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THE SAVOY NEGOTIATIONS OF THE COMTE DE TESSÉ
1693-1696

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University

By

Ralph Donnelly Handen, Jr., B.S., B.D.

*****

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vita</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFATORY NOTES</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. BACKGROUND TO THE NEGOTIATIONS</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France and Savoy to 1690</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Attempts at Negotiation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. TESSÉ'S NEGOTIATIONS: FIRST PHASE (1693)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Contacts of 1693</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Campaign of 1693</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Marsaglia to Turin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. TESSÉ'S NEGOTIATIONS: SECOND PHASE (1694-1695)</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explorations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casale</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. TESSÉ'S NEGOTIATIONS: THIRD PHASE (1696)</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Instructions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Preliminary Treaties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Alarms and Excursions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
V. ACHIEVEMENT AND AFTERMATH

The Treaties of June 29
The Truce
The Mission of Count Mansfeld
The Marriage Contract
Vigevano
Pont-de-Beauvoisin
Consequences

CONCLUSIONS

APPENDIX

A. Map of Piedmont-Savoy
B. The House of Savoy
C. Mémoires of the comte de Saint-Maiole
D. The Treaties of June 29, 1696
E. The Marriage Contract
F. The Treaty of Vigevano

BIBLIOGRAPHY
PREFATORY NOTES

Orthography

When quoting from manuscripts I have retained the spelling, capitalization, and punctuation of the original, except on those occasions in which "i" is used for "j" and vice versa. I have thereby avoided such exotic forms as Italie (Italie) and je (je).

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in footnote citations:

A.A.E.: Archives des Affaires Étrangères (Paris)
Cor. Pol.: Correspondance Politique
A.M.G.: Archives du Ministère de Guerre (Vincennes)
INTRODUCTION

In the wars of Louis XIV, France found herself opposed by coalitions of various members of the states of Europe. A consistent aim of French diplomacy during such times was to detach one or more members from a particular coalition by means of secret negotiations and separate treaties of peace or neutrality. 1

One of the more important of the secret negotiations carried on by Louis XIV—important both because of its immediate effects and its larger consequences for the future of Europe—was the attempt to detach Victor Amadeus II of Savoy from the Grand Alliance during the so-called War of the League of Augsburg (1689-1697).

The story of the secret negotiations between France and Savoy, which led to the Treaty of Turin in 1696, has never been told in detail. The fullest existing description of the negotiations is contained in an unpublished manuscript by LeDran, in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris. 2 LeDran's mémoire was drawn up in the early


2 "Histoire de la rupture survenue en 1690 entre le roy Louis XIV et le duc de Savoye Victor-Améde IIe du nom, et de la Paix conclue entre Sa Majesté et Son Altesse Royale par le Traité signé à Turin le 29
eighteenth century. It contains a useful account of the immediate
causes of the diplomatic break between France and Savoy in 1690,
together with a careful summary of the course of the negotiations
which led to the reconciliation on 1696.

The only detailed published accounts of the subject are found in
Tesse's Mémoires, in the comte d'Haussonville's work on the Duchess
of Burgundy, and in an article by Paul Canestrier in the Revue d'his-
toire diplomatique. It is now generally recognized that Tessé's
Mémoires were not the work of Tessé himself; rather, they were written
by Philippe Henri de Grimoard in the early nineteenth century. Grimoard
used Tessé's papers and correspondence with regrettable carelessness,
even to the point of inventing incidents which did not occur. For this
reason, the account of the negotiations in Tessé's Mémoires must be
used with care.

juin et puis le 29 aoust 1696, "A.A.E., Fonds divers, Mémoires et

3Philippe Henri de Grimoard, ed., Mémoires et lettres du maré-
chal de Tessé (2 vols.; Paris: Treuttel et Wurtz, 1806). (Hereinafter
referred to as Tessé, Mémoires.)

4G.P.O. de Cleron, comte d'Haussonville, La duchesse de
Bourgogne et l'alliance savoyard sous Louis XIV (3 vols.; 4th ed.;

5Paul Canestrier, "Comment M. de Tessé prepara, en 1696, le
traité de paix entre Louis XIV et Victor-Amédée II de Savoie," Revue
d'histoire diplomatique, XCVII (1934), 370-392.

6See below, Chapter V, footnote 100.
Haussonville's work is primarily concerned with the Duchess of Burgundy and her role in the French-Savoyard alliance in the years after 1696. The first half of Volume One is devoted to the negotiations which led to the Treaty of Turin. They are, however, treated primarily from the perspective of the marriage contract between Marie-Adeleide of Savoy and the Duke of Burgundy, an important but by no means crucial issue of the negotiations. Furthermore, Haussonville's account belongs to that genre of impressionistic, semi-popular studies so characteristic of the historians of the Académie française. It is valuable as far as it goes, but it can hardly be considered a definitive treatment of the subject.

Canestrier's article would seem to be more to the point. It is, however, quite discursive and suffers from compression. There are generous quotations from archival material, but there are no references and the context is sometimes unclear. Finally, Canestrier does not discuss the related negotiations which led to the Treaty of Vigevano in October, 1696.

An account of the Savoy negotiations of 1693-1696 need not be justified, however, solely on the grounds that no adequate modern treatment of them exists. There are other reasons for undertaking such a study. First of all, the Savoy negotiations provide insights into the motives behind the shifting configurations of war and diplomacy in late seventeenth-century Europe. The relative importance of considerations
of dynastic, territorial and economic aggrandizement in the policies of the princes of Europe may be clarified by such a study.

Second, the relationship between the aims of high policy and the means at the disposal of states to achieve those aims may be illuminated. To a great degree, the Treaty of Turin was a testimony to Louis XIV's recognition of the fact that his resources were not inexhaustible—that sacrifices of traditional policies and advantages might at times be required for the successful resolution of an otherwise hopeless situation.

One may also gain some appreciation of the nature of the day-to-day work of seventeenth-century diplomats. In this connection several questions immediately come to mind. How explicit were the instructions given by a government to its representative? Were alternative courses of action always spelled out in detail, or was the agent allowed room for improvisation? If a representative went beyond his instructions, what might be the consequences for himself personally and for the negotiations on which he was engaged? To what extent were governments influenced by the advice of their negotiators? What effect might the personal opinions or sentiments of the representative have on his negotiation, especially on those occasions when the diplomatist found himself at odds with the instructions of his government on a particular issue?

It would obviously be foolish to generalize on the basis of one
negotiation. It is not even pretended that answers to all of the questions just raised will be found in the negotiation under discussion. What is claimed is that such a study can help to clarify our understanding of the nature and importance of diplomacy in seventeenth-century Europe.

In a time when it is customary to explain the results of war and the provisions of peace treaties in terms of the "realities" of military, political and especially economic considerations, it is well to be reminded of the importance of the very human factors of intelligence, skill, patience and simple determination, which made the seventeenth century a "golden age" of diplomacy. One need not deny the ultimate importance of economic, political and military factors in history in order to appreciate the very real contributions of the individuals who worked to express those "realities" in the provisions of peace treaties. Indeed, it is quite likely that the diplomatists themselves played a not insignificant role in the shaping of the history of their times.
CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND TO THE NEGOTIATIONS

France and Savoy to 1690

The House of Savoy was one of the more active minor participants in the dynastic struggles which engaged the states of Europe in the seventeenth century. At that time the territories of the dukes of Savoy included three principal states: the duchy of Savoy and the small county of Nice west of the Alps, and the principality of Piedmont, with the ducal capital of Turin (Torino), east of the mountainous barrier between France and Italy.

The origins of the House of Savoy dated from the eleventh century, when the Holy Roman Emperor Conrad II invested Humbert the Whitehanded (Umberto Biancamano) with the valleys of Maurienne and Isère. These lands, high in the Alps between Savoy and Piedmont,

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were a part of the old Kingdom of Burgundy which had been absorbed into the Empire in 1033.

Over the following centuries the counts of Maurienne pursued a cautious policy of territorial expansion. The petty-nobility of the region were bound to the counts in a tightly-knit military organization, the so-called "Banner of Savoy," which remained until the fourteenth century the most powerful organ of the state.\(^2\) In 1232, Count Thomas I fortified Chambéry, establishing it as his capital. Amadeus V received the title, "Prince of Piedmont" in 1310 from the Emperor Henry VII. Later in the century Amadeus VI, the Green Count, and Amadeus VII, the Red Count, continued to gain territories at the expense of their neighbors. The most valuable of these acquisitions was the County of Nice, annexed in 1388. In the following century, after annexing the County of Geneva, Amadeus VIII received the title, Duke of Savoy, from Sigismund II in 1406. Amadeus later abdicated his office upon his election to the papacy in 1439 by the Council of Basel.

By the fifteenth century the dukes of Savoy had acquired a status among the princely houses of Europe out of proportion to their real power, measured in terms of territory, population and natural resources. The prestige of the House of Savoy was further enhanced in 1432 by the marriage of Prince Louis of Savoy to Anne of Lusignano,

daughter of Janus, King of Cyprus, Jerusalem and Armenia. This union was the origin of the claims of Louis' successors to royal status as Kings of Cyprus.

It was also in the fifteenth century that the dukes of Savoy made their first attempt on the Milanese. As a member of the league of Italian states against Filippo-Maria Visconti, Amadeus VIII obtained the important town of Vercelli by the Treaty of Turin (1427). "On peut voir la comme un premier essai des princes savoyards dans la politique d'absorption progressive qu'ils adopterent dans la suite, a l'égard du Milanaise." 3 The opportunity for further expansion at the expense of Milan was lost when Francesco Sforza succeeded to the archduchy.

In the struggle between Louis XI and Charles the Bold, the support of the House of Savoy was sought by both sides, presaging the more important role Savoy was to play in the Bourbon-Habsburg rivalry of the next three centuries. France's victory over Burgundy was matched by the ascendancy of French influence in Chambéry and Turin. "Attirés dans l'orbite de la France par le génie centralisateur du Roi, les etats de la maison de Savoie étaient comme une annexe du royaume." 4 The precarious position of Savoy was revealed in 1481, when Louis XI annexed Provence to the French crown and, in the

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3Beaucaire, Savoie-Sardaigne, I, xii; Carutti, Storia della diplomazia, I, 224.

4Beaucaire, Savoie-Sardaigne, I, xiv.
following year, claimed the title, Duke of Savoy, for himself.

Savoy's "close alliance" with France continued through the reigns of Charles VIII and Louis XII. Indeed, with the latter, Philibert II signed a convention (February 22, 1498) which was to become the first of a series of agreements between French sovereigns and the dukes of Savoy, by which the dukes, in exchange for promised advantages in Italy, gave France free access across their domains into Italy. 5

The relationship between the two states was radically altered, however, during the period of the wars between Francis I and Charles V. Duke Charles III found his territories taken from him by French arms; from 1536 to 1559, virtually all of Savoy, Piedmont and Nice was in the hands of the French king.

With the accession of Duke Emmanuel-Philibert (1553-1580), the fortunes of Savoy took a turn for the better. A capable warrior and administrator, Emmanuel-Philibert had served under the Emperor and had won a striking victory over Montmorency in 1557. By the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis (1559), he received back the territories taken from his father, including Savoy, Piedmont and Nice. Cateau-Cambrésis, then, meant a veritable resurrection for the House of Savoy. In the following years, Emmanuel-Philibert devoted himself to the task of rebuilding his state; he centralized the ducal power at the expense of

5Guichenon, Histoire généalogique, II, 184.
the nobility, strengthened his military forces, and revived the commerce and industry of his lands.

His son and successor, Charles-Emmanuel I (1580-1630), was husband of the Infanta Catherine of Spain; he espoused the party of the League during the French civil wars, hoping to acquire Saluzzo and even regain Provence from a weakened France. Charles-Emmanuel was, however, deserted by the Spanish during the negotiations which led to the Peace of Vervin (1598), and he was obliged to negotiate directly with Henry IV. By the Treaty of Lyon (January 17, 1601), France ceded the marquisate of Saluzzo to Savoy, in exchange for Bresse, Bugey, Valromey and Gex. In addition, Henry IV renounced further ambitions in Italy; the Duke similarly renounced ambitions in France. 6

From this time the dukes of Savoy looked only to Italy, particularly to the Milanese, for the enlargement of their domain. The Treaty of Brussol, signed in April, 1610, was a sign of this new orientation. By its terms, Charles-Emmanuel was to receive the duchy of Milan in exchange for the duchy of Savoy, upon the successful conclusion of Henry IV's projected war against Spain. The assassination of the French king on May 14 put an end, for a time, to the dream of annexing the Milanese.

The Franco-Savoyard alliance suffered various strains in the years following Henry's death. It came completely apart in 1627, upon the death of Vincent II of Gonzaga, Duke of Mantua. Charles-Emmanuel, opposing the claims of the Duke of Nevers, found himself checked and his territories invaded by Richelieu, in support of Nevers. Further French successes, together with the death of Charles-Emmanuel, led to the Treaty of Cherasco, signed by Victor Amadeus I in 1631.⁷

Cherasco—in reality several treaties, both public and secret—confirmed by the Treaty of Munster and the Peace of the Pyrenees, remained until the end of the century the basis of the relationship between France and Savoy. By its terms, the two powers entered into a secret alliance against Spain, with Victor Amadeus as generalissimo of their combined forces. Savoy ceded Pignerol and the Valley of Perosa to France; they had been sought by Richelieu to guard and keep open the way to Italy. The dukes of Savoy would henceforth make the restitution of Pignerol one of the chief aims of their policy, for, as Haussonville observes, "Pinerol aux mains de Francais, était, suivant l'énergique expression de Carutti, 'le Piemont en vasselage,' et, de ces vasselage, les ducs de Savoie chercheront toujours a sortir."⁸

⁷On this, and other treaties mentioned, see Clemente Solaro della Margarita, ed., Traité publics de la royale maison de Savoie (8 vols.; Turin: P.J. Pic, 1836-52), I, 374-376.

On the other hand, in 1635, the Treaty of Rivoli re-cemented the alliance between France and Savoy and reaffirmed the old dream of a conquest of Milan.

The period from Rivoli to the Peace of the Pyrenees was marked in Savoy by the struggle between the Regent, "Madame Royale Christine," widow of Victor Amadeus I and sister of Louis XIII, and Prince Thomas of Carignano, the brother of the late duke and an open supporter of Spain. During these same years French interests met with various reversals in Italy which were later redressed by French victories in the field in the continuing war against Spain.

The Peace of the Pyrenees, although blemished for the court of Turin by Mazarin's ruse of the marriage contract between Louis XIV and Princess Marguerite of Savoy, began an era of peace in northern Italy and of intimate relations between France and Savoy, cemented by the marriage of Duke Charles-Emmanuel II to Mile de Valois in 1663, and, upon her death in 1665, to Jeanne-Baptiste de Savoy-Nemours. The duke died in 1675 and was succeeded by his nine-year-old son, Victor Amadeus II, under the Regency of his mother, the second "Madame Royale." President Ennemond Servien, after bearing Louis XIV's condolences to the court of Savoy, reported of the young duke:

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9The basic account is that by Carutti, in his Storia di Vittorio Amedeo II (3rd ed.; Turin: Carlo Clausen, 1897).
Il a dit en pleurant a Madame Servien qu'il
supplioit Votre Majeste de luy servir de Papa,
puisqu'il avoit perdu le sien.  
As Beaucaire ironically observes, "Cet appel a l'autoritè paternelle
de Louis XIV ne fut malheureusement que trop bien entendu."

During the years of Madame Royale's regency the young duke
was effectively excluded from the exercise of power. He was also
deprived of his mother's love and affection, which she squandered on
various favorites. As a result, the young prince grew to detest both
his mother and all that she stood for, including the French alliance.

Indeed, an official mémoire from the year 1692 was to affirm that:

L'extreme aversion que ce Prince a concu pour
Më Royaie et pour ce qui a rapport a elle, peut
encore estre regardée une cause de l'éloignement
du Duc de Savoye pour la France.

It was also during the imperious regency of Madame Royale
that the influence of Louvois replaced that of Mazarin and Lionne in
the counsels of Louis XIV:

10A. A. E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 64, fol. 461, Servien to Louis XIV,
Turin, June 12, 1696.

11Beaucaire, Savoie-Sardaigne, I, xlviii. For a fairly complete
account of French-Savoyard relations during this period, see Camille
Vols. Ill and IV.

12"Relation de la Cour de Savoye," July 15, 1692, A. A. E.,
Cor. Pol., Turin, 94 (non-foliated).
En même temps que les hommes, changeaient aussi les procédés. À la douceur, à la persuasion succédèrent l'intimidation et la menace; à Turin, le marquis de Villars succéda au President Servien: l'homme d'épée, le courtisan hautain, remplaçait l'homme de robe efface et modeste. 13

The brusque ways of Villars offended even Madame Royale and, in 1679, he was replaced with the Abbé d'Estrades. The abbé encouraged Madame Royale's plan to marry her son to the crown princess of Portugal, since it would get him out of the country, prolong the regency and, thereby, insure the continued supremacy of French interests in Turin.

The ascendancy of Louvois in the conseil d'en haut led, however, to a series of rude insults to the Court of Savoy and its members, culminating in the purchase of Casale by France from the dissolute Duke of Mantua in 1681. The specter of a strongly fortified French outpost at the gates of the Milanese caused general alarm throughout Italy, not least at the court of Turin, which now found itself threatened from the east and the west by French bastions. The expulsion of the French from Casale was added to the recovery of Pignerol as a central objective of the Court of Savoy.

In 1682, in the face of growing opposition in the Court and among the people, Madame Royale signed the Treaty of Turin. It gave

13Beaucaire, Savoie-Sardaigne, I, xlix.
Louis XIV the right to maintain three thousand cavalry in Piedmont, in exchange for a subsidy of 300,000 livres annually for the support of Savoy's armed forces. In the event of war, Savoy was to receive one-third of all conquests; the term of the alliance was fixed at six years. To further bind the principality to France, Louis directed Madame Royale to marry her son to Anne-Marie d'Orléans, Mademoiselle de Valois. On March 10, 1684, two months before the wedding, Madame Royale belatedly turned over the reigns of government to her son.

A further estrangement between Turin and Versailles occurred in August of that year, when, after the signing of the Truce of Ratisbon, Louis XIV canceled the subsidy granted by the Treaty of Turin. In October, the French king forbade a pleasure trip to Venice planned by the young duke. Victor Amadeus was then criticized for entertaining his cousin, Prince Eugene, at his court. Finally, in 1685, following the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the duke was ordered to join his troops to those of France in a sustained campaign against refugee Huguenots and the duke's own loyal Waldensians living in the high valleys of the Alps between France and Piedmont. Although he bore no

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14 *Traité publics*, II, 103.


16 Prince Eugene of Savoy-Carignano (1663-1736), son of Eugene Maurice, comte de Soissons, and Olympe Mancini, niece of Cardinal Mazarin.
particular brief for Protestantism, the duke was upset by the brutality of the campaign and furious that the French king presumed to have the right to legislate the affairs of a neighboring state.

Meanwhile, elsewhere in Europe, events were occurring that would drastically affect the relationship between France and Savoy. In 1686, the Emperor Leopold I, with an eye to the Spanish inheritance, concluded the defensive League of Augsburg with the kings of Sweden and Spain (as electors of the Empire), the elector of Bavaria, Ernestine Saxony and the Franconian circle. The League was not, however, a major part of Leopold's strategy vis-à-vis France. In order to check and ultimately defeat his enemy in the west, whose encroachments on the Rhine were proceeding apace, he first wanted to defeat the Turks in the east, consolidate his Habsburg dominions, and then attack Louis from a position of strength. The victories of the Imperial armies over the Turks in 1687 and 1688, and the succession of William of Orange to the throne of England, would prepare the way for the Treaty of Vienna (May 12, 1689), between Leopold and the Dutch. This treaty, which had for its primary goal the restoration of the peace settlements of Westphalia and the Pyrenees, would be adhered to by

England, Brandenburg, Hanover, Saxony, Bavaria, Savoy and Spain, and was the true origin of the Grand Alliance, of which the Duke of Savoy would prove to be the linchpin.

In January, 1687, Louis XIV finally permitted Victor Amadeus to make a trip to Venice, under the watchful eye of the French ambassador, the marquis d'Arcy. Despite this precaution, the duke was able to hold secret talks with representatives of the League, including Max-Emmanuel of Bavaria. When, upon his return to Turin, the duke adopted measures to prepare his estates for war, d'Arcy informed Versailles and steps were taken to insure the duke's loyalty. In 1689, after the outbreak of the war, Victor Amadeus was forced to send three regiments for service in France. When news that the duke was again negotiating with the Allies reached Versailles, General Catinat was ordered to reinforce Pignerol. Then, early in 1690, the new French ambassador, the comte de Rébenac,18 presented the Duke with Louis' demand that the fortress of Verrua and the citadel of Turin be turned over to the French. The demand, the duke was reported to have said, was "too much." Assured of support from abroad, Victor Amadeus signed a treaty of alliance with Spain on June 3 and with Austria on the following day. Then, in a solemn convocation in the ducal palace before

18 François de Pas, comte de Rébenac (1649-1694).
four hundred of his assembled nobles, he declared the rupture with France. 19

**Early Attempts at Negotiation**

French arms in the campaign of 1690 were generally victorious. On August 18, Catinat won a decisive engagement at Staffarda; in the following weeks all of Savoy, except for the fortress of Montmélian, fell to the French. Finally, in November, as French troops were withdrawing from Piedmont to their winter quarters west of the Alps, Catinat captured the important fortress of Susa. Victor Amadeus, having good reason to doubt the capability or the willingness of his allies to defend his domains, began to explore the possibility of a negotiated settlement with France.

In December, 1690, the French commander at Pignerol, the marquis d'Herleville, was informed by an almoner of the duke, the Abbé of Cumiano, that there was considerable interest in Turin in a rapprochement with France. 20 Herleville immediately sent Perrachino, a lawyer from Pignerol, to discuss the matter further with Cumiano. The abbé told Perrachino that if Victor Amadeus could be certain of the safety of his territories from French attack, he would make every effort to

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withdraw from the League. For this to be accomplished, however, it would be necessary for Louis to grant the duke a secret three-month truce.

Herleville reported his findings to Catinat at Susa on December 26. The next day, Catinat wrote Louvois about the matter and concluded by observing:

Je n'ai rien à vous dire, Monseigneur, sur le caractère d'esprit de ce Prince, plein de finesse, de dissimulation et d'artifice. Je dirai seulement que l'abîme d'affaires où il s'est plongé peut luy avoir donné de grands envies d'en sortir.

Catinat felt that, except for the marquis de Saint-Thomas, all of Victor's court and council desired a reconciliation with France. Catinat described a meeting of the ducal council in which Victor Amadeus was begged, in view of the condition of his stricken land, to return to the good graces of the French king:

Ce discours l'ébranla si fort qu'il parut y donner quelque consentement, mais cela en demeura là. L'on soupçonne que le marquis de Saint-Thomas en a pu donner avis au gouverneur de Milan, parce qu'il est revenu fort promptement, immédiatement après ce conseil.  

Louvois received Catinat's letter on January 5, 1691. In his reply, Louvois expressed the King's desire to have an end to a war in Italy which was unlikely of success and tied up troops which could be

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21A.M.G., A1-1010, Catinat to Louvois, December 27, 1690.
better used elsewhere. His Majesty, however, was suspicious of
the sincerity of Amadeus' proposals; it was quite possible that the
duke was only seeking time, in order to strengthen in the spring his
exposed positions in the county of Nice and at Montmérian in Savoy.
Catinat was, therefore, to express Louis' willingness to receive the
duke back into his friendship, once he could be sure of the genuineness of his intentions.

As a test of these, Catinat was to propose a two-week suspension of arms, with an additional two weeks for the exchange of ratifications. Furthermore, he was to present the following proposals: Victor Amadeus was to break with the enemies of France and revoke his edicts of amnesty toward his Protestant subjects. French troops were to occupy the towns of Verrua, Saluzzo, Villefranche and Carmagnola, as well as the fortress of Montmérian, until the general peace. Furthermore, the duke was to provide three regiments of infantry and three of dragoons for service in the French army, "except against the Empire and the Emperor." Louis, for his part, would restore Savoy to the duke immediately upon the signing of the treaty; he would also grant the neutrality of Italy, which would be guaranteed by the Pope, the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Republic of Venice.

22 ibid., Al-1369, Louvois to Catinat, January 6, 1691.
It is clear from these terms that although France was willing to do without possession of the citadel of Turin, which she had demanded in 1690, she felt herself to hold such an advantage over the duke that she could still make demands of him without any comparable sacrifices on her part. Given the French victories of the previous summer and fall, the attitude of Louvois and the King is understandable enough. What is surprising is that they both seem to have assumed that Victor Amadeus would find such proposals sufficiently attractive to break with his allies and return to the French alliance of the past. Something more than the restitution of the status quo ante would be required to make the idea of reconciliation with France attractive to the Duke of Savoy.

When Victor Amadeus received the terms of the French, he promptly shut himself up in his palace and made no response to the proposals. Perrachino, who was apparently sincerely seeking to bring the two parties together, was hard put to justify the duke's conduct to Catinat. The latter had been advised by Louvois to end the negotiations, if it appeared that Victor Amadeus was attempting to deceive them. According to Camille Rouset, "Dès les premier symtômes de fraude, le general n'avait plus songé qu'a faire sentir au duc de Savoie la pointe de son épée."23

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23Rouset, Louvois, IV, 452.
After the fall of Nice on April 6, 1691, the duke made another attempt to contact the French, but when Louvois added the condition that the French be allowed to occupy the fortress and city of Nice until the general peace, Victor Amadeus once again broke off the discussions.  

In July of 1691 occurred an event which was to be of consequence for the future relationship of France and Savoy, as well as for the government and policy of Louis XIV: the death of Louvois. Not only did the king henceforth exercise a dominant role in the formation of military policy, but the removal of Louvois meant also a more moderate direction for foreign affairs. It was perhaps in part due to the pacific influence of the marquis de Pomponne, who, along with the duc de Beuvillier, was admitted to the council at this time, that Versailles became progressively more generous in the terms it offered Victor Amadeus.

However this may be, it seems clear that in the relations between the two courts, the influence of the secretary of state for foreign affairs grew at Versailles as that of the secretary for war declined. The secret diplomacy Louis had worked through Louvois (or was it the other

24 Ibid., p. 457, footnote 3.


26 Simon Arnauld, marquis de Pomponne, secretary of state for foreign affairs (1672-1679), recalled to the conseil d'en haut in 1691, where he served until his death in 1699.
way around?) did not continue when the marquis de Barbezieux27 succeeded to his father's post. Although the future negotiator for the French was to be the comte de Tessé, a soldier and protége of Louvois, his reports on the negotiations went to the king through Croissy's bureau; in the last stages of the negotiations, when diplomatic and military matters had to be closely coordinated, even Catinat reported almost as often to Croissy (and, later, Torcy) as he did to Barbezieux.28

This is not to say that only counsels of moderation were heard at Versailles after the death of Louvois.29 Indeed, in the ministry of foreign affairs itself there was at least one person who advocated an aggressive military solution to the conflict in Italy. The frequent mémoires from the hand of the comte de Saint-Maiole30 constantly warned the king of the dangers of compromise and accommodation with the Duke of Savoy. Nevertheless, the fact that Saint-Maiole's aggressive military strategies were not heeded would seem to indicate that other, more conciliatory, counsels prevailed.31

27Louis-François-Marie le Tellier, marquis de Barbezieux (1668-1701), secretary of state for war en survivance since 1685.

28See below, chapters IV and V.

29For an opposing view of the consequences of the death of Louvois, see Rousset, Louvois, IV, 503-510.

30An Italian nobleman in the service of Louis XIV.

31For a list of Saint-Maiole's mémoires, see Appendix C. For a discussion of the strategy proposed in them, see below, Chapter III.
In September of 1691, the comte de Rébenac was sent on a special mission to attempt to unite the independent states of Italy in a league against the House of Austria. 32 Rébenac was, in addition, instructed to contact the Elector of Bavaria and the Duke of Savoy, in the hope of detaching them from the Grand Alliance. Although he failed to accomplish the latter, Rébenac did succeed in signing secret alliances with the dukes of Parma, Modena and Mantua, and with the Grand Duke of Tuscany, in the event that Louis invaded Lombardy during the war. Such an action of French arms was not to materialize, however, until late in 1696, and then only after the defection of Victor Amadeus from the Grand Alliance. 33

Early in December the marquis d'Herleville was once again contacted by Perrachino, who told him that the Duke of Savoy desired to reopen negotiations with Versailles. Victor Amadeus had, the previous summer, seen Prince Eugene successfully lift the siege of Cuneo, but Catinat had taken Carmagnola and, more importantly, Montmélian. Herleville informed the king of Perrachino's message, and the marquis


33 See below, Chapter V.
de Chamlay, Louis' closest military adviser since the death of Louvois, was sent to Pignerol to conduct the negotiation. After an exchange of letters with the duke and Saint-Thomas, Chamlay was visited by Gropello, whom he described as "bailli de Veillane et auditeur de guerre de Son Altesse royale." The conditions proposed by Chamlay were somewhat less harsh than those of the previous year: Victor Amadeus was to receive back all of his estates conquered by the French upon the signing of the treaty, except for the fortresses of Nice, Villefranche, Montmélian and Susa. Casale would be occupied by Swiss and Venetian troops until the end of the present war. The return of the duke's fortresses would be guaranteed by the Pope and the other Italian powers. Louis would accept the neutrality of Italy and indemnify the duke for the cost of the war. Furthermore, if the Allies should not accept the treaty, Victor Amadeus would become generalissimo of the French army in Italy. In the event of the death of the King of Spain, "Monseigneur se trouvant heritier, le Roi ferait en sorte que Monseigneur luy cedast son droit sur le Milanois, et que Sa Majesté voudroit bien l'aider pour s'en mettre en possession."


36Louis, Dauphin of France (1661-1711), son of Louis XIV and Maria-Theresa.
For his part, the duke would send his dragoons and "some" infantry regiments to the Army of Flanders. 37

The proposal regarding the Milanese was the bait which Versailles hoped would draw Victor Amadeus out of the Grand Alliance. The pretensions of the Dukes of Savoy to the Iron Crown of Milan dated from the marriage of Charles-Emmanuel I to Catherine of Austria, daughter of Philip II, in 1585. Although Charles-Emmanuel had been disappointed in his expectation of the Milanese as a dowry, his hopes had been revived by the Treaty of Brussol in 1610. While Victor Amadeus may have at times dreamed of the entire Spanish Succession, the crown of the Milanese was, for him, the most attractive part of the Spanish inheritance possible of attainment. 38

Chamlay's terms did not, however, offer the solid advantages, particularly with regard to Pigneron and Casale, that the duke hoped for. In February, Chamlay wrote the king, "Je ne crois pas qu'il y ait presentement rien a faire avec M. de Savoye." 39 The negotiations were broken off at the end of the month and Chamlay returned to Versailles.

37 Carutti, Storia della diplomazia, III, 211-212.
38 Legrelle, La diplomatie française, I, 437-438.
39 A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 94, Chamlay to Louis XIV, Pignerol, February 10, 1692.
Even before Chamlay's negotiations, Victor Amadeus had been encouraged to seek peace by Pope Innocent XII, whose representatives were also at work in Madrid and Vienna on behalf of the same cause. The Pope, whose relations with Louis XIV had recently been improving, had thrown his weight behind the cause of peace in Italy. The duke, however, rebuffed the papal overtures and, on February 5, 1692, William III wrote to Heinsius, the Grand Pensionary of Holland:

Le duc de Savoie a refusé très résolument les offres que la France lui fit par l'entremise du Pape, et l'empereur a répondu sur la même ton au Bref du Pontife, par lequel il l'exhortoit à la paix. 40

Victor Amadeus wrote Leopold I at the end of February, reaffirming his loyalty to the alliance. He told the Emperor that he had rid himself of the solicitations of the French; that he preferred the amity of the Emperor to all the advantages offered by the French king; and that he hoped, with the troops promised him, to overcome the enemy and regain his lost territories and more besides. 41

Louis XIV, piqued by the failure of Chamlay's negotiations, published a full account of the offers and of their rejection by the Duke of Savoy. 42 The king portrayed himself as the champion of the

cause of peace in Italy, the Emperor as the chief villain, with the King of Spain as his unwilling accomplice. Victor Amadeus, intoxicated by the Emperor's promises, had chosen to plunge Italy further into the evils of war. Whatever may have been the effects of Louis XIV's mémoire on the princes of Italy, the fact that the Duke of Savoy had listened to the French proposals was in itself disturbing to the Emperor and William III.

During the summer of 1692, Victor Amadeus again opened communications with Herleville; they were broken off abruptly in August, when the duke invaded Dauphiné and captured Embrun and Gap. These victories, although short-lived, revived the duke's hopes that he could, with the help of the Allies, regain his lost possessions. All was thrown into confusion, however, when he was suddenly stricken with smallpox and forced to return to Turin.

Victor's illness lasted through the winter and spring of 1693. So precarious was his condition that on several occasions his death was momentarily expected. The gravity of the duke's illness caused great excitement at Versailles and Vienna. Victor Amadeus had no male heirs; in the event of his death, the succession would pass to his cousin, the Prince of Carignano, who had only a two-year-old son. In the event


43 Ibid., I, 31-32.
of their deaths, the crown of Savoy would pass to the comte de Soissons, the brother of Eugene of Savoy. 44 Reports reached Versailles that if the duke died the Emperor planned to seize his family and that of the Prince of Carignano and procure the succession for the prince's young son, under the tutelage of Eugene of Savoy. 45 Catinat was ordered to be ready to move on Turin in support of Carignano, in the event of the duke's death. Victor's gradual recovery, however, made such drastic action unnecessary. 46

By the end of 1692, Versailles' first attempts to detach the Duke of Savoy from the Grand Alliance had met with failure. More than the simple restitution of his conquered estates would be required to persuade Victor Amadeus to desert his allies. Perhaps the duke still hoped to regain his lost territories by military action. If so, he would have to be relieved of this hope before real progress in negotiation could be expected. On the other hand, the duke had shown himself interested in a reconciliation with France. He had at least listened to the

44 For a description of the principal members of the House of Savoy and the line of succession, see the "Relation de la cour de Savoie," July 15, 1692, A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 94. See also below, Appendix B.

45 An example of such a report is Tessé's dispatch of March 14, 1693, in ibid., 94, for an account of which, see below, chapter II.

