individuals. We know that its garrison numbered sixty men during the first year of its existence, two-thirds of whom nearly died during the


66 Casson, Montreal, pp. 372 ff.
winter for lack of food and clothing. The next year, 1667, its garrison was reduced to thirty men, whose fondest wish was doubtless that the winter would pass without an Iroquois attack over the ice which joined the island to the mainland for several months during coldest weather.

Yet a fifth fort was begun on August 15, 1666 about two leagues upriver from Ft. Sainte-Therese to guard the rapids in that place. It was apparently a flimsy affair constructed of pine logs with bastions at the four corners and enclosing a barracks for the garrison and a magazine for provisions. The fort was first named Fort Assumption but later changed to Fort Saint-Jean. It was abandoned before 1672 and had fallen into ruins by that date. The very limited tactical value of Forts Sainte-Anne and Saint-Jean must have quickly become apparent because both were occupied only briefly. Both must have been built with short-term prospects in mind.

While these preparations for war were going on in the spring and summer of 1666, a deputation of Oneidas arrived

67Casson, Montreal, pp. 372 ff.


in Quebec in an attempt to stay the hand of Ononthio. Speaking for themselves and the Mohawks, they implored Tracy and Courcelles for peace and for "black gowns" to be sent to their villages. The French were agreeable, and on July 12 a treaty was concluded with the two tribes. The Oneidas were the more easily believed because Tracy had received word from the commissioners at Albany that the Oneidas and Mohawks seemed favorably disposed toward peace after the scare Courcelles had thrown into them the previous February. With the treaty concluded, Tracy called off preparations for another campaign in the hope the chiefs could restrain their young warriors from making any further attacks on the French. Whether Tracy intended to let the matter rest there, or whether he intended secretly to prepare for another invasion of Iroquoia is unknown. In any case, the question soon became academic.

Exactly one week after the treaty had been concluded, a band of Mohawks attacked and killed seven men from

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Ft. Sainte-Anne who had left the enclosure to go hunting. Among the dead was Tracy's own nephew, M. de Chazy. As an answer to this seeming bold-faced treachery, Tracy dispatched an angry letter to the commissioners at Albany accusing them of duplicity. He then proceeded to order M. de Sorel to undertake a punitive expedition against the instigators of the crime. Sorel took with him 200 Frenchmen, regulars and volunteers, and eighty or ninety Algonquin Indians.

Sorel and his company set out from Three Rivers near the end of July. When they were within twenty leagues of the Mohawk villages, they encountered a Mohawk deputation headed by "the Flemish Bastard," a half-breed chief of the tribe. He said the deputation was on its way to Quebec to make amends for the attack at Ft. Sainte-Anne and to prove his good faith, produced some French prisoners taken in the raid. Sorel accepted the Indians' protestations of sincerity and returned with them and his army to Quebec. There the Mohawks met representatives from the four other

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74 NYCd, Vol. III, p. 131, Tracy to Commissaries at Albany, Quebec, 22 July 1666.

tribes who were already in the capitol, and for the first time in Canadian history, on August 31, deputies from all five tribes sat down with officials of Canada to discuss a general peace.\textsuperscript{76}

While these negotiations were in progress the first ships of the year reached Quebec with dispatches from the court. The dispatches brought news that France, allied with the Dutch, were at war with England. This news, in the light of the knowledge gained by Courcelles in February that the English controlled the government of New York and were presumably the new allies of the Iroquois, completely changed the complexion of circumstances in North America. The king ordered Tracy to consider whether it would be better to attack or refrain from attacking the English colonies to the south.\textsuperscript{77} If Tracy thought they could be easily conquered, he was authorized to do so; but if neutrality seemed the better course, he was to pursue it, without, however, undertaking negotiations to that end, since these would lower the prestige of the French crown.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{76} \textit{Journal of the Jesuits} in JR, Vol. L, p. 199.
\item \textsuperscript{77} PAC, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Angleterre, Vol. LXXX, pp. 27-29, King to Tracy, 24 March 1666.
\end{itemize}
Tracy had noticed that the Mohawks were holding back in their discussions about peace, and he now reasoned that they had known about the European war before the Canadians and were counting on the active support of the English in continuing the war with Canada. Their strategy was to stall for time so as to prevent a French attack and give the English a chance to mount an offensive against Canada. An attack on Canada was already under consideration in Manhattan and Boston.

The three Canadian leaders immediately took council over the meaning of these developments. Talon was of the firm opinion that no peace should be made with the Iroquois until they had been crushed in war; once that was done, he argued, the way would be open for an invasion of New York. He submitted his opinions on this subject to Tracy and Courcelles on September 1. His memorandum began by stating that the question at issue was "whether it is more advantageous to the service of the king to make war on the Mohawks, or to conclude peace with them." He proceeded to

78 JR, Vol. L, pp. 139-44.
79 NYCD, Vol. III, p. 120, Colonel Nicolls to the Council of Massachusetts, Fort James, New York, 6 July 1666.
enumerate the arguments on either side of the question. His arguments are an excellent example of the strategic thinking of Louis XIV's Canadian officials after New Netherland fell to the English.

Talon began by stating the reasons for war. First of all, he reminded Tracy and Courcelles that the king had sent troops to Canada with orders to fight the Indian enemies of the colony; it would therefore be more glorious to carry out those orders than to try and live at peace with the Iroquois. Second, experience had shown that the Mohawks could not be trusted to keep their word, as the recent killings at Fort Sainte-Anne had testified. Peace negotiations with the Mohawks were, therefore, of little value, and it would be unwise to place much reliance in a treaty made with them. Third, although the Iroquois might wish to uphold the peace of their own accord, "the proximity of the English, who encourage them, should cause us to understand that sooner or later this European nation, in war against the French, will excite the Mohawks and Oneidas to declare the same against us in the upper part of the river so as to divide our forces while it attacks us at the mouth or along the course of the St. Lawrence.

The fourth reason listed by Talon was that the fall of the year was an auspicious season to launch an attack because fall had none of the "inconveniences" of the other seasons, like mosquitoes and high water in spring or snow
in winter. Fifth, since there was presently no threat to the colony from the English, all available troops could be thrown into the Iroquois war, whereas if war were postponed until spring, a considerable number of men would have to be held in reserve at Quebec to guard against a possible English attack. Sixth, Talon argued that the Canadian force was then at its maximum effective strength, for the winter would be sure to carry off or disable an undetermined number.

Seventh, there was then in the country enough munitions to undertake the campaign, but the vicissitudes of winter might change the situation by spring. Eighth, in situations like the one then facing Canada, Talon said, where there is much to be gained and little to be risked, attack is the best policy. Last, the success of the enterprise against the Mohawks would open the door for an attack on Albany, an attack which would disorder the English forces "stronger in these countries than the French and capable of ruining Canada by an invasion."

Talon then passed to arguments in favor of peace with the Mohawks; but unlike the arguments in favor of war, to each of these was appended the Intendant's own confutation. To the first argument, that the colony should not be stripped of its defensive forces because the English might already be ascending the river for an invasion, Talon
answered that even if the English were on the river, they would not hazard an invasion: 1) because they would have no intelligence that Canada was not still guarded by 1200 regular troops, 2) because Boston then had few regular troops of its own, and its militia would not attempt such a bold plan, 3) because the season was too advanced for a successful attack on Quebec.

Second, to the objection that war against the Mohawks would necessitate the mobilization of the militia, thereby interrupting the harvest, Talon replied that the harvest could be continued by the other habitants and that such an interruption was in any case no worse than the interruptions caused by Indian attacks. Third was the objection that the Algonquins would not go to war with the French because they were outraged that some Iroquois prisoners had not been handed over to them. Talon answered this objection by saying that the allies could be ordered to war by the Canadian authorities or made more pliant with gifts. Fourth, concerning the opinion that the Mohawks may be sincere in their wish for peace and would never again trust the French if the French attacked them while peace negotiations were in progress, Talon said that it was better to have war with the Mohawks than an uncertain peace, for between them and the French "there is no more fidelity than between the most ferocious animals."
The fifth argument for peace supposed that the English and Dutch would be sure to mount a counter offensive against Canada if the French destroyed the tribe. The Intendant offered the opinion that far from combating the French force, the Dutch were likely to welcome it and use its presence as an occasion to throw off the English domination. Besides, Talon added, war having been declared in Europe, the English colonies would not require an excuse to take up arms against Canada. Sixth and last, to the argument that war with the Mohawks would require the removal of the best officers from the forts to accompany the expedition, and that their replacements might not be able to handle the all-important details of supplying the troops in the field, Talon replied that that danger had been greatly exaggerated.

Talon's memorandum was sufficient to convince Tracy and Courcelles. Tracy broke off peace negotiations with the Confederacy tribes and ordered their ambassadors held as hostages so they could not warn their fellow villagers of the French preparations for war. On September 6 he resolved to lead an army against the Mohawks, the apparent instigators of the colony's past and present trouble.81 By the middle of September the troops and the militia had been gathered, the supplies loaded on flatboats

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for the trip down the St. Lawrence and Richelieu, and on September 14 the invasion force set out for Iroquoia to begin the extermination of the Confederacy.\textsuperscript{82}

The army under the command of Tracy consisted of about 1300 men in all, 700 regulars, 400 habitants, and 100 Algonquins.\textsuperscript{83} They progressed up the St. Lawrence, passed the line of forts along the Richelieu, and by September 28 or 29 entered Lake Champlain.\textsuperscript{84} After pausing at Ft. Sainte-Anne several days to become organized, the army left the fort and started across the length of Lakes Champlain and St. Sacrement toward the Mohawk villages to the southwest.\textsuperscript{85}

From the tip of Lake St. Sacrement the men began their long march overland toward the point where their guides told them they would find the first of the Mohawk villages. The army was soon discovered by an Iroquois scouting party which quickly fled to spread the alarm. The first village

\textsuperscript{82} \textit{Journal of the Jesuits} in \textit{JR}, Vol. L, p. 201.

\textsuperscript{83} Estimates on the size and composition of the army vary in detail. The figures provided by Roy, \textit{Carignan} were followed here. For another estimate see \textit{Suité}, "Le Régiment de Carignan," \textit{Mélanges Historiques}, Vol. VIII.

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{Journal of the Jesuits} in \textit{JR}, Vol. L, p. 201.

\textsuperscript{85} \textit{Journal of the Jesuits} in \textit{JR}, Vol. L, p. 205. Accounts of Tracy's expedition are found in \textit{JR}, Vol. L, pp. 139 ff; the letters of Marie de l'Incarnation during the fall and winter of 1666-67; Casson, \textit{Montreal}, pp. 311 ff.
reached by the French was found deserted, likewise the second and the third. When the army reached the last village, drums beating and flags waving, it was also found abandoned, except for a few old men and women, too decrepit to flee, who were turned over to the Algonquins to burn and butcher. It appeared that the Mohawks had intended to make a stand at this largest of their villages, with its triple palisade twenty feet high, because the invaders found fires still burning and meals still cooking, as though precipitously abandoned. The French noticed many Mohawk warriors on the tops and sides of several nearby hills casting insults at the French and firing occasional, ineffective shots in their direction.

This did not prevent the French from going into the Mohawks' grain fields and putting them and whatever harvested grain could be found to the torch. Next the army turned its attention to the villages themselves, sacking and burning some one hundred long houses. Before departing Tracy ordered all of the troops to be assembled before the main village of Andaraque. There a cross and a post bearing the arms of Louis XIV were erected, and Jean Baptiste de Bois, acting in the name of the Intendant, took formal possession of the Mohawk lands by right of conquest. By November 5 Tracy and his men were back in Quebec, having returned the way they had come. Their only casualties were nine or ten men drowned while crossing Lake Champlain
During a storm. Nine days after Tracy arrived back in the capitol a joyous Te Deum was sung in the Cathedral in Upper Town over the success of the expedition.

But in what terms was it successful? Certainly it did not meet the king's intention to crush the Iroquois entirely. Talon, writing to the minister a few days after Tracy's return, had to rationalize about the benefits of the campaign. Only a few old Mohawks had been exterminated, and that was not due to the glorious arms of his majesty. The Mohawk lands were not occupied; so the French army's movement through them could be compared to a plow point passing through water. Other considerations must be taken into account in determining the success of the campaign.

The loss of the Mohawk's winter supply of grain was a much more serious consequence of the campaign. The aboriginal economy and society could not adapt itself to such a loss. The French estimated that the destruction of Mohawk grain would cost the Mohawks as many deaths by starvation as they would have suffered in battle had they stood and fought—about 400. What was perhaps just as


important was the moral effect the campaign had on the Confederacy. The French had shown their ability to strike the Iroquois a damaging, even fatal, blow.

Moreover, the Iroquois felt themselves increasingly isolated from their allies. The English had not distinguished themselves in the affair, and were apparently willing to leave the tribes to the mercy of the French. The Iroquois knew that despite the brief war in Europe, the crowned heads of England and France, Louis XIV and Charles II, were cousins and might in the future cooperate in war—a circumstance fraught with peril for the Confederacy, whose lands were now surrounded on three sides by the white men and their Indian allies.

Then, too, there was the related problem of the Andastes to the south and west. That relentless enemy of the Confederacy showed no signs of tiring in its long war with the Iroquois. The apprehension of what the future might hold, combined with the direct loss of the grain supply, must be judged as the principal success of Tracy's campaign. The Confederated tribes were led to adopt a basic change in their policy toward the French out of fear, not out of defeat.

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88 PAC, CI1A, Vol. III, fol. 77, Talon to Colbert, Quebec, 10 Nov 1670.
The three superior Iroquois tribes had already read the signs and had made their peace with the French before Tracy departed for the country of the Mohawks, but it took the campaign to chasten the two inferior tribes. On November 8, 1666, three days after his return, Tracy sent the captive Flemish Bastard, an old Mohawk, and two Oneida chiefs back to their respective tribes with an ultimatum: they should return with other hostages and negotiate a general peace with the French within four moons or risk total destruction in another campaign. On April 20 the Flemish Bastard and two Oneida chiefs returned, but without hostages, and Tracy extended the deadline by two moons.

This final threat had the desired result. On July 5 delegates from the two tribes arrived with hostages and joined delegates from the Seneca, Cayuga, and Onondaga in accepting the terms which Tracy laid down: there was to be a three-cornered general peace among the Iroquois, the French, and the allied Indians; what amounted to a mutual exchange of hostages was to take place, a number of Iroquois families remaining in the colony and a few French

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families and "black gowns" removing to the relatively more safe tribes of Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca; and the Iroquois were to accept the principle of eventual union with the French, a goal first articulated by Champlain and which Colbert, in his policy of "frenchification," was then pushing over the protests of the Jesuits. 91

Tracy had imposed a favorable treaty on the Iroquois, but it was imposed under circumstances quite different than Louis XIV had imagined. The Iroquois, almost unscathed after two ineffective campaigns had been directed against them, were still a force to be reckoned with. There was apprehension in the colony that the peace would last no longer than it served the Iroquois' purpose, and that the Frenchmen going to live in Iroquoia were already no better than dead men. 92 Talon was frankly expecting another war and wrote to Colbert in the fall to say that the forts along the Richelieu were being held in readiness in case the king wanted to follow his original plan and exterminate the enemy. 93


Talon was left waiting on this issue. By 1667 the four years of royal intervention had come to an end. In Europe other problems had already diverted the attention of the French government. The War of the Devolution had broken out between France and the United Provinces that year, and a recall had already been issued for the troops stationed in Canada. If the Iroquois were to be controlled, Canada would have to do the job alone.

Tracy received the recall order just weeks after the Iroquois peace settlement was made—before, in fact, the court knew of the settlement. He was ordered to embark with the four companies he had led to Canada and sail for France.94 He departed from Quebec on August 28, leaving the command of the royal regiment to Governor Courcelles. But the regiment was not long to remain either. The next summer, those of the Carignan-Salières regiment who were not going to make their homes in Canada set sail for France, and the colony again was mostly upon its own resources. It was to the great good fortune of Canada that the Iroquois, not to mention the English, found it expedient to live at peace with New France for the next seventeen years; for without royal troops and without the continued

impulse toward colonization that characterized the years, 1663-1667, the future of Canada remained under a cloud.

Louis XIV and Colbert may have foreseen the time when France would be unable to maintain a large force in Canada. From the beginning Talon had been instructed to encourage the officers and men of the Carignan-Salières regiment to remain in the colony and settle as habitants. It was reasoned that not only would these men increase the population of Canada by a significant number, but they would add a great deal of experience to the colonial militia. Colbert wrote to Talon several times on the subject, once saying that the king considered the matter of utmost priority in his general plan for colonial defense.

Talon noted on a copy of his original instructions, presumably during the fall of 1665, that surely some of the soldiers would remain in Canada because he had received promises of help in the settlement project from several regimental officers. Talon also noted that he planned to introduce the soldiers to Canadian agriculture that fall by having them assist the older habitants in clearing,
plowing, and planting new fields. The king would provide the grain and receive the harvest. Two benefits would result: the royal treasury would not be out the expense of feeding the soldiers the following year, and the soldiers could count the work toward fulfilling the requirement that all new immigrants spend their first three years as indentured servants of the older habitants. In this way, Talon added, the king would be saved some money, and Canada would gain its first "soldier-habitants."

As further inducement to settle in Canada, Talon was authorized to offer land and money to the members of the regiment. The Intendant set forth the terms on which the land and money would be offered in a letter to Colbert, dated October 4, 1665. The soldiers desirous of remaining in Canada would receive all of the necessary money and provisions to sustain them during their first year, after which they would be able to provide their own living. Soldiers of the lowest rank would be granted either 100 francs outright, or receive half that amount plus a year's

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provisions. Sergeants would receive 150 francs outright, or 100 francs and a year's provisions. Officers would be offered seignories in their new land. Enlisted men would be paid for bringing under cultivation two arpents of land. This land would remain their property. In return, they would be obliged to clear within four years two additional arpents which would be granted by the government to newly-arrived families.

The former members of the regiment would, of course, be subject to military service, either for the defense of the colony or for enterprises "which concern the utility and advantage" of the kingdom. Terms of settlement such as these, the government granting land and provisions in return for military service, had their example in Roman antiquity, in the praedia militaria by which Rome pacified distant provinces. "The practice of these [ancient] warriors and politicians," wrote the Intendent, "can, in my opinion, be judiciously introduced into a country a thousand leagues distant from its monarch and from the mother country of which it is only a very detached member, which often finds itself reduced to maintaining itself by its own forces."

These inducements and less tangible ones, like the attractiveness of Canadian women, caused around 400 men of the regiment to accept the king's terms and remain in the
Not all of the men settled and became soldier-farmers as Talon had hoped, but an important segment did. It has been estimated that of the 400 who remained, 100 became coureurs de bois and contributed little to the strength of the colony; another 100 became craftsmen of one sort or another and settled in the principal habitations; and 200 devoted themselves to agriculture.

The exact location where these and other immigrants of the period settled is difficult to determine, but there is good reason to believe the Canadian authorities tried to concentrate the new arrivals in three specific areas. One of the areas was Quebec and its satellite villages of Bourg-Talon, Bourg-Royal, and Bourg-la-Reine. One of the villages had been laid out with the soldiers in mind and by the fall of 1667 had received a number of habitants. The settlement of soldiers near Quebec was of obvious military value and suited the king's desire to consolidate the population of Canada around the capitol.

The second area of settlement was along the St. Lawrence above Quebec. The Relation of 1668 mentions that "it

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is nice to see at present nearly all of the banks of our Saint Lawrence River inhabited with new colonies which extend more than twenty-eight leagues along the edges of this great river." The colonies were new in that they were undoubtedly settled by some of the soldiers and non-military immigrants who had come to the colony in record numbers since 1662. They were colonies in that they followed a method of compact settlement which contributed to the collective defense, a proposal first put forward by Governor d'Argenson a decade earlier and seconded by Governor d'Avaugour and the Jesuits. The passage from the Relation of 1668 probably indicates that Talon was following the earlier suggestions to settle colonists along the great river in such a way as to provide both for their own security and for the security of the colony against those who would use the upper part of the river as an infiltration route.

The third area of settlement was along the Richelieu River. In 1666 three officers of the Carignan-Salières regiment who intended to remain in Canada, Messrs. Sorel, Saint-Ours, and Chambly, were granted seignories along the river in the vicinity of the forts. Within a year they

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102 JR, Vol. LI, p. 4. Italics are mine.

had built beautiful homes for themselves and their families and had stocked their farms with cattle, cows, and poultry. They naturally wanted to attract habitants to the seignories, and for that purpose had cleared their property of trees, especially around Forts Sorel and Chambly.

The authority and prestige of army officers in the seventeenth century was such that the three probably experienced little difficulty in recruiting new colonists for their seignories principally from among the men who had served under them in the army. That such was the case is confirmed by theRelation of 1667 which remarks that the troops had contributed greatly to the development of Canada and helped open up the country in many places, "especially on the Richelieu River, where the forts that have recently been erected are surrounded by fields cleared of woods and covered with very fine grain." There is no reason to believe that habitants would settle in locations as exposed as these unless the government had encouraged the project in the hope that the enclaves would offer an impediment to infiltration by the Iroquois.


Thus, by 1668 Canada was protected against Indian attack at three strategic locations: Quebec, the lower St. Lawrence, and the lower Richelieu. Each of the locations was strengthened by forts, by closed villages, or by a combination of both.

The history of defensive planning during these years would be incomplete without consideration being given to Talon's proposals for making Canada into a base of offensive operations against the other European colonies in America. His memorandum of September 1, 1666 on the subject of war with the Iroquois has already received attention. He urged an attack on the Iroquois so as to strip Albany of its allies and make the village a virtual hostage of Canada. This would forestall an English attack against Quebec.

This proposal was only one of several similar suggestions put forward by the Intendant. Less than a month after his arrival in Canada, Talon was writing of the colony's potential as a military staging area. Nothing, he wrote, could impede the progress of His Majesty's arms into New Sweden, New Holland, New England, Florida, or Mexico, if the king decided to use Canada as the base from which invasions are launched.

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106 *RAPQ* (1930-31), p. 32, Talon to Colbert, 4 Oct 1665.
A year later he returned to the same subject and remarked that since Canada bordered all of the other European colonies in America, the king could fall upon any he wished from his colony on the St. Lawrence. Florida and Mexico were then considered to border Canada immediately to the southwest.) The first step toward expelling the other European powers from America would be the military occupation of the lakes region and the headwaters of all rivers flowing toward the south. Although Talon did not say it in so many words, the key river in this regard would have been the Hudson, and occupying the headwaters would have probably entailed the conquest of Albany.

These were grandiose schemes considering the size of the Canadian population and the distances involved, but schemes not impossible of realization. They required a firm and continuous commitment on the part of the French government to carry them out. This was not soon to happen. But within twenty-five years Talon's vision of Canada as a base of offensive operations against the American colonies of England had become an official part of French governmental policy. Until that policy emerged

107 *RAPQ* (1930-31), p. 50, Talon to Colbert, Quebec, 3 Nov 1666.

108 See below p. 319.
around 1690 the French government was virtually without a military strategy for America, and Canada remained indifferently defended and led from abroad.

Talon's vision of Canada was broader than these proposals would indicate, however. He also thought of Canada as a potentially great and powerful colony worth developing in its own right and quite apart from its military utility to the crown. These views he first put forward in a memorandum to Colbert in 1666. Talon told Colbert that Canada would never be economically strong nor be secure from its enemies as long as the Hudson River remained in foreign hands. The Intendant suggested that France gain control of the Hudson by a combination of war and diplomacy. At the end of the Anglo-Dutch war then in progress, Holland should demand the return of New Netherlands as a condition of peace. Holland could then cede the colony to France out of consideration for Louis XIV's help in the war. Since the colony was of little value to Holland anyway, Talon believed the Dutch would be willing to accept these "reasonable conditions."

The colony along the Hudson would be of enormous benefit to France, the Intendant argued. In the first place, France would gain the warm-water port of Manhattan and

109 RAPO (1930-31), p. 75, Talon to Colbert, 15 Nov 1666.
achieve the possibility of year-round communications between the court and the colony. In the second place, France would be able to control both avenues along which the fur trade was conducted, the St. Lawrence and the Hudson. This would not only deprive the English of a present source of revenue but would also place the Iroquois at the economic mercy of the French. Moreover, the king of France could then "touch" New Sweden whenever he pleased and could confine New England within narrow boundaries.

The Anglo-Dutch war ended without the French gaining the Hudson River. Talon decided to make other suggestions. He wrote to Colbert in the fall of 1667 re-emphasizing the importance of the Hudson River to the French. He made clear his conviction that the best means of assuring the survival, let alone the prosperity, of Canada was to gain control of Manhattan and Albany by conquest or acquisition. Talon told Colbert that a separate memorandum containing his latest thoughts on the subject was being adjoined to the present letter. Unfortunately, the memorandum he spoke of has been lost, or we might have further evidence of Talon's concern over the strategic position of Canada. Even so, the evidence suggests that Talon closed

the years of royal intervention with a strong plea that more attention be paid by the French government to long-range planning for Canadian defense.

Internally, Canada was in much better condition in 1667 than in 1663 when the government of Louis XIV dramatically intervened in Canadian affairs. The population had been substantially augmented due to the impulse provided by the king and Colbert. The new arrivals had been encouraged to settle in enclaves around Quebec, along the St. Lawrence River, and up the Richelieu, each enclave designed to contribute to the overall security of the colony. The king had inaugurated a new, stronger, and more effective government for the colony, one conceived along lines that were distinctly military and designed to cope with the most pressing external problem of Canada—the enmity of the Iroquois. After two campaigns had been launched against these enemies of the colony, peace had been restored and the habitants enjoyed the first real security they had known in a quarter of a century.

Externally, in terms of the problems confronting the colony from without, the condition of Canada was little, if any, improved. The Iroquois, their designs on the western fur trade unaltered and their military strength still almost intact, had merely been chastened and made
more circumspect by the attacks against them. They remained a conspicuous threat to the colony. The English were a conspicuous threat, too, more so than ever in the past. They had inherited the Iroquois alliance from the Dutch, and they quickly developed commercial ties with the five tribes which ran counter to French interests in the western trade. Moreover, their control of the Hudson valley meant that in time of war they could endanger Canada from two directions, overland by the Hudson-Richelieu valley and over the sea by way of the Gulf of St. Lawrence.

Canada was still in a precarious position, and only a determined effort by the French government could remove the sword and the tomahawk that were hanging over the colony.
CHAPTER III

THE PAX GALLICA AND ITS DECAY, 1667-1684

The years of peace after 1667 were not years barren of events relating to the defense of the colony. Indeed, the measures taken, and not taken, had a profound effect on the history of Canadian defense during the later years of Louis XIV's reign. On the positive side, Colbert implemented his plan for the creation of a compact colony on the lower St. Lawrence, one that would be at the same time economically and militarily strong. Colbert and the king also strove to create a strong militia for the colony against the day when peace might end and Canadians would be called upon to defend themselves.

On the negative side, the years after 1667 were lean years for the colony, a time when the desire of the court to economize meant the drying up of immigration, the virtual cut off of funds for Canadian development, and the extreme reluctance to provide even the most elementary necessities for the security of the colony.

While this was taking place, Canadian commercial interests were expanding toward the west. Here they collided with the commercial interests of the Iroquois who coveted, for the same reasons as did the French, the rich beaver territories north and west of the Great Lakes. The ensuing
commercial struggle for control of the western region gradually deteriorated into an armed struggle for survival of each participant.

The one feature of European politics during this period which most affected Canada was war and preparation for war. Before the outbreak of the War of the Devolution in 1667 and its sequel, the Dutch War of 1672 to 1678, Louis XIV had spent liberally of his money and attention on Canada. There had been a massive infusion of workmen, money, and materials to place the colony on its feet after a quarter century of neglect by the Company of New France. Canada had received in addition to the ordinary expenses of government 234,000 livres for transporting and maintaining twenty-four companies of regular troops during the years 1665 to 1668, a sum that did not include the soldiers' pay. Courcelles' and Tracy's campaigns of 1666 cost another 15,900 livres, and the construction expenses for the forts along the Richelieu came to 15,000 livres. The costs of transporting colonists and farm animals from France to Canada totaled 55,810 livres in 1665, 41,700 in 1667, and 36,000 in 1668. Complete statistics for the period are not available, but the ones that are indicate that within a comparatively short time the king had expended at least 398,410 livres on the extraordinary expenses of Canada.  

With the outbreak of war in 1667, however, colonial expenditures could not be sustained at their previous high levels. The number of immigrants and workmen coming to the colony from France declined sharply. It was also necessary to eliminate the expense of maintaining twenty-four companies of soldiers in Canada, although their mission to destroy the Iroquois had not been achieved. They were withdrawn and none were sent to replace them, and the king found himself writing to Talon in 1672 to deny the Intendant's request for more soldiers and revenue and informing him that since war in Europe had again been declared there would be few funds at all available for the colony in the foreseeable future. The Intendant was told to make do as best he could until further notice.²

Economic prospects for the colony did not improve after 1672. The high costs of the military and naval campaigns against the Dutch kept money from being spent on Canada. Moreover, the unfavorable free-trade provision of the Treaty of Nijmegen which ended the war in 1679 had severe repercussions in French industry and commerce for a decade to come. The repercussions did not fail to affect

²PAC, B, Vol. IV, fol. 58, King to Talon, Saint Germain-en Laye, 4 June 1672.
the overseas possessions. The year 1672 in fact marked the end of any but the most essential royal expenditures on Canada.

The general economic condition of the kingdom after 1672 and the prolonged period of peace that Canada experienced caused the court to expend as little thought and money on Canadian defense as possible. Only three programs originated in France, each of them reflecting the official attitude in this regard. One was developed by Colbert and has since come to be known as his program to create a compact colony along the lower St. Lawrence. Although much of his program falls outside the scope of this study, it is important to call attention to the main elements of Colbert's plan because of its aim to create a more self-reliant colony, one that could present a strong defensive posture toward its enemies.

One feature of Colbert's program concentrated on fostering the economic well being of the colony. The minister was fully aware of the high cost involved in

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supporting a colony that was economically dependent on the mother country for every necessity of life. He was also aware that such a colony would fall like ripe fruit into the hand of any naval force that in time of war could close the sea lanes between the colony and the mother country. With these considerations in mind, Colbert launched an effort to improve the commercial and industrial capacity of Canada to put the colony beyond the insult of other European powers and make it less of a burden to the royal treasury.

Particularly after 1667 the minister encouraged as best he could such diverse industries as shipbuilding, agriculture, forestry, fishing, tarmaking, and weaving. He even wrote reassurances to Talon regarding the latter's intention to establish a brewery at Quebec, disregarding the fact that the success of the brewery would diminish the market for French wines and brandies in the colony.

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4 PAC, CL1A, Vol. III, fol. 31, Observations faites par Talon, 1669; fol. 39, King to Talon, 17 May 1669; fol. 43, Mémoire instructif, 22 June 1669; fol. 49, Mémoire de Talon, 1669. RAPQ, 1930-31, pp. 80-84, Talon to Colbert, 27 Oct 1667; p. 160, Mémoire de Talon, 2 Nov 1671; p. 168, Colbert to Talon, 4 June 1672; p. 71, Colbert to Talon, 8 April 1667; p. 126, Mémoire de Talon, 10 Nov 1670; p. 70, Colbert to Talon, 5 April 1667; pp. 159-60, Mémoire succinct, 18 May 1669.

5 RAPQ, 1930-31, p. 71, Colbert to Talon, 8 April 1667.
He tried to discourage Canadian participation in the fur trade because it turned the attention of the habitants away from their proper vocation of farming. Most of Colbert's economic projects for the colony did not survive him because they became mired in the quicksands of inefficiency and apathy that were everywhere present in the old regime, but they were at least successful to the extent that Canada was not able to be starved economically by the long American war that broke out soon after his death.

Another feature of Colbert's program concerned colonization, both the method and extent of settlement along the St. Lawrence. Colbert continued to insist after 1667, as he had done before, that the habitants group themselves in villages around the three districts of Quebec, Three Rivers, and Montreal, at least for closed hamlets along the river between the districts. He preferred that the French not push westward beyond Montreal until the central colony was well populated and firmly established. He set forth these wishes most forthrightly to Governor Frontenac in 1674 in criticizing him for constructing without prior approval a new fort at the eastern end of Lake Ontario.

You will understand...that His Majesty's intention is not that you undertake long voyages

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6PAC, B, Vol. III, fol. 22.5, Colbert to Talon, Versailles, March 1671; Vol. IV, fol. 59.5, Colbert to Talon, 4 June 1672.
by ascending the Saint Lawrence, nor that the habitants spread themselves in the future farther than they have already done. On the contrary he desires that you work constantly to consolidate, collect, and form them into towns and villages, that they may be placed in a position to defend themselves more successfully.\footnote{RAPQ, 1926-27, p. 58, Colbert to Frontenac, 17 May 1674.}

Two years later Colbert was again writing to Frontenac on the same subject. The Minister feared that because the Governor apparently favored the expansion of the French into the west he was thereby neglecting his instructions so far as the central colony were concerned. Frontenac was given to understand in frank language that Colbert considered it better to build well a small colony than to build weakly a gangling one. "You must on no account encourage\footnote{PAC, B, Vol. VII, p. 31, Le Roy to Frontenac, St. Germain, 16 April 1676.} new discoveries," the minister wrote, "unless there is a great need and some obvious advantage can be derived from them. You must hold to the maxim that it is far more worthwhile to occupy a smaller area and have it well populated than to spread out and have several feeble colonies which could be easily destroyed by all manner of accidents."\footnote{RAPQ, 1926-27, p. 58, Colbert to Frontenac, 17 May 1674.}

The success of Colbert's policy can be ascertained by a census taken in 1681 of the number of muskets and pistols
in each household in the colony. 9 Out of a total population of around 10,000, there were 1,537 households: 917 in the Quebec district, 191 in the district of Three Rivers, and 429 in the Montreal district. There were fifty-eight separate villages, including the three principal ones, located between Beaupre in the east (twenty-two miles below Quebec on the St. Lawrence) and Lachine in the west (on the western tip of Montreal Island). Only five of the villages contained fewer than five households, with twenty-seven households per village the average. On the basis of these figures, it would appear that the government had been rather successful in its policy of groupment within the central colony. Still, the scattered nature of Canadian settlement was such as to cause concern among government officials.

A third feature of Colbert's program involved population density. The minister wished to see a populous colony develop along the lower St. Lawrence, but he feared that this could come about only at the cost of depopulating France through emigration. 10 He was also concerned about the high cost of transporting colonists to Canada, a cost

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which ran upwards of 100 livres per person, not to mention the expense of supporting the immigrant until he got established in the new land. The reluctance of the court to meet these costs resulted in a marked slowdown in the Canadian rate of population growth after 1668 as compared with the years of royal intervention. The population of Canada doubled between 1663 and 1668 from around 2,500 to nearly 5,000; but it would not double again until 1688, twenty years later, and that was largely due to natural increase, not immigration. 

Colbert became the prime mover in an unusual project to increase Canada's population at little cost to the crown by "frenchifying" the Indian neighbors of the colony and inducing them to settle among the Canadians. Colbert first introduced the project in a letter to Talon in 1671. Talon was told to begin instructing the natives in the French language, customs, and religion so they would "compose one people with the habitants of Canada and

11 RAPQ, 1930-31, p. 103, Observations faites par Talon, 1669.

12 Chronological List of Canadian Censuses, Bureau of Statistics, Ottawa, 1942.

by this means fortify the colony." Two years later Governor Frontenac received the same orders.  

The project was at the same time idealistic and pragmatic—and doomed to failure. The Jesuits, Sulpicians, and Ursulines had all previously tried their hands at civilizing the Hurons and Algonquins living near the colony, never with much success. Indian boys refused to be cooped up in a classroom and subjected to discipline, and Indian girls were scandalous in the little respect they paid to the concepts of Christian morality. As Mother Marie de l'Incarnation said, "a Frenchman goes native more easily than an Indian becomes French." By 1685 the project was an admitted failure, and in that year Governor Denonville told Seignelay bluntly that his father's frenchification experiment ought to be abandoned entirely. The French could count only on themselves to defend the central colony.


15 Jean Delanglez, Frontenac and the Jesuits (Chicago: 1939), pp. 36-38, 43-47.


Colbert's ideas regarding a compact colony aimed at, among other things, creating a citadel of French power along the lower St. Lawrence at little cost to the king. A second major program issuing from the court during these years had a similar object in view. This was for the creation of a colonial militia. We have already noticed that by 1663 each of the three major villages had established a local militia organization to serve in the Iroquois war. These local organizations were overshadowed during the period of royal intervention by the regular troops who remained on duty in Canada until the summer of 1668. With their withdrawal it was felt necessary to unify under a single command the three militia organizations and standardize their equipment and training so the colony by itself could deal with any developing threat to its security without the dispatch of another large contingent of regular troops from France.

Louis XIV initiated the program in 1669 by writing to Governor Courcelles:

To maintain the country it is not only necessary to think of populating it, but also to make the habitants expert in the use of arms and military discipline; I am writing these lines to tell you my intention is that you divide all my subjects dwelling in the country into companies keeping in mind their geographic situation; and after having thus
divided them, appoint captains, lieutenants, and enseignes to command them.\textsuperscript{18}

The king went on to indicate his desire that the companies hold drill once a month and assemble for review by the Governor once or twice per year. Colbert wrote to Courcelles a few weeks later urging the Governor to make haste in complying with the king's wishes.

The Governor made haste slowly, however. In the fall of 1670 Talon wrote to Colbert saying that the program had not yet been put into effect, and when Frontenac assumed the office of governor in 1672 he reported that he was using all of the time and means at his disposal to train the militia and form companies "where there were as yet none."\textsuperscript{20}

One reason for the slow start is perhaps traceable to a lack of martial interest among the habitants in time of peace. To help remedy this condition Talon had earlier suggested that a few swords "of moderate value" be distributed among the militiamen as prizes to encourage them to maneuver and fire correctly during drill.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{18}PAC, C11A, Vol. III, pp. 3-5, King to Courcelles, Paris, 3 April 1669.

\textsuperscript{19}PAC, B, Vol. I, fol. 141, Colbert to Courcelles, 15 May 1669.

\textsuperscript{20}RAPQ, 1926-27, p. 16, Frontenac to Colbert, Quebec, 2 Nov 1672.

\textsuperscript{21}RAPQ, 1930-31, p. 129, Talon to Colbert, Quebec, 10 Nov 1670.
later reminded the minister how difficult it was to make civilians behave like soldiers in time of peace and how they resented leaving their families and farm chores to exercise in arms. The Governor wondered if it would not be better to rely on professional soldiers to defend the colony.22

Other reasons for the slow start may have been the tight-fisted policy of the court in supplying the habitants with military equipment and the greed of the habitants themselves. The habitants were expected to furnish everything necessary for their firing drills except powder—that is, they had to furnish the musket, bullets, and flints. A related fact is that next to brandy, a musket was the most valuable item in the fur trade with the Indians. In this time of peace the temptation was great for the habitant to trade his musket for fur, only to be without a weapon when time for the monthly drill rolled around.

The court was disposed not to send replacement muskets to the colony, and in 1673 Frontenac wrote that the habitants were by then desperately short of firearms.23 The

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22 RAFQ, 1926-27, p. 16, Frontenac to Colbert, 2 Nov 1672.

23 RAFQ, 1926-27, p. 47, Frontenac to Colbert, 13 Nov 1673.
next year he informed the court that in case of attack the ammunition on hand would not last two days. This dire announcement opened the hand of the court, and in 1675, a supply of arms and munitions was sent to Canada and ordered held in reserve in case of emergency.

We can only guess at what happened next. Either Frontenac dipped into the royal magazine for his own trading purposes, or he used the king’s supplies to re-arm the habitants—and the habitants, up to their old tricks, were quickly again without muskets. In any case, Seignelay and Louis XIV were astonished to learn in 1683 that the magazine at Quebec was empty and that most of the habitants possessed no arms of any sort.

The next year the government initiated a new policy regarding muskets to be used in militia drills. An ordinance was issued saying that those habitants who lacked a musket could buy or rent one from the king on an installment basis if necessary, but that each habitant must possess some kind of weapon for the defense of the colony.

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25 RAPQ, 1926-27, p. 81, King to Frontenac, 22 April 1675.

26 PAC, B, Vol. X, fol. 3-5, King to La Barre, Fontainebleau, 5 Aug 1683.

27 Roy, Ordonnances, Commissions, etc., Vol. I, pp. 80 ff., Ordonnance de M. de Meules, 10 Oct 1674.
The new policy became immensely popular with the habitants (for what reason we can again only guess), and in the next century complaints began coming from Versailles that the number of muskets being shipped to the colony was out of all proportion to the white population. 28

Despite all of the problems involved in arming the habitants and getting them to drill with enthusiasm, the Canadian militia gradually took shape after 1669. Every male citizen of the colony between sixteen and sixty years of age was obligated to serve in one of the companies created by the king. 29 The only exceptions were regular officers commissioned by the king and members of the colonial government. 30 The habitants and their officers received no pay for participating in their monthly drills nor for extended service on campaigns. 31 They were furnished no uniforms either, but tradition came slowly to dictate that the men identify themselves according to the


the district from which they came by wearing long blue coats with red caps and sashes if they came from the district of Quebec, blue caps and sashes if they came from Montreal, and white caps and sashes if from Three Rivers.\(^{32}\)

The organization was very simple.\(^{33}\) At the head of the colonial militia was the governor of Canada, and below him in each of the three districts was a local governor (a colonel), assisted by majors and the captains, lieutenants, and ensigns mentioned by the king. The habitants were grouped in companies according to parish if they lived outside one of the principal villages, or according to sector if they lived within. Over each company was usually placed a single captain who was responsible for this basic unit of the militia organization. For lack of municipal government in most parts of the colony, these "captains of the coast" soon became as much representatives of the intendant as representatives of the governor by publishing laws within


\(^{33}\)A discussion of the organization can be found in Lanctot's "Les Troupes de la Nouvelle-France" and Stanley's "The Canadian Militia During the Ancien Regime" among many other places.
the parish and arresting violators. By the beginning of
the next century they were fully as much civil officers
as military, serving as the only real link between the
habitants and the two highest officials in the colony.

Apart from its drills and campaigns, the militia per­
formed the service of supply for the forts of the central
colony and the western fur-trade posts. In time of peace
they could be mustered by the governor for a corvée. This
was done in 1673 when Frontenac established his post at
the eastern end of Lake Ontario. The same inertia which
showed itself at drill was present here in even greater
degree, and the Governor was peaked to report that there
had been a good deal of grumbling among the men on this
occasion.

A decade later the Intendant de Meulles
confided to Seignelay that he could not blame the men for
complaining about the corvées although he gave them no out­
ward show of support because "it is still of the greatest

34 Frontenac apparently was the first to appoint capi­
taines de la côte (PAC, Mémoires et Documents, Amérique,
Vol. V, fol. 345-46, Frontenac to Colbert, Quebec, 13 Nov
1673; C11A, Vol. IV, fol. 63-64, Frontenac to Colbert,
Quebec, 12 Nov 1674). They were thus named because the St.
Lawrence in places appeared as wide as the sea.

35 PAC, C11A, Vol. XXVI, fol. 150, Raudot to Pontchar­
train, Quebec, 10 Nov 1707.

36 PAC, C11A, Vol. IV, fol. 12, Voyage du Comte de
Frontenac au Lac Ontario, 1673.
consequence not to allow the people the liberty of expressing their opinion." In time of war, mobilization was usually put on a voluntary basis if possible in order to allow some to remain behind and tend the crops, but during the Seven Years' War that luxury could not be afforded and every able-bodied man was called out. During wartime the militia could be used in either its supply or fighting roles.

The program for the creation of a Canadian militia got off to a slow start and was accompanied by several difficulties during the first years. But the policy being followed by the court in another area, the dispatch of regular troops to the colony made the ultimate success of the militia program essential. The policy was again to confide the responsibility in this area to a commercial company, and as in the days of the Company of New France, the number and quality of troops sent was pitifully low.

In May 1664 Louis XIV had signed a charter which granted to the West India Company a veritable commercial empire comprising every French possession touched by the

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37 PAC, Cl1A, Vol. VI, fol. 382, De Meulles to Seignelay, Quebec, 8 July 1684.

Atlantic Ocean. So far as Canada was concerned the Company agreed to provide for the "maintenance" of the colony out of the revenue it would derive from a forty year monopoly "of all commerce and navigation" carried on between Quebec and the other French ports. The maintenance of the colony was understood mainly to include payment for the operation of the government, the transport of supplies to Canada, and the support of a regular colonial defense force, but was not understood to include the obligation to colonize the territory or to otherwise build and strengthen it.

Colbert's cousin, Colbert de Terron, Indenant at La Rochelle and one of the subscribers to the Company, had reservations about the success of the enterprise from the beginning. "Our French merchants lack the necessary vigour to engage in a business they know little about," he wrote to Colbert in 1664, "moreover they can be cured only with great difficulty of the fear they have for the Dutch." This perhaps accounts for the little interest the Company took in Canadian affairs apart from the fur trade. The Company did not exercise its right to appoint


40 Pierre Clement (ed.), Lettres, instructions et mémoires de Colbert. 7 volumes (Paris, 1861-1873), Colbert de Terron to Colbert, La Rochelle, 12 Feb 1664.
members of the government, nor did it put forth much effort to keep the colony supplied with manufactured articles from France.  

In the area of colonial defense the Company was likewise neglectful. In 1668 when the last royal troops departed from Canada the Company sent no soldiers as replacements. The following year three hundred and thirty-three so-called troops were sent, but the evidence suggests that they were more in the nature of colonists whom the Company agreed to transport at the king's expense at the going rate of 100 livres per person. In any case, Talon reported that when the "troops" arrived the Iroquois, who had lately grown insolent since the departure of the royal soldiers, were so contemptuous of the new men that they mocked them in derision. A few recruits of the same kind were apparently sent in 1670, but they were the last the Company was to land at Quebec.  

\[\text{Sources:}\]


4. PAC, B, Vol. III, fol. 34.5, Dépense fait par le Roy, Versailles, 10 March 1671.
Company went bankrupt, in part because of losses sustained in the Dutch War. The responsibility for sending troops to Canada again devolved to Louis XIV. At that time, however, war in Europe and peace in America put such thoughts out of his mind.  

Occurrences in the Canadian west eventually forced the king to act, though. While the Company was in its final death throes, Indian war in America was brewing around the Great Lakes, and there arose the danger that Canada would again be dragged into war poorly defended by regular troops. When the first rumblings of the war reached Talon in 1671 he appealed to Colbert for more support from France. It was then that the king wrote the Intendant informing him about the European war and telling him that the colony would have to go it alone. A decade later when the Lakes region seemed even more on the point of eruption, Frontenac begged Louis XIV, now responsible for Canadian defense, to reinforce the colony with five to six hundred troops, but his appeal went ignored. The next year

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45 Edits et Ord, I, pp. 74-76, Edit de révocation, 1669.

46 RAPQ, 1930-31, p. 146, Colbert to Talon, 11 Feb 1671; PAC, B, Vol. IV, fol. 58, King to Talon, Saint Germain-en-Laye, 4 June 1672.

47 RAPQ, 1926-27, p. 128, Frontenac to King, 2, Nov 1681.
Governor La Barre urgently requested eight hundred and bluntly added that unless he got them the king could count the colony as lost. The king was finally awakened to his responsibility, although not to the extent La Barre had wished, and late in the season of 1683 150 marines were dispatched. When these troops arrived in the fall they were the first colonial troops to land in the colony in thirteen years. They were members of a new branch of the military which was to serve in Canada's defense until the English conquest.

The royal marines (Troupes de la Marine) were regular army troops who had been recruited specifically for colonial service. As such, they differed on the one hand from the old company troops and on the other hand from the royal troops-of-the-line. The company troops who came to Canada under the auspices of the Company of New France and the Company of the West Indies were actually armed civilians, anyone of whom the agents of the companies could sign up for a term of service in Canada—soldiers of fortune, drunks, unemployed sailors, orphans. The royal troops-of-the-line (Troupes de Terre), conversely, were members of the

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48 PAC, C11A, Vol. VI, fol. 126, La Barre to King, 30 May 1683.

regular French army who were never required to perform colonial service except on two occasions: the 1666 Iroquois War and the Seven Years' War of the next century.50

The precise origin of the royal marines as a separate branch of the military is unclear. It seems that upon the recommendation of Colbert, Louis XIV had kept a certain number of individual soldiers in the various parts of France since 1669. The troops were unattached to any parent unit and had open orders to serve as guards or whatever on various maritime expeditions to the colonies.51 Because they served in this capacity they were not under the control of the minister of war, who controlled the regular army units, but under the control of the minister of the Marine and the officers of the marine. When their numbers were not sufficient to fill the needs of the moment, the intendants of the ports recruited additional men up to the required number.52 The expense involved in their recruitment and pay was defrayed by the minister of the Marine.53

50 A good discussion of this subject appears in the Introduction of Albert Depréaux's Les Uniformes des Troupes de la Marine et les Troupes Coloniales et nord Africaines des origines à nos jours (Paris, 1931).

51 The fact that they were unattached frequently gave them the name of compagnies franches or compagnies détachées.


It was from this source that Canada derived all of its regular troops after 1683. But Canada did not receive benefit of the program in time. By 1683 the western region of Canada was ringing with war cries, and the court's endeavor to create a strong, compact colony and establish a reliable militia would stand the colony in good stead in the years to follow.

It was the great paradox of French relations with the Iroquois that peace was as dangerous to the security of the colony as war. In time of peace the natural flow of the fur trade was down the Hudson River rather than the St. Lawrence. The English could always sell higher quality trade goods at a cheaper price than could be obtained in Canada. As a result the Iroquois were well supplied with blankets, cooking utensils, trinkets, and guns—all of the items held most dear by the aborigines of North America, items that had long since become necessities as the primitive way of life gave way under the impact of European civilization.

The only disadvantage experienced by the Iroquois in this trade was that their own territories contained no beaver. That had been quickly exhausted after the Iroquois learned its value to the white men. The Iroquois were consequently forced to do all of their trapping north of Lake Ontario, between the lake and the Ottawa River where the beaver was plentiful. The earliest maps of this region referred to it as "the hunting ground of the Iroquois." Some of the tribesmen even moved their villages to the northern shore of the lake around 1667 to be nearer the trails that led off into the rich beaver country of the interior and to be farther from their southern enemies, the Andastes of Pennsylvania and Maryland. Six settlements eventually ranged from east to west along the northern shore: Ganneious, a village of the Oneidas; Kenté, Kentsio, and Ganaraske, villages of the Cayuagas; and Ganatsekwyagon and Teiaiagon, villages of the Seneca. It is probable that others were located in the interior.

55 One such map has been ascribed to Joliet and is found in the Service Hydrographique Bibliothèque, 4044B, No. 43. Baron La Hontan (New Voyages, p. 323) and the anonymous author of a 1671 mémoire on the subject (NYC, IX, p. 84) agreed that the Iroquois did all of their hunting on the Ontario peninsula.
where their existence was known only by rumor among the Europeans.

In Ontario and throughout the region north of the Great Lakes the Iroquois came into friendly contact with the western allies of the French. Price comparisons between English and French trade goods could easily take place, and the Ottawas especially were amazed—and provoked—to learn that an item costing four pelts at Montreal could be got at Albany for one. The Ottawas were no more ignorant of the economic facts of life than any other people with whom the Europeans had dealings, and it did not take them long to calculate that the French alliance was costing them dearly.

Loyalty to the French counted as nothing to the Ottawas where the price of a skillet was concerned, and the notion arose to abandon the French alliance and divert the huge

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56 An excellent discussion of this whole complex subject is found in a book that deserves much more attention than it has received from writers in this field. See Percy J. Robinson, Toronto During the French Regime (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), Chapters I–III.

57 NYCD, IX, p. 1056. On 13 November 1763 Sir William Johnson wrote to the Lords of Trade that the Iroquois claimed possession of Ontario by right of settlement.
northern peltry traffic, which they controlled, to the white men on the Hudson. The path this trade would take would be from the upper lakes, across Georgian Bay and Lake Simcoe, and through a series of waterfalls which came out at a place called Cataraqui at the eastern end of Lake Ontario. From there the furs would move around the eastern tip of Lake Ontario and through Iroquoia to Albany.

The Albany merchants would have been delighted to have the Ottawas as customers. They were as pleased as anyone to hear that the French and their allies had made peace with the Iroquois in 1667 and that free intercourse among the tribes was then possible. They worked tirelessly to keep it that way, French suspicions to the contrary. The New Yorkers were eager for Ottawa furs to move unimpeded along the path to where the prices were the lowest. By one cast of the stone, so to speak, they could ruin the commerce of Canada and garner for themselves the choicest of the northern pelts which otherwise would have gone to the French.

At this point Iroquois diplomacy intruded. If they permitted the establishment a direct connection between the Ottawas and Albany traders they ran the danger of being closed out of the trade altogether through the sheer

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58 *NYCD*, IX, p. 84, Narrative of Governor de Courcelles' Voyage to Lake Ontario, 1671.
volume and quality of furs the Ottawas could deliver. It therefore became a keystone of their policy to prevent the Albany merchants from trading directly with the more remote tribes in order to safeguard their own position as sole agents of the English in the trade. Instead, they would play the middleman and reap a middleman's reward. They would obtain the thick northern pelts from the Ottawas and deliver the pelts to Albany, extracting a profit at both ends of the transaction.

To make the procedure work it was necessary to maintain toward the Ottawas a studied coolness of demeanor that was strong enough to discourage those tribes from journeying south of the St. Lawrence to trade at Albany, but not strong enough to drive them back into the arms of the French. Toward the English they must remain inflexible about allowing the Albany traders to establish a post in advance of their own territories, and in fact one was

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59 In 1684 Governor Dongan of New York wrote to Governor La Barre of Canada claiming that he was doing everything in his power to restrain the passions of the Iroquois in their war with the Illinois and Miami tribes to the west. Father Lamberville, a Jesuit stationed at the Onondaga mission, wrote to La Barre confirming Dongan's claim. This correspondence is printed in E. B. O'Callaghan (ed.), The Documentary History of the State of New York (hereafter cited as DHNY), 4 vols. (Albany: Weed, Parsons & Co., 1894), Vol. 1, pp. 36-56.
not established at Oswego until well into the eighteenth century. 60

All of this maneuvering followed quickly upon the heels of the 1667 peace, and the Canadian government was not slow in recognizing the implications. Recognizing the problem and finding a solution for it were two different matters, however. In the face of a fur-trade empire on the verge of imminent collapse, the French could of necessity play only a few extremely weak cards. The best solution to the problem, as Talon and d'Avaugour among others pointed out, was to conquer the Hudson valley and place it under French control; but that would require a much larger population and more military power than Canada had at its disposal. Another solution of merit would have been to lower the prices the Indians had to pay for their merchandise; but this solution was entangled in the question of the privileged position of the French commercial companies and in the higher manufacturing and transportation costs of French industry.

Neither could Canada solve the problem by destroying the Iroquois. 61 It was not only a case of lacking the


Fig. 7.--Early map of the region of the Great Lakes. Notice the representation of the Toronto portage. (La Hontan. New Voyages, Vol. I, facing page 1.)
military capacity to carry out such a program; the commerce of Canada would suffer enormously thereby because the Ottawas would then have no barrier between themselves and the eager merchants of Albany. A French threat of force against the Ottawas to prevent their trading with the Iroquois was similarly out of the question: one does not retain his allies with a gun leveled at their heads.

The only course open to the French was to promote a kind of suspended warfare between the western Indians and the Iroquois, knowing that to generate too much hostility was to risk losing the colony through war and to generate too little was to risk losing it through economic strangulation. It was a paradoxical policy, a policy impossible of achievement, and yet one necessary of success. How well it was followed would determine how long Canada remained solvent and at peace.

Governor Courcelles was the first to be caught in the grip of the paradox. In the summer of 1669 a group of Montrealers, for reasons unknown, ambushed and killed seven Oneidas and a Seneca chief. When news of this reached the Iroquois they were incensed, and there was talk of renewing the war. The Governor, who had just sent

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62 La Hontan, New Voyages, pp. 394-95. La Hontan was apparently the first to see this clearly when he wrote in the 1690's, although it was of course true all along.
porcelain collars (wampum) to the Iroquois by way of the Jesuits as symbols of his continuing desire for peace, took swift action lest the Confederacy use the ambush as a casus belli. Three Frenchmen were arrested for murder, tried, and executed in the presence of a large group of Iroquois who were in Montreal to trade.

Much impressed with the retributory character of French justice when it was their custom to offer presents to atone for murders they committed, some of the Iroquois traders brought news of the executions back to their people just as Ononthio's porcelain collars were on the point of being rejected. The Iroquois were persuaded to accept the collars and keep the peace intact. They did so, however, "with considerable coldness," and the Jesuits reported that the Indians would have preferred that the French settle the score with ten more collars than with the deaths of three Montrealers. Be that as it may, the Governor was able to preserve the peace by his action, and the west remained relatively tranquil for more than a year.

In the fall of 1670 some Iroquois chiefs and a few French traders went to the Ottawa country to reconfirm the peace by an exchange of presents as was their annual custom.63 While the Iroquois were there they were asked about the price of merchandise at Albany. When they told

the Ottawas how inexpensive prices had become since the English took control, the Ottawas who were listening became "inflamed" against the French and announced their intention to do all of their trading at Albany in the future. The Iroquois smelled a profitable relationship developing and offered escort the Ottawas on their first visit south of the lakes.

The French traders immediately grasped the meaning of these events and carried a report of them to Quebec. When Governor Courcelles heard the story he was fully confronted with the paradox of French policy in the west, for while he wished to see the two groups remain at peace, he could not permit a true alliance from being formed. There was open only one course of action, and he took it. He ordered the missionaries stationed in Iroquoia and the Ottawa country to foment hatred and suspicion of the one Indian group for the other.

He ordered the missionaries of Iroquoia to speak out on the dangers of allowing a former enemy to come among them. The missionaries were instructed to say that the Ottawas still nourished resentment in their hearts for past wars, and would come south of the lake only to spy out the locations of hunting grounds and villages with the thought of returning later to destroy them. To the Ottawa missionaries the Governor ordered a public recounting of all the old wrongs perpetrated by the Iroquois—how
the Iroquois had been treacherous in the past and how they had engaged in numerous ambushes against the people whom they now professed to love. The missionaries were told to vocalize the suspicion that the Iroquois offer was merely a trick to lull their victim into a false sense of security until that inevitable day when the Confederacy would invade and again shed Ottawa blood.

The effects of Courcelles' diplomacy were much stronger than he imagined. All of the rest of that winter of 1670-71 waves of panic swept across Iroquoia as tribesmen imagined they saw hordes of Ottawas sweeping down to massacre them. In the north, Ottawa tribesmen frantically worked to strengthen the fortifications around their villages. And in the spring the predictable occurred. War-parties of Seneca set out for the upper lakes in order to anticipate what they believed would be an attack on their own villages. It was the beginning of another Indian war, this one caused by Courcelles' attempt to cool relationships that had grown too warm. Within weeks the war could be expected to spread among the other western tribes and eventually to the colony itself unless drastic measures were taken.

The Governor, rather chastened by his foray into Indian diplomacy, reverted to form. He ordered the Senecas to desist at once or he would invade their lands with fire and steel. The Senecas, refusing to recognize the
Governor's authority in this matter and apparently relying for protection on their remoteness from the colony, complained that they could not tell who were French allies and who were not, that every time a French trader of missionary passed among a tribe that tribe became an ally of France and was placed under French protection. If Ononthio truly was chief of all the allies, "let him check their hatchet if he wishes us to stay our own." Their reply ended with the taunt, "Ononthio threatens to bring desolation to our land; let us see if his arm is long enough to lift our scalps." They kept their warriors in the field.

Courcelles was now in a difficult position. He could not afford to let the Seneca flout his authority as they were doing, and yet he did not have the military resources to carry out his threat. He therefore decided to run a bluff. He would take a small contingent of men down the St. Lawrence for the announced purpose of reconnoitering the eastern end of Lake Ontario. He would inform the

64 Source material for the period 1670-71 is sparse and scattered. The greatest portion of it is found in an anonymous mémoire of 1671 printed in NYCD, Vol. IX, pp. 75-85, Narrative of Governor de Courcelles' Voyage to Lake Ontario, 1671. The mémoire is reprinted in Pierre Margry (ed.), Découvertes et établissements des Français dans l'ouest et dans le sud de l'Amérique septentrionale, 6 volumes (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1879-1888), Vol. I, pp. 169-91. A shorter account is found in Casson's Montreal, pp. 404-406, and additional details are found in RAPQ, 1930-31, pp. 133-34. Addition to a mémoire of Talon, 10 Nov 1670; Richaud, Lettres de l'Incarnation, Vol. II, pp. 529-30; and JR, Vol. LIV, pp. 110 ff. Unless otherwise noted, my account follows the one printed in NYCD.
Senecas of this purpose and hope that the lesson would not be lost on them that if he could bring a few men on a peaceful mission, he could later return with an army on a mission of war.

Just to carry out the bluff was a major undertaking. It required moving men and baggage between Montreal and the lake over some of the worst rapids on the continent. There were not fewer than eleven rapids and falls in the river west of Montreal, some involving a portage of two leagues or more. If the journey were attempted in the traditional birch-bark canoe, it might take months to transport the baggage across the portages and involve a huge expenditure of money, men, and time spent away from the crops. The Governor then hit upon the idea of constructing a barge at Montreal and using it to float the supplies along the river and over the rapids while most of his men made the trip in canoes.

Accordingly, as soon as the river was free of ice in the spring of 1671 the Governor went up to Montreal. He there ordered a barge of two or three tons burden constructed and loaded with supplies. On June 2 Courcelles and a few men began the journey upriver, followed on the next day by the barge and fifty-six militiamen in thirteen canoes. After many difficulties, not the least of which were swarms of mosquitoes that made every foot of the
voyage a test of endurance, the party reached Lake Ontario on June 12. That same day the Governor met with representatives of the Confederacy and told them that although he had come on a peaceful mission that time, he could just as easily bring an army with him the next if they persisted in making war on the French allies. Having done all he could do, and undoubtedly with a prayer that he had done enough, he gave orders that same afternoon to begin the return trip. Within three days he was back in Montreal. The whole voyage had lasted only two weeks.

The Governor then waited for the results of his trip to become known. Some Ottawas soon arrived and thanked him for what he had done. They protested that of course they had never seriously entertained the thought of using the Iroquois as an agency for trade with Albany and that the French alliance would always be held in the highest respect among their tribes. Later several missionaries arrived from Iroquoia and reported that the Indians there had been terrified by the Governor's swift trip, that the war-parties previously sent out had been recalled, and that Frenchmen living among the tribes were being treated with the utmost deference. The bluff had apparently worked. Peace was restored, and the colony and its trade were once more saved.
The next year Governor Courcelles was recalled at his own request for reasons of health and was replaced by Governor Frontenac who thereby inherited the complex problems of war and peace in the west. Frontenac arrived at Quebec in September and immediately went into conference with Talon about how best to keep the Ottawas and Iroquois separated. At this meeting Frontenac was brought up-to-date on developments in the west and was told of a project that had been germinating in Courcelles and the Intendant's minds for two years.

In the fall of 1670 Talon had written to Louis XIV deploiring the fact that the Iroquois were hunting beavers north of Lake Ontario in territories belonging to the king and annually carrying to Albany an estimated 1,200,000 livres worth of pelts that rightfully were the property of His Majesty. To end this offense the Intendant proposed the erection of two posts on the lakeshore, both primarily commercial establishments, one on the north and the other on the south side of the lake. These could intercept furs that the Iroquois intended for Albany and also prevent the Ottawas from going south of the lake to trade. A small boat to keep watch along the shore would


complete the enterprise. The posts, garrisoned by 100 men, would have the additional advantages of keeping the Iroquois in the condition of "duty, respect, and fear" demanded by the king and of serving as an extension of French power across the interior towards Florida.

The next spring Courcelles took his barge up to Lake Ontario "to prove to those insolent [savages] that he could ruin them at his pleasure." But the trip was also connected with the establishment projected for the lake. The Governor wanted to reconnoiter the area for two sites, one on which to build a post to intercept furs, the other, perhaps nearby, on which to plant a colony which would facilitate access to a westward flowing river where gold and silver mines were reported to exist. The river itself was thought to flow towards Florida.

About the time an anonymous missionary who apparently knew the tribes of the area well, their hunting habits, and their hunting trails, wrote by way of seconding what Courcelles and Talon had in mind, that great advantage for the king and the colony would be derived from a post at the

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67 PAC, C1A, Vol. III, pp. 108-9, Talon to King, Quebec, 10 Oct 1670.

68 NYCD, Vol. IX, pp. 79-80, Narrative of Governor de Courcelles' Voyage to Lake Ontario, 1671.
entrance to the lake where the Indians normally passed on their way to and from Ontario. 69

Neither Colbert nor Louis XIV were much impressed by these initiatives. On Talon's letter of the previous fall Colbert had written the comment, "Establishment of Lake Ontario. To wait." 70 But when there came an additional dispatch on the subject dated one month later, explaining that through the construction of the two posts and the ship the Intendant foresaw a profitable trade developing and a means of indemnifying the king for the expense of the colony, Colbert had been more receptive and had written on the new dispatch, "Send this thought to M. de Courcelles to carry out." 71

The formal reply of Colbert to these proposals, dated March 11, 1671, stated that the king was not in favor of creating a military post on Lake Ontario for the sole purpose of obstructing the incursions of the Iroquois.

69 NYCD, Vol. IX, p. 80, Narrative of Governor de Courcelles' Voyage to Lake Ontario, 1671. If this reference is to the Ohio River, it would be the first time French sources make mention of the river which bulked so large in the logistical thinking of both French and English in the eighteenth century.


against tribes under the protection of France. Colbert, however, referred the question of whether to erect a commercial establishment on the lake to the good judgment of the two Canadian officials. This was where matters stood when Talon and Frontenac had their conversation.

Frontenac was quickly won over to the project. Within a few weeks he wrote to Colbert saying that he intended to visit Lake Ontario in the spring and select a site for a post that would prevent the Iroquois from carrying the king's furs to the English and would protect the nearby Sulpician mission at Quinte. Two years later Frontenac added that the post would also serve to keep the Iroquois in subjection and spoil any English attempt at sending traders into the area. There is considerable evidence to suggest that to these motives should be added one more. The Governor himself expected to benefit considerably from the trade that he hoped would grow up around the new establishment on the lake.