46 The health of Victor Amadeus was a subject of concern to France as late as the summer of 1693: ibid., 94, Tessé to Croissy, Pignerol, June 24, 1693.
French proposals. Meanwhile, the future of the French-Savoyard negotiations lay in suspense until Victor Amadeus recovered sufficiently from his illness to resume direction of his government's affairs.
CHAPTER II

TESSE'S NEGOTIATIONS: FIRST PHASE

Initial Contacts of 1693

In December, 1692, when Victor Amadeus' illness was passing through a critical phase, René-Mans de Froulay, comte de Tessé, was transferred from his command at Bearn to become the military governor of Pignerol. Tessé had entered military service in 1669, as aide de camp to Marshal de Crequi. Cultivating the friendship and patronage of Louvois, Tessé had risen by 1692 to the rank of lieutenant-general of the armies of the king and colonel-general of the dragoons. Despite the disparaging portrait of him by the duc de Saint-Simon, Tessé was an able soldier and would prove to be an even more able diplomatist.  

1Tessé, Mémoires, I, 7 and 17.


3There is no full-length study of Tessé's life. Selections from his later correspondence may be found in Lettres du maréchal de Tessé à Madame la duchesse de Bourgogne (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1888), and Lettres du maréchal de Tessé au prince Antoine 1er de Monaco, ed. André de Glay (Paris: A. Picard, 1917).
Tessé's first venture in diplomacy had occurred during an earlier tour of duty at Pignerol during the winter of 1691-1692. At that time he had made an abortive attempt to negotiate with the Savoyard Protestants in the mountain valleys, against the advice of General Catinat. "La négociation est entamée, et son mauvais succès justifie la prédiction du sage Catinat." 4

Shortly after Tessé's arrival at Pignerol in 1692, he was called upon by the lawyer Perrachino and his wife. They informed Tessé that the duke was interested in reopening negotiations between his country and France. The two Perrachinos were later joined by an unnamed Jesuit from Pignerol, who reported their discussions with Tessé to other Jesuits in Turin. The informal nature of the discussions and the unofficial character of its participants made significant progress impossible. In the words of Tessé's Mémoires, "C'était, ne pas une négociation, mais une intrigue." 5

Tessé's second abortive attempt at negotiation was soon followed by an encounter more promising of success. Early in February, 1693, he was visited by Giambattista Gropello, 6 who had traveled to Pignerol

4 Tessé, Mémoires, I, 18.
5 Ibid., I, 26.
6 Very little is known about Gropello. He is referred to in the dispatches as "intendant des finances" and once as "bailli de Veillane and auditeur de guerre" of the Duke of Savoy.
from Turin disguised as a peasant; the duke's auditor bore proposals for an accommodation with Louis XIV.

In a mémoire of February 8, 1693, Croissy discussed at length the prospect opened by Gropello's visit to Tessa. It was important, Croissy believed, to treat the duke's proposals as if they were sincerely motivated on his part. It was, after all, reasonable to suppose that Victor Amadeus, with so many of his territories devastated and occupied by France, really desired to break with his allies and receive from Louis the benefits he despaired of receiving from them. The rupture with France in 1690 had been, in retrospect, an act of desperation provoked by the French demand of the citadel of Turin; the duke could not but realize his present dependent and exposed position vis-a-vis France.

The most Victor Amadeus could expect immediately, Croissy avowed, was the entire restitution of Savoy, but not of Susa and the County and city of Nice; it was to be seen whether the king would wish to grant even this much. However, the County of Nice (the most difficult part of Victor Amadeus' conquered domains for France to part with), together with the fortresses in Provence and Savoy, could be placed in the hands of a neutral power until the general peace, as had been proposed in the negotiations of the previous year. Perhaps the King

7A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 94, Mémoire of Croissy, February 8, 1693.
would grant the duke additional benefits to make a reconciliation with France more attractive.

What had to be ascertained, Croissy continued, was whether Victor Amadeus was willing to work for the complete neutrality of Italy, by whatever means, or whether he sought neutrality only for himself. If the latter, then he definitely could not expect the king to return Savoy and Nice until the general peace.

If, indeed, the duke was seeking neutrality only for his own lands, the French had to discover whether and how he proposed to prevent enemy troops from crossing his territories, and, if he should find this impossible, whether he would agree to joining his troops to those of France for the defense of his estates. It would also have to be made clear to Victor Amadeus' ministers that the position of the French government on the return of the fortresses and estates of the duke would depend upon whether or not the Allies accepted a general neutrality for Italy and removed their troops from Italian soil. Thus, it would be in Victor Amadeus' interest to get the consent of his allies to the neutrality of Italy. Since the consent of the Allies, particularly Austria, was doubtful, Victor Amadeus would clearly need the support of French arms in the event he declared his neutrality.

Furthermore, Croissy continued, one should emphasize the importance of "les bons traitemens" to keep Victor Amadeus perma-

nently within a French alliance:
Tant d'Experience de faire voir de quelle Consequence
dangereuse peut Estre un Duc de Savoie dans le party
des Ennemis de la France.

One of the most productive things France could do at this point would
be to encourage Victor Amadeus' hopes in regard to the marriage of
his daughter with the Duke of Burgundy, a project which had already
been suggested by Gropello to Tessé. However, Croissy was not
persuaded of the value of requiring Victor Amadeus' daughter and the
son of the Prince of Carignano to be hostages:

Ces sortes de Conditions sont plustost une marque manifeste
de la mauvaise opinion de la parole de celuy auquel on
demande, qu'une surete pour la faire tenir.

Knowing the disposition of the duke, it was doubtful that even the
welfare of his own children would prevent him from pursuing a course
of action once he had set his mind on it. Thus, if Louis XIV should
ask for Princess Marie-Adélaïde as a hostage, it should only be done
to encourage Victor Amadeus' hopes for a royal marriage and in that
way bind him more closely to his promises. 8

The following day, the gist of Croissy's mémoire was incorporated
into a dispatch which gave Tessé authority to treat with Gropello on
the following points: Victor Amadeus was to agree to the gradual
restitution of his possessions, or there would be no treaty. He was to
receive Savoy, with Montmélian, upon ratification of his treaty with
France. Susa would be returned only upon peace in Italy; Tessé could,

8Ibid.
however, allow it to be sequestered with the Pope or some other power, if Victor Amadeus insisted. Nice, Villefranche, and their dependent châteaux would be returned only at the general peace. If the duke was willing to give his eldest daughter and the son of the Prince of Carignano as hostages, Nice and Villefranche could be sequestered with a third party. In any event, Marie-Adélaïde was to be sent to France and her marriage to the Duke of Burgundy would be arranged, although the ceremony would occur only after the general peace. Louis XIV proposed that Casale be sequestered at the same time as Nice and that it be returned at the general peace "entre les mains de celui des deux souverains a qui le traite l'adjugeroit." The king promised to pay Victor Amadeus an indemnity of 200,000 écus over a period of four years. If the Allies refused to accept the neutrality of Italy and continued the war, Victor Amadeus would be required to join his troops to those of France and force the enemy to sue for peace in Italy. Finally, if and when such a peace were made, the duke would send "une partie" of his troops for service in the other armies of the king. 9

In this latest proposal to the Duke of Savoy, Versailles showed itself willing to agree to a gradual return of the duke's fortresses: Montmérian at the signing of the particular treaty, Susa at the peace

9Tesse, Mémoires, I, 26-29.
of Italy, Nice and Villefranche at the general peace. Immediate
restitution of all the duke's possessions was still clearly out of the
question. The promise of a royal marriage and the offer of a subsidy
would perhaps mollify Victor Amadeus in this regard. Versailles had
to wait until the middle of April before it learned of his response.

On February 17, having heard that Victor Amadeus had suffered
a serious relapse of his illness, Croissy wrote:

On ne peut songer de trop bonne heure aux moyens de profiter
de la conjoncture si importante qui peut arriver de la mort
de M. de Savoie.  

It was necessary, he continued, to treat with great tact the
Prince and Princess of Carignano. France should also profit from the
good intentions of Madame Royale and the Duchess of Savoy; it should
likewise cultivate the good will of all those in the court inclined
toward the cause of peace in Italy.

On the same day, a mémoire du Roi was drawn up for the Abbé
de Rivarol, a Piedmontese of noble birth in the service of France.  
The abbé was instructed to try to make Victor Amadeus see the ad-
vantages to be derived from the most recent offer of Louis XIV. Of
greater concern was the question whether, in the event of the duke's

10 A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 94, Mémoire of Croissy, February
17, 1693.

11 Ibid., "Mémoire du Roy pour le Sieur Abbe de Rivarolle se
retirant a Turin," February 17, 1693. The mémoire is reprinted in
Beaucaire, Savoie-Sardaigne et Mantoue, I, 167-169.
death, German and Spanish troops would attempt to oust the Prince of Carignano and install Prince Eugene as administrator of the government. Abbé de Rivarol was to persuade the Court of Savoy to align itself firmly with France and request the Allies to withdraw their forces from Piedmont. The abbé's mission was unsuccessful, however, for his counsel was politely but firmly rejected by the Court of Turin.

On February 22 Tessé wrote that there was only a slight hope for Victor Amadeus' recovery; the duke was not expected to live until Easter. Early in March, the Marquis de Leganez, the Spanish governor of the Milanese, arrived in Turin. Since the duke's condition was extremely critical, it appeared that the Allies were indeed preparing for a coup. Then, on March 8, when it seemed that Victor Amadeus' condition was hopeless, a recovery had begun. Tessé learned that the Emperor had ordered, in the event of the duke's death, that Victor's family, along with that of the Prince of Carignano, was to be seized and taken to Vienna. Louis immediately instructed Catinat to

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12Ibid., Tessé to Croissy, Pignerol, February 22, 1693.

13Don Diego-Maria Felipe de Guzman, marquis de Leganez, governor-general of the Milanese since 1691.

14Ibid., Tessé to Croissy, Pignerol, March 6, 1693.

15Ibid., Tessé to Croissy, Pignerol, March 8, 1693.
be prepared to march on Turin in support of the prince, an action which the duke's recovery made unnecessary.  

Victor Amadeus' gradual recovery was accompanied by the return of Gropello to Pignerol in April, after an absence of two months. Gropello told Tessé that the Duke of Savoy was as determined as ever to pursue his negotiations with France. The duke offered to renounce his alliances with the enemies of the king. He would, he avowed, maintain a strict neutrality, whether or not he was able to persuade the Allies to accept a neutrality for Italy. If they did not, he would grant passage to Louis' troops through his estates and assist them with supplies. As security for his word, the duke offered as hostages his elder daughter, Marie-Adelaide, and either the only son of the Prince of Carignano or the prince himself. Gropello implied that the princess should be brought up in France in the expectation of marriage to the Duke of Burgundy. Finally, Gropello expressed the duke's desire that once his hostages were in France he would immediately be restored all of his estates in their entirety.  

Tessé, who had received new instructions from Versailles, reaffirmed the king's willingness to receive Victor Amadeus back into his good graces. He told Gropello that the king still offered the entire

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16Tessé, Mémoires, I, 25.

17A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 94, Mémoire of Croissy, April 20, 1693.
restitution of Savoy, including Montmélian, provided that its "grosse artillerie" was deposited in the arsenal at Grenoble until the end of the war. Louis would even return Susa and Nice upon the signing of the treaty, except for their fortresses and that of Villefranche, which would be restored to the duke at the end of the war or when the Germans had withdrawn their troops from Italy. The immediate return of the fortresses was, however, out of the question.\textsuperscript{18}

Upon receipt of the new proposals of Victor Amadeus, Croissy instructed Tessé to inform Gropello that the king was happy to know of the duke's continuing desire to return to his good graces. Louis XIV would not, of course, demand any security other than the duke's word, if it depended on Victor Amadeus alone. Unfortunately, Victor's best intentions to maintain a strict neutrality would come to naught if, as was likely, the Allies would not accept his decision and continued the war against France. For her part, France would be exposing herself to great danger if she gave up prematurely the fortresses of Susa, Villefranche, and Nice. For this reason only, Croissy continued, the king had to hold them until the peace or until the allied troops had withdrawn from Italy. The most Louis would consent to was that the fortresses be placed in the hands of the Pope or the Swiss, with Louis bearing the expense. Tessé was to confirm to Gropello that Marie-\textsuperscript{18}\textit{Ibid.}
Adelaide would be destined for marriage to the Duke of Burgundy.

Finally, Tessé was authorized to increase the indemnity for Victor Amadeus to 600,000 or even 800,000 écus.\(^{19}\)

After receiving Louis XIV's proposals, Gropello returned to Turin for consultation with his superiors. Croissy summed up the situation on April 20 in the following words:

*C'est l'Estat de cette importante affaire, capable de commencer a desunir la ligue, Et de descharger la France de la plus incommode et de la plus ruineuse des guerres quelle a à soustenir.*\(^{20}\)

More than a month passed before Tessé saw Gropello again. During that time the count reported regularly on the situation in Piedmont to Croissy and Barbezieux. The marquis de Leganez returned to Turin on April 27 for an important council of war; he was joined by Prince Eugene on May 1.\(^{21}\) They, together with other representatives of the Emperor and William III, pressed Victor Amadeus to renew his alliance with them. Opposing the efforts of the allied chiefs, the nuncio of Innocent XII urged the duke to work for peace in Italy. Victor Amadeus had listened gravely to the plea of the papal nuncio, but the duke told him that because of his alliance with the Emperor he could not conclude a peace without Leopold. The Emperor, for his part,

\(^{19}\)Ibid.

\(^{20}\)Ibid.

\(^{21}\)Ibid., 94, Tessé to Croissy, Pignerol, May 1, 1693.
had already pleaded his inability to act for the peace of Italy on the grounds that his obligations to William of Orange and the Dutch prevented him from doing all that he wanted to do in the matter. The result was, as Tessé wryly observed, that "M. de Savoye le rejetttra sur l'empereur et l'empereur sur le Prince d'Orange."\(^{22}\)

While he waited for Gropello to return, Tessé reported that the Emperor had decided to keep some detachments of Imperials in Lombardy during the coming campaign. Leopold suspected that the Italian princes were planning to join in a league with the Pope to force the Allies to accept peace in Italy.\(^{23}\) At the end of May, contingents of German troops arrived almost daily in Piedmont. Whereas Tessé had previously doubted the ability of the Allies to mount an offensive in the summer, he now began to be concerned about the plans of the enemy.\(^{24}\)

On the morning of May 30, Gropello suddenly appeared at Pignerol in his usual peasant disguise. Offering the duke's poor health as an excuse, Gropello apologized for the delay in his return. Tessé chided him about the duke's continual hesitations; the count asked how Victor Amadeus expected France to interpret the recent entry of German troops into Piedmont. Gropello protested the good faith of his master and

\(^{22}\)Ibid., 94, Tessé to Croissy, Pignerol, May 9, 1693.

\(^{23}\)Ibid.

\(^{24}\)Ibid., 94, Tessé to Croissy, Pignerol, May 30, 1693.
claimed that it was necessary for the duke to cooperate with the Allies now more than ever, in order to disguise his negotiations with France. Gropello then read a mémoire from the duke, which he refused to let Tessé transcribe, containing a series of twenty articles. Tessé was allowed, however, to write down the sense of the proposals and was able to get something of their wording. The count responded to each article as he was able and deferred for future discussion certain new proposals which he felt required further instructions from Versailles.

Most of the twenty articles read by Gropello were acceptable to Tessé. The Duke of Savoy would sever all his ties with the enemies of France and join Louis XIV "dans la splendeur d'une nouvelle alliance." The marriage of the Duke of Burgundy to Marie-Adélaïde was to be arranged, the wedding to take place after both parties were of age. 25 Victor Amadeus would be allowed to maintain normal diplomatic relations with his former allies. To expedite the withdrawal of the Germans from Italy, Casale was to be placed in the hands of the Pope, the final disposition of the place would be made at the general peace. Louis XIV was to make no treaty with the Emperor or the King of Spain without including the Duke of Savoy. Tessé also agreed to other articles dealing with matters of trade, commerce and taxation in the duke's territories. Finally, the French negotiator promised an

25 Marie-Adélaïde's twelfth birthday was December 6, 1697.
indemnity to the duke of 600,000 écus, to be paid over a four-year period.

Tessé agreed with some reluctance to an article dealing with the old problem of religious toleration. The Protestant subjects of Victor Amadeus were forbidden to have any communication with French citizens on the subject of religion. Furthermore, no French Protestants would be allowed to settle in the duke's territories. Tessé told Gropello that although the king would prefer the complete prohibition of the Reformed Faith in the lands of the duke which bordered on France, Victor Amadeus' proposal was acceptable as it stood.

The provisions of two new articles required instructions from Versailles before Tessé could make a definitive reply. The first proposed that upon the signing of the treaty the ambassadors of Savoy would be treated by the French as those of crowned heads. Tessé was, at that moment, able to confirm only the restitution of the duke's past rights and dignities; any further claims on his part had to be considered by Versailles. The other article concerned a debt of 100,000 écus, which was owed by France on the dowry of Duchess Anne. The debt would be paid upon the signing of the general peace. Until that time interest of 5,000 écus per year was to be given the duke from assignations in Dauphiné and Lyonnais. Tessé had no knowledge of the debt owed on the duchess' dowry, but he assured Gropello it would be paid, together with the interest specified.
There remained only three articles which Tessé could not accept. One of these was clearly the expression of a hope rather than of a demand on the part of Victor Amadeus. The duke proposed that Louis XIV exchange the town and citadel of Pignerol for the valley of Barcelonnette or other territory bordering France. Tessé was caught off guard by the proposal. He told Gropello that it was very unlikely that the king would even consider such an exchange. Tessé did agree, however, to write to Versailles for instructions on the matter.

The two remaining proposals of the duke were more substantial barriers to an accord between Versailles and Turin. The first declared that the restitution of the lands and fortresses of Victor Amadeus would take place upon the withdrawal of allied soldiers from his estates (i.e., Piedmont). In the second, the duke promised to get his allies to accept the neutrality of Italy; he would not, however, reveal the means by which he would accomplish this until Louis XIV agreed to the rest of the articles.

It is true that Victor Amadeus had compromised on the question of when his conquered estates would be returned to him. He was now willing to let Louis hold them all until the Allies were out of Piedmont. From the perspective of the French, however, the duke's concession was not enough. Tessé insisted that the restitution of the strategic fortresses could take place only on condition of an exchange of suitable hostages and only after the Germans had withdrawn from Italy.
In addition, Tessé declared that the king could not treat on the article until Victor Amadeus first explained how he proposed to get the Allies out of Italy.  

Tessé sent an account of his meeting with Gropello to Croissy on May 31. In his covering letter, Tessé expressed doubt that the Duke of Savoy would ever consent to sending Marie-Adelaide and the son of the Prince of Carignano to France as hostages. He asked for instructions on the matter of the dowry of Duchess Anne and on the treatment of Amadeus' ambassadors as those of crowned heads.

In regard to the duke's indemnity, Tessé explained to Croissy that he had offered only 600,000 écus, in order that the upper limit of 800,000 écus allowed to him by the king could be settled upon as a compromise if the duke should demand more. Tessé had also promised gratifications to Saint-Thomas and Gropello of 30,000 and 4,000 écus respectively.

It is clear from the proposals presented to Tessé that Victor Amadeus felt his position to be sufficiently strong to broach for the first time the future of Pignerol and to treat as an open question the final disposition of Casale. He had also continued to object to the

26Ibid., 94 "Articles Proposes par M. le duc de Savoie, Reponces de le comte de Tessé," May 31, 1693.

27Ibid., 94, Tessé to Croissy, Pignerol, May 31, 1693

28Ibid.
idea of an exchange of hostages and had not budged on his insistence that both his lands and fortresses be restored to him at the same time.

Louis XIV, for his part, had shown himself able to compromise on the article granting toleration for Victor's Protestant subjects—not a small concession for this monarch. The king had also offered a larger indemnity to Victor Amadeus, in the hope that he would thereby be made more responsive to the French proposals. Louis' assent to the marriage of his grandson to the Princess of Savoy had been another step of no little importance towards a reconciliation with the duke.

On the question of the time of the restitution of the strategic fortresses, however, Versailles was adamant. The king felt that the risk was clearly too great, particularly in view of the duke's studied vagueness regarding the means he would use to get the Allies out of Italy, for France to divest herself of these important defenses. Victor Amadeus had, after all, hardly proven himself to be a reliable ally in the past. Louis would have to desire a settlement of the war in Italy more desperately than he did to risk exposing his frontiers to the danger of an allied invasion.

Louis XIV's distrust of the Duke of Savoy caused him to disagree with Croissy, in regard to the subject of hostages, on their usefulness and importance. The danger of an Austrian coup in Turin

29 See above, p. 35.
was by no means a chimera. The king hoped, with the son of the Prince of Carignano in his possession, both to insure the duke's loyalty and to prevent Imperial control of the House of Savoy. It was for this reason that Louis also insisted that the hostages be kept until the general peace.

Upon these two principal issues—the time of the return of the duke's fortresses and the nature of the hostages to be given and their term of confinement—the two sides had in the spring of 1693 reached a stalemate.

The Campaign of 1693

Before Tessé received a reply from Versailles to his dispatch of May 31, Victor Amadeus united his troops to the detachments of Spanish and German soldiers which had been arriving in Piedmont since April. By the middle of June it was clear that the Allies planned a major action, although Tessé was not certain about its nature. In his dispatch of June 13, he suggested that an invasion of Provence might be in the offing.30

Early in July the allied chiefs—Leganez, Schomberg,31 and Prince Eugene—gathered in Turin for a council of war. An Allied army

30Ibid.

31Charles, second duc de Schomberg, killed in the Battle of Marsaglia in 1693. Son of Frédéric-Armand, first duc de Schomberg and Marshal of France, killed at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690.
then camped at Buriasco, less than five miles from Pignerol. It was clear that an attack on the fortress was imminent. On July 24, the enemy moved into position against Pignerol. Another allied force was marching in the direction of Susa. Marshal Catinat, with the main French army, was camped at Fenestrelle; Tessé, in command of the forces at Pignerol, was cut off from Catinat and even from the French garrison at Perosa, only ten miles up the valley of Chisone from Pignerol. In a hastily scrawled postscript to his dispatch of July 24, Tessé notified Croissy that the enemy had completed its blockade of the town; an attack was expected at any moment.

The siege of Pignerol, which lasted until October 2, was the major allied effort in Italy during the summer of 1693. The town and the fortress were so well defended by Tessé that, after a fruitless attack of several weeks, Victor Amadeus withdrew his main force and marched on Perosa, which he captured and burned. He was unable to dislodge Catinat from his base at Fenestrelle, however. In September the Duke of Savoy returned to Pignerol and on the twenty-seventh began a second bombardment of the town and its citadel.

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32 Catinat had been named a marshal of France on March 27, 1693. See the copy of the "Brevet de maréchal de France, pour le sieur Catinat" in Bernard le Bouyer de Saint Gervais (ed.), Mémoires et Correspondance du Maréchal de Catinat (3 vols.; Paris: P. Mongie, 1819), II, 106-113.

33 A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 94, Tessé to Croissy, Pignerol, July 24, 1693.

34 For a detailed account, see Tessé, Mémoires, I, 30-46.
Only five days before, Tessé had been surprised by a visit from Gropello, who bore a message from the duke. According to Gropello, his master was grieved that his allies had not given him time to reply to the last proposals of the French; the Spanish and Imperials had begun the campaign in spite of him! The duke regretted the first bombardment of the town of Pignerol and had done all he could to prevent it. The same was true of the ravages committed by the Allies in the valley of Perosa. Gropello begged Tessé to convey Victor's embarrassment to the king, affirming his master's desire to conclude, as soon as the year's campaign was over, a treaty with Louis XIV. If only Catinat would but leave his camp at Fenestrelle and move into Piedmont, Gropello suggested, Victor Amadeus would have an adequate pretext to lift the siege of Pignerol.

Tessé at once suspected the whole thing was another of the duke's tricks, perhaps to gain information about Catinat's plans. Two days later, another proposal of Gropello seemed only to confirm the count's suspicions; the "petit negociateur" returned empty-handed to the allied camp.35

In the meantime, Catinat, who had received reinforcements from the armies of the Rhine and Catalonia, moved down the valley of Susa

35Tessé, Mémoires, I, 43-45. See also A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 94, Mémoire of Croissy, December 18, 1693.
toward Turin. On September 28, Victor Amadeus learned that Catinat's army was camped at Brussolino. By the time the duke was able to withdraw his forces from Pignerol, Catinat had already marched onto the plain of Piedmont and taken Rivoli and Rivalta. Prince Eugene advised that the allied force fall back to a defensive line near Turin. Nevertheless, Victor Amadeus decided to join battle with the French at Marsaglia on October 4. There, at Marsaglia, Catinat won the most striking victory of his career. 36

The king's reaction to the news of the battle was unambiguous. "Je m'attendais," he wrote to Catinat, "à quelque action d'Eclat en Piemont, mais la victoire parfaite que vous avez remportée sur mes ennemis a surpassé mes espérances,..." 37 It was expected at Versailles that the duke would now be ready to treat seriously with France, before he was driven entirely out of Piedmont by the force of French arms.

36 Catinat's own description of the battle is contained in two letters to Louis XIV, dated October 7, 1693, in A.M.G., Al-1224. There are copies in A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 94, along with a copy of a published account entitled, Relation de la Bataille donnée en Piémont le 4 Octobre 1693. See also Emmanuel de Broglie, Catinat: l'homme et la vie, 1637-1712 (Paris: Victor Lecoffre, 1902), pp. 147-155.

From Marsaglia to Turin

In the weeks after Marsaglia it became clear that, despite Catinat's "victoire parfait," the French were not in a position to follow up their success of October 4. The resources Victor Amadeus had at his disposal may not have been sufficient to carry out a successful offensive against his foe, but they were sufficient to prevent the French from launching a sustained attack against Turin. Men and money soon arrived from the Emperor and William III to replenish the duke's army and frustrate further French action in Piedmont in 1693. 38

The inability of Catinat to capitalize on his victory was due not so much to his extreme caution, as his critics charged, 39 as to the fact that while Louis XIV was able to sustain a war on all of his frontiers, he was simply unable to press a momentary advantage such as Marsaglia to force a favorable conclusion to the war. The year 1693 had been critical for the French economy. The harvest of 1692 had been bad and that of 1693 promised to be no better. French offensives in Flanders, Germany, and Italy had indeed netted victories (Neerwinden, Charleroi, Heidelberg, Marsaglia), but none were of the "knock-out" variety, and at the end of the campaign the armies held approximately the same

38 Broglie, Catinat, p. 155

39 See, for example, the remarks of Vauban and Tessé on this subject in ibid., pp. 160-165.
lines as at the beginning. It had become clear that France, with its treasury almost depleted, could not hope to achieve a quick end to the war by military means alone. 40

With this in mind, it is understandable that "the year 1693 witnessed what we should now call a peace offensive on the part of France." 41 However, efforts made through the Pope and the Austrian and Spanish cardinals at Rome to persuade Vienna and Madrid to negotiate a settlement met with a rebuff at both courts. 42 Other attempts in Vienna and The Hague later in the year met with the same result. 43

A more promising opportunity presented itself a few days after Marsaglia when Gropello once again appeared at Pignerol, bearing a letter to Tessé from the marquis de Saint-Thomas. The duke's minister requested that negotiations be resumed at once between the two courts. Louis XIV gave Tessé permission to proceed with the

40 Wolf, Louis XIV, pp. 472-475.


42 Arsène Legrelle, Notes et Documents sur la Paix de Ryswick (Lille: Desclée, DeBrouwer, 1894), pp. 18-20. The correspondence is in A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Rome, 359.

negotiations, subject only to the condition that they be conducted on the basis of the proposals agreed to the previous winter.  

It was during the subsequent exchange of letters between Turin and Pignerol that Vandermeer, the commissaire of the Dutch troops serving in Piedmont, wrote Heinsius, assuring him of the fidelity of Victor Amadeus to the allied cause. Despite the solicitations of the French and the Papacy, Vandermeer wrote, "S.A.R. [Son Altesse Royale] demeure toujours ferme dans ses premières resolutions," in which his anxiety over French possession of his territories played a large part. The duke's constancy was also due, in part, to "les bons conseils de M. Le Marquis de St. Thomas." In a later dispatch Vandermeer assured Heinsius that "tout a que vous me dites des projets de la paix avec S.A.R. est sans aucun fondement."  

In November, Saint-Thomas wrote Tessé that the duke greatly desired to treat with him personally in Turin. After receiving Louis XIV's approval of the plan, Tessé traveled to Turin on November 30, disguised as a coachman.  

44Tessé, Mémoires, I, 50.  
45A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 94, Vandermeer to Heinsius, Turin, October 18 and 22, 1693 (French translation).  
46For a brief account of the Turin negotiation of 1693, see Tessé, Mémoires, I, 50-54. The substance of Tessé's dispatch of December 8 is in Croissy's Mémoire of December 18, in A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 94.
During the course of his meetings with Victor Amadeus and Saint-Thomas, which extended over a period of five days, Tessé was assured that the duke sincerely regretted the diplomatic break of 1690; that only the ill-treatment he had received from the ministers of France, and particularly Louvois' demand of the citadel of Turin, had forced him into the camp of the Allies; and that he desired above all things to return to the good graces of Louis XIV.

Of the more important of the duke's proposals, Versailles had already agreed to the marriage of the Duke of Burgundy to Princess Marie-Adelaide, although the details of the arrangement still had to be worked out. The treatment of Victor Amadeus' ambassadors as those of crowned heads was now agreed to by the king. One of the main issues yet to be resolved was the nature of the security Victor Amadeus would offer for the withdrawal of the allied troops from Italy. The duke insisted on the immediate return of all his possessions, including the fortresses desired by France. He also steadfastly refused to send the son of the Prince of Carignano as a hostage to France. More easily resolved was the long-standing question of the kind of action the duke would take in the event that Vienna and Madrid did not accept the neutrality of Italy. The discussions on this issue, sometimes lasting until three in the morning, led to the drafting of a convention conditionelle.

^47A. A. E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 94, Mémoire of Croissy, December 18, 1693.
by which Victor Amadeus agreed to act conjointly with Louis against
the Emperor, if Leopold did not agree to peace in Italy. 48

The results of Tessé's trip to Turin were finally embodied in two
projets de traité which the duke begged Tessé to deliver personally to
Louis XIV. Victor hoped that Tessé would be able to persuade the king
that with the duke's sworn word as security it was unnecessary for
France to require young Carignano as a hostage or to hold the fortresses
of Nice and Susa until the Allies were out of Italy. Victor Amadeus
swore that if he failed to live up to his word, "il vouloit passer pour
un fripon & un chien." 49

Tessé returned to Pignerol on December 6 and, after conferring
with Catinat, left on the eighth for Versailles. Toward the end of the
month, two new projets de traité were drawn up, on the basis of which
Tessé was empowered to treat with the Duke of Savoy. The first
treaty provided for the marriage of the Princess of Savoy. She was to
be sent to France only after the marriage contract had been signed
(and thus not in the quality of a hostage). The treaty provided for the
treatment of the duke's ambassadors as those of crowned heads, for an
indemnity for the duke of two million livres, and for the sequestering
of Casale with the Pope. The duke would promise to obtain his allies'

48 Tessé, Mémoires, I, 54.

49 A.A.E., Cor. Pol. 94, Mémoire of Croissy, December 18, 1693.
consent to the neutrality of Italy. However, Versailles now declared that both the lands and fortresses of the duke would be returned to him only after the German troops were beyond the borders of Italy.  

The second treaty provided that in the event Vienna and Madrid refused to accept peace in Italy, Victor Amadeus would join his arms to those of France. The duke would be generalissimo of the combined armies. Any conquests in the Milanese would be divided; if the King of Spain should die in the course of the war, Louis XIV would renounce any claim to Milan in favor of the Duke of Savoy. To help sustain the cost of the war, the king would pay Victor Amadeus a subsidy of 50,000 écus per month.  

The French proposals of December, 1693 reveal a relaxation of Versailles' demands on some issues, a stiffening on others. While nothing was said about the son of the Prince of Carignano as a hostage, and Marie-Adélaïde was to be sent to France only after the marriage contract had been signed, Victor Amadeus was now to receive back none of his conquered estates until after the allied troops had withdrawn from Italy. Versailles apparently felt that without young Carignano as a hostage for the duke's fidelity, no restoration of territory could be made until the withdrawal of the Allies was accomplished. Perhaps to soften

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50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
this blow, Victor's indemnity was raised to two million livres. In the event of a continued war, a sizable subsidy and the old promise of a division of conquests in the Milanese were added.

It was the duke's willingness to agree to the idea of a convention conditionnelle—which formed the basis of the second (secret) projet—that constituted the major advance in the December negotiations over the positions reached the previous spring. Now, for the first time, Victor Amadeus was willing to commit himself to a specific course of action, in the event that his allies would not accept the neutrality of Italy. Tessé had been able to persuade the duke of the necessity and utility of a secret, conditional traité d'action; its importance was accepted by both sides from this time forward.

More specifically, Victor Amadeus had promised that in the event of continued war he would take the decisive step of joining with France against his former allies. The concrete nature of this commitment marked a significant change in the duke's position. It was perhaps intended by him to elicit similar concessions from the French, particularly in regard to the question of hostages and the return of the duke's fortresses. It is likely that Victor Amadeus even hoped to receive additional benefits from France, such as Casale and even Pignerol. If this is true, Versailles' refusal to modify its position on the return of the fortresses must have destroyed Victor's hopes for further gains. A silence of more than a year's duration was the only response given by the Duke of Savoy to the latest proposals of Louis XIV.
CHAPTER III

TESSE'S NEGOTIATIONS: SECOND PHASE (1694-1695)

Explorations

In the course of Tessé's conferences with Victor Amadeus in December, 1693, the duke had told him that he would send the Abbé Grimani to Vienna to inform the Emperor of the French offers and to request his approval of a treaty for the neutrality of Italy. Grimani, who was something of a friend and counselor to Victor Amadeus, had served as his special representative to the Emperor on previous occasions:

Cet abbé, d'une des premières maisons de Venise, avait eu la principale confiance de ce prince dans tout ce que s'estoit traité entre luy et l'Empereur, et par la il le croiroit plus propre à y faire reconnoitre la nécessité où il se trouvoit de traiter avec la France.¹

Grimani's mission to Vienna was not, however, for the purpose described to Tessé. Rather, Grimani was instructed to inform the Emperor of the sorry condition of Piedmont, the alluring offers of the French (which Victor Amadeus had, of course, steadfastly rebuffed),

¹A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 94, Mémoire of Croissy, December 18, 1693.
and the consequent necessity that the Emperor send additional money and troops to Piedmont. In addition, the duke was especially desirous that the Emperor turn over some territories in northern Italy promised him by the treaty of 1690. Finally and most importantly, Grimani was to press for a decision on the marriage of Princess Marie-Adelaide to the young Archduke Joseph, the King of the Romans and Leopold's eldest son. The French proposal of a marriage with the Duke of Burgundy was to serve as a spur to the Emperor's decision in this matter. Thus, the Duke of Savoy continued to play, as was his custom, "le double jeu"--the double game--with France and his allies.