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72 PAC, C11A, Vol. III, pp. 117-18, Talon to King, Quebec, 10 Nov 1670.


75 RAPQ, 1926-27, p. 68, Frontenac to Colbert, 14 Nov 1674.
Time was pressing the Governor on this matter. Peace in the west brought disaster in its train. During the winter of 1672-73 Frontenac received alarming reports that the Iroquois and the Ottawas were again negotiating an alliance, this one to allow the exchange of all kinds of English goods for furs at Cataraqui. These reports were confirmed by Sulpician and Jesuit missionaries on both sides of the lake.

What was the Governor to do? He was not likely to repeat the unhappy experiment in Indian diplomacy of his predecessor. The colony was completely unprepared for war—without troops, without money, without guns, without ammunition, without a militia, and without hope of assistance from France. There seemed only one alternative: build a post at Cataraqui with the utmost speed and try to compete with the English.

As quickly as he could Frontenac made preparations for an expedition to construct a post on Lake Ontario. He dispatched a young man whom the Iroquois were known to respect, Robert Cavelier, Sieur de La Salle, to invite the

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76 On this subject see W. J Eccles. Frontenac: The Courtier Governor (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1959), chapters V and XVI.

77 RAPQ, 1926-27, p. 26, Frontenac to Colbert, Quebec, 13 Nov 1673.
Iroquois to meet the new governor and witness the construction of the trading post. When everything else was in readiness, Frontenac set out from Montreal on June 29, 1673 with about 400 men in 120 canoes and two barges. He and his party reached the vicinity of the Catarqui River on July 12 and there were met by some Iroquois chieftains. At the governor's invitation they came aboard his barge and guided him to where they thought the post would be advantageously located. Frontenac was pleased with the site they selected. It was located on a quiet little bay about a cannon-shot from the mouth of the river. It contained lands fit for cultivation, enough timber and wood to supply a garrison, a sheltered harbor, and a good lookout point on a nearby promontory.

Construction work on the post was begun early the next morning and was completed within a week. More than twenty arpents of land were completely cleared. Near the center of the clearing rested two buildings, one forty-six feet long which would probably serve as the barracks for the garrison of thirty men, and another twenty feet long to serve as the storehouse. There were no fortifications of any kind mentioned in connection with the post—no cannons, no bastions, no surrounding wall, no palisade. Frontenac was apparently trying to give the complete impression to the Iroquois that the establishment was a trading
post, not a fort meant to intimidate them and raise their hostility.

While the construction was progressing, Frontenac held consultations with the chieftains. According to his own account of the consultations, the governor first appealed to his "children" to become Christians and live at peace with the colony and its allies. He next declared that he alone was master of war and peace in Iroquoia and that the rapids of the St. Lawrence were no barrier against the armed might of Ononthio. He then came to the main point of his address. Frontenac exhorted the Iroquois to come to the new post and trade, promising that he would stock it with all kinds of merchandise at the lowest possible prices. Finally, he requested nine of their children, not, he said, to act as hostages, but to learn a useful trade and the language, customs, and manners of the French.

Frontenac did not report to Colbert the substance of the reply made to these points, preferring to avoid the subject by remarking, "you would surely have been surprised,

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Sir, to witness the eloquence of address and the finesse with which they spoke to me." We owe to another source the substance of their reply. The Iroquois manifested a notable indifference to most of what Frontenac had said. They thanked him for his remarks regarding the benefits of Christianity and told him they would look into the matter at another time. As for giving him nine of their children, they promised to discuss it among themselves and convey their answer to him sometime in the future. They professed delight at being able to obtain trade goods so near at hand but requested more precise information about the prices. And then they proceeded to put Frontenac on the spot. His reference to them as his children and his demand that they remain at peace with their neighbors, they shrewdly parried by pointing out that the Andastes were their only enemy and that it would be shameful for their "father" to allow this tribe to crush his "children."

Frontenac at this point must have shifted in his seat. He told the Iroquois that he would contrive to make the prices at the post as low as possible, but that he could say nothing definite until the transportation costs were calculated. As for the touchy Andaste issue, he managed to offer some vague assurances that he would not

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allow his children to perish or be oppressed. It was too late in the season, he said, to organize a campaign that year in any case. He promised that when they came to Quebec to inform him of their decision about the nine children he would discuss what joint action should be taken against the Andastes. With that the conference ended after expressions of good will were heard all around. By the first of August Frontenac was back in Montreal. He might have wondered on the return journey if he had not lost by diplomacy what he had gained by building the post.

The construction of Ft. Frontenac, as the new post was called, and the conference with the Iroquois had an immediate salutary effect on the western problems of the colony. No more talk was heard about the proposed alliance between the Iroquois and the Ottawa, and from the missionaries in Iroquoia came letters to Frontenac telling him that the English had been placed in a difficult competition position by his action and that the tribes were evincing all manner of friendliness toward the French in their midst. 80 Frontenac, buoyed by this information, wrote a memorandum to Colbert in the fall in which modesty was nowhere apparent. "We now have all of the trade

which the English and Dutch at Albany did with the Ottawas," the minister was informed,

and which was of no little significance since it amounted every year to a considerable number of pelts....Everyone here has come to agree that the construction of Fort Frontenac is the finest thing that could ever be done for advancement of religion, for the safety of the country, and for the increase of trade, because everything that went past Cataraqui went directly to the Dutch.

The Iroquois did not look upon the existence of Ft. Frontenac in the same light. Although they knew, or could have guessed, that the post had been built to insulate them from the northern trade and place them at the eventual economic mercy of the French, still they did not oppose the project. They were presently locked in a struggle with the Andastes and could not afford to open a second front with the French. Besides, they had used the occasion of building the post to maneuver Ononthio into promising military assistance in their war with the Andastes, the only condition being that they do some trading at the post, deliver some of their children to the governor, and remain at peace with the French—all of which they were willing to do.

The fort itself was of no consideration to them. In time of war it could easily be overrun or its garrison starved out. And even if it were not destroyed it was located so far away from the main current of the Cataraqui River that canoes could pass back and forth in the river without hindrance. In time of peace the post was a convenient place to obtain a few French items, like flints and hatchets, which the Indians prized more highly than the same items sold at Albany. And if they desired to trade with the northern tribes without disputing the Cataraqui passage with the French, the post could be bypassed completely by coming from Georgian Bay through Lake Simcoe, then down an eighteen mile portage to the Humber River, down the Humber to the Iroquois village of Teiaigon (modern Toronto), and around the western and southern waters of Lake Ontario to Iroquoia. Therefore, as long

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82 RAPQ, 1926-27, pp. 32-33, Frontenac to Colbert, 13 Nov 1673.

83 In 1684 Baron La Hontan wrote: "In time of war I take Ft. Frontenac to be indefensible; for the Cataracts and Currents of the St. Lawrence are such, that fifty Iroquoise may there stop five hundred French, without other Arms but Stones" (New Voyages, pp. 69-70). A year earlier, the Intendant De Meulles wrote that the post was not worth fortifying because of its impossible location. PAC, C11A, Vol. VI, fol. 182, De Meulles to Colbert, Quebec, 4 Nov 1683.

84 PAC, C11A, Vol. VI, fol. 182, De Meulles to Colbert, Quebec, 4 Nov 1683.
as they were at war with the Andastes, as long as the French held out the offer of military assistance in the war, and as long as the French confined themselves to the eastern end of the lake, the Iroquois were content to let matters rest where they were. This status in the west was not long to last, however.

In the summer of 1674 some Iroquois delegates came to Montreal to meet with Frontenac and go through the annual ritual of confirming the peace by an exchange of speeches and gifts. At the meeting the Iroquois presented the Governor with eight of their children as he had requested. In his memorandum to Colbert describing the meeting, Frontenac stated that the Iroquois had ratified all of the terms of the treaty, and he ascribed their giving the children to him to the personal sway he held over the tribes.85

If the Iroquois demanded a quid pro quo in the form of military assistance against the Andastes, he wisely neglected to mention it to Colbert; and yet, it seems unlikely that the subject did not arise at the conference. Frontenac had tied the discussion of the alliance to the delivery of the children when he spoke to the Iroquois the previous summer. And it is difficult to understand why the Iroquois would have made what was to them an enormous

85 Robinson, Toronto, Chapter II.
sacrifice, considering the great devotion they had for their children, without expecting something in return.

Regardless of what they expected or what had been promised, they did not get it that year. Whether Frontenac continued to hold out the prospect of French aid as a means of keeping the Iroquois friendly is not known; in any case the question of French aid soon became academic. The following year the Andaste War came to an abrupt end—no thanks to Governor Frontenac.

The Andaste War for some seventy-five years had held the main attention of the western Iroquois while the French established themselves in the St. Lawrence valley and slowly extended their influence toward the west. It had been prosecuted with unusual ferocity since 1667 when the peace of that year relieved the northern threat to Iroquoia and allowed the full force of the Senecas, Cayugas, Onondagas, and Oneidas to fall on their enemy to the south. The Mohawks, meanwhile, had used the 1667 peace to prosecute with greater vigor their old war with the Mohicans.

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86 PAC, C11A, Vol. IV, fol. 67-68, Frontenac to Colbert, Quebec, 14 Nov 1674.

Neither war had gone especially well for the Iroquois until 1675 when surprising events occurred. In May of that year the Andastes were surprised, not by an Iroquoia war-party, but by a force of Virginia frontiersmen who were annoyed by the Indians' reluctance to quit their tribal lands and abandon them to the whites. In the battle that followed the Indians suffered heavy casualties. At this the Andastes requested peace of the Iroquois, left their lands in the Susquehanna valley, and were adopted into the tribes of the Confederacy. About the same time, for reasons unknown, the Mohicans suddenly sued the Mohawks for peace and allied themselves with the English. Almost overnight the southern threat to Iroquoia ended, the Confederacy received a sizable adjunct to its population, and an end was made to the distractions which had for generations diverted the attention of the Confederacy from its most serious problem—the French attempt to engross the northern fur trade.

Bitter toward the French over help that did not come, and inflated with the knowledge that the balance of power in the west had now shifted in their favor, the Iroquois


89PAC, C11A, Vol. VI, fol. 517, Lamberville to La Barre, Onondaga, 10 Feb 1684.
saw no advantage in continuing to curry favor at Quebec. French-Iroquois relations went through a startling reversal in 1675. Previous to this time all of the missionaries in Iroquoia had remarked how favorably disposed the villagers were toward the French since the conference at Fort Frontenac in 1673. Then suddenly, a radical change. The missionaries began reporting being forced to endure insults and even bodily abuse at the hands of the Indians. They said they expected at any moment to be seized and burned to death over a slow fire. This rising hostility toward the French was also caused by something that was happening on Lake Ontario.

Governor Frontenac from the beginning had not been so unwise as to think that his post at Cataraqui would completely prevent the Ottawa and Iroquois from smuggling furs to Albany. He had probably been made aware in 1673 by La Salle and others that several trade routes existed which could allow their users to bypass the Cataraqui.

90 Blair, Indian Tribes of the Upper Mississippi, Vol. I, p. 226. Frontenac's correspondence for the years 1675-78 inclusive has been lost, or we might know more about this important shift in the balance of power in the west.

River completely. When the Governor wrote to Colbert in the fall telling him of the construction of the post, he mentioned that he had already sent craftsmen to the area to construct a ship that would operate out of the Cataraqui River to patrol the shores of the lake. The ship was intended to intercept any furs that were in the process of being smuggled past the post so as to make French commercial control of the lake virtually complete.

During the next two years further initiatives in this connection were taken. In 1674 La Salle, who was commandant at Ft. Frontenac at the time, petitioned Governor Frontenac to be granted the post in seigneuria. Frontenac was agreeable and forwarded the petition to court for a final decision. The court passed favorably on the request, granting La Salle seigneurial rights in the area of the post and a patent of nobility. In return, La Salle was required to maintain a garrison at the fort as strong as

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92 JR, Vol. LIX, p. 251, Present state of the missions, 1675.


94 WUfSL 1926-27, p. 35, Frontenac to Colbert, Quebec, 13 Nov 1673.

that of Ville-Marie (around twenty men), to reimburse Frontenac for the expenses incurred in the 1673 expedition, to attract French and Indian settlers to his lands, to build a church, and to maintain two Recollet friars in the place.

In the fall of 1675, fateful year, the young trader embarked for Cataraqui with canoes loaded with men and materials for his new enterprise. He came with soldiers, sailors, masons, carpenters, a blacksmith, an armourer, and other tradesmen. He and his men tore down Frontenac's post and in its place erected a more suitable structure. It was twice as big as the original. It had twelve-foot high walls, three of which were of masonry and a fourth of wooden stakes, and four bastions. The whole was surrounded by a ditch fifteen feet wide. Inside was a house of squared logs 100 feet long, a blacksmith shop, officers' quarters, a guardhouse, a well, and a cow-house. The carpenters also worked diligently to build a bark named Frontenac and three other small vessels to assist in patrolling the shores.

The Iroquois watched sullenly all of this fresh activity at Cataraqui. They later complained to Governor

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La Barre, by way of explaining some of their latest grievances against the French, that a primary condition of peace had been violated when Fort Frontenac was transformed from a trading post into a real fort.  The French in 1675 were bringing not only soldiers but settlers into the area. The Iroquois were no more friendly toward a French settlement in their lands than they would have been had the English tried to establish one there. It was a way of insulating them from the northern trade. Moreover, the French were no longer confining themselves to the eastern end of the lake but were using their ships to patrol all along the northern shore where the trade was most active. It was all just a commercial operation to the French, but that very thing made it an aggression to the Iroquois. The next year one of the missionaries wrote that the Iroquois regarded the French activity on the lake as a declaration of war.

French ambition did not stop with Lake Ontario. In the following years the colony extended its commercial empire deeper into the interior, an action which had the effect, if not the entire intention, of further insulating

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98 La Hontan, New Voyages, p. 83.
the Iroquois from the northern trade. In 1676 Frontenac and a work party journeyed to the western end of Lake Ontario where they constructed a post at the Niagara portage to Lake Erie.99 The next year La Salle crossed to France and obtained permission to explore "the western territories of New France."100 He was authorized to build forts where he thought necessary and maintain them under the same terms and conditions as applied to Ft. Frontenac.

La Salle cared nothing for explorations except insofar as they offered personal gain, but the permission to build posts in the west was a meaningful concession because it allowed him to garner for himself the fur-trade of half a continent. In December 1678 he was back in the colony, and the following spring he built the first of his posts, Ft. Saint-Joseph, near the southern end of Lake Michigan.101 Then quickly followed Ft. Crevecoeur farther to the southwest on the Illinois River. Shortly thereafter he built what was to become his greatest establishment in the west, Ft. Saint-Louis, about seventy-five miles above Ft. Crevecoeur on the Illinois.


This rapid extension of the French into the west not only sounded the death knell of Colbert's plans for a compact colony; what was more immediately important, it was seen by the Iroquois as the final provocation leading to war. By a series of leaps the French had interposed themselves between the Iroquois and the northern trade all along a line running from Quebec to the Illinois country. The Iroquois recognized that if the French could make this line a real barrier as they had done on Lake Ontario, the Confederacy would be reduced to a state of absolute dependence. It was then a time of resistance or a time for resistance might pass forever. In the fall of 1680, 700 Confederacy warriors invaded the Illinois country to breach the line at its weakest point.¹⁰²

This very serious news reached Quebec in 1681. According to reports given Frontenac, the Iroquois had attacked a village of the Illinois tribe near Ft. Saint-Louis. The French officer who had tried to prevent the attack had had a knife plunged into his chest, and a Recollet father had been killed. The Iroquois burned the Illinois village and carried the women and children survivors into captivity. On the return march a village

¹⁰² PAC, C11A, Vol. V, pp. 386-87, Frontenac to King, Quebec, 2 Nov 1681; Mémoire of Duchesneau, Quebec, 13 Nov 1681.
of the Miami tribe met a similar disaster.\textsuperscript{103} Equally serious, Frontenac later learned that when news of the Illinois defeat was heard by the Cat tribe of Virginia, its 600 men, women and children voluntarily surrendered to the Iroquois and were assimilated into the Confederacy so as not to meet the same fate.\textsuperscript{104} Iroquois strength was growing apace with their aggressiveness.

The western cycle of peace and war now presented Governor Frontenac with a situation similar in gravity to the one faced by Courcelles a decade earlier. Then, strong action had been necessary to prevent the colony from being dragged into war, and Courcelles was barely able to avert a disaster by using all of the limited means at his disposal. In 1681, after years of neglecting the colonial military establishment, the colony had even fewer means to intimidate the Iroquois. When Frontenac informed the court of the Iroquois attacks, he included a request for 500 to 600 regular troops and told the king that they would be used to make a show of force on the lakes above

\textsuperscript{103} PAC, Cl1A, Vol. V, pp. 386-87, Frontenac to King, Quebec, 2 Nov 1681; Memoire of Duchesneau, Quebec, 13 Nov 1681.

\textsuperscript{104} JR, LXII, pp. 55-107, Letter of Jean de Lamberville, Onondaga, 25 Aug 1682.
Iroquoia.\textsuperscript{105} In the meantime, he intended to make sure that the Iroquois compensated the Illinois for their losses, and if they did not, he would require the Iroquois to meet him at Ft. Frontenac the coming summer and account for their strange behavior.

Just as the Governor was about to seal this dispatch, worse news arrived which appeared to indicate that the war was already spreading among the Ottawa tribes.\textsuperscript{106} A Seneca chief had reportedly been captured by a group of Illinois in the Ottawa country. The Illinois had taken their prisoner to a village of the Kiskakons near Michilimackinac where a dispute arose over an Illinois girl whom the Seneca claimed was his slave.\textsuperscript{107} Some of the Kiskakons took the Seneca's side in the quarrel and began taunting the Illinois warriors, whereupon one of them, in a rage, grabbed up a knife and killed the Seneca. The Kiskakons, horror struck at the deed and fearing reprisals when news of it reached Iroquoia, abandoned their village and fled without taking action against the person who had committed

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\textsuperscript{105} PAC, C11A, Vol. V, pp. 386-87, Frontenac to King, Quebec, 2 Nov 1681; Mémoire of Duchesneau, Quebec, 13 Nov 1681. \\
\textsuperscript{106} PAC, C11A, Vol. V, p. 387, Mémoire of Duchesneau, Quebec, 12 Nov 1681. \\
\textsuperscript{107} The Kiskakons were one of the Ottawa tribes.
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the act, as their law required. When the Senecas heard what had happened, they recovered the skull of their slain chief and brought it back to their country, vowing to wreak their vengeance on the Kiskakons.

The scope and seriousness of the situation now became even more apparent. As the Indendant Duchesneau expressed it:

It is without doubt and everyone agrees that if we let the Iroquois alone, they will van­quish the Illinois and in a short time make themselves the masters of all the Ottawa tribes and will carry their commerce to the English; so it is absolutely necessary for us to make them our friends or destroy them.109

For lack of means to carry out the second alternative, Frontenac tried to temporize and appease until help arrived from France. In October 1681 he sent the Sieur de la Marque with a canoe load of trade goods to distribute among the Senecas.110 He instructed la Marque to urge the Senecas to regard the murder of their chief as a private quarrel and not as a cause for a general war. La Marque was to offer the Governor's personal assurances that the


\[110\] PAC, Cl1A, Vol. V, fol. 390, Frontenac to King, Quebec, 2 Nov 1681.
Kiskakons would be required to meet the full reparations expected of them. Finally, he was to invite the Senecas to a meeting at Cataraqui in the summer where the outstanding points of difference between themselves and the French could be discussed. But when la Marque arrived in Iroquoia to try his hand at diplomacy he was met with insolence and hostility. Yes, the Iroquois said, they would meet Ononthio in the summer but not at Cataraqui. They would meet him at La Famine, the mouth of the Onondaga River on the south of the lake.\textsuperscript{111}

Having received la Marque's report and now less sanguine than ever about the eventual outcome of events in the west, Frontenac convened a council of notables in March 1682 "to investigate together the most appropriate measures for deterring the war that there is reason to believe the Iroquois want to continue against the Illinois...and...the Ottawa."\textsuperscript{112} The council of six was composed of the Governor, the Intendant Duchesneau, Sieur Prevost (Town-Major of Quebec), and the Jesuit Fathers, Bechefer, Dablon, and Fremin.

\textsuperscript{111}\textit{PAC, C11A, Vol. VI, fol. 21-23, Mémoire concernant l'estat présent du Canada, Paris, 1683.}

\textsuperscript{112}\textit{PAC, C11A, Vol. VI, fol. 24-27, Extrait des opinions faites en conférence, Quebec, 23 March 1682.}
Frontenac asked the six to write their opinions on the following questions: where the conference with the Iroquois should be held; what preparations should be made for the conference; how many Iroquois would be hunting in the vicinity of Ft. Frontenac at the time so as to determine how large an escort would be needed; and how funds could be raised to pay for the escort, food for the men, and presents for the Iroquois delegates. That the last question should arise is sufficient testimony to the depressed condition of the colony.

Father Bechefer, who gave the Jesuits' viewpoint, stated that the Governor should not confer with the Iroquois at La Famine as this would involve a loss of face; that the conference should be held by June 15 before the Iroquois warriors were back from hunting and able to form war-parties; that there would not be many Iroquois in the vicinity at the time (so Frontenac should not take a larger escort than usual, fifty or sixty men in twelve to fifteen canoes, lest the Indian deputies become alarmed and fear a trap). Bechefer continued by remarking that the Iroquois were too intent on crushing the Illinois to think of attacking the French, one enemy at a time always having been the key to Iroquois policy. He ended by suggesting that the presents be liberal and given to chiefs and warriors alike in order to calm the Indians' anger against the French.
Sieur Prevost wrote that if Frontenac did not feel inclined to risk a visit at this time, he should nevertheless send representatives to meet with the Iroquois at Ft. Frontenac; that the chiefs should be given the presents earlier promised; and that the conference should be held at the beginning of June, since this was the date first mentioned to the Indians. Prevost went on to say that there would probably be few Iroquois in the neighborhood of the fort; so the Governor should avoid taking a large escort, which might do more harm than good. As for paying for the conference, the Town-Major referred that problem back to the Governor and the Indendant.

Duchesneau, in making his answers, was of course mainly concerned with that very problem. To keep the expense of the conference to a minimum, he recommended that the meeting be held at Montreal. If that were not practicable, then at Ft. Frontenac. He too suggested a conference at the earliest possible date, at the beginning of June, so as to meet with the Iroquois before their war-parties left for the north and west. The cost of the conference could only be met, there being little money in the colony, by borrowing from the agent of the Farm. The loan could be paid back, at least in part, by handing over to the agent all gifts received by the Governor from the Indians at the conference.
Frontenac, in giving his views, dissented from the opinions of the others on several points. Frontenac felt that he should decline to meet the Iroquois on either the south side of the lake or at Ft. Frontenac. The reason he gave was that he could not go to either place without a larger escort than usual "for the security and dignity of his person," owing to the large numbers of Iroquois expected to be hunting in the vicinity. And to take a large escort was impossible because there was not enough money to pay for it, the king having expressly forbidden borrowing from the Farm. Moreover, a large escort would cause the Iroquois to suspect his intentions.

The plan the Governor suggested was for him to feign some sort of indisposition as an excuse for not making the long journey but send to invite the Iroquois delegates to Montreal in the fall. To make it clear to the Iroquois that he was nevertheless eager to meet with them, they should be assured that food supplies for the trip to Montreal would be delivered to them at Ft. Frontenac or at any other point they cared to designate along the route. A conference in June, the Governor suggested, would be useless and would necessitate another in the fall because only by the later time would he have learned what reparations the Kiskakons intended to make for the murdered Seneca chief. Moreover, by the fall he would have received
new instructions from court and perhaps the troops and supplies he had requested.

The answers made by the members of the conference point up the seemingly hopeless situation facing the colony. It was absolutely essential to hold the conference with the Iroquois at the earliest possible date in order to avert a spiraling escalation of the war in the west; and yet, an early conference would be unable to settle the key point about Kiskakon indemnity. A meeting held anywhere on the lake would involve great expense, which the colony could not bear at the moment; and yet, the Iroquois refused to meet the Governor anywhere but at La Famine. The challenge to the colony could have been met if the court had seen fit to supply it all along with adequate troops, money, and material; as it was, forced inaction on the part of Canadian officials caused a deterioration of the western situation day by day.

By the end of July, reports reaching the central colony made the situation look critical. Duchesneau wrote to Frontenac, who had gone to Montreal in anticipation of the arrival there of the Kiskakons, that sad news had been received from the court—no aid for the colony would be forthcoming that year.\textsuperscript{113} In light of this, the Indendant

\textsuperscript{113}PAC, C11A, Vol. VI, fol. 28-29, Duchesneau to Frontenac, Quebec, 28 July 1682.
urged the Governor to do something, anything, that would retard the increase of reprisals in the west. He suggested that Frontenac meet the Iroquois demands for a conference on the south side of the lake; and since that would involve a great threat to the Governor's personal safety, he should sail to La Famine in La Salle's bark manned by a resolute crew and accompanied by another well-manned boat or two. The Iroquois chiefs could then be invited aboard the larger ship for the conference. Unless this, or something like it, were done quickly, the Intendant warned, the Iroquois would believe that the French had abandoned their Illinois and Ottawa allies. No one could foresee the disastrous consequences of that better than Frontenac, the Intendant concluded.

Before this dispatch reached Frontenac, news from the west inclined the Governor to the same conclusion. A group of Iroquois from the north shore of Lake Ontario had plundered the canoes of a group of coureurs de bois from Ft. Frontenac. When the commandant of the fort, Sieur de la Forest, had gone to the Senecas involved to complain and seek satisfaction, the villagers plundered his bark of its supplies, severely damaged its rigging, and gave the crew a severe beating. La Forest and his men had barely managed to escape with their lives.114 Appearances were that the colony itself was next in line for attack.

Frontenac hurried off a reply to Duchesneau on August 5 agreeing that a meeting with the Iroquois at La Famine now seemed the only way of averting a catastrophe, although such a meeting was sure to lower the prestige of the Governor by showing too great a deference to the arrogant demands of the Indians.¹¹⁵ Still, the problem of financing the voyage worried him. The Governor asked Duchesneau whether such an enterprise could be financed by borrowing from some Quebec merchants.

Before Duchesneau could reply to Frontenac's letter, a delegation of Kiskakons, Hurons, and Miamis arrived at Montreal to confer with the Governor.¹¹⁶ The Kiskakons opened the council by pleading that they not be abandoned to the Iroquois and urged the Governor to intercede for them with the Senecas. Frontenac replied that he had already requested a meeting with the Iroquois and that the matter must be treated as a private quarrel rather than a tribal issue. A Miami chief then spoke and complained that his tribe had been abandoned by the French, because on four separate occasions the French had refused to come to their aid when attacked. Frontenac could only reply to this

¹¹⁵ PAC, C11A, Vol. VI, fol. 4, Frontenac to Duchesneau, Montreal, 5 Aug 1682.

¹¹⁶ PAC, C11A, Vol. VI, fol. 5-13, Conférence entre le Comte de Frontenac et les Kiskakons, Hurons et Miamis, Montreal, 13 Aug 1682.
that he would "reproach" the Iroquois for what they had done.

When the council continued the next day the Hurons asked for aid against the Iroquois, not only for themselves but for their allies, the Miamis. The Kiskakons said that they were ready to make amends for the slain chief by giving the Senecas one child, one porcelain collar, and a beaver robe. They saw no reason to give more since it was not they who had committed the crime.

Frontenac, feeling the Iroquois looking over his shoulder at this conference, rejected the offer as inadequate. The Kiskakons retorted that further than that they were not prepared to go, that if the Iroquois expected more they themselves should have been more openhanded for the murders they had committed among the Miami. At this a Miami chief arose and declared vehemently that his people would suffer the attacks no longer; he and his warriors were going to take to the warpath. The conference dissolved with Frontenac pleading for more time to straighten matters with the Iroquois and begging the delegates not to send their warriors into Iroquoia.

The situation was now as bad as it could get short of all-out war. The allies had left the conference convinced that they had been abandoned by the French and were determined to carry the fight to the Iroquois. The Iroquois were certain to be contemptuous of the Kiskakons' offer
of indemnity; and in any case, they would be left unsatisfied regarding the restrictions the French had placed on the Lake Ontario trade. With a heavy heart, Frontenac started touring the Island of Montreal marking sites where redoubts should be built. When this was accomplished toward the end of August, there was no longer time to do anything other than depart for Quebec to be replaced by a new governor.

The governor who replaced Frontenac in the fall of 1682 was Le Febvre de la Barre, sixty years old and a long-time servant of Louis XIV. La Barre had served in the Parlement of Paris, and filled several posts as intendant in France before coming to Canada. He had risen to the rank of lieutenant-general in the navy and had conducted several successful naval engagements against the English. As soon as he arrived in the colony he was shocked to find the situation as desperate as it was. "I found the country on the eve of a war forced by the Iroquois and in the condition of succumbing to it," he wrote to Seignelay soon after surveying the affairs of the colony. His shock


118 PAC, CI1A, Vol. VI, fol. 361-62, La Barre to Seignelay, Quebec, 14 Nov 1684.

119 PAC, CI1A, Vol. VI, fol. 60, La Barre to Seignelay, Quebec, 1682.
stemmed from the fact that his instructions had not adequately appraised him of the true condition of the colony, or where he was going to find the resources to meet the threat posed by the Iroquois. This, regardless of the fact that Frontenac the previous fall had issued an urgent request for 600 troops to save the colony from being drawn into the western conflict.

La Barre's instructions stated that he must not only apply himself to preventing Iroquois attacks on the French, he must also stop the Iroquois from insulting the allies. This must be done, he was told, in order to preserve the colony and safeguard "the principal commerce of Canada," the beaver trade. The instructions blandly stated that all of this could be accomplished by taking a force of 500 or 600 Canadians to the border of Iroquoia and frightening the Indians into submission. The Governor was to attack them only as a last resort and only then if swift and total success were assured. The instructions said nothing about how this campaign was to be financed, nor was there any mention of reinforcements for the colony.

La Barre immediately called his own assembly of notables to get ideas about how he could best carry out his

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120 PAC, B, Vol. VIII, fol. 103-104, Instructions for La Barre, Versailles, 10 May 1682.
instructions. The assembly consisted of twenty-two of the most important men in the colony, including the Governor, the new Intendant (De Meulles), Bishop Laval, Dollier de Casson, a number of senior Jesuits, several militia officers, some merchants, and the Town-Majors of Quebec and Three Rivers. The assembly was unanimous in declaring that the cause of the problem was the Iroquois' determination to break the French hold on the western fur-trade; that the Indians had been aided in this design by the inexpensive arms and ammunition sold to them by the English; and that the Iroquois' present policy was to keep the French inactive by making threatening gestures toward the colony while in the meantime conquering the western allies one by one.

To defeat the designs of the Iroquois, the assembly declared, would take 1000 Canadians accustomed to the management of canoes and able to make the long campaign to Iroquoia. These men should be divided into two groups, 500 to be sent against the Onondagas and 500 against the Senecas. These should plan to remain in Iroquoia "sufficiently long to effectually destroy the Iroquois, and

121 PAC, C11A, Vol. VI, fol. 68-70, Mémoire de l'Assemblée tenu le 10e Octobre 1682, Quebec, Le Febvre de la Barre. This is reprinted along with many other documents relating to La Barre's administration in DHNY, Vol. I, pp. 95 ff.
not as was done seventeen years ago, making them partially afraid without weakening them." The king must aid the expedition by sending 200 or 300 soldiers to garrison the Montreal area while the militia was away. He must also send around 150 laborers to be distributed among the settlements to help with the farmwork while the men were gone.

The assembly at last passed to the most important question at issue—the matter of finance. It was essential, they did not hesitate to point out, for the king to provide funds as well as the troops and laborers to carry out the program; otherwise, "it is impossible to undertake anything of utility." La Barre was informed in no uncertain terms that "the failure of all aid from France" had been the one thing that had goaded the Iroquois into their present contemptuous attitude toward the colony. The Iroquois, he was told, "believed that we were abandoned by the great Ononthio, our Master, and if they had seen us assisted by him they would not hold their present attitude and would let our allies be in peace and consent not to hunt in [the allies' territories, or would] bring all their pelttries to the French."

La Barre forwarded the proceedings of the assembly to court along with a strongly worded letter of his own.122

122PAC, C11A, Vol. VI, fol. 66-67, La Barre to King, Quebec, 1682.
He appealed for regular troops, 200 to 300 of them to guard the upper colony as the assembly had suggested. He also requested the 150 laborers. With the aid of these reinforcements and the funds which the king would send for the expedition, the Governor proposed to march an army of 1200 Canadians into Iroquoia in the fall, winter there, and from a base which he would establish, send out mixed raiding parties of French and allied Indians to hunt down every last one of the Iroquois. He closed his letter with the blunt warning, "you must be convinced that what I have requested is absolutely necessary and that without aid the country is lost."

It was then La Barre's turn to temporize and appease until help arrived. He sent a canoe loaded with gifts to the Iroquois inviting them to meet with him at Montreal in June. The hope was that the gifts would cause the Iroquois to defer their threatened assault on the Ottawas until he was in a position to attack Iroquoia. As in the past, the Iroquois took the presents but informed the Governor that if he wanted to talk, he would have to come to them. When La Barre and De Meulles heard this and received word that the Iroquois were sending large war-parties to open war with the Ottawas, they secretly sent a

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123 PAC, C11A, Vol. VI, fol. 85-86, De Meulles to Seignelay, Quebec, 12 Nov 1682; fol. 167-70, De Meulles to Seignelay, Quebec, 2 June 1683.
ship to France to inform the minister of these developments and reinforce upon him the necessity for immediate aid. They now requested 600 men, 1000 muskets, and as many swords. Until these arrived, they said they would do what they could—which was not much—to save the west for France.

Again La Barre angled for a meeting with the Iroquois at Montreal. He sent the Frenchman most admired by the Indians, Pierre Le Moyne, to Iroquoia to persuade the tribes to relent in their refusal to visit the colony. Le Moyne, after considerable difficulty, induced the Confederacy to send representatives to meet with the Governor at Montreal in July. At the conference La Barre scored a minor triumph. He began by distributing lavish gifts to all the delegates, particularly the Senecas, to soothe their anger toward the Kiskakons. He demanded to know why the Iroquois were attacking the Illinois. "They deserve to die" came the reply, and the Governor did not feel it advisable to press the point any further.

He next demanded to know why they were attacking the Hurons and Ottawa. Here he received some satisfaction.

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124 PAC, C11A, Vol. VI, fol. 167-70, De Meulles to Seignelay, Quebec, 2 June 1683.

The delegates told him that in view of the presents they had received, which they would in part regard as the reparations owed by the Kiskakons, they would recommend to their general council that the Ottawas and the Hurons be left in peace.

When the delegates departed after the conference La Barre could fairly congratulate himself in that he had succeeded in confining the war to the Miami and Illinois tribes. That, in view of the circumstances, was a significant achievement. All he could do next was to continue planning for an offensive to be launched as soon as the requested aid arrived.

La Barre waited. The remainder of that summer of 1683 came and went without word from the court. When fall was turning into winter and the troops still had not arrived, La Barre became exasperated. He dictated a memorandum to Seignelay that must have caused the minister to raise his eyebrows as he read it. The Governor reported that his temporizing policy had gone about as far as it could go without concrete assistance from France. He had bought time for the colony—nothing more—by holding the July conference with the Iroquois. He had quietly sent

an officer of his guards, de Baugy, with men and munitions to reinforce Ft. Saint-Louis in the Illinois country. He had sent thirty men under the command of Durantaye to Michilimackinac where they had joined forces with Du Luth just in time to fend off a Cayuga war-party from attacking the Ottawas. At La Salle's request he had sent a sergeant of his guards with a body of men to Ft. Frontenac to reinforce that post.

This, Seignelay was told, just about exhausted the resources of the colony. If the minister sanctioned the campaign being urged by everyone in the colony, then the troops, munitions, supplies, and money would have to be sent out early next year in order to be of greatest effect. But if the minister decided against war, then the best course to follow would be to continue buying the Iroquois off with elaborate gifts. In case Seignelay decided on the latter alternative, La Barre requested permission to return to France and personally explain the situation to the minister, "for," the Governor bluntly asserted, "this country is not in the least known to Mgr. le Marquis, someone has made representations about it to you very far from the truth."

Then, just as the river was about to freeze, the royal frigate La Tempete arrived bearing the long-delayed aid and instructions from France. When La Barre broke the seals on the instructions and read them, his level of
exasperation must have reached a new degree. The king began by telling La Barre that nothing could be worse for the colony than war.\textsuperscript{127} The Governor must instead use diplomatic means to tone down the hostility of the Iroquois. To strengthen the hand of the Governor in these negotiations, the king indicated that 200 marines were being dispatched to the colony. In addition, the king was sending 1000 muskets and the same number of words, together with the other supplies requested by the Governor and Intendant. He was also sending 20,000 \textit{livres} in specie to be used only if war was absolutely necessary, in which case the Iroquois were to be decisively defeated in one quick campaign.

La Barre should be forgiven if he felt little stronger after the arrival of \textit{La Tempête} than before. He had received a set of ambiguous instructions which for some unknown reason betrayed a complete lack of understanding about the situation facing the colony.\textsuperscript{128} The king showed no awareness that the allies of the colony were already under attack and that the colony itself was on the brink,

\textsuperscript{127}\textit{PAC}, B, Vol. X, fol. 3-5, King to La Barre, Fontainebleau, 5 Aug 1683.

\textsuperscript{128}W. J. Eccles, the biographer of Frontenac, suggests the reason. Frontenac, in order to exculpate himself from the affair, upon his arrival in France told the Minister that a treaty had been negotiated with the Iroquois just before his departure from the colony and that all was tranquil when he left. (\textit{Canada under Louis XIV}, p. 131)
and had been for three years. La Barre was being asked to avert a war that had already started. Moreover, of the 200 soldiers promised, 150 were actually sent, and these were raw recruits who came without the proper equipment and with no money for their pay. Of the 1000 muskets, 740 were defective and could not be repaired in the colony; of the 1000 swords, 600 were found broken on arrival; and instead of the light brass cannon requested, heavy iron ones, useless in forest warfare, were sent—and these came without carriages.

With the season now far advanced, there was nothing for La Barre to do but wait until the opening of navigation in the spring, and in the meantime hope that his latest letter to court would serve to awaken the minister before events in the west forced his hand. Unknown to the Governor, those events had already occurred.

In May 1684 four coureurs de bois struggled into Quebec with word that the colony was at war with the Senecas. They told the story that the preceding fall they and their eleven companions had been stopped by a large war-party of Senecas near Ft. Saint-Louis in the Illinois country; their seven canoes and all their merchandise,

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129 PAC, C11A, Vol. VI, fol. 273, La Barre to Seignelay, Quebec, 5 June 1684.
valued at over 15,000 livres, had been confiscated; and that they had barely managed to escape before being killed.\textsuperscript{130} They were on their way to report the incident when even more startling news reached them. The war-party, after plundering the canoes, had proceeded to Ft. Saint-Louis and attacked it. The commandant, de Baugy, running dangerously short of food and ammunition, had sent an appeal for help to Durantaye at Michilimackinac.\textsuperscript{131} They knew nothing more than that, whether the appeal for help was answered, or whether there was anyone left alive at Ft. Saint-Louis when help arrived; they brought the report to the Governor without waiting to find out.\textsuperscript{132} It was subsequently learned that Ft. Saint-Louis finally managed to beat off the attack with heavy loss of life on both sides after a siege of six days.

The Iroquois account of this incident, as it was told to Governor Dougan of New York several years later, was that the Senecas who stopped the coureurs de bois and

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\textsuperscript{130}PAC, C11A, Vol. VI, fol. 255, Report of certain French individuals, Quebec, 28 May 1684.


\textsuperscript{132}PAC, C11A, Vol. VI, fol. 285, La Barre to Seignelay, Quebec, 9 July 1684.
searched their canoes, found the canoes loaded with arms and ammunition destined for delivery to the Illinois.  

The looting of the canoes and the attack on Ft. Saint-Louis, the supposed destination of the cargo, was in retaliation for supplying weapons to the enemies of the Iroquois.

Regardless of the justification for the attack, La Barre was now urged from every side to launch a full-scale invasion of Iroquoia to crush the Iroquois before they crushed the allies. The merchants of the colony had well over 100,000 ecus of merchandise in the western posts, and they feared losing the entire amount if the Iroquois attacks succeeded.  

Even the ordinary habitants caught the war fever. The commandants of the western posts and the Jesuit missionaries among the allies all declared that war was now the only viable policy to follow.

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133 *NYCD*, Vol. III, p. 444, Information received from several Indians and given to the Governor at the Towne House Albany, 6 Aug 1687.


136 *PAC*, C11A, Vol. VI, fol. 528-32, Boisguillot to La Barre, Michilimackinac, 7 May 1684; fol. 522, Durantaye to La Barre, St. Francois Xavier, 22 April 1684; fol. 525; R. P Enjalran S. J. to La Barre, Michilimackinac, 7 May 1684.
La Barre was not so eager as the rest. The colony was virtually defenseless; it had only 150 green soldiers; its stock of arms and ammunition was extremely low; its militiamen gone on a campaign would leave their fields untended and perhaps bring on a famine in the fall; the 20,000 livres sent by the king would scarcely pay for a small campaign, let alone one the size called for here. Moreover, the enemy was more powerful than it had ever been. It was then extremely well armed and equipped; it was larger by adoption; and in the event of war, all five tribes, not just the Mohawks and Oneidas as formerly, would combine their strength against the French.

Even so, events within and without the colony had moved to their climax. The Governor and De Meulles dispatched one more appeal for troops and supplies, this time requesting 700 or 800 men.¹³⁷ It was imperative, La Barre stressed, that this reinforcement arrive before fall, for if it did not, the colony would surely die. He closed the dispatch with the words:

Please have the kindness, Sir, to inform us promptly regarding the wishes of His Majesty; so that if we are not reinforced, he may accord me permission to retire and leave the colony on the last ship, not being able to resign myself to seeing the country lost while between my hands and under my government.

¹³⁷ PAC, C11A, Vol. VI, fol. 273-77, La Barre to Seignelay, Quebec, 5 June 1684.
The colony, ill-prepared and led by a Governor who feared the worst, had been sliding sideways into war for years. The war, inevitable as the seasons, stemmed from the clashing commercial interests of the two parties who tried to tap the wealth of the west for their individual benefit. The war about to begin was going to be the most desperate one yet waged by Canada.
CHAPTER IV

THE GREAT IROquoIS-ENGLISH WAR ON CANADA, 1684-1701

The years 1684 to 1701 were again years of crisis in Canada. The crisis was the result of another great war with the Iroquois, fought in a languorous way at first, but bursting into full fury in 1689, a date coinciding with the spread to America of hostilities connected with the War of the League of Augsburg in Europe. The Iroquois war had at issue the control of the western fur-trade and the security of French settlements in the St. Lawrence valley from Indian attack. The active entrance of New York into the war did not change the issues so far as Canada was concerned, for Canadians had long felt that Albany's policy of supplying arms and encouragement to the Iroquois was the basic cause of their, the Canadians', difficulties with the Confederacy. The active, though temporary, entrance of New England into the war in 1690 was the result of Canadians' confusing European issues with American ones and launching an unprovoked attack on the Boston area, not because New Englanders were enemies of Canada, but because they were subjects of the same William III whom their own monarch was fighting in Europe.
The intercolonial phase of the American war, settled in Europe by the Treaty of Ryswick (1697), came to an end in 1698 and called for a return to the status quo ante bellum. This, of course, did not settle the American issues. Those were favorably settled in 1701 when Canada was able to reimpose upon the Iroquois the great Pax Gallica which was to last as long as the French remained in America and finally settled the Indian-centered strategic problems that had been for more than seventy years plaguing the colony.

In the spring of 1684, in order to put a stop to the Iroquois attacks on the Illinois and Miami allies of the French, and to show the Iroquois that they could not attack a French post with impunity, Governor La Barre began to make plans for a campaign into the west. With the limited means at his disposal he could not, however, do what was best, launch a full-scale invasion of Iroquoia; he could only take a fairly small army to the borders of Iroquoia and intimidate the tribes into adopting a more peaceful attitude for the time being. The campaign, La Barre knew, would not be a permanent solution to the western problem, but it would have the virtue of buying additional time for the colony until assistance from France, he fondly hoped, arrived in the fall. Then, with enough additional troops and materials, he could carry out his original intention to winter an army in Iroquoia and achieve the final
solution to the western problem by totally destroying the five tribes.

With these thoughts in mind the Governor began preparations for the campaign. He sent an officer and eighty men with a supply convoy to Pt. Frontenac, the intended base of operations in the west.¹ The officer who made the journey and carried orders to put the fort in condition to receive the army was Sieur de la Hontan, recently arrived from France. He found the fort in a deplorable condition, which he attributed to La Salle's overconcern with the western trade.² La Houtan and his men hurried to strengthen and repair the walls of the fort which in some places had fallen to the ground.

Back in the central colony other preparations went forward. Part of the militia was called out and ordered to assemble at Montreal in July, not without some grumbling by a few habitants that the campaign was being undertaken to support the western trading activities of five or six Quebec merchants.³ Orders were also sent to Du Lhut, Durantay, and Perrot to assemble as many coureurs de bois

¹PAC, Cl1A, Vol. VI, fol. 285, La Barre to Seignelay, Quebec, 9 July 1684.

²La Hontan, New Voyages, p. 69.

³PAC, Cl1A, Vol. VI, fol. 382, De Meulles to Seignelay, 8 July 1684.
and allied Indians as they could into a so-called "army of the south" and bring it to Lake Ontario where it would link up with the main force under La Barre.4

An "army" of this kind was known to have a number of advantages so far as the colony was concerned. It would augment the fighting strength of the French, but even more importantly, it would pit the northern tribes against the Iroquois and so discourage the rekindling of a friendship between them. After 1684 it became a standard feature of French policy in the west to encourage by all manner of means the incitement of northern tribes, especially the Ottawa, against the Iroquois to achieve these very advantages.

The policy, of course, had its dangers: on the one hand, that it would not work well enough to keep the western trade out of the hands of the Iroquois; and on the other hand, that it would work too well and the western tribes would enter upon a kind of self-perpetuating war of reprisals that could not be stopped on command from Quebec. On this particular occasion, the difficulty Du Lhut, Durantaye, and Perrot had in raising an army from among the Ottawas indicated that those Indians were still favorably

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4PAC, Cl1A, Vol. VI, fol. 285, La Barre to Seignelay, Quebec, 9 July 1684.
disposed toward a commercial connection with Albany and were not eager to do anything to sabotage it. 5

By July 16 some 800 troops and militia were assembled at Montreal. 6 Here La Barre waited with his men for ten days while additional supplies were gathered and barges were made ready to transport the army's baggage to Ft. Frontenac. 7 While waiting, the Governor began receiving letters addressed to him from Father Lamberville, Jesuit missionary at Onondaga, who had heard about the projected campaign but not about its purpose. 8 Lamberville begged the Governor not to invade Iroquoia and gave a number of imperative reasons for making the appeal.

The five tribes were not yet firmly committed to a war with the colony, wrote Lamberville, but if an attack were made on them all five would surely combine to retaliate with vigor against the French. Such a war would be disastrous


7PAC, C11A, Vol. VI, fol. 309, La Barre to Seignelay, Quebec, 1 Oct 1684.

for the colony. The Iroquois method of warfare precluded their being harmed in any serious way by the campaign; they would not stand and fight but would harass the French army from ambush and then melt away into the forest to return and strike again. Only a remnant of the French force would live to see Montreal again. After that, flame and steel would be carried from La Chine in the west to Beaupre in the east. Already the Iroquois warriors were loudly boasting that if the French invaded their country they would get a chance to discover if French flesh tasted salty as they had been told.

Moreover, the missionary went on, war was completely unnecessary. There had arisen among the eastern tribes a considerable peace party, led by the Onondagas, which was urging the Senecas and Cayugas to bury the hatchet and offer reparations to the French for plundering their canoes and attacking Ft. Saint-Louis. This peace party could prevail and war could be averted if the Governor would support the activities of the Onondagas by offering to negotiate with the Senecas and Cayugas.

When the last of Lamberville's letters reached La Barre, he and his army were slowly portaging their way up the St. Lawrence toward Ft. Frontenac. It now appeared to La Barre that his errand should definitely be one of conciliation rather than intimidation. His convictions on this score were confirmed when there began to arrive
other letters addressed to him from Governor Dongan of New York. La Barre had initiated this correspondence some weeks earlier by informing Dongan of the projected campaign and urging him as a fellow Christian not to render aid to the pagan Iroquois. Dongan's letters contained warnings and information similar to those of Lamberville, though written from a different viewpoint.

The Governor of New York was outraged that La Barre and his army intended to set foot on English soil without permission and cautioned that serious consequences would follow if La Barre persisted in his scheme. Charles II and Louis XIV were on the best of terms, Dongan reminded La Barre, and neither king would welcome news from America that would tend to undermine that amity. Dongan, too, called attention to the peace party among the Iroquois and confirmed Lamberville's information that it was willing to mediate between the French and the Seneca. If La Barre would call off the war, Dongan said, the English would aid in the mediation and would assure entire satisfaction with the size of the indemnity.

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9 PAC, C11A, Vol. VI, fol. 268, La Barre to Dongan, Quebec, 24 June 1684.

10 This correspondence is reprinted in DHNY, Vol. I, pp. 99 ff.
Encouraged by the information from Dongan and Lamberville and perhaps alarmed by their warnings, La Barre sent word to the missionary that if the reparation were reasonable, mediation would be preferable to war.\textsuperscript{11} At the same time he sent Pierre Le Moyne to Onondaga to arrange the details for a peace conference with the Iroquois.\textsuperscript{12} When the army arrived at Ft. Frontenac they encamped to await Le Moyne's return. For two weeks they waited on the damp, marshy shores of the Cataraqui while last-minute maneuverings among the tribes took place. During this time a growing number of Canadians started to come down with a serious disease which had as its symptoms a high fever, debilitation, and often death.

Reacting to this grave turn of events, La Barre tried to save that portion of the army he could by sending those not stricken, 500 whites and 200 mission Indians, across to La Famine where they would be away from the sickness

\textsuperscript{11} PAC, C11A, Vol. VI, fol. 309-13, La Barre to Seignelay, Quebec, 1 Oct 1684.

\textsuperscript{12} What happened during the next few weeks is found in La Barre's and De Meulles' correspondence with the court in the fall (PAC, C11A, Vol. VI, fol. 309-13, La Barre to Seignelay, Quebec, 10 Oct 1684; fol. 388-93, De Meulles to Seignelay, Quebec, 10 Oct 1684), La Hontan's original narrative (\textit{New Voyages}, pp. 66-87, Letter VII, Montreal, 2 Nov 1684), and the anonymous \textit{Recueil de ce qui s'est Passe en Canada...depuis l'annee 1682}, printed in Third Series of Historical Documents, published by Quebec Literary and Historical Society, Quebec, 1871.
and could obtain their food from fishing, which was good in the area. When word finally came to La Barre at Ft. Frontenac that the Iroquois were ready to meet with him, he crossed to La Famine only to find the second contingent of men laid low with the disease.

On September 3 deputies from Onondaga, Oneida, and Cayuga met with La Barre in his camp at La Famine. The Iroquois were none too happy with La Barre for sending without their permission part of his army to the south shore, to the "hearth of the longhouse" as the Indians regarded it. They also quickly saw that his army was incapacitated with illness and soon learned from an informant that the part at Ft. Frontenac was in even worse condition. Under these circumstances the Iroquois were in no mood to be either intimated by or reconciled with the French.

The Governor, who had himself contracted the sickness and was near death's door, opened the conference by demanding to know what the Seneca planned to do by way of repaying the French for the merchandise lost in the canoes and for the attack on Ft. Saint-Louis. Grangula (big throat, indicating his oratorical abilities), the Confederacy spokesman, replied that the quarrel between his people and the French over that issue could come to an end because the

13 La Hontan gives the best account of this conference. New Voyages, pp. 76ff.
Fig. 8. — Governor La Barre's camp at La Famine (La Hontan, New Voyages, Vol. I, facing page 124).
Seneca were willing to pay 1000 beaver pelts as indemnity.

La Barre accepted this reparation, and next demanded to know why the Iroquois were attacking the Illinois and Miami allies of the French. Grangula replied that the Illinois had committed a number of hostile acts against his people and that the Iroquois must either crush them or perish in the attempt. As for the Miamis, Grangula said, they were not as deserving of death as the Illinois and would be spared out of consideration for the Governor. To this La Barre could only reply that in making their attacks on the Illinois, the Iroquois must take care not to harm any Frenchmen operating in the area.

The conference ended with Grangula chiding the French with the remark that he feared for the safety of the sick soldiers, that they should return to Quebec where they could sleep in safety. Infuriated that the condition of his forces made it necessary to endure this insult, La Barre went back to his tent in a rage.

The conference at La Famine was only a minor diplomatic achievement for La Barre; the condition of his forces precluded any major success. He had succeeded in ending the quarrel between the Seneca and the French and had won the concession that the Miami tribes would be left in peace. He had not been able to stop the Iroquois from warring on the Illinois, but had received a kind of tacit recognition by the Iroquois of the French right to be in the Illinois
country and to supply those tribes with arms and ammunition.

That he had been able to achieve this much must be regarded as some kind of miracle; for his main army was small and sick, and his reinforcement, the "army of the south," was at that time he knew not where. That he had not achieved more caused many prominent men of the colony, led by the Intendant De Meulles, to villify him, charging him with incompetence and cowardice and having abandoned the Illinois allies. The Sieur de la Hontan, who accompanied the expedition, gave his opinion about the justice of these charges:

The People here are very busy wafting over to Court a thousand Calumnies against him; both the Clergy and the Gentlemen of the long Robe, write to his disadvantage. Though after all, the whole charge is false; for the poor man could do no more than he did.

The major failure of the conference, as with all the conferences in the past, was that it did not solve the major point of contention between the French and Iroquois: the control of the western fur-trade.


The morning after the conference, La Barre started to make his way back to Montreal with his wretched army. He dispatched a message to Durantaye who was tardily making his way to Ontario with 700 men, 150 *coureurs de bois* and the rest allied Indians, to return to Michilimackinac because the campaign was over.\(^\text{16}\) Durantaye, Du Lhut, and Perrot had had to use all of their very considerable powers of persuasion to get even 550 Ottawa warriors to join the expedition, and then when the Indians learned that the enterprise had been abandoned without a blow being struck and that by coming on the expedition they had made themselves liable to Iroquois reprisals where they were not before, what little faith they had in the French was considerably diminished.\(^\text{17}\)

When the "thousand calumnies" reached the court, Louis XIV and Seignelay were finally awakened to the desperate condition of the colony; that the Iroquois were attacking the Indian allies of Canada; that the colony had fallen into war and then been retrieved at the last moment by Governor La Barre; and that neglect of the colony had caused a royal governor to suffer a near diplomatic and

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\(^{\text{16}}\) *PAC, C11A, Vol. VI, fol. 309-13, La Barre to Seignelay, Quebec, 1 Oct 1684.*

\(^{\text{17}}\) *PAC, C11A, Vol. VI, fol. 388.93, De Meulles to Seignelay, Quebec, 10 Oct 1684.*
military debacle at the hands of the Iroquois. Although the actual guilt for the condition of Canada rested elsewhere, La Barre's shoulders was the logical place for the blame to fall, and the next ships to Canada in the spring of 1685 brought the Governor's recall. The king softened the recall order by alluding to La Barre's advanced age as reason for his action.\textsuperscript{18} To the Intendant, the king was more frank: "I have no cause to be satisfied with the treaty made between the Sieur de la Barre and the Iroquois; the abandonment it made of the Illinois has displeased me very much, and it is that which has determined me to recall him."\textsuperscript{19}

Louis XIV and Seignelay demonstrated their anxiety over the situation in Canada by appointing as La Barre's successor one of the finest officers in the kingdom, Jacques René de Brisay, Marquis de Denonville, and giving Denonville substantial assistance in coping with the military problems of the colony.\textsuperscript{20} Denonville had been a Lieutenant Colonel

\textsuperscript{18} PAC, Cl1A, Vol. XI, fol. 6, King to La Barre, 10 Mar 1685.

\textsuperscript{19} PAC, B, Vol. XI, fol. 96, King to De Meulles, Versailles, 10 Mar 1685.

in the Queen's Dragoons before his appointment as governor and enjoyed a high reputation both at court and among his men. Some of the sergeants who accompanied him to Canada had formerly been his junior officers in France, and they resigned their commissions and volunteered for colonial service just so they could continue under his leadership. 21

Throughout his term of Canadian service, Denonville evinced that meticulous attention to detail and careful concern for the welfare of his troops which marks a distinguished soldier. He personally supervised the recruitment of 500 marines authorized to go with him to Canada, thereby assuring that they were of a higher caliber than those sent in 1683 and 1684.22 These 500 marines were the first indication of the success Denonville would have in obtaining troops from a worried court. By the summer of 1687 he would be in command of 1600 regulars, the highest number of troops deployed in Canada under Louis XIV.23

21 PAC, C11A, Vol. VII, fol. 18-19, Denonville to Seignelay, La Rochelle, 1 May 1685; fol. 37-38, Denonville to Seignelay, La Rochelle, 3 June 1685; fol. 43, Denonville to Seignelay, La Rochelle, 5 June 1685.

22 PAC, C11A, Vol. VII, fol. 18-19, Denonville to Seignelay, La Rochelle, 1 May 1685; fol. 37-38, Denonville to Seignelay, La Rochelle, 3 June 1685; fol. 43, Denonville to Seignelay, La Rochelle, 5 June 1685.

23 PAC, C11A, Vol. IX, fol. 20, Denonville to Seignelay, Quebec, 8 June 1687.
The primary task of Denonville was clearly stated in his instructions.

The principal duty you have is to establish by a firm and solid peace the tranquility of the colony; but to make this peace long-lasting it is necessary to abase the pride of the Iroquois, sustain the Illinois and the other allies that the Sieur de la Barre has abandoned, and commence by a firm and vigorous conduct to make the Iroquois know that they have everything to fear unless they submit to the conditions that you wish to impose on them.24

The king left the means of accomplishing this task, whether through negotiation or war, entirely to Denonville's discretion.

The rest of Denonville's instructions displayed a renewed awareness of the potential English threat to the colony, a threat which re-entered official planning at that time as a result of the new hostility of the Iroquois and the increasing English competition in the fur-trade. It was a threat which became more real and bulked ever larger in the minds of Canadian and French officials as the years passed. Louis XIV stated that he had protested to the English government about the scandalous conduct of the Governor of New York in supporting the Iroquois with arms against the French and extending the territorial claims of New York up to the St. Lawrence River. Denonville was

24 PAC, B, Vol. XI, fol. 6.5-18, Instructions from King to Denonville, 10 Mar 1685.
ordered to let the Englishmen of New York remain at peace so long as they stayed in their own territories, but to attack any whom he found in Iroquoia.

The French Governor was informed of the essential article of policy, that strong support should be given to the Indian allies of the colony, the Illinois in particular. The Ottawas also must be held in firm alliance. Denonville was ordered to make a journey toward Michilimackinac, strengthening Ft. Frontenac in the process and constructing new forts along the way for the protection and convenience of the Indians. He was, moreover, to begin aiding those Frenchmen who had started trading in the Hudson's Bay area. This last was to counter competition from English posts on the Bay that were luring the Ottawas there to do their trading. Thus, a second front was opened in the all-important commercial war between England and France in North America.

On the first of August, 1685, Denonville, accompanied by his wife and family, arrived at Quebec. Before sailing he had protested the cramped quarters assigned to the marines who were sailing with him, but Seignelay had dismissed the complaint as far-fetched. More than 100 of


the marines died from scurvy and ship fever during the crossing, and Denonville had to bring the troops back up to strength by replacing the casualties with indentured laborers who had been intended for farm work.\textsuperscript{27}

When Denonville landed and hastily surveyed the situation he was staggered by the condition of the colony. None of the three major settlements had defensive works of any kind.\textsuperscript{28} Quebec had only the crumbling Ft. Saint-Louis, which had not been repaired since Frontenac described it as a fort without walls, without doors, without bastions, "a place completely open into which one can enter from any direction."\textsuperscript{29} The village of Three Rivers was unprotected by not so much as a single pailing.\textsuperscript{30} At Montreal, the scare of the previous year had produced a brief flurry of activity. Palisades fifteen feet long had been cut, and there was talk of fortifying the village come

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\textsuperscript{28} PAC, C11A, Vol. VII, fol. 87-88, Denonville to Seignelay, Quebec, 13 Nov 1685.
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spring; but the immediate threat had passed and the palisade logs were still in a horizontal position.\textsuperscript{31}

Denonville investigated other affairs of the colony and found them in no better shape. The remnants of seven companies of marines already in Canada were badly disorganized, demoralized from lack of adequate clothing and pay, and armed with weapons that were virtually worthless.\textsuperscript{32} For lack of funds and supplies the previous two years, De Meulles had been obliged to allow the troops to hire themselves out to the habitants as day laborers.\textsuperscript{33} This had provided a much-needed boost to the agricultural production of the colony, but it had not helped the matter of military discipline, which was never high among the marines anyway. And now, with an additional 500 troops on his hands and no money to pay them, the Intendant was forced to adopt another unusual expedient. He took playing cards, ascribed a value to each, signed them, stamped each with


\textsuperscript{32} PAC, C11A, Vol. VII, fol. 87-88, Denonville to Seignelay, Quebec, 13 Nov 1685.

his official seal, and put them into circulation to serve as legal currency until the government was able to redeem them. The expedient solved such a pressing need that "card money" quickly became a permanent fixture of the Canadian economy.

Elsewhere, too, there was cause for despair. There was not a single magazine or storehouse at Quebec where munitions could be kept, and what few of the king's supplies already available in the capital were in a shocking state of confusion. The reason was not far to seek. The Intendant, Denonville quickly discovered, had been trafficking in those goods for years to his own profit. When confronted with the evidence against him, De Meulles professed no intention to mend his ways; so Denonville reported the malversations to court, and Seignelay promptly issued a recall for this corrupt official, replacing him with one of the finest intendants ever to serve in Canada, Jean Bochart de Champigny. The Canadian post was Champigny's first assignment in the royal service.

34 Roy, Ordonnances, Commissions, Vol. II, pp. 112-14, Ordonnance de M. de Meulles, 8 June 1685; pp. 125, Ordonnance de M. de Meulles, 6 Sept 1685.

35 PAC, C11A, Vol. VI, fol. 56-57, Denonville to Seignelay, Quebec, 20 Aug 1685; Vol. VII, fol. 97, Denonville to Seignelay, Quebec, 13 Nov 1685; Extract of Denonville's Letters to Seignelay, 3 Sept and 12 Nov 1685; B, Vol. XII, fol. 22.5, Seignelay to De Meulles, 31 May 1686; fol. 1, Commission for Champigny, Versailles, 24 April
Somewhat daunted by the magnitude of the problems before him, Denonville nevertheless began work immediately to put the colony in order. He reorganized the approximately 800 marines then under his command and furnished them with serviceable weapons from the stock he had brought with him. Without waiting for approval from court, he ordered a magazine constructed at Quebec, and with the assistance of the Chevalier de Callières, who had replaced Perrot as Governor of Montreal the previous year, he set some troops to work on finishing the palisade around that most-exposed village. By the time the dispatches from the court arrived in the summer of 1686 ordering Denonville to cease work on this last project because of the expense involved, the palisade was almost completed.

While these projects were being carried out, Denonville was giving thought to the larger problems facing the colony. He put down his ideas in a long memorandum

1686. See also the unpublished M. A. thesis of W. J. Eccles, Jean Bochart de Champigny, Intendant of New France, 1686-1702 (McGill University, 1951).

36PAC, C11A, Vol. VI, fol. 56-57, Denonville to Seignelay, Quebec, 20 Aug 1685.

37PAC, C11A, Vol. VIII, fol. 159-64, Denonville to Seignelay, Montreal, 12 June 1686.

38PAC, B, Vol. XV, fol. 20, King to Denonville and Champigny, Versailles, 8 Mar 1688.
addressed to the court in the fall of 1685. In this memorandum the new Governor, on the job only a few weeks, showed an unusually firm grasp of the issues confronting the colony. The most urgent need for Canada, Denonville wrote, was to eliminate the Iroquois. The Iroquois were a persistent danger to the colony because of the arms supplied to them by the English and their practice of adopting defeated enemies, a practice which maintained their numerical strength regardless of losses in war. They constituted a severe military threat to the colony at all times, and a constant economic threat as well through their efforts to seduce the Ottawa tribes.

Total annihilation of the Iroquois, according to the Governor, was the only viable solution to the military and economic threat they posed to the colony. Still, Frenchmen could not accomplish the annihilation alone. If Frenchmen alone were to attack the Iroquois, the Indians would simply melt into the forest, their greatest ally, only to reappear before the central colony and subject it to fire and death. This situation could be avoided by following the French attack with an attack by the allied Indians, the Ottawas and Illinois, who could pursue the fleeing

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Iroquois as far as Virginia if need be to cut them down to the last person.

Denonville admitted that there was however an obstacle to the plan. The allies were growing less reliable with every passing month. The Illinois were displeased with the paucity of French help in their war with the Iroquois, and there was presently the risk that those tribes would desert the alliance in order to secure peace. The disaffection of the Ottawas was even deeper. They too were in war, this one with the Sioux, and they believed the French were not standing solidly behind them. They were further embittered by the abortive campaign of 1684. There was open hostility being shown to French traders around Michilimackinac. This hostility in turn was being fed by English trading activities on Hudson’s Bay where those tribes were attracted by low prices and high quality trade goods. The English trade in that quarter was having a serious effect on the continuing allegiance of the Ottawa tribes to the king of France.

The tentacles of English commerce were, it seemed, rapidly encircling Canada like an enormous cephalopod making ready to devour the king’s possessions in North America. The plan of escape had to be as broad in scope as the size of the threat was great in magnitude. Denonville proposed a French offensive in three regions to eliminate the Iroquois and English menace to the colony. In the north, around
Hudson Bay, the English must be eliminated from competition in the fur trade. This would place the all-important Ottawa alliance on a more firm footing. In the west, throughout the Great Lakes area, forts and trading posts and ships must be built to insulate the Iroquois from the Ottawa trade and place the northern tribes in a condition of economic dependence on Canada. The Iroquois could then be destroyed by enacting the plan referred to earlier. In the south, at Albany, the English territorial claims against Canada could best be eliminated by Louis XIV’s purchase of New York from the King of England.