Once in Vienna, Grimani found his mission frustrated by the evasiveness of the Emperor and by interminable interviews with members of the Aulic Council. Leopold, desiring to stifle Victor Amadeus' negotiations with France, informed Louis XIV about the duke's request for more men and money for the approaching campaign. When Tessé was told of the duke's treachery, he wrote indignantly to Saint-Thomas:

L'Empereur n'a pas manqué de faire savoir au Roy, ... que Grimani n'a agi a sa cour que pour l'engager à envoyer un nombre considerable de troupes en Piémont, et à procurer de la part de monsieur le Prince d'Orange des remises assés fortes pour pouvoir agir plus offensivement que les années précédentes.  

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2 Grimani's mission is described in Haussonville, *La duchesse de Bourgogne*, I, 57-66.

3 Turin, Archivio di Stato, Tessé to Saint-Thomas, March 18, 1694; cited by Haussonville, *La duchesse de Bourgogne*, I, 63, footnote 1.
Saint-Thomas, hard pressed to answer Tessé's demand for an explanation, replied:

Son Altesse Royale avait été extrêmement agitée entre le désir de donner la dernière main au traité, et la réflexion des accidents et des dangers auxquels elle aurait été exposée, jouant un pareil tour à l'Empereur et au roi d'Espagne qui peuvent avoir si aisément des troupes en Italie.

It was, Saint-Thomas continued, only to convince the Emperor of the duke's loyalty and to dispose him to accept the neutrality of Italy that such a request was made. In fact, he concluded, a courier had just been dispatched to Vienna to press for the Emperor's approval of Savoy's negotiations with France. 4

The Emperor's response to Grimani's requests was not to Victor's liking. Pleading the ages of the prospective bride and groom and the uncertainty of events, Leopold declined, for the moment, to treat further on the subject of a marriage. Grimani got no further on the transfer of the feudal lands and increased allied support for the House of Savoy.

Victor Amadeus, in the meantime, sent the comte de la Tour (Della Torre) to present the substance of the French proposals to William III, in an attempt to get his approval of a separate peace for Italy. William told de la Tour that for Turin to break with the League

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4 Turin, Archivio di Stato, Saint-Thomas to Tesse, April 1, 1694; cited by Haussouville, La duchesse de Bourgogne, I, 64, footnote 1.
would be for it to lose everything, "et qu' il ne voyait d'autres re-
ponses pour les alliés que de prier V.A.R. de faire la paix pour
tous." Victor Amadeus' situation was not, William felt, as serious
as it might appear to him; only if the duke remained faithful to the
League could he attain the glory he desired. Still, William concluded
dryly to de la Tour, if the duke should find himself pressed by neces-
sity to make peace, "Priez-le de ma part de la faire pour tous; nous
lui en serons extrêmement obligés." 5

Frustrated in his efforts to form an advantageous union with the
House of Habsburg, yet unable to gain allied support for a separate
treaty with France, Victor Amadeus temporized. He proposed to Tessé
that Versailles and Turin work together secretly during the summer and
fall of 1694 to prevent decisive action on either side during the cam-
paign. The duke promised to do all he could, in the meantime, to gain
acceptance from his allies of a separate peace for Italy. However,
when Catinat and Tessé pressed him for a written agreement to this
effect, he refused. 6

Victor Amadeus none the less did prove faithful to his promise as
far as the campaign of 1694 was concerned. On August 26, Catinat

5 Turin, Archivio di Stato, De la Tour to Victor Amadeus, January
29, 1694; cited by Carutti, Storia della diplomazia, III, 219-220,
footnote 1.

6 Tessé, Memoires, I, pp. 55-56.
wrote Louis XIV:

Il semble que M. le duc de Savoye se conforme autant qu'il peut aux idées qu'il nous a fait donner de la conduite qu'il desirait tenir... Que V. M. joigne à cela qu'un homme de qualité nous donne des nouvelles, et selon tout apparence de concerte avec M. de Savoye ou quelqu'un de ses ministres; car ces nouvelles ont été jusqu'à présent très-justes, et nous annoncent d'avance les mouvements des ennemis. [emphasis mine] 7

The campaign of 1694 was therefore considerably less intense than that of the previous year. Catinat maintained a defensive position the entire summer. The Allies, with Prince Eugene as their new field commander, laid siege to Casale, but with the falling of the first snow the siege was lifted, although a blockade was maintained throughout the winter. Louis XIV was so irritated by the blockade that he brusquely ordered Tessé to suspend all communication with the Court of Turin. 8

**Evaluations**

The defensive posture of the French in Italy in 1694 was maintained on the Rhine and in the Low Countries as well. It was dictated by necessity, since the bad harvests of 1692 and 1693 and the expenses of the war had depleted the treasury. The serious financial condition of the country and the diminishing prospects of a decisive military

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7Catinat to Louis XIV, August 26, 1694; quoted in Tessé, Mémoires, I, 56.

8Ibid., I, 57.
solution to the war had, meanwhile, encouraged Versailles to renew its peace overtures in courts throughout Europe. In Stockholm, Munich, Vienna, Rome, and The Hague, French agents explored means of breaking up the Grand Alliance and bringing the war to a conclusion. Although all of these efforts failed of success, they were indicative of the desire of Louis XIV to find a way out of the military impasse and the continuing domestic economic crisis in which he found himself.

Some of the thinking at Versailles on the situation in Italy during 1693-1694 is expressed in a number of mémoires preserved in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris (see Appendix C). Five of these come from the comte de Saint-Maiole, who continued to advocate an all-out offensive action to bring the war in Italy to a close.

In a mémoire written in late 1693, Saint-Maiole declared that the ascendancy of the Emperor in Italy had only come about by means of intimidation and force of arms. The time was right for France to take the initiative. She should send a minister to the Italian princes to explain the king’s desire for the peace and security of Italy, which were clearly dependent upon the withdrawal of Imperial troops from her soil. In view of this, Saint-Maiole declared, the French envoy

9On these negotiations, see Legrelle, La diplomatie française, I, 383-394, and passim.
should seek to get the Italian princes to agree to the formation of a
defensive league against the Emperor. Under the terms of the league,
French troops would be allowed to occupy Italian fortresses, stores
would be provided for the provisioning of such troops, and a French
garrison would be stationed in Mantua. From such a position of
strength, a successful offensive could be launched against the Milan-
ese. In regard to more immediate goals, Saint-Maiole concluded:

On supposa pour fondement solide et incontestable que
l'Armee du Roy qui est victorieuse en Piedmont, se rendra
Maitresse de Cuneo et établira des quartiers dans le Piedmont
et le Montferrat sans quoy cette grande victoire seroit une
simple démonstration de la valeur de la Nation française qui ne
produiroit aucune avantage essentiel pour les affaires de sa
Majesté.\footnote{A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 94, "Reflections sur les suites
que peut avoir la Victoire que les Armes du Roy ont remportée en
Piémont . . . ."}

As we have seen, Catinat was unable to follow up the victory at
Marsaglia, so even the short-range effects of the battle, as envisioned
by Saint-Maiole, were not realized.

The count’s next \textit{mémoire} on the subject of Italy was written in
the summer of 1694. Although the advice in his last \textit{mémoire} had not
been followed, he observed, he would try once again to show how the
war in Italy could be brought to a \textit{swift} conclusion. An alliance with
the Italian princes was still the key. An invasion of Lombardy would
require only 12,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry. There was no need to
fear the intervention of the allied fleet stationed at Cadiz, since it
could not move until June and the transport of the French troops should
be completed by May. The gulf of Spezia would be an ideal landing
point for the troops; the neutrality of Genoa, on whose territory the
gulf was located, should prove to be no problem, once it was made
clear that the king's purpose "n'est que pour conserver aux Princes et
Republiques d'Italie leur liberté opprimée par l'Empereur."

The route from the gulf to Lombardy passed through fertile plains,
which would be a ready source of provisions. The army would be able
to establish itself at the fortresses of Piacenza in the duchy of Pavia,
and Brescello in Modena. Confronted by a fait accompli, the Allies
would have two courses open to them: either the Spanish and Germans
would draw back to defend the Milanese, leaving Piedmont unprotected,
with the consequence that Victor Amadeus would be forced to sue for
peace; or the Allies would stand and fight, in which case "on ravageroit
tout l'Etat de Milan et d'une maniere ou d'autre on finira une guerre qui
est a Charge a Sa Majesté." The Emperor would be forced to recognize
the danger of his position in Italy and agree to a peace. There was no
doubt in Saint-Maiole's mind that the princes of Italy would rush to
support the French invasion, especially if the command of the army was
given to a person of sufficient prestige to insure the confidence of the
Italians in the seriousness of the enterprise. Finally, it was important
that a French agent be sent to Italy as soon as possible to begin negotiations with the Princes. Saint-Maiole offered his services to Louis XIV for the mission.\(^1\)

The third and longest mémoire from the count presented his basic strategy in much greater detail. The principal thesis remained the same: the princes of Italy would rally behind a serious French effort to oust the Emperor from Italy. With their support the French army would be able either to isolate the Duke of Savoy and force him to sue for peace or to inflict such losses upon the Imperials that the Emperor would come to terms.\(^2\)

In retrospect, Saint-Maiole's advice suffered from at least two serious flaws. First, it had already become clear, even before 1694, that France simply could not mount a full-scale offensive against the Allies on any front; she had neither the men nor the materiel for such an undertaking.\(^3\) It had already been decided at Versailles that in 1694 and 1695 the French armies would have to maintain a defensive strategy. Under the circumstances, a defensive posture was the most that could be maintained. Saint-Maiole's strategy, then, flew

\(^1\)Ibid., 94, "Mémoire du Comte de Saint-Maiole," 1694.

\(^2\)Ibid., 94, "Moyen d'obliger M. de Savoy et mesme l'Espagne a demander la paix au Roy du coté d'Italie, en faisant passer des troupes en Lombardie pour Insulter le Milanois."

\(^3\)See Above, pp. 64-65.
in the face of reality and appears to be so much whistling in the dark.

The other major objection to Saint-Maiole's proposals concerns the validity of his assumption about the response of the Italian princes to the projected French invasion. For one thing, these princes would have had good reason by 1694 to doubt the ability of Louis XIV to mount, much less carry off, an offensive of such magnitude. The impression made by the victory at Marsaglia had faded with the passing months, months which had seen the French unable to wrest any tangible gain from their victory. Furthermore, how justified was Saint-Maiole's confidence that the Italian princes would greet a French invasion with such enthusiasm that they would offer their unqualified support to the French cause? The princes would, no doubt, have welcomed any diminution of the Emperor's power in Italy, but would they have given unambiguous allegiance to France as the instrument of their deliverance? Saint-Maiole seems to have been unable to entertain the possibility that French soldiers would be seen by the Italians as something other than liberators, pure and simple.

Saint-Maiole had expressed the same kind of naïveté in an earlier mémoire written in October 1693. It is a composition of special interest, however, because it is an exercise in seventeenth-century Machiavellism—a kind of latter-day version of The Prince, as adapted for the instruction of the Sun King.
"Le Roy possède en Italie Pinerol, Casal; et parmy les conquêtes sur Le Duc de Savoye, Suse." Pignerol was, of course, "la porte de l'Italie" and the most important of the king's possessions. Casale was, on the other hand, "la plus formidable place de l'Italie."

Mais si Pinerol est la porte, Casal est le Donjon de la France En Italie si l'on Considere que par la le Piémont est bridé, Le Milanez ebreché, Les autres puissances d'Italie liées par la Crainte ou par l'esperances d'appuy, La Cour de Rome reveillée, Les veues de l'Empereur et du Roy d'Espagne bornées. 14

Casale was also important as a basis for French claims to the Spanish, Mantuan, and Savoyard inheritances, all then in doubt.

Turning to matters of policy, Saint-Maiole repeatedly recalled "une des plus Importants maxims fondamentales de la monarchie francoise--a travailler a l'anneantissement de l'Autrichienne en Italie."

To this end, France should work for the independence of the princely states. She should be always careful, however, to see that they remain small "et ne point suivre la faute dont Machiavel accuse Louis 12 d'avoir Laissé les puissances trop grandes."

In regard to the Papacy, Saint-Maiole observed, Rome's pretensions to temporal power should not prevent the kings of France from supporting "l'aggrandissement des Papes en Italie au prejudice des Empereurs," when France is unable to accomplish the abasement of both powers at the same time.

La Secret sera de travailler a l'independence des autres Princes Italiens non seulement de l'Empereur, mais du Pape meme comme Venize a desja pris pied, comme Genes Et le grand Duc l'Envisagent, ... 15

Whether Louis XIV aspired to "universal monarchy" has been a question much debated by contemporary historians. 16 Whatever the personal ambitions of the king, at least one of his counselors seems to have had something of the sort in mind, for Saint-Maiole says of the abasement of the House of Habsburg:

C’est une fondation pour parvenir a la Monarchie de Charles Magne [emphasis mine] est sans cela meme tres essentielle pour jouir de la Couronne naturelle avec reputation, ... 15

Then, speaking of something more practical of attainment than "la Monarchie de Charles Magne," Saint-Maiole made the following observation on the importance of "reputation":

15Ibid.

To attain to arbitrage, to the position of arbiter of European affairs, Saint-Maiole believed that France should work for the transfer of the Empire from the House of Habsburg to a weak house, "comme on pratiqua avec les Suedois."

On the matter of Spanish power in Italy, the count observed that it would normally be better for France if Italy (i.e., Milan, Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia) were ruled by a weak Spain, than if the individual states were independent and strong. However, in view of the ascendancy of the Habsburg power, it would be more in France's interest to see Italy divided into a number of independent states. Indeed, it might be possible, Saint-Maiole suggests, to install the Princes of the Blood as the heads of these states, "car les Princes parens sont ordinairement meilleurs amis de loin que de près." 18

As far as the Crown of Savoy was concerned, Saint-Maiole recognized that neither France nor Austria would bide the other's possessing it. In view of that fact, the count felt it would be wise to load the House of Savoy with honors and attach it to France by means of alliances, grants of military commands, and by reviving "les projets de Henry 4, et de Louis 13, touchant l'eschange de la Savoye avec

17Ibid. 18Ibid.
le Milanez et le titre de Roy de Lombardie." The aggrandizement of the dukes of Savoy in Italy, Saint-Maiole continued, could then proceed as they gave up territory west of the Alps to France. It went without saying that France should never let the House of Savoy become strong enough to decide by itself affairs in Italy. To prevent this, France should not only keep Bignerol, but should also get control of the Aosta valley, "qui est l'ancien passage des Romains" and which was the most effective entrance into northern Italy.

Saint-Maiole was convinced that Victor Amadeus would never give up the idea that the House of Austria would fulfill its promises to him. The loss of his lands and capital would only make him more obstinant in his defiance. Still, the count believed that an all-out offensive by the French would lead to a happy conclusion of the war:

La maison d'Autricher seroit la premiere (le rempart du Milanez estant ainsy ebreché) a le [Victor Amadeus] porter avec elle a un accomodement, ce qui paroit l'expedient plus fructueus a tenter dans la conjoncture presente pour parvenir a la paix generalle. 19

Saint-Maiole's mémoire of October, 1693, so full of pretended insight and Machiavellian haute politique, reveals an astonishing blindness to the realities of political power and the motives and ambitions of the Italian princes and of Victor Amadeus in particular.

Saint-Maiole recognized the importance for France, even perhaps the

19Ibid.
desirability, of arbitration (as opposed to domination) as far as the Italian states were concerned. Yet almost in the same breath he proposed that the Princes of the Blood be installed as rulers of these states—as if there were no House of Habsburg to stand in the way! Again, Saint-Maiole seemed to realize that the Imperial throne was beyond the reach of the Bourbons, but he spoke of its transfer to a "weak house" without so much as a hint of the difficulty of the undertaking. Finally, while recognizing Victor Amadeus' hatred of the French, Saint-Maiole enlarged it to demonic proportions and completely misread the real intentions of the duke. For once Victor Amadeus was assured of the restoration of his territories, the return of Casale and Pignerol, and a royal marriage for his daughter, he was ready to put aside his "obstinate defiance" and become Louis XIV's faithful ally—at least until the opportunity for further aggrandizement appeared!

It was fortunate for France that Louis XIV and his ministers apparently did not share the distorted vision of the comte de Saint-Maiole on these matters. That the count's numerous mémoires were nevertheless preserved in the archives of the foreign ministry would seem to indicate that his advice was not casually dismissed. Whatever value the mémoires may have been to Croissy and the king, they provide the contemporary historian with striking examples of the vagaries of political thought and military strategy in the late seventeenth century.
A final mémoire of 1694 expressed the thought of another counselor of Louis XIV. The author of the "Reflexions sur la rupture de Savoye" is unknown, although, as will be seen, it is quite possible that it reflects the ideas of the marquis de Pomponne, Louis' "moderate minister."

"Nos derniers ministres," the mémoire begins, "ont eu peu d'attention aux cours étrangeres." Concentration on domestic affairs in the early part of the reign contributed to the general prosperity of the kingdom, but led also to a carelessness in foreign relations. France's alienation of the states of Europe made possible William of Orange's seizure of the English throne. The quarrel over the franchise alienated the Papacy. The alliance with the House of Savoy, a cornerstone of French policy in Italy, was destroyed by the way Victor Amadeus was treated by the ministers of France, particularly Louvois. Indeed, it was "la mauvaise politique de M. de Louvois" which was the source of France's difficulties with the Court of Turin.

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20A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 94, "Reflexions sur la rupture de Savoye," 1694.

The franchise was the right of ambassadors to the papal court to grant asylum to anyone requesting it. France's refusal to give up this privilege led to a confrontation between Innocent XI and Louis XIV in 1687. See John B. Wolf, Louis XIV, pp. 435-436.
Ce Ministre avait de grandes parties, Sa mémoire was et fidèle, le jugement prompt et solide, L'esprit décisif, Capable de fournir aux applications du ministre, ses éducation médiocres, les sentiments a proportion, aimant le bien, jouissant de sa faveur sans insolence, and sans vanité, très intelligent dans le détail de la guerre au gout et dans l' opinion du Roy; mais tres borné dans la grande politique, dans le savoir des cours, dans le jugement des intérêts de L'Europe, qu'il n'avait pas point en veue, nullement habile dans la conduite des negociations, n'ayant attention pour les affaires Domestiques de L'Etat.  

So much for Louvois. The mémoire goes on to discuss the role of William of Orange as the moving force behind the Grand Alliance and the rupture between France and Savoy. Through his creature, Duke Charles of Lorraine, William was able to win over the Emperor and Max Emanuel of Bavaria. The Papacy was easily seduced into accepting the alliance, because of the grievances it had against France. The Italian princes, with the exception of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, succumbed to the blandishments of the Duke of Lorraine; the "neutrality" of Venice and Genoa had, the mémoire observed, served France ill.

In spite of all this, the author believed that the rupture with Victor Amadeus could have been prevented. "Une negociation de la part de la france, quelques propositions agréables, un peu d'espero, L'auront determinè dans le parti de Son devoir." Even when Victor Amadeus had made a desperate appeal to the king to relent on the matter of the

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22 A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 94, "Reflexions ... ."
citadel of Turin, Louvois had answered the duke's petition with scorn and disdain.

De quelque opinion qu'on soit parvenu pour luy [Louvois] on ne s'abuser point en disant que la rupture de Savoye Vient de son imprudence, et les Ennemis qu'elle fera naistre decrieront sa memoire. 23

The future would show, concluded the mémoire prophetically, the unfortunate consequences of the break with Savoy. It had already cost France much in men and money; it could also result in the loss of Casale and other fortresses in Piedmont, and even in an invasion of France from Italy. 24

Whoever was the author of this mémoire, he clearly wanted to place the blame for the break between France and Savoy on the shoulders of Louvois and his "mauvaise politique." It is possible that Croissy had a hand in the preparation of the mémoire; it does not, after all, assign to him any responsibility for the debacle. Croissy apparently favored moderation as the best policy toward the Duke of Savoy in the months preceding the rupture. 25 Furthermore, the traditional rivalry between the Colberts and the Le Telliers would intensify Croissy's resentment of Louvois' direction of the king's diplomatie secrète. The mémoire may well be the repayment of an old debt.


25 See, for example, Rousset, *Louvois*, IV, 289-291.
On the other hand, if anyone had cause to criticize Louvois, it was Pomponne. Whatever feelings of resentment he may have borne towards Louvois because of his role in his disgrace, Pomponne clearly had reason to condemn the brutal policies of the war minister. The tone of the mémoire suggests an author who respected Louvois' obvious gifts, but who at the same time abhorred the war minister's unfortunate tendency to rely on violence rather than on persuasion as an instrument of international diplomacy.

Whoever the author of this curious document may have been, he was extremely conscious of the likely cost of the war to France. He recognized the distinct possibility of the transfer of Casale; perhaps even the loss of Pignerol was foreseen. In time, the writer was to be proven a prophet.

Casale

During the winter of 1694-95, while negotiations between Versailles and Turin remained suspended, Victor Amadeus sounded out his allies on their intentions regarding the return of Pignerol to the House of Savoy. The Emperor equivocated, suggesting that the duke discuss the matter with William III, who at that time was planning

26 On this subject see Charles Gérin, "La disgrace de M. de Pomponne (18 novembre 1679)," Revue des questions historiques, XXIII (1878), 1-70. For a discussion of Pomponne's career see Herbert H. Rowen, "Arnauld de Pomponne: Louis XIV's Moderate Minister," American Historical Review, LXI (April, 1956), 531-549.
a trip to The Hague. Victor Amadeus thereupon sent the comte de la
Tour to the Dutch capital at the end of February to find out William's
feelings on the subject of Pignerol.

De la Tour's first report to Turin was discouraging:

J'ai parlé ensuite moi même au Roy, et quoqu'il ne se soit
pas ouvert si positivement, il m'a assez témoigné que les
alliés ne pourroient ni soutenir ni la guerre ni ses pre-
tentions.  

William III was obviously wearied by growing opposition at home to
continuing the war and by the recent death of his queen.  

De la
Tour's dispatch at the end of March was even more depressing:

Le Roy m'a respondu qu'il estoit dans la même intention
[to maintain Victor Amadeus' interests], mais qu'à parler
franchement il ne voyoit pas que nous puissions forcer la
France à la cession de Pignerol si nous faisons la paix dans
l'estat où nous sommes.

The failure of Leopold I and William III to reassure the Duke of
Savoy about Pignerol only added to the already sizable quarrel Victor
had with his allies. The Emperor's rejection of the marriage proposal
and his failure to turn over the territories promised in 1690 still
rankled. Added to this was Victor's growing resentment over the con-
stant interference in his affairs by the allied representatives in Turin.

27Cited by Carutti, Storia della diplomazia, III, 224, footnote 1.
28Queen Mary had died January 7, 1695.
29Ibid., footnote 2.
30Some of these incidents are described by Legrelle, La Diplomatie française, I, 445.
Finally, in view of the response he had received from William III on the subject of Pignerol, Victor Amadeus had become convinced that his allies' war aims did not include the return of Pignerol to Savoy. As Legrelle observes, "Le duc de Savoie n'avait plus par suite d'autre resource que de chercher à obtenir Pignerol de la France elle-même."  

There was, however, another matter which first demanded his attention: Casale. While the allied blockade of the town continued through the winter months, Victor Amadeus was confronted with an increasingly difficult problem. He desperately desired to see the French evicted from Casale; yet Casale in the hands of the Emperor was a sobering prospect indeed. The duke had no wish to exchange one master for another. Imperial control of Casale would also block his designs on the Milanese. Weighing the alternatives, he decided to seek an agreement with Versailles which would, if not immediately deliver Casale to the House of Savoy, at least insure that it would not fall to the Emperor.

Early in January, 1695, the comte de Tessé, hearing reports of Victor Amadeus' dissatisfaction with his allies, wrote to Barbezieux and suggested that the negotiations which had been suspended the

31Ibid., I, 446.
previous fall be reopened. Barbezieux replied that the king had been greatly provoked by the continuing blockade of Casale and forbade Tessé to make any moves in this direction.

Versailles was, however, quite concerned about the future of Casale. The archives of the ministry for foreign affairs contain no less than four mémoires from the comte de Saint-Maiole on this subject. The first of these, dated February 13, 1695, strongly asserted the harm which would accrue to France if Casale were lost. Saint-Maiole warned that Pignerol and Susa would be exposed, as would the borders of the kingdom. Furthermore, the 20,000 men engaged in the siege of Casale would be released for service elsewhere in the allied armies. The loss of Casale would, in fact, delay the peace; the Duke of Mantua and the other Italian princes would easily be coerced by the Emperor to declare war on France. The most advantageous course for France, Saint-Maiole argued, would be to launch the all-out invasion of Piedmont he had recommended before. In one stroke, Turin could be captured and Casale relieved; then the territory to the north of Piedmont could be secured as a bastion between Piedmont and the Milanese.

32 A.M.G., Al, 1330, no. 2, Tessé to Barbezieux, January 5, 1695. The negotiations concerning Casale were carried on through Barbezieux's office. There are few communications from this period in the foreign archives.

33 Ibid., no 15, Tessé to Barbezieux, January 30, 1695.
Saint-Maiole suggested a feint in the direction of Catalonia or England to distract the Allies and facilitate the rescue of Casale. 34

In his second mémoire on Casale, Saint-Maiole asserted that the Allies were unlikely to launch a full-scale assault against the town in 1695, since they lacked the necessary manpower. The operation would also weaken their ability for the approaching campaign. Instead of a sustained assault on Casale, Saint-Maiole argued, the Allies would probably maintain the blockade and subject the town to a severe bombardment, in an effort to provoke the populace to revolt and force the French garrison to withdraw to the citadel. The count was confident that an early thrust by a French army of 50,000 men before the Germans left their winter quarters at the end of June would free Casale with no difficulty. The army could then camp at Casale until it determined what action the enemy was going to take. 35

Saint-Maiole's mémoires reveal his continued blindness to the reality of France's military situation over against the Allies. Although the harvests of 1694 had been near normal, the country was still in serious economic difficulties. Moreover, in January, 1695, Louis XIV's best general, Marshal Luxembourg, had died; as the campaign


season approached, the problem of military leadership was still un-
resolved. Louis, who wanted to launch an offensive in Italy, was
forced to call off the project because he lacked the resources. Of all these matters Saint-Maiole seems to have been woefully ignorant.

On March 6, Tessé informed Barbezieux that Breiner, the
commisary-general of the Emperor, and the marquis de Leganez
“avoient desja promis et signé que L'on demoliroit Casal apres l'avoir
pris.” Saint-Maiole's analysis of this information was that the
Allies, by promising Victor Amadeus that the fortifications of Casale
would be razed, had created in the duke the illusory hope that he
would thereby be able to become master of Lombardy, by virtue of his
position at Verrua on the Po and Vercelli on the Sesia. Nevertheless,
Saint-Maiole believed that the so-called siege was but a feint to
disguise the Allies' real intention to attack Pignerol.

Still, the count continued, if Casale should have to be surrendered,
France ought to do all it could to prevent it from falling into the hands of
the Emperor; it would be better to surrender the fortress to Victor
Amadeus or even to the Spanish. Its possession by one of the Allies
would at least stir up ill feelings among the rest. If it was to be given

36Wolf, Louis XIV, p. 478
37A.M.G., Al, 1330, no. 35, Tessé to Barbezieux, March 6,1695.
38A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 94, "Memoire du Comte de Saint-
Maiole," March 1695.
up to the Duke of Savoy, the town could be promised him at the general peace. This project, Saint-Maiole felt, together with promises of French support for the duke's claims to the rest of Montferrat and the Milanese, should persuade him to deal with the French. If he refused, negotiations could be pushed with the Spanish. The prospect of a German prince on the throne of Spain, which would be likely to attend permanent Austrian possession of Italy, could be expected to make the Spanish receptive to a French proposal on the future of Casale.

Even that contingency could be avoided, Saint-Maiole avowed, if a French army moved immediately and rescued Casale. Louis XIV would then be able to propose a neutrality for Italy which the Emperor will be hard-pressed to reject. The relief of Casale would also frustrate Leopold's efforts to put one of his sons on the throne of Spain; he would lose control of Italy and his power would therefore be confined to Germany. Such were the grandiose results of the offensive envisioned by Saint-Maiole. The count concluded that nothing could be more impressive than that the invasion were commanded by "Monseigneur"\(^39\) or one of his sons,\(^40\) along with several generals of "reputation."\(^41\)

\(^39\)Louis, Le Grand Dauphin (1661-1711).

\(^40\)Louis, Duke of Burgundy (1682-1712); Philippe, Duke of Anjou (1683-1746); Charles, Duke of Berry (1686-1714).

\(^41\)Ibid.
Whatever the curious compound of truth and error in Saint-Maiole's analysis of the situation in Italy, it was not to be Versailles which made the first overture concerning Casale. On March 14, Tessé was visited by the Count of Buriasco, an impoverished nobleman in the service of Victor Amadeus. Buriasco told Tessé that his master had done all he could to prevent the siege of Casale, and that, having failed, Victor Amadeus had sent him "pour voir si je ne savois pas quelque expédient pour sauver cette place." Tessé, knowing that "sauver cette place" meant preventing Casale from falling into the hands of the Emperor, replied that the question of who possessed Casale was less important to Louis XIV than to the Duke of Savoy, and that if that was all Buriasco desired to talk about he could have saved himself the trouble of coming to Pignerol. By replying in this manner, Tessé hoped to forestall any impression that the French considered their situation at Casale to be desperate. At the same time, he had left the way open for a renewal of the negotiations with Turin, which had been effectively suspended for over a year.

The next day Gropello appeared at Pignerol disguised in peasant garb. He claimed that Victor Amadeus had done all he could to prevent an all-out attack on Casale. The Allies had, however, persisted in their intention to capture the place; Victor Amadeus would have to leave

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42A. M. G., A1, 1330, no. 39, Tessé to Barbezieux, March 17, 1695.
on March 19 to take command of the siege. Prince Eugene and
Ruvigny were already at Casale with the Imperial generals. Gropello
therefore proposed that the French agree to surrender Casale to the
Duke of Savoy, on the condition that its fortifications be destroyed.
The duke was willing to give hostages for the safety of the French
garrison and promised to get his allies to agree to the transfer. 43

Louis XIV's reply was a blunt refusal to treat on a disagreeable
proposal which would give his enemies a strategic fortress at little
cost to themselves. 44 Tessé, however, held back the king's refusal
until Gropello returned on April 6 with a new request from the duke for
negotiations on Casale, which Tessé forwarded to Versailles in a long
report of April 8. 45

Meanwhile, Versailles had received discouraging news about
the situation at Casale. The Allies were augmenting almost daily the
size of their forces and the quantity of their materiel. A letter from
Ruvigny's secretary related that "il est aussi arrive mille bombes de
nouvelle fabrique et faites a Venize par un Ingenieur Anglois."
Furthermore, an allied fleet was preparing to raid the southern
coast of France, in order to prevent the withdrawal of French troops

43 Ibid., 1329, no. 39, Catinat to Louis XIV, March 17, 1695.
44 Ibid., 1330, no. 41, Louis XIV to Catinat, March 24, 1695.
45 Ibid., 1330, no. 46, Tessé to Barbezieux, April 8, 1695.
there for the relief of Casale. It was clear that Saint-Maiole had completely misread the enemies' intentions. If France was to extract any comfort from an already impossible situation, it would have to insure that Casale did not fall with its fortifications intact into the hands of the Emperor.

On April 24, Tessé received powers and instructions to treat on Casale. The king agreed to turn the town over to the Duke of Savoy on the following conditions: the fortifications of the town, including the fortress and citadel, were to be completely demolished; the French garrison was to remain until the demolition was finished; a truce would be observed in Italy until the end of November; finally, if the Allies did not consent to the plan, Victor Amadeus was to renounce his alliance with them and join his forces to Catinat's, "qui aurait ordre de la pro-téges afficacement, lui et ses États, ..." Negotiations were immediately resumed between Tessé and Catinat on one side and Gropello on the other. On April 24 Victor

46 A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 94, "Extrait d'une lettre du secrétaire de M. de Ruvigny du 22 Mars 1695." Henri de Massué, marquis de Ruvigny (1648-1720), special envoy of William III to the court of Turin and lieutenant general of the English auxiliary forces in Italy; created Viscount Galway in 1692, and hereinafter referred to as Galway.


48 Tessé, Mémoires, I, 58-59. Grimoard has incorrectly dated these terms at the end of March, 1695.
Amadeus proposed that the marquis de Crenan, the French military governor of Casale, be given an order to formally propose the surrender of Casale to the duke, in exchange for the demolition of its fortifications and whatever other conditions should be agreed upon.\footnote{A.M.G., Al, 1329, no. 69, Catinat to Louis XIV, April 24, 1695.} Louis XIV, however, felt that it should be Victor Amadeus who made the first overt move: he should have a \textit{chamade}\footnote{A military signal given with trumpet and drums, indicating a desire to treat with the enemy.} sounded and call upon Crenan to surrender. Then the latter could propose the conditions already agreed upon for the withdrawal of the French garrison and the delivery of the town to the Duke of Savoy.\footnote{Ibid., 1329, Louis XIV to Catinat, April 30, 1695.}

Conferences on the matter continued for several days until, on April 29, Gropello presented Tassé with a letter signed by Victor Amadeus, agreeing to the following proposals.\footnote{Tassé, Mémoires, I, 60-63.} After several days of siege Victor Amadeus would call upon the marquis de Crenan to surrender Casale. Crenan would at first refuse and then consent, on condition of the complete destruction of the fortifications of the city, its château and citadel. The fortifications were not to be rebuilt during the present war. In return, the duke promised not to undertake for the rest of the campaign any action west of the Alps against either
French territories or his own conquered lands of Savoy and Nice.

Neither would allied armies camp in the vicinity of Pignerol, Susa, or elsewhere near the borders of France.

Louis XIV, for his part, was not to undertake any expedition against any of the duke's fortresses, territories, or estates in Italy, or of those of his allies. Neither side would withdraw troops from Italy for use elsewhere during the campaign. Finally, Victor Amadeus promised that if his allies did not accept the capitulation and demolition of Casale he would join his forces to those of France and force their consent.53

Victor Amadeus requested that Tessé retain possession of the letter, which would serve as security for his word, and added that he had not gone into any detail about his "traité-particulier" with the king, since "il comtoit toujours sur les conditions réglées en 1694."54

An accord was signed that same day on the basis of the duke's letter,55 Versailles approved, and Tessé was instructed to inform Crenan of the project of capitulation.

Events were leaving the comte de Saint-Maiole far behind: in a mémoire of May 8 he still asserted the siege of Casale to be a feint

53Ibid., p. 63. 54Ibid. 55A.M.G., Al, 1329, no. 104, Catinat to Louis XIV, July 1, 1695.
for a real attack on Pignerol or Susa.\textsuperscript{56} He was entirely unaware of the agreement already signed between France and Savoy. In view of this, one must question how seriously his advice on the war in Italy was treated by Louis XIV and his ministers.

At the end of May, 1695, one estimate put the number of troops available to the Allies in Piedmont at 32,920; of these Victor Amadeus could count on a maximum of 25,000.\textsuperscript{57} Chamlay urged the king to order the marquis de Crenan to prepare for as lengthy a siege as possible, "pour accuper et fatiguer d'autant plus les forces des Impériaux et des Espagnols,..."\textsuperscript{58} Chamlay forgot to add that this tactic would necessarily cost some French lives as well. Victor Amadeus agreed to the idea, the better to deceive his allies about the true nature of the assault. After all, he argued, only after a furious attack might the French be expected to capitulate. Crenan's reaction to the plan, however, was one of complete astonishment; he wrote to Tessé:

Je commenceroi, mon vieil ami, par un grand signe de croix d'étonnement de ce que contient le pacquet que j'ai recu ce matin par une trompette de Son Altesse Royale.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{56}A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 94, "Suitte des memoires du Comte de St.-Maiole ... touchant le present siege de Casal, ...," May 8, 1695.

\textsuperscript{57}Ibid., 94, "Estat au juste des troupes de Son altesse royalle et de ses alliez qui sont presentement en Piémont, ...," May, 1695.

\textsuperscript{58}A.M.G., A1, 1329, no. 83, Mémoire of Chamlay, May 30, 1695.

\textsuperscript{59}Ibid., A1, 1327, Crenan to Tessé, June 9, 1695.
Crenan found himself in the middle of the ever-recurring conflict between conscience and duty; as Rousset observes, "cette intrigue tachee de sang humain lui repugnait, mais il ne pouvait pas s'y refusa." 60

The siege began on June 17; on the 24th "la tranchee fut ouverte;" on July 1, the cannon of both sides began a constant exchange. The young Margrave Charles of Brandenburg, brother of the Elector, was killed during the exchange, along with many others on both sides. 61

Finally, on July 8, Victor Amadeus called upon Crenan to surrender, subject to the terms already agreed upon; Crenan accepted the offer as planned and the Duke of Savoy confronted his allies with a fait accompli. The allied generals were furious, but when Victor Amadeus threatened to go over to the French side they grudgingly accepted the surrender. On July 11, the formal capitulation was signed by Victor Amadeus, Leganez, and Crenan. 62 Among its twenty-seven articles was one (the seventh) which guaranteed the rights of the Duke of Mantua to the possession of Casale. Victor Amadeus had not dared to claim Casale for himself at this juncture, but he had at one stroke

60 Rousset, Louvois, IV, 532.

61 See the account in A.M.G., Al, 1329-1330, passim. There is a "Relation du Siege de Casale" in A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 94.

62 A.M.G., Al, 1329, no. 113; A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 94, "Capitulation pour la redition de la citadelle, ville et chateau de Cazai," July 11, 1695.
achieved the demolition of its fortifications, the expulsion of the French, and had prevented its falling to the Emperor—an achievement of no little magnitude.

The terms of the capitulation of Casale caused a brief flurry of anxiety at Versailles. On July 18, the king wrote Catinat:

J'ai esté estonné de voir que l'ou n'y ait point porté que les armées ne feront aucun acte d'hostilité pendant le reste de la campagne, quoique la lettre du duc de Savoie le porte expressément.63

Tessé was at the same time ordered by Barbezieux to remind Victor Amadeus of his obligations in this matter. Catinat, however, reminded the king that Tessé had in his possession the duke's letter of April 29, in which the duke promised not to make any attack on territories held by the French, for the rest of the campaign.64 To have written the agreement into the formal act of capitulation would have made the collusion between Versailles and Turin unmistakably clear to the Allies, who in the fact of the capitulation itself already had sufficient reason to distrust the fidelity of their Savoyard ally.

As the demolition of Casale's fortifications proceeded, Gropello repeatedly visited Tessé, urging that the work be speeded up. Finally, on September 18 the French garrison of 2,500 men left Casale with full military honors and marched to Pignerol.

63A. M. G., Al, 1329, no. 119, Louis XIV to Catinat, July 18, 1695.
64Ibid., Al, 1329, nos. 126 and 127, Catinat to Louis XIV, July 27, 1695.
In the meantime, Victor Amadeus had been seeking from another quarter a prize of greater value than Casale or even Pignerol. In December, 1691, Max-Emmanuel of Bavaria had been appointed governor-general of the Spanish Netherlands. In the mind of the Duke of Savoy, the appointment virtually assured Max-Emmanuel possession of the territory as his share of the Spanish inheritance. Victor Amadeus proposed to make himself as certain with regard to the Milanese. In May, 1695, the Count of Vernone received instructions to go to Madrid and request the governorship of the Milanese in perpetuity for the Dukes of Savoy; Vernone was to cite the case of Max-Emmanuel as a precedent. In return, Victor Amadeus would supply Spain with 6,000 troops for immediate service in Catalonia (contrary to the promise he had made to Louis XIV). The duke even offered Spain the citadels of Turin, Montmérian, and Nice as security. Finally, he promised to defend the Milanese with his own force. 65

Vernone, who did not arrive in Madrid until July, was immediately rebuffed by the Spanish government. For one thing, the duke's ultimate aims in regard to the Milanese were well known; for another, his promise to defend the Milanese with his own forces would have meant the effective absence of Spanish troops in Italy outside of the Kingdom of Naples. Spain was not yet ready to accede to such a loss of influence in the peninsula. Did Victor Amadeus seriously expect Madrid to

65 Vernone's mission is described in Carutti, Storia della diplomazia, III, 224-227.
accept his proposals? The Italian historian Carutti is uncertain; he suggests that the duke may have been trying only to cover up his negotiations with the French by his negotiations in Madrid. It seems more likely that the Duke of Savoy was simply engaging in his habitual practice of seeking from several quarters simultaneously whatever might lead to the aggrandizement of his house.

Whatever his expectations regarding Vernone's mission to Madrid, its failure caused Victor Amadeus to turn once again to Louis XIV, this time with the recovery of Pignérol as his immediate goal. On July 24, the duke had dined with Crenan at Casale and had, in the course of the conversation, implied that "il se pourroit accomoder avec le roi, si Sa Majesté vouloit luy donner Pignérol." While Vernone pursued his mission in Madrid, Gropello was careful to maintain his relations with Tessé at Pignérol. In September, when Victor Amadeus belatedly renewed his membership in the Grand Alliance, Gropello was quick to explain to Tessé that his master had no alternative but to sign; that to have refused to do so would have confirmed the suspicions of his allies; and that the duke desired as strongly as ever to return to "les bonnes graces" of Louis XIV, if only something could be worked out in regard to Pignérol.

66Ibid., III, 227.
67A.M.G., A1, 1328, Crenan to Barbezieux, July 25, 1695.
68Ibid., A1, 1330, no. 133, Tessé to Barbezieux, October 26, 1695.
Such overtures on the part of the duke met with silence from Versailles. Saint-Maiole, in his final mémoire of 1695, stated categorically that the loss of Pignerol and Susa was too great a price to pay for peace, as it would leave the frontier of France exposed to attack and incapable of defense.

Moins doit-on se fier aux Negotiations dont Mf de Savoye fait peut-être malicieusement courir le bruit, que moyennant la démolition de Pinerol, la Restitution de vos Conquestes sur luy à la reserve des places de Nice, Monmelian et Suze qui resteront aux frais de Vostre Majesté en déposit des Suisses et des autres Puissances neutres jusqu'à la paix; comme aussiy avec promesse de quatre Cens mil Escus en dédomagement, le mariage de Sa Princesse Ainee avec Monseigneur de Bourgogne, il y a aura Trêve et Union avec la France contre les Alliez s'ils vouloient la Contrevenir.²⁹

Thus does Saint-Maiole rather aptly sum up the general position—apart from the matter of Pignerol—reached in Tessé's negotiations with Gropello almost two years before, about which Saint-Maiole had still not yet been informed!

In regard to the duke's latest overture on Pignerol, Saint-Maiole continued, "c'est une des ruses ord. res [ordinnaires] dont il se flatte de nous amuser, et il voudroit bien nous divertir sur tout des délberations qu'il concoit, ... " The duke was, according to Saint-Maiole, probably playing the same game with his allies, using their fear of an accommodation with France to wrest advantages from them.⁷⁰

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⁷⁰Ibid.
For once, the count had correctly understood the dynamics of the situation he writing about. Since almost the first years of the war Victor Amadeus had been playing a double jeu of just the kind Saint-Maiole described, except that the duke had at last concluded that his ultimate advantage lay with France. On November 23, after both allied and French forces had retired to winter quarters, Gropello returned once again to Pignerol. He was there ostensibly to retrieve the duke's letter of April 29, which Tessé had kept as a guarantee of the undeclared truce following the capitulation of Casale. After receiving the letter and burning it in Tessé's presence, Gropello discoursed at length on his master's difficult position and reaffirmed the duke's desire to enter into a firm alliance with the French king. Yet for Victor Amadeus to break with his allies was bound to bring dishonor to his name, Gropello averred, unless there were sufficient reason for such a reversal on his part. If Louis XIV would return Pignerol with its fortifications demolished, however, the duke would have a "prétexe plausible" for deserting his allies. If they could not forgive him, Gropello concluded, they would at least understand his reason for joining France. 71

Tessé, while firmly rejecting the idea of the return of Pignerol "comme ne pouvant mesme Estre faitte a Sa Mêté", forwarded to Versailles

71 Tessé, Mémoires, I, 67.
an account of Gropello's visit. 72 A mémoire by Croissy, written in November, reveals the position Versailles was finding itself obliged to take on the subject of Pignerol.

"Dans un autre temps elle [Gropello's ouverture] ne meritoit pas la moindre reflexion. Il peut n'en Estre pas de mesme dans Celuicy." 73 Nevertheless, Croissy continued, to save Pignerol from capture during the next campaign would require an immense undertaking on the part of France. The Duke of Savoy and his allies could move an army of perhaps 45,000 men into position against Pignerol as early as March. Louis XIV, on the other hand, would not be able to get a large force across the Alps before the middle of May at the earliest. Since it was likely that Pignerol would fall before help arrived, Croissy believed that the entire French effort would be wasted.

Dans cet Estat sy perilleux pour Pignerol, Et qui paroist plustost funeste du Coste de Sa perte, peust estre seroit-il de la prudence d'en faire un usage avantageux, and de la faire servir a destacher M'r de Savoie de la Ligue a laquelle la prise de cette place l'attacheroit plus estroittement. 74

Croissy had all but given up hope of saving Pignerol. The question now to be determined was how the loss of Pignerol could best be used to detach Victor Amadeus from the Grand Alliance. Tassé would

72Ibid.

73A. A. E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 94, Mémoire of Croissy, November, 1695.

74Ibid.
have to determine first of all what Victor Amadeus meant by "les termes de pouvoir se destacher avec honneur de ses Allies." For if the duke believed that he could accomplish this without engaging in "un Traité séparé" with France, all talk of negotiation was idle. If, on the other hand, the duke should be willing to accept a separate treaty with France, "on ne peut qu'espérer douter que sa première demande ne tombast sur Pignerol, et sur Pignerol rasé." Pignerol had been promised him by his treaties with the League, and Croissy was certain that if Victor Amadeus was not successful in obtaining it from France, he would redouble his efforts to obtain it with the aid of his allies. "Ainsi pour ne pas Exclure la seule Espérance dont il se flatte, on pourrait ne la pas Exclure d'abord de la Negotiation." 75

These remarks indicate that Versailles was unaware of the Allies' own doubts regarding their ability to insure the return of Pignerol to Victor Amadeus. Croissy seems at this juncture to have had more confidence in allied arms than did either Leopold I or William III! Furthermore, Croissy's words reveal that Versailles entertained the hope that, once the Duke of Savoy could be brought to the negotiating table, the return of Pignerol would only be discussed "d'abord." This hope was to prove ephemeral.

75Ibid.
Croissy suggested that it might be possible for Tessé to offer an exchange of territory for Pignerol, such as the County of Nice. If the duke refused, Tessé could then propose that France receive only the city and château of Nice and only "une partie de la Conte." If Victor Amadeus rejected even this, some other exchange might be possible. As a last resort, Tessé could agree to the return of Pignerol rasé, but only on condition that Victor Amadeus renounce all treaties with his allies, declare himself for the neutrality of Italy, pledge to effect the withdrawal of enemy troops from Italy, and, should the Allies refuse to accept, join his troops to those of France. If the duke agreed to these conditions, Croissy concluded, Louis XIV would grant the marriage of Princess Marie-Adélaïde to the Duke of Burgundy, as well as the other benefits promised Victor Amadeus two years before:

Fascheuses Conditions, mais assujetties peutestre aux Circonstances presentes que previendraient la perte de Pignerol, et qui feront trouver quelque utilité dans sa Cession en destachant le Duc de Savoie de la Ligue. Nulle guerre nest sy pesante que celle d'ltalie dans la Conjoncture ou nous sommes. 76

To make the most of a bad situation seemed to be the only course open to Versailles at the end of 1695. Whatever its hopes for the future, the initiative clearly lay with the Duke of Savoy.

76 Ibid.
CHAPTER IV

TESSE'S NEGOTIATIONS: THIRD PHASE (1696)

New Instructions

Although it is clear that the ministers at Versailles had begun to reconcile themselves to the prospect of the loss of Pigneron, Tessé was ordered to break off his discussions with Gropello shortly after their meeting of November 23, 1695.¹ Nevertheless, at the beginning of the following February Tessé was once again visited by the "petit negociateur."² Gropello rehearsed at great length the regrettable situation in which the Duke of Savoy found himself, tied as he was to his allies against his own will and true interests. The duke earnestly desired that Louis XIV receive him back into his good graces; he proposed as the basis of such a reconciliation "des articles duquel nous convinsmes a peu prés, il y a deux ans, ..."³ Gropello added that the duke still hoped for the advantages promised him by those

¹Tessé, Mémoires, I, 67.

²The account of this meeting is in A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 96, fols. 2-9, Tessé to Louis XIV, Pigneron, February 6, 1696.

³See above, pp. 56-57.
articles, except that instead of the cash indemnity he desired the return of Pignerol.

Upon signing such an agreement, Gropello continued, Victor Amadeus would renounce his former alliances and unite his troops to those of France "par un traité de ligue offensive, defensive, et perpetuelle Envers tous et contre tous." Furthermore, the duke was now willing to accept the return of his properties, including Pignerol, after the allied troops were out of Italy. He would also agree to an article concerning the Vaudois, "dont sa Majeste sera contente," and would accept the principle of an exchange of "quelques vilages convenables" for Pignerol.

Before his departure on February 5, Gropello urged Tessé to go to Turin and treat personally with the duke. Tessé replied that if Victor Amadeus promised not to attack Pignerol before April 1 he, Tessé, would request permission to go to Versailles and give a personal account of the situation to Louis XIV.

Tessé, in concluding his account of the meeting to the king, was optimistic regarding the prospects of an accord with Victor Amadeus:

Au surplus je dois encore ajouter que je remarquay un change
tement visible dans les discours de cet envoyé, qui ne parla plus si haut que dans nostre derniere conversation du commence
tement d'hiver, car dans ce temps, il disoit Insolentment. 4

4Ibid., fol. 9.
Two days later, Tessé wrote the king that he was leaving Pignerol to confer with Catinat. He enclosed a copy of a letter from Gropello which reaffirmed the substance of their previous conversation and promised that Pignerol would be safe from attack during the month of March. Gropello asked that the strictest secrecy be maintained in the matter. Only a short time before, Galway had shown the Duke of Savoy a letter stating that the conseil d'en haut at Versailles had energetically debated the question of the demolition of Pignerol:

Que M. le Marechal De Catinat & M. [Tessé] avoient dit qu'il N'y avoit de bon pour l'Estat que de se liberer de cette place onereuse & que le Roy seul s'estoit oposé a cette proposition.  

It had, then, been Louis XIV's opposition to the loss of Pignerol which had delayed the resumption of the negotiations until February, 1696. The king's reluctance was perhaps overcome as a result of Tessé's trip to Versailles, for on March 18 Tessé was furnished with formal powers and instructions to treat with the Duke of Savoy.

5Ibid., 96, fols. 10-11, Tessé to Croissy, Pignerol, February 8, 1696.

6Tessé, Mémoires, I, 68. The details of Tessé's interview with Louis XIV are, unfortunately, lacking.

7A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 95, fol. 17, "Plein pouvoir a M. le Comte de Tessé p. convenir d'un traité avec M. le duc de Savoye," Versailles, March 18, 1696.

The instruction observed that since Tessé had already been authorized to treat with Victor Amadeus on the basis of the two projets drawn up in December, 1693, the present mémoire would deal only with the Duke of Savoy's new request for the return of Pigneron.

Tessé was to first express the king's surprise that Victor Amadeus would ask for such an important concession "sans aucune autre avantage po. Sa Maj, te que ceux que le duc de Savoie propose, ..." Tessé was then instructed to offer the restitution of Pigneron in its present (fortified) condition in exchange for the city and county of Nice, including the port of Villefranche, and their dependencies. If this offer were rejected, Tessé could require the cession of only the city and county of Nice "en l'Estat qu'ils sont a present." As a last resort, Tessé could accept in exchange only the city and château of Nice with surrounding territory equal in extent to that which Victor Amadeus would receive with Pigneron and Perosa.

If even this last offer was rejected by the duke, no exchange would be possible unless Pigneron's fortifications were demolished and France receive un juste equivalent in territory. The most suitable would be the city and château of Nice with its fortifications instructions had been previously embodied in a mémoire, "Conditions auxquelles Mons' de Savoie s'obigelroit envers le Roy," A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 96, fols. 52-54.

9 Above, p. 56.
demolished, or perhaps Villefranche with its port and châteaux. Otherwise, Tessé could accept the town and valley of Barcelonette or only that part of the valley lying outside Piedmont. In extremity, Tessé could suggest territory in Savoy, near Seyssel.10

In the original draft of Tessé's instructions, this was as far as he was allowed to compromise on the matter of an exchange for Pignerol. However, a marginal addition to the draft of the instructions, which was incorporated into the final version Tessé received, read as follows:

Quoiqu'il semble que cette dernre proposition soit le plus avantageux party que M. le Duc de Savoye puisse raisonnablement desirer, neanmoins. Sa Majëe veut bien encore donner pouvoir aux S. Comte de Tessé d'accorder ni pouvant mieux faire, Pignerol demoli Sans aucun équivalent, à condition seulmen, qu'il ne pourra jamais estre fortifié, non plus que la Perouse ny aucun autre lieu cédé par Sa Maj.11

This was for Louis XIV the ultimate concession on the matter of Pignerol and must have been granted by the king only with the greatest reluctance. It does, however, represent the lengths to which Louis was willing to go in order to end the war in Italy and destroy the Grand Alliance.

Tessé was instructed to do all he could to persuade Victor Amadeus that the demolition and evacuation of Pignerol by the French should occur only after the general peace. If this was not acceptable to the duke, Tessé could propose that only the fortifications of the

10Ibid., 96, fol. 15. 11Ibid.
citadel be preserved until the general peace, at which time both town and citadel would be turned over to the duke. If necessary, Tessé could even agree to the immediate return of the town with its fortifications intact, the French holding only the citadel until the general peace; at that time the fortifications of both town and citadel would be destroyed. The rest of the duke's territories would be returned upon the signing of a peace for Italy, but only after "les troupes allemande ou autres étrangères seront sorties d'Italie et auront passé ou le Rhin ou le Danube." 12

Further, Victor Amadeus would be required to furnish at least six thousand troops for service in the French armies after the conclusion of peace in Italy, for use by Louis XIV until the general peace. Provisions regarding the support of any joint expedition against the Milanese were also to be worked out. After restating the king's intention that under no circumstances should the fortifications of Pignerol or Susa be rebuilt, the mémoire concluded:

Au surplus quelq. obstacle qu' Il trouve dans sa Négociation, Il est du service de Sa Majesté qu'Il ne le rompe point [emphasis mine], et qu' Il se charge seulement de l' informer des difficultés qu'on luy fera quelq. de-raisonnables qu' Elles puissent estre.13

Armed with these new instructions, Tessé returned to Pignerol.

Tessé's instructions reflected the king's intention to bind Victor Amadeus in an alliance not only for the achievement of peace in Italy,

12 Ibid., fol. 16.  
13 Ibid., fol. 17
The Preliminary Treaties

On April 6, a few days after Tessé had returned from Versailles, Gropello arrived at Pignerol to resume the negotiations. According to the Turinese negotiator, the Duke of Savoy was under considerable pressure from Galway and the other allied leaders to end his talks with the French. Gropello had, therefore, been instructed either to come to a positive conclusion with Tessé or to break off the negotiations once and for all. Gropello expressed the duke's anxiety over the fact that once the Allies had withdrawn from Italy he would be left at the mercy of Louis XIV. Tessé reassured Gropello of the king's good intentions toward the duke and reaffirmed Louis' willingness to send hostages for his word. The two negotiators then set to work on the provisions of two projets de traité, the first to apply if the Allies accepted the neutrality of Italy, the second if they did not.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid., 96, fols. 27-51, Tessé to Louis XIV, Pignerol, April 18, 1696.
The former projet\(^{16}\) contained fifteen articles of which the most important were the following: Victor Amadeus renounced his alliances with the powers of the League and promised to persuade them to accept neutrality for Italy. Failing this, he would enter a league "offensive, defensive et perpetuelle" with Louis XIV, "pour faire la guerre en Italie." In return, the duke would receive the fortress and town of Pignerol and its dependencies, with their fortifications demolished, on condition that the duke and his successors never refortify them.

By Article 2, Pignerol and the conquered territories of Victor Amadeus would be returned only after the German and foreign troops "seront sorties D'Italie & seront arrives sur les Bords du Rhin & du Danube."\(^{17}\)

Regarding the return of Pignerol to the Duke of Savoy, Tessé wrote the king,

\[\text{Il seroit inutile et Ennuyant, que je fatigasse vostre Majesté, de tout ce que j'ay dit, sur les differens articles proposés par Gradations dans l'instruction que vostre majesté m'a remise ... et Bien que Pinerol vous soit comme un fruit precieux du long ministere du cardinal Richelieu, ... il me reste pourtant la douleur de n'avoir pu faire Tout a fait, ce que vostre Majesté a souhaite.}\(^{18}\)

\(^{16}\)Ibid., 96, fols. 168-175, "Disposition D'articles Pour la paix D'Italie," [April 10, 1696]. This and the following document have been incorrectly placed in the archives after Tessé's account of the treaties of May 29, 1696. See below, p. 126.

\(^{17}\)Ibid., fol. 170.

\(^{18}\)Ibid., fol. 29.
Gropello refused to consider an exchange of any kind for Pignerol razé; Tessé nevertheless left open the question whether Louis XIV would be willing to give up Pignerol under such terms.

The first treaty also affirmed that the marriage contract of Princess Marie-Adelaide and the Duke of Burgundy was to be drawn up after the signing of the treaties; the princess would be sent to France when Victor's territories were returned to him. Article 5 granted the duke the right to maintain normal diplomatic relations with his former allies, "sans que S. M. le puisse trouver mauvais." The ambassadors of Savoy would be treated as those of crowned heads; the treaty made it clear that this honor was a consequence of the marriage of the princess to the Duke of Burgundy. On the subject of religion, Victor Amadeus would prohibit the exercise of the Protestant faith in the territories ceded to him by Louis XIV, "tandis que sa majesté ne permettra dans ses estats et pays aucun Exercice de la ditte Religion pretendue Reformée."19

The second projet declared that in the event of war, Victor Amadeus would be appointed "generalissimo" of the combined armies, with a French marshal or general as his second-in-command.20

19Ibid., fol. 173.

20Ibid., 96, fols. 176-182, "Projet D'articles Entre sa Majesté et S A R, suposant que l'Empereur & le Roy D'Espagne, ne voudront pas entrer dans le traitté de paix proposé pour la neutralité D'Italie," [April 10, 1696].
Article 5 stated that French officers would command Savoyard officers of equal rank. The Duke of Savoy would receive a subsidy from the French king as long as the war continued. In his covering letter to Louis XIV, Tessé explained that while Gropello had insisted on an annual subsidy of 600,000 écus, Tessé had refused to go higher than 400,000 écus. Gropello agreed to leave the final determination to the "generosity" of the king.

The most important article of the second treaty was the twelfth. Upon his declaration of war against the League, Victor Amadeus was to be put in possession of all his conquered territories, their revenues and other rights, including Montmélian and Susa. The French would continue to garrison the fortresses at Nice, Montalban, Villefranche, and St. Ospice until the German troops were out of Italy, in accordance with Articles 2 and 10 of the first treaty. Pignerol would also remain with the French until the exit of the foreign troops, as stated in Article 10 of the first treaty. In the meantime, the Duke of Savoy would enjoy civil jurisdiction over Pignerol and its dependencies.21

Finally, Article 17 limited the number of troops Victor Amadeus was to maintain "si la neutralité d'Italie s'acceptoit, Ou que la paix generale se fist." The duke was to support no more than 6,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry in time of peace.22

21Ibid., fols. 178-179. 22Ibid., fols. 180-181.
Gropello returned to Turin on April 10 to obtain the duke's approval of the proposed treaties. Instead, Victor Amadeus subjected the drafts to a complete revision. He also demanded that France grant him additional territory west of Susa. Gropello wrote that he hoped Tessé would not object to the changes Victor Amadeus had made in the treaties, since the Allies were making attractive counter offers which the duke would possibly find difficult to resist.23

Tessé replied in an angry letter on April 18: "A vous dire le vray, vostre lettre paroist une rupture par la teneur des propositions que vous y faitez, & que vous Y redemandez de nouveaux avantages ..."
The count warned Gropello that Louis XIV would consider the new demands insulting; any further grants of territory by the French were, he said, out of the question. He insisted that Gropello assure him that in the future he spoke for Victor Amadeus with authority, else further negotiation would be futile.24

Tessé immediately forwarded the proposed treaties as revised by the Duke of Savoy to Versailles.25 The first, now containing sixteen articles, stated that the duke would not rebuild the fortifications of

23Ibid., 96, fols. 45-46, Gropello to Tessé, Turin, April 16, 1696 (copy).
24Ibid., 96, fol. 47, Tessé to Gropello, Pignerol, April 18, 1696 (copy).
25Ibid., 96, fols. 27-69, Tessé to Louis XIV, Pignerol, April 18, 1696.
Pignerol and its dependencies, provided that Louis XIV agreed to
demolish the fort at Fsaes&toll6 and the other forts east of Montgenèvre.
In default of this, the duke would be able to fortify any place in the
ceded territory, with the exception of Pignerol. According to Article
5, the restitution of Victor Amadeus' territories would occur after the
German and foreign troops "seront sorties D'Italie & seront Entrees En
Allemagne" [emphasis mine]. More importantly, the French were to
give the Duke of Chartres and the Prince of Condé as hostages; Marie-
Adelaide was to be sent to France as a hostage for the fidelity of
Victor Amadeus.

The second of the revised treaties affirmed that while French
officers would command Savoyard officers of equal rank, equality of
rank would be defined by seniority of commission. Louis XIV was to
subsidize the duke at 600,000 écus per year in the event of war; the
duke would not accept less than this amount. The changes made in
Article 12 were more important: Victor Amadeus now required, even in
case of continued war in Italy, that Louis XIV return to him immediately

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26 Ibid., 96, fols. 55-64, "Disposition D'articles pour la paix D'Italie."
27 Ibid., fol. 59.
28 Ibid., 96, fols. 65-69, "Projet D'Articles Entre sa Majesté and S.A.R. suposant que l'Empereur et le Roy d'Espagne ne voudront pas entrer dans le traitte de paix propose pour la neutralite D'Italie."
all his conquered territories and fortresses, including Pignerol. The duke would, in return, give Louis Chivasso, Crescentino (both on the Po), or Asti (on the Tanaro) as a place of security in Piedmont.  

Victor Amadeus declared that Article 17 of the original treaty, limiting the size of his army in peacetime, was unacceptable. He was certain he would need more than 6,000 infantry in Piedmont alone to counter any threat from the 21,000 troops normally maintained by Spain in the Milanese. Finally, according to a new article:

Tout ce que dessus sera ponctuellement Exécuté par les parties jusqu'a la paix générale, après laquelle Elles ne seront plus obligées a rien & chacune restera dans un Estat naturel.

By means of this last article, the Duke of Savoy was attempting to transform the "alliance perpetuelle" into a temporary partnership.

Louis XIV was quite annoyed by the new demands of Victor Amadeus. The king forbade Tessé to give away one further scrap of territory. At the same time Louis urged his representative to do all he could to keep the negotiations going.

Accompanying the king's letter was a mémoire containing detailed instructions for Tessé on the new proposals of the Duke of Savoy.  

29 Ibid., fols. 66-67.  
30 Ibid., fol. 69.  
31 Ibid., 96, fols. 70-71, Louis XIV to Tessé, Versailles, April 25, 1696.  
In regard to the first treaty, the king could not agree to the demolition of the forts at Fenestrelle and Montgenèvre. Furthermore, Victor Amadeus had to promise not to refortify any of the places ceded to him by France; the restriction of this condition to Pignerol alone was unacceptable to the king.

The wording of Article 5 had to make it clear that the restitution of the duke's lands could occur only after the foreign troops had withdrawn "jusques sur les bords du Rhin ou du Danube." Victor's demand of the Duke of Chartres and the Prince of Condé as hostages was out of the question. Marie-Adeleide would come to France, after all, not as a hostage, but to assume "le premier rang." The king promised to give for his part "les principaux officiers de la cour," if it should be necessary.33 Louis insisted that the prohibition of Protestantism in the vicinity of Pignerol be extended to any other lands ceded by the treaty. The qualifying phrase, "tandis que sa majesté ne permettra dans ses estats & pays aucun Exercice de la ditte Religion pretendue Reformé," had to be entirely removed. The remaining articles of the first treaty, apart from a few problems of expression, were acceptable to the king as they stood.

In regard to the second treaty as revised by Victor Amadeus, Louis much preferred the preamble of the original version over that

33Ibid., fol. 22.
of the duke's revision.\textsuperscript{34} The last clause of Article 5 was unacceptable; that a French officer should defer to a Savoyard of equal rank simply because of the latter's seniority of service was an affront to the king's "reputation." The duke had set the subsidy to be paid by Louis XIV at 50,000 écus per month. It was up to Tessé to adjust this sum as best he could, whether to the 400,000 écus per year offered by the French negotiator or to the duke's figure of 600,000 écus.

The twelfth article, requiring the return of the duke's fortresses upon his declaration of war, was clearly unacceptable to Louis and raised grave doubts in his mind about the duke's sincerity. Article 17, which limited the size of the duke's army in peacetime, was not unreasonable and had to stand as originally written. As for the new article restricting the duration of the French-Savoyard alliance to the end of the war:

Le 21 du nouveau projet detruit entièrement tout a qui est stipulé dans les autres articles et il ne peut être admis pour quelque raison que ce puisse être.\textsuperscript{35}

Although the king had been in almost total accord with the original version of the treaties drawn up by Tessé and Gropello on April 10, the Duke of Savoy's revisions had created serious obstacles to the conclusion of a final settlement.

\textsuperscript{34}Ibid., 96, fols. 24v.-26, "Sur le Projet d'articles d'une ligue offensive entre le Roy et Monseigneur le Duc de Savoye," April 25, 1696.

\textsuperscript{35}Ibid., fol. 26.
While Tessé waited for instructions from Versailles, another exchange of letters passed between Turin and Pignerol. Gropello tried in vain to persuade the count of the reasonableness of Victor Amadeus' new demands. How, Tessé replied, could he continue to treat with Gropello if after each agreement new demands were constantly made?

Aujourd'hui, je traite avec vous, & le lendemain, quand je dois croire, qu'il n'y a qu'a dire oui, l'on me faite de nouvelles propositions & l'on récharge chaque article de nouveaux projets. Tessé heaped scorn on the chipoterie of Gropello's master and warned that Louis XIV's patience was not inexhaustible. Gropello replied that the Duke of Savoy felt it was useless to continue to attempt to negotiate by letter. He requested that Tessé send his secretary, Valère, secretly to Turin to resolve the difficulties still remaining in the way of a settlement.

Tessé wrote that he was willing to send his secretary, but he did not see what could be accomplished thereby. As far as the French were concerned, the substance of the treaties had already been established on April 10. Furthermore, since Valère would have no power to

36Ibid., 96, fols. 72-74, Gropello to Tessé, Turin, April 18, 1696 (copy).

37Ibid., 96, fols. 74-77, Tessé to Gropello, Pignerol, April 20, 1696 (copy).

38Ibid., 96, fols. 72-79, Tessé to Louis XIV, Pignerol, April 20, 1696.

39Ibid., 96, fols. 81-83, Gropello to Tessé, Turin, April 22, 1696 (copy).
conclude anything, direct negotiations between Tessé himself and Gropello would be much more productive. Still, if the duke insisted, Tessé was willing to send his secretary to Turin. 40

The French negotiator was certain, as he reflected on the matter to Louis XIV, that Victor Amadeus was negotiating with the Allies in the hope of obtaining their agreement to the neutrality of Italy before he concluded his treaty with the French. In this way, he would appear more as an "honest broker" between the two parties and less as a traitor to the League; if he was successful, he would save himself the added embarrassment of going to war against his former allies. Tessé felt that the delay in concluding the negotiations might be to Louis' advantage. Catinat's army would be moving into Piedmont before the end of May; its appearance would help spur the duke to a more reasonable course. 41

Meanwhile, Victor Amadeus renewed his request that Tessé send his secretary to Turin. Before he left Pignerol, Valère was instructed only to "escouter ... et de parler peu." Immediately upon his secretary's departure, Tessé wrote the king, assuring him of Valère's

40Ibid., 96, fols. 83-86, Tessé to Gropello, Pignerol, April 24, 1696 (copy).

41Ibid., 96, fols. 80-89, Tessé to Louis XIV, Pignerol, April 25, 1696
discretion and expressing confidence that the affair would turn out to Louis' satisfaction. The king, on his part, approved Tessé's handling of the negotiation. He told the count to consider the instructions sent to him on April 25 as definitive and charged him to remain in constant communication with Versailles.

Valère arrived in Turin without incident and was received at the ducal palace by Saint-Thomas; they were joined there later by Gropello and finally by the duke himself. For three hours Valère listened to a reading of the revised articles of the treaty. Although constantly prodded to comment upon them, he steadfastly refused. Then, in another session the following day, Victor Amadeus gave Valère a list of the terms on which he was willing to compromise.