Denonville signed and sealed this memorandum in the knowledge that the court would have to agree to meet the expense involved in many of these undertaking before they could be carried out; but one of them had already received the necessary endorsement—the project against Hudson Bay. In the winter of 1685-86 the French Company of the North, having received a trade monopoly in the Bay area but no soldiers to enforce it, applied through one of its representatives to Governor Denonville for aid, and and received his hearty support. 40

The idea proposed was to send a French expedition overland against the English posts on the Bay, capture them,

40 PAC, C11A, Vol. VIII, fol. 154-55, Denonville to Seignelay, Quebec, 10 Nov 1686.
and turn the trade in the area to the advantage of the French. The commander chosen by Denonville to lead the expedition was the Sieur Pierre de Troyes, an officer who had arrived with Denonville in the fall and was considered the most intelligent individual on the Governor's staff.

Troyes received his instructions from Denonville on February 12, 1686. They ordered him to proceed to Hudson Bay with a force of men and there capture the English posts. Special mention was made of Port Nelson, thought to be the main post in the region. Three Canadians, the Le Moyne brothers, Pierre, Jacques, and Paul were to be left in charge of the captured posts, and Troyes and the rest of his army must be back on the St. Lawrence before next winter. On his way to the Bay he was to construct trading posts to which the far northern tribes might resort, and was to search for mines thought to be along the route. While in the north he was to arrest any coureurs de bois who had deserted to the English, especially Pierre Esprit Radisson, for whose apprehension a reward of fifty pistoles was offered.

A month after receiving his instructions Troyes had collected at Montreal a body of about 100 men, seventy Canadians under the Le Moyne brothers and thirty marines

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41 PAC, C11A, Vol. VIII, fol. 264-69, Instructions of Denonville to Troyes, Quebec, 12 Feb 1686.
under Gédéon de Catalogue. These were divided into three detachments, each to take the lead in turn and well supplied with provisions, sleds, and canoes. On March 13, while the little village of Montreal was still in the grip of winter, the expedition set off over the ice and snow heading northward. The route chosen followed the Ottawa River, still frozen except at the numerous cataracts, through Lake Timiskaming and Abitibi, and down the Abitibi River to the point of their first objective, Fort Hayes.

After three months of intense hardship, which included sleeping in the snow and sometimes jumping neck-deep into partially frozen streams to drag their canoes over rapids, the small army reached Ft. Hayes in mid-June. Elaborate preparations for taking the post were made, all of which proved unnecessary: when the assault was made all of the defenders were found to be asleep, even the sentinel. After a brief struggle with the bleary-eyed Englishmen, the commander of the post, still in his nightshirt, capitulated, and the French occupied the structure. It was renamed Ft. Saint-Louis.

42 There are several accounts of this expedition. The principal one is Pierre de Troyes, Journal de l'expédition du Chevalier de Troyes à la Baie d'Hudson en 1686, ed. by Ivanhoe Caron (Beauceville, Canada, 1918). Another is thought to be the work of Gédéon de Catalogue: Recueil de ce qui s'est passé en Canada depuis 1682. See also Henry Sergeant's report to the Hudson's Bay Company, 4 Nov 1687 in B. B. Rich, Copy-Book of Letters Outward (Toronto, 1948).
Fig. 9.—Troyes' expedition.
Turning next to the weaker of two remaining posts in the south of the Bay, Troyes and his men attacked Ft. Charles on the Rupert River. The story was much the same as before. The defenders, surprised and outnumbered, could offer no effective resistance, and after a brief battle, the French took possession of the place, renaming this one St. Jacques.

Taking Ft. Albany, directly across the Bay from the last conquest, proved to be a more difficult undertaking than the others, well-constructed as it was and commanded by Henry Sergeant, Governor of Hudson Bay. It would have proved even more difficult if the garrison had been as willing to fight as Governor Sergeant; but they begged him to surrender before the firing began, and when it did, they all ran to hide in a storage cellar. Thus alone, Governor Sergeant could only surrender, and amid all the pomp that the latitude could afford, he handed himself and his men over to Troyes after receiving a promise of safe passage to England on the next ship. The French entered the post, renamed Ft. Sainte-Anne, in late July, having made a clean sweep of the English positions on James Bay in about six weeks time.

Since winter was then fast approaching, Troyes began to make hasty preparations for a return to Montreal. He had no time to attack Port Nelson, some 300 miles farther north; so he left part of his men under the command of the
Le Moynes with orders to occupy the three captured posts until spring when perhaps then an attempt would be made on the remaining English positions. Taking a quick farewell, Troyes and the rest of his men started to retrace their steps southward, arriving in Montreal two months later. Their return was a rapid one considering their burden: 50,000 beaver pelts taken from Ft. Sainte-Anne.

It was necessary here to take leave of the history of Hudson Bay because it becomes after this episode only indirectly germane to the story of Canadian defense. Troyes' expedition was part of Governor Denonville's comprehensive plan to stop English and Iroquois commercial competition with Canada, and thereby stop, or at least reduce, their military threat to the colony. The expedition was launched while Canada was under strong, capable leadership and was sufficiently unencumbered with problems closer to home to undertake the mammoth task of driving the English from the frozen north: an attack into a barren region 1500 miles overland from Quebec and against all odds that one might name.

It is not surprising to learn that Troyes' expedition was the first—and the last—dispatched from Canada to conquer Hudson Bay. French attempts in the future would be carried out by sea directly from France, with Canada lending what little assistance it could afford only indirectly. Aside from capturing the three English posts, Troyes'
expedition is most notable for introducing into the history of France a young man, then in his twenty-fourth year, who was going to become the greatest leader Canada ever produced, the nemesis of the English in North America for the next quarter century, Pierre Le Moyne the younger, soon to be ennobled and known as Le Moyne d'Iberville.\footnote{Nellis M. Crouse, \textit{Lemoyne d'Iberville, Soldier of New France} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1954); Guy Frégault, \textit{Iberville le Conquérant} (Montreal, 1944).}

While Troyes and his men were struggling to and from Hudson Bay, Denonville was busy carrying out plans for the western phase of his offensive. The Governor had remarked the previous fall that it was necessary to effect the economic isolation of the Iroquois before attempting their destruction, otherwise no campaign against them would be truly successful.\footnote{PAC, C11A, Vol. VII, fol. 178-87, \textit{Mémoire de l'état présent du Canada}, Denonville, Quebec, 12 Nov 1685.} In case the king did not agree to meet the expense involved in their economic isolation—a chain of forts throughout the Great Lakes area—a campaign was nevertheless essential at the earliest possible date because of the threatened defection of the Ottawa and Illinois. War in either case was inevitable; it was completely in the king's hands whether that war would be successful. 1687 was the date projected for the war, a
date that would allow the king a whole year in which to
make his decision and would give Denonville time to pull
the colony together for war.

Preparations were begun early in 1686. With the
colony in such a pitiable condition, Denonville had to keep
his plans secret as long as possible lest the Iroquois learn
his intentions and forfend an attack on their villages by
attacking the colony first. Supplies were covertly sent
to Ft. Frontenac; and the garrison at Chambly, guard post
of the central colony, was strengthened. Boards were
cut to size for the barges, then stored away out of sight
ready to be assembled at the final moment. Orders were
issued for the construction of forts and stockades in each
seigneury, this to answer for the scattered nature of
settlement along the great river. At Denonville's insis-
tence the Sovereign Council ordered every male in the colony
over fourteen years of age to provide himself with arms.

Instructions were sent to the commandants of the
western posts. Tonty and La Forest in the Illinois

45 PAC, C11A, Vol. VIII, fol. 59-63, Denonville to
Seignelay, Montreal, 12 June 1686; fol. 120-21, Mémoire de
l'état present du Canada, Denonville, Quebec, 8 Nov 1686.

46 PAC, C11A, Vol. VIII, fol. 209, Extract of registers
of the Sovereign Council of Quebec, 14 Jan 1686.

47 PAC, C11A, Vol. VIII, fol. 8-11, Denonville to
Seignelay, Quebec, 8 May 1686; fol. 53, Denonville to Du
Lhut, Montreal, 6 June 1686; fol. 99, Denonville to La
Forest, Montreal 6 June 1686.
country were ordered to recruit as many Indians in the spring of 1687 as were willing to leave their villages and bring them to the borders of Iroquoia. There they were to wait until the main army invaded Seneca country. Denonville expected the Senecas to flee at his approach, but with the Illinois waiting to the south, maybe the enemy could be forced to stand and fight. Durantaye, Du Lhut, and Perrot, in the region north of the lakes, were ordered to fortify their posts in the event of a counter attack. Perrot and a coureur de bois named Boisguillot were ordered to muster as many men as they could at Michilimackinac and await further orders. Durantaye and Du Lhut were ordered to gather the Ottawas and coureurs de bois at Niagara and wait to link up with the main army under Denonville. Every precaution was taken to insure that adequate supplies were received into all the posts in case the war would be a long one, and Jesuits were pressed into service to act as liaisons between Denonville and the post commandants.

In the spring of 1686 the Onondagas, who were becoming suspicious regarding the unusual activity in the colony and around Ft. Frontenac, proposed a conference to settle the most recent disputes between themselves and the French. Denonville agreed to the meeting, his aim being

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48 PAC, C11A, Vol. VIII, fol. 59-63, Denonville to Seignelay, Montreal, 12 June 1686; fol. 120-21, Mémoire de l'état present du Canada, Denonville, Quebec, 8 Nov 1686.
Fig. 10.--Early map of Iroquoia (Trudel. Atlas Historique, p. 33).
to lull the Iroquois into a false sense of security while preparations for the attack went forward. When Father Lambeville came to Quebec to arrange the conference, Denonville did not divulge to the priest his plans for a campaign, knowing that Lambeville might inadvertently give away the secret or what would be just as bad, refuse to return to Onondaga and thereby alert the Iroquois that something was amiss. Denonville agreed to meet the Iroquois at Ft. Frontenac in the spring of 1687.

While preparations for war were continuing, Denonville received disturbing news from another quarter. For the past two years the merchants of Albany had been encouraging French coureurs de bois to take service with them and pelt the region of the upper lakes to New York. In 1686 a group of these French renegades, together with a party of Senecas, led about thirty Albany merchants to the area of Michilimackinac where they were met by the Ottawas. Since the Kiskakon affair had been amicably settled the previous year and since the Albany merchants' prices were far lower than those at Michilimackinac, the Ottawas gave

49NYCD, Vol. III, p. 344, Sir John Werden to Governor Dongan, St. James, 10 Mar 1683/84.

the merchants and their guides an extremely cordial welcome.

Another alliance was on the point of being formed when Durantaye, commandant of Michilimackinac and warned by the Governor that just such an event might occur, interrupted the meeting and arrested the merchants. It was then only with the greatest difficulty that he and Father Enjalran, resident missionary, were able to calm the anger of the Ottawas over this interruption and persuade the chiefs to go down to Montreal and renew the French alliance. The chiefs met with Denonville in the late fall of 1686, and he exhorted them to remain faithful subjects of Louis XIV. They returned to their country after the exchange of many promises and gifts, but it was clear to the Governor that the alliance was in its last days. 51

Yet more disturbing was the intelligence received from Jesuit missionaries in Iroquoia and from a spy whom the Governor had sent to New York. They reported that 1687 would bring an all-out commercial offensive by the English directed at winning the entire northern trade. 52 Governor Dongan planned to send another and larger trading

51 PAC, C11A, Vol. IX, fol. 21-23, Denonville to Seignelay, Montreal, 8 June 1687.

expedition to Michilimackinac, and with this in mind, had already persuaded the Senecas to return several Ottawa and Huron prisoners they had recently captured. This was designed to speed the consummation of the commercial agreement among the tribes. He was also planning the construction of a fort at Niagara to keep the lake route open between Michilimackinac and Albany. This would have the additional advantage, so far as the English were concerned, of severing one path of communication between the French and the Illinois country.

As serious as this information was, it could not have had a more profound effect on Denonville than news coming from the court in 1686. It appeared the court had entirely misunderstood the Governor's motives in wanting to build a chain of forts throughout the Great Lakes area. Denonville was told that the king did not see the utility in the Governor's plan. The expense of Ft. Frontenac was excessive enough without adding to it the expense of other posts Denonville was told. If an attack on the Iroquois was absolutely necessary, the king was confident that if


54 PAC, B, Vol. VII, fol. 25.5-39, King to Denonville, 31 May 1686; Vol. XIII, fol. 16-34.5, King to Denonville, Versailles, 30 Mar 1687.
the Governor would use Ft. Frontenac as a base of operations, the campaign could be completed swiftly and successfully. After all, the king reminded Denonville, savages who have no experience in regular warfare were no match for a capably led colonial army.

When Denonville read these lines he must have had the same feeling in the pit of his stomach that La Barre had felt some years earlier. The news from the court left Denonville with the necessity of launching the attack in the spring under conditions he knew would be unfavorable for success. Against this background of events the Governor in the fall of 1686 wrote what must be regarded as the most somber memorandum ever to reach Louis XIV from a Canadian official.\(^5\) War is imperative, he wrote; and yet, "in the present disposition of the colony, war is the most dangerous thing in the world." After reviewing at length the scarcity of troops and equipment, the English plans for a commercial offensive in the Lakes region, and the growing hostility of the Senecas toward the Illinois and the French, Denonville spoke further of the dilemma facing the colony:

The principal affair at present is the security of this colony, which is in evident danger of perishing whether the Iroquois are left in peace

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\(^5\) PAC, Cl1A, Vol. VIII, fol. 117-118, Mémoire de l'état présent des affaires de Canada, Denonville, Quebec, 8 Nov 1686.
or we make war without having a decided advantage over them; and however decided ours may be, the habitants, separated as they are, will always be in danger. Yet...war will be the last inconvenience, for if we do not wage it, I believe the next year will not pass without the whole trade being absolutely lost; the savages, our friends, would revolt against us and place themselves at the mercy of the Iroquois, more powerful than any of them because better armed. The whole of the Hurons are waiting only for the moment to do it.

If a large number of troops were available, Denonville wrote, the best course to follow would be to attack both flanks of the Confederacy at once, one army to attack the Mohawks and Oneidas by way of the Richelieu River and another to join forces with the Ottawas and Illinois in attacking the Senecas. The two armies could drive the Iroquois toward Onondaga, ravaging villages and grain supplies, thereby making it impossible for any one tribe to succor the others. The Iroquois could not be destroyed in this way, Denonville reminded the court, but they could be harmed and could become a great burden to the English who would have to care for them.

"If I had a sufficiency of troops," the Governor continued, "I would not fail to undertake this plan, but having only what I have /no more than 800 ill-equipped militia and the same number of inexperienced marines/, I must attack one tribe after the other, and hope to raise another army from /among the western allies/, which now appears impossible to do." Among the Ottawas the
reputation of the French was almost totally destroyed, Denonville said, and there was no guarantee that when fighting began they would be on the king's side. As for the Illinois, a war between them and a tribe farther westward prevented their active participation in the projected campaign.

It would truly be an afflicting circumstance to see our allies devouring one another instead of uniting with us to destroy the common enemy. But it is useless to be vexed at it. Nothing remains but to be prepared for whatever may happen and rely only on ourselves.

Denonville, in a note of abject despair, closed his memorandum by expressing the hope that God would take a hand in the affairs of the colony. He then added:

My lord ought to place no reliance on the changeable disposition of people without discipline, or any kind of subordination. The King must be master of country to effect any sort of good, and success cannot be secured without expense. 56

With preparations having been completed, the winter of 1686-87 passed without incident in the colony. As spring approached and activity in the colony resumed, many of the Canadian habitants demonstrated an attitude toward the coming campaign that was far from enthusiastic. Inertia, coupled with frustration left over from La Barre's abortive campaign may have played a part. At any rate, when

56 Italics are mine.
Denonville issued an ordinance explaining the necessity of the campaign and the vicars general issued an explanation to the same effect, their attitudes changed, and they approached their work with more exuberance.\footnote{PAC, C11A, Vol. IX, fol. 20-21, Denonville to Seignelay, Montreal, 8 June 1687; F3, Vol. IV, fol. 288, Mandement of the vicars general, Quebec, 24 April 1687.}

On the tenth of June 1600 militiamen and troops gathered at Montreal, 800 militiamen divided into four detachments of 200 men each, and 800 marines divided in the same fashion.\footnote{Most of the details of this expedition are found in Denonville's official report: PAC, C11A, Vol. IX, fol. 104-20, Memorandum of an expedition, Denonville, Oct 1687. See also PAC, C11A, Vol. IX, fol. 177-79, Denonville to Seignelay, Quebec, 7 Nov 1687; fol. 64-68, Denonville to Seignelay, Montreal, 25 Aug 1687; fol. 33-36, Champigny to Seignelay, Quebec, 16 July 1687.} While these awaited orders to march, ships arrived at Quebec from France with 800 additional marines. Had these arrived earlier they might have allowed a simultaneous attack to be launched on both flanks of Iroquoia; but it was too late for that now, the new marines were distributed among the settlements to help guard against the retribution that Denonville knew would befall the colony.

On June 13 the army left Montreal bound for Iroquoia, followed the next day by 400 Mission Indians. Their first destination was Ft. Frontenac where they would be regrouped
and resupplied in preparation for the attack. For lack of troops Denonville had decided to focus the attack on only one tribe, the Seneca, the largest and currently the most troublesome. For this purpose the Governor had arranged a rendezvous at Irondequoit Bay on Lake Ontario with a contingent of allied Indians who were to be led from the Ottawa country. For the next two weeks the French army labored upstream against a current made more swift and dangerous by the spring thaw. By the time Ft. Frontenac had been reached, some 300 men had been disabled in one way or another by portaging operations along the way. 59

The Intendant Champigny, who accompanied the expedition, left the main body of the army at Cedar Rapids and proceeded ahead with a number of men in fifteen canoes. His mission may have been a scouting one, or he may have been going ahead to Cataraqui to make the fort ready to receive the army. In any case, acting on his own initiative or upon orders from Denonville, he and his men seized any Iroquois whom they met along the route so as to preserve the secrecy of the expedition yet a little longer. 60 At Ft. Frontenac a number of others were taken prisoner, some


of whom were the Onondaga representatives whom Denonville had promised to meet and talk peace.

Altogether ninety-five men, women, and children were seized and chained to stakes, whereupon they broke into their defiant death chant usually sung by prisoners about to be tortured and burned. There was no intention to harm them; the Intendant intended to keep them from spreading the alarm to their villages and save them as slaves for French galleys. Father Lamberville, who had accompanied the Onondaga representatives to the fort, issued an outraged protest to the Intendant, and later to the Governor, over this action; but to no avail. 61

The main body of the army, with Denonville at its head, arrived at Ft. Frontenac on July 1. The same day La Forest arrived from Ft. Saint-Louis in the Illinois country. He reported some good news and some bad. The good news was that the English commercial offensive for that year had been nipped in the bud. Durantaye had captured a party of thirty Albany merchants on Lake Huron and another such party had been captured at Detroit. The renegade French leaders of these and the party of the previous year had been given a summary execution, meant to be an example to

other deserters. Some more good news was that Tonty, Durantaye, and Du Lhut had been able to assemble an army at Niagara. The bad part of the news was the size of the army: 180 coureurs de bois and 400 allied Indians. Also disappointing was the report that Tonty had been unable to get any Illinois to march to the southern border of Iroquoia; they were too preoccupied with their own wars to aid the French.

On July 4 the army crossed to the south side of the lake, skirting the shore as they went so as to keep the Iroquois guessing as to which tribe would be attacked. On July 10, just as the disembarkation point was reached (Irondequoit Bay) the Niagara army made its timely appearance through the morning mist to form the juncture. The day was spent building a stockade enclosure to protect the boats, canoes, and supplies for the return journey, and 400 men were detailed to guard these important items.

For the next two days the men, now numbering around 2000, lumbered toward the Seneca villages. Each man carried his arms, equipment, and thirteen days' rations, and was accompanied by a swarm of stinging mosquitoes. On the third day the Senecas struck the flank of the advance guard, composed mostly of marines, and there was

momentary panic among these troops, threatening to turn the strike into a rout. Denonville and Vaudreuil who had arrived in the colony just in time to participate in the campaign, rallied the failing troops and brought up reinforcements. At this the Senecas, who apparently had mistaken the advance guard for the main army, threw away their weapons and fled in panic. When the skirmish ended the French were too tired to pursue the enemy; so they camped where they were and watched while the Ottawas, who often distinguished themselves in battle in this way, drank the warm blood of those who had been killed.

For the next nine days the army marched from one Seneca village to another, destroying the long houses, ruining the stored grain, and burning the standing crops. Denonville estimated that some 350,000 minots of standing grain and 50,000 minots of dried corn were destroyed. The population of the tribe fared better; only twenty-seven males were known to have been killed. There was talk of taking the army into Cayuga territory, but the distance involved and the difficulty of terrain over which the army would have to pass made Denonville decide against it. Moreover, food supplies were beginning to run low and sickness had begun to spread among the French and allies. Some of the latter in fact had already quit the campaign and had started back home, and the French had a hard time convincing the remainder to stay and finish the work.
Fig. 11.—The ambush of Denonville's expedition.
Returning to the stockade, Denonville sent the sick and wounded back to Ft. Frontenac while he and the rest of the army continued along the south shore to Niagara. There they quickly erected a log fort on the portage path around the falls. The fort was intended to forestall any attempt by the English to establish themselves in that area and to serve as a rallying point for the allies who Denonville hoped would then find it expedient to harass the Senecas. The fort would also act as a link in the chain he aspired to stretch throughout the lakes region, insulating the Iroquois from the northern trade. The Governor was acting in clear violation of orders received from the king in 1686 and repeated in 1687, but he felt that necessity impelled him to contravene the court on this issue. Denonville left a garrison of 100 men under the Sieur de Troyes at the fort, and took the rest of his army back to Ft. Frontenac en route to Montreal. He and his men arrived in the central colony on August 13.

Denonville's campaign had achieved nothing more than he had expected and not as much as he had wished. Short on troops, supplies, and support from the allies, he had been able to march an army into Seneca country and accomplish a certain measure of destruction. But the Senecas had not stayed to fight; they had disappeared into the woods; and Denonville could guess that already their villages were in the process of being rebuilt and their corn
supply was being replenished by the other Confederacy members and the English. He also knew that his campaign had served to open war in good earnest and that the colony would soon feel the effects of his unsuccessful campaign.

The positive effects were less tangible and harder to find. He hoped that his action would hold the western allies in the French orbit for yet one more season, and he trusted that he had disrupted the designs of the English in the lakes region. But the Governor did not delude himself that the positive effects would be lasting. The real problems of the colony were only just beginning.

Upon arriving at Montreal Denonville sent thirty-six of the fifty-eight or so male captives he and Champigny had taken to Marseilles where they were to serve in the galleys. The reason for this unusual action was that the king had ordered Denonville, as he had La Barre, to provide as many Iroquois prisoners as possible for galley service. The king, of course, had intended that these be prisoners taken in battle, not men surprised in time of peace, and certainly not leading men of the tribe, as the Onondaga ambassadors were. But sent they were, although Denonville

63PAC, C11A, Vol. IX, fol. 188, Champigny to Seignelay, Montreal, 26 Aug 1687.

64PAC, B, Vol. XII, fol. 80-81, King to Denonville Champigny, Versailles, 30 Mar 1687; C11A, Vol. VI, fol. 289, King to La Barre, Versailles, 31 July 1684.
requested Seignelay to keep them ready at hand in case they could be of value in reaching a peace with the Iroquois.  

Peace seemed very far away in the fall of 1687, however. No sooner had Denonville returned to the central colony than the fruits of his campaign started being harvested. In August eight men were killed and one captured on their way to Montreal from Ft. Frontenac. Along the Richelieu River a band of 150 Mohawks—a tribe quite docile since 1667—burned houses, cut down habitants in their fields, took prisoners, and even attacked Ft. Chambly. Some of their raiding parties ranged as far as Montreal and the lower Ottawa River. Denonville stationed 120 coureurs de bois under Vaudreuil at the eastern end of the Island of Montreal to fend off the attacks, but without much effect; some houses on the Island were burned and several farmers killed. Even the Onondaga, peaceful until then but enraged over the loss of their ambassadors, attacked Ft. Frontenac, captured three soldiers, killed all the live-


stock, and laid waste to the surrounding crops. Denonville reminded the court of something they had been told many times before, that only 100 determined Iroquois could destroy all of the settlements above Three Rivers. That the Indians had not already done so he attributed to the help of God.  

To add to the troubles of the colony, the king's ships had brought measles and smallpox to Canada. There were many deaths among the habitants and the mission Indians were desimated. Some of the Indians who died were the wives and children of the captured Iroquois. They had been placed in the care of the mission Indians at Montreal, and nearly all died within a short time of their arrival in the colony.

Denonville was still of the opinion that two armies, an eastern and a western one, were the only practical solution to the present situation, otherwise the war would drag on indefinitely. He asked the minister for another


800 troops and 150 workmen. He repeated his request that the soldiers be troops-of-the line; marines, he said, were of little value in the colony because they were the dregs of the French ports and came to Canada completely unaccustomed to bearing arms. In the meantime, he told Seignelay, he would be making plans for another campaign in the spring of 1688 and begged the minister to see that the requested troops embarked from France in time to participate in the venture.

With the colony under attack, thoughts again returned to the old vision of compact settlement and fortified hamlets. Denonville suggested to Seignelay that the only way to reduce the depredations practiced by the Iroquois on outlying communities was to build forts in every seigneurie or parish and require the habitants to live in compact villages near these forts. This would require, the Governor continued, an unusual expenditure of money and a complete reorganization of concessions. It also required time, several years free from attack, and time was something the colony had run out of.

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For the next two years Denonville and Champigny tried to do what they could to rearrange the pattern of settlement in Canada and get the habitants to take adequate precautions for defense; but in this they were little more successful than officials in the past had been. They had a number of obstacles in their path. One was the inertia of the habitants who could not convince themselves that death was as near as the closest tree. Another was the understandable reluctance to relocate and abandon the work of a lifetime for a new piece of land, even though the new piece was near a fort. Yet another was the desire on the part of the habitants to have river frontage for their farms because of the ease of transport and communication that meant. These obstacles to resettlement militated against the plans of the Governor and Intendant to secure the central colony against the marauding bands of Iroquois who descended on it.

The two officials managed to get a few "forts," little more than redoubts, built in the most exposed areas, but nothing more could be accomplished. Denonville had issued an ordinance before the Seneca campaign, warning the habitants to be on guard and requiring each male over thirteen years of age to carry a musket and at least ten

charges of powder and ball wherever he went, even to mass. Yet by the fall the ordinance was already being ignored. The habitants were taking no precautions for themselves or their livestock. Many of them still did not own a musket, and many more had not bothered to instruct their sons and servants in the use of firearms. Some were refusing to work on the forts Denonville had ordered built and were even trying to induce those who were working to quit.

The picture was no brighter in the west. With its livestock all dead and its grain destroyed, the garrison at Ft. Frontenac spent a miserable winter. One hundred men died of malnutrition and disease. At Niagara eighty-nine of the 100 men under Troyes succumbed to scurvy, confined as they were to the fort, unable to set foot out of the enclosure for fear of attack. Denonville came to believe that these forts were a definite liability in time of war. They kept men on station away from the central colony where the garrisons could neither help the habitants nor harm the enemy in any way. Moreover, the cost of

73 P. G. Roy, Ordonnances, Commissions, etc., Vol. II, pp. 163-64, Ordinance of Denonville, Montreal, 13 June 1687.

74 P. G. Roy, Ordonnances, Commissions, etc., Vol. II, pp. 166-68, Ordinance of Denonville, Montreal, 1 Sept 1687.

convoying supplies to them was enormous, occupying the better part of six weeks for hundreds of militiamen who were continually subjected to ambushes along the route and were absent from the central colony during the summer, the season for work in the fields.

It was at this juncture of events that Denonville received new instructions in the summer of 1688. The king denied Denonville's request for 800 troops-of-the-line, saying that they were needed in Europe as the international situation was at the moment quite unstable. The king felt that Denonville could suffice with 300 marines which were being dispatched from La Rochelle. Orders would be issued to reimburse those persons in the colony from whom 105,000 livres had been borrowed to finance the Seneca campaign of the previous year, although the cost of the campaign seemed exorbitant and an effort should be made in the future to keep expenses down. The king expressed his dissatisfaction with the Governor's action in fortifying Ville Marie; the money could have been better spent on the western forts. He approved, reluctantly, of the construction of Ft. Niagara, even though he was uncertain of the utility of a post on that site.

76 PAC, B, Vol. XV, fol. 11-17.5, King to Denonville and Champigny, 8 Mar 1688.
Accompanying this dispatch was one from Seignelay, more personal in tone. The minister suggested that Denonville use the 300 marines being sent to carry out La Barre's plan to winter in Iroquoia and effect the complete destruction of the Indians. Only through total humiliation could the Iroquois be brought to conclude a sure peace with the colony. The easiest way of dealing with the Confederacy, Denonville was informed, was to divide the Canadian army in two, one contingent attacking the Mohawks by way of Lake Champlain, the other attacking the Onondagas by way of Lake Ontario.

All of the villages of the latter could be burned, except Tariaguin, where the enemy's provisions could be collected and 400 soldiers wintered. A similar plan could be followed in the Mohawk country. Then, with these troops in position and 100 soldiers at La Famine, 200 at Niagara, and fifty at Cataraqui, Denonville and the rest of his army could reinvade Iroquoia in the spring and crush all resistance. This plan seemed like a good one to Seignelay and he wondered why Denonville had not tried it.

About the same time, Champigny was receiving advice from the minister on bookkeeping. Seignelay could not

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77 PAC, B, Vol. XV, fol. 17.5-20.5, Seignelay to Denonville, 8 Mar 1688.

78 PAC, B, Vol. XV, fol. 24.5-26, Seignelay to Champigny, 8 Mar 1688.
approve of the Intendant's method of keeping accounts. The Intendant had exceeded the funds allotted for the Seneca campaign by 20,000 livres, an extravagance he should not repeat. Moreover, he had resorted to borrowing funds for the campaign from the merchants of Quebec without permission. Was he not aware that the king would provide the necessary funds in due course?

Denonville and Champigny could hardly have felt reassured when they read these dispatches from court. Denonville sent a reply that the destruction of the Iroquois could not possibly be accomplished without three separate armies invading simultaneously, 4000 men, 400 to 500 barges, and two years' supplies on hand. 79

Since it was painfully apparent that he was not likely to get this kind of help, he decided to treat for peace before further losses were sustained by the colony. 80 He sent four of the Iroquois prisoners back to their villages with an invitation to send representatives to Montreal to talk peace. With the help of Father Lamberville the Onondagas (whom Seignelay would have destroyed first), Cayugas, and Oneidas were persuaded to confer with the Governor in June.

As testimony to the fact that at least some of the Iroquois wanted peace, ambassadors from the three tribes began their conference with Denonville on June 8. The ambassadors agreed to persuade the Mohawks and Senecas to accept peace, and Denonville agreed that when peace returned he would abandon Ft. Niagara. The Governor won the right to resupply Ft. Frontenac without interference. A mutual exchange of prisoners was to take place, including those who had been sent to France; and the Iroquois agreed that acts of hostility committed by the French allies before Denonville could inform them of the peace would not prejudice the ratification of the treaty. The treaty would be ratified at Montreal next year, and until then there would be a general truce among all the contestants.

This truce, like others in the past, was but a temporary expedient; it did not solve the fur-trade issue nor the question of colonial boundaries, which was coming into prominence since the English had invaded the lakes region some years back. The truce provided only a timely respite from attacks, long enough for the habitants to gather their harvests.\footnote{PAC, C11A, Vol. IX, fol. 63-71, Memorandum to Seignelay, 10 Aug 1688.} The truce also made it possible for Denonville to salvage the fortunes of the colony's merchants by sending a large party of Canadians to
Michilimackinac to bring down the furs that had accumulated there since the outbreak of war. He also used the truce as an opportunity to evacuate Niagara, ordering the fort razed to prevent the English from occupying it. The evacuation was completed in mid-September, and since La Hontan had abandoned the post at Detroit in April, Ft. Frontenac alone stood on the lower lakes.

In August 1688 an event occurred which had severe repercussions so far as the peace was concerned. Iroquois ambassadors were on their way back to Montreal to report their success in getting the Mohawks and Senecas to go along with the truce and arrange the date for a general peace conference to ratify the treaty. Near Cataraqui they were ambushed by a party of Hurons under the leadership of a chief named Kondiaronk, known to the French as "the Rat," who had personal reasons for wishing the failure of the embassy. He was afraid that some of his past treacheries against both the French and Iroquois would be exposed by the peace. After launching the ambush

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he made a point of telling the few survivors that Denonville had ordered the attack. When news of this reached Iroquoia, old visions of Champigny's treachery of the previous year were recalled, and no further embassies were sent to Montreal.