The duke agreed not to refortify any of the territories ceded by Louis XIV, including Pignerol. He now requested, however, that Louis XIV grant him a portion of La Chapelle, a village west of Perosa in the valley of Chisone. The duke promised to maintain in peacetime no more than 6,000 infantry in Piedmont and 1,500 in Savoy and Nice.

42 Valère had served as Tessé's secretary for twelve years.
43 Ibid., 96, fols. 91-93, Tessé to Louis XIV, Pignerol, April 27, 1696.
44 Ibid., 96, fol. 90, Louis XIV to Tessé, Versailles, May 2, 1696.
45 Ibid., 96, fols. 94-106, Tessé to Louis XIV, Pignerol, May 1, 1696.
In the event that the war continued in Italy, the duke still required the immediate return of Pignerol with the rest of his estates; on the other hand, he now offered the important town and citadel of Vercelli as a place of security for the French. The matter of the rank of the hostages which the French would give was still unresolved. Finally, the duke asked that the treaties remain secret for a specified period, during which time he would work to gain the Allies' consent to peace in Italy. At the expiration of the interval he would declare publicly for the neutrality of Italy and, if necessary, for war against Milan.46

Tessé was unhappy with Victor Amadeus' request for a portion of La Chapelle. La Chapelle was, it was true, only a small village, but it was a part of the former patrimony of Dauphiné. The Duke of Savoy was probably afraid that Louis would fortify La Chapelle and from there menace Perosa. Tessé suggested that the king's promise not to fortify the town might satisfy the duke on this matter.47

Tessé was convinced that Vercelli by itself was not strong enough to maintain France's position in Italy, should Victor Amadeus leave the war. However, if neither the Duke of Savoy nor Louis XIV were willing to compromise on French occupation of Nice, Villefranche, and Pignerol, the negotiations might be deadlocked. The count therefore proposed that Victor Amadeus be given a choice between French occupation of

either Montmélian or the fortresses of Cuneo, Demonte, and Verrua. 

The second alternative, Téssé felt, should be acceptable to the duke if he truly desired to conclude the treaties. On the matter of the hostages, the French negotiator understood the king's reluctance to send Princes of the Blood in this capacity. Still, he urged Louis to give him some idea of the number and rank of the hostages he was willing to give.

Téssé speculated at length about the duke's request for an interval between the signing of the treaties and their publication. Victor Amadeus apparently wanted time to get his allies' consent to peace in Italy; also, he was probably worried about the exposed position in which he would find himself should hostilities break out between the Allied and French armies—thus his demand for a written agreement on the matter. It seemed to Téssé that the principal questions still to be resolved were those regarding the hostages, the places of security for the French in case of war, and the interim between the signing and publication of the treaties.

Louis XIV replied that in case of war the French had to hold Nice, Villefranche, and Pignerol as originally agreed. For hostages, Louis would send two "des principaux officiers de ma Couronne." Téssé was

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48 Ibid., fol. 102  
49 Ibid., fol. 109.  
50 Ibid., 96, fol. 112-115, Louis XIV to Téssé, May 7, 1696.
authorized to grant a truce of at most one month between the signing (or ratification) and publication of the treaty. The king commended Tessé for rejecting the duke's proposal on La Chapelle, affirming that "je ne veux pas absolument donner un poulce de terre de ce qui est du Dauphiné." Nevertheless, Tessé could promise the duke that Louis would not fortify the village.

At the beginning of May, then, both sides had compromised on some points and had remained firm on others. Tessé was convinced that Victor Amadeus was caught in a serious dilemma: the duke did not want the negotiations to fail, but he did not want to give the French places of security which would leave him at their mercy. Still, Tessé believed that the duke was negotiating in good faith. Saint-Thomas had told Valère that upon the signing of the treaties the duke would order his ambassadors in Vienna and Madrid to propose the neutrality of Italy. Upon the Emperor's expected refusal, Victor would send couriers to inform the two courts of the nature of his negotiations with the French. He would threaten to change sides if Vienna and Madrid did not consent to peace in Italy.

51Ibid., fol. 115.
52Ibid., 96, fols. 116-120, Tessé to Louis XIV, Fenestrelle, May 4, 1696.
53Ibid., 96, fols. 122-129, Tessé to Louis XIV, Pignerol, May 9, 1696.
Despite Tessé's assurances about the duke's sincerity, Louis XIV continued to insist on Nice, Villefranche, and Pignerol as places of security. He also ordered Tessé to agree to an interval of no more than one month between the signing and publication of the treaty. 54

Then, on May 16, Tessé received a letter from Turin containing promise of a solution to the difficulties which still prevented a settlement. 55 Gropello reminded Tessé that they had once spoken of the châteaux of Montmélian and Susa as equivalents to those of Nice and Villefranche. He therefore proposed that, in the event of war, the French hold the châteaux and fortifications of Montmélian and Susa, with the duke retaining civil jurisdiction over the towns. Gropello also wrote that Victor Amadeus was willing to relent on his request for a portion of La Chapelle, in view of the king's promise not to fortify the town. Finally, the duke accepted Louis' offer of two hostages "de la première qualité." Gropello saw nothing in the way of a final settlement if these terms were acceptable to Louis XIV. He would, he told Tessé, come to Pignerol, sign the treaties, and work out the details concerning the conduct of both sides during the coming campaign.

54Ibid., 96, fol. 121, Louis XIV to Tessé, Versailles, May 13, 1696; fols. 130-131, Louis XIV to Tessé, Marly, May 16, 1696.

55Ibid., 96, fols. 132-136, Tessé to Louis XIV, Pignerol, May 13, 1696.
until the publication of the treaty. 56

Tessé felt that Montmélian and Susa were as adequate as Nice and Villefranche as places of security and recommended that the king accept the proposal. 57 Louis, apparently, did not agree. There was, he wrote, 58 a great difference between Montmélian and Susa on the one hand, and Nice, Villefranche, Montalban, and St. Auspice on the other. 59 Tessé was not to relent on the matter. Louis proceeded to name the duc d'Estrées 60 and the duc de Choiseul 61 as his hostages. Then, almost as an afterthought, he added: if the Duke of Savoy should prove unyielding on Nice and Villefranche, Tessé could consent—but only as a last resort—to Montmélian and Susa in their stead! 62

Concerning the time to be allowed Victor Amadeus before the treaty

56 Ibid., 96, fols. 137-138, Gropello to Tessé, Turin, May 14, 1696 (copy).

57 Ibid., 96, fols. 137-141, Tessé to Louis XIV, Pignerol, May 16, 1696.

58 Ibid., 96, fols. 143-147, Louis XIV to Tessé, Versailles, May 20, 1696.

59 Montalban and Saint Auspice were dependencies of Nice and were thus included in Article 12 of the original traité d'action worked out by Tessé and Gropello on April 10.

60 François-Annibal III, duc d'Estrées (1649-1698).

61 César-Auguste, chevalier du Plessis-Fraslin, duc de Choiseul (1637-1705).

62 Ibid., fol. 144.
would be made public, Tessé was now authorized to grant up to two months between signing and publication. As a final gesture, Tessé was not only not to request hostages from the duke; if offered them, Tessé was to refuse, "aimant mieux la simple parole de ce Prince, ...".

By agreeing to Montmélian and Susa as places of security and to an interval of two months during which the treaty would remain secret, Versailles had once again yielded on matters of importance to the success of the negotiations. In view of these concessions, Gropello, Tessé, and Louis XIV himself looked for an early conclusion of the affair.

While Tessé waited for Gropello's return to Pignerol he sent the king news of other events bearing on the negotiations. Early in May the Princess of Carignano had given birth to her second son. The new heir made it unlikely that the Soissons branch of the ducal family (including Prince Eugene) would ever succeed to the throne of Savoy. Tessé suggested to the king that a concrete expression of his good

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63 The original draft of the king's letter allowed Tessé to agree to an interim of three months. The period was changed to a maximum of two months in the final version of the letter; ibid., fol. 145.

64 Ibid., fol. 146.

65 See, for example, Louis XIV's letter to Tessé on May 26, 1696; ibid., 96, fol. 151.
will to the Carignano family might well be in order. Louis directed the count to offer his best wishes to the Prince and Princess of Carignano; if they granted the king "a part in the baby's birth," he would assure them of his esteem and affection.

It was reported to Tessé that on several occasions the Duke of Savoy had complained bitterly to Galway about the failure of the Allies to support him adequately against France. Once, referring to the expected arrival of Prince Eugene, Victor Amadeus said, "S'il n'amene ni troupes ni n'aporte d'Argent, il fera tout aussi bien de rester a Vienne que de Revenir icy." Tessé also learned that German troops had moved across the Po and were camped around Turin, where they continued to make "des grands desordres," calling the Piedmontese "traitors" and "Frenchmen." The duke ordered the regiment of his guards into the Citadel of Turin and sent three battalions of his troops into the city. Leganez even demanded the fortress of Vercelli as security for the duke's loyalty during the approaching campaign. In short, there was distrust on all sides, which Tessé felt could not but

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66 Ibid., 96, fol. 135, Tessé to Louis XIV, Pignerol, May 13, 1696.

67 Ibid., 96, fol. 146, Louis XIV to Tessé, Versailles, May 20, 1696.

68 Ibid., 96, fol. 153.

69 Ibid., fol. 153.
benefit the interests of France. 70

In a brief note to Croissy on May 23, the count--always the skillful courtier--expressed his happiness that he had been able to share a little in the honor of his cousin's marriage to the daughter of the minister. 71

Gropello returned to Pignerol on May 24. He and Tessé immediately set to work to conclude the treaties which had been their principal concern for so many months.

Il y a cinq ours, Sire, & quasi cinq nuits, que nous travaillons, que nous rompons nos traités, que nous les racrochons, que nous disputons, ... 72

The fruit of their labor was two treaties, of which practically every word had been bitterly contested. Tessé apologized to the king for his inadequacies in dealing with men "petris de toutte la politique italienne." 73

The greatest obstacle to a settlement, apart from "le tempérement indecis de M r le Duc de Savoye," had been a new demand by

70Ibid., fol. 156.

71Ibid., 96, fol. 157, Tessé to Croissy, Pignerol, May 23, 1696. Tessé's cousin, Louis-Joachim de Montaigne, marquis de Bouzols (1662-1746), married Marie-Françoise Colbert de Croissy (1671-1724) early in 1696.

72Ibid., 96, fols. 159-167, Tessé to Louis XIV, Pignerol, May 30, 1696.

73Ibid., fol. 159.
the duke that he be given until the end of the year to publish the treaty. Tessé and Gropello wrangled for two days over this proposal. When Tessé threatened to break off the negotiations, Gropello sent to Turin for further instructions. Gropello then begged Louis to grant a truce until at least the end of September. After further argument Gropello finally accepted an interval extending through the month of August. Although Tessé had exceeded his instructions by granting even this much, he explained to the king that he had seen no other way to settle the matter.

The conduct of the two sides during the interim period was regulated by a convention drawn up by the negotiators. The whole affair would be played out, as in the case of the capitulation of Casale, as a kind of game. First, Catinat was to formally propose the neutrality of Italy; Victor Amadeus would then send word to his allies of the French offer. Upon the Allies' expected disapproval, Victor Amadeus would propose a suspension of arms for thirty days. Catinat would accept and hostages would be exchanged. The French army was to subsist in Piedmont until the end of August, at which time the duke would publish the treaty, with or without his allies' consent.

On the vital matter of the places of security, Tessé held out as well as he could for Nice and Villefranche. However, the duke had

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74Ibid., 95, fols. 18-21, "Convention faite entre M'r le C'te de Tessé et le Sr Gropel," May 29, 1696.
forbidden Gropello to compromise on the matter. After hours of discussion and debate Tessé reluctantly accepted Montmélan and Susa in their stead. They, along with Pignerol démolé, would be returned to the duke only after the German and Imperial troops were out of Italy and "au bords du Danube et du Rhin."

Victor Amadeus asked for an additional favor. He desired that the published version of the treaty be dated later than the actual date of its signing. This expedient would, he believed, save him unnecessary embarrassment in his relations with his former allies. Believing that the duke's request was not unreasonable, Tessé asked for Louis' ratification of the treaties. "Mon Idée principale," Tessé concluded to the king, "a esté vostre Conservation et Vostre Gloire."75

By the terms of the first treaty,76 the Duke of Savoy promised, as before, to renounce his former alliances and to persuade his former allies to accept the neutrality of Italy. Failing this, he would unite his forces to those of France to force their consent. Louis XIV promised the cession of Pignerol and Perno, on condition that their

75Ibid., 96, fol. 167.

76There are, unfortunately, no copies of the treaties of May 29 in the foreign archives. The treaties placed after Tessé's dispatch of May 30 are undated and are actually those of April 10 (see above, footnote 17). The provisions of the treaties of May 29 have been reconstructed from Tessé's dispatch of May 30, the subsequent objections of Victor Amadeus, and the uncontested articles of the final treaty of June 29, 1696. See also Tessé, Mémoires, I, 69-71.
fortifications never be rebuilt. The duke was to receive Pignerol, along with the rest of his territories, only after the German and foreign troops "seront sorties D'Italie and seront arrivées sur les Bords du Rhin and du Danube." The demolition of Pignerol's fortifications would begin after the allied withdrawal and the place would be turned over to the duke within two or three months. The marriage of Marie-Adelaide and the Duke of Burgundy was provided for, as was the new status of the duke's ambassadors.

By the terms of the second treaty, Louis' officers would, in the event of war, command Savoyards of equal rank; no qualification was made in regard to seniority of commission. Victor Amadeus was, upon his declaration of war, to be put in immediate possession of his estates, except for the fortresses of Montmélian and Susa; Pignerol would likewise remain in the hands of the French until "l'Entière sortie des Troupes allemands, Bavaroises, religionnaires, and auxiliaires." The king would send formal promises to Venice and the Pope for the eventual return of the fortresses. The duke was to limit his forces, once peace was achieved, to 1,500 cavalry and 7,500 infantry.

Louis XIV was generally satisfied with what Tessé had accomplished. The king did express some unhappiness over the length of the interval Tessé had granted between the signing of the treaty and its publication. The matter was not, however, serious enough to
prevent ratification of the treaties by the king on June 4. 77 The ratifications, together with Louis' promises to Venice and the Papacy on the return of the duke's fortresses, were dispatched to Tessé on the same day.

New Alarms and Excursions

Three days before Louis XIV ratified the treaties of May 29, Tessé received a letter from Gropello that once again threw everything into confusion:

Je vous escris ces lignes plus mort que vif, SAR ayant extremement desaprouvé que j'aye signé les Deux traités de paix et de Guerre... Ainsi, Monsieur, je suis au desespoir d'Estre contraint de vous dire le desaveu qu'elle fait de ma signature. 78

There were, it seemed, three articles which were entirely unacceptable to the Duke of Savoy. In the traité de paix the wording of Article 5 was of special concern. Could not the French, asked Gropello, delay the return of Pignerol and the duke's territories by resorting to a speciously literal interpretation of the words, "et seront arrivées sur les Bords du Rhin and du Danube"? It was, after all, doubtful that all the Germans and Imperials would cross those rivers! For that reason,

77 A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 95, fol. 23, "Ratification d'articles convenus pour la neutralité d'Italie," June 4, 1696.

78 Ibid., 96, fols. 186-188, Gropello to Tessé, Turin, June 1, 1696 (copy).
Victor Amadeus desired that the words, "et seront entrées en Allemagne," be substituted for the offending phrase.\textsuperscript{79}

The duke further insisted that Article 17, limiting the number of troops he could maintain in time of peace, was "contrary to the dignity of a prince." He now refused to submit to such a restriction on his sovereignty in time of peace. Finally, in the \textit{traité de guerre}, Article 12 had entirely changed "du Blanc au Noir" the instructions given to Gropello. While the French could indeed hold the fortresses of Montmélian and Susa in the event of war, Victor Amadeus once again demanded the return of Pignerol at the same time as his other territories.\textsuperscript{80}

Tessé was furious. The Duke of Savoy, having obtained most of what he wanted, had clearly become greedy. Tessé wrote Gropello that he could not believe the duke would disavow that which his representative had duly signed on his behalf.\textsuperscript{81} Some of the duke's objections were but bagatelles. The intent of Article 5 of the first treaty, Tessé explained, was simply to make it clear that the Imperial troops had to be out of Italy before the duke's properties could be returned. The number of soldiers allowed Victor Amadeus by Article 17 had previously been agreed to by the duke. As long as Victor Amadeus behaved as a loyal ally, Tessé continued, it made little difference to the king

\textsuperscript{79}Ibid., fol. 187. \textsuperscript{80}Ibid., fol. 188. \textsuperscript{81}Ibid., 96, fols. 188-190, Tessé to Gropello, Pignerol, June 1, 1696 (copy).
whether he had a few more or a few less troops than the number stipulated in the treaty.

Finally, concerning French occupation of Pignerol until the end of the war, "Le Roy n'a jamais entendu, ni permis, ni pense qu'il pust estre autrement." Tessé could not believe that Victor Amadeus could dare expect to possess Pignerol before the peace of Italy was secured. If, Tessé continued, the duke did truly disavow the treaties of May 29, "il n'y a qu'a plier les espaules, and croire que Rien au Monde N'est ni ne peut estre stable." The count warned Gropello that Marshal Catinat's army, which had already moved from Susa onto the plain of Piedmont between Orbassano and Rivalta, would march toward Turin on June 2. For, he concluded dryly, "nous sommes immuables fideles and exacts dans ce que nous promettons, and le serons."

Tessé told the king that he had informed Catinat about the duke's latest reversal. Catinat would nevertheless proceed as planned; he would send an offer of neutrality for Italy to Saint-Thomas on June 2. It was important, Tessé felt, to get the duke to agree to a truce. There would then be time to work out the new difficulties he had raised. In a brief note to Croissy, the count summed up the latest

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82Ibid., fols. 189-190. 83Ibid., fol. 190. 84Ibid., 96, fols. 186-191, Tessé to Louis XIV, Pignerol, June 1, 1696
change of events: "Vous avez vu, Monsieur, le Blanc, par l'Arrivée de Mon courrier, vous verrez le noir par l'Arrivée de cette lettre."  

On June 2, Tessé was invited to come to Turin and treat personally with Victor Amadeus. The following day he discussed the situation with Catinat at Rivalta. The marshal agreed to delay sending his second proposal for the neutrality of Italy until Tessé's return from Turin. Leaving Rivalta on the night of June 4, the count was conducted in disguise through the enemy lines by Victor's adjutant general. The duke met Tessé in the palace garden and they went immediately to Saint-Thomas' house. Victor Amadeus repeatedly expressed his sorrow that his representative had so badly followed his instructions. Gropello was indeed "un sot" for having agreed to provisions which he had been clearly forbidden to accept.

"La sotise du pleni-potentiaire" had led Gropello astray at three principal points, according to Saint-Thomas. In regard to Pignerol, the duke had never intended that it should remain with the French if the war should continue. The duke required, after all, some "present fruit"

85Ibid., 96, fol. 191, Tessé to Louis XIV, Pignerol, June 1, 1696.

86Ibid., 96, fols. 192-194, Tessé to Louis XIV, Pignerol, June 3, 1696.

87Tessé's account of his trip to Turin is contained in his letter to Louis XIV on June 10, 1696, A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 96, fols. 199-214.
to justify his reversal of alliances. When Tessé replied that the advantages promised him by the treaty should be fruit enough, the duke got up to leave, saying that it would be useless to discuss the other articles until Tessé relented on the matter of Pignerol. 88

The next afternoon Tessé met privately with Saint-Thomas. The minister assured him of Victor's desire to ally himself with Louis XIV. The duke was, however, genuinely worried that the king would not give back Pignerol as he had promised. However, when Victor Amadeus returned to Saint-Thomas' house that evening, he had apparently had second thoughts on the wisdom of breaking off the negotiations over the matter of Pignerol. He gave Tessé a minute on the other disputed issues and promised to send the count a definitive statement of his position on the return of Pignerol by June 9.

The minute was in the form of articles amending or "clarifying" the two treaties of May 29. 89 The first article declared that the provision limiting the army of Victor Amadeus to 7,500 infantry and 1,500 cavalry would be in force only until the general peace; after that time, the Duke of Savoy would be free to determine for himself the size of his armed forces. The second article clarified the meaning of the term "aux bords du Danube ou du Rhin." The phrase was to be understood

88Ibid., fols. 202-203.

89Ibid., 96, fols. 205-206, "Minute de Victor-Amedée, ... " June 6, 1696.
to mean only that the German and Imperial troops were to be effectively out of Italy; the Brandenburgers in the pay of Venice were, of course, excluded from this provision. The third article extended the expiration of the truce from the end of August to the end of October. The duke insisted that the extension was necessary in order for him to persuade his allies to accept the neutrality of Italy.  

In his report to the king on June 10, Tessé suggested that the first and second articles of the minute were of little consequence and could well be accepted. The third article was more difficult; the count felt the length of the truce should remain as originally agreed. While Tessé waited for instructions on the matter, he and Catinat would proceed as planned. Whether Victor Amadeus ratified the treaties or not, the king's interests would be served, Tessé believed, by the publication of a truce. The probable effect of a suspension of arms on the Allies and on the duke himself would be of benefit to the cause of France.

In a hastily scrawled post-script to his report, Tessé informed the king that he had just received Amadeus' statement on the return of Pignerol. In it, the duke again pleaded that the French accept a suspension of arms until the end of October; he needed time, he

90 Ibid., fol. 206.

91 Ibid., 96, fol. 195-196, "Reponce par Gropel, que M'le Duc de savoye M'avoir promis," Turin, June 9, 1696.
argued, to bring his allies to the desired decision. Furthermore, he was deeply grieved by the thought of leaving the French in control of Montmélian and Susa; Louis XIV would thereby become "master of Savoy" while the duke would not receive Pignerol until the peace. The treaty would, after all, make Louis the arbiter of the general peace and, by consequence, of Europe. Why, then, concluded the duke, should "bondage" be his reward?

In an aside to Tessé, Gropello wrote, "Je vous jure qu'elle [the Duke of Savoy] signerait cet Article si le Roy le veut absolument come celui d'un arrest contre elle mesme." Saint-Thomas had previously indicated that if the king was willing to return Pignerol before the peace in Italy, Victor Amadeus would allow the French to occupy the fortresses of Nice, in lieu of Montmélian and Susa, until the neutrality of Italy was achieved. Tessé advised the king that he believed French possession of Pignerol, Susa and Montmélian to be preferable and that he would treat accordingly.

Louis replied that Tessé should not grant a delay in the publication of the treaty beyond the end of August. If Victor Amadeus agree to a truce of that duration, Tessé could accept the first two articles of the minute as they stood. Moreover, the king indicated

92Ibid., fol. 196.  
93Ibid., fol. 214.  
94Ibid., 96, fols. 216-218, Louis XIV to Tessé, Versailles, June 15, 1696.
that he would be willing to return Pignerol before the effective withdrawal of foreign troops from Italy if it appeared that "une bonne et parfaite correspondance" existed between the Duke of Savoy and himself. Tessé could even agree to a separate article to this effect, if it were absolutely necessary.\footnote{A separate article was drawn up and sent to Tessé with the king's letter, \textit{ibid.}, 95, fol. 25.} If, Louis concluded, Victor Amadeus would not agree to the specified truce, Tessé was to set a limit of a week to ten days for ratification of the treaties. Catinat's army would then be free to act as the king felt best.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 96, fol. 218.}

An official offer of neutrality for Italy was sent by Catinat to Saint-Thomas on June 12. The offer provoked a rapid exchange of letters between Turin and Pignerol, as the Duke of Savoy sought to persuade Tessé to accept his latest demands.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 96, fol. 225, Tessé to Louis XIV, Rivalta, June 12, 1696.} News of the French offer reached Milan and Venice; there was little doubt that Galway had promptly informed William III.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 96, fols. 232-233, Tessé to Louis XIV, Rivalta, June 19, 1696.} On June 21, Saint-Thomas sent an urgent letter to Tessé, begging him to relent on the matter of Pignerol. Once that was done, the French negotiator would be brought to Turin to conclude the treaty.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 96, fols. 236-238, Tessé to Louis XIV, Rivalta, June 24, 1696.} In order to increase the diplomatic
pressure on Victor Amadeus, Catinat wrote again to Saint-Thomas on June 23, repeating his offer of peace for Italy.

Three days later, Tessé received instructions from Versailles which cleared the way to a settlement. The count was authorized to agree to the return of Pignerol within three months after the neutrality of Italy or the renewal of the war, provided that Victor Amadeus gave the châteaux of Nice and Villefranche as security, along with Montmélian and Susa. Failing in this, Tessé could propose that the French keep only Susa, Nice, and Villefranche. As a last resort, he could agree to French occupation of only Montmélian and Susa as places of security. A separate article to this effect was included with the king's letter.100 Tessé immediately informed Saint-Thomas that he was in a position to treat on the subject of Pignerol.101

In the meantime, the Allies intensified their efforts to keep the Duke of Savoy in the Grand Alliance. A representative of William III promised the return of Pignerol, if only the duke would remain steadfast.102 The Emperor, for his part, sent a representative to negotiate a marriage between Marie-Adelaide and the King of the Romans.103

100 Ibid., 96, fol. 230, Louis XIV to Tessé, Versailles, June 20, 1696.

101 Ibid., 96, fol. 239, Tessé to Louis XIV, Rivalta, June 27, 1696.

102 Ibid., fol. 237.

103 Ibid., fol. 239.
The Allies were, in effect, tardily offering Victor Amadeus the very benefits which they had earlier refused to grant him.

Tessé was certain that the duke would turn a deaf ear to the belated promises of the Allies. Before leaving for Turin on June 27 the count wrote Croissy that "il me semble qu quelque chose d'invisible Me conduit heureusement dans Ma Mascarade de ce soir."104 Louis XIV, while he waited at Versailles for news of the outcome of Tessé's trip to Turin, was confident that the long and difficult negotiation would soon reach its desired end.105

104 Ibid., 96, fol. 240, Tessé to Croissy, Rivalta, June 27, 1696.

105 Ibid., 96, fol. 241, Louis XIV to Tessé, Marly, July 4, 1696.
CHAPTER V

ACHIEVEMENT AND AFTERMATH

The Treaties of June 29

J'arrive Sir, du voyage que j'ai fait aupres Du prince le plus difficile, le plus indecis & le plus soubconneux qui fut jamais. . . .

Thus begins Tessé's letter to Louis XIV of July 1, 1696. In it, he described at length the results of his trip to Turin.¹

Tessé had left Catinat's camp at Rivalta expecting a speedy conclusion to the affair. His first interview with Victor Amadeus showed the count that his hopes were premature. Once again the question of the places of security and the time of the return of Pignerol had to be argued through; once more Tessé had been subjected to interminable pleas for an extension of the interval between the signing and publishing of the treaty. Indeed, it was this last problem rather than Pignerol which proved to be the most difficult of resolution. Only after two days and nights of argument was Tessé able to get the duke to accept the three-month interval which had been agreed to in the convention of May 29.²

¹A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 97, fol. 3-14, Tessé to Louis XIV, Rivalta, July 1, 1696.
²Ibid., fol. 4
Tessé regretted that this meant Victor Amadeus would have until the end of September to declare himself publicly, instead of the end of August as in the earlier treaty. Tessé had, however, been able to retain not only the châteaux of Montmélian and Susa as places of security, but also the citadel of Pignerol; he had not been forced to make the ultimate concession allowed him by his instructions of June 20. 3

The treaties, accompanied by the ratifications of Victor Amadeus, were in substance the same as those agreed to on May 29. 4 By the first, 5 Victor Amadeus renounced his alliance with the powers of the League and promised to do all he could to obtain from them, "au moins de l'Empereur & Roy Catholique," the neutrality of Italy, either by a particular treaty or by means of declarations from Austria and Spain to the Pope and Venice. Failing this, the Duke of Savoy would join in an offensive and defensive league with the King of France, "jusqu'a la Paix generale," to make war against the Milanese. For his part, Louis XIV promised to cede Pignerol and its dependencies, with their fortifications demolished, to Victor Amadeus. These, along with the duke's conquered territories, would be returned only after the German

3See above, p. 136. 4See Appendix D.

5Ibid., 95, fols. 85-91, "Articles convenus pour la paix & neutralité d'Italie," June 29, 1696.
and foreign troops "seront arrivez réellement en Allemagne," 6 and within two or three months after the withdrawal of the allied forces.

The marriage of Princess Marie-Adelaide and the Duke of Burgundy was to be arranged as the negotiators previously agreed. The duke's ambassadors would be treated as those of crowned heads. Intercourse between French and Savoyard Protestants was prohibited, as was the exercise of the Protestant faith in Pignerol and its dependencies, "comme S. M. n'en souffre ni n'en souffrira dans son Royaume." 7 The duke agreed to limit his armed forces, supposing the Allies accepted the neutrality of Italy, to 7,500 infantry and 1,500 cavalry and dragoons; "& cette obligation de S.A.R. n'aura lieu que jusqu'à la Paix generale." 8 Louis XIV promised that the Duke of Savoy would be included in any treaty of peace made with the Emperor or the King of Spain. Other articles dealt with trade and tariffs, amnesty, and various civil and ecclesiastical matters.

The second treaty, which was to remain secret, was composed of twenty-two articles. 9 In the event of war, Victor Amadeus would become commander-in-chief (generalissimo) of the joint French-Savoyard army and receive an annual subsidy of 600,000 écus. The conquered territories of the duke, along with Pignerol and its dependencies (their

6Ibid., fol. 87. 7Ibid., fol. 89. 8Ibid., fol. 90.
9Ibid., 95, fols. 33-42, "Traité d'action," June 29, 1696.
fortifications demolished), were to be returned to him, except for the fortresses of Montmélian and Susa and the citadel of Pignerol, which would be held by the French until the peace of Italy and the withdrawal of the allied troops. As security for the return of the fortresses, Louis XIV was to send formal pledges to the Pope and Venice; he would also give the two hostages specified in the first treaty.

Article 14 stipulated that in the event of the death of the King of Spain, Louis XIV would renounce any claim on the duchy of Milan and do all within his power to help Victor Amadeus acquire it. Louis also promised to cede any conquests in Milan in exchange for their equivalent in Savoy; if all of the Milanese were conquered, France would receive all of Savoy. The terms of the second treaty would expire upon the signing of the general peace or of the neutrality of Italy, "et la teneur des articles inituler articles convenus pour la paix et neutralité d'Italie arrestés ce même jour demeura dans son entier." The ratifications of Victor Amadeus, signed by the duke and Saint-Thomas, were attached to each treaty. Tessé was thus able to send to Versailles not only the treaties but also the ratifications of the Duke of Savoy. The documents were accompanied by a letter of fealty to Louis XIV written in the crabbed hand of Victor Amadeus.

10 Ibid., fols. 38-39.  
11 Ibid., fol. 41.  
12 Ibid., fols. 91 and 42.  
13 Ibid., 95, fol. 31, Victor Amadeus to Louis XIV, Turin, June 29, 1696.
In his covering letter to Louis XIV, Tessé reported that Gropello had been disgraced and exiled from the court of Turin. Poor Gropello had been, Tessé avowed, more a victim of the duke's caprice than of any personal fault of his own.\(^\text{14}\)

**The Truce**

Having arrived at the goal toward which he had worked for over three years, Tessé now had to oversee the gradual unfolding of the events envisioned by the treaties of June 29.\(^\text{15}\) On that day, Catinat sent his third official proposal of neutrality for Italy to Saint-Thomas. This time, however, Catinat not only offered the return of Pignerol, but also the marriage of Marie-Adelaide to the Duke of Burgundy. On July 3, Saint-Thomas duly replied that "Son Altesse Royale est dans la bonne disposition que vous pouvéz désirer de profiter des bontez de Sa Majesté, ..." It was necessary, however, that the duke inform his allies of his desire; for this purpose a truce of forty days would be required. Saint-Thomas proposed that the French army remain west of

\(^\text{14}\) *ibid.*, 97, fol. 10.

\(^\text{15}\) The events of the summer of 1696 are treated rather discursively in Paul Canestrier, "Comment M. de Tessé prepara, en 1696, le traité de paix entre Louis XIV et Victor-Améde II de Savoie," *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, XXXVIII (1934), 370-392. Canestrier does not discuss Tessé's role in the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Vigevano.
the Po, the Allies to the east of it. Catinat, in turn, accepted the idea of a truce, but suggested a period of fifty days with an exchange of hostages. Galway, Leganez, and Prince Eugene at first refused to consider a suspension of arms. Finally, after Victor Amadeus threatened to go immediately over to the French, the allied chiefs agreed to accept the truce until orders arrived from their governments.

It was obvious to Tessé that, once the truce was announced, the Allies could not help but realize that a treaty had already been signed by France and Savoy. For, as Tessé explained to Louis XIV, there was something of the ridiculous in the spectacle of General Catinat, a marshal of France at the head of a powerful army, offering Victor Amadeus the marriage of his daughter and the Duke of Burgundy. It would not require a great prophet, Tessé concluded, to discern that the whole affair "n'est qu'une comedie Dont la principale sceine est Conclue."

On July 4, Victor Amadeus wrote to Leopold requesting that the Emperor approve of his desire to accept the offer of the French. Other letters were sent to the Pope, the Dutch, the Electors of Bavaria, and

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17 A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 97, fol. 20, Tessé to Louis XIV, Volvera, July 5, 1696.

18 Ibid., fol. 22.
Brandenburg, and the King of Spain.\textsuperscript{19} The suspension of arms was officially signed on July 11, the allied forces having already withdrawn from around Turin to positions east of the Po. Tessé reported to the king that there was much confusion evident in the allied camp; the Germans and the Spanish were even calling the Duke of Savoy "un schelme."\textsuperscript{20}

It was agreed that Tessé should go to Turin as a hostage for the truce. At his suggestion, and with Catinat's approval, the marquis de Bouzols was designated as the other French hostage. Croissy later thanked the count for suggesting his new son-in-law for the honor.\textsuperscript{21} Tessé and Bouzols entered Turin on July 13, more as conquering heroes than as hostages. They were formally received by the Duke, installed in the house of the comte de Vernon and called on by most of the court. The count was warmly received by Madame Royale and Duchess Anne. When Marie-Adelaide recognized him as the stranger she had seen with her father only two weeks before, she was warned not to reveal the matter to anyone.\textsuperscript{22} Tessé also paid calls on the Prince and Princess

\textsuperscript{19}The texts of these letters, with French translations, are printed in \textit{Actes et Mémories}, I, 173-196. Copies of Victor Amadeus' letter to the Elector of Brandenburg and the Elector's reply (in Latin) are in A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 95, fols. 72-74.

\textsuperscript{20}A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 97, Tessé to Louis XIV, Volvera, July 11, 1696.

\textsuperscript{21}\textit{Ibid.}, 97, fol. 29, Croissy to Tessé, Versailles, July 16, 1696.

\textsuperscript{22}\textit{Ibid.}, 97, fols. 30-35, Tessé to Louis XIV, Turin, July 14, 1696.
of Carignano and, at Saint-Thomas' suggestion, upon the duke's mistress, the comtesse de Verrue. 23

Upon the hostages' arrival in Turin, Victor Amadeus sent couriers to the princes of Italy to inform them of the events which had transpired. The duke sought their support for a league against the Emperor and for the "peace and neutrality of Italy." While Tessé found the duke to be quite friendly, he was not entirely convinced of the duke's sincerity—"C'est que Dieu seul peut sçavoir." 24

In the meantime, both sides waited for news from the allied capitals. The Abbé de la Tour wrote from Holland that William III had, like the Emperor, refused to consider Catinat's first offer of neutrality for Italy. 25 Indeed, Catinat had serious doubts that the Allies would ever consent to the idea; he wrote the king on July 22 that he was at work on a plan of military action in the event that peace was not obtained. 26 On July 25, Leganez, Eugene, and Galway had a lengthy meeting with Victor Amadeus and Saint-Thomas. The duke later informed


24 A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 97, fol. 36, Tessé to Louis XIV, Turin, July 16, 1696.

25 Ibid., fol. 39.

Tessé that William III had written the Emperor that he would leave the
decision about the neutrality of Italy up to Leopold. Victor Amadeus
accordingly dispatched new couriers to Vienna to plead his case as
persuasively as possible. 27

In Vienna the duke's ambassador, the marquis de Prié, was
rebuffed, first by the Emperor's ministers and then by the Emperor
himself. Leopold angrily reproached Prié and threatened severe con­
sequences if his master withdrew from the League. Prié found himself
in a most difficult position; the ambassador had been surprised by
Victor's decision and even tried to persuade the duke to accept the
Emperor's offer of Montferrat and the marriage with the King of the
Romans. 28

On the heels of Prié's dispatch the Abbé Grimani—now repre­
senting the Emperor--brought the duke new letters from Vienna. The
Emperor now promised Victor Amadeus not only Montferrat and the
Imperial marriage, but also Pignerol and the restoration of his con­
quered estates, if only the duke would remain faithful to the League.
The duke replied that he would refuse, even if the Allies offered him
Milan along with Montferrat. 29

27 A.A.E., Cor. Pol. Turin, 97, fols. 53-54, Tessé to Louis
XIV, Turin, July 25, 1696.

28 Ibid., 97, fols. 60-63, Tessé to Louis XIV, Turin, July 27, 1696.

29 Ibid., 97, fol. 73, Tessé to Louis XIV, Turin, July 29, 1696.
Tessé, who tried continually to impress upon Victor Amadeus the speciousness of such offers, was heartened by the duke's response. The count was also encouraged by Victor's handling of another problem of some importance. For several weeks the allied commanders had expressed unhappiness over the position of their forces in Piedmont. Not only were they in a relatively exposed position over against the larger French army but the Milanese had been left with only a handful of troops to defend it. The duke suspected that an allied withdrawal from Piedmont would serve as a pretext for the seizure of Casale. With Casale secure, the Allies could entrench themselves in Montferrat and successfully withstand a combined Franco-Savoyard assault. When Victor Amadeus conferred with Tessé concerning the situation, they agreed to unite their two armies immediately if the Allies made the slightest movement in the direction of Casale. 30

Finally, as the result of a tumultuous meeting between the duke and the allied chiefs on July 29, it was decided that the allied forces would be allowed to withdraw into northeastern Piedmont. Two days later, Victor Amadeus informed Tessé that he had decided upon a formal separation of his forces from those of the Allies. 31 The separation ceremonies, which Tessé described as "assez froid," were held in

30Ibid., fols. 74-65.

31Ibid., 97, fols. 76-81, Tessé to Louis XIV, Turin, July 31, 1696.
Turin on August 5. After thanking the allied officers for their past support, the duke expressed his hope that he would not have to fight against them in the future. Later the same day, Victor Amadeus was overheard saying to two ladies of the court, "Enfin, Mesdames, vous pouvez conter dorenavant que nous sommes français." 32

While the separation of troops was in progress, new couriers arrived in Turin from Holland and Vienna. De la Tour wrote that William III had sent messengers to the allied capitals, exhorting them to maintain the war in Italy. William III, de la Tour informed the duke, remained unalterably opposed to a truce or particular peace for Italy. 33 The marquis de Prié wrote from Vienna that the Emperor was sending Count Mansfeld to Turin with new proposals. 34 Catinat reluctantly agreed to extend the truce in Piedmont until the end of August, so that Mansfeld would have time to present his proposals before the renewal of hostilities.

Louis XIV was encouraged by Tessé's reports of Victor Amadeus' faithfulness to the agreements of May 29. It seemed to the king that by September 1 either the Allies would have agreed to negotiate or that

32Ibid., 97, fol. 97, Tessé to Louis XIV, Turin, August 5, 1696.

33Ibid., 97, fol. 85, Tessé to Louis XIV, Turin, August 3, 1696.

34Ibid., 97, fols. 105-107, Tessé to Louis XIV, Turin, August 7, 1696. Heinrich-Franz, Count Mansfeld (1641-1715), Austrian soldier and diplomat.
hostilities would have resumed. He accordingly sent to Catinat and Tessé powers to treat with the Allies on the neutrality of Italy. 35

Tessé was to warn the Duke of Savoy that Mansfeld's mission could well be only a delaying tactic designed to retard the renewal of hostilities until late in the season. 36

By the middle of August, the military situation in Italy was approximately this: If the Allies could prevent the combined Franco-Savoyard army from moving against Casale and one or more fortresses in the Milanese, most of the allied soldiers could safely withdraw to their accustomed winter quarters in Lombardy and the Tyrol. However, if the French wintered in Montferrat at the gates of the Milanese, not only would they be in excellent position for the campaigns of the following year, but they would also force the Allies to winter in Milan at great expense to William and Leopold. Stopping a combined French-Savoyard assault on Casale and the Milanese was impossible for the Allies in their weakened condition. The Duke of Savoy clearly held the balance of power in Italy; without his support the allied armies could not prevent a successful French offensive. Therefore, with William III swearing to continue the war in Italy at all costs, and with Leopold I

35Ibid., 95, fols. 79-80, "Plein pouvoir a M. le M. al de Catinat et a M. de Tessé par convenir avec l'Emper. et le Roy d'Esp. de la Neutralité d'Italie," August 17, 1696.

36Ibid., 97, fols. 108-110, Louis XIV to Tessé, Versailles, August 17, 1696.
unwilling to consent to neutrality for Italy, the Allies pursued a policy of delay while they attempted to arrive at an accommodation with Victor Amadeus.

**The Mission of Count Mansfeld**

Count Mansfeld's mission to Turin was the most important of the Allied efforts to conciliate the duke during the summer of 1696. The count arrived in Turin on August 11 and had two audiences with Victor Amadeus the following day. Mansfeld promised the duke possession of Montferrat and Pignerol or its equivalent, together with the marriage to the King of the Romans, in return for the duke's continued loyalty to the League. Mansfeld emphasized the shame Victor Amadeus would earn in the eyes of Europe for his double-dealing. On the 13th, Saint-Thomas formally rejected the Emperor's offers. He reminded Mansfeld that the Duke of Savoy was not the only one engaged in private negotiations with the French. For some time William III's representatives had been treating privately with the French in Holland, without the knowledge or participation of Victor Amadeus—or of the Emperor, he might have added!  

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37 *Ibid.,* 97, fol. 130-132, Tessé to Louis XIV, Turin, August 14, 1696.

38 Callières and Harlay had been carrying on fitful negotiations with Borel and Dykfeldt since November, 1694. In May, 1696, the Dutch representatives had presented Callières with a serious proposal for the general peace. The negotiations, of which the Emperor was
Then, in another interview with the duke, Mansfeld played his trump card. After being informed by Victor Amadeus that his treaty with the French was already signed, Mansfeld made a counter-proposal. He told the duke that the Emperor absolutely refused to treat with the French without the participation of William III. Leopold would, however, be willing to agree to the neutrality of Piedmont until the general peace. The Emperor would promise not to approach the French frontier in Italy during the rest of the war; he would, however, continue to maintain his own forces in Lombardy and the Milanese.  

Victor Amadeus, as chance would have it, was quite taken with the proposal. He explained to Tessé that France would still be able to hold Montmélian, Susa, and the citadel of Pignerol until the general peace. Furthermore, Louis XIV would be relieved of the expense of maintaining the war in Italy. Tessé replied that there was a great difference between the neutrality of Piedmont and the neutrality of Italy. By the former, the Emperor would continue to maintain his power over the princes of Italy; the effective end of that power was a major goal of Louis XIV's treaty with the duke. Tessé reminded the duke that Pignerol was not being restored to the House of Savoy in token of belatedly informed, were proceeding apace during the summer of 1696. For details, see Legrelle, La diplomatie française, I, 457-473.

39A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 97, fols. 151-152, Tessé to Louis XIV, Turin, August 22, 1696.
Turin's neutrality, but as a sign of a new alliance with France for the neutrality of all Italy. Victor Amadeus nevertheless insisted that Tessé forward to Versailles a mémoire containing Mansfeld's proposals. The duke promised to allow Louis XIV to maintain troops in Piedmont until the general peace, if he so desired. Victor even sent a brief note to the king in his own hand, beseeching him to "reflécir avec bonté" upon Mansfeld's proposals.

Tessé was quite alarmed by the duke's interest in the scheme Mansfeld had offered. He wrote the king that once again the Duke of Savoy had fallen victim to his innate indecisiveness. There was no doubt that Victor Amadeus had dreams of glory, of fame and conquest at the head of a French army. Yet at the same time he hesitated to take command of that army and betray his once-promising alliance with the Emperor. Mansfeld's proposal of neutrality for Piedmont was an attractive prospect indeed to the Duke of Savoy: the gains of the treaty with France might still be his; the odium of outright betrayal of his former allies would not.

On the other hand, Tessé informed the king, Victor Amadeus had requested that Catinat prepare to move toward Casale on September 1. Furthermore, the duke promised to take command of the expedition no

40 Ibid., fols. 153-154.

41 The mémoire is in ibid., 97, fols. 161-165. Victor Amadeus' letter to Louis XIV is in ibid., 95, fol. 82, Turin, August 22, 1696.
later than September 15, which was well within the period allowed him by the treaty of June 29. The duke required, however, his patent of generalissimo from Louis before he could assume command. Finally, Tessé wrote, Victor Amadeus had written the Allies that he would abide by the decision of the French king in regard to the Emperor's latest offer. The duke had, nevertheless, promised Mansfeld that he would not take the field against the Allies before September 15. By that time Vienna's reply to Mansfeld's last report on his negotiations should have arrived. Versailles did not seem unduly alarmed by the duke's response to Mansfeld's proposals. Louis XIV simply rejected the idea of neutrality for Piedmont alone and ordered Catinat to march on September 1.

Meanwhile, Père Salusse, an agent of the Duke of Savoy, was sent on a secret mission to the courts of Mantua, Parma, and Modena. Salusse was to persuade the Italian princes to actively support Savoy and France against the Emperor. Louis XIV had already dispatched the marquis de Chamilly to the Grand Duke of Tuscany for the same purpose. Père Salusse was to encourage the princes of Italy to send

42 Ibid., 97, fols. 151-159, Tessé to Louis XIV, Turin, August 22, 1696.

43 Ibid., 97, fols. 146-147, Louis XIV to Tessé, Versailles, August 27, 1696.

44 Noël Bouton, marquis de Chamilly (1636-1715).
representatives to Florence and treat with Chamilly. Innocent XII had already agreed to head an Italian league against the Emperor;\textsuperscript{45} Salusse was to emphasize the Pope's continuing support for the project.

Events then followed in rapid succession. On August 29, Tessé went through the motions of publicly signing a duplicate of the original "Treaty for the Peace and Neutrality of Italy" of June 29.\textsuperscript{46} On September 1, Catinat entered Turin and presented the Duke of Savoy with his patent of generalissimo. Victor Amadeus received the French staff officers with pomp and ceremony on September 3, at which time the duke publicly promised to leave Turin on the fifteenth to take command of the combined armies. On the fourth, Catinat rejoined the main body of the French army, which had already advanced beyond Chivasso toward Casale. The French had re-opened the war in Italy.

**The Marriage Contract**

During the month of August Tessé had worked strenuously to keep the Duke of Savoy faithful to his promises. Tessé had also seen that Versailles was well informed about the course of Mansfeld's negotiations with Victor Amadeus. In addition to these matters, Tessé's

\textsuperscript{45}\textit{Ibid.}, 97, fol. 122, Tessé to Louis XIV, Turin, August 11, 1696.

\textsuperscript{46}August 29, 1696, was thus the "official" date of the Treaty of Turin or Peace of Savoy. Louis XIV ratified the treaty on September 7; \textit{ibid.}, 95, fol. 104. The peace was published in Paris on September 10; \textit{ibid.}, 95, fol. 108-109, "Ordonnance pour la publication de la Paix de Savoye," September 8, 1696.
dispatches were concerned with other subjects of greater or lesser importance.

In regard to the hostages to be exchanged upon the signing of the marriage contract, Victor Amadeus absolutely refused to accept one of Louis XIV's nominees, the duc d'Estrées. This peer of France was a kinsman of Madame Royale, which was enough to disqualify him in the eyes of the Duke of Savoy. Furthermore, Estrées was a nephew of the Cardinal Estrées, who, as a special French representative to Turin in 1679, had been involved in Madame Royale's abortive attempt to marry Victor Amadeus to the Princess of Portugal. Another candidate was clearly required. Tessé requested several times that Louis XIV name a more suitable hostage. Finally, on August 27, the king informed Tessé that he was sending the duc de Foix and the duc de Choiseul as hostages. Tessé was then ordered to inform the king concerning the proper etiquette with which the dukes could expect to be treated in Turin. After thorough investigations, Tessé sent a mémoire on the subject to Versailles on September 13.

Another matter of concern to Tessé during the period of the truce was that of the subsidy promised Victor Amadeus in the event of war.

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47 Henri-François, duc de Foix et de Candale, chevalier des ordres du Roi (d. 1714).

48 Ibid., 97, fol. 149, Louis XIV to Tessé, Versailles, August 27, 1696.

49 Ibid., 97, fol. 217, Tessé to Louis XIV, Turin, September 13, 1696.
In order to alleviate the depleted condition of the duke's treasury, Louis had agreed to pay him 100,000 écus for the first month, in advance. Tessé reminded the king of his obligation on August 3, on August 11, and once more on August 22. Tessé found it embarrassing that the duke's intendants had spoken of the matter to him "not less than ten times." It seems likely that Versailles delayed payment of the subsity until it was certain of the duke's intentions, for the money was finally sent at the end of August.

As September drew near, Tessé was increasingly concerned about the return of the Duke's conquered territories. He wrote on this subject to the king, to Pontchartrain, to Barbezieux, and to local officials such as the marquis d'Herleville at Pignerol. In the midst of all this activity he found time to recommend Herleville for the position of French ambassador to Turin, to intercede on Victor Amadeus'
behalf for the comte de Soissons, and to oversee the duke's efforts to form an Italian league against the Emperor.

Tessé also did not fail to pay his respects to Torcy upon the death of Croissy on July 28. Tessé spoke of the "long and important services Croissy had rendered to the king and to the State, and expressed to the new secretary the sympathy of the Court of Turin. Victor Amadeus later wrote a personal note to Torcy, assuring the secretary of his sympathy and good will.

The most demanding of Tessé's responsibilities during the period of the truce proved to be the drawing up of the marriage contract and the resolution of all the problems attendant upon Marie-Adélaide's trip to France. By the end of July, work was well under way on a

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55 Louis-Thomas de Savoie, comte de Soissons (1657-1702), brother of Eugene of Savoy. After attaining the rank of brigadier and maréchal de camp in the service of Louis XIV, the comte de Soissons left the country (1694) and offered his services to the Allies.


57 A. A. E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 97, fol. 114-115.

58 Ibid., 95, fol. 153, Victor Amadeus to Torcy, Valenza, September 19, 1696.

59 For a fairly full treatment of this subject, see Haussonville, La duchesse de Bourgogne, I, 133-243.
projet d'articles for the marriage contract, modeled after the one which had been drawn up three years before. The most able jurists in Turin were laboring with particular care on the renunciations which Louis XIV, Monseigneur, and the Duke of Burgundy were to make with regard to the succession to the Crown of Savoy.  

The first real difficulty arose when Victor Amadeus requested that the marriage contract be inserted into the official peace treaty between France and Savoy. Louis XIV, however, saw no reason to write the contract into the treaty. He suggested that Tessé refer the duke to the Treaty of the Pyrenees as "un exemple qu'il ne peut refuser de suivre." That treaty had provided for the royal marriage of Louis XIV to Maria-Theresa, the eldest daughter of Philip IV of Spain. On that occasion the marriage contract, including Maria-Theresa's renunciation of the Spanish inheritance, had not been a part of the treaty itself. Louis XIV, anxious to follow tradition whenever possible, was therefore on firm ground in opposing the wishes of the Duke of Savoy.

Tessé was able to persuade Victor Amadeus to agree to a separate marriage contract and renunciations without using Louis XIV's argument

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60 A. A. E., Cor. Pol. Turin, 97, fol. 51, Tessé to Croissy, Turin, July 24, 1696.

61 Ibid., 97, fol. 94, Tessé to Croissy, Turin, August 3, 1696.

62 Ibid., 97, fol. 102, Louis XIV to Tessé, Versailles, August 13, 1696.
from tradition. Indeed, as Tessé explained to the king, it was just
the example of the Treaty of the Pyrenees which had provoked Victor
Amadeus to ask for a different procedure. The duke hoped by incor-
porating the contract and renunciations into the treaty to give the
renunciations the greatest possible validity. Tessé reminded the king
that the renunciations of 1659 in regard to the Spanish inheritance had
not, after all, been regarded as valid, "comme le sçait bien Vostre
Majesté."63

Tessé sent copies of the marriage contract, along with a separate
article concerning the dowry, to Versailles on September 3. The con-
tract64 had ten articles, of which the longest was the sixth, Marie-
Adelaide's renunciation of the inheritance of Savoy. The wedding was
to take place after the princess attained the age of twelve.65 Although
the Treaty of Turin had released Victor Amadeus from paying a dowry,
the duke promised, in Article 2 of the marriage contract, to give his
daughter en dot the sum of 200,000 écus, "payable de la maniere qu'il
a esté convenu a part." The meaning of this phrase was clarified by

63Ibid., 97, fol. 176, Tessé to Louis XIV, Turin, August 28,
1696. Tessé is referring to Louis' claims on the Spanish Netherlands,
which served as a pretext for the War of Devolution (1667-1668).

64Ibid., 97, fols. 186-192, "Contrat de Mariage de Mgr. le Duc
de Bourgogne avec M.e La P.$se Marie Adelaide de Savoye." Also,
ibid., 95, fol. 94-103. See Appendix E.

65On December 6, 1697. The wedding was, in fact, held the
the separate article agreed to on the same day. By it, Louis XIV discharged the duke payment of the dot in return for a quittance of the 100,000 scus still owed on the dowry of Duchess Anne and for indemnification of the duke for "des frais de la guerre." Thus the Duke of Savoy, while ostensibly obliging himself to pay a sizable dowry to his daughter, was actually released from any such obligation.

Furthermore, by Article 3, Louis XIV agreed to assign to the princess income-producing properties which would "insure" the dot at an annual rate of 5%. In addition, the king granted Marie-Adelaide as a douaire an income of 20,000 scus annually. Thus the king in effect paid both the dot and the douaire of the Princess of Savoy.67 Louis XIV sent his ratification of the marriage contract, along with those of the Dauphin and the Duke of Burgundy, on September 16.68 The formal signing of the contract had been held the previous day at the ducal palace in Turin amid great pomp and circumstance. Tessé, performing for the first time in his new position of premier écuyer to

66A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 97, fols. 193-194, "Contrat a part de Constitution de Dot que Sa Majesté tres Chrestienne fait a Madame La Princesse Marie Adelaide de Savoye."

67Ibid., fols. 187-188.

68Ibid., 97, fol. 210, Louis XIV to Tessé, Versailles, September 16, 1696; Ibid., 95, fols. 150-151. The date on the original of the ratification was left blank; September 25 was inscribed after the formal signing of the contract in Turin on September 15.
Marie-Adelaide,\footnote{69} escorted the princess through the three-hour ceremony. The duke and duchess, together with the entire court, were unmistakably joyful over the union which had been decreed.\footnote{70}

Two problems still remained, however; both were connected with the journey Marie-Adelaide was to make to France. The time of her departure from Turin was left in suspense until early in October. Since June, Victor Amadeus had been evasive about the date of his daughter's departure. Early in September he begged Louis XIV to allow the princess to stay in Turin until the following spring. The duke pleaded her tender age and the approach of autumn as reason for the delay.\footnote{71} The king was, however, of a different mind; he insisted that the princess leave Turin by the end of September at the latest.\footnote{72}

While Tessé tried to get the duke to send his daughter as early as possible to France, a related problem engaged the count's attention. \footnote{72}\footnote{69}Tessé had solicited the appointment in his letter to the king of August 25. As it happened, Louis had already decided to confer the honor on Tessé. Barbezieux to Tessé, Versailles, September 6, 1696; cited by Haussonneville, La duchesse de Bourgogne, I, 175-176.
\footnote{70}A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 97, fols. 218-220, Tessé to Louis XIV, Turin, September 15, 1696.
\footnote{71}Ibid., 97, fol. 181, Tessé to Louis XIV, Turin, September 3, 1696.
\footnote{72}Ibid., 97, fols. 202-203, Louis XIV to Tessé, Versailles, September 9, 1696.
How and where would the exchange of the princess be conducted?
Louis XIV had originally expressed the hope that the princess would be escorted to France by her mother, Duchess Anne; if that were possible, he and "Monsieur" would receive the ladies at Nevers. 73 However, since Victor Amadeus did not wish to grant his wife the pleasure of seeing her father and uncle, Tessé was unable to gain his consent to the king's proposal. 74 It was finally decided that the exchange would take place at the small village of Pont-de-Beauvoisin, on the Guiers River between France and the Duchy of Savoy. From there the princess would be escorted to Fontainebleau, where she would be received by the king and the entire Court.

A more serious difficulty developed over whether any of Marie-Adelaide's attendants would be allowed to remain with her once she was safely in France. From the beginning, Louis XIV wanted no one from the princess' suite to cross into France. Victor Amadeus insisted that at least a governess, two femmes de chambre, and a physician accompany his daughter and remain with her in France. Tessé suggested that the king compromise and allow the princess' attendants to remain in France for two or three months. 75

73 Ibid., 97, fol. 44, Louis XIV to Tessé, Marly, July 26, 1696.
74 Ibid., 97, fols. 119-120, Tessé to Louis XIV, Turin, August 11, 1696.
75 Ibid., fol. 121.
The king would not hear of it. He was certain that the ladies he was appointing to serve the princess would be acceptable to her; the physician he assigned should also be sufficient. 76 Tessé found both the princess and her mother willing to accept Louis' wishes; the duke, however, was not. 77 Louis XIV then ordered the duchesse de Lude not to allow any lady from Turin to cross the river at Pont-de-Beauvoisin. 78 On the eve of Marie-Adélaïde's departure from Turin, the king still held firm. 79

Tessé, on the other hand, had vainly sought to win the duke's consent. In desperation, Tessé finally agreed to allow two femmes de chambre and a physician to accompany Marie-Adélaïde to Fontainebleau; they were to return to Turin within five or six months, however, or by the time of the wedding at the latest. Tessé begged Louis XIV to accept the compromise and inform the duchesse de Lude accordingly. 80

76 Ibid., 97, fol. 125, Louis XIV to Tessé, Versailles, August 20, 1696.

77 Ibid., 97, fol. 218, Tessé to Louis XIV, Turin, September 13, 1696.

78 Ibid., 97, fol. 211, Louis XIV to Tessé, Versailles, September 16, 1696.

79 Ibid., 97, fol. 252, Louis XIV to Tessé, Versailles, September 20, 1696.

80 Ibid., 97, fol. 260-261, Tessé to Louis XIV, Valenza, September 27, 1696.
The king appreciated the difficult situation in which Tessé found himself. He consequently ordered the duchesse de Lude to allow the two ladies and the physician to travel with Marie-Adelaide to Fontainebleau. However, the king informed Tessé that it was his intention to send the princess' attendants back to Turin on the day after their arrival at Fontainebleau. Tessé was charged to reveal Louis' intention to the Duke of Savoy only after Marie-Adelaide was securely in France.  

Vigevano

While Tessé fretted over the details of Marie-Adelaide's trip to France, the French and Savoyard armies moved down the Po and occupied Casale on September 8. Catinat's original plan was to lay siege to Alessandria on the Tanaro; then it was decided that the important fortress of Valenza was a more suitable objective. Catinat therefore camped at Sartirana, about seven miles from Valenza, while he waited for Victor Amadeus to take command.

In Turin, the allied leaders were overcome by confusion. Leganez had for some time shown himself inclined toward accepting the neutrality of Italy. Indeed, an open split had developed between Leganez and Mansfeld on the matter. A few days after the departure of Catinat on

81Ibid., 97, fols. 263-264, Louis XIV to Tessé, Versailles, October 2, 1696.

82Ibid., 97, fol. 116, Tessé to Louis XIV, Turin, August 11, 1696.
September 4, Leganez informed Victor Amadeus that he had received from Madrid powers to accord the neutrality of Italy, subject to the Emperor's approval. Mansfeld was surprised and angry when told of Madrid's decision, but he could only wait for further instructions from Vienna. 83

On the afternoon of September 15, after the ceremonial signing of the marriage contract, Victor Amadeus held a lengthy meeting with Mansfeld, but with no result. With time running out—Tessé and Victor Amadeus were leaving the next day to join Catinat—the Austrian representative made several proposals which gave promise of an accord. 84 Mansfeld proposed, first of all, that negotiations be carried on by letter between Turin and Milan while the war continued. In the event that the Emperor and King of Spain agreed to peace in Italy, it was desired by the Allies that the Republic of Venice serve as sole guarantor of the treaty; the Emperor considered Pope Innocent XII to be "a Frenchman" and therefore unacceptable as a guarantor. It was also necessary that the King of Spain and the Emperor make the treaty for the neutrality of Italy with Victor Amadeus alone; France could then give its separate approval of the treaty to the duke. Any conquests made in Milan would

83 Ibid., 97, fols. 212-213, Tessé to Louis XIV, Turin, September 13, 1696.

84 Ibid., 97, fols. 222-225, Tessé to Louis XIV, Turin, September 15, 1696.
be returned; the French would withdraw from Italy at a rate proportionate to that of the Germans; the Emperor would be indemnified to the amount of 300,000 pistoles by the Italian princes for the greater expense to him of winter quarters in Germany. Finally, the Emperor requested that the treaty be for a "suspension of arms (or truce) until the general peace," rather than for the "neutrality of Italy." The latter phrase was, Mansfeld claimed, repugnant to the dignity of the Emperor.

Louis XIV was gratified to learn of Mansfeld's proposals; it appeared to the king that the neutralization of Italy was finally within reach. In regard to the substance of the proposals, Louis insisted that the Pope be a guarantor of the treaty; he could not believe that the Emperor would deny this honor to the "chef d'Église." Tessé was forbidden to agree to the return of any conquests in the Milanese in advance of the treaty itself, since once they were assured of this the Allies would be in no hurry to conclude the treaty. Furthermore, the king declared that Mansfeld and Leganez should treat directly with the representatives of France as well as with the Duke of Savoy. The principle of a reciprocal withdrawal of troops from Italy was acceptable to France. The matter of an indemnity for the Emperor from the Italian

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85 Ibid., 97, fols. 227-228.
86 Ibid., 97, fols. 229-230, Louis XIV to Tessé, Versailles, September 21, 1696.
princes was, Louis felt, not his concern. Finally, the exact term used to describe the purpose of the treaty—"truce," "suspension of arms," "neutrality of Italy"—was a matter of indifference to the king, as long as the treaty got the Germans out of Italy! 87

Victor Amadeus and Tessé left Turin on the afternoon of September 16 and arrived the next day at Catinat's camp at Sartirana. The combined armies completed the investment of Valenza on the 19th. 88 The following day the marquis de Saint-Thomas was summoned to meet with Mansfeld and Leganez in Pavia.

Saint-Thomas returned to the camp before Valenza in the evening of September 21, bearing a list of twenty-two "difficulties" raised by the allied leaders. 89 In his letter to Louis XIV of September 23, Tessé reduced the "difficulties" to the following points: The Emperor still refused to treat with France, as an action contrary to his obligations to the League. The allied representatives therefore again proposed that they make a treaty with Victor Amadeus for the neutrality of Italy. The French would then sign a separate act with the duke, promising to respect the neutrality. What was new in the proposal was that Victor

87 Ibid., 97, fols. 234-235.
88 Tessé, Mémoires, I, 75.
89 A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin 97, fols. 246-248, "Difficultez qui se rencontrent pour convenir du repos d'Italie proposées par M.rs de Mansfeld & Leganez. Réponces que nous y avons faites."
Amadeus himself would guarantee the execution of the treaty.

Another problem was the manner and time of the German withdrawal from Italy: if the troops returned to Germany by way of the Grisons, the withdrawal would be slow and arduous. Their withdrawal could be accomplished much sooner if they exited by way of Venice and the Tyrol. For the latter procedure permission would first have to be gotten from the Republic of Venice. Leganez strongly desired agreement on the return of conquests in the Milanese. Rather than waiting until the receipt of ratifications, the allied leaders also desired an immediate suspension of arms upon the signing of the treaty. Finally, in regard to the nature of guarantees for the execution of the treaty, Mansfeld and Leganez suggested that each side give hostages to Victor Amadeus as security for its fidelity.90

Tessé felt that the proposals of the Allies were reasonable and wrote Louis XIV for further instructions. Of particular concern to the count was the question whether military operations should cease upon the signing of the treaty or upon receipt of the ratifications of Vienna and Madrid. It appeared that while the Emperor was at last willing to accord the neutrality of Italy, he deeply distrusted France's intentions in the matter. Leganez, on the other hand, was doing all

90Ibid., 97, fol. 240-243, Tessé to Louis XIV, Valenza, September 23, 1696.
he could to bring about a settlement; Mansfeld and especially Galway continued to create difficulties. 91

Louis XIV was reluctant to agree to a suspension of arms before ratifications were received from the allied capitals. He also thought it rather strange that Victor Amadeus, the generalissimo of one of the opposing armies, should serve as guarantor of the peace in Italy; nevertheless, the king gave his approval to the idea. To facilitate the signing of the treaty, Louis now accepted the principle of the return of any territories conquered in the Milanese. Tessé could even promise Leganez that if Valenza were surrendered to the French, no further conquests would be attempted by the combined armies before the end of October. 92 Clearly, the achievement of peace in Italy was uppermost in the king's mind. Any dreams of conquest still entertained by the Duke of Savoy would have to be laid to rest.

Finally, at Vigevano on October 7, Mansfeld, Leganez, and Saint-Thomas put their signatures to a "Traité de suspension d'Armes en Italie" 93 which incorporated most of the principles already agreed to.

91 Ibid., fols. 244-245.

92 Ibid., 97, fols. 250-253, Louis XIV to Tessé, Versailles, September 30, 1696.

93 Ibid., 95, fols. 208-213 (Tessé's original copy of the treaty, with his annotations, sent to Versailles on October 10, 1696). See also ibid., 95, fols. 199-201; and ibid., 95, fols. 188-195, Traité de Suspension d'Armes en Italie Conclu à Vigevano le septième Octobre, 1696 (Paris: Frédéric Léonard, 1697). See Appendix F.
By Article 1, Mansfeld and Leganez pledged to Victor Amadeus a suspension of arms in Italy until the general peace. The Duke of Savoy, for his part, pledged the same to "la maison D'autriche" and to the Most Christian King. By this rather awkward means, France was indirectly made a party to the Treaty of Vigevano. The cessation of hostilities was to begin immediately, with the siege of Valenza ceasing within two days. Leganez had insisted on this point and Tessé had reluctantly agreed to it.

By Article 2, Victor Amadeus undertook to negotiate the general peace between Louis XIV and the Allies. Tessé explained, in his notation to the article, that Louis had the right to refuse the Duke's services in this capacity, if he so desired. The Emperor, it seemed, wanted "une porte a traiter avec plus d'avantage qu'en holande ou L'on songe peu a ses Interres." The reciprocal, proportionate withdrawal of French and German troops from Italy was decreed in Article 3. It was declared to be "juste" that France return Montmélián, Susa, and the citadel of Pignerol to Victor Amadeus. All was to be done in the shortest time practicable. By mentioning the return of the duke's fortresses and the citadel of Pignerol in the Treaty of Vigevano, the

94A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 95, fol. 209.

95Ibid. The reference is to Dijkstra and Boreel's negotiations with Callières. Leopold feared the Dutch were willing to sacrifice Strasbourg and Lorraine to a settlement with France advantageous to themselves; Legrelle, La diplomatie française, I, 468-470.
Emperor sought to preserve the appearance that Victor Amadeus' good fortune was in some degree the result of Imperial munificence. Louis XIV was irritated by the clause, but let it stand.96

Article 4 provided for the Emperor's indemnity of 300,000 écus from the princes of Italy. Tessé explained to the king that the representatives of the princes were so grateful for the withdrawal of the Imperial forces that they would have consented to a sum twice as large. The Italian princes had 100,000 écus on hand, which would be paid immediately; whether the Emperor received payment of the balance was an open question in Tessé's mind. Both Leganez and Victor Amadeus told the French negotiator that they would do no more than bother the princes by letter about the matter.97 Each side promised to give two hostages to Victor Amadeus as security for its fulfillment of the treaty. Ratifications were to be received from Vienna within one month, from Madrid within two months. Tessé noted that Leganez expected Spain's ratification much sooner, but that "Les Longeurs de madrid sont connues, ..."98 A separate article was added to the treaty declaring that "cette suspension d'armes et neutralité jusqu'à la paix générale" would extend to all of Italy. Tessé observed ironically:

96A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 95, fol. 211
97Ibid., 97, fols. 211-212. 98Ibid., fol. 213.
Il a bien fallu Leur lever le fantasie que L'on vouloit bombarder napes. Et apres toute L'horreur qu'ils avoient par Le mot de neutralité Ce sont eux qui ont demandé que L'on L'Inserast comme il est.99

The three plenipotentiaries at Vigevano also signed a secret article providing for the temporary subsistence of the French troops in the Milanese and for the mutual withdrawal from Italy. Victor Amadeus was to return with his troops to Turin, there to receive the promised hostages, by October 11. In addition to the two regular hostages from the Allies, Leganez promised that either he or Mansfeld would always be in Turin until the receipt of the ratifications of the Emperor and the King of Spain.100

When Saint-Thomas returned to Victor Amadeus' camp with the treaty of peace on October 8, the siege operations against Valenza were promptly halted. Tessé and Victor Amadeus arrived in Turin on the 11th, four days after Marie-Adelaide had left for France.101 The Treaty of Vigevano was ratified by Louis XIV on October 22, by

99Ibid., 95, fols. 203-206.