Denonville was shaken by this sudden turn of events. He sent an urgent request to Seignelay that the Iroquois prisoners be returned to the colony at the earliest possible date and that they be given the best of treatment. Quite apart from fulfilling an article of the treaty, their presence in the colony was then essential to testify to the good faith of the French and convince the Iroquois that their kinsmen had not died in chains as the English were claiming. He also sent the commandant of Montreal, the Chevalier Louis-Hector de Callières, to France in November to explain to the court the precarious condition of the colony and request aid. More than this he could not do; so he settled back to wait for something to happen. It did. That same November Janes II fled the English

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86 PAC, C11A, Vol. X, fol. 112, Denonville and Champigny to Seignelay, Quebec, 6 Nov 1688.
throne and was replaced by William III, the implacable enemy of Louis XIV.

The winter and spring of 1689 were ominously quiet. Denonville knew special meetings were in progress at Albany between the Iroquois and English, the subject of which was a mystery to him, though he was sure no good for Canada was intended. At Montreal, the scare of the previous fall was quickly forgotten when the spring passed into summer without an attack being recorded. Vaudreuil had taken command of the village in the absence of Callières, and Vaudreuil was not the disciplinarian that Callières was. The habitants were allowed to return to their homes scattered around the Island, and the marines under his command fell into a state of depressed morale and discipline that was uncommon even for them. Contributing to the overall disorganization was the fact that the troops were owed more than 50,000 livres in back pay from the previous year, and the king’s ships bringing funds for the colony were already overdue that summer.

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88 Recueil de ce qui s’est passé en Canada depuis 1682, pp. 22-23.

Champigny wrote to Seignelay informing him that although he realized that the problems of court left him with little time for thought about Canada, he was waiting most impatiently for the honor of receiving instructions and funds for the year. He was doing what he could to provide for the maintenance of the colony without these essential items, but some of the junior grade officers of the marine were refusing to carry out orders until they received their pay. It was therefore expedient, Champigny concluded, that funds reach the colony as soon as possible. Still waiting, too, was Denonville for the Iroquois prisoners who might soothe the feelings of the five tribes before it was too late.

By August 5 there was still no word from France, but by then it was too late. During a violent storm, on the night of August 4, 1689, Iroquois warriors crossed Lake St. Louis undetected and dispersed among the homesteads at Lachine on the western tip of the Island. At dawn, at the sound of a war-cry, the Iroquois struck. Doors were broken down and the sleepy habitants and their families

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were massacred in most cases before they knew what was happening. Homes and barns went up in flames and livestock met the same fate as their owners.

When a few terror-stricken survivors brought their tale of tragedy to Denonville at Montreal, he issued orders for everyone to take refuge in the forts and stay there until the situation could be clarified. He dispatched contingents of troops to each of four stockade forts in the Lachine area to help guard the habitants. Vaudreuil was sent to one of these, Ft. Roland. After he arrived and surveyed the situation, he sent word to Denonville for reinforcements. The Governor sent the Sieur de la Rabeyre with some eighty men. Within sight of Ft. Roland they were heavily engaged by a large party of Iroquois, whereupon the officers under Vaudreuil demanded permission to lead a relief squad to the rescue. Vaudreuil, taking too seriously his orders to remain in the fort, refused permission. The young officers had to watch as Rabeyre's men were cut down almost to the last man: only a handful of the beleaguered managed to reach the fort in safety.

This engagement, though disastrous, was the only one in which the marines participated during the two days, August 5 and 6, when Lachine was ravaged from one end to the other. The Canadians remained panic-struck behind
their fortifications, unable to know the number of the enemy or the scope of attack, knowing only that reports placed the enemy everywhere and in overwhelming numbers. When the Canadians again ventured out of the forts to view the actual damage, they discovered that of the seventy-seven houses in the area, fifty-six were destroyed. They also learned that twenty-four persons had been killed outright and scores had been taken prisoner, all but forty-two of whom later escaped or were freed. This, together with Rabeyre's lost men, meant that around 140 Frenchmen were killed at Lachine.

In looking for a place to cast responsibility for the Lachine massacre, Canadians did not blame their leaders in Canada. Nor did they blame the court for delaying the departure of the Iroquois prisoners until the five tribes surely believed in the utter duplicity of the French. Canadians blamed first the Iroquois, who by their usual tactics had gained an easy victory over the French. They blamed next the English, who were thought to let no opportunity pass for enticing the Iroquois against Canadians and their trade. It was natural for the habitants to want revenge for what happened at Lachine, and within a few months they would have it.

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92 Girouard, Désiré, Lake St. Louis, Old and New, (Montreal, 1895), pp. 124-35.
The rest of that summer and fall Iroquois war-parties invaded the central colony killing habitants at work in the fields, destroying crops and cattle, and then disappearing into the forest before a force could be organized to pursue them. With every man needed in the colony and with the military liability of the western forts a demonstrable fact, Denonville gave orders in September to abandon Ft. Frontenac. He instructed the commandant to completely raze the fortifications so as to leave nothing that would be of benefit to either the Iroquois or the English, and then retire to Montreal with his men. The action meant that France had now virtually withdrawn, or rather, been driven out of the west. Only Ft. Saint-Louis in the Illinois country and the huge fur-trade post of Michilimackinac remained of the French dream to insulate the Iroquois from the northern trade.

About two weeks after the expedition to destroy Ft. Frontenac set off from Montreal, the long-overdue supply ships from France reached Quebec. They were the pitiful remnant of a grandiose scheme to capture the colony of New York from the English. The project had

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93 PAC, C11A, Vol. X, fol. 244, Champigny to Seignelay, Quebec, 18 Nov 1689.

sprung to life some months earlier when the court learned that England and France would soon be at war. Callières, in France to beg aid for the colony against the Iroquois, saw a chance to strike at two foes at the same time. He suggested to Seignelay that both the Iroquois and the English could be dealt a crippling blow by directing two expeditions against the colony to the south. One expedition would be an assault by 800 Canadians down the Hudson River valley against Albany. They would capture the village, destroy it and the nearby settlements, and return to Quebec with prisoners. The other expedition would be a maritime expedition sent directly from La Rochelle. It would consist of six frigates and 1200 men and would have the assignment of capturing Manhattan. Then, using Manhattan as a base, the French could ravage the whole coast of New England. What was equally important, the French could then interdict supplies to Iroquoia, forcing the Indians to come to terms with the French.

When Callières first made his proposals the international situation had not yet deteriorated to the extent as would make the plan feasible; so Seignelay wrote to Denonville on the first of May that "although this proposition seemed good to His Majesty, He has not thought it

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95 PAC, C11A, Vol. X, fol. 260-70, Scheme of Callières, January 1689; fol. 271-74, Memorandum of Callières, no date; fol. 275-76, Callières to Seignelay, no date.
appropriate to execute at the present." Then on May 7, England declared war on France. By the beginning of June Callières' project had been adopted—though not, it is important to note, in the form Callières had proposed. Instead of the original plan (which had a fair chance of success owing to the size of the force recommended and the fact that coordination of the two expeditions was not critical), the court substituted a modification which was doomed to failure from the beginning.

The new plan called for two French warships under the command of the Sieur de la Caffinière to escort the Canadian supply vessels to the mouth of the St. Lawrence. There Frontenac, who was going to Canada to replace Denonville as governor, was to sail on to Quebec in one of the merchant ships while sending Callières ahead by the fastest means possible to muster a force of 900 marines and 600 habitants, and organize the necessary transport and supplies. This done, word would be sent to La Caffinière to take his two warships, L'embuscade and Le Fourgon, to Manhattan Island and wait. Meanwhile, with

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96 PAC, B, Vol. XV, fol. 63, Seignelay to Denonville, Versailles, 1 May 1689.

97 PAC, C11A, Vol. XI, fol. 81, Extract of Frontenac's instructions; B, Vol. XV, fol. 92.5-98.5, Instructions to Frontenac, 7 June 1689; fol. 100, King to la Caffinière, 7 June 1689.
Vaudreuil left in command at Quebec, Frontenac and Callières were to move their army down the Richelieu-Hudson valley in an attack on Albany. This village taken and a garrison stationed there, the remainder of the army would continue its march down the valley in an attack on Manhattan. Here they would be assisted by a naval bombardment from Caffinière's ships.

After the capture of Manhattan, the principal men of the colony, government officials and merchants, were to be imprisoned and held for ransom. All artisans and laborers were to be left free to work for their new masters. Those Catholic residents of the colony who would swear allegiance to France were to be left in the possession of their liberty and property; Protestants were to be expelled to Pennsylvania or New England and have their property confiscated. All Frenchmen, particularly Huguenots, were to be shipped back to France.

With New York firmly under French control, Frontenac was to return to Quebec. He was to leave Callières as Governor of the conquered province and let him keep a force adequate to beat off English counterattacks. Frontenac could then quickly negotiate a peace treaty with the Iroquois, who would be in no position to continue their war against the French. Thus, the western flank of Canada could be made secure and Louis XIV would gain a valuable possession, either to retain for France or bargain...
away when peace talks began in Europe to end the war.

This modified plan still had chance of success, given the defenseless and chaotic condition of New York in 1689; but it called for the complete co-operation of the Intendant at La Rochelle, the weather, the habitants of Canada, the English in New York, and the Iroquois—something not likely to happen. The convoy was supposed to leave La Rochelle by June 14 at the latest; it did not sail until July 23. The passage across the Atlantic was to be swift, but the delay at La Rochelle meant that seasonal storms would impede the progress of the convoy; so the convoy did not reach Cape Breton until September 13. Fog and westerly winds caused further delay, and Frontenac and Callières could reach Quebec only on October 12. Two weeks later the merchant vessels straggled into port. Even if the habitants had been on a prime war footing and ready to march, the season was then far too advanced, and the project against New York had to be called off.


When Frontenac, then in his seventieth year, arrived in Canada to begin his second term in office he carried two sets of instructions. One set, dated May 1 and intended for Denonville before his recall, had since been superceded. The other set was his own, now quite useless, detailing the project against New York. Denonville's instructions, though six months out of date, had the virtue of being the only ones available which remotely fitted the present situation. They also had the virtue of counseling a good deal of common sense.

The war in Europe was very likely to spread to America, the instructions said. It was therefore necessary to end as quickly as possible war with the Iroquois so the full attention of the colony could be directed toward the English. Hope was expressed that the war could be ended through negotiations; and to help in this, the Iroquois prisoners who were being returned to Canada should be sent back to their people with messages of peace. Once the Iroquois war had been liquidated, precautions should be taken to guard against English attack. In making these precautions, the nature of which was left to the governor,

101 PAC, B, Vol. XV, fol. 47-54, King to Denonville and Champigny, 1 May 1689.

102 PAC, B, Vol. XV, fol. 78-91.5, Instructions for Frontenac, 7 June 1689.
the colony would have to rely completely on its own resources because no men or money could be expected from France while war was in progress in Europe. These instructions, offering vigilance and hostility toward the English and an olive branch toward the Iroquois, were the ones Frontenac adopted as his own in the fall of 1689. They were to serve as his basic program of action until events altered his course.

As soon as he arrived in the colony, Frontenac sent three of the Iroquois prisoners back to their villages to urge their kinsmen to meet him the following spring and discuss a general peace settlement. While awaiting the results of this mission, results he firmly believed would be affirmative, Frontenac in the late fall of 1689 turned to the other prong of his policy--measures against the English.

He reorganized the existing troops of the marine in the colony, 400 of whom had been killed by the Iroquois or died of disease since 1687. This necessitated reducing the total number of companies from thirty-five, the previous high, to twenty-eight--a level at which colonial troop strength would remain until the days of Montcalm.

103 PAC, C11A, Vol. XI, fol. 84-85, Frontenac to Seignelay, Quebec, 30 April 1690.

Frontenac then commanded 1400 marines, the representatives of His Majesty's arms in America. The Governor also issued orders to begin fortifying the capitol in anticipation of an English seaborne attack in the spring.\(^{105}\)

Contingents of men were sent into the forests to gather large quantities of timber, earth, and stones into Upper Town for the building project to be undertaken as soon as weather permitted. Finally, late in the year, Frontenac invited a few of the hardiest spirits in Canada to participate in a direct strike against the foe thought to be behind most of the colony's many problems, the heretics to the south.

Frontenac's plan was to send three separate strike forces into enemy country in the dead of winter, when their coming would be least expected. These were to inflict what damage and terror they could and return to the colony in the briefest possible time. The aim was not to strike a severe blow against the English and cause their capitulation; there were not nearly enough men in Canada for that.

Frontenac's motives were threefold. The Governor believed that by attacking some English border settlements he could force the English to take the defensive and abandon any plans they might have regarding Canada in the

spring. He also expected the raids to lift Canadian morale. They had been subjected to a steady diet of defeat and frustration for years, and the chance to inflict some losses on the enemy would raise their spirits. But what was perhaps uppermost in Frontenac's mind was to involve the Ottawas, some of whom would accompany the expeditions, in the attacks against the English. It was hoped that if the Ottawa could be induced to spill a little English blood, all talk of a commercial alliance between the two peoples would come to an end. It was a very real fear in the colony that if the English could manage to engage the Ottawas in an alliance, hordes of redmen (some of them former friends) would descend on Canada from every direction and the colony would succumb in an orgy of carnage.

Thus motivated, Frontenac assembled three strike forces in January 1690, one at Montreal, another at Three

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106 PAC, Cl1A, Vol. XI, fol. 87, Frontenac to Seignelay, Quebec, 30 April 1690.

107 PAC, Cl1A, Vol. XI, fol. 87, Frontenac to Seignelay, Quebec, 30 April 1690.

108 PAC, Cl1A, Vol. XI, fol. 87, Frontenac to Seignelay, Quebec, 30 April 1690.

Rivers, and a third at Quebec. The Montreal force, led by Jacques Le Moyne and Nicolas D'Ailleboust de Mantet, and Pierre Le Moyne, consisted of 210 men, about half of them French and the other half allied Indians. Frontenac expressed the hope that they would attack Albany, but he left the final choice of objective to the discretion of the leaders.

Using the Richelieu-Champlain route, the little army trudged for many days over ice and snow, dragging its supplies and equipment on toboggans. When the party came to a fork in the route, one branch leading to Albany and the other to the smaller settlement of Corlear (Schenectady), the decision was made to attack the smaller of the two villages.

The decision to attack Corlear was evidently made after Indian spies brought back reports that the place was poorly defended and rife with factionalism. Leisler's Rebellion was then in progress in the colony and was causing bitter strife in Corlear, leading the people of

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110 French accounts of the expeditions are found in PAC, Cl1A, Vol. XI, fol. 5-40, Relation de ce qui s'est passe...depuis...Novembre 1689...jusqu'au...Novembre 1690, Monseignat; F3, Vol. IV, fol. 343-56, Memoire de ce qui s'est passe...devant Quebec, Champigny. An English account is in Proceedings of New York Historical Society (Albany, 1846), pp. 101-23, Memoire of the French and Indian Expedition against the Province of New York, M. Van Rensselaer.

the village to disobey their officers by refusing to keep watch at night. Corlear was approached by the French force around midnight on February 19, and finding one of the gates in the village stockade open, the invaders slipped silently inside and posted themselves by the doors of the houses. Then, as with Lachine, so with Corlear. At the sound of a war-cry doors were broken down and families were butchered before they could offer resistance. Sixty persons were killed in the first onslaught; around sixty were spared, some twenty-seven or thirty of whom were made prisoner. The invaders lost only two men, one Frenchman and one Indian. Thirty Mohawks found in the village were not harmed in obedience to the express orders of Frontenac. The Governor did not want their deaths to thwart his wish for a treaty with the Iroquois.

The next morning the village was burned except for one house of a lady who had helped French prisoners in the past, and the army began the return march to Montreal. During the march the men failed to stay in a compact group. About sixty leagues from Corlear the Indian allies straggled off to hunt; then some of the Canadians, encumbered with booty, fell behind; next some others pushed on ahead. By the time the main body was within a day's march of Montreal, it consisted of only forty of fifty men. These were attacked by a war-party of eighty Mohawks
whom the English with great difficulty had managed to stir into action. Nineteen Frenchmen were taken prisoner. The prisoners fed their captors the story that in the spring 1500 Canadians and Indians would fall upon Albany and destroy it, a story which startled all of New York.\textsuperscript{112}

The party from Three Rivers left on January 28 under the command of Sieur Hertel and headed toward the southeast. It consisted of fifty men, half French and half Indians. Its destination had perhaps not been determined before it left; but after eight weeks of difficult travel, Hertel and his men found themselves before the little fishing village of Salmon Falls, about seventy miles up the coast from Boston. As at Corlear, no watch was being kept by the villagers. Hertel's men attacked and killed thirty-four persons of both sexes and all ages, and fifty-four were taken prisoner. The village and the surrounding farms were put to the torch and all of the livestock were slaughtered. The invaders were at this business when a scout brought word that the Portsmouth militia was on its way to the scene; so Hertel's men gathered their booty and prisoners together and struck off through the nearby woods, hotly pursued by the English. They were overtaken at a

\textsuperscript{112} \textit{DHNY}, Vol. III, p. 708, Robert Livingston to Edmund Andros, 14 April 1690.
river, swollen by the spring flood; but after a brief skirmish the French managed to slip away and elude further pursuit.

A few days later Hertel and his men stumbled on to the Quebec party, led by Sieur de Portneuf. Hertel sent some of his men back to the colony with a few prisoners and joined the rest of his force to that of Portneuf, which consisted of fifty Canadians and about 450 Abenaki Indians from Maine. Since the remaining captives from Salmon Falls would only be a nuisance to the French, these unfortunate persons were turned over to the allies.

The whole army, now over 500 strong, headed again toward the coast and on May 25 fell upon a cluster of settlements around Casco Bay, about forty miles north of Portsmouth. In the first skirmish with the English twenty-six of the latter were killed, but not before alarm was spread throughout the area and most of the population had sought refuge in a fort. The Canadians might have had to leave them there, except a sapper was able to lay a mine at the base of one wall, and the defenders said they had had enough. Sixty-six persons surrendered, most of whom, in gross violation of the terms of surrender, were handed over to the allies. After the fort was destroyed, and the neighboring farms burned, the French returned to Quebec, arriving there on June 23.
For all of the importance Frontenac attached to these raids, they fell far short of the goals he had set for them. It may have been that they raised Canadian morale when it was at a low ebb, as he claimed; but it was not true that they forced the English colonies into a defensive position or that they bound the Ottawas closer to Louis XIV. Frontenac's raids succeeded in inspiring for the first time a sense of unity among the English colonies--no mean accomplishment. After the raid on Corlear, the Albany magistrates resolved to write to the governments of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia, and even to the rebellious Leisler at Manhattan, requesting them to join in a two-pronged invasion of Canada: an overland expedition against Montreal and a sea-borne assault on Quebec. The letters from Albany received a favorable response from the governments contacted, especially after Herbel and Portneuf made their presence felt in New England, and spring found the English feverishly preparing for an invasion of Canada.

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113 PAC, C11A, Vol. XI, fol. 87, Frontenac to Seignelay, Quebec, 30 April 1690.
Why Frontenac chose these petulant raids as a means of carrying war to the English is a wonder. Far from terrifying the English, the very scale of the attacks served to outrage the southern colonies. Champigny maintained that instead of dissipating the energies of Canada as Frontenac had done, the attack from Canada should have been a sizable thrust directed solely at Albany. With the addition of another hundred Canadians to the force that razed Corlear, Albany could have been as easily destroyed. "If we had directed a firm blow against [Albany]," he wrote, "we would have seen the Iroquois greatly humbled, because it is from there that they draw all their essential help, help which is outside the scope of Manhattan and Boston to provide, particularly in winter."

Champigny's contention was substantiated by the Governor of New York when he wrote to the other English colonies pleading with them to join in an invasion of Canada:

I need not relate unto you of how great import the preservation of [Albany] is, being the only bulwark and safe guard of all Their Majesty's plantations on the main of America, and if, for want of strength, the French should assault and gain Albany how

116Pac, F3, Vol. IV, fol. 343-56, Mémoire de ce qui s'est passé...devant Quebec, Champigny.
farr your Government and all the English Colonys on both sides of us would be endan-
gered, you can easily judge. For we have nothing but that place that keeps our Indians steady to us, and the loss of that must be the loss of them, and the loss of them must be the loss of all the King's interest on this continent.

It was Albany which since the time of Champlain had supplied the Iroquois with arms and other goods used in the struggle against Canada and its trade. It was Albany which sent merchants into the lakes region in 1686 and 1687, very nearly seducing the Ottawas away from the French alliance, and which continued to be the prime mover toward depriving Canada of those most essential allies. It was Albany which time and again had been singled out as the primary cause of all of Canada's many problems in the west.

This being the case, it is difficult to understand why Frontenac did not fall on Albany with all of the force at his command since war between the crowns of England and France sanctioned such an action. The only possible explanation, short of his being completely without the resources to undertake the campaign, was that he was banking heavily on being able to arrive at a peace settle-
ment with the Iroquois and feared that an attack on their

base of supplies might endanger his plans in this regard. 118

That Frontenac was even attempting reconciliation with the Iroquois was causing him trouble with the Ottawas, trouble that the raids in no way helped cure. Father Carheil among the Ottawas, as early as December 1698, warned that trouble was in the making. 119 The Ottawas, according to the story they gave Carheil, had been distressed over Denonville's efforts to reach an accord with the Iroquois. They feared, although they could cite no historical basis for their fears, that the French would make a separate peace with the Iroquois and leave them to face their old enemies alone. They had been appalled over the damage done at Lachine in August and over the failure of the French to retaliate. "They concluded," wrote Carheil, "that they had no alternative than to make terms with an enemy against whom we were no longer in a position to defend them."

Soon after Father Carheil gave this warning the Wagenhaer, one of the Ottawa tribes, concluded peace with

118 Frontenac's most recent biographer, W. J. Eccles, is highly critical of the Governor for launching these raids. See Frontenac: The Courtier Governor (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1968), pp. 227-229.

the Senecas, and in February 1690 three of its chiefs had gone to Onondaga to form an alliance with the other four Iroquois tribes. The ceremony was witnessed by two representatives from Albany, a town from which the Wagenhaer would in the future obtain its trade goods. The Wagenhaer chiefs swore to bring the other Ottawa tribes into the same alliance.

Frontenac had learned of this latest development from Durantaye at Michilimackinac who sent two Canadians in the dead of winter to Quebec to alert the Governor that all of the Ottawas were near to making a separate peace with the Iroquois and that when they did they would turn to attack the French. This had all come about, Frontenac was told, because the Governor's appeasement of the Iroquois had frightened the northern tribes. They had been told that Ononthio caused the release of thirty Mohawks at Corlear and this seemed to them a prelude to a separate peace between the Iroquois and the French, or at least a sign that the French were afraid of the Iroquois.


121 PAC, F3, Vol. IV, fol. 343-56, Mémoire de ce qui s'est passé...devant Québec, Champigny; C11A, Vol. XI, fol. 86, Frontenac to Seignelay, Quebec, 12 Nov 1690.
In any case, the Ottawas were determined to turn the tables on the French by agreeing to separate peace themselves.

As quickly as he could Frontenac got 143 men together, loaded them with presents for the Ottawas, placed them under the command of Sieur de Louvigny, and sped them off to Michilimackinac to try and wreck the impending alliance. If they succeeded, they were to act as guards for the convoy bringing furs down to Montreal.

While Frontenac anxiously awaited news from Louvigny, he decided to try again to establish contact with the Iroquois. He had sent three Iroquois, one of them a Cayuga chief, back to their people last fall with messages of peace, but since that time he had heard nothing from the five tribes. What had happened was that when the former prisoners spoke before the council of the Confederacy at Onondaga that winter, the two English delegates from Albany appealed to the five tribes to reject Frontenac’s proposal. The Council, which had no reason to accept it anyway, spurned Frontenac’s overture and

122 PAC, F3, Vol. IV, fol. 343-56, Mémoire de ce qui s’est passé...devant Quebec, Champigny.

pledged to continue the struggle against the French upon condition of English aid.

Unaware of this, Frontenac sent Chevalier Dau, an interpreter, and two Canadian voyageurs, to Onondaga to renew the peace proposals. It was this assignment that La Hontan claimed he was offered and firmly declined. When Dau and his men arrived at Onondaga the Indians gave them firm assurances of their regard for the French and their peace: Dau's companions were eaten and the Chevalier was severely beaten and handed over to the English as a token of loyalty.

Champigny had never been overly sanguine about these peace efforts in the first place. As he saw it, the Iroquois were too inflated with pride over their successes at Lachine and elsewhere, too hopeful that the western trade would soon fall into their hands, and too expectant of English support to even consider peace at the moment. What in his view was necessary was a strong lesson in humility: a full-scale invasion of

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124 PAC, C11A, Vol. XI, fol. 252-61, Champigny to Seignelay, Quebec, 10 May 1691.


126 PAC, C11A, Vol. XI, fol. 252-61, Champigny to Seignelay, Quebec, 10 May 1691.

Iroquoia in the spring. Only in this way could the Confederacy be brought to terms.

The Intendant was undoubtedly correct. The Iroquois were aware of the desperate condition of the colony--the savage though ineffectual raids against the English being the most recent example--and that Ononthio was trying to treat with them from a position of weakness. Under circumstances like these, with all of their goals so apparently near, there was nothing to discuss with the Governor. But Champigny, in making his criticism of Frontenac's policy, failed to mention how the colony would be protected from the English while the Canadian militia was on expedition in Iroquoia. He failed to mention also how the expedition would be paid for. Frontenac's policy was admittedly weak, but it was forced upon him by conditions that were in the last analysis outside his control.

Still waiting for word from Louvigny and Dau about their success (or lack of it) in Indian diplomacy, Frontenac resumed work on the fortification of Quebec in case he had miscalculated about the threat he would encounter from the English that season. Since there was little money in the colony to pay for these fortifications they were necessarily unimpressive, and time alone would tell how permanent they would be.128 A series of stone

redoubts were ordered constructed across the back of Upper Town where no natural barrier prevented an enemy from entering the capital.\textsuperscript{129} These redoubts were built of stone, reinforced on the insides with earth, and were situated along a line that ran between the Intendant's house and Cape Diamond.

A palisade of tree trunks was erected between the Intendant's house along the beach to the walls of the Seminary. Another, back farther from the beach and running parallel with the first along the edge of the cliff, was constructed between the Intendant's house and the Sault au Matelot. For the first time in its history Quebec could qualify as a "walled town," although the wall was plainly meant to stop nothing larger than bullets; it could offer little protection against cannon balls. Even so, it was better than nothing. As the engineer, Villeneuve, remarked, "Without this enclosure, however feeble it might be, the city and all the rest of the country ran the risk of being lost."\textsuperscript{130}


\textsuperscript{130} \textit{PAC}, Dépôt des fortifications des colonies, Carton VI, No. 355, Villeneuve to Pontchartrain, Quebec, 1691.
While work on the fortifications was progressing in Quebec and Dau's party was receiving its welcome in Iroquoia, Louvigny and his men were striving to reach Michilimackinac before all of the Ottawas forsook the alliance. After fighting their way through at least one serious ambush along the Ottawa River route, the Canadians were able to reach their destination in early summer.131

Accounts differ on the state of affairs at Michilimackinac upon their arrival. Champigny said that Durantaye had already succeeded in torpedoing the projected alliance and had convinced the Ottawa chiefs to go down to Montreal and confer with Frontenac.132 Frontenac, on the contrary, stated that Louvigny arrived just as the Ottawa chiefs were about to leave for Onondaga to ratify the dreaded pact.133 In any event, the Canadians were able to get the Ottawas and Hurons to boil and eat a convently-available Iroquois prisoner, and that put an end to the dangerous business of the alliance--at least for the time

131 PAC, F3, Vol. IV, fol. 343-56, Mémoire de ce qui s'est passé...devant Quebec, Champigny; C11A, Vol. XI, fol. 86-87, Frontenac to Seignelay, Quebec, 12 Nov 1690.

132 PAC, F3, Vol. IV, fol. 343-47, Mémoire de ce qui s'est passé...devant Quebec, Champigny.

Fig. 12.--The defenses of Quebec in 1690.
being. After this repast the Ottawas took up their furs and set off for Montreal to trade and talk with Frontenac.

At the council held with Frontenac in mid-August, the Ottawas showed themselves still distrustful of the French. They demanded to know why the French had been treating for peace with the Iroquois while they, the Ottawas, were being discouraged from doing the same. 134 A mission Iroquois inquired of the Ottawas why they would want to negotiate with the five tribes independently of the French. He received the curt reply that since the French were negotiating they, the Ottawas, had to look to their own best interests and negotiate, too. Again, the French were faced with the paradox, that peace in the west was every bit as dangerous for the colony as war.

Frontenac now saw that he would have to disavow his former policy of promoting peace in the west or run the risk of losing the allies. His decision on this occasion was made the more easy by the fact that he had heard nothing from Sieur Dau for many months, and it was clear that the peace offensive had foundered. The Governor reluctantly gave permission for the western allies to attack the Iroquois at every opportunity and

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134 PAC, Cl1A, Vol. XI, fol. 14-15, 24, Relation de ce qui s'est passé...depuis...Novembre 1689, Monseignat.
promised that the French would do the same.\textsuperscript{135} He did this in the full knowledge that the colony might hence-forward be caught between two fires, an English one and an Iroquois; but he was somewhat comforted to realize that at least while the Ottawas and Iroquois were fighting, they could not be trading. The Ottawas appeared to be satisfied with the new policy, and the conference dissolved into feasting and fur trading.

While this happy event was in progress, Frontenac received the news that he had dared to hope he would never receive. A large army of English and Iroquois had been sighted on Lake Champlain moving for an attack on the colony.\textsuperscript{136} Frontenac immediately mustered a rag-tag army--1200 militia, marines, and Indians--to repel the invasion and took his men across the river to Prairie de la Magdelaine and encamped for three days to await what might happen.\textsuperscript{137} When nothing did, Frontenac and his army recrossed the river to Montreal and again waited. Two days later smoke could be seen rising from burning

\textsuperscript{135}PAC, C11A, Vol. XI, fol. 88-89, Frontenac to Seignelay, Quebec, 12 Nov 1690.

\textsuperscript{136}PAC, F3, Vol. IV, fol. 343-47, Mémoire de ce qui s'est passé...devant Quebec, Champigny.

\textsuperscript{137}PAC, C11A, Vol. XI, fol. 89, Frontenac to Seignelay, Quebec, 12 Nov 1690.
homes at La Fourche on the south shore, half a mile from
the former camp site. It was the beginning of the invasion.

If the invasion had gone as planned, it would have
been the beginning of the end of Canada, as Frontenac
later admitted. On paper the campaign called for 855
militia from New York, Maryland, and New England to join
with a large force of Iroquois and attack the western
flank of the colony while an armada from Boston ascended
the St. Lawrence for an assault on Quebec. But when
the western force assembled at Albany the number of
militiamen proved to be considerably fewer than projected,
and the Iroquois did not make their appearance on time.
Canoes and supplies were wanting and soon the commanders
of the force fell to quarreling among themselves. When
the army finally got to Wood Creek on their way to Lake
Champlain the Iroquois put in a tardy arrival, but by
then smallpox had broken out among the English and the

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138 "The affair would have been very embarrassing,"
Frontenac reported euphemistically, "had not God taken a
part." PAC, C11A, Vol. XI, fol. 89, Frontenac to
Seignelay, Quebec, 12 Nov 1690.

Schuyler; NYCD, Vol. IV, pp. 193ff, Journal of Major
General Winthrop; Vol. III, pp. 692-94, Memorial of the
Agents from Albany, etc., to the Government of Connecti-
cut, Hartford, 12 March 1690; pp. 695-96, Memorial of the
Agents from Albany to the Government of Massachusetts,
Charles Towne, 20 Mar 1689.
warriors refused to come near. Captain John Schuyler managed to salvage twenty-nine Albany militiamen and 120 Iroquois from the general morass of events, and it was with this pitiful remnant of the great invading army that he attacked the little community of La Fourche and destroyed twenty-one men and four women. 140

As for the eastern prong of the invasion, Frontenac had only heard rumors of its existence, none of which he took seriously. 141 Some Iroquois prisoners captured in the spring had told of English plans to attack Quebec by sea, and the Abenakis of Maine had come to the capital at about the same time with reports of unusual activity in Boston. 142 Then, in June some Acadian sailors had hurried to Quebec with the story that Port Royal had just fallen to a fleet from Boston and that the Englishmen were talking about next attacking Quebec. 143 The nuns at Quebec took these rumors seriously, even if Frontenac did not:

140 PAC, F3, Vol. IV, fol. 343-47, Mémoire de ce qui s'est passé...devant Quebec, Champaigny.

141 PAC, C11A, Vol. XI, fol. 89, Frontenac to Seignelay, Quebec, 12 Nov 1690.

142 E. Myrand, 1690, Sir William Phips devant Quebec, (Quebec, 1893), p. 84, Relation of Mère Juchereau.

143 E. Myrand, 1690, Sir William Phips devant Quebec (Quebec, 1893), p. 84, Relation of Mère Juchereau.
they were offering daily prayers that God would keep the Boston fleet at a safe distance. 144

Just how mistaken the Governor had been about the English became apparent on October 10 while he was still at Montreal. 145 A messenger came hurrying to tell Frontenac that a whole fleet of English ships had rounded the Gaspé Peninsula and was headed for Quebec. The dumb-founded old warrior immediately set out for Quebec by canoe to take charge of the defense of the capitol. The next day a message reached him that the fleet was off Tadoussac and still bearing upriver. At this Frontenac sent word to Callières to leave a skeleton force at Montreal to guard that settlement and come at once to Quebec with every available man.