100Ibid., fol. 207. See also the letter from Leganez to Victor Amadeus, ibid., 95, fol. 187, Vigevano, October 7, 1696.

101Tessé, Mémoires, I, 77. Grimoard says that Tessé accompanied Marie-Adelaide to Fontainebleau before returning to Turin. This is clearly erroneous, since Tessé was one of the two French hostages in Turin for the Treaty of Vigevano. He did not leave Turin until the following year; Dangeau, Journal, VI, 6.
the Emperor on October 29, and by the King of Spain on November 8. The war in Italy was over.

**Pont-de-Beauvoisin**

The duc de Foix and the duc de Choiseul had received their instructions from Louis XIV on September 8. While serving as hostages for the Treaty of Turin, they were to impress upon Marie-Adele de France the king's desire "de la Voir et de prendre les meme soins de Son Education, qu'Elle peut attendre de la tendresse d'un Pere." On the day the two peers left for Turin, the comte de Brionne received powers and instructions from the king for his mission to receive Marie-Adele into France. The sieur Desgranges,

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103 Beaucaire, erroneously, reads "de l'avoir"; *Savoie-Sardaigne*, I, 181.


106 Michel Ancel, sieur des Granges (d. 1731).
master of ceremonies to the king, received his orders for the same occasion on September 22. The major positions in the princess' suite were given to the duchesse de Lude, dame d'honneur, the marquis Dangeau, chevalier d'honneur, and the comtesse de Mailly, dame d'atours to the princess. Tesse had been, of course, already appointed premier écuyer.

Marie-Adélaïde left Turin on October 7, accompanied by Duchess Anne and Madame Royale. Escorted by the marquis de Dronoero, the princess took leave of her mother and grandmother at Avigliana on the eighth. Because her journey was slowed by ceremonies in almost every town along the route, she only reached Chambéry on October 13. The French welcoming party, which had been waiting impatiently at Lyon since September 30, then traveled to Pont-de-Beauvoisin. There, on October 16, the comte de Brionne extended his hand to "Madame la Duchesse de Bourgogne." On November 5, she was received by Louis XIV and the Court at Fontainebleau.

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107 Marguerite-Louise de Bethune, duchesse de Lude (d. 1726); Philippe de Courcillon, marquis de Dangeau (1638-1720); Marie-Anne-Françoise de Saint-Hermiène, comtesse de Mailly (d. 1734).

108 Much of the correspondence concerning Marie-Adélaïde's trip to France is in A.A.E., Cor. Poll, Turin, 95 and 97. A large selection has been printed in Gagnière, Marie-Adélaïde de Savoie, pp. 73-151.

Consequences

The effects of the secret treaties signed by Tessé and Saint-Thomas on June 29, 1696, extended beyond the creation of a new alliance between France and Savoy and the achievement of peace in Italy. Important as these may have been, there were other consequences of perhaps greater significance for the future of Europe.

The most obvious beneficiary of 1696 was the Duke of Savoy. Victor Amadeus had been able to oust the French not only from Casale—thenceforth in the hands of the Duke of Mantua—but also from Pignerol, the possession of which he had coveted for so many years. Freed at last from the threat of encirclement by French arms, the duke had, by the same stroke, freed himself from the danger posed by Imperial forces in Italy. The House of Savoy had, indeed, begun to fashion the tradition of itself as the champion of Italian liberty, a tradition that would be put to good use in the more distant future.

Victor Amadeus also gained the prestige attached to the marriage of Marie-Adelaide to the Duke of Burgundy. The grandeur of this union was augmented in 1701 by the marriage of Adelaide's younger sister, Marie-Louise, to Louis XIV's second grandson, Philip V of Spain, the former Duke of Anjou. As subsequent events would show, the new alliance, or, better, alignment with France symbolized by these unions was hardly as important to Victor Amadeus as the honor the marriages
brought to the House of Savoy.

On the debit side, however, the Duke of Savoy did gain the permanent mistrust of the Emperor and the lasting hatred of William III. Indeed, the King of England never forgave Victor Amadeus for his treachery. It may be supposed that as much as the duke regretted the loss of his former allies' esteem, the benefits he had obtained from France made it possible for him to bear their enmity without undue pain.

For Louis XIV the treaties of 1696 meant the end of a long and costly war on his south-eastern frontier. The king could now devote the men and money hitherto expended on the stalemate in Italy to more productive uses on the Rhine or in Flanders. Catinat's successful siege of the city of Ath in May, 1697, was a token of the benefit France received from the treaties of 1696.

It may be questioned, however, whether the gains to France outweighed the losses. The loss of Casale and especially of Pignerol was recognized by many at the time to have meant the end of all that France had worked for in Italy since the time of Richelieu. Indeed, for Vauban it was the loss of Pignerol which made the Peace of Ryswick

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the greatest blow suffered by France since the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis.\textsuperscript{113}

For the Emperor, the treaties of 1696 meant the end of his hopes' for a resolution of the war by means of an allied victory in Italy and a consequent invasion of France. More importantly, he was prevented from pressing his claims to the Spanish inheritance by weight of Imperial arms in Italy. Madrid could view the future of the Spanish inheritance with greater equanimity after the withdrawal of the Imperial armies from the Milanese. Finally, Leopold I lost, for a time, the exercise of Imperial sovereignty over the princes of Italy, which he had enjoyed during the war. Only the will of Carlos II, which provided the prospect of French hegemony over the peninsula, would force the princes to submit again to the Emperor's authority.

The events of 1696 did not leave Leopold without some tangible gain, however. William III might rightly doubt that the Emperor would employ the 14,000 troops freed by Vigevano for service on the Rhine.\textsuperscript{114} Leopold was in serious difficulty in the Balkans in 1696, where the Turks were pressing his forces badly. It was there that units of the Emperor's Italian army, along with its field commander, Prince Eugene, were sent. The transfer of Eugene to the Turkish war was the only


real benefit to the Emperor from the treaties of 1696. Nevertheless, Eugene, with the men and money denied him in Italy, would go from victory to victory against the Turks in 1697. The gains of the Treaty of Carlowitz were therefore in part the happy if fortuitous result of the Emperor's losses from the Treaty of Turin.115

For war-torn Europe, the treaties of Turin and Vigevano opened the way to the general peace.116 William III, hard-pressed by Parliament and the Estates-General to bring a speedy conclusion to the conflict, found Louis XIV willing to recognize the succession of 1689 and to treat on Strasbourg. On September 3, Heinsius notified the Allies that the French had indicated their readiness to conclude a general peace. The Estates-General issued a call for a peace conference with the mediation of Sweden; the first public steps on the road to Ryswick had been taken.

The Peace of Ryswick, in conjunction with the Treaty of Carlowitz of 1699, signaled the emergence of a new balance of power in Europe.117 The emergence of England and Habsburg Austria as great powers able to effectively check France's ambitions in Europe was not the least of

116For details, see Legrelle, La diplomatie française, I, 456-515.
the legacies of Ryswick. In this new situation the Treaty of Turin had played an important role. Tessé and Gropello, while they negotiated secretly at Pignerol from 1693 to 1696, could hardly have foreseen the ultimate consequences of their labors.
CONCLUSIONS

The Savoy negotiations of Count Tessé reveal a great deal about the nature of diplomacy in seventeenth-century Europe. One is struck, first of all, by the obvious yet sometimes forgotten connection between diplomacy on the one hand and military and economic realities on the other. Louis XIV's success in bringing Victor Amadeus to the conference table was, indeed, in inverse proportion to the success of the Duke of Savoy and his allies on the battlefield. Conversely, it was only when the King of France was driven by adverse economic conditions in France during the latter stages of the war in Italy that he granted the concessions—Casale and Pignerol—which had been desired by Victor Amadeus from the beginning.

Again, as long as the Duke of Savoy had hope of obtaining Pignerol by conquest he remained relatively faithful to the Grand Alliance. It is quite likely that Victor Amadeus planned from the beginning to use his negotiations with the French in 1693 as a lever to wrest the particular gains he desired from the Emperor. Failing in this, the Duke of Savoy was able to reopen his negotiations with the French king on the basis of what had already been agreed to in 1693 and seek from Versailles what had been denied him by Vienna.
The Savoy negotiations also throw some light on the functions of the French secretaries of state for war and foreign affairs in the conduct of diplomacy. Through the time of Chamlay's mission in 1692, Louvois and Barbezieux seem to have played a greater role than Croissy in Versailles' attempts to detach Victor Amadeus from his allies. From the beginnings of Tessé's negotiations in 1693, however, Croissy became the principal intermediary between Tessé and Louis XIV. As Catinat's second-in-command on the Italian front, Tessé still had a continuing responsibility to report to Barbezieux as well. While the count's dispatches to Barbezieux did not diminish in frequency, after 1693 they were concerned with more purely military matters. The negotiations which led to the capitulation of Casale in 1695 might appear to have been an exception to this rule, but military and political factors---difficult to distinguish as they normally are in time of war---were particularly intertwined in the specific act of the surrender of the fortress and town of Casale. It was quite appropriate, therefore, that the matter be handled through Barbezieux's office.¹

The return of Pignerol to the Duke of Savoy was another matter, however. It was but one, albeit a most important, provision of a treaty of peace and alliance which included a host of other matters, including the marriage of Marie-Adelaide to the Duke of Burgundy.

¹See above, Chapter III.
Although the making of peace treaties might not exclude the active participation of the secretary for war, the activity—at least after the death of Louvois—was more naturally in the hands of the secretary for foreign affairs. Ultimately, of course, policy was determined by the king working through his ministers. The fact that the king did not invest the same confidence in Barbezieux that he had given to Louvois may also have played a part in the ascendancy of the foreign minister.

As far as the negotiators themselves were concerned, it is interesting to note that while Tessé and Gropello were furnished with rather explicit instructions from their respective governments, they both, at critical moments in the negotiation, went beyond their instructions, albeit with quite different results. Tessé, in the final negotiations of June, 1696, contrary to his instructions, allowed an extension of the truce until the end of September. Although this meant that joint French-Savoyard action against the Allies might not begin until quite late in the season, Louis XIV reluctantly accepted the arrangement. When, in the treaties of May 29, Gropello allowed the French to retain Pignerol until the achievement of peace in Italy, the concession was disallowed by Victor Amadeus and the negotiator

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3 See above, p. 138.
suffered official disgrace. The conclusion of a treaty with the Duke of Savoy was more important to Louis XIV than the duration of the truce. For Victor Amadeus, on the other hand, no treaty was as valuable as the immediate possession of Pignerol.

Another feature of the negotiations was the growth in both Tessé and Gropello of the sense of a stake in the success of their labors. Tessé's anxiety over the Duke of Savoy's fickleness and Gropello's despair when he wrote Tessé on June 1 of the duke's disavowal of their work, seem to be expressions of more than merely "official" concern.

It is difficult to know what influence Tessé's advice may have had in the counsels of the king. Sometimes the count's suggestions were followed, sometimes they were not. It is interesting that even when Catinat and Tessé both advised Louis to consent to the return of Pignerol to the Duke of Savoy, the French king only grudgingly agreed to give up the place. There can be little doubt that Louis XIV did not dismiss lightly the opinions of those representatives in whom he had confidence. Tessé appears, if we may believe the king's letters, to have been among those whose judgment the king trusted. Yet even here Louis knew his own mind, as when he rejected Tessé's

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4Above, p. 142.

5Above, p. 103.
suggestion of the equivalency of Montmélian and Susa to Nice and Villefranche as places of security.\textsuperscript{6}

The Savoy negotiations of Count Tessé are instructive, in the last analysis, because of the insights they give the twentieth-century historian into the world of seventeenth-century diplomacy. By tracing the twists and turns of Tessé's negotiations, with apparent achievement so often followed by frustrating delay and reversal, there emerges in one's mind an appreciation of the validity and integrity of an activity which has played so important a part in shaping the history of man. When one has discounted the romantic and melodramatic aspects of the negotiation (the secrecy, the disguises, the nocturnal meetings), there remains the solid stuff of human affairs, interesting in itself and for its larger consequences in the history of its own time.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{6}Above, pp. 118-120.}
APPENDIX B.

The House of Savoy

Catherine of Spain = Charles Emmanuel I
(1567-1597) (1562-1630)

Christine of France = Victor Amadeus I
(Madame Royale Christine) (1587-1637)
(1606-1663)

Marie-Jeanne-Baptiste of Savoy-Nemours
(Madame Royale) (1644-1724)

Charles Emmanuel II
(1634-1675)

Emmanuel Philippe
Prince of Carignan
(1628-1709)

Anne-Marie of Orleans
(1669-1728)

Victor Amadeus II
(1666-1732)

Marie-Adelaide
(1685-1712)

Marie-Louise
(1688-1714)

Charles Emmanuel III
(1701-1773)
## APPENDIX C.

**Mémoires of the comte de Saint Maiole, 1693-1695**

(A.A.E., Cor. Pol., Turin, 94)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Principal Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. January, 1693</td>
<td>The war in Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. October, 1693</td>
<td>Italian affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Late 1693</td>
<td>The war in Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 1694</td>
<td>The war in Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 1694</td>
<td>The war in Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. February, 1695</td>
<td>Casale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. February, 1695</td>
<td>Casale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. March, 1695</td>
<td>Casale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. May 8, 1695</td>
<td>Siege of Casale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. June, 1695</td>
<td>Siege of Casale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. October, 1695</td>
<td>Pignerol and the war in Italy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX D.

The Treaties of June 29, 1696

Traité de Paix entre la France et la Savoye


I.

Qu'il y aura doresnavant pour toujours une Paix stable & sincère entre le Roy & son Royaume, & son Altesse Royale Monsieur le Duc de Savoye, & ses Etats, comme si elle n'avait jamais esté troublée; & le Roy reprenant les memes sentiments de bonté qu'il avoit auparavant pour sadite A. R. comme elle l'en supplie, sadite A. R. renonce par le present Traité, & se depart entierement de tout engagement pris & de tous Traitez faits avec l'Empereur, Rois & Princes contenus sous le nom de la Ligue, & se charge d'employer tous ses soins & de faire tout ce qu'il pourra pour obtenir desdites Puissances, au moins de l'Empereur & Roy Catholique, la Neutralité pour l'Italie jusqu'à la Paix generale, par un Traité particulier qui sera fait, ou au defaut dudit Traité, par des Declarations que lesdits Empereur & Roy Catholique seront au Pape & a la Republique de Venise, & qui seront en même temps suivies de la
retraite de toutes les Troupes que les Alliez ont présentement en
Italie, ainsi qu'il sera marqué cy-après. Et faute par les susdits
Princes de donner leur consentement à ladite Neutralité d'Italie, sur
la requisition que son A. R. en sera à l'Empereur & au Roy Catholique,
S.A.R. s'engage avec le Roy à une Ligue offensive & défensive
jusqu'à la Paix générale, agissant conjointement avec les Troupes de
S.M. & les siennes, comme de bons & loyaux Alliez doivent faire
pour un même intérêt, & pour faire la guerre contre l'Etat de Milan,
& contre tous ceux qui voudront s'opposer à l'effet du présent Traité.
Au surplus pour témoignage évident du retour effectif de l'amitié du
Roy pour Son A. R. Sa Majesté veut bien consentir & promet que la
Ville & Citadelle de Pignerol, Forts de Sainte Brigitte, le Perouse &
arbres Forts en dépendants, soient razez & démolis, quant aux seules
Fortifications, aux frais du Roy; & lesdites Fortifications démolies,
le tout sera remis entre les mains de S.A.R. aussi bien que les Terres
& Domaines compris sous le nom du Gouvernement de Pignerol, &
qui avoient appartenu à la Maison de Savoie devant la cession que
Victor Amé premier Duc de ce Nom en avoir faite au Roy Louis XIII.
lesquelles Ville démolie, Citadelle & Forts démolis & Territoire
seront pareillement remis à S.A.R. pour les tenir en Souveraineté,
& en jouir pleinement & à perpetualité & elle & ses Successeurs à
l'avenir, comme d'une chose leur appartenant en propre; au moyen de
laquelle presente cession S.A.R. s'engage & promet tant pour luy que
pour ses Heritiers & Successeurs, & ayans cause, de ne faire rebâtr
ni rétablir aucune des susdites Fortifications, ni en faire construire
de nouvelles sur & dans l'espace des susdits territoires, fonds &
rochers, ni en quelque autre lieu que ce soit, cédé par le présent
Traité, suivant lequel il sera seulement loisible à S.A.R. ou aux
Habitants de Pignerol, de fermer ledit Pignerol d'une simple clôture
de muraille, non terrassée & sans Fortifications; bien entendu qu'hormis
dans ledit Territoire cédé par le présent Traité, S.A.R. sera en liberté
de faire construire telles Places ou Fortifications qu'elle jugera à
propos, sans que le Roy le puisse aucunement trouver mauvais.
Qu'en outre S. M. remettra à Sadite A. R. ses Pays & Places conquis,
Châteaux de Montmelland, de Nice, Villefranche, de Suze, & autres,
sans exception, sans démolition & dans leur entier, avec la quantité
de munitions de guerre & de bouche, canons & artillerie, tout ainsi
qu'elles estoient pourvues & munies alors qu'elles ont tombées entre
les mains de S.M. sans qu'il puisse estre touché aux bastimens, For-
tifications, augmentations & améliorations faites par S.M. & après la
restitution desdites Places S.A.R. pourra entretenir & augmenter les
Fortifications comme choses à luy appartenantes, sans que sur cela
le Roy puisse ni l'inquieter ni le trouver mauvais: bien entendu que
le Roy retirera de la Ville, Citadelle & Forts de Pignerol toutes les
artilleries, munitions de guerre & de bouche, armes & effets amovibles
de quelque nature qu'ils soient. Qu'à l'égard des revenus de la Ville, dépendances & Territoire de Pignerol, le Roy les remet à S.A.R. de la même forme & maniere que le Roy en jouit presentement, & les dispositions que le Roy peut en avoir faites, subsisteront de la forte portée par leur Contract, Don, Possession ou Acquission. Que ladite restitution des Pays & Places de S.A.R. & remise de Pignerol rasé, & ses dépendances comme dessus, se sera ensuite de la signature du present Traité, & seulement après que les Troupes étrangeres seront effectivement sorties d'Italie, & seront arrivées; scavoire, les Allemands, Troupes de Baviere, Brandebourg, Religionnaires soldoyez par l'Angleterre, & autres Troupes Auxiliaires, seront arrivées réellement en Allemagne; & les Espagnols & autres Troupes qui sont presentement à la solde du Roy Catholique, retournées dans le Milanois, en maniere que l'execution d'aucun des Articles ni restitution d'aucune Place n'aura lieu qu'après que ladite sortie des Troupes, telle qu'elle vient d'estre exprimée, aura esté entierement accomplie; bien entendu que ladite sortie des Troupes étrangeres sera censée entierement accomplie, quoi-qu'il arrivast, comme cela se pourroit, que les Espagnols en retirassent quelque petit nombre d'hommes pour recruter les Corps qui sont à leur solde. Et s'il y a quelques-unes des susdites Troupes qui prennent parti & entrent reellement dans les États de la Republique de Venise, elles seront censées estre rentrées en Allemagne des qu'elles seront sur l'Etat Venitien, & remises à ladite Republique de Venise; & après la ratification du present Traité, l'on travaillera incessamment aux fourneaux necessaires pour la démolition des susdites Ville, Citadelle & Forts de Pignerol. Mais au cas que S.A.R. jugeast à propos de continuer le secret du present Traité au delà du terme de ladite Ratification, il est convenu pour éviter l'éclat que pourroit faire le travail desdits fourneaux, qu'on ne le commencerà que quand après le temps de ladite Ratification S.A.R. le voudra; laquelle démolition se sera, & l'on y travaillera en maniere que deux ou trois mois après la sortie des Troupes cy dessus marquée, le tout soit remis à S.A.R. sur quoy il sera loisible d'envoyer un Commissaire pour y assister. Et jusqu'à l'exécution de ce que dessus, S.M. veut bien pour la plus grande satisfaction de S.A.R. lui faire remettre, lorsqu'il en requerra S.M. deux Ducs & Pairs pour rester en ostage entre les mains de Sadite A. R. qui les traitera selon la dignité de leur rang.

II.

Que Sa Majesté ne fera aucun Traité de Paix ni de Trève avec l'Empereur ni le Roy Catholique, que S.A.R. n'y soit comprise dans des termes convenables & efficaces, & que le present Traité sera confirmé dans celuy de la Paix Generale, aussi-bien que ceux de Querasque, de Munster, Pirenées & Nimègue, tant pour les quatre
cens quatre-vingt quatorze mille Ecus d'or, qui sont mentionnez parti-
culièrement dans celuy de Munster, à la decharge de S.A.R. dont le Roy
demeurera toujours garant envers Monsieur le Duc de Mantoue, qu'en
tout ce qu'ils contiennent, qui n'est point contraire au present, qui
sera irrevocablable & demeurera dans sa force & vigueur, le tout nonob-
stant la presente remise de Pignerol & de ses dependances. Et à l'égard
des autres interests ou pretentions qui regardent la Maison de Savoye,
S.A.R. se reserve d'en parler par Protestations, Mémoires ou Envoyez,
sans que ce present Traité puisse estre prejudiciable à icelles
pretentions.

III.

Que le Mariage de Monseigneur le Duc de Bourgogne avec
Madame la Princesse fille de S.A.R. se traitera incessamment pour
s'effectuer de bonne foi lorsqu'ils seront en age, & que le Contrat
se fera lors de l'effet du present Traité, après la publication dequel
la Princesse sera remise entre les mains du Roy. Que dans ledit
Contrat de Mariage qui sera considéré comme partie essentielle du
present Traité, & dans lequel ladite Princesse fera les renonciations
accoutumées, avec promesse de ne rien pretendre au dela de la dot
suivante sur les Etats & succession de S.A.R. Sadite A. R. donnera
pour dot à Madame la Princesse sa fille deux cens mille Ecus d'or,
pour le payement desquels S.A.R. fera une Quitance de cent mille
Ecus, dus du reste du Mariage de Madame la Duchesse Royale, avec
les interests échus & promis; & pour le restant, le Roy le remet en
faveur du present Traité, S.A.R. s'obligeant d'ailleurs de donner à
la Princesse sa fille, au temps de la celebration de son Mariage,
ce qu'on appelle en Piedmontois Fardel, & en François Trousseau, ou
Present de Noces: & dans le Contrat de Mariage sera stipulé le
Douaire que Sa Majesté accordera, suivant la Coutume de France.

IV.

Que S.A.R. se départant presentement, reellement, efficac-
ment & bonne foy, comme Elle a fait cy-dessus, de tous les en-
gagemens qu'elle peut avoir avec les Puissances Ennemies, espere
aussi que Sa Majesté correspondra avec tous les sentimens que S.A.R.
demande & souhaite, & qu'ayant l'honneur d'appartenir de si prés au
Roy, & s'engageant encore dans la splendeur d'une nouvelle Alliance,
S. M. luy accorde & promet sa puissante protection, dont S.A.R. luy
demande le retour, & que S.M. luy rend dans toute son étendue. Et
comme S.A.R. souhaite d'entretenir une entiere Neutralité avec les
Rois, Princes & Puissances qui sont presentement ses Alliez, S.M.
promet de n'exiger de S.A.R. aucune contrainte sur le desir qu'Elle
a de garder avec eux toutes les mesures exterieures de bienseance
& libres, telles qu'il convient à un Prince Souverain, ayant chez les
Princes des Ambassadeurs & Envoyez, & recevant & retenant dans sa
Cour des Ambassadeurs & Envoyez des mêmes Princes, sans que S. M. le puisse trouver mauvais, comprenant sous ledit mot de Princes, l'Empereur, Rois & Puissances de l'Europe.

V.

Sa Majesté promet & declare que les Ambassadeurs de Savoye, tant Ordinaires qu'Extraordinaires, recevront à la Cour de France tous les honneurs sans exception, & dans toutes les circonstances, que reçoivent les Ambassadeurs des Têtes Couronnées; savoir, comme le sont les Ambassadeurs des Rois; Et que les Ambassadeurs tant Ordinaires qu'Extraordinaires de S.M. dans toutes les Cours de l'Europe sans nulle exception, pas même de celle de Rome & de Vienne, traiteront aussi lesdits Ambassadeurs tant Ordinaires qu'Extraordinaires, & Envoyez de Savoye, de la même manière que ceux des Rois & Têtes Couronnées. Cependant comme cette augmentation d'honneur pour le traitement des Ambassadeurs de Savoye n'avait jamais été établie au point que S.M., l'accorde, S.A.R. reconnaît que c'est en faveur du Traité, soit Contrat de Mariage de Monseigneur le Duc de Bourgogne avec Madame la Princesse sa fille; & S.M. promet que cette dite augmentation aura lieu du jour que le Traité du Mariage susdit sera signé.

VI.

Que le Commerce ordinaire d'Italie se sera & maintiendra, comme il était établi avant cette Guerre, du temps de Charles Emanuel Second, Père de S.A.R. & enfin l'on fera, observera & pratiquera en tout & par tout entre le Royaume & toutes les parties de l'Etat de S.M. & ceux de S.A.R. ce qui se faisoit, observoit & pratiquoit en tout du vivant dudit Charles Emanuel Second, par le chemin de Suze, la Savoye & le Pont de Beauvoisin, & Villefranche, chacun payant les Droits & Douanes de part & d'autre. Les Bâtiments Français continueront de payer l'ancien droit de Villefranche, comme il se pratiquoit du temps de Charles Emanuel; à quoy il ne se fera nulle opposition, comme l'on pourrait en avoir fait dans ce temps-là. Les Courriers & les Ordinaires de France passeront comme auparavant par les Etats de S.A.R. & en observant les Reglemens, payeront les droits pour les Marchandises dont ils se seront chargez.

VII.

S.A.R. fera publier un Edit, par lequel elle ordonnera sous de rigoureuses peines corporelles, à ceux qui habitent dans les Vallées de Luzerne, sous le nom de Vaudois, de n'avoir aucune communication sur le fait de la Religion avec les Sujets du Roy, & s'obligerà S.A.R. de ne point souffrir de la date de ce Traité aucun établissement des Sujets de S.M. dans les Vallées Protestantes, sous couleur de
Religion, Mariages ou d'autres raisons d'établissement, commodité, héritage, ni autre pretexte, & qu'aucun Ministre ne vienne dans l'étendue de la Domination du Roy, sans être rigoureusement puni de peine corporelle; & qu'au surplus S.M. n'entrera dans aucune connaissance de la manière dont S.A.R. traitera les Vaudois à l'égard de la Religion, S.A.R. s'obligeant de ne souffrir aucun exercice de la Religion Prétendue Reformée dans la Ville de Pignerol & Terres cédées, comme S.M. n'en souffre ni n'en souffrira dans son Royaume.

VIII.

Qu'il y aura de part & d'autre un perpetuel oubli & amnistie de tout ce qui a esté fait depuis le commencement de cette Guerre, en quelque manière & en quelque lieu que les hostilités se soient exécutées. Que dans cette amnistie seront compris tous ceux qui ont servi S.M. durant la Guerre en quelque Employ que ce puisse estre, nonobstant qu'ils soient Sujets de S.A.R. en forte que l'on ne pourra faire aucune recherche contre eux, ni les inquieter dans leurs Personnes & biens par voye de fait ou de Justice, ou pour quelque autre pretexte que ce puisse estre. Il en sera de même à l'égard des Sujets du Roy qui auront servi S.A.R.

IX.

Que les Benefices Ecclesiastiques pourvus jusqu'à présent par le Roy dans les Pays de S.A.R. conquis par S.M. durant l'espace du temps que Sadite Majeste en a joui, demeureront à ceux qui en ont esté pourvus par le Roy & par les Bulles du Pape; & qu'a l'égard des Commanderies de Saint Maurice, Charges de Judicature & Magistrature, S.A.R. n'aura aucun égard à la nomination que le Roy en a faite pendant la possession des Etats de S.A.R. & les Provisions pour les Charges de Robbe faites par S.A.R. de ceux qui en ont abandonné les fonctions durant la Guerre, demeureront fermes.

X.

Qu'à l'égard des Contributions imposées sur les Terres de la Domination de S.A.R. bien qu'elles soient légitimement imposées & dues, & qu'elles se montent à des sommes tres-considérables, S.M. les remet dans leur entier à S.A.R. par un effet de sa liberalité, en manière que du jour de la Ratification du present Traité le Roy n'en prendra, ni n'exigera desdites Contributions, laissant à Sadite A.R. la jouissance de ses revenus dans tous ses Etats aussi-bien que de la Savoye, Nice, environs de Pignerol, & Suze: Comme aussi S.A.R. n'exigera sur les Sujets & Terres de la Domination du Roy aucune contribution.
XI.
Qu'a l'égard des prétentions de Madame la Duchesse de Nemours sur S.A.R. Sa Majesté laissera entre Szdite A.R. & ladite Dame de Nemours la discussion des susdites prétentions dans la voye ordinaire de la Justice, sans s'en mêler autrement.

XII.
Qu'il sera loisible à S.A.R. d'envoyer des Intendans ou Commissaires en Savoye, Comté de Nice, Marquisat de Suze & Barcellonnette, Pignerol & ses dependances, pour y regler ses interests, droits, revenus, & établir ses Douannes & Gabelles, Sel & autres; & lesdits Deputez seront reçus & autorisez dans leur fonction après la Ratification du present Traité, après laquelle lesdits droits seront & appartiendront a S.A.R. sans exception ni contradiction.

XIII.
Que si la Neutralité d'Italie s'acceoptoit, ou que la Paix generale se fist, comme un grand nombre de Trupes seroit totalement inutile & à charge à S.A.R. & qu'outre les dépenses excessives pour les entretenir, c'est souvent une occasion de mes-intelligence que de conserver sur pied plus de Trupes qu'il n'en faut dans un Etat, soit pour sa conservation ou pour la dignité du Souverain, S.A.R. s'oblige de n'entretenir en temps de Neutralité que six mille hommes de pied en deçà des Monts, & quinze cens au delà des Monts pour les Garnisons de la Savoye & Comté de Nice, & en tout quinze cens Chevaux ou Dragons; & cette obligation de S.A.R. n'aura lieu que jusqu'à la Paix generale.

Traité D'action
En execution de ce qui est convenu dans le traite de ce jour, S.A.R. devant faire tous ses efforts pour concilier et porter l'Empereur et le Roy Catholique à vouloir travailler d'autant bonne foy que S.A.R. se trouve obligée de la desirer du moins d'y consentir et au repos de ses Estats par une neutralité en Italie jusqu'à la paix generale, les Plénipotentiaires soussignés en cas que S.A.R. ne puisse l'obtenir après avoir essayé de les y obliger par tous les moyens de douceur possibles, sont convenus en vertu des pouvoirs en bonne forme qu'ils ont de S. M. tres Christienne du 18 mars dernier et de S.A.R. du 28e du present mois de juin, lesdits Plénipotentiaires après s'etre mutuellement donné les originaux de leurs pleins pouvoirs en vertu desquels ils traitent, ont arrêté et signé les articles qui suivent conjointement avec ceux en cas de neutralité.
d'Italie, lesquels ne derogent ni n'alterent en rien ceux du present traité.

I.
Que S. A. R. ne pouvant porter les allies à consentir à la neutralité d'Italie jusqu'à la paix générale S'dite A. R. s'oblige d'union ses forces à celles du Roy pour agir conjointement comme des allies unis, et dans les mêmes interest, doivent faire pour la même cause. Le Roy s'obligeant à ne faire aucun traité de paix ou de trêve avec l'Empereur ny le Roy d'Espagne sans que S. A. R. soit restable en ce qu'elle pourrait perdre dans cette guerre contre le Milanois.

II.
Que S. A. R. fournira dans des places on lieux seurs, des magasins pour les munitions de guerre et de bouche pour les troupes de S. M. et un mot ils agiront de concert pour la même cause.

III.
Que les troupes de S. M. vivront dans une discipline très exacte dans les terres de la domination de S. A. R. et que supposant qu'il arrivast quelque desordre, le général de S. M. et chaque General a part soy y remediera et fera faire justice aux sujets de S. A. R. leur procurant actuellement leur indemnisation.

IV.
Que S. M. declarera S. A. R. le generalissime de ses armées en Italie pour et aussi longtems que ses armes seront jointes à celles de S. M. Que cependant S. M. tiendra pour commander sous S. A. R. tels maréchaux de France general ou generaux en tel nombre qu'il lui plaira, qui recevront la parole de S. A. R. et agiront sous ses ordres. Que S. A. R. employera suivant leur caractère les Officiers generaux de ses troupes qu'il lui plaira et qu'elle nommera un des dits generaux de ses troupes, lequel recevra l'ordre et la parole de celuy nommé par S. M. et passera avec luy d'intelligence et de bon concert. Bien entendu que les Generaux et Officiers de S. M. auront tous égards, considerations respects et obeissance deubs à la dignité de la personne de S. A. R.

V.
VI.
Que s'il arrivoit quelque demesne entre les troupes et officiers de S. M. et de S. A. R. ou autres sujets de Sa dite A. R., la justice s'en fera par juges my partis à caractère égal des officiers du Roy et de ceux de S. A. R.

VII.
Que si du nombre des Troupes que S. A. R. sera obligée d'entretenir en campagne, lequel nombre sera spécifié dans un article cy après il convenoit que pour la seureté de quelques places de S. A. R. menacée d'être attaquée l'on y jettast quelques Troupes, il sera loisible à Sadite A. R. de retirer des (sic) sesdites Troupes de l'armée pour les y jetter.

VIII.
Que le Roy s'obligera de donner à S. A. R. pour ledit commandement de son armée en Italie et jonction de ses Troupes aux siennes la somme de 600,000 escus par an qui est 150,000 livres par mois payables d'avance dans quinze jours avant la fin de chaque mois et S. M. donnera le premier mois d'avance.

IX.
Que S. M. et S. A. R. donneront les ordres nécessaires pour que les Troupes soient pourvues de munitions de guerre et de bouche chacun se pourvoyant separem ent; et que S. A. R. donnera aussi ses ordres pour que les Munitionnaires du Roy ne soient point lesez dans l'achat des choses nécessaires pour faire fournir leurs magasins, et que les peuples ne survendront point les denrées au dela du prix courant des marchés.

X.
Qu'en cas de siege S.A.R. s'oblige de fournir la quantité qui sera trouvée nécessaire de gros canon avec leurs affuts boulets de calibre et mortiers dont il sera requis. S. M. se chargeant de toutes les autres dépenses nécessaires pour un siege, de fournir aux frais de la voiture et consommation de la poudre et de faire payer les boulets au prix qu'ils auront cousté à S. A. R. Et à l'égard des outils à pionniers, chacun y pourvoira de sa part pour l'usage et service de ses Troupes. Le Roy de sa part fournira 30 pieces de campagne attelées pour le service de l'armée et en estat de tirer et S. A. R. suppléera a la fourniture de la quantité des pieces de campagne qui sera jugé (sic) à propos pour la cause commune.
XI.

Que dans les places de S. A. R. ou lieux assurés S. M. pourra déposer le tout ou partie de son artillerie sans introduire des gens de guerre dans les places, et S. A. R. aidera suivant les conjonctures et les projets l'armée du Roy de munitions de guerre et de bouche dont il sera tenu compte et que S. M. fera payer ou remettre dans les mêmes quantités que les dites munitions de guerre et de bouche, suivant le besoin, auront été fournies des Magasins ou par les ordres de S. A. R. Comme aussi si le cas arriva que S. A. R. eust besoin de celles de S. M., l'on l'en aiderait aux mêmes conditions; ce qui s'entendra par un cas d'accident et en quantité modique de part et d'autre.

XII.

Qu'immediatement dans le temps convenu pour l'exécution du présent traité et que S. A. R. aura déclaré son traite à la Ligue pour unir ses forces en cas de guerre avec celles du Roy pour agir contre le Milanois, le Roy fera remettre à S. A. R. les Places, forts et pays conquis par le Roy sur S. A. R. pendant la présente guerre en l'estat et tout de même qu'il est porté par l'art. I du traite qui accompagne celuy cy; excepté seulement le château de Montmélian, château de Suze et citadelle de Pinerol, les fortifications de la dite ville de Pinerol, fort de sainte Brigitte et autres devant estre rasées, comme dit est dans l'art. I de l'autre traite de paix et de neutralité; desquels châteaux de Montmélian de Suze et citadelle de Pinerol, le Roy demeurera nanty jusqu'à la fin de la guerre de la dite Italie, et à la sortie des troupes allemandes Bavaroises religieuses et auxiliaires comme dit est dans le dit art. I du traite joint à celui cy. Au quel temps S. M. remettra et rendra à S. A. R., tant les dits châteaux de Montmélian, de Suze et citadelle de Pinerol, rasée comme il est porté par le traite de ce jour: S. M. promettant et d'en faire sa déclaration au Pape et à la République de Venise; et outre sa parole, S. M. pour la plus grande satisfaction et seurété de S. A. R. luy remettra quelques jours avant ladite déclaration les ostages spécifiques dans ledit traite de même date, Lesquels ostages resteront entre ses mains jusqu'à la restitution cy dessus convenue des châteaux de Montmélian, de Suze et citadelle de Pinerol rasée; moyennant quoy S. A. R. en vertu du present traite et au mesme tems de la declaration du Susdit traite et remise des ostages exercera toutes sortes d'actes de souveraineté non seulement dans les pays cy dessus remis, mais dans Pinerol et territoire cedé, marquisat de Suze et la Savoye et comte de Nice, le Roy se reserver seulement les places dudit Montmélian et Suze et citadelle de Pinerol pour la seurété du present traite et s'obligent de remettre les susdites places lors de la paix generale et neutralité d'Italie, comme dit est, sans delay nonobstant
toute raison et pretexte qu'il puisse estre, S. A. R. pourra aussi recevoir dans Pinerol et ses dependances ses droits de douane et de sel et autres de quelque nature qu'ils soient, comme elle le pratique dans ses Estats et commettra qui elle jugera a propos pour vaquer a ses interest; bien entendu pourtant que ce qui passera pour le service de l'Armée ne payera aucun droit moyennant les passe-ports que l'on donnera gratis.

XIII.
Que comme l'objet de la présente guerre est le repos de l'Italie, si quelque Prince de Lombardie ou autres vouloient ou pouvoient se joindre à ce traité ils y seront receus; et que si le sort des armes et les bons ordres que S. A. R. donnera pour faire agir l'armée qu'il commandera réussissent a quelque entreprise, et que Dieu, dont la cause est en cecy soutenue favorissoit suivant les apparences les entreprises que l'on pourrait faire sur quelques places de S. M. Catholique, les conquêtes seront partagées et pour les conserver, les garnisons y seront my parties; le Roy se réservant d'y mettre un Gouverneur et S. A. R. un lieutenant de Roy et un Major et en cas que l'on prist deux Places, S. M. en gardera une et S. A. R. l'autre; et les succès augmentans seront pareillement partagez.

XIV.
Qu'en cas que pendant la présente guerre la mort du Roy d'Espagne arrivast sans enfants, S. M. s'oblige d'aider de tout son pouvoir S. A. R. pour luy faire acquérir le Milanois, et renonce par ce présent traité au dit cas de la mort du Roy d'Espagne sans enfants a toute prétention par conquête ou autrement sur le Duché de Milan; et que si du vivant dudit Roy d'Espagne, on fait des conquêtes dans le Milanois, le Roy en cédera la possession à S. A. R.; bien entendu que S. A. R. en donnera l'équivalent à S. M. en Savoye; au cas qu'elle pust conquérir avec la protection et les assitances du Roy tout l'Estat de Milan, en sorte que le Roy remettrroit à S. A. R. l'Estat de Milan, moyennant la Savoye toute entière, sans autre prétention de S. M. à cet égard.

XV.
Qu'à l'égard des quartiers d'hiver, si l'on en prend dans le pays des Ennemis, S. A. R. les destinerá ou les distribuera; et si, pour le bien et l'occasion de la même cause S. A. R. jugeait à propos que quelques Troupes de S. M. hivernassent en Piemont, ce seroient en payant, et par une convention qui ne seroit point à charge aux Peuples des Estats de S. A. R. qui ne s'oblige qu'au simple couvert; et les Troupes de S. M. et celles de S. A. R. participeront aux dits quartiers d'hiver dans le pays ennemi, à proportion de leur nombre.
XVI.

Que pour l'effet de tout ce que dessus S. M. de sa part s'oblige d'entretenir pour la dite guerre d'Italie et faire descendre en Piémont 20,000 hommes de pied et au moins 5,000 chevaux ou dragons, outre le train d'artillerie spécifié dans un des articles cy dessus, auquel nombre de cavalerie et d'infanterie S. A. R. s'oblige de joindre et d'entretenir de sa part 2500 chevaux ou dragons y compris ses gardes du corps et 8,000 hommes de pied.

XVII.

Que si la neutralité d'Italie s'acceptoit ou que la paix générale se fît, comme un grand nombre de Troupes seroit totalement inutile et à charge a S. A. R. et qu'outre les dépenses excessives pour les entretenir c'est souvent une occasion de mesintelligence de conserver sur pied plus de troupes qu'il n'en faut dans un Estat, soit pour la conservation ou pour la dignité de Souverain, S. A. R. s'oblige à n'entretenir en temps de neutralité que 6,000 hommes de pied en deça des monts et 1,500 au delà des monts pour les garnisons de la Savoye et comté de Nice et en tout 1,500 chevaux ou dragons. Cet article qui a trouvé ici transposé est le 13e du traité de paix de ce jour et cette obligation de S. A. R. n'aura lieu que jusqu'à la paix générale.

XVIII.

Que si pour la cause commune et pour le soutien de cette guerre d'Italie, il estoit besoin que S. A. R. augmentast le nombre de ses troupes, S. M. voudra bien employer son crédit, autant qu'il le pourra auprès des Suisses pour que S. A. R. puisse lever et entretenir jusqu'à 3,000 hommes de troupes réglées, et ce seulement pendant que la guerre d'Italie durera; et que si cela ne pouvait réussir, S. M. lui fournira les susdits 3,000 hommes de troupes réglées, lesquels seront payés et recevront de S. A. R. le même traitement que le Roy leur fait; S. M. s'obligeant de les choisir dans les Troupes étrangères qu'il a à son service soit Savoyardes ou Piémontoises, soit Suisses, Valonnes, Bourguignonnes ou Allemandes; et lesdits 3,000 hommes quoy que payez par S. A. R. pendant le susdit temps seront sensées estre des Troupes de S. M. et non de celles de S. A. R. et recevrônt du Roy leurs commissions et brevets. Qu'en outre, si dans la suite de cette guerre S. A. R. avoit besoin de quelques services en France S. M. ne s'opposeroit pas qu'elle y en fît.

XIX.

Que pour le passage et séjour en Piémont des Troupes de S. M. et temps que les dites Troupes pourroient estre obligées de rester dans le pays de S. A. R. elle donnera ses ordres comme Souverain dans
son Pays et comme General d'armée pour les fourages nécessaires qui seront à fournir par magasins ou fourgez par les Troupes en campagne; et le Roy fera payer la ration de fourage accoutumée, à raison de 5 sols de Piémont chaque ration, tant pour les chevaux d'officiers, cavaliers, dragons, équipages, mulets et chevaux d'artillerie et des vivres, pour le détail de quoy S. M. d'une part et S. A. R. de l'autre nommeront des commissaires.

XX.

Qu'a l'égard des contributions que l'on pourra exiger du pays ennemy, le partage s'en fera au profit de S. M. et de S. A. R. à proportion du nombre dont l'armée sera composée.

XXI.

Que tout ce que dessus, sera ponctuellement exécuté par S. M. et par S. A. R. jusqu'à la paix générale ou neutralité d'Italie. Après quoy ladite paix générale ou neutralité d'Italie estant faite, le present traité de guerre estant remply, chacun demeurera dans son Estat naturel et la teneur des articles intitulz: Articles convenus pour la paix et neutralité d'Italie arrestez ce même jour demeurera dans son entier.

XXII.

Comme par le présent traité le Roy remet entierement les Places et Forts du Comté de Nice y compris Villefranche, l'on est convenu qu'en cas qu'il y eust quelque apparence positive que les dites Places du Comté de Nice fussent attaquées des ennemis, S. A. R. en ce cas permettra que pour le bien de la cause commune le Roy y puisse jetter de ses Troupes pour assister à la defense sous les ordres pourtant des Gouverneurs de S. A. R.

Nous plénipotentiaires susdits, avons arresté et signé les presents articles, et nous promettons et nous obligeons de les faire notifier et confirmer par S. M. et par S. A. R., promettant aussi qu'ils seront tenus secrets religieusement jusques à la fin du mois de septembre prochain qu'el temps, si on fera d'autres de la mesma substance et teneur, ceux-ci seront supprimez. Fait à Turin, le 29 de juin 1696.

TESSÉ

DE SAINT THOMAS
APPENDIX E.

The Marriage Contract

I.
Qu'avec la grace & bénédiction de Dieu, préalablement obtenue Dispense de Sa Sainteté à raison de la proximité & consanguinité entre Monseigneur le Duc de Bourgogne & Madame la Princesse de Savoie si-toist qu'Elle aura atteint l'âge de 12. ans accomplis, Ils feront célébrer leurs Épousailles & Mariage par parole de présent, selon la forme & en la solennité prescrite par les sacrez Canons & Constitutions de l'Eglise Catholique, Apostolique & Romaine; Et se feront lesdites Épousailles & Mariage en la Cour & en présence de Sa Majesté Tres Crestienne, où ladite Dame Princesse de Savoie sera élevée d'une manière convenable à sa haute Naissance. Et se fera ladite solennité des Épousailles, quand le temps de l'accomplir sera concerté & arresté entre Sa Majesté, Mondit Seigneur le Dauphin, & le Tres-Haut & Tres-Puissant Prince Duc de Savoie & Madame la Duchesse de Savoie.

II.
Ledit Tres-Haut & Tres-Puissant Prince Duc de Savoie promet & demeurera obligé de donner en Dot à Madame la Princesse Marie Adelaide de Savoie sa Fille ainée, en faveur du Mariage qu'Elle contracte avec Monseigneur le Duc de Bourgogne, la somme de Deux cens mil Écus d’or ou leur juste valeur, payable de la manière qu’il a esté convenu à part; Comme aussi de luy donner des Piergeries & autres ormens, ainsi qu’il sera trouvé convenable; promettant en outre de luy donner au temps de la célébration dudit Mariage son Fardel, soit Trousseau, ou present des Nôces, lequel sera estimé.

III.
Sa Majesté Tres-Chrestienne s'oblige d'assurer & assurera la Dot de ladite Dame Princesse Marie Adelaide de Savoie sur bonnes Rentes & sur Fonds & Assignations valables au contentement dudit Tres-Haut & Tres-Puissant Prince Duc de Savoie, ou des personnes qu'il nommera pour cet éfet; Et Sa Majesté envoyera aussi-tost à Mondit Seigneur le Duc de Savoie les Actes de ladite Assignation de Rentes: Et en cas de dissolution de Mariage, & que de droit la restitution de Dot ait lieu, elle sera rendue en comptant à ladite Dame
Princesse ou à celuy qui aura charge ou droit d'Elle, avec son Fardel, ses Pierreries & joyaux; & pendant le temps qui courra, qu'on ne luy rendra point la Dot, ladite Dame Princesse, ou ses Heritiers & Sucessseurs jouiront des Revenus à quoy se monteront lesdits Deux cens mil Ecus d'Or, à raison de denier vingt, qui seront payez en vertu desdites Assignations, que Sa Majesté & ses Heritiers & Sucessseurs seront obligez de garantir jusqu'à la juste valeur des interests au denier vingt de ladite Dot.

IV.
Sa Majesté Tres-Chrestienne donnera pour Monseigneur le Duc de Bourgogne à ladite Dame Princesse Marie Adelaide de Savoye pour ses Bagues & Joyaux, la valeur de Cinquante mil Ecus d'Or sol; lesquels & tous autres qu'Elle apportera avec for, luy appartiendront sans difficulté, comme estans biens de son Patrimoine propres à ladite Dame Princesse, ses Heritiers & Sucessseurs, ou à ceux qui auront son droit & cause.

V.
Sa Majesté suivant l'ancienne & louable coutume de la Maison de France, assignera & constituera à ladite Dame Princesse pour son Douaire, vingt-mil Ecus d'or sol chacun an, sur des Revenus & Terres dont le principal lieu aura Titre de Duché, desquels Lieux & Terres ladite Dame Princesse jouira par ses mains & de son autorité & de celle de ses Commissaires & Officiers, & aura la Justice, comme il a toujours esté pratiqué. Davantage à elle appartiendra la Provision de tous les Offices vacans, comme ont accoutumé d'avoir les Reynes & Dauphines de France; bien entendu neantmoins que lesdits Offices ne pourront estre donnez qu'à naturels Francois, comme aussi l'administration & les Fermes desdites Terres, conformément aux Loix & Coutumes du Royaume de France; de laquelle susdite Assignation ladite Dame Princesse Marie Adelaide de Savoye entrera en possession & jouissance si-tost que Douaire aura lieu, pour en jouir toute sa vie, soit qu'Elle demeure en France, ou qu'elle se retire ailleurs.

VI.
Il a esté particulierement convenu que ladite Dame Princesse Marie Adelaide de Savoye feroit les renonciations suivantes, & à cet effet ledit Seigneur Duc de Savoye son Seigneur & Pere l'a habilite & habilite & l'a dispense de son bas âge pour prester le Serment nécessaire, estant mineure de douze ans & neantmoins proche d'achever l'onzième & eu égard principalement à la grande connoissance & au Jugement au dessus de son âge dont elle est douée, derogeant ledit Seigneur Duc de Savoye à toutes les Loix, Constitutions, Edits,
Décrets & Usages contraires à ladite habilitation & dispense, avec les Derogatoires des Derogatoires, d'autant que ladite Dame Princesse reconnoist fort bien, ainsi qu'elle l'a déclaré & declare, combien avantageuse luy sera & à ses descendans l'effectuation dudit Mariage, qui luy donne une juste esperance de parvenir au rang de Reyne, & à ses descendans de succeder à la Couronne de France, reflechissant encore que s'est principalement pour affermir la Paix, si desiree & si necessaire, & son inclination geneureuse la portant aussi à vouloir conserver l'éclat de la Maison de Savoye dans la personne des Princes ses Freres qu'il plaira à Dieu de luy donner ou des autres Princes ses Freres mâles, quy que plus esloignez & en ligne collatérale à leurs descendans mâles à l'infiny pour le repos & la tranquilité des peuples de ladite Maison de Savoye. C'est pourquoi s'est presentement constituée ladite Dame Princesse Marie Adelaeide de Savoye, en presence dudit Tres-Haut & Tres-Puissant Prince Victor Amé son Seigneur & Pere, pardevant moy Marquis de S. Thomas, Ministre & Premier Secretaire d'Estat, & en presence des mêmes Témoins que dessus, & de l'autorité & assistance du Sieur Marquis de Bellegarde, Grand Chancelier de Savoye, nommé & élu son Curateur pour cet Acte; laquelle de son propre mouvement & libre volonté, pour les motifs cy-dessus exprimé, & principalement pour l'affermissement de la Paix, & le desir qu'Elle a de voir l'éclat de sa Maison conservé dans la personne des Princes ses Freres, & leurs descendans mâles, ou des Princes en ligne collaterale & leurs descendans mâles à l'infiny, ayant esté informée par ledit Seigneur Duc de Savoye son Seigneur & Pere, que sans cette renonciation ledit Mariage ne se seroit point fait, ny la Paix concluse, & en particulier par ledit Sieur Grand Chancelier, de la force & effet de ladite renonciation & ferment; a renoncé & renonce avec ferment presté sur les saints Evangiles entre mes mains, touchez tant par cession, donation entre-vifs irrevocable, & en la meilleure forme que faire se peut, tant par voye abdicative, que translatives pour Elle, ses Enfans & descendans, à tous les Droits, noms, raisons & actions personnelles, réelles, mixtes, hipotequaires & remedes possessoires qui pourroient luy appartenir ou à ses descendans, soit en qualité de ses heritiers, ou pour des raisons propres, pensées ou imprévues aux Etats, Duchez, Principautez, Marquisats, Comtez, Seigneuries, Jurisdictions & Fiels & leurs appartenances & dépendances, possedez & appartennans, tant de quels de là les monts, à sondit Seigneur & Pere, & qui pourroient à l'avenir luy appartenir & à la Couronne de Savoye, afin que sondit Seigneur & Pere en jouisse & ses descendans mâles successeurs à ladite Couronne, & leurs descendans mâles, & à leur defaut les mâles en ligne collateralle de ladite Maison & leurs descendans mâles à l'infini, en faveur desquels ladite Dame Princesse pour Elle & les siens, a cédé, remis & transporté, cede, remet & transporte tous
lesdits Droits, noms, raisons & actions qui luy peuvent appartenir ou à ses heritiers & descendans, les mettant & constituant en son propre lieu & place, avec promesse de n'y jamais contrevenir, en quelque maniere que ce soit, directement ny indirectement; de façon que ladite Dame Princesse & ses heritiers & descendans restent exclus à perpetuité, & censez & considerez comme étrangers incapables de succeder auxdits Estats, Duchez, Principautez, Marquisats, Comtez, Jurisdictions, Fiefs & dependances, sans aucune exception, encore qu'il fust necessaire d'en faire une specifique & individuelle mention, & même encore qu'il n'y auroit aucune Loy, Investiture, Coustume ou autre disposition exclusive des femelles & de leurs descendans par l'existence des mâles, quoique plus éloignez & en ligne collaterale; ledit Seigneur Duc de Savoye son Seigneur & Pere present, stipulant & acceptant pour tous ledits Princes, descendans & collateraux mâles nez & à naistre, qui pourroient y avoir droit, avec moy Ministre & Premier Secretaire d'Estat, avec declaration pourtant & protestation que fait ledit Seigneur Duc de Savoye, en acceptant lesdites renonciations & cession, de ne jamais admettre que ladite Dame Princesse sa Fille ainée, & autres Princesses ses Filles & leurs descendans, puissent en aucun temps, ny en aucun cas avoir aucun droit de succeder aux susdits Estats de la Maison de Savoye au prejudice des mâles. En outre ladite Dame Princesse, attendu la constitution dotale desdits Deux cens mil Écus d'Or, comme dessus, reconnoissant d'avoir une dote suffisante & telle qu'on a coutume de la donner aux Princesses de la Maison de Savoye, demeure entierement contente & satisfaite dudit Seigneur son pere, l'en a quitté & quitte ledit Seigneur Duc de Savoye present, & acceptant pour luy & pour les Princes mâles, soit en ligne directe ou collaterale de sa Maison, avec promesse que fait ladite Dame Princesse de ne luy en jamais rien demander, ny permettre que par autre luy en soit faite aucune demande; l'aquinelle stipulation & l'acceptation ensuite estant deuement intervenues en la presence écrite; & deplus Elle a fait & fait une renonciation abdicative & translatie de tous les Droits, noms, raisons & actions qui peuvent ou pourroit à l'avenir luy appartenir & à ses heritiers, successeurs & descendans, quoique non heritiers, comme s'ils pouvoient agir de leur propre chef en cas du decez de ladite Dame Princesse avant ledit Seigneur son pere, & biens paternels, maternels, libres & allodiaux, de quelque nature, qualité & valeur qu'ils soient, sans aucune exception, soit pour cause de dot, avantages nuptiaux, legitime & suplement d'icelle, & succession ab intestat, avec toutes actions, personnes, réelles, mixtes, hipotequaires & remèdes possessoires; De toutes lesquelles raisons & actions ladite Dame Princesse s'est deveste & en a investi ledit Seigneur Duc de Savoye son Seigneur & Pere present & acceptant, pour en disposer selon son bon plaisir; Toutes lesquelles choses
contenues tant dans la narrative & dispositive des renonciations cy-dessus, ladite Dame Princesse en l'assistance & de l'autorité dudit Sieur Grand Chancelier son Curateur, a assuré & assure estre veritables, avec serment de nouveau presté sur les saints Evangiles entre mes mains touchez, avec lequel elle a encore promis & promet pour elle & ses susdits descendans, de les avoir pour agréables, de les tenir fermes & stables, & de les observer inviolablement, sans jamais y contrevenir ny permettre qu'il y soit contrevenu, sous l'obligation de tous ses biens presens & à venir, avec la clause de constitut; renonçant a cet efet avec ledit serment réitéré à toutes Loix, Edits, Constitutions, Costumes, Statuts & dispositions à ce contraires, au benefice de la minorité d'âge, lesion enorme & énormissime, restitution en entier, nullité de Contrat par défaut de solennité, exception de choses non dûe & sans cause de dol, de crainte rever-entiale ou presumée absolution de serment, declarant de ne s'en vouloir servir; au cas qu'elle vint à l'obtenir, comme nulle & enefficace, & à toute autre cause & exception, tant pensées qu'imprevues, dont il fut besoin d'en faire une expresse & individuelle mention; par le moyen desquelles ladite Dame Princesse, ses heritiers, successeurs & descendans puissent contrevenir au present Contrat, voulant que lesdites raisons & exceptions soient tenues comme si elles estoient icy specialement exprimées, & qu'il y fust expressement dérogé & renoncé, & que lesdits sermens demeurent toujours fermes & irrevocables, qu'ils prévalent à tout autre Acte qui se pourroit faire au contraire, & qu'ils suppléent à tout défaut d'âge, de solennité & autres ausquels ledit Seigneur Duc de Savoye, de son autorité absolue, a pareillement voulu suppléer & supplée, & valide lesdites renonciations en toutes leurs parties. Et comme c'est l'intention de Sa Majesté Tres-Chrestienne que lesdites renonciations ayent leur entier efet, & qu'on ne puisse jamais y contrevenir; A cet efet ledit Sieur Comte de Tessé s'est personnelleme étalé & constitué, lequel en la susdite qualité de Procureur, & au nom de Sadite Majesté, de Monsieur le Dauphin, & de Monsieur le Duc de Bourgogne, a promis & promet pour eux, leurs heritiers & successeurs à la Couronne, d'observer & faire inviolablement observer lesdites renonciations, comme un Article essentiel du present Contrat de Mariage, de ladite Paix, & de n'y jamais contrevenir ny permettre qu'il y soit contrevenu en aucune maniere, de les faire ratifier de point en point par Sadite Majesté, Monsieur le Dauphin & Monsieur le Duc de Bourgogne, & de les faire entheriner au Parlement de Paris, selon la forme accoustumée, avec toutes les clauses nécessaires, & enregistrer au Conseil d'Estat de Sa Majesté, & partout ailleurs où besoin sera, sans aucune restriction ny modification, ainsi qu'elles devront aussiestre entherinées & approuvées au Senate de Piémont. Et tout ce que dessus ledit Sieur Comte de Tessé en la susdite qualité, a promis &
promet avec serment de garder, executer & observer sous l'obligation des Biens promis & à venir de Sadite Majeste, de Monseigneur le Dauphin, de Monseigneur le Duc de Bourgogne & de la Couronne, avec la clause de constitut: Le tout ainsi accordé & convenu dans ledit Traité de Paix, encore qu'il n'y soit pas spécifiquement déclaré, & principalement à l'égard des descendants de ladite Dame Princesse.

VII.

Sa Majesté donnera & assignera à ladite Dame Princesse Marie Adelaide de Savoye pour la dépense de sa Chambre & entretienement de son état & de sa Maison, somme convenable relle qu'appartient à une Princesse d'un si haut rang, la luy assignant en la forme & maniere qu'on a accoutumé en France, & donner assignation pour tel entretienement.

VIII.

Ledit Tres-Haut & Tres-Puissant Prince Duc de Savoye fera amener ladite Dame Princesse à ses frais & dépens jusqu'au pont de Bonvoisin avec la Dignite & appareil qu'il appartient à si grande Princesse, & elle sera receue de mesme de la part de Sa Majesté.

IX.

Qu'en cas que le Mariage se dissolue entre Mondit Seigneur le Duc de Bourgogne & ladite Dame Princesse, & qu'elle le survive, en ce cas il sera à la liberté de ladite Dame Princesse ou de demeurer en France en tel lieu qu'il luy plaira, ou de retourner en Savoye sans aucun empeschement, ou d'aller en tel autre endroit qu'elle choisira plus convenable hors de France toutes fois & quantes que bon luy semblera avec tous ses Biens, Dot, Fardel, & Douaire, Bagues & Joyaux & Vestemens, Vaisselle d'argent & tous autres Meubles & choses qu'elleesconques avec ses Officiers & Serviteurs de Sa Maison, sans que pour quelque cause que ce soit on luy puisse donner aucun empeschement, ny arrester son depart directement ou indirectement, empescher la jouissance & recouvrement de sesd. Dot, Fardel & Douaire ny autres assignations qu'on luy auroit donné ou deub donner, & pour cet effet Sa Majesté, Monseigneur le Dauphin & Monseigneur le Duc de Bourgogne donneront audit Tres-Haut & Tres Puissant Prince le Duc de Savoye pour ladite Dame Princesse telles Lettres de sûreté qui seront necessaires, signés de leur propre main & Scellés de leur Sceau, & dés apresen tant comme dés lors Sa Majesté les assure & promet pour soy & pour ses Successseurs Roys en foy & parolle de Roy.

X.

Ce Traité & Contrat de Mariage a esté fait avec dessein de supplier nostre Saint Pere le Pape qu'il ait agreeable de l'approuver
& luy donner sa Bénéédiction Apostolique, comme aussi d'en approuver les Articles & Capitulations qui en ont esté faites de part & d'autres, & ledit Sieur Comte de Tessé en ladite qualité de Procureur a promis & promet au nom de Sa Majesté, de Monsieur le Dauphin & de Monsieur le Due de Bourgogne, qu'ils approuveront & ratifieront de point en point le présent Contrat, & qu'à cet effet ils en fourniront leurs ratifications en bonnes & deues formes dans un mois à compter du jour & datte dudit Contract avec promesse de le faire entheriner au Parlement de Paris & Enregistrar au Conseil d'Estat de Sa Majesté sans restriction ny modification ainsi qu'il devra estre aussi approuvé & entheriné au Senat de Piedmont; Promettants & s'obligeants respectivement Sadite Majesté, Monsieur le Dauphin & Monsieur le Duc de Bourgogne sur leur foy & parolle, tant pour eux que pour leurs Heritiers & Successeurs, & ledit Sieur Comte de Tessé à leur nom en vertu des pouvoirs cy-dessus; & ledit Seigneur Duc de Savoye son Epouze & de la Dame Princesse Marie Adelaide leur Fille ainée, & pour leurs Heritiers & Successeurs de garder accomplir & observer inviolablement les susdits Articles & Conventions sans jamais y pouvoir contrevenir directemnt ny indirectement; Car ainsi l'ont promis & stipulé; ...
APPENDIX F.

The Treaty of Vigevano, October 7, 1696

Sa Majesté Imperial & Sa Majesté Catholique, ayant daigné écouter avec bonté les instances & les representations réitérées de Son Altesse Royale Monsieur le Duc de Savoye, & compatissans aux malheurs que son Pais a souffert durant cette guerre, se sont enfin disposez à agréer & approuver que son Excellence Monsieur le Comte de Mansfeld Prince de Fondi, & son Excellence Monsieur le Marquis de Leganez, munis d'un plein Pouvoir & suffisant de leurs Majestez Imperiale & Catholique, qui seront cy-bas inséréz, d'une part; & M. le Marquis de Saint Thomas, Ministre & premier Secrétaire d'Etat de S.A.R. muni d'un ample Pouvoir de Sadite A. R. qui sera aussi cy-bas inséréz, d'autre; ayent pour l'effectuation de ce que dessus, convenu comme il fuit.

I.

Comme le principal objet est le soulagement de Son Altesse Royale, & le repos qui en revient à ses Voisins, ces Messieurs se sont reciprocement obligez à S.A.R. & Elle à la Maison d'Autriche d'une part, & au Roy Tres-Chretien de l'autre, qu'il y aura dorenavant une Suspension d'Armes jusqu'a la Paix generale, toute hostilité cessant reciprocement du jour d'aujourd'hui, & par consequent on levera au plus-tard après demain le Siege de Valence.

II.

Que S.A.R. se charge de La negociation de La paix generale & qu'a cet Effet elle s'offre au Roy tres Chrestien, et qu'elle puisse Sans prejudice des autres Negociations desja admises, non seulement accepter Les propositions faites, ou que sera S. M.te tres Chrestienne generally pour tous, & en particulier pour Chascun des alliéz, et y respondu, mais mesme fixer Le terme, ainsy qu'il Sera Convenu aux dites responses Reciprokes, Jusqu'a La conclusion de La paix generalle, dans Laquelle elle devra Intervenir comme dans toutes Les garanties & obligations des autres alliéz.
Et afin que la tranquillité de ce Pays ne soit point troublée par le sejour reciproque des deux Armées, les Parties ont reciproquement promis à S.A.R. que leurs Armées & Troupes tant propres qu’auxiliaires, à la reserve pourtant de celles qui sont à la solde du Roy Catholique dans l’Etat de Milan, sortiront en même temps à proportion de leur nombre, pour se retirer respectivement dans leurs Pays, au moyen de quoy l’accomplissement des offres faites à S.A.R. estant assuré pour ce chef, il est juste que la France y satisfasse entièrement de son cote pour la seureté commune & le repos public, sans se conserver les moyens de le troubler par l’actuelle possession de la Citadelle de Pignerol, & des Châteaux de Montmélian & de Suze, & que tout ce que dessus exprime s’execute de part & d’autre dans le terme le plus court qui sera actuellement practicable. Et pour plus grande seureté qu’aucune des Parties ne contrevienne à cette Convention & à la Suspension d’armes établie jusqu’a la Paix Generale, S.A.R. du consentement des deux Parties, s’oblige à s’y opposer, & même a prendre les Armes contre celle qui manquera en tout ou en partie au present Traité, avec un engagement irrevocable jusqu’à la conclusion de la Paix Generale.

IV.

La marche des Troupes Imperiales estant d’une grande depense à S.M.I. & ne pouvant assigner les Quartiers d’hyver ausdites Troupes en Allemagne, sans une trop grande incommode, ne les tenant pas en Italie; on a conclu que les Princes d’Italie, sçavoir M. le Grand Duc de Florence, M. le Duc de Mantoue, M. le Duc de Parme, M. le Duc de Modene & autres inferieurs, & la Republique de Genes, devront payer conformément au repartiment fait de la somme de trois cens mille pistolets, cent mille presentement, & deux cens mille aux termes qui seront assignez. Moyennant les dûes précautions, S.M.T.C. s’oblige de ne s’ingerer directement ni indirectement en leur faveur, pour les exempter dudit payement; au contraire Elle promet de ne faire aucune opposition directement ou indirectement, aux diligences qu’ils se seront pour obliger ceux qui pourroient refuser de payer leur quotte; & afin que pour cela la marche des Troupes Imperiales & Auxiliaires ne soit point retardée, S.A.R. & M. le Marquis de Leganez demeurent obligez de poursuivre l’effet dudit payement effectif en toute maniere jusqu’a ce qu’il ait esté executé.
V.

Attendu la saison avancée & la distance des Puissances intéressées, & attendu que pour la seureté du ponctuel accomplissement de ce que dessus; on a convenu de donner comme chacun des Parties donnera réciproquement deux Ostages entre les mains de S.A.R., laquelle s'oblige de ne les pas remettre avant ledit accomplissement comme Elle devra faire après. On commencera d'exécuter le tout le plutôt qu'il fera practicable; à tout quoy la Maison d'Autriche, sans que par cecy on puisse jamais entendre ni presumer qu'elle se soit séparée en aucune maniere de ses Alliez, les susdits Messieurs promettent de rapporter la Ratification; scàvoir, son Excellence Mon- sieur le Prince Comte de Mansfeld, celle de S.M.I. dans un mois; son Excellence M. le Marquis de Leganez, celle de S.M.C. dans deux mois; & M. le Marquis de Saint Thomas, celle de Son A.R. dans deux jours. Donné à Vigevano le septième Octobre 1696.

L. S. H.F.P.F. C. D. MANSFELD.
L. S. Le MARQUIS DE LEGANEZ.
L. S. DE SAINT THOMAS.

(The following additional article was also agreed to.)

Que cette Suspension d'Armes & Neutralité jusqu'a la Paix generale, s'étendra a toute l'Italie, dans laquelle on n'innovera rien, ni par voye des Armes, ni par quelconque alteration de la legitime possession dont jouissent aujourd'hui les Feudataires Imperiaux, & ce ni presentement ni à l'avenir, sans le prealable consentement de S.M.I. ferme restant neanmoins pour toujours les Concessions faites par S.M.I. à S.A.R. le 8 Febrier 1690.
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