When Frontenac arrived in Quebec on October 14 he found the place a beehive of activity. Sieur Prevost, Town Major, had ordered into the capitol all of the habitants from as far downriver as Tadoussac to help with

144 E. Myrand, 1690, Sir William Phips devant Quebec (Quebec, 1893), p. 84, Relation of Mère Juchereau.

145 PAC, F3, Vol. IV, fol. 343-56, Mémoire de ce qui s'est passé...devant Quebec, Champigny; C11A, Vol. XI, fol. 37, Relation de ce qui s'est passé...depuis... Novembre 1689, Monseignat.
the defense of the city. He had put a great many men to work digging trenches and throwing earth up behind the palisade walls to the north of Upper Town. He had ordered that the three gaping spaces in the defensive works running behind Upper Town be closed with whatever was handy: barrels filled with earth, large stones, and logs. These spaces had earlier been meant to contain gates, but funds and initiative had run out before the gates were built. Not trusting to luck that these fortifications would stop the English, Prevost had thrown up several barricades along the road connecting Upper and Lower Town.

Prevost had already sited the cannon and stocked the batteries with ammunition. There were two batteries above the Sault au Matelot, one farther to the south on the edge of the great cliff, and another still farther south under the guns of Ft. Saint-Louis near Cape Diamond. There were two batteries in Lower Town near the water's edge, and one near the Intendant's house facing across the

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146 PAC, F3, Vol. IV, fol. 343-56, Mémoire de ce qui s'est passé...devant Quebec, Champigny; Cl1A, Vol. XI, fol. 37, Relation de ce qui s'est passé...depuis...Novembre 1689, Montseignat.

147 PAC, F3, Vol. IV, fol. 344, Mémoire de ce qui s'est passé...devant Quebec, Champigny; Cl1A, Vol. XI, fol. 37, Relation de ce qui s'est passé...depuis...Novembre 1689, Montseignat; Ferland, Cours d'Histoire, Vol. II, p. 20ff.
St. Charles River. In addition, there were a few smaller pieces scattered about the town, wherever a clear field of fire could be obtained or where the need was greatest, as behind the gaps where the gates should have been. There was an isolated battery across the St. Charles that could give an excellent cross-fire to those in the town and was itself protected by them.

Quebec was still alive with activity when, on October 16, someone caught sight of sails on the great river. They belonged to the Boston fleet, commanded by Sir William Phips, numbering in all thirty-four craft and carrying around 2300 men—the largest force ever to drop anchor in Quebec harbor. About ten o'clock the next morning a pinnace flying a white flag put off from the Admiral's ship with an envoy bearing a message for Frontenac. When the envoy arrived on shore he was blindfolded, not only to prevent his seeing the exact nature of Quebec's defenses but also to dupe the poor man according to prearranged plan. He was led to Ft. Saint-Louis and

Accounts of the siege of Quebec are numerous and extensive. A few of the best are: PAC, F3, Vol. IV, fol. 343-56, Mémoire de ce qui s'est passé...devant Quebec, Champigny; C11A, Vol. XI, fol. 37ff, Relation de ce qui s'est passé...depuis...Novembre 1689, Monseignat; C11A, Vol. XI, fol. 88ff, Frontenac to Seignelay, 12 Nov 1690; Myrand, 1690, Sir William Phips devant Quebec, Thomas Hutchinson, The History of the Province of Massachusetts by from 1628 to 1691, 2 vols. (London: 1765), Vol. I, pp. 350ff.
along the way was jostled by a small number of men and women, laughing and talking, giving him the impression that he was passing through a great crowd of carefree and confident Canadians. Led before Frontenac and unblindfolded, he saw before him in full panoply of war the Governor, Intendant, and the senior officers, all striving to appear self-assured.

The envoy, visibly shaken by the mein of the throng about him, managed to remember what he had come for and handed Frontenac an ultimatum from Phips written in English. It began:

The warrs between the two crownes of England and France doth not only sufficiently warrant; But the destruction made By ye French, and Indians, under your command and Encouragement upon the persons and Estates, of their Majesties subjects of new England, without provocation on their part, hath put them under necessity of this Expedition for their own Security and satisfaction.\(^{149}\)

The ultimatum went on to demand the surrender of Quebec within one hour or Phips declared he would take the place by force.

The envoy, having regained his composure, drew a watch from his pocket, handed it to Frontenac, and noted that since it was now ten o'clock, Phips must have the Governor's reply by eleven, no later. Frontenac angrily

answered that he would not keep the admiral waiting that long. He pointed to his officers and asked the envoy if he really believed those gentlemen would permit their governor to submit to terms such as those. The envoy, becoming rattled again, asked if Frontenac would be kind enough to put that reply in writing, whereupon Frontenac made his famous rejoinder: "I have no reply at all to make to your general except out of the mouths of my cannons." With that ringing in his ears, the envoy was re-blindfolded and led back to his pinacce in the same manner as he had come.

Frontenac's rejoinder, delivered to men who had buoyantly sailed to Canada to conquer the detested papists, was not quite what the New Englanders had expected. There were other things which also began to discomfit them. They soon learned that they were opposed by some 3600 men, including 500 or so Montrealers who had managed to slip into the capital the previous night. They noticed that a great many of the defenders, about 1000 in fact, wore the uniform of regulars in the French army, while they, the New Englanders, were a militia force, better able to contest a point of religion than a redoubt.

They saw that the fortifications around Quebec were inconsiderable, but they knew that if they tried to reduce them with their naval guns, the French would have time to reduce their ships to flotsam. But what was most on their
minds was the lateness of the season. They probably did not know that French ships often sailed from Quebec as late as mid-November. They could only know that unless Quebec was carried quickly, ice in the St. Lawrence might do what the cannons of Quebec threatened. A swift assault by land was therefore the strategy determined upon.

The Canadians, on the other hand, had every advantage. All they had to do was wait and the lateness of the season would cause the threat to go away. Under these circumstances (and to husband his meager resources since the supply ships from France had not yet arrived that year), Frontenac adopted a policy strictly defensive in nature. Therefore, when Major Walley and 1400 New Englanders landed at Beauport, about a league and a half below Quebec, the next day (October 18), Frontenac sent to oppose them only 200 volunteers under Jacques Le Moyne. The Governor's plan, as he later expressed it to the minister, was to harass the enemy until it crossed the St. Charles River. Once that water barrier was behind their backs, he would order a full counterattack to drive them into the water and destroy them. He had not thought it best, he said, to send a large force across the St. Charles to engage the English, for that would put the barrier to the backs of the French and give his own force the same disadvantage he hoped to inflict upon the English.
Fig. 13. -- The siege of Quebec, 1690 (La Honton. *New Voyages*, Vol. I, facing page 316).
As it turned out, Frontenac need not have devoted even this much thought to defeating the English. Poor English leadership, an undisciplined corps of men, the weather, unfamiliar terrain, and Canadian fighting tactics all served to make Frontenac's job easy. The English plan of attack was for Major Walley's men to move from Beauport across what they learned was a tree-filled swampy area known to the Canadians as la canardière (the duck), cross the St. Charles and assault what they saw to be the flimsy southern palisade wall of the town. While this was going on a naval bombardment was to take place, and as Walley's men were about ready to make their final assault, a commando group of 200 men was to be landed on the shore of Lower Town and storm its way into Upper Town. To complete the plan, some of the ships in the great river were to move upstream to feign an attack beyond Cape Diamond, hoping thereby to draw off some defenders from the city seeking to protect the flank.

As soon as the English tried to put the plan into operation things began to go wrong. When the Admiral's ships began their bombardment on October 19, the Quebec batteries answered and inflicted so much damage that the squadron had to withdraw out of range downriver. Major Walley did not coordinate his attack with that of Phips, and instead spent the day drying his men out from the dunking they had received upon landing in rough weather
the previous day at Beauport. When finally on October 20
his men started to move toward the St. Charles they were
stalled by Jacques La Moyne's 200 volunteers who fired at
them from ambush. They stalled and spent a miserable night
in the mud at la canadiere.

At daybreak the next day they were formed up in
battle order, as all of the European drill manuals said
they should be, and given the order to charge across the
St. Charles. As they started to slosh toward the river
and the palisade beyond, Le Moyne's men raked them from
one side and militiamen on the Island of Orleans raked
them from the other. Cursing the "bandits" who fired at
them from ambush and challenging them to come out in
the open and fight, the English again stalled.

Since their new position was less favorable than the
former, they started to withdraw, still in good order.
Then they heard the tocsin ring out from the cathedral.
Thinking this the signal for a mass sortie, all semblance
of order vanished in the headlong attempt to reach safety
farther, much farther, to the rear. The retreat ended
at Beauport. There, during the night boats were sent to
evacuate Walley's men. At the sight of the boats chaos
broke out again as every man tried to be the first to
quit Canada. Muskets and other pieces of equipment were
abandoned in the general desire to speed the departure.
The next day, after a mutual exchange of prisoners, the fine fleet from Boston began its unhappy return to Massachusetts.

Frontenac's defensive strategy, although it was in part forced upon him because of the inadequacies of his own forces, had paid off. The old Governor was exultant. He wrote to Seignelay that the coming spring would be the ideal time to follow up the Quebec victory with an attack on the English colonies.\(^{150}\) The strategy would be the same as the project abandoned in the fall. A force from France would "hurl a thunderbolt" at the Boston heretics and hunt the people of Massachusetts "in their lair." He meanwhile would personally lead a Canadian army against Albany.

The Governor's exultation over the defeat of the English was however mixed with grave concern over the physical condition of the colony. The king's storehouse at Montreal had burned that spring, and with it what was left of the year's supplies for the troops.\(^{151}\) Iroquois raids and heavy rains had helped ruin the harvest, and only three of eleven supply ships had reached Quebec that


fall because of the English and the weather. The results was that the colony's food, ammunition, and other essentials were in pitifully short supply. Champigny was forced to begin the dole of emergency supplies of pork and flour to the troops and habitants. Things were so bad, Frontenac complained, that within a week he, the Governor, would be forced to begin drinking water.

During the winter of 1690-91, while sipping his water, Frontenac had time to reflect on the policy that must be adopted to further French aims in North America. The Governor's instructions for the year, which had arrived after the departure of Phip's fleet, relayed the depressing news that the colony need expect no troops or funds from France for the foreseeable future. Frontenac was told to carry on as best he could until further orders.

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152 PAC, C11A, Vol. XI, fol. 40, Monseignat to Madame de..., 1690; fol. 95, Frontenac to Seignelay, Quebec, 12 Nov 1690.

153 PAC, C11A, Vol. XI, fol. 95, Frontenac to Seignelay, Quebec, 12 Nov 1690.


155 PAC, C11A, Vol. XI, fol. 95, Frontenac to Seignelay, Quebec, 12 Nov 1690.

156 PAC, B, Vol. XV, fol. 7-11, King to Frontenac and Champigny, 14 July 1690.
It seemed to Frontenac that some kind of offensive was clearly called for under the circumstances. The Ottawas, as a condition for continuing the alliance, had demanded and received his promise that the French would begin in a serious way to make war on the Iroquois. At the same time, Frontenac felt constrained to direct attacks against the English border settlements so as to keep them off balance and possibly prevent an attack against Montreal as Schuyler had almost succeeded in mounting. But the status of forces in the colony, most of whom would have to be held in readiness to defend the French settlements, were such that these attacks against the English and Iroquois would have to be more in the nature of hit-and-run raids, la petite guerre (trenchant war) as the Canadians called it. This style of warfare had also the advantages of being lower in cost than big campaigns and a style of fighting in which the Canadians excelled.\footnote{157}

But defense could not be overlooked. Frontenac had brought with him to Canada in 1689 a royal edict for the habitants to group themselves in fortified hamlets.\footnote{158}

\footnote{157} PAC, C11A, Vol. XI, fol. 94, Frontenac to Seignelay, Quebec, 12 Nov 1690.

\footnote{158} PAC, B, Vol. XV, fol. 55, Royal edict of 1 May 1689.
This extraordinary measure not only carried considerable legal weight, but was supported by sound judgment since the habitants were now subject to attack from the whole Confederacy and their English compatriots. Frontenac dared not break this obligation either. Then there was the matter of fortifying the major settlements, Montreal and Three Rivers against the Iroquois, and Quebec against the English. The Iroquois were certain to wreak havoc in the upper colony next season, and the English had vowed before leaving Quebec in the fall to return in the spring with an even larger flotilla and clean out the nests of plotting papists along the St. Lawrence.

Frontenac began to enact his policy of defense at home and la petite guerre abroad. The Governor and Intendant both strived valiantly to move the habitants of the countryside into closed villages, or failing that, at least to have a small fort built in every outlying seigneury. As usual they were met by opposition on the part of some and apathy on the part of others, but assisted by pressure from the Confederacy, some headway was made in

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159 PAC, F3, Vol. IV, fol. 347, Mémoire de ce qui s'est passé...devant Quebec, Champigny.
this area during the next several years. At Three Rivers and Montreal palisades encircling the towns were repaired. These palisades remained flimsy affairs, fit only to stop arrows and musket balls, the only projectiles thought likely to be directed against them.

At Quebec, the business begun the previous summer of fortifying the city against the English continued under spur of the threat delivered by Phip's men. Lack of funds slowed the work considerably, however. Frontenac was already out-of-pocket a considerable sum of his own money spent on the frantic efforts at fortification the previous fall, and the Governor was not wealthy enough to foot more of the bill himself. Since no one else came forward with a loan and since the king had already indicated that he would provide no funds, Champigny and Frontenac had to content themselves with patching the defensive works already existent and hoping the works

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160 PAC, C11A, Vol. XI, fol. 96, Frontenac to Seignelay, Quebec, 12 Nov 1690; fol. 241, Frontenac to Pontchartrain, Quebec, 20 Oct 1691; Vol. XII, fol. 220, Frontenac and Champigny to Pontchartrain, Quebec, 4 Nov 1693.


162 PAC, B, Vol. XVI, fol. 32.5, Pontchartrain to Champigny, Paris, 7 April 1691.
would never be put to the test.\footnote{163}

In the years that followed, the king was little more generous with funds for the fortification of Quebec than he had been in 1691. From time to time a few thousand livres would be designated for this purpose, but coupled with the allocation would be a reprimand to Champigny and Frontenac that the construction work was proceeding too slowly and was costing much more than it should.\footnote{164}

The trouble was that the allocations were so paltry that, far from being used for new construction, they had to go for repairing and replacing the rotting palisades thrown up in 1690.\footnote{165} The only major new construction undertaken during the 1690's was the building of a redoubt on Cape Diamond.\footnote{166}

In order to make Quebec truly impregnable by seventeenth-century standards, three things were necessary.

\footnote{163}{\textit{PAC, C11A, Vol. XI,} fol. 252, Champigny to Pontchartrain, Quebec, 10 May 1691.}

\footnote{164}{\textit{PAC, B, Vol. XVI,} fol. 34, Pontchartrain to Champigny, Paris, 7 April 1691; fol. 21, King to Frontenac and Champigny, April 1692; fol. 98, King to Frontenac and Champigny, 28 March 1693; \textit{Vol. XVII,} fol. 50, King to Frontenac and Champigny (1694).}

\footnote{165}{\textit{PAC, C11A, Vol. XII,} fol. 9, Champigny and Frontenac to Pontchartrain, Quebec, 15 Sept 1692.}

\footnote{166}{\textit{PAC, C11A, Vol. XIII,} fol. 369-70, Frontenac and Champigny to Pontchartrain, Quebec, 10 Nov 1695; fol. 371-75, Frontenac to Pontchartrain, Quebec, 16 April 1695.}
The earthworks, redoubts, and palisades which had been thrown together in 1690 would have to be replaced by solid stone walls, complete with fascines and bastions. The crumbling old Ft. Saint-Louis would have to be rebuilt, there not being much sense in trying to repair it. And finally, batteries, platforms, and redoubts would have to be constructed at strategic locations to protect the wall and defend the harbor. But all of this would be quite costly, and when the engineer Villeneuve submitted these proposals to court, they were met with a flat rejection.\textsuperscript{167}

The king took occasion to announce that Sieur Levasseur de Néron would replace Villeneuve as royal engineer for Canada.\textsuperscript{168}

De Néron, by virtue of his responsibility to report on such matters, soon also found himself in the position of the messenger who is the bearer of bad news. The walls around the town were woefully inadequate, he wrote, in most places being less than a foot thick and totally

\textsuperscript{167} PAC, C11A, Vol. XII, fol. 4-23, Frontenac and Champigny to Pontchartrain, Quebec, 15 Sept 1692; B, Vol. XVI, fol. 98, King to Frontenac and Champigny, 28 March 1693; Allana G. Reid, The Development and Importance of the Town of Quebec, 1608-1760 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, McGill University, 1950).

\textsuperscript{168} PAC, B, Vol. XVI, fol. 54.5, Royal edict, 1 March 1693.
unsuitable for stopping cannon balls.\textsuperscript{169} The walls were poorly placed, too. In several locations they stood on poorly-drained ground, a circumstance which contributed to their rapid ruin; and immediately in front of the walls on the west side of town were hills upon which an enemy could mount artillery, enfilade the walls, and destroy the town.\textsuperscript{170} He summed up his opinion of the Quebec fortifications in 1699 by writing, "The walls around most of Upper Town are not worth a thing."\textsuperscript{171} And that is where matters stood at the close of the century.

So in 1691 the defenses of the colony were about as strong as they were going to get during the war. They were soon put to the test. An estimated 900 to 1000 Iroquois descended on the Island of Montreal in two bands as soon as the ice had gone out of the river. Farms on the Island were raved; then the Iroquois scattered southward in smaller war-parties, moving up the Richelieu, burning and killing as they went. To protect themselves the habitants could do little other than take

\textsuperscript{169}PAC, Dépôt des fortifications des colonies, Carton VI, No. 362, Mémoire concernant Québec, 1699.

\textsuperscript{170}PAC, C11A, Vol. XVIII, fol. 345, De Néré to Pontchartrain, Quebec, 7 Nov 1700.

\textsuperscript{171}PAC, Dépôt des fortifications des colonies, Carton VI, No. 362, Mémoire concernant Québec, 1699.
refuge in the newly-built or newly-strengthened stockades, there being not enough ammunition available to fend off the attacks. Conditions in this regard became so desperate that Champigny was reduced to melting down the lead gutters and window moldings on the public buildings and private houses of Quebec to mold into bullets.172 Thus supplied, Vaudreuil hurried up from Quebec to Montreal to help defend the besieged settlement. He raised a force of 120 men, and with what food he was able to beg by going from door to door—a crust here, a piece of pork there—set off with his men in search of the marauders. The Canadian force was able to surprise a few Iroquois and give encouragement to the others to leave the colony, but not before the invaders had killed or captured over 100 men, women, and children of the area.

Scarcely had the Indians left than the English came, again under the command of Major Peter Schuyler.173 He brought with him 266 Albany militia, 80 Mohawks, and 66 Loups. Callières, who had received intelligence of this move by Schuyler, raised 600 men and sent word to

172 PAC, Cl1A, Vol. XI, fol. 251, Champigny to Pontchartrain, Quebec, 12 May 1691.

Frontenac, who advanced to Three Rivers with a secondary force. Callières' men were surprised and defeated at Prairie de la Magdelaine, but Schuyler's party was in turn surprised and defeated by a smaller Canadian force under Vallerenne, who had slipped behind the English and blocked their return march. The spring of 1691, because of the impoverished condition of the colony in time of war, was the worst since the period of company government, when Canada had felt similar pangs of deprivation.

But in July, with the arrival of thirteen supply ships laden with food, munitions, and merchandise, the situation changed for the better. Frontenac was now able to dispatch convoys to the western posts with merchandise and gifts for the Indians, items calculated to retain the aborigines' good will, if not their love, for the French. The men sent on convoys in the summer were expected to winter in the lakes region and return to the colony the next spring as guards for the canoes bearing their precious cargoes of furs to Montreal. This was a defensive measure which had proved quite successful during the first Iroquois war and which Frontenac had revived the

174 PAC, C11A, Vol. XI, fol. 41ff, Relation de ce qui s'est passé...en Canada depuis...27 Novembre 1690, 12 Nov 1691.

175 PAC, C11A, Vol. XI, fol. 280-82, Champigny to Pontchartrain, Quebec, 12 Oct 1691.
previous year under Louvigny. On the latter occasion the French had been able to bring safely down the gauntlet of the Ottawa River furs valued at 100,000 ecus. 176

Frontenac was also then able to enact the offensive phase of his program against the English and the Iroquois. Beginning in the summer of 1691 and continuing throughout the active part of hostilities in America, the French and their Indian allies, acting together or separately, traded blow for blow with their enemies in la petite guerre. Groups of Iroquois found parties of French and allies waiting in ambush for them at every portage or along every path that led from Iroquoia. In mid-July 1692 Vaudreuil and a mixed force of 320 men surprised and defeated 200 Iroquois warriors who were themselves waiting in ambush along the Ottawa River. 177

The border villages of Iroquoia and the English colonies also found themselves assaulted by numerous French-incited, but Indian-led, war-parties. Governor Fletcher of New York described this aspect of la petite guerre:

The French Indians...have destroi'd some careless people nigh our garrisons....They


are wolves, lay so close, no man can discover them, a hare sitting is much easier found England; the parties I send daily out, they lett pass--lurking close--but if a naked man, woman or child pass, they kill them or take them. Our Indians act the same part and with greater success on the French plantations.  

These allied Indians, warriors from the western tribes and mission stations, were encouraged to this work by liberal bounties given for the number of enemies killed or captured. The Quebec government began this policy in 1692 by paying twenty ecus for each male prisoner, ten ecus for each female, and ten ecus for each scalp.  

Pontchartrain objected to the policy on grounds that the prices were exorbitant. Champigny and Frontenac protested the minister's parsimoniousness, reminding him that he could not get a better bargain anywhere than the destruction of 1000 enemies for only 30,000 livres. But Pontchartrain remained adamant and in 1694 the bounties were reduced to

178NYCD, Vol. IV, p. 158, Governor Fletcher to Mr. Blathwayte, New York, 30 May 1696.


180PAC, C11A, Vol. XII, fol. 215, Frontenac and Champigny to Pontchartrain, Quebec, 4 Nov 1693.
two ecus for each male prisoner, one ecu for each female, and one ecu for each scalp.

By the fall of 1692 neither side in the American contest showed any sign of weakening. Champigny was still of the opinion that the only way to take the Iroquois out of the war quickly was a full-scale invasion of their lands. Frontenac continued to resist all such suggestions, arguing that a large campaign in the west would strip the colony of its defenders, leaving it exposed to attack from the English and Iroquois. Then, in the late fall of 1692 the Governor changed his mind. The reason may have been the arrival of dispatches from court.

Pontchartrain informed Frontenac of the intelligence received by the court that apparently the English were not preparing for another attack on Quebec; so the Canadian officials could feel free to attack the Iroquois in force. Predictably, the minister made no mention of

181 PAC, B, Vol. XVII, fol. 71-72, King to Frontenac and Champigny, April 1694; C11A, Vol. XIII, fol. 13-14, Frontenac and Champigny to Pontchartrain, Quebec, 1 Nov 1694.


183 PAC, C11A, Vol. XII, fol. 25-26, Frontenac to Pontchartrain, Quebec, 15 Sept 1692.

184 PAC, B, Vol. XVI, fol. 32, Pontchartrain to Frontenac, Versailles, April 1692.
sending troops to the colony--this, even though Champigny had issued an urgent appeal the previous fall, claiming that more than 500 men had thus far been lost in the war.\(^{185}\) The king was not completely tightfisted, however. Perhaps, he wrote, if the war continued to go well in Europe, Canada would receive some marines next year.\(^{186}\)

Choosing to look on the positive side of these dispatches, Frontenac began preparing for a winter campaign against the Mohawks to catch them unaware while snow was on the ground. On January 25, 1693 the expedition left Montreal with orders to kill every Mohawk male they found and take alive the women and children.\(^ {187}\) The party consisted of 625 men, 100 marines, 200 allied Indians, and the rest militia. Arriving undetected at two small Mohawk villages on February 16, the army was able to capture a number of villagers of both sexes and all ages without meeting any resistance. Both villages and their supplies

\(^{185}\)PAC, Cl1A, Vol. XI, fol. 280-82, Champigny to Pontchartrain, Quebec, 12 Oct 1691.

\(^{186}\)PAC, B, Vol. XVI, fol. 17.5ff, King to Frontenac and Champigny, April 1692.

\(^{187}\)Accounts of this expedition are found in the following: PAC, Cl1A, Vol. XII, fol. 182-206, Relation de ce qui s'est passé en Canada...depuis...Septembre, 1692, Monseignat; fol. 256-61, Champigny to Pontchartrain, Quebec, 17 Aug 1693; fol. 230, Frontenac to Pontchartrain, Quebec, 25 Oct 1693; fol. 318-21, Callières to Pontchartrain, Montreal, 30 Sep 1693; F3, Vol. V, fol. 52-59, Relation de ce qui s'est passé...depuis...Novembre 1692, Champigny; NYCQ, Vol. IV, pp. 293ff, Major Peter Schuyler's Report to Governor Fletcher, February 1693.
of grain were destroyed and the invaders moved to the next, a larger, settlement. It too was taken by surprise, and with it, more captives.

Two days were wasted as the Indian allies, who had discovered a large cache of rum, went on a wild drunken spree; and an additional day was wasted in debate over whether to attack Albany next. This could be done if the prisoners were disposed of; but when the order was given to destroy the prisoners, the mission Mohawks, who made up the bulk of the allies present, flatly refused to knock their own kinsmen in the head. There was nothing left to do but return to Montreal.

While the Canadian army made its way back to Lake Champlain, the alarm was spread in Albany by some Mohawks who had escaped the French net. Within hours a mixed force of almost 550 Albany and Corlear militia men and Mohawk warriors set off in hot pursuit. Since the French retreat was slowed by the prisoners, the advance party of the English force caught up with the struggling Canadians on the third day of the retreat. The English called to the French and asked them to wait, that peace had been declared in Europe and that they should all be friends.

The French officers would have none of this; but the Indian allies insisted on waiting, saying that if peace had been declared so much the better, and if not, fighting was what they had come there for anyway. This view
finally prevailed, and trees were felled to form a rough barricade facing the English. Two days later the main English force arrived, and when they began constructing their own defensive works it became apparent that peace was very far from their minds.

Two indecisive engagements were fought, after which the French, now running short of food, withdrew with frequent backward glances. When the French reached Lake Champlain, the English force right behind them, they were faced with an additional problem. An unexpected thaw had ruined their cache of food for the return journey. Runners were dispatched to Montreal to bring help, and ten days later a relief force arrived to assist the now desperate men.

Two or three of the original party had died of starvation and exposure, and several others were in extremis. Those able to move had been reduced to boiling their moccasins for broth. The rescue was effected, and nineteen days after the fight with the English, the first survivors of the expedition reached Montreal. Many of them had thrown away their equipment to lighten their load, and the Mohawk prisoners had long since been released to fend for themselves.

Callières, Monseignat, and Ramezay all blamed the Indian allies for what happened. They claimed the
Indians' refusal to kill the prisoners and the Indians' insistence on waiting for the main force of the enemy had turned what otherwise would have been a decisive blow against the Mohawks into a near-disaster for the French. But despite recriminations, some good had been accomplished by the campaign. The Mohawks had been dealt a hard blow at a time when they were already suffering heavily from la petite guerre of the allies. The prestige of the French among the allies, sagging from what the Ottawas believed was too little French activity in the war, had been somewhat restored; and the New York border settlements had definitely been thrown on the defensive.

This campaign also made the Iroquois change their defensive strategy. Even before the February attack the Iroquois were showing signs of war weariness. In a conference at Albany in June 1692, a Mohawk chief had complained bitterly that the English were not doing their share of the fighting. The February attack brought the complaint even more into the open. When Governor Fletcher

188 PAC, C11A, Vol. XII, fol. 318, Callières to Pontchartrain, Montreal, 30 Sept 1693.

189 PAC, C11A, Vol. XII, fol. 318, Callières to Pontchartrain, Montreal, 30 Sept 1693.

of New York tried to enflame the Iroquois into making a counterattack against Canada that winter, he found the mood of the Iroquois sullen indeed.\textsuperscript{191}

The Mohawks gave him to understand that their own strength had been greatly diminished during the past three years and that they would not attempt to overrun Canada alone without help from the great fleet of ships which they had been promised would attack Quebec. There were new complaints as well. The English were poor suppliers of munitions; some of their warriors were without muskets and others without powder and ball. Moreover, it was now dangerous for their warriors to invade Canada because the Ottawas were certain to attack their villages while they were away.

Being thus harmed in war, the Iroquois decided to harm the French by peace. In June 1693 an Oneida ambassador journeyed to Quebec to sound out Frontenac on the prospects.\textsuperscript{192} The answer he received was favorable, and in August the ambassador arrived once more at Quebec to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{191} \textit{NYCD}, Vol. IV, pp. 22-23, Answer of the Five Nations to Governor Fletcher, Albany, 25 Feb 1693.
\item \textsuperscript{192} \textit{PAC}, ClIA, Vol. XII, fol. 318-19, Callières to Pontchartrain, Montreal, 30 Sept 1693.
\end{itemize}
further the discussion. The Oneida suggested that instead of the peace conference being held at Quebec, it be held at Albany where French representatives would be allowed to come under promise of safe conduct. Since Frontenac recognized that to handle the negotiations in this way would involve a tacit recognition of Albany’s authority over the Iroquois—something the territorial claims of the French would not permit—the Governor declined to hear of it, and the negotiations were broken off. The Iroquois were being more successful in another part of the continent, however. Their ambassadors were being heard with considerable interest at Michilimackinac.

Callières claimed that the sole purpose of the Iroquois peace offensive was to bemuse the French and keep the Canadians from launching another campaign against them. Another campaign was absolutely essential, he stated, or the Iroquois would never be brought to discuss peace seriously. Champigny quite agreed, and added that only a strong blow directed against the Confederacy would

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193 PAC, C11A, Vol. XII, fol. 182-206, Relation de ce qui s’est passé en Canada...depuis...Septembre, 1692, Monseignat; NYC, Vol. IV, pp. 77-78, Joseph, Christian Mohawk’s report from Oneida, 2 Dec 1692.

194 PAC, C11A, Vol. XII, fol. 272, 276-77, Champigny to Pontchartrain, Quebec, 4 Nov 1693.

195 PAC, C11A, Vol. XII, fol. 320, Callières to Pontchartrain, Montreal, 30 Sept 1693.
save the French alliance from disintegrating. Frontenac was ready to admit that another campaign was at that time more appropriate than negotiations, but insisted that he would need at least 500 troops beyond the 400 who had arrived that year in order to attempt an invasion. Frontenac may also have had his eye on a recent dispatch from Pontchartrain in which the minister severely reprimanded the Governor for his lack of economy in government. Negotiations were far less costly to Louis XIV than war.

Early the next spring the Iroquois again approached Frontenac about peace. Two Onondaga chiefs came to Quebec and told the Governor that the Confederacy was ready to accept Quebec as the meeting place for the conference. If Ononthio would agree to a cessation of hostilities in the meantime, the chiefs continued, they would return

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196 PAC, C11A, Vol. XII, fol. 272, 276-77, Champigny to Pontchartrain, Quebec, 4 Nov 1693.


198 PAC, B, Vol. XVI, fol. 120ff, Pontchartrain to Frontenac, 28 March 1693.

in the fall with two chiefs from each of the other four tribes and enter into negotiations. The great Onondaga leader, Tegannissorens, would lead the delegation, thereby adding to its stature. Frontenac was delighted at the proposal and gave his consent to their plans. All of the rest of that summer there was much coming and going of Iroquois ambassadors to arrange the details of the conference.

At the same time as this diplomacy was in progress, the Iroquois were busy around Michilimackinac. They were sending their ambassadors to the Ottawas and Hurons telling these tribes that the French were on the point of signing a separate peace, something Frontenac in 1690 had assured the allies he would never do.\(^{200}\) The Ottawas were giving wide credence to these reports when Louvigny, who had replaced Durantaye as commandant of Michilimackinac, unfortunately chose this occasion to resort to a tactic that had always worked in the past.

He invited the Ottawas to go down to Montreal and see for themselves that the government was not betraying them. A few days after the Ottawa chiefs reached Montreal there came a group of Iroquois conducting back to

the colony thirteen French prisoners as part of the ex-
change called for in the peace settlement. The Ottawas
needed no clearer proof of apparent French duplicity and
returned to their country resolved to strike a bargain
with the Iroquois before the French beat them to it.

The misunderstanding with the Ottawas might have gone
no further if Frontenac had had a chance to arrange a
general peace settlement with the Iroquois; but just at
this critical juncture of events the Iroquois broke off
negotiations with the French, an act which Frontenac
attributed to English intrigue.  

He was nevertheless
convinced, he wrote the minister, that the Iroquois sin-
cerely desired peace and that the Ottawa affair could be
satisfactorily adjusted. Callières was again of a differ-
ent opinion. There was no alternative now, he wrote to
Pontchartrain, but to invade Iroquoia in force. Otherwise, the war with the Confederacy would drag on for years,
and the French allies would desert to the enemy en masse.

That Callières had correctly assessed the true danger
confronting the colony was proven by the events of 1695.
The Iroquois, now confident of an alliance with the
Ottawas and certain that their northern flank was secure,

201 PAC, C11A, Vol. XIII, fol. 67, Frontenac to Pont-
chartrain, Quebec, 4 Nov 1694.

202 PAC, C11A, Vol. VIII, fol. 108, Callières to
Pontchartrain, Montreal, 19 Oct 1694.
invaded the colony in the spring and spread fire and death throughout the Montreal district.\textsuperscript{203} At the same time, their ambassadors journeyed to Michilimackinac to confirm the alliance with the Ottawas; and in spite of everything the French commandant could do, the two peoples agreed to bury the hatchet and enter into a commercial agreement. The Iroquois pledged to furnish the Ottawas with English goods in exchange for furs, and the Ottawas agreed to permit Iroquois hunting parties in the region of the upper lakes.\textsuperscript{204} At this, the Renards (Foxes) and Mascoutins, allies living in Wisconsin and 1200 warriors strong, began negotiations with the Iroquois.\textsuperscript{205} The French alliance had finally been broken by that enemy counted most dangerous to the colony since the time of Courcelles--namely, peace. When news of these events reached Frontenac, he was beset on every side with conflicting advice. Champigny, Callières, and La Mothe Cadillac, the new commandant at Michilimackinac, all urged an immediate attack on the


\textsuperscript{204}PAC, C11A, Vol. XIV, fol. 183, Champigny to Pontchartrain, Quebec, 18 Aug 1696.

Confederacy. Further hesitation, they argued, would weld the Ottawas and the Iroquois together and encourage further defections among the allies. But Frontenac adamantly maintained that he did not have enough troops, that he had received no reinforcements in two years, and that he was afraid of a major attack on the colony by the English and Iroquois while the bulk of his forces were on campaign. He pointed to Denonville's expedition of 1687 as evidence of the futility of trying to hunt down Iroquois with insufficient forces. It was, he said, best to continue la petite guerre until reinforcements arrived from France or the Iroquois could be brought to sue for peace. Frontenac could also have pointed to the insufficiency of funds as ample reason for not undertaking a large campaign: the latest reprimand from Pontchartrain was that the colony was nearly 550,000 livres over its budget, almost three times the annual allocation for Canada.

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207 PAC, C11A, Vol. XIII, fol. 286-87, Frontenac to Pontchartrain, Quebec, 4 Nov 1695.

208 PAC, B, Vol. XVII, fol. 41, Pontchartrain to Frontenac, Versailles, 13 March 1694.
While this debate was in progress, dispatches arrived in August from the court. They were highly critical of Frontenac's delay in resolutely making war on the Iroquois. One of the king's dispatches gave Frontenac to understand that the Governor should no longer use the fear of an English invasion of the colony as a reason for keeping Canadian forces inactive.\(^2\) The English had not even been able to successfully defend themselves against the Indian allies of the French in Maine and Acadia, the Abenakis, much less think about laying siege to Quebec. Nor should the Governor use the prospect of a negotiated peace with the Iroquois as a reason for keeping Canadian arms inactive. The Iroquois dalliance in the negotiations and their simultaneous attempt to subvert the French alliance had indicated their lack of sincerity and the probability that the English had put them up to the whole business. The king expressed his wish that Frontenac would let nothing stand in the way of a decisive attack on the Confederacy, nothing.

In view of this attitude by the court and the urging of Champigny and Callieres, Frontenac determined to put aside any feelings he might have and begin planning a campaign. While these plans were nearing completion in

\(^2\)PAC, B, Vol. XVII, fol. 73.5ff, King to Frontenac and Champigny, 14 June 1695.
the spring, there occurred a decisive event in the history of the western alliance. When an Iroquois hunting party, who had wintered among the Ottawas as part of the new commercial pact between the Confederacy and the Ottawa tribes, left for their own country in the spring, the Ottawas were unable to resist the temptation to even some old scores with their erstwhile foes. They stealthily followed the Iroquois party for several days, and then ambushed them, killing fifty-one and taking twenty-two prisoners. This single incident, more than antying Louis XIV or the Canadian government could have done, saved the French empire in America, for it destroyed at a stroke the nascent alliance among the western tribes and reintroduced a need of the French presence in the lakes region.

It is interesting to note, by way of demonstrating the tangled skein of affairs facing the French in the west, that the Ottawa still refused to join Frontenac’s projected campaign against the Iroquois. They claimed that owing to a dispute with the Hurons, whom they did not trust, they dared not leave their women and children behind unguarded. Callières believed this was merely an

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excuse, the real reason being that they did not trust the French anymore than the Hurons.212

By July 4 all was in readiness. An army of approximately 2150, consisting of marines, militiamen, and mission Indians, was assembled at Montreal.213 Their objective was Onondaga, the hearth of the Confederacy and believed to be the village from which hatred toward the French was disseminated among the other tribes. The army left Montreal with Frontenac, seventy-six years old, nominally in command. Twelve days later they arrived without incident at Ft. Frontenac, reestablished the previous fall by the Governor for just such an eventuality. After six days spent putting the fort in good order, the army crossed Lake Ontario and entered the mouth of the Onondaga (Oswego) River. As they moved up the river on their way to the objective, Frontenac was carried in a canoe "on the shoulders of fifty Indians singing and shouting with joy."


Reaching the village of Onondaga on August 5 they found it deserted, except for one old man too enfeebled to flee. He was roasted and eaten with pleasure by the mission Indians. The village, the standing crops, and the stores of grain were all put to the torch, and Vaudreuil and 600 men were sent to an Oneida village nine leagues distant to do the same there. This accomplished, the entire army was reassembled on August 9 for the return trip, and on the twentieth reached Montreal.

This campaign, although it failed to come to grips with the enemy, brought a virtual end to the war so far as the French were concerned. In the English colonies, as Louis XIV had pointed out, the citizens were too busy defending themselves against the Indian allies of the French to give further thought to attacking Canada. In Iroquoia, the once proud Confederacy was but a shadow of its former self. Its numerical strength had been cut in half by seven years of grueling war. Its borders were under continual assault by the Ottawas, Illinois, and other hostile tribes, then emboldened to press the war

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214 NYCD, Vol. IV, p. 158, Governor to Mr. Blathwayte, New York, 30 May 1696.

with renewed vigor. Its hunters were everywhere hindered from obtaining the pelts which they needed to purchase merchandise at Albany. The result was that the Confederacy had increasingly to fall back upon the English, who were none too well off themselves, to furnish the necessities of life.

After Frontenac's campaign several Iroquois representatives wearily made their way to Albany to request aid from the English. The English at first refused to give the Indians any help, saying they already had enough problems of their own. Then, thinking better of what they had done, the New York government scraped together £300 worth of clothes, kettles, and a few muskets and presented them to a delegation of the five tribes in Albany. Governor Fletcher expressed his disappointment to the delegation that he could not include any food in the gift because, he said, there was none to spare.

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216 PAC, CIIA, Vol. XV, fol. 107, Champigny to Pontchartrain, 26 Aug 1697.
A Mohawk chief addressed the Governor and asked him to write his king and have his king send his big ships to attack the French. If the king would not do this, the Mohawk asked to be informed so he and his people could make peace with the French. Fletcher, much to his chagrin, could offer only evasions on this point.

Accordingly, early in 1697 the Iroquois began peace negotiations with the French. The negotiations that year proved unsuccessful, due primarily to the Iroquois' insistence that the western tribes be excluded from participation in the peace. In the meantime, neither the French nor the Iroquois pressed the war, each side now ready to rely on negotiations to settle the issues involved. In February, 1698 a delegation from Albany arrived in Montreal to inform the French that the Treaty of Ryswick had been signed in Europe ending the war between their respective monarchs. Since the terms of the treaty were status quo ante bellum, the dispute immediately arose about what these terms meant so far as the

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Iroquois negotiations were concerned. What was the status of the Iroquois before the war? If they were subjects of King William III, as the English claimed, then the negotiations should proceed under the auspices of the New York government and the country of the five tribes should be considered part of the English colony. If they were subjects of King Louis XIV, as the French maintained, then the negotiations rightly were the concern only of the Quebec government, and the Iroquois should be treated as rebellious children of the French King.

With the Governor of New York doing everything in his power to induce the Iroquois to let him be their bargaining agent with Quebec, and with the Iroquois stoutly maintaining their independence of both the French and the English, the negotiations between the Canadian government and the five tribes dragged on for several years. The person in charge of these negotiations for Canada was Callières, named governor after the death of Frontenac in 1698. Callières' aim was not just to settle the points

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224 PAC, C11A, Vol. XVI, fol. 50, Frontenac to Pontchartrain, Quebec, 10 Oct 1698.

at issue between the Iroquois and the French, but to solve the whole western problem of Canada as it involved the fur trade and the hostility of the tribes in the area. For two and a half years Callièrès worked to reconcile the conflicting claims, charges, counter claims, and counter charges of these tribes, some of whom had been at war with one another for longer than any man could remember.

Callièrès' work was crowned with success on August 4, 1701 when the Governor was able to read to some 1300 Iroquois and allied delegates gathered in Montreal for the event, a treaty to which they all agreed and to which the Iroquois adhered faithfully in the years that followed. Not only did the Iroquois refuse to accept the status of English subjects in the treaty; they agreed to remain neutral in any future war fought between France and England. At a single stroke the English were denied sovereignty over the lands of the Iroquois and were stripped of their greatest military asset. The Iroquois in the past had served as the primary offensive and defensive weapon of the English colonies to the south; but with the Iroquois removed as a buffer, those disunited and unwar-like colonies would have to face unassisted the assaults of Canada.

226 PAC, F3, Vol. VIII, fol. 278, Assemblée faite par M. le chevalier de Callièrès...de tous les nations Iroquoises, Montreal, 1 Aug 1701.
Another outstanding feature of the peace settlement had to do with the fur trade. The Iroquois, by remaining independent of English control, could continue to act as a barrier between the French allies north of the Great Lakes and the Albany merchants, thus insuring that the bulk of the fur trade would remain in French hands. Under these circumstances, it was not an exaggeration when Michel Bégon, the Indendant at Rochefort, wrote to his friend Villermont:

> We saw at Montreal a kind of estate of thirty three different Indian nations who came there and who have never come in such great number. Messrs Callières and Champigny have acquired an immortal glory in adjusting all the different interests of the people there who have made among themselves a peace which will in the future be very advantageous for our country.\(^{227}\)

The great peace of 1701 was the end of an era. The French had finally won a degree of security from Iroquois attack, something Canada had never before really known, and the Iroquois and Albany merchants had finally been defeated in their long attempt to win control of the western fur trade from the French. After 1701 the history of Canada began to flow in new channels. Canada remained the underdeveloped, undermanned, and underdefended orphan it had always been; but the colony was given a new

prime enemy, the English, and ordered to fight this southern colossus at and along the three great entrances of North America: Hudson's Bay, the Mississippi River, and the St. Lawrence. Canada, orphaned as it had been for most of its life, had needed more than seventy years to subdue five tribes of wildmen living in a small territory south of Lake Ontario. The defeat of the new enemy, spread over half a continent, would require an uncommon resolve by the Court of France to support its colony in the New World.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

For most of Louis XIV's reign Canada was bereft of support from abroad and had to rely for its defense on its own limited wits and resources. Where material aid was concerned, the evidence clearly shows that the colony seldom received enough men, money, or equipment to provide for even its basic security. Where advisory aid was concerned Canada received few in the way of workable solutions to its problems of defense.

The primary reason for this was the narrowness of French imperial vision. There is no evidence in the correspondence exchanged between Quebec and the court to suggest that Louis XIV and his ministers had any guidelines for Canadian development beyond making the colony a combination mission station and fur marketplace. That is to say, there was no imperial military strategy for Canada. Particularly was this true before 1689. After that date, with the outbreak of the War of the League of Augsburg, Canada did in fact receive an imperial role—that of acting as a staging area for offensive operations against the English. Still, French plans for Canada could
hardly have been called grandiose. It was only at the very close of the seventeenth century that Canada came to be regarded as the most considerable link in a chain of establishments along the great waterways of the interior of the continent designed to prevent further English penetration toward the west.

Prior to 1689 France followed three policies, dictated as much by common sense as anything else, to preserve French influence along the St. Lawrence. None of them was followed with determination, and none of them took firmly into account the special problems of Canada in its American setting. One was the attempt to promote a *Pax Gallica* among the Indian tribes of Canada and New York. This seemed to the court the best way of securing the western flank of the colony against Indian attack and at the same time fostering conditions where the fur trade and missionary effort could proceed to greater advantage. But as soon as the powerful Iroquois Confederacy was included in the peace in 1667, serious flaws in the policy began to appear.

The Iroquois began using the peace and the inexpensive trade goods obtained from Albany to detach the Ottawas from the French alliance. In the long run, subjugation of the Iroquois was essential if the western allies were to be retained; but the court doggedly stuck to its policy of peace, declaring that war would be the
worst thing in the world for the colony. France consistently refused to sanction war, let alone provide material aid for it, until the west was all but lost in 1685. In that year events finally pushed the court into accepting the war policy that Canadians had been urging for almost two decades.

A second policy which aimed at maintaining a foothold for France in Canada was Colbert's plan for the creation of a compact colony along the lower St. Lawrence. The idea was to concentrate the Canadian population in the river valley east of Montreal and induce them to devote themselves to farming, fishing, and manufacturing. By this means Canada could cease being an economic liability to the home government and become militarily strong enough to fend for itself.

The plan was a good one, although narrow in scope. In any case, it never received serious implementation after its inauguration in 1663; warfare in Europe saw to that. Canada remained the neglected, underdeveloped, underpopulated colony it had always been. By the end of the seventeenth century Canada had a population of only about 14,000 and had to import almost all of its manufactured articles, and sometimes its food, from France. At the same time, the English colonies to the south had a white population of over 220,000 and had begun to export
the surplus of its farms and factories. The court was content to let these conditions persist in Canada because the strategic importance of the colony was not recognized until near the close of the seventeenth century.

Max Savelle has called attention to a third policy of France toward Canada. This policy he calls "the doctrine of the two spheres." It was mutually followed by France and the other colonial powers in regard to their American possessions and required each power to observe the neutrality of the others' colonies in America, even though the respective mother countries might be at war in Europe. This "doctrine of the two spheres"--war in Europe but peace in America--had the evident advantage so far as the French were concerned of insulating Canada from European-generated hostilities which might overwhelm it.

Unfortunately, this policy was honored more in the breach than in the observance, so much so that it is difficult to determine what effect, if any, it had on events in North America. Every time it was put to the test, it

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failed. The first conquest of Canada in 1629 occurred as an outgrowth of an Anglo-French war. The colony along the Hudson River changed hands three times after 1665 as a result of wars between English and the United Provinces.

In 1666 Canadian officials entertained no illusions that the participation of France in the wars would bring English reprisals against Quebec. Louis XIV had ordered the officials to anticipate the reprisals by launching a campaign against Albany, and the campaign might have been possible had not the Iroquois problem prevented it. In 1689 only French boondoggles prevented Louis XIV from again shattering American neutrality by striking at New York. That neutrality was in fact shattered early the next year when Frontenac launched his three-pronged raid against the southern colonies. If French policy makers let decisions of Canadian defensive strategy hinge on "the doctrine of the two spheres," they were operating under extremely vain and misguided assumptions.

The men who guided the destiny of Canada during these years were not military strategists, or even colonial specialists; they were administrators and bureaucrats who received from the great Richelieu certain fundamental
preconceptions about Canada. Canada was seen by him as a base of commerce and religion, little else. This view conformed perfectly to the mercantilistic and counter-reformation attitudes of seventeenth-century France.

Jean Baptiste Colbert, the minister in charge of colonies and one of Louis XIV's chief advisors from 1661 until his death in 1683, continued in this view. "For more than two decades of the reign this 'cold, humorless, hardworking, honest, narrow, devoted' man was both a workhorse and a driving wheel in the government of Louis XIV." With Colbert the mercantile attitude toward overseas possessions found its most vigorous advocate. His primary interest in colonies was that they contribute monetarily to the state, and for Canada this meant placing the colony on a sound economic basis, not using it as an imperial instrument of foreign policy.

When Colbert died, no one of equal stature arose to take his place in the councils of the king. Respected even more in memory than in life, Colbert's views

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continued to exert a powerful influence at court. His views were perpetuated by his son, the Marquis de Seignelay, who succeeded his father as secretary of state for the Marine in 1683, after having been his assistant in colonial affairs since 1670. Colbert's views were also perpetuated by his friend and collaborator, Clairambault the elder, premier commis in the Ministry of the Marine and advisor in colonial affairs until his death in 1730.

When Seignelay died in 1690, Louis Phelypeaux de Pontchartrain was given charge of colonial affairs, although he had begged Louis XIV not to confer the honor on him because he knew nothing about the office. A conscientious administrator of modest talents, Pontchartrain immediately handed Canadian affairs over to the Indendant of Commerce, Jean-Baptiste de Lagny, while he, Pontchartrain, devoted himself to his other charge as Minister of Finance in trying to raise the vast sums needed to prosecute the war in Europe. De Lagny was a personal friend of Frontenac and wholly devoted to the fur-trade interests. Under his administration the first signs of an over-abundance of pelts became evident.

In 1696 Jerome Phelpeaux succeeded his father, Louis, as secretary of state for the Marine. That Canada was still regarded primarily as a commercial outpost and, more recently, as a base of offensive operations against the
the English can be judged by the fact that Jerome imme-
diately ordered Canadians to effect an almost total with-
drawal from the west--this, to concentrate their energies
against the English and correct the over-abundance of
pelts. The last years of the century were spent by
Canadian officials in trying to convince the new minister
that withdrawal from the west would be disastrous for the
colony.

It was not that the Ministry of the Marine was with-
out sound strategic advice from the men who knew the
Canadian situation best, the colonial officials in
America. These officials quite early recognized that the
demographic question was one of the keys to the success,
or failure, of France in Canada; and they never left the
minister with any doubt as to their feelings on this
point. They also repeatedly urged the adequate dis-
persement of funds and reinforcements to place the colony
beyond the threat of foreign insult. Furthermore, they
informed the minister continually that the only permanent
solution to the western problem lay in either the complete
subjection of the Iroquois or the control of the Hudson
River by which the five tribes received their arms and
munitions.

In the early days colonial officials were not alone
in requesting immigrants for Canada. The Jesuit mission-
aries in the colony repeatedly made the same request
through the medium of their Relations, published annually between 1632 and 1672. Champlain in 1633 was the first Canadian leader to urge the dispatch of troops—he asked for only 120—to end the Iroquois threat. But 1633 was a bad year to make such an appeal because Louis XIII's government was fully burdened with problems closer to home, and the appeal went unanswered. Eight years later Governor Montmagny entertained the thought of applying for aid to attack the Dutch along the Hudson, but the thought was abandoned as being unlikely to arouse any enthusiasm in France.

In the early 1660's Louis XIV received the truly imaginative proposals of Governor Dubois d'Avaugour. D'Avaugour envisioned a great empire for France in North America if the king would apply himself to the task of building one. The Governor advocated the rapid augmentation of Canada's population and its concentration at Quebec as a first step. With Quebec well populated and fortified, the king could use it as a citadel of French power to strike southward against the Iroquois and the Dutch, displacing the latter from the Hudson valley. Then, using Manhattan as a base, the forces of France could proceed to ravage and subjugate the other European settlements along the coast. Within a matter of months Louis XIV could make himself the master of "the most beautiful part of America." All that was necessary for
success was the determination of Louis XIV to seek an empire.

Later in the 1660's the Intendant Talon made suggestions similar to those of d'Avaugour. Canada could become a great and powerful colony, he argued, if France would resolve to subjugate the Iroquois and acquire the Hudson valley by conquest or diplomacy. This done, the entire continent would be at the feet of Louis XIV. With the western flank of the colony secure, Frenchmen would be free to advance southwestward toward Florida and so threaten that colony of Spain. By controlling the Hudson valley France would cut the ribbon of English settlements along the Atlantic coastline, placing both the northern and southern segments at an acute strategic disadvantage. With remarkable prescience, Talon implied that unless these things were done, Canada would atrophy and remain more of a burden than an asset to France.

Neither d'Avaugour nor Talon was a daydreamer. Judging from the relative ease with which the Hudson colony changed hands in the years after 1665, the two Canadian officials were undoubtedly correct that France was neglecting a golden opportunity by not taking immediate possession of the Hudson valley. But the eyes of Louis XIV and his ministers were on Europe; and the shifting alliances between the English, French, and Dutch during the 1660's and early 1670's meant that nothing could be
attempted against the colony along the Hudson. The imperial vision of France was not yet wide enough to sacrifice gains in Europe for goals in America.

In 1689 as a result of war with England, the interests of Canada and France temporarily coincided, and Louis XIV was ready to listen more attentively to projects directed against New York. Callières was in France and suggested a determined assault by land and sea against the people along the Hudson. A land force from Canada would capture Albany and a naval force from France would take Manhattan. With the Hudson valley in French hands, the Iroquois could be conquered without firing a shot, and the port of Manhattan could serve as a base for offensive operations up and down the coast.

Louis XIV was willing to authorize such an expedition, but he could spare a naval force only one-third the size of the one Callières requested. He coupled his authorization with the demand that the expedition accomplish a religious, as well as a political, reformation in the colony by evicting every protestant from the land. After delays and bad weather caused the cancellation of the expedition, none other was attempted as the war in Europe bore more heavily on the kingdom.

Canadians were not alone in urging that more be done for the colony. The Marquis de Vauban, Louis XIV's commissary-general of fortifications since 1667 and one whose
opinions were highly regarded at court, wanted France to strengthen its hold on the empire. He codified his views on this subject in a mémoire dated April 28, 1699, entitled *Moyens de retablir nos colonies de l'Amerique et de les accroitre en peu de temps.* Vauban bluntly stated that "unless the King works rigorously at the development of the American colonies of Canada and the West Indies upon the next war he has with the English and Dutch, we will lose them." By the West Indies he meant especially Santa Domingo, but he understood the designation to include the other French islands in the Caribbean and the projected settlements at the mouths of the Mississippi and the Rio de la Plata.

Vauban was especially interested in Canada. There and in the Caribbean he foresaw the development of two powerful colonies, ones which "by their own force, aided by the advantage of their location, will be able to balance one day all those of America and procure great and immense

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riches for the successors of His Majesty." To achieve this, a complete reorganization of French colonial policy should be effected.

Vauban recommended that the colonies be brought back directly under royal control, such as Canada had been during the year 1663-64. Second, all missionaries should be withdrawn from the colonies because they contributed nothing toward strengthening French overseas possessions. Third, all special privileges should be withdrawn from merchants and merchant societies having intercourse with the colonies. These special privileges only contributed toward raising prices in the colonies and weakening their economies. Fourth, a system of colonization should be followed which would aim at the creation of military colonies along the lines of those established by ancient Rome.

Vauban devoted considerable space in his mémoire toward explaining how his proposed system for colonizing Canada would work. It would be a long-range project and would require the unflagging determination of the king. Every five years from then until 1730 five or more battalions of soldiers would be dispatched to Canada. These would remain in the colony until relieved by the next group five years later. While in the colony they would work at clearing the land and bringing more acreage under
cultivation. They would also serve to garrison the colony and bring its fortifications to a state of readiness.

Vauban estimated that at the end of their five-year tour of duty in Canada each group would have cleared some 1200 to 1500 arpents of land and between one-third and one-half of the men would have married Canadian women. To these men the king would offer free land as an inducement to remain in Canada and raise their families. If this policy alone were followed, Vauban said, the population of Canada would reach 100,000 by 1730, and the colony would run a better chance of maintaining itself against its enemies. The plan was almost identical to the one proposed by Colbert and Talon thirty-five years earlier. His plan, like theirs, was soon gathering dust at the Ministry of the Marine as Louis XIV began preparing to fight another war, this one over the disputed Spanish succession.

All of these proposals of Vauban and the others were of less consideration to the Ministry of the Marine than schemes designed to insure the smooth operation of the fur trade. That trade had expanded enormously in the 1670's and 1680's, so much so, in fact, that by the early 1690's there was a glut of beaver on the European market. In 1692 the king took note of this and informed Frontenac and Champigny that trading activity around the western
posts of the colony would have to be curtailed in order to bring the market back into balance. 6 Frontenac and Champigny patiently reminded the court that the posts served an essential military purpose as well, in that it was through them the Indian allies obtained arms and munitions to fight the Iroquois and English. 7

These reminders had no effect on Louis XIV. When the ordered curtailment did not relieve the glut by 1696, the king and Jerome de Pontchartrain took drastic action, action that was in keeping with their presuppositions about Canada: they ordered Frontenac to effect an almost total withdrawal from the west. 8 Only Ft. Saint-Louis in the Illinois country was to be retained, but even at that post all trading activity was to cease. The king gave two reasons for the action. One was the insupportable expense of supplying the allies with trade goods when they seemed unwilling to help in the war; the other

6 PAC, B, Vol. XVI, fol. 91, King to Frontenac and Champigny, 1692.

7 PAC, C11A, Vol. XI, fol. 234-35, Frontenac to Pontchartrain, 20 Oct 1691; Vol. XII, fol. 24-25, Frontenac to Pontchartrain, Quebec, 15 Sept 1692; Frontenac and Champigny to Pontchartrain, Quebec, 4 Nov 1693.

was his desire to concentrate all dispersed Frenchmen into the central colony in order to aid in its defense.\(^9\)

The king probably took into account another reason. The surplus of beaver in French warehouses had reached almost 1,000,000 pounds weight, more than enough to supply all of Europe for ten years.\(^10\)

Frontenac and Champigny were stunned. All of the years of explaining the essential role of Canada in the west had been in vain. They protested that to execute the king's order would mean the ruin of the colony.\(^11\)

If the western posts were abandoned the Ottawas, Hurons, and Illinois would immediately make peace with the Iroquois and begin trading through the five tribes with the English. The two Canadian officials begged the minister to reconsider the decision to withdraw. This same plea was echoed by numerous other mémoires reaching the Ministry of the Marine from Canada. The total weight of the mémoires was sufficient to convince

\(^9\)PAC, B, Vol. XIX, fol. 91-92, King to Frontenac and Champigny, Versailles, 26 May 1696.


Pontchartrain that he had been too sweeping in his first order. In 1697 he modified the original order in such a way as to allow all of the major fur-trade posts to continue in operation: Michilimackinac, Ft. Frontenac, Ft. Saint-Louis in the Illinois country, and Ft. Saint-Joseph in the Miamis country. France was committed to the interior of the continent whether it liked it or not.

In Europe, meanwhile, events were transpiring which would allow France to use its position in the interior of North America to serve a strategic purpose. The unfortunate Charles II of Spain was dying without a son to inherit his vast kingdom. Under these circumstances Louis XIV and the Hapsburg Emperor put forward the claims of their respective families to the Spanish throne. During the involved diplomatic negotiations on this subject that followed the Peace of Ryswick, Louis XIV made plans so that, no matter what happened regarding the Spanish throne, France would be in a situation to benefit from the death of Charles II. Part of these plans involved a departure from past colonial policy.

In 1698 Le Moyne d'Iberville was given command of an expedition to discover the mouth of the Mississippi. The idea was to establish a French base in that location which would be useful in either of two eventualities. If the throne of Spain went to a son of France, the base on the Mississippi and those in the West Indies would serve
to protect the Spanish colonies from the English, who were certain to be hostile over the inheritance. On the other hand, if the throne of Spain went to a German Hapsburg, the bases in the Caribbean and on the Mississippi would be used to seize Florida and Mexico.

Since war with England was inevitable in either case, Iberville received secret instructions from Pontchartrain to anticipate an English thrust overland toward the Spanish possessions in America by destroying any English forts he might find in the Mississippi valley and establishing French ones in their place. Suddenly the Canadian posts around the Great Lakes were given a strategic value. They became links in a great encircling chain that was intended to confine the English to the eastern edge of the continent.

Iberville, as was customary with him, entered upon his task with determination and imagination. During the course of the next several years he presented the Ministry of the Marine numerous proposals which he hoped would be adopted as a guide for French expansion in the Mississippi valley. He was clearly worried about the

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13 These proposals fill much of Margv's fourth volume of Decouvertes et etablissements. A good summary of the proposals is found in Peter J. Hamilton, The Colonization of the South, History of America, Vol. III (Philadelphia: Scribners, 1904). See also O'Neill, Church and State in
demographic problem, the disparity of numbers between his own meager force of heavy-drinking soldiers and the English population of the seaboard colonies. This problem could be removed by an alliance between the French and the tribes of the great valley. Iberville meant to establish a broad *Pax Gallica* throughout the valley. He would attract the Indians to the French side and hold them in allegiance by means of the river trade. The English were at a clear disadvantage here because they had to bring their trade goods over the Appalachian barrier.

There would be five principal posts in the trade network: one at Mobile, one low on the Mississippi, another among the Arkansas, a fourth on the lower Ohio, and a fifth on the Missouri. Mobile would act as the capital because of its proximity to the English colonies and because from Mobile there could be communication with even the farthest of the others within fifteen days. Each post would have a sergeant and a corporal, with a garrison of at least ten additional soldiers. The primary industry of these men, who would act as a nucleus

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for the growing settlement, would be the tanning of buffalo hides and deerskins for shipment to France. These hides and skins would be received in trade from the tribes of the locality, who would be induced to settle around the French nuclei to form *camp retranchés*, or "assembled villages." This manner of settlement would offer a number of advantages over any other, the two most important being better defense against enemy attack and better control over the Indian allies. Iberville would thus model his trading posts after the Canadian post of Michilimackinac and strategically place them along the major waterways of the interior where they would be easily accessible to the more distant tribes of the Mississippi valley.

His plans went even further. He contemplated the resettlement of several great tribes so as to bring them nearer his river commerce and its French influence. By this means additional tribes could be drawn into the alliance. The first tribal change would be to shift the Indians in the mountains west of Maryland, Virginia, and the Carolinas nearer Mobile, around the waters of the Tennessee and Coosa Rivers. This would be a major achievement in that it would strip the southern colonies of England of their first line of defense. The next tribal change would be to shift the Sioux, Illinois, and Miamis toward the east into the area north of the Ohio
River, the eastern part of which was uninhabited, so that Indians already in the French alliance would threaten the middle colonies of England. A third change involved shifting the tribes west of the Mississippi so they would have better access to its tributaries. If these proposals were put into effect, Iberville was confident that a great inland empire could be built for France, one founded on trade and amply strong enough to block an English thrust toward Mexico.

In 1702, after the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession, Iberville submitted to the ministry his most famous proposal, Le projet sur la Caroline. This remarkable proposal aimed not merely at the defense of Louisiana, but at the extension of its boundaries eastward "au cote de Caroline." Indeed, Iberville recommended that France use Louisiana as a base from which to conquer all of the southern and middle colonies of England. To accomplish this task, a joint expedition by land and sea would be necessary. While a mixed force of 1000 French and Spanish attacked Charles Town fort by sea, 1500 Spanish Indians, armed with French weapons, would attack the frontier settlements of Carolina. Success would pave the way for a French alliance with the Creeks, and for the enactment of the second phase of the conquest.

\[14\] PAC, C11A, Vol. XX, fol. 222ff, Le projet sur la Caroline, 1702.
The second phase would involve the destruction of Virginia. This could be accomplished by an invasion southward and eastward by the relocated Indian allies of the French. Seven thousand of these led by 500 Canadians would be sufficient to extend the conquest to the borders of Pennsylvania and Maryland. The third phase would be a continuation of the second, the ravaging of the middle colonies all the way to Montreal. This done, Louisiana would have the Atlantic Ocean as its eastern boundary and the remaining English colonies in North America would be virtual hostages of France.

These were visionary proposals but they, like all of the others, required support from and determination by France to be effected. In May 1701 M. Tremblay, a cleric in Paris who was well informed about governmental policy, wrote to a friend in Quebec and gave the following account of French intentions regarding Louisiana:

It is not at the moment seen how the Mississippi area can be of much value to France, therefore it is not intended to found anything very considerable there, but to let it develop slowly. But as Spain has now fallen to a son of France, it is believed necessary, by means of the colony of the Mississippi and by drawing all the Indian tribes along this river into the French alliance, to create a barrier against the English from Boston as far as Florida, or Carolina as they call it; this to prevent them expanding farther into these lands and extending from one of these nations to another as far as the Spanish colonies, which they would lay waste were
they to reach so far. It is, therefore, desired to block them, and in order to succeed in this aim, it is intended to place as many missionaries as possible among all the Indian nations between the Mississippi and the English.\textsuperscript{15}

Colbert in 1666 had clearly foreseen where a policy founded on trade and unguarded expansion would lead. He had warned Talon, "it would be far more worthwhile to restrict one's self to an expanse of country that the colony itself could maintain, rather than to grasp too vast an area and perhaps one day be obliged to abandon part of it with some tarnishing of the repute of His Majesty and of his crown."\textsuperscript{16} But France was going to continue to rely on trade and expansion to hold together its empire, the difference being that after 1701 trade and expansion were directed toward a strategic end.

\textsuperscript{15}Quoted in W. J. Eccles, \textit{Canada Under Louis XIV}, p. 249.

\textsuperscript{16}Quoted in W. J. Eccles, \textit{Canada Under Louis XIV}, p. 249.
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